Graham Oppy
N.N. Trakakis
Editors

History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand

Springer Reference

History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand

Graham Oppy • N. N. Trakakis
Editors

History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand

With 14 Tables

Springer Reference

Editors
Graham Oppy
School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies
Monash University
Clayton, VIC, Australia

N. N. Trakakis
School of Philosophy
Australian Catholic University
Fitzroy, VIC, Australia

ISBN 978-94-007-6957-1 ISBN 978-94-007-6958-8 (eBook)
ISBN 978-94-007-6959-5 (print and electronic bundle)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8
Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014933399

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher's location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Preface

This is a two-volume history of philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. The first volume presents a chronological history, with chapters devoted to each of the decades from the 1920s onwards (though the emphasis of the first chapter is on the full period up to the end of the 1920s). The second volume presents a thematic history, with chapters devoted to many of the major sub-disciplines of philosophy: logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, aesthetics and so forth.

Prior to this work, there have been at least three significant contributions to the recording of the history of philosophy in Australasia: Grave, *A history of philosophy in Australia* (1984), Szrednicki and Wood (eds), *Essays on philosophy in Australia*, and Franklin, *Corrupting the youth: A history of philosophy in Australia* (2003). We have aimed for a more comprehensive coverage than any of these previous works; we have also aimed to avoid taking sides in partisan disputes (though readers will need to decide for themselves how far we have succeeded in this aim). Since some of the chapters in this volume were finalised two or more years ago, we do not pretend that this work gives a complete picture of this history right up to the point of publication; and, in any case, we are well aware that there is much more to be done to complete our understanding of the history of our discipline in Australasia. Apart from anything else, there are clearly thematic chapters that might have been included (some of which were initially solicited but failed to make it through to production): for instance, the history of philosophy (taking in ancient, medieval, modern and recent); philosophical method, including experimental philosophy and methodology; legal, political and social philosophy; and Asian and Indigenous philosophy.

Acknowledgments

This history of philosophy in Australia and New Zealand was produced under the auspices of a broader project that also saw the production of a *Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (eds. Oppy and Trakakis, Monash University Publishing, 2010) and two volumes of interviews with, and public lectures by, philosophers in Australia and New Zealand (*The Antipodean Philosopher*, eds. Oppy and Trakakis, Lexington Books, 2011). That broader project was funded by a large grant from the Australian Research Council (ARC, DP0663930), and by smaller grants from the Myer Foundation and the William Angliss Charitable Trust.

There are many people who have supported and assisted the production of this volume, and who are appropriately acknowledged here.

First, we are grateful for the efforts of the project team that was assembled with the support of the ARC funding. Lynda Burns, Steve Gardner and Fiona Leigh all made significant contributions to the overall project. In particular, we should note that Steve played a leading role in the administration of the broader project during its second year—2007—when Nick Trakakis took up a 12-month postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana.

Second, of course, we are grateful to all of the people who contributed materials to our wider project, and, in particular, to the philosophers who contributed material to the present volumes. Some of the chapters in the present volumes are team efforts; some—most notably the chapter on History and Philosophy of Science—involved contributions from a large number of people.

Third, we wish to acknowledge the support that we have received from our colleagues at Monash University, from within the Department of Philosophy, the School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, the Faculty of Arts and the University at large. We have been fortunate to have undertaken this project against the background of very widespread collegial support. In particular, we are grateful to our colleagues in the Monash Department of Philosophy: Dirk Baltzly, Linda Barclay, John Bigelow, Jacqui Broad, Sam Butchart, Monima Chadha, Justin Clarke-Doane, Karen Green, Toby Handfield, Jakob Hohwy, Lloyd Humberstone, Andy Lamey, Mark Manolopoulos, Josh May, Justin Oakley, Michael Selgelid, Jack Smart, Rob Sparrow and Aubrey Townsend. Nick would also like to acknowledge the support of his new group of colleagues in the Faculty of Theology and Philosophy at the Australian Catholic University.

Fourth, we are indebted to the team of people at Springer who were involved in the production of this work, including Floor Oosting and Annalea Manalili.

Finally, as always, we express our enormous debts to friends and family who have endured what turned out to be a somewhat ambitious undertaking. From Graham: to Camille, Gilbert, Calvin and Alfie, with love. From Nick: to my family and friends, with gratitude and affection.

About the Editors



Graham Oppy is Professor of Philosophy at Monash University and Chair of Council of the Australasian Association of Philosophy. He is author of *Ontological Arguments and Belief in God* (1996), *Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity* (2006), *Arguing about Gods* (2006), *Reading Philosophy of Religion* (2010, with Michael Scott), *The Best Argument against God* (2013), and *Reinventing Philosophy of Religion* (2014) and editor of *The History of Western Philosophy of Religion* (2009, with Nick Trakakis), *A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (2010, with Nick Trakakis), and *The Antipodean Philosopher* (2011, 2012, with Nick Trakakis, Lynda Burns, Steve Gardner, Fiona Leigh, and Michelle Irving).

N.N. Trakakis is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the Australian Catholic University. He works primarily in the philosophy of religion, and his publications in this area include *The God Beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe's Evidential Argument from Evil* (2007), *The End of Philosophy of Religion* (2008), and, as coeditor with Graham Oppy, *The History of Western Philosophy of Religion* (in five volumes; 2009). His editorial collaboration with Graham Oppy has also included *A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (2010) and *The Antipodean Philosopher* (in two volumes; 2011).

Contents

Volume 1

1 **Introduction** 1

2 **Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before** 15
Martin Davies and Stein Helgeby

3 **John Anderson Arrives: 1930s** 55
Mark Weblin

4 **The Influence of Wittgenstein: 1940s** 89
Graeme Marshall

5 **Reconstruction and Enthusiasm** 121
Brian F. Scarlett

6 **Political Polarisation: 1960s** 149
John Burnheim and Paul Crittenden

7 **Turbulent Times: 1970s** 175
Aubrey Townsend

8 **Achievements of the 1980s** 211
Lynda Burns

9 **The Canberra Plan and the Diversification of Australasian Philosophy: 1990s** 241
John Quilter

10 **Philosophers in Schools: 2000s** 291
Graham Oppy

Volume 2

11 **From Conventionalism to Scientific Metaphysics** 329
Brian Ellis

12 Metaphysics 361
John Bigelow

13 Epistemology 379
Stephen Hetherington

14 Philosophy of Language 413
Frederick Kroon and Denis Robinson

15 Philosophy of Religion in Australasia 445
Peter Forrest, John Bishop, and Ken Perszyk

16 Aesthetics and Philosophy of Music in Australasia 479
Ismay Barwell and Justine Kingsbury

17 Moral Philosophy in Australasia 511
Justin Oakley

18 Environmental Philosophy 543
Freya Mathews

19 Feminist Philosophy 593
Catriona Mackenzie

20 Black Swan: A History of Continental Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand 637
Robert Sinnerbrink and Matheson S. Russell

21 Logic 679
Ross Brady and Chris Mortensen

22 History and Philosophy of Science 707
Brian Ellis, Roderick Home, David Oldroyd, Robert Nola, Howard Sankey, Keith Hutchison, Neil Thomason, John Wilkins, John Forge, Philip Catton, and Ruth Barton

23 Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science since 1980 773
Elizabeth Schier and John Sutton

Index 817

Contributors

Ruth Barton Department of History, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Ismay Barwell Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand

John Bigelow School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia

John Bishop Department of Philosophy, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Ross Brady Department of Politics, Philosophy and Legal Studies, La Trobe University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

John Burnheim Sydney, NSW, Australia

Lynda Burns School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

Philip Catton Department of Philosophy, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

Paul Crittenden School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Martin Davies Melbourne Graduate School of Education, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

Brian Ellis School of Communication, Arts and Critical Enquiry, La Trobe University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

John Forge Unit for History and Philosophy of Science, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Peter Forrest School of Humanities, University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia

Stein Helgeby Department of Finance and Deregulation, Australian Government, Canberra, ACT, Australia

Stephen Hetherington School of Humanities and Languages, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Roderick Home School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia

Keith Hutchison School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia

Justine Kingsbury Philosophy, Religious Studies and Ethics, The University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand

Frederick Kroon Department of Philosophy, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Catriona Mackenzie Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Graeme Marshall The School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia

Freya Mathews Department of Politics, Legal Studies and Philosophy, School of Social Sciences and Communications, La Trobe University, VIC, Australia

Chris Mortensen Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia

Robert Nola Department of Philosophy, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Justin Oakley Centre for Human Bioethics, School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia

David Oldroyd School of Humanities, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Graham Oppy School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia

Ken Perszyk School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand

John Quilter School of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, Strathfield, NSW, Australia

Denis Robinson Department of Philosophy, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Matheson S. Russell Department of Philosophy, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Howard Sankey School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia

Brian F. Scarlett School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia

Elizabeth Schier Departments of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Robert Sinnerbrink Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

John Sutton Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Neil Thomason School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia

Aubrey Townsend School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia

Mark Weblin Queensland, Australia

John Wilkins School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia

Introduction

1

Contents

Indigenous Philosophies 1
A False Start 2
Universities and Departments 2
Seeds 3
Around the War 4
Growth 5
Conflict 7
The World Stage 8
Storm Clouds 10
Philosophical Associations 11
Beyond the Academy 12
Assessment and Explanation 13

This introduction is a thumbnail sketch of the story that is to be told in much greater detail in the two volumes of this work.

Indigenous Philosophies

Human settlement of Australia occurred more than—perhaps much more than—40,000 years ago. The indigenous inhabitants were semi-nomadic hunter-gatherers who developed tribal traditions that became the Dreaming: a web of beliefs, practices, rules and social structures grounded in stories of creation and naming that feature creator ancestors travelling across the land. Human settlement of New Zealand dates to around 1280 CE, with the arrival of groups from Eastern Polynesia. The Maori also developed rich and distinctive tribal traditions based in the belief that all things are connected by common descent and share a life force. In the wake of colonial settlement, one major focus for indigenous philosophy in both countries has been questions of identity: what is "being Maori" or "being Koori"

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_1, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

(or "being Anangu", or "being Bama", or "being Murri", or "being Nunga", or "being Nyoongar", or "being Palawah", or "being Wangai", or "being Yolngu")?

In this work, there is no further investigation of indigenous philosophies. This is not because there is nothing further to be said about indigenous philosophies; rather, it is because the primary focus of this work is the history of academic philosophy as it has been pursued in departments of philosophy in universities in Australasia. For historical reasons, the pursuit of academic philosophy in Australasia has primarily—indeed, perhaps almost exclusively—adopted and explored Anglo-American and Western European traditions. For better or worse, our story commences in the period after colonial settlement of Australia and New Zealand.

A False Start

Life after colonial settlement was not easy for the colonial settlers in Australia and New Zealand. Philosophy—and the life of the mind in general—was not initially a high priority at any levels of society. However, it was not very long before some turned their attention to questions of the cultivation of inquiry.

John Dunmore Lang (1799–1878) was a Presbyterian clergyman and pioneer educator. His first attempt to establish a school in Sydney in 1826—the Caledonian Academy—foundered almost immediately, and the Australian College that he established in Sydney in 1832 was only marginally more successful. However, during the final 2 years of the Australian College—before its ultimate demise in 1852—Lang employed a Congregationalist minister, Barzillai Quaife (1798–1873), to teach philosophy and theology. Because Quaife was unable to gain any subsequent academic employment, this episode turned out to be a false start for academic philosophy in Australasia.

Universities and Departments

There were no universities in Australia and New Zealand—and so no departments of philosophy in universities in Australia and New Zealand—until the second half of the nineteenth century. The earliest universities emerged in the largest cities: the University of Sydney (1850), the University of Melbourne (1853), the University of Otago (1871), the University of Adelaide (1874), the University of Auckland (1883), the University of Tasmania (1890), Victoria University Wellington (1899), the University of Canterbury (1901), the University of Queensland (1909) and the University of Western Australia (1911). In almost all of these universities, the teaching of philosophy commenced not too long after foundation, and departments of philosophy were relatively quickly in place.

After this initial flurry, there followed a lengthy period in which no new universities—and so no new departments of philosophy—appeared on the scene. The origins of some institutions that now have departments of philosophy can be traced to this period: some universities emerged from pre-existing institutions, as, for example, in the case of the Australian National University (1931) and the University of New South Wales (1949); and other universities had their origins in branch campuses of already established universities, as, for example, in the case of the University of New England (1938), and the University of Newcastle (1951).

From the mid-1950s, there was an explosion of new universities and new departments of philosophy: the University of New England (1954), the University of New South Wales (1960), Monash University (1961), the University of Newcastle (1965), Flinders University (1965), the University of Waikato (1965), Macquarie University (1967), La Trobe University (1967), Massey University (1969), Swinburne University (1973), Murdoch University (1974), the University of Wollongong (1975), Deakin University (1977), the University of South Australia (1987), Charles Sturt University (1990), Victoria University (1990), Australian Catholic University (1991), the University of Notre Dame (1992), Ballarat University (1994) and the University of Lincoln (1994).

It is perhaps not surprising that the first five of the universities established—Sydney, Melbourne, Otago, Adelaide and Auckland—have played very significant roles in the history of philosophy in Australasia. More recently, despite its much more recent inception (1949), the Australian National University has also had a central role, because of the special provisions governing the Philosophy Program in the Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS) in the Institute of Advanced Studies. Of course, many of the other departments of philosophy in universities in Australasia have had moments in the sun, sometimes for better and sometimes not.

Seeds

The first academic philosophers in Australasia were mostly educated elsewhere, almost always in the UK. A large percentage of these early academic philosophers were Scots. In particular, among the early—and mostly long-reigning—Chairs there were: at the University of Sydney, Francis Anderson (1890–1921) and John Anderson (1927–1962); at the University of Melbourne, Henry Laurie (1886–1910); at the University of Adelaide, William Mitchell (1895–1922) and John McKellar Stewart (1923–1949), who was succeeded by Jack Smart (1950–1972); at the University of Otago, Duncan McGregor (1871–1886), William Salmond (1887–1913) and Francis Dunlop (1914–1932); at the University of Auckland, William Anderson (1920–1955); and at Victoria University Wellington, Hugh Mackenzie (1899–1930). Apart from the Scots, other early long-reigning Chairs included, at the University of Melbourne, William Boyce Gibson (1911–1934), who was succeeded by his son Alexander Boyce Gibson (1935–1965).

While there was a broadly idealistic tenor to most philosophy in Australia and New Zealand prior to the early 1930s, one distinctive feature of the philosophical scene was its eclectic nature. There was widespread interest in the ideas of European thinkers, including prominently, among others, Bergson, Eucken and Husserl. There was widespread interest in religion and morality: many of the early academic philosophers in Australasia were interested in “improvement”.

Finally, there was extraordinary breadth of expertise amongst the earliest Chairs of philosophy in Australia and New Zealand: many were simultaneously engaged to teach economics and/or psychology and/or history and/or theology, and/or education and/or English literature and so forth. Indeed, one of those early Chairs—William Mitchell—memorably observed that his appointment was more Sofa than Chair.

Few Australasian philosophers prior to the early 1930s made much of an impression on the world stage. Many of those who had longstanding Chairs published next to nothing; many of their departments had reputations for being "intellectual backwaters". Of course, there were some exceptions. Samuel Alexander—who left Australia for Oxford after 2 years as an undergraduate at the University of Melbourne—was widely regarded as a national hero; his *Space*, *Time and Deity* was a formative influence upon British philosophy in the 1920s. William Boyce Gibson's rendition of *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* pioneered the translation of Husserl's writings into English. William Mitchell's major works—*Structure and Growth of the Mind* (1907) and *The Place of Minds in the World* (1933)—had an international audience, but were regarded as the difficult and obscure products of an isolated writer. Despite these—and other exceptions—it remains the case that, at least up until the middle of the 1930s, the community of philosophers in Australasia was very small, and the members of that community were not very well-connected (either to each other or to the wider community of philosophers in Europe, the US, the UK and elsewhere in the world).

Around the War

In the years prior to the Second World War, there were some auspicious appointments and developments in philosophy in Australasia.

In New Zealand, John Findlay held the Chair at Otago from 1934 to 1939, and Karl Popper held the Chair at Canterbury from 1937 to 1945. Findlay played a pivotal role in the education of Arthur Prior; Popper spent his time in New Zealand writing *The Open Society and its Enemies*. After Popper's return to Europe, Prior was appointed to the Chair at Canterbury, which he held from 1947 until 1959. At Wellington, George Hughes held the Chair from 1951 to 1984. He appointed Michael Hinton and David Londey soon after his arrival and, collectively, they oversaw the development of a vibrant group of students (including, among others, Graeme Marshall, Richard Sylvan (*ne* Routley) and Patrick Hutchings).

In Australia, George Paul—a one-time student of Wittgenstein—arrived in Melbourne at the outbreak of the War, and—in concert with other students of Wittgenstein such as Douglas Gasking, Stephen Toulmin and Helen Knight—contributed to the development of a very fine group of philosophers, including both "local" students—such as Camo Jackson, Don Gunner, Michael Scriven and Alan Donagon—and German and Austrian refugees—such as Kurt Baier, Gerd Buchdahl, Peter Herbst and David Falk. In Sydney, a formidable group of students developed under the influence of John Anderson: this group included philosophers such as Ruth

Walker, John Passmore, John Mackie, Eugene Kamenka, Percy Partridge, David Armstrong, David Stove and George Molnar. In Adelaide, from 1950, Jack Smart was involved in the development of a department with strong Faculty and excellent students, including, among others, Brian Ellis, Graham Nehrlich, Charlie Martin, Brian Medlin, Ian Hinckfuss, Max Deutscher and Michael Bradley.

At the end of the 1940s, Dan Taylor, who had been a senior lecturer at Melbourne, was appointed Chair of Philosophy at the University College of the Gold Coast (Ghana), a post he occupied until 1960. Taylor subsequently appointed three further philosophers from Australia—Len Grant, Peter Gibbons and Peter Herbst—to positions in Ghana. This colonial adventure in the teaching of Western philosophy in Africa ended in 1961, when all academic staff were sacked as part of an attempt, on behalf of the government, to establish an institution with a Ghanaian character.

Growth

By the mid-1950s, a number of strong departments of philosophy had become established in Australasian universities. In particular, the departments of philosophy at the University of Sydney, the University of Melbourne and the University of Adelaide had strong staff profiles, and were developing a new generation of philosophers. On a smaller scale, there were similar developments at Victoria University Wellington and the University of Canterbury. Graduates with MAs from New Zealand universities in the second half of the 1950s included Keith Campbell, Max Cresswell, Graeme Marshall, Richard Sylvan and Bede Rundle. At Canterbury, in the mid-1950s, Arthur Prior corresponded with Saul Kripke—then still a high school student in Omaha, Nebraska—and, working with Carew Meredith, arrived independently at possible worlds semantics for the most familiar propositional modal logics.

As an example of the vibrancy of philosophy in the major departments in the 1950s, one might consider the philosophers who had some association with the University of Melbourne in this period. Among others, these philosophers included: Alexander Boyce Gibson, Douglas Gasking, Camo Jackson, Stephen Toulmin, Helen Knight, Don Gunner, Kurt Baier, Annette Baier (*née* Stoop), Gerd Buchdahl, Peter Herbst, Michael Scriven, Alan Donagon, David Falk, Brian O'Shaughnessy, David Londey, Len Grant, Bill Ginnane, Len Goddard, Bill Joske, Harry Stainsby, Max Charlesworth, Eric D'Arcy, Jan Srzednicki, John McCloskey, Mary McCloskey, Anne Jackson, John Clendinnen, Brian Ellis and Vernon Rice.

In 1956, Jack Smart inaugurated the Gavin David Young Lectures at the University of Adelaide (on the basis of a bequest from Jessie Raven). Gilbert Ryle gave the initial set of lectures. Subsequent series of lectures were given by: Willard Quine (1959), Tony Flew (1963), Herbert Feigl (1965), Donald Davidson (1968), David Lewis (1971), Carl Hempel (1979), Dan Dennett (1984), Jack Smart (1987), Hilary Putnam (1998) and Simon Blackburn (2007). These lectures played a significant role in boosting the international reputation of Australasian philosophy.

A few years earlier, in 1951, Smart had made another very significant decision, appointing Ullin Place to a lectureship in psychology. While at Adelaide, Place developed the view that consciousness is a purely physical process of the brain, and—in the course of a three-cornered discussion with Smart and Charlie Martin—led Smart to the more comprehensive view that all mental states are purely physical processes of the brain (a view that was then even more systematically developed by David Armstrong, among others). Initially, this view was regarded as a piece of antipodean madness; later, this "Australian Materialism" became one of the dominant positions in worldwide philosophical debate about the nature of the mind.

In the early 1960s, some other long-established departments of philosophy began to blossom—e.g., at the University of Western Australia, where Selwyn Grave took up the Chair in 1961; at the University of Queensland, where Charles Presley took up the Chair in 1961; and at the University of Auckland, where Ray Bradley took up the Chair in 1964. In 1962, John Passmore became Head of the Department of Social Philosophy in RSSS at the Australian National University. Fellows in the Department during his tenure included Nobel Laureate John Harsanyi, Stanley Benn, Eugene Kamenka, Edwin Curley and Robert Brown.

The early 1960s also witnessed interesting developments in some more recently established universities. Len Goddard, who had been appointed to a lectureship at the University of New England (UNE) in 1956, and then promoted to the Chair, sought to establish a graduate school in logic. He managed to attract some outstanding logicians—including Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood (formerly Routley)—to UNE, and, until Goddard's temporary return to Scotland at the end of the 1960s, UNE was a significant centre for the study of logic.

Perhaps the greatest scandal in the history of philosophy in Australasia began with the dismissal of Sydney Orr from his post as Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tasmania in 1956. Orr had been appointed to the post in 1952, from a field that included John Mackie and Kurt Baier. In the face of a range of complaints about harassment, intimidation, sexual improprieties and so forth, and on the basis of a series of investigations, Orr was summarily dismissed. Orr appealed unsuccessfully to the Supreme Court of Tasmania and then to the High Court. In 1958, the Australasian Association of Philosophy approved a ban to prevent the Chair from being filled; this ban remained in force until 1968, 2 years after Orr's death. While the record shows that Orr was a criminal, deluded and manipulative individual who—among other things—had falsified parts of his application for the Chair that he came to occupy, he was (at least initially) quite widely regarded as the victim of a serious miscarriage of justice.

A lesser scandal played out in the history of philosophy in Australasia occurred in 1965, when the University of Sydney Senate blocked the appointment of Frank Knopfelmacher to a post in Political Philosophy. Knopfelmacher was an outspoken critic of Moscow and its domestic fellow-travellers; many philosophers in Melbourne—where he had held a post in the Department of Psychology since 1955—bore the brunt of his colourful invective (or abuse, depending upon your political standpoint). Despite the support of David Armstrong and others, Knopfelmacher remained at the University of Melbourne, where he continued to teach social theory for many years.

Conflict

Philosophers are no strangers to conflict; and Australasian philosophers have been no exception to the norm. For example, John Anderson managed to get himself censured by the Lang Labor Government, in 1931, over his “war idols” claims; by the University of Sydney Senate, in 1943, for his “no religion in education” claims; and by Archbishop Gough, in 1961, for his allegedly corrupting effect on youth. However, in the turbulent times from the middle of the 1960s, there emerged a kind of *internal* philosophical infighting that had quite dramatic consequences.

In part, this infighting was over differences in philosophical orientation. While—as noted above—there was an early Australasian interest in European thought, that interest had largely disappeared from academic philosophy by the beginning of the Second World War. In the 1940s and 1950s, Australasian philosophy had an almost exclusively Anglo-American tinge—though there were exceptions, such as Alec Ritchie, subsequently the foundation Chair at the University of Newcastle, who pursued an interest in phenomenology and existentialism during the 1940s and 1950s. From the middle of the 1960s, interest in European thought began to increase: at the University of Melbourne, where Max Charlesworth taught Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty; at the University of Sydney, where Paul Crittenden taught Sartre and Nietzsche; and at Macquarie University, where Max Deutscher taught Sartre, Heidegger and Jaspers.

In part, though, the differences were personal and political. In particular, the Vietnam War and the draft galvanised generational change. Matters came to a head most notably at the University of Sydney, where pressure from students and staff for courses on Marx and feminism—both with content derived heavily from European thought—helped to lead to “the Sydney split”: the formation, at the beginning of 1974, of two separate departments of philosophy, one with a primary orientation towards Anglo-American philosophy, and the other with a primary orientation towards European philosophy. At the University of Sydney, this state of separation persisted until 2000, when the Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy was formally reunited with the Department of General Philosophy.

The radical politics of the second half of the 1960s was immediately evident in some of the new departments of philosophy that emerged around this time. For example, at Flinders University—where Brian Medlin was the foundation Chair, and Greg O’Hair, Rodney Allen, Ian Hunt, Ken Sievers and Lawrence Johnson were members of the Department of Philosophy—there was a strong disposition towards Maoism, and a dramatic overhaul of curriculum to include units on Marxism, Politics and Arts and Women’s Studies (all of which initially met with considerable and hostile opposition from the relevant university committees).

Elsewhere, the divide between Anglo-American philosophy and European philosophy was managed in different ways than it was in the University of Sydney: most often, by having European philosophy located in further Departments or Centres in Faculties of Arts (or Humanities, or Social Sciences)—as, for example, at Monash University, where European Philosophy mostly belonged to the Centre for Comparative Literature, Critical Theory and Cultural Studies—but sometimes by having a more or less uneasy mixed marriage—as, for example, at the University of New South Wales.

The World Stage

Against the background of the consolidation of a number of strong departments of philosophy in the established universities in the 1950s, and the emergence of new and vibrant departments of philosophy in the newer universities of the 1960s, Australasian philosophy emerged as a significant presence on the world stage.

From the 1940s onwards, generations of Australasian students pursued graduate studies overseas. At first, the destinations of choice were primarily in the UK—particularly Oxford and Cambridge—but, over time, an increasing number of Australasian students elected to pursue their graduate studies in the US—with significant numbers at Princeton, Harvard, and other major American centres for philosophy. Eventually, strong graduate programs developed within Australasian universities—particularly, but not only, at RSSS—and the flow of students from Europe, the UK and the US to Australasia increased, as did the numbers of gifted Australasian students who elected to pursue their graduate studies in Australasia.

One measure of the presence of Australasian philosophy on the world stage is the number of Australasian philosophers who have come to hold significant appointments in universities in Europe, the US and the UK. A list includes, among others: Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge, Simon Fraser, UBC, Syracuse), Michael Scriven (Swarthmore, Stanford, Berkeley, Harvard, etc.), Brian O'Shaughnessy (Kings College London), John Mackie (York, Oxford), Alan Donagon (Minnesota, Chicago), Annette Baier (Pittsburgh), Kurt Baier (Pittsburgh), Gerd Buchdahl (Cambridge), Mark Johnston (Princeton), Michael Devitt (Maryland, CUNY), Ray Bradley (Simon Fraser), John Norton (Pittsburgh), Martin Davies (Oxford), Susan Okin (Vasser, Brandeis, Harvard, Stanford), David Chalmers (Santa Cruz, Arizona), Michael Smith (Princeton), Liz Grosz (SUNY Buffalo, Rutgers), Graham Oddie (Boulder), Kevin Hart (Notre Dame, Virginia), John Tasioulas (UCL, Oxford), Peter Godfrey-Smith (Stanford, Harvard), Brian Weatherson (Syracuse, Brown, Cornell, Rutgers), Henry Krips (Claremont Graduate), Daniel Nolan (Syracuse, St. Andrews, Nottingham), Roger White (NYU, MIT), Rae Langton (Sheffield, Edinburgh, MIT), Natalie Stoljar (McGill), Huw Price (Edinburgh, Cambridge), Claire Colebrook (Edinburgh, Penn State), David Oderberg (Reading), Penny Deutscher (Northwestern) Stephen Barker (Nottingham), Sue Uniacke (Hull), Rob Wilson (Queens, Urbana-Champaigne, Alberta), Rai Gaita (Kings College London) and Peter Singer (Princeton). (This list would be swelled if it included philosophers who first came to Australasia after the completion of their doctoral studies, spent extended time here, and then moved on to significant appointments in Europe, the UK and the US: for example, Krister Segerberg (Uppsala), Philip Pettit

(Princeton), Udo Thiel (Humboldt, Harvard, Graz), Michael Tooley (Boulder), Andre Gallois (Keele, Syracuse), Jay Garfield (Smith), Greg Currie (Nottingham) and Graham Priest (CUNY), among many others.)

Perhaps an even better measure of the presence of Australasian philosophy on the world stage is the number of ways in which Australasian philosophers blazed trails for others to follow. The establishment of history and philosophy of science as an independent discipline was led by Australasian institutions (most notably the universities of Sydney and Melbourne). The first centre for the study of human bioethics was based in Australasia (established at Monash University by Peter Singer). The study of environmental ethics was significantly kick-started by the publication of *The Fight for the Forests* (written by Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood, under the names Richard and Val Routley). Serious investigation of relevant and paraconsistent logics had two primary loci, one in Australasia—principally in the Logic Program in RSSS at the Australian National University—and the other in the US. The modern championing of materialist theories of the mind—and of materialism as a more general worldview—owes much to Australasian philosophy (in particular, initially, to work carried out in Adelaide and Sydney, but thereafter in many other Australasian departments). (Modern opposition to materialist theories of the mind also owes much to Australasian philosophy; in particular, arguments due to Frank Jackson and David Chalmers have been extremely influential in this sphere.) Recent enthusiasm for analytic metaphysics—and for the championing of realist conceptions of metaphysics—also owes much to Australasian philosophy (in particular, initially, to the pioneering work of Jack Smart and David Armstrong, but subsequently to others spread across Australasia). In the area of normative and applied ethics, Australasian philosophy has exerted a strong influence on the development, defence and deployment of consequentialist moral theories (beginning, perhaps, with Jack Smart's defence of utilitarianism, but becoming more pronounced with the work of Peter Singer, Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, Julian Savulescu and others). And so on.

In fact, there are very few areas of philosophy that have been completely untouched by Australasian philosophers. Apart from areas already mentioned, Australasian philosophy has made major contributions to, for example, feminist philosophy, philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of language, the history of modern philosophy, the history of nineteenth-century philosophy, metaethics, applied moral philosophy, philosophy for children and so forth. Australasian philosophers have published many books with the major presses—e.g., Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, Blackwell and Routledge—and are well-represented in the major journals—e.g., *Mind*, *Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophical Review*, etc. Indeed, Hugh Mellor, a British philosopher based in Cambridge, was reported, at some point in the 1990s, as having said that:

> It's just as well for the rest of the world that philosophy is not an Olympic sport. In the last few decades, Australasia has produced more good philosophers per square head than almost anywhere else. There is no better place for philosophers to go who wish to raise their game.

In the period from the mid-1960s, then, Australasian philosophy thrived, at least to the extent that it produced research that—and attracted and developed researchers who—had a significant impact in the academies of Europe, the UK and the US.

Storm Clouds

Although the history of philosophy in Australasia since the Second World War has been a (perhaps surprising) success story, it would be a mistake to suppose that it has been an unmitigated triumph.

We have already noted that, at least since the 1960s, there have been uneasy tensions—if not outright conflicts—between self-styled "analytic" philosophers, those who might allow themselves to be called "Continental" philosophers, and those who would prefer not to wear any labels of these kinds. While some hope that these antagonisms will simply die out as a consequence of generational change, and others hope for a future in which these kinds of divisions are transcended—in a "post-analytic, post-Continental" age—it is doubtful that we yet have very good grounds for optimism on either of these fronts.

There are difficult questions that are raised by the gender disparity that is evident in the history of Australasian philosophy. From the earliest days until comparatively recently, the senior positions in the profession have all been occupied by men. It is true that, from quite early on, there were some women who held positions as tutors and lecturers; but the Chairs, the main figures in the Australasian Association of Philosophy, and the people who were regarded as the intellectual leaders of the profession, were invariably men. While there has been a gradual improvement in the representation of women in philosophy in Australasia, it remains the case that there is a considerable gender disparity in philosophy, particularly at the more senior levels.

Given the international recognition that has been bestowed upon the academic discipline of philosophy in Australasia, there are also questions to be asked about the internal vitality of that discipline. Staffing numbers in departments of philosophy in Australasia have been in overall decline since the period of rapid growth that accompanied the arrival of the new universities in the 1960s and 1970s. Conditions of employment for academic philosophers—as for academics more generally—have deteriorated considerably since that time, as have the conditions under which students are now expected to conduct undergraduate and postgraduate studies of philosophy (and other disciplines). As the percentage of Federal funding of universities has decreased in concert with massive increase in Federal "oversight" and "regulation" of the management of universities, the place of basic scholarship—particularly in the humanities and pure sciences—has been placed more and more at risk. In much of the period under discussion, there was serious concern about "brain drain", as some of our most able philosophers went to what they considered to be more attractive appointments in Europe, the US and the UK—though, at the beginning of the 2010s, concerns about "brain drain" may have diminished because the range of attractive international appointments has narrowed considerably as state-funded universities in Europe, the US and the UK deal with the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

To the extent that concerns about the internal vitality of Australasian philosophy are well-founded, those concerns may not admit of simple remedies. Australasian governments aim to increase student participation rates in universities with the primary aim of improved “training” of our future workforce. While philosophers can—and do—argue that the study of philosophy is ideal for the development of a range of prized generic skills—related to writing, arguing, analysis and the like—it is unclear how much emphasis should be placed on this kind of skill development by advocates for philosophy. At the very least, it is worth observing that universities can be more than organisations that provide workforce “training”: universities can be organisations that prepare students to be rounded citizens whose contribution to society goes beyond the paid employment in which they engage; and universities can also be organisations that nurture and promote habits of inquiry and reflection—including philosophical inquiry and philosophical reflection—in a significant proportion of the population. On the other hand, it is also worth noting that arguments that emphasise the virtues of philosophical inquiry and philosophical reflections for those who engage in them run some risk of coming into conflict with prevalent anti-elitist sentiments in Australasian societies (even if, as seems plausible, there is no necessary connection between those arguments and those sentiments). The interests of providing effective political rhetoric and the interests of providing a full account of the value of philosophy may not pull entirely in the same direction.

Philosophical Associations

The primary advocates for philosophy in Australia and New Zealand are arguably the various philosophical associations, including, in particular, the Australasian Association of Philosophy.

The Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy was founded in 1923; it became the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) in 1958. From its inception, the primary business of the Association was the production of a journal—the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*—and the running of an annual conference. Up until the 1950s, the conference rotated annually between the University of Sydney and the University of Melbourne; at the time of writing, there remains a three-way rotation between the cities of Melbourne, Sydney and Canberra that serves as a fallback in the absence of voluntary hosts for the conference.

The first president of the Association was Bernard Muscio (Sydney), and early vice-presidents included William Ralph Boyce Gibson (Melbourne) and William Mitchell (Adelaide). The central role of the University of Sydney in the early running of the Association is also reflected in the editorship of the journal: Francis Anderson (1923–1926, Sydney), Tasman Lovell (1927–1934, Sydney), John Anderson (1935–1946, Sydney), John Passmore (1947–1949, Sydney), Alan Stout (1950–1967, Sydney), Graham Nehrlich (1968–1972, Sydney), Robert Brown (1973–1977, ANU), Brian Ellis (1978–1989, La Trobe), Robert Young (1990–1997, La Trobe), Peter Forrest, Fred D'Agostino and Gerry Gaus (1998–2002, UNE), Maurice Goldsmith (2003–2007, Wellington) and Stewart Candlish (2008–time of writing, UWA).

Over time, the AAP has evolved into the peak body for the promotion of philosophy in Australasia. The AAP collects benchmarking data for universities in Australia and New Zealand, and collaborates with relevant national and international agencies—including, for example, the Federation of International Societies for Philosophy (FISP), the American Philosophical Association (APA), the British Philosophical Association (BPA), the Australian Research Council (ARC), the New Zealand Tertiary Education Commission (TEC), the Australian Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR), and the Australian Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research (DIISR)—and with other philosophical societies—such as the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP), the Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy (ASACP), the Federation of Australian Philosophy in Schools Associations (FAPSA), the Australasian Association for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science (AAHPSSS), the Australian Association for Professional and Applied Ethics (AAPAE), the Australasian Society for Ancient Philosophy (ASAP), the Australasian Society of Cognitive Science (ASCS), the Australian Society for Legal Philosophy (ASLP), the New Zealand Society for Legal and Social Philosophy (NZSLSP), the Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy (MSCP), the Australasian Association for Logic (AAL), the Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association (APRA), the Australasian Phenomenology and Hermeneutics Association (APHA), the Australian Nietzsche Society (ANS), the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia, the Sydney Society of Literature and Aesthetics (SSLA), and the Australian and New Zealand Society of Literature and Aesthetics (ANZALA).

Beyond the Academy

While the primary focus of this work is the history of academic philosophy in Australasia, there remains a significant story to tell about the history of philosophy beyond the bounds of academia. There have been many groups and societies outside the universities (and seminaries) with a significant interest in philosophical questions—e.g., the Rationalist Society of Australia (founded in 1906), the New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists (founded in 1911), the Melbourne Existentialist Society (founded c. 1970) and so forth—and there have been many other groups whose interests have some kind of connection to philosophy—e.g., various Hegelian societies, atheist societies, Zen groups and so on. In more recent times, there have been philosophy cafes, philosophers in pubs, philosophy study tours, philosophical debates, philosophy radio, philosophy TV, etc. There is significant public enthusiasm for philosophy, even if there is no smooth connection between the animating concerns of academic philosophers and wider conceptions of the values and goals of philosophical inquiry.

Assessment and Explanation

It is perhaps not so very long since one might have expected most people—both at home and abroad—to have the Johnsonian attitude that what is remarkable about Australasian philosophy is not so much that it is done well but that it is done at all. However, for many years now, Australasian philosophers have been telling themselves—and anyone else who cares to listen to them—that, actually, philosophy is done well in Australasia. Two questions naturally arise. First, is it so that philosophy is done well in Australasia? And, second, if it is so, why is it that philosophy is done well in Australasia?

Since we are philosophers, we should be careful how we choose to answer the first question. Perhaps we can content ourselves with the observation that the opinion that philosophy is done well in Australasia has become very widespread. Consider the results of the 2011 QS World University Rankings. According to these rankings, there are no fewer than 7 Australasian departments of philosophy in the top 50 departments in the world—ANU (6), Melbourne (15), Sydney (20), Monash (26), UNSW (28), UQ (40) and Auckland (43)—and there are another 3 departments in the top 100—Macquarie, Otago and VUW. While this result does not seem credible—and while there are apparent flaws in the data upon which these rankings are based—it is worth noting that 50 % of the ranking is based upon a global survey of the opinions of academic philosophers. Wherever the truth may lie concerning the worth of Australasian philosophy, it seems incontestable that, around the globe, philosophers are widely persuaded that philosophy is done well in Australasia.

Australasian philosophers who believe that philosophy is done well in Australasia—and who are proud of this achievement—are typically unable to provide a serious explanation of how this state of affairs has come to pass. Some mention meteorological and climatological factors—but these are clearly not serious hypotheses. Perhaps the answer is that there has been a happy coincidence of a range of factors, the combined effect of which has been to permit the evolution of a strong academic community. By its nature, philosophy is not regional: logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, aesthetics and so forth raise the same questions in Melbourne and Auckland that they raise in Oxford, or Harvard, or Paris. By its nature, philosophy does not require massive investment in infrastructure: philosophers do not need the kinds of labs that are required to support research in medicine, physics, chemistry and engineering. By its nature, philosophy can be successfully pursued in relatively small and relatively isolated communities, provided that the members of those communities are given the time and resources required to enable that pursuit. By its nature, the world of philosophy is open to those who are prepared to make bold new hypotheses, and to support those bold new hypotheses with careful argument and investigation. When Australasian philosophy took off in the 1950s, it did so, at least in part, because—for whatever reason—philosophy in Australasia attracted the right kind of people at the right time; and it has continued to flourish, at least in part, because it has continued to attract the right kind of people to work in circumstances that are conducive to success in the philosophical venture.

Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before

2

Martin Davies and Stein Helgeby

Contents

Introduction 16
Prelude: Barzillai Quaife (1798–1873), the First Australasian Philosopher 16
The Background: Early Influences 17
  Scottish Imports 18
  Philosophy and Psychology 19
  The Australian Export: Samuel Alexander 20
Idealism in Australia 21
  The Rise of Idealism 21
  The Idealist Concerns 22
  Henry Jones' Tour of Australia 23
  Early New Zealand Philosophy 24
Henry Laurie (1837–1922): Australia's First Professor of Philosophy 27
  Laurie's Idealism 28
  Laurie's Theory of Mind 29
  Laurie's Moral Theory 30
Francis Anderson (1858–1941): The Christian Idealist 31
  Anderson's Christian Idealism 32
  Anderson's Views of Personality and Morality 33
  A New Civilisation 33
Sir William Mitchell (1861–1962): The Gifford Lecturer 34
  Mitchell's Administrative Contributions and View of Education 35
  Mitchell's Philosophical Writing 37
  Mitchell's Philosophical Influences 38
  Mitchell's Philosophy of Mind 39
  Mitchell and Current Philosophy 40

M. Davies (✉)
Melbourne Graduate School of Education, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
e-mail: wmdavies@unimelb.edu.au

S. Helgeby
Department of Finance and Deregulation, Australian Government, Canberra, ACT, Australia
e-mail: Stein.Helgeby@finance.gov.au

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_2, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

William Ralph Boyce Gibson (1869–1935): A Philosophy of Immediate Experience 41
Gibson's Personal Idealism 42
Gibson's Views on Philosophy and Personality 43
Conclusion: The Decline of Idealism 46
References 48

> *It is right and proper that Australia and New Zealand should undertake their combined share in moulding the world's thought.* (Miller 1929, p. 242)

Introduction

Two approaches have dominated Western philosophy in Australia: idealism and materialism. Idealism was prevalent between the 1880s and the 1930s, but dissipated thereafter. Idealism in Australia often reflected Kantian themes, but it also reflected the revival of interest in Hegel through the work of 'absolute idealists' such as T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Henry Jones. A number of the early New Zealand philosophers were also educated in the idealist tradition and were influential in their communities, but produced relatively little. In Australia, materialism gained prominence through the work of John Anderson, who arrived in Australia in 1927, and continues to be influential. John Anderson had been a student of Henry Jones, who might therefore be said to have influenced both main strands of Australian philosophical thought.

Idealism was particularly associated with the work of the first professional philosophers in Australia, such as Henry Laurie, Francis Anderson, and William Mitchell (who rejected the label), and a second generation including W. R. Boyce Gibson. In this chapter, we trace the beginnings of philosophy in Australasia, and the period of idealist dominance, mainly through these four key figures. Idealism had broad influence outside of the universities, in public and religious life (Hughes-Warrington and Tregenza 2008), but that is beyond the scope of this chapter. The stories of two subsequent philosophical traditions, the Wittgensteinian influence of the 1940s and 1950s, and the realism and materialism that have been the most prominent feature of Australian philosophy since the 1950s, are told in the chapters that follow.

Prelude: Barzillai Quaife (1798–1873), the First Australasian Philosopher

The honour of being the first to formally teach philosophy in Australia belongs to the Congregationalist minister Barzillai Quaife, in the 1850s, but teaching philosophy did not begin on a continuing basis until the 1880s, with the gradual establishment of universities (Grave 1984; Lockley 1967).

Quaife was appointed by John Dunmore Lang to the Chair of Mental Philosophy and Divinity at what was called the Australian College. During his tenure, Quaife produced probably the first philosophical work to be published in the southern hemisphere: *The Intellectual Sciences* (Quaife 1872), a document outlining his intellectual debt to William Hamilton, James McCosh, H. L. Mansel, and Thomas Reid. This publication was based on his lectures at the Australian College between 1850 and 1851.

Like those who immediately followed him, Quaife was influenced by nineteenth-century Scottish thought. However, his thinking was also motivated by a strong religious impulse, and his moral, ontological, and metaphysical views are coloured by notions of theistic necessity and the will of God (Grave 1984). His book has been described as an outline of psychology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and logic in theological and anthropomorphic terms, where a conception of reality is argued which we now associate with 'the great Chain of Being' (Passmore 1963, p. 137).

Quaife was an influential and controversial newspaper editor in both Australia and New Zealand. His political approach to journalism, in the interests of Maori rights and public accountability, attracted his principal biographer (Kennett 1991). While a newspaper editor in New Zealand, Quaife's *New Zealand Advertiser and Bay of Islands Gazette* were suppressed for attacks on the government policies on Maori land rights—rights which Quaife believed were being disregarded (Kennett 1991; Lockley 1967; Moon 1997). In Australia, Quaife was also noted among his local community in Paddington for decrying racism and preaching equality of men in relation to the local aboriginals (Hughenden History 2006).

After the demise of the Australian College in 1852, Quaife taught in a school, ministered to a congregation from home, and unsuccessfully attempted to resurrect his teaching career. His lack of success in obtaining an appointment may possibly be gleaned from students' view of his character: 'if teaching was his forte, omniscience was his foible' (Lockley 1967). Although he produced other works, particularly on religious themes (Quaife 1845, 1846, 1848), *The Intellectual Sciences* was his last major work, but it left no mark on his successors.

The Background: Early Influences

The first Australasian universities were established during the second half of the nineteenth century and grew relatively slowly. Institutionally, they represented the confidence of the colonial societies in which they were established. Intellectually, they represented both the aspiration for material progress through a highly educated social group, and the desire to engage with broader currents of European thought.

Much of the intellectual excitement of the second half of the nineteenth century attached to developments in natural science and the related fields of technology. Darwin published his *Origin of Species* in 1859, and evolutionary theory became prominent in a wide variety of fields, notably through the 'social Darwinism' of thinkers such as Herbert Spencer. Germ theory promised to revolutionise medical science and public health alike. Physiological discoveries of an apparently minor significance concerning the reflexes and the digestive system were taken to point to the redundancy of mental phenomena in explanations of mechanical and biological systems (Du Bois-Reymond 1848; Huxley 1874/1901; Passmore 1984).

