Indigenous Peoples' Movements, Developments, and Politics in Ecuador and Bolivia

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Setting the Stage

The Indigenous peoples of Bolivia and Ecuador share a centuries long history of conquest, domination, and resistance dating back to the 1500s (Stern 1987). Both the countries have large, predominantly rural, indigenous populations with important distinctions between highland and lowland nations; although at near 60 %, Bolivia's indigenous population almost doubles that of Ecuador.[1] In both countries, the highland population is by far the more numerous, geographically denser, ethnically and culturally more homogenous, has a longer and more intense history of contact with the dominant economy and society, and has developed a peasant-style agriculture based on small holdings. By contrast, lowland indigenous in the Amazon basin inhabit geographically much more extensive areas that are thinly populated and who practice subsistence economy. It was not until the 1960s and later, with the development of hydrocarbon extraction and the rapid expansion of agribusiness, that they came into significantly more intense contact with the dominant society.[2]

This chapter traces the trajectory of the modern indigenous peoples movement in these two countries over three distinct periods: formative years under national populism (1960s–1980s), leadership in cycles of anti-neoliberal contention (1980s–2005), and their relationship to the left governments that followed in the post neoliberal period (2006–present). It tells the story of their rise, relative decline, and current struggles. It also shows that for most of the national populist and neoliberal periods indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador developed along similar paths and then diverged sharply in the post neoliberal period. The narrative focuses on the largest movement campaigns, key protagonists, and changing relationships to the state from the 1950s and 1960s to the present. These were deeply influenced by the distinctive socioeconomic and political development models of each

[1] The figure for Bolivia is from the 2001 census and based on self-identification. The figure is controversial because preliminary figures for the 2012 census—also based on self-identification—is closer to 40 %. Hypothesis for this discrepancy abound, but in any case, Bolivia's indigenous population remains larger than Ecuador's.

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[2] In Bolivia, the highland population is predominantly Quechua or Aymara, they also live in the mountain valleys between highlands and lowlands. As the twentieth century wore on rural to urban migration accelerated, especially to the city of El Alto that looms over La Paz. Roughly 17 different indigenous nations inhabit the lowlands, among them Guaraní, Chiquitano, and Moxeño. Ecuadorean highland indigenous are mainly Quechua-speaking and are the descendants of indigenous nations that inhabited the area before the Inca. A sizeable migration to Quito and Cuenca has also occurred. Amazon basin nations include the Secoyas, Sionas, Cofan, Huaorani, Zaparo, Shuar, and Achuar. Since Ecuador is not landlocked, there are also coastal indigenous peoples such as the Chachis.

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period, which shaped the political opportunities and threats that indigenous peoples movements responded to. Of course, movement participants have agency, and so, drawing on a political process model of movements, we also examine how leaders perceived those opportunities and threats, built their organizations, and framed the issues, not just in terms of their movements, but in relation to other popular sector movements, political parties and the state (Tarrow 2011; Goldstone 2003).

National Populism and Indigenous Peoples' Movements, 1950s-mid-1980s

Following the crisis of mineral and agricultural elite-led oligarchic rule in the 1940s and 1950s that excluded popular sectors from politics, the national populist period in Bolivia and Ecuador turned to a more state-directed economic development model. Progressive democratic and military governments alike also sought to include the political, economic, and social grievances and demands of the popular sectors. Urban politics dominated the national-populist period, and so urban labor unions became the leading popular sector movement organizations (Collier and Collier 1991).

However, there was a rural component to the national-populist project in both Bolivia and Ecuador. During this period, the state mainly incorporated the highland indigenous population in the political arena via peasant unions, seeking to integrate them into the nation on the basis of class instead of indigenous identity. Land reform, infrastructure development, and state financial support for peasant agriculture benefited their communities. Lowland areas were just beginning to be integrated into the nation with the expansion of natural resource exploitation. Throughout this period, indigenous peasant unions were subordinate to urban labor unions, which were considered the leading transformative sector of the working class in the struggle against capitalist domination.

Bolivia The revolution of 1952, one of Latin America's few social revolutions, which was strongly supported by urban working classes and led by militant mine workers, ushered in the national populist period in Bolivia. Under the ensuing reformist democratic regime led by the middle-class Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario party (MNR), land reform, a key rural indigenous-peasant demand, was begun and the rural indigenous population organized into peasant unions to support it. Although land was redistributed, the material backing for peasant agriculture lagged. The military overthrew the democratic regime in 1964, set up a military government, and in the early 1970s established a Military–Peasant Pact to strengthen its rule. The military unified peasant unions in a state controlled confederation and promised to address peasant grievances. However, by the late1970s land taxes and repression alienated leaders of new peasant unions from the military government (Klein 2003).

