CHAPTER 6

PEDAGOGICAL CARE: CONNECTIVE THINKING

Remember the three friends talking together at a café. I used this scenario in Chapter 1 to distinguish between dialogue and mere conversation. Let us now revisit the concept of dialogue. The three friends engaged in mere conversation could be seen discussing an upcoming wedding. This conversation may surround the chosen flowers or the final details of a wedding dress. Despite the wedding banter that the conversation may consist of, what is important is that the focus is on retaining equilibrium lest the friends break the rules of conversation. A dialogue however, aims at disequilibrium whereby assumptions are explored and both agreements and disagreements examined. The three friends at the café may turn their conversation from wedding dresses and bouquets to topics such as identity and name changing that may require more critical consideration. While it is possible that a dialogue may result from an initial conversation, it is unlikely that the friends would choose to upset the equilibrium that surrounds chatting about the happy event. What is important in this scenario is that the friendship that has brought the three individuals together is based on mutual admiration and fondness. Friendship in this case, is unlikely to allow for a focused dialogue on matters of philosophical importance. However, three people who come together for the purpose of dialogue have a very different connection. Their aim *is* to examine agreements as well as disagreements and to find a balance between equilibrium and disequilibrium. We could say that their connection is based on care for finding truth. They may become friends outside of the dialogue, but their relationship while in the dialogue is one based on care. The three café-going friends could meet for the purpose of dialogue but then the relationship in the dialogical situation is one based on their common commitment of travelling together to find truth.

We will now make further the distinction between friendship and care to define what is important for Socratic pedagogy. When it comes to addressing caring thinking in philosophical dialogue, this is a necessary exploration in order to avoid the promotion of relationships that may be counter to philosophical progress through dialogue. In the previous two chapters we have concentrated on dialogue as a form of intellectual inquiry. In this chapter, we turn our attention to the dialogue as a form of communal inquiry. Because we are addressing relationships, in dialogue it is necessary to understand the kinds of connections we are making with others. The notion of care may depict multiple connections, anywhere from a connection out of duty, to a loving, emotional care that one has for, say, their child or close family member. Care has also come to encompass relationships based on friendship, a distinction I will make clearer in this chapter. In philosophical inquiry, the use of the terms is both vague and ambiguous. Ever since Aristotle drew attention to the connection between friendship and philosophical inquiry a

host of writers have revisited the topic (Reed & Johnson, 1999; Roumer, 1994; Badhar, 1993; Lynch, 2005).

Reed and Johnson (1999) trace the history of the role of friendship in philosophy. The most notable of these examples is C.S. Lewis's imagery of two friends sitting side by side, looking out in the same direction. This image reflects Lewis's definition of friendship; of two people with common views finding the same point upon which to fix their gaze. Reed and Johnson use Lewis's imagery to compare friends with lovers.

> The lover simply delights in the other, while the friend, it may be said, delights in the delight other takes in the shared activity, delights in the way the other "cares for the same truth". In Lewis's telling image,—"we picture lovers face to face but friends side by side; their eyes look ahead". (p.169)

Lewis's friends have in common something substantive; they are friends because they have common interests. Lewis was not the first to make such connections. Aristotle claimed common interest to be the basis of friendship, albeit he recognised the volatility of friendship. Immanuel Kant also was "aware of the fragility of relationships given the difficulties between individuals and the potential for conflict which difference entails" (in Lynch, 2002, p.9). We must, therefore, consider the impact of such difficulties on a dialogue in which difference is imminent.

Reed and Johnson (1999) give an example of the Dodgers baseball team—a group of men from different cultures, of different race and socio-economic status placed in a team as an experiment to see what would ensue. Sharing a commitment to baseball resulted in these individuals being friends, and subsequently, becoming a very successful baseball team. No doubt, friendship was important in this case, but it was a consequence of the team mates having an interest in common, i.e., the commitment to baseball. Recall that Reeve (2005) analogises that the relationship in a Bohmian Dialogue, which is based on impersonal fellowship, was like a group of people supporting a sporting team. It is important not to confuse this with what Reed and Johnson (1999) are pointing to. For participants in Bohmian Dialogue, their common interest *is* dialogue and the search for truth rather than a separate interest that does not underpin inquiry. Genuine dialogue requires a commitment to the process of inquiry. Common interest may, therefore, not be enough to sustain such an inquiry unless the common interest is dialogue itself. Friends may avoid voicing different opinions that could cause disagreement, and this could disrupt the natural dialogue. Disagreement should instead be seen as a catalyst for strengthening dialogue through the sharing of different points of view. The dialogue engages people in critical inquiry, whereby the ideas, and not the people who express the ideas, are open to criticism. This does not, of course, discount the possibility of a friendship founded on a common interest or commitment to dialogue.

Snyder and Smith (1986) suggest that friendship can be either shallow or deep. By shallow they mean that a person enjoys the company of another, and has a

fondness or liking for the other person. This is a social relationship that is not necessarily based on anything substantial between the friends except that they share common experiences together. Could this be what Lewis meant by lovers simply delighting in each other? Lewis's lovers face each other, which connotes a fondness between them. I suggest that the image of Lewis's lovers facing each other is synonymous with Snyder's and Smith's description of shallow friendship, albeit that linking the two broadens Lewis's description to incorporate both lovers and friends. But this need not be a problem if a defining feature of (shallow) friendship and of being lovers is having a fondness for one another. A deep friendship, on the other hand, is one in which two or more people share the same attitudes and values (p.69). This is an important difference, as it is not the feelings that friends have for one another that defines the friendship, but that they have attitudes and values in common. Snyder's and Smith's deep friendship echoes Aristotle's, Kant's, and Lewis's definition of friendship as that of sharing common interests. In the case of the Dodgers, they shared a deep friendship based on their attitudes and values with regards to baseball.

Plato's definition of friendship is somewhat different. He defined a 'true' friendship as being the common search for knowledge; to get to truth. David Allman (1988) describes the Platonic view of friendship as "two people sharing the experience of contemplating the universal quality of truth" (pp.113–26). Note that the quest for universal truth is what defines Platonic friends. Turning again to Lewis's imagery, we might want to say that Plato's definition of friendship qualifies as deep friendship. However, it is also something more. The point at which Platonic friends are gazing is unchangeable, beyond the material world. Deep friendship, as characterized by Snyder and Smith, is far less demanding. Having a common interest, such as an interest in baseball, or a concern for ecological sustainability, is enough to qualify for a deep friendship. The friends need not be concerned over any progress toward truth, or the process of dialogue, let alone the quest for universal truth. On the Platonic account of friendship, these are necessary requirements. It is possible to also interpret Reed and Johnson's view of friendship in this way especially if we concentrate on their words in relation to a friend who cares for the same truth (although the Dodgers analogy suggests otherwise). However, if this is the case, it is not an appropriate metaphor for philosophical dialogue. The quest for truth in the Socratic pedagogy I propose here is not for universal truth as described by Plato, but in the valuing of, or being motivated by, the progress toward truth (I use the term as attributed to Gardner earlier).

The question that we need to ask is whether or not the literature devoted to the importance of friendship in dialogue uses the term in the same way as Plato did in his dialogues. Reed and Johnson acknowledge the significance of the qualities that Plato tried to capture in his view of friendship, but, as we have seen, their use of the term is somewhat ambiguous to say the least. To avoid confusion between the Platonic view of friendship and Snyder and Smith's deep friendship, I suggest that a fundamental quality of Platonic friendship is 'caring'. To put it another way, dialogue requires a caring for progress toward truth, rather than friendship as Reed

and Johnson, and others claim. However, in the case of Platonic friends, their quest is for universal truth.