Empirical psychology gained a significant impetus with the establishment of the first psychology laboratory by Wilhelm Wundt in 1879. The study of neurology advanced through the discovery of associations between parts of the brain and various memory or cognitive deficits. The empirical work of Ebbinghaus, Freud, Galton, and William James, among others, was becoming increasingly important. Such influences were carried to Australasia through emigrants, visitors, books, and journals. Major influences can be traced in the Australasian thought of the time. There were lively periodicals with an intellectual orientation, including *The Victorian Review*, *The Melbourne Review*, and *The Centennial Magazine*. A small number of Australasian figures, such as Alexander Sutherland, author of *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, a work influenced by Darwin and Adam Smith, attracted attention overseas (Irons 1899; Sutherland 1898).

By contrast with the flourishing of natural science and technology, British philosophy is often regarded as being in decline for much of the early nineteenth century, and to have recovered only from the 1880s onwards. In 1865, David Masson located the nadir of British philosophy around 1835, but traced a gradual recovery in the succeeding 30 years (Masson 1877). A variety of empiricist and positivist philosophies predominated, with the older Scottish philosophy of common sense being perhaps the best known. Hume, the Mills, Hamilton, and, later, Spencer were highly regarded and influential. The broad field of philosophy was, however, understood to include literary figures, and particularly poets, such as Coleridge, Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning. Idealism was a relatively recent development in British thought. While Hamilton had been influenced by Kant, the influence of Hegel began to be felt only in the 1860s, with the publication of the first edition of James Stirling's *The Secret of Hegel* (1865), and the commencement of Edward Caird's teaching career at Glasgow.

Scottish Imports

Early Australasian philosophy might almost be characterised as a branch of Scottish philosophy. During the establishment of the universities of Sydney (1850), Melbourne (1853), and Adelaide (1874), the main centres of philosophy were all outposts of Scottish thought. This is not surprising given that many of the first philosophers to be given appointments were Scots. This included Francis Anderson and later John Anderson in Sydney, Henry Laurie in Melbourne, and William Mitchell in Adelaide (Grave 1984). At the oldest of the New Zealand institutions, the University of Otago (1871), the same tendencies prevailed, with the appointments of a succession of Scots, Duncan MacGregor, William Salmond, and Francis Dunlop (Pigden 2007). Elsewhere in New Zealand, highlander Hugh Mackenzie was appointed at Victoria University (founded 1899), and John Anderson's brother, William, was appointed to the University of Auckland (founded 1883) (Ardley 1982).

English backgrounds, and sometimes an Australian education, could also be found among those who wrote on or taught philosophical themes, including John Woolley, Charles Badham, and Bernard Muscio in Sydney, and M. H. Irving, H. A. Strong, W. E. Hearn, Richard Hodgson, and W. R. Boyce Gibson in Melbourne. Such backgrounds could also be found elsewhere, including R. L. Dunbabin in Tasmania (established 1890), George Elton Mayo (educated by Mitchell in Adelaide) in Queensland (established 1909), and P. R. Le Couteur in Western Australia (established 1911). Nevertheless, among the more influential professional philosophers, it was the Scots who predominated. While the Scottish influence is now well understood in relation to Sydney, particularly through the writings and influence of John Anderson (Anderson et al. 1962, 1980, 1982; Baker 1979, 1986; Coombs 1996; Franklin 2003; Kennedy 1995; Mackie 1962; Stove, 1977), little attention has been paid to other Scottish intellectuals and traditions that were influential in Australasia.

Regardless of their background, philosophers in Australasia were constrained by their relative isolation and broad range of responsibilities. The early Australasian philosophers taught across very wide fields. Francis Anderson was to teach 'Ancient Thought, Modern Philosophy, Ethics and Sociology, Metaphysics, Logic, Psychology, Politics, and Economics'. Mitchell said his Chair was more like a sofa, since it was to cover Philosophy, Economics, Literature, Education, and Psychology (Smart 1962). At Auckland University, the prodigiously talented J. P Grossman was engaged to teach Commerce, Economics, History, Commercial Geography, and Mental Science and followed this by publishing papers on topics as diverse as afforestation, bimetallism, and proportional representation. In addition, he coached the rugby team! (Ardley 1982, p. 12) At Otago, MacGregor had both medical and philosophical training and was noted as a surgeon in Dunedin, before later becoming Inspector of Lunatic Asylums.

Establishing a community among philosophers in Australia was no easy matter. As Edmund Morris Miller (1881–1964), an idealist philosopher, psychologist, administrator, and literary scholar, noted in 1929, there were 'no strong or concentrated bonds of communion or corporate life between the thinkers and scholastic workers' in Australia (Miller 1929, p. 242). Conditions in New Zealand were perhaps even more difficult, which may have contributed to the lack of a recognisable philosophical school to parallel the materialism inaugurated by John Anderson in Australia.

Philosophy and Psychology

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, philosophy was conceived in relation to psychology, and particularly in terms of how they should be distinguished from each other. The *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* published articles in each field, dropping the term psychology from its masthead only in 1946.

Many of the philosophers of the time wrote on psychology, and not solely among the idealists. Laurie, Mitchell, and Boyce Gibson saw philosophical psychology as a key introduction to metaphysics. M. Scott Fletcher, Professor at the University of Queensland from 1923 to 1938, wrote on *The Psychology of the New Testament* (Fletcher 1912). Elton Mayo in Queensland (1919–1923) and Bernard Muscio in Sydney pursued industrial psychology, although Mayo left Australia and established his significant reputation overseas. Morris Miller in Hobart undertook psychological work that influenced public policy. W. M. Kyle, who followed Scott Fletcher in Queensland from 1938 to 1961, worked for the Army psychological services during the Second World War (Gregory 1987, pp. 72–76). J. McKellar Stewart (1878–1953) in Adelaide wrote on the unconscious and the relationship between psychology and ethics (McKellar Stewart 1923, 1926). In New Zealand, psychology was also topical with C. F. Salmond publishing a paper on ‘Psychological Literature and Human Nature’ (Salmond 1930) and T. A. Hunter beginning the first experimental psychology laboratory. Francis Anderson stands out from this group because of the relative lack of attention he paid to psychology.

Among the idealists, while there was considerable interest in empirical psychology conducted in the laboratory, there was an important distinction to be made between such psychology, allied to natural science, and the philosophical psychology that served as a path into broader, metaphysical, thought. This psychology was characterised, in the work of Laurie and W. R. Boyce Gibson, by a focus on the method and results of introspection and conceptual clarification. It served to establish key philosophical themes, including the relationship of mind and matter, and the status of the ‘self’ or personality.

The Australian Export: Samuel Alexander

The early period in Australasian intellectual life produced at least one outstanding and notable thinker—Samuel Alexander (1859–1938). Alexander was born in Sydney, educated at the University of Melbourne, and left Australian shores in 1877 bound for Oxford. He eventually became Professor at the University of Manchester where he remained, never returning to his homeland. Alexander’s main work, *Space, Time and Deity*, delivered as Gifford Lectures in 1916–1918, was a landmark and highly influential in the 1920s and 1930s (Alexander 1920). Alexander was unusual in his presentation of a wide ranging metaphysic, in the garb of realism. It had the hallmarks of Scottish idealism and absolute idealists such as Bradley and Bosanquet, but also presented an interesting form of what became known as ‘new realism’. Alexander was a venerated figure and influenced realists as well as many who have been broadly labelled idealists, such as R. G. Collingwood.

In Australia, Alexander was a major inspiration for John Anderson, who lectured repeatedly on aspects of *Space, Time and Deity*, particularly its treatment of categories such as identity, universality, and quality. Anderson developed his own realist metaphysics through these lectures (Anderson 2005, 2007). For quite different reasons, Alexander also attracted Alexander Boyce Gibson—son and successor to W. R. Boyce Gibson. For A. Boyce Gibson, Alexander was important because he placed the importance of 'constructive metaphysics' ahead of epistemology. Alexander exemplified 'the "natural piety" which he preached as an antidote to the bragging anthropolatry of humanistic Idealism'. Yet his realism was 'more conciliatory and more far-reaching' than that of Moore and Russell, precisely because of his metaphysics and his search for 'the place of mind in the universe' (Boyce Gibson 1938, pp. 251–252).

Alexander's work continues to find defenders. One such defender claims that his work has been widely misinterpreted and that it offers 'a highly original version of physicalism under which higher level properties are realised by combinations of lower level properties and relations but where those higher level properties are nonetheless causally efficacious' (Gillett 2006, pp. 262–263). This continued reinterpretation of Alexander's metaphysic of emergence suggests an inherent attractiveness in the ambiguity of what might be called the pursuit of idealist concerns in a realist form. As we shall see, similar ambiguities can be found in a number of the Australasian idealists.

Idealism in Australia

The Rise of Idealism

Writing in 1929 and reflecting on nearly 50 years of academic philosophy in Australia, Morris Miller noted the strength of idealism in Australia. He remarked on the conjunction in Australia of an idealist philosophy with a highly practical and pragmatic worldview. Other philosophies were present, but they were not strong enough to result in any great contest between key ideas. Idealism was particularly associated with dynamism in ideas and in nation building. Miller commented:

> It is not desired, by any means, to leave the impression that naturalism or materialism in philosophy is inimical to national advancement or springs from immaturity or decadence. But it has never stood alone in the forefront of philosophical development; and where it has appeared to do so, it has rather been as a foil to idealism than as a power of independent standing. Behind it there ever lurks a background of idealistic presuppositions. (Miller 1929, p. 246).

Idealism had become the leading tendency in Australian philosophy because it was a dynamic and resurgent element within British philosophy. Australian philosophers sought to engage with exciting and influential ideas found in the work of Edward Caird, the Scot Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, and T. H. Green. Idealism was also dominant because the first generation of Australian philosophers was relatively long serving. Laurie retired in 1911, to be replaced by the personal idealist W. R. Boyce Gibson, while Francis Anderson retired in 1921. Mitchell, who died in 1962 at the age of 101, was Professor of Philosophy until 1922, and Vice Chancellor, then Chancellor at the University of Adelaide, ceasing his responsibilities only in 1948.

A variety of strains can be found within Australian idealism. Kantian and personalist influences were most fully represented, while Hegelian tendencies were more muted. Anderson, Laurie, and Miller, for example, were chiefly influenced by Kantian idealism, with its emphasis on the a priori conditions of knowledge. W. R. Boyce Gibson represented the personalist strain and derived much of his thought in response to Descartes and to the contemporary German thinker Rudolf Eucken. Miller was similarly influenced by Eucken, as was J. McKellar Stewart, who moved from Melbourne in 1923 to replace William Mitchell. Descartes was the focus of work by A. Boyce Gibson and W. A. Merrylees (Boyce Gibson 1932; Merrylees 1934). Bergson attracted considerable attention and was the subject of a study by McKellar Stewart (1911) and interested both Boyce Gibsons (Boyce Gibson 1937; Boyce Gibson 1911–1912)· W. R. Boyce Gibson studied with Husserl and McKellar Stewart wrote on him, although a book on his work was destroyed by fire while still in manuscript (Smart 1990). As we shall see, William Mitchell's complex variant of idealism was a curious blend of influences, including Reid, Green, Bradley, James Ward, and William James.

Selwyn Grave, in his seminal history of Australasian philosophy, partly attributed the prominence of idealism to its apparent links to orthodox Christianity, at a time when Christianity was both a key intellectual and public doctrine (Grave 1984, p. 25). Grave cited, in particular, the work of thinkers such as W. R. Boyce Gibson as exemplifying this approach. But while idealism was clearly religious and its practitioners often practicing Christians, it is not so obvious that idealist philosophy always sat easily with Christian doctrine. Rather, idealist thought could veer towards a generalised theism, linked to Christianity, but not equivalent to it. It is telling that A. Boyce Gibson noted that he was not brought up to believe in the Christian doctrine of incarnation and that it came upon him at a later point as a momentous discovery (Boyce Gibson 1964, p. 3).

The Idealist Concerns

The forms of idealism found in Australian philosophy are best characterised as a set of concerns rather than as a single body of doctrine. Starting from consciousness, and particularly from moral activity, idealists pursued moral, metaphysical, and religious themes, underpinned by a unified account of the world. They gave appropriate acknowledgement to the development of materialist natural sciences. Typically, they accepted the findings of natural science in all areas other than those that related to self-consciousness and the activities of mind. They refused to reduce consciousness or mind to matter and made mental and moral experience central to their account of the unity of the world. The idealists took little interest in, and were often hostile to, other doctrines that have sometimes been labelled 'idealist', such as the attempt to resolve all reality into mental phenomena or the theory of perception in general.

Miller's account of Laurie's position might also be taken to summarise much of the early Australian idealist position:

> An idealism that denies external reality is no true idealism. The experience of the real is admitted. What the idealist wants to know is the nature and meaning of reality; and as to its nature and meaning there may be and is a great variety of opinions. No one in his senses doubts the existence of material objects. . . . In a like manner we know mental facts as distinct from physical facts or processes. We may speak of mental processes as internal and of physical processes as external; but neither internality nor externality is applicable to mental processes as such. They are entirely different from the physical. They are not coordinate, to use Mitchell's words with which Laurie agrees; and "their correlation does not mean identity of nature". (Miller 1930, p. 10).

When seen in the context of later developments in philosophy, the idealists often appear to eschew technical argument and definition. With the exception of Mitchell, the idealist approach to philosophy appears more literary in orientation, but also directed to a wider audience than much more recent work. A particular strength of the idealist approach to philosophy was the ability to bring multiple perspectives to bear on an issue, both critically and constructively. An example of this was the tendency to approach a key theme, such as the concept of personality, simultaneously from a moral, metaphysical, and psychological perspective. They typically sought to penetrate or to grasp an issue in its fundamentals, and subsequently to convey the insight they had gained to others. In the work of some of the idealists, it was clearly also their intention to motivate and inspire others in their own work.

As in Britain, idealism in Australia was a philosophy of engagement with moral and social issues. Many of its adherents made significant practical contributions to society and politics. Francis Anderson was notably influential in the reform of teaching in New South Wales and through a variety of other movements such as the League of Nations Union (O'Neil 1979). Mitchell became a prominent university administrator (Edgeloe 1993), as did others such as Morris Miller. In New Zealand, MacGregor was an important advocate of social Darwinist policies, having retained much of the influence of Herbert Spencer, who was widely reviled by most idealists (Tennant 1993; Tennant and Hanson 1979). William Anderson engaged with issues associated with educational reform and the development of 'self' and character (W. Anderson 1928, 1944).

Henry Jones' Tour of Australia

While the influence of Hegel, with its emphasis on the development of mind and on history, was less prominent in Australasian philosophy, it was the great Welsh philosophical orator and Hegelian Henry Jones (1852–1922) who provided one of the landmark events in Australasian philosophy.

In July and August 1908, Jones, Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, undertook what must surely be the largest, and perhaps the only, blockbuster philosophical tour of Australia (Boucher 1990). Among those who attended his public lectures was Alfred Deakin, three-time Prime Minister of Australia, close friend of the American idealist philosopher Josiah Royce and himself recognised by a number of philosophers for his philosophical interests. Jones toured Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Newcastle, and Wollongong.

He was feted on his travels and drew audiences of up to 800 people to his lectures. His Sydney lectures were subsequently published as *Idealism as a Practical Creed* (Jones 1909) and became an important reference point for a variety of figures who sought to link the philosophical and the political worlds.

Jones had both personal and intellectual affinities with many of the philosophers and other key figures he met. In Sydney, for example, his friend Mungo MacCallum was Professor of English. In Melbourne, he dined with the Governor (a personal friend), Deakin, and Laurie, with whom he shared a deep admiration for Browning. In Adelaide, he met with Mitchell whose *Structure and Growth of the Mind* (1907) he had read for Macmillan.

Characterised as a ‘preacher’ of philosophy, Jones found a receptive audience for his message that the universe is a spiritual unity. He claimed that his Hegelian philosophy reflected the teaching of Jesus, and interpreted evolution as a theory that spiritualised nature. Jones was particularly important as a social and practical philosopher, building a case for State legislative intervention to provide the conditions for the development of character. In Australia he welcomed, and sought to inspire, social and political experiment. Both Deakin and H. V. Evatt welcomed his theoretical account of the breakdown of the opposition of liberalism and socialism that they each sought in practice (Boucher 1990; Hetherington 1924, pp. 103–109, 209–212).

It would be going too far to suggest that Jones’ tour in itself had a lasting impact on the philosophical and political climate in Australia, but his sojourn is important for the light it sheds on the openness of Australian intellectual life at the time to idealist thinking.

Early New Zealand Philosophy

As in Australia, the majority of prominent early philosophers in New Zealand were from Scotland, although they often owed more to other traditions, rather than to modern idealism.

Commencing in 1871 at the University of Otago, Duncan MacGregor (1843–1906) was the first appointment to a Chair of Philosophy in New Zealand. He is perhaps best considered as a Spencerian and controversialist, rather than an idealist. Born in Aberfeldy, Perthshire, MacGregor studied at the University of Aberdeen and distinguished himself by winning a Fullerton, Moir, and Gray Scholarship in Classics and Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. He followed this with a medical degree at the University of Edinburgh. It was on the strength of his potential that he was made, at the age of 27, the youngest professorial appointment at Otago and therefore the youngest in the country. Uniquely, MacGregor was the first at Dunedin hospital to perform an operation ‘under Listerian principles of antiseptic surgery’. This was all the more remarkable as he was qualified as an academic of medicine and a health administrator, not as a surgeon! (Tennant 1993).

MacGregor is remembered less for his philosophical output and more for the force and nature of his personality as well as his radical views on social policy.

An early defender of female emancipation, as well as an enthusiast of Spencerian principles of social Darwinism, MacGregor argued on grounds of social inclusion, and preparedness for 'the battle of life', that women should abandon Miltonian ideals of womanly submissiveness, eschew 'ivy drapery' and 'tawdry accomplishments', and be treated and regarded in exactly the same way as men (Tennant 1993). MacGregor was also noted for producing a series of articles on poverty, arguing that the colonies offered a chance to 'turn over a new leaf in the history of nations' (Coleman 1958; MacGregor 1876). However, MacGregor's rationale for this was Spencerian: 'the hopelessly lazy, the diseased, and the vicious' would normally be 'weeded out by natural selection', and it was the task of modern society to incarcerate the diseased, the dangerous, and the destitute (MacGregor 1876). MacGregor also appeared to be concerned about the 'contamination' of New Zealand society by lower races (Tennant 1993).

MacGregor created a storm of controversy when he advocated the study of evolutionary biology and sociology, coupled with a religious agnosticism (Numbers and Stenhouse 2000, p. 337). He also persisted in teaching evolutionary theory to students intended for the Presbyterian Ministry. This infuriated those who hoped he would be a safe appointment to the Chair. The Presbyterian Synod, and some influential church members, advocated that students withdraw from his classes and tried to prevent his further influence by unsuccessfully attempting to divide the professorial chair he occupied (Tennant 1993). MacGregor is probably the only professor of philosophy to forge a subsequent career as Inspector of Lunatic Asylums, a position he held from 1886 until 1898. In this capacity, he continued to advocate social Darwinism by means of a 'scientific' approach to welfare in his reports to parliament (Egarr 2006; MacGregor 1897; Murray 1944; Tennant and Hanson 1979).

William Salmond (1835–1917) was born and educated in Edinburgh where he studied theology, eventually becoming a minister in North Shields, England, for 17 years. He was appointed as the first professor of Theology at the Presbyterian Theological College in Dunedin in 1876. Following the publication of his *The Christian Doctrine of Providence and Prayer and the Reign of Law* (Salmond 1875), Salmond gained a reputation as an apologist for the 'reasonableness of Christianity'. This led to his succeeding MacGregor in the Otago Chair of Philosophy. The Presbyterian Synod of the time hoped for a religiously orthodox philosopher at the helm (Matheson 1993). He followed his appointment, however, with the publication of *The Reign of Grace* (Salmond 1888), a provocative document arguing for the compatibility of science and religion and decrying the 'intellectual terrorism' of Calvinism as inhumane. He was accused of hypocrisy and his views were denounced as heretical, although Salmond ultimately retained his appointment (Matheson 1993).

Salmond's replacement, Francis W. Dunlop (1874–1932), was appointed professor of philosophy at Otago in 1911. Like Boyce Gibson in Melbourne, Dunlop was associated with the work of Rudolf Eucken; Dunlop studied with Eucken and wrote his dissertation on Hegel: *Hauptomente in Hegel's Begriff der Personlichkeit* (1903). His philosophical output was scant, and his only known publication is *Deep Love's Severity and Other Sermons* (Dunlop 1908).

Other foundation professorial appointments in New Zealand include C. F. Salmond, son of William, at the University of Canterbury (appointed in 1901) and Hugh Mackenzie (1861–1930) at Victoria University (appointed in 1899). Neither appointment led to major philosophical output (Gardner et al. 1973; History of Philosophy at the University of Canterbury; Salmond 1929, 1930).

Mackenzie's professorial chair was in English Language and Literature. However, in keeping with the spirit of the times, he was prepared to be 'professor of things in general' including Mental Science (Ardley 1982). His only known writings, on aesthetics, the development of the English Language, and a variety of religious themes, remain unpublished (Mackenzie 1911, 1917a, b, 1921).

Mackenzie's work at Victoria was supplemented by the arrival of Thomas Hunter (1876–1953), an English rationalist philosopher, appointed in 1907 to the Chair of Mental Science and Economics (later Mental Science and Moral Philosophy). Hunter was strongly influenced by the psychological work of William Wundt, E. B. Titchener, and William Rivers and applied the new theories and experimental approaches developed in Europe to problems of perception and learning. He became Principal of the university and then its first Vice Chancellor and was knighted in 1939 (Beaglehole 1946, 1951, 2007). However, like MacGregor, Dunlop, both Salmonds, and Mackenzie, Hunter produced little in the way of philosophical publications; what he did produce bore evidence of his psychological interests (Hunter 1924, 1927, 1928, 1932, 1952). However, he did leave behind the first experimental psychology laboratory in New Zealand (Brown and Fuchs 1971).

The only other New Zealand philosopher besides Dunlop to hold discernibly idealist views, and who did publish philosophical work, was John Anderson's brother, William Anderson (1889–1955). Like his brother John, Anderson was educated in Glasgow under Henry Jones. Like John, William found a professorial post in the far-flung colonies. Anderson succeeded the indefatigable New Zealander J. P. Grossman (1865–1953) to the chair at the University of Auckland in 1921 (Ardley 1982). During his tenure, Anderson was influential in promoting quasi-religious, Aristotelian, and democratic strands of idealist thought, especially as they applied to educational policy. He exhibited 'an antipathy to state control and centralised administration', a commitment to rationality, and an 'instinct of decency faithful to the common man' (Ardley 1982, pp. 18–20). William Anderson entered the fray of educational reform, arguing in *The Flight from Reason in New Zealand Education* that it was wrong that only the wealthy could afford 'what has hitherto been the right of all, a grammar-school education' (Anderson 1944, p. 7; Collins 2003).

While not as prolific as his younger brother across the Tasman, he did leave a number of papers on topics as diverse as 'Psycho-biology and Democracy', 'Self', and 'Academic Freedom' (Anderson 1923b, 1926, 1928, 1930b, c, 1934, 1938a, b). His philosophy has been described as being written in the language of Bradley, Bosanquet, Caird, and Green, but being 'directed to the pregnant simplicities of reflective common sense and to the cultivation in his students of *theoria* and *phronesis* in a manner which would have won Aristotle's approval' (Ardley 1982, p. 18).

According to Anderson, 'Philosophy is the theory of practice', 'coextensive with political theory', and 'the nearest analogue of philosophy is to be found in the deliberative and legislative functions of a democratic community' (Anderson 1923b, pp. 241, 246). The aim of philosophy, moreover, is mental contemplation, from which flows good deliberation and morally correct practice. Naturalist views of the world, according to Anderson, are misguided in abandoning the importance of reflective contemplation. They have got the 'world the wrong way up' (Ardley 1982, p. 19). This anti-naturalist attitude informs Anderson's views on the nature of mind and consciousness. In his paper on 'Self', for example, Anderson argues for an account of self as a 'supreme universal', distinct from its various particular realisations (Anderson 1928). In view of John Anderson's philosophical trajectory on matters concerning naturalism and the self, nothing could be more different. Intellectually at least, the Anderson brothers may well have stared uncomprehendingly at each other across the Tasman.

In contrast to the early New Zealand philosophers, their Australian counterparts were relatively prolific, and in the following sections we detail some of the concerns of each of the major Australian idealists.

Henry Laurie (1837–1922): Australia's First Professor of Philosophy

Henry Laurie was the first person to be appointed to a chair of philosophy in Australia, a position he held from 1886 to 1911. This appointment occurred following the secession of Philosophy from the Classics department at the University of Melbourne in 1881.

Laurie is now remembered largely for his founding role in academic philosophy, and particularly for having written an article advocating the creation of a chair in philosophy shortly before being appointed to a lectureship in philosophy in 1881. Laurie was, however, highly regarded as a teacher and for his critical commentaries. More than a century later, his book *Scottish Philosophy in its National Development* remains a clear and insightful discussion of the leading Scottish thinkers from the early eighteenth century onwards (Laurie 1902). Laurie adopted a consistent critical position throughout the book, which drew on a Kantian theory of knowledge and a moral theory continuous with the idealist revival of the late nineteenth century. In Passmore's view, Laurie attempted 'to retain the distinction between God, the individual mind, and nature … by grafting quasi-Kantian idealism onto a Scottish common-sense stem' (Passmore 1963, p. 140).

Born in Scotland in 1837, Laurie studied at the University of Edinburgh, where he came under the influence of A. Campbell Fraser. He never graduated, having suffered from poor health. Instead, he emigrated first to Canada and then to Australia in 1864, settling at Warrnambool, where he became town clerk and then a journalist. In 1877 he co-founded the *Warrnambool Standard*, which continues to this day (Smith 1986, pp. 7–8). Laurie, like Quaife, therefore enjoyed the distinction of having been a newspaper editor before becoming a professional philosopher. During and after his professional career, Laurie continued to participate in broader public life, publishing journalistic pieces, poetry and work on ethics, Browning, and Plato.

Browning's poetry was particularly important to Laurie, whose philosophy reflected many of its themes. For Laurie, Browning showed the ability of art to lead philosophical thought; Browning was interested in the world of thought and feeling, rather than that of action. For Laurie, Browning's poetry explored an aspiration towards an ideal, rather than an ideal attained. Browning showed a 'faith that a wise and good Intelligence is at the heart of things, that the world is the manifestation of a loving purpose, and that even sin and sorrow are subservient to the good'. Yet Browning's faith also held that the power for good 'demands the moral activity of man' (Laurie 1889, 1912, pp. 59–60).

Laurie's Idealism

Laurie was known for the fairness of his critical appraisals of the work of others; Grave noted that even Laurie's students had difficulty identifying a clear philosophical orientation in his work. Grave nevertheless characterised Laurie as 'a sort of idealist, an idealist of the sort disposed to regard itself as a sort of realist' (Grave 1984, p. 16). The comment might also be made of many others in the tradition, whose idealism implied contact of the mind with the reality in which it participated. Idealists such as Henry Jones, for example, denied the possibility of epistemology, because it was a theory of the mediation of mind and reality.

Miller, who had been a student of Laurie and wrote a lengthy appreciation of his work, stressed that he had been a critical thinker rather than a systematic one (Miller 1930, p. 5). Nevertheless, to be an idealist at this time was certainly to hold, more or less explicitly, a systematic conception of philosophy and of reality. Indeed, Miller drew attention to several elements in Laurie's philosophy that point to an inherently unified view, including his treatment of psychology as a propaedeutic to philosophy, as well as a focus on moral experience.

In his last published work, *Plato in English Literature*, Laurie identified Plato as 'a great Idealist', but distinguished three kinds of idealism. The first kind of idealism resolves all knowledge into 'sensations or other states of Mind'. This 'subjective idealism' was a 'heresy' that could not be attributed to Plato (though it fits a common caricature of idealist thought). The second kind of idealism emphasises the role of ideals in human life, both in terms of our ability to form them and to pursue them. This makes Plato and everyone else an idealist, and Laurie chose rather to restrict this definition to those who pursue 'worthy ideals'. The third type of idealism was, however, the most important. In the third sense, idealism is a 'theory of the universe' or of 'reality'. The highest ideals we pursue are taken to be a clue to reality, and the world is interpreted in their light. The good, the true, and the beautiful become concepts through which to interpret the Universe. Plato was to be understood as the 'great protagonist of Idealism' in this sense, but Laurie also cited the personal idealist A. S. Pringle-Pattison in this regard (Laurie 1921, pp. 2, 4–6).

Laurie did not call himself an idealist in any of the three senses, although his affinities were most clearly with the second and third definitions. His clearest personal statements were either as an advocate of ‘mental philosophy’ in general or as a staunch critic of materialism. In his ‘A Plea for Philosophy’ from 1881 and ‘The Study of Mental Philosophy’ of 1885, Laurie argued for the key role of philosophy in civilisation and education while recognising the pragmatic and ‘utilitarian spirit of the age’ (Laurie 1881, p. 76). Nevertheless, he argued that philosophical questions could not be avoided. Philosophical positions were betrayed in the work of, for example, physical scientists and theologians. They were also explored by the poets: Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning could in fact be said to have been in advance of philosophical thought. Philosophy in the late nineteenth century, and particularly in the British universities, was renascent, largely through the renewed stimulus of continental European thought. The study of philosophy was therefore an essential aspect of student contact with the directions of modern thought and the intellectual traditions out of which it had arisen (Laurie 1881, 1885).

Laurie’s Theory of Mind

Underpinning Laurie’s view that philosophical questions could not be avoided was a Kantian view of knowledge, which is evident throughout all of his writings. Against the view that knowledge arises out of experience alone, he maintained that mind ‘contributes certain elements of cognition’. In particular, it provides the key concepts of universality and necessity which support scientific and practical experience alike. Knowledge is ‘experience *plus* the thinking mind’. Laurie held that this was in itself sufficient to dispose of materialism, since materialism as it stood sought to explain knowledge by reference to the material world and the effects of sensation (Laurie 1881).

The theory of knowledge was, however, less important to Laurie’s philosophy than the metaphysical aspects of his theory of mind and his moral philosophy. In a substantial piece on ‘Materialism’, from 1907, Laurie set out the reasons why he rejected materialism. Mental facts and physical facts are distinct and mental facts are never resolvable into physical facts. Therefore they are not resolvable into biological facts either (Laurie 1908).

Laurie was prepared to follow the notion that there is a science of the brain and that this would show that mental facts are ‘changes in the nervous system’. But material facts and mental facts differ significantly. A material object occupies space, but mental facts (such as mental objects or mental acts) do not. The two may be correlated, but are always distinct. Nor are mental facts a form of motion of the brain, and mental actions are not properties of material things; the brain is not the mind, and the mind is not the brain. Whereas we can seek to be acquainted with physical facts by attending to them, we become acquainted with the mind by introspection. Similarly, while matter involves energy, there is no equivalence between volition and muscular movement. Where the materialist theory explains how physical causes produce physical effects, it cannot explain how consciousness can be a by-product of such causal chains. Nor can it, therefore, explain how mental life is full of activity and life. Following G. F. Stout, Laurie argued that, on the materialist theory, 'mind has no efficiency within itself. We do not direct our thoughts or imaginations... man as a conscious being never does anything at all' (Laurie 1908, pp. 250, 256).

Laurie's Moral Theory

The moral sphere was, for Laurie as for most other idealists, both the distinguishing point between the world of the mind and the world of physical science, and supremely active and self-governing. In 'Materialism', Laurie drew attention to the world of our mental experience as representing a 'unity of consciousness' in a 'continuous series'; it is only in such terms that man can be understood. The unity of consciousness, however, brings a new character into the world, of which a theory of the universe or of reality must take adequate account (Laurie 1908, pp. 259–260). In his criticism of Reid, Laurie argued that moral actions are influenced by moral motives, but that they go beyond this and express character. Personality is free, not in the sense of being independent of motives, or apart from them, but in the sense of being able to form and act on moral ideals—'there is nothing parallel to this in the sphere of physical causation' (Laurie 1902, p. 158). Moral causes produce moral effects. Moral intuitions, he argued, involve the pursuit of ideals, which have changed over generations. These intuitions cannot be explained by hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics, but only by the handing down of moral precepts in writing, orally, and in examples, including through punishment (Laurie 1903).

Science and philosophy alike presuppose that the world is intelligible. For natural science, this intelligibility comes from concepts such as causation. For the moral sphere, it comes from the experience of ends, purpose, and choice. In 'Materialism', Laurie ventured the view that the mechanical world might also be subject to the concept of ends. The material world could be understood only in relation to thought. Intelligence combines qualities into precepts; mind is constructive, and the distinction between mind and matter arises only through the activity of thought. Far from mind being an effect of matter, matter exists only as related to mind. A unified account of the world would be achieved by showing that the mechanical world and the moral world are in fact united under concepts that apply to mind, particularly the concept of purpose. The theory of evolution would be preserved because the universe would be read in the light of the highest features of evolution. Indeed, the evolution of the universe would no longer be seen as 'a succession of aimless changes; it is instinct with purpose, shot through and through with thought' (Laurie 1908, p. 262).

It seems, then, as if Laurie had, at least at some point in his career, succumbed to the 'heresy' of abolishing matter by resolving it into mind. But this would be to misunderstand his point. Laurie sought to preserve a unitary explanation of the world. He had rejected materialism as a sole explanatory causal factor. Laurie rejected parallelism because it violated the concept of a single universe and he could not accept that mind and matter were completely isolated from each other (Laurie 1908, p. 258). He maintained their distinction but offered the interpretative concepts of ends and purpose, which he held to be fundamental to the moral world, as the basis for the interpretation of the universe as a whole. The unity of the universe is interpretative, rather than reductive.

Perhaps the most remarkable of Laurie's published papers is his lecture 'Some Thoughts on Immortality' (1901), which brings together many of his key themes, and strikes an unusual balance between the critical and constructive tendencies in his thought. Laurie followed Kant in rejecting any argument for immortality based on the nature of the soul and in turning attention to the moral argument. This is an argument that we pursue as our highest goals ends which can be attained; there can be progress towards an ideal. Laurie noted, though, that Kant anchored his argument in a relatively weak case for the existence of God. Laurie's own response was to focus on elaborating the moral argument, preserving immortality as a plausible hypothesis (Laurie 1901).

Science presupposes that the world is an intelligible system, and Laurie extended this assumption to religion and morality. When the universe is seen as rational from the perspective of morality, it is difficult to see it as being so irrational as to permit the pursuit of ideals that can never be fulfilled, and then for the pursuit to end abruptly in death. Materialism would hold otherwise, but materialism fails because mind cannot be reduced to a by-product of physiological change. Matter can be 'conceived only as related to sentience and thought'. The idea that the soul perishes with the death of the body has as much plausibility as the idea that it survives. The hope of immortality cannot be abolished by any argument about the relationship of mind and body. Neither can any hypothesis about immortality be proved as if it was a scientific hypothesis. There is no ground for dogmatic assertions about immortality, either for or against. But the hope may be found, as with Tennyson and Browning, conjoined with ethical feeling. It is a belief not a desire, one that results from interpreting the universe from a moral perspective: 'To one in the plenitude of life, life approves itself and gives promise of its continuance' (Laurie 1901, pp. 22, 25).

Francis Anderson (1858–1941): The Christian Idealist

Francis Anderson's role in Sydney philosophy was akin to that of Laurie in Melbourne. Anderson was the first Challis Professor of Logic and Mental Philosophy, a position he held from 1890 until 1921, having first been made Lecturer in Logic and Mental Philosophy in 1888. Like Laurie, Anderson was a Scot who emigrated first to Victoria in 1886; unlike Laurie, Anderson had a strong background as a professional philosopher (Lovell 1941; O'Neil 1979).

Anderson was a graduate of the University of Glasgow, where he had a very successful career. As the result of winning a fellowship, for 2 years Anderson became an assistant to Edward Caird. He also pursued theological studies and taught English literature.

Since his death, Anderson's reputation has rested on his contributions to the broader field of education reform. He was involved in a considerable expansion of the scope of university teaching. The subjects he promoted ranged from economics, politics, sociology, and psychology to teaching. Anderson also played a key role in redefining the expectations of a university education.

Anderson was particularly influential outside the university, in areas ranging from adult education to the school system in general. His early experience as a fourteen-year-old 'pupil-teacher' in Scotland fortified his criticisms of the school system, and his commentaries provoked a commission that led to the abolition of the 'pupil-teacher' system in New South Wales and its replacement by a Teachers' College. Among his other pursuits, he edited the *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*, was Chairman of the Council of Social Service, and State President of the League of Nations Union. His first wife, Maybanke, was a prominent suffragist and social reformer who he met through the Kindergarten Union (Roberts 1997).

In an age when philosophers often taught across wide areas, Anderson had perhaps the largest brief of any of the early teachers, although he was eventually able to relinquish the teaching of psychology to an assistant, H. T. Lovell. As with many of the early figures in Australian universities, Anderson was a revered teacher, renowned for his sincerity, passion, charm, earnestness, and a relative familiarity with his students (Lovell 1941, pp. 99, 101).

Anderson's Christian Idealism

Anderson has been variously described as an 'idealist and liberal' or a 'Christian idealist'. Grave has characterised his key message as one of 'self-realisation'. Lovell concluded that 'Anderson's system was a generous eclecticism governed by a preference for moral philosophy and a keen interest in sociology... His position was at once idealist and liberal—an idealism which served to draw its main inspiration from Kant's Categorical Imperative, a liberalism which knew how to examine dispassionately the work of the Marxian school' (Grave 1984, p. 20; Lovell 1941, p. 101).

The moral concern predominates in Anderson's published work, but it was underpinned by a conception of the real as rational (Anderson 1923a, 1930a, 1931a, b, c, d). In a paper extolling the philosophy of T. H. Green, Anderson noted Green's constant practical and theoretical engagement with 'ethics and politics'. This should be seen as a corrective to the narrowness of English philosophy from Bacon, through Locke, to Mill and Spencer. But Green's moral philosophy itself emerged out of a broader concern to achieve a unity of knowledge. Green had placed development at the centre of philosophy and seen 'that all nature is a process of unfolding' that is animated by a 'spiritual principle which can only be described as thought or reason'. Indeed, there are 'ends immanent in nature', and it is with these that the ‘scientific explanation of life’ begins. And while it begins there, it cannot end there for, on this account of the world, religion crowns knowledge, and ethics flows from the spiritual character of the world (Anderson 1902, pp. 177, 186–188).

Anderson’s Views of Personality and Morality

In his 1922 monograph, *Liberty, Equality and Fraternity*, Anderson argued that there had been four key revolutions in history, each of which was based on an ideal of ‘liberty, equality, and fraternity’, although not on the same form of each concept. There was first a spiritual Buddhist revolution, then a Christian religious revolution, a political revolution exemplified by that of France, and, finally, an economic revolution, still underway. Anderson assessed each revolution in terms of its moral and social dimensions. Buddhism was moral, but inwards in its orientation, and lacked an effective ‘social gospel’. Christianity centred on personal life, but had been interpreted through a focus on individual conscience, rather than through its social aspect.

For Anderson, the principle of personality provided the only true foundation for civilisation as a series of reciprocal moral relationships. It also provided the basis for criticism. The French revolution, for example, was political and economic, but it had a purely negative focus on removing restrictions on action, rather than on the use of freedom; liberty, equality, and fraternity were formal and negative conceptions. The Russian revolution similarly failed to address the moral dimension of social and political problems, and Anderson argued that State collectivism could not be a means to achieve the ‘full and free development of the activities of man as a moral and spiritual being’. In later years, Anderson was a fierce critic of totalitarianism in all its forms (F. Anderson 1922, p. 21).

To take a positive moral view of freedom is to seek to combine love and justice. Kant’s moral law is a pointer to this, because it sees man as an end and not simply as a means. But the true combination of love and justice is only achieved in the idea of God. This draws reform back to the principle of personality, which Anderson saw as the foundation of Christianity. The story of history is the story of the unfolding or discovery of personality, but man breaks the limits of history in pursuit of his moral goal. The moral dimension is essential to make social and political reform into true reform, to make not merely a human life, but ‘the good life’ possible for all (F. Anderson 1922, pp. 17, 20–24).

A New Civilisation

The moral concern similarly underpinned Anderson’s work with the League of Nations Union and his commentary on the developing crisis in international relations in the 1930s. He argued that conflict was inevitable in human affairs, but that war should not be equated with conflict. War arises from ‘the same spirit of violence and domination, which is the fundamental evil in human nature'. It would never be enough to pursue military disarmament, without at the same time pursuing economic and moral disarmament. It was the last of these which was the most important. He saw the principles of the League as those of a true internationalism, of 'mutual tolerance, respect for law, and sustained rational control'. In turn, this was part of a broader movement to a new civilisation, whose economic, political, and social systems must reflect new ends and values, and which was promoted by increasing physical connection and economic integration (Anderson 1935, pp. 9, 42).

Anderson criticised leaders in whatever field who were seeking to hinder the growth of the new international civilisation through policies such as economic nationalism. He particularly condemned Capitalism, Communism, and Fascism alike for their narrow conceptions of man and dictatorships of all types for their attacks on freedom. Indeed, he regarded those who rejected the gospel of peace in favour of force exercised without responsibility as embodying the Anti-Christ. The question to ask in relation to support or opposition to the League of Nations was 'Who is on God's side?' (Anderson 1935, pp. 11, 25, 34).

Sir William Mitchell (1861–1962): The Gifford Lecturer

Scottish-born Sir William Mitchell, the Hughes Professor of Philosophy and Vice Chancellor at the University of Adelaide, was the first major philosopher to live and work in South Australia. From the commencement of the University of Adelaide in 1874 and until the appointment of Mitchell, the Hughes Chair linked Mental and Moral Philosophy with English. The holder was not expected to be a specialist in Philosophy (Miller 1929, p. 248n). Mitchell's first predecessor, the Rev. John Davidson (1834–1881), who studied at St. Andrews, was neither a philosopher nor a graduate and was not 'of any great culture' (Walker 1972). He was replaced by Irishman Edward Vaughan Boulger, who initially showed great promise and who was appointed to the chair in 1883. However, in 1894, Boulger 'resorted to stimulants' and resigned after failing to perform his duties ('Boulger, Edward Vaughan, 1846–?' 1969). Boulger was followed by Mitchell, who was the first real philosopher in Adelaide and certainly the first philosopher working in Australasia to gain significant recognition overseas.[1]

Mitchell was born in Inveravon in Banffshire, Scotland, in 1861. He was the son of a hill farmer and one of six children. Mitchell studied at the University of Edinburgh under Campbell Fraser, gaining his MA in Philosophy and then a D.Sc. by thesis in the Department of Mental Science in 1891. He reluctantly had a paper published in the journal *Mind* while still an undergraduate and, following this, was appointed as an assistant to Henry Calderwood. He was a lecturer in moral philosophy at Edinburgh (1887–1890), an examiner in Philosophy and English (1891–1894), and a lecturer in Ethics and Education at University College, London, and at the University of Cambridge during the same period. He also spent time as a lecturer and examiner in English for the Royal University of Breslau in Germany (Edgeloe 1986).

---

[1] This section is partly based on the following publications and is reproduced with permission: Davies (1999, 2003, 2004).

In 1895, Mitchell accepted the Hughes Chair in English Language and Literature and Mental and Moral Philosophy at the University of Adelaide, having declined the Chair of Philosophy and Economics at the University of New Brunswick, Canada, on health grounds (under threat of tuberculosis). He held the Chair in Adelaide from 1895 to 1922 (Boucher 2004; Davies 2003; Edgeloe 1986). Mitchell retired in 1948 at the age of 87, having served as Vice Chancellor (1916–1942) and later Chancellor (1942–1948), and serving on University Council for 52 years (Edgeloe 1986). He was the first (and to date only) philosopher working in Australia to give the Gifford Lectures, at the University of Aberdeen in 1924 and 1926. In 1927 he was knighted for his services to South Australia (Miller 1929). An impressive building at the University of Adelaide and a State electorate in South Australia are named after him.

Mitchell's Administrative Contributions and View of Education

Mitchell is remembered as an important administrative figure at Adelaide University. He was highly successful in obtaining government grants for the university. He also founded the Chair of Biochemistry (in which he installed his son, Mark); spent large sums on library acquisitions; and made many administrative contributions, mainly in the field of Education. These included dramatically restructuring the arts curriculum to provide 'a general education in opposition to the widely-accepted view that education was simply a means for "getting on"' (Edgeloe 1986, p. 535). Like Francis Anderson in Sydney, Mitchell's early education committed him to the importance of education as 'the formation of an intellectual, an aesthetic, and a moral character, together with various kinds of skill' (Boucher 2004; Edgeloe 1986). Central to this was the education of teachers themselves. To this end, Mitchell embarked on an ambitious plan known as the Mitchell-Bragg plan. This included forgoing university fees for 2 years for trainee teachers in undergraduate studies, who were housed within the university. This eventually resulted in Education becoming a separate bachelor's-level degree. In parallel, Mitchell also established an independent teacher training college with its own governing body (Edgeloe 1986).

In the educational climate of the time, Mitchell's views on education were quite radical. He claimed that the fragmentation of knowledge by reason into a variety of 'isms' was part of the problem in education. It had resulted in schools and universities trying to cover too much ground at the expense of considerations of practice and interest. The aim should be to remove the emphasis on dispassionate reason and return to considerations of *value:* 'Reason is no substitute for [living value] any more than physiology is a substitute for breathing and digesting' (Mitchell 1937, p. 7).