As these organizational milestones unfolded, two strands of indigenous ethno-cultural identity within them—Katarismo and Indianismo—stimulated the formation of an independent indigenous peasant movement between 1968 and 1979. Katarismo, which initially dominated, combined class consciousness (defense of peasant interests) with advocacy for ethnic and cultural rights. This development had profound consequences for future struggles. First, it generated demands for a Bolivian state that was both tolerant of ethnic diversity and that included indigenous as well as Western governing forms (Healy and Paulson 2000). These demands eventually became enshrined in the constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia in 2009. Second, it facilitated alliance building with other social movements and leftist political parties (Van Cott 2005, p. 35), such as the main militant labor organization the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB).

The upshot of this second development was that, as the re-democratization movement was getting underway in 1978, the COB helped the Katarista peasant union leaders to form a politically independent unified peasant organization.

This was the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos Bolivianos (CSUTCB, Unitary Confederation of Syndicalized Bolvian Peasant Workers). It mainly represented highland peasants, including those of the Cochabamba valley, and it was affiliated with the COB. However, the CSUTCB did not enjoy much influence in the COB. The latter was dominated by mining and manufacturing unions whose Marxist orientation demanded the subordination of peasants to the vanguard of the proletariat (Ticona 2000, pp. 119–29). These difficulties aside, the indigenous-peasant movement's proclivity to enter into cross-class and cross-ethnic alliances was a key element in the development of cycles of anti-neoliberal contention that developed in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Ecuador Much like in Bolivia, the national populist state had organized indigenous communities under peasant identity and had a much greater impact on the highland indigenous population. Agrarian reform laws during the military governments of the 1960s and 1970s encouraged indigenous peoples to register as peasants. Legally chartered peasant communities strengthened indigenous community authority and customary law (Guerrero 1993). In the 1960s, they created the Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (FENOC).[3] With aid from FENOC, communities organized along corporatist lines to receive promised benefits, such as land, credit, and infrastructure improvement (Hurtado 1980; Isaacs 1993; Schodt 1987; Yashar 2005). Meanwhile in the Amazon region, oil development and colonist land invasions stimulated organizing by indigenous peoples, especially the Shuar (Gerlach 2003).

In the 1970s, highland and lowland indigenous had been organizing independently as well. By the late 1970s, highland indigenous organized the ECUARUNARI (Ecuador Runcunapac Riccarimui, Awakening of the Ecuadorian Indian) and lowland indigenous formed the CONFENIAE (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana, Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuadorian Amazonia). ECUARUNARI's framing of indigenous people's struggles mixed peasant issues such as land, prices for agricultural production and products, subsidies, and working conditions with indigenous ethnic and identity consciousness raising. It steadily displaced the class-oriented FENOC in indigenous communities. CONFENIAE grew in response to land grabs by landowners, colonists, and oil companies. Conserving and protecting territorial integrity was one of its top issues because it was inseparable from cultural and ethnic survival (Benavides 2004, pp. 140–41; Gerlach 2003; Selveston-Scher 2001; Yashar 2005; Zamosc 2004).

Neoliberalism, 1984–2005

As labor unions weakened during the neoliberal period in Bolivia and Ecuador, indigenous peoples' movements rose to lead the struggle against free-market economic restructuring programs. They stood at the core of heterogeneous leftist cross-class coalitions mobilizing against market reforms and for the reinstatement of state led development and welfare efforts. The period also witnessed the resurgence of indigenous identity as a key organizing principle; thus demands mixed claims for indigenous autonomy with material needs. In addition, Indigenous movements created political parties to take their fight more directly into the political arena. During this period, lowland indigenous groups experienced tremendous advances in the movement organization adding their associational power to that of highland indigenous unions.

The neoliberal period was paradoxical. On the one hand, it offered opportunities by encouraging organizational development based on indigenous identity in order to promote multiculturalism. The focus was on languages, festivals, rituals, cosmology and how culture informs the routines of everyday life. On the other hand, neoliberal

[3] The earliest indigenous people's organization was the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios (FEI), created along peasant-class lines in the 1940s. Agrarian reform was its major demand and once that was achieved in the 1960s the FEI declined rapidly.

economic reforms also presented threats (Almeida 2007). They harmed indigenous peoples materially and systematically excluded them from the policy process. This combination, with political decentralization, fanned the fires of indigenous mobilization.

Opportunities

In general, the neoliberal project excluded social forces from economic and social policymaking. However, in the interest of promoting formal equality the neoliberal project encouraged social movements as long as their activities were confined to non-economic arenas. Thus, governments emphasized formal recognition of individual and cultural rights of heretofore marginalized subaltern groups, such as indigenous peoples. It was assumed that formal equality before the law and promotion of cultural and ethnic diversity would not impact economic policymaking.

