Chapter 4
Reputation and Egotiation: The Impact of Self-Image on the Negotiator

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Introduction

In the realm of international relations, negotiations represent a "process of combining conflicting positions into a joint decision" (Kissinger 1969). Since the negotiation process prescribes a dynamic through which parties seek a suitable alternative position to their initial conflicting viewpoints, not surprisingly, the negotiations are often (maybe naively) exchanged for a bargaining process which entails a concurrence of conflicting and cooperative elements. In international relations, alternatives to a negotiated agreement are attainable through unilateral actions—varying from straining diplomatic relations to an employment of a series of coercive means such as sanctions, threat of, and/or the use of forceful means. Parties decide to negotiate when they perceive that the negotiations will generate gains that are unavailable to them by unilateral action. As pointed out by Zartman, negotiations "involve some action of mutually overcoming a conflict between the parties, each of whom holds a veto over the joint outcome. It is giving something to get something" (Zartman 2001a, b, 137). Reflecting on these dynamics Iklè pointed out, "without common interests there is nothing to negotiate for, without conflict nothing to negotiate" (Iklè 1985, 2). Therefore, for Iklè, negotiation represents "a process in which explicit proposals are put forward" for the "realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present" (Iklè 1985, 3–4). As such, the key feature of any negotiation process is not a mere achievement of an

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agreement, but rather the promotion and protection of one's own interests—which may also be strengthened by a potential agreement. In fact, some parties may use negotiations for tactical reasons—such as "buying" time and/or improving one's international reputation—that would allow them to improve their current position in the conflict without any intention of reaching an actual agreement (Stedman 1997; Richmond 1998). Therefore, negotiations can be considered as concluded "when the parties find a solution that is preferable both to continued conflict and to continued negotiation" (Zartman 2002, 7).

Along with explanations that emphasize the importance of process and structure in negotiations, some studies have yielded significant insights from a sociopsychological perspective. A growing body of literature makes an attempt to explain the impact of cultural factors on international negotiations (Avruch 1998; Blaker et al. 2002; Wittes 2005; Cogan 1997, 2003; Smyser 2002; Solomon 1999; Solomon and Quinney 2010). According to these studies, negotiations are affected not only by parties' incompatible interests and goals, but also by cultural differences that are characteristic for each party involved in the negotiation process (Avruch 1998). For instance, in order to explain French negotiating behavior, Cogan (2003) argues that "mixing rationalism and nationalism, rhetoric and brio, self-importance and embattled vulnerability, French negotiators often seem more interested in asserting their country's "universal" mission than in reaching agreement." As Freeman points out, international negotiators often conduct their affairs "in a foreign language, and on persons and peoples whose moral and political outlook is always different from, and often at odds with, their own" (Freeman 1997, 92). Cohen claims that negotiators are supposed to understand "the chemistry that occurs when negotiators representing mutually discordant traditions come into contact," as it is not rare that in such circumstances "typical patterns of miscomprehension can be observed to recur" (Cohen 2001, 473).

Argument

While cultural traits are practical heuristic tools that assist the parties in understanding their counterparty's behavior, these often provide a limited degree of information as no individual is ever defined by a single cultural trait. Rather, each negotiator brings to the table numerous cultural aspects related to his/her social, professional, family, educational, and other similar backgrounds. Nevertheless, stereotyping is not a rare phenomenon in everyday communication. As such stereotyping is also present in the negotiation process and has a potential of affecting the outcome. Jönsson (2012) points out that social stereotypes represent an important type of categorization. According to him, categorization "is basic to human thought, perception and action. Without the ability to categorize things and people we would not function in our physical and social environment" (Jönsson 2012, 174). Moreover, "stereotyped perceptions of "the other" constitute a key element of national identity, along with mythical perceptions of one's own nation's

past and unique features" (Jönsson 2012, 175). In the negotiation process, stereotyped perceptions might have a direct impact on the reputations that each party assigns to a respective counterpart. Reputation inevitably precedes any form of interaction between the parties, and it is based on either a previous interaction or the information provided by a credible third party. As Jönsson points out, "a counterpart's reputation evokes a stereotype of that counterpart" (idem).

Numerous conflicts worldwide have been subject to the negative effects of obstinate use of stereotyping and reputation. Relations between the USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and between Israel and the neighboring Arab states have been constantly influenced by the "reputational effect." Similarly, attempts to negotiate a peaceful solution to the violent conflicts that followed the dissolution of former Yugoslavia were often hampered by mutual creation of national stereotypes and consequent negative reputation that each party in conflict assigned to "the others." Jönsson argues that "by amplifying the conflictual elements of negotiations, national stereotypes may give rise to vicious circles of self-fulfilling prophecies" (idem). Similarly, Holsti argues:

> When the other party is viewed within the framework of an "inherent bad faith" model the image of the enemy is clearly self-perpetuating… at the interpersonal level such behavior is characterized as abnormal – paranoia. Different standards seem to apply at the international level; inherent bad faith models are not considered abnormal, and even their underlying assumptions often escape serious questioning (Holsti 1968, 17).

Evidently the anarchical system of international relations, where parties are focused on preserving their survival and maximizing their utility, allows for a more paranoid categorization of "the others."

Some recent studies have shifted their focus from parties' perceptions of one another to their judgments about each one's biases. Pronin et al. (2004) point out that people tend to assign self-serving bias to their counterpart, while being unaware of the similar processes on their own judgments and behavior. However, the importance of self-image and self-perception is still quite understudied when it comes to the process of (international) negotiation. Present research aims to provide some insights on this phenomenon. We depart from the assumption that the negotiation process is affected not only by negotiators' perceptions of their counterparts, but also of their own (mis)perception of themselves. In order to illustrate this dynamic, we propose the inclusion of the term "ego" in our analysis. However, we are not referring to the classical Freudian classification of Ego, Super Ego, and Id. Rather, we employ a more colloquial use of the term ego, which in international negotiations would represent self-esteem, pride, and/or status. Consequently, we propose a new term—egotiation. While negotiation could be observed as a process in which the parties strive to satisfy and enhance their material and nonmaterial needs, both for the negotiator and the organization (country) that he/she represents, egotiation refers to the process where the parties strive to the preserve and enhance the "face" of the negotiator—face being a combination of self-esteem, pride, and/or status.

In a nutshell, present research aims to explain a reverse mechanism from the one just described by Jönsson regarding reputation effect. We look at the perception of one's own role, reputation, and image and claim that it has a direct impact on the behavior of that actor during the negotiation process. Depending on the circumstances, the negotiator's character, personal preferences, and emotions can take precedence over the interests of the stakeholders and their representatives. In such a situation, we might talk about "egotiation" instead of "negotiation," meaning that the ego of the negotiator is an obstacle to effective representation of interests (Meerts 2010, 28–29). Here, we do not mean ego in the Freudian sense, but in the political sense: the self-image and the prestige of the negotiating politician or diplomat and, by extension, of his or her country. In certain situations, protecting self-image and prestige will be seen as more important than the object of negotiation. While Olekalns and Druckmann offer a discussion on how emotions affect negotiations, we focus our attention on a face-saving dynamic: We postulate that the protection of the leader's "face" and of the country represented will take priority over the needs and the interests of the state, or even of the negotiator (Faizullaev 2006). By analyzing the role of leading personalities, this chapter will first look at seven turning-point conferences in the twentieth century, after which it will briefly profile 14 leading negotiators who did not take part in these meetings. This cannot and will not provide us with a comprehensive study of "egotiation" in the last century, but it will provide us with some indications of the effects of personality on the processes of international negotiation in recent times (Faizullaev 2006).

