CHAPTER 1

CONCEIVING THE BODY

> Many people have to be persuaded that studying too is a job, and a very tiring one, with its own particular apprenticeship – involving muscles and nerves as well as intellect. It is a process of adaptation, a habit acquired with effort, tedium and even suffering.
>
> A. Gramsci (1973, p. 42)
>
> Our understanding itself is embodied. That is, our bodily know-how and the way we act and move can encode components of our understanding of selfand world.
>
> C. Taylor (1999, p. 34)

Education is not merely a cognitive process: it also has a bodily dimension. This point is captured by Gramsci who highlights the extent to which bodily discipline is necessary for academic success. The bodily nature of education is perhaps most obvious when children commence school. Much of the first few months of kindergarten are devoted to a form of corporeal induction whereby children's bodies are attuned to the temporal rhythms, spatiality and comportment of schooling. As time progresses there is an ongoing refinement of these disciplinary procedures as students' bodies also assume the regularities of literate practice: the spatiality of the page, desk and chair and the grip and movement of the pen – some more successfully than others. Yet, despite the undeniable corporeality of schooling, it seems to be taken for granted within mainstream education. Even in the primary years, the formative period of *pedagogic embodiment*, there seems little acknowledgement of the need for the apprenticeship to which Gramsci refers[i]. Rather, the body is relegated to the realm of classroom management and considered secondary to the role of the mind in learning.

Despite widespread interest in the body across various disciplines, mainstream educational practice and scholarship tend to give it little attention (Evans, Rich, Davies and Allwood, 2005; Evans, Davies and Rich, 2009). In contrast, from the early 1980s, the body and processes of embodiment have figured significantly within social and cultural theory (see for example: Turner, 1984; Frank, 1991; Shilling, 1994 2005, 2008; Williams & Bendelow, 1998; Crossley, 2001, 2006; Blaikie, 2004; Howson, 2004; Fraser and Greco, 2004 Blackman, 2008;). While this focus on the body has been influenced by many disciplinary areas and theoretical perspectives, in particular feminist thought and phenomenology, it is to Foucault that a great deal of the credit can be given for this recent interest. Much of the application of Foucault's work in the area of body studies, however, draws on the Foucault of *Discipline and Punish* rather than his later work around

technologies of the self. As a consequence, it tends towards an examination of disciplinary coercion, which, while valuable in highlighting the body's social malleability, falls short of assigning it any agentic capacity. Yet, the body is much more than the product of institutionalised structures or even broader social experience. As Taylor (1999, p. 34) points out, "Our understanding is itself embodied". For a productive theorisation of bodies and schooling, conceptualisations of the body need to provide much more than these very partial accounts of embodiment. Consideration needs to be given to how *embodied data* acquired through engagement in the world is fashioned as a type of modus operandi for action.

This chapter examines various conceptualisations of the body which are useful for understanding its role in learning. They tend to coalesce, however, around these distinct orientations that emphasise either structural constraint or agentic capacity, though with the latter receiving far less attention. Despite their differences, these perspectives on the body share a similar resistance to engaging with notions of mind and consciousness. To some extent this is understandable given their focus is the corporeal basis of being. Yet an implicit rationale underpins this work; namely the rejection of Cartesian dualism and its privileging of mind over body. A focus on the body at the expense of the mind, however, doesn't correct this theoretical imbalance; it merely inverts it. In theorising the role of the body in schooling a more viable ontology is required. It isn't sufficient to simply divert attention to the corporeal, as seems the preoccupation within social and cultural theory. Gramsci quite rightly points out that education has both a bodily *and* an intellectual dimension. Both, therefore, require consideration. Indeed, as this and the next chapter will argue, it is the interplay of mind and body that is fundamental to understanding pedagogy not only in the context of schooling but as a broader cultural process influencing subjectivity and everyday practice.

CHALLENGING DESCARTES: THE PHENOMENOLOGIES OF HUSSERL AND MERLEAU-PONTY

Despite the wealth of scholarship dealing with various aspects of the body, its intellectual treatment has a long yet generally unsatisfying history. Western philosophy has coupled the body with the mind as a binary opposition and, as Grosz (1994) points out, such dichotomous thinking generally results in a hierarchising of terms. Traditionally, the body is subordinate to the mind and this somatophobia has dominated its intellectual treatment (Spelman, 1982; Meynell, 2009). Such a perspective has its roots in classical philosophy, but it is the work of Decartes that has more firmly left its mark on the modern era. Utilising Aristotle's *a priori* category of substance, meaning not simply prior to but existing separately, Descartes devised a metaphysics that conceived of mind and matter as distinct. While, he did allow for mind/body interaction, referring to them as "substantially united", he was never able to thoroughly explain this relationship despite assigning both mind and body the status of substance (Curley, 1998). The form of interaction Descartes intends, however, is unidirectional, a movement from mind to body.

To Descartes the mind is the seat of reason overriding bodily affects and quelling desire. The very act of thinking, encapsulated in his dictum *cogito ergo sum* or "I think therefore I am", defines the self for Descartes and so he sees the mind as possessing the will to determine action. To Lloyd (1994, p. 39), however, "The price to be paid for Cartesian purity of consciousness is the separation of self from world". Despite this, Descartes' metaphysics have tended to dominate Western thought, developing into a commonsense logic whereby action is simply viewed as a function of will or mind over matter.

Contemporary social and cultural theory has reacted sharply against this understanding of action, questioning the very notion of self as simply pertaining to mind. While Foucault provided much of the inspiration for the intense scrutiny of the body from the 1980s, exemplified in the work of Turner (1984) and Featherstone, Hepworth and Turner (1991), it is with the diverse theoretical perspectives of phenomenology and sociology at the beginning of the last century that the body becomes a focus of study quite distinct from the mind. Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, first made the distinction between *korper*, the physical body, and *leib*, the lived body (Welton, 1999, p. 4). This distinction allowed the body to be viewed as much more than a physical or natural phenomenon: it became both a cultural entity and a product of history. The preoccupation of Husserl's phenomenology, however, is far from a study of corporeality. He felt the task of phenomenology was to study things as they appear in consciousness. In doing this, phenomenology had to deal with notions of consciousness, mind and the self. It had to confront Descartes' *cogito*, which to Husserl was erroneously conceived.

To arrive at the point where Descartes concludes, "I am only a thinking thing, that is to say, a mind, an understanding, or reason", he explains he had to, "efface from my thinking all images of corporeal things, or since that can hardly be done, I shall at least view them as empty and false" (Descartes, *Meditations* III). In his pursuit of philosophical truths, it was thought or rather doubt, which provided the only certainty. To Descartes, the sensate body was variable and uncertain, an unreliable basis for ontological proof. Indubitability was only achieved by separation from the physical world. Such a position was anathema to Husserl who could not conceive of being without world. His project was to insert the *cogito* back into the world through a reformulation that questioned Descartes' notion of a pure act of consciousness. Husserl concluded that thinking had to be about something. Each *cogito* required a *cogitatum* (Husserl, 1977, p. 33) and it is this intentionality of thought that implicates the world. To arrive at a point of pure consciousness, which Husserl still deemed possible despite his critique of Descartes' method, one had to bracket off experience, a process referred to as the *phenomenological epoche* (Smith and Woodruff Smith, 1995, p. 11). From this position the world could be held at bay and pure consciousness attained. Yet while Husserl could not venture a philosophy which divorced being from world, the phenomenological epoche essentially had this effect. In actuality Husserl was an idealist. His notion of

self maintained the Cartesian separation of mind and body privileging the former in a phenomenology of intentional consciousness.

It was Merleau-Ponty who breached this divide with a radical interpretation of Husserl's philosophy. He claimed that "the whole Husserlian analysis is blocked by the framework of acts which imposes upon it the philosophy of consciousness. It is necessary to take up again and develop the *fungierende* or latent intentionality which is the intentionality within being" (Merleau-Ponty, 1975, p. 244). To Merleau-Ponty, being and acting in the world couldn't simply be explained by a process of conscious acts. He viewed the self as much more than a mind, seeing subjectivity as embodied. He sought to excise the distinctions between mind and body, self and world or redefine them "as relational, intertwined and reversible aspects of a single fabric" (Crossley, 1995a, p. 47). Merleau-Ponty saw the body as both acting and being acted upon in a seamless, generative process. Unlike Husserl, where the subject is present in the world but somehow disembodied, with Merleau-Ponty the subject becomes a *body-subject* and is not merely present in the world but is of the world. There is a symphysis of *flesh*, the flesh of the body and the flesh of the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1975, p. 138).

