# Avicenna and Husserl: Comparative Aspects

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**Abstract** Philosophical continuity between medieval philosophy represented by Avicenna and analytic philosophy embodied by Husserl can be traced in a comparative way through a number of issues, already studied by many authors. This paper attempts to analyze some of the themes linking Avicenna and Husserl. The question of intention is at once the philosophical basis and the hinge that connects medieval philosophy to phenomenology through Brentano. Intention related to the issue of *phantasia* and perception also echoes to *tasawwur* and *tasdiq* in the medieval context. In this comparative analysis, the notion of hylè represents, in a differentiating way, the intelligibility of the data both by the materiality and by the original characteristic form. Hyle is the form of the intelligible data, their flesh and schematic appearance as well as the other side of the internal senses. A third theme which is relevant in a comparative context is logic, for the young Husserl sets out to demonstrate the inadequacy of classical or traditional logic to define a formal then transcendental or phenomenological logic, based on the concept of Logos, which can be compared with the prophetic intellect professed by Avicenna.

Husserl on rare occasions cites medieval philosophers like St. Augustine and Nicolas of Cusa, using the term "scholastic" to refer to those times, especially when he talks about the concept of intentionality or "traditional logic" (*traditionellen Logik*).[1] At the same time, phenomenological literature has focused on several points of the relationship between Husserl's thought and medieval

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[1] Cf. *Hua.*, VII, 1, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil, Kritische Ideengeschichte* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1956), p. 61, 329, 106. *Hua.*, XXX, *Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie: Vorlesungen 1917/18* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), p. 20. Husserl gives a number of detailed analyses of traditional logic, criticizing in particular conversion (*Konversion*) and consequence (*Schlusse*), cf. *Hua.*, Materialien, 6, *Alte und neue Logik: Vorlesung 1908–09*, ed. Elisabeth

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philosophy. Interest in these comparative studies has grown significantly over the past ten years. Researchers have attempted both to conduct comparative studies on the relationship between phenomenology and medieval philosophy and renew the interpretation of the latter by a phenomenological approach.

This article attempts to conduct a comparative study of Avicenna's philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology through some similar concepts and themes. Our goal is to understand in which way a number of philosophical questions are analyzed in Avicenna and Husserl and show the relevance of the connection that can be established by studying these questions.

We begin with a review of the literature and bibliographic data in which we find the first traces of studies on this subject. This section allows a better view of the stakes and the context in which the philosophical link between Avicenna and Husserl found a place in contemporary studies. We then take into consideration that intellectual relationship from various angles. Indeed, we will, first, tackle the question of intention on which a large part of the Avicennian corpus is based and which is also a founding element of Husserl's phenomenology. A second issue to be addressed will be the place of Phantasia in Avicenna and Husserl, especially in the context of the internal senses or intuitive data. Another fundamental issue is logic, that represents a major problem for both philosophers and especially for Husserl, whose critique of traditional logic significantly echoes Avicennian logic.

Between the philosophy of Antiquity and that of the modern period, medieval philosophy, or theology, was not the favorite subject of phenomenological studies and, for that matter, of Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl's philosophical genealogy seems flawed as it scarcely refers to scholastic schools. However, we know the paramount role that the Middle Ages have played in the transmission of philosophical and theological knowledge for the development of modern philosophy.

## The Concept of Intention (ma'na) and Its Connection to Other Concepts

The concept of intention is at the heart of medieval philosophy, namely that of Avicenna, and also of the phenomenology of Husserl. It is in the sense of the continuity of the Platonic idea that we can understand the continuation of this concept and particularly the modality of the articulation of the intent beyond mere representation. The intentional purpose Husserl expresses by consciousness can be compared with the functioning of intentionality from the perspective of the estimative imagination as expressed by Avicenna. The two most important axes of Husserlian intentionality are expressed in the first place by an intuitive phenomenology consistent with the hyletic aspect and the problematic of perception and then

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Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), p. 253 ff. He appears vehement in his criticism of traditional logic, cf. *Erste Philosophie*, ibid., p. 19 ff, tr. fr. 26.

by the phenomenology of the world of life. "Modern intentionality" looks into the study of phenomenology. This movement sometimes takes interest in classical or medieval philosophy but some of its representatives are actually only interested in modern philosophy.[2]

The concept of intention in Avicenna somehow highlights a paradox. On the one hand the search for meaning in the phenomenological sense matches the notion of *intentio*, for which Avicenna uses *ma'na* as equivalent, or sometimes other words, as we shall see; and on the other hand the idea that Avicenna seeks objective knowledge in the teleological horizon which appears to have remained unknown to researchers.

The word *intentio* is indeed used in the Latin translation of Avicenna to render the word *ma'na*, but it is also used to render other concepts such as *ârâ'* and *gharaz*.[3] There is a gap between the philological approach and the consistency of the philosophical concepts. Indeed, the notion of *intentio* refers to a continuum of bodily sensations in a temporal process and it is bound to the emergence of an external object in the brain being the center of the noetic perception in the context of the faculty of the soul performing its intelligible device. Avicenna, speaking of

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[2] A philosophical tradition after phenomenology proposes modern philosophical readings of intentionality and of the set of mental acts. Connected to a scientific reading, by means of the cognitive sciences or of the modern psychology, this tradition forms on a philosophic basis to try to enlighten the dark points of the question of the intentionality in particular from the question of language. The historic chain comprises numerous characters but to cite only some of them, see John R. Searle, *Intentionality: an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983); John R. Searle, *L'Intentionalité: essai de philosophie des états mentaux*, trans. Claude Pichevin, Propositions (Paris: Éd. de Minuit, 1985); Hintikka is particularly representative, see Jaakko Hintikka, *L'intentionnalité et les mondes possibles*, trans. and pres. Nadine Lavand, Opuscule 6 (Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses universitaires de Lille, 1989), transl. from: *The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities*; in France, Jean-Luc Petit gave a pioneer lecture of this tradition, see Jean-Luc Petit, *L'action dans la philosophie analytique*, Philosophie d'aujourd'hui (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1991); Jocelyn Benoist represents philosophical opinion in the tradition of modern intentionnality, particularly in the continuity of Americans, see Jocelyn Benoist, *Sens et sensibilité: l'intentionnalité en contexte*, Passages (Paris: les Éd. du Cerf, 2009); another current emphasizes the scientific and practical side of perception partly linked to the question of intentionnality, see *Philosophies de la perception: phénoménologie, grammaire et sciences cognitives*, dir. Jacques Bouveresse and Jean-Jacques Rosat (Paris: O. Jacob, 2003); one must also cite the work of Thomas Metzinger who inscribes a new modality of consciousness as reference or self-reference and who promotes a philosophy of consciousness literally individualised, see Thomas Metzinger, *Being No One: the Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity* (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2003).

