

HIGHER EDUCATION RESEARCH IN THE 21ST CENTURY

# Higher Education in Societies

## A Multi Scale Perspective

Gaële Goastellec and France Picard (Eds.)



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## **Higher Education in Societies**

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# Higher Education in Societies

A Multi Scale Perspective

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GAËLE GOASTELLEC & FRANCE PICARD

## INTRODUCTION

Since the Second World War, major events have structurally and substantively transformed higher education (HE) systems around the world: The Cold War which, amongst other things, ushered in a post-war race for economic supremacy; the development of the knowledge-based economy and the massification of education; the spread of a shared democracy as a model that both led to and was fostered by the opening of HE systems to more diverse student populations; and the onward-marching processes of globalisation and internationalisation that have intensified the interdependency and competition between HE systems. These seismic shifts have been accompanied during the last three decades by a complexification of higher education and research (HER) systems as they expanded both in size and the role(s) they play in societies. In the words of Mala Singh, “transformation has been used as much to denote the repositioning of higher education to serve as the more efficient “handmaiden” of the economy as to signify the drive to align higher education with the democracy and social justice agenda of a new polity [...]” (Singh, 2013, p. 1). As a result, the missions of HE institutions are increasingly under the microscope today, predominantly in the area of diversity (e.g. Hurtado, 2007; Van Vught, 2008), particularly in a time of global financial crisis (Kinser & Hill, 2011).

All this change has led to a growing, albeit fragmented body of research on HER systems across disciplinary lines (e.g. sociology, history, political sciences, economics) and a range of approaches to examine HE as a “social institution” at a time when it appears to be constantly driven by economic and marketplace forces. The present volume, drawn from papers presented by international researchers at the 2013 Consortium for Higher Education and Research (CHER) conference in Lausanne, is an attempt to collate research in this field in a multiscale analysis. The overarching theme of the conference centred on how the roles of higher education and research (HER) are woven into the fabric of society along three main threads: 1) the (re)definition of institutional, organisational, professional, individual and societal identities in and by HE, including research on the issues of access, elite production, and meritocracy; 2) the sphere of scientific knowledge in the fabric of societies; and 3) a reflective examination of the link between various scales of analysis of, theory on, as well as issues related to HER institutions and systems.

The keynote presentations, theoretical contributions and empirical studies paved the way for a broad discussion of the major historical and recent changes that have profoundly transformed HER systems around the world. This proved to be an excellent starting point to grasp and analyse the processes driving this transformation. In these processes, contextual changes have played a crucial part in

shifting the mission of HE over the years from one thought to produce an elite to one of distributive justice. Structured around the central concept of the social contract, the growing recognition of the role of HE in the implementation of state policy and political platforms, and regulations governing both individual and collective access, *Higher Education in Societies: A Multiscale Perspective* explores this shift by presenting research at the macro, meso and micro levels.

Education has long been studied as a vector through which national identity is seeded (Gellner, 1983). Broad concepts such as the “social contract” and the “public good” represent valuable heuristic tools to further examine the role devolved to current HER systems within this process, and enrich analyses of the transformation of national identity through HE policy. According to Paz-Fuchs, in contemporary analysis a social contract refers to two intertwined dimensions. The first is a procedural one, and is based on defining it as “the understandings and conventions within a society that help to explain and justify its legal, political and economic structures” (Paz-Fuchs, 2011, p. 3). The second is substantive and echoes John Rawl’s seminal 1971 work *A Theory of Justice*, where the social contract is based on the principle of social justice and the attainment of equality. Massification of HE, its increased role in individual social mobility and, more broadly, in offering access to positions of power and better living conditions as a whole (Baum, Ma, & Payea, 2013), illustrate why HE as an institution has become a pillar of the social contract in western societies, leading research to inquire how and to what extent this institution can foster equality of opportunity.

Consequently, there are at least two possible avenues available to researchers to assess how the social contract can be implemented through HE. In the first, the philosophy underpinning a social contract can serve as the standard by which the legitimacy of current policies is evaluated. The normative role of the state is thus examined, starting from policies such as those it defines on broadening access to higher education or funding education. The second positions HE as part of the welfare state, for example through the use of “welfare transfers.” In this scenario, research on equal opportunity in student trajectories can be used as a valid indicator of the congruence between the social contract in place and the real needs of individuals. This avenue can include assessing “a child against the relative advantages and disadvantages that they encountered during their school years in terms of the background institutions and opportunities available to them” (Paz-Fuchs, 2011, p. 13), and implies that “the state should compensate for different starting points by investing more resources in lower class families, schools, and neighbourhoods, so as to equalise opportunities” (ibid., p. 14). This echoes Sen’s (1992, 2009) theory of social justice focused on capabilities, and when applied to HE, implies that a fair and just distribution rests on the ability of a social mechanism such as the organisation of access to HE to expand. The second avenue contains the nascent theory that HE constitutes more than just added value for individuals, and should therefore be regarded not solely as a private good but above all a public one. As such it posits “a collective or social process that impacts more than just those directly engaged in the specific public good” (Chambers & Gopaul, 2008), or a “set of societal interests that are not reducible to the sum of

interests of individuals or groups of individuals and that demarcate a common space within which the content of moral and political goals like democracy and social justice can be negotiated and collectively pursued” (Singh, 2013, p. 4).

Throughout the chapters that follow, several issues related to HE are examined through a multiscale analysis: the intergenerational tensions among researchers on the call to update research evaluation criteria; the progressive transformation of HE since the 11<sup>th</sup> century; the humanistic perspective of the evolution of HER institutions and the recent issue of meritocracy in the context of a supply/demand imbalance; the recognition of HE as a key policy area starting with the massification of HER in the 1970s; and the advances, reversals or the status quo in access and admission processes, particularly for some vulnerable groups.

The book begins with two papers presented by keynote speakers designed to frame the discussions that followed. **Michèle Lamont** surveys how universities contribute to the well-being of society, firstly by questioning research practices such as the peer review process in an age of “uber-excellence” and differences in national cultures of evaluation. Second, Lamont proposes adopting a framework she developed in studying societal well-being in the field of health care for research on HE, her analysis calling for the development of research focused on how HE as an institution can foster societal resilience at both the collective and individual level, and to what degree. **Sheldon Rothblatt**, in tracing the evolution of HER, discusses two components of the HE admission process that could be studied as markers of this resilience – merit and worth – which have been at issue in cross-Atlantic democracies over the last two hundred years, and adopts a humanistic perspective to study the issue of meritocracy in access to select universities.

Following Lamont and Rothblatt, the next three chapters present theoretical foundations from which to analyse the transformation of HE. **Peter Maassen** argues that the HE as an institution is now in “a critical period with a potential for a major rebalancing of internal and external relations of authority, power and responsibility in higher education governance.” Behind labels such as “a Europe of knowledge” a search is underway for a new social contract or pact between institutions, political authorities, and society at large. As Maassen defines it, a social contract is a “fairly long-term cultural commitment to and from higher education, as an institution with its own foundational rules of appropriate practices, causal and normative beliefs, and resources, yet validated by the political and social system in which higher education is embedded.” As such, social contracts tend to be “different from a formal legal contract based on a continuous strategic calculation of expected value by public authorities, organised external groups, university employees, and students – all regularly monitoring and assessing the university on the basis of its usefulness for their self-interest, and acting accordingly.” In this chapter Maassen thus discusses the way in which the social contract with respect to the university is interpreted, criticised and renewed in different parts of the world.

What is the basis of “public goods” in advanced societies? How do HE institutions and systems deliver them and under what conditions? **Simon**

**Marginson** investigates these questions by considering HE institutions as prime social and economic movers: “They educate people in social skills and attributes on a large scale. They reproduce occupations, they provide structured opportunity and social mobility, they create and distribute codified knowledge, and they carry a heavy and growing traffic in cross-border relations.” While no single theoretical framework is sufficient to measure public goods in HE, many of the goods produced by HE institutions are more than just benefits for individual students or companies – they are collective in nature and consumed jointly. For example, HE institutions “contribute to government, innovation capacity, and the formation and reproduction of both knowledge and relational human society. The public outcomes of higher education include these collective outcomes. The public outcomes also include certain individual goods associated with public collective benefits, such as the formation, in individual students, of social and intellectual capabilities basic to social literacy, scientific literacy, effective citizenship and economic competence.” How, then, can we move beyond a purely economic understanding of “public goods” without losing sight of the notion of production? How can they be both inclusive and rigorously measured? Marginson proposes a conceptual framework to examine these questions through a comparative perspective and calls for incorporating the concept of global public goods within the inquiry.

For her part, **Joanna Williams** explores definitions of “public good” as included in a number of HE policy documents from the United Kingdom, which since 1963 has seen a shift from *public good* being equated to knowledge as an end in and of itself, to *public goods* being defined in relation to individual students’ increased employability and subsequent social mobility. Williams notes that in academic literature, the public good of higher education is linked to particular values of citizenship associated with a “good society;” this often takes the form of human flourishing, personal growth and individual empowerment. The old “public good” is thus being reconceptualised along more individualistic, private lines (private or “public goods”). Moreover, the author demonstrates that the relationship between HE and the public good has moved from knowledge as truth, to a state where “public good is to be found in the knowledge that there is no truth.”

The next two chapters cover the transformation of HE institutions by considering the role that policy along party lines may or may not play in the development of HE itself. The authors discuss a number of HE issues such as institutional autonomy and power, policy frameworks regarding access, the legacy of the church, as well as political steering models.

In examining recent changes in European HE policy, **Jens Jungblut** further demonstrates the trend discussed in the previous chapters of HE shifting from being an instrument of the welfare state context to one of innovation and economic competitiveness. Against this backdrop, Jungblut develops a conceptual framework to analyse the relationship between positions aligned along political party lines, social rifts and impact of electoral institutions on HE policy. To identify conflicts in HE policy in the allocation of societal values – including those related to access – his research links actor-focused and institution-focused approaches by merging

two theories: “social cleavage” and the “varieties of capitalism.” Zeroing in on the political sphere and the influence of institutions of the electoral system, Jungblut suggests that the heterogeneity of a society seen through active cleavage lines is one of the two factors that influence the space in which political parties manifest and orient themselves (the second factor being the institutional setup of the respective political system). Jungblut argues that not only do political parties matter in the positions and output of HE policy, but also that the extent to which they do matter is dependent on a number of institutional variables. These last, wide-ranging and intertwined, include the degree of massification of the HE system, the prevailing form of capitalism, and policy legacies stemming from how religious conflicts have been settled, particularly in the area of education.

Next, **Rómulo Pinheiro** traces the history of the development of HE in Norway by taking into account macro socioeconomic events as well as societal expectations. Access to higher education in Norway can be divided into three phases – from the 1950s to the early 1970s (“More is Better”), from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s (“More is a Problem”), and from the mid 1990s to the present (“More is Different”) – which can be interpreted as the direct outcomes of intervention by the Norwegian government to address issues and expectations in the area of access to HE. During the first phase, when regional colleges were first established, the expansion of HE was largely due to demand for a highly-skilled workforce needed during the post-WWII reconstruction as well as the coming of age of the baby-boomers. In the second phase, central authorities were caught off guard by the steep rise in university and regional college enrolment that resulted from a high level of unemployment amongst 16-24 year olds, as well as the growing aspirations of Norway’s youth. The current phase began as a result of the political willingness to steer the HE system to adapt to the knowledge-based economy, to meet the challenge of an aging population, and to address the thorny issue of unequal access to HE for some socioeconomic groups (minorities, women, students from rural areas). In discussing how Norwegian governmental agencies adopted and implemented policy responding to newly-emerging conditions and shifts in ideological and societal priorities, Pinheiro also highlights the pivotal role in HE policy territory management plays in understanding the evolution of the social contract.

How have all these changes impacted access to HE? What do policies on access to and demand for HE tell us about the evolution of the social contract in different countries? The last four chapters offer analyses of the major effects of the evolution of HER systems or policy directions on current student pathways in certain countries. The massification of HE appears to be a far from linear process: indeed, some countries have actually experienced a decline in demand (e.g. England, France, Australia and New Zealand; *see* Leach, 2013).

Such is the case in Portugal, where currently there are more available places than candidates in public universities and polytechnics. **Madalena Fonseca, Sara Encarnação, and Elsa Justino** analyse the causes and impact of this decline in demand for HE, and find that this contraction may be the result of a cluster of events and processes, some societal (e.g. demographic decline and the global

economic crisis), others specific to HE policies (e.g. more rigorous entrance exams for admission for some programmes). Using the programme of study that recorded the largest drop in the number of candidates in the first phase of 2012-2013 admission – Construction and Civil Engineering Programme – the authors posit that this decrease could have an unravelling effect on the entire Portuguese HE system: greater polarisation in some institutions, more concentration in urban areas, less mobility and access in outlying regions. As in the previous chapters, the issues of social and territorial equity once again appear to be at the centre of the national social contract.

Regardless of upward or downward trends in demand, access to HE institutions by non-traditional students continues to be either fostered or hindered in some countries, namely for immigrant students in France and Switzerland, and first-generation college students in Québec (Canada). This is the central issue woven through the final three chapters, which also examine ways to investigate the implementation of the social contract in HE by using various methodological approaches to interpret and define student diversity. **Jake Murdoch, Christine Guégnard, Maarten Koomen, Christian Imdorf and Sandra Hupka-Brunner** use a comparative approach to study access to HE for immigrants in France and Switzerland. The purpose of their study was to determine which educational pathways immigrant students use to access HE in those two countries, by contrasting the recent “vocalisation of the academic route” to HE in France with the traditionally high level of enrolment in vocational programmes in Switzerland. For example, while students can access HE through the vocational path in France, such is not the case in Switzerland. Using data of two youth cohorts, the study identified some factors (country of origin, academic performance in secondary school, student aspirations and different socioeconomic variables) likely to impact access to HE for immigrant students. The authors stress that inequality in access for some immigrant students tends to have roots in early disadvantages during primary and lower secondary education as well as early tracking, underscoring the need for a longitudinal approach to study educational trajectories as well as a potentially systemic approach to understand the mechanisms at play behind these trajectories.

**France Picard, Pierre Canisius Kamanzi and Julie Labrosse** outline new challenges facing HE in Québec through an examination of student pathways at the college level, specifically those students at risk of failing or interrupting their studies during the crucial first semester of college. When entering CÉGEP (the first level of the higher education system), a number of these students enrol in a transition programme (*Session d'accueil et d'intégration*), which includes a freshman seminar course and a range of remedial measures inside and outside the classroom. This group of students appear to share several distinguishing characteristics: greater socioeconomic heterogeneity, high school education paths interspersed with hurdles and detours (e.g. failed courses, repeated academic years, interrupted studies, adult education), as well as more pronounced academic and career indecision. The empirical data reveal the strengths and weaknesses in both the system as an institution and the remedial measures implemented to reduce

inequality and promote greater access to HE. This questions how the specific needs of students entering HE are identified, and underscores the need to consider ascriptive factors and the unique characteristics of individual education paths in any analysis. Contrasting these two aspects can thus help determine needs when implementing a social contract based on the principle of equity, by developing public policy tools likely to maximise individual capabilities.

Last, **Agnès van Zanten and Amélia Legavre** use an original approach to examine access to HE in a qualitative study conducted in France. Focusing on the role played by HE fairs, they asked the following question: what kind of information on programmes of study and institutions can potential applicants find at these events? Their study explores how HE fairs channel information between HE institutions and these applicants, and how likely these fairs are to either perpetuate or mitigate educational inequalities in access. The authors detail the strategies used by institutions to attract students during these fairs, namely in the “packaging” of products, services and programmes of study. Their findings confirm that these fairs tend to be “middle-class affairs,” “although the proportion of students from different social classes clearly varies based on the fair’s theme, with more upper-class visitors at fairs on *grandes écoles* and a wider representation of lower-class students at fairs on two-years studies and apprenticeships.”

In bringing together researchers and scholars to study the same issue through a multiscale analysis, this book forms the starting line for further theoretical and methodological debate on the value of weaving together different approaches to the study of HER, including but not limited to the historical, comparative, sociological, organisational, institutional, quantitative and qualitative. We hope it sparks the “sociological imagination” (Mills, 1959), characterised by the linking of biographical, historical, and structural approaches in discussing the “nominalist realism” (Lahire, 2012), or, in the words of Michel Grossetti (2012), the link between the development of theories of the social world, the scales of analysis chosen, and the type of problematisation.

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MICHÈLE LAMONT

# 1. HOW DO UNIVERSITY, HIGHER EDUCATION AND RESEARCH CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIETAL WELL-BEING?

## INTRODUCTION

It has been a real pleasure for me to come to the CHER 2013 conference held in Lausanne. I first would like to thank Christine Musselin, as the CHER president, and Gaële Goastellec, as the conference organiser, for their invitation to think more systematically about the question of the potential impact of University, Higher Education and Research on the well-being of societies. This theme is particularly important to me as over the last years, my research has converged around the issue of societal well-being on the one hand, and on peer review on the other. I am thrilled that the CHER invitation has given me the opportunity to make connections between two of my main research lines, which have been pursued largely independently of one another until today.

I take the opportunity of this invitation to reflect on my book *How Professors Think*, four years after its publication in English, and after it has made its way into various international audiences via translations (in Korean, Chinese, and Spanish). I will draw connections with a recent book titled *Social Resilience in the Neo-Liberal Era* (Lamont & Hall, 2013), which I coedited with the political scientist Peter Hall. This book is a follow up on a 2009 book titled *Successful Societies: How Culture and Institution affect Health*, and both are the outcome of a collaboration between a multidisciplinary group of social scientists who have been brought together by the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. We have met three times a year since 2003 to reflect together on the cultural and institutional conditions that lead to greater societal well-being.

How to articulate peer review in Higher Education and societal well-being? I will start with the assumption that meritocratic peer review is good for societal well-being and that it should be fostered given the present challenges that are created by a recurring obsession with excellence in research and teaching, as manifested for instance in the heightened importance of rankings of all sorts. I will then turn to other aspects of societal well-being that can be supported by the university and discuss how these can be maximised.

## HOW PROFESSORS THINK

*How Professors Think* concerned how peer review is practiced in the United States, in a context where the reviewers I studied generally believe in the fairness of the

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process – that cream rises – and where they say they behave in such a way as to maintain their own faith in the process. My book is based on in-depth interviews conducted with more than 80 panelists and funding program officers. I focused my attention on twelve interdisciplinary funding panels associated with five important funding competitions for fellowships and grants aimed at graduate students or faculty members of various ranks in the social sciences and the humanities. While I was able to observe three of these panels, interviews make up the bulk of the evidence mobilised for this study.

This book describes some of the conditions that make peer review possible in the United States. I focus on factors that make anonymous evaluation more likely, such as the significant demographic weight of the American research community and the spatial distance and decentralisation of American institutions of higher education. I also discuss the lengthy graduate education process that brings students in close contact with mentors, shapes their self-concept, and fosters a commitment and faith in peer review (as opposed to cynicism). The book suggests why it would be reasonable to expect that the very same customary rules of evaluation I described would be contested in countries where different conditions for scientific work prevail – for instance, where the conditions for the production of faith in peer review and the production of the American academic self that sustains it, are not present. I have extended this argument in my collaborative writings of evaluative cultures in Canada (Lamont, 2008), China (Lamont & Sun, 2012), Finland (Lamont & Huutoniemi, 2011), and France (Lamont & Cousin, 2009) to explore how peer review is practiced elsewhere in light of local conditions. These comparisons brought nuances to my earlier argument and allow me to contextualise my findings. To take only one example, the NORFACE peer review system adopted in Finland and widely used in Europe (Lamont & Huutoniemi, 2011) favours bringing in international reviewers to counter the localism that often prevails in small size academic communities. This system demonstrates the importance of adapting peer review processes to the features of national research communities, where anonymity as a condition for legitimate evaluation may not be as easily realised as it is in a very large field of higher education such as the one that exists in the United States.

With *How Professors Think* in the background, I will first mention a few challenges that peer review currently faces, and which are tied to the transformation of higher education. Second I will turn to how the well-being of societies may be connected to the transformation in higher education, university and research.

#### UBER EXCELLENCE AND THE CHALLENGES THAT PEER REVIEW MEET

Over the last twenty years, we have seen in Europe, China and elsewhere a ramping up of the international race toward excellence in higher education and research, sustained in part by the growing use and diffusion of rankings of all sorts, and by the fact that the allocation of resources has become increasingly tied to systematic evaluation. This affects institutional and scholarly practices in countless

ways. The Shanghai ranking has led French universities to engage in a major institutional reform. France is responding to the relatively low ranking of its institutions by creating consortiums of universities (the famous PRES or *pôle de recherche et d'enseignement supérieur*)<sup>1</sup> so that each unit will be larger and thus have more weight in the rankings. Bigger is now better, with all kinds of unexpected consequences at the micro-, meso- and macro-levels. The unintended consequence of this emphasis on rankings is that excellence is becoming more concentrated in a few institutions. To illustrate, the official designation of some German universities as “excellent” (by the German Forschungsgemeinschaft’s *excellenzinitiative*)<sup>2</sup> may lead to a concentration of the strongest German students in such universities and a weakening of the universities that have not received this label – whereas in the previous regime such students may have decided to stay in a second rate universities in order to work with a leading scholar in their field. The rich get richer while the poor get poorer, with “*l’Europe à deux vitesses*” (a two-speed Europe) becoming a reality not only in the national labour markets (Emmenegger, Hausermann, Palier, & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2012), but in the world of higher education and research as well. These transformations create many challenges for the world of university, research and higher education. Below I discuss seven of these challenges, starting with generational ones.

1) There has been an intensification of the challenge of national academic status orders by the growing importance of international status markers (e.g., publishing in international journals). This transformation often put older scholars who would normally serve as gate-keepers in a paradoxical situation, as they were not required to meet such criteria at the time when they were building their reputation and coming through the ranks. Yet, their seniority, relative status, and established expertise continue to entitle them to evaluate the younger generation. This discrepancy has many implications for the functioning of national intellectual communities and in some quarters it has generated a legitimacy crisis within academic fields. Younger researchers have felt blocked, instead of empowered by the older generations, in part because their own intellectual and professional capitals are often different from those valued by their predecessors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that strong tensions build around such generational differences across a number of European research communities.

2) A related challenge is the definition of criteria of evaluation used in the allocation of prestigious fellowship and grant competitions, and in particular, whether more weight should be put on the trajectory of candidates than on their project in the evaluation process. In a recent assessment of Canadian Social Science and Humanities Research peer review which I lead (Lamont, 2008), the international blue-ribbon panel in charge of the evaluation recommended that less weight should be given to the past record of candidates as compared to their research proposal, so as to even the playing field for more junior researchers. This is a source of tension as “the scientific establishment” may be more vested in putting more weight on past achievements, while innovation and creativity are most likely to come from the younger generations.

3) From a strictly productivist perspective, unleashing the forces of intellectual globalisation should result in greater convergence of criteria of evaluation and lesser barriers to innovation across intellectual communities. This change may be resisted by established researchers in part because their own form of intellectual capital is likely to be less international in nature than it is the case for younger generations. This national focus is particularly strong in the humanities, as demonstrated in a recent study by John Bendix (2014); after all, many humanists work on national histories and literatures. Yet, senior researchers have more experience as intellectual producers, and thus are more entitled to evaluate the work of their peers, which can work at the detriment of more junior colleagues. It will not be easy to find the proper balance between national and international certification in this rapidly changing environment.

4) There are also dysfunctional consequences associated with academics competing for a small set of very selective grant funders and space in a few highly prestigious journals. When publications or funding outlets give successive “revise and resubmit” to many applicants and accept very few articles (5 percent in 2012 for the *American Sociological Review*),<sup>3</sup> an unintended consequence may be a considerable depletion in time and energy and a reduction in the pace of disciplinary innovation. This raises the question of the desirability of adopting more variegated forms and sites of evaluation (through the creation of electronic journals – see for instance the recent creation of *Sociological Science* as a reaction to long-delays in peer review)<sup>4</sup> – which would encourage the development of a wider range of complementary types of excellence. From the researchers’ perspective, hedging one’s bet across a number of publications could be a more generative and productive approach. Aiming at a wider range of publication lowers the requirement of meeting the highly standardised format for articles (as described by Abend (2006), who compares major US and Mexican sociology journals), and of writing in English (an imposition for non-native English speakers). This is also likely to result in increased productivity – and perhaps innovation.

5) It may be difficult to find qualified and disinterested reviewers in small national research communities. Differences in the culture of evaluators (concerning for instance the respect of norms of confidentiality or whether researchers feel obligated to take turn and carry their weight in serving as reviewers as opposed to acting as “free loaders”) are often a problem. Respect for the rule of “cognitive contextualisation” (i.e. the norm of using criteria most appropriate for the discipline of the applicant) may favour clientelism and the use of inconsistent standards (Mallard, Lamont, & Guetzkow, 2009). Also, in a context where there are few high quality proposals, meeting basic standards such as clarity, feasibility and methodological soundness may need to be given more weight and importance than meeting criteria of evaluation such as originality. Criteria have to be adapted to the national context and the size and the demographic weight of a scientific field.

6) In a recent debate around *How Professors Think* published in a Spanish journal, the leading sociologist Juan Diez Medrano compared the conditions I described in my book not only to the Spanish context, but also to the European

Union's evaluation commissions where he has gained considerable experience (Medrano, 2013). He noted a growing bifurcation within the Spanish system, between those who are embracing international norms and others. The former group, he argues, put more emphasis on criteria of evaluation such as social and policy significance and methodological rigour, as opposed to theoretical and substantive contribution. The former criteria contrast with those preferred by more traditional researchers who put weight on the use of particular theoretical paradigms (Marxism, feminism, etc.). Such differences in criteria of evaluation are also a considerable source of conflict. While tying current practices to the broader features of national and academic contexts, Diez Medrano provides a most convincing description of the factors that may explain the current state of peer review in Spain (characterised by the low autonomy of the academic field). A first remedial step may be a collective reflections among Spanish academics on the future of peer review in their country and on how to reform the system while avoiding the perils of the over-quantification of excellence measurement – often perceived and denounced as a tool of neo-liberal governmental control (as experienced in France in recent years, with the creation of the *Agence d'évaluation de la recherche et de l'enseignement scientifique* (AERES), whose transformation was predictably announced by the socialist government shortly after it came to power in 2012).

The relationship between researchers and national governments is changing as well. Public administrators are redoubling efforts to manage and facilitate excellence in research, through the creation of centralised funding program and the regular evaluation of researchers for instance. Yet, the temptation to interfere and impose criteria of evaluation that do not emerge from the scientific communities themselves is often present. A tradition of state centralisation can be fundamentally at odds with the respect of academic autonomy and of the integrity of the peer review system. Administrative interference tarnishes the legitimacy of research evaluation all together, and discourages researchers from getting involved in funded research (as applicant or peer reviewer). Thus, challenges to peer review come not only from insufficiently professionalised localistic and clientelistic academics, but also from hungry public administrators who overextend the tentacles of governmental power. An obvious conclusion is that those in charge of scientific and research policy need to show the way, if they are seriously committed to fostering more universalistic academic communities. This applies to Russia, Spain, Italy, France, and numerous other countries.

#### SOCIETAL WELL BEING, HIGHER EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

These transformations signal challenges for the organisation of research and more broadly of higher education. But then, what's the link between societal well-being and higher education? How does higher education affect the level of societal success? Our research program on *Successful Societies* has discussed the social determinants that affect health and shows that economic resources are not the only one impinging on health but that social resources resulting from institutions and

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cultural repertoires constitutive of social relations are central too. To sum it up, we defined successful societies as societies where individuals have the capabilities to meet challenges. We view cultural and institutional resources as central to these capabilities, as they constitute the scaffolding or buffers and resources those individuals need to meet challenges. In other words, we view individual resilience as supported and empowered by collective cultural and institutional resources, but we are ultimately more interested in social resilience, i.e. the resilience of groups and societies.

Where does higher education come into play in this context? First, higher education supports recognition through a culture of diversity. This is what the evaluation process analysed in *“How Professors Think”* underlines: the importance of diversity (geographic, institutional, regional, and to a lesser extent, racial and gender diversity) as a resource for evaluation – as a distinct type of excellence that complements other types. More broadly, we now understand better the role of higher education in fostering a context in which the widest range of individuals possible are acknowledged cultural membership and given full recognition as members of the polity. In the US and the UK, universities play a crucial role in fostering cultures of diversity, ones where the perspectives and identities of members of sexual, ethnic and racial minorities are explicitly defined as equally valuable as those of majority group members and where a great deal of collective work is produced to make this principle a reality (Warikoo, 2013). This is one instance where universities contribute directly to the creation of successful societies, by creating the cultural and institutional conditions that enable greater social inclusion.

Second, the creation of a middle class of college educated professionals and managers is essential to state capacity and societal success. This is why organisations such as the Open Society Institute, the Ford Foundation, and other international philanthropies have dedicated considerable resources toward enabling individuals from a large range of societies to obtain BA and MA degrees. This is part of their wider agenda for fostering social justice, human rights and civil society across the globe. Social workers, urban planners, journalists, and a range of other professionals play an essential role in organising collective life at the institutional and cultural levels. Without them, and without the institutions of higher education that impart them expertise, much of what we take for granted in terms of the organisational resources and shared cultural framework that empower our lives would simply be non-existent. These are essential in fostering collective resilience and the role played by higher education in making such realities possible is absolutely crucial.

Third, and more broadly, as an institution, higher education provides students with collective resources that increase their social resilience, including when it comes to physical and psychological health as well as material resources. As shown for example by Baum, Ma and Payea (2010) for the US:

Beyond the economic return to individuals and to society as a whole, higher education improves quality of life in a variety of ways, only some of which can be easily quantified. High levels of labour force participation,

employment, and earnings increase the material well-being of individuals and the wealth of society, but also carry psychological benefits. Adults with higher levels of education are more likely to engage in organised volunteer work and to vote. They are also more likely to live healthy lifestyles. The issue is not just that they earn more and have better access to health care; college-educated adults smoke less, exercise more, are more likely to breast-feed their babies, and have lower obesity rates. These differences not only affect the lifestyles and life expectancies of individuals, but also reduce medical costs for society as a whole. Of particular significance, children of adults with higher levels of education have higher cognitive skills and engage in more educational activities than other children. In other words, participation in postsecondary education improves the quality of civil society.

This direct link between higher education and social resilience underlines the urgency to think further how higher education as an institution, nurture different levels of social resilience at collective and individual levels. This book takes this issue further.

## NOTES

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- <sup>2</sup> Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. (2014). *Excellence Initiative*. Retrieved January 27, 2014, from [http://www.dfg.de/en/research\\_funding/programmes/excellence\\_initiative/index.html](http://www.dfg.de/en/research_funding/programmes/excellence_initiative/index.html)
- <sup>3</sup> [http://www.asanet.org/journals/editors\\_report\\_2012.cfm](http://www.asanet.org/journals/editors_report_2012.cfm)
- <sup>4</sup> <https://www.scholasticahq.com/sociological-science/about>

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## 2. A PERSIAN GRANDEE IN LAUSANNE

### INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

Thank you for the kind invitation to address the 26<sup>th</sup> anniversary meeting of CHER and in such an agreeable location. Many years have passed since I have been able to journey to the annual meeting of an organisation in which I once had a small role. (Would you consider changing continents?) I have been given license to speak to any matter that crosses my mind (assuming of course that it is relevant to the work of CHER), even being allowed to discuss some of my past writing. The chance to comment even briefly upon aspects of one's own work is rare. I am grateful for that opportunity. I will say at the outset that much of what I now believe about higher education or larger issues concerning research was not necessarily present when I first started writing. A process of growth has occurred, and if "growth" is not exactly the right word, let me say that it has taken many years for me to arrive at conclusions with which I am comfortable. I did not say that they were correct, but they do comprise a sphere of ideas about life and scholarship that I believe infuse my writings and guide my research and teaching. I would like to emphasise teaching. CHER is a research society, but almost all of us are engaged in teaching. It is a noble occupation, a calling. I was fortunate in having teachers who changed my life. Although they are now departed, I try to provide my students with the interest and concern that they showed to me.

My talk today is roughly divided into two parts. The first involves some recollection of the CHER that I knew years ago, leading to reflections on the uses of higher education research activity. These reflections have been aided (and in part confirmed) by accounts of the early years of CHER collected by Barbara Kehm and Christine Musselin. Both of them have been signal players in the evolution of the Consortium (Kehm & Musselin, 2013). I will touch upon humanistic concerns that weave in and out of this keynote address. In the second part I revisit a book that I published in 2007 called *Education's Abiding Moral Dilemma: Merit and Worth in the Cross-Atlantic Democracies, 1800-2006*. That book amongst my other books best captures some of the concerns arising from my past association with CHER. The organisers of our meetings suggested this possibility, probably because it connects to the work of yesterday's keynoter, Michèle Lamont. We clearly have overlapping interests.

CHER MEMORIES: CHANGES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, CHANGES IN RESEARCH

Reviewing the topic of the conference – "The Roles of Higher Education and Research in the Fabric of Societies" – and the list of participants in this week's

events, I marvel at the range and variety of the presentations. I am simply stunned by the number of countries represented and the places of origins of the participants. CHER was a small society when it first began, mainly focused on European developments but allowing for some cross-Atlantic perspectives. The American scholar, Burton Robert Clark, the “Nestor” of higher education studies as Ulrich Teichler perfectly calls him, supported the decision of the founders to base the society in Europe but with an outward reference (Kehm & Musselin, 2013, p. 13). I was perfectly at home in all of this. Although an offshore representative, my writings were on the history of British universities from the Enlightenment forward, broadening later under the influence of Continental and American colleagues into more comparative dimensions.

As our numbers were small, a certain intimacy prevailed. One might say that we were perhaps clubbish, a “loose organisation” as Teichler confirms, and certainly, compared to the present, more parochial in our national reach. Naturally we could not predict the future, but it does appear as if CHER has been able to follow a familiar pattern of growth and expansion; and as professional societies grow, they invariably splinter and network differently. New territories appear, new emphases, and new debates about purpose and resources.

The field of higher education studies has grown well beyond anything I knew in my younger years, but in growing as a set of academic sub-disciplines, some might say knowledge domains if that is not too archaic, the inevitable has happened. Scholarship is imperial. It cannot be contained within tidy borders. Let us indeed be grateful for the kind of human curiosity that drives us into adjacent and foreign lands to investigate. Yet one consequence of this desirable condition is that a particular area of academic inquiry loses general coherence. The connecting ligaments weaken. Specialisation increases, and detail proliferates. Scanning through the large number of presentations at the conference, I perceive a willingness of obvious connection, or perhaps it is better to say that there do not appear to be governing paradigms or conceptual frameworks that tie the innumerable topics and research results together.

While from the beginning CHER defined for itself a full agenda of higher education interests, and its members came from different disciplines, the personal connections of the founders and allies provided a kind of unity. Although an air of exclusion was certainly not intended, such intimate groupings do eventually invite criticism (Teichler, 2013, p. 18). But a half century ago higher education researchers could also summon up over-arching conceptions or paradigms that, however received or used, supplied a basis for discussion. Scholars such as Clark Kerr, Burton Robert Clark, Martin Trow, Neil Smelser, David Riesman, and A.H. Halsey – to cite those whose names come first to my mind because I knew them – provided matrices and governing formulae that allowed us to see the evolution of higher education systems in terms of critical organisational features and historical change. Bob (to use his nickname) Clark especially, remaining extraordinarily creative and prolific even unto his last years, also stressed the filaments between lower and higher education. I don’t think there are many such presentations on this topic in our conference this year, although Peter Maassen for one captures some of

the spirit of the earlier generations in his call for a new social contract for higher education. Perhaps it is useful to emphasise along with Clark that unless we also concern ourselves with schooling, we will not be able to grasp the ways in which the earlier forms of education influence the later ones and present higher education institutions with thorny problems, especially with regard to access, curricula and remediation. And remediation in turn has an effect on resources, diverting funds from tasks more properly associated with higher education. Along with these names I would once again mention Ulrich Teichler, here today and the spiritual founder and actual founder or one of them of CHER, and Guy Neave, not present today but also a founder, a fixture and an inspiration.

The paragons of yore seized upon and explained the importance of market discipline in the functioning of higher education systems, the role of the state and civil servants, the very nature of the university as a collection of diverse units and values somehow struggling to maintain a scintilla of coherence. We learned about the importance of differentiation in modern societies, the necessity, corresponding to the reality of markets (notice the plural), of offering different kinds of educational experiences for different kinds of student aspirations and abilities. We heard about the characteristics of elite and mass access to higher education systems. Varied funding streams, we were told, were necessary for institutional survival wherever states were coming to play a much larger role in the governance of universities and in quality assurance than had ever been the case before (or at least since universities ceased to be instruments of church and state). Clark used to warn that state governments “can turn nasty.” If these themes are familiar today, let us remember that they were relatively new in the two decades after the Second World War. Of Clark’s numerous works, my favourite is his study of liberal arts colleges in the United States, a superb portrait of the culture and strategies of survival of a special type of American higher education institution. But certainly all of his work is distinctive. I once heard from colleagues in Italy that his book on the structure of Italian universities, now decades old, has never been superseded.

I suppose that a driving force behind the scholarship of this earlier generation was to explain how higher education institutions actually function as opposed to writings that are basically hortatory: normative as distinguished from prescriptive, higher education as it is rather than as it ought to be. Alas, most of the great names are now departed, certainly the American School. Clark Kerr, Bob Clark, Martin Trow, David Riesman are no longer with us. Despite their years, Neil Smelser and Chelly Halsey are still around in good mental health, Halsey reaching 90.

Amongst the contributions of the individuals I have named was the idea of higher education as a system, usually a national system, meaning that higher education institutions could be discussed as a congress of linkages, an alteration in one link producing an alteration in another. I recall debates (not necessarily at CHER) about the very meaning of a system and whether such a notion was merely a heuristic device, convenient for analysis, or a reality, or perhaps just a metaphor. Could an institution or an entire system serving human needs actually be described in mechanical language? Skeptics did not see the parts gearing together as in machines, and historians, accustomed to discrete inquiry and heavily empirical

work, were amongst the doubters. Historians often resisted because historians tend to view human affairs as messy, contingent, accidental, the best-laid plans going awry. The logic that the sociologists found in organisational structures, and in systems, was not the logic that historians recognised. I once thought that if the object of sociology was an essential simplicity, the object of history was complexity, interesting intellectually but not immediately functional.

In those early years of CHER there were several interesting differences between the outlook of Americans and Europeans, most notably on issues regarding supply and demand in higher education, private and public initiatives, academic freedom and institutional autonomy, quality control and assurance. The fact that the *Gelehrten* in Continental Europe officially had civil service status, and American academics in general shared the nation's distrust of meddling officeholders created interesting fault lines. One had a sense of sides that did not always grasp the perspectives of others. Americans insisted on the differentiation of missions. Some institutions were select, others featured open admissions, and in between lay any number of private and public options oriented towards different student markets. Quality varied according to mission. This was one important point that separated the earlier generation of higher education researchers. Europeans could not tolerate the idea of an array of institutions of inferior academic quality, at least with respect to undergraduates. Another key point was that connections existed between select and non-select institutions, particularly public colleges and universities, through student transfer, an essential ingredient in the American opportunity structure. Student transfer in Europe at that time was hardly known, although a number of European programs existed with student mobility as a goal. And because Europeans disagreed with Americans in the matter of quality as measured by mission, another important point was not grasped, namely, how the existence of lower quality institutions actually protected the higher quality colleges and universities. They did so in two ways: first, by allowing for student transfer; and second, by absorbing the demand for admission to brand-name institutions by less competitive students. This was especially important for public institutions such as my own, since private foundations did not face the political pressures encountered by state universities. In the beginning our European colleagues mainly thought in terms of elite models and believed (or some did) that widening access would threaten an inherited and cherished view of the superior nature of the university. I will return to this theme in the second part of this keynote address.

After decades of the restructuring of higher education in Europe, the numerical expansion of institutions and students, the use of markets by states to force some institutions into charging tuition, the growth of ideas of privatisation and the global rankings systems that have arisen, the differences for which the Atlantic was once a barrier have diminished.

Funding, quality and access problems in American higher education have now reduced the optimism quotient. Whereas implicitly if not explicitly American higher education specialists once regarded American solutions as more or less ideal (Clark Kerr was an exception), worthy of emulation abroad, grumblings have become more common. As Teichler perceptively observes, American scholars

tended to seek optimal and universal solutions to higher education issues based on the American experience (Kehm & Musselin, 2013, p. 3). I think that CHER and other societies helped restore a sense of perspective by promoting the comparative method, which is really the only way to measure the nature and success of any institution or nation.

One purpose, certainly discussed at the outset, and revisited ever since, was whether CHER should concern itself with problem-solving and invite policymakers and practitioners into its ranks. The practical argument for higher education research was met by the counter-argument that the disinterested character of research would be compromised if primary attention were paid to “relevance.” The dangers were that researchers, eager to obtain the support and attention of policymakers, would succumb to political and ideological pressures and shed their scholarly independence. Furthermore, immediate solutions might prove inadequate in the long run. I gather that there is some feeling within the Consortium that the conventional boundaries between scholars and practitioners may be eroding, although apparently communication between the two communities remains awkward (Amaral & Magalhaes, 2013).

Whatever the current state of the long-standing debate between scholarly and practitioner cultures, my view is that the primary work of the Consortium members remains present-minded, possibly suggesting a utilitarian urge. Current problems are customarily addressed as if historical antecedents are largely irrelevant. There is little recognition of inherited mischief. The impression is given that dilemmas can be overcome by steady and well-conceptualised research, especially research employing quantitative materials. I notice in the listing of the conference sessions that there is a greater use of data sets in achieving a possible correspondence between researchers and practitioners than was our previous inclination, with notable exceptions. Ulrich Teichler and his colleagues in their work on student markets made plentiful use of statistical data, and Halsey certainly did, in an easy way and with a special literary style. Memory may fail me, but I think that we were more qualitative than quantitative, only some of us technically competent in the use of statistical data. Run through the listing of the panels of the conference and see if I am right.

Where are we today in relation to the task of using higher education research to further public policy decisions? Despite the staggering number of topics represented at this conference, I am not confident that we have a very solid understanding of whether ideas and recommendations generated by higher education research make much difference when politicians, bureaucrats and their staffs gather to announce new guidelines and laws. That is my impression, reinforced by my earlier remarks on the existence of two cultures. My impression may be weak, however, and contrary instances may possibly be found in countries with which I have limited acquaintance.

The clearest example of travel between scholarship and policy that I know, and for obvious reasons, is Clark Kerr’s influence on the State of California Master Plan for Higher Education of 1960, the world’s first higher education planning document. Kerr came out of a tradition of social science and industrial economics

that developed between the two world wars. That tradition was heavily weighted towards planning as the most intelligent way to muster and concentrate resources and reconcile competing interests. Fervently anti-Marxist, but ironically intrigued by Marxist efforts to articulate big themes and great historical transformations, Kerr saw democracy and demography as the drivers of higher education policy. His younger colleague, Martin Trow, created a template for explaining how institutions differentiate under the twin pressures. When the student cohort available for post-secondary instruction rises above 15%, higher education can be described as “mass higher education” whereas before (and throughout history) it was “elite,” recruiting no more than about 1-2% of the available cohort depending upon period and nation. Trow explained how profoundly mass-access institutions differed from elite colleges and universities. Intake, selection, curricula, teaching and prestige were markedly dissimilar (see Trow & Burrage, 2010). Kerr saw the phenomenon of mass access higher education as a potential tidal wave threatening disaster if California’s colleges and universities did not meet the demands of a greatly-expanding student market. If student demand was thwarted, parents and voters would be angry, and their discontent would inevitably affect the higher education policies of the political classes. That was one potential calamity. The other was the threat to the quality of Kerr’s multi-campus University of California if higher education alternatives at tax-payer expense were not fully supported. The Master Plan dealt with these issues brilliantly. There are those today such as Patrick Callan who argue that the Plan is now inoperative, a victim of funding shortfalls, bureaucratic mishandling of resources on the part of university leaders and social problems inherent in the maldistribution of life chances throughout society (Callan, 2012, see also Douglass, 2000).

Kerr is usually regarded as the principal architect of the California Master Plan – one of his colleagues once called him the “father of the modern university” because of his idea of a “multiversity.” Multiversities, because they must be responsive to a great range of exterior demands, differentiate internally. They do not possess the internal coherence celebrated by past moralists such as Cardinal Newman. Halsey’s association with the British Cabinet minister Tony Crosland, as one of his advisers on matters concerning the sociology of education, is a different example of the relationship of academic research on education to policy-making. California is not Britain, and California’s politicians (by choice) did not play as central a role in the formulation of the Master Plan as would a powerful Cabinet Minister in Britain. Halsey’s role was significant, but Crosland was his own man with his own views, so advisers only provided views and data that could easily be disregarded. Yet the fact that Crosland gathered viewpoints based on academic research concerning the conversion of most historic grammar (secondary) schools into American-style comprehensive high schools to support a greater amount of upward educational mobility and promoted technical education, if not in ways congenial to Halsey, does indicate a place for accomplished researchers. Those interested in such important relationships are invited to read Halsey’s account of his life and times, *No Discouragement, An Autobiography* (Halsey, 1996).

You may be able to provide other and even better examples from your own national experiences or studies. But at least for the moment I will repeat that the disconnection between academic empirical research and the formulation of policy is very wide. It is easier for us to discuss the “role” or “roles” of higher education research than to follow the possible trail of research vertically or horizontally towards government leaders, officials and staff. It is harder for us to take a multi-variable approach and include in our analyses the media, the twists and turns of public opinion, the ideological perspectives of politicians, the trade unions and the various groups and organisations that we recognise as decision-making factors in any complex, plural and free society.

But the opportunity is certainly there. Would it be possible for CHER to organise an annual conference on precisely how higher education research reaches or fails to reach players, politicians and practitioners who define higher education issues, decide on policies and drum up the resources that affect the functioning and evolution of colleges and universities? Case studies, paying close attention to the many strands of decision-making, would be a sophisticated contribution to the long-standing conundrum of the relationship of scholarship to active problem-solving. What are the policy networks, who is in them, what is their reach? How have past studies found their way into the hands of those able to implement them? I am not aware that this kind of work is being done. Instead of merely remarking about the two cultures, we would actually understand the real reasons for the separation. We would be able to plot the story of the actual role of research in higher education in what is so often termed a “knowledge society” or a “knowledge economy.”

Case studies would enable us to pick up the trail. Nevertheless, we would still find the entire process bewildering, a mix of direct, indirect, accidental and contingent variables, always befuddled by the unpredictable movements of politics and history. We might end up greatly saddened, as did the Persian grandee in Herodotus’s history of the Persian Wars. Living long and seeing much, he confessed to his guest Solon, the legendary lawgiver of Athens, that he felt powerless to influence the direction of events.

EDUCATION’S ABIDING MORAL DILEMMA: MERIT AND WORTH IN THE  
CROSS-ATLANTIC DEMOCRACIES, 1800-2006

I will return to this ancient existential difficulty later in this presentation because it introduces a humanistic element into discussions and research so focused on social science and statistical methods that other aspects of higher education are overlooked. But for now I want to use the occasion allowed to me today to enter upon the second part of my presentation. I want to reflect upon where I might situate myself with respect to the question of the utility of higher education research. I am an historian. I am interested in the policy sciences insofar as I am interested in a large number of subjects in which I might have a keen but passing acquaintance. But I would not place myself amongst those whose work is aimed at public policy decision-making, even obliquely. For some years I was actually



uncertain how to label myself. My first book was on the great Victorian reform period of the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century when Oxford and Cambridge commenced on a new trajectory that restored, or refashioned, the eminence once enjoyed and might be lost. Just as Kerr was intrigued by the Marxist emphasis on historical determinism, I too wondered (and I was writing before Kerr's famous lectures were published) if there was a kind of ironic logic to history, the outcomes that might be predicted except that human actors are always looking in the wrong places. I called my book *The Revolution of the Dons*, and challenged readers to figure out that if dons could make a revolution, what kind of a revolution would it be?<sup>2</sup> Probably I should have been more direct and revealed the answer to the puzzle at the outset, but as an historian interested in recreating the past with all of its confusion, I wanted to show that even the participants to change were not fully aware of their ultimate destinations until they actually got there. A well-known and greatly respected left-wing literary critic, Raymond Williams, reviewing the book, agreed that a major transformation of Cambridge had indeed occurred, but he understandably objected to my use of the word "revolution" since I had used it ironically.