As a form of bodily consciousness, Merleau-Ponty's notion of the body-subject is also an attempt to override the mind/body dualism that pervades Husserl's phenomenology. As a result, he diverges considerably from Husserl claiming he was "pushing Husserl further than he wished to go" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964a, p. 72). With Merleau-Ponty, emphasis is finally given to the role of the body in the constitution of subjectivity. His conception of self has both a psychical and bodily dimension with consciousness no longer maintaining exclusivity over understanding. Subjectivity becomes not simply a function of consciousness but of bodily practice. Understanding, therefore, is both cognitive and corporeal with the mind and body possessing learning potential, the latter in the form of what Merleau-Ponty terms *motor significance*. Understanding is also not autonomously derived. In Merleau-Ponty's use of the term, consciousness is intersubjective, forever reliant on "the living relationship and tension among individuals" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p. 90), an important point in relation to education.

Merleau-Ponty, however, neglects to provide an account of the nature of the relationship between body and mind, and their interaction with the world. While these dimensions of existence are evident in his work, they seem to dissolve into an amorphous mass or "single fabric" (Crossley, 1995a, p. 47). For the purposes of phenomenology, which Merleau-Ponty (1999, p. vii) views as "a philosophy which puts essences back into existence", the fluidity of being seems a useful concept. As the basis for explaining individual practice, however, it is only a starting point, a way in which to begin theorising the relationship between body and world. Merleau-Ponty provides considerable insight into the corporeal dimensions of existence, but he is still faced with the ongoing quandary of how best to deal with the binaries of being. While recognising a distinction between mind and body, individual and world, his work essentially blurs and, at times, collapses these categories, particularly in his use of the term *flesh*. This dilemma is evident in his repeated use of the chiasmus, a rhetorical device inverting word

order to create the effect of counterbalance and interconnectedness, as in "We choose the world and the world chooses us" (Merleau-Ponty, 1999, p. 454). This may be interesting wordplay but it doesn't explain much about the nature of the relationship between individual and world. Merleau-Ponty may have abandoned Descartes' ontology but he seems to have only moved partway towards providing a satisfactory substitute.

MAUSS AND TECHNIQUES OF THE BODY

An emphasis on the body can also be found in the early sociology of Mauss, in particular his seminal text *Techniques of the Body* published in 1935. Mauss was interested in the socially acquired nature of bodily comportment. He made use of the much older term *habitus* to refer to the habitual nature of practice but wanted to instil it with a sociological quality[ii] While individuals may possess a particular gait which appears unique, Mauss recognised a commonality across individual practice; an embodiment of the social as a form of *practical reason*. Bourdieu later adopted this notion of habitus but whereas Mauss generally applies it as a descriptive category for individual action, Bourdieu reformulates it as an explanatory concept providing an overall rationale for practice. There is also some variance in Mauss and Bourdieu's understanding of the social. Mauss uses it as a term to denote broad, undefined social experience; to Bourdieu it implies the institutionalised structuring of social experience encapsulated in his category of *field*. While Mauss and Bourdieu may differ in their conceptualisation of the social and its effect on the body, they share a common cause of theorising the body as a sociological phenomenon. This contrasts markedly with the largely philosophical perspective of Merleau-Ponty who, as Turner (1996, p. 78) claims, provides "an individualistic account of embodiment…largely devoid of historical and sociological content". Turner's criticism, however, requires some qualification because there is an underlying sociology to Merleau-Ponty's work. This is evident in his emphasis on intersubjectivity and his ongoing difficulty with Husserl's notion of intentional consciousness which, to Merleau-Ponty, privileged individuality over world. Clearly the world is present in Merleau-Ponty's account, but its sociological content is never thoroughly explicated.

Mauss, on the other hand, takes note of the socially reproductive nature of the habitus. While dealt with in a fleeting manner, he classifies the reproduction of bodily techniques in terms of gender and age exemplifying how practice is rarely natural. To Mauss, bodily practice is learned through on-going social interaction. He states that "In all [these] elements of the art of using the human body, the facts of education were dominant. The notion of education could be superimposed on that of imitation" (Mauss, 1979, p. 101). Learning here is understood as mimesis. Through close observation of a particular activity individuals 'borrow' what they consider successful and make it their own. But there are various types of imitative behaviour, which are indicative of different pedagogies. To many, what Mauss intends here is a form of imitation that is pre reflective; it lacks conscious intent with individuals simply mimicking what they see without conscious

acknowledgement. Through repeated performance the activity is embodied as habitus which is similar in some respects to Merleau-Ponty's *fungierende*, the intentionality of being. While differing in their sociological force, both these notions are forms of bodily know-how displacing conscious intent.

Although generally interpreted in this way, Mauss's work can actually be read quite differently with *techniques of the body* implying an initial conscious response, at least in some forms of imitative action. This is evident in his frequent reference to training in which he discusses a number of instances where bodily techniques have been modified in this way. He recounts, for example, how the teaching of swimming had changed from when he first learnt the sport. Mauss was apparently taught to open his eyes under water only after he had learnt to swim, a practice which proved difficult especially when diving. As an adult Mauss observed how the technique had changed, with children being taught to control their instinctive reflex of closing their eyes in the water and to feel at ease opening them prior to learning to swim. The result of this was an improved diving technique. In another example Mauss discusses how Maori mothers instruct their daughters in the acquisition of *onioni*, a particular way of walking. He quotes from a study by Elsdon Best who describes how mothers drilled their daughters in this accomplishment: "and I have heard a mother say to her girl: 'Ha! Kaore koe e onioni' (you're not doing the onioni) when the young one was neglecting to practice the gait" (Mauss, 1979, p. 102).

These examples suggest that while Mauss was largely focusing on the role of mimesis in the social reproduction of bodily techniques, consciousness had an important part to play. Although this isn't made explicit, his references to training are very often accompanied by some mention of the use of language. This is generally on the part of the trainer but it can be assumed that a series of questions and answers would be used to clarify aspects of technique. Much of what is discussed as part of the instructional process may retreat to the unconscious but, "By being expressed in language thought processes can become perceptual contents available for consciousness" (Grosz, 1994, p. 30). The techniques of the body to which Mauss refers are socially acquired but not simply as a result of subliminal habituation. Bodily techniques do become habituated and certain aspects of individual corporeality are obviously acquired without conscious reflection through immersion within a particular milieu. But Mauss's work provides important pedagogic insights, not only into the socially acquired nature of bodily techniques – the body's receptivity, malleability and capacity to *learn* – but also into the body's ability to be *taught*, which denotes a quite different pedagogic intent. As Mauss (1979, p. 116) points out in one anecdote, "I can tell you that I'm very bad at climbing trees, though reasonable on mountains and rocks. A difference of education and hence of method". Mauss's tree climbing ability suggests it was a childhood-learnt behaviour whereas mountaineering was a skill he was explicitly taught; the difference in pedagogy resulting in a difference in the level of skill he attained.

The *taught* rather than *learned* nature of bodily techniques allows for a re-evaluation of the often neglected role of consciousness in recent sociological

analysis. What is generally missing from discussion of Mauss's work is the process whereby actions develop into habituated technique; an examination of the pedagogy involved rather than simply the end product. His reference to "drill", "practise" and "training" in relation to some techniques suggests not merely an unconscious adoption of bodily facility but conscious attention by both trainer and trainee to the acquisition of technique. According to Strathern (1996, p. 12), however, "Mauss did not link habitus with personne. Habitus calls to mind the unconscious, and personne the conscious aspects of ourselves". The focus in *Techniques of the Body* may be socially acquired bodily know-how, but this does not necessarily negate conscious intent. As Mauss (1979, p. 122) stresses at the end of the essay: "It is thanks to society that there is an intervention of consciousness. It is not thanks to unconsciousness that there is an intervention of society". While bodily techniques may be socially acquired they are open to conscious manipulation otherwise education and training would have little effect.