[3] *Ma'nâ* is the concept most often mentioned. In *Avicenna latinus*, vol. IV–V, 1968, *ma'nâ* is rendered by *intentio*, as are *maqsud*, *qasd* and *ârâ'*. About translation and its difficulties, see *ibid.*, (introd.), p. 112 ff., where the word *intentio* is cited. Herbert Spiegelberg gives more detail about the different meanings and uses of the notion of intention, see Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Context of the Phenomenological Movement* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981), p. 5. A short analysis of the occurrences of the notion of *ma'nâ* can be found in Jean Jolivet, "Le vocabulaire de l'Être et de la création dans la *philosophia prima* de l'*Avicenna latinus*", in *L'élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse and Carlos G. Steel (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), pp. 37–38.

the animal soul, divides the faculty of apprehension (*mudrakah*, *daryâftan*) into two kinds, external and internal. Here, the faculty of apprehension signifies a level previous to perception as such through the use of the Persian word *daryâft* which shows the receptivity of data. This receptivity is more comprehensible when it comes to internal faculties, as, in this case, Avicenna distinguishes between shape or image and sense which is equivalent to *intentio*.[4]

Similarly, we may consider that when speaking of apprehension (*Auffassung*) Husserl refers to the level of the reception of intentional data.[5] Indeed, by adopting the concept of intention, Brentano sought to determine non-existent data. But according to Husserl, Brentano was unable to distinguish between intention and intentional mental process or the content of intentional experience. In other words, Brentano merely remained within the same limits of the definition of intention and its established functioning as the medieval philosophers. The intentional purpose in the example of the wolf and the sheep in Avicenna, is inscribed within the same limit of consciousness, that is to say, the basic form of intention which seeks to know the thing seen or meant and to ascribe it to the intelligibility of consciousness.

At this stage in the intelligible process the estimative imagination (*tawahhum*) appears as the core of knowledge and intelligible perception. Thus the appearing, for example, of the wolf to the sheep is not just the intention, but the instinctive sensation which results in the intelligible or noetic process, in this case intentional, which means that the intention becomes the result of the appearing itself resulting in the estimative imagination in the common sense Avicenna qualifies as Phantasia (*bantâsia*).[6]

As for intention, what we may understand from Avicenna in the example of the wolf and the lamb is an instinctive bodily distinction in the sheep which "understands" the presence of the wolf as the actual enemy. Here we are facing common sense, that is to say the appearing of an animal before the sheep and the instinctive

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[4] Avicenna, *Resâleh-ye Nafs* [Treaty of the soul], ed. Mousâ 'Amid (Hamadan: Anjuman-i âsâr-i farhangi va mafâkhir-i farhangi; dânishgâh Bou 'Ali Sinâ, 1383/1994), p. 16 ff., here, p. 20; Avicenna, *Dânishnâmah 'Ala'i, Tabi'iyat*, ed. Mohammad Meshkât (Hamadan: Anjuman-i âsâr-i farhangi va mafâkhir-i farhangi; dânishgâh Bou 'Ali Sinâ, 2004), p. 96; receptivity has a passive and detached aspect in relation to the soul, *al-Ta'liqât*, p. 23. Let's underline the existence of a second current which denies the proximity between the medieval notion of intention and what has been treated as intention in modern philosophy from Brentano then Husserl, see J.-F. Courtine. About the word *intentio* and its modern presence, one can note that Jean-François Courtine uses the word "*visé*" to translate the word *intentio*, Jean-François Courtine, *Suarez et le système métaphysique* (Paris: PUF, 1990), p. 22. Later on, he draws conclusions from the medieval notion of intention which doesn't relate to "une problématique phénoménologique de l'intentionnalité au sens "*sich-richten-auf*"", Jean-François Courtine, *La cause de la phénoménologie* (Paris: PUF, 2007), p. 20.

[5] Edmund Husserl, *Phantasia, conscience d'image, souvenir : de la phénoménologie des présentifications intuitives : textes posthumes, 1898–1925*, trans. Raymond Kassis and Jean-François Pestureau; rev. Jean-François Pestureau and Marc Richir (Grenoble: Millon, 2002), p. 62.

[6] Avicenna, *Resâleh-ye Nafs*, p. 21.

consequence manifested thereafter.[7] In other words, the appearing of the enemy is in the direction of the intentional process, considering that the *tawahhum* is the faculty, among the internal senses, of free imagination, which gives access to knowledge.[8] If Avicenna is led to use this example, it is, in our opinion, because he looks for a natural attitude allowing to see the consistency between the man in his position of animal or natural attitude and the animal as a representative of Nature. The use of this natural attitude means that Avicenna must seek an original experience in a naïve state to show the foundings of a sense or sensation. Moreover, it is a way to explain the functioning of a faculty whose authenticity remains uncertain.[9]

Considering that the concepts of *wahm* (estimative imagination) and *tawahhum* (illusion in the sense of intuitive imagination) are among the intuitive data, we can say that these intuitive data exist in Husserl's theory. These can be found in perceptual consciousness and *phantasia* consciousness which can be treated in parallel with the emotional and kinesthetic sensations. In other words, in the context of the phenomenology of the world of life intentionality is based on the intersubjective and constituting foundation of the world in which the empirical intuition is born. This is a point of convergence between Husserl and Avicenna about the questioning of intention in the context of intuition. While Avicenna stops at the borders of intuition and intellect to determine the strength of *wahm* (estimative

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[7] About that aspect concerning common sense and distinction, see Max Horten, *Die philosophischen Systeme der Spekulative Theologen im Islam* (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1912), p. 183. For a more recent view, see Alain de Libera, *La querelle des universaux: de Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge* (2nd. ed., Paris: Seuil, 2009), p. 196.