Politicians are power brokers, people who want to gain power and to use it as a tool in controlling others, thereby harvesting profits for themselves and for their party. In order to do this, they need to have a positive self-image, while they strive to be respected by others, either through doing well or through fear (for the emotions related to the group level, see the chapter by Christov Moore and Iacobini). Legitimacy, in whatever form, will make the wielding of power more effective, and a leader with a strong reputation will have no insurmountable problems in governing his or her people. Reputation is therefore indispensable and will have to be defended against those who want to damage it. This in turn might lead to situations in which upholding reputation becomes more important than defending specific material interests. In that sense, reputation can be defined as immaterial interest which can have both positive and negative effects on striving for material profits. Behind the façade of reputation sits the ego of the politician, and we postulate further that the more powerful the leader, the bigger his or her ego, the bigger the impact of his ego-state on the negotiation process. While we do not focus on particular ideologies that these leaders endorse (this issue was discussed by Thagard in this volume), we treat reputation in negotiation as a phenomenon that does not only have an impact on the perception of actors' counterparts, and following the logic of "your reputation precedes you" impacts the negotiation process; we also propose that reputation has also an impact on the self-perception of the actor itself as he/she will aim to protect the mentioned reputation as it represents an asset for any future interaction.

We will focus on some of the most powerful negotiators of the twentieth century, trying to discover the egotiation effects related to their behavior, under the understanding that their ego is to some extent situational. As Goldman and Rojot pointed out, "our ego state can be influenced not only by what surrounds our bodies but what enters them as well" (Goldman and Rojot 2003, 139). Though we have defined "egotiation" as a phenomenon connected to personality, one should not overlook the dynastic and state dimension of the term. Dynasties and states have a reputation. They have some measure of prestige, and the defense of this prestige is important as it will help the dynasty or the state to assert its position in the world and thereby facilitates the defense of its material interests. In that sense, the dynasty or the state has an "ego" as well, including its positive or negative impact on the processes of international negotiation. The decision of President George Bush to help the Northern Coalition of Tajik and Uzbek to drive the Taliban out of Kabul can be seen as a rational action aimed at destroying the protectors of al-Qaeda. However, it can also be seen as a show of force: We do not let our reputation as the most powerful country in the world be damaged by some bunch of terrorists. Furthermore, it can be looked upon as old-fashioned revenge, and finally as an ego-decision by the president, feeling that his prestige and his "face" is at stake. In short, both the people and the president were outraged, so action had to be taken, even more so because action orientation is a dominant feature of American societal and political culture. This action might, and to us it did, lead to a situation of entrapment, not being in the interest of the USA, neither of the well-willing nonterrorist segments of the Afghan population. It resulted in "an international conflict for the sake of pointless goals—national prestige or the vainglory of a ruling elite" (Joll 1982). Maybe the reaction was not pointless, but the process and outcome were.

The seven conferences are characterized by the limited number of real decision makers. The wheeling and dealing is done by the most powerful, surrounded by other less important negotiators, as well as their advisers. One of the negotiations that is examined is de jure multilateral (Paris in 1919), but de facto trilateral. Another (Munich in 1938) is de jure a four-party negotiation, but de facto bilateral. We then have a true trilateral negotiation (Yalta in 1945) and four bilateral meetings (Vienna in 1961, Beijing and Moscow in 1972, and Geneva in 1985). The chapter will examine why self-image and prestige—the software of negotiation—took precedence over the hardware, and what the consequences of this were for the negotiation processes in which they played a decisive role.

The multilateral case is the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the First World War, which led to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Of all the negotiators, this chapter will focus on the main three—Georges Clemenceau of France, Lloyd George of Britain, and Woodrow Wilson of the United States—although it will not completely disregard the others. George Clemenceau was the President of the Paris Peace Conference, and all substantial negotiations took place between him and the other two political leaders. Although the Prime Minister of Italy, Vittorio Orlando, was an integral member of the core group of negotiators—the Council of Four—he never played an important role and even left the conference before it was over. The chapter will also ignore people like the Japanese Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi,

the Romanian Prime Minister Ion Bratianu, and the Chinese Prime Minister Lou Tseng-Tsiang, as they were outside the actual decision making. Although others were very influential as advisers, including John Maynard Keynes for example, they were not the real decision makers and are therefore also omitted from this discussion. It is interesting to observe, by the way, that most important multilateral conferences of the past two centuries were actually negotiations among a very limited set of actors. This was true for the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815 and Paris in 1919, while today we have a UN Security Council of only five parties.

The bilateral and trilateral cases are Munich 1938 between Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler, and Mussolini; Yalta 1945 between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin; Vienna 1961 with Kennedy and Khrushchev; Beijing and Moscow 1972 with Nixon, Mao Zedong, and Brezhnev, respectively; and Reagan and Gorbachev in Geneva 1985. The impact of "secondary negotiators" like Kissinger and Zou Enlai will of course be taken into account, as their behavior has probably even more decisive and reaching an outcome, than that of the official decision makers. To conclude, we will also look at profiles of those Presidents of the USA, Secretary Generals of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Presidents of France, and Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom who were not connected to the seven case studies.

We realize the shortcomings of such a limited number of conferences, all of which more or less center on Europe, as well as such a select group of leaders from the traditional Great Powers of the world. However, it has nevertheless been extremely difficult to distill the characteristics of each personality from the available records and biographical details of the pivotal people. The emotional side of their behavior is thoroughly underexposed, let alone their actions, which could be labeled as being the consequence of the projection of their self-image and the defense of their prestige, which run counter to the material interests of their countries and even of themselves. While participants in negotiation seminars will easily recognize the concept of "egotiation," as they have experienced this problem in their own dealings with political leaders, it is extremely difficult to prove it from the existing literature. After all, it is not only about the character and the behavior of the negotiator, but very much about his or her actions during the negotiation process.

The First World War: Closure Through Conference Diplomacy

The Paris Peace Conference had to create a new order for Europe and thereby for the world (MacMillan 2001; Sharp 2008). Between January and June 1919, negotiators from all over the world, excluding those who had been defeated in the First World War, gathered in Paris to settle the war issues and to lay the foundations for a more stable system of international relations than the "Balance of Power" of

the nineteenth century. Like at the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, there was no prepared agenda, nor a procedure upon which all of the interested parties agreed. Although the Paris negotiators were aware of the shortcomings of the Congress of Vienna because of the very disorderly way in which that conference had developed, they nevertheless made the same mistake of incomplete preparation. The Paris Peace Conference was not institutionalized, unlike the League of Nations that it produced, let alone the United Nations that we have today, or the African Union, European Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Organization of American States, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Whatever the differences between these international organizations, with the European Union being far more institutionalized than the African Union, they at least have a fixed set of rules and regulations, thereby protecting the negotiation processes inside their institutions against too much volatility.

The Paris Peace Conference had to do without this, with the consequence of great ups and downs. On January 13, 1919, the representatives of France, Britain, the USA, Italy, and Japan formed the "Council of Ten" (also referred to as the "Supreme Council") as it had two representatives from each of the states, namely the government leader as well as the minister of foreign affairs. In March 1919, the negotiations became more difficult and more intense, and the Supreme Council reduced itself to the "Council of Four," consisting of US President Woodrow Wilson, and Prime Minsters Clemenceau of France, Lloyd George of Britain, and Orlando of Italy. Prime Minister Orlando did not play an important role, however, and the real negotiations became truly trilateral. The Council met on a daily basis, using English and French as their languages of negotiation and French and English were also decided upon as the languages of the official documents. Not only were the ministers of foreign affairs of the four countries kept at bay, but also were the Japanese and their head of delegation, Marquis Saionji Kinmochi, a former Japanese Prime Minister. The rest of the negotiators of other concerned states had to wait until they were invited into the triangle to state their wishes and to try to negotiate them, although they were not allowed in as decision makers. Therefore, the personalities of the "big three" were the only ones with a decisive impact on the negotiation process (Sharp 2008).