What Mauss seems to grapple with in *Techniques of the Body* is an appropriate term for the kind of corporeal intuition of which he writes. While he decides upon the term *habitus*, he wants it to be understood as involving "the techniques and work of collective and individual practical reason rather than, in the ordinary, merely the soul and its repetitive faculties" (Mauss, 1979, p. 101). For Mauss, habitus is not simply socially acquired habit; it possesses a kind of rationality which is corporeal rather than simply cognitive. Habitus, therefore, need not be considered unconscious simply because it involves the social reproduction of the body. Rather, Mauss seems to be suggesting there is a conscious element in the development of what later becomes habitual. Strathern (1996, p. 12) recognises this in his own discussion of the Maori *onioni* when he explains that "teaching and learning are at first fully conscious. It is only afterward that the learned pattern becomes an unconscious part of bodily routines". It is not that Mauss fails to give emphasis to consciousness in *Techniques of the Body* because he is dismissing it, or fails to recognise its role; it simply isn't his prime concern. In many respects, particularly if Mauss is read as early twentieth century sociology, the conscious aspect of practice is probably understood. Mauss wants to examine what was largely ignored at the time, namely the importance of the body in understanding practice. Perhaps this is why Mauss uses the word *techniques,* which tends to denote purpose and skill rather than habit and routine. As he points out, what he ultimately wants is a term that signifies "skill, presence of mind and habit combined" (Mauss, 1979, p. 108). He may have assumed consciousness would be taken for granted, not anticipating its neglect within more recent theorisation of the body. The problem with Mauss is that he doesn't clearly articulate the role of consciousness in the acquisition of techniques of the body. This is a shortcoming not only in theories of practice more generally but also in conceiving the role of the body in learning.

FOUCAULT – REDISCOVERING THE BODY

While both Mauss and Merleau-Ponty have had considerable influence on theorisation of the body, it is Foucault's work that led to a rediscovery of the body

in the 1980s provoking a plethora of studies from different disciplinary areas on various aspects of corporeality. Foucault's notion of the body can be understood in different ways and has generated quite diverse theoretical perspectives, evident for example in the contrast between the work of Bryan Turner (1984, 1996, 2008) and Judith Butler (1990, 1993). While to some extent the body as discursive construct is a constant within Foucault's work, nevertheless there is a broadening of what he understands by *discourse*. In his earlier work, the term simply denotes the linguistic but is reformulated in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* to include the extralinguistic or material conditions of discourse which he defines as "institutions, political events, economic practices and processes" (Foucault, 1972, p. 49). Discourse, therefore, comes to encompass much more than language and, through the associated concept of *discursive formation*, is intertwined with the socio-historical relations within which language operates. From a Foucauldian perspective *discourse* evolves into a metaconcept, but in becoming such a bloated category it tends to create theoretical confusion blurring the relationship between language and material practice with the latter often only configured textually, relinquishing its substantive quality. From such a perspective the body is viewed as primarily discursive or, as Gibbs (2002, p. 336) points out, "a body of words", losing sight of the embodied nature of being.

It is this notion of the body as discursive construct which underpins Butler's work, with subjectivity conceived in terms of a process of *iterative performativity*. Butler (1993, p. 13) defines a performative as "that discursive practice that enacts or produces that which it names". In this quite liberal application of speech act theory, Butler's aim is to demonstrate the materiality of language; but materiality is not simply in the saying, it is a process of doing, a point of particular poignancy in relation to pedagogic practice. Her recourse to speech act theory simply conflates the two and, as Turner (1996, p. 28) points out, "The lived body drops from view, as the text becomes the all-pervasive topic of research". This is disappointing because the notion of *iterative performativity* has considerable application in theorising the pedagogic body. As an essentially linguistic concept, however, it provides little insight into the ways in which pedagogic practice can result in different forms of embodiment. Of course language has a role to play, but so too does the myriad of disciplinary techniques that teachers employ that are not specifically linguistic but which are fundamental to the production of particular student bodies.

Hunter (1991, p. 47) also critiques the notion of *discourse* as a metaconcept, arguing that:

> language or discourse plays no fundamental or general role in these groups of relations. It is the techniques of living themselves – the open-ended ensembles of behaviours, forms of calculation, social relations, norms, architectures, trainings – that give rise to the forms of human agency and capacity characteristic of different departments of existence. And it is the role of linguistic (mathematical, etc) notations to function as instruments deployed according to the highly various 'logics' of these instituted ensembles.

Hunter is of the view that Foucault actually leaves behind his focus on discourse in his work on technologies of power and the self and instead concentrates on *dispositifs* or apparatuses, the 'ensembles' to which Hunter refers. This perspective largely underpins the application of Foucauldian theory in various sociologies of the body as in the early work of Turner (1984) and Shilling (1994). Yet while there is a definite shift in Foucault's work which tends to downplay the role of discourse in relation to subject formation, Hunter's relegation of language to simply a product of the logics of practice may be taking it a bit far. Hunter's intention may be to mark out a space with which to theorise material practice, but he seems to suggest that it somehow lies outside the discursive. While subjectivity is largely a product of everyday experience, analyses of practice also need to recognise the materiality and performativity of language. At the same time, this must not be conflated with the materiality and performativity of the body; an individual's physical presence in the world or what Shilling (2005) refers to as "corporeal realism". It is this perspective on the body that is Foucault's focus in *Discipline and Punish*, a text which has tended to dominate analysis of the body within education.

FOUCAULT, BODIES AND SCHOOLING

In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault examines the disciplinary techniques of power within institutionalised settings with a particular emphasis on the development of prisons. This text is significant in its analysis of how spatiality and particular regimens shape the body to maximise its functionality for purposes of social control. As Foucault (1977, p. 138) explains discipline "…dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an 'aptitude', a capacity which seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection". In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault is centrally concerned with the body's propensity to acquire routinised traits through the imposition of spatial and temporal schemas, a notion of embodiment overlaid by a rigid social determinism. Any enabling potential of disciplinary power is directed towards social utility rather than individual agency. This passive conceptualisation of embodiment has tended to dominate sociology of the body (Shilling, 2005, p. 1) and is similarly evident within education. Jones's (2000) study on the dynamics at play in learning to write is one such example. Jones's focus is the contradictory nature of disciplinary power. She discusses the joy and sense of satisfaction a child feels in mastering the mechanics of handwriting but interprets this newfound bodily facility as a form of submission to "the meticulous controls of pedagogy". Jones seems to downplay the inherent pleasure of literate practice and the potential a child acquires in gaining control over a pen and composing text, in deference to what she terms "the strict subjection" of the pedagogic relation. While the power imbalance in favour of the teacher and the socially reproductive nature of pedagogy are not in dispute, it is these negative aspects of pedagogic practice that are often emphasised within educational theory. They are very much the mainstay of sociologies of education

(Gillborn and Youdell, 2000; Apple, 1995; Goldstein, 2005; Saltman and Gabbard, 2011), critical pedagogy (Giroux, 1983, 1988, 2004; McLaren, 1989, 2003; Kellner, 2003; McLaren, Martin, Farahmandpur and Jaramillo, 2004; Giroux and Giroux, 2006; Monchinski, 2008) and Foucauldian analyses of education (Goodson and Dowbiggin, 1990; Gore, 1998; Besley & Peters, 2007; Dussel, 2010). While the latter may give these issues a different gloss, with a focus on subjection of the body as opposed to the mind, the recurrent theme of pedagogy as social control is similarly foregrounded, rarely engaging with its enabling potential. Students are generally cast as supplicant bodies rather than agents with the potential to act competently in the world.