Reed and Johnson (1999) acknowledge the problem that friendship poses for philosophy. If people are closely aligned, they have the power to sabotage inquiry, e.g., through exclusion or by bullying others. Recall the discussion in Chapter 1 on technologies of silence, particularly coercion and friendship. If friends shut themselves off from the rest of the group, then they cannot be fully immersed in group dialogue. They may be in agreement with each other based on their relationship as friends, but not on reflecting upon their own beliefs and values. It may be more difficult for individuals to express their views, especially if their beliefs and values differ to that of their friends. This may also be intimidating to others in the dialogue. As for the whole group being friends, this may well prove to be impossible in a philosophical dialogue in an educative setting. It would be unlikely that all members would agree with each other on all aspects of a particular issue of concern. Friendship may well be detrimental to the success of philosophical inquiry. However, if the focus is not on friendship in dialogue, but on *caring thinking*, then this trap may be avoided. Even if friendship between some members does develop over the course of the dialogue, or exist beforehand as was the case of the café friends, if the dialogue is founded on care, then the care that each participant has for the outcome of the dialogue would not allow groups or individuals to hinder the course of dialogue and can avoid some of the technologies of silence.

If a defining feature of friendship is the sharing of common interests, then difference, conflict, and change may pose difficulties for such a relationship. Would a friend necessarily be honest about a difference of opinion if it is likely to cause considerable problems with the friendship? This, of course, is a matter for empirical investigation. However, I maintain that a dialogue based on care ensures that at least all beliefs and values are respected equally as we shall see in this chapter. Reed and Johnson (1999) argue that in a dialogue, "we create an environment in which children become friends in virtue. Those virtues include respect for truth, respect for evidence, respect for other persons and so on" (p.193). Again, I question Reed and Johnson's use of the term friendship. Children do not necessarily become friends based on these virtues. Indeed, it is more likely that childhood friendships are based on common interests or interpersonal qualities, or what the children themselves may describe as a 'liking for each other'. What Reed and Johnson define as friendship based on virtues can only be described as what I shall refer to as care, provided friendship in this case is defined as having a common interest in the quest for truth. Otherwise, it is no more than Snyder and Smith's deep friendship, like the friendship shared by the players in the Dodgers. If we only have respect for others out of friendship, then respect may well be given to a friend in dialogue but may not be given to others.

An analysis of friendship and caring can help to understand better the sort of relationship required, in order for progress to occur in dialogue. From here on in, this chapter will explore only caring thinking. I will be concentrating only on the aspects of caring thinking that are important for dialogue. Because a precise

definition of care is unlikely given its multiple meanings, mostly built around the everyday sense of the term as meaning an affective state linked to cognate terms such as fondness, compassion, empathy, and so forth, there is often confusion over what the term stipulates when it comes to pedagogy. Therefore our first task is to highlight what is important about caring thinking with regards to multi-dimensional thinking and Socratic pedagogy. What is common or central to the meaning of caring thinking is *connective thinking*. By connective thinking I mean collective thinking, impersonal fellowship, and awakened attentiveness. We will explore where connective thinking features in each of the models of dialogue to show its practical application.

WHAT IS CARING THINKING?

Caring thinking is a contentious term, even more so than its counterparts, creative and critical thinking. In the context of dialogue where we engage with others not only intellectually but collectively in a communal inquiry the term is vague. Because the environment that we come together in dialogue must be one that is conducive to inquiry, it is important to specify how care can inform effective dialogue. An obvious starting point is with Gilligan's ethic of care as it is her empirical studies into moral development that have laid the foundations for further research on care and caring thinking. Gilligan (1993) was a student of Lawrence Kohlberg (1981). Kohlberg proposed a stages theory of moral development to explain the development of moral reasoning.[1] His theory holds that moral reasoning has six identifiable developmental constructive stages that are each more adequate at responding to moral dilemmas than the previous stage. Gilligan has argued that Kohlberg's theory is not only overly andocentric but that it also emphasises justice to the exclusion of other values such as caring. Because Kohlberg's theory is based on the results of empirical research using only male participants, Gilligan argued that it did not adequately describe women's concerns. Instead of focusing on the value of justice, she developed an alternative theory of moral reasoning that is based on the ethic of care. Her studies found that women (or mainly women) base their decisions on care which has a focus on relationships and real-life situations, whereas men (or mainly men) base their decisions on a justice approach taking principles and rules of logic as paramount to ethical decision-making. It is interesting to note that after Gilligan's initial studies, other psychologists have also questioned the assumption that moral action is primarily reached by formal reasoning, and therefore that moral reasoning is less relevant to moral action than Kohlberg's theory suggests.

Gilligan's ground breaking research has had an influential and sustained effect on feminine and feminist ethical theory, philosophy, and through Nel Noddings, on education. The literature on care I draw on owes much to Gilligan, especially her emphasis on maintaining relationships, connections, and context. My concern is not with an ethic of care or even with care generally, but with caring thinking in relation to dialogue. Caring thinking is distinct from caring as emotional attachments, and cognate terms such as love or friendship. If we think of care as caring thinking, this

puts it into the context of critical thinking and creative thinking—both of which have contexts outside of inquiry. By defining care as a thinking process, we can look at it in the context of dialogue, or more specifically philosophical inquiry.

According to Ann Sharp (2004), caring thinking "suggests a certain view of personhood and pedagogical process" (p.9). I concur with Sharp, but she does not make it clear as to how caring as a pedagogical process could inform Socratic teaching. Pedagogical caring, a term used by Hult (1979, pp.237–43) gives us some insight as to what it means to display caring in the classroom.[2] In an educational setting, caring appropriately refers to students being provided with opportunities to receive the best possible education. In his article, 'I teach you not love you', teacher Michael Blumenthal (2001) stresses that practising teachers should place importance on caring about the education that is being provided to the student, which is different from any personal caring for individual students. If we incorporate Hult's term to Blumenthal's claims about teaching, we can say that pedagogical caring is necessary to student-learning, and should not be mistaken for personal bonds or concern, friendship or other emotional connections, which have the potential to be obstacles to productive inquiry or dialogue. It is important, therefore, to make a distinction between caring *for* and caring *with* in relation to caring in inquiry. It is far more meaningful in terms of Socratic pedagogy and as a description of the communal aspects of dialogue to think of caring as 'caring with each other' rather than 'caring for each other'. The nature of the 'care of' the child has implications for educational relationship between teacher and student and for this chapter our exploration will focus only on the relationship *between* participants in an inquiry.

In this part of the chapter we will identify the characteristics that are most common to caring thinking as it relates to dialogue. There are many authors who have written on care, most notably in psychology is Gilligan (1993), in philosophy Annette Baier (1986), and in education Nel Noddings (1984). While all agree that care and caring is in some way about connections between people, there is much to say on how caring contributes to effective communal dialogue. Sharp (2004), a colleague of Lipman, directly addresses the relationship between 'caring thinking' and dialogue in the classroom. Sharp is, therefore, an obvious starting point for our discussion on care as a way of organising how caring thinking fits into Socratic pedagogy. She places caring thinking in four categories. They are: (1) their care for the tools of inquiry, (2) their care for the problems they deem worthy, (3) their care for the form of dialogue, and (4) their care for each other (p.14). While Sharp certainly has more to say on the wider application of care as another dimension of thinking, these categories point to the experience of inquiry as embedded in care. She notes:

> This deeper dimension of meaning is not something of which they are always totally aware. The dimension lies not only in what they say to each other, how many problems they solve, what questions they decide to take on, but in the aesthetic and intersubjective form of the dialogue as a whole as they experience it. (p.14)

Sharp's categories of caring thinking offer a useful starting point for a discussion on care in dialogue. However, I will adapt them to make them applicable to Socratic pedagogy. Rather than speak of caring for the tools of inquiry and for the form of discussion I will refer to both as care for inquiry. Caring for inquiry includes paying attention to interactive patterns of inquiry, such as listening, turn-taking, and contributing, as well as caring for the tools of inquiry, such as the use of reasoning, conceptual exploration, asking questions, and making judgments. Note that I will refer to 'care with others', rather than retain Sharp's category of 'care for each other', as I think this is a more accurate description of what is necessary to dialogical inquiry. Moreover, we should not be concerned primarily with caring for one another, whether emotionally or in the sense that we have a concern for others, but that engaging in dialogue is something that we do with others together. I will, therefore, be examining: (1) care for inquiry, (2) care with others, and (3) care for problems deemed worthy.