I dealt with issues of social composition. Who actually attended these institutions before and after the reforms? I examined the Marxist thesis that the bourgeoisie had taken over from the aristocracy (not true). I fussed over the entire process of change, the pressures from below and outside, the pressures from government, the subtle transformations almost unperceived but decisive from within. Was I a social historian, an institutional historian, or, since I wrote about intellectual debates, maybe an historian of ideas; or perhaps, since the ideas were also about cultural values, should I conclude that I was a cultural historian? But as I was drawn to the personalities involved in my narrative, I was also constructing potted biographies. In the academic world we define ourselves by specialties and sub-specialties. I was therefore at some pains to define my work so that it would fit in with the scholarship of others. Then one day I realised that I could to some large degree avoid classification. I was living in a mentally picaresque world, but essentially I was simply an historian, and history is first and foremost about change and simultaneous activity. It illustrates the palimpsest of human conduct. Our method of explication is linear – the narrative, and even analysis can be narrative. Probably film is a better medium for capturing the past because images can be immediately juxtaposed.

One day, purely by accident, by the drift of circumstances within especially stimulating university environments, by friends whom chance brought into my life, I found myself hunting in the pack of educational sociologists and political policy analysts. My book on Cambridge was another entrée because it dealt with university history. In the beginning I may even have envied those who seemed to have opinions about contemporary higher education issues when I had none. They exuded a certain confidence.

From the perspective of the policy sciences, an historical outlook – at least then – was virtually useless. The number of historians or historically-minded sociologists inhabiting CHER in the other earliest years were only a handful. I am not aware that there are many at present. I remember sitting in on discussions held

by postgraduates in the Graduate School of Public Policy at Berkeley as they debated standing issues, learning how to find data, discussing methodologies, formulating conclusions, recommendations and options. I admired the rigour that the students were expected to demonstrate, but it all seemed so odd, rather hothouse. The historian in me said that the logic was unrealistic. There was that issue again about simplicity versus complexity. I do not for a moment mean to suggest that the policy discussions were simplistic. I mean that too much complexity interferes with the possibility of a clear diagnosis. I was then asked by the class to add an historical perspective. I do not remember what I said, but I imagine that it must have been in the way of a plea for greater insight into human motive, institutional confusion, partisan issues and the broader, wider themes that gather in the past, rush forward to the present and persist into the future. My world may have been a truer version of what actually existed, but it was still a world without the instrumentalism of the policy sciences.

The historian in me was interested in those great humanistic concepts of meaning and understanding. I have used the following example many times, and I suppose that I do so because no one ever put the necessary contrasts as well as the English logician John Stuart Mill when he was a young man in the 1830s. He compared the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, a sort of mentor since he knew him so well, with the Romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge. The first, said Mill, tested any value or institution according to a principle of expediency: did it give pleasure, was it conducive to happiness, or, because Bentham meant this, was the solution utilitarian? If so, it was good. If not, change it. But Coleridge, Mill concluded, had a far different view of utility. An institution may appear useless, but it can still possess meaning if we look beneath the obvious. That meaning could lead to something more precious than utility, something related to our understanding of what it means to be human. Surely can we grasp such Romantic themes? For example, once we get students into higher education through whatever policies are in place, what then? We want I hope to give them some sense of their worth beyond the quantitative and other measures that so occupy mass society.

Understandably, the policy sciences do not take well to the more humanistic aspects of scholarship. Ambiguity, uncertainty, irony, the search for personal integrity, philosophical conceptions of a good life or just a life of meaning – these do not commonly inform policy studies. To be sure: intimations sometimes appear in national reports or publications about the purpose and goals of higher education, but they are not central. They certainly are not easily arranged into a list of policy recommendations. It is not even clear for whom a humanistic message is intended, although for me as a committed university teacher the proper audience is composed of students. For them, or for anyone else willing to listen, the object of intellectual inquiry may be something vague and less tangible, more a matter of explaining, of understanding, of situating the human experience in some kind of pattern of self or social location. Our Persian grandee was saddened because he could not affect change, but merely to understand is in itself a profound existential value.

Because the language of humanistic inquiry seems to me to be absent from the topics being presented at our CHER meeting, at least not apparent to me from the

titles of the sessions, I want to stress its importance, the importance of language that speaks to human needs and has always been considered to be as much a part of education as anything that is labelled professional, vocational or specialised. I do not disparage any of these other educational possibilities. I am not speaking about an alternative. I am speaking about infusing our specialties with considerations and values that must be present if we are true to the human experience. The policy sciences define and establish the venues in which multiple human experiences take place. Nevertheless, we will always be left with some degree of moral and social ambiguity, and it should be one of our goals to explain why that is natural to the human condition, why such a goal would deepen our higher education research, and why it would provide needed perspective on a world desperate for relief from a record of vulgarity, brutality and misplaced values.

Coping with ambiguity might well be one of the most important aims of a higher education. Illustrating the moral dilemmas that arise from contradictions might well be an object that research into higher education problems should embrace and should embrace, I repeat, because our research has to be about reality if it is to be accurate. Therefore at this point in my talk let me address some issues of ambiguity or mixed messages that I encountered and examined in the 2007 book referred to at the outset. It is on the current much-discussed problem of access and democratic opportunity in education.

Some years back, but in the present century, I was asked to deliver the Bishop Waynflete Lectures at Magdalen College Oxford. The College, and the University, had been embroiled in a controversy regarding access. A leading politician, subsequently prime minister, levelled charges of social and gender discrimination against Magdalen for not admitting a prospective medical student who eventually was offered and accepted full tuition to Harvard University. The Minister's facts were wrong, but media attention was virtually global. The whole affair was wrenching for the Fellows of Magdalen, who had tried their best to assure fair access, fair access still being competitive. The rejected candidate was qualified, but where competitive entry exists, the numbers of qualified applicants exceed the availability of places. Some kind of sorting must therefore take place, and there were superior candidates reading medicine who were in fact women. The rejected candidate had gone to a state school in the north of England, and charges were levelled that Oxford favoured independent (private) schools over state schools and privileged students over disadvantaged students. These were conventional canards, but the state school was a good one, and the rejected candidate was not from the working classes. Furthermore, with respect to admissions, Oxford was, as one historian has demonstrated, a meritocratic institution (Soares, 1999). Magdalen College thought that perhaps an historian of universities might shed some light on the driving issues and problems. I stumbled about these for a time, delivered three lectures, was not satisfied, and sat down to rethink the issue of access again from a different interpretive angle.

Why was it that outsiders to a university's admission process were convinced that the failure of a qualified candidate to gain entrance to a select institution such as Magdalen College Oxford was attributable to social prejudice of some kind, or

even structural exclusion as we might now say? To start with, that was the convenient response. It was also historically true when universities were select but not meritocratic. It had taken a long time in the 20<sup>th</sup> century for select institutions, both in Britain and America, to become meritocratic; and as for America, there remains a strong suspicion amongst parents that private select institutions still favour “legacy” admits, the children of alumni. By the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century there was evidently leftover ammunition to fire at Oxbridge, to continue the accusation that the universities were repositories of social snobbery despite evidence to the contrary. Possibly in England meritocracy itself was an issue? The word is generally held to have been invented by Michael Young and used in a somewhat satirical book of 1958 entitled *The Rise of the Meritocracy*. The question of meritocratic entry was certainly a hotly-debated issue in the United States in the decades from about the 1960s or 1970s onwards, leading to important high-level legal cases involving university admissions policies called by the euphemism “affirmative action.” Legal challenges are still going on. The United States Supreme Court is expected to rule on the issue shortly enough.

Affirmative action policies were designed to advance the admission of members of under-represented minority groups, most notably African-Americans to begin with, a group that was in the process of emancipating itself from a bitter history that still remains an American tragedy. Let us now recall the Magdalen dilemma and broaden it: where places in a university are limited, increasing the numbers from one group means that the numbers from other groups will be diminished. This in itself promotes controversy especially if the members whose numbers are affected belong to another minority group but one that has been successful in moving through the admissions process.<sup>3</sup> The fundamental issue in a meritocratic, competitive system of admissions is defining merit. Can this be objectively measured? And what does “objective” mean in any event? The effort to define “objective” has endured for about a century, its origins in the U.S. lying in numerous movements for testing intelligence and constructing entrance examinations, the “Big Tests,” that grew in importance in the final decades of the last century. Psychometrists have not been without employment.

From the standpoint of admissions policies, affirmative action can and did take many forms, any number of which are not controversial. No one, for example, objects to high school recruitment efforts, summer bridging programs, special remedial tutorials or publicity aimed at potential students who, owing to location or circumstances or limited access to information, are unaware of available opportunities to improve educational chances. But objections arise when quotas and ethnic set-asides are in place, for these also have a history of discrimination, especially against Jewish students who were subject to quotas between the two world wars. Richard Atkinson, a cognitive psychologist and president of the University of California, initiated a furious national debate not long ago when he argued that one of the major national admissions tests (not used in every institution, however) was seriously flawed. Time does not permit me to discuss this matter today, but aspects of it are covered in my book (Rothblatt, 2007) on merit and in the excellent account of Atkinson provided by Patricia Pelfrey (2012). A

large point, and one that underscores the ambiguities in the issues over affirmative action, is that both sides to the controversy are correct. Those who argue for measurable meritocratic criteria as being fair, and those who object to criteria based on testing without reference to personal qualities that are not testable but provide evidence of future success are also correct. Much historical baggage lies behind these arguments, since objective tests were not really objective. They had once been designed to exclude even if the designers were unaware of their inherent prejudices. But of course admissions officers do not require a test or examination to exclude students who are not desired. A test of “character” will also achieve that end, but bias is easier to disguise when the criteria for entrance are represented as “scientific.” To the supporters of affirmative action the issues were incontrovertible. Large numbers of potential students had not been admitted to select institutions; and even if they did not possess the necessary qualifications, it was in their interest, the interest of the institution and the interest of the nation that room be found for them. For if they did not possess “merit,” they nevertheless possessed “worth,” or so I said.

I came up with the idea of “worth” because I needed to explain a democratic dilemma. In a democracy, opportunity is the key to advancement because, in theory, all who are willing to work hard and steadily are worthy of consideration where education is deemed essential to having a good life. Was selection in and of itself therefore compatible with professed democratic values? Furthermore, the idea of “worth” was embedded in western civilisation. So now we had reached a point where two contradictory but equally legitimate ways of assessing human value existed. There was merit – measurable by various kinds of tests and examinations. But the other, “worth,” was older and deeper, derived from history, from religious monotheism, from ethical and philosophical treatises, from humanistic strains and from clumsily-addressed elements of liberal or social democracy.

We in the west are committed to the values dating from long ago that all human beings are in some sense worthy, and that their worth must be respected and taken into account when sorting takes place for entry into select higher education institutions. There were ironies. I explained that before the meritocratic ideal was established in Britain, the students and their parents who most resisted the measurement of merit did so because they feared that their children would not be otherwise competitive. But unlike members of disadvantaged populations in America who do not achieve well on high stakes examinations, these were not disadvantaged but advantaged groups hoping to hold onto their advantages. Despite their obvious self-interest, those who resisted in Britain exemplified the principle of worth and carried it forward. Things of human value can never be mechanically and bureaucratically measured. The next step was to return “worth” to a more democratic foundation and to rescue it from the acquired argument that some people are “naturally superior” to others. At the same time, “worth” remained characterological, subject to assessment but not to measurement.

I found an interesting contrast between America and England. Americans were far more aggressive in using I.Q. tests and other forms of testing as merit

determinants than were the English. The reason was that English schoolmasters and others involved in identifying talented students had faith in their ability to recognise and assess worth. Of course they examined, but they did not readily adopt objective or allegedly scientific assessment. They tested for academic content. I.Q. testing was superfluous. But Americans embraced “objective” merit testing because, professing to be part of a democracy, they had abandoned gentlemanly traditions. Egalitarian aims seemed to suggest that objective testing was superior to character assessments which, from this perspective, were inherently biased or suggested class, gender, religious and ethnic preferences. America was also an avowedly plural and immigrant society, which added to the belief that merit determination should be scientifically based. Of course plenty of prejudices remained nonetheless and had to be bled from the methods of selection existing after 1945.

If every party to a debate is correct – merit and worth both have critical strengths and weaknesses – how do we arrive at policies that can be uniformly regarded as essential to promoting the goals of a culture of democratic opportunity? I cannot provide that answer, but I can suggest that unless we, as higher education researchers, take into account the double messages, ironies and contradictions arising from historical circumstances, we cannot possibly arrive at sensible conclusions regarding difficult options. To believe solely in merit is to ignore vital human dimensions. To advocate “worth” as a more just policy is to overlook the ways in which it can be corrupted. The lesson – we might say the moral – is to recognise the ambiguities of history. The Fellows of Magdalen College were caught in a profound and abiding moral dilemma. But there was a policy solution. The candidate had been admitted to another fine British university although she chose to go to an American one. The policy is to make certain that in the case of access to select institutions, a just society will provide significant alternatives: alternative educational opportunities, alternative chances, a variety of possibilities. Or to refer to my earlier remarks, a fair and just system requires a “system” of flexible opportunities for the many different cultures within a modern democratic polity. This was the California Master Plan as originally envisioned by Kerr.

#### CONCLUSION

I started my analysis of merit and worth in England, Scotland and America by going back to the year 1800, and I stopped when I finished writing, which was 2006. Apart from a possibly smug belief that I had identified cultural strains that were not featured in arguments over widening access, I was annoyed at what I thought was a certain failure of honesty. I suppose that I wanted more than partisan rancour, more understanding of the inherent conflict between merit and worth, more history. I wanted complexity, a recognition that human affairs were messy. I wanted a confession that even within the arena of policy studies there exist intangibles, asymmetries, imperfectly-grasped entanglements that, if carefully introduced into policy analysis, considerably advance the cause of social

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understanding. We would have policies that were not only more useful but had more meaning. The issues would be better understood. Public policies affect people emotionally. That should be taken into consideration from every possible perspective. Our Persian grandee, were he alive, might at last feel that his long life had been worthwhile.

But then again, he lived in a world governed by Fate, by the Heraclitean Law of Compensation, by the cosmic forces of history where irony was master. Do we? That is a subject for another kind of discussion. But assuming that we still retain a belief that through careful analysis of facts and sophisticated methodologies we can arrive at good public policies with respect to critical issues, we must marry a humanistic outlook to academic research in higher education. As scholars, we value accuracy. But we can never be accurate if we leave out of our calculations and research ways of viewing institutions, structures and systems that touch upon the deepest problems of the human experience.

#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> A written and longer version of an oral keynote presentation delivered 10 September 2013 at the CHER Annual Conference held at the University of Lausanne.
- <sup>2</sup> In some parts of the world now represented in our community the meaning of “dons” may not be evident. “Don” is a corruption of the Latin “dominus” or master and refers to the college tutors and Fellows of Oxford and Cambridge University. Similarly, “dominie” from the same root is a Scottish schoolteacher.
- <sup>3</sup> A famous university president told me the following story. When he was in office, representatives of an under-represented minority group in his university requested that he use his influence to eliminate admissions tests and entry examinations since their students did not score well on them. Representatives of another and very successful achieving minority group in the same university asked him to retain high stakes testing because of the opposite. Their students scored very well indeed. He asked that the two groups meet, arrive at a recommendation, and inform him accordingly. Of course nothing happened.

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### **3. A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR HIGHER EDUCATION?**

#### INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

Higher education is in a critical period with a potential for a major rebalancing of internal and external relations of authority, power and responsibility in higher education governance. An important element in this transition has been a growing policy focus on the contributions higher education institutions are expected to make to economic growth, job creation and innovation. Related to this policy focus, a third mission has emerged for higher education – next to its two traditional missions of education and research – which reflects an expected close engagement, in the first place economic, of higher education with society. This engagement is not taken for granted; there is an intensive international focus on how to measure its realisation.

This development has had an important effect on the socio-political institutional context in which higher education operates. Referring to this institutional context as the social contract among higher education, political authorities, and society at large, the emergence of the third mission represents a serious challenge if not crisis in the relationship between higher education and society. The traditional high level of mutual trust underlying the social contract has been seriously affected, and all major actors involved are part of a search for a new social contract.

A “social contract,” sometimes also referred to as a “pact,” can be defined as a fairly long-term cultural commitment to and from higher education, as an institution with its own foundational rules of appropriate practices, causal and normative beliefs, and resources, yet validated by the political and social system in which higher education is embedded (Gornitzka et al., 2007). A social contract is different from a formal legal contract based on continuous strategic calculation of expected value by public authorities, organised external groups, university employees, and students – all regularly monitoring and assessing the university on the basis of its usefulness for their self-interest, and acting accordingly.

This chapter will discuss the way in which higher education’s social contract has developed since the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, and how this historical development is of relevance for the current discussions around higher education’s relationship with society.

## ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Change in higher education generally takes place routinely and incrementally within a fairly stable institutional framework (Clark, 1983). However, under certain conditions institutional frameworks are themselves changing radically in higher education systems. In general, it is difficult to predict exactly under what conditions radical or revolutionary change is taking place or is likely to take place. Apparent radical events, such as the democratisation of the university during the 1960s and 1970s, may in a longer perspective turn out to have less transformative impacts than generally believed at the time. The same might be said in the future about the impact of the market model that is currently dominating higher education governance. At the same time, consistent incremental change may over time transform higher education systems in fundamental ways.

Further, under some circumstances change in higher education is argued to be the result of decisions, actions, processes or developments in its external environments. Under other circumstances change is the outcome of strategic choices of institutional leaders. Nevertheless, change routinely involves a much larger repertoire of standard processes and in contemporary settings change often takes place in a complex ecology of actors, processes and determinants (March, 1981; Brunsson & Olsen, 1998; Gornitzka et al., 2007).

Policy-makers often use the environmental determinism and strategic choice frameworks as foundations for higher education reform agendas. However, environments are likely to influence, but not determine higher education change dynamics. In addition, there are many actors and forces across levels of governance, policy sectors and institutional spheres and no single actor or coherent group of actors is likely to perfectly control reform processes and their outcomes. As a consequence, we cannot expect a straight causal line from the intentions of identifiable actors to higher education performance and development, also because higher education change can be triggered and influenced by many factors and change processes follow many different paths.

An underlying assumption for this chapter is that higher education needs a strongly institutionalised governance environment if it is to be able to produce the kind of outcomes society expects. As indicated above, the nature and stability of this environment are determined in the framework of the social contract between higher education and society at large. It can be argued that higher education is currently in a transition period, in the sense that its former stable governance environment has in many respects been de-institutionalised and all stakeholders involved are looking for ways to re-institutionalise higher education's governance environment in an appropriate and acceptable way. A condition for this to be realised is that a new balance is agreed upon between internal and external responsibilities, as well as authority and power constellations with respect to higher education governance. In each country this new balance is developed in a specific national context in which path dependencies play an important role.

The global nature of the search for a new "social contract" can be illustrated by referring to the 1998 declaration on *Academic Freedom, University Autonomy and*

*Social Responsibility* of the International Association of Universities (IAU), in which it reaffirmed its traditional principles and redefined their implications: “within the framework of a new Social Contract which sets out mutual responsibilities, rights and obligations between University and Society so that they may meet the challenges of the new Millennium” (IAU, 1998).

An important characteristic of the IAU Declaration is that it did not merely reaffirm traditional principles as an essential right, but instead located these within the framework of the need for “a new social contract setting.” While the various declarations of rights of the IAU effectively assume the existence of some relevant underlying social contract, the reference to a “new social contract” implies that its “old” one is no longer actually in place and needs to be (re-)negotiated.

The joint UNESCO and the International Council for Science’s World Conference on Science (1999) called for a new social contract that would update terms for society’s support for science and science’s reciprocal responsibilities to society. However, this Conference was characterised by confusing attempts to clarify the meaning of a social contract for science in different regions.<sup>2</sup>

A helpful indication of what might be involved in the development, adaptation and maintenance of a social contract is provided by Olsen (2007) who observes that in historical perspective the development of the modern university as a specialised institution committed to academic teaching and research, was one part of the large-scale transformation from pre-modern to modern societies in Europe. In this transformation the modern university constituted a particular institutional sphere, distinct from other autonomous domains of the economy and the market, state and bureaucracy or religion. However, at the onset of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Olsen (2007, p. 44) notes that public trust in higher education’s problem solving capacity has decreased drastically. The main consequence is the need for (re-)negotiating the terms of the social contract between higher education and society. In historical and institutional perspective, Olsen argues, the institutional foundations of universities and colleges are based on underlying social contracts involving long-term cultural commitments. However, in radically changing circumstances even entrenched institutions can encounter “widely-agreed-upon performance crises,” typically through the intrusion of values, criteria and procedures derived from other and alien institutional spheres. Olsen (2007) terms this a form of “institutional imperialism (which) (...) may threaten to destroy what is distinctive about (...) institutional spheres” (p. 28).

The distinctive nature of this notion of higher education institutions (re-) negotiating their underlying social contract with society may be clarified by contrasting it with competing notions, such as *the responsive university* (Keith, 1998) or *the enterprise university* (Marginson & Considine, 2000). In both cases the underlying assumption is that, in response to changing social conditions and demands, universities and colleges should change the distinctive nature of their academic operations. However, these interpretations of the consequences of changing conditions for higher education institutions ultimately neglect their basic characteristics and principles that can be argued to be responsible for their institutional robustness.

To sum up, in its broadest terms a social contract concerns the relationship between the state and its institutions, and presumes that in order to form a social order there has to be a mutual understanding of, trust in, and commitment to the roles and responsibilities of all partners involved. This implies that there is a “social contract” concerning an appropriate set of rules for behaviour and a mutual understanding of included obligations. Arguably, we can witness a shift in how the sectoral social contract for higher education is interpreted, especially in the context of the current economic crisis. In higher education, it has traditionally been understood as a broader “gentlemen’s agreement” on roles and responsibilities, but is now increasingly seen as a formal, mainly economic agreement (Gornitzka et al., 2004). This shift can be observed in “global reform scripts” that are based on a set of negative interpretations of the development of the social contract for higher education (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2011, 2014). The blame for this negative development is put especially on the university, as can be illustrated by the following quote:

After remaining a comparatively isolated universe for a very long period, both in relation to society and to the rest of the world, with funding guaranteed and a status protected by respect for their autonomy, European universities have gone through the second half of the 20th century without really calling into question the role or nature of what they should be contributing to society. The changes they are undergoing today and which have intensified over the past ten years prompt the fundamental question: Can the European universities, as they are and are organised now, hope in the future to retain their place in society and in the world? (Commission, 2003, p. 22)

However, despite these radical reform demands and the reform initiatives following these demands in most European countries, the results of these reforms have not led to a radical change in the nature and organisation of the academic activities of the university. The most far-reaching changes in the university have been introduced through the development of an executive structure that in many respects is more tightly connected to the external socio-economic and political actors and agencies than to the academic domain within the university. Before further elaborating the relationship between the university’s executive structure and academic domain, a number of historical reflections will first be presented. These are of relevance for understanding the current complexities of the attempts to renew the social contract for the university in particular and science in general.

#### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Since its establishment in the 11<sup>th</sup> century, the university’s relationship with society has gone through periods of apparent stability as well as crisis and change, related to the level of mutual trust and commitment, and the level of agreement on the university’s role in and for society, and society’s role in governing and funding the university. In its first centuries of existence the university was in essence a

professional school organised around theology, medicine and law, without any activities that we would consider “scientific” from today’s perspective. Even though after the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century the relationship between the university and the emerging nation state authorities in Europe became closer, the European university of the late 18<sup>th</sup>, early 19<sup>th</sup> century was still a “private, self-governing, property-owning and self-financing corporation” (Neave, 2001, p.23). The resistance of the university to governmental interference in its internal affairs was possible on the basis of the traditional principle of academic self-governance. Even in countries with a very tight state control, such as France and Russia, the traditional universities were allowed to continue some form of self-governance in this period. The emergence of the research university formed a crucial transition point in the development of the European nation state and the role of the university as one of its core social institutions.

How does the current relationship between higher education and society relate to the transformation of the university from a professional school to a research-intensive academic institution? For answering this question the notion of a “social contract” is of relevance. This notion emerged in the Age of Enlightenment as the leading doctrine of political legitimacy. Rousseau’s book *Du contrat social ou principes du droit politique* (“Of The Social Contract, Or Principles of Political Right”) from 1762 proposed reforms that would lead to a government that prioritises the interests of its people over its own interests. Using Rousseau’s starting point, social contract theorists aim at showing why and how a rational citizen would voluntarily consent to give up his or her natural freedom to obtain the benefits of political order. From this original political philosophical interpretation of social contract to analysing the relationship between higher education and society as a social contract, there is not necessary a logical and obvious step. However, in order to illustrate the relevance of the notion of a social contract also for current day debates on the relationship between higher education and society, two examples from the emergence of the modern research-intensive university are presented in the following sections.

#### *The German Research University and Its Scientific Structure*

Many prominent historians (see, for example, Ben-David, 1964; Turner, 1971; Clark, 2006; Watson, 2010) have analysed the factors that led to the rise of the research university and the role of the German state, the professoriate, and developments in society in this process. Ben-David (1964, p. 467) suggests, for example, that:

At the beginning of the nineteenth century there was nowhere in Europe any widespread desire for the organisation of scientific research in general (...). The emergence in Germany of a network of university laboratories after 1825 could therefore only be the result of unintended social evolution. It was a result of the existence of a great number of universities and the rivalry of

their famous teachers and students for ascendancy within a large German-speaking area.

Turner (1972) and Watson (2010) point out how the active coalition of the state, part of the scientific elite, and later on, also industry, was changing the mission of the German university from a mercantilistic one to the universities being national symbols, “showplaces of Prussian intellect and the chief foci of German culture (...) Prussians patriotically contrasted their universities to the French system of schools and academies which had rejected the university model. As national showplaces the universities required scholars of European reputation, not teachers or bureaucratic favorites” (Turner, 1971, p. 173). In the emergence of the modern research university the establishment of the new Berlin University in 1806 formed an important turning point. This university incorporated both the scientific innovations developed at other German universities (see below) as well as the new state vision on the role of the university in society as expressed by von Humboldt (Nybom, 2007). As indicated by Rüegg (2004, p. 5) Wilhelm von Humboldt persuaded “the King of Prussia, who favoured the French model” to found a university on the basis of a new, specific German university model. The essence of this German university model was not to transfer “directly usable knowledge such as schools and colleges did, but rather to demonstrate how this knowledge is discovered.”

An important factor allowing for this transformation and the introduction of a new scientific method, providing a new foundation for producing and handling knowledge, was formed by a radical shift in the nature of the professoriate through altered appointment regulations, moving the authority from the university to the discipline and the state:

(...) the state’s new control of professorial appointments acted as an important stimulus to the rise of the new professors. It became the specific institutional mechanism through which the new scholarly values induced partly by ideological and competitive pressures came so quickly to dominate the universities. (...) These scholarly values introduced and sustained the dualistic professorial role in Prussia and with it the emergence of the Prussian university as a center of research. (Turner, 1972, p. 182)

The development of the German scientific method started in the humanities, especially history and philology, somewhat later (after 1825-1830) followed by philosophy. The latter allowed for an emergence of natural science within the German research universities using the “pure science” approach of the humanities, thereby distancing itself from a utilitarian approach that was developed and used in independent institutes and academies of science, which at that time was called “bread study” (*Brotstudium*) (Turner, 1972, p. 152).

A crucial role in this was played by two universities, i.e. Halle and Göttingen. The latter university, for example, was the “first to restrict the traditional theological faculty’s traditional right of censorship” (Watson, 2010, p. 51). This censorship right had allowed for a religious control over all academic textbooks to be used at European universities. Göttingen’s decision marked the beginning of

academic freedom being an essential feature of the scientific approach developed in the German university system. Important elements of this approach were *Wissenschaft*, *Bildung* and *Kritik*. Especially the latter (*Kritik*) was of crucial relevance since it allowed for a critical method that was central in the development of the *seminar* as one of the main scientific innovations of the German research university. According to Watson (2010, p. 52) the seminar “led to the modern concept of research, to the modern PhD, to the academic and scientific disciplines or subjects, and to the modern organisation of universities into “departments,” divided equally between teaching and research.”

In Germany next to the research universities new technical schools (*Technische Hochschulen*) were established that increased in economic importance after 1850. They contributed in many ways to the technological and other innovations that formed the basis for the economic growth of Germany in the period until the First World War (McClelland, 1980). However, during the entire 19<sup>th</sup> century their status and organisational structure remained different from the traditional universities. For example, only after a long period of opposition from the traditional universities did the *Technische Hochschulen* in 1899 get the right to elect deans and rectors instead of having them imposed by their Ministries (Gerbod, 2004, p. 120). The integration of these institutions in the university sector implied that the separate scientific mission, the research universities in basic research and the *Technische Hochschulen* in technological transfer to industry, gradually blurred. Strikingly, in the first round of the recent governmental Excellence Initiative, two of the three universities that were most successful in applying for a special status as top research universities were former *Technische Hochschulen*, illustrating both how complete the integration of universities and *Technische Hochschulen* has been and how the technological fields have become part of the scientific forefront. In addition, it shows that the university’s role in the “social contract” between the university and society in Germany is, in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, built around these two components: basic and technology oriented research and transfer. An important scientific role is played in Germany by non-university research institutes, of which the Max Planck Institute is the most prominent one. In a 2006 ranking of non-university research institutions by the Times Higher Education Supplement, the Max Planck Institute was positioned at the first place in the world for basic research, and as the third most important institution in technology research.

#### *The Land-Grant Universities*

While in Europe the university became an essential part of the state structure, in the USA the initial efforts to include the university in the emerging new federal structure as well as the US state structures were less successful (Trow, 2003, p. 17). The consequence was that throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a decentralised US university system was more autonomous and more market driven than its European counterparts. However, this was a conditional autonomy since the US states clearly expected their universities to serve the general public. As a reaction to the refusal

of the classical private and public universities of that time to provide the education and research in areas of immediate relevance to the US states, the Morrill Act, or “Land-Grant Act,” was accepted in 1862. It radically altered US higher education by establishing land-grant institutions or programmes in every US state. These were expected to be “allies of their state governments in furthering the economy, health and cultural life” (Moose, 1981, p. 8; see also Nevins, 1962).

The Morrill Act stimulated the establishment of US state universities that differed fundamentally from the classical universities in at least three ways, that is, their disciplinary basis, their teaching styles, and their accessibility. As a consequence of the act, study programs in new areas were Land-Grant established, such as agriculture, engineering, business, forestry, architecture, education, and mining. The act also brought an element of professional training to the US campuses through the introduction of discussion classes, experiments, field trips, and laboratories, as well as through the emphasis on English as the language of instruction, instead of Latin and Greek. Finally, it opened up higher education to non-traditional students. An important consequence of the “Land-Grant Act” was that from 1862 on, the states could use a large number of their universities for the implementation of specific political agendas and the realisation of priorities that had to do with their economic, agricultural, medical, and cultural development. The act brought science and engineering into the university leading to major improvements and modernisations in agricultural and industrial production, sanitation, water supply, and transportation (Moose, 1981, pp. 5-8). The effect of the act on the institutional landscape of US higher education after 1862 was rather diverse since around half of the states established their land-grant universities separate from their state universities. In these states, the classical state universities were preserved as centres for the study of classics and humanities, while the land-grant universities became a second layer of more professionally and practically oriented universities. In other US states the land-grant idea was integrated into the existing public universities, leading to the first comprehensive universities that combined “classical” with more applied disciplines and fields.

The impact of the Land-Grant universities on society was to a large extent the result of the organised transfer of knowledge, especially to the agricultural sector and the major urban areas. For example, agricultural production in the USA grew dramatically towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, mainly as a result of the work of transfer agencies and officers that went to the farmers, and informed them about and helped them in using the latest developments in the agricultural science schools of the new universities. Equally important were the innovations that improved the living conditions in the major US urban areas considerably; for example, the introduction of streetlights and sewer systems were a result of the applied research work at Land-Grant universities (Moose, 1981). What is important in this is that the success of the Land-Grant universities did not threaten the existence of the traditional classical universities, or the position of the classical fields at the comprehensive universities. In the university’s social contract emerging in the USA during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, both were important institutions,



each playing a specific role in the production and transfer of technology and knowledge to society.

*Post-1945 Science Pact in the USA*

The Second World War (WW II) marked a change in the then world order, not only politically and economically, but also in the world of higher education and science. Until 1933 the German speaking countries in Europe had dominated the scientific world as can, for example, be illustrated by the fact that German (-language) scientists had been awarded more Nobel prizes until 1933 than US and British scientists together (Watson, 2010). The victory of the allied forces created the circumstances for the emergence of the USA as a global leader and role model in science and university education. The role science – in the sense of basic research conducted by university professors – had played in the victory of the allied forces led in the USA to a strong belief in the need to rely on science for socio-economic progress, also after 1945. Strikingly, it was decided that the core of the publicly funded research activities should take place in US universities. This policy decision has played a very important role in lifting “scientific research in the United States to the highest standards on the globe” (Likins & Teich, 1994, p. 178). However, the US science system did not introduce a new structure or basic organisation of scientific activity. Instead, it followed and further developed the independent basic structure of scientific activity emerging in Germany roughly 150 years earlier (Turner, 1971; Watson, 2010).

In addition, in order to prevent the confusion and turbulence with respect to benefits for returning veterans that characterised the USA in the period after the first World War (Ortiz, 2009), in 1944, the so-called GI Bill of Rights became Law in the USA and provided, amongst other things, university or vocational education for returning WWII veterans. The GI Bill was very successful in the sense that by 1956 in total 7.8 million returning WWII veterans had participated in an education or training programme with support, including tuition fee waivers, through the Bill. As such, the Bill formed the major driving force behind the massification of US higher education. For each subsequent war in which the USA participated a new version of the GI Bill was accepted, the latest in 2010.

The relationship between higher education and society emerging after the end of WWII – with a central role for research-intensive universities – can be regarded as a “social contract” that was based on mutual trust, and was not written down. The basic research part of this social contract has been characterised as “government promises to fund the basic science that peer reviewers find most worthy of support, and scientists promise that the research will be performed well and honestly and will provide a steady stream of discoveries that can be translated into new products, medicine, or weapons” (Guston & Keniston, 1994, p. 2). It was largely based on Vannevar Bush’s points of view, especially his presidential report “Science, the endless frontier” from 1945. In this report Bush wrote that basic research was “the pacemaker of technological progress.” He further stated that “new products and new processes do not appear full-grown. They are founded on

new principles and new conceptions, which in turn are painstakingly developed by research in the purest realms of science!” He recommended the creation of what would eventually in 1950 become the National Science Foundation (NSF).

At the end of the 1950s the situation with respect to the university’s social contract was the following. The USA had between 15 and 20 research universities that received the bulk of the federal research funds, and a large number of public state universities that received up to 80% of their budget in the form of a basic grant from their state authorities. At that time, tuition fees income represented 10-15% of the public university budget. The massification of US higher education really began to take off then, while the number of state universities with the ambitions to develop into a national research university was also growing. This was the time of important technological breakthroughs, contributing, for example, to the first moon landing and the development of the first personal computer, accompanied by increasing public expenditure on basic research. Of direct relevance for the current debates on higher education’s social contract is the fact that the discoveries that nourished the technological breakthrough were all made in publicly funded basic science at US universities. Venture capital or private firms did not play any role in these discoveries (Mazzucato, 2013, p. 57).

From the early 1960s on, the funding model underlying higher education’s social contract changed dramatically, as a consequence of the growing controversies with respect to the unconditional<sup>3</sup> funding approach underlying the social contract relationship. As discussed, for example by Feller (2000), this represented a shift from a public goods model to an exchange relationship model in the funding of US public research universities. In a public goods model all benefits are assumed to be public, justifying the unconditional public investments in the universities. The exchange relationship model on the other hand assumes that public investments in universities produce not only public benefits, but also institutional and individual private benefits. The latter model presents the rationale for the shift from unconditional public funding to the introduction of matching fund requirements for public investments in science, and (high) private “cost-sharing” investments in the form of tuition fees. This development is accompanied in some US states by the introduction of multi-year contracts between state authorities and public universities, as well as by a shift from basic “capacity maintenance and building” funding to “capacity utilisation and purchase of services” funding (see [Figure 1](#)). This shift implied a move away from public investments in the form of large block grants for maintaining and building the basic capacity of the main public research universities, to a public funding model that consisted of a small and further decreasing basic grant for capacity maintenance and building, combined with public authorities buying services (including research) from the research universities, through targeted and performance funding.

A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR HIGHER EDUCATION?

POLICY OBJECTIVES	POLICY FOCUS	
	Institutions	Students
Capacity Maintenance and Building	Base Appropriation	Base Tuition Need-Based Student Financial Aid
Capacity Utilisation/ Purchase of Service	Targeted Funding Performance Funding	Outcome-Related Aid Merit Aid

Source: Adapted from Jones (2003, p.13).

Figure 1. US State financing of higher education – The policy options

A major worry with respect to this development is that the move to “buying services” in the public funding policy will in the medium and long turn weaken the maintenance and building capacity of US public higher education institutions, especially those institutions that have no possibility to compensate for this development through (further) increasing their tuition fees, through finding other sources of income, or through using their endowments.

Another element to take into account is the development towards the high level of matching funds required for universities to receive research funds from the National Science Foundation (NSF) (Feller, 2000). The relationship between individual institutions and the NSF in research funding can therefore be regarded as having developed into a contract relationship where both partners invest in a project that is expected to be of benefit to society at large, as well as the institution in question.

Guston (2000) has discussed this changing relationship from the perspective of the principles underlying science policy. He argues that the “social contract” for science should be retired, to be replaced by a new principle underlying science policy, at least in the USA since the early 1980s, that is, “collaborative assurance.” This principle refers to the same shift in the science-society relationship as the shift discussed by Feller and others for the higher education-society governance relationship.

Overall when it comes to the governance (or steering) relationship between state authorities and public higher education institutions in the USA there is a clear trend which consists of the following elements:

- Institutional autonomy is increased and institutional leadership and management have become more professional and flexible.

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- The role of the state higher education agency is realigned to de-emphasise regulation and procedural controls and emphasise strategic policy leadership, strategic resource allocation, and public accountability.
- A multi-year “public agenda” is set forth linking higher education to efforts to raise the education attainment of the state’s population and improve the state’s economy and quality of life.
- Especially in smaller US states multi-year agreements (contracts or “compacts”) are established between the state and public universities with explicit performance and accountability requirements (McGuinness, 2005).

Finally, it is of relevance to point to the expectation of state authorities that their main public flagship universities in the framework of the traditional social contract understanding contribute on a voluntary basis to a more equitable and prosperous development of their states (Douglas, 2007). This contribution takes places through, for example, community volunteering activities, student service learning, and faculty engaged scholarship.

#### *The Post-1945 Science Pact in Europe*

In Europe the relationship between society and the university/science after 1945 has been a national responsibility, and the supranational (the European level) component has only been developed from the 1980s on.<sup>4</sup> In most European countries national resources had to be used in the late 1940s and 1950s to rebuild the national infrastructure, and therefore national governments were initially not able to invest large amounts of public funding unconditionally in science functions of their national universities. In addition, the distribution of research funds through national research councils implied that in the first decades after 1945, there was no European level competition between researchers for funds. The consequence of this was that in each European country a large number of research universities were funded as such, without a process through which European level top universities could emerge, or national diversity of universities was stimulated.

Another important component of the European science landscape after 1945 was that in a number of countries a large part of the publicly funded basic research was conducted in a system of independent research institutes outside the research university sector. This applies to France and Germany in Western Europe, Italy and Spain in Southern Europe, and all Central and Eastern European countries. Recently, reform initiatives have been introduced in some of these countries to strengthen the position of the research-intensive university. Examples are the Danish reforms of the 2000s (Christensen, Gornitzka, & Maassen, 2014), the German Excellence Initiative (Kehm, 2013), and the Polish university reforms (Kwiek & Maassen, 2012).

At the European level there is currently an executive capacity in the area of research first and foremost in the structure of the Commission portfolios and administrative Directorates General (DGs), which include a DG for research policy. However, capacity building at the supranational level was not supported by a common norm and did not happen overnight or without controversy. The issue

was not only whether to develop a European level involvement or not, but what kind of involvement this should be: supranational versus intergovernmental, science policy as an instrument for industrial policy or as a domain of its own, and which research sectors to prioritise. Hence both the vertical and horizontal principles for how to organise executive capacity in this area were at stake.

The most important development in European Union (EU) research policy instrumentation came in the early 1980s with the introduction of the multi-year Framework Programmes (FP). With the introduction of the FP supranational capacity for policy development expanded. The FP structure grew and gradually encompassed a complex web of organisations aimed at supporting the development and implementation of the consecutive programmes. In this FP development, DG XII (research)<sup>5</sup> was at the heart of the decision making and implementing machinery at the supranational level, totalling more than 1,000 officers (Spence & Edwards, 2006) by the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. DG Research took a leading role in science policy-making, and developed strong relationships to a growing number of international research actors, such as academic associations or interest-based organisations, whose establishment peaked in the 1990s (Beerens, 2008). What is important to notice here is that until the start of the 7<sup>th</sup> Framework programme in 2007, the FPs were formally only allowed to fund “applied research,” since funding basic research was seen as the responsibility of the national level.

The developments at the European level since the 2000s are somewhat paradoxical (Maassen & Stensaker, 2011). Many events at the European level in the 2000s have intensified the political rhetoric of the knowledge economy. Universities and colleges are increasingly seen as a kind of “transversal problem-solver,” implying that it does not matter much which socio-economic problem or “grand challenge” is identified in national and supranational policy arenas: higher education is expected to contribute to the better understanding of and solutions to the solving of the problem.

The attention attached to “knowledge policy” areas is unprecedented in the history of the EU. In the framework of the Lisbon strategy, the heads of state in the European Council had research and innovation repeatedly on their agenda. Attention to Europe’s innovative capacity, economic and scientific competitiveness, and universities seems to have been at an all-time high, especially in the mid-2000s. For instance, the Commission President, Barroso, got personally involved in proposing new initiatives, such as the establishment of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) (Gornitzka & Metz, 2011). In addition, after a long and intensive process the member states agreed to include in the 7<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme (FP7) for the first time a basic research part in the form of the European Research Council (ERC). The EIT, the ERC and the “Grand Challenges” each represent a separate pillar under the current “science pact” in Europe: the ERC represents the “scientific excellence” frontier research pillar, the EIT represents the innovation and industry oriented pillar, and the Grand Challenges represent the pillar that links science to the solving of the main problems societies face.<sup>6</sup>

The differences between the USA and Europe in the governance and funding of higher education that have their roots in the situation at the end of WWII, continue to play a role, also at the moment, and are of relevance for understanding the US-European differences and similarities in the governance relationship between state/national authorities and higher education systems and institutions. The main difference is, as indicated above, the balance between basic funding, tuition fees, and other external income. This is related to the fact that in the USA more than in continental Europe, the exchange relationship model has replaced the public goods model as the underlying model for the state-higher education governance and funding relationship. In all European countries, with the exception of the UK, still between 50% and 90% of the income of the higher education institutions comes in the form of a basic government grant. Compared to the USA the level of tuition fees charged in continental European universities and colleges is low, if a tuition fee is charged at all. Also the level of non-tuition fee external competitive income of most European higher education institutions is low compared to the budgetary situation of US universities and colleges.

Given that the notion of a “university/science pact” is strongly related to its budgetary situation, the consequence of the funding changes for public US higher education institutions – and especially flagship universities – is that the post-WWII mutual trust situation, with an unconditional public funding foundation, has been replaced by a multiple-contract relationship with various stakeholders. This concerns formal and informal contracts and agreements with state authorities, with high-tuition fee paying students (“students as customers”), formal contract relationships with private and public sector agencies, the continuation of community services undertaken by university staff, and a cost-sharing contract relationship between research-intensive universities and the NSF.

In continental Europe, national authorities are still responsible for the largest part of the income of their public higher education institutions and research institutions. As a consequence, these authorities are looking for ways to link universities and research institutions more directly to the needs of society and industry. This does not always happen through stimulating direct contacts or contracts with the main actors in the universities’ environments, but often through bilateral contracts or agreements between state (through the Ministry of Education and Science) and individual universities. In these contracts/agreements in general institutional interests as well as public interests are addressed, based on negotiations between institutional and ministerial/governmental representatives. Interested “third parties,” such as students, employers of university graduates, public and private sector “knowledge users,” and socio-economic interest groups, are in general not directly involved in the negotiations; their interests are represented by the ministerial representatives.

#### FINAL REFLECTIONS

In general terms, one can see important cross-country varieties in how a social contract for higher education traditionally has been defined, understood and

operationalised. This variation is also visible in the ways in which nationally and regionally current debates around the need to renew higher education's social contract take place. In some cases the traditional social contract has become more formal and has transformed into a more real, i.e. legal "contract." In these cases concerns can be raised whether the traditional and more social development oriented focus still has place in these contracts. Much of the discussion seems to be as if the old and new are two worlds apart and nothing is in between. However, a more relevant aim of the current debates would be to adjust the governance relationship between higher education and society to the realities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, without the foundation under this relationship turning into a strict business contract. A shift towards more formalised contracts also makes them more short-term and less permanent than the traditional social contracts. Contractual agreements that are formalised are in most cases dependent on included targets, the achievement of which can be measured explicitly, not realising that some of the targets can have unforeseen financial or other consequences. This might lead to strategic behaviour at the time of contract negotiations, such as playing safe and trying to avoid any "risky" targets, or lead to measurement conflicts at the time of reporting. Another characteristic of the use of formal contracts or agreements, is that they can contain contradictory targets that the institutions are expected to handle effectively. For example, one can find institutional contracts that have the following targets included: increasing student enrolment, reducing drop-out rates, and improving the quality of education. And these targets have to be realised without additional funding! Finally, another challenge concerning formal contract governance approaches in higher education, is that after the first round the negotiations about and implementations of the institutional contracts can turn into routine processes that have gotten a life of their own with only a limited number of Ministry and institutional staff being involved, and without any identifiable impact anymore on the operations of the higher education institutions included.

The traditional thinking underlying social contracts was not only in terms of measurable effects. We might be facing some issues if the dominant discourse indeed becomes "less thought, more action." One could perhaps further argue that this can also mark a refocus from logic of appropriateness guiding behaviour towards logic of consequence.

University reforms can be seen as part of a continuous struggle at several levels of governance for a place in the larger institutional order (Laffan, 1999; Olsen, 2009). This chapter has discussed some overarching trends in reforming the governance of the higher education sector from the perspective of higher education's social contract. Yet, much remains in identifying how governments perceive shifts in the balance between systemic concerns for order and control, and individual institutional autonomy. Research on structural changes in intra-institutional higher education governance has only started to unpack how these structural changes are absorbed by existing cultures, practices and institutional identities. The same goes for how we can identify and give theoretically underpinned accounts for variations in reform impact between systems, individual institutions and between different subject matters.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The chapter is produced as part of the ongoing work in two research council funded projects, that is, the HORIZON, and the FLAGSHIP projects, at the Department of Education, Faculty of Educational Sciences, University of Oslo, see: <http://www.uv.uio.no/english/research/groups/heik/>.
- <sup>2</sup> See: [www.unesco.org/science/wcs/abstracts/II\\_5\\_social.htm](http://www.unesco.org/science/wcs/abstracts/II_5_social.htm)
- <sup>3</sup> Unconditional here not meaning that all universities were guaranteed an NSF income, since NSF funds were divided through intense competition between universities. What it refers to is the fact that those universities that had been selected through competitive procedures for NSF funding did not have to do anything in return other than do the research for which they had received funding.
- <sup>4</sup> For a discussion of the emergence of science policy as an area of EU competency, see Gornitzka (2012).
- <sup>5</sup> After the Commission's reorganisation and renaming of DGs in 1999, DG XII was renamed DG for Research and Technological Development (for short DG RTD or DG Research). In 2010 this DG took over the innovation portfolio and was renamed DG for Research and Innovation (see below). This chapter predominantly refers to this DG as DG Research.
- <sup>6</sup> This is clearly visible in the organisation of HORIZON 2020 (see: <http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/>).

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## 4. HIGHER EDUCATION AND PUBLIC GOOD

*A Global Study*

### INTRODUCTION

Discussion about the purposes and benefits of higher education has been stymied by a particular construction of the relation between private and public benefits that now leads in policy circles and public debate. In this reading of higher education, the private and public benefits are rhetorically juxtaposed on a zero sum basis, while the individual benefits of higher education are defined as solely private and in solely economic terms. In liberal Western societies, in which limiting the role of the state is seen as the central problem of politics, and individual freedoms are positioned as outside both state and society, the collective conditions (“social benefits”) provided by higher education are readily seen as exclusive of the individual benefits. At the same time these collective benefits remain shadowy, under-defined or undefined altogether.