The Outer Ring

The most concerned of the other countries, besides those represented in the "Supreme Council," were the countries of the Central Powers that had lost the war: Germany, Austria and Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria. The most important of these, Germany, was seen as the real evil and therefore kept out of the discussion until the very end. The Germans were in no way involved in the negotiations and were given a document to sign during the concluding weeks of the conference, with hardly any possibility of changing it. The victors were a little more forthcoming to the other defeated members of the Central Alliance. One of the

former allies of the victorious Entente, Bolshevik Russia, was also kept out and had anyway no inclination to join the negotiations with the "capitalist" countries of the West. Poland and Romania, however, profited from the West's fear of communist Russia, by having their claims rewarded in order to create a bulwark against the emerging USSR. The other successor states of the former Austrian–Hungarian Empire also fared well: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (i.e., the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes). Belgium and Greece could take their spoils and so could the British Dominions, South Africa, Australia, and to some extent Canada. China, Ireland, the Arabs, and the Zionists were basically ignored, as were others, such as the Latin American countries and Siam (now Thailand) (MacMillan 2001, 5).

Several of the representatives of these countries in the outer circle, however, were reasonably influential, partly because of the need of the big three to have a second layer of involved states to help to stabilize the whole process. Big powers need middle powers to help control the smaller powers. The middle powers will then "borrow" power from the dominant nations, disciplining the host of small states in the international system. Of the six countries that were allied to the "Victorious Three," Poland was first, as it was after all the only major power in Europe that had been washed from the map more than a century before, but that now had to perform an important function in the postwar system as a buffer between Germany and Russia. Whatever the Allies wanted with Poland, Polish General Josef Pilsudski created his own reality by defeating the Red Army outside Warsaw in August 1920 and thereby creating a large Poland including substantial Ukrainian and other minorities. Romania sent Ion Bratianu to Paris, a chief spokesman for the ideal of a greater Romania. Bratianu managed this by blackmailing the Allies with the Soviet threat, as well as by creating new realities on the ground, as Poland did. He was backed up by the assertive Romanian Queen Marie, who travelled to Paris to court the Big Three. The Czechs, who now controlled the heartland of Austria–Hungary's industrial potential, could easily take the spoils as well: Hungary's Slovakia and Ruthenia. The Czech leaders, Eduard Benes and Thomas Masaryk, managed to build a democratic state in the heart of Europe—quite an exception. The charming and diplomatic Benes, representing the Czech Republic in Paris, was helped enormously by the delays in decision making, which gave his country the opportunity to annex regions with large Hungarian and Ukrainian minorities (MacMillan 2001, 240–242). Austria, which was completely dismembered, remained alive as an orphan that was cut off from the "German Fatherland" until the Second World War, when it tried to settle its identity, with two civil wars as a consequence.

Although at odds with each other, the Serbs—represented by Nikola Pašić—and the Croats—by Ante Trumbić—were overtaken by realities when Prince Alexander of Serbia proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, including Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo, and occupying the Banat in the process. Hungary became independent, sent the communist leader Béla Kun to Paris, but lost most of its territory in the wars against Romania in 1919, just after the end of the so-called Great War. Alexander Stamboliski, the Bulgarian Prime

Minister, did what he could in Paris, but Bulgaria was diminished to its core, be it less savagely than in Hungary. The Greeks, who sent Prime Minister Venizelos to Paris, managed to keep the territories that it had conquered during the war, expanding even to Eastern Trace and Smyrna, which were lost when Ataturk drove them out of Turkey a few years later. The Ottoman Empire, which collapsed like Austria–Hungary, successfully regained its lost territories in Anatolia, Kurdistan, and Trace after the Turkish war of independence. China, which was represented by Prime Minister Lou Tseng-Tsiang, refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, as the former German territory of Shandong—occupied by the Japanese—was not returned to the Middle Kingdom. China was the only participating country that did not sign.

Belgium received minor compensations for its enormous losses in lives and goods, and the Dominions remained in the British Empire, but received a higher status and were allowed separate membership of the League of Nations. Some of the Dominions, such as South Africa and Australia, could expand their reach, being enlarged with former German colonies as "trust territories."

Germany, meanwhile, was a special case (MacMillan 2001, 492–493). It lost its colonies, its fleet, big chunks of its territory, and it had to pay huge reparations. Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau led the German delegation at the signing ceremony at Versailles on April 29, 1919. The delegation was kept waiting for several days before it received the terms, and had only a few days to respond. The Diktat was born.

The Inner Ring

There were, of course, others inside the delegations of the Big Three who exerted influence on their leaders, although the overall impression remains that French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and President of the United States Woodrow Wilson were much more influenced by their own personality and the personality of their co-decision makers than by their foreign ministers, advisers, or minute takers, etc. Before turning to the personalities of the main decision makers, the seven most important players in the inner circle around the Supreme Council will have to be listed in alphabetical order (Duke International Security Conference 2005, 1–10): Alfred Balfour, member of the British delegation and foreign minister during the Great War, was seen as having a thoughtful demeanor that proved a balance to Lloyd George's boisterous, charismatic style. Count Macchi di Cellere, the Italian Ambassador in Washington DC, who worked closely with President Wilson, tolerated no disrespect, whether by action or by word, toward his country or its representatives. Edward House was the most important and loyal adviser to US President Wilson and worked well with Clemenceau and Balfour, but felt that Wilson could not effectively administer negotiations and agree to peace successfully. He strongly discouraged the President's decision to attend the conference and had hopes of leading the

American delegation in Paris himself. John Maynard Keynes was the leading economist of the British Treasury Department and saw Wilson as the only person with the moral authority to save Europe from another self-destructive war. Robert Lansing was former US Secretary of State to President Wilson and also wanted to be head of delegation, making President Wilson and Colonel House suspicious of his motives, which tainted their relations through the rest of the conference. French Foreign Minister Stephan Pichon's most important asset was his diplomatic skill, as he was skilled at finding points of agreement between negotiating parties and at gaining favorable compromises. Finally, Baron Sidney Sonnino, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, had little belief in the concept of the League of Nations or any other Wilsonian ideals and had an extremely negative attitude toward the French.

Of the main decision makers, French Prime Minister Clemenceau, who presided over the conference, will be discussed first. A provincial French medical doctor and shrewd negotiator, he was nicknamed "the Tiger." It was said that "he comes from a family of wolves," which did not mean that he was estranged from his own feelings, as "when he heard that the Germans had agreed to an armistice […] he put his head in his hands and wept" (MacMillan 2001, 38–39). Clemenceau's main drive was the interests of France and, above all, his hatred of the Germans, which had been kindled by the Franco–German War over 40 years earlier. This hatred obviously blinded him to solutions that might not later have sparked the resentment of the Germans, which was one of the main inducements of the Second World War. As Machiavelli once said, a statesman should always avoid creating resentment among his adversaries. This obsession with his eastern neighbor made Clemenceau open the Paris Conference on the day of the anniversary of the coronation of Wilhelm II in Versailles and to close it with the formal signing of the treaties in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles, where the Prussian King had been crowned Emperor of Germany in 1871. His hatred also induced Clemenceau to occupy the Rhineland and the Saarland and to demand enormous reparations, which caused the economic downfall of the democratic Weimar Republic with its unstable coalition governments. He ignored voices in the French government against these measures, including from one of his young assistants in that government, Jean Monnet. The time was not yet ripe for cooperation, just for competition, or, better, domination and oppression.

Clemenceau was politically isolated, so he had to rely on himself and his closest friends. He did, however, have a good relationship with the French military and the French press. His frictions were with parliament. The newly elected Chamber of Deputies of the French National Assembly was hostile toward him, as he kept the parliamentarians out of the peace talks. His main struggle, however, was with France's President Raymond Poincaré. Clemenceau and Poincaré disliked each other intensely. According to the President, Prime Minister Clemenceau was a "Madman […] vain man" (MacMillan 2001, 40), as he wrote in his diary. Clemenceau's relationship with his two direct co-negotiators was not too bad, but was not too good either. Wilson and Lloyd George had much more contact with each other than with Clemenceau. Lloyd George saw the French prime minister as

being a "disagreeable and rather bad tempered old savage" (MacMillan 2001, 43). For his part, Clemenceau mistrusted Lloyd George, seeing him as unreliable, while he regarded Wilson as a naïve man whose ideas about self-determination would produce a powder keg in the new Europe. Although Clemenceau presided over the negotiation sessions with authority, he could turn savage, as he regularly did if the negotiations reached stalemate. He literally created hurting stalemates by shouting and storming out of the negotiation room. Whether this was pure tactic, or indeed a genuine emotional rage, is unknown, but it could have been both.