For Mitchell, this pointed to the need for an education system which provides opportunities for 'tacit knowledge' to be explicitly modelled by teachers. On Mitchell's view, the teacher models more than explicit rules: he or she also models implicit understanding. This provides an argument for the importance of practical education. Practical education fosters the intrinsic merit of interest and application and does not devalue practice in place of explicit learning via examinations (Mitchell 1895). True understanding, according to Mitchell, requires interest and attention to be generated, time to reflect and ponder, opportunity for explicit modelling of desired routines, and a forum for practicing what one thinks implicitly: '[T]he measure of value of . . . education is not the quantity of knowledge which it conveys, but that character and permanence of the interest it creates' (Mitchell 1895, p. 15). Elsewhere, Mitchell outlined his 'model' university:

> There would be no examinations, no essays, nor even any prescribed readings; and there would be no fee. But I should make attendance compulsory for the greater part of one year in about a student's third year, and voluntary thereafter. The route would, I believe, soon reach a stage where lectures would give place to discussion; and, from the start, the professor in charge would be more the director of a clinic than a lecturer. We might call him a professor without portfolio, because he is for all students. He would be familiar with philosophy, but he would have a province of his own, and no chair in the university would have its province better defined. (Mitchell, 1937, p. 3).

Mitchell was considered something of a polymath, being engaged to teach economics and education as well as philosophy, psychology, and literature. It might be disputed how much teaching he actually did in economics and literature—though a recent publication claims that he taught economics four evenings a week in addition to his other duties as Professor of Philosophy and Vice Chancellor (Economics at Adelaide 2003). There is no doubt that he was a man of considerable energy. It was perhaps for this reason that he famously described his professorial chair not as a chair but a sofa. Mitchell was also said to be an easy-going character, 'with absolutely no pretentiousness or pomposity about him' (Edgeloe 1986).

Mitchell wrote two books: his main work, *Structure and Growth of the Mind* (1907), and *The Place of Minds in the World* (1933). He also published a number of shorter papers on a variety of topics including 'Reform in Education', 'What is Poetry?', 'Lectures on Materialism', 'Christianity and the Industrial System', 'Nature and Feeling', 'The Quality of Life', and 'Universities and Life' (Mitchell 1895, 1898, 1903, 1912, 1929, 1934, 1937). Mitchell was also a regular contributor to the early editions of *Mind* and frequently wrote shorter pieces for newspapers on topical issues, such as the First World War. He argued for a patriotism that concentrated on 'the country's task, welfare, honour, and shame', as opposed to simplistic and jingoistic 'us versus them' nationalistic accounts (Edgeloe 1986; Mitchell 1918).

Because of his considerable abilities as an academic, administrator, and social commentator, Duncan and Leonard describe Mitchell as 'the nearest approach to a philosopher-king the academic world has ever seen' (Duncan and Leonard 1973, p. 78; Trahair 1984). Australian philosophy, it may be said, has seen no one like him, before or since (Thom 2007).

Mitchell's Philosophical Writing

Mitchell always considered himself to be, first and foremost, a philosopher (Smart 1962). Curiously, however, he is not remembered at all as such, and—like W. R. Boyce Gibson and Francis Anderson—in academic terms he is today a largely forgotten figure (Davies 2003). Until very recently, the last critical discussion to appear in print on Mitchell's work was probably in Blanshard's *Nature of Thought* in 1939 (Blanshard 1939); the last review of his books appeared in 1934 (Acton 1934; Harvey 1934). Little mention has been made of Mitchell in contemporary philosophical writing. In Honderich's *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Mitchell's *Structure and Growth of the Mind* is described as the last remaining example of Australian idealism which 'still survives' (Honderich 1995).

The contemporary neglect of Mitchell's work is in sharp contrast to the widespread praise he received for *Structure and Growth of the Mind*. Blanshard cited it extensively and confessed he owed Mitchell a 'large obligation' (Blanshard 1939, p. 97); Henry Jones, a normally severe critic, also outlined its merits in a reader's report by noting: 'it is extraordinarily strong and manifests throughout the most thorough philosophical grasp' (Boucher 2004). Norman Kemp-Smith praised it as 'undoubtedly one of the most important philosophical publications of recent years' (Kemp-Smith 1908, p. 332), and R. F. A. Hoernlé said: 'In a book where almost everything is good, it is hard to single out special points to praise' (Hoernlé 1909). J. R. Harvey rated Mitchell's second book, *The Place of Minds in the World*, as 'a book of first importance' (Harvey 1934, p. 106).

His contemporaries were, however, also highly critical of Mitchell's style. Even allowing for the conventions of the time—and taking into account the difficulty of the philosophical concepts he was engaged with—his work is badly written: often divorced of clear central themes, lacking in detailed exegesis, and ponderous in delivery. (A professor of classics at Adelaide at the time 'used to say that he could never understand Mitchell's books until he had translated them into Latin'.) (Duncan and Leonard, 1973, p. 19; Grave 1984, p. 22) One reviewer of *Structure and Growth of the Mind* pointed out that, while reading it, one always has to 'retrace one's steps and grope for the context'. The same reviewer complained that, because of 'no contour or difference in emphasis', reading the book was like 'swimming under water with never a chance to come up and look about' (Perry 1908, p. 45). Everybody, except Mitchell himself, found his work virtually impenetrable, particularly *The Place of Minds in the World*. A modern-day reader of Mitchell outlines the problem as follows: 'No professional philosopher these days reading for a publishing house (except perhaps for those wallowing in the slough of postmodernism) would let Mitchell get away with it' (Mortensen 2005, p. 300). More kindly, Passmore called Mitchell's books 'very obviously, the products of a solitary thinker' (1962, p. 145).

Mitchell's Philosophical Influences

A wide range of influences, idealist and empiricist, can be traced in Mitchell's philosophy (Davies 2003). From the common-sense philosophers such as Thomas Reid, Mitchell took the arguments advanced against solipsism and anti-realism. From T. H. Green, Mitchell derived the idea that an uninterpreted sense datum was simply folly. From F. H. Bradley, Mitchell took the idea that experience—at least initially—is a seamless unity of knower and known. From James Ward, Mitchell drew the important idea that organisms grow and an adequate explanation of mental activity must capture this. From William James, Mitchell gained an 'empiricist streak' (Thom 2007). Despite being often recognised as one of the 'triumvirate of early Australian idealists' (Franklin 2003; Grave 1976; Kennedy 1995, p. 75), alongside Laurie and Anderson, Mitchell always insisted in conversations with J. J. C. Smart, a successor in the Hughes Chair in Philosophy, that he was a staunch realist (Smart 1962).

Mitchell developed complex views on the relationship of mind and matter, which suggest that he was neither an anti-realist nor an anti-materialist, even though he did reject any simple-minded reductionism of mind and matter. Instead, he argued that:

> . . .When you try to picture the structure and the action of the mind, remember you are trying to picture the structure and action of the nervous system. In this way you will avoid the usual confusion of trying to picture a hybrid process consisting partly of visible movements and partly of invisible feelings. (Mitchell 1907, p. 7). . .
>
> . . .A mind and its experience are realities that are presentable to sense as the brain and its actions. In that respect the mind and experience are not parallel with nature, but part of it. And, on the other hand, the facts of nature, including the brain, whenever they are phenomena, are not parallel with mental phenomena, but part of them. (Mitchell 1907, p. 23). . .
>
> . . .As a thing in nature, as visible, tangible, occupying room, etc., the mind and its experiences are the brain and its processes. (Mitchell 1903, p. 10).

Passmore might have been only partly right when he described Mitchell's work as articulating 'an introduction to an idealist philosophy for which the mind is the central ontological conception' (1963, p. 146). Certainly, for Mitchell, the role of the mind and experience is a pre-eminent consideration. Perhaps the best way to understand Mitchell's thought is to see him as articulating a *methodological idealism:* the mind and its experiences are the way by which one can understand the brain and its processes.

Like other early Australian idealists, Mitchell gave appropriate acknowledgement to the development of materialist natural sciences. He more readily accepted, however, the findings of natural science that related to the nature of mind, even though he eschewed any simplistic reduction of 'mind and matter'. It was this that made his account of consciousness very complex indeed. Mitchell certainly did not work in the spirit of the Christian Idealists in Australia at the time, such as Francis Anderson, nor the 'personal idealists' such as W. R. Boyce Gibson. Neither did he attempt to run the gauntlet of their criticisms. Instead, he remained 'isolated in Adelaide and uninterested in philosophical controversy' (Passmore 1963, p. 148). Mitchell appeared to borrow what he liked from idealism and set about constructing his own very idiosyncratic system.

Mitchell's Philosophy of Mind

Mitchell's philosophical contributions had as their focus the nature of mind and experience. His particular interest was in the *growth* of the mind, and, to a lesser extent, its ontology. The key elements of his thought are easy enough to state in general terms: experience is the crucial element of our mental lives, or, to put it another way, 'mental activity is central in experience' (Miller 1929, p. 249). However, Mitchell was not merely interested in such conscious experiences. He recognised that not all experience is conscious, but is nonetheless important to the growth of the mind. Experience, for Mitchell, covered everything from sensory content, or *qualia*, to high-level intentional content at various levels.

For Mitchell, there was no principled epistemic divide to be drawn between the levels of experience. One learns about the mind primarily by studying experience directly as we live it (the 'direct' approach) and secondarily by studying the mind indirectly by means of the emerging sciences of the mind, for example, neuroscience (the 'indirect' approach). Knowledge acquired by means of the direct approach aids in directing attention to relevant features of the indirect approach. Mitchell noted that it is only because we have phenomenal experience that we can make sense, and give meaning to, brain processes—which he viewed as the neural correlates of experience (Mitchell 1903, pp. 10–11). This reverse-engineering approach is surprisingly contemporary. It is identical to recent approaches that use phenomenal experience to provide resources for the empirical findings from the cognitive and neurological sciences. These days this is sometimes known as the 'natural method' (Davies 2003, p. 180; Flanagan 1992; van Gulick 1993).

The action of mind is always action on an occasion (Miller 1929, p. 249). The occasion, according to Mitchell, is the moment and conditions under which an experience happens and the content that such conditions bring about. The occasion is a stimulus property (either mental, physical, or environmental). Experience is what the mind, the 'reacting structure', does in reaction to its environment. The organism aims to resolve occasions in order to achieve pragmatic and experiential ends. Thus, we focus our eyes to achieve a better view. However, this also occurs at higher levels. So, for example, our concepts are deployed in making sense of more complex experiences. Organisms start off by resolving low-level instinctual experiences and then move to higher, more satisfactory levels of experience, though there might be evolutionary and experiential constraints on particular creatures. As the idea of resolving experiences is a key to Mitchell's account, this leads to an account which demands *levels* of experiential content.

The sensory level is roughly equivalent to instinct. Some organisms remain at this level and advance no higher. As Mitchell defined it, the course of instinctive action is 'the power of pursuing an infinite variety of course [sic], directed throughout by present sensation' (1907, p. 194). The next level is perceptual intelligence, which is equivalent to content which already comes with the power to anticipate further experiences (e.g., we simply 'see' a display of objects and know how to react; we don't have to infer our course of action). This has a number of levels (feeling, practical and cognitive interests). Some organisms—some humans—even remain at these levels. The last level is cognitive intelligence which is influenced by rules, language, and principles, and it helps differentiate the expert from the non-expert.

On the metaphysics of mind, Mitchell argued that the capacity to experience allows an *inference* to the notion of mind (Allen 1984, p. 7). This is rather different from some current approaches which regard the capacity to experience as a reason to *deny* the existence of mind (Churchland 1979, 1986, 1988; Dennett 1988, 1991) By complete contrast, Mitchell thought that the very *structure* of experience is evidence that mind exists (otherwise there would be no evident structure).

Contemporary philosophers refer to the ‘easy’ and the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness. The ‘easy’ problem consists in how brains might do things such as represent perceptions in thought in a neural or computational form; the ‘hard’ problem consists in explaining how things seem to us in experience (the ‘what it is like’ of consciousness) (Chalmers 1996). Mitchell developed his ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ approaches to the mind over a century ago. The ‘indirect’ method offers a potentially complete understanding of ‘the immediate physical correlates’ of experience (Mitchell 1907, p. 450). The direct method offers an understanding of what experience is like ‘from the inside’. Both approaches, according to Mitchell, are essential. This is surprisingly anticipatory of later discussions in the philosophy of mind in Australia and elsewhere (Davies 2003).

Mitchell and Current Philosophy

Of all of the Australasian idealists, it is Mitchell whose work resonates most closely with current concerns. It is particularly relevant to current thinking among cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Mitchell was attempting something very new and original. He wrote on issues that are only today being discussed by philosophers and psychologists as ‘cognitive science’. Mitchell was interested in science, and especially the psychology, physiology, and neurology of his day. He read and digested Baldwin’s *Mental Development of the Child and the Race* (1906), Loeb’s *Comparative Physiology of the Brain* (1900), and Campbell’s *Histological Studies on the Localisation of Cerebral Function* (1905), among other texts, as well as a large number of scientific and medical journal articles (Davies 2003, p. 32n). In his series of Gifford Lectures he aimed to ‘discover what conclusions about the place and power of minds emerge when due emphasis is placed upon philosophical and scientific inquiries’ (Acton 1934, p. 243), an approach which can be said to have ‘a very contemporary ring about it’ (Thom 2007).

Mitchell’s *Structure and Growth of the Mind* stands as a major (if now unread) treatise on philosophical psychology (Davies 2003; Mortensen 2005). He seemed to have anticipated the claims of the ‘new mysterians’ or ‘new dualists’ and their emphasis on *qualia*, or subjective experience (Davies 1999). He also seemed to have anticipated themes associated with perceptual plasticity and developmental accounts of the modularity of mind. Liberally interpreted, he might even be seen as prefiguring connectionist accounts of consciousness with his remarks about 'the localisation of sensation and intelligence' being 'spread over the entire cortex. The arrival platforms, or projection areas of mere sensation, extend each to an indefinite margin, which includes, without a definite dividing line, the parts that are concerned with organising the sensory elements into definite wholes and parts' (Mitchell 1907, p. 483). This was a remarkable a priori conjecture for 1907 and it is not, in essence, dissimilar from modern accounts: 'a percept is a pattern of activation over a set of processing units which takes place via the propagation of activation among units via weighted connections' (McClelland 1999, p. 137).[2]

Mitchell's first book ranged over issues in mind and content, philosophical psychology, and neuroscience. His second book covered issues overlapping mind and the philosophy of physics. This included the then relatively new area of quantum mechanics. The only copy of the third manuscript of *The Power of Mind*—intended as part of a trilogy—is said to have been lost during the London bombing raids in the 1940s. There are, however, surviving manuscripts of this last book and summaries of the Gifford Lectures (Mitchell 1926). Regrettably, none of these has ever reached print.

William Ralph Boyce Gibson (1869–1935): A Philosophy of Immediate Experience

Like Mitchell, W. R. Boyce Gibson is now relatively little known in Australian philosophical circles. A chair and a Departmental library at Melbourne University commemorate the contribution that he and his successor, his son Alexander, made as Professors of philosophy from 1912 to 1965. W. R. Boyce Gibson's translation of Husserl's *Ideas* remains well known, but his prolific writings across a wide range of philosophical concerns are now rarely read.[3]

Gibson, like John Anderson in Sydney, was a student of Henry Jones at Glasgow. Both Anderson and Gibson reacted against Jones' absolutist form of idealism. Anderson became a vigorous and distinctive realist. Gibson took an altogether different path, turning first to an alternative movement known as personal idealism, and subsequently attempting to show how the conflict between absolute and personal idealism could be overcome by reinterpreting absolute idealism on personal idealist lines.

Gibson was born in Paris in 1869. His father William was a Methodist minister, while his mother, Helen, was the daughter of a prominent Wesleyan. The religious element ran strongly in Gibson's subsequent philosophy and family life, with his brother and one of his sons becoming ministers, and he and Alexander making religion a key theme of their philosophical work. Philosophy ran strong, as another son, Quentin, also became a philosopher. His son Ralph became a leading figure in the Communist Party, which his widow, Lucy, also joined after his death (Boucher 2005; Grave 1981; Merrylees 1935).

---

[2] Space does not permit an outline of these themes. For a detailed account, see Davies (1999, 2003).

[3] This section draws on Helgeby (2006), with permission.

Gibson's early training and career were in mathematics. This interest in mathematics survived into his later work in two forms—through a concern with contemporary developments in physical science and in his work on logic. His turn to philosophy involved studies in both Paris and Glasgow. Rudolf Eucken exerted a particularly strong hold. Gibson undertook a number of translations of Eucken's work with his wife Lucy, as well as a full-scale commentary on *Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life* (Boyce Gibson 1907).

The attraction of Eucken was his attempt to develop a life-philosophy that was also a philosophy of reality. Eucken articulated a spiritual philosophy and sought to 'detect the working of this cosmic life within us'. Spiritual life should be seen as a development of the universe, appropriated through faith, and existing as 'ceaseless conflict'. For Eucken, life in the twentieth century must seek to reconcile rationalism with the historical approach and to renew Christianity in a new 'passionate' and 'constructive' phase of religion, grounded in life (Boyce Gibson 1907, p. 3; Eucken 1909).

Gibson became Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at the University of Melbourne in 1911, arriving in Australia in 1912; he served from then until 1934. He came to Australia with his reputation established and having published books on ethics, Eucken, religion, and logic. While he envisaged a second volume on logic, he did not write it and produced no further books. Instead, his philosophical output in Australia was largely in the form of journal articles, themselves often lengthy multi-part treatments of particular philosophical issues or philosophers. It might be speculated that the teaching obligations of philosophers in the early twentieth century were not conducive to writing books. Nevertheless, university life clearly allowed considerable opportunity for the study of the work of other thinkers, for Gibson contributed papers on a variety of contemporary continental thinkers such as Nicolai Hartmann (Boyce Gibson 1933a, 1934, 1935) and Melchior Palagyi (Boyce Gibson 1928a, b), and also studied with Husserl.

Gibson's Personal Idealism

Throughout his philosophical career, Gibson consistently identified himself as a personal idealist or 'personalist'. Personalism has a long history, continuing from the late eighteenth century in Continental philosophical thought and surviving in a number of forms, both in Europe and in America (Bengtsonn 2006). English personal idealism was influential from the turn of the twentieth century until the 1920s, but was preceded by that of the Scot A. S. Pringle-Pattison, whose work was prominent from the 1880s onwards. Personal idealism was seen as a significant alternative to both the naturalism of nineteenth-century thought influenced by science and the absolutism of the British Hegelians.

Personal idealism shared elements with naturalism as well as with absolute idealism. With naturalism, it shared a focus on experience, but denied that naturalism gave an adequate account of that experience. In particular, naturalism was said to provide an inadequate account of personality and moral action. With absolute idealism, personalism shared the view that reality is ultimately spiritual, and similarly denied that absolute idealism gave an adequate account of human experience. In particular, absolute idealism was said to provide an inadequate account of human volition. In the collection edited by Henry Sturt, *Personal Idealism*, personal idealism was said to issue in an 'empirical idealism' that linked 'a spiritual philosophy and empiricism' through 'personal life' and 'the study of common experience' (Sturt 1902, pp. v–viii).

Gibson focused on immediate experience but, unlike some other personal idealists, he ventured a view of the absolute. Indeed, he sought to bridge personal and absolute idealism by emphasising the idea of the real as rational. For Gibson, the experience from which we start is personal, but it is also religious and spiritual. We must conceive the personal in relation to God. It is in this conception that absolute idealism and personal idealism would discover that they shared the view that the real is rational and spiritual (Boyce Gibson 1906–1907).

Gibson's Views on Philosophy and Personality

Although Gibson's early training had been in mathematics, it was a work on philosophy of religion that drove his conversion. The conversion took the form of grasping the difference between causal explanation in the sciences, which depends on an account of the 'totality of the relevant antecedent conditions', and the idea of 'final causation'. This distinction was driven home to him by the second of Edward Caird's Gifford Lectures on *The Evolution of Religion*, where Caird discussed 'Different Methods of Defining Religion'. In particular, Caird defined religion not by examining what is common to religions but through 'the differentiae of the highest forms' (Boyce Gibson 1904, pp. 190–191; Caird 1907, pp. 36–59).

For Gibson, 'the philosophical baptism, par excellence, is that which confers the grace of teleological insight'. This insight is quite distinct from the scientific, causal, and abstract view. To lose this sense of teleology is to lapse from philosophy into science (Boyce Gibson 1904, p. 192). He consistently upheld a distinction between philosophy and science, stressing that science was concerned with external nature, but that philosophy was concerned with experience, in particular the immediate knowledge that we are purposive. This intuition is an 'intuition of Ideals, Values and real possibilities' (Boyce Gibson 1933b, p. 93; Weigall 1919).

On Gibson's account, the essence of philosophy is reason which links the 'whole of our life and experience', found, for example, in 'art, religion, and statecraft', to the divine ideals of 'beauty, truth, and goodness'. Self-critical reason was fundamental to philosophy. Although at one point he had held out Hegel as providing the best definition of philosophy as self-criticism, Gibson's final works took Plato to be the exemplar of how philosophy is both argument and an aspiration for truth, in a ‘complex unity of intuition, intellect, aspiration, and love’. Gibson shared the view of Samuel Alexander that philosophy should offer a ‘vision of reality’, and he stressed that philosophers should be judged not by their conception but ‘by the comprehensiveness and rigour of the thought through which that insight is explored and driven home’. At an early stage, he had seen the contemporary role of philosophy as the search for a ‘Monism *of the right kind* [sic], which shall do adequate logical justice to the moral claim of Personality to be free, and creative’ (Boyce Gibson 1902–1903, p. 182; 1923, 1933c).

The fundamental argument that runs through much of Gibson’s thought is that self-intuition is rational and concrete—it has rational content. In an article written before he commenced in Melbourne, Gibson pointed to thinkers, such as Descartes, Eucken, and Bergson, who shared the view that ‘the experience of spiritual power is the fundamental fact with which philosophy has to reckon’. Modern psychology, particularly that of G. F. Stout, enabled this experience to be analysed ‘as the central fact of life’, traceable from an ‘impression’ through to experience, and into morality and religion (Boyce Gibson 1911–1912, pp. 87–88).

Following Stout, and with an eye on pragmatism, Gibson identified the impressions of our experience with purposive needs. These purposive needs embrace values as well as instincts, particularly the ideals of ‘truth, beauty, and goodness’. ‘The experience of power is in last resort the experience of the power of these ideals in the shaping and perfecting of life’. Towards the end of his life, Gibson reiterated that: ‘The presence and efficacy of the Ideal is a feature, patent and palpable, of our very simplest and most ordinary experiences’ (Boyce Gibson 1911–1912, p. 100; 1934, p. 40).

For Gibson, the self is a unification of experience in a spatio-temporal order. It is a ‘non-rational’ unity, which in fact applies to all life, although we become ‘rational individuals’ through the pursuit of our aspiration. The self is immediately aware of itself as self. It feels unity not as a unity of parts, but as a unity of ‘total activity’; it is this ‘total activity in which the self’s conscious being consists’. Such experience is not to be ‘proved’ but to be ‘grasped’, and in grasping it we grasp our ends and ourselves as purposive agents (Boyce Gibson 1904, pp. 123–138; 1924, pp. 191–192).

Gibson was particularly critical of Kant for eliminating subjective experience in his account of the transcendental unity of apperception. He also criticised Kant for treating the category of cause as basic. He argued that Kant thereby eliminated the ‘*really* [sic] subjective’. In Gibson’s view, the objective presupposes the subjective, because objects are made intelligible in relation to subjective interest. For Gibson, ‘Once you say [the] self [is] an *object* you’ve taken a step that defeats any attempt to develop a rational conception of *experience*’ [sic] (Weigall 1919).

Although personal consciousness begins as ‘psychic unification’, it gains a more profound dimension through purposive striving. At the level of volition, personal consciousness becomes rational and derives its unity from the ideal. The ideal interpenetrates one’s life, and ‘self-development’ fundamentally involves moving towards a deep unity of aspiration. ‘Personality’ involves the pursuit of an ideal good and should be contrasted with ‘individuality’, which Gibson saw as a merely formal notion.

The notion of personality is not constrained by time or matter, and Gibson (like many personal idealists) subscribed to belief in immortality. Personality, as it develops through aspiration for the ideal, must persist. The ideal and the personal interpenetrate each other, although they do not submerge each other. For Gibson, the ideal exists as a super-personal being or 'supersoul'. Gibson's theory posited both the 'central supremacy' of God and 'the essential interests of man's free, inviolate personality' (Boyce Gibson 1904, pp. 140–141,151–152, 220–223; 1925a). As with many idealists, however, the God of his philosophy is not immediately reconcilable with Christian doctrine.

Gibson approached all areas of philosophy from the perspective of immediate experience. In his first book, *A Philosophical Introduction to Ethics* (1904), he took as his key theme the idea that 'the individual's own inviolate spiritual experience' is 'the central fact in Moral Philosophy and in our human philosophy generally'. He identified a teleological 'spiritual principle' as 'the unifying agency in personal experience' and argued that personal idealism sought the ultimate reality in the only way it could be sought—'in and through our own personal experience'. As a monistic philosophy, personal idealism must seek self-consistency and system, and it must relate the self to the absolute. Personality must be distinguished from the absolute, because otherwise the reality and creativity of 'finite persons' would be sacrificed (Boyce Gibson 1904: v–vii, 58, 64–65).

In *The Problem of Logic* (first edition 1908), Gibson distinguished a number of phases of logic. 'Truth' was to be understood as unity, but his book dealt with logic as a search for the 'truth of fact'. He differentiated the 'propaedeutic' of logic—the theories of judgement, proposition, and formal logic—from logic as an account of scientific method. Gibson defined the 'unity of thought' in terms of the realm of fact relevant to the purposes of the thinker. He treated scientific method through an account of inference and evidence, where inductive method was also determined by the concept of 'relevant fact'. But whereas inductive method was of value in scientific thinking, in so far as it implied causal determinism it was relevant only to inorganic fact. Consciousness, on the other hand, implied teleology, and this put it beyond inductive explanation. Concepts such as 'freedom', 'immortality' and 'God' are beyond mechanical causation, and their logic is a philosophical, rather than inductive, logic (Boyce Gibson 1914, pp. 1,3–6,314,367,459–462). In a second volume, never produced, Gibson was to deal with 'Philosophical Logic', the inward meaning of 'truth', seen through a 'Personalistic Logic'.

With his emphasis on freedom and on personality as a psychological unity of aspiration, Gibson was profoundly indeterminist in relation to the moral and spiritual realm. This was encapsulated in the logical distinction he drew between scientific method and philosophy, where one is causal and the other teleological. We inhabit a world of real possibilities and effective actions. Our freedom of choice is real, and so is our freedom to create (Boyce Gibson 1925b).

In particular, Gibson argued that imagination is the foundation of volition, in that imagination establishes 'possibilities'. For Gibson, possibilities are 'real constituents of the volitional world'. Imagination, therefore, provided the psychological foundation for this realm of possibilities. Gibson suggested that it was necessary to recognise 'a negative and hypothetical moment in volition, the moment or phase which renders deliberation possible. It is only through such a phase that the natural situation can pass on into the spiritual'. At this moment, 'natural impulse' is 'arrested' and turned 'into a real possibility'. These real possibilities are intermediate between the 'non-volitional' and the 'positively volitional' and represent the foundation of ethics. The fully undetermined nature of the ethical means it can become either moral or immoral; it is a source of freedom and becomes moral or immoral as a result of the exercise of freedom (Boyce Gibson 1933b, pp. 4–6; 1935, pp. 16–18).

Although Gibson did not produce a completed system, his work was in the tradition of systemic philosophy, and he worked up his thought particularly through accounts of ethics, logic, spirituality, and value. That philosophy was, at its core, a philosophy seeking to ground itself in experience and articulated through a philosophical psychology. It was a philosophy which could be developed through a consistent form of criticism, relating concepts back to the content of immediate experience. Gibson did not, however, leave behind a school. Instead, he gave a rigorous account of one of the key themes in Australian intellectual life in the first half of the twentieth century—the concept of personality.

Conclusion: The Decline of Idealism

Looking back over a century since the inauguration of the first chair in philosophy at Melbourne in 1886, Miller's judgement (given earlier, section "Idealism in Australia") about the dominance of idealism in the early period of Australian philosophy seems sound. It is also clear that he was writing at a time when the idealist dominance was being challenged, most clearly in Sydney. Indeed, since the middle of the twentieth century, open avowals of idealism have been rare, and the term 'idealist' became something of a convenient label with which to dismiss vast tracts of philosophic thought.

One view of what happened to idealism is that it simply vanished, in Australasia as elsewhere, to be replaced by realism, pragmatism, Wittgensteinianism, or phenomenology. This is the view taken by Franklin: 'Absolute Idealism in its day—around the 1890s—became the first and only philosophy to be accepted as orthodoxy in the whole learned world (Paris, Heidelberg, Edinburgh, Peking, Adelaide…). Then it simply evaporated' (Franklin 2003, pp. 113–114). Franklin's account, though, puts the decline of idealism far too early—closer, in fact, to its modern origins than to its end. At the other end of the spectrum to Franklin, Michael Devitt half-seriously claimed in the 1980s that idealism still survived in Melbourne, reflecting the lack of sunshine compared to other Australian cities (Devitt 1984: vii).

A different view would be that idealism in Australasia declined at around the same time as in Britain. Idealism was in significant retreat in the British universities following the death of its great exponents such as Henry Jones in 1922, Bernard Bosanquet in 1923, and F. H. Bradley in 1924. Even before that, idealism was frequently criticised during the First World War for its connections with German thought. Much of its rhetoric seemed overbearing and out of place in the context of a new form of war and the international uncertainties that followed. Realism had experienced its own resurgence, led by thinkers such as Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. New approaches to philosophy began to attract attention, such as those of Wittgenstein and Husserl.

A generational change also occurred in Australasia. In New Zealand, the decline of idealism can be traced to 1931, when Dunlop was succeeded to the Chair at Otago by the British philosopher J. N. Findlay. Although having been a Hegelian, and later being responsible for a considerable revival of interest in Hegel, Findlay had been purged of all forms of idealism under the influence of Bertrand Russell. By the time he arrived in New Zealand, Findlay regarded it as his mission to 'introduce mathematical logic to the Antipodes' (Pigden 2007).

In Australia, Laurie had died, and Anderson and Mitchell had retired from their Chairs by the middle of the 1920s; W. R. Boyce Gibson retired in 1934. There was a dramatic changing of the philosophical guard when John Anderson arrived in Sydney. According to Anderson, there were no relations of ideas; no 'consciousness' nor conscious knowers; no normative values, judgements, nor feelings; no 'self' nor purpose nor God.

Moreover, there were no abstract entities of any sort, no entities over and above the spatio-temporal world. In social terms, he held the radical thesis that 'there is no such thing as the pure individual apart from society, any more than society apart from the individuals who compose it' (Anderson 1917). As James McAuley was to famously put it: 'John Anderson had an answer to every conceivable question. It was "No"' (Bogdan 1984, pp. 6–7). Gilbert Ryle was also reputedly to have said of Anderson that 'He thinks there are only brass tacks' (Honderich 1995, p. 58).

But generational change was not total. When, for example, Mitchell retired from the professorship in Adelaide in 1922, he was succeeded by John McKellar Stewart—the first Australian-born professor. He held the chair from 1923 to 1949 (Passmore 1963). McKellar Stewart brought with him familiar idealist themes such as in his early work on Bergson, viewed from the perspective of a Kantian conception of reason (McKellar Stewart 1911). He also published on psychological themes such as the 'unconscious' and the relation of psychology to ethics—viewing the issues through an idealist lens (McKellar Stewart 1923, 1926).

In a different sense, the disappearance of idealism was by no means complete. In Britain, for example, a new generation of philosophers, such as R. G. Collingwood and Michael Oakeshott, rejected the label 'idealism' but continued to develop a broadly idealist tradition. Their greatest influence was, however, often outside of philosophy departments, in history, art, and politics. In Australia, A. Boyce Gibson was frequently called an idealist, although he characterised himself as a kind of empiricist, but one who was 'wide of the type' (Boyce Gibson 1970, p. 101). He had clearly been influenced by idealism, in both absolute and personalist forms, and continued to use idealism as a point of reference. He died in 1972, having produced his major works only after his retirement (Helgeby 2008).

Only in the 1980s did a significant reappraisal of British idealism begin, largely influenced by a perceived alignment between modern 'communitarian' social philosophy and the social and political ideas of Green and his successors. Similarly, but still more recently, it has been the social and political theory of Australian idealists that has kept their memory alive, and shown the relevance of idealism outside of the universities until at least the mid-century (Hughes-Warrington and Tregenza 2008; Melleuish 1995; Sawyer 2003). The emphasis on the social aspects of idealist thought brings out a key dimension to their theory and practice. Idealism had, however, in Australia as elsewhere, a far broader orientation. It is only through its metaphysical and moral dimensions that its social philosophy can be understood.

References

Acton, H. B. (1934). Review of 'the place of minds in the world. Gifford lectures at the University of Aberdeen 1924–26'. *Mind, 63*(170), 243–245.

Alexander, S. (1920). *Space, time and deity*. London: MacMillan.

Allen, H. J. (1984). *Mitchell's concept of human freedom*. Masters dissertation, University of Adelaide.

Anderson, F. (1902). A modern philosopher – Green of Balliol. In *The Union Book of 1902… Being the Contribution of the Sydney University Union to the Celebration of the Jubilee of the University (1852–1902)*. Sydney: William Brooks pp. 175–197.

Anderson, F. (1922). *Liberty, equality and fraternity*. Sydney: Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, Monograph series, No. 1.

Anderson, F. (1923a). The present religious situation. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 1*, 213–223.

Anderson, F. (1931a). The happy warrior. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 9*, 263–268.

Anderson, F. (1931b). Sidelights I. On sidelights in general. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 9*, 1–6.

Anderson, F. (1931c). Sidelights II. Gandhi *contra mundum. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 9*, 81–90.

Anderson, F. (1931d). Sidelights III. The simple life. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 9*, 161–171.

Anderson, F. (1935). *Peace or war*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson.

Anderson, J. (1917). *Is the State a Moral Agent? (Silver medal prize essay 1916–17)*. University of Glasgow Archives p. 45.

Anderson, J. (Ed.). (1980). *Education and inquiry* (Ed.: Phillips, D. Z.). Oxford: Blackwell.

Anderson, J. (2005). *Space-time and the proposition: The 1944 lectures on Alexander's space, time and deity* (Ed.: Weblin, M.). Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Anderson, J. (2007). *Lectures on metaphysics 1949–1950: Space-time and the categories*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Anderson, J., Cullum, G., & Lycos, K. (1962). *Studies in empirical philosophy*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson.

Anderson, J., Cullum, G., & Lycos, K. (Eds.). (1982). *Art and reality: John Anderson on literature and aesthetics*. Marrickville: Hale & Iremonger.

Anderson, W. (1923b). The meaning of philosophy (II). *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 1*, 241–247.

Anderson, W. (1926). Psycho-biology and democracy – Human nature, science, and society. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 4*, 41–56.

Anderson, W. (1928). Self. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 6*(2), 81–92.

Anderson, W. F. (1930a). On a University education. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 8*, 241–246.

Anderson, W. (1930b). Individuality and community. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 8*, 247–262.

Anderson, W. (1930c). On a fragment from Dewey. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 8*, 168–175.

Anderson, W. (1934). Academic freedom. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 12*, 138–142.

Anderson, W. (1938a). The entrance examination policy of the University of New Zealand (I). *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 16*, 23–40.

Anderson, W. (1938b). The entrance examination policy of the University of New Zealand (II). *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 16*, 143–172.

Anderson, W. (1944). *The flight from reason in New Zealand education*. Auckland: Catholic Teachers' Association.

Ardley, G. W. R. (1982). *Sixty years of philosophy: A short history of the Auckland philosophy department 1921–1983* (2nd ed.). Auckland: Department of Philosophy, Auckland University.

Baker, A. J. (1979). *Anderson's social philosophy*. Hong Kong: Angus & Robertson.

Baker, A. J. (1986). *Australian realism: The systematic philosophy of John Anderson*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Beaglehole, E. (Ed.). (1946). *The University & the community: Essays in honour of Thomas Alexander Hunter*. Wellington: Victoria University College.

Beaglehole, J. C. (1951). Sir Thomas Hunter. *New Zealand Journal of Public Administration, 13*, 1–5.

Beaglehole, T. (2007). *Hunter, Thomas Alexander 1876–1953: Vol. 3. Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, 1901–1920*. Wellington: Ministry for Culture and Heritage.

Bengtsonn, J. O. (2006). *The worldview of personalism: Origins and early development*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Blanshard, B. (1939). *The nature of thought*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Bogdan, R. J. (Ed.). (1984). *D. M. Armstrong* (Vol. 4). Dordrecht: Reidel.

Boucher, D. (1990). Practical Hegelianism: Henry Jones's lecture tour of Australia. *Journal of the History of Ideas, 51*, 423–452.

Boucher, D. (2004). *The Scottish idealists: Selected philosophical writings*. Exeter: Imprint Academic.

Boucher, D. (2005). Gibson, William Ralph Boyce (1869–1935). In S. Brown (Ed.), *The dictionary of twentieth-century British philosophers* (Vol. 1). Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum.

Boulger, Edward Vaughan, 1846–?. (1969). In *Australian dictionary of biography* (Vol. 3, p. 202). National Centre of Biography, Australian National University.

Boyce Gibson, A. (1932). *The philosophy of Descartes*. London: Methuen.

Boyce Gibson, A. (1937). Review of Henri Bergson's "The two sources of morality and religion". *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 15*, 65–80.

Boyce Gibson, A. (1938). Samuel Alexander: An appreciation. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 16*, 251–254.

Boyce Gibson, A. (1964). Preface. In *A. Boyce Gibson's Papers*. Box 5/2/2/2, 74–17: University of Melbourne Archives.

Boyce Gibson, A. (1970). *Theism and empiricism*. London: SCM Press.

Boyce Gibson, W. (1933c). What is philosophy? *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 6*, 88–98.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1902–1903). The relation of logic to psychology with special reference to the views of Dr. Bosanquet. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 3*, 166–186.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1904). *A philosophical introduction to ethics: An advocacy of the spiritual principle in ethics from a point of view of personal idealism*. London: Swann Sonnenschein.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1906–1907). A peace policy for idealists. *The Hibbert Journal, 5*, 407–424.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1907). *Rudolf Eucken's philosophy of life*. London: A. & C. Black.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1911–1912). The experience of power. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 12*, 65–104.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1914). *The problem of logic*. London: A. & C. Black.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1923). The meaning of philosophy (III). *Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, 1*, 248–255.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1924). Problems of spiritual experience: II. The personal bond. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, 2*, 183–196.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1925a). Does the ideal really exist? *Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, 3*, 159–178.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1925b). Problems of spiritual experience: IV. Freedom and evil. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, 3*, 91–98.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1928a). The philosophy of Melchior Palagyi. (I) space-time and the criticism of relativity. *Journal of Philosophical Studies, 3*, 15–28.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1928b). The philosophy of Melchior Palagyi. (II) the theory of life and mind. *Journal of Philosophical Studies, 3*, 158–172.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1933a). The ethics of Nicolai Hartmann. I. *The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 11*, 12–28.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1933b). *Freedom and open responsibility*. Paper presented on 29 September at the Symposium of Freedom and Responsibility. W. R. Boyce Gibson Papers, University of Melbourne Archives.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1934). The ethics of Nicolai Hartmann. II. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 12*, 33–61.

Boyce Gibson, W. R. (1935). The ethics of Nicolai Hartmann. III. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 13*, 1–23.

Brown, L. B., & Fuchs, A. H. (1971). Early experimental psychology in New Zealand: The Hunter-Titchener letters. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 7*, 10–22.

Caird, E. (1907). *The evolution of religion: The Gifford lectures delivered before the University of St. Andrews in sessions 1890–91 and 1891–92* (4th ed., 2 Vols., see Vol. 1). Glasgow: James Maclehouse.

Chalmers, D. (1996). *The conscious mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Churchland, P. M. (1979). *Scientific realism and the plasticity of mind*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Churchland, P. M. (1986). Some reductive strategies in cognitive neurobiology. *Mind, 95*, 279–309.

Churchland, P. M. (1988). Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality. *Philosophy of Science, 55*, 167–187.

Coleman, P. J. (1958). The spirit of New Zealand liberalism in the nineteenth century. *The Journal of Modern History, 30*, 227–235.

Collins, J. (2003). *Criticisms and accommodations: The Thomas report and catholic secondary education in New Zealand*. Paper presented at the NZARE/AARE Conference. http://publications.aare.edu.au/03pap/col03056.pdf

Coombs, A. (1996). *Sex and anarchy: The life and death of the Sydney push*. Ringwood: Viking.

Davies, W. M. (1999). Sir William Mitchell and the new mysterianism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77*, 253–257.

Davies, W. M. (2003). *Philosophy of Sir William Mitchell (1961–1962): A mind's own place*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

Davies, W. M. (2004). Sir William Mitchell. *Internet encyclopedia of philosophy*. http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/mitchell.htm

Dennett, D. (1988). Quining qualia. In A. Marcel & E. Bisiach (Eds.), *Consciousness in contemporary science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dennett, D. (1991). *Consciousness explained*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Devitt, M. (1984). *Realism and truth*. London: Basil Blackwell.

Du Bois-Reymond, E. (1848). *Animal electricity*. London: Duckworth (Cited in Passmore J. A. (1985). *Recent philosophers: A supplement to a hundred years of philosophy*).

Duncan, W. G. K., & Leonard, R. A. (1973). *The University of Adelaide, 1874–1974*. Adelaide: Rigby.

Dunlop, F. W. (1908). *Deep love's severity and other sermons*. Christchurch: Whitcombe & Tombs.

Economics at Adelaide. (2003). *Lumen Magazine*. http://www.lumen.adelaide.edu.au/2003winter/page15/

Edgeloe, V. (1993). *Servants of distinction: Leadership in a young University 1874–1925*. Adelaide: Educational Technology Unit, University of Adelaide Foundation.

Edgeloe, V. A. (1986). Mitchell, Sir William (1861–1962). In *Australian dictionary of biography* (Vol. 10, pp. 535–537). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Egarr, T. (2006). *Am I my brother's keeper?: State confinement in New Zealand under Dr. Duncan MacGregor and Capt. Arthur Hume, 1880–1910*. BA (Hons.) thesis, University of Otago, Otago.

Eucken, R. (1909). *Christianity and the new idealism: A study in the religious philosophy of to-day* (trans: Gibson, L. J., Boyce Gibson, W. R.). London: Harper.

Flanagan, O. (1992). *Consciousness reconsidered*. Bradford: M.I.T Press.

Fletcher, M. S. (1912). *The psychology of the new testament* (2nd ed.). New York: Hodder & Stoughton.

Franklin, J. (2003). *Corrupting the youth: A history of philosophy in Australia*. Sydney: Macleay Press.

Gardner, W. J., Beardsley, E. T., & Carter, T. E. (1973). *A history of the University of Canterbury, 1873–1973*. Christchurch: University of Canterbury Press.

Gillett, C. (2006). Samuel Alexander's emergentism: Or higher causation for physicalists. *Synthese, 153*, 261–296.

Grave, S. A. (1976). *Philosophy in Australia since 1958*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Grave, S. A. (1981). Gibson, William Ralph Boyce. In *Australian dictionary of biography* (Vol. 8, pp. 659–660). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Grave, S. A. (1984). *A history of philosophy in Australia*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Gregory, H. (1987). *Vivant professores: Distinguished members of the University of Queensland, 1910–1940*. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Library.

Harvey, J. W. (1934). Review of 'the place of minds in the world: Gifford lectures at the University of Aberdeen 1924–26'. *The British Institute of Philosophical Studies, 9*, 103–106.

Helgeby, S. (2006). Personal idealism, criticism and system: The philosophy of William Ralph Boyce Gibson (1869–1935). *Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, 12*, 75–102.

Helgeby, S. (2008). Alexander Boyce Gibson: Theism, empiricism and idealism. *Collingwood and British Idealism Studies, 14*, 96–127.

Hetherington, H. J. W. (1924). *The life and letters of Sir Henry Jones*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

History of philosophy at the University of Canterbury. http://www.saps.canterbury.ac.nz/phil/history.shtml

Hughenden History. (2006). http://www.thehughenden.com.au/about-us/hughenden-history/

Hoernlé, R. F. A. (1909). Critical notice of structure and growth of the mind. *Mind, 18*, 255–264.

Honderich, T. (Ed.). (1995). *The Oxford companion to philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hughes-Warrington, M., & Tregenza, I. (2008). State and civilisation in Australian new idealism, 1890–1950. *History of Political Thought, 29*, 89–108.

Hunter, T. A. (1924). What is wrong with the world? *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 2*, 51–57.

Hunter, T. A. (1927). Some concepts in relation to social science. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 5*, 161–185.

Hunter, T. A. (1928). Psychological clinic for children, Victoria University College, Wellington. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 6*, 300–303.

Hunter, T. A. (1932). Some reflections on social institutions. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 10*, 40–46.

Hunter, T. A. (1952). The development of psychology in New Zealand. *Quarterly Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 3*, 101–111.

Huxley, T. H. (1874/1901). Of the hypothesis that animals are Automata, and its history, method and results. In *Collected Essays: Vol. 1. Results and methods*. New York: Appleton and Company.

Irons, D. (1899). Review of the origin and growth of the moral instinct. *Philosophical Review, 8*, 420–424.

Jones, H. (1909). *Idealism as a practical creed: Being the lectures on philosophy and modern life delivered before the University of Sydney*. Glasgow: James Maclehouse & Sons.

Kemp-Smith, N. (1908). Review of structure and growth of the mind. *Philosophical Review, 17*, 332–339.

