The Whole World is Texting

Youth Protest in the Information Age

Irving Epstein (Ed.)

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION

INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES IN EDUCATION

The Whole World is Texting

PITTSBURGH STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

VOLUME 5

INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

The aim of the *Pittsburgh Studies in Comparative and International Education Series* is to produce edited and authored volumes on topics ranging from key international education issues, trends, and reforms to examinations of national education systems, social theories, and development education initiatives. Local, national, regional, and global volumes (single authored and edited collections) constitute the breadth of the series and offer potential contributors a great deal of latitude based on interests and cutting edge research. The series is supported by a strong network of international scholars and development professionals who serve on the Advisory Board and participate in the selection and review process for manuscript development. The volumes are intended to provide not only useful contributions to comparative, international, and development education (CIDE) but also possible supplementary readings for advanced courses for undergraduate and graduate students in CIDE.

Kathleen M. DEWALT, *Center for Latin American Studies, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Richard DONATO, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Erwin H. EPSTEIN, *Loyola University Chicago, USA*
Larry FEICK, *University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Carl FERTMAN, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
John FRECHIONE, *Center for Latin American Studies, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Gina A. GARCIA, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Noreen GARMAN, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Christine GROARK, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Michael GUNZENHAUSER, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Michele FERRIER HERYFORD, *Confucius Institute, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Ali IBRAHIM, *United Arab Emirates University, UAE*
Sean KELLY, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Asif KHAN, *Karakoram International University, Gilgit, Pakistan*
LEE, Feng-Jihu, *National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan*
Macrina LELEI, *African Studies Program, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Alan M. LESGOLD, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
LIN Ming Dih, *National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan*
Lindsay Clare MATSUMURA, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Maureen W. MCCLURE, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Nagwa MEGAHEAD, *Ain Shams University, Egypt*
Rich MILNAR, *Center for Urban Education, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Donald E. MORISKY, *University of California, Los Angeles, USA*
Enrique MU, *Carlow University, USA*
Christopher B. MUGIMU, *Makerere University, Uganda*
John MYERS, *Florida State University, USA*
Erik C. NESS, *Institute of Higher Education, University of Georgia, USA*
Yusuf K. NSUBUGA, *Ministry of Education and Sports, Uganda*
Christine ODOUR-OMBAKA, *Maseno University, Kenya*
PARK Namgi, *Gwangju National University of Education, Korea*
Louis A. PICARD, *Ford Institute for Human Security, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Allan PITMAN, *University of Western Ontario, Canada*
Simona POPA, *UNESCO International Bureau of Education, Switzerland*
Maureen K. PORTER, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Keith J. ROBERTS, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Jennifer RUSSELL, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
RUSWAN, *IAIN Walisongo, Indonesia*
M. Najeeb SHAFIQ, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Ronald STALL, *University of Pittsburgh, USA*
SUPARNO, *State University of Malang, Indonesia*
Stewart E. SUTIN, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Cynthia A. TANANIS, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Mayumi TERANO, *Institute of Education, University of London, UK*
Charlene TROVATO, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
YE Feifei, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
Shannon B. WANLESS, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*
John L. YEAGER, *IISE, University of Pittsburgh, USA*

The Whole World is Texting

Youth Protest in the Information Age

Edited by

Irving Epstein
Illinois Wesleyan University, USA

SENSE PUBLISHERS
ROTTERDAM / BOSTON / TAIPEI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF FIGURES & TABLES

FIGURES

TABLE

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABM	Abahlali baseMjondolo (Shackdweller's Movement) [South Africa]
ACES	Coordinating Assembly of High School Students [Chile]
ANC	African National Congress
APF	Anti-Privatization Forum [South Africa]
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BICI	Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry
CCHR	Cambodian Center for Human Rights
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CITA	Cambodian Independent Teachers Association
COMFREL	Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia
CONFECH	Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (Confederation of Chilean Students)
COSAS	Congress of South African Students
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CNN	Cable News Network
CNRP	Cambodian National Rescue Party
CNNTURK	Cable News Network Turkey
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DK	Democratic Kampuchea
DTF	Student Islamic Associations and the Office for Strengthening Unity [Iran]
ECCC	Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
EE	Equal Education [South Africa]
ENU	Escuela Nacional Unificada (National Unified School) [Chile]
FECH	The Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (Student Federation of the University of Chile)
FUNCINPEC	Front Nationale Uni Pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopertif (National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HaberTurk	Turkish News
HRP	Human Rights Party [Cambodia]
ICTs	Information and Communication Technologies
IPR	Internet Penetration Rate
IRI	Islamic Republic of Iran
JDP	Justice and Development Party [Turkey]
LGBT	Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender
LICADHO	Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

NAP	Nationalist Action Party [Turkey]
NEC	National Election Committee [Cambodia]
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NTV Tarih	NTV History [Turkey]
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OWS	Occupy Wall Street
PISA	Program of International Student Assessment
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
RPP	Republican People's Party [Turkey]
RuNet	Russian Speaking Internet
SACP	South Africa Communist Party
SECC	Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee [South Africa]
SIMCE	Measurement System of Educational Quality [Chile]
SMT	Social Movement Theory
SOC	State of Cambodia
SRP	Sam Rainsy Party [Cambodia]
TAC	Treatment Action Campaign [South Africa]
TIMMS	Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
UNESCO	United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USBO	University Student Basij Organization [Iran]
VOD	Voice of Democracy [Cambodia]
WSF	World Social Forum
WTO	World Trade Organization

JOHN C. WEIDMAN AND W. JAMES JACOB

SERIES EDITORS INTRODUCTION

We are pleased to introduce the next volume in the *Pittsburgh Studies in Comparative and International Education* book series, which is published and distributed by Sense Publishers. The issues that will be highlighted in this book series range from key international education issues, trends, and reforms to examinations of national education systems, social and educational theories, and development education initiatives. Local, national, regional, and global volumes (single authored and edited collections) are anticipated in order to offer potential contributors a great deal of latitude based on interests and cutting edge research.

PSCIE is sponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Institute for International Studies in Education (IISE), which manages the review of submissions and provides editorial assistance in manuscript preparation. Selected University of Pittsburgh doctoral students have the unique opportunity to gain editing and publishing experience working or interning at IISE as a member of our editorial team.

The series is supported by a strong network of international scholars and development professionals who serve on the International Advisory Board and participate in the selection and review process for manuscript development. Working with our International Advisory Board, periodic calls will be issued for contributions to this series from among the most influential associations and organizations in international studies in education, including the Comparative and International Education Society, World Council of Comparative Education Societies, and UNESCO.

In future volumes in the *PSCIE* series, we encourage the generation of exceptional CIDE scholarship from researchers, policy makers, and practitioners from around the world. We hope this volume will encourage prospective authors and editors to submit manuscript proposals to the *PSCIE* series about their current research and project interests.

IRVING EPSTEIN

1. INTRODUCTION

The Global Dimensions of Contemporary Global Youth Protest

In April 1968, students occupied Columbia University in protest over the University's efforts to expand and appropriate land in the Morningside Heights neighborhood in order to build a gymnasium. This project would have displaced low income and poor residents who lived in the vicinity of the University. On April 30, the students were violently removed from Hamilton Hall and the Low Library, the university buildings they had occupied, by members of the New York City police department, ending the most prominent of a number of student demonstrations on U.S. campuses during the year (Columbia 1968, 2014). Later, on Wednesday, August 28, United States citizens witnessed on television, a massive police riot outside the Hilton Hotel in Chicago, where youthful demonstrators were gassed and beaten while protesting during the National Democratic Party Convention. Such violence served as a coda to a year where the horrors of the Vietnam War were transmitted through television coverage of the Tet Offensive in late January, and where two of the country's most important political leaders, Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, were assassinated within an approximate two-month span on April 4 and June 5. The refrain of the Chicago demonstrators, "The Whole World is Watching," became an anthem for U.S. protesters throughout the remainder of the decade, as the cruelty of state perpetrated violence was exposed in its various forms. It has lived on in different iterations over the past forty odd years. We have appropriated and re-contextualized the term in order to analyze the changing nature of youth protest in the twenty-first century, with specific reference to selected global protests that arose in 2011, 2012, 2013 and afterwards. We do so however, acknowledging that a number of factors distinguish youth protest in the twenty-first century from that of the 1960s.

First, twenty-first century protests are indeed distinctively global in ways that mark their occurrence from their 1968 predecessors. To be sure, protest in 1968 was certainly not limited to the United States. In May, students protested against poor living conditions at the University of Paris campus in Nanterre, as well as general class discrimination throughout the country. They ignited massive demonstrations in France that came close to toppling the de Gaulle administration, which was saved only after it agreed to massive worker minimum wage pay increases. 1968 also witnessed the Prague Spring reforms that led to the Soviet Union's forcible invasion of Czechoslovakia and the peaceful if unsuccessful protests that resulted; the *Tlatelolco* massacre in Mexico City, where numerous protesting students and civilians were killed by the Mexican police ten days before

the start of the Olympic Games; and the continuing Cultural Revolution in China, where student Red Guard factions conducted massive demonstrations against entrenched political interests.

Protest in 1968 was international in scope, and there was some awareness among individual protestors as to what was occurring outside of one's national boundaries. Indeed, McAdam and Rucht (1993) point to the significance of some very direct and interpersonal connections between leaders of the New Left in the United States and their West German counterparts as having potentially contributed to the growth of the German New Left in the 1960s and 1970s. In any event, the motivation of the 1968 protests came from an understanding that it was essential to contest the illegitimate exercise of power conceived within the boundaries of the nation-state. Even when the state exercised its power across accepted state boundaries in imperious forms, it was the machinery and institutional apparatuses of the state as a cohesive and unified entity, that bore the criticism of the protesters (Wallerstein 2012). And so, although the whole world may have been watching in August 1968, it was the unilateral unchecked power of the United States government alone, to which the Chicago protesters referred in their chant. In so doing, they were no different from their counterparts in France, Mexico, China, and Czechoslovakia in voicing opposition to the State.

It is striking how illustrative a comparison between the protests of the 1960s and early 70s, and those described in this volume can be in demonstrating how globalization has developed and what twenty-first century globalization entails. In doing so, further unpacking the meaning of the term, "The Whole World is Watching," is quite useful. What for instance, does it mean, when it is asserted that "the whole world" is directly interested in a domestic police riot that symbolizes the failure of conventional U.S. politics to address fundamental social conflict? Why in fact is the "whole world" impacted by these events and what ramifications would they have held for "the whole world?" One is also struck by the passive nature of the expression "is watching," where the audience receives the visual images of state violence in front of the television screen. Their negative reaction to the viewing of a police riot that lurched out of control bloodying many innocent individuals is assumed, but the consequences or impact of their disgust is never spelled out. To be sure, it is fair to assert that even given license for the hyperbole, those who chanted the slogan assumed that the center of the world on August 26-28, 1968 was in Chicago, and that the electronic transmission of the horrific images of those days exposed the moral failings of state machinery, whose perpetrators could be justifiably shamed for their actions. Although those images were transmitted internationally, the primary audience watching the August events was domestic. Is it therefore fair to conclude that the U.S. was inherently positioned to be the primary and most important source of global events?

It is doubtful that forty-seven years ago, any of these issues would have been raised in the aftermath of the Democratic Convention or in the initial decades following its conclusion. Such a lack of curiosity not only is a function of its era, but also more importantly speaks to how dramatically our understanding of globalization forces has evolved. The consequences of that evolution are apparent

throughout the chapters of this volume. We thus speak to the ways in which political awareness has come to mean more than the passive act of viewing a set of images, how the global dimension of such awareness has directly encouraged protest in radically different settings, and how understandings of the nature and limits of state power have become more sophisticated and nuanced. Volume authors also address the very nature of youth protest in the twenty-first century, and how it has been influenced by the social media borne from the information age, itself an important artifact representative of globalization processes. In so doing, we vary in our assessments regarding the efficacy of social media usage as a tool that has expedited successful protest outcomes or whether it has served as a catalyst that has reshaped the very nature of social movement structure and organization.

A second series of issues that we confront involve the nature of neo-liberalism, state authoritarianism, and their inter-relationship. To be clear, it is important to differentiate between globalization processes and neo-liberalism, the latter being a specific doctrine and set of practices that has become more prominent in part due to the visibility of the former. The ease with which ideas are spread and re-conceptualized according to one's own social and political context speaks to one aspect of globalization. Other aspects include the growth of transnationalism, migration, and displacement, the construction of multiple but not necessarily exclusive civic and cultural identities, the free flow and appropriation of exogenous cultural forms, the growth of terrorist organizations undeterred by state boundaries, neo-colonial/empire building aspirations by states who also fail to recognize conventional boundaries and borders, the extra-territorial dimensions of consumption, and the expansion of global financial markets, free trade, and multi-national corporate entities. Neo-liberalism represents a global ideological force that frames much of the economics of globalization in rather specific terms, while analyses of authoritarian state practices can only properly be contextualized by addressing their relationship to the global face of neo-liberalism. The case studies we present in this volume differ upon their emphasis of neo-liberal and authoritarian state policies and practices, but we make the argument that there is a linkage between the two, understood by the actors within the social movements we chronicle.

A third theme we discuss involves the characteristics of twenty-first century social movements. In so doing, we evaluate the forces contributing to their evolution, the nature of their organizational structure, and the limits of their success. Social movement theory includes an extensive literature, and in summarizing that literature while applying its foundational concepts to the protests discussed in this volume, we evaluate their usefulness as a set of analytical tools. The protests of which we comment of course involved youth. Such involvement was not necessarily exclusive to all of the protests but was always significant, even when in an indirect manner. In certain cases, youth involvement in twenty-first century protest fundamentally shaped the type of social movement that evolved; in other instances, the protests followed generic trajectories that most social

movements share regardless of the age of their participants. We assess the impact of youth participation in the various cases examined throughout the volume.

Finally, although not always noted in direct or explicit ways, educational issues, broadly conceived, with regard to access, funding, inclusivity, and the unfettered exchange of ideas are present in many of the conflicts that we discuss. In the cases of Chile, the U.S. Occupy Movement, and to a lesser extent Spain, educational issues involving financing, access, and cost play a major role in catalyzing youth protest. In Spain, Turkey, Bahrain, Iran, Russia, and Cambodia, state censorship and state efforts to control different forms of social media as well as Internet access, and of course the ideas generated from both, are important factors in understanding how the protests in many of these areas escalated. By conceiving of education in the broadest of terms in ways that extend beyond the formal institutional marker of schooling, it is possible to appreciate its significance to youth protest in ways that are important even when they are opaque. More generally, when examining the educational backgrounds of dissenting youth and their followers, one notes that participants were more likely to be well-educated individuals who valued the importance of exchanging ideas and information with one another. In the remainder of this introductory chapter, we will discuss these themes in a more systematic fashion.

GLOBALIZATION

One cannot fully appreciate the meaning of globalization without first examining assumptions governing the nature of the nation-state. The inherent hybridity of the concept illustrates its historical construction, with the merging of a collective sense of community, often fantasized or imagined (Anderson 1991), with the bureaucratic machinery typically associated with the modernist project (decision-making based upon rationality). One perspective holds that the apparatuses or institutions of the state, ostensibly designed to protect and further the interests of its citizenry, have worked to form a powerful and cohesive entity that in its most evolved forms, asserts authority that is difficult for the disgruntled and excluded to contest (Giddens 1987). Indeed, the scale of violence perpetrated during two World Wars and the nuclear terror that characterized the ensuing Cold War attest in the minds of some, to the power of the nation-state to pursue its self-interests regardless of political predilection. Indeed, some of those who analyze Middle East conflict view the Iraq War of 2003 as a twenty-first century form of U.S. empire building, which occurs when the strong state seeks to legitimately extend its imperial influence within a global arena, motivated by the desire to control access to valuable natural resources rather than accumulate territory (Hurst 2009). Foucaultian notions of governmentality further chart ways in which the state seeks to regulate the day-to-day lives of its citizenry, often through methods that are less than visible and in ways that transcend ideology (Foucault 1991). Opponents of such a perspective point to contradictions within the state that have never seem to be resolved. They include competing power centers among conflicting special interests that influence various government institutions, many of which are

themselves in opposition to one another, as well as the general erosion of institutional efficacy due to corruption. Even World War II and post- World War II states that were defined as "totalitarian" upon examination, often failed to eliminate competing internal efforts to expand power bases, nor were they able to assert control over the private spaces of daily life in ways that were as totalistic as had been asserted (Geyer 2008).

By the late twentieth century, the power of nationalist forces to disrupt state institutions smashed the nation-state nexus in numerous environments, as the failure to address nationalist and ethnic extremism became a recurrent phenomenon. One response to the failure of state efficacy has been to label governments as "failed states," a term that has generated vigorous debate within academic circles, most often but not exclusively having been applied to African countries. While there are numerous critics of the concept with particular regard to its vagueness (Nay 2013), the prominence of the concept itself indicates the strong degree of disappointment with the performance of "weak states" regardless of their specific locales. As the attributes we associate with globalization became more prominent, the questioning of the efficacy of the nation-state from *external* influences became more pronounced, with weak states co-existing with authoritarian counterparts and the legitimacy of both being subject to widespread scrutiny. The dissatisfaction youth protesters have expressed with regard to the failure of their governments to address popular grievances must be analyzed in light of these trends.

Rapid increases in the number of forcibly dispossessed persons, often casualties of the ethnic and nationalist conflicts to which we have referred, have created millions of individuals without a firm sense of place or home. At the same time, as the potential for international mobility has become easier, there are those at the other end of the transnational spectrum who move in and out of and back and forth from various nation-states according to convenience. The hybridity inherent in the concept of transnationalism, and the understanding that one need not assert unitary allegiance to country, language, culture, or ethnicity in affirming one's identity, or indeed the possibility that one can negotiate multiple identities within these spheres, are characteristics suggestive of the larger meaning of globalization (Vertovec 2009). Certainly an erosion of the permanence of place has contributed to other globalization characteristics as well. Youth and social movement activists have recognized that their actions are played out before a world stage, and have realized that acts involving the modification of their own strategies, tactics, and political perspectives according to events occurring in external settings can be inherently opportunistic rather than self-defeating.

That the concept of place lies at the heart of what we understand globalization to mean, and that such a concept has become muddied and ambiguous during the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries is not surprising. Indeed, as the meaning of globalization has become more refined, the notion of glocalization, or the process by which local communities reinterpret and redefine global cultural, social, and economic practices emanating from external sources according to their own terms (Robertson 1995), is instructive for it argues against simplistic dichotomies that

posit the global in opposition to the local. In many of the cases discussed in this volume, global awareness of protest efforts in one setting does not result in the mechanical borrowing of tactics and strategies in the other context.

Such awareness tends to offer support for one's own efforts without circumscribing agency. Nonetheless, even allowing for the ambiguity with which sense of place is affirmed, globalization theory does assert the prominence of place in understanding fundamental changes that are affecting the world's population, substituting place for time, as the analytic most important in understanding the influences upon contemporary events. Conventional or modernist notions of time assume a linearity and progressivity with the past, present, and future viewed as having clear demarcations. In a world where flux, spontaneity, and speed characterize the modes in which events develop, the discrete categories of past, present, and future are easily deconstructed. That the pace of change can seem quite daunting in the twenty-first century is not surprising given the explosion of information available to large population groups and the increasing ease of access to that information. However, information accessibility has not only contributed to the enhanced speed with which events unfold but has also served to displace fixed categories in a number of domains including economics and finance, culture, and consumption. It is not coincidental that finance, predicated upon investment strategies that depend upon easy access to a wealth of information combined with the necessity of quick decision-making, has displaced traditional forms of manufacturing as a catalyst for wealth accumulation on a global scale. The ease with which financial centers can be created, repositioned, and moved is itself an artifact of globalization processes. The degree of interdependence with which they operate is also significant.

The speed and flexibility with which cultural practices from external sources are adopted, modified, and reconstructed is another artifact of globalization and is noteworthy for the multi-directionality in which cultural transmission and adaptation occur. Whether it involves food, music, dance, sport, fashion, literature, or politics, cultural exchange in a global era is messy, unpredictable but never unidirectional, as Appadarai (1996) has eloquently noted. It is because of this context that we can appreciate how easily Spanish youth were influenced by the Arab Spring protests, or why leaders of the Occupy Movement felt so comfortable in borrowing tactics from their Spanish counterparts.

Appadarai's depiction of global cultural flows is also relevant when one examines global consumption patterns. The use of planned obsolescence strategies on a global scale has certainly limited the shelf lives of consumer items but the bombarding of consumers with product alternatives has additionally heightened the emphasis upon the acquisition of consumer products as a valued lived experience. As is true of ethnic, cultural, geographic, and political affiliation, twenty-first century consumption at its core involves a process of negotiating identity, particularly when one's personhood is associated so closely with the products one consumes. To Ulrich Beck (1992), the uncertainty of which we have spoken creates in the minds of the global citizenry, a "risk society," whereby there is no clarity with regard to the correct or appropriate actions one must pursue and where

one is constantly aware that the consequences of one's actions can easily lead to failure. At the same time, Zygmunt Bauman (2004) has argued that given such circumstances, efforts to control one's body through identifying one's person with the objects one consumes are understandable.

There can be no doubt that twenty-first century consumption and consumerism legitimize the commodification of personal relationships as well as of objects of desire. But there are conflicting conclusions as to what the ramifications of global commodification entail. For some, the association of personhood with commodification objectifies one's identity in ways that are crass and inherently dehumanizing (Giroux 2012). For others (Kenway and Bullen 2007), it is through the creation, possession, and exchange of artifacts that one is able to express a degree of autonomy that enhances personal agency and individuality. It is of course likely that both conclusions can be true, but in any event, it is clear that efforts to define, negotiate, and express identity are apparent within all of the spheres of globalization we have commented upon, be they geographic, ethnic, cultural, or economic. It is our belief that the characteristics of globalization that we have noted, particularly with regard to the interplay of consumption and identity, find specific expression within the world of social media and Internet usage, a topic of primary emphasis in this volume. But before fully discussing their importance from a theoretical perspective, it is instructive to go back and examine the ways in which the economic dimensions of globalization have been packaged within the specific ideological framework of neo-liberalism.

NEO-LIBERALISM

Historians trace the antecedents of contemporary forms of global capitalism to the Breton Woods Agreements of 1944, where Allied powers established fiscal policies and mechanisms that dictated global trading patterns and policies during the 1950s and 60s. Such policies pegged national currencies to fixed exchange rates based upon the U.S. dollar as supported by the gold standard, while creating institutions including the International Monetary Fund, and the International Ban for Reconstruction and Development, which evolved into the World Bank. The impetus to promote international free trade policies arose as the Western victors of World War II blamed restrictive tariff policies and government intervention in currency devaluation for having contributed to the Great Depression. Of course, the standing of the U.S. after the Second World War gave it the influence to dictate the terms of global investment, as it controlled much of the world's resources.

In 1971, the U.S. moved off the gold standard and allowed the dollar to float, but as financial reserves became depleted, as deficit spending increased (due in large part to the Vietnam War spending), and as OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) raised oil prices due to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the U.S. dollar become weaker. The immediate response included government de-regulation efforts on the part of the Carter administration in the airline industry. But from an ideological standpoint, neo-liberalism was most compellingly articulated with the ascendancy of Margaret Thatcher and the expression of Thatcherism. Ultimately,

efforts to promote free trade and extend global investment on the part of the U.S. and other "North" countries culminating in the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 (Harvey 2007).

The tenets of neo-liberalism became appealing under conditions of stagflation and deficit increases, as experienced by countries in the Global North in the late 1970s. The solutions that were proposed did not simply include the promotion of free trade policies per se, but included efforts to limit government regulations that defined acceptable corporate trading policies, offers to guarantee tax breaks to businesses that initiated global investment commitments, and decisions to restructure state support for public services by privatizing, limiting, or eliminating them altogether. These solutions resulted in the re-concentration of wealth in the hands of elites, the dismantling of labor unions and an attack upon organized collective efforts to insure the adequate distribution of state goods and services to those in need. As a result, there was a re-incentivizing of speculative financial practices to produce profit through stock holdings, corporate mergers and take-overs, and real estate investment, rather than relying upon traditional methods of accumulating wealth through the creation, manufacture and distribution of goods and resources (Harvey 2007).

Neo-liberalism of course is not simply a set of practices but involves a number of ideological beliefs that rationalize the practices. These beliefs include an uncritical faith in the power of the market to produce wealth if it is allowed to operate naturally through individuals exercising choice within an environment characterized by unbridled competition. The structural adjustment policies invoked in its name are rationalized for their contribution in making external investment palatable once a government's budget is balanced. But they even more directly speak to a fundamental antipathy for the role of government, which is viewed as inherently antagonistic to the market. As is true of most ideological systems, neo-liberal principles are framed as supporting a set of practices whose inevitability is viewed as being beyond question. The libertarianism inherent in the ideology bespeaks of an autonomous individualism that can thrive when rational decision-making based upon the forces within a market environment are allowed to thrive.

Of course there are glaring contradictions within neo-liberalism as an ideology and a set of practices that are easily visible when the framework as a whole is scrutinized. The targeting of state assistance to corporations and investors, be it through tax breaks or even more direct forms of government support, particularly when corporate failure is immanent, belies the notion that a truly free market can operate with all players being treated in an equal fashion. Indeed, it is not surprising that different forms of crony capitalism have proliferated even within states that express uncritical support for the neo-liberal principles that they in practice violate. In a similar vein, when one examines the logic of speculation which has so driven global capitalist activity in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries, it is clear that obtaining a comparative advantage over one's competitors, through obtaining information not readily available to all, becomes a rational strategy for insuring the success of one's efforts. Yet such behavior too contradicts the very level playing field upon which the pure free market concept is based.

On a global level, European Union and U.S. farm subsidizes, along with restrictive tariffs and dumping policies that have been maintained in the WTO era, privilege the "North" at the expense of the "Global South," making it difficult for farmers in the developing world to compete with their counterparts and agribusiness interests in the North (Green and Griffith 2002). Transnational corporate investment in low labor cost industries, plagued by abuses in labor conditions and environmental degradation, has also demonstrated very mixed benefit at best to the world's poor. In both cases, multi-state interventions intrude upon the "sanctity of a truly free market," but within contexts that extend beyond the nation-state boundary.

Indeed, the unquestioned assumption in the importance of competition creates a global "race to the bottom" that has both exacerbated intra-state economic inequality along with the worst excesses of global capitalism on a cross-national basis, as seen in global slavery, child labor, and sex trafficking abuses (Bales 2004). However, awareness of the growing inequality caused by neo-liberal policies is not limited to those who are most dramatically affected, but is much more widespread, shared by the many who fear its consequences for their own futures. A majority of the youth who engaged in the protests we describe fell within this category; they were in fact responding to the global uncertainties of a risk society fueled by a widespread acceptance of neo-liberal policies.

Another of the contradictions within neo-liberal policies is that while global investors look for environments that are safe, secure, and offer protection for their investments, the very inequality and concentration of wealth that is produced as a result of such investment quickly becomes de-stabilizing. This may not matter for those seeking immediate short-term profit and are opportunistically more than willing to transfer their financial resources to new environs. However, the effects of polices that encourage a withdrawal of financial support before more fruits of economic growth can be shared place severe pressures upon states in need of capital. Indeed, Joan and John Comaroff have argued that as the effects of global neo-liberal polices become more widely shared in both the developed and developing worlds, the future of "Northern" countries can be seen through the negative experiences of the Global South (Comaroff and Comaroff 2011).

The search for profit, maximized through the securing of natural resources and reduced labor costs within a de-regulated business climate, coupled with the understanding that global capital is fluid and is no longer guaranteed to be reinvested once short term profits are secured, are global eventualities that most nation-states understand regardless of their democratic or authoritarian tendencies. But as economic and social inequality has become more pervasive, the challenge of defending the authoritarian state is more daunting, even when economic performance on the basis of growth rates alone is robust. Because the unfairness attributed to limited economic opportunity for all but the extremely privileged challenges the commitment to inclusivity upon which state authority is based, protests against the unfair concentration of wealth in the hands of a few occurred in both authoritarian and non-authoritarian political systems. Not all of the youth actors within the cases we examine in this volume expressed a direct rejection of

neo-liberalism. But whether they did so in specific terms or articulated their more general dissatisfaction with the authoritarian nature of their governments, in many cases, their awareness of the economic inequality they observed played into their own concerns regarding their own future economic opportunities.

In other situations, their opposition to state authoritarianism was simply more visceral, exemplifying a disgust for state efforts to control the private or public spaces of daily life, let alone denying opportunities for free expression, assembly, and political representation. As Yusuf Sarfati notes in chapter 2, the contested space of Gezi Park represented to protesters at least in a symbolic sense, Turkish government attempts to control access to a public space devoted to personal leisure, in order to privilege neo-liberal investment. It is ironic that in many cases, the libertarian values of individualism and autonomy, so much a part of the neo-liberal framework, found resonance as a reaction to the excesses of the neo-liberal authoritarian state. But this is just one of the contradictions inherent in the implementation of neo-liberal ideology that was exposed during the protests discussed in this volume.

SOCIAL MEDIA, THE INTERNET, AND THE INFORMATION AGE

In many ways, the Internet and social media characterize the nexus between the many facets of globalization of which we have spoken. The processes that involve commercialism, consumption, creativity, and the exchange of ideas and information are not only representative of what much of globalization entails, but are intrinsic to the character of the Internet and social media. As of June, 2012, it is estimated that there were 2,405,518,376 Internet users among a world population of 7,017,846,922, an increase in users of over two billion individuals since December 31, 2000 (Internet World Stats 2014). It was further estimated that one in four people worldwide would have used social networks in 2013, for a total of 1.73 billion users, up from 1.47 billion in 2012 (Bennett, 2013).

What such usage means and how it affects our daily lives has been the source of vigorous discussion and debate, but one area where there is strong agreement is that Internet protocols are indistinct, as lines of demarcation regarding commercial, personal, and state driven activities have been difficult to enunciate. Jenkins, Ford, and Green (2013) use the metaphors of spreadability and stickiness to describe the ways in which Internet usage is played out. By spreadability, the authors are referring to "the potential for audiences to share content for their own purposes" (2013, p. 3) as well as the resources that allow some content to be circulated more widely than others (2013, p. 4). The authors further note that the term stickiness, popularized by Malcolm Gladwell, refers to the need to solicit enough audience interest in an item to encourage its spreadability (2013, p. 4). In emphasizing these concepts, they make the case that users create a virtual community whose members comply with the principles one would associate with a moral economy. Citing Lewis Hyde's work on gift exchange, they view the willingness of Internet users to share information with one another without expecting material remuneration as an important indication of the principles through which a moral economy is conducted

(2013, pp. 67-68). They also reference Richard Sennett's work on the nature of craftsmanship in explaining how pride in the product one creates motivates Internet users to share their work with so many, creating a notion of value that extends beyond commercialism, as evidenced within the motivation behind such movements as open software and You Tube production (2013, pp. 58-59). As will be noted later, the notion of value within the moral economy framework has specific salience when examining contemporary youth protest.

Still, there are dissenters who espouse alternative narratives that address the ramifications of Internet and social media usage. One view emphasizes the power of the media to control individual behavior, thought patterns, and the general exercise of choice within daily experiences. Mark Winocur (2007), for example, has argued that the contemporary computer screen represents a twenty-first century version of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon, controlling one's behavior in ways that are easily disguised to the participant. As the user's language and vocabulary are mediated through word processing codes, with which she/he most likely has little understanding or familiarity, the very limits through which one is able to construct and interpret text are rarely understood or appreciated. The screen as window onto the outside world not only restricts one's own personal movement, but creates limited space through which one's visual, auditory and tactile sensations are stimulated, processed, and repackaged as responses.

Others have expressed caution regarding the addictive nature of the web given the plethora of images, sounds, and texts, made so readily available to the user, and the ease with which can become engrossed in a bombardment of information facilitated through use of the hypertext. A general concern involves the fear that Internet and social media users substitute authentic relationships with virtual ones, and as a result, succumb to a healthy degree of narcissism (Turkle 2011). What, for example, are the implications of substituting direct conversations with friends or associates with texting and instant messaging (Holden 2006; Turkle, 2011)? Even with regard to the creative processes with which youth engage, such as downloading YouTube videos of personal performances, it has been argued that efforts to gain widespread attention must conform to the commercial principles that permeate the Web (Banet-Weiser 2012).

As mobile technology has expanded and the popularity of the smartphone correspondingly increased, the above-mentioned concerns have become more prominent, as mobility has not only further eased access to information and facilitated greater communication, but in so doing has blurred the lines between work and leisure, and public versus private spaces (Winocur 2007). To the degree that critics view the use of such technology as serving to further expand the ability to control individual behavior in new realms, it is viewed with disfavor.

However, there is an alternative narrative that is at least equally compelling. This perspective views the expanding use of mobile technology as promoting agency rather than limiting it. The ease with which citizen journalists have used their Smartphones to download images of important world events while commenting upon them through use of Twitter and Facebook accounts is noted by Sahar Mohammed Khamis and Nada Alwadi in their examination of the Bahrain

case in chapter 3 of this volume. Their discussion gives context for the power of democratized journalism to profoundly enhance global awareness of important world events. The acts of Twittering or texting more generically encourage inherently creative communicative possibilities, and are the epitome of personal free expression, not its antithesis. More importantly, the cases in this volume demonstrate that the social media were a significant tool in expediting the organization of youth protest; they were employed in ways that encouraged protest participation.

There are important caveats to this contention. There are questions as to whether within a divided society, likeminded groups enhanced widespread social divisions rather than ameliorated them, resulting in social fragmentation rather than greater movement cohesiveness. In overtly authoritarian settings such as Bahrain (chapter 3), Iran (chapter 4), and Russia (chapter 6), regimes were adept at controlling Internet and social media access themselves, circumscribing their potential effectiveness for protest leaders. As Saied Golkar notes in chapter 4, Iranian authorities countered regime opposition through creating their own social network of government supporters. Nonetheless, the power of the Internet and social media allowed for events to be played out before a global audience in ways that were distinctly different from past protests. In addition, protest leaders' reliance upon social media and the Internet proved effective in enhancing significant support within domestic populations. The protests resulting from a compromised political election in Cambodia as described by Lawrence Finsen in chapter 8, and the expansiveness and depth of student protest extending to most social sectors in Chile (discussed in chapter 5), demonstrate evidence for this contention. Even in environments where the physical expression of protest within public spaces was not possible, such as in Russia, the imagery and social media reporting that did find its way onto the Internet allowed for a limited degree of free expression to be voiced.

But did the use of social media and information gained and exchanged through the Internet serve as something more than a tool for protest leaders? As noted in chapter 5, Manuel Castells (2012) believes that this is indeed the case, with particular reference to the Spanish *Indignados* Movement (as well as the Arab Spring). Castells has argued for many years that the organizational structure of electronic media has markedly influenced social organization of all types. The concept of networking implies a horizontal rather than vertical communicative structure, as leadership and decision-making are more likely to occur on a collective rather than hierarchical basis, according to consensual rather than directive top-down approaches. When examining the strategies used in Spain, and to a certain extent within that part of the Occupy Movement that found expression in New York City, similar social organizational patterns are apparent. Castells also argues that the fears of a disconnect between real and virtual community building external to or within the world of social media are largely overblown, as he views the demonstrations within public space, be it at the Plaza del Sol in Madrid, or Tahir Square in Cairo, as serving to codify and enhance relationships initiated through the social media. When one is notified of a demonstration that will take

place, and becomes aware of the acquaintances and friends of friends who will participate, it is easier to make commitment to the cause and express physical support for the goals of a movement through attending the protest march in person. In this way, the virtual and actual forms of relationship building in the name of a political cause become complementary and mutually supportive of one another.

To the extent that Castells' contention is correct, one can also assume that the moral economy of the web, of which Jenkins et al. have spoken, is especially salient when one considers youth protest. They become interested in an issue or set issues, share their views through use of the social media and other means, understand that their views have a wider range of support, and become committed to a course of action. That the initial sharing of their knowledge and perspectives is done without material remuneration or direct compensation in mind, speaks to a consensus perspective that holds the Internet and social media to be spaces where the sharing of information is a deeply personal act. It is within this context that perceived efforts to control Internet access or social media usage were so roundly condemned in Spain and the U.S, with the pejorative term "information capitalism" (Webster 2000; Castells 2010) used to describe what was viewed as statist interference in cyberspace in order to restrict access to the collective, in order to privilege specific commercial and business interests. The negative repercussions of neo-liberal principles were thus viscerally acknowledged.

It is clear that social media and the Internet directly influenced much of the youth protest discussed in this volume, although in examining the South African case, William Munro in chapter 7 presents a compelling counter-example. But, even where social media influence is evident, it is less clear as to how fundamental that influence was in determining the character of the protest. In the case of Spain, the presence of social media and the Internet was transformative. In the other cases examined in this volume, although distinct and important, their influence advanced the goals of protesters without dramatically changing their organizational strategy or their behavior. And, in still other cases, the power of these entities as potential tools for expanding and enhancing protest was understood and limited by the prescriptive actions of the authoritarian State. But in any event, the view of social media and the Internet as having contributed to narcissistic behavior or the damaging of social relationships does not seem to have been borne out in any of these cases, as least as those views relate to political participation and social protest. In order to more fully address the questions involving contemporary youth protest, it behooves us to summarize the robust literature dealing with social movement theory for the purpose of examining its application to twenty-first century events.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

The basic components of what has come to be known as social movement theory were first articulated in the 1970s, in reaction to prior analyses that stressed the collective behavior of mass movement participants. In so doing, they assumed that individuals naturally acted as autonomous, independent agents. However, in

reaction to the failure of social institutions to address their needs, they became influenced by the group, sacrificing their independence and rational decision-making capability for the instability and irrationality of collective mass action (Cohen 1985, 671-673). A variant of this view tended to characterize North American youth of the 1960s in particular, as little more than participants in adolescent rebellion, where institutions served as surrogates for parental authority, subject to the similar types of disrespect common within family units (Feuer 1969). The problem with such analyses was that protest movement participants often acted quite strategically in ways that were rationally defensible. A second problem was that the Durkheimian and structural functionalist assumptions which grounded these analyses were themselves ideological constructs and products of an era that showed mistrust for any type of collective action as threatening to political and economic authority, often associating Marxist, neo-Marxist, and New Left proponents as dangerous and irrational (Cohen 1985). That their level of social analysis with respect to their understanding of "mass" behavior was overly simplistic was also problematic.

Modern social movement theory was constructed as an alternative, emphasizing four major components of social movements that deserved analytical attention whenever a movement was being discussed. They include: resource mobilization, repertoires of contention, opportunity structure, and the framing function of movement messaging. McCarthy and Zald (1977), in their seminal *American Journal of Sociology* article, argued that social movement participants engaged in serious and significant strategic thinking when organizing and developing the resources necessary to conduct a successful movement. They had to identify relevant resources to be put to their advantage, many of which were eclectic in value, robustness, and specific purpose. Once such resources were located, they needed to be coordinated and deployed in useful ways. In so proceeding, movement leaders had to interact with a number of different individuals, institutions and social organizations, interactions that required their use of sophisticated communicative skills. In short, social movements required their leaders and followers to act rationally and strategically, rather than ways that were susceptible to crowd influenced emotion. The cases in this volume certainly demonstrate evidence for this conviction, illustrating a degree of sophistication that one might not normally ascribe to "youthful" (substitute inexperienced or naïve) demonstrators.

Charles Tilly's notion of "repertoires of contention" also significantly furthered our understanding of social movements within historical and comparative contexts. He used the term to denote the range of protest tactics individuals employed to further their claims (1977 as cited in Soule 2007, p. 300). In so doing, he discussed the ways in which such behavior was "culturally coded' but subject to real life experiences and situations (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, p. 16). Tilly noted that repertoires changed through time, that they took on different meanings according to the contexts in which they were expressed, but that sometimes, they were borrowed and repositioned according to the differing environments in which they were utilized. Through time, he specifically noted that repertoires utilized in

modern Europe became more generalized and not necessarily specific to the immediate grievance for which one was reacting. Above all, he viewed the process of contestation as being natural to social interaction, and saw repertoires as reflective of the interactive nature between opposing actors and institutions that created an inherently dynamic process. In this volume, we see repertoires that range from the demonstration and strike, to the Twitter message and YouTube video, to the protest camp within a notable public space, that were all used to further protest goals. Not only were the repertoires eclectic, but they were sometimes borrowed and redeployed cross-nationally.

Sidney Tarrow (2011) argued that one must consider what political opportunity structures exist in order to more fully appreciate how social movements develop and how their potential development may be limited. Factors including coalition building, relationships toward and among elites, the degree of state repression, etc., all had to be factored in assessing when, how, and why social movement formation occurred and how successful it might be. Indeed, throughout this volume, we see how the different opportunity structures in place within various political systems created the space for social movements to grow or impeded their development. Tarrow was quite clear in noting that the concept of "opportunity structure" did not preclude awareness of the importance of agency or of actors maximizing the potential for social movement creation, but instead implied an interactive relationship between the actors and the political environments within which they operated. In this volume, we see the growth of fully developed social movements as well as the repression of protest on the part of regimes that are able to limit the opportunities for such movements to foster. We additionally see expressions of protest that fail to develop into fully formed social movements, but nonetheless articulate a profound sense of grievance whose presence is unabated even after the specific acts of protest have subsided.

The final component of social movement theory that is applicable to our analyses involves the concept of framing, a "perspective [that] views movements as signifying agents engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for protagonists, antagonists, and bystanders" (Snow 2007, p. 384). Grounded within the symbolic interaction literature, scholars such as David Snow (Snow and Benford 1988; Snow 2007) understood that conventional views of ideology as a static, pre-determined set of ideas, adapted by or imposed upon protesters, were insufficient in their failure to appreciate the fluid and constructive ways in which social movement participants create meanings that enhance collective understandings. In distinguishing between "collective action frames" and the "frames of everyday life," Snow noted that the framing process allows individuals to focus upon relevant elements of one's social field, prioritize or select those elements that are most relevant or important to understanding the bigger picture, and transform or alter the meaning of specific events, allowing for new interpretations to percolate. In so doing, the meanings derived from the practices of everyday life become elevated into new and broader contexts reflecting larger culturally embedded meanings within the social structure as a whole (Snow 2007, pp. 381-384).

Within this volume, examples of framing can be observed in all of the cases that are examined. The clash of frames, depicting the mass demonstration as a threat to social order (as expressed by police and/or state authorities), or as an expression of popular will heretofore ignored by the same authorities is typical of most protest events and is certainly played out in the Chile, U.S., Spanish, and Turkish, cases, to name a few. In most of these cases, the larger frame is one of protesting existing neo-liberal and authoritarian practices as having exacerbated inequality. Indeed, given the pre-existing frames that posited these practices as being inevitable and socially beneficial in the long term (promoting eventual economic growth and political stability), the force with which anti-neo-liberal and anti-authoritarian frames were expressed on a global level should not be underestimated. In looking for the long-lasting repercussions of contemporary youth protest, the fact that critiques of neo-liberal policies, crony capitalism, and the authoritarian state can no longer be easily dismissed as irrelevant and have become part of regular global political discourse represents a major achievement.

Although it is easy to see elements of social movement theory throughout this volume, the cases we present raise questions about the applicability of the theory in a globalized, information/social media driven environment as well. For example, while one can speak of resource mobilization in conventional terms, what constitutes participation in a social movement becomes less clear in the digital age. As Taylor (2013) has noted, when signing an online petition requires little more than the use of a few keystrokes, how can such a level of participation be assessed? Of course, in some of the cases we present, such an action has more profound consequences for the actor than carrying the placard, but this of course is not always true. The example is indicative of how definitions regarding what a resource entails, its value, and the conditions under which it can be mobilized can become extremely murky.

In a similar vein, we have noted the diversity of repertoires that were employed throughout the youth protests discussed in this volume. But assessing which repertoires were planned and formally scripted, which ones were spontaneous, and for which audiences their employment was intended to reach can be quite difficult to determine, particularly within globalized settings. It, for example, is certainly paradoxical that as Michael Mead Yaquib and Iveta Silova note, the performance activities of the Pussy Riots band (chapter 6) and the repression to which band members were later subjected, captured the imagination of a global audience, more engaged in the band members' welfare than was their domestic audience. This was in spite of the fact that avante garde artistic expression within Russia and the former Soviet Union has had a long history with an expectation that such expression would be provocative and critical of political authority. Indeed, William Munro in chapter 7 presents evidence that a reliance upon social media created conflicting and not always supportive repertoires of contention among South African activists, many of whom relied upon more traditional organizational tactics. Does recognizing the fact that repertoires of contention in the twenty-first century are addressing multiple audiences within local, national, and international

contexts therefore change our ability to assess their efficacy, or the influence of the social movements they seek to promote?

Assessing the viability of political opportunity structures to encourage or allow for a social movement to develop presents an additional set of problems when one considers the global contexts of which we have spoken. Under what conditions, for example, does awareness of protest in one country create the opportunity for a social movement development in another setting? And, can such variables ever be measured given the speed but inexactitude with which ideas and events are recorded and transmitted through cyberspace? If one concentrates solely upon determining which formal structures and institutions create opportunities for successful protest, then one is compelled to assess the complementary roles of institutions at local, state, national and transnational levels with varying degrees of legitimacy and importance to different citizen groups, even when such structures may be in conflict with one another.

Finally, an understanding of the role of framing in a globalized environment where the influence of social media is pervasive creates its own set of issues. The act of meaning making within a political context implicitly involves searching for a connection between the assertion of one's person identity and the symbols that make sense of one's daily experiences in larger cultural terms. But as Poletta et al. (2013) have noted, congruence between the articulation of the personal, the collective, and the social can never be assumed as occurring naturally. Social media engagement does not necessarily compromise one's individuality, nor does it uniformly create a sense of collectivity. In the Chinese and Russian cases, a circumscription of the framing process occurred with social media participants often speaking to one another rather than to those whose backgrounds may have been different from their own. To be clear, in spite of these caveats, we believe social movement theory to still be very useful as an interpretive framework. However, the elements of social movement theory of which we have spoken need to be viewed within contexts different from those that existed when they were initially formulated.

YOUTH AND EDUCATION

As we have noted, youth have historically been deeply involved in the creation of social movements. However, there are factors that explain why their participation in twenty-first century protests has been particularly compelling. As Table 1.1 indicates, youth comprise a significant segment of the world's population (25%), and their involvement in tertiary education is noteworthy. The paradox of course is that their unemployment rate is also significant. The data collected for the cases examined in this volume largely (but not uniformly) follow global trends.

Table 1.1 Youth/Tertiary Educational Enrollment/Unemployment Statistics, 2013

Countries	Number of Youth aged 10-24 (2013)	Youth aged 10-24 % of total population (2013)	% enrolled in tertiary education male 2005/2011	% enrolled in tertiary education female 2005/2011	% unemployed 15-24 males	% unemployed 15-24 females
World	1.809,600 billion	25	28	31	14	17
Turkey	19.3 million	26	51	41	21	23
Iran	19.2 million	25	43	43	20	34
South Africa	14.9 million	29	-	-	45	53
China	299.1 million	22	25	27	-	-
Cambodia	4.6 million	32	10	5	4	3
Chile	4.2 million	24	58	61	14	23
Russia	23.5 million	16	65	87	17	18
Spain	6.8 million	14	66	81	43	40
Bahrain	0.2 million	18	-	-	26	37
United States	63.8 million	19	79	111	21	16

Source: The World's Youth: 2013 Data Sheet

It is not difficult to see that as youth have become more demographically prominent and their educational attainment has increased, the failure to accommodate their presence either with regard to economic opportunity or political participation has created conditions that have encouraged protest movements to percolate. But even more fundamentally, our understanding of who youth are and how they shape their identities and interact within a globalized environment has become significantly more sophisticated. For example, in examining the numerical ranges in age listed in Table 1.1 (youth ages listed as ranging from 10-24, youth employment figures calculated according to ages 15-24), we see how problematic it is to define youth according to pre-determined age categories because of their arbitrary nature, and their rigidity. The field of youth studies acknowledges the weaknesses of previous academic scholarship, where the youth designation was associated with adolescence, a culturally arbitrary construct categorized as a stage of transition to adulthood, implicitly privileging the latter at the expense of the former. By rejecting the concept of youth as a discrete developmental stage but affirming its importance as a series of cultural practices that involve subjects who actively express their identities in multiple ways, youth studies advocates acknowledge the conceptual ambiguity that is also evident in the treatment of

youth within this volume (Bucholtz 2002). Thus, in some of cases we describe, youth are indistinguishable from older colleagues with regard to their leadership and participation in protest movements. In other cases, they represent a distinct cohort that is easily identifiable.

The processes that we have discussed that mark the twenty-first century from previous eras: globalization, neo-liberalism, and information age/social media exposure, have certainly influenced the ways in which contemporary youth define their aspirations and the opportunities they utilize in seeking their fulfillment. But as we have noted, these processes too can be characterized by conceptual ambiguity. Therefore, while we see in Chile, student leaders assuming traditional political roles ascribed to those holding positions of leadership within the country's more prestigious universities, in Spain, formal leadership of any type was eschewed. As Lawrence Finsen notes with regard to the Cambodian case, an increasingly young population that came of age took upon itself the task of pressing for greater political representation without having had significant resources in the past to do so. And, it is clear, when examining some cases such as that of Russia, that protest movements as they have conventionally been conceived, did not develop as extensively as did their counterparts in other parts of the world. But what can be said for at least most of these cases is that the presence of youth as a significant or potentially significant political force was widely recognized, that their use of social media and other forms of cyberspace communication heightened their global awareness, and that their ability to translate their own political and concerns into messaging that spoke to broader issues of political and economic inequality was noteworthy.

The role of education as a part of social movement development was a strong one during the twentieth century and this continues to be true of twenty-first century social movements as well. Members of the Highlander Folk School, for example, along with the mentorship of teachers and leaders such as James Lawson at Vanderbilt University, taught principles and tactics of non-violence to future leaders of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement (Halberstam 1999). Many of the participants of the Freedom Summer campaign of 1964, who came from the North, were taught such tactics in a national effort to register African-American citizens to vote in Mississippi. They later employed the same tactics that were instrumental in protests against the Vietnam War. The use of the teach-in on university campuses throughout the country, for example, was directly derived from the educational experiences of Civil Rights workers and movement participants. Indeed, with regard to the South African case, the anti-apartheid movement gained international support after the massacre of Soweto high school students on June 16, 1976, who were peacefully protesting 1974 regulations that stipulated Afrikaans and English to be the two official languages within the school system. It is therefore useful to recognize that the direct role of educational policy in inciting student protest in Chile, has an important global historical legacy. And, it is this legacy that helps to further explain how protests in the U.S. and Spain, that were not immediately focused upon issues of educational inequality, in time, incorporated this narrative as a part of their movements.

Two points should be reiterated with regard to the relationship between education and protest in the twenty-first century. First, the neo-liberal values of which we have previously spoken are clearly evident within many of the educational policies that have been given a global presence. They, of course are most evident in the concerns regarding the responsibility of the state to provide public support for educational opportunity and the threat to the principle that privatization creates. But they are also present in an indirect sense. Youth are increasingly aware of the connection between education and employment, the global competition for highly skilled labor, and the claims that human capital is maximized when educational standards are raised. Those who accept these claims believe they are being denied the opportunities to compete for a better future. Those who reject the connection between educational attainment and employability view the political and economic systems within their own countries as rigged against their own futures because social institutions such as schools have been hopelessly compromised. But in both cases, their education serves as an identity marker that contributes to their broader worldviews.

A second point that bears emphasis involves the inter-relationship between educational issues and other political and social concerns. Because it is impossible to limit talk about inequality to the education sector only, given the ways in which neo-liberal policies affect the delivery of other basic services including housing, food, and medical assistance, youth were able to generalize personal grievance that was educationally focused into a broader critique of economic inequality quite easily. At the same time, those whose initial focus was centered upon the effects of crony capitalism in other domains were naturally led to consider the effects of educational inequality too.

A final comment that deserves reiteration involves the educational function of social media and Internet usage. The values that we associate with the moral economy of the Internet with regard to the privileging of what is deemed valuable rather than simply profitable, the sense of obligation that social media users feel with regard to the sharing of information with others, and the importance of protecting the right of unfettered access to information, are values that those that have also been used to justify the support of formal schooling and ancillary educational institutions. When we examine the purposes of education, these values are commonly employed in support of educational practices. Broadening our understanding of educational practice to include the use of the Internet and social media in support of political protest implies that these activities are not simply important communicative acts, but have intrinsic educational importance.

CONCLUSION

In November, 1999, in response to the hosting of the World Trade Organization's Third Ministerial Conference, one of the largest mass protests in Seattle's history was held to criticize the effects of free trade policies on the environment, agriculture, and worker wages and rights. The sheer number of demonstrators who gathered on November 30 and blocked access to the city Convention Center for the

meeting's opening session, surprised the police, although protesters advertised their intentions ahead of time. Although there were scattered incidents of property destruction, most of the protesters were peaceful. A city curfew was imposed soon afterwards, but

> By 5:00 pm., large squads in riot armor and gas masks, backed by armored vehicles, began sweeping through downtown using concussion grenades, rubber bullets, and tear gas to force remaining protestors and bystanders alike off the street. Later, the National Guard was called in and over 500 protesters were arrested. (Oldham 2009)

Both the Seattle mayor and the Washington State governor were accused of over-reaction, let alone violating the free speech and assembly rights of the protesters, as a no protest zone was enacted and protesters were prohibited from continuing to demonstrate in public spaces near the Convention Center (Oldham 2009). It should also be noted that protests against the meeting also occurred in over twenty countries at the same time (Vidal 1999). But the Seattle protests received a good degree of the world's attention and foreshadowed future demonstrations at U.S. national political conventions and at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in 2003. What then, made the Seattle protests any different from the ones we are analyzing in this volume? Unlike the demonstrations of the 1960s, of which we have previously spoken, an understanding of the nefarious effects of neo-liberalism and globalization processes was clearly articulated in Seattle. And, if one views the efforts of these protesters as having ultimately failed to accomplish their aims, the more contemporary protests of which we speak have certainly had at best, a very mixed degree of success.

Certainly, conditions changed in the decade subsequent to the 1999 Seattle protests. A more complete understanding of the effects of neo-liberalism became evident, particularly after the Great Recession of 2008. Even before that financial crisis however, the implications of crony capitalist practices and of state authoritarianism had become clearer. The first decade of the twenty-first century was one of global terrorism and ensuing conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, all of which belied the assumption that states could guarantee their public security solely through the use of domestic authoritarian practices. But above all, the growth of social media usage allowed for a global connectivity among 2011-2013 protesters that could only have been imagined in 1999. One can thus point to the scale of protests and the increased awareness of their messaging that mark the events chronicled in this volume from their predecessors. We also subscribe to the view that while it is understandable that one might assess the value of a set of protest activities according to the degree of change their presence effects, their importance lies beyond the immediate results they create. Thus the reframing of issues of inequality and authoritarian practice that occurred subsequent to the Seattle protests has had lasting significance, making concrete the issues that for many seemed to be abstractions in 1999 (Smith 2014). In the following pages, we invite the reader to examine those characteristics that are salient to the cases we bring forth in the volume, whether they involve the effects of globalization and

neo-liberalism, the use of electronic and social media, the elements of social movement theory, and where relevant, the role of youth and the importance of education, some or all of which speak to the ways in which protests develop and what makes them so compelling.

In so doing, it needs to be stressed that the case studies discussed in this volume offer a representative rather than comprehensive picture of contemporary youth protest. Because the Arab Spring has been commented upon at length in other venues (Howard and Hussain 2013; Lesch and Haas 2012; Lynch 2014), it is not emphasized here although certain implicit similarities and connections can be found in the authors' analyses of the Bahraini, Iranian and Turkish cases. It should also be noted that time constraints prevent a complete analysis of protests that are ongoing, be they mass protests in the U.S. over the need for more comprehensive policies at domestic and global levels that will more adequately address climate change concerns (Foderaro 2014), or student demonstrations in Hong Kong calling for a more expansive and transparent process for electing the next chief executive (Buckley and Wong 2014; Pepper 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). The fact that the global visibility of these protests is so strongly in evidence in late 2014 speaks to the ongoing need to analyze contemporary youth protest in all of its inundations. Hopefully, the cases presented in this volume will in a small way contribute to that process.

REFERENCES

Anderson, Benedict. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Revised edition). London and New York: Verso.

Appadarai, Arjun. (1996). *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Bales, Kevin. (2004). *Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy, 2nd edition*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Banet-Weiser, Sarah. (2012). *Authentic™: The Politics of Ambivalence in a Brand Culture*. New York: New York University Press.

Bauman, Zygmunt. (2004). "A Sociological Theory of Post-Modernity." In Craig Calhoun, Joseph Gerteis, James Moody, Stephen Pfaff, and Inderhomen Verk, eds., *Contemporary Sociological Theory* (pp. 429-440). Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher.

Beck, Ulrich. (1992). *Risk Society: Toward a New Modernity*. London: Sage Publishing.

Bennett, Shea. (2013). "One in Four People Worldwide Uses Social Media [STUDY]." *All Twitter*. Available online at: http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/social-media-worldwide-growth_b45043

Bucholtz, Mary. (2002). "Youth and Cultural Practice." *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 31, 525-552.

Buckley, Chris, & Alan Wong (2014). "Police Arrest Dozens of Pro-Democracy Protesters in Hong Kong." *New York Times*, September 27. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/world/asia/pro-democracy-protest-in-hong-kong.html?ref=world&_r=0

Castells, Manuel. (2010). *The Rise of the Network Society* (2nd edition). Malden, Ma: Wiley-Blackwell.

Castells, Manuel. (2012). *Networks of Hope and Outrage*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Cohen, Jean L. (1985). "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements." *Social Research*, *52*(4), 663-716.

Columbia 1968. (2014). *Columbia 1968*. Available online at: http://www.columbia1968.com/history/

Comaroff, Jean, & John Comaroff. (2011). *Theory from the South: Or How Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa*. Boulder, Co: Paradigm Publishers.

Feuer, Lewis. (1969). *Conflict of Generations*. New York: Harper Collins.

Foderaro, Lisa. (2014). "Taking a Call for Climate Change to the Streets." *New York Times*, September 21. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/nyregion/new-york-city-climate-change-march.html

Foucault, Michel. (1991). "Governmentality." In Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, & Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (pp. 87-104). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Geyer, Michael. (2008). "Introduction: After Totalitarianism – Stalinism and Nazism Compared." In Michael Geyer & Sheila Fitzpatrick, eds., *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (pp. 1-38). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Giddens, Anthony. (1987). *The Nation-State and Violence*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Giroux, Henry. (2012). *Disposable Youth, Racialized Memories, and the Culture of Cruelty*. New York: Routledge.

Green, Dunca, & Mathew Griffith. (2002). *Dumping on the Poor: The Common Agricultural Policy, the WTO and International Development*. U.K.: CAFOD. Available online at: http://www.iatp.org/files/Dumping_on_the_Poor_The_Common_Agricultural_Po.htm

Halberstam, David. (1999). *The Children*. New York: Fawcett.

Harvey, David. (2007). *A Brief History of Neo-liberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Holden, Todd Joseph Miles. (2006). "The Social Life of Japan's Adolechnic." In Pam Nilan & Carles Feixa, eds., *Global Youth? Hybrid Identities, Plural Worlds* (pp. 72-90). Abingdon: Routledge.

Howard, Philip N., & Muzammil M. Hussain. (2013). *Democracy's Fourth Wave?: Digital Media and the Arab Spring*. New York: Oxford.

Hurst, Steven. (2009). *The United States and Iraq Since 1979: Hegemony, Oil, and War*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Internet World Stats. (2012). "Internet Usage Statistics: The Big Picture." Available online at: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm

Jenkins, Henry, Sam Ford, & Joshua Green. (2013). *Spreadable Media*. New York: New York University Press.

Kenway, Jane, & Elizabeth Bullen. (2007). "The Global Corporate Curriculum and the Young Cyberflaneur as Global Citizen." In Nadine Dolby & Fazal Rizvi, eds., *Youth Moves* (pp. 17-32). Abington: Routledge.

Lesch, David W., & Mark L. Haas, eds. (2012). *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Lynch, Mark, ed. (2014). *The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East*. New York: Columbia University Press.

McAdam, Doug, & Dieter Rucht. (1993). "The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *528*(July), 56-74.

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, & Charles Tilly. (2001). *Dynamics of Contention*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

McCarthy, John D. & Mayer N. Zald. (1977). "Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology*, *82*(6), 1212-1241.

Nay, Olivier. (2013). "Fragile and Failed States: Critical Perspectives on Conceptual Hybrids." *International Political Science Review*, vol. 34 (no.3), 326-341.

Pepper, Suzanne. (2014a). "The Struggle Evolves." *Letters from Hong Kong*, September 8. Available online at: http://chinaelectionsblog.net/hkfocus/

Pepper, Suzanne. (2014b). "Students on Strike." *Letters from Hong Kong*, September 25. Available online at: http://chinaelectionsblog.net/hkfocus/

Pepper, Suzanne. (2014c). "Decision Time for Beijing." *Letters from Hong Kong*, October 6. Available online at: http://chinaelectionsblog.net/hkfocus/

Polletta, Francesca, Pang Ching Bobb Chen, Beth Gharrity Gardner, & Alice Motes. (2013). "Is the Internet Creating New Reasons to Protest? In Jacqueline von Stekelenburg, Conny Roggeband, & Bert Klandersman, eds., *The Future of Social Movement Research* (pp. 17-36). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Oldham, Kit. (2009). Seattle, Washington. HistoryLink.org. "WTO Meeting and Protests in Seattle (1999)." Available online at: http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=output.cfm&file_id=9213

Population Reference Bureau. (2014). *The World's Youth 2013 Data Sheet*. Available online at: http://www.prb.org/pdf13/youth-data-sheet-2013.pdf

Robertson, Rolland. (1995). "Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity." In Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, & Roland Robertson, eds., *Global Modernities* (pp. 25-44). London: Sage Publications.

Smith, Noah. (2014). "The Dark Side of Globalization: Why Seattle's 1999 Protesters Were Right." *The Atlantic*. Available online at: http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/01/the-dark-side-of-globalization-why-seattles-1999-protesters-were-right/282831

Snow, David A. (2007). "Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields." In David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, & Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (pp. 380-412). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Snow, David A., & Robert Benford. (1988). "Ideology, Frame, Resonance, and Participant Participation." *International Social Movement Research*, *1*, 197-217.

Soule, Sarah A. (2007). "Diffusion Processes within and across Movements." In David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, & Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (pp. 294-310). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Tarrow, Sidney G. (2011). *Power in Movement* (2nd edition). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, Verta. (2013). "Social Movement Participation in the Global Society: Identity, Networks, and Emotion." In Jacqueline von Stekelenburg, Conny Roggeband, & Bert Klandersman, eds., *The Future of Social Movement Research* (pp. 37-58). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Tilly, Charles. (1977). *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Turkle, Shelly. (2011). *Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other*. New York: Basic Books.

Vertovec, Stephen. (2009). *Transnationalism: Key Ideas*. Abington: Routledge Press.

Vidal, John. (1999). "Real Battle for Seattle." *The Observer*, December 4. Available online at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/dec/05/wto.globalisation

Wallerstein, Immanuel. (2012). "Upsurge in Movements around the Globe." In Kate Khatib, Maragret Killjoy, & Mike McGuire, eds., *We Are Many: Reflections on Movement Strategy from Occupation to Liberation* (pp. 105-112). Oakland: AK Press.

Webster, Frank. (2000). "Information, Capitalism, and Uncertainty." *Information, Communication, and Society*, *3*(1), 69-60.

Winocur, Mark. (2007). "InterpraNet: Foucault's Panopticon Versus the Codes of Cyberspace." In Irving Epstein, ed., *Recapturing the Personal: Essays on Education and Embodied Knowledge in Comparative Perspective* (pp. 23-55). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

YUSUF SARFATI

2. DYNAMICS OF MOBILIZATION DURING GEZI PARK PROTESTS IN TURKEY

> Capitalism will cut down the tree if it can't sell its shadow.
> – Karl Marx

> To live like a tree alone and free, like a forest in brotherhood.
> – Nazım Hikmet

A small group of environmentalists objected to the uprooting of trees in Gezi Park in the heart of Istanbul when the municipality began to implement its plan to raze the park and build in its place the replica of an Ottoman era military barrack with a shopping mall inside. The municipal police burnt down the tents of the camping protesters in Gezi Park and used excessive force against them in the early morning hours of May 31, 2013. When images of wounded protesters from this clamp-down spread through Twitter, Facebook and text messages, many more enraged Istanbulites flocked to Taksim square adjacent to Gezi Park, and in few days the protest movement had been transformed into a national uprising against the government galvanizing millions all around Turkey. For fifteen days, protesters occupied the Park and established the Gezi commune, which became a tent city with a free library, daycare, makeshift clinic, and a space where spontaneous rallies were held. People mobilized in every corner of Turkey and expressed their discontent and frustration with police brutality, the government's policies and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's combative political rhetoric. The riot police used tear gas, water cannons, and pepper spray to disperse the protesters. After the police raided Gezi Park on June 15 and ended the occupation, protester groups formed people's assemblies in various other public parks and continued to demonstrate albeit with lower intensity.

The Gezi Park uprising represented a unique experiment in Turkish politics by unsettling established political divisions and forging a multi-group alliance composed of diverse political, social and cultural currents in Turkish society, including environmentalists, feminists, soccer fan groups, gay rights movements, post-materialist youth, Islamist groups, Kurds, and ultra-nationalists (*ulusalcılar*).

By utilizing theoretically important insights from social movement theory and contentious politics (McAdam, McCarty and Zald 1996; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2011), this paper attempts to answer several questions: How do Gezi Park protests help us conceptualize transformations in the forms of collective action in Turkey? What were the mechanisms of political mobilization used by the protesters? What was the government's response to dissipate and discredit the protests?

To address these questions, first I draw parallels between the Gezi Park protests and new social movements. Then, I analyze how protesters translated societal grievances into collective action through framing processes (Benford and Snow 2000; Meyer 2004). Frames created by the protesters addressed popular grievances stemming from neo-liberal urban development projects diminishing residents' voices in their cities' living spaces and the governing Justice and Development Party's (JDP) increasingly authoritarian governing style and restriction of individual life choices. By framing popular urban grievances, the protesters aimed to unify diverse groups and build political influence against a common powerful enemy (Hathaway and Meyer 1997). The protesters posed a challenge to the authorities by innovating repertoires of contention, such as utilizing political humor and embracing forms of passive resistance, and using digital media networks to spread their messages. On the other hand, the government and its allies tried to weaken the protesters' frames by circulating counter-frames (Noakes 2005), which trivialized and securitized the protester groups, in the conventional and social media. These framing contests led to competition for cultural legitimacy between the *Geziciler* (Gezi protesters) and the government. This symbolic struggle over public opinion in Turkey would determine the future legacy of Gezi Park protests for Turkish politics.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Gezi Park Protests mark a significant "episode of contentious politics" in Turkey. According to Mc Adam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), contentious politics broadly refers to collective political struggle and is "episodic rather than continuous, occurs in public, involves interaction between makers of claims and others, is recognized by those others as bearing on their interest, and brings in government as mediator, target, or claimant" (5). An analysis of the Gezi Park Protests can inform several aspects of the literature on collective action and contentious politics. I particularly address the similarities Gezi Park protests bear with new social movements (NSMs) in regards to claim making and organizational forms, the role framing processes in mobilization, demobilization and counter-mobilization, and the framing contests between the authorities and the protesters.

Scholars of contention argue that the NSMs bear characteristics that differ from conventional social movements. While it would be inaccurate to define the multiple and highly heterogeneous constituents of the Gezi Park protests as part of one single social movement, it is clear that the protests constitute an episode of contentious politics, and many of the claims made by different protester groups and various organizational strategies they adopted have striking resemblances to NSMs. I point out five of these characteristics. 1) The grievances tend to focus on cultural and symbolic issues rather than economic grievances that characterized conventional working class movements (Melucci 1989; Johnston, Larana and Gusfield 1994, p. 7). By primarily emphasizing their 'right to the city' and life-style concerns, the Gezi Park protesters prioritized post-material concerns over materialist concerns (Inglehart 1995; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). 2) Rather than

targeting formal institutions and seizing political power, the protesters aimed to broaden participation in the civil society, democratize everday practices, and emphasize group identities (Melucci 1996, p. 102). 3) Similar to the contemporary social movements elsewhere, the rise of the protests revealed a crisis of the conventional channels of political participation, such as political parties and parliament (Offe 1987). The protesters were careful not to accept patronage from any political formation or to be co-opted by conventional political actors. For instance, on the second day of the uprising, the protesters objected to the entrance of the main opposition Republican People's Party (RPP) to Gezi Park with party banners. A poster held by a protester sums up the distrust towards conventional political actors: "We can attend to religion without the JDP, to father (Atatürk) without the RPP, to the motherland without the NAP (Nationalist Action Party), to Kurds without the PDP (Peace and Democracy Party), we are the people." 4) Unlike the radical working class movements that used violent tactics of disruption, Gezi Park protesters primarily focused on non-violent forms of resistance, such as tactics of civil disobedience, and political humor (Johnston, Larana, and Gusfield 1994, p. 8). The embrace of these novel tactics created many difficulties for the authorities. For instance, on June 17, Erdem Gündüz started the civil disobedience practice known as "standing man" (*duran adam*), where he would 'just stand' on the pavement in Taksim Square for eight continuous hours to protest. Thousands joined Gündüz in his protest in different parts of Turkey after the action was diffused through Twitter, and the police found it difficult to frame an appropriate response. Through using political humor, young protesters were able to access new audiences and use a vocabulary over which the authorities had little control. 5) Unlike cadre-led hierarchical structures of traditional social movements, the social protests had a leaderless, diffused and decentralized character (Melluci 1996, p. 103; della Porta and Diani 2006, pp. 130-131). Advances in wireless technology led to the creation of horizontal communication networks, which were difficult for governments to control and which brought together various groups on relatively egalitarian platforms (Castells 2012). The creation of mass assemblies in various public parks in Turkey in the aftermath of the protests also shows the distrust towards hierarchical authority structures and an embrace of participatory modes of decision-making.