[8] Max Horten translates *al-tawahhum* by the fact of knowing the intention of an individual by means of estimative [imagination], like for example the sheep which recognizes in the wolf its natural enemy, Max Horten, *Die spekulative und positive theologie des Islam nach Razi* (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1912), p. 364. About the notion of *wahm*, see Robert E. Hall, "The "Wahm" in Ibn Sina's psychology", in *Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale*, ed. Maria Cândida Pacheco and José F. Meirinhos (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), vol. I, pp. 533–549. About the medical aspect and the localisation of internal senses by Avicenna, p. 546 ff. According to the author, there is no localisation for *wahm* in Avicenna, even though he mentions it briefly, ibid., p. 548. About the notion of *Wahm* in relation with intentionnality and the elaboration of such notion, see Dag Nikolaus Hasse, *Avicenna's* De Anima *in the Latin West: the Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160–1300* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2000), p. 141 ff.; also Nader el-Bizri, "Avicenna's De Anima: between Aristotle and Husserl" in *The Passions of the Soul in the Metamorphosis of Becoming*, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymienieicka, Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue 1 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), pp. 82–85. Recent studies have also focused on this localisation, Paul Mazliak, *Avicenne & Averroès: médecine et biologie dans la civilisation de l'Islam* (Paris: Vuibert, 2004), p. 90 ff.

[9] Hence the critic of this attempt by Ibn Rushd: "Ibn Rushd reproche à Avicenne le fait qu'il pose dans l'animal une faculté autre que l'imagination, qu'il appelle "wahmyyah (en arabe)" à la place de la pensée en l'homme. Ibn Sînâ donne comme exemple: la faculté qu'a la brebis de reconnaître en le loup son ennemi. Ibn Rushd trouve qu'il est superflu de nommer une autre faculté ce qui ne relève que de l'imagination, puisque l'imagination elle aussi est une faculté cognitive …" cited after 'Abd al-Rahmān Badawī, "Avicenne en Espagne musulmane: pénétration et polémique" in *Milenario de Avicena* (Madrid: Instituto Hispano-Arabe de Cultura, 1981), p. 22.

imagination) and the perception of animosity by the sheep when confronted by the wolf, the major issue for Husserl is to strive to show the link between intention and intentional consciousness with the world of life and under the model of genetic phenomenology. The intentional and genetic relationship passes through the actual world in which we make our own individual and intersubjective experience. The intentional donation takes place in a constituted surrounding universe in which intentionality aims thoroughly while constituting itself. According to Husserl, the constitution of the world in the structure-of-horizon of systematic interpretation is the fact of interpreting intentionality or the fact of an intentional interpretation. This means that in the intentional consciousness we constitute the world by and from the intentional interpretation.[10] Moreover, Husserl expresses this intentional link with the world through the expression of "intentional acquisition" (*intentionale Erwerbe*) in the total acquisition (*Totalerwerb*) of the world.[11] Another reading of Husserl focuses on the close relationship between the apperception of the active self in the intentional consciousness and the world. This apperception by the self is a concrete manifestation of his "soul" (*Seele*) which is accomplished through the absolute consciousness (*absolut Bewusstsein*) localized in his living body which, in turn, is localized in the world.[12]

The process of appearing is the synonym of the figurative imagination (*tasawwur*) where the noematic possibility of the object is formed. The potentiality in this context is related in some way to logic in the sense of the formation of judgment when the enemy's (the wolf's) proposal is formed. Hence the use of the word "concept" by the translators of Averroes to render *tasawwur*. Here is where we note the absence of the hyletic aspect, in the formation of the concept of *tasawwur*. This aspect constitutes, in Husserl, with the noetic aspect, the formation of the intuitive data in the context of the phenomenology of intuition. It is through *tasdiq* that the process of appearing, in a sense, is accomplished and constitutes itself insomuch as intuitive knowledge, according to Avicenna, reaches its peak. We can say that the formation of the intuitive data meets the horizon of the acquisition of science, which shows in a certain way the teleological aim in Avicenna.[13]

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[10] *Hua.,* 39, p. 129.

[11] Ibid., p. 605.

[12] See *Hua.,* XV, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil, 1929–1935*, ed. Iso Kern (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 542–543.

[13] Amélie-Marie Goichon explains the concept of *maqsud*, but she stresses the fact that this word does not represent anything particular in the Avicennian vocabulary, Amélie-Marie Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sinâ*, (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1938), p. 304, Herbert Alan Davidson's article, "Averroes on the material intellect", *Viator* 17 (1986), analyses the aspect of the intellect, specifically the material and potential intellect, pp. 91–137; the question of the relation between *tasawwur* and *tasdiq* can also be found there, ibid., p. 8 ff. and the material intellect is considered according to Averroes' *Epitome* as a disposition and not a substance. One must also emphasize the question of the translation of notions, as, according to the author, Averroes understands *tasawwur* (concepts) as an equivalent of *tasdiq* (propositions), ibid., hence the author questions the statute of language in Averroes' phrasing. This aspect has been analysed

   Therefore, by analogy, Avicenna uses the face-to-face between the sheep and the wolf. This means that the intention manifested in the sighting and apprehension of the wolf by the sheep is not merely the intelligibility formed in the apprehension of the received image, but that it is an instinctive apprehension. Hence the fact that Avicenna in his *Dânishnâmah*, says that the sheep "sees the face of the wolf by the external sense and understands the animosity from the internal sense called estimative imagination (*wahm*) which is equivalent to the intellect for the animals."[14]

   In *al-Shifa* and *al-Najat*, we have, in a slightly different form, first the apprehension of the wolf by the external sense of the sheep referring to the soul, which is equivalent to the faculty of imagination, and secondly the intention (*ma'na*) which includes the internally designed meaning in its noetic scale.[15] Avicenna expresses the same nuance speaking of the fact that man has an understanding of himself, whereas in the animal that understanding passes either by the sensation (*hiss*) or the estimative imagination (*wahm*).[16] This allows us to consider that ultimately Avicenna believes an internal faculty of intellection or intelligibility funded on a noetic basis able to ignore a perceived datum. Speaking of *wahm* and of the internal sense and considering the former as an element belonging to the animal, Avicenna "corrects" the words of Farabi. On the one hand, in the example of the sheep, by the fact of considering that there is a return from the external sense to the internal sense and vice versa and also by distinguishing between *wahm* as the seizing that is proper to the animal and sensation that is the perception of external data. Farabi fails to distinguish between sense and *wahm* nor the process between internal and external senses.[17]

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by Harry Austryn Wolfson who explains that it originates in Averroes' commentary about conception and judgement in Aristotle, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Terms *Tasawwur and Tasdiq* in Arabic Philosophy and Their Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalents", in *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977–1979), pp. 119–123, here pp. 119–120. See also the rhetoric reading of Renate Würsch, *Avicennas Bearbeitungen der aristotelischen rhetorik: ein Beitrag zum Fortleben antiken Bildungsgutes in der Islamischen Welt* (Berlin: Schwarz, 1991) who sees the use of the words *tasawwur* and *tasdiq* in the *persanophone* Avicenna as equivalents respectively of *Begriff* and *Urteil.*, pp. 22–23.

