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PRACTITIONER REFLECTION AND JUDGEMENT AS PHRONESIS:

A Continuum of Reflection and Considerations for Phronetic Judgement

INTRODUCTION

Dominant conceptions of professional knowledge appear to have largely forgotten Aristotle's conception of phronesis and its place in considerations of what it means to know in professional life. Aristotle draws attention to *phronesis* as a form of reflective practical wisdom that complements *techne*, technically oriented approaches, and *episteme*, scientifically oriented approaches, in considerations of what it might mean to develop and enact professional knowledge.

This chapter proposes an elaboration of Donald Schön's reflective practice in light of Aristotle's phronesis. Beginning with the seminal work of Schön, I argue for a reinvigoration of phronesis through attention to a continuum of reflection and practitioner judgement in professional practice. Reflection is considered along a continuum that includes Schön's intentional and embodied reflection, and extends the notions of reflection to attend to phenomenological reflection and critical reflexivity. Also explored are the implicit criteria by which practitioners might make phronetic judgements in professional practice. Thinking of reflection as a continuum, and making explicit the criteria by which practitioners might make phronetic judgements, offers a generative framework for thinking about how reflection and judgement are implicated in the development of professional knowledge characterised as phronesis.

PHRONESIS

Aristotle highlighted three orientations or dispositions to knowledge: episteme, techne, and phronesis. *Episteme* is characterised as scientific, universal, invariable, context-independent knowledge. *Techne* is characterised as context-dependent, pragmatic craft knowledge and is oriented toward practical rationality governed by conscious goals. *Phronesis* is sometimes referred to as practical wisdom or practical rationality. Phronesis is defined in different ways but usually in ways that imply the significance of reflection, both tacit and explicit; that highlight a relationship to morality; and that convey a relationship between reflection and action. Phronesis emphasises reflection (both deliberative and that revealed through action) as a means to inform wise action, to assist one to navigate the variable contexts of practice, and as directed toward the ends of practical wisdom.

Table 1. Continuum of Reflection

Receptive Reflection	*Intentional Reflection*	*Embodied Reflection*	*Reflexivity*
Intuition	Thought	Action	Interrogation
Poetic worldmaking	Constructivist; individual worldmaking	Located/situated worldmaking	Social constructivist; social praxis & language in worldmaking
Pre-reflective world	Neutral pragmatic world	Contextual world	Sociality of world reference
Meaning – revealed, received autopoesis	Meaning – individually constructed	Meaning – in actions	Meaning – socially negotiated
Being	Thinking	Doing	Deconstructing & becoming
Raw material for reflection and reflexivity	Reflects on personal experience, evidence and technique	Reflects in/on actions	Reflects on social nature of knowledge construction
A-rational Contemplative	Rational	Embodied	Critical/skeptical Performative
Intuition Insight Emotion Wonder	Reason Cognition	Action Behaviour Body	Intersubjective Discursive Performative Power Relations
Implicit theories	Espoused theories of practice	Theories-in-use	Sociality, historicity of theory formation
Presence	Monologic	Monologic/dialogic	Dialogic
Connection to 'Other' through connection to self	Connection to 'Other' through thought	Connection to 'Other' through action	Connection to 'Other' through dialogue
Present to action	Examined action	Tacit action Intelligent action	Socially informed, critical, thoughtful action
Receptive knowing Aesthetic/poetic knowing	Knowing that	Knowing how Knowing-in-action	Deconstructing knowing

In the scholarship of contemporary professional education, Donald Schön is a key thinker. His writings on reflective practice (1983, 1987) are widely considered to be the most influential works produced in professional education in recent years (Eraut, 1995). Donald Schön critiques the predominant emphasis on technical rationality as the *modus operandi* for the generation of professional knowledge. He points out that the failure, of what Aristotle might call episteme and techne, to deliver solutions to complex contemporary problems has created a crisis of confidence in the professions. In response, Schön calls for a new epistemology, one rooted in reflection both in and on practice, and one that recognizes the messy, complex, and conflicted nature of practice itself (see Kinsella, 2007a, 2007b, 2009, 2010, for elaboration). This way of conceiving of professional knowledge, as garnered through reflection in and on practice, has much to commend it and might be argued to have much in common with what Aristotle had in mind when he conceived of professional knowledge as phronesis.

In this chapter, I examine conceptions of reflection in Donald Schön's theory of reflective practice and the implicit criteria he identifies as important for practitioner judgement. I argue that in the interest of phronesis, Schön's conception of reflection is important, but that it does not go far enough. I propose an elaboration of ways of thinking about reflection as a means of thinking about how reflection might be thought about in the interests of phronesis. In addition, I explicate the criteria that Schön implies practitioners use to make professional judgements, and propose three additional criteria that practitioners might consider in making judgements oriented toward phronesis in professional life.