Lloyd George seemed to love devious methods. "He was a politician of formulae rather than principles, […] quick-witted and voluble—the septuagenarian Clemenceau lamented 'si je pouvais pisser comme Lloyd George parle'—his adroitness in debate was sharpened by long practice and by unconcern for self-contradiction" (Pearton 1993, 73). One is tempted to link this to the opinions about British negotiation style: highly effective but quite unreliable, and perhaps therefore so successful in reaching the desired results in the British interests. While training British civil servants for their presidency of the European Union, trainers observed the British diplomatic way of pragmatically dealing with the process of international negotiation, while striving without much scruple for an outcome that is favorable to the UK (Hemery and Meerts 2006). The British prime minister seemed to fit into his English culture perfectly. The question then arises of to what extent his attitude was a personal or a cultural characteristic. As was observed with Clemenceau, the answer is probably both. Lloyd George was not quite aware of the European issues and shared this lack of awareness with the British main negotiator at the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, Lord Castlereagh. He was careless with appointments, could be quite ruthless in attempts to prevail over others, was of a domineering character, and had a problem in personal bonding. At the same time, however, he could be extraordinarily persuasive and charming—again, the true stereotype of the typical British diplomatist. During the negotiations, Lloyd George tried to balance Wilson and Clemenceau, and when asked whether he thought he had been successful, he answered that he thought he had done well, being seated between "Jesus Christ and Napoleon."

According to "Napoleon" (that is, Clemenceau), Lloyd George was "devious and untrustworthy," "shockingly ignorant," while "all arguments were good to him [Lloyd George] when he wishes to win a case and, if necessary, he uses the next day arguments which he had rejected and refuted the previous day," while to Wilson, Lloyd George simply "lacked principle" (MacMillan 2001, 41, 43 and 48):

> He was a politician of formulae rather than principles. He preferred oral to written agreements. He did not command universal trust, […] had an unconcern for self-contradiction. He made decisions on grounds of authority to act at once […] His greatest weakness, namely the lack of detailed background in foreign affairs […] led him blithely to discuss the problem of Silesia in the belief that he was settling the fate of a province in Asia Minor (Pearton 1993, 73).

(That vilayet was obviously Cilicia in southeastern Turkey, rather than Silesia, the region in Central Europe.) His short sightedness did not preclude his far

sightedness, however: "after the [signing] ceremony, Lloyd George commented presciently that 'we shall have to do the whole thing over again in 25 years at three times the cost'" (Reynolds 2007, 30)—he was exactly right. Like President Nixon and Henry Kissinger in their dealings with the Soviets and the People's Republic of China, Lloyd George did not consult the Foreign Office, which—just like in the cases of Nixon and Kissinger—boomeranged, as serious oversights could not be corrected by the experts. In conclusion, "He was universally respected for his boundless energy and strong work ethic, but his bluntness and sharp tongue endeared him to few people. Nevertheless, he was very popular among the British people and politicians of both parties" (Duke International Security Conference 2005, 3).

Finally, we come to Woodrow Wilson, perhaps the most complicated of the three main negotiators (Nordholt 1992). He was seen as a hypochondriac professional academic and as having a hard time understanding the Realpolitik of the epoch. His most important contribution was the (in)famous 14 points, including the creation of a League of Nations of which the USA was not going to be a member. He was an idealist, who thought of himself as being morally right. According to Clemenceau, "talking to Wilson is something like talking to Jesus Christ. In public, Wilson was stiff and formal, but with his intimates he was charming and even playful. He was usually in perfect control of himself, but during the Peace Conference he frequently lost control of his temper" (MacMillan 2001, 15 and 26):

> He became mesmerized by the strength and neatness of the phrases that he devised. […] He regarded himself as a prophet designated to bring light to a dark world. Yet, if we read again the tremendous sermons that he delivered during 1918, we shall find in them the seeds of the jungle of chaos that today impedes and almost obliterates the processes of rational negotiation. He failed to realize that the public is bored by foreign affairs until a crisis arises; and that then it is guided by feelings rather than by thoughts (Nicolson 1998, 85 and 87).

Wilson's aim was to avoid another world war, but his concept of world peace did not last and did not work. The idea of self-determination, which was not even clear to Wilson himself, did spark a series of minor conflicts during the interbellum period. Self-determination is not at all equivalent to independence, but to the masses and the politicians who manipulated them, it was interpreted as such. Perception determines reality, and so many conflicts were born. Why independence for some and not for all? Wilson's own interpretation of self-determination, being the right of peoples to decide on their own form of government, was not concrete enough to preclude any other vision that might be at odds with it. Wilson was far from being straight in the implementation of his vision:

> On reaching Paris, President Wilson quickly decided that by 'diplomacy' he had not meant 'negotiation', but only the results of that negotiation, namely treaties. He decided that the Phrases 'openly arrived at' and 'in the public view' were relative only and contained nothing that need deter him from conduction of prolonged secret negotiations with Lloyd George and Clemenceau […] The general public, however, […] continued to assume that by 'diplomacy' was meant both policy and negotiation. This is perhaps the most confusing of all fallacies that we owe to President Wilson (Nicolson 1998, 85–86).

Finally, we come to the fourth member of the "Supreme Council," the Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. A professor of law, diplomat, and politician, Orlando had striven for Italy to leave the bloc of the Central Powers and join the Entente. In doing so, Italy suffered severe losses, but gained South Tyrol, Trieste, and some other minor territories. This was perceived as a great injustice and gave rise to problems with Yugoslavia about Istria. As Orlando did not get what he wanted, and as his government was weakened beyond measure by his failure to get what he wanted, he left the conference in April 1919. Orlando saw himself and Italy as a victim of the Big Three: "I am indeed a new Christ […] and must suffer my passion for the salvation of my country" (MacMillan 2001, 306). He allowed Italy's conservative Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino to play an important role in Paris, and he resigned as prime minister before the signing of the Treaty. Orlando later supported Mussolini's rise to power and was connected to the Mafia during his entire political career.

The Second World War: Opening and Closure in Munich and Yalta

To categorize negotiations on the basis of the number of participants is useful, but also difficult. It is useful because the number of participants has a great impact on the flow of the negotiation process: the more actors, the more complexity, but also the more richness. The struggle with complexity is the main issue in multilateral bargaining. How can one manage the chaos? One needs good procedures, rules and regulations, effective chairs, a strong secretariat, and negotiators who are well aware of the organization's culture to set the boundaries and inner structure of the conference, etc. The management of complexity might be the main skill that negotiators of conference diplomacy have to possess; their advantage will be the choices that they have. Multilateral negotiation does generate many obstacles, but a lot of opportunities as well: multi-party, multi-issue, a multitude of problems as well as solutions, plus partial solutions for the power problem. It is, after all, easier to counterbalance the power of the powerful if many of them are present. Coalitions will ease the differences in strength and give the weaker parties a tool in playing the strong off against each other. The advantage of bilateral or trilateral bargaining is its transparency and speed. Multilateral negotiations tend to be slow, although there might be more assured outcomes. Bi- or trilateral negotiations could be speedy, but there might be more less-assured outcomes. It is also more difficult to deal with the power problem, but procedures are less of an issue and the directness allows for more personal influence. In bi- or trilateral negotiations, as well as in multilateral negotiation, much remains the same as well: the question of mandates and the relationship with the constituency.