[14] *Dânishnâmah 'Ala'i, Tabi'iyat.*, op. cit., p. 96.

[15] Avicenne, *Al-Shifâ, al-Tabi'iyat, 6, al-Nafs* (Cairo: al-hay'at al-mesriya al-'amma li al-kitab, 1395/1975), p. 35, the characteristic of an abstraction is here in the comprehension (*idrak*) without act (*al-idrâk lâ ma'a al-fi'l*). Avicenna, *Al-Najat: min al-ghargh fi bahr al-zalalat*, ed. Mohammad Taqi Danishpazhuh (Tehran: intisharat-e danishgah-e Tihran, 1374/1985*)*, pp. 327–328: "ce qui est compris du loup d'abord par le sens et ensuite par la faculté interne, là, c'est une imagination, et [en revanche] ce qui est compris par la faculté interne sans sens aucun, là, c'est l'intention" (*fa al-lazi yudraku min al-z'eb awwulan bi al-hiss summa al-quww al-batinah fahuwa al-sura(t), wa al-lazi turakuhu al-quww al-bâtinah dun al-hiss, fahuwa al-ma'ni*).

[16] Avicenna, *Al-Mubâhisât* (Qom: Intishârât Bidâr, 1371/1992), question 519, p. 179. About the notion of *wahm* and its difference with *zann* (opinion, belief), see Fazlur Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 79–80.

[17] See Al-Fârâbi, *Risâla al-Fusus*, ed. Max Horten, "Das Buch der Ringsteine Fârâbis. Mit Auszügen aus dem Kommentare des Emîr Ismâ'il el Hoseini el Fârâni" in *Abū Nasr Muhammad*

A concept which plays a significant part in the context of intuitive data is the *hads* (noematic intuition). The concept of *hads* can be translated as sightedness, which renders the noetic-noematic activity and in which we find again the kernel of the prophetic intellect. Avicenna in *al-Shifa.* puts the *hads* behind the faculty of the mind that is acquiring the definitions and opinions (*zihni*) and behind understanding (*fahm*) and considers it a faculty of understanding looking for half of what it encounters.[18] This concept can be equated with apperception and considered equivalent to the intuition given its character deriving from spatiotemporal data.[19] Avicenna is less explicit in the passage quoted to locate the *hads* among intuitive data, he is more explicit in contrast in the *Dânishnâmah* where the explanation of *hads* meets the prophetic spirit and thus the *hads* find a purely intuitive or innate meaning in the range of moods.[20]

## Intuitive Data and Phantasia According to Avicenna and Husserl in the Context of Perception

The concept of intention which occupies a prominent place in Husserl's phenomenology seems to encompass all intuitive data. However, we note that there may be a gap between intention, intentional consciousness and search for meaning, a gap that can occur at the noetic-hyletic act and the question of the absence of object during the intentional aiming. As we have seen, the notion of intention prevails in the comparative studies between Avicenna, as figure *par excellence* of the medieval non-Christian philosophy, and Husserl's phenomenology. Indeed, the internal senses return as one of the main similarities between the two medieval philosophies (Muslim and Jewish) and the phenomenology of intuition. Not only in his writings

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ibn Muhammad al-Fārābī: texts and studies, II, coll. and reprint. by Fuat Sezgin, Islamic philosophy 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science, 1999), pp. 26–27.

[18] Avicenna, *Al-Shifâ, al-Mantiq, 5 al-Burhân* (Cairo: Nashr wizara al-tarbiya wa al-ta'lim, 1375/1956), vol. 3, p. 259, also, in Avicenna, *Al-mabda' va al-ma'âd*, ed. Abdullah Nûrânî (Tehran: McGill University; Tehran University, 1984), pp. 115–116. For the definition of the notion of *Hads*, see Amélie-Marie Goichon, *Lexique.*, op. cit., p. 65. About the *Hads* as key to the prophetic intellect, see Herbert A. Davidson, "Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect" *Viator* 3 (1972), pp. 109–178, here, pp. 167, 176 ff. About prophecy as intellectual and noetic modality, see Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal "Multiplicité des modes de la prophétie" in *Études sur Avicenne*, ed. Jean Jolivet and Roshdi Rashed (Paris: Les Belles-Lettres, 1984) pp. 125–142.

[19] A recent study highlights this notion in Avicenna's philosophy and its difference with the notion of thought, see Dimitri Gutas "Intuition and Thinking: the Evolving Structure of Avicenna's Epistemology", in *Aspects of Avicenna*, ed. Robert Wisnovsky (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2001), pp. 1–38. In this article, *Hads* is equivalent to intuition.

[20] *Dânishnâmah 'Ala'i, Tabi'iyat.*, op. cit., p. 142 ff. Avicenna is even more determined to define the *hads* as a divine emanation (*fayz ilâhi*) and an intelligible connection without any acquisition, *Al-Mubâhisât.*, op. cit., Q 237, p. 107.

published during his lifetime (*Ideas I*) but also throughout his intellectual career, Husserl has given capital importance to intuitive data to make them into a phenomenology of intuition that goes along with eidetic phenomenology. In this context, intentional transcendental phenomenology is also recognized by its noetic-noematic aspect, especially as it was to couple with the hyletic aspect. In other words, Husserl founded through a deliberate and intuitive phenomenology, a method of descriptive analysis addressing the medieval issues addressed and discussed by philosophers such as Avicenna.[21]

The operation of kinesthesia gives way to an operation of the carnal unity that reverses the medieval method, namely the overthrow of the cosmic body in the real ground and the world of life. The phenomenological "alchemy" consists of a diversity and variety that constitutes as one in its transcendental sphere. This approach has enabled phenomenology to provide some fundamental elements which have been the foundation of a number of modern sciences like cognitive science and neurology. The biology of consciousness is not far from being linked to such a phenomenological view, which means that medieval philosophy as it was practiced by Avicenna, in turn reflects this vision that puts the body forward as a kinesthetic landmark as far as the knowledge of the world by the individual is concerned.[22]

