CHAPTER 2

PEDAGOGY AND THE MINDFUL BODY

> We learn bodily. The social order inscribes itself in bodies through this permanent confrontation which may be more or less dramatic but is always largely marked by affectivity and, more precisely, by affective transactions with the environment.
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> P. Bourdieu (2000, p. 141)
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> Reason is not seen as a transcendent or disembodied quality of the soul or mind; rather, reason, desire and knowledge are embodied and dependent, at least in the first instance, on the quality and complexity of the corporeal affects.
>
> M. Gatens (1996, p. 110)

The focus in Chapter 1 was to survey various past and present theorisations of the body, especially phenomenological and sociological understandings. Emphasis was also given to work within education largely involving applications of Foucauldian theory. Despite the benefits of this scholarship in demonstrating the ontological significance of the corporeal, there is little interest in articulating a role for the mind in determining practice. While there needs to be a much greater appreciation of the bodily aspects of learning, this should not be undertaken without also acknowledging the role of the mind. Although Bourdieu may feel that "We learn bodily", this is not exclusively so; cognition figures substantially in the process. The problem is that the mind and body are presented as separate entities, with the former seemingly devoid of any corporeal instantiation. Yet this need not be the case. Drawing on the work of Spinoza, Gatens (1996, p. 110) points out that "reason, desire and knowledge are embodied". Rather than distinct from the body, consciousness can be conceived as reliant upon "the quality and complexity of corporeal affects". This chapter returns to Bourdieu's notion of habitus to explore this relation. While the habitus is a productive conceptualisation of the relation between social structure and bodily action, it nevertheless achieves this by displacing the question of human consciousness. This chapter proposes a reformulation of Bourdieu's habitus drawing upon the insights of Spinoza's monism. In doing this, it provides a foundation for a theory of *pedagogic embodiment* that considers the role of the body *and* the mind in determining action.

BOURDIEU – LOSING CONSCIOUSNESS

Despite Schinkel's view that sociology's overuse of Bourdieu's term *habitus* renders it now in a state of "having been innovative" (Schinkel, 2007, p. 707), it

arguably provides the most effective means of bridging the structure/agency divide. Bourdieu (1990, p. 53) defines the habitus as:

> systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.

His intention in devising the habitus was to counter both the subjectivist and objectivist tendencies within social and cultural theory, dissolving the binarism that underlies both sociological and philosophical inquiry (Bottero, 2010, p. 4). Wacquant (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 19) refers to Bourdieu's theorisation of the social as "monist" as "it refuses to establish sharp demarcations between the external and the internal, the conscious and the unconscious, the bodily and the discursive". Bourdieu may be monist to the extent that he captures the simultaneity of structure and agency in the operation of the habitus, but this still rests on a dualism of mind and body. Bourdieu's "partial" monism is made possible through his focus on embodied practice; a view grounded in a "practical non-thetic intentionality" which he explains,

> "has nothing in common with a cogitatio (or a noesis), [it] is rooted in a posture, a way of bearing the body (a hexis), a durable way of being of the durable modified body which is engendered and perpetuated, while constantly changing (within limits), in a twofold relationship structured and structuring to the environment" (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 144).

This bodily intentionality is *lodged* within the dispositions of the habitus acquired through the repeated experience of everyday life. These dispositions operate in a virtual sense whereby schemas of action inscribed within the body take command and guide practice when prompted to act. The possibility of any recourse to consciousness, either prior to or during activity, is generally not a matter for the habitus. Given the concept's fundamental role in determining practice the only conclusion to be drawn is that neither conscious intent nor reflection is integral to action. To obviate the need for conscious intervention, as in the case of a situational disjuncture, Bourdieu (1990, p. 61) points out that "the habitus tends to protect itself from crises and critical challenges by providing itself with a milieu to which it is as pre-adapted as possible".

Apart from the problem of fetishising the habitus – seemingly providing it with its own in-built reflexivity – Bourdieu only ever deals with the concept as if it was already formed. The actual development of dispositions within the habitus, as in the case of young children beginning school, is not considered[i]. The pedagogic dimension of the habitus receives minimal discussion in Bourdieu's work. In his early analysis of education, pedagogy is viewed specifically from the perspective of "social reproduction" (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). While an important aspect of pedagogy, it is only one dimension of its overall impact. In focusing on this, Bourdieu fails to capture the enabling potential of the process. As his critics point

out, if the dispositions within the habitus merely replicate given social structures, the concept is simply a cog in the process of social reproduction and Bourdieu's sociology is overwhelmingly structuralist in orientation (Giroux, 1982; de Certeau, 1984; Gartman, 1991; Crossley, 2001; Sweetman, 2003; Adkins, 2004; Adams, 2006; Bottero, 2010). Bourdieu, however, is adamant this is not the case, stressing that the "Habitus is not the fate that some people read into it" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 133). Rather, Bourdieu sees it as "an open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experiences" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 133). Yet this doesn't tally with the propensity of the habitus to avoid incompatible contexts, and its overall resistance to change. Even if some compromise is found between these two positions, with the habitus understood as a more flexible concept, the impetus for change is located *outside* the individual with agency dependent not only on the external but also on forces which have a sustained impact upon the habitus. It is only through iteration that a dispositional inclination is attained. This process, as detailed by Bourdieu, goes partway towards explaining the logic of practice and is critical in understanding the importance of habituation within the pedagogic process, but the problem remains as to how to conceive of a socialised subjectivity which has some in-built mechanism for individual autonomy, without a resultant slippage into subjectivism.

As it stands, to Bourdieu, the habitus already provides the requisite degree of autonomy; though he does concede that at times there is a need for conscious intervention or, what he terms, *strategic calculation*. This mode of action, however, is not really accounted for in his overall logic of practice because it is only at "times of crises" that "rational choice" may intervene and, even so, this is only an option for "those agents who are in a position to be rational" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 131). As far as Bourdieu is concerned, consciousness is an aberration. It only intercedes at "times of crises" and is neither a part of everyday practice nor an aspect of embodied subjectivity. Instead, consciousness is conceived as quite separate from the somatic in its sporadic intervention in practice.

Wacquant may perceive a monist intent in Bourdieu's work, but his theorisation of habitus is still hampered by an underlying dualism. Bourdieu may not draw sharp demarcations between the various modalities of human existence but, at the same time, he is not even-handed in his treatment of their role in the formation of subjectivity and the determination of practice. One of the key strengths of Bourdieu's habitus is the conceptualisation of subjectivity as embodied. His understanding of embodiment, however, is still very much framed in terms of the anti-Cartesian stance of much sociology of the body. That is, Bourdieu's notion of embodiment is almost exclusively corporeal. Rather than incorporating the conscious mind within his conceptualisation of practice as also embodied; it is marginalised in deference to the intentionality inherent in bodily schemas. Instead of providing a monist ontology, Bourdieu inverts Descartes's dualism virtually effacing conscious intent from the processes of being and doing.

