Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15

Frederik Pio
Øivind Varkøy *Editors*

Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations

Music, Education and Personal Development

Springer

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VOLUME 15

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ISSN 1573-4528 ISSN 2214-0069 (electronic)
ISBN 978-94-017-9318-6 ISBN 978-94-017-9319-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3
Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014953789

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

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Chapter 1
Introduction. An Ontological Turn in the Field of Music and Music Education

Frederik Pio and Øivind Varkøy

Abstract In the article Heidegger's ontological approach to phenomenology is introduced. This is done with special reference to the notion of being (*Sein*) in its relation to music, art and education. The structure of the book as well as the authors and their contributions are presented.

Keywords Musical experience • Bildung • Education • Being

In this anthology, which is a contribution mainly to the field of the Philosophy of Music Education (PME), we offer a somewhat unusual perspective. The philosophical frame comes from phenomenology. More precisely: all the authors are inspired by Martin Heidegger's thinking. As far as we know, this is the first time that the focus has been placed to such an extent on Heidegger's philosophy in the field of PME. Since the reader now holds in her/his hands a book about music and music education inspired by Heidegger's thinking, it is of course a paradox that Heidegger has never written anything systematic about music or education. Therefore it is only natural that the different authors have a highly selective and subjective view on Heidegger's work in general, depending on their specific perspective and background. For philosophers these different uses of Heidegger's thinking might sometimes appear to be too selective. But it is not our mission to offer another contribution to Heidegger research. The reader of this book is offered a selection of *Heideggerian inspirations* – by authors within music education and musicology. As editors we regard these variations as the specific charm of our collection of texts.

Both authors contributed equally.

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_1

1.1 Music and the Question of Being

In the case of Heidegger, phenomenology is radicalized as 'ontology' (in contradistinction to 'the ontic'). Ontology is about what the world is *as such*, before our specific (ontic) ways of knowing it kick in (in terms of an intellectual, epistemological reservoir of methods, theory, concepts, categories, perspectives, etc.). However, this ontological turn toward the world is framed phenomenologically as a question of our *being* in it (*Dasein*).

We have been given a world that cannot be reduced to how we think of it, nor to the conceptions we have of it. It is a being-in-the-world that contains us. The world is present in us in a fundamental significance, before our mental apparatus starts processing it. As an existing being, the person for Heidegger is always already within reach of being. Heidegger understands being as the horizon within which it becomes possible for all things to become significant and meaningful in the totality of life that calls them forth. The human being is an objective entity in the world just like things and animals. But the human being gains distinction from everything else in the world by having a relation to the being (*Sein*) it is:

> The human being is in the essence of its historical being (*Seingeschichtlichen Wesen*) the being-ness (*das Seiende*) whose existence consists of living in the proximity of being (*Sein*). The human being is the neighbor of being. (Heidegger 1949, p. 34)

As modern human beings we have Mozart in our hearts; we have Mahler in our inner, conflictual schisms; we have Rhianna and Michael Jackson in the movements of our bodies; we have Bach and Arvo Pärt in our religiosity and our intuitive sense of the numinous; we have John Cage in our inner emptiness; we have the contemporary tracks of our time in our unconsciousness; we have Palestrina's *Marcellus Mass* as a guide and road sign to the great, dazzling openness of the world; we have Boulez's *Pli selon Pli* in our brain; we have the memories of a miserable infatuation hidden away somewhere in Ella Fitzgerald's *Miss Otis Regrets*; and we have the tone of Cannonball Adderley hovering above our sometimes staggering belief in the future. We have *The Beatles* dangling in the curtains covering a lost youth – and Bartok in our back pocket. And the world we set foot in from day to day belongs to techno-music – in the age of technical rationality.

Whatever we conceive of as 'musical' is characterized by referring to that which music *is*, when it is called forth as a phenomenon which is inherently part of a lived world. The distinction between 'being-ness' (*das Seiende*) and 'being' (*Sein*) cited above can be illustrated with the notion that a manifestation of any concrete musical 'being-ness' (*das Seiende*) is made possible by the presence of an always-already primary experience. A primary experience of what music *is*: the 'being' (*Sein*) of music. With that we are addressing the ontology of music.

For Heidegger phenomenology is about disclosing the 'being-ness' (*das Seiende*) of the phenomenon, so that it appears in its 'being' (*Sein*). So Heidegger employs phenomenology to pose his question of being (cf. *Sein und Zeit* § 7c). In the same way we can address music as a phenomenon, with a view to uncover the being of it:

> That which uncommonly remains veiled and always again is covered up or only dissimulates is not this or that 'being-ness' (*jenes Seiende*), on the contrary … it is the being of being-ness (*das Sein des Seienden*). This being (*Sein*) can be so extensively veiled that it is forgotten and the question of being (*Sein*) and its meaning remains absent. (Heidegger 1927, p. 35)

But we want to encircle in a more concrete way what Heidegger's distinction between 'being-ness' (*das Seiende*, the ontic) and 'being' (*Sein*, ontology) is about. The 'being-ness' (*das Seiende*) of the world concerns all the material, objective, factual and material dimensions. In a musical sense this includes works, recordings, concerts, instruments, and also the music-theoretical analysis that divides a movement into themes and identifies musical motifs, etc. However, through and around all these facts contained by the 'being-ness' (*das Seiende*) of music, 'being' (*Sein*) is manifested. Thus, to the disclosure of music in its being (*Sein*) belongs the amazing realization that musical experience actually *is* there, as something flowing through concrete sequences of sound. Why does this exist? Why are we not just facing a sonorous form of math as an auditory sensual stimulation? Just like the sun which sheds light on the objects in the world, what is it that makes sound sequences and combinations of timbre come forward *as* music *for* us?

This is the question of 'being' (*Sein*) with regard to music. In this question the 'being-ness' (*das Seiende*) of music is addressed in its 'being' (*Sein*) as an ontological phenomenon in the world. In other words, we ask what it is that makes music 'music-ish'? That is the question of its 'being' (*Sein*); a being which (as mentioned) is achieved through an analytical disclosure, where the divide between self and world – subject and object – becomes blurred. Here the transformative power of this process has to do with an openness toward what music can do to us. What it can allow us to recognize. There are close affinities here to the European concept of *Bildung* (personal and educational formation, cf. below).

1.2 Why Are We in Need of an Ontological Turn in the Field of Music and Music Education?

The science of music is characterized by calling forth the 'being-ness' (*das Seiende*) of music as it investigates *what* music is: its elements, compositional constructions, its historical chronologies, etc. The 'being-ness' (*das Seiende*) of music is called forth scientifically. Thus is produced a methodologically-empirically specified knowledge about a distinct object, which can be determined in a knowledge of certainty, correctness and technical precision.

However, regarding the 'being' (*Sein*) of music – the *is'ness* of it – the matter looks rather different. The 'being' (*Sein*) of music concerns the way we naturally take for granted that music *is* there in an obvious 'is'ness' which is natural and close to us. In our wondering composure that there *is* music (and not just noise, clatter, sounds, acoustics, structures of timbre or silence, etc.) we are led to the question of

its being (*Sein*). However, this matter of course is tacitly presupposed and not addressed by musicological science. Thus science is characterized by addressing the *what'ness* of music (not its *is'ness*) in its 'being-ness' (*das Seiende*):

> Wherever and however widely all scientific research seeks to isolate the 'being-ness' (*das Seiende*), never will it find being (*Sein*). (Heidegger 1929, p. 48)

This highlights our theme: to some extent 'being-ness' (*das Seiende*) blocks our recognition of 'being' (*Sein*):

> But the score human beings have to settle (*Betroffenheit*) with reality (*das Wirkliche*) can exactly block (*absperren*) the access to that (being, fp) which concerns the person in question. Thus we are concerned with something which in an enigmatic way continues to evade us. (Heidegger 1951, p. 5)

In other words, we are initiated into something (being) which constantly escapes us. This also applies to music in its 'being-ness' (*das Seiende*) as consisting of sound, tones, acoustics, etc. But its 'being' (*Sein*) potentially persists, as a musical experience rises out of this dense, dark morass of material elements (of 'being-ness'; *das Seiende*), and joins the divergent elements into a united musical occurrence in the world. So it is from within the structure of musical experience that the question of the ontology of music can be posed. But according to Heidegger, this question (of being) has fallen into decay.

1.3 Oblivion of Being

For instance, in the current world of education, politics and public opinion the musical experience is increasingly under pressure. It seems that it is increasingly designated as an expendable luxury. Music is gradually being pushed into the role of unnecessary cream on top of the educational cake. This kind of general trend has not left the thinking in our field of music and music education untouched. Influences are felt from the objectivizing, technical rationality of our time. This rationality seems to lead to oblivion for ontology. Examples of such oblivions are: (i) The objectivization of musicality as a measurable object (Pio 2008), (ii) the tendency of music teaching to focus on the outer, technical layers of the musical work (Nielsen 1994), (iii) the influence from the 'hard', quantitative research of music psychology (as science) that has inoculated the field of music education against ontological reflection (Ehrenforth 1982), and (iv) instrumental thinking within music education (Bowman 2005; Varkøy 2007).

It is the cultivation of modern subjectivism that blows through all four items. A subjectivism that simultaneously recognizes the surrounding world as an object. The above examples illustrate the relevance of asking about the extent to which music education has disengaged from the old paradigm of Cartesianism. The Cartesian subject observes the world (including aspects of music education) as an object. An object which can be controlled and mastered at a distance by virtue of the theoretical knowledge the subject holds about the object. But what is it that is lost in this dualist, Cartesian split?

What is forgotten here is the insight of phenomenology, that the musical object in principle constitutes a whole life-world: a big spectrum of experience possibilities. There is a layer division in music: acoustic layer, structural layer, bodily layer, tension layer, emotional layer and existential layer respectively. These layers of meaning correspond to comparative layers of human consciousness (Nielsen 1994). This means that the layers of meaning in music (Noema) can "only" be found as possibilities, as potential, and that they must be realized through meeting with the experiencing subject (Noesis).

The main concern of musicians and music educators is directed toward communication between music and humans. But the focus is not always as clear when it comes to communication between *all* of music's layers of meaning and the human consciousness. There is an inclination to look away from the profound perspective that can be found in musical objects, and a lot of activity appears to concentrate on bringing audiences and pupils into contact with the "outside of music": that which can be described technically and manageably. For instance, the focus on the existential layer of music is often perceived as difficult to verbalize and to deal with in pedagogical settings (Pio and Varkøy 2012).

In this volume Martin Heidegger's thinking concerning the human existence in the world, artworks and notions like 'being' (*Sein*) and 'oblivion-of-being' (*Seinsvergessenheit*) will be elaborated. This is a way of thinking we find relevant when it comes to discussions of what could be designated as a rather reductionist tendency in the philosophy of music and music education. This reductionist tendency is about the lack of focus on the fact that both music education practice and educational-political and cultural-political ideas about the role of music in people's lives seem to be very little interested in (or focused on) *all* sides of the musical experience. All too often dimensions relating to any *existential experience* are disregarded. We see this reductionist tendency as being connected to Heidegger's claim that our epoch (as mentioned) is marked by an 'oblivion of being'.

It is even possible to see this 'oblivion-of-being' in relation to the trend in cultural and educational politics as well as in music educational thinking to focus on the instrumental usefulness of learning music. Both in a historical perspective and today, it is easy to see how music activities are advocated by referring to their usefulness in terms of a number of ends of general political and/or pedagogical character. This means that in education today (for instance) we deal with music as an instrumentalized subject; based on an understanding of the subject of music in music education as a means, a tool, an instrument for something else other than experiencing music, making music and musicking. This way of thinking is very often connected to a logic and rhetoric imported from the financial sector and/or from the world of health science and health-thinking. The same thing even applies to a good deal of thinking with regard to cultural policy.

This tendency actualizes the tension between *education* and the German concept of *Bildung*. The *Bildung* tradition has often raised necessary and fundamental questions, for instance concerning educational political instrumentalism. Basically *Bildung* is about a *process*. The result of this process is not determined, *Bildung* should result in *Bildung*. *Bildung* is an uninhibited process of development. Seen

from another angle however, *Bildung* is also a process related to 'role models'. There is a normative objective for the process of *Bildung*. This double meaning is one which the word *Bildung* shares with the Greek word *paideia*. It describes both the education a person has (as a product), and the process one goes through as a human being (Varkøy 2015).

Our being-in-the-world (*Dasein*) concerns processes in which the relation between self and world moves into new figurations, just as it does in processes of *Bildung*. Music is in many ways an exemplary material of *Bildung*. Music is a condensed figure of basic human, creative force. Potentially it reaches into the human sense of what is imaginative and becoming. It fuels our ability to disclose the world in new aspects. Thus the musical experience is capable of provoking a modification of one's self-conceptions. It reminds us of our potentiality (Kaufmann 1974, p. 152).

1.4 What Do We Hear?

When Martin Heidegger in *The Origin of the Work of Art* emphasizes that artworks can potentially throw man back into a new sensitivity to the world and to the basic conditions of life, it seems like the character of the artwork as such is closely connected to its world-opening force.

For instance, we can no longer regard the passions of Bach as life-isolated aesthetical works. As works these passions disclose a world around themselves. The chorale *Oh Haupt voll Blut und Wunden* from the second half of Bach's *Matthäuspassion* is soaked in lived, religious grief. But this horizon of 'being' (*Sein*) which is disclosed in this work is today predominantly unheard. We are potentially in the process of becoming cut off from the understanding of the 'being' (*Sein*) of this work. Instead, one potentially hears 'a classic': B-A-C-H. This is tied into a situation today in which most editions of the collected works of almost all western composers can easily be accessed on-line. As a digital reservoir of aesthetic resources, this material appears to be a standby for downloading or streaming. But with all this music accessible in squeaky clean, digital quality 24/7 on a global scale, there is a risk that these songs and works appear (*Vorhanden*) as no more than resources. This situation potentially creates a relation between a listening 'customer-user' consuming a purchased 'aesthetic resource'.

The potential musical experience of wonder, fascination and absorption is then potentially replaced by a more trivial indifference or even a paralysis of our ability to be sensitive in this matter. When ultimately every conceivable sound pattern ever recorded in the western canon in the end is at our disposal on-line, this could possibly result in our *in*ability to act and respond in a creatively open manner. As Otto Friedrich Bollnow says (paraphrasing § 74 from *Sein & Zeit*): it is the sheer boundlessness in the number of opportunities available that contributes to a human rootlessness. A lack of commitment is potentially produced. Because there is always 'something more' or 'the next' presenting itself. We are always on our way (in the lab top menu, further and further. Something decays as a result. An open dwelling place in the

world is slowly abandoned (Bollnow 1959, p. 112). But what is it that remains unheard in the above-mentioned example with Bach? What is this unheard phenomenon we are encircling (Pio 2007)? And how can modern technology contribute to a disclosure of this phenomenon? The chapters of this book explore the way in which Heidegger's thinking can lead us deeper into these problems. The discussions in the book will touch upon key concepts such as experience, Bildung, truth, and 'being' (*Sein*).

1.5 The Artwork

According to Heidegger, works of art that surround us are something humans have produced; in a way they are *things.* However, they are not things or utility articles in the normal sense: they are *works*, *artworks*. Heidegger claims that artworks cannot be used for anything. They are things people have made that oppose use. For instance, utility articles have a tendency to disappear in their use. They withdraw themselves in the act of their practical use. Artworks, on the other hand, possess some kind of stubbornness which potentially makes them come forward. They oppose their application. So they do not permit us to pass by unaffected. When works of art appear in this way, they are not the only things that become visible to us. The entire world of which they are part – and to which we belong – becomes visible too. The world becomes sensible to us. Heidegger, then, is critical of the modern idea of the self-sufficiency of art. In his line of thinking, the artwork is related not primarily to itself, but to the world. Heidegger even criticizes the modern understanding of art which tends to put the experience (in a superficial understanding) in the center. Art is dying, he says, if its only mission is to provide quick and superficial experiences. These superficial experiences just absorb us, they don't stop us, and they give no room for thinking (*Denken*, *Besinnung*).

Musical experiences (in a not-superficial sense) are particularly suitable for bringing us into contact with *basic conditions* of our lives, with *frames* of our human existence. Our *being* is opened up by artworks. *Artworks* are among the things that have the potential to *stop us* in our daily lives, which are mostly occupied with *the things that exist* rather than with *being itself*. Anxiety and boredom have the same potential. To think about music in this way brings us from the outside to the inside of 'being' (*Sein*), from an ontic (*das Seiende*) to an ontological rootedness (*Sein*) – to speak with Heidegger. The musical artwork situates man in the world anew, as the artwork becomes a key to a renewed sensitivity to the given lifeworld that has shaped the individual self in question.

The committed ways in which we inhabit our world are closely connected to musical experience. When music is experienced as a kind of prism that has the effect of summarizing the attunement of a given community, then this musical work attains a kind of hidden presence, for everything that is said and done within the community in question. It is this quality that makes such music art for Heidegger. That which is beautiful in life and worth believing in – i.e. the projection of truthfulness characterizing a given community – is gathered in the musical experience.

And such music becomes a compass – a cornerstone of authority – in our lives. The horizon of our life is sustained in the experience of this music. When we let ourselves in for an experience of a musical work, this act reveals that as human beings we stand out from something that overshadows what we are as individuals. *The musical experience is an opening of the rootedness of our Dasein in being (Sein).* This is the ontology of music. To clarify what the ontology of the musical work is about, it becomes necessary to address one's own being-in-the-world. To recognize the fact that musical experience enables us to transgress our self-enclosed, self-satisfied, superficial happiness, is the first stage of allowing a questioning of one's own ontological rootedness in the world. However, this situation invites us back toward an ontologically oriented reflection concerning both music and music education.

1.6 The Book

PME is traditionally dominated not only by the English language, but also by authors (from all over the world) who are inspired by Anglo-American philosophical traditions (for instance, see the new *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Music Education*). Our book, however, offers an original contribution to international PME, offering new perspectives on the field which are inspired by continental philosophy. The authors in this book are mainly scholars from Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), with some "guests" from Germany, Great Britain and New Zealand. Most of them are very well known scholars in their field in these countries and even internationally – with long lists of publications to their names. Others are younger and have not published very much – yet… (CVs of all the authors are to be found on the last pages of this book, where they present themselves with some selected/important publications.) The authors are both music educators and musicologists. But they all connect their texts to both *music* and *education* (including *Bildung*). Heidegger's way of thinking invites us all into a philosophical world where the most natural thing to do is to transcend traditional borders – for instance the borders between music educational and musicological research – in a common interest in music, being, personal development and education/Bildung. We hope that this approach will be interesting for a broad audience in both music education and musicology.

Due to the diversity of the authors' backgrounds and the many different aspects of Heidegger's thinking, the book offers a variety of perspectives and personal approaches which cannot and should not be unified or standardized. However, we have decided to organize the book in four sections with the following headings:

(i) Technical rationality and nihilism
(ii) Music and being
(iii) Musical experience
(iv) Bildung and truth

1.6.1 Technical Rationality and Nihilism

In this section we find texts from the two editors, Frederik Pio and Øivind Varkøy, as well as contributions from David Lines and Hanne Fossum. In different ways all of these four texts focus on the need for an ontological turn in times of the hegemony of technical rationality.

Frederik Pio's chapter, "Musings of Heidegger. Arts education and *the Mall* as a 'debased' (Dreyfus) work of art", starts by investigating the phenomenology of artworks using Heidegger's notion of 'history-of-being' as a point of departure. The readings of three architectural structures are used as a prism to arrive at a disturbing interpretation of what we are currently in the process of becoming in our relation to artworks in general. Pio moves on to discuss such themes as commitment, truth and school culture in the way such categories can currently be disclosed in an arts education context. Connecting with the theme of teacher authenticity, the article offers a fresh account of the challenges currently being faced within the broad field of arts education.

In his chapter, entitled "The intrinsic value of musical experience. A rethinking: Why and how?", Øivind Varkøy discusses how we deal in general education today with music as a means, a tool, an instrument for something other than music. He argues that if the people involved in music education today are no longer able to relate to the idea that music has a 'value in itself', we are facing acceptance of the kind of technical rationality and financial way of thinking that embraces all fields of life today. Central to his investigations is Martin Heidegger's thinking in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, concerning the differences between *things, utility articles* and *artworks,* and Hannah Arendt's discussions in *The Human Condition* concerning our modern leveling of the differences between the three kinds of human activity: *labor, work,* and *action.* According to Arendt, the common kneeling in front of modernity's tendency to worship instrumental reason is a tendency which includes a denial of human freedom, and may open up for constructions of totalitarian ideologies. Varkøy argues that there is a need to rethink the term 'the value of music in itself' to establish a kind of new discursive order, not least in view of today's international trends in educational policy (focusing on outcomes, relevance and usefulness).

David Lines' chapter, entitled "Ways of Revealing: Music Education Responses to Music Technology", focuses on the powerful connection between music and technology in contemporary culture. Lines explores Heidegger's ideas on modern technology and links these with questions of music technology. He calls for a deeper questioning of the meanings, functions and patterns of perception that we encounter through modern technologies. From Heidegger, music technology can be redefined as ways of "revealing": as forms, cultural conditions, structures and pedagogies that bring different kinds of musical spaces, relationships and ways of being into our lives. Lines argues that this redefinition calls for music educators to closely question and trace the means by which they relate to musical forms. They should also question the relationships they encounter through technology, ponder how their lives are entwined with music technology, and reconsider and respond to technology in their local music cultures.

In "Towards an ontological turn in music education with Heidegger's philosophy of *being* and his notion of *releasement*", Hanne Fossum discusses the influence of current European educational policy on music education in some Scandinavian countries and in Germany in the light of Heidegger's philosophy of being and his critique of technology. Fossum argues that Heidegger's genealogical history of nihilism asserts that the individual's relation to reality has developed from "letting beings be" to "mastery" and "control." In the current paradigm of *enframing*, we increasingly deal with objects, including ourselves, as resources to be exploited. This has consequences of direct relevance to music education, in relation to the aspect of musical *Bildung,* to questions concerning the artistic qualities of music, and to the existential role of music in the lives of individuals.

1.6.2 Music and Being

In this section we find texts from Lars Oberhaus and Susanna Leijonhufvud & Cecilia Ferm Thorgersen. In his chapter, entitled "Body – Music – Being. Making music as bodily being in the world", Lars Oberhaus, starting with Husserl (lifeworld), and proceeding to Heidegger (being-in-the-world) and Merleau-Ponty (phenomenology of the body), discusses how a radicalization of ontology can be pointed out when we consider the body as a point of access to perceive and understand being-in-the-world. Oberhaus argues that making music is always a bodily act. Therefore, the concept of aesthetic/musical experience depends no longer on a primacy of perception/listening, as many traditional aesthetic theories do. Inter-subjective and inter-corporal dimensions become relevant because the subject is embodied in and through music. Music instruments are anchored in the world as an extension of the expressive and engaged body. Making music is an ontological interpretation of the world considering all inner-worldly existence.

In their chapter, "Music as Art – Art as Being – Being as Music. A philosophical investigation into how music education can embrace a work of art based on Heidegger's thinking", Susanna Leijonhufvud & Cecilia Ferm Thorgersen link the discussion to Heidegger's claim that a Work of Art contains an intrinsic power to open the space of Being. Leijonhufvud and Ferm Thorgersen argue that if a Work of Art can be a musical Work of Art, then music possesses the power to strike us and hence throw us into Being. The chapter communicates an investigation of the philosophical thinking in Heidegger's book *The Origin of the Work of Art* and what consequences that thinking could generate for music educational practice. The chapter presents an examination of Heidegger's thinking in relation to the new Swedish syllabus for the subject of music. Although this is not explicitly stated in the music syllabus, Leijonhufvud and Ferm Thorgersen believe that it is possible for art as Being to be expressed in the subject of music.

1.6.3 Musical Experience

This section presents texts from Erik Wallrup, Charles Ford & Lucy Green, Elin Angelo and Edvin Østergaard.

Despite Heidegger's ambiguous – sometimes even hostile – relation to music, Erik Wallrup suggests in "Music, Truth and Belonging: Listening with Heidegger" that if Heidegger's thinking on artworks is taken into account, especially its relation to truth and Being, then there is reason to rethink many of the conceptions that are pivotal for how we listen to, teach, and study music. The starting point in Wallrup's argumentation is Heidegger's treatment of the conflict between Wagner and Nietzsche, where he rejects Wagner's *Gesamtkunstwerk*. However, since he only repudiates the emotionality of music, another position of his should come to the fore: that indicated in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*. All artworks open up a world. Truth happens in these works. Wallrup argues that this must be valid for music, too, even though Heidegger remained silent on how.

In their chapter, "The Phenomenology of Music: Implications for Teenage Identities and Music Education", Charles Ford and Lucy Green discuss the fact that many writings about the philosophy of music and music education have focused on concepts of meaning, metaphor, emotions and expression, invariably from the perspective of the individual listener or composer. In their text they want to develop an alternative, phenomenological approach grounded in the writings of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. On the basis of these thinkers' discussions of musical being, the time of music and its internal dialectics, Ford and Green present an understanding of "style" as the primary basis for the mediation between production, musical experience, and musical learning. The authors argue that music comes into presence within, and resounds, a nonconceptual and collective socio-historical world, feeding into the formation of identity in teenagers in particular.

In her chapter, "Music Education as a Dialogue between the Outer and the Inner. A Jazz Pedagogue's Philosophy of Music Education", Elin Angelo discusses the philosophy of the work of a renowned Norwegian jazz pedagogue and its embodiment in practice as a dialogue between inner and outer aspects of music and human beings. Music, here, is conceived as something that doesn't necessarily involve sound. The chapter is based on a qualitative study, and aims to enrich basic thinking in music and art teacher education. Through a philosophically inspired discussion, Angelo highlights three dilemmas in her conclusion: Is jazz education about music or about humans? If it is about humans – is it about individuals or communities? And if jazz education and jazz performance are regarded as two sides of the same thing, what then should jazz teacher education be about?

The main educational argument in Edvin Østergaard's chapter, "Pendulum Dialogues and the Re-enchantment of the World", is that music can provide an entrance into the aesthetic experience of nature. Based on his own experiences as a composer and researcher with the ongoing art-science project *Pendulum Dialogues*, Østergaard discusses how artistic-scientific dialogues with the pendulum might reveal the world's ontological dimensions. Østergaard grounds his argumentation in

Heidegger's space analysis in *Time and Being,* his distinction between geometrical space and existential space, and the problem of the ontological reversal. Østergaard argues that an ontological re-reversal is a matter of both explicit philosophical investigations and innovative explorations of practical teaching efforts. Obviously, an ontological re-reversal also implies giving experience and sensing back their role in education. Discussing art and science, Østergaard argues that the differences between the artist's and the scientist's approach to one and the same phenomenon should be highlighted in order to create a dialogue between artists and scientists, teachers and students in a common learning space. The lesson to learn from music education is that science teachers should, in order to promote aesthetics in science class, intentionally cultivate a more open, unbiased kind of observation.

1.6.4 Bildung and Truth

In this last section we find contributions from Chris Naughton, Einar Rusten, Morten Carlsen and Karl Heinrich Ehrenforth.

In "Revisiting the cave: Heidegger's reinterpretation of Plato's allegory with reference to music education", Chris Naughton focuses on how Heidegger's essay *On Plato's Teaching of Truth (1942)*, although a treatise in itself on education, can be a helpful text for music teachers wishing to challenge their own understanding of knowledge and what and how they teach. Through this insight into Plato's thinking, with Heidegger's qualifications and commentary, some fundamental concerns regarding the interpretation of truth/knowledge currently adopted in music education are exposed. Naughton argues that the neo-liberal curriculum has effectively adopted an error. With increasing pressure on universities to find new models of teaching, Heidegger confronts the educator in this essay with a set of ideas requiring the music educator to re-configure the very concept of education and to re-align practice to adequately reflect the human condition.

Einar Rusten's text, "From Heidegger to Dufrenne, and back: *Bildung* beyond subject and object in art experience", starts by highlighting the tendency of an existing inherent divergence of ontological subjectivism and objectivism regarding the prevalent explanations of *the source and origin* of the various contents of aesthetic experience in general. Rusten claims that we, through Martin Heidegger's way of rejecting the very premises for the construing of an ontological abyss between a subjective and an objective realm of world, including his related, special view on the ontology of artworks, can achieve a new understanding of how the individual aesthetic experience comprises an aspect of knowledge. According to Rusten, one implication is that the content of the experience takes on a certain uniqueness and unexchangeability in its long-term impact and consequences for the person in question. Thus, brought into the realm of educational philosophy as well, parts of this chapter move within a frame of *Bildung* thinking. Drawing upon this particular German-cultural situated tradition of educational and cultural philosophy, connections in human life between content-rooted momentous aesthetic experiences on the

one hand, and longtime developments, knowledge, and enduring states of mind on the other, are highlighted to some degree. To a wide extent Rusten takes a general aesthetic theoretical point of departure, but musicological implications are taken into consideration as well. The inspiring sources are philosophical and aesthetic theoretical elements in works by Heidegger and Mikel Dufrenne, respectively, not least the Heideggerian thought of the artwork as a privileged place for experiencing anew being as such – a being which in reality lightens all the things, entities and other individual beings that we most often deal with in our everyday world in a more or less somnambulistic way. And in this way, the artwork can also be a privileged place to open up anew the being that we ourselves are.

In his chapter, "Practice as Self-exploration", Morten Carlsen discusses how musical practice is often regarded as a yoke you just have to carry if you want to sing or play an instrument well. Admittedly, to a certain extent it is: many a pupil has complained how dull it is… Perhaps this somewhat limited view has influenced the point of departure of much research on musical practice as a specific way of learning. It is thereby defined as an activity quite similar or even identical to physical training: the scientific methods sometimes seem rather behaviouristic. Musicians, presumably the experts in this field, have anyhow taken little notice. But Carlsen discusses whether practice really has to be dull. Is it perhaps the player who is dull when practicing? Could it be that we need to extend our scope, and that practice may even develop into a deeply rewarding activity? Carlsen's point of departure is his own practicing – and his attempts at teaching it.

In the very last chapter of the book, "Art and 'truth'. Heidegger's Ontology in Light of Ernst Bloch's Philosophy of Hope and Hans-Georg Gadamer's Play-Metaphor. Three Impulses for a New Perspective of Musical Bildung", Karl Heinrich Ehrenforth asks questions such as: What is truth? Is truth to be found only in religion or science? Why not in art? Ehrenforth focuses on how philosophers such as Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Graf York, Dewey, Bloch, Heidegger, Gadamer, Blumenberg, Ricoeur and Waldenfels have all dared to say that art is more than entertainment and/or illusion. Art is an important example of sensual-symbolic truth. But why has this attitude no echo in present cultural policy and education?

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Part I
Technical Rationality and Nihilism

Chapter 2
Musings of Heidegger. Arts Education and *the Mall* as a 'Debased' (Dreyfus) Work of Art

Frederik Pio

Abstract The article starts by investigating the phenomenology of artworks using Heidegger's notion of *Seinsgeschichte* (history-of-being) as a point of departure. Three different architectural structures from different epochs are juxtaposed (the temple, the cathedral, and the mall). The readings of these three structures are used as a prism to arrive at an interpretation of what we are currently in the process of becoming in our relation to artworks in general. From here the article moves on to discuss such themes as commitment, truth and school culture in the way such categories can currently be disclosed in an arts education context. Connecting such diverse categories as *The Acropolis*, St. John the Baptist and J.R.R. Tolkien's *The Hobbit* with the theme of teacher authenticity, the article offers a fresh account of the challenges currently being faced within the broad field of arts education.

Keywords Phenomenology • Artworks • Arts education • Teacher authenticity

2.1 Heidegger's Conception of Artworks as a Prism for an Understanding of Being

2.1.1 The Artwork as Prism

For Heidegger artworks gather, produce, manifest and condense the specific 'something' which constitutes the common background understanding of the world which applies to a culture or a regional community in a given time. In this perspective, artworks are associated with the experience of meeting the fundamental mood of a given cultural community (Varkøy and Pio 2012; Dreyfus 2006). Artworks provide an imaginative (non-discursive, pre-reflexive) way for a regional culture to vindicate

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_2

its world. Artworks exercise an important function in their ability to shine and shed light on the world in which we live:

> The way in which art thoroughly spans the being-in-the world of human beings as historical, the way in which it illuminates the world for them and indeed illuminates human beings themselves, putting in place the way in which art is art – all this receives its law and structural articulation from the manner in which the world as a whole is opened up to human beings in general. (Heidegger, quoted in Dreyfus 2007, pp. 413–414)

However to unfold the depth of this point, we first have to do a certain amount of work. In this chapter we will do this in an arts education context. Heidegger understands artworks as a potential prism reflecting how a given community puts its world in order and thus lives out a pre-reflexive understanding of its being. Such an understanding amounts to a basic sense of reality characterizing a community. It is a way to call forth the world in a holistic, meaningful way. Heidegger is thus interested in how an artwork works and what its function is. The famous example here is the Greek temple:

> The temple first joins and at the same time gathers the unity of the courses and relations around itself, in which … the human being achieves the form of its destiny. (Heidegger 1950, pp. 27–28)

Heidegger sees the poetical dimension of art as tied to the way a human inhabits its world. The earth is only earth in its habitational aspect. And this habitation is fundamentally carried out as a poetical occurrence (Heidegger 1954b, pp. 195–196). Heidegger sees the human as a habitating being, dwelling between the world and the sky (cf. 'Hölderlins Erde und Himmel' in Heidegger 1944, pp. 178–179). For Heidegger, this thought is all about (*Besinnung*) grasping a dimension which manifests itself poetically. He talks about a 'measuring out' (*Vermessung*) which is *not* calculative in nature, but appears as a 'sizing up' of man's inhabitation of the dimension between the world and the sky. Heidegger sees that this dimension is basically poetical – even musical – in its character[1] (Heidegger 1954b, pp. 189–190).

All objectivizing approaches to the world (calculating, computing, stipulating, etc.) are rooted in a more essential and poetical way to be in the world. It is this primary being-in-the world that makes it possible subsequently to make sense of the world as a measured object. Only on the basis of a pre-reflexive, poetical experience of the world:

> … the person receives the standard for the fullness of its being … .(Heidegger 1954b, p. 190)

[1] Hölderlin 'sings' his poetry in the shape of 'hymns' (Heidegger 1944, pp. 169, 171, 179). And Heidegger talks about Hölderlin's (*Tonart*) 'key' (p. 180). This suggests that in Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin the sonorous sound matter of tone is ontologized, in a way where it works as ether or as a fugue (*Fuge*) shaping the fourfold and disclosing its inner holism as a manifestation of Hölderlin's *Innigkeit*, which designates how everything contains more than itself. The fourfold of the world (*das Geviert*) is thus described as a song (*Gesang*): "Vier Stimmen sind es, die tönen" (op. cit., s. 170). These four voices are yielded into a belonging in which the center that unites them makes up a (*Fuge*) fugue (op. cit., s. 179). As sounding voices they are as such yielded into an unending relation.

Human beings can only be domiciled in their habitation of the world, in so far as the poets come forth as the ones:

> … who size up (*das Mass nehmen*) the architecture, for the house structure (*Baugefüge*) of dwelling. (Heidegger 1954b, p. 196)

In continuation of this, one can say that the quoted example above with the temple as an artwork is disclosed in its being, in so far as it constitutes the horizon of the Greek man in Antiquity. The temple in this way summarizes what living in this specific world was all about:

> The poetical first of all allows humans in their dwelling to approach their being. The poetical is the original way to allow dwelling. (Heidegger 1954b, p. 196)

In Heidegger's reading the temple as an artwork opens for the presencing of the gods in the world of Greek men and women. It is this reservoir of existence that the temple as an artwork is rooted in. As such the artwork exercises a world-disclosing ability (Thomson 2011, p. 66). A great work of art is characterized by disclosing the ontological posit of its epoch through the sovereignty of its statement. As Thomson nicely puts it:

> … the great poets and thinkers receptively shape the lenses through which we see the world and ourselves by creatively responding to the way things show or suggest themselves. (Thomson 2011, p. 76)

And this point can produce an insight if it is updated and thus 'translated' into our own time. But what can we see today 'looking through Heidegger's glasses'? Which artwork can bring us to perceive our modern way to call forth the world today? To answer this question we will take the Greek temple as our point of departure.

As mentioned above, Heidegger ties the function of artworks to concrete communities and their way of making sense of the world. But at the same time one realizes that today the Antique world of Greek man is gone. Thus today an artwork like the temple is:

> … torn out of the space of its own being. (Heidegger 1950, p. 26)

The temple remains there today, left behind as an objectivized monument, as a testimony of a being-in-the-world (the *Dasein* of Greek man) that no longer has any place in our modern world. The temple thus no longer *works* as an artwork. It no longer reflects the world in which it was originally created. When this happens, the temple falls into the decay of becoming just an object: an antiquated exhibit, a museum piece, a tourist attraction, a money-machine efficiently milked (Heidegger 1950, p. 56). As an artwork it has now ceased to exist. About such works Heidegger says:

> … the work constituted as object … does not make up its being as a work. (Heidegger 1950, p. 27)

For instance, in this perspective Bach's *Johannes-Passion* is also currently obliged to find itself torn out of the lived religiosity of the eighteenth century.

This work of art contributed originally to upholding this specific world. But today 'the passions' of Bach have become an aesthetical object: 'a classic', an item (in the 'Amazon basket') in the form of a digital box-set with lots of 'extras' including articles written by prestigious icons in the business. This artwork has now been lifted out of the world in which it was created. Such artworks are thus today threatened by a certain homelessnes (Heidegger 1950, p. 26).[2]

2.1.2 Heidegger's History-of-Being

After the publishing of *Being and time* (1927) Heidegger sees that being is a fundamentally *historical* occurrence. The world is thus called forth in new figurations according to the transformations of being that occur:

> … in the West for the first time in Greece … [w]hat was in the future to be called being was set into work, setting the standard. The realm of beings thus opened up was then transformed into a being in the sense of God's creation. This happened in the Middle Ages. This kind of being was again transformed at the beginning and in the course of the modern age. Beings became objects that could be controlled and seen through by calculation. At each time a new and essential world arose. (Heidegger, quoted in Dreyfus 2007, p. 415)

In this light the Greek temple condenses a way of making sense of the world which is specific for this epoch. A meaningfulness appears here which delimits this period from the later Roman-Christian era. Heidegger's thinking is thus based on the insight that being has a *history* consisting of changing figurations of intelligibility across epochs:

> 'Being' – it is not god and not a world foundation. Being (*Sein*) is essentially wider than all being-ness (*Seiende*) and yet being (*Sein*) is closer to humans than any being-ness (*Seiende*) …/Being (*Sein)* is the next as that which is adjacently near. However this nearness stays far from man. First and foremost humans always-already stick to the being-ness (das *Seiende*). (Heidegger 1949, p. 23)

When Heidegger sees that being changes historically, this results in a *Seinsgeschichte – a* history of being (Heidegger 1969, pp. 8–10). Heidegger claims that Western culture has gone through several horizons of being (Heidegger 1950, pp. 90–91). And as mentioned above, important artworks are seen as closely tied to these specific horizons of being, as each understanding of being in an epoch is gathered in specific artworks:

> The composure regarding what constitutes art is completely and utterly determined by the question of being. (Heidegger 1950, p. 73)

[2] It should be mentioned here that Gadamer has founded a form of philosophical hermeneutics which offers these artworks the possibility of melting into a contemporary horizon. In Gadamer's conception, artworks can dissolve their object character as they are handed down from one epoch to the next (Ehrenforth 1971).

The question becomes which artwork in a given epoch will be capable of commanding a sensitivity receptive enough to register and incarnate the sense, mood and style of an epoch and bring the tacit values given here to the fore in the joining of these elements together into a united work?

However, great art has drawn itself back from modern man, Heidegger says (Pöggeler 1977, p. 53). Heidegger is here aiming at the discourse of the immortal, eternal value of classical 'Grand Art'. Heidegger finds that this ideal is a symptom of the fear of thinking (Heidegger 1950, pp. 67–68). The notion of an artwork having *eternal* value (*Ewigkeitswert*) is for Heidegger a sign that modern man is losing sight of the essence of art. The immortality perspective is blurring the essence of the artwork as a seismograph for the way a *specific* epoch calls forth the world.

In what follows we will try (i) to transpose this thought of 'being-as-temporal' (*Seinsgeschichte*) into a contemporary example, and then (ii) to show its bearing on an arts education context:

> It is about venturing into the attempt to bring our accustomed notions round to an unusual, yet simple experience of thinking. (Heidegger 1944, p. 154)

2.1.3 The Mall

To illustrate the points made above, Heidegger refers to how the above-mentioned Greek temple as an architectural artwork originally gathered a world (i.e. condensed what it was all about) for Greek men and women and thus constituted a center for an existence in the presence of the gods:

> In firm repose the work of the temple opens a world and in addition refers this back to the earth, which thus itself comes forth as the native soil. (Heidegger 1950, p. 28)

Almost 2,000 years later the Christian cathedral as an architectural artwork focused the world of Christian believers around God as the creator of the world. High above the world dwelt the saints, assembled in God's presence and thus ascended and vindicated in contrast to the overthrown, fallen souls.

Thus Heidegger in his anthology *Holzwege* ('Off the beaten track') connects artworks to the phenomenology of the holy (cf. Dorrance Kelly and Dreyfus 2011; Heidegger 1950, pp. 269–320; Heidegger 1974, pp. 231–237, and Heidegger 1944, pp. 66–70). One can extend, modernize and thus challenge this thinking by asking what kind of architectural artwork we can see today as a condensation that summarizes essential features of our time?

To all appearances the answer could very well be the large, multi-floor shopping center as we know it from 'the big city', fully equipped with a large, fenced car park and underground infrastructure facilitating the constant influx and discharge of the available reservoir of consumers. We will henceforth call it 'the mall'. The mall has gradually assumed the character of a new ritualized place of worship, a platform of adoration complete with new matching cultural practices preserving the world

Fig. 2.1 The Mall (Photo: Author's own)

upheld here. Here it is just the casual kick of consumption that is adored. As a young girl said in the television news:

> When I feel empty inside, I shop to make it go away (Fig. 2.1).

The mall as a modern cathedral is designated as 'a center', even though in itself it is rather the opposite: it is without a center, and is more like a labyrinth.[3] Being without a center, the mall illustrates in an architectural way the life of the typical modern average subject: leveled, often without a center. Heidegger talks about *Wohnungsnot* as a repressed crisis in our ability to dwell (Heidegger 1954b, p. 156) and about our *Heimatslosigkeit*, the 'homelessness' of modernity (Heidegger 1949, p. 30). Today the endless, claustrophobic underground car park becomes a picture of the unconscious of the modern subject.

But this circumstance has to do with why this center-less mall can become the center in our modern, urban life. As the Greek temple functioned for the man of Antiquity more than 2,000 years ago, and as the Christian cathedral much later functioned for medieval believers, *so is the mall today characterized by gathering*

[3] A labyrinth making you feel like Theseus fumbling your way ahead. The difference here is that the red thread of Ariadne is unfortunately missing this time. But the Taurus is still there. Ever waiting for the rendezvous (for instance in the form of your financial adviser monitoring your spending and potentially closing down your credit card).

and condensing the background for how modern men and women typically perceive themselves. This has to do with our self-assured arrogance when we as modern subjects comprehend ourselves as technical resources.

2.1.4 Three Worlds

The examples above with the three architectural works demonstrate that the human being of (i) Greek Antiquity, (ii) Christian Middle Ages, and (iii) modernity lived in distinctly different worlds. This point can be illustrated by the following three figures. These work as icons reflecting distinctly different figurations of meaning and value from epoch to epoch.

The Greek hero:

In Homer's account of the Trojan War, Achilles is presented as an iconic Greek hero of Antiquity. Through Achilles as a hero, the Greek adoration of *Physis* manifested itself in a merciless subjugation of any weakness. This came to the fore in the Dionysian cultivation of 'the titanic' and 'the barbaric' (Nietzsche 1872, pp. 40–41). It was all about the adoration of the highest life forms, as they found an expression through sovereign pride and self-assurance.

The Christian saint:

Later, through Saint John the Baptist, the life of humanity appeared as a Christian sojourn in the valley of death, facing the call of Christian charity and agape love in the attempt to exempt oneself from sin. So on the final day of the apocalypse we could enter the life beyond in the presence of God.

The modern star:

The relationship of the modern, anonymous consumer to itself as a resource always standing by for further optimization appears in a distinctly different *third* figuration. As a resource the consumer upholds the world of the mall through the cultural practices of consuming. This happens through the adoration of the modern star by virtue of the use of entertainment services and goods like merchandise, accessories, franchise products, cable TV, lifestyle products, clothing, etc.

As Christian believers, the monks originally upheld the practices of the cathedral through their religiously organized everyday routines. In the same way, the anonymous 'consumer' (from the endless suburbs) now cultivates a meaningful world through the media and their distributed narratives of celebrity stardom. The star thus incarnates the high-water mark of the current aesthetical stylized life.

The hero (e.g. Achilles) and the Christian saint (e.g. St. John the Baptist) and the modern star (e.g. John Travolta) constitute figures rooted in three distinctly different sets of cultural practices. Each of the three above-mentioned architectural structures (the temple, cathedral and mall) is thus tied into three thoroughly different worlds. Each with a distinct icon (hero, saint, star).

2.1.5 The Mall as Work of Art?

All things considered, we are uniquely challenged in our modern times because we are no longer able to uphold common references as to which types of meaning and value should be used to unite people around a common belief or project. Greek Antiquity as well as the later epoch of Christianity were both (each in its own way) characterized by the existence of common referents as to what was considered important and valuable for everyone and what was considered unimportant and reprehensible. Apart from our fascination with technical control, such a type of common referent seems to be absent today (Varkøy 2012).

In a way the chapter of our epoch becomes a testimony of a certain crisis. More specifically, the mall as an architectural structure becomes an emblem of this crisis, in the way that in the mall our cultural practices have exalted 'the culture-of-reinforced-concrete' with its dubious aesthetics and used it in the construction of a modern 'cathedral-like' mall – an artwork – of our time.

Exactly in its capacity as condensing a current pattern of ways to make sense of the world (the modern, mass-oriented consumer-culture), this is in Heidegger's thinking an artwork we are dealing with. And as such the mall is – in an updating way – *duplicating the functions* that were carried out by the temple (in Antiquity) and by the cathedral (in the Middle Ages). It is in this sense that the mall is "… setting the truth into motion …" (Heidegger 1950, p. 21), as the historical way for a people to inhabit their world, is upheld through their artwork (Heidegger 1950, p. 66). The mall is an artwork because it gathers its 'players' and summarizes the significant cultural practices around itself as a sovereign architectural manifestation. A manifestation which is art because all the elements become integrated into a concluded whole defined by its continuous functioning (Heidegger 1944, p. 196).

The mall as manifested phenomenon should beyond any doubt be conceived as an expression in our time of truth. This architectural work is stirring truth in the sense that here is articulated the technical understanding of being in our time. And with that the belonging of the modern subject is defined into its technical being (as individualized subject, consumer, resource). Thus through the mall a common sense of reality is manifested (Heidegger 1950, p. 65). This technical rationality is inscribed into the enormous concrete constructions, the endlessly distributed 'wholes' as small 'pockets' in the structure each containing its own boutique or store. The labyrinthian structure is created in order to lead a maximum of people the shortest way to the highest number of shopping opportunities (Fig. 2.2).

As small, technical resources we swarm around this calculated infra-structure, all carefully administering our own individualized agency, which is given to each of us in the form of a credit card balance hovering somewhere in the cyberspace of netbanking. However, as Heidegger points out, there is something dangerous about this technical way to conceive of our being. This most uncomfortable aspect has to do with the fact, that the mall as a concrete center – and as a macro junction in our modern public space – appears to us today, *as a replacement of a functionality that*

Fig. 2.2 Inside the mall (Photo: Author's own)

was handled earlier in history by completely vital, authentic and ethical artworks like the temple and the cathedral:

> Image and temple cannot be achieved through a prize competition, when the god is dead; you can have no priests, when the flash of lightning of the gods does not strike, and it will not strike as long as the earth of home … as such is not upheld in the space of the storm. (Heidegger, quoted in Pöggeler 1977, pp. 29–30)

The temple of Antiquity and the Christian cathedral were vital artworks in a completely literal sense for the people that lived back then. These works instigated *Lebensraum,* and thus framed a background, on the basis of which life could be lived in its fullest sense. In a way the mall is just as important and vital today. But it says something about the technical clearing of our time and the fierce vehemence it contains, that this substitution has happened in the way it has. According to Heidegger, what is being displayed here is normalized nihilism. Thus he asks in 1967:

> How is art doing as part of the industrial society, which has started to become a cybernetical world? Are the statements of art becoming some kind of information in this world and for it? …/These questions are gathered in one single question which goes: How are humans doing as encapsulated in their scientific-technical world?. (Heidegger 1967, pp. 19–20)

According to Heidegger, the world of art becomes 'cybernetic' because humans (whose fate it has become to be the ones who call the artwork into its being) are now assuming the character of a resource. With that, the artwork is reduced to bits of

information which can be stored cognitively, so the learning output (brought about by the sensation of the artwork) can be measured. The openness of existentiality (which Heidegger calls a *Lichtung,* which again facilitates the possibility of *Unverborgenheit* 'un-hiddenness'; Heidegger 1969, pp. 74–78) is thereby closed down, as it is embedded into a scientific-technical ratio. In the mall the peculiar aesthetics of this technical control is found inculcated into concrete structures, in terms of a technical way to secure maximum functionality. In other words, the greatest possible capacity at the least possible expense. This technical rationality, which is currently containing our world-picture, Heidegger calls *das Gestell* (the frame; Heidegger 1962, p. 27). It is this technical understanding of being which is stirred, when we buy a ticket to the parking basement and disappear in our car into the dark entrance underground (like Jonas into the whale), only to appear ten minutes later on the ground floor, reborn as shopping consumers ready to rock. In the mall as artwork thus hibernates a value of truth. It is the truth that tacitly centers the cultural practices of our technical epoch.

2.1.6 Now What?

The above description of the mall poses the question of how far one can register a new departure regarding the notion of art in our contemporary epoch of technical rationality. It is in this context that Heidegger can claim in 1953:

> The epoch of Bildung (educative formation) is coming to an end …. (Heidegger 1954b, p. 65)

'Technique' (*das Teknik*) for Heidegger is not about instruments and concrete technologies. The essential aspect of technical rationality is that it has become the way we disclose the world and thus allow it to appear for us in a distinct extract. This means that *das Teknik* (technique) has come so close to us, that we ignore the fact that it has grown in intimacy, to an extent where it is now *the* constituent for our being-in-the-world:

> Technology is no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we pay heed to this, another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e. of truth. (Heidegger 1962, p. 12)

We have of course always had technique (*Teknik*) ever since our ancient ancestors discovered that stones could be used for splitting nuts. But our modern situation is a new situation. Our modern technical understanding of being fundamentally allows the world to appear as a distinctly definite extract, namely as a calculated resource. According to Heidegger, we are enclosed into this particular way of making sense of the world to an extent we are hardly aware of. Our tacit naturalness layered as a matter of course in our actions and thought thus makes it ever harder for us, to grasp that we can exist as something different than producers, consumers and as vehicle for input and output.

More and more we are obliged to appear for each other as individualized results of temporarily culminated developmental processes. We are all expected to be

readily accessible, optimizable and flexible resource units. And when you have defined yourself as such, you have already acknowledged the idea that as a modern subject you should preferably be under persistent, lifelong learning and development.[4] We have taken over this project so that we can recognize ourselves and feel ok. The key to this 'being ok' is about appearing to be as liberated and flexible as possible in our own eyes. We are constantly ready for change, administering an unlimited belief in our own autonomy. In the end everything becomes so flexible that there is no resistance in the world any more pressing the other way, and thus threatening to block the performativity-maximizing processes to pass off in ever more frictionless ways.

Today we are faced with a need to interpret the consequences of the fact, that our technical culture *is also shaping the way artworks appear to us* and the way we encounter them in our lives. If Heidegger is right, this is a formidable challenge. We must attempt to fathom the consequences that follow from our current situation, where artworks themselves have become ambiguous. So far we have:

(i) Disclosed the modern mall as a phenomenon by (*Seinsgeschichtlich*) bringing it into Heidegger's *Unverborgenheit* (Heidegger's term for the 'un-hiddenness' of a phenomenon).
(ii) This move has made us see that the mall is currently functioning today as a central artwork of our technical epoch.
(iii) The two points (i) and (ii) finally compel us to come to terms with our modern being-in-the-world as technical, individualized resources.

2.2 The Mall as Artwork Functions Through the Framing of the Subject as a Modern Hybrid Between Aesthetics and Technique

2.2.1 Aesthetics and Technical Rationality

The theme above on the relation between the phenomenology of artworks and technical rationality calls for a further investigation of how a generalized aesthetical experience today seems to be tied to a re-description of the artwork in the modernity (characterizing the mall). What we are looking at, seems to be a beauty-oriented consumer logic defining the individual as a resource and thus connecting this determination of the subject to a practical understanding of what an aesthetical phenomenon is (Heidegger 1944/46, pp. 78–79). The mall as artwork thus centers a horizon of cultural practices that makes the world appear meaningfull, by ascribing value to a distinct notion of what aesthetical phenomena are currently about. Consider the way a club sandwich is served in the bistro, the reason you choose a specially

[4] Technical rationality is characterized by its focus on endless optimization and unending development (lifelong learning through competence development), cf. Illeris and Berri 2005.

designed pair of jeans, the synthetical replica flowers in a vase in the customer service department. These are examples of how we consume more and more input of sensuous stimulation as *aesthetical* input. As the world is torn and wrenched ever more each day our stylized life as consumers (in the ontic) increasingly becomes an ever more aesthetical project.[5]

The phenomenology of the aesthetical seems today to be connected to a logic of resource optimization. To a certain extent, a technical rationality has seized a considerable magnitude of the aesthetical phenomenology. The core example is our body, which seems to have become the ultimate artwork. The body as exhibited and flashed in the public space is perhaps the most aesthetical that 'ordinary' people today is responding to. Aesthetically our body is our own artwork as it centers our practices. The body as aesthetically organized phenomenon is focused as a resource as we engage in socializing practices of relating to fitness, pilates, clothing, food choice, plastic surgery, movies, etc.

The above seems to imply that the escalating aestheticalization of ourselves and our surroundings is tied to how we perceive ourselves and our surroundings as resources.

2.2.2 Aesthetics and Modern Subjectivism

According to Heidegger, artworks must play a key role if we are to move beyond the grip of techncal rationality in which we find ourselves today. But to engage in artworks within such an endeavour, we must look beyond the paradigm of aestheticalization. Heidegger critically contemplates the notion of art as aesthetic. This critical inquiry is necessary if a countermove is to be made in relation to the technical rationality that is currently framing our relation to artworks. Not only is the *beautiful* brought about in artworks. There is also a potential experience of *truth* involved in the workings of artworks. For Heidegger beauty is a way in which truth (as un-hiddenness) comes to pass:

> Beauty is a way for truth as un-hiddenness to come forth. (Heidegger 1950, p. 43)

The purely aesthetic approach conceals the fact, that artworks can potentially contain a deeper, ontological quality, demanding another kind of engagement in art than just contemplating it as beautiful (Heidegger 1950, pp. 62–63). But this insight is forgotten today *as it has been replaced by* a tendency toward (*Verwissenschaftlichung*) 'scientificalization' (Løgstrup 1993, pp. 44f.). This is what Heidegger calls:

> … the increasing techne-ering (*Technisierung*) of all sciences. (Heidegger 2009, p. 211)

This reveals that the technical determination of the world as *an object* to be managed and controlled also posits *a subject* to stand in front of this surrounding

[5] It should be underlined that what is described here does not remotely resemble the existential oriented 'care of the self' promoted by the late Michel Foucault (cf. Foucault 1984, pp. 281f.). A comparative approach to this theme, however, cannot be unfolded here.

world. This cartesian split is simultaneously *executed technically* as well as *underpinned aesthetically*. For instance, when music is called forth (on-line in the marketplace) as a technologically mediated, aesthetical resource. This is tied into the determination of the individualized subject, taking these resources on-line as consumer (for instance as purchase of a download):

> The aesthetics become a psychology practised as natural science …/the arts become delivered over to the evidence of natural science and thus pushed into the realm of the factual sciences. As a matter of fact, the aesthetical inquiry about art in its last consequences is here brought to an end. (Heidegger 1944/46, pp. 89, 91)

Heidegger sees that the aesthetical experience of art is bound to end up in a numb dualism where the *subjective* dimension is *objectivized* by natural science. In our perspective we can recognize this pattern, when each single individual increasingly has its own, private, emotional experience of music as an aesthetically objectivized on-line product (available as a download from the net, mediated by smartphones complete with earplugs).[6] With that music is aestheticalized as a deeply subjective occurrence closed off from the world:

> That which determines the emotions of humans is aesthetics … the beautiful. (Heidegger 1944/46, p. 75)

For Heidegger, this mix of emotions and aestheticalization constitutes a complete dismantling of the ethical-authentic notion of artwork he finds in Greek Antiquity (the temple).[7] The aestheticalization thus underpins a modern notion of the subject matching seamlessly with the resource logic of technical rationality.[8] This is a logic which adores 'the subject' as solemnly as a saint is elected. This adoration is carried out by highlighting the subject as equiped with methods, techniques, instruments, calculations to master and control objects in the surrounding world. Thus the *subject* with all its inner emotions is installed into a world consisting of meaningsless *objects*. These are objects that remain meaningless until the subject – with an act of will – attributes a constructed value to the object[9]:

> The work of art is employed as 'object' for a 'subject'. (Heidegger 1944/46, p. 76)

Here Heidegger writes about the experience – the feeling subject-object relation – as an expression of the 'subjectivity of the subject':

> In this experience the self-assurance which belongs to the subjectivity achieves its most vacant emptiness because everything enters into it (*weil alles in sie eingeht*) …/With that the being-ness (*das Seiende*) has become an unconditional yardstick for the security of the experience (as 'truth', i.e. 'correctness', i.e. 'certainty'). (Heidegger 2009, p. 94)

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[6] On privatization see Pio 2009a, pp. 131 f.; and 2009b.

[7] Cf. Heideggers *Die Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*.

[8] Heidegger makes the point that the modern subject as 'a mental-autonomous entity' would stand in a completely alienated relation to the horizon of Greek Antiquity as to the question of what a human being is; cf. Pio 2012, p. 195.

[9] See Pio 2012, sections A and B for a description of Heidegger's critique of this dualism. There is a challenge here of clarifying the difference between the position of Husserlian phenomenology and social constructivist approaches when the relation between artwork and subject is determined, cf. Nielsen 2000.

That is, the significance of the subjective experience is swelling into accelerating importance. As a consequence, the artwork as an aesthetical product becomes entangled in the individualized subject's consumption of sensual pleasure. Here it is neither the temple nor the cathedral which comes into focus; it is the mall that becomes the new arena in which these practices are staged:

> The aesthetics determine the work of art as an object … of a sensual feeling in a broad sense. Today this sensual feeling is called 'the experience'. The way in which humans experience art shall throw light on its substance (*soll über ihr Wesen Aufschluss geben*) … /Everything is experience. But perhaps the experience is the element in which art dies. This dying goes on so slowly that it takes some centuries. (Heidegger 1950, p. 67)

This purely aesthetical enjoyment of the music is a Kantian disinterested distanced, enjoyment. Here Heidegger cites Nietzsche for saying that:

> Since Kant all talk of art, beauty, realization, wisdom has been messed up and defiled through the concept of 'without interest' (*Ohne Interesse*). (Heidegger 1944/46, p. 108)

The distanced experience of music, as aesthetical leisure enjoyment flows into one with the experience of 'the Mall' as a centerpiece in our current epoch of technical rationalization. 'The Mall' calls forth and exists through the subject as a resource with its distanced, aesthetical enjoyment of itself (Heidegger 1950, p. 67). Here no further engagement is needed. In this distanced enjoyment there is nothing at stake; there is no truth pointing beyond the internal self-reference[10] of the individualized subject. Such an aesthetical experience is debased as there is lots of foreground (*Welt*). But hardly any ontology (*Erde*).[11] With the ontological dimension erased, we lack the vital upholding of the artwork, which:

> … makes each person distinct, not in relation to his or her experience, but the concrete person is drawn into a belonging to the truth happening in the work, and thus a being with each other and for each other is grounded …. (Heidegger 1950, p. 55)

2.2.3 Ontology: Art?

As far as I can see we have arrived at an aspect of a certain importance in relation to the current crisis and loss of societal prestige surrounding an educational subject like music (this point is also underlined by Nielsen 2010):

> Perhaps the current exertion of art has no longer anything to do with the hitherto existing notions of art and its purpose. (Heidegger 2009, p. 393)

Removed, beneath the subjectivist consumption of aesthetical inputs the possibility always-already exist for us to engage with the artwork under the auspices of an ontologically oriented thinking. This is a turn away from aesthetics toward an experience of truth. This ontology of the artwork is not about a listening subject corresponding in a correct way to an aesthetical object. This concordant relation has

[10] On Luhmann's concept of 'self-reference', see Luhmann 1987, p. 57.

[11] Heidegger's distinction between earth and world is discussed elsewhere in this book.

nothing to do with the truth appearing as (*Unverborgenheit*) un-hiddenness also called *Aletheia* (Heidegger 1969, p. 77).

The artwork in its *Unverborgenheit* (un-hiddenness) calls forth something that overshadows the singular subject and its fervent emotions. What is called forth is an experience of that which is mastered as having its deeper repose in something not-mastered; the knowledge we have at our disposal as having its deeper repose in a non-knowledge (cf. Varkøy 2009, 2010). This is not about emotions and individual needs, but about a dwelling attitude of letting things be (*Gelassenheit*), which can take us into a mode of openness, where a reversal is allowed to happen, so that we suddenly find that the music has done something to us (and not the other way around). Such a mutual openness is described by Heidegger as *Lichtung* – 'a clearing'. The artwork is a latent seismograph, because the way the world is awake in us is all about a poetical frame of mind (as *Befindlichkeit*), which is more fundamental than any analytical, reflexive approach:

> The poetical roots humans to the earth, and thus leads them into dwelling. (Heidegger 1954b, p. 186)

Here Heidegger talks of the importance of *Verweilen* (dwelling) or *Gelassenheit* (Pio 2012, p. 285). But this is forgotten in our un-poetical modernity. Because this *openness* of dwelling becomes the object of a distinct *closure* in a technical rationality (Pio 2012). So this vital, phenomenological theme of *openness* that Heidegger tries to pin down (with concepts like *Unverborgenheit, Aletheia, Lichtung, Entbergen*), with an especially underlined importance for the understanding of artworks, *cannot be accomplished in the mall*. The aesthetical enjoyment of the individualized subject is a symptom of this impossibility, as the subject finds itself framed by the mall as debased artwork (Heidegger 2009, pp. 107–108). In this context the aestheticalization of the artwork is regarded by Heidegger as a hugely significant event in Western civilization:

> … the emergence … of aesthetics is … an event … that concerns … a transformation of history as a whole. (Heidegger 1944/46, p. 81)

Heidegger underlines the importance of this, as it is stated that:

> … art appears on the horizon of aesthetics. This means: the work of art becomes an object of experience, and accordingly art is determined as the expression of the life of humans. (Heidegger 1950, p. 75)

This goes together with a modern subject affirming itself as the center of the world (Heidegger 1944–46, pp. 74–91). With the aestheticalization of art in place, artworks are predestined sooner or later to arrive in the world as items of consumption, a product. The consequence following from this is that artworks no longer summarize the background understanding of the world applying for a historical community. As an item of consumption, art is now just one specific type of offering in the marketplace within a wider range of cultural goods. In other words, art moves from a potentially ontological mode of function to a purely aesthetical (ontic) mode of function. But how does the mall – as a current aestheticalized, communal space – fit into this analysis? [12]

[12] Julian Young claims that there is no such communal space today (Young 2004, p. 121).

2.2.4 The 'Machine'

As a hesitant, initial answer to this question, I have so far tried to show that 'the mall' is a modern centerpiece in our technial, rationalized culture. 'A debased work of art' in the sense understood by Dreyfus (cf. below). Here the modern notion of aesthetics is turned back upon itself. The mall as an artwork can be (phenomenologically) disclosed as a prism that works to summarize the cultural background-practices, that define the alliance between ourselves as individualized subjects and at the same time as resources constantly standing by for optimization. *As individualized subjects with our body as centerpiece we are presented – under the auspices of the Mall – as resources in the age of technical rationality. And this aesthetical scenario impacts how we can disclose music (art) as a phenomenon in our modern lives*.

In the mall we are all alone together. The mall ascribes certain practices centrality while others are marginalized. The mall centers the cultural practices of the subject as an individualized resource around a sovereign, architectonic, machine-like phenomenon. As shown above, *the mall is a gigantic kind of (structural) work, which stylizes cultural core-practices of modernity through an aesthetical encoding of life form*. So the mall is so much more than a certain 'building' or 'buisness'. It can be disclosed as an artwork, because it joins together distinctly separate elements into one throbbing, unified whole. It is in this context that Heidegger compares *Kunstwerk* (artwork) with *Kraftwerk* (power plant):

a) Power plant (*Kraftwerk*)
Energy, vigour (*Kraft*)
Nature and work
The frame (*Ge-stell*)

b) Work of art (*Kunstwerk*)
Art and work (Heidegger 2009, p. 378).[13]

When we decode the Mall and disclose it as a huge artwork so close to our everyday life that we can hardly conceive of it this way, this clears a space before us for a different way to inhabit the world.[14] And thus a different way to experience artworks as part of our lives (Heidegger 1954c, p. 87).