Jones's work is also interesting for its treatment of the socially regulative nature of pedagogic desire and the ways in which it operates within the teaching/learning relation. In recounting her own experience of learning to write she explains that "Via perfect writing, I desired to deliver the perfect mind to my teacher. The predictable and painstakingly even shape of my words signalled my willingness to conform, to be controlled which pleasured my teachers" (Jones, 2000, p. 53). Jones's willingness to please may be an act of conformity but not, as she seems to suggest, mindless obedience. The desire which drives Jones to write well and please her teachers results in a disciplining of her body endowing it with a capacity for literate practice (Watkins, 2008). Yet, Jones seems to view this manipulation of her desires in a negative light. While possessing the potential to be abusive – as in any unequal power relationship – this desire to please is what motivates Jones to succeed. Conforming to her teachers' desires does not lessen Jones's pre-existing sense of self; rather it leads to the acquisition of particular dispositions constitutive of her own subjectivity. Subject formation does not occur autonomously, it is an intersubjective process. Cultivating Jones's desire to write well may be an act of coercion, but it also shows her teachers exercising their pedagogic role of assisting their students attain the skills and knowledge they require for academic success. Minimising the teacher's role does not reduce the socially reproductive forces at play in a classroom; rather, a lack of effective teacher intervention can leave them unchecked. Jones's disciplined body, evident in her mastery of the pen and scholarly comportment, is a necessary precursor for academic endeavour. Illegible handwriting and an unruly body may suggest a form of resistance against the conformities of schooling but they also impede learning. A lack of self-discipline and a failure to acquire socially valued skills leaves one susceptible to more insidious forms of institutionalised control, what Willis (1977, p. 3) terms *self-damnation*. What Jones learns becomes part of her bodily make-up, a fluid set of dispositions equipping her with the capacity to succeed.

The disciplinary techniques of institutionalised schooling are generally viewed in a negative sense, with contemporary perspectives on learning advocating a greater degree of personal freedom and fewer restrictions upon the student body (Brady, 2006; Nolan, 2006; Silberman, 2006; Nash, 2009; Levine and Munsch, 2011). Yet, in frequenting almost any social space bodies need to conform to particular rules of motility; schemas which, while somewhat flexible, dictate speed, comportment and spacing between animate and inanimate bodies. These schemas,

or *carnal genres*, may appear restrictive but they actually equip bodies with a type of intuition with which to negotiate the world. Movement in public space is structured around rules such as keeping to the left or right, queuing for service, turn-taking to enter and leave buildings and maintaining a certain personal space. These develop as carnal genres because they are functional, ensuring the efficient and safe movement of bodies in social space. A similar perspective is presented by Goffman who analyses the bodily routines used to maintain public order (Goffman, 1972). In a school context these 'rules' are more rigidly enforced, but this is necessitated by the concentration and particular use of bodies. In class, students are constantly told to 'sit still', 'put up your hand', 'don't call out', and in the playground, 'don't run', 'line up properly' and 'don't litter'. The myriad of instructions given to children are designed to elicit a particular behaviour which when habituated constitutes a discipline that invests their bodies with the capacity to act in a manner both effective and efficient for schooling. As Foucault (1977, p. 211) explains, "The disciplines function increasingly as techniques for making useful individuals", yet in *Discipline and Punish* where the focus is on disciplinary power as social control, he neglects to adequately address the agentic aspects of this utility.

Another Foucauldian account of bodies and schooling pertinent to the perspective taken here is the earlier influential study by Kamler, Maclean, Reid and Simpson (1994) who examine the relationship between discipline and the formation of a corporate classroom body. While their focus is the degree to which gender differentiation becomes evident in the first month of school, they devote considerable time to examining how learning to be part of a class group is integral to becoming a school student. In their study of a class of 27 kindergarten students in an Australian regional government school, they document how the students' teacher painstakingly "tames" her class into the rituals of school. While Kamler *et al.* draw extensively on Foucault, they also make use of Bourdieu to capture how this disciplining of the young students' bodies develops into certain dispositions of behaviour or a "school habitus". Beyond the actual acknowledgement of its embryonic formation in the first weeks of school, there is little or no consideration given to how these dispositions within the habitus might enable students to perform academically. Despite a useful connection between Foucault's concept of discipline and Bourdieu's habitus, Kamler *et al.* typically concentrate on the socially deterministic, as opposed to agentic, aspects of disciplinary power. One of the ritual practices of schooling they investigate is the learning of songs. They compare the use of song in pre-school kindergarten classrooms, where they see the purpose as simply pleasure, to its function in the more formalised structure of school proper, where it is used on a regular basis throughout the day as a classroom management technique. On various occasions the teacher in this study has her class sing in unison and perform accompanying actions. Kamler *et al.* (1994, p. 107) see singing prior to school as a vehicle for pleasure but on entering kindergarten feel it is "transformed into a technique of power, whereby the teacher can get the group to look at her and be subject to her disciplinary gaze". Undeniably this is the teacher's intent yet it is not simply a technique to foster "a collective student body"

important in terms of the development of a school habitus. It is equally important on an individual basis as this discipline predisposes students to the regimen of academic work, listening and watching attentively and completing tasks in line with the teacher's instructions. Rather than pleasure being lost from these activities, as if the students were somehow leaving behind an idealised stage of childhood, it simply functions differently, or with an added dimension. Pleasure isn't only derived from the song itself; it is also linked to a sense of identification, "one of the most powerful and ubiquitous modes of social responsiveness" (Tomkins, 1962, p. 444). In following their teacher and other classmates in these activities, the students' pleasure is not diminished. Rather, through a desire for recognition and sense of belonging, they are learning a new social ethic as they move in time to the songs.

Kamler *et al.*'s central concern in examining the development of a school habitus in the first month of school is gender. Although not a focus here, their findings on gender differentiation provide useful insights into the formation of a scholarly habitus more generally. While Kamler *et al.* see gender as highly significant they point out that it only becomes a relevant category in certain aspects of classroom practice as it is often "sublimated" within what they refer to as the "androgynous corporate body" (Kamler *et al.*, 1994, p. 75). Gender is most obvious when it comes to issues of behaviour and discipline. Here Kamler *et al.* observe an imbalance because girls tend to be acknowledged in class for quietness and obedience whereas boys are singled out for poor behaviour, such as being rowdy. As a result, boys are highly visible whereas girls assume a certain invisibility within the class. Kamler *et al.* view this differential treatment of girls and boys as a matter of concern, yet in their analysis they tend to focus on the girls and interpret their internalisation of the teacher's gaze as problematic. The disciplinary techniques the girls embody are seen as a form of regulation promoting docility and disempowerment, but there is something of a contradiction in this analysis. The girls may be positioned to be quiet and still but, in the process, are acquiring a habitus for learning that is empowering rather than the contrary. The docility they exhibit and receive recognition for actually functions as a precursor to literate practice: sitting quietly, following instructions and completing work independently. On the other hand, through their visibility the boys tend to have poor behaviour reinforced and the teacher's "taming" is less successful. Boys tend to develop the appropriate dispositions for schooling much later than girls (Connolly, 2004; Keddie and Mills, 2007; Logue, 2007; Ponitz, Rimm-Kaufman and Brock, 2009) and this could partly explain the problems many experience at a later date in relation to literacy (Doctoroff, Greer and Arnold, 2006; Moss, 2007; Sullivan, 2009).

Within education considerable attention is given to boys' weaker literacy performance in comparison to girls, yet this is often attributed to a supposed 'feminised curriculum' and boys having been positioned as more interested in 'technical' subjects (Alloway, Davies, Gilbert, Gilbert and King, 1996; Rowan, Knobel, Bigum and Lankshear, 2002). Little consideration is given to the corporeality of literate practice and how girls and boys may embody different

dispositions to learning both prior to and in the first years of school. Often, as in Kamler *et al.*'s study, the enabling aspects of the ways in which girls are positioned are obscured by a focus on the discursive rather than material aspects of bodily practice. Yet as Foucault explains, docility can be productive, it need not be understood as disabling. In lectures published after his death as *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* he discusses the importance of docility to the Stoics who viewed it as a crucial quality in the cultivation of the self (Foucault, 2005, p. 338). This does not mean that the girls in Kamler *et al.*'s study were not disadvantaged in other ways by their teacher's actions. The girls may have been empowered by a discipline which predisposed them to literate practice, but the emphasis their teacher gave to rewarding quietness may have also encouraged them to be less assertive than the boys. Either way the discipline that students embody is of a far more complex nature than what Kamler *et al.* portray and their use of the term "androgynous corporate body" tends to mask a more subtle gendering of embodied dispositions that occurred within the class.