Whatever else phronesis might be, we can safely say that it involves reflection. In addition, it involves a disposition toward certain kinds of judgements, which Kemmis, in Chapter 11, suggests cannot be taught. I wonder if by making more explicit the criteria by which practitioners make judgements, and by encouraging the conscious adoption of criteria oriented toward phronetic ideals, practitioners might move toward phronetic judgements in professional practice. What criteria might we consider when using reflection to make judgements and to discern action oriented toward phronesis? If phronesis cannot be explicitly taught, might the disposition toward phronesis be encouraged, and the modes of thinking that work against it be revealed?

A CONTINUUM OF REFLECTION

This chapter proposes a continuum of reflection for phronesis in professional life. Such a continuum includes central dimensions of Schön's conceptions of reflection, yet extends Schön's view in two directions: first toward a deeper consideration of the inner life of the practitioner, and second toward a more rigorous interrogation of the sociality of world reference (see Table 1). This chapter considers two domains of reflection evident in Schön's work—intentional reflection and embodied reflection—and proposes an elaboration along two domains significant for professional life—receptive reflection and reflexivity. Bill Green (personal communication, May 11, 2009) has suggested that this continuum

might be thought of as a pulsating quadrant in which any piece might overlap with another at any time; I concur with this insight. While each dimension is presented separately for purposes of discussion, they are viewed as interrelated and interwoven and joined through what Sandywell (1996) characterises as an interminable, dialogic praxis.

Intentional Reflection

Intentional reflection is depicted in the second column of Table 1. Schön (1992) states that in the midst of writing *The Reflective Practitioner,* he realised he was reworking Dewey's theory of inquiry by adopting *reflective practice* as his own version of Dewey's *reflective thought* (p. 123). Many articles about reflective practice recognise the legacy of Dewey's work in Schön's theory, and include a description of reflection that draws on Dewey, usually citing one of two classic books: *How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process* (1933) or *Experience and Education* (1938). Schön (1992) acknowledges his debt both to Dewey's thought and to the link Dewey put forth between intentional reflection and intentional action.

Dewey (1933) explains the concept of reflection in terms of reflective thought, which he describes as "active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in light of the grounds that support it and further conclusion to which it tends" (p. 9). According to Dewey, reflective thought "converts action that is merely appetitive, blind and impulsive into intelligent action" (p. 17). In this way, Dewey articulates, and lays the ground for, a link between *intentional reflection* and *intelligent action*, which is also found in the work of Schön.

Schön integrates intentional reflection with action in three of his pivotal constructs: reflective practice, reflection-in-action, and reflection-on-action. In each instance, reflection occurs in and on actions that occur in practice, in a dialectic fashion. Schön (1983) describes reflective practice as a dialectic process in which thought and action are integrally linked. It is a "dialogue of thinking and doing through which I become…more skillful" (Schön, 1987, p. 31). While *reflective practice* is his umbrella term, *reflection-in-action* and *reflection-on-action* are distinguished by their temporality; the first occurs in the midst of practice, whereas the latter occurs retrospectively. Schön (1992) contends that reflection-in-action is central to the artistry of competent practitioners who conduct on-the-spot experiments in what he calls the action-present. He notes that this process need not employ the medium of words. Schön likens the process of reflection-in-action to that of a jazz pianist's improvisation of a melody or a basketball player's instant manoeuvring in response to a surprising move by an opponent. Reflection-on-action, is more closely aligned with Arendt's (1971) "stop-and-think"; here, thought turns back on itself in relation to the action carried out by the practitioner, and thereby has the potential to influence future action (Schön, 1992). In summary, the concepts of reflective practice and reflection-on-action may each be seen as invoking, and reflection-in-action may be seen as

partially invoking, a form of *intentional rationality* which may be characterised as a mode of *intentional reflection* on the part of the practitioner.

The emphasis on *intentional reflection* of the practitioner is further emphasised in the constructivist underpinnings of reflective practice. Schön draws on the work of Nelson Goodman (1978) to emphasise a constructivist orientation (Kinsella, 2006). Constructivists generally agree that knowledge is constructed, at least in part, through a process of reflection; that cognitive structures are activated in the process of construction; that cognitive structures are under continual development; that purposive activity induces transformation of those structures; and that the environment presses the organism to adapt (Noddings, 1990). Constructivists are concerned with the ways that worlds are made. Goodman argues that the symbols we construct inform the facts that we find and structure our understanding of them (Elgin, 2000). According to his famous dictum, worlds are made, not found. Such making involves active intentional reflection on the part of the *worldmaker*. The constructivist underpinnings of reflective practice therefore appear to inform what may be characterised as an intentional form of reflection.