Care for Inquiry

Care for the inquiry itself is what motivates participants in a dialogue. This aspect of caring thinking gives rise to the other aspects of care that Sharp (2004) mentions, namely, care for others, and care for the topics that students deem worthy. Caring thinking also motivates students to enlist critical and creative thinking. In Chapter 1 I discussed that the purpose of inquiry is to uncover truth, or at least to make some progression towards it. This view is particularly poignant here as it is caring for truth that gives inquiry its purpose. Without valuing truth or a greater knowledge, an inquiry does not have a purpose. One way to put this is that care is the facilitator of inquiry. If participants care for inquiry, then the other tools and requirements of inquiry will be carried through. For example, there may be disagreement on a matter of importance that has the potential to block the flow of dialogue. A group of students who care for the inquiry itself will put the energy into moving through this potential obstacle by engaging in thinking activities aimed a resolving the matter. On the other hand, a group that does not place any value on inquiry may quickly tire, and as a result may not have the desire to explore disagreements through reasoning or exploring alternatives in order to move forward. The teacher's role is to facilitate inquiry, but care is the primary facilitator that motivates the group and compels them to explore the matter further. If care is the facilitator of inquiry, then students will be more inclined to take risks rather than hold back. If this is so then care for the inquiry should be paramount and foremost in the minds of teachers as a virtue that requires nurturing. While there is no scope to address it here, surely caring for inquiry must come from the students themselves and through exposure to inquiry. It is suffice to say that if students are aware of the inquiry process and their active role as participants then emphasis should be placed on developing an awareness in students of different ways of knowing, meaning an emphasis on caring thinking in addition to the cognitive dimensions of thinking.[3]

Care with Others

While I have categorised care for inquiry and care with others separately, I acknowledge that they are interrelated. For it is out of care for inquiry that we care with others in the inquiry. I reiterate that care in this instance is care with the individuals in the inquiry as fellow inquirers, not as an emotional connection outside of those relationships that already exist or may exist in the future. It is important to note at this stage that when I refer to caring with others, I am referring to care as pedagogy not as affective thinking or as an emotional process or state. I, therefore, make a distinction between caring *with* and caring *for.* Engaging in philosophical inquiry requires that participants care with others. Caring with others involves the connections that we make in the dialogical community in our common journey towards greater understandings through inquiring together. The connection is one of impersonal fellowship, or pedagogical care. It is not an emotional connection to others and hence in the dialogue we do not care *for* others (despite the fact that this may occur outside the dialogue) but we care with each other in the dialogue as we progress towards reaching truth. On the other hand, we can care *for* the connections that we make and this requires us to listen, accept difference, and contribute to the dialogue. In this case, we are caring for the relationships and connections. We can also care for individuals outside of the dialogue in much the same way. For example, I could say that I care for humanity and hence I care for my neighbour as she is part of a global citizenship. While I may not have a friendship with my neighbour, I would treat that person with respect because of the care that I have for humankind rather than because of my personal relationships with a particular person.

Burgh, Field and Freakley (2006) offer a list of criteria for caring thinking: (1) being aware of the context in which discussion takes place, (2) sharing discussion, (3) welcoming and respecting each other's views, and (4) engaging in self-correction. Under each of these categories they list their essential characteristics.[4] A cursory glace at the categories and their characteristics suggests that what they have in mind is caring as pedagogy. However, they do not make this distinction themselves, but I mention it here as their list goes some of the way to illustrate what I mean by pedagogical care as dispositions that lend themselves to interactive patterns of inquiry necessary for engaging in dialogue. I think that Reich (1998) alludes to something similar with regards to what he calls Socratic Virtues for inquiry, which includes postponing judgment, trusting one's doubts, and patience. What I want to say is that these dispositions, virtues, or skills (whatever they may be) should be made explicit because caring thinking is an insurance against the risks inherent in the inquiry process; it connects participants through trust, reciprocity, and acceptance of difference, within the context of an inter-subjective community of people engaged in dialogue together.

The notion of caring as the facilitator of dialogue is tied to Dewey's notion of the Greater Community and the relationship between thinking together, social communication, and mutual interest necessary for supporting democratic ways of life. Pedagogical caring supports an educational arrangement suitable for

democracy for it develops the social dispositions needed for active citizenship, as well as the environment to nurture the intellectual dispositions and capacities for students to think for themselves. Viewed in this way pedagogical care could be considered to liberate the powers of the individual because the emphasis is on the cultivation of participatory and deliberative virtues. As Lipman (1998) points out, there are certain dispositions needed in a participatory democracy that favours deliberation such as trust, fair-mindedness and tolerance. These virtues are at the heart of a caring relationship in the inquiry. Without a certain regard for others and for the inquiry social communication in both the dialogue and the Greater Community is not possible. By enabling students to volunteer their beliefs, values, and opinions on issues in an environment of a communal dialogue they learn to transfer an attitude of respect for others and confidence in their own perspectives to their general dispositions (Vicuna Navarro, 1998, pp.23–6). If students have no regard for others and for inquiry then the inquiry will not be meaningful, and consequently will not support democratic ways of life (Sharp, 2004, p.9).

The overarching purpose of engaging in philosophical dialogue in the classroom is for the cultivation of democratic dispositions. The type of democracy I am advocating is a deliberative form of democracy which is participatory and requires a commitment by individuals. If inquiry is to reflect a form of deliberative democracy then care is foundational because individuals must have a connection to the process of communal deliberation and a connection to meaningful topics that may go some way to solving societal and environmental problems. Engaging in inquiry is, as Cam (2006) suggests, one way of enhancing a democratic way of life.

> This kind of collaborative inquiry encourages social communication and mutual recognition of interests that Dewey identifies with a democratic way of life. Such an engagement develops the social and intellectual dispositions and capacities needed for active citizenship, while liberating the powers of the individual. (p.8)

The connections Cam highlights are made possible through dialogue where emphasis is on care with others for the inquiry. Not only is caring thinking necessary for dialogue, but what I have said so far also acknowledges the UNESCO report's aims for creating democratic dispositions in students.

Because dialogue is a communal activity, caring thinking cannot be overemphasized. Participants *must* care with others in order to be a dialogical community and must care for the inquiry itself. Otherwise the notion of community would be reduced to interactions among individuals who do not relate to each other beyond mutual self-interest or adversarial negotiations. Community steeped in dialogue is founded on both a caring interrelationship (caring with others) and a care for inquiry itself (deliberation over matters of common concern). A community neighbourhood watch, for example, is a group of citizens concerned for their own safety and the safety of the community in which they live—a reciprocal connection as one relies on the other. Each person shares a caring relationship with others in the neighbourhood as part of a community, hence their coming together as a group. Perhaps these neighbours are acquainted on a personal level, which is

likely, but they have a caring regard for each other as neighbours. They also have a care for matters of concern to all of them, namely safety—this is the primary reason that brings the neighbours together. Similarly, in an inquiry, a community engages in dialogue because participants want to inquire into matters of concern to all within a communal environment (which brings perhaps previously unacquainted individuals together).This means that participants must care with others in their interactions on matters of mutual concern for the group.