It is the unified whole in its entirety as described above that dominates and contains the way arts subjects (such as music) can appear for students today in the general education system. As the everyday workings of 'the mall' are disclosed phenomenologically as a distinctly privileged artwork of our epoch (with its own distinct genealogy), this offers at the same time a possibility for us to rethink the

[13] See also the music psychology of Ernst Kurth, in which the sound material is described as a 'stream of energy or vigour' (*Kraftstrom*). The music is thus incarnated as a dynamic force deeply inspired from Schopenhauer's 'will of the world'. See Kurth 1947, p. 83.

[14] It is emphasized by Heidegger that what is closest to us is also the hardest to 'see' (i.e. to distinguish and decipher), cf. Pio 2012, pp. 55–57.

way we are currently contained by aesthetics in our (unmistakably *modern*) relation to art. Such an enterprise finds support in Heidegger, as it is stated that:

> … sufficiently considered the essence of technique (*Technik*) consists not just in enabling a composure of art, but is a demand for this (*eine Besinnung auf die Kunst nicht nur ermöglicht, sondern verlangt*). (Heidegger 2009, p. 376)

2.2.5 Danger and the Saving Force

Have you ever walked along the long, narrow, stoney pathway leading slowly upwards to the *Akropolis* hovering above the city of Athens? This is actually the road you are on, as you leave the comfort of your car, to step onto the rolling escalator connecting the parking basement with the air-conditioned ground floor of the mall with all its glimmering, expensive offerings. As you emerge from the shady coolness of the parking basement into the glimmering light of the Mall, you step into one of the crown-jewels of the modern welfare society in its technical celebration of endless consumer happiness and equality. The gods have certainly left the building – long ago. But we have a modern artwork in the workings here, alive and kicking. A *debased* artwork for sure. But it is working its technique.[15]

So far I have attempted to bring Heidegger's approximately 70-year-old critique of aesthetics up to date. This has been carried out by identifying those lived practices that currently vitalize Heidegger's art-directed points in a current context. As a result, some insight has been gained regarding how the mall as an artwork functions (through the described practices). *The mall as an artwork works by bringing about the background (*i.e. *the anonymous, implied, self-evident backdrop) on which the processes of aestheticalization can stand out*.

So the mall becomes the implied background for the appearance of the multifarious aesthetical objects. The mall is the artwork that allows all the plentitude of aesthetical objects in our lives to function *as* aesthetical (i.e. as objects open to be 'objectivized' within a technical relation). The Mall frames the unconscious space that makes it possible for us to *consume* the aesthetical work. It works as a background artwork – that is as a *Kraftwerk* (power plant) as quoted in Heidegger – simultaneously producing (and being produced by) a technical understanding of being. Thus the mall (as *Kraftwerk*) provides power (*Kraft*) and impetus to the complex processes, through which we bring ourselves about as resources. Resources whose beauty goes hand in hand with our efficiency. And as resources we make the world more aesthetical (inviting, tempting) through our technical mastery of it. Why? Because we make the world available for our needs. And that is currently the pinnacle of beauty.

[15] I do not wish to level the distinction between the great Acropolis and the anonymous Mall. But within Heidegger's history-of-being (*Seinsgeschichte*), I am obliged to draw a parallel between the epochs in which these two architectural structures belong.

So when Julian Young (2004) claim that our epoch is marked by the lack of an artwork that transgresses the aesthetical paradigm, this claim seems to be passing over the connections expounded here. With the mall one can see the ontology of art emerging in a quite uncanny way: at the very heart of aesthetics, as its stronghold. However:

> Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst
> Das Rettende auch. (Hölderlin, quoted in Heidegger 1962, p. 41)[16]

2.2.6 Unsolved Questions

The reading of the mall has highlighted our current relation to artworks as precarious and ambiguous. In the article *Heidegger's ontology of art,* another example is mentioned by Hubert Dreyfus. Here it is cursorily stated without any further elaboration that the 'freeway interchange':

> … is a debased work of art. (Dreyfus 2007, p. 413)

According to Dreyfus, this construction is "debased" because it applies an optimization-oriented efficiency agenda to nature which the ontology (*Erde*) of the artwork cannot resist. Heidegger refers to a congenial example of the water power plant installed in the the Rhine (Heidegger 1962, p. 15). This plant manifests the essence of how we are currently able to relate to the Rhine: as a technical resource supplying us with electrical power for our domestic comfort. In this way the water power plant discloses how the Rhine can appear today as a meaningful phenomenon. In the same way, the mall discloses what we are all about as human beings: the tale of the subject in its 'being in control' with all that this implies (comfort, effortlessnes, beauty, success, enjoyment, wealth, prestige, career). What is opened up here in the mall and consumed through aesthetical enjoyment is the sheer human energy of life. There is a certain totalizing feel to this machinery. Thus it is hard to imagine outsiders of any kind not being stamped out in this smooth, grinding mill.

These examples tell us, that in our technical modernity we have still not prevailed in creating an artwork, which can re-configure our world to be entrusted with a new paradigmatic kind of beginning:

> The possibility of a grand tremor of the historical *Dasein* (being-there, presence) of a people has faded away. Temple, image, manners and customs are unable to assume – in their entirety and from their foundation – the historical tradition of a people and to compel it into a new assignment. (Heidegger, quoted in Pöggeler 1977, p. 29)

Our epoch of technical rationality is accompanied by what Dreyfus – as mentioned – calls "debased" works of art. They are debased because they are unable to

[16] Translated to english: Where there is danger/the saving force will grow.

shed light on our life world. Instead, they disclose a technical ontology. Thus Heidegger sees that art currently has lost its history-creating power:

> … we must gain a new content for the word 'art' and for what it attempts to name. (Heidegger, quoted in Thomson 2011, p. 62).[17]

Heidegger briefly refers to Stravinsky as an example of the currently absent ability of art to vindicate a world (*Ort stiften*; Heidegger 1954a, p. 181). Heidegger sees that potentially it is around the artwork (in its ontology) that a new departure can be initiated as a countermove, in relation to the technical way in which we call forth our modern world. This change must contain a beginning, which is simultaneously a challenge:

> Is art still an important and necessary way in which the crucial truth about our historical *Dasein* comes about, or does art no longer work in this way?. (Heidegger 1950, p. 68)

A re-evaluation of the current relation between art and aesthetics will have a say in the decision of whether art can become "*geschichtebildend*" – i.e. history-making (Heidegger 1944/46, p. 77). But such an artwork is currently absent in the modern world. So we still need to come to terms with what kind of shadow is cast by the mall:

> So far the West has not produced any reconfiguring work of art that sets forth the earth and restarts history with a new struggle between earth and world. The question then arises for Heidegger whether our flexible style, which turns everything even ourselves into resources, could ever be reconfigured. (Dreyfus 2007, p. 418)

Heidegger sees our modern age as standing alienated (*undichterisch*) opposite the truth-evoking impact of poetical and musical works. This alienation goes together with a:

> … mysterious excess in the shape of a rage of measuring and calculating … . (Heidegger 1954b, p. 197)

The futurist question relates to whether we will be able to leave behind the resource logic that currently contains our self-image and thereupon disclose a new poetical experience of art in the world:

> When and where a turning point of our un-poetical inhabitation of the world can be reached, this can only be awaited as we heed the poetical. (Heidegger 1954b, p. 197)

2.3 Educational Aspects

2.3.1 Truth

Today in the general education system, the phenomenon of truth is primarily promoted through the categorical grids of science. The culture of schooling currently emphasizes fingertip knowledge, tests, measurable learning goals, competencies set

[17] In this context Thomson asks: "… which work of art does Heidegger think can help us late moderns learn to transcend modern aesthetics from within and thereby discover a path leading beyond modernity?" (Thomson 2011, p. 67).

out explicitly, the student as a stakeholder, quantitative output, pedagogy as codified by evidence-based knowledge, the eagerness to prove mechanisms of causality in teacher-student relations, and the promotion of OECD 'core subjects' (math, science, IT, among others) as enjoying privilege on almost all levels from kindergarten practices up to educational research-funding at universities.[18]

When students respond rationally to the tacit signals of this 'curricular environment' of 'what-is-important' and 'how to do school', this becomes connected to ideals of being able to solve problems quickly, to be efficient, to store as many bits of textbook information as possible, and then subsequently document the ability to reproduce that data in and interface with test software. These are virtues which are now part of the provisional end result of the science-rationalized school built in the West during the twentieth century. There seems to be a thematic proximity here to the quasi-*cybernetical* world mentioned by Heidegger above. For sure this dimension of school is necessary. But as this paradigm today assumes the character of an almost absolute discourse in school, it appears as an *uncannily narrow* notion of what 'the truthful' could be as a phenomenon in the world of the student. As stated by Theodor Wilhelm:

> Always the free equality of rights of the arts has been suspected of standing in the way of the actual purpose of the school. At best the arts have only buttressed this purpose in an utmost indirect way. (Wilhelm 1969, p. 395)

As positioned within this narrow notion of truth, artworks, songs, and performances are reduced to aesthetics. A non-committally, sensual pleasure as a kick of entertainment, a leisure subject of disinterested pleasure (Kant). But does the possibility not exist to throw a light on the world of the school *from the point of departure opened up by artworks* such as songs or performances? Reflection and dialogue among teacher and students could then begin from the *inside of a wonder* initiated through the common experience of the artwork in question. For Heidegger this relates to the domicile of *thinking* (Heidegger 1956, p. 24). In such a shared situation there is a possibility of something more than a student-subject corresponding to an aesthetical music-object. The artwork ceases to formally be a communication of signs (from artist-subject to student-object). Instead, the performance in question happens in the world as a distinct event, which calls on all the involved people who are together in this concrete situation to behold the actions of the moment. This becomes a joint search for cracks of something unknown right within the hardcore of all that is familiar. Thus it is a common attempt to winkle the sphere of 'the possible' out of 'the actual' (Heidegger 1969, p. 90). In other words, an experiment with an imaginary dimension (Vetlesen 2004).

However, the period from the Enlightenment until today is a process of a slow but relentless dismantling of this insight into art as containing truth about the world we live in. The experience of artworks as a vigor of orientation blowing through our lives, has been erased by new ideals of exact knowledge and technical precision. The point,

[18] This paradigm was confirmed in the 'No child left behind' act of the Bush administration in 2001 cf. Hoppman 2007.

of course is that both types of truth are necessary today: (i) the bookish, analytical and methodical dimension, as well as (ii) the poetical, imaginary way to disclose the world. Unfortunately, the balance between these two has been severely disturbed.

2.3.2 The Misty Mountain Song

According to Heidegger, we should:

> … open our ears, to make them free for that in the tradition which address us, as being (*Sein*) appears in being-ness (*Seiende*). As we heed and listen to this address, we reach into an attunement to it. (Heidegger 1956, p. 22)

The task of 'opening our ears' is thus about opening our hearts to everything that addresses beingness (*das Seiende*) in its being (*Sein*):

> "… ein Gehören zum Sein …" becomes a belonging which "… auf das Sein hört …". (Heidegger 1957a, p. 18)

And now translated: The task of listening (*Hören*) to being is thus about belonging (*Gehören*) to being. Among other things could this be about a recognition of an increasing need to *reconnect with a mythological dimension* in the phenomenology of music? What is involved here are projects which can bring people together around a common ritualized articulation of distinct values, ways of life, new icons. Consider the recently filmed novel *The Hobbit* by J.R.R. Tolkien.[19] More specifically *the Misty Mountain Song* of the dwarfs in Bilbo's house the night before the departure that will take the fellowship of dwarfs toward the dragon's mountain. This scene is an example of music and song as an integral 'ether' gathering and focusing specific values or beliefs, setting the frame of mind around an important matter in life. A matter which marks a clear distinction in life between that which is vital and that which is trivial. The dwarfs thus sing:

> Far over the misty mountains cold
> To dungeons deep and caverns old
> We must away ere break of day,
> To claim our long forgotten gold. (Tolkien 1937, p. 25)

In this scene the song and the music are connected to the intense engagement of a small, marginalized group. For decades the dwarfs have been expelled from their kingdom by a dragon, and they are now – assisted by the wizard Gandalf – setting out to take back what is theirs. In the song they sing, the essential background understanding of their world is focused, involving loss, hope, privation, and justice. This focus will turn out to be the most crucial factor for the outcome of their mission. The song that night in Bilbo's sitting room around the fireplace contains every truth in the world for the dwarfs involved. We are thus far distanced from disinterested aesthetics. The song rather comes forth as a way to vindicate the generational life

[19] *The Hobbit – an unexpected journey* (2012) directed by Peter Jackson.

project of the dwarfs. In Peter Jackson's film this is underlined, as the song is used as the general *leitmotif* through the entire movie.

Today we can choose to notice this as an important hint about the *possibility* of music in our ever more technically rationalized society of performativity. The challenge here could be to identify and invent platforms where music is allowed to appear as an 'ether or aura' leading a given community back toward a ritualized experience of the background which matters to them. Through the music and song it is affirmed that there can still be a commitment to certain values, and that not everything is yet sucked into our contemporary, technical logic of rationalization:

> … to be recognized and appreciated, individual commitment requires a shared understanding of what is worth pursuing. But as our culture comes more and more to celebrate critical detachment, self-sufficiency, and rational choice, there are fewer and fewer shared commitments. (Dreyfus 2006, p. 347)

The commitment of the dwarfs can only manifest itself on the basis of a shared background understanding of what is valuable and important in *their* world. If such a common background is absent, any engaged agency will appear slightly irrational or even slightly comical. Any commitment thus needs to evoke a response originating from a common backdrop if it is to be authentic. We need poetical icons carried by ritualized artistic truth.

Taken together gods, icons, heroes and other demigods from our Western heritage (from Homer to Chris Nolan) all incarnate the value of unconditional commitment. However, today the integrity of these icons is technically severely disputed (as almost nothing more than entertainment). And thus they are increasingly absent from our general educational system. Today we are framed as resources, all of us with a legitimate expectation to be enhanced and used under optimum conditions. Therefore it becomes tinged with a touch of something un-democratic, intolerant and politically un-correct to create distinctions which intimate that something in human life is worth more than something else. Technically it thus seems irrational to establish distinctions of rank and value in any available reservoir of human resources. Almost everything is considered equally good and valid as long as we are able to smoothly extract the maximum value of the resources available in a given field (be it nations, classes, segments, organizations, groups of staff members, etc.):

> With the help of sociology, psychology, psycho-therapy and other means, all people are soon, from all sides, deposited into the same condition of the same happiness. It will be taken care of that the equal well-being of all is secured. But this invention of happiness 'in spite of' will haunt human beings from one world war into the next. (Heidegger 1954c, p. 31)

In the name of the Enlightenment, this process of leveling (following the universal principle of equal value) relentlessly exorcises the 'intolerance of commitment'. So in school all heroes, all icons, all artworks, all musical intensities, and all poetical power handed down by tradition, which have given all kinds of communities something essentially important and life affirming to believe in, are already in the process of being done away with (as significant curriculum).[20]

[20] For the subject music in teaching and education in Denmark, this is documented in Nielsen 2010.

This urge us to note that the formal, official world of rules, principles, theories, formality, judicial sections, etc. all present us with an 'outside narrative' of the world. The exterior 'shell' so to say, which also corresponds with the intellectualized, measurable knowledge chased by students in their wish to fit into the culture of testing that is currently prevalent throughout the education system. However, our attempt to reinvent ourselves within this picture will strap us down to this outside shell of our world. But music, songs, pictures, stories and performances remind us of 'something' fundamental that somehow comes *before* this 'outside' narrative. Just like the singing in Bilbo's sitting room. There is no difference. Artworks thus lead to an openness to an (ontological) *inside* of the world. Here it is suddenly still possible to have that sinking feeling for the unknown, the possible, something 'more'. What is this? Somehow this reminds us of our inherent talent for love: our ability to cherish something to such an extent that we are prepared to go to extremes no matter what the cost might be. In art-directed practices, this could be about an attuned social mood, a reflection, a vague sense that there is something that is larger than yourself. Works of art have to do with an immediate experience of the world as it is awake within us, *before* we arrive at an intellectualized, analytical processing of the world. Musical phenomena can as such favor matters of life with a transparency. As such music calls forth truth as it did for the dwarfs in Bilbo's cabin (Pio 2014).

The above considerations leads us to the music with a renewed sensitivity. A sensitivity that suggests, that the auditive dimension is the part of the world that makes the deepest appeal to us, since we cannot renounce it. We cannot take our hearing away from an undesired sound, in the same way as we can remove our gaze from something we abstain from looking at. As listening beings we belong in a world that meets us sonorously. We hear a door slamming. We hear the wife scolding her husband a floor below. We never hear just acoustic data or neutral sound. We immediately hear a world 'worlding' as it happens (Heidegger 1954c, pp. 88–89). We listen from being (*Sein*) to being (*Sein*) in its unfolding process, before being becomes substantivized and made into beingness (*Seiende*), i.e. an object, a substance, a thing, a result (Heidegger 1957a, p. 37, 1954b, 166). The world is always-already there as something (*unerhört*) un-heard (Heidegger 1957b, p. 101) in our be-longing (*Ge-hören*) in it:

> … the incentive of being speaks, according to whether it is heard or disregarded … . (Heidegger 1956, p. 23)

This 'un-heard' is the lived out belonging in the world (Pio 2014). The un-heard is a holy chaos of 12-tone organized sonorous life. A chaos that craves to be realized in actual works, songs, and performances. In this way music becomes something that opens the world for us (Heidegger 1950: 54). Here one sees that music rests on pre-musical phenomena such as: celebration, feast, being together, loneliness, hope, fellowship, leave-taking, grief, and the safeguarding of specific times and events as 'high' or special. These pre-musical phenomena should not be misunderstood as non-musical phenomena. Because in their practical, lived dimension they make up

an 'ether' that extends deep into the most essential phenomenology of music (cf. Ehrenforth 2013). As Dufrenne nicely puts it:

> … I can rediscover … the world of Bach, for example, in the innocent games of a child, the sparkling grace of a dancer or of the early spring, or the smiling face of a man who has quelled his passions through happiness and not through the laws of conscience alone. (Dufrenne 1973, p. 519)

These pre-musical phenomena constitute *invariable* qualities in life. They can appear in a vast number of different kinds of circumstances and cultural contexts, but like sovereign manifestations in life, these pre-musical phenomena remain an invariable aspect of existence (Løgstrup 1993, pp. 48–50).

2.3.3 The Precious Daring

This discussion of art and ontology seems to indicate the need as a teacher to have a commitment to something. This might be relevant in relation to the songs and musical works the music teacher brings into her work. But today it seems that the common-sense focus is occupied instead with *means* (methods, techniques, templates, skills, tests). The interest in 'means' is about the belief that if you just work to make an effect on the *outside shell* of teaching (methods, techniques) you are automatically able to regulate at leisure *the inside* of teaching (to disclose the phenomenological content of the teaching, to reflect on and act in the concrete gathering of teacher and students). In my immediate attention to a student in teaching, there is *the inside* (being). And the exact same act on *the outside* (being-ness) now appears as a methodological theme regarding how teacher competence is operationalized in handling a problem.[21] What we call the inside of teaching is connected to that which Heidegger designates 'to lead your composure on the way', and this cannot be done methodologically in a calculative way:

> But – are 'method' and 'way-of-thinking' identical? After all, has not the time come – in the technical world age – to take into consideration the peculiarity with regard to 'way-of-thinking' in its difference from 'method'? (Heidegger 1954a, p. 233)

Heidegger is encircling a road of thinking (*Denkweg*) which is:

> … a thinking-ahead (*Vordenken*) … which is no longer planning (*Planen*) … .(Heidegger 1957a, p. 30)

The transition to this thinking is characterized as a 'modulation', which in musical nomenclature corresponds to a change of key:

> … the second key is not derived from the first …/The second key is sounding for itself and out of itself, with no regard (*Anhalt*) to the first. (Heidegger 1957b, p. 95)

[21] On the distinction between the outside and inside of teaching, see Pio 2012, p. 111 (Fig. 3: The didactic circle).

For the teacher this is about giving oneself over to the gathering of the teaching in a more complete way. This is what Bollnow describes as *the daring* (*Vågestykke*) of pedagogy (Bollnow 1969, 146–168). This is about making oneself visible as an advocate for specific values harvested through a life so far. Such pedagogical and musical values cannot be proved. On the other hand, one cannot get around them (or ignore them) as norms. As a teacher you cannot legitimize your norms, nor can you make them go away. Pedagogical and musical values should be fashioned in the student through the encounter with lived values, as these are incarnated through the teacher. Values cannot be fashioned for the student by means of a versatile teaching marked by an all-round neutrality (Breindahl 1999, p. 233). That will end up as a disservice of misunderstood tolerance. The executed choice of content and purpose of the teaching has to stand in an inner relation to a commitment that is carried by the person you are (and not a role you play). Only then can a weight and ground be registered beneath the technical, professional skills.

As far as I can see, Heidegger issues a challenge to educational thinking by obliging us to problematize the principle relation of: freedom/inhibition; rootedness/rootlessness. On the basis of a theoretical position the teacher has the possibility to reflect, select and plan. This activity constitutes a dimension of freedom as reflective educator. One can choose to do this or that. But if this reflexive freedom also comes to include an arbitrary freedom with reference *to the basis on which these free choices are made*, then the existential bound condition of the teacher in an unselected background is erased and not allowed to work. When this unselected background (being) is erased, it is a result of the fact that the reflexive and cognitive dimension has almost reached a supreme reign. This is what Heidegger calls *Seinsvergessenheit*, as being is forgotten. Total reflexive freedom will thus end up in the celebration of equal equality as a universal principle (Varkøy 2004, pp. 20–21). As the grand, historical illuminator of the Danish people N.F.S. Grundtvig once said:

> Og han har aldrig levet
> Som klog på det er blevet
> Han først ej havde kær. (Grundtvig, quoted in Carlsen 2002, p. 84)[22]

So the way to the heart cannot be found only through an accumulation of competence with a view to expanding a technical repertoire of situational command. For the teacher an unselected rootedness in some kind of background must merge with the theoretical freedom of reflexivity. Only through the tension between these two united oppositions can a vital educational practice be unfolded (Pio 2014).[23]

So that which is worth fighting for (in the concrete pedagogical context) needs to be contrasted with the leveled indifference of the top-down regulating policy discourses of technical rationality. According to Heidegger, nihilism thus drains life of value (Heidegger 1944/46b, pp. 35–40). The concrete teacher should use

[22] This poem is hard to reproduce in English verse. But is says something like 'the one who thinks that the key to cherish something is to get wise on it, this person has never lived'.

[23] See the distinction between 'social relations' (ontic) and 'cultural practices' (ontological) in Pio 2012, p. 170.

him- or herself to create valuable distinctions. Often – in (*das Geringe*) all the small, insignificant aspects of everyday life (Heidegger 1944, pp. 173–174) one becomes part of as a teacher, the challenge of creating valuable distinctions is always-already there in its constantly overlooked presence in the everyday pressure. Heidegger cites Hölderlin for this:

> Jetz aber blüht es
> Am armen Ort. (Heidegger 1944, p. 171)[24]

But '*das Geringe'* in all its insignificance is not that which has low value. *Das Geringe* is rather:

> … the intensified word for 'ring', which designates that which is light (*das Leichte*), supple (*das Geschmeidige*), accommodating (*das Fügsame*): the small (*das kleine*) …/However 'small' (*klein*) originally means delicate (*fein*) and precious (*kostbar*) (op. cit., pp. 173–174).

In a pedagogical context the teacher can attend to this preciousness and take care of this 'small-ness', by demonstrating that not everything has equal validity (*des Überall-Gleichgültigen*) and *that life thus can make itself felt* through the gathered teaching with distinct demands that it is up to us to wield (Heidegger 1957a, p. 49; Higgins 2003, pp. 131f).

When what I do as a teacher (in a reflexive freedom) is at the same time overshadowed by something which is greater than me (from a being I have neither selected nor chosen to do without), this tension can potentially call forth the best of what I am able to do. The development of (a) your *professionalism* as a teacher will ultimately urge you to (b) find meaning through the *being in the world* you are. An educational turn toward music will remind us about this duality between (a) and (b) as united oppositions. If we resign from this ongoing strife, we are forsaking the students and ultimately the pedagogical task that has been laid upon us. A such falling away can for instance manifest itself through curricular principles for subject content prescribing the greatest possible, allround versatility. The teacher is thus assigned a role as an official or even worse: as an impartial clerk. Ultimately all this amounts to a fight of death against life.

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[24] English translation: 'And thus it blossoms/In places of insignificance'.

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Chapter 3
The Intrinsic Value of Musical Experience. A Rethinking: Why and How?

Øivind Varkøy

Abstract In this chapter I will discuss the following questions: What characterizes a thinking about music which will make talking about 'the value of music in itself' possible and meaningful today? And why is it important to relate to this kind of idea in music education as well as in modern society in general?

Central to my investigations is Martin Heidegger's thinking in *The Origin of the Work of Art* concerning the differences between *things, utility articles* and *artworks,* and Hannah Arendt's discussions in *The Human Condition* concerning our modern oblivion of the differences between the three kinds of human activities; *labor, work* and *action.* I will even relate to Max Weber's discussion of the character of modern Western rationality and how it has been developed, as well as the Aristotelian concepts *poiesis* and *praxis,* and the Kantian concepts *pragmatic* and *practical actions.*

I argue that music as a product and object in the outer world cannot be said to have a value in itself. Music as an object is a means to musical experience. Musical experience however is not a product, it is action; a human activity which has a value in itself. This value is linked to thinking and reflection, actions which are related to the Aristotelian concept of happiness in the long run (*eudaimonia*). I think that this line of thinking of musical experience as action is a possibility for a philosophy of music education to transcend instrumentalism and technical rationality. It's a possibility for those who no longer want to accept the worshiping of instrumental reason and technical rationality as the one and only possible form of rationality, and the denial of human freedom which goes together with it. This type of thinking contributes to a fundamental critique of what seems to be a sort of 'totalitarian' economical and commercial ideology in today's educational and cultural politics.

Keywords Music education • Philosophy • Instrumentalism • Technical rationality • Labor-work-action • Artworks

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_3

3.1 Introduction

Everything is expected to be good for something. Have a purpose. Cause a result. A product. Something that can be used. By someone. In one way or another. At one level or another. Be *useful*. Sometime. Preferably, right now. The demand of usefulness – or relevance – applies in all areas, not only connected to music and other arts. Expectations and demands of usefulness, that the activities in which we are engaged ought to be good for something more than itself, apply to art as well as different areas of life such as education, nature, physical activity, friendship and religion. We are wrapped in this way of thinking as something obvious and 'natural.'

In this chapter, I will discuss the possibility of giving the term 'the intrinsic value of musical experience' a meaning that will make sense today. 'The intrinsic value' will be linked to the musical activity, not to the musical object. Music is focused as something people do together rather than 'a thing'. Certainly, we know that in our culture 'compositions' are basic in most of our musical activities. It is of course legitimate then to give all the interest in the world to compositions; musical objects – as such. In my reflection on 'the intrinsic value' however, it is not the musical object that is in the center of attention, but the meeting between the musical object and the human subject. This is why it is 'the intrinsic value of *musical experience*' that is discussed in the following and not 'the intrinsic value of *music*', as long as 'music' is a term traditionally associated with the musical object. Moreover, without holding back the differences between various musical styles and genres, the musical object in this context may be a jazz improvisation, an Indian raga, a pop song, or a student composition in the classroom in elementary school – as well as a symphony by Gustav Mahler.

My basic inspiration in these reflections is to be found in Martin Heidegger's thinking concerning the differences between *things, utility articles* and *artworks.* Unlike things and utility articles, the work of art according to Heidegger is its own end; it has no end or purpose beyond itself. Heidegger's text *The origin of the Work of Art* then underpins the discussions in this chapter (Heidegger 2002a).

Heidegger's philosophy has certainly influenced Hannah Arendt and her thinking concerning our modern oblivion of the differences between the three types of human activities: *labor, work* and *action.* According to Arendt, we very often think and speak about all human activities in terms of *labor* and *work*, in fact marginalizing and excluding the only kind of human activity which has its end in itself; *action* (Arendt 1958). This is related to the fundamental technical understanding of the world of the modern era (Heidegger 1954, 1962). The technical rationality is *The Way* of thinking: taken for granted.

My discussion is also related to the Aristotelian concepts of *poiesis* and *praxis* and the Kantian concepts of *pragmatic* and *practical* actions, which I find related to Arendt's thinking. In all modesty, I will in this text simply attempt to establish a kind of 'new discursive order' (Foucault 1981), by arguing that *the musical activity and experience* is a human activity of the kind that Hannah Arendt (1958) calls actions; human activities that have their ends in themselves – and that artworks are not things or utility articles: they are works (Heidegger 2002a).

My discussion of the term 'the intrinsic value of musical experience' may well be regarded as a 'case' for the possibility of thinking about 'intrinsic values' in general. Whether it is at all possible to speak about and think that something has an intrinsic value: art, nature, sports, playing, a good meal, friendship, etc. The fundamental point is the possibility, and necessity, of being able to distinguish between human activities which have their ends in themselves on the one hand, and activities whose ends are outside the activities themselves on the other hand. Activities that have intrinsic values and activities that do not.

3.2 Rethinking

The question of what something is good for is, of course, in principle always possible to ask. It seems a problem to me though that we do exactly that: we always ask it. It seems reasonable then to declare 'the death' of a concept such as 'intrinsic value.' What is, however, the meaning of such a statement? There are so many things that have been and can be declared dead. As we know, for instance, Friedrich Nietzsche declared 'the death of God.' Is this, however, to be interpreted as an atheist manifesto? Not necessarily – according to Hannah Arendt. She claims that Nietzsche in this respect may be understood to mean that

> […] the way God has been thought of for thousands of years is no longer convincing; and not that the old questions which are coeval with the appearance of men on earth have become "meaningless", but that the way they were framed and answered has lost plausibility. (Arendt 2003, pp. 161–162)

Alternatively – as Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly put it:

> What he [Nietzsche] meant by this is that we in the modern West no longer live in a culture where the basic questions of existence are already answered for us. (Dreyfus and Kelly 2011, p. 20)

When it comes to creating meaning, we are left to ourselves. This applies to all of us, although some of us at times seem to experience this as an overwhelming and partly break necking project.

In these reflections, Arendt as well as Dreyfus and Kelly are drawing on Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the statement "God is dead" contains the realization that *nothing*, that is, the absence of a supersensory, binding world, is spreading. However:

> The empty place (of the traditional 'Christian God') even invites to its own re-occupation and calls for the God who disappeared from it to be replaced by another. (Heidegger 2002b, p. 168)

To declare something dead then can be considered as a marker of the need to think and speak in new ways, to create new meanings attached to old questions, concepts and terms. Without drawing the comparison with 'God is dead' too far: this is what I mean when I declare the death of 'intrinsic values'.

The need for new ways of thinking and speaking occurs when I try to tell someone that musical and other artistic activity has 'intrinsic value' – without finding myself comfortable of being placed in the group of 'reactionary elitism,' 'romantic nostalgia' and other 'clubs' run by '(very soon) dead white males' with an arrogant lack of interest for the lives of 'ordinary people'. What is, however, the point of talking about 'the intrinsic value of *musical experience'*, risking being misinterpreted as to speak about 'intrinsic values of *musical objects*' and placed among them from whom 'the time has run away' – as one says? Why is it so important to be able to imagine that musical experience has intrinsic value – today?

I think that if we in music education are no longer able to relate to the idea that musical experience has a value in itself, we will face an acceptance of a technical rationality and an economical way of thinking embracing all fields of life. We will join the common kneeling in front of modernity's tendency of worshiping instrumental reason and technical rationality. This tendency includes a denial of human freedom, and may open up to constructions of more or less totalitarian pedagogical ideologies.

This is exactly what is happening, at least in my part of the world. A few years ago, when the former Secretary of education in Norway discussed eliminating music and art as subjects in general education in favor of another subject called 'creativity', he spoke about the value of this new subject more or less in terms purely borrowed from economic and commercial life. As this minister represented the Left socialist party, which is to the left of the Social democratic party in the Norwegian government at that time, it would seem that even left socialists now are enthralled to a philosophy of education that is fundamentally based on economic arguments. Hand in hand with this trend, technical rationality is dominating educational thinking as a type of totalitarian ideology, meaning that it presents itself as the one and only way of thinking about education, thereby marginalizing and suppressing other discourses. It would be a pity if philosophers of music education who regard themselves as liberals or even radicals have no way of dealing with this development. In this context, I will argue that my thinking is a form of critical philosophical thinking that has critical political potential as well.

In education today, we are in many ways dealing with music as a means, a tool, an instrument for something else (Varkøy 2002). Saying this we at once meet the old music educational discussion concerning 'music as end' versus 'music as means'. However, in newer Nordic music education research, this dichotomy in itself is discussed, many finding it a false one, and many concluding that music is always a means. A term such as 'intrinsic values' has more or less disappeared from the field of music education. My own contribution to this discussion has been to argue that a term such as 'values of music in itself' cannot mean that music has a value that is not connected to human life. I have turned the argument in favor of the autonomy of music upside-down, by claiming that people who are arguing for 'intrinsic values of music' often can be said to argue the value of dealing with music as some sort of self-realization. Self-realization in this regard certainly has to be seen as a non-musical value. This means that arguments for music as an end in itself, often turns out to become arguments for music as a means.

I have been arguing that music, then, always seems to be a means in some way or another. In my thinking I have, with Aristotle, argued that *happiness* is the only end in life; all things are means to reach happiness, music as well (Varkøy 2001, 2003). An interesting aspect of the story of the happiness-concept, however, is the continuing debate about what it contains. According to Aristotle (1999), there are clear connections between the realization of man's abilities as a logos creature, a creature with reason and ability to think, and the achievement of happiness (as *eudaimonia*, happiness in the long run, and not as *hedoné*, happiness in the short run). To Aristotle, happiness then consists of self-realization, not only understood as a development of personal, but of general human characteristics. Happiness is emerging in a person who uses his/hers 'skills' as a logos creature, in thinking, wisely.

This type of argument has earlier made me think about music as *a means* for happiness. However, what is then left? First: a recognition that music is always a means. Second: a discussion about what to which music is a means: happiness in some sort of Aristotelian meaning or better grades in mathematics. Terms such as 'intrinsic values of music' or 'values of music in itself' have disappeared as meaningful concepts. During the last years, I have become less and less satisfied with this situation. There is a need to *rethink* terms such as 'intrinsic value' or 'value in itself', not the least when looking at today's international trends in educational politics focusing on outcomes, relevance and usefulness.

3.3 On the Differences Between Labor, Work and Action

As said above: According to Arendt (1958), we very often think and speak about all human activities in terms of *labor* and *work*, in fact marginalizing and excluding the only kind of human activity which has an end in itself; *action. Labor* is cyclical, and has no beginning and no end. For instance, we always have to labor to make food. When we *work*, we use means to achieve an end, and in this way, work both has a beginning and an end – as is the case when a carpenter produces a table. Neither labor nor work has their ends in themselves. *Action* on the other hand – certainly has a beginning, but it has no clear or predictable end. Actions are social activities; things people do together with other people. While produced things, by labor and work, have no end in themselves, they are means; actions are characterized by being ends in themselves.

In modernity, solely the activity that produces a product is seen as important. It is useful. If an activity does not produce a product, it is seen as unimportant and useless.

> […] this all-important degradation of action and speech is implied when Adam Smith classifies all occupations which rest essentially on performance – such as the military profession, "churchmen, lawyers, physicians and opera-singers" – together with "menial services", the lowest and most unproductive "labour". It was precisely these occupations – healing, flute-playing, play-acting – which furnished ancient thinking with examples for the highest and greatest activities of man. (Arendt 1958, p. 207)

This worship of the instrumental reason holds, as Arendt sees it, an anti-humanistic tendency. It does not take into account any activity that has no end beyond itself, any activity that is free and unfettered, and therefore expresses the distinctive human freedom. This denial of human freedom as a tendency in modernity's worship of the instrumental reason is, according to Arendt, a cornerstone in the building of a totalitarian ideology.

> It is true that only the modern age defined man primarily as *homo faber,* a toolmaker and producer of things […] (Ibid., p. 229).

Central to Arendt's critique of modernity is the fact that we seem to be unable to distinguish between utility and the meaning of utility. This points toward the dilemma of meaninglessness, as modern man knows it. Everything is useful for something else. Even activities that traditionally have had 'intrinsic values' or 'values in themselves' are given instrumental functions. Arendt emphasizes the activity that constitutes an end in itself, practical *action*, the social activity. The end of action is nothing more than the activity itself: self-realization through action and speech (Øverenget 2003, 2012).

An example: To cook is labor. To make the table at which we are eating is work. A meal; to eat the food that is made along with family and friends at the table the carpenter has produced, is an action. Therefore: My cooking is useful. The carpenter's effort to produce the table is also useful. Both my labor and the carpenter's work produce products. The good meal together with family and friends around the table however, is, according to a rigid thinking about everything's usefulness, useless. It does not produce a product.

Another example: To organize a concert depends on many people's different activities. The composer's work to write pieces of music and the musicians' labor in practicing and working in performing are vital activities that end up in products; musical objects and concerts. The performance however, the activity where the musical objects meet the human subjects, is a process of action. This activity of action where musicians and audience share a musical experience does not lead to any product. It is as 'useless' as the meal above.

It is interesting to note then that what the rigid end-means-thinking finds of no value is precisely what most of us probably would say are very important and significant activities in what we think of as a good and meaningful life. We are all engaged in relation to play, games, sports, arts, nature, religion, family and/or friendship. We find these activities extremely valuable and meaningful – as values that rest in themselves and do not need to be justified by showing usefulness for other purposes. It simply looks like we love to be 'useless'.

I argue that musical activity and experience is one type of this 'useless' activity – which Arendt calls 'action'. I do this in spite of the fact that when it comes to art Hannah Arendt also is focusing on the work of art as an object. She looks upon *creating art* as a type of *work*. In this line of thinking then, an artwork is a product – and as we remember: products are not ends in themselves, but means for something else. On the other hand, Arendt focuses on that to create art is really not the task of 'homo faber'; laboring and working (Øverenget 2012). A work of art can even if it

certainly is a product, be considered as *action*. This makes art as having some sort of double character. We are facing questions like 'what is music?' and 'where is the music'? Is 'music' that what is to read in a score, or is it what is experienced in a performance?[1] I will come back to this.

Under the hegemony of narrow minded and rigid utilitarianism, however, it is more and more common to see the usefulness of a musical experience related to something outside the experience itself. Many music educators, cultural workers and politicians are, for instance, thinking about participation in musical experience as something that leads to better health conditions for all; a good thing for the national economy. This means that one is thinking of an activity of action as if it should be an activity of labor or work.

Hannah Arendt's discussions of labor, work and action are, of course, related to other thinkers and their concepts. Connected to his theory of knowledge, Aristotle (1999) is discussing the two forms of human activity *poiesis* and *praxis.* This distinction emphasizes the difference between activities that are means to ends outside themselves, and activities that have their ends in themselves. *Poiesis* is about to bring something forth. *Poiesis* means to produce and create something, such as a house. In this way, *poiesis* is an activity that has the end outside itself. The intellectual virtue that manifests itself in *poiesis*, in the good production of something, is *techne* (in English translated to *art,* in Scandinavian languages often translated to terms meaning a type of *practical knowledge*). *Praxis*, in contrast to *poiesis*, is an activity of *action*. An activity is an action when it has the end in itself. The intellectual virtue that manifests itself in *praxis* is *phronesis* (practical wisdom), The distinction between human activities that have their ends outside themselves (*poiesis*) and activities/actions that have their ends in themselves (*praxis*) is central to Aristotle.[2]

Immanuel Kant as well differs between activities that are means to ends outside themselves, and activities that have their ends in themselves. He differs between *pragmatic* and *practical* actions. *Pragmatic actions,* or technical actions, are actions which have an end and in addition to that a calculation. A pragmatic action is defined as successful when one reaches the end that has been set. *Practical actions*, on the other hand, are actions in the social world, such as in human relationships. In such processes, the thought of an end set by one part is less important. It is not ends or calculations, but universally valid moral norms that function as guidelines. The successfully calculated results are not the issue here. The point is that one's actions are based on moral principles, which are such that everyone can base their actions on the same principles. This is the content of what is often called *the Kantian categorical imperative* (Kant 1999). Based on this imperative, Kant introduced the ethical distinction between *things* and *persons*. A central point here is that it is only morally legitimate to act pragmatically towards things or objects, never towards persons or

[1] See Philip V. Bohlman's discussion on ontologies of music. What kind of 'thing' or 'not-thing' is music (Bohlman 1998)?

[2] See for example Thomas A. Regelski (1998) and Wayne D. Bowman (2005) for discussions on music education and the Aristotelian concept of praxis.

subjects. The categorical imperative, then, for instance, sets limits for a technically orientated educational thinking. It is simply morally wrong to treat persons as things, and to place them as factors in our calculations (Varkøy 2006, 2007).

3.4 The Hegemony of Technical Rationality

To 'forget' the Kantian distinction between *pragmatic* and *practical* actions, and the Aristotelian distinction between *poeisis* and *praxis*, as well as Hannah Arendt's distinction between *labor* and *work* on one hand and *action* on the other; to make *pragmatic* actions and *poiesis* model for all human activities; to think and speak about the human form of activity called *action* as if it is *labor* or *work*, are tendencies in modern culture which are often linked to what we call *technical rationality*.

Max Weber points out that the very concept of 'rationality' is a historical term that contains a world of contradictions. Human life can be 'rationalized' based on very different values and in many different directions. What from one point of view is 'rational', may from another point of view be seen as 'irrational'. Weber's project is to understand the character of modern Western rationality and to explain its development. In this context, it becomes clear that rationality from the areas of technology and economy – technical rationality – undoubtedly has become an important part of modern bourgeois society's ideals of life as a whole (Varkøy 2013). Weber emphasizes how the predilection for the mathematically founded, rationalized empiricism in Protestant asceticism is an important aspect of the Puritan spirit of capitalism. This implies, for instance, that sports are valued only if it serves a rational purpose, as well as a general distrust of cultural goods that cannot be directly connected to religious values. Weber even focuses the well-known significance of these ideas on the development of upbringing (Weber 2011).

According to Heidegger (1954, 1962), the modern technical understanding of the world is a new situation, which makes the world come forward to modern man in a very particular way. The world becomes a resource that is possible to put into a calculation. In addition, we are wrapped by this discourse of *technical rationality* to a degree of which we hardly are fully aware. The technical rationality is *The Way* of thinking: taken for granted. We do not see that we can exist as something more than producers, consumers and resources. The human individual is more and more perceived as a technical resource, both by others and by him/herself, characterized by endless optimization and development (i.e. lifelong learning). Frederik Pio (2012) points out how technical rationality today arrives in educational thinking in terms of buzzwords such as 'evidence-based', 'new public management', 'control' and 'measurable ends'. Education as well as humans is increasingly thought of in an instrumental way. Education is becoming a technical instrument for economic growth, and the people within education are at risk of ending up as means for achieving ends of economic growth. This is, of course, a discussion exceeding the discussion of techne as technical knowledge, meaning technical skills, as well as

exceeding the discussion of technical equipment in today's music education. This is about *a way of thinking of the world and being* in general.

When the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek discusses instrumental reason, he argues that we do not need "a passage from the 'critique of political economy' to the transcendental-ontological 'critique of instrumental reason'" (Zizek 2008, p. 15), which, according to him, is to be found in the works of Heidegger and Adorno. According to Zizek, instrumental reason as such is capitalism, and what we need is a new critique of the capitalism. To me, however, it seems obvious that any type of new critique in this context in some way or another needs to be based on an ontological turn like that which is to be found in Martin Heidegger's thinking.

3.5 "Oh Lord, Won't You Buy Me a Mercedes Benz?"[3]

The idea of a general hegemony of technical rationality is connected to what Max Weber defines as the general processes of disenchantment of the world and existence since Reformation time in Europe. Weber argues that this disenchantment makes the world more and more prosaic and less poetic, more predictable and less mysterious. Is this, the instrumentalism and technical rationality of disenchantment, however, the only explanation of the tendency to focus on non-musical outcomes of dealing with music in general education?

When curricula introduce music as a way to well-being and togetherness, are we in fact then not always facing a *calculating* instrumentalism, but more *beliefs* in the transforming 'magical' powers of music? Moreover, since not every belief in the powers of music seem to be based on scientific knowledge, are we then at times facing a more *ritual* than *instrumental* logic, a ritual logic based on the idea that music possesses magical powers that transforms and heals?

In the Norwegian curriculum for general education from 2006, music is said to lead to a greater understanding of one's self and of others both as individuals and as a society. Music is believed to contribute to the development of positive identities, to develop a sense of belonging to our own culture and heritage as well as tolerance and respect of the culture of others. Music has transformative power. This power is seen as a solution to some of the greatest challenges of our multi-cultural society. In short: Music changes us (Varkøy 2012).

Similar understandings can be found in cultural policy. In a chronicle in the biggest daily newspaper in Norway, a former Secretary of culture few years ago appealed to the understanding of the aesthetic experience as an experience that challenges our established ways of seeing things and opens up for new knowledge. In turn, the aesthetic experience can be transferred to the way in which we should meet the new situation of society. The Secretary specified this transfer in the following way; if we experience cultural forms and genres we do not know well, we can overcome genre chauvinism, and if we overcome genre chauvinism in itself,

[3] Janis Joplin.

we are one step further in overcoming other types of chauvinism. If we learn to enjoy music we did not know we actually enjoy, we can also learn to appreciate people and cultures we did not think we appreciated. If we no longer fear the unknown, but rather let the unknown fascinate us, we will be able to develop a cultural diverse community.

In the debate that followed his article, the Secretary further specified his views on the role of art in society, focusing on how art experiences can wake us up and make us conscious, create good growth conditions, build bridges between people and fight racism, and in general change society to the better. This way of arguing for the role of art in society can be seen as a form of justification where art is seen as representing transformative powers. The transformative powers are working both on the individual and the societal level. On a general level, art is introduced in the regional policy, the integration policy, the health policy and the innovation policy. When this is done, it is because it is believed that art can make people want to move to the rural districts, that art can create cohesion between social groups with little or no common cultural references, that art can make the ill people healthy and that art can supply commodities with irresistible cultural excess value that contributes to economic growth. The problems of society are placed before 'the altar of art,' and one is 'praying', hoping and wishing for the best, as you have to do when it is the logic of magic with which you deal. The magic sometimes works, and sometimes does not. When art is introduced in the regional policy, the integration policy, the health policy and the innovation policy, it is not primarily utility estimation that is the rationality involved. It is the belief in the transforming powers of art experiences (Røyseng 2012).

Concerning the argument that the end-means-thinking represents disenchantment, instrumentalism and technical rationality, a more nuanced perspective then would be to see the technical rationalization as only one aspect of this situation. This would imply that other types of processes go on at the same time. As Colin Campbell (1987) and George Ritzer (2004, 2010) have discussed, it is possible to see disenchantment and re-enchantment as parallel and dialectical processes. However: If instrumental rationality is related to the disenchantment of the world, and ritual rationality is about re-enchanting a disenchanted world, what *is* then this re-enchanting about? If we see the re-enchantment as some kind of 'countermovement' to the proclaimed disenchantment (by Weber) – what kind of 'countermovement' are we facing?

There have always been countermovements to processes of disenchantment. The Romanticism of the nineteenth century followed times of Enlightenment. Concerning ideas about music, Romanticism certainly included some very specific ideas on music as some sort of language that exceeds oral language – and which provides insights and understandings beyond the spoken word – and into a spiritual world. The genius musician became some sort of prophet or even 'shaman'. Sometimes 'the ritual arguments' concerning 'the good music' reminds me of 'shamanism'. Maybe connected to what is often called 'new age' spirituality. I even find it interesting to discuss re-enchantment related to reflections concerning what in theological circles is labeled 'prosperity theology' or 'glorification theology'. In this type of

understanding of the Christian faith – not at least as we know from evangelical and charismatic churches – the attitude towards the Holy can be summarized in the famous song line of Janis Joplin: "Oh Lord, won't you buy me a Mercedes Benz?"… (Røyseng and Varkøy 2014).

In prosperity/glorification theology, 'God' seems to be valued primarily as some sort of butler, a mega-handyman and a party fixer of existence (Eagleton 2009; Jenkins 2011). In the ritual logic concerning the positive outcomes of art, art is 'god' the party fixer. I will however argue that it seems adequate to raise a question if not even this type of ritual logic represents instrumentalism. When it comes down to it, both instrumental and ritual tendencies end up focusing on music as a useful means – to some other end than experiencing music. It seems that ritual as well as instrumental rationality primarily value music as a means. If so: Is it possible to discuss even ritual thinking concerning values of music related to the deep and mighty river or even tsunami of technical rationality of our culture? As mentioned above: According to Heidegger, we are wrapped by this discourse of *technical rationality* to a degree of which we hardly are fully aware. The modern technical understanding of the world is *The Way* of thinking: taken for granted (Heidegger 1954, 1962). Is even ritual thinking then 'a victim' of the end-means-thinking of technical rationality, always asking what everything 'is good for'? I think so. The paradox is that the tsunami of technical rationality today necessitates a consumerist ideology even when it comes to ritual logic, at the same time as this very ideology undermines the Protestant ethical attitude which made our modern Western societies possible (Zizek 2011, p. xiii).

3.6 On the Differences Between Things, Utility Articles and Artworks

According to Heidegger, artworks do not have a purpose. They are impossible to use (up) like other things. The work of art is its own end. It has no end or purpose beyond itself. Heidegger (2002a) emphasizes how the artwork potentially can throw man back into a new sensitivity of the world and the basic conditions of life. To him, the essential character of the artwork is closely connected with its world-opening force. Works of art that surround us are something we humans have produced; they are things. However, the works of art are not things or utility articles in a normal sense: they are 'works'; 'artworks'. Artworks cannot be used for anything. They are things people have made that oppose use. Utility articles have a tendency to disappear in their use (for instance a hammer). They withdraw themselves to their application. Artworks, however, are in possession of a sort of stubbornness making them come forward. They oppose the application. Therefore, they do not let us pass by unconcerned. When works of art appear in this way, it is not just the artwork that becomes visible to us, but also the entire world of which these artworks are parts and to which we belong. The world becomes visible to us. Heidegger, then, is critical of the modern idea of the self-sufficiency of art. In his line of thinking, the

artwork is not related primarily to itself, but to the world. The value of art is that it enables us to stop and reflect on our being-in-the-world. By doing this, artworks help us to realize aspects of our existence that we often do not notice (Pio and Varkøy 2012).

Heidegger criticizes the modern understanding of art, which tends to put the experience (in a superficial understanding) in the center. The art is dying, he says, if its only mission is providing quick and superficial experiences. These types of experiences just absorb us, they do not stop us. That means that these experiences provide no room for reflection. The idea of an intrinsic value of art then has to become linked to a deeper kind of experience and to its potential in reflection and thinking. The value of art, according to Heidegger, is not limited to the artwork as a personal expression of the artist, nor as a subject of superficial experiences, it is linked to the importance of art for everyone as reflection.

3.7 The Intrinsic Value of Musical Experience – As Reflection

As said above: In spite of the fact that Hannah Arendt is focusing on the work of art as an object, I think it is legitimate, inspired by her thinking, to consider art as *actions* as well as products. We find this duality already in Arendt's writings about the work of art as a product – where the work of art, unlike other products, is proclaimed to be without any utility:

> Among the things that give the human artifice the stability without which it could never be a reliable home for men are a number of objects which are strictly without any utility whatsoever […] Moreover, the proper intercourse with a work of art is certainly not "using" it; on the contrary, it must be removed carefully from the whole context of ordinary use objects to attain its proper place in the world […] Even if the historical origin of art were of an exclusively religious or mythological character, the fact is that art has survived gloriously its severance from religion, magic, and myth. (Arendt 1958, p. 167)

A work of art is without any utility. It is more a kind of *energeia* (actuality) which exhaust its full meaning *in the performance* itself. This becomes quite clear when Arendt writes:

> It is this insistence on the living deed and the spoken word as the greatest achievements of which human beings are capable that was conceptualized in Aristotle's notion of *energeia* ("actuality"), with which he designed all activities that do not pursue an end (are *ateleis*) and leave no work behind (no *par' autas erga*), but exhaust their full meaning in the performance itself. It is from the experience of this full actuality that the paradoxical "end in itself" derives its original meaning; for in these instances of action and speech the end (*telos*) is not pursued but lies in the activity itself which therefore becomes an *entelecheia,* and the work is not what follows and extinguishes the process but is embedded in it; the performance is the work, is *energeia* (Ibid., p. 206).

And further:

> […] in the performance of the dancer or the play-actor, the "product" is identical with the performing act itself (Ibid., p. 207).

I think it is possible to link these reflections to the difference between *a piece of music* (work of art) as an object on the one hand, and *a musical experience in a performance of a piece of music* (the meeting between the musical object and the experiencing subject) on the other. As stated in the introduction of this chapter: Music is not only an object, it is something people do together. Music is not only a product of a composer's work, but *energeia* and *musical experience* – meaning *to participate* in a musical performance as performer, listener, practitioner, composer or dancer. Music *is action* as well as a product.[4] Music is "a performance art" (Cook 1998, p. 77), and "the context of the musical work is musical experience" (Kramer 2002, p. 260).[5] This means that it is important to speak about 'the intrinsic value of *musical experience*' and not 'the intrinsic value of *music*'. If I speak about 'the value of music', I speak about the product/object music, but when I speak about 'the value of musical experience' I am focusing on the experiencing subject in musical action. I am focusing on that 'the intrinsic value' or 'the value in itself' is to be found in the musical experience, not in the musical object. This of course does not mean that the object music has no value. The musical object (at least in our culture) is a very important means to musical experience. However, it is *a means*. As a means, the object/product of music has no value in itself. The *intrinsic value* is embedded in the musical experience – being an activity of action. If we now are thinking of music as action, we no longer, for instance, have to think about music *as a means to* happiness – as I previously have done myself. It is possible to think of the musical experience *as* happiness. This is the fundamental element in my attempt to establish a new order of discourse: To start thinking about *the value of musical experience as within the action of musical experience.*

According to Heidegger, works of art arise out of the human ability to think and reflect at the same time as the artwork makes us think and reflect about being. My final step then, is to link musical experience with thinking and reflection; a type of 'reflection in action'. To connect the musical experience to terms such as 'thinking' and 'reflection', however, is not entirely unproblematic. For instance: Does not that represent an unacceptable intellectualization of art experiences? What about sensuality and embodiment? Is not the very idea of linking the intrinsic value of musical experience to terms such as 'thinking' and 'reflection' a typical example of the usual Western degradation of the body in favor of the soul – as we know our tradition from Plato and Descartes? These questions themselves, however, appear to me to be based precisely on the Cartesian distinction between thought and body they criticize. The argument in this text rests in Heidegger's fundamental critique of Descartes; the Cartesian distinction between the thinker and the world. Following Heidegger's phenomenological approach, it is impossible to distinguish and separate between the thinking subject and the object world about which he/she is thinking. The subject is a part of the object world. Both mind and soul are thus fundamental

[4] This may sound quite close to Christopher Small's concept "musicking" (Small 1998) and even to David Elliott' concept "musicing" (Elliott 1995). And maybe to a certain extent it is. I will however not discuss these concepts in relation to Arendt's concept of action in this chapter.

[5] See for example Peter Kivy (2002, Chap. 11) for a discussion on music as "works".

part of the body. This entails a rejection of the idea that only the technical rationality is considered thinking. This makes the musical experience a challenge to the thinking and reflecting activity's understanding of itself.

Hannah Arendt argues that thinking is an activity of action that has no end beyond the activity itself. What, then, is the meaning of thinking? Arendt distinguishes between thinking and understanding or cognition. Understanding or cognition relates to *work,* in that it is a process of beginning and ending. Thinking, however, does not lead to any results. Thinking follows life, just as endless and just as final. Thus, it is equally difficult or even impossible to answer a question of the meaning of thinking as it is to a question of the meaning of life. In our time, however, the meaning of life seems to be experiencing. Returning to Heidegger, who criticizes the modern tendency to put the superficial experience in the center when it comes to art (Heidegger 2002a, p. 50), I find it interesting to link his discussion on this matter to the Aristotelian discussion of the happiness concept. Aristotle distinguishes between happiness in the short run, as some type of superficial feeling, on the one hand (*hedoné,* as in *hedonism*), and happiness in the long run, as a type of deeper experience (*eudaimonia*), on the other. The Aristotelian happiness, *eudaimonia*, is linked to the human ability to think. If thinking now, as Arendt says, is to be seen as action, with no other end than itself, then the value of thinking is within the action of thinking.

In my previous discussions of the end-means-dichotomy in music education, I have thrown out 'the baby' called Intrinsic-Values-of-Music together with the bath water. This was accomplished by linking the experience of music to the Aristotelian thinking about happiness as the one and only end in life. In this reflection, I saw happiness as something outside music. By doing this, the one and only end in life, happiness, has become some kind of object in the outer world. If we now, however, are thinking of musical experience as action, as a way of thinking and reflection, we no longer have to think about music as *a means* to happiness. It is possible to think of musical experience *as* happiness. As said above, this is the most important element in my attempt to establish a new order of discourse; to move the value of music as *a means* to happiness – to start thinking about the values of music as *within the action* of musical experience. Music as a product and object in the outer world cannot be said to have value in itself. Music as an object is a means to musical experience. Musical experience, however, is not a product, it is an *action*: a human activity that has a value in itself, an intrinsic value. This value is linked to thinking and reflection, actions that are related to the Aristotelian concept of happiness in the long run (*eudaimonia*).

However: Do we not now after all speak about the usefulness and benefits of musical experience? In a way we do. Perhaps it is necessary to put it another way – as long as one can find the concept 'usefulness' (as well as the concept 'relevance') partially corrupted by 'business mentality'? As said above, it is always possible to ask the question of for what something is good. In some contexts, however, this is simply the wrong question to ask. It shows that we are unable to go beyond the dominant way of thinking – the end-means-thinking focusing on 'useful outcomes'. If we, after all, in some way wish to take advantage of the concept 'useful', the term has to include a

paradox such as 'the usefulness of being useless'. A central question then is of what this 'useless utility' consists. What type of value is the intrinsic value?

According to the French philosopher Jacques Maritain (1961), artists' task is not to give the bourgeoisie a light intoxication after the meal, but supplying us with spiritual food. Art experience then is in fact useful in the sense 'useful for that which is beyond usefulness'. Or, as the Norwegian playwright Jon Fosse puts it: "The literature is useless. It is just as useless as love and death" (Fosse 2011, p. 363, my translation). Art experience is therefore important and necessary precisely because it is 'useless'. Its 'uselessness' and freedom from the narrow minded and rigid end-means-thinking is what provides the musical experience a genuine value. As free and unfettered, the musical experience in its truest way benefits both the individual and the community. I believe that this line of thinking of *musical experience as action* provides a possibility for philosophy of music education to transcend instrumentalism and technical rationality (even when this appears as ritual rationality). It is a possibility for those who no longer want to accept the denial of human freedom that goes together with the narrow minded utilitarianism. This type of thinking could contribute to a fundamental critique of what seems to be a sort of totalitarian economical and commercial ideology in today's educational and cultural politics.

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Chapter 4
Ways of Revealing: Music Education Responses to Music Technology

David Lines

> *We shall be questioning concerning technology, and in doing we should like to prepare a free relationship to it.*
>
> (Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology)

Abstract Music has a powerful connection with technology in contemporary culture. This chapter explores Heidegger's ideas on modern technology and links these with questions of music technology. In the present day people engaged in music with technology are presented with the challenge of what Heidegger calls *Ge-stell* or enframing. This challenge privileges music as standing-reserve (*Bestand)* within the wider frame of consumer society. The chapter calls for a deeper questioning of the meanings, functions and patterns of perception that we encounter through modern technologies. From Heidegger, music technology can be redefined as ways of "revealing" (Heidegger, The question concerning technology. In: Krell D (ed) Martin Heidegger: Basic writings. Harper Collins, San Francisco, pp. 307–342, 1993: 311); as forms, cultural conditions, structures and pedagogies that bring different kinds of musical spaces, relationships and ways of being in our lives. This redefinition calls for music educators to closely question and trace the means by which they relate to the musical forms and relationships they encounter through technology, ponder how their lives are entwined with music technology, and reconsider and respond to technology in their local music cultures. The final part of the chapter deals with practical ways musicians and music educators can critically engage with new forms of technological being in music in contemporary culture.

Keywords Music education • Music technology • Enframing • Meanings, functions and patterns of perception

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_4

4.1 Introduction

In *The Question Concerning Technology,* Heidegger puts forth an argument about the nature of technology in the world today. He says: "the essence of technology is by no means anything technological" (Heidegger 1993a: 311) in a provocative statement that points to a more essential meaning of technology. What then is the role and place of technology in our daily lives? To answer this Heidegger draws our attention to different meanings and readings of technology. He says the most common notion of technology is *instrumentum* or equipment. This everyday notion is identified by the German word *technik,* which is associated with industrial technology, machinery and gadgets. Technology in this sense is the tools that help us with our daily tasks—machines and gadgets that are a "means to an end" (Heidegger 1993a: 313), objects that help us with our routine activities. But Heidegger reminds us that the everyday assumptions about the place and role of technology have altered over time and in fact continue to alter. Technology comes from the ancient Greek notion of *techne,* which is closer to art and the natural processes of bringing forth through art making. What was once an artful conception of technology for the ancient Greeks has now become an instrumental conception of technology with the advent of industrialisation and modern machinery. Further, Heidegger warns us that the meaning of technology is still changing. With the advent of modern technology in the twentieth century, Heidegger suggests that newer meanings of *technik* have emerged which move technology from an instrumental view to something more challenging to human society. Modern technology, he says, is now characterized by *Ge-stell* or 'enframing' which gives rise to *Bestand* or 'standing-reserve'. These new systems operate by fixing how things show up in a way that violates human choice and freedom. In short, the machine that was supposed to be our slave in industrialisation becomes our master (Young 2002) in a new kind of technological relationship.

Given that the meaning of technology in our lives is changing, Heidegger suggests a different approach is required so that we can find a more essential meaning of what technology is. An essential meaning must take into account the changing way that humans view technology and the different ways it affects their ways of being human. To accommodate this Heidegger suggests that technology is a way of "revealing" (Heidegger 1993a: 318). His main idea here is to refocus our thoughts on the preconditions and ontological aspects of technology, and to the *revealing of ways of technological being*. The revealing of something accommodates difference—one type of revealing may reveal something that is quite different from another as can be seen in the changing conceptions of technology over time. Ways of revealing also suggests something pedagogical in nature. Educationally speaking, what is revealed can thus be thought of as a pathway towards learning, an opening, a pedagogy or a pedagogical system that induces learning. Our learning through technology can be gentle or unobstructed in the *techne* sense of learning, in a way that supports the learner to use skills and techniques to bring about a new kind of learning experience. One the other hand technological learning can be a kind of

non-learning, a 'learning' that is manipulated and imposed by dominant patterns of cultural manipulation. Heidegger thinks this issue is problematic today because technological thinking in the modern world is captured, dominated and increasingly held in place by enframing. This new type of revealing in the modern age inhibits other kinds of natural, artistic, gentle revealing or *techne*. Technology as enframing is a dominating force; it shows up in a challenging way that leads us to follow preconditioned technological actions neutrally and without thought. It also challenges the direction and nature of our learning with and through music technologies.

In what follows I offer a pathway of thought that considers Heidegger's concept of technological being to help clarify thinking and action for musicians, music educators and cultural workers involved in music and sound technologies. My contention is that Heidegger's view of technology as enframing and standing-reserve helps us understand what is revealed to us as musical human beings in the modern age. Our interactions with music technology are often hyper-functional and carried out with little thought to how technological processes impact on musical intentions and actions. This creates a 'lack' or sense of neutrality and detachment in musicians/educators due to their lack of purpose in the technological act. The problem requires specific attention, inquiry and response. Given the field of technology now overwhelms the practices of music education in every respect it seems fitting to discuss some of the deeper questions of how technology shapes the ways of music teaching, in pedagogy, thinking and musicianship. Heidegger's philosophy provides a vehicle to do just that and establishes a basis for musicians and teachers to critique, question and respond to the technological saturation of music culture.

The work I present is not isolated but comes out of a small but growing genealogy of scholarship that has developed in Aotearoa/New Zealand over the past two decades. Aotearoa/New Zealand is a small postcolonial country in the South Pacific with a history of sensitivities to indigenous and marginal cultures and arts. Over this period a scholarly culture of inquiry in music and arts education has emerged (eg. Grierson 2000; Mansfield 2000, 2002, 2005; Lines 2003, 2004, 2005a, b; Naughton 2007; Locke 2011) through the influence of the work of Michael Peters and Jim Marshall[1] and other scholars in the philosophy of education. This scholarship has drawn attention to the role of the arts in education and critical issues of marginalisation of arts practices drawing from Continental Philosophy and poststructuralist perspectives. Heidegger is important in the genealogy of these ideas—and for this inquiry into music technology—because his work draws our attention to the cultural practices into which we are positioned and to our situation within those practices as active, political, culturally aware, artistic beings (Dreyfus 2004).

[1] Michael Peters who was supervised by Prof Jim Marshall in his PhD has gone on to publish over 65 books and many other journal articles on a wide range of scholarly topics on educational philosophy, theory and policy with a particular interest in poststructuralism and Continental Philosophy relating to the philosophy of education. Jim Marshall has written extensively on Foucault and education. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 37:3 (2005) is a journal issue devoted to his work and influence.