Embodied Reflection

In this section, I consider locations wherein Schön explores ways of engaging in reflection that are outside of the realm of intentional reflection. These reflections are depicted as *embodied* modes of reflection because they arise in the embodied experience of the practitioner and are revealed in action (see Kinsella, 2007b, for an extended discussion). Embodied reflection is depicted in the third column of Table 1. In addition to discussing intentional reflection and its relationship to professional knowledge, Schön notes that skillful practice may also reveal a kind of knowing that does not stem from a prior intellectual operation but is revealed through intelligent action (knowing-how), or tacit knowledge. The influence of philosophers Michael Polanyi (1967) and Gilbert Ryle (1949) can be seen in the development of these ideas. Both Polanyi and Ryle challenge conceptions of knowledge that recognise only propositional knowledge. Polanyi focuses on that which people are unable to say, knowledge that is *tacit*, whereas Ryle is concerned with overcoming dualities between mind and body. He links intelligence and action through *knowing-how*.

Tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1967) and knowing-how (Ryle, 1949) are central themes in Schön's constructs of *theories-in-use* and *knowing-in-action*, and are briefly considered below. In *The Tacit Dimension*, Polanyi (1967) sets out to "reconsider human knowledge" by starting from the assumption that "we can know more than we can tell" (p. 4). A famous example of tacit knowledge frequently used by Schön (1983, 1987) is that of face recognition. Polanyi observes that we can know a person's face and can recognise that face among a million faces, yet we usually cannot tell *how* we recognise a face we know. So, most of this knowledge cannot be put into words.

Schön refers to tacit knowledge in his early work with Argyris (1992/1974), in which they examine the implications of tacit knowledge for professional practice.

In *Theory in Practice*, the terms *implicit knowledge* and *tacit knowledge* are used interchangeably, and are taken to mean that "we know more that we can tell and more than our behaviour consistently shows" (1992/1974, p. 10). Argyris and Schön contend that tacit knowledge is particularly useful for understanding theories-in-use. In their view, each practitioner develops a theory of practice, whether or not he or she is aware of it. Such a theory is composed of both explicit knowledge, what one is able to say about what one knows, and theories-in-use, which may be unconscious and are revealed through behaviour. Theories-in-use tend to be tacit structures whose relation to actions can be compared to the relationship of grammar-in-use to speech; theories-in-use contain assumptions about self, others, and environment, which constitute a microcosm of everyday life (pp. 29–30), and may have both negative and positive elements.

Philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1949) seeks to dispel what he refers to as 'Cartesian dualism,' which he contends sets up a dualism between body and mind. Ryle states that the exercise of intelligence cannot be analysed by first considering operations with the mind and then executing them with the body; rather, the mind and body are much more integrated. Ryle resists dualistic thinking with respect to the separation of activities of the mind and activities of the body by directing attention to the 'doings' of persons, such as playing chess, knot-tying, car-driving, theorising, and other activities. Ryle finds mind revealed *in* the doings of persons, doings that are explainable by the doer's aims, not by 'ghostly' inner causes. He writes:

> The statement 'the mind is its own place' as theorists might construe it, is not true, for the mind is not even a metaphorical 'place.' On the contrary, the chessboard, the platform, the scholar's desk, the judge's bench, the lory-driver's seat, the studio and the football field are among its places. These are where people work or play stupidly or intelligently. 'Mind' is not the name of another person, working or frolicking behind an impenetrable screen; it is not the name of another place where work is done or games are played; and it is not the name of another tool with which work is done, or another appliance with which games are played. (Ryle, 1949, p. 51)

One can see resonances of these ideas in Schön's *knowing-in-action*. Schön (1987) coins the term *knowing-in-action* to refer to the sorts of know-how revealed in intelligent action, in such publicly observable, physical performances as riding a bicycle and in such private operations as an instant analysis of a balance sheet. In these situations, according to Schön, the knowing is *in* the action and is revealed by spontaneous, skillful execution of the performance, which one is characteristically unable to make verbally explicit (Schön, 1987, p. 25). With respect to knowing-in-action, Schön (1983) points out that "although we sometimes think before acting, it is also true that in much of the spontaneous behaviour of skillful practice we reveal a kind of knowing which does not stem from a prior intellectual operation" (p. 51). Implicit within this knowing-in-action, which does not stem from a prior intellectual action, is a tacit dimension, an implicit *knowing-how*. Rather than invoking intentional reflection, knowing-in-action and theories-in-use illuminate a

different kind of reflection, revealed in knowing-how, which is characterised for the purposes of this discussion as *embodied reflection*.