This exclusion of consciousness in the theorisation of the habitus is significant. The concept has generated much debate, yet commentary seems focused on its success or otherwise in bridging the structure/agency divide. Despite

acknowledgement that the habitus may function as a useful heuristic for explicating the individual/social nexus, there is considerable criticism of its failure to adequately account for agency. Turner (1992, p. 90), for example, comments that the habitus is not dissimilar to Durkheim's account of social facts and that Bourdieu's work in general is a form of "disguised structuralism". This criticism is interesting in its failure to elaborate reasons that could account for the deterministic tendencies of the habitus that relate specifically to issues of the mind/body relation and Bourdieu's neglect of consciousness. There are some exceptions to this such as Margolis (1999, p. 76) who "cannot see how to ensure the theoretical contribution of the habitus without a reasonably detailed account of the cognizing process of social life". Aboulafia (1999), Bohman (1999) and Jenkins (1992) share similar views. In general, though, Bourdieu and his critics display ambivalence towards consciousness. Bourdieu attributes minimal significance to its role in everyday life, and his critics seem to contain their critique within the confines of attempting to resolve issues of structure and agency, generally by altering the structural component of the equation or reframing notions of the social.

The agentic function of consciousness is generally downplayed as a result of an anti-Cartesian backlash (see Chapter 1 for discussion of this point). In contrast, it is a central concern of neuroscience and, through interdisciplinary dialogue, (Damasio, 1994, 1999; Brook and Mandik, 2004; Steinberg, 2006; Immordino-Yang and Damasio, 2007) there is renewed interest in some areas of philosophy (Searle, 1997; Bennett, Dennett, Hacker and Searle, 2007). The humanities, however, still seem to view consciousness as something of a theoretical pariah with little attention given to its ontological significance. It is generally conceived as a purely cognitive phenomenon, the preserve of a unified, thinking, yet disembodied, subject prompted to act as a result of rational and calculated thought. Affect, emotion, desire and the body are all categories typically considered antithetical to reason and consciousness. Bourdieu may have rejected this epistemological stance in focusing his attention on the role of the corporeal in his logic of practice, but he has tended to limit the impact of corporeality and the effect of the sensate to the realm of the body and habituated action. Their role in the working of consciousness is not considered. While broadening a sociology of action to incorporate socially acquired bodily schemas of practice, a Cartesian separation of body and mind is still evident in Bourdieu's work.

CONSCIOUSNESS – A VIRTUAL CONSTANT

It could be argued, however, that consciousness is a virtual constant of everyday life, not simply as Bourdieu sees it, as strategic calculation, but, as a set of capacities, which allow for various levels of reflection to impact upon practice. This may be as banal as what to wear on a particular occasion or reassessing the family budget. Such matters may not require the degree of intellection envisaged by Bourdieu but they do involve consciousness and a form of reflexivity with the potential to engender more sophisticated degrees of reflexive thought. Conceptualisations of consciousness, as Greenfield (2000, p. 168) points out, are

often premised on an unnecessary and false assumption that it is "either on or off, there or not there". She suggests it is better to view consciousness as a continuum – "not as a sudden blinding light but as a dimmer switch" (Greenfield, 2000, p. 168). Consciousness can be considered a polymorphous state, having various forms or, to be more precise, levels moving from basic wakefulness through to awareness, attentiveness and on to degrees of reflection which involve complex thought. As a result, it is variable, changing in intensity from one moment to the next.

In terms of understanding pedagogic practice, the role of consciousness must be considered, particularly as it pertains to complex thought. In learning to write, its role is clearly evident. Before the mechanics of handwriting are routinised to the point of habituation, children first exhibit a mindful focus on the formation of letters and spacing between letters and words. If this conscious attention is not initiated by children themselves, their teacher is generally quick to intervene. What results is a play of consciousnesses between teacher and student, and also among students themselves, which is an integral aspect of the teaching/learning dynamic. Once a degree of competency is attained, there is little need for much conscious monitoring of handwriting. Accordingly, greater cognitive processing, and degrees of reflexivity, can be devoted towards choice of words and the sense and flow of sentences, much of which must also be habituated for children to produce more sophisticated textual forms.

What is evident within school-based pedagogy, and which can be effectively extrapolated to the pedagogy of the everyday, is how consciousness operates in a dialectical and complementary relation to the habitus. Consciousness is not anomalous in terms of what we do; rather, it is an immanent aspect of practice. A distinction needs to be made, however, between the pedagogy of the everyday and institutionalised pedagogy, as in the case of schooling. While there is a dialectic in relation to the habitus and consciousness within all forms of pedagogy, the ratio of habituation and consciousness may vary between the everyday and schooling. In the latter, learning is concentrated. Specific skills and knowledge must be acquired within a shorter timeframe, and with additional restrictions. Schooling does not have the luxury of the time and organisation of the everyday and so habituation must be orchestrated and conscious awareness heightened. This can be achieved through a teaching methodology that emphasises the repeated and detailed treatment of certain skills and knowledge, together with a combination of explicit teaching and focused and sustained learning. Schooling *condenses* the everyday. This is a process many progressivist educators deride as artificial, and so work against, without fully realising the need for, and appropriateness of, this process.

Pedagogy has both a cognitive and corporeal dimension, as does practice per se. Bourdieu's notion of the habitus, however, focuses on the latter and does not acknowledge the importance of consciousness as a factor in determining action. Despite allowing for consciousness in terms of strategic calculation, this lies outside the habitus and the realm of the corporeal. The concept itself is devoid of any conscious intent and so consciousness is disembodied within Bourdieu's theory of practice. Consciousness, however, need not be understood as separate to the body. As Searle (1997, p. 184) explains, "we ought to think of the experience

of our body as the central reference point of all forms of consciousness". Consciousness, therefore, can be understood as embodied and reliant upon the corporeal affects resulting from day-to-day experience. Much of this ongoing flow of sensation may not be registered overtly by consciousness but, depending on its intensity and recurrence, may still have the capacity to function as a *somatic marker* alerting the mind to act. Damasio (1994, p. 174) refers to somatic markers as "a special instance of feelings generated from secondary emotions". He explains that "these emotions and feelings have been connected, by learning, to predict future outcomes of certain scenarios". An accumulation of affect, therefore, has the capacity to function as a somatic marker, which has implications for habituation and learning.