What is the basis of “public goods”? How do we maintain and reproduce our sociability, the collective human environment essential to our existence? The neo-liberal hegemony in policy, which models erstwhile public activities in terms of economic markets and business logics, and also the ubiquitous cultural emphases on autarkic individual self-realisation and competitiveness, have created new questions about the sustainability of social relations. We are constantly aware of the conditions of society, on a daily basis. Yet we know very little about public goods, or “the public good,” in terms that can be recognised by social science.

Although it is evident that higher education does not function in the manner of a capitalist market, and arguably can never so function (Marginson, 2012b), methodological individualism, business models and market ideology have together blocked recognition of the public good or goods in higher education. How can we grasp the public good comprehensively? How do we move beyond a solely economic understanding of public goods without setting aside notions of production? How do we measure public goods, while satisfying both inclusion and rigour? How common are public goods between social sites and across national borders? How can we enhance the incidence and value of public goods? Which institutions contribute to public goods and how? How does higher education as a whole contribute? Under what conditions? Arguably, empirical social research, policy-focused inquiry, and conceptual development concerning the public functions of higher education institutions (HEIs), are important both in their own right and as a way into the larger problem of public goods in all social sectors.

HEIs are among the main social and economic institutions of advanced societies. They educate people in social skills and attributes on a large scale. They reproduce occupations, they provide structured opportunity and social mobility, they create and distribute codified knowledge, and they carry a heavy and growing traffic in cross-border relations. While there is no general theory of higher education, it is clear that many of the goods produced by HEIs are not captured as benefits for individual students or companies but are consumed jointly. They are collective in nature. For example, HEIs contribute to government, innovation capacity, and the formation and reproduction of both knowledge and relational human society. The public outcomes of higher education include these collective outcomes. The public outcomes also include certain individual goods associated with public collective benefits, such as the formation, in individual students, of social and intellectual capabilities basic to social literacy, scientific literacy, effective citizenship and economic competence. These individual capabilities are not associated with measured private benefits. Higher education has a special and multiple importance as a producer of public goods.

HEIs also produce private goods for students and industry; that is, rivalrous and excludable benefits distributed on a zero-sum basis, such as the social status of graduates, earnings attributable to higher education, and income generated by intellectual property originating from university research. This does not negate their role on producing public goods. Yet higher education is under some pressure to focus primarily or exclusively on individualisable economic benefits. What happens to sociability when the pendulum swings more towards private goods? We need to better understand the collective costs entailed in this reduction.

To break open the problem of the public contribution of HEIs and systems, it is necessary to investigate relations between the state, society and university. The nation-building role is central to the evolution of the modern university (Scott, 2011). However, state/ society/ university relations vary across the world, as do conceptions and practices of public goods.

Given that in liberal Western societies – especially English-speaking societies – understandings of the public good(s) created by higher education have become ideologically “frozen,” so that the public good can scarcely be identified, it may be helpful to look beyond the liberal Western jurisdictions for fresh insights and possible conceptual frameworks. Arguably, an inquiry into higher education and public good that is pursued on a comparative basis can enable us to more deeply explore generic dynamics of the collective in higher education. Notions of the role of government and of universities, of the “social,” the “community,” individual and collective, and public good, vary considerably between different traditions of higher education, for example the Nordic, German, Russian, Latin American and Chinese traditions as well as those in the United States and the Westminster countries. Meanings of “higher education,” “society,” “state,” “government,” “public” and “private” are not uniform or fixed, but nationally and culturally nested (Enders & Jongbloed, 2007). There is no good reason to treat the Anglo-American approach to public/private as the sum of all possibility. Arguably any of the differing national/cultural traditions have the potential to contribute to the common

pool of ideas about, and practices of, the social and collective aspects of human existence – including the public dimension of higher education and strategies for augmenting it. By comparing the different approaches to “public good” in higher education that have evolved across the world, generic elements can be identified, and a common language of public good developed. This move can also make it possible to establish a broad-based notion of specifically global public goods.

Within the broad scale variations between the differing national/cultural traditions, there are differences within national systems in the activities of individual HEIs. Public goods in higher education and research have a local dimension, a national dimension, in some locations a regional dimension, and also a global dimension whereby “global public goods” (Kaul et al., 1999) are produced and distributed. National systems, and HEIs, vary in the extent to which they are globally active. At the same time there are growing elements in common between HEIs, especially research-intensive universities, amid global and regional convergence in knowledge, HEIs and state practices. Given the centrality of HEIs in contemporary societies – and the importance of questions of “public” across the world – by identifying the shared “public” elements in higher education, it may be that we can better understand what nations, and human societies, have in common. This understanding can contribute to the evolution of global society.

Nevertheless, inquiry into public goods presents significant methodological challenges because of the nature of those goods: complex, difficult to measure, globally variant. Collective benefits are a frontier problem in social research. It must be said that we lack firm, consistent definitions, modes of observation, and pathways to measuring public goods in higher education. No single disciplinary framework has been adequate. Applied policy economics, the principle discipline of government, has been unable to adequately capture those goods. Many existing concepts of public goods are solely normative. Evidence-based methods and means of measurement are under-developed. In short, we need stronger concepts and analytical tools. To investigate concepts and tools we need to begin by locating higher education as a social sector (see next section of the chapter).

#### *The Conceptual Basis for an Empirical Study*

The remainder of this chapter outlines the conceptual basis for an empirical study of higher education and public good(s), using a globally-defined comparison that takes into account both differences between national systems, and global public goods. The ultimate objective of this empirical study is the development of a common generic language and analytical system for observing, judging and where possible measuring public good(s) in higher education. To understand the commonalities, it is first necessary to grasp the specificities and the patterns of similarities, divergences.

The empirical study is currently underway. At the time of writing, case studies had been completed in two national systems of higher education, with six more planned. The Appendix to the chapter provides more details.

## HIGHER EDUCATION AS A SOCIAL SECTOR

Higher education institutions, especially large research universities, are major concentrations of political, social, economic, intellectual and communicative resources. They reach freely across populations and cultures and connect “thickly” to government, professions, industry and the arts. Their functions centre on the creation, codification and transmission of knowledge, and certification of graduates. The potential of higher education is larger than it is suggested by the model of university as self-serving firm current in policy discourse in the English-speaking countries. The social meanings of HEIs derive from their many connections with other social sectors and their continuing direct and indirect effects in many people’s lives.

More global forms of higher education are now gathering momentum: a fast growing informal sub-sector on the Internet led by Mass Online Open Courseware (MOOC) programmes produced by the leading American universities, formal cross-border distance learning, and university branches outside the parent country. Nevertheless, higher education still largely takes the form of institutions physically located in, and closely engaged in, nations (and regions) and cities. At the same time HEIs are visible and connected to each other in the global environment, and subject to continuous comparison and rank-ordering. University ranking has normalising effects (Hazelkorn, 2011) generating convergence on the Americanised model of “Global Research University” (Ma, 2008) inherent in ranking systems. HEIs also operate in an open information setting, with multiple potentials for collaboration, in which national borders are routinely crossed, and identities are continually made and self-made in encounters with diverse others.

*A Worldwide Assemblage*

Recognising the interplay of all of the local, national and global forms, agencies and practices, we can imagine higher education as a single world-wide arrangement: not as a unitary global system but as a complex combination of, or worldwide assemblage of, (i) global flows of words, ideas, knowledge, finance, and inter-HEI dealings, with (ii) national higher education systems led by governments and shaped by history, law, policy and funding, and (iii) single HEIs themselves operating locally, nationally and globally (Marginson, 2006).

This worldwide arrangement is imperfectly integrated. There are uneven and changing patterns of engagement and communication, zones of autonomy and separation, stable and unstable hierarchies. Relations are structured by both cooperation and competition. There are fecund mutual influences, doggedly persistent differences, and surprising similarities of approach across borders. This bounded, complex, hierarchical, fragmented, contested, product-making, subject-forming, continually transforming world-wide setting of higher education – with its rules, discourses and exchanges that are on the one hand specialized to higher education, and on the other hand draw on more universal habits of government, business and civil society – recalls Bourdieu’s (1993) notion of a “field of power.”

Despite their globalised character (King et al., 2011) and various traditions of autonomy and academic freedom, mainstream HEIs are above all creatures of society-building and nation-building by states (Scott, 2011), and in Europe, creatures of the Europeanisation project. This is true in relation to all public HEIs, many private HEIs – in most nations private HEIs are closely regulated, except for online institutions – and also in relation to HEIs’ global activities. Through higher education, states provide comprehensive social opportunity and vocational training, reaching well over half the school leavers in some countries, and sustain basic research and research training. HEIs are often central to development in sub-national regions (OECD, 2007). “Global competition states” (Cerny, 2007) model the nation-building role of HEIs in terms of national economy and prosperity. HEIs are expected to advance the global competitiveness of the nation by preparing and attracting knowledge-intensive labour, and fostering innovation.

State management of HEIs is not always made explicit. Increasingly, contemporary states achieve policy objectives not through direct provision but through the arms-length steering of actors in semi-government instrumentalities, universities, NGOs and the private sphere, by using codes, financial incentives and prohibitions (Rose, 1999). Further, the policy frameworks used by governments often model HEIs as economic units in a competitive market, and students as consumers (Marginson, 1997). New Public Management reform enhances the scope of HEI executives. In many nations, the government share of HEIs’ income is falling (OECD, 2012), a trend exacerbated in the post-2008 recession. Nevertheless, in the neo-liberal era, states have not reduced their hold on higher education. Nor has the broader public concern been withdrawn. State interest in the sector is enhanced by globalisation, the economics of innovation, and the growth of student participation. In all countries higher education is politicised and an object of economic and societal expectations. In many countries it is subject to extensive public debate. It is not the exclusive province of HEIs as economic producers, student as self-investors/consumers, and the employers of graduate labour as human capital, as the market model implies. It remains a common property.

Higher education departs from orthodox economic markets in another respect (Marginson, 1997, 2012b). Universities produce status goods (Hirsch, 1976; Frank & Cook, 1995), student places and certificates that are subject to absolute scarcity. Elite universities are not driven by profit maximisation or market share. They do not expand to meet all demand. The hierarchy of elite HEIs is stable over long periods, unlike producer hierarchies in other industries. Leading HEIs are more like core institutions of government, such as the legal system, than firms. Commercial training and mass education HEIs are more demand dependent and less stable.

#### *Universities and States: The Comparative Dimension*

In sum, research universities in all countries are best understood as semi-independent institutions tied to the state. The relationship with the state varies by type of HEI and also by the prevailing state formation and the associated political culture. The strongest research HEIs have the most organisational agency and most

scope for global engagement and partial disembedding in relation to the nation-state.

The relationship with the state also varies markedly by country. In East Asia, Russia and Latin America, the leading universities are publicly positioned as autonomous arms of government. Nevertheless, even in the USA, where higher education has long been defined as a market, federal programmes and regulation crucially shape that “market,” for example in relation to student loans, research funding, intellectual property, and “for-profit” HEIs (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). HEIs’ global strategies mostly harmonise with state policy.

While higher education everywhere is implicated in the projects of nation-states, these projects, and the ongoing relations between state and HEI, also vary significantly. As noted, relations between state/society/HEIs, including ideas and practices of the “public” mission, are shaped by long-term national and cultural traditions and also by differing hybridisations between longer traditions and global modernisation. It is known that across the world there is marked variation in private/public funding balances in higher education (OECD, 2012). The variations in notions of public good are less well understood. Within the global setting we can identify distinctive *meta-national regional* approaches to higher education, deriving from differing ideas of the social character of HEIs, the scope and responsibilities of government and family, and relations between family, state, professions, employers and HEIs. These regional variations are shaped by differences in the role of the state, and in political and educational cultures (Marginson, 2013). In English-speaking countries there are North American and Westminster systems. The role of national government is felt more directly in the UK, Australia and New Zealand than in the United States and Canada. Europe has sub-regional traditions like Nordic (Valimaa, 2011), Germanic and Francophone. There is Russian higher education (Smolentseva, 2003), Latin American (Marginson, 2012a), the Post-Confucian systems in East Asia and Singapore (Marginson, 2011), South Asia, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.

For example, when we compare the English-speaking systems and Post-Confucian systems, we find differences that are significant in relation to the public dimension of higher education. In the Anglo-American world and where the British colonial legacy is strong, Adam Smith’s limited liberal state prevails, with separations between government-market and government-civil society. Normative individualism problematises “collective” and “public.” State agendas are pursued in the language of deregulation; though at the same time, state subsidies are often used to buy the participation of poor families in tertiary education. Tensions on the state/non-state border dominate politics, the correspondingly question of university autonomy dominates the politics of higher education. In the Sinic East Asia, in both single-party and multi-party polities, a more comprehensive state prevails. This form of state is in direct lineage from the Qin and Han dynasties in China in the third century BC. In the Sinic world government and politics are typically dominant in relation to economy and civil society (Gernet, 1996). The state’s role in ordering society is less often questioned than it is in the West (Tu Wei-Ming, 1999, p. 2). Notions of social responsibility are more holistic than in English-



speaking systems (Zha, 2011a), and notions of the individual are inclusive, taking in the social Other. Nonetheless the endemic debate in Western universities, between higher education for instrumental economic purposes and higher education for moral formation and social enrichment, plays out also in East Asia (Bai, 2010; Xiong, 2011).

Sinic universities are openly part of the state, albeit with scope behind closed university doors for independent scholarship, debate and criticism of state practices. Confucian educational cultivation at home, and “one-chance” examinations that allocate social status via entry to high status universities, underpin near universal desires for education that extend even to very poor families. The state does not need to incentivise poor families to participate in tertiary education. The post-Confucian desire for education is universal. Post-Confucian takeoff in higher education and science (Marginson, 2013) is created not only through performance-focused state policy, state-financed infrastructure and international benchmarking, but by symbiosis between state and family. Yet while in East Asia comprehensive states are joined to high household funding and stratified systems, in Nordic countries the state provides equitable access to universal high quality public services, though the Nordic model is now under pressure (Valimaa, 2005). Compared to East Asia, and notwithstanding recent funding cuts, higher education in most English-speaking nations and all of Western Europe is more state dependent in the economic sense, while more autonomous from direct state ordering in the political sense.

The way to a generic analysis of higher education and public goods lies through nuanced exploration of national practices and regional cultural variations, enabling the identification of not only differences but also commonalities of approach. This requires an interdisciplinary method. A political economy framework tends to flatten out qualitative differences that are nested in cultural practices. But when national political economies are become parallel to each other at global level, the differing political and educational cultures around the world, with their associated behavioural practices, operate as mediums in which political economic practices and global trends become articulated or filtered in varied ways. This does not mean that a relativist cultural analysis replaces a generic political economy analysis. Arguably, both are needed. Together their analytical power is maximised.

#### CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS FOR IDENTIFYING PUBLIC GOODS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

The politicised nature of public outcomes in higher education, together with the difficulty of identifying public goods, especially on a comprehensive basis, tend to favour *a priori* normative approaches. Many statements by HEIs, HEI organizations and governments address the issue with rhetorical claims about the role of higher education in relation to productivity, knowledge, literacy, culture, local economies, social equality, graduate training in leadership, democracy, tolerance and global understanding – even to “civilisation” and “the future of humanity.” Such claims are rarely tested empirically. But notions of “public” with

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no grounding in empirically observable practices tell us nothing. The other problem lies in the use of narrow approaches. As noted, economics is the main discipline used for empirical investigation of public goods. Neo-classical economics employs analytical frameworks that privilege market transactions and use *a priori* ideas of “public” that exclude much of what HEIs do, especially collective goods.

There are three disciplinary approaches to the public outcomes of higher education, grounded in economics, political theory, and communications theory respectively. The public goods are modelled as a production, as a polity or part of a polity, and as a communicative network. No single approach on its own can provide a comprehensive theorisation. Arguably, however, all can contribute to the understanding of sociability.

### *Economics*

In economics, Samuelson (1954) provides an influential schema for distinguishing public and private goods. Public goods are defined not by ownership (state or non state) but by social character. Public goods are non-rivalrous and/or non-excludable. Goods are non-rivalrous when consumed by any number of people without being depleted, for example knowledge of a mathematical theorem, which everywhere sustains its use value indefinitely on the basis of free access. Goods are non-excludable when the benefits cannot be confined to individual buyers and are consumed collectively, such as national defence. Private goods are neither non-rivalrous nor non-excludable. Private goods can be produced and distributed as individualised commodities in economic markets. Public goods and part-public goods are unproduced or under-produced in markets. Ostrom (2010, p. 642) notes that this approach is consistent with the idea of an “institutional world” divided between “private property exchanges in a market setting and government-owned property organised by a public hierarchy.” Samuelson’s schema, while couched in generic terms, embodies the norms of one kind of society and polity. It applies best in Anglo-American nations in which the role of government is limited, private/public tend to be practised as zero-sum, and ideally, all production occurs in markets unless there is market failure. But the world is not as neatly divided as Samuelson suggests, and subsequent work in economics has rendered his public/private distinction more complex.

After Buchanan’s “club goods” (1965), Ostrom (2010) adds “toll goods” exclusive to part populations while non-rivalrous in the group, as in collegial relations in universities. Stiglitz (1999) reflects on the public good nature of knowledge, which affects both research and teaching. At first, new knowledge is confined to its creator and can provide exclusive first mover advantage as a private good. Once communicated knowledge is a classical public good that retains its value, no matter how often it is used. Across the world, regardless of public/private financing in other respects, basic research is subject to market failure and funded by states or philanthropy. Despite this, devices like journal pay-walls artificially prolong the excludability of texts or artefacts embodying particular

knowledge. Those who seek free access to university research assert the natural form. The OECD (2008) notes the potential for creativity in innovation, especially collaborative creativity, is maximised when knowledge flows freely and quickly. Other economists emphasise that intellectual property barriers provide incentives to creators. Economics produces one or another summation of public goods, depending on the political and technical assumptions in which the analysis is nested. In the economics of education, neo-liberals downplay the problem of market failure and the scope for collective goods, favouring markets and high tuition (e.g. Friedman, 1962); endogenous growth theorists tend to talk up the roles of public goods and public investment (e.g. Romer, 1990).

#### *Political Theory and Communications Theory*

One strand of political theory models the “public good” as comprehensive or universal, akin to an all-inclusive polity. A more precise concept, though difficult to operate empirically, is that of the “commons,” a shared resource that is utilised by all and not subject to scarcity (Mansbridge, 1998). Universal education systems may take this form but the stratification of HEIs on the basis of status or resources qualifies the notion. Another strand in political theory models higher education as a semi-independent adjunct to the state with a distinctive role as source of criticism and new ideas and options for state strategy. Calhoun (1992) and Pusser (2006) apply Habermas’s (1989) notion of the “public sphere” to the broad political role of higher education.

Habermas describes the public sphere in 18th century London as the field of discussion, debate and opinion in salons, coffee shops, counting houses and semi-government agencies where people met and opinions were formed and communicated on the matters of the day. Organisationally separate from the state while also focused on it, the public sphere provided it with critical reflexivity. Likewise, in American research universities, expert information and education help the public to reach considered opinions (Calhoun, 1992). Pusser (2006) models the university as a zone of reasoned argument and contending values. American higher education has been medium for successive political and socio-cultural transformations, such as 1960s civil rights. In China, leading national universities, especially Peking University, perform an analogous role inside the party-state, as a space of criticism that is continually connected to power within the framework of Sinic practices of constructive intellectual authority and responsibility (Yang, 2009; Hayhoe, 2011; Zha, 2011a). Because of its advanced capacity to form self-altering agents and engender critical intellectual reflexivities (Castoriadis, 1987, p. 372); and also because of the way it facilitates movement across boundaries; at times, in both East and West, higher education incubates advanced democratic formations. This suggests one test of a “public” university is the extent that it provides space for criticism, challenge and new kinds of public space.

Habermas’s public sphere also highlights the role of communication in constituting “public.” Some theorists define “public” as the network of organisations, public and private, constituting the common communicative space

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(for contrasting but potentially compatible ideas about the communicative public space see Castells, 2000; Cunningham, 2012; Drache, 2010). Here research universities are quintessentially “public” in their capacity. Early adopters of the Internet all over the world, they are intensively engaged in global, regional and local/national networks.

However defined, the public outcomes of higher education have three spatial dimensions. The national dimension encompasses sub-national regions like states/provinces, and cities. Knowledge about public goods in higher education mostly imagines HEIs as solely in a national system and defines their outcomes in national political terms. But HEIs also operate regionally and globally.

### *Global Public Goods*

The notion of global public goods, which emerged from United Nations Development Programme work on ecological sustainability and cross-border refugees, provides another conceptual framework, combining economic theory with an inclusive polity. Global public goods are “goods with a significant element of non-rivalry and/or non-excludability and broadly available across populations on a global scale. They affect more than one group of countries” (Kaul et al., 1999, pp. 2-3). Such goods are increasingly important in higher education, with its thick cross-border flows of knowledge and people, especially in research.

### THE EMPIRICAL TERRAIN

On the empirical terrain, many practices can be identified as “public” in whole or part. In almost all of the national higher education systems, regardless of political culture, the growth of student participation, and enhancement of social equity in participation, are seen as public goals (OECD, 2008) – though around the world, there is much variation in notions of “equity” and programmes designed to achieve it. Social equity is a keystone public good that conditions other public (and private) goods. Goods like social literacy and collective citizenship are maximised when there is universal access to good quality education. Three other public goods common to most systems, albeit difficult to monitor, are industry innovation via research; the “engagement” of HEIs (Gibbons, 1998) in servicing local populations, cities and sub-national-regions; and internationalisation via student and academic mobility and cross-border HEI collaboration (Knight, 2004). Despite much research on these and other outputs, no study is comprehensive.

McMahon (2009), in the economics of education, integrates other studies to summarise the private and public goods in terms of individualised benefits to students. The limitations of this method are that it downplays the collective benefits; it limits scrutiny to outcomes assigned prices or shadow prices, and reflects the conventions of North American higher education. McMahon finds the non-market benefits of higher education exceed the market-derived benefits. Private non-market benefits for individuals, like health and longevity for graduate and children, and better savings patterns, average USD \$38,020 per graduate per

year, 22 per cent more than the extra earnings benefits per graduate per year (\$31,174). The social (collective) benefits of higher education include its contribution to stable, cohesive and secure environments, more efficient labour markets, faster and wider diffusion of new knowledge, higher economic growth, viable social networks and civic institutions, cultural tolerance, and enhanced democracy. These direct non-market social benefits of higher education – externalities received by persons other than graduates, including future generations – average \$27,726 per graduate per year. McMahon notes the full externalities of HEIs also include indirect social benefits, the contribution of the direct social benefits to value generated in private earnings and private non-market benefits. Once this indirect element is included, externalities total 52 per cent of all benefits of higher education. McMahon argues that because externalities are subject to market failure, more than half the costs of higher education should be financed by persons other than the student (p. 2).

Yet tuition regimes are not primarily based on calculations of the value of externalities. The public/private balance of costs can vary sharply in higher education systems similar in other respects. In two thirds of the OECD countries, state-dependent institutions charge domestic students under USD \$1500 per year. In the five Nordic countries, the Czech Republic and Turkey, public students pay no fees. Tuition fees in English-speaking systems are relatively high: in the UK the norm is 9000 pounds per year. In Japan and Korea private outweighs public funding by three to one (OECD, 2012) and China may be heading towards this level. In Russia, free student places sit alongside low fee and high fee places. These variations reflect historical, cultural and political factors such as differing notions of citizen entitlements and household responsibilities. There appears to be little fit between the public/private balance of costs and the public/private balance of benefits. In high fee education, some public goods are financed by private tuition (e.g. formation of citizenship). In free systems governments fund the production of private goods (e.g. scarce places in sought after universities and programmes). This does not negate the potential for market failure in public goods. Rather it suggests that market failure is not linearly related to financing, and is likely to be socially and culturally nested.

Perhaps the empirical dimension of public goods in higher education that is most neglected is that of global public goods, which were first discussed by the present author (Marginson, 2007; Marginson & van der Wende, 2009). The concept has since entered policy discourse in several nations, including Singapore, South Korea, and the US (Sharma, 2011). Globalisation has enlarged the space for free “public” exchange (Peters et al., 2009). The considerable potential for global public goods is mostly under-recognised. Global public goods range from capacity building in developing nations to the inadvertent fostering of global cosmopolitanism in education export markets. Public research goods include not only inter-university collaboration on common problems like epidemic disease but all scholarly knowledge that crosses borders.

## POLICY PROBLEMS

The absence of an agreed nomenclature for classifying public outcomes, the lack of tools for monitoring and measurement in most areas, and the normatively-charged nature of the discussion, have generated policy lacunae in relation to the difficult problem of higher education and public goods. As noted, policy-makers take an approach that is too broad or too vague, so that the extant notions of public goods become meaningless; or an approach that is too narrow, using *a priori* economic methods solely focused on readily measured benefits. Both approaches disable policy. Either way, public goods cannot be effectively identified and regulated.

The narrow economic approach mostly understands the HEI outcomes as private earnings and rates of return. This policy bias is dominant in English-speaking countries. Over time it weakens the rationale for public planning and public funding, except in basic research, emptying out awareness of the public outcomes of teaching, except in relation to social equity and perhaps institutional engagement. Successive reductions in public subsidies are justified by pointing to measured private earnings (Dawkins, 1988; Browne, 2010; Norton, 2012). Anglo-American policy enjoys global influence in a wide range of other jurisdictions. Yet, arguably, the Anglo-American discussion of public goals in higher education has been unhelpful. As noted, concepts and policy mechanisms are largely frozen, reducing state purchase on the higher education sector. So long as private/public are treated as zero-sum and public goods seen as marginalised or diffuse, there appears little prospect of a forward move in conception, practice or measurement of public goods. There has been little effort to explore the measurement of public goods, except in relation to social inclusion and balance in student participation. Without conceptual and practical clarity on public goods in higher education, governments around the world find it relatively easy to make large-scale cuts to higher education budgets in recession (Eggins & West, 2010; Douglass, 2010; UNESCO Bangkok, 2012); and also to introduce large scale marketisation reforms as in the UK, where public subsidies for non-STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) teaching are now zero, without regard for the negative short-term or long-term effects on collective benefits.

Likewise, there is little awareness or clarification of global public goods in higher education. This is partly explained by the absence of a global state or regulatory framework. Because global public goods are under-recognised they are under-funded and probably under-produced. No one nation takes responsibility for them. No global protocols regulate equity in distribution. Yet global public goods raise issues of regulation and financing that should be considered. For example, when research in one nation generates benefits elsewhere, should the cost of research be shared between producer and consumer? What governance mechanisms could identify, regulate and finance global public goods in education and knowledge? (Kaul et al., 2003). Inversely, negative global externalities (“global public bads”) such as brain drain raise questions about cross-border compensation for countries losing their “brains.”

Recognition of global public goods also suggests the question of *whose* public goods. Each nation (and institution) has its own global projects and distinctive ideas of global good. Thus there are multiple – partly overlapping – global public goods. However the dominant ideas of global public goods are skewed towards the strong higher education nations (Naidoo, 2010). For example the use of English as a global language and the standardisation of science as a single system constitute global public goods to the extent that all institutions communicate and share a common system. Yet diversity of knowledge is another, often contrary, global public good. In nations with academic cultures in, say, Spanish, English-language, dominated globalisation can generate both public goods *and* “public bads.” The “bads” tend to be maximised when global relationships take a one-way imperial form, with all the influences flowing in one direction and the benefits flowing in the reverse direction; and tend to be minimised when there are broad two-way flows between national and global domains. The key is to identify, monitor and broaden the common global ground. The problem of “whose public goods,” and the contested nature of the identity of the global dimension of practice, highlight the value of comparative research conducted from more than one point of view.

#### MOVING FORWARD

How can we investigate higher education and public good(s) so as to advance concepts, empirical understanding and policy wisdom? In contrast to the normative and *a priori* conceptions that have hitherto dominated ideas about public goods in higher education, two moves are essential. First, it would seem best to adopt an empirical and cross-disciplinary inclusive method (here normative practices of “public” in higher education are among the objects of study rather than the horizon of inquiry). Second, this kind of work requires an adaptive theory approach (Layder, 1998). Using this method the starting notion of public goods is left partly open, to maximise inclusions from the higher education systems under study. Thus the notion of “public goods” is used to frame the project; it functions as an object of study during empirical research; and then, having been developed during the processes of research and data synthesis, a revised form of that starting notion – all going well, constituting a newly coherent generic definition of public goods in higher education – becomes the outcome of the inquiry.

#### *Starting Notion of Public Good*

What follows is more tentative than the preceding analysis and ultimately requires empirical test.

Rather than starting from a notion of public goods in higher education drawn from one discipline, it would seem best to begin by combining economics and sociology. Such a bi-disciplinary approach might draw on Samuelson’s (1954) distinction between public and private goods, his notion of rivalry and excludability as determinants, and the idea of public goods – including collective goods – as goods subject to market failure and dependent on governments or

philanthropy. Whether such public goods are consumed individually (e.g. productivity spillovers at work) or jointly, they require a policy, administrative or donor process. However, it would be unwise to adopt Samuelson's assumption, grounded in marginalist economic assumptions about scarcity, and implying that relations between public and private goods are zero-sum. Observation suggests that in higher education, as in other social sectors, public goods and private goods may be advanced at the same time, rather than the one necessarily excluding the other. Indeed, one may function as condition of the other; for example the education of students in elite HEIs may advance citizenship, or internationalisation. These potentials are open-ended. For these reasons, the public/private balance of funding cannot be read from the public/private balance of goods created. Nevertheless, the reverse causation partly applies. Funding is one (but only one) factor that determines whether the goods are public or private. For example, high student tuition charges enhance the private character of student places, as excludability is advanced thereby.

Samuelson's assumption that public goods are exhaustively defined by their natural or intrinsic characteristics also seems mistaken. Whether an activity is "public" or "private" is shaped not by whether markets are intrinsically possible – that would privilege markets as the norm of social organisation – but by social arrangements. The category of "public" can extend beyond residual goods, subject to market failure. If there is no hierarchy between HEIs and if student places are universally accessible, the "public" element is enhanced. Hence both teaching and research can be more or less rivalrous and/or excludable in character. Research, when first created and when subject to property arrangements, can be exclusive. Otherwise it is public. The knowledge contents of teaching are mostly non-excludable and non-rivalrous. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Harvard and Stanford provide free access to MOOC (Massive Open Online Courses) units on the Internet, without impairing the private value of their face-to-face Ivy League degrees. Degree programmes entail more than knowledge. Places in MIT, Harvard or Stanford provide scarce valuable private goods, constituting zero-sum social positions and access to elite networks. This enables high fees. Teaching programmes are mixed, variable and ambiguous, embodying a wide range of combinations of public and private goods.

### *Measurability*

One key question is the measurability of public goods in higher education. To conduct empirical research it is necessary to make provisional decisions on this; yet conclusive decisions about measurability require research. In the face of this circularity the issue must be kept partly open.

Keynes remarks in his *Treatise on Probability* (1921) that qualities apprehended by social science can be divided into three categories: those open to measurement and computation, those to which a precise number cannot be assigned that are nevertheless capable of rank ordering (more/less, better/worse), and those that can be apprehended only in the exercise of expert judgment. All three categories are



relevant. Quantification provides states and HEIs with more direct purchase on the problem. Nevertheless, given the overlapping and multiple nature of the public goods, and the fact only some can be measured or even ordered (all such computations are only partial in their reach across the material domain), when apprehending public goods there is considerable need for expert judgement.

#### *Globalised Comparative Methods*

The transformative (and problematic) impact of global university rankings (Hazelkorn, 2011) shows the growing weight of the global dimension. However, orthodox comparative education cannot simultaneously comprehend both global and national elements. The orthodox method compares bounded national systems using templates grounded in the home country, most often the United States. This tends to downplay global elements and systems such as policy borrowing, people mobility and cross-border science, though these elements have a strong presence in both public and private goods. The part-global integration of higher education and knowledge, and the emergence of a more plural higher education world, in which the European Higher Education Area and the East Asian systems have larger roles – reducing Anglo-American dominance – highlights the limits of this approach (Marginson & Mollis, 2001). This suggests we need an alternate *relational* method (Marginson, 2008; 2010a) that (a) envisages worldwide higher education as a unified field of heterogeneous organisations, national systems and cross-border agencies, including all relations inside, between or across nations; (b) combines the global, national and local dimensions of action (Marginson & Rhoades, 2002) while acknowledging pan-national regions (Dale & Robertson, 2009) and scales of subject-relations; and (c) engages concepts, values and practices from higher education traditions other than the Anglo-American, like the French, German, Nordic, Latin American, Japanese, and Chinese.

Here the guiding meta-assumption is that the route to common understanding lies through national case studies that foreground diversity. Using this method, the generic language about public goods, devised after empirical investigation in contrasting sites, will be site-sensitive and inclusive of the major systems and traditions, not grounded in only one (Zha, 2011b).

In a 2008-2011 study of Asia Pacific universities for the Australian Research Council, the author distinguished global and national effects, focused on relations between them, and separated elements common to the universities in the study from context specific elements. This approach can be extended to identify definitions and practices of national public goods in higher education, through case studies that investigate contrasting national systems; distinguish that which is common to national public goods across the different systems from that which is nation-context bound; interpret observed public goods in the context of differing national/regional political cultures, state practices and education cultures; and devise generic terms and indicators that integrate notions of public goods from the range of national/regional traditions.

## CONCLUSIONS

The above argument suggests that in order to situate public goods effectively within each national system and cultural tradition, and also across national systems and in the extra-national global space, empirical data concerning the potentially “public activities” of national systems, global consortia and partnerships, and individual HEIs, should be interrogated in terms of:

1. *The state and political culture*: Ideas and practices of the roles, responsibility and scope of government, state relations with economic markets and civil society, prevailing ideas of “society” and “public”;
2. *Relations between government and higher education*: Higher education and state/society building, autonomy, regulation, funding, discursive/other practices of the social and economic roles of HEIs;
3. *Social-educational culture*: Social and economic expectations of higher education, family educational practices, examinations/social selection, social mobility, school-university relations;
4. *System organisation in higher education*: Institutional stratification, competition and cooperation between HEIs, within national systems and within regional and global networks, and the diversification of public and private goods;
5. *The private sector and public goods*: State/society/higher education relations in the private sector;
6. *The global perspectives and activities of institutions and systems*: Global imaginings, global position and positioning, cross-border linkages and mobility, global policy borrowing and commonalities;
7. *Public goods in higher education*: Specific programmes and practices of institutions and systems, including measurement of relevant activities, that contribute to public goods (broadly defined) in the national system; and those that contribute to global public goods; the funding of those activities, and the relation between funding and activity;
8. *Global public goods in higher education*: Specific programmes and practices of institutions and systems, including measurement of the relevant activities, that contribute to global public goods, whether produced from one country or between countries; the funding of those activities, and relations between funding and activity.

Because global public goods are neglected, any such inquiry should explicitly incorporate global public goods in cross-border flows and systems, identifying both nationally-specific elements and globally common elements. Global public goods can be identified from the viewpoints of several national/regional traditions, enabling both triangulation between perspectives and isolation of common elements.

## APPENDIX: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND DATA ANALYSIS

As noted, the author has developed a research programme designed to explore the question of the public good(s) produced in higher education, on a comparative basis as outlined above. This research programme entails semi-structured

interviews across HEIs, government, industry and other organisations. There will be at least 30 interviews per national system in eight national systems, and at least 260 interviews all told, constituting a relatively large qualitative study. The data set will enable many relevant internal comparisons.

At the time of writing, case studies had been completed in Australia (47 interviews, including 6 in government, conducted between November 2012 and August 2013) and Russia (30 interviews, including 5 in government, conducted in April-June 2013). The results will be combined with the findings of later case studies so as to simultaneously explore public good(s)-related phenomena on both national and comparative basis, while identifying global patterns.

Data from all country studies will be synthesised and used to identify public goods common to all national systems. As suggested, it is hoped that the ultimate outcome will be a widely applicable conceptual framework that can be used by researchers and governments for defining, where applicable measuring, comparing, and enhancing public good(s) in higher education. By comparing the different approaches to “public good” in higher education that have evolved across the world, generic elements can be identified, and a common language of public good developed. This move can also make it possible to establish a broad-based notion of specifically global public goods.

It is expected that the outcomes of the research programme will assist policy makers, philanthropists and HEIs themselves to clarify public goods and think creatively about practices designed to optimise those public goods and their distribution.

The following are the “stem” interview questions used in the study. In the manner of semi-structured interviews, there is some variation according to context and subject; and significant variation, including follow-up questions, on the basis of the answers received to the “stem” questions.

1. Please list your training, job history, present position and main responsibilities
2. What is the role of government in higher education? What should government do? Are there limits – what should government not do?
3. What do you understand by the term “public good”? What benefits and activities fall under this?
4. Does higher education produce collective goods, some say social goods, that are distinct from benefits that can be identified in relation to individuals? What are those collective goods?
5. What does higher education contribute to the “public good,” in the following areas [some individual, some collective]. Consider: (1) Are there public good/ public goods created here? (2) How do we know, and can we measure them?
  - Knowledge;
  - Research, development and innovation;
  - Arts and Science not vocationally specific;
  - Professional and occupational training;
  - Equitable social opportunity;
  - Creativity in different fields;

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- Social communications;
  - Building cities and region;
  - Citizenship, tolerance and cosmopolitanism;
  - Internationalisation;
  - Arts and culture;
  - Public policy development, and better government
6. If higher education creates a mix of public and private goods, do you think that both kinds of good can grow together? Or is it that the more public goods are created, the less private goods are created? Is it zero-sum?
  7. If higher education was 100 per cent funded by student tuition would the public goods still flow? (*Possible follow-up question – In part or whole?*)
  8. Higher education is funded from a mix of public and private sources. How should the balance be determined? (*Possible follow-up question – Is it essentially just political and arbitrary? Can it be grounded?*)
  9. What is the global public good?
  10. The UN Development Program defines the global public good as benefits that flow across borders and are widely shared. Do Russian universities contribute to this global public good? How? How do we know?
  11. Governments fund research because it generates innovations in the national economy. What if the benefits are captured by foreign firms?
  12. If public goods flow across borders, who should pay for them, producer country or receiver country?

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## **5. DEFENDING KNOWLEDGE AS THE PUBLIC GOOD OF HIGHER EDUCATION**

### INTRODUCTION

One welcome consequence of the global drive to shift the funding of higher education (HE) away from national governments and onto individual students is a growing debate about the role of a university, and the nature of the outcomes higher education produces both for individuals and society more broadly. Particular discussion has focused upon the concept of “public good,” in both academic literature (see for example Fisher, 2006; Marginson, 2011; Nixon, 2011) and, in the context of England, within policy documents and government commissioned reviews of higher education (see especially BIS, 2009, 2011). Although, arguably, the philosophical and sociological concept of HE as a public good dates back to the founding of universities, such explicit discussion as to the nature of the public good HE provides is new. The British Education Index database records show just one journal article, which made reference to HE and the public good, published between 1980 and 1989 whereas the three years 2010-2012 saw the publication of forty-nine articles on this topic.

With increased discussion there has also been a notable shift in the conception of the public good the higher education sector provides to the rest of society. In policy, we have moved from the public good of higher education being directly equated with knowledge; to public good being defined in relation to individual students’ increased employability and subsequent social mobility. In academic literature, it is argued that the public good of higher education is to be found in social benefits such as citizenship, participatory democracy (Nixon, 2011), and more individualised projects of personal and intellectual transformation (Abbas & McLean, 2010). In this chapter I argue that in both academic literature and policy discourse the public good of higher education is being reconceptualised along increasingly individualistic lines. As a result, public good is rarely understood nowadays as knowledge as an end in itself; rather it is seen as the social product of purely individual benefits.

### THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION

Discussions of public good in higher education often take as a starting point the earlier existence of a comparatively non-marketised, publicly funded HE sector which was primarily driven by national and collective goals as opposed to individual and private gains. There are two risks to such discussions: first that a non-existent “golden age” of higher education is evoked; and second, that there can



appear to be an historical continuity in the discourse of public good. I will explore the relationship between HE and the public good as it has played out in policy and academic discourse since the “Robbins Report” of 1963. My starting point is the problem of definition and the premise that constructions of the concept of public good have shifted over time. Government policy documents, and the reviews and reports which feed into them, have variously explored the public good of HE in terms of promoting a common culture to unite the nation, national economic development, social justice, individual prosperity, and social mobility.

Definitions of public good in both academic and policy discourse have altered as the prevailing social, political and economic climate has shifted. Current discussion as to the nature of the public good of HE comes against a backdrop of a dominant policy agenda in which an increasing number of national governments have moved from publicly funding (or substantially subsidising) HE to considering it a private good conferring benefit chiefly upon individuals who are expected to contribute to its costs (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Carpentier, 2010). Elsewhere in this volume, Marginson notes that “higher education is under some pressure to focus primarily or exclusively on individualisable economic benefits” (2014, p. 52). The current political ideology seeks to encourage individuals, rather than the state, to accept financial responsibility for previously publicly funded provisions such as HE, pensions, and some elements of health care.

For many economists and academics a defining concept of a public good is the fact of it being financed by the state out of “general revenues” (Tilak, 2008). The economist Paul Samuelson (1954) is credited with the initial definition of a public good as having non-excludable and non-rivalrous outcomes; being state funded; and generating externalities in the form of social and public benefits (in Tilak, 2008; Desai, 2003). The integral point of state funding to the definition of public good locates it within a specific historical era which Desai suggests “we are about to leave or have even already left” (2003, p. 13). In this context the removal of state funding from HE explicitly challenges the concept of HE as a public good.

Attempts to explore the concept of HE as a public good at a time when state funding is being cut raise questions about the nature of the outcomes and “externalities” generated by the HE sector. Marginson (2011) draws a useful distinction between public goods (plural) and the public good (singular). He defines public goods as the end product or the commodities produced by the HE sector, although noting that they may be intangible and take an individual or collective form. This would include a range of intellectual, social and economic outputs such as: knowledge conceived of as a search for truth; a more productive workforce; or knowledge and intellectual capacity leading to scientific advance. Of these, Marginson argues “the most important goods produced in higher education are universal knowledge and information” (2011, p. 416). The public good (singular) on the other hand, Marginson suggests refers to activities, benefits or resources accessible to all and is to be found in the processes and the participation in he rather than in the outcomes; this would include: knowledge conceived of as an end in itself, or better informed citizens leading to improved democracy and a

more cohesive, inclusive society. Sheehan (1973) draws a similar distinction between consumption and investment goods.

One difficulty with demarcating between categories of public goods and Public Good is that, as Sheehan notes, differentiation is often based more upon the use to which a good is put rather than an inherent property of the good itself (1973, p. 21). It is possible to see knowledge as both public goods and Public Good, as an investment and consumption good, depending upon the timescales measured (the act of gaining knowledge or the knowledge gained) and the purpose to which knowledge is put (instrumental or as an end in itself; economic or social). British government policy documents and government commissioned reviews of the HE sector from the past fifty years demonstrate a general shift in the stated purpose of HE from intellectual to social and economic outcomes, and from providing public benefits to individual gains.

#### HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD BEFORE WORLD WAR TWO

In terms of government policy, perhaps a first indication that HE will come to be seen as a public good is provided by The Robbins Report (1963): “higher education is so obviously and rightly of greater public concern” (1963, ch. 2). There are no such explicit statements to be found in HE policy documents prior to 1963. However, Robbins’ statement of “public concern” did not alter what occurred in universities but merely provided a label for a pre-existing state. It could be argued that much of what occurred in universities at this time, primarily in relation to the transmission and advancement of knowledge, but also in connection with the moral and cultural training of a social elite for leadership in society, was so automatically considered to be of public good it did not need to be explicitly stated. Indeed, “the entire scientific endeavour was considered to be relevant and useful” (Nybom, 2013, cited in Muller & Young, 2014).

The religious foundations of medieval universities meant that knowledge production and transmission was inherently linked to a religious concept of truth. Gaining knowledge was both good in itself, an act of spiritual devotion; and for itself, revealing knowledge of God’s purpose. From the eighteenth century onwards the relationship between religion and knowledge in the universities began to weaken and in the nineteenth century, universities in countries, which had experienced the Enlightenment, began to repose the search for truth through knowledge as a rational rather than spiritual pursuit.

In the UK, from the late nineteenth century the concept of the university, and its intellectual products, was for the first time, considered instrumental to a range of national, social, economic and political goals (Delanty, 2001, p. 34). Elsewhere in this volume, Maassen suggests this follows a similar change of emphasis in US higher education: the Land Grant Act of 1862 establishing universities which were expected to further the economic and cultural life of the state. However, the legacy of the Enlightenment persisted until prior to the Second World War, an era Delanty terms “liberal modernity,” when the pursuit, and importantly, the nature (or mode)

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of knowledge within the university was still compatible with the Enlightenment's ideal of truth and the ultimate unity of culture (Delanty, 2001, p. 33).

#### HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 1939-1963

The experience of the Second World War, and especially the capitulation of the German universities to the demands of Nazism, lent urgency to funding, expanding, and simultaneously maintaining the autonomy of British HE institutions (see Shattock, 2012, p. 10). In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, public good was assumed to be found in two directions. The very existence of universities as places of learning and advancing knowledge was inherently linked to a particular concept of civilisation and considered to serve a civilising influence upon the country (Delanty, 2001, p. 51). This was considered an important counterbalance to the barbarism of the war and a means of preventing such atrocities happening in the UK. The autonomy of institutions and the exercise of academic freedom represented a means of maintaining civilisation.

In addition, the public good was considered to be evident in scientific advance and the driving forward of technological development. Maassen (Chapter 3) notes that in the US street lights and sewer systems were introduced as a direct result of the applied research conducted at Land Grant Universities. In the UK, the 1950 University Grants Committee "A Note on Technology in Universities" focused specifically upon the need to harness higher education to technological advance (Shattock, 2012, p. 21). Universities, and the knowledge they produced, were looked upon to provide a national service in ensuring Britain's continued standing on the world stage: a fact made particularly important by the growing awareness of the fragility of the British Empire and the need to compensate through industrial progress at home.

#### HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 1963-1997

The beginnings of a more formal declaration of HE as a public good in the Robbins Report (Committee on Higher Education, 1963) took place against a backdrop of post-war political compromise, relative economic prosperity, and the creation of the Welfare State. It has been argued that the Robbins Report did not represent new thinking but merely summed up the existing direction of travel in HE policy since the Second World War (Shattock, 2012, p. 3). However, the fact that the public good of HE was the subject of explicit discussion for the first time, itself marks a shift in thinking from the idea that knowledge itself was a public good and that the existence of universities was an inherently civilising influence upon society. There had previously been no need to justify a public good outside of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. The Robbins Report begins a perceived need for government ministers to explicitly justify the public good of HE. This is indicative of the start of an epistemological shift: for the first time there is questioning of the assumption that knowledge can be linked to a pursuit of truth or justified as an end in itself. Instead, it appears to need external and instrumental justification.

Robbins' statement that "higher education is so obviously and rightly of greater public concern, and so a large proportion of its finance is provided in one way or another from the public purse" (1963, ch. 2) begins to create a quid pro quo between public funding and economic, intellectual or social returns for the nation.

Desai (2003) characterises the state at this time as being perceived by the public as a "benevolent dictator" in that government sought to safeguard the economic and social well being of all citizens. Universities were perhaps keener to accept the benevolence than be dictated to: as relatively autonomous institutions, universities had up until this point been mainly free from state interference and able to set their own largely liberal academic priorities, admissions criteria and overall sense of purpose. Although referring to a later period, Brown notes that universities have typically enjoyed high degrees of autonomy in return for the production of valued public goods (2013, p. 125). Increased state funding, motivated by a desire to promote the public good, opened up universities to greater direction from national government. Robbins suggests four aims for the HE sector, these were succinctly summarised by Dearing (1997, pp. 5-7) thirty-four years later as:

- instruction in skills for employment;
- promoting the general powers of the mind;
- advancing learning;
- transmitting a common culture and common standards of citizenship.

It is notable that three of these four aims focus on knowledge in one form or another.