The notion of intersubjectivity is important to community. Below I will discuss further Buber's I/thou dichotomy, but suffice it to say that a community is made up of individuals who act both as 'I' and 'thou'. Intersubjectivity implies a collective process in which all participants volunteer, and contribute to, arguments on matters of concern. The emphasis is placed on the participants in the dialogue to move towards an understanding that has been reached through the contributions of all participants. This does not necessarily mean that there has been no disagreement during the inquiry, as disagreement is inevitable, especially when dealing with matters of ethical concern, but instead, as a community, participants move together towards a common goal of seeking truth. When an individual reflects on his or her own argument, that contains his or her perspective as well as the views of others, it becomes clear that this perspective has been shaped by all members of the inquiry. There may still be disagreement amongst the community members, but if, after reflection, the group decides to accept the different opinions, they have come to this conclusion collectively. Care in this sense allows for community by enhancing thinking as collaborative. Let us now look at the specific elements that contribute to thinking collaboratively.

Care as Reciprocity: The Temple of Hearing Petra von Mornstein (2005) addresses intersubjectivity in terms of its relation to Martin Buber. She takes Buber's theory of the I/thou relationship and applies it to philosophical dialogue. Von Morstein says that in an inquiry we are both object and subject. Because we are both object and subject at the same time, this is the state in which we can say we are 'intersubjective'—both individual (I) and opposite of others (thou). She argues that in an inquiry we base our experiences on being a subject. But we must also know each other (hence, the I/thou relationship). This is bound up in concepts of empathy. By knowing others in an inquiry we must empathise with them (to put our feet in their shoes to try to understand their viewpoint). But to allow us to be truly intersubjective we must have trust. We need to trust in order to be trusted. She argues that in philosophical inquiry "our individual boundaries are transcended when we are I/thou" (n.p). However, the I/thou relationship is not always sustainable for long and she warns against the perils of becoming a 'we'. If her warning is understood as becoming friends then this supports my earlier claim that it is care and not friendship that is necessary for dialogue, and that friendship could become an obstacle to effective inquiry.

Integral to von Mornstein's theory on the I/thou relationship and inquiry, and to the definition of care presented here, is the notion of a 'Temple of Hearing'. What

von Mornstein is referring to is reciprocity in terms of language. Much like the question of a tree falling in a forest, she questions whether a word is indeed a word until someone receives it. The hearer has to attend to the speaker and also suspend their own meanings of the word in order to actually hear. She asserts that it is love that allows this process. It is not the word but the ear that allows communication to happen. The speaker trusts in being heard. Although von Morstein uses the term 'love', given our discussion so far, a more suitable term is care. In a dialogue our actions have to be reciprocal because if we don't create an environment that is conducive to others' inquiry, then our own inquiry will suffer. In a dialogue we listen and attend because that is what we would hope for when we are the person in a position of speaker. This is trust, as we only speak when we trust that we will be received. In relation to my assertion that participants must care for the inquiry to make it truly meaningful, von Mornstein is relevant insofar as she pays attention to participant's care for words. We must care for our words in order to care for each other (i.e., care for what we are saying). We must have a commitment to the dialogue that comes from being part of an 'I/thou' relationship. This is the 'Temple of Hearing', a process of being both interconnected and different in the dialogue, in which we are both hosts and guests together.

Noddings (1984) also describes caring as having a regard for the views and interests of others, and that it requires reciprocity (p.9). For caring to be fulfilled, the 'one-caring' must receive some sort of validation from the 'cared-for', in order for the act of caring to be complete. Caring, argues Noddings, "must somehow be completed in the other if the relationship is to be described as caring" (p.4). Dialogue requires reciprocity, as well as a regard for the views and interests of others, which entails trust, tolerance, and fairmindedness.[5] Opinions or points of view can be truly received only when others engage with those opinions or points of view as we discussed earlier. Regardless of disagreement, if the relationship is a caring one, then a commitment to the process of inquiry becomes paramount. Caring is, as Noddings says, integral to the success of the dialogue, as it is this element that helps participants to accept different views.

> Through such a dialectic, we are led beyond the intense, and particular feelings accompanying our deeply held values and beyond the particular beliefs to which these feelings are attached *to a realization that the other who feels intensely about that which I do not believe is still to be received.* (p.186, *emphasis* my own)

In sum, caring helps participants value and accept different points of view. Instead of placing importance on common interests, caring accommodates for differences. In an inquiry where participants may not share the same beliefs or values, they can still follow the dialogue from their own perspective and from the perspectives of others. In such cases, while participants acknowledge disagreement, they also are learning that the beliefs and values of the participants must be given equal respect and attention.

John Thomas (1997) says something similar to Noddings. Although he talks specifically of the Community of Inquiry, his argument applies equally to dialogue and inquiry generally: "[t]he idea of the community of inquiry in which people

come together for the common purpose of thinking rationally together has the potential to bridge the difference between individuals such that a deeper understanding of their differences and mutual respect for them can happen" (p.42). Thomas talks of differences being "transcended and yet retained" in the community set up (p.43). Rather than agreeing with the views of a participant in the inquiry, we can perhaps say that we value what an individual brings to the group inquiry. When we engage with the viewpoints of others in a dialogue, this shows that we value what that person has to contribute to the development of the argument. We may not always come to an agreement in inquiry and it is this aspect that gives us greater understanding of the topic being inquired into. It is also this aspect that makes philosophical inquiry intrinsically democratic. Students are allowed to voice our viewpoints and to actively disagree or agree on a topic.

Coming together for a common purpose and acceptance of difference requires empathy. Empathy should not be mistaken for or should not imply compassion because the capacity for empathy can be present in other contexts such as cruelty. Rather, empathy is to recognise or understand someone else's state of mind or emotion. It is not in itself an emotion, but a kind of reflective disagreement insofar as it allows for the exploration of disagreement through 'putting yourself into another's shoes'. This is consistent with pedagogical care, and requires the ability to listen attentively to others, to imagine, to think analogously, and to be open to possibilities and different perspectives. As such, empathy is integral to caring thinking as it allows us to connect to the experiences of others. The presence of empathy as integral to dialogue would also satisfy the concerns of critics such as de Bono's regarding philosophy as adversarial. If not, then perhaps the critics should heed Pitchard's warning: "If people are not convinced that one can learn through reflective disagreement, then perhaps what is called for is some discussion of what learning involves and why it is important to explore our disagreements as well as out agreements" (in Power, 1999).

Care as Trust   The cooperative nature of dialogue described so far is not possible without trust.[6] In a philosophical inquiry, we enter into a kind of contract i.e., we are committed to seeing an inquiry to its completion, and, hence, there is a certain amount of trust involved that participants of the inquiry will respect the contract that they have entered into and will behave accordingly. According to Baier (1986) "[i]t seems fairly obvious that any form of co-operative activity … requires the cooperators to trust with one another to do their bit" (p.232). In a cooperative endeavour such as a philosophical inquiry, it is imperative that each participant 'does their bit' and contributes to the dialogue or the inquiry itself could not ensue. We must all contribute ideas and also engage with the ideas of others or we risk the inquiry becoming a series of monologues. This reciprocal arrangement that we agree to when we enter into dialogue is founded on our caring for the process of inquiry.