While a considerable proportion of practice is routinised, and individuals function, as Bourdieu explains, with a socially embodied "feel for the game", this is not the totality of what constitutes the logic of practice (Bourdieu, 1998b, pp. 80–81). There is rarely one logical choice or move in a game. A *feel* for the game involves considering the array of options and instantaneously deciding on the best one, such as looking for the best kicker or fastest runner. In terms of writing, this could involve how best to construct a sentence, the choice between active or passive voice, for example. Although giving it a more sociological slant, Bourdieu seems to draw on Merleau-Ponty's notion of the *body-subject* here, which emphasises the complementary relationship between body and space. Yet, as with Bourdieu, Merleau-Ponty's concept neglects the potential tensions within practice which require conscious evaluation and not simply a reliance on bodily intuition. While the two are interdependent, they are not one and the same. As Damasio (1994, p. 133) points out, even though we possess "the means to respond adaptively at an automated level…consciousness buys an enlarged protection policy".

CONSCIOUSNESS, AFFECT AND EMOTION

Damasio's understanding of consciousness is not distinct from the body. It is reliant on bodily affects and their emotional states. He explains that "feeling your emotional states, which is to say being conscious of emotions, offers you flexibility of response based on the particular history of your interactions with the environment" (Damasio, 1994, p. 133).

When Damasio refers to emotions, or feelings, however, he is not referring exclusively to states of mind. While emotions are essentially cognitive they are derived from bodily affects. Emotions, at least initially, result from the conscious registering of these affects. This important distinction is also made by Massumi (1996, p. 221) who points out that emotion and affect "Follow different logics and pertain to different orders". In her discussion of Massumi's work, Boler (1996) explains how he sees affects as "intensities" and emotions as "qualified intensities" adding that "In some sense, affect is similar to a preliminal / prediscursive and uncapturable dimension of experience, while emotion is an identified intensity, or recognised affect".

Boler (1996), however, is not happy with this distinction. She sees emotions as "inscribed habits of inattention" that need to be understood as "frequently imperceptible, less fixed and qualified". What Massumi appears to be capturing in the distinction he makes, particularly with his reference to "different orders" and "different logics", is how affects and emotions relate to different modalities of being. This should not be understood as a form of dualism. Rather, Massumi is referring to what pertains to the mind, namely emotions, and the body, that is affect, as having an ontological correspondence, similar in a sense to Spinozan parallelism. Affect and emotion are at the same time different and similar: different in the sense that they belong to distinct modes of existence, but similar in that emotion is substantially a product of affect or, as Damasio (1994, p. 159) puts it, "Feelings [by which he means emotions] offer us a glimpse of what goes on in our flesh".

Boler does not seem to want to make this distinction. Her conceptualisation of emotions as "inscribed habits of inattention" seems to locate them, along with affects, in the realm of the corporeal, with an implied resistance to any conscious expression. The distinction she draws between affect and emotion seems to focus on the longevity of their bodily effect; that is, affect is more fleeting whereas emotion is generally sustained. Affect, however, also has the propensity to be inscribed in the body, lodged in flesh as traces of experience. Although in this sense, it is as an accumulation of affects, or, as Spinoza would term it, "affection" resulting from the repeated impact of similar encounters with, and in, the world (Deleuze, 1988, p. 48). In explaining Spinoza's notion of affect, Deleuze (1988, p. 49) makes reference to its two aspects: force or "*affectus*" which refers to the passage from one state to another; and affection or "*affectio*" the state of the affected body. Spinoza, therefore, understood affect as both process and product. Affective force or *affectus* can reside in the body as *affectio,* over time forming the dispositions which Bourdieu views as the habitus.

It is in relation to this that Massumi, no doubt, views affect as autonomous. While affect can receive conscious attention as emotion, it may not. Even without instantiation through consciousness, affect could still possess the capacity to direct behaviour, or at least, provoke a response. In these instances, it could be viewed as autonomous. Such an example is provided by Massumi in his discussion of Hertha Sturm's experiment of children's reactions to viewing different versions of a film with the aim of generating different affective responses (Sturm, 1987 cited in Massumi 1996). As an initial bodily sensation, however, affect in itself is generally far too ephemeral to be viewed as much more than a combinatory element in inducing individuals to act in particular ways. By and large action is conditioned by, or rather learned through, the repetition of similar affects. This is also the view of Tomkins (1962, p. 181) who, while acknowledging that humans possess innate affective responses, stresses the impact of learning on affect. To exemplify this, Tomkins refers to the affective response of crying in infants and how, over time, this response is considerably weakened through social conditioning to the point where few adult males cry in public. Tomkins is not simply referring to the outward display of the affective response, that is the act of crying, he explains that "We also learn to change some of the internal components of the innate affective responses" (Tomkins,

1962, p. 182). Humans, therefore, may possess affective predispositions, but how affect operates in relation to subject formation and its role in shaping action is a function of pedagogy in its broadest sense. In ascribing affect autonomy, Massumi neglects the role of the pedagogic in human response. What appears as a singular affect may in actuality be an assemblage of previously experienced sensations, perhaps even having received conscious mediation in the past.

Boler also has difficulty with Massumi's notion of "the autonomy of affect", yet her criticism is quite different. Boler suggests that viewing an affect as autonomous is not dissimilar from psychoanalytic notions of the "preliminal or prediscursive" (Boler, 1996, p. 12). This view, however, seems to narrow the domain of the unconscious to the psychical and fails to acknowledge that it is equally corporeal. Given Boler's description of emotions as "inscribed habits of inattention", it doesn't seem her intention to make such a distinction because the term itself suggests that emotions function within the realm of the bodily unconscious. Boler, however, does not adequately distinguish between affect and emotion; instead there is a blurring of categories. While emotion may possess corporeality, what is not clear are the ways in which this is distinct from that of affect. As it is understood here, affect denotes the sensate, the initial bodily reaction to ongoing encounters with the external. In contrast, emotion involves conscious awareness of bodily affects. A similar distinction is made by Nathanson (1992, p. 49) who uses *affect* to describe "the strictly biological portion of emotion". Once receiving conscious attention, emotions may lay dormant ready to be reactivated again and again given inducement by affect. From Boler's perspective, the *location* of dormant emotions produced through this iterative process seems to be the body. This may be why she refers to emotions as "inscribed habits of inattention", but this definition obscures the necessary conscious recognition involved with emotion. As Lupton (1998, p. 33) points out, "There is a world of difference between a physical feeling and an emotion, even where the embodied sensation may be the same". To explain this further Lupton cites Miller's work on the emotion of disgust where he points out that "Disgust is a feeling *about* something and in response to something not just raw unattached feeling. That's what the stomach flu is. Part of disgust is the very awareness of being disgusted, the consciousness of itself" (Lupton, 1998, p. 33, original emphasis).