This chapter postulates that the smaller the circle of negotiators, the greater the impact of power and personality. What, however, about prestige? What about "egotiation"? One could expect them to be more of a problem than in multilateral

negotiations, because the negotiators are, after all, more directly connected in small forums. The counter-argument would be that the defense of prestige, and thereby the risk of "egotiation," is less if the negotiator is not exposed to many colleagues, let alone to public opinion. This is why secret and back-channel negotiations are often the preferred mode. It is also less because it is much easier for negotiators who operate in small groups to influence each other and thereby to put a limit to the tendency to "egotiate." The downside is groupthink. The risk of groupthink is much bigger than in multilateral negotiation processes. Although the number of parties does influence the people, power structure, flow of the process, and the product of their work, it remains difficult to link this fully with maximized-party and minimized-party negotiations. After all, talks between two, three, four, or five negotiators are essential for progress in multilateral meetings. While we have to characterize the Paris Peace Conference as multilateral, we also saw that in reality it was very much a trilateral process. However, this trilateral negotiation also had multilateral aspects, as advisers in the Inner Circle were quite involved and influential, actors in the Outer Circle did exert some influence, and the constituency back home—as well as public opinion—was part of the overall flow as well. In other words, bi- and trilateral negotiations have a multilateral dimension and multilateral talks are dependent on bi- and trilateral meetings within them. It seems, however, that the essence of the process of international negotiation can only be handled in groups of up to five actors, which we might label as the "core caucus" of the negotiation.

Munich 1938

The Munich negotiation process can perhaps be termed the mother of catastrophic negotiation processes. It was seen by Western leaders as a huge mistake: Britain and France selling out Czechoslovakia to Adolf Hitler and thereby opening the road for German hegemony of Eastern Europe up to the borders of the Soviet Union. This is true, although the question remains of what the alternatives would have been. Adolf Hitler himself was not as happy with the outcome of the Munich conference as one would presume:

> […] er wollte […] alles, was ihm vorschwebte, zu seinem Lebzeiten schaffen. Er hatte keine Zeit. Das Münchener Abkommen, in dem Freund und Feind mit Recht einen märchenhaften Triumph Hitlers sahen, empfand er selbst geradezu als Niederlage: Es war nicht nach seinem Willen gegangen, er hatte aus der Hand Englands und Frankreichs entgegennehmen müssen, was er lieber mit Gewalt genommen hätte, und er hatte Zeit verloren. So erzwang er 1939 den Krieg, der ihm 1938 entgangen war (Haffner 2011, 125–126).

Hitler felt restrained by the Munich agreement and was taken by surprise by the peace efforts of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain:

> By the summer of 1938, Hitler was convinced that the Czech problem had to be resolved by war: this had become for him a test of personality. At the same time, across the North Sea, a mirror-image situation was developing: for Chamberlain the search for peace had become almost an ego trip' (Reynolds 2007, 41).

Chamberlain's determination to be successful and to save Britain and the world from disaster had its root in his family history. His father, Joseph, was one of the heroes of liberal politics in the nineteenth century, although he never became prime minster. The son wanted to do better than the father and he was ready to take the necessary risks for that, in competition with his half brother Austin: "As the marginal man in this fiercely proud family, Neville would always be less than human if he did not sense a chance to outdo his father and his brother in the battle for reputation. [… He] was always measuring himself against his father and brother" (Reynolds 2007, 50). In order not to be hindered in his endeavor concerning Adolf Hitler, he ignored his Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, who resigned because he felt bypassed. Chamberlain's personal mission took off, and nobody could stop him but reality. He began to overestimate himself and told his sisters: "now I have only to raise a finger and the whole face of Europe is changed." Acknowledging the publication of H.A.L. Fisher's new History of Europe in March 1938, he replied: "At the present moment I am too busy trying to make the history of Europe to read about it" (Reynolds 2007, 49).

Without consulting the British Foreign Office, Chamberlain offered to visit Hitler in his residence "the Berghof" on the Obersalzberg above the town of Berchtesgaden, although the German Foreign Ministry had been fully engaged through its Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop from the very first moment. It was an unprecedented step, to go to the wolf's lair, and Chamberlain did not even take an interpreter with him. Dr Paul Schmidt, interpreter of the German Foreign Ministry, acted as interpreter. This, of course, could and did lead to miscommunications, as Chamberlain could not check on Schmidt's words. At first he did not even receive a transcript of the minutes made by Schmidt. The talks lasted for one day and were a mere exchange of opinions and arguments. They nevertheless raised expectations of a peaceful solution, as Hitler showed his readiness to discuss the contentious issues in something that looked like a dialog. As history showed later, however, this dialog was not for real, nor were the follow-up talks in Bad Godesberg. This second encounter was anyway much grimmer than the first. This time Chamberlain took his First Secretary Ivone Kirkpatrick, who spoke German fluently. Hitler did make some minor concessions, but in reality the British were eaten on the spot and Hitler got what he wanted on the question of the Sudeten Germans. The meeting did not give any reason for optimism and ended in an icy atmosphere (Reynolds 2007, 75–80).

As a next step, Chamberlain proposed a four-power meeting, with the Italians and the French also present. This was very much welcomed by Italy's Benito Mussolini (known as the Duce), who feared that a German invasion of Czechoslovakia would further upset the balance of power between the Hitler's Third Reich and Mussolini's fascist Italy. Hitler thus invited the Duce, Prime Minister of France, Édouard Daladier, and Chamberlain to come to Munich. This was the third time in a row on German territory, and the Czechs were not invited. At the end of the meeting, Chamberlain and Hitler held a bilateral meeting about the issue of Anglo-German relations in the future, whose resolution was reluctantly undersigned by Hitler. It stated that "We are resolved that the method of

consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of differences and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe" (Reynolds 2007, 95). The meetings were prepared amateurishly, and in that sense, there is not much of a difference from the Paris Conference discussed earlier in this chapter, or for that matter the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815. There were no briefing papers, no position papers, no planning, no strategy, and no profiles of the main negotiators—nothing of the kind. In such a situation, the danger of so-called salami tactics being used by the other side is immanent. Without overall planning, it is difficult to trace the trade-offs, and one side might walk off with the biggest part of the cake because it got more in every distributive bargaining, precluding integrative win–win outcomes. "In short, Hitler was a much more effective negotiator than Chamberlain, but he never wanted to negotiate, whereas Chamberlain, a less skilled tactician, got what he really wanted—peace not war" (Reynolds 2007, 99). In other words, Chamberlain's need for a settlement was much greater than Hitler's, and by being the "demandeur," he had to concede much more than his opponent.

What about the personality and the position of Adolf Hitler? While Chamberlain had a short-term plan of preventing war, Hitler had a long-term strategy: dominating Europe in his lifetime (Reynolds 2007, 100). In order to do this, he had to swallow Austria and Czechoslovakia in a peaceful way in order to be able to attack Poland and thereby dominate the whole of Eastern Europe up to the Soviet border. The final goal was to conquer Russia, but in order to do so, he had to subdue France first in order to overcome the classic German dilemma of a war on two fronts. Britain, it was thought, would then be so isolated that it would have to accept German hegemony over Europe—actually, it would be more apt to say to accept Hitler as the hegemon. For Hitler, the German people were merely tools in his conquest and the fulfillment of his second aim: the destruction of the Jewish people on the European continent. After the German failure to take Moscow, Hitler's dream of a pan-European Third Reich dominated by the "Germanic race" withered away, leaving him with his second target: to sweep away the "Semitic race." He thought in terms of peoples, not of states. Actually, he destroyed the German state system, in order not to be bothered by laws and institutions. Everything should circle around "der Führer," and thus the state had to wither away, like in Marxism, but for reasons of autocracy, not of equality. He was a criminal, political Darwinist, with a complete lack of empathy—unable to make intimate friends among men and women—who did not allow for much of a compromise. His tool was war, not negotiation. Like Chamberlain, he grossly overestimated himself until the bitter end (Haffner 2011, 13).

Yalta 1945

While Munich stood at the beginning of the Second World War, Yalta marked the end. This exclusive trilateral negotiation by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill

can be seen as the real closure negotiation of the Second World War. Although the Potsdam Conference in July and August 1945 was the last wartime summit, it did not change the foundations laid in Yalta in February 1945. The leaders' personalities played a prominent role:

> Of the three, Roosevelt probably had the greatest strengths and the least coherent conception of how to utilize them. Roosevelt was […] jaunty, self-possessed, confident, cheerful and capable of inspiring trust and affection. [However,] he held no well-defined or sophisticated world view […] Roosevelt saw himself as a realistic Wilsonian (Buhite 1986, 11–12).