A key policy objective of the neoliberal project was to reduce the size and functions of the state in the economy and to strengthen local civil society. In order to bypass the state, international development agencies relied heavily on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for the delivery of services and programs and to promote civil society organization independent of the state. NGOs penetrated most heavily in areas where the organizations developed during the national populist period had little or no presence. As a result, NGOs promoting indigenous rights were most effective organizing movements among lowland ethnic groups, which tended to be more marginalized from the overall capitalist economy, relied more on subsistence economies, and had lower density populations spread out over much larger territories.

The central role of NGOs had another impact. They provided a link to the environmental movement. Indigenous peoples, especially those living in Amazonian regions, were considered victims of development. International organizations, especially the United Nations and later the World Bank, promoted indigenous rights and development that was environmentally sustainable. NGOs teamed with fledgling indigenous organizations to promote the demarcation of indigenous lands, national parks that would restrict large-scale development projects, and support alternative, ecologically friendly, small-scale community economies. They also advocated for environmental legislation. This alliance of environmental NGOs and indigenous people's organizations was important in both the anti-neoliberal protests and in the struggles of the post neoliberal period.

In Bolivia, beginning in the early 1980s, NGOs helped to organize two important organizations. One was the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB), the principal tropical lowland indigenous social movement organization.[4] CIDOB's principal struggle is against the expansion of the agricultural frontier and hydrocarbon exploration and development. The other was the CONAMAQ, which represented highland Aymara and Quechua who inhabit marginal pastoral lands and who are weakly integrated into markets, hence still attached to communal ways of production (Zegada et al. 2008).

In Ecuador in the 1980s the Shuar nation in Ecuador, along with NGOs, formed the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (CONFENIAE, Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon).[5] An important struggle was the fight against the environmental degradation of their lands and devastation of their communities due to oil exploitation (Gerlach 2003). In the 1980s and 1990s, international environmental NGOs strongly supported their struggles against international oil companies and the expansion of oil field exploitation. Environmental NGOs also linked up with specific communities in efforts

[4] Peoples that formed CIDOB included the Chiquitanos, Ayoreos, Guarayos, and Guaraníes.

[5] The other members are the Kichwa, Acuar, Siona, Secoya, Cofan, and Huaorani. The principal advisory NGO is CIPCA (Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado).

to establish protected areas. The Yasuní National Park became emblematic; it sat atop substantial oil reserves.[6]

Cycles of Anti-Neoliberal Contention

Despite these opportunities for cultural inclusion, the negative effects of neoliberal economic, social, and political reforms drove the indigenous movement organizations of Bolivia and Ecuador to protest with increasing intensity from 1990 to the early 2000s (Silva 2009). Between the initiations of neoliberal reforms in 1984/1985 to the early 1990s, it became clear that labor unions were too weakened to lead the struggle. As anti-neoliberal contention gathered momentum, first in Ecuador and then in Bolivia, the indigenous people's movement took on crucial leadership roles and built heterogeneous coalitions with labor, environmental, and urban popular sector and middle-class organizations. The leadership role was more clear cut in Ecuador under the direction of the Confederación Nacional de Indígenas Ecuatorianos (CONAIE, National Confederation of Indigenous Ecuadorians) than in Bolivia where no such overarching indigenous peoples confederation existed. We now turn to largest campaigns and their results.

Ecuador The next milestone in the development of the Ecuadorian Indigenous peoples organization and power occurred in 1986 when ECUARUNARI and CONFENIAE joined forces and formed the CONAIE in reaction to the initiation of neoliberal economic reforms during the administration of León Febres Cordero (1984–1988) (Yashar 2005). The intertwining of land and cultural survival issues united them. Febres Cordero's economic stabilization program, emphasizing fiscal retrenchment, cut subsidies to consumption for poor households and state sponsored construction work in rural areas, eliminated or drastically reduced state support for peasant agriculture, and devalued the currency. Steeply rising prices and income loss threatened already precarious livelihoods among rural poor indigenous communities whose inhabitants mostly owned tiny plots of land and depended on state subsidies to peasant agriculture and supplemental income to make ends meet. Moreover, the administration's emphasis on private enterprise and promotion of agribusiness threatened land tenure security in highlands and lowlands alike (Pallares 2002, pp. 210–11; Zamosc 1994). Deepening poverty and loss of land or farming capacity would destroy indigenous communities and with it their culture.