The aspect of disciplinary power that Foucault (1977, p. 176) finds particularly insidious and which is of particular relevance to a discussion of bodies and schooling, is its panoptic quality. In describing the spatial (and temporal) dimensions of panopticism, Foucault shows how the architecture of modern institutions distributes individuals in space in such a way as to enable a "new physics of power". Institutions such as schools can do this because their "analytical arrangement of space" produces an "axial visibility" which allows for the hierarchical observation that orders and corrects human movement and engenders the internalisation of reformed behaviours as second nature. This "architecture and geometry" involves "channels of power" which run along what might be called vectors operating in this field of visibility (see Section 3 – Bodies in Practice for an empirical account of vectors within classrooms). Foucault analyses this disciplinary "cage" in terms of sequestration, constraint and subjection but it could be argued that these *vectors* and the regimens associated with them, are potentially enabling. In classrooms such vectors are not simply the trajectories allowing observation from a position of authority; they are also lines of intersubjective engagement. These vectors are fundamental to the production of carnal genres, the particular ways of behaving motivated by specific institutions (Foucault, 1977, pp. 200–208). In a sense, panopticism contributes to the durability of embodied discipline giving it the potential to function as a technology of the self rather than simply a technology of power. Disciplinary power can be pedagogically productive, not only because it aids classroom management but its panoptic quality gives it the potential to function as a form of embodied social conscience or corrective mediating behaviour. In habituating the carnal genres of schooling, students also acquire a set of ethical dispositions that guide their behaviour as a member of a larger social group. Their bodies become infused with an understanding that effective social participation generally depends on a disciplining of their own bodies in terms of how they affect others. This discipline, therefore, has a broader social good beyond a delimiting form of governance.

While important pedagogically for the development of a social ethics of the body, these effects of disciplinary power are enabling in other ways more specifically related to academic performance. As is evident in Gramsci's comment that opened this chapter, studying has its own particular apprenticeship. This process of induction into scholarly labour begins very early in a child's life, prior to schooling. The ability to sit at a desk for even short periods of time and concentrate on a task can be quite difficult for many children. Simply sitting at a table is a learned behaviour. Anyone having closely observed the stage when children move from a highchair to sit at a table to eat will understand this. Much of what is taken for granted in everyday practice requires learning. Once learnt, however, it tends to become naturalised to the point where the initial learning process is forgotten. Elias (1978) has explored this phenomenon in relation to the development of social etiquette, what he terms the *civilising process*, whereby individuals and societies over time implement particular "rules" governing social behaviour which are learned and then assume a taken-for-grantedness within everyday life. Elias's focus is the mundane: using a fork, sneezing into a handkerchief and not farting in public. This notion of a civilising process also has applicability for the learned nature of scholarly comportment. While much time is devoted in kindergarten to enculturating children into the practices of school life, this need not only be understood from a classroom management perspective. Such practices are also important in developing a *scholarly habitus*, a naturalness about sitting at a desk to read and write and work independently. It is this learned behaviour, this civilising process, which constitutes an important part of the apprenticeship of academic learning. As Elias (cited in Shilling, 1994, p. 164) explains, "…in the development of civilised bodies, the boundaries between consciousness and drives strengthen. The civilised body possesses self-controls manifest in 'morals' or 'rational thought' which interpose themselves between 'spontaneous and emotional impulses, on the one hand and the skeletal muscles, on the other', and which allow for the deferral of satisfaction. This prevents impulses from expressing themselves in action without the permission of these control mechanisms".

Practice is essentially governed by desire, but it is the nature and formation of this desire that is important in a study of pedagogy (Watkins, 2008). In assisting children acquire a desire for academic endeavour and literate practice; they firstly require a certain scholarly habitus, a bodily disposition which engenders that desire. The bodily dimension of writing involving sitting and labouring to construct a text, which is essentially habituated technique in proficient writers, is generally taken for granted. To write and write well, however, is not simply a matter of will. Bodies need to be attuned to the dynamics of writing which requires a certain bodily discipline that curbs other desires, "the impulses" to which Elias refers. This discipline eventually attains the status of a disposition generating an ongoing desire to write.

Many children enter school already predisposed to write. To teachers they are either seen as 'natural' learners or their early success is related to a combination of

social class and parental involvement. While the latter explanation is no doubt true, a blanket concept such as 'class' does not provide much insight into what it is that constitutes the readiness for academic learning. What these children possess may appear as natural due to its habituation, but what they have acquired prior to entering school is a particular habitus for learning. They are comfortable sitting at a desk and have considerable bodily control when completing work. The ease and early success experienced by many children who have attended childcare for a number of years prior to commencing school can be partly attributed to this bodily preparedness for the classroom (Raban and Ure, 2000; Dockett and Perry, 2001; Barnett and Hustedt, 2003; Fantuzzo, Rouse, McDermott, Sekino, Childs and Weiss, 2005; Magnuson, Ruhm and Waldfogel, 2007). In childcare centres, days are generally highly structured with time devoted to indoor and outdoor activities; much of the former either sitting at work tables completing puzzles, craft or sitting on mats listening to stories and singing songs. These regularities of practice are over time embodied by children and so they develop a somatic familiarly for the desk and chair; the basic hardware of scholarly labour. This formative period for the embodiment of scholarly posture does not signal the beginnings of a passive approach to learning. It is the necessary precursor to the self-discipline required for independent learning and academic work. In children whose bodies are accustomed to sit at a desk and concentrate for sustained periods, their body in a sense disappears as they begin to habituate a scholarly posture. It doesn't receive their conscious attention and they are no longer aware of its role in what they do. We use our bodies in virtually everything we do but over time we attain a level of 'disengagement' from each and every task, without which it would be impossible to function or to increase the complexity of our actions (Leder, 1990). What is familiar and habitual is assigned to the unconscious, generally only resurrected by consciousness if modification is required. This *disappearance* of the body reduces cognitive load, resulting in a greater capacity for conscious thought (Leder, 1990).

To write effectively children need to habituate the biodynamics of literate practice. This entails not only mastering the appropriate writing technology, initially an implement such as a crayon, pencil, pen or even a keyboard, but also the ability to sit at a desk for sustained periods of time and concentrate on producing text. Children need to feel 'at one' with what they are doing, a sense of flow or naturalness about the actions they perform. Their use of the pen and their posture when writing must become a part of their being (Watkins and Noble, 2011). As Merleau-Ponty (1999, p. 91) explains, "those actions in which I habitually engage incorporate their instruments into themselves and make them play a part in the original structure of my own body". This process is also referred to by Foucault (1977, p. 152) who discusses it in terms of *body-object articulation* whereby "Discipline defines each of the relations that the body must have with the object that it manipulates". To Foucault the point at which the body and object work as one is attained as a result of a disciplined body. It is only through the incorporation of this bodily know-how, and disengagement from the very physicality of writing, that children possess the necessary cognitive capacity to focus more directly on the content of their work; the form and function of what

they write. For learning in general this process of disengagement is ongoing, whereby what is learned retreats to the unconscious only to be accessed at point of need. Through the habituation of this scholarly technique children acquire a practical ability to write as well as a bodily disposition for learning. It is this generative capacity of disciplinary power and its agentic function that Foucault and much application of his work tends to downplay.

THE PROBLEMS WITH FOUCAULT'S BODY

In *Discipline and Punish,* Foucault (1977, p. 215) explains that,

> "Discipline" may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a "physics", or an "anatomy" of power, a technology.

Foucault, however, rarely gives individual bodies agentic discretion over this technology, rather it is institutionally engendered. It may not be directly identifiable with any particular institution, but it is manifest in the particular procedures and routines which they employ and from which they ultimately seem to benefit. According to Foucault (1977, p. 167), institutions harness certain aspects of disciplinary power which he categorises as: cellular, the manipulation of spatial distribution; organic, the coding of activities; genetic, the organisation of time and; combinatory, involving the grouping of individuals. Despite the usefulness of these categories in analysing the different forms and functions of disciplinary power, Foucault tends to invest the procedures themselves with the capacity to discipline. Crossley (1996, p. 107) similarly notes this problem, although specifically in relation to discipline imposed spatially stating, "Space is not an (external) object-like force which imposes itself on the body from without. It is a lived and shared dwelling whose 'effects' cannot be understood or accounted for independently of the human action which animates them". Crossley highlights the ways in which Foucault downplays the agency of individual bodies' utilisation of space, which is indicative of his response to the array of disciplinary techniques he documents.