Collective Action Frames and Framing Contests

Scholars of contentious politics have long debated mechanisms of political mobilization. After the mid-1980s, there was a renewed focus on the role of symbols, ideas and meaning in mobilization efforts. Scholars of Social Movement Theory (SMT) discussed, for instance, how meaning-making is a necessary link between social grievances and collective action. In this view, structural factors, political opportunities and organizational resources are not sufficient to explain collective action, because political actors need to make grievances meaningful for potential supporters. Thus, activists interpret grievances and try to generate and diffuse those interpretations among the general population (Snow et al. 1986,

p. 466). Hence, rather than focusing on macro or meso-level factors, the ideational approach emphasizes micro-dynamics of mobilization. This emphasis on ideas and meaning-making also differs from earlier works on ideology, which have treated ideas as part of a coherent template that can be deduced from works of ideologues (Snow and Benford 2005). In this social constructivist view, ideas form through intersubjective negotiation, have an emergent quality, and stem from shared meanings and identities that constitute the symbolic, expressive, and interpretative part of social life (Ross 1997, p. 42). By participating in these meaning-making processes, the makers and receivers of claims engage in a "politics of signification" (Benford and Snow 2000, p. 623). As agents of signification, political actors articulate and disseminate collective action frames that aim to mobilize potential adherents, sway by-standers and demobilize antagonists (Snow and Benford 1988, p. 198). These collective action frames are defined as "the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and suggest alternative modes of action" (Zald 1996, p. 262). In other words, different aspects of the observed phenomena are sliced, assembled, and packaged in a novel way to produce a new vantage point (Benford and Snow 2000, p. 623).

Scholars of framing identified three main types of frames, namely diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Diagnostic frames help to diagnose problems and attribute responsibility, while prognostic frames propose ways to solve social problems (Zald 1996, p. 265). On the other hand, motivational frames "provide(s) a 'calls to arms' or rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action, including the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive" (Benford and Snow 2000, p. 617). In the case of the Gezi Park protests, the protesters primarily used diagnostic and motivational frames. While diagnostic frames identified social grievances shared by primarily urban, educated, young, post-materialist societal segments and attributed blame to the JDP government's authoritarian policies and neo-liberal urban development projects, motivational frames provided inspiration to bystanders to take onto the streets, and motivation for the participants to continue protest activities.

The success or failure of the collective action frames and counterframes depends on the degree of resonance they have with the life experiences of the target audiences and the cultural stock of the society (Gamson 1992, 2004; Williams 2004). Hence, framing contests cannot be understood detached from their historical, cultural, and everday context. As long as these cultural resources differ among different groups, the resonance of collective action frames among these groups also differs (Gamson 1992). The protesters primarily constructed injustice frames that appealed to the grievances felt by educated, young, post-materialist youth. These societal segments perceived the laws and regulations passed by the JDP government as restricting their lifestyles, and the paternalistic language of Erdoğan as authoritarian. The protesters also critiqued neo-liberal urban development by constructing "environmental justice" frames that appealed to urban residents.

Frames, however, are not only utilized by opposition actors to challenge the dominant authority, but also by the authorities to discredit and demobilize opponents (Naokes 2005). This leads to framing contests between opposition figures and officials (Benford 1993; Zuo and Benford 1995). The JDP government and the pro-government media outlets tried to securitize the protests by framing the protesters as vandals, terrorists, vagabonds as well as tools of an international conspiracy. Moreover, Erdoğan deliberately cast the protester groups as enemies of religion and desecrators of religious mores. The aim was to capitalize on the long-standing distrust that existed among the conservative constituents against Republican elites and their secular followers and thereby to politicize the secular-religious cleavage that formed the main axis of Turkish politics in the 1990s and 2000s.

The Role of the Media

SMT literature indicates that during contentious episodes the media becomes a site for the construction of meaning and a space where discursive, symbolic contests are carried out (Gamson 2004; Noakes and Johnston 2005). In the case of the Gezi Park protests, digital media became a site where framing contests were carried out. Moreover, the protesters utilized new forms of information technology, particularly Twitter and Facebook, as mobilizing structures. Due to their anonymous and decentralized qualities, these networks were hard to control by the governing authorities and rapidly emerged as the primary tools in organizing protest, particularly among the tech-savvy youth. In addition to their communication potential, these virtual networks also quickly disseminated the injustice frames in the forms of videos, cartoons, and slogans to both national and transnational audiences. While social media's mobilization potential has also been emphasized in the recent Arab uprisings, in the Turkish case it is important to indicate that it also became a tool for counter-mobilization. The well-organized supporters of Turkey's governing JDP were quick in responding to the protesters and circulating counterframes to both national and international target audiences. This shows that social media can be a potential tool in organizing protests against the state, but can also be used by the state and its allies to diffuse or discredit protests.

In the case of the Gezi Park protests, there was also a third role that the media played. The broadcasts of the visual media, mainly national mainstream TV channels, such as CNNTURK, NTV, and HaberTurk, became the subject of collective action frames. The lack of coverage of the protests, specifically during the initial stages in the mainstream mass media was depicted as a sign of government pressure, and media bosses' complicity in the disappearance of multivocality in Turkey's public sphere.

CONSTITUENTS OF THE NEW FACE OF POLITICS IN THE GEZI PARK PROTESTS

Socially as well as politically Gezi Park protesters formed a diverse coalition. Tarrow, Levi and Murphy (2006) define coalitions as "collaborative, means-

oriented arrangements that permit distinct organizational entities to pool resources in order to effect change." One of the sources of coalition building in the case of the Gezi Park protests was the desire of groups to gain "legitimacy and political influence against more powerful enemies." (Hathaway and Meyer 1997). By framing popular urban grievances, the Gezi protesters aimed to unify and mobilize various opponents of the JDP government. Erdoğan's harsh and uncompromising reactions towards the protesters consolidated an alliance that was composed of groups who would not otherwise stand next to each other.

While the uprising included a multiplicity of groups and experiences that defy easy categorization, for the sake of simplicity I cluster the components of this coalition in two main categories. On the one hand, there were political groups that conventionally opposed the JDP. These traditional political opponents of the JDP included the hyper secular-nationalists (*ulusalcılar*), which were represented by groups such as the Workers Party or Turkish Youth Union, radical left organizations, such as Socialist Democratic Party, Turkish Communist Party, and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party. On the other hand, identity based groups, such as environmentalists, feminists, LGBT activists, Anticapitalist Muslims, and post-materialist university youth composed another layer of participants. It is these latter groups that I will focus on in this chapter, as I think their participation and demands demonstrate the novelty of the Gezi Park Protests in Turkish political life.

As one of the most marginalized groups of Turkey, LGBT activists were at the forefront of the protests. Disdain towards gays is officially voiced and illustrated by the statements of the former minister of women and family Aliye Kavaf, who has claimed that homosexuality is a disease and needs to be cured (Bildirici 2010). Various gay rights organizations participating in the protests came together and formed the "LGBT Blok." During the commune, a tent was opened under the banner of LGBT Blok in Gezi Park, demolition of which was a direct threat to the gay way of life as the park had been a clandestine gay-meeting point, where homosexual youth hooked-up (Zengin 2013). The tent, which was well attended during the Gezi Park Commune days, became the center of pro-gay rights speeches and numerous impromptu actions (Tarhan 2013). In addition, LGBT activists challenged the homophobic premises of Turkish political and public discourse by actively fighting against the police in the barricades and embracing slogans that increased their visibility, such as "Let's say we are queer! Get used to it, we are everywhere" (*Velev ki ibneyiz. Alışın heryerdeyiz*), "Love is to organize" (*Aşk örgütlenmektir*), "Lesbians exist" (*Lezbiyenler vardır*), "Transsexuals exist" (*Translar vardır*). LGBT groups also opened stands with their rainbow flags in the participatory forums conducted in public parks in the aftermath of the Gezi occupation and continued to raise awareness on LGBT issues, such as hate crimes committed towards gays. Many in Turkey became familiar with and publicly supported LGBT causes for the first time in their lives. This support culminated with the LGBT Pride Parade held on June 30, when over 30,000 gathered in Taksim to celebrate gay rights (*Cakiroglu*, 1 July 2013). By many accounts, the

gay rights movement was the most successful horizontally organized collective in the public square. As one LGBT activist put it:

> There is no center. No person. Everything [messages] goes through transfers and everyone does it. Entirely a horizontal organization. Gezi was the appropriate environment for us. The space where there is no hierarchy. This is exactly what we champion, and we can quickly adapt to this. (quoted in Iplikci 2013, p. 404)

The feminist movement was also at the forefront of the Gezi uprising. According to one survey, half of the participants in the Gezi commune were women (Kilic 2013, p. 114). Similar to the LGBT movement, feminists used the Gezi Park protests to challenge patriarchy and sexist stereotypes in the society. Feminists in Turkey have long criticized the patriarchal language of Erdoğan, who encourages three children for each woman and speaks of motherhood as the most significant role of women, as well as contesting the attempts of the current government to control their bodies. For instance, a year before the Gezi events, Erdoğan hastily declared in a meeting of JDP's women branches that he is against caesarean births, sees abortion as murder, and would prepare a legal proposal outlawing abortion. JDP's mostly male leadership supported the proposal, and some JDP parliamentarians went as far as claiming that abortion should be outlawed even in cases of rape (*Radikal*, 1 June, 2012). While a legal ban did not go into effect – because it drew criticism from most women, including pious women supporting the government (Çalışlar 2012) – a *de facto* ban on abortion is in place in public hospitals (*Posta*, 11 March, 2014). During the uprising, women carried signs, such as "JDP, hands off my body!" to criticize the government's attempt to control their bodies, but also conducted "Swear Workshops" to challenge and transform the sexist as well as homophobic language used by mostly-male protesters in their chants and graffiti (Tekay and Ustun 2013). Moreover, feminist caucuses formed in the participatory public forums organized events that raised awareness on women's experiences in Gezi and beyond, such as the use of sexual harassment by police against protesters, women's lives in the city, uneven division of labor in the family, and women's relation to the Kurdish question (Kavakli 2013, pp. 297-298).

Anti-capitalist Muslims, a group that weaves a radical, anti-systemic critique of neo-liberal capitalism with an Islamic worldview, was the only constituent group of the Gezi Park uprising that explicitly embraced a religious identity. The group was present in Gezi Park with its big banner "Property belongs to God, Capital Get Out" (*Mülk Allahındır, Sermaye Defol*) since May 29, two days before the protests evolved into a national uprising. According to members of the group, this slogan indicated that Gezi Park belonged to all Istanbul residents, to all God's creatures and animals, to all humanity, to nature's order, and therefore could not be converted to a mall that would serve the wealthy (Birelma 2013, pp. 67-68). During the protests, Anti-capitalist Muslims undertook Islamic practices of solidarity, such as distributing savory-rolls covered with sesame seed during Lailat Miraj (*Miraç Kandili*) to all protesters who in turn did not consume alcohol in the park out of respect for religious sensibilities that day. They raised a banner that

31

read "Holy nights are times of unification, equality and solidarity for nations" (*Kandiller halkların birlik, eşitlik, dayanışma günleridir*) and publicized the message of ethnic peace and socioeconomic solidarity through religious symbolism (ibid., p. 70). The group's simple potluck-type fastbreaking dinners, called earth tables (*yeryüzü sofraları*) in Taksim and other public forums, were attended by over 10,000 people (Dogan 2013, pp. 311-312). Secular protesters also formed protective shields around the Anti-capitalist Muslims who practiced the Friday prayer in the Taksim Square at the height of the uprising. The group's active and continuous participation played a significant role in countering criticism that the protests constituted a "secularist" attempt to undermine the "Islamic" JDP and were intolerant of religion (see section on framing contests below).

Lastly, it is important to mention that educated, urban, middle class youth constituted one of the main societal pillars of the uprising. According to one survey, 63.2 percent of the Gezi Park protesters were under 25 years of age, and 81 percent of the protesters were under 30 years old (Ete and Tastan 2013, p. 42). Similarly, 82.2 percent of the surveyed protesters in Gezi Park were either university students or graduates, and an additional 12 percent were high school students (ibid, p. 42). Among the non-student population, many of the protesters were white professionals, who came to Gezi Park from business plazas after work hours. Ronald Inglehart's theory of post-materialism and self-expression values can be helpful in illustrating the demands, values and concerns of this societal segment. According to Inglehart (2006), economic development transforms societal values, because generations who are born in relatively wealthy, high-technology circumstances take survival for granted, and move from "an emphasis on economic and physical security above-all, towards increasing emphasis on self-expression, subjective well-being, and quality of life concerns" (p. 116). Thus, in post-industrial settings, a generational value change occurs from trust in state authority to skepticism towards all forms of authority, and from an emphasis on economic development and 'law and order' to post-material concerns, such as environmentalism and participatory decision-making in everyday institutions (Ingleahrt 1995, 2006). According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005) these emergent self-expression values also promote the embrace of equal rights for the marginalized, such as homosexuals, the disabled and women (p. 47).

The demands raised in the Gezi Protests by the urban, educated, middle class youth were indicative of self-expression values, as they focused on the restriction of state authority, expansion of life style choices, democratic decision making in urban settings, critique of unlimited economic development, and protection of the environment. In that regard, they differed from the major claims of the Occupy Wall Street movement in the U.S. and the Indignados movement in Spain, which primarily focused on material concerns and demanded economic justice.

Some pundits and scholars labeled the Gezi protesters as apolitical youth because of their lack of engagement in conventional political practices. According to one survey half of the participants in Gezi Park stated that they had never participated in a protest before in their lifetime (Kilic 2013, p. 114). The common perception was that the members of the 90s generation emerged as a product of

Turkey's integration into the international capitalist system, and the members of this generation embraced a high-tech, individualistic, consumerist yuppie life style with no interest in political engagement. I argue that labeling the Gezi Park youth as "apolitical" is a misnomer, because rather than participating in formal political institutions most of these youngsters politicize everyday practices, and engage in a *politics of presence* which is expressed in "everyday cultural struggles and normative subversions" (Bayat 2010, p. 128). For instance, dozens of couples kissed in a subway station in Ankara to challenge the subway authorities' admonishment of a kissing couple (Kandiyoti 2013). Hence youth's engagement with politics cannot be solely understood as participation on a formal institutional level, but can be better captured if studied on a cultural-sociological level and in everyday practices of cultural subversion.

COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES

The protester groups constructed two major collective action frames to mobilize supporters. These frames diagnosed injustices which stemmed from societal grievances, assigned blame primarily to the Erdoğan government, and motivated participants to act. One of the main claims used by the protesters was that the neo-liberal urban development projects diminished residents' voices in their cities' living spaces. According to this frame – which can be broadly labeled as "right to the city" – the implementation of neo-liberal urban policies promoted developmentalist and consumerist values, while increasingly destroying the historical character of major metropolitan areas and shrinking livable spaces. In Istanbul, the destruction of the historical Emek movie theater, the construction of the hyper-modern Demirören mall in Istiklal street, the proliferation of shopping centers in metropolitan areas, plans for the construction of the third bridge crossing the Bosporus without consideration of the ecosystems in its surrounding, gentrification projects underway in inner-city neighborhoods, such as in Sulukule, and the plans to build a mall in place of Gezi Park were all cast as projects that disregarded citizen input, destroyed the historical character of the city, and harmed the environment. A number of slogans used in the protests pointed to the undemocratic nature of wild neo-liberal ventures. A line from Karl Marx, "capitalism will cut down the tree if it can't sell its shadow" became one of the most popular slogans. According to this frame, the implementation of neo-liberal projects by various municipalities without any citizen input has transformed the urban space, shrunk livable spaces, and therefore should be considered as "undemocratic." In these arguments, democracy is conceptualized as participatory democracy and not representative, elitist democracy. Since political elites have a symbiotic relation with economic elites, they carry out the interests of the capital by privatizing state land, and disregarding the interests of the urban residents. Accordingly, protesters demanded the creation of a truly democratic system, which will open channels for citizens to directly participate in local political decisions that immediately impact them. The participatory decision-making structures, such as people's assemblies created in the Gezi Commune and other public parks in the

aftermath of Gezi Park's evacuation, were attempts to create an alternative to elitist representative democracy and neo-liberal economics. Slogans, such as "JDP hands off my neighborhood," "these trees are not for sale," "capital get out, these streets are ours," and "we own this city" all framed neo-liberalism as an undemocratic and unjust system, and therefore motivated urbanites to take to the streets in order to regain their voice in their city's future.

It is important to note that there is a significant difference between the protests against neo-liberalism in the U.S. and Spain on the one hand, and in Turkey on the other hand. In the former two cases, protests erupted during economic crises, and neo-liberalism was primarily criticized for expanding the gap between rich and poor, destroying the safety-nets and making the poor vulnerable. In contrast, the uprising began in Turkey in a relative period of affluence, when GDP per capita rose 50 percent in real terms in the past ten years under JDP governments (*The Economist*, 29 March 2014). However, the protests in Istanbul showed that neo-liberalism, even in contexts where it is deemed economically successful, created social, spatial and cultural effects that are harmful and unfair.

A second master-frame that was used by the protesters to mobilize support was "fight against authoritarianism."[1] One of the biggest catalysts for the initial popular mobilization was the harsh police force used to dissipate the protesters in Gezi Park. An unarmed girl with a red dress being sprayed with tear gas by a policeman from very close range became one of the iconic pictures of the protests. Similar photos of excessive police force against unarmed protesters were rapidly disseminated throughout social media and were used as a sign of the government's lack of tolerance towards legitimate societal demands. In a few days, words like TOMA (vehicle to intervene in societal incidents), tear canisters, and pepper gas became part of the public debate.

Another issue that was used by the protesters to show the government's increasing authoritarianism was the complacency of major mainstream media channels. In addition to the pro-government networks, the mainstream TV channels, such as CNNTURK, NTV, and HaberTurk largely ignored the protests in their broadcasts. One of the infamous incidents was the broadcasting of a penguin documentary on CNNTURK on May 31 and June 1 at the height of the uprising. Similarly, an interview aired by a prominent journalist with Erdoğan on HaberTurk on June 2 essentially turned into government propaganda, when the journalist did not challenge any of Erdoğan's assertions on the protests. Doğuş Media Group closed down NTV Tarih, a reputable history magazine, and fired all its staff in order not to publish the magazine's most current issue that documented the Gezi uprising.

The silence of the mainstream press is linked to the corporate structure of the media and the symbiotic relations of the media bosses with the government. As the owners of these media corporations also own shares in different economic sectors and depend on government contracts, the government pressures these media bosses to censor critical editorial content (Oktem 2013). Various JDP critics were fired and lost their newspaper columns due to the government's active pressure on media outlets to discipline their personnel in previous years (Temelkuran 2012;

Ozdemir 2012). The government also did not hold back from punishing media groups that would not toe the government line. For instance, after the Doğan media group, one of the biggest media conglomerates, published reports on JDP's alleged ties to a religious charity organization that faced trial for fraud in Germany, it was charged with a tax-evasion case, and fined $2.5 billion, which was later dropped to $600 million (Filkins 2012). The Doğan group had to sell some of its assets, including the daily *Milliyet* in 2011, to pay the fine (Ognianova 2012, 3). In order to avoid such consequences, many newspaper editors and journalists implement self-censorship.

The mainstream media's lack of independence from the government and their minimal coverage of the uprisings were decried by the protesters with various slogans and graffiti, such as "Media for sale", "Timid Media", "Television did not show it, but we were here", "Turn off the TV and go onto the street for freedom" (Ozkoray 2013).

Another theme that was included under the "fight against authoritarianism" frame was the demand to increase the extent of individual liberties. Many protesters voiced their concerns about losing individual freedoms. As discussed above, women protesters saw Erdoğan's attempts to outlaw abortion and his constant advice to women to bear at least three children as an intrusion on their bodily freedoms. LGBT people saw the homophobic language used by different JDP politicians as a threat to the free expression of their sexual identity. The youth voiced their discontent about recent laws that prohibited the selling and consumption of alcohol in specific hours and places, and moralistic policies implemented by local authorities, such as chastising publicly kissing couples. Unsurprisingly, 18.9 percent of the protesters surveyed by Genar in Gezi Park cited the lack of freedoms as the most significant problem in the country (cited in Ete and Tastan 2013, p. 61). The restriction of individual freedoms is seen by many as a result of the JDP government's authoritarian tendencies. The remarks of a 23 year-old protester are instructive:

> Actually, Gezi Park was the explosion of everything that we kept to ourselves. [It was] their clarification for us. Gezi Park events were different, we used to discuss the alcohol issue, the abortion issue, but something like this could not happen. Gezi became the agenda, when it was voiced together, as a common reaction …. The fog that covered each of these issues dissolved, everything is very clear now. This problem exists, in Turkey we can say that this problem exists …. (cited in Iplikci 2013, p. 68)

This above statement shows how grievances existed on individual or group levels before the Gezi uprising among the youth. However, the protester claims that the protests highlighted the interrelation between these grievances, made their presence clear, and created a common agenda for action. Hence, these separate individual liberty concerns were framed as a collective problem that needs to be solved through popular mobilization, and blame is attributed to increasing authoritarianism.

Due to the prevalence of "fight against authoritarianism" frame among the protesters, some pundits inaccurately dubbed the Gezi Park Protests as the "Turkish Spring" highlighting similarities between Arab uprisings and the Turkish uprising. While it is true that the JDP government became increasingly authoritarian especially after its third term, it is important to note that it has always been elected through competitive elections and still has a very broad popular base. Therefore, the Turkish protesters' main demand was not the ousting of then PM Erdoğan, as "*irhal*" (get out in Arabic) and "*degage*" (get out in French) were the rallying cries in Egypt and Tunisia for aging dictators. Rather, they highlighted the authoritarian policies of a popular government, which embraced an illiberal, majoritarian understanding of democracy and became increasingly restrictive of minority life styles, and demanded its democratization.

NEW REPERTOIRES OF CONTENTION

In order to challenge the hegemony of the JDP government, the protesters invented new repertoires of contention. Political humor provided the youth with discursive power to challenge the government in a language over which the former had the upper hand. In their own words, young protesters used 'excessive wit' against the authorities, who used excessive physical force against them. Humor is part of a culture of fun, which is "a metaphor for the expression of individuality, spontaneity, and lightness in which joy is the central element" (Bayat 2010, p. 138). Political humor expressed in public has subversive and dissenting aspects and poses a challenge to the moral hegemony of the authorities (ibid). The protesters ridiculed police brutality, the government's restrictive policies, and the mainstream media's silence with creative jokes. The protesters adopted the penguin as one of the uprising's symbols to mock the silence of the mainstream media. Similarly, when the prime minister called them looters (*çapulcu*) (more below), the protesters quickly appropriated the word and called themselves *çapulcular* to create an alternative discourse and camaraderie among themselves. A graffiti that read "Are you sure you'd like to have three children like us?" mocked the prime minister's constant advice to women to bear at least three children. Another made fun of the alcohol restrictions: "You prohibited alcohol, and the people got sober!"

In addition to utilizing humor, protesters invented new strategies of civil disobedience to attract public attention and capture the moral high ground in their struggle against the government. One of the most successful acts of civil disobedience was the protest dubbed "standing man" (*duran adam*) initiated by a young performance artist two days after the Gezi Park was evacuated by the police. Erdem Gündüz stood still in the middle of Taksim Square for eight hours facing the now unused opera house which has been a point of contention between the arts community and the government. During this defiant act he was joined by more protesters, and before he ended his stunt, the hashtag #duranadam where his pictures and act of passive resistance was shared became the most popular worldwide topic on Twitter (Tufekci 2013b). In the following days, silently standing protesters popped up in different parts of Turkey in solitude or in groups

showing their discontent with the government's policy of evacuating Gezi Park, disregarding their democratic demands, and demonizing their cause. The "standing men and women" in the initial group were detained and then released. However, the authorities soon realized the absurdity of detaining individuals for 'standing' and could not decide exactly how to deal with this new form of protest. This reveals how state institutions that have a monopoly on legitimate use of physical force while equipped to deal with violence, struggle to counter simple tactics of passive resistance.

COUNTERFRAMES

Since the suppression of the mainly unarmed protesters with riot gear, tear gas and pepper spray was not sufficient to quell the uprising, the government used discursive tactics to discredit and vilify the protesters. Erdoğan was the most vociferous actor in framing the protesters. The government and its allies constructed three main counterframes to the uprising: The protesters have been depicted as a security threat, as enemies of religion, and as tools of an international conspiracy.

The most immediate response of the government was to label the protesters as looters and vandals, who pose a threat to the stability of small businesses and increase criminal activity. While in the initial stages, most protests were non-violent, the government and the pro-government media were quick to highlight episodes that contained acts of violence, such as stone-throwing and vandalism. The government prepared a special CD, which collated all acts of disturbance and distributed it to the public and to foreign diplomats. Moreover, prominent politicians repeated these claims. For instance, the then minister of European Union Affairs Egemen Bağış said immediately after the evacuation of Gezi Park by the police, that anyone who entered Taksim Square would be treated as a terrorist (*Radikal*, 16 June 2013). This framing resonated with constituents for whom "law and order" issues are of prime importance.

Second, the government deliberately depicted the protesters as enemies of religion. Two events have been circulated widely by pro-government circles, and above all by Erdoğan. On June 3, around a hundred protesters who were injured in the events took refuge in a mosque in Istanbul which was quickly transformed into a make-shift clinic (*Radikal*, 3 June 2013). After the injured protesters spent the night there, the pro-government media started to circulate stories about alcohol consumption in the mosque. Another story surfaced, when a veiled woman claimed that she was attacked with her 3-month old baby by seventy half-naked men and assaulted because of her veil.[2] The prime minister continuously repeated these two stories and tied them to Gezi Park indicating that the protesters were enemies of religion. The aim of this framing was to politicize the religious-secular cleavage which has shaped Turkish politics in the 1990s and 2000s. By appealing to the religious sensibilities and fears of conservative segments in Turkish society and reminding them of the wrongs committed against them by secularist actors in the

recent past, the government successfully framed the Gezi Park protests as a secularist attack against religious values.

Last, the government aimed to discredit the protesters in the eyes of the public by using conspiracy theories. The JDP politicians and the pro-government media circulated stories about how dark international forces, such as a bogus financial lobby dubbed 'the interest lobby,' Israel, or the CIA aimed to weaken the government by creating chaos in Turkey. By creating a link between the protests and attempts of international forces to influence Turkish politics, these frames tried to cast the protesters as a non-native and anti-democratic force.

By using these three frames, the government aimed to amplify the stereotypic views Islamist and traditionally center-right constituents had against secular antagonists. Personified as vandals, enemies of religion and tools of international conspiracies, the protesters were seen as outside of the "normative order and…the span of sympathy" (Snow et al. 1986, p. 470). These counterframes were also circulated to millions in "respect to national will rallies" organized by the JDP all over Turkey which were used as a means of counter-mobilization.

SOCIAL MEDIA AS NETWORKS OF ORGANIZATION AND COMMUNICATION

In common with other youth-led global protests, such as the Iranian Green Movement, the Egyptian uprising, and Occupy Wall Street, social media played a central role in the Gezi Park protests. The social media served two major functions in the protests. In the absence of reliable coverage by the mainstream TV channels, the digital media became the main source to spread information on the uprising to protesters and bystanders. The graffiti that read "The revolution will not be televised, but it will be tweeted" became one of the mottos of the protesters indicating the poverty of conventional media and the power of digital media. By recording events on the streets with their smart phones, posting them online, and sharing them with larger networks, many protesters were transformed from passive receptors of news to creators of information, and became practitioners of "citizen journalism" (*vatandaş gazeteciliği*).

Secondly, social media, particularly Twitter and Facebook, became effective means to create communication between protesters, coordinate activities, provide logistics, disseminate collective action frames to larger audiences and attract international public opinion. The hashtag #direngezipark (#resistgezipark) was used in 950,000 tweets during the uprising's first day, 1.8 million times in the uprising's first three days, and more than 4 million times in the first eleven days (Tucker 2013a, 2013b). Put in perspective, the main hashtag of the Egyptian uprising, #jan25, was used in less than a million tweets during the entire eighteen days of the Egyptian uprising (Tucker 2013b). Also, it is notable that ninety percent of the tweets were tweeted by users within Turkey and half by those in Istanbul (ibid). This should not come as a surprise as Turkey is a major hub of social media. 39.3 percent of Turks were Facebook users as of May 2013, which is above the average of the OECD countries, and there are about 9.6 million Twitter users in the country, which makes it the eighth country in the world with the

greatest number of Twitter users (Irak 2013, p. 91; Aymaz 2013, p. 236; Hubbard 2013).

In the absence of strong formal organizations, social media proved to be an invaluable resource for the protesters to mobilize vast numbers of citizens. Istanbulites started to flock to Taksim square, after images of police brutality were publicized through social media. Similarly, social media proved to be key in organizing the walk of the protesters from the Anatolian side of the city to Taksim square via the Bosphorus bridge, which became a symbol of the protesters' resilience. In addition, social media was extensively used for logistics: Food, medicine, cleaning products, legal advice and other necessities were provided to the residents of the Gezi commune as well as to protesters elsewhere after lists were circulated on Twitter and Facebook.

On the third day of the protests, Erdoğan called the social media a menace showing that this form of digital mobilization caught the government off guard. However, supporters of the government were quick to mobilize through social media as well. They led campaigns that aimed to show support for the prime minister by circulating images of government rallies and discredit the protesters and international media sympathetic to the uprising. That some of those campaign hashtags became international trending topics on twitter does not only show the extent of digital media's penetration in Turkey, but also demonstrates that social media has the potential to be a tool of countermobilization in the hands of governmental allies.

Lastly, it is important to mention that online tools for mobilization have certain limitations in capacity building. While digital media enabled the protesters to reach millions of individuals in a very short period of time and sustain mass support for the occupation for weeks, the digital nature of mobilization impeded the building of representational capacity, which requires long-term efforts of movement building (Tufekci 2013a, 2014). For instance, when the government wanted to negotiate with the protesters, it was not clear who could appropriately represent the protest movement.

CONCLUSION

The Gezi Park uprising represented a novel understanding of politics in Turkey. The mostly young, urban and educated protesters who were organized horizontally blurred the rigid ideological distinctions of the Turkish political spectrum, revealed the crisis of conventional politics, asserted their particularistic identity claims, and invented new repertoires of contention, such as political humor and passive resistance in their struggle against the government. Two master frames created by the protesters addressed popular grievances stemming from neo-liberal urban development projects, diminishing residents' voices in their cities' living spaces and the governing JDP's increasing authoritarianism. By framing popular urban grievances, the protesters unified diverse groups against a common powerful antagonist.

One of the main questions asked about the Gezi Park uprising is what the outcome of this episode of contention was. In the immediate term, the protest movement succeeded to prevent the demolition of Gezi Park. However, surveys conducted immediately after Gezi showed that public support for the government did not fall, but even increased. The local elections of 30 March 2014, in which the governing JDP received around forty-three percent of the vote and the current presidential elections which Erdoğan won in the first round, show that the JDP's popular base is very much intact. It is important to emphasize that while "right to the city" and "fight against authoritarianism" frames resonated with post-materialist youth and middle class urban residents' grievances they do not have the same appeal for the rural migrants and urban poor who constitute one of the main pillars of the government in metropolitan areas. These groups prioritize bread and butter issues and do not see the proliferation of malls in cities or limitations on alcohol use as social problems. The government also solidified its base by engaging in framing contests with the protesters and casting them as a threat to domestic peace and stability. This framing appealed to small shopkeepers as well as significant economic actors who would lose from political or economic instability.

The lack of an immediate effect on electoral politics does not mean however that the protests failed. After all, the protesters did voice a disapproval of conventional, formal political structures. I argue that the protesters contributed to grassroots democratization by making many particularistic claims visible and publicly contesting patriarchal, homophobic, moralistic, ideological, and neo-liberal premises imposed on them. The uprising also created a new political awareness among the younger protesters, dubbed the 90s generation. These youngsters who have been challenging authoritarian tendencies through everyday practices of cultural subversion became more cognizant of the political salience of their actions. The legacy of the protests will depend on the future success of these groups in building grassroots power, in making alliances with different sectors of the society and in spreading the new language of politics to wider audiences.

REFERENCES

Aymaz, Göksel. (2013). "Gezi sürecinde medya" ["Media during Gezi Process"]. In Nuray Sancar, ed., *Sıcak Haziran: sonraki direnişe mektup* [*Hot June: Letter to Next Resistance*] (pp. 231-238). Istanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın.

Bayat, Asef. (2010). *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Benford, Robert D. (1993). "Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement." *Social Forces*, *71*(3), 677-701.

Benford, Robert D. & David A. Snow. (2000). "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology*, *26*, 611-639.

"Bezmi Alem Valide Sultan Camisi revire döndü." ["Bezmi Alem Valide Sultan Mosque turned into a clinic"] (2013). *Radikal*, June 3. Available online at: http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/ bezmi_alem_valide_sultan_camisi_revire_dondu-1136008

Bildirici, Faruk. (2010). "Eşcinsellik Hastalıktır Tedavi Edilmeli" ["Homosexuality Is a Sickness. It Needs to Be Cured"]. *Hürriyet*, March 7.

Birelma, Alpkan. (2013). "Antikapitalist Müslümanlar grubu üyeleriyle söyleşi: 'Bizim yapmak istediğimiz, mahalleler arasında geçişkenliği sağlamak'" ["Interview with Members of the Group Anticapitalist Muslims: 'What We Try to Do Is to Enable the Penetration between Neighborhoods'"]. *Birikim*, *293*, 61-76.

Cakiroglu, Sahin. (2013). "Direnişin En Renklisi: Yasak ne Ayol?" ["Most Colorful Resistance: What Is a Ban Dear?]" *Radikal*, July 1.

Çalışlar, Oral. (2012). "Uludere ve kürtaj: İslami kesimin muhalif kadınları" ["Uludere and Abortion: Opposing Women of the Islamic Sector"]. *Radikal*, June 5.

Castells, Manuel. (2012). *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

della Porta, Donatella, & Mario Diani. (2006). *Social Movements: An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Doğan, Sedat. (2013). "Mülk Allahındır sermaye defol" ["Property Belongs to God Capital Get out"]. In Nuray Sancar, ed., *Sıcak Haziran: sonraki direnişe mektup* [*Hot June: Letter to Next Resistance*] (pp. 309-312). Istanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın.

"Egemen Bağış: Taksim'e çıkan terörist muamelesi görür" ["Egemen Bağış: Anyone Who Steps in Taksim Is Treated as a Terrorist"]. (2013). *Radikal*, June 16. Available online at: http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/egemen_bagis_taksime_cikan_terorist_muamelesi_gorur-1137822

Filkins, Dexter. (2012). "The Deep State." *The New Yorker*, March 12.

Gamson, William A. (1992). *Talking Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gamson, William A. (2004). "Bystanders, Public Opinion, and the Media." In David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, & Hanspeter Kriesti, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (pp. 242-261). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

"Gizli kürtaj yasağı mi başladı?" ["Did a Secret Ban on Abortion Start?"]. (2014). *Posta*, March 11.

Hatem, Ete, & Coşkun Taştan. (2013). *Kurgu ile Gerçeklik Arasında Gezi Eylemleri* [*Gezi Movement between Construction and Reality*] Ankara: SETA Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı Yayınları [SETA Politics, Economics and Society Research Foundation Publishing].

Hathaway, Will, & David S. Meyer. (1997). "Competition and Cooperation in Movement Coalitions: Lobbying for Peace in the 1980s." In Thomas R. Rochon & David S. Meyer, eds., *Coalitions and Political Movements: The Lessons of Nuclear Freeze* (pp. 61-80). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Hubbard, Amy. (2013). "What Country Has Highest Number of Active Twitter Users?" *Los Angeles Times*, November 21.

Inglehart, Ronald. (1995). "Changing Values, Economic Development and Political Change." *International Social Science Journal*, *145*, 379-403.

Inglehart, Ronald, & Christian Welzel. (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Inglehart, Ronald. (2006). "Mapping Global Values." *Comparative Sociology*, *5*(2-3), 115-136.

İplikçi, Müge. (2013). *Biz Orada Mutluyduk: Gezi Parkı Direnişindeki Gençler Anlatıyor* [*We Were Happy There: Youngsters in Gezi Park Resistance Tell*]. Istanbul: Doğan Kitap.

Irak, Dağhan. (2013). "Sosyal medya direnişin neresinde?" ["What Is the Place of Social Media in the Resistance?"] In Nuray Sancar, ed., *Sıcak Haziran: sonraki direnişe mektup* [*Hot June: Letter to Next Resistance*] (pp. 91-96). Istanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın.

Johnston Hank, Enrique Larana, & Joseph R. Gusfield. (1994). "Identities, Grievances, and New Social Movements." In Enrique Larana & Hank Johnston, eds., *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity* (pp. 3-35). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Kavaklı, Banu. (2013). "Direnişin kadın hali" ["The Female Condition of the Resistance"]. In Nuray Sencer, ed., *Sıcak Haziran sonraki: direnişe mektup* [*Hot June: Letter to Next Resistance*] (pp. 293-300). Istanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın.

Kandiyoti, Deniz. (2014). "Contesting Patriarchy-as-Governance: Lessons from Youth-Led Activism." *Open Democracy*, March 7. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/deniz-kandiyoti/contesting-patriarchy-as-governance-lessons-from-youth-led-activism

Kılıç Özlem. (2013). *Türkiye'nin Gezi'si: Gezi'ye bir de Her Açıdan Bakın* [*Turkey's Gezi: Have a Look at Gezi from Every Angle*]. Istanbul: Postiga Yayınları.

Levi, Margaret, & Gillian Murphy. (2006). "Coalitions of Contention." *Political Studies, 54*, 651-667.

McAdam Doug, John McCarthy, & Mayer N. Zald. (1996). "Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes – Toward a Synthetic Comparative Perspective on Social Movements." In Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, & Mayer N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (pp. 1-20). New York: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, & Charles Tilly. (2001). *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Melucci, Alberto. (1989). *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Melucci, Alberto. (1996). *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Meyer, David. S. (2004). "Protest and Political Opportunities." *Annual Review of Sociology*, *30*, 125-145.

Noakes, John A. (2005). "Official Frames in Social Movement Theory: The FBI, HUAC, and the Communist Threat in Hollywood." In Hank Johnston & John. A. Noakes, eds., *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (pp. 89-112). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Noakes, John A., & Hank Johnston. (2005). "Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a Perspective." In Hank Johnston & John. A. Noakes, eds., *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (pp. 1-29). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Offe. Claus. (1987). "Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics: Social Movements Since the 1960s." In Charles Maier, ed., *Changing Boundaries of the Political* (pp. 63-106). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ognianova, Nina. (2012). *Turkey's Press Freedom Crisis: The Dark Days of Jailing Journalists and Criminalizing Dissent*. New York: United Book Press.

Oktem, Kerem. (2013). "Why Turkey's Mainstream Media Chose to Show Penguins Rather Than Protests." *The Guardian*, June 9.

Özdemir, Cüneyt. (2012). "Nuray Mert'in gazetede basılmayan yazısı anlatıyor" ["Nuray Mert's Piece That Is Not Published in the Newspaper Tells"]. *Radikal,* February 21.

Özkoray, Imre. (2013). "Muhteşem Gezi: Sloganlar-Duvar Yazıları-Pankartlar" ["Fabulous Gezi: Chants-Graffitis-Banners"]. In Nurten Özkoray & Erol Özkoray, eds., *Bireyselleşme ve Demokrasi: Gezi Fenomeni* [*Individualization and Democracy: The Gezi Phenomenon*] (pp. 217-246). Istanbul: İdea Politika Yayınları.

Ross, Howard. (1997). "Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis." In Mark Lichbach & Alan Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (pp. 134-161). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Snow, David. A., & Robert. D. Benford (1988). "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization." *International Social Movement Research*, *1*, 197-217.

Snow, David A., & Robert. D. Benford (2005). "Clarifying the Relationship between Framing and Ideology." In Hank Johnston & John. A. Noakes, eds., *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (pp. 205-212). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Snow, David et al. (1986). "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation" *American Sociological Review*, *51*(4), 464-481.

Tarhan, Mehmet. (2013). "LGBT hareketi ve haziran direnişi" ["LGBT Movement and the June Resistance"]. In Nuray Sencer, ed., *Sıcak Haziran: sonraki direnişe mektup* [*Hot June: Letter to Next Resistance*] (pp. 301-308). Istanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın.

Tarrow, Sidney. (2011). *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Tecavüze uğrayan da kürtaj yaptırmamalı" ["The One Who Is Raped Also Should Not Have an Abortion"]. (2012). *Radikal*, June 1.

Tekay, Cihan, & Zeyno Ustun. (2013). *A Short History of Feminism in Turkey and Feminist Resistance in Gezi*. Paper presented at the *Talk Turkey Conference: Life since Gezi*, New York City, 4-5 October 2013.

Temelkuran, Ece. (2012). "Turkish Journalists Are Very Frightened – But We Must Fight This Intimidation." *The Guardian*, January 27.

"The Battle for Turkey's Future." (2014). *The Economist*, March 29.

Tucker, Joshua. (2013a). "Extensive Use of Social Media in the Absence of Traditional Media by Turks in Turkish in Taksim Square Protests." *The Monkey Cage*, June 1. Available online at: http://themonkeycage.org/2013/06/01/a-breakout-role-for-twitter-extensive-use-of-social-media-in-the-absence-of-traditional-media-by-turks-in-turkish-in-taksim-square-protests/

Tucker, Joshua. (2013b). "Extensive Use of Social Media Continues Over First Weekend." *The Monkey Cage*, June 3. Available online at: http://smapp.nyu.edu/reports/turkey_data_report.pdf

Tufekci, Zeynep. (2013a). "Networked Politics from Tahrir to Taksim: Is There a Social Media-fueled Protest Style?" *dmlcentral Digital Media + Learning: The Power of Participation*, June 3. Available online at: http://dmlcentral.net/blog/zeynep-tufekci/networked-politics-tahrir-taksim-there-social-media-fueled-protest-style

Tufekci, Zeynep. (2013b). "Be Quiet and Don't Move So You Can Be Heard." *dmlcentral Digital Media + Learning: The Power of Participation*, June 20. Available online at: http://dmlcentral.net/blog/zeynep-tufekci/be-quiet-and-don%E2%80%99t-move-so-you-can-be-heard

Tufekci, Zeynep. (2014). "Capabilities of Movements and Affordances of Digital Media: Paradoxes of Empowerment." *dmlcentral Digital Media + Learning: The Power of Participation*, January 9. Available online at: http://dmlcentral.net/blog/zeynep-tufekci/capabilities-movements-and-affordances-digital-media-paradoxes-empowerment

Williams, Rhys H. (2004). "The Cultural Context of Collective Action: Constraints, Opportunities, and the Symbolic Life of Social Movements." In David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, & Hanspeter Kriesti, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (pp. 91-115). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Zald, Mayer N. (1996). "Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing." In Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, & Mayer N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (pp. 261-274). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zengin Aslı. (2013). "What is Queer about Gezi." *Fieldsights-Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology Online*, October 31. Available online at: http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/407-what-is-queer-about-gezi

Zuo, Jiping, & Robert D. Benford. (1995). "Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement." *The Sociological Quarterly*, *36*(1), 131-156.

NOTES

1. Some protesters called it dictatorship or fascism.
2. Video footage that surfaced months after the incident showed that the assault either did not take place or was at best an over exaggeration.

SAHAR KHAMIS AND NADA ALWADI

3. CYBERACTIVISM AND ONGOING POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

The Case of Bahrain

INTRODUCTION

The ongoing political resistance and civic engagement movements that have been sweeping the Arab world since 2011, and came to be widely referred to as the "Arab Spring" or "Arab Awakening," have empowered large segments of the region's populations across different countries. We argue that the assumption that the Gulf region, unlike other Arab spring countries, is going to remain politically stagnant and largely immune from this sweeping tide of socio-political change, due to factors such as economic affluence, oil revenues, small and homogeneous populations, robust security forces, and support from foreign superpowers, is inaccurate and faulty. In fact, Jane Kinninmont, a Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House, notes that "The economic process of telecoms liberalization has facilitated a surge in social media technologies that are having a profound impact on the distribution of information and of power over communications, with a dramatic impact on political, religious and cultural debate. This is a prime example of the ways in which economic and demographic change can lead to social and political changes in the dynamic and rapidly evolving societies of the Gulf" (2013).

The most obvious example for this trend is Bahrain, a small gulf island that has been witnessing a popular movement that has advocated on behalf of political and democratic transformation since February 2011. Taking into account the significant impact that the media, in general, and social media, in particular, have played in titling the balance in favor of democratic transition and popular revolt in the Arab region (Khamis and Vaughn 2011), it becomes especially important to analyze the media landscape in the country, with a special focus on the growing role of social media, and its many implications for influencing the country's political landscape. Therefore, in a country like Bahrain, where transformation is yet to be visible in the political arena but has been prevalent through the content of many social media platforms, it becomes especially important to examine the role that social media may have played in paving the way for political change and determining whether they can be considered instruments for inspiring actual change on the ground, or have simply mirrored this change.

In this chapter, we will provide a deep examination of the political content of social media in Bahrain, with the aim of explaining ongoing political trends while

predicting future ones. We thus provide a transparent picture of the country's political and media landscapes, describing the media landscape in Bahrain before and after the political events of February 2011, while examining how far change in the media mirrors or reflects change in the political landscape. This chapter will also discuss whether political discussions and debates are actually encouraged by social media in Bahrain, and how much of a synergy exists between social and traditional media with regard to political discussion. The final part of this paper will examine the role played by social media in helping Bahraini women to shape and reflect their political leadership.

"CYBERACTIVISM" AND THE "ARAB SPRING"

New media and social media, in particular, played a critical role in triggering the wave of revolt and upheaval that has been sweeping the Arab world since 2011. In their article "Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution," Khamis and Vaughn (2011) argue that the role of new media before, during, and after the Egyptian revolution was especially important in three intertwined ways, namely: enabling cyberactivism, which was a major trigger for street activism; encouraging civic engagement, through aiding the mobilization and organization of protests and other forms of political expression; and promoting a new form of citizen journalism, which provides a platform for ordinary citizens to express themselves and document their own versions of reality.

This is true in many Arab countries, including Bahrain, a small country with a large Internet population. While Bahrain has witnessed a great surge in social media usage that both inspired and paralleled political activism, it has also witnessed governmental efforts to resist and halt this activism, both on the ground and online. There are many cases where the government has shut down Internet websites, blogs and Twitter accounts, and has arrested political opponents who were also social media activists. As a result, Bahrain was added to the Reporters Without Borders list of "Enemies of the Internet in 2012" (Reporters Without Borders 2012b) after a number of journalists, bloggers and social media users were arrested and tortured by the authorities in power. According to this report, the online activists' community in Bahrain is very well organized, but closely watched by the government. The report indicates that,

> Because of Internet filtering, a lot of online content is in theory inaccessible to the general public. The filtering obviously targets 'pornographic' content, but also, and above all, political and religious opinions that are at variance with the regime. Content about the ruling family, the government, and the opposition is strictly regulated, although there are ways to circumvent the filtering. (Reporters Without Borders 2012b)

The effective role that new media played in both the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, has broad implications for repressive states in the Arab region and, indeed, throughout the world. Given the demographic, economic, and political conditions in the broader Middle East region, uprisings and political movements

are likely to continue to ferment. Howard presciently, given the Egyptian example, noted that nations with significant Muslim populations show "modular political phenomena", i.e., "political action based in significant part on the emulation of successful examples from others," that "successful democratization strategies in particular countries are transported into the collective action strategies of movements in other countries," and that "democratization movements appear to be learning to use information technologies from each other, linking up to share experiences and transporting successful organizational strategies" (2011, pp. 20-21). The true implications of the current wave of political upheaval in the Arab world, and the extent to which it will be influenced by social media, remain to be seen over the course of the coming years. As Jeffrey Ghannam (2011) states in a report to the Center for International Media Assistance, "Social networking has changed expectations of freedom of expression and association to the degree that individual and collective capacities to communicate, mobilize, and gain technical knowledge are expected to lead to even greater voice, political influence, and participation over the next 10 to 20 years."

THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN BAHRAIN BEFORE AND AFTER 2011

It is evident that the year 2011 was a major turning point for the media and freedom of expression in Bahrain. In this year Bahrain dropped 29 places in the *Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index* rankings, to be in the 173rd position among 179 countries. The organization blamed the drop on "its relentless crackdown on pro-democracy movements, its trials of human rights defenders and its suppression of all space for freedom" (Reporters Without Borders 2012a). The international advocacy group Freedom House started classifying its press status as "Not Free" as of 2011 and this status has not improved since then. Previously Bahrain used to be classified in the same index as "partly free" before the political crisis in 2011, a status that whose existence was shared in the Gulf region only with Kuwait (Freedom House 2011). Thus, it was not a surprise to witness a large shift in the Bahraini media landscape in recent years, where new and social media have been playing a bigger role than ever, serving as channels that facilitate the exchange information, news and ideas about the political future and the nature of democratic transition within the Gulf Island. New and social media are providing individuals in Bahrain with the space to freely express their views at a time where the traditional media is more controlled than ever.

Given the regulatory environment, most of the media outlets in Bahrain have always been either government-owned or have presented government viewpoints. Local radio and television outlets are government owned and controlled. Radio broadcasting in the country dates back to 1940, while television broadcasting started in 1973. Bahrain television was set up in 1975, as the number of official television channels eventually increased to six, all controlled and funded by the Ministry of Information. In addition, the Bahrain News Agency was inaugurated in 1976 under the name "Al-Khaleej News Agency," also to be administrated by the Ministry of Information (now titled the Information Affairs Authority).

Due to legal constraints, private television and radio stations were generally not allowed in Bahrain. The media in Bahrain is organized only according to regulations within the 2002 Law No. 47 that address the organization of the press, printing and publishing. While this law recognizes the instruments, devices and programs used to transfer words, figures, photos or films, it lacks sufficient articles that clearly enunciate the roles and responsibilities of the radio and television media. For example, the Information Affairs Authority has never allowed any private television channel to transmit programming except for channel Al-Arab, which began broadcasting from Bahrain in 2012. This channel, owned by Saudi businessman, Prince Al-Walid bin Talal Al Saud, technically has been operating under an illegal license, because of a lack of legislation that regulates audio-visual media in the country. The channel was forced to close in early 2015 after one day of broadcasting, upon airing an interview with a Bahraini opposition figure.

While newspapers are generally semi-privately owned in Bahrain, four out of the five main Arabic newspapers in the country are owned or affiliated directly or indirectly with members of the ruling family. Those newspapers, Akhbar al-Khaleej, Al-Ayam, Al-Watan, and Al-Bilad, do not offer oppositional views. The only exception is the daily newspaper Al-Wasat, known to be the only critical voice in the Bahraini press. Print journalism in Bahrain was relatively independent before the severe political crisis in 2011. The economic prosperity and political openness that accompanied the political reform initiative leading up to the Bahrain National Charter in 2001 gave license to starting new newspapers and press freedom enjoyed its golden era. Newspapers started to compete over investigative stories and attract competent journalists. By 2005, the golden age began to fade away, and the Bahraini press started to suffer from local and regional political tension with more restrictions enacted by the government. Bahrain was swept up in the global financial crisis in 2008, and the press also suffered economically. Government advertising became the only source of income for most newspapers after the decline of private advertising, and this shift was reflected in the coverage of these newspapers, which started to become less critical and more biased in favor of the government. This was the case for most newspapers in Bahrain, except for two independent publications: Al-Waqt, which was forced to shut down in 2009, and Al-Wasat, which faced a difficult political situation after being accused by the Information Affairs Authority of fabricating news in its coverage of the 2011 uprising (Bahrain Press Association 2014).

While traditional media in Bahrain were suffering from a lack of independence as well as the economic challenges threatening their survival, new media were on the rise, assisted by the fact that Bahrain has one of the best levels of Internet coverage in the Middle East. With an Internet penetration rate of 77%, most Bahrainis are connected to the Internet, connection speeds are fairly good (ranging from 512k to more than 20M, according to the region) and the number of Internet Service Providers is very high for the size of the population (23 ISPs for 1.25 million inhabitants). Batelco, owned and operated by a member in the ruling family, is the most important of the ISPs.

However, legal constraints were also an obstacle for new media, as news websites needed to obtain licenses from the Information Affairs Authority in order to operate and online censorship has always been commonly practiced by the Authority with online public forums and websites having often been blocked several times after posting any critical political discussions. In an interview for this chapter on May 5, 2014, prominent online activist Ali Abdulemam said that the rise of online media usage as a source of information in Bahrain started fifteen years ago. He argued that freedom that was available online attracted growing numbers of Bahrainis to join online public discussion forums and debates. According to him,

> Since the year 2007, the online space started to have an impact on the ground; I personally noticed how people started discussing issues, organizing events, and then covering these events online, all while traditional media was absent; it was amazing to watch how people learned to write their own stories from their point of view, and create their own online media platform to publicize it.

Inspired by the so-called "Arab Spring," Bahrain witnessed major popular protests on Feb 14, 2011 when tens of thousands of Bahrainis joined protests in their capital, Manama, demanding political reform and a democratic transition. The use of social media was essential in organizing this movement and mobilizing people to join it. The discussion about the movement first started on an online popular public forum called "Bahrain Online," where the idea of organizing protests on February 14 was first introduced. As political events escalated during February and March, social media, particularly Twitter and Facebook, became the main source of information for those who wanted to follow the news. The majority of those who were in the lead of this movement in Bahrain were independent youth activists, many of them organized themselves later into different groups and coalitions, such as the February 14 Youth Coalition. Considering the fact that around 25 % of the population in Bahrain is under the age of 25, it was not surprising to see the youth taking a big part in this movement. Meanwhile, state-controlled media, including television and radio, were largely one-sided in their coverage, and most newspapers, except for Alwasat, were also reflecting the state's agenda by portraying the protesters as violent and sectarian.

This uprising was crushed a month later by the Bahraini authorities, and emergency law was declared in the country for three months. Major human rights violations were committed during these months including imprisonment and torture leading to death in some cases, as well as the dismissal of thousands of employees for participating in protests. Members of the media were targeted, imprisoned, tortured and dismissed from their jobs at the Information Affairs Authority or at pro- government newspapers. Al-Wasat founder Abdul –Karim Fakhrawi and blogger Zakariya Al- Ashiri were both arrested and severely tortured, their treatment leading to their eventual deaths. France 24 correspondent Nazeeha Saeed was also arrested and tortured in 2011. After three years in court, the trial against the police officer accused of torturing her was adjourned without resolution, which has raised serious concerns about the spreading of a culture of impunity in Bahrain.

After the worst of the violence in Bahrain, the government appointed an independent body to investigate the factors that led to the protests and ensuing chaos. The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, which included a reputable team of international human rights experts, released a 513-page report in November 2011 detailing their investigation. The report documented 46 deaths, 559 allegations of torture, and more than 4,000 cases of employees dismissed for participating in protests. The commission summarized the lack of freedom of the press in Bahrain by noting, "… that the media in Bahrain is heavily censored by the government and does not represent the views or outlook of the vast majority of Bahrainis" (Bassiouni 2011, p. 396). Most of the BICI recommendations have not yet been implemented in Bahrain despite the fact that the government has accepted the results of the report and has pledged to implement its recommendations. In fact, the latest government moves in Bahrain appear to increase more restrictions on freedom of speech rather than reduce them. According to the BICI report, Bahrain television broadcasting during the period of the imposition of the Emergency Law, used insulting language and engaged in provocative and defamatory coverage of events. This situation hasn't improve much since then as the government media policy continues to be biased and excludes opinions of the opposition. State-controlled television and radio channels still present political programs that are supportive of the government and its policies.

Furthermore, the influence of the Bahraini press declined dramatically in the years following the 2011 crackdown on the pro-democracy movement, which was followed by an aggressive attack on journalists and the press. The Bahrain Press Association was one of the bodies launched after the crackdown specifically to document and report the situation of journalists in Bahrain, as well as the degree of freedom of expression and media in the country. In its latest report delivered in May 2014, the BPA stated that

> objective news coverage became rare in the local press due to the lack of transparency as well as the one-sided coverage of the political crisis in Bahrain since 2011. Many important issues received insignificant and unbalanced coverage in newspapers, including stories of violations of human rights, corruption, reports of the national audit court and illegal land acquisition by members in the ruling family. Newspapers practiced self-censorship rather than chance appearing to be supportive of the opposition leading the protests. (Bahrain Press Association 2014)

Today, most of the newspaper headlines in Bahrain are the same, due to the fact that newspapers usually depend upon press releases issued by the government as the main source for their stories. This reflects a lack of professional reporting and the absence of critical journalism, as well as the dominant influence of the government over the local press.

THE RISE OF "CYBERACTVISM" AND CITIZEN JOURNALISM IN BAHRAIN

It is evident that the Bahraini government adopted vigorously tried to curb the press and force it to endorse its views. However, it became very difficult to contain the flow of information after the political crackdown and the growth of the February 14 movement, since these events took place in the digital age. The previous role of the press as a supporter of authority was weakened, and new dynamic and popular tools became available to individuals to use for free. New and digital media started to fill the information gap created by the ineffective and biased traditional media in Bahrain, and these new media channels were equipped with the capacity to transmit photos, videos and documented recordings. Thus, the officially declared the era of "citizen journalism" in Bahrain began and has since thrived. Four years after the crackdown in 2011, the number of citizen and photojournalists is on the rise in the country. There have been many cases of imprisonment, torture and the targeting of these individuals, sometimes resulting in their death, as was true of the case of citizen videographer Ahmad Ismael, who died after being shot while he was filming a protest in 2012. However, the harsh treatment of some citizen journalists doesn't seem to be effective in stopping others from spreading news, photos and videos through the social media, Twitter in particular being an effective vehicle for disseminating information.

The July 2012 Arab Social Media Report (Dubai School of Government 2012) found that #bahrain was the most-tweeted hashtag in the Arab world in February and March 2012, mentioned 2.8 million times in English and 1.5 million times in Arabic. In fact the usage of Twitter has been thriving in Bahrain in recent years by both anti and pro-government individuals, not only among the youth demographics but also among political leaders and public figures. This also was the case for the rest of the Gulf countries, which have relatively high-income levels that allow widespread use of smart phones. According to the same report, the penetration of social media usage in Bahrain is among the highest in the Gulf area, with 25.93% of the internet users in Bahrain on Facebook, and 5.33% of the internet users in Bahrain on Twitter. These percentages even exceed the penetration of social media usage in Saudi Arabia, a country which is well-known for the widespread usage of social media, with 19.18% of the internet users on Facebook and 2.89% of the internet users on Twitter (Dubai School of Government 2012). Jane Kinninmont (2013) argues that Twitter has played a major role in allowing like-minded people to network across national borders and may be contributing to the continued formation of a 'Khaleeji' (Gulf) identity. However, she also mentions the "darker side" of Twitter in the region, which is the fact that it started to be used as a source of misinformation, propaganda and hate speech. This resulted in polarizing the society in Bahrain even more, as well as giving space for sectarian language and the incitement to violence. Twitter has also become a new battleground for censorship over political and religious sensitivities. Censorship over Twitter and other social media in Bahrain increased to its maximum level in recent years, and harsh punishments have been directed against those who have been critical in the social media. Indeed, more than thirty-eight Bahraini citizen journalists were

arrested in 2014 for their activism on Twitter, with many of them having been convicted of "slandering the king", receiving prison sentences ranging from one and seven years.

Therefore, using social media for political activism in Bahrain is becoming harder and riskier than ever even though those who consider themselves online activists are still strong believers in its power and effectiveness. As Abdulemam stated in his May 5 interview,

> There was a time when the regime didn't really pay attention to what's written in social media. This time has passed and now they monitor every single word, they even started to believe in the power of social media and are using it. No matter how risky it is, social media helped us in so many ways; it gives voice to the young and empowers them. We struggled a lot dealing with the old dominant powers in our society, in this era we have the space to mobilized people and think outside the box.

Thus Abdulemam believes that the use of social media was essential to the success of the February 14, 2011 movement, and that people will continue to use it to bring change in Bahrain even with the high risks that such usage entails.

THE RISE OF INDEPENDENT AND ALTERNATIVE MEDIA IN BAHRAIN

Attempts to create independent and alternative media in Bahrain arose almost immediately after the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in 2011. Activists, opposition parties, as well as journalists felt the need to create their own media in order to reach out to the public in Bahrain, in addition to the international community, in order to convey their messages and their news. This was especially important to them since there was a media blackout on the Bahraini story since the crackdown, as well as a complete state control over mainstream media. Several media projects started broadcasting, including a television station, news websites and several online blogs. These media outlets have attempted to provide alternative voices to analyze the situation in Bahrain, beyond the mainstream media's agenda. The following are a few good examples.

Lulu TV is a privately-owned channel that was established in London in 2011. It is widely known that this channel has strong ties with the opposition parties in Bahrain. The channel focuses on the Bahraini political events and news, and it is critical of the Bahraini government. Therefore, the channel doesn't have an official office in Bahrain as the Bahraini authorities have refused to authorize one. Since Lulu television launch, its signal was jammed on the Egyptian Satellite Company, Nilesat, so it chose another satellite to broadcast is programming. However, as it is still difficult to watch the channel inside Bahrain, it created a YouTube channel (https//www.youtube.com/user/loulouatv) to upload its news and programs as videos to reach out to the audience inside, and outside, Bahrain.

The Bahrain Mirror (http://bmirror14feb.2011.no-ip.org/index.html) is another source of alternative media in Bahrain. The Mirror is an online news website that started also in 2011 to create a space for critical voices to be heard. Several

Bahraini journalists manage and write for this website, and it has become one of the main online resources for news on Bahrain. As the website is also very critical to the Bahraini government, it's blocked inside Bahrain. However, activists have been creating ways to make its content available through other technologies. Manama voice (http://manamavoice.com/) is another of the most famous news websites in Bahrain. This website was one of the very few websites that got a license from the Information Authority in 2009. It is run by a prominent Bahraini journalist, and focuses upon reporting local news. The website has had to illuminate its audio and video online coverage due to the restrictions imposed by the Information Affairs Authority, but it has continued publishing news from inside Bahrain.

Many other blogs and Facebook pages have appeared as an alternative media and are being used by activists on the ground to spread news and information about the situation in Bahrain. Both anti- government and pro-government online groups are gaining a lot of attention and followers inside Bahrain. However, as most of these pages and blogs are run by young and inexperienced activists, the quality and credibility of the news varies from one website to another. Examples of these websites are the Feb14 Media Network and the Bahrain Forums, where activists from many villages around Bahrain have created Facebook pages or Twitter accounts to write news and updates from each village, some of which appear to be very well organized efforts.

THE TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICAL AND MEDIA LANDSCAPES IN BAHRAIN

Since the year 2011, there has been a general media blackout on the Bahraini political story, either inside Bahrain or in the Arab media. In its report on the enemies of the Internet for 2012, the Paris based organization Reporters without Borders stated that "Bahrain offers an example of an effective news blackout based on a remarkable array of repressive measures: keeping the international media away, harassing human rights activists, arresting bloggers and netizens (one of whom died in detention), smearing and prosecuting free speech activists, and disrupting communications, especially during the major demonstrations" (Reporters Without Borders 2012c). Thus, the uprising in Bahrain, which at its height engaged more than half the Bahraini population and brought them out to the streets, largely disappeared from the television screens in many Arab countries, as Qatar and Saudi Arabia intervened to help the monarchy crush its opponents. However, the Qatari based channel Al-Jazeera English, unlike Al-Jazeera Arabic, has been trying to include the story of the uprising in Bahrain in its coverage, and its production of the famous documentary "Bahrain: Shouting in the Dark" was the highlight of its coverage of the Bahraini protest movement, describing its root causes and ramifications. Later on, however, Al-Jazeera's correspondent was not able to resume his work in Bahrain, due to restrictions from the Bahraini government. The coverage of other Arab media outlets was predominantly in line with the coverage of the Bahrain state-controlled media, thus confirming an "official" narrative, without providing enough space for the "alternative" narrative

developed by the opposition movement and its supporters. In a report titled "Political Science and the New Arab Public Spheres", Mark Lynch argued that "Bahrain did not only rely on force, or even on the shocking wave of sectarian repression which followed. It also fully invaded the public sphere. Saudi and Qatari television stations (including Al-Jazeera) largely ignored Bahrain in order to remove that struggle from the popular regional narrative, while the Bahraini regime launched a massive public relations campaign designed to tarnish peaceful human rights protestors as radical Iranian proxies. Bahraini regime supporters flooded social media sites to promote the regime narrative and relentlessly hound anyone expressing support for the opposition" (2012).

Based on the above analysis, it's highly unlikely that traditional media in Bahrain actually mirror or reflect the changes and transformation in the political landscape inside this country. As a matter of fact, it's hard to say that any media outlet can truly present a clear picture on the changing dynamics of politics in Bahrain today, even the social media, which is now highly polarized. If there is any sign of synergy between traditional and social media in Bahrain, it is the fact that they are both polarized. The Bahraini state media started using the sectarian card in early 2011 as a technique to defame pro-democracy protesters. And the situation escalated when the peaceful movement in Syria turned into a violent civil war that helped to fuel sectarianism throughout the whole region. The sectarian Sunni-Shi'a dynamic is currently represented on a big scale in social media with inflammatory hate speech and divisive sectarian language being exchanged by users on both sides in unprecedented ways. The question that is raised in this context, is whether this is a representation and a reflection of the current polarization in Bahraini society or whether social media is in fact provoking polarization and contributing to its escalation.

Online Bahraini activist Asma Darwish, in an interview with one of the authors on May 13, 2014, attributes polarization in the social media to two factors. First, the length of the political crisis in Bahrain has been exceptional, as it has gone on for a long time with no prospect for a successful resolution in the near future. Second, there have been organized "official" efforts through use of the social media to fuel and feed this polarization. Darwish's claims are based on her observation of the political discussions on twitter, as she argues that "most hate and polarized speech looks engendered and doesn't reflect what people really think in Bahrain."

The Constraints on Social Media in Bahrain

The issue of the censorship of cyberactivists in Bahrain, whether they are journalists, bloggers or photographers, has become a pressing one addressed by many organizations focusing on human rights and freedom of opinion and expression around the world. The many arrests of journalists, human rights activists and politicians resulting from Internet censorship have added to the urgency of the issue, and created an unhealthy environment for political debate on social media in Bahrain. Reporters Without Borders classified Bahrain as one the

five most important enemy countries of the Internet for 2012 for its imposition of restrictions on the Internet, its monitoring of published contents and its imprisonment of bloggers (Reporters Without Borders 2012b). The organization added Bahrain to its list after the death of the Bahraini blogger Zakariya al-Ashiri while in government custody in 2011. It also suggested that the Bahraini authorities have arrested many Internet users and opened a campaign to defame those who protest for freedom of expression and communications.

Bahrain Watch, a volunteer initiative led by group of cyber-activists and specialists, is the first group to document the use of British spyware by the Bahraini government to spy on activists in a report published in 2012. According to their report, there were several methods used by the Bahraini government to censor activists. These included sending online messages containing spyware that automatically uploaded to the recipient's device and hacking Facebook and Twitter IP addresses in order to determine the identities of users and arrest them. In addition, the government demanded the passwords to the online accounts of arrested cyberactivists to access their personal contacts and investigate their associates. The report documented the cases of five people who were arrested on the charge of insulting the king on Twitter. Some of them confirmed having been targeted and pursued through IP spy links. The report documented more than 120 pro- and anti-regime accounts that were targeted in the years 2011 and 2012 with IP spy links using public mentions through vehicles such as Tweets that are visible to the public to target accounts (Bahrain Watch 2012).

SOCIAL MEDIA AS A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FOR BAHRAINI WOMEN ACTIVISTS

The wave of uprisings which swept the Arab world in 2011 did not just instigate a "political awakening" that has shaken the power structures in a number of Arab countries and resulted in dictators fleeing their countries, resigning from office, or facing brutal death. Rather, it also instigated a "social awakening" that has shaken Arab societies' commonly held assumptions about gender roles and women's ability to challenge them. This was evident in the many heroic examples and iconic images of Arab women's activism and resistance, in both the political and social spheres. This stunned the world, earning respect and recognition for these activists, as evident in the selection of Tawakul Karman, as the first Arab Nobel Prize winner ever, in what has been seen by many as a node to the "Arab Spring" movements, in general, and to Arab women's roles in them, in particular (Khamis 2011, p. 693; Radsch and Khamis 2013, pp. 881-890).

Since the uprising in February 2011, Bahraini women activists emerged as new leaders in their society, thanks to the increasing role of social media and their effective utilization of this platform to spread their opinions and exercise their social and political activism. Their ideas, voices and activities have been receiving stronger support from within their often conservative communities. It is now more accepted by the public that democratic transition cannot be achieved without the participation of women. However, women's activism in Bahrain is not new. The

women's movement in Bahrain dates back to the 1950s when young educated Bahraini women started their activist work that revolved not only around empowering women in the society, but also in engaging in political struggle. New generations of women activists rose in Bahrain during the political unrest era in the 1990s (Khalaf 2013).

However, through their use of social media, women activists gained a new opportunity to be presented as "leaders" in their own community after the political unrest started in 2011. Women activists were very active in using social media as well as being involved on the ground, and their role continues to be essential to the political struggle in Bahrain (Alwadi, 2014). Indeed, the participation of women in both the opposition and in the pro-government movements has been an important feature of the political conflict in the country, indicative of a growing sectarian split within the society. Female supporters of the government have gained a voice to express their concerns as part of the national dialogue but it is still a matter of time before one can assess whether their voice will be heard and their recommendations will be implemented. Female opposition members, on the other hand, are active in on-going protests and concentrate on pushing for political reforms while keeping gender related demands absent from their agenda. Despite some improvements though, Bahraini women still face challenges in their efforts to facilitate female empowerment. So far, it is clear that the way forward lies in the hands of the Bahraini authorities who play the paramount role in encouraging female empowerment. As a result, they are able to promote a pro-female image abroad, which sets them apart from their opposition.