Kennedy, B. (1995). *A passion to oppose: John Anderson, philosopher*. Carlton South: Melbourne University Press.

Kennett, P. (1991). *Unsung hero: Barzillai Quaife*. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.

Laurie, H. (1881). A plea for philosophy. *Victorian Review, 5*, 76–89.

Laurie, H. (1885). The study of mental philosophy. *The Melbourne Review, 38*, 185–195.

Laurie, H. (1889). Some of Browning's thoughts about painting. An address delivered to Victorian artists. *The Centennial Magazine, 2*, 35–38.

Laurie, H. (1901). *Some thoughts on immortality: A lecture*. Melbourne: Melville and Muller.

Laurie, H. (1902). *Scottish philosophy in its national development*. Glasgow: J. Maclehose & Sons.

Laurie, H. (1903). *The theory of use-inheritance, psychologically considered*. Paper presented at the report of the ninth meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, Hobart.

Laurie, H. (1908). *Materialism*. Paper presented at the report of the eleventh meeting of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, Adelaide.

Laurie, H. (1912). Australian appreciation of Robert Browning. In W. A. Knight (Ed.), *The Robert Browning centenary celebration at Westminster Abbey*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Laurie, H. (1921). *Plato in English literature*. A paper read before the Classical Association of Victoria, Carlton, Victoria.

Lockley, G. L. (1967). Barzillai Quaife (1798–1873). In *Australian dictionary of biography* (Vol. 2, pp. 356–357). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Lovell, H. T. (1941). In memoriam. Francis Anderson, Challis professor of philosophy (1890–1921), University of Sydney. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 19*, 97–101.

MacGregor, D. (1876, January). The problem of poverty in New Zealand. *New Zealand Magazine*, pp. 60–61.

MacGregor, D. (1897). *Aspects of the charitable-aid question: Extracts from reports presented to the houses of the general assembly, New Zealand*. Wellington: Government Printer.

Mackenzie, H. (1911). *The origin and development of Priesthoods*. National Register of Archives and Manuscripts, Victoria University.

Mackenzie, H. (1917a). *Brief outline of the development of the English language*. National Register of Archives and Manuscripts, Victoria University.

Mackenzie, H. (1917b). *Utopias, ancient and modern*. National Register of Archives and Manuscripts, Victoria University.

Mackenzie, H. (1921). *Aspects of the philosophy of criticism (Aesthetics)*. National Register of Archives and Manuscripts, Victoria University.

Mackie, J. L. (1962). The philosophy of John Anderson. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 40*, 265–282.

Masson, D. (1877). *Recent British philosophy: A review, with criticisms: including some comments on Mr. Mill's answer to Sir William Hamilton* (3rd ed.). London: MacMillan.

Matheson, P. (1993). Salmond, William 1835–1917. In *Dictionary of New Zealand biography* (Vol. 2, pp. 1870–1900). Wellington: Ministry for Culture and Heritage. www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/2s3/1

McClelland, J. (1999). Cognitive modelling, connectionist. In R. A. Wilson & F. C. Keil (Eds.), *The MIT encyclopedia of the cognitive sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

McKellar Stewart, J. (1911). *A critical exposition of Bergson's philosophy*. London: MacMillan.

McKellar Stewart, J. (1923). The idea of the unconscious in the new psychology. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, I*, 191–197.

McKellar Stewart, J. (1926). The meeting-point of psychology and ethical theory. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, IV*, 77–90.

Melleuish, G. (1995). *Cultural liberalism in Australia: A study in intellectual and cultural history*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Merrylees, W. A. (1934). *Descartes: An examination of some features of his metaphysics and methods*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Merrylees, W. A. (1935). Obituary: William Ralph Boyce Gibson. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, XIII*, 85–92.

Miller, E. M. (1929). The beginnings of philosophy in Australia and the work of Henry Laurie, part 1. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 7*, 241–251.

Miller, E. M. (1930). The beginnings of philosophy in Australia and the work of Henry Laurie, part II. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 8*, 1–22.

Mitchell, W. (1895). Reform in education. *International Journal of Ethics, 6*, 24–50.

Mitchell, W. (1898). *What is Poetry*? A lecture given to the South Australian Teachers Union, Southern Cross Print.

Mitchell, W. (1903). *Lectures on materialism. Extension lectures – Syllabus of three*. Adelaide: Thomas.

Mitchell, W. (1907). *Structure and growth of the mind*. London: Macmillan.

Mitchell, W. (1912). *Christianity and the industrial system*. Adelaide: Hussey & Gillingham. Issued by the Methodists Social Service League.

Mitchell, W. (1918, December 19). The national spirit. *The Advertiser*.

Mitchell, W. (1926). *The power of the mind (Syllabus of the Gifford lectures, second series)*. Aberdeen: MacMillan.

Mitchell, W. (1929). *Nature and feeling*. Adelaide: Hassel & Son Press.

Mitchell, W. (1933). *The place of minds in the world*. London: MacMillan.

Mitchell, W. (1934). The quality of life. In *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 20. Annual British Academy Henrietta Herz Lecture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mitchell, W. (1937). *Universities and life. Introductory address*. Paper presented at the Australian and New Zealand Universities Conference, Adelaide.

Moon, P. (1997). Barzillai quaife: An early advocate of indigenous land rights in New Zealand and victim of censorship. *Journal of Pacific History, 32*, 234–242.

Mortensen, C. (2005). Review of the philosophy of Sir William Mitchell (1851–1962): A mind's own place. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83*, 298–300.

Murray, N. S. (1944). *The life and work of Dr. Duncan MacGregor*. Otago: University of Otago.

Numbers, R. L., & Stenhouse, J. (2000). Antievolutionism in the antipodes: From protesting evolution to promoting creationism in New Zealand. *British Journal for the History of Science, 33*, 335–350.

O'Neil, W. M. (1979). Anderson, Sir Francis (1858–1941). In *Australian dictionary of biography* (Vol. 7, pp. 53–55). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Passmore, J. (1962). John Anderson and twentieth century philosophy. In J. Anderson (Ed.), *Studies in empirical philosophy* (pp. ix–xxiv). Sydney: Angus & Robertson.

Passmore, J. (1963). Philosophy. In A. L. McLeod (Ed.), *The pattern of Australian culture* (pp. 131–169). Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Passmore, J. (1984). *A hundred years of philosophy*. London: Penguin.

Perry, R. B. (1908). Review of structure and growth of the mind. *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method, 5*, 45–48.

Pigden, C. (2007). *Philosophical history: The Otago Department*. http://www.otago.ac.nz/philosophy/history.html

Quaife, B. (1845). *A condensed view of the proper design and uses of the Lord's supper*. Parramatta: Benjamin Isaacs.

Quaife, B. (1846). *The rules of the final judgement: A sermon, the substance of which was preached at the Scots Church*. Parramatta: Benjamin Isaacs.

Quaife, B. (1848). *Lectures on prophecy and the kingdom of Christ*. Sydney: Colman & Piddington, & W. Ford.

Quaife, B. (1872). *The intellectual sciences*. Sydney: Gibbs, Shallard and Co.

Roberts, J. (1997). *Maybanke Anderson: Sex, suffrage and social reform* (2nd ed.). Avalon: Ruskin Rowe Press.

Salmond, C. (1929). Some aspects of modern thought. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 7*, 1–18.

Salmond, C. (1930). Psychological literature and human nature. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 8*, 23–42.

Salmond, W. (1875). *The Christian doctrine of providence and prayer and the reign of law: Three lectures*. North Shields: John Shields.

Salmond, W. (1888). *The reign of grace: A discussion of the question of the possibility of salvation for all men in this life, or in the life to come* (3rd ed.). Otago: James Horsburgh.

Sawyer, M. (2003). *The ethical state? Social liberalism in Australia*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Smart, J. J. C. (1962). Sir William Mitchell K. C. M. G. (1861–1962). *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 40*, 261–263.

Smart, J. J. C. (1990). Stewart, john McKellar (1878–1953). In *Australian dictionary of biography* (Vol. 12, p. 91). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Smith, A. G. (1986). Laurie, Henry (1837–1922). In *Australian dictionary of biography* (Vol. 10, pp. 7–8). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Stove, D. (1977). The force of intellect: Fifty years of John Anderson. *Quadrant, 21*, 45–46.

Sturt, H. (1902). Preface. In H. Sturt (Ed.), *Personal idealism: Philosophical essays by eight members of the University of Oxford* (pp. v–viii). London: MacMillan.

Sutherland, A. (1898). *The origin and growth of the moral instinct*. London: Longmans, Green.

Tennant, M. (1993). MacGregor, Duncan 1843–1906. *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* (Vol. 2, pp. 1870–1900). Wellington: Ministry for Culture and Heritage. www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies//2m7/1

Tennant, M., & Hanson, E. (1979). Social welfare: Social justice or social efficiency? Duncan MacGregor and charitable aid administration 1886–1896. *New Zealand Journal of History, 13*, 33–40.

Thom, P. (2007). Philosopher kings. *The philosopher's zone*. http://www.abc.net.au/rn/philosopherszone/stories/2007/2067525.htm#transcript

Trahair, R. C. S. (1984). *The humanist temper: The life and work of Elton Mayo*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

van Gulick, R. (1993). Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just Armadillos? In M. Davies & G. W. Humphreys (Eds.), *Consciousness: Psychological and philosophical essays*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Walker, R. B. (1972). Davidson, John (1834–1881). In *Australian dictionary of biography* (Vol. 4, p. 26). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Weigall, M. (1919). *Honours metaphysics* (Discussion class, Melbourne University). The University of Melbourne Archives, 88/24.

John Anderson Arrives: 1930s

3

Mark Weblin

Contents

Introduction 56
Anderson in Scotland (1893–1926) 57
Anderson at Sydney (Early Period: 1927–1937) 60
  Philosophy 60
  Metaphysics 61
  History of Philosophy 62
  Ethics 63
  Aesthetics 64
  Proletarianism 65
  Education, Censorship and Freethought 66
  The Andersonians 1 67
Anderson at Sydney (Middle Period: 1938–1949) 67
  Philosophy 68
  Ethics 68
  Aesthetics 69
  Metaphysics 70
  Liberal Democracy 71
  Freethought, Education and Religion 73
  The Andersonians 2 75
Anderson at Sydney (Late Period: 1950–1962) 76
  Philosophy 76
  History 77
  Cultural Criticism 79
  Politics, Education and Religion 80
  The Andersonians 3 82
Conclusion: Realism, Idealism and Empiricism 83
References 87

M. Weblin
Queensland, Australia
e-mail: markweblin@bigpond.com

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_4, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Introduction

John Anderson was born in Scotland in 1893, educated at the University of Glasgow and worked at various Scottish universities before being appointed as the Challis Professor of Philosophy at Sydney University in 1927. With the exception of a year on sabbatical in 1938, Anderson remained in Sydney until his death in 1962. Anderson brought to Australia a distinctive Scottish philosophical and cultural heritage which took root and developed in Sydney and in a more general way in Australia.

Although Anderson was a regular contributor to the *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* (*AJPP*), he published only one book in his lifetime, a slim volume, *Education and Politics*, in 1931. At the time of his death, he was working on the index for *Studies in Empirical Philosophy* which was published posthumously in the same year. However, Anderson was also an active polemicist and spoke and wrote on a number of political and public affairs, issues and theories. He was involved with the Communist Party of Australia and the Trotskyist Workers Party of Australia and was president of both the Sydney University Freethought Society and the Sydney University Literary Society for many years. Anderson was also at the centre of three major public controversies during his residence in Sydney: the 1931 ‘war idols’ controversy, the 1943 ‘no religion in education’ controversy and the attack on him by the Anglican Archbishop Dr. H. V. Gough, in 1961.

For 40 years after his death, only two collections of Anderson’s writings were published, *Art and Reality* and *Education and Inquiry*. During this time the only works on Anderson that were published were *Anderson*’*s Social Philosophy* and *Australian Realism*, both by A. J. Baker. In 1999, a biography on Anderson—*A Passion to Oppose*—was written by Brian Kennedy, and in the same year, the first John Anderson Senior Research Fellow was employed at Sydney University. Since then several collections of Anderson’s lectures, articles and addresses have been published including *A Perilous and Fighting Life*; *Space-Time and the Proposition*; *Space*, *Time and the Categories*; *Lectures in Political Theory*; *Lectures on Greek Philosophy*; and *Lectures on Modern Philosophy*. The John Anderson and Family Archives were also established in 1999 at Sydney University and hold over 13 shelf metres of lectures, articles, addresses, correspondence, photographs and other miscellaneous material. The John Anderson website at Sydney University contains many of Anderson’s lectures and addresses in electronic format.

John Anderson never wrote a systematic exposition of his philosophical views and his main published work—*Studies in Empirical Philosophy*—is, with the exception of two articles, merely a collection of previously published articles. Even in this work, there is little detailed exposition of his views, and it has only been with the more recent publication of his metaphysical, historical and political lectures and writings that some of this detail has begun to come to light. While the publication of this work has been important for providing the basis for understanding Anderson’s theories, there remains a great deal of unpublished material.[1] There is also the problem that while Anderson's philosophical position is generally assumed to have remained unchanged during his lifetime, his political position went through a radical change from Communist to anti-Communist, and the question naturally arises of whether his philosophical position also went through significant changes during this period. Given these considerations, the most productive way for understanding Anderson's philosophy is to present it in its biographical and historical development. However, this methodological approach is faced with the difficulty that in the 16-year period from 1927 to 1943, Anderson wrote over 80 % of his published work. Clearly any attempt to present Anderson's philosophy on the basis of his published work will invariably be biased in favour of his earlier views. Complicating this situation is the fact that after 1943, Anderson wrote several new sets of lectures on a wide range of subjects and these lectures contain important restatements and revisions of his philosophical position. Unfortunately, these lectures have not yet been published. It is evident, then, that a full assessment of Anderson's philosophical and theoretical development must take account of the work published in his own lifetime, his published and unpublished lectures and his published and unpublished political, social and cultural writings.

Anderson in Scotland (1893–1926)

John Anderson was born on 1 November 1893, in the village of Stonehouse, 30 miles southwest of Glasgow.[2] He was the third born and second son of the marriage of Alexander Anderson, the headmaster at the local school with radical political tendencies, and Elizabeth Brown, also a schoolteacher but with literary interests. Anderson attended his father's school until 1907, when he transferred to the Hamilton Academy at which he came first in the All-Scotland Bursary Competition in 1910.

In 1911, Anderson entered the University of Glasgow, studying Greek, Latin and Mathematics in his first year before continuing his study in Mathematics and Natural Philosophy in his second year, winning prizes in both classes. In his third year he progressed to Higher Natural Philosophy, Logic and Moral Philosophy, winning a First Class Certificate of Merit in the Moral Philosophy class and a Certificate of Merit in the Logic class. In his fourth year he continued with Higher Natural Philosophy and studied Honours Mathematics in which he won the Cunninghame Medal. Over the next 2 years (1915–1917), he studied Logic, Moral Philosophy and Political Economy and won the First

---

[1] This unpublished material includes several sets of lectures on various subjects including Plato, Scientific Method, Logic, Criticism, Greek Theories of Education, Ethics and Aesthetic and Mental Science. Anderson's freethought, religious, educational and polemical writings are also unpublished.

[2] For Anderson's writings from Scotland, see the Professor John Anderson and Family Archives, Sydney University, Series 1 and 2; see also Kennedy (1996).

Prize Certificate of Merit in his Logic and Metaphysics class. As a result of his academic labours, Anderson graduated with his M.A. in 1917 and was awarded the Caird Medal and First Prize in the Honours Class of Moral Philosophy and the University Silver Medal for an essay in Political Science. He was also awarded the Logan Medal as the most distinguished graduate in Arts for 1917 and won the James Ferguson Bursary which enabled him to work as an assistant in the Moral Philosophy Department at Glasgow from October 1917 to May 1918.

The influences on Anderson during these early years in Scotland are wide ranging and various. The University of Glasgow, since the appointment of Edward Caird as Professor of Philosophy in 1866, had long been the leading centre of Hegelian studies in Britain. Caird had an enormous influence on several generations of Scottish students until his move to Oxford in 1893 to replace his old teacher, Benjamin Jowett. Caird's place at Glasgow was taken by his former student, Henry Jones, and it was under Jones that Anderson gained his philosophical education. However, Anderson was too intelligent, and perhaps too radical, to accept the idealism preached by Jones, and apart from gaining an interest in contemporary Scottish philosophers such as Robert Adamson and John Burnet, he was more significantly influenced by British and American philosophers such as William James, the young Moore and Russell, the American new realists and Samuel Alexander. However, Anderson did not confine himself simply to philosophers and was well acquainted with the works of Freud, Marx, Sorel, Joyce, Ibsen, Vico and Arnold.

From the middle of 1918, Anderson was employed as an assistant to Professor Hetherington at the Philosophy Department at the University of Wales and also lectured to Workers Educational Association (WEA) classes on economics. After completing this initial contract, he was reemployed for the first term as head of the department while Hetherington was in America on sabbatical and, apart from lecturing on philosophy at Cardiff, also taught the WEA class in social science. After completing his employment at Cardiff, Anderson returned to Glasgow at the beginning of 1920 where he lectured to the Ordinary, Higher Ordinary and Honours Logic classes.

In October 1920 Anderson commenced work as a lecturer in the Department of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh and over the next 6 years lectured Ordinary, Intermediate and Honours students in logic and metaphysics. He worked closely with the two professors—Norman Kemp Smith and A. E. Taylor—and provided detailed commentary on Kemp Smith's *Prolegomena* and Taylor's *Plato: The Man and His Work*. His immediate responsibility at Edinburgh was to give lectures in economics, but over the next 3 years, he lectured extensively on modern philosophy with particular reference to Berkeley, Leibniz and Hegel. In 1922 he married Janet (Jenny) Baillie, whom he had known since his school days and courted during and after his study at university. Their only child Alexander (Sandy) was born in the following year. It was about this time that Anderson wrote two unpublished outlines of his early philosophical views in which he clearly articulated his conception of philosophy.

In ‘Some Problems of Positive Philosophy’, Anderson defended a ‘positive’ account of philosophy which was opposed to both comparative or relativistic philosophy and superlative or idealistic philosophy. He defined superlative philosophy as the Hegelian view that there are ‘Absolutes’ which are independent of experience and therefore unhistorical, which implied that philosophical thinking differs from scientific thinking in kind, not degree. Comparative philosophy, on the other hand, is the relativistic view that there are no ‘Absolutes’, where philosophical thinking differs from scientific thinking only in terms of degree. Anderson’s positive conception of philosophy was opposed to both of these positions and defended a theory of the positive nature of things as they are found in experience, where philosophical thinking differs from scientific thinking only in terms of the comprehensiveness of the treatment of the objects. Philosophy gives ‘definition’ to the sciences, and while both share the common hypothetical or empirical method, science is concerned to ‘save’ hypotheses, whereas philosophy is concerned to ‘remove’ the metaphysical hypotheses which the special sciences generate.

In his other outline, ‘Philosophical Theories’, Anderson defined idealism as any theory which sets up an ‘ideal’ or, more generally, as that attitude of mind which follows after ideals. In contrast, realism is that theory which denies all ideals of this sort and maintains that there is no theory which is beyond the reach of criticism. The logical difference between the two can be expressed by saying that for realism all things are commensurable, while for idealism there are certain ‘standards’ which measure other things but which are not measurable by these things. This idealism is a special form of rationalism, for the human reason of idealism is an inward entity unaffected by impulses or external objects. In contrast, realism, as the view logically opposed to rationalism, not merely has to assert that there are independent things which affect the mind but must also insist that there are accidents and intersections everywhere and thus sets up a positive theory of a variety of independent entities, interacting in a common medium of Space-Time. He concluded that any theory which is opposed to idealism must defend the notion of objective truth and falsity.

At the start of 1925, he delivered the Shaw Fellowship Lectures on the Nature of Mind at Edinburgh University. In these lectures, he argued that since knowing and willing are relations, they cannot characterise the quality of mind itself. Hence, if we understand the mind as a variety of complex processes, then the only quality that can constitute these processes is feeling or emotion. All emotions have an objective which they seek and when these objectives are achieved, a ‘sign’ is produced. A collection of these signs constitutes a common language and a collection of these languages is called a ‘sentiment’. Sentiments which are obligatory can only reveal the psychology of the person concerned, whereas ethical sentiments have no fixed ends and are on a higher level than the merely obligatory.

It was also around this time that Anderson wrote a logic textbook, and while the manuscript was never published, it contains important details of his logical theory. Anderson adopted the main tenets of the traditional syllogistic logic, namely, that the logical form of any proposition is ‘S is P’, where ‘S’ represents the subject of the proposition, ‘P’ represents the predicate of the proposition and the copula ‘is’ can be understood as either the affirmative ‘is’ or the negative ‘is not’. When this interpretation is combined with the quantifiers of universality and particularity—all or some—this yields the four basic forms of the proposition: all S are P (SaP), some S are P (SiP), some S are not P (SoP) and all S are not P (SeP) (also rendered as no S are P). To this traditional form, Anderson brought two important innovations. Firstly, the copula ‘is or is not’ is to be explicated in terms of occurrence or non-occurrence in Space-Time. Secondly, he adopted Russell’s theory of propositional functions and argued that the subject places or locates the thing under consideration, while the predicate characterises or qualifies the subject of the proposition. Any term can occur in either the subject or predicate position, although to do so it must be a real or existing term. Further, any proposition can be either asserted or denied, and therefore there can be no undeniable or necessary propositions. Every proposition is a contingent proposition and will have the function of either conclusion, premise, hypothesis or observation, with such functions being determined by the conditions of discourse itself.

In 1926, he published ‘Propositions and Judgements’ and ‘The Truth of Propositions’ in *Mind*. In these articles he rejected idealist and relativist theories of logic, arguing that in either case the context of the judgement or proposition is taken to determine the truth of the proposition, which would imply that the truth of *that* proposition must be determined by another context, and so an infinite regress is generated. For Anderson, a proposition is true or false independently of the context that it occurs in, with this truth or falsity being indicated by the copula in the proposition ‘is or is not’. After the publication of these articles, Anderson was successful in his application for the Challis Chair in Philosophy at Sydney University.

Anderson at Sydney (Early Period: 1927–1937)

Philosophy

During Anderson’s first 10 years at Sydney, his philosophical activity can be clearly outlined.[3] Between 1927 and 1937, he published a large number of articles and reviews in the *AJPP*, in which he presented his general conception of philosophy. In the early years of this decade—from 1927 to 1931—there was a strong emphasis on a doctrinal conception of philosophy, while from 1932 to 1937 there was a move to a more historical treatment and presentation of these doctrines. Apart from his published work during this period, in his lectures to students, he discussed the details of his logic and ethical theory and his interpretation of Greek and modern philosophy. Throughout the decade, the subjects of these courses remained unchanged, although he did rewrite several of these courses. In his teaching duties, he was assisted by Perce Partridge and John Passmore. In 1934, he was appointed editor of the *AJPP*, a position he held until 1946.

---

[3] The most significant of Anderson’s early metaphysical and ethical writings are published in *Studies in Empirical Philosophy*. Details of other philosophical writings from that period can be found in that book’s bibliography.

Metaphysics

In his early writings in philosophy (1927–1931), Anderson argued that philosophy can be defined as a set of doctrines which in turn are comprised of distinct propositions.[4] Although he published several articles which articulated and defended his general philosophical position during this time, this doctrinal conception of philosophy was most clearly set out in his 1931 article 'Realism and Some of its Critics'.

For Anderson, realism is firstly the epistemological position of direct or immediate realism. Anderson argued that any theory of knowing which postulated an entity such as an 'idea' or 'sense datum' which mediates between the object of knowledge and the subjective knower must also hold that our knowledge of this idea or datum is also mediated by another idea or datum, and so an infinite regress is generated.[5] Hence, realism is the doctrine that the subject of knowledge—the knower—is directly related to the object of knowledge, the known. Expressed slightly differently, realism can be said to be the doctrine that the object and subject of knowledge are independent of the relation of knowing and cannot be reduced to that relation in any way. The logical form of this doctrine is s/R/o, and the logical basis of this doctrine is the doctrine of external relations which holds that in any relationship 'a/R/b', 'a', 'b' and 'R' all exist and can be spoken of independently of each other.

In this article, Anderson argued that realism is opposed to idealism—idealism is, in fact, 'unintelligible'—but rejected Moore's claim that idealism is self-contradictory, arguing that since contradiction can only occur *between* propositions, there can be no such thing as a 'self-contradictory' proposition.[6] Anderson also argued that idealism can be characterised by three further doctrines, viz., monism, rationalism and absolutism, and in opposition to these doctrines, realism develops as a pluralist, empiricist and positivist philosophy.

Firstly, realism develops as a pluralist philosophy where 'a/R/b' is the logical form of either a complex or a simple situation. While such a pluralist position is obviously opposed to the monism typical of absolute idealism, it is also opposed to the logical atomism of the early Russell and Moore for whom 'a/R/b' is an 'unanalysable whole' which cannot be a situation of further complexity

---

[4] For Anderson's doctrinal conception of philosophy, see Anderson (1931b). For a general discussion of the key doctrines of Anderson's philosophy, see Weblin (2005).

[5] Anderson's 1935 lectures on Reid are an extended discussion of the representative theory applied to the individual senses. See Anderson (2008b) and Weblin (2007).

[6] Anderson discussed Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism' in his unpublished 1929 *Lectures on Modern Philosophy*.

(Passmore 1969). For Anderson, any occurring situation is both simple and complex, and therefore there can be no monistic ‘Absolute’ in which all difference is contained, but nor can there be any logically simple ‘atom’ from which reality is built. This pluralist theory is one of the most distinctive features of Anderson’s philosophy and marks his place in twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon philosophy, for as a systematic realist philosopher Anderson turned his face against the analytic realism of Moore and Russell and the entire analytic tradition that followed them.

Secondly, Anderson argued that realism develops into an empiricist philosophy and as such is opposed to the rationalism of idealism. However, Anderson did not understand these terms in the traditional sense of ways of knowing, but adopted an ontological interpretation of these terms. While traditionally empiricism has been used to describe the doctrine of subjective idealism, Anderson followed Samuel Alexander who used the term to describe a general theory of reality. Alexander had formulated a theory of Space-Time which vacillated between a ‘stuff’ theory from which all things are created and a spatio-temporal ‘medium’ theory in which all things exist. Anderson accepted and defended the latter theory throughout his life. Hence, empiricism is the doctrine of a ‘single way of being’, of every occurrence understood as a spatio-temporal situation, while rationalism is the doctrine of the division of reality into the separate realms of the changing, everyday experience of ordinary things and the immutable and unchanging forms or ‘ideas’ of things. Central to Anderson’s empiricism was his contention that Space-Time (the ‘togetherness’ of Space and Time) was infinite and not, as Alexander had held, a finite ‘stuff’ which constitutes the universe. Indeed Anderson rejected the very notion of ‘the Universe’, arguing that if Space-Time is infinite then there can be no term which expresses the ‘totality of things’. The existence of a thing is simply its occupation of a spatio-temporal location.

Finally, the ontological doctrine of empiricism develops into the logical doctrine of positivism, although this term should not be confused with logical positivism. For the logical positivists, experimentation and verifiability were the determinants of the truth value of a proposition, while for Anderson the truth or falsity of a proposition is simply determined by experience. An integral part of Anderson’s ‘positive’ logic was the intimate relation between his theory of the proposition and his theory of Space-Time, where every situation can be expressed in terms of ‘the proposition’ and every intelligible proposition must have real or existing terms. For Anderson, the subject term in a proposition indicates the place of a situation, the predicate term of the proposition indicates the qualities of a situation, while the copula ‘is or is not’ indicates whether the attribution of the predicate to the subject actually takes place or not.

History of Philosophy

After 1931, Anderson’s academic writings in philosophy began to move from a doctrinal presentation of his philosophy to a historical presentation of those doctrines. Articles on Hegel, Descartes and Hume were published in the *AJPP*, while in his lectures to students he presented his views on classical Greek philosophy and modern philosophy.[7] In contrast to the Hegelian view that philosophy is defined in terms of its history, where each historical period is a phase in the definition of philosophy, Anderson argued that philosophy is defined in terms of problems, issues and methodologies independently of its history, even though these issues and problems can also be presented in their historical context. Anderson's views on the history of philosophy were also unusual for the fact that in the modern period he thought Hegel to be the only philosopher of any importance, that the medieval period was 'philosophically null' and that in ancient Greece only Heraclitus and Socrates, and to a lesser extent Plato, were the only important philosophers of the period.

Ethics

While much of Anderson's writing during the 1930s was concerned with his metaphysics, he also published some important statements of his ethical theory.[8] Anderson's ethical theory was based on the realist doctrine of external relations and the distinction between quality and relation. As a consequence of this view, he held that goodness is a naturally occurring quality and that the moral notions of 'ought' and 'should' are relations. He argued that goodness and badness are to be defined in terms of Sorel's distinction between the producer ethic and the consumer ethic. Hence, goodness is defined in terms of the producer ethic of 'consuming in order to produce' and included such qualities as initiative, investigation, co-operation and creativity. In contrast, badness is defined in terms of the consumer ethic of 'producing in order to consume' and included such qualities as competition, obscurantism, imitation and moralism. It is important to recognise that for Anderson 'goods' are social forces and as such are part of the general Marxist conception of society as organisation for production. Another important distinction that Anderson emphasised at this time was the Socratic view that while goods assist one another, they oppose bads, whereas bads oppose both goods and other bads. While he insisted that such relations would not define good and bad, he remained adamant that all goods and bads work in this way. Later critics believed that such a view implied a relational definition of good and bad which is inconsistent with a qualitative theory.

Anderson's theory of morality held that since the moral notions of obligation and imperative are relational terms, then no moral theory is complete without expressing the other terms in the relationship, usually some psychological or social force or interest. That is to say, no moral judgement is categorical, absolute or objective and any moral theory such as the Christian or the Kantian that treats obligations or commandments in this way is an incomplete theory. Anderson argued that Bentham's utilitarianism went some way to removing the vague generality which lies behind the operation of moral demands, but that the unhistorical nature of utilitarianism revealed itself in its concealment of ethical and political struggle. In contrast, the historical character of Marxist theory enables it to uncover the concealed social forces behind the various moral theories. However, while Marxism was critical of the relativist conception of the 'absolutely commanded', it could not arrive at a positive and qualitative conception of goodness because of its conception of 'society' as an absolute. In these early writings Anderson also reiterated his earlier view that goodness is something that 'can be pursued' which, as a relational conception, is inconsistent with a strict qualitative theory, and it is significant that he later explicitly rejected this view.

---

[7] See 'The Place of Hegel', 'The *Cogito* of Descartes' and 'Design' in Anderson (1962); see also Anderson (2008a, b).

[8] See 'Determinism and Ethics', 'Realism vs Relativism in Ethics', 'Marxist Ethics' and 'Utilitarianism' in Anderson (1962).

Aesthetics

During the 1930s Anderson never presented a detailed exposition of his aesthetic theory, although he did a great deal of writing on literary criticism on authors as varied as Joyce, Dostoevsky, Melville, Shaw, Wells and Meredith.[9] During this period Anderson defended a theory he described as realist aesthetics and rejected aesthetic theories such as expressionism and romanticism for defining beauty as a relation, whether it be the romantic strivings or expressionistic feelings of the artist. Further, he also rejected the Marxist view that art was to be judged in terms of its social or political import or effect, even though at this time his political theory was still strongly influenced by Marxism. It is significant that on the assumption of the realist distinction between quality and relation, Anderson's own realist aesthetic theory would treat beauty as a quality of things, although he never described it in this way, preferring to use the term 'character'. Anderson also argued that in Joyce's conception of beauty as involving 'claritas, consonatia and integritas', he is the predominant classical writer of the modern period. However, apart from these formal considerations of his aesthetic theory, Anderson also articulated a theory of secular damnation and aesthetic redemption. This theory was most explicit in his writings on James Joyce, where he supported Joyce's view that the human soul is born enslaved to the social illusions of religion, nationalism and the State, all of which are conditioned by history. He accepted Joyce's view that 'History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake' and argued that such awakening can only be achieved by the creative activity of the artist.

---

[9] Most of Anderson's aesthetic and literary writings for this period can be found in Anderson (1982).

Proletarianism

During this period, Anderson adhered to a political philosophy which he later described as 'proletarianism'—the Marxist view that the working class was the determining factor in the movement of twentieth-century capitalism.[10] Anderson was widely read in Marxist literature, being familiar with the writings of Marx and Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and Bukarin. However, the most significant influence on his political and ethical theory was the work of Georges Sorel. Anderson adopted Sorel's distinction between the producer ethic and the consumer ethic and argued that Russia, with 'history on its side', was in the process of becoming a society of producers which would ultimately triumph over the individualistic and consumptive ethic of capitalism.

Anderson's Communist period from 1927 to 1932 was marked by a belief that Russia was in the process of becoming a workers' republic. Although never a member of the Communist Party of Australia, he wrote regularly for its papers and journals, *The Workers Weekly* and *The Communist*, mainly on theoretical issues. He accepted the economic interpretation of history, the Marxist analysis of the State prior to and after Communist revolution, the distinction between base and superstructure and the view that Russian Communism, under the leadership of Stalin, was in the process of becoming a 'workers' republic'. Anderson eventually rejected Communism when he recognised the corrupt nature of Stalin's leadership of Russia and the Communist International and the inability of the Communist Party of Australia to develop a position independent of Russia.

In 1933, Anderson was a founding member of the Trotskyist Workers Party (Left Opposition) and over the next 4 years wrote extensively for their paper, *The Militant*. During his Trotskyist period from 1933 to 1937, he accepted Trotsky's thesis that Russia was under the temporary domination of the Stalinist state. In distinction to his Communist writings, his Trotskyist writings were primarily analyses of international political events in Russia, China and France, although his developed theoretical writings could be found in articles written for the *AJPP* and *The Australian Highway*. By the time of the 1936 Moscow Trials, Anderson was beginning to question the Trotskyist thesis that the domination by Stalin was only temporary, and by the end of 1937 he had rejected Trotskyism totally.

However, Anderson's political philosophy was not incidental to his metaphysics but was a direct consequence of it. Hence, he held that social and political forces were as determined, objective and pluralist as any other thing and that our knowledge of them is only advanced by holding to and defending propositions which we believe to be true. This implied that Anderson rejected any theory of ideological relativism concerning the truth of propositions, any theory of dialectic as a process leading to a utopia in history, any theory of special subjective forces such as the professional revolutionary in the movement in history and any theory of monism or atomism in social or political processes. On the positive side, Anderson accepted the general theory of historical materialism as a deterministic and objective theory of history, the theory of social pluralism which emphasised that the class theory is not simply a conflict between classes but is also between different forms of economic activity and a conception of society which held that production is essential to society and that consumption is only incidental to it. However, the consequences of these views were not fully appreciated by Anderson at this time, and after 1937 his political theory moved away markedly from the proletarianism of the 1930s.

---

[10] Most of Anderson's theoretical writing on politics for this period can be found in Weblin (ed) (2003). Anderson's more polemical writings are still unpublished although copies can be found in the Anderson Archives. For a fuller discussion of Anderson's political theory, see Weblin's 'The Political Development of John Anderson' in Weblin (ed) (2003, pp. 9–21).

Education, Censorship and Freethought

During this decade Anderson was also active in his defence of education and freethought and his opposition to censorship.[11] This activity can be marked into two distinct periods. From 1927 to 1930, he spoke regularly on education, censorship and freedom of thought at a series of public meetings as an independent public intellectual. However, from 1931 to 1937, he was an active president of the Freethought Society and from that position gave numerous addresses on a wide range of subjects including the nature of freethought, obscurantism, social service, the monarchy, censorship, Fascism, anarchism and the failure of Bolshevism.

Anderson's educational theory at this time emphasised the importance of a liberal education, understood as the development of a classical understanding of things, although in line with his adherence to Marxism at this time, he also argued that educators needed to co-operate with the working class in the pursuit of a 'producers' society'. In his main philosophical elucidation of the concept of education, he argued that all education is critical and opposed to the mere habituation of skills and techniques. This is the Socratic theory of the 'life of examination', without which life is not even worth living. Further, education is characterised by free inquiry and opposed to any theory of educational utilitarianism where education is judged according to the utility of its effects. Anderson also argued that a critical education is opposed to any form of censorship, and during the late 1920s he was active in uniting university staff to oppose the Federal Government's censorship of a wide range of political and literary works. As part of this campaign, he presented an elaborate analysis of the notion of censorship, arguing that there are no conditions under which an item should be censored, whether it be said to be seditious, obscene or blasphemous. The free nature of inquiry is opposed to any suggestion that there are subjects which cannot be studied or presented as works of art.

---

[11] Some of Anderson's educational writings for this period can be found in Anderson (1931) and Phillips (ed) (1980), although Anderson's freethought writings have not yet been published. For a discussion of Anderson's freethought theories and activity, see Baker (1979).

Anderson's theory and activity of freethought was an important aspect of his academic life during the 1930s. He argued that freethought was the view that any subject can be a matter for investigation and that for the secular mind there is nothing 'sacred' which is beyond inquiry. He argued that in mythology an ideal world is said to exist and in this world there are certain 'privileged entities' which are not amenable to ordinary scientific laws. In contrast, for the secular mind there is nothing sacred, and in recognising that certain social forces are arrayed against freethought, freethinkers must oppose and expose these obscurantist forces. In his 1931 'war idols' controversy, Anderson argued that freedom of thought came out most positively in the opposition to political superstitions. He argued that a superstitious regard for 'the State' or 'the country' was a noteworthy feature of modern political life and that such superstitions concealed the absence of a true democracy. He also stated that war memorials were political idols for they were made the basis of practices which prevented critical thinking about the character and conditions of war and social relations in general. He was subsequently censured by the Sydney University Senate for 'using expressions which transgress all proper limits', although he was defended by the Lang Labour government.

The Andersonians 1

Anderson's students during this decade—the so-called 'Golden Age' of Andersonianism—included the philosophers John Passmore and J. L. Mackie, the poets A. D. Hope and James McAuley, as well as a number of lesser-known figures such as Perce Partridge, Frank Fowler, Harry Eddy, Ruth Walker, Margaret Mackie and Alf Conlon. Midway through this decade, Anderson began an affair with Ruth Walker, which flourished until his departure on sabbatical at the start of 1938.[12] The correspondence which survives from this period is of some psychological, social and historical interest in providing details of their first meeting in August 1935, their first sexual encounter a year later, and some observations of the social life of NSW at that time but is of little philosophical importance.

Anderson at Sydney (Middle Period: 1938–1949)

In 1938, Anderson took a 1-year sabbatical and travelled to Great Britain and America. In England he visited Oxford and Cambridge universities and attended a philosophy congress, all of which merely confirmed for him the 'backward state of philosophy in Great Britain'. In America, he travelled to New York, Chicago and Los Angeles and visited Max Eastman, Sidney Hook and Rudolf

---

[12] The correspondence between Anderson and Walker can be found in the Professor John Anderson and Family Archives and the Ruth Walker Archives at Sydney University.

Carnap. Anderson's only academic writing for the year was an article for the *AJPP* on 'The Problem of Causality'. During this year, a second chair in philosophy was advertised and Anderson had the opportunity to discuss the position with several applicants, including the ultimately successful candidate Alan Stout, son of the famous idealist philosopher G. F. Stout.

Philosophy

Between 1939 and 1949 Anderson's published philosophical activity fell into two distinct periods. From 1939 to 1943, Anderson published eight articles for the *AJPP*, all of which dealt with issues in ethics. In addition to these writings, he also wrote several reviews for the journal, many of which discussed areas related to ethics, such as education and psychology. However, after 1943 he wrote virtually nothing until the end of the decade, even though he continued as editor of the *AJPP* until 1946. In his lectures the situation was markedly different, for after the appointment of Alan Stout, Anderson began writing several new sets of lectures on a wide range of subjects.

Ethics

Immediately after his return from sabbatical, Anderson became engaged in a debate with R. A. Miller, a member of the philosophy department at Melbourne University, which concluded with an exchange with A. B. Gibson, the professor of philosophy at Melbourne.[13] In these articles, Anderson argued that the prime concern of ethics is with what goods actually are and that 'what aims at goods' is of no ethical importance. This was a clear rejection of his earlier view that goodness is 'something which can be pursued'. He argued further that when we remove the vagueness of moralism, we are left with demands and commands issued by certain individuals or social movements, although we can still recognise goodness as a character of specific activities.

In 1942 he wrote 'The Meaning of Good' which opened with a sustained critique of the non-naturalism in Moore's *Principia Ethica*. In developing his own theory, Anderson argued that since obligation is a relation, it can have no positive meaning if goodness is understood as a quality. Hence, the concept of the 'ought' as 'that which is "commanded" or "demanded" is only intelligible in terms of a relational theory of morality. Goods, as qualities, reside in 'causes' or social movements, the content of which is liberty or freedom. However, the conclusion of this article equivocated on the question of whether goods are primarily mental or social, and while Anderson came down on the mental side, later critics argued that it would have been more consistent for him to adopt a social position.[14] In his 1943 article, 'The Nature of Ethics', Anderson appeared to confuse this issue even further when he asserted that inquiry, which is one of the goods, could refer to both the possession of the quality and the possession of the relation, which, to later critics, appeared to be a relativistic identification of quality and relation.[15] Finally, in his 1943 article, 'The Servile State', he reiterated his earlier view that goods only exist in their struggle with evils and argued that the conception of goodness as an end is an individualistic view.

---

[13] All of Anderson's significant philosophical writings for this period can be found in Anderson (1962).

Apart from outlining his own theory, Anderson criticised many ethical theories during this period. He criticised both Christianity and socialism for fostering an ethic of philanthropy. He argued that philanthropy seeks to provide relief to the underprivileged, but what such protection actually does is weaken the operation of those actual and independent social movements that can provide escape from the servitude of bourgeois society. He argued that such servility is not something that one can be 'saved from', for it is only by what men are and not by what they are given that they can win release from servitude. Anderson also criticised Mill's theory of ethical hedonism, arguing that while pleasure is a quality of natural things and hence could in principle define the nature of goodness, in fact it is too narrow a conception to provide such a definition.

Aesthetics

After his return from sabbatical, Anderson's addresses to the Literary Society were concerned exclusively with Joyce, Ibsen and Dostoevsky.[16] He argued that man's estrangement from society is caused by the loss of love between self and others and that it is by the activity of love that this estrangement can be overcome. He also praised Joyce for insisting that the artist must escape from the patriotic and religious conventions that are accepted by the modern crowd. Further, he argued that when Joyce speaks of the 'eternal affirmation of the spirit of man in literature', he is invoking a spirit which is scientific as well as artistic, for both science and art constitute movements which enable the escape from servitude. Science and art differ only in terms of their form of presentation, with science being more 'ponderous', whereas art particularises and 'bites through the defences of those whom mere argument would leave unaroused'.

In 1942, Anderson presented a lecture series dealing with aesthetics in which he detailed his criticisms of expressionism and romanticism. However, these lectures also contained a detailed discussion of the concept of beauty understood either as a theme in temporal arts such as music or drama or as structure in spatial arts such as painting and sculpture. While Anderson equivocated on whether theme or structure was the best general description of beauty, he did make the remarkable assertion that beauty cannot be a quality. This statement is significant because the realist criticism of relativist theories such as expressionism and romanticism presupposed the distinction between quality and relation and the treatment of beauty as a quality. To deny that beauty is a quality is to deny that his own aesthetic theory is a realist one and is a view which robs his criticism of aesthetic relativism of much of its logical force.

---

[14] See Eddy (1944: 74) and Baker (1979, pp. 45–46).

[15] See A. Anderson (1987, pp. 136ff, 141ff).

[16] Anderson's aesthetic writings for this period are contained in Anderson (eds) (1982).

Metaphysics

In 1944 and 1949, Anderson presented two series of lectures on Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity* which detailed his own views on metaphysics.[17] Anderson adopted Alexander's definition of metaphysics as 'the empirical study of the non-empirical' and argued that it is impossible to assert that a philosophical position is self-contradictory, for if the contradictory of the false is true, then the 'self-contradictory' precludes the very possibility of truth itself. However, the more intelligible meaning of the conception of the 'self-contradictory' is the 'self-refuting', for to say that something is self-refuting is to say that it is refuted or disproved by its incompatibility with the conditions of discourse. Anderson then considered the problem of Space and Time and argued that it was impossible to conceive of either as separate from the other and that they must be understood as the unity of 'Space-Time'. Following Alexander, Anderson rejected both the notion of a mental Space-Time where Space-Time is an aspect of the Hegelian Absolute Mind and the notion of a physical Space-Time, a doctrine he described as materialism or substantialism.

Anderson defended Alexander's theory that Space-Time is a medium in which things exist and argued that this is the only theory which does not contradict the possibility of talking about Space-Time. He argued that this conception of Space-Time implies infinite divisibility and infinite extensibility, which in turn implies that the theory of the 'indivisible atom' from which all things are made and the theory of the 'universe' as a totality in which all things exist are both false. Anderson then moved on to a consideration of the categories of existence. Firstly, he discussed the five categories of Identity, Diversity, Existence, Relation and Universality, all of which he described as logical categories or categories of the subject of the proposition. With the category of Universality occurring as a transitional category to the next grouping, he next considered the categories of Universality, Particularity, Number, Order and Quantity, all of which he described as mathematical categories or categories of the copula of the proposition. Finally, with the category of Quantity occurring as another transitional category, he considered the five categories of Quantity, Intensity, Substance, Causality and

---

[17] See Weblin (ed) (2005) and Anderson (2007b). For a fuller discussion of Anderson's metaphysics, see Weblin's 'Introduction' in Weblin (ed) (2005).

Individuality, all of which he described as physical categories or categories of the predicate of the proposition. Any object, then, exists in the medium of Space-Time, and in thus so existing is characterised by each of these 13 categories.