Moreover,

> The President was a 'feely' politician, operating on a blend of intuition and experience, and his approach shaped his views of both Hitler and Stalin. FDR knew Germany well, or at least the Kaiser's Germany before the First World War. Speaking to [US] senators in January 1939, Roosevelt described the German leader as a 'wild man', 'walking up and down the room for hours on end', 'pounding the table and making speeches'. 'We should call him a "nut"'. The contest between Roosevelt and Hitler became very personal, whereas Churchill's animus was directed at German militarism and autocracy (Reynolds 2007, 108–109).

This brings us to Churchill:

> Churchill's world view rose from his concern that a single power, regardless of its ideology, might dominate the European continent. [He was] a man of great courage. […] especially his ability to use the language, stood unequalled among his countrymen […] What he possessed in learning and eloquence, he lacked in patience. He would be terribly impressed with his own performance, and then become bored, refuse to hear responses […] A better negotiator than Roosevelt, he was still surprisingly ill prepared. While voluble and emotional, at the same time he was insufficiently persistent. Churchill also suffered bouts of extreme depression, which tended to immobilize him. Many men of great prominence, whose aggressive behavior allows them to perform brilliantly toward opponents, turn their hostility inward once a foe is vanquished or an issue resolved. A man of massive ego […] 'Of course I am an egotist', he said to Clement Attlee. 'Where do you get if you aren't?' He had the egotist concept of leadership (Buhite 1986, 14–16).

As for Stalin, it has been observed that "Joseph V. Stalin [… était] un homme parvenu par les moyens les plus pervers au sommet de la puissance et n'y ayant pas trouvé ce qui'il en attendait, un homme totalement désabusé" (Laloy 1988, 15). Moreover,

> Stalin's style was that of recluse. The author of a psychological portrait of Stalin suggests that he was the quintessential paranoid personality. A vain, power-hungry man with a keen sense of his own inferiority, he harbored intense jealousies and a mean, vindictive spirit, […] mastering the art of manipulating people and laying them off against each other for his own benefit (Buhite 1986, 17).

In addition, "Although Stalin had a sharp mind and a prodigious memory, he had always had an inferiority complex about his lack of formal education; he was also deeply xenophobic" (Reynolds 2007, 115). "His greatest strength in Yalta lay in the Russian contribution to the war effort and the positioning of the Soviet forces" (Buhite 1986, 18). It was much more Roosevelt than Churchill who wanted to keep Stalin on board the alliance, also because Roosevelt still believed at Yalta that he needed the Russian war effort in the Pacific to underpin the American struggle

against Japan: "Yalta est donc l'effort ultime de Roosevelt pour preserver l'entente avec l'URSS" (Laloy 1988, 9).

During the meeting, Stalin had the advantage of being on his home front, while Roosevelt in particular had to travel a long way and suffered increasingly from his weak health. Even Churchill arrived worn out by the long war years:

> Summitry requires quick wits and mental stamina. Arriving at Yalta, neither Churchill nor Roosevelt seemed to be at their best. Both he and Roosevelt listened intently to Stalin. Churchill watched the Soviet leader even when his words were being translated. […] Conference diplomacy is about resolving differences through an interlocking set of compromises and trade-offs, in which no party gains everything but all get something and concede something. This is what happened at Yalta. Over the first two days, the Big Three brought most of the diplomatic issues to the table. From Wednesday, February 6, the deals began to be made (Reynolds 2007, 122–125).

The atmosphere seems to have been amicable, but the Soviet leader's position precluded many of the decisions that were taken. The facts on the ground were decisive, but this did not mean that emotions were absent:

> Of the two leaders [Roosevelt and Churchill], Churchill was more hard-line and often highly emotional. The only point when Roosevelt lost his cool was when Stalin protested about peace feelers made by the German army in Italy to US emissaries in Bern. […] He was furious—face flushed, eyes flushing (Reynolds 2007, 150–151).

Roosevelt's answer to Stalin was, according to Churchill, "about the hottest thing I have ever seen so far in diplomatic intercourse" (Reynolds 2007, 151). It worked, because Stalin withdrew his complaint: "Stalin was indeed a skillful negotiator, letting the others do the talking and saving his succinct remarks for the right moment. Nevertheless, Churchill's more bombastic approach should not be underrated: it wore down the other two over France and German reparation" (Reynolds 2007, 159).

The Cold War: Attempts to Unfreeze in Vienna, Beijing, Moscow and Geneva

To negotiate during the Cold War was not an easy task. With the threat of nuclear destruction, both the USSR and the USA became increasingly aware of the necessity to start talking, to create a safety net in case of unintended escalation and the danger of unleashing their nuclear arsenals. While it was feasible during the First and Second World Wars to have a victorious party (not to belittle those wars' disastrous consequences), a Third World War would certainly end in catastrophe for all of the parties concerned: a lose–lose outcome. Negotiation, then, was the only way out. The first case in this section deals with a very difficult, but serious, attempt to bridge the gap between the two superpowers. It failed. The second and the third cases were already more successful and opened the road to the fourth case, which was indeed a success. Although a very precarious and bumpy process, it laid the foundations for

the end of the Cold War half a decade later. With this, the chain of events that started with the Balkan Wars at the beginning of the twentieth Century came to an end with the inner-Yugoslav/Balkan War resulting from the implosion of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia—one century from a Balkans to Balkans crisis, with negotiation processes trying to prevent, manage, and end the use of violence as an instrument in international relations in and around the European continent.

Vienna 1961

US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev were the egos clashing at the summit meeting in Vienna in 1961. Khrushchev appeared to be the dominant figure in their encounters, being much more experienced than Kennedy. Actually, this took Kennedy by surprise and the Soviet leader exploited his situational advantage in a very skillful way by turning the negotiation into an ideological show of force. Khrushchev, from Ukrainian peasant ancestors and lacking serious formal education, appeared to be a ruthless negotiator, confirming the stereotypes about Russian bargaining styles (Meerts 2009, 4–8):

> Khrushchev retained a huge inferiority complex about his lack of education and culture and was always alert to condescension, real or imagined, at home and abroad. Stalin, too, had such a complex, but Khrushchev was not as good at concealing it. Nor, unlike his patron, could Khrushchev control his explosive temper: within seconds he could shift from good humor to foul-mouthed abuse. At their first meeting in Geneva in 1955, the Soviet leader seemed a frankly 'obscene figure' to the elegant, urban Macmillan [the UK Prime Minister], who wondered if 'this fat, vulgar man, with his pig eyes and his ceaseless flow of talk' could really be the head of a great country' (Reynolds 2007, 169).

Khrushchev's attitude was one of the reasons for his split with Mao Zedong (Reynolds 2007, 170), and it gave John F. Kennedy a very hard time.

Kennedy, a believer in negotiation as a tool in international relations, also saw the limits of this instrument. His famous saying that one should never negotiate out of fear, but nevertheless never fear to negotiate, is a case in point. Kennedy had a complicated family background. Like Chamberlain, he had to struggle with a dominant father figure, Joseph Kennedy, and an elder brother who was meant to be a politician but who died at too young an age, while his other brothers were groomed to play an important role in US politics as well. Given the Irish and Roman Catholic background of the family, there were also aspects of emancipation involved, perhaps not as much as in the case of Khrushchev—after all, Kennedy did attend Harvard Law School—but nevertheless. According to Thomas Mongar, ego structures are of two basic types, namely "satellizing" and deviant. "Satellizing" occurs when a child is intrinsically valued, but Mongar adds:

> Alternatively, if the child thinks he has been extrinsically valued, he will protect his omnipotent self-image (and) will attempt to increase his capacity to perform to meet the burden of vastly inflated aspirations. Kennedy's 'ego profile' is almost a perfect representation of the deviant structure. Deflation of aspiration was ruled out because of the

> neurotic pressures for achievement from the family. The only remaining alternative was a massive effort to inflate his performance capacities, which required a strategy of managing the symptoms of his neurosis and turning his weaknesses into competitive assets (Mongar 1969, 206–208).

