Francis Baert
Tiziana Scaramagli
Fredrik Söderbaum   *Editors*

Intersecting Interregionalism

Regions, Global Governance and the EU

Springer

Intersecting Interregionalism

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Preface

This book has its early origins in the collaborative work initiated through two European Union-funded research projects from which we benefited greatly in producing this volume.

Firstly, through work conducted in the context of the Network of Excellence on *Global Governance, Regionalisation and Regulation: The Role of the EU* (GARNET), coordinated by the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR) at the University of Warwick and funded under the European Commission's 6th Framework Programme (FP6). One of GARNET's themes was Regionalism and Interregionalism, and a variety of workshops and seminars, that subsequently spurred the discussions leading up to this book, were organised on this topic.

Secondly, some of the results on interregionalism that came out of GARNET were further developed and tested in the field of peace and security studies in the project *Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-Regional Actor in Security and Peace* (EU–GRASP), funded under the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme (FP7) and coordinated by the United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU–CRIS).

The underlying idea behind this book is that the phenomenon of interregionalism is sometimes misunderstood and that the research agenda on interregionalism is heading in the wrong direction. As an attempt to improve the situation, we decided to structure the book around 'theory' and 'regional agency'. For the first part of the book we searched for leading theorists who could provide distinct theoretical perspectives on comparative and intersecting interregionalisms. For the second part of the book we invited experts who could provide thought-provoking studies on the role played by EU member states, the Council of the EU, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice in interregional relations around the world.

These contributions were first discussed at a workshop organised by UNU–CRIS and partly sponsored by GARNET. The institutional support from UNU–CRIS and the participants of that workshop are gratefully acknowledged. Although some of the participants are not contributors to this volume, they nevertheless provided

invaluable inputs by stimulating the discussions during the workshop. Several authors have subsequently met with the editors at other workshops and conferences to further discuss the topic and their contribution.

The institutional and financial support from the GARNET Network of Excellence, the EU–GRASP project and UNU–CRIS has been crucial for the success of this project. Our special thanks go to the UNU–CRIS Director, Luk Van Langenhove, who has been a strong and generous supporter of the project from the beginning. We received valuable inputs and suggestions for improvement on several chapters of the book from Sarah Delputte and Fabienne Bossuyt. We would also like to express our appreciation to Alexandra Kent, Nieves Claxton and Leila Brahimi for language editing. And last, but by no means least, we would like to express our gratitude to the editorial team at Springer for its support, professionalism and patience.

Bruges, Paris and Gothenburg   Francis Baert
December 2013   Tiziana Scaramagli
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Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ALADI	Latin American Integration Association
ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
APEC	Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEF	Asia–Europe Foundation
ASEM	Asia–Europe Meeting
ASEP	Asia–Europe Parliamentary Partnership
ASPF	Asia–Europe People's Forum
AU	African Union
BBVA	Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Bank
BSCH	Santander Central Hispano Bank
CACM	Central American Common Market
CAN	Andean Community
CAP	Common Agriculture Policy
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CCoJ	Community Court of Justice
CFI	Court of First Instance of the European Union
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJ	Court of Justice of the European Union
CMI	Chiang Mai Initiative
COPA–COGECA	European Farmers and European Agri-Cooperatives
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Language Countries
CSME	Caribbean Single Market Economy
DG	Directorate-General
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan

EAC	East African Community
EC	European Community
ECIP	European Community Investment Partners
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European Parliament
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUROLAT	Euro–Latin American Parliamentary Assembly
FEALAC	Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation
FIDE	Fédération Internationale de Droit Européen
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
G7	Group of 7
G20	Group of 20
G77	Group of 77
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IOR–ARC	Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
JPC	MERCOSUR Joint Parliamentary Committee
LA	Latin America
LAC	Latin America and Caribbean
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MP	Member of the Parliament
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCT	Overseas Countries and Territories
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PARLASUR	MERCOSUR Parliament
PARLATINO	Latin American Parliament
QMV	Qualified majority vote

SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SARC	South African Retail Council
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SELA	Latin American Economic System
TCL	Trinidad Cement Limited
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa
US	United States of America
WID	Women in Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Chapter 1
Introduction: Intersecting Interregionalism

Francis Baert, Tiziana Scaramagli, and Fredrik Söderbaum

1.1 Problem and Purpose

In spite of a proliferation of research and interest in interregionalism since the early 1990s, a growing number of observers have begun to claim that interregionalism peaked in the 1990s and early 2000s, but is now fading away or being replaced by other forms of activity, especially bilateralism (Gratius 2011; Grevi 2010; Renard 2011). This idea of a turn from interregionalism to bilateralism is believed to be inspired, *inter alia*, by the geopolitical shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world (Conley 2011).

The transition of the international system from a short-lived unipolar American hegemony to a world of relative power fundamentally challenges the established political and economic primacy of the United States (US) as well as of the European Union (EU). In a polycentric world, authority is not given, legitimacy is contested and different narratives compete with each other. The new global environment resembles a fluid marketplace of influences and ideas, rather than a static order

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where roles, values and responsibilities are fixed. The emergence of a more diverse international system marks the end, or dilution, of 'exceptionalism' and questions notions about US and/or EU global leadership and power. The new global situation spurs a new debate on national priorities and on the means to achieve them. As their respective positions and interests are challenged, the relationship between the US and the EU is undergoing significant changes.

Within this changing environment, Europe has to find its position. The contours of a 'post-American' world are far from clear. The formidable growth of the economies of developing countries has already secured them a seat on the new council of global economic governance, the Group of 20 (G20). But the impact of shifting power relationships on other dimensions of international relations is more difficult to predict. The 'rise of the rest' matters a great deal (Conley 2011).

Without a doubt, this new geopolitical environment has resulted in changes that are associated with bilateralism. In the economic field, we see the prominence of new muscular actors such as China, India or Brazil penetrating regions like the Middle East, Africa or Latin America, which are traditionally seen as Western 'profit markets' (Cheru and Obi 2010; Ellis 2009; Kemp 2010; Taylor 2009; World Bank and IPEA 2011). This is followed by bilateral trade agreements returning to favour—the so-called 'new bilateralism' (Ravenhill 2003; Heydon and Woolcock 2009). As a response to this, the EU supports setting up relations with these new economies, resulting in the so-called Strategic Partnerships with 'the special ten': Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the United States (Gratius 2011). However, it would be misleading to conclude that interregionalism is giving way to bilateralism. As Elsig (2007) has convincingly argued, EU policies are a combination of multilateral, interregional and bilateral approaches.

The claim of this book is that the study of interregionalism is conceptually and theoretically underdeveloped and therefore goes a long way in explaining the misinterpretation that interregionalism is of decreasing significance in world politics. Although some issues certainly involve less interregional cooperation than others, the book draws attention to the diversity of contemporary interregionalism as well as the fact that interregional relations are often 'nested' with other forms and levels of cooperation, that is to say, bilateralism, regionalism and multilateralism.

For instance, Camroux claims that the 'imagined alchemy denoted as interregionalism [is not] an appropriate and useful analytical category' and that scholarly attention needs to be devoted to the different forms of regional cooperation and integration (rather than to interregionalism in itself) (Camroux 2010: 57). We reject notions of 'either-or' and competition between interregionalism, on the one hand, and regionalism or bilateralism, on the other hand. We claim instead that regionalism and interregionalism are 'joined at the hip' (Doidge 2007, 2011).

As already touched upon, there is a similar tendency in the field to put in contrast bilateralism and interregionalism, ignoring that they can exist side by side and even be mutually dependent. Hence, bilateralism is not necessarily autonomous from or competing with interregionalism, and the two often need to be understood within the same broader framework. The strategic partnerships with the 'special ten' is a

clear feature of EU foreign policy of the last decade, but most of these counterpart powers play a crucial role within their own regions. These types of relationships (between a region and a country) have been referred to as quasi-interregionalism or hybrid interregionalism (Hänggi 2006; see more below). Furthermore, new interregional initiatives are emerging. To name a few, the EU started the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the six regions of Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP), revitalised the relationship with its neighbourhood through the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean and a renewed neighbourhood strategy, and started projects covering the African Union, Central Asia, the Arctic, Pacific, Sahel and Horn of Africa. Some of these interregional projects also received the label of 'strategic'. These examples underline that we are faced with a challenge to understand the interregional phenomenon and its relation with processes and modes of governance at other levels and scales.

The general ambition of this book is to contribute to a more nuanced understanding, theoretically and empirically, of interregionalism in world politics. The book shows that interregionalism is not as one-dimensional and simple as it is currently being described. Instead, it is increasing in diversity and intimately tied to processes and modes of governance within and beyond regions.

The book is structured in two parts which are closely linked to the two main objectives of the book. The first objective is to contribute to theoretical development and to a more productive debate between different theoretical approaches to the study of interregionalism. There is surprisingly little theoretical and conceptual debate in this burgeoning field, which we claim is one major reason for the failure to fully grasp the diversity of today's interregionalism and how regionalism and interregionalism are related. In the most authoritative study of interregionalism so far, *Interregionalism and International Relations*, Heiner Hänggi, Ralf Roloff and Jürgen Rüland acknowledge that 'a convincing theory of interregionalism is still outstanding' (Hänggi et al. 2006: 10). Most research in the field is carried out on the basis of single examples or with a limited set of (comparative) cases. Too often, rather than presenting conceptual and theoretical insights, the purpose of this research is descriptive or aims at providing historical and empirical evidence. When theory is at the forefront, scholars are primarily interested in verifying a particular perspective, without really engaging alternative theoretical approaches or competing research results. This book constitutes the first attempt in the field to bring together leading theories and theorists of interregionalism.

The emphasis on theory by no means implies a neglect of the empirical world. On the contrary, theory is a very practical tool and it enables us to make sense of the world. It is hardly possible to think systematically and scientifically about interregionalism without theory. This book helps to clarify differences and similarities between some important theories and approaches in the field, in order to facilitate increased theoretical and conceptual reflection which we believe is necessary for the further development of this field of study.

The second part of the book, centred on regional agency, connects the theoretical discussion of the first part with a manageable empirical object. The empirical focus is placed on institutional actors and strategies in interregional processes involving

the EU, especially the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament (EP), the Court of Justice and the EU member states. This focus on the EU may invite some criticism. However, it is a deliberate choice because the EU is the region with the deepest engagement in interregional relations around the world and it has the most diverse involvement of regional actors and institutional strategies. The EU is therefore considered the best and 'most likely' case for the study of regional actors in interregionalism. Furthermore, the book is explicitly comparative and our methodological stance is that the EU should be included rather than excluded in such an endeavour.

It is only quite recently that the complexity of EU's institutional structure has come to the fore in the literature on the EU's global role and in interregionalism. The foreign policy machinery of the EU is emerging historically, rather than being designed consciously, and there are several EU institutions with different mandates and views on interregionalism. The EU is thus by no means a monolithic actor/unit, and it consists of many different actors and institutions—e.g. the Council, the Commission, the EP, the Court of Justice and the individual EU member states— that, although inter-connected, all have powers to engage in various types of interregional activities. In addition, a large number of special agencies and policy instruments are at play in various issue areas. The result is a patchwork of intersecting interregionalisms, which are interlinked with multilateralism, bilateralism and regionalism. This is what Alan Hardacre and Michael Smith refer to as 'complex interregionalism' (Hardacre and Smith 2009; Chap. 6 in this volume).

1.2   Conceptualising Interregionalism

Interregionalism is a multidimensional phenomenon and, to some extent, even a moving target. The pluralism and the fact that it is still an emerging field of study help to explain that there is a considerable disagreement about conceptualisation. In a generic sense, interregionalism can be defined as a situation or a process whereby two (or more) specified regions interact as regions, in other words, region-to-region interaction. Similarly to many other studies in the field, it is also specified as *institutionalised* interregional relations (Hänggi et al. 2006: 3). This is a very broad definition of the general phenomenon and cannot be used for operational purposes.

A very large number of more specific concepts and distinctions have been made (Hänggi et al. 2006). One distinction is temporal, and differentiates, for instance, between the actor-centred 'old interregionalism' of the early years and the system-centred 'new interregionalism' of the post-bipolar period (see Chap. 3 in this volume; Hänggi 2006). In this regard, some have referred to the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), which is sometimes considered as a prototype for new interregionalism (Steiner 2000). Furthermore, Martin Holland makes a distinction in EU–ACP relations between the classical Lomé period (1975–2000) and the contemporary Cotonou period (2000–2020) (Holland 2006: 254–255). The temporal distinction is useful as a way to distinguish 'old' and 'new' features, but most scholars

agree that there are many continuities as well, which make the distinction less useful as an operational construct.

'Pure interregionalism' is the classical and most often referred to form of interregionalism. It develops between two clearly identifiable regional organisations within an institutional framework. Pure interregionalism, however, only captures a certain part of contemporary institutionalised interregional relations. Pure interregionalism does not feature strongly in non-Triad regions and South–South relations (Hänggi 2006: 54). The limitation of pure interregionalism derives from the fact that many regions are dispersed and porous, without clearly identifiable borders, and reveal only a low level of regional agency. There is, therefore, a need for a broader conceptual toolbox for understanding the emergence and the many varieties of interregionalism. The tendency to exaggerate pure interregionalism appears to be related to the same bias as in the literature on regionalism, which is heavily geared towards the study of regional organisations as 'visible' formal interstate frameworks (Söderbaum and Shaw 2003). Interregionalism needs to be nuanced.

In the most thorough exercise of conceptualisation and typologisation existing in the field, Hänggi shows that it is necessary to distinguish regional groups from regional organisations. In addition to pure interregional relations between two regional organisations, there are two other types of interregional relations: between one regional organisation (often the EU) and a regional group,[1] or between two regional groups. All these three types may be referred to as 'bilateral interregionalism' (or bi-regionalism), but it allows for an increasing diversity of interregional relations. This is closely connected to the concept of transregionalism and, to a lesser extent, to hybrid or quasi-interregionalism.

'Transregionalism' has been employed as a concept in order to go beyond the narrow interaction between two institutionalised regions within a formal and mainly intergovernmental framework (Aggarwal and Fogerty 2004: 5ff). Transregionalism refers to interregional relations in which two or more regions are dispersed, have weak actorship, and neither region negotiates as a regional organisation. There can be several aspects of transregionalism. According to Rüland, it can be defined as a 'dialogue process with a more diffuse membership which does not necessarily coincide with regional organisations, and which may include member states from more than two regions' (Rüland 2006: 296). Usually member states would also act in their individual capacity. There is considerable disagreement in the field on how to conceptualise ASEM, but according to Rüland, it would fit this category since its membership cannot be referred to as two distinct regions in accordance with the above-mentioned bilateral interregionalism. Transregionalism has also been used in order to cover so-called transnational (non-state) relations—including

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[1] Aggarwal and Fogerty (2004: 5) define 'hybrid interregionalism' as a framework where one organised region negotiates with a group of countries from another unorganised or dispersed region. For instance, in the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership, the Mediterranean countries negotiate individually with the EU. The same authors take the Lomé Agreement as a similar example of hybrid interregionalism, where the EU has trade relations with a set of countries that are not grouped within their own customs union or free trade agreement.

transnational networks of corporate production or of non-governmental organisations (NGOs)—again for the purpose of moving beyond conventional state-centrism: 'any connection across regions—including transnational networks of corporate production or of NGOs—that involves cooperation among any type of actors across two or more regions can in theory also be referred to as a type of transregionalism' (Aggarwal and Fogerty 2004: 5). Betts clarifies that transregionalism 'is not reducible to [pure] interregionalism insofar as it need not necessarily involve an inclusive dialogue between representatives of different regions' (Betts 2010: 29). Hence, transregionalism draws attention to a more flexible understanding and conceptualisation of region/regional organisation. It may also be more suited to account for the links between different levels of cooperation, such as transregional cooperation and bilateralism or multilateralism (Betts 2010).

'Quasi-interregionalism' has entered the debate in order to transcend bilateral interregionalism and transregionalism. Quasi-interregionalism is used to describe relations between a regional organisation/regional group and a third country in another region. Formally, this can be thought of as a 'region-to-state' relation, and some scholars do not accept quasi-interregionalism as a case of interregionalism. As Rüland points out, to some extent, quasi-interregionalism has been used as a residual category and has also covered a wide variety of relationships, such as the continental Europe–Africa process, 'imagined interregionalism' and 'interregionalism without regions', such as the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) cooperation (Rüland 2006). Nevertheless, the 'borderline status' is already emphasised in the terminology (Hänggi 2006; Rüland 2006), and the important points being relevance and utility.

Even if we need to avoid conceptual overstretch, we agree with Hänggi (2006: 41ff) about the utility of quasi-interregionalism for three main reasons. First, these relationships may play an essential component part of the relations between two regions (Hänggi 2006). Secondly, quasi-interregionalism is a particular type of 'interregionalism' (in the widest sense) in those cases where the single (third party) state is included because it is the leader of a particular region. This is often the case when, for instance, the EU designs its strategic partnerships with the important countries, such as Brazil in South America, South Africa in Southern Africa, India in South Asia, and China in East Asia. Needless to say, such region-to-state relations are not unequivocal and under certain conditions they may prevent interregionalism from being developed (but this simply underlines its hybridity). However, the two may also exist side by side or even be mutually reinforcing. Thirdly, with regard to the 'region' in a quasi or hybrid relationship, it usually involves one coherent region (regional organisation or regional group). Conventionally, bilateralism is used to denote activities between two nation-states, but the quasi category needs to be distinguished from classical or Westphalian bilateralism. We are simply dealing with a new phenomenon in world politics.

Finally, 'megaregions' constitute very large regions or megaregions linking two or more component regions. Similarly to quasi-interregionalism, it is a 'borderline case', and only a case of interregionalism in the widest possible sense. What is

important is the relevance of the concept, and we agree with Hänggi that 'institutions such as the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) play an interregional role regardless of their conceptions' (Hänggi 2006: 42).

1.3 Structure of the Book

This volume is organised in two main parts. The first four chapters provide distinct theoretical studies of interregionalism, from the perspective of International Relations, EU studies, comparative regionalism and security studies. The next four chapters of the book analyse the diversity of actors and institutions from within the EU that are engaged in the creation of contemporary interregionalism, with a focus on the Council, the Commission, the EU member states, the EP and the Court of Justice.

In the next chapter, *Interregionalism and International Relations: Reanimating an Obsolescent Research Agenda?*, Jürgen Rüland claims that, although studies on interregionalism currently struggle with a deadlock, there is still space for innovation. To some extent, Rüland echoes the idea of a decline in interregionalism studies, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, but he is not pessimistic about its future. Rüland's argument is developed in three steps: first, he summarises major findings of studies on interregional relations as conceptualised in international relations theory. This is followed by a discussion of Alfredo C. Jr. Robles' (2008) and David Camroux's (2010) sweeping critiques of the state-of-the-art of interregionalism studies with the objective of showing that much of this critique is weakly founded and that it is possible to take previous studies on interregionalism as a point of departure for more innovative work. From there, Rüland proceeds in a third step towards sketching an agenda for future and innovative research built around institutional balancing and hedging, network analysis and interregional relations as norm transmitters. Rüland concludes by emphasising three issues that future research needs to address: (i) interregionalism research is still a highly Eurocentric research agenda, aggravating the Western-centric tendencies in theorising on international relations; (ii) comparative studies on interregionalism are almost entirely absent; and (iii) if interregionalism is to become more than en epiphenomenon of international relations and regionalism, scholars should also act as policy advisors.

In the third chapter, *Interregionalism and the European Union: Conceptualising Group-to-Group Relations*, Mathew Doidge addresses the conceptualisation of interregionalism within studies of the EU. He explores the actor-centric and incidental focus of the period of 'old interregionalism', and the transformation in the nature of theorising that accompanied the transition to the 'new interregionalism' of the post-bipolar period, an approach rooted more broadly in International Relations theory and which is more system-centred. The chapter moves on to consider the emergent actorness-interregionalism framework and the patterns of engagement apparent in Triadic Europe–Asia relations, before questioning whether this model

can be applied beyond the Triadic architecture. In so doing, it addresses the need for a comparative approach in studies of interregionalism. According to Doidge, one failing of the literature on interregionalism is the absence of (theory-based) comparison. Interregional structures have first and foremost been conceived within a Triadic setting in the form of Europe-Asia relations. Given the comprehensiveness of the Europe-Asia relationships, this narrow focus is not altogether surprising, according to Doidge, but it raises the question as to whether the actorness-interregionalism framework apply beyond the EU or beyond Triadic interregionalism. Doidge asks whether the small-*n* problem that has plagued regional integration theory also becomes a difficulty for the study and conceptualisation of interregionalism? Doidge also asks when we consider interregionalism, is the EU a *sui generis* case? Does it represent an *n* of 1?

Björn Hettne picks up on this question of a lack of comparison in interregionalism studies in the fourth chapter of this volume, entitled *Regional Actorship: A Comparative Approach to Interregionalism.* Drawing on the 'new regionalism approach' (Hettne 1993, 2003, 2005; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000), the chapter raises the question of how regions become actors, and how regions interact to shape interregional structures. It deals, firstly, with the concept of regional actorship. The concept is built around three interacting components: (i) internal cohesion and identity formation, or *regionness*; (ii) international *presence* in terms of territorial and population size, economic strength, diplomacy, military power, etc.; and (iii) the capacity to act purposively in an organised fashion in order to shape outcomes in the external world, or *actorness*. In the subsequent two sections, the framework is employed for a comparison between the historical emergence of the European region and current regionalism and interregionalism in East Asia and Latin America.

The fifth chapter, *Interregionalism: A Security Studies Perspective*, by Ruth Hanau Santini, Sonia Lucarelli and Marco Pinfari, illustrates in which form regions and interregional dynamics have been considered in the security studies literature and proposes a possible way to integrate a greater attention to interregional dynamics. This is one of the first systematic attempts to combine the insights from security studies with the literature on interregionalism. The authors first deal with traditional security studies, and then they illustrate four approaches adopted by regions to structure their interregional relationships: the main approaches dealing with a regional dimension of security—security communities (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998), regional security complex theory (Buzan and Wæver 2003), and regional orders (Lake and Morgan 1997)—all have the potential to contribute to the analysis of security dynamics *between* regions. The same applies to a more recent approach, that of multilateral security governance (Kirchner and Sperling 2007; Krahmann 2005; Christou et al. 2010). The authors argue that all these approaches are relevant to understand interregional security dynamics and that they are not mutually exclusive. As a matter of fact, this chapter argues in favour of more cross-fertilisation in the attempt to develop a possible research agenda on interregionalism in security studies. While not fully complementary, these approaches present features that shed light on under-explored aspects of security dynamics leading to regionalism and interregional relations. In this regard, the authors find evidence in

the security literature to support the idea of broadening interregionalism studies to hybrid and quasi interregionalism as well as transregionalism.

Alan Hardacre and Michael Smith's chapter, *European Union and the Contradictions of Complex Interregionalism*, bridges the first and the second part of the book. Hardacre and Smith focus on the evolution and changes of EU inter-regional strategy through the lens of the concept of 'complex interregionalism'—the changing interlinkages of bilateral, regional and transregional relations that the EU has around the globe. The authors focus in particular on the key institutional drivers of EU complex interregionalism (the Commission, the Council, the member states and, more recently, the European Parliament) and analyse the implications of their differing interests in the construction of complex interregionalism. Finally, the chapter offers a first evaluation of the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon for EU interregionalism, notably through the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the renewed position of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the creation of the President of the Council and the increased powers of the European Parliament, before ending with some conclusions for the future of EU complex interregionalism.

In the remaining chapters of the second part of the book, authors critically investigate interregionalism as promoted by the EU member states, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice, respectively. In Chap. 7, *The Impact of the Iberian States in European Union–Latin American Interregionalism*, Sebastian Santander studies the role of EU member states in the process of interregionalism by focusing on the role undertaken by Iberian countries (Spain and Portugal) in the elaboration and evolution of the Latin American strategy of the EU. The author first identifies European states having interests in Latin America, the Latin American projection of their foreign policies and their implications in the construction of a community-based approach *vis-à-vis* Latin America. Secondly, he analyses the role played by Spain within the EU in the *rapprochement* between Latin America and Europe and in the progressive construction of interregional relations. Third, Santander studies the role of the Ibero–American grouping as a framework for preliminary discussion concerning Euro–Latin American agreements. The author focuses finally on the implications of changes in international, European and Latin American politics in terms of EU–Latin American interregionalism.

Thereafter, Olivier Costa and Clarissa Dri address the question on *How does the European Parliament Contribute to the Construction of EU's Interregional Dialogue?* Usually, the EP is not recognised as an important actor in interregional dialogues. However, for many reasons, it plays a key role in EU contacts with other regional organisations. First of all, in the 1970s and 1980s, external relations were a substitute for the weakness of EP's legislative powers, and thus an important con-cern for the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) Secondly, MEPs have proved to be prone to export the principle of 'political' regional integration to other continents for ideological reasons and as a means to support human rights and democracy. The promotion of a proto-federal form of integration was also a way to legitimise EP's own pretention of playing a central role in the European integration process. The EP has thus been very active in supporting the development of other

regional organisations and the formalisation of an interregional dialogue with them. The case of Latin America, and especially the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), shows the high degree of mobilisation of MEPs on this topic. Not only has the EP pioneered and pushed for interregional contacts with Latin American partners, but it has also served as a promoter and source of inspiration for the creation of new regional parliaments. There are some 30 regional parliaments in the world and EU actors have often been active in the processes leading up to their establishment.

In the ninth chapter of the book, *The Court of Justice of the EU and Other Regional Courts*, Stefaan Smis and Stephen Kingah investigate the role of the European Court of Justice in interregional cooperation. Smis and Kingah identify three dimensions within which jurisdictional and adjudicative interregionalism may be invoked: (i) judge-to-judge meetings; (ii) cross-referencing by the European Court of Justice judges to the decisions of other regional courts and vice versa; and (iii) interregional dispute settlements. The extent to which the Court of Justice can forge interregional cooperation between the EU and other regions depends therefore on which of these dimensions (judge-to-judge meetings, cross-referencing or interregional dispute settlement) one is hoping to achieve. The authors conclude that the accelerating jurisprudence, for instance in the regional protection of human rights, may lead to the fact that judges of different regional courts will converse more with their peers and this will not only lead to better decisions, but also to better interregional politics.

In the final chapter, the editors summarise the main findings of the book and draw conclusions for future comparative research in the field. The chapter is divided in four sections. The first section discusses the main points raised in theoretical approaches elaborated in the first part of the book. The second section deals with the call made by many authors for a non-Eurocentric comparative interregional research agenda. In the final two sections, these conceptual, theoretical and methodological insights are made more explicit by looking at both the internal and external dimension of interregionalism. The third section draws conclusions about the unpacking of the region and the interests and strategies of various regional actors (that is, the European Commission, the Council, the EU member states, the EP and the Court of Justice). The final section situates interregionalism within the broader context of global governance.

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Part I
Theorising Interregionalism

Chapter 2
Interregionalism and International Relations: Reanimating an Obsolescent Research Agenda?

Jürgen Rüland

2.1 Introduction

In the late 1990s and the years thereafter, a new phenomenon caught the attention of international relations scholars: the proliferation of interregional dialogue forums. With them flourished a literature studying their genesis, formats, functions, performance and prospects. A concomitant of these studies was the optimistic belief that interregional relations have the potential of becoming significant building blocks of an emerging, increasingly vertically and horizontally differentiated, multilayered global governance architecture.

In the meantime, the wave of publications on interregionalism has subsided. One reason certainly is that today many scholars have become disillusioned with global governance as a project promoting cosmopolitan values, legalisation and contractualisation of interstate relations. American unilateralism, paralysed international organisations and stagnating regional cooperation schemes seemed to have doomed in recent years the prospects for further global and regional institutional growth. Research interests thus shifted to topics such as strategic partnerships, the 'new bilateralism' (Smith and Tsatsas 2002; Kiatpongsarn 2010) or cross-regional relations (Solis and Katada 2007) and their impact on global governance. However, perhaps even more significant for the decline of interregionalism studies is another reason: the widespread impression in the international relations community that studies on interregionalism have obviously reached conceptual and empirical limits and thus ceased to improve our understanding of global governance and processes of multilateral policymaking. Such conclusions are hardly surprising given the fact that only a few of the 82 dialogue forums counted by Hänggi have been able to establish regular and enduring interactions (Hänggi 2006). The empirical substance

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from which theory-guided studies of interregionalism can draw is thus finite. While this predicament may be attributed to the narrow nature of the research topic, it is a serious challenge for interregionalism studies that a more recent publication declares much of the existing literature obsolete (Robles 2008).

This chapter claims that, although studies on interregionalism currently struggle with stagnation, there is still space for innovation. The argument is developed in three steps. The first section briefly summarises the major findings of previous studies on interregional relations. This is followed by a discussion of Robles' sweeping critique of the state-of-the-art of interregionalism studies with the objective of showing that much of his critique is unfounded and that it is possible to take previous studies on interregionalism as a point of departure for more innovative work. The third step involves sketching an agenda for future research that will stimulate innovation in the still novel field of interregionalism studies.

2.2 Interregionalism and International Relations: Where We Stand

In a nutshell, the findings of previous research on interregionalism may be summarised in the following seven points. First, a lot of disagreement exists on what defines interregional dialogue forums. While some authors seem to believe that you know them when you see them, this is certainly a misleading view. Otherwise there would be no reason to discuss at length whether the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a region (Ravenhill 2001), a mega-region (Hänggi 2006), a pan-regional arrangement (Gilson 2002), a transregional forum (Aggarwal 1998; Rüland 1999b, 2001, 2006a) or a form of multilateral interregionalism (Faust 2006). APEC is particularly illustrative of the problems of determining the research object. It is reflective of the fact that regions are not natural geographical entities and that there are no objective criteria for defining regions. As regions are socially and politically constructed and reconstructed, their nature is contingent and open to interpretation (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002: 575). Although the debate about the 'nature of the beast' is not yet settled and typological ambiguities remain, there is an increasing consensus that interregionalism is a *generic* term under which three types of dialogue formats may be subsumed: bi-regional or bilateral interregionalism, transregionalism and hybrid interregionalism (also see the Introduction to this volume). While *bi-regionalism* denotes group-to-group relations—European Union (EU) relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), EU relations with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), etc.—*transregionalism* refers to a dialogue process with a more diffuse membership. It does not necessarily only include regional organisations but also member states from more than two regions and participants without membership in a regional grouping plus some overarching organisational structures (APEC; Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR–ARC)). Finally, *hybrid interregionalism* is a residual category which covers all other formats of

interregional interactions defying categorisation in the first two formats. Among them are continental relationships such as the Europe–Africa process (Olsen 2006), 'imagined interregionalism' such as the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) process (Holland 2006), 'interregionalism without regions' such as the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) cooperation (Rüland and Bechle 2010) or relationships between regional organisations and one great power (Hänggi 2000, 2006).

Second, theorising on interregional dialogue forums concentrated on two major themes: to what extent regional organisations have developed actorness qualities and what functions interregional dialogue forums perform for the emerging global governance architecture. Based on a relational actorness concept and three key criteria (purposive response to action triggers; existence of policy structures and policy processes; and ability to make and implement decisions), regional organisations such as the EU, ASEAN or MERCOSUR were found to have developed actorness, albeit to varying degrees (Doidge 2004, 2008, 2011; Haubrich Seco 2009; Wunderlich 2012; also see Doidge in this volume). Actorness asymmetries between the EU, with its partly supranational decision-making, and other regional groupings, which are invariably organised along intergovernmental lines, have been found accounting for the type of functions carried out by interregional dialogue forums and the level of effectiveness by which the respective functions have been performed (Doidge 2004, 2008, 2011).

The literature distinguishes five major functions performed by interregional forums reflecting realist, liberal institutionalist and social constructivist logics: balancing, institution-building, rationalising, agenda-setting and collective identity-building. Balancing in connection with interregional relations is confined to 'soft' or institutional balancing (Maull and Okfen 2006). It denotes the strategic use of interregional forums to respond to shifts in global or regional power distribution. Institution-building refers to the formation of a new institutional layer in the multi-layered global governance architecture, to the emergence of many auxiliary institutions under the umbrella of interregional dialogues and to the impact of interregional interactions on intra-regional cohesion, which is facilitated by the need to define common standpoints prior to interregional dialogue meetings (Soesastro and Nuttall 1997). Rationalising stresses the clearing-house functions of interregional dialogues for global multilateral organisations, which have to contend with a growing and increasingly heterogeneous membership and increasingly complex policy issues (Rüland 1999a, b, 2001, 2006a). Interregional forums may also be used as sounding boards for new themes and agendas (Rüland 1999a, b, 2001, 2006a) and they may perform collective identity-building functions by sharpening notions of the regional self through the process of interaction with regional others (Gilson 2002). Hänggi has coined for this process the felicitous formula of 'regionalism through interregionalism' (Hänggi 2003).

Third, a holistic approach explaining interregional relations is thus far missing. Most theory-guided studies operate with a combination of theoretical approaches. The approaches either vary along the time axis (for instance, balancing in the early stages of a forum, institution-building and identity-building at later stages) or are applied issue-specific. Some authors also use concepts which accommodate

arguments of seemingly contradictory paradigms. One example for the latter is Roloff's 'concert of regions', which fuses institutionalist and neo-realist arguments (Roloff 2001). Interregionalism studies thus confirm a general trend in international relations research towards multivariate theories. The price for this procedure is certainly a lack of parsimony and a strong dose of eclecticism. This price, however, seems to be affordable for many authors given the fact that in the absence of a universal, culturally sensitive theory of international relations, Hemmer and Katzenstein have declared eclectic theorising a virtue (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Katzenstein and Sil 2008).

Fourth, much of the literature on interregionalism argues from systemic and structural 'outward-in' perspectives (Rüland 2006a). This applies particularly to the genesis of interregional dialogue forums, which is generally regarded as a result of the twin-processes of globalisation and the 'new regionalism'. Systemic perspectives also prevail in analyses which seek to assess the impact of interregionalism on regional cohesion and regional identities, whereas in the balancing literature systemic and unit-level arguments are found side by side. By contrast, actor-oriented literature is sorely missing. The exception are studies with a liberal institutionalist background modelling interregional dialogues as complex multilevel games, which involve domestic, state and regional actors. Aggarwal and Fogarty, for instance, attach a pivotal role to domestic interest groups as enabling agents of interregionalism. In their view, interest pluralism has a strong impact on the format of institutional arrangements, that is, the depth of the institutional arrangements and the uniformity of agreements (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004: 226).

Fifth, empirical research confirms that interregional forums indeed perform the functions ascribed to them by theoretical deduction, albeit to a much lesser extent than anticipated (Bersick 2004; Loewen 2004; Doidge 2004; Hardacre 2011). In fact, the intensity by which these functions are performed varies considerably. Balancing and, to some extent, bandwagoning are the functions most frequently and most intensively performed by the majority of interregional forums, whereas institution-building and collective identity-building have played a much less prominent role. In the absence of any effective rationalising and agenda-setting functions, interregional dialogues have so far failed in becoming a 'multilateral utility' (Dent 2004). The empirical literature has thus cast strong doubts on the normative and teleological dimension often associated with studies regarding interregional relations as building blocks for global governance.

Sixth, most of our empirical information on interregional forums is derived from Triadic relations between North America, EU–Europe and East Asia. The overwhelming number of studies centre on Asia–Europe relations under the roof of ASEM (Reiterer 2002; Yeo 2003; Pareira 2003; Bersick 2004; Loewen 2004; Robles 2008; Gaens 2008). Additional insights are provided by studies of the European web of interregional relations, especially on EU–MERCOSUR (Bessa Rodrigues 1999; Grugel 2004; Grabendorff and Seidelmann 2005; Santander 2005; Faust 2006; Doctor 2007). However, many of these studies are only indirectly contributing to research on interregional relations. They associate themselves with European studies and are primarily interested in the procedures and processes of the EU's external

relations and the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Telò 2006; Kernic 2007). Serious studies on non-Triadic relations are almost non-existent (Low 2006; Wagner 2006; Dosch and Jacob 2010; Adelmann 2012), which must be attributed to the 'thin' institutional substance of these ties, but also to the Western-centric characteristic of theorizing on international relations (Ayoob 2002; Chen 2011).

Seventh, like many other international organisations, interregional dialogue forums suffer from a serious democracy deficit (Grugel 2004; Bersick 2008). Most of them have a strong executive bias. While many interregional forums provide virtually no institutional avenue for parliamentarians and non-state actors to the government-centred 'track one' dialogue, the institutionally more developed ones such, as ASEM or APEC, have created at least a business forum and, in the case of ASEM, a foundation (e.g. the Asia–Europe Foundation, ASEF) facilitating civil society interaction. At the same time, the Asia–Europe People's Forum (ASPF), a critical network of civil society organisations and social movements, has been consistently excluded from the ASEM dialogue process. Also, the Asia–Europe Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP) is operating outside the official ASEAN institutional framework (Bersick 2008). The internal structure of the more elaborated interregional forums such as ASEM is thus is highly pillarised, with horizontal links between the governmental track one, the business sector and civil society either entirely missing or at best only weakly developed (University of Helsinki 2006).

2.3 Not all Is Wrong with Interregionalism Studies: Meeting the Critics

In his book on ASEM, the Filipino political scientist Alfredo C. Robles deplored the poverty of interregionalism research (Robles 2008). Although Robles' critique in the first place targets studies analysing ASEM, it has ramifications far beyond Asia–Europe relations. Because theorising on interregionalism was strongly inspired by studies on ASEM, they also influenced research on other interregional dialogues. Much of what Robles found wanting in ASEM studies can thus also be applied to studies of interregionalism in general.

Robles charges that 'the small but growing body of literature on ASEM will not be of much use, since it has failed to assess properly ASEM's capacity to achieve its aims and to portray accurately the outcomes of ASEM's activities' (Robles 2008: 3). For him the theoretical explanations of ASEM and, by extension, interregionalism, 'commit one or more of the following errors: they contradict the basic assumptions of the theory; they fail to address fundamental objections to these theories or they fail to provide convincing empirical evidence that supports their theoretical claims' (Robles 2008: 11).

To do justice to Robles' provocative study, it is undoubtedly an intellectually stimulating and empirically rich piece, in fact, one of the best studies on ASEM and interregionalism. Robles has good arguments in pointing to the neglect of (material)

structure in some constructivist analyses of ASEM, in arguing that ASEM is not an interregional group-to-group dialogue (a point, however, addressed in the transregionalism concept of which Robles does not take notice) and in questioning the applicability of the regime concept to interregional forums (Robles 2008: 12–17). But in other significant points, his critique is off the mark and thus cannot pass without a rejoinder. For want of space, I limit myself to addressing two of his most controversial claims: that there is no interregional level in international relations and that the theoretical approaches used are incommensurable.

Robles takes issue with the claim that interregional relations have constituted a new level of international interaction. Unfortunately, however, the reasons for this criticism and its implications for the study of interregionalism are not entirely clear. To my knowledge no one has ever argued that the 'interregional level' is more than a descriptive and heuristic concept. The concept is exclusively empirical and used for the sole purpose of illustrating that an institutional arena has emerged that did not exist before. I cannot see why the key definitional criteria for a 'level' he names should not apply to the interregional interactions as we know them from existing studies. Definitely not all, but at least some, of the major interregional dialogues certainly create 'new and relatively enduring opportunities for or constraints on action' (Robles 2008: 11). Even if in the majority of cases these actions are by no means spectacular and (still) far below expectation, they have nevertheless created new opportunities (and constraints) for actors in an array of issue areas ranging from economic cooperation to security and culture. This is even acknowledged by David Camroux, another critic of the interregionalism literature, although Camroux' contention that studies on interregionalism are essentially normative is likewise hardly tenable (Camroux 2010).

Also puzzling is Robles' claim that the attempt to determine the functions of interregional dialogue forums for global governance rests on faulty theoretical assumptions and a tendency to link 'incommensurable theories' (Camroux 2010: 17). Robles singles out studies (e.g. Yeo 2003), which in some cases admittedly display an extravagant understanding of international relations theories. But deriving from them the conclusion that the theories used in these studies cannot explain the functions of interregional dialogue forums is untenable. Moreover, by stressing the incompatibility of the three major theoretical strands—realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism—Robles himself exhibits a rather rigid understanding of international relations theories. He ignores that they are much less exclusionary than appears at first sight. While there is indeed a tendency to stress mutual exclusiveness of theoretical approaches whenever a new paradigm enters the debate, the essentially supplementary nature of international relations theories usually comes to the fore once the dust of the initial controversy has settled. In fact, what has happened after every great debate in international relations theorising is a convergence of theoretical arguments. Liberal institutionalism, for instance, has adopted key realist concepts such as anarchy and state egoism, while realists concede that under certain conditions, such as hegemony, cooperation is feasible in an otherwise anarchic world. Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism also fuses realist and institutionalist arguments (Moravcsik 1999). Moreover, Barkin's

'realist constructivism' (Barkin 2003), the English, Copenhagen and Munich schools, all combine to varying degrees realist and constructivist arguments. In a similar vein, Johnston's strategic culture approach defies the liberal ontology of many constructivists and shows that cognitive path dependencies and social constructions of the environment may explain the persistent Chinese preference for a *'parabellum'*-strategy, a foreign policy-behaviour congruent with many aspects of political realism (Johnston 1995, 1996). Finally, Wendt's 'thin constructivism' reconciles rationalist and reflexivist epistemology (Wendt 1999), as does Schimmelfennig's 'rhetorical action' and, to a lesser extent, Risse's concept of 'arguing' (Schimmelfennig 2003; Risse 2000).

In contrast to these ramifications of international relations theorising Robles builds up theoretical straw men. His treatment of realism is a case in point. It is vintage realism if he claims that 'most realists do not accept regions as important international actors' and that 'it is hardly possible to draw a parallel between the balance of power of states and that of region, whether as "hegemons" or as "challengers"' (Robles 2008: 12–13). Charles Kupchan's work would be one prominent case that immediately comes to mind when counter-checking Robles' claim (Kupchan 2002). Moreover, if regions have developed actorness qualities, it is not comprehensible why they should not engage in balancing moves—a point already made from quite a different theoretical angle by Mitrany as early as in the 1940s (Mitrany 1943). That regions have developed (limited) actorness qualities has been shown by the respective literature of which Robles unfortunately does not take note (Sjöstedt 1977; Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Doidge 2004, 2008, 2011; Wunderlich 2012; also see contributions by Hettne and Doidge in this volume). Aside from this, even realists have in the meantime accepted that power does not exclusively rely on military capacities, but that power may also be wielded in institutions given the increasing significance of institutions for international politics (Barnett and Duvall 2005). Institutions may thus serve both as actors in balancing moves and an arena for institutional balancing. The concept of 'institutional balancing' precisely acknowledges these changes in international relations, ushering in theoretical amalgamations that may be termed 'institutional realism' (He 2008) and reconciling what Robles believes cannot be linked. In fact, one can go even further and show that by linking Habermasian communicative action theory with political-economy and dependency-theory inspired structuralism, Robles himself links theoretical strands, which only a few pages earlier he had declared as 'incommensurable' (Robles 2008: 17).

It is also not clear why balancing and identity-building should be mutually exclusive (Robles 2008: 17). Shared historical experiences and similar mental representations of the past may create collective regional identities which favour balancing as an institutional behaviour. Even Robles' own Habermasian communicative action approach does not rule out such a link: if after deliberation members of an interregional dialogue forum reach a reasoned consensus on the international political context, their conclusion may well be that institutional balancing is the most adequate response to deal with it. Moreover, the functions interregional forums perform may change in their lifetime and may also vary according to issue-area. Shallow

institutional balancing may thus be a low-cost response to real or perceived shifts in global or regional power equations, while at the same time or at a later stage functional needs driven by the pathologies of globalisation (such as climate change, energy shortages or migration) may spur institution-building and collective action.