Music in the contemporary world is completely saturated by technology. This total immersion includes the way we find, explore, listen, produce, change, remix, share, redistribute, and learn music through everyday activity, formally in educational institutions and generally through mainstream media culture. The aim here is to describe a view of music technology in the present day and show how this is related to matters of music education. While there are interesting and insightful texts emerging in the music education literature on the use and value of specific music technologies (see Finney and Burnard 2009; Gouzouasis 2006; Gouzouasis 2005) there is very little discussion to date on the broader problems and issues facing musicians and music teachers as they grapple with technological ways of being in contemporary music culture. Mansfield (2005: 150) notes that generally "there has been an absence of debate on political, hegemonic, technological constructions of music education". Heidegger suggests we should question concerning modern technology. There is a need then to open up new pathways of thinking and debates about technological ways of being for music and music education through questioning. This leads to questions of subjectivity—to images, concepts and perceptions of self in music technology contexts, and to an examination of ways in which the self can project positive and creative pedagogical action within controlled technological paradigms. This is a critically important project because in the present day technological enframing disables artistic freedom and the capacity of music educators and musicians to prepare and share music as a critical pedagogy in the local and global cultural environment.

4.2 Our Relationship with Music Technology

Music has always had a close relationship with technology. Right from the beginning of music making in human history, music has been developed, ordered, shaped, and remade through a variety of technological ways and means. As an intentional music maker and listener, the human being is a technological being and technology pervades the human condition and relational environment. As such, music technology is ever-present in the contemporary world and is part of our identity as musicians—it is part of what defines us as musical beings—we are embodied with technological ways of being. Technological systems generate the production and decoding of music notation through digital software that reform and repackage older systems of musical coding. Other kinds of technologies dictate the ways and means of music listening through the amplification of live sound and the reproduction of digital recordings that are internalised with earphones. These sound reproduction technologies contribute to various degrees of abstraction of musical sound as derived from the intentionality and initial contexts of sound sources. The production of musical sound is now easily accessible through digital computers, iphones, ipads and other similar devices. The technological embodiment of music in the world does not rest with the equipment—a broader, systems-view is necessary. Music is also reproduced and distributed through technological means. The distribution of music on the internet is

actioned through structures of access such as iTunes, YouTube, facebook, phone apps and other similar systems of communication, commodification and distribution. Technological systems also assist the reproduction and transmission of musical knowledge and expression through both institutional pedagogies—formal classes, music education studios, systems of teaching, systems of curriculum policy—and through "public pedagogies" (Giroux 2004), that present musical sounds, styles and genres in a variety of contexts (eg. gaming, film, television, advertising, shopping music etc.) in public multimedia.

This view of music technology is more wide-ranging than a simple account of the functions of specific gadgets and software. As Sterne (2003) notes, a study of music and sound technology must take into account the historical development of ideas, the cultural contexts of technological designs and the cultural systems that position and shape technological cultural work. In Sterne's words, "sound reproduction is historical all the way down" (ibid: 23). He notes that ideas, practices and constructs predate technological machines. But equally apparent is that following machine development "technologies crystalise[d] and combine[d] larger cultural currents" (ibid: 2). The instrumental[2] view of music technology misses this cultural perspective and rather, concentrates on the immediate practical use of a gadget for a musical task. Heidegger's argument suggests that an exclusive instrumental view of technology limits us and could in fact even be dangerous because in its zeal to find efficient means and ends, it fails to recognise our own position and identity in the music making process. In music practice the extreme instrumental view can be described as technicity[3]; this is the condition of thought where musicians regard technical efficiency and the mastery of technical musicianship over and above all other matters implicated in a cultural practice. The desire implicated in a great deal of music training is for more and more tools to assist musicians and educators with their work. Musicians and music teachers scope and assess the value of specific technological innovations in music in terms of instrumental efficiency in the first instance. Gadgets and software are assessed accordingly: YouTube assists a learner by providing efficient music lessons; an internet guitar tuner provides a efficient way to tune the guitar; a notation software programme gives a composer rapid access to codified representations of their composition ideas; a play-along recorded track provides a vehicle for a jazz learner to develop improvisation skills and so on. From this instrumental point of view music technology enhances technicity; it makes the processes involved in music reception, creation and performance more technically effective and efficient.

As noted above a full analysis of music technology should take into account cultural practices that embody music technology. This broader position also takes into account the historical actions, choices and decisions that determine the cultural milieu of the present day. Although these broader cultural contexts define our present-day 'thrownness'—that is, the cultural environment with which we find

[2] Note 'instrumental' in this sense does not refer to musical instruments specifically.

[3] Tom Regelski (2002) discusses the notion of technicism in relation to "teaching as a kind of assembly line technology."

ourselves—we may simply take this present-dayness for granted due to our total immersion in it. The everyday actions and interactions with technology become very familiar to us and part of our everyday lives. In discussing Heidegger's key philosophical text *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1996), Dreyfus (2004) notes that a significant portion of our lives is experienced in a kind of "non-mediated coping mode" through which we are not necessarily thinking about our actions in the way Descartes would have us believe. This is our experience of *Dasein*, which Dreyfus interprets as "a non-autonomous or culturally bound (or thrown) way of being that can yet change the field of possibility in which it acts" (ibid). The everyday mode of music technology pervades the *Dasein* of musicians and music teachers in modern times in this way; we are accustomed to technological ways of music making and being to the degree that they do not seem to require deeper ontological reflection or thought. The danger then, is that we can forget who we are, and fail to reflect on ourselves as musicians and teachers because of our unreflective condition as 'thrown' into the world of functional music technology. The everydayness of music technology is all-pervading and ubiquitous. This raises some key questions: In what way are we inhibited by everydayness of modern music technology? Further, is it possible to change the field of possibility in which we act as musicians/music teachers and respond to technological changes in critical and creative ways?

4.3 The Experience of Ge-stell and Bestand

One of Heidegger's main themes in his writing is that of 'thinking.' He observes that humans think in different ways over different times. We have already seen that he targets instrumental thinking as being predominant in technological contexts. Heidegger also sees many problems and issues in the dominant ways of thinking that have held firm in different ages. In *The Origin of the Work of Art* he is critical of "aesthetic" thinking in the formalist sense which he says has been dominated by the distinction of "matter and form" (Heidegger 1993b: 153). Further, referring to the post-Enlightenment development of the concept of aesthetics, Heidegger states that what is aesthetic in art shows up as an object of the subjective experience. Here, he is critical of the crude distinction of subject and object and the process of the objectification of art in the western context. This subject-object orientation of thinking dominates all sectors of society in the modern world. Heidegger observes that the model of the rational, knowing Cartesian subject carries over into a dominant form of thinking: calculative thinking. Of this style of thinking he says: "first, that man [sic] installs and secures himself as *subjectum*…and secondly, that the beingness of beings as a whole is grasped as the representedness of whatever can be produced and explained" (Heidegger 1987: 178). Thus there is a separation of the individual and the object in mind that is represented, measured, calculated and explained. In this mode of thinking we observe and measure objects and judge them in terms of their practical value. Peters describes this type of calculative thinking as a kind of "empty subjectivity" (Peters 2002: 8) that takes account of

objects, calculates and manipulates them without any attention to the relationship between the person and the object under consideration.

In music these styles of thinking continue to operate by creating a division between the subject (the human) and the object (music that is written/created/performed/listened to) with music technology seen as a tool that facilitates the creation of the object. Music technology here becomes concerned primarily with the direct interests of the human subject. In this sense, music, and its technological processes become objects for human consumption—for human means and ends. This stage is problematic because the relationship becomes "twisted around toward the human being" (Heidegger 2001: 110), singularly concerned with the cumulative interests of the individual. This amounts to music becoming being-for-me as opposed to being-as-it-is. What is lost in such a purview is the resonance of music and technological being as a relational force that draws in factors of community, expression, pedagogy, politics, collaboration and other things that gather around a given musical event. Music being-for-me is in fact a nihilistic position because music controlled exclusively for me [and us] as a human becomes a form of empty subjectivity. It denies the fact that humans live relationally in the world.

These critical observations of predominant thinking styles underpin Heidegger's discussion on technology. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, he proposes that modern technology moves beyond the instrumental position and presents itself as *Ge-stell* or enframing. Heidegger describes enframing as "the challenging claim that gathers man [sic] with a view to ordering the self-revealing as standing-reserve" (Heidegger 1993a: 324). This type of ordering and framing of things is different from original forms of relationality (being with other people, natural things) because it obscures the relation of humans with technological practices by treating everything as a resource for consumption and use. Young (2002: 50) recalls Heidegger's use of the example of a petrol station to demonstrate this. The station exists purely for the accumulation of a resource (petrol); The user drives in, collects the resource, pays and drives away again. In this sense the station's sole purpose and function exists for the purpose of gaining the resource. The petrol station can be said to be a functional standing-reserve that has no 'open' consideration of meaning, rather the resource is ordered so that the commodity can be efficiently bought and sold. Music technology has created a similar kind of resource in the modern world through digital music and through internet data transmission. Music knowledge in its multiplicity of forms is now extensively archived in digital form. As a result, if we have access to digital technologies (or encounter them in public spaces), we also encounter a global music stockpile that is unimaginable in scope. This is an indication of the ubiquitous[4] presence of the ordering of music and sound in the present day in a way that has changed our thinking about music and what musical encounters mean to us as humans living in today's cultural environment. The danger lies in us becoming uncritical and unaware subjects within a commodified music 'petrol station'.

[4] Anahid Kassabian (2013) provides a very interesting account of a present day condition she calls "ubiquitous listening" in her book by the same name. It refers to the phenomenon of widespread access and exposure to recorded musics and the resulting impact of "distributed subjectivity."

What is challenging in the present day is not so much the human recipient of music per se, but the stockpile of digitally recorded music itself and the processes of politics, power and commodification that ensure humans remain unthinking about their relationship with music and the technological means of music storage. The phenomenon of music as standing-reserve forms a new relational situation of technological being in music, where both the consuming/experiencing human and the music object are treated as resources. What matters here is not so much the 'gathering', the particular emergent aspects and relationships gathered through living and learning music, but the efficient processing of music consumerism. Note, this exegesis of the condition of music today in technological society is not a critique of the *kinds* of music that are objectified and compartmentalised as technological resources; there are many kinds of wonderful, vibrant and musically stimulating recorded musics within the resource. Rather, the point of critique attends to the way in which, as *Ge-stell,* modern music technology joins together with forces of neoliberalism, consumerism and globalisation, to present an ordered music environment that denies us any sense of response to the cultural practices that we are thrown into. As we continue to stand in spaces that favour instrumental and humanist conceptions of technological being in music, we remain blind to the stockpile and the overarching condition of commodification and consumerism in global music culture.

The global condition of neoliberalism is built on notions of the free market, individual choice and the privatisation of cultural practices (including education and music) for commercial ends. It has become the dominant condition of the cultural economy in the west and its resonance challenges the whole world. Neoliberalism is a particular pertinent strand of liberal humanism, which has more recently become aligned with the emergence of a family of concepts: 'knowledge cultures', the 'knowledge economy', the 'digital economy' and 'globalisation' along with a new kind of rationalism and abstract individualism favouring the idea of *homo economicus* (economic-consumer-man) (Peters 2006). Giroux provocatively comments: "Within the prevailing discourse of neoliberalism that has taken hold of the public imagination, there is no vocabulary for political or social transformation, critical education, democratically inspired visions, or critical notions of social agency" (Giroux 2003: 180). His description carries remnants of Heidegger's description of *Ge-stell*, of the lack of thinking of being, or vocabulary or means of expression for people acting within the wider framework of cultural action. While the politics of neoliberalism is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is pertinent to briefly note here its effects on music and musicians. In writing about music in the culture industries in late capitalist society Taylor (2013) describes changes in the neoliberal workscape for musicians. He notes that in the present-day music industry environment most working musicians become exploited and put in marginal positions with regard to their music as performers and composers due to the processes of commodification embedded in global music culture. Within an immensely competitive environment and the drive for efficient musical product, music composers are forced to submit their compositions for commercial use to make ends meet, and at the same time face competition from a new kind of music 'supervisor' in the

industry who outsources music requirements and builds databases of recorded music bytes for later access and control for media requirements. These observations have clear references to the increasingly nihilistic condition people who work first-hand with music face within the cultural economy today.

Despite the very real problems and struggles facing musicians working in the industry, music educators, as cultural workers who think and act daily in schools, private teaching and university based music education have choices they can make as they work with their local cultures. Educational cultures are not safe havens from the politics of neoliberalism, and pressure can be felt from policy makers and other protagonists who challenge the relevance of a music curriculum within a dominant framework of neoliberal vocationalism. A consumer can simply purchase music from the stockpile without the need for an educated musician. This fact changes the way the public and policy makers see music education. I would suggest that in many cases the empty subjectivity, sense of nihilism and lack of vocabulary distinctive to *Ge-stell* is something that music educators also grapple with alongside working musicians outside educational cultures. How then, can music educators exercise choices that free them from the shackles of *Ge-stell* culture in music technology?

4.4 Responding to Music Technology

Musicians and music educators need to find new ways to respond to the dominant and powerful renderings of technology in music culture that limit choice, agency and musical expression. Heidegger gives us some lead in this area by suggesting that it is through the example of art (Heidegger 1993a: 340) that we become more open to being and thus free from the constraints of technological enframing. In addition the practice of questioning helps build a "free relationship" (Heidegger 1993a: 311) with technology.

It is striking that the art of music embodies ways of being that are transformational, that reveal new worlds of expression, mood, imagination and sense, along with the power to affect conceptual change when aligned with forms of language and narrative expression. In this sense, music offers education and learning a vital dimension in the creation of the artistic or musical self. One aspect of music as art that is prominent in any piece or performance is *mood*. Music tends to embody moods and to Heidegger a *mood* of disclosure is synonymous with a *mode* of disclosure—in other words it reflects a state of being. "Mood assails. It comes neither from 'without' nor from 'within,' but rises from being-in-the-world itself as a mode of that being" (Heidegger 1996: 129). The shifting nature of moods indicates the differential experience of *Dasein*, fluctuating, changing and moving from one event of 'thrownness' to the next. Music, as cultural work, directs us to states of heightened sensitivity and mood. However, the nihilistic mood of *Ge-stell* and *Bestand* is a mood of detachment, of switching off, due to the feeling of helplessness one has when faced with the size and intensity of music as expressed and broadcast through media. It's the feeling that as a musician and teacher, there is little you can do to

change and express alternative forms of musical culture in the face of the dominance of the digital stockpile. A critical sense of mood in contemporary music culture, then, is important. If we are able to re-attune ourselves and become more critically aware of the moods of technological culture in music—and understand the origins of these moods—we may begin to get a sense as to how we can then create and affirm alternative 'musical' moods through creative action.

Another striking aspect of any musical art to be mindful of is the possibility of the imagination. "Music, as work brought forth, opens intuitive spaces of insight and feeling, transforming our daily life responses through its idiomatic nuances and established planes of resonance, sparking and triggering imaginative forces in a multiplicity of possibilities" (Lines 2003: 6). Music splits into a thousand metaphors (Kofman 1993: 11), opening up spaces of truth removed from the initial creative offerings of the initiating musician/educator. The power of the imagination, when actioned with metaphor and musical sound, is that it can forge new insights and perspectives on things, new ways of hearing and understanding. This gift is part of the tool kit of the musician/educator.

Consider this in relation to the prevalence of the sound cliché in Blockbuster film music. It is noticeable that with the production of each new commercial film, music soundtracks tend to conform to simplistic repetitions and renditions of music that are considered more likely to 'sell' a film. This results in endless repetitions and slight variations of the same kinds of musical signifiers in film soundtracks. Thus the low resonant 'death drone' repeatedly indicates peril and terror or the nostalgic full-strings sound indicate an expression of patriotism and so on. These clichés are in the main, accepted by film audiences with little critical response, they serve to perpetuate a technological way of being that is normalised and sustained by commercial processes. What is often missing in these film music episodes is the imaginative dimension; the employment of a more imaginative or provocative musical score that can take an audience into different expressive realms. There is a need for film composers to find new ways of hearing in these commercial contexts. Music students need to become more versed in the methods employed in film music processing and music educators need to consider ways of creatively assisting students in developing more critical assessments of media music. This would then open the door for more imaginative treatments of media music.

Musicians/educators also need to become more aware of the processes and effects of electronic and digital sound reproduction in relation to themselves as musicians. This amounts to need for a greater understanding and awareness of 'self' as digital/electronic art-maker, listener and performer. One key aspect of sound technology for instance deals with the controlling and manipulation of sound through digital alteration and electronic amplification. Music educators and students need to understand the historical need for such technological developments (for instance amplification developed through the need for performances to mass audiences), and also learn to appreciate the resulting sense of abstraction that one feels when faced with an electronic speaker or digital soundtrack as opposed to the lived presence of a physical, bodily-active performer. Sterne notes: "Once telephones, phonographs and radios populated our world, sound had lost a little of its

ephemeral character. The voice became a little more unmoored from the body, and people's ears could take them into the past or across vast distances" (Sterne 2003: 1). The development of an understanding of this sense of abstraction and displacement which is now commonplace is also critical so that musicians/educators can begin to design and plan for new acoustic experiences that they want audiences to directly feel and critically appreciate. The key here again lies in the raising of critical awareness through artistic action.

The rise of digital music has also *intensified* the cultural conditions of functionality in music. Functional music, which has been around as long as music itself, can be heard most graphically in the commodified music of advertising, television genres (eg. news, cartoons, documentaries, soap operas) and in music for particular settings like shopping malls, restaurants, cafes and so on. In these settings, music works in a direct way as a tightly coded 'function' to support the condition of a contextual partner—be it an image, a narrative or a particular environmental or consumer driven purpose. The study of the functional qualities of music and the cultural circumstances and narratives they support opens up interesting questions of what it means to be musical through the daily consumption of these technologies. It is clear that multimedia music (such as television advertisement music and music videos posted on YouTube) now contributes to significant portion of our daily engagement in music. This reality impacts on music students as they grapple to understand their own music learning alongside the cultural reality of public exposure to functional multimedia music. Functional music is everywhere in advertising and in music-image forms on the internet and in films. It is available and 'at hand' and able to be readily assembled and consumed by the public. How does this leave the music student who is learning to play or sing songs and pieces? How can live performance be seen alongside tightly coded functional multimedia? There are many possibilities. In one creative response a student could design a performance that 'plays' with multimedia forms alongside live music making. The result of such 'play' is the revealing of the functional character of music to an audience. Such a response could enable the student to open up a freer relationship with multimedia technology to listeners and viewers.

Another recent music technology innovation has been the rise of the mobile mp3 music player. This represents an interesting move in music towards the revealing of a new kind of personalisation and free choice of music listening habits, and of the self-stylisation of listening consumerism and the advent of personal music libraries and playlists. Being musical in the mp3 sense means, developing a personal library of music. This personalisation is underladen with a commodified system of music marketing and sales, as observed in the familiar iTunes store set-up. The danger of this form of technological being lies in the potential for music reception and learning to become dominated by music playlists—where collecting and consuming the stockpile of available music becomes an act of ritualistic consumerism. In music education a level of critical awareness is again needed. As musicians/educators become more aware of the new emerging relationships and processes connected with mp3 players they can begin to position their own music performing and teaching accordingly. One obvious strategy could be the positioning of specific live

performances along with allowing for personalised playlists to be formed informally, thus building a sense of local music culture that increasingly recognises the cultural practices of audiences.

These areas are just some examples of how music educators and students can understand and respond creatively to the ordered, ubiquitous character of modern music technology. The music educator's critical awareness of technology is a vital part of their role in today's society. Part of the problem is that music educators have traditionally examined music technology from an instrumental-functional perspective and have not questioned it to any great degree or established creative, musical and culturally adept ways of moving forward. With the advent of ubiquitous, enframing music technology systems, this lack of criticality has become even more disabling for the profession and for music students. There is hope but it requires a new mind-set. We can respond poetically (musically, artistically) to the challenging revealing of technological being that modern music technology presents to us. This requires a certain amount of critical judgment and creative response. It can be sustained through the revealing of media functions and processes and through fresh pedagogical approaches that are attuned to artistic modes of being.

4.5 Conclusion

Heidegger reminds us of the essense of technology and in doing so he takes us back to the Greek origins of the word *techne*—as knowledge making as a natural revealing (*poiesis*) (Heidegger 1993a: 319). Cultural work (work done by teachers, musicians, artists and others) that employs this kind of *techne* pays more attention to the emergence of cultural forms, achieved through practical know-how and with a respect or openness for what might be naturally revealed, coming forth from artistically generated action. The sense of humans working in culture and perceiving it as part of the natural world—of culture and nature working together—is quite different from the technological mastery paradigm of *Ge-stell* and *Bestand* that overrides nature and turns music making and listening into a ordered, calculative or disembodied act.

Heidegger's critical point, that we remain unthinking about technology still has relevance in music culture today—both within the spheres of education, and in the marketplace of the cultural industries. But musicians and music educators can become cultural workers if they have a desire to act musically in ways that resist and creatively respond to enframing technological relationships of being in music.

Heidegger suggests we need to establish a free relationship to technology. His thinking opens up some ground to do that, however his thinking only goes so far. As musicians we can rethink and redevelop our understanding of our art—music—move beyond Heidegger's prompting, and respond to music technologies today with new creative acts and a revisionary concept of music education.[5]

[5] Thanks to the editors of this book for their helpful comments in the shaping of this chapter.

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Chapter 5
Towards an Ontological Turn in Music Education with Heidegger's Philosophy of *Being* and His Notion of *Releasement*

Hanne Fossum

Abstract This chapter discusses the influence of the current European educational policy on music education in some Scandinavian countries and in Germany in light of Heidegger's philosophy of being and his critique of technology. Heidegger's genealogical history of nihilism asserts that the individual's relation to reality has developed from "letting beings be" to "mastery" and "control." In the current paradigm of *enframing*, we increasingly deal with objects, including ourselves, as resources to be exploited. This has consequences of direct relevance to music education, in relation to the aspect of musical *Bildung,* to questions concerning the artistic qualities of music and to the existential role of music in the lives of individuals. This chapter discusses a possible ontological turn in music education, considering the current paradigm. Such a turn includes the move from an understanding of Bildung as the transfer of truth as *veritas* or correctness, into an understanding of Bildung as *aletheia* or the uncovering of truth. Since art to Heidegger is a happening of truth similar to the happening of truth as aletheia, music as an arts-based subject assumes a unique role among the other school subjects. As a result, a renewed focus on the significance of musical experiences may be an appropriate response to the *oblivion-of-being* in music education.

Keywords Quality • Competencies • Relevance • Musical Bildung • Oblivion-of-being • Releasement • Aletheia • Autochthony • Musical experiences

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_5

5.1 Introduction

The conditions for music education have changed substantially in Norway as well as in most European countries during the two last decades.[1] The recent development in European education policy matters plays a decisive part in this situation. The Swedish philosopher Bernt Gustavsson associates this state of affairs with the moral philosophy of utilitarianism, which according to him currently dominates education policy in many western countries. The doctrine of utilitarianism defines utility as a benefit for the single individual and measures the moral quality of an act by its consequences. Utility in this doctrine is understood in terms of economic usefulness. Utilitarianism in an educational context implicates that education, to an increasing extent, has to be "effective," which means that students should be guided the shortest way through education to occupation and profession. Central terms in education, such as the notions of "learning" and "knowledge," are increasingly economized and politicized, which marginalizes the possibility of reaching a basic understanding of the conditions for meaningful education (Gustavsson 2012: 94).

As the subject music today generally is not seen as contributing to the doctrine of utility, the subject's status in both general education and teacher education is threatened. Questions of great importance to the subject music, such as the aspect of music education as musical *Bildung* and questions concerning the existential role and meaning of musical experiences in the lives of individuals, are suspended in favor of a focus on certain core competencies and immediately measurable educational outcomes (Varkøy 2009; Kalsnes 2008; Pio 2012). In the primacy of commensurability, musical experiences happen to be quite useless (Pio and Varkøy 2012). It is further questionable how certain artistic qualities in music and musical activities are taken care of in the new and more efficient – or even technological – educational context.

This state of affairs will be discussed in light of Heidegger's philosophy of *being* and his critique of "the world of technology," in particular his notion of *releasement* [*Gelassenheit*], developed in *Discourse of Thinking* (1969). The article uses and connects quite a few terms and ideas from different periods of Heidegger's authorship. Some readers might find this rather overwhelming, and maybe even find that this tactic results in a confusion of different ideas. However, behind this approach lies just the assumption that there is a natural and logical connection between these ideas from the early and late Heidegger's thinking, and that this approach will provide a basis for a deeper understanding of Heidegger's critique of technology in general and his notion of releasement in particular.

As a part of his treatment of this notion, Heidegger describes two contrary positions that man can take: *calculative thinking* [*rechnendes Denken*] and *meditative*

[1] What in this context holds true for music education in general applies to music *teacher* education as well. Both fields are equally affected by the paradigmatic changes. The article addresses and brings relevant examples from both fields, even though music teacher education is most often addressed, but will for the sake of convenience mainly just use the expression *music education*.

thinking [*besinnendes Denken*]. The latter belongs to releasement. Heidegger describes how calculative thinking in modernity is about to take over and dominate the world entirely. This threatens the *autochthony* (rootedness) of the human being (ibid.: 46ff). The utilitarian mindset that pervades current educational policy may be related to calculative thinking in Heidegger's sense of the meaning. Heidegger writes in connection with his critique of technology: "(…) a profound change is taking place in man's relation to nature and to the world" (ibid.: 55). Thus, an ontological turn is needed, which implicates moving into another relationship to oneself and the things of the world. It implies a turn from the *oblivion-of-Being* in music educational thinking and educational politics into a "remembrance" of the meaning of music in people's lives and in society, which could be equated to Heidegger's meditative thinking.

The text is divided into three main parts. It will move from a presentation of the status of current educational reforms (part two), through a discussion of oblivion-of-being (part three) to a concluding discussion of the possibility for an ontological turn in music education (part four).

5.2 Current Educational Reforms

5.2.1 The Epistemological Content of Higher Education at Stake

5.2.1.1 *Research-Based* and *Professional-Oriented* Knowledge

Both the transnational Bologna process, with its emphasis on market-based and occupational criteria for quality in higher education, and the PISA-studies, along with other studies focusing on measurable competencies, have contributed to setting the agenda for the current reforms in Norwegian music education (European Commission 2013; OECD 1997; IEA 1967–2013). Subsequent to the Bologna process, a Quality Reform has been implemented in Norwegian higher education during the last decade (Kunnskapsdepartementet 2013). Due to these quality improvement processes, the question about the educational content and the epistemological basis of higher education has also been at stake. It has for example been explicitly stated that teacher education should be both *research-based* and *professional-oriented* (Kunnskapsdepartementet 2001–2002, 2003–2004, 2008–2009, 2011).

5.2.1.2 Research-Based Knowledge as Resource

In recent debates and speeches about education policy in Norway, it is regularly argued that knowledge, and especially research-based knowledge, is among the most important resources for solving future challenges in the Norwegian society.

The former Minister of Education and Research, Kristin Halvorsen, stated in a speech given at the Norwegian Academy of Music that Norwegian institutions of higher education, (implicitly also the Academy of Music), are vital in establishing Norway as a "knowledge society" (Halvorsen 2012).

Such handling of knowledge, by focusing measurable competencies, making it a strategic issue and talking about it as a resource, reveals how knowledge is reduced to being a resource to be exploited. Even the students are objectified, as they are seen as the "producers" of this knowledge. In Heidegger's view, this manner of treating things and people as resources belongs to the age of technology and is part of the process of *enframing* [*Ge-stell*]. In this process, and in this phase that our culture has entered, we deal with things, including ourselves, as *standing reserve* or as resources to be used efficiently and then disposed of when no longer needed (Dreyfus 1991: 18, Heidegger 2011b).[2]

Such a practice of objectifying human beings and things equally may also be connected to the Norwegian philosopher Hans Skjervheim's notion of "the instrumentalist's mistake" from his identically named essay from 1972. According to Skjervheim, the instrumentalist's mistake means ignoring Kant's distinction between pragmatic and practical actions by regarding pedagogy as solely rational objective activity, and thereby treating pupils in the same way as one treats things (Skjervheim 1996). Skjervheim's criticism of instrumentalism as well holds true for today's complete trust in research-based knowledge in educational improvement processes. Both Skjervheim and Heidegger criticize the tendency of making calculating rationality the only one valid in modernity (ibid., Heidegger 1969).[3]

5.2.1.3 Professional-Oriented Knowledge, Closed Loops, Relevance and Ontological Bildung

As already mentioned, the need for professional- or practice-oriented knowledge is highlighted in the recent reforms as well. This is especially the case in professional studies, and thus also in music teacher education. Such practice-focus is not new, as teacher education always has had, and must necessarily have, a nearness to the practical field. However, the practice-orientation has increased during the last decade through the strong influence of professional theory in Norwegian teacher education.

[2] The process of *enframing* is in Heidegger's view ambivalent, as it at the same time contains "the saving power," the key for an exit out of a solely technical worldview (Heidegger 2011b; Pio 2012: 266). In the Spiegel-Interview (1976), he says: "My conviction is that only in the same place where the modern technical world took its origin can we also prepare a conversion (*Umkehr*) of it" (Heidegger 1976).

[3] Pio objects that the criticism of instrumentalism itself is idealistic in that it builds on the premise of a subject-object-duality, which Heidegger criticizes. For Heidegger, the man of the age of technology is always-already part of the technological being-in-the-world, whether he acts instrumentalistic or not: "Self-assertive man, whether or not he knows and wills it as an individual, is the functionary of technology" (Heidegger 2001: 113, Pio 2012: 221). I still choose to mention the similar agendas of Skjervheim's and Heidegger's notions, especially the criticism of calculative thinking.

The Norwegian philosopher Harald Grimen, who has been influential in the field of professional studies, asserts that professional studies per se are *heterotelic*, which means that they have the purpose of their existence outside of themselves. This purpose is expressed in practice as a demand for relevance to, qualification for, and coordination with the professions (Grimen 2009). The practice-orientation could make us believe that music teacher education would be safe from the dangers of objectifying music and of distancing from the core values of the subject music. In fact, though, even this orientation in certain ways tends to increase instrumentalism in music education by reducing music into something manageable and useful.

One may ask who is eligible to decide which educational content is of "practical relevance." When the field of practice defines what is relevant, the status quo with well-tried activities and contents may dominate. This type of practical knowledge is not necessarily of poor quality, but it may hinder professional improvement of music education (Grimen 2009: 55). The German educationalist and philosopher Jürgen Vogt points out that what is then actually happening is that the entire professionalization of music teacher education is defined by what is seen in the school as relevant to practice or "up to date." Then, Vogt says, the process of professionalization of music teacher education becomes a closed loop in which practice is merely turning around on and confirming itself (Vogt 2002: 5).

When the students themselves are regarding the relevance-value of subject matters, the same tendency can be observed. The more up to date, "everyday" and instantly viable the content of lectures and courses in teacher education are, the "better" they seem to be evaluated by many students. Apparently, the focus on instant relevance tends to undermine in-depth dealing with subjects, slow-going artistic processes, as well as the notion of Bildung. The educational paradigm of our time, moreover, seems to value methods and learning concepts such as "learning to learn" higher than the content itself (see even Pio 2012: 136).

Such focus on (instant) relevance, the abandonment of educational content as well as the acceptance of fragmentation into "closed loops" of the well known and of practice confirming itself, lead to an erasure of a Heideggerian ontological understanding of education, which holds that education comes to pass as a process of Bildung in openness. Frederik Pio uses the term *ontological Bildung* about education in accordance with Heidegger (Pio 2012: 136, 277ff, 290). The term *existential Bildung* [*eksistentiel dannelse*], used by Finn Thorbjørn Hansen, expresses a similar position (Hansen 2011).[4]

Heidegger's relation to Bildung is ambivalent. On the one hand, he regards the old European tradition of Bildung as being on the wane: "The age of intellectual cultivation [*Bildung*] is coming to an end (…) because the signs are appearing of a world age in which that which is worthy of questioning will someday again open the

[4] Hansen's and Pio's educational models differ in that Pio places the "System" dimension as an *external* framework condition, while Hansen includes this as one of the four "voices" affecting higher education. Additionally, Pio emphasizes more clearly the tensions between the subject-specific and pedagogical dimensions in his model.

door that leads to what is essential" (Heidegger 1999a: 181).[5] Likewise, he is critical towards the "aesthetic approach" to art that often is thought of in connection with the European tradition of Bildung (Heidegger 1977). On the other hand, he still seems to want to retain Bildung as the notion that comes closest to the Greek *Paideia*-thinking, which he wishes to revitalize (Heidegger 1998a: 166, Pio 2012: 293). In the Spiegel-Interview (1976), Heidegger expresses the view that a new appropriation of the European tradition (stemming from the Greeks) is necessary for the conversion of thought into the nontechnical, future paradigm. Heidegger's notion of autochthony may also be interpreted as a sort of Bildungposition, as it to my mind has to do with rootedness – in the *phenomenon* and in traditions (Heidegger 1969). This means that ontological/existential Bildung and autochthony are closely related terms. We will return to these later.

The focus on instant relevance observed among students is understandable. Norwegian students are since Bologna under constant pressure through the intensified frequency of tests and exams during their studies. Under such conditions students are not quite encouraged, "taking into account any activity that has no end beyond itself," as Hannah Arendt (1998) describes the genuine, human action that is not of an automated character, done out of necessity or for practical purposes, but out of freedom. The students are caught up in institutionalized means-end rationality where instant usefulness of an activity or a subject matter becomes the greatest good. Subject matters that involve in-depth-studies, artistic ambiguity and divergent thinking (Guilford 1967, 1988) do not necessarily seem relevant to one's own practice. Unsurprisingly, such issues are quickly deemed less relevant than ready-made concepts and teaching activities for direct use by the students in their teaching.

However, in a Heideggerian perspective, it is neither the research-based nor the professional-oriented educational focus itself that is problematic, rather it is the way we relate to these concepts, the way we, under the influence of the paradigm of enframing, see and use them as *standing reserve.* We will return to this notion, but first we will look at some central terms used in current Quality Management processes in the context of arts and music education.

5.2.2 *The Terms* Quality *and* Evidence-Based Research *in Arts Education*

Recently, a study by the Australian Anne Bamford has been conducted, titled *Arts and Cultural Education in Norway*, which intention is "to inform current and future development work in Norwegian schools" (Bamford 2012). In 2004, UNESCO carried out the first international study of this kind, conducted by Bamford as well.

[5] Already this sentence contains this ambivalence, as the same power (technicity) that brings about that Bildung is coming to an end, at the same time "will some day open the door that leads to what is essential"–namely the pondering on the essence of technology, that contains the saving power that initiates the new, non-technical mode of being in the world (Heidegger 2011b: 238).

What – at least in Norway – is highlighted as the maybe most astonishing finding of this international study, presented in the report *The Wow Factor* (2006), is the insight that arts education needs to be *of good quality*, as poor arts education appears to have no – or even *negative effect on children's learning* (Bamford 2006: 104, emphasis mine, Musikk i skolen 2010). In the Norwegian study, Bamford states that "the intrinsic aims of art are highly valued in Norway," and that "successive governments have given priority to arts and culture programmes," yet "an objective (…) overview of the actual *effect of these investments*" is missing. Bamford's conclusion is that some areas need to be addressed "to ensure that Norway *gets value for its money*, and the *full potential for previous investment* can be realized" (Bamford 2012: 9, emphasis mine).

Obviously, Bamford and the Norwegian Centre for Arts and Culture Education, by whom the study was commissioned, have the best intentions for the study, which overarching aim it is to enhance the importance of arts and culture education in Norway. This should be in the interests of every music educator. The arguments used in the study to justify arts education, though, are mainly descriptions of extrinsic outcomes and transfer effects, which have little to do with art or music. At least this is the case for the arguments in the extract of the study, which is translated into Norwegian and highlighted as research-based rationale by different agents in current Norwegian music and arts education policy debates. The arguments have to do with performing well in other subject matters such as mathematics or reading in the PISA testing process, making school more interesting, helping against dropout problems (ibid.: 56–59) and similar outcomes. Apparently, one feels obliged to use this type of argumentation in order to be noticed by the governments and in the political debates. Arguments that have to do with the intrinsic value of music as important to humanity for its own sake, without having to bring nonmusical, measurable effects of any kind, at least seem to be undercommunicated in the report.[6]

It seems natural to associate this report with evidence-based research, which has become known as the "what works-agenda" (see, for example, Simons 2003). The increasing dominance of evidence-based educational research in Norway and other European countries gives the impression that this type of research is the only way to bring about improvement of educational quality, and that it follows from this procedure that the quality in succession will be ensured. The Norwegian educationalist Tone Kvernbekk remarks that having the possibility of appealing to empirical evidence might provide views and policies an aura of scientific support that is misleading or unfounded, depending on the quality of the evidence. Negative evidence runs the risk of simply being ignored. The public may thereby be manipulated (Kvernbekk 2011: 515). Surely, it is not reasonable to assume that Bamford and the commissioners of the study intend to manipulate anyone; neither do the many enthusiastic

[6]The notion of "intrinsic value of music" should here be understood in terms of being a "unique potential for music in human life," as stimulating, "meaning-creating reflection" with "importance of art for everyone," and *not* as "self-sufficiency of art" as a type of higher, independent value inherent in musical objects "separated from the living subject" (Pio and Varkøy 2012: 105ff).

Norwegian followers of Bamford. Yet, enthusiasm alone should not prevent music and arts educators from a critical scrutiny of the rationale that is expressed through the study.

In the Bamford-report, the term quality is used in a way that matches current European educational thinking, referring to "world standard quality alphas" (ibid: 26). This gives the impression of referring to a global authority having defined once and for all what quality means. Gustavsson criticizes the use of the terms quality and evidence-based research, among others, in European policy documents, which affects Sweden as well as most other European countries:

> *Quality* is only one of many policy-terms that are introduced by anonymous policy-makers, who are employed and trusted by big organizations like EU and OECD. Other such terms are *lifelong learning* and *evidence based research*. These terms have in common that they are all undefined in the policy-documents. However, they become their definitions by the institutions that are dependent on using them to be funded. They become powerful instruments for selecting and eliminating activities that do not meet the criteria (Gustavsson 2012: 93, emphasis and translation mine).

It seems to be the trend that evidence-based research currently makes its way also into music education in many European countries.

5.2.3 *The Replacing of* Musical Bildung *with* Competencies

Vogt comments on a similar development in German music educational research and practice. He criticizes the growing confidence in means-end-rationality, particularly when it comes to questions concerning Bildung. Today, one expects that *musical Bildung* should have positive effects on learning as well as influencing the character of the pupils. The arguments used, Vogt says, are mainly strategic or rhetoric motivated, and to support the arguments primarily empirical findings are summoned. It is newly even argued that the term Bildung ought to be "translated" into parameter of empirical educational research: "The context of justification of empirical research need to operationalize Bildung in such a way that Bildung becomes observable and measurable" (Tippelt in Vogt 2012: 19, translation mine). It is assumed that only such an identifiability of Bildung would ensure that it would be manageable for education policy steering measures. It is further assumed that the term Bildung may be replaced by the term *competency* without loss of substance, an assumption with which Vogt substantively disagrees (Vogt 2012: 18ff). Vogt refers to Hermann Kaiser, who together with a group of researchers conducted a study at the University of Hamburg during the years 1991–2000, working on a redefinition of the notion of *musical-aesthetic Bildung,*[7] a project in which Vogt was himself involved:

[7] Graduiertenkolleg Ästhetische Bildung, Fachbereich Erziehungswissenschaft der Universität Hamburg 1991–2000. See also:
http://www.forschungsbericht.uni-hamburg.de/Forber8/aforber/e32/e32046/b32046.htm

> It is impossible to build a means-end relation that ensures that somebody at the end of this process is *musically gebildet* (musically educated in the sense of Bildung, my comment). With regard to *musical Bildung*, it cannot be determined if and when somebody acts competently. (…) The term *competency* is in processes of Bildung incongruous (Kaiser in Vogt 2012: 19, translation mine)

Furthermore, Vogt alleges that one can only speak of musical Bildung when the available abilities and skills, attitudes and motivation, given the actual situation of musical learning, proves oneself to be inadequate or subject for debate, and consequently should be *altered*. Musical Bildung is thus always "transformation of basic representations of the self and the world" (Koller in Vogt 2012: 20, translation mine).[8]

This view implies that planning and predicting in which ways such transformation is going to be fulfilled, which would be necessary in order to formulate learning objectives as competencies to be mastered by the pupils, is scarcely possible. At best, it is possible to account for such transformation in retrospective interpretive reconstruction, Vogt says. Therefore, musical Bildung will remain being a likewise, irritating necessary element of music educational discourse (Vogt 2012: 20).

In connection with the development of a competency model for the subject music in Germany (Niessen et al. 2008), the German music educationalist and philosopher Christian Rolle (2008) as well is skeptical towards the unquestioned and self-evident use of the term competency in music educational discourse: "As music educators we may ourselves be sure about the great significance of music in the lives of human individuals; questionable is, though, if the term competency will be helpful in trying to describe this significance" (ibid.: 45, translation mine). Furthermore, one cannot require that pupils have to learn certain contents and show certain competencies without getting involved in discourses of justification (ibid.: 50). The research group that has developed the competency model uses the curriculum plan as a starting point without questioning its aims and objectives, and is thereby leaving the responsibility for normative questions concerning the plan and the competencies to others. Crucial, however, is that "the normative abstinence of such a procedure not preserves the competency model of being inquired concerning its validity" (ibid.: 51).

5.2.4 Musical Bildung as Uncovering of Truth

The shaping of pedagogical contexts where learning is regulated by learning objectives or competencies in steering documents is not preferable in a Heideggerian perspective. This procedure presupposes a ready-made learning content, a "truth," to be passed on to the students by way of representation, in

[8] Heidegger also emphasizes the transformative function of *Bildung*: "(…) the essence of paideia does not consist in merely pouring knowledge into the unprepared soul as if it were a container held out empty and waiting. On the contrary, real formation [*Echte Bildung*] lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first of all leading us to the place of our essential being and accustoming us to it." (Heidegger 1998a: 167).

order to afford the learning outcome to be gained and reproduced as similar to the described objective as possible (Pio 2012: 137). Such rationality belongs to the metaphysical paradigm, which Heidegger wanted to overcome. In the metaphysical tradition from Plato to Nietzsche, truth is the static, that which is identical with what it mirrors, the accordance of a statement with a matter (Heidegger 2011a: 69). According to Heidegger, the passing over of truth should not be seen as correctness, as in the Latin understanding of truth as *veritas,* or as correspondence in the sense of an alignment of one entity with another (ibid: 67). Rather truth – not least in a Bildungs- and art-related setting – should be understood as the Greek term for truth: *aletheia* (uncovering), which points at the event character of truth. This understanding of truth shows that disclosure of the world, especially as a process of musical Bildung, cannot be controlled and predicted by steering documents or teachers, rather it is an ambiguous, unforeseeable and uncontrollable event [*Ereignis*] (Heidegger 1962, 2000). The understanding of truth as aletheia also influences the way we relate to truth and things. An uncovering of truth as aletheia requires a transformation of thinking, in that we "let beings be the beings they are" in order for beings to have the freedom of revealing themselves in the openness of being (Heidegger 2011a: 72f). This means that the human subject is not the creator of truth; rather truth reveals itself as an act or event that is uncontrollable by the subject:

> "Truth" is not a feature of correct propositions that are asserted of an "object" by a human "subject" and then "are valid" somewhere (…) rather, truth is disclosure of beings through which an openness essentially unfolds [*west*] (ibid.: 74).

The event of uncovering of truth is particularly potent in the work of art. In *The Origin of the Work of Art* (2011c), Heidegger says: "Art is (…) a becoming and happening of truth. (…) The essence of art (…) is the setting-itself-into-work of truth" (ibid.: 127). This statement provides an artistic subject such as music a unique role among other school subjects. In Heidegger's view, the essential truth appears in art rather than in terms and concepts. The truth that Heidegger aims at is not the truth of veritas or correctness, which has its place in school as well. It is another and more primordial mode of truth that lies beyond and has its basis in an openness prior to concepts, in a revealing that first makes correctness possible (Heidegger 2011a: 70, Øverenget & Mathisen 2000: 153). This idea leads to the assumption that artistic knowledge is of a special type, and therefore is indispensable and incommensurable in education. Consequently, a rationale for arts education should rather take ideas of this type as its point of departure, instead of arguing the usefulness of art for other subjects in agreement with the paradigm of utilitarianism.

In the following chapter, we shall further continue investigating some Heideggerian notions that may contribute to throwing light on the music educational discourse in the age of technology, in which we according to Heidegger live (Heidegger 1969).

5.3 Heidegger's Philosophy of *Being*

5.3.1 Being *and* Oblivion-of-Being

Heidegger's *being* is "that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood" (Heidegger 1962: 25–26). Heidegger spells this out through a description of the intelligibility of the everyday world. This world is "the whole context of shared equipment, roles, and practices on the basis of which one can encounter entities and other people" (Dreyfus 2005: x). Heidegger's main enterprise in *Being and Time* (1962) is thus to make explicit the general structure of these background practices in order to map out the conditions for the possibility of intelligibility (Dreyfus 2005: xiv). Yet, these background practices are easily passed over and hidden to us, as they are so familiar. They are at the same time the nearest to us, but ontologically the farthest away (Heidegger 2011d: 159). Being in the world thus often goes along with certain blindness, the *oblivion-of-being*, a taken-for-granted-ness, for which Heidegger especially criticizes western metaphysics, philosophy and sciences. The first, simplest and most fundamental question one in a state of "not seeing the forest for the trees" has forgotten to ask: the question of Being. "Why are there entities at all and not nothing?" Heidegger asks (2000: 1). What are the conditions for knowledge? Moreover, most crucial: What is the sense[9] of being?

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger is not explicitly using the term oblivion-of-being, but he clearly describes its main characteristic, namely the negligence of asking the question about the sense of being. The sciences take for granted and make their investigations based on the fact *that* the phenomena and the things of the world *are*. They however fail to question the origin and sense of their being, the condition of possibility for the things of the world and for human beings to *be* at all. To Heidegger, all science, and all ontology "(…) remains blind and perverted from its own-most aim, if it has not first clarified the meaning of being and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task" (Heidegger 1962: 31).

Certain aspects of evidence-based educational research may be seen in light of this aspect of Heidegger's philosophy of being. According to Pio, this type of research is interested in generating explicit, measurable knowledge. It is building on the premise that educational practices may be divided into separate elements, and that these elements may be analyzed in terms of the principle of cause and effect. This type of research divides the world into separate sections that can be controlled and mastered separately. As already indicated, in a Heideggerian perspective, all our understanding of the world, including science, is contingent on prereflective comprehension and cultural "background practices" (Pio 2012: 21ff, Dreyfus 1991).

[9] I choose here to use Dreyfus' translation of the German word *Sinn* into *sense*, instead of the translation into *meaning*, which is the word used in *Being and Time*. Dreyfus remarks that sentences such as "the meaning of being" sound too definitional (Dreyfus 1991: xii).

Our understanding of entities thus rests on a sub-rational apprehension of things existing as a whole and hanging together more or less coherently (Carman 2011: xi). Evidence-based educational research seems to have a tendency of neglecting questions of coherence, meaning and normative dimensions. Such neglect may be characterized as a type of oblivion-of-being, as one "remains blind and perverted from the own-most aim" of education and forgets to take into consideration the question of its meaning.

Both the undisputed trust in the quality of a Quality Reform building on research-based and professional-oriented knowledge, the "normative abstinence" in German music education, as well as Bamford's unquestioned adoption of "world standard quality alphas," may as well be characterized as expressing a type of oblivion-of-being. In all cases, one takes for granted that the ground the reform and studies build on and refer to is given and not discussible. One finds it unnecessary or has even forgotten to (re-) consider the question of meaning and the complexity involved when using terms such as competency and quality in the context of music and arts education. One addicts oneself to the technical rationality that turns upside-down the understanding of music educational being in the world. This happens when rules and principles, in these cases the principles of professional education, measurement of music educational outcomes and "world standard quality alphas," are raised to become a primary status, while the lived world of music and music education is reduced to having a secondary status. According to Heidegger, however, this lived world exists beneath and beyond the rules and principles, and thereby is the instance that constitutes the entire idea about an "idea" or a "principle." The principles and rules therefore rather should ensue as secondary to the lived world, and they should be based on the intrinsic qualities of the lived world of the entity in question, in these cases, the lived world of art and music. Such turning around of what has a primary status leads to an erasure of an ontological reflection on the world of music and musical experiences that carries music education, and to a nihilistic negligence of values and care for basal human and art-related conditions in music education (Pio 2012: 227).

5.3.2 Towards a Change in Comportment: From Mastery *and* Control *to* Releasement

Inherent in Heidegger's critique of the sciences, as in the term oblivion-of-being, lays a critique of the *attitude* or *mindset* that characterizes the way in which humans in modernity tend to inhabit the world, with a certain ignorance and even arrogance. Also in his critique of technology, Heidegger is interested in how technology influences human attitude and thinking, more than being concerned about technology itself: "Yet it is not that the world is becoming entirely technical which is really uncanny. Far more uncanny is our being unprepared for this

transformation, our inability to confront meditatively what is really dawning in our age" (Heidegger 1969: 52).[10]

Heidegger himself uses the term *comportment* [*Verhalten, Haltung*] to refer to the way human beings relate to things (Dreyfus 1991: 51).[11] As a contrary stance to the common human attitude in the age of technology, Heidegger suggests taking up the comportment of *releasement towards things* [*Gelassenheit zu den Dingen*] (Heidegger 1969: 54f). However, Heidegger's notion of releasement is neither thought of as a cure for healing all wounds of the technological age, nor does it require an ascetic attitude. Heidegger is not condemning technology or trying to "brake or direct the progress of history in the atomic age" (ibid.: 52). His question is rather how man can move into an adequate, free relationship to technique (Nießeler 1995: 44). This free relationship implies being able to use the technological devices, and at the same time leaving them alone "as something which does not affect our inner and real core" (Heidegger 1969: 54). Having such a free relationship to technology is equivalent to releasement: "I would call this comportment toward technology which expresses "yes" and at the same time "no," by an old word, *releasement towards things*" (ibid.: 54). Without this comportment, man himself is in danger of being reduced to a thing, to something technical, to a machine.

According to Heidegger, the self-reliant attitude of the sovereign subject is a mindset that has developed into its extreme through the modern age and the age of technology. Heidegger challenges the idea of an unlimited constructivism, the opinion that the rational, autonomous subject is the creator and master of all knowledge. In the essay *The Age of the World Picture* (1977), Heidegger describes the modern way of being human in which human capability is seen as "a domain given over to measuring and executing" (ibid.: 132). The modern subject brings into play its "unlimited power for the calculating, planning, and molding of all things" (ibid.: 135). In *Discourse of Thinking* (1969), Heidegger characterizes such a mindset as calculative thinking. According to Heidegger, the greatest threat to mankind in the age of technology is not even the destruction of the earth through the atom bomb, but rather the total dominance of calculative thinking: "In the dawning atomic age a far greater danger threatens. (…) The approaching tide of technological revolution (…) could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as *the only* way of thinking" (ibid.: 56).

The widespread acceptance of the utilitarian mindset accompanying New Public Management, which comes with the transnational policy documents our educational institutions today are obliged to live up to, could point to Heidegger's prognostication coming true. As these policy documents and plans are steering all educational activity on a national and transnational level, we have no other choice but to accept this mindset as a general condition we have to put up with. What we

[10] Even in the Spiegel-Interview, Heidegger has to correct his interviewers for understanding his critique of technology too concretely (Heidegger 1976: 214).

[11] *Comportment* is Heidegger's own term for Husserl's *intentionality* (Dreyfus 1991: 51).

with Heidegger, however, *can* do, is take up the comportment of releasement, which means that we at the same time say both "yes" and "no" to technological rationality. It implies that we "use technical devices," in this case the educational steering devices, "as they ought to be used. (…) We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them to dominate us" (ibid.: 54).

A development project conducted by the Pedagogical University of Denmark in 2010 may exemplify how such two-sided educational thinking can be put into practice. The project explored the possibility of creating a double-barreled pedagogical approach. Both a top-down, theory-driven competency- and learning-strategy, as well as a being-oriented, bottom-up Bildung approach were pursued. The first approach complies with the demands from the "system", that is, the educational steering guidelines. The latter is based on the pedagogical concept of *wonder* (Hansen 2009, 2010), starting from the phenomenological description of a case by which the students were emotionally affected. This was again followed up by hermeneutic reflection (Hansen 2011). The project rests on the assumption that an ontological turn in teacher education is vital. This calls for a pedagogy that engages students as persons, not merely as knowers (Hansen 2011: 251, Barnett 2004: 247, 2005: 795). Such an educational approach acknowledges that openness, wonder, commitment and passion are integral to learning (Dall'Alba and Barnacle 2007). Heidegger's term releasement is in this approach interpreted as a specific type of "cautious listening", and is also connected to Gadamer's "hermeneutic listening" and Arendt's "wondering". This cautious listening is twofold. First, it is about listening to oneself and becoming aware of one's own position. Second, it is about listening to what one is *not*, but which calls for attention in that particular moment. Together, these two types of listening will lead to "real formation" [*echte Bildung*] in a Heideggerian sense, that is, ontological education (Hansen 2011: 252).[12]

5.4 An Ontological Turn in Music Education

5.4.1 *From* Control *to* Releasement

How is an ontological turn in music education to be undertaken? Let us recall what has been said about the ontological turn in music education until now: It implies a turn from the oblivion-of-Being in music educational thinking into a "remembrance" of the meaning of music in people's lives and in the society. It also implies a turn from calculative to meditative thinking. Further, it implies a turn from the ontic, which concerns the appearances and the evident, to the ontological level of our existence, the ground beyond appearances, the roots of our existence. Finally, an ontological turn implies a move from the rootlessness of the age of technology into

[12] The twofold listening is supported by two quotations by Heidegger. The first ist identical with the citation in footnote 8, the second reads as follows: "To learn means to make everything we do answer to what essentials address themselves to us at a given time." (Heidegger 1968: 14).

autochthony, which is Heidegger's term for the new rootedness humans can attain in the technological age.

As a further contribution to this discussion of the ontological turn, we shall take a closer look at Heidegger's *Discourse on Thinking* (1969). The book's second part, titled *Conversation On A Country Path About Thinking,* is formed as a conversation between a scientist, a scholar and a teacher. This text is an inquiry into the nature of thinking, yet a way of thinking that corresponds to the comportment of *releasement*. At the end of this conversation, the scholar summons an old Greek word, the shortest of Heraklit's fragments, which he (Heidegger) regards to be a keyword in understanding the nature of thinking. The word spells *alchibadie* and means, literally translated, "moving-into-nearness" (ibid.: 89).

To understand the significance of this word, it may be helpful to read it in light of Heidegger's enterprise of offering the history of nihilism. He does so by describing *Dasein's* world disclosure in the succeeding cultural paradigms. The early Greeks experienced reality as "that which opened itself and took man into its presence (…)." In modern times, subjects "encounter *objects* to be controlled and organized" by them "in order to satisfy their desires," while at this final stage of technology we "experience everything including ourselves as resources to be enhanced, transformed, and ordered simply for the sake of greater and greater efficiency" (Dreyfus 1991: 337–338).

It becomes obvious that human beings' relationship to reality and the things of the world during these historical periods has developed from "letting beings be" to "mastery" and "control." This implies a development from world disclosure as aletheia to the dominance of *veritas* and calculative thinking. As an answer to the experience of oblivion of being, which may be seen as a specific response to the rootlessness of man in the final stage of technology, Heidegger proposes releasement to be the appropriate comportment to adopt for individuals while awaiting a non-nihilistic culture.[13] Releasement is characterized by openness to "a new understanding of reality, should one be given us by a new cultural paradigm," and to "other sorts of practices that still survive" (ibid.: 337ff). In connection with these "other sorts of practices," or "marginal practices," as they are often named (ibid.), Heidegger calls attention to "the saving power" of what may seem insignificant: "We are (…) summoned to hope in the growing light of the saving power. How can this happen? Here and now and in the humble things [*im Geringen*], that we may foster the saving power in its increase" (Heidegger 2011b: 236).

Heidegger is especially looking for hints in Greek practices left over from ancient times in order to return back to the forgotten state. This is the state of being at home in our world once again, in the same way as the pre-Socratic Greeks were at home in their world. Heidegger wants to provide us a vision of a new autochthony which represents a way out of the oblivion-of-being in the age of

[13] Heidegger's concern in his later works is usually not how the *individual* should live in a nihilistic culture, rather he is interested in the possibility of saving the culture as a whole. In the treatment of his notion of *releasement,* however, the individual is considered to be able to attain an openness to a possible change in its understanding of being as well (Dreyfus 1991: 339 f; Heidegger 1969).

technology (Heidegger 1969: 55). This new ground will be attainable to us through a two-sided comportment:

> Releasement towards things and openness to the mystery belong together. They grant us the possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally different way. They promise us a new ground and foundation upon which we can stand and endure in the world of technology without being imperiled by it (ibid.: 55).

The comportment of *openness to the mystery*[14] enables us to keep open to the hidden meaning of technology (ibid.). By using the word "mystery," Heidegger also aims at the characteristic way in which the phenomena of the world at the same time reveal and hide themselves. As we have already seen, this is remarkably obvious in an artwork, which brings man face to face with being and lets him regain a forgotten way of thinking that arises from the origin of thought (Heidegger 2000).

Heraklit's word alchibadie, moving-into-nearness, may provide us with another hint in understanding the ontological turn. Seen in light of Heidegger's genealogical history of nihilism, the ontological turn means to restrain from a "totalitarianism of thought," where technological rationality is *the only way* of relating to the world. Instead, one should allow room for a more primordial mode of world disclosure by recalling ancient Greek practices. As we remember, the ancient Greeks experienced reality by *letting reality open itself* and thereby *being taken into its nearness*. This description reminds one of the characteristic way in which truth happens in aletheia, which requires "letting beings be" in order for them to reveal themselves in the openness of being. There is thus a "letting be" necessary to move into the nearness of things, which is also the original meaning of the term releasement in the German word Gelassenheit. Such an attitude, which is characterized by a certain humbleness, contrasts the attitude of the sovereign subject in the final stage of technology, whose primary ambition it is to control and predict reality.

It becomes clear that the ontological turn in the first instance has to do with a changed *attitude* of both the individual and the collective self. This does not mean that this attitude could not lead to actions and changed conditions. In the following section, we will look closer at possible changes as a consequence of a changed attitude regarding the current conditions in music education described in part two. It further becomes evident that Heidegger's notions of releasement, meditative thinking, openness to the mystery, aletheia, moving-into-nearness, autochthony, humble things and marginal practices are closely intertwined with each other. All of these notions are parts of the ontological turn. When one of them is mentioned, the others resonate together with it.

So what could be the implications of a changed comportment in the context of today's music education? First and foremost, it could mean to move our educational practices into the nearness of music and musical experiences, back to the rootedness in the phenomenon music. The reforms in European education policy, with their demand for evidence, measurability and competencies, as described in part two,

[14] Hansen's approach to existential *Bildung*, built on the pedagogical concept of Wonder, also includes a reflection on the "unsolvable mystery" that life experiences often represent (Hansen 2011: 255).

have contributed to a distancing from the phenomenon music and the musical experience in all its uncontrollability. A renewed focus on the significance of musical experiences in the lives of human beings will be particularly suitable for bringing music education back on track in order to return back to forgotten and marginal practices. A musical experience represents in itself a primordial mode of world disclosure. As we remember, the truth of being "happens" in the artwork (Heidegger 2000). We will return to the musical experience's place in the ontological turn at the end of the chapter. First, we shall try to find out what marginal practices and humble things in the context of music education could mean.

5.4.2 *Marginal Practices and* Humble Things *in Music Education as* Saving Power *Against the Powers of Technical Rationality in the Current Educational Paradigm*

Examples of marginal practices can be practices that were central in the past, such as Christian caring in the early Christian communities, the commitment of romantic chivalry or Greek mentoring of adolescent boys (Dreyfus 1991: 329). In the context of music education, which currently has to find its bearings in the middle of a "trademarked discourse of learning that propagates the ontic," Pio brings up a vision of the establishment of regional cultures or communities of educators and researchers, which through reflection would be able to turn away from the technical rationality and gradually reestablish a new rationale for their subject and their practice (Pio 2012: 302). Out of commitment to the case, and in solidarity, they could work together on problem identification and action plans. Bottom-up oriented and situated types of action research could support such a project. It could be a source for a new authority for teachers and give weight to the ethical responsibility of each teacher to care for "the valuable but fragile community" of the pupils and students who are entrusted to them (ibid.: 302f). This again recalls the ancient Greek mentoring of adolescent boys.

Personal mentoring of students in music teacher education is a practice that is not as highly accounted for by the institutions as lecturing or even publishing. Such mentoring is for example needed in vocal and instrumental tuition, in tuition before and during conducting of choral and instrumental activities, as well as in academic writing processes. The resources given from the institutions for personal mentoring seem to shrink from year to year. Despite this, still some teacher educators choose to give priority to this time-consuming, hidden and often not very personally profitable practice, just because they care for their students' personal and subject-specific needs. Such personal mentoring, either in small groups or individually, could mean more to the students' lives and vocations than the driving forces of the educational reforms at the moment seem to recognize. To recognize the value of student mentoring could, in a Heidegger-perspective, represent a restoration of the notion of "humble things," namely, the *commitment* of chivalry and the *care* from the early Christian communities, and so constitute a living example of the re-establishment of a Heideggerian marginal practice.

Pio's vision of regional communities of educators and researchers also implies that there would be given a forum for reflection on how ontological/existential Bildung concretely could be conducted in music teacher education of late modernity. Such a forum could have a safeguarding function in the current paradigm of the individualized subject's unlimited constructivism, where the slow and unpredictable processes of Bildung attach little importance. The forum could represent a "saving power" against the domineering idea of an unlimited constructivism. It could remind the world of education of an almost forgotten idea: that education also shall prepare the students for *life*, not only conduct utilitarian-minded "catering service" for the working world (ibid.: 290).

5.4.3 Heidegger's Earth *and* Autochthony

The word autochthony stems from the ancient Greek mythology. The Autochthones were those mortals who sprang directly from the soil, who were rooted in and belonged to the land forever.[15] Hence, having gained autochthony could be translated into being "earthborn." With this in mind, the connection to Heidegger's *earth* in his essay *The Origin of the Work of Art* (2011d) is noteworthy. As a counterpart to the notion of *world*, Heidegger in this essay introduces the term earth, which is a self-secluding, enigmatic ground specific to art. The earth, which Heidegger also calls "being as such," consists of a dynamic phenomenological abundance that we can never fully grasp or finally master. A work of art may thus teach us that intelligibility is rooted in this ground and that "we are far from having exhausted the possibilities inherent in intelligibility" (Thomson 2011). It teaches us that "the known rests on the unknown" and the mastered on that which cannot be mastered (ibid.). In Heidegger's thinking, a struggle is taking place between the respectively opening and closing forces of the world and the earth. This conflict between *un-concealment* and *concealment* preserved in a work of art represents for Heidegger the basic structure of intelligibility, and in my reading, it is closely related to the process of truth revealing itself in aletheia (Heidegger 2011a, 2004).

The literary theorist Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht connects Heidegger's strife between earth and world to the tension between the semantic and the non-semantic dimensions of a poem (Gumbrecht 2004: 84). The earth represents the non-semantic, the dimension of our reality that lies beyond language (See even Pio 2012: 302).[16] Thus, Heidegger's notion of the strife between earth and world could function as a basis for a renewal of European educational and aesthetic thinking. Heidegger's idea about the struggle between earth and world in an artwork as the basic structure of intelligibility indicates that art has a unique place among other types of knowledge.

[15] See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autochthon_(ancient_Greece).

[16] This gives associations to Frede V. Nielsen's dividing of the school subject music into its *ars*- and *scientia*–dimensions (Nielsen 1998: 110).

Giving the specific type of knowledge represented by art and music a fundamental place in education means to acknowledge that the known rests on the unknown, and that intelligibility is rooted in the abundant, ambivalent and art-associated earth. This theme could be investigated further, but this will have to wait for another occasion.

5.4.4 Humble Things: Musical Experiences

As already indicated, one of music education's humble things may be a simple and nearly self-evident notion, namely the musical experience. There is indeed a consciousness about the significance of this notion in Norwegian music education, as the current national curriculum guidelines in music provide the musical experience a central place (Kunnskapsdepartementet 2006). However, as the plan is built on the premises of the current educational reforms, with its measurable competencies as steering measures, the musical experience, that resists such measurement, is not in its right element in this plan (Kalsnes 2008). Still, it is necessary to point out the importance of grounding not least music teacher education in the lived world of musical experiences.

In his concept of *Music as a multi-faceted world of lived experience*, the Danish educationalist Frede V. Nielsen describes musical experiences as encounters between human beings and music. According to him, music contains different layers of potential meaning: acoustic, structural, bodily, tensional, emotional and existential. These layers correspond with similar layers in the experiencing persons. The main task of music education is thus to facilitate the communication between human beings and all layers of music (Nielsen 1998). This includes also the innermost, existential layer, which may be called "the inside of music" (Varkøy 2010). In this age dominated by technical rationality, music education tends to stay on the "outside" of music, in the same way as the subject experiencing oblivion-of-being stays on the "outside" of being. Staying at the "outside" of music means that only aspects of music that are manageable, measurable or may be described technically are focused (Pio and Varkøy 2012). This is, for example, what happens when musical Bildung is reduced to mere competencies, or when the notion of practical relevance becomes the greatest good in music teacher education and brings students to stay on the surface of music's potential.

To have musical existential experiences means being touched or "hit in one's innermost being" (Bollnow 1969). It means experiencing the innermost, existential layers, or the "inside" of music, and its power to move and touch deeper layers in humans. Varkøy maintains that musical experiences seem to be particularly suited to make us aware of the frames of our human existence, as mortality, the fragility of relationships, loneliness, vulnerability and dependency – basic conditions of our lives that are beyond our control (Varkøy 2009: 41). We may thereby realize aspects of our lives that we otherwise do not notice and that often evade language. Musical existential experiences thus seem to have the ability of bringing us from the ontic to

the ontological level of existence, from the outside of being into the nearness of being (Varkøy 2010). What is more, they therewith seem to be particularly suited to being a part of an ontological or existential Bildung that prepares for life, not only for the working world (Varkøy 2010).