Notwithstanding—or perhaps because of his chronic back problems—Kennedy managed to become US President.

In May 1961, Bobby Kennedy, John's younger brother, had a preparatory back-channel meeting with Georgi Bolshakov from the Soviet Embassy in Washington DC, a close friend of Khrushchev's son-in-law. Events then started to roll, partly managed through official diplomatic channels by US Ambassador to the USSR Llewellyn Thompson and his Soviet counterpart Ambassador Mikhail Menshikov and partly through the aforementioned back channel, trying to overcome the two main obstacles: Berlin and Vietnam:

> Each leader was going with his own list of priorities and with a confidence that, if he played it tough, the other man would come around. Each had fundamental blind spots about his adversary. The world has moved a long way since the days of Hitler and Chamberlain – communications had been transformed and information was much fuller – yet the psychological barriers to summitry were much the same (Reynolds 2007, 199).

The summit took place in Vienna from June 3 to 4, 1961. On the first day, Kennedy and Khrushchev met in the residence of the US Ambassador to Austria, surrounded by their staff. They exchanged ideological arguments about communism and capitalism, a debate in which the Soviet leader was much more versed that the President: "the [US] ambassador was shaken that Kennedy seemed to be taking one hit after another from the Soviet leader. In an effort at rational discussion, the president had ended up on the defensive in an ideological argument, even conceding that the Bay of Pigs had been a misjudgment" (Reynolds 2007, 203). On the second day, they met at the Soviet Embassy in Vienna. No progress was made and emotions rose, for example, with Khrushchev's comparison of the death toll of the USSR and the USA during the Second World War. A face-to-face bilateral meeting —with only interpreters present—did not bring any progress.

Beijing and Moscow 1972

Approximately ten years later, US President Richard Nixon was preparing for summitry with both Chinese leader Mao Zedong and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev. The Americans had learned from Vienna, and they prepared much more thoroughly through back-channel preparatory talks, in which US Security Adviser Henry Kissinger played a decisive role, a role in which he himself was perfectly aware. In the run-up to the Moscow meeting, the Americans strengthened their position enormously by creating a "best alternative to a negotiated agreement," the alternative being talks with Beijing before the Moscow summit was due. It was vital that the back-channel talks with the Chinese would not be leaked to the Soviet Union. Kissinger therefore had to act without consulting the US State Department. He flew to Pakistan

and from there, in secret and with only a few security men, to Beijing. As in the case of Chamberlain's flight to Berchtesgaden to meet with Hitler in 1938, Kissinger did not take an interpreter with him. Kissinger conferred with Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai for seventeen hours. He was duly impressed by the cultivated Zhou.

> As we now know, Zhou was treated by Mao as his round-the-clock diplomatic factotum, forced at times to grovel even more basely than Gromyko did before Khrushchev. In 1972 Mao denied Zhou treatment for bladder cancer lest his premier outlive him, and even refused to pass full diagnosis' (Reynolds 2007, 240).

They decided that Nixon would fly to Beijing for a meeting with Mao before his summit in Moscow. The Kissinger mission upset the Russians so much that Nixon's hand in his negotiations with Brezhnev was substantially strengthened—one of the reasons why the Moscow meeting became a success.

Nixon was an unemotional and tough "Real Politiker." Nevertheless, like any other human being, he has an Achilles' heel: jealousy. As it was in US interests to make the trip to Beijing known to the Soviets, Kissinger talked to the media extensively, taking the credit for the meeting with Zhou Enlai. President Nixon was furious and decided that he would not allow Kissinger the same media attention in the case of Moscow: "Still chafing at Kissinger's self-promotion, Nixon stressed on numerous occasions during the flight that no one else must be in view when he and his wife descend from Air Force One. Just to make sure, a burly Secret Service agent blocked the aisle after they landed" (Reynolds 2007, 243). Nixon negotiated with Zhou Enlai and paid a courtesy visit to Mao Zedong. So-called ping-pong diplomacy was born. However, as the US State Department was only involved at the very last moment, while Secretary of State William Rogers was kept out of the talks with Zhou Enlai, Kissinger made two serious mistakes. He agreed to a wording in the final communiqué that was detrimental to Taiwan. He therefore had to renegotiate the communiqué, which could have been avoided if China experts had been involved in the drafting. Nixon was not amused.

Such a mistake was made again in the final joint statement after the Moscow meeting with Brezhnev, a few months after Beijing. Kissinger met Brezhnev in Moscow on April 21, 1972. Again, the US State Department had been left in the cold, but it was drawn in a little when Nixon finally flew to Moscow to talk to Brezhnev. The Soviets managed to slot the term "peaceful coexistence" into the final communiqué, an ideological term that Kissinger did not value, as it meant a continued struggle between communism and capitalism and a final victory of the first made possible by the avoidance of war. The Kremlinologists of the US State Department were not allowed to participate in the drafting and so could not correct the text.

US Secretary of State William Rogers felt that Kissinger was "deceitful, egotistical, arrogant, and insulting. Kissinger felt that Rogers was vain, uninformed, unable to keep a secret" (Reynolds 2007, 246).

Kissinger found Brezhnev to be:

> […] very forceful, extremely nervous, highly unsubtle, quite intelligent but not of the class of the other leaders we have met. Brezhnev, as much as Nixon, wanted to portray himself as a political virtuoso and take political credit for the eventual agreement. For his part, Nixon

> was struck by Brezhnev's physical presence and sheer 'animal magnetism'. [… As] Kissinger put it in his memoirs, 'Given Nixon's feelings about who should get the credit, I doubt that he would have agreed if we had proposed [to bring the arms control delegations to Moscow to work in conjunction with the summit]. We shall never know because I did not put forward the idea, not uninfluenced by vanity and the desire to control the final negotiation.' Time magazine had made [Kissinger] and Nixon joint Men of the Year for 1972, much to the president's fury. Even Kissinger begged the editors not to do it. If Watergate had not exploded, Kissinger might well have been a casualty of Nixon's jealousy in the second term (Reynolds 2007, 250, 268, 272 and 277).

Other personalities were involved, of course, such as President Nikolai Podgorny, Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on the Soviet side, but they did not play a decisive role.

On May 22, 1972, Nixon landed in Moscow for his summit with Brezhnev. They met alone, with interpreters but without Kissinger. Members of both delegations were to be included later. The atmosphere changed from moment to moment, like a rollercoaster, but in the end the two leaders arrived at a common understanding on matters such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and basic principles governing relations between the two superpowers. Furthermore, they signed six bilateral agreements. Thus, "The Moscow meeting was not seen as a contest between victors and losers, but as an understanding from which both sides gained" (Reynolds 2007, 274).

Geneva 1985

In November 1985, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan met in Geneva at a summit where they insulted each other, but also built a unique chemistry between them, as well as between their teams. This negotiation in Geneva foreshadowed the end of the Cold War. Ronald Reagan was a Cold Warmonger, but he was averse to nuclear weapons and wanted them out of the international security arena. Mikhail Gorbachev needed an end to the arms race with the Americans, as he needed the money for restructuring the Soviet Union and putting an end to its stagnating economy. Moreover, he feared a new arms race because of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the so-called Star Wars Program. Just because Reagan did not believe in mutual assured destruction (MAD), he wanted to build a missile defense system, and this threatened the credibility of the Soviet potential to retaliate in the case of a US nuclear attack (Reynolds 2007, 346). Both sides therefore had good reasons to negotiate and they did so in Geneva, starting on November 19, 1985 in Fleur d'Eau, where the Americans hosted the first session. The next day they met on the grounds of the Soviet mission. The two leaders had long face-to-face bilateral fireside talks, keeping their delegations at arm length. Although they had grave problems on content, their personal relationship evolved in such a way that they became tenacious about solving the problems between the

two superpowers, if not right away, then at least in the future. They cooperated in forcing their delegations to make headway. For example,

> [Reagan] concluded that earlier leaders had not accomplished very much. So he suggested, with Gorbachev nodding in agreement, that the two of them should simply say 'To hell with the past – we'll do it our way and get something done.' When an angry [US Secretary of State George] Schultz interrupted coffee to complain that [Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy] Kornienko […] was blocking agreement on parts of the joint statement, Gorbachev said smilingly to Reagan: 'Let's put our foot down.' Each took his delegation aside. In fact the Soviet Leader leaned harder on his staff to sort things out (Reynolds 2007, 381).