Boler does not intend to deny consciousness – indeed a focus of her work is consciousness raising – rather, it seems she wants to merge affect and emotion. Making an analytic distinction between the two, however, is important because what pertains to emotion and affect, like mind and body, consciousness and unconsciousness, have different pedagogic implications. As mentioned previously in relation to Massumi, this recognition of the different modalities of existence is not about maintaining a dualist ontology but rather accounting for the different aspects of being. Also, simply conflating affect and emotion provides little insight into the workings of consciousness. As Nathanson (1992, p. 114) explains, "Consciousness itself is a function of affect". It is the actual recognition of an affect – as an emotion – which is the most basic form of consciousness (Greenfield, 2000, p. 161). Boler perhaps feels no real need to make a distinction between affect

and emotion given her work is about considering the important role of emotion within education (Boler, 1999). In particular, she is concerned with how *feminine* emotion has been devalued in preference to *masculine* reason, and how emotions can function as a powerful pedagogic resource. I would agree with Boler on this point. Emotion is not only a significant aspect of thought, it actually provides the foundation for reason and rational judgement. Such a view of the interrelationship of emotion, affect and reason relates very much to the Spinozan framework of knowledge discussed later in this chapter and resonates with Tomkins's point that "Out of the marriage of reason with affect there issues clarity with passion. Reason without affect would be impotent, affect without reason would be blind" (Tomkins, 1962, p. 112). Here, however, the emphasis is not the pedagogic significance of emotions but pedagogic embodiment and the formation of academic dispositions for learning. As a result, there is a need to acknowledge the difference between affect and emotion and articulate how the former functions in relation to the corporeal and the psychical, the unconscious and consciousness, and to consider their respective pedagogic effects.

THE EMBODIED MIND

The blurring which occurs with the categories of affect and emotion is also evident in dealing with notions of consciousness and unconsciousness. What the terms *consciousness* and *unconsciousness* actually denote varies considerably. Not only is there fractured understanding resulting from the disciplinary disjuncture between the sciences and humanities, but their almost exclusive association with the mind is now challenged with some acknowledgement that each has a corporeal dimension. Within the sciences, consciousness has been predominantly studied as an embrained, as opposed to embodied, phenomenon with notions of mind equated substantially with the brain. Dennett (1998), for example, uses the terms *mind* and *brain* interchangeably, as though they were synonymous. Within philosophy, consciousness has tended to be a very loaded term evoking the ghost of Descartes and humanist notions of an all-knowing, unitary self. Consciousness is conceived as *self*-consciousness involving reasoned reflection and a notion of mind as transcendent, divorced from bodily experience. Although this perspective and its related ontology have lost considerable theoretical traction, this hasn't seemed to provoke a reassessment of the nature of consciousness itself. Instead, it has been left to languish as a philosophical concept with a kind of theoretical ambivalence towards it in many areas of the humanities.

Despite this, in both the sciences (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1993; Damasio, 1994, 1999, 2003; Oyama, 1995; Feldman Barrett and Lindquist, 2008) and philosophy (Searle, 1997) some inroads have been made into rethinking consciousness as an embodied aspect of human existence with the mind viewed as "embodied, in the full sense of the term, not just embrained" (Damasio, 1994, p. 118). Attention is now drawn to how the mind is shaped through experience. Given the emphasis assigned to genes and natural predisposition, resulting from the current fashion for genetic determinism, the contribution of the experiential on the

formation of mind is often downplayed. While genes may be important in determining certain aspects of bodily make-up and an individual's propensity for particular diseases, many neuroscientists such as Greenfield (2000) want to stress how the uniqueness of mind is directly attributable to individual experience not a pre-programmed capacity. Greenfield and Damasio share the view that experience does not necessarily have a direct effect on the brain; rather its impact is felt via the body through the skin, musculoskeletal system and in Greenfield's case, the hormonal system.

It is interesting, therefore, to ponder how such embodied notions of mind, and, in particular, the conscious mind, might be articulated with Bourdieu's understanding of the logic of practice and the autonomy he assigns to the role of the habitus in accounting for agency. If consciousness is a product of bodily experience it seems worthwhile to incorporate its function within a theory of practice rather than treat it, as Bourdieu does, as an epiphenomenon to the processes of being and doing. This acknowledgement of the importance of consciousness in understanding practice does not run the risk of resurrecting Cartesianism; rather, with consciousness as an embodied concept it possesses an oppositional logic to dualism in that mind and consciousness are a product of experience, rather than distinct from it. Practice may be a product of habituated response but it also involves degrees of conscious reflection. These embodied processes of habituation and consciousness operate as a dialectic. Not only do some activities which were initially conscious become habituated over time, but this habituated practice may also be reflected upon and perhaps modified, as in the case of children correcting poor writing. This example may seem trivial but the processes involved – the movement between the habitual and consciousness – are evident in practice in general. Even practice that has become embodied without recourse to consciousness is open to conscious reflection. Bourdieu may allow for this in terms of strategic calculation, which intercedes when there is a misfit between habitus and field, but conscious intervention is a possibility in the course of any activity. It may not result from a self-directed act of intellection; rather, it could be predicated on outside intervention. This is evident in such cases as a teacher drawing attention to a child's poor writing or their inability to sit still. Such a comment by a teacher may trigger the child to make a conscious decision to change what they're doing at that time and, if the intervention is consistent and effective, may instil a type of *habitual consciousness* in the child to self-correct; a habit for reflexivity (Sweetman, 2003).

The understanding of practice proposed here does not involve such a tight fit between Bourdieu's notions of habitus and field nor a singular causal relation. Instead, while individuals tend to perform almost automatically within specific milieus with which they are familiar and in which the processes of bodily enculturation have occurred, there is still the ongoing possibility of degrees of conscious reflection to modify behaviour, even within the context of the familiar. Also, rather than a "crisis situation" always resulting from the disjuncture between habitus and field, practice, with an ongoing recourse to consciousness, can be understood as far more seamless than that which Bourdieu proposes. As such, there is the possibility of a reasonably fluid movement across fields; even those with

which we may have little or no experience, depending of course on the particular make-up of an individual's habitus. Such a view of practice can provide some explanation as to why some working class children confronted with what is largely the middle class culture of schooling still manage to succeed. It also frees pedagogy from the treadmill of social reproduction allowing it to be understood as a potentially enabling process. This enabling potential, however, is very much dependent upon the ability to habituate certain practices – one of these being the propensity or disposition for conscious reflection. This seems a contradiction in terms as the very process of habituation seems to rule out the intervention of consciousness. Yet, with consciousness understood as embodied, there is no longer a contradiction. Thought can be triggered by a dispositional tendency, functioning in a similar way to Damasio's notion of a somatic marker.