Ironically, despite developing an interesting alternative approach, Robles' ends up not far from the studies he criticises. While rejecting the functions mentioned above, he explores to what extent ASEM is a 'dialogue' (Robles 2008: 18). Robles certainly has a point in deriving this question immanently from ASEM pronouncements, unlike the exogenously deduced propositions of interregional functions. The problem, however, is that in communicative action theory a dialogue is the most demanding mode of communication (Risse 2000). Robles thus commits the same mistake as those who have proposed the set of functions interregionalism presumably performs: he measures ASEM's performance by an ideal type. His findings are thus predictable: there is little communicative action in Asia–Europe relations. But what then is ASEM, if it is neither a dialogue nor an institutional arrangement performing the functions attached to it by the theoretical literature? The answer remains open even though communicative action theory provides interesting explanatory alternatives: ASEM may be a forum where 'rhetorical action' or 'norm-based' behaviour prevails, as Gabriela Manea shows in her studies of the Asia–Europe human rights dialogue (Manea 2008, 2009).

2.4 Revitalising Interregionalism Studies: But How?

Robles' critique of interregionalism research may throw out the baby with the bathwater, but he identifies a sore point: many studies lack theoretical sophistication. This is not surprising, given the novelty of the research theme. But if interregionalism research is to endure, theory-guided research must be intensified and transcend the current stagnation. The subsequent sections thus seek to outline some avenues for revitalising interregionalism research. Although they follow the established lines of international relations theorising, most of the proposed approaches seek to bridge the paradigmatic divides of the international relations discipline.

2.4.1 From Institutional Balancing to Hedging?

The balancing function of interregional dialogue forums has so far been mainly understood as a sequence of *external* or *horizontal* institutional balancing acts. APEC, for instance, was portrayed as a response to the stagnating Uruguay Round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the anticipated rise of (regional) trading blocs (Ravenhill 2001). The formation of the European Single Market seemed to corroborate such fears. ASEM subsequently reflected European fears of a rising Asia and the emergence of a Pacific Century in which the United States (US) shifts

its regional priorities from Europe to the Pacific Rim. At the same time Asians, fearing a coming 'Fortress Europe', searched for ways to keep the European markets open. The New Transatlantic Agenda was then a response of transatlanticists in both the US and Europe who in the light of seeming global geo-economic and geo-political shifts sought to revitalise the transatlantic axis (Rüland 1996). EU–MERCOSUR relations can be read as a response to Washington's plan to set up a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) ranging from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, which went hand in hand with Latin American and European fears of a strengthened US hegemony in the Southern Hemisphere (Santander 2005; Faust 2006; Doctor 2007). Finally, the IOR–ARC reflects the marginalisation of its main protagonists (i.e. Australia, India and South Africa) in the emerging web of interregional relations. With its integration in Triadic networks such as ASEM (India) and the East Asian Summit (India, Australia) the dialogue lost its momentum and has since been moribund (Michael 2013).

Accounts of interregional dialogue forums as institutional balancers have so far largely ignored the *internal* dimension of balancing (Rüland 2010). Although interregional dialogues have frequently been the venue for (informal) bilateral meetings, little is known of their purpose and content. Bilateralism and minilateralism embedded in interregional forums may be driven by a desire to rationalise international diplomacy in the wake of increasingly dense calendars of leaders, ministers and senior officials, but they may also be perceived as an opportunity to launch agendas, to establish or consolidate leadership claims (both at the regional as well as the interregional level) and to forge intra-institutional alliances against leadership aspirations of others. In other words, bilateralism may be employed to influence the intra-institutional power equation. As a footnote, from an EU perspective it would also be interesting to explore to what extent bilateral meetings with members of the *other* region have been used to bypass common positions and to pursue particularistic national interests.

Finally, interregional dialogues may also proffer options for a *vertical* dimension of institutional balancing. They may serve as an arena to balance the perceived predominance of certain actors in global multilateral institutions. For instance, it would be interesting to find out why Brazil convened a Latin American–Arab dialogue in May 2005. Was it part of a Brazilian strategy to build a Third-World coalition against the weakened, but still strong position of the US and the EU in the forthcoming Hong Kong ministerial of the WTO? Vertical balancing would then be part of what Forman and Segaar have called 'forum shopping', by which actors 'pick and choose among the [institutional] mechanisms that best fit their individual political agenda' (Forman and Segaar 2006: 213). Forum shopping makes use of the increasingly differentiated multilayered nature of global governance, thereby constituting and re-constituting it.

While internal and vertical institutional balancing has attracted little attention in studies of interregional relations, neither have new concepts transcending the realist balancing-bandwagoning dichotomy. Examples are the concepts of 'soft balancing' (Pape 2005; He and Feng 2008) and 'hedging' (Goh 2005; Kuik 2008). However, the problem with these concepts is that—together with 'institutional balancing'—they

are often used interchangeably and thus cause confusion. Some conceptual clarification is thus in order.

At first, institutional balancing, soft balancing and hedging must be distinguished from 'hard balancing'. He and Feng define 'hard balancing' as a means of 'increasing the relative power of a state against a powerful and threatening state through internal domestic military build-ups and external balancing through military alliances' (He and Feng 2008: 365). It is the type of balancing which classical and neo-realists mean when they speak of balancing. By contrast, institutional balancing, soft balancing and hedging are concepts recognising the fact that pure military power has become ineffective in tangibly affecting policy outcomes in non-military issue areas so that policymaking in international relations has increasingly shifted to institutional arenas (Keohane and Nye 1977). Although all three concepts may be subsumed under the conceptual umbrella of 'institutional realism' (He 2008), they differ by the way they merge realist and institutionalist arguments.

'Institutional balancing' is the most 'institutionalist' concept because it confines the essentially realist logic of balancing to institutional arenas. In practice, institutional balancing may take place through the creation of new institutions, the revitalisation of existing ones, the rewriting of institutional rules and decision-making procedures and constituting new norms or re-constituting existing ones for the purpose of changing the intra- and inter-institutional distribution of power. Unlike the two other balancing concepts discussed below, 'institutional balancing' does not include a military dimension.

'Soft balancing' denotes a wider concept. It focuses on 'undermining the relative power of the strong and threatening state through bilateral and multilateral coordination among other states' (He and Feng 2008: 365). It may be subdivided into a 'military soft balancing' component and 'non-military soft balancing' (He and Feng 2008: 373). While the former includes arms sales to the opponents of a potential opponent and arms control targeting the perceived opponent, the latter entails economic sanctions and strategic non-cooperation, a primarily institutional strategy (He and Feng 2008: 373).

'Hedging' is an even more complex concept. It is a two-pronged approach that 'operates by simultaneously pursuing two sets of mutually counteracting policies': return-maximisation and risk-reduction (Kuik 2008: 171). While it shares with 'soft balancing' the objective of reducing risks by undermining the power of putatively threatening states, it goes beyond it by combining it with an absolute gains perspective derived from liberal theory. The latter includes economic cooperation, various forms of engagement and can even include material rewards for limited bandwagoning. Risk reduction, on the other hand, is a policy wherein states forge defence cooperation, upgrade their own military and seek to deny potential hegemons a dominant role in their region, mainly through institutional and diplomatic means (Kuik 2008: 166).

The question then is how states instrumentalise interregional forums for their balancing exercises. That there is ample evidence for (external or horizontal) institutional balancing is hardly contested in the literature. But what about 'soft balancing' and 'hedging'? Neither studies of interregional relations nor those

examining 'soft balancing' and 'hedging' practices have so far taken note of interregional relations as an arena or even tool in attempts of balancing major powers in a cost-effective way. Moreover, institutional balancing, soft balancing and hedging have so far only been pursued as a rationalist agenda, leaving aside the question as to what extent these hybrid types of balancing are part of a 'strategic culture' (Johnston 1995, 1996). Can it, for instance, be shown for the EU with its self-styled identity of a 'civilian' or even 'normative' power (Manners 2002) that institutional balancing, soft balancing and hedging are central elements of its strategic culture? Alone, answers on these and other questions may not rescue interregionalism research. Yet they may raise the consciousness of international relations scholars for a level of interaction which they have so far ignored and thus make balancing studies more complete and subtle than they hitherto are.

2.4.2 Interregional Relations Studies and Network Analysis

In an article published in *International Organization*, Hafner-Burton et al. directed attention of international relations scholars to network analysis (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009). While admitting that networks are nothing new in international relations, Hafner-Burton et al. argue that so far only certain aspects of networks have been studied by international relations scholars. Until recently, networks 'have typically been regarded in international relations as a mode of organisation that facilitates collective action and cooperation, exercises influence, or serves as a means of international governance' (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009: 560). They have been neglected as 'structures that can constrain and enable individual agents and influence international outcomes. Research has focused on networks' effects on their environments […] rather than the effects of network structures on actors and outcomes within those networks […]' (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009: 561).

Network analysis seeks to identify patterns of social relationships, such as hubs, cliques, or brokers, and to link these relations with actor capacities and policy outcomes. It does so by mapping and measuring relationships and flows between nodes or agents (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009: 562; Krebs 2008). Of interest to network analysts is less the attributes of particular nodes rather than the associations between them. Network analysis posits that nodes and their behaviours are mutually dependent; ties between them can be channels of transmission of material (people, weapons, money, etc.) and non-material products (information, ideas, norms, etc.); and persistent patterns of association among nodes create structures that can define, enable, or restrict the behaviours of nodes (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009: 562).

Crucial for the exploration and evaluation of networks is the location of nodes or agents in the network. Nodes can be located in the core or centre of a network or in the periphery. Centrality is assessed by three indicators: degree centrality, betweenness centrality and closeness centrality (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Krebs 2008). Degree centrality measures the activity of a node by its number of connections with other nodes. A node with many connections is considered a 'hub'. Between-ness

centrality refers to a location of a node between networks. Such nodes are considered 'brokers'; they are highly influential because they can control the flows between networks. Finally, closeness centrality refers to the distance of a node to other nodes. A node that has the shortest paths to the greatest number of other nodes has also the quickest access to them and is therefore able to monitor what is happening in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Krebs 2008). With these research tools at hand, the question arises as to what added value network analysis can contribute to studies of interregionalism. The subsequent sections seek to provide some answers to this question.

For one, network analysis can be applied to states and to regions. It can assess the patterns of interactions of states within an interregional forum and those between regions. In the first case network analysis would evaluate the position of state members within a dialogue forum and thus provide additional information about the internal structure of an interregional dialogue. At this level network analysis would measure the frequency and intensity of interactions of member states within a forum. One simple indicator for such an analysis could be the frequency of bilateral interactions on the sidelines of a forum. Methodologically more demanding is the measurement of the entire profile of bilateral relations within a forum. Indicators could be trade flows, foreign direct investment flows, the flow of people, and the frequency of state visits, to name a few. Particularly interesting would be the extent to which member states entertain relations across the regional boundaries, in other words how often and how intensively they interact with member states of the regional other(s) in a dialogue forum. This entails interesting additional questions such as to what extent the hubs of each region are connected with members of the other region. Are they or are other member states of the respective regional organisation gatekeepers in the interaction with the other region? Are they gatekeepers for only one or several other regions? In which policy areas do these interactions occur? What about the paths of interaction between 'track one' and civil society organisations? Is there a correlation between the frequency of interactions in a forum and the level of legalisation, that is, the extent to which non-binding agreements are substituted by binding decisions? Are dialogues with a high frequency of interactions better situated to play the role of a 'multilateral utility' as defined by Dent (2004)?

In the second case, the level of analysis would be regions. Here, it may be measured in how many interregional dialogues a region is involved and how central it is placed in the web of interregional dialogues? How important are the dialogues in which it is involved, a factor which could be measured by the scope of dialogues and their role as agenda-setters in global multilateral forums? Scope of dialogues refers to the number of policy areas it covers. An additional question is whether involvement in many forums can be translated into increased influence in multilateral forums. Does the level of information increase significantly with multi-membership in interregional forums and can this knowledge be used for forming winning long-term or *ad hoc* coalitions in global multilateral forums? Do frequent interactions of regions with other regions facilitate the formation of social capital, that is, enhancing access to resources which allow engineering (better) solutions for regional or

global problems? And are regions, which are a hub in interregional relations, particularly dynamic exporters of their norms and values?

These are only some of the questions which can be addressed by network analysis. I am sure that network analysis is able to provide answers to them, thereby complementing existing findings of interregionalism studies. However, in how far network analysis opens up avenues for new knowledge and in how far it generates new insights into the structure and dynamics of interregional dialogues remains to be seen and is a matter to be tested.

2.4.3   Interregional Relations as Norm Transmitters

A promising, but still underexplored research area is the ideational dimension of interregional relations. Most, though not all, of these studies, have strong constructivist leanings. Broadly speaking, three approaches may be distinguished in the ideational literature on interregionalism: the 'norm reinforcement thesis', the 'norm diffusion thesis' and the 'cooperative hegemony' approach.

The 'norm reinforcement thesis' is closely associated with the work of Julie Gilson (2002, 2005). Drawing from Wendt's social constructivism, Gilson explores regional identity-building as an intersubjective process wherein regional identity may be 'formed and reformed in the very process of looking at a [regional] other and reflecting back on the self' (Gilson 2005: 309–310). In the process of interaction the regional self is exposed to material and ideational challenges of regional others. The ensuing need to speak with one voice, to develop bargaining power and to find recognition as a regional entity by others spurs ideational self-inspection. With it go questions such as what is the region, who belongs to it and what role concepts may be appropriate to it? Interregional relations may thus strengthen 'regionness' (Hettne et al. 1999; Hettne 2003; also see Hettne in this volume), fostering 'regionalism through interregionalism' (Hänggi 2003). Gilson regards the Asia–Europe dialogue as one such example in which both protagonists are mutually strengthening their identity as a region and international actor in the process of interaction: the EU as a 'civilian' or 'normative power' by championing norms such as democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance, East Asians by responding with the Asian value thesis.

While Gilson's thoughtful study must be credited with opening up research on interregional relations to an ideational agenda, at least two major questions remain unaddressed. The first is a methodological problem haunting other ideational studies of interregionalism as well: how can we determine that Europe had been the decisive 'mobilising agent' (Gilson 2005: 310) advancing Asian-ness? Could it not be that the Asian value thesis was a rather general response to the post-Cold War forays of Western cosmopolitanism into non-Western societies? If so, what then is the American, Canadian or Australian 'share' in the construction of Asian values? And can we explain the fact that ASEAN placed norms such as democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance prominently in the recently ratified ASEAN

Charter exclusively as a result of interactions with the EU? This problem is even exacerbated if we try to determine to what extent interaction with Asia has shaped European identity (or better identities?), given the multiplicity of interregional dialogues in which Europe is involved. And second, it cannot be generalised from ASEM that interregional interaction necessarily strengthens regional identities. More complex outcomes are imaginable and must be examined: interregional cooperation may, for instance, also launch unidirectional processes of norm diffusion, in which the norm recipients fully adopt externally-sponsored norms or, much more likely, in which they localise them in a way Acharya argues in his localisation theory (Acharya 2004, 2009).

This brings us to norm diffusion studies. With the EU's designation as a 'normative power' (Manners 2002) and claims that the EU reproduces itself 'through the external projection of internal solutions' (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 249; Börzel and Risse 2004; Söderbaum et al. 2005: 371; Grugel 2007: 44) norm diffusion could have expected to become a topic of significance in the study of interregional relations. But although there is now a rich literature on processes of norm diffusion in international relations, there are only few analyses exploring interregional relations as conduits for norm diffusion. This is surprising, given the fact that in European studies the diffusion of norms from the EU to Eastern European accession countries has become an important research area. Known as 'Europeanisation research', these studies explore the role of the EU as a norm entrepreneur (Radaelli 2000; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Crucial in this respect is how and to what extent accession countries have internalised the norms propagated by the EU at a policy, politics and polity level (Börzel and Risse 2003).

Derived from Europeanisation studies, norm diffusion could be explored by interregionalism studies along four major avenues. First, rationalist scholarship claims that norm diffusion can be advanced by conditionalities based on material incentives (assistance for integration, economic and development aid, market access) and sanctions (Warkotsch 2007). In how far this is the case in interregional relations has not yet been systematically explored. It is however unlikely that norm diffusion through interregional interactions can be persuasively explained by rational choice. Given the limited material incentives the EU offers in interregional dialogues and its record of inconsistency in applying sanctions, it is quite unlikely that the EU has a tangible impact on the domestic opportunity structures of its partners. The EU's partners in interregional relations would thus have little incentive to change their interest structure and identities.

A second explanation of norm diffusion comes from a structuralist variant of sociological institutionalism. It explains norm adoption as a process of isomorphism (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The isomorphism thesis presumes that other regional organisations imitate the organisational structure, the norms and integration rhetoric of the EU. They mimic the EU because as the most advanced model of regional integration it stands for institutional modernity and it is hence believed to confer prestige, recognition and respectability on more recently established regional organisations. There is in fact some empirical evidence that this is happening (Bicchi 2006; Grugel 2007; Jetschke and Rüland 2009; Jetschke 2009; Carrapatoso 2011). The problem with the isomorphism thesis is, however, that it

leaves open how and to what extent the seeming normative vacuum is filled with alternative meaning. After all, new regional organisations aspiring to achieve at least a modicum of cohesion must do more than just passively emulate organisational form and practice of the model. The task ahead of them is twofold: they must, first, match the imported organisational structure and its ideational underpinning with norms domestically considered appropriate and hence held legitimate. And they must, second, frame these norms in a way that they can be shared by other member states in the region.

The way out of this predicament is Acharya's localisation theory, which is also superior to actor-oriented versions of norm diffusion literature (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 1999; Börzel and Risse 2003). While the latter attach agency only to the (external) norm entrepreneurs, Acharya's norm localisation theory also captures agency of norm recipients. It presumes that neither complete norm transformation nor norm rejection is normal practice for norm recipients, but rather practices of actively adjusting the alien norm to the local repository of norms. Local agents do this through framing, grafting and pruning, thus making foreign and local norms compatible. This way they modernise existing norm structures and thereby endow them with fresh legitimacy (Acharya 2004, 2009). I presume that such processes also take place when regions interact. Wang has made the important point that external norm advocates may also localise their norms when faced with a strong local normative orthodoxy in the recipient society. A case in point is the EU's democracy promotion policy in the 1990s which, confronted with resistance by their Asian addressees, conceded that democracy may take multiple forms. With this admission, the EU adjusted its democracy promotion to Asian versions of democracy which may be quite remote from concepts of Western liberal democracy (Wang 2012).

A third approach to study interregional norm diffusion could be communicative action theory. Manea's studies examining the logics of interaction between Europe and Asia in the ASEM human rights dialogue show how over time Asian–European modes of interaction have been transformed from inconclusive 'bargaining' to 'rhetorical action' (Schimmelfennig 2003; Manea 2008, 2009), a mode of communication whereby actors seek to persuade others to change their beliefs, interests and identities without being prepared to let themselves be persuaded by better arguments (Risse 2000: 8). However in a 'competitive' (in contrast to a 'controversial' and 'pseudo-competitive') argumentation 'rhetorical action' creates alternative spaces for communicative action which approximate to what Risse calls 'arguing' (Schimmelfennig 2003: 211). The latter denotes a process of truth-seeking, a deliberative process in search of the better argument and a reasoned consensus (Risse 2000: 8). At the regional level the broader scope for communication created by the interregional human rights dialogue spurred a gradual rethinking of ASEAN's norms, climaxing in a 'certain degree of internalisation of human rights in ASEAN's process of regional integration' (Manea 2008: 392). More research along these lines in other issue areas of interregional relations and applied to other dialogue forums could indeed provide new insights into the dynamics of ideational change through interregionalism. It needs, however, to be carefully explored if what is believed to have been a change of identities as a result of 'arguing' is not 'norm localisation' and thus initiating a new round of repackaged 'rhetorical action'. At a more general

level, it would be interesting to explore under which conditions instrumental and persuasive strategies of norm diffusion are applied. Finally, totally neglected in the norm diffusion literature is the case of reverse diffusion, that is, the extent to which as a result of 'entangled histories' (Randeria 2006) the EU (or other regional organisations) adopt norms from their partners.

A last approach with some prospect for capturing ideational factors is Pederson's 'cooperative hegemony' approach (Pedersen 2002), an interesting mixture of realist, political economy, liberal institutionalist and constructivist arguments. So far the approach has been tested only in one short paper written by Mary Farrell (2004). Farrell attaches actorness and hegemonic status to the EU and argues that—even as it reclaims for itself the status of a civilian power—the EU seeks to accumulate power through the exploitation of its economic strength. To enlarge its market is a crucial precondition for the EU to extract maximum benefit from deeper integration. One way of securing these economic interests and ultimately the power of the EU is through interregional cooperation. The latter, in turn, is pursued by the exploitation of soft power. Soft power means here that institutions and ideas are combined to offer a framework through which a regional order is constructed. Diffusing its own particular set of ideas and intrinsic values in the conduct of interregional relations is thus a way of locking in other states to the ideas and values of the hegemon and of reaping the envisioned economic benefits (Farrell 2004: 4–11). The problem with this approach is the hegemonic status that it attaches to the EU. First, it is questionable whether it makes sense to define a hegemonic structure in the realm of nation states—with the United States as the presumable hegemon—and to construct a different power structure at the level of regional organisations with the EU as a 'regional hegemon'. And second, it excludes all interregional relations from analysis which are not part of the EU's web of interregional relations, thus entailing a strong Eurocentric dimension. The approach could however expose the contradictory and at times openly opportunistic nature of EU norm export policies. While the EU seems to play down normative issues in its Triadic relations, it imposes them in an almost hegemonic way on its non-Triadic partners (Söderbaum et al. 2005: 377).

2.5   Conclusion: Towards Non-Eurocentric Comparative Interregionalism Studies

The previous sections have summarised the state of the art of current interregionalism studies, discussed objections of critics and outlined avenues for further research. At the end of this chapter three points so far neglected require attention. First, interregionalism research is still a highly Eurocentric research agenda, aggravating the Western-centric tendencies in theorising on international relations (Ayoob 2002; Acharya 2005; Rüland 2006b). Studies such as those of Robles (2004, 2008), theorising and analysing interregional relations from a Third-Worldist position, are thus highly welcome and enriching to the debate. Second, comparative studies of interregionalism are almost entirely absent. The comparison of ASEM and APEC

by Maull and Okfen and the concluding article in a special issue of the *Journal of European Integration* are two noteworthy exceptions (Maull and Okfen 2006; Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2005). Developing a research framework and methodological tools facilitating the comparative study of interregional dialogue forums is thus an urgent task ahead of scholars working in the field of international relations. Third, and last, if interregionalism is to become more than an epiphenomenon of international relations and regionalism, scholars should also act as policy advisors stressing the advantages of an increasingly institutionalised, contractualised, multi-layered, vertically and horizontally differentiated, yet sufficiently pragmatic and flexible global government system. The advantages of legalisation and institutionalisation of international relations for peaceful conflict resolution are almost self-evident and interregional relations working as a 'multilateral utility' (Dent 2004; Rüland 2011) could certainly contribute to it.

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Chapter 3
Interregionalism and the European Union: Conceptualising Group-to-Group Relations

Mathew Doidge

3.1 Introduction

Interregional dialogues have been present in the external relations of the European Union (EU) for nearly half a century, for much of which period it seemed to possess exclusive rights to the concept. As a consequence, theorising on interregionalism has always been intrinsically linked to, and indeed dominated by, the study of the European Union. In short, this chapter explores the past, present and future of the study of interregionalism. Roughly two periods may be determined within the study of interregionalism from the Union's perspective: first the actor-centred 'old interregionalism' of the early years; and second the system-centred 'new interregionalism' of the post-bipolar period. The two are characterised by fundamental differences in the architecture of such group-to-group relations, and in their perceived significance in the international system.

The chapter begins with a quick definition of interregionalism. It then explores the way in which the old interregionalism was conceived within European studies, before moving on to the changes both to the architecture of interregionalism and to its conceptualisation in the post-bipolar period. The chapter then considers what models of the 'new interregionalism' tell us about the shape of European Union group-to-group relations, before questioning whether such patterns and expectations can be applied beyond this narrow focus. Can a framework generated within the context of studies of EU external relations apply to interregionalism more generally?

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3.2   Interregionalism: A Quick Definition

At the most basic level, interregionalism may be defined as 'institutionalised relations between world regions' (Hänggi et al. 2006: 3). This, however, clearly leaves significant room for variation in typologies of interregionalism, necessitating at the outset of this chapter that certain clarifications be made (also see the Introduction and Hardacre and Smith in this volume). While regional organisations constitute the natural starting point in any definition, interregionalism being the product initially of the external relations of one such organisation—the European Union—to define such dialogues exclusively as those between regional integration arrangements would be overly restrictive and not representative of the full range of group-to-group structures that have emerged, particularly over the last two decades. At the same time, however, some level of regional organisation remains the foundation of any definition; to go beyond this region-to-region focus is to lose a certain amount of clarity. In this respect, Hänggi's (2006) 'borderline' or 'quasi-interregional' structures encompassing region-to-state (e.g. EU–Canada) and mega-regional institutions[1] are a step too far, effectively defining interregionalism as any external relationship in which a region (however defined) is engaged.

Rather, the favoured approach of this chapter falls between these two poles. Interregionalism is defined as institutionalised relationships between groups of states from different regions, each coordinating to a greater or lesser degree. This therefore spans the range from highly institutionalised regional organisations—most prominently the EU—to looser aggregations of states for which the engagement in a specific interregional dialogue is their *raison d'être* as a grouping—for example, the 'imagined' region that is the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States (Doidge 2011: 2). From this spine, three forms of interregionalism may be disaggregated. The first comprises those relationships between regional organisations. This is the classic type, characteristic of Rüland's (1999: 2–3) 'bilateral interregionalism', Aggarwal and Fogerty's (2004: 1) 'pure interregionalism' and Hänggi's (2006: 42) 'old interregionalism' (e.g. EU–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), EU–Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)). The second type involves dialogues between a regional organisation on the one hand, and a more-or-less coordinated regional grouping of states on the other (e.g. the Asia–Europe Meeting, ASEM), while the third concerns engagement between two more-or-less coordinated regional groups (e.g. the Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation, FEALAC). These latter two may be collectively termed 'transregionalism'.

3.3   Old Interregionalism and EU External Relations

Despite the early emergence of interregionalism, most prominently through the conclusion of group-to-group agreements with the Associated African States and Madagascar in the form of the two Yaoundé Conventions, it was initially accorded

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[1] Institutions comprising states from two or more regions, but for which the organising principle is state-to-state rather than group-to-group relations (e.g. the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC).

little significance as a phenomenon worthy of study in its own right. Rather, interregional dialogues were primarily understood as a means of expression of the then European Community (EC) as an external policy actor, a product both of the apparently *sui generis* nature of the Community itself, and of the nature of the interregional architecture that emerged roughly between the signing of the first Yaoundé Convention in 1963 and the ending of the bipolar conflict heralded by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. It was rooted in the early distinctiveness of the European integration project from other regional constructions evident at the time that the interregional architecture was being established, and particularly during the period of growth of such dialogues from the mid-1970s and early 1980s. The two—the nature of the European construction and the emergent interregional architecture—were clearly interlinked.

In contrast to other 'old' regional projects characterised by strict intergovernmentalism and a largely inward focus, European integration incorporated from the outset a (sometimes grudging) willingness to cede authority to supranational institutions, including the according of certain external relations competences (even if these were not always successfully realised). The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), for example, had taken the first steps towards an external role in being accorded legal personality with which to perform its core functions (including the promotion of international trade). Subsequently, the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the attribution of competences with an external component (agricultural trade and development, the common market), as well as the eleventh hour incorporation of relations with the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) into the Treaty of Rome, helped to turn the face of Europe outwards from the beginning. Further to this was a European desire, particularly strongly felt among certain member states, to establish a global identity distinct from that of the United States (US) (Smith 2002: 34). Together, these helped to condition Europe's own view of its place in the world, embodied in a push to establish itself as an object of significance in the international system by developing a network of external relationships of which group-to-group dialogues were one iteration.

The resulting interregional architecture resembled an EC-centred hub-and-spokes system, 'a novel and specific mode of international cooperation developed and dominated by the most advanced regional organisation' (Hänggi 2006: 32). Studies of EC external relations reflected this novelty, with a focus on conceptualising or exploring the role of the Community as an international actor, and group-to-group dialogues—being seen as a largely European phenomenon of only limited significance to the international system (Regelsberger 1990: 14)—explored only as incidental to this focus. Sjöstedt's seminal work on conceptualising the external role of the EC, for example, touched on interregionalism only in passing, recognising that commercial negotiations between the Community and another grouping could be bilateral rather than multilateral in character where the partner grouping acted in a unitary fashion (Sjöstedt 1977: 34). In so doing, he was among the first to recognise the importance of actorness to interregional dialogues (also see Hettne in this volume). Regelsberger's 1989 study also saw interregional structures as largely incidental to the primary focus—the study of EC external relations—utilising

the EC–ASEAN dialogue as simply a framework within which to explore European Political Cooperation.

The first major study of the EC's group-to-group relations—Edwards and Regelsberger's (1990) edited volume on *Europe's Global Links*—was very much rooted in this approach. Its focus was almost exclusively on the European side of the group-to-group equation, with a series of largely descriptive and policy-oriented case studies lacking in a common theoretical foundation. This descriptive approach remained prominent among the literature on interregionalism that emerged over the subsequent decade.

The volume nevertheless raised a number of issues that have continued to impact studies of interregionalism today. Most prominently, reflecting back on the Community's push to develop a global identity, was a recognition of the potential utility of group-to-group dialogues in establishing the Community as an object of significance on the world stage: interregionalism, in Regelsberger's conception, as a mechanism for 'improving Europe's international profile' (Regelsberger 1990: 11). Two further elements are also identifiable in the volume, both of which have gained greater prominence in the post-bipolar period of the 'new interregionalism'. First, harking back to Sjöstedt, was a recognition that intra-regional structures of cooperation impact the utility of interregional cooperation (Regelsberger 1990: 16)—the actorness issue—though this was not subsequently to be taken up with any real focus until theories of the 'new interregionalism' had become firmly established. Second, though never conceived as such in the volume, was the prefiguring of a number of potential functions that interregionalism might perform in the broader architecture of global governance. The cementing of group-to-group alliances to balance the influence of external powers (Regelsberger 1990: 12), or the utilisation of interregional relationships to promote cooperation among the EC's partner states provide two such examples, both of which would gain greater prominence a decade later in the context of 'new interregionalism'.

What we see in early conceptualisations of interregionalism then, reflecting the group-to-group architecture of the period, is a focus on such dialogues as an expression of EC actorness. Insofar as theoretical considerations were present, these largely reflected this European focus, being characterised by their treatment of the European project and its external relations as *sui generis*. Nevertheless, by adopting an actor-centred framework, the studies of old interregionalism have been important in highlighting motivations underpinning interregionalism: if interregionalism is conceived as an expression of actorness, then there must by implication be some underlying intent in their establishment. Where this has flowed over into the modern period is in the focus on the utility of external relations frameworks such as interregionalism in establishing a global presence. Such a view was the antecedent to recent conceptualisations of interregionalism as a pragmatic strategy with the core objective of establishing the place of the EU as a global actor (Söderbaum et al. 2005: 373), and as a mechanism for maximising EU influence in the international system—an acknowledgement that, despite the rhetoric of equal partnership that characterises the EU's group-to-group engagement, interregionalism is not free from power politics (Aggarwal and Fogerty 2004: 12–14). Thus, Aggarwal and Fogerty (2004: 13), in

their analysis of EU trade strategies, have conceived interregionalism as a framework within which the Union may deploy its own economic and institutional strengths to establish itself as the senior partner in any group-to-group dialogue, impacting the nature of its trading relationships and the settlement of disputes. Within this body of work, interregionalism is viewed largely through the agency of the EU, with studies exploring, for example, the way in which one region (Africa, MERCOSUR, etc.) is acted upon by the EU, or the manner in which European policy and preferences in its interregional relationships are formed.

3.4 New Interregionalism and the Five Functions

It is in the post-bipolar period that the study of the European Union's interregionalism has been subject to a greater awakening, a product of the fundamental transformation in the architecture of interregionalism that has been evident, resulting from an altered international system (conceptualised through the framework of globalisation) and the attendant emergence and proliferation of new 'open' regional formations. As these new regional structures have become increasingly internally coherent and institutionalised, they have in turn sought to express themselves more clearly in the external policy space with the result that this proliferation of new regionalisms has been accompanied by an ever-denser network of their external relations including, prominently, interregionalism. While the EU remains the primary actor in this emerging network, the EU-centric system has been replaced by one of multiple hubs, with ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the Andean Community (CAN) in particular progressively developing their own networks of group-to-group dialogue. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the process of globalisation (Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995: 151), and as a result the new regionalism, emerged and deepened first within the Triad of regions—North America, Europe and Asia. It is correspondingly within this Triad that the new interregionalism has developed to the greatest extent, both in the forms of bilateral interregionalism (EU–ASEAN) and transregionalism (ASEM), as well as in the marginal cases highlighted by Hänggi (Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC). One consequence is that studies of European Union interregionalism have been dominated by those of Europe–Asia relations.

This transformation in the architecture of interregionalism produced a concomitant transformation in the way in which interregionalism is theorised. As the network evolved from the actor-centred framework of the old hub-and-spokes model to the system-centred framework of the new interregionalism (Hänggi 2006: 32), so too were theoretical conceptualisations of interregionalism forced to move beyond the actor-centred literature of European external relations to draw on that of international relations more broadly. In this respect, the establishment of interregionalism as a seemingly indelible feature of the international system, existing beyond the agency of the European Union, has been conceived as the emergence of a new governance space, banded by institutions of regional and global governance (Rüland 1999, 2001). This space has been understood by reference to realist, institutionalist

and constructivist literature of international relations, each offering differing interpretations of the nature of interregionalism, and each contributing to a more complete understanding of the role and functioning of interregional structures in the global system. Thus realist theorising on power and the pursuit of equilibrium in the international system (particularly among the Triad regions), liberal institutionalist concerns with cooperation as a mechanism for managing complex interdependence, and constructivist concepts of reflexivity and the constitution of identities, have all contributed to the post-bipolar framework of interregionalism. From these was generated a set of roles and functions which interregionalism was expected to perform: balancing, institution-building, rationalising and agenda setting, and collective identity formation (also see Rüland in this volume).

Importantly, even as interregional dialogues and the corresponding set of functional expectations associated with them have been conceived as a systemic rather than a specifically EU-centred phenomenon, and theoretical explanations have consequently been sought beyond the narrow framework of EU external relations theory, the conceptualisation of interregionalism has continued to be dominated by an EU focus. Thus, for example, the role of interregionalism in power balancing (Rüland 1996; Dent 1997–1998), in rationalising global *fora* (Maull 1997), and in the reflexive formation of collective identities (Gilson 2002) all saw early consideration in studies of Europe–Asia relations. Indeed, the first aggregation of these theoretical insights into a single model of interregionalism was undertaken in the context of the ASEM and EU–ASEAN dialogues (Rüland 1999, 2001).

3.4.1   Functions of Interregionalism

Stated simply, the balancing function of interregionalism involves two interlocking elements. The first involves the utility of such group-to-group structures for avoiding possible marginalisation through maximising autonomy and room for manoeuvre in an anarchic/self-help system (Faust 2004: 749). This self-focused component of balancing has found expression in the economic sphere, for example, in the push to increase regional competitiveness, or to diversify trade relationships as a means of reducing dependence on particular markets. Second is an externally-oriented balancing, in which interregionalism constitutes a mechanism for constraining other actors or ensuring their open and honest participation within the global multilateral framework, thus strengthening and stabilising these structures (Ferguson 1997). Such balancing may involve cooperation to ensure access to markets,[2] or efforts to prevent unilateral action by a specific power.

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[2] Thus APEC has been seen as an attempt to keep the EU committed to open regionalism, while ASEM has similarly been conceived as a mechanism for ensuring ongoing US commitment to multilateralism (Segal 1997: 127).

Institution building recognises the way in which interregionalism, through the creation of structures and norms of cooperation, has a 'legalising effect on international relations' (Rüland 2001: 7) and a regularising effect on the external relations of regional groupings, facilitating dialogue between groups in a way not possible where engagement is only *ad hoc*. Further, such institutions strengthen the institutionalisation of international politics, helping to socialise states and groups of states into the web of rules, norms and values that facilitate and constrain global relations (Rüland 1999: 9; also see Rüland in this volume). Similarly, interregionalism encourages regional norms of cooperation—intra-regional institution building—as a consequence of engagement with an external other. This process of 'regionalism through interregionalism' (Hänggi 2003) may be entirely endogenous, with regional partners acting as a passive influence (as has largely been the case with East Asian integration as an outcome of ASEM), or it may involve exogenous contributions with the regional partner acting effectively as an external integrator (a role increasingly adopted by the European Union) (Doidge 2011: 37).

Of most interest to regional actors has been the potential contribution that interregional structures may make to overcoming the difficulties intrinsic to large-*n* multilateral negotiations (rationalising) and as a means for pushing cooperative agendas at the global level (agenda setting). Regional actors already constitute important, albeit variable, mechanisms for the aggregation and reconciliation of state interests, such coordination being one of the motive forces underlying regional integration. Interregional *fora* are the next step in this process, constituting as they do a further level of interaction between the state and global multilateral levels, regularising contacts and facilitating the merging of actor expectations (Doidge 2011: 44). With negotiations between regional blocs being potentially more efficient than those between states, interregionalism is seen as serving a 'clearing house' function for global *fora* (Dent 1997–1998: 498; Maull 1997: 51–52; Rüland 1999: 7). Closely related to this rationalising role is the suggestion that smaller numbers and a greater sense of consensus and common interest generated through interregional engagement creates the possibility for collective agenda setting at the global level.

Finally, collective identity formation concerns the establishment of regional identities. Such 'regional awareness' is an intrinsic component of actorness, centred on 'language and rhetoric, means by which definitions of regional identity are constantly defined and redefined' (Eliassen and Børve Arnesen 2007: 206). As such, regional actors, as Campbell (1999: 11) notes of states, are the sum of the practices and interactions that express their existence, with regional identity the product as much of engagement with an external other (Campbell 1999: 9, 70–72) as it is of intra-regional state-to-state interaction. Interregionalism, as an increasingly densely institutionalised structure of region-to-region relations, provides a locus for regularised contact and a venue for socialisation. It provides, in other words, a framing context for the construction of regional identities and awareness (Doidge 2011: 46).

3.4.2 Integrating Actorness: Functional Varieties
of Interregionalism

While a significant advance on the conceptualisation of old interregionalism, this framework nevertheless established little more than a set of expectations concerning the sort of activities likely to be seen in interregional dialogues. As such, while formulated within the context of the study of the European Union, it was sufficiently flexible to be used as a lens through which to view essentially any group-to-group dialogue process. In so doing, it provided a useful mode of categorisation of interregional behaviour, but it offered little in the way of explanation as to why such functions were or were not performed in specific dialogues. It was in theories of European Union actorness, with their genealogies traceable to the work of Sjöstedt (1977) and the concern with conceptualising EC external relations that was characteristic of the bipolar period, that an explanatory variable was able to be found, and in so doing something of a link between the studies of the old and new interregionalisms provided. Again, this move in the theorising of interregionalism was framed largely in the Triadic context, in Europe–Asia relations (Doidge 2004a, b, 2007, 2008).

Drawing on a range of theorists from Sjöstedt (1977) to Bretherton and Vogler (2006), a simple definition of regional actors may be conceived involving identity, presence and actorness (also see Hettne in this volume). *Identity* is that which distinguishes the actor from its external environment, and informs and structures its external action. *Presence* (Allen and Smith 1990) acknowledges the passive impact of regional identity on the external environment. It acknowledges, in other words, that regions may be consequential even when not acting, or indeed not capable of acting. By contrast, *actorness* concerns agency in the international arena—it designates the ability to act in purposive fashion in the pursuit of given goals and interests (informed by a region's identity). It is a function on the ability to formulate coherent policies, and to pursue them effectively in the international system. As such, it is impacted by the nature of regional institutions[3]: norms and structures of decision-taking, the nature of authority and so on (Doidge 2011: 18–26).

It is not necessary to rehearse in detail the case for the impact of actorness on interregionalism, this argument having been made elsewhere (Doidge 2004a, b, 2007, 2008). It is sufficient simply to acknowledge that actorness relates to the functions of interregionalism in three ways. First, for those externally-oriented functions of interregionalism, directed towards the global multilateral level and involving purposive activity—external balancing, rationalising and agenda setting—a high level of actorness on the part of both groupings is necessary. Such functions are dependent on the ability of regional groupings to coordinate intra-regional positions with sufficient flexibility to negotiate at the interregional and subsequently global levels.

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[3] Drawing on Grieco (1997: 165), institutionalisation may be seen to involve three dimensions: (i) *Locus of institutionalisation*: the legal basis on which the regional actor is built; (ii) *Scope of activity*: the extent of regional cooperation; and (iii) *Level of institutional authority*: whether organisational principles are supranational or intergovernmental.

The greater the actorness of the partners, the greater the potential for performing such functions (see Hettne in this volume).

Second, for those internally-oriented functions, directed downwards towards the regional level—intra-regional institution building, collective identity formation—it is the comparative difference in actorness that is significant. Thus, for example, intra-regional institution building—regionalism through interregionalism—is more likely to occur where a comparatively weaker regional actor is confronted by a comparatively stronger external other. Finally, actorness remains of only tangential importance to functions such as interregional institution building, it requiring little strategy or effort to establish most formal structures of cooperation (working groups, joint projects, networks, etc.).[4]

In short, those facets of interregionalism involving an 'internal' impact downwards to the regional level are linked to a comparative asymmetry in actorness between the partner groupings. By contrast, those high-end functions of interregionalism conceived as having an 'external' impact upwards to the global multilateral level are linked to the strength of actorness of both partners (and *ipso facto* greater symmetry between them). Such a recognition allows us to rearticulate our understanding of interregionalism, identifying two functional varieties: first, an internally-focused, capacity-building interregionalism; and second, an externally-focused, globally active interregionalism.

The capacity-building role for interregionalism, the product of qualitative differences in actorness between interregional partners, sees it directed largely towards the strengthening over time of regional actorness. This is expressed in two ways: first through the building of intra-regional institutions or norms of cooperation within the 'weaker' partner as a consequence of the need for greater coordination in the dialogue process; and second through the formation and strengthening of regional identities as a product of engagement with a more coherent external other. Both components are strongly associated with regional actorness. The globally active form of interregionalism, by contrast, is concerned with the expression of interregional cooperation on the global stage. It is about the pursuit of agreed goals and interests in the international system and global *fora*. It is with this actorness-interregionalism framework and the attendant functional varieties that the remainder of this chapter will engage.

3.5   Patterns of Engagement in EU Interregionalism

This framework—aligning the literature of EU actorness with the framework of functions linked to the conceptualisation of new interregionalism—provides us with a useful tool for considering the shape of EU interregionalism. When applied to the

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[4] One consequence is that, in the absence of substantive cooperation, institutional proliferation can become a simple means for demonstrating progress in group-to-group relations (Doidge 2007: 243).