In critiquing Foucault's treatment of the disciplinary tendencies of spatial organisation, Crossley draws largely upon Merleau-Ponty referring to the ways in which he sees the body in an "active relation to its environment" (Crossley, 1996, p. 106). Yet while Foucault is far too determinist, limiting agency in terms of the disciplinary procedures he describes; Merleau-Ponty seems excessively subjectivist, endowing the body with the capacity to exact what it deems useful from its surroundings. Crossley points out that Merleau-Ponty clarifies this in that the body is empowered to do this as a result of "acquired schemas and habits", but doesn't explain how these are acquired and in what way they provide impetus for action. There is no account of the process or pedagogy whereby bodies develop the ingenuity to manipulate their environment. Crossley attempts to address this in his own work through his notions of carnal sociology (Crossley, 1995a) and reflexive

embodiment (Crossley, 2004, 2006) in which the body is both active and acted upon. He is justifiably critical of the tendency within sociology of the body to concentrate on the latter at the expense of the former (Crossley, 2007). While not specifically addressing the issue of pedagogy, in highlighting both these perspectives Crossley at least intends to erase the theoretical gap of conceptualising how it is that forces enacted upon the body are *encoded* and function to affect individual action, a process Foucault neglects.

Foucault acknowledged his lack of engagement with the agentic aspects of discipline in one of his last interviews commenting that "Perhaps I've insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I am more and more interested in the interaction: between oneself and others in the technologies of individual domination, the history of how an individual acts upon him/herself in the technology of the self" (Martin, Gutman and Hutton, 1988, p. 19). Foucault's later concept of *technologies of the self* seems to provide something of a balance to his perspective on discipline. His understanding of technologies of the self, however, does not appear to act in concert with his notion of disciplinary power. In fact, his technologies of power and the self seem conceptually quite distinct. The former operates as an external force investing the body with a certain social utility whereas he defines the latter as allowing, "individuals to effect…a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality" (Foucault, 1990, p. 18). This seems to suggest an internal force of will, the conscious mind determining action. Foucault can conceive of the body as socially constituted, a product of the play of disciplinary forces, but he seems unable to view these as individually agentic and so gives the mind, rather than the body, the capacity to effect change in fashioning the self. Given its usual omission, this apparent insertion of the mind within a technology of the self is pleasing, but without addressing the nature of the mind/body relation in determining action an unhelpful dualism remains. Foucault simply suggests subjectivity is a process of interaction between techniques of power and the self; a position left under-theorised and which only provides a partial account.

Despite these unresolved gaps in Foucault's theorisation of the body, his work proved instrumental in spawning a wealth of interest in the topic as a distinct area of intellectual concern. Within sociology, his work influenced the development of a sub-discipline related specifically to the body as the locus of inquiry. Despite Mauss's insights during the 1930s and 40s, the body was largely neglected within sociology, considered either a topic of primarily biological concern or an area where theorisation tended towards a form of individualism lacking a sociological focus (Turner, 1984). This latter criticism was often directed towards ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism, as in the work of Garfinkel (1967) and Goffman (1959, 1972). Their notion of the social as an instantiation of individualised ritual practice was generally viewed as sociologically naive. The social, of course, can be understood in different ways from the product of institutionalised structures to an aggregation of individualised action. Yet in

theorising bodies and practice there are pitfalls in emphasising one over the other resulting in a pendulum swing favouring either structure or agency. This is clearly the case in comparing the conceptualisation of the social within the work of Turner (1984, 1992) and Frank (1991). In Turner, whose *The Body and Society* provides one of the first examples of a specific sociology of the body, there is a clear bias towards structure. Following Foucault, Turner's frame of reference is quite clearly the body as a product of social control. To Frank, however, who critiques Turner's take on the body, the focus is agency. Frank makes some attempt to incorporate social structure in his account but it seems to function as mere setting. Its central role in the development of bodily capacity and subject formation is never developed. The social, however, is not simply structure or agency; it is both. In the main, social structures, or rather structuring, allows for individual agency. This is not simply theoretical pragmatism but rather an acknowledgement that the social and the individual cannot be understood as distinct entities. It is the nexus that needs to be theoretically expounded, not simply the poles.

In the introduction to the second edition of *The Body and Society* Turner accepts and responds to criticisms of his 1984 edition referring to the "lopsided development of the sociology of the body" (1996, p. 32) that emphasised structure over agency. For Urry (2000), however, the sociological debates around structure and agency are simply unhelpful and he feels different logics need to be embraced. He wants to see "the ordering of social life as contingent, unpredictable, patterned and irreducible to human subjects" (Urry, 2000, p. 16). Like Latour (2005), similarly keen to reassemble the social, Urry wants to acknowledge the impact of objects on human agency: desks, chairs, computers, etc, and to incorporate both the animate and inanimate, human and material, in what might be conceived as 'social'. Importantly, Urry views agency as embodied, but in his account of the ways in which objects contribute to this he tends to overstate their role, claiming that "Agency is to be seen as an accomplishment and this is brought about through various objects …" (Urry, 2000, p. 78). Yet, it is not so much the objects that achieve this but an individual's ability to use them, which is generally dependent on the acquisition of skill often requiring the guidance of others. Urry does not adequately account for the pedagogic relations involved in the use of things, which cannot simply be explained in terms of "the forming and reforming of chains or networks of humans and non-humans" (Urry, 2000, p. 78). Such an explanation tends to erase the often difficult task of object use and mastery, as in a child's use of a pen. The pedagogic process requires further elaboration in Urry's account and, so too, Latour's (1992) as it is far more complex than a matter of human/object engagement. Agency is embodied but embodiment is a function of a particular pedagogy; a process that inevitably raises the issue of power and so structure and agency. Within sociology of the body, however, not only is the issue of pedagogy generally neglected, so too is agency. For Turner, research on the body has concentrated on a limited number of areas and has failed to treat adequately issues relating to embodiment and bodily practices, a view Shilling (2005, 2007) shares. Despite these criticisms, problems with Foucault's notion of the body derived from his emphasis on technologies of power within *Discipline and Punish* remain. There

is still limited treatment of the more agentic aspects of embodiment within recent scholarship and in particular their empirical explication.

PHYSICAL CAPITAL, HABITUS AND PEDAGOGIC EMBODIMENT

Sociology of the body likewise tends to give little consideration to schooling and embodiment[iii]. An exception to this can be found in the work of Shilling who, while writing more generally on the relationship between the body and society (1994, 2005, 2007, 2008) also explores the role of the body in schooling (1991, 1992, 2004, 2010). Shilling's work draws on a range of theorists but of particular interest here is his discussion of Bourdieu. Shilling refers to the selective application of Bourdieu's work within the sociology of education, namely the widespread use of his early work on social reproduction, which, while utilising the notion of cultural capital, tends to neglect its embodied state as habitus, the set of socially acquired dispositions that generate individual practice (Shilling, 1992). Since making this comment, however, there is now far more engagement with the notion of habitus within educational research to the extent that Reay (2004) bemoans its habitual use especially as she feels its explanatory power is often taken as given. Rather than a concept at the service of the data, Reay is of the view the opposite is the case. Given this, close examination of the embodied dimensions of habitus and the impact of schooling upon its formation tends to receive minimal attention. Although not focusing specifically on habitus, Shilling aimed to redress this oversight by examining how embodied capital is an important aspect of schooling, which, through conversion into economic or symbolic capital, possesses a similar capacity for the reproduction of social inequality.