Robbins reasserted the importance of knowledge outcomes in HE and considered knowledge to be important in and of itself. Where he goes beyond this he claims those knowledge outcomes (rather than individuals participating in a university experience) will provide the cultural capital to unite the nation and the scientific advance to drive forward the economy. In this government sponsored declaration that HE should be considered of public social and economic value, the autonomy of institutions is challenged. In return for increased state funding universities are expected to meet the government's agenda in terms of providing the knowledge and skilled workers to drive the economy.

Robbins' aim was for universities to "realise the aspirations of a modern community as regards both wealth and culture" in "an era of rapid social and economic advance" (1963, ch. 2) but he was clear that this would be achieved through a focus upon knowledge and learning. For Robbins, the public good of HE was to be realised through the national economic and social benefits accrued to the whole of society, that is, non-graduates as well as graduates. This emphasis on benefits for everyone in society stands in contrast to today's more individualised preoccupations. The focus was on public goods (plural) as it was the outcomes of HE that were expected to benefit everyone in society. Although Robbins did begin to consider expanding university places "for all those who are qualified by ability and attainment" (1963, ch. 2) and who wished to pursue higher education, there was no expectation that the rewards of HE could only be reaped by those attending university.

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Throughout the 1960s the driving force of increased funding to the UK HE sector (and a prime motivation for the establishment of the polytechnics) was a belief that the public goods of HE were realised outside of institutions and in the external benefits to the economy or society more broadly. Not only the relationship between the state and HE changed, but the relationship between the academy and knowledge also changed. Instead of a liberal view of knowledge being considered an end in itself (such as described by Newman in *The Idea of a University*), knowledge becomes an instrumental means to achieving the public good – however that may be defined. The good of HE is publicly stated and linked to public funding. The purpose of HE is then open to change with the priorities of different political regimes.

#### HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 1997-2007

The economic downturn of the early 1970s saw the emergence of human capital theory in the USA at first (see for example Becker, 1993) and later, its pervasive influence upon UK education policies. The Conservative government's "Higher Education: meeting the challenge" (1987) emphasised the role of universities in supplying graduates for industry. While the public good of HE continued to be perceived primarily in relation to national economic competitiveness, this was increasingly in terms of the particular financial returns to businesses to be accrued from employing graduates rather than in broader terms of scientific and technological development.

In the 1997 National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, Dearing suggests an update to the four aims noted by the Robbins Committee. Dearing argues universities should aim:

- to inspire and enable individuals to develop their capabilities to the highest potential levels throughout life, so that they grow intellectually, are well-equipped for work, can contribute effectively to society and achieve personal fulfilment;
- to increase knowledge and understanding for their own sake and to foster their application to the benefit of the economy and society;
- to serve the needs of an adaptable, sustainable, knowledge-based economy at local, regional and national levels;
- to play a major role in shaping a democratic, civilised, inclusive society (1997, pp. 5-11).

What is notable is the shift away from knowledge as an aim of higher education towards more explicitly individual and instrumental ends. Although both the "Percy Report" (1945) and the "Barlow Report" (1946) urged UK universities to play a role in creating knowledge to drive forward the economy, what we have here is a complete reversal: now, the economy is to drive forward the production of knowledge. The role of universities is to serve the needs of the economy rather than the economy responding to the impetus of new knowledge. In addition, it is now only the individuals themselves who "own" that knowledge and the businesses that employ them that can be expected to reap the rewards. Although Dearing does

appear to return us to a more direct focus on intellectual outcomes, this is something very different to the idea that knowledge is worth pursuing as an end in itself. The effect of this upon HE was that the public good of HE was no longer perceived to be extended to everyone in society but simply to those who had experienced HE themselves or had direct contact with graduates.

By 1997, Dearing suggested that government and universities must “encourage the student to see him/herself as an investor in receipt of a service, and to seek, as an investor, value for money and a good return from the investment” (1997, ch. 22, para. 19). This notion of HE as an individual investment chimed with a more atomised social and political climate (see for example Lukes, 1973; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2001). Dearing breaks with the established discourse of national economic advancement and begins a focus on private economic gains for which students become investors in their own stocks of human capital. The public returns to HE in terms of increased wealth and employment are seen to be accrued by graduates alone, and it is only “spillovers” that benefit others in society. It is perhaps only logical that students are then expected to contribute towards the cost of this private investment. One notable change here is that as the perceived benefits of HE are no longer considered accessible by everyone in society but only by those who actually attend university, attention shifts to disparities of access, and a new political focus upon widening participation in higher education. The state takes on a new role in seeking to regulate university admissions and attempting to equalise opportunities for all citizens to participate in HE (see Fisher, 2006, p. 158).

Post-Dearing, and with the introduction of higher tuition fees paid by individuals, the Labour government felt the need to reclaim (at least rhetorically) the concept of HE as a public good. In the administration’s final HE policy document, *Higher Ambitions* (BIS, 2009) it is claimed:

The process of knowledge generation and stewardship is a public good and important in its own right. Research and learning in universities have intrinsic value aside from any economic consideration. But it does mean that we are determined that no stone should be left unturned in maximising the economic potential of higher education for this country. (BIS, 2009, p. 41)

This statement quickly moves on from claims about the intrinsic importance of generating knowledge to the economic potential of HE. The rhetorical force of the second sentence “no stone left unturned” somewhat undercuts the first and almost suggests that those pursuing knowledge purely for its own sake will be publicly exposed.

Perhaps to balance these economic goals, *Higher Ambitions* begins a discourse, which explicitly presents the public good of HE in relation to social justice:

Everyone, irrespective of background, has a right to a fair chance to gain those advantages. This is vital, not just as a question of social justice and social mobility but also for meeting the economy’s needs for high-level skills. (BIS, 2009, p. 3)

This is the first time we see social mobility as a stated goal of government HE policy although it may have been the intended outcome of previous policies designed to raise the age participation ratio to 50%. Social mobility is by definition an individualised phenomenon in contrast to national prosperity, which is a collective goal. Social mobility suggests movement from a lower social class to a higher social class. However, if all of society gets generally more prosperous, then it is more difficult to measure individual movement. The discourse of social mobility shifts responsibility onto individuals for their own employment prospects and economic circumstances. Individuals are expected, through education, to create the conditions for their own economic reproduction. There is room neither for consideration of social class nor for questioning national economic structures and productivity (see Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2001, p. 203).

There were three key assumptions behind national HE policies at this point. The first is that social and economic benefits not only go hand in hand but are in fact one and the same; the aim of HE is: “the greatest return in excellence and social and economic benefit” (BIS, 2009, p. 4). The “greatest return” employs economic language to assess social benefits. The second assumption is that HE is intrinsically linked to individual employment prospects: “as the providers of life chances for individuals in an environment where skills and the ability to provide those skills are an essential precondition for employment” (BIS, 2009, p. 7). This suggests that there are few returns from the public good of HE to be gained for those who do not actually attend institutions themselves. More significant is the implication that there is no longer a political project to develop the economy and job opportunities beyond strategies to enhance individual employability through education. The third assumption is that there is little belief in transmitting knowledge from one generation to the next if it is not to enhance individual employability and social mobility.

The 2010 coalition government continued these assumptions and this dominant discourse. *Students at the Heart of the System* (BIS, 2011) defines social justice as brought about through individual social mobility which, in turn, is defined as increased earnings potential and greater job security:

Higher education can be a powerful engine of social mobility enabling young people from low-income backgrounds to earn more than their parents and providing a route into the professions for people from non-professional backgrounds. (BIS, 2011, p. 54)

Although HE has arguably always led to social mobility for some individuals, in the past such social mobility was a by-product of the social and cultural capital students more or less consciously accrued. Promoting social mobility was not the defining role of universities it has now become: “[institutions] must take more responsibility for increasing social mobility” (BIS, 2011, p. 4). The public good of HE thus becomes reconceptualised according to a more individualistic methodology as “the mathematical sum of the private benefits” (Marginson, 2011, p. 413). As there are considered to be few benefits from HE for non-participants, the emphasis in terms of promoting the public good through HE is placed upon

encouraging more individuals, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds, to participate (see for example DfES, 2003b).

In turn, universities now relate to students as individual fee-paying customers who make a private investment to gain a return in their own future employability and/or social mobility. Despite direct state subsidies to universities in the form of block teaching grants being withdrawn, universities become increasingly concerned with state projects of ensuring employability and prosperity of individual citizens. As Marginson notes in Chapter 4 of this volume:

Increasingly, contemporary states achieve policy objectives not through direct provision but through arms-length steering of actors in semi-government instrumentalities, universities, NGOs and the private sphere, using codes, financial incentives and prohibitions. (2014, p. 55)

This represents a “structural, sociological transformation” of universities as social institutions and through them, a new relationship between individuals and society (see Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2001, p. 202). In effect, HE comes to be co-opted as part of a renegotiated, increasingly individualised welfare state.

#### WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO KNOWLEDGE?

Throughout the past fifty years, the definition of public good in relation to HE has shifted emphasis between intellectual, social and economic goals. Whereas the public good of HE was initially conceived primarily in terms of knowledge, knowledge itself has come to be de-centred from state educational projects. First, we see knowledge moves away from being considered as an end in itself to serving the interests of the national economy. From here knowledge comes to be seen as a route to increasingly individualised economic and social outcomes. In relation to teaching, knowledge outcomes are no longer presented as benefitting the national economy but as providing private gains to individual graduates who can earn more than those without a university degree.

Knowledge, most specifically in the form of culture, is no longer presented as a civilising influence on society or serving a social role in including all of society into a coherent cultural vision, but as a means of bringing about social justice through individual social mobility. McLean argues we can no longer think of knowledge as serving a unifying purpose and that universities have outlived the role of “producer, protector and inculcator of the national culture” (2008, p. 38). Students are no longer perceived to be potential contributors to the public intellectual capital of the nation, but instead as private investors seeking a financial return in the form of enhanced employability skills.

In relation to the research role of universities, we perhaps see some attempts to resuscitate an idea of public good through a particular focus upon “the impact arising from excellent research” defined as: “social, economic or cultural impact or benefit beyond academic” (Research Excellence Framework, 2014).<sup>1</sup> New forms of



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public good can perhaps also be seen in institutional public engagement and knowledge transfer or innovation strategies. Despite laudable attempts to recreate a connection between publicly funded research and public good, problems occur when this is put into practice. Often the time frames involved and the very specific conditions placed upon what counts as measurable impact can make comparison with an earlier sense of knowledge outcomes difficult. In addition, the inevitable separation between teaching and research in terms of public funding and the public good is something qualitatively new.

When the idea of a university was linked to the Enlightenment project of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake in the context of universities, which were relatively autonomous institutions, it was the separation between institutions and the state that allowed the public good to be realised in terms of knowledge production and transmission. The move from HE as a collection of autonomous institutions, to being subsumed within the broader political goals of the government of the day has led to universities taking on expressly political roles, such as promoting individual employability and prosperity, that would have previously been considered national structural economic concerns. This reconceptualised public good is problematic for HE as the focus upon social justice and individual social mobility moves universities away from non-excludable knowledge outcomes, described by Marginson as: “the unique claim of higher education” (2011, p. 414).

#### INCULCATING VALUES

Many recent academic arguments for the public good of HE take as a starting point both the changed nature of knowledge, and the altered relationship between universities and knowledge. Discussion of the public good of HE therefore becomes reduced to arguments for an extension of the welfare state into universities not in a directly economic way (since the ending of means-tested maintenance grants) but rather as a means to promote a particular concept of citizenship and to shape individuals’ values. Welfare states are considered to play a political role in promoting equity and inclusion as well as a re-distributive economic role (see McLean, 2008, p. 37). Nixon, writing in his book “Higher Education and the Public Good” claims a key value universities may be expected to cultivate in individuals is: “a common commitment to social justice and equity” (2011, p.1). Delanty argues access to higher education is a central dimension to social inclusion in the western world (Delanty, 2001, p. 49). These views appear to stand in radical opposition to a more “neo-liberal” discourse of education as individual investment in one’s future earnings potential. Yet it changes the focus of HE away from knowledge transmission and onto social and political projects involving the inculcation of particular values.

Nixon argues that universities are places “where people are provided with some of the capabilities necessary to become citizens” although acknowledging that people can and do acquire these capabilities without higher education. He suggests a key function of HE is to promote a sense of civic purpose among those who

attend university (2011, p. 42). Despite the arguments that a public good of HE is to be found in increased democratic citizenship, the recent expansion in the UK HE sector correlates with a period of relative public political disengagement. There is concern about voter turnout in elections and there has been a decline in the membership of trade unions. This may suggest that democratic citizenship is perhaps best built through organic experience of society, in particular with the labour market, rather than through individuals spending an extended period in the classroom.

Despite the claims made for defining public good in relation to social justice, equity and social inclusion, I would argue that a focus on values necessarily makes higher education a more individualistic pursuit. McLean (2008) suggests, with Habermas and other critical theorists, that higher education should be “emancipatory” and “transformative” through a focus on individual fulfilment and transformation. Nixon similarly argues: “Higher Education is centrally concerned with the ways in which people develop their life projects, negotiate their life choices, and configure their life purposes. It is, first and last, concerned with human flourishing” (2011, p. 32).

Yet Nixon also argues that the 2008 economic crisis served as a reminder that individualism is problematic and that there is a need for members of society to discover shared responsibilities. There is surely something contradictory in asking students to discover shared responsibilities through the pursuit of individual projects of personal development and transformation. In the context of today’s socio-economic and political climate there is a risk that such claims of HE become further reconceptualised as private goods. It is arguably the individual who benefits most from his or her own (almost therapeutic-like) personal transformation. Furthermore such private goods can by definition only be accessible to those who actually attend university. If, instead, the transmission and production of knowledge itself was considered a collective project then shared responsibilities may more naturally emerge.

The focus on personal values means the public good of higher education comes to be located in the individuals who attend university and hold particular values. Nixon defines public good as: a “common good” but a common good that recognises difference; “it is what we understand by the good society but a good society which struggles with what goodness means in a world of difference” (2011, p. 16). One problem here is with the word “we”: the implication seems to be that there is a common conception of a good society, which celebrates diversity and difference, but one that all “right-thinking” people can share. There is a risk that this could be seen as anti-democratic; despite widening participation in recent decades, university graduates remain a minority of the population and for an unelected educated elite to impose a view of “what we understand by the good society” goes against broader principles of democracy. Similarly, it could also be considered disingenuous. Despite the rhetoric of recognising difference it is clear that some values are to be encouraged more than others. There is a focus on addressing inequality, and tackling issues associated with poverty, the environment and conflict (McLean, 2008, p. 17).

For McLean, the public good of HE is something which is realised outside of the university but as a result of knowledge individuals have gained; she imagines “communicatively reasonable” graduates who will be “committed to working with others for the public good” (2008, p. 79). The knowledge individuals gain while at university can make them critical, imaginative and analytic and with a strong public service commitment but the important point here is that according to this conceptualisation, public good is realised in the public service not in the knowledge outcomes. So, this means that there is a particular vision of the kind of public service involved, this is not about creating knowledge for people to make their own and put to their own ends.

The emphasis on “recognising difference ... in a world of difference” moves us from a position where public good was found in knowledge as truth, to a state where public good is to be found in the knowledge that there is no truth. Nixon argues “the legitimacy of any institution of higher education cannot be premised on prior assumptions regarding the provenance of truth ... [it is instead a] place where arguments are held and divergence of opinion and view-point is valued.” (2011, p. 42). Much here depends upon our understanding of the concepts of knowledge and truth. Michael Young suggests “education presupposes the possibility of both knowledge and truth.” (2008, p. 83). This must be the case if we are to consider, along with Young and Durkheim that truth as “something external to individuals but social (and therefore essentially human)” and that it is a necessary condition for the production of knowledge and that knowledge must be the norm for the curriculum. (Young, 2008, p. 63). The search for truth through disciplinary enquiry has proved itself over two centuries to be the best way of advancing knowledge (Muller & Young, 2014).

Finally, to assume that there is no truth and that only difference can be acknowledged would mean people can no longer access the powerful knowledge needed to be able to argue for some ideas to win over others in the marketplace of ideas. We are left with only “voice discourses,” which reduce knowledge to experience. As Young notes, “the practical and political implications of such a rejection of all knowledge claims is that voice discourses are self-defeating. They deny to the subordinate groups, with whom they claim to identify, the possibility of any knowledge that could be a resource for overcoming their subordination” (2008, p. 5).

#### CONCLUSIONS

Successive redefinitions of the public good in both HE policy and academic discourse reinforce, rather than challenge, the notion of higher education providing individuals with private benefits. An alternative model would be to perceive the public good of HE as the formalised relationship through which disciplinary-specific, non-excludable knowledge outcomes are passed on from one generation to the next. Hannah Arendt (1954) suggests education plays a role in inculcating new generations into the knowledge of a pre-existing world for them to make anew. This would be to consider HE as a social contract between the generations

based upon the broader public good its knowledge outcomes provide for the whole of society (Tilak, 2008; Brown, 2011) and not just the individuals who attend university. This necessitates bringing knowledge back into the university, but “without denying its fundamentally social and historical basis” so as to avoid “the slide into relativism and perspectivism” (Young, 2008, p. 19).

This involves acknowledging that the public good of higher education lies solely in the knowledge transmitted and produced in universities, knowledge which “is objective in ways that transcend the historical conditions of its production” (Young, 2008, p. 19). It is important to point out here that this is not an argument for a curriculum “set in aspic,” that aims at preserving the status quo through transmitting an unchallengeable body of knowledge that transcends generations and social circumstances. Instead, this is an argument for knowledge to be explored in relation to its social, political, historical and cultural origins; for it to be part of a living curriculum that can be mastered, engaged with, questioned, and challenged.

To conclude, I would locate the central task of the university in the twenty-first century as attempting to become, through the production and transmission of knowledge, a key source of public good. By making knowledge accessible to all in society, graduates and non-graduates alike, we could see a genuine democratisation of knowledge. This would move us away from instrumental concepts of the public good that focus upon individual psychological and economic gains, and instead refocus universities upon knowledge that can be to the benefit of everyone in society.

## NOTE

- <sup>1</sup> [www.ref.ac.uk](http://www.ref.ac.uk). Accessed the 12th of December 2013.

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## 6. PARTISAN POLITICS IN HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY

*How Does the Left–Right Divide of Political Parties Matter in Higher Education Policy in Western Europe?*

### INTRODUCTION

Political parties are a key institution in modern democracies. Through representing their electorate they aggregate interests, offer coherent policy packages and when holding government offices are expected to shape policy accordingly (Klingemann, Hofferbert, & Budge, 1994). Thus, the participation of different parties in government can be one reason for policy differences both within and between countries. There is a rich body of literature in political science dedicated to the influence of the ideological background of a party on its policy positions and the resulting differences in outputs. In this literature, the number of existing studies on education and especially higher education policy is rather limited (e.g. Ansell, 2010; Boix, 1997; Busemeyer, 2007, 2009; Busemeyer, Franzmann, & Garritzmann, 2013; Castles, 1989; Jensen, 2011; Rauh, Kirchner, & Kappe, 2011; Schmidt, 1996, 2007; Voegtle, Knill, & Dobbins, 2011) and therefore represents an area where there is still ground to be covered.<sup>1</sup>

Higher education traditionally has been a more marginal policy topic that gained more importance in the last fifteen years, especially in the light of discussions around the knowledge economy, European integration and other arenas of international policy coordination (Gornitzka, 2008; Gornitzka, Maassen, Olsen, & Stensaker, 2007; Maassen et al., 2012; Maassen & Stensaker, 2011). The growth in political saliency of higher education led to a situation where it is treated less special and at the same time is expected to deliver problem solutions for other policy areas (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2011; Maassen et al., 2012). Furthermore, higher education is also debated in the context of different policy frames, including welfare as well as economic policy and thus offers possibilities for parties to pursue (re-)framing strategies. Therefore, higher education is not just any other policy field, but instead shows unique characteristics and dynamics that call for detailed analysis.

Whereas in other policy areas the link between the ideological position of a governing party or coalition and the expected policy output is rather clear (e.g. Bodet, 2013; Hibbs, 1977; Klitgaard & Elmelund-Præstekær, 2013), the existing studies concerning higher education policy show two disagreements. First, two groups of studies from the area of comparative politics deliver contradicting results and explanations for partisan dynamics in higher education policy. One group of

authors argues that, in line with the expansion of the welfare state, parties of the left should increase public funding to higher education as a mean of redistribution, long term social mobility and thus support of their core electorate (e.g. Boix, 1997), or to cater to new groups of voters in the middle-class (Busemeyer, 2009). Second, the opposing group claims that due to the fact that access to higher education is skewed to the more wealthy part of the population, it is more likely that right-wing parties increase public spending on higher education (Rauh et al., 2011).

Further, a third strand of literature concludes that instead of being driven by the ideological pre-disposition of the party, differences in higher education policies are mainly influenced by institutional factors. While some studies see institutions as intervening or conditional factors under which partisan influence might take place (Ansell, 2008, 2010), or expect certain path dependencies stemming from policy legacies (Busemeyer et al., 2013), the most drastic version of the argument expects institutional setups to overshadow partisan influence (Iversen & Stephens, 2008; Jensen, 2011). Thus, the existing literature disagrees on the direction and rationale for partisan influence in this area as well as on the question whether agency or structure can be seen as the main determinant of differences in policy outputs.

This chapter takes these disagreements in the literature as a starting point to critically revisit the findings of the key studies on the connection between political parties and higher education policy. The main interest is to use the critique of the existing studies and their conceptual shortcomings as a basis to create hypotheses that allow to study both the differences in partisan positions as well as the partisan impact on higher education policy, while accounting for institutional factors as intervening variables. The paper will make a case for a more complex relationship between political parties, partisan positions, institutional settings and higher education policy outputs, than offered in the literature so far. In doing so the hypotheses proposed will aim to explain both differences between political parties but also between countries. For this purpose the paper incorporates approaches from comparative politics as well as work from political economy. Following the argument made by Busemeyer et al. (2013) this article will focus on countries in Western Europe, due to their similar socio-cultural and historical background. Finally, the paper will offer a research design with which the hypotheses can be put to a test.

The starting point of this paper is to explain the partly conflicting results of existing studies on the partisan effects in higher education policy. While addressing this, the paper will cover two aspects of partisan dynamics in higher education policy and thereby argue for two sets of dependent variables for further research. On the one hand, it addresses conceptual considerations on partisan differences in higher education policy positions, as portrayed for example in election manifestos, representing the parties' input into the policy process. Here the interest is to identify whether parties actually differ in their proclaimed political goals concerning higher education. On the other hand, the paper will cover partisan differences in policy outputs. Here the focus will be on the question, whether governments composed of different political parties lead to differing outputs and if

so how the relationship between the left-right orientation of the parties in government and several indicators of higher education policy can be described. While addressing both questions the role of the existing higher education system, the variety of capitalism and the electoral system will also be examined. So the question to ask is not only: Do political parties matter in higher education policy? But also if they matter and how do they matter? Do they offer different policy options, use different policy instruments and/or lead to differing policy outputs?

By combining the more actor focused comparative politics literature – especially the sociologically oriented cleavage theory – with the more structure and institution focused varieties of capitalism approach, this paper includes two main explanatory approaches to policy differences and through this tries to uncover the conflicts around the allocation of values in higher education policy (Qvortrup, 2012).

The chapter will start by addressing more in detail why higher education policy is a policy field well suited to study party effects. Next, the socio-economic partisan conflicts on higher education policy will be investigated. Furthermore, the cultural conflicts on the materialist / post-materialist (Inglehart, 1984) or manager / socio-cultural specialist (Kriesi, 1998, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2006) cleavage line will be discussed, focusing on the steering mode of the government used towards the higher education system. The influence of the existing variety of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Iversen & Stephens, 2008) on the partisan conflict will be the focus of the next section of the paper. Finally, a suggestion for the empirical assessment of the hypotheses will be presented, and in the conclusion the question how this contribution advances the broader scientific debate on partisan policy influences will be discussed.

#### HIGHER EDUCATION – A MORE SALIENT BUT LESS SPECIAL POLICY FIELD

Higher education is a policy field that underwent numerous changes in the last decades, leading to a situation where it also became a more important policy area. Beginning with the massification of higher education in the 70s and culminating in today's debates around the knowledge economy, the pact between higher education and society has been object to changes leading to a plurality of belief systems around higher education (Gornitzka et al., 2007). A new pact between higher education and society often takes the form of a societal contract. It regulates the relationship between the state and its universities and gives higher education the institutionalised governance environment needed to produce the kind of outcomes expected by society (for a detailed discussion on the development of the societal contract for higher education see the contribution by Peter Maassen in this volume). The pact is negotiated to a large extent within the political arena and between parties competing in elections with different platforms and visions for higher education (Busemeyer et al., 2013, p. 533ff).

One part of this renegotiation is connected with the fact that contrary to primary and secondary education, which in all industrialised democracies have a participation rate of nearly 100%, higher education is not a public good accessed equally by all citizens in all countries and thus has a higher potential to be used as a



measure of redistribution (Ansell, 2010). The changes in higher education since the 70s also led to a re-framing of the policy field. While in the decades before massification, higher education was in the first place an elite issue, it transformed during the massification of the 70s to a topic debated in the frame of the welfare state and policies of social mobility (Maassen et al., 2012; Scott, 1995). In a second more recent process, the debate with respect to the knowledge economy led to a growing discussion around higher education as a tool to support economic growth, innovation and economic competitiveness (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2011). At the same time higher education is more and more expected to function as a transversal problem solver for other policy areas (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2011), again leading to more saliency in political debates.

The processes of re-framing of higher education can be regarded as an opportunity for political parties to shift the debate as well as their position on issues related to it by debating it in a different policy frame. Through such a process a party can highlight different aspects of a policy without losing many supporters by formally changing the core of its political position, simply by addressing it in a different setting (Daviter, 2007). Thus, this possibility to debate higher education, in for example the context of welfare policy or economic policy, gives parties more room to manoeuvre.

Higher education also witnessed a growing Europeanisation especially since the late 90s and the rise of higher education as an integral part of the attempt to strengthen Europe's economic competitiveness (Gornitzka, 2008; Maassen & Stensaker, 2011; Musselin, 2005). These developments created a situation in which higher education policy became a more important, but at the same time less special topic, being governed increasingly in the same way as other public sectors (Olsen, 2007). One of the results of this is the emergence of different approaches to higher education steering (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000). Furthermore, the growing Europeanisation of higher education policy led to more inter-governmental policy coordination, especially in the frame of the Bologna Process. While this process could lead to policy convergence, policy differences are still visible (Voegtle et al., 2011) and convergence seems only to be possible if among other things the preferences of the governments towards higher education are rather similar (Heinze & Knill, 2008).

Higher education is a special and different policy area that recently saw a rise in political saliency and international coordination. It is a policy area in need of more detailed analysis, due to the fact that it is more fluid and can be discussed in multiple policy frames. These specific characteristics of higher education policy make it an appropriate area to study party positions and their impact on policy outputs, however, the findings will also help to get a better understanding of the general relationship between partisan positions, institutions and policy outputs.

#### HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

To answer how political parties position themselves on higher education policy, one has to start with the general idea of the formation of political parties. One key

explanation is that parties develop according to opportunities stemming from the distribution of societal cleavages and the corresponding political views within a country (Peters, 2005 p. 132). It is expected that parties, in their attempt to win votes and offices, offer distinct programmatic choices, which are both appropriate to their electorate's needs and their own ideological characteristics (Schmidt, 1996). This idea is also captured in the classic works that conceptually structure the political space along cleavage lines (Bartolini & Mair, 2007; Inglehart, 1984; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 2009).

While Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identified four main cleavage lines and Inglehart (1984) expanded their concept by adding a fifth, there is a wide agreement within the literature that today's political conflicts in Western European democracies are mainly structured along two of the cleavage lines, namely the socio-economic cleavage and a cultural value cleavage (Kriesi, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2006).<sup>2</sup> Especially in higher education policy following the secular realignment (Knutsen, 2013) the conflicts between the church and the state, as well as the primary and secondary sector have lost their importance with the existence of matured mass public higher education systems in Western Europe (Walczak, van der Brug, & de Vries, 2012).<sup>3</sup>

Existing literature on partisan influence on higher education policy focuses almost exclusively on a left-right distinction based on the socio-economic conflict dimension. However, using the structuring power of class voting as an assumption when analysing higher education policy introduces some problems. First of all, one problem of a class voting assumption in higher education policy is that it is less likely due to the educational bias in politics. As Bovens and Wille (2009, 2010) have shown modern political parties are run by and for the well-educated part of the population. Less educated members of society are less likely to get involved in politics, especially in participatory ways that would allow them to actively shape policy outside of elections. Furthermore, their study shows that citizens with a lower educational background care significantly less about education policy. The problem of politicians not sharing the same personal background as their electorate and thus probably having different preferences can be bridged through the ability of these politicians to nevertheless defend the interests of members of a different class. However, politicians are better in doing so on older, highly politicised left-right issues than on newer, less politicised non left-right issues (Bovens & Wille, 2010, p. 409). This calls for the question whether higher education as a policy issue is old and politicised enough for politicians to be able to act as advocates for underrepresented groups.

On the one hand, the rise in saliency of higher education policy also made it a more politicised topic, but on the other hand the position of the policy area more in the centre of political debates is a new one. Furthermore, the educational bias of different electorates has also an effect on how far-sighted their policy preferences are. While well educated citizens perceive longer causal chains linked to policy packages offered by parties, less educated citizens prefer instant advantages and rely on short causal chains when seeking for rewards for their votes (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 857).

The educational bias might also lead to a second problem. It could create a mismatch between the party and its electorate with the party focusing on education as an important policy, while the electorate is not opposed to the plans but doesn't have it high on its personal agenda (Bovens & Wille, 2010). As long as the party would also address the issues, which are on top of the personal political agendas of their electorate, the mismatch between party and electorate wouldn't have negative consequences for the party. This "*representation from above*" (Bovens & Wille, 2009, p. 411) would allow to use the left-right divide and the class voting assumption to study partisan differences, as long as the focus is on the relation between the parties and not between the voters and the parties.

Furthermore, studies on individual electoral behaviour show that although the left-right divide lost some of its capacity to structure political preferences since the early 2000s, it is still an ideological core issue summarising diverse political positions (Walczak et al., 2012). This holds true especially for sophisticated voters with a high level of education since they are more prone to show strong partisan views (Dettrey & Palmer, 2013). Since party systems are comparatively stable institutions and also determine the behaviour of parties participating in them (Peters, 2005, p. 127), it is still rather likely to find the left-right divide on the level of political parties, even though this might be the reason for them to be de-aligned with parts of their electorate. Since this paper is not addressing the micro-foundations and voters' attitudes towards higher education policy and their reflection in partisan activities but rather focuses on the level of political parties, their positions and the consequences of their involvement in government, the application of the left-right divide as it is done in the existing studies seems reasonable even if a mismatch between the voters' preferences and the parties exists.

While there is an intensive debate on the applicability of class voting, it is argued that the importance of cultural values and the respective cleavage is growing in comparison to socio-economic class conflicts (Bovens & Wille, 2010, p. 416). Therefore, this paper will use both the socio-economic and the cultural cleavage to explain differences in party positions and policy outputs in higher education policy. By incorporating the cultural cleavage and linking it to higher education steering, including partisan approaches to public sector reforms, a more nuanced picture of partisan dynamics in higher education policy will be possible.

#### *The Re-distributive Characteristics of Higher Education Policy*

The conflicts around socio-economic issues are characterised by the question whether a party favours economic redistribution or not. It is expected that the political left caters to their electorate by favouring more re-distribution, while the political right is expected to protect its electorate from such measures. One possible policy instrument for a targeted re-distribution is publicly funded education. As Ansell formulates it: "Thus, education spending is a powerful tool that political actors manipulate for their own redistributive ends [...]" (Ansell, 2010, p. 3).<sup>4</sup> Since primary and secondary education have become nearly universal, especially in

OECD countries, the conflicts in the field of education policy have shifted (Iversen & Stephens, 2008). While discussions around secondary education focus more on the public/private divide, debates around access to education and general expansion are increasingly connected to higher education.

Most of the existing studies on higher education in the field of comparative politics capture the re-distributive effect by linking the ideological composition of the government to changes in the amount of public spending in the area of education (e.g. Boix, 1997; Busemeyer, 2007; Castles, 1989; Castles & Obinger, 2007; Schmidt, 2007). One part of this group of studies finds strong links between the participation of left parties in government and higher public spending on (higher) education (Boix, 1997; Castles, 1989). The main argument here is that by spending more public money and expanding the provision of publicly subsidised higher education parties of the political left can increase the participation of their own electorate in higher education and offer them social upward mobility (Ansell, 2008, 2010).

At first this argument seems intuitive and fits well with the general literature on the welfare state that expects parties of the left to favour more public spending (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Hibbs, 1977; Huber, Ragin, & Stephens, 1993). However, there are two problems that need to be addressed. First, the implicit link between increasing public higher education spending and automatically enlarging access to higher education is not a given fact. One could imagine a government spending more money on higher education without enlarging access but for example, increasing per student funding and thus the quality of higher education instead. In this case the additional public funds would not lead to more re-distribution. Further, it is also possible to enlarge access to higher education without increased public spending. Instead a government could opt for more private higher education spending or could refrain from any additional funding thus decreasing per student funding and with this deteriorating the quality of higher education (Plümer & Schneider, 2007). Additionally, access to higher education can be regulated using two mechanisms: through the formal qualification needed as an entrance requirement, and through the number of study places available. Both mechanisms can be influenced politically and when investigating the empirical relation between the partisan composition of a government and shifts in the access to higher education one should address each of them. The two possibilities of decoupling higher education access from funding call for an analytical approach that catches re-distribution not only over the amount of public money spent but also through the level of access to higher education. Thus, political parties potentially differ not only on the question whether to expand public funding for higher education, but also concerning the partially unrelated question in how far to enlarge access to higher education.

The second problem, connected to the link between the participation of left parties in government and increased public spending on higher education, is that contrary to other instruments of the welfare state, access to higher education is skewed towards the wealthy part of the population and the socio-economic background of students is positively related to their likelihood of attending

university (Lucas, 2001; Raftery & Hout, 1993). This means that additional spending first and foremost is to the benefit of the electorate of political right parties and thus increased public higher education spending through the low personal costs for attending higher education can actually be seen as a tool of reverse re-distribution, as demonstrated by Rauh et al. (2011). This effect makes it more likely for parties of the political right to focus on higher education since it shields their electorate and preserves their social position (Ansell, 2008).

Following the arguments made earlier about framing of a policy and combining it with these observations, one can expect that if parties of the left favour higher education policy, using it as a tool for social mobility, they would debate it in the framework of welfare policy, while parties of the right focusing on higher education policy as a means for reverse redistribution would debate it more in line with economic and innovation policies to align it with their remaining policies. This is also in line with the salience theory on party competition, which stresses that parties address the same issues in their electoral programmes but differ in the way they emphasise or contextualise the problems (Busemeyer et al., 2013, p. 7). Thus the first hypothesis that can be drawn from the literature presented so far is:

*Hypothesis 1: If a party of the political left addresses higher education policy in its manifesto it does so in a welfare policy frame; if a party of the political right addresses higher education policy in its manifesto it does so in an economic policy frame.*

An approach that further helps to bridge the question, whether higher education is a re-distributive or reverse re-distributive tool is the work by Ben Ansell (2008, 2010). He expects governments to face a trilemma concerning higher education policy, as they can only achieve two out of three possible policy objectives: mass enrolment, full public subsidisation and low total public costs. In his view the combination of these objectives leads to three different models of higher education systems. The first model is characterised by mass enrolment and low public costs, which are ensured through partially privatised funding for higher education. The second one ensures mass enrolment and full public subsidies while creating high costs for the general public, and the last model provides full public subsidies and low public costs through having low enrolment rates (Ansell, 2010). If only two of the three above mentioned objectives can be reached at a time, a party that would like to shift the focus to the neglected objective has to sacrifice one of the other two, thus the existing higher education system can generate path dependencies. An additional way out of the trilemma would be the already mentioned option of increasing access without any additional funding, which can be argued to lead to a deterioration in quality (Plümper & Schneider, 2007). Ansell (2010, p. 173) discusses this problem only very briefly and does not go into a detailed analysis of this option, however it seems a possible strategy, especially in cases where a party caters to voters with a lower educational background, who opt for a short-term improvement and disregard long-term consequences (Kitschelt, 2000).

Based on the structure of the higher education system, the approaches to higher education policy, using it as a re-distributive or a reverse re-distributive tool, will

manifest in diverse ways. Ansell (2010, p. 166) finds a strong conditional effect of partisanship and enrolment levels in higher education with right-wing parties favouring spending in elite higher education systems with less than 33% of gross enrolment rates and left-wing parties favouring it in mass higher education systems with a gross enrolment rate over 50%.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, if a left party is faced with a higher education system that ensures mass enrolment, it is more likely to expand public funding for higher education than a left party facing an elite higher education system. This is due to the fact that in the first case the increase in expenditure has the possibility of having a positive re-distributive effect for the party's electorate, while in the second case enlarging the access to a mass level would be needed before increased spending in higher education would have positive effects on the party's electorate. These arguments call for the inclusion of the existing level of access to higher education as an influencing factor on partisan positions.

If right-wing parties favour a limited access to higher education and left-wing parties refrain from investing into higher education until the level of access has reached a certain level, the question rises, how do higher education systems turn from elite to mass systems, as they did across all industrialised countries (Maassen et al., 2012)? One way of explaining the shift from an elite to a mass system is the aforementioned possibility of enlarging access without increasing higher education spending (Plümper & Schneider, 2007). Another explanation for the move from elite to mass higher education can be drawn from Busemeyer (2009). He argues that left-wing parties might expand public investment in higher education, to reach out to new voter groups in the middle class. To ensure that such a policy wouldn't put too much fiscal burden on their core electorate, left-wing parties might enlarge access to higher education but shift some of the costs for it to the users by introducing or increasing private higher education spending, while at the same time ensuring that this won't serve as a deterrent for the targeted part of the population (Ansell, 2008). Furthermore, also in situations where there is no attempt to increase access to higher education, private education spending can serve as a compensation for cut-backs in public spending (Schmidt, 2007) and partisanship has been found as a strong indicator for the nature of the public-private mix in social policy spending (Castles & Obinger, 2007). As the access to higher education widens, the preference for further expansion of private higher education expenditure shifts from left-wing to right-wing parties, since they use it to deter participation of a greater part of the population to protect their core electorate's labour market advantage (Wolf & Zohlnhöfer, 2009). Based on these considerations the analysis of the re-distributional characteristics of higher education needs to take into account separately changes in the public as well as the private level of funding.

In an analysis of party manifestos Ansell (2010, p. 137) finds an inverse-U relationship between the ideological position of a party on a left-right scale and support for educational expansion, with large centre parties being the strongest proponents of educational expansion while parties on the more extreme ends of the political spectrum are less supportive of expanding education. At the same time, comparing the relationship between party manifestos and policy outputs, such as

higher education spending, he finds that even though there are similarities in rhetoric on educational expansion between social democrats and conservatives, there is considerable conflict concerning the policy output. Based on this argument it is not possible to theoretically pin-point precisely where a given party would position itself, also because of the influence of the institutional setup of a country (Busemeyer, 2007) as well as the concrete level of enrolment (Ansell, 2010) and because the institutional structure generally affects which issues can be politicised and make it on the agenda (Kauko, 2013). However, one can identify areas in which certain parties are most likely to be found.<sup>6</sup>

Since there is no higher education system in Western Europe that could still be characterised as an elite system, the description of partisan preferences in elite systems serves more as an illustration to highlight the partisan positions in mass higher education systems which are at the core of this section.

In an elite system a left-wing party has very limited gains from public funding for higher education, since its electorate doesn't profit from it. Thus the party will opt for stable or decreased public funding (Ansell, 2010).<sup>7</sup> At the same time it will try to expand access to higher education. Contrary to that a party of the political right will try to keep access stable or increase it to the point that its electorate is well covered. It will support increased public funding, while at the same time limit private funding to relieve its electorate of additional fiscal burdens (Ansell, 2010).

Once the higher education system has reached mass enrolment the partisan interests shift. Since now also its main electorate has the chance of directly profiting from higher education, a party of the political left will favour the expansion of access to higher education, while ensuring the quality of higher education through increased public funding (Ansell, 2010). A left-wing party would also decrease private funding for higher education to prevent higher personal costs that would deter members of its electorate to enter universities. [Table 1](#) illustrates this. The darker a given cell is shaded, the more likely it is that the party goes for the respective policy option.

*Table 1. Policy position of a left wing party in a mass higher education system*

	<i>Decrease</i>	<i>Stable</i>	<i>Increase</i>
<i>Access</i>			
<i>Public funding</i>			
<i>Private funding</i>			

*Hypothesis 2a: If a country has a mass higher education system, then a party of the political left will increase access to higher education, increase public expenditures and limit private expenditures.*

A party of the political right will try to keep the access in a mass higher education system either stable or, if possible, limit it. It will also limit public spending on higher education. However, to ensure a stable quality of the higher education system, which is still used by its electorate, a right-wing party will opt for increased private funding (Wolf & Zohlnhöfer, 2009). This gives an advantage to the right-wing party's core electorate, since it will be less deterred from participating in higher education by increased private spending (Coelli, 2009; Heine, Quast, & Spangenberg, 2008).

*Table 2. Policy position of a right wing party in a mass higher education system*

	<i>Decrease</i>	<i>Stable</i>	<i>Increase</i>
<i>Access</i>			
<i>Public funding</i>			
<i>Private funding</i>			

*Hypothesis 2b: If a country has a mass higher education system, then a party of the political right will keep access to higher education stable, decrease public expenditures and increase private expenditures.*

The impact of the level of enrolment to the existing higher education system is one way of explaining cross-country differences in the partisan conflict on higher education. Busemeyer et al. (2013) offer a second explanation. For them policy legacy is the main driving factor of cross-country variation in the partisan conflict on educational expansion, which can be either a consensual topic, or an issue owned by the political left or the political right (Busemeyer et al., 2013, p. 2). Starting from the assumption that the historical conflict between church and state over education was especially intense in countries with strong Catholicism, they link a strong Catholic religious heritage with a slowed down expansion of the educational sector. Together with a strong Christian conservative party in government especially during the post-war period, this led to the creation of conservative welfare states and segregated educational systems, with only a limited access to higher education (Busemeyer et al., 2013, p. 6). In these countries the authors expect parties of the political left to be the main proponents of educational



expansion. Countries with a strong Protestant tradition on the other hand are expected to be more supportive of educational expansion, characterised by comprehensive and state-centred education systems. Here the political right is expected to be the main issue-owner in education (Busemeyer et al., 2013, pp. 2, 6). The idea of a confession-based policy legacies is also in line with the argument that even though the religious cleavage has lost its explanatory power for many policy areas, there are still strong institutional factors influencing policy decisions whose roots can be traced back to the way in which the cleavage was bridged (Knutsen, 2013, p. 181). This is especially true in the area of education (Ansell & Lindvall, 2013; Busemeyer et al., 2013). Therefore, it is necessary to include these institutional factors into an analysis of partisan differences in higher education policy:

*Hypothesis 3: If a country has a strong catholic heritage, then the education system is more segregated and thus access to higher education is more limited, therefore parties of the political left in these countries are the main proponents of educational expansion.*

Furthermore, Busemeyer et al. (2013, p. 17) also find in their longitudinal analysis that educational expansion becomes more contested from the 1950s until today and at the same time also increasingly an issue owned by the political left. Considering the general move of European higher education systems to higher levels of enrolment, this result is most probably equal to the phenomenon of conditionality of partisan preferences for higher education depending on the level of enrolment as described above.

#### *The Cultural Conflict Dimension in Higher Education Policy*

After having shown how socio-economic conflicts and the re-distributional capacity of higher education can affect partisan positions, the focus will be now on the cultural conflict dimension. While in its classic version this conflict is one between materialists, who favour monetary and materialistic values and post-materialists, who give priority to goals such as sense of community and the non-material quality of life (Inglehart, 1984), more recent contributions refer to this conflict as the one between managers and social/cultural specialists (Kriesi, 1998) or between libertarian/universalistic and traditionalist/communitarian values (Bornschieer, 2010). All of these dichotomies have in common that they describe different sets of values but also differing approaches to authority, power, autonomy, and steering.

The cultural underpinning of higher education and universities in Europe was characterised from its beginning by cultural values and the virtue of science and research as open processes. This vision of a university as a “*rule-governed community of scholars*” (Olsen, 2007, p. 29) never put a strong focus on materialistic or economic approaches. This can also be seen in the Magna Charta Universitatum (MCU) from 1201, where the core values of the European universities were defined. In this text values such as preserving the natural

environment, producing and proliferating culture, research and teaching that is morally and intellectually independent of all political and economic power as well as the European humanist tradition are high-lighted (MCU, 1988). In line with these arguments, higher education represents a time-wise reverse approach to the materialistic/post-materialistic divide since the post-materialistic historical core of the universities is challenged by the new materialistic focus from new public management reforms aiming at managerialism, economic efficiency and innovation (Olsen, 2007). Using instruments such as heightened accountability measures, output orientation and new governance arrangements, substantial change is introduced into a system that used to be rather stable (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000, 2011; Gumpert, 2000).

Pollitt (2001) in his work on new public management reforms identifies a general move of governments from classical state structures to more managerial approaches. While pointing to a strong discursive convergence on new public management concepts in all policy areas, he also identifies considerable divergence when it comes to the actual reforms. He explains this divergence both with the existing institutional context as well as decisions by actors. Due to the adaptability of new public management reforms governments can adopt the details to their local context as well as ideological preferences and a shift in the composition of the government might cause a shift in the objectives of on-going reforms (Pollitt, van Thiel, & Homburg, 2007, p. 5).

Following the work of Olsen (1988), who identified four different public sector steering approaches, Gornitzka and Maassen (2000) transfer these models to the steering of higher education. The four models, the sovereign rationality-bounded state, the institutional, the corporate-pluralist and the supermarket steering, differ with regard to: (a) the role of the state, buffer structures, other stakeholders and the market; (b) rationale for and nature of autonomy of higher education institutions; (c) accountability and modes of assessment of higher education; and (d) how change of higher education takes place (Jungblut & Vukasovic, 2013). Thus, the four different steering modes also represent different partisan approaches to the relationship between the state and higher education.

Depending on the level of participation in a higher education system left- and right-wing parties have different preferences concerning their steering approaches. This is on the one hand due to the aforementioned skewedness of access and on the other hand due to an increasing complexity of steering of higher education as the systems move from elite to mass levels of participation (Ferlie, Musselin, & Andresani, 2008; Rosa & Amaral, 2007; Scott, 1995).

When participation is at an elite level, parties of the political left prefer the sovereign, rationality-bounded steering model. Due to its close link to the interventionist state, this model sees higher education as a governmental instrument for reaching political goals and ministries uphold tight control over universities, which in turn have only limited autonomy (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000, p. 270). This steering approach permits the party to directly influence an institution, in which neither a large part of its electorate participates nor it is likely to have many supporters.<sup>8</sup> A right-wing party on the contrary, would prefer an institutional

steering model. This model is characterised by non-interference from the state, self-governance of the academic oligarchy and protection of academic values (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000, pp. 270-271). Since a right-wing party represents the main participants in an elite higher education system it is also very likely to have many supporters within the universities, thus upholding the institutional autonomy and allowing for academic self-governance clearly caters to its electorate.

Once participation reaches a mass level, close and direct steering of higher education through a ministry gets more complicated, as the sector itself becomes more complex. Furthermore, the general pressure of new public management reforms towards more decentralisation and more autonomy of the public sector from direct ministerial control incentivises steering solutions that are more at arms-length (Maassen & Stensaker, 2003; Pollitt et al., 2007). At the same time the enlarged access to higher education leads to a growing participation of the electorate of the political left and in turn also to a growing political plurality of the academic oligarchy. Thus, a party of the political left facing a mass higher education system is more likely to opt for a corporate-pluralist steering model. This approach is characterised by the inclusion of multiple stakeholders, such as trade and student unions that together with the ministry negotiate the steering of higher education (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000, p. 271). This offers the advantage that the left-wing party can include more of its traditional electorate in the steering processes and allows for participation in the steering even during times of right-wing governments.

When faced with a mass higher education system, parties of the political right opt for the supermarket steering model. In this approach the role of the state is minimal and the government interferes only to strengthen self-regulating capacities, while the main criteria for evaluation of higher education is its success on the market and ability to deliver services (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000, p. 272). Having lost the monopoly of their electorate to participate in higher education, choosing a market-oriented steering model allows right-wing parties to ensure a strong influence of its electorate on higher education, while at the same time not alienating the members of academia through direct ministerial interference.