They both saw summitry as a process, not as a one-time event.

Gorbachev came from humble origins, but contrary to Stalin and Khrushchev, he had enjoyed an advanced education. He had, however, experienced traumatic events in his childhood. His grandfather suffered under the Stalinist purges, although he was a good and loyal communist. His father and elder brother were sent to the Front to fight the Nazis, and his brother never returned. Although Gorbachev was a true believer in Marxism–Leninism, he was pragmatic by nature (Gruyter 1993). It was this attitude that brought him close to Reagan, who was a pragmatic politician as well, notwithstanding his seemingly ideological conservative utterances. Reagan, with an optimistic view of life, was a team player. He thereby avoided the "egotiation" mechanisms that bedevilled egotist loners such as Nixon and Kissinger. The personalities of the leaders set a series of summits in motion, melting away the Cold War. It is important to note that the extraordinary understanding between Reagan and Gorbachev was quite exceptional

> […] However,] most leaders find it difficult to disentangle their country's national interests from their personal political goals. Yet it is essential to intuit these needs and goals, and it is even more vital to understand the other leader as a political animal, rather than merely a newfound 'friend.' The ultimate question, more political than diplomatic, is whether the leader feels that in the last resort he can afford to walk away empty-handed from the summit. Summitry is predicated on the idea that better personal relations can yield diplomatic benefits. This makes most leaders reluctant to have an open row at the summit […] Nevertheless,] lower-level negotiations between specialists are […] essential; they also allow the leader room to repudiate what has been tentatively agreed (Reynolds 2007, 429–431).

Discussion and Conclusion: Lessons for Theory and Practice

Looking back at the case studies, despite previously accepted limitations, a number of conclusions can be drawn regarding the impact of powerful prestigious personalities on the process and the product of international negotiation processes. Conventional understanding of potential negotiation failure emphasized the importance of preservation and promotion of specific interests through negotiation, which are generally prioritized over the achievement of a shared solution. In fact negotiations are rarely conducted for the sole purpose of achieving a solution.

Rather, the process is often constructed for the protection of particular negotiators' interests. Therefore, it is no surprise that negotiations often do not generate a commonly accepted solution as parties might use negotiations as a smokescreen and/or a tactical maneuver to regroup and garner outside sympathies and support. Looked from this rationalist angle, deadlocks in negotiations tend to be seen as a direct result of a calculated cost-benefit analysis by negotiators. However, as the case studies show, deadlocks are more than just a calculated choice. Individuals that act as negotiators bring to the table not only their mandate and set of priorities—they also bring their personal emotional profiles. As such, potential deadlocks can be liked also to their irrational side: the volatile nature of their emotional profile. While the mandate each negotiator has emphasizes a set of goals and priorities that need to be preserved, promoted, and potentially achieved through negotiations, depending on the circumstances negotiator's emotional profile—character, personal preferences, and emotions—can take precedence over the interests of the entity they represent. This process, which we termed "*egotiation*," inevitably has an impact on the negotiation process.

Parties opt to negotiate as a "way out" of their perceived deadlock. Consequently, the process serves as a "face-saving" method since the parties, aware that they are entrapped in the current conflict and are unable to escalate or de-escalate the situation to their favor, through negotiations aim to obtain more than what they can achieve by perpetuating the conflict (Zartman 2001a; Meerts 2005). The present case studies focused on the choices made by politicians and diplomats. The case studies support our initial proposition that under certain circumstances these actors will be more concerned with protecting the reputation (both personal and that of the entity/country they represent) than with finding a solution to the conflict they are currently in. The trade-off in this sense is that the face-saving aspect of negotiation is primarily related to the reputation which "precedes" the party, than with the potential image that party might obtain with the achievement of a specific solution. In other words, to borrow the terminology proposed by Zartman and Kremenyuk, the "face saving" becomes more "backward looking" than "forward looking" (Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005).

The second crucial element of our analysis represented the power aspect of negotiators. We defined power as a perceptive phenomenon: ability to induce a change in behavior on the part of one's counterpart/interlocutor, a change which otherwise would not be possible. In the realm of negotiation politicians are perceived as power brokers, individuals that strive to gain power and use it as a multi-functional tool: limiting and/or controlling others' behavior, and generating profits for themselves and the entity they represent. Among many forms of leverage in negotiation, reputation certainly represents one of the most important ones based on nonmaterial resources. Reputation can be observed as a two-way process: attributed characteristics from outside actors based on one's record of previous behavior and self-interpretation of these characteristic by the actor to whom they were attributed. In essence, reputational power allows an actor to bypass situations in which their involvement is either questioned or marginalized by their counterparts/interlocutors because "the reputation precedes the actor" in way that it allows to its counterparts

to predefine the role and potential impact of the actor even before the negotiation process has even started. With this premise, we postulated that in a dynamic process such as negotiations, negotiators' reputation is an asset that needs to be preserved and defended even more than specific material interests. As case studies show, interpretation of one's reputation is directly related to the "ego" of a politician or diplomat. More importantly, the case studies provide sufficient support for our claim that the more powerful the leader the bigger his or her ego, the bigger the impact of his/her ego-state on the negotiation process. Countless deadlocks which occurred in all of the case studies were a direct result of a calculation made by negotiators which saw that their first task was to protect their and their country's reputation and only once that was not jeopardized a solution could be sought after.

In such circumstances ego-driven individuals, concerned primarily with reputation, might have both a constructive and destructive impact on the negotiation. On the one hand, if "egos" are the common stakeholders of a given issue, they will be proud of their success and their ego may thus steer the process away from disaster. If leaders realize that victory is not possible or that in fact defeat is looming on the horizon, they might opt for joint victory through cooperation. Finally, their ego might actually be comforted by a positive outcome. As the case studies show, despite their strong "ego" structures politicians might be induced to assume a great deal of responsibility where others back down. After all, somebody has to do the job. Their role appears to be indispensable in crisis situations. In that sense, the ego question might have more positive than negative effects on negotiation processes. It all depends on the leaders' motivation for wanting to be the leader. On the one hand, ego distorts an objective view of the negotiators' interests, "hardens" the negotiations, and contributes to the loss of flexibility—flexibility that is needed to enter the give-and-take bargaining phase in negotiations.

Looking more closely at our case studies, a number of avenues for future research seem to open. First of all, while we managed to find support in our claim that there is a tendency of prioritizing reputation over specific goals that are at the discussed at the negotiation table, future research needs to illuminate what circumstances trigger such behavior. For instance, how much impact time-constrained crisis situations have on the process of prioritizing reputation over material gains. At the same time, as each future research could shed more light on whether a combination of specific emotional profiles actually yields particular outcomes. For instance, whose ideas and interests will get most transposed into the final outcome? Will this depend on the perceived power of the entity a negotiator represents (i.e., country) or his/her particular emotional profile. Or is it a combination of the two? While practitioners find that emotional profiles of their interlocutors play an important role in their negotiation processes, it is still difficult to understand if there is a suitable strategy, potentially "one size fits all" to deal with each particular emotional profile. Quantitative studies in this regard would be of greater help and could pave the road for better understanding of how to approach and prepare for the negotiations given the likelihood that one's counterparts might be primarily focused

in protecting and promoting their reputations instead of reaching a solution. Clues of how to avoid potential deadlocks stemming from such behavior thus represent an asset that should not be overlooked.

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