The reciprocal relationship between caring and trusting when engaging in dialogue together requires that we trust people with 'things we care about'. When

we enter into dialogue we not only agree to care for the inquiry but we trust that others will share a reciprocal care for inquiry. But we also care about our ideas in inquiry. It is the contribution that we make to inquiry that makes us vulnerable, but it is also the production of ideas that shows that we care for what we are saying. This brings us back to von Mornstein (2005) and our discussion on caring for our words. When we care enough about developing our own and others' ideas, then we enter into dialogue. This is where trust must be enlisted. At the time of being most vulnerable (or at the time of greatest risk), we trust that "the trusted will not harm one, although one could harm one" (Baier, 1986, p.235). It is possible that our ideas may not be received in an inquiry and it takes courage to voice viewpoints to a group of people (hence why some participants may take some weeks to find confidence to contribute to a dialogue). We trust that these ideas will be met with openness. In doing so, we have, according to Baier, a reciprocal relationship of one-trusting to the trusted, which creates unequal power. We give the trusted power and trust that they will not do ill to us (such as laughing out loud at an idea rather than treating it with respect). In a caring inquiry, these power relations become less threatening. All participants in the inquiry are in a position of power as the trusted, but also in the vulnerable position as the truster. Because we must treat each other with respect, not only out of care, trust is necessary for a successful dialogue. The teacher must facilitate the inquiry by creating an environment where care is ever-present, by modelling appropriate connections and encouraging the building of a classroom community alongside building critical and creative thinking skills.

In Chapter 4 we touched briefly on the idea of creativity as risk. It is undeniable that the exploration of new or innovative ideas in a group can be confronting to some students. Were this to go undetected, then the very environment which was intended to develop students' ability to think well, could itself become a technology of silence. But risk also plays a role in the broader context of inquiry, as dialogue requires participants to be intellectual risk-takers. Caring thinking creates opportunities for students to take risks; to be creative in their thinking, to generate, expand and develop their ideas, but also to be critical, to challenge their own ideas and those of others. Caring thinking allows the participants in the dialogue to take risks in an environment that is intellectually safe (Miller, 2005). In other words, the presence of caring thinking in inquiry may 'soften the fall' so to speak, in terms of taking risks as creative and critical thinkers. It seems that risk and trust go hand-in-hand; we cannot have one without the other. The transition between risk and taking the step forward in creating intellectually safe environment is the act of trusting. Baier (1986) sees this process as:

> … the natural order of consciousness and self-consciousness of trust, which progresses from initially unself-conscious trust to awareness of risk along with confidence that it is a good risk, on to some realization of why we are taking this particular risk, and eventually to some evaluation of what we may generally gain and what we may lose from the willingness to take such risks.

> The ultimate point of what we are doing when we trust may be the last thing
> we come to realize. (p. 236)

Baier's words remind us of the interplay between risk and trust, and how we move from unconscious awareness of trust at the moment of taking a risk to eventually feeling confident about the risks we take, which we ultimately do not recognise as an act of trusting. This process could be made more explicit in an intellectually safe environment.

The conception of philosophical dialogue as an intellectually safe educational environment rests on two presuppositions in relation to distribution of power, in that it requires openness to inquiry and readiness to reason, and mutual respect of students and teachers towards one another. However, these presuppositions are dependent upon the ability of participants to share power (Yorshansky, 2007; Burgh & Yorshansky, 2008). To introduce an intellectually safe environment requires that the participants within that environment behave accordingly, but this is the very thing that the safe environment is supposed to bring about. Turgeon (1998) recognises that there are many factors that contribute to some students' lack of openness to inquiry and readiness to reason, or lack of mutual respect of students and teachers towards one another. Students may have personal reasons or deep seated reasons for not actively engaging in learning regardless of whether or not it is a safe intellectual environment (p.11). However, she points out that some of these problems can be overcome through the creation of such an environment.

> Before one can do philosophy, one must have the sense that one's ideas will
> be listened to, taken seriously, and respectfully responded to. This does not
> mean that you must have a fully developed community of inquiry as a pre-
> requisite for doing philosophy but it does point to the important need to focus
> on the nature of community and its importance in knowledge building from
> the start. (p.14)

In other words, there are distinct aspects of dialogue to which we must be alert in order to develop and maintain a safe environment. If taken into consideration with the processes Baier describes on the emergence of trust then it seems that a safe intellectual environment is possible through caring thinking. I am not offering this as a solution, but as a way of illustrating that the idea of a safe intellectual environment should not be discounted with regard to developing the relationship between risk and trust.

Despite what I have said, I also offer a caution that we should not discount the practicalities of students' unwillingness to openness or mutual respect. As Burgh and Yorshansky (2008) point out:

> It is not clear how dispositions towards sharing power necessarily develop in
> the course of the inquiry process. This prevalent assumption overlooks the
> possibility that sharing power, opinions, and other resources could cause
> strong emotional responses, which are often manifested as resistance, among
> participants in a community of inquiry. For example, certain members who

are prone to silence or who dominate discussion might not be receptive to changing their patterns of behaviour. (p.10)

What this passage suggests is that blocked inquiry is an indication that something is wrong. But blocked inquiry should not always be interpreted as a potential obstacle to dialogue. Some behaviours, typically seen as blocked inquiry, could be interpreted as providing opportunities for growth. The following comment by Turgeon (1998) suggests this should be the case.

> Paradoxically we might also re-examine the whole dilemma of the recalcitrant classroom as a sign of health, rather than as something that must be 'fixed' or eliminated. Perhaps such conflicts and protestations against philosophy reveal a more honest engagement within the classroom than is generally found in the traditional room. (p.14)

Turgeon's comments bring us back full circle to the relationship between risk and trust and the facilitation of an intellectually safe environment built on care. The absence of caring thinking can only result in a lack of trust and a reluctance to take intellectual risks. Caring thinking is, therefore, necessary, although I stress not sufficient, for the creation of opportunities to participate in the generation of innovative ideas and their evaluation in order to develop the intellectual and social dispositions and capacities for active citizenship. This, in turn, also liberates the individual and subsequently furthers the growth of an intellectually safe environment.

Care for Problems Deemed Worthy

Sharp (2004) argues that students may engage on a deeper level if what they are inquiring into is meaningful. This is reflective of Dewey's thinking that learning should be connected to the students' own lives in order for them to make substantive connections to what they are learning about or inquiring into. If students care for the process of inquiry, then their engagement will no doubt be deeper if what they are inquiring into is meaningful to them. The stimulus need not be a text, narrative, or other resource but an actual situation. For example, in a school classroom, a teacher may use some of the concerns that students raise in a weekly class meeting as stimulus for dialogue. A scenario could, for instance, arise out of student concerns that bullying is being disguised as 'just a joke'. While both bully and victim may have different views on what constitutes a joke, the situation could be addressed through inquiring into the meaning of the word joke. Conversely, if students are handed down ready-made topics to study that have either no connection to the students' own lives and experiences or do not spark their interest in any way, then they are less likely to become involved in moving through the process of inquiry. This is not to say that all students will necessarily be more interested in a topic through the process of inquiry, to which the reasons stated in the section above attest.

There are various ways of setting an agenda and these vary depending on the model of dialogue being used. For instance, in Socratic Dialogue the initial question to be explored throughout the dialogue is generally brought to the group by the facilitator (although this may be changed if the group has a different question or if they agree that another question needs to be addressed first). In Bohmian Dialogue, the group sets the agenda based on what is of interest to the group. This eventuates out of the initial discussion that precedes the dialogue. In the Community of Inquiry stimulus material can elicit questions, but this ultimately is decided on by the students themselves. This occurs in two ways; by making connections between questions by the students in order to arrive at an agreed upon question, or by voting to decide what question is of most interest. Caring thinking is particularly important in the initial stage of inquiry, where the use of the stimulus, the raising of the questions, and the setting of the agenda create the tone for whether or not students will consider a topic to be worthy of further exploration and analysis. Despite differences about what should count as stimulus material for inquiring, how to address questions, or set an agenda for inquiry, by focusing on what matters to students and inviting them as a group to problematise a situation, that is, by creating a caring environment that connects the social and intellectual aspects of inquiry, this will create opportunities to elicit thinking that is both transformative and substantive. Above all, it will be meaningful dialogue which in turn will create further connections and more opportunities for facilitating social communications and mutual recognition which underscores caring thinking.