Europe–Asia relationship, a pattern in three parts emerges involving: first, motivations; second, the delivery of capacity-building functions; and third, aspirations towards a globally active interregionalism (Doidge 2011: 171–175).

3.5.1   Motivations

A constant factor underpinning the EU's choice to pursue interregionalism has been the potential for interregionalism to assist in establishing the Union as an object of significance in the international system. Beyond this, however, the balancing function has gained increasing prominence. While again this has always been present,[5] in the post-bipolar period it has become the primary motivation for the establishment of bilateral interregional and transregional processes. Concern with the failure to gain sufficient traction in the 'Asian miracle' markets, for example, has been a key factor behind the drive to revitalise Europe–Asia relations. The 1994 *New Asia Strategy* raised 'as a matter of urgency' the need 'to strengthen its economic presence in Asia in order to maintain its leading role in the world economy […] [and] to ensure its interests are taken fully into account there' (European Commission 1994b: 1), a concern translated into the Southeast Asian context with 1996s *New Dynamic in EU–ASEAN Relations*, which posited the European Union as 'a counterbalance to the presence of Japan and the United States' and expressed the fear that the EU would be 'shut out of the region by the dynamic action of other great economic powers' (European Commission 1996: 10).

3.5.2   Capacity-Building Interregionalism

The second element in European Union interregionalism is the visibility of capacity-building, a product of the asymmetry of actorness present between the Union and its dialogue partners. Importantly, particularly evident in the post-bipolar period has been the engagement in purposive forms of capacity-building in the context of bilateral interregionalism as the Union's partners themselves establish clear integrative goals towards which EU activities can be directed. The EU's promotion of regionalism stems from two motive forces. The first has been an ongoing drive to promote stability in the international system, and the associated preference for positing its own external relations within settled frameworks (Hill and Smith 2005: 12). Integration promotion is an extension of this, serving to regularise and structure interactions between states. Second, drawing on its own history, is the conviction that regionalism delivers clear benefits to its constituent members, a belief that

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[5] Thus, for example, a concern that it would be marginalised from economic dialogue has been highlighted in relation to the launching of relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1973 (Nuttall 1990: 148).

found early expression in the preambles to Cooperation Agreements with ASEAN in 1980, the Andean Pact in 1984, and the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1989.

As a consequence, the promotion of regionalism has become entrenched in the Union's interregional relations. Thus, for example, has been the establishment in 1995 of the Institutional Development Programme for the ASEAN Secretariat, and in 2004 of its successor ASEAN Programme for Regional Integration Support. These reflect the goal, stated explicitly in the 2001 *Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships*, to 'provide active support for reinforced regional integration' (European Commission 2001: 22). Indeed, they constitute a particularly overt form of integration promotion: by offering capacity-building and technical assistance programmes modelled on the Union's own experience, the Commission is helping to influence the integration debate within the Association. Specifically, these programmes are helping to define an appropriate role for the ASEAN Secretariat within the broader integration project, seeking to remedy an acknowledged weak point in the EU–ASEAN relationship—that 'the ASEAN Secretariat is really a secretariat' (Commission official, quoted in Doidge 2004a: 202). Aside from such overt measures, also evident in the ASEM context has been a process of intra-regional institution building within the Asia grouping as a consequence of engagement with a more coherent external other, a process considered in detail by Hänggi (2003).

3.5.3   Globally Active Interregionalism

The third element in European Union interregionalism has been the importance accorded to the globally active form. It is in this variety, premised upon active engagement at the global level, where the Union's greatest interest lies, the establishment of 'effective multilateralism' (European Council 2003: 9) and participation in global *fora* being the 'defining principle' of its external relations strategy (European Commission 2003: 3). With the increased emphasis on multilateral governance institutions and on multilateral solutions to global problems that has been characteristic of the post-bipolar period, the need for external cooperation to achieve global goals has become firmly entrenched in the EU's interregional relationships, at least in a declaratory form. The utility of interregionalism as a mechanism for facilitating effective global engagement has been increasingly highlighted, with Commission President Prodi, for example, arguing that effective multilateral institutions require 'co-operation between strong and integrated regional entities', and that 'global governance can emerge only from such interregional cooperation' (Prodi 2000: 5).

Such goals have been prominent in Europe–Asia relations. The first ASEAN–EC Ministerial Meeting in 1978, for example, highlighted the need for cooperation in international *fora*, pointing to the imminent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1979 and the push for a New International Economic Order. In the post-bipolar period, the need to cooperate to achieve global multilateral goals (particularly in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the United Nations system) has become a significant element in the relationship, at least

in declaratory form, appearing in all Commission strategy documents and Chairman's statements of EU–ASEAN *fora*. ASEM *fora* too, since the launch of the process in 1996, have routinely expressed a similar ambition. A rhetorical commitment to a globally active form of interregionalism has therefore been a key component of Europe–Asia relations, helping to structure expectations for engagement in both the EU–ASEAN and ASEM *fora*.[6]

Despite rhetorical commitment to such partnership, what has been largely absent is any substantive delivery of these functions, a product largely of asymmetries in actorness undermining the capacity of these dialogue structures to deliver all that has been envisaged (Doidge 2011). Practitioners within both the Commission and the ASEAN Secretariat, for example, have attributed this failure in the EU–ASEAN relationship to the inability of the Association to achieve intra-regional positions enabling it to 'offer the support of a real bloc' (Commission official, quoted in Doidge 2004b: 50).[7] The delivery of such functions is similarly difficult to find in the transregional ASEM process, again a function of the inability of intra-regional structures of cooperation to overcome the diversity of Asian viewpoints (Doidge 2011: 125).[8]

3.5.4   Capability-Expectations Gap

This tripartite pattern defies the apparent logic suggested by the functional varieties of interregionalism. Despite the very different demands that these functional varieties make of the regional actors involved, raising the expectation that they would form two poles of a *continuum* charting a transformation in the nature of interregional dialogues as the actorness of the engaged groupings increases (Doidge 2011: 52), they are clearly not treated discretely by the European Union. Rather, they co-exist in the Union's goal-setting for its interregional relationships, with high-end aspirations for a globally active partnership appearing alongside capacity-building activities, raising the spectre of a certain dissonance in the Union's approach. In conceptualising this dissonance, the study of the EU's external relations again provides a framework, in the form of Hill's (1993) capability-expectations gap. Hill's approach, part of a tradition of theorising on European Union underperformance in the international arena, is particularly relevant to interregionalism. What we clearly see in the EU's emphasis on a globally active interregionalism is a mismatch between its expectation of what can be achieved, and the capability of itself and its

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[6] Indeed, said one Commission official, 'if there is any value in having a relationship with ASEAN, or a relationship in ASEM […] then it is as a clearing house in which you try to get an agreement […] And that's also what ASEAN said to us' (quoted in Doidge 2007: 243).

[7] The irony that this is often more than the Union itself is able to deliver should not be lost.

[8] Some suggestive hints of progress in rationalising may be found in the ASEM process, though these constitute limited success at a lowest common denominator level (see, for example, Doidge 2011: 123–127).

partner groupings to deliver these results. There is a clear disconnect between, on the one hand, the Union's investment in capacity-building interregionalism, acknowledging implicitly as this does a perception of the limitations of its partner groupings to act intra- or extra-regionally, and, on the other, the expectation that these interregional partnerships will deliver high-end globally active functions.

3.6 Beyond the European Union

The theorising of interregionalism has been dominated by the place of the European Union as its primary interlocutor. And while there has been a significant evolution in the way in which it has been conceived—from an actor-centred to a system-centred phenomenon—it remains the case that studies of interregionalism have continued to be dominated by this European focus and indeed, as far as interregional structures go, have been conceived almost exclusively within a Triadic setting in the form of Europe–Asia relations, a situation not altogether surprising given the long-standing and breadth of engagement that these relationships have involved. This narrow focus raises the question as to whether the actorness-interregionalism framework and the pattern of engagement outlined above apply beyond the European Union or indeed beyond Triadic interregionalism. Is, for example, the small-*n* problem that has routinely bedevilled integration theory also a difficulty when conceptualising interregionalism? When we consider interregionalism, is the EU a *sui generis* case? Does it represent an *n* of 1?

One clear failing of the literature of interregionalism is the absence of theory-based comparisons of intra- and extra-Triadic structures. One of the few attempts to conceive such is Dosch's (2005) typology, which makes a clear distinction between Triadic and peripheral, or first and second order, interregionalism. Whereas the former, in Dosch's conceptualisation, engages 'primary actors', involves a high degree of institutionalisation and is directed towards order-building and the management of the global system, the latter, as a consequence of the engagement of 'secondary actors' (lower-medium and small powers), involves a low level of institutionalisation and is not directed towards altering the international system or impacting global governance (Dosch 2005: 185–186). This would suggest, then, that the pattern of engagement in Triadic Europe–Asia relations would not be present in peripheral interregionalisms involving partnerships between the Union and secondary actors, or indeed in structures which exclude the EU entirely. Two preliminary investigations of peripheral interregionalisms, however, suggest the contra case.

3.6.1 EU–MERCOSUR

Within the EU–MERCOSUR relationship, characterised again by asymmetric actorness, clear suggestions can be found that the tripartite pattern of engagement highlighted inheres beyond the Triad. The EU's push to extend its relationship with MERCOSUR,

for example, was motivated in large part by the emergence of hemispheric free trade negotiations stemming from George H.W. Bush's 1990 Enterprise of the America's Initiative, concretised in the 1994 proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The EU's 1994 *Enhanced Policy* document must be read in this context, signalling as it did a re-orientation of the relationship with MERCOSUR towards greater economic engagement, highlighting the economic potential of MERCOSUR integration (European Commission 1994a: 8) along with the concern that a failure to respond to hemispheric initiatives would have adverse consequences for the Union's market share (European Commission 1994a: 11–12; also see Santander in this volume). A similar balancing motivation may be found on the part of MERCOSUR itself, with an interest in diversifying away from a situation of dependence on US markets, combined with a concern with the diversionary impact of the Union's eastern enlargement, the candidate countries being competitors in agricultural trade and certain manufacturing sectors (e.g. auto parts) (Bulmer Thomas 2000: 9).

Also evident in this relationship is the clear aspiration for a globally active engagement. The *Enhanced Policy* made this explicit, calling for greater cooperation and envisaging 'the coordination of positions in some multilateral organisations' (European Commission 1994a: 10). Nevertheless, the relationship has failed to deliver such cooperation, a matter attributed to MERCOSUR's own limitations. An inability to overcome intramural differences within the grouping, alongside a lack of commitment—notably on the part of Brazil and Argentina—to a regional approach to multilateral *fora*, has meant that the organisation has lacked the agency to make such an interregional partnership work (Commission official in Doidge 2011: 156; also see Santander in this volume).

Where aspirations for a globally active interregionalism have remained unfulfilled, capacity-building has continued apace. While such Union goals have a long history in its relations with Latin America, they were given added impetus with the emergence of MERCOSUR, an integration arrangement consciously modelled on the Union itself. Only months after the launching of MERCOSUR, the EU had established an accord under which it would provide administrative support to the organisation. In the following year this was formalised through the conclusion of an *Inter-Institutional Cooperation Agreement* between the Commission and the Common Market Council, the underlying intent of which was to develop MERCOSUR sufficiently to act as the key interlocutor in the Union's relations with the common market countries (Santander 2005: 291). These early efforts have been further entrenched in the 1996 *Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement* and in a series of institution building and technical cooperation programmes.

3.6.2   Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation

In the FEALAC, a transregional framework exclusive of the European Union, a similar *prima facie* case can be made. Balancing motivations again underpinned the establishment of the dialogue, with Goh's (1999) initial proposal for the forum

mirroring his earlier ASEM initiative in positing Asia–Latin America relations as a 'missing link'. Given the ambitious economic integration goals of both ASEAN and MERCOSUR, this situation was seen as untenable, the case being clearly stated by Singaporean Foreign Minister Shunmugan Jayakumar at the first forum meeting in 1999 with the assertion that a failure to fill this gap 'would prevent both regions from mutually exploiting their enormous economic potential' (quoted in Low 2006: 87).

Similarly evident is a rhetorical commitment to the globally active functions of interregionalism. FEALAC's 2001 *Framework Document* made clear the need to leverage cooperation on the global stage in defence of common interests (FEALAC 2001: §4). Notably lacking, however, is any movement towards achieving such aspirations. As with ASEM, the non-binding nature of the forum has mitigated against establishing collective goals, with the role of regional coordinators (replicated from ASEM) proving insufficient to generate cohesion within the two groupings. Neither East Asia nor Latin America as constituted within FEALAC are regional actors, and in the absence of effective mechanisms for intra-group cooperation, national interest has continued to dominate. Added to this, the forum lacks a Summit-level Heads of state and government meeting to provide direction to the process, further impacting the ability to generate collective interests.

In contrast, however, to the EU interregionalisms outlined, FEALAC shows little evidence of capacity-building. Again, this would seem to be a product of the lack of integration and actorness on the part of both groupings—a lack of sufficient asymmetry and the corresponding weakness of the concept of an external 'other', combined with the low density of engagement, serves to undermine potential integrative responses. Further, overt integrative behaviour of the sort associated with the EU seems to be precluded by a lack of financial resources, and more importantly by an emphasis on such regulative principles as non-interference. Insofar as capacity-building may be seen in the framework, it is in the low-level identity building associated with the establishment of membership criteria, the decision to incorporate (or exclude) specific states, and in the importation of the 'Asian way' of cooperation into the forum, and the reinforcement of such principles in the *Framework Document*.

3.7 Conclusion: The Future Study of Interregionalism

From a situation of relative indifference, interregionalism has come to occupy a greater place in the study of the European Union. Indeed, the conceptualisation of interregionalism is a process that has taken place largely within the confines of the study of the EU. In a period when interregionalism is increasingly seen as a systemic rather than EU-centric phenomenon, this raises the difficulty that the theoretical models that have emerged are too EU-specific. As already stated, the great absence in the study of interregionalism has been of theory based comparative studies, and it is toward filling this gap that studies of interregionalism must now be directed.

What seems at least presumptively clear from the above is that the pattern of engagement generated by application of the actorness-interregionalism framework to the Triadic Europe–Asia case is also present in non-Triadic EU interregionalism, and in interregional structures excluding the European Union entirely. This suggests, therefore, that the framework outlined may be a useful starting point for this undertaking. The challenge is twofold. First, further attention must be given to the framework of actorness. Drawing as it does on theoretical models of the European Union as an international actor, the risk is present that it is not sufficiently nuanced to reflect the diversity of integration arrangements. It may, in other words, presuppose to an extent the form an actor should take, impacting on its use as an explanatory variable in comparative analyses. A greater cross-pollination between the study of interregionalism and of comparative regionalism is therefore necessary.

Second, and more generally, is the need for further studies of interregionalism representing the full array of relations on offer, moving beyond Europe–Asia relations, and indeed beyond the European Union entirely. More must be done to explore the peripheral interregionalisms, to test whether the *prima facie* case for a broad similarity in patterns of engagement outlined above is more than simply a passing resemblance, and to test whether differences may be explained within the actorness-interregionalism model outlined. If theoretical and empirical work is not extended in such a way, interregionalism runs the risk of becoming little more than a *cul-de-sac* in the study of the European Union.

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Chapter 4
Regional Actorship: A Comparative Approach to Interregionalism

Björn Hettne

4.1   Introduction

According to the dominant paradigm in international relations, the nation-state is the main, if not the only, relevant actor in the international system constituted by nation-states. However the 'nation-centric paradigm' is now being overtaken by the 'post-national paradigm' (Nicolaïdis and Lacroix 2003), and 'methodological nationalism' is being overtaken by 'methodological cosmopolitanism' (Beck 2004). This dualism is not simply a matter of 'either or', but rather what kind of theoretical glasses we are using. Neither of the images represents 'the truth'. Accordingly, in this study, regions are seen as 'actors' in order to grasp their potential actorship even though this could be questioned on empirical grounds from one situation to another.

Somehow, a general theory of regionalism in the world system must begin to be built. There are a number of competing approaches according to which a region may appear as a geographical area, a military alliance system or a trading block. A region can also be seen as 'imagined community' since any historical region contains shared cultural traditions that can be used in a region-building process. As Tony Payne puts it, 'regions are always in the making, constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed through social practice and discourse' (2004: 20). Amitav Acharya similarly argues for 'an agency-oriented perspective that acknowledges local resistance to, and socialisation of, powerful actors and attests to the endogenous construction of regions' (2007: 630). This dynamic understanding of region as process is central to the new regionalism approach (Hettne 2001, 2003; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000). An 'approach' is more modest than a 'theory' and serves the

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purpose of dealing analytically in a non-reductionist way with a multidimensional phenomenon. 'New regionalism' must be seen as a new political landscape in the making, characterised by several interrelated dimensions, many actors (including the region itself) and several interacting levels of society. Hence several theoretical approaches are needed (as stated in the Introduction to this book).

The region is moving into a centre place in current theories of international relations and international political economy, hence the growing interest for the dynamics of regionalism, as well as for interregionalism, as a possible world order. However, the study of regions and regionalism still lacks a firm ontological and epistemological foundation. What is a region? And how to approach it? Unless we simply focus on the state-led regional organisation as such, the relevant region must be seen as continuously changing and growing in size, as shown in the case of the repeated enlargements of the European Union (EU), the more active role taken by the African Union (AU), the convergence of Southeast Asia and East Asia into a possible East Asian Community (EAC), and the merger of the Southern Cone and the Andean region in the new Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The ontological target is moving.

What about epistemology? 'Comparative regionalism' has often been suggested as a useful point of departure for theorising regionalism (Breslin et al. 2002; Hettne 2001). This approach has to be built from a rather fragmented field, consisting of European integration studies, regional area studies, international political economy, international relations and comparative politics (De Lombaerde et al. 2010). As in this chapter, the controversial starting point is often the case of Europe, not least because the EU is promoting regionalism in its own image around the world (see Santander in this volume). The universally rejected bias of Eurocentrism can nevertheless be overcome and kept at bay. It is difficult not to see regionalism in the light of the European experience, but it is of course essential to take into account the specific preconditions and dynamics of each region. It is now appropriate to speak of regionalisms in the plural rather than the singular. This necessitates inputs from area studies specialists to the field of regional studies.[1] It is also essential to specify what is to be compared. Should it be the region as a whole (whatever that may be) or a specific regional process (regionalisation)? As will become clear, the region is itself a process. This is obvious in the case of Europe, but the shape of other regions is also changing with the challenges they are facing, and with the way they try to deal with these challenges through the pooling or sharing of sovereignty, thereby increasing their capacity to act as regions.

Normally a region is not associated with actorship, but rather seen as an 'arena', a 'level' of action, or limited to a regional organisation. Regions are here understood

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[1] This sounds easy, but a closer dialogue between area specialists and students of globalism and regionalism is in fact a difficult one. Either the latter has to devote time to many types of empirical realities in a number of regions, or the former must widen the interest to other regions, as well as international relations theory and international political economy. For a well-known example of the first option, see Peter J. Katzenstein's *A World of Regions* (2005). The risk with a too strong empirical approach is the neglect of potential future change.

as processes; they are not geographical or administrative objects, but potential subjects, and thereby actors in the making; their boundaries are shifting, and so is their actorship and capacity as actors. Our recent history in the Westphalian era has been completely dominated by national actors. This has also resulted in state-centric theories of international relations. Regional agency has come to life due to the transformation of the EU from being simply an area and an instrument for economic cooperation, to being a political actor. The same process can be discerned in other regions, which increasingly take on an external role. The need for regional agency comes from the challenges of globalisation, as most nation-states are unable to manage pressing global problems on their own.

A region exhibits a similarity to a nation, in that a region is an 'imagined community', and like a nation it has a territorial base. But there are also differences, for instance the variety of interests and the problem of coordination within the region. The unique feature of regional agency is that it must be created by voluntary processes and therefore depends on dialogue and consensus within the emerging region in which the nation-states typically cling to their sovereignty. Regional agency is thus distinct from state action, which operates according to a different logic, particularly in the case of a strong national power.

This chapter firstly develops a comparative framework built around the concept of regional actorship: the mutually supportive role of regionness, presence and actorness. In the subsequent two sections the framework is employed in a comparison between the historical emergence of the European region and current regionalisms and interregionalisms in East Asia and Latin America (LA). The final section draws conclusions about the relationship between regionalism, interregionalism and world order.

4.2   An Anatomy of Regional Actorship

Regional actorship is used as a summary concept for a region's ability to influence the external world, and for instance engage in interregionalism. The preconditions for regional actorship must be looked for both in internal developments in the region and in its external context. The relative cohesion of the regional actor shapes external action, which in turn impacts on regional identity and regional consciousness through the expectations and reactions of external actors *vis-à-vis* the region. The concept of regional actorship is built around three interacting components: internal cohesion and identity formation, or *regionness*; international *presence* in terms of territorial and population size, economic strength, diplomacy, military power, etc.; and capacity to act purposively in an organised fashion in order to shape outcomes in the external world, or *actorness*. Actorship for a region is thus a complex phenomenon and the three components may influence each other. An increase in the level of regionness leads to a more distinct presence, which in turn actualises the question of actorness, due to expectations flowing from various forms of presence.

4.2.1   Regionness

Regionalism is usually seen as the ideology and project of region-building, while the concept of regionalisation is reserved for more or less spontaneous processes of region-formation by different actors—state or non-state. When different processes of regionalisation intensify and converge within the same geographical area, the cohesion—and thereby the distinctiveness of the region in the making—increases. A regional actor takes shape. This process of regionalisation can be described in historical terms of five levels of *regionness*: regional social space; regional social system; regional international society; regional community; and regional institutionalised polity (Hettne 1993, 2003; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000). The concept of regionness defines the position of a particular region in terms of its cohesion. It is derived from the European experience and must therefore be modified and universalised to be relevant for other regions.

Regional social space is a geographical area, normally delimited by natural, physical barriers. Even if the region is rooted in territory, it must be understood as a 'social' space. In social terms, it is organised by human inhabitants, at first in relatively isolated communities, and later constituting some kind of translocal relationship, which can result from demographic change or changes in transport-technology.

The increased density of contacts, implying more durable, but still unsettled, relations, is what creates a *regional social system*. Historically the often precarious security situation ('security complex'), characterised by competing political units, lacking organised diplomatic relations, has often led to an empire, or even more often to pendulum movements between a centralised and a more or less decentralised order (Buzan and Wæver 2003). The centralised imperial systems achieved order by force and coercion.

The region as an *international society* implies a set of rules that makes interstate relations more predictable (less anarchic), and thus more peaceful, or at least less violent. It can be either organised (*de jure*) or more spontaneous (*de facto*). In the case of a more institutionalised cooperation, the region is constituted by the members of the regional alliance system or regional organisations.

The region as a *community* takes shape when a stable organisational framework facilitates and promotes social communication and the convergence of values, norms and behaviour throughout the region. Thus a transnational civil society emerges, characterised by social trust also at the regional level. In security terms we (after Karl Deutsch) speak of a 'security community' (Deutsch et al. 1957; also see Chap. 5, by Santini, Lucarelli and Pinfari).

Finally, the region as an *institutionalised polity* has a more fixed and permanent structure of decision-making and therefore stronger acting capability, or actorship. Such a regional polity does not have to be characterised by the normal terminology used to describe political systems but can be *sui generis*, as in the case of Europe, or Europolity. At present no other region in the world can be described in these terms.

The approach of seeing a region as process implies an evolution of deepening regionalism, not necessarily following the idealised, stage-model presented above,

which mainly serves a heuristic and comparative purpose. Since regionalism is a political project, created by human actors, it may move in different directions. It might indeed also fail, just as a nation-state project can fail. Seen from this perspective, decline means fragmentation and decreasing regionness as well as dilution of identity. The failure of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to keep the post-Soviet space together is an example of such a fragmentary process. Such processes have implications also for interregionalism, which consequently suffers its ups and downs.

4.2.2   Presence

The concept of 'presence' constitutes a bridge between endogenous and exogenous factors. A stronger presence implies a greater capacity to act, but the actor must be subjectively conscious about its presence and prepared to make use of it. Furthermore, a stronger presence means more repercussions and reactions, and thereby pressure to act. In the absence of such action, presence itself will diminish and leave a vacuum behind. Europe, unique among regions in terms of presence, is more than the EU's foreign policy, and more even than the aggregate of the EU's policies across all areas of its activity. Simply by existing, and due to its relative weight (demographically, economically, militarily and ideologically), the Union has an impact on the rest of the world. Its footprints are seen everywhere. It is the largest donor in the world. The size of its economy is comparable to that of the United States (US). It is also building a military capacity, meant to be used outside the region. All this provokes reactions and creates expectations from the outside. In the 'near abroad', presence is particularly strong and can even develop into the outright absorption of new territory (enlargement).

   Presence is thus a complex and comprehensive material variable, depending on the size of the actor, the scope of its external activities, the relative importance of different issue areas, and the relative dependence of various regions upon the European market.

4.2.3   Actorness

'Actorness' implies a scope of action and room for manoeuvre, in some cases even a legal personality, however not common in the case of regions. In the case of the EU, actorness is closely related to the controversial issue of 'competencies' (who has the right to decide what?), ultimately determined by the member states as a whole group. Actorness follows from the strengthened presence of the regional unit in different contexts, as well as from the interaction between the actor and its external environment. Actorness is thus not only a simple function of regionness, but also an outcome of a dialectic process between endogenous and exogenous forces.

Actorness has received a great deal of attention in the discussion of EU as a global actor. Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 30) identify four requirements for actorness: (i) shared commitment to a set of overarching shared values and principles; (ii) domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities relating to external policy; (iii) ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate consistent and coherent policies; and (iv) availability of, and capacity to, utilise policy instruments (diplomacy, economic tools and military means) (also see Sjöstedt 1977). Obviously, these requirements are fulfilled in different degrees in different foreign policy relations and different foreign policy issue areas: from the 'near abroad' to far away regions; and from the areas of trade, in which the EU is a strong actor, to security, where the competence given to the EU is contested and highly controversial. In other words, actorness is shifting over time, between issue areas and between foreign policy relations. This has to do with the peculiar nature of the EU as an actor and the complexity of its foreign policy machinery. The most problematic requirement of actorness appears to be that of domestic legitimation, in view of the democratic deficit of the EU. This is posing a severe challenge to EU actorness, particularly in the field of security.

In contrast with nation-states, regional actorness must be created by voluntary processes and therefore depends on dialogue and consensus. This mode of operating is the model Europe holds out as the preferred world order, since it is the way the new Europe (as organised by the EU) developed. With increased levels of actorness in different fields of action and in different parts of the world, Europe will be able to influence the world order towards its own preferred model of civilian power: dialogue, respect for different interests within an interregional, pluralist framework based on democracy, social justice and equality, multilateralism and international law (Telò 2006).

4.2.4 Regional Actorship and Interregionalism

Even though the concept of regional actorship is derived from the EU as a global actor, it is nevertheless meant to serve as an analytical framework in studying the transformation of *any* region from being an object to becoming a subject, that is with a certain actor capacity in its external relations. This can be done comparatively as tried in this chapter. The concept is also relevant in order to understand the preconditions for interregionalism. For two regions to establish a functioning relationship, it is essential that both have achieved a certain degree of actorship, that is, a combination of internal cohesion, external presence and organised actorship. Otherwise there will merely be a subject-object relationship, which oftentimes seems to be the case in the EU's relations with weaker or dispersed counterpart regions (Söderbaum and Stålgren 2010). Interregionalism can thus be described as a relationship between actors more or less well provided with the three components of actorship. These components, varying in importance, can compensate for each others' weaknesses. A weak presence can for instance be compensated for by

stronger internal cohesion (regionness), or a more effectively organised actorness. To this comes the importance that the interregional interaction may have for the internal cohesion. A strong presence does not necessarily lead to regional actorship. North America as organised in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for instance, is strong in terms of presence but as a region it is weak in terms of regionness and actorness. Other regions short of actorship are the Middle East, which is paralysed by interstate and intrastate conflicts, the Mediterranean, which is a social construction by the EU Neighbourhood Policy, as well as Caucasus and Central Asia, which can be described as 'pre-regions'. Africa is well provided with regional organisations but this has not led to strong actorship. The AU is modelled on the EU but whatever regionness there is to be found is of a rather informal nature with roots in pre-colonial times.

4.3   Comparing Regionalisation

This chapter highlights the close link between regions and interregionalism. In other words, it is necessary to start with an analysis of regionalisation and regional actorship in order to understand the preconditions for and the nature of contemporary interregionalism. The problem with comparative analysis is that the number of cases to compare, at least if this is to be done systematically, has to be limited. This section discusses the cases of Europe, East and Southeast Asia (*de facto* constituting East Asia) and Latin America, focusing on processes of regionalisation towards regional actorship.

   The more recent regionalisation process in Europe can be described in terms of three convergences leading to increased cohesion: regime convergence, economic homogenisation, and relaxed security relations. In spite of having happened in Europe, these processes seem to qualify as general preconditions for actorship and will therefore be used as a backdrop for analysing the more state-driven regionalisation in East Asia and Latin America.

4.3.1   Regionalisation in Europe

The regionalisation process in Europe is constituted by different forms of convergence: of political regimes, economic homogenisation, and in the way security arrangements are organised. *Regime convergence* implies the reduction of differences within a particular political space, in this case an emerging region. The homogenisation of essential features of the political system can be seen as a precondition for joining the EU, and thus as a factor explaining enlargement. Normally a country Europeanises before being adopted as 'European' and forming part of the EU, whereby regionalisation from below changes into harmonisation and coordination from above. The recent (post-1957) process of political homogenisation in

Europe has gone through three phases: (i) in the South, the disappearance of military dictatorships in the mid-1970s; (ii) in the West, the more widespread self-assertion of the European Atlantic partners in the field of security, beginning in the early 1980s; and (iii) in the East, the fall of the communist regimes in the late 1980s and the Soviet collapse in 1991.

The transformation in the post-communist countries formed part of the general homogenisation process, or the Europeanisation of Europe largely coming from below. The Soviet Union's withdrawal from dominance in Eastern Europe dramatically reinforced the 'de-Eastern Europeanisation', which had been ongoing for some time, at varying speeds in different countries (Dannreuther 2004; Smith 2003).

The process of *economic homogenisation*, associated with uniform national adaptations to globalisation, led to a state of liberal hegemony in Europe, although at the beginning, when the EU was formed, the policy of state interventionism was widespread. Still European capitalism is referred to as 'social capitalism'. The economic regionalisation of Europe arising out of the intensification of the internal market project has thus so far been consistent with market-led economic globalisation. Indeed, both processes have been founded on the same neo-liberal paradigm and pursued by a majority of governments.

Security is the third field of convergence and coordination. The two post-war military blocs, albeit with a group of neutrals in between, manifestly expressed Europe's political subordination to the superpowers. It was an era of hegemonic regionalism, imposed from above and from the outside. From the viewpoint of economic organisation, the security imperative imposed a more or less corresponding cleavage pattern. In periods of *détente* it became evident that economic contacts tended to follow a logic of their own. In periods of high tension, economic relations, in contrast, had to adapt to the political imperatives built into the security arrangement. All this underlines the predominance of the security factor. In spite of this, the security factor was not expressed in institutional and policy terms until recently. Here, the break-up of Yugoslavia was the major learning process.

4.3.2   Regionalisation in East Asia

Inter-state relations in East Asia have historically been rather tense and unsettled. This should realistically be expected in a security complex with few institutionalised inter-state arrangements, thus making it into something even less than an 'anarchical society', which characterised 19th century Europe (Bull 1977). To this unsettled contemporary situation comes a historical legacy of interstate violence and problems of distrust, particularly directed against Japan, and not yet quite resolved. East Asia proper is economically dynamic, but weak in terms of transnational political structures and regional identity. The future of this region is either rather bleak (in case the potential conflicts are translated into war) or very bright (if *de facto* interdependence leads to convergence of interests, where every state gets a stake in stable peace). The latter scenario seems more likely.

There are indications that the level of regionness is on the increase, both in terms of economic convergence and identity (Acharya 2007). The role of China is crucial here. There is a dramatic change in this classical empire from aloofness and introvertedness to a dynamic, optimistic constructive engagement with the outside world, including neighbouring countries in East and Southeast Asia. The record of the other giant Japan has been rather ambivalent, but, after its sensational landslide victory in 2009 the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) declared that it will be more 'independent' (*vis-à-vis* the US), re-establish Japan as an Asian nation ('member of Asia') through historical reconciliation and multilateral institution-building. As an example, the then leader of DPJ Yukio Hatoyama (2009) published a controversial essay in the *New York Times* in which he announced an end of US hegemony in the region, decried the US-led neoliberal model of globalisation, and advocated greater integration within Asia.

In the sub-region of Southeast Asia, *regime* convergence and *economic policy* convergence are obvious by the fact that former communist Indochina has been integrated in capitalist ASEAN. It should be remembered that interstate relations in Southeast Asia, now considered to qualify as a security community, were quite tense before ASEAN was established (Kivimäki 2001). Burma is now the only odd man in the grouping. An *ASEAN Charter* was agreed in 2007 (the 40th anniversary of the organisation) in the shadow of the intractable Burma crisis. It was therefore somewhat diluted compared to the bolder original ambitions, a codification of existing norms. Nevertheless, the charter created a legal foundation for the organisation and an ASEAN Summit, constituted by the region's Heads of state, to meet twice a year.

ASEAN has thus meant significant security cooperation, which has tended to gradually involve also the East Asian sub-region. Similarly, the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) process has also created a more cooperative atmosphere in the larger region: ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the 'three' being Japan, China and South Korea, illustrating the interactive relationship between regionalism, regional actorship and interregionalism (cf. Gilson 2002).

The Asian Financial Crisis and the 'war against terror' exemplify regional and global events promoting cooperation. The financial crisis underlined the interdependence within the larger region of East Asia and made the afflicted countries frustrated over the Western attitude. Of particular interest here is the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) based on bilateral currency swaps to counter speculation. Before this, there had been little discussion about regional approaches to the management of financial stability. In June 2008 finance ministers from the APT further agreed to create a pool of 80 billion dollars for the protection of regional currencies. This replaced the CMI arrangement and was a step towards a regional equivalent to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Yet, the two Burma crises (the political uprising and the cyclone catastrophe) revealed the lack of actorship in other issue areas, particularly security. Domestic crises (as in Thailand), and interstate tensions (as between Thailand and Cambodia and Thailand and Malaysia) are again becoming problematic. However, it should be remembered that, in the long perspective, the East Asian region as a whole has been remarkably stable, which to a certain extent is due to regional cooperation.

4.3.3   Regionalisation in Latin America

For an outsider, the Latin American continent may appear as rather homogeneous, but the internal divisions and cleavages are nevertheless substantial. Regional cooperation was therefore late in coming and has faced many setbacks. Latin America has strong Iberian roots due to its long colonial heritage (see Santander in this volume). The cultural imposition was opposed by a multitude of indigenous cultures, by a combination of oppression and resistance shaped into an 'Indian world'. Neither of these two cultures were compatible with the 19th century fragmentation into nation-states, which started as 'national' elite projects run by important Ladino families—in contradistinction to the continental 'Bolivarian project', which is now reawaken (see Santander in this volume). With regard to cultural legacy, there should nevertheless be some basis for Latin American integration, but often political and ideological differences have prevented genuine and long-term cooperation (Phillips 2004). There are quite a few regional organisations pursuing the project of building regionalism from above, the most ambitious being the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). The other regional organisations certainly have comprehensive regional agendas but they are rather *ad hoc*. There is also a problematic lack of supranational institutions able to manage inter-state conflicts.[2] MERCOSUR is now bent on widening rather than deepening (Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela), which increases presence but decreases regionness and actorness, among other things due to diverging attitudes towards liberalisation and free trade. On the other hand, a consensus could be built on the general sympathy for redistributive interventionism, being part of the Latin American (as well as European) political legacy.

In terms of *regime* convergence, there has recently been an overall trend towards democracy (whereas there was a contrary trend in the 1970s). For example, when the Honduran military forced out the country's president, Manuel Zelaya, in June 2009, the Organisation of American States (OAS) invoked its so-called *Democratic Charter*, and stated that Honduras would face suspension from the organisation if it did not restore Mr. Zelaya to the presidency. It was the first time the *Charter* had been used since it was adopted in 2001. Both MERCOSUR and UNASUR have similarly reacted against authoritarian tendencies.

In some countries the trend towards democracy has gone together with a mobilisation and strengthening of indigenous groups, in turn leading to populist or socialist positions frightening both Ladino-dominated countries (Argentina) and Ladino elites in the countries concerned (e.g. Bolivia). However, left-centrist governments now predominate and it would not be wrong to speak of a long-term regime convergence throughout the continent. Socialism has recently (in Venezuela and Ecuador) been referred to as '21st century socialism', now supposed to be democratic rather than revolutionary.

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[2] There are unresolved bilateral problems such as the protests from Argentine environmentalists against the building of a pulp mill close to Argentina's territory just across the Uruguay river. On the other hand, Argentina has been criticised by the other member states for depreciating its currency and exporting its own problems.

In *economic* life, there have also been regional convergences, though also in this case in different directions at different points in time. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, which severely damaged the colonial and post-colonial primary goods export economy, the development model based on 'import-substitution-industrialisation' became generally applied and popularised by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (Hettne 2001). This structuralist strategy was successfully applied from the late 1940s to the 1970s. According to the model, the strategy should be combined with regional integration in order to create the biggest possible Latin American market, but in practice the strategy was carried out on the national level and therefore soon faced obstacles not possible to break through (Sunkel 2008). Instead, globalisation and opening up of the economies became the general answer after a turbulent 1970s with attempted revolutions and military dictatorships starting in Chile. A cautionary approach to state-intervention has, since then, been more generally acknowledged by most regimes, although 'neoliberalism' generally has got a bad name after the unsuccessful orthodox experiments of the 1980s and 1990s. However, few countries today believe in protectionism and strong interventionism, although such signals have not disappeared completely.

In the late 2000s, the presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela, along with a representative from Uruguay, gathered in Buenos Aires and signed the founding charter of the Banco del Sur, or Bank of the South. This can be compared to the Chiang Mai Initiative in Southeast Asia. Later, twelve Latin American countries met in Rio and founded the Union of South American Nations. Thus MERCOSUR and the Andean Community (CAN) will ultimately merge. The Union is modelled on the EU, and there is talk of financial cooperation and a common currency.

The *security* situation as regards interstate relations is with a few exceptions relaxed, and has never been a big problem in Latin America in comparison with other regions. Similar to Southeast Asia (ASEAN), Latin America (MERCOSUR) has been referred to as 'security community'. This cannot be said about the domestic conditions in a number of countries, particularly in Bolivia, Central America, most recently Honduras, and the Andean area. The UNASUR was created for security reasons as MERCOSUR has been largely preoccupied with economic issues. It has shown a certain bias against the US, which made it hard for Colombia, in fact the only US ally on the continent, to join. In view of the problems already experienced by MERCOSUR and the CAN, the building of a new organisation for regional cooperation will not be easy. The tensions within these two organisations are multiplied in the UNASUR. However, a regional organisation covering the whole of Latin America is badly needed. Its usefulness was demonstrated in the support for the Bolivian government when threatened by fragmentation due to autonomy-seeking provinces. As mentioned above, UNASUR also took a stand in the Honduran crisis. However, competing initiatives multiply, such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), emanating from Venezuela, and the Latin American Pacific Arc, sponsored by Peru. The latter is an interregional initiative, linking countries in Latin America and Asia. The number of initiatives indicates lack of substance, but also the felt need for various ways of sharing sovereignty, which so far has not happened to a very large extent.

4.4   Comparing Interregional Structures

Europe, North America and East Asia, constituting the 'Triad', make up the 'core regions' of the world economy, whereas Latin America, South Asia and Southeast Asia have an 'intermediate' position, linked to the Triad regions. Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East can be seen as 'peripheral regions', the criteria being degrees of economic dynamics and political stability, corresponding to levels of regional actorship and capacity for entering into interregional relations (cf. Hettne 2001).

In the Triad there are two 'interregional' (broadly defined)[3] organisations, the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEM, the first becoming largely ritual, the second being an EU–East Asia institutionalised summit process, in which East Asia is being organised in the APT. Thus APT is emerging as a new regional actor in the wake of crises in ASEAN and APEC, and in response to crises affecting the larger region, such as financial crises and pandemic diseases. Both Europe and Asia tend to consider ASEM as a welcome opportunity to discuss controversial issues in an informal but nevertheless slightly institutionalised context, with joint committees working on a number of issues. Thus, declarations at one summit may create the basis for subsequent action in a way that reminds about 'the community method' in Europe. ASEM is one of the few international organisations of political importance where the US is not a member, which is bound to be divisive in both camps, where some states value their relations with the US more, should it come to a conflict of interest. It should also be noted that one of the reasons for creating ASEM was that the EU had been denied association status to APEC. ASEM is on paper a comprehensive, multidimensional type of collaboration, in spite of limited formalisation. The EU–ASEAN relationship, an example of pure interregionalism, constitutes its institutionalised backbone. Julie Gilson (2002, 2005) has pointed out that ASEM provides a mechanism for institutionalising not only a partnership, but also the partner *per se*, the point being that, by participating in an interregional process, a regional identity is created, hence illustrating the close link between regionalism and interregionalism (also see the Introduction to this book). At more recent summits, the EU has downgraded its participation. It can of course be questioned whether summits with Heads of states are the best way of enhancing interregional cooperation.

The triangular relationship between the EU, the US and Latin America can be compared with the Triad in that there is a competitive relationship between the US and the EU *vis-à-vis* the third part (also see Santander in this volume). The US–LA relations are organised in the Organisation of American States (OAS), whereas the EU–LA relations are constituted in a summit process comparable to ASEM. The EU–MERCOSUR relationship is an example of 'pure' interregionalism, since there exists a formal agreement between two organisations. The interregional partnership

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[3] Transregionalism refers to actors and structures mediating between regions. To the extent that this takes place in a formal way between the regions as legal personalities, one can refer to (pure) inter-regionalism. If the pattern of interregional relations becomes more predominant, constituting a new regionalised form of multilateral world order, this can be referred to as 'multiregionalism'.

is built on three pillars, of which the first includes a political dialogue, the second a substantive financial support to MERCOSUR's institutional development, and the third economic and commercial cooperation.

The links between the EU and Latin America appear to be growing closer, albeit not necessarily in the form of 'pure interregionalism', partly due to the fact that the US seems to have lost interest in its own 'backyard', or perhaps is too preoccupied with other areas. Due to the fact that MERCOSUR, with the entry of Venezuela, moves further towards an anti-US stand, the US has tried to create divisions within the organisation, for instance by making a bilateral agreement with Chile and, more recently, friendly gestures to Paraguay and Uruguay. Colombia has for some time been subject to a 'special programme' fighting the drugs trade, and in a controversial move the US will have access to Colombian air bases. The US under Democratic leadership is becoming more lukewarm about Free Trade Agreements. A continental free trade area is thus not an immediate, or even long term, possibility (see Santander in this volume). Rather, the Latin American continent as a whole will ultimately unite, however difficult this may seem at the moment. In this context, and with regard to the future of interregionalism, it is also worth noticing that UNASUR seems particularly keen to reach out to non-Triad regions, as illustrated by the ongoing process of Africa–South America summits. The first meeting was held in Abuja in 2006 while the second was held in 2009 on the Venezuelan island of Margarita, which declared a commitment to interregional cooperation in the fight against poverty. The third Africa-South America summit was held in 2013 in the Republic of Equatorial Guinea on the theme of strategies and mechanisms to strengthen South-South cooperation.