These threats spurred CONAIE to direct action.[7] In June 1990, CONAIE organized the first of several "National Indian Uprisings." The mobilization lasted 10 days, drew in unaffiliated peasant and indigenous organizations, and their novel forms of protest (such as the road block) paralyzed six commercially important highland provinces. The Indian Uprising transformed CONAIE into a national political actor and Ecuador's leading social movement.

CONAIE adroitly translated the threats posed by neoliberal economic reforms into common framing devices and demands that appealed to its diverse base. Land and access to state resources for community development and peasant agriculture were central issues. Other key framing devices and demands were more political and cultural, such as the right to self-management (*autogestión*) and self-government of indigenous communities. This eventually became the basis for constitutional claims for a plurinational state, which required the establishment of a constituent

[6] The Yasuni National Park is an area of 9820 km² between the Napo and Curaray rivers in Napo and Pastaza provinces in Amazonian Ecuador. It lies within the Napo moist forests ecoregion and is primarily rain forest.

[7] Initially CONAIE chose to advocate for cultural issues. In the early part of Rodrigo Borjas' administration (1988–1992) CONAIE successfully lobbied for bilingual programs and in 1988 the government established an Intercultural Bilingual Education Program that CONAIE would help to run (Zamosc 1994). CONAIE, however, was also very responsive to regional and local indigenous organizations. Highland members wanted CONAIE to fight for land issues, which meant taking a more contentious stance towards the government.

assembly as a necessary prior condition (Silva 2009).

Sustained efforts by subsequent presidencies to deepen market-oriented economic and political reforms turned these demands into the irreducible core of CONAIE's platform. But CONAIE's leaders concluded early on that the struggle against neoliberalism required alliances with other popular sector and middle-class organizations that were also protesting, such as labor unions, urban neighborhood associations, anti-free trade movements, human rights groups, teachers' associations, and state employee unions. CONAIE took on a leadership role because these groups were not strong enough to organize massive, national mobilizations. It was only when CONAIE entered the fray that governments really took notice. And so, for the rest of the decade, CONAIE led several cycles of anti-neoliberal contention. In the process, CONAIE extended its framing and expanded its demands to include the interests of other groups that were protesting. Because governments refused to back down (even though they sometimes negotiated agreements only to renege on them) CONAIE-led mobilizations turned expressly political, demanding the resignation of incumbent presidents. We now turn to some of the major campaigns.

In addition to stringent economic stabilization, Sixto Durán's presidency (1992–1996) pursued an aggressive economic structural adjustment program that included steep tariff reductions, financial market liberalization, capital market and foreign investment liberalization, privatization of state enterprises, and an agrarian reform in favor of agribusiness (García 2003, pp. 87–88; North 2004). The trigger for the CONAIE-led cycle of mobilization that followed was Durán's attempt to push an enabling law through the legislature that would give him free rein to implement his modernization plan.[8]

Between 1993 and 1995 public and private sector labor unions, a large number of civil society organizations, and the CONAIE staged numerous protests that reached a crescendo in mid-1994 when CONAIE organized a Second Indian Uprising in reaction to the hasty passage of an agribusiness-friendly agrarian development law. This was a massive "Mobilization for Life" of highland and lowland indigenous peoples. Core demands remained the same as in 1990, only more clearly defined (CONAIE 1994). To encompass other protesting groups, the CONAIE's framing stressed the common threat of neoliberalism to all of the popular sectors, a menace that necessitated a solidary response. The CONAIE also demanded a referendum calling for a constituent assembly. In the midst of rising diplomatic tensions with Peru, the government eventually negotiated with protesters and offered concessions on agrarian reform, credit to peasants, and access to water rights (Silva 2009).

Durán's successor, Abdalá Bucaram, reneged on those concessions and proposed to follow through with Durán's original neoliberal program, and added a twist: to fully dollarize the economy by using the dollar itself as the national currency. This would require a "shock treatment" type of fiscal stabilization program. The CONAIE, labor unions, and a civil society broad front mobilized in early 1997. The cycle of anti-neoliberal contention that followed demanded Bucaram's ouster. Bucaram lasted barely 6 months in office (August 1996 to February 1997) as the political establishment and large portions of the private sector also turned against him. The caretaker government that followed acquiesced to a constituent assembly. The results for the CONAIE were mixed. Indigenous peoples gained many rights related to cultural, ethnic, and local administrative issues. However, the CONAIE's core socioeconomic platform was defeated. Privatization, and thus the expansion of agribusiness, was reaffirmed and demands for popular sector (hence CONAIE) participation in policymaking did not prosper (Silva 2009).