Turning to the ontological level in today's music teacher education could mean to initiate a "remembrance" of the students' musical experiences, which represents a "ground" on which their identities as music teachers are founded. This would imply facilitating a reflection on how musical experiences have influenced their choice of becoming music teachers. Such reflection is an act of turning back to the basics, reminding music teachers about the existential importance of music for their own lives and for the life of their pupils and students. This could be a step towards an ontological turn in music education and music teacher education, which means turning away from the calculating mindset that, to an increasing extent, invades school life, and instead turning towards a reflective, mindful mode of thought that allows us to be humans, and that allows music to be music.

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Part II
Music and Being

Chapter 6
Body – Music – Being. Making Music as Bodily Being in the World

Lars Oberhaus

Abstract Starting with Husserl (philosophy of consciousness: lifeworld) over Heidegger (fundamental ontology: being-in the-world) to Merleau-Ponty (phenomenology of the body: être au monde), a *radicalization of ontology* can be pointed out because of a consideration of the body as an access to perceive and understand being-in-the-world. Thus, Heidegger's fundamental ontology is an important approach to an embodied phenomenology. While Edmund Husserl's phenomenology is based on an apodictic Ego cogito (transcendental reduction: epoché) that leads to difficulties in the constitution of the others as to their consciousness, Martin Heidegger solves this problem of solipsism in form of a fundamental ontology. Each individual meets the world in the coexistence with others (being-with). This openness of being-in-the-world unlocks the door for music educational prospects. Making music is always a bodily act. Therefore, the concept of aesthetical/musical experience depends no longer on a primacy of perception/listening as many traditional aesthetic theories. *Inter-subjective* and *inter-corporal* dimensions become relevant because the subject is *embodied in and through music*. Music instruments are anchored in the world as an extension of the expressive and engaged body. Making music is an ontological interpretation of the world considering all inner-worldly existing.

Keywords Phenomenology of the body • Music education • Inter-subjective and inter-corporal dimensions, embodiment

6.1 Introduction

In the following, the development of a phenomenology of the body from Edmund Husserl over Martin Heidegger to Maurice Merleau-Ponty and its dimensions for music education will be pointed out. Although Heidegger didn't create a specific

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_6

'body-philosophy', his ideas are very important for this direction of thought, because it works like a 'link' between the philosophy of consciousness (Husserl) and the phenomenology of perception (Merleau-Ponty).[1] The important role of the body for an individual being is also relevant for music education, because music can/should be learned actively and expressively with all senses. From a music educational point of view, aesthetic experiences are bodily experiences, so that sensual perceptions are the ground and basis of learning and making music.

6.2 Two Different Meanings of Body: Körper and Leib

In German the word 'body' has two different meanings: 'Körper' and 'Leib'. They represent two different ways of human being. Körper describes the anatomic and technical side, Leib is close to the word 'Leben' (life) and underlines an individual being.[2] Researchers of phenomenology and anthropology also differentiate between Körper and Leib. Gabriel Marcel speaks about a "corps que j'ai/corps que je suis" (Marcel 1991: 15), which can be translated as 'having a body (Körper)/being a body (Leib)'.[3] Having a body means that it looks like an *object*, which can be controlled or manipulated like a machine. In particularly, modern society has established normed body images, which prescribe how one should look like or move. In contrast, 'being a body' illustrates the unique individuality of a *subject,* which expresses itself in an individual way.

The juxtaposition of Körper and Leib also refers to basic questions of ontology, because the body is undoubtedly like an entity in the outer world. But it is more than just a thing because of its subjectivity. Thus, the body is *a special ontological phenomenon*, because it has an objective existence outside *and* an individual mind inside. These special ontological dimensions of the body were particulary highlighted by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his *Phenomenology of Perception*.[4] He differs between a 'corps propre' and 'corps phenomenal' which recurs to the dualism of Körper and Leib. But for him, it is important to overcome this contradiction of different states of being. Husserl and Heidegger can also be classified in a tradition of body-phenomenology by adopting the Leib and showing its existential dimensions.[5]

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[1] See for example Aho 1969; Levin 1999; Overgaard 2004; Johnson 2010.

[2] From an etymological point of view the word 'Körper' refers to the latin 'corpus' or the Middle High German 'lîch'. 'Leib' comes from the word 'lîp'.

[3] There are many different interpretations of this quote, because the French word 'corps' in German can be translated both as Körper or Leib. Marcel for himself uses the German terminology. Even the question, if 'being' or 'having' belongs to 'Körper' or 'Leib' is discussed differently. The difference between Körper and Leib isn't often translated correctly. In English texts the uniform meaning body is used. See Oberhaus 2006.

[4] See Merleau-Ponty 1962.

[5] In the following the word body always obtains to the phenomenological body (=Leib).

In the following, the body-philosophy of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty with the music educational implications are presented.

6.3 Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology of Consciousness – The Body as a Medium of Intersubjectivity

Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, addressed the body throughout his philosophical life with much of the relevant material to be found in lecture courses, research manuscripts, and book-length texts not published during his lifetime. One of the most important texts – the second volume of his *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* and usually referred to as *Ideas 2 (written 1912–1928; published posthum 1952)* – was particularly influential.[6] Heidegger, for example, had access to it in manuscript before writing his own major work *Being and Time* (1927) and Merleau-Ponty consulted it while working on his *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945). Husserl himself was dissatisfied with the text of the *Ideas 2,* because it was incomplete and had a very complex editorial history. He also presented the main facts in the *Cartesian Meditations* (written 1929, published 1932), in which he precisely develops his theory of embodiment and intersubjectivity.[7]

Husserl's phenomenology is a philosophy of consciousness, which is based on the 'methodic doubt' (Ego cogito) of René Descartes. The main aim is searching for evidence. So sensory perceptions are being questioned, because only the thinking of the Ego gives knowledge. Consequently, an ontology is negated, because perceptions depend on the consciousness and have – from a transcedental point of view – no real existence. Therefore, ontology is a "phenomen of being" and the world is robbed of the "natural believing in existence" (Husserl 1977: 20). Husserl calls this process of‚bracketing' the ontological outside 'epoché' (ἐποχή) and describes it as a transcendental-phenomenological reduction. Setting the world in brackets also applies to sensory perceptions, such as hearing, moving or seeing. Husserl's phenomenology is not an ontology, but 'egology', because the world is constituted by one isolated Ego as "transcendental subjectivity" (Husserl 1977: 18). He also describes the epoché (primordial reduction) as a way to 'bracket' the appearence and experience of the others, because they are also constituted by the consciousness (Ego) and have no real existence. Consequently, they appear as things or machines that are perceived as any other object in the environment. The Ego is alone in the world (solus ipse). This problem of solipsism is a central issue within the theory of Husserl's phenomenology of consciousness, especially with regard to the foundation of an inter-subjective world.

[6] See Husserl 1955.

[7] See Husserl 1977.

Husserl finds a way out of the solipsism in exposition the body in the lifeworld. The Ego also has a physical presence which gives sensations. It is perceived as other natural objects that can be seen and touched, so that it enables a connection to the subjectivity of the 'alter Egos'. The body is not a mere thing that exists in nature, but part of the perceptual experiences of consciousness.

> Among the bodies (Körper) belonging to this 'nature' and included in my peculiar ownness, I then find my animate organism (Leib) as uniquely singled out – namely as the only one of them that is not just a body (Körper) but precisely an animate organism (Leib). (Husserl 1977: 97)[8]

Husserl establishes the body (Leib) as a *medium between internal Ego and external world*. Outer and inner experience are working together on the basis for a single phenomenon. The Ego is no longer included, but finds itself together with the others, who see, feel and hear (inter-subjectivity, inter-corporeality). Due to this possibility of appropriating the world by means of perceptions the body gets individual skills that sets him apart from other objects in the environment. Husserl calls this specific ability of the body to perceive *and* being perceived, 'double sensation' ('Doppelempfindung'). The turn from solipsism to an embodied world is very important for all other conceptions of a phenomenology of the body and includes a specific understanding of ontology. For Husserl, the body is not an extended physical substance in contrast to a non-extended mind, but a locus of distinctive sorts of sensations that can only be felt firsthand by the embodied experience concerned. And a coherent system of movement possibilities allows us to experience every moment of our situated, practical-perceptual life as pointing to more than our current perspective affords.

6.4 Music Learning as Reception and Cognition – The Body as Music-Machine

Husserls starting point from the apodictic Ego cogito, which causes a dualism between thinking and world, can be transferred to learning theory considerations. Thus, learning is often seen as an internal cognitive process, so that affective and sensory dimensions of learning are devalued. From a perspective of musicpedagogy, such forms of teaching and learning are based on rational explorations, such as analysis of musical works and aural training. The approach is mainly cognitive as it is grounded on the reflection of music. Bodily expressions and perceptions have no relevance.

[8] "Unter den eigentlich gefassten Körpern dieser Natur finde ich dann in einziger Auszeichnung meinen Leib, nämlich als den einzigen, der nicht bloß Körper ist, sondern eben Leib, als das einzige Objekt innerhalb meiner abstraktiven Weltschicht, dem ich erfahrungsgemäß Empfindungsfelder zurechne, […], das einzige 'in' dem ich unmittelbar 'schalte und walte', und insonderheit walte in jedem seiner 'Organe' (Husserl 1995: 99).

Furthermore, a solipsism arises in music lessons, because there is no freedom expressing music in an individual way. The others are like machines, because the body is like an empty vessel, where one can put in the subject matter. From the perspective of the Ego cogito all the others, such as pupils, students and teachers, appear as functional things and their instruments are mechanically used objects. This scenario of an alienated world changes, when the others express themselves over their body and demonstrate indiviual exprerience. This is where the 'double sensation' of the body as appearing object and perceiving subject becomes evident. Therefore, Husserl's exposition of the two sides of the body as the outer and inner experience is *essential for all creative and intersubjective musical experience in general, if music is a productive and receptive process at the same time*. Music is not just the objective presence of musicians and the accurate reproduction of sheet music, but a diversity of expressive and perceptive musical experiences, moods and emotions, which constitute the intersubjective lifeworld.

6.5 Martin Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology – Embodied Music as Being-in-the-World

Heidegger dedicated his magnus opus *Being and Time* to his teacher and mentor Edmund Husserl.[9] This tribute includes a connection to the phenomenological tradition, but can also be understood as a critical distance from central premises, such as the transcendental philosophical approach. Heidegger's starting point is not an apodictic Ego cogito, but the already present factual world and other subjects in their being-with ('Mit-Sein'). The world is there (ontical) and has to be discovered (ontological) with its existentialia. This radical critique of metaphysics and the turn to facticity of the world opens up the whole range of experiences in-the-world.

It has often been criticized that Heidegger refuses to discuss the body. How is it possible, that he "sets out to underscore precisely that human being are in-the-world, […] – and then he refuses not to discuss the phenomenon of human corporeality" (Overgaard 2004: 116).[10] Against this criticism, it can be said, that Heidegger himself states shortly in *being and time*, that corporeity of the Dasein "contains a problematic of its own, not to be dealt with here" (ibid.: 108). But on close reading, it is clear, that the body as a medium of perception and orientation is always part of being-in-the-world.[11] Besides, in his early philosophy Heidegger gives some references, which suggest that embodiment plays an important role in the analytic of the Dasein. For

[9] See Heidegger 1962.

[10] Even Kevin Aho states that Heidegger fails to discuss 'the body' in *Being and Time,* which has generated a cottage industry of criticism. He shows parallels between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Aho argues, that Heidegger's neglect of the body affects his early project of fundamental ontology. Any analysis of the body is 'ontic' or regional and is made possible only on the basis of Dasein. See Aho 1969 and Heidegger 2001.

[11] See Levin 1999; Overgaard 2004.

example, in his last Marburg lecture *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* Heidegger states: "Dasein is thrown, factical, through its corporeality in the midst of nature" (Heidegger 1984: 212). The facticity of the world is bounded to the facticity of being (Dasein) with all existential-bodily dimensions. For Heidegger "the body (Leib) is not only nature, but always integrated into the basic constitution of human existence, with all its possibilities of understanding, behavior, etc." (Thomas 1996: 95).[12] This inseperable relation of body and being is grounded in the being-in ('In-Sein'). It's not just there, like an object in space: Dasein is always bounded in bodily motions, discovering the enviroment.

This also regards the contact with the 'equipment' ('Zeug'), which is at first present-at-hand ('Vorhanden-Sein'). But using it bodily in an individual way it gets ready-at-hand ('Zuhanden-Sein'). Handling with the equipment means to get in respect with things, like an ability, acting with it in an personal way. Moreover, every work, which appears in the world, makes clear that the body as part of the Dasein is present. In this context Heidegger explicitly uses the word 'Leib':

> The work produced refers not only to the what-for its usability and the whereof which it consists. The simple conditions of craft contain a reference to the wearer and user at the same time. The work is cut to his figure (auf dem Leib geschrieben); he 'is' there as the work emerges. (Heidegger 1962: 66)[13]

The equipment also refers to those, who use it. The boat anchored at the shore refers in its 'being-in-itself' to an acquaintance who undertakes his voyages with it, but as a 'boat strange to us', it also points to others. Heidegger thus avoids the problem of solipsism by connecting the others and the world. He extends Husserl's understanding of intersubjectivity to existential dimensions, because the others are always bodily there.

Mainly the language is an expression of being-in-the-world. In the explicit listening to speech of the others, the Dasein understands 'what is said'. This understanding comes neither from a lot of talking nor from busy listening around. Understanding means listening carefully, also to the silence.

> In talking with one another the person who is silent can 'let something to be understood', that is, he can develop an understanding more authentically than the person who never runs out of words. […] But to keep silent does not mean to be dumb (ibid.: 154).[14]

For Heidegger hearing is more than a sum of sounds, because it's the existential being-open of the Dasein as being-with for others.

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[12] "der Leib nie bloß Natur, sondern stets eingebunden in die Grundverfassung des menschlichen Existierens, mit allen ihren Möglichkeiten des Verstehens, Verhaltens, usw." (Thomas 1996: 95). See also Johnson 2010.

[13] "Das hergestellte Werk verweist nicht nur auf das Wozu seiner Verwendbarkeit und das Woraus seines Bestehens, in einfachen handwerklichen Zuständen liegt in ihm zugleich die Verweisung auf den Träger und Benutzer. Das Werk wird ihm auf den Leib geschnitten, er" ist "im Entstehen des Werkes mit dabei" (Heidegger 1993, 70). The English translation uses the word "figure" to translate "Leib"; see also page 111.

[14] "Wer im Miteinanderreden schweigt, kann eigentlicher 'zu verstehen' geben. […] Schweigen heißt nicht stumm zu sein". (Heidegger 1993: 164).

> Hearing even constitutes the primary and authentic openness of Dasein for its ownmost possibility of being, as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every a-Sein carries with it. Dasein hears because it understands (ibid.: 153).[15]

The speech is part of the body, because the mouth produces the sounds and forms sentences. Even the ear is a bodily condition of the perception, that leads to the understanding of the others in "listening to each another" ('aufeinander-hören'). To describe the process of listening to someone/something, Heidegger chooses symbolic formulations that come from the corporeality (follow, gone with, turn away). The voice is an ontological sign of belonging to the world. Thus, Heidegger shifts language and understanding as a kind of bodily act.

6.6 Music Instruments Ready-to-Hand, Interactions as Listening und Being Listened To

From a music-pedagogical point of view the facticity of the world is very important, in which music is a fundamental part of the world. Music can be seen, touched and listened to. In the environment music-instruments are at first present-at-hand, but by using them individually with the expression of the body, they become ready-at-hand. Therefore, making music is being-with-instuments and checking the possibilities of having aesthetic experience with them. Making music, in an Heideggerian ontological way, means to keep in touch with the world and its sounds.[16] The environment offers a full range of music experiences that has to be explored. The openness of the world and the openness of music leads to a paradigm of contemporary classical music, so that everything is music, even the silence. Here is the relevance for music education making musical experiments with objects and testing their sond characteristics. It is important to listen carefully to the environment. *Therefore, the body is the primary medium for approaching aesthetical things and exploring the environment with its experiences. It's a central role of music education to develop a different perception of music and use the expressivity of the body to express oneself.*[17] Moreover, music instruments provide opportunities and resources for action. There are no rules or skills according to which one should play. It is more important to be together with instruments, because they are direct extensions of the expression of the body. Especially singing and listening are not only functional conditions of the body, for they are always linked to others in the world.

Heidegger's world is not a silent world full of unknown sounds. They have their own story, because the sounds refer to the others, who have produced them. It is crucial that making music no longer means using instruments as efficient machines.

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[15] "Das Hören konstituiert sogar die primäre und eigentliche Offenheit des Daseins für sein eigenstes Seinkönnen, als Hören der Stimme des Freundes, den jedes Dasein bei sich trägt. Das Dasein hört, weil es versteht" (Heidegger 1993: 163).

[16] See Ingarden 1962 and Heidegger 2008.

[17] See Heidegger's critique of technology in Heidegger 1963.

Making music with others belongs to the facticity of the world. So music education is a form of encounter ("Begegnung") with different subjects in a common world. The Dasein is in the 'with-world' and opens up a variety of ways interacting with and making music together.

6.7 Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception – Embodied Being

Unlike Husserl, but like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty looks beyond the subject-object dualism to get insight into the concrete structures of worldly experience.[18] But whereas Heidegger does little more than mention the problem of embodiment in passing, Merleau-Ponty bases his entire phenomenological project on an account of bodily intentionality. In the *Phenomenology of Perception* he describes the body (Leib) as a fundamental foundation of human existence. Like Heidegger he starts with the "facticity of the world" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: xiv), in which the subject acts and perceives. But he goes one step further and understands perception in-the-world as a bodily source of insight: "The world is what we perceive" (ibid.: xvi). Thus, the body is a medium of all experiences in the world. For Heidegger the body is a hidden condition of being-in-the-world, for Merleau-Ponty it's the fact of being:

> It is a fact that I believe myself to be first of all surrounded by my body, involved in the world, situated here and now (ibid.: 37).

To describe this fundamental bodily being in the world, Merleau-Ponty originally uses the term 'être au monde', which is very near to Heidegger's being-in-the-world. The English translation even uses the word being-in-the-world, although it would be better to speak about being-to-the-world, because the body is intentionally moved to the world with its perception and all sensations. Like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty also describes being-to-the-world as a sort of dwelling.[19] It's important that the body gets the status of a subject, which lives in the objective world with all perceptions. The dualism of Ego and world, ontology and metaphysic or res extensa and res cogitans is cancelled in support of an integration (chiasma) of body and world. Thus, the body stands *between* subject and object, ambiguously existing as unity. Merleau-Ponty uses the double sensation of Husserl and the being-in-the-world of Heidegger to denote the body as one phenomen with two sides: objective and subjective at the same time.

> Saying that I have a body is thus a way of saying that I can be seen as an object and that I try to be seen as a subject (ibid.: 167).[20]

[18] See Merleau-Ponty 1962.

[19] See ibid.: 7, Heidegger 1993: 17ff.; Merleau-Ponty uses some terms in German to show the resemblance to Husserl and Heidegger. See Heidegger 1993.

[20] See also Sartre 2001.

Merleau-Ponty creates a direct intentionality of the body and expands the awareness of 'I think' towards 'I can'. The subject is engaged with the world and feels with all sensations. The perception is bound to a bodily being and with that the action has an aesthetical foundation. Art is mirroring the experiences in the lifeworld over the body and its sensory experience. These experiences are tranformed into music, painting or movement. Therefore understanding is grounded and anchored in behaviour.

> To understand is to experience the harmony between what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the performance – and the body is our anchorage in a world (ibid.: 144).[21]

On the basis of an organist, Merleau-Ponty illustrates, how playing an instrument doesn't only depend on a special thinking or knowledge, but in the habit and routine of the body as a part of the environment. The musician has a perturbed perception of his body, which enables a relation between body and instrument.

> Between the musical essence of the piece as it is shown in the score and the notes which actually sound round the organ, so direct a relation is established that the organist's body and his instrument are merely the medium of this relationship. Henceforth the music exists by itself and through it all the rest exists (ibid.: 145)

So, the organist has the ability of playing on every organ, which provides the same propositions, so that the body can use its expressivity directly. Body, instrument and world establish a relation as a part of community.

6.8 Embodied Music as Being-to-the-World

For music educational prospects Merleau-Ponty's accentuation of the body as being-in-the-world shows that music experiences first of all *are* bodily experiences. The body is the condition for making aesthetic experience by all senses. In that case, music education can be understood as a special form of *radical practice*. Making music is *expressing oneself in and through the body.* Sounds are related to movements and feelings. Expression and impression are equally original and form an indissoluble unity with others. The exposition of the body requires an all-encompasing holistic approach, in which music is taught and learned with all senses. This implies that the body especially in the field of music education is more than an object that performs mechanical movements (Körper). Rather, spontaneous and expressive actions are necessary, which lead to an expression of the musicians. Specifically, this means an appreciation of bodily learning in which the others can expressed themselves through music, such as dancing or dramatic acting. Making music and listening to music is an act of being-to-the-world, because of a 'body-speach' telling others and understand themselves there. The ambiguity of the body shows that music education should not devide between theory and practice or reception and action. Any kind of 'knowledge' is always bound with a bodily ability.

[21] Merleau-Ponty underlines that the body understands (!) movements.

6.9 Conclusion – Learning Music with the Body

Generally, the described concepts of the phenomenology of a body lead to the criticism of a desensualized school-system. There is a loss of learning with the body because of too many behavioral rules and rational instructions.[22] Instead of these control mechanisms the children need more freedom for integrated learning with all senses and body-consciousness. These educational claims have also rudimentarily been transferred into music education. Joachim Th. Geiger criticizes that playing instruments is technically without expression. The musician is like a conditioned body-machine. The aim is having experiences with the body while making music.[23] Ursula Fritsch also criticizes, that learning with the body has no place in the realm of aesthetic learning. She claims that students express their feelings in dancing.[24] These demands stop in the end of the 1990s and a concrete reference to the role of the body ("Leib") in the contemporary music education is still missing.

The development of the phenomenology of embodiment and the music educational aims can be shown in form of a graph. Here Heidegger's role as a 'link' between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, is recognizable. The positions of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are bounded to music educational claims, showing that an increasing focus on the body as a medium of expression is needed, which establishes an expressive intersubjective musical world.

Topic	Husserl	Heidegger	Merleau-Ponty
Ontology	Intentionality, constitution of the outer world, epoché = philosophy of consciousness	Being-in-the world; Dasein	Being-to-the world; intentionality of the body
The others	Solipsism	Being-with; the one	Embodiment; inter-corporeality
Conception	Philosophy of consciousness	Existential ontology	Phenomenology of perception;
Embodiment	Constitution of the other; double sensation	Embodied Dasein, equipment and the body (being-with), ready-at-hand, speech/listening as part of the body	Ambiguity: body as subject and object
Music education	Reception of music vs. production of music; problem: body as music machines	Listening-to-the world, sounding of the world, speech as sound; making music as bodily activity; instruments ready at hand	Bodily expressivity of music

[22] Rumpf refers to the research of Frederik F. J. Buytendijk, Erwin Straus und Hermann Schmitz. See Rumpf 1981: 67; Buytendijk 1953; Straus 1978; Carman 1978; Shusterman 2008.

[23] "Erleben des musizierenden Körpers als Erkenntnisinstrument für sämtliche Spielvorgänge" gefordert.

[24] See Fritsch 1992.

While Husserl's philosophy is still based on the constitution of Egos, Heidegger shows the factual being of the body in-the-world. Merleau-Ponty then unfolds the body as being-to-the-world with all the bound enforcement and recognition opportunities. In Heidegger's phenomenology the body is subliminally hidden and indirectly present. The facticity of bodily being allows an escape from the philosophy of consciousness and refers to a bodily grounded withworld in the sense of Merleau-Ponty. All three body positions expose a specific understanding of ontology. The body is as well subject and object, available and unaivailable, visible and invisible. Due to the equiprimordiality of acts of thought (noesis) and intentional objects of thought (noema) the mind-body dualism and the resulting solipsism does not exist.[25] The body is a permanent experience, a constituent of the perceptual openness to the world. The *primacy of perception* signifies a *primacy of experience.* "Perception is nothing that happens to us, or in us. It is something that we do" (Noë 2004: 1).

From an educational perspective, this means a *fundamental appreciation of all music-related activities, in which the subject can express itself*. In a radical way, the dualism of learning with the body or with the mind is overcome by learning music as part of the body itself. This perspective is also relevant for the embodied *musical* practice. The basic assumption points out that musical perception is a way of musical action. Sensory perception always enables music based actions such as music performances. The human body stands in direct relation to all musical activities and musical perception. It is a natural mediator between mind and physical environment. Meanings to music are given through movement. Embodied music practice also has consequences how to teach music. If students are fundamentally embodied in the musical praxis, it is important to arrange music learning, which should be expressive and body-orientated. It concentrates on aesthetic single and collective motions and their emotions. Therefore, music teaching is communicating with the body. It is something we enact or achieve as a way of musical experience. Music teaching doesn't have to form functional body-skills, but a vitality, variety and openness of musical motions. Playing music, dancing and singing articulate the individuality of the human body and its expressiveness. It is bodily grounded and a way to cultivate the aesthetic appreciation. Individual expressiveness of the body shows an understanding of the movements.[26]

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[25] See Husserl 1995.

[26] See Varela et al. 1991.

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Chapter 7
Music as Art – Art as Being – Being as Music. A Philosophical Investigation into How Music Education Can Embrace a Work of Art Based on Heidegger's Thinking

Susanna Leijonhufvud and Cecilia Ferm Thorgersen

Abstract Martin Heidegger claims that a Work of Art contains an intrinsic power to open the space of Being. If a Work of Art can be a musical Work of Art, then music possesses the power to strike us and hence throw us into Being. The chapter communicates an investigation of the philosophical thinking in Heidegger's book *The Origin of the Work of Art* and what consequences that thinking could generate for music educational practice. The chapter presents an examination of Heidegger's thinking in relation to the new Swedish syllabus for the subject music. To structure the philosophical investigation two lines were drawn; one investigating Art as an opener to Being and the other line investigating the inescapable nexus of how the Artist makes the Work of Art simultaneously as the Work of Art makes the Artist. The results show that there is an overrepresentation of phenomena connected to what Heidegger refers to as Earth and an underrepresentation of what he refers to as World. According to Heidegger, the phenomenon of art will not reveal itself unless both Earth and World are present, connected to each other through *strife*; a state of tension where *Being* comes forth. Being, in the Heideggerian sense, has the power to change history and hence constitute history on both a collective and an individual level. Although not explicitly stated in the music syllabus, our results suggest that there are possibilities for art as Being to be expressed in the subject of music.

Keywords Music • Art • Being • Music education • Syllabus

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_7

7.1 Introduction

Music is considered to be an art form. Art may therefore be expressed in music.[1] Music in this sense is regarded as a phenomenon of music. After an introduction to Martin Heidegger's conception of the phenomenon of Art some years ago, we questioned whether we could find space for this Artness within the phenomenon of music as it is presented as a subject in schools. Our point of departure for this investigation was the Swedish music syllabus from 2011. This chapter will present the philosophical thinking in Heidegger's book *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* and examine the possibilities it may generate for music educational practice. As Heidegger attempts to capture truth within the phenomenon of Art, he investigates the essences of Art as well as Being. In this thinking and analysis, we introduce yet another part in the process of the Origin of the Work of Art within an educational practice: the educator.

As educators in music, we inhabit a field which, from time to time, is preoccupied with Art; the bringing forth of the Artist as well as the Artwork. As Heidegger begins to contemplate a work of art as a phenomenon, he recognises both the artist's making of the artwork and the artwork's making of the artist[2] (cf. Benson 2003). This inescapable nexus of Art has captured our attention. What are the possible spaces provided in educational practice for such an origin? Since there is a multitude of different parameters for orchestrating educational practice, we have limited this investigation to a content analysis of the syllabus, leaving other pre-requirements, such as classroom environment, teacher education and professionalism, pupil prerequisites, motivations for teaching, as well as learning, outside the scope of this analysis.

This chapter will focus on Heidegger's discussion of the artwork, as it can exist within the phenomenon of music. Heidegger's examples of art in painting, architecture, poetry, and musical composition are therefore extended with examples from a music educational practice. How can we relate to Music as an Artwork with the same distinctions as Heidegger presents to us, by looking upon an Artwork as a Thing as well as a Tool but also as Art? The aspect of Art may occur and exist within space that constitutes the "in-between" or "the gap", between the concepts of Earth and World which, according to Heidegger, is the space for Being and, in that sense, Art is seen as making of history.

The analysis in this chapter will lead us to question how educators can or should be aware of the origin of the artist, the origin of the artwork and, most crucially, the origin of Art itself when teaching. Whilst acknowledging regulations within the

[1] In this article, the word Art should be read as a shortening of a work of art and not as the school subject Art, which, in the Swedish curricula, includes pictures and the creation of images as well as the gaining of experience from film, photos, design, art, architecture and various environments (Skolverket 2011b).

[2] In Lines's work (2005) we notice a focus on the artist's making of the art. Little consideration is given to the opposite formulation. We claim that the opposite way is just as important for the music educator if we are to follow Heidegger's understanding of the Origin of the Work of Art.

syllabus, we ask what pedagogical questions could be awoken in music educational practice in order to recognise Art. And, most importantly, if Art is to originate and exist within music educational practice, we ask how questions of pedagogy can be formulated regarding the educator and the educational practice as an inevitable part of the origin of Art.

This chapter will further describe Heidegger's view of the phenomenon of Art and how Art originates. In the description, the three dimensions of Art are presented: the thingness, the toolness and the artness. We follow this with a presentation of Being as something crucial and only present in the so called strife (Streit) between Earth and World. We then continue to provide a brief outline of the Swedish syllabus of music from 2011. After this, we present the results of our analysis before closing with some pedagogical questions that we consider relevant to the field of music education.

7.1.1 Linguistic Considerations

This chapter is based on the Swedish translation of *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (2005). However, when words, concepts, text fragments and sentences are quoted, these are taken from the German Reclam edition (1960). English translations are taken from Heidegger's *The Holzwege*; *Off the Beaten Track,* translated by Young and Haynes in 2002. Throughout the chapter, the German word *Kunstwerk* is translated as *Artwork* and *Kunst* is translated as *Art*. Although the term *art* in English originally refers to paintings, in this paper, it should be understood in the wider sense of the German concept of *Kunst. Werk* is translated as *work*, but it is used as a noun (and not a verb) in order to capture the notion of "achievement" and "creation" involved.[3] The use of original documents is also applied in the analysis of the Swedish syllabus *Läroplanen för grundskolan*, *Lgr11* (Skolverket 2011a). Quotations are presented as they appear in the official English document (Skolverket 2011b), unless the quotation is marked with "our translation".

The German word *Kunst* – in Swedish "konst" and in English "Art" – originally means knowledge, knowing and insight.[4] Considering this original meaning, it is no surprise that *Der Ursprung das Kunstwerke* is a book about truth where the Artwork marks the knowledge itself. Heidegger's profound doxa is that the very origin of such a phenomenon must be the origin of the truth (Wahrheit) per se.[5]

[3] Lines (2003) is preoccupied with considering the term "work" as a verb, since he stresses the technical part of an artwork. Young does the same when he derives meaning out of the English word artwork and how the "work" in the artwork must work (Young 2001: 51).

[4] It was not until after 1800 that the concept of Art acquired the meaning it has today; Art as in artistic and artwork.

[5] The whole idea of and focus on "origin" most likely derives from Heidegger's catholic studies (Ott 1991).

Our investigation, which is guided by Heidegger's *Der Ursprung das Kunstwerkes*, does not claim to present or complete the main task in the book – namely, to investigate the essence of truth mentioned above – or to overcome the question of aesthetics or to show how the reducing of Art to an art experience finally entails the death of Art. Instead, we aim to follow the description of the general essence of Art and how or where it may be presented in an educational framework. The English concept of "fine arts" is not applied in this text, even though the adjective "fine" can be regarded as something that points towards purity and authenticity and something that, to a certain extent would, fit Heidegger's thinking of an Artwork as something extraordinary.

Kunst, in Swedish "konst", is etymologically connected to the Swedish word "konstig" (Hellquist 1922/1957: 494), in English, "artificial", "odd", "weird", "peculiar", or "out of the ordinary". The latter translation is a rather mind-provoking description of what an Artwork is or might be. If an Artwork is something out of the ordinary, it must first of all be rare. Art, as we shall discover, is connected to the very constitution of history. History is rare; history is kairos[6] and should in this sense be understood as Truth, as Origin, as Being (Ott 1991: 26). Therefore, true Art cannot be common in any sense. It may only exist occasionally, perhaps even most unexpectedly. Heidegger writes: "In proximity to the work we were suddenly somewhere other than we are usually accustomed to be" (2002: 15).[7] Secondly, an Artwork can never be anything natural, created by nature. It must be "konstgjord" (Swedish), in German *künstlich,* and in English *artificial*.[8] Heidegger exemplifies "Nature" as rivers, rocks or mountains. In using C.F. Meyer's poem *Der römische Brunnen* (2002: 17; 1960: 32), Heidegger presents an example of how a fountain, through an artificial transformation to a poem, becomes Art. The fountain itself is not to be regarded as Art; however, the artistic poetic exposure of the very same fountain is indeed Art. Therefore, Art is a phenomenon separated from nature. Additionally, we can conclude that, in order for *Kunst* to be *Kunst*, it must be *Künstlich,* rare and out of the ordinary. Heidegger reflects upon the situation in which, in the presence of the artwork, we find ourselves somewhere else than usual. Hence the artwork contains an intrinsic power to move us to something else, something or somewhere out of the ordinary. It is in this moment of time and space we find ourselves thrown into Being.

[6] Kairos time is an ancient Greek word and stands for the experience of time with a qualitative nature. Compare kairos to the time of chronos, which is the sequential time that, in contrast to the time of kairos, can be measured by quantitative means. History should not be regarded as a sequence of time, rather it should be understood as the moments of time when history is created through Art (2002: 49).

[7] "In der Nähe des Werkes sind wir jäh anderswo gewesen, als wir gewöhnlich zu sein pflegen." (1960: 29).

[8] The Swedish word "konstgjord", artificial, consists of "konst", in English "art", and "gjord" which means "made".

7.2 The Three Dimensions of Art: Thingness, Toolness and Artness

Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes starts with a most profound sentence: "Ursprung bedeutet hier jenes, von woher und wodurch eine Sache ist, was sie ist und wie sie ist" (1960: 7). According to this statement, if we locate *the origin* of the Art, we also find Art itself. The origin may then be found in the very creation of Art. This Art is created in a double sense: "The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist" and Heidegger continues, "Neither is without the other." (2002: 1).[9] In claiming this, Heidegger highlights a very important idea. As educators, we might concentrate fully on the artist in order for the artist to produce art. However, according to Heidegger, we should also pay attention to the artwork's ability to form the artist. Mozart would not be Mozart unless the musical pieces of Mozart had created Mozart to be – Mozart. So, in order for the educator to be a part of the originating process of Art, the educator may have to reconsider her or his interference with the artist as well as the artwork. The educator may be responsible for providing Artwork to encourage the origin of the artist, as well as materials, skills and techniques to encourage the origin of the artwork.[10]

After this introductory statement, Heidegger embarks on an extensive task to describe the different extensions and dimensions of the phenomenon of the Artwork. According to Heidegger, the phenomenon per se consists of three different dimensions: thingness, toolness and, perhaps most significantly, artness. The first dimension is the thingness. Viewing the phenomenon of Art from this perspective, the Artwork can be considered as a thing. Heidegger exemplifies this with a reference to Beethoven's string quartets (presumably considered as an Artwork). These scores – pieces of paper with symbols written on them – lie on a shelf in the storage room of the publishing company, in the same way as a sack of potatoes lies in the cellar (2002: 10). In music education, our examples of things could be the instruments, musical scores, mp3 files or records. This is not to reduce an Artwork to a thing; it is simply to describe one dimension of the Artwork, the thingness dimension. We might interact with a thing by touching it, seeing it or by hearing it. We might come across or be acquainted with a phenomenon by using its name. In this way, the thingness is clearly defined and built on a materialistic essence, even if this consists in sound (in the verbalised expression of a name). Heidegger goes as far as presenting God with a dimension of thingness, since God has a name – *God* (2002: 4). Heidegger has some difficulties in naming a human a thing. However, given

[9] "Der Künstler ist der Ursprung des Werkes. Das Werk ist der Ursprung des Künstlers" and Heidegger continues "Keines ist ohne das andere." (1960: 7).

[10] This might be the most crucial setting for an educational practice. An attempt towards a creation of an artwork; in poetry the words might be unable to speak to us, the colours in a painting might not glitter or in our example of a musical practice, the tones might be unable to carry the tune beyond the sounds (cf. "Das gilt in gewisser Weise nur dort, wo das Werk mißlingt", 1960: 44).

Heidegger's explanations, a human consists of a thingness dimension – the name *human* as well as the human corpus.

Heidegger's analysis of thingness is followed by a description of the toolness of the phenomenon of the Artwork. In some respects, toolness may be more difficult to experience, since its general essence is "to disappear". The toolness of a phenomenon is described as the disappearance of its thingness. Heidegger gives several examples in order to understand this explanation of disappearance. The hammer, for example, shows an obvious thingness, especially if we hit our thumb while using it, or if we accidentally drop it onto our toes. But, whilst using the hammer as a hammer, it shifts from a thing to a tool. At this point, we can recognise a striking similarity in the context of music. While learning to play an instrument, we might experience great difficulties managing the body of the instrument and the technique to master the instrument. However, as we become increasingly acquainted with the instrument and we learn how to play, the musical instrument becomes truly instrumental – instrumental for music. Let us remain with this example for a while and look closer at the phenomenon of technique. One might consider technique as a phenomenon that only possesses the dimension of toolness or assume that technique is toolness per se. However, this is not always the case. We can all recognise the situation in which the musician performs musical technique instead of performing music. In such a situation, technique is seen as a thing rather than a tool to perform something else. In both of these examples, the thingness of the instrument or the thingness of the technique must disappear in order to reveal the toolness.

Art is something more than a thing or a tool. Art is a phenomenon that possesses artness. This artness is something remarkable. In the introduction, we mentioned the example of *Der römische Brunnen*, in which the poetic creation of the fountain brought a special artness to the fountain that the fountain itself did not have the potential to originate (2002: 17). Heidegger provides us with several examples of this. His most famous example is van Gogh's painting *A pair of Shoes.* This painting is considered to be a piece of Artwork since it opens up to a world – the farmer's world – and an essence of artness that not even the shoes themselves would achieve. The *Artwork* of a pair of shoes can never be reduced to a *work of art*. A work of art only comprises canvas, brush strokes and marks of paint: a work of art only becomes Art if it reveals an additional dimension, an artness (Steiner 1994: 65). The same thinking would apply to Debussy's *La Mer* which opens a world to the essence of the sea that not even the sea itself might have the power to do (cf. Braver 2009).

7.3 The Origin of the Work of Art: The Strife Between Earth and World

Heidegger's conclusion is that Art itself has the power to open up to a dimension that transcends the thingness of the Artwork as a thing as well as the toolness of the Artwork as a tool. This transcendence is the artness of Art. Let us briefly examine this conclusion from a different perspective. When we meet Art, we are struck. We

can, in a kairos of time,[11] be somewhere else; we can be in Being. In this respect, the artness of Art is comparable to the time space of Being. In fact, Heidegger draws parallels between Art, Being and Truth in this matter. The space of Being is a crack between two different dimensions – the Earth (Erde) and the World (Welt). The Strife (Streit) is the space in which it is impossible to determine whether it is all about Earth or all about World. There is no possibility to determine whether the phenomenon in question, music as Art, originates from Earth or World. The Strife is a type of 'no man's land', like the field of tension between two magnetic poles. The Earth is Heidegger's answer to the Greek concept of *fysis*. The World, on the other hand, is the experienced but untouchable and unseen world. The World is the World of beliefs and faiths and the constituting phenomenon that creates the history of life (2002: 23).[12]

The term "world" is used frequently within the Heideggerian context. It appears in the "life-*world*" (Lebenswelt) as well as in the "Being-in-the-*world*" (our italic).[13] For the philosophical followers of Heidegger, the introduction of the concept Earth (Erde) was puzzling and provoking (Lines 2005: 100). When the concept of world is used in this chapter it should always be understood as one of the words in the pair Earth – World.

Heidegger provides several examples in order to bring these abstract ideas of Earth and World into existence. The earthly rock may reveal an earthly sculpture that opens up the world as the world at the same time opens up for the sculpture to reveal the rock. Gadamer illustrates how musical tones are needed to make music, but how, at the same time; the music reveals these tones (1960: 106). Heidegger describes this event as follows: "World and earth are essentially different and yet never separated from one another. World is grounded on earth, and earth rises up through world" (2002: 26).[14] This presentation describes the necessity of the Earth and the World and the inevitability of having them both present in order for them to shine through, through each other, into their existence. At first, it might seem somewhat contradictory and tautological to claim that they need to be in existence in order to exist. This double nature of earth revealing the world and the world enhancing the earth is not describable; it is only exemplified as *strife*. Strife is the space of tension in which you cannot establish whether the Artwork belongs from the Earth or the World.

[11] According to Heidegger, truth, Being and history all connect in the time of kairos (Ott 1991: 26).

[12] When Heidegger uses the term world, this is a term that stands for the beliefs and the history of a people. For instance, Heidegger makes a clear difference between the Greek world and the Roman world. To read and use a word from respective language, one needs to be able to capture their whole world of thinking in order to truly understand and comprehend the word in question (Heidegger 1960; Young 2001).

[13] The concept of lifeworld is a Heideggerian development from Husserl's concept of *Lebenswelt* (Husserl 2004). The "Being-in-the-*world*" is a central consequence of Heidegger's thinking of Being which is his theme overall in *Sein und Zeit* (Heidegger 2004).

[14] "Welt und Erde sind wesenhaft von einander verschieden und doch niemals getrennt. Die Welt gründet sich auf die Erde, und Erde durchragt Welt." (1960: 44–45).

Heidegger attempts to describe an Artwork with a characteristic artness dimension. In doing so, he emphasises the very essence of Art. If the Artwork itself originated in the experience of the beholder, then the Artwork would be nothing in itself; it would not possess any dimension of artness. Artness would instead be displaced in an "experience of the Art" and not the Artness of the Artwork itself. Such placement of Artness would reduce Artwork to an "experience of the Artwork". Heidegger claims that such a development only leads to the vanishing, and eventually the death, of Art as such (Heidegger 2004; Steiner 1994). Following this line of reasoning, one could hesitate to touch upon the concept of experience, since, used carelessly, art as experience could apply to the very death of Art. However, this is not the case for the phenomenon of experience as such. When we talk about experience, we presume that there are no such things as experiences *and* phenomena; there are only experiences *of* phenomena. Therefore, at this point, we suggest a clarification of the concept *experience*. We agree with Heidegger about the risk of reducing Art into an art-experience. However, even though Art might be an experience, an experience of Being might not necessarily be an experience of Art. This is an important shift in focus and understanding. Art provides experience of Being – an ontological awareness. If Art is to exist as a musical piece of Art, then a musical experience is thus regarded as an existential experience (Pio and Varkøy 2012).

Experiences as strong experiences related to music in music educational settings have been studied by Finnish-Swedish Johanna Ray 2004.[15] Even though her findings show that only 2 % of strong musical experiences were located in a school context – mostly in the school hall, public concert halls, and so on – the results demonstrate important qualitative aspects, such as when the pupils transcends boundaries in ontological awareness or existential experiences. Ray's finding also show that strong musical experiences (SEMs) are personally significant experiences "loaded" with meaning, and that these experiences may result in a deepened understanding of "feeling", not only for music, but also for "oneself and life in general" (2004: 310). For the purpose of our analysis, it is also interesting to note that Ray's findings demonstrate that strong experiences related to music

> [do] not occur on the curriculum level; however the analyse revealed a number of interesting "openings" which are illustrated. Even though all teachers displayed a fundamentally positive attitude towards the idea of regarding SEM as a feature of formal musical learning, it became clear that many teachers never had approached this theme from a pedagogical point of view before (Ray 2004: 287).

It is interesting to note that Ray has not found any signs of strong musical experiences on the curriculum level. One aim of this article is to articulate pedagogical questions that can be used in order to influence the teacher's approach towards music education with a focus on the curriculum and make Art experience possible within the music educational context.

[15] The doctoral work of Johanna Ray in 2004 is an extension and a variation on the work of Professor Emeritus Alf Gabrielsson's work *Strong Experiences with Music*, 2011.

7.4 When Music Is Art: Music Changes History

Heidegger claims that, when Art throws us into Being, we are struck or hit. In our musical context, we are used to experiencing this: to be hit by the musical hit! The musical *hit* throws us into Being. It won't leave us; it makes an impression on us, which is sometimes so deep that it affects our very profound existence (Pio and Varkøy 2012). This can occur on an individual and personal level, but also on a collective level. Some musical pieces, performed by the right artist in the right context, can change history for a whole collective of people, even a whole generation. Pio & Varkøy appeal to John Lennon's *Imagine* or Michael Jackson's *Thriller* as examples of this. However, it is important to note that, in the very act of changing history, the Artwork renders itself incapable of performing this act again, since it changes the very premises on which history rests. This means that, just because a piece of music as Art has the intrinsic power to change history on one occasion, it may not be able to do this repeatedly. Pio & Varkøy provide us with examples of music that changed history for a whole collective (or even a whole generation), yet this music is unlikely to be able to change history again because history has moved on. Therefore, there is no guarantee that, by exposing pupils to pieces of Art that have changed history, the educator will be able to change history for pupils; unless, of course, the educator has the ability to navigate the plurality of the pupil's historical horizons (Lines 2005: 68). The value of the Art in question must not have paled.

We can apply this reasoning when trying to assemble a musical canon valid for all pupils in all situations. Can certain pieces of music be selected as music that changed history and therefore serve as good examples of true musical Artworks for future generations? Of course, based on the above reasoning, Heidegger's answer is no. As the Artwork changes history, history also changes; so the artwork cannot necessarily continue to perform the same transformative function it once did. Therefore, although certain pieces may serve as good examples for learning about how history once was, a consequence of the essences of Art could be that, owing to the changing nature of history, musical pieces cannot be organised into musical canons. The striking of Art will forever change this canon for the individual or the community as such. Therefore, the canon undergoes constant change, along with history, where the actual change itself is the very creation of history, the origin of Artworks.

7.5 Analysis of the Swedish Curricula and the Music Syllabus

In an initial text analysis of the Swedish curricula, the word of "Art" or "Artwork" is only present in four different contexts[16]: *art*, *mother tongue tuition*, *mathematics* and *music* (Skolverket 2011b). In the subject of art, Art is present as a part of *art*

[16]This number of result is only relevant in the text analysis of the Swedish version. The English translation shows more results on a search of the word "konst" as the word "art" is frequent when translated from art as in painting.

paintings. Art is also present as a part of the word *Artwork*. In the second example, mother tongue tuition, Art is present when the language is needed in order to express knowledge about Art as in *art paintings*. In the third example from mathematics, Art is present when symmetries are to be studied in *Art*work. In the subject of music, the word Art is only present in a secondary manner. The syllabus for music prescribes "music from different cultures and epochs is associated with other forms of *art* in new expressions" (Skolverket 2011b: 95, our italic). In this sentence, one can interpret music as being an artform expected to blend with other artforms in new expressions. The introduction to the music syllabus says nothing about whether the subject should be a subject of Artness or whether phenomena of Art may be expressed in music. By consulting the previous syllabus (from 1994 and revised in 2000), we can see that artness appeared in the following quotation: "music is a social and general cultural instrument used at different levels, covering everything from daily enjoyment of music to the highest forms of *artistic* expression." (Skolverket 2000: our italic).

In the art section from the same syllabus (2000), the National Board of Education goes one step further. In the subject of art, "The education asserts the rights of children and youth to fully participate in *artistic* and cultural life…" (our italic). If we read only the introduction to the music syllabus (whether from 1994, 2000 or 2011), Artness does not seem to be an explicit part of the subject of music. However, although it is not explicitly stated within the text, our deepened content analysis of the text in the syllabus actually opens up the possibility for Artness to be a part of Swedish pupils' daily lives in music education. In what ways does the new syllabus for music as a subject in Swedish compulsory schools make it possible to use music as an opener to the world – a base for Being and learning?

7.5.1 The Aim of the Subject Music Expressed in the Syllabus

Since 2011, the syllabus for the subject music in compulsory schools in Sweden has been organized into three parts. These parts are *aims* (including expected abilities of development), *core content* and *knowledge requirements*. We would like to suggest possibilities and challenges that the music syllabus offers when it comes to using Art as a starting-point for musical education through Being in the strife between Earth and World expressed in, or as, musical phenomena.

In the introduction to the music syllabus, the aim of having music as a mandatory subject in school is described, as well as what musical abilities pupils are expected to develop during their nine years in the compulsory school system. Among other things, it is stated that the pupils should: "…develop knowledge which makes it possible to participate in musical contexts, both where they play and listen to music" (2011b: 95). This excerpt could be interpreted as an impetus for offering the pupils Art in school, both as performers, composers and listeners if the phenomenon of music is to be a phenomenon that could be expressed as a musical Art phenomenon. It is also underlined that the pupils should embody music as a form of expression

and means of communication, which can be seen as a possibility of achieving music as Art. Other writings strengthen the opportunities of letting the *Art make the artist* and *the artist make the Art*; for example, occasions for pupils to develop sensitivity to music (musikalisches Feingefühl[17]) both as creators and listeners. The syllabus also implies that the pupils are to develop confidence in singing, playing and be creative in musical activities: "Through teaching pupils should develop the ability to experience and reflect over music. Pupils' experiences of music should be challenged and deepened through their interaction with the musical experiences of others" (2011b: 95). If experiences of music are interpreted as a phenomenon of Art that throws the pupils into Being, then the content of this quote can be regarded as a possibility for the pupils to experience Art. The words "develop the ability", "challenged" and "deepened" all points towards an enriched experience of music; an experience that transcends the thingness and the toolness of the musical phenomena towards the dimension of artness. Hence, the quotation does not guarantee the pupil's experiences of music as Art. What should also be mentioned is that music as tools is underlined in the text rather extensive, seen as a prerequisite for embodying the musical participation described above.

When it comes to the pupils' expected abilities (which are described explicitly), it remains unclear which dimensions of the phenomenon music: music as things, music as tools or music as Art should be presented and embodied Let us turn to a section of the syllabus:

- play and sing in different musical forms and genres,
- create music as well as represent (to form, to shape; our translation) and communicate their own musical thinking and ideas, and
- analyse and discuss musical expressions in different social, cultural and historical contexts (Skolverket 2011b).

These abilities above can be experienced as dominated by a thingly dimension among some of the pupils. For example, singing a song can be reduced to "knowing a song" or knowing a particular section of a song. The abilities can also move on towards an instrumental status, adopting a toolness dimension. This toolness could be exemplified by playing technique or arranged instructions when pupils play along with each other. In both of these cases, it is also possible that the activity per se actually develops into an Art experience for an individual or the collective. The struggle to perfect finger work can suddenly be transformed into an "automatic" and "autodidact" move in which music just happens. Such an event can take the individual to a sense of Artistry where history changes and the particular pupil transforms from a technically challenged player to a player who can perform music. When it comes to perform (to "communicate" the pupils "own /…/ thinking and ideas"), the syllabus clearly moves towards a Heideggerian conception of Art. The

[17] In the Swedish music syllabus, the term "musikalisk lyhördhet" (in German "musikalische Feingefühl") is used. In English, this term is translated into sensitivity to music. However, this translation does not define the term explicitly. "Lyhördhet" or "Feingefühl" points towards an aspect of listening that lacks the English equivalence.

poem of *the Römische Brunnen* is a way of performing and communicating of an idea the fountain. Whether these abilities can be used explicitly in order to create Art or whether the content of these writings can provide Artistic experiences in order to develop the pupils into Artist remains a didactic question that falls outside the scope of the syllabus.

7.5.2 The Core Content of the Subject Music Expressed in the Syllabus

The second part of the syllabus covers and describes what knowledge content the pupils are expected to meet in years 1–3, 4–6, and 7–9. All pupils must have encountered all of the described core contents; however, the teacher is free to enlarge and enrich the content as long as it falls within the aim of the subject. The core content is divided in three areas: *Playing and creating music, Tools of music,* and C*ontexts and functions of music.*

Let us begin with *Playing and creating music.* Some parts of the core content are generally described and open for thing-, tool- and artness. In other words, it is the teacher's choice what the pupils are offered while working with these sections; the introductory aim could act as a guide, as could the achievement criteria, but we shall return to this idea shortly. On the other hand, the parts of the core content that involve creative and compositional aspects are more Art-directed, since words such as "improvisation, creation, and interpretation" are used. In the higher grades, the word "representation" is used, which opens up space for how music can offer something more than the world-earth itself, as Heidegger writes in relation to Debbusy's *La Mer.* However, what is noteworthy is that concepts like *creation of music,* which, at first sight, seem to open up the World, area actually at risk of being closed off by the following exemplifications: "…in different genres, such as ballads, sound compositions and songs" (2011b: 96). Such examples of genres do not necessarily diminish the possibilities of a free creation (in some cases, the limitation itself can demand that free creativity expand). However, in order not to limit the creative process, these limitations should be used reflectively.

The second part, *Tools of music,* is obviously tool-oriented; but, to a certain extent, it is also thing-directed. In almost all excerpts, the word "for" is used, which makes it clear that something should be learnt and embodied for something else to be done. At this point, "Digital tools *for* music creation, recording and processing" (2011b: 97), and "Chord and melody instruments, bass and percussion *for* playing in different tone and time signatures" (2011b: 97, our italics) can function as examples. All contents are formulated as nouns. In this second part of the core content, it becomes clear that such formulations contribute to making the content more thingnessly than artnessly. If active verb, such as "bass-playing" or "melody-playing", had been used instead, the situation may have been completely different.

The third part of the content, *Contexts and functions of music,* could be interesting to look at from the Earth and World perspective, even if "function" is a tool-concept.

As stated above, Heidegger proclaims that it is in the strife between Earth and World that Being is made possible. There are some openings for World, defined as the abstract dimensions of life and music in this part of the content description: "Impact of music's physical, conceptual and emotional characteristics on people in different contexts. How music is used to influence and for recreation in various ritual contexts" (2011b: 97). Connections to specific musical pieces, instruments and contexts, which are expressly stated in this third part, emphasises the Earthly dimension. The activity of expressing oneself about music and musical experiences is also underlined, which opens up space for aspects of Being. On the other hand, specific concepts are a part of the core content in order to write and talk about music that makes us hesitate at that point. In the last bullet in the core content art music is mentioned as one kind of music that the pupils should meet and interact with. Even though art music is explicitly expressed in the syllabus, there is no guarantee that this possesses an opportunity for the pupils to be thrown into Being. As we have argued previously, art music is not per se Art music.

7.5.3 The Knowledge Requirement of the Subject Music Is Expressed in the Syllabus

The last part of the syllabus contains knowledge requirements that should be used for grading. They express to what extent and in what ways the expected abilities should have been developed. The formulated requirements are arranged in a way that describes which parts of the specific ability should be assessed and how different levels of competence should be demonstrated. For example, singing ability is assessed on the extent to which the pupils can sing in tune and in rhythm, which can be seen as exemplifying a rather instrumental view of singing. When it comes to what pupils are expected to do in relation to instruments, they should be able to play (parts of) melodies and chords. The ability to play or sing with rhythm, in a technical way, and with appropriate style is what is assessed. However, in the later grades, the sensitivity to music (musikalisches Feingefühl) is valued to some extent: "Pupils adapt to some extent their voice to the whole by listening and to some extent perceive what is happening when making music […] Pupils can contribute to cultivate and interpret the music into a musical expression" (2011a: 99, our translation). These quotations show that some World dimensions are included, as well as possibilities for Being, in the strife between Earth and World.

Another assessment area concerns the ability to compose music. The ability is described as creating functional compositions based on the pupil's own ideas. In the lower grades, this can be based on musical patterns and forms, and, in the higher grades, the ability to put musical building blocks together to create compositions is assessed. The pupils are also expected to reflect upon the ways in which the compositions are functioning. The description seems to be relatively instrumental. However, it is left to the educator to provide an appropriate context and atmosphere

to provide the pupils with the possibility of becoming Artists through their Art. It is not until this point that this required knowledge could play along with improvisation, interpretation and creation mentioned in the core content.

When it comes to the ability to analyse and talk about music, there are some openings for Art to be experienced, even though these openings are not explicitly stated. The pupils are expected to apply reasoning to their own and others' music making (in the later years, aiming to develop musical performances) which should demand musical experience. There are also openings for this to be done in forms of expression other than speech and written language. In the later years, this reasoning should be connected to specific traditions and situations. In addition, the pupils are expected to express their own musical experiences, which self-evidently demand such experiences and which, in turn, should open for being hit by music. The last aspect of being able to analyse and talk about music is to "distinguish and give examples of the characteristic features of music from different genres and cultures, and with some certainty give examples of instruments from different groups of instruments" (2011b: 99). In the later years, pupils are also expected to distinguish between musical characteristics in different genres and styles. This last aspect is rather instrumental and clearly connected to World.

7.6 Conclusion: The Origin of the Work of Art Within Music Education

Neither the curriculum nor the syllabus of music writes explicitly about Art. Therefore, music educators within the Swedish school system are not obliged to foster potential artist, nor to present Art to the pupils. However, at the same time, there is nothing in the curriculum nor in the syllabus that in any way opposes the subject of music to be a subject of Art (*Kunst*). As Ray (2004) suggests, it could simply be that teachers have not reflected upon the possibilities. However, if the artness dimension of music, music as Art or musical artists, is not explicitly mentioned in the syllabus of music, the possibilities for the individual teacher to include the dimensions of artness lies in the culture of the teachers, the individual preferences or creativity – the world of the teachers. If the teacher lacks or has a poor experience of world in a Heideggerian sense, the existence of Art within the subject of music boils down to serendipity, a much too uncertain path of educational practise. One may consider that the constructors of the syllabuses have overlooked the phenomenon of Art. This may be a relevant critique. On the other hand, making Art specific within the syllabus of music would force music teachers to provide art moments for the students.

If we are to follow Heidegger's description of Art, this might appear as an impossible task. Art is to be considered as something rare, something unusual, and something so significant that it actually changes history. Our investigation shows that there are several places within the syllabus where opportunities for Art to originate exist, even though it is not explicitly written. Art that opens space for Being may change history both on the collective and the individual level. Vandenberg formu-

lated this beautifully when dealing with the question of how education through Art can be grounded in Being: "Not merely in their lives, but in their very projects of being to ground education in their becoming themselves, i.e. in their temporal perspective of their own historicality." (Vandenberg 2008: 259). Lines argues in the same way, claiming that the educator should "broaden our singular concepts of music by affirming the interconnected regions or spaces in the moment" (2003: 18). In order to achieve this, Lines suggests that the subject of music may be regarded as a "dynamic model of change and action" (ibid.).

When studying the content of the syllabus, Heidegger's concept of things and tools are evident. It is though important to remember Heidegger's description of the toolness in the tools, and how that very same shall disappear while in use. Even though technique is studied, the aim should be to deliver artistry, which is also underlined in the aim part of the syllabus. However, when educators plan, generate and construct musical experiences, it is still impossible to determine what constitutes the "what the artistic outcome will be" (Lines 2003: 5).

In order for the educator to transcend the writings of the syllabus, yet remain within the aim, a number of pedagogical questions may be raised:

- How do music educators identify Art per se? In which forum do we nurture our professional and collegial dialogues about Art and its origins within our educational contexts?
- How do music teachers provide Art for the pupils to originate as Artists?
- How do music teachers interact with the Origin of the Work of Art without interrupting the Origin per se? Considering this interference, are there time and spaces where the teacher must abandon the pupil in order for Art to origin? How can the educator notice the Origin of an Artist? How can the educator inspire the Artist to originate from Art?
- How could successful educational methods be created aiming to nurture potential artists when dealing with the musical classroom context?
- How is it possible to change history on a collective level? What possibilities do schools offer when an Art context should not be limited to a school context?

These pedagogical questions aim to transcend the syllabus of music and embrace the full potential of the phenomenon of music to include music in school as a potential arena for Art to Originate. To use Heidegger's philosophy of Art in such an investigations reveals the possibilities for educators to become aware of how to create space for Being as music in historical moments of Art within existing frames of a curriculum. When Music is Art, Art opens Being; hence Being is Music as Art.

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Part III
Musical Experience

Chapter 8
Music, Truth and Belonging: Listening with Heidegger

Erik Wallrup

Abstract Despite Heidegger's ambiguous—sometimes even hostile—relation to music, his thinking opens itself up to the musical sphere not least through key words such as *Stimmung*, *Fuge*, and *hören* ('mood', 'fugue', and 'listening'). This article suggests that if his thinking on the artwork is taken into account, especially its relation to truth and Being, then there is reason to rethink many of the conceptions that are pivotal for how we listen to, teach, and study music.

The starting point is Heidegger's treatment of the conflict between Wagner and Nietzsche, where he rejects Wagner's *Gesamtkunstwerk*. However, since he only repudiates the emotionality of music, another position of his should come to the fore, that indicated in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*. All artworks open up a world. Truth happens in these works. This must be valid for music, too, even if Heidegger remained silent on how. It is shown in the article—with the 'Eroica' Symphony as principal example—how a musical world may change the conception of the world, how music may establish truth with a 'thrust'.

This thrust can be recognized only if the listener is thoroughly attuned. In this attunement, the listener belongs to Being. Heidegger's formulation in German clarifies the relation: *Zugehörigkeit* ('belongingness') incorporates the verb *zu hören* ('to listen' or 'to hear'). Such a relation to the artwork is, of course, entirely at odds with how music is conceived in our education. In the concluding part of the article, it is suggested how Heidegger's listening can not only inform but even reform the notion of music in academia.

Keywords Truth • Belonging • Music • Listening • Artwork • Education

8.1 Traces of a Musical Philosophy

We do not find a philosophy of music in Heidegger's work. In fact, it could be argued that Heidegger's attitude towards music is antagonistic. It has been claimed

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_8

that Heidegger silences music (Pöltner 1992), but also, more dramatically, that he represses it (Bowie 2007) or censures it (Molzino 1998). In one of his major treatises on the arts, *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, Heidegger is obliged to refer to music, since he intends to say something about all major arts; however, the principal examples in the discussion are an ancient Greek temple, a van Gogh painting, and a poem by C. F. Meyer. Music is not prioritised. Instead, it is relegated to the cellar (like a 'sack of potatoes', Heidegger 2002: 3), just as the Beethoven string quartet scores are placed in the publisher's storeroom. However, rather than appealing to this example to indicate the insignificance of music, Heidegger uses it to show how such art works can also be things that demonstrate an unavoidable physicality. All works of art share this predicament.

Despite these obstacles, musicologists have still turned to Heidegger in order to shed light upon musical phenomena. Among these, J. P. E. Harper-Scott has discussed the temporality of music in terms of a 'mimesis of our temporal existence' when dealing with Elgar (2006: 39) and, when writing about Mahler's symphonies, David B. Greene has assumed that music 'offers us aural images of temporality' (1984: vii). It is of course perfectly legitimate to bring Heidegger into the picture when time and temporality are discussed, but the notion of music being a kind of representation of temporal consciousness is completely at odds with Heidegger's thinking. Perhaps it would be wise to take seriously the claim that Heidegger is musically questionable, but that he nonetheless forces musicologists to start asking questions (Flechsig 1977).

However, the same scholars who describe the various ways in which Heidegger represses music have also written substantial texts in which Heidegger's thinking is considered in relation to music. So, even though there is only a handful of composers mentioned in Heidegger's philosophical writing—Bach, Mozart, Beethoven and Wagner in his major works and Stravinsky, Orff and Conradin Kreutzer in his smaller texts—we should be aware that certain aspects of Heidegger's thinking open themselves up to music. When Heidegger writes or speaks about *Stimmung* in the phases following *Sein und Zeit*,[1] he occasionally refers to music (even if this relation can be described in both positive and negative terms). And it is also possible to identify a kind of polyphony in the structure of his works (in an equivocal way, *Beiträge zur Philosophie* is said to be a fugue or a jointure) as well as characterization (when Heidegger describes the world as a fourfold of mortals and gods, heaven and earth, they are referred to as four voices, *Stimmen*, singing together).

Therefore, we could claim that Heidegger does not offer us a philosophy of music, but indications of a musical philosophy. This is indeed a point made by the philosopher Andrew Bowie, who has demonstrated how Heidegger's discussion on meaning in language can be better understood if the non-representational art of

[1] The ontic *Stimmung* (mood) and ontological *Befindlichkeit* (disposition) are crucial in *Sein und Zeit*, but it is only later that Heidegger discusses the background of *Stimmung* in music.

music is taken into account (Bowie 2003, 2007). Neither Bowie nor his colleague Günther Pöltner is frivolous when identifying the useful and relevant aspects of Heidegger's work.