While this process of habituation is markedly different from what Bourdieu proposes, it doesn't require discarding the notion of habitus. Rather, it involves breaking down Bourdieu's implicit dualisms of body and mind, consciousness and unconsciousness, and refashioning the habitus so it becomes a truly embodied concept with consciousness, and the potential for reflexivity, corporealised. Bourdieu does view the mind/body relation in a non-dualistic sense in terms of the unconscious, but when it comes to consciousness he seems to retain the binary relationship pointing out that "The very structures of the world are present in the structures (or to put it better the cognitive schemes) that agents implement in order to understand it" (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 152). He explains, however, that these cognitive schemes "are not forms of consciousness but dispositions of the body [or] practical schemas" (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 176). The mindful state of unconscious understanding, or what Giddens views as "practical consciousness", is corporealised by Bourdieu. The unconscious, however, needs to be understood as an amalgam of the psychical and the somatic.

The unconscious, as it is used here, is quite distinct from psychoanalytic understandings of the unconscious (Sullivan, 2006, p. 7). The Freudian unconscious is conceived as a purely psychical phenomenon and a realm not simply below the level of consciousness, but, particularly in relation to Lacan, unable to be accessed by consciousness and quite distinct from the body. The terms *consciousness* and *unconsciousness* can be understood in various ways. Bourdieu has been able to transcend a solely mentalist notion of the unconscious through his incorporation of bodily habituation. Despite this broadening of the term to include the corporeal, Bourdieu views unconsciousness as quite distinct from consciousness. He retains the latter exclusively within the psychical domain. The possibility of conscious reflection attaining a dispositional status is ruled out. This theoretical impasse is unfortunate, given Bourdieu is able to conceptualise the unconscious in such a productive sense as both "mindful" and bodily. With the embodied notion of consciousness proposed here, however, no such clear distinction is made. Unconsciousness is not radically differentiated from consciousness; rather, it is placed in a chain of intensities similar to the grades of light in Greenfield's "dimmer switch" analogy. For this reason, and to mark its differentiation from psychoanalytic understandings, it is perhaps better understood as non-consciousness, which denotes inattention or action that is not

reflexive. Given this, the movement between non-consciousness and consciousness is not difficult to conceive. What is required, given the corporealisation of these states, or intensities, is an ontological framework which, while recognising the role of bodily experience, does not simply collapse the category of mind into body but retains an analytic distinction between the two. In many respects this can be found in the work of Spinoza.

SPINOZA AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL PARALLELISM

Despite Wacquant's reference to Bourdieu's work as monist, it is evident from the sharp distinctions Bourdieu makes between consciousness and unconsciousness and his separation of the former from any bodily instantiation, that an underlying dualism is apparent in his work. With Spinoza, however, the dualistic tendencies of the mind/body relation are erased with a monism that identifies thought and extension as attributes of a single substance. Despite the inherent dualism in language whereby the very act of naming seems to maintain the binary distinction between mind and body, Spinoza (Spinoza, *Ethics*, II, P7) proposes a parallelism whereby, "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things". Thought and extension, and the finite modes of these attributes, namely individual minds and bodies, "are not separate entities but distinct expressions of the same reality" (Allison, 1987, p. 85). To Spinoza, the mind and the body act in concert or, as he states, "the order of actions and passions of our body is, by nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of the mind" (Spinoza, *Ethics*, III, P2D).

This contrasts markedly with Descartes's dualistic account that sees the mind and body as separate substances. Despite this substantive distinction, which would seem to rule out any causative relationship between mind and body given a substance is by definition existentially autonomous, Descartes, unlike Spinoza, allows for mind/body interaction. What is significant about the notion of interaction informing Descartes's account, however, is the hierarchising of mind over body and the latter's exclusion in terms of understanding self and world. To Descartes (*The Principles of Philosophy*, Part 1, 8) "thought is known prior to and more certainly than anything physical". The impact of the world upon the body is best resisted as it only serves to cloud the mind's capacity for rational thought.

Descartes identified two modes of thinking: *the intellect* through which reason is attained, and *the will*, which is a free unbound capacity for choice. While to Descartes the will is infinite, the intellect is not. Herein, he contends, lays the basis of human error; namely, acting simply in response to will which is not informed by the perception of the intellect. With the mind and body substantively distinct, it is quite feasible, or in fact requisite within Descartes's metaphysics, that the mind can be all-knowing. Yet, as Lloyd (1994, p. 39) explains, the dilemma of the Cartesian self "resides in its status as self-contained substance. This is the source of its supposed autonomy as knower; but, at the same time, it is the source of its separation from the world it purports to know". In contrast, Spinoza (*Ethics*, II, P23) explains that the mind only comes to know itself through the body never

viewing the order of understanding proceeding from mind to body. Instead, it is the human body "which provides the focal point from, and through which alone the human mind can perceive its world" (Allison 1987, p. 107). It is the body's interaction with the world, its capacity to be affected by other bodies, which provides the basis of human understanding. This focus on the external world has led Spinoza to be viewed as a materialist (Curley, 1988). Yet, while there is a material grounding to his philosophy, Spinoza should not be read as simply inverting Descartes's idealism rather, the parallelism governing the attributes of Spinoza's single substance ensures equal weight is given to mind and body. Dualisms, as such, are avoided within his metaphysics. To Grosz (1994, p. 13), however, Spinoza's *psychophysical parallelism* is problematic. While she rejects Cartesian dualism, she insists Spinoza fails to explain "the causal or other interactions of mind and body". Indeed Spinoza (*Ethics*, III, P2) writes that "The body cannot determine the mind to thought; neither can the mind determine the body to motion nor rest, nor to anything else".

In response to the ontological positions of Descartes and Spinoza, Grosz (1994, p. xii) proposes an alternative similar to the Mobius strip, which she suggests is able to capture "the fluid interface between mind and body, the internal and external". Yet, this notion of interaction between mind and body maintains the dualism which she is keen to avoid. It seems only through the kind of parallelism proposed by Spinoza, where there is no question of interaction, that any form of dualism and its concomitant ontological problems are evaded. Parallelism renders the idea of *interaction* unnecessary. The relationship between mind and body is not one of interaction or reciprocity between separate entities. Rather, it is one of coexistence, with the mind and body being isomorphic in nature, or in Spinoza's words (*Ethics*, III, P2D), "the mind and body are one and the same thing which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension".

In some respects Spinoza's psychophysical parallelism is not very far removed from some contemporary theorising within neuroscience. Greenfield, who holds the view that the mind is the personalisation of the brain resulting from individual bodily experience, points out that the brain and the body work in concert (Greenfield, 2000, p. 176). Yet, by this she does not intend a simplistic notion of mind/body interaction but that "the brain and the body must have a form of communication that is more related to feelings and not dependent upon the fast zaps of simple electrical signals buzzing up and down the spinal cord" (Greenfield, 2000, p. 176). Her answer is hormones, but from a Spinozan perspective, these bodily chemicals that are related to sensation provide further affirmation of the ontological parallelism of body and mind.