CONNECTIVE THINKING: A WAY OF THINKING WITH CARE

We are in a position now to sum up what we have said so far about caring thinking. In Chapter 4 we explored the production, development, and extension of ideas as a way of thinking creatively that has application to the world, to situations, or problems. In the previous chapter the focus was on the development, application, and evaluation of criteria through conceptual analysis, reasoning, and logic. In this chapter caring thinking was described as the connections between individuals and thoughts in the communal dialogue. It is a process of: (1) caring for inquiry, which motivates students throughout the dialogue, (2) caring with others, which emphasises the connections between students through reciprocity, and an acceptance of difference, trust, and hearing, and (3) caring for problems deemed worthy, or those problematic situations that warrant further inquiry. Now that we have identified the characteristics or general features of caring thinking that are important for dialogue, in this part we can see that what is common to these characteristics or central to their meanings is *connective thinking*. By connective thinking I mean the connections between students in the dialogue as well as the connections inherent in multi-dimensional thinking. Connective thinking is comprised of three interrelated components**:** (1) collective thinking, (2) impersonal fellowship, and (3) awakened attentiveness.

Before we move on to our discussion we need to be clear about the distinction between care as affective thinking or as an emotional process or state, and care as

caring thinking. Care is usually thought of as an affective state, which includes love, liking, friendship, and other emotional attachments, as well as compassion, sympathy, and nurturing. Lipman (2004) is more specific and uses the term 'caring thinking', which he says is comprised of appreciative, active, normative, affective, and empathic thinking, each of which has their own characteristics (p.271). The list of characteristics attests to Lipman's intention to purposely conflate the distinction that we wish to make here. The way that caring thinking is presented here is that it is a kind of thinking that is necessarily connective. Connectivity, simply put, is the messages that are sent between different conduits that connect fragmented elements to create a greater understanding and allows for coherence that comes from wholeness. This connection is one of an impersonal fellowship or pedagogical care. It is the interaction between the participants in the inquiry (between teacher and students, and students and students as co-inquirers) and the content of the inquiry through a relationship of intersubjectivity. Participants follow the inquiry where it leads through a complex process of interactive patterns of inquiry conjointly guided by generative and evaluative thinking.

A necessary condition of connective thinking is that it is collective thinking. This is because engagement in dialogue is a shared activity where participants collaboratively exchange and explore ideas, and where the process of dialogue—its patterns of thinking, inquiry, and interactions—are internalised by the group. They are continual connections. The connection between the individual and the idea, and the individual and the group is a series of connections that occur when there is a communal dialogue. There is a level of disassociation from ego as thought becomes, as Bohm suggests, collective or participatory thought. Collective thinking is, therefore, intersubjective. Bohm's (1991) description of intersubjectivity may be helpful.

> As sensitivity and experience increase, a perception of shared meaning emerges in which people find that they are neither opposing one another, nor are they simply interacting. Increasing trust between members of the group— and trust in the process itself—leads to the expression of the sorts of thoughts and feelings that are usually kept hidden. There is no imposed consensus, nor is there any attempt to avoid conflict. No single individual or sub-group is able to achieve dominance because every single subject, including domination and submission, is always available to be considered. (n.p)

The impersonal fellowship, as Bohm prefers to call it, is an intersubjective connection between the participants in the dialogue and their ideas, and their inner thoughts and feelings as individuals and as a group.[7] The idea of the relationship as being both impersonal and a fellowship is important to connective thinking. A relationship that is founded on a connection between participants in the dialogue for the common purpose of inquiring together takes away the need to care *for* others, and instead puts the emphasis on caring *with* others as a way of engaging in dialogue. Recall the three café friends that we discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Their connection was an emotional connection based on fondness for each other and would likely support the retaining of equilibrium. However, if the three friends were to come together for the purpose of dialogue, their relationship would

be connected by a fellowship rather than a friendship. This allows for a genuine commitment to the inquiry with the aim of progressing toward truth of finding meaning together. This is not to deny that friendships may result from the inquiry process but they are not necessary to effective dialogue.

Interconnected with collective thinking and impersonal fellowship is awakened attentiveness, which is a kind of collective self-awareness. It is notable that the impersonal fellowship may be mistakenly depicted as 'uncaring' but it is far from that. What underpins it is *attending* to emotions and feelings, but rather than letting these emotions or feelings guide the dialogue, what is required is purposeful reflection in order to gain an understanding the feelings, assumptions, judgments, and thoughts that underpins emotion. This involves engaging in continual meta-dialogue. Because participants gain an awareness of what and how they are thinking they internalise this process and apply their awareness outside of the dialogue, effectively reconstructing thinking as a system, instead of remaining fragmented. The participants begin to develop group thinking attitudes rather than seeing problems exclusively from their own perspective. To understand this better it will be helpful to revisit the idea of proprioception.

> The body can perceive its own movement. When you move the body you know the relation between intention and action. The impulse to move and the movement are seen to be connected. If you don't have that, the body is not viable. (Bohm, 1991)

Being aware of movement can be applied to dialogue as an awareness of how we think through dialogue. To use Bohm's favoured analogy, the awareness of movement is like a collective dance of the mind.[8] In a dialogue participants must be aware of their connections to others and how their movements, or thoughts, impact on the movements of others, and how both the connection between movement and each other propels them further in collective dialogue. Bohmian dialogue is fundamentally connective as it is a continual process of reflection through a collaborative process in order to progress toward coherence.

CONNECTIVE THINKING IN DIALOGUE

We can now move on to where connective thinking features in each of the models of dialogue to show its practical application. So that we have a better understanding of how connective thinking features in Socratic pedagogy, we will explore how it has been employed in Bohmian Dialogue, Community of Inquiry, and Socratic Dialogue. Firstly we will look at Bohmian Dialogue and the metaphor of a collective dance of the mind. We will concentrate also on agenda setting and self-reflection as significant for connective thinking. Next, we look at the Community of Inquiry and Lipman's various approaches to caring thinking that have implications for generative thinking. Lastly, we will see how Socratic Dialogue also utilises connective thinking because there is a focus on meta-dialogue and personal anecdotes.

Bohmian Dialogue

In Bohmian dialogue, connective thinking is not simply present but is the very foundation of dialogue. Bohm's description of dialogue as a collective dance of the mind was intended to illustrate that participants need to look inwards at the way in which they interact with others, and reciprocally how others interact with them. He described this process as an awakened attentiveness. This means that the dialogue should be slow enough so that the participants can observe how they were actually thinking and how their interactions and the interactions of others impacted on their own thoughts, in order to experience thinking as a system rather than as instrument for tackling a problem. This process rests on a level of reciprocity that comes out of having an impersonal fellowship or cohesive bond. In an impersonal fellowship speech and silence are interwoven insofar as the distinction between speaker and listener tends to disappear. This allows for the dialogue to slow down so that careful attention can be paid to the interaction patterns of the dialogue and the internal thoughts and feelings of the participants revealed to themselves. Bohm envisaged that by enabling participants to concentrate on the connections that they make through collective thought, that there may be a greater level of self-awareness. This relies on connectivity through a process of awakening, being attentive to what is happening in the dialogue and the internalization process. The dialogue itself occurs out of collective thought that is informed by an intersubjective awareness; how our own movements in inquiry impact on others (a concentration on relationships) and how our own thoughts impact on the movements we make. If we do not engage in a collective dance of the mind, then there is no dialogue.