8.2 Heidegger's Repudiation of Emotionality

As we have seen, Heidegger is almost completely silent about music. His vocabulary—in which *Stimmung*, *Fuge* and *Spiel* are central terms—is sometimes related to the field of music; however, instead of affirming this connection, Heidegger is inclined to distance himself from it. For instance, when he elaborates *Stimmung* and its relation to thinking, he is keen to emphasise that this tuning of thought has nothing to do with music:

> The tuning understood in this sense is not music of accidentally emerging feelings which only accompany the correspondence. If we characterize philosophy as tuned correspondence, then we by no means want to surrender thinking to the accidental changes and vacillations of sentiments. (Heidegger 1958: 77–79)

Two things are important here. Firstly, Heidegger wishes to free himself from the sphere of feelings when discussing *Stimmung*. Secondly, he associates music with precisely feelings. Even though we can identify intriguing comments on music in Heidegger—for instance, when he supposedly claims that it is impossible to achieve in philosophy what Schubert achieves in his Piano Sonata in B-flat major (Picht 1977), or when he refers to a letter by Mozart (unaware of its unauthentic nature) in which Mozart writes about a 'viewing' hearing (Heidegger 1997: 117–118)—we cannot ignore the fact that the only extensive discussion about music in Heidegger's work is largely negative. This discussion concerns the role of music in Wagner's *Gesamtkunstwerk*. We should read this passage closely, being aware of what Heidegger actually says—but also what he does not say.

The passage is found in the first section of *Nietzsche*, Heidegger's large-scale confrontation with Nietzsche, which was originally delivered as lectures in the second half of the 1930s, soon after his catastrophic engagement in the National Socialist movement. In these lectures, he attempts to rescue his precursor from the Nazi reception. However, we should not expect Heidegger to offer a democratic interpretation of Nietzsche's work; Heidegger wishes to show that, despite its criticism of traditional metaphysics, Nietzsche's philosophy is metaphysical, and that in this lies both its strength and its weakness (since Heidegger at this point examines the history of metaphysics and views it as a necessary development in western philosophy).

Here, Wagner's notion of a total artwork is said to be one of the six basic developments in the history of aesthetics, along with examples such as Hegel's proclamation of the end of art and Nietzsche's own countermovement to nihilism in the name

of life. Heidegger strives to release Nietzsche from Wagner, showing how, from the outset, a personal difference hinted at the famous break between them after Nietzsche's period as a Wagner apologist in works such as *Geburt der Tragödie* and the fourth *Unzeitgemässige Betrachtung*. This is connected to Heidegger's critical reflection on the Nazi movement, not while Wagner's works were celebrated there (which indeed they were), but while Wagner was said to demonstrate the same nihilistic tendency as the National Socialists.

In the history of aesthetics that Heidegger affords the reader, the central problem is the loss of great art. He claims that art in various forms still exists, but that great art—making manifest what beings as a whole are—is no longer possible. Richard Wagner tried to contest this fact by projecting his *Gesamtkunstwerk*, both in theoretical works and in his realization of the theories in his musical dramas. Already in choosing the stage for the new kind of artwork, insurmountable difficulties appear: 'Drama possesses its importance and essential character, not in poetic originality, i.e., not in the well-wrought truth of the linguistic work, but in things pertaining to the stage, theatrical arrangements and gala production' (Heidegger 1981: 86). It is important to read the citation in relation to Heidegger's treatise *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, which was written in the same period as his confrontation with Nietzsche and in which the artwork is said to set truth to work, where it can be felt like a thrust (*Stoß*). Furthermore, in this treatise, the privileged art is poetry. Wagner certainly wrote his own librettos, but, according to Heidegger, these cannot be classed as poetry, because they pertain to stage and gala. However, the obstacle in question is not Wagner's status as a librettist, but his main project:

> What is wanted is the domination of art as music, and thereby the domination of the pure state of feeling—the tumult and delirium of the senses, tremendous contraction, the felicitous distress that swoons in enjoyment, absorption in 'the bottomless sea of harmonies', the plunge into frenzy and the disintegration into sheer feeling as redemptive. (Heidegger 1981: 86)

Suddenly, Heidegger has taken two more steps in the argument. First, music is held to be an art that cannot be privileged. It cannot dominate art; art, in its essence, is poetic, not musical. Second, it is said that music equals pure feeling without bonds—a delirium. It is not surprising that, after this declaration, Heidegger turns to Nietzsche's harsh critique of Wagner flowing the breakdown of their friendship. Heidegger selects some citations in which Nietzsche ridicules Wagner's hypnotic effects on the listener and the composer's wish to write a collective artwork. It is the boundless expressiveness, the feminine weakness and the evocation of sentiment that disturbs Heidegger.[2]

[2] Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (2007) has suggested that these salient features should be interpreted as being part of both Heidegger's and Nietzsche's notion of feminine hysteria. To counteract this state, Nietzsche suggested the *große Stil*, Heidegger *Gestaltung*, both with a 'virile' character. According to Lacoue-Labarthe, it is not by accident that Heidegger took such a stance during his years of political engagement (even if, *nota bene*, Heidegger's intensified reading of Nietzsche's oeuvre took place when he had begun to criticize the NS revolution).

However, Heidegger cannot even allow Wagner to be great in his errors. The composer only did what he was destined to do; he was a victim of the times. It was not just 'the predominance of music with respect to the other arts in his work' that made him fail, but the problem inherent in aesthetics itself; namely, the reason why music was allowed to aspire to such a position. The notion of aesthetics forwarded 'the conception and estimation of art in terms of the unalloyed state of feeling and the growing barbarization of the very state to the point where it becomes the sheer bubbling and bowling of feeling abandoned to itself' (Heidegger 1981: 88). At this point, we should remind ourselves that, during this time, Heidegger was formulating his idea of a history of Being (*Seinsgeschichte*), in which Being is given or withheld in different ways throughout history, and, therefore, in which truth means different things at different times. Aesthetics is only a part of a greater movement in history—that of nihilism.

Heidegger's judgment on music as being the reign of feeling is itself a common position in the history of the aesthetics of music. In his words, we can hear echoes of Kant's depreciative attitude towards music, which claims that music is only a play of sensation in which there is nothing to reflect upon. It may be true that, of all the arts, music has the greatest power over the mind; however, if Kant supposes that music is the language of affects (Kant 1987 [1790]: 199), this only makes things worse, not better. Kant's formulations have their roots in the affective theories of the seventeenth century, and they form a continuity with the expressive theories of Romanticism, the hermeneutics of music, and onwards. We also know that this affective tradition has been forcibly rejected. The *topos* of ineffability of early Romanticism, the formalism from Johann Friedrich Herbart to Eduard Hanslick, and the phenomenology of music—not to mention the standardized formalism in modern musicology—have all refuted affective theories. That which Heidegger suppresses is therefore not music itself, but the pivotal change of musical aesthetics in the late eighteenth century, when instrumental music became a model for the different arts. He does not take into account this extremely important change in the history of music, when music not only breaks loose from language, but from emotional life as well. The reason for this is that it does not fit into his version of the development of aesthetics, just as it also fails to fit into his history of Being.[3]

Accordingly, when Heidegger attacks the emotionality of music, he does not do this in an attempt to devalue music. He is not the type of philosopher who, like Kant, thought that music lacked urbanity (since it disturbed people who did not want to listen to it). That which he struggles against is the modern subject, being the principle upon which the standard view of man and his relation to the world is founded. When Heidegger develops a philosophy of attunement (*Stimmung*), he continuously distances himself from the notion of emotions in psychology and of affects in the philosophy of Descartes and onwards. But he fails to acknowledge that it was precisely

[3] The publication of 'the black notebooks' gives further evidence of Heidegger's extremely critical attitude regarding music during the 1930s. Here, using terms of the history of Being, he combines the emotionality of music with its mathematical traits, seeing both as aspects of manipulation (2014: 132–133, 149–150).

this concept of *Stimmung* that was central to the first reflections on instrumental and autonomous music; and he makes no recognition of the formalistic notion of *Stimmung* that can be discerned in Hanslick and Gustav Theodor Fechner when they suggest the existence of *musikalische Stimmungen*—musical attunements—which are separate from feelings, emotions and identifiable moods.

In this campaign, Nietzsche does not seem to be of any help to Heidegger. In the later phases of his thinking, Nietzsche introduces the notion of a 'physiology of art', where music draws his attention again after a period of neglect or, in the case of Wagner's music, hatred: it is something that stimulates the organism, makes us dance, allows us to digest well (Nietzsche 1988: 285). Instead of affirming Nietzsche's thought, Heidegger suggests that this is an expression of how aesthetic questioning is thought to its bitter end: 'The state of feeling is to be traced back to excitations of the nervous system, to bodily conditions.' (1981: 91) However, with force, Heidegger is able to reconcile the physiologic aesthetics of Nietzsche with his own attunemental thought. Yet this only brings to an end the dynamic confrontation between Heidegger and Nietzsche on the matter of affectivity. We still have other things to sort out; namely, Heidegger's scepticism concerning music and the possible way around his reductive understanding of music.

8.3 Off the Beaten Track in the Reign of Music

There is another possibility concerning Heidegger and music; namely, a kind of exegesis that attempts to pursue lines of thought which are only indicated by the philosopher himself. Such an exegesis has been carried out by Günther Pöltner, who concentrates on the principal example of a 'worlding' work in Heidegger's *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*—the ancient Greek temple—which is described as an event of truth. It is interesting that Heidegger does not choose a poem or a painting as his main example; instead, he pictures a temple in a valley. There are clearly many advantages to this example, since a temple demonstrates perfectly the ontologically conceived interplay between 'world' (the temple gathers the possibilities of the Greek people who live around it, governing over the ideas of birth and death, managing victory and causing decline) and 'earth' (*Heimat*, homeland, in which the temple stands, but also the rock upon which the temple stands, and the temple stones themselves). However, Pöltner identifies another reason for Heidegger's choice: to prevent the erecting of a world being understood solely as representation, Heidegger selects a work that is non-representational. Of course, the temple may represent both power and faith, but that is not what Pöltner intends to investigate. There is a statue of a god within the walls of the temple, and this statue is representational, whereas the walls themselves do not represent anything. Nor does the music that could have been heard there. According to Pöltner, music would have been an even better example of a non-representational art, since, in his opinion, music is something totally at odds with language and representation.

This is not the place for a closer examination of Pöltner's skilful argument concerning music, but it should be pointed out that he suggests that music is characterized by being the 'art of man's at-tunement' ('die *Kunst der Ge-Stimmtheit* des Menschen', Pöltner 1992: 142). Being claims man through attunement. This tuning of Dasein is pivotal: whereas the words of a poem are attuned, music is attunement itself. Pöltner describes the difference between music and poetry, claiming that, in a poem, beings are brought to language and a world is opened up. However, in music, there is no relation to beings; instead, the non-objectivity (*Ungegenständlichkeit*) of the world-relation is opened up itself (Pöltner 1992: 137). In other words, Pöltner takes advantage of the most powerful musical discourse of the twentieth century, which was founded on formalism and reached its breakthrough with Hanslick, only to be established as common ground for both musicology and the philosophy of music in the following century.

The problem is that Heidegger chose architecture, not music, and he did so because of his conviction that music is essentially the art of feeling, not the art of tonally moving forms. Wagner's attempt to renew the arts through his *Gesamtkunstwerk* was deemed to be a failure, since he posited music as the centre of all the arts.

However, with Heidegger's treatise on the artwork, yet another approach is made possible, akin to that of Pöltner but without its formalistic solution. We should remember that, even if the central aim of the text is not to say something about the arts but to find yet another way of asking the question of Being, Heidegger does afford us with a notion of how the artwork works. That is, all essential works that belong to the arts, not only the poems by Hölderlin and George, not only the paintings by van Gogh and Klee, and not only the ancient temple in the valley. Music, in some way or another, even though it is an art form where feelings appear to dominate, is not excluded.

According to Heidegger, a world is opened up in the work of art: 'To the work-being belongs the setting up of a world' (Heidegger 2002: 24). What kind of world is a musical world? It cannot be the world of a farmer's wife—imagined by Heidegger in his treatise—rooted in the soil and worried about the harvest. It cannot be the world of the ancient temple, in which people pray and the decisions about the future are made. In a powerful passage, Heidegger describes the world of the temple:

> It is the temple work that first structures and simultaneously gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire for the human being the shape of its destiny. The all-governing expanse of these open relations is the world of this historical people. From and within this expanse the people first returns to itself for the completion of its vocation. (Heidegger 2002: 20–21)

Pöltner seems to be on safe ground when he says that this kind of world is excluded for music, even when it is '(mis)understood as programme music' (1992: 135). We shall return to this problem later, but, for the time being, we must ask ourselves how music can set up a world at all.

It is a simple question. We do not have to think for very long to realise that, when we are captivated by a musical performance, we are not thinking about the everyday world; we find a contrast to it. The rite of the concert hall is a safeguard for the exclusivity of the musical event; no intruding sound, no unexpected movement, no sudden light can be permitted if music is to be undisturbed. The audience is precisely that: an *audience*. The concert hall is an auditory world that is made present. Of course, in this case we should acknowledge the physical movements necessary for the production of music—musicians playing their instrument are not stationary, and there are many aspects of choreography in the conductor's motions—but these visual elements are completely dominated by the sounding musical work. The movements illustrate the music brought forth, not the other way around.

Music is known to be the emblematic art of time. When the listener is absorbed by music, clock time is put out of play by the musical temporality: the musical time is the listener's time. The passing of time is not experienced individually. The entire audience (at least those who are absorbed by the music) shares the temporality of the work, just as the musicians do. The merely subjective experience of music, in which memories and biography are decisive, does not interfere; instead, the notion of inter-subjective temporality becomes important. Often, after a successful concert, listeners say that they have been moved by the music. This expression is pertinent: the listener has not just followed the movements of the music with his or her mind, but these movements have occupied the movements of the listener's mind; that is, the movements of the mind have been those of the musical movements.

As soon there are movements, there is space, too. Movement (of some kind or another) cannot exist without space (of some kind or another). In music itself, we do not find three-dimensional space, even though there are some works that investigate the space of the concert hall, such as the offstage musicians in Mahler or Kurtág. However, what we do find is the spatiality inherent in the musical movement. The teleological structure of much of western music is an expression of a musical logic that takes the listener from one point to another. The listener is situated in musical movements originating from the past and directed towards the future, though, at all times, located in an expanded present, where the past says something about the future and the anticipated future is related to the past. In the embodied act of listening, there is a spatiality that can be described in terms of movements upwards or downwards; there is both depth and volume. These characteristics have sometimes been called illusions or metaphors (for instance, by Scruton 1997 and Johnson and Larson 2003), but they describe how we orientate ourselves in music.

The temporality, mobility, and spatiality of music depend upon the tone. The tone is the materiality of music; Heidegger calls it 'earth', since every art brings fourth its foundation, even if it is simultaneously withdrawn: 'The rock comes to bear and to rest and so first becomes rock; the metal comes to glitter and shimmer, the colors to shine, the sounds to ring [*Klang des Tones*], the word to speak' (Heidegger 2002: 24). In the musical work, the materiality is brought forth in the world with its temporality, mobility, and spatiality.

I provide a more detailed discussion of these elements elsewhere (Wallrup, forthcoming), but, for the purposes of this paper, these short characterizations suffice to

indicate how a world can be said to emerge in a musical work as an ontological event, bringing forth the sounding earth. Moreover, they correspond to a series of formulations in Heidegger, in which he describes how the world 'worlds' in the artwork, and, since a world always emerges in an attunement, his thought on *Stimmung* must be taken into account. In the artwork treatise, Heidegger touches upon both spatiality and mobility: 'By the opening up of a world, all things gain their lingering and hastening, their distance and proximity, their breadth and their limits' (2002: 23). When elucidating Hölderlin's poetry, he claims that the attunement determines the fundament and ground, and that it attunes the space on which and in which the poetic saying founds a being (1999: 79). Being a fundamental attunement, this attunement determines the place and the time of our Dasein in its being (Heidegger 1999: 140–141). These formulations are just hints, but what they are hinting at is how the artwork works.

8.4 The Establishment of Truth in the 'Eroica' Symphony

When truth is established in an artwork, in strife between world and earth, it happens with a thrust. This thrust is a sign of the strangeness of the work; it cannot be reconciled with that which has been or anything to which we are accustomed.

The thrust of a new artwork—a work that appears alien from the outset and retains this strangeness for a long period of time—can be found in a number of outstanding musical works. There are numerous testimonies of alienness in music, from the reception of Mozart's 'Dissonance Quartet' to that of Schoenberg's Second String Quartet and Nono's *Fragmente—Stille, An Diotima*. In these works (selected to avoid confusing thrust with a striking character), we can still—after thirty years, after one hundred years, after two hundred thirty years—acknowledge the thrust, despite the fact that so much has happened in music since Mozart's, Schoenberg's and even Nono's day. All these composers changed the conception of the string quartet; they changed the conception of what was possible in music. And, in a certain sense, their worlds changed the world that has become our world.

It seems to be harder to understand 'truth' concerning music. Truth in music cannot be the correspondence between a proposition and facts in reality. Even if I find no reason to contest music's abilities to represent reality, the musical depiction of a cuckoo or a locomotive only has to do with truth in a very strained sense; it is true to that which is represented. Of course, this sense is not Heidegger's when discussing truth in the work of art. The establishment of truth does not mean that the artwork is a truthful representation of some object in the world; instead, the work changes our relation to the world. Heidegger understands truth in the artwork in the following way: 'Truth, as the clearing and concealing of that which is, happens through being poeticized' (2002: 44). Therefore, even music is poetic, since it changes the way in which beings come forth to the clearing and how they are concealed. Truth happens in the opposition between world and earth.

Truth and thrust: they are related, but how are they related in a specific artwork, indeed in a musical work? I would like to exemplify that interrelation with a work that has indisputably changed the conception of the musical work of art (through a thrust) and then turn to the question of its relation to the world (in terms of truth). Beethoven's 'Eroica' Symphony is such a work. It was heavily criticized after its first performances in Vienna, but, from the very start, it was recognized as something completely new, breaking with the classical forms that Beethoven had received from Haydn and Mozart and subsequently elaborated in his two earliest symphonies. Furthermore, I would like to discuss the 'Eroica' Symphony in relation to two musicological investigations on Beethoven; namely, an article by Reinhold Brinkmann on the 'Eroica' and its time (2000) and a study of the reception of Beethoven through history by Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht (1972).[4] Neither Brinkmann nor Eggebrecht can be reconciled with the perspective put forward here, even though both of them have contributed to freeing musicology from its institutional rigidity; however, it is in light of these contrasts that an alternative can take shape.

Let us recall some characteristics (formulated in foremost ontic terms) of the first movement of the 'Eroica' Symphony. First of all, the movement is much longer that the limits set not only by classicism, but by Beethoven's own expansion of it. With more than 800 measures, it was the largest symphonic movement to have been written; a new way of thinking instrumental music. This means that temporality is made into an unprecedented musical dimension. It also breaks with tradition in its formal aspects: the introduction of a new theme (in E minor) in the development section and the 'false' entry of the horn on the tonic over the dominant in the strings before the beginning of the recapitulation are both striking novelties. But Beethoven's tendency to break the rules was only the most salient feature of a general strategy to change the mobility of music: instead of using an even meter as normal, the first movement is in 3/4 and, from the outset, the two great orchestral chords suggest that an extraordinary event is going to take place; the introduction of the tonally foreign C#, replied by syncopated violins (b. 7), forebodes the extreme dissonance of the forthcoming development section. The general character of mobility and the urgent pushing forwards towards an endpoint is an expression of a relentless teleology, where the almost schematic material of the first theme (a broken triad) makes it obvious that the developing thematic elaboration, and not the melodic quality, is the central aspect of the work.

In order to spell out the radical character of the symphony, Brinkmann reminds us of Friedrich Schlegel's keys to the new era in which he was living; namely, the French revolution, Fichte's philosophy, and Goethe's novel *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*. Brinkmann suggests that we add the 'Eroica' to this list. The reason for this is related to the new mode of experiencing time: the Revolution had given rise

[4] At this point, we should mention Scott Burnham's intelligent investigation of Beethoven's heroic style (Burnham 1995). However, Brinkmann's and Eggebrecht's studies have the advantage of focusing on one specific theme: Brinkmann on the parallel between temporality and epochal shift and Eggebrecht on the 'reception-constants'.

to a 'tempo of change, the acceleration in the passage of time itself […] and differing levels of acceleration in disparate fields'. Brinkmann relates these temporal characteristics to the notion of history: 'The acceleration in temporal experience is seen as a special feature of historical progress, an intensification if not radicalization of the idea of progress' (2000: 8–9).

Brinkmann refrains from claiming that the music is that of the Revolution. Neither does he say that the music is revolutionary. Instead, he traces a shift of consciousness. It would be tempting to use the music as a mere illustration of the historical change of the period. Beethoven almost invites us to do this with his dedication to Napoleon, which was later erased in the manuscript. Taken in this way, the music would be an expression of the revolutionary spirit, even if the person who was supposed to embody those ideas showed himself to be a counter-revolutionary force. But music is no mere illustration. In this symphonic movement, a new potency can be discerned. A new kind of subjectivity comes to the fore: it is a new subjectivity in the sense of bringing an almost brutal force into musical being, both as affection and as a steering power over the material. The developmental work with the motifs and thematic material is not just an elaboration, but also a manipulation. Therefore, we do not witness a sheer disclosure of Being in Beethoven's work; instead, we may take part in a projecting of Being (*Seinsentwurf*). It conceals as well as it discloses, it is both true and false. A world is set up, with a temporality and a mobility (as salient features) that were unknown from the start. This world brings fourth a sound, *Klang*, which cannot be described without being made to an ontic object, but can be discerned in the primordiality of such different interpretations as those by Willem Mengelberg and John Eliot Gardiner. What it tells us should be understood as a salient musical moment in the history of Being, when Being in a certain way refuses to speak—even if what is heard is still held to be true.

I would suggest that this discussion is related to the primordial establishment that gives rise to the 'reception-constants' (*Rezeptionskonstanten*), which Eggebrecht has uncovered in his investigation of Beethoven reception since the beginning of the nineteenth century (Eggebrecht 1972). Rather than regarding the verbal interpretations of Beethoven's music as nothing other than discursive constructs, Eggebrecht has suggested that this is how the non-conceptual art music is brought to concepts. Differentiating between conceptual fields such as 'experiential music', 'authority', 'surmounting', and 'utopia', he shows that such divergent schools of thought, like Hoffmann's Romantic conception, Wagner's notion of historical development, Riemann's way of analysing specific works, the objectivity of the 1920s, and the anti-mythological stance of the 1970s, return to the same key words. Eggebrecht assumes that these constants correspond to a spiritual content of the music, a *musikalische Gehalt*, but I would rather suggest that his key words are related to the dimensions of the musical world that brings forth its earth; a world that both is situated in history and creates history. However, what Eggebrecht does show is that we are still living in Beethoven's world, since, according to his investigation, there are no breaking points in the actual period of history—there are only different methods of interpretation. Eggebrecht's methodology is not as subtle as recent discursive investigations, and he wrote his study before he could have been influenced by

Reinhart Koselleck's 'conceptual history'. Nevertheless, Eggebrecht is able to show that the audience, critics, and aestheticians contemporary with Beethoven encountered great problems when dealing with his new music: it established a musical world, with powerful dynamics and a deeply moving mobility that were hard to describe in conventional musical language, but, even in the absence of the exact words, the world was perceived in its strangeness. This is how truth is established in the workings of the artwork.

8.5 Before Thinking, Playing, and Teaching: Listening

When we teach or learn music—either in the lecture hall at university or the practice room at music college—questions on truth in the sense put forward in this paper are not asked. Yet it is clear that truth and truthfulness are important issues in such milieus. Let us examine some examples related to the 'Eroica' Symphony. It was first performed in Vienna on 9th June 1804 at Prince Lobkowitz's palace with Beethoven as conductor, and the first public performance was held at the Theater an der Wien on 7th April 1805. The first movement has 842 bars (or 695, not including the reprise). The two E-flat-major chords at the beginning are not only two chords, but they also include the material of the first theme. A reliable interpretation of the symphony should examine the motivic relation between these chords, the first theme, and its later development. With an increasing amount of interpretation, we move from simple facts to a cogent understanding of the work. It is *true*—the first sentence corresponds to facts, i.e., what the documents say—that the symphony was first performed in June 1804. An interpretation that is *truthful* to the work should be aware of and draw awareness to the internal motivic relations. This is how we teach, and this is how we are taught. But do we really understand the impact of the symphony in this way? Of course, we can also relate to the reception of the symphony, read reviews of it, follow its vicissitudes in the cultural life of Austria and Germany, as well as the rest of the world—always with documents in our hands, or reading the written history of the work. However, this does not provide us with an entrance to the work, to that which is at work in the work. For this, we have to listen. But (and this is no less true) we hear the symphony when taking part in historical lessons on western art music, both at the university and the college of music. We can go to the concert hall where the orchestra plays all of Beethoven's symphonies at a festival. We may buy a CD box set with the complete symphonies and interpretations from renowned conductors such as Riccardo Chailly, Nicolaus Harnoncourt or Bernard Haitink. We may even go to the digital archives or use the internet to research Furtwängler, Toscanini and Mengelberg. It is all there, at our disposal, and enframed. However, the question is whether we really listen to the music, or whether we only hear it. Again, we should turn back to Heidegger.

According to Heidegger, the act of listening is necessary for thinking as well as learning. As a matter of fact, we do not just start to think; we must learn how to think, and, in order to learn this, we need to listen. The teacher, to whom the students

listen, must learn to learn: 'Lernen geht auf wissendes Aneignen und Eigentum des Wissens, aber je auf ein Eigentum, das nicht uns gehört, sondern dem wir gehören' (Heidegger 1994: 190). In a conventional translation, this citation would read something like this: 'Learning rises from knowing appropriation and property of knowledge, but always from a property which does not belong to us, instead to which we belong.' However, in this translation, almost all the meaning is lost. Gone is the etymological relation to *Ereignis*—the event—in which we are related to Being. Gone also is the bond to the verb *hören*, which here can be understood as 'to belong to' (e.g. *zugehören*), but which also has to do with listening: we must listen to the way in which Being speaks to us. Being speaks to us, Heidegger says, and Being often speaks to us with a silent voice, a *lautlose Stimme*. Listening to the voice of Being, we are attuned, *gestimmt*, to it. When Heidegger lectures on Heraclitus, trying to show how *logos* is related to a German verb like *lesen* (here, not 'read' but 'choose'),[5] he concludes that, through his lecture, one can hear the sounding of the basic words of the beginnings of thinking. They may be monotone, but they are the 'tonic of this originating Greek thinking' (1994: 298). Without this tone, it would not be possible to listen to the beginning.

This is not the first time Heidegger shows that he is perfectly aware of the importance of being in the right mood for learning and thinking. Rüdiger Safranski, Heidegger's most insightful biographer, has identified that, after the fundamental analytics of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger changes his approach to writing and lecturing: 'Heidegger's new style is "event philosophy." Philosophy must conjure up state of mind, which it then endeavors to interpret' (Safranski 1999: 177–78). Philosophy must make the listener belong to the event. There is no better exemplification of this rhetorical strategy than the great series of lectures that Heidegger held in Freiburg 1929–30, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt—Endlichkeit—Einsamkeit*. Here he speaks about three different kinds of boredom: the boredom experienced when waiting for a train at a station, the boredom disclosed after a party intended to be a pastime, and, finally, the boredom that can be discerned in a large city on a Sunday, when everything is closed and no-one is in the streets. I have summarised this idea in one sentence, though Heidegger devotes five chapters of the published book (or almost 140 pages) to expounding these three types of boredom. The rhythm of his speech, the verbose exactitude of his investigation, the slow progression and the occasional stop is, without doubt, in itself a performance of boredom. But Heidegger has not selected boredom arbitrarily. Boredom is declared to be the mood of the times, which characterizes German thinking around 1930. This mood should not be investigated as an object, because it isn't an object. Every attempt to forcibly bring it out is deemed to be a failure. Instead, it should be awoken. And this is why Heidegger presents us with hours (and pages) of explication (or rather elucidation). We can all recognise the feeling of being bored by a professor whose lecture never seems to finish. What Heidegger does is to use an ordinary situation for an extraordinary goal. It is easy to dismiss it as humour, but

[5] Heidegger's etymological investigation of *logos* has been cast into doubt, both on philological and political grounds. For an example of this, see Nicholas Rand (1990).

we should also remember that, if Heidegger was right about the mood of his times, the intense reaction to the boredom following only three years later in Germany is the logical affective consequence.

To a limited extent, the question of listening has already been examined in the literature on Heidegger and education. Michael Bonnett has described a triadic interplay between teacher, learner and that which calls to be learned: a 'genuine *listening* is required to that which calls to be thought in the evolving situation', understood as 'the engagement of the learner with that which concerns him/her and the teacher's sensing of this and of the integrity of the subject matter itself as a tradition of concerns and perspectives' (Bonnet 2002: 239). This interpretation, however, emphasises the interplay within the triad teacher-learner-matter, whereas Heidegger seems to be more concerned with that which 'calls to be thought'. Iain Thomson is much closer when he outlines a three-step development towards an 'ontological education', related to Heidegger's pondering on Plato's allegory of the cave: first, the students hold their education for being just a means to make money or fulfil their potential (seeing only the shadow of things); then, the students turn their gazes to the matter itself, still being in the metaphysical mould of enframing (looking at the actual things); but, finally, they may be attuned to 'the *being* of entities', to *dwell* in the open (outside the cave) (Thomson 2005: 163–64). At this point, I would like to add that attunement means listening to the voice of Being; Being's voice (*Stimme*) is listened to in an attunement (*Stimmung*). Listening to the voice of Being means that we belong to it (in a *Zugehörigkeit*), open ourselves up to it, long for it—being longing. That is listening in its most distinctive meaning.

So, which impact on music has Heidegger's insistence on being in the right mood for thinking and learning? Let us turn back to our 'Eroica' Symphony one last time. We may still speak and learn about oddities in the structure. We may still attempt to establish which relation Beethoven had to Napoleon and to the French Revolution. We may still investigate the sketches, perhaps suggesting that the finale was the thematic origin of the work (Lockwood 1992: 134–50). But this is what the sources say—texts, score and sketches. It is only when listening to Beethoven's work that we come to know what it says, and this saying does not have to be anything linguistic. Even if we always interpret, the saying doesn't necessarily have anything to do with musical hermeneutics of the kind we know from the twentieth century, from Kretzschmar to Kramer, which has never had anything to say about how we listen to and belong to Being or how Being refuses to be heard.

Let us, finally, join the different remarks made in the paper into a jointure (or a *stretta*). Despite the fact that Heidegger proved himself to have an anti-musical tendency, at least during specific periods of time, his thought can open itself up to music. Accordingly, in terms of the worlding of a musical work of art, Beethoven's 'Eroica' revealed itself to work out an inexorable, manipulating subjectivity, where the temporal dimensions expand vehemently and the mobility turns into a relentless striving forward. Being is refused in this music, but it is withdrawn musically in a completely new way compared with the compositional efforts made before and around Beethoven. That is how the thrust of the work comes about, its immense striking power. The immensity of that work must resound, even in the words we say.

The only way to deal with the singularity is to listen and learn. Learning about this or any other musical work means to listen to it, and teaching is all about allowing ourselves to listen and give testimony. Only when this testimony shelters the immensity do we say something that has to do with the workings of the work.

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Chapter 9
The Phenomenology of Music: Implications for Teenage Identities and Music Education

Charles Ford and Lucy Green

Abstract Many writings about the philosophy of music and music education have focussed on concepts of meaning, metaphor, emotions and expression, invariably from the perspective of the individual listener or composer. This essay develops an alternative, phenomenological approach grounded in the writings of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. On the basis of these writers' discussions of musical being, the time of music, and its internal dialectics, we present an understanding of "style" as the primary basis for the mediation between production, musical experience and music learning. The essay suggests that music comes into presence within, and resounds, a nonconceptual and collective socio-historical world, feeding into the identity-formation of, in particular, teenagers. Through this, we offer a way of understanding why, as has often been argued, a purely conceptual music education can never be entirely satisfactory.

Keywords Music • Music education • Music learning • Phenomenology • Nonconceptual • Style • Teenage identities

9.1 Introduction

Many writings on the philosophy or aesthetics of music and music education have focused on terms such as meaning, metaphor, emotions and expression, invariably from the perspective of the individual listener or composer.[1] This essay seeks to

[1] For some examples of recent work in this area within the philosophy of music generally see: Koopman, and Davies (2001), Trivedi (2001), Stecker (2001), Zemach (2002), Matravers (2003), Budd (2003), Carr (2004), Kivy (2006); De Clercq (2007), Zangwill (2007). An argument in favour of the nonconceptual in musical experience, which tallies in many ways with our position here, is found in Luntley (2003). Within the philosophy of music education, texts which put the concept of musical meaning centrally, though from different perspectives include Reimer (2003); and Green (1988).

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_9

develop an alternative framework for thinking about music, musical experience and music learning which avoids the above terms altogether, by extrapolating from the writings of three German philosophers. Hegel's phenomenology of music in Part II of his *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art* (1842)[2] is our starting point; Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* (1905) provides the basis for our thinking about musical time; and three works by Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1926), "The Essence of Truth" (1930) and "The Origin of the Work of Art" (1936), inform our understanding of "musical matter" and the "nonconceptual", though nonetheless historical, nature of music and musical experience. This focus on music's place in the realm of the nonconceptual takes the discussion away from the customary aesthetic concerns mentioned above, and more towards collectivist, rather than individualist and materialist rather than idealist ways of thinking about music, musical experience and music learning. This has implications for identity-formation through music, particularly in relation to that of teenagers. We are concerned only with tonal Western classical and popular music and jazz in this essay. The extent to which the arguments would or would not be applicable to other musical styles could be an area for further consideration.

9.2 Hegel's Phenomenology of Music

We understand phenomenology as a way of thinking about relationships between consciousness and circumstance as a mutual and changing dynamic. Hegel's phenomenology of music brings together music and listeners into a unity, whilst at once preserving their respective identities. In other words, he did not subsume one term, music or the listening subject, into the other, after the fashion of relativism and formalism respectively. So, despite Hegel's central concern with subjective responses to music, he never lost touch with musical particulars. Indeed, about half of the section given over to music in his *Aesthetics* concerns rhythm, harmony and melody.[3]

Hegel recognised music's ephemeral temporal and sonic nature. Moreover, he used music to advance a new theory of time, as did Edmund Husserl (1905) and Henri Bergson (1910), again from phenomenological perspectives, about 70 years later. Hegel proposed that music, because of its temporal nature, does not stand over and against us as something concrete and fundamentally other, like a statue, painting, novel or poem. Rather, music is ephemeral, and so "volatilizes its real or

[2] Hegel's *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art* was published in 1835, 4 years after his death. It was later revised and expanded to include lectures that he had given in 1823, 1826 and 1829, and then republished in 1842. The Oxford edition, translated by Knox in 1975, is divided into two volumes which are through numbered. The first volume begins with a general introduction to the three parts (pp. 1–90), followed by the first two of these parts. Volume 2 begins with an introduction to the third part (pp. 613–620), which contains the section on music (pp. 880–958).

[3] There is a detailed discussion of Hegel's phenomenology in relation to musical experience in Green (1988), which differs slightly regarding the extent to which Hegel allows music's objective status.

objective existence into an immediate temporal disappearance" (Hegel 1835: 905). Because this idea is fundamental to Hegel's phenomenology of music, it is important to take particular care with two issues that arise from it.

Firstly, the objectivity of the statue, or indeed anything else, whether an art-work or not, was not left unquestioned by Hegel. For him, perception is not simply given. Rather, it is a dialectical unity insofar as consciousness "finds itself" in its objects, whilst at once "cancelling" that objectivity in the act of returning to the self with a conceptual or subjective representation of that object. In so doing, we find ourselves, or become self-conscious, amidst the objective world. Nonetheless, the "thing in itself" still remains "out there", persisting in this, its irreducible, ontological otherness. In both this, the fundamental otherness of the objective world, as well as that world's absorption into consciousness as a concept, Hegel understood the subject and its object to be in a dialectical unity, whilst nonetheless standing apart from one another. As Knox, in his preface to the *Aesthetics*, put it:

> … self-consciousness knows no distinction between the knower and the known, but consciousness of all else depends on reflexivity, which is to say that consciousness becomes aware of itself by being aware of objects and then by being reflected back into itself from them. Hegel is fond of this metaphor. The eye does not see itself except through its reflection in a mirror. (Knox 1975: x)

The second reason for taking care with Hegel's suggestion that music "volatilizes its real or objective existence into an immediate temporal disappearance" is because this idea seems to deny music any objective status. But this is not the case, as can be seen in the following discussion of the systematic nature of music.

> … the note is not a merely vague rustling and sounding but can only have any musical worth on the strength of its definiteness and consequent purity. Therefore, owing to this definiteness in its real sound and its temporal duration, it is in direct connection with other notes. Indeed it is this relation alone which imparts to it its own proper and actual definiteness and, along with that, its difference from other notes whether in opposition to them or in harmony with them. (Knox 1975: 910)

Music constantly passes away in time. But this, music's essentially ephemeral nature, does not mean that it is any less objective than anything else.

Having presented these two caveats, we return to Hegel's idea that music comes into presence, not as an object standing apart from ourselves, but by way of absorption "into an immediate temporal disappearance" because of its ephemeral nature. Music's realm, therefore, is not that of reason, but that which Hegel called the "inner world of feeling". Feelings do not find themselves in objects, as does self-consciousness. Hegel compared "self-conscious thinking" with feelings. In the former …

> … there is a necessary distinction between (a) the self that sees, has ideas, and thinks, and (b) the object of sight, ideas, and thought. But, in feeling, this distinction is expunged, or rather is not yet explicit, since there the thing felt is interwoven with the inner feeling as such, without any separation between them. (Hegel 1835: 904)

On the other hand, the inner world of feeling is entirely self-contained as a negative subjective unity.

> The inner life in virtue of its subjective unity is the active negation of accidental juxtaposition in space, and therefore a negative unity. But at first this self-identity remains wholly abstract and empty and it consists only in making *itself* its object and yet in cancelling this objectivity (itself only ideal and identical with what the self is) in order to make *itself* in this way a subjective unity. (Hegel 1835: 907)

When Hegel wrote that feelings are only "abstract and empty at first" he intended "at first" to mean "before", in a logical rather than temporal sense, those feelings are taken up with anything "external", such as music. Music is absorbed into this inner world of feelings, and in so doing shapes them.

> … what alone is fitted for expression in music is the object-free inner life, abstract subjectivity as such. This is our entirely empty self, the self without any further content. Consequently the chief task of music consists in making resound, not the objective world itself, but, on the contrary, the manner in which the inmost self is moved to the depths of its personality and conscious soul. (Hegel 1835: 891)

Hegel thought that music lends substance to the inner world of the feelings because of its similarly ephemeral nature as "mere vibrations" that constantly die away in time.

Before addressing the temporal nature of music, consider how Hegel thought that the self interrelates with time, even to the extent that "time is the being of the subject himself" (1835 p. 908). The cyclical nature of self-consciousness, the dialectic by which it projects itself as an object and then cancels that objectified self by returning to the "subjective self", is in continuous temporal flux. In this movement, self-consciousness breaks up the undifferentiated continuum of "external" time into differences, spans of time or temporal fields, in accordance with its cyclical nature.

> [This] implies an *interruption* of the purely indefinite process of changes … because the coming to be and passing away, the vanishing and renewal of points of time, was nothing but an entirely formal transition beyond this "now" to another "now" of the same kind, and therefore only an uninterrupted movement forward. Contrasted with this empty progress, the self is what persists in and by itself, and its self-concentration interrupts the indefinite series of points of time and makes gaps in their abstract continuity; and in its awareness of its discrete experiences, the self recalls itself and finds itself again and thus is freed from mere self-externalization and change. (Hegel 1835: 914)

It is important to recognise that music is not *in time*, and neither does it move through time, for this would be to suggest that time is something external, or logically prior to it. Musical time is *how time is* for music and its listeners. Music forms phenomenological time.

> Now since time, and not space as such, provides the essential element in which sound gains existence in respect of its musical value, and since the time of the sound is that of the subject too, sound on this principle penetrates the self, grips it in its simplest being, and by means of the temporal movement and its rhythm sets the self in motion (Hegel 1835: 908)

We return to Hegel's aesthetics of music at the end of this essay. Now we present Husserl's more detailed conception of musical time, in order to develop Hegel's understanding of how self-consciousness "interrupts the indefinite series of points" of musical time into spans or fields of presence.

9.3 Phenomenological Time and Musical Time

Music exists but it does not persist. Music is before all else ephemeral, constantly passing away from, and thereby denying, the merely notional points of time that we call "now". In Heidegger's words:

> The sequence of "nows" is uninterrupted and has no gaps. No matter how "far" we proceed in "dividing up" the "now", it is always now. (Heidegger 1926: 475)

Most of our awareness of time is governed by clocks and alarms, which register a combination of astronomically and mechanically determined, as if spatial, divisions. Yet when we are alone and relatively passive, perhaps waiting, travelling or resting, we turn in on ourselves and into our own fluid time. Such states of mind are characterised by chronic distraction: the endless, uncontrolled droning on of mind's "sub-thoughts", that are more-or-less beyond our control. The temporality of this distracted, "subjective time" is as unintelligible as that of dreams, and can become fragmented under extreme conditions. Nelson Mandela wrote about the distorted sense of time experienced by prisoners enduring extended sentences like his twenty-seven years in prison on Robben Island. His fellow long-term prisoner, Ahmed Kathedra once said that …

> … in prison the minutes can seem like years, but the years go by like minutes. An afternoon pounding rocks in the courtyard might seem like forever, but suddenly it is the end of the year, and you do not know where all the months went. (Mandela 1994: 463)

In such extreme conditions inner, or subjective time, becomes separated from what Husserl called "phenomenological time".

Husserl, in his *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, compared this subjective or "immanent" time with external or "objective time" (Husserl 1905: 24–25), which latter is not available to consciousness beyond its measurement by clocks.[4] Phenomenological time is neither of these, but the interface between changing consciousness and changing reality. As such, phenomenological time is not a series of discrete "presents" or "nows" but a continuous flow. What is "now" is no more than a notional section of that flow: it may refer to a few seconds, or to an era. For instance, a person can be enjoying a particularly pleasant day when all at once the quality of the day as a whole comes to mind in the instant when they think, "Oh what a wonderful day!" Such moments can take in hours of experience, or even historical epochs. Then again, memory, or what Husserl termed "retention", might recall the day as a "unity in memory" (1905: 106). Husserl called this past "gist" of the day as a whole not a simple retention, but a "retention of retention" (1905: 107). This distinction marks up the difference between a recent memory that constantly merges with and informs the present – a "retention", and one that is cut off and distinct from the present – a "retention of retention".

[4] For another account of Husserl's theory of time with reference to music see Clifton (1983).

Husserl's discussion of the time of a melody is couched in terms of the retentions of the immediate past.[5] Music, he said, involves a continuous and constant "running off" of sounds into this past. The content of this running off is implicit within the musical "now" (1905: 104–105). So, whilst we perceive a melody note-by-note, we also accumulate what we have already heard up to the present instant as the "unity in memory" that we apprehend as the "now". Meanwhile, what is "now" changes the character of those retentions that are implicit within that "now".

> …everything new reacts on the old; its forward-moving intention is fulfilled and determined thereby, and this gives the reproduction a definite colouring. (Husserl 1905: 77f)

That which is "now" itself becomes a retention as it "runs off" behind, so to speak, some future "now". What is perceived to be now is as one with the unperceived past (1905: 60). "Now" is no more than the leading edge of the past, or the end of what was.

Meanwhile, expectations, like memories, are component parts of what is now. Husserl called expectations "protentions". Protentions arise on the basis of what is now. What is now is constantly, as fluidly as water, moving forwards. It is noteworthy that, because time is of course irreversible, there cannot be a symmetrical relationship between retentions and protentions, but rather they stand in a dynamic dialectic. So, whereas the protentive aspects of musical, or any other form of phenomenological time involve the content of its retentions, retentions do not involve the content of protentions.

Whilst Husserl used the example of a melody to develop his explanation of phenomenological time, he did not account for musical processes and structures, such as how music defines the duration or extent of retentions and expectations or "protention" (1905: 76), by means of periods, up-beats and cadences; or how, at some point during our perception of a melody, the retentive qualities of the musical "now" are taken over by protentions, as we begin to sense how far we are from the end of that protention, and the form that end will take.[6] These changes involve seconds and fractions of seconds of music. The temporal compression of all the parameters of music – rhythm, pitch, harmony, timbre, texture and dynamics – is astonishing. One minute of music can seem like fifteen minutes of most other experience.

We now turn to the question of the aesthetic object, after which we discuss specifically musical matter.

9.4 Functional and Artistic Materials

As mentioned at the beginning of this essay, the central section of Hegel's chapter on music in his *Aesthetics* (Hegel 1835: 310–333) concerns music's "sensuous materials". But this is little more than what is now called the "rudiments of music":

[5] Smith (2006: 231–33), gave an alternative account of Husserl's theory of musical time; as did Clifton at greater length in the first part of his *Music as Heard* (1983).

[6] L. B. Meyer's music theory is grounded in a similar idea of melodic 'implication' to Husserl's 'protention' (see especially Meyer 1956, 1973).

how "triple time" is notated for instance. So we turn instead to the way in which Heidegger conceived of artistic matter generally, which will then serve as a basis for a discussion of musical matter in particular.

Heidegger's philosophy is particularly promising for music because one of its principal concerns is with "nonconceptual consciousness", meaning that range of experience which is not linguistic, or which is "unsayable". This unusual concern arose from Heidegger's dissatisfaction with propositional truth, or what he called the "correspondence theory" of truth. We approach his insight into the material of art by way of three stages, on which we will base a model of musical matter. First we turn to his criticism of this traditional understanding of truth, and the alternative that he presents.

In his essay "The Origin of the Work of Art" (1936) Heidegger continued the discussion of truth that he first developed in *Being and Time* (1926), and then again in his essay "The essence of truth" (1930). In the latter, he called the customary understanding of truth one of "correspondence", because it concerns the correctness of a concept to a thing. But, Heidegger asked, how can there be an "inner-possibility of agreement" between a thing, such as a 10p piece, and a proposition concerning one? The 10p piece is round and metallic, whereas the proposition, which is said to agree with it, is linguistic (Heidegger 1930: 122–123). In order to find a definition of truth that is rooted in being, rather than in propositions, Heidegger turned to our immediate, nonconceptual experience of things, though not to "mere things", which he referred to as "self-refusing" or unknowable, but to tools and equipment generally. Heidegger's thinking about equipment is the object of the next, second stage of his discussion of functional and artistic matter.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger pointed out that, because we are so preoccupied with instrumental attitudes, much of our awareness of things is in terms of their functions or use value (1927: 96). Just as the sign always draws our attention away from itself, so too does the tool. Both sign and tool are encountered as being "ready-to-hand", or, in the English vernacular, as being "handy", rather than "present-at-hand", or, again in everyday terms, as "present" (1927: 101–102). Tools do not become present, because our concern is not with them but with the work in hand. Heidegger gave the example of a hammer, the purpose of which is to bang in nails. We do not encounter the hammer by thinking about it for our concern is not with *it* but with our reason for using it (1927: 98–99). Furthermore, a tool can only be handy when it is manipulated in accordance with a purpose, or what Heidegger called an "assignment" or "in-order-to" to which it refers, as does the symbol to the sign. Within this "manifold of reference", or "equipmental world", tools are manipulated according to the purpose for which they have been designed. For example, hammering in a nail has the immediate "in-order-to" of fixing, say, the side of a desk. The purpose of the desk is to provide a surface for studying. The "towards-which" of studying is to write an essay, so much so that the writer is unaware of their pen, or of their keyboard and mouse. Because the ultimate "towards-which" is always our individual or collective selves, Heidegger said that we are already ahead of ourselves in our concern with our projects (1927: 99–101).

However, if the hammer breaks and its reliability fails, so too is its manifold of reference interrupted, and the hammer changes from being handy to become present

(1927: 101–102). It stands forth as that which is disrupting the project. But this is only momentary, because the defective equipment immediately becomes something to be mended, and as such is absorbed back into its equipmental context or "world" (1927: 105–106). In other words, something is revealed to us before we put a name to it, in this case, "broken", broken within the context of, in this case, the "world" of the person mending the desk.

Heidegger continued his discussion of tools in his later essay, "The Origin of the Work of Art" (1936), though now with respect to the useful materials that are worked on in order to produce something. Such functional materials, like tools, disappear in their use. "Equipment" and "material" are synonymous in the following.

> The production of equipment is finished when a material has been so formed as to be ready for use. For equipment to be ready means that it is dismissed beyond itself, to be used up in serviceability. (Heidegger 1936: 64)

However, in the artwork the "thingness" of the thing, its matter, is revealed to be of value in itself, or as being *present*.[7]

> To be sure, the *sculptor* uses stone just as the mason uses it, in his own way. But he does not use it up. That happens in a certain way only where the work miscarries. To be sure, the painter also uses pigment, but in such a way that colour is not used up but rather only now comes to shine forth. To be sure, the poet also uses the word – not, however, like ordinary speakers and writers who have to use them up, but rather in such a way that the word only now becomes and remains truly a word. (Heidegger 1936: 47–8)

As will be discussed at the end of this essay, Heidegger's conceptions of "handy", "present" and "world" can shed light on teenagers' relationships with music, and thus have implications for the classroom.

9.5 Musical Matter

Now we are better placed to address the matter of music. Consider first the distinction between noise and sound. Noises are dismissed as soon as they are heard because they are "used up" in Heidegger's sense, rejected out of hand as the unwanted by-product of some, usually known, activity. "Sounds", on the other hand, like noises, are always sounds of something either more or less welcome: telephones, cash registers or birdsong for example.

Musical sound stands forth from all other sound as sufficient to itself. It is immediately distinguishable from sonic matter partly because notes are far more acoustically focussed than noise (as can be seen through an oscilloscope). Musical sound is characterised by an acceptable balance of "overtones" – a high series of pitches within and above named notes: which give what Hegel referred to as the musical note's "definiteness and consequent purity" (Hegel 1835: 410). This "harmonic

[7] John Silkin uses the word "haeceity" to refer to "thisness" in poetry, by which term he means a similar "coming into presence" as Heidegger (1979: 56).

series" defines the timbre or tone of a musical sound. Musical sounds move and change in accordance with a more-or-less steady pulse, which, because of its lack of differentiation and therefore pattern, is not yet rhythmic. We will refer to this barely musical combination of sound and pulse as *primary musical matter*. Primary musical matter is not yet music, for there are a further two levels of musical matter before it can serve musical creativity.

Secondary musical matter arises from the differentiation of these basic musical sounds. In Western music, secondary musical matter is grounded in the division of the octave – the primary overtone of the "harmonic series" – into twelve discrete and evenly "spaced" pitches, known as the "chromatic scale". But these notes do not form a scale as such, because they are evenly spaced, and, like a mere pulse, therefore have no pattern, no beginning or end: they merely start and stop. Similarly, in terms of rhythm, when the mere pulse of primary musical matter takes on similarities and differences – downbeat, after-beat and so forth – it becomes patterned into metres – ¾, 4/4 etc.

Tertiary musical matter forms when these evenly spaced series of notes are divided into unevenly spaced scales, which, being poised between similarity and difference, are thereby patterned. As a result of this patterning, scales have a primary note and chord, towards which all other notes and chords are directed. The primary notes of scales are at their strongest and clearest when they are underpinned by metric downbeats. This happens most clearly at cadential points. The combination of patterned pitches and patterned rhythms is the tertiary musical matter that is ready to be formed into music *per se*.

An illustration may clarify this point. We are driving to a pop festival. As we approach the site we begin to distinguish primary and secondary musical matter, in the form of musical notes and a pulse, emerging through the traffic noise, but as yet we cannot hear its tertiary musical matter, let alone any music. Primary, secondary and tertiary musical matter coexist in pieces of music. In this example the various levels of musical matter arise successively as we approach the festival site.

9.6 Hegel and Heidegger's Dialectics of Art

So far, we have provided an account of musical time and matter. This alone, for Hegel and all other nineteenth-century philosophers of art, would have been insufficient to explain music's extraordinary power, its transcendence of mere matter. Hegel, and much later Heidegger, thought that the matter of art, which they called "sensuous materials" and "earth" respectively, only took on the real mantle of art in combination with "ideal thought" for Hegel, or "world" for Heidegger. In this section of the essay we enquire into these two dialectics on the way to proposing a different, more material model.

Hegel's understanding of the nature of art is bound up with his claims for art's capacity to reveal truth, which probably influenced Heidegger's thinking about truth generally. Hegel thought that if a work of art is to carry the possibility of truth it

cannot be reducible to its material or "sensuous" being, but rather "stands in the *middle* between immediate sensuousness and ideal thought" (1835: 38). (This conception of "ideal thought" is coextensive with Idea, Spirit and the Absolute in the *Aesthetics*: xiv.) Neither the perceived sensuous materials of the work of art, or the transcendent, unperceived Idea that it embodies, can take precedence over one another. Both must be present in a dialectic.

> … art's vocation is to unveil the truth in the form of sensuous artistic configuration, to set forth the reconciled opposition just mentioned [between sensuous material and Ideal thought], and so to have its end and aim in itself, in this very setting forth and unveiling. (1835: xiv)

To find an equivalent dialectic in Heidegger, we resume our earlier discussion of the way that he understood artistic matter in "The Origin of the Work of Art". As an example of how the matter of a work of art is *not* used up, Heidegger turned to Van Gogh's painting of a pair of peasant's shoes. In this essay both mere things and equipment are referred to as "earth".

The "self-refusing" materiality of the shoes, by which Heidegger meant their "unknowability", can only be brought forth and revealed with an intensity that is unique to art; or can only "be true", by the way in which the painting evokes the broader context of the world of the peasant.

> Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. (Heidegger 1936: 34).
>
> The peasant woman … has a world because she dwells in the overtness of beings, of the things that are. Her equipment, in its reliability, gives to this world a necessity and nearness of its own. (1936: 45)

Heidegger uses the term "world" in this passage in a particular sense to imply an over-arching context, similar to the artisan's "manifold of reference" as discussed above, though much greater, within which things emerge, or "thing" for artistic experience.

> The world worlds, and is more fully in being than the tangible and perceptible realm in which we believe ourselves to be at home. World is never an object that stands before us and can be seen. World is the ever-nonobjective to which we are subject … (1936: 44)

Heidegger's idea of the "ever-non objective to which we are all subject" refers to the fact that this world can never be predicated, and so can never become objective. It will play an essential role in this essay because it is to this nonconceptual world that music belongs.

The work of art combines earth and world, in a similar way to Hegel's "sensuous materials" and Idea.

> The setting up of a world and the setting forth of earth are two essential features in the work being of the work. They belong together, however, in the unity of work being. (1936: 48)

This unity is not an easy one but a continuous striving between the two terms, not so much against, as between one another; a striving in which earth and world preserve their mutual independence *and* their interdependence.

> In essential striving … the opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of their natures. (1936: 49).

But, whilst Hegel's general aesthetic theory, as expounded in his introduction, rests on the dialectic between "sensuous materials" and Idea, there is no mention of the latter in the section on music. This can be attributed to his fundamental identification of music with feelings, which in Hegel's scheme have no access to the Ideal. It would seem that this was the reason why Hegel did not rate music as highly as literature and art in his hierarchy of the arts. Despite this essential part of Hegel's dialectic having been thus denied to music, we will retrieve some of Hegel's ideas on the subject later in this essay.

There is also a problem in relation to thinking about music in Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art". Despite his critique of the correspondence theory of truth, and his concern for the nonconceptual, and despite his idea of the stone of the sculpture and the paint of the painting being brought forth and held as "earth" in its dialectic with "world", both "earth" and "world" are bound up with representation in his discussion of Van Gogh's painting. Both the shoes and the peasant's world are represented, or referred to by the painting after the manner of concepts. However, Heidegger's idea of the preconceptual "world" in "The Origin of the Work of Art" will prove to be most pertinent at the end of this essay. However, we prefer the term "nonconceptual" rather than "preconceptual" because we do not want to suggest any primacy for either the conceptual or the nonconceptual worlds.

Both philosophers pointed to a dialectic in works of art between their perceived matter and something unperceived that goes beyond that matter, and which brings that matter into presence *as art*. In both cases this unperceived "something other" is of a completely different order to the matter of the work of art. Both Hegel's Idea and Heidegger's "world" imply something far greater and more complex than any one piece of music, something at the level of an era, epoch or *zeitgeist*. But this "something other" that lets music come into presence need not be of a different order to music when music's world is understood in terms of "style".

9.7 Mediation by Style

The combination of primary, secondary and tertiary musical matter that we advanced earlier is not music *per se*. Like Hegel's "sensuous materials", tertiary musical matter, such as scales and metres, require something else to become music. This something is customarily called "style", which signifies not "fashion" but a musicological and philosophical category with a specific meaning.[8] Within music education Green (1988/2008) has emphasised style as a crucial element in the stratification of musical knowledge, as reproduced by the education system; and later we will go on to

[8] L. B. Meyer was probably the first music theorist to place such importance on style. See (1956, 1967, 1973).

argue how this relates to the issue of teenagers' identity and its presence in the classroom. Style is the system by which musical matter becomes music; and, as such is usually equivalent to fourth level musical matter. Style, like "Idea" and "world", is imperceptible as such. Nonetheless, "style", *unlike* "Idea", is "musical", in the sense that it is a set of musical conventions for organising musical matter into pieces of music. So this conception of style is material rather than transcendent, rather than metaphysical as is Hegel's Idea and Heidegger's "world". Music is brought down to ground, as it were, by style.

Style differentiation does not only involve changes of fourth level musical matter, but sometimes also changes of third, and even second level matter. For instance, whilst the shift from the Classical style of the later eighteenth century to early nineteenth-century Romanticism represents a change of fourth level matter, the shift from late nineteenth-century tonality to the serial music of the Second Viennese school, because it involved a rejection of tonality, took the form of a change of secondary musical matter. Moreover, John Cage's "ambient" and chance music, as compared with pretty well all earlier music, represents a change at the primary level of musical matter of notes rather than noise.

It is particularly important when thinking about music education to consider the general stylistic differences between classical and popular music. Whilst classical music tended towards atonality in the twentieth century, popular music has preferred modal, pentatonic and "blues scales" as its tertiary musical matter. Whilst classical music in the second Viennese school and its followers made any pulse imperceptible and almost did away with beat, popular music lays great emphasis on both. Dynamics, apart from detailed accentuation, are far less important to popular music, most songs remaining at roughly the same dynamic level throughout. Timbre, on the other hand, has been vitally important for popular music's development, in the form, for instance of changing guitar sounds and ways of producing the voice, sometimes involving pre-primary level, or 'non musical' sounds known as "dirt". Popular music's rhythmic tertiary musical matter is also distinct from that of classical music. For instance, much popular music and jazz has been characterised by a play of surface, millisecond differences, sometimes known as the essentially non-conceptual notion of "feel", or what Ford has elsewhere called "contraflection" (Ford 1998).

Furthermore, "style" is not only an "objective" quality of music, but is also a condition of consciousness in the form of listeners' familiarity with a style. All musical experience depends on the interweaving of the style of a particular piece of music and listeners' familiarity with that style, which we call "musical competence", after the fashion of "linguistic competence" (Eco 1976: 4; also see Green 1988). Familiarity with style pulls itself up by the bootstraps of its experience because every new piece contributes to listeners' "style-competence". Because producers contribute to styles with every new piece they produce, and because listeners become increasingly familiar with those styles, they are dynamic, historical.

When a listener does not have the necessary familiarity with a style, there can be no such accord, which might lead them to say "that's not music", or "that sort of music always sounds like that", whereas in the former response, perhaps even

tertiary musical matter is not recognised as such. In the latter, a particular piece sounds only as an example of an unfamiliar style, and consequently has no particular identity.

Whilst musical competence is learnt it does not necessitate any ability to conceptualise music. People often say, as if apologetically, "I don't know anything about music". Not only listeners, but musicians who have acquired their skills and knowledge primarily through informal learning are apt to make such statements, and to consider themselves to only "know" about music to the extent that they can apply labels to it such as "modulation" and "middle-eight"; and/or to the extent that they are able to read notation. Furthermore, when musicians are teaching, there is a tendency to consider that concepts are of prime importance. Even musicians who initially develop their skills and knowledge informally, and without attaching concepts to them, often have a tendency to start applying concepts as soon as they are in a professional role as teacher (see Robinson 2012; Green 2001, 2008).

But there is nothing to know, in the sense of conceptualise, about music's nonconceptual nature. Indeed, freedom from musical concepts can perhaps enable a "purer", since nonconceptual musical experience.[9] On the other hand, such conceptual "props" can assist sustained musical attention. We will discuss how greater and lesser competence with nonconceptual "subjective style" has profound implications for listening, learning to listen, and thus for music education. It must be emphasised that conceptual and nonconceptual are not discrete or mutually opposed realms of consciousness, but are always intertwined, informing one another. A purely nonconceptual musical experience is at least improbable. Nonetheless, musical competence requires only attentive and repeated listening to representative pieces in any one style. Every new musical experience contributes to deepening and broadening listener's musical competence.

Because of the shared necessity of style for both musical production and musical reception, *style is the primary form of mediation between music and listening*. Music only exists insofar as it is the incarnation of a style. Reciprocally, style is only perceived insofar as it becomes incarnate in pieces of music. This is unlike the way in which Hegel's perceived "sensuous materials" and Heidegger's perceived "earth" are opened up by their dialectical union with unperceived "Ideal thought" and "world" respectively, because now both terms – piece and style – are essentially musical. There is nothing transcendent about music. Indeed, it is probably at the level of style, rather than any one particular piece, that music resonates the sociohistorical circumstances of its production and reception.

The philosophical significance of this conception of style is far-reaching. Think, for instance, what form Kant's *Critique of Judgement* would have taken if he had presented his notion of *sensus communis* in terms of style. We leave this question to Kant scholars. Meanwhile, questions of musical access and distribution, together with listeners' various and diverse responses, continue to be discussed by sociologists

[9] See also Luntley 2003 on this topic.

of music and music education.[10] In the context of the present essay, we think of these issues as forms of secondary mediation, in the sense that musical style as primary mediation logically proceeds them. When, as we will discuss in the last section of this essay, style is understood in this way, it can throw light on some of the issues that teachers encounter in the classroom.

9.8 Musical Worlds Within Worlds

In this section we consider how music comes into presence within what can be thought of as the "world" of its style, and within Heidegger's understanding of "world" as a nonconceptual historical totality: worlds within worlds.[11] But first, let us consider the power and the limits of nonconceptual experience.

The nonconceptual world, which is an all too often neglected aspect of collective consciousness, is of necessity closed to predication. As such, although this might seem contradictory at first, it is of immense significance. Its power over our lives is so powerful *because* we cannot predicate it, and are in this sense directed by it, or are as if victims of it. Thus nonconceptual consciousness can have more power over our lives than conceptual consciousness. This world is that of our desires and our fears, and all those perceptions that are beyond our control: sounds and smells, both of which have such enormous power to recall our past. It is a world of vagary, of soft edges and fluidity.[12]

The "conceptual" and "nonconceptual" are far more inclusive terms than Hegel's understanding of reason and feeling. Just as information is conceptual though not the whole of reason, so too is music nonconceptual but not the whole of feelings. Concepts and "nonconcepts" are as one within most experience, and it is only when listening to music in a completely unfamiliar style, that we do not automatically identify instruments, ways of performing, verses and so forth. Usually, musical concepts can help nonconceptual musical experience insofar as they can provide toeholds for concentration. As mentioned above, "Pure" nonconceptual listening may give the most pure and profound musical experience, but it is probably rare.

How can music be thought to render incarnate in sound, or give voice to, not only the world of its style but also the greater, non-musical, nonconceptual world of which it is a part? Haydn's music, on the one hand, and the blues on the other, provide

[10] For some examples see: Becker (1963), De Nora (2000, 2003), Frith (1978), Green (1988), Hennion (2003), Leppert and McClary (1987), Martin (1995), Shepherd et al. (1977), Small (1977), Willis (1978), Wright (2012a, b).

[11] Bowie (2007) presents a profound philosophical argument as to why music might be able to transcend modernism's challenge to the limits of language. An interesting application of Heideggerian thought to music education, this time in relation to composition, is to be found in Naughton (2012); and a discussion of the importance of the processes of musical engagement in relation to Heidegger's thinking and music education is provided in Lines (2005).

[12] Both the necessity and the vagary of the preconceptual world are illuminated by the ideas of 'God' in Christian theology, and 'Tao'. See Lao Tzu (1963), especially paragraph XXI, p. 78 and XXV, p. 82.

starkly opposed examples of how music comes into presence in different relationships with its style, and in this way brings into presence very different worlds.

Haydn's remarkable ability to transform mere scraps of the secondary musical matter of the Classical style into distinctive music contributed to and arose from the late eighteenth-century European Enlightenment's fascination with empiricism and sense perception. Thus his music brings into presence, or "resonates with", firstly the world of the Classical style, and secondly with the "nonconceptual" totality of the Enlightenment.

On the other hand, *a* blues of the sort that was recorded in the 1920s and 30s in the US Deep South, and which continues to be produced today, is a mere strip off *the* blues. The style's riffs, licks and sung phrases were freely plundered and reordered by individual singers. So, rather than resonating with the valued aesthetic unity and unique originality of Classical music, *a* particular blues resounds not its own particular identity, but *the* blues as an anonymous, collective style-world. Whereas Haydn's music *develops* its style, the blues *insists* on it, thereby resounding the enduring and seemingly indelible shadow of absolutely unindividuated slavery.

Whilst we can still hear the resonance of both Haydn's music and the "Delta Blues" today, their worlds remain more-or-less distant from us. Music can open a door on foreign or past worlds, but, as with all history, what we hear coming through that door is only what music affords to us from where and when we are listening.[13] For this reason, we distinguish between *resonating* and *resounding*. Whilst music from the past has the potential to *resonate* with the nonconceptual world of its production (within the terms of a particular style), music of our own time can *resound*, in the sense of give voice to, our own world.