While there is a bodily basis to Spinoza's conceptualisation of self and human understanding, his parallelistic approach to the mind/body relation acknowledges the equally important role of the mind. Despite the distinct corporeality of his philosophy, Spinoza was undeniably a rationalist. Knowledge of the world may be attained through the impact of bodily affects, yet to Spinoza this form of understanding is "mutilated, confused and without order for the intellect" (Spinoza,

Ethics, II, P40S). This kind of understanding, termed *opinion* or *imagination* by Spinoza, is merely the lowest level within a hierarchy of knowledge. Imagination, or the bodily basis of understanding, requires the order of reason for considered or, in Spinoza's terms, *adequate* thought. Spinoza, like Descartes, placed reason at a premium. Where they differ is that Descartes viewed reason as a product of an all-knowing mind, separate from world and bodily influence. To Spinoza the foundation of knowledge is premised on what Descartes rejects, namely the world and its impact on the body.

A SPINOZAN HABITUS

Spinoza's parallelistic treatment of the mind/body relation and his embodied notion of reason have much to offer contemporary social and cultural theory which, in its rejection of Cartesianism, has embraced the body but generally excised the mind. In particular, it is useful in reassessing Bourdieu's notion of habitus. As it stands Spinoza resonates throughout Bourdieu's work. Bourdieu makes use of Spinoza's term *conatus* or *striving to be* in relation to how social structures "perpetuate their social being" (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 19). Bourdieu's main debt to Spinoza, however, can be seen in the emphasis he places on the body and the processes of social embodiment in understanding practice. The habitus as the key construct within this theory of practice is essentially an accumulation of bodily affects, which over time have sedimented into dispositions. These dispositions function like a set of virtual genres of practice which, given the nuances of a particular situation, are triggered into action. The habitus's capacity to retain bodily affects, in essence the process of embodiment, is also referred to by Spinoza, who writes that "The human body can undergo many changes, and nevertheless retain impressions, or traces, of the objects and consequently the same images of things" (*Ethics*, III, Post. 2). The difference here is that, unlike Bourdieu, Spinoza is not simply considering embodiment as a corporeal process. Given his parallelistic ontology, it is simultaneously a cognitive process, hence his reference to bodily traces as also being "images of things".

As already discussed, Bourdieu does not totally exclude the mind. He acknowledges the impact of embodiment on cognitive structures, but to Bourdieu this does not mean consciousness. Rather, he is referring to the unconscious mind, fusing it with the bodily unconscious, the realm in which the habitus functions. As such, Bourdieu generally excludes consciousness from his logic of practice and in doing so only provides a partial account of what guides human activity. His focus is the automatic which is an essential and, at times, all pervading aspect of practice. As Pascal writes and Bourdieu (2000, p. 2) cites, "we are as much automatic as intellectual". Pascal also points out that "Custom is the source of our strongest and most believed proofs. It inclines the automaton about the matter". The mind, though, does not remain in automatic mode. It is also inclined to reflect upon activity, which may lead to a modification of behaviour. The kind of customary knowledge Pascal refers to is similar to what Spinoza terms imagination but, as with Spinoza, he identifies other kinds, or levels, of thought, namely those involving reason and the intellect. Reason need not be understood as a separate or

compartmentalised notion of thought as Bourdieu seems to suggest; only activated at times of crisis. Rather, thought operates as a more fluid phenomenon. While for much of the time the mind and the body function in a habitual way, there is also the ongoing potential for reflection. This is particularly the case during the process of teaching and learning where there is a constant slippage between habitual and reflexive modes of thought; generally, the greater the aptitude for a particular activity the less the reliance on the reflexive. It remains, however, as a virtual corrective, often interceding even if not required, if individuals have developed a dispositional proclivity for the reflexive mode. Reflection, as it is used here, does not necessarily typify higher levels of reason but it surely falls within the parameters of the rational. Reason is neither transcendent nor disconnected from the everyday; it is simply a point along a continuum of different modes of thought. It is an essential aspect of human activity yet one which Bourdieu has difficulty incorporating within his theory of practice.

Bourdieu's habitus, therefore, requires reassessment. It is a far too useful theoretical concept to discard. It requires a more comprehensive treatment of the processes of embodiment whereby consciousness and unconsciousness are understood as being derived from a corporeal base. This is where a Spinozan reading of Bourdieu's habitus is useful. Infusing the habitus with Spinoza's parallelistic monism ensures the construct has the theoretical flexibility to not simply explain the habitual aspects of practice but to embrace a dialectic with consciousness which allows for degrees of reflexivity to be taken into account in terms of understanding the nature of practice. With the habitus conceived in this way, it has a far greater application to theorising the pedagogic which needs to be understood as encompassing both the cognitive and the corporeal dimensions of being.

VYGOTSKY, SPINOZA AND PEDAGOGIC AFFECT

Central to theorising the pedagogic within a school context is trying to ascertain those practices that are most effective in equipping students with the skills they require for academic success. The focus here is learning to write and one of the key theorists in this field is Lev Vygotsky who investigated the relationship between thought and language development in the Soviet Union in the early twentieth century. Vygotsky detailed the importance of teacher direction upon student learning. He theorised the notion of a Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD), which refers to the gap between a child's actual development determined by independent problem solving and their potential development achieved when assisted (Vygotsky, 1996, p. 187). The form of assistance Vygotsky intended was not simply that which results from peer collaboration. This is very much the interpretation of Vygotsky's ZPD within 'whole language' and progressivist applications of his work (Berk and Winsler, 2002). Although peer support can be beneficial to learning, in outlining his theory of the ZPD, Vygotsky was detailing a particular pedagogic approach that is considerably divergent from the student-directed learning that underpins contemporary progressivist-inspired approaches. Vygotsky was a fierce critic of the progressivist free education movement

prevalent in the Soviet Union during the 1920s (van der Veer and Valsiner, 1991, p. 53). He claimed that "Instruction is one of the principal sources of the schoolchild's concepts and is also a powerful force in directing their evolution; it determines the fate of [their] total mental development (Vygotsky, 1996, p. 157).