The metaphor represents the connections between individuals and to thinking that are made when steps are being followed: individuals must be aware of their movements. It places the emphasis on both thinking and collaborating. The metaphor of a collective dance of the mind is significant because it puts the focus not on the content of dialogue but on the very process of how dialogue features in a collaborative context, which is lost if the emphasis on thinking in dialogue remains only an intellectual process. While self-reflection has a role to play in the other models of dialogue, in Bohmian Dialogue reflection is a paramount feature and of utmost consideration as it places emphasis on *how* we inquire rather than on the content of the discussion. If in the dialogue there is disagreement, contention, or ill-feeling participants are encouraged to examine their assumptions, opinions, judgments, and feelings in order to awaken their awareness and to engage in meta-dialogue. In doing so, they engage in an internal dialogue within the dialogue itself.

The idea of 'no agenda' is also significant for our discussion on how connective thinking applies to Bohmian Dialogue. Not only should students be connected to each other through dialogue, but must also have some connection to matters of importance to the participants. Like arriving at a cocktail party, the group gathers around in conversation, but unlike a cocktail party the conversation inevitably leads to substantive topics of concern in order to begin the dialogue proper. Through this process, the individuals will be able to address topics that are

meaningful to them. Only those topics that are worthwhile being inquired into will be addressed in a successful inquiry. Because of this, it is likely that most or all participants would become interested in the content of the dialogue as it was generated by the interests of the participants themselves.

Let's revisit the three friends featured at the beginning of this chapter. The three friends who come together for the purpose of conversation may turn their conversation on wedding flowers towards identity and hence their connection moves from one based on friendship and equilibrium to fellowship, based on dialogue. This is Bohm's point about dialogue. While some critics have argued against Bohm on this issue, theorists and practitioners who have continued with Bohm's work on dialogue have found that participants do eventually engage in effective dialogue. Because there is no agenda, topics for dialogue can be many and varied. For Bohm, the group chooses the topic based on what is meaningful that comes out of conversation. Bohm notes that by having no set purpose this allows for topics that are meaningful to naturally make their way into the conversation that leads to dialogue. Bohm essentially shows us that a conversation may not remain as a 'mere conversation' but that it may be facilitated towards something more meaningful. We must therefore find an approach to agenda setting that allows for topics that resonate with the participants if we are to have proper connections to what we are inquiring into.

Bohm is important to our definition of connective thinking because he places reflection at the forefront of dialogue rather than as a 'meta-dialogue'. It *is* the dialogue. If we are to have a model of collective thought that gives rise to an awakened attentiveness to our own assumptions within the connections we have with others, then Bohm is integral to the connections that we should be making in a Socratic classroom.

The Community of Inquiry

According to Sharp (2004) Lipman has not given enough attention to caring thinking in the Community of Inquiry. She argues that while Lipman recognises the role of care in the Community of Inquiry, it is not given the same level of description and importance in Lipman's theory of educational philosophy than the other dimensions of multi-dimensional thinking. However, in the second edition of *Thinking in Education* Lipman made several substantial and significant revisions, including a full chapter devoted to caring thinking, and its relationship to critical and creative thinking. It appears that Sharp's concentration of caring thinking had an effect on Lipman. Nevertheless, Lipman's approach to caring thinking needs clarification.

Lipman (2004) offers five criteria for caring thinking, which he calls value-principles. They are: (1) appreciative thinking, (2) affective thinking, (3) active thinking, (4) normative thinking, and (5) empathic thinking. The criteria are intended to be used as an inventory of varieties of caring thinking rather than a precise definition, which he states he is not in a position to offer. He does mention that caring unavoidably creates a struggle to balance our propensity toward

emotional discriminations and our normative tendencies to place all humans on an equal standing (p.264). I think Lipman is correct in his stipulation, but it is the continual process of finding this balance which suggests to me that caring thinking is something more than what Lipman suggests on his inventory. For me this is pedagogical caring which is a kind of connective thinking, or at least underpinned by it. It is connective thinking because it links all of Lipman's categories.

First on the rank of Lipman's inventory is appreciative thinking. By appreciative thinking, he means paying attention to the things that matter. Examples of appreciative thinking are doctors who care for health, or judges who care for the law, and relevant to our discussion teachers who care for education. These people are in a position of care, who attend to what matters to them rather than act out of an emotional attachment or connection. Appreciative thinking could be said to be a feature of pedagogical caring. That is to say, teachers who care for education attend to what matters to them as professionals, for example, the development of social and intellectual dispositions and capacities required for active citizenship. But they do this because of the concern for the education of students generally. Similarly, participants in a dialogue who care for inquiry attend to what matters to them as a group not because they care for anyone in particular but because they are motivated out of their concern for the topic.

Affective thinking connects the affective and the cognitive. Some emotions are themselves judgments, or to put it another way the emotion itself has judgment built into it. Some examples are: guilt, shame, indignation, pity, and sympathy. These emotions carry with them an awareness of the event or action that prompted the emotion. Lipman claims that affective thinking is important for moral education. To this there can be no doubt. However, without pedagogical caring, i.e., being a teacher who cares for education and pays attention to what is required to meet the goals of education, teaching runs the risk of being tainted with inappropriate judgments in any given context. Connective thinking, i.e., making connection to broaden the scope of our thinking, allows teachers to judge what is or what is not misplaced emotion within the context of education.

Active thinking has an inbuilt reflective component that connects action and caring. According to Lipman, when talking about care in terms of caring *for* or *about*, this means having an affectionate feeling for someone that this is affective thinking. However, when we use the term caring *for* in the sense of taking care or looking after someone this is better described as active thinking. It is active because it is a way of thinking that implies an action. What mediates thinking and action is judgment. The judgment is an appraisal of the situation and how one feels about it. Pedagogical caring can assist in preventing us from acting in ways that are not pedagogically appropriate, meaning that when we are caring for the inquiry or for the problem deemed worthy then it is appropriate to act accordingly, as we are caring for something because we aim to calculate its worth as educationally useful. However, this is not so when we care for others as it could result in taking care of students or looking after them in ways that have no pedagogical value. Pedagogical caring asks teachers to think about the

situation differently as caring with others. This still implies action, but a different kind of action. It requires empathy and caring for the things they care for as a group, caring for outcomes, and other things considered educationally valuable.

Normative thinking refers to caring conduct; that someone who cares about something would behave in a certain way. It is thinking about what we ought to do. Since it is reflective it is also cognitive. It makes us pay attention to how we act in the world and makes us reflect on the sort of person we would like to be, or more importantly who we ought to be. Normative thinking, therefore, has a crucial role to play in pedagogical caring. Pedagogical caring, by definition, is defined by its attention to the role of ethics, i.e., it asks us as professionals to reflect on what it means to be a professional in an educational context, and to pay attention to what matters in regard to teaching practices. It is therefore underpinned by appreciative thinking. Normative thinking is also crucial to the progress of the dialogue as it facilitates the social aspects of engaging in dialogue.

Empathic thinking is about putting ourselves in another person's situation in order to experience that situation and the emotions as if they are our own. I note that under empathic thinking Lipman lists 'sympathetic'. This is a contentious use of the term. Whereas empathy is to consider how others might feel in a given situation or vicarious experience of another's emotions, sympathy evokes an emotional response toward another person. Empathy is caring *with* someone, to feel as they do. Sympathy is both caring *for* someone, meaning having an affectionate feeling, and caring *about* someone, meaning a sense of wanting to look after them or aid them in some way. Empathy is necessary for pedagogical caring, as it can broaden our understanding of the different way in which different people experience situations, but it also makes a logical connection as it allows us to compare and contrast situations, to see things analogously. Again, pedagogical caring helps teachers to discern between misplaced emotions that arise out of affection for someone or a wanting to look after them, and empathy.