Because tacit knowledge and knowing-how are revealed in the actions, the doings, of the individual practitioner, I suggest they may be characterised as *embodied modes of reflection* (see Kinsella, 2007b, for an elaboration), distinct from the intentional mode highlighted earlier. Through his conceptions of *knowing-in-action*, *theories-in-use*, and partially through *reflection-in-action*, Schön invokes this type of embodied reflection, and attends to the duality, with respect to a separation of mind and body, that has frequently been re-inscribed following Descartes.

Receptive Reflection

Although Schön elaborates beyond intentional reflection by highlighting an embodied dimension, a duality continues to exist between the modes of reflection to which Schön refers, and the pre-reflective experience (Greene, 1995; Merleau-Ponty, 1967; Sandywell, 1996), receptive reflection (Willis, 1999), or contemplative reflection (Miller, 1994) depicted by others. Receptive reflection is depicted in the left-hand column in Table 1.

Willis (1999) makes a distinction between active/reductive and intuitive/receptive modes of reflection. He observes that the more one thinks about it, the more one is confronted with a proactive and a contemplative dimension. In the proactive stance, a thinker takes in and names experiences, orders them, and locates them into categories of language and ways of seeing the world. Willis contrasts this stance with an intuitive/contemplative stance, which highlights receptive and aesthetic ways of attending to the world. The receptive stance holds back discriminatory analytic thinking, in favour of a more contemplative process, in which the mind acts more like a receptor, receiving ideas, images, and feelings, and being moved by them. In a receptive stance, "the mind does not seize upon the object to analyse and subdue it but attempts to behold it, to allow its reality, its beauty and its texture to become more and more present" (p. 98). This approach "holds the thinking mind back from closure and returns again and again to behold the object, allowing words and images to emerge from the contemplative engagement" (p. 98). Willis makes a useful distinction between intentional reflection and the type of reflection that emerges from receptivity or contemplation.

With respect to this notion of receptive reflection, physicist David Bohm's (2003) ideas are of interest. He discusses the way in which thought can generate illusions, and suggests the possibility of moving beyond this illusion-generating structure to what he refers to as a "response from the emptiness." He writes:

> When one internally imitates an illusion-generating structure, one is thereby immediately lost in illusion, so that whatever one does is worse than useless. Therefore, what is called for is an ending of the response of thought, which is too mechanical. Rather, what is needed is response from the emptiness, which sees the structure of illusion generation, without imitating this structure. (p. 234)

Bohm (2003) uses the analogy of the mind as an ocean that is stirred up and stormy on the surface but peaceful at the bottom. He suggests:

> The mind may have a structure similar to the universe, and in the underlying movement we call empty space there is actually a tremendous energy, a movement. The particular forms which appeal in the mind may be analogous to the particles, and getting to the ground of the mind might be felt as light. The essential point is not that it's light but rather this free, penetrating movement of the whole. (p.157)

MacInnes (2001) observes receptive reflection through meditation. She suggests that in meditation "we endeavour to stop linear thinking, even to avoid entertaining random thoughts, and all such mental activities" (p. 83). Such an approach complements intentional forms of reflection. MacInnes views meditation as a process in which individuals "disengage the Psyche from all its busy-ness" (p. 83), a shift she describes as gargantuan in today's world, where she characterises an "overactive mind" as the "disease" of our times (p. 77). She believes that the non-thinking state achieved in meditation gives our whole being freedom to experience a deep sense of unity and the freedom to "do its thing" (p. 22). Thus, according to this perspective, the insight achieved in meditation and the practice of disengagement from the mind have the potential to inform action in a new way.

Miller argues that Schön's reflective practice, while valuable, continues to perpetuate dualities, whereas contemplative modes of reflection focus on overcoming such. Miller contrasts Being, a concept rooted in Heidegger's (1962) philosophy, with intentional reflection:

> Being is experienced as unmediated awareness. This awareness is characterized by openness, a sense of relatedness, and by awe and wonder….When we experience Being, duality drops away and as teachers we see part of ourselves in our students. At the deepest level we may experience brief moments of communion with our students. (Miller, 1994, p. 25)

Others focus on the arts as a vehicle for uncovering such prereflective or receptive landscapes. As educational philosopher Greene (1995) notes, engagement with the arts "may provoke us to recall that rationality is itself grounded in something prerational, prereflective—perhaps in a primordial, perceived landscape" (p. 52). Drawing on Merleau-Ponty (1964), Greene suggests that the prereflective—that is, what we perceive before we reflect on it—becomes the launching pad for rationality. She contends that we must take account of our own landscapes if we are to be truly present to ourselves and engage in authentic relationships. It is on "primordial ground that we recognize each other; that ground on which we are in direct touch with things and not separated from them by the conceptual lenses of constructs and theories" (p. 75).

Schön attends to an intentional cognitive type of reflection and an embodied type of reflection revealed in action, yet never explores the significance of receptive reflection to practice. He hints at related concepts, such as the tacit, artistic, intuitive performance of successful practitioners, yet never fully confronts this realm.