Vygotsky did not base his understanding of the ZDP upon a theory of affect yet, before his death, as Werstch (1985, p. 189) explains, he clearly demonstrated an interest in its role as an "integrating and motivational force for consciousness". The effectiveness of the teacher-directed pedagogy underpinning Vygotsky's ZPD is understood here as pertaining to a heightening of pedagogic affect and, as such, a heightening of consciousness, an effect which is not as potent with less teacher-directed pedagogies. Being a psychologist, Vygotsky's focus was mental development. His theoretical perspective, however, was in sharp contrast to the biological determinism that governs Piaget's theory of child development (Vygotsky, 1996, p. 45). While acknowledging an innate component, Vygotsky viewed development as primarily a social process; namely that a child's intrapsychological processing is a function of prior and similar processing on an interpsychological plane (Wertsch, 1985, p. 60). It was children's mental development and, in particular, the relationship between thought and language which was Vygotsky's central concern. In relation to this, he began to demonstrate some interest in the impact of affect on consciousness (Wertsch, 1985, p. 189) and was keen to counter the dualism that he believed underpinned psychology, commenting that "the tragedy of all modern psychology … consists in the fact that it cannot find a way to understand the real sensible tie between our thoughts and feelings on the one hand and the activity of the body on the other hand" (cited in van der Veer and Valsiner 1991, p. 355).

Affect seemed to provide a solution to this problem and Vygotsky found Spinoza's monism a much sounder ontological basis from which to theorise the impact of affect on consciousness and children's overall mental development. Due to Vygotsky's premature death his theorisation of the role of affect was never elaborated and, to many, there is evidence that he finally felt that Spinoza did not provide the answer. Followers, such as Leontev and Ileynkov, pursued these ideas in what is now termed Activity Theory; an approach aimed at studying the relationship between human activity and consciousness (Cole, 1997). Given the significance that Vygotsky attached to instruction, it is interesting to contemplate how he would have theorised the relationship between pedagogic practice and affect and, in turn, how this impacts upon consciousness as an embodied phenomenon. Although much of his own work seems to confirm the cognitive bias within education, Vygotsky's interest in Spinoza's monist ontology indicates a certain unease with this position. As Wertsch (1985, p. 200) points out, "Following Spinoza, Vygotsky argued that investigations are often misled in their attempts to understand the relationship between mental and neurophysical phenomena because their analyses are based on the false assumption that they are dealing with two substances rather than with two attributes of the one substance".

Education's preoccupation with the mind at the expense of the body has major pedagogic repercussions. With consciousness understood as an embodied

phenomenon, in line with the logic of Spinoza's monism, the body as well as the mind can be seen as an object of pedagogic concern with a view towards a parallelistic conception of the mind/body relation. Although not utilising a Vygotskian approach, there are similar concerns here, namely to theorise the affective impact of a teacher's practice in terms of a Spinozan notion of habitus, or how classroom activity affects students' bodies and minds. In many ways, this is a function of the disciplinary force generated by a teacher's manipulation of the classroom environment and their particular approach to curriculum implementation, all of which possess considerable pedagogic affect.

RETHINKING PEDAGOGY AND THE ROLE OF THE BODY

With mainstream educational theory locked within a Cartesian paradigm giving emphasis to the mind and viewing learning as a purely cognitive process, theorisation of pedagogy tends to suffer from an impoverished ontological framework. Little attention is given to the function of academic dispositions that predispose learners to the regimen of schooling and academic work (Watkins and Noble, 2008). If considered, these dispositions are understood in cognitive terms as concentration, persistence and interest generally linked to a Cartesian notion of free will, with a view that a child will succeed if he or she 'puts their mind to it'. Yet a propensity for learning, particularly that associated with institutionalised education, has probably more to do with how a child's body has been regulated prior to school and the extent to which they have embodied abilities such as sitting still, working for sustained periods of time and following instructions (Watkins and Noble, 2010). Bourdieu does not specifically refer to this form of pedagogic embodiment, but it relates very much to his understanding of the structuring of dispositions within the habitus and clearly shows the need for a more detailed understanding of the role of bodily habituation in learning. Habituation does not simply relate to the unconscious as a bodily phenomenon, it also has a psychical dimension. In fact, without the ability to make knowledge and skills automatic, cognitive processing would become overloaded and learning an impossibility. While this is not a call to resurrect traditional pedagogic practices, such as those where students' learning experiences were dominated by the numbing overuse of drill and practice, it suggests there needs to be a better understanding of how certain skills and knowledge are best learned and the implications of this for the programming and delivery of curriculum.

In a sense, there are similarities between the role of habit in learning and Spinoza's account of the impact of affects on the body. He considered, "the more an affect arises from a number of causes concurring together the greater it is. A number of causes together can do more than if they were fewer. And so, the more an affect is aroused by a number of causes, the stronger it is" (Spinoza, *Ethics*, V, P8 & D). The logic here is simple yet the implications profound, especially in relation to pedagogy. While Spinoza is not directly referring to the impact of the habitual on learning, the crux of his proposition is specifically related to this application, namely that repetition intensifies affect. Pedagogically, this is significant as it indicates that

iteration leads to acquisition, a point Butler (1993) argues though more in a discursive as opposed to material sense of the body. From a teaching perspective this would suggest a need for a systematic and consistent pedagogy and, in relation to learning, the importance of practice and sustained effort.

While habituation has an important yet generally neglected role in the processes of teaching and learning, it does not account for the entirety of how individuals function in the world. Also, it tends to minimise the degree of agency involved in human practice, a criticism levelled against Bourdieu's habitus. Similar criticisms are voiced by progressivist educators and proponents of critical pedagogy with the process of habituating skills and knowledge through drill and practice considered ineffective pedagogy that only encourages low-level skill development and a lack of critical thought. If drill and practice was all there was to education this would be a valid criticism, but the ability to habituate certain skills and knowledge is essential for learning and academic success. What is troubling, and ultimately inequitable, is that the habituation of academic dispositions and relevant skills and knowledge is not evenly distributed. Generally children from low socio-economic backgrounds have habituated dispositions that are unsuited to schooling and academic work (Nash, 2005). Of course other children may have failed to acquire these necessary *traits* as well. While there is a significant class basis to this failure to acquire what can be given the umbrella term *academic dispositions,* there are other groups of children whose poor academic success may also relate to this factor, such as boys experiencing difficulty with literacy. This suggests that the teacher's role is central. They need to understand the dispositions of each student's habitus and scaffold learning appropriately. For learning to be ongoing and productive it needs a dispositional foundation achieved through the habituation of certain knowledge and bodily capacity.

While habituation is crucial, learning would be a particularly passive activity if it were simply a process of inculcating the abilities to function automatically. Learning also involves conscious reflection. While there are certain skills and knowledge which may be acquired relatively unconsciously, learning also involves reflection. What is important about conscious processing, be it learning something new or in applying previously acquired knowledge and skills, is its effectiveness in modifying behaviour. Spinoza (*Ethics*, V, P9D) points out that "because the mind's essence, that is, power, consists only in thought, the mind is less acted on by an affect which determines it to consider many things together than by an equally great affect considering one or few objects". In effect, the mind needs to focus on a limited number of things at any one time to be effective and, it is concentrated and sustained thought that heightens the degree and effect of reflection. This is significant in a number of ways, many of which relate to the pedagogic centrality of the teacher and their methodological approach.