Liberal Democracy

By the time of his return to Sydney in 1939, Anderson's political thinking had changed markedly from the previous decade, and he began to articulate and defend a theory of liberal democracy.[18] During 1939 and 1940 he rejected the Marxist view that the State is the organ of the ruling or dominant class and argued that insofar as socialism is utopian, it denies difficulties and conflicts and confuses the questions of origin and destiny. Anderson's general social theory was outlined in his 1940 article 'Freudianism and Society', in which he criticised the conflict between psychological individualism and social monism in the theories of Freud and Marx. He argued that Freud's individualism led him to reduce the social to the psychical, while Marx made the opposite error of reducing the psychical to the social and regarding social institutions as the key determinants of social change. In contrast to these monistic and atomistic theories, on Anderson's theory it is social movements, 'causes' or 'ways of life' which determine social change, for such movements have the power to 'take up' individuals into them and in doing so transform them. During these years Anderson was also formulating a theory of democracy, although he gave varying definitions of the term. For example, he argued that democracy is the extension of political enterprise, that it is a system within which minority groups recognise the prevailing system of justice and that it is the freedom of the oppressed to have social movements. Prima facie, none of these definitions entail any other, and this ambiguity suggests that Anderson was working through various conceptions of democracy while still influenced by his 'proletarianism' of the 1930s.

In his 1941 lectures on 'Green's *Principles of Political Obligation*', Anderson argued that democracy is not an established system of government or a settled system of rights, but is a set of limitations on the ruling order that the ruled have to struggle to secure and maintain. Hence, there will be no absolute democracy although there will be political systems which are more or less democratic. Anderson returned to the question of democracy in the following year in his course on 'Political Theory', in which he argued that the doctrine of the liberal state as a balance of interests does not necessarily imply the parliamentary theory of representative government. Further, the Soviet system of elective and executive functions combined in one body is a superior system to the parliamentary one where these functions are separated and the political activity of the people is taken to be only exercised at elections. However, Anderson criticised Lenin's argument that parliament is a mere 'talking shop', for this underestimates the value of discussion in political life and leads to the dogmatic view that the one true political doctrine has been discovered and merely has to be ‘applied’ to existing social and political life. He argued further that the balance of powers within a state is a balance between social movements and organisations and that enfranchisement properly understood is only for these movements and organisations and not for individuals. If this is the case, then no absolute democracy of uniform enfranchisement is possible and such freedom as does exist does so through the clash of interests. Society, then, is a balance of opposing tendencies, and there is no conceivable society in which there is not struggle and in which forms of organisation do not become hardened and thus an obstacle to the development of social forces. Complete equality, he concluded, can only mean the loss of freedom and initiative.

---

[18] For Anderson's political writings, see Anderson (1962), Weblin (ed) (2003) and Anderson (2007a).

In his 1943 article, ‘The Servile State’, Anderson argued that servility, understood as the attempt to plan for the abolition of insecurity and conflict, is based on the refusal to recognise that insecurity and opposition are part of the nature of things. He argued further that liberty and servility are conditions of any society, with liberty declining under conditions of imagined security and re-emerging under conditions of adversity. This relational view of liberty was an important part of his reformulated criticism of socialism as concerned with ends. He argued that the attempt to establish the belief that social struggle can be eliminated is an important cause in the loss of vigour of independent social movements. Further, the notion of a ‘social unity’ must also be rejected, not only as a description of present conditions but also as a conception for future society. Although he insisted that the contemporary emergence of servility was indicative of long-term cultural degeneration, he concluded that freedom could never be completely eliminated, for those social institutions such as universities and trade unions which have a doctrine of independence can always refuse to be mere instrumentalities of the State and, in opposition to the State, become a measure of freedom within a community.

Anderson returned to the question of democracy in 1945 in his ‘Lectures on Socialism’ in which he defined democracy as universal political activity where public responsibility is shared by all the members of a community and argued that while no society has ever been democratic, some approach the democratic ideal more than others. Hence, the parliamentary system may indicate a certain progress towards democracy, and the fact that a government bows to political agitation may be an example of democracy insofar as a particular social interest is exercising power which did not find expression through the ordinary mechanism of voting. In his introductory essay to W. H. C. Eddy’s *Prospects of Democracy* (1945), he argued that democracy involves the extension of political activity throughout the community and not its concentration in a single body. This implies that the democratic State is the ‘general machinery of adjustment’ of the plurality of existing interests and that the general interest of ‘the community as a whole’ is a much lower interest than specific interests such as academic or trade union interests. Independent activity and opposition to the State, then, are essential to democracy, although in an important qualification of his earlier views, Anderson argued that opposition to the State will defeat itself if it breaks up the balance of powers altogether.

After 1945, Anderson's only other serious political writing until 1952 was his 1948 'The Politics of Proscription' in which he argued that the proposal by R. G. Menzies, the leader of the Liberal Party opposition, to ban the Communist Party was an attempt to defeat the Communists by using their own weapons of suppression, censorship and banning. Such an attempt was to succumb to the techniques of totalitarianism and was therefore undemocratic and illiberal. However, he consistently described Communism and egalitarianism as 'the disease of the modern time', for if society is by its very nature hierarchical, then it is impossible to establish an egalitarian society, and the very attempt to do so irrevocably weakens the operation of independent social movements.

Freethought, Education and Religion

During this decade, Anderson remained active in his defence of freethought and education and his criticism of religion.[19] While Anderson's addresses at the university during the early war years were mainly concerned with political issues, from 1941 onwards he became interested in questions on religion and education. After 1943, he lost interest in religious questions but continued discussing issues in education until the end of the decade.

Anderson argued that education is the critical liberation of the mind from superstition and prejudice and that a training in Arts subjects within the university is a training in disinterested inquiry and speculative thinking. In this sense a liberal education is the struggle of a militant minority to defend liberty and culture as the continuing themes in the history of civilisation. As such, a liberal education is opposed to mere vocational training and educational utilitarianism, and the conflict between culture and technology will be expressed as the conflict between freedom of thought and expression and the technological attempt to plan and regulate thinking. He also argued that educational institutions have their own history of struggle and the university is part of the adjustment of diverse social movements and as such will operate in opposition to the State. Further, the real importance of the university lies in the intellectual activity of its permanent members, and as such the activity of the university cannot be subordinated to some external criteria such as 'winning the war'.

Anderson was also critical of religion, arguing that religion is closely bound up with solidarity and whereas Judaism has a positive core of solidarity as a reaction of an oppressed people against their oppressors, in Christianity there is only a veneer of solidarity as a Nietzschean slave mentality of acquiescing in worldly oppression. However, religion can only ever be a covering over of real solidarity, and, in setting up the spiritual over the bodily, it is a compensatory doctrine for those debarred from social struggle. In contrast, mythology indicates real solidarity and the Marxist notion of the ‘class war’ and the Sorelian doctrine of the ‘general strike’ can be taken to be mythical expressions of existing ways of living.

---

[19] Anderson's religious and freethought writings have not been published. The more important of these writings include the following: 'Liberal Education', *Honi Soit*, 10 September 1942; 'Why an Arts Faculty?' *Honi Soit*, 7 August 1941; 'Christianity, Faith and Credulity', *Honi Soit*, 14 August 1941; 'Christianity in the University', *Honi Soit*, 13 August 1942; 'Psychoanalysis and Religion', *Honi Soit*, 3 September 1942; 'Anderson Controversy', *Honi Soit*, 7 April 1943; 'Freethought and Sex', Anderson Archives Series 8 Item 6; 'Obscenity', Anderson Archives Series 4 Item 21; and 'What is Freethought?' *Honi Soit*, 17 May 1945. See also Anderson (1941), Phillips (ed) (1980) and Baker (1979).

The tension between education and religion came into focus in 1943 when Anderson addressed the New Education Fellowship. In this address, he argued that education is necessarily secular and since the religious conception of the ‘sacred’ sets up limits to inquiry, the more religious instruction there is in an educational system, the less it is truly educational. The religious teacher must instruct on the basis of dogma and authority, and when a child is presented with such ‘instruction’, the child becomes either cynical by giving verbal adherence to doctrines which it does not believe or credulous, believing what it has been told without having thought through the subject itself. Further, the submissiveness induced by religious teaching serves the interests of the ruling class, and the failure of the Christian Church to compete with other moralities leads it to insist on a special position in schools to maintain its authority in social affairs. Anderson concluded that the morality natural to an educational system is that of freedom of thought. On this occasion, in a reversal to the 1931 controversy, Anderson was censured by the NSW parliament, but defended by the Sydney University Senate.

Unlike the 1930s, during the 1940s the Freethought Society did not dominate Anderson’s life at the university. During the war years, Anderson often spoke at organised meetings at the university but only rarely so under the auspices of the Freethought Society. After the end of the war, the Freethought Society again grew in importance at the university, although there was a growing rift between Anderson and the student population, many of whom were returned servicemen and less influenced by the force of Anderson’s personality.

One of Anderson’s key interests at Freethought Society meetings during the early war years was sex, an interest no doubt stimulated by his ongoing relationship with Ruth Walker. It was at this time that Anderson, apparently referring to his own domestic situation, asserted that the notion of a ‘life partner’ is a deadening influence and that the working out of marital conflicts may mean loss of strength for cultural ones. In an address on ‘Freethought and Sex’, he argued that there is a close connection between political enslavement and sexual enslavement and the rejection of political authority implies the rejection of sexual authority and the hierarchical conception of sexual reproduction elevated over sexual gratification. Further, there is no such thing as ‘unnatural vice’, and hence the criticism of such sexual activities as homosexuality and incest as ‘unnatural’ has no logical force. In an address on obscenity, he argued that in the use of obscenity there is both an assertion of masculine virility and an attack on femininity which have a common cause in the male fear of castration in the sexual act. He argued that in the Anglo-Saxon male there is a swing between the sentimental view of women as virgins and the brutal view of them as prostitutes, and this deprecatory attitude is linked to the mechanistic and empiricist character of the English mind. He concluded that the only way to avoid this swing between dominance and submission is through comic copulation. Finally, in an article on ‘Art and Morality’, he argued that the Christian depreciation of sex is closely linked to Christianity’s individualism and salvationism. He argued further that the Christian’s sacrifice of his sexuality to God serves to keep his actual sexuality apart from an active social life. In particular, the heavenly imaginings of the chaste have a hidden sexual content and there is a link between the distorted sexuality of chastity and political quietism, for fear of sexuality is linked to fear of social disorder, and therefore sexual repression will have a central place in any repressive polity. In contrast, he supported Feuerbach’s view that sexual love is a condition for other freedoms and that it enriches and enhances the various forms of productive activity such as science, art and industry.

However, Anderson was also interested in more theoretical issues, and in an address on mythology he argued that myth is a way of approaching questions for which a people had not yet formed a terminology. He supported Vico’s view that a people’s myths are its representations of its own early history, and combining that view with the Marxist view that the religion of a people is its indirect representation of its own social character, he concluded that myths and religion are a people’s first approach at social science. He argued that there is no need to wipe out the myths of a people, but rather it is possible to get to the positive meaning behind those myths. In an address on ‘History and Consciousness’, he argued that Vico’s view that we can be certain about history because we make it is simply false because we do not always understand what we make. Society has its own laws of development and the active elements in society are the social conditions themselves. He concluded that both Marx and Vico were aware of this and in particular Vico, with his doctrine of Providence, was insisting on something immanent in the actual workings of history itself.

In another address he argued that freethought seeks to uncover the social content of religion and reject the tribal mentality of possessiveness and acquisitiveness and that the freethinking position is one of opposition to the setting up of idols and the search for security. He also criticised the establishment of the United Nations, arguing that the attempted establishment of ‘world solidarity’ would merely reflect the same acquisitiveness and privileges that the member nations such as Britain, America and Russia exhibited and held. After the war, Anderson discussed a wide range of subjects in his freethought addresses including police brutality, the repressive nature of the RSL and the bureaucratic nature of student unionism.

The Andersonians 2

From 1939 onwards, Anderson’s influence at the university became more widespread. After the appointment of Stout to the chair of Moral and Political Philosophy, Partridge moved into Stout’s department while Passmore and Walker remained in Anderson’s department. During the war years—the so-called ‘Silver Age’ of Andersonianism—several Andersonians such as Tom Rose, Jim Baker and

Harry Nicolson were exposed to Anderson's own views in his lectures and to reformulated versions of his views modified by lecturers such as Passmore and Partridge. Also, several 'fringe' Andersonians emerged such as Donald Horne, James McAuley and Oliver Somerville, who either had rejected his views or had not even studied under him. After the end of the war, Tom Rose was appointed to work with Anderson and J. L. Mackie to work with Stout. At the same time—the so-called 'Bronze Age' of Andersonianism—a new generation of students emerged who were less inclined to accept Anderson's views in toto and began to reformulate the 'Andersonian position' in their own terms. Among these students were John's son Sandy, David Stove and David Armstrong, who would later hold Anderson's chair at Sydney University. Outside the university, annual philosophy conferences were held at Newport from 1939 onwards where there was regular contact between Anderson and his ex-students. After the war, these conferences became more professionally oriented. This decade also saw an intensification in Anderson's relationship with Ruth Walker to the point that he declared himself to being in a 'crisis of love'. The correspondence between them during this time is of some philosophic importance for in 1949 he stated that, 'I don't think anyone but you would appreciate my "idealism",' and in 1950 he asserted that, 'I seem to be going more and more Hegelian.' In neither case did he elucidate the meaning of 'idealism' or 'Hegelian', although it is clear that there was a significant change in his own terminology to describe his philosophy.

Anderson at Sydney (Late Period: 1950–1962)

During the final decade of his life, Anderson gradually returned to his academic writing on philosophy after a silence of many years. In 1952 he published academic articles on a range of subjects including logic and Freudian psychology as well as delivered important addresses on the subjects of history and literary criticism. In the same year, Ruth Walker was on sabbatical in England during which they maintained an extensive correspondence and discussed a wide range of philosophical subjects. Over the next decade, Anderson wrote several articles on the history of ideas, and this emphasis continued until his death in 1962.

Philosophy

In a 1952 article on logic, Anderson argued that it is the logician's task to oppose eclecticism by immersing himself in the philosophical tradition and articulating the philosophical theme of objectivism versus subjectivism, a theme which makes inquiry and philosophy intelligible.[20] It was at this time that Anderson began to emphasise the concept of 'form' while discussing his philosophy. Hence, in 1952 he asserted that in aesthetic criticism, questions of form and content go together and without formal or common aesthetic principles there could be no such thing as aesthetic criticism, while in 1953, in discussing the psychological aspect of his ethical theory, he emphasised that people belong together in common forms of activity. Further, in 1955 he argued that if something, such as God, is said to be bound up with everything, then this will be a question of form, and in his 1959 review of Croce's *My Philosophy and Other Essays*, he argued that while the stimulus to philosophical problems may arise from historical or cultural problems, this was no ground for asserting that philosophy and history are identical and for not distinguishing between the two in terms of form and content. Finally, in his 1962 article, 'Empiricism and Logic', he argued that the distinction between philosophy and science must be based on the distinction between form and matter and that a 'common measure of terrestrial events' could not itself be some material thing but can only be something formal. While Anderson did not systematically discuss this notion of form, its appearance in such a wide variety of significant contexts suggests that it was occupying an increasingly central place in his thinking.

---

[20] See Anderson (1962) and 'Realism' in *The Australian Highway* (Journal of the Workers Educational Association of N.S.W.), September 1958, pp. 53–56.

Anderson did not consider his systematic philosophical views until the occasion of his retirement from Sydney University in 1958. In his paper 'Realism', Anderson argued that the general heading of 'Realism' covers a wide range of differing tendencies encompassing an objective view of things and the denial of the privileged position that idealism had reserved for mind as qualifying all of reality. He argued that realists have no difficulty in showing that there was nothing mental about the logic of relations, but the important advance made by realism was the specification of the vague notion of the 'real' as the spatio-temporality of things. However, in an apparent qualification of his earlier views, he now argued that a common error is to mistake the object of realist attack as idealism, whereas in fact the Hegelian doctrine of objective mind is an important step towards a general objectivist position. He argued that the real object of realist attack was rationalism or the dualist doctrine of 'natures' and 'essences', and it is significant that he identified the work of the later Moore and Russell as examples of such manifestations of rationalism. In his last article on philosophy, Anderson argued that empiricism is the only doctrine which makes the history of philosophy possible and that it is a doctrine of ways in which situations stand towards situations and the experimental procedures by which investigations can be carried out.

History

One issue that did occupy Anderson's attention during the 1950s was the question of history.[21] This interest was first stimulated by an address in 1952 in which he accepted Croce's position that history is the story of liberty, but argued further that this theme is nothing less than the history of thought as the continuing theme in human affairs which in itself is the history of classicism. Anderson returned to this theme 2 years later in his 1954 review of Croce's *Politics and Morals*, in which he argued that Croce's distinction between politics and ethics can only be supported in terms of an empiricist treatment of them as qualitatively distinct and not, as Croce held, as different aspects of the 'liberal spirit'. Such a doctrine is immanentism or humanistic idealism, where the liberal or ethical spirit has its own ways of working and is superior to authoritarianism because this humanistic idealism can understand authoritarianism and make it a part of itself by transcending it, whereas authoritarianism cannot transcend itself. Further, against Croce's optimistic view of history, Anderson argued that it is possible to maintain a historical pessimism which recognises that the ethical or liberal spirit is something that has its own ways of working but would not be a directive to action. The distinction between politics and morals will then be in terms of qualitatively different activities, for there will be ethics if certain activities can be empirically described as good or bad and there will be politics if there are found to be certain distributions of power.

---

[21] For Anderson's historical writings, see 'History', Anderson Archives Series 6 Item 37; Anderson (1954, 1959, 1960, 1961).

In his 1959 review of H. B. Acton's *The Illusion of the Epoch*, Anderson argued that Marx's determinist and objectivist interpretation of history is a theory of reality as process and that the materialist interpretation of history is the doctrine that productive organisation is the continuing subject of history. Further, against the contention that social history should be identified with a 'postulated movement of things in general', Anderson defended a pluralistic recognition of the distinction of any process from surrounding processes and of an irreducible plurality of processes within it. Both mental and social activities are material processes, and it is because a materialist view of history is pluralistic as well as deterministic that Marx's doctrine of 'single-track social development' is a departure from his professed materialism. It is 'forms of activity' and not isolated individuals which keep the historical process going, for rather than individuals being fused and transmuted into social movements, it is these 'forms of activity' which make up and form individuals.

In a 1960 review of Caponigri's *Time and Idea*, Anderson rejected Caponigri's idealist interpretation of Vico's concept of providence as the synthesis of transcendence and immanence, arguing that such a view of the synthesis of time and idea is not Vico's contribution to a 'science of society'—Vico, rather, emphasised the concrete and continuing social activities that are the driving forces of human history. Anderson argued that both Caponigri and Croce, in defending a totalistic and progressivist theory of history, reject the theory of historical regression which is implied in Vico's theory that historical laws can be discovered in the ways of working of the human subject matter itself, instead of being laid down from 'above'.

Finally, in his 1961 review of Bronowski's and Mazlish's *The Western Intellectual Tradition*, Anderson rejected the authors' anti-intellectual and humanistic attitudes of voluntarism and subjectivism and defended an objectivist and scientific view of things. He argued that Hegel's rejection of all dualisms was of particular importance in the defence of objectivism and concluded that modern science is particularly weak in its neglect of the intellectual tradition of systematic philosophy going back to the Greeks.

Cultural Criticism

Concomitant with this interest in questions of history, Anderson began to discuss general issues in cultural criticism.[22] This interest began in 1952 with an address on 'The Freudian Revolution', where he argued that the revolutionary character of Freud's theories lay in their naturalistic or objective treatment of mind as conative, understood as a set of urges or drives. In this article he also argued that 'the only true revolution is a revolution of ideas', which clearly indicates the gulf from his earlier proletarian belief that political revolution could produce an improved society. Anderson's general interest in cultural criticism was also evidenced in his 1954 'Lectures on Criticism' in which he presented a unified theory of criticism that extended across a number of subjects.

However, his most developed statement of culture and criticism is to be found in his 1959 article, 'Classicism', where he argued that classicism referred particularly to the period of philosophical Hellenism, a period he praised for adopting an objective theory of culture and the turning of a critical intelligence onto all subjects. He particularly praised Socrates for upholding the objective treatment of subjects such as religion, ethics and aesthetics and argued that it is part of the classicist position to see that culture exists in its struggle with superstition and backwardness. However, not even Socrates can be regarded as exclusively objectivist, for with his belief in 'ultimates' Socrates can be seen to have a mystical or romantic streak. Such a tendency could not be found in his predecessor, Heraclitus, who in his thoroughgoing objectivism was unremitting in his attack on subjectivist illusions. However, while Heraclitus had a sense of the interlocking of all materials and all problems, he had not worked out a critical apparatus as a doctrine of types of problems and forms of solution as Socrates and Plato did, and so Anderson concluded that for a general conception of the objectivist outlook, we have to go back to both these sources. Although he despaired at the 'barbarism of reflection' that characterises modern philosophy from the time of Descartes and Bacon, he singled out Hegel for praise for steadily opposing dualism and rationalism in modern philosophy and for stimulating interest in Hellenism and advancing an objective view of the whole of culture.

---

[22] See Anderson's unpublished 1954 'Lectures on Criticism' and 'Classicism' in Anderson (1962).

Politics, Education and Religion

In the decade prior to 1950, Anderson had published only one article on politics, but with the election of the Menzies government in late 1949 and its proposal to ban the Communist Party, Anderson became reinvigorated in his political activity: he attacked the proposal and campaigned against the issue in the subsequent referendum.[23] Anderson's explicitly political writings were rare during this period, with only one article, his 1952 'Democratic Illusions', dealing with politics. In this article he outlined what has been described as a 'conservative' political theory where he was critical of the inquisitorial character of income tax collection, the 'vexatiousness' of compulsory voting, the failure of the attempted 'improvement of conditions' and the growth of a class of professional paid politicians. However, Anderson's more important theoretical point was that there can be no civilised living without a variety of cultural, political and economic traditions, each with a special body of custodians and their own special privileges. Such a view is opposed to egalitarianism, where the tendency of social levelling is downwards.

During 1950, the Freethought Society underwent a crisis of leadership with Anderson's emerging conservative political position now at odds with the more radical position of the students over issues such as conscription and Communism. During 1951, there were a series of debates within the Freethought Society, with Anderson's own position leaving little doubt about his views. He argued that the student body of the Freethought Society (now calling themselves 'Libertarians') embrace the negative notion of freedom as being untrammelled in whatever they want to do and in doing so embrace servitude in the name of freedom. In contrast, Anderson advocated the freedom that is to be won by artistic consciousness and argued that the freethought movement is not one of the agitation for the propagation of ideas, but is the critical and objective study of theories and ideas, the aim of which is to expose the superstitious characteristics of all movements.

During this year, Anderson also addressed a group of students as an independent speaker free of the constraints of any society on the subject of 'The University and Religion'. He argued that the demand for more religion in the university was a demand for the restriction of inquiry and argued that the whole direction of modern thought and philosophy, and even Protestantism itself, was away from theism and towards atheism. He argued that the content of the religious notion of 'the kingdom of God' could be understood in human terms as community or co-operation and that Bosanquet's notion of human communication as 'manifestations of spirit' could similarly be understood in a secular fashion. He also supported Croce's doctrine of 'immanentism' as the view that if we seek the principles of things, we find them in things themselves. However, the more important issue for Anderson was that study was essential to the operation of a university and could not be subordinated to any other political, social or religious tradition or movement. In 1955, Anderson wrote an article on ‘Morality without Religion’ in which he argued that religious ethics are moralistic in being based on obligation and that ethical science must go beyond ‘the obligatory’ to the nature of the authority making the demands. When this authority is taken to be God, the Christian is faced with the particular dilemma that if God is thought to be a particular thing, then the demands that the Church makes in his name do not have any special force, whereas if God is not taken to be a particular thing and is believed to be bound up with the nature of everything, then this is illogical because ‘everything’ cannot make particular demands.

---

[23] For Anderson's political, religious and educational writings, see Weblin (ed) (2003); 'The Communist Ban and the University', *Honi Soit*, 4 May 1950; 'The University and Religion', *Honi Soit*, 12 July 1951; and 'Morality without Religion', Anderson Archives Series 6 Item 49. On Anderson's 'conservatism', see Stavropoulos (1992).

Throughout the 1950s Anderson argued that academic autonomy was under threat from various religious, commercial and political pressures, and he was particularly vocal in the case of Sydney Sparkes Orr, a professor of philosophy at the University of Tasmania who had been sacked by the University Council. In 1957, Anderson argued that the Orr case stands for the maintenance of academic traditions in the face of outside interference and attacked the lack of academic interest in the case, arguing that the affair showed the uselessness of staff associations that were more interested in salary scales than in academic freedom. He argued that Orr’s dismissal was a reaction to the role that Orr had played in setting up a Royal Commission into the University of Tasmania which had shown that the staff had a great deal to complain about in terms of the operation of the University. He again returned to the Orr case in 1958 when he criticised the inaction of academic bodies over the issue of academic freedom raised by Orr’s dismissal and supported Orr’s criticism of the Council’s conception of university staff as ‘servants’ of the public. He argued that academic freedom is sometimes taken to mean that academics should have the rights of ordinary people, but people see teaching as ‘laying down the law’, and to speak on political matters is taken to be teaching those matters and hence being a propagandist. However, academics need to critically examine those popular views which are ‘natural’ to a community, and the unsettling of such views is part of the process of education. Academic freedom, then, is one of the special privileges that enables the carrying out of academic work by academics.

After his retirement in 1958, Anderson’s public life was one of an independent intellectual, criticising religion and defending educational autonomy. The full exposition of his theoretical views on the university is to be found in his 1959 address, ‘The Place of the Academic in Modern Society’, where he argued that universities only exhibit intellectual force and uphold culture through the operation of a vigorous opposition to officialism and legalism. In particular, the academic, as a social critic attacking the linked notions of welfare, progress and equality, is also attacking the false conception of ‘universal educability’ that in its process of ‘levelling down’ is destroying intellectual distinction and thus destroying education. On a pluralist interpretation of the university, then, the academic, during a period of cultural decline, finds his place in society to be ‘nowhere’.

In 1961, Anderson was faced with his final controversy when he was attacked by the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney, Dr. H. V. Gough. In a pulpit address, Gough criticised the teaching of ‘soul-destroying philosophies’ at Sydney University, and while he didn’t single out Anderson by name, it was clear that Anderson was the object of his attack. In reply, Anderson argued that the campaign initiated by the Gough sermon was an attempt to subordinate the university to the control of clerical interests, which, if successful, would lead to the steepest drop in academic standards. He argued further that the fundamental conflict between religion and philosophy is that religion takes a ‘personal’ view of reality and is concerned with knowing what person to give your faith to, while philosophy takes an ‘impersonal’ view and is concerned to discover the forms of connection between things. The movement in modern thought, he concluded, has been anti-religious, even though it is less classical than it previously was.

The Andersonians 3

During the 1950s students who studied under Anderson were being exposed to views that were reformulations and departures from his earlier published work. Further, the staff in Anderson’s expanding department no longer included the ‘old guard’ of Passmore and Partridge, who had moved to the Australian National University (ANU) and were less inclined to follow the ‘Andersonian line’. Most prominent among these students was Eugene Kamenka, who would later also work at ANU, although many of these students went on to pursue further careers in philosophy. After the dissolution of the Freethought Society in 1951 and the formation of the Libertarian Society in the following year, the intellectual foundation of the Sydney Push was created. While some of the more famous members of the Push such as Germaine Greer, Robert Hughes, Clive James and Barry Humphries could only loosely be called ‘Andersonians’, the leading theoreticians of the movement such as Jim Baker and George Molnar were strongly influenced by Anderson’s philosophy and articulated their interpretation of that philosophy within the Push. In this way, many of Anderson’s psychological, sexual and social theories permeated into the cultural milieu of Sydney and Australia in the decades following his death.

The 1950s also saw the decline of Anderson’s relationship with Ruth Walker. At the end of 1949, the strain of their secret relationship and the pressures of work precipitated a nervous breakdown in Ruth, and she was hospitalised with electroconvulsive treatment in 1950. Although she returned to full-time teaching duties in 1951, the relationship appears not to have resumed with its previous intensity, and in 1952 she departed for an extended sabbatical at London University College. The correspondence during this year is full of philosophical and political commentary, and Anderson particularly praised Walker’s ‘non-atomistic mind’ and stated that ‘in these times, it’s certainly atomism that’s the enemy (hence my revived Hegelianism!)’. This correspondence also contains several poems about Karl Popper (‘The bull in the china shop’) and Gilbert Ryle (‘John’s got him beat by a mile’). More seriously, the correspondence contains extensive discussion of contemporary analytic philosophy and the decline of a systematic conception of philosophy. After 1952, there is little further correspondence between John and Ruth, even though she continued working in the philosophy department after his retirement in 1958.

Conclusion: Realism, Idealism and Empiricism

At the time of his death in 1962, John Anderson was generally recognised as the most important intellectual in Australia. No other intellectual in the twentieth century had developed a philosophical or cultural theory as systematic, extensive or detailed as Anderson's. No other intellectual in the twentieth century had such a significant influence on several generations of students, many of whom went on to be prominent philosophers or academics in their own right. No other intellectual in the twentieth century had such a thorough understanding of the Marxist corpus, had both supported and opposed the Communist cause in Australia and who, even when in opposition to Communism during the 1950s, insisted on it being given an open platform and vehemently opposed any attempt to ban the Communist Party.

However, within a decade of his death, the Andersonian influence was on the wane, and by the end of the century, he was a forgotten and unknown figure in Australian cultural history. The most lasting Andersonian influence during this period was the 'philosophical Andersonians', which included such prominent philosophers as J. L. Mackie, John Passmore, D. M. Armstrong and D. C. Stove, as well as many lesser-known academic philosophers, a group which would number between 20 and 30. To this group of philosophical Andersonians could be added those many Andersonians who pursued professorial careers outside philosophy in areas as diverse as law, anthropology, psychology and literature. Beyond the academic sphere, Andersonians could be found in a range of occupations and industries in Australia including medicine, journalism, psychiatry, broadcasting, teaching, painting, poetry and the public service. Anderson's influence was also crucial in defining the relationship between Sydney and Melbourne philosophers, academics and intellectuals. Philosophy conferences during the 1940s and 1950s were dominated by the conflict between the Sydney Andersonians and the Melbourne Wittgensteinians, and, as the writing of Manning Clark makes clear, Anderson was also important in defining the relationship between the Sydney philosophers and the Melbourne historians.

The critical appreciation of Anderson as a philosopher has been marred by the absence of a single systematic work by him that outlined and developed the breadth and detail of his philosophy. This lack of a systematic exposition means that the best way to approach Anderson's work is through a historical and biographical treatment, although the integrated nature of Anderson's thinking means that there can be no separation between his work as an academic philosopher and his activity as a public intellectual. Anderson's early life in Scotland exposed him to a wide range of philosophical, cultural and social influences. By the end of the 1920s, he was not only familiar with the major philosophical figures and controversies of the period, but was also well read in Marxism, Freudianism, secularism, a wide range of contemporary literature and a significant number of cultural theorists. By the time of his arrival in Australia, he had developed a doctrinaire conception of philosophy incorporating a number of influences, including realism, empiricism, positivism, pluralism, determinism, naturalism and objectivism. This doctrinal approach to philosophy facilitated a period of elaboration and exposition which led to a remarkable academic output during this period. This doctrinaire approach to philosophy was reflected in a similar attitude to his political theory. Hence, the determinist, pluralist and objectivist doctrines of his philosophy found expression in the historical materialism of Marxism, and while his view of Russian Communism changed markedly during the 1930s, he retained these key aspects of his political theory. Anderson's other public intellectual activity during the 1930s, such as his involvement in the Freethought Society and his addresses on education, also reflected a doctrinal conception of thinking, although in his addresses to the Literary Society he was much freer in his thinking about key issues in aesthetics, a situation which may have been influenced by his relationship with Ruth Walker.

After his return from sabbatical in 1939, Anderson's thinking began to change on several important issues and this began to affect the rate of his publication, for after 1943 he published very little for the rest of the decade. Anderson's key interest during this period was with ethics, although later critics believed that there were inconsistencies and contradictions expressed in his ethical theory during this period, particularly concerning the question of whether goodness is a quality or a relation. Anderson's aesthetic theory was also undergoing reformulation, and the extent of his departure from realist principles can be seen from the fact that he explicitly denied that beauty is a quality, a position that a realist aesthetic would be committed to. In his political theory, Anderson was moving away from the doctrinairism of the 1930s, and he began to articulate a political theory where democracy and liberty are not states or conditions of a particular sort of society, but are relations that exist in any society whatever. One important consequence of this view was that no society is purely democratic or liberal and that the State is a balance of diverse and competing interests that is subsidiary to the free operation of those particular interests. Anderson's freethought and educational writings also began to emphasise liberalism and freedom of thought, and he was continually critical of the incursions of religious groups and government into the domain of education and free inquiry. However, Anderson's new political position was at odds with the egalitarian beliefs of the student membership of the Freethought Society, and after the war there were a series of conflicts within the Society that led to a public confrontation between Anderson and the student body. Anderson's movement from the doctrinairism of the 1930s was no doubt strongly influenced by his ongoing involvement with Ruth Walker, and in his correspondence to her in the late 1940s, he freely admits to a new philosophical position which he describes as 'Idealism' and 'Hegelianism'.

By the start of the 1950s, Anderson had not published an academic article for almost a decade, and in the year of Ruth Walker's sabbatical in England, he published several articles that outlined a reformulated philosophical position that was at odds with his views from the 1930s. Central to this reformulated theory was the concept of form, and while he never fully developed his understanding of this concept, its use in a wide variety of contexts suggests that it occupied a central place in his thinking. By the end of the decade, Anderson was insisting that the conflict between idealism and realism was not the most important issue in philosophy, and he appeared to question whether 'Realism' was even the best title for his philosophy. In his political theory, he was now vehemently anti-Communist and anti-egalitarian and advocated a conservative theory that defended the rights of traditions within society and of special privileges within those traditions. After the demise of the Freethought Society in the early 1950s, Anderson was an important public intellectual in Sydney and spoke out on academic freedom on several occasions. While this historical evidence is suggestive of a transition occurring in Anderson's philosophy towards idealism, it does not in itself constitute proof of such a movement. However, there are several arguments and criticisms of Anderson's philosophy that strongly support the view that he was in fact moving in this direction.

The first argument concerns the notion of *form*.[24] The distinction between form and content had been central to Anderson's exposition of logic since his arrival in Australia and the notion of categorical form played a central role in his discussion of the metaphysics of Samuel Alexander. However, from the start of the 1950s, Anderson developed and extended his systematic conception of philosophy, and the term most consistently used in this discussion was that of 'form'. It is arguable that a synonym for this notion of form is that of 'Ideal', and if this is so, then this might explain Anderson's use of the terms 'idealism' and 'Hegelianism' to describe his own philosophy. This usage might also explain Anderson's mature view that idealism is not necessarily opposed to realism and his belief that the Hegelian doctrine of objective mind is an important step towards the development of an objectivist philosophy. However, it can be objected that too much emphasis is being placed on isolated statements to redefine Anderson's entire philosophy, and while there is some basis for this objection, the fact remains that he did describe his philosophy in terms such as 'idealist' and 'Hegelian'.

A second argument in favour of this redefinition of Anderson's philosophy is based on an assessment of his views on ethics and aesthetics. During the 1940s, Anderson asserted that beauty is not a quality, and the clear implication of this view is that his aesthetic theory cannot be a realist theory. Anderson is faced with the alternative of arguing that either his non-realist aesthetic theory is not part of his systematic philosophy or it is such a part but that his philosophy should not be described as realist. Also, while Anderson consistently emphasised in his ethical theory that goodness is a quality, he was equally adamant that goods always support other goods and always oppose evils. It is unusual, to say the least, that a particular quality will *always* have a certain relation to similar qualities, and some critics have argued that such a view commits Anderson to a relativistic view of good as both a quality and a relation. While this argument is not conclusive, these inconsistencies and equivocations do give pause to automatically attributing the description of 'Realist' to his ethical theory.

---

[24] For an extended discussion of this issue, see Birchall (1983).

Finally, a third argument derives from one of the most serious criticisms of his entire philosophy. A central feature of Anderson's philosophy was the intimate relation between his theory of the categories and his theory of the proposition. He argued that the categories, as the universal features of things, cannot themselves be things, but also maintained in his propositional theory that any intelligible proposition must contain real, existing terms that are connected by the copula of existence. The difficulty for Anderson is that he must either admit that the categories cannot be terms in propositions and hence cannot be spoken about or admit that there are propositions which do contain terms which are not things but that such propositions cannot be described as realist ones. In his lectures on Alexander, Anderson recognised this difficulty and also noted that since the categories cannot have a 'significant opposite', then they cannot be connected by the copula of existence that presupposes the opposition of terms. The only alternative for Anderson here is to admit a copula that is not that of existence, but if categorical terms are not connected by the copula of existence, then Anderson's criticism of Hegel's dialectic, which was based on the assertion of the unambiguous copula of existence, collapses. There appears to be no other conclusion available to Anderson than to admit that categorical discourse is 'idealist'.

There is little doubt that Anderson began his philosophical career with a doctrinal defence of realism and proletarianism. His defence of realism was based on the belief that realism and idealism are opposed and that idealism was in fact 'unintelligible'. However, during the 1940s he began to gradually move away from the doctrinaire proletarianism of his political philosophy and in his aesthetic theory denied the possibility of a realist aesthetic. This movement in his political and aesthetic thinking had repercussions in his philosophical thinking, and by the end of the decade he was using terms such as 'Idealism' and 'Hegelian' to describe his philosophy. During the 1950s, the idealist concept of form began to occupy a more central place in his philosophical thinking and he argued that the real object of realist criticism is not idealism, but rationalism. Further, when various criticisms of his philosophy are considered, it is arguable that the best description for his mature philosophical position is idealism. It may be objected that too much emphasis is being placed on the use of 'realism' to describe Anderson's philosophy, even though there is a well-established tradition for describing his philosophy in this way. In support of this view, it can be observed that two of the most significant articles he wrote were his 1927 'Empiricism' and his 1962 'Empiricism and Logic' and that his own title for his book of collected articles was *Studies in Empirical Philosophy*. 'Empiricism' would certainly appear to be Anderson's preferred term for describing his philosophy.

By the end of his life, it is clear that Anderson's understanding of philosophy had gone through a remarkable development. It has long been evident that Anderson's political philosophy had moved from support and defence of Communism to vehement criticism and opposition to Communism. However, it has not been so obvious that Anderson's philosophy also went through a radical change and there is clear evidence of a movement from a doctrinal defence of realist philosophy which is opposed to idealism to a more considered acceptance of idealism as a suitable description of his philosophy. It would appear that the only way to resolve this tension between realism and idealism within Anderson's philosophy is to treat them as partial descriptions of a philosophy best described as empiricism.

References

Anderson, A. (1987). Following John Anderson. *Dialectic, 30*, 129–143.

Anderson, J. (1941). Art and morality. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 19*, 253–266.

Anderson, J. (1945). Introductory essay. In W. Eddy (Ed.), *Prospects of democracy* (pp. 7–12). Sydney: Consolidated Press.

Anderson, J. (1954). *Politics and Morals* by Benedetto Croce: Critical notice. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 32*, 213–222.

Anderson, J. (1959). The illusion of the epoch. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 37*, 156–167.

Anderson, J. (1960). *Time and Idea: The Theory of History* in Giambattista Vico by A. R. Caponigri: Critical notice. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 38*, 163–172.

Anderson, J. (1961). Review of *The Western Intellectual Tradition, from* Leonardo to Hegel by J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish: Review. *Australian Journal of Politics and History, 7*, 278–284.

Anderson, J. (1962). *Studies in empirical philosophy*. Sydney: Angus & Robertson.

Anderson, J. (1931a). *Education and politics*. Sydney: Angus & Robertson.

Anderson, J. (1931b). Review of *The Book of Diogenes Laertius: Its Spirit and its Method. Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 9*, 71–75.

Anderson, J. (1982). In G. Cullum & K. Lycos (Eds.), *Art and reality: John Anderson on aesthetics and literature*. Sydney: Hale & Ironmonger.

Anderson, J. (2007a). In C. Cole (Ed.), *Lectures on political theory*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Anderson, J. (2007b). In C. Cole (Ed.), *Space time and the categories: Lectures on metaphysics 1949–50*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Anderson, J. (2008a). In C. Cole & G. Cullum (Eds.), *Lectures on Greek philosophy 1928*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Anderson, J. (2008b). In C. Cole (Ed.), *Lectures on modern philosophy: Hume, Reid and James*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Baker, A. J. (1979). *Anderson's social philosophy*. Sydney: Angus & Robertson.

Baker, A. J. (1986). *Australian realism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Birchall, B. (1983). The problem of form. *International Studies in Philosophy, 15*, 15–40.

Eddy, W. (1944). Ethics and politics. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 22*, 70–92.

Kennedy, B. (1996). *A passion to oppose*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Passmore, J. (1969). Russell and Bradley. In R. Brown & C. Rollins (Eds.), *Contemporary philosophy in Australia* (pp. 21–30). London: George Allen & Unwin.

Phillips, D. (Ed.). (1980). *Education and inquiry*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Stavropoulos, P. (1992). Conservative radical. *The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 3*, 67.

Weblin, M. (Ed.). (2003). *A Perilous and fighting life*. Sydney: Pluto Press.

Weblin, M. (Ed.). (2005). *Space-time and the proposition*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Weblin, M. (2007) 'Anderson on Reid and Scottish Philosophy' The Monist, 90, 310–25.

The Influence of Wittgenstein: 1940s

4

Graeme Marshall

Contents

Introduction 90
The Oral Phase 90
Cambridge 91
  Georg Henrik von Wright 92
  John Wisdom 93
  Norman Malcolm 94
  Douglas Gasking and A. C. (‘Camo’) Jackson 95
  Stephen Toulmin 96
  F. R. Leavis 97
  M. O’C. Drury 97
  Rush Rhees 97
  Peter Geach Writing About His Wife, Elizabeth Anscombe 98
Melbourne 98
  George Paul 99
  Douglas Gasking 100
  Camo Jackson 103
  Helen Knight 105
  Stephen Toulmin 106
New Zealand 107
  J. N. Findlay 107
  Wellington with Hughes and Hinton 109
Wittgenstein at Further Removes 111
  The Students’ Students 111
Oxford 113
  J. J. C. Smart 116
Conclusion 118
References 118

G. Marshall
The School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia
e-mail: homemarsh@gmail.com

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_5,

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Introduction

Being influenced by another is, in effect, to be much influenced, anything less is hardly being influenced at all and of little interest to anyone. Being much influenced by another is invariably thought by those who have become so to be something fortuitous, awakening, positive, full of grace and in some respect more than just good, without which they would not be the person they are. To have fallen under the influence of another may be felicitously bemoaned only by one who begins to realise that without it, they would not be the person they have become. In either event, the will may be indeed influenced but is never totally subject or enslaved. The question to be addressed here concerns the respects in which Wittgenstein influenced antipodean philosophers and what changes that brought to what they did and how they did it.

Part of the answer is that he showed how philosophical problems could or should be dealt with—not solved but dissolved: ‘The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. . . (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.)’ (Wittgenstein 1953, p. 308). This is not a panacea nor was meant to be, for he was drawn only to troublesome questions in metaphysics, logic, mathematics, epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophical psychology in general and philosophy of mind in particular. But one must be careful, since the wide range of his thought, the general remarks he made, and the many striking metaphors he used in making them have equally wide and surprising application. His *not* going far into some fields of inquiry encouraged many who were already influenced by him to try and see what his insights could make of questions in those fields, with some distinctly interesting and significant results, especially concerning the moral life.

The Oral Phase

Wittgenstein’s influence in Australasia during this period was initially through those who had attended his classes in Cambridge, had been much affected by them and later came or came back to, as it happened, Melbourne and Wellington. Significantly, the word was spread orally. Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and philosophising had not then been published except for some notes to accompany his lectures which he had dictated to a few of his students in 1933–1934 and further in 1934–1935. These notes not surprisingly had a clandestine and increasingly wide circulation but were only officially published in 1958 as the *Blue and Brown Books*, 5 years after the central text of Wittgenstein’s later work, *Philosophical Investigations*, itself published 2 years after his death. So during the period to the mid-1950s when philosophy was in ferment, there were no written texts to interpret apart from the notes as dictated and remembered. Even when they were published and open to public scrutiny, they still most appropriately belong to what we might call the oral phase of the, probably general but certainly antipodean, Wittgensteinian experience. Thought and talk with Wittgenstein's students were exciting discoveries, mutually enjoyed.

John Cook quotes Alice Ambrose in her review of his *Wittgenstein's Metaphysics* as saying of those, including herself, to whom the *Blue Book* (1958) was dictated and who attended the accompanying lectures that 'they will be surprised by my description of it. But why should they *not* be surprised? . . . It would have been unlike Wittgenstein to *tell* his students that he shared the views of the neutral monists' (Cook 2005, pp. 399–400). And it would have been even more unlike him to countenance any philosophising that came already labeled. The oral phase properly has primary authority here. It is extremely doubtful that Wittgenstein had even bothered about neutral monism.

Like all such phases, the boundaries of the oral phase were blurred, and its content often revisited, mostly in written texts recollecting past times when what was said was known by acquaintance, soon yielding in the natural course to interpretative knowledge by description through the very texts in which that experience had come to be expressed. The certainties and uncertainties of the oral phase gradually diffused into the stuff of history properly ripe for scholarly research and judgement.