*Hypothesis 4: If a country has a mass higher education system, then parties of the political left prefer a corporate-pluralist steering approach and parties of the political right prefer a supermarket steering approach.*

Kriesi's (1998) division between managers and social/cultural specialists finds itself reflected in the left-right divide in elite higher education systems. While an institutional steering approach is an example of catering to a professional community and its autonomy, as it leaves the main decisions about higher education with the academics within the institution, the sovereign, rationality-bounded steering focuses on authoritatively managing universities from a ministry. While generally the political left is supposed to support social/cultural specialists and the right is supposed to support managers (Kriesi, 1998), in elite higher education systems one can find a reverse pattern. When enlarging the access to a mass higher education system, the steering approaches reflect the classical pattern

again. The political left is expected to favour a corporate-pluralist steering model that includes a multitude of stakeholders from the higher education community and diminishes the role of the ministry, thus reflecting more an approach favouring social/cultural specialists. The political right focuses on a supermarket steering that puts a focus on market mechanisms and thus strengthens managers. Based on these observations it is possible to construct the following overview over the partisan effects on higher education steering:

*Table 3. Partisan preferences on higher education steering*

	<i>Left-wing party</i>	<i>Right-wing party</i>
<i>Elite higher education system</i>	<i>Sovereign, rationality-bounded steering</i>	<i>Institutional steering</i>
<i>Mass higher education system</i>	<i>Corporate-pluralist steering</i>	<i>Supermarket steering</i>

Even though there are good arguments for the above outlined patterns, there is a chance that in reality one would not find clear shifts between the different steering approaches but rather that a change in government would lead to shifts within one approach. Due to the path dependency of prior governmental decisions, innovations have to be moulded to the status quo (Pollitt, 2001). This in turn heightens the possibility for variations within one steering approach or the emergence of hybrids (Jungblut & Vukasovic, 2013).

#### HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND THE VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM

It has been shown that the level of enrolment of the existing higher education system influences the partisan positions in higher education policy. However, this is not the only influencing factor, also the existing variety of capitalism impacts the way in which political parties position themselves on higher education policy.

The varieties of capitalism (VoC), a conceptual approach stemming from analyses of the political economy, is a concept, which is focused on structural arrangements in a country and the path dependencies stemming from them. Based on the idea of institutional complementarities of the system of political economy, VoC assumes that the interplay of certain sets of institutions in a country leads to comparative institutional advantages. Thus, VoC expects all countries to fall in one of two categories, according to the structure of their political economy: coordinated market economies (CME) or liberal market economies (LME) (Hall & Soskice, 2001). While CMEs function on the basis of negotiations, intermediary actors and

coordination, LMEs are driven by market-based competition. The importance of the VoC approach for an analysis of higher education policy is based on two arguments: (1) The VoC approach distinguishes two different kinds of skill sets, general skills and industry-specific skills, which are at the core of LMEs and CMEs and (2) due to the central role of higher education in the frame of modern knowledge economies there is a growing link between the political economy and the higher education system of a country (Graf, 2008, 2009; Hall & Soskice, 2001).

However, VoC also encountered a lot of criticism mainly along two lines. First of all, since VoC regards formal characteristics of the political system and their fixed institutional effects as determinants for policy outputs, it has been criticised for being prone to institutional determinism (Radaelli, Dente, & Dossi, 2012, p. 540). The key argument being that the political chain between the institutional starting point and a concrete policy output is too long to be ignored and that there are too many possible intervening factors. Secondly, VoC is often criticised for dropping cases in a finite number of boxes. This is seen as problematic because (a) the fit between the chosen box and the country might be very low and (b) there is often no theoretical justification linking the box to the phenomenon (Radaelli et al., 2012, p. 542).

Even though this criticism exists, this paper will argue for VoC as an explanatory approach. The main arguments underlying this decision are that: (1) by combining it with the more socially focused arguments from comparative politics the influence of the institutional determinism is diminished; (2) there are other explanatory possibilities proposed besides dropping countries in boxes; and (3) the link between the institutional characteristics assessed in VoC and the educational sector is, through the arguments on skill regimes, more direct than in other policy areas. However, it needs to be kept in mind that the basic intellectual starting point of VoC is inherently different.

#### *CME and LME Higher Education Systems*

In his VoC based analysis of internationalisation strategies of German and British universities Graf (2008, 2009) transfers the characteristics of the two different varieties of capitalism to higher education systems. Following him, a higher education system in a LME country is driven by the market, open to radical innovations and the state works only as an agent for market preservation granting significant institutional autonomy, while using performance-based steering (Graf, 2008, 2009). Cooperation between parts of the higher education system is driven by economic gains and innovation is self-incentivised through pull-factors of the market. Labour market success of graduates and higher education credentials are only loosely linked and transferable skills are of key importance.

CME higher education systems on the contrary are negotiation-driven, prone to more incremental innovation and the state provides a legal and regulatory frame that leaves the universities with more limited autonomy (Graf, 2008, 2009). The higher education system is characterised by strong national intermediary actors and cooperation is driven by mutual trust and long-lasting cultural links. Innovation is

driven through push-incentives from the state and the specific skills are of key importance.

The specific variety of capitalism also has an influence on the funding of higher education. While CMEs are characterised by higher public expenditures for higher education, LMEs show less public but more private higher education funding (Graf, 2008, 2009). This difference in funding is linked to the fact that the biggest challenge for modern-day economies is de-industrialisation and its impact on the workforce (Jensen, 2011). While LMEs due to their generic skill profile show a low risk of skill redundancy, CMEs with their high level of skill specificity show a large risk of skill redundancy. Here de-industrialisation leads to the need of extensive re-skilling of the workforce, which in turn demands educational expansion and thus also more public higher education spending (Jensen, 2011).

The last part of Jensen's argument partially contradicts the already mentioned findings of Plümper and Schneider (2007), that especially in times of growing unemployment shortly before elections, governments tend to increase the access to higher education without additional public spending. To bridge these two findings, one could re-formulate the last part of his argument as follows: De-industrialisation leads in CMEs to a need for educational expansions, which in turn demands an enlarged access to higher education. Whether this is accompanied by additional funding, depends on the nature of the higher education system and the partisan composition of the government.

Following the arguments made above on higher education and comparative politics, one can create a link to the VoC arguments saying that the partisan composition of the government matters, but the policy position of the governing parties depends on the given higher education system as well as the VoC. In practise this means that parties in LME countries would be more prone to support private higher education expenditures and only a limited expansion of access as well as public higher education expenditures, while their counterparts in CME countries would be more likely to support an increase in access to higher education and, if they want to keep the quality of the higher education system stable, also the amount of public funding attributed to it. Due to the differing nature of the state and differing modes of coordination, parties in LMEs are more likely to support supermarket steering approaches, while those in CMEs prefer corporate-pluralist higher education steering.

*Hypothesis 5a: If a country is categorised as a LME, then political parties support private higher education funding and a stable access to higher education; if a country is categorised as a CME, then political parties support increased access to higher education and more public funding.*

*Hypothesis 5b: If a country is categorised as a LME, then political parties prefer supermarket steering models; if a country is categorised as a CME, then political parties favour corporate-pluralist steering models.*

Table 4. VoC effects on policy positions on higher education

	<i>LME</i>	<i>CME</i>
<i>Higher education funding &amp; access</i>	<i>More private funding, stable access to higher education &amp; less public funding</i>	<i>Increased access to higher education and more public funding</i>
<i>Higher education steering</i>	<i>More supermarket steering</i>	<i>More corporate-pluralist steering</i>

The complementarities between institutions, which are at the heart of the VoC approach, are not only limited to the economic or educational system, they also include the electoral system. While majoritarian electoral institutions generally characterise LMEs, CMEs tend to have proportional representation (Cusack, Iversen, & Soskice, 2007; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Iversen & Stephens, 2008).

Based on this one can link the differentiation between LMEs and CMEs with electoral institutions and distinguish three different groups of systems (Iversen & Stephens, 2008):

- LMEs with majoritarian election systems, which are mainly governed by right-wing governments and experience only medium levels of public higher education funding but high levels of private higher education funding;
- CMEs with proportional representation and no Christian Democratic (CD) party are characterised by mainly left-wing governments and high public higher education funding;
- CMEs with proportional representation and a strong CD party, which mainly have centrist governments, due to the fact that the CD party is a cross-class party; parties in these countries prefer a medium level of public spending, close to the one of LME countries with majoritarian election systems, but there is also a strong vocational education and training (VET) sector.

This classification combines the VoC approach with parts of the argument made by Busemeyer et al. (2013) on policy legacy and the institutional impact of a strong Catholic heritage as discussed earlier in this paper:

*Hypothesis 6: If a country is categorised as a CME and has a strong Christian Democratic Party, then political parties support medium levels of access to and public expenditures in higher education.*

#### SUGGESTION OF A RESEARCH DESIGN

To further investigate the claims laid out in the hypotheses previously established a triangulated approach using both quantitative and qualitative data would be

advisable. This is due to two reasons: First, to establish the link between different partisan preferences and subsequent shifts in policy outputs it is necessary to also identify differences in the respective policy positions to strengthen the causal claim (Kelle, 2005; Klitgaard & Elmelund-Præstekær, 2013, p. 53). Second, from the outset this paper was interested in two different dependent variables, which are needed to answer the question whether political parties matter in higher education: the differences in policy positions and the differences in policy outputs.

In a first analytical step one would use party programmes, manifestos and coalition agreements as a basis for a content analysis.<sup>9</sup> In this analysis the party family of a specific political party in a country would serve as the independent variable, the respective policy positions on higher education would be the dependent variable and the institutional factors such as the level of enrolment in the existing higher education system, the variety of capitalism, the catholic heritage as well as the existence of a Christian Democratic party would be intervening variables. This would also allow identifying the policy frame in which different parties in different countries address higher education policy.

In a second step, the partisan composition of a government would serve as the independent variable to explain policy outputs in the area of higher education using the intervening variables mentioned above. Indicators for policy outputs in higher education could include for example student numbers, student-staff ratio, public as well as private higher education funding. To identify more qualitative policy outputs, changes in higher education laws and government white papers also need to be taken into consideration.

When analysing the impact of political parties on a specific policy, the turnover of a government is a good reference point. It creates a situation, in which a part or all of the main political actors in a government are exchanged and new political programmes are put in place. Especially in situations where not only the people in office but also the ideological composition of the government changes, one can expect to observe subsequent changes in policies. Given the symbolic character of reforms and changes in policy (Scott, 1999), they can be used as a signal by the new incoming government to show the voters that their vote had an impact. Furthermore, analysing government turnovers helps to limit the number of intervening variables by keeping the time frame limited to the term before and after the turnover elections.

Future research, using the hypotheses and design proposed above, links well with claims in the literature that call for a joint analysis of both divergence in policy positions as well as divergence in policy outputs to control for effects such as cartel parties (Klitgaard & Elmelund-Præstekær, 2013; Peters, 2005, p. 135). By linking the more actor-oriented research on comparative politics and the more structure focused VoC approach a study based on the proposed hypotheses and research design would offer new insights into the structure versus agency controversy and would also allow to investigate different levels of policy rigidity (Baumgartner, 2013) based on the differing influences of policy legacies versus structural legacies.



## CONCLUSION

It has been shown that the existing literature suggests diverging answers and offers disagreements and ambiguities. Studies in the area of comparative politics support the view that parties matter both concerning differences in policy positions and policy outputs in higher education. However, there is disagreement on the question how the preferences for higher education policy are actually distributed along the political spectrum. When it comes to studies based on the variety of capitalism approach, they highlight more the importance of structures and see them as the reasons behind cross-national differences in higher education policy.

Responding to the question, do political parties matter in higher education policy in Western Europe and if so how, one can state, based on the arguments made in this paper, that it is rather likely that they matter both concerning differences in policy positions and differences in policy outputs. However, the extent to which they matter depends on several intervening institutional variables such as the level of enrolment of the existing higher education system, the variety of capitalism and policy legacies stemming from the way religious conflicts have been settled.

However, so far the argument rests solely on conceptual considerations, thus to move the research frontier even further ahead it would be necessary to use the proposed design to test the hypotheses offered. This would not only give a possibility to harmonise the existing findings but also add to the so far only limited amount of research on the partisan influences on higher education policy. Such work would not only give a clearer picture of the interaction between the partisan political sphere and higher education but also add to the general knowledgebase on partisan policy positions, the link between partisan input and government policy output as well as inter-country and inter-party differences. Higher education is not just any other policy area but represents a unique arena, which is more fluid and offers less clear cut partisan positions due to its recently gained saliency, its possibility to be debated in different policy frames and its peculiar re-distributive capacities. Both the existing conflict in the literature on partisan preferences in higher education and the primacy of an actor-based versus structure-based approach make higher education policy a good case study to gain knowledge on political parties' behaviour in a less typical policy area.

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### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> For an overview see Busemeyer and Trampusch (2011).
- <sup>2</sup> A third cleavage line, the conflict between center and periphery, might lead to potentially interesting analyses of party behaviour in higher education, especially concerning the question of the relationship of different kinds of higher education institutions and the level of centralisation of the higher education system. Unfortunately the limitations of this chapter do not allow for an in-depth analysis of this, especially since the territorial cleavage was weakened due to the nationalization of politics (Knutsen, 2013).
- <sup>3</sup> In a more historical analysis of the political development of different higher education systems this would be different.
- <sup>4</sup> For a debate of the redistributive capacities of education see Jensen (2011) and Ansell (2010, pp. 5-7).
- <sup>5</sup> It is noteworthy that Ansell's definition of elite and mass higher education systems differs from the one proposed by Trow, who defines an elite system until 15% enrollment, a mass system between 16% and 50% and a universal higher education system to have more than 50% of enrollment (Trow, 2006).
- <sup>6</sup> For the sake of simplicity the presented model focuses on comparing a large center-left and a large center-right party, however it would also be possible to expand it to other parts of the political spectrum. But as Ansell (2010) has shown with his inverse-U relationship between the party position and support for educational expansion, extreme parties are less likely to be in favour of educational expansion.
- <sup>7</sup> I mentioned before that running on a programme to defund education is rather unlikely for political parties, however in a situation of budgetary constraints a left-wing party might shift funds from higher education to policy areas, which are more directly targeted towards its core electorate and have more direct redistributive effects.
- <sup>8</sup> The second part of this argument is the logical next step from the assessment that access to higher education is skewed towards the wealthy (Lucas, 2001). Since the entry requirement into a higher education career is connected to prior participation in and graduation from higher education it can also be expected that those working in higher education are more supportive of right-wing parties if access is skewed to the wealthy.
- <sup>9</sup> It should be noted that the pre-coded data of the Comparative Manifestos Project is not very helpful for this approach since, as Busemeyer et al (2013, p. 8) pointed out, the respective code neither separates between different levels of education nor between the preference for educational expansion and educational improvement. “

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## 7. ACCESS, EQUITY, AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

*A Norwegian Tale*<sup>1</sup>

### INTRODUCTION

All over the world, the transition from elite to mass, and in many cases, universal higher education (Trow & Burrage, 2010) has resulted in a new set of policy dilemmas regarding the governance of higher education (HE) systems in general (Amaral, Jones, & Karseth, 2002), as well as attempts to steer access to HE in particular (Pinheiro, Charles, & Jones, 2013; Pinheiro & Antonowicz, forthcoming). Pressures for expansion originate from a variety of sources; from local labour markets (economy), youth aspirations (demand-driven), and the internal willingness by HE institutions to expand programmatic offerings (supply-driven), increasing notably the sub-specialisation amongst academic groups. In addition, expansionary drivers are often associated with the political goal of enhancing equality of educational opportunity (Aamodt & Kyvik, 2005) as a means of fostering social mobility, particularly when it comes to underrepresented groups like ethnic minorities, women, students from rural areas, etc. Further, and intrinsically linked with the rise of a knowledge-based economy (Rooney, Hearn, & Ninan, 2008), HE expansion is thought to play a critical role in the ability of countries, regions, and localities to be able to compete, nationally and globally (Lester & Sotarauta, 2007).

This chapter takes stock of the historical policy efforts made by the central government in Norway to steer developments regarding access to HE. In addition, it sheds light on the effects that such policies have had regarding equity on the one hand and regional development on the other. Three distinct access or massification waves are identified. Conceptually, our discussion builds on the burgeoning literature on access, regionalisation, and the role of HE institutions in regional development.

The chapter is divided into six core sections. Following the introduction, section two sketches the conceptual backdrop of the paper. We then move on to illuminate the policy logics and initiatives associated with the three historical access waves. This is followed by a (shorter) empirical section on the link between equity, access, and regional development. Section five discusses the findings in view of the literature, and finally section six concludes the paper by shedding light on the implications of the study's main findings and by suggesting avenues for future research.

## CONCEPTUAL BACKDROP

*Access, Regionalisation, and Regional Development*

In a number of countries, access to HE has been at the forefront of the policy agenda since the post-World War II (WWII) period (Aamodt & Kyvik, 2005; Clancy & Goastellec, 2007). Considerable policy and scholarly attention has been given to enhancing educational opportunity amongst specific social groups, including ethnic minorities (John & Noell, 1989), women (Bradley, 2000), mature students (Reay, Ball, & David, 2002), as well as those from low social economic strata (Ball, Reay, & David, 2002). These aspects are associated with what some have termed “the politics of access” (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2005, p.7). In his seminal work on HE systems, Clark (1983) refers to the fact that:

Access became publicly defined in the late 1960s and early 1970s as the most important problem of the many problems brought about the expansion of national systems into mass higher education. (p. 38)

In a handful of countries, such as the Nordics, expansion was facilitated through decentralisation in the form of the establishment of regionally embedded HE providers, with clear goals as for the recruitment of local students and direct interaction with regional actors across the public and private sectors (Kyvik, 1981; Hölttä, 2000; Pinheiro, 2012).

Regional socio-economic asymmetries, both within and between countries, have also been a traditional concern of policy makers, particularly within the OECD region (OECD, 2009). Higher education institutions, both research and non-research-intensive ones, are thought to be critical actors in addressing pending local problems (Gunasekara, 2006; OECD, 2007). One of the (many) ways in which HE institutions are expected to contribute is to provide local populations with the necessary sets of skills and competencies required in the “new” knowledge economy (Harding, Scott, Laske, & Burtscher, 2007), which, in turn, is likely to assist local economic prosperity, including the ability to process, absorb, manipulate, and transfer knowledge assets (Benneworth & Sanderson, 2009; Nilsson, 2009; Pinheiro et al., 2012).

There is solid empirical evidence suggesting that, all things being equal (e.g., access to jobs and quality of life), graduates are likely to remain in the geographic vicinity of the urban areas that they inhabited while undertaking HE studies (Lin, Rowland, & Fields, 2006; Mathews, Rourke, & Park, 2006). This alone creates an additional policy incentive for promoting the decentralisation of HE provision. During the 1980s and 1990s, policy efforts across (Western) Europe aimed at decentralising HE were gradually replaced by a policy of regionalisation (i.e., centralised decentralisation processes) characterised by the establishment of new, relatively autonomous educational providers and/or study centres at the local level (Kyvik, 2009, p. 109). Over the years, and in countries where regional dimensions play an important role at the national level, such as in the Nordics, higher education policy and regionalisation policy became increasingly intertwined (Pinheiro, 2012).



## EMPIRICAL SECTION (I): GOVERNING ACCESS

In Norway, three main phases or “access waves” have been identified since the mid-1950s until recently. In the first wave (mid-1950s-early 1970s), entitled here “more is better,” the prevalent policy logic was that of expanding the number of vacancies and institutions as a response to increasing demand for high-level skills following the post-WWII reconstruction period and the expectations of the baby-boom generation. The second access wave (mid-1980s-mid-1990s) was characterised by the challenges associated with expansions, a phase that we typify accordingly as “more is a problem.” Finally, the third access wave (ongoing) was initiated in the mid-1990s, and is symbolised by the willingness to steer the systems in the direction of particular skills and competencies, aligned with the knowledge economy and an aging population (welfare services), as well as tackling pending asymmetries with respect to access inequalities amongst certain groups. This phase is termed here “more but different.”

*“More is Better” (Mid-50s-Early 70s)*

During the first expansionary wave, between 1955 and 1966, enrolments quadrupled, from less than eight thousand students to close to twenty-nine thousand (OECD, 1971, p. 23). By the mid-60s, the proportion of all 20-24 year olds enrolled in HE reached 11.2%, up from an estimated 3.6% a decade earlier. There were two main drivers: (a) the shortage of a qualified labour force, an aspect associated with the “economic rationale” for expansion; and (b) a policy emphasis on equality of educational opportunity, linked to a “socio-political rationale.” The government-led policy of expansion was articulated via the Norwegian research councils, which had been established in the late 40s. By the mid-60s, the growing aspirations of students (“baby-boomers”) entering the age-cohort became the key legitimating factor for expansion. Throughout the 60s and 70s, access to HE was further expanded with the doubling of university providers, from 2 to 4. Between 1960 and 1975, the number of students enrolled at Norwegian universities quadrupled, to 40,000 (Aamodt, 1995, p. 64). Growth patterns varied across fields nonetheless, with sharp increases in the humanities and the pure and the social sciences, but with declines in law, the medical sciences, and technology (OECD, 1971). That said, the most significant expansionary feature during this period was the establishment (late-60s) of a public-run regional college system comprising a set of shorter, vocationally oriented institutions focusing on cross/multi-disciplinary education (Kyvik, 1981). Over time, this system, which also included former post-secondary schools (for teacher training, nursing, etc.), would expand from 3 to 14 institutions, accounting for a significant number of domestic HE enrolments. The vast popularity (and legitimacy) of this particular policy instrument was largely due to the fact that it led to greater geographic decentralisation, from the main cities (Oslo & Bergen) to the peripheral areas or regions. Hence, during this first wave, the creation of the regional colleges became

the symbol of the new policy on HE (Aamodt, 1995, p. 65), and marked the initial period of convergence between regional(isation) and higher education policies.

In the mid-70s, as a direct result of the oil shocks, there was sluggish economic growth across the entire Nordic region. This in turn led to public budgets cuts and rising unemployment. The strong belief in universities as engines for economic development (Castells, 1993), so prevalent in the 50s and 60s, was then replaced by a new policy logic substantiated by the demand for “socially-relevant universities” (Bleiklie, Høstaker, & Vabø, 2000, p. 95). The newly established regional colleges were expected to respond (more efficiently) to the needs and expectations of various external constituencies: students, local labour markets, etc. During the first half of the 1980s the focus attributed to short-term, vocational HE led to the rise of a “policy of vocationalism” (Bleiklie et al., 2000, p. 96). The latter was exercised in the form of a technocratic attempt – and by governmental agencies – to manage HE outputs in light of the economic needs of the country. In the decade 1975-1985, enrolments across the non-university, vocational college sector grew by 136% (Vabø & Aamodt, 2005, p. 17). In contrast, and partly due to resistance by the university establishment towards reform proposals during the late 60s/early-70s (Bleiklie et al., 2000), university enrolments did stagnate. As a result, the response by universities became increasingly more local, with these expressing a sense of “abandonment” by the national authorities (Aamodt, Kyvik, & Skoie, 1991).

*“More Is a Problem” (Mid-1980s-Mid-1990s)*

In contrast to the first expansionary period, this second wave was neither planned by the central authorities nor was the result (side-effect) of ongoing policy initiatives. The main drivers for further expansion during this period were: (a) high levels of unemployment amongst 16-24 year olds; and (b) higher educational aspirations amongst Norway’s youth. Caught by surprise, one of the mechanisms used by the Norwegian government in order to match (balance) supply and demand was the re-directing of public funds targeting unemployment subsidies into HE, via the creation (subsidisation) of new study places. This basically meant that HE became a de facto policy instrument (Olsen, 2007) for tackling rising unemployment. Besides redirecting unemployment funds into HE, the Norwegian government devised a series of new policy instruments to cope with the unexpected demand. One such measure encompassed enhanced efficiency of publicly run institutions. To this effect, a new legal framework (1990) enabling the integration of the existing (4) universities with the (6) university-colleges was adopted. This policy measure marked the beginning of the homogenisation of rules and regulations governing Norway’s binary divide, an aspect that would become a critical factor in “academic drift” processes experienced since the mid-90s (Kyvik, 2007; Pinheiro & Kyvik, 2009).

In the early 90s, the pronounced rise of university enrolments (from 16 thousand to 46 thousand) resulted in the introduction of stricter admission policies targeting university education. However, such restrictions had little practical implications on

university enrolments, which continued to climb throughout the 1990s. By 1996, 170 thousand students were enrolled at HE institutions across the country, 45% of whom attended university-based education (NSD-DBH). During the second half of the 90s, gross enrolment rates at universities (12%) greatly surpassed those of the university colleges (2%).

When it comes to governance-related issues, increasing interaction (late 90s onwards) amongst the university and university-college sub-sectors – around the idea of a “Network Norway” – was geared towards facilitating coordination across Norway’s tertiary sector by addressing obstacles hindering institutional collaboration. This, in turn, further contributed to the convergence of goals, functions, structures, and programmes, further enhancing system-wide integration. In addition, the Ministry of Education devised a set of new measures aimed at strengthening the institutional basis for teaching and research across the college sub-sector, a process that, in the mid-90s, culminated with the forced (“top-down”) merger of 98 regional colleges into 26 (new) state colleges (*høgskoler*). The amalgamation process was driven by two main drivers: efficiency and quality (Kyvik, 2002). Finally, this second access wave was marked by the alignment between government objectives and the constellation of various political forces, actors, and values, which on the whole seem to have been successfully accomplished (Bleiklie et al., 2000, pp. 75-76).

*“More but Different” (Mid-90s-2013)*

By the mid-90s, the rise of the “knowledge society/economy” paradigm (World Bank, 1999) raised new policy concerns regarding future labour-market needs, the retraining of individuals (focus on skills and competencies), and the (still) unfulfilled socio-economic and cultural aspirations of society, including the under-representation of certain groups in HE. As it was the case in the 1950s and 1960s, the sector came, once again, to be seen as a key one in leveraging Norway’s capacity to compete, both regionally and internationally, as well as in helping to address pending socio-economic asymmetries. In the late 90s, the central government enacted a comprehensive structural reform (Competence Reform) with the objective of easing access to HE by non-traditional students (OECD, 2005, p. 63). A central aspect of this policy mechanism was the implementation of measures for documenting the formal, non-formal, and informal qualifications of adults. Later on, in 2003, a strategic plan targeting ethnic/language minorities and aimed at improving learning and participation rates across the entire educational sector (from day care to schools to HE institutions) was adopted. Its primary goal was to increase the participation of minority language students, particularly first-generation immigrants, in HE (Pinheiro, 2010). As far as gender-related issues are concerned, government policies during this period focused on three main aspects: (a) reduce the gender segregation across study fields; (b) increase female participation/completion at the graduate (masters and PhD) levels; and (c) enlarge the share of female professors (OECD, 2005, p. 62). Starting in the mid-2000s, all

Norwegian HE institutions are required to develop a strategy (and follow it up with an action plan) regarding gender equality.

Institutional ambitions by the university colleges to become fully fledged universities have led to increasing academisation or academic drift tendencies (Kyvik, 2007; Pinheiro, 2013). This, in turn, has helped spark government concerns with respect to system-wide issues such as overcapacity, fragmentation, relevance, and efficiency (NOU, 2008). The 2005 Act<sup>2</sup> for universities and colleges stipulates a series of new regulations (amended in 2007)<sup>3</sup> affecting students' admission into HE. For example, section 3.7 addresses a number of critical issues ranging from the role of the Ministry of Education and Research in issuing sector-wide regulations concerning the national coordination of admissions, to the development of a separate admission process for higher degree courses, to the delegation of responsibility to the institutions concerning the placement of foreign students. Between 1995 and 2005, total HE enrolments increased by 29% (NSD-DBH). In 2005, 40% of enrolments occurred at universities. Those have continued to climb in the period 2006-2013 (19% growth rate over this period), totalling 245 thousand students in 2013, 43% of which enrolled at one of the (8) public universities (NSD-DBH).

In recent years, public HE institutions have been pressured to become more responsive to the needs of society. This is largely a result of demographic trends affecting the size of the age cohort across all regions outside greater Oslo (NOU, 2008), which, amongst other things, is resulting in the emergence of new providers (through mergers) and collaborative arrangements (strategic alliances) at the local and regional levels (Kyvik & Stensaker, 2013). There is some evidence suggesting that universities, both the "old" and the newly established ones, are more willing than in the past to collaborate with various external actors across the public and private sectors (Gulbrandsen & Nerdrum, 2009; Pinheiro et al., 2012). That said, major challenges, both structural and cultural, remain (Pinheiro, 2013).

Currently, there are some concerns regarding the shortage of graduates (national and regional labour markets) across certain key (knowledge-intensive) areas of the economy such as engineering, education, health, and welfare. A recent ministerial commission has suggested fostering institutional collaboration (formal mergers and strategic alliances) and differentiation (institutional profiling) in order to better respond to local and national labour market needs (NOU, 2008) and make Norway a robust and competitive knowledge-based economy in years to come.

In order to enhance predictability and transparency regarding national, educational, and research investments, a 2012-2013 White paper to Parliament has urged the need to develop a long-term plan for HE and research (KD, 2012). According to the Ministry of Education and Research, the latter 'will serve as an arena in which the research and higher education sector, trade and industry, and the users of research may engage in an open discussion of how to prioritise resources' (KD, 2012, p. 8). Furthermore, the above plan highlights that there 'is a demand in all parts of the country for good access to higher education and specialist knowledge environments' (KD, 2012, p. 11).

## EMPIRICAL SECTION (II): EQUITY, ACCESS, AND DEVELOPMENT

Equity, in the form of “equality of opportunity,” has been at the forefront of Norway’s HE policy agenda since the post-WWII period (Aamodt & Kyvik, 2005). Two aspects have been central to this strategy: first, the establishment (late 40s) of the state-run financial system (lånkassen), which removed financial barriers for entering HE; and second, the creation of a regional college system across the country, which later became the foundation for the establishment of a binary HE system composed of universities and university colleges (Kyvik, 2009). Recent studies have shown that the decentralisation of HE provision across the entire country was aided by the development of a dual system, i.e., a more formalised version of the binary system based on a common regulative framework (Kyvik, 2009). Decentralisation has been found to have a positive effect when it comes to fostering access to HE by regional student populations, including underrepresented groups such as those from rural areas and/or emanating from lower socio-economic and educational family backgrounds (Aamodt & Kyvik, 2005; Stensaker et al., 2005; Pinheiro, 2012b). Notwithstanding this, regional asymmetries with respect to enrolment and attainment rates, e.g., as regards long-term higher education attainments, persist (NSD-DBH).

Few studies have, so far, thoroughly investigated the effects of the presence of HE institutions, particularly university colleges, on regional development in Norway. Evidence from selected regions suggests that the effects on the private sector of the economy, e.g., when it comes to technology transfers, local innovation systems, and regional absorptive capacity, have been rather negligible (Hauge et al., 2013; Isaksen & Karlsen, 2010; OECD, 2009). As for the contribution of comprehensive, research-intensive universities to regional development (e.g., insofar as technology transfers and regional innovation systems), studies suggest that the benefits accrued to their presence in a given locality are far from being optimal (Arbø & Eskelinen, 2003; Pinheiro 2012a, b), despite the fact that institutionalised inter-sectoral (university-industry) cooperation dates back to the 1980s (Gulbrandsen & Nerdrum, 2009).

## DISCUSSION

The historical account provided above suggests that HE expansion and system-level regulation (government steering) are characterised by increasing ambiguity, dynamism, bi-directionality, and unpredictability. Intriguingly, such aspects are often neglected in policy circles across Europe (Maassen & Olsen, 2007; Maassen & Stensaker, 2011) and/or as a key ingredient of policy making (and implementation) processes (Gornitzka, Kogan, & Amaral, 2005; Amaral, Neave, Musselin, & Maassen, 2010). The gradual yet steady transition from governance to steering at a distance (Amaral, Jones, & Karseth, 2002; Kickert, 1995) has, *inter alia*, meant that ongoing dynamics across the organisational field of HE (Kyvik, 2009) as well as within HE institutions themselves, e.g., with respect to their “autonomous functions” (Trow, 1970), are increasingly characterised by the complex interplay amongst a set of key factors, namely:

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- The needs and expectations of internal and external constituencies (Benneworth & Jongbloed, 2010; Jongbloed, Enders, & Salerno, 2008);
- Conflicting logics at the policy (government), institutional (universities), and/or sub-unit levels (Maassen & Stensaker, 2011; Jones, 2008; Pinheiro, Benneworth, & Jones, 2012b);
- Strategic agendas, internally and/or externally driven (Rip, 2004; Pinheiro, 2012; Fumasoli, Pinheiro, & Stensaker, 2012; Pinheiro & Stensaker, in press);
- Academic and institutional goals, models, or archetypes as well as future developmental trajectories and aspirations (Hazelkorn, 2009; Pinheiro, 2013; Pinheiro & Stensaker, in press).

Together, the above elements contribute substantially to the complexity associated with the “black box” of the (causal effects) mechanisms surrounding the governance of HE (Amaral et al., 2002; Cloete, Maassen, & Muller, 2005) on the one hand, and, on the other, that of HE institutions, particularly research-intensive universities, as: (a) distinct organisations (Musselin, 2007); (b) relatively autonomous (and resilient) institutions (Pinheiro, Benneworth, & Jones, 2012a); (c) instruments or tools for broader political goals (Olsen, 2007); and (d) strategic actors (Ramirez, 2010). In addition, it is worth taking into account the (evolving nature of the) complex ecology of relations amongst stakeholders involved in the coordination of the domestic HE system (Clark, 1983). This, we contend, is a direct reflection of the changing nature of the “social pact” between HE and society, brokered via the state (Gornitzka, Maassen, Olsen, & Stensaker, 2007; Maassen, this volume).

The broad agreement within Norwegian society with respect to the value – economic and otherwise – of HE as a public investment (Mora & Vila, 2003), in tandem with the role undertaken by a variety of actors at the national, regional, and local levels (Jongbloed et al., 2008; Pinheiro, Normann, & Johnsen, 2012c), are at the heart of the uncontested (and deeply institutionalised) link between decentralisation (regionalisation of HE), equity (enhanced access), and local and regional economic development (Pinheiro, Charles, & Jones, 2013). Despite the lack of systematic empirical evidence of the positive (generative and/or developmental) role (Gunasekara, 2006) played by HE institutions with respect to localised innovation processes and systems (Nilsson, 2006), it is undeniable, nonetheless, that the mere presence of HE institutions (both universities and university colleges) in more peripheral locations (remote regions) has had a positive impact – both when it comes to enhancing access to HE and also with respect to training professionals (nurses, teachers, managers, public administrators, etc.) – for the vast public sector (hospitals, schools, municipalities, etc.) spread across the entire country.

#### CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

This chapter makes sense of attempts by Norway’s super structure (Clark, 1983) to steer and/or cope with ongoing developments in light of changing macro socio-economic circumstances (oil shocks, financial crisis, youth unemployment, aging

population, etc.), shifting (global and local) policy imperatives, as well as growing societal expectations with respect to the role of HE institutions towards a more equitable and economically competitive society. Amongst other aspects, our discussion illuminates how governmental agencies in Norway enacted policy instruments in light of emerging circumstances and ideological/societal priorities, as well as the (evolving) nature of the social contract between HE and Norwegian society. Further, it was also shown that the interplay between HE and regional(isation) policy resulted in positive effects both in terms of access (equity) as well as regional development imperatives, albeit in the absence of extensive comparative data.

Going forward (in terms of a research agenda), we contend that there is much to gain from comparative historical analysis, within Europe and beyond, encompassing national HE systems that possess different starting points and endogenous characteristics but that at the same time manifest converging policy priorities and similar dynamics, tensions, and unresolved policy dilemmas, which are intrinsically linked with the level of maturity (massification) of the domestic HE systems. Future comparative studies investigating issues pertaining to the governance of access in HE should, in addition to the key aspects highlighted in this chapter, take into account the interplay between: local vs. global dimensions, e.g., regarding the local translation of global (hegemonic) policy scripts; top-down (state-initiated) vs. bottom-up (institutionally led) initiatives; short vs. long-term effects, including unintended ones; convergence (isomorphic) vs. divergence (polymorphic) tendencies; etc. Finally, following Gornitzka et al. (2007) and Maassen (this volume), future inquiries could cast critical light on the extent to which policy initiatives (successful or otherwise) geared towards enhanced access, greater decentralisation (of provision), and regional development (economic impact) have affected the traditional relations amongst key actors at the system level, and, consequently, the nature of the social pact between HE and society, brokered via the state.

#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> This chapter builds on comparative studies in which the author is currently involved together with colleagues from Poland (Dr. Dominik Antonowicz), Canada (Prof. Glen Jones) and the UK/Australia (Prof. David Charles).
- <sup>2</sup> Online (in English) at: [http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/KD/vedlegg/uh/UHloven\\_engelsk.pdf](http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/KD/vedlegg/uh/UHloven_engelsk.pdf)
- <sup>3</sup> Online (in English) at: <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/kd/documents/legislation/regulations/2010/regulations-concerning-admission-to-high.html?id=640003>

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## 8. SHRINKING HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEMS

### *Portugal, Figures, and Policies*

#### INTRODUCTION

After a long period of expansion and diversification – the massification process – the Portuguese higher education system is witnessing a dynamic of stratification where it is possible to identify winners and losers, not only amongst institutions but also amongst locations. A set of key indicators on access to public higher education in Portugal, derived from the national database, highlights at different levels the persistence of a mismatch between supply and demand of vacancies (Teixeira, Fonseca, Amado, Sá, & Amaral, 2009). A select group of top universities seen as the most attractive was able to maintain or even strengthen their public recognition, through higher quality assurance and excellence due to the scientific research developed on their campuses or to the success of their graduates. The existence and persistence of “status” in a segment of the higher education system, “the elephant in the room” as referred to by Marginson – “No one can talk about it – even though everyone knows is there, and that it matters” (Marginson, 2011a, p. 32) – gives some support to the argument that there is a lack of elasticity in the demand for higher education, or even to the failure of national policies that, sustained by principles of equity, aim for the expansion of higher education to more peripheral areas and population groups (Marginson, 2011).

The process of massification did extend access to higher education to more diversified socio-economic groups, including lower income groups, which are traditionally underrepresented. However, at the same time, more elitist and exclusive segments recomposed themselves, not necessarily according to meritorious criteria but rather because of their greater social and cultural capital and wider *mean information field*, all of which are more easily attained by higher income groups. Although more inclusive, the higher education system in Portugal does not experience a real democratisation since there is always an over-representation of students from the upper classes.

The existence of a set of utopian conditions should guarantee the right to higher education and to universal access in the broadest sense of the term. Tristan McCowan uses Tomasevski’s model of the 4 “As” to assess these conditions: “availability (existence of sufficient places), accessibility (non-discrimination in access to those places), acceptability (meaningful and respectful curriculum) and adaptability (institutional flexibility in accordance with student needs)” (McCowan, 2012, p. 125).

This study intends to contribute to further discussion of the theoretical framework on social and territorial equity in higher education by analysing empirical data on the process of access to public higher education in Portugal in the last fifteen years with national policies and measures, and by focusing the analysis in the construction and civil engineering field.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, this field has registered the largest decrease of candidates in the last admission process of 2012/2013. This particular focus will allow us to identify the process of self-organisation in the patterns depicted by the candidate's choices, which, if unchanged, can cause a restructuring of the system through the polarisation of not only a few institutions but also some urban centres. These arguments will be supported by different theoretical frameworks on stratification of higher education, which include Marginson's theoretical proposals on the persistence of status hierarchies that are "more stable and permanent than any aristocracy" (Marginson, 2011a, p. 31) and recent research studies on higher education's adaptation to the international crisis (Douglass, 2010; IPPR Institute for Public Policy Research, 2013; Leach, 2013; Marginson, 1998, 2007, 2011a, 2011b; Marginson & Rhoades, 2002).

The behaviour of the demand for access to public higher education in recent years reflects national policies and is conditioned by a number of factors that can be aggregated into two groups: expansion forces and contraction forces, some of which will be identified in our empirical analysis. By integrating two levels of analysis (nationwide and a particular field of study) we intend to show that the system as a whole can be highly responsive and adaptive to different kinds of changes, which, in turn, should be considered in prospective studies in other fields, anticipating future scenarios.

#### SETTING THE SCENE

The current Portuguese higher education system can be characterised by its dimension, complexity, and territorial dispersion. There are public and private universities and polytechnics dispersed throughout the country. Despite showing a higher concentration in both metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto, Portugal has institutions of higher education located in medium-sized cities and small centres in more peripheral areas (Fonseca & Encarnação, 2012). From the 1970s (with the end of the dictatorship) to the late 1990s, demand for study places in the public system remained higher than supply (Fonseca, 2012). In order to deal with the growing demand and with the objective of broadening access, the system was expanded through the foundation of new universities and polytechnics (public and private) in new locations, breaking the previously existing concentration, in only three locations: Lisbon, Porto, and Coimbra. Overall, there has been an expansion and spatial dispersion of new higher education institutions (HEI) all over the country (Figure 1).

SHRINKING HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEMS




Figure 1. Higher education institutions in Portugal by establishment date<sup>2</sup>

The high demand for places in medical schools led to the introduction of *numerus clausus* in 1977/1978 and would later be extended to the whole system. The disparity between supply and demand for places in higher education continued, however, to characterise the system, albeit alongside the growing number of new institutions. The growth of private-sector institutions was thus supported on the grounds of insufficiency of places in the public system, which would then register a major expansion, mainly concentrated in Lisbon and Porto (Fonseca & Encarnação, 2012; Magalhães, Amaral, & Tavares, 2009). Apart from the *numerus clausus* for all first-cycle programmes (*licenciaturas* and *mestrados integrados*), access to public higher education in Portugal is centrally regulated at the government level through a national process (Fonseca, Tavares, Sá, & Amaral,

2013). Each applicant can choose up to six study programme/institution pairs, which will then be sorted by students' final average grade and/or other special conditions<sup>3</sup> (Fonseca & Encarnação, 2012). This system has been in operation for about 35 years and has generated a number of criticisms with some arguing that public universities should have more autonomy in the process of recruiting their students. The combination of *numerus clausus* generalised to all study programmes and a centralised system of access to higher education has always aimed at a more balanced distribution of applicants amongst not only fields of study but also amongst institutions, preventing a strong concentration in Lisbon and Porto and ensuring the sustainability of institutions in more peripheral areas.

Paradoxically, the current disparity between supply and demand still remains and is evident, above all, between universities and polytechnics and between the main urban regions and the peripheral areas. However, the overall supply surpasses the demand for places. At the same time, in certain fields (e.g., medical schools) and locations (Porto, above all urban areas), supply is still lower than demand. These apparent paradoxes show that a centralised regulation has not been capable of mitigating the unbalanced relation between supply and demand (Fonseca & Encarnação, 2012; Fonseca, Tavares, Sá, & Amaral, 2013; Teixeira, Fonseca, Amado, Sá, & Amaral, 2009). Therefore, it seems legitimate to question the efficiency of those policies and actions – aimed at widening access to higher education and increasing enrolment rates – that seem to assume that demand would continue to exceed the supply for places. This reinforces the idea that the enlargement of the higher education network was not fully grounded in the study of different future scenarios of supply and demand.

HEI can be characterised as high-order functions and their sustainability can be threatened if a minimum population threshold (or critical mass) is not achieved, even more so in low population areas with small student influxes. Given the current demographic, social and economic conjuncture in Portugal, the following questions should be posed: has the demand for higher education reached the expected levels? And, does the current demand justify all of the public and private institutions that already exist or will in the near future? Although difficult to answer, these issues do not detract from the overall improvement of the system as a whole, nor do they deny the rise in the number of graduates, both crucial for the reinforcement of human capital. In Portugal, as elsewhere, positive developments in higher education and research in recent decades have confirmed that the system can play an important role as one of the backbones of a country's development (IPPR, 2013).

In Portugal, the demand for places began to decrease by the middle of the 1990s (Fonseca, 2012). Between 1995/1996 and 2007/2008,<sup>4</sup> the system has witnessed a general decrease followed by an increase in the number of candidates until 2009.<sup>5</sup> This growth may be related to the Bologna process (three-year study programmes) and also to the opening of other non-traditional access tracks (e.g., 23-year-old students or older), though it was only transitory inasmuch as the demand for places started to decrease again after 2009. Specifically, in the last school year (2012/2013) there were 52,298 places and only 45,093 applications in the first

phase. The slight increase in the number of places available since 2006 can also be associated with the Bologna process and the growth in the number of initial study programmes. But the general increase in the number of places may be traced back to the 1980s, when new funding mechanisms were implemented, which were related to the number of students of each institution and to the overall application of tuition fees (Cerqueira, 2009). However, it is not clear that this growth in the number of places was in any way supported by future scenarios of student population dynamics and minimum thresholds that would account for the sustainability of institutions. Between 2011 and 2012, there was a slight decrease in the number of places due to some legislative measures that restricted to a minimum the demand for the opening of some study programmes (Administrative Rule – Portaria – n.º 195/2012 from the 21<sup>st</sup> of June). In the last 14 years, the number of enrolled students followed the fluctuation of the number of applicants and the difference between both variables remained constant. The number of enrolled students (1st phase, 1st option), however, shows a more stable behaviour. In a period of decreasing demand, the system efficiency would improve the number of enrolled students in their first option; however, this has only occurred, albeit insignificantly, in the years 2001 to 2004. The demand elasticity reveals itself to be relatively weak and a segment of prime study programmes and/or institutions concentrate the majority of the candidate's choices. The existence of a more competitive segment of the system would thus be responsible for the persistence of the mismatch between demand and supply as already emphasised.

#### RECONSIDERING THE DEMAND ELASTICITY FOR HIGHER EDUCATION

In recent years, the behaviour of demand for public higher education reflects the results of national policies and is also a reaction to a number of factors that affect access and that can be aggregated into two main groups: expansion forces, and a set of demand retracting forces.

As expansion forces, one must take into consideration the effects of educational policies towards widening access, educational policies for improving primary and secondary education, increase of lifelong learning programmes, the entry of non-traditional students (older and already employed), as well as the acceptance of students through non-traditional paths (e.g., vocational training and other skills recognition systems), and finally the socio-economic and education upgrade of the population in general. Retracting forces on demand should include demographic decline (aggravated by falling birth rates), some lack of interest in higher education resulting from the loss of trust in the system due to the current and increasing problems of unemployment and employability of graduates, as well as a general loss of individual and family purchasing power related to the present financial crisis. Graduates' low salary levels when compared with non-graduates (especially at the beginning of their careers) can eventually lead to a reduction of the returns of investment in education (or even losses) when opportunity costs are considered (Lenton, 2012).



Thus – and contrary to what might be expected and desirable – higher education massification has, paradoxically, created situations of over-education, a concept apparently absurd but that reflects the mismatch between qualified employment offers and labour market demand (Lenton, 2012). The outflows of graduates to other countries – *brain drain* – demonstrate the aforementioned over-education and the vulnerability of the economic base of some regions, unable to make use of the available human capital.

Taking into account the general indicators of school enrolment rates in primary and secondary education, the percentage of active population having completed secondary education, and the national education policies aimed at improving the education indicators at the country level (Amaral & Fonseca, 2012), one would expect an increase in the number of young people applying to higher education. Indeed, an increase in the number of applicants to higher education between 16 and 19 years old would be expected as a result of the efficiency gains of those same policies, which in turn could attenuate the impact of demographic decline due to falling birth rates. Adding to the above, the expansion of non-traditional applicants, in the context of lifelong learning policies, the demand for higher education could even have made an upward trend in recent years. The magnitude of this upward trend could in some way be retracted by the financial crisis; however, the efficiency gains in primary and secondary education should have delayed the decline in demand of higher education in the medium term.

It is difficult to accurately measure the efficiency of primary and secondary education cycles due to the lack of a homogeneous time series for some indicators. Nevertheless, there were some tangible gains that were expressed in the relative increase of demand for higher education, though not always sufficient to compensate for the demographic decline.