In his earlier work Shilling favours the term *physical* as opposed to *embodied* capital and tends to focus on how individuals make use of their bodies in relation to sport and leisure activities. In the school context his work is primarily concerned with social class and gender differentiation in the teaching of physical education (PE). This is an important field of inquiry, especially in relation to how it impacts upon the academic sphere and employment post school, but neither Shilling nor other theorists in the area of body studies in education (Wright, 2004; Evans, 2004; Evans, Rich, Davies and Allwood, 2005; O'Loughlin, 2006; Skattebol, 2006; Hills, 2007; Burrows, 2010; Lee and Macdonald, 2010, Vander Schee and Boyles, 2010) consider physical capital from an academic perspective; the school's role in the embodiment of dispositions to learning. Literate practice and the capacity for academic endeavour are not obviously seen as forms of physical capital, yet they are embodied. Notions of *embodied* and *physical* capital, however, seem to have different orientations. Embodied capital is a term which gives emphasis to process whereas physical capital seems to stress product or the end result of a process of embodiment. Although making reference to "production" in the titles of his early work on physical capital and schooling (1991, 1992), it seems product rather than production is Shilling's focus. The actual production of physical capital is given minimal treatment, examined predominantly in terms of the development of

particular sporting skills, preference for physical activities and also as bodily representation, such as through dress.

Although drawing on Bourdieu, Shilling makes little use of his notion of habitus. While he mentions the term and acknowledges its embodied nature, he seems to attach minimal significance to its role in the production of physical capital. This may be due to Shilling's critique of the concept which he details elsewhere (1994, 1997). Shilling is not alone in his criticism of Bourdieu's construct (see for example: Giroux, 1982; Gartman, 1991; Aboulafia, 1999; Bohman, 1999; Margolis, 1999; King, 2000; Crossley, 2001; Lahire, 2003; Adams, 2006; Bennett, 2007; Reed-Danahay, 2007). To many, the habitus is overly socially determined ruling out any possibility for individual transformative action. As Shilling (1997, p. 747) explains, "As operationalised in Bourdieu's work the habitus makes it impossible to separate out action from structure, as the two are inextricably entwined, or to account for social change as the two are mutually regenerating". While there are problems with Bourdieu's notion of habitus, which are taken up in more detail in Chapter 2, it does possess a certain functionality for theorising a socially informed yet individually agentic understanding of practice. Bourdieu does conflate structure and agency within the habitus, but this is intentional on his part. The habitus is intended as a mediating device wherein structure is individuated, bridging the structure/agency divide. His success in achieving this, however, is debatable. Shilling also draws on Giddens's structuration theory and Archer's morphogenetic approach to resolve issues of structure and agency. Interestingly, however, he is critical of these theorists for failing to engage with the corporeality of practice and their "undersocialised" view of agency that places too great an emphasis on the role of consciousness in the determination of action, pointing out that,

> For structuration theory and the morphogenetic approach to incorporate a greater somatic component would require a view of the embodied dimensions of agency that is shaped by the social system but is no mere reflection of it, that possesses a creativity able to affect the reproduction or transformation of social structures; and that is subject to change over time.
>
> (Shilling, 1997, p. 748)

What Shilling sees as a weakness in Giddens and Archer is actually one of the strengths of Bourdieu's work. The habitus allows for what Giddens and Archer do not; the capacity for a socially embodied form of action. Shilling's critique of the adequacy of the habitus to affect change may be valid but the value of its socially embodied nature should not be dismissed. In more recent work Shilling (2010) appears to acknowledge this. As is the position presented here and elsewhere (Watkins, 2005a), Shilling similarly places emphasis on the role of pedagogic embodiment[iv]. Unlike a notion of physical capital that highlights externalisation, with embodiment, and the pedagogy that guides this process, internalisation and embodied dispositions or habitus are foregrounded. Bourdieu, however, actually rejects the idea that the habitus is immutable and considers this a misinterpretation of his work (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, pp. 132–137). To Bourdieu the habitus

does possess the capacity for change; the problem is that the impetus for this is located in social structures not within the individual. As Bourdieu (1998b, p. 122) explains, "… rupture cannot result from a simple awakening of consciousness; the transformation of dispositions cannot occur without a prior or concomitant transformation of the objective structures of which they are the product and which they can survive". As such, Bourdieu leaves himself open to the criticism that the habitus is overly deterministic and lacks any transformative potential. A way out of this would be to give greater emphasis to individual reflexivity as a socially acquired capacity, but this would entail a re-examination of how the habitus deals with notions of consciousness and a reassessment of the mind/body relation, the possibility of which is taken up in the next chapter.

NEGLECTING THE MIND: SOCIOLOGY AND ANTI/ANTE THEORY

In general, the theorisation of practice within sociology seems overly preoccupied with issues of structure and agency at the expense of an adequate conceptualisation of the mind/body relation. If mentioned, it is often in terms of an anti-Cartesian stance which, as little more than critique, is hardly a viable alternative. As a result, tacit reference is given to the mind, as it seems anathema to conceive of consciousness as integral to the shaping of action. Shilling (1997), for example, is critical of what he terms "the theoretical weight" given to consciousness by Giddens and Archer but is equally critical of Bourdieu for failing to infuse the habitus with a greater potential for initiating change which, it could be argued, is due largely to its lack of a conscious component. In analysing theories of practice Shilling has termed perspectives either "under" or "over" socialised which, while a useful description, does not in itself provide a way out of the theoretical pendulum swing between structure and agency. A useful intervention seems to be some engagement with the nature of the mind/body relation, but this is generally left to philosophers to explore. Consequently, issues of structure and agency overshadow debate around the role of the mind and body in determining action. Within sociology a focus on the body is seen to remedy this situation but what this seems to produce is a *mindless* ontology which, in pursuing an anti-Cartesian line, has simply inverted Descartes's dualism. Shilling's (1997, p. 748) request for "a view of the embodied dimensions of agency that is shaped by the social system but is no mere reflection of it" may be more effectively met with a reassessment of the mind/body relation which views consciousness as functioning dialectically with embodied aspects of subjectivity. While socially constituted, individual action is not simply a result of bodily determination. To a considerable extent, everyday practice functions below the level of consciousness, and much can be theorised from a purely bodily perspective, but individuals also possess a reflexive capacity that allows them to modify and refine what they do. So, although arguing against a Cartesian dualism, there needs to be some recognition of the heuristic distinction between mind and body if a balance is to be found between the "over" and "under" socialised notions of agency to which Shilling refers and which Bourdieu attempts to address in his notion of habitus. This interface between structure and agency,

mind and body, is where theorisation about the nature of pedagogic practice should be centred. Given its usual cognitive bias, educational theory has much to learn from sociologies of the body, but it will be of minimal use without an accompanying reconceptualisation of the mind/body relation.

This counter-Cartesianism within social and cultural theory which neglects the mind seems to function as a kind of anti-theory, but in being *anti-Cartesian* it has also assumed a position of being *anti* the mind and conscious intent. This *anti-theory*, however, could also be interpreted as a kind of *ante-theory* operating as a prior, or preliminary stage of reconceptualising the mind/body relation in the wake of Cartesianism's rejection. It seems an almost necessary intellectual exercise, given the body's neglect within the Western philosophical tradition, to focus attention on its role in the processes of being. Yet, there seems to be an implicit rationale that doing this provides a kind of epistemological correction to its previous neglect, as if focusing on the body and embodiment will somehow excise the mind/body binary. While analysis of subjectivity as an embodied concept is an important field of inquiry, failure to engage with notions of consciousness means it only provides a partial account of human practice with the theoretical gap around consciousness remaining. As discussed, attempts to bridge this gap within sociology tend to be narrowly conceived in terms of structure and agency with the epistemological links between this opposition and the mind/body relation rarely considered. In attempting to resolve the structure/agency divide, the nature of the mind/body relation is also an issue yet; it isn't factored into the equation except in terms of the rejection of Cartesianism. Debate around human embodiment, therefore, tends to concentrate on notions of structural constraint and bodily inscription on the one hand and phenomenological engagement and social interactionism on the other. Attempts to link what is done to the body and what the body does are generally undertaken without reference to the mind and conscious understanding. There is also minimal theorisation of the intersection of these perspectives; a space of particular pedagogic concern which necessitates engagement with issues of conscious intent, not as the sole determinant of action but as an integral aspect, along with corporeal competence, in explaining human practice.