There were as well Wittgenstein's students' students who were fortunate in having it both ways. They were privileged to have Wittgenstein's new ideas, and attitudes illuminated by those who had listened to, engaged with and had become friends of Wittgenstein himself. Without falling into an outmoded romanticism, one can admit an awareness of reflected light, having a sense of fellow feeling and being caught up in a shared quickening and bewilderment. One had as well as the fruits of our masters' labours in finding their way through exposed complexities and collapsed houses of cards. On the other hand, there were the texts that were becoming available and soon commentaries upon them. We shall return to Wittgenstein's students' students and to the widening circle of those for whom the later Wittgenstein's work stood alone. But first there is how his students were influenced by him, since they were responsible for the beginnings of his influence in Australasia.

Cambridge

Wittgenstein had returned to Cambridge in 1929 when he felt he could again do creative work. The next year by invitation and later as part of his duties, he began regularly, with some interruptions, to give lectures. Moore retired in 1939 and not surprisingly Wittgenstein was elected to succeed him in the chair, failure to do so, Broad said, would be like refusing Einstein a chair of physics (Drury 1981, p. 156). What is more surprising perhaps is that Wittgenstein with his egalitarianism and his dislike of ceremony accepted the invitation. But he was passionate about the hard insights he had won, and he felt, very strongly, his duty to work them through again creatively with anyone seriously engaged enough to stay the course.

However, before he could assume the chair and continue his classes, WWII broke out. He did not want to watch it from 'his eagle's nest of a room at the top of the Whewell's Court tower' (Janik and Toulmin 1973, p. 21) at Trinity College. He went instead to Guy's Hospital in London as a porter and later worked in a medical laboratory at Newcastle where he couldn't help, incidentally, indulging his old engineering skills by devising an ingenious new manometer. After the war he returned with somewhat mixed feelings to Cambridge.

The radical change that took place in Wittgenstein's thinking was not sudden and had been brewing ever since his return to Cambridge in 1929, possibly before, and may indeed have been part of the reason for it. What this was and why and how it was significant comes through the following tributes written with the benefit of a good deal of reflection by those who were then influenced by him and what he had to say.

Georg Henrik von Wright

Von Wright became a close friend of Wittgenstein's and was one of his literary executors. He attended Wittgenstein's lectures in 1939 and again in 1946 and 1947. As Wittgenstein had hoped, von Wright succeeded him in the chair when he resigned in 1948.

Von Wright wrote:

> In our conversations in 1939 what Wittgenstein did was to completely 'shake me up'. The basic problems in philosophy which I had considered settled, revived. I felt I had to start again from scratch in philosophy. But in order to reach 'scratch' I had to crawl back quite a way—and this I could not accomplish quickly (von Wright 1989, p. 11).

This resonates with Wittgenstein's own remark: 'It's so difficult to find the *beginning*. Or better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not to try to go further back' (1969, p. 471).

Von Wright noted that Wittgenstein was commonly thought to have inspired two pervasive schools of thought: one, logical positivism and, the other, the linguistic movement which he says 'spread over the entire Anglo-Saxon world'. Wittgenstein repudiated both claims. While acknowledging this, von Wright is right to insist that Wittgenstein was 'of great importance to both of these trends in contemporary thought then: to the first, his early work *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and discussions with some members of the Vienna Circle; to the second, besides the *Tractatus*, his lectures at Cambridge and also glimpses of the works which he did not publish in his lifetime' (1989, p. 14). Then he adds:

> It is also partly true that Wittgenstein repudiated the results of his own influence. He did not participate in the world-wide discussion to which his work and thought had given rise. He once said that he felt as though he were waiting for people who would think in a quite different way, breathe a different air of life. When I returned to Cambridge in 1946 the impression he made on me was even deeper than that of eight years earlier. Each conversation with Wittgenstein was like living through the day of judgment. It was terrible. Everything had constantly to be dug up anew, questioned and subjected to tests of truthfulness. This concerned not only philosophy but the whole of life. . . . He moulded my conception of what philosophy is. He made me realize that one cannot hope for 'final

> solutions' in that subject. Many things which philosophers say, naively simplifying matters, I could never say, having learnt from him to appreciate the conceptual multiplicity of the situations with which the philosopher has to cope. The insights I acquired from him were thus essentially 'negative'. I am still struggling to transform them into something 'positive' as he successfully did himself. But my way will have to be different (1989, p. 16).

Von Wright regretfully agrees with Wittgenstein's own thought that his influence as a teacher was, on the whole, harmful to the development of independent minds in his disciples. He says:

> I am afraid that he was right. And I believe that I can partly understand why it should be so. Because of the depth and originality of his thinking, it is very difficult to understand Wittgenstein's ideas and even more difficult to incorporate them into one's own thinking. At the same time the magic of his personality and style was most inviting and persuasive (1955, p. 542).

John Wisdom

John Wisdom, who continued the succession in the chair after von Wright resigned in 1952, made explicit the newly revealed complexities among particulars which von Wright adverted to. Wisdom's version was this:

> Looking at the detailed pictures of utterances, we saw them all anew and in doing so saw how the old system of descriptions hid so many of their varieties of purpose and of logic; regardless of distortion they were crammed into boxes with labels on – no need to look inside. It's not because it is bad that the old system won't do but because it's old. As we all know but won't remember, any classificatory system is a net spread on the blessed manifold of the individual and blinding us not to all but to too many of its varieties and continuities. A new system will do the same but not in just the same ways. So that in accepting *all* the systems their blinding power is broken, their revealing power becomes acceptable; the individual is restored to us, not isolated as before we learned language, not in a box as when language mastered us, but in 'creation's chorus' (Wisdom 1953, p. 119).

In a short essay, published in 1967, Wisdom wrote:

> I have no notes worth speaking of about what Wittgenstein was saying in the years 1934, 1935, 1936, and 1937 when I attended his lectures and he talked to me about philosophical questions. . . . As I remember, when I first went to a lecture by him, he was talking about the question, 'What is it to understand a general term, such as plant'? . . . He studied the cases in which we say of someone, 'He understands', 'He knows the meaning', 'He is being taught the meaning', 'After all he doesn't know the meaning,' 'I know the meaning,' and so on. This led to his emphasizing the point he expressed by: 'We have the idea that the several instances of a general concept all have something in common'. . . . He said that in applying the same word to several instances we mark a family resemblance and not the possession of something in common. . . . This remark of his was connected with a point he expressed in the words: 'We have the idea that the meaning of a word is an object'. . . . This is connected with his saying: 'Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use', recommended as a supplement to 'The meaning of a statement is the method of its verification' And all this is connected with the question 'What happened when you understood?' and thus with his study of 'What happened while I was expecting so-and-so from 4 to 4:30?', and so with how much a question as to

> what happened when someone understood, believed, remembered, was reading, was coming to a decision, felt frightened, etc., is a matter of what happened before, and what will or would happen after, he understood, believed, etc., and with how our recognition of this is hindered by the idea of a mental mechanism the hidden movements in which are these activities of the mind.

Wisdom elaborates:

> 'We have the idea that the meaning of a word is an object' is also connected with 'The application (every application) of every word is arbitrary'. And this is connected with the question 'Can you play chess without the queen?' And all this about understanding is connected with his study of what it is to prove a thing, with the fact that people were often exasperated by his ending the discussion of a philosophical puzzle with 'Say what you like'. . . . The substitution of 'Ask for the use' for 'Ask for the meaning' is linked with the procedure of explaining meaning by presenting not a definition but cases, and not one case but cases and cases. And this is linked with dealing with the philosophical, metaphysical, *can't* by presenting cases and cases (Wisdom 1967, pp. 46–48).

Wisdom was highly influential in his own right despite his frequent disclaimers in his many articles that 'those who know his work will see how much of this is due to Wittgenstein' and 'Wittgenstein would not care for this way of putting it but . . .' and the frequent footnotes in especially *Other Minds* (1952, pp. 82, 127, 140 through to 247). And while Wittgenstein himself did not draw the analogies with psychoanalysis that Wisdom did and indeed criticised Freud for his failure to appreciate its distinctness from scientific practical and theoretical procedures and explanations, Wittgenstein respected what Freud saw and sought. Wisdom put that to his own illuminating philosophical use.

Norman Malcolm

Norman Malcolm, who attended many of Wittgenstein's classes, early and late, and who became a close friend, wrote a fine and moving *Memoir* (1958). He was more of a disciple than most though he was, like them all, no mere imitator and no silent critic. He wrote:

> I attended Wittgenstein's lectures, which were on the philosophical foundations of mathematics, in the Lent term of 1939. . . . I think that I understood almost nothing of the lectures until I restudied my notes approximately ten years later. Nevertheless I was aware as others were that Wittgenstein was doing something important. One knew that he was fighting his way through profoundly difficult problems and that his method of attacking them was absolutely original. . . . He told me that the only thing that made it possible for him to conduct his lecture classes in this extemporaneous way was the fact that he had done and was doing a vast amount of thinking and writing about all the problems under discussion. This is undoubtedly true; nevertheless what occurred in these class meetings was largely *new* research (1958, pp. 23–24).
>
> Some have thought that Wittgenstein's lectures were only for his friends and favourites. In fact he would admit anyone to his lectures. He required, however, that they should attend continuously and for a considerable period of time. He would not allow anyone to come for only one or two meetings. To one such request he replied, 'My lectures are not for tourists'. This was reasonable. It kept lectures from being invaded by numbers of the curious. And it

> was true that one had to attend for quite a long time (at least three terms, I should say) before one could begin to get *any* grasp of what he was doing. Wittgenstein could not tolerate a facetious tone in his classes, the tone that is characteristic of philosophical discussion among clever people who have no serious purpose. It is worth noting that Wittgenstein once said that a serious and good philosophical work could be written that would consist entirely of *jokes* (without being facetious) (*Memoir* 1958, pp. 28–29).

The seriousness of philosophy and working one's way through until one had a *grasp* of the matter while realising with Wittgenstein that the most important and hardest problems are *in front* of us never left Malcolm and was still being declared in the title of his last major book *Nothing is Hidden* (1986).

Douglas Gasking and A. C. ('Camo') Jackson

Douglas Gasking and 'Camo' Jackson, who in different years, Gasking earlier, Jackson later, attended Wittgenstein's classes and got to know him and Wisdom well. Of them, more below. They jointly wrote the following obituary for the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (1951):

> Ludwig Wittgenstein, sometime Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge and Fellow of Trinity College is dead. His only published work, apart from a short address to the Aristotelian Society in 1929, was his celebrated *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, the English version of which appeared in 1922. . . . But in the last twenty or so years of his life Wittgenstein turned his back on the *Tractatus* and went on to produce and to teach at Cambridge a whole new way of philosophising. None of this later work has been published [1951]. Yet its effect on Australasian and American philosophy and its enormous effect on philosophy in Britain is apparent to anyone familiar with it who compares the sort of thing philosophers used to write twenty years ago with what very many of them write today. It is perhaps even more evident if one compares the technique of oral discussion then and now. . . .
>
> The considerable difficulty in following the lectures arose from the fact that it was hard to see where all this often rather repetitive concrete detailed talk was leading to—how the examples were interconnected and how all this bore on the problem which one was accustomed to put to oneself in abstract terms.
>
> Wittgenstein once, in lectures, gave the following sort of description of his procedure. 'In teaching you philosophy I'm like a guide showing you how to find your way around London. . . . After I have taken you many journeys through the city, in all sorts of directions, we shall have passed through any given street a number of times—each time traversing the street as part of a different journey. At the end of this you will know London: you will be able to find your way about like a born Londoner. Of course, a good guide will take you through the more important streets more often than he takes you down side streets; a bad guide will do the opposite. In philosophy I'm a rather bad guide.
>
> There are many sorts of human excellence. Not least among them is the excellence of one who devotes his whole life, giving up all else, to the attempt to do one single thing supremely well. That Wittgenstein did. How far he succeeded, those who come after us will tell.

This suggests that they thought there was something to tell while they yet could. And they did so. And so shall we.

Stephen Toulmin

In an interview with Gary A. Olson, Stephen Toulmin said this:

> If we're talking about who influenced me philosophically, well obviously Wittgenstein. I went to his classes in Cambridge in the last couple of years of his time there; I wrote the Wittgenstein/Vienna book with Alan Janik (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1973) and certainly Wittgenstein's whole approach to philosophy was tremendously influential on me. In certain respects, attending Wittgenstein's lectures gave me the courage of previous convictions; that is, I was already strongly inclined to move in the direction that he encouraged us to move in: toward a kind of classical scepticism. . . . I think that where he ends up in regard to all matters of technical philosophy is in a classical Pyrrhonist position of saying that the thing to do with philosophical questions is not to answer them but to avoid answering them and to step back and ask 'How on earth did we get into this trap?'
>
> The very fact that Wittgenstein was introduced to other Cambridge philosophers—and so to the whole network of English-speaking academic philosophers—through Bertrand Russell has given the whole subsequent interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas a Cambridge-orientated stamp. . . . Surely (his Cambridge colleagues agreed) he was a curious, touchy and eccentric figure, with un-English habits of dress and social opinions, and a quite unfamiliar moral earnestness and intensity. Yet a 'genius' was what he remained to the end, in the eyes of his English-speaking colleagues and successors. By labeling Wittgenstein as a foreigner of odd personal habits, with an extraordinary, phenomenal, possibly unique, talent for philosophical invention, the English thus defused the impact of his personality and moral passion. . . . 'Viennese, you know; Freud and all that. . . .'
>
> This was the point of view from which Wittgenstein's students at Cambridge still saw him during his final years in the chair. . . . Those of us who attended his lectures during the Second World War or during the last two years of teaching there, in 1946 and 1947, still found ourselves looking upon his ideas, his methods of argument and his very topics of discussion as something totally original and his own. . . . We would have done better to see him as an integral and authentically Viennese genius who exercised his talents and personality on philosophy among other things, and just happened to be living and working in England (Olson n. d.: website).

In seeing Wittgenstein as a kind of classical sceptic, Toulmin might be thought to be using another strategy for dealing with him and his thought giving him a familiar methodological theory and placing him in a School. I think Toulmin chose the wrong one though any other would have been wrong too. Wittgenstein was not a sceptic, and he did not ask himself *how* he might have got into the trap he was in so much as *where* he made the move that solved nothing and how instead he should have *gone on*. He was in this sense a prospective thinker not a retrospective one; he was concerned to *see* something aright, to diagnose perhaps, but not, as a psychologist or historian might, to *explain* anything. And he thought there was more than one way of doing philosophy. He wasn't just being a Viennese philosopher. But these construals at least enabled Toulmin to do his own thinking which still was very Wittgensteinian. His widely influential *Uses of Argument* (1958), for example, shows both points plainly.

F. R. Leavis

F. R. Leavis was not a student of Wittgenstein's, but they had a curious and friendly respect for each other and often walked together. Leavis is rightly said to have been an 'unignorable' presence for 50 years at Cambridge. It was also said (by Ian Robinson, one of Wittgenstein's former pupils) that Leavis' seminars at Downing College were of the same family as Wittgenstein's at Trinity except that Leavis was content to do most of the talking without much assistance (Leavis 1981, p. 82).

Leavis wrote:

> The 'influence' represented by the immense vogue generated by Wittgenstein's genius, which was so manifest and so potent, wasn't in general the kind that has its proof in improved understanding of the influencer and his theme, or in fortified intellectual powers. And this is the point at which to avow that I can't believe Wittgenstein to have been a good teacher. It is not only that I knew very well some of the young men who were, or whom professed to be, enthusiastic attenders at his lectures; I can't believe that most (at any rate) or even the mature and academically officed professionals who were present supposed that they could sincerely claim to have followed, in the sense of having been able to be even tacit collaborators (that is, serious questioners and critics), the discussions carried on by Wittgenstein. . . . But what one has seen written and heard said a good many times seems to me well-founded: that the wonder and the profit for the lecture-audience lay in the opportunity to witness the sustained spontaneous effort of intellectual genius wrestling with its self-proposed problems (Leavis 1981, p. 76).

Almost in spite of himself but like Wittgenstein's students, Leavis' perceptiveness bespeaks the behaviour of an early student and life-long friend of Wittgenstein's. He wrote he had a 'compelling wish to go do likewise'.

M. O'C. Drury

Drury was an early student and lifelong friend of Wittgenstein's. Drury wrote:

> For the first time he talked to me about his present writing. He showed me the 'duck-rabbit' picture. He said 'Now you try and say what is involved in seeing something *as* something; it is not easy. These thoughts I am now working at are as hard as granite. . . . But I wouldn't say now 'thinking is hard'. There is I believe a stage in philosophy where a person feels that. This material I am working at is hard as granite but I know how to go about it (Drury 1981, p. 173).

That became true too of the best of Wittgenstein's students at the best of times.

Rush Rhees

Of Rush Rhees, which was certainly true, he knew how to go about it and so was something else that von Wright, Drury, Malcolm, Jackson and others all comment upon: philosophy for Wittgenstein was always part of life, and both how you did philosophy and how you otherwise lived and thought must affect each other. Rhees remembers once saying to him, for example, that he had been thinking about becoming a member of the Revolutionary Communist Party:

> Wittgenstein stopped walking and said: 'Now let's talk about this.' His main point was: When you are a member of the party you have to be prepared to act and speak as the party has decided. You will be trying to convince other people. . . . You keep along that road. Whereas in doing philosophy you have got to be ready *constantly* to change the direction in which you are moving. At some point you see that there must be something wrong with the whole way you have been tackling the difficulty. You have to be able to give up those central notions which have seemed to be what you must keep if you are to think at all. Go back and start from scratch. And if you are thinking as a philosopher you cannot treat the ideas of communism differently from others (Rhees 1981, pp. 229–230).

Rhees adds that in 1931, Wittgenstein wrote in parenthesis: 'A philosopher is not a citizen of a thought-community. This is what makes him a philosopher' (cited in *Zettel* 1967, p. 455).

Peter Geach Writing About His Wife, Elizabeth Anscombe

> I heard him address Elizabeth as 'old man' on several occasions. It was not the only way in which he treated her as an honorary male. Each year at the beginning of his course of lectures Wittgenstein would have a great many listeners, largely female; this crowd would rapidly shrink to a hard core of regular attenders by the third or fourth lecture. This happened in particular during one year's attendance by Elizabeth; noticing this shrinkage, Wittgenstein looked round the room with gloomy satisfaction and remarked 'Thank God we've got rid of the women!'. His anti-woman attitude, from which he dispensed Elizabeth, amused me but also rather alarmed me; I knew that at least one woman formerly his pupil had had it made brutally clear to her that she was no longer in his good books, and I feared for the effect on Elizabeth if she should thus be rejected (Geach 1988, p. xii).

She was far from rejected and remained a close and trusted friend for as long as he lived. He asked her to translate the *Investigations*; Part I was finally completed before he died and she had seen the draft of what became Part II. Anscombe is probably the best known and most distinguished of Wittgenstein's female students. I much regret being unable to discover how others here then but, sadly, dead now, Ann Jackson, Helen Knight and Elizabeth Gasking, for example, felt about that.

Melbourne

Influenced by Wittgenstein in the ways sampled above, his students spread the word and style and mode of philosophising to their students and others they came in touch with. Most notable for us in Australia were, as already mentioned, Douglas Gasking and Camo Jackson, later Helen Knight and briefly Stephen Toulmin, all of whom came to Melbourne. George Hughes came to the chair in Wellington followed there soon by Michael Hinton. But the first to come to Australasia was George Paul.

He knew Gasking in Cambridge and came to Melbourne in 1939 for what he intended to be a short visit, but it was our good fortune that WWII kept him here. He and Gasking had attended Wittgenstein's classes during the years before the war and had been much influenced by them.

George Paul

Paul's effect especially on advanced students and junior staff in the Melbourne department was remarkable. Don Gunner, for example, of whom more below, caught Paul's infectious enthusiasm and subsequently fired his own students with it. It was also well captured by R. M. Crawford, then newly Professor of History, who was much taken with Paul and had him lecture to his final honours class in Theory and Method of History. Crawford said:

> What Paul offered us from Philosophy was not mystery but clarity. It was not only that he used common language and not a technical jargon. Behind this was his desire to remove any obstruction, not only to communication between us, but to our own clear view of what the problem before us was. 'What do you do?' was his repeated question, a genuine one, for he wanted to know; and it was a question which made us in turn look at our practice with a closer, if somewhat anxious, scrutiny (Crawford 1962, p. 10).

This is the Wittgenstein who shook up von Wright but also the Wittgenstein for whom the relevant practices reveal meaning and provide for the possibility of agreement and disagreement in judgement within, in this case, the history language game.

And one can hear Paul's excitement coming through his lecture about Wittgenstein in the BBC series *The Revolution in Philosophy* (published as Ayer et al. 1956):

> Yet philosophy is not just any description of uses of language, however extensive, various, and exact. Such a description only '*gets its purpose from the philosophical problems*'. It is not enough to turn our attention away from the sublimated, indiscernible essence and accommodate our sight to the multitudinous ordinary; or to loosen our concentrated gaze from what is at this moment immediately in front of our mind, and spread our attention so that we see also circumstances before and after. In the crowd of circumstances thus seen, I may still remain every bit as lost as before. 'A philosophical problem has the form: I don't know my way about. I may be lost even when I see clearly everything that is around me. . . .
>
> The very nature of philosophical investigation compels us to travel over a wide region of uses, criss-cross in every direction, the same use being approached again and again, each time from a different direction, from a different point of view, from a different use. These various sketches do not of themselves fall together to form a picture, or even a map, of a place or region; they have to *be* arranged so that if you looked at them you could *get* a picture of the landscape there, and so to some extent get to 'know your way about'. Hence the importance of *finding* and *inventing* intermediate cases. Only by this *finding*, *inventing*, and *arranging* of views, not by an inactive observation of all equally that happens to come before my eye, do I get to know my way about. . . . Here is why Wittgenstein presents no method in philosophy; there is no method for inventing cases, no method for arranging them. And there is no method for 'being struck by' one fact rather than another (Paul 1956, pp. 94–95).

Paul left Melbourne in 1945 for a Fellowship in Oxford. Selwyn Grave relates that in the early 1950s, Don Gunner wrote to Paul expressing disappointment with Cambridge—Moore was ill and Wittgenstein had resigned—and saying that he wished he had gone to Oxford to do his postgraduate work with him. 'In his reply, which Gunner kept, Paul described himself as being "a routine practitioner, treating minor ailments with a now rather old-fashioned list of drugs"' (Gunner in Grave 1984, p. 80). Sad for Paul and sad for Gunner, all round except for Paul's earlier and well-remembered stimulation.

In writing about Alan Donagan when he was a student at Melbourne, Stephen Toulmin sums up well those Pauline times. He says:

> He [Donagan] was introduced to academic philosophy at a lucky place and time. Through a coincidence of two distinct historical accidents, the Philosophy Department at the University of Melbourne in the 1940s was the focus of a vigorous conversation and a great place to be drawn into the traditions of philosophical literature and debate. This conversation began early in WWII with the arrival from Cambridge of a newly appointed lecturer in philosophy, George Paul. . . . But it developed a full head of steam a couple of years later when Paul was confronted by a lively group of immigrants from Central Europe—not least from Vienna. . . . was a group of Germans and Austrians . . . having first been interned in Britain as 'a threat to national security' and later deported to get them out of the way. The fact that many of them were from Jewish families and had well-established records as anti-Nazis was not enough to save them from being deported, or as we might say with greater historical resonance, 'transported'. . . . In Australia it became so clear that they could do no harm that they were allowed to move to Melbourne and resume their normal civilian lives. Among them were Kurt Baier, Gerd Buchdahl, and Peter Herbst, and they found themselves working along with such Australian-born students as Camo Jackson, Don Gunner, Bruce Benjamin, Michael Scriven, as well as Alan Donagan himself. They were exposed to the impact of Wittgenstein and 'analytical' philosophy in its most vigorous, original, and creative stage (Toulmin 1993, pp. 143–44).

Douglas Gasking

Gasking came to Melbourne as Paul's replacement. He used to describe himself as an old Bolshevik Wittgensteinian: he was there at the beginning of the revolution. He had gone to Cambridge after graduating from Liverpool, having read the *Tractatus* in the Liverpool Public Library. He had to wait a month or two for Wittgenstein to return at last from the hut in Norway in which he had been living for a year writing up and continually revising what were to become the early sections of the *Philosophical Investigations*. So Gasking was with Wittgenstein at the point of his re-entry, as it were, when the move from simples to samples was made and the exploration of the consequences begun. The meaning of words was not to be secured by their reduction to an absolutely determinate relation between simple symbols and simple logical pictures of possible worldly states of affairs, all not further analysable, but by sampling the deployment of a significant concept in ordinary sentences used in a great variety of familiar states of affairs by people at home in the world talking in one way and another in the natural course of lives.

Gasking remained impressed by the power of examples and particular cases which he used to refer to as the *Heinz* phenomenon—the 57 varieties (as they were then). I well recall our first scheduled philosophical discussion in 1958. I had come with a thesis; he kept asking how it dealt with this case and that case and this other. The next time I came with a whole load of cases; he asked me what problem I thought they might illuminate. Here was someone who had heard and talked well with Wittgenstein.

The sample methodology, if that is not too grand a word, he never gave up though he used it in subtle and sophisticated ways. This shows up best, perhaps, in his late and under noticed paper 'Clusters' (1960) which does for 'family resemblances' and 'following a rule' what Wisdom in his early articles did for 'analysis': both go into some of the much needed but rarely supplied fine detail. In that paper Gasking is not explicitly concerned with rules but with sets, classes, aggregates, groups, clusters and kinds and with their identity criteria and the criteria for membership of them. The result, however, is to exhibit, inter alia, the complexities standardly involved in following rules, for 'going on in the same way'. Whether a certain term, 'game', for example, means the same over time, or in different contexts, or for people differently situated or placed, depends on whether it refers to or describes, for example, a cluster *as distinct from* a class or set or group or other aggregate or ways of being.

When he arrived in Melbourne, Gasking sets about establishing courses on Wittgenstein in the honours degree. One was in the third year in the slot called 'realists and idealists'. I used to wonder how it came to be a course on the *Tractatus* until I remembered 5.64: 'Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it' (1922, p. 153). That would have been a fine defence for anyone thought to be changing the course description entirely. The second course was in the final year on the early sections of the *Investigations*. Each year we used to wonder how far Gasking would get beyond the private language argument. It was an indicator of how good the class was since Gasking never hurried and enjoyed lively discussions even, or perhaps especially, when they became therapy sessions for wishful-thinking metaphysicians. Everyone, colleagues and students alike, remarked upon Gasking's clarity, directness, lucidity, intellectual honesty and philosophical seriousness. The *activity* of philosophy was done almost entirely by discussion, and it was seldom solemn partly because it was vigorous and positively co-operative. This is part of the change in oral discussion noted by Gasking and Jackson in their obituary. It also incidentally partly explains the want of publications. If in following Wittgenstein, one is constantly trying to grasp the proliferation of relations between particulars in an expanding world without the false certainty of philosophical theories and at the same time keep the size of conceptual families manageable, *surveyable* (a good word my colleague Edwin Coleman gave me); without Wittgenstein's genius, one's work is going to be frustratingly incomplete. The strong temptation nonetheless to declare completion is irresistible only for the faint hearted. A proper and real sense of what is *good* *enough* is difficult to convince oneself of. Better, one might think to return to philosophising on the false model of the scientific method! And sell the pass?

But would it be so? Gasking is a good example of one who was never totally sure that it would be. I remember once asking him about his sympathetic attitude towards the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle. He replied: ‘They were the only philosophical friends we had back then’. That somewhat evasive reply is of a piece with his attitude towards behaviourism. John Wisdom had said that behaviourism is the most dangerous doctrine because it is the most nearly right. Gasking agreed in the shadow of ‘the primacy of the public’ as far as meaning at least is concerned and approved of both Skinner and Quine in their different ways for not going inside the skin but that ‘nearly right’ hides a wealth of philosophy. It states one of the most persistent and difficult philosophical problems that even Wittgenstein seemed not to have come to the end of. Gasking, being taken not to have eschewed all theory, spells out according to Frank Jackson (Camo’s distinguished son but no Wittgensteinian) ‘a notion of the reference analytic and then applies it to the mind-body problem to deliver the theory we would now call a token identity version of empirical or scientific functionalism’ (1996, p. v). It sounds as if Gasking had come a long way from Wittgenstein. Perhaps he had.

Gasking spreads Wittgenstein’s influence not only by providing his students and colleagues with admirable expositions and elucidations of Wittgenstein’s thought but also through his genial attendance and participation at national and local conferences and colloquia. His company and conversation was much sought after and generously bestowed. There were agreeable enough battles of course, especially with the Sydney Andersonians, but at least they became familiar with what they neither would nor could accept. As to that, Gasking had published in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 1949 an article, ‘Anderson and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’, subtitled ‘An Essay in Philosophical Translation’. Selwyn Grave said that the article was written evangelistically with no expectation of conversions but with genuine concern that terminological differences between the *Tractatus* and philosophers in Sydney might make it difficult for them to grasp fully its ‘philosophically illuminating doctrines’. Gasking wanted serious discussion but regrettably failed to achieve it.

Gasking had internalised much that he received from Wittgenstein and had made it his own so he was able to amplify and develop it further in his own voice and always move on. A clear example of all this is his 1955 *Mind* article ‘Causation and Recipes’. It is also seen in his work on logic. Like Wittgenstein when he turned his back on the *Tractatus*, Gasking saw no philosophical merit in purely formal logic. He told me that was generally accepted in Cambridge when he was there. Logic belongs in the midst of life.

His interests lay in what he called the soundness of arguments, criteria for judgement, the scale of non-collusive agreement, probable truth, what he called ‘the rule of candour’ and such matters. With respect to the last, he takes up Grice’s earlier not entirely happy attempt to formulate a similar rule. ‘Let us see, he says, if we can revise it so as to make it at least roughly true. Since we are dealing with a free-born language, not a regimented calculus, we cannot hope for better than an account of how the logic strength tends to go' (Gasking 1996, p. 61). He came up with this: 'Unless the circumstances are of the exceptional sort in which it is your duty to practise deception, you may not properly make any statement if you could, at that time make a stronger abbreviation of it' (Gasking 1996, p. 63).

It is not surprising therefore that Gasking should think as highly as he did of Toulmin's *Uses of Argument* (1958) where logical form and content are preserved as requiring each other. In this one cannot fail to hear Wittgenstein's question 'Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it' (1969: 501). One also cannot fail to understand why Gasking approved of Quine's doubts about the analytic/synthetic distinction and of the holism of Quine's concept of the 'web of belief' according to which no statement is immune from revision: Wittgenstein had already been there.

Camo Jackson

In a certain and precise sense, Jackson, unlike Gasking as presented above, did not move on: he did not need to. Perhaps, even, he *could* not do so without forsaking the philosophical enquiries that continued to possess him and ceasing to be the philosopher he was. He was not stuck in a rut; he remained struck, and at times dismayed, by the richness he found around him. He could have said something that Michael Hinton did say when I had been trying unsuccessfully in Oxford to interest him in Davidson's 'Mental Events' (1970): 'I think I'll stay with Wittgenstein; there's still more than enough there'. Not that Davidson was ignored by either of them. Jackson said that he admired the philosophical voice but, semantics aside, there was little worth noticing in Davidson's mature theory of interpretation and his triangularity thesis that in one way or another is not already there in Wittgenstein's late work.

As an undergraduate Jackson had dropped out of the university and was junior sports master and cricket coach at Scotch College when he first met Paul. Paul was impressed by the fact that here was someone who had actually read Moore and seemed to understand what he was about. With Paul's encouragement Jackson returned to the university, completed his honours degree and on a scholarship went to Cambridge where he embarked on a Ph.D. and attended Wittgenstein's classes. Towards the end of the 1940s he returned to Melbourne with his wife Ann, both to positions in the department, Ann to a tutorship and Camo to a senior lectureship.

He published nothing except Wittgenstein's obituary with Gasking until 1988 when he contributed his notes to a collection edited by P. T. Geach of Wittgenstein's 1946–1947 lectures on Philosophical Psychology (1988). In the preface, the publisher wrote: 'Professor Jackson used to write up his notes from memory in the evening of the day on which the lectures were given. He emphasises that "the attribution to Dr Wittgenstein of verbatim sentences is intended to convey one auditor's understanding of the opinion expressed"' (1988, p. viii). Just for the record, when Jackson gave me a copy of this volume he added somewhat ruefully perhaps: 'I wasn't given the last proofread copy so I couldn't explain that "S" in my thing stands for "somebody" and sometimes for "self", not Shah [another contributor]. So my *one* concession from W. that I was "completely right" goes awry'.

Grave wrote:

> Though he published nothing, A.C. Jackson was to become one of the most influential philosophers in Australia. His reputation was carried abroad, and in 1958 he gave the John Locke Lectures at Oxford. Of all philosophers in Australia, he most conveyed a sense of the complexity of philosophy, and it was his own sense of this complexity that held him back from publication. He was 'the great technician' in the words of one of his former students. He worked minutely, conscious at the same time of vast problems such as that of the connection of thought and reality ('A very curious connection it is, because you can't crash through the symbol') (1984, p. 82).

Another of his former students said that what contributed to its being so profitable and stimulating talking with him was that 'you could never tell where he was coming from—it was out of left field somewhere'. I meant something similar in the obituary for him when I wrote 'He opened windows on bare heights'.

I would not have used the word 'technician'—he had no time for the *merely* technical, though Grave is right to say that he worked minutely while being acutely aware of how many threads he held together and not totally sure of where each clearly ended up. I was provided with a good example of all this when I asked him to tell me about his Locke lectures (he had not published them either). He said they were on seeing and how there was always more to visual experiences than what is expressed by both 'it looks to be . . .' and 'it looks as if . . ..' His interest was in what Wittgenstein wanted to say about 'seeing as' and private experience and what follows from what he did say. He thought that Wittgenstein thought that in the complexities of perception lay the equally complex beginnings of action and that becoming really clear about the one would also illuminate the other.

His thinking when he was attempting to achieve clarity was, however, never muddled; he was only ready to change tack if need be. I remember saying something to him once in the course of discussion; I cannot now recall about what, but I do vividly recall his sudden stiffening and the look that passed over his face, a curious mixture of despair and suppressed excitement, as he said 'You don't mean I have to start again!' I was quite unsettled to think that anything I said could have had the kind of effect on Jackson that von Wright, Rhees, Malcolm and others remarked on as Wittgenstein's students.

I did my Ph.D. with Jackson and we remained close friends for as long as he lived. I felt about him much as Wittgenstein's students felt about *him*, as expressed in the memoirs above. Both in our weekly 2-hour supervision sessions and outside of them, he taught me what philosophy is and what it takes to do it. He introduced me to his Wittgenstein and the depth and range of his thought as well as talking about action and the will on which I was writing. We also listened to a lot of music together. He did so as seriously as he did philosophy. As I write this it happens that I am hearing on the radio in a further room the wonderfully spare and clear early sections, full of promise never to be disappointed, of Bach's *Art of the Fugue*, as if

Wittgenstein had come in, as he did once at Leavis's house, and put on just the right record for us to listen to, evoking the richness of the best kind of simplicity we all desire in the end and Wittgenstein so often achieves.

Jackson's total attention to fine particulars and their significance in what absorbed him was part of the deeply satisfying pleasure, no matter how hard won, he both derived from his activity in play - such as his love of cricket and music - and the enjoyment he gave to those with whom he shared it. But above all there was his deep concern with how we should live and be living. David Armstrong who attended, as many of us did, Jackson's seminars at the end of the 1950s caught well his effect on us. He observed that: 'The effort of understanding Jackson and the effort he put in to understanding others, notably in his Philosophical Psychology seminars, acted as a philosophical catalyst for generations of Melbourne philosophy students' (1983, p. 95).

Much of that effort for both Jackson and his students went into finding and seeing the significance of the cases that filled the gaps intermediate between where he and we began and where he had got to. And 'catalyst' is good; he very much wanted his students to be independent of mind and worked hard to enable them to be so while helping them avoid pitfalls, blind alleys, simpliste solutions and superficialities and not upbraiding them for failing to be *sufficiently* serious. He did, however, give them up if they were not.

Wittgenstein certainly had no cause to give up on *him*. Once when we were talking over a glass or two of good shiraz, he broke off and exclaimed: 'I wish I had that man here now, I'd give him a piece of my mind!' I doubted that profoundly; Wittgenstein's presence would have been enough to scotch that. I still don't know what he was thinking of then. Not many, even so too many, real possibilities abound. But in the last note he sent me, he wrote: 'I agree, of course, that every new move "appears greater that it is". But I think that even those who criticize W. should show more kindness.' He was kind enough never in fact to have given Wittgenstein a piece of his mind.

The difference that remained between Gasking and Jackson perhaps comes down to this: using the distinction between saying and showing which in all Wittgenstein's thought 'stood fast' for him though under a variety of interpretations; Gasking said how things stood when expounding his thinking, while Jackson showed it. It may be that each condition is necessary for the possibility of the other; the difference is where in any particular case the emphasis rests. Through both Gasking and Jackson Wittgenstein's influence came here under each aspect.

Helen Knight

Helen Knight attended Wittgenstein's classes in the mid-1930s, and in the mid-1950s she also came to live in Melbourne. Although she had published impressively, had a high reputation and was a sought after symposiast, there was no position available for her in the Melbourne department at the time. She became instead a tutor in Philosophy and English at Janet Clarke Hall, one of the Colleges of the University. She was much appreciated there by both staff and students and became in the course of time vice-principal while remaining very much part of the Wittgenstein group Melbourne was fortunate to have.

One of her former students told me that it was well known that you could have the kind of intellectual conversation with her that you could not have with anyone else. I confirmed that many times. Her graceful acumen was as great as her range which was considerable. She, as it were, took Wittgenstein into aesthetics in general and painting, literature and film in particular, with much erudition lightly held and well-considered insight. She characteristically showed that the criteria for aesthetic merit are many and varied and all have their appropriate application, sometimes even together in mutual opposition when different aspects of a work of art are emphasised. Her family resemblances, or Gasking's clusters, have gone up a further level as well. Here is Wisdom's 'creation's chorus' indeed (see, e.g. Knight 1954).

Her Wittgensteinian influence, conveyed with the kind of sharpness and precision which also carried his claim that 'stand roughly here' can be perfectly precise as it is, could have been much wider than it was. But she had come to prefer a more local stage, much to the pleasure and profit of those of us fortunate to attend her upon it. It came as no surprise that in her retirement, she both continued pursuing the latest films and rereading all the novels of Henry James.

Stephen Toulmin

Stephen Toulmin also came to Melbourne but only for a year in 1954 on an exchange visit from Oxford to the newly formed History and Philosophy of Science department. He had recently published his *Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (1953), and there he says that Wittgenstein was a major influence in part because they both shared an interest in physics. Toulmin's first degree was in maths and physics and as he correctly says Wittgenstein particularly acknowledged Hertz in whom he found something of his own philosophical attitudes. Toulmin found those attitudes not merely confined to physics but more generally congenial as well.

As is obvious from his writings, Toulmin was a lively presence. One of his advanced students at that time recalls frequent lunches at Jimmy Watson's Wine Bar with him and Kurt Baier, Camo Jackson, Douglas Gasking and others, talking philosophy seriously though far from solemnly under Jimmy's benign gaze. It was, and remained, a good place for that, just off campus and much patronised by companionable staff and promising students alike, though, or maybe because the sixpenny dark was hardly a premier cru.

Toulmin clearly enjoyed philosophy at Melbourne then as his remarks already quoted show. It was where Wittgenstein met Vienna again and where he and his old friends were back at Cambridge.

New Zealand

J. N. Findlay

Wittgenstein's influence in New Zealand began when George Hughes took the newly established chair of Philosophy at the Victoria University of Wellington in 1951. But first there was the instructive case of J. N. Findlay, Professor of Philosophy at Otago, who was well placed much earlier to introduce his colleagues and students to Wittgenstein's philosophy, but it appears did not do so. He had been contemporary with Ryle and Kneale at Oxford and, aged 25, paid his first visit to Wittgenstein at Cambridge early in 1930. That he says:

> can only be described as a transporting experience. Not only was his reception of myself, on the mere introduction of a common friend, quite dizzying in its informal friendliness and charm, but I also found him, at the age of 41, of a quite unbelievable personal beauty. . . . As the extreme beauty of Wittgenstein is not often spoken of, it seemed fit to mention it here: certainly it contributed, even if unconsciously, to his immense influence at Cambridge (1984, pp. 19–21).

Findlay was appointed to the Otago chair in 1934. He was on leave in 1939, saw Wittgenstein again, attended his seminars in Cambridge and had many personal discussions with him:

> One could not listen to Wittgenstein's least pronouncement, however falteringly expressed, without feeling that it sprang from a mind of supreme integrity and the most penetrating insight. The impression did not diminish however long one reflected on what he had said. . . . He treated me with extraordinary graciousness. He gave me his then only copy of about the first 150 sections of his *Philosophical Investigations* to read and asked me to help on the conduct of his courses by raising any objections or criticisms that I might feel (1984, p. 21).

Hence his being known then as 'Wittgenstein's stooge' when the notoriously long silences became too excruciating.

Assuming the chair, he had said that he would devote himself as a teacher to 'introducing mathematical logic to the antipodes'. So he did, and Arthur Prior was his most distinguished student. In the introduction to his first book, Prior says:

> I should not like it to be thought that my debt to my teacher Professor Findlay is exhausted by his having provided me with something to criticize. I owe to his teaching, directly or indirectly, almost all that I know of either Logic or Ethics; and if I criticize him here, it is only by developing lines of thought into which he himself initiated me (1949, p. xi).

It seems that it was logic and ethics and of course Hegel all the way in Otago. (One anonymous writer pertinently called Findlay 'the once and future Hegelian'.) But why not Wittgenstein especially after his 1939 visit? If Wittgenstein had influenced him so much, it is not implausible to expect there to be some record of it in his teaching or mention of it by someone at Otago or elsewhere in New Zealand. But then philosophy in Wellington had not yet been established and Popper at Canterbury probably would not have bothered anyway, though with Anderson's brother in Auckland, there might have been a premonitory preview of the battles to come a bit later between Melbourne and Sydney. Annette Baier would almost certainly have made some reference to Findlay's Wittgenstein had she been around in Findlay's days though they had not long gone when she came up. Perhaps his apostasy was already becoming too obvious to be acknowledged by Wittgenstein's other students. Or perhaps his 'transporting experience' was too precious for him to be shared.

Most probably he was just not sure enough of where he stood though his 1940 paper in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* shows a clear understanding of Wittgenstein's later work that would have been a happy occasion for some lively discussion. (It is interesting that the same issue of the *Journal* also contained Gasking's article 'Mathematics and the World'.) However, he says later that he wrote it:

> more to clear up my own mind than to produce illumination in others. . . . It is by attempting to explain to myself what the Cambridge people are saying and by attempting, further, to go with them as far as I can, that I hope in the long run to come to terms with them (1984, pp. 19–21).

That sounds a fair way off and not very enticing. He clearly saw what other students of Wittgenstein also found that 'one certainly had to rebuild the whole structure of one's thinking to accommodate what one had learned from him'.

It sounds as if Findlay was already beginning to doubt that he was up to it when his preference was to continue in his old metaphysical ways. There is some confirmation of this in what he wrote later:

> It will be plain to readers of this book [1984's *Wittgenstein*: *A Critique*] that I am deeply critical of almost anything Wittgenstein said on almost any topic whatsoever. I have in fact systematically used him to climb on to contrary, rather traditional opinions, which have seemed to me truer and better. But without the stimulus of his teaching I should not have arrived at these contrary opinions at all, nor at my general view of metaphysics as being quite fairly describable as the most exciting and richly various of all language-games. It is in the light of his many kindnesses that I should wish this present, highly critical book about his teachings to be regarded, not merely as a critique, but also as a tribute (1984, pp. 20–21).

But in a tribute to Findlay himself who died in 1987, a former student and colleague of his, one Sanford L. Drob wrote this:

> While in his earlier years Findlay had been a student and something of a follower of Wittgenstein in Cambridge, he later developed a terrible antipathy towards Wittgenstein and was particularly sarcastic regarding Wittgenstein's imitators and disciples. Findlay used to say that if one answered all of Wittgenstein's or Malcolm's rhetorical questions in precisely the opposite manner of the way they wanted you to answer, then you would arrive at the true philosophy (2004: website).

Findlay might seem to be a case of someone who was much influenced by another whose influence remained all his alone; or rather, in the light of this tribute, someone who became soured by the other who once had transported him. In either event, through Findlay Wittgenstein had at least no positive influence on antipodean philosophy and really no influence at all.

Wellington with Hughes and Hinton

George Hughes had attended Wittgenstein's last classes. He later became the first Professor of Philosophy in Wellington. Before he came, the subject had been offered, as was quite common, in conjunction with psychology. He therefore first needed to put together a coherently structured degree course which had to include the most significant elements of the history of philosophy, since they are a necessary part of the discipline itself. This was required in any case if his students were even to begin to understand where the subject had arrived, which then included in the English-speaking world at least, Wittgenstein. Michael Hinton said to me once later on when he was feeling the weight of his responsibilities: 'We first have to teach them our past glories and then need to rub the shine off. How can we do both convincingly and in good faith?'

Hinton was Hughes's first appointment and arrived 2 years after him, coming from Cambridge where he had been doing his Ph.D. under John Wisdom's supervision. It was a happy coming together, since one of the ways Hughes dealt with Hinton's rhetorical question was to institute for interested students, in addition to set courses, readings of John Wisdom's *Other Minds*, principally a collection of the series of articles Wisdom had published in *Mind* about, inter alia, the problem of other minds. Wisdom's philosophical writing is inimitable. The philosophy owes much to Wittgenstein, as he acknowledges, and it is Wittgenstein most profitably mediated by his own sparkling insights and understanding, orderings and interpretations, backed by his well-honed erudition. Hughes told me that queues used to be seen in Oxford outside Blackwells when the latest issue of *Mind*, carrying the next instalment of the series, was due to arrive.