Between 1999 and 2006, the percentage of population aged 16 to 19 years that applied to higher education in the following school year registered some increase, though not very significant. For example, the 17-year-old cohort registered a small increase in the participation rate from 17.55% in 1999/2000 to only 18.95% in 2006/2007.<sup>6</sup> However, the resident population of that same age group has decrease from 142,250 in 1999/2000 to 116,547 in 2006/2007 (-18.07%). Also, the percentage of students that, in a given school year, would be 17 years old and would have applied in the following year to higher education at age 18 increased from 27.95% in 1999/2000 to only 30.89% in 2006/2007.

#### ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS

The admission process of 2012/2013 registered a decrease in the number of candidates (-1549) over the previous year, a variation of -3.32%. However, applicants to public universities, about 71% of the total, accounted for an increase of 2.01% as opposed to a negative growth of -14.37% in candidates to polytechnics. Overall, the general decrease in demand for higher education has thus more affected the polytechnic system (Table 1).

## SHRINKING HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEMS

Table 1. Main indicators for the National Access Process of 2011/12 and 2012/13

	Vacancies		Vacancies: absolute variation	Vacancies: change rate (%)
	2011	2012	2011-12	2011-12
Polytechnic	24,737	23,745	-992	-4.01
University	28,763	28,553	-210	-0.73
TOTAL	53,500	52,298	-1202	-2.25

	Applicants 1 <sup>st</sup> phase 1 <sup>st</sup> option		Applicants: absolute variation	Applicants: change rate (%)
	2011	2012	2011-12	2011-12
Polytechnic	15,185	13,003	-2182	-14.37
University	31,457	32,090	633	2.01
TOTAL	46,642	45,093	-1549	-3.32

	Strength index		Successful students 1 <sup>st</sup> phase	
	2011	2012	2011	2012
Polytechnic	0.61	0.55	15,926	14,465
University	1.09	1.12	26,326	25,962
TOTAL	0.87	0.86	42,252	40,427

	Enrolments 1 <sup>st</sup> phase		Occupancy rate by enrolments 1 <sup>st</sup> phase	
	2011	2012	2011	2012
Polytechnic	13,757	12,379	0.56	0.52
University	23,580	23,194	0.82	0.81
TOTAL	37,337	35,573	0.70	0.68

Note: there is a difference of 46 students enrolled in a programme that moved from polytechnic to university system between 2011 and 2012.

This contraction in demand is also visible in the number of study programmes that did not register any candidates. In 2011/2012, there was no study programme under such circumstances, but by 2012/2013, 62 study programmes did not offer vacancies and 80 did not register any candidate in the first phase. Of the latter, 57 did not account for any allocated students and 23 had one or more allocated students, but two had no enrolled students at the end. Of the 80 study programmes that had no candidates in 2012/2013, there are some scientific fields particularly hit as is the case of construction and civil engineering (ISCED 97: 582) with 18 study programmes without candidates; electronics and automation (ISCED 97: 523) with 9 programmes; crop and livestock production (ISCED 97: 621) with 6 programmes; forestry (ISCED 97: 623) with 5 programmes; food processing (ISCED 97: 541) with 4 programmes; and environmental control and technology

(ISCED 97: 851) with four programmes. Of those 80 programmes, 59 have “engineering” in the name of the programme, 47 of which had no candidates allocated in the first phase of the access process.

After the first phase, the system enrolment rate was slightly lower than in the previous year, with 68% as opposed to 70% in 2011/2012. However, these overall values hide the different performance of polytechnics and universities. The enrolment rate in polytechnics decreased from 56% to 52%, in contrast with a slight change from 82% to 81% in universities, also in the first phase of the process. About 60% of the faculties and high schools from the different HEI registered a decrease in their strength index<sup>7</sup>; polytechnics with 73% and universities with 42.4%. On the other side, 39.5% of the faculties and high schools of all HEI registered an increase in their strength index; the polytechnics with 26.4% and universities with 57.6%. The reduction of vacancies was higher in the polytechnics than in universities but the universities maintained, in 2012/2013, a higher number of candidates as opposed to polytechnics. At the programme level, 53% of the programmes reported lower strength indexes, with 57.7% in polytechnics and 47.3% at the universities. The overall decrease registered in demand was thus less intense in universities. This led to a polarisation of public universities that achieved better enrolment rates in a scenario of shrinking demand.

Although the decline in the number of candidates can be explained by several factors, one cannot exclude some legislative measures introduced in 2003 on the new admission conditions (some of the existent programmes would have to comply only in 2006). The Decree-Law n.º 26/2003 established that a minimum score of 95 points (on a 0 to 200 scale) would be required on all final exams that entitle a student to a secondary diploma, which is necessary to apply to higher education. Previously, a student would need to have a positive mark on the specific exam required by the institution and department of appliance but not necessarily on all exams, provided that the overall average would be positive. Until 2003 (in some cases 2006), some candidates had negative marks in certain exams although they had a positive average grade.


Again, in 2009, the new legislation (Ordinance n.º 1031/2009) established that physics and chemistry admission exams at the end of secondary school would be mandatory (in effect from 2012/2013) for engineering programmes (with the exception of computer science, ISCED 97: 481), environmental control and technology (ISCED 97: 851) and mining and extraction (ISCED 97: 544). Previously, only mathematics was mandatory, in some cases in combination with other exams chosen by each institution. Most public universities adopted the new rules in 2011/2012, but polytechnics started only in 2012/2013, which may explain the stronger decrease in demand registered in the last school year in polytechnics. Those changes in the access rules may also explain some of the decline of the demand for engineering programmes.

The candidates’ mobility seems to have also adjusted itself. It is possible to identify a reduction in the number of candidates who were willing to move, and simultaneously a reduction in the number of potential destinations. Indeed, the shrinking demand led to a rearrangement of the system, increasing the polarisation

of a restricted set of institutions, especially public universities, and specific locations as the two metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto and, with less intensity, some second-tier cities such as Coimbra, Braga/Guimarães, Aveiro and Covilhã.

The system spatial mobility rearrangement is also visible in the number of candidates in 2012/2013 that chose their own district. The national average was 61.13% of the candidates applying to their own district; Lisbon and Porto registered the maximum values of 91.09% and 80.56%, respectively, as opposed to other locations with minimum values such as Guarda (11.19%) and Portalegre (14.52%). In addition, 38.87% of candidates chose a district other than their own (see Appendix) and the aforementioned districts had correspondingly higher and lower values.

A group of districts can thus be considered attractive given the positive balance between the candidates from outside the district and those from the district applying outside: Lisbon, Porto, Coimbra, Vila Real, and Castelo Branco (Figure 2); in contrast, districts such as Guarda, Portalegre, Santarém, Viana do Castelo, Viseu, Bragança, Beja, Setúbal, and Leiria show some repulsive behaviour with higher percentages of candidates that apply to other districts.




Source: DGES

Figure 2. Number of applicants by district of origin, district of destination, and applicants to the district of origin in the National Access Process in 2012/2013

The reduction in the number of candidates disseminated through the system, and even those fields that traditionally have a high number of candidates, showed a declining trend as was the case for medicine, nursing, rehabilitation, pharmacy, economics and others. The largest decrease was recorded, however, in construction and civil engineering (ISCED 97: 528), with 617 fewer candidates than in the

previous year. Given that construction and civil engineering was also affected by the previously discussed legislative measures, it was selected for further analysis.

As a starting point, we first considered the behaviour of the number of candidates for the same time period of all those fields that comprise engineering study programmes, namely: mechanics and metal work (ISCED 97:521), electricity and energy (ISCED 97: 522), electronics and automation (ISCED 97: 523), chemical and process (ISCED 97: 524), motor vehicles, ships and aircraft (ISCED 97: 525), construction and civil engineering (ISCED 97: 582), and mining and extraction (ISCED 97: 544) (Figure 3).



Note: 521: mechanics and metal work; 522: electricity and energy; 523: electronics and automation; 524: chemical and process; 525: motor vehicles, ships and aircraft; 544: mining and extraction; 582: construction and civil engineering. Source: DGES

Figure 3. Candidates in fields with engineering programmes, 1999 to 2012

On the whole, it is clear that until 2006, electronics and automation as well as construction and civil engineering attracted a significant number of candidates when compared with other fields with engineering programmes. Though attractive, both showed a strong decline between 2004 and 2006. The reasons for this lower demand are not easy to grasp since there is no data available regarding the reasons behind student choices. However, it can be hypothesised that this behaviour can be linked to the general trend of shrinking demand registered since the year 2000, as other areas of engineering also exhibited a decline in numbers.

After the year 2006, all educational areas depicted in Figure 3 show an increase in the number of candidates to which it is possible to associate the outset of the Bologna process (with shorter time lengths for graduation) and an increase in the

access of non-traditional students to higher education. Several engineering fields seem to have benefited from this, as for example electricity and energy, mechanics and metal work, chemical and process, construction and civil engineering and most of all electronics and automation.

Electronics and automation encompasses, amongst others, courses in computer engineering that for admission do not require, unlike civil engineering, physics and chemistry exams in secondary school in addition to mathematics (as imposed by new admission rules in 2009). Although there was no candidate in nine study programmes/institution pairs of this field in the last admission process, it remained very popular and may have been less affected because of that reason.

Considering the evolution of all selected fields, construction and civil engineering, and electricity and energy – which in turn include electrical engineering (closely linked to the building industry) – show a pattern that contrasts with the others. Since 2008, these two areas present a shrinking trend, reaching minimum levels in 2012/2013 and even becoming two of the least popular amongst all others. The building industry started to show signs of decline in 2001, which was aggravated after 2008 with the start of the financial crisis and the housing bubble that cannot be dissociated from the previously discussed behaviour.

For all of the above, construction and civil engineering was chosen as a case study in order to understand and identify possible adjustment processes to times of shrinking demand and anticipate future solutions and policies.

#### A SHRINKING SYSTEM: CONSTRUCTION AND CIVIL ENGINEERING

Construction and civil engineering (ISCED 97: 582) maintained the number of vacancies close to 2000 in recent years, but between 2011 and 2012 there was a reduction from 1934 places to 1748 (Table 2).

The demand, which in turn has been declining for several years, suffered in 2012/2013 the largest number of breaks of the time series, with only 318 first-choice applications in the primary phase. This decline was only attenuated by the end of the first phase with an extra 233 second choices (students that were not successful on their first choices). By the end of this initial phase, construction and civil engineering had 540 successful applications. Those extra 233 students had chosen fields as diverse as engineering in other areas (191 candidates), social sciences, business and law (15 candidates), science, mathematics, and computing (10 candidates), health and welfare (8 candidates), services (5 candidates), humanities and arts (2 candidates) and agriculture (2 candidates). Between 2011/2012 and 2012/2013, the number of applications decreased by nearly 66% (Table 2), but this impact was harder on polytechnics with a negative growth of almost 90% as opposed to that of the universities, with -57.7%. Within this context, it was not surprising that only 29% of all available vacancies were filled in the first phase (51% in universities and 6% in polytechnics).

It is not possible to state unequivocally that this selective behaviour takes into account the higher quality or recognition of some institutions, although this should

Table 2. Main indicators for Construction and Civil Engineering, 2012/13

	Vacancies		Vacancies: absolute variation	Vacancies: change rate (%)
	2011	2012	2011-12	2011-12
Polytechnic	1012	855	-157	-15.51
University	922	893	-29	-3.15
TOTAL	1934	1748	-186	-9.62

	Applicants 1 <sup>st</sup> phase		Applicants: absolute variation	Applicants: change rate (%)
	1 <sup>st</sup> option			
	2011	2012	2011-12	2011-12
Polytechnic	247	27	-220	-89.07
University	688	291	-397	-57.70
TOTAL	935	318	-617	-65.99

	Strength index		Successful students	
	2011	2012	1 <sup>st</sup> phase	
			2011	2012
Polytechnic	0.24	0.03	364	57
University	0.75	0.33	823	483
TOTAL	0.48	0.18	1187	540

	Enrolments 1 <sup>st</sup> phase		Occupancy rate by enrolments 1 <sup>st</sup> phase	
	2011	2012	2011	2012
Polytechnic	325	51	0.32	0.06
University	774	455	0.84	0.51
TOTAL	1099	506	0.57	0.29

be a factor to consider. The scale of demand in larger urban centres, where the oldest and most prestigious public universities are located, ensuring greater competition, seems to have a cumulative effect. For example, it is very significant that, in the national access process of 2012 and as already described in the scenario of shrinking demand for vacancies in civil engineering, despite the high number of available places, 11 candidates did not get placed in the first phase. Those were candidates in the district of Porto who applied for the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Porto with admission grades lower than other students who applied to the same vacancies but as second choices. This reinforces the polarisation of some locations where, in spite of the great decrease in demand, competition remains high.

The evolution in demand in construction and civil engineering (ISCED 97: 582) in the last 14 years is marked above all by a general declining trend, although with some inter-annual oscillations of growth and fall (Figure 4). The maximum number

of candidates was recorded in the year 2000, corresponding to 4.2% of total applications to public higher education in that same year. The partition between both subsystems at that time was similar with around 51% in polytechnics and 49% in universities. Since 2000, the number of candidates began a downward path,





Figure 4. Candidates and vacancies in Construction and Civil Engineering, 1999 to 2012

The two major decreases in demand for places of construction and civil engineering programmes occurred in 2006/2007 and from 2011/2012 onwards, with a minimum in 2012/2013. The fall in the relative weight of polytechnics reflected a drastic reduction in the attractiveness of these institutions that occurred in 2005/2006. Both periods correspond to the beginning of the implementation of legislative measures referred to above that increased the difficulty of access to engineering programmes. However, taking into account the behaviour of other programmes in engineering, the housing bubble and the global crisis in the real estate and building industry seem to be the most relevant factors in the decline of demand for vacancies in higher education in construction and civil engineering.

Polytechnics were more penalised by the shrinking demand. More peripheral districts, where usually only public polytechnic institutions exist, suffered the highest impact. By contrast, the attractiveness of both metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto was reinforced (Figure 5).





Note: Circles are proportional to  $\frac{((Cand_{in} + Cand_{int}) - Cand_{out})}{Cand_{total}}$ , where  $Cand_{total} = \sum(Cand_{in}, Cand_{int}, Cand_{out})$ .  $Cand_{in}$  accounts for the number of incoming candidates to district  $x$ ;  $Cand_{int}$  the number of internal candidates of district  $x$  and  $Cand_{out}$  the number of outgoing candidates from district  $x$  (applications to other districts). Arrows (links) give the direction of candidates' outgoing fluxes in each district (strongest links in thick arrows).

Figure 5. Candidates' mobility when choosing Construction and Civil Engineering programmes, 2010, 2011 and 2012

The former dynamics had consequences also in the candidates' mobility patterns. The ratio of the difference between the number of candidates that a given district receives (those that come from other district plus the internal candidates of the district) and the number of candidates that it loses (applications from resident candidates to another district) over the total number of candidates of that same district can show some of the changes that have occurred in the mobility patterns of the last three years, from 2010 to 2012 (Figure 5).

As expected, the decreasing number of candidates has induced a decline in the mobility potential. Considering the fluxes between districts, the polarisation of both metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto became even clearer, as well as some intermediate districts as Coimbra, Braga, and Castelo Branco, though these latter also lost some of their former attractiveness.

The reduction in the number of candidates for construction and civil engineering contributed to the concentration of applications in a very limited group of institutions. The universities registered, on average, lower losses in the number of candidates than polytechnics, but amongst them there were two institutions that stood out with comparatively high values of enrolment rates close to those of previous years: the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Porto (97% in 2011/2012 to 96% in 2012/2013) and Instituto Superior Técnico (a faculty of engineering) of the Technical University of Lisbon (97% to 89% between 2011/2012 and 2012/2013). The third highest rate was achieved by the University of Minho – with only 44%, however, when in the previous year it had registered 96%.

#### DISCUSSION

More than a closed conclusion, the present study aims to raise hypotheses and some discussion that may support future decisions in a context of not only national but also international higher education systems that are shrinking (Douglass, 2010).

Adérito Sedas Nunes in 1968 focused on what he called “the social selectivity of the Portuguese university recruiting system” attempting to assess the responsibility of the universities in the selectivity of students regarding access. He laid out the question:

To what extent or in what way are universities involved – if at all – in the social process which imprints upon the higher education recruiting process such a high and prevalent social selectivity in our country? (Nunes, 1968, p. 389)

Nunes argued that universities were institutional barriers hindering students’ access (*ibid.*, p. 394). The low educational level of the Portuguese population was largely responsible for the persistence of an elitist model of higher education. In this context, universities were structurally unsuited to meet the latent demand of the labour market and indifferent to the process of industrialisation, modernisation, and technological development (*ibid.*, p. 394). Moreover, potential students were in some ways discouraged from higher education by university practices. Being organised for young people without responsibilities, i.e., full-time students, and at the same time by showing low productivity and success rates in programmes, which often took too long to complete, a university education posed a significant risk for lower income social classes. Indeed, opportunity costs – today as in the past – have been differentiated by social class, which, in times of crisis, can be critical factors in deciding whether or not to enter higher education.

More than 30 years after the creation of a dispersed network of HEI in Portugal, a small country with strong regional development disparities, the higher education system now faces a recessive demographic, socio-economic, and financial

conjuncture. The system is not only shrinking but also restructuring itself in a stratified way in which the predominance of a top segment of institutions alludes to a return to the past.

In 2013, Linda Leach asked, “(...) are we going back to the future?” in a study on ways to address shrinking systems in three countries, namely New Zealand, England, and Australia. She argues that the combined effect of policies and strategic responses of higher education systems may be redirecting these systems to unwanted directions further away from massification and again towards elitism (Leach, 2013, p. 281). This is not, however, incompatible with expansion strategies, such as those being followed in Australia that are somehow counter-cyclical and have expanded very intensively the number of places in higher education (Leach, 2013, p. 275). In England, also, a commission of prospective studies for higher education advocated expansion, albeit differentiated, strengthening the “low cost” segment, and being more vocational, opening the way for a return to the “polytechnic” typology (IPPR, 2013).

Currently, the overall size of the higher education system in Portugal, with about 400,000 enrolled students, cannot be compared with the less than 50,000 students in 1974. However, it is not possible to ignore the existence of a specific segment of institutions that at the national level polarises demand. These are highly competitive institutions that assume an almost elitist position and contrast with the rest of the system. Thus, and given the empirical data depicted in this study, it seems adequate to reflect on the thesis of “persistence inequality” described below:

Persistent inequality emphasised that expansion enables the privileged classes to retain their relative edge in the process of educational stratification. (Arum, Gamora, & Shavit, 2007, p. 29)

Using another metaphor from Simon Marginson, in Portugal as in other countries, in the higher education system, “cathedrals loomed over the landscape” (Marginson, 2011b, p. 1) and “participation in a low status institution is not the same as participation in a high status institution” (Marginson, 2011b, p. 31). Differentiation and stratification in higher education systems have been widely discussed and two fundamental types of differentiation have been identified: vertical and horizontal (Brennan & Naidoo, 2008; Marginson, 1998; Reichert, 2009; Shavit, Arum, & Gamoran, 2007; Teichler, 2009). Differentiation gives rise to stratification which, in turn, is defined by a hierarchy of institutions and study programmes (or diplomas) with different profiles and aimed at different student segments. Stratification of higher education leads us to more complex questions on the nature and mission of higher education.

Nevertheless, it is important to remember that there is no consensus to some theoretical questions that have remained open since the beginning of the massification process, and their connection to the model proposed by Martin Trow on the three evolution stages of higher education systems: elitist, mass, and universal (Trow, 1974).

Is higher education a right or a privilege? Is it a public good or a private benefit? These and other questions remain open and are particularly relevant in times of crisis, when some systems, or parts thereof, face contraction processes that highlight the aforementioned contradictions between mass and elitist education (McCowan, 2012). Brennan and Naidoo (2008, p. 294) clarify the analysis when stating that:

Mass systems and their credentials are increasingly differentiated; elite sectors remain, new vocational sectors and qualifications are created for the masses; different classes of higher education come to serve different social classes.

Vertical diversification has been the dominant trend in mass higher education differentiation processes (Teichler, 2009, p. 174). In Portugal, construction and civil engineering presents itself as a sharp example of this diversification, intensified by the decline in the number of candidates. Between 2011 and 2013, only two institutions have maintained high enrolment rates, namely the University of Porto and the Technical University of Lisbon.

This case allowed us to analyse the tension between excellence and access, perceiving excellence as the public recognition or the “good name” of some institutions or study programmes. More than quality assurance, excellence itself became a positional good. The social status associated with a higher education degree is established increasingly in relation to the diplomas of others. The difference and importance lies no longer in having or not having a higher education diploma, as was the case in the past, but in the type of institution that delivers the diploma. There is a positional dimension of diplomas related to the different institutions (Brennan & Naidoo, 2008; McCowan, 2012, p. 117).

Marginson has shown why this elitist segment persists and how it is limited to institutions with a top status of superiority over the rest of the system. The production of knowledge is, by nature, localised and not ubiquitous in space; the production of innovative ideas and cutting-edge research is a rare commodity. Universities, where the most advanced research takes place, will gradually develop their comparative advantages vis-à-vis small universities, private HEI or polytechnics, in a cumulative process, becoming increasingly farther from the rest of the system. No government can (or wants to) destroy the potential for creativity linked to research institutions in this polarised higher education system. Those processes, however, give rise to disparities and establish the structure of differentiation or stratification of the systems (Marginson, 2011a, p. 32).

## CONCLUSION

The demand for higher education in Portugal, measured by the number of candidates in the access process, has registered a decline since 2009. Currently, the number of candidates is lower than the number of available places in the public universities and polytechnics. There are several factors that seem to have been

contributing to this declining trend, namely the demographic decline due to falling birth rates and the loss of interest of potential students taking into account employability difficulties aggravated by the mismatch between offer and demand in the labour market, especially for highly qualified workers.

While shrinking, the system revealed some sustainability by developing new forms of stratification. The reorganisation of the system in times of crisis leaves winners and losers. Polytechnics and, in particular, those located in peripheral regions, are the biggest losers while the universities of the two major metropolitan areas are the big winners.

By analysing access in recent years and the case study of construction and civil engineering, particularly in the context of the economic and financial crisis, it is possible to identify some exit strategies of the system and anticipate scenarios for other fields that could go through identical paths in the future. In the analysed programmes, there was a decrease in demand, a reduction in the mobility of candidates, and a higher concentration of applicants in a smaller number of institutions and locations, highlighting the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Porto and the Instituto Superior Técnico of the Technical University of Lisboa as the only two institutions where the enrolment rates remained at levels close to those of previous years.

Different policies have been applied in different countries in order to face the crisis; some are more restrictive, others more expansionary. Globally, higher education systems develop segments inside themselves with different missions targeted to different objectives. It is possible to develop measures that simultaneously increase inclusion and ensure desirable levels of equity; both objectives can be optimised but not maximised, since, in the end, they are antagonistic.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> We considered the International Standard Classification of Education ISCED 1997, taking the three-level hierarchical classification of fields of education and training, with 65 fields, gathered in 25 fields at level 2 and organised in 9 broad groups. This classification is used by UNESCO, OECD and EUROSTAT.

<sup>2</sup> The Regions of Madeira and Azores were not represented due to graphic limitations. The University of Azores was created in 1976 and the University of Madeira in 1988. In the Madeira Region there is private higher education since 1948.

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.dges.mctes.pt/DGES/pt/Estudantes/Acesso/>.

In the school year 2012/2013, the national access process was regulated by the administrative rule n° 195/2012 of the June 21<sup>st</sup>. (*Portaria n.º 195/2012 de 21 de junho*).

<sup>4</sup> Source: DGES (GPEARI/DGEEC)

<sup>5</sup> In the present study we considered the Data Base of access created since 1999 by DGES.

<sup>6</sup> Source: DGES, DGEEC and EUROSTAT with own calculations.

<sup>7</sup> The strength index corresponds to the ratio between the number of candidates and the vacancies.

Appendix. Global mobility of students 2012

2012	Vacancies	Candidates						Balance					
		Candidates by District (origin) (4 + 6)	to the District of residence (Destinatário) (4 + 5)	to the District of residence (inside)	from other District (outside)	to other District (outside)	Balance at destination from inside from the outside (4 - 5)	% of balance at the destination (7/3*100)	Balance at the origin from inside to the outside (4 - 6)	% of balance at the origin (9/2*100)	% from inside (4/2*100)	% to the outside (6/2*100)	
Distrito	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Lisboa	13785	10833	15331	9868	5463	965	4405	28.73	8903	82.18	91.09	8.91	
Porto	7485	9018	10577	7265	3312	1753	3953	37.37	5512	61.12	80.56	19.44	
Braga	3369	4506	3267	2461	806	2045	1655	50.66	416	9.23	54.62	45.38	
Aveiro	2089	2406	2000	1007	993	1399	14	0.70	-392	-16.29	41.85	58.15	
Coimbra	5476	2341	4688	1939	2749	402	-810	-17.28	1537	65.66	82.83	17.17	
Leiria	2167	2044	995	606	389	1438	217	21.81	-832	-40.70	29.65	70.35	
Setúbal	2334	1856	1201	468	733	1388	-265	-22.06	-920	-49.57	25.22	74.78	
Santarém	1699	1603	423	245	178	1358	67	15.84	-1113	-69.43	15.28	84.72	
Viseu	1484	1492	468	312	156	1180	156	33.33	-868	-58.18	20.91	79.09	
Faro	1653	1427	854	622	232	805	390	45.67	-183	-12.82	43.59	56.41	
R. A. Madeira	605	1241	643	626	17	615	609	94.71	11	0.89	50.44	49.56	
Viana do Castelo	991	1085	430	221	209	864	12	2.79	-643	-59.26	20.37	79.63	
Vila Real	1365	1011	1077	422	655	589	-233	-21.63	-167	-16.52	41.74	58.26	
R. A. Açores	683	877	450	402	48	475	354	78.67	-73	-8.32	45.84	54.16	
Castelo Branco	2221	817	1276	441	835	376	-394	-30.88	65	7.96	53.98	46.02	
Evora	1091	706	775	338	437	368	-99	-12.77	-30	-4.25	47.88	52.12	
Guarda	761	581	124	65	59	516	6	4.84	-451	-77.62	11.19	88.81	
Bragança	1873	449	248	100	148	349	-48	-19.35	-249	-55.46	22.27	77.73	
Beja	549	428	161	104	57	324	47	29.19	-220	-51.40	24.30	75.70	
Portalegre	618	372	105	54	51	318	3	2.86	-264	-70.97	14.52	85.48	
Total	52298	45093	45093	27566	17527	17527	10039	22.26	10039	22.26	61.13	38.87	

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## 9. PATHWAYS TO HIGHER EDUCATION IN FRANCE AND SWITZERLAND

*Do Vocational Tracks Facilitate Access to Higher Education  
for Immigrant students?*

### INTRODUCTION

Over the past decades, educational policy implementations in France and Switzerland have increased the eligibility of those completing (upper or post compulsory) secondary education to access higher or tertiary education, by introducing vocationally orientated programmes on the upper secondary level that offer access to higher education. Such policies should help to reduce some of the well-known inequalities in the educational system by improving educational achievement of disadvantaged groups such as students with an immigrant background or those coming from low socio-economic households. Despite their different immigration histories and policies as well as countries of immigrations, both France and Switzerland have a sizeable immigrant population, some of which do experience obstacles in their educational and professional careers (Brinbaum & Guégnard, 2012; Fibbi, Lerch, & Wanner, 2006; Frickey, Murdoch, & Primon, 2006; Hupka & Stalder, 2011).

In France, over half of the total immigrant population is second-generation, which is a particularity of this country compared to most Western European countries. Moreover, the proportion of the second-generation at the age of enrolment into tertiary studies is high. Indeed, 19 percent of the second-generation are between 18 and 24 years old versus 7 percent for the first-generation and 10 percent for non-immigrants (Bouvier, 2012). Ninety percent of the immigrant population aged between 20 and 35 have been schooled only in France. However immigrant youths generally obtain less frequently the *baccalauréat* (which enables access to higher education) compared to non-immigrants (61% vs 68%). In addition, only one in five immigrant youths obtain at least a Bachelor's degree whereas it is the case for a quarter for non-immigrants (Brinbaum et al., 2012).

Even though 20 percent of students in Swiss higher education institutions are foreign nationals, only one out of four of them have been schooled in Switzerland itself (OFS, 2005). Given that young people with immigrant background represent almost a third (29%) of the resident population aged 15 to 24 years (Fibbi et al., 2006), Swiss-educated immigrant students are considerably underrepresented in higher education. Indeed, Picot (2012) shows that 35 percent of non-immigrants

have attended a tertiary education programme by age 23 in 2007, compared to 26 percent of second-generation students, and only 17 percent of first-generation students.

In terms of comparison, a study by Crul, Schneider, and Lelie (2012) that looked at second-generation Turkish students in France and Switzerland, through a two-city study,<sup>1</sup> indicates that a lower proportion of second-generation Turkish students enrol in higher tertiary education in Switzerland (13% vs 37% for native Swiss), compared to France (40% vs 68% for native French). In turn, the dropout rate among those second generation Turks in tertiary education appears to be lower in Switzerland than in France (9% vs 15%). Despite this, comparative findings on the access to higher education programmes by immigrant and non-immigrant students in both countries show that once students possess a higher education entrance qualification, and once social origin of students is taken into account, the chances of accessing higher education may be even higher for high-school graduates with an immigrant background (Griga, Hadjar, & Becker, 2013). According to the same study, this is especially the case for women of North African origins in France and for men from south-eastern European, Turkish and Portuguese origins in Switzerland.

In this chapter we wish to clarify through which institutional pathways higher education is accessed by immigrant group students in Switzerland and France. We have chosen these two countries because they differ from each other both in their educational systems and in the ways new routes to higher education have been set up through vocationally orientated programmes. The educational landscape in France is characterised by a more school-based system and has a greater tradition of prestigious tertiary education institutions (Duru-Bellat, Kieffer, & Reimer, 2008). Moreover, traditional vocational education and training (VET) does not have very high status and therefore fails to attract a large proportion of well-performing students. However, France has witnessed a *vocationalisation of the academic route* to higher education through the implementation of the specifically vocationally orientated track (particularly the *baccalauréat professionnel*). The situation in Switzerland is more or less reversed. Less people pursue academic education and over two thirds of students enrol in a variety of VET programmes. In the Swiss case, a new route to higher education has been created through the *academisation of VET* with the setting up of the Federal Vocational Baccalaureate diploma that grants access to universities of applied science.

Using youth panel data from France (DEPP *panel d'élèves*) and Switzerland (Transitions from Education to Employment, TREE), we will analyse the pathways to higher education in both countries in more detail, looking specifically at the access of higher education through different educational tracks while taking in account the different characteristics of the students, e.g. immigrant backgrounds, gender, and aspirations. We will first outline the different educational systems of France and Switzerland with a special focus on the new routes to higher education and what is known from previous research concerning the whereabouts of immigrant students within this system. Next, we will present our data and our analysis strategy. In Switzerland we compare the pathways to higher education of

first and second-generation immigrant students from Turkey and former Yugoslavia to non-immigrant students. For France, we similarly look at first and second-generation youths from North African origin (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) comparing their pathways to higher education with French natives. We will use multinomial logistic regressions to analyse and juxtapose the different educational pathways that lead to higher education in France and Switzerland.

#### EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN FRANCE AND SWITZERLAND

In France the *baccalauréat* is the standard final diploma of upper secondary education and gives access to higher education. There are two particularly important decision stages in the secondary school system for both families and their children. The first occurs at the age of 15 at the end of lower secondary (*collège*), where the choice is between academic track (e.g., *baccalauréat général*) and vocational tracks (e.g. the *Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle*, CAP). The second arises when students are 18 years old and concerns the access to tertiary education. We can first note that the latter access to tertiary education has expanded considerably as a result of the increasing number of pupils in secondary education, the increasing number of *baccalauréat* holders and the high social demand for training.<sup>2</sup> In the context of the democratisation of secondary education and the expansion of higher education, increasing numbers of second-generation immigrants access higher education. Another measure that has increased this access is the creation of a vocational orientated *baccalauréat* in 1985. After the end of lower secondary school, youths can first follow the aforementioned short school-based vocational CAP programme for two years and then follow a *baccalauréat professionnel* for a further two years.<sup>3</sup> This diploma offers new opportunities, particularly to children of working-class or immigrant origin. This said, as a whole, 58 percent of young people from immigrant families compared to 69 percent of French natives obtain one of the three types of *baccalauréat* diploma, i.e. a *baccalauréat général*, a *baccalauréat technologique* or a *baccalauréat professionnel* (Brinbaum & Kieffer, 2009).

These same inequalities remain in the access to higher education, where around forty percent of immigrant students have access higher education compared to over half of the natives. Immigrants, especially a significant proportion of youths of North African origin, have a preference for selective short vocational tertiary programmes but are often diverted towards the non-selective university sector, as the former programmes frequently attempt to select academic baccalaureate holders with good grades.<sup>4</sup> It is also possible that there is discrimination in selecting students for these vocational tertiary programmes (Brinbaum & Guégnard, 2012). This in turn leads to higher dropout rates in the university sector (particularly for *baccalauréat professionnel* holders), because students often enrol in “second-choice” university programmes after being turned down for these vocational tertiary programmes. This unequal access to higher education impacts on degree completion and the subsequent entry into the French labour market (Brinbaum & Guégnard, 2012; Frickey et al., 2006).

In contrast to France only one out of five students in Switzerland enrolls in general baccalaureate schools to obtain an academic baccalaureate (*Matura, maturité*), which grants access to higher education, i.e. to universities in general or, after an additional year of work experience, to a university of applied science. Foreign nationals are markedly underrepresented in such schools: 13 percent compared to 29 percent for Swiss nationals (SKBF, 2011). The majority of students that finish compulsory education at age 15 enrol in some form of vocational training (VET) that typically lasts between three to four years (Cortesi & Imdorf, 2013). A majority of these VET programmes (87% in 2010 according to SERI, 2013) are “dually” organised: apprentices divide their time between the vocational school and a training company. When apprenticeship places are in high demand (e.g. in the early 2000s), training companies can recruit very selectively. Previous research has indicated that this recruitment process is to the disadvantage of some school-leavers with an immigrant background, if competition for apprenticeship places is high (Imdorf, 2010). To increase the permeability between VET and higher education, a double-qualification that enables the simultaneous or subsequent acquisition of a VET qualification and a higher education entrance qualification was introduced in Switzerland in 1994 (Gonon, 2013). This so called Federal Vocational Baccalaureate (*Berufsmaturität, maturité professionnelle*) grants access to universities of applied sciences and requires enrolment or completion of a school or company-based vocational study programme. Schmid and Gonon (2011) did not find any direct effect of immigrant background on higher education access rates for students holding a vocational baccalaureate. This said, Swiss-educated foreign nationals remain underrepresented both at conventional universities and at the universities of applied sciences (6% and 7% respectively in 2007 according to SKBF, 2011).

One possible reason for this, might be that access to the vocational baccalaureate is mostly restricted to those who are recruited to academically more demanding apprenticeships. The opportunity to obtain a Federal Vocational Baccalaureate is strongly linked to training for particular professions that are generally more academically demanding. Some of the immigrant students may face employer discrimination hampering their access to company-based apprenticeships, which offer vocational baccalaureate careers. Frequently relegated to less demanding apprenticeships and to bridge-year courses (Imdorf, 2006), immigrant students may accept to decrease or “cool down” their occupational aspirations to a level where a vocational baccalaureate is no longer an option. Such obstacles might affect the educational pathways of immigrant students.

The unequal access of immigrant students to higher education in both countries raises the question of how the institutional settings in France and Switzerland foster educational and social mobility of vulnerable groups. Varying institutional settings of national education systems are likely to affect this mobility in various ways. We will use the concept of educational pathways to analyse educational careers of youths and to draw a comparison between France and Switzerland. We distinguish between academic versus vocational tracks as primary pathways into higher education, and we ask how academic versus vocational tracks shape

pathways from secondary to tertiary education for male and female students of immigrant origins. As outlined above, the vocational pathways to higher education have evolved differently in the two countries. Whereas the Swiss Federal Vocational Baccalaureate was created as a distinct vocational pathway by basically providing additional general education beyond the practical part of VET training in Switzerland (Graf, 2013), the French *baccalauréat professionnel* evolved from “vocationalising” the academic *baccalauréat* (Verdier, 2001). We focus on the equity issues of such policies designed to increase enrolment in tertiary education and on programmes geared to encourage the passage from upper-secondary VET to tertiary level education.

#### DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The analysis presented in this chapter is based on data taken from the DEPP and TREE longitudinal surveys. Both surveys follow students through their educational career, but differ slightly with regard to their sampling and overall design.

For the DEPP survey, the French Ministry of Education tracked the educational pathways of a national representative sample of students (panel) who entered the first year of secondary school in September 1995 (N = 17,830 youths) following them until 2005. They were surveyed through lower secondary (*collège*), upper secondary (*lycée*) and subsequently tertiary education. For this study we focus on first and second generation Maghrebians whose parents are North African, born either in Tunisia, Morocco, or Algeria. Our sample of Maghrebians in the DEPP survey amounts to 890 individuals<sup>5</sup> (of which 46% are girls). This migrant population is ethnically visible and vulnerable (Vallet, 1996). We compare youths from North African origins with a reference group of youths born in France of two native French parents (13,806 of which 48% are girls). Moreover, children of mixed parenthood have also been excluded as their educational pathways are similar to French natives (Brinbaum & Kieffer, 2009). From this initial sample of 14,696 individuals in 1995, 13,179 (90%) are still surveyed by the year 2005.

The Swiss TREE study has been designed as a PISA follow-up and surveyed a national representative sample (panel) of compulsory school-leavers, focusing on their educational pathways and transitions into employment. School-leavers were followed after their participation in PISA 2000 and surveyed on an annual basis until 2007. An eighth wave has been carried out in 2010. From the initial 6,343 sampled school-leavers responding in 2001, 3,979 (63%) still participated in the 2010 wave. Since Maghrebians do not constitute a considerable migrant group in Switzerland we have selected school-leavers with a Turkish or former Yugoslavian migration background as a comparison. As is the case with Maghrebians in France, migrants from Turkey and former Yugoslavia are among the most vulnerable in terms of societal acceptance and socio-economic position (Hupka & Stalder, 2011; Stolz, 2001). Even though immigrants from Turkey and former Yugoslavia are relative newcomers in Switzerland in the light of the situation of North-Africans in France, both populations often arrived as

labour migrants in the respective countries, sharing a relatively low socio-economic position and equally poor educational achievements. In the TREE sample there are 328 students from Turkish or former Yugoslavian origin (of which 52% are girls).<sup>6</sup> We will compare this group with school-leavers that have two Swiss-born parents (4,430 of which 55% are girls). Due to sample restrictions we include both first and second generation immigrants to ensure sufficient observations.<sup>7</sup> Only immigrants who did not receive Swiss citizenship at birth have been included, in order to filter out school-leavers that have at least one Swiss parent.

#### YOUTH CHARACTERISTICS AND EDUCATIONAL CONTEXTS IN FRANCE AND SWITZERLAND

##### *Lower Secondary Education in France*

In recent decades, the level of education in France has been steadily on the rise. However, immigrant children appear to experience specific educational difficulties (Vallet, 1996), due mainly to their working class backgrounds and a lack of knowledge of the French educational system (given notably a lower level of French language of immigrant families). According to the DEPP panel data, North African parents have low levels of education.<sup>8</sup> In many cases, they have attended primary or no education at all (four out of ten fathers and mothers have no formal education). Concerning higher education, 27 percent of French natives have at least one of their parents with a higher education diploma compared to only two percent of North African parents (cf. [Table 1](#)). Moreover, the latter are generally in low-level occupations (manual workers, unskilled service workers). We define the socio-economic status of the parents into three categories (high, middle, low status) using the occupations. Ninety percent of North African parents are coded as having a low socio-economic status versus 50 percent of French parents.

The children of immigrants do not enter secondary school with the same educational assets or experience. They have more frequently repeated years in primary school than French native children. Four out of ten North African youths are late on entering secondary versus two out of ten French natives. This situation affects subsequent educational pathways. Differences in academic performance appear from the beginning of secondary school (lower performance for North African youths) ([Table 1](#)). For both mathematics and French, only about one quarter of immigrant students have above average marks, versus nearly 60 percent of the French native students. Finally, for North African youths, 45 percent envisaged studying in higher education whereas it is 53 percent for French natives.

Table 1. Social and schooling characteristics in secondary school (%)

Country of parental origin	North Africa	France
Parents higher education diploma	2	27
High socio-eco status	2	26
Low socio-eco status	90	50
Belated entry in secondary school	42	18
Above average marks (language)	27	59
Above average marks (math)	23	58
Aspirations to study in HE	45	53
<i>N</i>	890	13806

Source : *Students' panel of secondary school, survey 1995- 1995-2011 (2006) [electronic file], DEPP INSEE [producer], Centre Maurice Halbwachs [diffuser].*

#### *Lower Secondary Education in Switzerland*

The Swiss educational context is rather complex due to its decentralised and federalist nature. In relationship to France, the 26 Swiss cantons have much more autonomy when it comes to organising schooling and training. Important for the comparison of the two countries is the fact that the Swiss system is highly tracked. Student tracking starts at the end of primary schooling (International Standard Classification of Education level 1 years 4 to 6, depending on the canton), and is primarily based on academic selection. In most cantons students are placed in two to four different lower secondary education tracks that range from basic to more extended curricula and academic requirements. While tracking is formally based on student performance, research indicates that factors such as cultural and family background also strongly influence student allocation to the various types of tracks (Kronig, 2007).

Since the early 1980s, a continuously growing overrepresentation of immigrant students in the lowest track of lower secondary school was observed at a national level (Imdorf, 2005). In 2000, one out of two foreign nationals, but only one out of four Swiss nationals, was enrolled in the lowest track. The TREE panel data shows a consistent picture: nearly half of the Ex-Yugoslav and Turkish students are in the lower secondary school track with only basic academic requirements, compared to only 22 percent of the Swiss students (Table 2). In addition, Ex-Yugoslav and Turkish students are more frequently enrolled in bridge-year courses before entering upper-secondary education. This extra year between lower and upper secondary education can function as a “waiting room” for those unable to secure an apprenticeship place (Meyer, 2003; Stalder & Nägele, 2011). The recruitment process of training companies can form an obstacle for students with an immigrant background who want to access certain vocational education and training programmes. Bridge-year courses have become an institutional offer for foreign nationals to manage their transition from school to VET (Imdorf, 2006). In terms of

school performance, 62 percent of Ex-Yugoslav and Turkish students have grades in mathematics and language (French, German, or Italian) that are above the pass mark. Their Swiss counterparts outperform them and receive grades above this mark in mathematics and language in 77 percent of all cases.<sup>9</sup> Similar to France, the most visible difference between the two groups appears in family cultural and socio-economic backgrounds. However, in Switzerland these differences seem to be less marked. The parents of Swiss students, for example, have completed higher education twice more often than their immigrant counterparts. This said, the number of Ex-Yugoslav and Turkish students with at least one parent having completed higher education is high in comparison to the Maghrebians in France and approaches the level of native parents in France (i.e. around 20%). In terms of occupational or socio-economic status the same findings can be seen. Although there still appears to be a clear difference between native and immigrant parents in Switzerland (with 62 percent of immigrant parents having a low socio-economic status compared to 23 percent of Swiss parents) the difference between the migrant and native control group is again not as pronounced as in France.

*Table 2. Social and schooling characteristics of students in Switzerland*

Country of parental origin	Turkey and former Yugoslavia	Switzerland
Parents higher education diploma	20	38
High socio-eco status	10	37
Low socio-eco status	62	23
Basic requirements lower secondary school track	47	22
Above the mark (language)	59	74
Above the mark (maths)	55	64
High future job aspirations	18	25
<i>N</i>	328	4430

*Source: TREE panel (Transition from education to employment) 2000-2010 University of Basel*

Student aspirations have been measured slightly differently in France and Switzerland. Unlike the DEPP study, the TREE data does not allow us to directly measure students' aspirations to reach or complete higher education. Instead, we use a proxy variable that measures around the age of 15 which occupation the student expects to have at age 30. These occupational categories are then recoded into the ISEI scale in order to group students' aspirations into high, mid and low occupational status categories. [Table 2](#) shows that immigrant students have slightly lower aspirations than their Swiss counterparts, but, like in France, the difference only amounts to a few percentage points.



*Upper-secondary and Tertiary Education*

The educational pathway pupils follow are the result of key decision-making moments, school tracking, opportunities and constraints within an institutional context. In our analysis we construct educational pathways with common elements in order to draw a comparison between the educational trajectories and the diplomas obtained up until tertiary education in the two countries, which have different educational systems and traditions.

In France, as already mentioned, tracking does not start before the end of lower secondary (*collège*). At upper secondary level, students may enrol either in a *lycée* on the *baccalauréat* track (formally three years) or on a two year vocational track (VET system), aiming to obtain a *Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle* (CAP) and possibly, as said before, after another two years, a *baccalauréat professionnel*. However, some youths leave the secondary school system without a diploma, either after lower secondary (*collège*) or during upper secondary (*lycée*).

In terms of figures, the category of school leavers with no diploma in France accounts for 10 percent (Table 3). Around 17 percent enrol on the aforementioned vocational track (VET system) and obtain a diploma, but do not go on to the vocational baccalaureate. Access to the *baccalauréat* track (academic and vocational) represents close to two thirds<sup>10</sup> of the youths. Finally, almost half of academic baccalaureate holders enter university whereas forty percent of vocational baccalaureate holders enrol in short vocational tertiary programmes (*Instituts Universitaires de Technologie* (IUT)/*Sections de Technicien Supérieur* (STS)). Moreover, forty percent of vocational baccalaureate holders do not take up tertiary studies compared to 13 percent for holders of an academic baccalaureate.

In the TREE panel a quarter of the students acquire an academic baccalaureate (Table 3). The majority of those students enrol into university or a university of applied science (74% and 17% respectively). Only a small minority (7%) does not continue on to any form of tertiary education. Of the students obtaining a vocational baccalaureate, only 43 percent continue on to a university or a university of applied science, meaning that more than half of the vocational baccalaureate holders do not use their diploma for tertiary studies.

## PATHWAYS TO HIGHER EDUCATION IN FRANCE AND SWITZERLAND

What is the likelihood of being in a particular educational pathway in Switzerland and France when we compared immigrant students to their counterparts with native parents? In our two country comparison we will focus on four educational pathways from secondary to tertiary education:

- Path 1:* Those who access tertiary education with a general (FR) or academic (CH) baccalaureate.
- Path 2:* Those who access tertiary education with a professional (FR), technical (FR) or vocational baccalaureate<sup>11</sup> (CH).

Table 3. Upper-secondary diploma and tertiary enrolment in France and Switzerland<sup>12</sup>

	University	IUT-STIS	Other HE	No tertiary enrolment	Total (row)	Column percentages
<i>France</i> ( <i>N</i> = 14696)						
Academic baccalaureate	47% (2355)	17% (828)	23% (1142)	13% (627)	100% (4952)	34% (4952)
Vocational baccalaureate	9% (382)	42% (1779)	10% (410)	39% (1638)	100% (4209)	29% (4209)
Other upper secondary diploma	.	.	.	.	.	17% (2510)
No upper secondary diploma	.	.	.	.	.	10% (1508)
No data/sample attrition	.	.	.	.	.	10% (1517)
<i>Switzerland</i> ( <i>N</i> = 6343)						
	University	University of Applied Science	Tertiary B	No tertiary enrolment	Total (row)	Column percentages
Academic baccalaureate	74% (1127)	17% (253)	2% (37)	7% (113)	100% (1530)	24% (1530)
Vocational baccalaureate	4% (30)	39% (326)	10% (81)	47% (395)	100% (832)	13% (832)
Upper-secondary specialized school	2% (4)	48% (101)	18% (38)	31% (64)	100% (207)	3% (207)
Other upper secondary diploma	.	.	.	.	.	29% (1845)
No upper secondary diploma	.	.	.	.	.	3% (174)
No data / sample attrition	.	.	.	.	.	28% (1746)

PATHWAYS TO HE IN FRANCE AND SWITZERLAND




Figure 1. Educational pathways in France and Switzerland

- Path 3:* Those with any type of baccalaureate who do not access tertiary education.
- Path 4:* All other upper secondary diploma holders (those not eligible for higher education).

Tertiary enrolment in Switzerland includes those who enrol in universities or in universities of applied science.<sup>13</sup> In France, we cover the university sector as well as the short vocational programmes (IUT/STS, and other types of HE programmes – preparatory schools for business and engineering schools, schools of art, architecture, nursing, social work, etc.). We further exclude students who have not completed upper secondary education<sup>14</sup> or those for whom we have no or insufficient data.