A final cycle of anti-neoliberal contention in which CONAIE played a leading role resulted in the toppling of Ecuador's next president, Jamil Mahuad (1998–2000). Mahuad began his presidency determined to push neoliberal reforms, a task made even more urgent by a deep economic crisis that elicited shock treatment economic sta-

[8] In passing an enabling law a congress temporarily delegates legislative capacity to the executive branch.

bilization policies and a renewed determination to dollarize the economy. Another long cycle of mobilization broke out, and CONAIE organized yet another Indian Uprising to lend it decisive force. A dynamic was soon established in which Mahuad negotiated with the CONAIE and other protesting organizations, acquiesced to concessions, and subsequently reneged on them which sparked a new upsurge in the cycle (Silva 2009).

This pattern radicalized a faction of the CONAIE, which began to believe that indigenous peoples would find no justice in Ecuador's democracy. They took a putschist stance and in 2000 supported maverick Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez and some lower ranking officers in a coup d'état. They successfully stormed the presidential palace and, after Mahuad fled the scene, set up a short-lived military-civic Government of National Salvation that lasted barely 24 hours because the military high command quickly negotiated a return democratic rule (Zamosc 2007).

The putschist adventure ushered in a period of decline for the CONAIE and, among other problems, contributed to the loss of its leadership of the popular sectors and civil society. It called the CONAIE's democratic credentials into question and generated debilitating internal strife. These problems deepened when CONAIE supported former Colonel Lucio Gutierrez's campaign for the presidency, which he won in late 2002. When he took office CONAIE leaders ascended to important cabinet and other government appointments. Gutiérrez, however, pulled a policy bait and switch. He ran on a national populist platform and once in office quickly changed stripes implementing economic stabilization programs, running a corrupt and nepotistic government, and manipulating internal divisions between ECUARUNAI and CONFENAIE to his advantage. This political misadventure further weakened the CONAIE. Thus, when civil society rose to depose Gutiérrez, CONAIE mobilized but could no longer lead, not the least of their it because its *dirigentes* lost the confidence of their its base in the communities and they no longer heeded their calls to mobilize. Moreover, the general public now perceived CONAIE to be a narrow indigenist interest group whose leaders were primarily focused on gaining government employment (Wolff 2007; Zamosc 2007).

Throughout the neoliberal period, the CONAIE insistently demanded that governments recognize it as the representative of Ecuadorian indigenous peoples and as such include it in the policymaking process. To this end, CONAIE participated in the formation of a political party in 1995 so that indigenous peoples could put their own candidates in political office. The Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik—Nuevo País had moderate success at the national and local levels. Its participation in the Constituent Assembly of 1998 was perhaps its finest hour (Andolina 2003). Pachakutik formally joined the Gutiérrez government, but its ministers resigned after he changed stripes and began to implement the same neoliberal policies that harmed indigenous communities (Becker 2011a).

Bolivia Bolivia's indigenous people's movement never built an overarching confederation capable of coordinating action like Ecuador's (Yashar 2005). Still, their organizations played leading roles in the cycles of anti-neoliberal contention that wracked the country, especially from the mid-1990s on. We now turn to an examination of three of the major milestones in movement development and campaigns.

When Bolivia's neoliberal period got underway during the presidency of Victor Paz Estenssoro (1985–1989) the CSUTCB was the major indigenous organization in Bolivia, although as a member of the COB it was subordinated to mine workers unions and urban labor unions (Zegada et al. 2008). The unions, however, were unable to resist aggressive neoliberal reforms effectively. In this context, the success of CSUTCB-affiliated coca grower federations in the late 1980s became the first milestone in the rise of indigenous people's movements to a leadership role among the popular sectors and subaltern groups resisting neoliberalism. They were effective in combating the US-sponsored coca eradication policies and forcing the government to negotiate with them. The coca federations used indigenist and cultural images of resistance that appealed to both indigenous peasants and to urban labor organizations.

Coca had become a symbol of indigenous culture and national resistance to external pressure on the economic front (Silva 2009).

A second milestone occurred during the first presidency of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993–1997) who pursued an aggressive neoliberal economic, social, and political program when the CSUTCB, now under leadership of the coca grower federations, organized a March for Life, Coca, and National Sovereignty in 1994. In addition to the defense of coca, rural and urban popular sector organizations protested against privatization and agribusiness-friendly policies. They marched for the reinstatement of support for peasant agriculture. A sign of the coca federation's rising leadership was the fact that the mobilization by labor unions and other groups petered out once the government met the principal demand of the coca growers: a pledge to end forcible eradication of the plant (Pinto Ocampo 2004). The campaign culminated in 1996 with negotiations over a neoliberal-inspired agrarian reform law. Highland indigenous gained protections against land usurpation when they secured agreement that the agrarian superintendency would not have authority to rule on land tenure questions. Lowland indigenous gained an even more significant victory. The legislation recognized communal property, which was much more prevalent in Amazonia (Silva 2009).