In *Ideen*, Husserl emphasizes that phenomenology "In its purely eidetic attitude "excluding" every sort of transcendence, on its own peculiar basis of pure consciousness (...) necessarily arrives at this entire complex of transcendental problems."[23] It is within this context that "the pure hyletic is subordinated to the

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[21] The phenomenological analysis of perception leads Husserl towards analyzing the issue of *phantasia*, see *Phantasia, conscience d'image, souvenir*, p. 49. These are writings from the years 1904–1905 and according to the editor, they are posterior to *Logical Investigations.*, ibid., p. XXXI. One takes into account that these lessons are Husserl's teaching about "[...] phenomenology and the theory of knowledge in which for the small circle of the more advanced students I begin [to teach] a phenomenological system of intuition [...]", Edmund Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, in collab. Elisabeth Schumann, ed. Karl Schumann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), vol. I, p. 25 (*Der Phänomenologie und theorie der Erkenntnis, in welcher ich für einen kleineren Kreis fortgeschrittener Schüler Anfänge einer systematischen Phänomenologie der Intuition.*). About method, see Bernhard Rang, *Husserls Phänomenologie der materiellen Natur* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1990), p. 223, in which the author points out that the triad *Hyle-noesis-Noema* corresponds to *Empfindung-Auffassung-Auffassungsinn* in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. About the complexity of the noetic and hyletic relation in Husserl's phenomenology, see Michel Henry, *Phénoménologie matérielle* (Paris: PUF, 1990), pp. 24–29; another author underlines this relation in *Ideen*, see Alfons Süssbauer, *Intentionalität, Sachverhalt, Noema: Eine Studie zu Edmund Husserl* (München: Alber, 1995), pp. 102–106.

[22] Husserl, meanwhile, in *Ideen.3* analyses a kinaesthesy from the animated body, French tr. Paris, 1993, p. 140 ff.; *Ideen 2* makes a conclusion about a consciousness constituting objects in its totality, Fr. tr. Paris, 1996, p. 53. The noetic act can be considered as pure abstraction. A certain aspect which distinguishes the noetic act of sense has been approached by Dagfinn Føllesdal, "Noema and Meaning in Husserl", in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 50, supplement (1990), pp. 263–271.

[23] Edmund Husserl, *Collected Works, Volume II, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983), §86, p. 209.

phenomenology of transcendental consciousness."[24] However, Husserl later returns to this difficult question, mentioning, for example, the overlapping between the noetic and the hyletic moment.[25]

While Avicenna, as a physician, discusses the philosophical aspects with a physical approach, as a philosopher Husserl emphasizes the transcendental subjectivity from the living body in all its manifestations and all its features. Returning to the body in the context of transcendental unity appears as a common determinant of the unity of the body and shows that the Middle Ages had an almost immediate consciousness of the unity of the body and that of man as the centric pole of the cosmos.[26] We know of the important role of medicine in the formation of philosophical thought and in this case that of Avicenna. He sees philosophy and the "conceptualization" of data through medicine.

Another element which may appear in this context of comparison between two philosophies is the fact that Husserl establishes a proper phenomenological logic in which reason finds a new ontological foundation. We think here of Logos which refers to both significance and meaning under the trilogy thinking, reflection and speech. Hence we can establish a relationship between intention and data for intentional consciousness seeks to grasp the meaning of data in order to be able to constitute it under the eidetic background. What we can highlight is the responsibility of the prophetic intellect in Avicenna which works deeply and resembles the noetic activity of Logos. However, the question is whether Husserl's phenomenology always looks for the meaning or whether it is an apperception wider than the meaning and the language application. In other words, the constitution of meaning attempts to do without language to reach the transparent world, the conscious and

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[24] Ibid. p. 210.

[25] *Hua., III/1, Beilag 51*, p. 606.

[26] The question of the body and the continuity of bodily sensations has been discussed, see Max Horten who stresses this dimension, *Die philosophischen Systeme*., op. cit., p. 177 ff. For Descartes, the reception of common senses follows the union between the soul and the brain. See Étienne Gilson, *Index scolastico-cartésien* (Paris: Vrin, 1979), p. 263, and postface, p. 366. The self is posed as an entity, an Ego and « le centre spirituel de la personne humaine », in *Avicenna latinus*, *De Anima*, vol., IV–V, (Introd.), pp. 37–38. It must be noted that Ján Bakos translates *Badan* by the word "corps (vivant)" in the sense of the unity of the self which understands in anticipation its kinaesthetic members rather than the intelligible and rational knowledge, Ján Bakos, *Psychologie d'Ibn Sinâ d'après son œuvre As-šifa'* (Prague: Académie tchécoslovaque des sciences, 1956), vol. 2, p. 182 (original text., vol. I., p. 253). About the unity of the self via the kinaestheses and the kinaesthetic sensation, ibid., vol. II, p. 181, (vol. I of the original text., p. 252), Avicenna the philosopher may have had a more detailed knowledge of the body by the means of the medicine available to him through the Greek tradition, in particular Galen (*Jâlinous*) along with others, as Eudemus of Rhodes (*Ozimous*). Manfred Ullmann stresses the importance of Avicenna's *Qânoun*, see Manfred Ullmann, *Die Medizin in Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), p. 172 ff., about Eudemus, see Dimitri Gutas "Eudemus in the Arabic Tradition", in *Eudemus of Rhodes*, ed. Istvan Bodnar, *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 11 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), pp. 1–23. Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino, "Ibn Sinâ and Husserl on Intention and Intentionality", *Philosophy East and West* 54:1 (2004), p. 74 ff. mentions that Avicenna cites « physicians » in a context of criticism of the views of Aristotle's predecessors about sight and perception, *Dânishnâmah 'Ala'i, Tabi'iyat*, op. cit., p. 87.

awake world. If Avicenna achieves a kind of individual mystique to escape from God, we can also consider that Husserl inclines towards a metaphysics of Logos in the process of accomplishing the meaning of the world.[27] Husserl attempts to modernize traditional logic by excluding on the one hand the apophantic rationale which doesn't know of grammatical fluidity and on the other hand the consequential conclusion of this logic.