ATTEMPTS TO BRIDGE THE DIVIDE

Crossley's attempt at bridging this theoretical divide was referred to in relation to his critique of Foucault, but he draws on a number of theorists to examine how embodied aspects of existence guide practice. Together with Foucault, Crossley makes particular use of Merleau-Ponty meshing structuralism[v] and phenomenology to provide a more balanced account of the corporeal bases of being. He tends, however, to give greater emphasis to Merleau-Ponty and his concept of the *body-subject*, a notion intended to counter Descartes's dualism. As Crossley (1995b, p. 135) states, Merleau-Ponty "shows how the field of perception and the field of action are articulated, how they function together in a mutually transformative fashion and thus how action is always oriented to a present situation which it will accommodate and transform". This account of action, however, also seems to

discount the role of consciousness. The body's interaction with its surroundings is never presented as problematic. No account of reflexivity, the thinking through of the possibility of a bodily mismatch with circumstances and the need to consciously adjust behaviour is required. Instead there is an assumed ongoing complementarity. Crossley, however, still finds Merleau-Ponty's conceptualisation of the body-subject valuable because it equips the body with not only a social past of acquired traits but also a social present; namely, how these traits function as a set of competencies for effective action, something he finds lacking in Mauss (Crossley, 1995b, 2004). While to some extent this is a valid criticism in that Mauss doesn't engage with the immediacy of intercorporeality and spatiality, he does refer to training and drill and so at least there is an implication of the pedagogic; the process whereby agents are taught to utilise their bodies more effectively and for specific purposes. Despite Merleau-Ponty's insights into the productive interrelationship of body and space, he also neglects to provide a detailed account of the processes whereby agents develop and, in some cases, explicitly learn bodily capacities for social competence. In other words, Merleau-Ponty also takes the pedagogic for granted. The acquisition of particular competencies is understood as primarily a process of immersion, a view Crossley (2004, p. 52) largely shares, whereby agents simply assume bodily know-how as a result of being in the world. While Merleau-Ponty also explains acquisition in terms of habit, there is similarly little emphasis on its formation or the central role of pedagogy in this process (Merleau-Ponty, 1999, p. 144).

Pedagogy is much more than a process of unconscious osmosis or repetition. It requires recourse to consciousness, often as a result of the intervention of other more capable bodies and minds. The process of learning, even at a bodily level, involves degrees of reflexivity or conscious reassessment of the effectiveness and suitability of particular actions (Noble and Watkins, 2003). Crossley does point out the weaknesses in Merleau-Ponty's treatment of bodily interaction and sees Goffman as providing a more thorough account of how agents modify their behaviour to maintain face and the requirements of appropriate social performance. He adds, however, that Goffman "is clear that such observance belongs to embodied action itself and not to any separate act of intellection: that is action follows rules without the mediation of conscious or otherwise 'mental' processes" (Crossley, 1995b, p. 138). Crossley's own position on the role of consciousness is unclear. He seems to want to deny its role in the determination of action in his interpretation of Goffman but endorses Merleau-Ponty's comment that "mindedness and embodiment of human life are inseparable" (Crossley, 1995b, p. 142). While I'd agree in part with Merleau-Ponty, what he means by mindedness requires clarification, particularly given its implications for pedagogy and learning. Mindedness here does not relate to consciousness or specifically cognition but to a bodily mindedness or intuition. Crossley's notion of reflexive embodiment has a similar meaning because the reflexive doesn't involve recourse to consciousness but rather operates as a pre-reflective bodily corrective or, as Crossley (2004, p. 51) explains, "a way of knowing both body and world for the practical purposes of using both to modify the former". In his account of the reflexive body techniques

of circuit trainers, however, Crossley (2004, p. 49) refers to their acquisition of particular routines as "more or less a constant process of adjustment and self-monitoring". Yet to Crossley this doesn't entail conscious intervention, rather he sees immersion in practice as guiding this process. Surely, however, for newcomers learning routines and the fact that an instructor is on hand to offer advice to all those participating in the circuit classes, conscious awareness has a role to play. The pedagogy here does not simply entail a dialectic of body and world but of body and mind as they mediate the world, with the mind retreating when proficiency is attained. The automaticity of the circuit trainer's routine is achieved through a process of bodily incorporation. Conscious awareness necessarily fades as bodily intuition takes over but it remains "on call" if required; a process examined in Chapter 2. While consciousness seems an uncertain category for Crossley, his use of both phenomenology and social interactionism ensure he provides a more agentic perspective on human embodiment and action than is evident in much sociology of the body. His attempts to reconcile the structure/agency divide in his notion of reflexive embodiment, however, shows an ambivalence towards the issue of conscious intent.

Another theorist keen to bridge the structure/agency divide is Giddens. Whereas Crossley attempts to do so in relation to human embodiment and action, Giddens tends to ignore corporeality, viewing action more in terms of the function of a thinking and purposeful agent. Giddens's contribution to the debate is the concept of structuration, which focuses on the duality of structure. To Giddens (1979, p. 5), structure is "both the medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices". He rejects the notion of structure as constraint, viewing it instead as a set of rules and resources; the inherent properties of social systems that are in turn constitutive of practice. In terms of this fundamental interrelationship between structure and agency, Giddens has much in common with Bourdieu but, whereas Bourdieu uses the habitus to mediate structure and agency, Giddens has no such mechanism. Instead, he explains that "structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices and 'exists' in the generating moments of this constitution" (Giddens, 1979, p. 5).

Giddens's use of the term *constitution*, however, is misleading. Given his lack of engagement with notions of embodiment it is difficult to ascertain the ways in which structure *enters* the agent and functions as an enabling capacity to generate practice, except in terms of a conscious monitoring of activity. In Giddens's account structure does not sediment into corporeal dispositions as with Bourdieu's notion of habitus. Instead Giddens (1979, p. 40) refers to "stocks of knowledge" that appear to be the accumulation of agents' social experience, of which they may not be conscious but can draw on to guide behaviour.

Giddens (1984, p. 49), therefore, makes a distinction between what he terms *discursive* and *practical* consciousness. The former involves verbal expression, the latter simply tacit awareness, which an agent *knows* but cannot verbally recount. Giddens's understanding of practical consciousness though avoids the body and its own learned behaviour which, as habituated practice, is generally and necessarily below the level of consciousness. Giddens wants to retain some ongoing form of

consciousness but in doing so provides a particularly *unpractical* account of practice. Consciousness at various levels or "states of intensity" is crucial for understanding what agents do, but so are inscribed patterns of behaviour of which we may not even be tacitly aware (Searle, 1997, p. 5). The apparent "naturalness" of the corporeal is easy to discount. It is this "hidden" nature of embodied facility that is all but ignored in theorising the pedagogic; a process understood as almost exclusively cognitive. Giddens's neglect of the body and any acknowledgement of the role of unconscious bodily intuition could be a result of his intention to counter structuralist theorisations of practice given he feels, "the pressing task facing social theory today is not to further the conceptual elimination of the subject, but, on the contrary, to promote a recovery of the subject without lapsing into subjectivism" (Giddens, 1979, p. 41). From Giddens's perspective, any lapse in the workings of consciousness by allowing a corporeal unconscious to assert a role in determining behaviour seems to work against what he understands by agency, thereby contributing to "the conceptual elimination of the subject". But with the disembodied agent of structuration theory acting essentially on the basis of conscious intent, Giddens gives his own theory of practice a subjectivist slant; the very position he is keen to avoid. In *Modernity and Self-Identity* Giddens (1991) does attempt to engage far more with the bodily dimensions of subjectivity, yet he still gives little emphasis to the processes of embodiment. Instead, his central concern is ontological security which involves a kind of psychological monitoring of individual practice drawing heavily upon the work of Goffman and Laing.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A focus on structure or agency – or alternatively, attempts to bridge this divide which invariably reveal a structural or agentic bias – tend to dominate theorisation of the body. A fundamental shortcoming is the inadequate treatment of its ontological underpinnings. Cartesianism is summarily dismissed, but the gap resulting from its demise is all but ignored, seemingly filled by the concentration given to explicating the corporeal. Yet debates around emphasising either structure or agency may in fact result from this failure to engage with notions of consciousness and the nature of the mind/body relation; an issue of particular poignancy for understanding the role of the body in learning. In the next chapter an attempt is made to correct this imbalance by proposing an alternate ontological framework that incorporates notions of body and mind with the intention of providing a firmer foundation on which to theorise the pedagogic.