Nowadays in many parts of the world the music that most clearly holds the promise of resounding "our" world, or "the" contemporary world, is popular music. This is most especially so for teenagers, for whom popular music is akin to "the soundtrack of their lives". Yet in most reception contexts and practices, popular music is listened to in a "distracted" way. Many teenagers, at least under the age of fourteen, declare that they do not listen to "music" but "only to lyrics", and that they experience music as "just a big block of sound" with undifferentiated parts. A number of examples of this are available in Green (2008: 73–84), where teenagers discuss their music-listening experiences. Moreover, these particular teenagers were only in a position to make these kinds of claims, because their listening had been required to deepen, through being asked to listen "purposively" in order to play music from a recording by ear. It was only after that experience, that they could make such statements, because it was only then that they were able to differentiate their earlier, distracted or, in Heidegger's terms, "handy" listening experiences from their new experiences of musical presence. They could now describe how they heard music as being made of "layers", with "underneath bits". Another example is the way that many of the same teenagers, on being asked to copy music

[13] Gibson (1986) used the term 'affords' to mean the possibilities that anything offers to interpretation. This has been applied to music notably by Moore (2002), De Nora (2000) and Clarke (2004).

by ear, started by playing the rhythm of the main melody line or vocal line on the drums, as if under the impression that the drums play pitches. This was also a manifestation of hearing music as "nothing but lyrics", or as "just a big block of sound".[14]

How can popular music resound anything when, as is so often the case particularly amongst young teenagers, it is not actively listened to, but only heard in a distracted manner as the "handy" background for some other concern? Because we have no "ear-lids", and no need to turn towards the source of sound, we are far more vulnerable to it than we are to visual perceptions. Sometimes we can feel almost as if victims of our sonic ambience, which we hear but try *not* to listen to. Pieces of popular music, whatever their value and however casually they are listened to, resound their contemporary world for even the most distracted listeners. It is precisely because popular music is often *not* listened to attentively, and consequently not controlled by conceptual reason, that it can take on so much significance – precisely because it is not fully brought to consciousness. It is the very distracted or "un-listened" to way that so much pop is heard that gives it such potency. Popular music is of the utmost importance for the formation of teenage identity, because it resounds teenagers' collective nonconceptual world, and consequently goes on to become an essential part of our adult identity. In this sense, we are what we have heard.

Of course there will be children, typically young instrumentalists, singers, or composers, for whom popular music and/or classical music, comes into presence, but they are in the minority. Even among those who take classical instrumental lessons, nearly all youngsters today are primarily wrapped up in various styles of popular music and their associated sub-cultural worlds.

9.9 Musical Presence

Hegel said that music does not present itself as being apart from the self like an object, but enters into the time of the negative unity of self-consciousness, shaping it, as it were, from within. We quoted the following passage earlier:

> … what alone is fitted for expression in music is the object-free inner life, abstract subjectivity as such. This is our entirely empty self, the self without any further content. Consequently the chief task of music consists in making resound, not the objective world itself, but, on the contrary, the manner in which the inmost self is moved to the depths of its personality and conscious soul. (Hegel 1835: 891).

Hegel's identification of music with the object-free realm of the feelings can be read to refer to the way that "feelings" are generally thought to be ill-defined, abstract or ideal. But musical experience is neither "inner", of the "soul" or "spirit", or absolutely individual. Rather the reverse, for pieces do not throw listeners into inwardness, but rather open them out to a nonconceptual world which, whilst

[14] On the drumming phenomenon, see Green (2008: 48–9). For some examples of teenagers' listening habits see Hargreaves and North (1997, 1999).

registered individually, is also *collective*. So, rather than having individual control over music, we offer ourselves up to musical experience within the freedom of a collective style. This idea is in accord with Kant's grounding of aesthetic judgement in universal subjective validity, (Kant 2000: 99–101) though, and this is most important, with "universal" substituted.[15]

Levinas proposed a similar idea of listeners giving their individual ego to music, in a way that is close to Hegel's thinking, though in the following he writes about rhythm alone.

> Rhythm represents a unique situation where we cannot speak of consent, assumption, initiative or freedom, because the subject is caught up and carried away by it. The subject is part of its representation. It is so not even despite itself, for in rhythm there is no longer a oneself, but rather a sort of passage from oneself to anonymity. (Kant 2000: 99–101)

Because of the ephemeral nature of sound, it has only a transient and insubstantial objectivity. Mere sounds recede and are absorbed into the preconceptual ambience of the everyday world. Whilst music is absorbed in this way, it nevertheless stands forth *as music*. Music brings sounds into presence in the most incredibly compressed, complex and detailed patterns of sound in time, measurable only in milliseconds. When we are involved with music we are absorbed into this, its fine web of temporal similarities, differences, structures and processes: its various fields of presence and their inter-relations. Music is the only art that forms time through sound, and then so much so that listeners' intentional time *becomes* that of music. In Hegel's words, music thereby "penetrates the self, grips it in its simplest being" (Hegel 1835: 908). But, this "gripping", rather than being inner and individual, and "expressing feelings", frees us from the fragile limits of the individual ego, delivering us over to the collective anonymity of musical style, whilst also perhaps, resounding the collective anonymity of the nonconceptual world.

The truth of music, in the sense of Heidegger's idea of truth as revelation, is its coming into presence by standing forth from mere sound *as music*; and this together with (though not necessarily so) its resonance or resounding of a nonconceptual world. Musical revelation, its glorious passage into transcendent anonymity as musical presence, can resound entirely new and unfamiliar ways of being in the nonconceptual temporality that is peculiar to it. Music dissolves all distinctions between subject and object, me and them, reason and feeling, fears and desires.

9.10 Implications for Music Education

Hegel's, Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenological thinking can reveal the power of the nonconceptual in our lives. More particularly, Hegel and Husserl show how music forms subjective time, and thus how it has immense power over our

[15] It could well be argued that Kant's idea of 'universal subjectivity validity' is equivalent to Heidegger's 'world'.

consciousness; whilst Heidegger's distinction between the "handy" and the "present" throws philosophical light on musical experience: we can think of "distracted" musical hearing as handy, whereas "purposive" listening has an involvement with musical presence. All three ways of thinking can help to explain the powerful effect of popular music on the fragile consciousness of young people, which makes them so vulnerable to popular music itself, its world and the subcultures that it resonates for them. Thus music education should foster the nonconceptual, and attempt to bring music – any music –from heard, distracted awareness into musical presence.

Music education has to continue building upon ways that evade objectives, assessment-led and conceptually oriented educational policies. Swanwick persuasively argued for the recognition of the essentially nonconceptual nature of music and its experience in terms of the importance of "acquaintance knowledge", as opposed to conceptual "knowledge how" and "knowledge that" (Swanwick 1994). As he says, no amount of "knowing that" certain musical facts exist or "learning how" to play musical instruments can be sufficient conditions for stimulating musical understanding and learning. The nonconceptual nature of music makes it difficult to assess students' musicality other than through the assessment of their performance or composition, closely sticking to agreed, conceptual criteria. Thus latent musicality is not picked up; its apparent lack may be left unattended, and so often this apparent lack becomes a part of the young person's self-concept, which they take into adulthood.

Current music education practices and research are tackling this kind of problem by bringing into the classroom a range of what here we would call "nonconceptual" musical practices based on "purposive" listening and on musical experience itself.[16] Rather than teaching the "whats" and "hows" of popular – or any other music – some teachers are applying some of the ways that popular and other vernacular musicians learn to the music lesson. In many such contexts students choose their own music to play or sing, and their friends with whom to learn, and outside conventional structured music teaching that proceeds from simpler to more complex music. Thus what the students like – what they "are" in the profound nonconceptual sense of their musical "world" – is what they do in the classroom, quite irrespective of its difficulty. We believe that such approaches are truly critical because they can awaken students' distracted, or "handy" hearing of popular music, by bringing forth their hearing into listening, and thus into true musical presence.

[16] A few examples of practical work with teachers and students include: Abrahams et al. (2011), Andrews (2013), Baker (2013), Baker and Green (2013), Chua (2013a, b), Chua and Ho (2013a, b), Costes-Onish (2013), D'Amore (2011), Feichas (2010), Gower (2012), Green (2008, 2014), Ho (2013a, b), Jeanneret et al. (2011), Karlsen (2010), Lebler (2007, 2008), O'Neill and Bespflug (2012), Price (2005, 2006), Wright (2011, 2012a, b).

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Chapter 10
Music Education as a Dialogue Between the Outer and the Inner. A Jazz Pedagogue's Philosophy of Music Education

Elin Angelo

Abstract This chapter discusses the philosophy of work of a renowned Norwegian jazz pedagogue and its embodiment in practice as a dialogue between inner and outer aspects of music and human beings. Music, here, is conceived as something that doesn't necessarily involve sound. The chapter is based on a qualitative study, and aims to enrich basic thinking in music- and art teacher education. Through a philosophical inspired discussion, three dilemmas are highlighted in the conclusion: Is jazz education about music or about humans? If it is about humans – is it about individuals or communities? If jazz education and jazz performance is regarded as two sides of the same thing, what then should jazz *teacher* education be about?

Keywords Philosophy of work • Jazz education • Pivots • Musicking • Musicality

This chapter provides an example of what music education is about, in the philosophy of work and the practice of a renowned Norwegian jazz music pedagogue. The jazz pedagogue concerned, John Pål Inderberg (hereafter referred to as JP), is an accomplished, internationally-recognised, ground-breaking jazz musician and jazz educator.

Among other things, he has been honoured for being a driving force in the establishment of the first formal jazz education program in Norway.

According to JP, 'the aim of this jazz education is for the students to *become* themselves.' This 'becoming' is realised through a dialogue between the inner and the outer in music and human beings – in which music is conceived as something that doesn't necessarily involve sound.

In this chapter I present a narrative framed around one of JP's ear-training lessons to illustrate the overarching existential focus of his philosophy and how he realises it in his teaching practice. The narrative is followed by a discussion of three key themes

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_10

that emerged from my study of JP, expressed as a set of binary 'pivots': *tradition/liberation*, *music as 'hearable'/music as 'un-hearable'*, and *pedagogue/performer*. I reflect on these pivots in the light of Martin Heidegger's thoughts about art and human beings and Christopher Smalls' notion of 'musicking' (Heidegger 2000; Small 1998, 1987). In conclusion I explore how this chapter might enrich basic thinking in music and art teacher education.

10.1 Background

Since the 1960s, the Norwegian jazz scene has gained a reputation as one of the most vibrant and innovative in the international jazz community, led by pioneers such as Jan Garbarek, Karin Krog and Terje Rypdal. Their rise to success as a force in international jazz was supported by targeted efforts in the Norwegian jazz community at large. One of the strategies implemented was the formalisation of jazz education, beginning with establishment of the country's first formal jazz progam (Jazzlinja in Norwegian) in 1979 at the conservatory of the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim.

At first, NTNU's Jazzlinja was greeted with resistance and scepticism from the conservatory, which was strongly rooted in classical and church music, and even used to have signs hung on the school's instruments that strictly prohibited their use to play pop or jazz music (Svedal 2004, website). The professional jazz community too raised doubts and objections about putting jazz education into the conservatory environment because they worried that this would destroy jazz completely.

Thus, the process of establishing the program was fraught with difficult negotiations and challenges. Yet, it also required JP to carefully reflect upon and articulate his own philosophy of jazz education – something that was a precious condition for my study.

As JP explains, the founders of Jazzlinja were musicians who 'lived for their passion', with 'strong experiences of the importance of this' – something that was hard to translate into a set of clearly-stated intentions and precise objectives for the curriculum of the program. 'Jazz education is about encouraging the students to play something that has never been played before,' JP elaborates, 'otherwise, jazz education would become completely reactionary.' (interview).

Although such intentions challenged the cherished traditions of the conservatory, they were 'simply not negotiable,' JP says. The current Jazzlinja website, JP and all the other teachers as well as the students of Jazzlinja affirm how glad they are that the program employs standards from the jazz community – outside the institution – as their norms.

Another feature that distinguishes Jazzlinja is its focus on ear training (No: Gehør, from German: Gehören). This is a main subject and is closely intertwined with the two other subjects comprising the basic curriculum, namely, jazz theory and one-to-one instrument teaching. Below, I will present a research narrative framed by one of JP's ear-training lessons. First, though, I would like to offer a brief explanation of the research I undertook and the terms that I used both to frame the study and to make sense of my findings.

10.2 Research Design and Process

The basic question behind my study was: What philosophy of work can be seen in a jazz pedagogue's teaching practice? The term 'philosophy of work' was developed in dialogue with Nordic professional theory, and Nordic Research in Music Education (Bouij 1998; Dale 2001; Englund 1996; Grimen 2008; Krüger 2000; Molander and Terum 2008; Nerland 2003; Schei 2007). From this vantage point, identity, knowledge and power are considered fundamental and inseparable aspects of an art educator's philosophy of work, and thus, they combine to make *one* focus and are not studied separately.

The data for this article consisted of video observations and field notes of JP's teaching practice in classroom ear-training and in one-to-one saxophone teaching. I also conducted an interview, and JP completed a mapping form about his background. Supplementary data came from official reviews of JP's work and of the NTNU jazz program (Jazzlinja).

I analysed these data using a narrative thematic approach (Riessman 2008). Narrative approaches are considered beneficial for inquiring into complex practices such as art and teaching, and permit questions that could hardly be asked in stricter research traditions (Barrett and Stauffer 2009; Clandinin and Conelly 1996; Riessman 2008). They might be regarded as approaches that cut across strict academic disciplinary boundaries, and offer a way to work that is both 'artful and artfull' (Barrett and Stauffer 2009: 20). In the context of music- and art-education research, they provide a sustainable way to inquire into *multiple* understandings of music, art and education, and to identify 'multiple stories, multiple voices, and multiple meanings of music and musicking' (op.cit., p 19).

In narrative research, the borders between analysis and other parts of the research work are 'soft'. Still, the analysis I made can be described as three-staged process, in which I (1) searched for verbally-articulated narratives and performed narratives in the data, (2) searched for themes, or 'pivots' that JP repeatedly emphasised, and (3) constructed a narrative to convey the insights as a story of JP's practice.

Throughout this process I also sought theoretical/philosophical approaches that could facilitate my reflections on JP's philosophy of work. I took Michel Foucault's discourse-oriented thinking about power and knowledge as a point of departure, but found that this perspective did not provide me with either the language or the depth I needed for a discussion of JP's philosophy of work that was legitimate, or resonated with JP's thinking. An 'ontological turn' to Heidegger's philosophy gave me frames of reference that seemed more appropriate (Foucault 1999; Heidegger 2000). Whilst considerable similarities between Foucault's and Heidegger's work can be identified, there are significant differences as well (Angelo and Varkøy 2011; Dreyfus 2004; Pio 2005).

The analysis was thematically focused around the topics that JP frequently reiterated both *in* his practice and in his *reflections* about his practice, and are therefore positioned as thematic narrative analysis (Riessman 2008: 53). I called the themes that emerged from my analysis *pivots*, both to underline the dynamic nature of the inquiry into his practice, and also to underscore them as aspects around which JP's practice rotated – and which simultaneously 'moved' or motivated his work.

The themes I identified were a source of frustration for me, as they seemed to be interdependent and contradictory at the same time. I had no tool to deal with that, and the solution became to see them as binary pivots, stretching into two opposite directions simultaneously.

For example, JP recurrently emphasised 'tradition', and the importance of respectful imitation of great musicians. At the same time he stressed the necessity to seek inwards for personal, brand-new expressions. Articulating the two themes as a binary pivot, – *tradition/liberation* –enabled me to see the outer and discursive as inextricably bundled to the inner and personal. According to French philosopher Jacques Derrida, such a binary opposition might be regarded to define its own logic; it opens a space for an approach to dilemmas that recognises diversity and sees oppositional perspectives and contradictions as fundamental for giving meaning (Derrida 1976; Dyndahl 2006). Thus, I conducted the study both within a narrative approach, and within a logic that recognises a 'both/and' perspective.

10.3 Into the Music

The following narrative is framed within one of JP's ear-training lessons with six first-year Jazzlinja students, reconstructions based on video records along with other empirical materials. JP has read this chapter, and we have corrected any misunderstandings before publication.

JP puts on the music and opens the door; it is the second lesson in ear training for the first-year students of Jazzlinja. The students stroll in, chit-chat with each other and find their places in a semi-circle of chairs facing the blackboard. JP watches them. He doesn't know these students yet, either *what* they hear or how they will express it. This is something he will learn, during the ear-training lessons throughout the year. As usual, the lesson starts with listening:

'This is an interview with Tony Williams,' JP says, 'He started as a drummer in Miles Davis band already as a 16-year old; here he is commenting on a *late* recording of this band.' The students and JP listen. 'He's reacting to Miles!' Williams says, pointing out how the drummer responds to Miles Davis's playing. 'He ended it, you know,' Williams says a little later, when the drummer *finishes* the musical conversation, adding: 'That's Miles, no one else could even *think* of that!'

JP explains Williams' comments for the students: 'You can hear how he is constantly *inside* the music,' JP says, 'how he moves in and out of the rhythmical, in and out of the melodic.' When the interview ends JP explains how he sometimes brings this recording, '… to underline that *this* is the way we listen, here.'

Next, JP tells the students about his own 'jazz education', which consisted only of a theoretical course in improvisation with pianist George Russell when JP was 16. This course became a defining experience, JP explains, which encouraged him to develop methods to teach himself what Russell obviously *heard*, in his inner ear, about scales and systems. Russell not only understood these systems theoretically; he also *heard* them, in his inner ear. JP intuitively grasped this, and decided to teach himself how to do it. He bought jazz records and studied history-making musicians such as Stan Getz, John Coltrane and Lee Konitz.

'To acquire other musicians' styles through listening and imitation is time-consuming, but necessary work' JP says, when he explains his learning to the students, and underlines how this work is never finished, but continues even when one is over 60 years old, like he is. He knows the amount of time and effort that these students will need to spend on such

imitation work, but he also knows that he will continue to support them. It is essential to keep doing this, to develop deeper and deeper insights into great musicians' ways of playing.

The first-year students listen attentively – now to saxophonist Jan Garbarek. JP plays a recording from the very earliest period of Garbareks' career, where the phrases are typical of the masters he has studied.

'That's Dexter Gordon,' JP comments, and 'that's a Coltrane phrase.' He keeps pointing out the styles that Garbarek imitates, and comments when Garbarek lands wrong; 'You can hear that he *hears* right, but that the horn won't go along – he doesn't land in his ear!' JP says. Then he turns on a later recording with the same Garbarek, from another period, when he has developed a *unique* style, and turned into a musician who *others* imitate. This is the exact aim: to move on – from the imitation process, and with this as a basis – to create something new and personal. 'The aim is not to become Bill Evans,' JP says, 'but, to avoid becoming Bill Evans, we must first become Bill Evans.'

The necessary imitation work implies intensity and precision, to the extent that one actually 'becomes' someone else for a while, and develops insights into how the other person 'thinks music'. The next challenge is to *free* oneself from this. Many musicians remain stuck in the imitation process, and become nothing more than good copyists. This is both frustrating, and frowned upon. JP recalls an episode from the early 1980s, when he first met saxophone player Lee Konitz at a jazz stage in Voss, an experience which he analogises to 'meeting history in the door'.

'Suddenly he was there, three feet's from me!' JP tells the students. 'This was quite a strange feeling. I had spent endless hours studying Konitz' playing. Of course, Konitz noticed that, and surprisingly, reacted quite negatively.' JP explains that Konitz was neither impolite nor rude, but responded rather ironically to JP's playing, and made it clear that he didn't like it. 'He didn't want me to be a copycat' JP says, 'He wanted me to play *personally*.' And this is the issue – to draw some essence from what one imitates, and then use this essence to create something new.

'How, then, do we do this?' one student asks, 'I'm stuck, and no matter what I do – I still sound like a bad copy of Coltrane!' JP understands and gives the example of a former student who strived to free himself from the be-bop style. This student was frustrated and sick of himself and his playing, ready to give up. The solution he arrived at was to shift to a different aesthetic framework, and turn to *Messiaen's* music to free up the learnt codes. JP explains how his own work with the music of Messiaen and Schönberg has been fruitful: 'To change, and work with the same essence, inside a completely different framework, can contribute to freeing the existing codes from their original system,' he says, 'and provide an opportunity to use them in other ways.'

'Do you remember the last ear-training class?' JP asks the students, 'When we listened to some Coltrane blues?' One student begins to tap his foot. JP notices this and asks him what he hears. The student responds, a bit bewildered, 'the bass.' JP asks several questions about this bass, and encourages the student to communicate what it is he is hearing in his inner ear. The student unsteadily begins a bass line, and JP supports this from the side and keeps the beat with his foot. 'Yeah, I hear that you hear right, but it doesn't come out correctly. Nice search – keep going!'

Gradually several other students join in this imaginary bass line, and JP organises them so that everyone sings something alone. Once the bass line is established in the group, JP walks over to the piano and adds chords. A good atmosphere and great enthusiasm fills the room. Towards the end, both the students and JP participate in improvising over the bass line. 'In improvisation,' JP explains, 'one aim is to hear what the others hears, and then to relate one's own playing to that.' This requires JP, as a teacher to these students, to take part in *their* playing, to learn what they hear. Moreover, Jazzlinja teachers are musicians who actually play with their students on stages as well as in classrooms. In fact, this is made explicit as one of the prime intentions of the program. The basis to become good musicians is to imitate and to create something personal, and this work is done actively – by listening, by participating with body, voice and instrument, and by trying to express to others what oneself is hearing.

10.4 The Pivots: Identification and Discussion

The foregoing narrative illustrates a philosophy of work that simultaneously points *outwards* – towards a society and culture, and *inwards* – into the person/music. The inner/outer dichotomy could be reversed, in a context where the core/essence is considered to be inherent to a collective society, or in an epistemologically-oriented education where music is considered something that is objectively audible to anyone. In these cases, the individual and the individual's inner ear would be considered a sediment of, or constructed by, these essences. Here, though, *inwards* is seen as inherent in the individual, while *outwards* concerns the collective. This resonates with how JP emphasises the individual's own ear and personal expression.

In the pivots I identified in my study of JP, the outward perspective is represented by the first term in each word pair: *tradition*, *music as 'hearable'*, and *pedagogue*. These terms may be easily linked to an *epistemological* or even discourse-oriented discussion of JP's philosophy of work, because they underscore something collective, intentional and potentially measurable. In this view, *diverse* notions of music, teaching and learning certainly exist – all constructed and constituted by social and cultural contexts (Cook and Everist 2001). 'Ear-training' then, may differ significantly among diverse music traditions, in relation to specific instruments, styles, institutions, or musicians. JP's way of teaching ear training, scale exercises or music theory would probably resonate quite differently, for example, in a classical music education context than in this jazz education context.

The inward perspective is underlined by the second term in every word pair; *liberation, music as 'un-hearable'* and *performer.* These may be associated with an *ontological* discussion about what it is to *be* a jazz pedagogue, what jazz is, and the intrinsic value of jazz education. All three indicate processes that go on *inside* humans and music, processes that are impossible to measure.

The imitation work, which is fundamental in JP's practice, seems to be about getting to know both the *outer structures* in the music heard, and *the person* that one imitates. When JP explains how musicians, to avoid becoming Bill Evans, must first become Bill Evans, he underlines how *person* and *music* are perceived to be conjoined in jazz education.

From the point of view of Heidegger's philosophy, the artist and the work of art are not categorically separate units, but intractably bundled (Heidegger 2000: 94). They are also regarded to have the same origin: 'The essence of art, in which the artwork and the artist at once rest, is the setting-itself-to-work of truth.' (Heidegger 2006: 55). The work setting of art presumes a work of art, which in Heidegger's thinking doesn't necessarily mean an art object, but *dichtung*, or poetry, in a wide sense, as the heart of both building, picture and tone (Heidegger 2000: 86 ff.). To bring truth into work in works of art requires a knowledge known as *technè,* which connotes both handcrafting and artistry, and thus, presumes an *artist* (Heidegger 2000; Varkøy 2012). Art, then, is both in the *artwork*, and in the *person* making the artwork. Similarly, in JP's philosophy of work, what is to be learnt and revealed in

jazz education exists both in the music, in the recognised musicians, and in the students. Therefore jazz musicians must direct their attention both inwards and outwards at the same time.

A key purpose of the jazz program, as JP puts it, is to 'enable the students to become themselves.' This process evolves through precise imitation work, where the aim is to copy great musicians' expressions 100 %, and then acquire insights into how others have brought forth personal expressions from within themselves. The process of becoming then, does not happen unbiased, but under this specific jazz horizon.

According to New Zealand music philosopher, David Lines, who discusses music education in a Heideggerian framework, music pedagogues need deep insight into the specific music that they teach, including the contexts of this music and the communities where it has meaning, in order to be able to reveal truth and elicit ground-breaking expressions. Western music education is accused of over-focusing on strategies for mastery and *control* of the music, and that this overshadows how music education also must qualify working *with* music (Lines 2005).

The example of JP's practice may provide a counterweight to right this imbalance, as a premise for bringing forth brand new expressions that rests on longstanding and profound experience with a jazz tradition. His perpetual hard work in learning this tradition and searching inwards, and his familiarity with the ways of working in a jazz community, constitute an unquestionable fundament for his perception of what jazz education is about.

10.4.1 Tradition and Liberation

The pivot *tradition /liberation* comprises both the content of the education, and the ways of working. The styles of influential musicians, such as Miles Davis, Jan Garbarek or Eric Dulphy are examples of what is considered content in JP's teaching. Such history-making musicians' expressions seem to be regarded as 'mandatory' in this jazz environment and as something into which students need to gain insight, in order to succeed. To *succeed* means both to possess qualifications to climb up the hierarchy of well-regarded musicians, and to gain insight into one's own being, and then reveal immanent, personal potentials. Also, it is not only *what* is being played, but also *how it is learned* that is considered 'tradition' in JP's practice. For example, there is an absence of music scores here. Music is to be learned through listening, imitating and recreating. This is regarded as fundamental to the main purpose of directing attention inwards to bring forth essences that might become groundbreaking expressions.

This work is also something that continues *after* one's formal jazz education has ended. JP underscores how he still strives for this, as a 60-year-old, and how the jazz

legend Lee Konitz, who is over 80, works this way too. The aim of learning something (or someone) 100 % is perhaps unachievable, but still the tradition is to constantly strive for this.

'Some of the most important things I do are to convey humility for tradition, and to continuously search deeper into good musicians' ways of playing,' JP says about his work. Ultimately, the purposes are to free oneself from copying, and to create something no one has ever heard before. Procedures for such liberation are, for example, to move the codes between diverse music styles, or into 'other aesthetic frameworks' as JP puts it. This is exemplified in the anecdote about the student who worked with Messiaen's music to break free from the be-bop style. JP's story about Jan Garbarek's progress from copycat novice into history-making expert also exemplifies the *tradition/liberation* pivot.

10.4.2 Music as 'Hearable' and Music as 'Un-hearable'

This pivot too points inwards and outwards at once. *Music as 'hearable'* may be defined as a noun (*a* music, *the* music), and as something that can be described in terms developed within a Western musical understanding (Cook and Everist 2001). JP employs such terms in his teaching practice, for example in the narrative when he points out how Tony Williams 'goes in and out of the rhythmic, the melodic and the harmonic.' Williams does not employ these analytical terms, but focuses on interaction, collaboration and communication in his comments. JP also emphasises interaction, collaboration and communication in his work, for example when he underlines how musicians communicate what they hear, both in their inner and outer ears (field notes, interview). This focus, though, draws on a notion of music as something that *does something* – a verb rather than a noun.

In Heidegger's writing's, verbing is extensive: 'Art *west* in the art-work' (Heidegger 2006: 2, 2000: 9). The word 'west' is from 'wesen'- meaning something like 'the essence', here. When the 'wesen wests' then, may be explained as 'the essence' 'essences'. Heidegger employs *west* to underline how something manifests itself in the truth of its own way of being. A central point for Heidegger is that the works of art are not mere dead objects, they *do* something (Heidegger 2000: 85). JP told me early in our collaboration for this study that British music philosopher Christopher Small's concept of *musicking* could provide a valid perspective on his practice. Small turns the western notion of *music* as a noun – connected to objects such as recordings and sounds, or possible sounds like in written music or MP3-files – into a verb: '*to* music' and defines this verb as follows:

> To music is to take part, in any capacity, in a musical performance. That means not only to perform, but also to listen, to provide material for a performance - what we call composing - to prepare for a performance - what we call practicing or rehearsing - or any other activity which can affect the nature of the human encounter. (Small 1998: 9)

In JP's work, *participation* is most important, in listening, imitation and recreation. Everyone involved participates, first with voice and body, and finally with musical instruments. The same procedure is followed in one-to-one lessons with the saxophone student as in the ear-training lessons. Listening is carried out actively, and intense work is undertaken to search into the listener's, and the performer's ear. 'You have to listen *deeper* into your ear,' JP repeats, indicating that the ear has *depth*, and the search, deeper and deeper, seems to happen through singing, clapping and playing.

Listening *inwards* in music may be illuminated by Danish music philosopher Frede V. Nielsen's thoughts about the object of music as a multi-faceted universe of meaning, corresponding to different layers of human consciousness (Nielsen 1994: 137). Nielsen considers the music object as multi-layered, where the different layers are realised in encounters with an experiencing and participating human being. When JP makes statements such as: 'Great! I can hear that you hear, but that you don't land in your ear. Nice search!', this implies that he, as a third person, experience a communication between something heard, and an experiencing listener, and thus – a musical communication without sound. This suggests that the musical communication is not limited to one piece of music and one human being, but embraces and relates all those present in the same musical happening. This brings together Small's perspective of musicking and Nielsen's ideas about meaning-correspondence (Nielsen 1994; Small 1998), and underlines music as something both '*hearable'*, and '*un-hearable'*.

Frederik Pio (2005, 2007) discusses the emergence of the concept 'musicality', and argues that it can be seen as a physiological/psychological sensitivity. He employ the term 'the audible' for outer, physiological stimulation of senses, and the term 'the heard' for inner, mental-psychic impressions, and argues that humans, in this perspective, are first and foremost seen as *anatomical* beings. Pio contrasts this with the consideration of musicality and *musicality-bildung* as a *phenomenological sensitivity*, whereby humans are mainly considered as *lived* beings (Pio 2007). In the latter perspective he employs the term music as something 'over-heard', understood as the subject's constitution of an aesthetic object, and music as something 'un-heard' – referring to the individual's immediate experience of Truth, in meaningful encounters between human beings and music.

My use of the terms *music as 'hearable'/music as 'unhearable'* is inspired by Pio's ideas, and seeks to point out how music is regarded both as an outer, noticeable phenomenon, and as an inner, phenomenological phenomenon in JP's philosophy of work. The discussion about this pivot also underlines how these two views seem entwined and interdependent in JP's perception of jazz education, bringing forth a view of music education that evades the subject/object division, and is not only about *the sound* of music.

In both Danish and Norwegian – *unheard* is an ambiguous word that also means something outrageous, inappropriate, upsetting or terrible, or even exceptional, powerful and overwhelming. Although Pio (2006) doesn't reflect upon the ambiguity of this term, I think that exactly this equivocality and all the power that it

embodies, make it suitable as a term to describe the revelation of existential Truths – which seems to be a core aspect of Pio's term for music as something 'unheard' (Pio 2007). In this article, the term for music as 'hearable' is linked to the outer, physiological object music, while 'un-hearable' points toward potential encounters with truths.

In my experience JP's philosophy of music education entangles all four of Pio's terms (*the audible, the heard, the over-heard* and *the un-heard*) (Pio 2007). This because JP emphasises music both as an *outer* potential, which may be perceived in genuinely different ways, and at the same time as something relentless that reveals immediate and intrinsic Truths in encounters with experiencing and participating individuals. The latter can neither be explained, nor calculated or measured, whether in epistemological or physiological terms.

The pivot *music as 'hearable'/music as 'un-hearable'* deals with JP's musical ontology. Music as something 'un-hearable' is far from any *object* focus, which might seem fundamental in Nielsen's thinking concerning music as something palpable, either as sound or as a potential sound stored in a medium (Nielsen 1994). Lines (2005) argues that music ontology is an important focus in music teacher education because it concerns the basis for what music education is about. Upcoming teachers need practice in articulating and discussing this to be able to work *with* the specific music in its contexts, and not only to control it. In JP's philosophy, music is perceived as something that is both heard and and 'un-heard', and in his practice *musicking* is seen as the practicing of a tradition where the revelation of new expressions is the ultimate aim. This aim directs the practice to be realised as an existentialistic dialogue between inner and outer aspects of humans and music. In Small's notion of musicking, the bringing forth of ideal relations is central (Small 1998). Relations, here, are seen both as phenomena that exist between persons, between music and humans; and as phenomena that exist inside oneself, between humans and the supernatural, or that one only *wishes* existed:

> Musicking is an activity by means of which we bring into existence a set of relationships that model the relationships of our world, not as they are but as we would wish them to be, and if through musicking we learn about and explore those relationships, we affirm them to ourselves and anyone else who may be paying attention, and we celebrate them, then musicking is in fact a way of knowing our world – not that pre-given physical world, divorced from human experience, that modern science claims to know but the experiential world of relationships in all its complexity (Small 1998: 50)

Small stresses human yearning for diverse kinds of relationship, and argues that musicking brings forth such relationships. This coincides with how Heidegger emphasises that humans long for insight into their own being (Heidegger 2000; Small 1998). JP's practice seem to embody a search for such relationships, both inside oneself, with the sound-less hearing of others, and with the music. In the context of music teacher education, JP's philosophy of work provides an example of music education that in fundamental ways resists a typical foci in western music education, namely the sole aim to build skills to master an outer, audible object.

10.4.3 Pedagogue/Performer

The last pivot is *pedagogue/performer*. JP says that 'to be a jazz pedagogue, or to be a jazz performer, there's really no difference. It's two sides of the same coin.' At the NTNU jazz program, the teachers often play *with* their students, for example, as members of the same bands – before, during and after the students' education. On the Jazzlinja's website the jazz teachers' own experiences from the field of jazz are regarded as the primary references for the pedagogical thinking of the program. JP repeatedly points out: 'I don't *act* as a teacher. This is my life!' This says something about the intensity of his work, but most of all, it is to be taken literally: It *is* his life – being a jazz musician/ jazz pedagogue – which is realised in his educational practice. He teaches his students what he taught himself, and the ways that he taught it to himself. This personal approach to education harmonizes with the intentions underlined on the Jazzlinja website, and also coincides with other practices in art education (Angelo 2014; Østern et al. 2013). Such philosophies of work seem both important and challenging to discuss, from ethical as well as methodological standpoints, in art-teacher education. Who is qualified to decide for whose life what is good enough to be the fundamental content in formal education? How should ways of working in such education be improved? And, how should *quality* be considered?

In the Jazzlinja context, the value and the knowledge of both jazz and jazz education are seen to exist in the field. 'Real jazz' happens outside, and may bear ways to view knowledge and education that are oppositional to the epistemological focus that prevails in western education. Still, jazz education might benefit from being institutionalized within accomplished institutions, to enable the students to receive accreditation and certification. On the one hand, such 'stamps' of societal recognition can provide jazz education with power that can benefit the jazz world. On the other hand, the institutionalization of jazz can also threaten the oppositional power of the values and knowledge that come from jazz's extra-institutional position.

JP is glad that almost all jazz students choose a pedagogic direction for their jazz education. 'They need this to qualify their *reflections* upon their work,' he says, and underscores that further improvements of the jazz education curriculum will require the musicians to be able to articulate and critically discuss their practices. This might raise concerns that public regulations and mainstream views will come to form this art education practice, which now relies on traditions that only border the traditions of formal education. JP stresses that music pedagogy needs to be context-oriented, aimed towards the particular musical lives, be it jazz, church music, or classical music, that the education qualifies students to live. 'Being a *church* musician, a *classical* musician or a *jazz* musician are three very different things, and teacher education toward these lives needs to reflect that,' he says, again stressing that it is the specific life and the specific ways of being in each form of musicianship that must be the point of departure.

In music teacher education, diverse *cultures of knowledge* can be identified that are dissonant with each other, and point to a need for opposite content (Johansen

2006). In JP's philosophy of work, the dissonance is not only about *knowledge*; it is also about different ways of being. *Being* a jazz pedagogue seems to be not only about epistemological knowledge, but also about ways to *be* in the world, and about how being a jazz musician can be something fundamentally different than being a classical pianist.

10.5 JP's Philosophy of Work: Contributions to Basic Thinking in Music Teacher Education

In conclusion I would like to highlight three aspects of this discussion of JP's philosophy of work that may enrich basic thinking in music teacher education.

First: it is two different things to facilitate music education if 'music' is considered an object that the teacher brings to the lessons in a suitcase, or if 'music' and 'humans' are regarded as two aspects of the *same* thing. Given JP's practice: Is it *Jan Garbarek* that we hear, or is it Jan Garbarek's *playing*? If it is the *human* we hear, the next question is, whether we can talk about *music* education, or if it would be more correct to regard it as a form of *human* education? *Where* we consider the subject music to be – inside or outside of human beings – has a great bearing on our basic thinking about music education.

This also touches on the problematic division between *professional* and *personal* issues in the discourse of music teacher education. Discussions about music education sometimes highlight a distinction between *content* and *activity,* or between whether music education aims to educate students *in* or *through* music (Bamford 2006; Hanken and Johansen 1998; Nielsen 1994; Ruud 1983; Varkøy 2003). Such questioning lacks relevance in JP's philosophy, in which, as discussed above, the existential dialogue between the outer and the inner isn't biased on a differentiation of subject and object (musician and music). A focus such as listening deeper into one's own ear must be considered as *both* the content, *and* the activity; it lacks the object that provides the premise for this distinction. Instead of the misleading question of 'in or through', JP's philosophy of work enables other questions that might be even more interesting to discuss in music teacher education. For example, questions about the ontologies of music, and what practices diverse ontologies might enable or hinder.

Second: the education that JP's philosophy of work underscores centres on the individual. The 'becoming' of the self is to happen through listening 'into the ear' to reveal immanent, *personal* expressions. The individual focus in western art and artistry on soloists, composers, and so on, might be considered antithetical to art, for example, in Asian cultures where greater focus is placed on the collective (Couteau 2011). Whilst a music educator in a Balinese gamelan[1] might centre on the collective in music performance as fundamental to reveal Truths, and to relate to the

[1] Balinese gamelan: Traditional music ensemble with metallophones, xylophones, drums, dance and drama. Intrinsic part of Balinese culture and Balinese Hinduism.

Divine, JP's philosophy of work rather takes the individuals involved as a starting point in his teaching practice, which is not merely about qualifying jazz musicians, but also about qualifying persons for their lives (Angelo 2013a, b).

The 'becoming' in JP's philosophy relates to one specific jazz context. It is 'framed' by a specific time and place. Heidegger uses the term *Gestell* to address how such frameworks are essential to what can be brought forth and how (Heidegger 2000: 75–76; Pio 2012: 220–222). What comes forth relates in fundamental ways to the specific backgrounds of the artwork and the artist. Small underlines the same thing, when he writes about how musicking cannot bring forth *any* identities or relations, but depends on the person's familiarity with the specific context (Small 1987). The *power* that *forces* the becoming, then, can be seen both as *inside* the individuals, and also embedded in the *context*. Power, and being, are omnipresent, and come both from the inner and the outer – anyway one turns it. To 'listen *into* the ear,' as JP puts it, then, might be about tuning the senses towards sensitivity *beyond* the auditory, towards what looms within the tradition – without necessarily sounding. When individuals become aware of this, it may provide an opportunity to break through the barriers that entrench each person's becoming. To 'tune' the ear towards 'hear-abilities' without sound might also allow relations far beyond those that can be verbally expressed using pronouns (Small 1998). Such experiences are not necessarily pleasant or enjoyable, since art may be as brutal as life itself. Exactly this fact seems fundamental to real becoming in jazz education, from the point of view of JP's philosophy of work.

Third: to consider the activity of an art *performer* and an art *pedagogue* as *inseparable* is a perspective that challenges the fundamental assumptions underlying music teacher education. If being a performer and being a pedagogue are two sides of the same coin – what then should music *teacher* education be about? The subject 'pedagogy' is a fundamental part of any teacher education in Nordic contexts, and is a subject that concerns individuals, society and humanity, as well as strategies for teaching and learning.

In JP's philosophy, such foci are also fundamental in *jazz* education, where the *subject* and the *pedagogy* are entwined and conjoined in the same way as *music* and *musicking* in Small's thinking. In Heidegger's thinking, *art* has a unique relationship to truth, a relationship that is never spelt out, but can be revealed through presence and careful attention to the 'tone in the tone, the colour in the colour, or the shape in the shape' in artworks (Heidegger 2000: 11). By *not* splitting insights into what is art and what is pedagogy, music and art education might strengthen their focus on presence and attention. If the intentions are *presence* and *attention,* as in JP's philosophy of jazz education, then art and pedagogy are two things of the same kind – both serving to direct attention both inwards and outwards, both into music and into human beings. This philosophy calls for a focus in music teacher education on one's own existential experiences with music, and in a substantial way, on the intrinsic values of music/musicking.

Throughout this article, I have highlighted the tensions and opposite ways of thinking that have enabled my study and discussion about JP's philosophy of music education. The three binary pivots I have discussed suggest that the inner and

essential in music education is inextricably linked to the external and discursive. Subject cannot be separated from object in this context, even though these concepts in *analytical contexts* derive their content by contrasting one another. *Tradition/liberation*, *music as 'hearable'/music as 'un-hearable'* and *pedagogue/performer* are as indivisible as the word pair *music/music education*, and precisely this might be the simplest, yet most important contribution that this article can offer to music teacher education.

It does not seem legitimate to define teacher education that aims to qualify teachers for practices comparable to JP's as either 'epistemological' or 'ontological'. It would be better to regard it as an approach to education that underscores an *inquisitive kind of knowing*, which intersects academic boundaries between subject/object, epistemology/ontology, identity/knowledge. JP's philosophy of work and practice provides *one* example to spur a discussion of basic thinking in teacher education, about what music education really concerns. The professional music educator, then, can reconcile the outer and the inner in the form of a dialogue in which subject and object are linked together, in an approach to music education that enables free, autonomous, and musicking individuals to live and develop.

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Chapter 11
Pendulum Dialogues and the Re-enchantment of the World

Edvin Østergaard

Abstract In this chapter, my main educational argument is that music can provide an entrance into aesthetic experience of nature. Based on my own experiences as composer and researcher with the ongoing art-science project *Pendulum Dialogues,* I discuss how artistic-scientific dialogues with the pendulum might reveal the world's ontological dimensions. I ground the argumentation in Heidegger's space analysis in *Time and Being,* his distinction between geometrical space and existential space, and the problem of the ontological reversal. I argue that an ontological re-reversal is a matter of both explicit philosophical investigations and innovative explorations of practical teaching efforts. Obviously, an ontological re-reversal also implies giving experience and sensing back their role in education. Discussing art and science, I argue that the differences between the artist's and the scientist's approach to one and the same phenomenon should be highlighted in order to create a dialogue between artists and scientists, teachers and students in a common learning space. The lesson to learn from music education is that science teachers should, in order to promote aesthetics in science class, intentionally cultivate a more open, unbiased kind of observation.

Keywords Re-enchantment of the world • Aesthetic experience of nature • Ontology • Artists and scientists • Aesthetics in science class

11.1 Dialoguing with the Pendulum

What makes the pendulum so intriguing to explore, so fascinating to watch? Before moving to the art-science project and its relevance for education, let us first take a closer look at this phenomenon. In the history of science, we can count three grand dialogues with the pendulum, dialogues which have had great impacts on how we–in ontological terms–perceive and value the world. In the groundbreaking experiments of Galileo,

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_11

Foucault and Maelzel, we find manifestations of man's struggle to scientifically understand and existentially grasp the riddles of nature. This phenomenon is again and again used for illustrating scientific methods historically or for deducing the physical law of swing period. This is probably the reason why one is more likely to find a pendulum at a science center or in science class than at an art museum or in a music class.

One of the first naturalists to convert the pendulum from a (seemingly) everyday phenomenon into a scientific object was Galileo Galilee (1564–1642). According to a classical anecdote, he used his own pulse to time large and small swings while observing the swinging candelabrum of the cathedral of Pisa. He discovered that the period of each swing was exactly the same, and that the length of the rope was the only parameter to regulate the swinging speed. In the moving pendulum, Galileo saw laws of nature being expressed that were describable in an exact, mathematical language. In the concrete, sensuous phenomenon of a moving candelabrum, Galileo recognized the "hidden" law of a swinging object. Later, the laws themselves were to become scientifically more prominent than the concrete phenomena through which they were discovered. In the history of science, Galileo is considered as the one who introduces a mechanistic explanation of nature, until then considered as God's work. His discovery signifies the beginning of a major turn in what is regarded as primary ground, ontologically speaking. Harvey (1989) defines this major turn as the "ontological reversal," the change when abstract knowledge and scientific models are perceived as *more real* than our everyday reality, when abstract, often mathematical, models are taken to be the *real causes* behind everyday experiences (Dahlin 2001). As I will dwell on later, this turn is not merely of historical interest; the "ontological reversal" is practiced daily in our schools.

Pendulum Dialogues began as a music-physics project based on the French physicist Jean-Bernard-Léon Foucault's well-known pendulum experiment in 1851. This simple experiment is considered as one of the most intriguing, beautiful and ambiguous experiments in the history of science. Foucault hung a 28 kg heavy weight on a 67-m long wire under the dome of Panthéon in Paris. Because of the pendulum's slow movements (one swing period lasts approximately 16 s), it was possible for laypersons to observe the movement of the pendulum's plane of oscillation. The experiment is an arrangement for experiencing the Earth's rotation, not only understanding it cognitively. Foucault used the rotation of the pendulum's plane of oscillation as the incontestable proof that it is the Earth, and not the sun, that moves. Foucault's experiment is regarded as the definitive expression of the transition from a geocentric to a heliocentric world-view. This is a quantum leap in mankind's self-awareness in relation to the Earth: it implies a permanent loss of stability and solid ground on which to stand. The staggering awareness that the Earth moves has since revived man's desire to find firm ground. Today Foucault's experiment is normally displayed as a historical rather than a contemporary event. Later I will discuss that a contemporary dialogue with the pendulum also reveals new and disregarded insights.

The German inventor and engineer Johann Nepomuk Maelzel (1772–1838) used the pendulum to construct a machine for measuring time in exact quantities. Compared to other methods for measuring tempo in music at that time, the

metronome, made public in 1814 by Maelzel, represented an enormous improvement, as its system of measurement conforms to the second-division of the clock (Wehmeyer 1989). The metronome ticks as often in a minute as is indicated on the measuring scale. Thereby, the differences between persons' individual pulse beats are eliminated. The intuitive perception of an *Andante* movement could now be fixed in exact time measuring, independent of an individual pace of walking. The *Musical Time-keeper*, as Maelzel called the metronome, is well-known from musical practice as a machine for learning the beat and how to keep it (ibid.: 42). The metronome signifies, however, more than a tool for dividing time into exact identical parts; it represents a significant step on the path from time as lived experience to time as measurable quantities.

What Maelzel, Galileo and Foucault have in common is that they, each in their own manner and through their own discoveries, manifest different worldviews. Their different explanations of the moving pendulum lead to them experiencing and describing the world differently. The pendulum is used for exploring and understanding more than the phenomenon itself, thus making it an object of utility, a "zuhandenes Zeug" (Heidegger 1993: 112). Galileo uses the pendulum for displaying the hidden laws of nature. Foucault wants to create a learning situation that makes it possible for laypersons to experience something big and complex (the rotation of Earth). Maelzel, finally, constructs the metronome, a tool for ordering and standardizing the flow of musical time. Through their discoveries, they initiate what eventually will become commonly shared and accepted truths. In their hands, the pendulum becomes a sensitive organ for displaying nuances in humans' experience of the world.

11.2 Heidegger's Space Analysis

With an intention of merging physics, drama and music, we eventually started to talk of the pendulum dialogues as taking place in *a scientific-aesthetic space*. This double-space is characterized by being aesthetically experiential as well as scientifically comprehendible–*not* either-or (Østergaard 2011b). The distinction between scientific space and aesthetic space is in certain manners comparable to Heidegger's space analysis in *Time and Being* (Heidegger 1993: §§ 22–24). The very basis for his phenomenological investigation is the concept of *being,* that which is to begin with, "zunächst", in our lives (Zahavi 2007: 51). Heidegger points to the fact that the expression "zunächst" has not only temporal, but also spatial connotations: what we meet to begin with is in our immediate closeness, "Nähe" (ibid.). On the basis of Heidegger giving primacy to our being and rootedness in the world, we can understand that closeness is not to be understood primarily in spatial terms. The object of utility, "zuhandenes Zeug," is expressed in practical use, not in how it is described with scientific concepts. The spatiality of the object shows itself in how it is being utilized for purposes, not primarily in how it is measured within a three-dimensional space. Closeness is not a question of physical distance; it is a question of practical handling and use. What is close to us in the sense of nearby; that is, what is *at hand,*

"das Zuhandene" (Heidegger 1993: 111), is something we can utilize for purposeful practice.

The world in which we live our lives is what Heidegger refers to as the primary space: the primary space is a context of relating objects of utility, not a three-dimensional coordinate system without center (Zahavi 2007: 52). In the primary space the acting and meaning-seeking person forms the center. Here, we retrieve the distinction between the geometrical space and the existential space; the first being describable by laws of physics, the latter the often pre-conscious and self-evident space of existence. Heidegger's analysis leads to the radical conclusion that the geometrical space *presupposes* the existential space, and not the other way around. Our very being is a precondition for conceiving the dimensions of the physical space. Our existence is not something that is filled into an empty, three-dimensional space. Rather, we are, as acting and sense-seeking human beings, *always already* in the world, prior to our knowledge formulation. Heidegger explicitly warns against a one-sided emphasis on the geometrical space, as this would lead to an *Entweltlichung*, the fact "that the wordly character of the ready-to-hand gets specifically *deprived of its worldhood*" (Heidegger 1962: 147; italics in original). A neutralization of the primary space might have as consequence that the world "becomes spatialized [verräumlicht] to a context of extended Things which are just present-at-hand and no more." (ibid.: 147)

Let us return to the pendulum phenomenon and examine its swinging in the two spaces. In the geometrical space, the pendulum can be described using a physical–mathematical language. Here, the phenomenon is exactly measurable in the three-dimensional space. This is how it is normally depicted in physics textbooks and taught in science class. In the existential space, the pendulum shows its aesthetic expression and its handiness, its usefulness. Here, the pendulum is not observed from the outside; rather we ourselves encounter it in the aesthetic experience. The metronome measures time in the geometrical rather than in the existential space. Phenomenologically speaking, musical rhythm is closer to the bodily experience than the ticking metronome. Following Heidegger's argument, one could say that purposeful use of the metronome *presupposes* a lived experience of rhythm and pulse. The pace of an *Andante* movement is bodily experienced rather than instrumentally measured. The metronome's rhythm needs to be bodily re-internalized again in musical practice and performance.

Early in the project, I noted:

> In 1900, Husserl proclaimed: *go back to the 'things themselves.'*[1] In the case of the pendulum, this implies that we must move beyond the pendulum as a mere physical–mathematical device. We must shift our attention from the self-conception of physics to a phenomenological and open conception of how we use and experience the phenomenon. (notebook, 30.1.11)

In later entries, I definitively move in the Heideggerian direction of regarding the phenomenon as something we can use or utilize, rather than as a swinging object in three-dimensional space. This turn to the interrelation of pendulum and observer opened up for the person's participation. However, regarding the pendulum as a tool, an object

[1] Husserl (1970: 168).

of utility, might also lead to possible reductions of the phenomenon. Is the pendulum to be valued according to its degree of usefulness, its handiness? Before we turn to significant signs of Heidegger's "Entweltlichung" in education (in particular in science education), I would like to point out some attempts to "compose" the pendulum dialogues.

11.3 Musicalizations

How might music allow for an aesthetic experience of the pendulum dialogues? There already exist some examples of musical compositions based on the pendulum. Of the more interesting, I would mention György Ligeti's complex and polyrhythmic composition *Poème Symphonique* for 100 metronomes (1962) and Steve Reich's piece for microphones, amplifiers, speakers and performer, *Pendulum Music* (1968). However, to my present knowledge, no attempts have yet been made to fuse both aesthetic and scientific aspects of the pendulum in one composition.

The unfolding of the pendulum phenomenon began in a workshop (June 2011) and was further explored in a workshop at the Norwegian Opera in Oslo (November 2011). Here, possible realizations into a musical form were tried out and discussed. The November workshop was based on my composition *Six pendulum sketches* (2011) for female singer, mixed choir, string quintet and two percussionists. Let me briefly refer to three characteristics of the music:

- The archaic, majestic expression of the swinging pendulum is related to man's profound and primal ways of musical expression: the human voice and the un-pitched percussion instruments. Both the voice and the (un-pitched) percussion instruments have qualities of a primitive force, an *Urklang*, which are congenial to the pendulum (or rather Earth's rotation) as an original phenomenon, an *Urphänomen*. This consideration motivated me to use a soprano skilled in overtone singing, a technique associated with indigenous people and sacred chanting.
- The rhythmic, repetitive character of the pendulum is of course prominent, the period being "governed by the square root of the length of the wire and π" (Eco 1989: 3). Together with the rotation of the oscillation plane, there are *two time levels* in the performance, to which the dramatic elements (music, visual effects, drama, etc.) relate. The fast time confirms to the sound of the ticking metronome, whereas the slow time is planned as one slowly changing event throughout the whole piece.
- The relationship between monotony and change is a striking quality of the swinging pendulum and it is a basic composition principle in the music. This is realized as complementarities: Monotony vs. unforeseen event; consonance vs. dissonance; and continuity vs. discontinuity (notebook, 9.12.10).

While composing *Six pendulum sketches,* I noted: "It [the swinging pendulum] is a simple expression for something extremely complex. Finding a simple musical utterance for something complex–this is a challenge for me" (workshop, June 2011). In a certain sense, we considered, the entire artistic process, from idea to performance, as a process of *making traces*. The idea of a pendulum leaving traces

corresponds to Foucault's own attempt to visualize the rotation of the pendulum's plane of oscillation by using banks of sand to mark the pendulum's changing position at the end of each swing (Crease 2003). "Music itself is a temporal movement, and the pendulum is a temporal movement. We could reinforce the quality of temporality by leaving traces." (workshop, June 2011)

These ideas for musicalizations were tried at the workshop in November 2011. An unfolding of the pendulum phenomenon alone, however, turned out to be suitable only for a concert form, not for a musical drama. This led eventually to a more explicit focus on the *dialogues* between the phenomenon and the participatory observers. However, what type of a form would a dialogue drama require?

Illustration: From the workshop, Norwegian Opera, Oslo, November 2011 (© Snorre Nordal, 2011)

The notion of musicalization is found in post-dramatic theatre as an attempt to reorganize the hierarchy of the theatrical means. A story is not necessarily told here; the dramatic development is rather "an involvement of inner and outer stages" (Lehmann 2006: 68). The tendency towards "a musicalization (not only of language) is an important chapter of the sign usage in post-dramatic theatre" (ibid.: 91). Out of this emerges an independent non-verbal language based on the director's sense of

music and rhythm. The story itself is not necessarily the prominent driving force in the performance; phenomena and objects might just as well be voiced. The ideas from post-dramatic theatre were consonant with my own intentions of retaining the pendulum as phenomenon and avoiding all its possible and probable reductions. The stage performance as some type of "replacement of dramatic action with ceremony" (ibid.: 69) also fitted well into my initial idea of bringing the pendulum to the stage.

The turn to *Pendulum Dialogues* does not change my fascination for the aesthetics of the pendulum, even though we now deploy concrete experiences and dialogues with the pendulum. Rather, the reality character of the pendulum has become even more prominent. A sensation of the reality character of the pendulum–what the phenomenon *is*–touches upon both ontological and educational questions. By exploring possibilities of putting the pendulum on stage, and by taking the pendulum as dialogue partner seriously, the questions emerge: What do we, today, beyond a historical setting, find when dialoguing with the pendulum?

11.4 Experiencing the Pendulum Anew

A glance at the pendulum in a historical perspective reveals fundamental different worldviews. The history of the pendulum might be brought into the present in education, in class or at science centers, or it might be refreshed in a theatrical form. "Science on stage" is being used increasingly in education to bring students closer to the process of knowledge formation in science and to the origin of specific disciplines (Shephard-Barr 2006). The art-science project *Pendulum Dialogues* is, however, not another science play. All through the project, I have avoided two pitfalls; that the pendulum is reduced to a mere scientific experiment in education and that it becomes an object artistically adapted for a pleasant night at the opera. Rather, it is a main point in the project, not to transfer an (abstract) idea from the visual to the auditive realm, regardless of the particular expression of the art form. In "Science on stage"-projects, there is a tendency that the knowledge content is unnoticeably sneaked to the student through drama. Again, this leads to a reduction of both art and phenomenon to a mere means for higher purposes.

I refer to the notion of the reality character of the phenomenon in several of my notebook entries, for example: "To retain the phenomenon's reality character implies, all the time, to pay it respect–all the time!–and all the time regard the phenomenon as something open, not-finished. There is more to see…" (notebook, 19.3.2011). Foucault arranged his pendulum as a visualization of the Earth's rotation, for his contemporaries, a refreshing and astonishing idea. Today, however, every child knows that the Earth rotates, even though it still is challenging to really experience its rotation. We certainly do not need a Foucaultian pendulum to prove that! Today Foucault's experiment easily becomes an example of historical exploration, an account for nineteenth century scientific inquiry. By honoring the reality

character of the swinging pendulum, by regarding it as a *contemporary* phenomenon, and not just a historical one, a new interpretation emerges:

> The whole idea of Foucault's pendulum is that something must stand still so that something else can move. Today nothing is stagnant. Everything moves in relation to everything else. This is a new existential situation. We need a new reading of Foucault's 1851 experiment. We need to find firm ground. (workshop, June 2011)

Movement is a matter of relation: Foucault's contemporaries watched the pendulum and experienced that they themselves were moving. We would today look at the swinging pendulum and experience that we–or, more exactly, the ground beneath our feet–is *not* moving. We are reminded of the fact that the world still has a *being-character*. Something still has a quality of permanence, not everything is changing. It strikes me that the conclusions drawn out of Foucault's 1851 experiment might be reversed. The common interpretation of Foucault's pendulum installation–that the Earth beneath our feet is turning and that eventually everything is moving in relation to something–only makes sense within the geometrical space. A (re-)turn to the existential space would imply a (re-)interpretation of how I *today* experience the pendulum in the span between movement and standstill. In the existential space, the ground, our original earth, does not move–"she rests" (Husserl 1940: 313; my translation). Whereas geometrical space is infinite and without a center, I myself form the center in the existential space. It is from this firm center that I experience the pendulum as a *being-in-motion* rather than a swinging object.

Heidegger's warning, that a one-sided emphasis on the geometrical space might lead to an *Entweltlichung* of the original existential space, is highly relevant for today's science education. In his late philosophy, Husserl argues that the natural sciences have lost contact with the lifeworld. For this reason, it is hard to realize "how scientific knowledge is related to everyday experience and that it in fact always *presupposes* the lifeworld as its ontological foundation" (Østergaard et al. 2008: 96). In his account of Husserl's critique, Harvey (1989) brings this argument one step further by defining this as an "ontological reversal." Science is at the top of the knowledge formation hierarchy, high above other forms of learning and knowledge acquisition. The phenomenological critique of this hierarchy is explicitly expressed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who argues that our relationship to nature is primarily a doing, and not a knowing, relationship. The ability to think is based on our already being and acting in the world: "Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of 'I think' but of 'I can'" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 137). This critique might form the very basis for a return to the rootedness in the world: A new turn, an ontological *re*-reversal, would start by giving the world back its ontological primacy.

11.5 Dialogues with the Pendulum in Education

Let us now more explicitly turn to the educational aspects. In educational research connected to the pendulum phenomenon, the aesthetic aspect of the pendulum is hardly touched upon. For example, when linked to music, the concept of metrical

time is highlighted (Matthews 2000: 276, 277). This is, I would think, in accordance with the role the pendulum has in the history of scientific inquiry. It does, however, also resonate with Root-Bernstein's (1997) claim that students "rarely, if ever, are given any notion whatsoever of the aesthetic dimension or multiplicity of imaginative possibilities of the sciences, and therefore, no matter how technically adept, can never truly understand or appreciate them" (pp. 63–64). If this is the case, the question arises how science teachers can approach phenomena with an open mind also for phenomena's aesthetic qualities and the potential they afford for aesthetic appreciation. Girod (2007) states that science education has only to a small degree adopted connections between art and science, "beyond what could be characterized as superficial linkages between art and science found in many curriculum materials" (p. 50). The challenge is to highlight the potential of such connections.

Obviously, an ontological re-reversal also implies giving experience and sensing back their role in education. Due to the ontological reversal, (sensuous) experience is regarded as subordinate in relation to (abstract) understanding. As long as abstract, scientific laws are taken as the real causes behind everyday experiences, laws that by nature are to be understood and explained, teachers tend to put less emphasis on students' sense experience. At the beginning of Umberto Eco's monumental novel *Foucault's Pendulum*, the narrator witnesses a young couple conversing about the swinging pendulum in the abbey church of Saint-Martin-des-Champs in Paris. He starts to explain the pendulum using a scientific vocabulary, but he is obviously not capable of making her understand that the phenomenon conforms to natural laws. Reflecting on this, the narrator remarks:

> A moment later the couple went off–he, trained on some textbook that had blunted his capacity for wonder, she, inert and insensitive to the thrill of the infinite, both oblivious of the awesomeness of their encounter–their first and last encounter–with the One, the Ein-Sof, the Ineffable. (Eco 1989: 6)

This situation displays in its essence what often takes place in a science teaching situation: Some knowledgeable person offers an explanation of a phenomenon to another person who is not capable of connecting explanation with experience of the phenomenon. The scientific explanation might even serve as a kind of filter that tends to black out other aspects of the phenomenon. The richness of the phenomenon is reduced to what is scientifically explicable. What remains is a partly comprehended phenomenon or, in the worst case, something totally un-understood. As a science teacher educator, I am concerned with the question how we, instead of blunting the students' "capacity for wonder," might cultivate and acuminate our students' sensitivity for beauty and "awesomeness" of the encounter with the phenomenon. Obviously one great challenge in science education is to restore the value of open, aesthetic experience.

In Foucault's genius experiment, we recognize the skilled teacher as he found an extremely simple expression for something extremely complex. The skilled educator is capable of designing a learning environment that enables the students themselves to grasp a specific content experientially. He transforms Panthéon into a learning space: using the swinging pendulum, he facilitates an existential quantum leap, from regarding the movement of the pendulum's plane of oscillation to

experiencing the movement of *oneself*. The question is whether the teacher today can manage the "reversed leap" back to the position where one can experience oneself standing on firm ground when regarding the swinging pendulum.

11.6 Music and Aesthetic Experience

What connects science education and music education is the question of how an ontological turn to the world can encourage students to interact with their experience of the world. An ontological re-reversal has to be performed through a diversity of efforts; it is a matter of both explicit philosophical investigations and innovative explorations of practical teaching efforts. The pendulum is a useful phenomenon in this context as it is a sensitive instrument for displaying man's experience of the world and of oneself. In the hands of a skilled teacher the pendulum can be utilized for opening up our multiple relationships and interactions to the world.

Experiencing music is a matter of different modes of listening. In music, Pio (2007) argues, we have the possibility to experience a general enhancement of our sensitivity (p. 149). Here, four dimensions of musicality-*Bildung* are distinguished: "the audible" (the level of scientific explanation) and "the heard" (the level of psychological feeling), as well as "the over-heard" (the level of aesthetic sensation) and "the unheard of" (the level of existential thought). These levels are, first of all, related to different ways in which we experience music. It is easy to understand that music pedagogy ought to be concerned with skills of diverse and deeper listening. It is, however, a somewhat different question whether this increased sensitivity is transferable to other realms of experience, for example experiencing nature. A crossing of the disciplines of music and science should, pedagogically speaking, also connect to skills that are generally applicable on both sides.

The inner relationships between aesthetics, experience and interaction with nature are thoroughly developed in John Dewey's *Art as Experience*. Here, the attention is directed towards the act of aesthetic experience beyond a conventional focus on the art object. Experience is "the result, the sign, and the reward of that interaction of organism and environment which, when it is carried to the full, is a transformation of interaction into participation and communication" (Dewey 2005: 22). He even goes one step further by claiming that the aesthetic experience *integrates* person and environment. In an aesthetic experience, there is no distinction of self and object, "since it is esthetic in the degree in which organism and environment cooperate to institute an experience in which the two are so fully integrated that each disappears" (ibid.: 259). However, exactly what is aesthetical in the aesthetic experience? Dewey claims that aesthetics is no intruder into experience from without; "it is the clarified and intensified development of traits that belong to every normally complete experience" (ibid.: 48). Thus, an aesthetic experience is not necessarily the same as an experience of beauty, wonder or awesomeness. The word "aesthetics" is derived from the Greek words *aisthetikos*, "sensitive, perceptive," and *aisthanesthai* which means "to perceive (by the senses or by the mind), to

feel."[2] Etymologically speaking, aesthetic experience is a precognitive, sensuous experience, an experience that is opened up for through sensuous perception.