## The Comparative Approach Through the Critique of Traditional Logic by Husserl

Young Husserl at the turn of the century is very interested in traditional logic which he analyses and to which he applies a thorough and severe critique. By traditional logic, one must understand pure logic as opposed to transcendental logic or formal logic. Upon publication of *Logische Untersuchungen*, Husserl's endeavors go in the direction of a confrontation with traditional logic. For Husserl, the attachment to Kantian philosophy and logic is a historical landmark, and he says that Kant has not seen "fully in all clarity the essence of the aimed discipline."[28] This approach towards traditional logic is a common theme in his late writings.

Traditional logic comprises at first Aristotelian logic soon joined by Stoic logic. The basis of this logic, according to Husserl, is that it was not a true "logic of truth but merely a logic of non-contradiction, a logic of matching".[29] Consequently, the

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[27] Husserl defines logic from *Logos* as synonym of reason (*Vernunft*) in one of his writings, *Hua.*, XVII, *Formale und transzendentale Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*, ed. Paul Janssen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 22 ff. Étienne Gilson, *Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin* (Paris: Vrin, 1981), discusses Avicenna's doctrine about logic (cited from *Avicenna, Logica*, p. III; f; 9 r b., he compares with Duns Scot p. 171: "Il (Avicenne) distingue en effet alors le *genre logique* du genre naturel. Est genre naturel l'essence même de la chose, celle que l'on assigne pour répondre à la question: qu'est-ce que c'est ? c'est le cas de *l'animalité* par exemple. Est genre logique ce qui s'ajoute au genre naturel pour lui conférer l'universalité").

[28] Edmund Husserl, *Recherches logiques: Prolégomènes à la logique pure*; trans. Hubert Elie, Arion L. Kelkel and René Scherer (3rd ed., Paris: PUF, 1994), vol 1., p. 239. Far from traditional logic, Husserl only mentions it to criticize it vehemently: "Personne ne voudra se familiariser avec l'idée de réduire la science à ce qu'elle était du temps de la logique aristotélico-Scolastique. Surtout quand il paraît en outre en résulter que, comme l'enseigne Kant lui-même, la logique a depuis Aristote, le caractère d'une science achevée"). The absence of certain names as Boetius or Porphyry is to be noted in Husserl's criticism of traditional logic. New readings mention the Porphyry's *Isagoge* in Husserl's logic, see George Heffernan, *Isagoge in die Phänomenologische Apophantik: eine Einführung in die phänomenologische Urteilslogik durch die Auslegung des Textes der "Formalen und transzendentalen Logik" von Edmund Husserl* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989). About the continuity of this tradition of logic in western thought, see Porphyre, *Isagoge*, trans. Alain de Libera and Alain-Philippe Segonds; introd. and notes Alain de Libera (Paris: Vrin, 1998), p. CVII.

[29] *Philosophie première, 1923–24. 1, Histoire critique des idées*, trans. Arion L. Kelkel (3rd ed., Paris: PUF, 2002), pp. 25–26, my Eng. trans. On aristotelian logic, see Richard Cobb-Stevens "Being and Categorial Intuition", *The Review of Metaphysics*, 44:1 (1990), pp. 43–66.

characteristic of traditional logic is that it is a complete science which wants an absolute match and an integrity of formation from the statement of the premises until the conclusive consequence. In this context, any contradiction has proved false in logical analysis under the form of syllogism.[30] Husserl's criticism against traditional logic is based on the fact that this logic fails to understand the relationship between the statement of the judgment and the real goal. In other words, the traditional formal logic is contained to an initially intelligible reasoning without realizing the existing correlation between predicative truth and objectivity.[31]

Husserl's criticism of traditional logic may also be applied to Avicenna's logic to the extent that such logic was inspired directly from Aristotelian logic and contains all the elements criticized by Husserl.[32] Logic is an important part of the Avicennian corpus and its ultimate utility is to serve intelligence in order to know the imagination (*tasawwur*) and the veridical perception (*tasdiq*).[33] Logic is also the means by which we shall find out something unknown by something known.[34] Avicenna, in turn, and although he is aware of the correlation, considers logic in its fundus of purely intelligible and rational activity that begins with the statement in the language and the language data.[35]

However, it should be noted that the logical review through the statements happens in the context of the acquisition of meaning and with an intentional objective. In other words, the beginning of the intelligible activity of logic by the statement is a search for the general or universal sense (*al-ma'ni al-kulli*) which reflects the substance of things in external reality.[36] This general sense is a

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[30] *Philosophie première*, p. 32.

[31] Ibid., p. 37. Husserl also discusses traditional logic in the context of apophantic logic which will appear in further analyses.

[32] The Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Organon* has introduced at once a science that has been developed by Arab philosophers. The question of conversion is part of analogy and appears as one of the modalities of syllogism. Aristotle, *Mantiq Arastū*, ed. 'Abd al-Rahmān Badawī, Dirāsāt Islāmiyyať 7 (Beirut: Dār al-qalam, 1980), 3 vols; vol. 1, p. 137 ff. An analysis of Avicenna's logic and its relation, through induction, to Aristotelian logic is found in Jon McGinnis, "Scientific Methodologies in Medieval Islam", *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 41:3 (2003), pp. 307–327.

[33] *al-Shifâ, al-Mantiq, 1, al-Madkhal* (Cairo: Nashr wizara al-tarbiya wa al-ta'lim, 1371/1952), pp. 17–18.

[34] *Danishnâmah, Risâlehy-e Mantiq*, ed. Muhammad Mu'in and Muhammad Mishkât (Hamadan: Anjuman-i âsâr-i farhangi va mafâkhir-i farhangi; Dânishgâh Bou 'Ali Sinâ, 1383/1994), p. 9; Fr. trans.: *Le Livre de science*; trans. Mohammad Achena and Henri Massé (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1955), p. 24. In spite of the considerable efforts of learned translators, a new reading of this translation is necessary, particularly as far as some notions, like intention, are concerned. This text and its translation are criticized in Jules Janssens, "Le Dânesh-Nâmeh d'Ibn Sînâ: un texte à revoir ?" *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*, 28 (1986), pp. 163–177.

[35] *al-Shifâ*, op.cit., p. 23 ff.