Women who have supported the opposition movement come predominantly from the Shi'a sect or are secular. From the start, they participated widely alongside men and as the government crackdown became a reality, they bore the consequences of their actions as did their fellow men activists. Although the facts are in dispute, the opposition claims that so far fourteen female protesters died in the crackdown, mostly from tear gas suffocation. Furthermore, women were detained and incarcerated. Among the imprisoned female protesters, the case of Ayat al Qurmezi, the young female poet who dared to publicly read a poem which harshly criticized the ruling family in Bahrain, made headlines throughout the world. She was incarcerated and released after a forced apology aired on Bahraini television. Another iconic female figure is the daughter of the activist Abdulhadi Al Khawaja, Zainab Al Khawaja, who has been campaigning for the release of her father and other activists from jail and has faced prosecution in the Bahraini courts. According to Magdalena Karolak (2013), women activists who supported the pro-government movement participated in numerous sit-ins and rallies as well as displaying demonstrations of loyalty organized throughout the country. They had no specific demands with regard to the targeting of at female empowerment, but strongly feared an "Iran/Shi'a takeover" of Bahrain. They thus saw their interests as similar to the aims of the pro-government movement, which were centered on the preservation of the monarchy and the Sunni identity of the country.

Since 2011, the portrayal of women in Bahrain has dramatically shifted. Women are now being portrayed as proactive leaders, vocal, and brave, a portrayal which is

somehow new to the small island. When Jalila Alsalman, a Bahraini teacher and mother, was released after spending months in prison for her activism, people treated her like a heroine. Thousands of Bahrainis gathered in front of the prison to receive her and cheer her and her family. Huge banners showing her picture were hung on the houses in her conservative village for months to express the pride in her role in the prodemocracy movement. Ironically, many people in such traditional Bahraini villages who were hesitant to vote for women in the election are now treating one of their own women as a heroine and a leader.

The impact of women's activism in support of the uprising in Bahrain was very alarming to the authorities, which is why they were punished in equal measure to their fellow men activists. Bahrain is still the only country in the Gulf region that allowed women to be jailed and tortured for their political activities, and witnessed several cases of women having been killed by police forces. But the crackdown on women activists created a lot of admiration on the part of the general public. People from very conservative villages started chanting on behalf of women activists and they started viewing them differently, following them on Twitter and listening to them speak in the media, or on the stage when they organized public protests. Suddenly the image of the Bahraini woman as a political leader became popular and acceptable, as Bahraini women became active both online and on the ground.

Online activist Asma Darwish, in her May 13, 2014 interview, recalls her experience in the year 2011 as an example of how social media could be used to glorify the role of women activists. She says, "I still remember when I participated with few other women in a strike campaign at the UN building in Bahrain during the status of Emergency law 2011. Social media, Twitter in particular, picked up the story and it went viral in few hours. International media were calling us and reporting our story. I will never forget this moment as I felt the whole world was watching what those Bahraini women are doing, it was very empowering."

If there is something that the "Arab Spring" has achieved in Bahrain so far, it involves giving women an outlet to prove themselves as real and equal political players for the general public to see. Previously, this outlet was only available to those who were privileged by the state but not to average women. However, one result of the uprising was to give ordinary Bahraini women a golden opportunity to emerge in the public sphere as iconic role models and public opinion leaders, capturing the public's attention and earning its admiration and respect. By doing so, they have proven their political importance to their own communities as leaders, while, most importantly, demonstrating the fact that political transition can be achieved without the full participation of women.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The rise in the use of social media in Bahrain was related to the popularity of these new technologies, but was also largely triggered by the political crisis in Bahrain and a lack of freedom of expression in the public sphere that was controlled by traditional, state-controlled, mainstream media. Bahrainis used to deploy social

media only for the purposes of improving social communication and networking. However, social media in Bahrain now offers an open space for Bahrainis to express their oppositional views and alternative political opinions while sharing information and exchanging knowledge related to the ongoing political struggle in their country.

As the use of social media in Bahrain increased dramatically over the past few years due to the political situation in the country, the government itself began to realize the significance of the role played by social media, and began to catch up, participating in a new wave of online activism. For example, there have been an increasing number of Twitter and Facebook accounts affiliated with the Bahraini government in recent years. In fact, it is safe to say that social media became one of the major sources of information for Bahrainis today, to a level whereby it successfully competes with, if not exceeds, a reliance on traditional media, including television and newspapers. The political crisis in Bahrain resulted in the emergence of many new online media outlets, as well as new initiatives, including the growth of citizen journalism. These efforts are seen within a context where there is a need to fill the knowledge gap created by the total government control over traditional media outlets.

However, the online sphere is not always a safe place for Bahraini bloggers, citizen journalists and activists. It is reported that the Bahraini government is currently using advanced technologies for surveillance, including new spyware, which in many cases results in the tracking and jailing of online activists. Furthermore, using social media as a main source of information represents another major challenge, as stated by prominent Bahraini journalist Hana Buhiji. She noted in a May 23, 2014 with one of the authors of this chapter that "social media needs to be accompanied with public awareness to make sure that people are able to filter out the fabricated and wrong information, especially those news and information which directly affect the local political situation."

Buhiji's observation arises from the fact that the discussions and debates in social media in the Gulf region have become extremely polarized, as interest based groups have also been using social media to disseminate false news and information to influence the political situation in their favor, contributing to the sectarian nature of the political narrative. However, there are some doubts that the polarization and hate speech prevalent in social media actually represents the reality on the ground. To be sure, the polarized and highly risky political environment within the country make social media a very challenging tool for Bahraini activists to use. Nonetheless, pro-democracy activists, as well as bloggers, journalists, women and youth, continue to rely heavily upon the social media to voice their opinions and vent their grievances. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that as the struggle for democracy, freedom and justice in Bahrain is likely to continue for years, the multiple roles that are being played by the social media in this struggle will continue to have an impact upon the social and political transformation the country is experiencing.

REFERENCES

Alwadi, Nada. (2014). "Social Media as an Opportunity to Bahraini Women." *CyberOrient*, *8*(1). Available online at: http://www.cyberorient.net/article.do?articleId=8815

Bahrain Watch. (2012). "The IP Spy Files: How Bahrain's Government Silences Anonymous Online Dissent." Bahrain Watch, February 13. Available online at: https://bahrainwatch.org/ipspy/viewreport.php

Bassiouni, Mahmoud Cherif. (2011). "Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry." Manama, Bahrain: Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, November 23. Available online at: http://www.biciactions.bh/wps/themes/html/BICI/en/pdfs/bici_report_en.pdf

Bahrain Press Association. (2012). "Annual Report: Silence is a War Crime." Bahrain: Bahrain Press Association. Available online at: http://www.bahrainpa.org/wp/2013/03/03/silence-is-a-war-crime/

Bahrain Press Association. (2014). "Annual Report: Less Freedom, Broader Impunity." Bahrain: Bahrain Press Association. Available online at: http://www.bahrainpa.org/Report/English/index.html

Dubai School of Government. (2012). *Arab Social Media Report: Twitter in the Arab Region*. Dubai: Dubai School of Government, 2 (1). Available online at: http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/Twitter/LineChart.aspx?&PriMenuID=18&CatID=25&mnu=Cat

Freedom House. (2011). "Freedom in the World 2011: Bahrain." Washington, D.C.: Freedom House. Available online at: http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/bahrain#.U2bUE_ldWSo

Ghannam, Jeffrey. (2011). "Social Media in the Arab World: Leading up to the Uprisings of 2011." Washington, DC: Center for International Media Assistance, February 3. Available online at: http://cima.ned.org/publications/social-media-arab-world-leading-uprisings-2011-0.

Howard, Philip N. (2011). *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Internet World Stats. 2014). "Internet Users in the Middle East and the World – 2013." Bogota, Columbia: Miniwatts Marketing Group. Available online at: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm

Karolak, Magdalena. (2012). "Bahraini Women in the 21st Century: Disputed Legacy of the Unfinished Revolution." *Journal of International Women's Studies*, *13*(5), 5-16. Available online at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=jiws

Khalaf, Abdulhadi. (2013). "Double Efforts to Minimize Women's Movement in Bahrain,", Alsaffir Alarabi [Bahrain Spring]. Available in English at: http://bahrainspring.com/index.php/bahrainspring-articles-2/item/143-double-efforts-to-minimize-woman-movement

Khamis, Sahar (2011). "The Arab Feminist Spring?" *Feminist Studies*, *37*(3), 692-695.

Khamis, Sahar, & Katherine Vaughn. (2011). "Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution: How Civic Engagement and Citizen Journalism Tilted the Balance." *Arab Media and Society*, *14* (Summer). Available online at: http://www.arabmediasociety.com/index.php?article=769&printarticle

Kinnimont, Jane. (2013). "To What Extent Is Twitter Changing Gulf Societies?" London: Chatham House, February 1. Available online at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/189413

Lynch, Mark. (2012). "Political Science and the New Arab Public Sphere." New York: Social Science Research Council Institute for Public Knowledge. Available online at: http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/lynch-political-science-and-the-new-arab-public-sphere/

Radsch, Courtney, & Sahar Khamis. (2013). "In Their Own Voice: Technologically Mediated Empowerment and Transformation among Young Arab Women." *Feminist Media Studies*, *13*(5), 881-890.

Reporters Without Borders. (2012a). "Crackdowns on Protests Cause Big Changes to Index Positions." World Press Freedom Index 2011-2012. Paris, France: Reporters Without Borders, January 25. Available online at: https://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html

Reporters Without Borders. (2012b). "The Enemies of the Internet: Bahrain." Paris, France: Reporters Without Borders. Available online at: http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/bahrain/

Reporters Without Borders. (2012c). "Internet Enemies Report: 2012." Paris, France: Reporters Without Borders. Available online at: http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport-internet2012_ang.pdf

SAEID GOLKAR

4. STUDENT ACTIVISM, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN IRAN

INTRODUCTION

Iranian students have been seen as one of the country's most influential social groups, alongside clerics and workers, and they have consistently challenged state authorities since the establishment of modern universities in 1934 (Parsa 2000). Some even believe that "the modern history of social movements in Iran is unimaginable without the student movement" (Sreberny and Gholam 2007, p. 284). During the last several decades and under repressive regimes which have exerted a pervasive control over the society, Iranian universities have created a political space where students have been able to network and challenge authorities. In addition, students have used cyberspace to create another political space to contest the power of Iranian state authorities. Iranian students have used social media to achieve their objectives ever since new information and communication technologies (ICTs) were introduced to the country in the early 1990s. The Internet and social media have thus become more than just tools to disseminate information and increasingly have been used for public awareness and political participation. They have also served as an alternative place for students to express themselves, network with others, and challenge official political and social norms.

As is true of physical space, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has tried to control cyberspace and suppress online activities. The IRI has limited Iranian youth access to the Internet by slowing down the Internet's speed, filtering websites and weblogs, and expanding security services on social media. The IRI has also facilitated the presence of its own student supporters on the Internet, encouraging them to propagandize in favor of the Islamic regime.

There is little research on Iran's student movements, and the majority of the research that has been published is focused on the student movements' history prior to 2005 (Mahdi 1999; Mashayekhy 2001). Moreover, because there are few studies on social media in Iran, there is a visible lack of research on the impact of social media on student activism. The research in this chapter will attempt to fill that void. The chapter is divided into two main sections. In part one, the nature of "social non-movements" will be discussed, and the impact of social media on "non-movements" will also be analyzed. In the second part of the chapter, I will offer a brief history of student movements in post-revolutionary Iran and will continue with a discussion on the impact of social media on student activism after the expansion of ICTs in Iran.

SOCIAL NON-MOVEMENTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA

While many scholars use the term "student movement" to refer to the social and political activities of Iranian students in challenging the authorities (*Tohidi* 1999; Mohammadi 2007), other scholars believe that "students' activism" is a much better label for these activities (Rivetti & Cavatorta 2012). According to these scholars, student movements in Iran are not typical "social movements" because they lack organized collective action, cohesive ideology and leadership. In this context, "social non-movement" is a better term to explain these groups.

Social non-movement is a term coined by Asef Bayat to explain the collective actions that suffer from a lack of organization and cohesive ideology, especially in the Middle East. According to Bayat, the term "social non-movements" refers to the collective actions of dispersed and fragmented actors; "non-movements embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented, but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations" (2010, p. 14).

Social non-movements are shaped under authoritarian regimes where there is no freedom of organization and expression. In this situation, where states can quickly identify and target any opposition to the regime, the collective action of unorganized individuals can defy authoritarian domination. Bayat (2010) argues that unlike actors involved in social movements, those who are involved in non-movements are in a continuous state of mobilization, despite the fact they remain detached. This means that when there is any political opportunity, dispersed individuals have the capacity to rapidly transform themselves into a visible collective body or engage in larger political and social mobilization (Chandour-Demiri 2013).

In the absence of political and civil spheres that are not allowed to exist under repressive regimes, individual actors use places to express the collective mood that initially are not designed for this aim. The 'street,' in this sense, serves as a locus of collective expression for those who structurally lack an institutional setting to express discontent. The 'street' serves as a place where the problems under discussion are collected, discontent is communicated, and the dispersed activities develop into joint activities to change particular problems without having been organized or planned (Bayat 1997, p. 63). In these spaces, people move through what Bayat calls "quiet encroachment of the fragmented people; a silent, patient, protracted and pervasive advancement of ordinary people on the propertied and powerful" (Bayat 1997, p. 57). The result is that individual becomes communal in these spaces and non-movements develop.

Cyberspace is another place that has been transformed into a political space. Here, the Internet and social media allow people to shape virtual communities as a "virtual political street" (Wolf 2011). Some scholars argue that dispersed individuals articulate their discontent in cyberspace, and use the Internet and social media as a new space for expressing themselves. For example, Masserat Amir-Ebrahimi shows how cyberspace has become a "communal" space that has evolved and developed its own norms and styles of interaction (Khalid 2009, pp. 25-26).

Another example is in Turkey, where the Turkish youth have used cyberspace as a public sphere to express their discontent and suffering (Lukuslu 2014, p. 76).

Social media also helps non-movements by replacing hierarchy with network. While social movements are usually hierarchical, one of the components of non-movements is their lack of organizational structure because of the pervasive repression they confront. In these situations, social media acting as a network can empower people; in a way, everybody can be a leader and construct one's own movement strategies. Moreover, unlike social movements that are usually controlled by a single central authority, social media can help non-movements by expanding the "weak ties" between fragmented people.[1] As Honari notes, "weak ties: play a role in transferring information, opinion and behaviour" (2013, p. 164).

Social media assists the actors of non-movements by providing them with a platform for communicating, increasing general awareness, and connecting people with the other social movements that have the same objectives. "The actors use the social media to gather, share and disseminate information. This is crucial in regimes where the state has an effective monopoly of the means of communication" (Breindl 2010). Social media also helps non-movement's actors shape new models of contentious activities, such as cyber disobedience, cyber protest and political hacktivism (Garrett 2006, p. 208).

Social media can simultaneously hurt non-movements by empowering authoritarian regimes to contain dispersed individuals (Deibert & Rohozinski 2010, p. 43). As Clay Shirky writes, social media produces as much damage to social movements "as good because repressive governments are becoming better at using these tools to suppress dissent" (Shirky 2011). The authoritarian regimes try to stop the 'quiet encroachment of the ordinary' on the cyberspace through expanding the regime loyalists on the Internet and social media. Many scholars also point out how social media gives authoritarian regimes a unique ability to use surveillance on their population, collect personal data, as well as identify and monitor opposing groups (Bajoghli 2014). The authorities also use the Internet and social media as a new tool for spreading their propaganda inside and outside of their countries (2012, p. 115). The last criticism is that ICTs and social media can also undermine activities of people by creating an air of delusion in regard to activism – better explained as "Slacktivism" (Morozov 2012). Social media allows many activists to seek political change through low cost and sometimes meaningless activities such as liking a Facebook page, activities that have little impact on the real, offline world.

HISTORY OF STUDENT ACTIVISM IN IRAN (1979-2013)

Students were one of the most influential social groups who challenged the monarchical regime (1941-1979), playing an important role in the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty, and contributing to the victory of the Islamic revolution in 1979. During this time, student activists consisted of three main groups; leftists, nationalists, and Islamists. Among them, the Marxist groups were the most influential in dominating Iranian universities. In 1981, the Islamic regime closed all

universities for two years to purify them from the influences of non-Islamists students and teachers (Razavi 2009). In the name of the Cultural Revolution, more than two-thirds of the dissidents, who were leftist, liberal and nationalist students and professors, were fired. With the reopening of universities in 1983, the Islamic Republic consolidated its power by supporting Islamist students, who were organized under Student Islamic Associations and the Office for Strengthening Unity or (*Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat*) (DTV). As a result of the division of the clerical establishment into two political factions in 1984, the DTV stood alongside the left wing.[2] This faction supported more radical social and economic policies, such as economic planning, price controls, antipoverty programs, the nationalization of industry, land reform, the redistribution of wealth, and efforts to promote national self-sufficiency (Abrahamian 1998).

A small group of students, who supported the right wing, separated from the DTV and established a new organization called the Union of Islamic Student Societies (*Etehadie Jame Eslami Daneshjooyan*). Unlike the leftist faction, the right-wing/conservative factions advocated a market economy and small state but, at the same time, were in favor of strict social and cultural affairs policies.[3] The left faction of the Islamic Republic was weakened by the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. The selection of Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader and the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani served as a shift in the political history of Islamic Republic, which led to the domination of the conservative wing. The Rafsanjani administration tried to undermine the DTV's challenging of Rafsanjani's economic policies (Mashayekhi, 2001, p. 294). For example, in 1994, the Rafsanjani administration tried to pass a bill that pushed for limited privatization of the universities (such as collecting tuition for failed classes). The DTV objected to and criticized this policy, and as a result, the implementation of this policy was stopped (Hajizadeh 2001, p. 37). However, conservatives formed some organizations in order to limit the influence of the DTV and its supporters, and to increase their control over universities. The University Student Basij Organization (USBO), for example, was a branch of Basij militia, created in 1990 in support of Ayatollah Khamenei as Iran's new Supreme leader but the establishment of Basij bureaus encountered opposition from groups such as the DTV, which believed that the USBO was not an independent student organization.

The creation of these entities showed that, as one Iranian scholar points out, between 1982 and 1996, the student movement had been dependent on the political structure of the Islamic revolution (Mahdi, 1999, p. 33). However, despite their origins, a majority of students preferred to be apolitical and not join to any of these organizations; thus, there were few political activities at the universities during this period. The situation changed at the end of 1996 when the Seyyed Mohammed Khatami announced his candidacy for the seventh presidential election. Khatami's candidacy was welcomed by the DTV as well as by the majority of students who were dissatisfied with conservatives and their subsequent policies. In 1996, many of the 1,150,000 students in Iran, voted in favor of Khatami, who went on to win 73% of the vote in 1997.

Student Activism under the Reform Period (1997-2004)

Khatami's presidency (1997-2004), which was known as the reform period, was an opening in the political space in post-revolutionary Iran. During the reform era, students became more involved in politics by challenging the conservatives and pushing for more political reform (Yaghmaian 2002, p. 76). From 1997 to 1999, students demonstrated frequently to protest lack of the "freedom of the press, the existence of political prisoners, housing issues, and the poor quality of food in the dormitory" (*Tohidi* 1999, 18). The students also criticized the influence of many non-elected organizations including the judiciary, or the Guarding Council.

Since 1998, the conservatives have used the USBO to create an atmosphere of fear and to suppress the pro-reform students. For example, Basiji students were used to suppress student protests in the summer of 1999 (Golkar 2010, p. 25). During this time, students in Tehran took to the streets to protest against the conservatives in the Parliament who passed legislation closing down opposition papers, which severely curtailed the freedom of the press. In response, security forces initiated a brutal attack at the University of Tehran and Tabriz University that resulted in the deaths and imprisonment of several students.

Another tactic the conservatives used to block reform involved organizing their student supporters to attack the reformist government for focusing on political development and not paying attention to issues of social justice. These students formed various groups including "Justice- seeking students" or *Daneshjooyane Edalatkhah, which became active in* leading campaigns against poverty and injustice in coordination with hardliner student groups who blamed the Khatami government for its continued blight on society.[4]

Student Activism and the Internet in Iran

The desire for political change has intensified among students since the introduction of the Internet in Iran at the end of 1990s. As is true of other parts of the world, the Iranian universities were among the first institutions in the country to establish a connection to the global network (Naeli 2013). In 1999, there were only 48,000 people throughout Iran with access to the Internet, and they mainly used it for sending and receiving emails. It was only after 2001 that the Internet became accessible to many university students. The catalyst for enhanced Internet usage was the introduction of the blog by a student in September 2001(Khonsari, 2011). Since then, many Iranian youths and students, who had access to the Internet and the basic knowledge of how to use it, started writing weblogs. According to a study published in 2014, in the early years of Blogestan, or the Iranian blogosphere, "many bloggers were college students (Giacobino et al. 2014, p. 28). One reason for the proliferation of student bloggers could be that universities and academic centers were among the first institutions in Iran with affordable or even free access to the Internet." Soon the number of Persian blogs increased from two hundred Persian weblogs in 2002 to the tens of thousands in 2003, with over two million Internet users (Mahdavi 2006).

In response to the enforcement of the Islamization policies at universities for more than three decades, many students became less ideological and more critical of official interpretations of Islam by the clergy (Rivetti 2012, p. 86; Golkar 2006). Secularism and liberalism became more popular among students who were critical of the Islamic regime's ideology. The DTV, for example, was divided into several groups including secular and liberal factions but while the majority of students supported the democratization of the Islamic Republic, a minority continued to advocate for the Islamic regime. Since 2002, secular and liberal factions have become more critical of both the reformist administration and the entire clerical establishment and have asked for "true democracy." Liberal students established an organization called the *Iranian Liberal Students and Graduates*, which has supported the promotion of liberalism, mainly within political and cultural realms, at the universities. They are the first group to label themselves as liberal, since the term has had a negative contention due in part to the influence of Marxist and Islamist ideologies.

In July 2003, a group of students protested against the privatization of universities, which had been advocated by the government (Golkar 2012). They specifically protested against the "neoliberal governmental plans in higher education" that included the imposition of tuition fees for free state universities and the admission of students to universities without their having passed the entrance examination or *Konkor*. For the first time after the introduction of ICTs in Iran, some students used the Internet to organize students in support of the 2003 protests. According to Babak Rahimi (2003), "they used the internet as a mode of communication between activists to circumvent censorship of the print media by using e-mail and websites to express their opposition."

As a result of the student protests, which were ultimately suppressed by the government security apparatus, the students shifted the focus of their criticisms from the reformist administration to the Islamic Republic itself (*Sustar* 2003). Although students became more critical of both the Islamic regime and the reformist government, many students, including the DTV, reached the conclusion that the Islamic Republic, as an authoritarian regime, could not be reformed, and that regime change was inevitable. Some student groups asked for a public referendum as a method of democratizing the regime. Some students also established several weblogs and websites where they criticized the reformist government's inefficiency in implementing its promised political and social reforms.

The radicalization of student activism occurred alongside the reemergence of Marxist socialism among students, whose predecessors had been purged after the Cultural Revolution in 1981-3. Several small socialist and Marxist groups were formed and became active in criticizing the Islamic regime. Furthermore, several small student ethnic groups formed including Kurdish and Arab student activists. These students have continued to protest against the suppression of their language and their ethnic identity.

In the absence of any clearly defined political or social sphere, many of these groups became active on the Internet and in cyberspace, establishing several

weblogs and websites. They used the Internet to publish their student bulletins and magazines and disseminate them among their supporters. An example of this was the launching of a weblog called "Militant" by a group of leftist students as a source of news[5] and the publishing of an online magazine called *Bazr* by another leftist student group. Another activity of the student activists was the launching of Internet Radio stations, such as *Ashoob,* and *Ava-e Kar* that broadcast news about leftist activists (Hosseini 2011).

With the expansion of social networking sites in Iran in 2004-5, many students joined networks such as Orkut and Yahoo 360. Iranian membership in Orkut increased dramatically and made Iranians the third most common nationality using Orkut, with more than 300,000 Iranians members in 2004 (Rahmandad et al. 2006). Through these networks, they disseminated their ideas and connected with each other. For many of the Iranian Internet users, the Internet thus became a relatively safe place to express themselves freely and to speak out (Masserat 2008).

However, the popularity of the Internet among Iranian youth, especially students, led the Islamic government to limit its access. Social networking sites such as Orkut were filtered immediately after becoming popular in Iran. The clerical establishment also arrested some bloggers to induce fear among other online activists. For example, more than 20 bloggers and Internet users were detained in 2004; among them were students, who were imprisoned for "insulting the Supreme Leader" and inciting "immorality" (Hendelman 2007, p. 85).

Student Activism under Hardliners 2005-2013

Because the majority of students were disappointed by reformist policies, they pushed for a boycott of elections in Iran, as they viewed them as meaningless activities. The boycott assisted in the election of hardliner candidate, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential election and soon after his election, Ahmadinejad's administration began to tighten the state's control over universities by supporting pro-regime student bodies and suppressing dissident students groups. The hardliner government supported those students and professors who were affiliated with the Basij militia at the universities. As a result, the members of SBO increased from 420,000 members in 2004 to over 600,000 in 2007. Moreover, several independent students associations were dissolved, student magazines were banned, and many students and professors were expelled after 2005 (Golkar 2012). The result was an "effective exclusion of democratic-reformist student activism" (Rivetti, 2012).

With the increasing degree of suppression at the universities, the majority of students became opposed to the Ahmadinejad administration and used any available opportunity to criticize Ahmadinejad's populist and authoritarian policies. For example, in December 2006, students protested against the Ahmadinejad presence at *Amir Kabir* University, shouting "Death to the dictator!" and "Fascist President, the university is not a place for you," interrupting Ahmadinejad's speech in the process (Afshari and Underwood 2007, p. 91). The student demonstrations continued at major universities throughout Iran in 2007 and

2008 when students chanted slogans against President Ahmadinejad and his hardliner administration (Elling 2009). With regard to domestic policies, students objected to hardliners' authoritarian educational and social policies and demanded for more political and cultural liberalism. In terms of international issues, they criticized Ahmadinejad's rhetoric about denying the existence of the holocaust and wiping Israel off the map. One of the frequent slogans students chanted was "Forget the Holocaust! Do something for us" (Fathi 2006). While the former generation of Iranian students supported the Palestinian movement as well as other liberation movements throughout the world, this slogan was a sign of the deepening gap between the new generation of students and the Islamic regime.

By tightening the state control over the universities, and limiting the students' offline activism, many students became more active in cyberspace. According to a study, the Iranian weblogs became more political in 2006 compared to 2005. Using the allonym name, the weblogs mainly criticized the Hardliner administration in cyberspace (ZiaeePour 2007). The Internet was also used as a means of communicating and disseminating news among students. For example, leftist students launched two weblogs the "*13 of Azar*" and "*Azadi va Barabari*" to broadcast the news about students who were arrested by the security forces after their demonstration at universities in December 2007. Moreover, the "Leftwing Students of Iranian Universities" reached out with their counterparts in South America and Venezuela, and criticized the relationship between Hugo Chavez, the leftist Venezuelan President, and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Sreberny & Khiabany 2010, p. 144).

Thanks to government support, pro-regime students also became more active on the Internet. These students usually supported the current government and praised Ahmadinejad as a hero of the masses who fought against corruption and injustice (Kelly & Etling 2008, p. 12). While the government supported many hardliner student bloggers, many of the dissident blogs, which were critical of the Ahmadinejad administration or the Islamic Republic, were filtered by the government, a sign of increasing offline suppression after 2005.

Since 2006, the Ahmadinejad government also pushed for more suppressive policies over Internet and cyberspace usage by drafting new criminal laws on Internet offenses and asking all weblog writers to register with the Ministry of Islamic Guidance. The most important measure taken by the Ahmadinejad government in an effort to control the Internet was the formation of Guard Cyber Defense Command (GCDC). The GCDC, which is the cyber branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), began its activities in 2006 and has been responsible for supervising and investigating online activities that are viewed as potential threats to the Islamic Republic.

However, despite the tightening of online control, the Internet continued to be very popular and served as the most trustworthy source of political news among students. According to Kavous Sayed-Emami, as of 2008, 40.5% of students searched the Internet "'almost every day' or 'several days a week' to gain access to … news," because they trust the Internet as a news source more than twice as much as they trust domestic televisions (2008, pp. 60-61).

Since 2007, social networking sites (SNS) such as Facebook and Twitter have become very popular among Iranian youths. One study shows that the majority of Iranians who use the social networking sites were under 30 and 80% were single (Rahmandad et al. 2006). The number of students enrolled in Iranian universities correspondingly rose from 1,700,000 in 2002 to 2,089,283 in the 2008 academic year (Ministry of Science & Technology 2008). It is therefore not surprising that the popularity of Facebook among Iranian youth and the potential threats such networks posed with regard to connecting and organizing people made the Islamic Republic immediately filter and restrict access to it.

The clerical establishment unblocked Facebook in February 2009, a few months before the presidential election in June and there were several explanations as to why the Islamic Republic pursued this action before the election, including the belief that "the authorities liked to give the people some social freedom so to encourage younger people to vote, since higher electoral participation can be a sign of state legitimacy." Another explanation that was offered was that "it enabled security services to identify the dissidents, who express their views on Facebook as a social networking forum" (Gheytanch and Rahimi 2009).

The unblocking of Facebook led to an influx of online activities by both supporters of the hardliner incumbent as well as supporters of the competitor reformist candidates. And, since February 2009, youth, student and women activists have increasingly begun to organize discussion groups and political meetings online, asking for help promoting human rights and the releasing of political prisoners (Gheytanchi and Rahimi 2009). According to a political activist: "As we were closing to the election's day, the Facebook environment changed gradually, and the number of political posts increased as well" (Moghanizadeh 2013, p. 17).

While all candidates' supporters were active in cyberspace, the supporters of reformist candidates utilized social media more in comparison to the hardliner incumbent's advocates. This was because the social base of the reformist candidates was among the middle class, the urban population and students, whereas the hardliner social base was centered in rural areas and was comprised of more traditional groups, who had more limited access and ability to use the Internet and social media (Kia 2012). Social media was vital in increasing the awareness about the importance of the election among people, especially after the boycott of the 2005 presidential election. Social media also helped the youth and less politically informed students become more aware of the elections and the candidates. According to an interviewee, "I did not even know about these candidates nor did I want to vote. I just used to wander in Facebook occasionally and got attracted by these emerging activities, symbols and photo editing and hence decided to experiment (with) the things myself. I was apathetic to vote but after a while I felt this is a different case. I cannot say what exactly happened, but I think I very much got seduced by the excitement that was generated around the whole thing in my Facebook community" (Gheidary 2010, p. 218).

Along with other social activists, students launched numerous political weblogs criticizing the Ahmadinejad government and according to the Basij study, more

than 30,000 weblogs were explicitly publishing content to undermine the administration (Markaz-e Motaleat va Pazhuheshha-e Sazeman-e Basij-e Danshjoui 2010). Moreover, several political campaigns against Ahmadinejad prior to the 2009 election were triggered on social networking sites. These included "Do not vote for Ahmadinejad!" and "I bet I can find 1,000,000 people who dislike Mahmoud Ahmadinejad" (Rahimi and Gheytanchi 2009). Social media also helped activists circulate information and news among people in a country where the majority of the media had been under severe state control. For example, the DTV, which supported one of the reformist candidates, launched a website called "Free Citizens" or "Shahrvand-e Azad" as a news source that was designed to facilitate local news circulation (Honari 2013, p. 150).

Student Activism, Social Media and the Green Movement 2009

When the regime cut off the text messaging services and the Internet on the night before the June 12th, 2009 election, it was viewed as a sign of what was perceived to be a "fraudulent election." After the expansion of the Green movement following the disputed election, students, of whom more than 70% voted against President Ahmadinejad (BBC, 2011), joined other social groups to question the election's results and later question the entire political regime. Since 2009, students have protested against the clerical establishment at every opportunity they could find. In December 2009 on "student day," [6] many students challenged the hardliners by participating in demonstrations in several universities. According to Abbas Milani, "the turnout was the largest since the summer of 2009 and spread to campuses across the country, despite increasingly harsh government tactics, including alleged torture, rape and deaths in prison" (2010, p. 43). A year after the election, in June 2010, some students again protested against the Ahmadinejad government at two of Tehran's leading universities (Labi 2010). Student activists widely used ICTs and social media to confront the Islamic Republic by calling people to the streets through social networks. Although labeling the Green movement as a "Twitter revolution" is too far removed from reality, the social media helped the student activists in many ways, including the circulation of information, increasing public awareness, and delegitimizing the political regime (Golkar 2011). Many people used the Internet to get the news when the state severely controlled all access to the mass media. According to one interviewee whose comments were representative, "Every day after work Facebook was the first place I was checking to get the latest videos and rumors" about the Green Movement (Gheidary 2012, p. 218). Social media also contributed to the universal awareness of the political events that occurred in Iran and the despotic nature of the Islamic Republic. One example was the broadcasting of the video showing the killing of a young female student Neda Agha-Sultan, which was widely viewed on the Internet and caused mass global empathy for the Iranian protesters.

Student activists also tried to expand the Green movement by informing other people. Mir Hossein Moassavi, one of the opposition leaders, asked students to increase the political awareness of the public, understanding that any systemic

change requires broad social awareness. In his letter to students, he asked them to extend their knowledge to those who had no access to the virtual world (Sohrabi 2011). Students printed online publications and distributed them throughout the country in places such as phone booths. Many of student protests at universities were recorded and broadcasted to wider audiences. Through circulating the news regarding the brutality of the security forces when confronting dissidents, the students succeeded in decreasing support for the Islamic Republic and delegitimizing the clerical establishment not only in Iran, but also among other Islamic countries.

In response, the Islamic Republic brutally suppressed the students, as well as other activists who were part of the Green Movement. One of the first places that security forces attacked after the announcement of the election results was student housing in the various universities. Only three days after the election, security forces engaged in harsh attacks, resulting in the death of at least seven students and imprisonment of hundreds (Rivetti 2012). Many of these students, including Majid Tavakoli, and Bahareh Hedayat, were still in prison, six years after the Green Movement was initiated. The crucial role of students in the creation and expansion of the Green Movement caused the Islamic Republic to tighten its control over universities by launching a new wave of the purges against dissident students and professors. The government also expanded the presence of the Basij militia branches (comprised of both students and teachers) at universities to induce fear among student activists and subdue the universities (Golkar 2013). The result was to tighten control over universities and quiet the student bodies. The majority of students became silent after the brutal suppression of the Green Movement and even after the privatization of universities' dormitories, there was no public critique among the students. However, the expansion of state sponsored repression at universities led a great number of students turning to cyberspace as more secure place to confront the political regime (Bazooband 2014, p. 106). An Iranian student described the situation, saying, "Most of our activities are in the virtual world, in the domains of Facebook and the Internet. We disseminate the news, launch a tweeter cascade, and, of course, attend casual gatherings at each other's homes (Green Movement Activists 2013)." Some of the Iranian students who studied abroad were also active in cyber activism. They were mainly active in the circulation of information about the Green Movement, the existence of political prisoners and in the writing of petitions. For example, *Iranian Liberal Students and Graduates* launched several campaigns such as "no to mandatory Hejab" and "no to compulsory military service." Although these groups have continued to challenge the Islamic Republic, their impact is limited. For example, these campaigns have only had 60,000 postings and 13,000 likes on Facebook respectively.

The government has continued to expand its repressive policies in cyberspace to control youth and student dissidents. Since 2009, the Islamic Republic has adopted increasingly complex surveillance and monitoring techniques, increasing the security forces' activities on the Internet and social media, and inducing fear among cyber activists. Iranian authorities have also limited youth access to the

Internet by slowing down the speed of the Internet, filtering many weblogs and websites, and tracking down dissident Internet users through locating their IP addresses (Carriere et al. 2013). These efforts have allowed the Islamic Republic to identify and arrest many online student activists who were active on social networking sites. One of these students was Mostafa Akhavan, who was sentenced to prison for his activities on Facebook. Even the student cyber activists who studied outside of Iran were arrested as soon as they reentered the country (Iranian Student and Blogger Arrested 2011). The common allegation against the student activists has been their illegal involvement in cyber activism. Alleged activities under this category have included the posting news related to the Green Movement, organizing illegal gatherings, and sending articles and email messages to opposition websites (Iran Briefing 2011).

The state's methods of intervention, which varied from filtering to outright suppression, consequently led to the decreased involvement of many students in cyber space. While prior to 2009 most students thought that social networking was safe, after 2009 they began to realize that the government could monitor their activities, identify their networks and capture them more quickly through accessing their social networking accounts. Student bloggers became less active on the Internet because security forces used their online postings or weblogs to arrest and charge them with criminal activity. According to a study in 2014, only 20% of the prominent weblogs from 2008 to 2009 were still online in 2013 (Petrossian et al. 2014). Moreover, some students have stopped engaging with social media even with regard to non-political activities such as socializing with friends, acquaintances, or strangers, because most of them have experienced a sense of insecurity and distrust of government officials (Shahzeidi et al 2013). Nonetheless, those who do use social media do so for personal reasons. As another study conducted mainly after 2009 notes, "Iranians rely on Facebook primarily to communicate with friends and family and only a small percentage use Facebook for political purposes. As such, it appears that Facebook functions as an alternative or quasi "public space" where social norms and codes of conduct for public life are less restrictive" (Iran Media Project 2013).

The Islamic Republic has not only limited student activists' presence in cyberspace, but has tried to expand the presence of its supporters on social media as well. In fact, with an aim of conquering cyberspace as the "virtual political street," regime supporters such as Basij members have been encouraged to become more active on the Internet. The government has provided high-speed Internet connections to student Basij offices, around 2,500 offices throughout Iran. These offices sponsor short and intense classes to train Basijis on Internet use and in these short courses, student Basij members learn about blogging, psychological operations, social networking sites, online spying, Basij cyber centers, and computer games, with the aim of targeted entry into the virtual world (Esfandiari 2010).

Pro-regime students have also used the Internet as a tool to push their conservative values within universities. An example is the modesty Movement (*Jonbesh-e Haya*), which pushes for more enforcement of dress code and

behavioral regulations among university students.[7] Students have started an online campaign for "*Amr beh Ma'ruf va Nahy az Monkar*" or "Propagate Virtue and Prohibit Vice" in support of what are defined as Islamic values. Through this campaign, which occurs both online and offline, they try to fight what they perceive to be cultural invasion or the expansion of a western and American lifestyle among students.

The pro-regime students have also become more active in social media after the launching of Google+ in 2011. Since Facebook was filtered in Iran, Google+ has been widely used by hardliners and Basiji students as an alternative to Facebook. The regime also established a new series of domestic social networking sites such as *Afsaran*,[8] which is dominated by the student Basij members. Through such activities, pro-regime students' activities have tried to further promote the Islamic ideology and discourage political activists and critics of the Islamic Republic. In 2010, hardliner students started to use social media to propagate their candidates for the 2013 presidential election. Some of them started their online political campaign by launching a Facebook page for their candidate, Saeed Jalili, in 2012. Through use of the Internet, they tried to reach and connect with each other while introducing Jalili's profile and his achievements as the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and the country's chief nuclear negotiator (Naeli 2013).

In opposition to this effort, another group of students became active in support of *Hassan Rouhani*, a more moderate candidate, in the hopes of changing the political atmosphere. The existence of pervasive mismanagement, political suppression, and economic difficulty encouraged dissatisfied people to vote for Rouhani, who won the 2013 presidential election. Students were among many groups that voted in favor of Rouhani in reaction to the hardliner era. With Rouhani's election as new president, the level of the regime suppression within universities has decreased as compared with that of the hardliner era (2005-2012). Some of the students and professors who were expelled from universities have returned to academia. Also, some of the student associations have been allowed to become active again. All of these policies have led the hardliners to criticize the Rouhani administration and even attempt to interrupt the tenure of his Minister of Science, Research & Technology (*MSRT*). In response, the students and professors have launched online and offline campaigns to support the Minister of MSRT. For example, students have launched a Facebook campaign called "*No to interpellation of the minster of MSRT.*"[9] Through this page, they disseminate information and increase the awareness of people about the academic corruption that occurred during the Ahmadinejad administration.

The Rouhani administration has also worked against expanding limitations on the Internet and social media. For example, they resisted filtering Viber, a voice application that provides access to the Internet (Parvaz 2014). In such circumstances, Internet and social media usage are still increasing among Iranians after 2013, in spite of those areas of the social media where there are blockages (Hajin 2013). Such policies have been welcomed among Iranian youth, who are known as the most tech-savvy youth in the Middle East. While there is no exact number of Iranian student Internet users, some statistics shows that Iran (with a

42,000,000 Internet users and a 53.2% penetration rate in 2012) has one of the highest Internet-user growth rates in the world (Internet World 2013). There is no exact number of social media users in Iran because as a result of the widespread blockage of social media websites, many users utilize the VPNs and proxies to access these sites making it problematic to find a precise number of social media users (Hajin 2013). But, according to the Iran Cyber Police Report, more than 85 percent of Iranian Internet users are members of the social media (Mehr News Agency, 2012).

CONCLUSION

Since the establishment of the modern university in Iran, students have been among the most influential groups in triggering political transformations in Iran. According to official statistics, there were 4,200,000 students in 2013 in 2030 universities throughout Iran compared to 148,000 students in 1979. More than 50% of the students' population was female in 2013. Because of their age and level of education, students are usually the main clients of new communication ICTs, and their usage of social media is higher than that of the average population. The majority of Iranian students use social media for socializing and getting information, not for political activities. But because of political repression, they have also used their active presence on the Internet to challenge the policies of the Islamic Republic. For Iranian students, cyberspace has worked as a new "political street" in which students as well as Iranian youth consolidate their presence and challenge the authorities through their actions. Their presence on social media, despite being filtered and illegal, fulfills a political agenda. Through the pervasive increase in expertise on the part of students and youth who use social media, they not only propagate cultural values and informal norms but challenge the official norms of the Islamic Republic as well. In response, the Islamic Republic has tried to control the social media by expanding the number of its supporters on cyberspace, inducing fear among Internet users and limiting access to online social networks such as Facebook and Google+, especially among youths. The main reason for such behavior is the clerical establishment's deep concern about any attempts to connect people and form networks online, and their belief that such activity will eventually lead to offline mobilization that could threaten the survival of the regime.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

REFERENCES

Abrahamian, Ervand. (1998). "Iran." In G. T. Kurianm, ed., *World Encyclopedia of Parliaments and Legislatures, Volume I* (pp. 338-342). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Afshari, Ali, & H. Graham Underwood. (2007). "The Student Movement's Struggle." *Journal of Democracy*, *18*(4), 80-94.

Amir-Ebrahimi, Masserat. (2008). "Transgression in Narration: The Lives of Iranian Women in Cyberspace." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies*, *4*(3), 89-115.

Amir-Ebrahimi, Masserat. (2009). "Weblogistan: The Emergence of a New Public Sphere in Iran." In Seteney Shami, ed., *Publs, Politics and Participation: Locating the Public Sphere in the Middle East and North Africa* (pp. 325-358). New York: Social Science Research Council.

Rahimi, Babak. (2003). "Cyberdissent: The Internet in Revolutionary Iran." *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, *7*(3), 101-115.

Bajoghli, Narges. (2014). "Digital Technology as Surveillance: The Green Movement in Iran." In Linda Herrera, ed., *Wired Citizenship: Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East* (pp. 180-194). New York: Routledge.

Bayat, Asef. (1997). "Un-Civil Society: The Politics of the Informal People." *Third World Quarterly*, *18*(1), 53-72.

Bayat, Asef. (2010). *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bazooband, Sara. (2014). "The Democratic Movement in Iran: A Case Study of the Role of Online Technology." In Galia Golan & Walid Salem, eds., *Non-state Actors in the Middle East: Factors for Peace and Democracy* (pp. 102-115). New York: Routledge.

Breindl,Yana. (2010). "Critique of the Democratic Potentialities of the Internet: A Review of Current Theory and Practice." *Triple C*, *8*(1), 43-59.

Carrieri, Matthew, Ali Karimzadeh Bangi, Saad Omar Khan, & Saffron Suud. (2013). "After the Green Movement: Internet Controls in Iran, 2009-2012." *OpenNet Initiative*, February. Available online at: https://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/iranreport.pdf

Chandour-Demiri, Nada. (2013). "The Urban Subalterns and the Non-Movements of the Arab Uprisings: An Interview with Asef Bayat." *Jadaliyya,* March 26. Available online at: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10815/the-urban-subalterns-and-the-non-movements-of-the-

Committee on Human Rights Reporters. (2011). "Iranian Student and Blogger Arrested." *Committee of Human Rights Reporters*, November 23. Available online at: http://www.chrr.biz/ spip.php?article16546

Committee on Human Rights Reporters. (2010). Feteneh-e cyberi ["Cyber seduction"]. Markaz-e Motaleat va Pazhuheshha-e Sazeman-e Basij-e Danshjoui, Tehran [The Center of Researches and Studies of the University Basij Students Organization]. Available online at: http://www.fetyan.ir/ Doc/89/siberi%20(Fetyan.net).pdf

Deibert, Ronald, & Rafal Rohozinski. (2010). "Liberation vs. Control in Cyberspace: The Future of Cyberspace." *Journal of Democracy*, *21*(4), 43-57.

Elling, Rasmus Christian. (2009). "Bring in the Dead, Martyr Burials and Election Politics in Iran." *Middle East Report Online*, March 19. Available online at: http://www.merip.org/mero/mero031909

Esfandiari, Golnaz. (2010). "Iran: Basij Members Trained to Conquer Virtual World." *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* (RFE/RL), August 21. Available online at: http://www.rferl.org/content/ Basij_Members_Trained_To_Conquer_Virtual_World/2134023.html

Fathi, Nazila. (2006). "Students Cry 'Death to the Dictator' as Iranian Leader Speaks." *New York Times*, December 12. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/12/world/middleeast/ 12iran.html?_r=0

Garrett, R. Kelly. (2006). "Protest in an Information Society: A Review of Literature on Social Movements and New ICTs." *Information, Communication and Society*, *9*(2), 202-224.

Gheytanchi, Elham, & Babak Rahimi. (2009). "The Politics of Facebook in Iran." *Open Democracy*, June 1. Available online at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/the-politics-of-facebook-in-iran

Giacobino, Laurent, Arash Abadpour, Collin Anderson, Fred Petrossian, & Caroline Nellemann. (2014). *Whither Blogistan: Evaluating Shifts in Persian Cyberspace*. Philadelphia, PA: The Iran Media Program, the Center for Global Communication Studies at the Annenberg School

for Communication, University of Pennsylvania. Available online at: http://www.iranmediaresearch.org/en/research/download/1607

Gladwell, Malcolm. (2010). "Small Change." *The New Yorker*, October 4. Available online at: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell?currentPage=all

Global is Asian. (2011). "Mobile Activism in Asia, A Catalyst for Political Change." *Global Is Asian*, 9-11. Available online at: http://issuu.com/nuslkyschool/docs/global-is-asian_issue11/8

Golkar, Saeid. (2005). "From Black Crow to Barbie: Changing Students' Norms in Iran." *ISIM Review*, *16*, Leiden 10-11.

Golkar, Saeid. (2010). "The Reign of Hard-line Students in Iranian Universities." *Middle East Quarterly*, *17*(3), 21-29.

Golkar, Saeid. (2011). "Liberation or Suppression Technologies: The Internet, the Green Movement and the Regime in Iran." *Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society*, *9*(1), 50-70.

Golkar, Saeid. (2012). "Cultural Engineering under Authoritarian Regimes: Islamization of Universities in Post-Revolutionary Iran." *Digest of Middle East Studies*, *21*(1), 1-23.

Golkar, Saeid. (2013). "University under Siege: The Case of the Professors' Basij Organization." *The Middle East Journal*, *67*(3), 363-379.

The Guardian. (2013). "Green Movement Activists Live in Fear as Iran's Presidential Election Nears." *The Guardian*, May 17. Available online at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/17/green-movement-activists-iran-repression

Hadi Sohrabi-Haghighat, Mohammad. (2011). "New Media and Social-political Change in Iran." *CyberOrient*, *5*(1). Available online at: http://www.cyberorient.net/article.do?articleId=6187

Hajin, Mona. (2013). "Seeking Personal Autonomy through the Use of Facebook in Iran." *SAGE Open*, March 28, 1-13. Available online at: http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/3/1/2158244013483759.full-text.pdf+html

Hajizadeh, Ali. (2001). "Jonbesh-e Danshjoui va Dolat-e Eslahat" ["The Student Movement and the Reformist Government"]. *Andish-e Jameh*, *22*, 36-41.

Honari, Ali. (2013)*.* "From Virtual to Tangible Social Movements in Iran." In Paul Aarts & Francesco Cavatorta, eds., *Civil Society in Syria and Iran: Activism in Authoritarian Context* (pp. 143-168). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Hosseini, Hossin. (2011). "Dar Soda-e Yek Makteab Posideh Borhan" [*"*Looking for a Rotten Ideology"]*.* P*ayegah-e Tahili-e Va Tambieni Borhan* [*The Analytically Explanatory Website of Boran*]*.* Tehran, July 7. Available online at: http://borhan.ir/NSite/FullStory/Print/?Id=1394

Hounshell, Blake. (2011). "The Revolution Will Be Tweeted." *Foreign Policy*, June 20. Available online at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/20/the_revolution_will_be_tweeted

Human Rights Activists News Agency. (2011). "Mostafa Akhavan Sentenced to One Year in Prison for Facebook Membership." *Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA)*, June 15. Available online at: https://hra-news.org/en/mostafa-akhavan-sentenced-to-one-year-in-prison-for-facebook-membership

Internet World Statistics. (2012). "Internet Users in the Middle East and the World." *Internet World Statistics*, June 30. Available online at: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm

Iran Media Program. (2013). "Liking Facebook in Tehran*:* Social Networking in Iran 2013." *Iran Media Program*. Philadelphia, PA: Center for Global Communication Studies, Annenberg School for Communication University of Pennsylvania. Available online at: http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/fileLibrary/PDFs/Facebook.pdf

Kelly, John, & Bruce Etling. (2008). *Mapping Iran's Online Public; Politics and Culture in the Persian Blogosphere* (pp. 5-36). Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2008-01. Cambridge, MA: Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University.

Kia, Ali Asghar. (2012). "Tahlil-e Shabakehaye Ejtemai Majazi dar Iran, Facebook Motalh-e Moredi." ["The Analysis of Virtual Social Networks in Iran, Facebook, A Case Study"]. Available online at: http://goo.gl/ZrLEsW

Khalili- Gheidary, Lida. (2012). "Social Media and Iran's Post-election Crisis." In Sean S. Costigan & Jake Perry, eds., *Cyberspaces and Global Affairs* (pp. 215-221). Farnham: Ashgate Press.

Khonsari, Shahriar. (2013). *Case Study of the 2009 Iranian Presidential Election and the Uprising in Iran: The Impact of Social Media on Social Change and Political Power*. M.A. thesis. Malmo University School of Arts and Communication.

Labi, Aisha. (2010) "Student Activism, Though Muted, Endures a Year after Crackdown in Iran." *Chronicle of Higher Education*, June 13. Available online at: http://chronicle.com/article/Despite-a-Year-of-Crackdown-in/65934/?sid=at&utm_source=at&utm_medium=en

Hendelman-Baavur, Liora. (2007). "Promises and Perils of Weblogistan: Online Personal Journals and the Islamic Republic of Iran." *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, *11*(2), 77-93.

Lukuslu, Demet. (2013) "Cyberspace in Turkey, A Youthful Space for Expressing Powerful Disconnect and Suffering." In Linda Herrera, ed., *Wired Citizenship: Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East* (pp. 76-88). New York: Routledge.

Mahdavi, Mojtaba. (2006)." Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Democratic Transition: Iranian Lessons." Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto.

Mahdi, A. Akbar. (1999). "The Student Movement in the Islamic Republic of Iran." *Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis*, *15*(2). Available online at: http://go.owu.edu/~aamahdi/students.htm

Markaz-e Motaleat va Pazhuheshha-e Sazeman-e Basij-e Danshjoui [The Center of Research and Study of the University Basij Students Organization]. (2010). "Feteneh-e cyberi" ["Cyber Seduction"]. Markaz-e Motaleat va Pazhuheshha-e Sazeman-e Basij-e Danshjoui [The Center of Research and Study of the University Basij Students Organization], Tehran. Available online at: http://www.fetyan.ir/Doc/89/siberi%20(Fetyan.net).pdf

Mashayekhi, Mehrdad. (2001). "The Revival of the Student Movement in Post-Revolutionary Iran." *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, *15*(2), 283-313.

Mehr News Agency. (2012). "Amar-e Karbaran-e Irani ozve shabakehay-e Ejtemi" ["The Statistics of Iranian Users in Social Media Networks"]. *Mehr News Agency*, Tehran, October 10. Available online at: http://www.mehrnews.com/TextVersionDetail/1716707

Milani, Abbas. (2010). "The Green Movement." In Robin B. Wright, ed., *The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy* (pp. 41-44). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Ministry of Science & Technology. (2008). *Tozih-e Tedad Daneshjoyan bar Hasab-e Doreh-e Tahsily* [*Distribution of Students Based on Level/Field and Gender*]. Ministry of Science and Technology, 2008. Available online at: http://www.irphe.ac.ir/files/site1/pages/Stat_1386_87/EnrolmentTable/10_2.pdf

Moghanizadeh, Somayeh. (2013). *The Role of Social Media in Iran's Green Movement*. M.A thesis, Department of Applied Information Technology, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Available online at: https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/34206/1/gupea_2077_34206_1.pdf

Mohammadi, Majid. (2007). "Iranian University Students' Politics in the Post-Reform Movement Era: A Discourse Analysis." *Iranian Studies*, *40*(5), 623-634.

Morozov. Eugene. (2012). *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*. New York: Public Affairs.

Naeli, Mina. (2013). "New Trends of Social Media Use in Iran: Candidates' Campaigns on Social Networks in the 2013 Presidential Election." *Global Media Journal German Edition*, *3*(2), 1-7. Available online at: http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-28719/GMJ6_Naeli_final.pdf

Parsa, Misagh. (2000). *States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Parvaz, Dorothy. (2014). "Hassan Rouhani and the Hope for More Freedom in Iran." Committee to Protect Journalists. Available online at: http://cpj.org/2014/02/attacks-on-the-press-iran.php

Petrossian Fred, Arash Abadpour, & Mahsa Alimardani. (2014). "The Decline of Iran's Blogestan." *Washington Post*, April 11. Available online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/11/the-decline-of-irans-blogestan/

Rahmandad, Hazhir, Sara Sarkhili, Mohammad Hafezi, Ali Mostashari, Farzan Parsinejhad, Nima Saeidi, & Ali Khademhosseini. (2006). *Iranians on Orkut: Trends and Characteristics. A Research*

Report. Cambridge: The Iranian Studies Group (ISG) at MIT. Available online at: http://isgmit.org/projects-storage/Orkut/updated-orkut_report_Mar07_06.pdf

Razavi, Reza. (2009). "The Cultural Revolution in Iran, with Close Regard to the Universities, and Its Impact on the Student Movement." *Middle Eastern Studies*, *45*(1), 1-17.

Rivetti, Paola. (2012). "Student Movements in the Islamic Republic: Shaping Iran's Politics through the Campus." In Rouzbeh Parsi, ed., *Iran: A Revolutionary Republic in Transition* (pp. 81-100). Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) Chaillot Paper no. 128.

Rivetti, Paola, & Francesco Cavatorta. (2012). "Iranian Student Activism between Authoritarianism and Democratization: Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation between the Office for the Strengthening of Unity and the Regime." *Democratization*, *21*(2), 289-310.

Seyed-Emami, Kavous. (2008). "Youth, Politics, and Media Habits in Iran." In Mehdi Semati, ed., *Media, Culture and Society in Iran* (pp. 57-68). Oxon: Routledge.

Shahzeidi, Mehri, Elhahe Shabani, Younghoon Chang, & Myeony-Cheol Park. (2013). *Can Women Benefit from Cyberspace as a Public Space?* Paper presented at the CPRsouth8/CPRafrica Conference, Mysore, India, September 5, 2013. Available online at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2331886

Shirky, Clay. (2011). "The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change." *Foreign Affairs*, *90*(1), 12. Available online at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67038/clay-shirky/the-political-power-of-social-media

Sreberny, Annabelle, & Gholam Khiabany. (2007). "Becoming Intellectual: The Blogestan and Public Political Space in the Islamic Republic." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, *34*(3), 267-286.

Sreberny, Annabelle, & Gholam Khiabany. (2010). *Blogistan the Internet and Politics in Iran*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Surowiecki, James. (2004). *The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies, and Nations*. New York: Doubleday.

Sustar, Lee. (2003). "New Protests in Iran Sign of Political Crisis." *Socialistworker.org*, June 20, 5. Available online at: http://socialistworker.org/2003-2/458/458_05_Iran.shtml

Tohidi, Nayereh. (1999). "Student Movement: The Harbinger of a New Era in Iran." *ISIM (International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World Newsletter)*, *4*(1), 1. Available online at: https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/17356

Wolff, Christian. (2011). "Social Media in the Revolution – Web 2.0 and the Uprising in the Arab World." *Digital Development Debates*, *4* (June). Available online at: http://www.digital-development-debates.org/issue-04-media.html

Yaghmaian, Behzad. (2002). *Social Change in Iran: An Eyewitness Ac-count of Dissent, Defiance, and New Movements for Rights*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

NOTES

1. While Gladwell argue that social media undermine the social movements because of different nature, I argue that the characteristics of social media will help non-movements. For example, he argues that while social movements should base on hierarchical organization, the social media are tools for building networks (see Gladwell 2010).

2. Majma-e Rohanion-e Mobarez (Assembly of Militant Clergy) is a political organization was established in 1988, consisted of clergies who have mostly supported the big state and the welfare state programs. President Mohmmad Khatami was one of the members of this organization, which split from Jameh-e Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez-e Tehran (see note 3). Since 1997, this organization became more supportive of political and cultural liberalism.

3. Jameh-e Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez-e Tehran or the Association of Combatant Clergy of Tehran is a political organization consisted of clergies, who have more conservative attitude regarding the

political and cultural issues, but supports the liberal economy. It was established in 1977, but became one of the most infl
unetail political orginzation after the establishment of Islamic regime. For more information see Jame'eh-ye Ruhaniyyat-e Mobarez-e Tehran, Iran data portal, Princeton University, http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/parties/jrm/JRMProfile.pdf

4. Other groups include the Islamic Association of Independent Students, which was established in 2002.

5. The Militant weblogs are available online at: http://militantmag.blogspot.com/2007/09/blog-post_3080.html

6. Students Day is the anniversary of the killing of three university students by Pahlavi regime in 1953.

7. For more information about the Modesty movement or (*Jonbesh-e Haya*) look at their website, "About us," The Modesty website is available online at: http://hayauni.ir/haya_banoo-index

8. For more information about the Basij social networking site, look at Afsaran website, available online at: http://www.afsaran.ir/about

9. For more information about the campaign in defense of Rouhani minster of Science, Research & Technology, Dr. Fraji-Dana, see this page at Facebook, "No to interpellation of the minster of MSRT." Available online at: http://vhdo.nl/1n0BJkY

IRVING EPSTEIN

5. NO TURNING BACK, NEO-LIBERALISM EXPOSED

Youth Protest in Chile, Spain and the U.S.[1]

One of the key purposes of this volume is to examine how issues of equity, access, and fairness, as applied to educational and social policies, represent a recently constructed concerted and powerful response to a four-decade global diffusion of neo-liberal ideology and in alternative cases, state authoritarianism. Certainly, the rise of social protest in 2011, continuing through 2012 and even in some situations onwards, demonstrates evidence for the breadth of this response. An examination of the cases of Chile (the Chilean Winter) Spain (the *Indignados* or 15m Movement), and the U.S. (the Occupy Movement) makes it possible to analyze in specific terms how student protest within these inundations was able to expose the ideological contradictions of neo-liberalism generically, which often led to an examination of specific policies that exacerbated educational as well as social inequalities. To be sure, the responses that are discussed below evoked various degrees of success. But their contribution to the unpacking of neo-liberal and authoritarian assumptions regarding their comparative advantage and the inevitability of the inequities they created, is long lasting.

As has been previously noted in the introduction to this volume, social movement theory is both robust and conceptually rich, and we find it useful in our analysis of these three cases. Although it has been directly applied to an examination of the Chilean example (Salinas and Fraser 2012), a comparative examination of the three cases presented in this chapter has yet to be constructed, although as will be discussed later, there is evidence that suggests that the political actors within each setting were influenced to varying degrees by the actions of one another. What is clearly apparent is that in all of the cases, social networking has been used to attack traditional power centers in ways that are creative and imaginative. At the same time, the processes that have been invoked to challenge conventional power and authority have been influenced by the increased access to information and the ease of communication that is possible through global social networking. Nonetheless, these cases illustrate the influence of embedded local political and cultural affectations that are reflective of the differing opportunity costs and possibilities that shape their actors' behaviors, often according to specific conditions. As is true of the conclusions authored within other chapters in this volume, the degree that engagement with social media represents a *fundamental* shift in the nature of political protest remains a question that generates responses fraught with varying degrees of clarity, even though this is an issue of central importance whose discussion links the three cases together. In an even more

general vein, these cases also illustrate the limitations of relying upon conventional explanations as exclusive explanatory devices that can successfully explain how the global exchange of ideas occurs. The cases therefore additionally contribute to a deeper understanding of the limits and possibilities of collective agency within a global context.

CHILE

Historical Overview

Students have played an important role in Chile's modern history, as one might expect in one of South America's oldest democracies. Evidence for the contention can be found when examining the history of the student organization, The Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (FECH), which was founded in 1906 and was the first student federation of its kind on the continent. It was repeatedly influential in advocating in favor of reform, be it within the university or more broadly within society as a whole (Bonilla and Glaser 1970), until its elimination after the 1973 coup that brought Augusto Pinochet to power. Resurrected in the 1980s when it lobbied for Chile's return to democratic rule, since the 1990s, it has played an active presence in the country's democratic life. Over ten years ago, the organization Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (CONFECH) was formed, whereby the 26 most important student university federations came together to represent students throughout the country, its leadership chosen from the elite universities, including the University of Chile, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, and the University of Concepcion. Although the Cordoba reforms of 1918 had a profound impact upon many of Latin America's universities, establishing principles of institutional autonomy, while codifying the role of student leadership as an important component of self-governance (Walter 1969), it is clear that Chile has been an especially influential historic site of student activism. As a result, education has played a generic role in contributing to the continuous framing of the country's political discourse.

As Jill Pastrana (2007) has noted, "Chile was the first Latin American nation to formally establish a system of public instruction in 1842." It founded normal schools in the early 19th century and by 1973, 53% of its population enjoyed access to formal education, most of which was public (Pastrana 2007). The assumption that education represented an inherent public good was thus never contested, even if educational outcomes traditionally favored elites and privileged social classes. It is therefore not surprising that in Chile's 1925 constitution, the role of public education as a responsibility of the state was explicitly acknowledged, and a national superintendency was created to direct and inspect local teaching while the importance of insuring compulsory primary education for all students was affirmed (Oliva 2010). During Eduardo Frei's presidency in the 1960s, the influence of President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress initiative, and the neo-colonial attitudes it invoked were also felt in Chile, as educational aims became more directly tied to economic development as defined according to capitalist terms (Oliva 2010). On

the other hand, the Allende government's plan (the ENU or Escuela Nacional Unificada), which sought to create increased coherence among primary, secondary, and vocational education sectors while striving to expand educational access, albeit according to socialist terms, was extremely controversial and led to significant rightist opposition during the final year of his presidency (Farrell 1986). Clearly, these examples illustrate the truism that the creation and reform of educational policies signified various ideological directions and tensions that were evident in wider social spaces than those situated more narrowly within the educational sector.

However, the use of educational reform to reframe political and social relations is also evident in the aftermath of the 1973 coup and the ensuing Pinochet dictatorship. Indeed, this era represents a visible example of a continuous process. Nonetheless, the educational reform efforts of the 1970s and 80s were in themselves, as correspondingly extreme as was the general brutality of the Pinochet regime, and they represented one of the first attempts in the world to comprehensively and unabashedly reposition educational policy and practice as a direct affirmation of neo-liberalism. The specific policies put in place included creating a voucher system at the primary and secondary levels, allowing the state to directly subsidize the funding of private schools on the basis of attendance, decentralizing state educational authority to the municipal level (municipalization), making public schools subject to local governmental control (their funding now being based strictly according to student attendance and enrollment), allocating a low percentage of public funding to educational resources relative to GDP, and encouraging the proliferation of private schools and universities while limiting state funding to public ones. The expansion of private universities was not simply an effort to relieve policy growing enrollment pressures as had been true in other Latin American countries (Levy 1986), but was fundamentally driven by ideological considerations. Indeed, all of these policies represented a radical shift in orientation, explicitly embracing the same free-market economic policies that were implemented by the regime influenced by the "Chicago boys." No longer was education conceived to be a public good, but instead was deemed a private responsibility. As codified in the reformed constitution of 1980, parents had the right to choose schools for their children, while the state would serve as a source of educational support of the last resort (Oliva 2010). Parents theoretically were afforded four options: enrolling their students in municipal (public) schools, having them attend private schools that were subsidized by the state, enrolling their students in private schools that obtained their entire operating funds from parental tuition without state subsidy, and sending their children to corporation schools (vocational schools funded by the government but managed by businesses) (Cox 2006, 16). Not surprisingly, the retreat of the state from involvement in educational practice did not extend to its monitoring of academic freedom, for the 1980 constitution also stipulated that the freedom to teach was circumscribed by considerations of morality, the public order, and national security (Oliva 2010). Teacher status declined precipitously as a consequence of these trends: decentralization, privatization and the overt politicization of curriculum and

teacher role. The 1990 Organic Constitutional Education Law, enacted one day prior to Pinochet's leaving power, codified these principles.

When Chile returned to democratic rule in 1990, the center-left governing political coalition known as the Concertación, in power through 2010, embarked upon incremental educational reform, without changing the fundamental structure of the educational system as constructed during the Pinochet regime. Indeed, it is significant that the basic elements of the country's 1980 constitution continue to be currently operational although a reform in 2003, enacted in 2004, made 12 years of education compulsory. In 2009, a second reform law was passed with the purpose of enhancing educational quality. In a sense, the 2004 law was a reaction to enrollment patterns that were already in place. Thus, a pattern of expanded student enrollment at the secondary level was evident since 1970 and continued, with increased percentages ranging from 49.7% to 65% from 1970-1990, and 65%-93.7% occurring from 1990-2004 (Cox 2006,7). However, since 1990, the other significant trend has been one of increased enrollment in private subsidized schools to the detriment of municipal public ones (Cox 2006, 11). And in spite of increases in expenditures for public education (from 2.4 to 4.3% of GDP from 1990-2002), along with reform efforts aimed at increasing teacher salaries and improving school retention), social class equity disparities also increased significantly (Cox 2006, 18-23). Within the higher education sector, there has been a drastic expansion of private universities, along with a dramatic increase in the number of students attending higher education institutions. As will be explored later, unresolved issues of equity and fairness have explicitly marked this expansion and contributed directly to the student protests of the Chilean Winter of 2011.

Suffice it to note here that the unwillingness of Concertación policy makers to fundamentally change the structure of the educational system, put in place by its right-wing ideological predecessor, complemented a technocratic, supposedly apolitical ideological perspective that permeated much of its twenty year rule. The incrementalism characteristic of educational policy, for example, was also evident in an initial reluctance to systematically prosecute human rights violators or adequately support truth commissions that were supposedly formed to create a authoritative accounting of the nature of past atrocities and those responsible for their occurrence (Robben 2010). The fear of opening old political wounds and the difficulty of pushing forward political and constitutional reform given the continued influence of the right, particularly in the Senate, are offered as excuses for such a stance. But it is easy to see how a technocratic approach to educational reform, supported by World Bank funding and advisory support (Delannoy 2000), complemented this larger ideological agenda.

The Penguin Revolution and the Prelude to 2011

In 2006, Chile elected the first female president in Latin America, Michelle Bachelet. A torture survivor of the Pinochet regime, her election raised expectations for substantive social reform in the country. Although her administration was noteworthy for its emphasis upon pension reform and enhanced

attention to child welfare issues, progress in reforming the country's educational system was more modest. Shortly after Bachelet officially took office, secondary students organized massive protests from late April to June, 2006, Known as the "Penguin Revolution" or the "March of the Penguins" in deference to school uniforms that resembled the birds, it has been argued convincingly that these demonstrations served as a dress rehearsal for the 2011 Chilean winter protests (Cabalin 2012). Focusing upon increases in the cost of student transportation passes that made it more difficult for students to travel to their schools from their residences, along with the high cost of university entrance examination fees, their concerns quickly expanded into a systematic criticism of the unfairness of the Chilean educational system as a whole, with its privileging of private school attendees (Cabalin 2012, p. 223). When President Bachelet failed to directly address student concerns in her May 26 Presidential address, mass strikes and demonstrations organized by the Assembleia de Estudiantes Secundarios (the Coordinating Assembly of High School Students or ACES) occurred, with up to 100,000 high school students, supported by teachers, parents, and university students participating in demonstrations (*Internationalist Striker* 2007, 18 in Chovanec and Benitez 2008, p. 44). Two national strikes ensued, the first including over 600,000 students on May 31, the second held on June 5. With the ensuing creation of a commission to examine student demands that included student representation, and a promise to offer assistance to Chile's poorest students, the protests subsided, although they continued periodically throughout the school term through November (Chovanec and Benitez 2008, pp. 44-45). Commission recommendations culminated in a new general education law, enacted in 2009, which was intended to address issues of educational quality through creating an education superintendency, an agency for quality, and a national council on education (Cabalin 2012; MINEDEC, OECD, and UNESCO 2010).