Dewey's attempt to pull aesthetic experience out of the narrow field of artistic practice into a more general educational situation is as important as his shift of focus from experiencing the (aesthetic) art object to the (aesthetic) experience itself. What interests me is how the specific quality of aesthetic experience might be fostered in education. What is there to learn from the artist's skill of careful observation and creative expression? Dewey argues that an artist "is one who is not only especially gifted in powers of execution but in unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things" (Dewey 2005: 51). In cultivating the "sensitivity to the qualities of things," I see a beneficial sharing between the music teacher and the science teacher. Is this a way to apply the musical sensitivity, which Pio (2007) describes, to an aesthetic experience of nature phenomena? A transfer the other way around is found in several of the works of the French composer Olivier Messiaen. With a fine-tuned sensitivity for sounds in nature, he incorporated bird song in several of his compositions, for example *Oiseaux exotiques* (1955/56). Messiaen's thorough field studies were asked for by ornithologists who at that time lacked precise notations of bird songs and who in Messiaen's research found valuable (scientific) knowledge (Brech 2013). A similar, but more radical approach to sound, music and the act of listening is found in John Cage's works. His artistic project is an invitation to listen *carefully,* not only to music, but also to the surroundings of our everyday lives. His approach is clearly to extend the musical experience from the musical object to a more general auditive awareness. In this regard the intensions of Cage and Dewey are concurrent. Both encourage us to school our sensitivity for sounds and interact with the world through our audial sense.

The perhaps most direct and productive way of promoting aesthetics in the science class is by intentionally cultivating sense competencies. Learning to observe precisely is in accordance with core competencies in science, whereas a more open-minded form of observation is often neglected due to time strains and science teachers' priority of teaching specific content knowledge. Here science has a lesson to learn from art. The core skill of music experience, displayed for example at a concert, is to listen. Listening to music allows for a space to be opened which is concrete and un-defined at the same time. In contrast, core skills of science experience seem to be connected to (careful) describing and (correct) explaining. Exact sense observations are valued to the extent to which they form a basis for conceptual understanding. In a physics class, the swinging pendulum is measured in order to deduce the law of swing time. This is a narrow form of observation as it intentionally focuses on measurable features. What if the moving pendulum is observed like one would listen to a piece of music? What if the observation would allow for an *aesthetic pendulum space* to be opened? Is it only through an open, pre-conceptual act of sensing that an aesthetic experience can take place at all, that an "unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things" (Dewey 2005: 51) can be cultivated? If this is

[2] From: Douglas Harper, Online Etymology Dictionary (http://www.etymonline.com/), accessed June 24, 2013.

the case, then the measure-oriented observation in science class is hardly suitable for evoking students' sensations for beauty, wonder or awesomeness. Maybe such sensations are more likely to be experienced in the concert hall simply because the act of listening is not directed towards some form of abstract explanations. The lesson to learn from music education is that science teachers, in order to promote aesthetics in science class, should intentionally cultivate a more open, unbiased kind of observation.

11.7 Cultivating Connectedness

In this chapter, my main educational argument is that music can provide an entrance into an aesthetic experience of nature. The *Pendulum Dialogues* does not so far provide an empirical basis for discussing its consequences for teaching. It does, however, provide for educational reflection. The paths I would like to follow in this last part are the cultivation of the skill of aesthetic appreciation in education and whether music can reinforce connectedness to nature.

The moving pendulum itself, with its "isochronal majesty" (Eco 1989: 3), is a beautiful and solemn appearance. An experiential encounter with the pendulum motivated me to contrast these dimensions with the pure scientific ones and to seek a joint expression. By approaching the pendulum from an artist-composer perspective, the participants in the project group practice a skill which might be called "aesthetic appreciation", the ability to sense and value aesthetic experience (Winters 1998). The idea is not to erase the differences between the scientist's and the artist's approach to one and the same phenomenon. On the contrary, the intention is to highlight these differences and to create a dialogue between scientists and artists, teachers and students in a *common learning space*. Here we practice ways of exploring and re-discovering natural phenomena by means of parallel efforts of both science and art. As science teachers, we would have to train a conscious removal of–or at least engage in a reflection on–the filters through which phenomena are observed. As music teachers, we would have to learn to share the musical-aesthetic practice with non-musicians and with teachers of other subjects. A common field for science teachers and music teachers is to practice and stimulate a mutual "sensitivity to the qualities of things" (Dewey 2005: 51). We would highlight both similarities and differences between the multiple ways that scientists and artists, and science teachers and music teachers, make sense of their experiences.

Throughout the exploration of *Pendulum Dialogues,* it has become increasingly clear that aesthetics is not a character of the pendulum itself, but rather a characteristic of the *relationship* between participating person and pendulum phenomenon. The relationship signifies a connectedness; it constitutes a "sense of the including whole" (ibid.: 201). In the theory of relational aesthetics, the focus is on the interplay between man and phenomena in the world. Its intention is to foster this interplay artistically: "A relational aesthetic is characterized by a concern for the capacity of art to promote healthy interactions within and among people and the

created world" (Hyland Moon 2002: 140). There is a growing interest in pedagogical ideas regarding art as an eye-opener to the aesthetics of natural surroundings. A relevant example here is "arts-based environmental education," an attempt to re-connect to the world and cultivate an environmental consciousness (van Boeckel 2009). In the continuation of *Pendulum Dialogues,* I further plan to investigate the relationship between musical composition, aesthetic appreciation and our rootedness in the lifeworld.

The ontological challenge does point towards a new concept of teaching: If we are teaching our students the pendulum exclusively in the geometrical space, we reduce the phenomenon in its original multitude. It is a paradoxical problem that we, as science educators, impart a reductionist interpretation of lifeworld phenomena, while we simultaneously lament our students' view on school science as abstract and detached from their daily lives (Østergaard 2011a). This problem rests on the ontological question of the significance of the existential space. As an effect of constructivist philosophy in education, the focus has shifted from the world as it is to our knowledge creation. Doing so, nature has become an arena for man's self-realization. Are we, as Dixon (2011) rhetorically asks, "destined only to ever consider the world as a resource from which we can fund our project?" (p.116) The view of nature as a mere supermarket of resources, stripped of its value and dignity, is a major challenge when it comes to re-reversing ontology.

Dialogues with the pendulum connect music, science and ontology in a web of polyrhythmic patterns. The pendulum's slowly repeating movement evokes in me the sensation of *being*. A dramatic-musical piece based on a sensation of *being* might turn out to be quite boring. However, as a contrast to our time's *fast*-being, it nevertheless opens up for a reflection on profound questions in both ontology and education: how to revitalize our connection to nature, how to return to the phenomena as they are, and how to renew teaching with an aim of re-enchanting the world.

Acknowledgements I am deeply grateful for comments, inputs and encouragements from Dr. Jan van Boeckel, Professor Morten Carlsen and the two editors while preparing this text.

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Part IV
Bildung and Truth

Chapter 12
Revisiting the Cave: Heidegger's Reinterpretation of Plato's Allegory with Reference to Music Education

Christopher Naughton

Abstract Heidegger's essay *On Plato's Teaching of Truth (1942),* although a treatise in itself on education, can be a helpful text for music teachers wishing to challenge their own understanding of knowledge and what and how they teach. Through this insight into Plato's thinking, with Heidegger's qualifications and commentary, some fundamental concerns regarding the interpretation of truth/knowledge currently adopted in music education can be reexamined. If like Heidegger, we look again at the implications of this misreading, according to Heidegger, the neo-liberal curriculum has effectively adopted an error. With increasing pressure on universities to find new models of teaching, Heidegger through this essay confronts the educator with a set of ideas that ask of the music educator to re-configure the very concept of education and to re-align practice to adequately reflect the human condition.

Keywords Plato • The cave • Music education • Neo-liberal curriculum

12.1 Introduction

In his essay *On Plato's Teaching of Truth (1942),* Heidegger addresses some key issues facing those working in music education including; the categorization of knowledge; the imposition of predetermined learning outcomes and use of performance measures of achievement. Heidegger suggests that we see education as a process that is deconstructive, where educators provide an experience of learning that is authentic, one that engages students in their own knowledge building. Reading Heidegger's study of Plato's allegory, affords a challenge to the prevailing utilitarian mood in higher education, questioning the definitive terms of reference that are employed and offering music educators a means to reflect on the scope and

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_12

dynamics of what is termed music education. In providing an overview, Heidegger argues that learning that is wholly governed by predetermined educational outcomes – inside the cave – might be contrasted by the act of students being allowed to exercise their own ideas coming to presence – by moving outside the cave beyond the reach of the ends driven curriculum?

Heidegger adds that knowing is not simply a matter of what it is that the cave dwellers see on leaving the cave. Seeing, Heidegger maintains, has been historically misrepresented, so that verification or truth as propositional knowing, that being knowledge that is in effect removed from experience, achieves pre-eminence. In this historical reading of the cave Heidegger discerns the difference between propositions – or representation of what is seen – and truth that which is gained through experience of the opportunity to know. The argument made by Heidegger is that students acquire a comportment (Verhalten) to different beingness (Seindheit) and hence different knowing through their presencing of things. These are some of the key points that will be discussed in this chapter and referenced to music education.

12.2 Heidegger/Plato and Truth: Aletheia or Correctness

In unraveling Heidegger's argument, it is necessary to establish what is meant by the terms truth or *aletheia* and essence. These terms have an important place in how we might comprehend what Heidegger refers to as the authentic in education. Iain Thomson (2001), referring to Heidegger's discussion of essence and truth, indicates that essence in Plato is a fixed pre-defined term whereas in Heidegger's essay, the word becomes a verb – to essence (*west*) or remain in play (*im Speil Bleibt*) (Thomson 2001: 246). With reference to being, essence is placed by Thomson within a changing historical context which allows, essence, to shift meaning, laying a foundation for seeing truth as a shared understanding or knowing within a particular historical context. If a truth is shared or generally held over a period of time, then truth the word changes according to different historical epochs where truth has different interpretations. Thomson adds that for "him (Heidegger), 'the essence of truth' is the 'history of being.'" (2001: 247). This suggests that we cannot know the essence of something, unless we already know what it is, so that we only act on the basis of an unconscious or prior understanding of essence. If this is so, then essences are neither something we can prove conclusively or establish to be true but something that we strive for within multiple understandings. This concept of truth therefore refers to knowing words and knowing how they belong to both our lived experience (being-in-the-world) within our lived context, and having a knowledge or specific knowing that to us works before we arrive at conceptual formulations. As an example consider the word, or phenomenon, such as desk for example. This might be a desk situated in an office where certain tasks are appointed to a desk or alternatively a desk might be as in a school, a different kind of desk. Here relations are described and identities located, in such a way that we can see things in the overall context of desks, offices, schools and related activities. Heidegger sees our

relationship to an object connecting to this rich experience of the world that articulates that object. Hence it is possible for a person to speak of a desk and use the word even though they may have no idea of what it is. The implication for music education is that teaching knowledge of something that students do not have the 'world' experience or connect with fails in the attempt.

To elaborate the point consider a teacher introducing a style of music utterly removed from the daily experience of students being taught. Perhaps classical music being introduced to a lower decile population is a good example. What occurs is a form of musical colonisation in this exercise, where high art is provided for those that normally can't afford such access. This is not to say learning and teaching music may not be provided but that musical skills and development that is rigorous yet remain within the musical traditions of that place of that culture are important factors (D. Lines, personal communication February 10th 2008). What is the point of making an investment in a music program for a population that may result in one or two being 'saved' from the music of their own culture? Sadly the reverse message to those learning to play classical music from wealthier districts is that their culture is of a higher order than others. When those same students enter the academy the sense that one culture is 'higher' is made very apparent as the options system often reduces 'other' music to a sideshow. Listening to Chinese music students at a New Zealand University dismissing their grandparents playing by ear on the traditional instruments sums up the dilemma, or a student from one low decile school in South Auckland asking about their composition option remarked to their teacher: "I can't write my composition for guitar can I sir? 'Cause that's a party instrument eh sir?'" (Student, personal conversation, 2003).

12.3 Truth as Propositional Knowledge

If we take the concept of truth, we discover more in Heidegger's reading in relation to the difference between truth or propositions, and truth related to what is termed the negation of truth – untruth. While this may seem confusing at first, the construction is a useful one.

Mark Wrathall (2004) in discussing Plato, claims that he draws attention to seeing truth only "in so far as it is a property of propositions." (2004: 444). This becomes a view of things in terms of the unchanging properties. Heidegger adds to this that truth "…needs to be approached by understanding its negation" (2004: 444). What is to be unconcealed is "thus determined in relationship to a positive state of concealment" (2004: 445). That is to say that what first needs to be understood is concealment, "seen as something positive…" before the unconcealment can be addressed. (Wrathall 2005: 342). Here we come to the question of hiddenness or concealment in Heidegger's reading of truth, where to determine the unsaid, the unsaid being the "background assumptions, dispositions, conceptual systems etc., which ground the actual views they (those open to the unconcealment at the time) accept" (2004: 445). This unsaid hidden aspect of being or the potential of knowing is, according to Heidegger present within the unconcealment of knowing.

In looking more carefully at our present day usage of the word truth, can we say that truth is seen as correspondence – that is the correspondence of a proposition within a set of propositions?(Wrathall 2004: 445). Heidegger maintains that Plato limits truth to this propositional knowing in the cave allegory. For Heidegger truth is grounded in the unhiddenness and hiddenness of entities:

> What is primordially true, i.e., unhidden, is not the proposition about a being, but the being itself – a thing, a fact,…The proposition is true in so far as it conforms to something already true i.e., to a being that is hidden in its being. Truth in this sense of correctness presupposes unhiddenness. (Heidegger 2002: 86).

The distinction between a proposition relating to an object, and unhiddenness revealing potentially a phenomenon needs to be borne in mind in making this reading, as truth is seen not only in the concrete manifestation of objects but seen without the context of their being. This is encapsulated in knowledge without experience.

Heidegger sees *aletheia* (unconcealdness), as different in meaning when removed from unhiddenness. Truth can be truth as unhiddenness and truth as correctness as they arise quite differently, relating and functioning according to our comportment or response to an object or thought at the time. The experience of unhiddenness, according to Heidegger, is then the foundation of truth as correctness, that we need to reawaken or at least make the attempt to do so. Heidegger put this to his students in the 1931/32 lectures, to make an interpretation of the text in the proximity of our "…ownmost being" (2002: 94). The idea behind this questioning was a challenge for students to confront their own being or essence if truth is considered as a series of propositions or pre-ordained knowing.

12.4 Heidegger's Interpretation of Plato's Allegory of the Cave

To return to the allegory and to music education, let us examine the four stages of the cave allegory alongside the question: What is teaching and how can we present to the student an authentic experience that provides an essential musical encounter? The implications of this question for the music educator will be discussed with reference to Heidegger's reading of the allegory.

12.4.1 Stage One

In stage one the cave dwellers, or prisoners, are shackled and blinkered looking up at a wall. Images are projected by the puppeteers, who hold up objects that are reflected from a fire and the sun behind them. This depicts "our everyday abode – which is revealed to sight as we look around." (1998a: 517a8–518d7). The real for

the cave dwellers, is thus what they see – that which is. This setting is home for the cave dwellers where they are in the world. This becomes an illusion of being, where beings are simply shadows, representations that are controlled by the puppeteers. However there is more to the visible form, whereby a thing presents itself. Here we might say that what is true in terms of correspondence is recognised, but the challenge to that truth, whereby the opportunity to engage in new revealing looking to new concealments or opportunities is not met.

The cave dwellers see only the proposition not the unhiddenness of the object. The controlled situation they are in means that they only see concrete objects. It is pointed out that while we need to see the objects as a concrete illustration (otherwise we would never be able to perceive this or that as a house or a tree) this does not mean that the onlooker realises what is seen is everything that passes as real. Thus that which is nearest, though it has the consistency of shadows, holds us as humans captive day after day as we fail to see the hiddenness and see only what is primordially true.

Can we say that in music education when what it is to be musical might be very specific, where a performative culture pervades, this may limit the scope of our being? If the role of the teacher is seen as imparting a body of knowledge, such as teaching the song or the instrumental teacher teaching the repertoire, there may be little prospect for invention and making to reveal new possibilities. Sadly the outcome can become very predictable especially in higher education, where performance of the 'repertoire' equates to recognition amongst your peers. This emphasis on performance, can create a two tier community where the sense is that those who perform – usually being those more experienced in performing before entering higher education – are seen as legitimate musicians, whereas those who choose not to perform the 'repertoire' are seen as 'other.' This differentiation can become a mindset and create a disconnect, for those unable to see beyond this received value system (Naughton 2009a).

12.4.2 Stage Two

In the second stage of the allegory the prisoners are turned around to look at the objects and the fire. Their shackles are removed but all they do is look at the shadows and approach a "little nearer to what is." (2007a–515 d2). As Heidegger maintains, the freed prisoner "… will consider that (the shadows) he saw before (without any help) are more unhidden than what is now being shown." (Heidegger 1998a: 209) Here for the first time in the essay we come across the term unhidden. The glow of the fire blinds those who have been turned around so that they see other things but see them in confusion. Heidegger suggests that the prisoners lack the prior condition for assessing concrete beings in their being and see only shadows still as their unconcealed reality.

Similar to the 'not seeing' on the part of students, an institution can become so formalised that students may not 'see' beyond the value system of that institution or university department. If we consider the social pressures to conform to what music is, especially for newly arrived students from a Junior Academy or secondary school, music may already have been fixed for those students in terms of power and roles that music played in the system. A Head of Music at a leading New Zealand University recently pointed out that students arriving at her department were quite clear that they wanted to be taught, and not 'muck about!' As Christopher Small remarked:

> Since a social order is a matter of relationships between human beings, the performance of this or any other ritual act together is a powerful means of ensuring the social cohesion and stability. That being so, we need not be surprised to find that it is commonly used, often deliberately and sometimes even cynically, by those who rule to maintain the acquiescence of those over whom they rule. (Small 1998: 97).

Hence power often dictates how music is conceptualised in the secondary school, and music plays a key a role in the maintenance of that power. One has only to reflect on the school song, the national anthem, prize giving, where the orchestra and choir serve to reinforce a sense of order and power vested in the authority of the institution.

12.4.3 Stage Three

The prisoners are removed from the cave in this stage with a new orientation to ideas and so learn to discern the presencing of beings and of themselves. Here they see beings appearing as they are, not as representations provided by others in the cave. This slow turning around has to be nurtured and must unfold from a relation that sustains. Heidegger links this thought to the German Bildung to *paideia* as the prisoners themselves create their own boundaries, unlike the puppeteers making their decisions for them, as they allow being, their light, to presence within their new experience of being. This creation of their own new boundaries might suggest that the prisoners have both an ontic knowing of artefacts as in concrete objects (*Seinde*) or the unhidden as well as an ontological knowing (*Sein*) of the process that they are engaged with in relation to their being.

As Thomson observes: "Recall Heidegger's succinct and powerful formulation: 'Real education lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first of all leading us to the place of our essential being and accustoming us to it.'" (Thomson 2001: 254). The opportunity arises at this point for the "attunement to – this 'open' … what Heidegger famously calls 'dwelling.'" (2001: 258).

As things show themselves as they are at this stage, the role for the teacher can be seen as removing the students from an enframing within the confines of their daily experience. What then can be made of this third stage in assisting students to think and experience and be open to experiencing music beyond their conscious

understanding, reaching that state of antecedent learning and knowing "…what appears antecedently in everything that appears and … makes whatever appears be accessible." (Heidegger 1998a: 170).

As Heidegger indicates much care has to be taken at this stage by the teacher. The type of experience that might be offered to develop the students from their daily experience and allow them access to the encounter through other experiences of becoming or being. It may be that such an opportunity is afforded for instance in a less structured more improvisatory community celebration, where the experience of music allows the students to experience what may have been a predominantly prescribed experience up to that time (Naughton 2006). The introduction of community samba for example into a conservatoire, serves this purpose as students encounter a musical awakening of something that may have lain dormant for too long in their experience of their being. If students come from a classical background, the opportunity to re-connect with the child in themselves, to break from reading music to be making music and experiencing music as part of a community of musicians may be something quite new. Here decisions are made as to what students may want to do in the act of making, where music is not prescribed, where students have to commit to something that moves and changes as it is fluid and uncertain. For students growing up in a rapidly changing world where the opportunity for personal engagement is becoming more and more limited such an opening brings many challenges. For students a sense of making, free from judgements of right or wrong where reliance is placed on others in the spontaneous arising can be a healthy alternative to the prescription that most are obliged to follow in their predetermined degree (Naughton 2009a). Students in this experience may develop a concept of being as Being where they move from preconceived ideas of themselves within the confines of an individual, to a space in which they might realize an attunement with others in music, removing the barriers that may previously have delimited them as musicians.

Heidegger sees the pivotal role of the teacher, by analogy, leading the prisoners out of the cave, in engaging with the students allowing them to encounter the 'beingness of being.' In musical terms considering the world for themselves, allowing students to discover an awareness of working with others to reveal music beyond the confines of their musical enframing (Young 2002). This is seen as all part of the disclosing – as in Small's reference to the Maori god Tane and the envelopment of being:

> Even the deities who are evoked to preside over the pattern, or aspects of it, are the result of metaphoric thinking. The Polynesian god Tane, for example, is – not represents or symbolizes but is – the proper relationship between humanity and the life of plants and the forest, and the Yoruba–American goddess Yemayá is that which connects us to the sea and its creatures (Small 1998: 103, Small's italics)

And as Wrathall writes:

> The liberation requires force, work, and exertion, strain and suffering to break out of our everyday orientation to the world. It gives the prisoner a 'new standpoint,' from which the everyday comportments of men are shown to be empty. (Wrathall 2004: 253)

12.4.4 Stage Four

The prisoners, now liberated, return to the cave. With the return, the liberators, as they have become, are able to distinguish different levels of intelligibility on the basis of which beings can appear in their being. Here the liberators engage in a struggle between two different concepts of truth. One is unhiddenness and recognition of hiddenness and the other is the belief that what is seen within the cave is the extent of all relevant conscious knowing. Plato states that when something is more uncovered, unhidden or unconcealed it also becomes the lowest form of truth. For Heidegger unconcealment is the moment or revelation of Being where concealment is reliant on unconcealment, where in the revelation of knowing beings are disclosed in the act of being revealed: "Truth is this dynamic opposition, and truth as the unconcealment of beings is constituted out of this dynamic opposition. Truth as unconcealment is in this sense self-grounding for Heidegger." (Duits 2004: 22)

In the final stage, the prisoners, now liberators, access a more fundamental understanding of truth or knowledge, as they endeavour to draw out new knowing from that which is hidden, veiled or obscured. This stage is more complicated to interpret where Heidegger might be said to see the final stage as a recognition of the teacher, and a re-orientation to the environment. At this point in making comment on a return to the cave the emphasis is on the teacher to be an exceptional learner with the capability to enable students to learn and actively respond to the demands of the context or as Heidegger put it, the teacher has to "learn to let them learn." (Heidegger 2004: 15) The recognition here is that teaching is the highest form of learning as opposed to teaching fulfilling standards, or worse teaching that reduces the learning to training so that, "The true teacher is ahead of his students in that he has more to learn than they." (Heidegger 1998b: 129)

12.5 Implications of the Allegory for Music Education

In his later works such as the *Origin of the work of Art* (1993) and the *Question Concerning Technology* (1977), Heidegger develops in depth such questions as the disclosing of an artwork. In the cave allegory, Heidegger points at some of the underlying aspects of those later works in grounding his theoretical thinking with respect to Plato. While Heidegger's work on Plato is more concerned with education, it is informative in addressing how art education might be re-looked at, in the light of a future vision for education (Naughton 2012).

Heidegger's reference to ontological knowing can be expanded within the context of music education by looking at the implications of the cave in a more literal sense. Initially we might say a lot of the time teaching in music, certainly in the studio tradition, is an unflinching experience of the cave. The combined effects of teaching the music of the 'masters,' plus the teacher's own lengthy apprenticeship often leaves little alternative, as students painstakingly develop their skills and

competence over the years in reproducing the 'repertoire'. The spectre of the puppeteer looms large with the insistence on compliance with the score, learning the theory and adopting the manner of playing and stylistic conventions for each composer of each period. Obedience to the rules are implicit in the process, and this characterisation of music, depending on the student culture and the response of the parents, can have an injurious psychological impact on a young children learning an instrument (Boucher and Ryan 2011). This is where the music teacher, like so many teachers in the performing arts who were brought up themselves from a very early age, find it difficult to acknowledge change to the established order. Who or what though can take the teachers from the cave or reveal to them that they are in the cave?

The mantra of standards, excellence and performance is one that is constantly repeated by universities seeking a higher standing in terms of their global academic rating. Yet this striving for ever higher position to secure the top students may make little impression on local students and their selection of university. It is more an appeal to students and countries where there is a much narrower definition of education who see these ratings as important in deciding on their choice according to the global ranking that has been achieved by any university (Lawrence 2009: 21.). As discussed by Bill Readings (1996) the word excellence here denotes a university as an efficient corporate where educational process is reduced to little more than a perfunctionary role (Readings (1996) cited in Thomson 2001: 252).

What is plainly missing from the discussion of music in education is that the talented few are given all the attention. While this accords with the prestige of a department to have 'winners' in their midst, what of those young people who may not have sufficient performance experience to compete at this level and who may in any case, owing to their cultural preference and wider vision of being, see music and their being in a much broader light? What kind of education or 'excellent' education is provided for these students who do not wish to, or cannot go down this track of excellence? Can music education be envisaged in a way that as Heidegger suggests, meeting the ontological understanding of being in our age, be inclusive and recognise diversity?

The idea of letting things become in themselves relates to music becoming part of our being in a conscious/unconscious practice. It is this understanding of affect that removing music from a scientific, analytical perspective allows the work, as it is, to arrive in the world, bringing its own attunement or mode of being. Thus music is not seen as is, in the present tense only. Music becomes a matter of possibilities as a might be, or a very different view of music as an object (Naughton 2009b). This is similar to the recognition that Heidegger describes in his way of seeing unhiddenness. Heidegger effectively takes us into a sphere of affect, in which objects are seen as what arrives. It is thus within the openness to mood contained in the temporal nature of affect that music can be felt, a future event encompassing the present experience and the history of place and of being. This understanding of seeing possibilities, in hiddenness, and what arises in the process typifies what occurs in community music where what arises can become the fundamental of a new making process (Naughton 2009a). Often I have seen this as after a samba practice where students

may invent a rhythm and from one inspiration others join in and in moments a new samba emerges – only because students allow themselves to be immersed in the process and form a comportment to this new musical possibility.

Reflecting on the provision of music in tertiary education let us ask: Why do we have chosen styles of music on offer and within those styles why must all be predetermined? We have many composition tools today that we can use without the use of a score such as the sequencer software. This software provides all that is needed for creating music and is used throughout the music profession, yet the need to script, to legitimize the music so often remains a requirement. Why is this the case? The answer might be, despite ambivalent graduating standards, reading notation or musical 'literacy' being seen as part of the attraction for the international market? Sadly this can thus become a series of impossible demands for potential students who may want to further their musical ambitions making and developing music without writing the music next to those who have had the privilege of private tuition.

Are we not at a time when learning the rudiments scales, and the rigidity of playing the right notes fails to match the operation of the arts in our current era? Music education is dominated by a fixation with precision but this may not be justified in the context of how, in previous eras music was intended or understood in the current professional world. Making use of Heidegger's notion of an epoch (epoche), let us see music put back into an historical context, to see music against the present day world. The alternative it seems is to maintain an endless repetition of the same, with impassable boundaries created for students when they could embark on creating their own boundaries as in the third stage of the allegory.

Taking music students out of the conservatoire or university, presenting them with a philosophical grounding and new experiences, might stimulate a way to relook at music and music in education. By teaching students to improvise on their instrument, not according to practiced conventions but to what they want to do, by allowing students to learn how to play in different musical environments may reveal music as life enhancing. We might bring students own works with others into the scope of music making, where teachers work with students where music in education can be part of the work of the university. With significant changes occurring in society that include the dissolution of many practices owing to shifts in technology, including access to online learning, the music institution is in danger of stasis and hence losing their relevance if new thinking and awareness is not adopted.

Such experiences as the samba school or any musical event that allows students the space in which they might wholly engage in an experience of music that allows them to open new horizons and create space for re-making might be considered viable in this new order. The acceptance of students developing their own ideas, no matter initially how derivative at first, has to be applauded. If students themselves are engaging in a musical activity that allows them that sense of being for themselves or as Heidegger describes as, dwelling, new potentialities will be revealed.

The final stage of the cave allegory is a reflection by Heidegger on the term teaching, which he links to the German word 'zeigen' to point or show. In focusing on what a teacher's words reveal, Thomson remarks: "To learn means to make everything we do answer to whatever essentials address us at a given time" (Thomson

2001: 259). Learning is then prefaced by what essentials we may encounter in our environment.

12.6 Conclusion

Heidegger saw that through teaching, the essentials of learning are engaged. This speaks a lot for the role of music education and not taken too literally shows how to build into new practice the opportunity to teach, in no matter what capacity, is to develop a broader understanding of music. Perhaps this is why music students have remarked on the best times in their tertiary experience career being when they had the opportunity to invent what they did (Salisbury 2009) without their teachers being present. If teaching others were seen as an integral part of learning this might be of value to all connected with music education reducing the individualistic and promoting a 'disindividuation' as a vital musical acquisition (Naughton 2009a, b).

It is the human interaction and connection that Heidegger prizes in much of his writing seeing the realization of ideas and knowing through a making and gathering together. From an analysis of the cave with music education in mind the opening of where we all are, becomes apparent. The students, by seeing music not as a means to repeat the same modernist typology, but by engaging in a making process linked to a revealing of their own enframing in their metaphysical being, might take thought and practice in new unexpected directions. This in turn may bring new insight and music back to the profession and more presciently to music education at all levels.

Heidegger adds that the things that we encounter themselves, demand a comportment. Our fundamental way for making sense of the world is therefore nothing natural or necessary, but in this we are attuned by the natural world around us. We are then always projecting ourselves into the world, into action and possibilities, comporting ourselves in different ways and making sense of objects and situations that we encounter, looking to build our own communities. To achieve this we need to admit to the fractures in society and work to build relations between those unquestioning, who wish to remain in the cave.

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Chapter 13
From Heidegger to Dufrenne, and Back: *Bildung* Beyond Subject and Object in Art Experience

Einar Rusten

Abstract In this chapter, the author begins highlighting the tendency of an existing inherent divergence of ontological subjectivism and objectivism regarding the prevalent explanations of *the source and origin* of the various contents of aesthetic experience in general; *i.e.*, not least often met upon as a dual tendency within one and the same particular body of thought. The claim is that we, through Martin Heidegger's way of rejecting the very premises for the construing of an ontological abyss between a subjective and an objective realm of world, including his related, special view on the ontology of art works, can achieve a new understanding of how the individual aesthetic experience comprises an aspect of knowledge. One implication is that the content of the experience takes on a certain uniqueness and unexchangeability in its long-term impact and consequences for the person in question. Thus, brought into the realm of educational philosophy as well, parts of the chapter moves within a frame of *Bildung*-thinking. This particular German-cultural situated tradition of educational and cultural philosophy being drawn upon, connections in human life between content-rooted momentous aesthetic experiences on the one hand, and longtime developments, knowledge, and enduring states of mind on the other, are highlighted to some degree.

To a wide extent the chapter takes a general aesthetic theoretical point of departure, but musicological implications are taken into consideration as well. The inspiring sources are philosophic and aesthetic theoretical elements in works by Heidegger and Mikel Dufrenne, respectively, not least the Heideggerian thought of the artwork as a privileged place for experiencing anew being as such—a being which in reality lightens all the things, entities and other individual beings that we most often in a more or less somnambulistic way are dealing with in our daily world. And in this way, the artwork can also be a privileged place to open up anew the being that we ourselves are.

Keywords Bildung • Subject-object • Aesthetic experience • Artwork • Being

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_13

13.1 Introduction

This chapter takes as its point of departure the implications of Heideggerian philosophy for the untying of one particular knot within aesthetics, namely, whether to have recourse to (1) subjectivism, or (2) objectivism on the ontological level in seeking to explain the true, effective *source and origin* of various concrete contents of aesthetic experience in general. Alternatively, whether (3) seeking to mediate somehow between the two first-mentioned explanatory 'strategies.' The subjectivist standpoint, here, seeing various emotional, sensuous, etc. aesthetic experiential contents as something due to the experiencing consciousness itself in some *projective* way—as in the saying 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder'—must historically be seen in connection with the gradual shift of weight from ontology towards epistemology, accelerating considerably in the eighteenth century through philosophers such as Locke, Hume, and Kant. The last two of these mentioned philosophers, again, with their respective interest in epistemological problems of the appreciation of art and beauty, have both contributed for the good or worse (all depending on one's own standpoint), to a long-lived weakening of the general claim on knowledge as something possible to obtain in a given aesthetic experience worthy of its name, in favor of some less 'ambitious' portraying of the phenomenon of aesthetic judgment as something which naturally comprises a normative appeal to the common, public agreement of the same.

The objectivism of point (2) above, on the contrary, shall denote a main weight on the ontological side regarding the interest in various aesthetic objects, implying a focus on the extra-individual independence of the same object *per se*, and including a far more positive estimation of the actual claim on knowledge on the epistemological side. Indeed, within this large picture, there are vast differences between various theoreticians regarding the object's estimated status of universality and endurance across time and different cultural embodiments, as in all those diverse theoretical interpretations spanning from something experiential conceived as stemming solely from an attentive absorption of the single, particular art work as a self-contained, independent entity, eternally existing once brought into being and with wholly indigenous structural and signifying traits, all the way to various conceptions of something extra-individual objective or objectified to be found mainly—or even solely—in the respective art works' social, subcultural, institutional and/or larger cultural historical, semantic, etc. embodiment. Regardless of such differences, the common denominator would be a positive estimation of the possibility of art-related meaning and knowledge contained in some extra-individual dimension, as opposed to a subjectivist view on art experience. *Nota bene*: the question of absolutism/formalism vs. referentialism, as we find it among others in a musicological connection, has no function as a discerning criterion in *this* particular context; such, and similar views as hinted to under point (2) above are to be sorted under the overarching objectivist position, *given* a strong element of the same positive estimation as mentioned.

Finally, a more detailed comment on point (3) above: to my opinion, art-related philosophies and theories of greater interest will 'normally' tend to seek some type of precarious oscillation between the two first-mentioned positions; that is, often with a main weight on the side of objectivism, but not without the inclusion of subjectivism to some degree (*e.g.*, cf. Beardsley 1958: 34–43). In addition, the other way round: where the subjectivist position prevails, as in Hume and Kant's writings on the actual topic, there is still a concern for which traits in the respective object bring on the semi-private subjective aesthetic emotions, sensations and judgments, and which special attitude of reception is called for by art and beauty itself.

Martin Heidegger's Gordian way of cutting through this threefold entanglement not only on a regional (here, *i.e.* art-related), but on a fundamental ontological plane, is to question the very viability of 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' as foundational categories *per se* (Heidegger [1927] 1993, [1936] 1950a, [1938] 1950b, 1957a, b). -Cf. the concept of the latter in the Cartesian mind/matter dualism, with *its* vast influence later on in the history of philosophy and science, upholding a dominant ontological picturing even today of a division between an 'outer' objective and 'inner' subjective world. Incidentally, John Dewey's aesthetic theory reverberates to some extent when it comes to the mentioned position of non-dualism (Dewey 1934), although Heidegger displays a far more radical approach. Another philosopher even more in harmony with the actual approach would be Hans-Georg Gadamer, an independently influential thinker who at the same time must be characterized as Heidegger's follower in part not only with respect to the most fundamental level of philosophic questioning, but also regarding the special challenges of art experience and art ontology (cf. Gadamer 1960: 27–161). Dispensing with any 'triangulation' through Gadamer for the sake of concentration, though, however tempting and relevant, there is one particular philosopher in addition to Heidegger who *will* be drawn upon in this chapter, namely the French aesthetician and phenomenologist Mikel Dufrenne (cf. *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience* [1953] 1973.) The latter's own reverberations with Heidegger will come to the fore later on, along with its special usefulness in the chapter's context.

What is to be anticipated on this point, is the implication of the non-dualistic ontological visions only touched upon so far, that the content of the aesthetic experience takes on a certain uniqueness and unexchangeability in its long term impact and consequences, bringing parts of the discussion into the realm of educational philosophy. The claim is that we, by the help of Heideggerian and Dufrenneian thought, can obtain a new understanding of how the individual aesthetic experience comprises an aspect of knowledge.

13.2 Philosophic Conceptual Point of Departure

In Heidegger's struggle to destruct the Cartesian dualism between mind and matter (*e.g.*, Heidegger 1993: 19–27, 89–101; cf. Descartes' concepts of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*), he finds the prevailing concepts of 'subject' bound to a fatal tradition

of reification (Heidegger 1993: 46). This is due to the fact that the etymological roots of the very term 'subject' lay in various philosophical presuppositions of the existence of a unifying and defining substratum of each and every *thing* in the world, upholding the identity and endurance of the respective thing in the midst of its shifting phenomenal faces—what could be named the 'thinghood' of things. -Cf. the following quotation of the passage in question (here, in English translation): "*Ontologically*, every idea of a 'subject'—unless refined by a previous ontological determination of its basic character—still posits the *subjectum* (*ὑποκείμενον*) along with it, no matter how vigorous one's ontical protestations against the 'soul substance' or the 'reification of consciousness.' The Thinghood itself which such reification implies must have its ontological origin demonstrated if we are to be in a position to ask what we are to understand *positively* when we think of the unreified *Being* of the subject, the soul, the consciousness, the spirit, the person." (Heidegger 1962: 72.) Herein lies also much of the reason why Heidegger seeks to listen in another phenomenal direction, and launches his new, idiosyncratic interpretations of the old concepts of 'presence,' 'being here'/'being there' (*Dasein*), 'disclosure' (*Erschließung*; Gr., *alétheia*) and 'understanding' (*Verstehen*) as more adequate ways to capture central phenomena related to human existence in a given world, semantically pointing to man's awareness, understanding and experience of world and own self; in a word,—although captured far more freely this time, knowingly introducing another concept which Heidegger finds highly problematic in light of its potential neo-Cartesian purport (*e.g.*, cf. the quotation above)—pointing to the phenomenon of *consciousness* (*Bewußtsein*).

To be drawn from all this, is that Heideggerian philosophy in reality does comprise a concern about the phenomenon of consciousness and even that of the 'subject,' *given* operating with some anti-Cartesian, simultaneously nonobjectivist and -subjectivist revised versions of those latter concepts. This incidentally is something which even Heidegger slightly signals the possibility of in a reconciling manner from time to time (again, *e.g.*, cf. the quotation above; further: Heidegger 1993: 208, 366, 1998a: 122–123, 1998c: 284–285). That precisely will be the case in this chapter in some connections: a strategy facilitating the general dialogue between Heidegger and other philosophers, and which more specifically will prove useful during the juxtaposition of Heidegger and Dufrenne.

Another philosophic conceptual point of departure in this chapter strongly connected with the abovementioned, is the point that the 'I think,' 'I do,' 'I feel,' etc. always represents an awareness, understanding and experience *of* something or someone, and that the self always constitutes a 'self-in-a-world,' and, as such, a 'self-in-relation-to-something/someone' (Heidegger 1993: 316–323, *et passim*). This again implies that an 'empty' consciousness cannot exist (Heidegger 1993: 229).

Finally, a highlighting of Heidegger's idiosyncratic interpretations of the concepts of 'being' (*Sein*), and 'world' (*Welt*): namely, *being* conceived together with the *Dasein* as an inextricable, reciprocally belonging pair, amounting to a *world*'s intrinsic, global self-disclosure (Heidegger 1993: 212, 230 *et passim*; also, cf. Heidegger 1957a: 22–25 and the following section of this chapter). Unless *Dasein*—and that is

to say, unless presence, disclosure, understanding, experience—exists, neither is there any being in the sense of that which lightens the world, 'giving' it free into its disclosure and openness, and *vice versa.* According to a certain trend in various translations of Heidegger into English, I distinguish the actual concept of being from other, more common ones by a capital letter in the following.

'Being' in this sense, then, is distinctly opposed to the notion of being (*Seiendes*) as the mere occurrence of individual things and other 'non*Dasein*-wise' (*nichtdaseinsmäßiges*) entities as something independently given and discernible *within* an existent world (Heidegger: *Sein vs. nichtdaseinsmäßiges Seiendes*.) In addition, especially to be set off from that type of 'dry' registration and definition of matter reigning for instance within natural science. Truly, the latter form finds its justification within in its own rights and limits; it must nevertheless be seen as something derivative, contingent upon a more primordial form of experience (Heidegger 1993: 356–364). In the same tenor, Heidegger sees the phenomenon of *attribution of values* into anything given as a symptom of a weakening awareness of Being, and hence as a feeble substitute for the latter. Only where a leveling-out reification of all being has grown into the very bones of man—which ultimately leaves us with nothing, but an objective world emptied of all inherent qualitative being—must a thing such as values and their necessary attribution to given phenomena be taken up as an important topic (Heidegger 1993: 98–100, 286, 1998b: 263–265, 1950b: 83–94). Accordingly, any discourse built centrally around something such as 'values' in an aesthetic experience must be seen as barking up the wrong tree.

13.3 Heidegger's View on the Work of Art

In the writing *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (Heidegger [1936] 1950a), which emerged almost a decade later than *Sein und Zeit*, the weight becomes all the more prevalent on Being as the *Dasein*'s true source of consciousness, cf. the *vice versa* aspect above. Hence, from an existential point of view on the side of the *Dasein*, Being symbols something humbly sought-after, namely true presence. As a necessary condition in a meeting with a work of art, man has to put away the attitude of the sovereign subjectivity which always seeks the mastery and domination of a given environment, typically being accompanied by forgetfulness and lack of listening when it comes to the realization of the very Being in its *own* terms of a world and its contents. Instead, it is our task to open ourselves for that global self-revelation of a given world of which a work of art is capable. However, how is this possible, considering that scarcely any thematic substance of a work of art would be seen 'striving' for a capture of a given *totality* of a world?

The work of art does not so much display, render and show anything in particular, as it lets a disclosure happen concerning *all* being *through* the revelation of its concrete, specific content (Heidegger 1950a: 44). The discovering *Dasein* finds itself fundamentally rocked and thrown out of its quasi somnambulistic way of being at home in the world; not necessarily in some dramatic, violent way, but

rather *inconspicuously*, and thereby all the more effectively (Heidegger 1950a: 54). The given thematic artistic substance functions mainly as a type of vehicle in this connection, no more, no less: The 'lightening' or 'clearing' (*Lichtung*, cf. the aforementioned disclosure/*Erschließung*) of the truth of the concrete, individual 'artwork-Being'—which again freely formulated equals to the emergence of the aesthetic consciousness and experience taken as something genuinely content-rooted—takes on a certain spreading effect which in turn sheds a new light on every being and makes us see our daily world anew. Reality becomes more real. *Truth* in this Heideggerian context then simply can be translated as the event of disclosure, *alétheia* (Heidegger 1950a: 40). Moreover, that very same lightening, this gloom, has taken its residence in the artwork as beauty, which is one of the essential ways wherein truth takes place (Heidegger 1950a: 44). Thus, with a free formulation of Heidegger's standpoint, it is not the human brain, taken as some non*Dasein*-wise, objective entity, that makes up the *source* of consciousness (Heidegger 1998c: 284–285). Rather, it is Being's own, intrinsic ability to self-revelation that provides the general instance of a reliable and shareable 'passage through' to beings which are not human, as well as an access to the 'Being-here' we are ourselves (Heidegger 1950a: 41–42). In the midst of this, only man has the ability of *having a world*, as *the* unique receptacle for, *the* aware listener to, Being's own voice and luminosity (Heidegger 1950a: 34, 1957a: 22–23).

Still, the new disclosure of Being through a work of art is always a result of a struggle between self-revelation and self-*closure*—the latter denoting Being's complementary tendency at *hiding* itself. On this point, Heidegger introduces the dual metaphor of the artwork's dimension of 'world' on the one hand, to a wide extent connected to its potentiality of self-revelation (cf. the circumscription of Being and world in the former section!), and its demeanor of 'soil' (*Erde*) on the other, equally connected to its inclination at self-closure (Heidegger 1950a: 29–46). This soil of the artwork is not akin to something completely hidden, though. Far more, it is that which reveals itself *as* self-hiding (Heidegger 1950a: 35–36, 44). It is all contained within the clearing, or, in other words: within consciousness rooted in Being. In the same way the notion of world, in the midst of its association with the actual global revealing *per se*, at an even deeper level points to the lightening being at work of certain founding 'essential directives' of given worldly existence (in German: "… die Lichtung der Bahnen der wesentlichen Weisungen, … ."; Heidegger 1950a: 43); path-making essential directives by which all concrete determinations are molded and enabled for their coming into being. As Heidegger idiosyncratically puts it regarding such defining rooms of possibilities: a world "worlds" (*weltet*; *i.e.*, in the shape of a verb), and therefore represents a reality more fundamentally real than any concrete being at hand (Heidegger 1950a: 33). On the other hand, such a thing as preexistent "worlding" forces causing the existing world in the next instance in a *one-way* fashion, let us say, *à la* the *ens increatum* of medieval scholasticism, cannot be inferred as applicable to Heidegger's ontological vision. The essential directives on the one hand and the actual determinations and concretions at the other, in other words, the actual forthcoming world as a whole, are rather at work in a *mutual*, *reciprocal* process of emergence (Heidegger 1950a: 49–50; regarding the 'reciprocity'

etc., here, cf. the similar way of picturing during a discussion of the topic of 'ontological difference,' in: Heidegger 1957b: 62–63.) All other comparison aside, this can be aligned with the Einsteinian time-room continuum, which in its very existence is dependent on factual occurrence of matter and energy.

Hence the need for a concrete *work* of art, showing a unique structure. The inherent struggle stemming from Being's dual tendency at self-disclosure and self-hiding needs a containing and defining outline (*Riß*) in order to force these antagonists to stay battling *together within* their mutual, unifying ground (Heidegger 1950a: 51–52). This type of founding 'outline,' again, must be seen as an aspect, or simply a rewriting, of the abovementioned essential directives—the unique "worlding" powers—of each and every artwork for a rediscovery and elicitation of factual contents in a given *existential* world. In addition, the artwork's self-hiding trait must in this connection be seen as the aspect of a necessary partway *shadowing* of Being's own luminosity, both contour creating and sharpening on the side of the new facticity being met upon.

Such an outline cannot exist without an artistic material medium out from which it can be carved. The artwork's inherent, never-resting dynamics of lightening and veiling must find its living equilibrium in a concrete, 'soilwise' manifested *gestalt* (Heidegger 1950a: 52). Taking a small step aside on this point: the notion of a type of art in which the content would consist of mere concepts and ideas, therefore becomes problematic from a Heideggerian point of view.

13.4 Between Heidegger and Dufrenne

The section above has given a synopsis of some essential traits in Heidegger's view on the nature of truth and presence in the general shape of the artwork. As a useful new perspective, which in many aspects will prove to be strikingly in line with a Heideggerian train of thought, I now turn to Dufrenne's *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience* ([1953] 1973; original title: *Phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique*), a philosophy of aesthetics wherein the aesthetic object is discerned as having properties of a humanoid *Other* in certain respects, more than merely coming forth as a thing-like object in our experience. With Dufrenne's own expression, the pivotal point is about the aesthetic object's presence as a 'quasi subject.' This view harmonizes with Heidegger's plea for a renouncement of all types of instrumental, world-dominating orientation in a meeting with a work of art, and with the notion of the world-founding and -lightening powers of the latter:

> … we can say that the aesthetic object possesses certain characteristics of the natural object, such as indifference, opacity, and self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, though the natural object does not call to us so insistently as the object of use, it still refers us to a world in which it is rooted and on whose basis it appears. […] This non-expressive thing, which is not possessed and animated by an internal signification, belongs to being only to lose itself in being. … . This type of externality does not fit the aesthetic object, which is always unified by its form, a form which is a promise of interiority. The aesthetic object bears its meaning within itself and is a world unto itself. We can understand this kind of object only by

> remaining close to it and constantly coming back to it. […] The aesthetic object is luminous through its very opacity—not by receiving an alien light by which a world is outlined, but by making its own light spring from itself in the act of expression. Thus we shall call the aesthetic object a "quasi subject." (Dufrenne 1973: 145–146)

In this picture, it is additionally noteworthy to observe the author's weight on opacity as a characteristic: translated in a Heideggerian terminology, this points to the artwork's self-hiding trait, its aspect of 'soil.'

Due to the discernment of the highlighted quasi-subjective property, Dufrenne must be understood as operating with a model of *inter-subjectivity* in the realm of aesthetic experience. The following two passages are illustrative: "The aesthetic object, …, places us on the plane of the I and thou … ." (Dufrenne 1973: 113.)/"It is in the world in somewhat the same way that other people are there for us, as when someone's expression touches or convinces us." (Dufrenne 1973: 148.) We are invited to a type of dialogic lingering within another person-like world, a manner of presence in which the work "… establishes itself as inexhaustible." (Dufrenne 1973: 64.)

The aesthetic object is thus conceived as a world unto itself, but simultaneously as something that constitutes itself *within* consciousness and experience. 'Aesthetic object' and 'aesthetic experience' become two sides of the same body of matter and event (Dufrenne 1973: lxvi–lxvii). In the same vein as for instance Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Dufrenne here aligns with that way of simply stepping back from the dualism(s) of subject(ivism) and object(ivism), which has been focused on in the former sections, though neither of these two French phenomenologists operates equally painstaking and neologizing as Heidegger when it comes to the question of whether simply carrying on in a redefining manner, or not at all using existing terms with potential neo-Cartesian purport. At the same time, Dufrenne insists on a certain implication of the qualification *'aesthetic'* in the actual perception, namely, that the way in which we approximate ourselves to the artwork has to be in accordance with the way it both invites to and deserves (Dufrenne 1973: lii). Obviously, this last point harmonizes with the view of most philosophers of art historically from the very beginning of aesthetics as a distinct theoretical discipline.

An even further hint to the non-dualistic guideline in Dufrenne's aesthetic phenomenology being discerned above, should lie in various statements such as the following: "For the aesthetic object is within consciousness without being of it; […] ." (Dufrenne 1973: lii.) Though the aesthetic object is portrayed as constituting itself within consciousness in one of its main aspects, it never takes on the characteristics of some projective, chimerical entity in an isolated mind, be it in an ontological, epistemological, or mere psychological sense. Precisely *of* what, then, is the work as something aesthetically experienced, if not of consciousness solely, *i.e.*, despite its constitution within the latter? With an answer in accordance with the Heideggerian view, it is of *Being*.

With a slightly syncretistic juxtaposition of Heidegger and Dufrenne on this point of the discussion, the aesthetic 'subject-object' comes to the fore as our meeting with a quasi other *Dasein*, with *its* own world-founding and -lightening powers, but also as a meeting with something nature-like, resembling a slumbering soil drawing

back unto itself; two aspects of one body which again has the potentiality in its unique way for evoking a new disclosure and 'resetting' of both non-human being and our own *Dasein*-wise existence. The very same source of presence and truth demands the keen attendance and keeping (*Bewahrung*; cf. Heidegger 1950a: 54–56) from our side—also, cf. the *longer* Dufrenne-quotation above—not as a being which pours its own, preconceived contents into the object at hand (Heidegger 1950a: 24, 41), but as a special type of being imbued with the unique ability to realize that lightening of Being which lies in the independent aesthetic 'subject-object' as a quiet potentiality.

In one essential dimension, the experienced reality of the work then makes up an encounter with something unyieldingly present, turning back to Dufrenne: "For the aesthetic object is, above all, the irresistible and magnificent presence of the sensuous. What is a melody, if not a stream of sound which washes over me?" (Dufrenne 1973: 86). In other words: we are meeting a type of potentiated sensuousness of a simultaneously alien, irreducible, and, as it were, '*triumphant*' character (cf. Dufrenne 1973: 145, 190–192). Having renewed recourse to Heideggerian terminology, there is an essential element of the *Dasein* losing its 'homely,' everyday 'I-being' completely. -Alternatively, as put in the following by Dufrenne: "It is necessary that the object exert a kind of magic so that perception can relegate to the background that which ordinary perception places in the foreground. […] The sensuous fascinates me and I lose myself in it. I merge into the shrill melody of the oboes, the pure line of the violin, the din of the brass. I merge with the thrust of the Gothic spire or the dazzling harmony of the painting. … . I am lost—literally, "alien-ated"—in the aesthetic object." (Dufrenne 1973: 226.) In this way, the aesthetic sensuousness becomes basic in *Dasein*'s new state of being carried away by and into the enchantment; a simultaneously inebriating and widely awake state of mind that can be transcribed as the element of positive alienation into the aesthetic otherness. A presupposition for all this on the side of the experiencing individual is having a critical amount of fundamental openness, a certain humility:

> This alienation itself is a task for me, since I must surrender to the enchantment, deny my tendency to seek mastery of the object, and conjure up the sensuous so as to lose myself in it. Then I recognize in the object an interiority and an affinity with myself. I intend the aesthetic object, but I intend it as consubstantial with myself. While penetrating into it, I allow it to penetrate into me, rather than keeping it at a distance. It does not cease being an object while it mingles with me. The distance which it has is not abolished because I am absorbed in it, since it remains a rule for me and imposes its meaning on me. Such is the paradox: I become the melody or the statue, and yet the melody and the statue remain external to me. I become them so that they can be themselves. It is in me that the aesthetic object is constituted as other than me. In other words, the phenomenon of alienation here modifies the usual notion of intentionality. I cannot say that I constitute the aesthetic object. Rather, it constitutes itself in me in the very act by which I intend it, since I do not intend it by positing it as outside myself but by vowing myself to its service. (Dufrenne 1973: 231–232)

In other words, Dufrenne insists on a type of polarity-keeping correspondence between subject and object under the arch of an even more fundamental identity. The two poles seem to retain their respective selfhood in the midst of a mutual pervasion. An experienced otherness of the aesthetic reality does not disappear in one's

own diffusion into the former. On the contrary, we experience a firm independence of that otherness: "The fullness which the aesthetic object possesses is always that of an appearance, that is, of the sensuous which is the act common to the sensing being and to what is sensed. But there is an in-itself of this sensuousness (where the in-itself continues to be opposed to the for-us)." (Dufrenne 1973: 225.) Now, with a further juxtaposition of Dufrenne and Heidegger, this points to the two philosophers' respective concerns about the artwork's dimension of *essential independence*—its status as an 'in-itself,' as something standing in itself, resting in itself, etc., and of its having a type of lasting solidity, cf. the focus on this dimension in Heidegger's *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (Heidegger 1950a: 36–38, 46, 53).

13.5 The Potential of *Bildung* in Art

The movement of self-recognition via alienation and loss of everyday self into a given otherness—here, specifically in the aesthetic realm—can be seen as identical on a general level with the movement described by that concept of cultivation or cultural formation, which finds it epitome in the term of '*Bildung*.' This latter pedagogical and cultural philosophic situated train of thought (mainly stemming from the German-speaking cultural community), discerns no other way to a deeper, wholly appropriated and reflective knowledge of world *and* self, but through man's immersion into deep-learning encounters with and further developing relationships to cultural objectifications of various types, *i.e.*, works of art, literature, history etc., and/or purely-physical objective matter as something societal spiritually contained (Rusten 2002: 87, 2006: 17, 74–79, *et passim*). *Music-cultural* objectifications in this picture, then, should denote the entire spectrum from works, pieces, records and improvisation-based performances, on to relatively stable music-related socio-practical patterns, customs and rituals.

Further; especially the central *Bildung*-theoretician Wolfgang Klafki seems to be fostering a basis of ontological non-dualism in his view of the cultivating process, which feeds well both into a Heideggerian and Dufrenneian train of thought (undoubtedly, despite Klafki's deliberate renouncement of explication on this point.) *Bildung*, here, is characterized as a 'double-sided opening up' (Klafki 1964: 297–298, 322, 338 *et passim*), and there are descriptions of a sense of being confronted with the otherness of a firm, unyieldingly present reality. The following passage should provide an informative taste of the actual discourse: "The attempt to express linguistically the experienced unity of *Bildung* can only succeed with the help of crossing over formulations: *Bildung* is the *state-of-being-opened-up* of a material and spiritual reality for a human being (the objective aspect), but that is at the same time: the *state-of-being-opened-up* of this human being for this personally experienced reality (the subjective aspect)." (Klafki 1964: 297, my translation.) In light of the descriptions of the realization of artwork-Being on Heidegger's hand, respectively of the apt meeting with an aesthetic 'subject-object' on Dufrenne's hand, it is tempting to raise the question: Maybe it would show to be a hard task

finding some more distinct cultivating instance than just the artwork-grounded potentiality for an acquisition of a wholly altered, reopened, and eventually a wholly *new* 'eye,' even, for the mystery of being? In any case, as an obvious element in cultivation processes, an ongoing and recurrent meeting with artworks should take place. One further implication is that the concrete content of the experience—for instance of a performed musical artwork—takes on a certain uniqueness and unexchangeability in its long-term impact and consequences for the person in question, as anticipated already in the introduction of this chapter. Even though the specific *thematic* content of an artwork earlier has been characterized as a type of vehicle, 'no more, no less,' it is not at all an indifferent matter *which* specific, singular work-gestalt is being chosen, or, alternatively, incidentally met upon as an object of realization. The world-founding and -lightening essential directives of the artwork are exactly that: A defining outline (*Riβ*) of presence in coming, path-making rooms of possibilities. In other words, there is a substantiality in that 'alien' selfhood of work-Being, regardless of the ever-shifting actual realization of work-Being in accordance with the respective *Dasein*'s existential 'thrownness,' situation and mood (concerning the latter, cf. the Heideggerian *Geworfenheit* and *Befindlichkeit* of *Sein und Zeit*).

Thus, in an *educative* context, the latter notion indirectly contains a certain curricular theoretical dimension that must be left only touched upon within the confines of this chapter. This done, it is also worth mentioning that the notions of 'education' and '*Bildung*' have not been following an all-concordant trajectory historically. Within the tradition of *Bildung*, education is foremost conceived as something alleviative in and for cultivation; *i.e.*, with Klafki, that "…, … 'education' and '*Bildung*' do not designate separate matters, but rather that 'education' is understood as the conscious, pedagogical help to make *Bildung* possible." (Klafki 1986: 469, my translation, also, cf. Rusten 2002: 87.)

Turning back to the aforementioned 'deeper, wholly appropriated and reflective knowledge of world *and* self,' this also implies the dimension of *human individuation*, which is an intimate part of the comprehensive concept of *Bildung*. The type of individuation in question does not equal some introvert, subjectivist cultivation of one's own peculiarities, though. On the contrary, it is precisely the 'deep-learning encounters with and further developing relations to cultural objectifications of various kind' that is to bring about the never-resting process and achievement of self-formation and -understanding—in short, the individuation.[1] Heideggerian philosophy revisited, we are now inevitably led to an evocation of the twofold way in which the *Dasein* can relate to its own existence, namely, the essential, authentic way (*Eigentlichkeit*) on the one hand, and the opposite non-authenticity (*Uneigenlichkeit*) on the other. Further, highlighting another key term, here, in close connection with the concept of *Eigentlichkeit*: the quest for an ongoing process of *Vereinzelung* (*e.g.*, Heidegger 1993: 336), which translated into English should denote the *Dasein*'s reflective self-distinction. Seen together with the concept of authenticity, while at the same time embedding those two latter concepts in the current context of encounters

[1] Also, cf. Rusten (2006): 17, 22, 26, 53, 75, 156, 197, 215–217, 247, 363–368.

with cultural objectifications, the reflective, authenticity-seeking *Vereinzelung* of the *Dasein* now reverberates with the phenomenon of human individuation in a *Bildung*-sense of the word: namely, as seeking of one's own truth through the indispensable prisms of given (and world-'giving'!) firm otherness.

The picture above also includes a description on an ontological level of the viable opposite to an unreflecting, group dominated, and thus not self-responsible way of behaving and forming one's opinions, cf. the well-known picture of man's falling into *das Man*, the anonymity and averaged-out lack of distinct own self in the midst of the public. For instance, in the realm of music, then (juxtaposition with the concept of *Bildung* still ongoing), a build-up of consciousness of one's own distinct musical taste in various directions, that is, awareness of one's gradually acquired ability to uphold a vigorous 'storehouse' of discriminative musical value acknowledgements, *ditto* content-related feelings, cognitions, and deep senses of meaning and knowledge, and also of one's deliberate, experience-based turning away from certain music and/or forms of 'musicking'—eventually along with a reflection on one's own music-related life narrative—would show *one* facet of culturally formative individuation.

Taking a step aside, regarding the not only central, but vast topic of authenticity vs. non-authenticity in *Sein und Zeit* (cf. especially Heidegger 1993: 267–372) and the question of its partial congruency with the picture of individuation in and through otherness as one necessary element of any given process of *Bildung*: the first-mentioned topic is in any case important to highlight as indicative of Heidegger's urge to pinpoint an existential alternative to the prevailing forgetfulness of everyday life when it comes to the question of the very Being of beings, including forgetfulness of one's own true self-Being.

13.6 The Content of the Aesthetic Experience Revisited

In the latter section, I pointed to the fact that there is an ever-shifting actual realization of work-Being in accordance with the respective *Dasein*'s existential thrownness, situation and mood; that being so exactly *in the midst of* the unyielding firmness and substantiality of the work as experienced, cf. the highlighted role of the founding and lightening directives of work-Being as something leading and sketchily defining in and for the same experience. It now becomes necessary to pursue this notion of the singular individual's perspective type of realization of the respective artwork, be it in a purely receptive, or in a performing, new-representative direction. Maintaining that this would not represent any lapse back into a subjectivist dualism, I embark upon the topic through a look at Dufrenne's concept of the aesthetic 'affective a priori.' *Nota bene*, this concept should be read as a tentative equivalent to the paradoxical non-causal, *'not one-way'* character of the directiveness of the experience when taken as something coming into being, cf. the mutuality/reciprocity in the relationship between Being and experienced world described in Sect. 13.3.

I take departure in the following statement by Dufrenne: "Aesthetic experience itself calls for the notion of the *a priori.* This is due to the power of the aesthetic object to open up a world through its expressiveness and, though itself given, to anticipate experience." (Dufrenne 1973: 437.) As something fundamentally ahead of the dichotomy of subject and object, Dufrenne discerns a kind of 'preobjective' latency in any genuine work of art, having the ability to evoke an unmistakably recognizable, though not all-definite, ambiance and direction in given subjective realization of the work. Again with Dufrenne: "…, …, … in expressing a world the aesthetic object already expresses a preobjective space and time *as* this world." (Dufrenne 1973: 183.) This model of understanding should apply not exclusively to a comparison of given experiences from one human being to another, cf. the aspect of shareability in knowledge and experience, but also to one and the same individual's repeated actualizations of a given work. At the same time, it is necessary to underscore that Dufrenne ultimately does not point to some 'empty' continuum in a Kantian sense of the *a priori*; rather to forms of meaning-imbued, and in this sense only *relatively* open fields of perception, while having object-, thing- and world-constituting subjectivity 'spread out' also to the side of objects or objectivity. (Once again the partial harmony with Heidegger is striking.) With another illustration from physics, cf. Sect. 13.3: The fields of perception are in a way finite, still endless and inexhaustible such as the 'crooked' room-space continuum in the Einsteinian theory of relativity.

Together with a pervasive underscoring of the importance of evoked content-related emotions, feelings and moods as a key to an understanding of meaning and knowledge in the general aesthetic experiential context, Dufrenne develops the more specific concept of an aesthetic 'affective a priori':

> The affective exists in me only as the response to a certain structure in the object. Conversly [sic], this structure attests to the fact that the object is for a subject and cannot be reduced to the kind of objectivity which is for no one. There is something in the object that can be known only by a sort of sympathy in which the subject opens himself to it. […] The horrible in Bosch, the joyful in Mozart, the mocking in Faulkner, the tragic quality in *Macbeth* all designate an attitude of the subject as well as a structure of the object, which are in each case complementary. (Dufrenne 1973: 442)

An implication of the quotation above is the notion not only of the affective *a priori* inherent in one singular artwork, but of the possibility of *ditto* directiveness as something eventually inherent in entire corpuses of works by one and the same creator, such as the perception of a pervasive joyfulness in Mozart, etc. Further, an opening is made for the affective *a priori* as something possibly inherent in an entire epochal style as such (Dufrenne 1973: 178).

From the conception of the affective (aesthetic) *a priori*, Dufrenne then makes a seamless descriptive connection to something atmospheric and attitudinal, as implied in the last quotation. This connection, again, shows the aesthetic perception as an also *cognitively* marked mode of consciousness. Although not coming forth as the reasoning variant, the *noesis/cogito* simply turns out as one central descriptive criterion of the general phenomenon of aesthetic experience (Dufrenne 1973: 337–338, 386). Through the latter, in its turn, an implicit pointing to the more traditional,

narrower senses and definitions of 'learning' and 'knowledge' can be traced, obviously. Having stated this, it should be underscored that the strongly related affective dimension in the aesthetic experience points to the phenomena of learning and knowledge in equal terms with the cognitive aspect, when truly and deeply rooted in a meeting with an artwork as an independent 'quasi *Dasein*.' Considering the tendency of a lingering, reverberating endurance of emotions, moods, atmospheres, attitudes towards life, etc., as a result of instantaneous art encounters, not least of the *momentous* ones of such, and seen together with our tendency at turning back to the very same 'subjects-objects' of encounter, one tentative criterion of a more fully appropriated kind of knowledge should be fulfilled, namely that it should be possible to trace the existence of a deeply self-rooted, vividly alive, while also lasting shareability of a given experiential content.[2]

13.7 Epilogue

It has naturally enough not lain within the scope of this chapter to venture upon some comprehensive analysis and definition, not even tentatively, of various both discernible and intertwined elements constituting the phenomenon of knowledge in general and art related knowledge in particular. Nor has it been a part of my agenda to seek any similar type of elaboration on the process of art related *Bildung* in general, or music-related *ditto* in particular. For instance, an undertaking as the latter would obviously need no less than the space of a longer treatise (*e.g.*, cf. Rusten 2006). What *has* been focused on, on its side, is among others the question of whether, and eventually *how*, aesthetic experience in general can be seen as comprising an aspect of knowledge in the midst of its subjective situation and realization, and this more precisely by the help of the respective Heideggerian, Dufrenneian and Klafkian non-dualistic thought being drawn upon. Looking back in this respect, a positive conclusion seems reasonable, and strongly so—for instance, if traceable change and novelty in a given individual's experiential contents due to encounters with extra-individual otherness were to be one primordial criterion of knowledge. Surely, such change and novelty could mean a rather short-lived occurrence, and thus as if craving for renewed realizations in this state, but it can also amount to a long-lived, not to say life-long, endurance of content, altering the very 'bones' of a person in a decisive way.