4.5   Conclusion

This chapter takes the case of the EU as a point of departure, which probably will provoke accusations of Eurocentrism.[4] This problem is, however, not solved by closing our eyes on Europe. As we, for the purpose of comparative analysis, relate the case of Europe to various experiences of regionalism, there are at least three distinctions to be made: the EU as a *paradigm* of regionalism, showing regionalisation to be a systemic tendency in the current world system; as a *model* of regional integration, imitated in other geographical areas; and the empirical pattern of *interregional* relations between Europe and various world regions where the EU, due to its substantial actorship, has more or less impact. These distinctions are analytically separable, but nevertheless more or less impossible to keep completely

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[4] I once called Europe 'the paradigm' for which, although it was not meant as a model to apply, I have been criticised. A contrary view was expressed by Shaun Breslin, Richard Higgott and Ben Rosamond, who argued that, 'ironically, the EU as an exercise in regional integration is one of the major obstacles to the development of analytical and theoretical comparative studies of regional integration' (2002: 11).

apart in real world conditions. If external challenges motivate regional integration elsewhere, the EU experience will automatically turn up as an obvious example to consider, and, furthermore, this happens to be strongly supported by the EU foreign policy of interregionalism.

The idea of EU as a *paradigm* that other regions follow, not through imitation but rather as a general global tendency, is controversial, but should not be dismissed altogether if we believe in some sort of world system logic. It is thus not unreasonable to suggest that regions respond in similar ways to similar challenges, for instance intrusions from stronger powers affecting internal cohesion. Thus the presence of the US plays a major role in Latin America in creating obstacles but also incentives for regionalism. The same can be said about the role of Russia in the post-Soviet space (Russia's 'near abroad'). Except for the Baltic area, the room for regional initiatives seems limited, however, and the much needed CIS is dormant, if not dead.

That the EU is seen as a *model* is undeniable but the actual role it plays differs from one case to another; it may even serve as a negative model, as for example in the ASEAN distaste for EU-style centralised, bureaucratic decision-making (Nesadurai 2008). However, to the extent that the model is perceived as positive, as seems to be the case in most of Africa and the Southern Cone of Latin America, the EU will exercise normative influence, without having to impose its values through 'soft imperialism', although hard to resist (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005).

There are different sorts of foreign policy relations between Europe and other regions, such as enlargement, stabilisation, bilateralism, and interregionalism. The most important type of relationship from a world order perspective is *interregionalism*, but there are also more traditional bilateral links with regional great powers in far away regions (Brazil, Japan, China, South Africa) as well as regular summits on the continental level (EU–Latin America meeting, ASEM, EU–Africa meeting) (cf. Hänggi et al. 2005). 'Soft imperialism' undoubtedly appears in some of these cases (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005; Söderbaum and Stålgren 2010).

In conclusion, there are both differences and similarities in the processes of regionalisation in Europe and other regions. All of them need supranational cooperation to manage internal crises and external challenges inherent in globalisation and to increase their cohesion. In Europe, regionness has reached the unique level of regional institutionalised polity, but there are no guarantees that this degree of cohesion can be sustained even in Europe. In East Asia the dynamics of economic regionalisation are stronger than the actual political preparedness to engage in a formal regional project (regionalism). In Latin America there are deep cleavages, which are rare in Europe (Bolivia is an example), and the political tensions between states (for instance Colombia and Venezuela) are also becoming stronger. Thus the record does not really support the end of sovereignty thesis, not in the case of Europe and certainly not in the cases of East Asia and Latin America. At the same time, it is undeniable that the forces favouring regional cooperation and some degree of sovereignty sharing are growing stronger, although not at an even pace.

Finally, a word on interregionalism and world order (cf. Hänggi et al. 2005). The next world order will be multipolar. The global crisis has made the Group of 20 (G20) rather than the Group of 7 (G7) the relevant plurilateral body. This raises the

issue of the nature of the emerging poles. Will they be regional actors expressing a collective concern or will they be regional great powers pursuing national interests? Disturbingly, lack of global responsibility characterises the emerging powers, with Brazil as a possible exception (having expressed the view that its interests are best served by working through Latin America). Russia is restoring its imperial position in the Caucasus and elsewhere, alienating its neighbours.[5] The urgency of its internal problems and its external needs, for instance energy, makes it less likely that China will act externally in a responsible way, the relations to Africa often mentioned as example of ruthlessness. India is increasingly preoccupied by various regional conflicts in South Asia and with its own great power status. South Africa is plagued by domestic conflict and may not live up to the expectations regarding it being a positive force in Africa's development and peace. The old powers do not provide good examples. The US has only recently abandoned its unilateralism. The EU shows an embarrassing lack of unity and as an organisation it is not consistent in its foreign policy, pursuing interregionalism as well as bilateralism *vis-à-vis* other world powers. Japan, in the shadow of the US and in a long recession, is rarely seen as a world power. However, in 2009 (then) Premier Yukio Hatoyama announced a more independent political position and an interest in being part of the Asian region, as well as a different view on the meaning of development (Hatoyama 2009). The road to a new world order is certainly not linear and different types of relations will coexist. Regionalism as well as interregionalism is a process of trial and error with uncertain outcomes and no single theory will explain this.

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[5] In the mid-1990s, China, Russia, and several Central Asian countries formed a new multilateral security organisation known as the 'Shanghai Five'. Now this grouping is organised in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). It is still unclear if we shall see this as a security-driven alliance or a more comprehensive regional organisation in the making. The main concerns are 'terrorism, extremism and separatism'.

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Chapter 5
Interregionalism: A Security Studies Perspective

Ruth Hanau Santini, Sonia Lucarelli, and Marco Pinfari

5.1 Introduction

Throughout the Cold War, attention to interregional dynamics has been limited both in International Relations and in the security studies literature. Although this might seem surprising in the light of the subsequent proliferation of regional forums and interregional relations, this is easily understandable looking at the reality of the Cold War. In fact, regions and their interaction played no significant role in Cold War times—the period in which security (or strategic) studies flourished as an International Relations sub-discipline. The world after 1945 was regarded, depicted and performed as bipolar: the two superpowers were the main actors in the security game and the rest of the world was broadly divided into the spheres of influence of the two. States belonged to the core areas of interest of the two superpowers (as was the case for Europe) or to the periphery. The latter was an arena for great power competition and little attention was paid to stability, development and peace in these areas (Ayoob 1995). States that were peripheral but relevant—for economic or geopolitical reasons—could obtain advantages from their superpower but could never aspire to modify their calculus of costs and benefits in international politics or significantly influence their security concerns. Within such a frozen

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geopolitical context, it was hard for regional powers to think globally and create alliances on an interregional level. Some did try to foster intra-regional cohesion and unity—frequently even as a result of a feeling of insecurity caused by the West (Niva 1999: 148–149)—but with modest results (Nasser's pan-Arab rhetoric, the short-lived unity between Egypt and Syria in 1958–1961). As remarked by Diehl and Lepgold (2003), the Cold War period defined most regional conflicts in terms of superpower interests: when the superpowers got involved, the effect was as much to exacerbate as to mitigate (potential) regional conflicts.

In this context, the logic of bipolarism implied that attention was directed predominantly to the relationship between the two superpowers. As a consequence, in International Relations and security studies, regions were not treated as significant actors in their own right. Furthermore, attention to third states was limited to their behaviour *vis-à-vis* the two superpowers, as either bandwagoning, balancing, or non-aligning (see also Calleya 2000: 235)—as in the case of attention devoted to the non-aligned movement and the Group of 77 (G77), both of which emerged in the 1960s.

The end of the Cold War led to the redefinition of regional dynamics, the emergence of regional powers and new regional organisations. An example of the first tendency is the fragmentation of the former Soviet Union into at least two macro-regions (Central Asia and Southern Caucasus) and a series of regions (Central Europe, Central–Eastern Europe, the Baltic area) with their own peculiarities and dynamics. A redefined regionalisation has occurred also in other areas of the world; one example is the Middle East, whose particular dynamics have spread towards Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. With respect to the second tendency, the end of the Cold War, together with the globalisation that then also became more evident, created opportunities for new regional powers with global aspirations to emerge, such as Brazil, India, China and South Africa. Finally, globalisation acted upon existing and potential regional groupings, pushing them to strengthen their integration in order to cope with global economic and social dynamics. This led to the formation of new organisations—such as the Asian–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)—and the radical restructuring of existing bodies—such as the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Regional organisations dealing with security issues also rose in number.[1] However, perhaps the most interesting phenomenon is the fact that a number of interregional forums have started to pursue a joint security agenda—it is the case of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) (Gilson 2005: 323), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) (Rolfe 2008: 105) and the Africa–Europe process (Olsen 2006: 204). Although these initiatives have

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[1] A number of regional organisations that were created during the Cold War dealt with security issues—for instance the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)—but more recently their number has increased.

not yet led to the signing of detailed security cooperation agreements, they resulted in the adoption of joint protocols in key areas such as conflict prevention and management (as in the case of the 1995 ARF Concept Paper) and which at times extended to other issues including terrorism and demining, as in the 2000 Cairo Plan of Action that was signed as part of the Africa–Europe process. Security issues have also been discussed by a number of other interregional bodies, such as APEC, although often 'as much by accident as by design' (Rolfe 2008: 105).

The European Union (EU) partnership with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) has historically focused on humanitarian issues and trade, but it has also dealt with security, as in the cooperation in 'the war on terror' (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2006: 119). Interregionalism has also played a functional role in helping manage global change, as relations between Europe and East Asia show: since 9/11, interregional relations have also aimed at tackling transborder threats (Gilson 2005: 73).

Seen from an interregional perspective, the international system does not only include regional relations among states (e.g. ASEAN, the Southern Common Market–MERCOSUR), but also interregional relations among groups of states (EU–ASEAN; EU–African Union–AU), hybrid and transregional relations between regions and states (ASEM) and bilateral inter-state relations (United States (US)–China; US–Russia).

This change caught International Relations and security studies largely unaware. Regionalism was revised and reinterpreted so as to provide conceptual tools to deal with the changed scenario (Hettne and Inotai 1994). New studies on the relationship between and among regions emerged. However, security studies was only partially touched by this conceptual development. The discipline has attempted to study security dynamics at the regional level and has paid little attention to interregional dynamics though the main approaches dealing with a regional dimension of security—security communities (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998), regional security complex theory (Buzan and Wæver 2003) and regional orders (Lake and Morgan 1997)—all have the potential to contribute to the analysis of security dynamics *between* regions. The same applies to a more recent approach, that of multilateral security governance (Kirchner and Sperling 2007; Krahmann 2005; Christou et al. 2010). This is the reason that these approaches will constitute the bulk of this chapter. Here it is argued that they are all relevant for understanding interregional security dynamics and that they are not mutually exclusive. In fact, this chapter argues in favour of more cross-fertilisation in the effort to develop a research agenda on interregionalism in security studies. While not fully complementary, these approaches present features that shed light on under-explored aspects of security dynamics that lead to regionalism and interregional relations. This is particularly true if we understand interregionalism to encompass but also go beyond region-to-region relations and to include transregional relations, as well as hybrid situations involving regions and states; geographic regions and constructed regions (e.g. EU–ACP); and regional powers representing entire regions (e.g. India, Brazil, South Africa) (Dent 2003; Hänggi 2006).

In what follows, the chapter will illustrate the role of regions in security studies over time. It will then review the aforementioned four approaches to regional

security with a view to understanding their contribution to the analysis of regional and interregional security dynamics. Finally, it will propose a way to develop more attention to interregional dynamics.

5.2   Traditional Security Studies and the Constructivist Turn

The literature on security studies developed largely in the Cold War period, when the attention of scholars was primarily devoted to the relationship between the two blocs or, more precisely, to that between the two superpowers. It is in fact through the analysis of nuclear deterrence between the two blocs that security studies developed as an independent field both in the academia and in the world of think tanks (McSweeney 1999; Walt 1991). During the 'golden age of security studies' (Paret 1986), attention was focused on tangible and military threats. The debate within the discipline revolved around the analysis of deterrence, war and the way in which, according to different scholars, the security of the state could be better guaranteed—as in the case of offensive *versus* defensive realism (Snyder 1991). Therefore, security was conceived as an objectively identifiable state of affairs that was related to the states' relative invulnerability to military threats. In mainstream security studies, there was little space for cognitive factors and for non-state actors (for an exception, see Jervis 1976).

It was the liberal tradition of thought in international relations that opened interest in non-state actors and non-military threats. Building on the founding work of philosophers like Immanuel Kant, liberal international relations thinkers have focused on the conditions conducive to peace, particularly the factors that could lead states to develop non-conflictual relations. This theoretical context allowed for the emergence of an analysis of regional groupings in their security dimension. Here the seminal work of Karl Deutsch et al. (1957) on security communities is a case in point.

A real turn in security studies took place in the 1980s and 1990s, when the concept of security came to be applied to several areas (from the economy to the environment) and referents (from the individual to society). This broadened both the understanding of security and the potential levels of analysis, which started to include individuals, groups and even humanity. Moreover, the reflectivist turn in International Relations brought attention to the subjective and inter-subjective dimensions of security: security increasingly came to be seen as a socially constructed phenomenon (see Buzan 1983; Buzan et al. 1998; Krause and Williams 1996; Lipshutz 1995). The constructivist studies of security and the so-called 'critical security studies school' have devoted much more attention than previously to non-state actors and to a non-objectivistic understanding of security. This has also led to the development of approaches that look at the social construction of security and insecurity at the regional level. Moreover, these approaches share with the literature on new regionalism a constructivist perspective and attention to non-material factors (Hettne and Inotai 1994). So far, though, the links between these branches of literature are not explicit.

Moreover, while constructivists were developing new approaches within security studies, traditional realist approaches were undergoing major revisions. Authors like Barry Buzan—founding father of the constructivist school of security studies known as 'the Copenhagen school'—also enriched the realist tradition by looking at regional security dynamics and underlining the existence of specific *regional security complexes.* Others worked around the idea of *regional security orders*, still drawing from a traditional realist school. Finally, *multilateral security governance* is a recent branch of literature that deals specifically with an understanding of security that includes regional and interregional dimensions. Among the vast literature of security studies, these approaches are those offering the most fruitful avenues for cross-fertilisation with studies of regionalism and interregionalism. In what follows, the chapter deals with how each of these security approaches interacts with interregionalism, by pointing at their strengths and weaknesses and finally putting forward an alternative reading based on some of the elements of these approaches.

5.3 Security Communities

The concept of security community was developed as early as 1957 and later revisited in constructivist terms. The term refers to an area in which states do not feel threatened by other states and conditions typical of international politics, such as the security dilemma, no longer occur. In Karl Deutsch's words, a community of states is a pluralistic security community within which there are dependable expectations of peaceful change, that is, when states neither expect nor consider using organised violence to solve their disputes (Deutsch et al. 1957: 5). Reciprocal expectations of peaceful settlement of disputes are therefore what make a community a security community.[2] Deutsch regarded the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the countries therein—a transregional area—as a security community. More recently the concept has been revised in constructivist terms by Adler and Barnett (1998), who brought attention to a concept that during the Cold War had been overshadowed by attention to deterrence. The authors in Adler and Barnett's volume (1998) speculated on the existence of a security community in several regions, from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) area to the Gulf, Western Europe and Southeast Asia. Later on, the preferred areas of application have been the EU (Lucarelli 2002), the enlarged NATO (Adler 2008) and ASEAN (Acharya 2001; Emmerson 2005).

The literature on (pluralistic) security communities lists three main characteristics of such a community: (i) shared identities, values and meanings; (ii) many-sided, direct relations between the units; and (iii) diffuse reciprocity (Adler and Barnett 1998: 31). These characteristics create a region in which the probability of war is reduced to the minimum. Historically, the security community *par excellence*, the

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[2] In other words, not all 'communities' are 'security' communities as Deutsch assessed in his founding work; see Adler and Barnett (1998).

transatlantic security community, coincided with an area of democratic peace. Shared identities, values and meanings were constructed around a common understanding of the relationship between, on the one hand, the development of liberal democratic institutions and norms (plus economic interdependence and common institutions) and, on the other, peace. This pluralistic security community becomes an 'amalgamated' security community, when there is a formal fusion of previously independent units into a single, wider unit and the creation of a common form of government (Deutsch et al. 1957: 6).[3] The historical case that comes closest to an amalgamated security community is the European Union.

Even in the context of a pluralistic security community—one in which the units (states) each maintain an independent government—various degrees of closeness are possible. Adler and Barnett (1998) have reinterpreted the concept by extrapolating and underlining three main features: (i) the degree of intensity of a security community; (ii) the degree of maturity; and (iii) the degree of trust.

Firstly, these two authors have distinguished between 'loosely-coupled' and 'tightly-coupled' security communities. The former is 'a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change […] [by virtue of] their shared structure of meanings and identity' (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30). Tightly coupled security communities go beyond the minimal definitional properties of a security community in that they (i) have a 'mutual aid' society; and (ii) 'possess a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralised government' (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30). However, in both cases stable peace is due to the existence of a transnational community in which: core identities, values and meanings are shared; many-sided and direct relations occur and reciprocity is practised (either for long-term interest or out of a sense of obligation and responsibility). Some authors have noticed how NATO and the EU can be considered examples of loosely and tightly coupled security communities respectively (Rieker 2000: 16).

Secondly, security communities can be looked at also with respect to their 'maturity'. Mature security communities have accomplished all three phases of the creation of such a community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 56–57). In the case of a security community in which reciprocal expectations of peaceful change depend on the successful diffusion of democratic norms and values, the degree of maturity depends on the extent to which this democratisation has provided the type of institutional, societal and cultural guarantees that make an area of democratic peace work. Lucarelli (2002) maintained that what matters most in the creation of closer links between the members of a democratic security community is not the degree of technical implementation of democratic institutions and procedures (fair and free elections, rule of law, respect of

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[3] Deutsch's conditions for a security community to be 'amalgamated' included: (i) similar values (political ideologies but also economic and religious values); (ii) the formation of a common sense of 'us'; (iii) similar lifestyles; (iv) a group of leading actors (so as to prevent the logic of the balance of power prevailing); (v) high economic growth; (vi) positive expectations with respect to the advantages of integration; (vii) intensive transactions and communication; (viii) widening of the leading elites; (ix) stable links among the elites of different states; and (x) high geographical mobility of the population (Deutsch et al. 1957: 6).

human rights and minority rights legislation), but the degree of interaction that states and societies undertake by virtue of the democratisation process.

Thirdly, Adler and Barnett's analysis stresses the notion of trust, of which the expectation of absence of conflicts is the most evident manifestation. In the reformulation of Adler and Barnett, trust is seen as the basis of community building, a quality determined by a series of factors: *the existence of political and economic interactions* (the reference is to Simmel's analysis of the role of 'exchanges' among individuals as the backbone of societal structure); *institutions* (facilitating communication and exchanges, showing other possible areas of cooperation, establishing norms, guaranteeing peace and favouring a sense of belonging to a region); and *social learning* (which is a collective process of learning by doing that enhances trust and shapes identities) (Adler and Barnett 1998: 416–422). Security communities are also assumed to develop around cores of strength, to be understood either as states that use sticks and carrots or states that project a sense of purpose. The overall aim of the authors is to contrast the realist assumption of anarchy as the permanent feature of the international setting, pointing instead to a combination of factors—force, exchange based on self-interest and normative integration—whose relative weight varies over time but whose combination assures stability to the international system. The literature on security communities represents an important contribution to the analysis of security between the domestic, the inter-state and the regional levels. The unexplored element, as far as the topic of this book is concerned, is the analysis of interregional relations.

From this perspective, NATO may be regarded as a transregional security community in that it encompasses two geographic regions. However, if we conceive a region not in (exclusively) geographical terms but as an imagined area with which states and organisations within it identify, then NATO is probably one of the best examples of a region that has been created by means of identity and security-building as well as through practices of self-restraint (Adler 2008). The transatlantic area has the characteristic of being both an interregional context (North America–Europe), a case of transregionalism (due to the transnational links between Western societies) and an imagined region in its own right (the transatlantic region). In security terms it is above all a region in itself.

In the case of the Asia–Pacific, it is open to discussion whether it is or may be becoming a security community. Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama (2002: 88) suggested that the Asia–Pacific system, which at present is best described as a 'concert system', could evolve into a pluralistic security community, even though this evolution was 'still at an early stage' (see also Acharya 2001).

In the case of the Mediterranean, it has been suggested that it may develop into an interregional security community. William Zartman recently argued that 'much can be done' for the creation of a 'Mediterranean security community', starting from the development of trust among members through a number of confidence-building measures such as 'advance notice of troop movements' that would later result in 'open borders, transportation links and military meetings' (Zartman 2010: 35). On the other hand, Sven Biscop has argued that Europe and its southern neighbourhood currently represent a security complex as defined by Buzan, which in the

long-term might evolve into a 'Euro–Mediterranean' security community, such that security cooperation would complement all other areas of the existing partnership (Biscop 2004). Others have argued that the EU has purposely attempted to forge a Euro–Mediterranean security community. In Adler and Crawford's view, the three-fold purpose of the Barcelona process—community, region-building and creating a security partnership—was intended to lead to the emergence of a Mediterranean pluralistic security community (Adler and Crawford 2006: 4). A more realistic and less ambitious 'regional security partnership' idea has been proposed by Fulvio Attinà, who suggests that mutual expectations of peaceful relations may constrain state behaviour even though they fall short of becoming institutionalised (Attinà 2004). However, if a security community were to develop in the Mediterranean, what type would it be? In purely ideal terms, there are two possibilities: the creation of two security regions that enjoy peaceful relations (an interregional security community) or the gradual emergence of a new enlarged security community. In the case of Euro–Mediterranean relations, the line between regionalism and interregionalism is particularly blurred. Given the clear-cut nature of the EU as a region and its efforts to push for the creation of a Mediterranean region on principle (the EU considers regions a welcome development in international politics and one potentially conducive to more prosperous and peaceful relations) and because of interests (dealing with regional blocs facilitates trade and security agreements).

In general, various obstacles stand in the way of the creation of interregional security communities. The major one is the cultural and political heterogeneity within these forums—that is, the absence of 'shared norms and linked systems' (Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama 2002: 88). In this regard, it is unclear whether the debate within interregional studies on the role of interregional forums in spurring 'collective identity-building' can be extended to the prospect of creating effective security communities across regions. At present, the only substantial evidence on the role of interregionalism in collective identity-building concerns the strengthening of identities *within* regions—and not *across* regions—as a consequence of interregional interactions (cf. Rüland 2006: 308–310; also see Rüland's and Hettne's contributions in this volume). It would be interesting to speculate upon the conditions under which interregional forums evolve into forms of interregional security communities. It would also be interesting to study whether and how interregional (and transregional) relations may develop into 'arenas of persuasion' that can generate 'a partial change in preferences and interests' (Katzenstein and Okawara 2001/2002: 181) and thus transform existing regions into imagined regions that share their security perception.

At first sight, the expectation that interregionalism could evolve into something approximating collective identity-building appears too ambitious. Because of the inherent cultural barriers in cross-regional cooperation that stem from the very defining of regions as cultural or identitarian blocs, it is more realistic to expect interregionalism to result in concurrence on a limited set of values or norms—such as the management of illegal immigration and organised crime—rather than in generating new political communities. This outcome would seem closer to what Robert Jervis (1982) defined as 'security regimes', where 'norm compliance does

not provide evidence of community building' (Collins 2007: 203). Gorm Rye Olsen, for instance, argued that the Africa–Europe process constitutes an incipient form of 'African security regime' bound together by 'more or less identical interests in promoting security on the continent' and by the fact that 'the two actors are in frequent contact and […] in basic agreement about the norms and principles which are to guide future security interventions in Africa' (Olsen 2009: 20).

Focusing on the potential mismatch between norm compliance in specific security-related issue areas and community-building could also help explain the development of what is sometimes defined as an 'incipient' (Blair and Hanley 2001: 10) or 'emerging' (Adler and Greve 2009: 62) security community in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific region, centred on the ARF. In this region, and especially within ASEAN, we observe that most nations 'share dependable expectations that conflict will not come from external aggression by a fellow member state' (Blair and Hanley 2001: 10). However, both the persistence of 'balancing practices' in the region (Adler and Greve 2009: 76), the presence of 'hostile relations' even between ASEAN members such as Singapore and Malaysia (Adler and Greve 2009: 76) and the 'operational feebleness' of the ARF (Aggarwal and Koo 2009: 12) seem to be 'inconsistent with security community practices' (Adler and Greve 2009: 76). Nevertheless, this framework has produced some interesting but limited shared security initiatives, such as the agreement in 2002 between ASEAN and China on a 'Code of conduct in the South China Sea', and since its 2003 summit in Phnom Penh ARF has often been credited with making 'active efforts' (Bradford 2008: 482) to improve cooperation in tackling piracy.

5.4 Regional Security Complexes

An apparently similar concept to the previous one, that of the regional security complex, was developed in the early 1980s by Barry Buzan and refined by him and other colleagues after the end of the Cold War (Buzan 1983; Buzan and Wæver 2003). A regional security complex is a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot be tackled individually. Its members have interrelated security relations and each member's action has consequences for the others (Buzan and Wæver 2003). All states are tied up in a system of security interdependence (the anarchic setting), which cluster regionally in what they term security complexes. In other terms, security complexes 'are about the relative intensity of interstate security relations that lead to distinctive regional patterns shaped by both the distribution of power and historical relations of amity and enmity' (Buzan et al. 1998: 11–12). They embody durable patterns of amity and enmity. Hence security complexes are, by definition, a product of the anarchic international system and could be thought of as 'miniature anarchies' (Buzan et al. 1998: 13), durable but not permanent features of the system. Regional security complexes are held together by common threat perceptions and security concerns but with no guarantee of having created a stable and long-lasting peaceful

regime. Theoretically, the regional level of analysis challenges the dual obsession with national and global security and, at the regional level, national and global securities interact.

A strong tenet of this theory is that threats travel more easily over short rather than long distances. That is why Buzan acknowledges that its applicability is limited in the economic and environmental sector, while a regionalising logic possesses a strong explanatory value in the military-political and societal context.

Regional security complex theory links the national, regional and international levels of security. The authors operate a blend of materialist (notion of bounded territoriality, distribution of power) and constructivist (securitisation theory) ideas generating a bottom-up vision within which security complexes arise from the expression of security needs by the potential constituent units. Securitisation processes—that is extreme politicisation and transformation into a security issue of low relevance political issues by policymakers in order to justify their security measures to counter these external or domestic challenges—are intertwined in the logic behind the emergence of regional security complexes. Indeed, alongside structural variables such as the distribution of power—i.e. balance of power and geographic closeness—the only cognitive factor acknowledged as motivating regional security complexes are threat perceptions. Common perceptions of what constitutes a threat to one's security become a push factor in the regionalising process.

Broadly speaking, regional security complexes and security communities share some features but there are many more that differentiate them. While complexes and communities partly share the same rationale—namely building a regional security system in order to enhance their peace and prosperity and counter potential external threats—the conditions that urge their development differ. The motivation for the formation of regional security complexes is the shared perception of an external threat. By contrast, the motivation for the formation of a security community is the gradual transformation of relations between those involved, even without a common perception of threat. While in the first case, threat perception is the causal factor, in the second, the transformation of threat perception is the *result* of the formation of a security community. Moreover, if it is the anarchic international system that determines states' behaviour in the development of regional security complexes, in the emergence of security communities it is sub-system units that play a more autonomous role. The security community is then embodied in relations based upon trust and reciprocity, which are preconditions for spill-overs from one policy area to another. A community is further favoured by the existence of an ideological element that spurs integration and which facilitates cooperation. In regional security complexes: spill-overs are much more difficult to bring about: since the complex evolves from systemic factors and lacks an ideological component.

Intuitively, the most intriguing question raised by the development of interregional forums is whether such forums, which by definition transcend territorially-bounded regional groupings, substantially transform or challenge regional security complex theory. However, answering this question is harder than it may seem. In particular, the failure of interregional forums to generate substantial cooperation over security issues confirms one of the assumptions of regional security complex

theory; it gives the regional level prominence over both the global and national in analysing both the emergence of security dilemmas and the prospect of developing security cooperation.

Regional security complexes can interact and this is then a case of interregionalism with an important security dimension. Sometimes an important role in relations *between* security complexes relations is played by 'insulators'. In Buzan's theory, the world includes regional security complexes, insulators and global level powers. An insulator is a state that cannot create links and hence join the regional security complex. Turkey is—or at least has been until 2010–2011—a good example of an (assertive) insulator that is suspended between two regional security complexes, that of Europe and that of the Middle East. If one looks at different sectors of the regional security complex, such as the societal and the economic, it becomes clear that Turkey is torn between competing urges. To simplify, while the Turkish economic sector mainly looks to the West, its societal sector is increasingly identifying with the East. Being an insulator, or a *status quo* country, allows Turkey to balance its competing domestic and external dynamics. What this example shows is that the interaction between different regional security complexes can lead to hybrid forms of transregionalism, if not interregionalism *per se*.

5.5 Regional Orders

Some of the key limitations or contradictions of the early formulations of the theory of regional security complexes have been addressed by Lake and Morgan's 'regional orders' framework (Lake and Morgan 1997). Their hegemonic-hierarchic approach shares the anarchic assumption of the regional security complex approach but pays closer attention to the international order. This approach looks like a contemporary version of traditional realist understandings of security, albeit more comprehensive in terms of variables and constellations of power. According to Lake and Morgan, regional orders emerge in order to fill power vacuums left by the structure of the international order. Unlike a regional security complex, geographic proximity is not a necessary condition for belonging to a regional order, as demonstrated by the role of the US in the Middle Eastern security complex.

In Lake and Morgan's formulation, regional orders are the mode of conflict management in regional security complexes. They include balance of power, security concerts, collective security and pluralistic communities to integration (Lake and Morgan 1997: 11–12). If one power dominates over the other members (unipolarity), the system will tend to be stable and limit interference by external parties. The legitimacy of regional hegemony is granted by the provision of public goods (public order) in exchange for which subordinate states grant their loyalty as well as parts of their sovereign prerogatives.

If, at the other end of the *continuum*, a multipolar structure is in place, there will be a higher risk of conflict but third parties will stay out of the game. If, finally, the system is bipolar, both risks—of internal conflict and of external

intervention—will be run. Either way, Lake stresses, any international to regional distribution of power will be characterised by hierarchy (Lake 2009). Lake distinguishes between the nature of the international system—which remains anarchic—and the relations between its constituent states, which are hierarchical. Authority is thus a social construct, a sort of contractual relation by which a dominant party guarantees social order in exchange for legitimacy and some form of concessions of sovereignty. The degree of authority may range from the condition of Westphalian states, in which state A exercises no authority over state B, through spheres of influence and then protectorates and, ultimately, absolute hierarchy. The first end of the spectrum corresponds to the description of the anarchic international system, characterised by diplomacy, whereas the other end corresponds to an Empire.

In his work on Arab–Israeli relations David Pervin (1997) argues that the intervention of external powers has significantly altered the equation in the Middle East and rendered the regional system far from autonomous. This weakens the explanatory power of realist approaches, which consider anarchy and the lack of peaceful regional dynamics to be inevitable features of international life. However, Pervin detects mixed elements that could lead to the emergence of regional order in the Middle East: increased cooperation, continuing competition and ambivalence in Israeli–Arab relations. He argues that the possibility of a regional concert forming, especially in the face of the threat posed by Iran, should not be discarded.

Among the bases of concert are recognition of the potentially high costs of war, a dispersal of power (all being vulnerable to international sanctions), compatible views of the international order, acceptance of the *status quo* and a high level of transparency.

One advantage of Lake and Morgan's revision of the regional security complex theory is that, by de-territorialising regional security complexes—or by including non-regional actors as external hegemons within a specific regional order—it enables transatlantic relations also to be regarded as a form of interregionalism (*sui generis*). This avoids the problem of considering transatlantic relations to be regional while European–Russian relations are regarded as interregional.

However, this comes at a cost. As noted by Buzan and Wæver (2003: 81), Lake and Morgan's approach 'generates a regional security complex for each security problem', removing almost entirely the geographic and/or material element from the analysis of regional security. Indeed, defining a regional security complex as 'the states affected by at least one transborder but local externality' (Lake 1997: 46) focuses on the locality of the *security threat* and not necessarily on the political actors involved. This risks depriving regional or interregional security studies of their own defining element—the focus on how states or organisations act—both unilaterally and in concert and both within and across regions—in response to specific security problems. Lake and Morgan's framework is therefore more useful for understanding hybrid interregionalism (particularly region-to-state and regional power-to-regional power) than for analysing traditional region-to-region interregionalism.

5.6 Multilateralism and Security Governance

The attempt to devise less state-centred and more regional thinking about multilateralism, security and governance has given rise to an array of understandings of multilevel and multilateral security governance. This way of thinking has gained ground since the mid-1990s thanks to the recognition that security is a multilevel phenomenon; that sub-systems can cooperate and are not competing blocks; and that regional security is a new reality.

The concept of multilevel governance was introduced by Hooghe and Marks (2001) to capture evolutions in the study of the EU, which was no longer being viewed as a process of integration but as a political system in its own right. Multilevel security governance points to a system in which states are still the main actors but other actors—global, regional, local and transnational—play a key role as well.

The notion of multilevel governance has also been useful for rethinking what multilateralism is in an international environment in which states and global international organisations are no longer the only actors. An implicit or explicit reference to multilevel governance is present in several contributions to the analysis of global governance. For instance, Slaughter (2004), and Forman and Segaar (2006) have coined the term new multilateralism to refer to a multivariate network of actors and global governance issues. Adler (2006) has written of communitarian multilateralism to refer to a 'community of practice' involving regional organisations and global institutions. Telò (2006) and Ortega (2007) have examined multilevel multilateralism and referred to regional entities as 'multilateral workshops' that help reform multilateralism. Lucarelli et al. (2012) have analysed the role of the EU in the system of multilateral security governance.

Krahmann (2005), Sperling (2009) and Kirchner (2007) have developed the concept of security governance, which in turn has spawned a significant body of literature (see Christou et al. 2010). In Kirchner's words, security governance is an 'intentional system of rules that involves the coordination, management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, interventions by both public and private actors, formal and informal arrangements and purposefully directed towards particular policy outcomes' (Kirchner 2007: 3). On the whole, the body of literature on security governance is rich and promising. However, it suffers from certain shortcomings and is also somewhat fragmented. In the first place, the literature tends to be more descriptive than theoretical or analytical and it has tended to downplay the security dimension. Moreover, it has been biased in favour of focusing on the European context. A valuable exception to this is the work of James Sperling, who envisages different systems of security governance depending on internal features, external relationships, and the strength of the security dilemma (Sperling 2009).

The concept of security governance seems to be particularly promising for analysing the role of interregionalism in reframing security cooperation. Firstly, the notion that global governance involves actors at all levels from the national, through the interregional and all the way up to the global levels provides a conceptual

framework for locating processes that are unlikely to *replace* the identity-building processes of regionalism but that could *supplement* them by creating a degree of norm convergence across regions.

Secondly, the development of interregional security agendas could provide another opportunity for generating a 'division of labour' in global governance. This would be relevant where the main regional organisations failed to take the lead in maintaining security in their areas of competence as they had been expected to according to Article 52 of the United Nations (UN) Charter. Today, especially in conflict mediation and resolution, we are seeing a proliferation of forms of inter-regionalism that bypass the regional level. Instead, interregional forums are now being composed by sub-regional local organisations and regional extra-mural actors as the first level in the international 'division of labour' for addressing local crises and wars. For instance, the troika meetings between the EU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) do not replace the parallel bi-regional dialogue between the EU and the AU but support two sub-regional organisations that are engaged in conflict resolution. They represent an attempt to generate, through interregionalism, the combination of legitimacy and effective funding procedures that regional organisations such as the OAU/AU failed to achieve. The EU, for example, worked closely with ECOWAS and the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) in elaborating a 'Framework of Action for Peace and Security' to support security sector reform in West Africa (Ebo 2007: 169). The EU has also developed close working relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and this is marked by annual joint council/ministerial meetings between EU and GCC foreign ministers. Close cooperation with the GCC again reflects the weakness of the regional organisation that should formally operate as natural partner for the EU in the region—in this case, the Arab League. However, as opposed to the bilateral cooperation between the EU and the African sub-regional bodies, the EU–GCC cooperation framework has yet to result in a shared security agenda.

The potential problems of this proliferation of levels of governance and of the sub-regional, regional and interregional forums that are involved in tackling security issues are many. Behind the belief that multilevel multilateralism may benefit global politics is the assumption that the actors involved will coordinate effectively and intervene on issues that pertain to their own level. This sometimes happens, as is the case when interregional forums focus on 'naturally' interregional issues such as migration. However, as first argued by Haas (1983: 216), the idea of generating effective division of labour across multilateral organisations is somewhat optimistic. As the troika meetings between EU and African sub-regional organisations demonstrate, interregional forums often emerge not because their level is the most appropriate for dealing with specific issues but rather to compensate for the failure of other, more appropriate multilateral forums to do so (examples include weak regional organisations such as the OAU or the Arab League). In the absence of effective coordination across forums, multilevel multilateralism could increase the chance of forum shopping both by states and by sub-state actors (see Crocker et al. 2001), thus reducing rather than increasing the chances of success. Therefore, the

idea of multilevel governance of security is theoretically and practically important for framing interregional security cooperation but only as long as it is not used to justify institutional proliferation.

5.7 Where to Go from Here?

As we have seen, attention to regions and interregional relations in the security studies literature has been limited. The state has long been considered to be the main referent and actor of security and the latter has been considered a close relative of 'defence'. The analysis of regional dynamics has been captured by a few approaches that have explored two main dynamics. On the one hand, analysis has focused on the process of formation of a region characterised by a low probability of internal war because of: (i) a process of community-building practices (security communities approach); (ii) a common perception of (external) threat (security complexes approach); or (iii) pressures of the international system (regional orders approach). On the other hand, there has been analysis of regional responses to security challenges that cannot be dealt with at the level of the state but require interaction between different levels of governance.

These approaches are not incompatible. A region may not be characterised by geographic continuity but may form around a shared perception that a security challenge can only be handled by coordinating efforts at a regional level. This allows for interaction between different actors and levels of governance within that region. The characteristics of the international system, in terms of both polarity and ideological homogeneity (Aron 1962), will influence the way groupings form around a particular security challenge. The creation of a regional entity for jointly responding to a security threat will in turn affect the definition of the security challenge and the collective responses. The intra-regional reflection on the security challenge and the legitimacy of tools to be employed (such as torture in the war against terrorism) touch on basic values that may or may not be shared by members of the region and this will influence its cohesiveness or 'we-ness'. Therefore, while the shared perception of a common security challenge may prompt the formation of a new regional grouping, this process will in turn prompt redefinition of the security challenge and of the region itself. Multilateral security governance at the regional level is thus not only a policy process undertaken by various actors within a security region but is also a process through which actors in a region redefine their collective identity.

Research using this theoretical framework would begin with the security challenge around which a group (of state and other actors) has formed in the belief that a coordinated, joint response is necessary. The analysis would then proceed to identify the main actors involved and the interaction between them within the region both in terms of discourse and policy practices. Focus would be on identifying the regional definition of the problem and its solutions and on internal reflections concerning legitimate tools for redress. The core of the study would be on securitisation

and de-securitisation (at the level of individual states as well as of the region) and on intra-regional debate and its transformation. A further dimension of research would concern the relationship between regions on the specific issue area—how interaction between regions affects the construction of the region under study. Enmity and amity as well as comparisons are relevant.

This way of exploring the relationship between regions and security challenges comes close to the literature on new regionalism and the notion of region found in it. This notion stresses norm convergence as well as processes of identity formation. The proposed approach could help fill a gap in the literature by addressing the lack of attention to regions in security studies and the lack of communication between security studies and the literature on new regionalism.

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Part II
Regional Actors and Strategies

Chapter 6
The European Union and the Contradictions of Complex Interregionalism

Alan Hardacre and Michael Smith

6.1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) has systematically supported regional integration and simultaneously promoted interregionalism as key components of its external relations strategy around the world. In doing so, it has specifically sought to enhance relations with emerging regional groupings. This strategic support has made the EU, without question, the most active sponsor of interregional relations, credited by many commentators with having actually developed the concept. Malamud notes that the 'consolidation of European unity since the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, along with the contemporary mushrooming of integrating regions all around the world, illustrate a significant new phenomenon' (2003: 53). The significant phenomenon to which Malamud was referring is interregionalism, spreading both due to the dynamics of regionalisation and globalisation and to the strategic support of the EU. Region-to-region interregionalism—that is to say, relations between the EU and other regional organisations—is not, however, the only relationship that the EU seeks to engage in when it approaches other regions of the world. At the intercontinental level, it engages in what can be termed 'transregional relations and strategies', whilst at the bilateral level it has developed a complex web of agreements and negotiating processes that runs alongside and often cuts across its activities at the transregional and interregional levels.

The simultaneous development, and coexistence, of different levels of relations with regions has created a phenomenon that has been termed 'complex interregionalism' (Hardacre and Smith 2009; Hardacre 2010)—a phenomenon that is

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uniquely (thus far) to be found in the EU's interregional strategies. The term 'complex interregionalism' relates specifically to the result of the EU's external relations policy of differentiation between levels of relations that has been implemented since the 1990s. Complex interregionalism was originally centred on the sustained strategic pursuit of region-to-region relations (as opposed to bilateral or other limited relationships) across the globe, notably with respect to Asia, Africa and Latin America. In its original form, this strategic initiative on the part of the EU centred on the pursuit of 'pure interregionalism' with regional integration bodies, and it was complemented by the search through transregional relations for broader intercontinental frameworks. This original orientation has been tempered by a variety of factors in recent years, leading to more bilateral developments in EU external relations—often at the expense of region-to-region relations. Bilateral and region-to-region relations are often not compatible; hence the choice of one or the other relationship implies a decline, or an end, to the other relationship. As a result of recent developments in EU 'complex interregionalism' towards bilateral relations, important questions arise about the inclination, or the capacity, of the EU to continue to devote its energies to interregional relations and to the export of regional integration models. To address these questions it is important to understand the linkages and/or tensions between the key levels of 'complex interregionalism' as it has developed and fluctuated over the past decade.

The framework of 'complex interregionalism' thus offers an analytical lens through which to understand these fluctuations in EU external relations between transregional, pure interregional and bilateral relations, and more importantly the reasons behind them. It generates important questions about the extent to which the EU is capable of sustaining its initial search for differentiated interregional relationships when faced with the difficulties of implementing such a strategy, and about the ways in which this reflects internal inter-institutional tensions within the EU itself, particularly between the Commission and the Council of the EU. These tensions have been put into a new context by the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, with its new institutional arrangements for the conduct of the EU's external policies and the resulting uncertainties about responsibilities and powers in the post-Lisbon Union. There are a number of important provisions and developments in the Treaty that have already had, and will have in the future, direct and important consequences for the pursuit of complex interregionalism across the globe.

By setting out to look at the apparent recent trend in EU external relations towards bilateral relations, at the expense of the pursuit of pure interregional relations, and at the internal reasons why this has happened in the EU, this chapter also assesses the future prospects for interregionalism as part of EU external relations. What role will pure interregionalism play in future EU strategies, and to what extent can the EU sustain a broad approach to complex or differentiated interregionalism? To answer these questions the chapter is separated into two main sections. The first section contains an overview of the evolution of complex interregionalism in EU external relations, in which the balance between transregional, interregional region-to-region and bilateral relations is analysed. This section also presents comparative illustrations from the development of EU relations with Africa, Asia and Latin

America as a means of highlighting the trends and some of the 'external' problems they have created.