[36] Ibid., p. 34. Avicenna in his advice at the end of his logical treatise *Danishnâmah*, underlines the fact that one must believe in sense (*Ma'ni*) and not name, *Danishnamah 'Alâ'i: Mantiq*, op. cit., p. 160, tr. fr. ibid., p. 86.

translation formed on the Platonic idea that morphs as the modality of understanding things in logic. The general meaning of which Avicenna speaks is the state of judgment of pure intellect (*zihn-e al-mutlaq*).[37] The correlative link which is determined by the pure intellect and the modality of internal perception of real things, is a unilateral link always aiming at the external object by an intelligible statement. Consequently, we can say that the general sense is an idea, which loses its Platonic origin due to the change of mode of perception. In other words, the general sense is not conceived by Avicenna as an absolute but as an intention, that is to say, the act of aiming or the mode of inner perception. This aspect is beyond the analysis of Husserl who only sees in traditional logic efforts of the intelligible action locked in its reasoning. Husserl can not admit either that traditional logic and medieval philosophy, and in this case that of Avicenna, manages to change the direction of the Idea into a new modality that attempts to determine the relationship between thinking subject and being thought of.

Husserl's criticism against traditional logic is echoed in his lectures of 1908–1909 which contain a detailed analysis in particular from the theory of consequence.[38] Husserl focuses on the question of consequence but we can see that his analysis does not embrace all the theoretical and analytical courses of traditional logic and its various arguments. Thus, considering the scope of Avicenna's logic, and in particular the importance of the issue of consequence in his corpus, we can see that Husserl did not take into account all the aspects of this logic. Husserl's attack is somehow directed towards the basis of logic, the functional purpose of the syllogistic approach to achieve the "truth".

One of the conclusions Husserl draws from his analysis of traditional logic is that the consequence is true only if the premises are too, as is the case for judgment which laws are true.[39] This consequence, according to Husserl, cannot be defined in the sphere of logical consequence (*Sphäre der rein logischen Schlüsse*) as a

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[37] *al-Shifâ.*, op. cit., p. 36.

[38] Edmund Husserl, *Alte und neue Logik: Vorlesung 1908–1909*, ed. Elisabeth Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), Vol. 6, p. 253 ff. It is a set of writings by Husserl about logic and the theory of judgement, being part of the F group of manuscripts, see *Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie: Vorlesungen 1917/18 mit ergänzenden Texten aus der ersten Fassung von 1910/11*, ed. Ursula Panzer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), Vol. 30, pp. 236–249. A certain trend wants modern logic to inscribe itself in a continuity from Frege to Russell and Wittgenstein. To mention only one typical example, see Rudolf Carnap, *Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie und andere metaphysikkritische Schriften*, ed. Thomas Mormann, Philosophische Bibliothek 560 (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 2004), p. 63 ff., here, pp. 65–66. This tradition is very narrowly linked to mathematics whereas modern logic in Husserl's view has a phenomenological basis destined by *Mathesis universalis*, see Edmund Husserl, *Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie et une philosophie phénoménologique pures. 3, la phénoménologie et les fondements des sciences; Postface à mes idées directrices pour une phénoménologie pure*; trans. Dorian Tiffeneau and Arion L. Kelkel (Paris: PUF, 1993), p. 69. *Mathesis universalis* reaches a formal ontology in the view of some authors, see Jean-François Courtine "L'objet de la logique" in *Husserl*, dir. Jocelyn Benoist (Paris: Éd. du Cerf, 2008), p. 83.

[39] *Alte und neue Logik.*, op. cit., p. 262 (... *der Schluss ist nur wahr, wenn die Prämissen eben wahr, wie sie urteilmässig als Wahrheiten gesetzt sind*).

categorical consequence (*kategorialen Schlüsse*). To explain this idea, Husserl gives the example of mathematical quantity (*Menge*), speaking of the number (*Anzahl*) or the ordinal number (*Ordinalzahl*), etc. in the context of relational consequence (*Relationsschlüsse*).[40] For example a is in b, b is in c, resulting in a is c and so on. Relational terms are here as the essence (*Wesen*) of the categorial concept of quantity and as a consequence the very number funds itself as categorial.[41] According to Husserl, such consequence takes another character (*Charakter*) as is the case in traditional logic, for example in this statement, on an apophantic background that "if every A is a B, then there is no A which is not B, [and] if some A is B, then we do not need that each A be a B" and so on.[42]

Avicenna, meanwhile, confirms that the relationship is essential to the premise in order for it to be a premise. However, the definition (*al-hadd*) of the deleted relationship is in the deletion of the premise and not in the removal of the relationship itself. In other words, the relationship does not have to be invalidated as long as the premise itself is not deleted. As for the condition, it is the letters and their properties as well as the prepositions on which the relationship depends which are eliminated while the premise and consequence remain.[43]

This presentation leads Husserl to emphasize the apophantic character of the consequence (*apophantischen Schluss*) to characterize the variants by a "nominal representation" (*nominale Vorstellung*).[44]

Another criticism of traditional logic by Husserl focuses on the difference between direct (*unmittelbaren*) and indirect (*mittelbaren*) consequence in modern logic.[45] The example of direct consequence is in a certain judgment that we make while saying that "the ABC triangle is an equilateral triangle and each equilateral triangle is an equiangular triangle and so this triangle is an equiangular triangle". As

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[40] The link between logic and mathematics has been studied by various authors, e.g. Barry Smith, David Murray, "Logic, Form and Matter" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 55, (1981), pp. 47–63, 65–74; see also Richard Tieszen, "Phenomenology and Mathematical Knowledge" *Synthese*, 75:3 (1988), pp. 373–403.

[41] *Alte und neue Logik.*, op. cit., p. 263, (*Die hier auftretenden Relations termini sind als im Wesen der kategorialen Begriffe Menge, Anzahl gründende selbst kategorial*).

[42] *Alte und neue Logik.*, op. cit., p. 263. See Richard Cobb-Stevens, "Being and Categorial Intuition", op. cit., p. 63.

[43] Avicenna, *al-Shifâ 2, al-Mantiq 4, al-Qiâs,* (Cairo: Nashr wizara al-tarbiya wa al-ta'lim, 1383/ 1964), p. 54 (*wa amma a-râbita fa zâtiya li al-muqaddma hattâ yakoun muqaddama, va lâkinnahâ tabtal 'ind al-inhilâl, va lâ yakoun mâ tanhal 'ilay al-muqaddam mâ yabtal 'inda al-inhilâl, falâ yakoun haddan li almanhal, fa inna al-hadd huwa mâ tanhal 'ilaih al-muqaddam. wa fi al-shartiyât, izâ asqatat hurouf al-shart wa al-ajzâ' wa hurouf al-'inâd allati bihâ al-irtibât, baqiy al-muqaddam wa al-tâli*).