Firstly, it suggests teachers need to provide activities that encourage the development of sustained thought in learners. While it is important to provide variety, it is essential that this is not undertaken at the expense of allocating ample time and depth of application to learning. Activities need to be structured around key skills and learning outcomes. Variety can be offered within these parameters

providing there is concentrated application of key knowledge and skills. Yet, to cater for what is often considered the short concentration spans of children, they are inundated with a variety of brief learning activities. While these may function as an effective short-term behaviour management technique, the brevity of these activities fails to allow them to develop a detailed understanding of curriculum content. As a result, it tends to compound the problems that students experience, which may not even be cognitive. Instead, they may relate to a failure in having habituated the appropriate bodily dispositions for schooling. Constant change and limited application only serve to reinforce this lack of bodily discipline.

Secondly, to intensify the effectiveness of cognitive processing as much understanding as possible needs to be processed automatically. This means that as much knowledge as possible needs to *reside* in the realm of the unconscious in a virtual state ready to be retrieved when required. Tomkins (1962, p. 115) also stresses the necessity of habituating knowledge, stating: "This capacity to make automatic or nearly automatic what was once voluntary, conscious and learned frees consciousness for new learning". This dormant bank of knowledge and skills has a complementary relationship with consciousness, with the two states functioning dialectically. The repercussions of this for teaching methodology are significant. To ensure students can master more sophisticated tasks it is necessary that they have achieved a certain level of automaticity with regard to prerequisite understanding. This is recognised in areas such as learning to read, where certain phonological, syntactic and semantic knowledge needs to be processed automatically if adequate comprehension and reading beyond the literal is to be achieved. This suggests the need for iteration to assist the habituation of required and at times foundational skills and knowledge. In the area of writing the need for certain kinds of knowledge, such as lexicogrammar, to become habituated is not well recognised. While proficient writers play with text through the manipulation of lexicogrammatical forms, little is understood, pedagogically, about how best to attain these skills, particularly in the early years of school. Since the mid 1990s there has been a greater acceptance of the need for children to develop a more explicit understanding of grammar and textual form, yet the theorisation of the pedagogy to support this is limited (Board of Studies, New South Wales, 1994; Board of Studies, New South Wales, 1998; National Curriculum Board, 2009). It seems that as with reading, the more knowledge that can be processed automatically from basic syntactical understanding and sentence construction through to literary and rhetorical forms, the more a writer can concentrate on composition. The effectiveness of conscious intervention depends on its dialectical relationship with the bodily and psychical unconscious; the location of previously habituated skills and knowledge. Consciousness is not only a part of the initial phase of a considerable amount of learning – that is, when attention is first drawn to a new concept or skill – it also intervenes in the habitual, and, through ongoing, heightened degrees of reflexivity, modification of both understanding and practice can occur.

Learning, however, and practice in general, is not simply premised on the workings of the mind/body relation, it is also dependent on interaction with the

environment; that is, the potency of affects generated by other minds and bodies which is discussed in more detail in the empirical treatment of these issues in Section 3 – Bodies in Practice. Consciousness shouldn't *only* be understood as an embodied phenomenon, it should also be seen as intersubjective, its power to act not simply a result of accumulated bodily affects but a function of the intervention of other consciousnesses. In relation to learning in the early years of school, this suggests the importance of key others: parents, classmates and, in particular, the teacher. The teacher has a central role, not simply in structuring the classroom environment and designing activities for learning which are appropriately scaffolded, but for actively intervening in the learning process. This entails ensuring students are aware of what they are doing, that is, reflecting upon and evaluating their efforts to the point where they habituate not only knowledge and skills but also the capacity for reflexive thought. This process is not undertaken autonomously by the child. It is constantly reinforced by the teacher and the classroom activities they devise, which of course also involve the contribution of all students in a class.

In much contemporary theorising of pedagogy, this form of intervention is seen as interference in a child's learning, yet such a view fails to acknowledge the intersubjective nature of learning, and also that the teaching/learning relationship is not an equal one. This does not mean that the relationship is unidirectional with the teacher simply directing the child's learning, but it does acknowledge a power differential, which is not simply a function of the teacher's institutional position but, rather, a result of their greater understanding. The teacher, therefore, through their own accumulated knowledge and skills, has a responsibility to guide and support a child's learning. In practice, the teaching/learning process is dialectical. The teacher may direct their students' learning, but, so too, the students' learning will, and should, direct the teacher's teaching. Being is intersubjectively determined and quite obviously so in the context of schooling. While reference is made here to the intersubjective play of consciousnesses, primarily in relation to the teacher and student, intersubjectivity is also fundamentally an unconscious phenomenon, in both a psychical and somatic sense. While these notions of intersubjectivity are discussed further in later chapters, it is an area of inquiry that requires more detailed analysis, particularly as it pertains to the cultivation of pedagogic desire, both a teacher's desire to teach and a student's to learn.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A prime concern in theorising the pedagogic is to reconsider certain ontological presuppositions of teaching practice. The critique of Cartesianism which pervades contemporary social and cultural theory has had little impact on educational theory and practice. The tendency to simply invert Descartes' dualism and concentrate on the body as the locus of understanding may shatter the paradigmatic dominance of Cartesianism, but its virtual erasure of consciousness means it provides a less than viable alternate ontology. Bourdieu's belief that we "learn bodily" is only partially correct. The conscious mind is also integral to determining what we do. Spinoza's

mind/body parallelism is a useful way to think through not only the mind/body relation, but consciousness and unconsciousness, reflection and habituation and the intersubjective torsion between one embodied consciousness and others. Spinoza's parallelistic monism effaces dualistic understandings yet allows for an analytic distinction between mind and body, essential in terms of theorising the pedagogic. While the mind and its capacity for conscious reflection are prominent within Spinoza's ontology, the corporeal basis of understanding is always foregrounded. Spinoza, therefore, allows for what Bourdieu only positions marginally; that is, an embodied notion of consciousness and a view of reflection which is not separate to everyday practice but simply a particular level of understanding linked to our ongoing engagement in the world. Infused with a psychophysical parallelism, the habitus provides a more comprehensive notion of practice wherein there is an ongoing dialectic between consciousness/non-consciousness and reflection/ habituation, determining what individuals do and how they do it. In relation to pedagogy, this dialectic provides the means for understanding how knowledge and skills are acquired and are then, in a sense, *naturalised*, embodied, yet available for conscious evaluation and modification. The pedagogic body, therefore, needs to be understood as not simply shaped by the external, nor capacitated by its ability to retain affects, but rather, as *mindful*; that is, where these affects form the basis of conscious understanding and where embodied reasoning is integral to how we learn.