The second section of the chapter focuses on the internal institutional reasons behind the changes in EU strategy, which we see as having been driven thus far by the relationship between the Commission and the Council. This section also explores the potential consequences of the Treaty of Lisbon for the EU's inter-regional strategies, providing some initial discussion of actual and potential implications for the 'three pillars' of interregional relations (political, trade and development), the role of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the new powers of the European Parliament (EP) in external relations strategy and implementation. The conclusions assess the potential futures for the EU's strat-egy of complex interregionalism in light of internal institutional changes and external challenges, and particularly the extent to which interregionalism can be seen as a continuing vehicle for the export of the EU's integration model.

6.2   Complex Interregionalism in EU External Relations

The EU has pursued an ambitious and increasingly complex interregional strategy across the globe for over 30 years, focused on three world regions: Asia, Africa and Latin America (Regelsberger in Edwards and Regelsberger 1990: 5; Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 2005). The strategy first took shape in the EU's relations with Asia, such that in 2012 the EU has long-standing interregional relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and transregional relations through the biennial Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM). These two sets of relationships have established the EU as a player in a wide range of issues concerning Asia in the global arena, but it is also fair to say that they have operated much more prominently in the economic (trade and development) sphere than in the political, security or other domains. Despite limited involvement in a range of regional conflicts (Aceh, East Timor), the EU remains largely an observer in respect of Asian security prob-lems. Notwithstanding these established multilateral relationships—or perhaps, because of their limited impact—the EU has been moving, in recent years, towards more bilateral relations in Asia—opening (preliminary) bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations with Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand, and courting a number of 'strategic partners' headed by China and India.

The EU's relations with Africa have always had a strong element of inter-regionalism, especially in relation to development issues arising from the Lomé and then the Cotonou Conventions, ranging from the original EU–African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) relations through to the current negotiations for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) under Cotonou. Whilst there has always been a strong region-to-region element in relations under Lomé and Cotonou, this has only moved towards pure interregionalism as a result of the implementation of Cotonou (Söderbaum et al. 2005: 365). These long-established aspects of the EU's policies have more recently been complemented by the effective designation of

Africa itself (in the shape of the African Union, AU) as a 'strategic partner' and the development of the *Joint Africa–EU Strategy* with a number of key thematic priorities. At the same time, the involvement of the EU in a series of African security issues, including conflicts in central Africa where EU missions have been deployed under United Nations (UN) mandates, has given a specific twist to the balance between economic and political issues. Whilst the EU has not resorted in wholesale fashion to the bilateral route as it has in Asia, the relationships between the Union and key regional partners such as South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt have often led to issues of priority and focus.

Finally the EU's interregional relations with Latin America are possibly the most extensive and well developed. At the transregional level, the EU interacts through the biennial EU–Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) Heads of state summit and then on a pure interregional level with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Andean Community (CAN) (see contributions by Santander, Costa and Dri). In contrast to both Africa and Asia, the EU has moved forward, at varying speeds over time, with its interregional relations with the three Latin American subgroups without any pronounced move towards bilateralism. Recently, however, the announcement of Brazil as a 'strategic partner' for the EU, and the pursuit of similar relationships (as well as a fully-fledged Free Trade Agreement) with Mexico, have complicated this picture, as have the fluctuating fortunes of negotiations between the EU and the regional organisations with whom it has attempted to develop long-term partnerships in Latin America.

This short overview of the evolution, and current state, of EU interregional strategies points to a number of aspects that need to be explored more fully: firstly the fact that the EU used the same strategy across three world regions; secondly that the strategy was received and worked differently in the different world regions—something that is reflected in the current state of interregional relations across the three regions; and finally that in certain circumstances the EU has felt the need to move to more bilateral forms of relationship, whilst retaining the rhetorical commitment to transregional and pure interregional agreements. Figure 6.1 below provides a summary of the EU's key interregional links in 2012.

The discussion so far has assumed that 'EU strategy' is an unproblematic notion, but in reality it is a contested and often questionable construct, both within and outside the Union. To take one 'external' example, the announcement that certain countries are 'strategic partners' of the EU does not automatically ensure that those countries will respond as the EU would like them to (the example of India is important here, but the phenomenon can be found in almost all cases). In the internal EU context there is an inherent tension between the focus and interests of different institutions, notably the Commission and the Council, and there are also tensions within—for example—the Commission, between the Directorates General (DG) that focus on trade, development and broader political or security relations with key regions, and within the Council where there are different national trade and development interests. It can be argued, in particular, that there is an inherent tension between the Commission as the instigator of an interregional strategy, the Council

Transregionalism

ASEM (1994) (Asia)
Europe – Latin America Summit (1999) (Latin America)
EU – Africa Summit (2000) (Africa)

Pure Interregionalism

EU – ASEAN (1980) (Asia)
EU – SAARC (1994) (Asia)

EU – Rio Group (1999) (Latin America)
EU – CACM (1993) (Latin America)
EU – MERCOSUR (1995) (Latin America)
EU – CAN (1996) (Latin America)

EU – EAC (under negotiation) (Africa)
EU – ESA (under negotiation) (Africa)
EU – SADC (under negotiation) (Africa)
EU – West Africa (under negotiation) (Africa)
EU – Central Africa (under negotiation) (Africa)

EU – CARIFORUM (2008) (Caribbean)
EU – Pacific (under negotiation) (Pacific)
EU – GCC (1989) (Middle East)

Fig. 6.1 The EU's main interregional relations in 2012 (Source: Own creation)

as the legitimating body for the strategy, and both the Commission and the Council as the implementing bodies for specific aspects of the strategy. What is more, implementation needs to take account of the specific regional contexts into which the strategy is projected, as noted by one of the present authors:

> [Complex interregionalism] encapsulates the tension between the fact that EU interregionalism is a strategy that is implemented in different regions according to local circumstances, according to a set of core aims and with a standard model in an attempt to achieve similar outcomes....Given that interregionalism has evolved in a context of differentiation, this has created region by region examples of complex interregionalism whereby interregionalism as a strategy has to be implemented.
>
> (Hardacre 2010: 106)

This distinction is important in understanding and evaluating complex interregionalism because it is one of the key reasons why we have witnessed fluctuations in the EU's external relations between transregional, interregional and bilateral levels (in certain regions); the Commission builds and delivers the strategies, which can contain powerful normative as well as material elements, and also negotiates with key regional partners, whilst the Council ultimately has to authorise them through the signing of Association Agreements (which crucially include FTAs) and its approval of specific institutional arrangements.

As noted above, the obvious other key element in this equation is the receptivity of partner regions and their level of regional integration. To put it simply, the EU's search for regional partners may find the candidates either unwilling to proceed or

Stage 1: (Pre-1978)	- Early interregionalism - Created and existing regional partners - Cooperation agreements signed - Principally Asia and Africa
Stage 2: (1978–1990)	- Interregionalism expands in EU strategy - EU develops existing relations and seeks new ones - Principally Asia and Africa
Stage 3: (early 1990s)	- Height of Interregionalism - EU finds new partner regions across globe - EU starts to differentiate its relations by region
Stage 4: (1995–2005)	- EU develops transregional discussion *fora* (Summits) - EU misses opportunities to solidify interregional relations - EU needs to find new framework for Africa—interregional - EU encounters problems with partner region levels of regional integration
Stage 5: (from 2005)	- EU starts to move towards strengthening bilateral relations with key trade partners in key regions - EU struggling to sign off on interregional negotiations due to partner regional integration issues and Council reluctance - Council drive towards bilateral FTAs with key trade partners in Asia

Fig. 6.2 Five stages of EU complex interregionalism (Source: Own creation)

incapable of doing so on the basis that the EU would prefer. One of the most obvious examples in this area is the EU's decade-long search for a more sustained partnership with MERCOSUR, a regional integration organisation set up in part on the basis of the example provided by the EU itself, but one which has been prevented from moving forward both by its own internal divisions and by the thus far insurmountable obstacle of agricultural trade in relations with the EU. Problems have also been encountered in the EU's pursuit of EPAs with regional groupings in Africa especially, where the EU's 'construction' of partners with which to negotiate sits very uneasily alongside existing African attempts at regional integration. Finally in Asia there has been an outright rejection of the EU model of regional integration, leading to the development of an 'ASEAN way' (Rüland 2002: 8). These elements become clear when we look at the five main stages in the development of complex interregionalism, as summarised in Fig. 6.2.

Figure 6.2 highlights the recent move away from an apparently consistent and coherent strategy towards stronger relations with regional groups across the globe, in which the European Community (EC) aspired towards comprehensive three pillar (political, development and trade) partnership agreements. In stages 1–3 (that is, from the 1970s to the early 1990s) the Commission was very much in the driving seat in negotiating cooperation agreements and in giving varied support for partner regional integration projects—a process that clearly encompassed the 'export' of key EC ideas and institutional fixes (Farrell 2005: 264; also see Doidge in this volume). In this sense, as Stage 3 highlights, the mid-1990s were very much the zenith for EU interregional strategy. At this time the EU was already working with ASEAN in Asia and with the ACP grouping, predominantly covering Africa, and these two

major partnerships were joined by MERCOSUR and the two other rejuvenated Latin American integration vehicles CACM and the CAN. It was also around this period in time that some key tensions emerged in the strategic process: whilst broad frameworks and rhetorical or normative commitments to interregional partnerships could be established, the strategy that the Commission had largely framed needed to be delivered on in various regions, i.e. there needed to be progress and results—and the results that were identified often took the form of Association Agreements incorporating FTAs. There was thus a clear potential contradiction between the search for regional partners and the promotion of regional integration outside Europe, and the more concrete demands of EU external trade as expressed, for example, in the *Global Europe* strategy (not to mention the potential issues arising around such areas as political conditionality and the EU's efforts to re-shape domestic societies through the recasting of its development policies) (European Commission 2006).

Stage 4 of the development of interregional relations should have been about the cementing of key interregional relations with ASEAN and with MERCOSUR, but this proved impossible for two key reasons. Firstly the level of regional integration of ASEAN and MERCOSUR was making region-to-region agreements very difficult to consider—especially in the case of ASEAN. In Asia the EU was required to rethink its strategy and how to move forward with key developing countries there. With MERCOSUR it was less of a concern (although still a concern) over the level (and aspirations) of regional integration but more a negotiating issue whereby the Council (and key member states in particular) was unwilling to grant the agricultural concessions needed to seal an agreement with the Latin American bloc (see Santander in this volume). By the end of the 1990s, therefore, the EU's interregional strategies were showing the first signs of serious strain; this was compounded by the re-shaping of EU relations with developing countries through the conclusion of the Cotonou Convention and by the opening of negotiations aimed at concluding a series of Economic Partnership Agreements with various African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.

The current stage of EU interregional strategy appears to show an important move away from interregionalism in favour of bilateralism in Asia, but not yet (or not to the same extent) in Latin America or Africa. In Africa the EU is working closely with existing African regional organisations for capacity-building and institutional support in terms of aid, and also in many ways for peace/security. This is somewhat at odds with the EPA negotiations that are being conducted with the more artificial EU-created regions. The question of coherence in African regional integration, a very important challenge, is not being assisted by the actions of the EU. The situation in Southeast Asia is particularly worth looking at in a little more detail given the important change of focus. The EU launched formal interregional negotiations with ASEAN in 2007 in an attempt to harness the economic drive of the region in an interregional free trade agreement (despite reservations regarding the level of regional integration), but these negotiations never really took off and in March 2009 the parties officially designated a 'pause' in negotiations. In December 2009 the Council instructed the Commission to pursue bilateral FTA negotiations in the region so that the EU did not lose any ground to competitors who were signing

Fig. 6.3 EU complex interregionalism in Southeast Asia in 2012 (Source: Own creation)

FTAs in the region (United States, China and Japan, for example). This means the interregional picture in Southeast Asia resembles that outlined in Fig. 6.3.

Therefore, what started out as a strategy with 'an increasing emphasis on interregionalism as a guiding principle for the EU's foreign policies and external relations' (Söderbaum et al. 2005: 366) has in the space of a few years been almost entirely reversed—with important long-term consequences. This pattern has not (yet) been fully replicated in Africa, where the EU is locked in EPA negotiations (although, as noted above, those negotiations raise important questions about the nature of interregional strategies), nor in Latin America. In Latin America the EU moved to upgrade its bilateral relations with Brazil in 2007 (stopping short of trade relations) (European Commission 2007) but is still negotiating with MERCOSUR at the interregional level.

The EU's interregional strategies as of 2012 thus seem to reflect only a distant echo of the initial idea that the EC and then the Union should seek out partnerships with kindred organisations in other regions, support them and see them as building blocks for a world based on interregional partnerships. As noted above, one set of reasons for this erosion of the EU model is to be found in the dynamics of complex interregionalism itself—the accretion of new levels of interaction and institutionalisation necessitates a new variety of strategy and a mix of transregional, interregional and bilateral strategies. At the same time, the development of the broader global arena has created new possibilities for alignment and de-alignment, and has transmitted pressures for conformity with institutions of global governance in such a way that pure interregionalism is less feasible, or appropriate, as a strategy than it was in

the 1970s or 1980s. Both of these sets of 'external' arguments are well taken, but the focus in the rest of this chapter is on the 'internal' aspects of the EU's interregional strategies: is there something in the internal institutional and other dynamics of the EU that makes pure interregional strategy and the export of EU norms, values and institutions less salient or practical in 2012 than it was 20 years ago?

6.3   Drivers of Complex Interregionalism in EU Policy-Making

Historically, the internal drivers of EU interregionalism are to be found in the intersecting roles of the Commission and the Council. The European Parliament has not had a major influence over the strategy, or the implementation, of complex interregionalism given its limited role in external relations. The Parliament has evidently played a role in sanctioning EU funding for regional integration in the budget procedure and it has also, on occasion, had an impact on the broad climate of relations between the EU and its key regional partners. For example, the Parliament's championing of human rights in respect of Myanmar has at times had an important influence on relations with ASEAN. Beyond this the Parliament has largely been supportive of the Commission's strategy and positions, in particular as they have represented a contribution to the building of a distinct 'European identity' in external relations. We will come back to the role of the Parliament in interregionalism at the end of this section because the changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon signal an interesting new role for it (also cf. Costa and Dri in this volume).

The Commission has carefully crafted a series of strategy documents to push forward its interregional aspirations and it has been very successful in supporting regional integration around the world. In some senses it is more accurate to say that the Commission has been the main sponsor of regional integration and interregionalism than it is to credit this to the EU—because it is very much a Commission construct. The Commission's influence can be read in almost all founding texts of regional integration efforts, such has been its outreach and support across the globe. For some, this Commission support has gone too far and become blinded to other developments; for example, Söderbaum, Stålgren and Van Langenhove accuse the Commission of 'striking self-confidence', both in its view of the merits of regional integration and in the way it has pursued it in partner regions (notably by creating regions to partner with in Africa). The same authors also quote the Commission as being eager to export the 'reality of the EU to a world hungry for its presence' (Söderbaum et al. 2005: 371). This Commission drive has been unstinted for over 30 years and has had extremely important implications for many partner regions, whose regional integration has been spurred and bolstered by Commission driven financial, technical and political support. For example, the EU, through Commission initiation, pledged 50 million Euros to MERCOSUR in the 2007–2013 period to help consolidate and advance its regional integration (also see contributions in this volume by Doidge, Hettne, Santander, Costa and Dri).

This strategic drive from the Commission has, however, wilted somewhat in recent years due to the problems and resistance that it has faced in partner regions. First and foremost, not all regions have shown an appetite for increased regional integration, and a number of them have been anxious to differentiate their efforts from the 'EU model', something that has notably been the case with ASEAN, as mentioned above. Furthermore, in literally all partner regions, the Commission has struggled to negotiate FTAs with 'virtual regions', a term its officials have in the past used in connection with MERCOSUR (Hardacre 2010: 217). To negotiate comprehensive FTAs on a region-to-region basis, the partner region has to be able to negotiate regionally and then ensure smooth regional implementation—two things that all EU partner regions have problems with. Thus, even within the Commission there is a dichotomy between the strategic pursuit of interregionalism and the problems of giving effect to the strategy through negotiations. This can be compounded by the fact that in many interregional negotiations, the EU's partners face not just one Commission but more frequently two or three: the Commission of hard-nosed trade negotiations, the Commission of development policy and the Commission of political conditionality and the search for 'good governance'. These problems notwithstanding, the Commission remains the staunchest advocate of regional integration and by logical extension interregionalism. The key difference in 2012 is that, beyond a certain point, the Commission's strategy needs to be implemented and show results—which depends on the Council. In recent years the Council has intervened more actively in the Commission's strategy to outline where it will continue to support the Commission's interregional efforts, by signing agreements–because the Commission's strategy has to be implemented.

The strategy/implementation dichotomy is even more evident when it comes to the Council. It is logical to expect that the Council, representing the member states, will reflect the varying intensity of interests among those states in relation to key regions and countries, arising from historical and other roots. Thus, there has always been a more consistent and detailed attention to the EU's interregional strategies in France, the United Kingdom and Spain than there has been among smaller member states with a less weighty colonial heritage, and this has become even more marked since the Eastern enlargement of the Union in 2004–2007 (see Santander in this volume). During the past decade, this has been compounded by the growing focus of the Council (and by certain parts of the Commission) on what might be described as 'economic realism', given a vicious twist by the onset of the global (and then specifically European) financial crisis since 2007. This tendency has cast a big shadow over interregionalism, which was failing to deliver trade benefits as FTAs were not forthcoming, and can be seen as a key driving force in the more recent switch to bilateralism, especially in Asia—here, the economic dynamism of the Southeast and East Asian countries can be defined much more as a threat than as an opportunity in a period where the dynamism of China and other Asian partners contrasts vividly with the fragility of the EU economy.

This tension between a preference for interregionalism at the normative and institutional level and the growing pressure for bilateralism and defensive policies at the practical level has long established roots. Even at the zenith of EU interregionalism,

in 1995, the Commission published an appraisal of FTAs in which it noted that 'failure on our part to engage in this wider economic co-operation may well result in important economic regions developing a regulatory framework which will potentially hurt the Union's interests' (European Commission 1995: Art. 7).

In retrospect, this can be seen as an attempt to square the circle by reconciling an increasingly hard-nosed approach to interregionalism with the broader normative component to which we have already referred. This logic, and strategy, was fine for the Council in 1995 but this was soon to change. As already noted, it did not change uniformly in relation to all partner regions. For example, the Commission led 13 negotiation rounds with MERCOSUR between 2000 and 2004, and on a couple of occasions felt that it had unlocked the difficult negotiations, only to find resistance in the Council. Despite this failure, one mirrored by negotiations with the EPA regions and ASEAN for example, the Council did not press the Commission to open bilateral discussions with MERCOSUR countries. The EU actually reopened region-to-region FTA discussions with MERCOSUR in May 2010, although for reasons we will address, there seems even less chance of success now than there was during the 2000–2004 period. In the case of ASEAN, the dynamics in the Council come very much to the fore. When the EU decided to stop interregional negotiations in 2007, it was only 2 years before the Council requested bilateral FTAs. The reasons why the Council took these steps in relation to Asia and not in relation to other world regions can be explained by the increasing dynamism of the Asian region and by the signing of FTAs with countries in the region by EU trade competitors—leading to a strong demand from member states in the Council to quickly redress this situation and move from the much slower and more difficult interregional level to the bilateral level. Another reason why this is possible with the Asian region is the complementarity of trade dynamics in the EU's external relations, and specifically the relative absence of the problem of agricultural trade that is so dominant in relations with Africa and Latin America.

The Council is the forum in which member states decide on negotiating mandates, in which they all want to extend their offensive interests (often focused on trade in services and better regulation of markets in developing countries) and to protect their defensive concerns (often agriculture). This makes the Council susceptible to interest group activity around FTAs—especially at times of financial crisis and rising unemployment. An FTA can have very localised impacts on an industry or sector and no national government wants to sign away national jobs. For this reason trade symmetry between FTA partners is important, and in the case of the EU this means that agriculture will be difficult to address if it is an offensive interest of the EU's partner. This is the case for MERCOSUR and all African EPA negotiations where there is a strong asymmetry of agricultural trade. At the very moment that EU–MERCOSUR FTA negotiations were reopened in 2010, French agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire told an Agriculture Council meeting, 'France is opposed to the re-launch of the negotiations between the EU and MERCOSUR' (MercoPress 2010). The French position was quickly supported by Italy, Ireland and a further 13 member states. This unprecedented show of hostility to a trade negotiation almost dooms it to failure before it begins, but it highlights that the economic realism of the Council trumps Commission strategy.

In Asia the situation is somewhat different because agriculture is less of a concern than it is with Latin American countries, and the interests of the EU are more pressing. There is FTA competition from the United States, China and Japan, all of whom are engaging in active bilateral FTA campaigns in the region (which is not the case with MERCOSUR or Africa). For this reason the Council has pushed to move to bilateral relations in the region—creating a sort of domino effect and a race to negotiate FTAs with the most promising partners. Thus the Council ultimately drives the long-term EU interregional strategy through its implementation of trade provisions and its trade motivations. This explains why the Council has not pushed for bilateralism (yet) in Latin America (trade is not so important for them and there is no pressing competition) and in Africa (trade is not so important for them and there is no pressing competition) whilst it has instigated a major bilateral crusade in Asia.

Trade, though, is not the whole of the picture. Whilst the EU is not engaged in a race for FTAs in Africa, it is embroiled in a number of contradictions arising at least in part from the conflicting motivations of different institutional groups within the EU itself. Thus, as already noted, the EPA negotiations following on from the Cotonou Convention have proved intractable, partly as a result of the EU's determination to construct negotiating partners that do not always make sense in regional terms and partly as a reflection of the tensions between the EU's development aims and its trade strategies. At the same time, there is competition in Africa, not so much in trade (with one notable exception) as in development, with China especially promoting a regional presence based on what appears to be a more practical and less normative development model. More recently, the growth of the oil industry in sub-Saharan Africa has intersected with a number of political and security concerns to engage the United States as well as China more strongly in a region which for a long time the EU might have considered a *domaine réservé*. This means that the EU's interregional strategy—still by a long way more comprehensive and wide-ranging than any of its competitors'—is under threat partly because it is so wide-ranging and because of its explicit normative dimensions. In Asia, the predominance of the trade issue means that a number of these more political and normative aspects are suppressed, whilst in Latin America the stakes, at least at present, are relatively lower.

As we can see from this discussion, the relationships between the Commission and the Council are not straightforward when it comes to interregionalism. The Commission has a strong incentive to support a form of regional mimetism (Manners quoted in Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004: 19) elsewhere in the world, partly because of the institutional investment in interregionalism over decades and partly as a reflection of the drive to create a distinctive European identity in external relations. But its position is not monolithic or uni-directional, since there are differences of approach and priorities among different parts of the Commission and these are underlined by the impact of external and internal challenges, especially the economic challenges created by the financial crisis. Whatever the Commission's position, it is also the case that its strategies are ultimately subject to the economic realism of the Council—a force that has grown in recent years, and which has been asserted more directly. The Council in turn is heavily influenced by 'defensive'

economic lobbies, most obviously the agricultural lobby, notably the European Union Farmers Union, 'European Farmers and European Agri-Cooperatives' otherwise known as COPA–COGECA, and as a result the Council is characterised by resistance to agricultural concessions. Given the impact of the financial crisis and the challenge of emerging economic powers such as China and India, this defensiveness is no longer confined simply to agriculture, and has resulted in an increasing focus on competitiveness in the guise of the *Global Europe* strategy—developed, of course, within the Commission in response to member state pressures. It must be noted that the agricultural resistance is not unanimous in the Council as a number of member states do not have defensive agricultural interests; but in at least some cases, those same member states are at the forefront of demands for the regulation of trade with the emerging economies in other sectors.

Have the Treaty of Lisbon and its changes to the framework for the conduct of the EU's external policies modified this apparently bipolar confrontation within the EU over interregional strategy? One point that must be made at the outset is that actually the confrontation is not as bipolar as it might seem. The inter-institutional dynamics operating between the Commission and the Council in respect of interregionalism are complicated, and involve overlapping interests between (for example) DG Trade and those member states most interested in the promotion of EU competitiveness. In the same way, the dynamics create unexpected tensions or complementarities in areas such as development policy, or security policy, where the adoption of more comprehensive or holistic approaches not only reflects the reality of demands in the developing countries but also the increasing intersection of member state and 'European' interests. Lisbon promised to make it easier for the EU to speak with one voice and to pursue joined-up policies, through its creation of the EEAS and of a new inter-institutional relationship between the Commission, the President of the European Council and the High Representative. It also gave the European Parliament new powers, especially in relation to the approval of trade agreements, which were potentially very significant in terms of interregional relations. In principle, all of this would result not only in a greater coordination of EU policies, but also in greater legitimacy for those policies that are agreed, given the broader participation and the involvement of the EP (see the contribution by Costa and Dri).

In reality, the jury is still out (and is engaged in heated argument) on the ways in which Lisbon might affect the EU's capacity to pursue effective interregional strategies. One area of debate concerns the relationship between trade policy and interregional strategy. The Treaty did not fundamentally affect the institutional position of DG Trade, nor the institutional arrangements for the conduct of trade negotiations—so it might be argued that with interregional relations more focused on trade and the pursuit of FTAs, the trend towards a more hard-nosed and materialistic EU stance would continue. That trend might or might not be reinforced by the new powers of the EP, which has already asserted its right of assent in a number of cases, and specifically the FTA with South Korea. Will this make it more difficult to pursue the kind of interregional FTAs that seem to be on the agenda (whether bilateral or more extensive)? The growing politicisation of trade negotiations in the wake of the

financial crisis and the continuing failures of the Doha Round in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) might also make it much more problematic to develop inter-regional trade links in the foreseeable future.

A second area of debate concerns the relationship between development and diplomacy. As we have seen development is a concern, to a greater or lesser degree, in all three of the EU's key interregional relationships (with Asia, Africa and Latin America). But two problems have proven disruptive of smooth policy-making in this area since the implementation of Lisbon. One is the need to transfer large numbers of the Commission's development policy staff to the EEAS, coupled with the need to develop a way of working across the two institutions in a situation where the EEAS is responsible for policy development and the Commission for implementation. This is a new, and for some very troubling, area of uncertainty, and it is not one that has been resolved in the first year of the EEAS' operation. Alongside (and connected with) this, there is the growing evidence that development policy is becoming increasingly securitised on a global scale—in other words, that the EU's normative and institutional commitment to a comprehensive and holistic model of development is challenged by the increasing instrumentalisation of development policy. The fear that this will be underlined by the EEAS' role in development policy formation is a significant one, and could destabilise the development dimension of the EU's interregional strategies. This in turn connects to a third area of uncertainty, concerning the politics of the EU's interregional strategies and their relationship to the emergence of new 'strategic partners' in the EU's external relations. We have seen that this is one of the key developments in complex interregional policy for the EU more generally, but there is significant uncertainty about the ways in which this can be reconciled on a continuing basis with the more comprehensive approach to interregional strategy that we have identified in this chapter—and about the priority that those more comprehensive approaches might receive in the foreseeable future.

6.4   Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the development and the prospects of the EU's interregional strategies, with specific reference to the emergence of 'complex interregionalism'. We have identified the growth of a (partly designed) pattern of 'complex interregionalism' in EU actions towards the three key regions with which it has substantial and continuing involvement: Asia, Africa and Latin America. This pattern is subject to fluctuations and contrasts across time and across the three partner regions, responding to developments in the EU, the partner regions and the global arena. The notion of 'complex interregionalism' draws attention to a number of key aspects of the EU's interregional strategies, including the ways in which the EU has set out to manage and give institutional expression to its interregional relationships. In this context, the management of linkages between the transregional, the interregional and the bilateral levels is a key activity, but this activity

does not take place in a vacuum. In particular, the management of interregional relations is complicated by the pressures exerted by broader developments in the global arena, by the unwillingness or inability of partner regions to respond to EU advances, and by the internal organisational dynamics of the EU.

These broad insights have enabled us to come to some more specific conclusions about the current state of play in the EU's interregional strategies, and give the basis for speculating about potential future developments. We have noted the ways in which the transregional, the interregional and bilateral levels of action and interaction have fluctuated in the three partner regions. A key element in this fluctuation seems to be the extent to which there are high stakes to play for in the more material areas of trade (and to this we might add investment, given the new EU powers implied by the Lisbon Treaty), and the extent to which EU member states assert their interests through the Council. In relation to Asia, it is tempting to conclude that it is all about trade, and that this will remain the case for the foreseeable future; in this context, the retreat or the marginalisation of the more comprehensive interregional strategies that we have described might be predictable. It is also very important to emphasise that a sustained move towards bilateral relations undermines the possibility of meaningful interregional relations in the future. If the EU signs a series of bilateral deals with ASEAN member countries the future of region-to-region relations looks very different. In the case of Africa, it is much more about development, and to an increasing degree about security; in this case, we might predict that the EU's involvement would be more directly a part of 'foreign and security policy' rather than external relations and the promotion of the EU's external identity. This being the case, and given the weak incentives for the EU to deviate from the current EPA path, it is unlikely that the bilateral path will be followed in Africa—it is more likely that an interregional approach will persist. Finally, in the case of Latin America, there is the most important evidence in favour of a more comprehensive interregionalism, and of the search for regional partners broadly in the mould of the EU itself; this trend may well continue, but not if the region becomes more politicised or seen as more of an economic threat to defensive interests in the EU.

Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger concluded, in 2005, that the pursuit and promotion of interregionalism had 'helped the EU and its member States to pursue their stated objective of becoming a global power in international relations' (2005: 338). One important aspect of this objective has been the aim of promoting regional integration in the regions with which the EU has partnered itself. But the argument in this chapter implies that this aim has been inconsistently pursued and rarely realised. It has to compete with the more pragmatic, material and immediate pressures exerted by the EU's insertion into the global arena, and it often cannot compete very effectively. It also has to negotiate the internal institutional dynamics of the EU, in ways that have not been simplified by the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, and of the highest importance in the current context, it has to cope with the fact that the EU model itself is under severe challenge from within and from the global arena, and that there are plausible competitors in areas of international activity that the EU has for a long time considered its 'property'. In essence the very promising interregional model that the Commission has pursued politically, financially and technically is proving

easy to unravel with important long-term consequences for regional integration around the world. This is a challenge not only to the EU model in general, but to the normative and institutional basis for the EU's interregional strategies.

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Chapter 7
The Impact of the Iberian States on European Union–Latin American Interregionalism

Sebastian Santander

7.1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) maintains relations with the entire international community. This is in keeping with its approach of developing various strategies that are appropriate to the particular requirements of its partners. It is also an expression of the key interests and core values of the EU. The diversification of its external relations has led the EU over the past two decades to develop an overall strategy for the Latin American continent and this represents a shift from an unclear strategy and low level of political interest to a more structured and coherent relationship with Latin America (LA). Today's EU strategy for LA has clear objectives and regular meetings are now being held at administrative and ministerial levels as are biannual summits with the Heads of state and governments of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The EU is now a relatively important economic partner for Latin America; it is the region's leading donor, primary foreign investor and second most important trade partner after the United States (US). Among the priorities at the heart of this strategy are the promotion of regionalism and of relations between the European Union and regional groups in LA.

The methodological approach adopted in this chapter considers a 'region' neither as a monolithic actor nor like a set of billiard balls. Instead, there is a need to examine the details of a region, particularly the EU, in order to better understand region-society complexes (Hurrell 1995: 72–73). The EU is therefore viewed as a composite international actor (de Wilde d'Esmael 2000; Engelbrekt and Hallenberg 2008). This chapter will identify some of the key actors in EU external policy making and focus particularly upon those involved in the development of the EU's strategy for Latin America.

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Focus here is upon the European institutions, in particular the European Commission, which have played an active role in pursuing the strategy of *rapprochement* with the Latin American continent. However, individual EU member states have also played decisive roles in this process and the roles played by the Iberian countries (Spain and Portugal) are of particular interest for our discussion. Although some European countries have economic and commercial interests in Latin America, Spain is the only one that has a Ministry for Latin American Affairs and this has enabled Spain to develop a strategy for the whole continent. Contrary to popular belief, LA has no special place in Portugal's foreign policy. Although Portugal has special interests in and relations with Brazil, it has not developed an overall strategy in relation to the continent, but has instead tended to follow Spanish initiatives with regard to EU–LA relations. Spain remains the only European country that has consistently paved the way for stronger EU cooperation with LA.

This chapter also argues that there is reciprocal influence. In other words, while Spain's membership of the EU has led to the inclusion of a Latin American strategy in the European agenda, so too has Spain's policy for relations with its former colonies been affected by the EU's approach to LA. Developments in Spain and in the EU have thus evolved in tandem.

The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section identifies the EU member states that have interests in LA and examines the elements of their foreign policy that have implications for LA, particularly with regard to community-based strategies. The second and third sections analyse the place of LA in Portuguese and Spanish foreign policy. This comparison enables us to then assess Spain's role in the development of EU's Latin American strategy. Here the chapter also examines the mutual influences between the LA policies of Madrid and of the EU. The fifth section explores the role of Ibero–American relations in agreements reached between Europe and LA and analyses the influence of the Iberian states in promoting relations and multi-dimensional agreements between the EU and various regions of LA. The final section looks at the implications of changes in international, European and Latin American politics for EU–LA interregionalism.

7.2   European Interests in Latin America

Only a few EU member states have any interest in developing relations between the EU and LA. Their interests derive from previously established bilateral relations with some of the countries in LA based on trade, investment, development cooperation and socio-cultural relations. Of the EU's 28 member states, five account for 87 % of these relationships; these are Germany, Spain, Italy, France and Portugal (Sarraute Sainz and Théry 2008). These states, together with the United Kingdom (UK), already held dominant positions in LA half a century before the establishment of the European Community (EC) was undertaken. They constituted the most important providers of capital, arms and technology for the Latin American continent. France and Germany participated in the modernisation of local armies and

provided training for Latin American officers. France also represented an ideological and cultural model for local elites, while the UK, as a globally leading capitalist power, was the most important supplier and principal financer of LA (Rouquié 1998). However, after the two World Wars and the Great Depression plunged the European powers into decline, influence was ceded to the US, which soon acquired the status of a world hegemonic power with international responsibilities. The US then began investing in all the sectors in LA and it was not until the 1980s that Western European countries began to make their return to the Latin American continent.

Today, the European countries that maintain the bulk of relations with LA have bilateral relations with a series of Latin American states and support a common European strategy for LA. Europe is particularly interested in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Colombia, which are the five main commercial partners of European countries and answer for 80 % of LA's trade with the EU (Quenan and Santiso 2007). In the EU, the Netherlands occupies an important position as the leading importer of products from LA and ranks seventh among the European exporters to the region (Dasque 2006).

Germany is the primary donor of development aid to LA and is a relatively important economic partner for the continent. It is the leading exporter and importer in Europe, followed by France, Italy, Spain and the UK. Germany has traditionally developed close relations of free trade with Brazil, which represents the largest economy in LA. Brazil is Germany's largest commercial partner in LA and attracts the majority of German private investment in the continent. Brazil hosts more than 1,200 German companies, most of which are located in São Paulo (Auswärtiges Amt 2009).

Portugal has historically had close relations with Brazil, which hosts the largest Portuguese community outside Portugal (1.2 million persons). There are also more than 60,000 Brazilians living in Portugal and they constitute the largest foreign community in the country. Portugal has developed economic and commercial relations with its former colony that are far more important than its relations with the rest of LA (Amador 2008). Further, Brazil has become a country of choice for Portuguese investment ever since the 1990s. Lisbon also has a special interest in Venezuela, where there is a Portuguese community of over half a million people. Relations between Portugal and Venezuela are regulated by a number of bilateral agreements covering issues such as energy cooperation, food supply, diplomatic concerns, tourism and the fight against drug trafficking. Portugal has recently increased its trade with Argentina, Mexico, Chile and Colombia. However, Portugal's relations with these countries are not as strong as they are with Brazil (see also below).

France has also developed economic and commercial relations with some countries in LA and it is among the leading foreign investors on the continent after Spain and the Netherlands. France maintains relations with Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Argentina in particular. Italy focuses upon ties with the countries in the Southern Cone, where there are large Italian communities; in Argentina over 50 % of the population is of Italian descent and, in Brazil, over 15 %.

Like Italy, Spain has framework agreements with a number of South American countries and these cover the financing of exports, development cooperation and the promotion of investment. Regarding trade with the Latin American continent, Italy and Spain rank third and fourth among the European countries and Madrid outranks all other European capitals in terms of private investment. Moreover, recent years have seen the growth of decentralised cooperation between local collectives in LA and those in Germany, Spain, Italy, France and Portugal. This has increased the decentralisation process in both continents and it answers for a considerable amount of political, technical, financial, economic and cultural exchanges (Sarraute Sainz and Théry 2008).

Although there is thus a group of states that has maintained multiple relations with countries in LA for more than 20 years, the majority of EU member countries lack a Latin American dimension to their foreign policies. Despite the various relations maintained between the states of the old continent and a few nations of the New World, no European country except for Spain has developed a 'global' policy for the entire Latin American continent. In effect, the member states have left it to the EU to develop such a policy. Europe's Latin American policy has therefore been conceived primarily by EU agencies. For the majority of European chancelleries, LA occupies a peripheral place in their international agendas. Indeed, these countries' external relations have traditionally been eclipsed by other imperatives, such as trans-Atlantic and European partnerships and the particular zones of influence of each country. Germany, for instance, influenced since the 1970s by the *Ostpolitik* of Chancellor Willy Brandt, prioritised a close relationship with the countries of Eastern Europe and championed their integration into the EU. For historical reasons, the external relations of France and the UK are oriented toward Africa and Asia and they show less interest in LA.

7.3   Latin America in Portuguese Foreign Policy: The Importance of Brazil

In most of the scientific publications and policy documents regarding EU–LA relations, Portugal, like Spain, is presented as having important strategic interests in LA. From this it might be deduced that the entire Latin American continent holds a special place in Portuguese foreign policy. However, this is not so. Several official documents from Portugal describing the main lines of its foreign policy are revealing in this regard. Neither LA nor the Ibero–American Association— widely considered to be a 'natural bridge' between the Old and the New World— tend to be mentioned (see Portuguese Embassy 2009). In fact, Portugal's foreign policy after the Carnation Revolution resulted from the convergence of three geopolitical axes: the Portuguese-speaking countries (Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea–Bissau, São Tomé and Principe and East Timor), the EU and the US (Almeida Cravo and Freire 2006). Portugal consequently has no special

policy for the Latin American continent[1]; its interests in the region, its resources and its political will are all limited.

Portugal's interest in LA is mainly focused on Brazil. This is evident from three indicators: private investment, trade and development aid. 95 % of Portugal's private investment in LA feeds into the Brazilian economy (CEPAL 2006: 211). However, LA represents only 2.6 % of Portugal's exports and 1.1 % of her imports but Brazil is nonetheless Portugal's main trade partner in the region; more than 50 % of Portuguese exports are sent to Brazil and more than 50 % of its imports from LA come from Brazil (Amador 2008: 84–85). LA does not figure at all as a destination for Portuguese development aid. Most Portuguese aid has traditionally been directed to the African continent and its Portuguese-speaking territories, which receive 66 % of Portugal's development aid, while Asia receives only 18 % (including East Timor) and the entire LA continent only 1 % (IPAD 2009), almost all of which goes to Brazil. These data testify to Portugal's interest in countries in which Portuguese is the official language.

Lisbon wants to develop its links with Portuguese-speaking countries not only for economic reasons—as attested by its interest in Angola's and Brazil's energy products (oil, ethanol)—but also for reasons related to international representation. Both in Europe and in today's globalised world, Portugal is surrounded by nations that enjoy more external recognition and political and economic power than Portugal does (Santana Ferra 2007). Also, as the EU's centre of gravity and external relations move eastwards, Lisbon finds itself in a weaker geographical position within Europe (Almeida Cravo and Freire 2006). Portugal's relations with Portuguese-speaking countries therefore represent a platform for the country's own projection and affirmation on the European and international stage. This is one of the reasons for Portuguese interest in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), which was created in 1996 in order to strengthen the global status of the Portuguese language in politics, culture and development. Portugal aspires to be recognised in the EU for its special relationship with the CPLP countries and thus for its ability to establish relations with countries in four continents (Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe). The CPLP comprises 240 million people and it includes Brazil, whose economic and political potential make it an emerging power (Santander 2009a) that is increasingly being courted by Europe (Santander 2007, 2012). Lisbon's relationship with Portuguese-speaking countries is an asset that is not subject to interference by other EU member states but that nevertheless helps Portugal strengthen its influence within the EU. This contrasts with the Ibero–American Community of Nations that was established in 1991 at Spain's initiative with the double purpose of securing its interests in LA and serving as a 'bridge' between EU and LA.

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[1] This assertion was confirmed by a representative of the Portuguese Embassy in Brussels during an interview on 24 August 2009.

7.4   The Political Importance of Latin America for Spain

7.4.1   Convergence Between Spain and the European Community

Unlike Lisbon and the other European capitals, Madrid considers LA to be a key element of Spain's international projection. Spain is the only European country that has a 'global strategy' for LA and it considers this to be an important element of its European policy. For the Spanish authorities, Spain's influence in the EU depends strongly on the Latin American component of its foreign policy. Spain is one of the few member states that has consistently supported the development of an EU strategy for LA. At the same time, Spain's policy towards its former colonies has also been affected by the EU's strategy for LA.

A more active involvement by the EC in LA coincided with the evolution of Madrid's policy of *rapprochement* with the New World. Spain's interest in developing closer relations with LA began with the Spanish democratic transition of 1976 and gathered momentum with the Socialist Party's rise to power in 1982. Prior to this, Spain had shown little interest LA after its colonies had gained independence in the early nineteenth century. The Spanish–American War of 1898 had also left Spain humiliated by the loss of Cuba and Puerto Rico.

The European Community's attitude to LA was thenceforth hesitant, uncoordinated largely disinterested. The first generation of bilateral trade agreements made by the EC with a limited group of countries (Argentina, 1971; Uruguay, 1973; Brazil, 1974; Mexico, 1975) was essentially an 'empty shell'; meaningful political dialogue with LA was lacking and EC interest was instead focused upon African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, on developing dialogue with the Mediterranean countries (the Euro–Arab dialogue) and with the Eastern Bloc (security issues and *détente*). It was not until the early 1980s that LA began to attract renewed attention in Europe.

The interests of Madrid and Brussels in LA prior to the 1980s can be explained in terms of a number of interlinked factors. Like the EC of that time, Spain was striving to position itself in the world and wanted to play a more active role in international affairs. Madrid was trying to break with the previous era of international isolation and take on a new role on the international scene (Aixalà i Blanch 2005) at the same time as the EC was designing a policy for European Political Cooperation (EPC) and creating new international policy instruments, such as trade sanctions, which politicised economic cooperation. LA's conflicts with Central America offered the EC a chance to shine on the global stage; both Madrid and Brussels now aspired to become international mediators and they shared a similar vision of the situation. Unlike Washington, Madrid (Schumacher 1995) and Brussels (Crawley 2006) refused to see these wars as yet another expression of East–West conflict and instead adopted the North–South model in order to interpret these conflicts as the result of poverty and the extreme inequality that existed in Central American societies.