Still, as has been noted, the basic structure of the Chilean educational system remained the same since the Pinochet era and inequality continued to increase significantly since 1990. Indeed, even while lauding improvements in student achievement for students in the fourth and eighth grades, as measured by the country's own national testing system, the Measurement System of Educational Quality (SIMCE), President Piñera noted in 2012 that according to the 2011 results, the gap between students from lower and higher socio-economic groups, while 81 points in 2002, was still 66 points (out of a point scale ranging from 0- over 300 points (Gobierno de Chile 2012).

In addition, there was considerable evidence to suggest that the quality of student achievement, as measured through international assessments, had been consistently disappointing (Valverde 2004; Carnoy et al. 2007). For example, on the basis of the Third International Mathematics and Science Survey of 1999, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s Program of International Student Assessment (PISA) 2003 results, Chilean students performed at a comparative level to those of other Latin American countries but quite below those of students from the developed world (Carnoy et al. 2007, p. 26). In 2009, Chilean students performed 44th in reading, 49th in math, and 44th in

science among the 65 countries participating in the PISA assessments. With regard to the first international test of digital reading, also conducted in 2009, Chile's score was in 18th place among the 19 country participants, ranking only above Colombia, with 38% of the test takers failing to reach the minimum level necessary to access a website (SIMCE 2012).

Two points deserve specific comment here. First, the inevitable questions regarding the quality of education Chile's students receive as a result of these disappointing test scores create skepticism not only with regard to the performance of the country's educational system and its components, but also strike at the very logic of the neo-liberal agenda that has served as the system's core rationale. The competition for students and the resources that accompany them supposedly create an incentive for more efficient schools and therefore should result in a rise in the level of educational quality (as defined by student achievement outcomes) throughout the system over time, while demonstrating a comparative advantage over other countries with similar GDP and other demographic indicators. In addition, the assumption that students' education should primarily be a parental responsibility is also thrown into question when modest student performance is in evidence across the board, with regard to the quality of parental decision-making regarding school placement decisions and the general relationship parents have with their children's school.

A second point worth noting is that beginning in the 1990s and certainly since Chile joined the OECD in 2010, the frame of reference for comparing and evaluating not only the country's educational progress but its social and economic development has correspondingly expanded to include developed and more highly developing economies. It is significant, for example, that not only are SIMCE test scores routinely published, but their TIMMS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study) and PISA counterparts are listed alongside of them on the SIMCE web page. Such an increase in global awareness not only speaks to Chile's comparative economic growth and development over the past two decades, but also illustrates how the framing of educational issues has also been influenced by the increased exchange of information that is collected and analyzed in global terms.

Throughout our discussion, we have tied growing social and economic inequality within Chile to educational policy. That connection is most easily visible when one examines the higher education sector. As of 2009, Chile had the highest degree of income inequality among all OECD countries with a Gini co-efficient of .49 in 2009 (OECD 2012, p. 13). Parenthetically, by 2014, its Gini co-efficient rate had risen to .509 in comparison with the OECD average of .313 (OECD 2014). Although the country's overall unemployment rate in 2011 was lower than that of its average OECD counterparts (7.4% to 8.2%), the average percentage of 15-24 year olds participating in the labor force was lower in Chile than the OECD average (38.4% as opposed to 47.2% (OECD 2012, p. 13). At the same time, the increasingly high level of aspiration on the part of Chilean youth to achieve upward social mobility through enrollment in the higher education sector transformed the character of Chilean higher education from an elite to a mass educational system over the past decade, with enrollments growing from 521, 882 students in 2002 to

1,127,200 students enrolled in 2012 (OECD 2012, p. 18). Until the 1980s, the country had eight universities, two of which were publicly owned and publically funded, six of which were privately owned but publicly funded. Since then, the system expanded to include public and private universities, professional institutes, and technical training centers. Of the 173 higher education institutions operational in 2012, 60 were universities, 45 were professional institutes and 68 were technical training centers (there were 20 additional institutions under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense) (OECD 2012, p. 18). Of the 60 universities, 25 were considered to be "traditional" (state run or state subsidized receiving direct public funding, and 35 were private), with the growth in student enrollment occurring most prominently among private universities, professional institutes, and technical training centers (OECD 2012, pp. 17, 18, 19). Most significantly, amongst all OECD countries, the percentage of private expenditure for higher education is the highest in Chile, at over 75% (OECD 2012, p. 22). Yet only the traditional universities were able to apply for direct public grants, their counterparts consigned to applying for indirect grants, allocated on the basis of the number of enrolled students with superior grades on the university entrance examination. Not surprisingly, most of the students enrolled in the traditional universities that were most heavily subsidized by the state graduated from fully private secondary schools as opposed to publicly funded privates or public municipal schools (OECD 2012, p. 22). Students and their families were forced into taking out loans in order to finance their higher education, but as *The Economist* notes, here too, the distribution of monies could be quite unfair.

> Although around 60% of students get grants or government-backed loans, these cover only 70-80% of fees. Loans at "traditional" universities – a group of 25 public and private non-profit institutions – carry an interest rate of just 2% a year. But the interest rate on state-guaranteed bank loans to students at newer private universities, introduced in 2006, was fixed at 5.8%. Many poorer families find that they can achieve their dream of educating their children only by taking on large debts. (*The Economist* April 14, 2012)

While it is not an exaggeration to conclude that the results of the educational system's inequalities crystalized within the higher educational sector, one other characteristic within the private higher education sector is especially worth noting. By law, all higher education institutions are supposed to be non-profit. However, private institutions that are by necessity tuition driven have not always followed the law. In June 2012, for example, seven universities were specifically named by an independent commission as being guilty of engaging in a number of suspect practices. In some cases, deals were made with property developers who built university facilities and then charged rent for use of the buildings and facilities, the proceeds of which were redirected to university managers and administrators (Franklin 2012). In other cases, the outsourcing of services and involvement in nepotistic practices has been noted (Gastal 2012). To sum up, by the winter of 2011, Chilean university students were part of a system that had become increasingly privatized, where those who had attended elite private schools were

more likely to attend prestigious universities that benefited from receiving direct government aid. The burden for paying for higher education was increasingly being placed directly upon students and their families with the interest paid on student loans disproportionately affecting those from lower socio-economic strata, and job prospects for higher education graduates were diminishing, particularly for those graduating from private institutions. At the same time, the leaders of some private institutions were engaging in suspect profit making schemes and were later charged with violating the law.

The Chilean Winter

The events that comprise the Chilean student protests of 2011 have been documented and analyzed at length, most perceptively by Salinas and Fraser (2012) and Cabalin (2012). Suffice it to summarize here some of the main issues that have emanated from their occurrence. On April 21, a group of two hundred student protesters marched on the Ministry of Education in protest against the take-over of the private university, Amagro Central University, by an investment group. Although coordinated by students from a number of private universities, the then student president of the University of Chile, Camila Vallejo, noted that this was a case that represented a privatization trend that was impacting all students, regardless of their specific institutional affiliation (*El Mercurio* 2011). Later, on May 12, the leaders of CONFECH (the country's national student federation), including Vallejo and Giorgio Jackson, organized the first national student protest that included 20,000 participants in Santiago (Salinas and Fraser 2012, p. 21). On May 26, Minister of Education Lavin outlined the government's initial higher educational reform plan to the leaders of Chile's 25 traditional universities. The plan, which included allocating additional funds for scientific equipment, changing the way in which state university funding was allocated to emphasize institutional performance indicators rather than historical information, and giving direct voucher assistance directly to the top performing students (*La Segunda* 2011), not only ignored student concerns, but forcefully reiterated the government's neo-liberal agenda. Student demonstrations continued throughout 2011, with the police estimating that over 230,000 events occurred with over 2 million, 100,000 participants (Salinas and Fraser 2012, p. 22).

Government responses to the demonstrations were at best inept and at worst incendiary. On July 7, President Piñera introduced the "Grand National Agreement on Education" which had a number of provisions, few of which directly addressed student demands. The text of the proposal sought to create an education fund from copper revenues, reduce the interest rates on student loans for those attending non-traditional universities to 4% (from the average 5.8%), increase access to scholarships for poor students who obtained good examination performance, create a Department of Higher Education and a Higher Education Superintendency, create a new law articulating responsibilities among the various types of higher education institutions, begin a debate about the rights and responsibilities of non-profit and for profit institutions, and engage in competitive funding to regional universities to

assist in the training and professional development of teachers (*Gobierno de Chile* 2011). Not surprisingly, the students and their allies, who called for more dramatic reform and opposed Piñera's call for a designated space through which for profit institutions could operate, forcefully rejected the proposal.

CONFECH's formal response, "The Basis for a Social Agreement for Chilean Education," called for a systematic reform of the entire educational system. Specific demands regarding primary and secondary education included the creation of a free, democratic, pluralistic, public education system with a constitutional reform that explicitly acknowledged education as a public good with the right to an education being fundamental. In addition to the call for the de-municipalization of public education, the student federation also demanded a new funding system and reforms regarding teacher status and professional development, free public transport to schools, a national plan for improving school infrastructure, investment in technical and vocational education, and a suspension of subsidies to new institutions until guidelines would be formulated by the Superintendent of Education (El Ciudadano 2011). Many of these demands were not new, as they were articulated during and in the years after the Penguin Revolution. Nonetheless, their inclusion as a significant part of the proposal speaks to the efforts of university student leadership to be inclusive in its orientation, even if the nature of the protest may have initially been more narrowly based (Salinas and Fraser 2012 p. 31).

The students' specific demands with regard to higher education policy included financing reforms with regard to government allocations to institutions, increasing socio-economic diversity with respect to admissions to the traditional universities, creating a new student aid financing system with the goal of eventually eliminating household debt and insuring that private universities that receive state funding were strictly non-profit, fully accredited, transparent, and respectful of academic freedom principles. They also called for the development of a new accreditation system for all higher education institutions that received state funds, the creation of a higher education superintendency (mimicking the Piñera proposal of July 7), democratizing higher education governance while protecting institutional autonomy, and the creation of a network of free publicly funded technical and vocational institutes. They finally called for recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples by increasing financial support to indigenous students and their families, creating a new public intercultural state university, and embarking upon curricular reforms that would include appropriate content in this area (El Ciudadano 2011).

It is clear that the contrasting political distance between government and student views as to what educational reform should entail was significant and represented fundamental differences regarding the functions of government and its relationship to the private sector. But in the context of the demonstrations, the divide was further exacerbated by the exposure of Minister of Education Lavin's reputed financial ties to three companies affiliated with a private university, the Universidad del Desarrollo (Figueroa and Araya 2011). Lavin was the first of three education ministers to hold office under the Piñera regime, and he resigned in July. Later investigations resulted in the imprisonment of the official charged with

accrediting private universities and the resignation of the Minister of Justice in December, 2012, with whom he had an association, and who also had ties to for profit private university (Franklin 2012).

As protests continued, the government offered two additional proposals to students that were rejected. On August 1, a twenty-one point plan was presented that proposed the end of local control over public secondary education and an increase in university scholarships with additional assistance for debt relief. Students viewed the proposal as being too vague and non-responsive to their specific demands (Salazar 2011) and responded with a national protest on August 4 that provoked a forceful police response in Santiago, including the use of tear gas and the arrest of 874 demonstrators, with injury to 90 police (La Tercera 2011) and the burning of a department store on the part of protesters (Franklin 2011). A third government plan, presented on August 18, that called for lowering interest rates on government backed student loans was also rejected (Clarin 2011); the student response included massive marches on August 18 and 21 and a nation-wide strike on August 24-25, organized by the Workers' United Center of Chile. Hundreds were arrested during these strikes, with the police using tear gas and water canons on the protesters, and one young student was shot and killed by the police. Suffice it to conclude the narrative by noting that protests continued sporadically with students returning to classes toward the end of the year. In December, the Chilean Congress passed provisions including an increase in funding for education, interest rate loan relief for private university students, and additional scholarship assistance for poorer students (Salinas and Fraser 2012, p. 23), although student protests still continued into 2012.

Analysis

On one level, it can be argued that the Chilean Winter was a conventional case that exemplifies the generic and historic strengths and weaknesses of student movements. Students were successful in articulating the importance of their grievances to a broader public and were able to garner popular support for their cause by expressing their demands as part of a larger political and social critique that engendered widespread loyalty. The forced resignation of two education ministers and later the Minister of Justice, and the congressional response to student demands that included lower interest rates and more scholarship funding for socio-economically disadvantaged students, while modest, represented success in forcing the government to engage in some educational reform. In the immediate aftermath, it is clear that students were unable to pressure the government into acceding to their most basic demands, and the government was able to eventually wait out the students as their activism dissipated. But it is also true that the protests influenced political debate that colored the country's national election in 2013. Educational reform for the purpose of reducing inequality became a key part of the political platform of victorious presidential candidate, Michelle Bachelet (elected for a second time). Legislation to address existing inequality within all educational sectors (kindergarten through the university level) through raising taxes on the

country's most affluent population segment was formally proposed and was being deliberated in 2014. In addition, it is noteworthy that Camila Vallejo and other student leaders, Giorgio Jackson, Gabriel Boric, and Karol Cariola, all gained seats in Chile's lower house of the Chamber of Deputies (Reuters 2013).

One can certainly view both the students and the government as having used conventional tactics to further their respective aims. University students looked to allies including secondary students, teachers and workers to demonstrate the depths of popular support for their cause and did so with considerable success. On the other hand, internal disagreements with regard to the extent to which the students should actively negotiate with the government led to Camila Vallejo's eventual loss of position as President of the University of Chile student federation in spite of her worldwide popularity. The tension regarding negotiation and compromise while affirming ideological purpose is certainly common among social movements of all types and remains present today (Reuters 2013). On the other side, government officials were slow to understand how quickly student protests tapped into popular discontent, were inept at negotiating with the students, offered half-hearted compromises, employed permit restriction strategies that unsuccessfully attempted to control the physical contours of the protests, and over-reacted with the use of excessive force when initial efforts at crowd control faltered.

Both sides respectively attempted to frame the conflict according to terms favorable to their own side and the discourses they relied upon to frame the content were typical of social movement protest as well. In this case, the students argued that their cause was the creation of a more equitable education system and therefore a more equitable society while the government argued that students were perpetuating chaos and violence, and that official responses were necessary to preserve public order. Activists promoting both perspectives expressed rather conventional tropes but the students were able to frame their arguments in more compelling terms, in part because of the opportunity structures that were made available to them.

An analysis of these opportunity structures helps us to appreciate the unconventional nature of the Chilean winter protests as well.[2] It is easy to note in hindsight, how a relatively new government that was becoming unpopular and had recently confronted protests over environmental issues such as the construction of massive dams in the Southern part of the country, offered students an opponent who already was facing difficulties in shaping public opinion in its favor. At the same time, as has been noted, participation in the Penguin Revolution gave students experience in confronting public authorities systematically. The fact that visible politicians engaged in practices that if not officially corrupt, presented clear conflicts of interest, offered students an opportunity to connect establishment faces with the practices they criticized and the need for the reformist messages they espoused. It is important to emphasize that the possibilities for organizing successful mass protest were enhanced by the failure not only of the Piñera administration but of its predecessors as well, to tackle structural inequities within an educational system that had become more pressing as middle class aspiration increased. Indeed, administration officials believed that they were generally

following past precedent in allowing for increasing higher education privatization, precisely because limited educational reform that did little to alter the structural characteristics of the educational system had been agreed upon and enacted during the first Bachelet term. Their inability to anticipate the depth of discontent regarding prevailing educational and social inequality, created the possibility for students to successfully organize popular support for their efforts.

From a resource mobilization perspective, the traditional strength of student organizations including FECH and CONFECH, as well as ACES (Asamblea Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios or the Coordinating Assembly of High School Students) was unique and contributed to the students' ability to plan massive demonstrations as well as national strikes. At the same time, the use of social media cannot be underestimated when examining the resources students used to mobilize support for their cause. In 2011, it was reported that Chile had the fifth highest usage of social network sites in the world, that 9 out of 10 Chilean internet users were on Facebook, and that Chile had the 13th largest Twitter membership in the world on a population percentage basis (Rogers 2011). Their use of social media therefore allowed the students to vary their repertoires of contention while significantly enhancing their ability to frame their struggle to a worldwide audience. Nonetheless, there is little evidence that through their extensive employment of social media, Chilean students fundamentally changed their reliance upon a traditional organizational structure or adapted their messaging to these new communicative strategies in radical ways. Their use of social media in this instance complemented their more conventional efforts to organize mass protest. However, as was noted in the introduction to this volume, the very meaning of social movement participation in the broadest of terms became more expansive as the range of activities associated with movement affiliation increased, whether they included forwarding a text or political image or marching in a public space.

Strategies involving specific repertoires of contention included both traditional forms of protest: the strike, mass demonstration, school sit-in and the occupation of public space, as well as non-traditional forms of protest: re-enacting Michael Jackson's Thriller video, a staged Kiss-In, running around the La Moneda Palace (Presidential Palace) for 1800 hours, and banging pots and pans during a formal demonstration. All of the above tactics with the exception of the latter represented creative efforts to gain broad sympathy for their cause in performative and symbolic ways that were decidedly non-threatening (Salinas and Fraser 2012, p. 32). In the final case, the tradition of banging pots and pans began as a demonstration against food shortages during the Allende regime, was resurrected as a protest strategy during the Pinochet years, and was then re-used in 2011. It in fact is a technique that has been employed in many cross-cultural protest settings, including that of Gezi Park in Istanbul, in 2013. The example more generally conforms to other examples of social protest, going back to the barricade, whereby traditional strategies are given new meanings when they are resurrected in different contexts. It should also be stressed that their astute use of new media including You-tube videos, tweets, and Facebook messaging allowed the students to express

their views before a world audience, and student leaders such as Camila Vallejo became internationally known celebrities as a result.

Their savvy use of social and electronic media also allowed the students to expand the frame through which their protests could be interpreted to include the global as well as the regional and local. It was no longer simply Chilean educational inequality that was on trial but educational neo-liberalism in its totality, at least as viewed by many throughout the world. Thus, student leaders Vallejo and Jackson traveled to Europe, met with members of the OECD and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and reported back about the virtues of Scandinavian education. In so doing, they used their celebrity to further argue for their cause (Salinas and Fraser 2012, p. 23). These tactics not only put further pressure upon the Chilean government to take student demands seriously, but they added to the sense of global solidarity protesters in Europe and North America also experienced while simultaneously fighting their own battles.

It should be stressed though, that in spite of the tactics they employed and their reliance upon a creative use of social media, the reformist goals of the Chilean students were quite conventional with regard to schooling and educational policy more broadly. Indeed, their calls for improved assessment of higher education institutions, for example, were suggestions that the government also supported. Most importantly, Chilean students through their protests, reaffirmed their faith in the power of educational institutions to provide for upward social mobility and decrease social inequality, at least in the abstract, if reformed in a constructive manner. They did not challenge the generic institutional legitimacy of schools and universities even as they expressed their extreme discontent with the government's educational policies and with the exercise of its authority. Such a distinction is important because it was not present in the other two cases subject for discussion in this paper, at least in their initial formations.

SPAIN AND THE INDIGNADOS MOVEMENT

In many ways, the *15-m Movement* or *Movimiento quince*, which later came to be known as the *Indignados Movement*, appears to be the antithesis of the Chilean Winter. Although students played an important role in its origination, their initial involvement was not as exclusive as was the case in Chile, for youth, the unemployed, and representatives from numerous other social sectors all contributed to its formation and subsequent development from the start. Unlike the Chilean student protests, educational reform was only one of a number of issues that captured the imagination of the Spanish activists. In addition, the *Indignados Movement* by design was leaderless, and its participants prided themselves for their intentional rejection of formal organizational structure. The purity of their grassroots mobilization efforts in their minds reaffirmed their rejection of the institutional authority of the state and the corrupt political processes that led to the Spanish debt crisis. Two other points of contrast bear mention. While the genesis of the Chilean winter protests spoke directly to the country's 38 year flirtation with

educational neo-liberalism, expressed through use of a vocabulary that was distinctly Chilean, the *Indignados Movement*'s influences were more eclectic. It thus drew upon mobilization models emanating from Iceland, Greece, the Arab Spring, the popularity of French philosopher/diplomat Stephane Hessel's short monograph *Indignez-vous*, longstanding tensions with European Union economic policy, as well as specific areas of contention of a domestic nature. Second, the *Indignados Movement* did not really end in 2012. By eschewing formal participation in the country's politics, its members have been able to continue to critique, mobilize, and protest against government policy through blogging and social networking well into 2013, albeit with an intensity that has ebbed and flowed with the moment.

To be sure, there are interesting similarities between the two movements that deserve to be stressed. First, participants in both movements relied upon and used the resources of Internet and social media quite successfully in mobilizing support for their causes. This was indeed a virtue made out of necessity, given the reluctance of traditional media to cover their events. Second, to varying degrees, they relied upon the use of symbolic politics to communicate their views, but were quite effective in doing so. Third, as a result of the above, participants in both movements were able to generate widespread support for their efforts, even when they articulated their demands in unconventional ways.

Spanish Popular Democracy in 2011

There are a number of antecedents that influenced the formation of the *Indignados Movement* that deserve specific mention. They include the Spanish Government's response to the Atocha train bombing in 2004 (where Basque separatists were reflexively blamed for the incident as opposed to an Al Quaida affiliated terrorist cell), protests calling for the right to fair housing in 2006 and 2007, opposition to the banking system, and general discontent with cuts in health care and education (Fuster Morell 2012, p. 3). Some have specifically noted the vehemence of student protest against the Bologna Process (Warden 2008), which was perceived to have placed students' work/study options in jeopardy, as having also served as one of many dress rehearsals for the events of 2011 and then 2012. Certainly basic structural factors including Spain's particular vulnerability to the global recession of 2008 due to the bursting of its housing bubble, the banking practices that contributed to the bubble, and successive governments' unwillingness to address its debt crisis helped set the stage for the *Indignados Movement*. Not insignificantly, overall unemployment in Spain rose to 21.3% in the first quarter of 2011 (EITB April 2011), and youth unemployment reached 43.5% (Oliver 2011), indicators that were amongst the worst of their type in Europe.

But this was very much a mobilization borne out of the Internet and the use of social media, factors that contributed to its unique character. The Internet facilitated easy and quick access to information that allowed Spaniards to frame their challenges within comparative reference points. The Icelandic protests in 2008, in response to the country's bankruptcy, resulted in the writing of a new

constitution with some direct citizen participation, the removal of the governing party, imprisonment of some of those who were responsible, and direct state control of the banking system. Knowledge of these events as they unfolded from 2008-2011 was very much on the minds of the leaders of *Real Democracy Now*, who organized the initial demonstrations in Madrid. In a similar vein, the events of the Arab spring were influential in shaping the thinking of Spanish youth too. While the Internet provided Spanish youth with quick access to information involving protest in other countries, globalizing their contexts, it is the use of social media that stands out as being particularly influential, for it was not only the spread of information but the ability and willingness to process that information empathetically that created the cohesiveness necessary for the movement to proceed. The strong collective response to the publication of Stephane Hessel's pamphlet, *Time for Outrage* (*Indignez-vous*) is particularly instructive in this vein. The 29 page document, based upon a speech the author wrote, calls for non-violent action in response to the widening gap between rich and poor in Western countries, the poor treatment of immigrants and expulsion of illegal immigrant workers, the plight of the disadvantaged in the Third World, and includes a specific condemnation of Israeli policy in the West Bank and Gaza. But its popularity was also due to the power of the author's personal biography. Hessel was a Holocaust survivor, member of the French Resistance, diplomat, co-participant in the writing of the Declaration of Human Rights, and an advocate writing at the age of 93. Although originally only 8,000 copies were published in 2010, by 2011, it had sold over 3.5 million copies, and over 500,000 in Spain (McNichol 2011). The call for action that formed the basis of the argument in *Indignez-Vous*, influenced the decision of Spanish protesters to adopt the *Indignados* label as the movement evolved. Manuel Castells (2012) has argued convincingly that the social movements that germinated globally in 2011 were distinctive not only in the ways in which their participants used electronic media to access and disseminate information, but in the ways in which they used social media in particular to generate massive political involvement through their collective emotive appeal. The *Indignados Movement* gives direct evidence for his contention.

It is therefore important to reiterate Fuster Morell's (2012) emphasis upon the strong popular reaction to the Sinde law. Proposed in December 2010 and passed in February 2011 with the widespread support of mainstream political parties, the Sinde law attempted to limit piracy, intellectual property and copyright violations over the Internet by creating a commission to quicky adjudicate complaints in this area. Viewed as an infringement upon the public's right to access information and as a legitimation of potential Internet censorship, protesters including the groups *Anonymous* and *Do Not Vote for Them* expanded their immediate reaction against this law into a wider political and social protest, resulting in the contestation of the May 22 municipal elections (Fuster Morell, 2012, pp. 5-6).

Castells notes that other Internet based groups concurrently articulated more conventional concerns, with *Juventud Sin Futuro* (Youth With No Future) in particular, specifically organizing an April 7 demonstration designed to protest against policies that they believed endangered the right to work, housing, and

education (Castells 2012, 122-123). Ultimately, organizational efforts coalesced around a Facebook group in March that became *Democracia Real Ya* (Real Democracy Now), morphing into a strong Internet presence based upon "a decentralized network with autonomous nodes in different cities" (Castells 2012, p. 111). As the specific 2011-2012 events of the *Indignados Movement* are well-known, there is little need to offer an extensive summary here. The brief discussion that follows is taken from the chronology compiled by Cardenas and Conill (2012).

On May 15, *Democracia Real Ya* sponsored a national demonstration in Spain's largest cities, drawing over 130,000 protesters. On May 16, Madrid protesters occupied the Puerta del Sol, the main public space within the city. When the police tried but failed to successfully disperse them, camps were set up throughout the major cities within the country, in addition to Madrid and most notably in the Plaza de Catalunya in Barcelona. In the following days, the number of cities with camps expanded to the point whereby on May 20, there were 166 Spanish cities with camps. On May 18, in Madrid, protesters created daily assemblies on the Plaza del Sol, where resolutions calling upon government action were debated and developed. As a result of the municipal elections held on May 22, the conservative People's Party won a strong majority, at the expense of the socialist party. Soon after, the assembly concept expanded to many neighborhoods within Madrid. On May 27, protesters were evicted from the Plaza de Catalunya with accompanying police violence; national protests in support of the Barcelona colleagues ensued coupled with a resolution to maintain camps in a number of cities. On May 30, *Democracia Real Ya* called for a global protest on October 15. Subsequently, protests throughout the country continued, while the encampment in the Plaza del Sol itself ended on June 12 and camps in other cities lasted for varying durations. In addition to the assembly concept, the invention of the commission structure, with specific groups researching and proposing direct action before the assembly, was a noteworthy creation of the movement. But above all, its decentered and flexible nature allowed the movement to adjust to changing circumstances through employing an eclectic series of tactics. Thus, on June 11, protesters demonstrated against city councils across the country, and there were demonstrations against Parliament members in Barcelona on June 14 and 15, with violence occurring on the later date. On June 17, protesters demonstrated during a Santander Bank shareholder's meeting, while efforts were concurrently made to block housing evictions. Calls for the release of those arrested as a result of their participation in protests (June 22), opposition to the European Union Euro-Plus Pact (June 18), and a march from Madrid to Brussels to petition the European parliament (July 26), are selected examples that give a sense of the vibrancy of the activism within the *Movement*. On June 30, Barcelona police rid the Plaza de Catalunya of those who were encamped there; other camps across the country were dissembled afterwards in periodic fashion (Cardenas and Conill 2012, pp. 260-270). The United for Global Change event on October 15, involving protesters from over 82 countries, which was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, included strong participation from Spanish *Indignados* members, and their protests continued throughout 2012. Of particular interest were the protests held in Valencia from February 15-25, in

response to education budget cuts. They later spread throughout the country including Madrid and Barcelona, where on February 29, fires were set and bank windows were smashed (Frayer 2012). Protests continued intermittently, and on April 29 over 10,000 participants demonstrated against both health care and education budget cuts (Heckel 2012).

To be sure, although not the sole concern of movement members, educational issues were always articulated as being important considerations. As Calvo, Gomez-Pas-Trana, and Mena note (2011), education ranked sixth among 14 factors listed as movement objectives among a representative sampling of participants, above those of reducing military spending, punishing those responsible for the economic crisis, and engaging in environmental and urban reform, but below those of pursuing electoral reform, fighting against corruption, limiting financial markets, transforming democracy, and confronting a partial media. Even more importantly, through their use of the assembly and commission models, movement participants created informal educational mechanisms to communicate their objectives. Castells describes the assembly as a leaderless, grass-roots participatory structure that was granted decision-making power within camps and later neighborhoods. As participants attempted to balance the demands of inclusivity and efficiency within their decision-making processes, and as they debated the merits of decision-making through consensus building as opposed to majority rule, the commission was developed to be at times an auxiliary and at times an independent entity which would address issues with a greater degree of focus (Castells 2012, pp. 121-125). While both entities were leaderless, their success depended upon a collective sharing and analysis of information that formed the basis for their participants/ decision-making. In short, their presence reinforced a commitment to creating the space where grass roots education could flourish among movement participants and then be disseminated to larger audiences.

The popular educative function of the assemblies and commissions thus resulted in significant public policy demands of a specific nature, and in the case of the Madrid Puerta del Sol Assembly, even included a call for a re-examination of Franco era atrocities (Declos and Viejo 2012). Some of the efforts that benefited from the movement's decentralized nature and continued onto 2012 involved the continued vibrancy of certain neighborhood assemblies. One initiative was labeled "time-banking," whereby reciprocal services were offered with the time of one's labor constituting alternative to monetary remuneration, facilitated through Internet communication. Other efforts included the creation of organic food gardens in urban spaces as well as food cooperatives, and mobilizations to contest forced housing evictions. And, the Madrid based neighborhood brigade for human rights monitoring publicized the conditions of police detention centers where illegal immigrants were housed (Roarmag.org 2012). Such efforts continued into 2013, where grass roots mobilization efforts defended public health and public education entities, labeled "the tides in defense of public services (mareas)." In these instances, doctors, nurses, patients and neighbors organized a "White Tide" to defend public health, while teachers, students, and parents organized a "Green Tide" to defend schools and public education (Moreno-Caballud 2013).

In both cases, a reliance upon a horizontal, grass-roots bottom-up organizational structure continued to be in evidence. Moreno-Caballud (2013) further points to efforts to contest popular deference to public intellectual culture, through the creation of the "thinking work group," or the creation of the "Platform for the Citizen's Audit of the Debt," which encouraged local entities to refuse to pay debt based upon exorbitant interest charged by those banks that received bailout monies, as further examples of grass roots organizing. He views this phenomenon as one of many that demonstrated a level of popular education and information sharing that eschewed deference to the authority of conventional experts and public intellectuals.

If members of the *Indignados Movement* embraced popular education concepts to further their goals, they did so in part because they framed their actions according to a strong moral code that attacked what they viewed as the materialism implicit within a capitalist mindset (Democracia real YA! 2011). Because they viewed traditional institutions, be they political, economic, and social, as being complicit in creating the lack of transparency and rampant corruption that the country was experiencing, designing spaces that encouraged the antithesis of the above was essential in generating a frame that endorsed the legitimacy of their claims and actions. Although this was a movement borne from the Internet and social media, as Castells (2012, pp. 10-11) notes, it was one that needed the physical presence of urban space to make the messages emanating from the Movement concrete and real. The physical presence of the camps, the assemblies, the commissions, and the protest marches all fulfilled such a role.

Although the discontent expressed by *Indignados* members did not initially focus upon government educational policy as the sole basis for protest, as we have noted, educational concerns have always been important in helping to define the shape of the movement. It is therefore not surprising that the prospects of future educational privatization within the higher education sector became a focus for alarm among protesters in the fall of 2012, even if the initial logic of the movement was predicated upon a decidedly anti-institutionalist perspective. I would argue that from the start, this movement engaged in political activity that affirmed the nexus between education and activism. The desire to confront neo-liberal approaches to the higher education sector was consistent with movement goals and aims (Juventud Sin Futuro 2012). In any event, by mid-to late 2012, the political agendas of the student veterans of the Chilean Winter and *Indignados* members had crossed with regard to their educational concerns.

And it is clear that in both cases, a re-framing of the contradictions within neo-liberalism occurred that has lasted beyond the culmination of discrete protest events. In the Spanish case, one need only examine popular responses to the June 2, 2014 abdication of King Juan Carlos to note the permanence of continuing dissatisfaction with the country's prevailing economic and social inequality, perceived to have been permanently constructed as a result of government support for the perpetuation of class privilege (de Miguel and O'Leary 2014).

Analysis

When one examines the generic characteristics representative of most social movements, their applicability to the 15m/*Indignados Movement* is apparent. With a recent history political paralysis and corruption within the country, rampant unemployment with youth being particularly targeted, and with the juxtaposition of significant cuts in social services alongside of bank bailouts, the opportunity to engage in protest with a minimum of cost was readily apparent. Coupled with the counter-examples of Iceland and Tunisia where activism was judged as successful in response to governments that were also viewed as inefficient and/or corrupt, and the government's efforts to limit Internet access through passage of the Sinde Act, there should be little surprise when one assesses the degree of strength and popularity of the *Indignados*.

What has been particularly significant about the movement has been the ways in which its members have mobilized the resources of the Internet and social networking to gather popular support. In so doing, as Castells (2012, pp. 116-122) has so adroitly noted, the *Indignados* created organizational structures in the forms of the camp, assembly and the commission that mirrored and took advantage of the characteristics and strengths of social networking with particular regard to their lack of formal leadership, their inclusivity, spontaneity, and their flexibility. We have noted that these organizational forms also allowed protesters to utilize different and unconventional repertoires of contention. Although they often complemented one another, the autonomy and freedom implicit in Internet and social media usage supported the use of public urban space through utilizing the camp in the public plaza. As was true of students during their Chilean winter protests, the *Indignados* relied upon performativity as a means of fostering internal cohesion, while symbolically attacking one's opponent in a non-threatening manner that engenders popular support. Placard messaging included statements such as "No es una crisis, es que ya no te quiero [It's not a crisis, it's that I don't love you anymore]," while theatrical performances included "a funeral for democracy" and an "aerobics assembly" (Romanos 2012, pp. 7-9), all of which had strategic and palliative benefit.

Together, through their use of the alternative media for mobilization purposes, and their differing repertoires, the *Indignados* were able to frame their movement according to unconventional terms. Thus, although they claimed to be apolitical, in fact, most of the *Indignados* favored leftist policies (Cavlo et al. 2011, p. 8). Although they claimed to be representative of all social sectors, they in fact were predominantly well-educated youth, within the 19-30 cohort, with 70% attending or having completed the university (Cavlo et al. 2011, p. 7). But by positioning themselves as critics of all established political parties, and in fact the entire formal political system, they gained widespread popular sympathy for their activities. Their anti-establishment framing was additionally significant because it challenged the expansiveness of the neo-liberal status quo. In so doing, it unmasked the close relationship between the market and the state, questioning its viability in the aftermath of economic crisis. At the same time, the framing of their protest went

beyond typical critiques of neo-liberal political agendas, insofar as government regulation of Internet freedom served as a catalyst for a collective response to what was viewed as unacceptable support for information capitalism. The ubiquity of the social construction of Internet access as an individual right to free expression and the free exchange of ideas, resulted in a recognition of the authoritarian nature of neo-liberalism in spaces that had been previously viewed as sacred and protected from government or market intrusion.

<div align="center">THE U.S. OCCUPY MOVEMENT</div>

A superficial analysis of the U.S. Occupy Movement would lead one to view it as simply a North American derivation of the *Indignados* protests and to be sure, there are a number of important similarities as the following chronology indicates.[3] The decision to organize a protest near Wall Street on September 17 was initially publicized in the online anti-consumerist Canadian magazine *Adbusters* in mid-July by the journal's co-founder and senior editor (Byrne 2012). In August, a group calling itself "New Yorkers Against Budget Cuts" joined with a counterpart to organize the actual protest on September 17, supported by members of *Anonymous*. This was the same Internet hacking group that played a role in the formation of the *Indignado*s Movement. After approximately 1000 protesters marched on Wall Street, on September 17, Zucotti Park, a privately owned nearby public space, became the site where protesters permanently encamped. An ensuing march on September 2 resulted in 80 protesters being arrested, with some being pepper sprayed. This foreshadowed a larger protest march toward the Brooklyn Bridge with 700 arrests on October 1. On October 5, established political organizations joined in a lower Manhattan march that included approximately 15,000 marchers but resulted in mass arrests as police barriers and barricades were broached. By October 6, additional marches were held throughout the U.S. in cities including Portland, Houston, Austin, Tampa and San Francisco, with numerous U.S. protesters participating in the worldwide demonstrations of October 15. Arrests occurred on October 21 and 23 in Tampa, Orlando, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati and on October 25, Iraqi war veteran Scott Olsen suffered a fractured skull due to police efforts to disperse peaceful protesters in Oakland. A general strike in Oakland ensued on November 2, with riot police clashes occurring on November 3. Occupy Portland members were evicted on November 13, and on November 14, Oakland police evicted protesters from their city plaza encampment arresting 20 individuals. At 1:00 am. on November 15, Zucotti Park was cleared of its Occupy Wall Street inhabitants. Later, on November 18, University of California-Davis police pepper sprayed student protesters who were sitting on the campus quad, demonstrating against dramatic tuition increases. This was the culmination of previous student protests held at various public university campuses throughout the state. In spite of the subsequent disbanding of camps in other cities, sporadic protests continued well into 2012.

As was true of the Spanish case, the various Occupy sites were organized with a high degree of autonomy, and relied upon social media as well as participatory

forums such as the "New York General Assembly" to conduct business within the various encampments. Leadership personas were eschewed; formal organizational hierarchies rejected. Similar to what occurred within the Puerta del Sol environment, a webcam constantly streamed images of activities and discussions in Zucotti Park. That site, along with those where camps were established in other cities, reiterated the importance of public space and the right to free assembly (Gitlin 2012, pp. 244-245) that were essential components of both the Spanish and Chilean protests. And, as was true in the above cases, efforts were made to portray all protesters as violent and dangerous, with those who settled into permanent spaces in Spain and the U.S. accused of creating harmful, unsanitary living conditions. To be clear, instances of sexual assault and rape were repeatedly reported at the Zucotti Park site, but the overwhelming responses of Occupy Movement protesters were non-violent. Like the Spanish example, the creation of settlement within public spaces further reiterated the injustices of home foreclosure and eviction. The use of symbolic repertoires of contention, so evident in both the Chilean and Spanish cases were in evidence here too, and they included creation of a People's library in Zucotti Park, whose destruction by the New York City police was framed as the State's reluctance to support dialogue and conversation (The Guardian 2012).

All this being said, as a result of extensive research conducted by Milkman, Luce, and Lewis (2013, p. 5), we now have a clearer picture of the Occupy Wall Street experience, if not the Occupy Movement in its totality. They report that many of the organizers of OWS were politically experienced rather than naïve novices; that their ranks included a large number of young adults who were under or unemployed, carrying a significant degree of indebtedness but who nonetheless were highly educated, and that while skeptical of the mainstream political system, many have remained politically engaged in the aftermath of the events of 2011-2012.

To my way of thinking, there are additionally significant differences between the two movements that should be emphasized. First, the Occupy Movement from its beginnings defined itself through embracing the vocabulary of social class and class exploitation. Members of the *Indignados* Movement to the contrary posited at least in a formal sense, an apolitical stance, rejecting all formal political parties as having been irreparably corrupted through their association with economic elites. Such a categorical dismissal of conventional political engagement had the benefit of promoting an inclusivity that spoke to popular frustration. In the case of the Occupy Movement, although many participants were extremely disillusioned with the Obama administration and its reluctance to hold Wall Street accountable for the economic collapse of 2008, inclusivity was promoted through articulating a belief in the necessity of combatting class exploitation that affected the 99% of the population.

Second, from the start, the importance of the educational background as a contributing factor that helped define class privilege was acknowledged. The sense of entitlement Wall Street practitioners were perceived to embrace was as much due to their Ivy League pedigrees as it was their accumulated wealth. Certainly the

more highly educated OWS participants of whom we have previously spoken understood that educational achievement was no guarantor of material success, particularly in the aftermath of the greatest recession in U.S. history since the Great Depression. But such realizations clashed with those Wall Street counterparts who having reaped the benefits of educational neo-liberalism, justified their acquired affluence as evidence of their unique talent and effort, and viewed the government Troubled Asset Relief Program as an unquestioned entitlement.[4]

If the most enduring legacy of the Occupy Movement was its reframing of the neo-liberal agenda in ways that exposed its plutocratic tendencies, this achievement could not have been accomplished without an acknowledgement of the role of education in promoting neo-liberalism but conversely, the power of education to promote specific policy reforms. A comparison with the Tea Party Movement is thus illuminating. As a pre-cursor to the Occupy Movement, the Tea Party Movement relied upon reflexive populist anger toward the government's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (stimulus package) to organize opposition to government programs of all types. The movement quickly evolved into an effort to promote the election of government representatives who would articulate similar anti-government sentiments. The Occupy Movement, while also capitalizing upon populist anger, embraced specific policy proposals that were more constructive, embracing rather than decrying civic engagement. In so doing, they embraced a rather vibrant exchange of ideas. The collective "Research Justice," for example, conducted its own demographic and participation survey to document the background and attitudes of Occupy participants and in so doing, used "research justice for movement building" (Schwindler, Mazón, Waheed and Costanza-Chock, 2012 p. 69). Professional sociologists such as Joel Olsen offered self-critiques regarding the "whiteness" of the Movement and the necessity of confronting "left-colorblindness" (2012, pp. 46-52) in its aftermath. The possibilities and challenges of collaborating on a long-term basis with labor unions and other established social movement organizations without losing the flexibility inherent in decentralized, anarchistic approach that marked the Occupy protests around the country was also the topic of extended discussion (Bookbinder and Belt 2012, pp. 263-274).

It is thus not surprising that the Occupy Movement was characterized through its inception and duration by a significant intellectual undergirding. Public intellectuals such as Cornel West were quick to address the inhabitants at Zucotti Park, for example. The anthropologist David Graeber (2012, pp. 141-149), credited with coining the term, "We are the 99%," was able to situate the appeals to direct democracy that Occupy followers expressed as an appropriate legacy of the anarchist tradition. Similarly, Joseph Stiglitz's excerpt from his book, *From the Price of Inequality* in the May 1 issue of *Vanity Fair* magazine, titled "Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%," articulated themes of central importance to Occupy members (Stiglitz 2011; Gitlin 2012, p. 19). Indeed, 63 members of the New School faculty signed a letter supporting their students' decision to walk out of classes in support of Occupy Wall Street on October 5, 2011 (*Art and Education* 2011).

Given this background, it is not surprising that higher education reform became a key issue among Occupy participants, particularly in California. The protests that were occurring throughout University of California and California state university campuses prior to the UC Davis pepper spray incident, highlighted the consequences of draconian state cuts in higher education funding that had been ongoing for a number of years. As a result, institutions were confronted with their increasingly limited capacity to enroll students, while enrolled students were unable to complete courses necessary for their graduation in a timely manner. Full-time faculty positions were being eliminated in favor of the hiring of contingent faculty, employees faced furloughs, salary cuts, and freezes; in short, the system seemed to be crumbling, while conversely, students and their parents were confronted with consistent tuition increases resulting in exorbitant loan indebtedness. It is within such a context that the student protests, culminating in the UC Davis incident, occurred.

But one would be remiss to conclude that the results of these protests were limited simply to an articulation of the conditions that influenced their formation. For example, a group of student newspaper editors at the University of California-Riverside developed an alternative plan to finance public higher education in the state by substituting student loan financing with a program that would deduct a percentage of graduates' wages once they were employed after leaving the university. The amount of one's financial obligation would be tied to one's post-graduate income to be paid over a twenty-year period. Labeling their organization "Fix UC," this student group, along with members of the Occupy Movement, met with the Board of Regents on the Riverside campus in January, 2012 to discuss their concerns in light of the prospects of even more state budget cuts for higher education (Rossoni 2012). To be sure, the Fix UC adherents devised their plan concurrently but independent of Occupy Movement activities in California. Nonetheless, the serious attention afforded the Fix UC plan by university officials was influenced in large part by the degree to which Occupy protests captured widespread public support. A more direct example of collaboration for the purposes of educational reform also occurred in January, 2012 in Baltimore, when members of the Occupy Baltimore Movement joined forces with the Baltimore Algebra Project to occupy a site designated for the construction of a juvenile detention facility. The irony of the state committing $112 million to the creation of this building when schools were being closed and budgets cut dramatically was not lost upon organizers, six of whom were arrested in the aftermath of their demonstration (Spence and McGuire 2012, p. 63). These examples highlight one of Milkman, Lewis and Luce's (2012) conclusions, that Occupy activists not only were able to collaborate with established socially active organizations, but that their commitment to social reform was substantive, lasting beyond specific protest events and the evictions of protesters from various encampments.

The creation of an Occupy Sandy relief organization in the aftermath of a devastating hurricane that brought property damage and loss of life to many mid-Atlantic regions including New York and New Jersey, and its continued presence as a vehicle for offering assistance to the victims of the natural disaster, speaks to

the depth of civic engagement some of those associated with the original Occupy Movement, continue to express (Occupy Sandy Recovery 2014). And, in a parallel reminiscent to a smaller degree of the continuing involvement of Chilean students in their country's political process, Kshama Sawant, Occupy leader and part-time university instructor, became the first avowed socialist to be elected to the Seattle City Council in 2013. She ran on a platform of significantly raising the city worker minimum wage, which was enacted into law at a rate of $15.00 an hour in 2014, the highest in the country (Johnson 2014). Nonetheless, as is also true of the Chilean and Spanish cases, the power and importance of the Occupy Movement lay as much with its influence in re-framing political discourse as it did with specific policy reforms that have arisen as a result of its formation.

Like both the Chilean and Spanish cases, Occupy Movement participants confronted a conservative media establishment that at least initially failed to take their demands seriously (Gitlin, 2012, p. 31 citing Bellafonte 2011). But as the protests continued, and outrage regarding the existence of growing social class inequality continued to be raised, there was a reframing of mainstream political discourse that helped to shape the 2012 Presidential election. To be sure, many of the Occupy protesters wanted nothing to do with mainstream politics, and argued that politicians such as Elizabeth Warren, had coopted their messaging while professing ambivalence regarding their tactics (Johnson 2011). But whether castigated by the political right in the voices of politicians such as Newt Gingrich (Wyler 2011), or somewhat embraced by President Obama during the New Hampshire primary (Gitlin 2012, p. 192) and more forcefully argued in his post-election State of the Union address (Garofoli 2012), an important consequence of the Occupy Movement protests was the open discussion of class privilege that mainstream politicians were forced to address, thereby structuring the discourse of the 2012 presidential election and its aftermath.

Their ability to reframe discourse regarding neo-liberal principles in ways that found resonance with the broader public compares favorably with 1960s anti-war protesters who lacked the communicative resources available to occupy members through their use of social and electronic media (Gitlin 2012, p. 5). Thus, as was the case with Chilean Winter and *Indignados* participants, the strength of the Occupy movement was enhanced by the speed with which messaging was communicated through the ability to use Facebook, Twitter, and other forms of social media. When one examines the opportunity structures that precipitated the Occupy Movement protests, one sees that they were prevalent and consequential. Protests against Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker's "Budget Repair Bill" mobilized students, academicians, and public employees within the state, foreshadowing strategies used within the Occupy Movement. After the bill was enacted, recall elections of state senators and the governor were later held. As has been noted, the success of the Arab Spring but particularly the *Indignados* Movement had a significant influence upon those who planned the initial Occupy Wall Street activities. But, given the results of the 2010 United States Congressional election and Tea Party success in supporting extremist Republican candidates in opposition to the Obama administration, as well as the lingering

effects of unemployment, foreclosure and housing loss created by the actions of a deregulated financial industry, the conditions for creating a vibrant national protest that evolved into the Occupy Movement were clearly present prior to its inception.

We have mentioned various repertoires of contention with reference to the Occupy Movement including encampment within public space, protest marches, rallies, university student strikes, along with less orthodox methods such as the general assembly, the People's library, and the webcam documenting encampment activities on a twenty-four hour basis. These strategies mirror those used in Chile, Spain, and in Arab Spring countries. Their use, along with a reliance upon social and electronic media, created strong feelings of community and solidarity within the various Occupy sites (Gitlin 2012, pp. 238-239). Due to their ability to mobilize existing resources including the tapping of the expertise of those with prior experience in organizational activism and their use of social media, they understood that conditions were ripe for massive protest against a heretofore uncontested neo-liberal agenda. As a result, Occupy Movement participants were able to significantly reframe political discourse in the United States. They did so in spite of specific agendas that were diffusively eclectic rather than well-defined, and they successfully battled old media that initially marginalized their importance, all the while refraining from creating formal leadership positions within vertical organizational hierarchies. As was true of the *Indignados* Movement, educational reform was at first an implicit rather than explicit agenda item, but in time, concerns regarding educational quality and student indebtedness, with particular reference to the state of higher education in the United States, were more prominently voiced.

CONCLUSION

Both Chile and Spain responded to decades of authoritarian repression by instituting representative democracies that embraced neo-liberal policies. By 2011, youth in both countries seized upon the failure of their governments to address the educational and social consequences of those policies to confront authorities with protests that helped create a global social movement. At the same time, their efforts were met with popular support in their respective countries. Their strategies differed markedly, at least initially, with regard to their respective institutional foci. In the Chilean case, the results of higher education privatization, which negatively affected equity, access, and personal family indebtedness, created a reaction whereby unfairness within the educational system served as a surrogate for the blockage to upward social mobility that a majority of the population experienced or of which it was fearful. The response of the student protesters, even with their judicious use of alternative and social media, was focused upon broad institutional reform even if there was strategic disagreement among student ranks regarding the advisability of negotiating with the center-right government. Unlike the Spanish and U.S. cases, Chilean students examined educational neo-liberalism as a continuum, and saw how privatization of the public schools negatively impacted higher education opportunity while underscoring the profound inequities within the

higher education system itself. In the Spanish case, youth framed their protests as anti-institutional from the start and in so doing, appealed to widespread dissatisfaction with all political parties and the state institutions with which they were associated. As the movement progressed though, they turned to creating alternative institutional structures and at least with regard to education, affirmed their faith in the traditional university through protesting budget cuts and the possibilities of creeping higher education privatization that might ensue, in 2012. A somewhat similar pattern occurred when examining trajectories within the Occupy Movement, although it should be stressed that from the start, a significant number of Occupy adherents had previous experience engaging in political activism.

Social scientists have debated among themselves the degree to which the global spread of schooling is an exemplar of neo-institutionalism. In so doing, they have viewed their embrace of interdisciplinary curricula such as those involving human rights themes, as resulting from the efforts of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) to promote those ideas that become socially acceptable and are then assimilated within formal school settings (Meyer et al. 2010) Similarly, within the social movements literature, Keck and Sikkink (1998) have argued that the role of NGOs has been crucial in creating a global human rights movement that has helped define the contours of global social protest movements in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Alternatively, it can be argued that the social movements that formed and expressed themselves with such vehemence in 2011 and 2012 demonstrate that the spread of those ideas that facilitates political engagement is not limited to conventional institutional diffusion. The power of the Internet and of social media to foster a sense of autonomy as well as community was visibly in evidence among the *Indignados* and Occupy Movement participants. And even in the Chilean case, use of the Internet and social media allowed for a movement that relied initially upon traditional repertoires of contention to expand upon its base and touch large population segments. Nonetheless, the Spanish, Chilean and U.S. cases support the proposition that neither neo-institutionalism nor the use of the Internet and social media offer sufficient explanations for the growth and success of these 2011-2012 social movements. For educators and policy makers, the lesson that is evident is that while institutions such as schools and universities do facilitate the growth and exchange of ideas, the information age has democratized access to information and the speed with which it is disseminated in revolutionary ways, while social media have provided us with alternative methods of communicating with one another and defining what collective engagement might entail. Although formal modes of organization institutional affiliation have not been supplanted, it would be a mistake to only examine the flow of ideas and the types of responses they engender by limiting one's focus to the traditional institution: be it the school, the university, the established political party, or the student organization when pursuing comparative work.

It is important to additionally note that participants in all three of the social movements we have surveyed implicitly embraced core academic freedom values. In the Chilean case, the issues of higher education access, affordability, transparency, and equity, speak directly to the calls for institutional accountability

documented within the UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel (1995). A similar point can be made with regard to the student protests in California that characterized later demonstrations within the Occupy Movement. With regard to the *Indignados* Movement, it should be stressed that strong opposition to the Sinde Law that helped to spark the Movement's initial formation demonstrated a fundamental concern regarding the threat of Internet censorship and of course, the free exchange of ideas that such censorship would prevent from occurring. The connection between academic freedom and political advocacy is not surprising, for the justification of the former is inextricably tied to the promotion of democratic values implicit in the political agendas of our participants. To assess the nature of these social movements without making reference to the core academic freedom principles each implicitly embraced would thus be irresponsible.

Finally, it is appropriate that a comparative assessment of the long-term impact of these three youth driven social movements be offered. When evaluated according to their idealistic goals, one could argue that they have been unsuccessful. Chilean students have not been able to replace the major political party blocks with units more attentive to their goals even though a number of student leaders successfully entered the formal political arena. The *Indignados* have been unsuccessful in creating the non-materialistic society, governed according to the populist and direct democracy principles that they embraced. And Occupy followers have been unable to fundamentally crack the close relationship generators of financial capitalist have been able to maintain with the state. Indeed, it is tempting to note that participants in most social movements fail to achieve their goals as the momentum for their cause inevitably dissipates through time.

I would argue though, that the cases presented here are somewhat different. First, popular support for the causes the Chilean students and the *Indignados* have advocated remains strong. And, Barack Obama was able to win a U.S. national election embracing some of the very criticisms of neo-liberalism first articulated by Occupy movement members. But most importantly, in all three cases, some of the basic contradictions within the neo-liberal agenda have been exposed in ways that will prevent them from being so camouflaged in the future to the same extent that has been true of the past. Chilean students refuted the neo-liberal assumption that the tide of a vibrant free market will lift all boats, if left to its own devices, particularly when the state was complicit in favoring privileged elites in its privatized education schemes. Similarly, the *Indignados,* through their systematic rejection of mainstream politics, conveyed a sense of inclusive possibility that refuted the assumption that there could be no realistic alternative to a prevalent crony capitalism that justifies offering loans to bankers while enforcing targeted housing evictions or information capitalism that seeks to regulate the free exchange of ideas according to market or state pressure. Occupy members exposed the class privilege that insulated the financial industry from accountability for its nefarious practices. Due to at least in part the power of the electronic and social media, these cases formed part of a global social movement that legitimized the critique of neo-liberalism to a point whereby neo-liberal advocates have had to at least

acknowledge the power of their opponents' argument, as well as the vibrancy of their opposition. The fact is that whether in the foreground or background, education has played a role in helping to shape the contours of this debate, setting the stage for continued discourse that will arise even after the long term effects of the worst global economic crisis since the depression recede.

REFERENCES

Art and Education. (2011). "The New School Faculty in Support of Occupy Wall Street." *Art and Education*. Available online at: http://www.artandeducation.net/announcement/the-new-school-faculty-in-support-of-occupy-wall-street/

Bellafonte, Gina. (2011). "Gunning for Wall Street with Faulty Aim." *New York Times*, September 23. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/25/nyregion/protesters-are-gunning-for-wall-street-with-faulty-aim.html

Bonilla, Frank, & Myron Glazer. (1970). *Student Politics in Chile*. New York: Basic Books.

Bookbinder, Rose, & Michael Belt. (2012). "OWS and Labor Attempting the Possible." In Kate Hatib, Margaret Killjoy, & Mike McGuire, eds., *We Are Many* (pp. 263-273). Oakland, CA: AK Press.

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2011). "Chile Strike: Clashes Mar Anti-Government Protest." *BBC*, August 26. Available online at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-14677953

Byrne, Janet. (2012). "9 Moments in the Occupy Movement History." *Huffington Post*, April 30. Available online at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/janet-byrne/occupymovement_b_1464717.html#s918480title=MidJuly_2011

Cabalin, Cristian. (2012). "Neoliberal Education and Student Movements in Chile: Inequalities and malaise." *Policy Futures in Education*. *10*, 219-228. Available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2304/pfie.2012.10.2.219

Cardenas, Amalia, & Conill Joana. (2012). "Spanish Indignados Movement Timeline: May 2011-May 2012." In Manuel Castells, ed., *Networks of Outrage and Hope* (pp. 260-270). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Carnoy, Martin, Amber K. Gove, & Jeffery H. Marshall. (2007). *Cuba's Academic Advantage: Why Students in Cuba Do Better in School*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Castells, Manuel. (2012). *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Cavlo, Kerman, Teresa Gómez-Pastrana, & Luis Mena. (2011). "Movimiento 15M: ¿quiénes son y qué reivindican?" ["15M Movement: Who Are They And What Do They Claim?"]. *ZoomPolitico*, *4*, 4-17. Available online at: www.falternativas.org/content/download/17... -

Chovanec, Donna M., & Alexandra Benitez (2008). "The Penguin Revolution in Chile: Exploring Intergenerational Learning in Social Movements." *Journal of Contemporary Issues in Education*. *3*(1), 39-57. Available online at: http://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/JCIE/article/view/2227/2482

Clarín. (2011). "Mundo Chile Bajo una intensa lluvia y mucho frío, miles de estudiantes marcharon por Santiago" ["Amidst Heavy Rain and Extreme Cold, Thousands of Students Marched in Santiago"]. *Clarín*, August 18. Available online at: http://www.clarin.com/mundo/intensa-estudiantes-marchan-capital-chilena_0_538146385.html

Cox, Cristián. (2006). *Policy Formation and Implementation in Secondary Education Reform: The Case of Chile at the Turn of the Century*. World Bank Education Working Paper Series. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available online at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/08/28/000090341_20060828093017/Rendered/PDF/370140CL0Secondary0ed0reform01PUBLIC1.pdf

Delannoy, Francois. (2000). "Education Reforms in Chile, 1980-1998: A Lesson in Pragmatism." *World Bank Country Studies: Education Reform and Management Publication Series*. Washington, D.C.:

World Bank. Available online at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1099079877269/547664-1099080026826/Ed_reforms_Chile_EN00.pdf

Delclós, Carlos, & Raimundo Viejo. (2012). "Beyond the Indignation: Spain's Indignados and the Political Agenda." *Policy and Practice: a Development Education Review*, *15*, 92-100. Available online at http://www.developmenteducationreview.com/issue15-perspectives4?page=show

de Miguel, Rodrigo, & Elisabeth O'Leary. (2014). "Spain's King Juan Carlos Abdicates to Revive Monarchy." *Reuters*, June 2. Available online at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/02/us-spain-royals-idUSKBN0ED0NS20140602

Democracia real YA! (2011). "Manifiesto" ["Manifesto"]. *Democracia real YA* [*Democracy Real Now*]. Available online at: http://www.democraciarealya.es/

Edwards, B., & John D. McCarthy. (2007). "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization." In David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, & Haspeter Kreisi, eds., *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (pp. 116-152). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

El Ciudadano. (2011). "Las Bases para un Acuerdo Social por la Educación Chilena" ["The Basis for a Social Accor for Chilean Education"]. *El Ciudadano* [*The Citizen*], July 31. Available online at: http://www.elciudadano.cl/2011/07/31/38923/las-bases-para-un-acuerdo-social-por-la-educacion-chilena/

El Mercurio. (2011). "Más de 200 estudiantes se movilizaron en protesta por conflicto de Universidad Central" ["More Than 200 Students Were Motivated to Protest against the Central University conflict"]. *El Mercurio*, April 21. Available online at: http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2011/04/21/477364/mas-de-200-estudiantes-se-movilizaron-en-protesta-por-conflicto-de-universidad-central.html.

Euskai Irrati Telebista (EITB). (2011). "Unemployment in Spain Rises Sharply to 21.3 Percent." *EITB*, April 29. Available online at: http://www.eitb.com/en/news/detail/646452/unemployment-spain-rises-sharply-213-percent/

Farrell, Joseph P. (1986). *The National Unified School in Allende's Chile: The Role of Education in the Destruction of a Revolution*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Figueroa, Juan Pablo, & Tania Araya. (2011). *¿Obtuvo ganancias o recuperó su inversión? Las tres sociedades que vinculan a Lavín con la Universidad del Desarrollo* [*Profits Obtained or Investments Returned? The Three Companies Linking Lavin with the University of Development*]. Centro de Investigación e Información Periodística [Center for Research and Journalistic Information] (CIPER), July 6. Available online at: http://ciperchile.cl/2011/07/06/las-tres-sociedades-que-vinculan-a-lavin-con-la-universidad-del-desarrollo/

Franklin, Jonathan. (2011). "Chile Student Protests Explode into Violence." *The Guardian*, August 5. Available online at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/05/chile-student-protests-violence

Franklin, Jonathan. (2012). "Victory for Chilean Students as Minister Resigns over Corruption Scandal." *The Guardian*, December, 19. Available online at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/19/victory-chilean-students-minister-resigns

Frayer, Lauren. (2012). "Students Protest Education Cuts in Spain; Some Rioting Reported." *Los Angeles Times*, February 29. Available online at: http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/02/students-protest-and-in-some-cases-riot-across-spain.html

Fuster Morell, Mayo. (2012). "The Free Culture and 15M Movements in Spain: Composition, Social Networks and Synergies." *Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest*, *11*(3-4), 386-392.

Garofoli, Joe. (2012). "Obama's Speech Echoes Occupy Movement Themes," *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 26. Available online at: http://www.sfgate.com/politics/joegarofoli/article/Obama-s-speech-echoes-Occupy-movement-themes-2715617.php

Gastal. Débora. (2012). "Prosecutor Will Investigate Private University Profits in Chile." *I Love Chile*, June 22. Available online at: http://www.ilovechile.cl/2012/06/22/prosecutor-investigate-profit-private-universities-chile/60478

Gitlin, Todd. (2012). *Occupy Nation*. New York: Harper Collins.

Graeber, David. (2012). "Occupy Wall Street's Anarchist Roots," In Janet Byrne, ed., *The Occupy Handbook* (pp. 141-149). New York: Back Bay Books.

Gobrierno de Chile. (2011). *Gran Acuerdo Nacional por la Educación (GANE)* [*Grand National Educational Agreement*]. Gobierno de Chile [Government of Chile], July 7th. Available online at: http://www.gob.cl/especiales/gran-acuerdo-nacional-por-la-educacion-g-a-n-e/.

Gobierno de Chile. (2011). "*We Should All Feel Very Proud of the Latest SIMCE Results Which Show That We Are Continuing to Improve Standards in Education and Are Ensuring Equal Opportunities for Every Pupil.* Gobierno de Chile [Government of Chile], April 11. Available online at: http://www.gob.cl/english/featured/2012/04/11/we-should-all-feel-very-proud-of-the-latest-simce-results-which-show-that-we-are-continuing-to-impro.htm

Heckle, Harold. (2012). "In Spain, Protests by Tens of Thousands against Health, Education Cuts." *The Huffington Post,* April 29. Available online at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/29/spain-protests-health-education_n_1462751.html

Hessel, Stéphane, & Marion Duvert. (2010). *Time for Outrage!* New York: Twelve Publishing.

Johnson, Kirk. (2014). "Seattle Approves $15 Minimum Wage, Setting a New Standard for Big Cities." *New York Times*, June 2. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03/us/seattle-approves-15-minimum-wage-setting-a-new-standard-for-big-cities.html

Johnson, Luke. (2011). "Elizabeth Warren on Occupy Wall Street: I Created 'The Intellectual Foundation For What They Do'." *The Huffington Post*, October 25. Available online at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/25/elizabeth-warren-occupy-wall-street_n_1030974.html

Juventud Sin Futuro. (2012). *¿Universidad en crisis? Facultad en conflict* [*University in Crisis? Faculty in Conflict*]. Juventud Sin Futuro [Youth Without Future], October 16. Available online at: http://juventudsinfuturo.net/universidad-en-crisis-facultad-en-conflicto/

Keck, Margaret E., & Kathryn Sikkink. (1998). *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

La Segunda. (2011). "Reforma a la Educación Superior: Lavín detalló una propuesta Rectores de Ues Tradicionales" ["Reform of Higher Education: Lavín Detailed a Proposal to the Rectors of the Traditional Universities"]. *La Segunda Online*, May 26. Available online at: http://www.lasegunda.com/Noticias/Nacional/2011/05/650821/Reforma-a-la-educacion-superior-Lavin-detallo-propuesta-a-rectores-de-Ues-tradicionales

La Tercera. (2011). "Gobierno confirma 874 detenidos a nivel nacional y 90 carabineros heridos tras protestas estudiantiles" ["Government Confirms 874 Arrested Nationwide and 90 Police Injured after Student Protests"]. *La Tercera*, August 5. Available online at: http://www.latercera.com/noticia/nacional/2011/08/680-384341-9-gobierno-confirma-874-detenidos-a-nivel-nacional-y-90-carabineros-heridos-tras.shtml

Levy, Daniel. (1986). *Higher Education and the State in Latin America. Private Challenges to Public Dominance.* Chicago: University of Chicago.

McCarthy, John, & Mayer N. Zald. (1973). *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.

McNichol, Tracy. (2011). "Prophet of Outrage: How an Obscure Pamphlet by a Former Resistance Fighter Inspired Europe's Grassroots Protesters." *Daily Beast*, September 25. Available online at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/09/25/stephane-hessel-s-indignez-vous-inspires-protesters.html

Meyer, John D., Patricia Bromley, & Francisco O. Ramirez. (2010). "Human Rights in Social Science Textbooks: Cross-National Analysis, 1970-2008." *Sociology of Education*, *83*(2), 111-134.

Milkman, Ruth, Stephanie Luce, & Penny Lewis. (2013). *Changing the Subject: A Bottom-Up Account of Occupy Wall Street in New York City*. New York: Murphy Institute of the City University of New York. Available online at: http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/562862-changing-the-subject-2.html#document/p2

MINEDEC, OECD, & UNESCO. (2010). *Challenges of the Chilean Education System*. Paris: UNESCO. Available online at http:// unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001903/190330e.pdf

Moreno-Caballud, Luis. (2013). "Cultures of Anyone: The Spanish 'Indignado' Movement and Its Contexts." *Culturas de cualquiera* [*Anyone's Culture*], October 21. Available online at: http://culturasdecualquiera.wordpress.com/2013/10/21/cultures-of-anyone-the-spanish-indignado-movement-and-its-contexts/

Occupy Sandy Recovery. (2014). "We Still Need Your Help*." Occupy Sandy Recovery*. Available online at: http://occupysandy.net/

OECD. (2012). *Quality Assurance in Higher Education in Chile*. Paris: OECD. Available online at: http://www.oecd.org/chile/Quality Assurance in Higher Education in Chile - Reviews of National Policies for Education.pdf

OECD. (2014). *Society at a Glance 2014 Highlights: Chile OECD Social Indicators*. OECD. Available online at: http://www.oecd.org/chile/OECD-SocietyAtaGlance2014-Highlights-Chile.pdf

Olsen, Joel. (2012). "Whiteness and the 99%." In Kate Khatib, Margaret Killjoy, & Mike McGuire, eds., *We Are Many* (pp. 46-52). Oakland, CA: AK Press.

Oliva, María Angélica. (2010). "Política educativa chilena 1965-2009. ¿Qué oculta esa trama?" ["Chilean Educational Policy 1965-2009: What Was Hidden behind the Frame?"]. *Revista Brasileira de Educação* [*Brazilian Journal of Education*], *15*(44), 311-328. Available online at: http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/275/27518764008.pdf

Oliver, Juan. (2011). "El desempleo juvenil alcanza en España su mayor tasa en 16 años" ["Youth Unemployment in Spain Reaches Its Highest Level in 16 Years"]. *La Voz de Galicia* [*The Voice of Galicia*], April 1. Available online at: http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/dinero/2011/04/02/0003_201104G2P26991.htm

Pastrana, Jill Pinkey. (2012). "Subtle Tortures of the Neo-liberal Age: Teachers, Students, and the Political Economy of Schooling in Chile". *The Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies*, *10*(2). Available online at: http://www.jceps.com/index.php?pageID=article&articleID=102

Reuters (2013). "Chile's Ex-Student Leaders March Their Way to Congressional Victory." *Reuters*, November 18. Available online at: http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/11/18/chile-election-camila-vallejo-idINDEE9AH04H20131118

Roarmag.org. (2012). "Losing Strength? An Alternative Vision of Spain's Indignados. " *Roarmag.org*, June 30. Available online at: http://interoccupy.net/ttsinternational/losing-strength-an-alternative-vision-of-spains-indignados-15m/

Robben, Antonius C. G. T. (2011). "Testimonies, Truths, and Transitions of Justice in Argentina and Chile." In Alexander Laban Hinton, ed., *Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and Mass Violence* (pp. 179-205). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Rogers, Andrew. (2011). "Chile Ranks Fifth in the World for Social Networking Usage." *I Love Chile*. September 21. Available online at: http://www.ilovechile.cl/2011/09/21/chile-5th-highest-social-networking-usage-worldwide/32451

Romanos, Eduardo. (2012). *The Strategic Use of Humor in the Spanish Indignados/15M Movement*. Paper presented at the "The Politics and Protest Workshop," CUNY Graduate Center, New York, October 4. Available online at: http://www.academia.edu/2013270/The_Strategic_Use_of_Humor_in_the_Spanish_Indignados_15M_Movement

Rossoni, Jessica. (2012). "Upcoming Regents Meeting Spurs Plans for Student Demonstrations." *Daily Californian*, January 16. Available online at: http://www.dailycal.org/2012/01/16/upcoming-regents-meeting-spurs-plans-for-student-demonstrations/

Salazar, Paulina. (2011). "11 universidades rechazan la propuesta educativa del gobierno" ["11 Universities reject Government education proposal"]. *La Tercera*, August 3. Available online at: http://www.latercera.com/noticia/educacion/2011/08/657-383956-9-11-universidades-rechazan-la-propuesta-educativa-del-gobierno.shtml.