With respect to professional action and the busyness of practice, I wonder about the relevance of receptive reflection as an opening for new ways of seeing and for informing wise action. To what extent can the capacity to disengage from what MacInnes (2001) calls the disease of our times, an overactive mind, contribute to how practitioners might reframe the problems of practice and discern wise action in practice? What, I wonder, is lost by failing to acknowledge receptive reflection in professional practice? How might attention to receptive reflection inform other modes of reflection and offer hope for contributing to practice environments that are more humane and that transcend purely instrumentalist ideals?

Reflexivity

Reflexivity is depicted in the right-hand column of Table 1. Schön (1992) states that Dewey "never fully confronts the *ontological* differences in our ways of seeing situations and construing them as problematic or not" (pp. 122–123, italics in original). Some social theorists might say something similar of Schön: that he fails to attend to reflexivity. Social theorists might argue that Schön never fully confronts the ontological implications of the agent as embedded in social, cultural, historical, and linguistic communities, and the implications of such for ways of seeing situations and construing them as problems or not. In other words, although Schön acknowledges that we each have different ways of seeing situations and constructing the world, he does not appear to fully acknowledge the background and social conditions that implicitly influence and contribute to our ways of seeing, what Kemmis (2005) refers to as the extra-individual features of practice; nor does he direct practitioners' attention to a critical consideration of such background conditions. Rather, drawing on Nelson Goodman's (1978) constructivist ideas in *Ways of Worldmaking,* Schön focuses attention on individual constructions (Kinsella, 2006) in his epistemology of practice.

Schön takes Goodman's ideas about the ways in which worlds are made and applies these ideas to considerations about the world of professional practice. Underlying this notion of worldmaking, in the work of both men, is a constructivist orientation that emphasises individual reflection as opposed to social constructions, and focuses on viability within the subject's experiential world. The practitioner in this account tests out actions for their fit within the system within which he or she participates. Thus, in Schön's conception, within a particular created world, he suggests one can discover the consequences of one's moves, make inferences, and establish by experiment whether one's way of framing the situation is indeed appropriate. An implicit assumption in this approach is a focus on the individual person as the locus of meaning construction.

While individual reflection is important, one of the critiques of reflective practice is its focus on the individual practitioner's constructions of knowledge without adequately attending to the material, social, or discursive dimensions of practice knowledge (Kemmis, 2005). In this way, reflective practice relies primarily on the practitioner's own resources (Taylor & White, 2000). Yet, professional practice occurs within a variety of communities (Wenger, 1998) and is shaped by

social relations and discursive codifications (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Kemmis, 2005; Taylor, 2003; Taylor & White, 2000).

Inherent in this tension is the question of how meaning is constructed. The words of philosopher Merleau-Ponty (1967) are striking: "because we are in the world, we are *condemned* to meaning" (p. xix, italics added). In professional practice, too, we are *condemned* to meaning; therefore, the question of how meaning is constituted is significant. Is meaning constructed within the solitary practitioner? To what extent is meaning construction a dialogic or social process? How are constructions of meaning influenced by historical conditions, contexts, and discursive practices?

Philosopher Richard Kearney (1988) highlights the intersubjective nature of meaning construction. He argues that meaning "does not originate within the narrow chambers of its own subjectivity, but emerges as a response to the *other*, as radical interdependence" (p. 387). Does reflective practice, with its focus on practitioner subjectivity and worldmaking, have the potential to occlude this "response to the other" in the construction of meaning? In Sandywell's (1999) view, this is indeed a danger; he believes that individual reflection can fail to consider the accounts of 'Others.' Sandywell notes that, since Descartes, cognition appears as a type of inner contemplation, conducted by the solitary meditator, and is distinct from older dialogical views of existence, which, he suggests, have been displaced in favour of a proprietary conception of objects constituted through acts of introspective cognition (Sandywell, 1999). Solitary reflection, according to Sandywell, carries with it the danger of objectifying the other. In response, he proposes a form of dialogic reflexivity. Sandywell (1996) observes that "whereas reflection posits a neutral world of entities, reflexivity reminds reflection of the sociality of all world reference" (p. xiv). He notes:

> In day-to-day living we plan and negotiate our ordinary affairs against a relatively fixed background of pregiven relations and structures whose origins and workings are not typically subject to critical reflection. As finite beings we are even unaware that the narratives we use to describe the world actively constitute its otherness as intelligible 'experience'. Yet by virtue of their located and embedded character, forms of world-interpretation are in principle revisable constructs. (p. xiii)

Thus, Sandywell highlights the social nature of worldmaking implicit in its located and embedded character. Whereas Schön and Goodman might agree with the located and embedded nature of worldmaking, their focus is on the individual agent's activity as opposed to considering the 'sociality' of world reference that Sandywell highlights.