Spain also agreed with the principles and values supported by the EC in the region. The EC now agreed to contest authoritarianism in Central America and to promote democracy, human rights and regionalism (European Commission 1984). These ideas resembled those advanced in the foreign policy of the Spanish labour government, which was struggling to consolidate democracy in Spain and then use its own democratic transition as an example for Latin American countries to follow. Finally, Spanish and EC agreement about the need to structure relations with LA can also be explained by the fact that Madrid was seeking to further its own European integration as well as its own *rapprochement* with LA. For Felipe Gonzalez's labour government, these two objectives were to be compatible and they needed to advance simultaneously (Schumacher 1995).

Even before joining the EC, Spain was trying to create ties between Europe and LA and to persuade Portugal to help establish an interface between the two sides of the Atlantic. Both Spain and Portugal then became involved in the 'San José Process', which institutionalised interregional political dialogue between the member states of the Central American Common Market and those of the EC. This was to contribute to Central American stability and allow the region to benefit from European expertise regarding integration. The goals were to stimulate regional development, economic integration and intra-regional commerce. This was a typical example of 'old' interregionalism, which was largely the legacy of European ideas about political dialogue and development cooperation. Old interregionalism tended to focus on regional issues in the Third World rather than on global governance.

7.4.2 Spain as a 'Natural Bridge' Between Latin America and Europe

Europe saw this interregional engagement as a test of its fledgling cooperation policy. However, on the eve of Spain's accession to the EC, the Spanish authorities were viewing it more as the beginning of a Community strategy for LA. Spain now began representing itself as a privileged emissary in relations between the EC and LA, just as the UK had in relation to the Commonwealth and France had in relation to its former colonies. Regardless of their political colour, Spanish leaders have since developed a political discourse that portrays Spain as the 'natural bridge' between LA and Europe. On joining the EC, Spain hoped to be able to promote a global Community strategy for LA and secure a privileged trade position for the region, similar to the ACP countries. From the outset of negotiations on Spain's accession, the Spanish delegation was explicit about its interest in developing relations with LA. However, Spain was unable to obtain any privileges for the region from the EC because of opposition from France and the UK, which were afraid that privileges granted within the framework of the EC could adversely affect their own spheres of influence. Madrid was able though to ensure that a declaration of intention was included stating the EC's wishes to intensify relations with LA. In June 1986, the European Council at The Hague then asked the Commission to

reflect upon the ways in which economic and political relations with LA could be strengthened. This marked a victory as well as a relief for Spain because its accession to the EC presented an economic problem for LA. The Iberian agricultural markets had become beneficiaries of aid furnished by the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). As a result, the Iberian agricultural markets were partly closed to Latin American exports.

The French European Commissioner at the time, Claude Cheysson, who was known for his weak interest in LA, was given responsibility for devising strategies for developing relations with the continent. Dissatisfied with early versions of the document drawn up by Cheysson, the Spanish authorities decided to interfere in the Commissioner's work and lobby for something more in line with their expectations (European Commission 1987). The amended document was approved by the European Council in June 1987 and this represented quite an achievement for Spain. The highest European political authority had thus given an important political signal; it had now decided for the first time to adopt a strategy that would encourage the Community to actively engage with LA (Grilli 1993). A series of directives were then adopted for strengthening relations with LA: continuation and strengthening of Community aid, support for democratic regimes, support for nascent regional integration, support for commercial promotion and more.

However, Spain was not satisfied with these measures and soon began pressuring to accelerate the prioritising of LA. Taking advantage of its EC presidency in 1989, Spain put pressure on its pawns within the Community and succeeded in securing membership for Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the Lomé IV cooperation agreement between ACP countries and the EC. In order to further strengthen Europe–LA relations, Spain then devised a strategy to increase the number of its high-ranking representatives in decision-making positions dealing with EC–LA relations. Thanks to the influence exercised by the Gonzalez government on the Delors Commission (1985–1995), Madrid managed to see that a Spanish national replaced Claude Cheysson as Commissioner for North–South relations and the Mediterranean. In order to demonstrate that this was a national, bipartisan priority, the Spanish socialist government appointed the opposition party leader Abel Matutes to the post. He was to be assisted by a second Spanish commissioner, Manuel Marin, who was put in charge of relations with the ACP countries.

During the term of Commissioner Matutes (1989–1994), relations between the EC and LA took an institutional turn. The number of offices representing the Commission in LA tripled and the Commission acquired observer status in the Organisation of American States (OAS). The Commission also established cooperation with various regional and continental economic organisations, such as the Latin American Economic System (SELA), the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (Schumacher 1995). Moreover, in 1990 Spanish activism led to the creation of a new Community document known as the *Rome Declaration*; this expanded the geographical scope of political dialogue—which had hitherto been conducted mainly with Central America—to the entire continent. This document opened the way for a number of

third generation agreements with various Latin American countries and regional groups: Argentina and Chile (1990), Mexico and Uruguay (1991), Brazil and Paraguay (1992), and the Andean Community (CAN) and Central America (1993). The Commission thus established a network of agreements covering the whole of LA except for Cuba. These third generation agreements, of which Spain was the chief promoter within the EC, were distinguished by the interest shown in integration and regional cooperation. They also included an evolutionary clause that allowed parties to increase their level of cooperation and a democratic clause that exhorted signatories 'to guarantee respect for the basic principles that are part of our heritage of common values' (European Commission 1995: 8). Prior to this, the EC–LA relationship had consisted essentially of a political dialogue and agreements on development cooperation. The third generation agreements prepared the ground for more ambitious interregional agreements in economic and commercial areas, as called for by Spain.

The EU's Latin American strategy thus took on a more economic appearance from the turn of the twenty-first century onwards. This was due to the consolidation of world competition, as seen in the Marrakesh Agreements that founded the World Trade Organisation (WTO), in the proliferation of bilateral and regional commercial treaties and in the US' project of creating a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which Europe saw as a threat to their new relations with LA. This increasing economic emphasis in the EU's LA strategy can also be explained by the new economic interest shown by Spain in the region. An increasing number of Spanish companies now saw the Latin American market as the best way to further the transnationalisation that had begun in the 1980s and to deal with European competition following the creation of the Single Market (Youngs 2001). Spain quickly took the lead among European countries in the acquisition of markets and public companies in LA. Spanish investments in the region reached more than 50 % of the European total.[2] Leading Spanish economic operations in LA included Repsol, Endesa, Iberdrola, Fenosa and Gas Natural (energy), Iberia (transportation), Telefonica (telecommunications), the Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Bank (BBVA) and the Santander Central Hispano Bank (BSCH), and Mapfre (banking and insurance). The development of Spanish investment in LA was impressive considering that it had been practically non-existent before the 1990s (Quenan and Santiso 2007). From 1991 to 1992 alone, Spanish companies increased their investments in LA from 100 million US dollars to 900 million US dollars per year (Baklanoff 1996: 117–118). In 1996, Spanish investment in the region amounted to 27 % of its total investments, compared to 52 % invested in the EU countries. In 1999, Spanish foreign investment in LA reached 63 % of the country's total investments, compared to 28 % in EU countries. This made Spanish companies the leading providers of capital to the Latin American continent (Vuillemin 2002).

Some official and academic explanations (Spanish and European) for the acceleration of this transatlantic *rapprochement* cite the historical and cultural

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[2]The rest of the investments were made by French (6 %), German (5.5 %), British (4 %), Dutch (3.5 %), Italian (4 %) and Portuguese (4 %) companies (Amann and Vodusek 2004).

affinities between Europe and LA. However, Spain also has an economic interest in this *rapprochement* because Spanish companies have been the greatest beneficiaries of funds made available by the EU programmes AL-Invest and European Community Investment Partners (ECIP), which are intended to facilitate investment in LA (Youngs 2001). It is therefore unsurprising that Spain is so actively involving itself in the new EU–LA strategy that was influenced during the 1990s by Commissioner Manuel Marin. Marin defined the main lines of the EU's new LA strategy—still in force today—in two documents (European Commission 1994, 1995) approved in October 1994 by the Council of the EU and in December 1995 by the European Council. Initially, the EU welcomed the new LA regionalist wave enthusiastically and offered to share its experience in this area. This made the sub-continent the most important beneficiary of technical and economic assistance provided by the Commission to any regional initiative (Kaufman Purcell and Simon 1995). By promoting Latin American regionalism, the EU saw a means of exporting its model of regional integration and thus increasing its visibility and legitimacy as a political actor on the international stage (Santander 2008; also see the contributions in this volume by Doidge and Costa and Dri). The emerging regional schemes also offered European companies economies of scale. The EU's support for regionalism therefore appears to provide leverage for enhancing free trade zones and customs unions. Considerable attention has been paid to the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) because of its economic dynamism and the fact that it attracts more than 65 % of European investments in LA (Amann and Vodusek 2004).

The two documents outlining the EU's new LA strategy explicitly recognised the new economic interests. It was noted that 'the development of commerce and investments will continue to be the touchstone of our associations with LA […]', and for this reason 'we [the EU] favour beginning conversations on new and more ambitious agreements that reflect the economic potential of our associations […]' (European Commission 1994: 3). The Commission proposed to begin work on fourth generation agreements based on three pillars: political dialogue, cooperation and free trade (European Commission 1994). These agreements were made with Mexico (1999) and Chile (2002) and interregional negotiations were launched with MERCOSUR in 2000 and with the CAN and Central America in 2007.

Unlike old interregionalism, which was sporadic and constrained by the bipolar international context, the new group-to-group relations have expanded more. They have a broader scope and tend to be multifaceted and comprehensive in nature (Söderbaum et al. 2006: 119). Interregionalism is also considered to provide a means of shaping global governance. In other words, it is seen as an international phenomenon that can and must contribute to the development and consolidation of the global multilateral agenda. Interregionalism must, for example, conform to WTO standards and rules and be an incentive to world trade negotiations. The interregional economic and trade agenda is ambitious: it aims to create an interregional free trade area in accordance with global neoliberal principles.

7.5   Madrid's Ibero–American Policy: A Lever for Spanish Identity and Prestige in the EU

In order to strengthen the relations with LA that were developed by the EU, a new initiative arose to organise biannual summits for Heads of state and government representatives from EU–LAC. The first summit was held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1999 and its mandate was to launch a 'strategic association' that would be articulated around three strategic dimensions: economic and financial relations; cooperation in the areas of education, science, technology and in cultural, human and social areas; and political dialogue that would enable partners to express views on common interests in multilateral forums. These summits were supposed to provide a common relational framework. They were also supposed to give global visibility to the EU–LA relationship and to provide opportunities for showing the results of the strategic partnership between the two regions.

In reality, the proposal to consolidate EU–LA relations through a large biannual summit came from the Spanish government. The idea was born out of another framework, the Ibero–American scheme, which may be considered a direct antecedent to the biannual EU–LAC summits. Alongside its engagement within the EU in promoting a European strategy for LA, Spain was also pursuing a national strategy for the whole Latin American continent and was hoping to develop an Ibero–American space for encounters. This was to be for Spain what the Portuguese-speaking community was intended to be for Portugal: an asset that would allow Madrid to extend its influence within the EU.

The idea of creating an Ibero–American community is not recent. Its origins date back to the nineteenth century, when Madrid was promoting economic and cultural relations between Spain, Portugal and the rest of LA. This project has had several come-backs throughout history, particularly after the Second World War, when Spain was trying to establish relations with its former colonies in order to avoid international isolation. However, it was only in the 1990s that an institutional framework for coordinating Ibero–American relations emerged. To reach this point, Spain had created a post for a Secretary of state for Ibero–American Affairs within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1980s. This served as a springboard for the development of a strategy for LA. Since its transition to democracy, Spain's Ibero–American policy has become very important (Walsh 2006).

However, Spain's main interest was not in promoting Ibero–American economic and political integration, but in enabling Spain to become an interface between Europe and LA. Since the Ibero–American idea solved Spain's problem of maintaining the EU's renewed interest in LA, Madrid decided from the outset to involve Lisbon, with its relations with Brazil, and thereby strengthen the group of European countries that were favourable to a *rapprochement* between Europe and LA.

The Ibero–American dialogue gave rise to a series of summits, with annual meetings of Heads of state and government representatives as well as ministerial meetings and monitoring mechanisms. More than 80 % of the costs of these summits

was met by Madrid, with only 1.5 % being covered by Lisbon (Malamud 2004: 11). The summits were to allow Spain to affirm its Ibero–American identity and to create a connection that would support dialogue between EU and Ibero–American partners. The Ibero–American meetings served as a *locus* for preliminary discussions that would later lead to agreements between the EU and LA and they aided coordination between Spanish-speaking countries and Portuguese-speaking countries on both sides of the Atlantic. This grouping emerged at a time when the Community was launching negotiations for a third generation of agreements. The Ibero–American space also prompted the EU to forge new agreements with Latin American regional blocs.

Within this framework, Spain was able to promote a number of themes that were in its interest and these often became part of the EU–LAC agenda: scientific and cultural cooperation, political dialogue, poverty reduction, economic and commercial issues, and the promotion of fourth generation agreements. Spain also used the Ibero–American framework to incite Latin American countries to consolidate regionalism and adopt common strategies and institutions. Part of the 40 % of the EU aid allocated to LA is devoted to supporting Latin American regionalism (Rato 2000). The Spanish authorities regularly encourage the continent to adopt the 'European model of integration' in order to accelerate the signing of interregional agreements between the EU and LA (Larraya and Lafuente 2009). For Spain, as for Europe, these agreements must be multidimensional and cover political as well as economic and social issues.

It was within the Ibero–American framework that the former Spanish Prime Minister, José Maria Aznar, launched the idea of reproducing summits at the European–Latin American level to accompany the Ibero–American dialogue. This proposition was interpreted by Jaques Chirac as a means of countering the excessive global influence of American power, of consolidating the European presence in LA and of beginning to construct a 'multipolar world' (Chirac 1999). The Spanish proposal was therefore quickly taken up by the French President, who wasted no time in promoting it during a trip to South America in March 1997. It was then decided in 1999 to hold regular biannual EU–LAC summits. This was in line with the relations that Spain had already developed with LA. Alongside the summit meetings, mini-summits have also been held either between states (Chile, Mexico) or between regionally integrated groups in LA (CAN, MERCOSUR, Central America).

7.6   External and Internal Factors Affecting EU–Latin American Interregionalism

Despite numerous economic and institutional interactions between the EU and LA since the early 1990s and Spain's importance in this, the relationship between the EU and LA is currently experiencing difficulties and, since the 2000s, it has been increasingly affected by external and internal factors.

7.6.1 External Factors

Two main external factors have contributed to a permanent weakening of the EU–LA strategic project since the beginning of the twenty-first century. The first is related to the post-9/11 global context. After 9/11 and the emergence of the new international security agenda, the EU downgraded LA in its foreign policy agenda. Since the second EU–LAC summit, which was held in Madrid in 2002, Spain and the EU have focused more on security issues, whereas LA has remained more interested in trade and economic issues. Furthermore, the EU has placed more emphasis on its external priorities, in particular, toward the US, Eastern Europe, Asia and China. Meanwhile, LA's importance for the EU has diminished and it now represents only 6 % of the EU's overall trade and receives less than 4 % of the EU's overall development aid budget.

The second factor relates to the evolution of the FTAA project and the fact that Washington has gradually turned away from LA since 9/11. While the FTAA negotiations were moving forward, EU–LA relations continued to develop. In the course of trying to bring about the FTAA, the parties organised many meetings at the technical, ministerial and presidential levels over a period of more than 10 years. Different issues were tackled and nine groups of negotiators and experts were established to look into issues of market access, investment, services, government procurement, dispute settlement, agriculture, intellectual property rights, subsidies, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and competition policy. The OAS, the UN Economic Commission for LA and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the IDB all provided technical and analytical support to the various groups.

In 2001, three summit meetings of Heads of state and government representatives of the Americas took place, compared with only one for the EU–LAC association. The negotiations for a free trade area from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego appeared to be progressing rapidly. For more than a decade, Spain and the EU had feared the emergence of a pan-American regional bloc led by the US, a bloc that could shape the rules of the worldwide economy. To ensure that the EU would not be excluded from negotiations about these new rules, the Europeans wanted to increase their presence in LA.

However, the Miami consensus of November 2003 between Brazil and the US, which was then confirmed by the Americas Summit of Buenos Aires 2 years later, put an end to the 'Single Undertaking principle', affecting forever the FTAA project and also the EU's strategy towards LA. The Single Undertaking principle had required participants to accept or reject the outcome of multiple negotiations in a single package, rather than selecting between them. So, by deciding to negotiate the agricultural dossier solely within the WTO, the US administration found itself forced to accept the Brazilian demand to refer negotiations on investment protection, the liberalisation of services, intellectual property and government procurement to the WTO as well. As a result, Brazil managed to get the US authorities to accept the idea of a more flexible and slimmed-down FTAA (dubbed 'FTAA–Lite'). This led to the abandoning of the US promise to make progress in the FTAA negotiations by extending the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

to the South. The collapse of the FTAA project also affected the EU's political will to establish closer relations with LA. Today, the FTAA is no longer considered a threat to European interests in the region. This demonstrates that interregionalism develops within and is constrained by the global political economy (Santander 2006; Grugel 2002).

7.6.2   Internal Factors

The EU's enlargement since 2004 has resulted in agricultural subsidies being extended to many East European countries. This has reinforced pre-existing internal opposition within the EC to negotiating Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Latin American regions or countries. The Spanish position is ambiguous in this regard. On the one hand, Spain encourages interregional negotiations in order to reach an association agreement but, on the other, Spain also benefits from European agricultural subsidies and therefore appeals to the inflexibility of European norms and the problem of changing them (Malamud 2004: 18).

The eastern expansion of the EU has also had a political impact on its external strategy, which is increasingly oriented towards the East—as seen by the proposal developed by Sweden and Poland to launch an 'Eastern Partnership'. This partnership was established in 2009 in order to create a multinational forum between the EU–28 and six countries from Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. The partnership offers the prospect of free-trade pacts, financial aid, help with energy security and visa-free travel to the EU from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. This adds a specific eastern dimension to the EU's umbrella policy for neighbouring countries (European Commission 2009). Most East European countries have little or no political interest in Latin America. The 'Easternalisation' of the EU's external agenda is therefore weakening the political influence of other EU countries—such as Spain and Portugal—that currently support the forging of closer EU relations with Latin America.

Latin America's current political developments are also affecting the EU–LA relationship. The growth in LA of political radicalisation and the return of economic nationalism have soured relations between the continent and the EU. These trends are also creating divisions within LA itself for there is now a growing ideological struggle and political rivalry between some Latin American states (e.g. Colombia/Venezuela, Brazil/Paraguay, Argentina/Uruguay). Moreover, some governments in the region are developing autonomous external strategies and very different visions of regionalism, which are affecting current regional integration projects (Santander 2009b). Some LA states are recovering control of strategic economic sectors such as gas or oil (Bolivia, Ecuador), and are erecting trade barriers in order to restore or protect their national industry (Argentina) from external competition. The rivalry between Venezuela and Brazil is a good example of this. The two countries are competing to promote different sources of energy that are linked to their own national interests. Venezuela is promoting hydrocarbons while

Brazil is favouring biofuels. The two countries are also developing different regional projects. Backed by money flowing into the national coffers from petrodollars, Venezuelan President Chavez and his successor (Maduro) have been now involved in building the Bolivian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). Meanwhile, successive presidents Lula and Rousseff of Brazil have supported the Union of South American Nations. Unlike the Venezuelan regional project, the Brazilian project is based on free trade and is market-oriented.

7.6.3   From Group-to-Group Relations to Bilateralism?

All of these external and internal factors have impacted on the group-to-group strategy of the EU with Latin American regional organisations. The European authorities are now questioning the relevance of their interregional strategy. As mentioned earlier, the EU has consistently provided technical aid in support of regionalism and has supported centripetal forces in the Andean Community, MERCOSUR and other groups in order to reach agreements between interregional associations. EU support for regional integration has encouraged the creation of regional free trade areas, customs unions and common markets. The EU has also promoted common policies and institutions as well as the creation of supranational frameworks. This strategy has proved to be important for the development of integration within Latin American regionalism, particularly during periods of uncertainty. Moreover, the interregional agreement negotiations have provided an incentive for some Latin American regional groups to cooperate in external trade negotiations. This has been particularly so because the EU stated that association agreements with regional groups must be based on a 'sufficient level' of regional integration. Thus the EU has been playing a role as 'external federator' for regional projects in Latin America.

However, the EU is now developing closer relations with single states that it considers to be 'reasonable' and 'key' countries in LA, as was encouraged in the 2005 Communication of the European Commission (European Commission 2005: 5). Some EU members, such as Germany and Spain,[3] as well as the former High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, have supported this approach. They believe that the interregional strategy has failed and that it is time to negotiate ambitious bilateral FTAs with certain countries, as has been done with Mexico and Chile. Such agreements were made during the 2010 EU–LAC Madrid Summit, with Colombia and Peru rather than with the Andean Community, with which the EU had had an interregional framework

[3] The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and Spanish Ministers under the Zapatero government, such as Alberto Navarro and Trinidad Jiménez (in charge of European and Latin American relations respectively) have repeatedly declared that it is time for the EU to replace interregional negotiations with bilateral ones. In Spain, some influential think tanks, like the Real Instituto Elcano or Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, barely support the idea. See, for example, Malamud (2004) and Gratius (2011).

agreement since 2004. The EU left Ecuador and Bolivia outside the agreement because they were deemed to be pursuing an alternative economic model to the free market. This emerging European approach is designed to thwart economic nationalism and political radicalism in Latin America. This means that the EU's Latin American strategy is approximating that of the United States, which has independently signed FTAs with countries that are considered 'politically friendly', such as Colombia and Peru. Regardless of the diversity of the new Latin American governments, European leaders are now viewing the sub-continent as split into two: the 'serious' left-leaning governments, with which it is possible to cooperate, and the others, which must be isolated because they are 'irrational' and a source of 'instability'.

Another agreement was signed during the EU–LAC Summit in Madrid in 2010. This time it was with the whole of Central America, with whom the EU already had an interregional framework agreement. However, the bargaining method used by Commissioner De Gucht's team differed from that of the past. In order to optimise the EU's position, De Gucht's team decided to negotiate with each country separately and even threatened to exclude the most reluctant countries altogether from talks (El Periódico 2010). Instead of pursuing group-to-group negotiations as it had in the past, the EU had now 'bilateralised' its bargaining with Central America.

The EU has also been bilateralising its relations with Brazil and, in July 2007, it signed a *Strategic Partnership* with the country. There are two possible political explanations for this shift. The first is that there is a European will to strengthen the EU's position in an emerging multi-polar world and to facilitate cooperation with emerging powers such as China, India, South Africa and Brazil (Santander 2012). For the EU, Brazil is a 'key' country both in LA and in the international arena so it is important to establish a good relationship (European Commission 2007). The second explanation is related to the ongoing political rivalry in South America. Although Brazil is by far the most powerful state in LA, several countries refuse to join forces with it. This is most obvious in the case of Venezuela, which drives its own autonomous foreign policy in order to counterbalance the power of Brazil, the US and the EU. As noted, Chavez and now Maduro is spending its oil revenues on building a Venezuelan zone of influence. Venezuela has already established the ALBA bloc and has been developing a regional energy project that is designed to connect the national oil companies of LAC without allowing external interference.[4] Venezuela is pursuing and promoting non-market oriented policies in the region. Using a loan from Russia, it has also bought powerful missiles and been involved in developing a project with Iran to build an oil refinery in Syria. Since Chavez, Venezuela has developed strong ties with the government of Ahmadinejad, in particular in the areas of energy production, and economic and industrial cooperation.

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[4] Venezuela has promoted the creation of regional oil initiatives particularly for the Caribbean (*Petrocaribe*) and the Andean region (*Petroandino*). The initiatives include assistance for oil developments, investment in refining capacity and preferential oil pricing. The most developed of these is the *Petrocaribe* initiative: 13 nations signed the agreement in 2005. Under *Petrocaribe*, Venezuela will offer crude oil and petroleum products to Caribbean nations on preferential terms and prices (Drouin 2006).

Both the EU and the US fear Venezuela's economic and political radicalism and his foreign policy. Consequently, Brazil is seen by Brussels as a country that should be taken seriously and given external political support so as to counterbalance Venezuela's regional ambitions and the spread of political radicalism in LA. The signing of the *Strategic Partnership* between the EU and Brazil sent a strong political message: it is time to counteract Venezuela's oil power and support Brazil's objectives of becoming a regional and international power.

By developing a closer relationship with Brazil, the European authorities are opening up a new phase in their relations with the South American Cone. Contrary to the EU's original expectations, this is creating competition between bilateralism and interregionalism. In the past, the EU had long promoted an institutional, political and trade interregional dialogue with MERCOSUR. Today, the EU is instead developing a special political dialogue with Brazil that undermines the rationale for the relationship it has had with MERCOSUR for more than 20 years. Although the EU has not abandoned plans to conclude an interregional association agreement with MERCOSUR, it is looking to shift from a dialogue with the region to a dialogue with a single country. Moreover, the message the EU is sending out is that it is no longer following its traditional doctrine of interregional dialogue and negotiations with regional groups. By developing a close relationship with Brazil, the EU appears to be adopting a strategy similar to that of Washington, which has always favoured relationships with states rather than with regional groups (Santander 2008). The EU's new approach has not been favourably received in the rest of the Southern Latin American countries and this is contributing to fragmentation and rivalry within LA. Following the example of Argentina, some states are now asking Brussels to grant them the same status as that of Brazil, while others are trying to go it alone and develop bilateral relations without consideration for MERCOSUR's collective commitments.[5]

7.7   Conclusion

For reasons that are as much political as economic, historical or cultural, LA has become a priority for post-Franco Spain, and this has occurred independently of changes in the legislature. Spanish political leaders of all parties agree that it is essential that foreign policy towards LA favour Spain's position on the international stage. Spain has therefore tried to streamline its Latin American policy with its membership of the EU. Spain exploited the EC's/EU's lack of a clear strategy for LA to construct a European framework for the entire region and it encouraged Portugal and other member states to engage in this. The Latin American continent is evidently a major factor in Madrid's European policy. Further, although Spain has developed a bilateral strategy for LA within the Ibero–American framework, securing

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[5] In 2007, Uruguay agreed with the United States to sign a bilateral framework agreement on trade and investment.

its interests has also necessarily involved the EU and Spain's LA policy has in turn been Europeanised. Spanish LA policy and EU strategy are thus intertwined and they mutually influence one another. The two strategies have been constructed around similar values and principles: promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, the peaceful resolution of differences and the development and consolidation of regionalism and relations between regional groups.

Initially, European interregional strategy was based on regular and institutionalised political dialogue, strengthening of development cooperation and support for the reinforcement of regional space. The end of the Cold War was followed by increasing economic interdependence and the emergence of new regionalism. This period also saw the consolidation of European integration and the internationalisation of Spanish companies. Today, the EU is in a position to develop more multidimensional and ambitious interregional agreements. These have received strong support from Spain, which has developed important economic links with LA. The interregional agenda now includes mutual trade-liberalisation programmes in line with the WTO's rules and regulations. These new programmes are even more ambitious than those at the multilateral level. The compatibility required between the WTO and any other kind of FTA reduces the room in interregional agreements for traditional development cooperation policies, such as the Generalised System of Preferences that may be granted unilaterally by the EU to regions composed of developing countries. Consequently, while interregionalism includes strategic elements, it is distinguished by its neoliberal economic tendencies.

Political radicalism and economic nationalism in LA and the international scramble for preferential agreements are affecting interregional relations. Today, each regional group in LA is composed of countries that are promoting an alternative economic model to that of neoliberalism with the exception of the Pacific Alliance established in 2012 by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Perou. However, the EU is competing with the US to sign FTAs and European authorities, including those in Spain, are now starting to question the relevance of interregional strategy. To date, Europe has consistently provided technical aid in support of regionalism and it has supported centripetal forces in LA in order to reach agreements between interregional associations. However, some EU countries are now in favour of bilateral agreements instead of those with interregional associations. This has resulted in FTAs being drawn up between the EU and individual countries rather than with regional organisations. Further, although the EU engaged in interregional dialogue with MERCOSUR for over 20 years, it is now developing close bilateral relations with Brazil. It has now signed a *Strategic Partnership* with Brazil, as it has with other emerging countries. European authorities are now focusing their attention on 'key' international actors in a bid to strengthen the EU's position in the rising multipolar world. This new bilateral approach is having a negative impact on Latin American regional groups and is fuelling fragmentation of its regional groupings. It is also contributing to a perception of the EU as increasingly intertwined with the US. Finally, the new bilateralism may ultimately deprive the EU of the foreign policy instrument (group-to-group regional dialogue) with which it has built its international identity and legitimacy as a global actor for some 20 years.

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Chapter 8
How Does the European Parliament Contribute to the Construction of the EU's Interregional Dialogue?

Olivier Costa and Clarissa Dri

8.1 Introduction

In the decade to come we may expect to see continuing tension in interregional relations. The crisis of regionalism that began in the early 2000s was exacerbated by the financial strain on the global economy that occurred in 2008. Individual states responded by trying to protect their own interests rather than collaborating to find common solutions that seemed more risky. However, these unilateral solutions did not yield the results that leaders had hoped for and we may therefore now witness the evolution of a new kind of regionalism and, correspondingly, interregionalism. Future interregionalism is going to require new flexibility in order to allow for participation by a plethora of regional organisations around the world and to enable these to communicate with alliances of 'emerging powers'. Today's national and regional parliaments, although they played little role in the interregional negotiations of the past, are well aware of the changes that are taking place. There are several cases of parliamentary assemblies adapting to the needs of these new and complex forms of regionalism more constructively than have their executive bodies.

This chapter focuses on the role of the European Parliament (EP) in the evolution of the interregional relations of the European Union (EU). The aim is to explain how the EP has contributed to the conception and implementation of the EU's interregional strategies. This is crucial in order to understand how the EU's behaviour in

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interregional relations is evolving and to consider its democratic dimension. National parliaments are not traditionally associated with the management of foreign affairs. Many researchers have noted a similar weakness of the EP in this regard although this conceals the fact that in both national and the European systems foreign policy is the responsibility of the executive arm of government. Parliaments may be called upon to scrutinise actions of the Head of state such as the ratification of international agreements or approval of the budget, but the major decision-making power rests with the executive.

There are many historical reasons and contemporary motivations behind this asymmetry between executive and legislative powers: monarchical heritage; the need to have a leader who is able to represent the nation internationally; the poor capacity of an inherently divided assembly to react quickly and decisively to international events; the problems of ensuring confidentiality within the assembly; the preference of representatives for handling domestic legislative and accountability issues because of electoral interests.

The growing presence in contemporary democracies of international, transnational and non-governmental actors who claim to represent the citizens, have also altered the role of parliaments in democratic systems; this has also impacted on the very concept of representation (Castiglione and Warren 2005). The organisations aim to express popular will alongside elected bodies. The status of elected representatives, and parliaments in particular, have also been encroached upon by regional and international organisations, which are becoming increasingly powerful. National legislative elections, which have for so long been the centre of political life in advanced democracies, are now simply one of many factors involved in the policy process. This means that legislative accountability is weakened as the range of actors from organisations that do not work according to the logic of democracy become participant in policy making (Grant and Keohane 2005).

This crisis of democracy has had two consequences. The first is that parliaments are regaining interest in becoming involved in foreign policy. This may be through new forms of inter-parliamentary cooperation or by creating organs devoted to it, such as committees in the national parliament that are specialised in EU affairs. The second is that parliamentary assemblies are being created within regional integration systems (the EP, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) Parliament (Parlasur), the Pan-African Parliament) in response to concerns about 'democratic deficit'. Contemporary analyses of interregional relations therefore cannot neglect the increasing activity of parliaments in matters of foreign policy.

There has been a growing interest in the involvement of parliamentary bodies in foreign policy. However, the role of the EP in the development of the EU's interregional dialogue is not yet clear. The EP may be considered an example of the 'parliamentarisation' of regional integration, which is distinguished by the creation of regional parliamentary assemblies within established blocs (Malamud and Sousa 2005). The role played by regional parliaments in foreign affairs thus differs from that played by national parliaments in that they develop functions suited to establishing supranational institutions (Malamud and Stavridis 2011). Regional parliaments, which are defined as parliamentary associations among more than three

states and are based on individual membership, may be considered one type of international parliamentary institution (Šabič 2008; Cutler 2001). Although regional parliaments currently contribute only marginally to democratic legitimation beyond the nation-state (Kraft-Kasack 2008), they are able to deliberate about and exchange information on issues of common interest and to act as normative entrepreneurs (Šabič 2013). Not only regional and international but also national and sub-national parliaments are increasingly practising a kind of para-diplomacy or 'parliamentary diplomacy' by engaging in international dialogue alongside the executive authorities (Stavridis 2002; Weisglas and de Boer 2007). The EP is special since it is by far the most powerful regional parliament in existence and it actively promotes regional integration and parliamentary democracy both inside and outside Europe.

Building on the above, this chapter aims to analyse the role of the EP in the EU's foreign policy and in particular in its interregional dialogue. On the one hand, just like national parliaments, the EP is weak in this area. However, while national chambers have traditionally only handled foreign policy issues that challenged their domestic political system (internationalisation, Europeanisation, regional integration), the EP has taken a clear stance on broader foreign policy issues, in part because of its limited legislative and accountability powers. In their pursuit of internal and external legitimacy, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have actively promoted regional integration on other continents and have advocated for interregional dialogue by means of various declarations and institutional adaptation. This was particularly marked in the Latin American case. The EP was in fact the first European institution to establish regular contact with the Latin American continent and this took place at a time at which the Commission and the Council of the European Union were mainly concerned with former African colonies. The recent parliamentarisation in MERCOSUR results partly from the institutionalised relations that evolved between Members of the Parliament (MPs) from both regions.

8.2 The European Parliament: The Passion for Foreign Affairs

Despite the traditional weakness of parliaments in foreign affairs, the competence of the EP in this area has increased over time. This is due to the activity of its members, who have shown themselves able to use the EP's deliberative mechanisms in such a way as to strengthen its constitutional, functional and rhetorical resources for foreign affairs. This means that the EP's participation in the EU's foreign policy results from pressure exerted by MEPs rather than from a decision reached by the authorities of member states or by treaty. Although the EP is now active in the field of foreign affairs, parliamentary activities are poorly coordinated with the other involved EU institutions and actors, such as the Commission, the Council of the EU, the European Council, the High Representative, the Court of Justice and the EU member states.

8.2.1   A Weak but Mobilised Institution

Research on the EP or on the institutional system of the European Union rarely mentions the EP's primary function, which is still that of deliberation. Until the mid-1980s, this enabled the EP to overcome its lack of real legislative powers since declarative resolutions on all issues relating to the activities and missions of the Communities could be made by majority rule (Costa 2001). These resolutions confirmed the EP's status as one of the major institutions of the Communities. Formally, the EP's non-legislative resolutions lack juridical impact and only express the parliament's point of view; they are directed to the general public and to other institutions and member states. Despite the strengthening of the EP's legislative powers and accountability, MEPs continue to use non-legislative resolutions, particularly in the field of foreign affairs.

MEPs have consistently used this mechanism to develop a dialogue with other institutions and to enhance their competence. This has also become the major instrument through which MEPs have developed a kind of para-diplomacy by establishing direct contact with third countries and creating inter-parliamentary delegations, joint commissions and a parliamentary assembly with the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states (ACP). In the 1980s, the EP was caught up in a frenzy of deliberation on foreign policy issues: MEPs were intent on discussing the political situations in various parts of the world, promoting democracy and human rights, denouncing violations and calling for the establishment of multilateral dialogue.

The Commission, the permanent representatives of states and some of the MEPs, have often opposed the EP's efforts to meddle in the political situation of third countries and larger issues (world hunger, prevention and resolution of armed conflicts, gender issues and so on). Nevertheless, the EP's interventions have contributed to democratic transitions and to the solution of national and international crises, though their endeavours are generally better known in third countries than they are within the EU. Some resolutions have also had a direct effect upon EU foreign policy. This has been particularly evident when MEPs have managed to articulate them using the EP's formal powers in international agreements or in the budgetary procedure. Over time, these resolutions have enabled the EP to develop a relatively coherent discourse that has mainly concerned human rights and the promotion of democracy, and they have given the EP a privileged position as interlocutor for minorities and political opponents worldwide (Zanon 2005). The EP may therefore be considered the main source of inspiration for the conditionality principle that today underlies European development cooperation policies and some aspects of trade policy.

Some of the EP's actors (the President, Presidents of the committees on Foreign Affairs and Development) are also active on the international scene and they increase the number of visits to and contacts with third countries. Although the EP has only limited formal powers in the field of foreign policy, the committee on Foreign Affairs has always been one of the most important committees in the EP in terms of number of members and resources.

Because of the increase of its legislative functions, the EP's activities in international relations are less visible now than they were in the past but they remain important for the processes of deliberation that go on in the hemicycle. The limitations of the EP's powers within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) did not discourage the MEPs; on the contrary, they sought ways to overcome them and in response, the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 granted the EP new powers of consultation in the field of CFSP.

Over the years, MEPs have developed an ambitious discourse on the role the EP, as the 'largest democratic assembly of the world', ought to play, particularly in promoting human rights, democracy, development and peace in former colonies and globally. The EP has thus fashioned itself into something of a proselyser for a method of achieving regional integration that differs from that of creating free trade areas. Historically, MEPs seem to share a conviction that the EP has a mission to perform in which interregionalism plays a central role.

Unlike the Council of the EU and the Commission, which were explicitly awarded foreign policy responsibilites from the start, the EP has had to decide what role to play in this field. Still today, the EP's powers in EU foreign policy are limited and reliant upon a complex set of resources, which will be discussed in the next section.

8.2.2   Means and Resources

When seeking to make an impact on the EU's foreign policy, MEPs usually draw upon three kinds of resources: constitutional, functional and rhetorical. The EP's constitutional competences in foreign policy are limited. Its role in interregional cooperation is shaped by the political guidelines that are articulated by the Council and then embodied in the Commission's proposals. Broad interregional strategies defined under the CFSP framework are given form in the international policies of the old first pillar: development, cooperation, commercial policy and trade, international or association agreements. The legislative influence that the EP is able to exert upon interregional policies depends on the topic. The attributes of each EU institution may be summarised as follows (Table 8.1):

The co-decision procedure used to apply only in development cooperation matters, but with the Lisbon Treaty it was expanded to include economic cooperation and a common commercial policy and this represented an important new area of influence for the EP. The EP must be consulted in the ratification of international agreements. In the case of adhesion and association treaties, trade agreements and other international agreements that establish a specific institutional framework, have budgetary implications or entail amendment to an act adopted by co-decision, the EP may either approve or reject the agreement. However, the EP has no formal role in negotiations and it cannot propose amendments to the agreements. The EP therefore tries constantly to compensate for this legislative weakness by using alternative instruments related to its budgetary, accountability and deliberative functions.

Table 8.1 Decision-making procedures in interregional cooperation (after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty)

	Competence	Commission	Council	European Parliament
Development cooperation	Complementary	Proposal	Qualified majority vote (QMV)	Ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision)
Economic, financial and technical cooperation				
Commercial policy	Exclusive			
Trade agreements		Recommendation to open negotiation; proposal for signing and concluding an agreement	QMV (with exceptions)	Assent
International agreements	Complementary			Consultation or assent
Association agreements	Exclusive		Unanimity	Assent

Source: Adapted and updated by the authors from Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 105)

Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (which abolishes the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditures), the EU's expenses for external relations and development fell under the category of non-compulsory expenditures, on which the EP had the final word. The EP used this competence to prompt the Commission to follow EP recommendations and to prioritise democracy and human rights. At the initiative of the Parliament in 1994, a chapter entitled *European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights* was created within the EU budget. Its objective was to promote human rights, democracy and conflict prevention in third countries by providing financial aid for specific projects. The CFSP budget has also been seen by the EP as an opportunity for self-empowerment in foreign policy because it is subject to the general budgetary procedures of the EU. In 1997, the EP agreed not to modify details of CFSP expenses in exchange for better information from the Council about activities in this policy field, and recognition of the principle of parliamentary scrutiny. However, member states often avoid parliamentary interference on this topic by opting for *ad hoc* solutions to financial programmes or by launching projects with insufficient funding (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 120).

Still within the ambit of the CFSP, the EP may present questions in writing to the Council or invite the presidency to explain the nomination of the EU High Representative as additional ways of enhancing the parliamentary role (Crum 2006). The Lisbon Treaty also meant that the High Representative became the vice-president of the Commission and this made appointment to this post subject to the approval of the EP.

The EP also makes use of some resources that go beyond the text of the treaties. Over the years, various inter-institutional agreements have increased the EP's access to information and *droit de regard* over the EU's external activities in relation to the Council—the *Luns procedure* of 1964 and the *Luns–Westerterp procedure* of

1973—or to the Commission—the *Framework agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the Commission* (European Parliament and Commission of the European Communities 2005). The EP has also taken advantage of its organisational autonomy to maximise its influence, mainly using its rules of procedure to broaden its space for manoeuvre. MEPs have additionally demanded scrutiny rights over foreign policy by arguing that they already have legislative and budgetary competences related to the EU's external actions. More specifically, MEPs claim, in certain areas covered by the assent procedure, the right of elaborating real negotiation mandates mainly in commercial matters.

MEPs also lean on their accountability functions, particularly in relation to supervising international negotiations by means of hearings, committees of enquiry, questions, reporting and debates. Depending on the agreement under discussion and the third countries involved, the EP may opt for an intervention before, during or at the end of the negotiation (Di Paola 2003). On completion of negotiations, the EP may only approve or reject a treaty but its report will usually refer to conditions that should be fulfilled when the agreement is implemented. During negotiations, the EP may send signals to the parties in the form of legislative resolutions, recommendations to the Council within the framework of CFSP and urgent debates. If the EP wishes to try and exert influence before the negotiation mandate is given to the Commission, it may appoint a *rapporteur* to follow the discussions and then indicate political guidelines for the negotiations. The increasing participation of MEPs in summits organised between the EU and third countries or regions also reflects this 'anticipation strategy'.

However, the EP's interventions may be ineffective unless MEPs are capable of acting, which means obtaining and handling information. In order to do this, they must search for information in other institutions (mainly the European Commission, but also the Council and permanent representations), in third countries' institutions and from experts and interest groups (non-governmental organisations (NGOs), political opposition in exile). This is no easy task since EU institutions tend to interact minimally with the EP and generally only fulfil their formal obligations to deliver information (Diedrichs 2004: 35). Once they have received information, MEPs will consult experts such as specialised civil servants of parliamentary committees and political groups for analysis.

In 2008, the EP launched a new initiative in the international field: the Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy. This is intended to provide technical assistance to parliamentary institutions in new and emerging democracies that are not part of the EU. This organ is innovative for two reasons. First, it constitutes an exclusively EP initiative that bears no intrinsic relation to earlier EU actions or agreements. Second, the financial support for the activities of the Office is provided entirely by the EP's budget and this had not previously been common practice. The Office may give the EP relative autonomy to act externally, at least in relation to strengthening the role of parliaments in developing countries.

To these legal and functional resources, MEPs have added rhetorical instruments. They must not only adopt a position but must also prove their usefulness in order to quell the scepticism of other EU actors. MEPs must therefore try to maintain their

credibility by reconciling contradictory qualities: on the one hand, determination and engagement and, on the other, moderation and realism. They must also position themselves collectively and this is problematic since the EP suffers from numerous internal divisions. Since the assembly makes decisions about external relations on the basis of simple majority and usually votes on declarative resolutions at the end of the monthly session, when attendance is low, the results of votes are unpredictable. The EP also has to present a coherent position over time in order to be listened to and this position needs to be in harmony with its other activities (legislative and budgetary).