In France, the first pathway of youth who obtain a *baccalauréat général* and who enrol in tertiary studies account for 37 percent of those who obtain an upper secondary diploma (38% for French natives but only 20% North African youths) (Figure 1). Pathway 2 refers to the 22 percent of youths who obtain a *baccalauréat professionnel* or a *baccalauréat technologique* and continue onto tertiary studies (22% for French natives but 31% for youths of North African background). The third pathway covers 19 percent of youths who do not enrol in tertiary studies after their *baccalauréat* (19% for French natives and 22% for North African youths). Pathway 4 includes the 21 percent of youths who are VET graduates but do not continue onto a vocational baccalaureate (21% for French natives and 27% for North African youths).

Quite similar to France, the first pathway in Switzerland covers 37 percent of youths who acquire an academic baccalaureate and enrol in university studies (37% for native Swiss and 26% for Ex-Yugoslav and Turkish students) (Figure 1). Hence, in both countries the immigrant groups are underrepresented in the pathway to higher education *via* the traditional baccalaureate (path 1). The percentages of students accessing higher education with a vocational baccalaureate (path 2) appear relatively lower in Switzerland than in France. Only 13 percent of native Swiss students and 11 percent of Ex-Yugoslav and Turkish students follow this path. The most striking finding is that immigrant students do not seem to be able to compensate for their relative low representation in the academic baccalaureate track by accessing higher education after completion of a vocational baccalaureate, as is the case in France. The share of students that do not use their baccalaureate diploma to access higher education (path 3) is at a comparable level with France. Among both native Swiss and immigrant students, 19 percent of baccalaureate graduates do not access higher education (path 3). The share of students obtaining a non-baccalaureate upper secondary diploma (path 4) in Switzerland is relatively high when compared to France (especially with regard to the immigrant group) and reflects the relative popularity and prestige attached to VET programmes in the Swiss educational landscape.

In the next two sections we will use multinomial logistic regression models to analyse the odds of being in a particular educational track. The first pathway (academic baccalaureate track → tertiary studies) is used as the reference track

category. The aim is to see if there remains a residual effect of country of origin between the two groups, native and immigrant youths, once we control for schooling factors, family social and economic capital, and aspirations of the youths.

*Explaining Pathways to Higher Education in France*

The first model in Figure 2 only takes into account the country of origin. Set against French natives, youths with North African background have almost three times more chance to access tertiary studies *via* a vocational baccalaureate (path 2) than *via* an academic baccalaureate (path 1, reference track). In comparison to non-immigrants, students with North African backgrounds are twice more probable to be in the VET system (other none *baccalauréat* diploma holders, path 4) and also twice as likely not to use their *baccalauréat* to enter tertiary education (path 3), than to access HE *via* an academic baccalaureate. Nevertheless, the predictive power of the model remains modest (Nagelkerke pseudo  $R^2 = 0.009$ ).




Figure 2. France

The second model introduces the schooling variables (mathematics and French marks at the beginning of secondary school and repeating primary school). It reveals that North African youths have half the chance to be in the VET system (path 4) as the French natives (compared with the reference track path 1). Immigrant youths are still more likely to access tertiary studies with a vocational baccalaureate (path 2). There is no significant difference between the French and the North African youths in terms of not accessing tertiary studies with a *baccalauréat* (path 3) and the reference track. The predictive power of this model

has considerably increased (Nagelkerke  $R^2 = 0.365$ ). In the reference track (path 1, academic baccalaureate and tertiary studies) students have repeated less a primary school year and have received better marks at the beginning of secondary school. The North African youths (who have lower marks and repeat primary school) initially enrol less in the academic baccalaureate track and less frequently access tertiary studies. However, school performance controlled for, the situation of the North African youths is close to that of French in terms of access to higher education *via* the vocational baccalaureate (path 2) and *via* the academic baccalaureate (path 1). No doubt this result is due to the fact that North African students are usually geared into the vocational baccalaureate tracks. With similar marks and in relationship to French natives, North African youths have a higher probability to be in tertiary studies than in the VET system (path 4). Those North African youths who have good marks obtain an academic baccalaureate and access tertiary studies. Being late on entering secondary school is indicative of past schooling difficulties and influences the access to tertiary studies. This said, it is especially schooling performance and the weight of marks that are crucial in the educational decisions in France.

The third model adds the social characteristics of the parents (economic and cultural capital), aspirations and gender of the students. The model accounts for half of the variance (Nagelkerke  $R^2 = 0.544$ ). The North African youths are four times less likely to be in the VET system (path 4). The probability of continuing tertiary studies with a vocational baccalaureate (path 2) is no longer significant for North African youths (compared to the reference path). The North African youths have twice less chance to have a baccalauréat and not enter tertiary studies (path 3).

Keeping marks constant, the social and economic variables increase the differences between the two groups of country of origin, given that the North African youths more often come from families with lower socio-economic and cultural capital. The *baccalauréat* holders of North African origin are over-selected in terms of schooling performance and social background (Caille & Lemaire, 2009). The North African youths are therefore not less likely to access higher education with an academic baccalaureate diploma because they are North African, but because of their lower secondary schooling performance.

#### *Explaining Pathways to Higher Education in Switzerland*

In Switzerland a similar yet slightly different development can be observed (Figure 3). There is no significant difference between Swiss and immigrants students in accessing tertiary education *via* a vocational baccalaureate (path 2) in comparison to those doing so with an academic baccalaureate (reference path 1). Ex-Yugoslav and Turkish students have nearly twice less chance to access tertiary education after receiving a baccalaureate diploma (path 3) and are twice more likely to have received a non-baccalaureate upper secondary diploma (path 4). The predictive power of the first model is again very low (Nagelkerke pseudo  $R^2 = 0.003$ ).

PATHWAYS TO HE IN FRANCE AND SWITZERLAND




Figure 3. Switzerland

Compared to France the model estimated for Switzerland changes somewhat less after the introduction of lower-secondary school variables. As in France, the predictive power increases considerably once earlier school characteristics are taken into account (Nagelkerke  $R^2 = 0.198$ ). After controlling for lower secondary school type and grades in mathematics and language in lower secondary education, the statistically significant difference between immigrant students and their Swiss counterparts in obtaining a non-baccalaureate diploma disappears (in relation to those accessing higher education with an academic baccalaureate). Only the effect for having an Ex-Yugoslav or Turkish background and not enrolling for tertiary studies after acquiring a baccalaureate diploma (path 3) remains statistically significant. Overall, after controlling for previous school performance and early tracking, there appears to be less of a difference between immigrants and native Swiss students. Immigrant students are only slightly more likely not to enrol for tertiary studies after acquiring a baccalaureate diploma. For all students being in a low-level school track at the lower secondary level, greatly decreases the odds of acquiring a baccalaureate diploma and continuing on to tertiary education. In Switzerland, tracking in lower-secondary education appears to be a major factor in determining whether or not a student obtains a baccalaureate, whereas differences in lower secondary school grades matter little for accessing higher education through either an academic or a vocational baccalaureate. This said, students with lower grades in language and mathematics have more chance not to receive any baccalaureate diploma.

Lastly, in the third model we introduce the educational level and socio-economic status of the students' parents as well as students' future job aspirations and gender, which further improves the predictive power of the model (pseudo  $R^2 = 0.434$ ). Compared to the reference path, the Ex-Yugoslav and Turkish students

have now half less probability to obtain a non-baccalaureate diploma (path 4). There is no longer a statistically significant difference between immigrant and Swiss students in obtaining a baccalaureate diploma and not accessing higher education (path 3). However, after controlling for both schooling and social background factors there is a strong negative effect for having an Ex-Yugoslav or Turkish background and accessing higher education through a vocational baccalaureate (path 2). Similar to Maghrebians in France, Ex-Yugoslav and Turkish students are not less likely to access higher education with an academic baccalaureate because of their immigrant background, but because of their previous school performance, early tracking, as well as the socio-economic background and cultural capital of their parents. When controlling for these factors, we find Ex-Yugoslav and Turkish students to have higher odds to be in the academic baccalaureate to tertiary education pathway in comparison with their native Swiss counterparts.

#### CONCLUSION

Students with a North African background in France and students with a Turkish or ex-Yugoslavian background in Switzerland are underrepresented in institutions of higher education. This raises the following question: what are the main reasons for their limited access to higher education? This chapter has analysed how the institutional settings in both countries influence access to higher education with a special interest in the integrative function of vocational baccalaureate certificates. These certificates have recently been introduced in both countries to increase permeability of the education system and allow some of those completing vocational training to access higher education, which may foster access to higher education for vulnerable groups.

What did we learn from the comparison of students with upper secondary degrees in France and Switzerland, and from the patterns of how native and immigrant students make use of their baccalaureate diplomas? At first glance, our descriptive analysis confirms that students with an immigrant background who complete upper secondary education are more likely to graduate without any higher education entry certificate compared to their native peers (27% vs 21% in France; 43% vs 31% in Switzerland).

As far as vocational pathways to higher education in France are concerned, immigrant students indeed seem to benefit from vocational programmes to compensate for their underrepresentation in the traditional academic track to higher education. The democratisation of the French educational system has led to a greater access to higher education for all youths, including those from immigrant backgrounds. For Switzerland in contrast, our results do not show such a compensation function. This might be due to the difficulties of the particular immigrant groups we studied in being hired by training companies that provide high level VET programmes, as these types of programmes are often the ones needed to enrol in a vocational baccalaureate programme. Their relegation to bridge-year courses, where students often accept to “cool down” their occupational



aspirations to a level where a vocational baccalaureate is not an option anymore, may be provoked by employer discrimination.

Once earlier school performance and career variables at lower secondary level are controlled for, North African youths in France have the same chance to access tertiary studies *via* an academic baccalaureate as their native French peers. The same holds true for Ex-Yugoslav and Turkish students in Switzerland. Once we control for the socio-economic background and cultural capital of the parents, as well as for the aspirations of the student, we find that first and second-generation students of Turkish and Ex-Yugoslav descent are more likely to access higher education through the traditional academic track. Our results confirm recent findings for both countries. In France, immigrant children have a higher probability to obtain the *baccalauréat* than the native French (Vanhoffelen, 2013), when differences in educational characteristics are taken into account. This higher probability of obtaining a *baccalauréat* for immigrant youths illustrates a higher level of aspiration and a strong ambition for social mobility (Brinbaum & Kieffer, 2009; Caille & Lemaire, 2009; Griga et al., 2013; Mey, Rorato, & Voll, 2005). Picot, 2012) concludes for Switzerland that the post-secondary attendance gap in favour of non-immigrant students is due almost entirely to poorer secondary school performance among immigrant students (as measured by the PISA reading scores). Secondary school tracking is also strongly associated with a significant part of the gap in access to higher education.

In other words, if the educational characteristics of the North African youths in France and those of students with Turkish or former Yugoslavian background in Switzerland were similar to those of the native students, the former would have at least the same odds of obtaining a baccalaureate diploma and access to tertiary education. Hence, the main factors of inequalities in higher education participation rates between native and immigrant youths lie in the early disadvantages during primary and lower secondary schooling. They need to be tackled at this level, and not at the crossroads at the end of upper secondary education.

To understand how educational inequalities arise in the school career of immigrant youths in France and Switzerland, and what policies could lead to its reduction, it is necessary to look closely at the integration context of immigrants in each country (Crul et al., 2012). For instance, studies in Switzerland show that naturalised second-generation immigrants are more likely to enrol for tertiary studies compared to non-naturalised second-generation migrants (Fibbi et al., 2007). Hence, citizenship regimes seem to matter for academic success.

Switzerland and France differ significantly in terms of citizenship regimes and actual naturalisation rates. Switzerland has one of the most restrictive immigration policies in Europe especially when immigrants are third country nationals, i.e. from outside of the EU. A federal minimum of 12 years of residence is required for naturalisation. Individual cantons can set a further requirement that the applicant has resided within the canton for a set number of years before naturalisation can be requested. This puts those that move frequently, for example, labour migrants, at a disadvantage. In addition, Switzerland does not have a policy of *jus soli* and Swiss-born children of migrants are therefore not automatically granted Swiss nationality

at birth (Fibbi et al., 2006, 2007). France, in contrast, has a more lenient citizenship regime with a limited form of *jus soli*, meaning that third generation immigrants are automatically granted French citizenship on birth and second-generation immigrants receive French citizenship when turning 18 if they were born in France and resided there since the age of 13 (Brubaker, 1992). The naturalisation rates among first and second-generation immigrants are slightly higher in France, meaning that they should in theory have better access to political rights and social services than immigrants in Switzerland. Further research is needed to analyse if and how citizenship relates to academic achievement in France and Switzerland.

Issues of segregation in schools and neighbourhoods are a further aspect of the integration context that impacts on academic achievement of immigrant students. Given their lower socio-economic status, North African families in France often have little choice but to send their children to schools with fewer resources. This educational segregation takes place at a very early stage in the school career and continues onto lower secondary school (Felouzis, 2003; Ichou, 2013). Possible policies aimed at reducing school segregation, particularly at an early stage in the school career, such as compensatory resources for challenged schools or the busing of youths from challenged neighbourhoods could be developed. However, little is known about the marginal positive effects of such policies in terms of reducing educational inequalities.

In addition, differences in family values can create a conflict with institutions such as schools (Ichou, 2013), and educational actors within schools. Increasing the awareness and understanding of cultural and gender diversity of key educational actors could help to alleviate these problems (Mc Andrew, Potvin, & Borri-Anadon, 2013). Indeed, in the province of Québec in Canada, teacher training programmes include modules on multiculturalism and ethnic diversity (Borri-Anadon, Larochelle-Audet, Mc Andrew, & Potvin, 2013) to fight stereotypes.

Finally, education policies should consider issues of integration with special focus on selection processes in general, and on school guidance early on in the careers of immigrant students in particular. In Switzerland, the allocation of children in lower secondary school tracks with either basic, extended, or academic requirements should, for instance, be based less on language skills, which is at this moment the most important selection criteria, but more on mathematics or other general indicators of competence.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Paris and Strasbourg for France, and Zurich and Basel for Switzerland.

<sup>2</sup> The educational policy of the French Ministry of Education has three objectives: 1) the access to a minimum level of education such as the *Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle* (CAP, the first vocational diploma in secondary school); 2), 80 percent of an age group to reach the *baccalauréat* level at the end of upper secondary school, and; 3) one in two youths to obtain a *licence* (a bachelor diploma) within higher education.

<sup>3</sup> The remodelling of the vocational track, which has already been in motion for a number of years, aims to enable the highest number of youths to reach the *baccalauréat* level and also to encourage

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- further study in tertiary education. 24 percent of CAP holders continue onto the *baccalauréat professionnel* (DEPP, 2011).
- <sup>4</sup> During the year that they take the *baccalauréat*, students who plan to enter higher education fill out one or several application forms submitted to different institutions. The institutions screen the applications, focusing mostly on students' school performance and type of *baccalauréat*, and decide whether or not the student will be offered admission.
- <sup>5</sup> Of which 86% are second generation.
- <sup>6</sup> These as well as the following figures of immigrant students in the Swiss data represent unweighted numbers.
- <sup>7</sup> Previous research has pointed out that there are differences between first and second-generations immigrants in accessing higher education (Griga et al., 2013; Picot, 2012) and our estimates for immigrant students are likely to be overestimated for first-generation immigrants and underestimated for the second generation.
- <sup>8</sup> The integration of immigrant from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in the 70s and 80s into French society took place in a context of post-colonialism (especially during the aftermath of the Algerian War), that marginalised the parents and their children in economic and cultural terms, even if they have French citizenship (Bouvier, 2012).
- <sup>9</sup> However, reading literacy scores as measured by PISA were much lower among immigrant students (Picot, 2012). Felouzis and Charmillot (2013) argue that such educational inequalities of academic performance are mainly due to the social segregation that goes hand in hand with early tracking.
- <sup>10</sup> Of which 34% an academic baccalaureate (*baccalauréat général*) and 29% a vocational one (*baccalauréat professionnel* or *technologique*).
- <sup>11</sup> Higher vocational education and training leading to an Advanced Fed. Certificate or a Fed. Diploma of higher vocational education and training (see SERI 2013 for further information).
- <sup>12</sup> In Switzerland this pathway includes those who graduated from an upper secondary specialised school.
- <sup>13</sup> This excludes Professional education and training (PET) (or tertiary B in Switzerland), which prepares professionals for highly technical and/or managerial positions (SERI, 2013).
- <sup>14</sup> In the Swiss case, this excludes disproportionately immigrant youth from former Yugoslavia and Turkey who show a lower participation rate in VET and higher youth unemployment rates compared to Swiss nationals (Imdorf, 2006).

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## **10. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUÉBEC HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM**

*Why At-risk College Students Remain a Political Priority*

### OVERVIEW OF THE QUÉBEC EDUCATION SYSTEM

The development of the Québec higher education system is fairly recent (Conseil supérieur de l'éducation, 2003). Compared to some of the world's oldest universities founded as early as the 11<sup>th</sup> century CE,<sup>1</sup> the first Québec universities only opened their doors some 800 years later: McGill College – later to become McGill University – in 1821 and Université Laval in 1852. At the beginning of the 1960s there were only six universities in Québec. The first CÉGEPs (Collège d'enseignement général et professionnel, known officially in English as a “General and Vocational College”) opened in 1967.

Therefore, during the 1960s, access to higher education was significantly lower in Québec than in other provinces in Canada, and became one of the driving forces behind a vast societal reform movement commonly referred to as the “Quiet Revolution.” Seemingly contradictory in name, this reform was in fact a “rapid but orderly change,” with state-sanctioned measures supplanting the then-omnipresent authority of the Catholic Church (Trottier & Bernatchez, 2005). Narrowing this gap in access to higher education and modernising the education system were some of the goals of the Quiet Revolution. During this period, widespread public consultations were held by the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Québec, better known as the Parent Commission. These consultations were instrumental in drafting the foundations of an entirely new social contract<sup>2</sup> between the State, the education system and the Québec population. The age of compulsory school attendance was raised from 14 to 16. New comprehensive secondary (high) schools called “polyvalentes” offering both general and vocational programmes began appearing in many Québec towns and communities. The higher education system was restructured to comprise two levels of instruction: CÉGEPs and universities. The State substantially increased its participation in funding the education system, thus lessening the burden of education costs hitherto borne primarily by families.

Others universities began to appear during this decade and the 1970s. The Université du Québec network was established in 1968 and was gradually introduced throughout Québec (Ferretti, 1994). The creation of the Université du Québec en Abitibi-Témiscamingue (UQAT) marks the most recent – yet by no means last – phase of the development of the university system we know today,

comprising a total of 14 universities and 4 affiliated schools. Since then, universities have been opening satellite campuses across Québec (Julien & Gosselin, 2013).

Today the province boasts 48 CÉGEPs including a network of college centres for the transfer of technology, private colleges as well as satellite campuses. The CÉGEPs made it possible to increase the offer of college education throughout the vast regions of Québec. CÉGEPs offer students three main pathways in a college education: pre-university programmes (compulsory for admission to university studies), career or technical programmes (leading either to the labour market or university), and the *Session d'accueil et d'intégration* (SAI) transition programme.

Over the years, the creation of new universities and CÉGEPs led to a significant increase in Québec's higher education student population. Indeed, since 1961, the student population in universities has increased twelve-fold (Trottier & Bernatchez, 2005). In 2012, nearly half (45%) a generation of Québec students was enrolled in a bachelor programme (MELS & MERST, 2013a). Since CÉGEPs were first established, the student population has jumped ten-fold, with 63% of college students now enrolled in a pre-university or technical programme (MELS & MERST, 2013b).

#### THE ROLE OF UNIVERSITIES AND CÉGEPs

During the post-war period of massification of higher education that swept across many Western countries, improving the level of education in Québec became an intrinsic part of the social contract, not only for youth in their initial training, but also for adults, who historically have had very little access to higher education. This led to an expansion of full- and part-time programmes in universities. Today, higher education continues to be at the heart of Québec's social contract, and is centred on issues related to economic and scientific development as well as the training of a highly-qualified workforce.

In Québec, universities and CÉGEPs are playing an increasingly important role in the area of scientific and technological development alongside private sector and government laboratories (Conseil supérieur de l'éducation, 1994). Given the current industrial fabric of small and medium businesses less likely to invest in research, Québec and Canadian higher education institutions are stepping in to fill this void. The participation rate of these institutions in research and development (R&D) is markedly higher than that of their counterparts in OECD countries or the European Union. In 2010, for example, the percentage of R&D conducted by higher education institutions averaged 36% in Québec alone and 38% for all of Canada combined, compared to 24% in EU countries and 19% for all OECD countries combined, a trend that has intensified over the past decade (Institut de la statistique du Québec, 2013). In this context, national funding agencies for university-based research are being created to support scientific development, and a part of the funding is being specifically allocated to niche areas of research. Since the beginning of 2000, Québec has adopted two policies on science and two national research strategies (Gouvernement du Québec, 2001, 2013). Today,

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scientific development is closely aligned with economic development and the advancement of society, with higher education institutions playing a key role in policy and strategy. In fact, in 2013, the Québec Government declared *knowledge* a public good likely to increase the enrichment of Québec society as a whole:

The national policy on research and innovation [Politique nationale de la recherche et de l'innovation] will foster the advancement of Quebecers in every aspect: economic, social and human. Enrichment in all its forms requires knowledge, education, and an increase in the number of college and university graduates – particularly first-generation graduates. (Gouvernement du Québec 2013, p. 9). [Free translation]

Thus, two major factors have largely contributed to shaping the social contract between Québec higher education and society: the predominantly Catholic heritage<sup>3</sup> of the French-speaking majority – which must be viewed in the historical context of under-enrolment compared to English-speaking Canada – and the paucity of R&D in the private sector, both in Québec and Canada.

## ACCESSIBILITY ISSUES AND AT-RISK STUDENTS

Despite the considerable gains in the development of higher education in Québec, issues related to equal opportunity and greater accessibility persist. For example, there appears to be a positive correlation between university attendance and parents' highest level of education (Child, Finnie, & Mueller, 2010). Québec's current higher education system is characterised by both the selection, rigour and constraints intrinsic to a standard educational pathway and the greater access and flexibility offered by pathway variability and reversibility (Doray, Picard, Trottier, & Groleau, 2009). Indeed, most educational reforms in Québec since the Quiet Revolution have, to varying degrees, promoted flexibility within the structure of the system. These reforms facilitated extending the deadline for high school students to decide on a specialisation, encouraged greater student mobility within the education system, removed dead-end tracks, and brought about measures aimed at “warming” students' aspirations toward higher education training (Doray et al., 2009). Consequently, atypical pathways – shaped by withdrawals, re-entry, reorientation (e.g. switching programmes mid-stream during higher education studies) or even reversals within the education system (e.g. enrolling in a college programme after attending university) – have become increasingly commonplace (Finnie & Qiu, 2008; Kamanzi, Doray, Bonin, Groleau, & Murdoch, 2010; Veillette, Auclair, Laberge, Gaudreault, Perron, & Arbour, 2007).

In examining student pathways at the college level – specifically those of students at risk of failing or interrupting their studies during the crucial first year of college – our research has revealed some new challenges facing the higher education system in Québec. When entering CÉGEP, a number of these students typically enrol in a transition programme (*Session d'accueil et d'intégration*, or SAI), which includes a first-year seminar course and a range of remedial measures inside and outside the classroom. Introduced in 1993, SAIs are single-semester



courses designed to assist new college students overcome certain hurdles, be they academic (e.g. weak high school grade point averages, missing mathematics or science courses) or vocational (e.g. academic and/or career indecision). SAIs allow students to delay deciding on their programme of study, and encompass a range of indecision interventions (e.g. counselling, career information, etc.), prerequisite courses, credit courses in orientation, as well as general education courses (e.g. French or English, Humanities, Physical Education, elective courses) compulsory for pre-university and technical programmes. In 2010, approximately 9% of the Québec CÉGEP population was enrolled in an SAI (MELS & MERST, 2013a).

Our research was part of a comprehensive study that followed a group of at-risk students. Compared to other first-year students in pre-university or technical programmes, those enrolled in an SAI tended to be first-generation students, to have high school education pathways marked by hurdles and detours (e.g. failed courses, repeated academic years, interrupted studies, adult education), and to manifest more pronounced academic and career indecision<sup>4</sup> (Forner, 2007; Picard, Boutin, & Skakni, 2010; Picard, 2012). In measuring the short-term effectiveness of SAIs in reducing this indecision, we found that compared to other first-year college students, the SAI group showed a higher rate of improvement in both academic and career indecision by the end of their first semester (Picard, 2012). We also considered the explanatory variables in the effectiveness of the SAI over the first college semester. We also found that student-faculty relationships in the SAI environment proved statistically significant in improving academic indecision. Orientation courses in SAIs, pre-enrolment activities and assessing student needs were found to lessen career indecision. Moreover, students in the comparison group whose mothers had a high school diploma showed a more pronounced deterioration over the first semester in lack of method in decision-making (i.e., difficulty in deciding on different but equally attractive goals) compared to those whose mothers had a university degree.

Our study was based on a longitudinal design using two cohorts and two waves of data collection in each. The aim was to compare the pathways of SAI students to those in a pre-university or technical programme. Our investigation centered on the following questions: To what extent does a transition semester foster a successful integration into college? What events shape the educational pathways of these students in high school and college? Is there a “turning point” along these pathways?

#### CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The measurements and analysis carried out for our study were largely guided by Pierre Doray’s concepts of “learning pathways” and “educational pathways” (Doray, 2012; Doray et al., 2009; Picard, Trottier, & Doray, 2011). “Learning pathways are defined as the result of educational experiences or events and educational pathways as the result of educational situations that occur within the framework of formal training and the school system” (Doray et al., 2009, p. 12). Educational pathways are therefore an integral part of learning pathways. Four

axes describe the properties of the learning pathways (Doray, 2012; Doray et al., 2009; Picard et al., 2011):

1. *Transactions between the individual and the educational institution.* Pathways are the outcome of a transaction that occurs between students and the educational institution, whose structure and organisation weigh heavily in the pathway's progress, since they limit – if only by their formal and informal entrance requirements – both the access and opportunities available to individuals. Research on educational inequality has amply demonstrated how diverse social factors work to differentiate access to educational resources. Some of these factors issue from symbolic or cultural parameters and others from living conditions. In this sense, we must consider that the “decision” to pursue (or not to pursue) higher education, as well as the choice of field of study or programme, are influenced by cultural dispositions, cultural and cognitive achievements, and living conditions. The “gaze” that individuals cast on the education system is therefore socially conditioned.
2. *Dynamics between the objective and subjective aspects of an individual's experience.* This dynamic is reflected primarily in the “*croyance dans le «jeu» éducatif que les étudiants peuvent exprimer, c'est-à-dire dans l'illusio*” [“students' expressed belief in the educational ‘game,’ which is to say, in the *illusio*”] (Bourdieu, 2001, p.103). It can also be understood from the interactionist perspective, in which the pathway includes both an objective dimension, consisting of identifiable social positions, status and situations, and a subjective one, essentially the meaning that individuals attribute to their experience (Crossan, Field, Gallacher, & Merrill, 2003). Lastly, we can also analyse this dynamic by drawing on the sociology of experience. Coulon (1992) showed that the institutional relations between students and schools do not necessarily lead to analogous educational experiences (e.g., academic failure can discourage some but motivate others to reinvest in their studies).
3. *Transactions between school-based and extracurricular experiences.* Educational experiences can be structured around various aspects that include the relationship to knowledge, social integration in the institutions or the acquisition of the student skillset (“le métier d'étudiant”) as a time to internalise the institutional rules or arrangements that govern learning within the school system. While extracurricular experience can facilitate the return to school and enhance the school experience, it can also act as a constraint leading to a possible bifurcation in the pathway. The literature on adult education indicates that individuals' living conditions may be detrimental to education (Cross, 1982; Darkenwald & Valentine, 1985; Rubenson & Xu, 1997; Rubenson & Schuetze, 2001). Economic resources, the work/family/education balance, and the situation regarding work (including company characteristics) and employment are factors that can facilitate or hinder access to education. In addition, extracurricular experience should not only be considered in the present: previous experience, particularly family background and geographic context, affects individuals' subjectivity (as the meanings individuals assign to situations guide their decision to continue or withdraw from studies) and educational future. The

extracurricular experience encompasses other aspects that affect educational and school choices, such as the influence of peers and social relationships. Life events, including health problems, bereavement and teen pregnancy, can also modify the course of a pathway and necessitate directional shifts or changes in momentum. We must also consider broader phenomena such as the entry into adulthood or the experience of migration or immigration.

4. *Relationship to time.* This axis enables the pathway to be positioned within the broader framework of the different timeframes that form part of any life story. It touches on the social, economic, cultural and cognitive dimensions that shaped the individual prior to entering higher education. Social background and prior educational experience are the two main past dimensions that bear consideration; projects and expectations are the two main elements that refer to the future. The experience underway can also impact the pathway's "pitch" and cause more or less pronounced bifurcations (Doray et al., 2009, pp. 13-14).

#### METHOD

In 2009, we enlisted the collaboration of eighteen career counsellors, two professors, and one academic advisor from twenty-one Québec CÉGEPs, based on the geographical location (urban/rural), size, and language of instruction of their institution. These professionals then recruited two cohorts of first-year college students for a repeated measures study. Each cohort was comprised of SAI students who might benefit from targeted orientation interventions and a comparison group of students enrolled in either a pre-university or technical programme. The sample was based on gender and academic pathway.

2009 cohort: A total of 920 first-year students (SAI group = 481; comparison group = 439) formed the first cohort. At the pre-test, the sample comprised 520 women, 399 men, and 1 unspecified participant. The response rate was 82%. The mean age of participants was 17.7 ( $SD = 2.12$ ). Pre-test data collection took place in August 2009, post-test data collection in March 2011. At the post-test, the number of participants dropped to 359 (39.0% of the initial sample), with 145 (40.5%) remaining in the SAI group and 214 (59.5%) in the comparison group. The mean age of the participants was 17.6 ( $SD = 2.13$ ) at the pre-test.

2010 cohort: Using the same method of data collection (pre-test in August 2010 and post-test eighteen months later), the second cohort consisted of 966 first-year students (SAI group = 520; comparison group = 446). The response rate was 75%. At the pre-test, the sample comprised 513 women, 444 men, and 9 unspecified participants. The mean age was 17.6 ( $SD = 2.0$ ). At the post-test, the number of participants dropped to 320 (33.1% of the initial sample), with 155 (48.4%) remaining in the SAI group and 165 (51.6%) in the comparison group. The mean age was 17.7 ( $SD = 1.80$ ) at the pre-test.

## VARIABLES, PROCEDURE, AND ANALYSIS

Our study investigated some of the events occurring along learning and educational pathways. As dependent variables, we selected *interrupting studies*, *working while studying*, and *switching programmes* from the gamut of variables explored in a prior study (Picard, Kamanzi, & Labrosse, 2013). To compare the pathways of at-risk first-year CÉGEP students enrolled in a SAI to those in a pre-university or technical programme (comparison group), we selected the *programme* as the independent variable.

Quantitative data were collected in a repeated measures study. During class time, the goal of the study was explained, and questionnaires and instructions were distributed to the class. Those students who accepted to participate filled out a consent form and the questionnaire, while those who declined were free to leave. E-mail addresses and telephone numbers were collected. No compensation was offered for participating in the study. For the post-test, we used an online survey. A follow-up survey of participants who did not complete the online survey was carried out a month later by telephone. The same variables were integrated into the questionnaires at both pre-test (high school and first college semester pathways) and post-test (second to fourth college semester pathways).

A chi-square test was used to compare the pathways of the SAI and comparison groups. When the data did not satisfy the assumptions underlying the use of this test, Monte Carlo methods were employed to obtain non-biased assessment of the exact level of significance of the test of independence. A level of significance of .05 was applied throughout the analyses.

## RESULTS

At every stage of the educational pathway, from high school to the fourth semester in CÉGEP, a higher percentage of SAI students tended to interrupt their studies (Table 1). These differences between the two groups are statistically significant for both cohorts at the high school level, yet at the college level, these differences are statistically significant for the 2009 cohort only.

Working while studying is a growing trend among student populations in Québec. In each cohort that participated in our study, between 69% and 78% of the students were gainfully employed throughout their college semesters, and no significant difference was observed between the SAI and comparison groups. Students were asked whether or not they worked during a college semester to earn money for personal expenses (Table 2). In 2009, a great majority of students in both groups worked while studying for this reason and no significant difference was found between them. In 2010, fewer students in the SAI group indicated this reason than in the comparison group (other reasons chosen were: *I'm solely responsible for my own livelihood – rent, food, school, transportation, etc.*; *to gain work experience*; and/or *validate my choice of career*). This result may be attributed to weaker economic conditions among the SAI group and must be considered in any integration mechanism and in the challenge of adapting to CÉGEP.

Table 1. Interrupting studies

	High school		2 <sup>nd</sup> semester		3 <sup>rd</sup> semester		4 <sup>th</sup> semester	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>2009 cohort</i>								
SAI gr.	55	11.1	24	16.6	29	20.0	32	22.2
Comp. gr.	30	6.4	18	8.5	20	9.4	23	10.8
$\chi^2(1)$	6.8**		5.5*		8.2**		8.5**	
<i>2010 cohort</i>								
SAI gr.	97	18.7	19	12.3	25	16.2	31	20.3
Comp. gr.	31	7.0	17	10.3	16	9.7	22	13.3
$\chi^2(1)$	28.6***		—		—		—	

\* p &lt; .05; \*\* p &lt; .01; \*\*\* p &lt; .001.

Source: Picard, Kamanzi, and Labrosse (2013). Adapted with permission.

Table 2. Working while studying to earn money for personal expenses

	2 <sup>nd</sup> semester		3 <sup>rd</sup> semester		4 <sup>th</sup> semester	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>2009 cohort</i>						
SAI gr.	81	77.1	79	79.0	82	78.8
Comp. gr.	125	80.6	135	83.3	129	82.7
$\chi^2(1)$	—		—		—	
<i>2010 cohort</i>						
SAI gr.	81	67.5	76	63.9	69	60.5
Comp. gr.	87	73.7	90	75.6	91	77.1
$\chi^2(1)$	—		3.9*		7.5**	

\* p &lt; .05; \*\* p &lt; .01; N includes participants who worked during the semester.

Source: Picard, Kamanzi, and Labrosse (2013). Adapted with permission.

From the first to the second semester in CÉGEP, 50% of students in the SAI group switched to another programme, compared to only 15% in the comparison group (Table 3) – a statistically significant difference. This result was expected, as SAI programmes are designed to last only one semester and students must enrol in a new programme in order to continue their studies. From the second to the third semester, more students in the SAI group switched programmes. At this point in their pathway, students are allowed to enrol in a programme of their choice, either a pre-university or technical programme. From the third to the fourth semester,

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Table 3. Switching programmes

	From 1 <sup>st</sup> to 2 <sup>nd</sup> semester		From 2 <sup>nd</sup> to 3 <sup>rd</sup> semester		From 3 <sup>rd</sup> to 4 <sup>th</sup> semester	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>2009 cohort</i>						
SAI gr.	61	50.4	58	53.7	15	13.8
Comp. gr.	29	14.8	33	17.6	16	8.9
$\chi^2(1)$	46.7***		42.1***		—	
<i>2010 cohort</i>						
SAI gr.	73	53.7	84	67.2	18	15.4
Comp. gr.	29	19.6	26	18.1	14	10.0
$\chi^2(1)$	35.8***		66.9***		—	

\*\*\* p < .001; N excludes participants who interrupted studies.

Source: Picard, Kamanzi, and Labrosse (2013). Adapted with permission.

13,8% of the SAI group in the 2009 cohort switched programmes, but no difference was found between the two groups. The same trends were observed in the 2010 cohort. It appears that a turning point occurs during the third semester, when SAI students finally find their way in college.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Our study followed first-year college students enrolled in an SAI transition programme and considered to be at risk of failing or dropping out over four semesters of CÉGEP (18 months) – a segment of the student population that is a concern for college administrators, professors, and career advisors alike. Indeed, education statistics indicate that students enrolled in an SAI graduate at a lower rate than those enrolled in pre-university or technical programmes (Commission d'évaluation de l'enseignement collégial, 2004; MERST, 2012).

The aim of our study was to compare the pathways of these SAI students to those enrolled in a pre-university or technical programme, and attempted to answer the following questions: To what extent does a transition semester foster a successful integration into college? What events shape the educational pathways of these students in high school and college? Is there a “turning point” along these pathways?

Doray et al.'s (2009) four axes of learning and educational pathways underpinning our conceptual framework were useful in examining and interpreting events along these students' college pathways, and proved effective in suggesting the interruption of studies and switching programmes as possible adaptive behaviours. For example, we observed that our first dependent variable, *interrupting studies*, appears to be a major trend among SAI students. To a certain

extent, this behaviour reflects the fragility of students in this group. In addition, we noted a negative chain of reaction, as interrupting studies in high school often resulted in further interruptions at the college level. However, if we consider this in terms of the fourth axis of our conceptual framework (*relationship to time*), these interruptions must be viewed within the broader framework of different timeframes that form part of any life story. Interrupting studies is but one point in time and a longer study is needed to evaluate the reasons for leaving college and draw valid conclusions, as re-entry remains a distinct possibility.

Another indicator of the fragility of these students (particularly those in the 2010 cohort) was our second dependent variable, *working while studying*: SAI students tended to work during the academic year for reasons other than personal expenses. This finding confirms the relevance of our third axis (*transactions between school-based and extracurricular experiences*). In this case, extracurricular experience can be viewed as a constraint that could lead to a bifurcation in the pathway, as SAI students tended to have more limited financial resources than those in the comparison group. This variable can hinder successful integration into college.

While *switching programmes* throughout semesters in college can be seen as an erratic behaviour, we interpreted this reorientation – based on our first axis (*transactions between students and the educational institution*) – as a personal strategy or adaptive behaviour useful in overcoming previous weak academic performance. By the third semester, SAI students tended to persist in their studies, enrol in a programme, and continue on to the fourth semester. Indeed, the second year of CÉGEP appears to be a turning point in this group's educational pathway.

Why is it relevant to study an at-risk student population with an uncertain educational fate? How is this population an integral part of the social contract in the development of higher education in Québec? Our study has shown that a number of these students can be resilient at key turning points in their learning pathways, and that this resilience can be bolstered through the implementation of educational measures that support both: 1) cultural integration (e.g. assisting first-generation students escape their “class” destiny); and 2) acquiring the “student skillset” (Coulon, 1992). The validity of a transition measure as a programme to access higher education, along with other student support measures adopted in CÉGEPs, reveal another facet of the current social contract in democratising higher education in Québec.

#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> See Maassen (Chapter 3, this volume).
- <sup>2</sup> Maassen defines the social contract as “the relationship between the state and its institutions, and presumes that in order to form a social order there has to be a mutual understanding of, trust in, and commitment to the roles and responsibilities of all partners involved.”
- <sup>3</sup> For more on the effect of religion on the level of education, see Jungblut (Chapter 6, this volume).
- <sup>4</sup> According to Forner (2007), indecision refers to the inability to make a choice or engage in action necessary for decision-making when required to do so. For our study, we defined indecision using Chickering and Reisser's (1993) comprehensive framework as the product of the interaction between students' psychosocial characteristics and the learning environment of the college.

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## 11. ENGINEERING ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION THROUGH HIGHER EDUCATION FAIRS

### INTRODUCTION

In 2013, 577,220 secondary school students obtained their baccalaureate in France and most of them continued their studies in higher education. If we add together all those students who apply to institutions of higher education each year after some work experience and those already in higher education (2,387,000 in 2012), it seems relevant to consider transition to higher education as a major social process. This transition has been mostly studied by French sociologists of education and higher education from perspectives focusing predominantly on the role of the socio-economic status, academic profiles and different tracks followed by secondary school students (Convert, 2010; Duru-Bellat & Kieffer, 2008; Merle, 1996), and, to a lesser extent, on the types of secondary schools attended (Duru-Bellat & Mingat, 1988; Nakhili, 2005) and the local higher education provision (Berthet, Dechezelles, Gain, & Simon, 2010; Orange, 2013). Although these structural determinants play a major role in explaining significant regularities, they provide more powerful explanations for individuals representing the extremes of the different variables considered (upper-class *versus* lower-class students, students with high grades *versus* those with low grades, students in prestigious academic tracks *versus* those in less prestigious professional tracks, urban students *versus* rural students), leaving room for the influence of other major factors for those students in intermediate situations. In addition, even in the case of students occupying extreme positions, structural perspectives better explain the distribution of students between different higher education tracks than they do between institutions and disciplines.

In this chapter, we adopt a perspective that we see as complementary to and interacting with the perspective centred on structural determinants by focusing on the role of the devices that mediate the exchanges between students and higher education institutions (hereafter referred to as HEIs), and more specifically on one device: higher education fairs. The notion of “device” (Callon, Millo, & Muniesa, 2007) refers to all the assemblages that play a role in the construction of concrete market exchanges, although we adapt it to fit an exchange not only structured by the market but by the state as well. Indeed, higher education fairs constitute a hybrid object with features specific to “market devices” as well as others that are more typical of “policy instruments” (McFall, 2014). We focus on two types of mediations that take place at fairs and that contribute, at another level, to their

hybrid character. The first is the mediation of the exchange between providers and consumers of higher education through a classic market device, the “packaging” of products and services (Cochoy, 2002). Contrary to all appearances, higher education fairs are not events that favour a direct exchange between providers and consumers. Rather, HEIs, with at least some indirect state support, attempt to attract and hook consumers at fairs through the use of devices and instruments similar to those seen in other markets. The second is the mediation of these exchanges via devices that play a major role only in the case of non-standard goods, where prices are not the only nor the major means of articulating provision and demand, and where considerations of the quality (Callon, Meade, & Rabeharisoa, 2001) and status (Podolny, 1993) of goods and services play a major role. In these types of cases, providers and consumers tend to rely on “judgement devices” (Karpik, 2010), that is assemblages that provide them with additional information and advice both on variations in the characteristics of goods and services and on the extent to which these characteristics match their own so that they can increase the benefits and satisfactions linked to their use and to associating with them.

Our purpose in doing so is not only to document how these various devices frame, in ways that remain largely unexplored by researchers, exchanges between providers and consumers of higher education but also to point out – and further explore in future publications – how these devices, and the specific features of fairs, contribute to the reproduction and transformation of educational inequalities in access to higher education (Benninghoff, Farinaz, Goastellec, & Leresche, 2012). To do so, we will focus not only on how packaging and advising might affect student choices but also borrow some elements from the perspectives adopted by researchers who have studied fairs as “tournaments of value” (Anand & Jones, 2008) and “field configuring events” (Lampel & Meyer, 2008). Although these notions have been applied mostly to fairs in the creative industries (Moeran & Pedersen, 2011) and to fashion trade fairs (Skov, 2006), which serve purposes other than the exchange between providers and consumers, they help us to account for the fact that fairs are socially, spatially and temporarily bounded events. They bring together a large and diverse number of participants involved in the production and distribution of the goods and services being exhibited. By doing so, they contribute to the structuring of specific fields, in this case the field of higher education. Following Bourdieu’s definition of field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), fairs can be seen as recreating a socially structured space in which agents (in this case, HEIs) struggle to maintain or improve their position through the different devices previously evoked but also through competition and cooperation within the network of HEIs and related agents created by the event itself (Moeran & Pedersen, 2011). Our complementary hypothesis is that these processes in turn affect the way in which visitors perceive the landscape of higher education and the different positions occupied by different institutions within it, in ways that might significantly affect their choices.

The results and interpretations that follow are based on an on-going research project on the transition to higher education that takes into account the role of

different types of determinants and mediations, including the role of policy instruments and devices.<sup>1</sup> This study of fairs currently includes the analysis of nine fairs that took place in Paris between 2011 and 2014 and incorporates the collection and analysis of Internet advertising and paper brochures as well as the conducting and analysis of interviews and observations. For this paper, we chose to focus only on the six most recently studied fairs (between November 2013 and January 2014) because of the more systematic character of the fieldwork.<sup>2</sup> Four of the fairs were organised by the two agencies presented in the next section and the other two by public-private or private agency networks. In addition to analysing the fairs' websites and a sampling of the brochures distributed by the different HEIs at the events, we observed 37 booths (between five and seven at each fair) and eight lectures. We also conducted short interviews with 67 booth hosts and five long interviews with students working at booths. In addition, we use data from three interviews with lecture organisers as well as from a small visitor survey conducted at a fair in 2011.

This qualitative study allowed us to conduct direct observations of material arrangements, events and discourses in real time and reduced classic problems such as the interviewers' limited recall of facts and their tendency to provide idealised visions of their role and activity. Nevertheless, it also involved some of the weaknesses of observational studies, notably a selectivity bias (Yin, 2009). Even in those cases where we could rely on a team of observers (three fairs were observed by groups of 10 to 18 students), it was impossible to study a large number of booths and, while for each fair we took an initial sampling in order to represent their variety, we had to take into account important limitations to and opportunities for observations and interviews that were dependent on the contexts and situations as well as on individuals' perceptions of the study. Observing interactions in the booths was the most difficult task. Although it would have been useful to stay "hidden" for long periods in order to observe the similarities and differences between booth hosts and the interactions between a single booth host and different visitors, it was difficult to do so without being noticed. It was only at the most popular booths that we could observe and go unnoticed but then the noise levels at such booths prevented us from listening to conversations. We therefore decided to tell booth hosts about the research<sup>3</sup> and ask them for short interviews while accepting to be interrupted at any time if a new visitor came to the booth. This proved to be a productive technique in most cases and allowed both for interviews and observations of conversations with visitors. Also, in those booths where there were not many visitors and the booth hosts were interested in the topic, we were able to conduct interesting group interviews and observe group discussions between booth hosts. In addition, we negotiated longer interviews with student hosts while they were not working. As a general rule, we took a few notes at booths during observations and interviews and completed them shortly after the event once out of the participants' view. Observing at lectures was easier although it was important to arrive early to get a seat (and this was not always possible when visitors remained in the room for several lectures in a row). Also, it was sometimes difficult to identify the speakers and hear the questions. While the material

collected is abundant and varied, we still lack significant information on the visitors. Therefore, in addition to further analysing the short questionnaire given to a sample of parents and students, we are planning on conducting interviews with some of them at other fairs and analysing the visitor information collected by fair organisers.

#### FAIRS AS ORGANISED MICRO-FIELDS AND MICRO-MARKETS

##### *Organisers and Forms of Organisation*

Higher education fairs are organised in France mainly by two main private agencies, *L'Etudiant* and *Studyrama*. *L'Etudiant* belongs to the Express-Roularta media group whose majority shareholder is Roularta Media France, an international multimedia group. Created in 1972, *L'Etudiant* was initially a journal. In 1983, a series of guides on higher education was added to the brand. In 1986, it organised the first ever higher education fair in Paris and after the group was bought by Express-Roularta in 1988, it further developed the sector by targeting other French cities. *L'Etudiant* currently offers publications, fairs and Internet services, some for free and some for profit, and around 50 people work in its newsroom. *Studyrama* is an independent media group founded by two management and finance students. They started off by writing a free magazine and a guide on "good student plans." In 1994, the company launched a series of education guide books and then organised its first higher education fair in Paris in 1998. It is now part of a larger media group, Studyrama-Vocatis, that employs around 150 workers and offers publications, fairs and Internet services that focus on educational guidance, student life and professional success.

The State is also an actor in higher education fairs, in several ways. *L'Office national d'information sur les enseignements et les professions* (ONISEP), a public agency created in 1970, is also a central provider of information and guidance for higher education studies. It organises two fairs: the ONISEP education fair, which takes place within a larger fair, the European fair on education, in which *L'Etudiant* and other public and private agencies also participate; and a fair created in 2010 in collaboration with a private media group to help students make good use of the new central Internet application system for higher education, *Admission Post-Bac* (APB) known as the APB fair. ONISEP, the Ministries of Education and Higher Education and regional educational and political authorities also take part in the organising committees and sponsor the fairs organised by *L'Etudiant* and *Studyrama* so that visitors do not have to pay. It is important to note, however, that regional political and educational authorities are much more involved in organising and sponsoring those fairs taking place outside the Paris region, partly because public HEIs are much more present at these fairs.