The Water War of Cochabamba in 2000 has became an icon of anti-neoliberal contention in Bolivia. Although it was not led by the major national indigenous movements per se, they played an important role in it. The struggle against water privatization involved a cross class, multiethnic coalition and many of the local organizations in the small communities near Cochabamba and in city neighborhoods were controlled by indigenous peoples (Olivera and Lewis 2004; Assies 2003). The fight was fierce and epic. In the end, the water works of Cochabamba were not privatized. National indigenous movement organizations like CSUTCB played significant roles in the mobilization. CSUTCB put water rights on its list of grievances and mobilized in La Paz, paralyzing the capital city and expanding the struggle from a local to national level, eventually engulfing the departments of Oruru and Tarija too.

The Gas War of 2003 marked the high water of cycles of anti-neoliberal contention in Bolivia. Indigenous peoples movements, especially the CSUTCB, played a leading role in it. The Gas War started when, in his second presidency, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada offered international companies low taxes to expand gas field exploitation and to export natural gas to California. It culminated with his resignation in the same year. Beginning in February 2003 the CSUTCB mobilized against the government's plans, claiming that a precious and valuable natural resource was being given away to foreigners rather than used for national development (Crabtree 2005). Neighborhood organizations of the strategic city of El Alto that looms over La Paz joined in as did local labor unions. El Alto has a predominantly indigenous population, many of them new migrants from the countryside, and they responded to CSUTCB's call (Lazar 2008). After a number of fierce confrontations in February and October, which involved a broad cross class, multiethnic coalition, Sánchez de Lozada was forced to resign and the gas concessions were put on hold (Assies 2004; Kohl and Farthing 2006).

As in Ecuador, the indigenous peoples movement formed a political party, the Movimiento al Socialismo (Harten 2011; Zuazo 2009). It was organized along CSUTCB-peasant union lines. Unlike Pachakutik in Ecuador, this was a multiethnic and cross class party; thus, it appealed to a larger electorate. Its candidate, Evo Morales, himself of indigenous extraction, a leader of the coca federations, took a close second place in the 2002 presidential election. The MAS helped to organize mass mobilization during the Gas War.

The Gas War had significant outcomes. The caretaker government of Carlos Mesa abandoned his predecessor's international company-friendly concession policy. Equally important, it set the agenda for a future MAS government, the so-called October Agenda. Its main planks were a commitment to nationalize gas to fund state-directed economic development with social equity; to establish a constitutional assembly to set

the legal foundations for the recovery of national sovereignty in the face of globalization; agrarian reform to bring social justice to the countryside; and trials for criminal politicians.

Post Neoliberalism

The cycles of indigenous peoples-led anti-neoliberal mobilization in Bolivia and Ecuador contributed to the election of left governments in both countries in the mid-2000s. In the first year or so of those governments they played significant roles in securing, or reinforcing, rights for their peoples in the constituent assemblies charged with recasting the nation state and its relationship to citizens.[9] After that, however, the paths of the indigenous people's movements in Bolivia and Ecuador diverged sharply, especially in their relationship to left governments and the state. In Bolivia, we see a changing mixture of cooperation and confrontation from 2006 to the present. In Ecuador confrontation appears to dominate. In both countries, much of the conflict can be traced back to the commodity boom that began in the early 2000s. It has encouraged intensified exploitation of renewable and non-renewable natural resources, which has sparked numerous defensive protests against meg-development projects. On balance, I think it fair to say that in both cases Indigenous peoples movements have weakened from the peaks they achieved during the cycles of anti-neoliberal mobilization, although deterioration seems more pronounced in Ecuador.

Indigenous Peoples' Movements and Constituent Assemblies in Bolivia and Ecuador In Bolivia, the party that gained the presidency with Evo Morales in 2006, the MAS, included important highland indigenous organizations. At the beginning of his government, the major indigenous social movement organization formed a Unity Pact (Silva 2013). The Unity Pact worked closely with MAS representatives in the Constituent Assembly. They insured the new constitution declared Bolivia a plurinational state in which indigenous peoples had a right to autonomous territory and that they had to be consulted for authorization regarding development projects on their land. It promoted decolonization and interculturality. Economic rights also received constitutional standing, including decent wages and salaries, land reform, food sovereignty, health, and social security (Garcés 2010). Indigenous people's movements, especially CSUTCB, mobilized to defend Evo Morales' government and the process of constitutional change from near insurrectionary and secessionist opposition from lowland departments, the so-called *Media Luna*, led by the department of Santa Cruz, which had become wealthy as a result of aggressive agribusiness expansion.