Salinas, Daniel, & Pablo Fraser. (2012). "Educational Opportunity and Contentious Politics: The 2011 Chilean Student Movement." *Berkeley Review of Education*, *3*(1), 17-47. Available online at: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/60g9j416

Schweidler, Christine, Pablo Rey Mazón, Sabra Waheed, & Sasha Costanza-Chock. (2012). "Research by and for the Movement: Key Findings from the Occupy Research General Demographic and Participation Survey." In Kate Khatib, Margaret Killjoy, & Mike McGuire, eds., *We Are Many: Reflections on Movement Strategy from Occupation to Liberation* (pp. 69-73). Oakland: AK Press.

SIMCE [Sistema de Medición de Calidad de la Educación]. (2013). *PISA 2009*. Santiago: SIMCE [Measurement System of Quality Education]. Available online at: https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/documentos-web/Estudios+Internacionales/PISA/PISA+/PISA+2009/Informe+Preliminar+Chile.pdf

Snow, David A., & Robert D. Benford. (1988). "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization." In Bert Klandersmans, Hanspeter Kriesi, & Sidney Tarrow, eds., *From Structure to Action: Social Movement Participation across Cultures* (pp. 197-217). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Spence, Lester, & Mike McGuire. (2012). "Occupy and the 99%." In Kate Khatib, Margaret Killjoy, & Mike McGuire, eds., *We Are Many* (pp. 53-65). Oakland, CA: AK Press.

Stiglitz, Joseph. (2011). "Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%." *Vanity Fair*, May 31. Available online at: http://www.vanityfair.com/society/features/2011/05/top-one-percent-201105

Sanchez, Marta. (2012). "Losing Strength? An Alternative Vision of Spain's Indignados." *Roarmag.org*, June 23. Available online at: http://roarmag.org/2012/06/losing-strength-an-alternative-vision-of-the-indignados/

Tarrow, Sidney. (2011). *Power in Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Economist. (2012). "Chile Progress and Its Discontents." *The Economist*, *14*, April 11. Available online at: http://www.economist.com/node/21552566

The Guardian. (2012). "Destruction of Occupy Wall Street 'People's Library' Draws Ire." *The Guardian*, January 18. Available online at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/nov/23/occupy-wall-street-peoples-library

This American Life. (2010). "Crybabies." *This American Life*. Available online at: http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/415/transcript

The Week. (2011). "Occupy Wall Street: A Protest Timeline." *The Week*. November 21. Available online at: http://theweek.com/article/index/220100/occupy-wall-street-a-protest-timeline#

Tilly, Charles. (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

UNESCO. (1997). *Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel*. Paris: UNESCO. Available online at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13144&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

Valverde, Gilbert A. (2004). "Curriculum Convergence in Chile: The Global and Local Context of Reforms in Curriculum Policy." *Comparative Education Review*, *48*(2), 174-201.

Walter, Richard J. (1969). "The Intellectual Background of the 1918 University Reform in Argentina." *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, *49*(2), 233-253. Available online at: http://www.jstor.org.proxy.iwu.edu/stable/2510819?seq=19

Warden, Rebecca. (2008). "SPAIN: Protests against Bologna Begin to Spread." *University World News*, December 7. Available online at: http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=2008120509191347

Wyler, Grace. (2011). **"**Newt Gingrich Slams Occupy Wall Street: Take a Bath and Get a Job." *Business Insider*, November 21. Available online at: http://www.businessinsider.com/newt-gingrich-occupy-wall-street-video-2011-11

NOTES

1 This chapter expands upon a much shorter version of the theme in the book chapter, "2011 Social Movements and Global Youth Protest: The Chilean and Spanish Cases," in Liber Amicorum in Honor of José Luis Garcia Garrido, Maria Jose Garcia Ruiz, editor, Madrid: Ediciones Academicas,

SA 2013. In addition, the author is especially indebted to Cecilia Sanchez Novoa and Marcela Sanchez Novoa for their counsel and editorial assistance that have been crucial to the development of this chapter.

2 For an elaborated discussion, see Salinas and Fraser (2012, pp. 29-38).

3 The chronology summarizes various chronologies appearing in the literature (The Week 2011; Byrne 2012; Castells 2012).

4 One example of this sentiment can be found in the September 24, 2010 interview with Wall Street bar patrons conducted by producers of the radio program, *This American Life* and the Planet Money Team of National Public Radio. The following excerpt from the program's transcript is particularly illustrative:

Jane Feltes: You guys still have your jobs.

Bar Patron 2: Because I'm a smart person.

Jane Feltes: And you think you got to keep your job because you're smart? You got to keep your job because you guys got bailed out. You guys got bailed–

Bar Patron 2: No, no, no, no, no. That's not what happened with my job. I mean, survival of the fittest.

Bar Patron 1: Because I'm smarter than the average person.

Adam Davidson: And even if the government bails out your industry that failed, you still say it's because you're smarter.

Bar Patron 1: No. The government bailing out an industry was out of necessity for whatever the situation was. The fact that I benefited from that is because I'm smart. I took advantage of a situation. 95% of the population doesn't have that common sense. The only reason I've been doing this for so long is because I must be smarter than the next guy.

MICHAEL MEAD YAQUB AND IVETA SILOVA

6. REMIXING RIOT

*The Reappropriation of Pussy Riot through User-Generated Imagery
across the Russian Internet*

INTRODUCTION

In the last few years we have witnessed new digital media technologies play a pivotal role in political protest around the world, from the shockwaves of the Arab Spring still reverberating across the Middle East to the anti-government demonstrations of the EuroMaidan movement in Ukraine. While much of the scholarship on the political impact of social media in authoritarian contexts has been unabashedly optimistic – framing Facebook and Twitter as inherently democratizing "liberation technologies" (see e.g. Diamond 2012) – a subsequent backlash of research has tempered declarations of these technologies' inherently liberatory effect. Among the loudest critics of the "liberation technology" thesis, Evgeny Morozov (2011) has argued rather forcefully that instruments of new digital technology are readily used as a kind of authoritarian toolkit, stifling dissent and increasing state power.

More recently, scholarship on the interplay of new media technologies and political change has taken a more nuanced approach. Rejecting deterministic and all-encompassing assumptions about the "liberatory" or "authoritarian" potential of new media, the most compelling scholarship recognizes that the political outcomes of new media are not inherent to the technologies themselves. Rather, they are entirely dependent on the particular actions these technologies afford and on how people *use* these affordances (see e.g. Earl and Kimport 2011; Lievrouw 2011).

Among the most understudied and undervalued political capacities of new media technologies is the potential to easily create, replicate, modify, and disseminate *imagery*, whether in the form of videos or jpegs, gifs or memes. Spectacle and sensational imagery have always been a part of political discourse and struggle, from the relatively innocuous 2D texts of political cartoons to the extremes of public self-immolation. But in the age of new digital media – of blogs, YouTube, and photo-sharing platforms – the consumption and the production of images have become increasingly easy, accessible, and ubiquitous. Whereas a wealth of scholarship has examined the capacity of new media technologies to mobilize political protest, fundraise, and coordinate other forms of action, there has been comparatively little work on the increasingly important role of new digital technologies, especially social media, on the creation and circulation of user-generated imagery as a key part of contemporary political activism and protest (Bennett and Segerberg 2013; Milner 2013; Shifman 2014). This is an unfortunate

gap in the literature, as increasingly, the trading and modifying of imagery on social media becomes a popular, prominent, and meaningful form of "polyvocal" political participation, especially among young people (Milner 2013).

This study aims to contribute to our fledgling understanding of image-based political engagement through a qualitative, rhetorical examination of the user-generated imagery inspired by, responding to, and reappropriating Pussy Riot, the Russian performance art collective that became internationally iconic after their incendiary anti-Putin "punk performance" in Moscow's Christ the Savior Cathedral landed them in prison on charges of "inciting religious hatred." From 2011 to 2012, in the wake of surprising and unprecedented public protest against the reelection of President Vladimir Putin, Pussy Riot utilized social media in a campaign critiquing Putin's authoritarian regime and, more broadly, the socially conservative and politically repressive terrain of Russian society as a whole.[1]

Although Pussy Riot staged protest performances in the luxury stores and the metro stations of Moscow, the real end-goal of their performances was the subsequent broadcasting of these real-world actions through the virtual channels of social media (Gessen 2014). New media technologies enable political actors like Pussy Riot to disseminate their messages with minimal cost and effort, and beyond the control and selective framing of restrictive state media. But the very same affordances of social media – its interactivity and the malleability of its content – present digital media activists like Pussy Riot with a challenge that is becoming increasingly salient as the digital politics of the Internet evolves: the shapeable, participatory nature of social media allows other users to reinterpret and refashion the imagery created by or surrounding Pussy Riot in new, perhaps undesirable ways (Lievrouw 2011, pp. 80-85). Pussy Riot constitutes a vibrant case study in how digital social media both *enables* image-based political communication and activism, and yet, troubles its intentions and trajectories. This study seeks to investigate the ways in which the imagery and iconography of Pussy Riot has been (re)interpreted and (re)appropriated on the participatory platform of social media through the form of user-generated replication and remixing.

SITUATING PUSSY RIOT: THE PAST AND PRESENT OF PROTEST ART IN RUSSIA

Art has played a powerful role in political critique and resistance in Russia for centuries, spanning iterations of state-sanctioned authoritarianism. In a context in which the organization and execution of grassroots collective protest has been aggressively censured, art has served as a powerful alternative outlet for political opposition. From Gogol's pointed satire of tsarist Russia to the prison writings of Solzhenitsyn, art has chiselled fissures of resistance into the monolith of Russian state power and ideology. In today's Russia, Pussy Riot's punk performances continue this tradition of political protest art, though departs from it in significant ways, adapting to the globalized, media-saturated environment of Russia that is more than 20 years post-Soviet.

Although Pussy Riot is one of the best known performance art collectives outside of Russia, it is hardly the country's first. In his extensive ethnography of

the paradoxes of "late socialism" (1960s-1980s), anthropologist Alexei Yurchak (2006) argues that the ideological currents of daily life in the later days of the USSR became so plain, ubiquitous, and "hypernormalized" that "straightforward support or criticism smacked of idiocy, narcissism, and bad taste" (p. 252). Straightforward dissent was considered naïve, ineffectual, as crudely dogmatic as the ideology of the state. In response to this ideological environment, the late Soviet period saw the emergence of ubiquitous micro-politics of dark, subversive, and ironic humor – jokes and riddles traded everyday by ordinary Soviet citizens. It is from within this cultural milieu of humor and absurdity that emerged a number of unconnected youth art/pranking movements in the late Soviet period that rejected any clear boundaries "between seriousness and humor, support and opposition, sense and nonsense" (Yurchak, 2006, p. 243). Many of these groups of the late Soviet period resemble and resonate greatly with the nature and style of early "culture jamming" movements like the Guy Debord and the Situationist art movement in France. As Lievrouw (2011) nicely summarizes, "culture jammers" are tactical media entrepreneurs who "employ a range of media technologies, including experimental film and video, local access cable television, or theater in public spaces, to intervene in and comment on political and economic conditions" (p. 73).

The most sensational of these late Soviet aesthetic projects was a group of young Leningrad men calling themselves the "necrorealists." The necrorealists staged sensational public spectacles, such as undressing while waiting in line for a movie, or organizing fake public brawls. In one extreme instance, the necrorealists terrified unsuspecting onlookers by dropping a clothed mannequin out a fifth story window while engaged in one of their signature mock-brawls. "Central to that aesthetic," Alexei Yurchak (2006) writes, "was a refusal of clear-cut boundaries between reality and performance, common sense and absurdity" (p. 244). As media entrepreneurs, the necrorealists filmed and edited their exploits into a substantial video collection that was clandestinely circulated among the Moscow and St. Petersburg intelligentsias.

Pussy Riot evolved out of the performance art collective *Voina* (War), formed in 2007 by a loose collection of university art students, whose aesthetic and spirit clearly resonated with the ethos cultivated by the necrorealists and other iterations of Soviet performance art practice. As was the case with the late Soviet period described by Yurchak (2006), the ideological framework of Putin's Russia had become an overdetermined and over*determining* system in which outright opposition was made to look not so much as impossible but rather pathetic, laughable, and, importantly, socially *regressive*. In Putin's Russia, discourses challenging the state's power and vision were rendered as threats to the "stability" and "progress" that he had achieved – even if that progress had come through aggressively autocratic means. Challenges to state power were the domain of the decrepit and discredited last remnants of the socialist party or fringe oppositional figures like former chess world champion Garry Kasparov. In a system that turned opposition into regression, a foil justifying Putin's "power vertical," Voina, like the necrorealists before them, looked to conceptual art as a way to lodge critiques that

could not be so easily manipulated. "Voina," as Masha Gessen (2014) writes, "wanted to confront a language of lies that had once been effectively confronted but had since been reconstructed and reinforced, discrediting the language of confrontation itself. There were no words left" (p. 35).

Without the resource of "words," Voina staged and video-recorded several performance art "happenings" throughout Moscow. These absurd and sometimes extreme forms of public spectacle ranged from throwing live cats across the counters of McDonald's restaurants to more elaborate actions, such as staging group sexual acts inside an exhibition space of Moscow's Timiryazev State Museum of Biology. In some instances, the particular political commentary of Voina's performances was relatively accessible, marking a clear response to proximate political happenings and currents in Russia. In most cases, however, the political valences and symbolic intentions of Voina's were ambiguous, eluding easy interpretation. In the tradition of Soviet-era performance art before them, far from occupying a clear political position or voicing an oppositional discourse, Voina's actions responded to the constrictive ideological apparatus of contemporary Russian society with an unintelligible code intended to temporarily displace conservative social norms.

Despite the success and attention garnered by Voina's actions throughout Moscow, St. Petersburg, and sometimes internationally, Voina split apart in the winter of 2009-2010 due to infighting, and, at least in part, to differences of artistic vision. Yekaterina "Katya" Samutsevich and Nadezhda "Nadya" Tolokonnikova, among the youngest and most active members of Voina had been becoming increasingly invested in Western feminist theory, and the largely male directed operations of Voina had begun to trouble them (Elder 2014; Gessen 2014). Moreover, Samutsevich and Tolokonnikova grew disenchanted with the highly abstract and largely inaccessible political messaging of Voina's actions (Gessen 2014). In late 2011, the two formed Pussy Riot (originally dubbed *Pisya* [Wee wee] Riot) largely in response to both these concerns. Voina was a male-dominated affair; Pussy Riot was to be all-female collective. In contrast to the thematically disconnected actions or "happenings" of Voina, Pussy Riot devised their now iconic singular aesthetic and performance type so that its political messages and culture referents would be immediately accessible and aggressively articulated.

Pussy Riot saw and adopted the punk rock feminist aesthetic of American Riot Grrrl subculture – of the Guerilla Girls and Bikini Kill – as an accessible shorthand for accomplishing this agenda (Gessen 2014). Understanding that Russia lacked a culture of or reference for feminist critique, Samutsevich, Tolokonnikova, and the roughly ten other women who would eventually join Pussy Riot, including Maria Alekhina, saw the Riot Grrrl ethos as the most suitable vehicle for introducing an accessible and impactful feminist critique of patriarchy. Moreover, as a counter-cultural idiom well-known and understood in Western media, the Riot Grrrl aesthetic allowed Pussy Riot to be easily understood, easily translated outside Russia – and in the U.S. in particular.

REMIXING RIOT: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF ACTIVISM THROUGH
PARTICIPATORY MEDIA

In Putin's Russia, as was the case in the Soviet Union, virtually all major media
institutions are controlled by the state. Media voices that criticize the Kremlin and
its political allies or that disseminate political viewpoints not in line with party
orthodoxy face censure and various forms of retribution, like the removal of
licensing. In contrast to other authoritarian regimes throughout the world, such as
China, Russia does not exercise pervasive technical control of the Internet, such
blocking and filtering access to websites (Deibert et al. 2010), although there is
evidence that these measures have increased in last few years in the wake of the so-
called "Snow Revolution" (Oates 2013). Instead, the Russian state has adopted a
strategy of competing with oppositional media online through a coordinated and
sophisticated "counter-informational" campaign on the web (Deibert et al. 2010).
In a society that does not allow for plural political voices, Pussy Riot used new
media channels as a vehicle for creating and diffusing political and cultural
critique, avoiding overt state manipulation of traditional media and thus reaching a
wider audience.

The videos Pussy Riot posted on Internet platforms such as LiveJournal[2] and
YouTube within hours of their performances illustrate the particular power of new
digital technologies. They allow for the swift, low-cost, and easily accessible
dissemination of content that disrupts and contests ideaological fields that are
particularly impenetrable in authoritarian contexts like Russia, where the state has
long held a monopoly over media's production of political discourse and ideology.
As Weeden (1999) contends, authoritarian regimes like Russia "attempt to control
the symbolic world, that is, to manipulate and manage systems of signification …
helping to reinforce obedience and sustain the conditions under which regimes
rule" (p. 5). Thus, in the struggle for more democratic possibilities in autocratic
contests, the critique of official discourse is vital. And yet, as will be explored in
the upcoming section, the possibilities and promise of digitally-enabled activism
are also complicated, and perhaps *hindered*, in certain ways as a result of a digital
technologies and the particular participatory engagement they engender.

The Contestation of Politics through User-Generated Content

The affordances of the Internet and its social media platforms – ease of use, low
cost, interactivity, replicability, and networked structure – have given birth to a
new culture of participatory communication (Jenkins 2006). With little resources
and only basic technical skills, Internet users cannot merely consume but also
create diverse forms of digital content. Increasingly, this user-generated content is
taking the form of multimedia imagery, either video, gifs, or still-images that are
often augmented through the addition of interposed text, audio, photoshopping or
other digital modifications. Once published, this digital content can be easily
accessed, and importantly, further modified and redistributed by other Internet
users. This is the essence of the Internet's culture of participation and remix.

Although a substantial amount of user-generated content is humorous, whimsical, or irreverent in nature, a small but growing amount of scholarship is beginning to consider the nature and significance of visual *political* communication created on and disseminated through digital media (Dylko and McCluskey 2012; Milner 2013; Pearce and Hajizada 2014; Shifman 2014). In his analysis of user-generated Internet images engaging with the Occupy Wall Street movement, Milner (2013) argues the ability of ordinary citizens to engage in political discourse outside of traditional, gate-keeping media channels resulted in a vibrant "polyvocal" public discourse. Supporters of the Occupy movement, for example, created, disseminated, and constantly remixed images that humorously but sharply critiqued what they perceived to be a world economic system dominated by elite corporate interests. Social media platforms like Tumblr served as a forum on which users built a community of solidarity with the "99 percent," posting self-portraits in which they posed with hand-written testimonials attesting to their particular personal socio-economic plight. Importantly, however, this collection of critical voices was met with a powerful counter-response. Those critical of Occupy mimicked and remixed the forms and tropes of 99 percent's user-generated content with their own collection of Internet imagery mocking and ridiculing the movement's participants and ideologies.

The political possibilities of user-generated content has also been studied in less democratic contexts. In Azerbaijan, Pearce and Hajizada (2014) describe a vivid of example of how user-generated content on social media can conflict with authentic civil discourse. They detail how Internet users connected to the authoritarian government of Azerbaijan have employed social media for pro-government purposes. They argue that pro-government actors have successfully combatted the social media efforts of oppositional groups through their own campaign of counter-informational content, using social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter to spread images that ridicule and abuse the opposition. Effectively, in this example, government forces have hijacked the opposition's own guerilla media tactics.

Thus, participatory culture and user-generated content can be used to engage in purposeful and powerful political critique. But, as is evident in the examples above, the trajectory of that critique is hard to control, and the evolution of the conversation it starts is hard to predict or steer. User-generated content created on or spread throughout social media platforms and other Internet pathways can engender a vibrantly democratic, "polyvocal" public discourse (Milner 2013). But it can also be co-opted to serve commercial, corporate interests (e.g., Wang 2012). In less democratic, user-generated content may not represent the voices of citizens at all, but rather that of government propagandists in disguise (Pearce and Hajizada 2014; see also MacKinnon 2013; Morozov 2011).

Culture jamming artists/activists like Pussy Riot have always dealt with the peril that their media creations will be reappropriated in unforeseen and undesired ways (Lievrouw 2011). In particular, the co-optation of countercultural and rebellious political expression by corporate forces – imbuing consumer products with a "rebel," anti-establishment "edge" – has served as a prominent iteration of a reverse appropriation, or "reverse jamming" (Heath and Potter 2004; Hebidge

120

1979; Wallace 1998). But in the new landscape of digital media, the possibilities for image and symbolic remixing are hyper-realized because digital content can be so easily copied and modified. The very same aspects of digital media that enable activist media entrepreneurs like Pussy Riot to create and spread their critique outside of traditional media gatekeepers are the attributes that imperil the control and symbolic purity of that message. That is, technological capabilities to create, replicate, and distribute co-exist with the capacity to *modify*, *distort*, and *reappropriate* original imagery into new iterations (Lievrouw 2011).

It is to this latter body of scholarship, that this project hopes to contribute. This project aims to trace the image politics of Pussy Riot as they have been rewoven, respun across the fabric of the Internet's participatory culture, without any assumption that this reappropriation is necessarily reflective of Pussy Riot's original communicative intent. This analysis is interested in tracing the remixing and reappropriation of Pussy Riot through the creation and circulation of user-generated online content that has taken the imagery of Pussy Riot and remade it in some way, through altering or adding to its original form (e.g., adding text, photoshopping two images together, etc.), as in the images below.

ANALYZING PUSSY RIOT: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This study is guided by two broad questions. How has the imagery of Pussy Riot been reinterpreted and reappropriated through user-generated image content across Russian-language Internet platforms and sites? More specifically, how do these reappropriations build on or augment the particular political and feminist valences embodied by Pussy Riot, or, how do they imply alternate, parodic, or defamatory readings of the group?

From the summer of 2013 to the spring of 2014, we regularly searched social media platforms and compiled a corpus of user-generated content referencing Pussy Riot along the Russian-speaking Internet, or, as it's colloquially called "RuNet." Data were gathered via regular searches through the most prominent search engines of RuNet, including Google Russia (google.ru) and Yandex.ru, as well as the most popular social media platforms used by Russian-speaking Internet users. In all, the sample included the social networking sites (SNS) VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, which are predominantly Russia(n)-based platforms, as well as Twitter, Tumblr and Instragram, which predominantly English language platforms that are also used widely by Russian-speaking/Russian users. Search engines and sites were purposefully scanned for images both through the deliberate use of platform-specific search functionalities, as well as by regular casual browsing (as in some instances where images are not labeled with searchable tags). In all, some 400 images have been included in our sample. Images selected for our sample include both explicit references to Pussy Riot – incorporating images of the group's performances or members, and/or containing the Pussy Riot name in text – as well as those that allude to the group via less explicit, more ambiguous means. Images containing brightly-colored balaclavas, for example, while not explicitly

making allusion to Pussy Riot were nevertheless included precisely because this unusual piece of clothing has become a popular visual shorthand for the group.

Having gathered a sizeable body sample of Internet imagery, our analysis followed the methodological approach of critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough 1995; Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Wodak and Meyer 2009). Less of a specific systematic approach to the analysis of content, CDA is a greater *theoretical orientation* and *axiological commitment* to the analysis of communicative artifacts. Under a CDA orientation, micro-level discourses such as user-generated Internet content are considered to be embedded in and emerging from greater, macro-level discursive fields: "systems of reason" such as culture, ideology, and power (Vavrus and Seghers 2010). Thus, a CDA approach to textual analysis means that our investigation seeks to identify the ways in which micro-level texts – UGC in our case – are in conversation with larger, predominant cultural and social discourses. As critical readers of these texts, we deliberately forefront our knowledge of the various discursive threads that have surrounded Pussy Riot, both in the English-language/international field of discourse and in the Russian/domestic field.

In addition to ascertaining the links between the micro-level of discourse (specific utterances) and the macro-level of discourse (ideology/power), CDA also allows for exploration of the intertextual or interdiscursive dialogue between texts: the "meso-level" of analysis (Fairclough 1995; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). And this level of discourse is particularly important and relevant to the analysis of user-generated content. The replicability and easily edited nature of digital content allows Internet content creators to modify or amend an existing image through any number of ways; that image can then be passed around to other users in an endless loop of reappropriation. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity are central to the practice and culture of the Internet's participatory memetic culture, and therefore CDA's focus on this meso-level interplay between texts is well suited to the untangling of the various communicative threads that make up the "discursive knots" of user-generated imagery (Jager and Maier 2009, p. 47).

Our approach to analyzing the sample was an inductive, collaborative, and iterative process of exploration. Working first individually, the researchers combed through the sample of images, working to identify emergent patterns, trends, or themes in the content composing our sample. After our initial, individual evaluations, we meet to discuss the emergent themes we have identified. Together, we identified commonalities among each other's evaluations, acting to verify and triangulate our assessments. Significantly, operating within the CDA assumption that discourses are embedded in greater fields of power, we also discussed the ways in which predominant discourses identified at the micro- and meso-level of the texts respond to, echo, or challenge macro-level societal discourses about Pussy Riot in Russia. These are narratives that all of the authors have been following closely, in English and Russian-language media.

In the qualitative and open-ended textual analysis we took there were no arbitrary, predetermined criteria – such as number of corresponding images – employed in order to assess what constitutes a relevant and interesting theme.

Rather, evaluations of emergent themes were based on the reasoned deliberation between co-authors, and the extent to which themes resonated with or challenged predominant cultural scripts. One prominent discourse, for instance, central to Russian popular discourses (and the group's criminal trial) was a dichotomous debate on the question of Pussy Riot's artistic and political credibility: Could a poorly performed punk song performed in church really qualify as credible form of political protest art? Or, did this constitute nothing more than the anti-social pranking of hateful "hooligans?" In a CDA approach, it is expected that rhetorical framing such as this will be referenced and responded to by the micro-discourses of social media imagery. In order to feel mutually confident in the validity and relevancy of the themes we have identified, we cycled through individual analysis and group deliberation as many times as was necessary.

Following in the mold of our qualitative and emergent process of data evaluation, the subsequent discussion of analysis likewise takes the form of detailed, qualitative explication and parsing. The possibility of blurred, messy, or overlapping categories/themes is taken as a given, and our discussion of this discursive reality is not smoothed over, but drawn out. Lengthy and detailed analysis of particular images – and their possible meanings, intentions, and connections with other images – are used as exemplars for demonstrating the larger categories of discourse that we have identified. For the sake of analytical focus and depth, this paper discusses the discursive patterns that emerged as the most predominant and pervasive themes across the Russian-language Internet. It focuses on those micro-discourses that are informed by and resonate with greater societal discourses at play in contemporary Russia. User-generated imagery responding to and reappropriating the imagery and iconography of Pussy Riot were wide ranging, and there were several interesting emergent themes, such as the commercial co-optation of Pussy Riot's punk rock aesthetic, that, while interesting, we have chosen not to discuss here.

REMIXING PUSSY RIOT: FINDINGS

In Russia, public reactions to Pussy Riot's performances raised ambiguity in what seemed before to be crystal clear, permanent, and static beliefs in the minds of many Russian people. In particular, Pussy Riot radically questioned what is considered to be (political) "art," what is believed to be "sacred" and "holy" in Russian Orthodox religion, and who is "us" versus "them" in a Russian society.

Art or Bezdarnostj (Untalented)

For many people throughout Russia and much of the world, Pussy Riot's punk performances were regarded as neither art nor legitimate political protest, but rather some combination of nonsense, trash, or indeed, hooliganism. This distinction between art and trash, politics and juvenile pranksterism, was a critical component of not only the Pussy Riot trial but also the broader public debate, producing a variety of images either challenging or completely denying Pussy Riot the status of political artists (Figure 6.1).[3]

(1)

(3)

(2)

Figure 6.1 Representations of Pussy Riot as bezdarnostj *(untalented).*
(1) Pussy Riot "Pestnya." (2) "Pussy Riot: Freedom of Expression." (3) I thought that this was a punk group and not prancers [plyasuny] *in idiotic hats*

Aesthetically mirroring the genre of motivational poster art that emerged in the 1990s, the images of Pussy Riot as *bezdarnostj* (untalented) are all examples of the mimetic Internet genre known as "*de*motivationals" or "*de*motivators." Demotivationals feature a single static image framed in black, accompanied with a caption or tagline written below the image in simple white font. True to their name, *de*motivationals are designed to ridicule and denigrate the target subject matter of the image--sometimes in vicious and vulgar ways. The Russian Internet is particularly rife with this form of mimetic Internet art, and demotivationals have become a popular media for political communication, especially among young Russians (see e.g. Bukreeva 2013; Sanina 2014).

True to their generic form, the demotivationals above ridicule Pussy Riot, questioning the artistic and political legitimacy of the group. For example, one image compares Pussy Riot members to a trio of monkeys, crooning into a microphone. With this visual association, not only is Pussy Riot rendered sub-human – portrayed as monkeys – but their political valence and hip rebelliousness of their punk aesthetic is also stripped away. The garish background lighting and girlish, over-bright lipstick and eyeshadow worn by the apes is more suggestive of cheap lounge act or trashy cabaret crooner than of avant-garde punk. The visual is

124

further enforced by the small tagline at the bottom of the demotivator, a purposeful misspelling of the Russian word "*pesnya*" (song) as "*pestnya*," making a linguistic pun with the English word "pest." Another demotivational, a diptych of two images, similarly delegitimizes Pussy Riot's "punk" identity by explicitly comparing a picture of Pussy Riot's balaclava-clad punk performance at the altar of Christ the Savior with a stereotypical presentation of a tattooed, spiky-haired, all-male punk rock group. The accompanying caption reads: "I thought that this was a punk group and not prancers ["*plyasuny*"] in idiotic hats."

In a more vulgar image, the legitimacy of Pussy Riot's artistic and political aesthetic is denigrated through social and moral critique. In this demotivational, a woman wearing nothing but high heels and underwear is shown squatting down in small burial plot, and, apparently, urinating or defecating. The image is given the Russian caption: "Pussy Riot – Freedom of Expression." While the previously discussed images merely ridiculed the artistic and punk aesthetic of Pussy Riot, labelling them monkeys, "pests," or idiotic dancers, this image associates Pussy Riot with an act of obscene social transgression and obvious disregard for religious sanctity. Moreover, it explicitly ridicules Pussy Riot's argument that the Christ the Savior demonstration was an act of political and artistic expression, equating it with the desecration of a grave. This image fits with the predominant perception and stance in the Russian public, especially among those of strong Orthodox faith, that Pussy Riot's actions were motivated by a disregard for religious sanctity and were highly offensive.

Furthermore, this demotivational image resonates with another macro-level debate triggered by Pussy Riot's performances, indicating a strong degree of disdain and skepticism towards the "Western" or "foreign" concept of "freedom of expression." For example, a Russian journalist Maxim Shevchenko, who identifies himself as an Orthodox believer, saw the Pussy Riot's "punk prayer" in the Cathedral as "an invasion of the front-line squadrons of liberal Western civilization into the personal life of millions of Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Georgians and Armenians" (quoted in Uzlaner 2013, p. 34).

This set of images reveals multiple forms of discursive denial: an aesthetic/artistic denial, rejecting recognition of Pussy Riot's "punk" status and their claim to performance art; and a political denial of Pussy Riot as civic activists. For instance, discourses in both the general Russian public, as well as in more elite intellectual circles, debated the extent to which Pussy Riot represented legitimate opposition to Putin's power vertical. Anti-corruption blogger Aleksei Navalny, who emerged as a prominent opposition figure among Russian liberals, described Pussy Riot as "stupid" and "fools" (Bernstein 2013), drawing a line between his ostensibly legitimate oppositional camp and Pussy Riot. In his analysis, Miller (2012) theorizes that Pussy Riot perhaps embodied the "perfect opposition" in the mind of Kremlin political strategists, inasmuch as the punk group did not appear to embody any real, substantial threat to Putin's regime. Moreover, the art collective's transgressive tactics and blasphemous image probably did more to discredit opposition politics. Describing the majority of the Russian population as conservatives who are not natural fans of a punk music,

Miller (2012) states that Pussy Riot were widely considered offensive, hostile messengers for Russian public, and, therefore, were not widely supported or even understood as political.

In contrast, the Western public was much more generous in welcoming Pussy Riot at the intersection of two cultural circles well understood in the Western imagination: riot grrrl political punks/artists and (post)Soviet dissidents. As seen in Figure 6.2, user-generated images across the English-speaking platforms readily celebrate Pussy Riot as a fresh brand of punk feminists bravely challenging an autocratic, oppressive system. Accompanied by captions like "Punk Rock is not a crime, Free Pussy Riot," "Art must be political, free our sisters," and "Pussy Riot, Punks not Dead," these visuals capture Pussy Riot members in powerful, triumphal poses, with their backs to iconic symbols of Russian state power and culture, like the Kremlin's clocktower and the altar of Christ the Savior. In these images, Pussy Riot's performance undeniably appears as heroic, courageous, and noble.

Figure 6.2 Representation of Pussy Riot as Artists

Saints or Satans

Pussy Riot's "punk prayer" performance was motivated by a desire to critique and expose what groups members considered a deeply problematic and corrupt relationship between church and state. Undoubtedly, the strongest reactions provoked in Russian society by Pussy Riot's performance centered on the role of the Orthodox church in the political and social life of post-Soviet Russia, and the sanctity of religious faith and religious spaces. Pussy Riot's performance of "Mother of God, Drive Putin Away" (*Bogoroditsa, Putina progoni*) brought to light contradictions inherent in an attempt by the Russian government to reintegrate the Orthodox Church – officially rejected under state socialism – as a critical piece of a new Russian cultural and social identity. The tensions between the secular and the religious became increasingly visible during the trial of Pussy Riot members, when the court was challenged to mediate between the civil and religious stands, and in the end, formulated an awkward compromise, classifying the Pussy Riot case as a *civil* act of "hooliganism," but motivated by *religious* hatred towards Orthodox believers (Uzlaner 2013).

126

Throughout the trial, a number of key witnesses brought forth by the prosecution were Orthodox believers present in the church during the time of Pussy Riot's brief performance. Common to their testimonies were descriptions of the deep offense and spiritual pain the Pussy Riot performance caused them. In their defense, Pussy Riot challenged these individuals' status as "true believers," grounding their arguments in a Christian ideology of forgiveness and mercy. The court, in contrast, clung to formal, procedural characteristics in their definition of an Orthodox believer and considered the person's self-identification, the act of baptism, and church attendance as the main characteristics. As Uzlaner (2013) describes, the court's definition of true believers included only those individuals who were, indeed, offended by the performance. In this formulation, believers' feelings of Christian sympathy or forgiveness toward Pussy Riot would have effectively negated rather than legitimized the witnesses' true believer status.

Highlighting contradictions inherent in blurring the lines between the secular and the religious in Russia's political, legal, and social spheres, Pussy Riot's performance in the Christ the Savior Cathedral and the trial that followed their arrest generated an interesting debate in the digital space. Here, Pussy Riot was generally portrayed as either holy or evil, as either saintly or blasphemous.

Figure 6.3 Representation of Pussy Riot as Saints.

While there was little evidence to suggest that Pussy Riot aimed at proclaiming themselves as prophets, users actively associated them with religious figures, specifically Virgin Mary and Jesus Christ. In two images from Figure 6.3, the faces of Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Maria Alekhina are transposed into images of the Virgin Mary in the aesthetic style of traditional Russian Orthodox iconography. In another pair of images (Figure 6.3), Pussy Riot members take the place of Jesus Christ on the crucifix, suggesting that Pussy Riot have sacrificed themselves or their freedom for some kind of salvation, although it is not immediately apparent what kind of salvation, from whom or for what the Christ-like Pussy Riot members deliver. Considering the context, the images are strongly suggestive that Pussy Riot are the saviors from Russian authoritarianism, patriarchy, and from the corruption and degeneration of the Orthodox Church that Pussy Riot members had been voicing. Furthermore, while any association with Jesus Christ is heavily

symbolically laden and generally considered blasphemous by deeply religious individuals, in a social and cultural context that is highly gendered and patriarchal, the portrayal of Christ as a balaclava-clad woman is even more subversive. And, indeed, in one of the images (Figure 6.3), the creator has made a point to strip their Christ figure of everything but her signature bright neon balaclava, leaving the womanly body of a *female* Christ fully exposed.

Whereas the images above clearly supportive of Pussy Riot, elevating them to godly figures, there were many images across the Russian Internet portraying Pussy Riot on the opposite end of the saintly spectrum – not madonnas but demons or witches.

(1)   (2)

Figure 6.4 Representation of Pussy Riot as Blasphemous and/or Evil Forces.
(1) Mother of God, banish the evil spirits. (2) Pussy Riot – 15th century

Once again, this negative response to Pussy Riot takes the form of demotivationals. In one image (Figure 6.4), the lyrics of Pussy Riot's infamous song ("Mother of God, drive away Putin") are inverted: the caption reads "Mother of God, banish the evil spirits" (*Bogoroditsa nechist' izgoni*). In this image, a Russian iconographic image of the Madonna and Child is juxtaposed to a picture of two Pussy Riot members in balaclavas. The balaclava in the forefront of the image, though, as been modified to look as though it has the five-pointed star or pentagram, the sign of the Satan, woven into its fabric. Along similar lines, another demotivational image shows a grainy, black and white picture of a "witches execution," in which the silhouettes of three figures (the same number of Pussy Riot members arrested and tried) hang from nooses. The accompanying caption, reading "Pussy Riot – 15th century," suggests that in a much earlier period of Russia's life, such blasphemers would have received a much harsher, and, presumably, in the mind of this image creator, more fitting fate. In contrast to the portrayals of Pussy Riot members as the Madonna or even Christ, these images clearly condemn Pussy Riot as sacrilegious, evil "witches."

User-generated critique of the Russian Orthodox Church also appeared in a series of provocative images offering a clever (re)mixing of Russian classical works. Interestingly, some of these images do not reference Pussy Riot explicitly – in either image or text – but are nevertheless clearly tapping into debates stirred by Pussy Riot.

(1)   (2)

Figure 6.5 Remixing Pussy Riot with Orthodox Believers and Offenders.
(1) Pushkin Riot. (2) Rape does not offend the feelings of believers

One image from Figure 6.5 recalls a famous tale *The Priest and his Workman Balda*, written by 19th century Russian literary luminary Alexander Pushkin. The story recounts the tale of lazy priest who attempts to exploit a man, Balda (meaning stupid or simple person), for cheap labor. In the story, Balda agrees to work for a year without pay in exchange for being allowed to hit the priest three times on his forehead. The priest agrees, but after observing Balda hard at work, he realizes how strong Balda is. The story ends when Balda gives the priest three blows to the forehead, resulting in the priest losing his mind. The image shows a still shot from a popular animated version of "Balda" tale, in which Balda is just about to deliver the mind-crippling blows to the priest's forehead. It is given the caption, "Pushkin Riot," suggesting a connection with Pussy Riot, and thus favorably comparing their respective critiques of the corruption and moral vacuity in members of the church establishment.

Other images referenced the Pussy Riot, not so much because they were concerned with fate of the group specifically – with supporting or denigrating the group – but because the Pussy Riot case was emblematic of problems in the Russian legal system and greater sense of moral adjudication. Some images compared Pussy Riot's case with the treatment so-called "real" criminals received. For example, one image compares the sentencing of Pussy Riot members ("they received two years in prison for singing and dancing in a church") with the sentencing of former senator and politician Provkin ("received four years probation for raping a girl"). The large central caption of this de-motivational reads, "Rape does not offend the feelings of believers," echoing and satirizing a refrain of the prosecution heard repeatedly throughout the Pussy Riot trial (Figure 6.5). Similar

images compared Pussy Riot's "crime" to a man who killed a student and received two years of probation, and to a case where a self-proclaimed satanist destroyed 12 graves in Pskov and received no punishment at all. The caption reads, "The church kept silence. The feelings of believers were not offended." With bitter irony and sarcasm, these examples highlight that individuals who clearly committed more serious crimes than Pussy Riot but received either no or far lighter punishment, offering clear critiques of the politically driven nature of Pussy Riot sentencing and/or the injustice of the Russian law enforcement and judiciary system.

Insiders (Svoi) and Outsiders (Chuzhiye)

Pussy Riot's "punk prayer" and the debates surrounding the trial of its members became a focal point in an ongoing cultural debate about what exactly constitutes the Russian identity and Russian belonging, exposing the confrontational division of Russian society into the native "ours" (*svoi*) and foreign, alien "other" (*chuzhuye*). As Yablokov (2014) summarizes, the state-aligned mass media as well as social media constructed a narrative in which Pussy Riot's performance was presented as "an attempt on the part of Russia's enemies from the West to destroy the Orthodox religion and thus deprive the Russian people of their identity" (p. 621). In this context, Pussy Riot and their supporters represented "the anti-religious, anti-state, pro-Western minority," which was juxtaposed to "the vast and loyal majority of Russians who professed Orthodoxy and supported the authorities" (p. 632). Such reading of the Pussy Riot's performance resonates with the long-held and enduring cultural concept of *svoi* ("ours") and *chuzhiye* ("other") in Russia – a binary construction in which the "native" and "true" Russian people and identity are dimetrically opposed to, and often seen as threatened by, a conspiring and contaminating foreign presence.

A great number of user-generated images explicitly framed Pussy Riot as a group of cultural subversives supported and paid by some kind of foreign entity (Figure 6.6). In one diptych image (image 1) the upper half, rendered in the bright, cartoonish style of Japanese anime shows four innocent-looking schoolgirls carrying instruments being offered a handful of cash by a shadowy figure outside of the frame. The lower half of the image is a simply a still frame of Pussy Riot's performance on the altar of the Christ the Savior. In the passage from the upper to lower frames of the diptych, the narrative thrust and argument is clear: portraying Pussy Riot as innocent girls who were corrupted and bribed into performing their punk prayer. While, in this image, it is not clear who offered the would-be provocateurs money or why, other user-generated images are more explicit about the origins of Pussy Riot's foreign sponsors.

In another demotivational (Figure 6.6, image 2), a picture of Tolokonnikova's Canadian permanent residency document is amended with the caption: "That is why *gnilopezdiye* (rotten pussies) are dancing in the church." This and other images of Tolokonnikova's (no longer valid) Canadian residence permit became an inspiration for various similarly derisive user-generated images circulating around RuNet.[4]

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Figure 6.6 Representation of Pussy Riot as Outsiders (Chuzhiye).
(1) Anime girls. (2) That is why gnilopezdiye (rotten pussies) are dancing in the church. (3)
The generation raised with Teletubbies has grown up. (4) First, we were paid to shit at
home, and now to humiliate the motherland. (5) Are enemies again invading Rus'? We are
going to beat the enemies of Rus' just as we did before. (6) Let's purge enemies of Rus':
Who comes with the sword, dies from the sword

While some images drew inspiration from anti-Western conspiracy theories, accusing Pussy Riot of working for foreign intelligence service, others undermined their legitimacy by infantilizing them in social media. One such image (Figure 6.6, image 3) compared Pussy Riot to Teletubbies – a popular (and somewhat controversial) British BBC children's television series aimed at preschool children. Drawing a visual comparison between bright balaclava-clad Pussy Riot members and the unusually bright colors of Teletubbies, the caption accompanying the image reads, "The generation raised with Teletubbies has grown up," alluding to the "wrong" values that the new Russian generation was exposed to in their childhood. In all these images, the degradation of ostensibly "true" Russian values was explicitly attributed to the influence of the West, recalling the Cold War rhetoric of the superiority of the Russian nation and the Western attempts to undermine its glory.

The narrative of the West as a conspiring "Other" intensified after two Pussy Riot members – Tolokonnikova and Alekhina – were released from prison and went on a tour of Europe and the United States to voice their concerns about Russian prisons. In the United States, they became the highlighted guests in the Amnesty International Human Rights concert in New York where, together with Madonna, they openly criticized Putin's regime in front of a large audience. While having an opportunity to voice their opinion openly at such a high-profile event, a letter posted on the band's official LiveJournal account excoriated Tolokonnikova and Alekhina's participation in celebrity-studded, fee-charging, highly commercialized events, condemning this as a clear violation of the group's radically anti-capitalist, punk performance ethos and essentially excommunicating Tolokonnikova and Alekhina from the group. [5] Despite Tolokonnikova and Alekhina's immediate response that "everyone can be Pussy Riot," the Russian media immediately joined in on the theme of (Western) commercial corruption. The Russian Internet became flooded with photos of Alekhina and Tolokonnikova abroad, with various commentaries highlighting the commercial nature of the band. An example of one such image, featuring a press release photo of the two in New York proclaimed, "First, we were paid to shit at home, and now to humiliate the motherland" (Figure 6.6, image 4).

In another series of user-generated images, the "otherness" of Pussy Riot is compared to Russia's ancient, legendary struggles with civilization-threatening invaders. Recalling the image of a *bogatyr* (a warrior-like character from medieval East Slavic legends), Pussy Riot is portrayed as an enemy invading the sanctity of the traditional Russian life (Figure 6.6, images 5 and 6). The captions accompanying the images say: "Are enemies again invading Rus' [a proto East Slavic civilization]? We are going to beat the enemies of Rus' just as we did before" and "Let's purge enemies of Rus': Who comes with the sword, dies from the sword." These images situate Pussy Riot in the history of foreign intruders posing a civilizational threat to the nation, a threat that needs to be violently defended against and expunged.

While much of the imagery generated on the Russian internet decidedly presented Pussy Riot as *chuzhiye* – alien others – there was at least one rhetorical

strain that creatively framed the art/punk group as a particular kind of *svoi*, or insiders: communicating support for the group through the idiom of Soviet realist utopian propaganda.

Figure 6.7 Representation of Pussy Riot as Svoi (Insiders)

Three of the images above (Figure 6.7), recalling classic Soviet public art, represent Pussy Riot as the engine of a large-scale social progress and transformation. In one image, two balaclava-clad people are holding their hands high in front of a locomotive that appeared in many Soviet posters as a symbol of progress and technological advancement. Along similar lines, another image showcases a woman in balaclava with a pointed finger touching her lips – the sign that invites the reader to keep a secret in silence. The caption says "Pussystroika," resonating with the Soviet "Perestroika" and associated in the Russian minds with a large-scale transformation of the Soviet political and economic system. The idea of Pussy Riot bringing social change is further developed in an image depicting the map of the Russian Federation labeled "Pussia," cleverly suggesting a rebellious move from an authoritarian Russia to a more open "Pussia."

CONCLUSION

At the altar of Moscow's Christ the Savior Cathedral, Pussy Riot performed and raged for less than a minute. However, by videotaping their guerilla concert, and more importantly, by disseminating, like they always had before, this video through the channels of digital media, their punk performance reverberated far beyond the walls of Christ the Savior and for longer than a mere 40 seconds. Through videos posted and spread across YouTube and VKontakte, through posts debated on LiveJournal and Facebook, Pussy Riot embraced the potentialities of new digital media for sustaining vibrant political discourse outside the gatekeeping and power-brokering structures of authoritarian state media. Moreover, with their brightly colored girlish dresses, vulgar but clever punk songs, and most of all, their signature neon-colored balaclavas, Pussy Riot conjured and cultivated a striking

visual aesthetic, building a brand that translated well to the highly visual field of new digital media. There was no mistaking a Pussy Riot performance, a Pussy Riot video.

And yet, as has been traced in this paper, it is the very affordances of digital media – its replicability, its malleability – and the very same visual signatures of Pussy Riot's particular brand of street/digital activism that makes their likeness almost limitlessly referenced, replicated, and remixed across the sculptable surface of the digital media platforms – either for good or bad. Just as someone in Buenos Aires can easily don a pink balaclava and post a selfie on Instagram in a display of solidarity with Pussy Riot, an Internet user in Yekaterinburg can juxtapose the brightly colored image of Pussy Riot with a photo of Teletubbies, forming a demotivational that mockingly derides the punk pose of Pussy Riot. In the era of digital media, the discursive markers and symbols earnestly created by media entrepreneurs like Pussy Riot are just as easily reappropriated and remixed by a vocal, engaged, and participatory audience through any number of media forms – gifs, photoshopped image macros, or demotivational posters.

No matter their valence, their support or condemnation of Pussy Riot, the wide-scale response provoked by Pussy Riot performances illustrate how the trading and modifying of imagery on social media has become a popular and meaningful form of "polyvocal" political participation in Russia. By provocatively (although only temporarily) displacing conservative social norms, Pussy Riot positioned itself as a false mirror in Russian society, challenging everyone to question what they see and what they think they know about Russian political and social life. In Bernstein's (2013) words, Pussy Riot "crossed a mysterious invisible line, breaking a previously unspoken taboo and, thereby, revealing its existence" (p. 221). Their performances caused a major discursive disruption in a relatively static field of Russian public sphere, spilling over into the public discussions and activating political participation across fairly unrestrictive digital media. In an authoritarian context of Russia, Pussy Riot performances have thus challenged the traditional definitions of political protest and redrawn the established contours of opposition itself through the use of the vibrant, participatory field of Internet imagery.

REFERENCES

Bennett, Walter Lance, & Alexandra Segerberg. (2013). *The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Bernstein, Anya. (2013). "An Inadvertent Sacrifice: Body Politics and Sovereign Power in the Pussy Riot Affair." *Critical Inquiry*, *40*(1), 220-241.

Bukreeva, Olga. (2013). "Perception of Russian Political Power and Political Leaders in the Conceptual Area of Demotivational Posters." *Politics, Culture & Socialization*, *4*(1), 15-22.

Deibert, Ronald, Palfrey, John, Rohozinski, Rafal, & Jonathan Zittrain, eds. (2010). *Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Diamond, Larry J. (2012). "Liberation Technology." In Larry Jay Diamond & Mark F. Plattner, eds., *Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy* (pp. 3-17).Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dylko, Ivan, & Michael McCluskey. (2012) "Media Effects in an Era of Rapid Technological Transformation: A Case of User-Generated Content and Political Participation." *Communication Theory*, *22*(3), 250-278.

Earl, Jennifer, & Katrina Kimport. (2011). *Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in the Internet Age. Acting with Technology*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Elder, Mariam. (2014, February 7). "What Does Pussy Riot Mean Now?" *BuzzFeed*. Retrieved from http://www.buzzfeed.com/miriamelder/what-does-pussy-riot-mean-now

Fairclough, Norman L. (1995). *Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Longman.

Fairclough, Norman L., & Ruth Wodak. (1997). "Critical Discourse Analysis." In Teun Adrianus van Dijk, ed., *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction* (pp. 258-284). London: Sage.

Gessen, Masha. (2014). *Words Will Break Cement: The Passion of Pussy Riot*. New York: Riverhead Books.

Heath, Joseph, & Andrew Potter. (2004). *Nation of Rebels: Why Counterculture Became Consumer Culture*. New York: HarperCollins.

Hebidge, Dick. (1979). *Subculture: The Meaning of Style*. London and New York: Routledge.

Jager, Siegfried, & Florentine Maier. (2009). "Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis and Dispositive analysis." In Ruth Wodak & Michael Meyer, eds., *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (2nd edition, pp. 34-61). Los Angeles: Sage.

Jenkins, Henry. (2006). *Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide*. NYU press.

Lievrouw, Leah. (2011). *Alternative and Activist New Media*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

MacKinnon, Rebecca. (2013). *Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom*. New York: Basic Books.

Miller, A. (2012). Perfect opposition: On Putin and Pussy Riot. *Public Policy Research*, *19*(3), 205-207.

Milner, Ryan M. (2013). "Pop Polyvocality: Internet Memes, Public Participation, and the Occupy Wall Street Movement." *International Journal of Communication*, *7*, 2357-2390.

Morozov, Evgeny. (2011). *The Net Delusion the Dark Side of Internet Freedom*. New York: PublicAffairs.

Oates, Sarah. (2013). *Revolution Stalled: The Political Limits of the Internet in the Post-Soviet Sphere*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Pearce, Katy, & Adnan Hajizada. (2014). "No Laughing Matter. Humor as a Means of Dissent in the Digital Era: The Case of Authoritarian Azerbaijan." *Demokratizatsiya*, *22*(1), 67-85.

Pussy Riot (2012, February 23). "*Vyn' prezhde brevno iz tvoego glaza i togda uvidish*" ["First, Take the Plank out of Your Eye, and then You Will See]. Live Journal of Pussy Riot. http://pussy-riot.livejournal.com /12658.html, accessed July 28, 2014.

Sanina, Anna G. (2014) "Visual Political Irony in Russian New Media." *Discourse, Context & Media* (May 1).

Shifman, Limor. (2014). *Memes in Digital Culture*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Uzlaner, D. (2013). "Delo Pussi rajot i osobennosti rossijskogo postsekuljarizma" ["Pussy Riot Case and Features of Russian Post-Secularism"]. *Zhurnal'nyj klub 'Intelros'*, *Gosudarstvo Religija Cerkov: setevoj zhurnal* [*Journal Club 'Interlos'. State Religion Church: An Online Journal*], *2*. http://www.intelros.ru/

Vavrus, Frances, & Maud Seghers. (2010). "Critical Discourse Analysis in Comparative Education: A Discursive Study of "Partnership" in Tanzania's Poverty Reduction Policies." *Comparative Education Review*, *54*(1), 77-103.

Wallace, David F. (1998). *A Supposedly Fun Thing I'll Never Do Again: Essays and Arguments*. New York, NY: Little, Brown.

Weeden, Lisa. (1999). *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wodak, Ruth. & Michael Meyer, eds. (2009). *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (2nd ed.). Los Angeles: Sage.

Yablokov, Ilya. (2014). "Pussy Riot as Agent Provocateur: Conspiracy Theories and the Media Construction of Nation in Putin's Russia." *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 42(*4), 622-636.

Yurchak, Alexei. (2006). *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

NOTES

1. After the arrest, trial, and imprisonment of Nadezhda (Nadya) Tolokonnikova, Maria (Masha) Alekhina, and Yekaterina (Katya) Samutsevich in 2012, Pussy Riot has been inactive for the most part, with remaining members releasing only one video (lambasting key Russian oligarchs for their corrupt business and political dealings). Since the release of Tolokonnikova and Alekhina in early 2014, the pair have travelled around the world publicly speaking out against Putin, the Russian government, and have formed a domestic civil society organization committed to reforming the condition of prisons in Russia and fighting for prisoners' rights.

2. Although LiveJournal is no longer a widely used Internet platform in North America, it remains a highly popular platform of personal blogging in Russia and much of the Russian-speaking world, with 51% of its blog posts generated by users located in Russia ("LiveJournal.com – How Popular is LiveJournal.com?" http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/livejournal.com, accessed August 27, 2014).

3. The user-generated images gathered for this research were published on popular blogging and social media sources such as VKontakte, Facebook, LiveJournal, etc. and as such are widely and readily accessible to the general population of Internet users. As with a great amount of user-generated participatory media, the creator and/or source origin of most of the images gathered is difficult to trace since the images are freely and diffusely shared without precise attribution of a specific identifiable creator or source. Consistent with guidelines outlined by the International Communication Association regarding the use Internet media content in academic publications, the images shown as exemplars throughout this paper are republished here under the principle of "fair use": these widely accessible images are being republished for a purpose entirely distinct from their original intention, as illustrative devices used for non-commercial, scholarly/educational purposes.

4. At the time of her marriage to dual Russian-Canadian citizen, Pyotr Verzilov, Tolokonnikova earned permanent residency status. According to the Canadian law, all permanent residents must be physically present in the country for at least two out of five years to preserve their residency status, and Tolokonnikova last visited the country in May of 2011. During her trial, however, the presiding judge cited Tolokonnikova's Canadian residency status as a partial reason for extending her detention, explicitly citing a fear that Tolokonnikova might flee.

5. For more information, see http://pussy-riot.livejournal.com/34528.html

WILLIAM A. MUNRO

7. ADJUSTING THE MARGINS

Poor People's Mobilization in Post-Apartheid South Africa

It began on the Internet social networks, as these are spaces of autonomy, largely beyond the control of governments and corporations that had monopolized the channels of communication as the foundation of their power, throughout history. By sharing sorrow and hope in the free public space of the Internet, by connecting to each other, and by envisioning projects from multiple sources of being, individuals formed networks regardless of their personal views or organizational attachments. They came together. And their togetherness helped them to overcome fear, this paralyzing emotion on which the powers that be rely in order to prosper and reproduce, by intimidation or discouragement, and when necessary by sheer violence, be it naked or institutionally enforced. From the safety of cyberspace, people of all ages and conditions moved towards occupying urban space, on a blind date with each other and with the destiny they wanted to forge, as they claimed their right to make history – their history – in a display of the self-awareness that has always characterized major social movements. (Castells 2012, p. 2)

The point is, we have to build where we are. We have had workshops on the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO and we've got strong people working on those issues. We've set up structures for the Campaign Against Neoliberalism in Southern Africa. But in the end we had to get down to the most basic questions: what are the problems facing people on the ground that unite us most? In Soweto, it's electricity. In another area, it is water. We've learned that you have to actually organize – to talk to people, door to door; to connect with the masses. But you have to build with a vision… But still, connecting with what touches people on a daily basis, in a direct fashion, is the way to move history forward. (Ngwane 2004, p. 134)

Shortly after 11.00 pm on June 4, 2014, the South African shack dwellers' organization Abahlali BaseMjondolo (AbM) posted the following note on its Facebook page:

Kennedy Road Settlement is on fire since 20h00 until now. $\pm$ 2000 people affected. The leadership of Abahlali is in the area as we speak. Anyone who can help with anything is welcome to do so by droping [sic] it [sic] in the scene in Kennedy or contact Abahlali basemjondolo Movement. Any help is welcome. It's that time of year again. The statement with full details will

> follow tomorrow morning. The leadership is helping those affected as well as the firefighters to put the flames out.

Though issued by a social movement organization, this post was not a call to action; it was a call for assistance.[1] Nevertheless, it opens a window on the role of social media in contemporary South African political mobilization. Winter is an especially treacherous time for South Africans who live in informal housing settlements. Houses are often closely packed and built of flammable materials. In the absence of municipal electricity and water supply, an inadvertent bump against the paraffin stoves or candles with which shackdwellers heat and light their homes can have disastrous effects. For this reason, AbM interprets shack fires not simply as the tragic effects of risky living conditions but as events saturated in politics and shaped by the failure of the state to live up to its responsibilities of providing adequate social protection and full citizenship rights to shackdwellers (Birkinshaw 2008; Chance 2012). In addition, if the post reflects this conflation of the quotidian and the political, it also captures some of the attributes that new social media bring to social mobilization: the ability to share crucial information widely, rapidly, and at any time; the possibility of galvanizing quick action in pressing circumstances; the opportunity for leaders to frame events, and to demonstrate their purpose and leadership. All in 'real time.' In effect, the post seems to accord social media a key location in the fabric of popular politics.

How to make sense of this location in the era of 'internet activism' is a major preoccupation of this volume. For many observers, the global wave of post-2010 protest action – from the liberal capitalist systems of North America and Western Europe to the autocratic patrimonies of the Middle East and North Africa – represents more than the diffusion of action repertoires, injustice frames, and cultural symbols *across space*. Rather, it is generative, constituting a *common* global space delineated by the transnational reverberations and resonances of risk under conditions of neoliberalization. It is these resonances, for instance, that inform the expressions of solidarity between Egyptian protestors in Tahrir Square and American protestors in the Wisconsin Capitol building. Activist groups are highly networked, following and publicizing each other's campaigns, sharing information and analyses, developing common discourses about power, and building critical communities of solidarity. In this light, some analysts view the post-2010 protests as part of a global revolt by a 'global generation' trying to mediate the impacts of postmodernity: the increasingly precarious livelihoods (and perhaps identities) that arise from neoliberal public policies and reach across classes and across space; access to new communication possibilities via digital media that invigorate a new public sphere that reaches across classes and across space; and new claims to *dignity* that are perhaps a response to sensibilities of ephemerality and alienation embedded in postmodernity (cf. Harvey 1989).[2] Thus Glasius and Pleyers (2013, p. 552) suggest that "Precarious working conditions along with the use of new ICTs have deeply shaped the repertoire of actions, forms of involvement and concept of the world of these activists."

For these authors, it appears, the conditions of postmodernity move identities away from 'class' towards 'generation' as precariousness spreads socially under the impetus of neoliberal public policies. Moreover, they seem to suggest not only that these movements are a global phenomenon but that activists understand themselves as (part of) a global movement, i.e. they are self-consciously global (as reflected, perhaps, in the pizzas ordered by Egyptian protestors to be delivered to American protestors in Madison,Wisconsin). Thus the literature on post-2010 mobilizations tends to conceptualize an emerging global middle class, communicatively networked in ways that allow for 'permanent states of organizing across time and space' (Biekart and Fowler 2013). Shah (2013, p. 666) suggests that this entails a deep questioning of institutional life – governance, welfare, social protections, etc. – and argues that "digital technologies and Peer-2-Peer citizen structures fostered by market expansions often facilitate this questioning, contributing to a crisis in governance and forms of community formation." Nevertheless, this sense of global connection does not diminish the importance of local and national contexts. Indeed, Glasius and Pleyers (2013) suggest that these activists see themselves not as acting globally against a local iniquity (as, for instance, one might understand the globally synchronized protests against the Iraq war), but as acting locally *and* globally against a *global* iniquity – the generalized assault on social protections embedded in neoliberal strategies and orchestrated by a globally networked capitalist class in which the domestic ruling classes of such disparate states as Egypt, Spain, Chile, Tunisia, and the United States are all implicated.

The principal animating element of this global public space lies in new communication technologies, particularly the internet and new social media which are understood to create conditions for information-sharing and participation that avoid the distorting effects of capitalism, class power, and political institutions that shape the traditional media. To 'internet democrats,' the communicative environment provided by the new social media is understood to be qualitatively more open, inclusive, and participatory than anything that has gone before (cf. Gerhards and Shafer 2009; Sen 2012). For many 'internet democracy' analysts, the Internet is a vehicle for radical democracy because it enables marginalized groups – i.e. groups that are unable to exercise voice in public discourse – to connect, debate, construct their own deliberative forums, and to contest mainstream or dominant meanings or practices (Sen 2012, p. 490). In this sense, some analysts assign the Internet and social media not merely an instrumental role in post-2010 activism but indeed a substantial *causal weight* in mobilizing protest action (cf. Lim 2012; Shah 2013). By extending social distance and meaning-making both expansively and non-hierarchically, these technologies help to *constitute* communities of 'outrage and hope' through what Nishant Shah (2013, p. 666) terms 'digital activism' by developing 'new and networked ways of thinking.' Among the most optimistic analysts, this digital activism has profound transformatory potential (cf. Biekart and Fowler 2013).

Such optimism is perhaps most eloquently expressed and substantiated by Manuel Castells (see opening quote). For Castells, the dynamism of the new social

media movements lies in the new public sphere located between cyberspace (or digital space), which is autonomous space, and urban space, which is occupied space (the Square). It is in this interstitial space that common consciousness is forged and solidarity is built (cross-class, cross-issue, and cross-locale). In this space, new communications technologies – particularly new social media – play a crucial role in *sustaining* occupiers in the Square; it enables participants to consult, to network, and to share information as well as messages of moral support *in situ* and in real time, thereby consolidating and reinforcing courage and a sense of common purpose. Ineluctably, therefore, it is the ability of these communication technologies to extend the social distance of communities that fuels these movements.

South Africa offers an intriguing opportunity to reflect upon these arguments about the impact of new digital media on social and political mobilization. Recently, there has been a broad popular celebration of growing connectivity in Africa as a sign of Africa's accession to modernity, with all its promise of a new, more equitable and accessible public sphere (see, e.g. Aker and Mbiti 2010; *The Economist* 2013). Africa, in this view, 'is rising,' and South Africa is an early riser. Indeed, the transition to post-apartheid democracy in the mid-1990s, which ushered in a new political dispensation, with all its promise of new meanings and modalities of citizenship, was more or less contemporaneous with the explosion of new media – high speed internet, cellphone technology, social networking, etc. – with all their promise of new meanings and modalities of citizenship. South Africans are increasingly connected. According to the 2011 Census, mobile phone ownership rose between 2001 and 2011 from 32% to 90% of the population.[3] In 2012, South Africa was ranked number 2 in Africa for the number of Facebook users – just behind Egypt – with some 5,365,460 Facebook users (up from 3,187,180 in 2010); Facebook was also the second-most popular social media network in South Africa, behind MXit, a locally designed cellphone network (Steenkamp and Hyde-Clarke 2014, p. 92). In addition, a Twitter Map of Africa produced by Portland Communications indicated that South Africans are the most active tweeters on the continent (Wu 2013). De Lanerolle (2012) notes that internet use has doubled over the last four years, though the starting base is very low: a relatively small proportion of the population own a computer, and only about 22% of all adults use the internet daily.[4] Thus, connectivity is rapidly expanding but questions remain about the extent of access and the nature of usage.

At the same time, South Africa today might be described as a 'movement society' (Tarrow 1998, pp. 8-9), i.e. one in which social activism is a part of the quotidian fabric of national civil society. As the South African sociologist Peter Alexander has noted, from 2004 onwards "South Africa has experienced a level of ongoing urban unrest that is arguably greater than anywhere in the world"; in effect, Alexander argues, South Africa has become "the protest capital of the world" by virtue of a 'massive rebellion of the poor' (Alexander 2012; Alexander and Pfaffe 2013). Mottiar and Bond (2011), focusing on the city of Durban in the period 2009-2011, catalog protests around an extraordinary array of issues, including housing and service delivery, land access, police violence, healthcare,

xenophobia, student concerns, labor conditions, restrictions on fishing, healthcare, rights of informal traders, and environmental destruction. In general, this rising tide of popular anger is aimed principally at the government's failure to adequately deliver services such as housing, electricity, water, education, etc. But it also reflects a deeper strain of frustration and betrayal associated with the African National Congress (ANC) government's rapid adoption in the mid 1990s of neoliberal strategies for economic development (Ballard et al. 2006;; Johnston and Bernstein 2007; Wasserman (2014). Booysen (2009) has suggested that such actions not only reflect a broader culture of protest but that they indeed establish protest as a form of political participation in contemporary South Africa.

Given this combination of a burgeoning 'social mediascape' and a quotidian politics of protest, one might expect South Africa to have an invigorated public sphere in which the excitement of the global 2010+ mobilizations would resonate robustly.[5] But somewhat surprisingly, especially in the light of South Africa's long-term prominence in international liberation politics, the local impact of these global reverberata has been muted. In this chapter I argue that this apparent anomaly is explained by the ways in which apartheid's legacies continue to frame both the public sphere and the patterns of social mobilization. Drawing on Jacobs' and Krabill's (2005, p. 157) conception of the public sphere as "the ever-shifting boundaries of constant contestation over who is allowed to make valid citizenship claims on the South African political system," I show that contemporary political mobilization is driven by a politics of exclusion that focuses today on the poor but is still defined by the geographical lineaments of apartheid. In this context, the construction of identity, trust, and solidarity that is critical to political movements takes place principally at the community level through processes of micro-mobilization in which the role of new communication technologies and social media is at best limited and ambiguous. The chapter first sketches the rise and nature of post-apartheid social movements, and then considers the role of social media more directly.

POST-APARTHEID MOBILIZATION

The upsurge of popular protest in South Africa is noteworthy in view of the excitement and relief that attended the end of apartheid and the first democratic elections in 1994. To be sure, South Africa has a vibrant tradition of social and political protest. The transition from apartheid to a democratic dispensation in the early 1990s was made possible by an extensive and sustained process of popular political mobilization against a repressive racist regime. This mobilization had taken place at the grassroots level of the street, at the shop floor level of the workplace, and ultimately at the level of mass insurrection (see Beinart and Dawson 2010). But the election of the African National Congress (ANC) to government by mass acclaim in 1994 dramatically transformed the political landscape. Not only does the post-apartheid government operate, by and large, through democratic and legitimate institutions that provide formal channels for voicing grievances, but it has its own profound struggle history that enables it to

'own' culturally resonant opposition frames (cf. Buhlungu 2004). Thus, it is fair to ask, as Herman Wasserman (2014) does, "why, in a country where stable democratic institutions are in place, the procedural aspects of democratic life such as elections are functioning well, and a strong, vibrant and robust media continue to operate freely, do young citizens resort to direct action in order to make their voices heard?"

In South African analyses, the marginalizing effects of neoliberal globalization provide a crucial part of the answer. Twenty years after the democratic transition, South African society remains marked by grinding poverty, profound inequality, and intractably high levels of unemployment. Between 2006 and 2011, according to Statistics South Africa, 61.3% of national consumption went to the richest 20% of the population, while only 4.3% went to the poorest 20%. In 2011 45.5% of the population was poor while 26% was absolutely poor. And between 2004 and 2012, the official unemployment rate in South Africa hovered around 25% (Statistics South Africa 2014, pp. 12-16). In some ways, these conditions weigh most heavily on the youth. South Africa's high prevalence of HIV/AIDS has exacerbated a demographic 'youth bulge' in which large numbers of youths must compete for increasingly scarce job opportunities. At the same time, South Africa's secondary education system, distorted and deeply undernourished under the apartheid regime, remains in a chronic state of crisis. Despite the government's consistently robust budget allocations to education and promethean projects of educational reform, gross inequalities in access and quality of education persist along lines of race, class and location. Educational infrastructure is particularly poor in the rural areas and apartheid-era black urban townships, where poverty is most deeply etched into the social fabric. In those areas, schooling is plagued by profound deficiencies in library and textbook supply, high levels of teacher absenteeism, and low levels of numeracy and literacy. High school students in poor areas, confronting a looming post-schooling employment void and small chance of attending college, experience very high levels of stress (Dugger 2009; Vellem et al. 2014).[6] One result of these conditions has been an extraordinarily high dropout rate among high school students, especially those in their mid- to late teens (cf. Republic of South Africa Department of Basic Education 2011; Bosch 2013).