[44] *Alte und neue Logik*, op. cit., pp. 263–264. For the analysis of some grammatical terms see Käte Hamburger, "Zur Theorie der Aussage", *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 20:1 (1966), pp. 23–56, here pp. 24–30. Other remarks have been made about the grammatical logic and its articulation in Husserl, see a review by Ignacio Anglelli, "The Logic of the Articles in Traditional Philosophy" *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 16:2 (1978), pp. 250–252, here p. 251.

[45] *Alte und neue Logik*, op. cit., p. 267.

for the indirect consequence, we want such a judgment as "property of equilaterality comes from the ABC triangle. There, each equilateral triangle is an equiangular triangle, so this triangle is also equiangular". The consequence in each of these two cases is quite similar. But according to Husserl we have a premise which is replaced by an equivalent relational premise and this changing of premise is cause that now the consequential proposal does not remain in the direct premise.[46] The syllogistic argument exposed through the triangle is also found in Avicenna who takes it from the Book of Euclid. Avicenna considers this argument in his analysis about "compound syllogisms". What is at stake in this syllogism is that the resulting conclusion from two premises becomes itself, in turn, a premise for another syllogism.[47]

This argument allows Husserl to get rid of direct consequence to the extent that the perfect and irreducible proof (*Beweis*) must be a perfect and irreducible judgment in the example he proposes "since A is, A' is, since A' and B are, B' is, and from this we can draw that "since A and B are, B' is." This also applies to the further proof "since B' and C [are], C is" and we can extract from that that "since A and B and C are, C' is", and so on.[48] The search for a consequence that is articulated in modern logic and flows in the sense of things leads Husserl to describe such a consequence as the eliminatory consequence because in a true proposition, the direct consequence is no longer used to associate the links of the terms with each other.[49]

Based on this argument, Husserl returns to evaluate traditional logic, saying that "traditional logic only separates here as a rule consequences from a premise as a bare "conclusion" and consequences from several premises".[50] We can say that Husserl seeks a new rationale in logic through a critique of the foundations of traditional logic. This rationale does not keep at all costs the consequence and to implement inadequate premises but to see the object of the logic and the judgment as the foundations of a transcendental logical reasoning.

Husserl's criticism against traditional logic postulates that this logic is at once a completed science. Husserl's attempt to establish a new rigorous science collides with this traditional logic as a science, that is to say that it would not have contributed to modern philosophy. However, on closer inspection, traditional logic does not totally lack any philosophical consideration. It seems that traditional logic succeeds in taking into account the intelligible possibilities outside completed logic, those possibilities that are part of an individual approach. Avicenna, at the

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[46] Ibid., p. 267 (*Aber die eine Prämisse haben wir durch eine äquivalente Relationsprämisse ersetzt, und diese Prämissenänderung macht es, dass nun der Schlusssatz nicht unmittelbar in den Prämissen liegt*).

[47] *Dânishnâmah, Mantiq.*, op. cit., p. 83 ff., Fr. tr., *op. cit.*, p. 57 ff.

[48] *Alte und neue Logik.*, op. cit., p. 269.

[49] *Alte und neue Logik.*, op. cit., p. 272, (*Das "Neue" das sie lehren, besteht in einem wahren Satz, der unmittelbar noch nicht verknüpfte Termini zur Verknüpfung bringt*).

[50] *Alte und neue Logik.*, op. cit., p. 272 (*Die traditionelle Logik scheidet hier in der Regel nur Schlüsse aus einer Prämisse als blosse "Folgerung" und Schlüsse aus mehreren Prämissen*).

end of the Treaty of logic of the *Danishnâmah*, proposes a kind of "Ten command-ments" in the form of ten advice (*vasiyat*). This is a treatment always logical but still qualified by individual efforts. This advice shows that Avicenna does not remain within the limits of the logical laws, but that he is aware of what's at stake in human activity. This advice, called "Advice that will give security against sophism", also has a logical foundation but in a philosophical twist, that is to say, which involves the individual in its rational efforts.[51]

## Conclusion

Both the issues about intuitive data and the methodical and philosophical perspec-tive towards an objective knowledge tend to show that more extensive research can be undertaken to investigate the continuity and the comparative links between medieval philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology. This was actually attempted but has not led to tangible results. The formation of a number of cognitive researches in relation to medieval philosophy shows this same continuity in another context. A major problem with two dimensions is at work when considering the relationship between medieval thinking and modern philosophical thinking. On the one hand, there is the philological challenge that different authors have tried to take into account, without achieving satisfactory results. Wolfson has identified the different translations of the concepts of *tasawwur* and *tasdiq* in different languages and over time; we, in turn, would like to suggest to translate *tasawwur* by hyletic or hyle-morphic imagination (or figurative imagination) and *tasdiq* by noetic percep-tion or noematic apprehension. Indeed, what allowed a number of translators to render *tasawwur* by conception was the idea of materialization of form and image in the brain (the alchemy of the intellect) but the notion of hyle is lacking in this translation. Similarly, translating *tasdiq* by doxical judgment or perception lacks the idea of noetic activity and the very intellection of the brain. That is why phenomenological insights can start a new attempt to reformulate the translations of *tasawwur* and *tasdiq* since it is the perceptual and cognitive unit of understanding and intentional consciousness.[52]

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[51] *Danishnamah.*, *Mantiq.*, op. cit., pp. 156–165, Fr. tr., op. cit., pp. 85–88.

[52] A certain philosophical school is still under the influence of this current which sees perception as comprehension or intelligible apprehension (*idrak*). According to this current, perception refers to *aesthesia* which must match noetic perception (*tasdiq*) and in that context we are always surrounded by perception as intuitive data where noesis comes to us in a direct way. Perception in the sense of *idrak* corresponds to *Wahrnehmung* which covers at once all of the corporal sensations. Obviously, perception is opposed to *phantasia* and in general to imagination which, in turn, represents a different intelligible and noético-morphique dimension and, both by formation and function, of perception. There is also the idea that phantasm becomes like the flesh of consciousness, which means that there exists a carnal dimension in *phantasia* in the process of acts. See Arno Anzenbacher, *Die Intentionalität bei Thomas von Aquin und Edmund Husserl* (Vienna: Oldenburg, 1972), p. 115.

On the other hand, due to the hidden conflict between the Middle Ages and the modern era, we are always confronted by indecision in the philosophical discourse regarding the patent relation between those two types of thinking in two different eras.