In Ecuador, Rafael Correa's "citizen revolution" government had a conflicted relationship with the principal national indigenous confederation from the very beginning, largely for political reasons (de la Torre 2012). However, CONAIE working with Pachakutik in the Constituent Assembly, was able to reaffirm and strengthen key indigenous rights clauses they had won in the 1998 Constituent Assembly (Acosta 2008). The new constitution promoted plurinationality, interculturality, environmental protection and collective rights, such as a commitment to food sovereignty and controls over the formation of large landholdings. Economic rights similar to Bolivia's also received constitutional standing (Becker 2011b).

Divergent Fortunes

Bolivia Indigenous movement organizations in Bolivia developed two parallel tracks in their relationship with Evo Morales' government after

[9] Movement organizations played direct roles when the clauses they drafted were included in the new constitution. At other times their effect was mediated by MAS delegates to the constituent assembly. For a detailed review of the connection between protest and policy see Silva (2013a). For the involvement of indigenous peoples in those assemblies see Garcés (2010) and Becker (2011a, b).

the new constitution was approved by national referendum in 2009. The first track involves mostly cooperative relations with the CSUTCB, cocaleros and related highland groups, including an indigenous feminist organization that were part of the core coalition of the MAS (Silva 2013b). Many of their members have received government posts in the central state and at the subnational level (from ministers to clerical staff), have stood for (and won) MAS seats in the new National Assembly and at the municipal level (Do Alto and Stefanoni 2010). CSUTCB, and other core MAS social movement organizations, also unconditionally support Evo Morales' government on controversial policy issues and organize counter-movements when lowland indigenous, urban labor unions, and other social movements mobilized against specific policies of Morales' government after 2009 (Zuazo 2010).[10]

The second track involves conflictive relations with CIDOB and CONAMAQ, as well with environmental movements, over two major policy decisions by Morales' government. On the one hand, the government favored large-scale development projects, both infrastructure and mining, and this required overriding local community interests that often are against such projects. On the other hand, it delayed implementation of constitutionally mandated indigenous territorial autonomies.

These tensions came to a head in the conflict over the Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isoboro Sécure (TIPNIS). The government decided to build a tranche of paved highway connecting two of Bolivia's departments (as well as Bolivia to Brazil) in a protected area that claimed status as an autonomous indigenous territory. The MAS administration did not—as it legally should have—consult local communities as to whether they approved of the road passing through their territory. This rallied the CIDOB and the CONAMAQ to defend the autonomy rights of the TIPNIS and pitted colonists and coca growers against CIDOB in support of the road (and the government's preference). In protest, the CIDOB and CONAMQ, with support from NGOs and environmentalists, organized two indigenous people marches from the affected areas to La Paz. The first one, launched in August 2011, was successful. It received significant support and media attention and the administration backed off the plan. When the administration started backtracking, CIDOB and CONAMAQ launched a second march that was less successful (Lanzara and Arias 2010; Fundación 2012; Calla 2012). While the marchers were camped in front of the government house dissident factions of CIDOB organized an election in Santa Cruz to replace the sitting executive director who, along with most of the leadership that supported him, was in La Paz with the marchers. They duly elected a female executive director and the CIDOB is now divided (Silva 2013). After much back and forth on whether to allow the highway to be built, the Morales administration decided in 2013 to suspend construction until all pending controversies could be resolved.

Ecuador There are two principal reasons for the tensions between Rafael Correa's government and CONAIE. First, CONAIE was a late supporter of his candidacy for the presidency. In reaction to their political misadventures with Gutiérrez, CONAIE/Pachakutik decided to run their own candidate for president in 2006 with embarrassingly poor results. Only then, did they grudgingly support Correa in second round balloting (Larrea 2009). Second, Correa and his inner circle believed that narrow interest groups were obstacles to sound policymaking for the public good, and it thought of CONAIE as such an organization. Hence, CONAIE should not be allowed important roles in the policy process or co-govern with the state in matters pertaining directly to the interests of indigenous nations. CONAIE was in a poor position to press its abiding interest in a major policymaking role. Its political misadventures had left it internally divided and it had lost significant legitimacy on the national political stage (Martínez Abarca 2011).

[10] These developments have led to claims that the highland indigenous movement has been co-opted by the government.

The Correa administration's efforts to sever the connection between the national organization and its base in the local communities further debilitated CONAIE. The success of national and regional indigenous social movement organizations depended in part on their brokerage role between state institutions and local indigenous communities to obtain goods, services, and legislation for the community. Correa's government, however, chose to mobilize citizens electorally around a policy agenda built on the one hammered out by the social movements that had led the resistance to neoliberalism. Thus, where indigenous peoples are concerned, the government established a direct connection to the base organizations of CONAIE: in the indigenous communities themselves to deliver more public goods such as infrastructure projects, educational facilities, health, and other benefits (Tuaza 2011; Muñoz Eraso 2010).