Because of Lipman's emphasis on multi-dimensional thinking, connective thinking has a ready-made place in the Community of Inquiry. While is it right at home in Bohmian Dialogue, in the Community of Inquiry it has a natural connecting role. Connective thinking compels students to follow the argument where it leads by caring for the inquiry, caring with others, and caring for the problems deemed worthy. It requires participants to think appreciatively, to pay attention to matters of concern, especially important in relation to caring for the problems deemed worthy. Normative thinking is also vital to connective thinking as that is what we are doing when we care with others. Empathy is another crucial element of connective thinking, and is central to caring for the inquiry. In order to develop innovative thinking and to care for the logic of inquiry, including the content and form of the dialogue, requires a level of empathetic thinking when welcoming, respecting, and considering other people's point of view, or considering alternatives. Connective thinking by its very nature is complex as it makes existing connections, links new pathways, but also discovers

new ones. The educational setting within which it operates is facilitated by: collective thinking, connecting people and ideas; an impersonal fellowship, caring with others; and awakened attentiveness, and being aware of our intersubjective connection to others.

Socratic Dialogue

Connective thinking can be easily identified in the beginning stages of Socratic Dialogue. Firstly, a number of participants must volunteer a personal experience that acts as an example for the topic question. Entering into dialogue brings with it some level of risk, but particularly in Socratic Dialogue, where the information we give up can be personal and in some cases, can be emotional. In order to feel able to take that risk, trust must already be present in the group in order for the environment to be intellectually safe. Such an environment could be described as an impersonal fellowship. In an impersonal fellowship, we may trust that others will take the same sort of risk and in doing so that these experiences will be accepted with the same respect that is given to them.

Secondly, participants must choose an example from the volunteered experiences. We have already acknowledged that volunteering an example involves some kind of risk for the participant. When each example is scrutinised, it must be done with a level of sensitivity, but in keeping with the process of dialogue, it is done with the intention to further the dialogue. In order to find the example, to allow for a genuine dialogue, participants must act both through a connection with the process of inquiry and through connections of other participants in the group. That is to say, if we have a connection to the dialogue we care with others in the dialogue, and subsequently provide a safe intellectual environment for rigorous inquiry. Each example must be examined carefully in order to provide a foundation as a focus for dialogue. This is paramount for the progress of the dialogue. Unlike friendship, which can act as an obstacle to genuine dialogue, an impersonal fellowship keeps us intellectually rigorous.

The idea of an impersonal fellowship underpins collective thinking and goes someway to define the relationship that participants can expect in a Socratic Dialogue. While participants should not be concerned over the impact that dialogue could have on the feelings of others, lest we avoid any sensitive topics, these feelings should be taken into consideration. Respect must be shown to each participant who has volunteered an example and this respect must be retained throughout the dialogue. Showing respect is integral to the wellbeing of the participants and the health of the inquiry, as in the long term trust can be built that will allow participants to feel comfortable in the future to volunteer their examples. In other words, an impersonal fellowship can contribute to the creation of an intellectually safe environment, which in an inquiry where logical rigor and consensus is demanded, is necessary.

In some variations of Socratic Dialogue participants have the opportunity to break into meta-dialogue. The purpose of the meta-dialogue is to resolve any problems, differences, or confusions that arise from the relationships between the participants in the dialogue. This is integral to creation of an intellectually safe

environment. Moreover, because Socratic Dialogue requires a deep level of rigor throughout the dialogue, which means that participants have to explore each of the disagreements, an emphasis on connective thinking is imperative. What is required is a commitment to collective thinking in order to sustain the rigor required to come to consensus, but also in order to 'weather the storm', so to speak, when students have to examine their disagreements deeply.

WHERE ARE WE NOW?

Before moving on to the next chapter we need to pause for a moment to review where we are. In Chapter 4 we saw that generative thinking, which is the pulse of creative thinking, is concerned with the generation, development and extension of ideas that comes out of wonder. Subsequently, Chapter 5 focussed on evaluative thinking, which is central to critical thinking, is concerned with reasoning and analysis, criteria and judgment. So, what have we said about caring thinking in this chapter? There are three characteristics: (1) collective thinking, (2) impersonal fellowship, and (3) awakened attentiveness, common to caring thinking. Connective thinking is central to the meaning of these three characteristics. Therefore, connective thinking is necessary for effective caring thinking. We also identified where connective thinking fits into a multi-dimensional framework for Socratic pedagogy by demonstrating how it can be applied to each of the models of dialogue in order to gain a better understanding of its practical application.

We can extrapolate from the analysis in this chapter that connective thinking, in relation to multi-dimensional thinking, is best described by Bohm's model of dialogue. Bohmian Dialogue embeds the principle of connection to others, an awareness of self, and attendance to thought, all represented by the metaphor of a collective dance of the mind. Because Bohmian Dialogue has a concentration on the connective elements of dialogue, it has much to contribute to the development of connective thinking in Socratic pedagogy. It is suffice to say that by acknowledging connective thinking as the defining feature of caring thinking it illustrates the connections between the intellectual and social aspects of dialogue.

Connective thinking connects much more than just relationships between people. It sets standards by engaging in normative thinking, analogous reasoning, empathy, and attentive awareness through listening and questioning. In concert with generative thinking connective thinking creates new ways of making connections. It connects the social with the mental, the generative and evaluative aspects of thinking, the cognitive and the affective, risk and trust, and rationality and empathy. Lipman's description below offers a context from which connective thinking flows.

> [E]very mental act actualizes a mental move; every thinking skill actualizes a thinking move; every connection of mental acts has already been made possible as a mental association or bridging. In other words, any particular thinker is the site of an enormous number of paths, roadways, avenues, and boulevards that crisscross the terrain that is already familiar through constant

use, and that suggests hitherto unrelated connections or clusters of connections to those adventurous thinkers who are looking to explore new terrains. Due to ignorance or prejudice, certain connections are deemed unachievable or improbable, but often it is just these that the inventive or creative or imaginative mind will select for a breakthrough. (2004, p.255)

This passage by Lipman describes what it means to think beyond the familiar, to see good thinking as more than evaluative thinking. Good thinking also requires generative thinking to make intellectual connections that would otherwise not be made possible by evaluative thinking alone. But it is connective thinking that makes this possible as it is the social dimension of thinking. Because we think together in dialogue, through wondering and evaluation we are able to make the familiar strange and see old patterns in new ways. Without connective thinking we will, as Bohm says, remain fragmented in both our thinking and in our social connections.

We are now ready to move on to the final chapter where I shall outline the framework for Socratic pedagogy.

NOTES

[1] For more on Kohlberg, see *Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I: The Philosophy of Moral Development, 1981.*
[2] For more on pedagogical care, see Davey (2004, 2005).
[3] For further exploration of this idea, see Mia O'Brien who argues that students do have an awareness of their own ways of knowing and reflect on ways of learning (2000).
[4] The characteristics as listed under each of the categories are: (1) alert listening for clues to understand the context of the community, constantly reminding and reshaping self and others, and an attitude of openness and willingness for genuine inquiry, (2) asking questions, giving reasons, commenting on the whole group, listening attentively and actively, using silence for listening and thinking, and not opting out of discussion, (3) being open to possibilities and different perspectives, exploring disagreements, helping each other build on ideas, responding to the idea and not the person, and openness to alternatives, and (4) accepting fair criticism, being prepared to have ideas challenged, and being precise not vague (Burgh, Field & Freakley, 2006, p.113).
[5] See Lipman (1988); Cam (1995).
[6] Trust is not a new concept to the history of philosophy. Plato's 'Gyges' Ring' suggests that morality is being able to trust in one another that we will all act ethically in times of invisibility. Thomas Hobbes' idea of 'social contract' is one based on setting up conditions to enable trust in the community.
[7] The idea of an impersonal fellowship was originally used to describe the early form of Athenian democracy in which all the free men of the city gathered to govern themselves (Bohm, Factor & Garrett, 1991).
[8] Bohm argues that we should try to distance ourselves from our deeply held opinions and notice how these have been formed rather than try to argue them.