Under these conditions, it is perhaps no wonder that youths continue to occupy a central role in the political mobilizations of today (Johnston and Bernstein 2007; Gower 2009; Alexander and Pfaffe 2013; Meyer 2013; Wasserman 2014). Indeed, there is a venerable tradition of youth mobilization in South Africa which reaches back to the dramatic 1976 student uprising in Soweto, a galvanizing moment in the anti-apartheid struggle. Subsequently, students played an increasingly key role in popular mobilizations, both through their own youth organizations such as the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and in the community- and street-based civic organizations that provided the backbone of insurrection. Yet continuities between that political activism and youth mobilization today should not be over-stressed. First, overall youth engagement with politics declined in the decade following South Africa's democratic transition. A Rhodes University research project on media and citizenship in South Africa found that youths are

disillusioned with politics and pessimistic about their prospects in the post-apartheid economy (Wasserman 2014). Indeed, this trend has inspired the leading political parties in recent years to turn to social media as recruitment instruments, though these efforts are still surprisingly rudimentary (Bosch 2013; Wu 2013; Steenkamp and Hyde-Clarke 2014). Second, as I discuss below, while youth have in recent years mobilized specifically around education through the establishment in 2008 of a social movement organization, Equal Education, that process has not entailed an assault on the state but a single-issue campaign for relief. It has also failed to reach substantially beyond the apartheid-defined geographical distinctions in educational infrastructure and become a *general* movement for educational quality; it remains largely within poor townships and rural communities. Third, and relatedly, even where youth have taken the leadership, it is principally as the *poor* – unemployed, marginalized and excluded – that youths have mobilized and built their social coalitions.

In an early assessment of post-apartheid social mobilization, Ballard et al. (2006) noted that the movements that have emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s are substantially 'new,' weakly linked institutionally and ideologically to the anti-apartheid movement.[7] Many analysts identify two waves of popular mobilization in post-apartheid South Africa, the first associated with the rise of the 'new social movements' in the late 1990s and the second marked by the community-based protests starting in 2004 (cf. Ngwane 2012).[8] The distinction is quite fine; both waves arose out of community-level responses to the systematic marginalizing effects of technocratic neoliberal public policies. Arguably, the first phase was ideologically more closely linked to the global movement against neoliberalism and the later phase has involved a more self-consciously theorized and local 'politics of the poor,' exemplified by Abahlali baseMjondolo (established in 2005). To some analysts, this entire process reveals the consolidation over time of a radical grassroots socialist ideology (Dawson 2010; Rosenthal 2010; Pithouse 2014). There is a substantive difference between South Africa's new social movements and the post-2010 movements in both the Arab countries and Northern countries. On the one hand, they do not confront an authoritarian state in the Arab mold – though local state and party operatives have certainly been violently repressive. On the other hand, they lack the middle-class participation that has characterized the movements in Spain, Britain and the United States; they do not even draw substantial support from students. It is precisely as the poor that they have been marginalized, and they confront the state from that particular point of exclusion, which is both social and physical.

Many analysts and activist themselves trace the rise of contemporary movements in South Africa to 1996, when the ANC government abandoned its welfarist Reconstruction and Development Program for a stringently neoliberal macro-economic development strategy known as GEAR – Growth, Employment and Redistribution. In terms of public policy, GEAR involved a retraction of the state, privatization of key services, and the requirement of full cost recovery for provision of public goods such as water, electricity, and sanitation; those who could not pay their rents or meet their utility bills would be evicted or cut off.

Unsurprisingly, the strategy was exceedingly hard on poor township residents who came home from work to find their electricity supply disconnected or their belongings in a pile on the street. In various cities, poor communities began organizing to protest and resist such treatment, building campaigns and coalitions against evictions, water price hikes, and electricity disconnections. In Cape Town, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign was formed in February 2001 to resist the dispossession of poor and marginalized communities in the region. In South Durban, the Concerned Citizens Forum morphed out of local civic associations that had emerged in community struggles against apartheid. In the huge township of Soweto outside Johannesburg, the Anti-Privatization Forum (APF) was established as a broad coalition of several dozen groups, with the aim of coordinating "clusters of affiliated groups in the communities" (Ngwane 2004, p. 126); the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC), with some 22 branches, was one of its most active affiliates (Desai 2002; Ngwane 2004; Ballard et al. 2006).

Because they emerged from particular community struggles, these movements were ideologically and organizationally heterogeneous. In his analysis of the APF, Sakhela Buhlungu (2004, p. 4) indicates that the membership was drawn generally from "three broad but not homogeneous groupings of the left." One grouping comprised left activists within the ruling alliance (the African National Congress, The South African Communist Party, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, ANC/SACP/COSATU) who were on their way out of the alliance because of the betrayals they perceived in GEAR. The second comprised left activists already outside of the alliance, mostly young, student or youth activists who "were also searching for relevance particularly in light of developments in the anti-globalization movement elsewhere in the world." The third comprised community members "looking for answers in a context where retrenchments and cost-recovery had combined to destroy their livelihoods and limit their access to basic goods and services." In similar vein, Egan and Wafer (2006), in their analysis of the SECC, distinguish between 'New Left' activist leaders and 'survivalist' members at the community level, suggesting that different movement participants both played distinct roles and framed the meaning of the movement in different ways. Still, it is clear that the heft of these movements lay with the communities. Umbrella organizations such as the APF or the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (WCAEC) were structured to coordinate campaigns and actions in ways that allow for flexibility and autonomy among constituent organizations and groups. While the venerable mass march remained the most frequent direct action taken by these movements, the weekly community meetings provided the decision- and identity-making pulse of the organizations. It was at these meetings that cultures of democratic participation and accountability could be fostered and reinforced (although actual practices inevitably varied quite widely). In his analysis of AbM, Richard Pithouse notes that "from the beginning the meeting was the engine of struggle for the *Abahlali* … Meetings have a serious and reverent feel and are conducted formally. When an issue is raised all the different positions are expressed and then the matter is discussed until consensus is reached. If consensus is not reached delegates are asked to discuss the matter in their settlement or

branch meetings and the discussion is then continued the following week. If consensus cannot be reached then the matter is finally put to a vote." To be sure, "many activists have good cause to dread the meeting as a slow enervating nightmare. But … the meeting, when genuinely open to the wider life lived in common, is a space for people and communities to become something new – in this case, historical agents in the material world" (2008, pp. 78-79; see also Bryant 2006; Robertson 2014; Gill 2014).

Even allowing for what might be an overly sympathetic account of *Abahlali*, and also for the fact that movement practice inevitably varies by place and community, depending on local histories of organization and struggle as well as local leadership, the importance of physical community gatherings to the construction of identity and solidarity in the new movements is a recurring theme in accounts of post-apartheid popular mobilization. As Hinely (2009) notes, it was "at marches and campaigns, through lectures and municipal meetings, at functions and over the communal cooking pot" that the women of Chatsworth began to define themselves *politically* as 'the poors of Chatsworth.**'** In this sense, the space that defines these movements and their mobilizational realm is not so much the space between urban space and cyberspace, as Manuel Castells suggests in the quotation that leads this chapter. Rather, it is the space between 'lived space' and 'urban space' that they inhabit, a space, as Ashwin Desai (2002, p. 10) describes it pointedly, 'between the broken and the built,' in which poor citizens encounter the material effects of neoliberalism on a quotidian basis.[9] This space reflects the profound and resilient ways in which a politics of exclusion was etched into South African society by the physical geography of apartheid, and it continues to frame the political imaginations of the poor a generation after transition. For many South African movements, it is a space in which they can invoke the panoply of rights enshrined in the post-apartheid constitution in order to assert their citizenship claims (Miraftab and Wills 2005; Dawson 2010; Paramoer and Jung 2011).[10] For these protest movements, then, it is the political space between their lived reality of poverty and the South African constitution, rather than the new autonomous public sphere of the internet, that sets their 'emancipatory horizon' (Glasius and Pleyers 2013). In one sense, one might argue that these movements represent an attempt by popular forces to 'own' the constitution, to take it out of the formal spaces in which it is operationalized by the duly constituted authority of the state, and to bring it home to the marginalized spaces of shacks and other poor communities.

This is not to say that these movements are not widely or even transnationally networked. The core activists in the 'new social movements' that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s certainly saw themselves as part of a larger global process driven both by the overweening and destructive power of an unrestrained corporate capital nestled in the warm embrace of international financial institutions, on the one hand, and by a global mobilization of resistance to its neoliberal ideology and strategies on the other. South African activists were inspired by – and some participated in – the 1999-2000 Mobilization for Global Justice movement that was precipitated by the mass action in Seattle in November 1999 which shut down the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference and

was followed by mass actions in Washington, Genoa and other European cities the following year. [11] Many of these activists consolidated and extended their international networks at the launching of the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porte Alegre, Brazil, in January 2001, and in turn welcomed their international comrades to Johannesburg in August 2002, where they embarrassed the South African government with large and effective mass actions. As the activist leader Trevor Ngwane noted, "though the WSF has its strengths and weaknesses it is important for us to link up to it: this is the movement of the millennium. Personally, I found the discussion of different methods of struggle at Porto Alegre a very useful one. It was an inspiration to meet up with people from La Coordinadora in Bolivia, Oscar Olivera and others, to find out about what's been going on in the fight against water privatization there. That sort of solidarity can be very powerful in terms of keeping you going through pauses in the struggle" (2004, 133).

In short, prominent South African activists, and especially their most visible intellectuals, are extensively and effectively networked across the globe. Leading activists from all the new South African social movements maintain electronic contact with comrades, counterparts, and allies in other parts of the world on a daily basis (see Buhlungu 2004, p. 17; Dwyer 2006, p. 99). Many participate in global debates through daily blogs and listservs. They support each other's campaigns by signing petitions, writing letters, lobbying, and providing publicity on Facebook and their web pages. For instance, Abahlali has ties of solidarity with the Anti-Eviction Campaign in Chicago, and has picketed the Austrian consulate in Durban in support of 'abahlali basePizzeria Anarchia,' a 'squat' in Vienna forcibly evicted by armed police in July 2014 after a two-year occupation (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2014). Certainly, then, these activists are part of a global information-sharing community where they participate in, and contribute to, transnational analyses and critiques of global economic power. As such, they do act in global space.

But even if this is an 'autonomous' space, as Castells defines it, it remains a fragmented space in which iconic symbols of anger and inspiring events of resistance, transmitted via social media and the internet, are translated into local meanings. In 2012, for instance, a coalition of community-based movements in Durban, South Africa, organized a campaign to 'Occupy Umlazi.' The action was, of course, an homage to Occupy Wall Street much like the Occupy actions that had burst out in other parts of the world; the Umlazi occupiers, led by a coalition of AbM, the Unemployed People's Movement, and the Ward 88 Crisis Committee, used the same rhetoric as Occupy Wall Street protestors, referring to themselves as the 99 percent and the new and old elites as the one percent. They fully understood that the link between them and the denizens of Zuccotti Park in New York ran through the cultural and institutional logics of neoliberalism. But beyond this rather playful salute, the similarities were sparse. Zuccotti Park is conveniently located close to the New York financial district, which is not only a global power center but an iconic symbol of unrestrained greed and self-gratulatory impunity; it was the genius of the New York Occupiers to present the mavens of money with a visible, non-threatening, but incessant reminder of their moral greasiness. Umlazi lacks all

146

the locational advantages of Zuccotti: previously an apartheid-era black township on the edge of Durban, it remains overwhelmingly poor and infrastructurally underdeveloped. The Occupy in Umlazi, in fact, did not start as a reference to Occupy Wall Street but as a strategy to protect the local councilor's office from being burned down by angry residents of the Zakheleni shack settlement whose requests for services, attention and accountability were being consistently ignored (Mottiar 2013). When the initial march on the councillor's office was met with police violence, plans for an Occupation were further developed and a month-long occupation launched on a piece of ground outside of the councilor's office. The camp was occupied by up to 3,000 people at a time. Mottiar (2013) notes that social media do not seem to have been used much in mobilization; meetings were advertised by pamphlets and loudspeaker, and no immediate linkage with other Durban struggles was made. Word of the protest spread throughout Umlazi by word of mouth and through ad hoc communications, although activists were able to send out regular updates via listservs such as the 'Debate' list maintained by the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.[12] The mainstream media paid little attention to the action.

For the local community, however, the Occupation was deeply significant. As Mottiar's (2013, p. 613) interviewees stressed, "the Occupy camp was a space to discuss views, demands and struggles, to share ideas about building a local clinic and park and a way to bond as a community." The movement drew on a strong community sense of self-reliance – in the face of official neglect, harassment, and disdain – among the Zakheleni shack dwellers. Their sense of place within, and solidarity with, a wider global community of protestors – what Biekart and Fowler (2013) call a 'globalization of disaffection' – was stoked by the screening and discussion of the movies *Dear Mandela* (about their own constitutional battle) and *Occupy Wall Street* by AbM (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2014). For the community, the Occupation conveyed a powerful, if parochial, sense of political agency, inspiring the prominent – and globally intensively networked – Left intellectual, Patrick Bond, to declare subsequently that "the most impressive protest along these lines [non-violent civil disobedience in the Gandhian mode] in Durban was Occupy Umlazi in mid-2012, which was a powerful statement of shack settlement creativity, which won major improvements after residents cleared a site next to the municipal councilor's office and camped there for several weeks" (quoted in Rondganger et al. 2014).

For Bond, the intriguing and distinctive feature of Occupy Umlazi was that it was not a 'popcorn protest,' i.e. the kind of 'spontaneous' local protest that erupts swiftly and explosively (when the social heat is right), blasts off erratically, and then fizzles. Such protests, in Bond's view, are so focused on local grievances and concerns about service delivery that they are unable to generate a broad societal wave of liberatory action. But this view may sell these protests short. To be sure, many contemporary South African protests do exhibit such short time- and space horizons. These actions tend to be quite specifically focused on particular local concerns (such as evictions), particular officials (such as incompetent, uncaring, or corrupt local councilors), at particular times. Yet this does not mean that they are

not well planned and organized, or that they combust spontaneously.[13] Community organizations draw on venerable action repertoires developed during the anti-apartheid struggle, such as mass direct action and non-violent confrontations with local officials through mass rallies, marches, sit-ins and occupations, negotiations-in-the-street, petitions and memoranda, etc., as well as more surreptitious actions such as illegal electricity hook-ups. Community-based activists run local education and information-sharing campaigns; they conduct workshops on constitutional rights; they plan actions carefully; they collaborate with other community organizations in the vicinity; and they liaise with larger umbrella organizations and national-level campaigns such as the APF or the landless peoples' movement in order to build solidarity, secure wider media exposure and raise the decibel level of popular anger. On the one hand, then, protest actions are local, sporadic, and frequently isolated from each other because they are timed according to local considerations (see Egan and Wafer 2006). For instance, the students' organization, Equal Opportunity, organizes marches on – or boycotts of – local schools in order to protest teacher absenteeism or the state of facilities in those particular schools. On the other hand, the networks of information-sharing, publicity, and discourse-making in which activists move indicate that these protests are part of an on-going, low-grade, bricolage-style campaign for the recognition and rights of poor people.

The framing of protests in terms of citizenship rights and constitutional claims also does not mean that South African movements are so bounded by the ideological preoccupations of liberal democracy or the formal institutions for practicing citizenship as to limit their transformatory aspirations (and perhaps capacity). In their analysis of the Western Cape anti-eviction campaign, Miraftab and Wills (2005) argue that these local movements embody a kind of 'insurgent citizenship' in which the urban poor go beyond the 'invited' spaces of citizenship to 'invent' their own, thus "expanding the arenas of practicing citizenship to include both invited and invented spaces of citizenship." The invited spaces are formal – the ballot box, the court system, etc.; the invented spaces are informal – street-level agreements hammered out with local councilors during heated confrontations, etc. In these invented spaces, Miraftab and Wills imply, the marginalized urban poor claim the constitution for the poor in defiance of the citizenship rights assigned to them by a neoliberalizing government.

The movement most well-known for deploying this kind of inside/outside politics successfully is the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a movement founded in 1998 to force the government to take HIV/AIDS more seriously and to make antiretroviral drugs available to AIDS victims. The TAC won acclaim for both using civil disobedience strategies and working through the legal system to bring pressure to bear on the government (Friedman and Mottiar 2006; Mbali 2010; Paramoer and Jung 2011). The TAC provided the model for Equal Education (EE), which was founded in 2008 in the Cape Town township of Khayelitsha to press the state to improve the conditions of schooling and education for poor township children (Isaacs, 2011). Zachie Achmat, a prominent activist who learned his craft in the anti-apartheid movement and subsequently spearheaded the TAC, has played a key role in advising EE. To date EE's signal achievement has been its

successful campaign to force the Minister of Basic Education to promulgate legally binding norms and standards for all South African schools – a result it achieved through marches, pickets, petitions, letter-writing campaigns, and ultimately legal action (Equal Education 2012).

Both the TAC and EE are single-issue campaigns that have sought to engage the government on the traditional terrain of public policy reform, and both have received support from international NGOs and foundations. Both have been criticized by some activists for lacking a radical vision.[14] Both the strength and limits of EE as a social movement organization are defined less by its ideology than by its organizational form. Like other contemporary movements, EE emerges from poor communities and works directly in poor communities. Its activities are led by student activists, known as 'equalizers,' who mobilize for specific gains in schools: libraries, toilets, timeliness on the part of teachers and students, etc. Training and thinking-work takes place at weekly meetings and local solidarities are highly prized. These conditions enable the movement to build local solidarities, but inhibit the spread of the movement beyond the realm of poor townships and rural locations.

Among South Africa's contemporary movements, the shackdwellers' movement, Abahlali baseMjondolo has framed its political identity most explicitly and self-consciously as a 'politics of the poor' that lies outside the reach of South Africa's formal democratic institutions. Abahlali, which is widely regarded today as the largest of the grassroots movements, had its start in 2005 when residents of the Kennedy Road informal settlement in Durban launched a series of demands against the city for land, housing, toilets, an end to the threat of forced removal, and the resignation of the local councilor, which were met first with disdain and then with violence. From a localized protest, the movement spread rapidly to other settlements all around the city, and subsequently to other cities. In 2008, it formed the Poor People's Alliance, along with the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, the Landless People's Movement and Rural Network. As shack dwellers, its members live in 'invented spaces,' spaces carved out of inhospitable terrain (and consequently not yet claimed by the city or the bourgeoisie) and characterized by the parlous conditions sketched at the beginning of this chapter (see Zikode 2006). In their interactions with the local state, Abahlali perceive a criminalization of poverty that place them beyond the formal socio-political arena, and by virtue of their place on the margins – both physical and social – they have been compelled to develop a politics of their own. Repeatedly declared 'out of order' in their efforts to engage their local councilors with claims for services and citizenship rights, they have declared themselves 'out of order.'[15] It is thus in these marginal spaces that they have struggled fiercely to build and defend a realm of political autonomy, a struggle captured in the defiant slogan that they wielded until 2014: 'No Land, No House, No Vote!'[16]

The decision to eschew the formal political arena, and to define the 'politics of the poor' as an autonomous space was the outcome of long and careful deliberations among movement members. Abahlali operates on the conviction that the 'politics of the poor' cannot succeed unless communities are run autonomously

and democratically. This conviction informs the movement's scrupulous adherence to democratic procedure and inclusive deliberations at community meetings (Bryant 2006; Pithouse 2006). At the same time, movement leaders have worked hard to nurture an endogenous sense of historical agency by theorizing the 'homegrown knowledge' that is acquired from the experience of living in shack settlements (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2014; Gill 2014; Pithouse 2006; Robertson 2014). This approach to inclusive and autonomous political practice as a process of *learning* takes place both in physical space and cyberspace. On the one hand, community meetings are a crucial locus for intellectual work; this is where documentaries are screened, politics is debated, connections to global trends are pondered, and theories are assessed. On the other hand, the movement participates in broader analytical and theoretical debates about the condition of poverty, marginalization, and informality via its webpage titled "University of Abahlali baseMjondolo." This page contains an extraordinary archive of written resources that not only trace the history of the movement but also offer comparative research on shack dwellers and poor people's movements elsewhere in the world, as well as theoretical debates on social power and history.

NETWORKS, COMMUNITIES, AND SOCIAL MEDIA

Pondering the rise of transnational activism in the 1990s, the social movements theorist Sidney Tarrow noted that internet networks do have the capacity to reduce transactions costs and to transmit information rapidly, and that they do "put those with access to computers into contact with others like themselves rapidly and with a sense of participation lacking in less personal forms of communication." Still, Tarrow was skeptical that these connections could underwrite the same 'crystallization of collective trust' that is forged in the frequently intense interpersonal experiences of on-the-ground collective action and coalition-building (1998, 193). Manuel Castells believes that they do; indeed, for Castells it is the death of popular trust in established social and political institutions that enabled the emergence of a new public sphere constituted by internet activists during the Arab Spring. In South Africa, it is clear that the ANC's local functionaries have systematically extruded such trust from the urban poor through their practices of marginalization, disdain, and violent repression. Yet the public sphere of digital activism has not been consolidated. South African experience thus suggests that Tarrow may be right to direct attention towards the importance of more intimate local and interpersonal networks and experiences in producing, and sustaining, political mobilization among poor urban youth.

There is support in social movement theory for such a focus on micro-mobilization. In his influential study of mobilizing networks in the 1871 Paris Commune, Roger Gould (1991) argued that successful mobilization in the Commune depended in significant part on "the interplay between social tries created by insurgent organizations and pre-existing social networks rooted in Parisian neighborhoods. Organizational networks maintained solidarity because they were structured along neighborhood lines." Dwyer's analysis of the

Concerned Citizens' Forum in South Durban captures a similar dynamic eloquently. While the CCF certainly emerged from the common material challenges of surviving on the margins, Dwyer notes that its members "are further united by what they bring to the CCF: an array of shared living experiences, identities, loyalties, symbols and resources that they draw on, and continually create and exchange, as a source of mobilization and campaigning" (2006, p. 89). This structure – which, as I have argued in this chapter, is common in post-apartheid poor people's movements – had two implications. On the one hand, it demanded intensive and extensive networking between the 'core activists' who organized and coordinated actions. Communication technologies and social media facilitated such networking enormously. Unsurprisingly, it eased the everyday work of organizing: arranging meetings, setting agendas, securing transportation, sharing information, etc. (cf. Gill 2014). In addition, it made it easier for leaders to network with affiliates and allies across the country and the world, sharing information about plans and protests, and expressing public support for local actions elsewhere. It also increased the nimbleness of movements, keeping lines of communication open when leaders under threat of assassination had to go into hiding, and enabling activists to alert the media *in real time* when local authorities were using violence to crush, disperse, or arrest protestors. As analysts of the post-2010 movements have pointed out, the power of keeping in touch during times of danger should never be underestimated, and this has been a significant source of strength for South African movements. In short, the internet and social media have added substantially to the capacity and public presence of post-apartheid movements.

On the other hand, as I have argued above, the structure placed a great deal of mobilizational emphasis on very local and interactive community relationships. As Dwyer points out, "From interacting with participants, it is evident that more than an organizational network is involved in mobilizing, campaigning and reliving events. This includes contacts between neighbors, friends, family, school friends and workmates who learn about issues and impending protests, and talk, debate, and gossip and argue about this, and encourage each other to participate or not" (2006, p. 95).[17] In this sense, face-to-face interactions play a crucial role in nurturing a democratic culture, consolidating the shared meanings and sensibilities of solidarity that constitute the 'living politics' of the poor, a politics described by S'Bu Sikode, chairman of Abahlali, as 'a homemade politics that everyone can understand and everyone can find a home in.' Access to wider sources of information via social media certainly contributes to the vibrancy of these interactions. As Richard Pithouse has noted (2006, p. 17), once Abahlali began to gain international media coverage (including in the *New York Times*, *The Economist*, and *Al Jazeera*) anyone finding an article would quickly spread the word via text message (if that person had credit on their phone) and this would spark intense discussions when people met.

In the context of South African poor people's movements, then, micro-mobilization matters in a way that McAdam and Paulsen have suggested: "at the microlevel, [social] ties are less important as conduits of information than as

sources of social influence" (1993, p. 152). New communications technologies provide a powerful conduit for movement politics when they strengthen and extend such ties in this way. Indeed, under such conditions the distinction between 'online spaces' and 'offline spaces' drawn by some analysts of the new public sphere can be effaced. Still, in a context where the creation of an autonomous community space lies at the heart of mobilizational politics, the intersection between online and offline mobilization is not untroubled. Understanding this intersection demands close attention to "the complex and often contradictory intersections between access and use, mobility and stasis, connectivity and regulation" (Wasserman 2013). In addition, if we are to understand its impact on social and political *mobilization*, we must be attentive to existing traditions of mobilization and cultures of community. New forms of communication do not simply *expand* social connections; they might also *disrupt* pre-existing networks of community and trust.

Unsurprisingly, research shows that, even if cyberspace is an autonomous space, its terrain is quite uneven. A University of Witwatersrand survey study found that, even though access to digital technology is expanding rapidly in South Africa, "There are some parts of society that the internet is struggling to reach – those on the wrong side of South Africa's digital divide are the unemployed, the disabled, the uneducated, those over 45 and especially those who cannot easily read and write in English" (de Lanerolle 2012, p. 10).[18] Moreover, the critical question is perhaps not the *degree* of connectivity – its social and geographical reach – but how that connectivity is targeted, i.e. who is using what platforms for what purposes. Consider the vignette with which this chapter opened: it was Facebook that enabled Abahlali baseMjondolo to send out its call for fire assistance; but ironically the very conditions that give rise to AbM's call for assistance – the fire-proneness of shacks to which no electricity is supplied – also make it difficult for the organization to reach its most proximate audience: close-by community members who might be able to rush to the scene (reading the post on a late afternoon in central Illinois can keep me tuned in to the movement's fortunes but is of little help in fighting that particular fire). Facebook is more readily accessed on a computer, which shack dwellers do not have, than on a phone; it is more readily accessed on a smartphone, which many shack dwellers lack, than on an ordinary cellphone; it is more readily accessed on a cellphone with a monthly data plan than the pre-paid arrangements that many poor people use because they are cheap and can be suspended during hard times. In short, a variety of infrastructural barriers make the terrain of digital connectivity quite uneven and impede the promise of the technology. While core activists are likely to ensure that they remain well connected, poor community members are likely to go off the grid from time to time.

In addition, different platforms have different cultures of usage, which are often class-based or generational. To be on Twitter means participating in a particular kind of discourse with its own set of conventions, practices, and communication idioms. Facebook offers a sense of contact with constantly changing communities with whom one's cultural connection may, at any one moment be opaque, tenuous

or puzzling; as the opening vignette in this chapter illustrates, it might not spark any possibility of efficacy. These cultures may not be congenial to marginal user groups. The University of Witwatersrand research project on connectivity found that the most significant predictor of internet usage was English language literacy – more significant than age, income, gender or where people live. Moreover, as the internet and social media become as much about images, audio, and video as they are about text, the lack of access that millions of South Africans experience to cheap, fast broadband literacy remains a critical limitation (de Larondelle 2012, p. 10). In such conditions, as Gerhards and Shafer (2009) point out, institutionalized actors may be in a position to dominate discourses.

Arguably, uneven access to digital media intersects with socio-structural characteristics of South Africa's poor people's movements. Because of their profound roots in communities and community relationships, these movements are deeply inter-generational. Many analysts stress the importance of families and households to the composition of movements. Because older women frequently manage key resources within households such as pensions and social grants, their voices are very important to community debates and mobilizations even when youth take the lead (see, e.g. Buhlungu 2004; Miraftab and Wills 2005; Dwyer 2006). Trevor Ngwane affectionately invokes the 'grannies of Soweto' as a powerful component of the SECC/APF; AbM stresses the role played by the 'gogos' of the community; Desai celebrates the 'aunties' of Chatsworth and Isipingo (Desai 2002; Ngwane 2004; Abahlali baseMjondolo 2014). Yet these crucial constituencies are the least connected to the internet or social media. Many must rely on more media-savvy youngsters for access and dissemination of information that is crucial to the framing of political sensibilities and actions. These disjunctures between the 'autonomous space' of the internet and the 'autonomous space' of community organizing can fuel resentments, uncertainties, or distrust. They can be pernicious, especially for movements that build their identity around inclusive, democratic, community-based decision making.

In 2014, an example of this danger played out within the Abahlali movement when one core activist, under physical threat and financial stress, became disaffected with the lack of support he was receiving from the movement.[19] In order to build support for his grievance, this activist launched a campaign on the social media network Whatsapp. The strategy not only ran counter to the participatory culture of the movement, according to which concerns are aired and resolved in open community meetings, but opened a separate discursive realm via Whatsapp groups to which not all movement members had access. Older members in particular were excluded and confused as social media became a locus of coalition-building and contestation within the movement; equal and open debate became compromised. Ultimately, the disaffected activist left the movement and the leadership posted a long explanation on its Facebook page. But, it acknowledged, social media entailed risks for the movement: "This is not where our struggle is. It is in the branches. This is where we will focus our energies" (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2014b).

CONCLUSION

An exploration of contemporary popular mobilization in South Africa demonstrates that the particular histories and patterns of marginalization shape the impact of new social media on protest in significant ways. In South Africa, optimism about the power of new communication technologies as agents of mobilization appears unwarranted. On the one hand, *traditions* of mobilization remain strongly focused on identity and solidarity at the community level: movements grow outwards from the community rather than downwards from the cybersphere. At the same time, *patterns* of mobilization have been shaped by the marginalization of the poor, whose lives are bounded by the converging spatial and social geographies of apartheid and neoliberalism. Under these circumstances, the 'many to many' characteristics of digital activism have remained muted, and the public sphere remains a fragmented space. As a recent survey found, Internet usership in South Africa reveals "not one digital divide – this New Wave is not static – but many digital divisions" (de Lanerolle 2012, p. 4). To be sure, activists are highly networked both nationally and transnationally, and they participate actively in global discourses of power and justice. But in the absence of a broader social coalition that reaches more substantively beyond 'the poors,' these networks have been unable to bridge the digital divides of South Africa's social landscape. In this respect it is noteworthy that, unlike post-2010 mobilizations in other parts of the world, the occupation of central urban public spaces (the Square) is not part of the South African repertoire of action – although marches in those spaces are.

By and large, youth participation in movements reflects one of these divides: non-poor youth tend to eschew politics and mobilized youth tend to be poor. In a small paradox, then, those who are most connected by social media are least mobilized; and those who are least connected are most mobilized. The critical advantage of social media in extending the social distance of community by spreading common idioms of belonging as well as frames of justice is effaced. It is likely that the communicative landscape of protest will shift as the established political parties use social media more in their efforts to build support, and the culture of Internet usage changes. In the meantime, however, the politics of micro-mobilization shapes the impact of social media rather than the other way around.

REFERENCES

Abahlali baseMjondolo. (2014a). Abahlali baseMjondolo [The Shackdweller's Movement]. Available online at: http://abahlali.org/

Abahlali baseMjondolo. (2014b). Abahlali baseMjondolo [The Shackdweller's Movement]. Available online at: http://abahlali.org/node/14055

Aker, Jenny C., & Isaac Mbiti. (2010). *Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa.* Center for Global Development, Working Paper no. 211. Washington, D.C.

Alexander, Peter. (2012). "A Massive Rebellion of the Poor." *Mail and Guardian*, April 13. Available online at http://mg.co.za/print/2012-04-13-a-massive-rebellion-of-the-poor

Alexander, Peter, & Peter Pfaffe (2013). "Social Relationships to the Means and Ends of Protest in South Africa's Ongoing Rebellion of the Poor: The Balfour Insurrections." *Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest*, August 2. Available online at:

http://www.uj.ac.za/EN/Faculties/humanities/departments/Research-Centres/sacsc/Events/
Documents/Social%20Relationships%20to%20the%20Means%20and%20Ends%20article[1].pdf

Appadurai, Arjun. (1990). "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy." *Theory, Culture, and Society*, *7*(June), 295-310.

Ballard, Richard, Adam Habib, & Imraan Valodia, eds. (2006). *Voices of Protest: Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Beinart, William, & Marcelle C. Dawson, eds. (2010). *Popular Politics and Resistance Movements in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Biekart, Kees, & Alan Fowler. (2013). "Transforming Activisms 2010+: Exploring Ways and Waves." *Development and Change*, *44*(3), 527-546.

Birkinshaw, Matt (2008). "A Big Devil in the Jondolos: The Politics of Shack Fires." Abahlali baseMjondolo Shackdwellers Movement, Durban, South Africa. Available at http://abahlali.org/files/Big_Devil_Politics_of_Shack_Fire.pdf

Booysen, Susan. (2009). ""Public Participation in Democratic South Africa: From Popular Mobilization to Structured Co-optation and Protest." *Politeria*, *28*(1), 1-27.

Bosch, Tanja. (2013). "Youth, Facebook and Politics in South Africa." *Journal of African Media Studies*, *5*(2), 119-130.

Bryant, Jacob. (2006). *Toward Delivery and Dignity: Community Struggle from Kennedy Road.* Research Report No. 41. Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal, Centre for Civil Society.

Buhlungu, Sakhele. (2004). *The Anti-Privatization Forum: A Profile of a Post-Apartheid Social Movement.* Research Report No. 41. Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal, Centre for Civil Society and School of Development Studies project on Globalization, Marginalization and New Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa.

Castells, Manuel. (2012). *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age.* Cambridge: Polity Press

Chance, Kerry. (2012). "'Where there is Fire, there is Politics': Ungovernability in Democratic South Africa." Development Studies and Population Studies Seminar, University of KwaZulu-Natal, July 24.

Dawson, Marcelle C. (2010). "'Phansi Privatisation! Phansi!' The Anti-Privatisation Forum and Ideology in Social Movements." In William Beinart & Marcelle C. Dawson, eds., *Popular Politics and Resistance Movements in South Africa* (pp. 266-285). Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

De Lanerolle, Indra. (2012). *The New Wave: Who Connects to the Internet, How They Connect, and What They Do When they Connect*. Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand.

Desai, Ashwin. (2002). *We Are the Poors: Community Struggles in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Dugger, Celia. (2009). "Eager Students Fall Prey to Apartheid's Legacy." *New York Times*, September 20.

Dwyer, Peter. (2006). "The Concerned Citizens Forum: A Fight within a Fight." In Richard Ballard, Adam Habib, & Imraan Valodia, eds., *Voices of Protest: Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (pp. 89-110). Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press .

The Economist. (2013). "Africa Rising: A Hopeful Continent." *The Economist*, March 2.

Egan, Anthony, & Alex Wafer. (2006). "Dynamics of a 'Mini-Mass Movement': Origins, Identity and Ideological Pluralism in the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee." In Richard Ballard, Adam Habib, & Imraan Valodia, eds., *Voices of Protest: Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (pp. 45-66). Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press .

Equal Education. (2012). *Annual Report.* Khayelitsha: Equal Education. Available online at: http://www.equaleducation.org.za/content/2013/08/08/Equal-Education-Annual-Report-2012.pdf

Friedman, Steven, & Shauna Mottiar. (2006). "Seeking the High Ground: The Treatment Action Campaign and the Politics of Morality," in Richard Ballard, Adam Habib, & Imraan Valodia, eds., *Voices of Protest: Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (pp. 23-44). Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Gerhards, Jurgen, & Mike S. Shafer. (2009). "Is the Internet a Better Public Sphere? Comparing Old and New Media in the U.S. and Germany." *New Media and Society*, *XX*(X), 1-19.

Gill, Gerard. (2014). "Knowledge Practices in Abahlali baseMjondolo." *Interface*, *6*(1), 211-229.

Glasius, Marlies, & Geoffrey Pleyers. (2013). "The Global Moment of 2011: Democracy, Social Justice, and Dignity." *Development and Change*, *44*(3), 547-567.

Gould, Roger. (1991). "Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871." *American Sociological Review*, *56*, 716-729.

Gower, Prim. (2009). "Idle Minds, Social Time Bomb." *Mail and Guardian,* July 31. Available online at: http://mg.co.za/article/2009-07-31-idle-minds-social-time-bomb/

Harvey, David. (1990). *The Condition of Postmodernity. An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hinely, Rebecca. (2009). "'Poors of Chatsworth' Take Charge." *The Mercury*, September 16.

Jacobs, Sean, & Ron Krabill. (2005). "Mediating Manenberg in the Post-Apartheid Public Sphere: Media, Democracy and Citizenship in South Africa." In Steven L. Robins, ed., *Limits to Liberation after Apartheid: Citizenship, Governance and Culture* (pp. 157-172). Oxford: James Currey.

Johnston, Alexander, & Ann Bernstein. (2007). *Voices of Anger: Protest and Conflict in Two Municipalities*. Johannesburg: Centre for Development and Enterprise.

Lim, Merlyna. (2012). "Clicks, Cabs and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004-2011." *Journal of Communication*, *62*, 231-248.

Mbali, Mandisa. (2010). "The 'New Struggle:' Resources, Networks and the Formation of the Treatment Action Campaign, 1994-1998." In William Beinart & Marcelle C. Dawson, eds., *Popular Politics and Resistance Movements in South Africa* (pp. 227-242). Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

McAdam, Doug, & Ronnelle Paulsen. (1993). "Specifying the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism." *American Journal of Sociology*, *99*, 640-667.

Meyer, Matt. (2013). "New Movements in South Africa?" *OpenDemocracy*, September 25. Available online at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/civilresistance/matt-meyer/new-movements-in-south-africa

Miraftab, Faranak and Shana Wills (2005). "Insurgency and Spaces of Active Citizenship: The Story of Western Cape Anti-eviction Campaign in South Africa." *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 25, 200-217.

Mottiar, Shauna. (2013). "From 'Popcorn' to 'Occupy:' Protest in Durban, South Africa." *Development and Change*, *44*(3), 603-619.

Mottiar, Shauna, & Patrick Bond. (2011). *Social Protest in South Africa*. Durban: Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal, September. Available online at: http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Social%20Protest%20in%20South%20Africa%20sept2011.pdf

Ngwane, Trevor. (2004). "Sparks in the Township." In Tom Mertes, ed., *A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?* (pp. 111-135). London: Verso.

Ngwane, Trevor. (2011). *Ideology and Agency in Protest Politics: Service Delivery Struggles in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Master of Arts thesis (Development Studies). Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal.

Paramoer, Lauren, & Courtney Jung. (2011). "The Role of Social and Economic Rights in Supporting Opposition in Postapartheid South Africa." In Ian Shapiro & Kahreen Tebeau, eds., *After Apartheid: Reinventing South Africa?* (pp. 199-230). Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Pearce, Jenny. (2013). "Power and the Twenty-First Century Activist: From the Neighbourhood to the Square." *Development and Change*, *44*(3), 639-663.

Pithouse, Richard. (2006). *'Our Struggle Is Thought on the Ground, Running': The University of Abahlali baseMjondolo*. Research Report No. 40. Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal, Centre for Civil Society.

Pithouse, Richard. (2008). "A Politics of the Poor: Shack Dwellers' Struggles in Durban." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, *43*, 63-94.

Republic of South Africa Department of Basic Education. (2011). *Report on Dropout and Learner Retention Strategy to Portfolio Committee on Education*. Pretoria: Republic of South Africa Department of Basic Education, June.

Robertson, Cerianne. (2014). "Professors of Our Own Poverty: Intellectual Practices of a Poor People's Movement in Post-Apartheid South Africa." *Interface*, *6*(1), 185-210.

Rondganger, Lee, Lyse Comins, & Nosipho Mngoma. (2014). "Be Angry with Government, Not Cops." *Daily News*, February 21.

Rosenthal, Kelly. (2010). "New Social Movements as Civil Society: The Case of Past and Present Soweto." In William Beinart & Marcelle C. Dawson, eds., *Popular Politics and Resistance Movements in South Africa* (pp. 243-265). Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Sen, A. Fulya. (2012). "The Social Media as a Public Sphere: The Rise of Social Opposition." Paper presented at the International Conference on Communication, Media, Technology and Design: Istanbul, May 9-11.

Shah, Nishant. (2013). "Citizen Action in the Time of the Network." *Development and Change*, *44*(3), 665-681.

Statistics South Africa. (2014). *Poverty Trends in South Africa: An Examination of Absolute Poverty between 2006 and 2011*. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. Available online at: http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-06/Report-03-10-06March2014.pdf

Steenkamp, Marika, & Nathalie Hyde-Clarke. (2014). "The Use of Facebook for Political Commentary in South Africa." *Telematics and Infomatics*, *31*, 91-97.

Tarrow Sidney. (1998). *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vellem, Yonela, Kedebone Legoale, Lucas Siphelo Ndabeni, & Buhle Booi. (2014). "Pupils Who 'Stood up for Their Rights.'" *Mail and Guardian*, May 23. Available online at: http://mg.co.za/article/2014-05-23-pupils-who-stood-up-for-their-rights

Von Holdt, Karl, Malose Langa, Sepetla Molapo, Nomfundo Mogapi, Kindiza Ngubeni, Jacob Dlamini, & Adele Kirsten. (2011). *The Smoke that Calls: Insurgent Citizenship, Collective Violence, and the Struggle for a Place in the New South Africa*. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Available online at: http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/thesmokethatcalls.pdf

Wasserman, Herman (2013). "Borders and Horizons." Available online at: https://hermanwasserman.wordpress.com/

Wasserman, Herman. (2014). "Youth, Conflict, Governance, and the Media." Available online at: https://hermanwasserman.wordpress.com/

Wu, Yu-Shan (2013). "South Africans Have Yet to Discover the Real Power of Social Media." *Mail and Guardian*, March 8. Available online at http://mg.co.za/print/2013-03-08-00-south-africans-have-yet-to-discover-the-real-power-of-social-media

Zikode, S'Bu. (2006). *The Third Force*. Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society.

NOTES

1. In the world of social movements, of course, calls for assistance are also very often calls to arms.

2. Biekart and Fowler (2013) refer to this as a 'globalization of disaffection.' My references to 'ephemerality' and 'postmodernity' here draw on David Harvey's concept of time-space compression as developed in his book *The Condition of Postmodernity*; when applied to the political terrain of poor people's movements, however, they might equally invoke his notion of 'accumulation by dispossession.'

3. This figure is cited by Wu (2013). De Lanerolle (2012) offers the slightly different figure of 84%. She also notes that 62% of South Africans spend more than R1 per day on a mobile phone.

4. Different authors cite slightly different data: Steenkamp and Hyde-Clarke (2014, p. 92) argue that in 2010 Facebook users 'accounted for 6.5% of the total population and 60% of all local internet users."

5. The term 'social mediascape,' as I use it here invokes Arjun Appadurai's (1990) notion of 'mediascapes' as the electronic capabilities of the new media as well as the images that those capabilities produce to generate scripts that people can use to constitute narratives of their own – real, imagined, and possible – lives, as well as those of others.

6. This combination of poverty and educational deficiency represents a convergence of what the UNDP calls 'life-cycle vulnerability' and 'structural vulnerability;' but it does not arise from neoliberalization, i.e. the withdrawal of public resources – the South African state *is* concerned about the condition of schooling. It arises from a profound history of willful neglect, etc.

7. On the ideological distinction between these two eras of movement, see in particular Rosenthal (2010) and Dawson (2010), who both see a substantial ideological shift from a nationalist frame to a socialist frame among the new social movements. Ngwane (2012) argues that the new social movements emerged after a 'lull' in popular mobilization in the mid 1990s.

8. Ngwane has also suggested that there are three waves of protest (see Mottiar 2013); Accounts of which community protest initiated the second wave vary: according to Johnston and Bernstein, the escalation in protests really began in September 2004 in Harrismith.

9. Analysing social mobilization in the global North, Jenny Pearce (2013) observes a similar trend; there, she argues movements find their core 'between neighbourhood and square.'

10. The documentary movie *Dear Mandela*, directed and produced by Dara Kell and Christopher Nizza, traces the successful campaign by Abahlali bseMjondolo to have the KwaZulu-Natal legislature's Prevention and Re-Emergence of Slums Act (2007) declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.

11. For instance, the documentary movie *Two Trevors Go to Washington* (directed by Ben Cashdan) focuses on the disjuncture between two South African Trevors at the IMF/World Bank meetings in Washington, April 2000: on the 'inside' was Trevor Manuel, South Africa's Finance Minister and chair of the IMF Board; on the 'outside,' protesting neoliberalism, was Trevor Ngwane, an ANC councilor from Soweto who would soon be expelled from the party for opposing neoliberal social policies and become a social movement leader. See http://go.to/two.trevors

12. Activists were, however, able to send out regular updates via listservs such as the 'Debate' list run by the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

13. Miraftab and Wills note that some of their respondents refer to the Western Cape actions as 'spontaneous.' But it is clear from their discussion that there is a great deal of community-level coordination, liaison, and work that goes into them.

14. Framing protest in terms of reform rather than radical change does not of course mean that a movement is less likely to have a radical impact. Indeed, as Doug McAdam has argued (and the history of TAC suggests), such a frame might be most effective in driving substantive political change.

15. The depth of this sense of alienation and exclusion from the political arena and the realm of citizenship can be gauged, perhaps, by Abahlali's close alliance with Congolese refugees in Durban.

16. In 2014, the movement made the highly controversial decision to vote for the neoliberal Democratic Alliance party as a protest against the ANC which was, quite literally, killing its members. While the move generated deep distress or anger among some key activists and movement allies, the leadership noted that a vote democratically taken could not be overturned.

17. For similar analyses, see Egan and Wafer (2006); Mottiar (2013), Hinely (2009).

18. The poorest households are least likely to have access to a digital device, e.g. a phone. In their study of protests in Phumelelo, for instance, Johnston and Bernstein (2007) noted that 16.6% of the population had no access to a phone (landline, mobile, or mobile with neighbours, or public phone).

Moreover, many poor people have access only to expensive pre-paid phones, which makes them unreliable.

19. This very brief sketch draws largely on the account posted on the Abahlali website (http://ahahlali.org/node/14055/). My point is not to represent or analyze the positions taken in this conflict; it is merely to reflect the role of social media. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth noting that AbM was sympathetic to the concerns of its activist member. As it acknowledged: "When people have been driven from their homes, have lost everything and are living under fear of death and all this is supported by the government it puts them under great strain. People can start to doubt each other and there can be conflict about how the movement decides on its priorities and collective security."

LAWRENCE FINSEN

8. THE ELECTION FACEBOOK (ALMOST) WON

The Cambodian National Assembly Election of 2013

The events surrounding the 2013 election in Cambodia are pretty much what would have been expected by observers familiar with the political scene in Cambodia in the last two decades: a National Assembly election fraught with charges of irregularities, followed by a long period of negotiation and demonstrations during which the dispute between the ruling party and the opposition was not resolved, even intensifying and breaking into violent conflict at times. By the end, the ruling party's hold on power, though challenged, remained in place. In this fifth National Assembly election since the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991 brought to a close two decades of civil war, genocide and foreign occupation, things seemed in many respects normal. After all, the ruling party – the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) – did not actually win the 1993 election, and though it had achieved majorities in 1998 and 2003, it did not acquire the supermajority needed to form a government. It had succeeded in maintaining its powerful position in all these cases nonetheless, and its strong-arm tactics in doing so have not varied a lot.

Yet, there is also something different about the most recent political campaign and the subsequent maneuvering that raises the question whether the Cambodian political scene has changed in a way that will make a difference in the longer term. That change is arguably due primarily to two interconnected factors: the very young age of the population, and the use of new and social media. In this chapter, I explore the role that new/social media has been playing in recent Cambodian politics.

To get a taste of the role of social media in this election, let's consider one event. On July 19, 2013, a crowd of 100,000 enthusiastic supporters greeted opposition leader Sam Rainsy[1] when he returned from years of self-imposed exile just nine days before the election (Seiff & Cheang Sokha 2013). The mainstream media – all of the television stations, most of the radio stations, and the Khmer language newspapers – treated it as a nonevent, covering it minimally or not at all. Regarding this lack of coverage two *Phnom Penh Post*[2] reporters wrote "The television channels – all of them dominated by the government ties – showed no footage of the rally, while other media downplayed it." Yet a large number of people were mobilized to greet Sam Rainsy at Pochentong Airport and parade victoriously through the streets of Phnom Penh to Freedom Park. How was this mobilization possible with a media that would clearly not help the opposition deliver its message to the public? In one way the answer is simple: it was Facebook.

Sam Rainsy's triumphant return to Cambodia is but one of many incidents that exemplify the transformation of Cambodian politics thanks to new media and a young population eager to use it. When the election was held last year, more than 52% of Cambodians were under the age of 25 (CIA 2013). The eligible pool of voters was the youngest it had been in Cambodian history, with 3.5 million voters between the ages of 18 and 30 and 1.5 million of those young people eligible to vote for the first time (Ponniah 2013a). Unsurprisingly, this young population was experiencing newfound access and interest in the use of social media. In a context in which government (and therefore the majority party) tightly controls traditional media, a newfound power of dissenting voices to disseminate their message, to organize and mobilize actions, to train and empower others in the uses of new media, and ultimately to challenge the entrenched ruling party's domination has emerged. Facebook is currently at the heart of the explanation of how those many examples came to be, but the story of that change is more complex and is changing already, and for a number of reasons its prospects to alter Cambodian political life are uncertain.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Cambodia secured its independence from nearly a century of French colonial rule in 1953, with Norodom Sihanouk leading the country, sometimes as head of state and sometimes as head of government. In 1970 a coup led by Prime Minister Lon Nol displaced Sihanouk (who was at the time head of state, with the title 'Prince'). Civil war ensued in which the communists, who Sihanouk dubbed the "Khmer Rouge" (but who actually called themselves the Communist Party of Kampuchea – CPK), succeeded in taking control of the country in 1975. From April 17, 1975, when the Khmer Rouge forces marched into Phnom Penh, until January 7, 1979, the country was isolated from much of the world, its people virtually imprisoned, money and banks eliminated, markets abolished, schools and professional institutions closed, religion banned. In their place was an agrarian revolution that forced people from the cities to the countryside to collective agricultural work, separating families and making "angkar" – "the organization" – the center of life. Anything foreign was rejected, despite most of the top leadership having themselves received higher education in France, and those who were tainted – the educated, those who spoke foreign language, artists, professionals, anyone who wore eyeglasses – were suspect and in danger. Many who were suspect in these or other ways were murdered outright. Additionally, certain portions of the population – such as the Cham Muslim community, people of Vietnamese or Chinese ethnicity, and the Buddhist monastic community – were singled out as targets for genocide. After less than four years of this reign of terror, close to 2 million people, roughly a quarter of the population, had perished – from malnutrition, starvation, disease, or outright murder.[3]

Cambodian political life has been dominated in the decades since the overturning of the Khmer Rouge regime by the CPP, with self-described "strong man" Hun Sen consolidating power as Prime Minister with repeated success in

maintaining a hold on control of the government through and sometimes in spite of elections. Hun Sen was himself a Khmer Rouge military officer (a Deputy Regional Commander) when he defected to Vietnam in 1977, as did Chea Sim and Heng Samrin. With Vietnam's encouragement, they formed a military force of defectors and local ethnic Cambodians that assisted the Vietnamese army when the latter invaded Cambodia on Christmas day, 1978, driving the Khmer Rouge from Phnom Penh to the jungle, from which the latter waged guerrilla war for the next two decades (Gottesman 2003, pp. 32-34; Mehta & Mehta 2013).

The invading forces succeeded quickly, taking control of Phnom Penh after only two weeks. "Democratic Kampuchea" (DK), as the Khmer Rouge had referred to the state, was now replaced by the "People's Republic of Kampuchea" (PRK). Vietnam maintained a military presence and oversight of PRK administrations for the next decade. Less than 30 years after securing its independence from French colonial rule, Cambodia was once again dominated by a foreign power. Throughout the 1980s the PRK was led by former Khmer Rouge military commanders, including Heng Samrin, Chea Sim and Hun Sen, or others, such as Pen Sovan, Say Phoutang and Bou Thang, who had split from the Khmer Rouge years earlier and remained in Vietnam (or Thailand in Say Phoutang's case) until the Khmer Rouge was ousted. Hun Sen was appointed Foreign Minister in 1980, Deputy Prime Minister in 1981 and became Prime Minister at the age of 32 in late 1984 (Gottesman 2005, p. 204; Chandler 2008, p. 277; Mehta & Mehta 2013).

Despite the quick success of the Vietnamese invasion, the Khmer Rouge remained a powerful player in Cambodia for some time. After the invasion, with Pol Pot leading the Khmer Rouge from the northwest jungles, larger geopolitical forces quickly came to the foreground. Evan Gottesman argues that the Cambodia conflict became a proxy for the cold war, pitting Vietnam and the Soviet Bloc against Thailand, China, the United States, and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (p. 42).

The Khmer Rouge found financial and diplomatic support throughout the 1980s. Both China and the United States refused to recognize the Vietnam-occupied government in Phnom Penh, insisting that Cambodia's seat at the U.N. be held by the Khmer Rouge representatives of a "government in exile" rather than the PRK. Two years following Vietnam's withdrawal of military troops in 1989, the Cambodian government, now calling itself the "State of Cambodia" (SOC), was able to reach a multination accord – the "Paris Peace Agreements" – setting the stage for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to lay the foundation for a nationwide election in 1993. David Chandler points out that the reduction of aid to Vietnam following collapse of the Soviet Union and the growing self-sufficiency of the PRK/SOC administration encouraged the 1989 Vietnamese withdrawal, which in turn paved the way for the breakthrough that finally led to the election, as the U.S. and China would now withdraw their support of the Khmer Rouge as representative of Cambodia in the U.N. (Chandler 2013, pp. 281-286). The Khmer Rouge boycotted the election, and many of their followers continued to battle the new government for a few more years, but they ceased to be a factor after thousands defected (with hundreds of their soldiers being

absorbed into the national army). The Khmer Rouge's complete demise seemed punctuated by Pol Pot's death while under house arrest after being tried by the Khmer Rouge itself for assassination of Son Sen and his entire family (Chandler 2008, pp. 289-90).

Nonetheless, the legacy of the Khmer Rouge period's devastation remains in many ways, and Cambodia has struggled to lift itself from the deep wounds inflicted. Justice for the victims has been long delayed, but in 2003 a treaty between the United Nations and Cambodia established the framework for a tribunal in which surviving senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge could be tried in Cambodian courts under a novel hybrid model that includes international participation and standards, as well as civil parties' participation and the possibility of "moral reparations."[4] The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is currently in the second phase of its second trial, trying Nuon Chea (former Deputy Secretary of the Communist Party) and Khieu Samphan (former Head of State) for crimes against humanity, genocide and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949, as well as a number of charges within Cambodian law. Two other defendants were originally charged as well – Ieng Thiritt and Ieng Sary – but Thiritt was determined to be incompetent to stand trial due to dementia, and Sary died during the first phase of the trial. Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan were both found guilty in the first phase of case 2 and given life sentences (there is no death penalty in Cambodia), while Kaing Guek Eav (also known as "Duch") was found guilty in the first trial and is now serving a life sentence (ECCC). Two additional cases with at least five defendants are being investigated for possible prosecution.

THE ELECTION OF 2013

On July 28, 2013, Cambodia held its election for the National Assembly, the fifth such "mandate" since the Paris Peace Agreements created the conditions for establishing a "multiparty parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy" (Women's Media Center of Cambodia 2013). Elections for National Assembly, which, along with the Senate comprises the Parliament, are held every five years. Other elections are held at varying intervals, but not at the same time as the National Assembly election. The CPP, under the leadership of Prime Minister Hun Sen, has succeeded in maintaining power throughout this period, winning by increasingly large margins in the National Assembly (and even greater margins in local, commune-level elections) throughout the first decade of this century. In the first three elections, the results did not favor the CPP with clear victories. In 1993, the CPP received fewer votes than the royalist party FUNCINPEC,[5] but Hun Sen refused to relinquish power, leading to a stalemate and eventual resolution with shared power and two prime ministers. The CPP managed to outmaneuver FUNCINPEC and maintained control over provincial governorships, defense, the national police, and the civil service (Chandler 2008, p. 289). In 1997 violence instigated by the CPP set the context for the next election. A grenade attack on a peaceful demonstration of Sam Rainsy supporters killed more than twenty, while more than a hundred FUNCINPEC officials and supporters died in what Chandler

describes as a "preemptive coup." In 1998 and 2003, the CPP did receive a majority of the votes, but not the two-thirds required to form a government. Despite the preemptive coup, the 1998 elections themselves were "free and fair" according to local and foreign observers, but the opposition parties had no access to electronic media and were not allowed to campaign in the countryside. The elections were followed by periods of struggle, out of which coalition governments were forged between CPP and FUNCINPEC (Chandler 2008, pp. 290-291). Before the 2008 election a constitutional amendment reduced the necessary result to 50% plus one, enabling the CPP to form a government without a coalition partner. As a result, heading into the election of 2013 the CPP held 90 of the 123 seats in the National Assembly.

But the results in 2013 seemingly reversed the trend of the CPP's ever-tighter grip on power, with a surprisingly strong showing from the newly formed opposition party, the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP). The CNRP is a coalition formed by two opposition groups, the Sam Rainsy Party and the Human Rights Party, which held 26 and three seats, respectively, following the 2008 election. Official results of the 2013 election gave 68 seats to the CPP and 55 to the CNRP (Sokchea & Seiff 2013, p. 1), a stunning outcome that signaled that despite continually increasing its grip on power, the CPP's dominance could still face a strong challenge. Indeed, that official result may not have reflected the actual strength of the opposition, which maintains that, but for widespread irregularities in the conduct and oversight of the election process, they would have actually won the election.

That strong showing at the polls needs to be considered in light of a series of significant events both prior to and after the election, including pre-election maneuvering, large turnouts for pre-election rallies and post-election demonstrations, continuing pressure to address alleged irregularities in the election process, and mobilization to address a variety of social issues. The opposition struggle included a 10-month boycott of the Assembly by all 55 opposition members-elect, a string of mass demonstrations, and a social media battle. Resolution came suddenly after an entire year passed with negotiations that started and stopped many times. Along the way, the opposition increased the pressure with more frequent demonstrations that included those with any number of grievances against the government, tapping into a growing agitation to address a broader set of social issues, such as minimum wage demands of garment and other workers, land rights, and attitudes toward Vietnam. At the same time, the government responded to demonstrations in increasingly repressive ways.

Given Cambodia's recent history, that an election had not resulted in an outcome accepted by all parties at the time its official results were announced is not remarkable. Despite the admonition in the Election Law that the National Election Committee (NEC) is to carry out its work in a neutral and impartial way, those overseeing the elections are perceived as being no more independent of ruling party control than are the judiciary or the mainstream media. For one thing, the manner of appointment makes independence problematic: members are nominated by the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet) and approved by a majority of

the National Assembly, both controlled by the ruling party (Kingdom of Cambodia 2013). Critics maintain that the composition of the committee reflects that lack of independence. For example, the current Chairperson, Im Suosdey, rose to his current position from the central committee of the CPP's youth wing, the Youth Association of Cambodia, before being appointed to the NEC (Lewis 2013). Thus, even with the odds stacked against them, the newfound success of the CNRP at the polls, along with its ability to maintain pressure and momentum for months of protests represents a noteworthy change. Undoubtedly, one important element in explaining the success of the CNRP is the presence and use of new media to challenge the state control of mainstream media: the television, radio and print sources from which most Cambodians receive most of their information. Without new media – especially Facebook and YouTube – it is doubtful that the opposition would have been able to achieve the results they did in the election or to mobilize the support they did in its aftermath in a continuing movement to address election irregularities and the stalemate about governance that continued for a year after the election.

PREELECTION MANEUVERING

The Cambodian National Rescue Party was created in 2012, when meetings between Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha, leaders of the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) and the Human Rights Party (HRP), finally resulted in declaration of their intention to merge the two parties and strengthen the opposition. Interestingly, the merging of the parties led to one of the maneuvers used by the CPP against the opposition. In early June, 2013 (less than two months before the election), all 27 CNRP members (24 from SRP, 3 from HRP), as well as 2 more from the disbanded Norodom Ranariddh Party were expelled from the National Assembly, stripped of their salaries and their immunity from prosecution as Assembly members. The ground of the expulsion according to the permanent committee of the National Assembly was their "simultaneously holding membership in two parties," presumably prohibited by the election law, which allows for election of parties' representatives proportional to the vote, not simply individuals (Phorn Bopha & Meyn 2013). Discussions of both the interpretation of the election law as well as the subsequent question whether the removal undermined the constitutional legitimacy of the Assembly (for no longer containing the requisite 120 members) seemed rather strained in their logic. But the aim of the expulsion was clearly to weaken the growing threat of the opposition just prior to the election. Loss of parliamentary immunity posed a serious threat to opposition members speaking openly in criticism of their opponents while seeking re-election in a context in which free speech is not well protected.

Another important event in the pre-election context has already been mentioned: Sam Rainsy's return to Cambodia. In addition to being an example of the ability to mobilize large numbers of people to act despite lacking access to mainstream media, Rainsy's return on July 19 also exemplifies the opposition's commitment to maintaining control of their messages through social media rather than reliance on

the mainstream media. Rainsy had been in self-imposed exile since late 2009, when, as a member of the National Assembly and leader of the Sam Rainsy Party he led a demonstration at the Vietnamese border at Svay Rieng involving speeches and moving border markers in a symbolic gesture, which led to his being tried in absentia for destruction of property and racial incitement; later in 2010 new charges led to a second trial for disinformation and falsifying public documents (Meas Sokchea & O'Toole 2010). He remained in Europe to avoid the sentences (which combined came to 11 years plus fines) until 2013. King Norodom Sihamoni, who became King in 2004 when his father Norodom Sihanouk retired, could grant a pardon, but only with an initial recommendation from the Prime Minister. Negotiations with Hun Sen had not resulted in an agreement on terms for Rainsy's return before the election. On July 5, 23 days before the election, Rainsy announced he intended to return even without a pardon, despite facing possible imprisonment. In a video that was "widely disseminated on social media" (first released on Facebook), Rainsy went further, saying: "I agree to sacrifice my life for national homeland, daring to die myself to rescue the nation from catastrophe." The *Phnom Penh Post* reporters mention that Rainsy refused their request for an interview at the time, indicating that he would have nothing to add that he had not already made clear on Facebook (Boyle & Meas 2013, p. 1).

AFTER THE ELECTION – A YEAR IN LIMBO

The results were not declared official until September, but the preliminary count had 68 seats for the CPP, 55 for the CNRP, and none for any other party. The opposition made its view clear immediately: the vote was rigged and the new government would be illegitimate. While there was less violence reported than in previous elections, observers suggested that things may have been worse in other respects, with the top issues raised right away including inaccurate voter lists (as many as a million people were alleged to have been left off the lists, according to one source), ghost voters assuming the identity of others by obtaining a temporary identity certificate supplied by the NEC (apparently as many as 100,000 of these were issued in Battambang alone); and fears of double voting (as video evidence went viral that the "indelible" ink in which voters had to dip their fingers was too easy to remove) (PP Staff 2013; Sen David 2013). Complaints lodged with the NEC were investigated and ultimately dismissed as either lacking a basis or insufficient to have changed the outcome of the election (NEC 2013). Rejecting the NEC's objectivity, the CNRP called for an investigation of the irregularities to be conducted with UN oversight, as well as local and international NGO participation. Official results, unchanged from the preliminary figures, were announced by the NEC on September 9 (Ponniah 2013c).

The next 11 months saw the longest political deadlock in modern Cambodian history, with a resolution only being reached almost a year after the election. The year was punctuated by mass demonstrations in Phnom Penh as well as other cities and negotiations that seemed to be reaching closure, only to have one party or the

other withdraw. Sam Rainsy took the CNRP case to other nations to withhold recognition of the government, but found little help there.

Social media continued to play a role, as it had already been doing in the campaign, with videos of alleged violations of voting rules going viral on Facebook and Twitter as early as election day (Woodside 2013a). In August, the CNRP held only two rallies, but announced plans for a peaceful but very large rally to last three days in September. In the meantime, King Sihamoni called on members-elect to a swearing-in ceremony on September 23, refusing opposition requests for delay to await the outcome of negotiations. True to their threat, all 55 CNRP members boycotted the swearing-in ceremony, instead holding a ceremony of their own at Angkor Wat, a location chosen for its powerful symbolic connotation of a glorious Cambodian tradition.

The government initially reacted to the mass demonstrations with concern, setting up barricades all around Phnom Penh to control the flow of demonstrators coming from the provinces. On September 16, the first day of the three-day rally, thousands gathered at Freedom Park, an area in Phnom Penh designated for public gathering and free speech. Later in the evening, angry workers, tired of waiting for hours at an overpass, pushed barriers aside so they could get home; the situation escalated and shots were fired. By the end of the melee, police had shot dead one man, injured 10 (four with gunshot wounds), and six had been arrested (May Titthara & Woodside 2013).

In October when the next major CNRP rally was planned, the government exercised more restraint, with a much smaller police presence and very few barriers around the city. Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha led many thousands in peaceful protest at Freedom Park, followed by a march to the UN office to deliver petitions for investigation of the election (with millions of Cambodians' thumbprints affixed attesting to the fact that they voted opposition) (May Titthara et al. 2013).

Throughout autumn, the CNRP held occasional rallies and marches; in early December, having made little progress in achieving their demand for a new election and an investigation, they raised the heat by declaring a strategy of daily demonstrations in Freedom Park. By mid-December the daily demonstrations attracted thousands. In the same period, the CNRP was not the only group protesting in Phnom Penh – striking garment workers and land rights activists, for example, were bringing their cases to the public eye.[6] Often these demonstrations received a much more violent response from the government, which was employing not only military and police to control demonstrations, but also a notorious group of "security guards" who were used in the front line to disperse crowds and crack heads (May Titthara 2013). The Daun Penh security guards (named after a district in central Phnom Penh) are easily identified in videos by their dark clothing, motorcycle helmets and batons. The government had responded to garment workers' wage protests by authorizing a raise to $95, far short of the $160 demanded. The CNRP invited them and others disaffected with the government to join their protests, and by late December the protests were drawing large turnouts, reaching a crowd of either 100,000 or 500,000, depending on whose estimate you consult (Meas Sokchea & Pye 2013). Things were getting tense for

the government, which initiated a crackdown. On January 2 and 3, demonstrating strikers at one of the garment factories were met with a strong response, resulting in five deaths and scores of injuries among demonstrators.[7] Twenty-three demonstrators were arrested, removed to a secret location and held incommunicado for a week, then detained for five months until their trial in June. Within a few days of the demonstration, the government banned all demonstrations in Phnom Penh. Nonetheless, various groups defied the ban throughout January, leading again to violent crackdowns, usually by the Daun Penh security guards, who by now had gained a reputation for their ruthlessness. One of the many videos exhibiting the brutality (visited upon demonstrators as well as journalists and NGO workers there to observe and assist) that went viral showed Daun Penh District Deputy Governor Sok Penh Vuth bashing a man with his bullhorn (Khouth Sophak Chakrya 2014a).

By early March the ban on demonstrations in Phnom Penh had been lifted, but Freedom Park remained off limits. In April, Assemblywoman-elect Mu Sochua started a campaign to re-open Freedom Park, appearing there each morning and trying to exercise her right to speech. She repeated the exercise daily, and was removed or barred from entering equally frequently. One day, after being refused entrance, she walked around the city to various sites, including Independence Monument and Prime Minister Hun Sen's house, making speeches. Her efforts attracted a following of young CNRP supporters, whose videos and photographs showed this courageous woman standing firm or sitting down and giving lessons on such things as the law protecting the right of free speech or the plight of garment workers. Usually, she can be seen being jostled, strong-armed, or carried away from the park, but the security guards raised the ante in late April when they attacked the group, injuring 10 (but not Sochua herself), including three journalists. Within a few days, Freedom Park was shut down more tightly, with razor wire reinforcing the barriers at all the entrances.

By June, the 23 defendants arrested at the garment factory demonstrations on January 2 and 3 had been tried, convicted and released with suspended sentences.[8] Some of those charged in the September 16 melee at the overpass received even better outcomes when their trial was held in February, with three released without charge, two given suspended sentences, while the last one retained a prison sentence of a year, reduced from three. Rights groups had questioned whether there was any evidence that they bore any connection to the incident, and none of the 30 police testifying for the prosecution could identify any of them (Khouth Sophak Chakrya 2014b).

In July, Mu Sochua announced she would be joined by a number of the other CNRP lawmakers-elect in her fight to re-open Freedom Park. On July 15, she and three other lawmakers, along with about 200 supporters placed a "Free the Freedom Park" banner on the razor wire blocking the entrance. Security guards removed it and started pushing and hitting demonstrators with their batons to force them to disperse. For the first time, demonstrators fought back. Until that point they had always been disciplined in their non-violent activism. The guards seemed unprepared for such an eventuality[9] and were easily separated, resulting in demonstrators circling and attacking them individually. Nearly 40 guards required

hospitalization; three were seriously injured. Police arrested all of the lawmakers-elect present, as well as two more who were not present, though none of them had had any part in the violence. Within a few days, a number of other leaders from the CNRP were also questioned, or arrested and detained. After spending the night in jail, Sochua and the other lawmakers were released, but three CNRP youth leaders were held for investigation until August 22, when they were finally granted bail (Khy Sovuthy & Blomberg 2014). Despite the releases, charges of insurrection and inciting violence (with potential sentences of up to 30 years) are still pending for 16 people, including the lawmakers.

Sam Rainsy, at the time traveling outside Cambodia,[10] altered his plans and returned on July 19, one year to the day after he had first returned from exile. He and Hun Sen resumed negotiations in person, and by July 22 they announced an end to the deadlock. The boycotting members of parliament would take their places in the Assembly[11]; the constitution would be amended to make the NEC an independent body of nine members, four from the ruling party and four from the opposition, with each elected by majority vote of the Assembly, as well as one independent member to be agreed upon by both parties. Within a week they agreed upon a candidate for the independent position, Pung Chhiv Kek, 71-year old founder and president of LICADHO, who had been instrumental in arranging negotiations between Hun Sen and King Norodom Sihanouk before the Paris Peace Agreements of 1991. She agreed to the appointment conditional on a number of guarantees of the NEC's independence.[12] Despite having been ineligible to run in the election, Sam Rainsy was given an Assembly position (representing Kompong Cham); in turn, Kuoy Bunroeun, the CNRP member who stood for election to the post Rainsy now holds, will be one of the CNRP members of the NEC.[13] A number of other conditions were agreed upon, some requiring legislative action once the new members were sworn in. Immediate reaction from CNRP supporters was mixed, as some were disappointed that their leaders had appeared to back down, securing much less than they felt they had been led to expect. CNRP leaders, for their part, asked for patience, as reforms and other details develop in the coming weeks and months (Seiff 2014).