Almost 150 higher education fairs have taken or will take place during the 2013-2014 university year. As is true for all events of this type, these fairs are temporarily and spatially bounded. Their temporality depends on the calendars of schools and HEIs, and especially on the time line imposed by the new APB

application system. Most fairs take place before the APB system opens, i.e. between November and January, and then again when it is open and students are still reflecting on their choices, i.e. between January and March (the APB system opens around mid-January and applications must be completed around mid-March). While the two private firms organise almost exactly the same number of fairs (71 by *L'Etudiant*, 70 by *Studyrama*, and six by other agencies or groups of HEIs), they try to not hold them simultaneously in the same place. The cities that can only hold two to three fairs each year, for their part logically want to spread them out over the five most intense months. Depending on their degree of specialisation, HEI fairs last one to three days, with longer fairs usually taking place towards the end of the week and the rest taking place over the weekend. Fairs are also spatially bounded and their spatial distribution is very unequal: 41 fairs take place in the Paris region (38 in Paris proper) and 106 in other regions. Almost two-thirds of the 47 cities outside the Paris region that host fairs have only one fair per year; Lyon is second to the Paris region with 14 fairs. The spatial differences are also qualitative. While half of the fairs (51%) are non-specialised and the other half are devoted to specific types of higher education tracks and occupational and professional sectors, students living in or near cities hosting one or two fairs do not have access to specialised fairs. Those living in cities hosting between three to seven fairs have access to both non-specialised fairs and fairs on different higher education tracks, but not to fairs on different occupational and professional sectors; the latter are only organised in Paris and Lyon.

#### *Activities, Agents and Visitors*

Fairs typically propose two main forms of interaction between higher education providers and consumers. The first is one-to-one interactions at exhibitor booths. While it is crucial to have an objective representation of the profiles of the HEIs present at these events so as to understand the processes at work, this is a very difficult task requiring the collection of data on size, academic provision and degrees, staff and student composition, job openings, etc., for the hundred or so HEIs present at each fair. Not only are the HEIs not the same from one fair to another, but this information is also not always readily available. However, a more superficial analysis of the HEIs present at the nine fairs observed between 2011 and 2014 (four organised by *L'Etudiant*, three by *Studyrama* and two by other bodies) shows that at fairs organised in the region of Paris, two main dimensions contribute to a biased representation of the French field of HEIs. The first has to do with HEIs' institutional status and funding: while only around 30.000 students (18% of the total number) in France are educated at private HEIs, these institutions, which strongly depend on student tuition for survival, are greatly over-represented at fairs. On the contrary, public universities are under-represented, given the nature of their funding, which makes them both less dependant on external funding and less able to spend money on booths at fairs. Also, given the fact that although they are now losing students, they are not used to the market themselves. The second dimension is prestige. The most prestigious HEIs, especially top *grandes écoles*,

are either totally absent from the fairs or only present at the fairs specialising in *grandes écoles*. More generally, HEIs that invest money and time at fairs are those that cannot count on their reputation alone to attract enough students or enough students of the “right” calibre.<sup>4</sup>

The people working at HEI booths are usually institutional staff members in charge of communications and guidance and, less frequently, admissions, as well as students from the institutions. In a small number of cases, directors and professors also participate. The number of individuals per booth varies greatly based on its size as well as the institutional status of the HEI: booths for public universities and small professional *écoles* usually have fewer hosts, sometimes as few as one or two, while private low-prestige *écoles post-bac*, notably in management, frequently have many representatives, especially students. The type of individuals involved also varies based on institutional profile and prestige. Most *grandes écoles* and *écoles post-bac* of medium prestige send administrative and managerial staff members. Directors are usually only present in the case of low-prestige *écoles post-bac*, while professors are mostly found at the booths of professional schools and, less frequently, universities.

Students, hereafter referred to as “student ambassadors” to use a folk term (Slack, Mangan, Hughes, & Davies, 2012), are present in most if not all booths. According to the director of *L’Etudiant*, student participation in fairs was a movement started 20 years ago by private HEIs in search of students; it advocates a consumer-oriented approach and has now become a general trend (October 2011 interview). Student ambassadors are not usually paid but their participation is usually taken into account in their studies, as an exercise in communication with strangers, and is sometimes subject to evaluation, especially in the case of students preparing for management careers. Some students receive a short training from the institution before their participation at fairs, usually a short PowerPoint presentation of major institutional characteristics and selling arguments, as well as some advice regarding how to behave towards visitors. However, the main difference between booths has to do with the degree to which the students’ activities are supervised by senior staff members, this being much more frequently the case in the booths of *écoles post-bac* in management<sup>5</sup>.

The second most central form of interaction is the one that takes place during lectures. Depending on the expected number of visitors and the fair’s main themes, between four and twelve one-hour lectures are organised at each fair. A lecture typically involves three to four speakers who are commonly representatives of different HEIs (directors, managers, professors, etc.) and a moderator who is usually a journalist specialised in a specific area of higher education or, more exceptionally, a psychologist or counsellor. Student ambassadors also frequently attend lectures as part of their training exercise. Analysis of the 652 lectures organised or to be organised by *L’Etudiant* in 2013-2014 (*Studyrama* does not systematically publish the titles of lectures beforehand on its website) shows that 255 (40%) of the lectures focus on specific occupations, professions and higher education tracks, while 17% are devoted to *grandes écoles*<sup>6</sup> and another 17% to higher education choice based on secondary school track. Lectures on two-year

track studies are well represented when discussed along with work-study opportunities and apprenticeship (13%), whereas universities are strongly under-represented (only 17 lectures, i.e. 2%) and most lectures devoted to them focus on the most prestigious and selective disciplines, medicine and law. Moreover, as lectures on universities are almost always organised by the Ministry of Higher Education and Research, it is likely that they are at least to some extent imposed on organisers by the state in return for state sponsoring of fairs.

A final and central question about fairs concerns the number and characteristics of the visitors. Numbers are difficult to estimate because the only figures available are those provided by the agencies themselves. Not only do they not provide the numbers systematically, they also tend to publish only those of the most popular fairs. However, from the figures that we were able to collect, it appears that numbers in the Paris region range from 10.000 for one-day fairs targeting specific segments, such as the SAGE fair on *grandes écoles* in 2012, to up to more than half a million (550.000, considered a record) for the four-day European fair on education in 2013. One of the most non-specialised and well-known fairs, le *Salon de l'Etudiant de Paris*, seems to attract between 200,000 and 300,000 visitors each year and its equivalent in Bordeaux 50.000 visitors. In any case, fairs are clearly popular events for a large number of students using the APB application system<sup>7</sup>, as well as for all those students already in higher education who are planning on changing tracks or institutions. It is nevertheless important to note that there is no direct relationship between the number of visitors and a fair's "efficiency" or "effectiveness" in terms of the percentage of students applying to the HEIs present at the event. While *Studyrama*'s fairs get less visitors on average than *L'Etudiant*'s fairs due to their duration and location, some of the HEI representatives interviewed remarked that the *Studyrama* fairs produced greater returns.

It is more difficult still to get information on visitor characteristics. From the small survey we conducted at the *Salon de l'Etudiant* in 2011, whose results are not representative given the small sample size and the fact that the questionnaire was filled out only by voluntary visitors, it appears that of the 66 students (out of 75) who answered the question regarding their father's occupation, 18% came from upper-class families, 44% from middle-class families, and 38% from lower-class families. Our qualitative observations corroborate the idea that fairs are probably "a middle-class affair," although the proportion of students from different social classes clearly varies based on the fair's theme, with more upper-class visitors at fairs on *grandes écoles* and a wider representation of lower-class students at fairs on two-years studies and apprenticeships. Our observations also allowed us to get some idea of the age of visitors and their visiting patterns. A very salient element is the significant presence of parents, this being particularly the case at fairs on *grandes écoles*. For the director of *L'Etudiant*, parental presence, which is clearly the consequence of the parents' increasing anxiety about their children's futures and their growing investment in educational choices (van Zanten, 2009), is the most significant and striking change in visitor profiles over the last 10 years (November 2012 interview). Some parents, most often mothers, come with their son and, more frequently, daughter, but some also come by themselves. Students



who do not come with their parents most frequently visit fairs with their boyfriend or girlfriend or with one to five friends. A few of them come alone. During weekdays, there are also groups of students who visit non-specialised fairs, such as *L'Etudiant* fair for secondary school students and the APB fair, with their secondary school teachers.

#### HIGHER EDUCATION FAIRS AS “PACKAGING” DEVICES

##### *The Material Packaging of HEIs*

As stated in the introduction, fairs “engineer” the relationship between providers and consumers of higher education through the packaging of products and services. The first type of packaging concerns the fair setting. In the region of Paris on which we will concentrate our analyses from now on, both *L'Etudiant* and *Studyrama* rent space in three of the ten centres for conventions, exhibitions, fairs and related events that belong to the Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In that sense, educational products and services are proposed to consumers in the same way that commercial products and services are proposed to consumers attending commercial exhibitions and events. However, it is important to note that *Studyrama* frequently rents another space at the *Cité Internationale Universitaire de Paris* (CIUP), a private foundation recognised to be of public utility that was created in 1920 and funded by private philanthropists, business and foreign governments. As the most important place of residence for foreign students studying in Paris and a provider of different services for the academic community such as libraries, concerts, films and plays, it is a prestigious academic setting clearly chosen to encourage visitors to envision themselves in ambitious careers of study, especially at the international level.

A second form of packaging concerns the ways in which fairs are publicised. The higher education fairs are advertised through different channels: the websites of each agency, ONISEP and the state and private agencies that sponsor them; adverts in non-specialised, specialised and professional magazines; strategically placed posters, including in the Paris Metro; and especially written information sent to secondary school professionals and, more exceptionally, oral presentations given at schools (interview with an agent in charge of *L'Etudiant* fairs, March 2011). In order to make fairs attractive, all agencies provide free entrance tickets on the Internet, a service which allows them to attract visitors to their websites, gather information on visitor characteristics such as gender, age, level of study and occupational areas of interest, and send the interested parties additional information by e-mail and SMS. Posters, adverts and presentations on websites emphasise both the wide variety of HEIs present at each fair and the need to think seriously about one's transition to higher education.

The packaging continues within fairs through the location and general design of the exhibitors' booths. Booths are generally physically placed in a way that both facilitates the free flow of visitors and presents a “rational” grouping of HEIs based on their institutional status (universities on one side and *écoles* on the other) or the

occupational and professional sectors they prepare students for. In some cases, however, we observed that the grouping was also based on institutional prestige, this being especially the case for top *grandes écoles* at fairs dedicated only to *grandes écoles*. However, as at other fairs (Moeran, 2011), exhibitors can reinforce their attractiveness by buying more square meters for their booths or the most strategic locations, e.g. near the entrance. Each HEI present also micro-engineers exchanges with visitors by strategically designing its booth. In that respect, we observed a significant difference between university – and *école* – run booths. The former are generally closed, creating impersonal settings for the interaction between booth representatives and visitors, whereas the latter are generally open, allowing visitors to enter the booth and, symbolically, the institution as well. Moreover, while university booths are almost bare, many of the booths of the *écoles post-bac* and the professional *écoles* (especially of those of low prestige) have colourful and sometimes striking visual devices.

In most booths, however, there are posters on walls and vertical supports with the institution's logos and colours and attractive slogans, all emphasising elements presented as distinctive to each institution. Although some institutions, following a more Anglo-Saxon model, underscore distinctive institutional values in their messages, the majority present more instrumental competitive advantages such as possibilities for internships and apprenticeship, connections with firms and job openings, study abroad opportunities, integration into prestigious networks of HEIs and position in rankings. Another packaging device for attracting visitors to booths and the institution itself are glossy brochures. These brochures present the HEI's different tracks, areas of study and degrees, its selection criteria, funding schemes and job openings, and often frequently contain short narratives of student experiences and colourful photos of buildings, activities and students. Finally, in one more step of packaging, designed to create more expressive ties between visitors and the institution, some HEIs also propose "goodies" such as pens, pins and even condoms with the HEI's name, logo and colours, as well as more expensive gifts such as umbrellas "reserved for visitors who are really interested" (seen and heard at a *grande école* booth at a *Studyrama* fair on *grandes écoles* in 2013).

#### *Packaging through Actions and Words*

The most important packaging of HEIs at fairs nevertheless occurs in the actions and words of booth hosts, who are themselves repackaged as institutional "icons" via their clothing. Student ambassadors in particular frequently wear t-shirts with their HEI's name, logo and colours. Although their main objective is to talk to visitors, they also perform two types of activities designed to engage visitors. The first, more frequent in the booths of low-prestige management schools, involves pleasantly greeting with a smile those visitors passing by their booth and immediately addressing those who briefly stop in front of the booth so as to engage them in an immediate exchange. The second is to attract visitors for the future, that is to engage them in a circuit (Trompette, 2005) that will eventually lead them to

choose their institution. After they have hooked the visitor, the next step is to invite him or her to attend an open day at the institution where, as we have observed in studying more than 20 such events, a more targeted kind of packaging and pre-selection takes place. To achieve this, which is sometimes the booth hosts' main goal at a fair ("no matter what they say or do, they must close by inviting visitors to open days," said the person in charge of the booth for a low-ranked management school at a *Studyrama* fair in 2013), they ask visitors to write their names and addresses down on electronic or paper forms.

The booth hosts' discursive strategy includes three ideal-typical forms that are frequently mixed during actual interactions. The first is the delivery of a well-rehearsed discourse, sometimes involving brochures or posters as props that underscores distinctive institutional assets and qualities. The second is to engage in direct discussion with visitors, letting them ask questions and, through adapted answers to their queries, channel some of the same institutional messages that others present in the "delivery" mode. The third strategy is to provide short narratives of personal experiences at the institution. The first strategy, which allows for a more in-depth covering of all the dimensions that the institution wants to convey but is less appealing to visitors who may feel that there is no true interaction, seems to be adopted by institutional representatives who stick to a very official definition of their role or by student ambassadors who feel insecure about their knowledge of the institutions or fear a negative evaluation from their supervisors. However, it may be used skilfully by booth hosts who are used to anticipating all possible visitor questions. The second strategy is much more appealing to consumers but forces booth hosts to run the risk of delivering incomplete institutional messages. Some hosts, however, and especially those from management schools, do use it in a very accomplished manner, establishing parallels and links between the tastes and desires of the visitors, especially students, and the characteristics of their HEI. Only student ambassadors use narratives of personal experiences, but this less frequently than other strategies. This discursive form is highly appreciated by student visitors as it provides them with "warm" information about the future of higher education that they are seeking in particular (Slack et al., 2012).

The main arguments used in these different strategies focus, as do the messages on the posters and brochures, on institutional "distinctiveness," a typical market strategy directed towards both consumers and "competitors" (François, 2008). However, many of the messages do not contain direct comparisons but rather self-centred expressions such as: "We are the only ones to ..." or "we offer this or that." Moreover, while in many market situations, packaging strategies are oriented towards the creation of subtle and many times artificial differences between very similar products (Cochoy, 2002), in the field of higher education, the variety of institutional profiles and services strongly facilitates the task of pointing out how each institution has special qualities that correspond both to visitors' immediate and long-term concerns.

To underscore distinctiveness, some general elements of the curriculum are frequently mentioned. Engineering schools and universities, for instance, will

praise their non-specialised or multidisciplinary curricula. Big Parisian universities and prestigious *grandes écoles* emphasise the qualification of their academic staff while smaller universities near Paris or private institutions of intermediate prestige focus more on their capacity to supervise their students' work thanks to their small size and also closer staff involvement. On the other hand, public and private HEIs proposing two-year professional tracks as well as low-prestige *écoles post-bac* emphasise their specialised character. The latter also underscore their pedagogical methods (project work, a focus on practice rather than theory) and the fact that their professors are "true professionals," so as to differentiate themselves from universities whose curricula and professors are depicted as "too theoretical," and also sometimes to hide the fact that their academic staff is less qualified.

In addition to underlining their distinctive provision, the HEIs' messages also emphasise their utility, that is how their distinctive characteristics are convergent with the visitors' instrumental goals and how that will provide them with greater satisfaction than other institutions. Given the negative situation of the French economy, the major instrumental argument of many HEIs is the extent to which their education will help students remain unaffected by the economic crisis: "a non-specialised *école* is safer in times of crises" (said a communication manager of a five-year engineering *grande école* at the *Studyrama* fair on *grandes écoles*); "Our sector has not been affected by the crisis" (student ambassador of an *école* specialising in the marketing of luxury goods at the *L'Étudiant* fair on *grandes écoles*). Each type of institution also focuses on how its distinctive factors are conducive to future positive experiences in the job market. *Grandes écoles* and universities providing non-specialised training focus on their capacity to help students "keep doors open" for different types of postgraduate education or future jobs (Renkens, 2014). And while representatives of the most prestigious and selective *grandes écoles* also stress the importance of alumni networks in helping recent graduates get good jobs, two-year track institutions insist on the fact that they facilitate short-term access to the job market through apprenticeships, internships and degrees well adapted to employer expectations.

Although to a lesser degree, the discourse of institutional representatives and student ambassadors also focuses on the quality of the expressive experience that their institution provides for students and on how this experience will match their desires. The campus and its surroundings along with the institutional "atmosphere" are frequently mentioned as contributing to the quality of the overall student experience. The *grandes écoles* and some universities located outside Paris or in semi-rural areas focus on the former, whereas small *écoles* that stress their "human size" and "family" character, in implicit or explicit opposition to the anomie attributed to large universities, focus on the latter. Some student ambassadors, especially those from *grandes écoles* and *écoles post-bac*, also praise the variety of social activities and the quality of student life at their HEI, frequently by sharing personal narratives. The international nature of these schools is also often mentioned. While this dimension is also presented as an instrumental asset in a "global job market," the expressive dimensions of studying and living abroad and of being part of a multicultural student body are also regularly shared, sometimes

through personal narratives. This focus on personal experiences is partly due to some student ambassadors' incomplete knowledge of the institution, as well as to the fact that they tend to see it as a more truthful presentation of what the institution they are representing is really like and one that is more likely to inspire the student visitors' choices.

Interaction at booths is also conditioned by the demand of visitors who come to fairs with their own personal agendas. Although many visit with only vague ideas in mind or with a feeling of being lost because they lack information or have too much information, they bring with them expectations and desires that in turn influence how booth hosts choose to promote their products and services. Visitor perspectives can nevertheless vary greatly. Although our observations at booths did not allow us to determine the influence of variables such as gender and social background, we did notice important differences related to the position of either parent or student. Parents tend to adopt a strong instrumental perspective, the majority of their questions focusing on funding and job openings. Student visitors, on the other hand, focus more on the content of the curriculum and its relation to desired occupations and professions as well as on factors such as location, from a mix of instrumental and expressive perspectives.

The attitudes of student visitors vary in turn based on their age, institutional status, ways of visiting and types of fairs. Young secondary school students who come with their parents over the weekend, which is most frequently the case at *Studyrama* fairs and *grandes écoles* fairs, and who probably come from higher socio-economic backgrounds ask few questions despite the fact that, in line with instructions from senior institutional staff, booth hosts systematically approach students during the interaction. Students who come alone over the weekend and who are frequently older and already engaged in higher education studies tend to ask precise instrumental questions related to clearly defined study projects. Young students who come over the weekend in groups adopt more expressive perspectives. They focus on the discovery of new occupations and professions and a few use the most outstanding displays to play games. Finally, young secondary school students who come with their teachers to non-specialised fairs are clearly less engaged in interactions and tend to ask questions prepared in advance in class or just say, "Tell me more about your school."

#### THE FAIRS AS JUDGEMENT DEVICES

##### *"Customised" Prescriptions*

Visitors not only go to higher education fairs to look for relevant information on "what is out there," but are also lost in the sense that they do not know how to evaluate the quality and status of the wide array of HEIs presented to them. And even if they did, because they are influenced by their family and school socialisation and are at least partly aware of the possibilities and limitations associated with their past educational paths and present academic profiles, they orient their choices towards specific types of institutions and tracks and often feel

quite uncertain about how to make relevant comparisons between similar HEIs and areas of study. Conscious of this, higher education fair staff members and HEI representatives frequently assume a prescriptive role (Hatchuel, 1995) that is particularly ambiguous. This is especially the case for HEI representatives who, being both party and judge, tend to combine advising and sophisticated packaging into their interactions and presentations.

Visitors are especially interested in getting personal advice that takes into account their individual profiles, expectations and desires and suggests adequate “customised” institutional offers that fit them, thus leading to a satisfying matching between student and institution (van Zanten, 2013). This demand leads institutional representatives and especially students ambassadors to provide advice first on selection procedures, through which the actual matching will materialise. This should be easy but is not always. Many visitors have questions, for instance, regarding the possibility or probability of being selected by the institution based on their path and profile. These questions are difficult to answer because selective HEIs may have different requirements for different admission procedures. It is also a delicate exercise because booth hosts must take into account particular cases while adopting the generic encouraging discourse concerning selection that most institutions advocate, although with different goals in mind depending on their status.

Low or medium-prestige and not very selective institutions tend to reassure students and parents of the fit between their profile and the institutional expectations or give tips and advice regarding how to improve it, thus increasing the chances that they apply. Representatives from prestigious and selective institutions, on the contrary, tend to underscore their selection criteria and re-route students that, in their view, do not fit their institution. However, they too develop, more in lectures than at booths, a rhetoric concerning their “social openness” by insisting on the diversity of their admission procedures and their funding schemes (scholarships, apprenticeship in firms and bank loans) as well as on their “widening participation policies” and involvement in “equal opportunity actions” dedicated to reduce self-censorship and encourage ambition among lower-class students. However, these dimensions, especially the latter, are used less to attract new types of students – which remains extremely difficult as funding schemes do not eliminate economic barriers nor do alternative admissions procedures that affect a very small number of students eliminate cultural barriers to success at competitive examinations – than they are used as competitive assets in comparing similar institutions that are less successful this respect and as a response to accusations of elitism by public opinion leaders (van Zanten, 2010).

Booth hosts and lecturers are also asked by visitors to provide more general advice on the soundness and relevance of different types of institutional choices. Their discourse, and especially that of the student ambassadors, oscillates between the two extremes of adopting exclusively the institutional point of view or taking up the visitors’ points of view. Some booth hosts do not hesitate to adopt a clear-cut commercial stance. For example, at the European education fair, one student ambassador from an engineering school told us, “Some visitors ask if it is better to

choose a professional school or to choose us. Well, naturally, we always answer ‘choose us.’” In other cases, it is more difficult to decide whether the student ambassadors’ advice is dictated by their efforts to package their institutions and tracks or by their “institutional habituses” (Reay, 1998). For instance, one of the students ambassadors interviewed told us that he considers himself better positioned than the rest of the booth staff to attract student visitors to the institution and, more generally, to selective *grandes écoles* recruiting after two years of preparatory classes, because he himself has gone through these classes and is proud of his path. As he sees it, his “mission” is to destigmatise the *preparatory classes* and counter their elitist image as well as that of the *grandes écoles* they lead to (male engineering student at a prestigious *grande école*, *Studyrama* fair on *grandes écoles*).

Other student ambassadors adopt a more “impartial” stance, either because they play their role with some distance – that is, they do not live up to all the institution’s behavioural prescriptions (Goffman, 1961) in order to assert their independence and capacity to adapt their judgement to concrete situations – or because they identify with student visitors or both. They might give different types of generic advice or use their own path to show that many different choices are possible. For example, another student ambassador we interviewed told us that he opted for university studies without having really thought about it. He had a chaotic university experience and did not earn a bachelor’s degree even after five years of study. He then found the *post-bac* engineering school where he is currently studying and finds it “a redeeming experience.” His stated “mission” is to show other students that “it is not a huge problem to make mistakes but that they should not retreat into solitude and waste their time like he did” and to “help them find their way” (male, engineering student at a *post-bac école*, interviewed at the European educational fair).

#### *Generic Advice*

Institutional representatives and student ambassadors nevertheless complain about the fact that they spend a lot of time at the booths explaining to visitors how the higher education system is organised and especially how the new APB application system works. This was also apparent in visitors’ questions during lectures. Not only do many hosts feel that this kind of advice goes well beyond their interests and expertise, but they also think it dispels the “magic” dimension of the one-on-one encounters between individual projects or desires and packaged institutional products and services, and is at odds with their focus on factors that facilitate rather than constrain access to higher education. Although fair organisers and staff members in particular feel that their role is more than giving specific advice in response to individual questions, they also want to mark the difference between their analyses and goals and those of secondary school teachers and counsellors. While the latter are thought to limit students’ choices through their focus on using past paths and grades to determine students’ chances of future success and their use

of outdated information on HEIs and the job market, fair organisers and staff see their own role as future-oriented, encouraging and informed.

Ideally, they should help students accomplish their dreams and desires and facilitate more ambitious and diverse higher education and job careers by giving valuable advice on “the tricks and ropes” of higher education, such as alternative admission procedures or possibilities for catching up and getting a “second chance” despite initial mistakes or bad choices. Lectures are perceived as the best context for displaying this general perspective and providing generic advice of this type. However, actual lectures combine the pursuit of this “noble” goal with the promotion by institutional representatives (i.e. the main speakers) of their own interests through discursive and practical compromises and arrangements. Many institutional representatives, for instance, manage to reconcile the organisers’ recommendation to avoid talking about their own institution and focus only on general information and advice – a prescription put into practice by not placing institutional name plates in front of the speakers – and their institutional interests by underscoring assets and advantages that only their *class* of institution possess. In that sense, lectures give institutional representatives from similar types of HEIs an opportunity to adopt a common front either to dispel what they see as negative perceptions of their activity and role or to promote common assets.

For example, representatives from private institutions, which as we mentioned previously are over-represented in fairs in Paris, use lectures to dispel their image as a commercial business by insisting that they are not firms but rather associations or foundations, and that they work closely with representatives of the Ministry of Higher Education and Research and train professionals to work for the state. *Grandes écoles* also underline that they are not inaccessible to low-income students because of the free character of preparatory classes and of their funding schemes. The most prestigious private *grandes écoles* also promote their many international advantages (language of instruction, nationalities of teaching staff, study abroad opportunities) and the provision of better opportunities for jobs due to their excellent image, privileged relations with employers and active role of alumni networks. The less prestigious private *post-bac* schools instead focus on their institutional climate or reactivity: “in private *écoles*, the relationship between teachers and students is of higher quality because professors are around all the time, not just during their classes” ; “private schools are more responsive and are closer to firms” (both heard at a lecture at the *Studyrama* fair on *grandes écoles*). Although this discourse is presented by institutional representatives as “non-promotional” because it lacks direct references to their institution and combines both information and advice, it clearly packages some specific types of institutions, specifically private *grandes écoles* and *écoles post-bac*, in a much nicer “wrapping paper” than public universities, which, as previously stated, are frequently absent from fairs.

The “disinterested” character of lectures is also emphasised through the choice of speakers and the discourse of the chairpersons. The former are usually chosen to express diverse and sometimes divergent views but their heterogeneity is seen as conducive to the general positive message that “every institution (or track or field



of study) has something to offer to some groups of students,” sometimes explicitly stated by the chairperson during or at the end of the lecture. In lectures that group together *écoles* that differ in institutional and curricular design and prestige, each representative will defend the model used in the class of institutions to which his or her HEI belongs and speak in favour either of *grandes écoles* requiring preparatory classes and of non-specialised studies or of *écoles post-bac* and specialised curricula. And although these different types of institutions are not equally accessible to all students, the main focus is to match students’ tastes and projects rather than capabilities and resources with the different institutions, which are not placed, at least explicitly, on a vertical hierarchical order but rather on a horizontal plane. To facilitate this last process, chairpersons working at *L’Etudiant* propose in the most non-specialised lectures a psychological test designed to help students discover their interests and tastes and how they might fit with specific professions, occupations and higher education tracks. These tools are also frequently employed at the “counselling spaces” present at some fairs and by the coaches who promote their services on the *L’Etudiant* and *Studyrama* websites.

#### *External Instruments and Criteria*

Although booth hosts and lecture participants encourage students to visit open days to get personally acquainted with their institution and therefore become better equipped to make a “patterned” choice of what is suitable for them rather than a generic choice (Lareau, 1989) based only on external evaluations or established reputations, they simultaneously make frequent reference to external instruments and criteria such as rankings, labels and networks. Nevertheless, HEI representatives tend to refer to these external instruments or criteria selectively at their booths as well as in lectures, varying references to them according to what best fits their interests. The most prestigious HEIs refer to well-known rankings but only to those rankings in which they occupy a top position. On the other hand, less prestigious HEIs, especially low-prestige management *post-bac* schools, frequently mention their rank but then rarely mention the ranking agencies and the criteria and the procedures they use: “We are #9 in international openness” (management school student ambassador, SAGE fair); “Our bachelor’s degree is among the 15 best” (management school student ambassador, *L’Etudiant* fair on *grandes écoles*); and even “We are the first concerning the activity of students associations” (management school student representative, *L’Etudiant* fair on *grandes écoles*). Some of them also warn visitors about not taking rankings “as the final word concerning institutional choice” (representative of an agency organising competitive examination for middle-status *écoles*, *Studyrama* lecture on *grandes écoles*).

During one-on-one exchanges at booths or lectures, institutional representatives also refer to degrees and labels as criteria for evaluating the quality and status of HEIs but, again, in varying degrees and in different ways based on their institutional profile. *Grandes écoles* and universities promote the fact that they award official master’s degrees; prestigious private management *grandes écoles*

promote their offer of *mastères spécialisés* and sometimes MBAs that are recognised by international accrediting bodies. On the other hand, low-prestige private *écoles* tend to remain vague about their certifications and degrees, which do not have State recognition, and talk about “a master’s level” or “bac +5,” i.e. five years of post-baccalaureate training.

To boost their status (Podolny, 1993), some institutions also promote their participation in prestigious networks. This used to be the case mostly for *grandes écoles*, as the label “member of the Conference of *grandes écoles*” (an association that defends the interests of 212 public and private HEIs which are recognised by the State and propose 5-year programmes sanctioned by national official degrees) was originally created to single out the most prestigious *écoles* from those less esteemed. However, due to the push by the Ministry of Higher Education and Research to create higher education clusters in order to improve the synergy and visibility of French HEIs at the national and international level, many HEIs, and notably the most prestigious ones, are now members of wider networks. In addition to mentioning these new networks, we observed that the less prestigious institutions tend to implicitly borrow some of the features of more prestigious institutions with which they are associated. For example, at a *Studyrama* fair on *grandes écoles*, we heard the student ambassador of a management school say, “We are one of the Shanghai 100’s top HEIs,” while in fact it is the university with which his management school is associated in a wider network that has been ranked.

It is important to note that visitors seem to show little interest in these criteria in evaluating quality and status and that for at least three reasons. First, as was clear from some of the questions we heard, many visitors have difficulties grasping the different dimensions taken into account in rankings as well as the meaning of some of the labels and the identity of the accrediting agencies. They tend to feel confused and overwhelmed by and suspicious of figures and names they view as “esoteric” professional knowledge. Second, for most visitors, this type of “cold” data is not what they are looking for at fairs (Ball & Vincent, 1998; Slack et al., 2012). Even in specialised lectures, many parents – more than students, who participate less in these public settings – ask questions that are either pragmatic, especially on how to use the APB system, or of personal importance. And finally, those parents and students who are more likely to understand and use external indicators of quality or status (i.e. upper-class parents and students) either do not attend fairs because they choose HEIs whose reputation makes getting additional information unnecessary, or prefer to analyse that kind of data at home.

## CONCLUSION

Higher education fairs are presented by both the French national and local authorities who support and sponsor them as well as by their organisers as “private events of public utility.” Despite their commercial character, the fact that they provide free guidance services for visitors allows them to be viewed as “complementary instruments” alongside those implemented by public agencies and

by secondary schools to help students find their way in a complex higher education system and reduce disparities between social groups tied to a lack of or imperfect information. Yet there has been no evaluation of their impact on reducing inequalities in access to higher education. In the absence of data – a shortfall that we are trying to rectify through research based on questionnaires and interviews with secondary school students and their parents – those researchers using a structural perspective might be tempted to dismiss the fairs' influence. However, we believe that this position would be a mistake, not only because it would disregard the role that fairs play in fine-tuning students' choices between similar types of institutions and different areas of study but also because it would ignore the growing importance of external agents and agencies and of public-private partnerships in the area of educational guidance. On the contrary, we believe that a comprehensive perspective focusing on the role played by different agents, events and devices intervening in the transition from secondary to higher education is needed in order to enrich the analysis of how their interaction at present contributes to the reproduction, exacerbation or reduction of educational inequalities.

The results and interpretations presented in this chapter do not lead to clear-cut conclusions in that respect. On the one hand, it is possible to argue that fairs allow visitors to improve their knowledge of HEIs both in breadth, as many students and parents discover institutions and tracks they have never heard of, and depth. Interactions at booths, in particular, possibly followed by the reading of brochures, give them a much more comprehensive overview of the organisation, curricular content and assets of a particular institution. The large number of visitors who feel "lost" about how to distinguish between institutions, evaluate their quality and status, and find the one that best "matches" their profile, ambitions and desires, can also expect to find some help in these areas. In addition, those students whose teachers have channelled them into low-prestige higher education tracks which lead to low-prestige and poorly-paid jobs (Willis, 1977) might also benefit from the general focus at fairs on their dreams and tastes, as well as from the up-to-date information.

On the other hand, other factors show a more nuanced picture. To start, it would be wrong to consider fairs as a representative sample of existing higher education institutions. Some institutions are over-represented while others are under-represented. Not only does this lead students and parents to adopt an incorrect cognitive representation of the landscape of higher education but has practical negative consequences as well. An important one is that students from lower class or lower-middle class backgrounds may end up applying to private HEIs, thus taking out loans and earning degrees of little value in the job market when they could have studied the same subjects for free at public universities and obtained official degrees well recognised by employers. This risk is significant because it would be naïve to think that fairs promote a direct exchange between providers and consumers. As we have shown, this exchange is mediated both by packaging devices through which institutions embellish and promote their image and by "interested" judging devices through which they lead visitors to focus on certain types of criteria that are advantageous to them. In other words, if fairs, like the

market in general, can free individuals from institutional constraints such as diverse forms of institutional channelling by educational institutions (van Zanten, 2009b), these “dis-embedded” individuals are then immediately “re-embedded” in another web of influences whose effects remain to be precisely assessed.

## NOTES

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- <sup>2</sup> The six fairs observed are: the *Studyrama* fair for *grandes écoles* (Nov. 9-10, 2013), the *SAGE-Le Monde* fair for *grandes écoles* (Nov. 16-17, 2013), the European fair on education & *L’Etudiant* fair (Nov. 21-24, 2013), the *Studyrama* fair for secondary school students (Dec. 7, 2013), *L’Etudiant* fair for *grandes écoles* (Dec. 13-15, 2013), and the *Admission Post-Bac* fair (Jan. 10-11, 2014).
- <sup>3</sup> Amélia Legrave told booth hosts she was a research assistant and used her student status to create a good rapport with student booth hosts. The booth hosts were asked about visitor profiles and typical visitor questions and about what kind of information and advice was typically given to them.
- <sup>4</sup> The French higher education landscape is extremely complex. In this chapter, we will make the following distinctions: universities (i.e. public non-selective universities offering bachelor’s, master’s and PhD degrees); *grandes écoles* (i.e. prestigious and selective three to four years HEIs, public or private, offering master’s or equivalent degrees); *classes préparatoires* (i.e. two-year preparatory classes after the baccalaureate needed to present the competitive examinations for accessing *grandes écoles*); *écoles post-bac* (i.e. public and private HEIs of medium to low prestige offering bachelor’s and master’s or equivalent degrees, notably in engineering, management and education); professional *écoles*, technology institutes and technical post-bac tracks (i.e. two to three years of professional training in a wide variety of areas including social work and the paramedical professions). For a more detailed presentation of this landscape and the different types of institutions involved, see the various *Notes d’information* on higher education at <http://www.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/pid24800/notes-d-information.html>
- <sup>5</sup> Fairs also include other types of booths offering different services (banking, student insurance services, youth services, book exhibits and “counselling spaces” where students can get information, advice and coaching on preparing CVs, writing cover letters or conducting admissions interviews), as well as booths with recreational activities, food and beverages. Although some of these mediations are also significant to understanding student choices, we will not focus on them in this chapter.
- <sup>6</sup> Most *grandes écoles* are present only at fairs on *grandes écoles*. The most prestigious public *grandes écoles*, which are mostly engineering schools, are totally absent from fairs while the most prestigious private *grandes écoles*, which specialise in management, are present at some.
- <sup>7</sup> In 2013, of the 754.000 candidates created an electronic form on the APB system, 710.000 indicated at least one choice and 667.000 validated it. (Source:[http://cache.media.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/file/médiathèque/49/5/Dossier\\_APB\\_10\\_juin\\_2013255495.pdf](http://cache.media.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/file/médiathèque/49/5/Dossier_APB_10_juin_2013255495.pdf))

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## CONCLUSION

*Higher Education in Societies: A Multiscale Perspective* collected research across disciplinary lines presented by historians, sociologists, political scientists, economists, geographers, social workers, and social psychologists at the 26th annual conference of the Consortium for Higher Education and Research (CHER) at the University of Lausanne. The overarching theme of the conference was the transformation of higher education (HE) and how its mission is woven in the social contract, not only in Europe but around the world. During the conference, debate among speakers and participants focused not only on issues germane to higher education and research (HER) systems but on *research on the systems themselves*, namely by considering the type of issues that interest researchers in this niche field of knowledge, as well as the type of scientific approaches used. These two major perspectives dominated the conference, and can be broadly summarised by gathering the threads running throughout the papers in this volume.

In studying and debating issues related to HER systems, significant tensions have been noted between the mission of HE institutions to produce and disseminate knowledge (while safeguarding its autonomy and academic freedom) and pressures to place more emphasis on services to society (the so-called “third mission”). For the most part, these pressures take the form of external demand to increase support for innovation needed to stimulate national economic growth as well as train a highly-skilled workforce to meet the ongoing needs of the labour market. In this context, the role(s) of HE as a social institution is/are examined in terms of its contribution in the *public good* (e.g. specific contributions and benefits to society as a whole) as opposed to the *private good* (e.g. benefits specific to the individual graduate). Also examined in this same context are issues related to governance or steering models established by HER policy (often developed along polarised political party lines); the level of development of HER systems (massification vs. declining enrolment); and the type of national economy. Lastly, student pathways – indicators of academic and vocational aspirations and the resilience of youth – are also taken into consideration, given that for some socioeconomic groups, these pathways remain profoundly marked over time and space by unequal access to and perseverance in HE.

To what extent do the theories proposed by Maassen (Chapter 3) on the “social contract,” by Marginson (Chapter 4) and Williams (Chapter 5) on the “public good” as well as Jungblut (Chapter 6) on the HE policy-making process allow us to reconsider empirical research and case studies on these issues found in Chapters 7 to 11? Do these studies in turn help drive theoretical advances? The first part of our

conclusion discusses how the theoretical and empirical contributions presented at the conference and in the chapters of this book can be interwoven.

For Maassen, “a social contract concerns the relationship between the state and its institutions, and presumes that in order to form a social order there has to be a mutual understanding of, trust in, and commitment to the roles and responsibilities of all partners involved” (Maassen, p. 36). Unlike a formal, legally binding contract with clearly defined terms and expected outcomes, a social contract is largely founded on a long-term commitment on the part of both the HER system and the state, in compliance with rules and with respect for the resources and culture of the former, and is reflected in the support that the HER system receives from political and social institutions. For his part, Jungblut develops theoretical assumptions to explain the policy-making process in HER systems of European countries, one largely framed by the platforms of political parties (right- or left-leaning), religious heritage (Protestant or Catholic) and/or the type of economy (coordinated market or liberal market). Jungblut thus maintains that the social contract between the HER system and the state is, in a sense, forged in the democratic process.

Case studies conducted in Norway and Portugal eloquently speak to the breadth and limitations of these concepts in contrasting ways. In studying the recent history of the development of Norwegian HER systems, Rómulo Pinheiro (Chapter 7) noted that boosting enrolment rates in HE has been the target of repeated government measures from the end of the Second World War to today. The objective underpinning these policy initiatives during the first phase of this expansion was two-pronged: to address the shortage of highly-skilled workers needed to support the country’s economic development, and to encourage equal access to HE for different socioeconomic groups. During this expansion period, Norwegian governance of the HER system closely resembled the left-leaning intervention model as described by Jungblut: increased support for access to HE accompanied by a significant leap in public funding. In the second phase, between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, high youth unemployment and growing educational aspirations led to a near-tripling of enrolment in HE, something which at the time had neither been planned for nor was the result of policy initiatives. This phenomenon demonstrates how demand can put pressure on the governance model, and in some ways precede the revision of the social contract. To alleviate this pressure, the Norwegian government enhanced the efficiency of public HE institutions, restructured the HE system by integrating some universities and regional colleges into a publicly-run regional college system and introduced stricter university entrance requirements. This case study clearly illustrates the fleeting impermanence of a social contract between the state and an HER system. Indeed, the expansion of the HER system in Norway rested on the adoption of a binary university-college model, one that had already been restructured barely two decades into its existence, a relatively short time in the life of an institution.

The Portuguese case study (Fonseca et al., Chapter 8) revealed a strikingly different reality. Like England, France, Australia and New Zealand, Portugal has recently experienced a decline in HE enrolment: In the 2012/2013 academic year,



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admission applications to HE institutions were mainly concentrated in urban areas, polytechnics saw a sharp decline in Engineering Sciences applications, 80 programmes of study did not report any candidates in the first phase, and two of these programmes did not receive any admission applications at all. In light of Portugal's current economic crisis – where graduates have been significantly affected by high unemployment, education levels are persistently low, and democracy is a rather recent institution – what happens to the social contract between the HE system and the state? What role does the policy-making process play amidst such instability? These questions remain all the more relevant given the recency and scope of the decline in student populations. Indeed, given these conditions, the authors posit the possible return of an elitist HER system in Portugal. While posing great challenges on a social scale to say the least, this phenomenon nonetheless offers a valuable comparison to the policy-making process outlined by Jungblut to other European HER systems characterised by massification and a seemingly non-stop surge in student populations.

Interestingly, both the Norwegian and Portuguese case studies touch upon the issue of territory, not only in public initiatives, but in the social contract as well, and reveal how the allocation of HE institutions across a territory, their appeal relative to the period of time and geographical location can have an impact on equal access to HE.

Building on the work of economist Paul Samuelson, Marginson (Chapter 4) proposed that “public goods” are defined not by ownership but by social character: “Goods are non-rivalrous when consumed by any number of people without being depleted, [...] non-excludable when the benefits cannot be confined to individual buyers and are consumed collectively” (Marginson, p. 58). For her part, Williams (Chapter 5) noted tensions in the growing externality of the output of HE systems: Over recent decades, “public good” has been operationalised in terms of tangible returns on or expected outcomes of public investment allocated to university funding, be they economic or intellectual, social benefits or spin-offs. These tensions appear all the more pronounced in North America, where HER governance is increasingly veering toward marketisation. As an illustrative example, France Picard et al. (Chapter 10) observed that Canadian HE institutions historically taking up the slack for the scant R&D carried out by the industrial sector (and at a significantly higher rate compared to other OECD countries). As a result, recent public policies on universities and research such as those adopted in Québec have placed economic development and innovation on par with the university's contribution to human development and social justice (e.g. greater access by first-generation students). The Québec case also provided further evidence of the tensions in the contribution of the “public good” and “public goods” as nuanced by Marginson and Williams.

The second part of our conclusion discusses issues linked to research on HER systems themselves. This research is largely dependent on the contributions of countless scholars who, as Rothblatt (Chapter 2) has pointed out, have paved the way for a humanist approach through which to study the dilemmas, issues and impasses these systems have encountered throughout their history. Some of these

scholars are still active and affiliated with CHER, and their analyses as relevant as ever. Although the bulk of HER literature is qualitative, as Rothblatt remarked, this field of research can be equally founded on quantitative studies. While many disciplines in this field have produced an abundance of research questions and approaches, as Marginson noted, no single disciplinary framework is adequate to grasp the evolution of HER systems. The gamut of approaches used in the studies collected here speak not only to this multiplicity, but also contribute to the expanding body of literature on HER systems.

Drawing on Lamont's analysis (Chapter 1), it can be safely assumed that any field of research in HER systems is subject to the same pressures experienced by university-based research in other disciplines. Lamont notably drew attention to the major importance given to *social relevance* and methodological rigour over the contribution of theory as evaluation criteria for grant competitions and publication in scholarly journals – a critical distinction, as these criteria remain an important component of international research, influencing how researchers in HER define the objectives and approaches of their studies and how their work is ultimately measured against this body of research.

Following Lamont's observations, three of the papers included here were based on comparative international studies. When undertaking comparative studies of HER systems, allowing for different national specificities can often minimise the danger of falling into ethnocentric traps and lead to a meaningful discussion of the outcomes. Maassen (Chapter 3) used a qualitative approach to trace the evolution of the social contract through the ages in the United States, Germany, and other European countries as a whole. His multinational comparative study drew on numerous examples of the social contract throughout history that have singularly defined (and redefined) the role and mission of the university (from professional schools organised around theology, medicine or law in the 11<sup>th</sup> century to the integration of scientific research in universities adopting the Humboldtian model starting from the 19<sup>th</sup> century). Ultimately, Maassen's study highlights the inevitability of the transformation of HE and the importance of the ongoing debate on adapting the social contract to better reflect 21<sup>st</sup> century realities, one entrenched in long-term mutual trust, social commitment and respect for the missions of the HER system and the state alike.

In a second study, currently being conducted in eight HE systems around the world to compare the benefit of the "public good" at the national and supranational levels (global public goods), Marginson (Chapter 4) presents preliminary data collected in Australia and Russia. The merit of his methodology lies primarily in the use of a global comparative approach to advance theoretical considerations: 1) Ultimately, what is the university's contribution to society in terms of "public good"? 2) Can these contributions redefine the social contract between the HE system and the state in a contemporary way? Operationalising this concept could thus allow to clearly identify the tangible benefits of HER systems, and dissipate the haziness produced by this complex phenomenon and the difficulty of measuring multifaceted benefits.

In the third empirical study, Murdoch et al. (Chapter 9) examined the issue of unequal access to HE in immigrant populations in France and Switzerland. Basing their research on a longitudinal study that followed two youth cohorts, the researchers sought to determine whether the vocational track in secondary school influences the probability of access to university for youth of immigrant background. Comparing these two different education systems – namely the demographics of the immigrant population and the degree of importance vocational tracks have in secondary school, combined with key variables in student pathways (e.g. academic performance in secondary school, parental socioeconomic background) – made a meaningful interpretation of the net effect of immigrant status on access compared to other variables possible. In addition to furthering the debate on the issue of territory, the study also suggests that HE has now become a global issue defined by internationalisation, student mobility, and the increasing interconnectedness of HE systems.

In discussing the merits of using qualitative or quantitative methods in empirical studies to grasp HER as an area of study, Jungblut (Chapter 6) favoured mixed methods research, where a qualitative analysis of political party platforms is measured against quantitative indicators such as the rate of public/private funding, size of the student population and supervision rate (student/teacher ratio). In light of the debate raised by Rothblatt around this issue, it would be valuable to understand the extent to which mixed methods are used in research on HE to fully capture its true scope and evaluate its level of acceptance as a research method.

As a striking example of an innovative methodological approach, van Zanten et al. (Chapter 11) conducted an ethnographic study of unequal access to HE in France from the perspective of differentiated ability (by socioeconomic background) on the part of youth to gather and process information on schools in their orientation steps and in applying to HE. The researchers used direct observation to study both the information young people found at HE fairs and recruitment strategies used by HE institutions. This approach proved to be effective in not only unwrapping the “packaging” of information on schools commonplace in the highly competitive world of student recruitment, but also in observing how various social groups use these fairs differently.

With the multiscale analysis on the transformation of HER systems presented throughout this book, we hope to stress the importance of dialogue between research that places the concept of HE as a “social institution” at the heart of inquiry, and the policy-making (and at times scientific) bias of considering and questioning the effectiveness of HE systems in economic terms. To be sure, the intention here is not to question the validity of the latter perspective, as a social approach can no longer be ignored in any study of economic benefits of a HER system. Indeed, these two perspectives would be all the more valuable were they to complement each other. The methodological and scientific issues arising from analyses of the roles played by HER systems broadly outlined here form the basis to (re)think the transformation of these systems, through socio-historical, political, societal or systemic comparative approaches. At the national level, these issues underscore the need to fully distinguish the relationships between HE, society and

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the state. They validate the contribution of current research in establishing international standards to define HE as a “public good,” as well as the type of “social contract” that would underlie this definition.

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