Though it must be underscored that the axis spanning from such a thing as 'altered consciousness,' on the one side, via 'altered experience,' all the way to various definitions of 'learning (content),' on the other, necessarily must be seen to comprise sliding ambiguities and partly overlapping areas: that type of firmness which applies to the sort of propositionally contained certainty which feeds into the most narrow definitions of 'learning' and 'knowledge', was anyway never a central part of aesthetic knowledge in a deeper sense of the word. The special firmness of

[2] Cf. Rusten (2006), where themes in this direction are being pursued.

aesthetic knowledge has rather been found in another direction during the chapter, namely in connection with the firmness of non-yielding aesthetic 'otherness.' Moreover, not least, Heidegger's concept of 'truth' in the context of art experience, that is, the philosopher's plea for an attentive letting free of the artwork's own Being in a non-projective, non-dominative way (cf. Sects. 13.3 and 13.4), points to the side of shareability, far more than to the side of the semi-private subjective aesthetic emotions, sensations and judgments to be discerned in a Humeian, or Kantian vein. To summarize; one has to acknowledge the centrality of experiential subjectivity grounded in something extra-individual, not only regarding cognitive contents, but also on the side of emotions, feelings, moods, attitudes etc. In addition, the discerned possibility of radicalness and ever-spreading universality in the alteration of experience must be estimated as an important outcome of the investigation.

At the same time, the very concepts of subjectivity and objectivity *per se* have been put in a precarious position as applicable tools when it comes to the question of a proper understanding of aesthetic experience and even regarding a proper understanding of the phenomenon of *Bildung*. What can be drawn from the separate trains of thought of the three philosophers/theoreticians drawn upon in this chapter, as a common denominator—explicitly on the part of Heidegger, more implicitly, but still justified on the part of Dufrenne and Klafki—is that ontological dualism should be put aside in such connections, regardless of whether one chooses to carry on with the respective old, 'precarious' terms (cf. 'subject', 'consciousness', and even 'experience') in a redefining manner, or not.

By the help of Heidegger and Dufrenne, a close connection between *Bildung* and art experience has also been established, with respect to both that former concept's central bearings on processes of knowledge, and regarding its aspect of human individuation. Aesthetic experience, in other words, the impact of art works and/or other aesthetic objectifications encountered in a given situation, must be estimated as a strong cultivating force due to its unique openness *and* firmness of Being as something possible to realize.

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Chapter 14
Practice as Self-Exploration

Morten Carlsen

Abstract Musical practice is often regarded as a yoke you just have to carry if you want to sing or play an instrument well. Admittedly, to a certain extent it is: many a pupil has complained how dull it is! Perhaps this somewhat limited view has influenced the point of departure of much research on musical practice as a specific way of learning. It is thereby defined as an activity quite similar or even identical to physical training; the scientific methods sometimes seem rather behaviouristic, and the results? Musicians, presumably the experts in this field, have anyhow taken little notice.

But does practice have to be dull? Is, perhaps, rather the player being dull when practicing? Could it be that we need to extend our scope, and that practice may even develop into a deeply rewarding activity? This is what I set out to investigate years ago, my original point of departure being my own practicing – and my attempts at teaching it.

Keywords Musical practice • Self-exploration • Teaching musical practice

14.1 Is Practice Purely Practical?

1.1 A musical performer is by definition a practicing human being. This time-consuming daily activity constitutes a part of his or her personality and frame of mind: it becomes a way of thinking, perhaps even a mode of being. Frustration follows when I have practiced carelessly, or not at all, whereas I feel balanced and relaxed when my practice was fruitful. Countless hours of practice together with a professional ritual on the day of a concert are my mental crutches when facing the audience. And, likewise, the most important gift I can give my students is teaching them how to practice. But what is it actually? Let us begin by discussing what some thinkers, teachers and researchers have had to say on this topic.

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_14

1.2 The performing artist was not of much concern to philosopher Martin Heidegger when writing *On the Origin of the Work of Art,* his main work on the arts, their foundation and meaning. The painter and poet and their calling had most of his attention; possibly he saw the likes of me among the jesters and jugglers. Still, mentioning Beethoven's string quartets as examples of great art (Heidegger 1960: 9), he would have to admit that musical performers are indispensable for revealing the truth hidden in these works to an audience. Furthermore, this revelation of truth constitutes the philosophic value of great art for Heidegger. Actors and dancers have similar roles as performing musicians within their disciplines. The term *translation* ("Übersetzung") might perhaps be more familiar to Heidegger's thinking than *performance*, and is, indeed, very relevant in our context too. The hermeneutical process of interpreting and embodying a string quartet by Beethoven is deeply related for instance to Heidegger's philosophic interpretation of ancient enigmatic fragments by Heraclitus and Parmenides (Heidegger 2009: 199–274; see also paragraph 2.3). Being a translator of texts and thoughts himself, he could have had interesting insights into our field too.

1.3 How you practice will vary a lot with proficiency and genre, with personality, age and external conditions. It may seem problematic to use the same term for all: is the beginner basically committing him- or herself to the same task as the mature master? What about the classical contra rock musician? Besides, other arts and disciplines apply practice of some sort. It would be a pity to leave the common term, but is it possible to define practice, or at least musical practice, in a way that integrates all?

1.4 There is a variety of literature on musical practice and performance. One group consists of manuals and collections of exercises dealing with the craft of playing a specific instrument, with hints and guidelines on practice (examples from the string world: Carlsen 2002/2006; Galamian 1962; Menuhin 1981; Pleeth 1992). A second group are treatises and articles on how to become a thorough musician, written by experienced artist-teachers familiar with the implicit challenges from their own experience. These necessarily have a main focus on practice and are often more enlightening in our context (Bernstein 1981; Bruser 1997; Gallway and Green 1987; Gordon 2006; Klickstein 2009; Rink 2002). As a learning method musical practice has been a field of study among pedagogic and other researchers for decades, and a third category is made up by textbooks and scientific studies published by mostly pedagogic researchers (Jørgensen 2011; Lehmann et al. 2007; Mahlert 2006). The difference in content and language between these approaches is often large, and it tends to be a gap between the perspectives of artists and researchers.

1.5 We will look at two definitions from this category of research-based works: In their authoritative *Psychology for Musicians* A. C. Lehman, J. A. Sloboda and R. H. Woody offer the following: '(Deliberate) practice (is) a structured activity … with the explicit goal of increasing an individual's current level of performance.' (Lehmann et al. 2007: 65, they quote from Ericsson and Lehman 1999: 695) A short description follows, which underlines the need for goals, 'full concentration and effort'. Focus on *deliberate* and structured practice makes it and its outcome more

accessible to empirical research. K. A. Ericsson explains the researcher's dilemma: 'Unfortunately, expert performance occurs naturally in complex and unique contexts, where the conditions of performance differ between performers, making comparison difficult.' To avoid these unfortunate conditions 'musicians are asked to play … music while being recorded, and are then asked to repeat their performance exactly …. Experts' consecutive renditions show much less variations than renditions by less skilled musicians and, by implication, experts exhibit greater control.' (Ericsson 2006: 689) Thus it is possible to measure the impact of deliberate practice 'under controlled laboratory conditions' as being equivalent to the ability to copy oneself. With all due respect, I must admit having some doubts that musicians in general are happy with this valuation of their artistry.

1.6 The comprehensive German anthology *Handbuch Üben* (Practice Manual) states: 'Practice is … the learning and perfection of a practical activity through repetitions.' (Mahlert 2006: 9; where no English source could be found, the translations are my own). This definition seems more accommodating, as it does not limit meaningful practice only to a *deliberate* activity, whose quality is determined by its efficiency. The emphasis on repetitions is nevertheless very restrictive, as it also seems to exclude improvising, mental imaging or just playing for fun. Everybody will agree that some measure of repetition is unavoidable, but it is perhaps not the only practice method? Editor and co-author Ulrich Mahlert certainly agrees to this later in the book. Both definitions, however, view practice only as a method serving an external goal. Is there not something important missing?

1.7 The artist-teacher literature self-evidently also focuses on efficiency and perfection. But at the same time moral terms like honesty and dedication are very much present. The idea of personal growth, joy and inspiration is often mentioned: 'More and more we realize that practicing is not forced labor; more and more we realize that it is a refined art which partakes of intuition, of inspiration, patience, elegance, clarity, balance, and, above all, the search for ever greater joy in movement and expression. This is what practice is really about.' These are the great violinist Yehudi Menuhin's words (foreword to Bruser 1997: xiii), stating that the mere struggle to meet external demands is of limited relevance, a point frequently made in literature within this category. Musical expression is rooted in deep experiences, some of them unforgettable solitary practice-room adventures.

1.8 Researchers, rarely musical experts themselves, tend to avoid these aspects. Empirical pedagogic research has certainly revealed some interesting insights – for instance into the importance of practice planning and the amount of time normally involved on different instruments. In addition, medical studies have shown how regular practice affects the brain and its health relevance (e.g. Altenmüller and Hildebrandt in Mahlert 2006; Myskja 1999). As long as mainly quantitative methods are applied, though, Menuhin's words about 'greater joy in movement and expression' seem irrelevant, and the scope will be limited to measurable elements. The definitions above come close to equating musical practice with physical training, which seems like an over-simplification (Bollnow 1991: 112f.; Pio 2012: 21f.).

1.9 There are also researchers who are more intrigued by the anthropologic aspects of the phenomenon. Relying less on measurements, their results include physiological and psychological implications of practice, thus focusing also on the inner world of the musician. However, Ulrich Mahlert admits in the preface to his above-mentioned anthology: 'A number of investigations apply empirical methods and aim thus at establishing a "science of practice." These studies are not always easy to apply. Often they (merely) verify knowledge long evident to competent musicians and teachers who pass it on verbally through their teaching.' (Mahlert 2006: 9) Furthermore, the jargon of many scientific studies feels strangely irrelevant to the artist; and the level of communication between researchers and musicians is also for this reason generally poor. Musicians tend to be overly sceptical towards theorizing and researchers may in turn lack an understanding of the musician's more intuitive approach (see also paragraph 4.5). It may indeed be that each group views the other as a threat to its own integrity. Anyhow, it is hard to see how research can truly be fruitful if it is not shared with and compared to the expertise of experienced artists and teachers. For whom is the research carried out – for the researchers themselves?

1.10 Interestingly, a valuable contribution to our reflection exists, which seems hardly to deal with music. The one-time Heidegger-student Otto Friedrich Bollnow, physicist, then philosopher and pedagogue, first published his *Vom Geist des Übens* (On the Spirit of Practice) in 1978. His focus is on the potential of practice as a path to inner freedom, thus concentrating on the internal process, not efficiency: '… the radical change leading to relief from the restlessness of everyday life and to inner freedom, which is the result of proper practice, takes place slowly and almost imperceptibly.' (Bollnow 1991: 100) The German word "Üben" is more concise than the English *practice*, and Bollnow makes a point of its etymological association with an originally religious sphere of life (Bollnow 1991: 20ff). In this context he also discusses Japanese Zen practices described by the German philosopher Eugen Herrigel in *Zen in the Art of Archery* (Herrigel 1984), a well-known source of inspiration to musicians. Central concepts are total immersion and transcendence of movement. Artist-teachers often refer to similar processes and attitudes in their essays on musical practice (e.g. Bernstein 1981; Bruser 1997; Gallway and Green 1987; Klickstein 2009). The inner freedom to experience and express the moment spontaneously is undeniably essential to musical communication on a high level.

1.11 Being an artist-teacher myself, my further reflections will also draw on my own practice, as well as experiences with professional musicians, students and talented pupils from an early age. It is obvious that beginners view practice differently from advanced performers, and with maturity it takes on other values and goals. But some challenges will be common if we do not limit our view, and hopefully these reflections will be relevant also for the less accomplished player or singer.

14.2 The Problem and Its Elements

2.1 What precisely is practice about? What does it consist of? Playing an instrument is interaction between one's inner self, the music and the instrument (Fig. 14.1a). Text and instrument are to a large extent given and invariable, only the self has a potential for change. The interplay between these three elements is always flowing back and forth: 'For the player … is master and servant, and as soon as the bow touches the string the marvellous battle has begun, the challenge and the response are joined …' as Yehudi Menuhin describes the symbiosis between the violinist and his violin (Menuhin 1981: 12). Simultaneously, the performer is in continuous dialogue with the music he plays, following its ebb and flow and changing moods and committing them through his instrument to the audience, be it real or imaginary.

2.2 **Technique** is the common term for the interplay between player and instrument. It involves the acoustical laws behind the sound production, often much more complicated than a superficial examination will reveal. Instrumental technique in itself is worthless and as such not interesting to an audience, perhaps apart from its acrobatic aspect. In relation to Martin Heidegger's highly personal language it seems more appropriate to use the term *craft* ("Handwerk") than *technique* ("Technik"). As in his own advice to a philosophy student: 'To walk such paths needs practice in walking. Practice needs craft. Do remain … on the path and learn … the craft of thinking.' (Heidegger 2009: 179) Anyhow, without such craft, or instrumental technique, there is no music. A large part of the performer's time is given to perfecting his or her technical tools, whereof balance, sensitivity and relaxation form the basis. This challenging work has deep-reaching psychological aspects, to which we will return.



Fig. 14.1 (**a**) The music we study is conveyed to the *outside* world, filtered through the *inner* world of the player, the self. The instrument should ideally be felt as part of the body, bringing both worlds together. (**b**) Sound is the combination of acoustical signals reaching an audience. Technique (craft) has as goal the integration of body and instrument, whereas interpretation is the interaction between the artist and the composer's text. Shallow interpretation and expressivity inevitably result from not caring for the development of the self

2.3 Music is written – if written down – in a rather unsophisticated notational code, which the musician must decipher in terms of meaningful information. This unavoidable sketchiness implies that practice has to be explorative. There will normally be plenty of room for personal – and spontaneous – decisions on how to recreate the text, which makes the difference from improvised music only a relative one; after all, improvisation is also not void of pre-conceived elements ('*explorational practise*' being a main concept in Guro G. Johansen's thesis on practicing improvisation. Johansen: 2013, iv). The bond between musician and music is generally called **interpretation**, the key being understanding and identification. The performer's musicianship and command of music theory form the basis: notation, harmony, rhythm, rhetoric elements, stylistic awareness etc. In addition, intimate knowledge of other works by the same composer and similar works by others, familiarity with the composer's background and insight into performance history may contribute to the quality of the interpretation. In the end, the complete personality and culture of an artist will be integrated in the performance. This process may aptly be described as hermeneutical. (See paragraph 1.2.)

2.4 **Sound** links music and instrument, the venue of a performance with its specific acoustical properties being an extension of the instrument. Sound, of course, is also the main connection between performer and audience, which may be oblivious of interpretational and technical subtleties (Fig. 14.1b).

2.5 How does one work out these three elements: technique, interpretation and sound? How to execute written music in a meaningful way, may feel like a riddle. The first step towards solving it must be to understand the basic text. Having studied it carefully the next step is to translate it into imagined sound, a clear conception of tone colour, phrasing, rhythm etc. in the inner ear being essential. This **sound-image** should be as precise as possible before being embodied as technical execution. Obviously, to try to create a meaningful result without a concept is a matter of sheer luck; still, it is a common manner of wasting time among students. Some useless practice may be necessary before discovering sensible strategies and hence improve one's working habits; but often it is seen as a detour to spend time on musical imagination and the "inner ear". With a clear inner sound-image, though, the technical **execution** and its sounding result can be evaluated immediately and their quality assessed. The reward is faster and more reliable progress.

2.6 **Reflection**, finally, is crucial to find ways of further improvement and the means to achieve it, be it through perfecting the inner sound-image or additional work on technical aspects. Leaving the reflection stage out is another common malpractice (Fig. 14.2).

2.7 'Productive practicing is a process that promotes self-integration' according to pianist Seymour Bernstein (Bernstein 1981: 9). 'Interpreting a musical composition requires you to convert the symbols of musical notation into a synthesis of thought, feeling and action, …' (Bernstein 1981: 196). This happens when the inner image is transmitted into sound effortlessly and *how* it is done becomes irrelevant.



Fig. 14.2 The sound-image in the inner ear should be translated into actual sound without disturbances caused by the technical execution. This is achieved by establishing the sound-image as clearly as possible before translating it into as simple movements as possible. Reflection is to the master an indispensable part of the process, but must be supported consciously by the student. Improvement (*thin arrows*) will be achieved by further development of either sound-image or execution – or both

14.3 Towards Proficiency

3.1 Research has discovered that 10,000 h of work are vital to acquire the necessary skills to qualify as an expert in areas as diverse as instrumental performance, basketball or chess. This means 10 years of hard work, whereby '… elite musicians … need closer to 20–30 years of training and often peak when they are around 30–40 years old.' (Ericsson 2006: 691) This has been adopted by popular scientific authors like Malcolm Gladwell (2008: 35ff.) and Daniel Kahneman (2011: 238). I should think the handy "10,000 hour rule" has made such an impact because few other traits seem to be common to experts. As the quantity of work is certainly not the only important parameter in the development of a skill, interesting results might also be gained through research on professionals or amateurs who never reached expert level, in spite of 10,000 h with their instrument, basketball or chess-board. But lack of talent (though hardly relevant according to Ericsson 2006: 694), inhibiting attitudes, bad teaching and other negative individual circumstances are unfortunately not easy to measure empirically. On the other hand, could it be that "talented" children practice more because they find it enjoyable?

3.2 It is hardly possible to survive thousands of hours, mostly alone, to build first-rate skills without developing certain virtues like patience and self-awareness. Improvement cannot be pre-ordered and tends to come in quite sudden steps, with longer periods of hard and apparently futile effort in between. The student has to come to terms with himself and his limitations during such periods, and it will help to develop a view of practice as having intrinsic value, i.e. an attitude that allows the process to be a goal in itself. Often, motivated by the memory of overwhelming artistic experiences as a listener, the student will dream of reaching the same level

as his or her heroes. Enriched by such remembrances, the feeling of music coming to life through one's own effort is a strong reward, already in the practice-room. The artistic growth of a professional musician may be compared to a long-distance run through an unfamiliar landscape, whereby the goal is hardly, if ever, visible. Under such circumstances one should certainly enjoy running!

3.3 The player's genes and background prime him or her for the trial; family, friends, peers and environment may make it easier. The teacher or teaching staff support through guidance and, hopefully, pointing out attainable goals, thereby avoiding unnecessary hardships. These circumstances will be common to fortunate students. But, in addition, some seem to have a kind of strong inner image directing them, often without being aware of it. This image has components of sound and movement, which guide them in their course; it may also include an attraction towards a future artistic role. The German bio neurologist G. Hüther thinks 'it has to do with the images of ourselves … which we carry around in our heads, and which decide our thinking, feeling and actions …. It depends on the kind of these once developed inner images how we use our brain and which neuronal and synaptic connections are formed and conserved in our brain.' (Hüther 2004: 9) Without, or with a weak inner image, a student will have to try out by-roads and sometimes impasses in his search for excellence. It appears to be a significant factor in the definition of talent, a kind of creative self-projection into the future. It is also a very important motivating force. If strong enough, this inner image may even create tension between a gifted pupil and a teacher in cases where they have different views of artistic development and goals.

3.4 This closely corresponds to Heidegger's explanation of the term "Bildung" (education). "Bild" is German for "image", and Heidegger views "Bildung" as a process where a young person becomes conscious of an image worth striving for. This "Leitbild" (guiding image or model) helps the person find his or her own way of acting (Heidegger 2009: 65; Pio 2012: 291). A teacher should clearly try to link up with this source of personal motivation, even if it is working on a sub-conscious level.

3.5 Another central point in the process towards proficiency is the relationship between a student's actual level of playing and his or her self-assessment. To a music student, the way he or she plays easily means who he or she *is*, thus we may speak of implicit self-definition. Ideally his or her own estimate will be similar to that of a competent teacher, which helps making their cooperation smooth and relaxed. But this is not always the case, as some of my own experiences may illustrate:

> M.O., a lovely girl with a rare gift for the violin, joined my class at fourteen. Her parents had recently divorced, and she felt responsible for her depressed mother. Her former violin teacher had taken little notion of her, was unable to remember her name after half a year of teaching and repeatedly even forgot their lessons, whereby M. had a one-hour bus-ride to get to the music institute. There she led a shadowy existence among her gifted peers. She seemed insecure and on her guard in our first lessons, and it took a long time before she dared return my smile. We worked together for four years. I avoided pieces that were not clearly within her reach, but facing any challenge, which she herself deemed of a virtuoso kind, she faltered. My attempts to help her overcome her lack of faith in her technical abilities failed, a promising career never unfolded.
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> H. J. auditioned for the Norwegian Academy of Music taking the jury by storm. He performed a sonata by Brahms in concert-like fashion with a pianist who shared his youthful



Fig. 14.3 The student is at any stage a result of his or her innate talent and past. Ideally a student will define his or her actual skills as a player similarly to a competent teacher. Practicing on the borderline of momentary skills will lead to maximum progress. If the self-assessment is too positive, practice will take place beyond the level of control, thereby lacking refinement and sensitivity (H.J.); if too low, the student will avoid exploring new ground (M.O.)

extroversion. He was well aware of his strong qualities and amply enjoyed his freedom as a student. Already on the verge of a professional career he cared more for gigs than practice, overslept afternoon lessons or turned up with a hangover. At the end of four years he realized that he was but a mediocre player and turned to computer studies.

3.6 These two case stories illuminate the difficulties occurring when a student sees her- or himself in a false light: feeling inferior to her real level created illusory problems for M.O., whereas his superiority complex created very real ones for H.J.; both kinds may destroy a performer's future. The most productive practice happens just within the level of control. Low self-esteem will easily lead to an overly defensive practice style where limits are seldom challenged, whereas arrogance makes its victim overlook obvious shortcomings and thus never reach true mastery (Fig. 14.3).

3.7 We could generally speak of basic attitudes towards practice, which might perhaps be assessed as in sport psychology (LeUnes 2011: 117ff.). With an appropriate assessment it would be easier to correct a practice bias, perhaps with the support of a counsellor. In addition to the character poles self-unconfident/arrogant, the following could possibly be explored: structured/spontaneous, analytic/intuitive and timid/adventurous. I have not yet seen any attempt in this direction.

14.4 Self-Exploration and Freedom

4.1 Every perfect-sounding tone involves a multitude of nerve impulses and sensory perceptions in addition to mental representations. Let us consider a single bow-stroke on a string instrument:

– Muscles in the shoulder area initiate the movement, the impulse creating a wave-like feeling down the arm – elbow, wrist and fingers follow through and give in subtly to enable the bow to move at an optimal angle to the string. The friction makes the string vibrate, whereby the whole body takes part in balancing the movement.
– Simultaneously the vibrations of the string are transmitted back through the bow stick and enable the right-hand fingers to feel the string's resistance; also the

left-hand finger stopping it can feel its tickling. These sensations allow the player to react to imperfections before they manifest themselves audibly, provided there is no undue muscular tension.
– The ear finally compares the sound to ideals developed and saved in the "inner ear" (see paragraph 2.5). These involve details like audible harmonics and the fizzling friction noise. Resonances in the instrument and the room contribute a lot to the overall impression, inspiring the player to modulate the sound further.

This short analysis leaves out preparation, attack, vibrato, dynamic development, release and reverberation. But it is already obvious that the awareness involved is immense and constant care is required even to produce a single beautiful tone; the same is, of course, true for other musical instruments. The difference between plain hearing and real listening involves identification and a heightened feeling of time. Thus Heidegger makes a sensitive point in showing how, in German, the verb "hören" (hear) is the root of "gehören" (belong) and "gehorchen" (obey): 'The mortals hear the heavenly thunder, the rustling of the forest, the flow of the fountain, the sound of strings … only and only insofar as they in a certain way already belong or do not belong to them.' (Heidegger 2009: 207) Fittingly, *obey* is etymologically derived from Latin *ob-*+*audire* (hear, Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary 2003 s.v.). In a sense I belong to and must obey the sound I produce!

4.2 Heidegger has influenced the American philosopher Hubert L. Dreyfus, whose theory of expertise constitutes a different approach from K. Anders Ericsson's mentioned earlier in this article (1.5 and 3.1). Through five levels he and his co-authoring brother Stuart E. delineate the learning process within a field, focusing on the progress from basic to analytical to intuitive attitudes towards problem solving. The expert's understanding (level five) may be described as holistic, whereby decisions are based on an *intuitive* grasp of situations established during long experience. Before this, the learner reaches a stage defined by *analytical* thinking (level three). However, many never leave this middle level of competence, thereby having to overcome their ingrained habit of consciously 'figuring out' what to do (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986:16–51; Pio 2012: 61–94). Dreyfus is open to the possible deep inner change involved in learning: 'We can begin to understand this by noticing that the achievement of skill involves substantially more than the mere acquisition of a physical ability. Learning a skill is learning to see the world differently.' (Dreyfus and Kelly 2011: 207)

4.3 In our field awareness and concentration must be cultivated together with musical and technical skills, and may even be of benefit to the musician outside his art. Along the way to expertise several kinds of inner resistance have to be overcome. A few examples must suffice:

– Established **habits** offer a feeling of comfort when practicing. Practice itself should be a good habit, like brushing your teeth: practicing may be a kind of mental hygiene. But problems arise with *bad* habits because *these too* make you feel comfortable. To break bad habits feels risky, as no alternative is yet in place. The violinist used to clutching the instrument or the pianist holding his or her breath at the beginning of difficult passages need courage to let go of these comforting inhibitions. It takes courage to change and 'see the world differently.'

– **Fear** is another ubiquitous factor – fear of dropping it makes it so natural to clutch the violin! Later the fear of making mistakes, of being misunderstood by your teacher, of your own judgement or that of peers or composer may be cultivated in the practice room and grow to be a heavy load on a student's shoulders. Playing an instrument on a professional level always involves risk, and the player has nothing else to rely upon than trust in his or her own preparation, skills and competence and, hopefully, a philosophic attitude based on knowledge of the fragility of all things human. Paradoxical, though, is the unconscious *fear of success* often observed. The strategies employed to avoid success are plenty and frequently tragicomically amusing. On a sub-conscious level this could have to do with evading responsibility. It may be rewarding to entice a student to accomplish feats in the lesson, which he or she would think impossible, if allowed time to reflect. Likewise, playing chamber music with more competent partners, the student may be surprised by his or her artistic potential, being carried away by the other players. This may in turn help him or her get rid of ingrained inhibitions.
– Also being overwhelmed by imagined complexities may get in the way of the effort to rise above one's limitations. This easily leads to mental and physical tensions, which seem to confirm **negative thoughts** and a lack of self-confidence. As instrumental technique (or craft) is the art of achieving maximum effect by minimum effort, though, real solutions to problems of execution will in the end feel easy. Paradoxically we are all the time working *hard* to find *simple* ways to move and breathe, in other words to feel at ease! Understandably this may be confusing to the student. Let us give some attention to R. L.'s story:

> From the time when I began to take the violin seriously, at 13, my attitude towards practice was strained. "You should practice to be the best!" I repeatedly heard teachers say. Being all too conscious of the fact that I was far behind, I worked 6 hours a day without a break for many years. I was a practicing machine.
>
> Ten years later I allowed myself two weeks off for the first time during all these years. Away from the inhuman pressure I had internalized I suffered an extreme reaction. I could not even think about my violin afterwards and left the Music Academy. After some time I started playing again, just a little, and for my *own* sake. Now I could hear music, phrases, stories and moods! This was a new experience to me! Finally, 12 months later, I could again enter the practice-room. In the end music is such a precious and positive thing it should not be allowed to influence anybody the opposite way. (Private communication)

R. L.'s activity was for many years totally in accordance with Ericsson's as well as Lehman, Sloboda and Woody's above-mentioned (1.5) definition of 'deliberate practice as a structured activity with the explicit goal of increasing an individual's current level of performance.' What an awful assignment for her!

4.4 Overcoming bad habits, fears and other inhibitions – like negative thoughts and lack of self-confidence – leads to a subtle transformation of our inner self: deeply immersed in the world of sound and movement the musician may leave the everyday state of mind, described by Heidegger as involving *inauthenticity* ("Uneigentlichkeit") and *chatter* ("Gerede"). He or she opens to the message of music and is intent on letting that message flow freely. Imperfections are experienced

either as a lack of meaning in phrasing and expression, or as clumsy execution. To overcome these issues, patience and an inner urge are needed to deepen the understanding of musical meaning, or dissolve the roughness of movement. A player thus detached from his wilfulness and cravings, Heidegger's *authentic being*, is on the threshold of dismantling mental and technical limitations. If successful, a new feeling of freedom is realized. When music reveals itself in a manner of sudden self-evidence to its practicing medium, one could with Heidegger speak of truth revealing itself. A distinguished Norwegian pianist friend of mine thus aptly calls the piano his lie detector. Who has reached these depths in his or her practice will not be satisfied anymore by an everyday regimen of exercises and repetitions. And practice thus takes on a creative value in itself through the need to connect to oneself and one's inner world.

4.5 Once in conversation with a senior practice researcher, I recalled the following remark, which links practice rather to well-being than to achievement:

> The violinist Stephan Barratt Due complained to me about his exhausting workload as leader of the Barratt Due Institute of Music in Oslo. The burden had been heavy lately, but: 'When I manage to spend an hour with my violin I again feel refreshed.' He added smiling: 'I do not learn anything by it, though.'

– Hearing this, the researcher exclaimed: 'That is not practice, it is music-making!' She was wrong. It is common knowledge among musicians that good practice literally is a painkiller, a fact that is supported by medical literature (for instance Myskja 1999: 110ff). As musicians mature, the intrinsic value of practice grows in importance: to gain access to the instrument's and our own inner voice day by day – regardless of any improvement – is nothing but practice. And it is at the same time a precondition of musical achievement on a high level. How it is possible to perceive practice as not involving music-making, as this researcher did, remains a mystery.

4.6 In *The Essence of Truth (Vom Wesen der Wahrheit)* Heidegger equates the *essence of truth* with *freedom* (Heidegger 2004: 192). As mentioned above, a phrase or a complete work can suddenly open up and reveal itself in its meaning and beauty to the musician studying it. Parts seem to fall into place without any effort, the execution becomes smooth, and a new feeling of ease is evident. 'Freedom … allows existence to exist as what it is.' (Heidegger 2004: 188) We may also recall Otto Fr. Bollnow's description of practice as a path towards inner freedom, a gift that can only be received by overcoming inner obstacles through continuous exercise. In *Existenzphilosophie und Pädagogik* he develops a theory of discontinuous learning where progress occurs as a result of sudden flash-like insights. The effort will have to be maintained even when no progress is forthcoming. Phases in the educational development of a pupil are described in terms of crisis and awakening, familiar appearances to the experienced music teacher (Bollnow 1959, see also paragraph 3.2). When suddenly inner freedom is achieved, if only in rare moments, the musician, as medium, steps into the background as the meaning of music manifests itself.

14.5 A Final Lesson

5.1 The Norwegian music therapist Trygve Aasgaard relates:

> Mr. N. is in his late sixties. He suffers from cancer and knows that he will not live for long. Mr. Aasgaard invites him to make music with him on the keyboard. Afterwards Mr. N. asks for some guidance, and Mr. Aasgaard agrees to teach him. At home Mr. N. practices as much as he can, but the number of lessons is very limited. Nothing more can be done to relieve his symptoms when he calls to ask for a "last lesson". They arrange to meet right away, and then work focused on *In the Mood for Love.* Once again he asks for comments to improve his playing and leaves grateful, saying he will practice as long as possible. Five days later Mr. N. passes away. (Private communication)

This is a beautiful example of Heidegger's 'authentic "Dasein" (being) running ahead towards its own death' (Inwood 1997: 78). There is no future, no performance to come, only a man with a keyboard and a wish to make music. His practice is solace and meaning in itself. Similarly, there are master musicians who continue to practice long after they have finished their career – life would be empty without!

5.2 In the long run, practice without a degree of self-fulfillment is nothing less than destructive. You will not get far as an artist without immersing yourself totally in your own musical world, exploring your potential and challenging your imagination, on a daily basis. Detaching yourself from the outside world creates room for surprises as you discover new depths of meaning and novel nuances of musical expression within yourself. Music is a gift and makes her dedicated servants gifted.

5.3 Sadly it is also possible to develop into an automaton, without involving the imagination or challenging the truth-searching self. This was R. L.'s experience. A performance may still be technically impressive and polished, but predictable and bland – even a musical lie. There are teachers who prefer to let their pupils imitate, avoiding any creative response. Teaching is easier that way, the pedagogic ideal being the player merely reproducing the intended sound at the right time, showing off dexterity and sheen. This is committing a pedagogic and artistic fraud, and their license to teach should be withdrawn!

5.4 Golden hours of meditative or playful *deep practice* (Klickstein 2009: 20, keywords here are mastery, integration and transcendence) are a portal into the riches unfolding when music and our innermost self interact. They lead to overall integration of thought, feeling and movement, without first and foremost being efficient. A genuinely higher performance level *must* not be intended; it would in Mr. N's case even be a ridiculous pretense. Yet, also for the professional musician, discovering and cultivating self-fulfilling practice is the key to truly artistic achievement. A relevant definition or description of artistic practice cannot leave this aspect unmentioned, as it would then be an impermissible and banal falsification by oversimplifying a complex challenge: *Musical practice is achieving expression through outward and inward exploration.*

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Chapter 15
Art and "Truth." Heidegger's Ontology in Light of Ernst Bloch's Philosophy of Hope and Hans-Georg Gadamer's Play-Metaphor. Three Impulses for a New Perspective of Musical Bildung

Karl Heinrich Ehrenforth

Abstract What is truth? Is there truth only in Religion or Science? Why not in Art? It is for many people surely surprising, that modern philosophers as Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Graf York, Dewey, Bloch, Heidegger, Gadamer, Blumenberg, Ricoeur and Waldenfels has dared, to say: Art is more than entertainment or illusion (Platon). Art is an important example of sensual-symbolic truth. But why has this perception, which seems to be a "declaration of war" against Cartesianism, no echo in present cultural policy and education? This article tries to show some bridges between philosophy and (Music-)education: (1) Heideggers "Sein zum Tode" and music as "meditatio mortis", (2) Heideggers "Kehre" (turn) and his exploration of beauty in poetry as "Sein" (being), (3) Blochs "Prinzip Hoffnung", exposed in Beethoven's *Fidelio* and Brahms' *Ein deutsches Requiem*, and (4) Gadamers ontology of "Spiel" (game) as phenomenon of Art.

Keywords Art • Truth • Philosophy • Music education • Musical Bildung

15.1 What Is Art?

Art is merely an illusion, it is said. Art will never be at home in real life. We might appreciate it, but it cannot solve our problems, neither the everyday ones nor the problems of the bigger world. Actually, art is merely an imitation of what is already heard and seen. So what is art for?

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F. Pio, Ø. Varkøy (eds.), *Philosophy of Music Education Challenged: Heideggerian Inspirations*, Landscapes: the Arts, Aesthetics, and Education 15,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9319-3_15

However, it is also said that art speaks a noble language that leads us beyond everyday life. Art means exploration of the possible and is able to release us from fixations in our accustomed ways of perception. Art therewith brings another world to the fore, it is able to raise and uplift us, to comfort us and let us hope for the "Other." However, is this not to demand too much of art?

There are contrasting views. Is art "victual," or is it merely "aesthetic wallpaper"? Is it hedonistic luxury, or even religious surrogate? The answers to these questions decide if art belongs to the basic education of man, or if it merely remains one of the world's nicest minor matters from which education may refrain when things are getting serious. Most parents find it necessary – with good reason – that their children *learn* something to do well in their lives. In particular, they find that knowledge and skills are needed, that is, the powers of 'Head' and 'Hands.'

However, what will become of the soul? Is it immaterial? Following Lev Tolstoy, one could ask: How much soul does a man need? May the nobleness of the heart, that Pestalozzi claims, remain a private affair and even be left to chance? These questions concern everyone who is dissatisfied with today's school, which still considers itself a "scientific" school in which arts education only plays a minor part. Most educational theorists are fond of the arts, but they do not insist on their significance for education. In Germany, which is admired as the land of poetry and music, arts and music education in schools are increasingly losing ground. In order to prevent the entire culture from sickening, and for the sake of the children and youngsters, this trend needs to come to an end. School is more than just a deliverer of employees for economy and engineering. We have to do with human beings. Therefore, art could be of much greater importance to education than which is today presumed.

15.2 The Unrecognized Philosophical Paradigm Shift

Against this problematic background, it is a bright spot that wise thinkers of (not only) the nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy informed by hermeneutics and phenomenology, from Schleiermacher to Dilthey, Graf York, Dewey, Heidegger, Gadamer, Blumenberg, Riceur and Waldenfels, have ventured to oppose the traditional truth claim of Cartesian scientism. All of these thinkers have, without exception, emphasized – and more or less obviously explicated – art as a paradigm of truth and as a medium of knowledge of the world.

The reason for this astonishing philosophical paradigm shift has been that one has been dissatisfied with a conceptual model that considers the "thing" to be more real than the relationship to the thing. This model is foredoomed to failure in dealing with art, as art is reliant upon disclosure. Art as a pure object withers. It is the openness of the perspective of aesthetic perception and awareness that perceives a picture by Dürer or a piece of music by Mozart, not as "thing," but as "message" for the viewer and listener. This is not a matter of distance or detachment, but of dialogue. "Subject" and "object" are "partners," they are dependent on each other. This

condition provides the approach to art with a specific openness, which is indeed superior to the pressure of the sciences having to be conceptualizing, abstracting and systematizing. Their truth claim pays a high price for the associated loss of reality, inasmuch as the multiplicity of shades of reality is becoming lost. Vibrant coherences and rational, barely perceptible, mutualisms are disappearing from view. Most of all, the rationally inaccessible depths of human feeling, hoping and suffering evade the sieve of science like water.

Thus, art reopens those windows which science had to close for the sake of its own aim and purpose. It is long since recognized that such self-imposed captivity and high specialization in the interests of the scientific objectives are at the expense of humanity, meaning the totality of the human being as it is bound up with the body (Merleau-Ponty 1945). Medicine can tell a tale or two about this. The German physician Viktor von Weizsäcker and many others have early objected this trend of instrumentalization of humans.[1]

The human being indeed "has" a body (*Körper*), but it "is" first body and limb (*Leib*). Martin Heidegger proposed a clear statement as to the concurrent truth claim of the exact sciences: "Mathematics is not more rigorous than historiology, but only narrower, because the existential foundations relevant for it lie within a narrower range" (Heidegger 1962: 195). This sentence could be an advantageous core for an education policy memorandum, which would take into account another, more human school that would properly consider the arts central to education.[2]

15.3 What Does the Frequently Invoked "Truth" of Art Mean?

Pilate's skeptical question facing the suffering Christ seems to have passed out of the minds of those who tend to deal with the term "truth" in a rather uncritical manner. Apparently, it is still assumed that the authority of this word speaks for itself and that it therefore is not necessary to comment on it. When Heidegger's ontological philosophy states that "*(a)rt (…) is a becoming and happening of truth*" (Heidegger 2011: 127), then an ordinary mortal would, though, indeed like to know what is here meant by "truth," and what is concretely meant by the "becoming" and "being" of this truth. Hans-Georg Gadamer's art philosophy with its truth claim of the work of art has been reproached for being an empty formula, of not being concretized. This is not the case. At least Gadamer, more persuasive than his teacher Heidegger, has dealt extensively with the mental landscapes of the truth of art, specified in terms such as *Festival*, *Symbol* and *Play* (Gadamer 1986).

[1] Weizsäcker's most known book *Der Gestaltkreis* (1940) begins with the sentence: "In order to understand life, you have to participate." See as well: *Natur und Geist* (Weizsäcker 1986).

[2] See also: Ehrenforth (1971, 1993, 2001, 2013).

If truth is claimed, then this posit demands the proof of evidence. However, what qualifies as evidence when a truth is personally, but nevertheless undeniably experienced and asserted by an individual, when this individual, for instance, characterizes his beloved partner as beautiful, whereas this same partner in the eyes of non-participant others appears to be loathsome? Absolute truths can only avoid being redolent of ideology when they have to do with such irreversibleness as life's finiteness. The truth claim of art lies between these extreme positions, not least because it remains to be a historical truth, and because this remaining is not ensured. In particular, it is crucial that art itself remains true, to the effect that it suspends its own historicity, meaning that it is able to initiate a cross-generational reception history. Most of all, it is unavoidable that thinking stammers when giving thought to such a truth. The topic is too big.

15.4 About the Deep Sleep of Educational Theory and of Educational Politics

It is an alarming symptom of not only our times that such a radical paradigm shift in a leading segment of European philosophy has had no considerable consequences for educational theory and politics. A similar exile as the one art has had to endure for quite some time, now threatens philosophy as well. This book endeavors to avert the danger, hoping that it is not too late. The following arguments could be alleged:

First: When broadening the epistemological view by including the human perspective, a horizon opens up in which the perception of the world is (or at least should be) closely linked to the self-awareness of the human being. Thereby epistemology, ethics and theory of education meet. Then, epistemology will have to realize that the human being is not only a being that thinks rationally and accumulates knowledge, but is also a being that acts, and that has to answer for his actions to himself and others.

Second: Only dialogically-circularly generated insight, which arises from the conversation between the "world" and the "self" and between the "ego" and the "self," is capable of fulfilling the truth claim that we need in order to do not only what we are *able to*, but most of all what we also are able to *answer for*. Only then, the often battered and misused word *Bildung* comes true. *Bildung* is more than merely knowledge (information) and skills (competencies). Rather, *Bildung* approves its meaning in the attitude – an attitude of being able and wanting to answer for one's own actions. If *Bildung* literally means to realize a picture (*Bild*) of the "world" *and* the "self," then this can only be understood in the existential meaning of guidance towards responsibility.

Third: Heidegger's philosophical "revolution" had the effect internally of a tsunami in the philosophical debates. However, in the politically influential hubs, this was not the case. There are many reasons for this circumstance. Many people found

Heidegger's language bewildering, and his intentions were often met by stunned disapproval. It is understandable, though, that a philosopher does not want to be a politician.[3]

Fourth: It should not be forgotten that already at the time when *Being and Time* was written, remarkable paragons of a humanitarian education existed, most notably in the progressive educational movement, which had departed from a one-sided scientific education in school, such as the Dalton Plan, the Gary Plan, Ellen Key, Maria Montessori, Hermann Lietz, John Dewey, Anton S. Makarenko, Georg Kerschensteiner and Kurt Hahn, among others. Mainly, the changes initiated by these reformers had been inspired by Nietzsche. Yet, they were regarded as elitist in the eyes of the public and have therefore had only a limited impact on the public education system globally. At least, these reformers knew that the world of art has a unique role in enabling *Bildung*, as its "language" addresses the human being in a particular way.

Fifth: This book project asserts that Heidegger's existential philosophy and its subsequent turning into an ontology of art is still undiscovered for a theory of education of today. Thus, we will now turn to Heidegger.

15.5 Some Main Features in Heidegger's Thinking

Heidegger is concerned with a certain philosophical "earthboundness," which the titles of his magnum opus *Being and Time* already indicate. The (for a philosophy, unusual) subtitles of Chapter five, Division One (§ 35–38), for example, read as follows: *Idle Talk – Curiosity – Ambiguity – Falling Prey and Thrownness* (Heidegger 1962: 211–224).

Heidegger – similar to Karl Marx, though with entirely different ambitions – wants to turn upside down the world of Western metaphysics. He proposes that the basal fundamentals of human existence become a central subject of philosophy, but not in terms of idealistic, or even arrogant, metaphysics. To Heidegger, it is a question of the "naked existence" of man in his earthiness, which is now to be bestowed on the particular dignity of philosophical reflection. The hitherto valid paradigm of Western metaphysics with its "veiling," is now "decluttered" with the assistance of the foresighted Pre-Socratics and Aristotle. This is to make the human existence recognizable across all cultural characteristics, and to make *Dasein* visible as one of *Being's* entities (*Seiendes des Seins*).

The consequence is severe: all idealizations of the autonomous subject break down. In fact, the human being is *thrown* (*geworfen*) into the world, which subsequently means that the human being cannot on his own reverse his *thrownness* (sich

[3] Heidegger only once makes concrete political statements in *Being and Time* (p. 403f). Here he states, fairly awkward and anti-democratic: "To dissolve elemental public opinion, and, as far as possible, to make possible the molding of individuality in seeing and looking, would be a pedagogical task for the state."

selbst "*ent-werfen*"), on the contrary, he is exposed to life itself. Certainly, this fate is at the same time the source of the *resoluteness* (*Entschlossenheit*), which enables the human being to move from "*the One*" and the public "*idle talk*," to the irreplaceable "*mineness*" of the self.

Another central term in Heidegger's terminology is "*care*," which is the gift that enables *Dasein* to be ahead of itself. This "*being-ahead-of-itself*" (*Sein sich vor Weg*) culminates in the insight that life is "*Being-towards-Death*" (*"Sein zum Tode"*) (Ibid: 279–311). The knowledge about this destiny, the facing of death, is characteristic of all existential philosophy. This is where the essential question of meaning is put to the test.

Indeed, Heidegger has himself described *Being and Time* (1962) as merely a "fragment" that preceded the crucial turn in his thinking towards *The Origin of the Work of Art* as "*clearing*" ("*Lichtung*") of *being* (Heidegger 2011). Nevertheless, the theme of death from *Being and Time* will be addressed in the following in light of the theme of this book.

15.6 Example 1 – Heidegger's Being-Towards-Death and Music as "Meditatio Mortis Continua"

The book title *Being and Time* introduces Heidegger's terms and sets the agenda for his enterprise. The term "*Being-towards-Death*" is about both being and time. "*Dasein*" is rooted in "*Being*," and is lived by each individual. "*Dasein*" is not only marked by the "*idle talk*" of *"the One,"* but by temporality as well. It is fatefully finite. The question is; How do we deal with this? Above all: Is death life's enemy, or is it a natural part of life itself?

A superficial view may conclude that, as "all turns to dust again," life is meaningless. Viewed in this light, death is the mortal enemy of life. Nothing can remain unchanged or endure. Heidegger, however, vehemently argues that death belongs to life, since life from the beginning is under the sign of death.

Since "(n)o *one can take the Other's dying away from him*," (…) "mineness and existence are ontologically constitutive for death" (Heidegger 1962: 284). Hence, the question that arises is "*in what sense, if any, death must be conceived as the ending of Dasein*" (Ibid: 289). The human being not only is aware of death, he lives with death from the outset. Is this really an end? "Death (…) is a phenomenon of life. Life must be understood as a type of Being to which there belongs a Being-in-the-world. (…) If "death" is defined as the 'end' of Dasein – that is to say, of Being-in-the-world – this does not imply any ontic decision whether 'after death' still another Being is possible, either higher or lower, or whether Dasein 'lives on' or even 'outlasts' itself and is 'immortal'" (Ibid: 290ff).

Heidegger's meditation on the theme of dying and death indicates that he is also aware of the Christian-theological aspects of this topic. Actually, he has also studied

(Catholic) theology – a circumstance that is still unknown to many. In 1920, he writes to his fellow philosopher Karl Löwitz, whether rightly or wrongly remains open: "I am a Christian theologian" (Gadamer 1977: 204). To the author of this contribution, Heidegger's meditation on death belongs to the most impressive in *Being and Time*.

In the everyday and in school we can observe that this issue is generally avoided. Even more important it appears to be. It would be a fallacy to hold that children and youngsters should be "spared" from this theme. Even adolescents experience dying and death and ask after the funeral of the grandmother where she now might be. Who has the courage to talk to them about this theme, and to try to find answers? Who dares to speak freely about this issue? Do the sciences? They can merely determine the cause of death, but cannot say anything about the theme itself.

Music history is replete with experiences of dying and death. The musical rendering of the *Requiem* has in the course of the centuries provided the most manifold documentation of these experiences. They tell of sorrow, hope, faith, skepticism, fear and protest in the face of death. One only has to think of the *German Requiem* by Johannes Brahms, the *Musikalische Exequien* by Heinrich Schütz and the *War Requiem* by Benjamin Britten. These are three fairly different answers to the subject. By listening to music of this type, we not only experience what Cherubini or Mozart have to "say" about dying and death, but most of all the reverberation of moods and attitudes in ourselves. Music invites us to venture to address this intimate topic. There is a whole world in it that challenges our selves. Only such interplay between the world and the self is truly to be called *Bildung*, and it does not end upon leaving school. However, just why is it music that comes so near to the theme of death?

First: Music, as an art of time, is a sound metaphor for the finite nature of human existence. Adam von Fulda, a composer and music theorist of the late fifteenth century, writes in his treatise *De Musica* about music as the "*meditatio mortis continua*," meaning the continuous contemplation of death (Von Fulda 1784: 329).

Second: Music plays in temporality, but on another temporal level, beyond the measured time of everyday life. This subjective experience of time tends to suspend itself as time. Yet music is tangibly finite, as are its listeners and players. Music comfortingly indicates that there are other layers of time, hinting at what it could mean to be free of the fetters of time. This power of suspension provides music with that character of hope, which plays an important role in Bloch's thinking. This is where music's character of having a particular closeness to the human being and its anxiety and hope becomes apparent. Moreover, should this be mere "recreation" and "playground"? Themes are addressed with which no science could ever catch up. These topics make us speechless, but in music, they find a "language." Hence, it is beyond doubt that these matters belong to basic education.

15.7 Heidegger's "Turn" and His Way into Art as Paradigm

Being and Time (*Sein und Zeit*), originally written in 1927, has remained until today Heidegger's magnum opus, although it – as already mentioned – soon after the publication was declared a fragment, even by the author himself (Heidegger 1962, 2001). As early as from approximately 1930, Heidegger speaks about a "turn" ("Kehre") in his thinking, which is not to be understood as reversal, but rather as a curve of a mountain road that merely changes the direction, without returning down into the valley.

The philosopher now changes his previous approach to thinking from an existential-ontological perspective to an approach focusing the history of being. Broadly speaking, no longer the human "*Dasein*" is occupying the center stage, but rather the "meaning of Being," and with it the question of the "truth" of Being.

What is surprising about this development is that Heidegger chooses the (poetic) work of art, above all Hölderlin's, as the new paradigm of his thinking. This was a provocation, not least because the aesthetic-artistic perspective of grasping and understanding the world by contemplating the beautiful was barely in a position to claim existential significance – according to the assertion that it are the arts that one most likely could abstain from when things are getting serious.

However, during his search for the truth of Being, Heidegger recognizes the power of the "presentation" of art. Art *"unconceals"* ("*entbirgt*") truth and "*sets*" it into the "*Unconcealment*" of presence (präsentia). He is also speaking of a "*Clearing*" ("*Lichtung*") – a term that he shortly mentions, but does not develop further in *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962: 171).

With the "turn," Heidegger embarks upon a path, which previously Dilthey had already entered, and after him Gadamer. Art becomes the central paradigm of philosophy, which is certainly also due to Dilthey's book *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung* from 1906. Whereas Dilthey later also devotes himself to the topic of music (Dilthey 1933), Heidegger unfortunately abstains from this perspective. He turns his attention to painting (Van Gogh) and, pre-eminently, to poetry (Hölderlin). His interpretations of Hölderlin, though, aroused opposition in all its eccentricity. It was argued that Heidegger had underestimated the artistic nature of Hölderlin's poetry and instead perceived and used it as philosophical construct.

It has to be said, however, that it was not Heidegger's epistemological interest to justify or establish a new aesthetics of art. On the contrary, he investigated the ontological origin of the work of art prior to and beyond all aesthetics. Thereby, he had to cope with the circumstance that art, as is generally known, more specifically is a phenomenon of the relatively late European culture, and that no one at the (historical) beginning of the "homo sapiens" was able to think of neither producing nor receiving "art." Nevertheless, for all that, this did not bother Heidegger. For him, it was a question of the origin of what today in the widest sense is called art. This origin was not an aesthetic phenomenon, but rather a phenomenon of Being. It may irritate that Heidegger still had no qualms about bringing up the term "the beautiful" at the end of his thoughts about *The Origin of the Work of Art* (Heidegger 2011: 134,

epilogue), a term that indeed rather belongs to an exclusively aesthetic approach to art, which was exactly what Heidegger wanted to avoid. However, this is where he moves "the beautiful" into the question of Being, notably saying: "Beauty does not occur apart from this truth. When truth sets itself into the work, it appears. Appearance – as this being of truth in the work and as work – is beauty" (Ibid).

It is important to know that Heidegger characterizes the work of art as "*aletheia*." He translates this Greek word into "truth." Art reveals and "unconceals" truth. The "being emerges into the unconcealment of its Being" (Heidegger 2011: 102). Art is a "*bestowing*" ("*Schenkung*") (Ibid: 130). "Bestowing and grounding have in themselves the unmediated character of what we call a beginning" (Ibid). "(S)cience is not an original happening of truth, but always (merely, K. H. E.) the cultivation of a domain of truth already opened" (Ibid: 120).

This makes it obvious that Heidegger posits art at the place in the historical self-understanding that was previously occupied by the myth.[4] The myth is a narrative about origin that again and again anew will be made present. Myths are points of reference for the identity both of individuals and of societies. They stay relatively unchanged in the flow of history. Heidegger confirms this when he says: "Art is history in the essential sense that it grounds history" (Ibid: 131). Insofar, art is also "prinzipium," meaning the beginning as origin and foundation. In the view of Heidegger's interpreters, this statement by Heidegger also objects Hegel's controversial and often misconceived "end of art."[5] Art replaces the old myth and becomes an ontological entity, not only an aesthetic one. The circumstance that this myth was predominantly poetry, that is "word-art," according to Heidegger does not necessarily imply that art in place of the myth has to be poetry in the literal sense, then "all art is in essence poetry" (Ibid: 128). This means that music is also part of the mythical story through art. It can indeed be suggested that music, in an even deeper sense than poetry, can fulfill its role of conveying a mythic "message." Why is that? Because tone and sound go back to the pre-mythic age of an archaic, magical world-view that for its part has shaped the myths.

Thus, the statements by Heidegger cited above turn out to be a controversial provocation to present-day educational theory and –policy, which by insisting on their academic, scientific and discipline-related thinking, still seem to remain in the nineteenth century. To Heidegger, it is a matter of history as a medium of the national self-understanding. If it is actually the work of art that tells this history in a particular and diverse language, then its significance to another, quite differently accentuated theory of education rises to undreamt-of levels. It is about "self-orientation" and "world-orientation." The consequence is obvious: art, and thus music, belongs at the very center of education and should therefore not be marginalized.

[4] The discussion about whether the myth lives or long since is dead shall not be discussed here. See Hübner (1985).

[5] In Heidegger's Epilogue to *The Origin of the Work of Art* (2011: 133ff.), he refers to this dictum of Hegel, yet he does not take a view on the matter about whether his own thinking after the "turn" rejects Hegel's view or not. However, this question has been addressed later by Heidegger's interpreters.

15.8 Hope – The Overlooked Existential. Ernst Bloch's Philosophy of Music

It is striking that hope has not explicitly been included as one of the "existentials" in Heidegger's philosophy. He is indeed aware of a "not-yet" ("Noch-nicht") of the existence (Heidegger 1962: 303), but it is the "*Anxiety*" ("*Angst*") (See, for instance: ibid: 227) that most often represents the "not-yet." Hope is only treated with half a page by Heidegger in *Being and Time* (Ibid: 395f). That is insufficient.

Against this, Heidegger's only 4 years older German college Ernst Bloch has dedicated his life's work to the "Principle of Hope,"[6] however, on another philosophical foundation than Heidegger. Bloch's quasi-Marxist philosophical stance is completely free of dogmatism, yet strongly colored by Jewish-Christian apocalyptic and by an expressionistic rhetorical style. To Bloch, *hope* is an urgent, basic human force that does not lose its power in finding a future fulfillment and a "better world," even when faced with reality. The Biblical-eschatological promise of Christianity is just one variant of this hope. Bloch's hope is more oriented towards the humanist-immanent self-fulfillment of history. Bloch is scorning class struggle and revolution, he thinks rather in the categories of the Hegelian "World Spirit." What, however, links him with hermeneutic-phenomenological philosophy is the convincement that art enters the world either as "*clearing*" (Heidegger) or as "*foreshadowing of an achievement*" (Bloch).

Unlike Heidegger, who favored painting and poetry, Bloch devotes himself to music, of which he is a lover and connoisseur. The language of created sound obviously offers him the persuasive undertone of hope, out of which he has developed a quite unconventional philosophy of music. However different Heidegger and Bloch's ways of thinking and styles of argument might be, in this respect they are complementary.

15.9 Example 2 – *Fidelio* and *German Requiem* as Messengers of Hope

Bloch's philosophy of hope exemplified through music frequently draws on Beethoven's Opera of liberty, with its *Prisoners' Chorus* and its trumpet signals of deliverance in the 3rd *Leonore Ouverture* on the one hand, and on the other hand – which is all the more surprising, as Bloch is an atheist – the *German Requiem* by Brahms. It is documented that Bloch listened to extracts from *Fidelio* from a gramophone record one last time on the evening before his death.

His main proposal is that we as individuals and as a society have not yet arrived at ourselves. He believes that we still live in a period of anticipation, in an "advent" of ourselves. That which we truly are is not yet apparent to us. Literally, he states: "true

[6] See Bloch (1986).

Genesis is not at the beginning but at the end" (Bloch 1959: 1628). This means that what the world is to become, is unknown from the beginning, it will first appear at the end. Thereby, he seems to be moving towards Biblical-eschatological figures of thought, as for example in the First Epistle of John (1. John 5:12): "(…) and it doth not yet appear what we shall be," or in Psalm 126 (Ps 126:1): "When the Lord turned again the captivity of Zion, we were like them that dream." Bloch goes as far as saying: "(t)here arises in the world something which shines into the childhood of all and in which no one has yet been: homeland" (Bloch 1959: 1628). Marx and Lenin would never use such a vocabulary. Not alienation as expropriation, but rather homelessness as "provisionalness" defines Bloch's view of the world and of history. Music is a foretaste of this true homeland. Thus, music is to hear over and over as a "*call into what has been foregone*" ("*Ruf ins Entbehrte*") (Bloch 1985: 196). In addition, the Marxists acknowledges that "(b)oth historically and objectively, (…) music proves to be essentially a Christian art." It "(…) reveals itself, becoming the *source-sound of self-shapings still unachieved in the world*" (Ibid: 219). The reception history will first be wholly accomplished at its peak: "*(N)obody has as yet heard Mozart, Beethoven or Bach as they are really calling, designating and teaching*; this will only happen much later, with the fullest maturation of these and all great works" (Ibid: 207).

About the music of his highly loved *Fidelio* by Beethoven, Bloch writes: "Here and nowhere else, on the other hand, music becomes a rosy dawn, (…) the dawning of a new day so audible that it seems more than simply a hope" (Ibid: 243). Moreover, about Brahms' *Requiem* he states: "In fact most people have not believed the Church's account of death and damnation for (…) almost 200 years. Yet it lives on in music.[7] Mozart, Beethoven, Cherubini and Verdi still wrote their masses for the dead in the grand style – and thoroughly genuine masses at that. (…) *If one is seeking a musical initiation into the truth of utopia*, then the first, fully comprehensive light is *Fidelio*. The second – covered by a shade and suitably distanced – is the *German Requiem*. The choir sings 'Here on Earth we have no continuing place, howbeit, we seek one to come'" (Ibid: 239f).

If hope is something of the type that runs like a golden thread through life, which even remains true to us when we experience defeats, which remains acting as an impetus that time after time makes us break up and start over again, which emanates the energy of Bergson's "élan vital," and which encompasses our dreams, visions, need for comfort and maybe also the hope of faith; then, from an existential and historical point of view, it becomes apparent how essential this perspective is to education. No other school subject is able to render this aspect as impressively as music. If it is true that music is the medium that in particular ways is able to reach the depths of our historical roots, then, for example, it would make sense to confront the huge political potential of hope of the French Revolution – that however rapidly was submerged in blood and in a vortex of inhumanity and violence – with the soon thereafter composed *Requiem* by Berlioz. This would be *Bildung* that is worthwhile.

[7] It is notable that agnostic music lovers have such experiences. The philosopher Hans Blumenberg has a similar experience in his encounter with Bach's *St. Matthew Passion*. See: Blumenberg (1988).

15.10 Example 3 – Gadamer's Ontology of Play

Hans-Georg Gadamer's magnum opus *Truth and Method* (1998) was met with a wide response after it was originally published 1960 (1990). Gadamer was a student of Heidegger and was regarded as a once-in-a-century philosopher. The in antique philosophy comprehensively scholarly educated Gadamer, however, was far apart from Heidegger's rigor. In contrast to his teacher, Gadamer's main concern was the ontological grounding of the philosophical hermeneutic tradition in Europe. Gadamer's hermeneutics is not only an appropriate technique for the correct understanding of historical "texts," but includes, since Schleiermacher, also the self-understanding of the historical subject in a historical world. Thus, Gadamer lifted the venerable hermeneutics to a philosophical-ontological level.

Also in Gadamer's thinking, art plays a paradigmatic role. He is concerned with "the question of artistic truth" (Gadamer 1998: 81). Therefore, he asks: "Does not the experience of art contain a claim to truth which is certainly different from that of science, but just as certainly is not inferior to it? And is not the task of aesthetics precisely to ground the fact that the experience (Erfahrung) of art is a mode of knowledge of a unique kind, certainly different from that sensory knowledge which provides science with the ultimate data from which it constructs the knowledge of nature, (…) but still knowledge, i.e., conveying truth?" (Ibid: 97f).

To establish this artistic truth, Gadamer develops his ontology of the work of art by exploring the concept of *play* (Ibid: 101). The phenomenon of *play* in its varieties of cultural forms had begun to become an issue of philosophy with Johan Huizinga's inquiry *Homo Ludens* ([1938] 1955). To Huizinga, *play* constitutes culture. When this is so, then *play* has to be a central issue of *Bildung* and education. What is *play* about?

Gadamer focuses on a particular variant of play. To him, it is a matter of play as "the mode of being of the work of art itself" (Gadamer 1998: 101). Play is especially present in music. Music must be "played" to become sound and thereby present. However, play is an element in other art forms as well. A painter can "play" with colors or with perspectives.

However, the continued reading of Gadamer shows that to him it is more about "the mode of being of play as such" (Ibid: 102), which particularly appears in the relational interplay between the recipient and the work of art. Thereby, it is essential "that the work of art is not an object that stands over against a subject for itself. Instead, the work of art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an experience that changes the person who experiences it" (Ibid). However, what is meant here by "change"? It does not mean any type of magical metamorphosis or ethical conversion, but simply a change of awareness of the subject's role when dealing with the work of art. When the work of art is not an "object," then the spectator or listener is not a detached observer of this alleged object either, but rather an active participant who is allowed to (and has to) get involved with the artwork to understand the *play* of art and to allow room for this play in oneself. Gadamer names this role awareness "the communion of being present" (*Kommunion des Dabeiseins*) (Ibid: 132).

The work of art has a "message." So, the work of art and the recipient are both integrated within a dialogical relationship that places them both under the law of *play*. Only this partnership describes the phenomenon of art adequately.[8] However, this does not require any "*transformation into structure*" ("*Verwandlung ins Gebilde"*), a change of play into an artistic structure, as Gadamer holds (Ibid: 110), in as much as art involves both the work and the perception of it.

Particularly important in this context is that Gadamer, from the example of *play*, describes a field of knowledge and experience that is clearly distinguished from the method of scientific knowledge. Not the inner detachment, but solely the declared commitment of the subject is an appropriate attitude in the encounter with art, as art needs the listener and the viewer to be able to continue to exist.

15.11 Result

Art – and thus also music – has long been recognized as a paradigm of knowledge of truth which casts doubt on the scientific methods of the Cartesian age. The world-view of human medicine, as well as the increased awareness of environmental concerns, has contributed to this development.

If this contribution sometimes polarizes in the question of science and art by portraying them inappropriately in black and white, then this has only been done to clarify the fundamental question. Of course, it has long been proven that this black and white neither is true for contemporary scientific self-understanding, nor for artistic reflection. Science is dependent on imagination and creativity, as art is reliant on conceptualizing.

The problem is that neither the theory of education nor educational politics have considered this philosophical turn as a challenge for a new education, just as the public school system, especially in central Europe, has not seen the experiences of progressive education as an opportunity.

Art and science offer two different types of world experience. It is a clear sign of arrogance that art has been degraded and marginalized as ancillary to the sciences. The time is long overdue that the two of them meet on an equal footing and together are allowed to make their contribution to the humanity's becoming human. The *Being-towards-Death*, the *Principle of Hope* and *Art in the metaphor of play* provide opportunities, particularly within the field of music, to change school and therewith culture. It is high time.

[8] See also Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogue, particularly his book *I and Thou* (Leipzig 1923, here cited after the edition: Buber, Martin (1970): *I and Thou*. A new translation with a prologue "I and you" and notes by Walter Kaufmann, New York: Scribner's Sons) where art is given a field "in-between": art is to Buber neither merely an "it" ("Es" – an object, a thing) nor merely a "thou" ("Du," a person). "This is the eternal origin of art that a human being confronts a form that wants to become a work through him" (Ibid: 60).

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