With respect to a social dimension to worldmaking, Bohm (1996) points out that thought is both a collective and an individual process. He writes:

> We could consider two kinds of thoughts—individual and collective. Individually I can think of various things, but a great deal of thought is what we do together. In fact most of it comes from the collective background. Language is collective. Most of our basic assumptions come from our

society, including all our assumptions about how society works, about what sort of person we are supposed to be, and about relationships, institutions, and so on. Therefore we need to pay attention to thought both individually and collectively. (p. 11)

This view has significant implications for considerations of how meaning is constructed in practice. Attending solely to individual thought, as in the thought of the practitioner, becomes insufficient without a consideration of the collective background. Rather, it becomes important to attend also to the collective thought that implicitly informs the backdrop to the process of an individual's worldmaking in practice.

In addition, even the construction of disciplinary knowledge has itself been portrayed as a social process (Harding, 1991; Kuhn, 1962, 1977). Although Schön appears to acknowledge the role of applied science and technique in the education of professionals, and to critique the unreflective application of such, he does not emphasise practitioner 'reflexivity,' defined by social philosopher Sandywell (1996) as "the act of interrogating interpretive systems" (p. xiv). Reflexivity goes beyond reflection to interrogate the very conditions under which knowledge claims are accepted and constructed, and it recognises the sociality of that process. Sandywell writes:

Where reflective orientations tend to adopt an empiricist orientation to their world domains and a pragmatic attitude toward their own authority, reflexive perspectives approach first-order reality work as a constructive process. Reflection posits a neutral world of entities, reflexivity reminds reflection of the sociality of all world reference. (p. xiv)

According to Sandywell (1996), for reflection, objects are simply things; for reflexivity, however, things are materialised significations, the outcome of social constructions and translation procedures, and require critical interrogation (p. xvi). Epistemic reflexivity is a phrase used by Bourdieu (in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) to denote reflection and critical interrogation of the social conditions under which disciplinary knowledges come into being and gain credibility.

Greene (1995) describes this invisible process of signification using the metaphor of a noxious cloud—the "cloud of givenness." She writes that in the interpretive act,

we have to relate ourselves somehow to a social world that is polluted by something invisible and odorless, overhung by a sort of motionless cloud. It is the cloud of givenness, of what is considered 'natural' by those caught in the taken-for-granted, in the everydayness of things. (p. 47)

Greene (1995) notes communicative "distortions" (as defined by Habermas, 1971, p. 164) in the language of costs and benefits and in the language of instrumental reason by which phenomena are "explained" by powerful purveyors of an indecipherable reality of signs and symbols (p. 46). She laments that too few people are enabled to "crack the codes, to uncover that in which they are embedded" (p. 48). This is the goal of reflexivity, to enable practitioners to begin

to "crack the codes," to consider together the invisible cloud that pervades everyday life and everyday practice, and from this location to envision new possibilities together (Kinsella & Whiteford, 2009). Bohm (1996) refers to the need for relentless questioning of everything that does not make sense in all of one's given presuppositions, assumptions, and taken-for-granted knowledge. Sloan (1983) similarly claims that a major task of the education of professionals is to "create a climate of trust in which radical questioning can take place without fear" (p. 146). Sloan implies that this questioning should be in the context of service to the positive possibility of gaining new perceptions, and insights, as opposed to the endless spiralling of negative critique.

Thus, while Schön's concept of reflection focuses on individual constructions, it neglects to consider the materialised significations, the outcomes of social constructions and translation procedures, which Sandywell (1996) refers to as the sociality of world reference, in any depth.

An important example of the significance of reflexivity in the health professions is the type of radical questioning that is beginning to take place with respect to clinical trials funded by pharmaceutical companies. Recently increased media and professional attention has focused on the implications of privately funded clinical trials. The questioning of how such results are constructed and presented to physicians, and the implications for how pharmaceuticals come to be accepted and prescribed, is an example of critical reflexivity. Although Schön focuses on reflection, he does not go so far as to advocate this type of reflexivity.

Reflection: An Interminable Dialogue

Reflection and reflexivity do not, however, form the terms of a binary opposition. Indeed, Sandywell (1996) imagines a continuum between prereflective, reflective, and reflexive experience:

> Prereflective experience already contains the primitive forms of embodiment, tacit interpretations and imaginary formations which provide the horizon for more reflective systems of action. Human experience is to this extent an interminable dialogue between prereflective experience, reflective practices, and reflexive action. (p. xiv)

This interminable dialogue between different dimensions within a continuum of reflection are proposed as a central underpinning of how we might think of reflection as important for practical wisdom—phronesis—in professional life.