I have never enjoyed philosophical reading groups more than those on *Other Minds*. The essays have remained some of the most enjoyable and stimulating pieces of philosophy I have met with. They were my introduction to Wittgenstein and I cannot imagine a better one. It used to be said in Cambridge that if you wanted to understand what Wittgenstein meant, then ask Wisdom, and if you wanted to understand what Wisdom meant, then ask Renford Bambrough. I came to know Bambrough only years later with great pleasure and profit, but by then I didn't need to get to Wittgenstein by that route.

There was no course on Wittgenstein when I was an undergraduate there though his and Wisdom's philosophical attitudes and approach were often present in the courses we took. In retrospect I am surprised at how much then we must have absorbed. For example, it became second nature to be immediately wary of any philosophical theory one came across or saw or heard advanced and to be alert to the issues very likely being dodged, principally where, beyond the theory, was to be found its justification. We were made acutely aware of the significance of particular cases and were contemptuous of those who themselves took a contemptuous attitude to them. I don't recall anyone explicitly teaching us these things.

I don't know how long Wittgenstein's influence lasted for the small handful of my fellow MA students then. Patrick Hutchings with his firsts in English and Philosophy went to Oxford for his postgraduate work and came back by way of

UWA, finally to Deakin and Melbourne; Richard Routley (Sylvan) went to Princeton and ended up with great distinction at the ANU; Keith Campbell went to Oxford and in due course after Melbourne became Challis Professor at Sydney. I remember them as good friends, but I don't think, in their writings and our talking, they showed anything of a distinctively Wittgensteinian bent. It is hard to tell with Hutchings; there is so much else there though he remembers well those times. Routley still found Wisdom philosophically interesting 20 years later, characteristically showing both how his paradoxes should be updated and could be rendered unworrying (Routley 1976); and Campbell's forsaking Melbourne for Sydney was much regretted especially by Gasking who found in him a kindred philosophical spirit.

What I most consciously took from Wisdom mediated by Hinton was his recommended methodology: start with a question you have satisfied yourself is a properly philosophical one because it is not answerable by doing some calculation or empirical research; ask what reason one *could* have for answering it, with the history of the subject as one's guide, *this* way, and what reason one *could* have for finding *this* answer unacceptable; continue until you have a clear grasp of the question itself and what is at stake in answering it at all; and then choose the best answer! Easier said than done, since any reason one could have for choosing a certain answer as the best would have to be something one should already have taken into account. *That* seems to give us only a temporary respite from the question which had thus become only more urgent to answer. I found this a fine way to begin but decidedly unsatisfying in the end.

This dissatisfaction was somewhat assuaged by attempting, in my MA under Michael Hinton, to follow Wisdom's apparently soothing advice: 'Never define anything at all; if you do, define it as wildly as you can and then if you're lucky you'll be wrong' and Kent's threat or promise in *King Lear* 'I'll teach you differences' which Wittgenstein was going to use as an epigraph in *Philosophical Investigations* but thought better of it. It was hard when I was trying to write on the contrariety of love and hate which seemed to call for not a little definitional precision and soon found no happy resting place among the profusion of similarities and differences, only some room with a view.

I could never have articulated then my situation in that way and had to learn to live *philosophically with contingency* while avoiding the certainties that probably would left me in contradiction with myself. I had to see how Wittgenstein could hold that some things 'stand firm for us', but only for as long as they do. A philosophical theory would not secure definitive closure anyway, since any theory which aspired to fill that role would not make us immune to contrary cases that Quine called 'don't cares' but as they mounted up became importunate.

Wittgenstein argues that 'to renounce all theory one has to regard what appears so obviously incomplete as something complete' (1980b, p. 723). It would seem impossible to renounce something when one knows there is more work to be done on it. What I could and did say then, with perhaps some vague awareness of some of this, was that I wanted something more than Wisdom's assurance that after working through the complexities and achieving the required grasp, we would find that the solutions to philosophical problems become ‘matters for decision or cheerful indecision’ (Wisdom 1950).

But ‘*Cheerful* indecision’? And what is ‘the required *grasp*’? Perhaps it is one’s knowing how to go on from what one can defeasibly conclude from what one can so far *survey*. Presumably that depends on the content of the defeasance presented, in which case Hinton’s Wisdom vanishes again into the platitude that all is never done. He did warn us:

> It’s this way in metaphysics. Its doctrines are paradoxes when they aren’t platitudes. . . . Metaphysical questions are paradoxical questions with the peculiarity that they are concerned with the character of questions, of discussions, of reasons, of knowledge. But this peculiarity does not make it impossible to carry through the reflection they call for so as to reveal the character of that with which they are concerned. And thus, indirectly, the character of that with which that with which they are concerned. (Presidential Address to Aristotelean Society, November 1950, as above)

Wittgenstein saw that our difficulties here begin with our craving for generality and our irresistible temptation to ask and answer questions in the way that science does. This tendency, he said, is “the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness” (1958, p. 18). For Wittgenstein philosophical insights do not come from and cannot find their proper expression in any kind of theory. Philosophy neither is nor is like a science, real, social, or ersatz. “It ought really to be written only as a poetic composition” (1980a, p. 24). Instead of a theory what we need are concepts, usually familiar but sometimes novel like Winnicott’s enormously useful concept, when well judged, of what is ‘good enough’, ‘A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words. Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in “seeing connexions”. Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate cases*’ (1953, p. 122). There is indeed an enormous amount behind Wittgenstein’s ‘Say what you like’.

When I had completed my MA, Hughes advised me to go to Melbourne and do my Ph.D. with Jackson. It was very good advice.

Wittgenstein at Further Removes

The Students’ Students

So far we have it that Wittgenstein first came to the antipodes by way of his students. Then, second, there was the influence of the texts as the oral phase passed, and as well there were, but only rarely now, encounters with his students’ students. Of the first enough in this context has been said. With respect to the second, texts speak for themselves as the common occasions of influence, and the students’ students are as answerable to them as they were to their own teachers. There were in any case not many in 1958 when I arrived. They were mostly then in Melbourne or like Peter Herbst had not long left.

I don't think I ever heard any of them, or anyone else for that matter, calling themselves a Wittgensteinian, not in Australia and certainly not in Melbourne. The term seems to be used only vaguely in good natured enough opposition. Those who could have owned the expression as self-referring would not have. The closest anyone came was to admit they were 'working with Camo' or thought of themselves as 'primarily one of Douglas's students' as did Tim Oakley and Len O'Neill, the editors of Gasking's *Philosophical Writings* which they put together (1996). Some came from elsewhere. Tony Coady, for example, who 30 years later was to occupy the Melbourne chair for a decade, came from Sydney to do his MA with Jackson. Some were present or past final honours students, others part-time tutors writing their Master's theses or junior members of staff, still others visitors or just fellow travellers; only one other, Bill Joske who years later returned to Tasmania to occupy the Hobart chair, was a fulltime tutor and doing a Ph.D. with Camo as I was.

But there was another who had been a student of one of Wittgenstein's students and should be mentioned as a fine exemplar. Don Gunner still remembered Paul and is himself remembered with pleasure and affection by his own students. Gunner was a great performer though somewhat sensitive when applauded as one. The message was not to be obscured by the medium. This, however, did not prevent him in public subjecting to vigorous parody theories he thought blinded those who use them to what lay open to view. He offered the Australian materialists, for example, his 'tube theory of persons'; and against Jack Smart's influential 'Sensations and Brain Processes', he argued that 'nothing which I (Gunner) believe to be true finds its expression in the words 'experiences are a sort of ghost stuff'. I think that such an alleged belief is no less tenable than Smart's own alleged belief, but it is no more tenable either, and I reject both. Smart says that those positions are equally intelligible. I shall try to show that they are equally unintelligible and for the same reasons' (Gunner 1971, p. 5).

I will remember the first philosophical society meeting I attended. David Armstrong was reading a paper on primary and secondary qualities. As he began, Gunner moved from the back row of the lecture theatre to the next and continued his spasmodic passage during the paper until by question—time he had reached the front. He raised an overly simple question. Armstrong raised his arms heavenward and said: 'Oh Don, just follow the argument, follow the argument!' Gunner, half rising in his stall, retorted: 'That's what they said to Galileo!' It took me a while to brave the public arena. But I also remember his clear, straightforward and thoroughly illuminating expositions of Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* when it came out in 1969 and like many others much enjoyed his company and conversation both in and out of philosophy.

My confreres were not homogeneous enough to be a group but I did observe a growing tendency especially among Gunner's students to treat the later Wittgenstein's work in isolation and to narrow even that down to its therapeutic aspects. In my view, then and now, that was regrettable and led to misinterpretation. It at once ignored the subtleties which are the stuff of Wittgenstein's thinking and oversimplified the problems he was addressing. The *Tractatus* is the frame for the early sections of the *Investigations* whose arguments are devastating because they expose and dispose of errors in the early position which is itself the most elegant distillation yet of centuries of philosophical mistakes about meaning. Without the illumination of those very mistakes and the theories that made them, their therapeutic avoidance lacks justification.

Gilbert Ryle is much sharper in his criticism of Bouwsma who showed the same tendency. Ryle says: ‘We are told with pathos that Wittgenstein “sought to bring relief, control, calm, quiet, peace, release, a certain power.” Well!—what of the Wittgenstein who got us interested, frustrated, excited, angry, shocked? He electrified us. Whom did he ever tranquillize?’ and he quotes Bouwsma as seeing the *Philosophical Investigations*:

> “not at all as a theory of mind, in fact as no theory at all. . . . It contains no arguments at all. There are no proofs. It rectifies nothing. There is nothing to rectify. There are no refutations’. . . . Yet Wittgenstein often declares that quite definite mistakes have been committed by St. Augustine, Russell, and the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Nothing to rectify? Yet Bouwsma quotes ‘The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.’ No arguments? Not even arguments about the privacy of sensations versus the imputed privacy of sensation-concepts?. . . . No arguments? Yet, ‘You say the point isn’t the word but its meaning, and you think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also different from the word.’. . . . No arguments? ‘Yet I remember having meant *him*. Am I remembering a process or a state?—When did it begin, what was its course &c. [etc.]?’ No arguments? But lots of Wittgenstein’s wearisome interrogatives are, like this last one, the rhetorically barbed conclusions of *reductio ad absurdum* arguments. The clang of Wittgenstein’s metal against the metals of Frege, Russell, Ramsey, Brouwer, Moore, and the author of the *Tractatus* is here muted to a soothing bedside murmur” (Ryle 1979, pp. 132–133).

To identify the confreres was, however, not all that easy since it became difficult, though hardly important (except where Bouwsma and his likes are concerned), to say how they had come to be influenced by Wittgenstein. The dissemination of his later philosophy and commentaries on it increased the variety of its interpretations and decreased whatever homogeneity there might have been among those who discussed them.

Oxford

Much more significantly, however, Wittgenstein’s influence in general had come to be increasingly mediated by Ryle’s Oxford through his establishment there of the B. Phil. degree which he had designed especially for future teachers of the subject. Oxford rather than Cambridge quite soon became the preferred locus for postgraduate work worldwide. The philosophical community in Cambridge was always relatively small, whereas, perhaps by way of reciprocal causation, Oxford had more lively philosophers than anywhere else. Besides, it was in Oxford that the enticing ‘linguistic turn’ was taking place. And Ryle was there. Jack Smart, of whom more later, said: ‘I am glad that I went not to Cambridge, but to Oxford, where Gilbert Ryle was not only the most exciting philosopher, with views a bit like Wittgenstein’s, tempered by English common sense and good humour, but also a man of extraordinary friendliness' (Smart 1990, p. 34). John Passmore adds: 'Gilbert Ryle is a trained academic philosopher as Wittgenstein was not, a philosopher "in the tradition" whatever his unorthodoxies. That is one reason why his ideas have been widely discussed, even by philosophers who can "make nothing" of Wittgenstein' (Passmore 1968, p. 442).

One might have reminded Passmore that Wittgenstein came from *fin de siecle* Vienna with its own traditions then under some exciting scrutiny, but as Toulmin pointed out, that was brushed aside by the dominant Cambridge connection. Passmore is right, however, to stress that Ryle and his philosophising were more open and accessible than was Wittgenstein and his. He says that at Oxford, Wittgenstein's ideas entered a very different philosophical atmosphere from that which prevailed at Cambridge and that not all of his former students 'looked with kindness on the "ordinary language" philosophies which had come to dominate the philosophical scene there, for all that they showed clear signs of his influence. In the eyes of many of the Cambridge "old guard" of Wittgensteinians, Oxford philosophy had "desiccated into scholasticism"' (Passmore 1968, pp. 440–441). One might be forgiven for wondering whether the boot might not have been on the other foot. Wittgenstein himself repudiated the commonly expressed thought that he had inspired the 'linguistic movement', as von Wright reminded us though nonetheless properly insisting that Wittgenstein was of great importance to it.

So it is right to say that those who took the B. Phil. at Oxford were thought to have been influenced by Wittgenstein, while it is also right to have some reservations about whether it was purely Wittgenstein's ideas and attitudes they were influenced by. It is tempting to wonder whether something similar may not have been true of Ryle himself, which is not to say anything to detract from the great influence he has had in his own right. Ryle was obviously impressed by Wittgenstein, 'an original and powerful philosopher', as he calls him, and is invariably generous in the many highly perceptive remarks he makes about his philosophy and philosophising, witness his answer to Bouwsma. Ryle also wrote about many of the same problems that possessed Wittgenstein and in some ways they might be thought to have come up with similar results. For example, Wittgenstein's interlocutor asks Ryle: 'Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?' (1953, p. 307). Ryle says of *The Concept of Mind*: 'The general trend of this book will undoubtedly, and harmlessly be stigmatised as behaviourist' (1949, p. 327). Wittgenstein replies to his interlocutor: 'If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a *grammatical* fiction'. Ryle responds to his objectors by saying: 'The programme of locating, inspecting and measuring the process or state of seeing, for instance, and correlating it with other states and processes, is a hopeless programme—hopeless not because the quarry wears seven-leagued boots or a cloak of invisibility, but because the idea that there was such a quarry was the product, almost, of inattention to grammar' (1954, p. 104). Similarities are of course to be expected; the differences lie in the 'grammar'.

Be that as it may, the linguistic or ordinary language Oxford philosophy at its best was a positive advance in that it showed *how* to go on doing it. When dealing with a question that had often interested philosophers—Is there a special activity of attention?—Ryle, for example, says:

> It is useful to begin by considering a battery of concepts that could be brought under the vague heading of 'minding' or described as 'heed concepts': concepts of noticing, taking care, attending, applying one's mind, concentrating, putting one's heart into something, thinking what one is doing, alertness, interest, intentness, studying and trying. . . . When a person hums as he walks, he is doing two things at once, either of which he might interrupt without interrupting the other. But when we speak of a person minding what he is saying, or what he is whistling, we are not saying that he is doing two things at once. He could not stop his reading while continuing his attention to it, or hand over the controls of his car, while continuing to exercise care; though he could of course continue to read but cease to attend, or continue to drive but cease to take care. Since the use of such pairs of active verbs as 'read' and 'attend' or 'drive' and 'take care' may suggest that there must be two synchronous and perhaps coupled processes going on whenever both verbs are properly used, it may be helpful to remember that it is quite idiomatic to replace the heed verb by a heed adverb. We commonly speak of reading attentively, driving carefully and conning studiously, and this usage has the merit of suggesting that what is being described is one operation with a special character and not two operations executed in different 'places', with a peculiar cable between them (1949, p. 138).

Well, we at least know what to do next. Another example, this time from the other Oxford master, J. L. Austin, in 'A Plea for Excuses', he says:

> It is plainly preferable to investigate a field where ordinary language is rich and subtle, as it is in the pressingly practical matter of Excuses, but certainly is not in the matter, say, of Time. At the same time we should prefer a field which is not too much trodden into bogs or tracks by traditional philosophy, for in that case even 'ordinary' language will often have become infected with the jargon of extinct theories, and our own prejudices too, as upholders or imbibers of theoretical views, will be too readily, and often insensibly, engaged. Here too, Excuses form an admirable topic; we can discuss at least clumsiness, or absence of mind, or inconsiderateness, even spontaneousness, without remembering what Kant thought, and so progress by degrees even to discussing deliberation without for once remembering Aristotle or self-control without Plato. Granted that our subject is, as already claimed for it, neighbouring, analogous or germane in some way to some notorious centre of philosophical trouble, then, with these two further requirements satisfied, we should be certain of what we are after: a good site for *field work* in philosophy. Here at last we should be able to unfreeze, to loosen up and get going on agreeing about discoveries, however small, and on agreeing about how to reach agreement (all of which was seen and claimed by Socrates when he first betook himself to the way of Words). How much it is to be wished that similar field work will soon be undertaken in, say, aesthetics; if only we could forget for a while about the beautiful and get down instead to the dainty and the dumpy (Austin 1961, p. 130).

It is hard to refuse such attractive implicit and explicit invitations. It is much easier to avoid ordinary language philosophy at its worst which, it is generally agreed now, is the paradigm case argument. Antony Flew characterises it thus:

> If there is any word the meaning of which can be taught by reference to paradigm cases, then no argument whatever could ever prove that there are no cases whatever of whatever it is. Thus, since of the meaning of 'of his own freewill' can be taught by reference to such paradigm cases as that in which a man, under no social pressure, marries the girl he wants to marry (how else *could* it be taught?), it cannot be right, on any grounds whatsoever, to say no one *ever* acts of his own freewill. . . . To the extent

> that the meaning of the expression is given in terms of paradigm cases, they are, by definition, what 'acting of one's own freewill' is (1956, p. 19).

There are no prizes for saying how many questions there are herein begged.

These are samples of the riches our antipodean postgraduates found themselves with when they went to Oxford for the B. Phil. They also encountered other students of Wittgenstein—perhaps Rhees, Malcolm, Winch, Anscombe, Geach and their students. These were the influences they were in a position to bring back home. Most, if not all those who at least came to *soi-disant* permanent positions here then, had enjoyed, sometimes suffered, their Oxford experience, either through doing a degree or spending their leave there or being invited to a visiting fellowship or otherwise making a visit; it was almost a kind of philosophical Hajj. One must observe the distinction, however, between becoming familiar with Oxford philosophy and Wittgenstein's part in it on the one hand and being influenced by either or both on the other. Some returned from Oxford only with their memories and momentos like their college tie; their influence on their students was then mostly by way of anecdotes.

J. J. C. Smart

That cap or more appropriately in his case trencher fitted Jack Smart too. He was one of the first to do the B. Phil. In 1950, he went from Ryle and Oxford to the chair in Adelaide, made an immediate impact there and soon became an impressive influence in Australian philosophy. It was not, however, a Wittgensteinian influence. He did not seem to mind that others might have fallen under it though he would have intended the pun if he had noticed it. His was not even a Rylean influence, apart from the behaviourism, in his case, unnuanced. Grave notes that at Glasgow Smart had been much puzzled philosophically by the mind and quotes him as saying: 'How good it was to get to Oxford and to find the mind vanishing into behaviour dispositions' (Grave 1984, p. 111). Smart began and ended with the firm conviction that metaphysics was continuous with science, as he and Quine put it, which I think means that a good metaphysical hypothesis, when it was not just a piece of nonsense, is simply a placeholder for a properly scientific one. Hence his advocacy of the theses that sensations are brain processes, the mind is the brain – identity theory, strict act, utilitariansim and any other philosophical view that could be made to admit of empirical confirmation or disconfirmation and so, some might protest, entirely removing it from philosophical inquiry. Grave adds that Smart found that "what Ryle was saying appealed to him also as giving rise in fact "to a certain implicit way of looking at the world"" (1984: 111). To wit, I take it, no nonsense, and a penchant for empirical realism and Occam's Razor.

Smart knew where he firmly stood but he did encourage his students to read widely and eclectically. Both the *Tractatus* and *Concept of Mind* were required reading, and he even advised at least one—Henry Krips—who asked him about Wittgenstein, to pay a visit to Melbourne and find out. He defended his own position with vigour and rigour and good humour, but his greatest contribution to

Australian philosophy probably remains the lecturers he appointed and the students they had. Both lists are impressive: U. T. Place who had been at Oxford with Smart, as had C. F. Presley doing his B. Phil., and C. B. Martin highly recommended by John Wisdom were the staff; and the students included Michael Bradley, Max Deutscher, Brian Ellis, Brian Medlin, Graham Nerlich and later the aforementioned Henry Krips. All were influenced by Smart when undergraduates and went on to influence others yet each remained very much his own man and later came to follow their own more or less different interests. They also may have acknowledged Ryle, but none I think owned Wittgenstein as an influence though they clearly knew his work.

On a more distanced view, it appears that nationally at least Smart's influence largely supplanted Ryle's and Austen's together with Wittgenstein's. Their influence has persisted of course; though as with the usual reactions to counterrevolution, it mostly went underground and is careful where it surfaces.[1] Smart remains a puzzle to many: an accomplished philosopher with characteristically hardheaded positions, a great capacity to deal with difficult problems and always entirely open to argument, or so it seemed. Yet in the last paper I heard him read a few years ago, he said that he had been reflecting on the philosophical positions he had taken and the objections he had heard and discussed and could not think of one that had, or should have, made him change his mind. He remained totally dismissive of modern and contemporary European philosophy and anything that smacked of paraded sensibility. He dismissed Wittgenstein as a mystic 'as biographical evidence seemed to show' he said to Douglas Gasking, who replied 'Yes, the old boy had us tricked' (Smart 1990, p. 36). I cannot hear that remark in Gasking's voice, but of course I may be wrong.

In 1969, Alan Donagan wrote the Introduction to *Contemporary Philosophy in Australia*. He says at one point: 'As for the Wittgensteinian tradititon in Melbourne, superficially it has left no trace in this volume at all. No doubt it has borne fruit but it has done so like the grain of wheat in the Scriptures, by falling to the ground and dying' (1969, p. 17).

Perhaps so, but the signs were that Wittgenstein's philosophy was being doubly outflanked: on the left by literary theory, flourishing on the Continent through Derida and Lacan et al.; on the right by a reaffirmation of metaphysical theory under US hegemony through especially the properly distinguished Mr. Quine; and head on by a burgeoning formal semantics, especially through David Lewis, a frequent visitor here, with his philosophers' logical paradise of possible worlds. There was little time for attention to particulars, for close reading from the first, for 'don't cares' from the second and for metaphorical creativity from the third. David Armstrong expressed the increasingly common view when he remarked that Wittgenstein is now a great philosopher *in the past*. But like all the others, his philosophy remains a rich field to harvest.

---

[1] Discernible, for example, explicitly or implicitly, in the writings of Stewart Candlish, Raimond Gaita, Cathy Legg, Don Mannison, Huw Price and Lloyd Reinhardt

Conclusion

Wittgenstein would have been happy, I think, that his influence in the antipodes reached beyond the academic philosophers to someone such as the Australian poet Gwen Harwood. Here is part of her poem ‘Wittgenstein and Engelmann’ (2001), one of several poems evincing more than a passing interest in one she called ‘my philosophical hero’.

> Philosopher and architect
> walk through the flaking town,
> Wittgenstein in his uniform
> of red and chocolate brown,
> formal and courteous they talk
> of the Count’s hawthorn flower;
> how nature and our thought conform
> through words’ mysterious power;
> how propositions cannot state
> what they make manifest;
> of the ethical and mystical
> that cannot be expressed;
> how the world is on one side of us,
> and on the other hand
> language, the mirror of the world;
> and God is, *how things stand*.
> Europe lies sick in its foul war.
> Armies choke in clay.
> But these friends keep their discourse clear
> as the white hawthorn spray,
> one a great genius, and both
> humble enough to seek
> the simple sources of that truth
> whereof one cannot speak.

References

Armstrong, D. (1983). An intellectual autobiography. *Quadrant, 27*, 68–78. (Mar): 68–78.

Austin, J. (1961). *Philosophical papers*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Brown, R., & Rollins, C. (1969). *Contemporary philosophy in Australia*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Cook, J. (2005). *The undiscovered Wittgenstein*. New York: Humanity Books.

Crawford, R. (1962). The school of prudence, or inaccuracy and incoherence in discerning chaos. *Historical Historical Journal, 2*, 3–16.

Donagan, A. (1969). Introduction. In R. Brown & C. Rollins (Eds.), *Contemporary philosophy in Australia* (pp. 15–19). London: Allen & Unwin.

Drob, S. (2004). J. N. Findlay: A personal appreciation. *New Kabbalah* website. http://www.newkabbalah.com/Findlay%20bio.htm.

Drury, M. (1981). Some notes on conversations with Wittgenstein. In R. Rhees (Ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein, personal recollections* (pp. 91–111). Oxford: Blackwell.

Findlay, J. (1984). *Wittgenstein: A critique*. London: RKP.

Flew, A. (1956). Philosophy and language. In A. Flew (Ed.), *Essays in conceptual analysis* (pp. 1–20). London: Macmillan.

Gasking, D. (1960). Clusters. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy Today, 38*, 1–36.

Gasking, D. (1996). The logic of deceit. In Oakley & L. O' Neill (Eds.), *Language, logic, and causation: Philosophical writings of Douglas Gasking* (pp. 58–68). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Gasking, D., & Jackson, A. (1951). Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 29*, 73–80.

Geach, P. (1988). *Wittgenstein's lectures on philosophical psychology 1946–47*. London: Harvester.

Grave, S. (1984). *A history of philosophy in Australia*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Gunner, D. (1971). Professor smart's 'sensations and brain processes'. In C. Presley (Ed.), *The identity theory of mind* (2nd ed., pp. 1–20). St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Harwood, G. (2001). Wittgenstein and Engelmann. In A. Hoddinott & G. Kratzmann, *Selected poems*. Melbourne: Penguin.

Jackson, F. (1996). Foreword. In I. Oakley & L. O' Neill (Eds.), *Language, logic, and causation: Philosophical writings of Douglas Gasking* (pp. 5–6). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Janik, A., & Toulmin, S. (1973). *Wittgenstein's Vienna*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Knight, H. (1954). The use of 'Good' in aesthetic judgements. In W. Elton (Ed.), *Aesthetics and language* (pp. 147–160). Oxford: Blackwell.

Leavis, F. (1981). Memories of Wittgenstein. In R. Rhees (Ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein, personal recollections* (pp. 63–82). Oxford: Blackwell.

Malcolm, N. (1958). *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A memoir*. London: Oxford University Press.

Malcolm, N. (1984). *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A memoir* (2nd ed.). London: Oxford University Press.

Malcolm, N. (1986). *Nothing is hidden: Wittgenstein's criticism of his early thought*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Marshall, G. (1992). Wittgenstein and the analytic tradition. In J. Srzednicki & D. Wood (Eds.), *Essays on philosophy in Australia* (pp. 19–37). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Marshall, G. (2006). Faith, passion, and Wittgenstein. In I. Weeks & D. Reid (Eds.), *A thoughtful life: A Festschrift for Rev Professor Harry Wardlaw* (pp. 41–54). Adelaide: ATF Press.

Olson, G. (n. d.). Interview with Stephen Toulmin. http://lilt.ilstu.edu/theory/authors/toulmin.htm.

Passmore, J. (1968). *A hundred years of philosophy*. London: Duckworth.

Passmore, J. (1985). *Recent philosophers: A supplement to a hundred years of philosophy*. London: Duckworth.

Paul, G., et al. (1956). Wittgenstein. In A. Ayer (Ed.), *The revolution in philosophy* (pp. 88–96). London: Macmillan.

Prior, A. (1949). *Logic and the basis of ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rhees, R. (Ed.). (1981). *Ludwig Wittgenstein, personal recollections*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Routley, R. (1976). The semantical metamorphosis of metaphysics. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 54*, 187–205.

Ryle, G. (1949). *The concept of mind*. London: Hutchinson.

Ryle, G. (1954). *Dilemmas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ryle, G. (1979). *On thinking*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Smart, J. (1990). Douglas gasking: A review and appreciation. *Australian Rationalist, 55*, 34–41.

Toulmin, S. (1958). *The uses of argument*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Toulmin, S. (1993). Alan Donagan and Melbourne philosophy. *Ethics, 104*, 143–147.

von Wright, G. (1955). Ludwig Wittgenstein, a biographical sketch. *Philosophical Review, 64*, 527–545.

von Wright, G. (1966). A biographical sketch. In N. Malcolm & L. Wittgenstein (Eds.), *A memoir*. London: Oxford University Press.

von Wright, G. (1989). Intellectual autobiography of Georg Henrik von Wright. In P. Schilpp & L. Hahn (Eds.), *The philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright* (pp. 2–58). Lasalle: Open Court.

Wisdom, J. (1950). Metaphysics. Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society. Reprinted in *Other Minds* (1952), 236–59.

Wisdom, J. (1952). *Other minds*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wisdom, J. (1953). Philosophy, anxiety, and novelty. In *Philosophy and psycho-analysis*. Oxford: Blackwell, 112–19.

Wisdom, J. (1967). Ludwig Wittgenstein 1934–1987. In K. Fann (Ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The man and his philosophy* (pp. 258–260). New Jersey: Humanities Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1922) *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. (trans: Ogden, C.& Ramsey, F.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. (1958). *The blue and brown books*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. (1967). *Zettel* (G. Anscombe & G. von Wright, Eds., trans: Anscombe, G.). Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. (1969). *On certainty*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. (1980a). *Culture and value* (G. von Wright with H. Nyman, Eds., trans: Winch, P.). Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. (1980b). *Remarks on the philosophy of psychology, vol. I*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. (1988). In P. Geach (Ed.), *Wittgenstein's lectures on philosophical psychology* (pp. 1946–1947). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Reconstruction and Enthusiasm

5

Brian F. Scarlett

Contents

Introduction 121
The Demographic, Political and Institutional Background 122
The Character of the Philosophical Enterprise 124
Auckland 125
Otago (Dunedin) 125
Canterbury (Christchurch) 126
Victoria (Wellington) 128
Philosophical Migration 128
Melbourne-Sydney Dualism? 130
John Anderson: The Master and His Disciples 133
The Melbourne Versus Sydney Contest: An Adelaide Victory? 136
The Sad Story of Sydney Sparkes Orr 138
Smaller Operations 143
The Change of Decade: The Beginnings of Australian Materialism 143
References 146

Introduction

The 1950s decade started well for the public profile of philosophy in Australia with an extremely successful 2-month lecture tour by Bertrand Russell. It ended with a public relations disaster, the Orr case, but also (and of more importance to the central business of philosophy) the beginnings of central-state materialism. Unfortunately, as his biographer reports but Russell omits to mention in his autobiography, the Russell triumph was somewhat spoiled when philosophers in Melbourne and Sydney obtusely insisted on tackling Russell over his earlier

B.F. Scarlett
School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Parkville,
VIC, Australia
e-mail: brianfs@unimelb.edu.au

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_6,

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

philosophical views, some of which he no longer held, ignoring his current social and political views. (For some of those views, real or imagined, he had been attacked by various public figures, including Daniel Mannix, Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne. Mannix was in the wrong, and when he publicly apologised, Russell lost the chance of a successful legal action against him.) During Russell's time in Australia, the Korean War broke out, casting him into gloom for the prospects of mankind at risk of global nuclear conflict and, no doubt, strengthening the case for more emphasis on social and political philosophy (Monk 2000, pp. 326–327; Russell 1969, p. 21; cf. Franklin 2003: 49ff). The Korean War was bad enough, but it did not last long; the decade had a lot more to offer to discourage the peacemakers.

The Demographic, Political and Institutional Background

Both Australia and New Zealand were involved in the Korean War, but for the purposes of this story, it is more important that they were also both involved in coping with the consequences of the 1939–1945 conflict; universities in Australia and New Zealand suffered similar problems of increasing demand and inadequate supply in those years.

Australia in 1950 admitted to a population of 8.3 million. By 1960 the figure was 10.4 million, a 25 % increase for the decade (O'Neil 1970, p. 13).[1] The size of the university sector can be gauged by the number of bachelor's degree enrolments. In Australia there were 21,539 for the whole country in 1955 and 34,061 in 1959, an increase of 36 % in half a decade. Higher degrees were vastly rarer. Those conferred in 1957 numbered 332; in 1958, 314; and, in 1959, 382 (Grundy and Yuan 1987, p. 342). As in New Zealand, these were predominantly Master's degrees: the PhD was quite rare in both countries and scarcely found at all in philosophy. The total number of PhDs awarded in Australia in 1950 was eight, and they were all in the sciences. In 1960 there were 97, two in 'Philosophy and Religious Studies'. There were nine 'unknown', so the discipline might have picked up a little here (Evans et al. 2003).

With the exception of the Australian National University (ANU) and Canberra University College, tertiary education was the responsibility of the states, but this was the decade that saw the Commonwealth Government become involved. In 1951 the Commonwealth Scholarships scheme was introduced. In the same year, legislation was introduced enabling the Commonwealth to provide funding for universities. The Murray Commission into the future of Australian Universities (Murray 1957) reported in 1957, recommending federal involvement in funding. In 1958 the Menzies Government appointed Sir Leslie Martin, professor of physics at the University of Melbourne, to chair the Australian Universities Commission. The time was ripe for expansion of the sector, the Martin report recommended involvement and the Menzies Government accepted the recommendations. A biography of Martin observes:

---

[1] I say 'admitted' since most Aborigines were not counted in the census until 1967. There were, of course, few if any in the universities at that time. For yearly rounded population figures for the 1950s, see Old (ed) (1997).

> In the decade that followed the second world war, the condition of the Australian universities steadily worsened. Between 1939 and 1946, university enrolments doubled. With the cessation of hostilities, the universities were faced with the added problems posed by the Commonwealth Reconstruction Training Scheme. Because of the 'hand-to-mouth' basis on which government grants were provided at the time, there was some lack of forward planning by universities and they received little encouragement to think beyond their immediate needs. . . The student population trebled from around 35,000 in 1957 to over 95,000 in 1966 and there was a doubling in the proportion of the Gross National Product allocated to universities by Government in the form of grants. (Caro and Martin 2010: website)

The establishment of some new universities was approved in the late 1950s but the increase in the number of universities did not occur until the next decade. The only institutional changes of note about this time were the founding of the New South Wales University of Technology (later the University of New South Wales) in 1949, the founding of the University of Newcastle as a college of the University of New South Wales in 1951 and the granting of autonomy to the University of New England (previously a college of the University of Sydney) in 1954. With a few exceptions like those, Australian Universities were autonomous institutions, and there was an expectation that those exceptions would likely achieve autonomy.

At this time in New Zealand, however, there was only one university, the University of New Zealand. It consisted of four constituent colleges: Auckland, Victoria (at Wellington), Canterbury (at Christchurch) and Otago (at Dunedin). There was a common syllabus and there was a degree of central control via external examiners in Britain. J.N. Findlay, who came to the chair at Otago in 1934, thought the arrangement absurd: 'the foundering of script-laden vessels off Cape Horn and the depredations of U-boats during the war put an end to this inconceivable system, under which, however, I had to suffer' (Findlay 1985, p. 25). In 1961 the University of New Zealand was dissolved, but Findlay had moved on.

In 1959 the Committee on New Zealand Universities reported that the population was approaching 2.4 million and had been increasing by an average of 2¼ % for the previous decade, which would put the population in 1950 at a little under two million (New Zealand 1960, p. 14). Another source puts the rate of increase at 2 % (Belshaw 1956, p. xvi). The number of enrolled university students ranged from 10,333 in 1950 to 13,335 in 1959 (New Zealand 1960, p. 22). Thus there was about one student per 180 citizens in 1959, dramatically more than the Australian figure, viz., about one per 300 in 1959–1960. Several submissions to the committee argued that too many were being provided with a university education, claiming that the corresponding figure for British universities was 1 in 500. The committee did not agree, claiming that the British figure was erroneous as it ignored colleges of advanced education and that the New Zealand figures were misleading unless the high rate of part-time enrolments was noted. (The percentage of part-time enrolments ranged from 46 to 54 in the years from 1950 to 1959. Public servants were encouraged to attempt degrees and lectures were scheduled to accommodate them (New Zealand 1960, pp. 22–23)). Findlay mentions 'the untoward hours at which one often had to teach since many of one's pupils were at work during the day' (1985, p. 25). There were concerns that New Zealand students were not a particularly successful lot. Only 28 % of the men enrolled in arts in 1955 managed to complete in 3 years, with a further 18 % by 4 years. At Victoria University 328 students enrolled in 1951 for courses in arts, law, commerce or science. Of that group only 35 % had graduated by 1958 (New Zealand 1960, p. 25). The committee quoted similar concerns in Australia. In Australia, the Murray Report stated that only 35 % of the 1951 cohort of 'day students' finished in the minimum time (Murray 1957, p. 31, #112).

The New Zealand Committee wondered rather plaintively about standards and about what the university system was trying to achieve: 'What is the "honours" or master's degree? Is it the equivalent of the Scottish Universities' MA? Of an Oxford or London honours BA? What is its purpose in New Zealand?' (New Zealand 1960, p. 91). In 1925, a Royal Commission had found that 'it seems impossible to maintain that the New Zealand initial degree in Arts or Science is up to the level of the corresponding British or Australian degree'. The reason given by those earlier commissioners was that it was then possible to do the degree entirely at first-year level (New Zealand 1925, p. 21). Evidently there had been a lot to worry about for a good many years. Staff levels were another concern. The committee reported that 'the New Zealand universities are seriously understaffed and as a consequence students have quite inadequate instruction and guidance, especially at the early stages of their courses' (New Zealand 1960, p. 57).

The Character of the Philosophical Enterprise

Despite the difficulties in New Zealand, some good teaching and learning was done in philosophy about this time. However, there were marked differences in output between the university colleges. A list of theses submitted for higher degrees in New Zealand (New Zealand 1963) lists 21 philosophy MA theses (and no PhDs) during 1955–1961. These include some familiar names: Keith Campbell (who wrote on Zeno's paradoxes), Max Cresswell (modal logic), Ben Gibbs (Wittgenstein and meaning), Graeme Marshall (love and hate), Richard Routley (moral scepticism) and Bede Rundle (Aristotle on substance). In the light of the apparently dismal performance of students from Victoria University referred to above, it is noteworthy that 14 of the 21 philosophy Masters came from that university, with five from Canterbury and two from Otago. None were listed from Auckland. Why the variation?

Auckland

In the case of Auckland, there is a clear explanation. Philosophy there took a long time to flourish. William Anderson, first professor of philosophy and the brother of Sydney's John Anderson, died in November 1955, as he was about to retire. He was warmly remembered in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* by 'R.P.A.', his colleague, the philosopher R.P. Anschutz (1955, pp. 139–142). Anderson and four others were the entire staff in the first half of the 1950s and they also had responsibility for teaching political science and psychology, under some understanding of the nature of these disciplines. The struggle between philosophy and psychology is an enduring theme in the history of this period in both New Zealand and Australia. In Auckland it seems that psychology was the loser. Keith Sinclair, a historian of the Auckland University, says: 'On the Arts Faculty and Professorial Board the leader of the academic resistance was William Anderson… Anderson was in a splendid position to block progress in the social sciences because he was, in effect, Professor of Political Science and Psychology as well as Philosophy' (Sinclair 1983, pp. 201–202).

Anschutz succeeded Anderson as professor. He had graduated in philosophy at Auckland, winning an Australasian prize for an essay on pragmatism, and studied under A.E. Taylor and Norman Kemp Smith at Edinburgh, where he was awarded a PhD for his thesis on the ontological argument (Sinclair 1983, pp. 132–133). Sinclair says that he 'attracted some very able staff, including Max Charlesworth and Annette Stoop, but was unable to retain them. Both of these lecturers became professors abroad, while philosophy languished for years in Auckland' (Sinclair 1983, p. 209). Sinclair's list of the academic staff of the department shows that four of the five lecturers appointed between 1956 and 1959 left within 2 years (1983, p. 317). The one who stayed, C. I. Pearson, was not appointed until 1959 and so was in no position to turn the ship around in the period I am considering.

Otago (Dunedin)

At Otago there was similar volatility. John Passmore succeeded D. D. Raphael in 1950, applying for the job in the hope of escaping a crushing teaching load in Sydney. An alternative would have been promotion to Reader, which involved reduced teaching duties, 'but Anderson, who was persistently severe in his attitudes to promotion, refused to put my name forward' (Passmore 1997, p. 266). In Otago, Passmore was professor of philosophy and psychology and was surprised to be asked to authorise the purchase of 'spaghetti' tubing used in the psychology laboratory (Passmore 1997, p. 122). (Findlay had earlier experienced more profound problems in relation to psychology. Faced with the necessity of teaching it, he devoted 3 years to mastering the subject and constructing a curriculum that gave him intellectual satisfaction (Findlay 1985, p. 26)). In Passmore's time the teaching load was a big improvement on what he had experienced in Sydney. A university history relates that in 1946 enrolments jumped by 25 % above the previous year and then levelled out, not reaching the 1946 level again until 1959. The total enrolment was 2,270 in 1950 and 2,543 in 1943. Unlike the situation at Canterbury, ‘staff of Arts Departments, which had seldom, if ever risen beyond two in the interwar years, now rose to three as a rule, sometimes four, and in philosophy even five’ (Morell 1969, pp. 163, 166, 244–245). This, Passmore reports, was for an enrolment of 100 students, compared with Sydney’s five for over 2,000. However, the administrative load became excessive and he left in 1955 for a position at the Research School of Social Sciences at the ANU (Passmore 1997, p. 266). He was briefly replaced by J. L. Mackie, earlier rejected for the chair in Tasmania in favour of Sydney Sparkes Orr. Mackie went to the Challis chair at Sydney in 1958, being replaced by Dan Taylor in May 1959.

The Otago Department gives a very lively account of the period on its departmental website under ‘Philosophical History’ (http://www.otago.ac.nz/philosophy/history.html).

Hector Monro published *The Argument of Laughter* in 1951. Annette Stoop, mentioned in connection with Auckland, was a student. Denis Grey leaps from the page: ‘The flamboyant Denis Grey delivered spell-binding lectures on Plato, though his habit of wearing lipstick to his classes came as something of a shock in dour, post-war Dunedin.’ What was the lipstick about? I do not know, but Grey himself emerges from the pages of the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* as an elegant and penetrating philosophical stylist. A two-part article from 1951 investigates the subtle dialectic between an artist’s intention and the observer’s subjective response to the work and is enjoyable, learned, clear and insightful. It is also occasionally very amusing. For example:

> Again, at least sometimes it is the intention of the author which determines whether or not we are dealing with a work of art at all. Consider this advertisement from a newspaper:
>
> I shall be transporting Bobby Calves, as usual, from March 13 to June 26. Signed X.Y., Carrier.
>
> If this statement is taken as the carrier’s comment on the pathos and futility of his own and of all human existence, accepted and recognized with ironic humour and resignation, then it gives distinct aesthetic pleasure (at least to me) and is, in its degree, a work of art, an example of the aesthetic use of symbols. But if he does not so intend it the pleasure we have is of our own making and not of his: we are the artists, and not the carrier, and we should be mistaken to suppose otherwise. (Grey 1951, p. 100).

Otago was clearly fortunate to have had the services of this man. When New England University College became the University of New England in 1954, Grey was appointed to the chair in philosophy. He died in 1961 (Grave 1984, p. 104).

Canterbury (Christchurch)

Philosophy at Canterbury in the 1950s was a very short-staffed operation. Karl Popper had been in Canterbury from 1937 to 1945, and it has been said that he greatly improved the standing of philosophy there. If that is so, the impact was certainly not reflected in staff numbers after his time. His replacement, Arthur Prior, was appointed in 1946 as the sole lecturer in philosophy, and he remained so for 7 years. Things improved in 1952 when the department doubled its staff to two and he was appointed professor. Prior was yet another philosopher who had to separate philosophy from psychology. His wife, Mary Prior, has given an account of the early years:

> Christchurch was a wonderful place to be in those earliest years. Returned servicemen and former conscientious objectors filled the classrooms along with people straight from school. The distinction between staff and students can never have been less. It was a period when everyone was catching up on lost years. For Arthur it meant preparing courses of lectures in logic, ethics, the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Locke, Berkeley and Hume; Kant and Hegel, Mill and other 19th century English speaking philosophers. Philosophy was then part of a joint Psychology and Philosophy ... course, in which Logic and Ethics and one year of psychology were common to psychologists and philosophers in a 9 unit degree. . . . . [There was] a more advanced logic course and specialist subject—e.g. Plato and Aristotle. The special subject rotated. As all the philosophy teaching fell to Arthur, he refused to teach the Kant and Hegel option. He did not speak German and had a distaste for Hegel. (Hasle 1998, p. 3)

Despite the staggering demands on him, Prior published *Logic and the Basis of Ethics* in 1949. He continued in a similar vein in 1951, with an article considering Hume's calling 'ought' and 'ought not' copulas and relating them to modal operators. The article exemplifies the manifold virtues of the book. He concludes it with a lighthearted reply to the objection that his views multiply entities beyond reason and should therefore be rejected. He quotes Boswell's reply to Hume, who had argued against immortality on the grounds that 'new Universes must be created to contain such infinite numbers'. Boswell said: 'This appeared to me to be an unphilosophical objection, and I said "Mr Hume, you know spirit does not take up space"' (Prior 1951, p. 154). This was the first of 11 publications for the decade, 2 books and 9 articles in good journals (Copeland 1996/2007).