As in Bolivia, a commitment to development based on the expansion of natural resources has sparked new conflicts with indigenous social movement and their allies in the environmental movement (Becker 2011a, pp. 176–184; Martínez Abarca 2011, pp. 109–112). At the level of national politics, the flashpoint has been the fate of the Yasuní National Park. This is a protected area inhabited by indigenous peoples sitting on top of substantial oil reserves. Local communities do not want oil development, given the disastrous experience with the Shuar and other peoples in Amazonia. Correa's administration initially committed to not exploit the reserves. But in 2013 it reversed its decision and is now receptive to their development. It remains to be seen whether CONAIE and other social movements find in this decision the opportunity to revive their capacity to mobilize their base and to reconstruct their coordination with a heterogeneous coalition that oppose the government's development model. CONAIE, its member federations, and environmentalists would be building on more localized social conflicts that have erupted due to the government's need to increase exports of renewable and nonrenewable natural resources.

Indigenous Movements and Karl Polanyi's Double Movement of Capitalist Society

This chapter emphasized that, beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, the indigenous social movements of Ecuador and Bolivia successfully organized around both cultural identity and material interests. It is necessary to understand both of these strands to their struggles if we are fully comprehend them. The narrative further emphasized that indigenous peoples movements in Ecuador and Bolivia played crucial roles in the cycles of anti-neoliberal mobilization from the 1990s to the early 2000s that paved the way for subsequent left governments. Once those left governments were in power the fate of those movements diverged sharply—from partial incorporation in Evo Morales' to exclusion for the national and regional indigenous movement organizations in Ecuador.

Yet we also saw that there are similarities in the fate of indigenous people's movements in post neoliberal Bolivia and Ecuador. To begin with, they weakened from their peak during anti-neoliberal mobilization. The left governments addressed some of their material, cultural, and political demands, partially demobilizing them. Left governments also intervened in them directly to reorganize their bases of sociopolitical support. Furthermore, the left governments' economic development model provoked conflicts because it was predicated on the intensification of extraction of natural resources. This often pits indigenous communities and their allies against government-backed megaprojects.

What might the anti-neoliberal struggles and post neoliberal development in the indigenous peoples movements of Ecuador and Bolivia mean in a larger historical sense? Building on Karl Polanyi (2001), even in their current relative decline, we can think of indigenous peoples movements as a new source of leadership in counter movements to the construction market society. Polanyi argued that free-market capitalism seeks to intensify the commoditization land, labor, and capital as much as possible. In the pro-

cess, it seeks to subjugate politics and society to the utopia of a self-regulating market economy, meaning that politics and social organization should shield market mechanisms from forces that aim to distort them. Land, labor, and capital, however, are more than commodities, Polanyi argued. They also embody social relations and livelihoods that give meaning and stability to the lives of human beings. Therefore, people will naturally seek protection from markets when these become too intrusive and disruptive to everyday life. This dynamic generates the double movement of capitalist society. Capital attempts to impose the self-regulated market economy and subordinates politics and society to it. This causes a natural reaction by people to defend themselves from the onslaught of the naked market.

We can think of the neoliberal period in Latin America as one in which there was an attempt to construct a contemporary form of market society, which necessitated the dismantling of the protection to markets introduced by national populism and of the collective gains of organized popular sectors, principally labor unions. In this context, the indigenous peoples movements of Ecuador and Bolivia rose up to lead the struggle against neoliberalism because, despite the cultural recognition neoliberalism offered, the material threats to individuals and communities was severe, in the form of rising prices, diminished subsidies to consumption and production, land grabs, declining wages, political exclusion, and more. This was the core of the motivation for the extraordinary mobilization of the period, although, of course, other factors intervened (Silva 2009, 2012).[11]

Indigenous people's movements rose to lead the counter movement against contemporary market society in part because neoliberal globalization substantially weakened labor unions, which had led popular sector mobilization against oligarchic rule in the 1950s and 1960s. Once left governments came to office and governed with left programs that addressed income, health, education, housing, infrastructural, rural agricultural needs, and cultural demands it was only natural that the movements should decline (Tarrow 2011). Many of their demands were being met, albeit selectively. Nevertheless, it is clear that the indigenous peoples movements in Ecuador and Bolivia will remain significant, if not leading, social and political actors for a long time to come. Even in their diminished condition they possess more associational power than other civil society organizations.

[11] For a Polanyian interpretarion of popular mobilization in Central America see Paul Almeida (2007).

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