THE CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Among the main accomplishments touted by the CPP are the period of political stability and economic growth Cambodia has enjoyed under its leadership (Women's Media Center of Cambodia 2013, pp. 8-9). Since the demise of the Khmer Rouge, the country has enjoyed a period of peace it had not known for many decades. The World Bank reports that it has also enjoyed consistent economic growth over the last decade, with average annual GDP increases of around 8%, and has succeeded in meeting the Millenium Development Goal of reducing its poverty rate by half – from 6.9 million or 54% in 2004 to 3 million or 20.5% in 2011 (World Bank 2014).

Thus, under the CPP, there has been considerable progress economically. Nonetheless, that claim may not be as compelling a message to the electorate as it

seems it should be at first sight. While the number living below the poverty line has decreased, many Cambodians remain economically vulnerable, with almost twice as many (8.1 million, or 55% of the population) living in "near poverty"[14] in 2011 as there were in 2004 (World Bank 2014). With three out of every four Cambodians either living below the poverty line or finding themselves uncomfortably close to it, many Cambodians have not yet enjoyed the benefits of the improving economy.

The other major claim the CPP has made concerns its ability to maintain peace and security for Cambodia. Sometimes the security argument seems to be as much of a threat as a prediction about who would be better at maintaining peace, as when Hun Sen made comments in April 2013 suggesting that electing the CNRP would sink the country into war (civil or otherwise). In that context, he not only mentioned the risk of more hostile relations with Vietnam, but also concern about the response of current government officials to electing a CNRP-led government, given Sam Rainsy's statement that the CNRP would bring some unnamed officials to justice for their role in the Khmer Rouge period. In his remarks, Hun Sen seemed to be suggesting that those government officials, himself included, would fight rather than be arrested (Vandenbrink 2013). But the larger issue is whether the youthful electorate, many of whom have no personal memory of the recent violent history, would find the CPP's claim as persuasive as it has been to their parents' generation.[15] The CNRP banked on the opposite message – appealing to the desire for change.

Whether or not the CPP's messages were persuasive to Cambodian youth and the economically vulnerable, Cambodia does face quite serious problems, a number of which congregate around issues of human rights and corruption, and these were focal points for the opposition campaign.

In 2013 Transparency International scored Cambodia 20/100 in its Corruption Perceptions Index (lower scores indicate perception of more corruption), which puts it at 160th of 177 countries ranked (Transparency International 2013). Harold Kerbo and Craig Etcheson each argue that corruption is the source of many of Cambodia's most serious problems (Kerbo 2011; Etcheson 2005). Etcheson, in discussing Cambodia's "culture of impunity," in which the "strong can do what they will and the weak will suffer what they must," points to the fact that "it is the norm in Cambodia that a poor person might be brought before the court to answer for a murder committed in passion, in greed, or in desperation, but it is rare that a rich or powerful person will suffer consequences for a similar crime, whether it is motivated by passion or greed or by politics." It is indicative of that culture of impunity, he says, that no one was ever held responsible for the 1997 murders of Sam Rainsy supporters or FUNCINPEC officials mentioned above (pp. 167-169). One might easily add to the evidence he offers the fact that no security guard or police officer was investigated, much less charged for their violent suppression of demonstrators in any of the events I have described here (and in many other cases).

Harold Kerbo points out that corruption is not limited to a small elite preying on the masses, but permeates Cambodian society, creating a vicious cycle in which replenishment of human and physical capital is difficult. For example, the health

care system is dysfunctional, with only 40% of money spent by the government for health care actually going to help patients: the rest is siphoned off in various ways – bribes to doctors, medicine and equipment that had been donated by NGOs resold for a profit; at a higher level, siphoning take such forms as bribes to make contracts and funding of salaries of nonexistent employees.[16] For many Cambodians, access to health care and economic insecurity are intertwined. Rural people whose living depends on agriculture may sink into more dire poverty if a family member becomes ill, as treatment will often be withheld without payment of a bribe. Needing medical treatment is one of the major causes of loss of assets in Cambodia, as many have to sell their cattle or their land to raise funds for treatment (Rainsy 2013; Kerbo 2011).

It would be bad enough, Kerbo argues, if the corruption affected only those in such dire situations. But given the economic vulnerability of the population (with 73% living on less than $2.30/day), even those who have steady incomes find themselves earning wages (with minimums set by government) that are insufficient for a decent standard of living. Consequently, government officials, teachers, police, people in a position to hire,[17] prosecutors and judges,[18] and others who can do so seek additional sources of income, and many come to expect such extraordinary payments – bribes – as a condition of performing their ordinary functions (Kerbo 2011).

To get a feel for how this problem is woven into the everyday life of Cambodians, consider public education. Students in presumably free public schools may be asked either to pay for such things as "private tutoring" (extra lessons offered after school where information crucial for examinations but withheld from the ordinary lessons is taught), registration and enrollment in school, the school's water and energy costs, parking bicycles, and attendance booklets. In addition to needing to pay to access education, they may also be able to purchase the marks of educational achievement without actually having to learn. For example, they may be able to purchase passing or higher grades, questions for an upcoming exam, the right to cheat on an exam, or the ability to skip a grade. Teachers have apparently learned that collecting such fees on a daily basis from students' pocket money rather than monthly or at other longer intervals is more lucrative, and so children are asked for money regularly (Dawson 2011). Kerbo reports from interviews he did in villages that a family with three school-age children spent around 10% of their daily income to send the children to school (Kerbo 2011, p. 50).

One aspect of the corruption in the educational system in Cambodia relates to high stakes exams. The Education Ministry has been increasing its efforts to eliminate the influence of cheating and bribery on the national grade 12 exam. A lot rests on success in that exam, as scores determine eligibility for admission to university. In 2014 the Ministry enlisted the help of the government's Anti-Corruption Unit to help prevent students from bringing notes and smart phones into the 154 exam locations. Newspaper reports showed photos of anti-corruption unit officers patting down students as they entered. The Ministry reported success, but reports of students entering and leaving print shops near exam centers with cheat sheets prior to the exams led to some skepticism. Defenders of the crackdown

pointed out that students purchasing cheat sheets risked buying useless fakes. One mother was interviewed about the experience:

> … a 55-year-old mother who would only give her name as Thy waited for her son to emerge from the exam. Ms. Thy said that her son had taken a different approach to the exam and, rather than risk trying to carry in the potentially useless "answers" being sold on the outside, would wait and attempt to buy some on the inside. "It will be best if he can get the answers to copy from a teacher," she said. (Sek Odem 2014)

That there would be teachers and exam monitors willing to turn the other way or positively assist students in cheating, or mothers who speak about which strategy is best, indicates that the behavior is not simply the result of failure to provide adequate monitoring. The problem is more deeply embedded within a system that does not pay adequate salaries to teachers and school administrators, nor budget enough for schools, and it seems unlikely that it can be fixed without substantial improvement in both taxation and compensation for public workers, among other things. Currently, the minimum salary for teachers in Cambodian public schools is $100 per month, and two out of three teachers take second jobs (such as offering private tutoring) to earn enough for their families. The Cambodian Independent Teachers Association (CITA) maintains that the minimum monthly salary for teachers should be $250. CITA also provided survey evidence that most teachers would relinquish their second jobs if compensated at that level, and organized "piecemeal strikes" for higher wages in 2014, at the same time that agitation for improvement of the minimum wage of garment workers and others was occurring (Wilkins & Sek 2014).

Corruption within the education system is hierarchical, with teachers also required to pay "facilitation fees" to principals, who must in turn pay higher level education authorities, and so on up the food chain. With teachers collecting fees daily, a culture which accustoms people to bribes is established at a young age. That experience within the educational context is, of course, not separate from the rest of life for Cambodians. Such an extensive and embedded culture of corruption leads some observers, such as Walter Dawson (2011), to wonder how easy it will be to bring real rather than just cosmetic reform to the education system.

Sam Rainsy, recognizing the centrality of corruption in the plethora of problems facing Cambodia, put overcoming corruption at the center of the platform he articulated for a change in leadership. He argues that the anti-corruption law enacted in 2010 has serious flaws, such as not requiring financial disclosure for spouses and relatives of government officials, in whose names illicit assets are often placed (Rainsy 2013, p. 181). A number of items on the CNRP campaign platform seem designed to attack the incentives to corruption – such as making health care for poor Cambodians free, raising minimum wages for workers and civil servants, and guaranteeing equal access to education and employment (Women's Media Center of Cambodia 2013). One major point of contention concerned minimum wages for garment workers. The garment industry represents Cambodia's major export and employs nearly half a million people, mostly young

women, many of whom travel from the countryside to urban centers to find work (Derks 2008). The government raised the minimum wage from $61 to $80 in May of 2013 and was not promising further raises (until it announced a $15 raise at the end of December 2013); one of the CNRP's campaign promises was to double it to $160 per month.

Judicial reform is an issue of great importance. In his 2013 autobiography, Sam Rainsy pointed to many problems in the justice system: "The judiciary, rather than being a series of independent institutions, is simply a part of Hun Sen's patronage network;" "Testimony from a single government official or police officer is usually enough to convict a defendant;" "Courts are starved of resources as a matter of policy … The corruption among judges that this breeds deprives the poor of access to the law;" "Police refuse to execute court rulings with which they disagree, or, more often, because there is no cash incentive;" and "Defense rights are poorly understood and seldom implemented" are among the problems he enumerated (pp. 113-117).

One of the hoped-for outcomes of the ECCC trials is that Cambodians would see a better model of justice in action,[19] and that the training received by those participating[20] would have a positive effect on the judiciary. Whether those outcomes are likely is hard to predict, but the process has been quite slow, with only three defendants tried and convicted after a number of years and hundreds of millions of dollars spent. While not long by the standards of such complex cases involving international law and crimes that encompass a wide range of events – the closing order (indictment) for the first phase of case 2 is itself over 400 pages long – it will be a long slow process to obtain such benefits from the tribunals. There has been a concerted effort to use the trials as educational tools, with the ECCC sponsoring significant outreach, bringing many people to witness the trial proceedings,[21] and provision of an excellent website that models transparency well, making public all the legal documents (in Khmer, English and French), updates about schedules, who the players are, and much more (ECCC).

While the ECCC and its impact has not been at the forefront of political debates in the campaign period, it obviously relates to larger questions of how Cambodia can move toward a more independent judicial system. Rainsy is not optimistic about the ECCC's ability to remain independent of Cambodian political manipulation, writing that, if he were Prime Minister he would "ask the UN to transfer the Khmer Rouge tribunal outside Cambodia to put an end to the farcical process that serves mainly to hide connections between the Khmer Rouge and the current regime" (Rainsy 2013, p. 181). There is certainly evidence that attempts to interfere have been made. For example, Hun Sen is quoted as telling UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon that "Case 003 will not be allowed … [t]he court will try the four senior leaders successfully and then finish with Case 002" (Open Society 2012),[22] and there have also been a number of crises caused by failure of the Cambodian government to provide promised financial resources. Its failure pay the national staff on a number of occasions for months at a time led to delays when staff went on strike (Minegar 2013). Nevertheless, whether the current regime's

resistance to extending the scope of the court has made any impact on the current cases, and how moving the trials out of the country would help is not obvious.

THE VIETNAM QUESTION

Another important theme surrounding the 2013 election concerns attitudes toward Vietnam. The opposition clearly intended to link the CPP with a pro-Vietnam attitude, leading to charges that the opposition's populist appeal on Vietnam employs dangerous racist rhetoric. This is not a new issue for Sam Rainsy, as one of the charges made against him in 2009 when he made the symbolic relocation of the boundary marker at the Cambodian-Vietnam border was racial incitement, and the claim that he and other opposition figures were playing a "race card" continues to alienate some who might otherwise be more sympathetic to the opposition (Ou Virak 2013).

The issue was used in the post-election maneuvering, as the CNRP appeared to have adopted a strategy of reminding the public of the current governing party's cozy relations with Vietnam at every opportunity, at the same time that a fairly consistent theme of vilifying the Vietnamese (especially in the social media postings of opposition supporters), whether for being party to vote-rigging, or for their alleged theft of Cambodian territory, and sometimes more broadly as exhibiting a colonial or master-slave relation, or even for aiming at the destruction of Cambodian culture. This complex issue needs a bit of historical context.

David Chandler argued that Cambodia's position between Thailand and Vietnam has been a significant factor in Cambodian politics for more than two hundred years, with Cambodia alternatively forced by one or the other more powerful neighbor to prefer its patronage. That long history reached a low point in the early 19th century when there was a decade-long period of Vietnamese occupation, with a puppet government installed (2008). Against that historical backdrop, the 1978 Vietnamese invasion was viewed as more of a mixed blessing than one might think at first blush – certainly it liberated Cambodians from the ruthless Khmer Rouge regime and, over the next decade established a more open and free society than Cambodians had seen since 1975. But that openness did not come all at once, and Vietnam's ulterior motives were not entirely trusted, especially as the new government retained many reminders of the communist regime that had been ousted. The regime in place in the 1980s may have had Cambodians in office, but the extent to which it was a "puppet" of Vietnam was surely a question in the minds of many (Gottesman 2003).

Whether the Vietnamese government was able to manipulate the PRK administrations throughout the 1980s did not exhaust the fears of many Cambodians. In the context of discussing the PRK years, Evan Gottesman described the climate that existed in the early 1980s in this way:

> The anti-Vietnamese rhetoric that the Lon Nol and Khmer Rouge regimes had disseminated throughout the 1970s, the unremitting anti-Vietnamese propaganda coming from the resistance, and the semi-mythical stories of Vietnamese atrocities from the nineteenth century inspired a nationalistic,

175

racist opposition to the Vietnamese occupation. The charges, expressed openly in the border camps and whispered inside Cambodia, were endless: the *yuon* were colonizing Cambodia; the *yuon* were taking Cambodian rice and starving the Khmers; more than a million *yuon* were in Cambodia, with more to come; the *yuon* were committing a "genocide" against the Khmers, forcing Khmers to speak their language, even taking Khmer orphans back to Vietnam to turn them into *yuon* spies. Most Cambodians, resentful of the occupation but unable to separate truth from myth, inferred from these accusations a larger conspiracy to absorb and destroy Cambodia and its people. (p. 138)

These deep suspicions about Vietnam and the Vietnamese people residing in Cambodia did not end with the departure of the Vietnamese in 1989. Indeed, writers today who discuss the Cambodian-Vietnamese relation are almost assured of receiving comments that reflect a very similar sentiment in online forums. Some are rather mild and make an effort to engage in reasonable discussion, such as this example responding to an *Al Jazeera* article reporting on the anti-Vietnamese attitudes of the opposition:

Till Cambodia becomes a country like Laos…which is run almost by Vietnamese then you will understand that CNRP president's statement is right. I am a Cambodian and where I live there are Vietnamese as well. Normally, we live peacefully together. However, we hate the policy of [the] Vietnamese government toward Cambodia. We don't like the way that [the] current regime of Cambodia [is] treating their people and offer[ing] good opportunity for Vietnamese to exploit everything. We feel like the Cambodia-Vietnam relation is slave-master (or modern colonization by Vietnam). (Wallace & Neou Vannarin 2013)

In other cases, authors receive less reasonable responses, peppered with personal abuse or threats, as one author did for making a case against the arguments that the island of Phu Quoc (or Koh Tral in Khmer) belongs to Cambodia (see comments at the end of Khmerization 2014, which reprints Mudrick 2014 with their reponse). Such attitudes were easily exploited as the opposition stirred up anti-CPP feeling among Cambodians in the election campaigns in the 1990s, sometimes with deadly results for ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia when the rhetoric led to riots and killings (Meyers 2002). Similar anti-Vietnamese rhetoric has been used in the political maneuvering in the most recent election, again resulting in violence against ethnic Vietnamese (Hul Reaksmey & Wallace 2014).

In the campaign for the 2013 election, this strategy was manifested in charges that the CPP was stacking the deck by allowing many illegal Vietnamese immigrants to both remain in the country and enroll as registered voters, at the same time that thousands of Cambodians, especially those likely to support the opposition, were not finding their names on the registration rolls. The claim that ineligible Vietnamese were helping the CPP steal the election was not a new charge. Similar claims had been made, for example, in the 1998 election. The CPP response has remained consistent, pointing out the process for challenging

176

suspected illegitimate registrations, and that those making the charges had to be careful to present evidence that the people in question were not entitled to vote rather than simply attacking legal immigrants who were less fluent in Khmer (Khuy 1998).[23]

But even after the 2013 election, the Vietnam question resurfaced numerous times in other contexts. One example concerns the question of borders and claims to territory currently within Vietnam. A sizable number of ethnic Khmer, the "Khmer Krom," live in southern Vietnam, where their religious and political freedoms have been restricted. Immigrating Khmer Krom have been welcomed by the CPP-led government, but their protests against Vietnam have not always been tolerated as well as when they were perceived to threaten relations between the countries (Human Rights Watch 2009a). In 2014, as the election conflict dragged on, the territorial issue was again raised by the Cambodian Khmer Krom community, demanding that Vietnam return Cambodian territory. The opposition has been supportive of their concern, with the CNRP posting information about the issue and protests on their social media – for example, Sam Rainsy's Facebook page kept the issue alive for many days, with the story given prominence. Protesters from the Khmer Krom community in Cambodia as well as the Federation of Cambodian Intellectuals and Students gathered outside the Vietnamese Embassy in Phnom Penh for a number of days in July, 2014. When the Vietnamese embassy spokesperson, Trung Van Thong, stated that the territory in question was never Cambodian in the first place (rather than having been given to Vietnam by France in 1949, as the protesters maintain), demonstrators demanded an apology and acknowledgement of Cambodia's claim to the territory. Marchers carrying banners with messages such as "Kampuchea Krom is Khmer's Homeland" tried to deliver petitions, but were blocked from getting near the Vietnamese embassy. The Phnom Penh government finally agreed to accept the petitions, promising to give them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deliver to the Vietnamese embassy, bringing demonstrations to an end at just about the same time that the CNRP and CPP appeared to be arriving at a settlement of the year-long stand-off (Khouth Sophak Chatrya & Peck Sotheary 2014).

But beyond such issues as voting or borders, the current election rhetoric continues to raise concerns among critics about inciting anti-Vietnamese racism. A number of comments from CNRP leaders, including Kem Sokha and Sam Rainsy, were claimed to be aimed at stirring up anti-Vietnamese feeling.

Kem Sokha, Vice President of the CNRP, has gotten into hot water on a number of occasions for such comments. In some cases he has apparently spoken of Vietnamese conspiracies, as when audio recordings of comments attributed to him and released by the government charged that the well-known S-21, or Tuol Sleng, was not actually a prison that had been the site of the torture and murder of thousands of people during the Khmer Rouge regime, but a myth staged by the Vietnamese. The charge that Tuol Sleng was a Vietnamese fabrication is based on a kernel of truth. Seeing the propaganda value of the site in justifying the invasion, they moved quickly after successfully routing the Khmer Rouge from Phnom Penh to turn Tuol Sleng – a school that had been used as a prison – into a museum to

show the world the extent of the Khmer Rouge's crimes. Tuol Sleng, from which only a small number of people survived, is one of the very powerful symbols of the terror wrought by the Khmer Rouge. The government's release of the recordings was clearly part of a strategy to focus negative publicity on Sokha,[24] and clearly had some effect. One of the survivors of the prison, Chum Mey, sued Sokha for defamation, keeping the issue alive for some time.[25]

In another case, Sokha stated that the Vietnamese were behind the collapse of the Koh Pich bridge in Phnom Penh during the water festival in 2010, (the collapse had been caused by a tragic stampede that resulted in more than 300 deaths). When asked to clarify, he is reported to have said: "I did not accuse [Vietnam] completely. I just thought about the history. I guess I did not say it was the [definitive] truth .… I wanted to say that one country wants to eliminate the race of another country [and] they eliminate through traditions, the same as in Kampuchea Krom" (Meas Sokchea & Ponniah 2014). While one may have been able to dismiss the comments about Tuol Sleng as manipulated for political purposes by the CPP (as Sokha disputes the authenticity of the tapes they released), it's harder to dismiss the evidence of Sokha's appeal to popular anti-Vietnamese sentiments in this case.

Sam Rainsy maintains that concern about Vietnam is a perfectly legitimate part of his platform, and that he does not advocate prejudice or violence. Rather, he points to concerns about the location of the borders, and about the presence of foreign economic interests in the development of economic land concessions that have driven many people from their land and become one of Cambodia's major human rights problems. Nonetheless, the way these concerns are expressed clearly involves a nationalist, populist appeal. That point is driven home by continued insistence, for example, on using the term 'yuon,' which has been used in CNRP speeches by Rainsy and others, and is freely used in social media postings by many supporters. Critics claim the term is a pejorative way of referring to Vietnamese people, though those using it dispute that claim, maintaining that it is simply a traditional Khmer term for Vietnamese. Rainsy defended his use of 'yuon,' saying that while it is not a "politically correct" term, it is not racist (Chen & Meyn 2013). Whether or not that is accurate, that many do find it offensive might have been sufficient argument for refraining from its inflammatory use.

CONTROL OF MEDIA

Amid all the reporting about the results after election day, a small article in the *Phnom Penh Post* might have gone unnoticed. It reported on how the Khmer language media, print and online, had reported the results. Interestingly, the Khmer language reports barely mentioned or downplayed the strong showing of the opposition, despite its historic dimensions (Mom Kunthear 2013). Another striking example was provided by the lack of coverage of the ouster of the opposition members just a month before the election. In an analysis of the Khmer language media's coverage of that event, White and Khouth noted that only two of eight major media outlets made any mention of the expulsion at all, and those two

covered it only briefly, omitting mention of opposition arguments that the move was unconstitutional (White & Khouth 2013).

Such distortion is not really surprising, as domination of media by the ruling party has been an important factor in the CPP's ability to maintain power through many elections, and the import of the recent CNRP showing in the election can only be understood against the background of that control and influence of the media. In 2013 Cambodia was ranked 143rd out of 179 countries in Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index. In a joint publication, Reporters Without Borders and the Cambodian Center for Independent Media reported that Government control of media lay at the core of the low ranking. In 2012, all 11 TV stations in Cambodia were either entirely owned by the government or by government in conjunction with CPP-allied private parties. Of the 30 regularly published newspapers, many are at least partly owned by a government party and "are used as platforms for spreading propaganda and discrediting the opposition." The report identifies not only the centralized ownership as a significant problem, but also the need of television stations, the single most popular source of election information for Cambodians, to vet news programs with the government prior to broadcast. Radio stations, on the other hand, while being heavily regulated, apparently provide somewhat greater access to opposition voices in Cambodia than TV does (RWB & CCIM 2013).

The importance of media access in the Cambodian context has been noted in detail in previous elections. As mentioned above, the opposition was restricted from access to electronic media in the 1998 election. In previous elections a number of groups like the Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL) and the United Nations Cambodia Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights have monitored coverage, while others have made attempts to help improve access, such as the United Nations Development Program's "Equity Access Programme" in 2003, which assigned airtime to registered parties based on their popular support and other factors (Hughes & Kim 2004).

The domination of the media by the ruling party is also noted by COMFREL in their analysis of the conduct of the 2013 election. COMFREL monitored the behavior of the media during the period before the election, considering how often candidates were mentioned, their platforms explored, and the extent to which coverage was biased. The privately held media, for example Bayon TV and Cambodian Television Network (CTN) – which have the most extensive audience nationwide – offered coverage that was the most disproportionate, with the CPP dominating 88% of Bayon TV's election coverage and 76% of CTN's. The greater disparity is not surprising: Bayon TV is owned and managed by Prime Minister Hun Sen's daughter, Hun Mana, while CTN is one of the many holdings of Kith Meng, Chairman of Royal Group (Cambodia's largest conglomerate), President of the Chamber of Commerce and reputed to be an advisor to Hun Sen. COMFREL also points out that when coverage was provided to opposition figures it rarely included discussion of their platforms or policy proposals (COMFREL 2013).

The National Election Committee has come in for much criticism by the opposition in relation to this election, with both its makeup and conduct as one of

the issues the contending parties have disagreed about. A number of NEC regulations concern equal media access in election campaigns. For example, during the official campaign period (the month prior to the election), NEC regulations require provision of airtime to all parties on an equal basis. However, COMFREL points out that no legislation has ever been passed to enforce the NEC's regulations, leaving them as guidelines that are easily ignored. In the one case during the 2013 campaign in which the NEC requested that the Ministry of Information respond to violations by temporarily shutting down a radio station two days prior to the election, the Ministry failed to do so (COMFREL 2013).

Control of the media is not only exerted over the stations and newspapers corporately, but is also applied directly over individual journalists, who have been subjected to intimidation if they step out of line. There have been a number of prominent cases in which legal retribution has been used to discipline dissenting voices. Sometimes the intimidation comes in the form of using vague defamation or disinformation laws, such as when Hang Chakra, editor of the daily *Khmer Machas Srok* was sentenced in 2009 to a year in prison for publishing allegedly defamatory articles that accused the Deputy Prime Minister of corruption. Another prominent example concerns Mam Sonando, owner of Beehive radio and an outspoken critic of the government, who was sentenced to 20 years in 2012 for allegedly assisting a secessionist movement in Kratie province. Critics note that his arrest came shortly after he had aired a news report about a complaint lodged in the International Criminal Court that accused the government of crimes against humanity. After appeal, his sentence was reduced to five years – eight months served and the remainder suspended, leading to his release (RWB & CCIM 2013).

There have also been a number of cases, especially in the environmental area, where reporters critical of officials and companies have met with outright violence. In one case, Heng Serei Oudom, an environmental reporter for the *VorakchunKhmer Daily* who had written articles implicating a local police official in illegal logging activities, was found dead in the trunk of his car. In another case, Vichey Anon, a Radio Free Asia journalist, reported on the arrest of another journalist named Trang Try, who had reported on illegal logging. Vichey was later found unconscious by the side of the road, and remains in a coma. And in a recent case in Phnom Penh, Voice of Democracy (VOD) reporter Lay Samean was beaten by security guards while trying to photograph their crackdown on a peaceful march by CNRP supporters prior to the May, 2014 commune elections (CCIM 2014).

When not able to directly influence or control media, the government has resorted to controlling access to certain kinds of sources. At the end of June, 2013, a prohibition of local rebroadcast of any Khmer-language programs from foreign sources for the official campaign period was issued by the Ministry of Information. The Ministry explained the 31-day ban as an effort to ensure media neutrality and to enforce an NEC regulation that prohibited foreigners from campaigning for or against any parties. Tep Nytha, spokesperson for the NEC, explained the ban, noting that use of foreign-sourced broadcasts about the election creates an "imbalance" because they "broadcast only negative points about the government." On Friday evening, June 28, the ban was made public, resulting in programs from

Voice of America, Radio Free Asia and Radio France International being taken off the air by such local stations as Beehive Radio and the Women's Media Center. There was an immediate outcry from many quarters, including the United States government, which appealed directly to the Cambodian government, as well as issuing a public condemnation of the threat to freedom of the press and expression in Cambodia. By Saturday night, the Ministry of Information reversed course and withdraw the ban. The reversal did not, however, include another less publicized ban that had been made a few days earlier on all broadcasts from foreign-sourced surveys relating to the election in the five days prior to the election and all election-related broadcasts in the 24 hours prior to the election (Khy & Crothers 2013; May & Seiff 2013).

Opposition parties and critics of the government have tried to obtain licenses for television and radio stations for many years, with limited success. They are given reasons such as lack of available frequencies, but in 1998, the United Nations Special Representative for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, observed that Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Rinariddh (who had been co-prime ministers until Hun Sen took solo control after the coup in 1997) had "colluded in blocking media access to other parties" (Grainger 1998; Mom Kunthear 2014). Opposition parties continue to try,[26] but with the opening of alternatives made possible by the explosion of internet access and social media in Cambodia, they have also found new ways to reach people.

THE INTERNET EXPLOSION IN CAMBODIA

Access to the Internet has become available and rapidly expanded in quite a short time in Cambodia. According to the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, of a 2010 population of approximately 14 million, 320,190 people were using the Internet, equaling an "Internet penetration rate" (IPR) of approximately 2%. By 2011, this had grown to 1.68 million users (an IPR of 11%), which rose again in each successive year by more than a million users. In mid-2014, there were an estimated 3.8 million Internet Cambodian users, a remarkable rise from 2% to 25% of the population using the Internet in just a few years (Ben Sokhean 2014).

The explosion has likely resulted from rapid expansion of mobile access. Inexpensive mobile phones with data plans are widely available in Cambodia, with adequate reception in many (though not all) places in the country. While there are less than a half million landlines in a country of over 15 million people, there are currently over 20 million mobile phones. Even a casual observer visiting Cambodia over the last few years would likely notice the rapid change. In annual visits since 2009, I began noticing an increase in use of "smart" phones by Cambodians in the last few years, while the availability of free wi-fi hotspots was also increasing – so much so that the number of Internet cafés in Siem Reap and Phnom Penh was decreasing, though this may have also been the result of the threat of government closings allegedly due to school children spending too much time playing games (Chak Sopheap 2013). In 2014 I observed many construction workers and tuk tuk drivers using phones capable of connecting to the Internet, noticeably more than I

observed in previous years. When, during the same visit I had an opportunity to speak with a group of approximately 150 10th grade students in Phnom Penh, I asked them to raise their hands if they use Facebook. My question was greeted with laughter, and I was quickly informed by a few close to me that they did not need to show their hands because they were confident that every single one of them had Facebook accounts.

Evidence of the prevalence of devices to capture digital footage is easy to find in a myriad of videos of demonstrations and rallies posted to YouTube: looking at such videos one quickly notices the recurring theme of people filming the events on their phones and tablets. (For a particularly good example culled from hundreds that could be given, see the YouTube video of a demonstration at the Vietnamese Embassy on July 8, 2014, http://youtu.be/n59XlQCxP8U.) The citizen journalists far outnumber the official press, with people rushing to capture anything happening at a rally or demonstration.

NEW MEDIA VOICES

The internet explosion in Cambodia has given rise to many different voices. YouTube and Facebook were the two most important communication venues during the political upheaval of the last year. Twitter is beginning to have a presence, but probably played a lesser role up to this point. While YouTube is being used to document events (rallies, speeches, interviews, demonstrations, violent acts against demonstrators and the like), Facebook seems to be the single most important access point for people to spread political messages, as it provides a stable location for people to find information and post reactions. Major opposition figures – Sam Rainsy, Kem Sokha, and Mu Sochua, for example – have all maintained active Facebook pages in which they broadcast messages about their viewpoints and events, as well as requests for action. Aware of its multiple audiences, Rainsy's page broadcasts many messages in both Khmer and English, and occasionally adds French. It also includes a "Summary of the Main News of the Day," a video that takes the form of a traditional television newscast: a newscaster sits before the camera, a statue of Buddha and flowers the only adornment, reading (in Khmer) scripts that are also available as written postings on Rainsy's Facebook page. That there would be such broadcasts that mimic old-fashioned television news programs on the web might seem odd at first, but given that the CNRP request for a television license had been turned down repeatedly, it has taken to the "air" on the Internet instead. In addition to Rainsy's broadcasts, there is also "CNRP TV," which describes itself as "established by a group of people who support the National Rescue Party" (apparently from the Cambodian diaspora in the United States) that includes digital programming they categorize as "TV Programs," "Discussion" and "Talk Shows." The "TV Programs" are also organized as newscasts. There is also CNRP Radio – all of these are accessible from multiple sites, including their webpage, their Facebook page, and YouTube.

Another opposition leader who has a significant online presence is Mu Sochua, first elected (as a CPP party member) to the Assembly in 1998. She served as

Minister of Women's and Veterans' Affairs until 2004, when she declined reappointment to the Ministry to join the Sam Rainsy Party, and now serves on the Executive Committee of the CNRP and as their Public Affairs Chief. Well known for her advocacy for human rights, nonviolence, and women, she emerged as a highly visible figure in the campaign, especially thanks to her courageous nonviolent activism to reopen Freedom Park. Often jostled by the Daun Penh Security guards at Freedom Park, she did not allow them to provoke her or to push her out, with a small army of citizen journalists following her and posting the events (see, for example the videos posted on I Love Cambodia Hot News II's Facebook page for April 1 and 2, 2014). Her grass-roots approach continues in her use of social media, where she is more likely to be depicted talking and listening to ordinary Cambodians, such as victims of land grabs whose attempts to petition the government fall on deaf ears, than being photographed with other politicians or in ceremonial contexts. The very active Facebook page she maintains creates the impression of a hands-on approach, often responding personally to comments – one response to a comment questioning her conversations with ordinary Cambodians is interesting for the frank statement about the state of media access: "this is how lawmakers with no access to state media take the Constitution to the people." Her postings are usually written in both Khmer and English. She also maintains an active blog, "Mu Sochua: MP and Human Rights Advocate," that lays out her positions on such things as women in politics, human trafficking, poverty and land rights.

Clearly opposition parties and leaders have recognized the potential value of the new media. Up to this point, the same cannot be said about the ruling Cambodian People's Party or most of its top figures. The CPP itself has a Facebook page, but it has very few "likes" (4,346) and very infrequent posts (the most recent on their timeline when I checked in July, 2014 had been posted eleven months previously), compared to the CNRP's 159,500 "likes" and numerous daily updates. In addition to Facebook, each has its own website: the CNRP maintains an active webpage with frequently updated content and prominent links to its Facebook page as well as a related YouTube channel which offers videos of current events, while the CPP webpage is sometimes difficult to access[27] with infrequent updating, and there are considerably fewer CPP-sponsored YouTube videos, mostly with songs.

There is a "Samdech[28] Hun Sen, Cambodian Prime Minister" Facebook page, though he disavows any connection to it. Upon learning of Sam Rainsy's Facebook popularity during the campaign, Hun Sen said he was not interested in a social media popularity contest (Willemyns & Kuch 2014; Vong Sokheng 2013). To the extent that "likes" indicate actual readers,[29] Sam Rainsy's Facebook page is the most popular of any kind (political or otherwise) in Cambodia with over 700,000 likes as of July, 2014. An exception in the ruling party is Khieu Khanarith, Minister of Information, an active poster on Twitter whose following of more than 600 is still significantly smaller than that of such tweeters as Kounila Keo, Ou Rithy, Ou Virak, the Ruom Collective (a group of journalists specializing in "social reportage throughout Southeast Asia") and Hun Sen's Eye (a satirical poster who describes himself as "Social media consultant for misunderstood strongmen

everywhere"). Clearly, social media does not figure significantly in the communication strategy of the ruling party, but does for the opposition.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have also begun to make important use of new media in their campaigns on a variety of issues. One striking example of the power of new media in the hands of CSOs is the interactive map created by the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human rights (LICADHO) that shows in visually intuitive terms the extent of the problem of land concessions. Land concessions (popularly known as 'land grabs') involve lease of "private state land" by the government to private companies for agricultural and other development projects. One problem is that much of the land is already inhabited by individuals who may not be able to prove title to the land,[30] but who have resided on and used it for a long time. Many such people have been evicted, often forcibly, to make way for the land concessions with little or no compensation, leading to one of Cambodia's most severe human rights crises. Human Rights Watch estimated that 85,000 Cambodians were evicted in such land grabs between 1999 and 2009 (Human Rights Watch 2009b). Perhaps the best known case internationally is the Boeung Kak Lake development project in Phnom Penh, which displaced thousands of people from their homes for a private business venture quite near the government's central offices. Thousands were evicted from their homes so the 133-hectare lake could be filled in, but they didn't go quietly. Protests continue to this day, with a number of courageous women (most prominently Yorm Bopha and Tep Vanny) resisting the development and going to prison for their protests. In addition to the continuing protests, activists have created a blog that archives all the published articles and information about the struggle, getting the message about their plight out (http://saveboeungkak.wordpress.com/). Boeung Kak is only the most visible tip of the land grab iceberg, as the LICADHO map demonstrates.

LICADHO's time-lapse map dramatically represents the land rights problem by depicting the increasing area of the country that has been given to private companies in the last 20 years – each additional concession marked in red and accompanied by the "ka-ching" sound of a cash register. LICADHO's powerful tool, available for anyone to use easily, was noted by Voice of America, the *Phnom Penh Post,* and Global Witness, and has helped to communicate the severity of the problem of land grabs to a wider audience (LICADHO 2012).

The Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), an independent CSO advocating for democracy and human rights in Cambodia, is the most important advocate of new media's potential as a tool in promoting democracy in Cambodia. CNRP Vice President Kem Sokha founded CCHR in 2002, and then left in 2007 to form the Human Rights Party. Ou Virak became President and led CCHR until March, 2014, when he became Chair of the Board of Directors; Chak Sopheap now serves as Executive Director. Under Sokha's leadership CCHR created both Voice of Democracy (VOD) Radio and the Cambodian Center for Independent Media (CCIM), which offered training to 21 citizen journalists prior to the election. In 2009 CCHR saw the potential of new media forms and began creating programs and publications to help build the country's capacity, including helping other CSOs learn to use the technology (CCHR 2013). Under Sopheap's leadership, CCHR

continues this strategy by training young activists to use social media for effective human rights advocacy. One example among many such projects CCHR has created is called "Empowering Cloghers," in which female university students from rural backgrounds are trained in online activism to help break down the digital divide that disadvantages both women and rural people. More broadly, CCHR has created both an online portal, "Sithi.org" ('sithi' means rights in Khmer), as well as a physical space at the CCHR headquarters in Phnom Penh ("Sithi Hub") for training and dialogue, with the ultimate goal to "promote the protection of human rights in Cambodia through the use of Information Communications Technology (ICT)." At Sithi Hub activist members can participate in training in technical skills such as creating Khmer Unicode, multimedia training, and online security, as well as sessions attending less to the technical side and more to such topics as effective blog content, video journalism, and using data to enhance storytelling.

In addition to the training sessions, Sithi Hub is available for activists to meet formally or informally in a safe space. One group using Sithi Hub is Politikoffee, whose Facebook page describes it as "a group of young enthusiastic and social media-savvy Cambodians who love sociopolitical and economic discussion. Politikoffee Group believes in "Liberal Democracy" prevailing in Cambodia by enhancing Discussion and Debate based on principles of national interest, solidarity and fraternity" (Politikoffee 2014). They sponsor regular meetings as well as occasional guest speakers at Sithi Hub, discussing such timely topics as likely scenarios to end the political deadlock, nationalism v. patriotism, and the problem of anti-Vietnamese sentiment. Politikoffee's leader is Ou Rithy, whose Twitter postings, blogs and columns on political developments are deservedly gaining a wide following.[31]

The emergence of blogging as an important forum for political conversation and analysis in Cambodia, as one informant told me, is aided by the fact that "everyone knows that many things, especially controversy, do not make it to the mainstream media, and so they must look elsewhere." In addition to Ou Rithy, a vital group of young bloggers (or *cloggers* and *cloghers*, as the terms for male and female Cambodian bloggers have evolved) has gained some notice. Kounila Keo and Chak Sopheap are among the earliest voices: both began blogging as University students in 2007. While Kounila Keo's "Blue Lady Blog" and tweets range from the political to the culinary, Chak Sopheap's have become decidedly oriented to political and human rights issues, as the subtitle she chose for her blog suggests: "Riding the Wave of Change in Cambodia." Ou Virak doesn't blog, but is active on Twitter, pointing his thousands of followers to longer discussions that share his insights about current affairs, such as his Facebook postings, interviews and newspaper articles. His analyses have become an important contribution to the public political conversation in Cambodia today. For example, his August 8, 2013 video interview with the *Phnom Penh Post* provides a thoughtful analysis of the issues that both parties faced in reaching resolution (Ou Virak 2013).

Cambodians are not only taking to social media to discuss their country's future, but are also learning from and contributing to a larger global conversation about

such matters. They are becoming a location to hold international conferences and workshops, such as the 2012 Blogfest Asia Festival in Siem Reap, where 200 bloggers gathered to talk about such things as Internet Freedom (Greenwood 2012). Cambodian social media users are also making their presence felt elsewhere. To take but one of many possible examples, Kounila Keo is not only blogging and training others to use social media in Cambodia, but has participated in media training programs and conferences in the United States, Germany, France, South America and Africa, and gave a TEdx talk in 2012 (Kounila Keo 2014).

In addition to the people like Chak Sopheap, Ou Rithy and Ou Virak, whose passion for change is tempered by their perception of a need for a more sophisticated, reasoned analysis in Cambodia's public political discussion, there are others, like "Khmer Sovannaphumi" (a pseudonym meaning "The Golden Land of Cambodia"), Kheang Sreymom and "I Love Cambodia Hot News"[32] who are using social media to criticize the powerful, post videos, political cartoons, and news items, with more emphasis on outrage and less on detailed analysis. Such postings surely account for much of the impact made by social media in the election. Some have become celebrities in their own right, such as Thy Sovantha, an outspoken teenage girl whose bold anti-government speeches are featured on YouTube and Facebook. Initially, she posted frequently on "I Love Cambodia Hot News," but eventually created her own page, which describes her as a "CNRP supporter." By August, 2014 it boasted over 400,000 followers. But not all has gone smoothly, as her anti-government rhetoric brought her death threats, as well as rumors that she was really a CPP spy (Murray 2014).

There are many more social media sites that have gained followings in Cambodia. Anonymous Cambodia, a group which has hacked government websites, appears to have one with 26,000 followers. There are many others, with the range of interests that are typical elsewhere. Clearly, the alternative media have become deeply entangled in the lives of Cambodians in a short time.

PROSPECTS FOR LONG-TERM CHANGE

In 2012 the government announced that a law would be drafted to address cybercrime. In April, 2014, a draft of that law was obtained by Article 19, a London-based group advocating freedom of expression. They published it on their website along with an analysis of its dangers (Article 19 2014). Criticism of the leaked draft came quickly, with concerns that vague provisions might be used to censor critics of the government. Section 28 especially raised concern, as it would criminalize websites and online postings that are deemed to "hinder the sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia," incite or instigate "anarchism," generate "insecurity, instability and political [in]cohesiveness," slander or undermine the "integrity of any government agencies, ministries" at all levels, or damage moral and cultural values, such as "family values." In addition to the dangerous vagueness in the descriptions of the crimes, critics pointed out that the punishments in the draft law went beyond the levels of punishment for comparable offenses (such as slander) committed offline. One provision seems clearly a

response to the kinds of caricatures one finds on some dissenters' Facebook pages, as it prohibits "drawings, pictorials, or pixilation that [are] deemed to slander or defame human beings or commoners of the state performing activities unbecoming, with animals of any species." The government spokesmen refused to comment on a leaked, and therefore "illegal" document (Ponniah 2014).

Whether the law will pass in its current form is unclear, though drafting controversial laws in secret and then revealing them only when they are close to finalization is not unusual in Cambodia. But if it or something like it is legislated, the question whether the government intends to use it to suppress the kind of speech that led to the strong opposition showing in this election is a serious concern; and even if they do not have such an intention for the near future, the capacity to do so would seem likely to have a chilling effect on dissenting voices.

Many are optimistic that the current experience has altered the terrain in Cambodia. Faine Greenwood sums up that view when she concludes her discussion of the role social media played in the election by saying, "Whatever the outcome of the 2013 Cambodian elections, one thing is clear: an online democracy is here to stay in Cambodia." But she also notices that "some in power in Cambodia are well aware that they will need to get the Internet under control if they wish to maintain dominance in the long-term," a pessimistic note that should not simply be dismissed (Greenwood 2013). Indeed, the government has blocked access to certain blogs, usually for pornography or sexually explicit imagery. Some websites that publish criticism of the government (such as KI-Media, Khmerization and Sacrava) have been blocked from time to time, though the government denies that it ordered the restrictions. In one case access was restored when customers complained to their cell provider, but was then subsequently blocked again, leading to some worry that there could be real challenges to Internet freedom in Cambodia (Chak Sopheap 2013).

One important consideration in thinking this through is the history of the CPP and their willingness to take ruthless measures to maintain their hold on power. That they are debating a draft of a Cybercrime law, rather than how to assure a peaceful transition of power, or whether there should be term limits for Prime Ministers,[33] suggests that the party's view of the importance of having mechanisms in place for a peaceful transition of power has not changed. A vague cybercrime law might well be considered a useful tool to have before the next election. One would look for more concrete evidence that intentions had changed before concluding that they will let loose their grip on power too readily.

On the other side, though the widespread use of the Internet in Cambodia is still a very recent phenomenon, it seems clear that it has become an important part of everyday life to many who are therefore not likely to relinquish it easily. Perhaps its use has already become so important in Cambodian life that turning back the clock and blocking access to sites like Facebook is not a realistic option. For one thing, the taste for democracy in Cambodia may have been strengthened by this experience, with a generation of young people (who now make up more than half the population) who are tweeting and posting on Facebook not just to update each other on their status (though they do this too), but also engaging in serious

discussion of the direction their nation should take, thinking that their contribution to that dialogue might actually mean something. For another thing, a young, tech-savvy generation that is training itself to use these tools for effective activism would surely try to remain one step ahead of the government in finding ways around any such measures.[34]

And, one must not forget that, though a minority within the government, the opposition that is now sitting alongside the ruling party in the National Assembly owes its stronger voice today to their embrace of the new media. Surely they will not stand idly by and watch that democratic tool eliminated. The question is whether their increased position is sufficient to enable them to block the ruling party in such an eventuality. Additionally, the power of the new media extends beyond the opposition, to include the ruling power (potentially), and also civil society organizations (CSOs) and those who are skeptical of both the entrenched power and the opposition; all of these people have a stake in defending it. For all these reasons, resistance to using a tool like the draft Cybercrime law to suppress dissenting voices would likely be quite strong.

At this point, we don't know whether Cambodian politics is changed for the long term by the experience that new and social media has provided in the last year. In the election of 2013, new media's presence and promise was felt in Cambodia. Its main contributions include helping the opposition articulate its message in detail to a broad audience without censorship, enabling them to get their supporters out to vote and assisting in monitoring the election. Mobilizing large numbers of demonstrators would have been much more difficult or impossible without it. And when the opposition took to the streets, the government's attempts at suppression became clear through the activism of many who courageously broadcast the evidence for the whole world to see. But whether the longer-term result is reform and further democratization, or a continuation of the old tactics to hold onto the power that a small elite currently enjoys, the election of 2013 showed that new media has become a significant player in that struggle.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

REFERENCES

Article 19. (2014). "Cambodia: Secret Draft Law Seeks to Undermine Free Speech Online." Available online at: http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37516/en/cambodia:-secret-draft-cybercrime-law-seeks-to-undermine-free-speech-online

Ben Sokhean. (2014). "Mobile Users Top 20 Million, Internet Usage Still Rising." *The Cambodia Daily*, March 27. Available online at: http://www.cambodiadaily.com/business/mobile-users-top-20-million-internet-usage-still-rising-55024/

Boyle, David, & Meas Sokchea. (2013). "Rainsy Pledges Return." *Phnom Penh Post*, July 8.

Butt Reaksmey Kongkea, Shane Worrell, & Daniel Pye. (2014). "High Profile Cases Stick to a Script." *Phnom Penh Post*, June 2. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/high-profile-cases-stick-script

Cambodian Center for Human Rights. (2013). *Best Practices for Using Social Media for Human Rights.* Available online at: http://hub.sithi.org/document_detail.php?id=64&ln=en

Cambodian Center for Independent Media. (2014). "CCIM Condemns Beating of VOD Reporter, Calls for Investigation." Press Release, May 2. Available online at: http://www.ccimcambodia.org/press-release/96-ccim-condemns-beating-of-vod-reporter

Central Intelligence Agency. (2013). *The World Factbook.* Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Available online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html

Chak Sopheap. (2013). *Cambodia: Freedom on the Net 2013*. Freedom House. Available online at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/cambodia#.U_-ldjKwJcS

Chandler, David. (2008). *A History of Cambodia* (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press.

Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL). (2013). *2013 National Assembly Elections Final Assessment and Report*. December. Available online at: http://www.comfrel.org/eng/components/com_mypublications/files/559262Final_Report_and_Assessment_National_Assembly_Elections_Final.pdf

Dawson, Walter. (2011). "Supplementary Education in Cambodia." *The Newsletter (International Institute for Asian Studies)*, *56* (Spring), 18-19.

Election Reform Alliance. (2013). *Joint Report on the Conduct of the 2013 Cambodian Election. Phnom Penh: Election Reform Alliance*. Available online at http://www.comfrel.org/eng/components/com_mypublications/files/684510eERA_Joint_Report_on_Cambodian_Elections_2013_Final.pdf

Etcheson, Craig. (2005). *After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide*. Lubbock, Texas: Texas Tech University.

ECCC (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia). (2014). Website. http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en.

Ford, Liz. (2013). "Global Fund Halts Contracts Over Bribes for Mosquito Nets in Cambodia." *The Guardian*, November 15. Available online at: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/nov/15/global-fund-suspends-contracts-bribes-mosquito-nets

Gottesman, Evan. (2003). *Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Grainger, Matthew. (1998). "UN Blasts CPP's Domination of State-Run Media." *Phnom Penh Post*, July 3. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/un-blasts-cpps-domination-state-run-media.

Greenwood, Faine. (2012). "Asian bloggers Discuss Internet Freedom at Cambodia Conference." *Global Post*, November 4. Available online at: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/cambodia/121104/asian-bloggers-discuss-internet-freedom-at-cambod

Greenwood, Faine. (2013). "Social Media Drives Youth Involvement in Cambodia's National Elections." TechPresident, July 31. Available online at http://techpresident.com/news/wegov/24223/rising-social-media-use-drives-youth-involvement-cambodias-national-elections

Hughes, Caroline, & Kim Sedara. (2004). *The Evolution of Democratic Process and Conflict Management in Cambodia: A Comparative Study of Three Cambodian Elections*. Working Paper 30. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute. Available online at http://www.cdri.org.kh/webdata/download/cpdpapers/evolutione.pdf

Hul Reaksmey, & Julia Wallace. (2014). "Vietnamese Shop Near Protest Site Looted by Demonstrators." *The Cambodia Daily*, January 6. Available online at: http://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/vietnamese-shop-near-protest-site-looted-by-demonstrators-50139/

Human Rights Watch. (2009a). "On the Margins: Rights Abuses of Ethnic Khmer in Vietnam's Mekong Delta." Available online at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/vietnam0109web_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch. (2009b). "Universal Periodic Review Submission: Cambodia." December 1. Available online at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/12/01/universal-periodic-review-submission-cambodia

Human Rights Watch. (2013). "Cambodia: Land Titling Program Open to Abuse." June 12. Available online at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/12/cambodia-land-titling-campaign-open-abuse

Kerbo, Harold. (2011). *The Persistence of Cambodian Poverty*. Jefferson, NC: MacFarland & Company.

Khmerization. (2014). "Koh Tral: Is it a Cambodian or Vietnamese Island?" Blog, June 22. Available online at: http://khmerization.blogspot.com/2014/06/koh-tral-is-it-cambodian-or-vietnamese.html

Khouth Sophak Chakrya. (2014a). "Video Can't Be Trusted: District Gov." *Phnom Penh Post*, January 30. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/video-can%E2%80%99t-be-trusted-district-gov

Khouth Sophak Chakrya. (2014b). "Clash Accused Will Appeal." *Phnom Penh Post*, March 3. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/clash-accused-will-appeal

Khouth Sophak Chatrya, & Peck Sotheary. (2014). "Krom Protests End for Now." *Phnom Penh Post*, July 23. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/krom-protests-end-now.

Khuy Sokhoeun. (1998). "F'Pec Criticizes Registration." *The Cambodia Daily*, May 26.

Khy Sovuthy, & Lorren Crothers. (2013). "Foreign Broadcasts Banned Ahead of Election." *The Cambodia Daily*, June 29. Available online at: http://www.cambodiadaily.com/elections/foreign-radio-broadcasts-banned-ahead-of-election-32648/.

Khy Sovuthy, & Matt Blomberg. (2014). "Three CNRP Youth Freed on Bail." *The Cambodia Daily*, August 23. Available online at: http://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/three-cnrp-youth-freed-on-bail-67086/

Kiernan, Ben. (2004). "The Cambodian Genocide–1975-1979." In Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, & Israel Charney, eds., *Century of Genocide* (pp. 338-373). New York: Routledge.

Kim Sam Ath. (2014) "New Media is a Platform to Reshape Social Spaces for Cambodian People." *Deutsche Welle Global Media Forum*. Available online at: http://blogs.dw.de/media4sustainability/2014/06/03/new-media-is-a-platform-to-reshape-social-space-for-cambodian-people/

Kingdom of Cambodia. (2013). Law on Election of Members of the National Assembly (LEMNA) and Amendments of Law on Election of Members of the National Assembly. Unofficial translation. Available online at: http://www.necelect.org.kh/nec_english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&Itemid=216

Kounila Keo. (2014). "Writing is Remembering." Blog. Available online at: http://www.kounila.com/

Kuch, Naren. (2013). "S-21 Survivor Sues Kem Sokha for Defamation." *The Cambodia Daily*, June 15. Available online at: http://www.cambodiadaily.com/elections/s-21-survivor-sues-kem-sokha-for-defamation-31066/

Kyle, James. (2014). "Leaked Draft of Cambodia's Proposed Cyber Law Reveals Threat to Free Expression." *Deutsche Welle*, May 14. Available online at: http://dw.de/p/1ByIN

Lewis, Simon. (2013). "Amid Calls for Probe, NEC's Independence in the Spotlight." *The Cambodia Daily*, August 2. Available online at: http://www.cambodiadaily.com/elections/amid-calls-for-probe-necs-independence-in-the-spotlight-38152/

LICADHO. (2012). "The Great Cambodian Giveaway: Visualizing Land Concessions over Time." Available online at: http://www.licadho-cambodia.org/concession_timelapse/

Mateus, Sofia Diego. (2014). "Cambodian Political Rivals Reach Deal to End Deadlock." *Deutsche Welle*, July 22. Available online at: http://dw.de/p/1CgqX

May Titthara. (2013). "Protesters Beaten by Guards." *Phnom Penh Post*, October 31. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/protesters-beaten-guards

May Titthara, & Abby Seiff. (2013). "Reversal on Ban Leaves One in Place." *Phnom Penh Post*. July 1. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/reversal-ban-leaves-one-place

May Titthara, & Amelia Woodside. (2013). "Shootings a 'Throwback' to Earlier Era." *Phnom Penh Post*, September 17. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/shootings-%E2%80%98throwback%E2%80%99-earlier-era

May Titthara, Meas Sokchea, & Kevin Ponniah. (2013). "Taking it to the Streets." *Phnom Penh Post*, October 24. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/taking-it-streets

Meas Sokchea, & Abby Seiff. (2013). "More Protests Promised." *Phnom Penh Post*, September 9. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/more-protests-promised

Meas Sokchea, & Daniel Pye. (2013). "CNRP's Sunday 'Tsunami.'" *Phnom Penh Post*, December 23. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/cnrps-sunday-tsunami

Meas Sokchea & James O'Toole. (2010). "Rainsy Gets 10-Year Term." *Phnom Penh Post*. September 24, 1.

Meas Sokchea, & Kevin Ponniah. (2014). "A Bridge Too Far." *Phnom Penh Post*, June 6. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/bridge-too-far-sokha

Mehta, Harish C., & Julie B. Mehta. (2013). *Strongman: The Extraordinary Life of Hun Sen.* Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions.

Meyers, Bill. (2002). "Cambodia's Ethnic Vietnamese Continue to live in the Shadow of Discrimination and Hatred." *The Cambodia Daily*, July 6. Available online at: http://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/cambodias-ethnic-vietnamese-continue-to-live-in-the-shadow-of-discrimination-and-hatred-699/

Minegar, Benjamin. (2013). "Cambodia Khmer Rouge Tribunal Staff Goes on Strike." *Jurist*, September 1. Available online at: http://jurist.org/paperchase/2013/09/cambodia-khmer-rouge-tribunal-staff-goes-on-strike.php

Mom Kunthear. (2013). "In Khmer News Outlets, A Different Election Tale." *Phnom Penh Post*, July 30. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/khmer-news-outlets-different-election-tale

Mom Kunthear. (2014). "Expansion of Beehive Shot Down." *Phnom Penh Post*, January 15. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/expansion-beehive-shot-down

Mu Sochua. (2014). "The Price of Freedom." *Phnom Penh Post*, April 28. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/analysis-and-op-ed/price-freedom

Mu Sochua. (2014). "Mu Sochua: MP and Human Rights Advocate." Blog. http://sochua.wordpress.com/

Mudrick, Jeff. (2014). "Cambodia's Impossible Dream: Koh Tral." *The Diplomat*, June 17. Available online at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/cambodias-impossible-dream-koh-tral/

Murray, Bennett. (2014). "Q&A: Thy Sovantha: The Teenager Who Stirred up a Political Storm." *Phnom Penh Post*, February 7. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/7days/qa-thy-sovantha-teenager-who-stirred-political-storm

National Election Commission. (2013). *White Paper: The 2013 Election for the General Election for the 5th Mandate of the National Assembly of the Kingdom of Cambodia.* Phnom Penh: Kingdom of Cambodia. Available online at http:// http://www.necelect.org.kh/nec_english/

Open Society Justice Initiative. (2012). *The Future of Cases 003/004 at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia*. Available online at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/eccc-report-cases3and4-100112_0.pdf

Ou Rithy. (2014). "Cambodia: Old Politicians in a New Society." Asian Human Rights Commission. June 23. Available online at: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1406/S00184/cambodia-old-politicians-in-a-new-society.htm

Ou Virak. (2013) "Ou Virak Examines Post Election Fallout." *Phnom Penh Post*, August 8 (video interview). Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/video/ou-virak-examines-post-election-fallout

Peter, Zsombor. (2014). "Medical NGO Refuses to Reform, Loses Global Fund Financing." *The Cambodia Daily*, April 11. Available online at: http://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/medical-ngo-refuses-to-reform-loses-global-fund-financing-56420/

Phnom Penh Post Staff. (2013). "Big Opposition Gains." *Phnom Penh Post*, July 29. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/big-opposition-gains

Phorn Bopha, & Colin Meyn, (2013). "Opposition Lawmakers Stripped of Posts, Salaries." *The Cambodia Daily*, July 8.

Pike, Amanda. (2009). "Cambodia Confronting Its Past." *Frontline/World Dispatches*, February 20. Available online at: http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/blog/2009/02/cambodia_confro.html

Ponniah, Kevin. (2013a). "Political Eyes on Youth Vote." *Phnom Penh Post*, July 9. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/political-eyes-youth-vote

Ponniah, Kevin. (2013b). "Cambodia's Vietnamese Community Finds Voting is Not Necessarily a Right." *The Guardian*, September 4. Available online at: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/sep/04/cambodia-elections-vietnamese-voting

Ponniah, Kevin. (2013c). "Reform Talk from CPP." *Phnom Penh Post*, September 10. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/reform-talk-cpp

Ponniah, Kevin. (2014). "Cyber Bill Raises Concerns." *Phnom Penh Post*, April 9. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/cyber-bill-raises-concerns

Reporters Without Borders, & The Cambodian Center for Independent Media (RWB &CCIM). (2013). "Written Submission by Reporters Without Borders and the Cambodian Center for Independent Media on the State of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in CAMBODIA to the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review 18th Session." Available online at http://www.ccimcambodia.org/reports/71-un-human-rights-council-universal-periodic-review

Rainsy, Sam. (2013). "Announces Intention to Return to Cambodia." Facebook Posting, July 13. Available online at https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=10201524416061059&set=vb.520708567985881&type=2&theater

Sam Rainsy with David Whitehouse. (2013). *We Didn't Start the Fire: My Struggle for Democracy in Cambodia*. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books.

Seiff, Abbey. (2014). "Cambodia's Deadlock Ends But Questions Linger." *Al Jazeera*, July 28. Available online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/07/cambodia-deadlock-ends-but-questions-linger-sam-rainsy-hun--201472870394456.html

Seiff, Abbey, & Cheang Sokha. (2013). "Unprecedented Turnout Greets Rainsy." *Phnom Penh Post*, July 19. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/unprecedented-turnout-greets-rainsy

Sek Odem. (2014). "Exam Cleaner, But Students Still Seek to Cheat." *The Cambodia Daily*, August 5. Available online at: http://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/exam-cleaner-but-students-still-seek-to-cheat-65710/

Sen David. (2013). "Voters Test Whether Bleach Removes Ink." *Phnom Penh Post*, June 29.

Teytelman, Lenny. (2014). "What Do Facebook "Likes" of Companies Mean?" *PubChase*, January 23. Available online at: http://blog.pubchase.com/what-do-facebook-likes-of-companies-mean/

Transparency International. (2013). "Corruption by Country/Territory: Cambodia." Available online at: http://www.transparency.org/country#KHM

Vandenbrink, Rachel. (2013). "Hun Sen Warns of 'War' If He Loses Election." *Radio Free Asia*, April 19. Available online at: http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/hun-sen-04192013173854.html

Vong Sokheng. (2013). "PM Takes CNRP to Task for Racist Claim." *Phnom Penh Post*, June 20. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/pm-takes-cnrp-task-racist-claim

Vorajee, Ismail. (2014). "The Blue Lady Speaks." *What's Up Magazine*, August 6-10. Available online at: http://www.wuppmag.com/article.php?id=8791

Vrieze, Paul, & Phann Ana. (2010). "Hun Sen Marks 25 Years as Country's Prime Minister." *The Cambodia Daily*, January 14. Available online at: http://www.cambodiadaily.com/special-reports/hun-sen-marks-25th-anniversary-as-countrys-prime-minister-3316/

Wallace, Julia, & Neou Vannarin. (2014). "Cambodia Protests Unmask Anti-Vietnam Views." *Al Jazeera*, January 24. Available online at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/01/cambodia-protests-unmask-anti-vietnam-views-2014122101345786547.html

White, Stuart, & Khouth Sophak Chakrya. (2013). "Expulsion Makes No Waves in Media." *Phnom Penh Post*, June 12. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/expulsion-makes-no-waves-media

White, Stuart, & Vong Sokheng. (2013). "Gov't Posts Racy Audio from Sokha's 'Mistress.'" *Phnom Penh Post*, June 19. Available online at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/gov%E2%80%99t-posts-racy-audio-sokha%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98mistress%E2%80%99

Wilkens, Emily, & Sek Odom. (2014). "Low Salaries Stifle Education Reform Efforts." *The Cambodia Daily*, April 19. Available online at: http://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/low-salaries-stifle-education-reform-efforts-56752/

Willemyns, Alex, & Kuch Naren. (2014). "Australian Media Cite Hun Sen Facebook Page on Refugee Deal." *The Cambodia Daily*, May 21. Available online at: http://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/australian-media-cite-hun-sen-facebook-page-on-refugee-deal-59229/

Women's Media Center of Cambodia. (2013). *Electoral Analysis Report.* November. Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Available online at: http://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/images/Ausland/Suedostasien/Vietnam/Electoral_Analysis_Report-WMC_final_revision.pdf

Woodside, Amelia. (2013a). "Social Media Shows Election Day Muscle." *Phnom Penh Post*, July 29.

Woodside, Amelia. (2013b). "For Foreign Observers, A Crash Course, Then Go." *Phnom Penh Post*, July 30.

World Bank. (2014). "Cambodia." Website: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cambodia

---

NOTES

1. In Cambodia, names of people are presented in reverse order from that used in western countries – family name first, followed by individual name. But when referring to people by just one name, writers customarily use the individual name rather than the family name. I will follow those customs here.

2. The *Phnom Penh Post* publishes both English and Khmer language editions. Throughout, when I refer to this newspaper, I am referring to the English language edition.

3. Estimates vary considerably, but scholars such as Ben Kiernan and David Chandler estimate the minimum number of dead under the Khmer Rouge as 1.7 million. See Chandler (2008) and Kiernan (2004).

4. Moral Reparations granted in the first case included wide publication of video apology by the defendant; in the first phase of case 2, reparations were expanded to include memorials to be built and other educational efforts. Moral reparations do not allow for individual financial reparations.

5. FUNCINPEC stands for "Front Nationale Uni Pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopertif." See FUNCINPEC website at http://funcinpec.free.fr/

6. See the discussion of garment wages and land grabs later in "Campaign Issues" section for background on the issues being contested in these demonstrations.

7. Accounts differ about how the violence began – some accounts accuse demonstrators of hurling stones, while others do not.

8. It seems that the tactic of reducing sentences to time served and the remainder suspended is used frequently by the Cambodian judiciary. The suspended sentences allow the government to "save face" while releasing defendants the public believes to have been unjustly charged, thus averting a volatile situation and blunting international criticism. See Butt Reaksmey Kongkea et al. (2014).

9. Indeed, Long Dimanche, spokesperson for the city of Phnom Penh, had said on an earlier occasion that they were untrained, confirming the speculation of observers that they were just thugs hired to deal with demonstrators so the police could remain innocent of the violent suppression.

10. Rainsy made numerous trips abroad during the past year, either to raise funds or to gather support for the cause in other countries, leading to criticisms that his absence may have led to a more protracted deadlock.
11. They did so on August 5.
12. As the legislation creating the new NEC was being finalized in March 2015, Kek declined the post as leader of the NEC.
13. A leak revealed the CNRP choices for the NEC, which included Kem Sokha's daughter, Kem Monovithya, leading to questions about nepotism, a familiar problem in Cambodian politics.
14. According to the World Bank, those in "near poverty" live on less than $2.30 per day, while those living below the "national poverty line" live on less than $1.25 per day.
15. There has apparently also not been much education about it in schools. One of the hoped for outcomes of the ECCC – the "Khmer Rouge Tribunal" – is for a more widespread awareness and memorialization.
16. In that case, the corruption made international headlines, when the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis threatened to withdraw funding entirely in Cambodia in 2013 when large "commissions" to officials at the National Center for Parasitology, Entomology and Malaria Control for making contracts for mosquito nets were uncovered; it threatened to withdraw more than $100 million in funding if the bribes were not repaid, and it later ended its relation with MediCam, an umbrella organization of health NGOs which was implicated in the Global Fund investigation for charging NGOs for salaries for positions that did not exist, because they refused to accept reforms aimed at cleaning up their practices (Ford 2013; Peter 2014).
17. Many jobs or promotions come with a price-tag – a substantial commission for which a person may have to obtain a loan to pay (Kerbo 2011, p. 162).
18. Nil Nonn, a local Judge in Battambang, is paraphrased by a Frontline interviewer as saying that "he took money from the people who appeared before his court, but only after their trials were over. He said there was no other way to survive on his salary of $30 a month" (Pike 2009). Nonn later became president of the trial chamber of the ECCC.
19. That is one of the reasons that the decision to hold the trial in Cambodia rather than in another country seemed especially appropriate.
20. There are hundreds of Cambodians on the staff, as well as a structure that includes both Cambodian and international lawyers and judges at all levels from initial investigation to final appeals court.
21. On the two occasions I have had opportunity to attend, the gallery (which seats almost 500) was nearly full with large groups of Cambodian teachers.
22. The conflict about whether cases 3 and 4 should proceed led ultimately to the resignation of the International Co-Investigating Judge, Laurence Kasper-Ansermet, who was being stonewalled by the National Co-Investigating Judge, You Bunleng, as well as the Cambodian government, which refused to make his appointment as Co-investigating Judge official (before his predecessor's resignation, he had been a reserve Co-Investigating Judge, presumably making the appointment automatic).
23. It appears that the concern that legitimate Vietnamese voters might be blocked from voting by the frenzy to prevent illegitimate votes is one that should have been taken seriously. See Ponniah (2013b).
24. At about the same time a woman named Keo Sophannary came forward to sue Sokha, claiming to have been his mistress and having adopted two children with him. The government's Press and Quick Reaction Unit posted an interview with her on its website, raising concerns that a government agency was engaging in partisan politics as an arm of the CPP rather than being used only for its official business (White & Vong Sokheng 2013).
25. Chum Mey is a fairly prominent figure, a constant presence at Tuol Sleng, where he and another survivor, Bou Meng, talk with visitors and sell their memoirs. They are president and vice president, respectively, of the Victims Association of Democratic Kampuchea. Chum Mey was featured in press interviews about finally putting former senior Khmer Rouge leaders on trial, and was also a witness in the first trial of Kaing Guek Eav (also known as "Duch"), commandant of the

prison who received a life sentence in 2010. Through a spokesperson, Kem Sokha denied having made the statements in the recordings (Kuch 2013).

26. A CNRP television license was one of the items being negotiated for in resolving the recent deadlock; it appears that agreement was reached that a privately owned station (not directly owned by the party) sympathetic to the CNRP would be permitted. Whether that part of the agreement is fulfilled remains to be seen.

27. When I tried to access the website on July 26, 2014, the Khmer page was not available, while the English page appeared to have been hijacked by a diet program; in August, the Khmer page was back up.

28. Samdech (សម្តេច) is an honorific title bestowed infrequently on people at the highest rank, and is perhaps translatable as "Excellency." Currently, only a small number hold this title, including Hun Sen, Chea Sim (President of the Senate), and Heng Samrin (President of the National Assembly).

29. A problematic inference, given that there are artificial ways to inflate "likes." See Teytelman (2014).

30. Land titles are a complex issue in Cambodia – after the eradication of private ownership under the Khmer Rouge, everything had to be reestablished. A window of opportunity to apply for titles was given, but many people did not do so (undoubtedly for a variety of reasons including illiteracy, inability to pay the fees, lack of trust of the government). Whether the title amounts to much given the politicized nature of the judiciary is yet another question Cambodians must have asked themselves when considering whether to obtain title. A program established by Hun Sen in response to criticism sent out young people to assist in surveying and titling, but critics maintained it was not transparent and open to abuses (Human Rights Watch 2013).

31. For an example of his work, see Ou Rithy (2014) for his insightful discussion of the election impasse one month before its resolution.

32. There are a number of different Facebook pages with similar names: "I Love Cambodia Hot News" and "I Love Cambodia Hot News II" each boasts hundreds of thousands of followers, while "I Love Cambodia Hot News III" appears to be a much more recent addition. All have similar (though not the same) content.