If they want their colleagues in the Commission, the Council and the European Council to listen to what they have to say, the MEPs need to persuade them of possible benefits. In the first place, the MEPs have called attention to the need to reduce the democratic deficit that is affecting the EU and its international policies. They have argued that EU negotiators should combine two simultaneous mandates: one from the Council, in the name of member states, and another from the EP, representing Europe's citizens. This follows the logic of double representation mentioned in Article 10 of the Treaty on European Union.[1]

More broadly, MEPs claim that they mediate between citizens and governments: they want to bring the citizens' point of view to government attention and, conversely, to explain to voters the EU's external policy. MEPs maintain that parliamentary implication in the management of international negotiations enhances EU efficiency and they refer to the 'capacity of constraint' (Meunier 2005: 74) and the 'strategy of tied hands' (Orbie 2008: 41) that North American negotiators have commonly referred to. Their argument is that a political body may exploit its institutional deficiencies in negotiations in order to win concessions from the other parties: citing internal inflexibility may earn concessions from the outside. It may thus be to the advantage of EU negotiators to mention a mandate given by the EP, risks of parliamentary veto (through the assent procedure) or other sanctions.

The EP still has few formal powers in the field of foreign policy and this suggests that the European level reflects the constitutional arrangements of the national level (Thym 2006). Declaration 14, annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, explicitly states that 'the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy do not give new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European Parliament'. The EP's influence in the field of external relations thus depends largely on the ability of its members to mobilise functional and rhetorical resources in order to exert pressure on the Commission and the Council to deliver information and to take the EP's position into account. These informal strategies are applied mainly in interregional negotiations.

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[1] Article 10: 1. The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy. 2. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of state or government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.

The following section presents the way in which the EP incorporates these mechanisms into the legal framework of the EU and it discusses their implementation through parliamentary resolutions concerning regional integration worldwide.

8.3   The European Parliament and Interregionalism

One of the European Community's first initiatives in the international field was to foster regional cooperation in other regions (Smith 2008: 76). Ironically, critique of the ambiguities and weaknesses of European integration has always been accompanied by optimism about the benefits of integration for other regions of the world (Costa and Foret 2005: 507–508). The European Community's institutions therefore gradually developed a policy of exporting their own concepts and mechanisms by offering technical and financial support to states that showed interest in developing regional organisations. From the 1990s, this strategy was elaborated with trade agreements, partly in response to the United States' (US) moves towards regionalism (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2005: 265).

In the 1960s and 1970s, preferential agreements were signed with the immediate neighbours and former colonies of France, Belgium and the United Kingdom. In the 1980s, Latin America was included on account of its ties to Portugal and Spain. In all of these regions, interregionalism played a fundamental role in EU foreign policy. By institutionalising economic relations with these hitherto non-formalised regional zones, the EU became an external catalyser of regional dynamics (Petiteville 2006: 119). Regionalism therefore not only spurs interregionalism but may also be influenced by it.

This section aims to assess the instruments and positions adopted by the EP concerning EU's interregional relations. The first part analyses how the MEPs have shaped the internal structure of the EP in order to be able to act effectively in this field. The second part provides a qualitative analysis of texts adopted by the EP from 1994 to 2009 concerning regional integration in the world.

8.3.1   Committees and Delegations

Interregional issues used to fall under the competence of the following parliamentary committees: Foreign Affairs, Development and International Trade. However, because of the EP's formal weakness in the field of foreign affairs, inter-parliamentary delegations and joint parliamentary committees are useful tools for the development of 'para-diplomacy'. The committees are the most important actors for legislative work while parliamentary delegations (from the EP), joint or cooperation committees (that gather representatives from the EP and other regional or national parliaments) and inter-parliamentary assemblies play a particular role in political relations with different regions. These committees and assemblies try to bring the EP's

perspectives to the attention of parliamentarians from third countries/regions and also to inform the EP's dialogue with the Council and the Commission (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 96). These organs therefore have a dual function; they help supplement the EP's information about the EU's external relations and execution of agreements and also keep the EP abreast of the foreign policy process. Indeed, the exclusion of MEPs from formal negotiations enables them to take positions that are not possible for EU's officials (Weiler 1980: 181). This explains the central role that the EP plays, along with the Council, in regular political dialogue in interregional relations. The Commission is also involved in these dialogues but its role is often more bureaucratic than political and this tends to result in discussion about formalities rather than genuine dialogue. Because of their democratic legitimacy and political skills, MEPs are often able to smooth the way towards the conclusion of negotiations.

Parliamentary dynamics reveal two main movements. Firstly, MEPs have gradually achieved a degree of autonomy from the EU in the international forum. While the first delegations were organised to follow international agreements signed by the EU, in the 1970s MEPs began building delegations without waiting for special legal steps from the Community. This was the case, for instance, with the delegations for the United States (1972) and for Japan (1978). Secondly, the MEPs took account of the fact that regional organisations were gaining strength around the world; exclusive delegations were created for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1999, the Andean Community (CAN) and MERCOSUR in 2004, and the Pan-African Parliament in 2009. It therefore seems that the EP's delegations are particularly sensitive to the promotion of regionalism. As one MEP put it, 'our task is to spread the value of the new multilateralism, the need and advantages of supranationalism' (Herranz 2005). The effect of social interaction in inter-parliamentary encounters is also significant: parliamentarians from third countries are exposed to the EP's regional experience and MEPs strengthen their involvement in regionalism and international relations. In this sense, delegations contribute to the parliamentarisation of EU's interregional dialogue.

8.3.2   Resolutions

With the enlargement of the Community in the 1970s and 1980s, and especially after the direct elections, the EP gradually acquired the status of a forum for discussion of international challenges—a kind of 'United Nations bis' (Mammonas 1999: 583). In the period covered in our analysis (from the 4th to the 6th legislatures; 1994–2009), the place of regional integration is visible in the approved documents, mainly regarding Latin America, Africa and, to a lesser extent, Asia. Whenever possible, the EP connects the subject of the resolution to the role of regionalism in the corresponding country or region. A clear example is a resolution on MERCOSUR from 2002, in which the EP calls for a rapid resolution of the Argentinian crisis, strengthening of integration within the bloc and a satisfactory

conclusion of the EU–MERCOSUR Association Agreement (European Parliament 2002a). In its efforts to strengthen relations between the EU and Eastern Europe, the EP also highlights the benefits of greater cooperation between the countries of the Baltic Sea (European Parliament 1996b) and even argues that an increased effort to achieve regional cooperation is what is required to put a stop to Isreali blockage of goods from reaching Palestine and to bring peaceful integration instead (European Parliament 1995d, e).

These arguments correspond rhetorically with the perspective that claims that 'there is no development without integration nor integration without development. The entire integration process revolves around the benefits of peace, democracy and economic well-being' (Barón 1992). It may also be argued that the EP's emphasis on regionalism is also part of an effort to increase EU influence in the world, analogously to the way the EP stressed the importance of European integration in order to increase its own influence (Costa 2001: 25). The Parliament recognises:

> [the] Union's goal of creating a global network of cooperation and understanding, the European Council's aim being both to establish closer relations between the EU and the various regions at bi- and multilateral level and to promote regional integration. Nor is cooperation at the various levels to be confined to the economic sphere: it is also to embrace political and social exchanges. This multifaceted cooperation is intended to increase the European Union's influence on the various regions so that the overriding objectives may be pursued.
>
> (European Parliament 1996a: 7).

This explains the large number of resolutions that focus on interregional relations. The support to EU–ACP cooperation is frequently mentioned in EP resolutions (European Parliament 1997, 1998). A recent text on EU–Africa relations calls for a continent-to-continent approach to political dialogue and suggests ways of achieving this that stress the role of the African Union (European Parliament 2007d). In a resolution on the EU–South Africa Strategic Partnership, the EP points out that this partnership should complement the EU–Africa strategy and requests that South Africa clarify its relationship with the various regional integration projects on the continent so that a more comprehensive regional development policy might be devised (European Parliament 2006b). In the context of the Euro–Mediterranean Conference of 1995, the EP highlights the importance of founding a new framework for closer cooperation with Maghreb countries (European Parliament 1995a, c). Latin America and Asia have also been the subjects of numerous resolutions in which the EP reiterates its belief in the usefulness of regional approaches to strategic issues and expresses support for elaboration of EU policies for these regions, and for greater mutual economic cooperation (European Parliament 1995b, 2002b, 2005, 2006a, 2008a, b, c). With regard to MERCOSUR, the EP explicitly states its agreement with the Commission's policies of technical and financial support to this regional integration project and it suggests economic priorities (European Parliament 1994).

The EP not only offers institutional support to the EU by defending regionalism, but its resolutions on the issue stress its own role *vis-à-vis* the other institutions. This is evident in two resolutions on regional strategy papers: the EP argues that the Commission goes beyond its implementation powers by including policies designed

to strengthen regional integration and the EU's relations with other regions and it requests that the Commission adhere to its primary task, which is the eradication of poverty (European Parliament 2007b, c). Because MEPs attach such value to their institutional autonomy, they end up counteracting the EP's traditional position on interregionalism though this may also reflect the lack of internal agreement on some issues; the EP is a heterogenous organisation and differences between the stances of its national delegations and political groupings have to be reconciled before a common position can be presented (Viola 2000).

The resolutions in which the EP most vigorously supports interregionalism also include a bid for more power, as a challenge to both the Commission and the Council. If greater European integration benefits the EP, then an increase in regional integration initiatives around the world that spur the development of other regional assemblies may help legitimise the EP and enhance its role both internally and externally. The EP has therefore repeatedly requested greater parliamentary input into the EU's interregional activities. For instance, in its annual resolutions on the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, the EP highlights the importance of the Assembly's input into negotiations about agreements and into the normalisation of conflict situations.[2] These arguments are put forward even when no other regional parliament or joint parliamentary assembly is involved in interregional negotiations; the EP then calls for 'a parliamentary branch' to be developed and for regular exchange visits of parliamentary delegations that 'are essential if there is to be greater mutual understanding of matters of common interest' (European Parliament 2006b, 2007a). More explicitly, the EP has requested the prompt establishment of a regional parliament in partner regions that would enable inter-parliamentary delegations to be formed from both regional assemblies and this would ultimately award the EP a stronger role in driving the negotiations (European Parliament 2006c).

The EP's resolutions on interregional relations show a parliamentary interest in an issue that does not usually fall within the remit of national parliaments. EP debates mean that resolutions are taken seriously and have a political impact both in the EU and in the target countries. However, surmounting democratic deficit is not the primary motivation for the EP's interest in regionalism. Promoting regionalism is understood within the EP largely as a way to optimise the EU's global position and to affirm its status both internally and externally as a parliamentary institution. Both of these goals may be achieved if the EP is able to prompt regional organisations to become key actors in international relations.

8.4 Promoting Cooperation with MERCOSUR

The relations between the EP and MERCOSUR reflect the EP's support for inter-regionalism and its use of a combination of formal, functional and rhetorical instruments. Indeed, the creation of the MERCOSUR Parliament in 2006 is closely

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[2] Resolutions on the results of the work of the ACP–EU Joint Assembly from 1994 to 2003.

related to the policies carried out not only by the Commission but also by the EP. The EP's interest in MERCOSUR as a bloc has two origins. Firstly, the EP supports the Commission's pursuit of trade partners through the use of parliamentary diplomacy. Although the Commission is pragmatic and simultaneously develops bilateral and multilateral agreements, interregional contacts make negotiations more efficient for the EU and in the case of MERCOSUR they have the added advantage of excluding the United States (see Santander in this volume). Secondly, bloc-to-bloc relations allow the EP to establish relations with other regional assemblies—something that is not possible in bilateral relations. MERCOSUR proved to provide fertile soil for developing these kinds of relations, particularly after 2005.

The EP first mentioned Latin America in a 1963 resolution on the commercial relations between the two regions (European Parliament 1963). In 1974, dialogue between the EP and the Latin American Parliament (Parlatino)[3] was formally established through biannual inter-parliamentary conferences between the European Community and Latin America. These were intended to provide a forum for analysis and discussion of matters of mutual concern. When military dictatorships dominated in Latin America, Europe had problems approaching them for discussions and so this parliamentary forum provided the main instrument for contact with Europe (Dabène 2009: 137). This gave EC–Latin America relations a political dimension that has no equivalent in other geographic areas (Celare 1996: 45). The conferences have helped strengthen historical, economic and cultural ties between the two regions and to increase deputies' knowledge about foreign political systems. For the Latin American parliaments, it was chiefly the innovative features of a supranational parliament that were brought to their attention every 2 years. Support for regional integration was regularly reiterated at these conferences and was usually included in final declarations and other legal acts (Irela 1993: 33).

After the creation of MERCOSUR in 1991, the EP followed the developments of its Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) closely. In 1996, the EP's Delegation for relations with South America became the 'Delegation for relations with South America and MERCOSUR'. A special Delegation for relations with MERCOSUR was created in 2004 and this consolidated relations and the regularity of visits of MEPs to the Southern Cone. Although its competences regarding inter-parliamentary delegations are yet to be defined, the recently created Euro–Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (Eurolat) within the Committee on Foreign Affairs should help consolidate parliamentary exchanges between the regions. Eurolat follows the model of the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly that was created with the Lomé Convention (1975). However, the establishment of Eurolat also springs from the ambitions of some right-wing Spanish MEPs who wanted to increase their influence and counterbalance the left-wing majority in the EP's Delegations for Latin

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[3] Parlatino was created in 1964 in Lima, Peru, but its Treaty of Institutionalisation was only signed in 1987. This was partly because of the dictatorial regimes that governed several member states at the time. Parlatino is formed from the national elected parliaments of Latin America and it is intended to promote political dialogue and exchange of parliamentary experience and is to bring the parliaments of the region together in the creation of democracy and integration.

America during the 6th legislature. This strategy was well understood by left-wing MERCOSUR MPs, who then agreed to participate in Eurolat in order to counterbalance the 'strong right-wing character' it has acquired.[4]

Since the beginning of the JPC, parliamentarians from MERCOSUR also pursued closer relations with the EP and received a ready response. In 1996, both institutions agreed to hold regular meetings and to strengthen their cooperation in accordance with the 1995 Interregional Agreement EU–MERCOSUR. Subsequent exchanges, technical assistance, instruction courses for JPC staff and financial cooperation from the European Commission resulted largely from this parliamentary contact. An intention to build a parliament in MERCOSUR was also often reiterated in the final declarations of these meetings.

Inter-parliamentary conferences between the EU and Latin America were also carried out in this period. Their agendas included the growing number of integration initiatives and consequent sub-regional inter-parliamentary dialogue. These conferences played an important role in guiding the EP's legislative acts and political initiatives with regard to Latin America. However, EP members recognised that the final documents resulting from the conferences had little influence over parliamentary activity (European Parliament 1999: 32). This is the reason that from 1993 onwards, participants began trying to 'leave the utopias behind' by reducing the number of topics for discussion at the meetings and instead increasing the depth of discussion about each one (Parlatino 1993: 7). The quality of debate was thus improved and the Commission began to show greater interest in their conclusions and resulting recommendations. Nevertheless, their importance is related more to political dialogue about relations between the regions and to exchange of viewpoints through deliberation than to practical issues or policy-making. 'Efforts in the name of regional integration' were often singled out as a major political achievement in Latin America and EU support to such initiatives was considered to be the main axle of relations between the regions (Parlatino 1993: 26). The potential benefits for Latin America of strengthened democracy and integration were also noted: 'it is clear that integration is not a panacea, a solution for all situations. But it is a method of civic work, often efficient, which must evidence in the next years its capacity to contribute to the growing of the economies of this side of the ocean as well and to create a fairer society' (Parlatino 1993: 43).

This international legislative network (Slaughter 2004: 104) helped MERCOSUR MPs to act as catalysts for the institutional development of regional integration. It also helped legislators to do their work better (Slaughter 2004: 125) since it provided participants—both from the EU and MERCOSUR—with technical support, advice and resources that have influenced their level of professionalism and the establishment of a common language for parliamentary work. Consequently, this network favoured institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 151): the reference to the European experience became central for JPC members.

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[4] Authors' interview, member of the MERCOSUR Parliament, Montevideo, March 2009.

MPs explicitly mentioned the EP as a model for MERCOSUR in meetings and written documents.[5] The impact of the EP on the imagination of MERCOSUR MPs continued after the establishment of the Parliament. A survey of 24 members of the Parlasur from all member states show that around 90 % believed that the EU is an important or very important source of inspiration for MERCOSUR and that the EU has had an important or very important influence in the evolution of the institutional system of MERCOSUR. Many MEPs think in the same way (Sierens 2009: 69). Overall, MERCOSUR parliamentarians affirm that 'the European Parliament has been a model for the MERCOSUR Parliament'[6] and 'it is even superior to national parliaments in some areas, we have to work responsibly to get there, not hurriedly, but we have to walk in this direction'.[7]

There are several reasons for the interest of MEPs in the MERCOSUR region. Firstly, there is the economic significance of the region. Parliamentarians generally follow economic agreements that have been negotiated by the Commission as part of their accountability powers. In the case of MERCOSUR, negotiations progressed to bring about an association agreement; this is still rare for the EU and it deserves particular attention. According to one MEP, the agreement between the EU and MERCOSUR would create 'the most important association and free trade area on the planet, in political, commercial and economic terms'.[8] Moreover, as Santander points out in this volume, some European countries have historically had special economic interests in and commercial relations with Latin America.

The second reason for MEP interest in the MERCOSUR region is related to the consensus among European institutions on the need for stronger regional integration within Latin America, because 'it is easier to cooperate with regions than with each country separately'.[9] EP powers have historically grown stronger in tandem with the deepening of the European integration process; similarly, a parliament in MERCOSUR would enhance integration within the bloc and then increase the possibilities for the EU to develop a privileged partnership in South America. According to one MEP, 'MERCOSUR has to advance in the integration of markets as a priority, to build a communitarian law, to move forward, to do more in the sense of integration. [...] I think the creation of Parlasur is a decisive step'.[10]

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[5] For instance, Brazilian proposal to an agenda for the institutionalisation of the MERCOSUR Parliament, Porto Alegre, 9 November 2000; Ney Lopes, Brazilian Deputy, Partido da Frente Liberal, open meeting about the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and MERCOSUR, Brasília, 9 September 2001; Confucio Moura, Brazilian Deputy, Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, ordinary meeting of the Brazilian section of JPC, Brasília, 18 September 2001; Dr. Rosinha, Brazilian Deputy, Partido dos Trabalhadores, Workshop 'Parlamento do Mercosul e Integração Fronteiriça', Foz do Iguaçu, 3–4 November 2003. The reference to the European Union when MERCOSUR is mentioned is also usual in academic sectors and media of all member states.

[6] Authors' interview, member of the Brazilian National Congress, Brasília, April 2009.

[7] Authors' interview, member of the Brazilian National Congress, Brasília, April 2009.

[8] Authors' interview, member of the European Parliament, Brussels, October 2008.

[9] Authors' interview, member of the European Parliament, Brussels, October 2008.

[10] Authors' interview, member of the European Parliament, Brussels, October 2008.

The third reason is that many MEPs believe that the EU is an exportable model.

> The European model is a global model. […] there is nothing like it in history. Twenty-seven states have given up their sovereignty to constitute a supranational organisation that has a real parliament, for the citizens, elected by universal suffrage. There is nothing like this in the world, so our example is for the whole world. […] We have good experience of integration and we have seen its benefits. We strongly believe that if other regions integrate themselves it will be beneficial for them.[11]

By stimulating the creation of new regional parliaments, the EP increases its own chances of gaining double legitimisation and institutional reinforcement. MERCOSUR is widely understood among European deputies as the most important example of integration in the Americas and as the one in the world that is most similar to the EU.

The fourth reason is the cultural and historical links between parts of Europe and Latin America. Some MEPs, mainly those from Spain or Portugal, claim that 'they carry Latin America in their hearts'.[12] They also say,

> That the European Union and Latin America have a natural inclination to get along well due to the political, historical and cultural affinities. This does not exist between the EU and other blocs, such as Southeast Asia, which may be very important blocs but they do not have the deep affinities that exist between Latin America and Europe.[13]

As Santander argues in this volume, this corresponds with the desire of Spanish and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese leaders to maintain their position *vis-à-vis* their former colonies. Since joining the Community, Spain has pushed for the development of relations between Europe and Latin America as part of a political strategy for its own international projection.

The interest displayed by the EP has had considerable influence upon deputies from MERCOSUR countries (Dri 2010). No other assembly or organisation in the world has kept such close parliamentary relations with MERCOSUR (more than 50 meetings of various kinds in 18 years). Nor has the JPC received any greater financial, technical and ideological support than that given by the EU. The JPC considered the EP an important ally in the struggle for power within MERCOSUR and the European model was the only example of regional integration readily available to the parliamentary actors of the bloc. Of course, most insisted that MERCOSUR must find its own way to create a regional assembly in a way that responded to the region's needs at that time but ideas taken from the European model were always in the background. When Parlasur held its first plenary session in May 2007 it therefore copied several features of its European counterpart: political groups, direct elections and demographic representation. By thus helping to strengthen regional integration, the EP has contributed to the 'capacity-building interregionalism' carried out by the EU (see Doidge in this volume; also see Doidge 2007: 242).

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[11] Authors' interview, members of the European Parliament, Brussels, October 2008.

[12] Authors' interview, members of the European Parliament, Brussels, October 2008.

[13] Authors' interview, members of the European Parliament, Brussels, October 2008.

8.5 Conclusion

According to the institutional design and treaties of the EU, the EP is not supposed to be an important actor in interregional dialogue. However, in reality it plays a key role in EU contacts with other regional organisations for many reasons. Firstly, in the 1970s and 1980s, external relations became a concern for MEPs as an area of influence that could compensate for the EP's lack of legislative powers. Secondly, MEPs have tended to export the principle of 'political' regional integration to other continents on ideological grounds (federalism) and as a means to support human rights and democracy. The promotion of proto-federalism could help legitimise the EP's own claims to be playing an indispensable role in European integration. The EP has therefore actively supported the development of other regional organisations and the formalisation of interregional dialogue with them. This is most evident in the case of Latin America in general and in MERCOSUR in particular. The EP has not only pioneered and encouraged interregional contacts with Latin American partners but has also promoted and inspired the creation of new regional parliaments. The Latin American case illustrates the EP's ability to contribute, through interregional dialogue, to regionalisation outside the EU and to the parliamentarisation of regional integration.

EP activities in this field are problematic for the EU and raise the question of the coherence of its external action. The EP has consistently upheld an idealistic approach to international relations that is grounded in European values (human rights, democracy and peace) and notions of federalism. The EP's position on interregional dialogue is more idealistic than that of the Commission or the member states. Since MEPs hold direct responsibility for neither negotiations nor their immediate consequences, they enjoy relative freedom in their approach to foreign affairs and are less constrained by *realpolitik* considerations than are the members and agents of the Commission and Council. If focus is put solely upon the actions of the EP then the EU's relationship with MERCOSUR may seem to be a form of pure interregionalism but the strategic partnership between EU and Brazil promoted by the Commission and member states in fact give it a more 'hybrid' nature.

The divergence between the visions of the EP, the Commission and the Council regarding interregional relations begs questions about the EP's impact on EU foreign policy. The EP clearly has an impact through its activities in interregional relations, but this also reveals some of the EU's foreign policy coordination problems. The discrepancies between the Commission and the intergovernmental organs (Council of Foreign Affairs, European Council) are well-known but further research is required to analyse the new tensions that have been growing since the creation of a permanent President of the European Council and of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs, who are at the same time members of the Commission and the European Council/the Council. The EP is also part of this story and scholars will eventually need to examine its impact on the coherence of EU external action, particularly in the field of interregional dialogue, in which the EP has always been active.

We should not simply consider that the EP is doing the 'right' thing by advocating a supranational vision of interregional relations. The precise effect of its actions on EU relations with other regions remains uncertain. It is not yet clear whether the EP is rigidifying or softening power relations between the EU and other regions. MEPs have traditionally advocated for 'pure' interregionalism that is guided by European values and principles, but is this really what EU partners want? International relations literature has shown that, although interregional relations are conducted on the pretext of yielding win-win solutions, real power differentials mean that the EU is often able to impose its vision upon its partners. By the same token, it is more difficult for the EU to impose its vision on the relatively more powerful East Asian region than on the relatively weak African region, while Latin America lies somewhere between these two (Söderbaum et al. 2005: 377). It is thus important to acknowledge the resistance among some of the EU's counterparts of the idealistic views promoted by MEPs, especially in the current context of emerging powers and crisis of traditional regionalism.

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Interviews

Members of the European Parliament

Malgorzata HANDZLIK, European People's Party (Christian Democrats), Poland. Member of the Delegation for relations with Mercosur and Eurolat. October 7th 2008, European Parliament, Brussels.

Ján HUDACKÝ, European People's Party (Christian Democrats), Slovakia. Member of the Delegation for relations with Mercosur. October 9th 2008, European Parliament, Brussels.

Sérgio SOUSA PINTO, Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, Portugal. President of the Delegation for relations with Mercosur, member of Eurolat. October 14th 2008, European Parliament, Brussels.

Daniel VARELA SUANZES-CARPEGNA, European People's Party (Christian Democrats), Spain. Member of the International Trade Committee and Eurolat. October 15th 2008, European Parliament, Brussels.

Members of the MERCOSUR Parliament

Dr. ROSINHA, Partido dos Trabalhadores, Brazil. April 14th 2009, Brazilian National Congress, Brasília.

Marisa SERRANO, Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, Brazil. April 15th 2009, Brazilian National Congress, Brasília.

José Paulo TÓFFANO, Partido Verde, Brazil. April 8th 2009, Brazilian National Congress, Brasília.

Chapter 9
The Court of Justice of the European Union and Other Regional Courts

Stefaan Smis and Stephen Kingah

9.1 Introduction

Interregional relations pertain to the realm of foreign policy. Courts do not determine or pursue foreign policy since this is the responsibility of the executive and to a lesser extent the legislative branches of government. State officials are therefore often reluctant to defer the mandate of defining and controlling foreign policy questions to the courts. The member states of the European Union (EU) and its officials are no exception in this regard (Bronckers 2007: 603). Eyal Benvenisti provides a good explanation for the moribund leverage that courts wield in matters of foreign affairs. He suggests that judicial independence and especially the force of judicial review are two components of a 'deal' struck between the courts and the other branches of government and this 'deal' does not appear to incorporate the granting of judicial discretion in the area of foreign affairs (Benvenisti 1994: 425). However, courts interpret laws that can have an impact on the manner in which foreign policy is conducted. Can the opinions of the Court of Justice (CJ) of the European Union affect the EU's international relations with other regional organisations? This is even more important bearing in mind that the EU's legal system does not function within the international legal order in the same ways as states do (Foriers 1965: 320–321).

International relations scholars, especially those of the realist hue, have seldom awarded any importance to the role of supranational institutions such as courts because they hold that states still have the monopoly on deciding whether to adhere

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to or dismiss judicial preferences (Mattli and Slaughter 1998: 179). In the case of the EU, neofunctionalists have argued that member states have to succumb to the power and influence of the Court. But neorealists argue that this is not the case and that the Court cannot bend the interests of big powers within the Union. Alter finds truth in all these explanations but claims that none adequately explains why or how the political influence of the Court has operated. She argues that the main reason member states created the CJ was to ensure that the Commission did not exceed its competences. The Court was created to fulfil three limited roles for the member states: to ensure that the Commission and the Council of the EU did not exceed their authority, to clarify aspects of European Community laws through dispute resolution and decide on charges of noncompliance raised by the Commission or by member states (Alter 1998: 121–124).

This chapter will consider the role that the CJ has played in EU interregional relations with other regions. Attention is focused on the modalities and fallouts of judicial cooperation. Judicial cooperation or adjudicative interregionalism does not exist in a vacuum. The proliferation and multiplicity of international and regional courts have been under discussion for some time and this reflects a deeper epistemological concern with the fragmentation of international law (Oellers-Frahm 2001; Buergenthal 2001; Pocar 2004). These issues will be presented in the next section of this chapter so as to situate the efforts made by judges to limit the problems that may result from proliferation. After briefly explaining the role and functions of the CJ in the third section, the subsequent three sections concentrate on ways by which jurisdictional or adjudicative interregionalism may be invoked. The first (Sect. 9.4) is the need for comity that is attested to by frequent judge-to-judge meetings. The second (Sect. 9.5) is cross-referencing by the CJ and Southern regional judges of the decisions of counterparts or colleagues in other regional courts. The third (Sect. 9.6) is the inclusion of dispute settlement clauses in interregional agreements that refer to the CJ. Some progress has been made with regard to the third dimension, and Sect. 9.7 includes a sample of regional courts in other regions. These regions are those that have well developed judicial third-party obligatory dispute settlement mechanisms modelled on the EU's. They include the East African Community's (EAC) Court of Justice, the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) Court of Justice, the Caribbean Community's (CARICOM) Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the Andean Community (CAN). The concluding section discusses some of the prospective avenues for sub-regional courts.

9.2 Context: Proliferation of International Courts and Fragmentation of International Law

There has been a steady effort to create courts and tribunals at the international level. Such dispute settlement organs include the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (general jurisdiction), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (general with respect to the law of the sea), various administrative tribunals

(administrative matters), the International Criminal Court (ICC) and various international criminal tribunals (grave crimes). Also at the lower level are the many (sub-)regional courts that have competence on various issues including human rights and trade. The vertical dimensions of proliferation of courts can be alluded to when matters of alignment of approaches arise, such as that between the international courts or tribunals and the regional ones.

The problems that have been associated with proliferation of courts have to do with the danger of incoherence for the international legal system (Spelliscy 2001: 152). The incoherence of the legal system has a negative impact on its legitimacy. Pauwelyn points out that the increasing number of international tribunals may mean that two tribunals make opposing decisions about the same issue. He adds that the increase in international tribunals and inconsistent findings may deprive international law of its predictability and hence its effectiveness (Pauwelyn 2003: 114–115; Kelsen 1992: 62). However, not all scholars regard the proliferation of courts as negative, particularly not when the courts are able to coordinate their work between themselves or with the ICJ (Abi-Saab 1999: 926–928). Dupuy suggests that the ICJ should play a stronger role in coordinating the operations of other courts (Dupuy 1999: 807). Others, such as Charney, see no threats in proliferation and regard it as a positive process (Charney 1998: 347).

Fragmentation of international law refers to the sundering of the law of nations as a result of the expanding of issue areas that require international normative responses, such as the environment, the seas and international trade. International law has burgeoned and it is no longer a subject that mainly addresses adjectival issues and questions of state responsibility or sovereignty but now embraces a wide spectrum of specialised areas and topics (Brownlie 1987). Alongside this sundering at the international level, which could be regarded as horizontal, is the vertical dimension of sundering, whereby regional entities are also adopting regional standards on various issues. This means there is potential for antinomy between the international level and internal level: be this municipal, domestic or regional (Salmon 1965: 285). Hafner argues that 'a major factor generating this fragmentation is the increase of international regulations' (Hafner 2002: 143). He claims that another element is the increasing political fragmentation juxtaposed with growing regional and global interdependence in such areas as economics, environment, energy, resources, health and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Hafner 2002). The issue here is that fragmentation may lead to conflicts about norms. The International Law Commission identifies some of the possible areas of conflicts over interpretation of general norms; conflict between a general law and a special one and conflicts between two specific norms in different fields (International Law Commission 2002; Koskenniemi 2003). It is now taken for granted by some that conflicts of norms within the international legal system are inevitable (Rousseau 1932: 191–192; Jenks 1953: 451; Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 2004: 1004). However, fragmentation of international law is not necessarily a problem (Pauwelyn 2004: 904). This is especially true if one looks at seemingly divergent fields such as trade and human rights as indivisible components, as Delmas-Marty does (Delmas-Marty 2003: 27). Actually a number of observers regard the sundering of law into

various fields as a good thing for international law. In any event within international law itself important rules and principles addressing possible conflicts have been developed over the years. They include the following: *lex specialis derogat lege generali, lex posterior derogat lege priori*, and *lex posterior generalis non derogat lege prior speciali*. However, a rule of *ius cogens* always takes precedence over a treaty even if the former is *generalis* or *prior* (Article 53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

9.3   Functions of the Court of Justice of the European Union

This chapter looks at interregional relations from the point of view of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It is therefore relevant to briefly situate this European institution. The CJ was created in 1952, having been included in the Treaty of Paris that led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It was established as the main organ for the ECSC to interpret the Treaty. In the Treaty of Rome, the founding fathers of the European Economic Community (EEC) decided that there will be one Court for the three communities (ECSC, EEC and EURATOM). Through its case law and particular method of interpretation, the Court has played a crucial role in framing the contours of European law. The increase in workload led the framers of the European integration project to provide for the creation of a Court of First Instance (CFI) attached to the Court of Justice and later on an EU Civil Service Tribunal.

As the judicial leg of the Union, the Court has a general function to ensure that Union law is observed. Its role is specific in the sense that

> the Court […] carries out tasks which, in the legal systems of the member states, are those of the constitutional courts, the courts of general jurisdiction or the administrative courts or tribunals, as the case may be.
>
> In its constitutional role, the Court rules on the respective powers of the Communities and of the member states, and on those of the Communities in relation to other forms of cooperation within the framework of the Union and, generally, determines the scope of the provisions of the Treaties whose observance it is its duty to ensure. It ensures that the delimitation of powers between the institutions is safeguarded, thereby helping to maintain the institutional balance. It examines whether fundamental rights and general principles of law have been observed by the institutions and by the member states when their actions fall within the scope of Community law. It rules on the relationship between Community law and national law and on the reciprocal obligations between the member states and the Community institutions. Finally, it may be called upon to judge whether international commitments envisaged by the Communities are compatible with the Treaties.
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> (Court of Justice 1995: 2)

To this end, the Court establishes whether or not a member state has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty (such actions can be brought by the Commission or a member state); exercises jurisdiction with regard to penalties in actions brought by the Commission; gives preliminary rulings at the request of national courts or tribunals; grants compensation for damages caused by the institutions in actions

brought by member states, natural and legal persons; acts as a court of appeal from the CFI; and reviews the legality of an act or of a failure to act of the Council, the Commission, or the Parliament, at the request of member states, the Council or the Commission. One of the strong and novel elements of the Court's jurisdiction is a compulsory and exclusive one: judgements not only apply *to* states but importantly also *in* member states (Mouton and Soulard 1998: 4–5; Arnull 2006).

Over the years, the CJ has used its leverage to expand the rendition of its mandate. It has been keen to ensure that the goal of the Communities, and later of the Union, of freer flow of production factors within the internal market is enhanced. It has developed technical doctrines through tests and landmark cases to chisel EU law into the fabric of municipal legal systems. This has been done through doctrines of direct effect and the supremacy of EU Law (Alter 2011: 4).[1] Through these principles, the Court has succeeded in commanding untrammelled legitimacy in what Weiler calls the 'silent revolution' (Weiler 1994: 517).

But why did the CJ succeed in embedding EU laws into the mould of domestic laws? The first reason is that the CJ relied graciously on the various national courts to apply EU law in the various states. National courts could use procedures, such as the preliminary reference, to secure a judicial conveyor belt to the CJ. The Court used test cases to seal important doctrines. For instance, in the *Van Gend & Loos* and *Costa/ENEL* cases, it developed the notions of direct effect and supremacy of Community law. Through these doctrines, national judges were simply converted into ordinary Community judges (Dehousse 1998: 33). In *Cassis De Dijon*, it further cemented the importance of harmonisation in forging the free flow of factors of production within the internal market (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994: 537; De Waele 2010: 6). In the *ECOWAS* case it extended its remit into the realm of second pillar issues on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) allowing itself the discretion and competence of reviewing the legality of instruments adopted under the CFSP regardless of its formal exclusion from such acts under Article 46 of the EU Treaty (Case C-91/05, *Commission* v. *Council (ECOWAS)*; Eeckhout 2008). With this case, the Court slowly ventured into the domain of foreign policy, an area that (as noted above) was traditionally excluded from judicial review.

The second reason is that the CJ benefitted from the vital role played by Euro Law associations that mustered social and political capital together with legal arguments and premises to enhance the primacy of EU law at the national levels (Alter 2009a: 66–69). In the 1950s the Euro Law associations were formed in most EU member states but were directly coordinated regionally. Workers of EU institutions like the Commission, the Court and Legal Services were often implicit and explicit members of the Euro Law associations. Associations helped in the training of lawyers on EU law matters and in creating a 'European' legal tradition. Financial support from the European Commission entailed that conferences could be

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[1] During the early years of the Court and especially in the 1960s, Italian and French courts rejected the notion that international rules were superior to subsequent national ones. Initially, when the Court of Justice was created, it was more of a toothless bulldog since there appeared to be no strong sanctions when Community rules were violated.

organised and other activities carried out. Some of the associations included the *Wissentschaftliche Gesellschaft fûr Europarecht, Association belge pour le droit européen, Association française des juristes européens, Associazione Italiana dei Giuristi Europei, and the Nederlandse Vereniging voor Europees Recht.* The Commission also contributed to the creation of the *Fédération Internationale de Droit Européen* (FIDE) (Alter 2009a: 65).

The third main reason is that the CJ has been operating within a framework where the principles of rule of law and separation of powers are respected. So, unlike some of the regional courts of the South, there has been an accommodating environment for the growth of the Court with minimal political involvement.

Even if the CJ recorded favourable ratings when compared with other regional judicial organs, it also attracted criticisms, such as the workload and cumbersome nature of the tasks for the judges (Weiler 2001: 219). Other problems identified have related to the office of Advocates General and language and translation problems (Schiemann 2008: 5). In any event, the Treaty of Lisbon has provided initial solutions to the issue of workload and cumbersome nature of the CJ by re-assigning more tasks to the Court of First Instance (henceforth to be called the General Court) and reshaping the European Court of Justice (ECJ) into the Court of Justice of the European Union.

9.4   Judge-to-Judge Meetings

A first manifestation of judicial interregionalism refers to judge-to-judge contacts. Judges can relate to peers in other judicial systems in order to enrich their perspectives as to how similar challenges or issues are addressed in other *fora* and jurisdictions. Judge-to-judge cooperation is characteristic of what Slaughter describes as 'judicial globalisation' (Slaughter 2004: 66). She argues that judges are increasingly building a strong community amongst themselves and 'they see each other not only as servants and representatives of a particular government or polity, but also as fellow members of a profession that transcends national borders' (Slaughter 2004: 68).

CJ judges have in the past regularly engaged with their counterparts from other countries and regions. Examples of such interactions have been with the US, where exchange has been patent with CJ judges visiting the United States (US) Supreme Court and US Justices such as Retired Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Justice Stephen Breyer visiting the CJ (Slaughter 2000: 1119). Such meetings are vital for judicial comity that has been characterised as the lubricant of trans-judicial relations (Slaughter 1998: 708; 711).[2] Conversely, more conservative US Justices,

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[2] US Supreme Court Associate Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas have resisted the use of approaches or references to decisions of foreign courts in US courts. However, there is a US Committee on International Judicial Relations of the US Judicial Conference that has a mandate to coordinate the Federal judiciary's relationship with foreign judiciaries and with official and unofficial

including Scalia and Thomas, award minor importance to the degree to which judicial comity influences US legal and judicial processes. Friendly meetings have also been organised between CJ judges and judges from other regional courts, such as the ECOWAS Court, the Central American Court of Justice and the Andean Court of Justice. The European Commission has also been supporting the training of lawyers from other regions who visit the CJ to be schooled in the substantive and adjectival laws of the EU (Alter 2009b: 24). Even if some of these exchange programmes and judge-to-judge meetings are still weak (partly due to the youth of some of the courts), there is a visible trend.

Judge-to-judge visits that are not institutionalised in themselves cannot, however, fully account for the interactions that may exist between regional courts. As will be explained below, cross-referencing decisions of other regional courts is also important in determining how regional courts may impact on others.

9.5   Cross-Referencing Decisions

Through cross-referencing, judges use precedents from other courts to back up their decisions. This approach is highly regarded as it fortifies the broad appeal of the justifications and arguments marshalled by judges for specific positions adopted in their judgments. Helfer and Slaughter correctly submit that, 'invoking the reasoning of another tribunal that has no link to a particular case other than that its previous consideration and pronouncement on an analogous problem acknowledges the power of reason and the value of deliberation over time as well as across cultures' (Helfer and Slaughter 1997: 389).

Cross-referencing of decisions in other courts is regarded as a tool for enhancing judicial globalisation. It is an approach that has been common between the CJ and the European Court of Human Rights (Helfer and Slaughter 1997: 323–324). Within the human rights context, an interregional approach needed to be developed in the past because the Council of Europe and increasingly the European Communities were competent to adopt measures impacting on human rights. In the 1970s, responding to a challenge posed by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht in the *Solange I* case, the European Court of Justice developed a doctrine that human rights were part of the general principles of law binding that Court. To interpret these general principles, reference was made to the constitutional traditions common to the member states and the European Convention on Human Rights adopted within the framework of the Council of Europe.[3] In the words of the Court,

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agencies and organisations interested in international judicial relations, and the establishment and expansion of the rule of law and the administration of justice, and to make recommendations as appropriate to the Chief Justice, Judicial Conference of the US and other judicial entities.

[3] ECJ, *Erich Stauder v. Stad Ulm* (12 November 1969); ECJ, *Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel* (17 December 1970); ECJ, J. *Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffhandlung v. Commission of the European Communities* (14 May 1974); ECJ,

> fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of the law, the observance of which it ensures; that in safeguarding those rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to the member states, so that measures which are incompatible with the fundamental rights recognised by the constitutions of those states are unacceptable in the Community; and that, similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the member states have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community law. That conception […] refers on the one hand to the rights guaranteed by the constitutions of the member states and on the other hand to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950.
>
> (*Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz:* paragraph 15).

This means that, when confronted with human rights issues, the ECJ/CJ will maintain that it is not bound by the European Convention on Human Rights but will nevertheless draw its inspiration from the way the European Court of Human Rights interpreted this human rights instrument. This doctrine developed by the ECJ was later taken over in the subsequent Treaty amendments to the original Treaty of Rome that established the European Community. To illustrate, one can refer to Article F.2 of the Maastricht Treaty where the member states agreed that 'the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the member states, as general principles of Community law'. As the CJ embraces greater competences in the human rights field within the context of the Lisbon Treaty and its interpretation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, it will be significant to appraise how the two courts communicate with each other and how this cross-fertilisation may impact on the political processes of interregionalism.

As is the case with the European Court of Human Rights and the CJ, here is a trend of cross-referencing and citations between the various regional human rights control mechanisms such as the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the newly-established African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. All these institutions are controlling the implementation of regional human rights instruments which are by their nature very similar and partly overlapping in terms of content. An interesting pointer is that the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights has even created *expresis verbis* the possibility, with its Articles 60–61, to draw inspiration from other human rights systems (Smis and Janssens 2008). Strictly speaking, these Articles allow the African Commission, when interpreting the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, to draw inspiration from UN and other African human rights instruments. Indeed, the practice of the African Commission has developed since the turn of the century and the Commission is increasingly using these Articles as a means to look for inspiration

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Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz (13 December 1974); ECJ, *Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary* (15 May 1986); ECJ *Hubert Wachauf v. Federal Republic of Germany* (13 July 1989); ECJ, *Höchst AG v. Commission of the European Communities* (21 September 1989).

from other regional and particularly the European human rights system. For instance, in *Huri-Laws v. Nigeria*, the African Commission referred to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (in particular *Ireland v. United Kingdom*) to question the absolute character of the prohibition of torture. Similarly, in *Curtis Francis Doebber v. Sudan*, it invoked the reasoning developed by the European Court of Human Rights in *Tyrer v. United Kingdom* to interpret the terms 'torture and degrading treatment' referred to in Article 5 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights.