The proposed continuum of reflection retains Schön's intentional reflection and embodied reflection, as depicted in the two central columns of Table 1. However, a continuum of reflection also includes sensitivity to receptive modes of reflection, those open to revelation, intuition, emotion, aesthetics and contemplation, as depicted in the left-hand column of Table 1. Further, attention is drawn to reflexivity (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), in the sense of critical discernment of the social conditions under which disciplinary knowledges are constructed, and an ongoing interrogation of these conditions. As such, the practitioner oriented toward practical

wisdom is cognisant of the extra-individual features of practice (Kemmis, 2005); the role of power, discourse, and intersubjectivity in the construction of 'versions of reality' in practice; and mindful of the imperative of reflexive attention and dialogue in this regard. Reflexivity is depicted in the right-hand column of Table 1.

Although this continuum of reflection is presented in a static form for purposes of presentation, the proposed character is much more dynamic and iterative. It embraces an interminable dialogic praxis (Sandywell, 1996) between different types of reflection. The different types of reflection in the continuum might be thought of as dimensions of reflection, in the sense that they always comprise a mixture of types of reflection, and rarely, if ever, is there a pure enactment of just one type or another. The continuum might be envisioned more as a pulsating quadrant (I am indebted to Bill Green for proposing this image), a messy interacting mixture of different dimensions of reflection alive in professional practice.

CRITERIA FOR PHRONETIC JUDGEMENT: THE DISPOSITION TOWARD PHRONESIS

Reflection is implicated in professional practice through the judgements and actions it informs in the lives of practitioners. How might such judgements and actions be informed with a phronetic quality?

Many scholars contend that professional practices are interpretive practices (Montgomery, 2006; Polkinghorne, 2004; Schön, 1983, 1987), centrally concerned with how practitioners make judgements. If this is so, it raises questions about the grounds on which practitioners make judgements, and how practitioners might orient such judgements in the direction of phronesis.

Schön (1987) suggests, drawing on Spence (1982), that all interpretations are essentially creative and that any number of different interpretations, equally coherent and complete, might be provided for any particular clinical event. In this view, right interpretations have a power to persuade grounded in their aesthetic appeal. They may also acquire pragmatic usefulness, grounded in the expectation that they will lead to additional clarifying clinical material (Schön, 1987, p. 229). Schön draws attention to three criteria for professional judgement: pragmatic usefulness, persuasiveness, and aesthetic appeal. Illuminating the implicit criteria by which practitioners make judgements may be a useful way both to conceive of, and make explicit, the balancing act in which professionals continually engage, and to begin to think about what types of considerations might lead practitioners beyond instrumental approaches and toward practical wisdom in their interpretations and judgements in practice.

In the following discussion, I briefly consider the criteria of pragmatic usefulness, persuasiveness, and aesthetic appeal, and propose three further criteria—ethical imperatives, dialogic intersubjectivity, and transformative potential—which might be worth considering in the quest to engage phronesis through wise judgements in practice. This list is not meant to be exhaustive or to suggest that some normative criteria for phronetic judgements might be found; rather, this discussion is an

exploratory consideration of possible criteria that might guide practitioners in the disposition toward phronetic judgements in practice.

Pragmatic Usefulness

The first criterion that Schön highlights by which practitioners make judgements in practice is the criterion of pragmatic appeal. His notion of pragmatic usefulness refers to the idea of practice fit or viability within the practitioner's experiential world. Furthermore, Schön draws on a pragmatic philosophical tradition: his works are grounded in the pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey, and the assumptions implicit within that tradition are evident in his perspective.

Persuasiveness

The second criterion identified by Schön is persuasiveness. I assume here that Schön refers to persuasiveness with respect to the course of action a practitioner chooses in light of his or her reflections within a particular practice context and within a particular disciplinary community. Such a view may be likened to philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn's (1962, 1977) insight that persuasiveness within a scientific community is one of the key criteria by which scientists make judgements about which theory to adopt or accept. In practice, persuasiveness within the disciplinary community and the practice context is a criterion by which practitioners make judgements.

Aesthetic Appeal

A third criterion is aesthetic appeal. Dewey (1929) suggests the word *artistic* be used to designate the activities by which works of art (including practice) are brought into being, and the term *aesthetic* be used for the appreciation of such works (p. 5). Thus, an aesthetic vision of experience views professional practice as an art, and the appreciation of that art as the aesthetic. Such a conception recognises more than instrumentalist and efficiency-based views of practice (Stein, 2001) and includes realms that fall outside of traditional epistemic lines. The aesthetic serves as a way of considering the experience of practice itself, in the sense that successful practice may be conceived of as an art form.