33. In a 2010 speech, Hun Sen is reported to have said: "Please do not try to limit the mandate of premiership. You want the mandate limited because you are worrying you will lose to me" (Vrieze & Phann Ana 2012).

34. Whether they would outrun a repressive government intent on reasserting its control of the information flow is less clear, though. As James Kyle points out, it can call on the assistance of others with greater resources to do so, as it apparently did in obtaining FBI assistance in identifying suspects from Anonymous who had hacked government websites (see Kyle 2014).

FENGSHU LIU

9. POLITICALLY INDIFFERENT NATIONALISTS?

Chinese Youth Negotiating Political Identity in the Internet Age[1]

INTRODUCTION

A number of incidents in relation to the 2008 Olympic Games, such as the anti-government protests in Tibet, the disturbances during the international leg of the Olympic torch relay, CNN commentator Jack Cafferty's remarks against the Chinese and the alleged 'anti-Chinese' tendency of CNN and some other western media, sparked a sharp surge of nationalism among Chinese both at home and abroad. Inside China, where political passions are usually kept in check by government control, much of the outrage was vented in cyberspace, to which 210 million Chinese (mostly educated, young people under 35) had access then (China Internet Network Information Centre 2008). 'Netizens' set up nationalistic websites such as www.anti-cnn.com (with a thematic song entitled 'China's Return to Prosperity Cannot Be Prevented') and www.dalai-liar.com. A lyric entitled 'Do not be too CNN' sung by a young man in a rap style accompanied by a video was circulating in cyberspace. The phrase 'Do not be too CNN' became one of the most popular online expressions in China in 2008. By mid-April 2008, a Google search in Chinese for boycott of 'Carrefour,' a French chain store, which it was alleged was giving financial assistance to the Dalai Lama, yielded more than 2.4 million hits, mostly created within the previous week. Some 2.3 million MSN users had attached 'I love China' icons to their online profiles and many users put a 'red heart China' on their screen names as an expression of their solidarity against the 'Tibetan separatists' and the West. By 1 July, a petition calling on Chinese people from all over the world to oppose 'splittism' had been supported by more than 8.16 million people on www.sina.com. There were many other websites with similar petitions.

Flaring nationalism in Chinese cyberspace is not new (Wu 2007). There have been outbursts both online and offline over issues such as the Japanese occupation of the Diaoyu Islands and the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. China also has a breed of 'red' hackers who pride themselves for sabotaging and defacing websites in countries perceived as anti-China (Wu 2007). However, what is interesting about this surging cyber-nationalism is that it constitutes a striking contrast with the normally apolitical nature of Chinese netizens' use of the Internet, which is focused on entertainment, lifestyle and private issues (Qiu 2003; Damm 2007; Liu 2011).

Although the Internet has created a public space previously not possible despite government control (Yang 2003), there still seems to be a general lack of

interest in employing the internet for engaging with the government for civic and democratic purposes. Apparent political indifference and nationalistic passion among Chinese netizens are both well-known by now. However, they have been largely treated as isolated phenomena, and rarely examined side-by-side within a continuum of changing subjectivities in post-Mao China. What makes Chinese netizens indifferent to other forms of political involvement but enthusiastic about nationalism? What does this say about young people's negotiation of a political self in a reform-era China undergoing dramatic sociocultural changes? This article explores these questions from netizens' own perspectives by focusing on their perceptions and experiences of the internet as a political tool, and their understanding of political participation and nationalism.

The chapter draws on individual interviews with 38 university students in China in 2008 and is part of a larger project on Chinese youth's identity construction in the Internet age. The participants were recruited by a snowballing procedure, starting with the author's former students at a Chinese university at the time. The interviews lasted one to one and a half hours. They were all recorded with permission from the participants. In order to ensure confidentiality, the names of the students and universities are not mentioned in this article. Information about any individual's identity is kept to the minimum.

In addition to the interviews, valuable information comes from browsing Chinese websites from mid-March to the end of May 2008. I paid special attention to postings that had to do with the incidents related to the 2008 Olympics. In the rest of the article, first, I shall provide a review of the changing notion of politics, taking into account young people's nationalistic sentiment and behavior in China. I shall then present the main themes from the participants' narratives, followed by a conclusion.

FROM 'TRADITIONAL POLITICS' TO 'NEW POLITICS': POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNET AGE

A consistent theme of social analysis over the past decades has been the gradual disengagement of citizenry from public life, coinciding with the arrival of the internet generation: a trend found in many countries such as Canada, Germany, Sweden, the UK and USA (for review and discussion, see Zukin et al. 2006; Milner 2010; Dahlgren 2007; Loader 2007; Bennett 2008). A generational decline in levels of participation in elections, political parties and traditional social organizations, general civic involvement and political knowledge is seen as evidence of this. While some lament this trend, worrying that it will harm the health of democracy (e.g. Milner 2010), others argue that a transformation of politics is taking place concomitant to the individualization of society, resulting in a generational shift away from traditional (or institutional) forms of participation to cause-based, or issue-based participation (e.g. Inglehart 1997; Norris 2002; Bang 2005. For a review of these competing views, see Zukin et al. 2006; Loader 2007; Caldena and Meijer 2009). From this latter perspective, young people are still interested in politics, but in a different way to previous generations. Various labels

have been used to describe this general trend, such as 'politics of choice' (Norris 2002), 'lifestyle politics' (Bennett 1998), 'sub-politics' (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002) or simply 'new politics' (Dahlgren 2007; Calenda and Meijer 2009).

Frequent reference to the Internet has been made in the ongoing debate about young people and political participation. Echoing Putnam (1995), who blames TV as the main culprit for the decline in civic engagement in the USA, some claim that recent technological advancements, in particular computers and the Internet, have led to young people losing interest in civic and political participation (Kraut et al. 1998; Wilhelm 2000). However, many others have looked to the Internet either as a means of increasing participation of the digital generation (particularly in conventional forms of politics) or as spaces where evidence of young people's new modes of expression and participation can be found (Bennett 2008; Dahlgren 2007; Loader 2007; Collin 2008; Olsson 2008; Vromen 2008). A streak of technological determinism is often inherent in such discussions. Notwithstanding this problem, there has been an increasing awareness that while the Internet makes creative expression and representation possible, it is not enough in itself to ensure engagement (Livingstone 2007; Calenda and Meijer 2009; Yang 2009a). Rather, the online political world forms a natural extension of the offline world, reflecting and sometimes reinforcing existing patterns of participation (Calenda and Meijer 2009). This is also supported by the findings in this study.

Debate is still continuing as to what constitutes the 'political' and whether contemporary young people are political dropouts or are engaged, but in different ways. However, there seems to be a growing recognition that in studying young people's political participation, it is no longer sufficient to focus on 'traditional politics' such as membership of political parties and voting in elections; it is equally important, if not more so, to pay attention to 'new politics,' such as membership of single issue movements, cause-based movements and involvement in non-partisan networks (Calenda and Meijer 2009).

Broadening the concept of political participation to include 'new politics' is not only necessary for gaining an understanding of the emerging political identities among young people in liberal democratic societies, but also applies to youth in non-democratic societies such as China, where a similar pattern of 'depoliticalization' has taken place over the past three decades. The individualization of post-Mao Chinese society has led to the shifting focus of self-development among young people, from public life in the Maoist era to private life in the reform era (Rosen 2004; Yan 2006; Damm 2007; Yan 2009). A strong interest in consumerism, individual lifestyles and identity politics has replaced the type of political enthusiasm of the pre-1989 generations, many of whom gathered in Tiananmen Square demanding democracy in 1989. Chinese youth today seem to be indifferent toward both official ideology and the prospect of political reforms (Rosen 2004; Yan 2006; Damm 2007; Rosen 2009). Nevertheless, they can be active in civic activities related to events such as the Sichuan earthquake and occasional protests (mostly online) about social injustice, environment-related issues and identity issues (Lagerkvist 2009; Yang 2009b; Liu

2011). This phenomenon bears much similarity to the trend in many democratic countries that has warranted a broader concept of political participation.

However, what seems to distinguish Chinese youth from their western counterparts is that alongside their apparent indifference to governmental politics, the current generation is known as passionately nationalist. This forms a contrast with youth in many western societies where, according to some authors (Bennett 1998; Smith and Jarkko 2001), there has been a general diminished pride in nationality over the past decades. Largely based on observations about western democratic societies, talk about evolving notions of the political has downplayed nationalistic behavior as an important form of 'new politics' among contemporary youth. This also may have to do with a tendency to overlook the political nature of nationalism, as noted by Breuilly (1993[1982]). Such an omission prevents us from gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the emerging political self in China, which has seen a new surge of nationalism among young people in the past two to three decades at the same time that society is undergoing individualization.

Chinese nationalism in the reform era is multifaceted, although it is heavily sponsored by the party state (Townsend 1996; Zheng 1999; He and Guo 2000; Zhao 2004; Chan 2005). This is not least evidenced by the coexistence of popular nationalism and official nationalism. Popular nationalism, that is, bottom-up national sentiments from the masses, has been flourishing since the mid-1990s (Xu 2001). It has to do with both the government-led 'patriotic education' campaign (Zhao 2005) and the fact that since the beginning of the 1990s, in its attempt to promote nationalism, the regime has allowed the rise of pluralistic nationalistic voices among the masses, despite its control over other aspects of political discussions (Zheng 1999; Xu 2001). Furthermore, this has been reinforced by the Internet, which has served as a hotbed for popular nationalism over the past two decades (Qiu 2003; Wu 2007).

Although often overlapping and sharing interests with official nationalism, popular nationalism constantly challenges official nationalism by sometimes running against official state policies (Zheng 1999; Zhao 2004; Liu 2005). Moreover, allowing the common people to join with each other in forming ideals of equality and dignity in the national environment, popular nationalism has become in a sense the incarnation of democratic processes (Xu 2001). This contradicts official nationalism, which emphasizes maintenance of the political status quo. Thus, popular nationalism adds another dimension to the political nature of nationalism in the Chinese context.

'THE INTERNET IS A SPACE FOR RECREATION AND A PLATFORM FOR COMMUNICATION'

Similar to university students in some other countries (McMillan and Morrison 2006), the participants viewed the Internet as an integral part of their lives. Most of them had a personal computer and could access the Internet at the dormitory or at a nearby home. Going online everyday at least for two hours was common among most of them. The few who did not own a personal computer visited an Internet

cafe at least once a week for a few hours each time. Some mentioned that they could borrow their classmates' computers in the dormitory as well.

When asked to define the Internet, a shared perception was that 'the Internet is a space for recreation and a platform for communication,' to use their words. How, then, did they personally make use of this 'space' and 'platform'? The participants indicated that for them the Internet was mainly a tool for entertainment, although they did occasionally look up things related to their studies. Or as a young man put it: 'Even for us university students, the Internet is mainly for recreation, just as it is for other Chinese users.' This is in line with the general trend among Chinese users (as of 2010). In addition, scanning the front pages of major websites, such as MSN, Tencent and Sina was a common practice. They spent much time reading headlines and topics about lifestyles, pop stars and other celebrities as well as national and international news. However, they tended to see such activities as a pastime as it was unrelated to their studies. Their online communication was limited predominantly to their own circles of friends, acquaintances and families, which is in agreement with the research findings on youth and the Internet in some other societies (Livingstone and Bober 2005; Ellison et al. 2007; Boyd 2008). They argued that communicative activities, especially chatting with friends, were a form of pastime, as they were usually not about 'serious' topics. Thus for these young people, the boundary between online recreation and communication was blurred.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that they overlooked the communicative functions of the Internet. Many of the participants emphasized that the Internet offers, in their words, 'a quick and easy way to exchange information and to connect people.' This phrase captures the main reasons underlying many people's expectations about the Internet's implications for democracy in China. Nonetheless, how and the extent to which the Internet's potential is exploited depends on citizens' and governments' attitudes towards it, which can be different in different societies, particularly in terms of political participation (Taubman 1998; Chase and Mulvenon 2002). As we shall see in the following, the participants' perceptions and experiences of the Internet as a political tool are specific to the technology's 'receiving context' (Zhou 2006, p. 232) of present day China.

'NO EFFECT ON ME'

In discussing the Internet's impact upon Chinese society, the participants differentiated between the personal and national Internet. They saw the Internet, first, as a space for recreation and second, a platform for communication, often with the overtone that it is not essential, albeit important, for individuals. However, they argued that the Internet is playing an irreplaceable role in China's national development. Typical remarks include: 'It is crucial for China's development,' 'It allows China to enter the world and the world to enter China' and 'It is the Information Age now. Without the Internet and other high technologies, it would be impossible for China to compete with other countries.' Such views reflect the

official discourse on the Internet inside China, where agents ranging from the government to the mass media, companies and mainstream academics strongly share the view that the Internet is the driver for China's economic development and its overall modernization project (Damm 2007). Promoting democratic participation with internet has not been the government's intention.

The participants' agreement with the official internet discourse lends support to the observation that China's netizens, who belong to the newly-emerging middle class, generally show affiliation with the government, as they are the beneficiary of the reform and opening up (Damm 2007). The participants showed pride in the achievement that China has made in information technology which, according to them, is indicative of the country's growing power, like its success in launching rockets into space. This focus forms a contrast with the western 'freedom versus control' discourse on the Chinese Internet (Damm 2007), which focuses on the Internet's political implications for China. Reflecting the general trend among Chinese citizens, these university students largely saw the Internet as a means of national economic modernization and personal recreation, rather than political modernization.

Unsurprisingly, then, when asked 'How has the Internet, as a more open medium of information and communication, influenced your political views and participation?,' a predominant reply was 'No effect on me.' Talking about their online communication, the participants predominantly indicated that they seldom or never participated in online discussion forums (such as bulletin boards). The few exceptions show that if one regularly visited a certain online forum, it was mainly for game-related topics and/or maintaining 'real life' hobbies. A young man mentioned that the only online forum he had participated in was about online car-driving contests, because he was fascinated with the game. For another young man interested in fishing, a fishing forum proved helpful in maintaining his hobby.

In talking about their experiences of the Internet, no one mentioned governmental control. When asked 'What do you think of China's internet censorship and how does it affect your use of the internet?,' the majority of the participants indicated that they had not heard about censorship. Some of them asked instead: 'What is the censorship about, please?' Among the few who did show some knowledge about it, only one mentioned, 'It appears a bit authoritarian.' The others insisted that it had not affected them because 'The things we do, such as playing games, are not related to censorship.' Another participant explained, 'The censorship is against pornography. We just play games. So it is not relevant to us.' Moreover, according to some of the participants, the Internet 'is already a platform for people to say whatever they like to say' (*changsuo yuyan*), implying that they did not feel there was anything limiting or lacking. However, not everyone liked this 'freedom.' Rather than wishing for a freer Internet, some of them expressed a wish for a 'real name' system, not only to protect people more from harm due to anonymity, but also to exert a stronger control over what people can say in cyberspace. Whereas it may be a good intention for people to be responsible for what they say in cyberspace, such views legitimize governmental control. Thus it is ironic that what the young people perceived as problematic in relation to

the internet seems to be quite different to some western observers' concern about the Chinese Internet.

'I AM NOT VERY CONCERNED ABOUT POLITICS'

The participants' lack of interest in employing the Internet to engage with the government not only has to do with their perceptions of the Internet itself. More importantly, it is related to their political self in the offline context, especially how they perceived political participation. Reflecting upon the Internet and political participation, the majority of the participants indicated that they were not interested in politics. Or as some put it, 'I am not very concerned about politics.' To understand this indifference to politics from their perspective, I asked them how they conceived political participation. In response to this question, most of them replied 'I do not know,' 'Have no idea' or 'Have no such concept in my mind,' although a few did name some examples such as voting, joining the party and participating in a rally. A probe of whether they had participated in politics or planned to do so in the future yielded a predominant reply: 'No. I don't think so.' Nevertheless, from the reasons they offered for this negative reply, one can see that they did have their own opinions of what political participation means in the Chinese context, as reflected in the following remarks:

> It is no use even though you make a suggestion or criticism. They will not adopt it. So it is better not to bother about that. People would say you are interfering in things that do not concern you [*duo guan xianshi*], or you are not observing the 'proper' norm [*bu shou benfen*].

> Chinese people are all relatively selfish [*zisi*]. For the Chinese, it is not necessary to do something if it is not beneficial to yourself. Nowadays, people are pragmatic.

> Politics is not practical. It is very hypocritical and full of corruption. I feel it is distanced from me.

> I do not vote. Only party members vote. As long as I live well, I do not care who the president is.

> I do not want to be influenced by the *Falungong* people. I trust the Chinese Communist Party much more than the *Falungong* people.

One can see that these young people had a rather narrow notion of political participation. It is limited largely to engagement with the government, especially anti-government activities, such as criticizing and making suggestions to the government and making attempts at subverting party rule, much in agreement with the opinions of the elderly internet users in a study conducted by Xie and Jaeger (2008). It is understandable that people just choose not to participate, given that one will not be able to make a difference anyway, and worse still, one may cause trouble for oneself. Or as a young man emphasized: 'Participating is one thing, participating effectively is quite another. When one

cannot make a difference, why bother?' Moreover, if politics is seen as a complex and 'dirty' game, as it is 'hypocritical' and 'corrupted,' not getting involved may represent one's declaration not to mix with the 'bad.' In addition, in the case of present-day China, where economic success has generated much confidence among Chinese people in the party leadership for a bright collective future (Zhang 2004), engaging with the government may be viewed as disturbing the hard-earned social stability by both the government and society at large. The wish to retain the status quo is reflected in another shared understanding that, as a young man put it: 'It takes time to develop. The leaders are doing a good job. China has its own characteristics. China cannot copy the West, and vice versa.'

ANGRY NATIONALISTS GOING ONLINE

Although they professed lack of interest in what they perceived as 'politics,' the participants did employ the Internet for nationalistic expression. Talking about the Beijing Olympics-related incidents, each of them said, 'I was enraged and disgusted!' Many of them reported having signed some online petitions calling on Chinese all over the world to support the Olympics against the 'separatists.' Nearly all of them took part in similar activities organized by their university and/or online communities. All indicated that they kept a close watch on relevant information via the Internet and TV. Many of them were among the millions of Chinese netizens who attached a 'red heart China' or 'I love China' icon to their online profiles. Some changed their online names into expressions such as 'I Love China' and 'Powerful China.' A few of them posted comments on bulletin boards to let out their anger and encourage Chinese people to unite and make the country powerful. A young woman said:

> I was so angry. The national dignity was insulted by CNN, Dalai and the West. The West represented by the US is always afraid of China becoming strong. They would grasp every chance to disturb us …We Chinese people have suffered too much in the past. It is high time that China became powerful. I sent out many postings in the bulletin boards to cheer up the Chinese people.

The participants recalled that one frequently got and sent out messages such as: 'If you are a Chinese, you ought to read this, and/or sign this.' Some of the participants saw Internet-organized 'political consumerism' (Stolle et al. 2005) in the form of boycott as an effective way to teach anti-China individuals and organizations a good lesson. A young woman who had signed up for boycotting both Dior and Carrefour told a story about how the American celebrity Sharon Stone was heavily condemned by Chinese netizens when she indicated that the 12 May earthquake was karma for 'wrong deeds' by the Chinese people. She said that she and many of her female friends had stopped buying Dior, which has Stone as a spokesperson, in response to an online petition by another Internet user. 'We cannot affect her power directly, the only thing we can do is to make her lose economically,' she added.

The young people experienced online nationalism as a powerful means to unite people for a common goal. Some of them reported experiencing an unprecedented sense of belonging and collective power these days, which was much celebrated in their online communication. One of them remarked:

Chinese people have not been so united [*tuanjie*] for many years. People have been divided since the reform started. All have been bent on their private interests in the competitive market economy … We should thank the anti-China forces for making us so united. The more they are against us, the more united we are. This has greatly encouraged us Chinese. They should study Chinese history before claiming that Tibet is a country. How ridiculous!

I came across similar opinions on many other Chinese websites both inside and outside of the country, where there were many postings in praise of the re-found solidarity among Chinese people. It is not hard to discern the delight and pride that the young people had found in their 'regained' collective identity as Chinese. What has made them so nationalistic and yearn so much for assertion of a collective Chinese identity? A good start for understanding this question is to explore how they understand nationalism, or the Chinese term '*aiguo zhuyi*' (patriotism), which they used to refer to one's love for one's country (*guojia*).

'*AIGUO ZHUYI* IS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE'

The participants were articulate about *aiguo zhuyi*: all emphasized that it is of great significance. They provided explanations that are at the same time primordialist and instrumentalist. They strongly shared an understanding that their love for the country is natural, or as some of them argued, 'I love China because I am a Chinese. It is in our nature [*tianxing*].' With this primordialist assumption, they argued that to love one's country is a most basic quality (*suzhi*) as a human being and that this moral-normative dimension of '*aiguo zhuyi*' is comparable to one's devotion to one's family. Indeed, they see the country as a family and the people who live in it as family members, echoing the official concept of a pan-Chinese nation (Chan 2005) with 56 ethnic groups who are brothers and sisters within a big family. They argued that it is only natural for one to love and be loyal to the family, even if the family is not perfect. Furthermore, just as its members' interests are closely tied to the family flourishing, one's own fate will be definitely affected by the nation's development. This kind of loyalty to one's country constitutes what Fong (2004) refers to as 'filial nationalism' found among Chinese young people.

Some carried the primordialist explanation of their *aiguo zhuyi* even further, arguing that such a strong kinship bond is a unique characteristic of the Chinese people, and of which one should be proud. A young man claimed:

It is Chinese people's nature to unite themselves against outsiders once there is a common enemy, although there may be serious conflicts among themselves. This is in our blood. That is what Chinese people are like, quite different from westerners.

205

For these youth, then, the nation is not constructed for instrumental purposes, neither is it felt to be a 'imagined' community, about which Anderson (1991[1983]) wrote. Rather, it is real and tangible, embedded in common roots and kinship bonds.

However, at the same time as they emphasized this natural givenness of their love and loyalty, some of them also alluded to the acquired aspect of their *aiguo zhuyi*, pointing to 'patriotic education' since 1990. A young man said: 'This has to do with the education we have been through. From the beginning of our schooling, we have been exposed to *aiguo zhuyi* education. It is hard not to be influenced.' Furthermore, they claimed that *aiguo zhuyi* should be the most basic quality (*suzhi*) of a citizen too, not only that of a human being. In other words, it is a consciousness which can and should be cultivated in every member of the nation-state. With this acquired consciousness, many of them uttered a declaration-like remark: 'Of course, I love my country. As a Chinese citizen, I will definitely not cower when my country needs me. This is fundamental.' They emphasized that such loyalty to the nation-state, and obeying the law and maintaining social order, are the most important indications of a qualified Chinese citizen.

Both in China and the West, patriotism is expected to play a role in sustaining a higher ideal of citizenship (Stapleton 2005). Yet the Chinese understanding of citizenship, as reflected in the participants' narratives, seems to have quite different connotations from the western concept of citizenship. In the latter case, citizenship has much to do with demanding individuals or groups' rights in decision-making and challenging the political status quo. With the emphasis upon 'obedience' and loyalty, hence on duties rather than rights, the Chinese understanding reminds one of the 'subject' rather than the 'citizen,' thus begging the question whether or not the Chinese young people, even the educated elite, have deserted their status as 'subjects' and assumed the role of citizens in the true sense of the word.

In short, although scholars on nationalism tend to see primordialist and instrumentalist approaches as contradictory, it seems that these Chinese young people used them complementarily. Such understandings echo post-Mao leaders' construction of patriotism (Liu 2011). However, it would be misleading to believe that the young people's notion of nationalism is totally identical to governmental discourse of patriotism. As we shall see in the following, even though they used the same term as the leaders, their perception of *aiguo zhuyi* goes beyond that of the official nationalistic discourse.

'THE NATION IS HIGHER AND GREATER THAN THE PARTY-GOVERNMENT'

Chinese official nationalism identifies China closely with the Communist Party and equates the goals of the state with those of the nation (He and Guo 2000; Zhao 2005). In contrast, although their understanding of *aiguo zhuyi* reflects very much the patriotic socialization to which they have been exposed, many of the participants deliberately emphasized that one must distinguish the party

(*zhengdang*) from the nation (*guojia*) in talking about *aiguo zhuyi*. A young woman expressed a shared view:

> Loving the country and loving the party are two different things. I'd like to give just one illustration. The country is over 5000 years old now. However, the current government is only several decades old.

Another student put it: 'The nation is higher and greater than the party-government. They may not represent the same things, although they do not need to contradict each other.' Precisely because what the nation represents transcends what the party stands for, as one student put it, 'The country's honor (*rongru*) is considered higher than the interests of the party.' For the same reason, *aiguo zhuyi,* the participants argued, should not only be outward-directed, but also inward-directed. This means, some of them explained, that action may be taken against party leaders if they are harming national interests through, for example, corruption or stupid foreign policy. This echoes the claims made by participants in the 1989 pro-democratic protest, who claimed that their action was patriotic. It follows that now that these same young people are showing little interest in engaging with the government, they may be basically content with the current government. However, it is worth noting that the effect of political control also may have played a role in shaping the Chinese political habitus.

The kind of nationalist enthusiasm exemplified by the participants may have an important bearing on Chinese youth's collective identity, China's relationship with other countries and individuals' relationship with the current government. In this sense, their nationalistic expression, be it online or offline, is political in nature. However, the participants contended that *aiguo zhuyi* has little to do with politics. Some argued that *aiguo zhuyi* is morally superior to political participation – or as a young woman put it: '*Aiguo zhuyi* is a noble and commendable thing, whereas participating in politics may not be so.' This reflects their understanding of political participation in the Chinese context, with a series of negative connotations: for example, getting involved in subversive activities and/or participating in corrupt and dirty game playing, as mentioned earlier.

Despite their view that *aiguo zhuyi* is apolitical, they did see online nationalism as a demonstration of democracy because, they claimed, it is participatory in nature and everyone (with Internet access) has an equal chance to have a voice. This power of mass participation, according to the participants, lay behind CNN's final apology to China – it was the power of Chinese netizens, who were connected by the Internet, that had made the difference. This echoes an article posted in the Strong Nation Forum (*Qiangguo Luntan*) on 25 April 2008 entitled 'Not Afraid of the Mainstream Media, but Afraid of Chinese Netizens' (Xiangyun 2008). The author makes the point that the Internet has had such power precisely because it is a mass-participatory medium, in sharp contrast with the other forms of media tightly controlled by the government. Thus, according to the author, the apology from CNN was a result of the confrontation between Chinese netizens, rather than China's official media (or government), and the West. The author calls on the government and the whole of society to reflect upon the role that mass

participation can play in defending the country's interests and supporting the government. This role, the author argues, should form the grounds for the government to treat the netizens, who represent the people, well.

Taken together, the young people's creative and active use of the Internet for nationalistic actions was not only an expression of their patriotic sentiments, but also their wish to exert influence upon national affairs. Thus, the Chinese case has added another dimension to the political character of nationalism.

CONCLUSION

It is observed that Chinese young people's use of the Internet is apolitical, with a focus on entertainment, lifestyles and private issues. Yet such a depiction neglects another theme in Chinese cyberspace, namely nationalism. Nationalism constitutes the 'most viable political discourse among Chinese netizens' (Qiu 2003, p. 15), forming a contrast with their otherwise apolitical uses, which was especially striking in the wake of the incidents surrounding the 2008 Olympics. In this article I have explored such a contrast from the perspectives of a number of university students. Given the qualitative nature of the study, it is not my intention to generalize about Chinese university students, or youth in general. However, the main themes that have emerged do shed light on how young people negotiate a political self in a reform-era China undergoing dramatic sociocultural changes.

The Internet holds the potential to affect understandings and activities of political participation. However, the ways in which users appropriate it for political purposes are closely related to the contexts in which their lives are embedded. As reflected by the participants' narratives, the 'dual' political identity emerging from Chinese youth's uses of the Internet is reflective of their offline self. Their apparent lack of interest in engaging with the government and strong nationalism are two interrelated products of the same process of changing subjectivities in post-Mao China.

The account offered by the participants for their apparent indifference to the government, like the generally 'apolitical' uses among Chinese netizens, reflects what Sheldon Lu (2000, 146), in talking about post-Mao Chinese society, refers to as 'consumerist postmodernity' characterized by consumerism, fragmentation and individualism. This has been reinforced by the post-1989 'pragmatism' widely found among Chinese young people. The lesson from the Tiananmen Square bloodshed, along with rampant consumerism, has taught people to be more concerned about their own well-being and private life rather than to get involved in government politics. This coincides with a tendency among the Chinese to take comfort in conformity and to leave state-related matters to the leaders, which has been nurtured by the Confucian tradition as well as Mao's regime (Farquhar and Zhang 2005; Xie and Jaeger 2008). Such a mentality has been further encouraged by the post-Mao leaders' emphasis on social stability, which is reflected in a more recent discourse on the 'harmonious society.'

'Political inaction' is also an effect of the high levels of acceptance that the regime as a whole has been enjoying since the early 1990s (for an analysis of the

Chinese government's authoritarian resilience, see Nathan 2003). This is not only thanks to rapid economic growth and China's growing power in the world, which lends legitimacy to the post-Mao leadership, but also has to do with the fact that a 'cultural turn' has taken place over the years, whereby the kind of 'naïve, pro-western outlook' among late-1980s youth (Rosen 2009, 361) has been replaced by a common understanding that the western model of democracy may not suit China's development after all. Research shows that even as they embrace western liberalism and popular culture, Chinese youth, especially the well-educated and well-informed such as the participants in this study, tend to view the western concept of democracy sceptically and see the West as having an 'anti-China' agenda (Damm 2007; Rosen 2009). They sympathize with the government's fear of political disorder as exemplified by post-communist Russia.

Of course, one should not overlook the effect of political control, which contributes to a perceived political inefficacy and fear for causing trouble for oneself, hence passivity in engaging with the government. Governmental control of the Internet, as an extension of post-Mao leaders' overall attempt to maintain social order, does counteract the liberal potential of the Internet.

Due to the combined effect of these factors, Chinese netizens generally do not seem to be interested in subversive activities against the government. Although there have been occasional cases of online activism, Chinese netizens rarely demand radical political change. Rather, the struggles are about social justice, cultural values and personal and collective identity (Yang 2009b).

However, the apparently apolitical self takes on quite another appearance when viewed together with nationalistic expression. In line with the coexistence of these two contrasting themes in Chinese cyberspace, although they had rarely used the Internet to engage with the government, the participants reported having taken an active part in the online nationalist activities related to the 2008 Olympics. Just as we need to associate their lack of interest in engaging with the government with changing subjectivities in reform-era China, we need to do the same with their nationalism.

Flourishing nationalism represents Chinese youth's solidarity with the party-state as a result of a range of factors: for example, the common wish to build a strong nation and to reinvigorate China as a world power, the understanding that western democracy may not suit China, that the West has its own anti-China agenda, and confidence in party leadership's ability to lead China on its way to be a world power based on the country's economic achievement since the late 1970s. These same sociocultural conditions, as mentioned earlier, have led to a lack of interest in engaging in subversive action. China's growing influence in the world has resulted in increased national pride among today's youth in contrast with the pre-1989 generation, who often demonstrated shame of their own nation (Rosen 2009). Thus, the participants' deliberate distinction between the party-government and the nation does not contradict the fact that as long as the former serves the interests of the latter, they are seen as one unity. It can be argued that compared with other groups of young people, university students such as those in this study may identify more with the party-state's blueprint of modernization with Chinese

characteristics because they are among the main beneficiaries of this project. After all, despite the harsh employment situation for university graduates in recent years (Liu 2011), they are the group from which the future national elite will emerge. Meanwhile, their nationalism also reflects a general trend among China's younger generation.

However, Chinese youth's 'dual' political self is not solely attributable to those factors that have resulted in a kind of ideological consensus with the government. As is clear from the participants' narratives, it also has to do with the individualization of Chinese society, which partly underlies young people's apparent political indifference. Nationalism grows not despite of, but due to, this same process, serving as a complement to the social and political 'lacks' due to China's social transformation since the late 1970s. It constitutes a kind of idealism as a counterforce to the extreme rationalization and widespread materialism and pragmatism underlying the depoliticalization of Chinese society. Moreover, whereas politics is viewed as 'unpractical, dirty and hypocritical,' as some of the participants said, nationalism stands for the noble and the laudable. Similarly, just as nationalism serves as a means for the government to rule the Chinese people in the face of the collapse of communism, it represents the common people's longing for solidarity, community and recollectivization under the circumstances of social stratification, fragmentation and individualization (Liu 2011). In short, nationalism, like other forms of online community-building, represents 'a critique of the present and a yearning for a better world,' which 'originates in the social, cultural, and political displacements associated with the market transformation' (Yang 2009b, p. 156). Last but not least, in the context of political control, nationalism serves as an enclave of participatory public life (Xu 2001). The liberal tendency inherent in the participants' *aiguo zhuyi*, in line with China's popular nationalism, is reflected in their distinction between the nation and the party-government, their understanding that *aiguo zhuyi* should be inward-directed as well as outward-directed, and their celebration of online nationalism as a platform for mass participation.

Thus, nationalism constitutes a form of 'new politics' among contemporary youth in societies such as China. It constitutes an important extension of the political self in the Chinese context. Viewed in this way, the widely shared claim about Chinese youth's political apathy seems to be a rather simplified one.

REFERENCES

Anderson, Benedict. (1991[1983]). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Bang, Henrik. (2005). "Among Everyday Makers and Expert Citizens." In Janet Newman, ed., *Remaking Governance: Peoples, Politics and the Public Sphere* (pp. 159-178). Bristol: Policy Press.

Beck, Ulrich, & Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim. (2002). *Individualization: Institutionalized Individualization and its Social and Political Consequences*. London: Sage.

Bennett, W. Lance. (1998). "1998 Ithiel De Sola Pool Lecture: The Uncivic Culture: Communication, Identity, and the Rise of Lifestyle Politics." *Political Science and Politics*, *31*(4), 740-761.

Bennett, W. Lance. (2008). *Civic Live Online: Learning How Digital Media Can Engage Youth*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Boyd, Danah. (2008). "Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in Teenage Social Life." In David Buckingham, ed., *Youth, Identity, and Digital Media* (pp. 119-142). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Breuilly John. (1993[1982]). *Nationalism and the State*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Calenda, Davide, & Albert Jacob Meijer (2009). "Young People, the Internet and Political Participation. *Information,Communication & Society*, *12*(6), 879-898.

Chan, Brenda. (2005). " Imagining the Homeland: The Internet and Diasporic Discourse of Nationalism." *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, *29*(4), 336-368.

Chase Michael, & James C. Mulvenon. (2002). *You've Got Dissent: Chinese Dissident Use of the Internet and Beijing's Counter-Strategies*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

China Internet Network Information Centre. (2008) *Statistical Survey Report on Internet Development in China*. China Internet Network Information Centre. Available online at: http://www.apira.org/data/upload/pdf/Asia-Pacific/CNNIC/21streport-en.pdf

Collin, Phillipa. (2008). "The Internet, Youth Participation policies, and the Development of Young People's Political Identities in Australia." *Journal of Youth Studies*, *11*(5), 527-542.

Dahlgren, Peter. (2007). "Introduction: Youth, Civic Engagement and Learning via New Media." In Peter Dahlgren, ed., *Young Citizens and New Media: Learning for Democratic Participation* (pp. 1-8). London: Routledge.

Damm, Jens. (2007). " The Internet and the Fragmentation of Chinese Society." *Critical Asian Studies*, *39*(2), 273-294.

Ellison, Nicole B., Charles Steinfield, & Cliff Lampe. (2007). "The Benefits of Facebook Friends: Social Capital and College Students' Use of Online Social Network Sites." *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *12*(4), 1143-1168.

Farquhar, Judith, & Qicheng Zhang. (2005). "Biopolitical Beijing: Pleasure, Sovereignty, and Self-cultivation in China's Capital." *Cultural Anthropology*, *20*(3), 303-327.

Fong, Vanessa. (2004). " Filial Nationalism among Chinese Teenagers with Global Identities." *American Ethnologist*, *31*(4), 631-648.

He, Baogang, & Yingjie Guo. (2000). *Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Inglehart, Ronald. (1997). *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kraut, Robert, Michael Patterson, Vicki Lundmark, Sara Kiesler, Tridas Mukopadhyay, &William Scherlis. (1998). "Internet Paradox: A Social Technology that Reduces Social Involvement and Psychological Well-Being?" *American Psychologist*, *53*(9), 1017-1031.

Lagerkvist, Johan. (2009). "Contesting Norms on China's Internet? The Party-state, Youth, and Social Change. In Thomas Tufte & Florencia Enghel, eds., *Youth Engaging with the World. Media, Communication and Social Change* (pp. 215-231). Gothenburg: Nordicom,

Liu, Fengshu. (2011). *Urban Youth in China: Modernity, the Internet and the Self*. London: Routledge.

Liu, Shih-Diing. (2006). "China's Popular Nationalism on the Internet: Report on the 2005 Anti-Japan Network Struggles." *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, *7*(1), 144-155.

Livingstone, Sonia. (2007). "The Challenge of Engaging Youth Online." *European Journal of Communication*, *22*(2), 165-184.

Livingstone, Sonia, & Magdelena Bober. (2005). *UK Children Go Online: Final Report of Key Project Findings*. London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Available online at: http://eprints.lse. ac.uk/399/1/UKCGO_Final_report.pdf

Loader, Brian D., ed. (2007). *Young Citizens in the Digital Age: Political Engagement, Young People and New Media*. London: Routledge.

Lu, Sheldon Hsao-peng. (2000). "Global Postmodernization: The Intellectual, the Artist and China's Condition." In Arif Dirlik & Xudong Zhang, eds., *Postmodernism and China* (pp.145-174). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

McMillan, Sally J., & Margaret Morrison. (2006). "Coming of age with the Internet: A Qualitative Exploration of how the Internet Has Become an Integral Part of Young People's Lives." *New Media & Society*, *8*(1), 73-95.

Milner, Henry. (2010). *The Internet Generation: Engaged Citizens or Political Dropouts?* Lebanon, New Hampshire: University Press of New England.

Nathan Andrew J. (2003). "Authoritarian Resilience." *Journal of Democracy*, *14*(1), 6-17.

Norris, Pippa. (2002). *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Olsson, Tobias. (2008). "For Activists, for Potential Voters, for Consumers: Three Modes of Producing the Civic Web." *Journal of Youth Studies*, *11*(5), 497-512.

Putnam, Robert D. (1995). "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." *Journal of Democracy*, *6*(1), 65-78.

Qiu, Jack Linquan. (2003). *The Internet in China: Data and Issues*. Working Paper. Los Angeles: Annenberg Research Seminar on International Communication, University of Southern California. Available online at: http://annenberg.usc.edu/ international_communication/Papers/JQ_China_and _internet.pdf

Rosen, Stanley. (2004). "The State of Youth/Youth and the State in Early 21st Century China: The Triumph of the Urban Rich?" In Peter Hays Gries & Stanley Rosen, eds., *State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation* (pp. 159-179). New York: Routledge.

Rosen, Stanley. (2009). "Contemporary Chinese Youth and the State." *Journal of Asian Studies*, *68*(2), 359-369.

Smith, Tom W., & Lars Jarkko. (2001). *National Pride: A Cross-National Analysis*. GSS Cross-National Report No. 19. Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center/University of Chicago.

Stapleton, Julia. (2005). "Citizenship versus Patriotism in Twentieth-century England." *The Historical Journal*, *48*(1), 151-178.

Stolle Dietlind, Marc Hooghe, & Michelle Michelett. (2005). "Politics in the Supermarket: Political Consumerism as a Form of Political Participation." *International Political Science Review*, *26*(3), 245–269.

Taubman, Geoffry. (1998). "A Not-so World Wide Web: The Internet, China, and the Challenges to Nondemocratic Rule." *Political Communication*, *15*(2), 255-272.

Townsend, James. (1996). "Chinese Nationalism." In Jonathan Unger, ed., *Chinese Nationalism* (pp. 1-30). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Vromen, Ariadne. (2008). "Building Virtual Spaces: Young People, Participation and the Internet." *Australian Journal of Political Science*, *43*(1), 79-97.

Wilhelm, Anthony G. (2000). *Democracy in the Digital Age: Challenges to Political Life in Cyberspace*. New York: Routledge.

Wu, Xu. (2007). *Chinese Cyber Nationalism: Evolution, Characteristics and Implications*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Xiangyun Xu. (2008). "Not afraid of the Mainstream Media, but Afraid of Netizens." Strong Nation Forum, 25 April. Available online at: www.people.com.cn/GB/32306/33232/7169322.html

Xie, Bo, & Paul T. Jaeger. (2008). "Older Adults and Political Participation on the Internet: A Cross-cultural Comparison of the United States and China." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology*, *23*(1), 1-15.

Xu, Ben. (2001). "Chinese Populist Nationalism: Its Intellectual Politics and Moral Dilemma." *Representations*, *76*(1), 120-140.

Yan, Yunxiang. (2006). "Little Emperors or Frail Pragmatists? China's 80ers Generation." *Current History*, *105*(692), 255-262.

Yan, Yunxiang. (2009). *The Individualization of Chinese Society*. Oxford: Berg.

Yang, Guobin. (2003). "The Internet and Civil Society in China: A Preliminary Assessment." *Journal of Contemporary China*, *12*(36), 453-475.

Yang, Guobin. (2009a). "The Internet as Cultural Form: Technology and the Human Condition in China." *Knowledge, Technology and Policy*, *22*, 109-115.

Yang, Guobin. (2009b). *The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Zhang Tiejun. (2004). "Self-identity Construction of the Present China." *Comparative Strategy*, *23*(3), 281-301.

Zhao, Suisheng. (2004). *Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Zhao, Suisheng. (2005). "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" *Washington Quarterly*, *29*(1), 131-144.

Zheng,Yongnian. (1999). *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zhou, Yongming. (2006). *Historicizing Online Politics: Telegraphy, the Internet, and Political Participation in China*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Zukin Cliff, Scott Keeter, Molly Andolina, Krista Jenkins, & Michael X. Delli Carpini. (2006). *A New Engagement? Political Participation, Civic Life, and the Changing American Citizen*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

NOTE

1. This chapter originally appeared in *The European Journal of Cultural Studies*, *15*(1), pp. 53-69, copyright 2012 by SAGEpro. Reprinted by permission of SAGE. This article is part of a larger project on Chinese youth and the Internet funded by the Research Council of Norway. More comprehensive analysis of that theme is provided in the author's book, *Urban Youth in China: Modernity, the Internet and the Self* (2011).

IRVING EPSTEIN

10. CONCLUSION

The issues that have been raised within the case studies that comprise this volume are emblematic of the possibilities and constraints that characterize the nature of twenty-first century youth protest. The case studies themselves offer a representative rather than comprehensive gaze, and have been presented with such a limitation in mind. Nonetheless, there is benefit in reflecting upon the assumptions that have governed the thinking throughout this volume as a guide for further investigation, and the concluding remarks offered below are drafted with that aim in mind.

Perhaps the most important assumption that was made in constructing this project was that youth protest in the twenty-first century differed significantly from its predecessors, due to the influences of globalization, neo-liberalism and newer forms of state authoritarianism. A second assumption concurrently held that the nature of the information age and the impact of social and electronic media on social and political interaction profoundly influenced the character of youth protest. The collective wisdom within this volume supports these assumptions, but only to a certain degree and with a number of caveats. A third assumption reiterated the importance of social movement theory in presenting useful analytical tools, which are of assistance in understanding the nature of twenty-first century protest movements. Here too, the assumption was reaffirmed, but not without some reservation. A final set of assumptions involved the relationship between youth and protest, and the contributing role of education in promoting political activism. Again, evidence was presented that supported these assumptions, but not unambiguously.

The face of globalization was visible throughout the cases highlighted in the volume. In Chile, Spain, the U.S., Turkey, South Africa, Russia, Bahrain and Cambodia, political actors operated with a degree of global awareness unprecedented in previous generations. Even in the Iranian and Chinese examples, where the State was quite active in limiting information access beyond its borders, youth expressed an understanding of the power of a global audience. In the Chinese case, the patriotic nationalism that youth demonstrated was heightened by China's hosting of the Olympic Games and was framed with regard to demands that the country's stature receive the degree of international respect to which they felt it was entitled. In the Iranian case, the death of Nega Agha Soltan resulted in her becoming an internationally known martyr. In the Cambodian case, NGOs with human rights orientations deeply influenced domestic politics and the call for representative democratic rule. Even with regard to the Russian Federation example, the very fact that Pussy Riots band members used the vocabulary of "punk" to express their disapproval of State invoked hyper-nationalism speaks to

the power of globalized cultural rituals and images that have influenced the character of contemporary protest. And, with regard to the South African case, it can be noted that while globalization influences were by no means determinative of protest strategies and efforts, their presence was clearly understood. These examples, along with others presented throughout the volume do not demonstrate that the globalized state is necessarily a weak state, or that globalization and a respect for the State are inextricably opposed to one another. Instead they confirm that the concept of glocalization, or the repositioning and adaptation of global patterns according to local practices, discussed in the introduction to this volume, has salience in the realm of political protest as well as within the cultural, consumptive and economic domains for which it was originally constructed.

We have also argued that it makes sense to link together perceptions of neo-liberalism and state sponsored authoritarianism when attempting to understand the motivations of protesters and the conditions under which they operate. In the case of Turkey, the linkage was explicit, as the government's efforts to convert Gezi Park into a shopping mall was interpreted as an overt abuse of state power for the purpose of privileging wealthy elites. One could also point to Mohamed Bouazizi's suicide, when the Tunisian street merchant set himself on fire after being refused a permit to sell his wares, as a cataclysmic event, not only perpetuating the Arab Spring, but in so doing demonstrating with equal force the symbolic connection between the State's use of authoritarian policies and its efforts to promote neo-liberal values. As this conclusion is being written, events in Hong Kong point to both the appropriation of the symbolism of the U.S. Occupy Movement, for the purpose of democratizing the election of a chief executive there in 2017, and a countervailing criticism of the reformers, for jeopardizing the economic stability of the region as an international magnet for global capitalist practice (Forsythe and Wang 2014). In all of these examples, the influence of neoliberalism is clear, and in many of the cases we have studied, the legitimacy of the state has been questioned because of practices perceived as authoritarian that are directly or indirectly linked to neo-liberal values. But in making this claim, it is important to reiterate that neo-liberalism as we conceive of the term, extends beyond the economic strategies that are associated with the concept, as it has come to represent a set of principles that rationalize political and social behavior and affect daily life calculations. Hence, the connection between neo-liberalism and educational policy is one that is easily configured, as can be explicitly seen in the Chilean and U.S. examples. Nonetheless, there are imbalances with regard to the degree of emphasis protesters placed upon their opposition to economic inequality as opposed to overt authoritarian practice among the cases presented in the volume. The direct and immediate impact of the 2008 global recession upon youth protest, for example, was more clearly visible in the U.S. and Spanish movements, than was true for many of their counterparts. Parenthetically, the cases of China, the Russian Federation, Bahrain, Iran, and Cambodia present specific instances where state authoritarian practice was so systemic, comprehensive, and enduring, that its presence transcended or at least overshadowed prevailing economic conditions.

The use of social, digital, and electronic media, and their impact upon youth protest has been a consistent area of discussion throughout this volume. And, not unlike the conclusions rendered by Howard and Hussain (2013) with specific regard to the impact of digital media upon the Arab Spring, there is evidence that the new media has had an impact upon contemporary protest, even if the nature of its effects remains ambiguous. On the one hand, we have seen that the new media have been used as effective tools in enhancing traditional modes of protest, particularly in the Chilean, U.S., and Turkish examples. On the other hand, the South Africa example demonstrates how new media proponents clashed with reformers of longstanding who relied upon traditional protest tactics and strategies and how that divide in many cases arose from social class divisions within the country, the poor not having the same degree of digital access available to others. The Iranian, Russian Federation, Chinese, Bahraini and Cambodian illustrations did offer evidence for the use of digital and social media in the creation of safe political spaces that allowed for a degree of free expression not tolerated within conventional spheres. But the effectiveness of the advocacy that was articulated within such safe space differed markedly within each context, ranging from the non-governmental nationalism professed by Chinese youth, to the "non-movements" described as applying to the Iranian situation, to the creation of effective citizen journalism in Bahrain, to the formation of strong political opposition to the existing Cambodian regime.

It needs to be noted however that authoritarian states have periodically responded to the efforts to use new media for advocacy purposes, especially when the latter have proven to be efficacious. The Iranian regime's efforts to create alternative social media by sponsoring pro-government groups such as the Basij in cyberspace, for example, offer evidence of the power of the State to use new media in the same ways it has manipulated traditional media for propaganda purposes in the past. The case of Bahrain is similarly illustrative. Nor should efforts to censor and restrict access to the new media, as evidenced through the examples of Iran and Bahrain be dismissed as inconsequential.

Perhaps the Spanish case represents the best example of the influence of digital media, not simply as a set of advocacy tools, but of communicative strategies that fundamentally shaped the nature of a protest movement itself. It is in this context, that one can appreciate the prescience of Castells' formulations regarding the power of the new media to reshape the nature of social interactions by creating networks rather than hierarchies within social organizations. In addition to the Spanish case, we saw that participants in the U.S. Occupy Movement also created network influenced organizational structures, although not always to the exclusion of conventionally hierarchical relationships. There seems to be little doubt that as a result of being a part of and participating in the information age, new forms of advocacy, new types of social relationships, and more horizontal and less vertical organizational structures can develop and thrive as a part of contemporary youth protest. But the evidence in this volume does not demonstrate that such outcomes are inevitable. We thus note how the longstanding charismatic leadership of Cambodian dissident leader Sam Rainsy was enhanced through the use of social

media upon his return to the country, and that new charismatic leaders such as Chilean student leader Camila Vallejo quickly acquired international prominence, in large part because of the students' use of new media in support of their cause. These examples argue against the contention that the flattening out of organizational hierarchies among protesters is a pre-determined outcome of new media usage, although as we have noted, the counter-examples of the U.S. Occupy and *Indignados* Movements illustrate the possibilities of eschewing conventional leadership in favor of consensus based decision-making.

Social Movement Theory has been invoked throughout this volume as an analytic, deemed useful to our understanding of contemporary youth protest. In the introduction to this work, the four of the components of social movement theory: resource mobilization, repertoires of contention, opportunity structure, and collective action framing were discussed in light of the globalization and new media influences to which we have referred. Although a number of open questions were raised in the introduction regarding the meaning of these categories in light of twenty-first century trends, it is fair to conclude that they continue to remain salient, although subject to more elastic definition and interpretation. Perhaps the most fundamental issue that was raised in a number of the cases that have presented involves the very definition of the nature of a twenty-first century social movement. We have clear examples of social movements analyzed throughout the volume, particularly with reference to Chile, the U.S., Spain, Cambodia, and Turkey. We also have examples of political expression, expedited through new media usage that would not have occurred in more conventional public spaces, as attested by the Iranian and Russian Federation cases. The question of course becomes one of determining when and how a "non-movement" becomes a movement or how discourse can be transformed into concerted political action. Certainly there is an assumption that the political discussions that have been expedited through new media usage can lead to more direct and focused forms of political engagement. Indeed, the efforts of State authorities to control and censor this discourse belie their agreement with such an assumption. But whether the types of political discourse evidenced in the Russian Federation or Iran, for example, are necessary if insufficient preludes to more influential forms of movement construction remains an open question.

As was noted in the introduction to this volume, the use of new media has additionally raised ancillary questions regarding the difficulty in defining significant political participation in light of the increasing ease with which one can acquire and respond to disseminated information, registering support for a cause through the completion of a few keystrokes. If we can agree that the ability to mobilize resources remains an important component in building a successful social movement, establishing a more nuanced understanding of what twenty-first century mobilization entails is necessary. When we examine the use of new media as a set of resources that can expedite movement mobilization, the evidence presented is positive in many of the cases that have been presented. The ability to more quickly and efficiently transmit information, the spreadability factor that was discussed in the introduction to this volume, enhances global awareness of regional political

conflict in profound ways. It can also expand opportunities for direct participation on the part of nascent advocates, as opposed to a more select leadership group. This represents a fundamental change from the diffusion of social movement resources that occurred in the late 1960s, where, as noted in the introduction, chronicled accounts of cross-national interchange and borrowing focused upon leadership training among experienced activists primarily (McAdam and Rucht 1993). Suffice it to note that the resources that were mobilized as a result of twenty-first century protest efforts included the use of electronic and traditional media to evoke discussion, advocacy, and action in virtual as well as real spheres, and that these resources with some exceptions, were used in ways that were complementary and supportive of one another, rather than mutually exclusive.

The specific repertoires of contention that were noted within the volume included a mix of traditional and non-traditional strategies, the latter appealing directly to the sensibility of youth. The use of popular culture references and images, in the Russian and Chilean cases for example, offer evidential support for the claim. In these situations as well as others, many of the strategies employed were performance based, as their proponents were sensitive to the need to attract attention for the purposes of ensuring new media "stickiness," aware of the plethora of imagery competing for the attention of prospective followers. The popularity and ease of use of the new media additionally resulted in tactics originating in one context and borrowed and appropriated to new situations, as evidenced by similarities noted between the U.S. Occupy and Spanish *Indignados* movements. Charles Tilly noted the ways in which the same social movement tactics could be re-employed for differing purposes within different historical time periods. The same process seems to have occurred within twenty-first century protest, albeit in spatial rather than temporal terms.

Sidney Tarrow's emphasis upon the importance of opportunity structure as a variable of important significance in understanding the shape, development, and ultimate success of a social movement is resoundingly reaffirmed throughout the pages of this volume. On the one hand, the economic crisis of 2008-9 resulted in widespread dissatisfaction throughout Europe and North America that created opportunities for protest that participants of the Occupy and *Indignados* movements expertly exploited. We have repeatedly seen on the other hand, protesters' use of effective resources and tactics having been circumscribed by state authorities through tactics that included their control of national media and their willingness to use or threaten to use force. The Iranian and Bahraini cases offer an explicit example for this contention. We have also seen though, that authoritarian and neo-liberal states create opportunities for protest advocacy, often unwillingly. Time after time, state authorities demonstrated their ignorance of the power of new media, and were forced into playing "catch-up" after the impact of social and electronic media usage became irrefutably clear. The history of state responses to internal dissent in Iran, the laggardly response of Cambodian government authorities to oppositional new media usage, and the Spanish government's lack of appreciation of the popular response to its Sinde law, restricting popular Internet usage ostensibly to protect copyright privileges, were

among the most visible examples of this trend. The opportunity to engage in successful protest will always be present in a latent sense, if one assumes that political, economic, and social conflict is a natural and endemic characteristic of societies of all types. The popularity and speed with which new media was adopted created specific opportunities for advocates to create spheres of protest that were not as historically vibrant as has been true of contemporary situations. At the same time, the fragmentation of social cohesion as a result of some social media usage, as evidenced by the South African case, offers evidence for the contention that new media have also been employed in ways that restrict the opportunities to cultivate and develop responsive social movements.

Of all of the elements of social movement theory noted throughout the volume, the process of collective framing is perhaps the most important. It was argued, for example, that the contradictions of neo-liberal policies were consistently exposed during the demonstrations in Chile, the U.S., and Spain. And, it was noted that in cases such as Cambodia and Iran, the limits to which citizens would accept non-democratic electoral processes were clearly delineated, while the weaknesses of both neo-liberalism and state authoritarianism were exposed as protesters marched in Gezi Park in Istanbul. It is also clear that in most of the cases that have been discussed, protesters articulated a sense of personal grievance that held resonance above and beyond the specific circumstances that gave rise to their expression. In so doing, unresolved issues involving the construction of one's national identity and the effectiveness of the state in resolving those issues in an equitable manner were unmasked. In Chile, student protests were effective because they called into question quintessential inequities intrinsic to the functioning of a neo-liberal state. The Occupy Movement and the *Indignados* Movement addressed the fundamental failures of the U.S. and Spanish governments to hold the financial industry accountable for the reckless speculation that led to the 2008 worldwide recession. In China, youth who are in the process of becoming part of a growing middle class, articulated a sense of nationalistic pride, commensurate with what they viewed as the country's development into a global economic power, while at the same time separating themselves from the inefficiency and corruption of the State. And, in Russia, the use of new media to debate the messaging of the Pussy Riot band spoke to issues involving the nexus of nationalism and religion as collective identity markers.

In this volume, it was postulated that it is through the process of collective framing that one can view the most concrete of results when examining the long-term effects of contemporary protest movements. Under this assumption, it was noted that conventional political parties appropriated the messaging of Occupy Movement proponents and Chilean students during national elections, to a point whereby their views have now become part of accepted political discourse. No longer can one convincingly argue that in focusing upon inequality as a result of neo-liberalism, one is inciting class warfare and thus undermining economic stability and future prosperity. Similarly, one could claim that participants in the Spanish *Indignados* Movement and the Turkish protests of 2013-2014 helped to enlarge the parameters of acceptable debate that will justify continued critique of

neo-liberal and authoritarian state policies in the respective environments. Indeed, the widespread popularity of Thomas Pikkety's massive work, *Capital in the Twenty-first Century* (2014) can at least in part be attributed to the global critique of neo-liberalism to which many of these movements contributed. But any effort to attribute the success of creating consequent shared meaning to the collective framing function of social movement activity, is fraught with difficulty, in part because of the linearity implicit in the contention.

As was noted in the introduction to this volume, the attributes of a globalized information age to which we have become accustomed demand new accommodations with temporality, particularly when the duration of events is short-term and when we feel bombarded with information whose half-life is increasingly ephemeral. If time in the twenty-first century is more and more likely to be associated with flux rather than a strict progression of events whose order is easily decipherable, then it becomes problematic to assert that the impact of social movement messaging can be clearly discerned. Such an assumption necessarily implies that we have a firm sense as to how social memories are formed, the conditions under which they remain shared as opposed to contested, and what their impact upon future events might be, assertions that have been challenged by social theorists (Olick and Robbins 1998). Within this volume, one can point to the demands of *Indignados* Movement protesters to find and properly bury the remains of Spanish Civil War victims as being indicative of one example of the way in which social memory can be reinvigorated as a result of the efforts of those involved in a powerful social movement. The efforts of those involved in the anti-apartheid movement within South Africa, who continued to protest government policies in the post-apartheid era, represents an additional example of the enduring importance of social memory as a collective framing mechanism. But there are counter-examples to consider as well, including the efforts on the part of some to manufacture an artificial hyper-nationalistic religious orthodoxy in Russia, or the loss of social or cultural memory on the part of other youth, in China or South Africa, who ignored or were unaware of those protests that marked their countries' recent histories. Acts of memorialization, be they through cultural practice and/or the creation of material or symbolic references to past events, assist in contributing to the authenticity of social memories. But such acts conventionally are directed from or are at least supported by the nation-state. In the globalized information age, it becomes problematic to assert that the collective frames that have been articulated within contemporary social movements will necessarily and indelibly change the nature of political discourse within their respective settings, particularly when the probability of message "stickiness" can never be assured and where one might be dressing a multiplicity of audiences not exclusively beholden to the State.

Although a principle aim of this volume is to chronicle the nature of contemporary protest in disparate settings, the role of youth in contributing to such protest has been more difficult to define. To be sure, cultural and educational identity markers, as exhibited through resource utilization (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) or organizational affiliation (university leadership positions) signified the important role of youth in contributing to protest in Iran, Chile, the U.S.,

Cambodia, and Spain. In the Chinese example, their use of new media has resulted in their creation of a rather separate social and political role as "netizen." But as categorically specific delineations marking the distinctions between youth and adulthood have become conceptually problematic from an analytical standpoint, discerning the unique role of youth in the movements and activities we have chronicled has not proven to be as easy or precise as one might have hoped for.

The role of education in contributing to the promotion of political advocacy is similarly ambiguous. In some of the cases analyzed such as Chile, and the U.S., the call for educational reform was an important motivation in bringing youth together. Corrupt educational practices contributed to demands for larger political reform in Cambodia and although not a primary goal of the *Indignados* Movement, the demand for educational change contributed to that movement's general landscape. In the introduction to this volume, we argued that the new media played an important educational role with regard to fostering civic engagement, contributing to the sharing of ideas and information, and providing an incentive to participate in politics. Viewed within a more liberal definition of what education entails, the new media can be seen as having complemented rather than detracted from traditional efforts to promote civic involvement. Although there are certainly caveats to this proposition, primarily when one examines the divisiveness of affiliation within South African advocacy groups, it should be noted that there is no evidence of narcissism or a pre-occupation with consumption to the detriment of establishing social relationships, on the part of those who both used the new media and participated in political protests in the cases that we examined.

NEXT STEPS

It is fair to assert that the case studies in this volume have raised more questions than they have answered, but in so doing, it is our hope that the resultant ambiguity may generate further research that can shed light upon the issues that have been highlighted. To be sure, the real limits to a case study approach that are apparent here include the difficulty in making systematic comparisons of a cross-national nature that are more easily subject to empirical verification, a snapshot perspective that does not allow for more lengthy considerations of changing conditions over time, and a tendency to emphasize contextual specificity at the expense of generalization. But whether or not further scholarship is focused upon macro or micro level analysis, there is much that is worthy of consideration for future research.

First, as the field of youth studies is one that is evolving, it is clear that a focus upon youth protest and advocacy as a subset of that field is quite important, not only for its potential contribution to the debate over boundary issues involving the relationship between youth and adulthood, but for its importance in assisting in our understanding of developing political awareness and commitment among youth. The changing nature of new media and its impact upon social relationships and organizational structure is another important area deserving of further attention. We have presented evidence that the influences of new media upon advocacy and

protest efforts have been significant if sometimes ambiguous and conflicting. A better understanding of its importance and functioning, to be derived from future research projects is clearly needed. A corollary to that effort would include focused attention to changing educational roles regarding the political socialization of children and youth and the promotion of civic engagement. Although there is little evidence for ascribing a clear bifurcation in significance between the formal institutional (educational) and non-institutional new media sites that contribute to political messaging, enhance political awareness, and encourage advocacy and engagement, the fact that the relationship between the two spheres is in a state of change would suggest that more attention ought to be paid to the dynamics that characterize the relationship. Of specific interest is whether the efficacy of schooling in promoting these behaviors is compromised by the use of new media, whether new media usage has proven to be an effective substitute for traditional channels promoting these behaviors, or whether the two domains indeed complement one another and can be viewed as mutually supportive.

Although it may be true that social movements have finite lifespans and that the success of a particular movement cannot be judged solely according to its immediate outcomes, determining how consequent contemporary protest activity may be over short and long-terms is an important area deserving of further study. Specific attention should focus upon the duration and frequency of twenty-first social movements, for the purpose of determining whether these characteristics differ historically from previous inundations and if so why. Assessing their efficacy can lead to broader understandings involving social cohesiveness within environments that have become increasingly globalized, along with a more complete appreciation for the ways in which participants elucidate meanings from political interactions and then make commitments that result in advocacy, protest, and eventually, social movement participation. Finally, more work needs to be conducted that can further contribute to an understanding of the conditions under which different forms of political communication become enduring, as participants create collective frames whose legacies may contribute to the re-shaping of thinking involving political and social change.

REFERENCES

Castells, Manuel. (2010). *The Rise of the Network Societ* (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Howard, Philip N., & Muzammil M. Hussain. (2013). *Democracy's Fourth Wave: Digital Media and the Arab Spring*. New York: Oxford University Press.

McAdam, Doug, & Dieter Rucht. (1993). "The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *528*(July), 56-74.

Pikkety, Thomas, & Arthur Goldhammer. (2014). *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge: Belknap Press.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Nada ALWADI is a Bahraini journalist, writer and researcher. She has been working in media since 2003 covering politics and human rights issues in Bahrain and the Middle East. She holds a Master's degree in Mass Communication with an emphasis on women's political empowerment in the media, was a Humphrey/Fulbright fellow at the school of journalism in the University of Maryland, and covered the recent crackdown in Bahrain for several international media outlets including *USA Today*. In 2011, she was one of the recipients for the first James Lawson Award for Nonviolent Achievement by the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. Alwadi co-founded the Bahraini Press Association with other prominent Bahraini journalists last year. This Association focuses on defending local and international journalists who have been attacked or targeted by the Bahraini authorities. She has lectured, reported and published widely on the role of media, social media and women during the Arab Spring. Some of her writings have been published in the *New York Times* and *Open Democracy*.

Irving EPSTEIN is the Ben and Susan Rhodes Professor of Peace and Social Justice at Illinois Wesleyan University, where he serves as Chair of the Department of Educational Studies and Director of the Center for Human Rights and Social Justice. His publications include the edited volumes, *Chinese Education: Problems Policies and Prospects* (1991), *Recapturing the Personal: Essays on Education and Embodied Knowledge in Comparative Perspective* (2007), and the *Greenwood Encyclopedia of Children's Issues Worldwide* (2007). He is especially proud of his service as a member of the Board of Directors of the Scholars at Risk Network, a network of over 300 universities around the world dedicated to protecting threatened scholars and promoting academic freedom.

Lawrence FINSEN is professor of Philosophy at the University of Redlands (Redlands, CA), where he has taught since 1979, and has served as Associate Dean and Interim Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. He previously taught at California State University (San Bernardino, CA), Waseda University (Tokyo, Japan) and Reitaku University (Chiba, Japan). In addition to teaching philosophy, he introduces students to study of Cambodia in a First Year Seminar and a travel course to Cambodia. Among his publications are two books: (co-author Susan Finsen) *The Animal Rights Movement in America: From Compassion to Respect*, (Twayne, 1994) and (co-author Nancy Carrick) *The Persuasive Pen: An Integrated Approach to Reasoning and Writing* (Jones & Bartlett, 1997).

Saeid GOLKAR is an adjunct professor at Middle East and North Africa studies at Northwestern University, and senior fellow of Iran policy at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Prior to joining Northwestern University, he served as a post-doctoral fellow at the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. He received his PhD in political science from Tehran University in

2008 and was a lecturer at Azad University before coming to the US. His research interests encompass politics of authoritarian regimes, domination and resistance, social movements in the Middle East. He has recently completed a book on the Basij (Iran's paramilitary force) and the social control In Iran, to be published by Columbia University and the Woodrow Wilson Center Press in 2015. Recent publications can also be found in journals such as *The Middle East Journal; Armed Forces & Society; Politics, Religion & Ideology; Middle East Policy, Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World, the journal of Middle East and Africa, Digest of Middle East Studies, Middle East Quarterly, and Journal of Emerging Technologies & Society*. He can be reached at Saeid.golkar@northwestern.edu

Sahar KHAMIS is an Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Maryland, College Park. She is an expert on Arab and Muslim media, and the former Head of the Mass Communication and Information Science Department in Qatar University. Dr. Khamis holds a Ph.D. in Mass Media and Cultural Studies from the University of Manchester in England. She is a former Mellon Islamic Studies Initiative Visiting Professor at the University of Chicago and is the co-author of the books: *Islam Dot Com: Contemporary Islamic Discourses in Cyberspace* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) and *Egyptian Revolution 2.0: Political Blogging, Civic Engagement and Citizen Journalism* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Additionally, she has authored and co-authored numerous book chapters, journal articles and conference papers, regionally and internationally, in both English and Arabic. She is the recipient of a number of prestigious academic and professional awards, as well as a member of the editorial boards of several journals in the field of communication, in general, and the field of Arab and Muslim media, in particular. Dr. Khamis is a media commentator and analyst, a public speaker, a human rights commissioner in the Human Rights Commission in Montgomery County, Maryland, and a radio host, who presents a monthly radio show on "U.S. Arab Radio" (the first Arab-American radio station broadcasting in the U.S. and Canada).

Fengshu LIU is a professor in the Department of Education at the University of Oslo, teaching mainly in the field of Comparative and International Education. Her publications include research concerning youth and the Internet, the identity construction of China's only-child generation, intergenerational relationships within only-child families, rural youth and education in China, gender and school culture, culture and education, Confucian self-cultivation, the efforts Chinese youth make to negotiate modern womanhood, and the rise of the 'priceless child' in China. Her most recent book is titled *Urban Youth in China* and her current projects include "Modernization as lived experiences: Three generations of young men and women in China and Norway," "University capacity-building in Tanzania," and "An international study on girls' university ambitions."

226

William A. Munro is the Betty Ritchie-Birrer '47 and Ivan Birrer Ph.D. Professor in the Department of Political Science at Illinois Wesleyan University. His research focuses primarily on the politics of agrarian change, popular mobilization and state formation in Africa. He has conducted fieldwork in Zimbabwe and South Africa, and has published extensively on the politics of identity and democratization. He is the author of *The Moral Economy of the State: Conservation, Community Development and State-Making in Zimbabwe* (Ohio University Press, 1998). His co-authored volume (with Rachel Schurman), *Fighting for the Future of Food: Activists versus Agribusiness in the Struggle over Biotechnology* (Minnesota University Press, 2010) received Honorable Mention for the Charles Tilly award and won the Lynton Caldwell Prize in 2011, awarded by the American Political Science Association for the best book in environmental politics over a three-year period.

Yusuf Sarfati is an Assistant Professor of Politics and Government at Illinois State University, where he teaches comparative politics of the Middle East. He is also the director of Middle Eastern and South Asian minor program at ISU. Sarfati's research interests revolve around politics and religion, social movements, democratization, politics of identity and state-society interactions. His research appeared in various journals and edited volumes. Sarfati is most recently the author of *Mobilizing Religion in Middle East Politics: A Comparative Study of Israel and Turkey* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013).

Iveta Silova is an Associate Professor and Program Director of Comparative and International Education in the College of Education, Lehigh University, Pennsylvania, USA. Her research and publications focus on the study of globalization, post-socialist education transformation processes, and policy 'borrowing' in education. She is the editor of *European Education: Issues and Studies* (a quarterly peer-reviewed journal).

Michael Mead Yaqub holds an M.A. in Comparative and International Education from Lehigh University (Pennsylvania, USA), and is currently a graduate student in the Department of Communication at the University of Washington (Seattle, WA, USA). His research and publications have focused on national identity formation, language politics, and new media activism in the former Soviet Union.

INDEX