Cross-referencing by CJ judges of their colleagues in sub-regional courts of the South is still to be chronicled. The approach to settling disputes by courts has a longer tradition in Europe than elsewhere and the European model has therefore become the model for other regional organisations. With the exception of the human rights domain, the European judge was often the first to be confronted with key issues of regional cooperation and integration and there has therefore been less interest in seeking inspiration elsewhere. Nevertheless, the converse has occurred as judges in the Andean Court of Justice as well as those in the EAC Court have made references in their decisions to the CJ-developed doctrines of direct effect and supremacy of Community rules over national ones. However, in both instances, the judges were unable to withstand the pressure from political figures who are often keen on dispensing with such ideals.

While this chapter considers the various ways in which the CJ has impacted on the decisions of other regional courts, the foregoing section has shown that the CJ's approaches on certain human rights questions have also been shaped by other regional bodies that sanction matters pertaining to human rights.

9.6   Interregional Dispute Settlement

There are few instances of interregional third party dispute settlement involving the CJ. There are many reasons for this. Firstly, the CJ has little leverage in this area because its mandate is to focus on the internal market in terms of promoting freer flow of factors of production within the Union.

Secondly, interregional issues are, as mentioned above, mainly a function of political decisions taken by state representatives rather than being decided by judges. On this point it is also important to distinguish between issue areas. Interregional cooperation that hinges on development cooperation will seldom elicit differences amenable to dispute settlement panels or adjudicative mechanisms. By the same token, differences arising from political dialogue, which now characterises the EU's ties with the Mediterranean countries, are not expected to be addressed in court because of the nature of the relations. They are inherently politically-driven rather than judicially accommodated.

Thirdly, although dispute settlement mechanisms are already included in some EU interregional arrangements, it is interesting to note that in most of these agreements the first method of dispute settlement (consultations) is political.

In the interim Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) for the East African Community (Council of the European Union 2008a), Cameroon (Council of the European Union 2009), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Group (Council of the European Union 2008b) and the Pacific (Council of the European Union 2008c), standard clauses on consultation, mediation and arbitration are integrated in various ways. The trend of using arbitration gained steam when the EU signed Free Trade Agreements with Mexico (2000) and Chile (2001) (Bercero 2006: 383).

Fourthly, politicians often prefer mediated dispute settlement. In all the interim EPAs cited above, the main goal is that of dispute avoidance. Because of the time and costs that are associated with adjudication it is the least favoured option.

9.7   The Court of Justice of the EU as a Model

Even if the financial crisis that began in 2008 has exposed economic fault lines within the EU, Europe's model of integration is highly regarded and many developing countries seek to understand what has made the EU such a strong regional entity. One of the main factors for this has been the strong supranational institutions including the Council, the Commission and the Court. Many regional groups have sought to replicate the institutions of the EU in their own regions in the hope that they too can secure prosperity and peace. In the case of the judicial organ, Alter has estimated that there are now 11 operational copies of the CJ (Alter 2011: 2). But not all of the courts and tribunals are active. Some African, Caribbean and Latin American sub-regions have embraced the CJ styled regional courts. These are modelled on three main factors. First, the model is characterised by the existence of a commission that monitors compliance and brings cases to court. Second, the model is marked by the use of preliminary rulings that allow national courts to send references to the supranational court. Finally, the model accommodates the possibility of constitutional reviews where litigants can challenge Community acts before supranational courts (Alter 2011: 7). The influence of the CJ on some of the regional courts of the South reflects the broader trends of cross-fertilisation of institutions whereby most regions lean on European integration initiatives as models. At the sub-regional level, trade arrangements such as the EAC, the ECOWAS, the Andean Community and the CARICOM have all established functioning courts, the media coverage of which remains timid (Knott 2011: 2).

For courts like those of ECOWAS, policy makers copied the CJ model but adapted its lessons to suit the specific needs of the sub-regional actors. When the CJ was created, the objective was to check the actions of political masters (Alter 2011: 3). When it was formed, compliance levels to its rulings were very low. This experience is now being relived in some of the Southern sub-regional courts, like those of the SADC, where political actors have sought to trim, suspend or even abrogate the powers of the sub-regional tribunal as they feel more and more threatened by judicial rulings. Initially, when the CJ was created, there appeared to be no strong

sanctions regime when Community rules were violated. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Court was not held in high regard. CJ doctrines of direct effect and supremacy of Community law helped to build a constitutional order at a time when the political process of integration was largely paralysed in Europe (Alter 2011: 5–6). In the 1980s, governments changed attitudes as they realised the importance of the single market for global competitiveness. A more stringent application of European law was required. So, after this period, greater attention was placed on a stronger role for the common Court. In the 1980s and 1990s, there was the introduction of the former CFI (now General Court) alongside sanctions for non-compliance with European law.

In her recent study of regional courts, Alter finds no evidence that the EU has been using money to pressurise other sub-regions to use its model. Her explanation for judicial mimicry is that various regions desire to promote regional integration through law so they rely on the sub-regional courts that are similar to the CJ model. The paragraphs that follow present the manner in which the regional courts of the EAC, ECOWAS, CAN and CARICOM have made references to the decisions of the CJ in their own rulings or used some of the legal techniques of the CJ.

9.7.1   The East African Court of Justice

The EAC was initially created in 1967. Due to divergent economic and political interests of the members, it was dissolved in 1977 but revived in 2000, following the Treaty of the EAC being signed in 1999. The Community became a customs union in 2004, taking effect in 2005. The vision of the EAC is 'to have a prosperous, competitive, secure and politically united East Africa' (East African Community 2005: vi). The vision is geared at dealing with the main challenge for the organisation perceived as stimulating 'investments beyond the natural resource sectors and guaranteeing a higher level of linkages in the economy' (East African Community 2005: vi).

The EAC's Court has alluded to ECJ decisions in some of its cases. In *Nyong'o v. Att. Gen. of Kenya*, the Court leaned on CJ decisions in *Van Gend & Loos, Costa/ENEL, Factortame and Simmental* to illustrate how vital it was to apply the doctrine of primacy of Community law in the municipal systems to ensure effective application of the Community rules (Van der Mei 2009: 14). It has been difficult for the EAC's Court to apply notions of direct effect and supremacy. The EAC approaches regional integration from an intergovernmental perspective. It is not a supranational organisation like the EU and it was that specific characteristic of European economic integration that enabled the CJ to develop the doctrine of direct effect. In the much cited *Van Gend & Loos* case, the CJ stated it as follows:

> The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only the member states but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of member states Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on

individuals but is also intended to confer on them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon member states and upon institutions of the Community.

Moreover, member states such as Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, have been dualists in terms of incorporating international law into their legal systems and this makes the issue of supremacy and direct effect even harder to apply in these countries. Considering the political atmosphere in which judges work in that part of the world, one cannot be optimistic about the future role of the Court to enhance harmonisation of Community rules (Van der Mei 2009: 30).

In *Calist Andrew Mwatela, Lydia Wanyoto Mutende and Isaac Abraham Sepetu v. East African Community* (which was a case brought to challenge the composition of the Judicial Sectoral Council of the EAC), applicants sought to annul the decisions adopted by the Council. In deciding the matter, the Court relied in part on the CJ's decision in *Defrenne v Sabena* to rule that since the Court was created in 2001 and the case was to be decided in 2006, it would not annul decisions of the Council between 2001 and 2006. Rather, it ruled that it would rely on the doctrine of prospective annulment that was used by the CJ in the *Defrenne case* to invalidate only those Council decisions adopted following the ruling. In other words, the Court upheld the principle of non-retrospective application of its decisions, meaning its judgments will not have retrospective effects.

9.7.2 ECOWAS' Community Court of Justice

The Treaty by which ECOWAS was created was signed on 28 May 1975. It was revised in July 1993 to provide new impetus to the regional process. The goals of ECOWAS as contained in the Treaty and its Vision 2020 include the eradication of poverty through the development of human capital. The ECOWAS Commission (formerly the Executive Secretariat) was inaugurated in January 2007, following a decision to implement a process of structural reforms taken at the January 2006 Summit of the Authority. The Revised Treaty of 1993 introduced a Community Parliament and a Community Court of Justice (CCoJ).

The CCoJ has heard important cases with ramifications for trade and especially for human rights (*Chief Ebrimah Manneh v The Republic of The Gambia; Hadijatou Mani Koraou v The Republic of Niger; Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v Federal Republic of Nigeria and Universal Basic Education Commission*). It appears to be the most activist of all the sub-regional courts studied in its approach on defending the human rights of citizens of the region. In doing this, it has also relied on its own jurisprudence as well as on cases from the European Courts. Yet, in *Olajide Afolabi v Federal Republic of Nigeria,* the Court resisted calls made by the applicant to emulate the approach of the former ECJ by extending standing to individuals even if this was not expressly provided for in the Treaty of ECOWAS (Opong 2009: 141).

9.7.3   Andean Court of Justice

When the Andean Community was formed following the Cartagena Agreement of 1969, its member states were greatly influenced by the European model of integration. Conscious of reaching the goal of economic prosperity and human development, the designers of the Community were advised by EU officials to create strong institutions, especially a Court with robust powers akin to those wielded by the CJ (Saldias 2007: 3). The Tribunal was created in 1979 but commenced its operations in 1984 following requisite number of ratifications of the Tribunal's Treaty by member states. Over the years, the Court has indeed sought to reflect the approaches used by the ECJ or the EU's CJ by the embracing precepts developed by the CJ, such as supremacy of Community law and direct effect (Saldias 2007: 4). Adjectival mechanisms, such as preliminary rulings, that have been widely used and are still used by the CJ of the EU have also been imported for use in the Andean tribunal (Helfer and Alter 2009: 874).

9.7.4   Caribbean Court of Justice

CARICOM was created in 1973 following the endorsement of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. It is composed of 15 countries and dependencies. An important watershed in the region's history was the signing of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas in 2001. The Treaty ushered in the notion of a Caribbean Single Market Economy (CSME). The main goals behind the CSME are to move the common market blueprint to that of a single market economy and to fortify trading links between the region and non-traditional trading partners. The future of Caribbean integration now rests on implementation of the CSME that was formally created on 1 January 2006 and is expected to be fully operational by 2015.

The Caribbean Community is another sub-regional entity whose institutions are modelled on the EU's. One such institution is the Caribbean Court of Justice that has been hearing important cases. In some of the cases, the judges have made allusions to the EU's CJ. In *Trinidad Cement Limited (TCL) v The Caribbean Community*, TCL accused the Secretary General of CARICOM for lowering the tariffs for cement imported into the region without duly informing the company which had relied on higher tariffs as the basis upon which to make crucial investments to meet the regional needs for cement. This act, the company contended, compromised its chances to expand its cement business venture. Summoned to the Court, the Secretary General responded that he had acted according to the needs of the region and the fact that prior notice of the action served on the government of Trinidad and Tobago (where TCL is registered) had received no objections. Using a flexibility test in alluding to the EU Treaty and demarcating the role of the CJ under that Treaty, the Court quashed the claims of TCL, noting that the Secretary General had acted in good faith (*Trinidad Cement Ltd. v The Caribbean Community:* paragraph 34, footnote 2).

But the Court welcomed the fact that TCL had brought the claim, signalling that the private sector could actively bring cases before it (*Trinidad Cement Ltd. v The Caribbean Community*: paragraph 16).

9.7.5 Summary

The sample of cases from the Regional Trade Agreements indicates that sub-regional courts are starting to gain traction albeit in difficult and challenging political environments (Gathii 2010). The courts have borrowed from the CJ's design and approaches in certain instances and have also gone beyond the characteristic trade mandates bestowed on them to hear matters related to human rights (Alter 2011). Among the sub-regional courts considered here, only the EAC's Court has made important references to the CJ's rulings, especially to its doctrines of direct effect and supremacy of Community law. The real test for the sub-regional courts will be the degree to which they can act without interference from political masters. As Nyman-Metcalf and Papageorgiou argue, for a regional court to be successful, there must be a minimum level of integration; the need for the rule of law and culture of respect for rulings; the ability to sanction, and states in the grouping must be willing to relinquish some sovereignty and accept the supremacy of Community law. Above all, political masters must adhere to the *dicta* of the courts (Nyman-Metcalf and Papageorgiou 2005: 117–118).

9.8 Conclusion

Judicial cooperation in terms of dispute settlement and even cross-referencing that is meaningful at the interregional level is either still seminal or non-existent. Prospects for stronger interregional cooperation cannot be positive if interlocutors are either weak or bereft of enthusiasm to push for greater interregional court-to-court exchange. Yet, there are prospects for greater interregional court relations.

First, it is likely that court-to-court cooperation will continue and the first two dimensions of jurisdictional cooperation (judge-to-judge contacts and cross-referencing) will increase not so much on the region-to-region level during these initial stages but on a *court-to-court* basis, irrespective of the level (national or regional). In this regard, the work of the European Commission for Democracy through Law, also known as the Venice Commission, is worthwhile. The Commission was established in 1990 with the aim of strengthening constitutional practices in Europe. It is an advisory arm within the Council of Europe but its membership has been extended to 57 countries including Algeria, Israel, Morocco, Chile, South Korea. Canada, the US, Argentina and Mexico are all observers. South Africa and the Palestinian National Authority enjoy a special status akin to that of observers.

Second, prospects for a truly interregional dimension of judicial cooperation are particularly evident in the realm of human rights. Cross-referencing is strong between the CJ and the European Court of Human Rights but not very well developed between the CJ and sub-regional courts of the South that are modelled on the CJ. For instance, in *Fischer v Austria* as well as in *Konig v Federal Republic of Germany*, various judges of the European Court of Human Rights evoked the authority of the CJ. As the other regional courts gain traction in adjudication, it may be expected that cross-fertilisation will ensue. While there are prospects for court-to-court cooperation at the regional level, this is of course contingent on the regional courts being strong, respected and used. In a new context of grave economic crisis and the increased economic clout of emerging countries, there is little evidence that these new actors have a particular penchant for regional approaches to judicial governance. Rather, their approach has been to identify, in the case of China, how leverage can be exerted through the dispute settlement systems, especially that of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Hsieh 2010: 999). Unlike the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the ICJ and the ICC as well as human rights bodies will not be well regarded by China (Posner and Yoo 2006: 11–13).

On the cross-citations, one is reminded by Voeten that transnational citations do not necessarily coincide with transnational influence (2009: 4). In other words, although instances have been identified in which Southern courts make references to CJ rulings, it cannot be concluded that this leads to substantive political leverage by the EU. Also in none of the cases cited was reliance on the CJ cases used to determine the merits of the issues litigated.

Courts have received relatively scant attention in new governance scholarship (Scott and Sturm 2007: 1) but the CJ of the EU continues to generate great interest. The extent to which the CJ can forge interregional cooperation between the EU and other regions depends on whether one is hoping for better judge-to-judge meetings, cross-referencing in decisions or active participation in interregional dispute settlement. As noted in this chapter, the last dimension presents specific challenges. However, the work of the Venice Commission and the accelerating jurisprudence in the regional protection of human rights suggests that judges of regional courts will converse more with their peers and that this will lead not only to better decisions but also to better interregional politics.

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Chapter 10
Conclusion

Francis Baert, Tiziana Scaramagli, and Fredrik Söderbaum

10.1   Introduction

The general purpose of this book has been to contribute, both theoretically and empirically, to a better understanding of institutionalised interregional relations and the role of interregionalism in foreign policy and global governance. This concluding chapter summarises the main findings of the book and draws conclusions for future comparative research in the field.

   The contributors to this book may disagree about which particular theory is most appropriate to any given situation, but they share views about the weaknesses in the field and about how these should be addressed. Several authors note that the study of interregionalism suffers from a number of theoretical and methodological problems. Firstly, they argue that theorising in this field is underdeveloped and that the development of interregionalism as a field of study requires more theory-driven research. Secondly, they note that the study of interregionalism is still markedly Eurocentric. Thirdly, they observe that there is a dearth of comparative studies.

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Finally, they note that most of our empirical information on interregionalism is derived from studying the Triadic relations between North America, Europe and East Asia.

The next two sections of this concluding chapter further elaborate upon these identified problems and sketch some possible solutions in terms of theoretical development and comparative research. The third section summarises the analysis of the actors and the institutional strategies that are involved in interregionalism. The European Union (EU) is presented as an example of the key roles played by regional actors such as the Council of the EU, the European Commission, the EU member states, the European Parliament (EP) and the Court of Justice. The final section situates interregionalism within the context of global governance and focuses on the relationship between interregionalism and bilateralism, regionalism and multilateralism.

10.2 Theoretical Innovation

One of the main objectives of this book has been to stimulate theoretical debate about the study of interregionalism. The book shows the relevance of a number of different theoretical perspectives with 'each offering differing interpretations of the nature of interregionalism, and each contributing to a more complete understanding of the role and functioning of interregional structures in the global system' (Doidge, p. 42). Empirical evidence may, after all, always be interpreted in more than one way.

Most of the contributors are enthusiastic about theoretical dialogue and cross-fertilisation. Although they derive from different theoretical backgrounds, the perspectives offered in this book complement and 'speak' fruitfully to one another, enabling the volume to contribute to theoretical bridge-building or even to a useful analytical eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). Building on this argument, Doidge argues that

> realist theorising on power and the pursuit of equilibrium in the international system (particularly among the Triad regions), liberal institutionalist concerns with cooperation as a mechanism for managing complex interdependence, and constructivist concepts of reflexivity and the constitution of identities, have all contributed to the post-bipolar framework of interregionalism. From these was generated a set of roles and functions which interregionalism was expected to perform: balancing, institution-building, rationalising and agenda-setting, and collective identity formation.
>
> (Doidge, p. 42)

Both Doidge and Rüland draw attention to the importance of the motivations that underpin interregionalism—if interregionalism is conceived of in terms of actors, then this implies that these people have intentions that contribute to the processes of interregionalism. This is a view to which most authors in this book subscribe and it is the reason why there is a stress on agency. Although Hettne does not elaborate on the functions of interregionalism, he discusses the utility of external relations frameworks such as interregionalism in establishing a global presence for a region

and as a mechanism for maximising a region's influence in the international system (see Söderbaum and Stålgren 2010).

In Chap. 2 Jürgen Rüland notes how International Relations theory contributes to the study of interregionalism and he endorses the idea of analytical eclecticism. He points out that much of the literature is focused on systemic and structural 'outward-in' perspectives and the so-called exogenous factors, while far less is known of 'what goes on internally within regions and interregionalism' (see also Doidge's contribution). In response, Rüland advocates greater use of network analysis and norm diffusion in the study of interregionalism. Both of these approaches are widely used in the study of international relations, but they are largely ignored in the study of interregionalism. Network analysis could be used to gain insight into both the endogenous and exogenous aspects of interregionalism and to address questions about which states play central roles in one region and also connect with other states in a counterpart region. The internal structure of interregional dialogues is often overlooked and network analysis could help shed light on the internal power dynamics of regions by viewing them as 'networks of *bilateral* contacts'. Similarly, the exogenous features of interregionalism could also be studied using network analysis, addressing questions regarding which regions play central roles in interregionalism, how regions are connected to one another and how the external power dynamics of a region may operate as a 'network of *multilateral* contacts'. Studying regions as networks would also make it possible to study interregionalism from the perspective of civil society and other non-state actors. Rüland also notes the promise of examining norm diffusion. This is a largely neglected avenue of research, which is surprising given its prominence in both the study of regions and in EU external relations. Rüland finds inspiration in four strands of literature that focus attention on the ideational side of interregionalism. He uses Europeanisation literature and International Relations literature and a variety of theoretical perspectives such as rational choice, sociological institutionalism, localisation theory and communicative action theory.

It may be useful to distinguish here between rationalist and constructivist approaches. Rationalist approaches (such as realism, liberalism, and Marxism) tend to look for the constant interests that underlie actors' behaviour, whereas constructivist approaches tend to analyse norms and interests as continuously changing in the course of action and to view societies as historical structures that are undergoing constant transformation. Constructivism also allows for purposive change and conceives of disintegration and lack of cooperation, not simply as signs of incompetence or inevitable fragmentation, but also as incentives for renewed action and reconsideration of objectives.

Hettne is an outspoken constructivist. He highlights the link between regions and interregionalism, arguing that 'it is necessary to start with an analysis of regionalisation and regional actorship in order to understand the preconditions for and the nature of contemporary interregionalism' (Hettne, p. 61). Accordingly, regions may be understood as processes; they are potential subjects (rather than geographical or administrative objects) and are thereby also actors in the making. Their boundaries are ever-shifting, as are their actorship and capacity as actors. However, interregionalism

is not only formed from the inside-out; according to Hettne, the preconditions for regional actorship must be looked for *both* in internal developments in the region and in the external context. Hettne's comparative approach to regional actorship consists of examining the mutually supportive role of regionness, presence and actorness. Regionness refers to the region's internal cohesion and identity formation; international presence is understood in terms of territorial and population size, economic strength, diplomacy, military power, etc.; and actorness refers to the capacity to act purposively in an organised fashion in order to shape outcomes in the external world.

The chapter by Ruth Hanau Santini, Sonia Lucarelli and Marco Pinfari is one of the first systematic attempts to combine the insights from security studies literature with the study of interregionalism. This chapter illustrates in which form regions and interregional dynamics have been considered in the security studies literature and proposes a way to include greater attention to interregional dynamics. The main approaches that deal with the regional dimension of security—security communities, regional security complex theory and regional orders—all have potential to contribute to the analysis of security dynamics *between* regions. This is also true of a more recent approach, that of multilateral security governance. These approaches expand the concept of interregionalism beyond pure interregionalism to embrace transregional and quasi-interregional relations, thus involving regions and states as well as geographic regions and constructed regions (e.g. EU relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states, ACP).

The authors draw some important conclusions. For instance, 'the idea of multilevel governance of security is theoretically and practically important for framing interregional security cooperation, but only as long as it is not used to justify institutional proliferation' (Santini et al. p. 85). Also, linking back to the issue of constructivism discussed above, the authors claim that 'it is more realistic to expect interregionalism to result in concurrence on a limited set of values or norms—such as the management of illegal immigration and organised crime—rather than in generating new political communities' (Santini et al. p. 78).

This volume suggests that we are on the brink of innovation and theoretical development in the field of interregionalism. It shows that theoretisation is needed and the authors have identified a number of questions that require both further investigation and theorisation. Jürgen Rüland, for instance, mentions the democratic deficit of interregionalism; interregional dialogue forums, like many other international organisations, suffer seriously from this. It is telling that, with few exceptions (e.g. Pevehouse 2005; Ribeiro Hoffmann and van der Vleuten 2007), scholars have not systematically dealt with this in the comparative study of regional organisations.

Several authors show that many of the issues on interregional agendas are dealt with through multi-country dialogues, summits and policy declarations. Interregionalism may consequently become rhetorical or symbolic. Doidge suggests that EU studies might provide a framework for dealing with this dissonance in the form of Hill's (1993) capability-expectations gap. Hill theorised the EU's

underperformance in the international arena and the same approach could be applied to interregionalism. Doidge notes a mismatch between the EU's expectations of what may be achieved through interregionalism and the ability of itself and its partner groupings to deliver these results. He sees an incongruity between the fact that the EU, on the one hand, provides capacity-building to partner regions to help them deal with other regions and, on the other, expects these interregional partnerships to contribute to more effective global governance. This gap between capacity and expectations may explain the problematic nature of many interregional partnerships.

It is necessary to go beyond the 'problem-solving' nature of contemporary interregionalism studies and ask more critical questions about interregionalism. Scholars need to consider what the EU is projecting to others and for what purpose. Hurt (2003) notes how the EU projected neoliberal norms internationally by introducing market liberalisation into trade agreements. Adopting a neo-Gramscian perspective, Cafruny and Ryner (2003) view the EU as a subordinate actor in a global historical bloc that is dominated by the financial system of the United States (US). They argue that the relative weakness of the EU in this neoliberal transatlantic alliance has resulted in the (unstable) military dominance of the US within much of Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia and that this is achieved with either the explicit or tacit support of EU elites.

Regardless of theoretical perspective, the idea that interregional relations are more or less equal 'partnerships' between two (or more) regions has not been subjected to adequate critical scrutiny (Rutazibwa 2010; Söderbaum and Stålgren 2010). Critical theory could enhance understanding of the asymmetric relationship that often characterises interregional relations involving the EU. It follows that EU strategic partnerships and interregionalism are not simply normative or 'good'; they are about the active pursuit of (material and ideational) power by the EU in other regions of the world (Bossuyt 2012) and they may sometimes even be rooted in EU 'paternalism'. The image of a passive other is inscribed within the partnership discourse itself (Eriksson Baaz 2005).

There are many other areas within the study of interregionalism that require theoretical attention and some are dealt with below. However, before moving on, the almost complete absence of attention to gender within studies on interregionalism should be highlighted. The first attempts to integrate gender equality into the European Commission's development policy took place in the context of the United Nations Decade for Women 1975–1985 and the Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985. After these events, the Commission established its Women in Development (WID) approach, which included its first WID desks, communiqués and references to women in the Third and Fourth Lomé Conventions (Orbie 2006; Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000; Petö and Manners 2006). There have been a few scattered attempts to integrate the gender dimension into the study of interregionalism (Debusscher and van der Vleuten 2012), but it remains to be seen whether these studies will lead to greater theoretical attention to the way in which interregionalism is gendered.

10.3   Towards Comparative Interregionalism

All authors in the first part of this book stress the need for more comparative studies of interregionalism. Matthew Doidge charges that 'one clear failing of the literature of interregionalism is the absence of theory-based comparisons of intra- and extra-Triadic structures' (Doidge, p. 49). Similarly, Rüland argues that 'developing a research framework and methodological tools facilitating the comparative study of interregional dialogue forums is thus an urgent task ahead of scholars working in the field of international relations' (Rüland, p. 31).

Several authors point out that Eurocentrism has dominated both theory-building and comparison. Theories have hitherto evolved primarily from the EU stance and theorising and conceptualisation from a non-EU stance are needed. 'Indeed, the conceptualisation of interregionalism is a process that has taken place largely within the confines of the study of the EU. In a period when interregionalism is increasingly seen as a systemic rather than EU-centric phenomenon, this raises the difficulty that the theoretical models that have emerged are too EU-specific' (Doidge, p. 51). Doidge argues persuasively that the combined effect of globalisation and the emerging pluralism of regions in world politics have transformed the way in which interregionalism should be conceptualised and theorised—from the actor-centred framework of the old hub-and-spokes model centred around the EU to the more pluralistic and system-centred framework of the new interregionalism (Doidge, p. 41). As a result,

> theoretical conceptualisations of interregionalism were forced to move beyond the actor-centred literature of European external relations to draw on that of international relations more broadly. In this respect, the establishment of interregionalism as a seemingly indelible feature of the international system, existing beyond the agency of the European Union, has been conceived as the emergence of a new governance space, banded by institutions of regional and global governance.
>
> (Doidge, p. 41)

Although the systemic changes demand that we go beyond the EU and EU-driven interregionalism, Hettne points out that the problem of Eurocentrism will not be 'solved by closing our eyes on Europe' (Hettne, p. 67). We therefore urge that the EU and Europe be included in the emerging comparative research agenda since nothing would be gained by excluding cases of interregionalism that involved the EU; the problem is not EU interregionalism *per se* but the Eurocentric method that sets the EU as a benchmark for comparison.

There has been heated debate about the Eurocentric bias in International Relations theory more broadly (Waever and Tickner 2009). It is interesting to note that several authors refer also to the Eurocentric nature of interregionalism studies. Although interregionalism involves two partners, one of which is often from the non-Western world, the 'Other' is often forgotten in studies of interregionalism and one region is frequently given pre-eminent status, particularly if the EU is involved. This may be related to the problem of acquiring sufficient relevant data about non-EU counterparts.

The second part of this book may be criticised for being somewhat EU-centred, but one should distinguish between a Eurocentric attitude and focusing on the EU as an object of analysis. The second part of the book deliberately selected the EU as the most appropriate case for examining regional agencies and the pluralism of intersecting interregionalisms. The intention is that this kind of research may then inspire the analysis of other cases, in particular South–South interregionalism, which has been largely overlooked in the literature (Dosch and Jacob 2010; Abad 2010).

The stance advocated here is eclectic and relatively simple. We are not rejecting the need for specific case studies—some of the most informative studies in the field are case studies of particular interregional relations and, according to proponents of mono-, multi- or interdisciplinary studies, detailed case studies of interregionalism are essential for identifying the historical and contextual specificities that allow detailed and 'intensive' analysis of any single case. However, the disadvantage of case studies is that they are inadequate for making broad generalisation or for invalidating accepted generalisations. In the previous section we argued that the study of interregionalism in the twenty-first century should be more theory-driven and in this section we advocate for more (theory-driven) comparative studies (see Doidge, p. 51). There are many methods for conducting comparative research: qualitative and quantitative, structured and unstructured/historical (Landman and Robinson 2009). We do not wish to promote any particular method although we are sympathetic to the 'eclectic centre' of comparative studies. This establishes a middle ground between, on the one hand, context and case study and, on the other, 'hard' social science as reflected in the use of 'laborative' comparisons (see Kohli et al. 1995).

10.4   Unpacking the Region: Regional Actors and Strategies

This book suggests that we need to go beyond any narrow definition of inter-regionalism and include transregionalism, quasi-interregionalism as well as a broad set of regional actors and strategies. Sebastian Santander makes the valid observation that regions may be understood as 'composite international actors' rather than as monolithic actors. This requires recognising the intricacies of the region in order to better understand the region-society complexes and the intersecting agencies of interregionalism. While the EU may be the most diverse and pluralistic regional actor, it would seem somewhat Eurocentric to believe that other regions cannot expose a similar pluralism, albeit with different institutional configurations.

We know from the study of regionalism that actors usually represent various regionalisation strategies and hold a multitude of ideas about a particular region and these may merge, mingle or clash. This plurality is then translated into external behaviour. It is therefore important to 'unpack the region' and analyse how different regional actors engage in interregional activities. The second part of this book focuses on the main institutional drivers and actors within

EU–interregionalism—the European Commission, the Council, the EU member states, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice.

The chapter by Hardacre and Smith makes a number of significant points in this regard. Firstly, it focuses on the evolution of EU interregional strategy through 'complex interregionalism'—the changing interlinkages of bilateral, regional and transregional relations that the EU has developed with regions around the globe. Complex interregionalism offers an analytical tool with which to understand changes in EU interregional policy over time. The chapter addresses the key institutional drivers of EU complex interregionalism (the Commission, the Council, the member states and, more recently, the European Parliament) and analyses the implications of their differing interests in interregionalism. 'EU strategy' needs to be viewed as a construct that is contested both within and outside the Union. Hardacre and Smith show that there is an inherent tension between the focus and interests of different institutions within the EU, notably the Commission and the Council. This corresponds well with other literature that has also identified various inconsistencies in EU foreign policies (Christiansen 2001; Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006; Spence 2006; Nuttall 2005).

Hardacre and Smith also discuss the effects on EU interregionalism of some of the institutional changes that have taken place since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon: the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the renewed position of the High Representative on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the creation of the President of the Council and the increased powers of the European Parliament. They round off with some conclusions about the future of EU complex interregionalism. The EEAS was created in order to establish an 'EU diplomatic corps' in response to demands for increased coherence and consistency. Although there were high expectations of the EEAS, after its first year in action observers have been disappointed because institutional complexity has increased rather than decreased (Reynaert 2012). This is problematic since it reinforces perceptions in counterpart regions of the EU's complex institutional set-up.

The EP is one of the institutions whose power has increased due to the Lisbon Treaty. In Chap. 8 Olivier Costa and Clarissa Dri underline the importance of the EP in the development of the EU's interregional dialogue. The EP has considerable autonomy that may be understood as a process of 'parliamentarisation' of regional integration and interregionalism. Regional parliaments may be considered to be one type of international parliamentary institution—defined as parliamentary associations between more than three states and based on individual membership. Thus they differ from national parliaments. There is a trend towards a growth in the number of interregional parliamentary assemblies with examples including the Asia–Europe Parliamentary Partnership, the ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly or the Euro–Latin American Parliamentary Assembly.

However, the EP is by far the most powerful existing regional parliament and it actively promotes regional integration and parliamentary democracy both inside and outside Europe, but there are also other regional parliaments, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) Parliament, the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. The interplay between the EP and its counterparts in other regions deserves more scholarly attention.

In their pursuit of internal and external legitimacy, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have tried to promote regional integration in other continents and have advocated for interregional dialogue by means of institutional adaptation and declarative resolutions. These initiatives were particularly marked in the Latin American case, as observed by Costa and Dri. Indeed, the EP was the first European institution to establish regular contacts with the Latin American continent at a time in which the Commission and the Council of the EU were mainly concerned with African former colonies. The parliamentarisation process that recently took place in the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) results partially from these institutionalised relations between Members of Parliament from both regions. The EP promotes regionalism in order to maximise the EU's global influence and to affirm its status, externally and internally, as a parliamentary institution. If the EP is able to prompt regional organisations into becoming the key actors in international relations, both of its goals become attainable. Simultaneously, by strengthening weak regional integration arrangements, the EP has contributed to the EU's 'capacity-building interregionalism' (Doidge 2007: 242). While Costa and Dri view these developments as positive, Hardacre and Smith are more skeptical.

> [T]he European Parliament has not had a major influence over the strategy, or the implementation, of complex interregionalism given its limited role in external relations. The Parliament has evidently played a role in sanctioning EU funding for regional integration in the budget procedure and it has also, on occasion, had an impact on the broad climate of relations between the EU and its key regional partners. For example, the Parliament's championing of human rights in respect of Myanmar has at times had an important influence on relations with ASEAN. Beyond this, the Parliament has largely been supportive of the Commission's strategy and positions, in particular as they have represented a contribution to the building of a distinct 'European identity' in external relations.
>
> (Hardacre and Smith, p. 99)

The chapter by Stefaan Smis and Stephen Kingah investigates the role of the Court of Justice of the EU in interregional relations and the role of regional courts of the East African Community, ECOWAS, the Andean Community and the Caribbean Community. This is one of the first chapters to be written on the Court of Justice of the EU and interregionalism. It also marks a new step in the literature on (inter)regionalism by including several oft-neglected regional institutions, such as the Caribbean Court of Justice, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. In this regard, the track record of the Andean Tribunal of Justice is worthy of note. It is generally assumed that the Andean Community has little potential as a regional organisation, yet its Court, the Andean Tribunal of Justice, is one of the most successful regional courts in the world. After the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, it is the third most active international court in the world and is considered to be more active than the World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute settlement system and the International Court of Justice (Alter and Helfer 2010: 564). The role of and interrelations between regional courts therefore deserve further attention.

10.5   Interregionalism and Global Governance

Although a growing number of scholars now accept the concept of transregionalism, there are still many who posit 'pure interregionalism' as a benchmark. This volume shows the relevance of incorporating not only pure interregionalism but also transregionalism and quasi-interregionalism into a single framework. Several of the authors in this book stress that interregionalism in the post-Cold War era is used to refer to a systemic international phenomenon, namely links between regions in general (also see Hänggi 2006). It is not necessary for interregionalism to take a *single* form, which also hampers attempts to settle clear and unambiguous definitions (since we are grappling with an emerging phenomenon). The diversity of intersecting interregionalisms is then closely related to bilateralism, regionalism and multilateralism on the other hand.

An analysis of the EU's interregional cooperation with regions around the world (Africa, Asia and Latin America in particular) reveals that the EU uses a variety of instruments and models of engagement to foster relations with other countries and regional partners. EU-driven interregional cooperation tends to be multifaceted, with different issues and themes receiving different emphasis in different counterpart regions. Interregional policy is thus not fixed but is subject to adaptation. A comparative assessment has shown that there is variation in the way the EU conducts its foreign policies towards different regions (see Söderbaum and Stålgren 2010). The EU is evidently acting increasingly on a variety of levels in world affairs with 'a global strategy' (Farrell 2010). Far from being anchored to a specific foreign policy doctrine (such as interregionalism), the EU is using whatever type of policy it has at its disposal that seems appropriate for a given objective.

Hardacre and Smith's framework of 'complex interregionalism' is useful for conceptualising the EU's foreign policy relations in this regard. Complex interregionalism seeks to understand the fluctuations in EU external relations between transregional, pure interregional and bilateral relations and, more importantly, the reasons and driving actors behind them. This framework generates pertinent questions about the implementation of EU interregional relationships and about internal inter-institutional tensions within the EU, particularly between the Commission and the Council. The Lisbon Treaty, with its new institutional arrangements for the conduct of the EU's external policies, has put these tensions into a new context. Hardacre has earlier claimed that complex interregionalism

> encapsulates the tension between the fact that EU interregionalism is a strategy that is implemented in different regions according to local circumstances, according to a set of core aims and with a standard model in an attempt to achieve similar outcomes. […] Given that interregionalism has evolved in a context of differentiation, this has created region-by-region examples of complex interregionalism.
>
> (Hardacre 2010: 106)

Appreciation of this differentiation is important for understanding and evaluating complex interregionalism; it is one of the main reasons for the fluctuations in the EU's external relations between transregional, interregional, quasi-interregional

and bilateral levels. The Commission designs and delivers the strategies, which may contain powerful normative as well as material elements, and it also negotiates with key regional partners, whilst the Council ultimately has to authorise these activities by signing Association Agreements (including Free Trade Agreements) and approving of specific institutional arrangements.

It follows from the above that two general issues are of particular importance. The first concerns the degree to which the EU's interregional cooperation varies according to the nature of the counterpart region. The second concerns the relationship between interregionalism, bilateralism and multilateralism. Regarding the first, the interregional model is perhaps most developed in the EU's relationship with Africa, in which interregional cooperation and partnerships exist in most issue-areas, with Africa as a whole as well as with all of its sub-regional organisations. Yet, it is clear that EU–Africa interregional cooperation is dominated by the EU and that it is coloured by EU's interests and agenda. However, this is not to say that asymmetric interregionalism is necessarily a bad thing. Even though the EU is leading the way, it may have legitimate security concerns that are handled through interregional cooperation and this may also benefit its African partners. Nor is it simply so that the EU dictates the agenda. In fact there are observers who would say that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is African-driven and EU–Africa interregional cooperation is largely designed to strengthen Africa's management of its own security crises.

EU–Asia collaboration differs in the degree of institutionalisation as well as in the nature of the issues it covers. Interregionalism in Asia is affected by the fact that ASEAN is more or less the only viable counterpart regional organisation. However, the EU is not only advocating an increase in pure interregionalism, but in the past it has combined pure interregionalism with forms of quasi-interregionalism and more flexible solutions, especially bilateralism. Hence, despite the EU's numerous official declarations about its preference for interregional relations, a closer look reveals a complex pattern of intersecting, complementary and sometimes competing models of external relations.

The Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) is one of the most researched instances of 'interregionalism' in recent decades. ASEM is one of the few major international frameworks of political importance in which the US is not a member. It is notable that one of the reasons for the establishment of ASEM was that the EU was denied association status in the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and both Rüland and Doidge note in this volume the significance of this 'balancing' function. On paper ASEM enables a comprehensive, multidimensional form of collaboration despite its limited formalisation (the EU–ASEAN relationship constitutes the backbone). As yet though, of its three pillars—economic, political, and cultural relations—the economic pillar (especially trade and investment) has been the focus. A reading of the official documents emanating from ASEM meetings nevertheless reveals the risks of too ritualised a diplomacy and the lack of a properly institutionalised relationship which evidently work against the accumulation of shared stakes.

The ASEM process shows that the institutionalisation of interregional relations and multi-regionalism is a slow process that is vulnerable to sudden changes in the geopolitical environment. Indeed, interregionalism in fact aims to make this environment more stable and predictable. However, such institutionalisation cannot go deeper than the Asian model of informal consensus-building allows. This results in what has been called 'soft institutionalisation' (Acharya 2001). One interpretation of this is that the EU places considerably less emphasis on good governance and human rights in its relations with Asia than it does in its relations with Africa. With Asia, the EU accepts different Asian views about the freeing up of markets and trade, whereas with Africa it promotes economic and market-based liberalisation as well as political conditionality.

Hardacre and Smith identify five phases in EU complex interregionalism. The first (pre-1978) is dominated by early forms of interregionalism and they then follow through the signing of cooperation agreements predominantly in Africa and Asia up to the fifth and current phase (post-2005), which is dominated by a move towards bilateralism.

The issue of bilateralism is addressed in several chapters in this volume as well as in the literature more broadly. Some observers correctly note that bilateralism may compete with interregionalism. However, several authors in this volume draw attention to a more complex relationship. Santander, for instance, points out that Brussels considers Brazil to be a crucial partner that 'needs external political support in order to counterbalance Venezuela's regional ambitions and the spread of political radicalism in LA' (Santander, p. 123). The EU's strategic partnership with Brazil should be understood in this context and the EU appears to try to send a strong political message: 'it is time to counteract Venezuela's oil power and support Brazil's objectives of becoming a regional and international power' (Santander, p. 123). The partnership with Brazil is clearly seen to be an important way for the EU to strengthen its relations with South America and, although this partnership tends to undermine EU–MERCOSUR interregionalism, it illustrates a complex relationship between pure interregionalism and quasi-interregionalism, in which also Spain and Portugal are important.

As mentioned above, interregionalism in the form of multi-country dialogues and summits may be criticised for being rhetorical, symbolic and sweeping. However, there is also evidence that interregionalism may provide a useful forum for dialogue and a framework for enhancing cooperation at lower or higher levels. In this way, interregionalism may reinforce bilateral collaboration, or it may be a stepping-stone towards multilateral cooperation. This is yet another reason why it is misleading to concentrate solely on pure interregionalism. The more complex and pluralistic processes of transregionalism and quasi-interregionalism reveal that especially the counterpart regional organisations are more open-ended and may lead intersecting interregionalism as well as interacting forms of collaboration on different 'levels'—that is, intersecting or complex interregionalism.

This volume has also provided evidence of the ways in which interregionalism impacts upon and even transforms multilateralism. Doidge stresses that EU interregionalism is a global strategy and that it is linked to multilateralism.

> The utility of interregionalism as a mechanism for facilitating effective global engagement has been increasingly highlighted, with Commission President Prodi, for example, arguing that effective multilateral institutions require 'co-operation between strong and integrated regional entities', and that 'global governance can emerge only from such interregional cooperation' (Prodi 2000: 5).
>
> (Doidge, p. 47)

Hettne also elaborates on the link between regions, interregionalism and multilateralism. According to Hettne, a multilateralism based on regions—a 'regional multilateralism' or 'multi-regionalism'—implies a different kind of multilateralism (or global governance) than that of conventional Westphalian multilateralism that is based on nation-states as the principal actors. A regionally-based multilateralism implies relations between most of the comprehensive and multipurpose intergovernmental or supranational regional organisations and this results in a distinct mode of global governance built on regions.

Finally, this volume does not suggest that interregionalism is in itself the dominant trend in world politics, but it does highlight its systemic repercussions and argues that it should be included in any analysis of contemporary global governance. Since regionalism has become an indispensible feature of global politics and since regional actors may perform on a variety of levels in world affairs, there is also reason to believe that we will witness more rather than less intersecting interregionalisms. If this book has enhanced our understanding of this phenomenon, then it has fulfilled its objective.

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