Ethical Imperatives

A fourth proposed criterion is ethical imperatives. Ethics receives little direct attention in the work of Schön, despite its centrality in Dewey's writings (see Dewey, 1972/1897, Dewey & Tufts, 1978/1908). I suggest this area requires significantly more attention with respect to considerations of how practitioners reflect in practice and the criteria by which they make decisions. Many decisions that fall within the indeterminate or grey zones of practice are infused with ethical concerns. For example, when I speak to front-line health practitioners, they

frequently express concerns about ethical issues and ethical relationships in their practices. Many suggest that it is their connection and care for other human beings that keep them in their vocations despite difficult and morally complex conditions. In an increasingly complex world, in which the infiltration of corporate values in health care (and other environments) is frequently a reality (Stein, 2001), the time and opportunity for reflection on ethical issues can easily become displaced, or simply silenced amid the vast cacophony of other voices. If one is to take phronesis as professional knowledge seriously, then ethics is of central concern. When considering the criteria by which practitioners might make phronetic judgements in practice, consideration of ethical concerns appears to lie at the centre.

Dialogic Intersubjectivity

I propose that phronetic judgements recognise the sociality of consciousness, such that reflection is viewed as an individual and a social process, considered in light of both individual and collective thought. To simply reflect on one's own interpretations, without a consideration of what Levinas refers to as the "face of the other" (Kearney, 1988, p. 362), and an acknowledgement of the 'Other's' interpretation of meaning, raises ethical questions (Kinsella, 2005). An ethics of care (Nodding, 1984) and answerability (Bakhtin, 1993) recognise the dialogic nature of identity and the practitioner's responsibility to others in this regard. It draws attention to the imperative within practice to attend to the powerful intersubjectivity that is always at play. Dialogic intersubjectivity recognises both the negotiation of meaning within practice settings and the role of discourse in this process. Thus, a fifth proposed criterion by which practitioners might move toward phronetic judgement in practice is through recognition of dialogic intersubjectivity: the extent to which the dialogic nature of interpretation is acknowledged and the extent to which 'Others'' versions of 'reality' are given a hearing. The practitioner oriented toward phronesis is aware of and concerned with not only his or her own interpretations in practice but also the dialogic possibilities implicit in the recognition of the interpretations of clients, co-workers, and others.

Transformative Potential

A sixth proposed criterion for phronetic judgement is attention to the transformative potential within the practice situation. Rather than looking solely for pragmatic fit within the traditions of practice, one might also consider the power of imagination and the transformative potential of a situation. Such a perspective embodies the idea of the practitioner as a transformative intellectual (Giroux, 1988) and attends not only to pragmatic or practical interests but also to emancipatory interests and possibilities (Habermas, 1971) within the situation at hand. Rather than accepting received views, the practitioner oriented toward practical wisdom critically considers why things are as they are, examines the taken-for-granted, and engages with possibilities for transforming the situation at hand, in the interest of justice.

In summary, I highlight six criteria by which practitioners might move toward phronetic judgements as they engage in processes of reflection in practice. These criteria do not claim to be exhaustive or normative in any way. However, if we accept that professional practices are interpretive practices, centrally concerned with how practitioners engage in reflection to make judgements, perhaps it behooves us to begin to think about and make explicit the implicit criteria by which such judgements are weighed. Beginning first with three criteria discussed by Schön, I propose an elaboration to six criteria that might foster practitioner reflection in ways that move toward phronesis or practical wisdom: pragmatic usefulness, persuasiveness, aesthetic appeal, ethical imperatives, dialogic intersubjectivity, and transformative potential. These criteria are offered not as the final word but rather as a means to open a conversation about how phronetic judgements might be cultivated in professional life.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have proposed an elaboration of Schön's reflective practice in light of Aristotle's phronesis. It is my hope that this chapter will spark further conversation about how we might extend conceptions of reflection and think about practitioner judgements and the implications for phronesis. I propose that reflection, in the interest of phronesis, might usefully be conceived as a continuum, and have begun to articulate what that continuum might look like (see Table 1). This continuum is not meant to be linear or hierarchical, and indeed it might better be imaged as a pulsating, overlapping, quadrant. In addition, I have examined the criteria for professional judgements identified by Schön, and propose an elaboration, recognising that this is just the beginning of a scholarly conversation in this realm. These criteria are not meant to be an exhaustive list, nor are they meant to imply that a normative schema can be identified; rather, this discussion is offered merely as a means of opening an important and largely unarticulated conversation.

Schön (1992) noted that philosophers remain alive for us, in so far as we are inspired to rethink and renew the meanings of the ideas they plant in our minds. The same may be said of Schön and Aristotle; both have left us with important legacies. It is our job to rethink and renew the meanings of these ideas in light of contemporary theoretical conversations and complex practice contexts, and to do so with as much practical wisdom as we can muster. Perhaps it is through our efforts to engage such conversations, as much as in any insights that we might garner, that we will find phronesis!

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