That Prior made a big impact on students is evident from the report of his student Jim Wilson, reproduced in B. J. Copeland's article in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*:

> The strained precision of clock time was alien to him, so he was usually late for his own lectures (or anyone else's for that matter—he was very egalitarian about it). But he almost always turned up eventually, thinning hair blown vertical by his dash on his bike when he remembered the time. He would pull cycle clips off his trousers and plonk an ancient shopping bag on the desk in front of him. Out of this bag would come. . .a cabbage, a bunch of carrots, a loaf of bread, a bottle of milk. . .until, always at the bottom, he would find the book he was looking for. Back into the bag went the rest of the goodies, then he would look up at us, apologise for being late if he was more than usually so, and ask: 'Now where were we last time?' Someone in the front row would consult her or his notes—Arthur couldn't as he never had any—and would say, 'You were just dealing with such and such.' 'Ah yes, thank you,' Arthur would respond, and forthwith launch into an extempore exposition which followed on perfectly from the previous session and was beautifully structured and

> clear even though he was just thinking along with us. And of course we could stop him and ask for clarification or elaboration at any time, without in the slightest affecting the overall structure and direction of his thoughts. (Copeland 1996/2007)[2]

Prior's comparative isolation as a pioneering logician made a move from New Zealand an attractive option. He gave the John Locke Lectures at Oxford in 1956 and accepted a chair at Manchester in 1958 and later a fellowship at Balliol College. He was replaced by Michael Shorter in 1959.

Victoria (Wellington)

Much of the credit for the flourishing of philosophy at Victoria goes to George Hughes, who founded the department when he accepted the new chair of philosophy there in 1952. He was co-author with Max Cresswell of *Introduction to Modal Logic*. Cresswell was his student and, from 1963, a member of the department (Barrowman 1999, p. 267). Wikipedia reports and Patrick Hutchings and Graeme Marshall, both from New Zealand and both now in Melbourne, have confirmed that Hughes was an Anglican priest, ordained in Wales without the customary theological studies, to meet the need for clergy who could handle the Welsh language ('George Edward Hughes' Wikipedia: website). The unsigned obituary in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* states that he had a horror of making disciples, that he constantly fought against the idea that philosophy is a substitute for thinking and that he was 'revered and even loved by those within the University, in the Australasian philosophical community, and in the wider world of scholarship (on account of) his humanity and gentleness' (Anon 1994, p. 548).

No doubt the renaissance at Canterbury had something to do with Hughes being an inspirational leader, but that can hardly be the full explanation. Splendid man though he obviously was, as described in the obituary, it is difficult to conceive that he or anyone else was more inspirational than Prior, and the difference in outcome does not seem to lie there. Each was appointed at about the same time. Each was a logician with wider interests. But Hughes had an established reputation where Prior, after getting his MA (a second according to the external examiner), had gone travelling in Europe and had subsequently spent the war years as a radio mechanic in the Royal New Zealand Air Force. His fame lay ahead of him. Moreover, unlike Prior, who for some years had no option but to be a one-man band, Hughes was one of a department of four.

Philosophical Migration

The character of the movement of philosophers between Australia and New Zealand suggests that it was too rapid for the good of the institutions.

---

[2] I have also made use of the Canterbury University philosophy website.

It is possible that this churning can be accounted for in terms of the discrepancy between academic salaries between the two countries. New Zealand was clearly not competitive in this respect. For the period late 1957 to early 1958, in New Zealand the professorial salary was £2,190 and in Australia £3,500. The lecturer range in New Zealand was £1,025–£1,275, with a bar; in Australia it was £1,450–£2,100 (Sinclair 1983, p. 215; these figures ignore exchange rates). Nonetheless, in Australia the Federal Council of University Staff Associations called for a 40 % increase at this time (Murray 1957, p. 59, #208).

There was some churning in Australia, too. The University of Western Australia calendars for the 1950s show that the philosophy department consisted of two people from 1950 to 1954, A. C. Fox and S. A. Grave. Fox served from 1921 until 1960 and was succeeded in the chair by Grave. There was a series of lecturers and temporary lecturers from 1954. John McCloskey, Patrick Hutchings, Richard Franklin, David Lloyd Thomas and Bill Joske came and went, never more than two at a time. In 1960 the complement of the department was back to two. Geographical isolation had a role here. At Sydney, to consider an opposite case, positions were much more closely held. The university calendars show that in 1952 the department had eight lecturing staff and in 1959 there were 12. During that period the list of those who had been on the lecturing staff numbered 15. Few left during this period. One of those who departed was John Anderson on his retirement, another was John Mackie on his brief foray into New Zealand and back and a third was David Stove, who returned to Sydney but only after about 7 years at the University of New South Wales.

In Melbourne the annual Arts Faculty Handbooks for the 1950s show that there were eight lecturers and above in 1950, nine in 1959 and a total of 16 lecturing staff for the decade. One retired, two went to chairs (Kurt Baier to the ANU and Sydney Orr to Tasmania), and David Falk, after a sabbatical in the United States, remained there in a series of positions, eventually settling in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Those who came and went after brief stays (many of them postgraduate students in temporary tutorial positions) included Peter Herbst (Ghana and later professor at ANU), David Londey (Victoria, Wellington and University of New England), Brian O' Shaugnessy (King's College London), Calvin Rollins (coeditor of *Contemporary Philosophy in Australia* (Brown and Rollins 1969) who went on to the Research School of Social Sciences at ANU and later Brooklyn College, Oberlin College, the University of Western Ontario and the University of Connecticut),[3] Graham de Graaf (University of New England and founding editor with Max Charlesworth of the journal *Sophia*), Len Grant (Ghana and Monash), Bill Ginnane (ANU), John McGechie (Monash), Len Goddard (lecturer and later professor at New England, then St. Andrews and then Melbourne), Bill Joske (professor and vice-chancellor at Tasmania) and Harry Stainsby (Monash). Some who came as tutors were to return or remain on the lecturing staff into the 1960s. These were Max Charlesworth (subsequently professor and dean at Deakin), Eric D'Arcy

---

[3] See Shaffer (1994) for an obituary of Rollins.

(later Catholic archbishop of Hobart) (cf. Scarlett 2006), Jan Srzednicki, Mary and John McCloskey and Vernon Rice. Vernon had been a policeman before the war and had spent the war as a signalman in the army in New Guinea, where, apart from avoiding being shot and performing his military duties, he studied Thomas Aquinas. The philosophy of Aquinas was new to him, and he sent long letters to his friend and former fellow student Gwen Taylor, expounding its many virtues.[4] In a memorial lecture given by Mark Johnston of Princeton, he was described as being one of the best of men. Few who knew him would dissent.

Kurt Baier was at Melbourne through the 1950s, until departing for the chair at the ANU. He and his wife, Annette Baier (née Stoop, mentioned before in connection with Otago and Auckland), went on to stellar careers in the United States in the 1960s and beyond, outside my remit. Their story before the move to Pittsburgh is interesting enough. Here is a brief account from Charles Pigden's obituary published by the Bioethics Centre at the University of Otago:

> Professor Baier was born in Vienna in 1917 where he began to study law at the university. But he had to abandon the law and flee to Britain after the Anschluss because of his partly Jewish descent. Like several other refugees who went on to distinguish themselves in Australian academic life, he was interned as a 'enemy alien' and transported to Australia in the hell-ship Dunera. There was a striking contrast between the brutality of the guards on the Dunera (where beatings with rifle-butts were common) and the friendliness of the guards at the internment camp in Hay, New South Wales (where one of them asked Kurt to look after his rifle). Kurt went on to take a BA (1944) and an MA (1947) at the University of Melbourne where he taught for several years. He was sent on paid leave to study at Oxford where he gained his D.Phil under the direction of the slightly younger Stephen Toulmin (1952). His D.Phil thesis metamorphosed into his first and most important book *The Moral Point of View* (1968). He taught for a while at the ANU in Canberrra and in 1958 met and married Annette Stoop who had just taken up a post at the University of Sydney. (Pigden 2010: website)

Melbourne-Sydney Dualism?

Selwyn Grave's history of Australian philosophy presents a picture of a discipline dominated by Melbourne and Sydney until about 1962, the year of John Anderson's death. Alan Donagan gives a similar account (Donagan 1969). Jack Smart agrees: 'When I came to Australia in 1950 most of the significant philosophical activity was in Sydney . . . and Melbourne. . . . As a result philosophical conferences took on something of a Melbourne v. Sydney match' (1976, p. 6). Opinions divide sharply on the evaluation of this contest and in particular on whether the influence of Anderson was mainly a good thing or not. Anthony Quinton writes: 'Australian philosophy has benefited enormously from the fact that it was dominated by John Anderson for the greater part of his active career, and it is entirely just that the only one of the 12 chapters of Grave's *History of Australian Philosophy* [1984] that is devoted to a single philosopher is devoted to him' (Quinton cited in Baker 1986, p. ix). Nonetheless, John Passmore found that changes of opinion made it opportune to conclude his autobiography with a defence of his old teacher:

---

[4] Gwen Taylor, personal communication.

> In the manner characteristic of our times, there is now a tendency to denigrate my principal teacher, John Anderson, and my own account of him might selectively be used as a weapon in that denigration. So let me again insist that I could not have wished for a more mind-opening teacher. The *Europa International Who's Who* is neither particularly oriented towards Australians nor towards philosophers. Yet it has included such pupils of Anderson's as Mackie, Armstrong, Kamenka, Stove, and myself. Few Australian teachers could say as much. We all went our own way but were nevertheless permanently marked by Anderson's influence, as were very many others whose lives were lived outside the academic world, even, sometimes, knowing him only at second-hand, in the manner of Robert Hughes or Germaine Greer. (1997, p. 268)

Some of the denigrators—from Sydney—are reported in Grave's *History*. A.K. Stout spoke of a 'susurration of horror' in the lecture theatre when he endorsed the concept of the common good, an idea strongly rejected by Anderson. Mackie refers to the 'vagueness and schematic character' of many Andersonian moves and says this 'helped to produce the Andersonian blight' (Grave 1984, pp. 89–90). Smart supplements the case outside Sydney, beginning with a report of the Oxford philosopher George Paul's remark that if you wanted to experience something like Wittgensteinian discipleship, you should go to Anderson's department. Smart's comment on this is that Anderson was keen on free inquiry in principle but not in practice and that he believed that 'serious discussion was possible only among people who were basically in agreement' (1976, pp. 7–8).

In Melbourne, the Department of History and Philosophy of Science was growing to maturity in the 1950s after beginning as a provider of service courses. The philosophers in that department at this time were Gerd Buchdahl, John Clendinnen and Brian Ellis. A few yards away the philosophy department was led by Alexander Boyce Gibson, who took a different view from Anderson on how a department should be run. He did not seek to surround himself with disciples, consistently favouring a diverse range of appointments, so that his own views were not privileged in his department. Smart says of him: 'He wrote elegant English, but, rightly or wrongly, he seemed to most of us to be old fashioned. He deserves credit for building up the exceptionally strong Melbourne department' (1989, p. 38). Gibson was undoubtedly old fashioned when assessed against Smart's conception of philosophy (and not alone in that), but he had ensured that if there were any defects in his own conception of philosophy, they were not writ large in the department as a whole. His policy worked, not necessarily to his personal advantage; the poet Vincent Buckley refers to him as a 'small and lonely battler', one whose 'preoccupations were central to his treatment of every topic' (1983, p. 62). His own work stands up well. Outside his major interest in the philosophy of religion, a 1951 article on democratic theory, for example, impresses by its erudition and clarity and would not be out of place in a contemporary reading list (Boyce Gibson 1951). It is an exposition and extension of the work of his tutor at Balliol, Lord Lindsay of Birker. It is not fanciful to discern similarities between his approach to philosophy in this article and Douglas Gasking's expository and exploratory style, on which more later.

In Gibson's department the philosophy of Wittgenstein was especially prominent, though not dominant. Smart observes that Melbourne, Oxford and Cornell were the three universities outside Cambridge most influenced by Wittgenstein (Smart 1976, p. 6). The tendency at Melbourne was principally represented by Douglas Gasking and Alan Cameron Jackson, known as 'Camo', and dubbed 'the gnomic Wittgensteinian' by Smart (1989, p. 36). Another member of the Wittgensteinian tendency, in a style different from both Jackson and Gasking, was D.L. Gunner, who came from Adelaide in 1953. A talented actor, Gunner occasionally introduced an effective histrionic element to his exposition of philosophical topics.

With Jackson there was no doubting the presence of a serious intellect, and to see him at work at his second-year honours seminar, which I attended in 1966, was a memorable experience, so memorable in fact that a couple of us once brought along two friends from other disciplines—English and engineering—to share with them what we realised was sui generis. Jackson's powerful personality caused some of his students to imitate him in gesture and word. As in the similar case of Anderson, to be considered, we have to ask whether the blame, if any, primarily attaches to Jackson or to those who imitated him. A sympathetic judge might consider that he could not be blamed any more than Anderson could. Vincent Buckley has an interesting line on this:

> The good side of this was that it associated thinking, the discussion, earthing, uncovering and demystifying of philosophical issues with style: style of mind and even of body, comic or irritating as *some* bodily mannerisms might be. I believe that this is important, and have no doubt that Socrates was as comically addicted to gesture and posture as any modern... The more important and difficult the question, or body of questions, that are under discussion, the more important it is to bring something habitual and formalized to their uncovering: something habitual: a balancing of the body by which the union of mind and body can be enacted even while it is being investigated. Jackson created this effect with grace and reticence. (Buckley 1983, pp. 63–64)

Another element in the explanation, or another dimension of what has already been identified, was surely the influence of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy. Gasking and Jackson said of him: 'There are many sorts of human excellence. Not least among them is the excellence of one who devotes his whole life, giving up all else, to the attempt to do one thing supremely well. That Wittgenstein did. How far he succeeded those who come after us will tell' (1951, p. 79). It is not surprising if one you regarded as living like that had profound effects on you at many levels. Wittgenstein and Anderson had similar but different effects; a university containing both of them would afford an interesting study of the phenomenon.

Gasking was another memorable teacher in a very different style from Jackson, his lectures and papers outstanding for their apparently effortless clarity. Frank Jackson, a student of Gasking's (and son of A. C. Jackson), insists that he was an 'absolutely first-class philosopher' and that, despite his having been a student of

Wittgenstein's and having a continuing interest in that approach to philosophy, he remained interested in the big questions of metaphysics, unlike some of the followers of the later style of the master. On the question of clarity of exposition, Jackson places Gasking with Smart and Armstrong as having set the tone of directness and clarity with which philosophy is often conducted in Australia (Jackson 1996, pp. v–vi). The clarity was accompanied by depth. I have heard one of Gasking's students, now a senior academic in philosophy, say that his lectures on epistemology (to an undergraduate audience) were the intellectual experience of a lifetime. The editors of a fine collection of his papers report:

> He expounded to decades of honours students a very lucid, comprehensive and plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein's teaching, kept fresh with unexpected applications and striking illustrations. Kripke's perspective on Wittgenstein on rule-following came as no surprise to Gasking's students… One of the most attractive features of Gasking's writings is their persistently positive and constructive character. The discovery of truth rather than the exposure of error is his dominant goal. Typically, he recognizes a kernel of truth in some philosophical position which nonetheless has an inadequacy of scope or an obscurity; he then seeks to reveal the theory's strength to yield a more powerful version. For example, in "Criteria, Analyticity and the Identity-Thesis" Gasking recognizes both the fertility and the obscurity of Wittgenstein's notion of criterion and goes on to give an account of criteria which is both plausible and lucid. (Oakley and O'Neill 1996, pp. 4–5)

Another example of this irenic and generous spirit is his discussion of John Wisdom's *Other Minds* and *Philosophy and Psychoanalysis*. He sets the tone in the opening lines: 'In these two books are collected some of the most important and exciting papers published in the last 20 years. Every philosopher should have them in his shelves, and few could fail to profit by an occasional re-reading of them' (Gasking 1954, p. 136). Consistently with what this reveals of his character, Gasking was also the most amiable of men, and the Melbourne department under his guidance (as it was in the late 1960s and the 1970s) was a remarkably happy place.

John Anderson: The Master and His Disciples

Wittgenstein, whether the early or the late, did not count for a lot in Sydney. The reading lists for the two honour subjects, 'Moral and Political' and 'Logic and Metaphysics', were nearly Wittgenstein-free. In 1957 the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* appeared 'for reference', and in 1958 it had gone, a remarkably brief cameo appearance for such a work of genius. Meanwhile, in Melbourne, the philosophy of John Anderson was considered by Douglas Gasking in 'Anderson and the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*' in 1949 (Gasking 1949). This attracted no published attention from Anderson and his disciples. Gilbert Ryle's 1950 paper, 'Logic and Professor Anderson', fared a little better. Anderson said to Smart: 'I haven't read it. It would only make me annoyed, and I'm too busy to be annoyed' (Smart 1976, p. 8). Later, Smart noted that Anderson did read it eventually, since he replied to it in his paper, 'Empiricism and Logic' (Smart 1989, p. 37; Anderson 1962: 171ff).

Another example of the characteristic Andersonian narrowness occurred early in his career and concerns medieval philosophy. The poet A. D. Hope relates that he had planned to write a thesis on Ockham but Anderson prevented him on the grounds that there was nothing worth studying in medieval philosophy. When asked if he had read any, he replied: 'No. I've read De Wolfe on them. I know there's nothing in them!' (Hope 1992, p. 52). Yet Anderson's position is conflicted: he may not have read any medieval philosophy but his aesthetic owes a good deal to James Joyce, and he in his turn owed a great deal to Aquinas (as well as to Aristotle and, as it happens, Cardinal Newman). John Cornwell outlines the historical lineaments in a discussion of the aesthetics of Joyce's Stephen Dedalus in *Stephen Hero* and *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*:

> Stephen in both early novels reveals a subtle grasp of Newman's *Idea*, the *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* and key sermons; while the Jesuits pay lip-service to the Cardinal's writings, which they neither know nor understand… In *A Portrait* Stephen debates the crucial contrast between art and religion with the Jesuit Dean of Studies who has been laying a fire—demonstrating the 'useful' arts. Unlike Newman, the Dean has become atrophied by his failure to change and to grow: 'his very soul had waxed old in that service without growing towards light and beauty or spreading abroad the sweet odour of her sanctity.' They talk. The Dean opines that the beautiful should be marked by its utility and ethical value; while Stephen, quoting Aquinas, says '*Pulchra sunt quae visa placent*' (those things are beautiful that please on being seen). By the same token, Stephen is following Newman, who himself follows Aristotle, in declaring that art should be enjoyable for its own sake: 'All I have been now saying is summed up in a few characteristic words of the great Philosopher,' writes Newman. . . . 'Of possessions . . . those rather are useful which bear fruit; those *liberal*, *which tend to enjoyment*. By fruitful I mean, which yield revenue; by enjoyable, *where nothing accrues of consequence beyond the using*.' (Cornwell 2010, pp. 133–134)

Anderson knew the character of this intellectual lineage of his, at least insofar as it involved Aquinas. In 'Further Questions in Aesthetics: Beauty', he says: 'If we take the aesthetic view put forward by Joyce (following Aquinas) that all works of art must have *wholeness* (being one thing), *harmony* (being a thing), *radiance* (being a thing of a certain sort—a what), we could say that all things fulfil these three conditions. Are all things beautiful then?' (Anderson 1982, p. 266). That brief passage, possibly the only reference to Aquinas in the corpus, may have come late (the paper it occurs in is undated). Perhaps he was unaware of this single nugget of valuable insight from the medieval period when he vetoed Hope's project. Passmore and Partridge each report that he was no scholar, that he was not widely read and that he was given to relying on commentators (quoted in Docker 1974, pp. 143–144). The invocation of De Wolfe was not an isolated event.

This habit of mind is hardly a defence, of course, and in any case even if his resources were exiguous, there is enough in what he did know to extend his insight. The discussion between the dean and Stephen in the Cornwell passage above strongly suggests the fundamental principle of Anderson's realism that nothing can be constituted of its relations. Anderson, as an admirer of Joyce, must have been aware of the connection and his interest in Joyce (almost exclusive according to some) goes back at least as far as the 1932 paper 'Some Questions in Aesthetics'.

There are other references to medieval philosophy in Anderson's brief acknowledgement, though he may well not have picked them up. The third requirement for works of art, and, as he points out, for things in general, is identified elsewhere, in Latin, as *haecceitas* (that is to say, 'thisness'), a concept associated with Duns Scotus, but relevant also to Ockham's rejection of the substantial reality of universals. But Anderson was not interested in such historical fossicking.

His emphasis on a unitary and coherent philosophy and the master-disciple relationship was successful in giving him considerable influence, at least in Sydney. Moreover, A. D. Hope reports on the more superficial aspects of the impact the new professor made on his more susceptible students: 'He had a great deal of personal magnetism which drew a group of devoted disciples round him so completely that they adopted his mannerisms, including a slight stammer, and all his methods of argument and judgments on other disciplines which were not properly the domain of philosophy at all' (1992, p. 51). Was this primarily a fault in Anderson or was it primarily a weakness in his disciples? The question has already been raised in connection with Camo Jackson and Wittgenstein. While it would be harsh to blame Anderson for what was largely a defect of others, his conception of fruitful discussion, as Smart noted, required a considerable background of agreement between the discussants. Hope took this to mean an acceptance of the totality of his thought: 'I admired him immensely but always found myself disagreeing with him on one question or another. This, of course, would not do. Anderson's intellectual position had to be a single seamless garment for his disciples. They could not accept only parts of it... I discovered that this prophet of free enquiry could often be extremely overbearing' (1992, p. 52).

On the wider scale his influence was similar, and some will doubt whether Sydney libertarianism was the sort of cultural phenomenon that could possibly do credit to a philosopher. John Docker points out that the content of the Andersonian position changed: 'In specific political terms Anderson's career spanned an interest in the possibilities of Russia as a "workers' state", Trotskyism, sympathy for trade union activism to anti-communism in the 1950s and "anti-proletarianism",' and 'in part Andersonians have followed these lines as they developed' (Docker 1974, p. 131). We should note the 'in part', in the spirit of Passmore's defence, quoted above. Passmore and Hope were not the only independent thinkers to admire him, even if for some of the followers, his influence was a substitute for their own thinking.

John Docker offers two statements of the perceived attractiveness of the freethought movement (which he does not identify with Andersonianism *simpliciter*): 'Its attraction for successive generations of Sydney University intellectuals was that it provided a total cultural stance which both justified their existence as intellectuals in a primarily anti-intellectual and utilitarian society, and offered an alternative mode of living.' As to that mode of living, 'reality was divided between the intellectual and utilitarian modes of life. The intellectual mode was different from and superior to, the rest of society.' A less nakedly self-interested attraction was that 'like Marxism or Christianity, it offered a comprehensive metaphysic of society, politics and "human nature". It was seen as a total explanation, to which no area or field was inaccessible: ethics, social theory, education and methodology, science, or aesthetics' (Docker 1974, p. 131).

While it is reasonable to understand philosophy as an attempt at a comprehensive vision of all that there is, philosophy, so regarded, is a process, not to be understood as a product. If it were a product, philosophy, except in the case of a few originators, would be a matter of understanding and remembering the accomplished truth, no room being left for development. The subordinate 'intellectual' would resemble Aristotle's slave by nature, possessing reason only in the sense of being able to understand what was demanded of him, but without insight or creativity. What Docker offers us is in fact a repellent picture of some aspects of Anderson's influence, a picture of a narrow and paradoxical world of intellectuals not given to independent thought, content to subscribe to a package of views that suited their interests. In Marxist terms, their thinking was an ideology, part of 'the stink above the factory', an epiphenomenon, prominent, but causally redundant. Was Anderson's influence on these people as bad as that?

Docker's offhand dismissal of Marxism and Christianity as invariably closed systems in which all questions have, in a sense, been answered before they have been asked should make the sober reader sceptical. While the charges are not totally without foundation, they exemplify a crude reading of history, reminiscent of Anderson's own. In any case, a philosopher whose influence produced anything remotely like the situation alleged by Docker would do well to repudiate what he had produced.

The Melbourne Versus Sydney Contest: An Adelaide Victory?

Whatever the ultimate qualitative judgment about Anderson as a philosopher, there remains a question about the outcome of the Melbourne-Sydney contest identified by Grave, Donagan and Smart. On one clear measure, even if the discipline was dominated by the contest, it was certainly not dominated by Anderson and his party. A reading of the programs for the annual philosophy congresses (published in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*) shows a considerable presence of the man and the school. From 1951 to 1959, there were 80 papers offered. Anderson himself gave six, and the total contribution from him and those who might be counted as Andersonians was 15. On the other hand, disorganised Melbourne eclecticism weighed in with 24.

A quick survey of six journals (*Analysis*, *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *Mind*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophy* and *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy*) reveals 76 authors with Australian connections between 1950 and 1959.[5] The informal count shows Melbourne coming back to the field but still ahead 16–14. This seems largely irrelevant, however, when Adelaide turns up with 26. Smart was one of the multiple publishers, his name appearing 19 times. The two-giant theory is not convincing as an account of the 1950s on this measure.

---

[5] Some journals did not give institutional addresses. Some of the authors identified contributed before or after as well as during their Australasian periods. For this informal indicative survey this does not matter.

Smart's contribution was not restricted to his own output of publications. Among his students and colleagues at Adelaide who made their presence felt were Brian Ellis, Graham Nerlich, C. B. Martin, Brian Medlin, Ian Hinckfuss, Max Deutscher and Michael Bradley. He also attracted a series of distinguished visitors to give the Gavan David Young Lectures, including Ryle and Quine in the 1950s. U. T. Place, who initiated Australian materialism with the idea of the (contingent) identity of mind and brain, was one of Smart's appointees, serving from 1951 to 1954 as head of psychology, newly separated from philosophy. Smart's appointment was one of the better ideas of selection committees in the 1950s; Sydney Orr had also been an applicant (Pybus 1993, p. 40).[6]

Smart, dissatisfied by the idealism of his teachers, was originally attracted by Ryle's account of the mind: 'How good it was to get to Oxford and find the mind vanishing into behaviour dispositions. All seemed clear for a physicalist world view, with cybernetics 1 day explaining the dispositions' (Smart 1975, p. 63). He was also energised by a conception of philosophy as a good deal closer to physics in its presuppositions and methods. There is, or should be, a body of shared knowledge underpinning a discipline. This, he believed, was coming to be the case in philosophy, where 'in order for a student to understand a great deal of current philosophy, it is necessary for him to familiarize himself with quantification theory, Gödel's and Church's theorems, Tarski's definition of truth and so on. . . A generation or two ago a background of discipline in the form of Greek scholarship performed a similar function for Oxford philosophy' (Smart 1975, pp 60–61).

What is to be said about philosophy that does not conform to Smart's favoured paradigm? Well, Kierkegaard and Hegel are purveyors of angst, better by far to emulate the sanguine or at least stoical Hume. Wittgenstein is a mixed case—he should have embraced the philosophy of the Vienna Circle (Smart 1975, pp 60–66). This last judgment, no doubt, helped Smart in abandoning one half of his joint commitment to religion and philosophy, a project relying on what he came to regard as Wittgensteinian double-talk. This conversion was prompted by the Catholic Selwyn Grave, who remarked that he could not see how Elizabeth Anscombe could be both a Catholic and a Wittgensteinian; how could she understand the doctrine of transubstantiation? Whatever the merits of this argument, it convinced Smart, but not *pace* Mortensen and Nerlich, instantly (Mortensen and Nerlich 2010). The process took some months, and Smart reported that 'the memory (of the "double-talk") makes me feel quite ashamed' (1989, pp 38–39).

---

[6] Pybus gives the source for Boyce Gibson's reference: Melbourne University Archive RDW 1/1/18 ('RDW' denotes the papers of Roy Douglas Wright).

The Sad Story of Sydney Sparkes Orr

Tasmania provides yet another instance of a combined department of psychology and philosophy. In 1951 the staff were Edmund Morris Miller, professor of psychology and philosophy from 1927, and the newly appointed James Alexander Cardno, senior lecturer in psychology. In 1952 the department had been divided, Cardno being professor of psychology and Sydney Sparkes Orr, professor of philosophy and sole staff member of that department, newly arrived from the University of Melbourne. At this point the narrative diverges from the normal pattern of sober academic doings and focuses on the strange and unhappy figure of Orr himself, a philosopher who became famous but not for any contribution to philosophy.

When he arrived at the University of Tasmania, Orr became involved in a major political struggle in the university. He wrote an open letter to the Minister for Education, calling for a Royal Commission into the University Council. One paragraph of the letter illustrates its combative tone. It runs as follows: 'It is self-evident that the Council of the University of Tasmania, as a result of apathy, neglect and maladministration over recent years, has failed completely to discharge its most vital duty to the Government and the people of Tasmania, of maintaining the traditional ideals of, and essential prerequisites for, a University' (Davis 2002, p. 49). Tasmania was a small state and its university was a very small operation: 35 others (or as Pybus says, 37) signed the letter, and we are told that they numbered half of the staff (Davis 2002, p. 44; Pybus 1993, p. 48). It was easy for one person to make a big impact in such a small community. Orr got his Royal Commission and the Royal Commission savaged the council. Its members were not likely to forget.

Orr had put his head above the parapet, at a time when several complaints had been lodged against him. But his troubles may be said to have really begun when Suzanne Kemp, an 18 year-old philosophy student, told her parents that she and Orr had been in a sexual relationship for months. Her father, Reg Kemp, a Hobart businessman, confronted Orr at home and knocked him down. Orr denied the accusation, stood up to Kemp verbally and threatened legal action. The matter soon came to the attention of the vice-chancellor and in due course he received Orr's resignation. If he had accepted it, a great deal of trouble for both sides would have been avoided, but he did not. Instead, he presented it to council where it was decided that the accusations needed to be investigated. Orr's sexual relationship with the student was the principal basis of the proceedings but not necessarily the motivation, for Kemp's complaint had placed the professor in the hands of powerful enemies. The outcome of their investigation was that on 16 March 1956, Orr was dismissed for misconduct. Three days later he counterattacked with a writ for wrongful dismissal. His action in the Tasmanian Supreme Court failed, as did a subsequent appeal to the High Court of Australia. The case became a long and bitterly contested issue between the university and the Federated Council of University Staff Associations. The Australasian Association of Philosophy declared the chair black, and the ban remained in force until 1963. The university then made an admission of having acted unfairly and offered Orr $32,000. A good deal of fruitless negotiation followed in an attempt to get him a better result, but eventually Orr signed up to the deal in 1966, dying a few months later.

The story of these events has been told in five or six succinct pages by S. A. Grave (1984, pp 105–111); in a chapter by James Franklin (2003); in books by Cassandra Pybus (1993) and W. H. Eddy (1961); a joint book by John Polya and Robert Solomon (1996); a chapter by Richard Davis (2002), author of the centenary history of the University of Tasmania; and a brief introduction by Davis and his colleague John Biggs (2002).[7]

The polarisation of views on the Orr case is indicated by the titles of two of the books chronicling it: *Gross Moral Turpitude* by Cassandra Pybus and *Dreyfus in Australia* by John Polya and Robert Solomon (Pybus 1993; Polya and Solomon 1996; Davis 2002). Biggs and Davis sum up tendentiously:

> The case polarised public opinion, both at the time and for many years afterwards. People tended to focus on one aspect of the case or the other. Some, like the then Tasmanian Establishment and later Cassandra Pybus, focused exclusively on the sexual aspect. At the time, it was seen as a sackable offence if an academic had sexual relations with a student, even where, as in this case, the student had initiated the liaison. Today, nothing has changed, to some. Pybus, in *Gross Moral Turpitude* (1993), insisted that a consensual relationship between teacher and student was a straightforward matter of sexual harassment. Orr had had a consensual relationship, therefore Orr was guilty of harassment and had got what he deserved.
>
> Others saw Orr's dismissal in political terms, whether or not he was guilty of the sex charge. Some of these believed his protestations that he was innocent, while others did not believe that a consensual relationship between a teacher and a student over the age of consent was an offence (Biggs and Davis 2002, p. 18).

It is a massive misreading to say that Pybus focuses exclusively on sexual matters. She has a far more detailed charge sheet, raising questions about Orr's academic record and references, his mental stability, his academic competence, his honesty and his alleged plagiarism and claims of improper non-sexual relations with students (Pybus 1993).[8] She does treat the issue of sexual impropriety extensively, both the Tasmanian affair and earlier alleged relationships and objectionable behaviour (Pybus 1993, pp. 36–38, 41–43, 173). She notes the Sydney Libertarian line on the morality of such liaisons and that Orr did not endorse it. John Anderson's published view was that 'students are not children and the personal relationships of either staff or students are not the universities' concern'. George Molnar criticised Orr for not taking the opportunity to attack bourgeois sexual morality as a matter of principle. Orr 'emphatically denied the affair and equally forcefully said it was improper'. Pybus agrees with Briggs and Davis that Suzanne Kemp, the young woman involved, was 'eager to initiate a relationship'. Pybus does think it reasonable to hold that behaviour like Orr's is a sacking offence but explicitly denies that just any sexual relationship between an academic and a student is grounds for the academic's dismissal. The question of the inequality of power has to be considered but the answer will not necessarily be the same in all cases (Pybus 1993, pp. 23, 101, 213). In the Orr case the judgment requires consideration of the disparity in power and influence between an 18 year-old undergraduate and a professor of philosophy, especially given that he professed to be an expert on love and a competent amateur psychotherapist and she was an immature young woman.

---

[7] Robert Solomon, co-author of one of the books, is not the University of Texas philosopher and frequent visitor to Australia, the late Robert C. Solomon, but a member of the University of Tasmania Geography department at the time.

[8] For Pybus' discussion of Orr's academic record and references, see (1993: 35–37, 166–71); for his mental stability, (1993: 40, 51); for his competence, (1993: 38–39); for plagiarism, (1993: 50).

In the University of Tasmania calendar at the beginning of the decade, the philosophy course descriptions were very sparse. One of the two Philosophy III subjects was 'History of Philosophy from Descartes to Kant'. The other was 'Ethics', covering utilitarianism and Kant. The calendar remarkably declared without any further guidance: 'Students are requested to read a standard account of the history of ethics.' By 1953, with Orr the only staff member, the reading lists were out of control in respect of length, and the intemperate listing of texts continued until some moderation was introduced in 1957. By then Orr's name had been removed from the staff list. Kajica Milanov had joined the department by 1955 and remained as the sole staff member after Orr's removal. He was joined by a visiting professor, Israel Levine, for 1958. In 1959 it was Milanov alone once more.

This dismal narrative alone shows that there was something seriously wrong. In fact, there were things wrong with both Orr and the university authorities. Orr, ostensibly a student of Plato with an interest in love, could never manage to finish a long-promised study on the philosopher. The Research Report section of the University of Melbourne calendar for 1950 listed a project on 'Virtue and Knowledge in Plato's Dialogues' and reported that it was 'a review and novel interpretation of the main Platonic texts on this subject', declaring: 'The writer has begun his final revised version.' The study never appeared. At Queen's University Belfast, Orr had managed to complete a PhD thesis on a Platonic topic, but it was twice rejected and the degree never awarded (Pybus 1993, pp. 35, 37). Further, he had a long history of irregular sexual relations and unacceptable behaviour that had got him into difficulties elsewhere, including at Melbourne.

The university authorities were defective in a different way. Presumably without intention or effort, John Anderson had influenced their thinking by engendering fear. His ability to disturb conservative minds had been deeply felt in Tasmania and the move to enhance the standing of philosophy in the university occasioned fears that someone like him might be appointed. The authorities wanted a safe moral conservative for the position and thought that they had found him in Orr. They rejected better philosophers. Pybus reports that Paul Grice had indicated that he would welcome an invitation to the chair (1993, p. 204). Applications were received from Kurt Baier, Quentin Gibson and John Mackie. Mackie drew criticism because of his article 'A Refutation of Morals' (Orr 1945a), a piece of work inimical to the cause of moral comfort and security. As James Franklin puts it, 'The University of Tasmania's efforts to keep out of the orbit of Sydney atheism had led it to appoint a third-rate Christian philosopher from Melbourne' (2003, p. 3).

The same issue of the *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* that contained Mackie's 'Refutation' was the last to bear that joint name and the last edited by John Anderson, who had been editor since 1935. It contained a two-part article by Orr, 'Some Reflections on the Cambridge Approach to Philosophy'. Orr's article is pedestrian and the style is laboured, but if we make allowances for the author's lack of the advantage of subsequent more widespread and deeper understanding of the issues discussed, it is not disgraceful as a journeyman effort. Anderson could not be accused of negligence in accepting it. In the same year Orr published a contribution to an Aristotelian Society symposium on Plato. The style and quality is not greatly different from the Cambridge philosophy piece (1945b). These were his last publications. Other philosophers represented in these volumes were, in the *Australasian Journal*, Quentin Gibson, John Anderson, Arthur Prior, P. H. Partridge and John Mackie and, in the *Aristotelian Society*, H. H. Price, F. Waissman and W. C. Kneale. A selection committee considering that Orr was in the right company would not have been deluded and would have had grounds for a defence of their appointment if one had been called for. This is not to say that this would have justified them in making the professorial appointment; they were not personally competent to do so unaided and had rejected advice from those who were competent to give it, on the grounds that, as they believed, contemporary philosophy was corrupt and its practitioners not to be trusted. One of Orr's defenders observes that his was 'a good appointment by the standards of the day' (Davis 2002, p. 44), presumably referring to those then prevailing in the University of Tasmania, but even if this is so, it is clear from the detailed account provided by Pybus that the selection process was intellectually corrupt (Pybus 1993, pp. 203–210).

One of Orr's referees was Alexander Boyce Gibson, his head of department in Melbourne. Orr's defenders, Polya and Solomon, indicate that Gibson was to blame: 'His boss in Melbourne also wrote a very good reference, little supported by objective assessment of Orr as a researcher or teacher, but justified by Professor Gibson's wish to shift the time-bomb in his department across Bass Strait' (Polya and Solomon 1996, pp. 46–47). This echoes the claim made by the vice-chancellor of the time, Torleiv Hytten (referred to by Polya and Solomon as 'the vindictive Troll') (Polya and Solomon 1996, p. 77).[9] Gibson seems to have been exposed to this charge by the difference between his reference and his report to the selection committee. Pybus states: 'Gibson gave an uncritical but not fulsome reference. It is what Boyce Gibson said in his confidential report to the selection committee which really tells the story. Classing the four applicants in descending order, he placed

---

[9] This is not the only instance of overblown abuse in the book. Note the assessment of the character and abilities of Reg Kemp, Suzanne's father: 'Reg Kemp was untutored and unintellectual beyond the barely tolerable average level of the semi-literate colonial business class of Australia. It is hard to decide whether his habitual lack of good sense was due to heavy drinking or to a poor supply of oxygen at birth. Polya, who met him repeatedly in his store before the Orr affair and in court afterwards, could smell the grog-laden aura around Reg several metres away. Those without an analytical chemist's sensitive nose had to approach closer' (Polya and Solomon 1996: 89).

Orr “well below” the others, he felt constrained to say that Orr could not work with those who did not agree with him, students or colleagues, and that he was deficient in both discretion and dignity’ (Pybus 1993, p. 207).[10] The committee ignored that advice.

Among Orr’s troubles at Hobart was his reported difficulty in putting together a set of lectures. Though allegedly an expert on Plato, he was accused of making excessively close use of Boyce Gibson’s notes on the subject. One of his students was Edwin Tanner, a talented artist and the painter of a memorable representation of Orr as a professorial pterodactyl flying into a sparsely attended lecture theatre. He had complained about Orr on other matters, but on this point he remarked: ‘I didn’t give a damn whose notes he used provided he used something that made sense. The trouble was . . . the notes were not used often enough’ (Buckley 1983, p. 62). Students at Melbourne and elsewhere had complained about his lectures, but Vincent Buckley said he was not a bad teacher: ‘in discussion he was quick, sharp, and hard to predict’ (Pybus 1983, p. 62). In that case, his teaching difficulties require explanation: he was not without talent; the combined text of the three final articles could have been chopped up into a set of lectures; and if the worst came to the worst, he surely could have done a less obvious job of using another lecturer’s notes. In Tasmania he was under extreme pressure, but the beginning of the difficulties predates these events. It was in Melbourne, for example, that he came up with the idea that he was the illegitimate son of King Edward VIII (Pybus 1993, p. 40). His propensity to stray from the subject was evident at St. Andrews’ and caused more than the normal amount of difficulty, for him and his students (Pybus 1993, pp. 37–38).

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Orr was unbalanced. The obsession with his allegedly royal parentage was later conjoined with the idea that he was a Christlike figure, both, as he claimed, being illegitimate and being committed to the supremacy of love (Pybus 1993, p. 91). He had a far higher estimate of his abilities than an objective assessment would support. One of his less attractive overestimations of his powers is shown in his amateur use of psychoanalysis, dating back to his Belfast days, frequently applied to women students, but also to his enemies, including Reg Kemp and Edwin Tanner (Pybus 1993, pp. 37, 57, 66, 97–99). He had a lot of loyal and energetic supporters in his battle with the University of Tasmania but managed to alienate many of them and to annoy even those who remained steadfast. Perhaps this explains the intemperate and even vituperative tone of Polya and Solomon’s book. They dedicate it, inter alia, to Sydney Orr, ‘foolish but brave’, and make it clear that he was a nuisance to them, however dedicated they were to his cause (Polya and Solomon, pp. 140–141).

---

[10] The source given is University of Tasmania Archives 47/126 and the addressee was Hytten, the vice-chancellor who later blamed Gibson for misleading him.

Smaller Operations

Many Australian institutions that flourished later than my period had small and sometimes tenuous existence in the 1950s, and it is difficult to unearth the information that is relevant to the precise period. Grave gives a useful brief summary (Grave 1984, p. 104). There was little to report from the University of Queensland. Gary Malinas devotes six lines to the history of philosophy at his university in the years from 1911 to 1961 when C. F. Presley took over and renewed the department (Malinas 2010). Other smaller philosophy operations in Australia were generally part of the Andersonian sphere of influence. Philosophy was established at the Newcastle University College in the mid-1950s. Presley, who had not been taught by Anderson, was on the staff along with Alexander Anderson (John Anderson's son), Alec Ritchie and Bill Doniela, though not all at the same time. The University of New England had its origins as a college of the University of Sydney. It achieved independence in the mid-1950s with responsibility for correspondence teaching. Philosophy at the University of New South Wales was to expand and flourish in the next decade; in the 1950s it seems to have been restricted to offering service courses. Undergraduate teaching of philosophy in Canberra began at the Canberra University College, affiliated with the University of Melbourne and eventually federated with the research schools as part of the Australian National University. Staff up to the end of the 1950s included Quentin Gibson throughout, Alan Donagan until 1955, Bruce Benjamin and Kurt Baier, who took the new chair of philosophy in 1958 and began the expansion that transformed the place in the 1960s. It is appropriate to include the philosophy component of the Research School of Social Sciences as it was in the 1950s under 'Smaller Operations'. It was founded in 1952 with Percy Partridge as head. Grave reports that there were five on the staff in 1958. John Passmore arrived in Canberra in that year and it was also in that year that he published his much-admired *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*. 'Small' is a relative term in these matters, as this case and the extraordinary example of Arthur Prior at Canterbury demonstrate. In New Zealand in the 1950s, there seems to have been no significant expansion of philosophy outside the original colleges.

The Change of Decade: The Beginnings of Australian Materialism

U. T. Place produced his article, 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?' while at the University of Adelaide. His acknowledgment captures some of the excitement, frustration and collegiality he found in this centre of philosophical energy: 'I am greatly indebted to my fellow-participants in a series of informal discussions on this topic, which took place in the Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, in particular to Mr C. B. Martin for his persistent and searching criticisms of my earlier attempts to defend the thesis… to Professor D. A. T. Gasking, of the University of Melbourne, for clarifying many of the logical issues involved, and to Professor J. J. C. Smart for moral support and encouragement in what often seemed a lost cause' (Place 1956, p. 50).

Place favoured a behaviouristic treatment of intellectual and volitional mental states but could not see how this could work for consciousness. There is something 'inner' in consciousness. Hence the attempt to work out an identity theory recognises the inner element but does not entail dualism. The identity of sensations and brain states was a reasonable scientific hypothesis, like 'lightning is a motion of electrical charges'. In this example, the 'is' was not the 'is' of definition but what Place called the 'is' of composition. The thesis is not about what people mean when they talk about sensations; it could be true even if no one believed it or had even thought of it. The question is: What are people referring to, perhaps without knowledge or intention, when they speak of sensations? The smart money is on the brain process theory. Thus Place laid the foundations for a formidable philosophical effort largely centred in Australia.

Place's article dealt very briefly with what he calls the 'phenomenological fallacy', which he identified as the view that when I describe my sensations, I am describing the 'literal' properties of inner objects and events. The treatment of untutored thought as fallacious could be developed in two different ways. One of them undertakes an analysis of consciousness that is true to what we need to recognise but manages to be neutral between the categories of the mental and the physical. The other, later dubbed the 'disappearance' form of the identity theory, denies the existence of anything that could give comfort to psychophysical dualism or embarrassment to materialism. The choice between them is a matter of considerable importance and delicacy. Smart, and later Armstrong, repudiated the radical revisionism of the disappearance form of the theory, refusing to solve the problem of consciousness by denying that there is any such thing. Thus in the 1959 paper, 'Sensations and Brain Processes', Smart, though drawn to a Wittgensteinian expression theory because 'on this view there are, in a sense, no sensations', very swiftly repudiated the move (Smart 1959, p. 143). In the same paper, he gave what turned out to be prescient consideration to epiphenomenalism, then regarded as outré, to say the least, but to receive powerful advocacy in Australia not long after. What Smart said was that the identity theory is not in all respects a straight-out scientific hypothesis because there is no empirical method of deciding between materialism and epiphenomenalism. Apart from that, it is a matter of scientifically plausible reasoning (Smart 1959, pp. 155–156). What is epiphenomenal, if anything (the suspects being the qualitative elements of experience), would be a feature of reality without causal powers. This question is another way of identifying a key question about materialism: whether it can get away without anomalous events in the world, 'nomological danglers', as Smart called them following Herbert Feigl. If there is anything epiphenomenal involved in consciousness, all the work being done by what is without doubt physical, then we have a dualism of properties, those that matter causally and those that don't. Materialism is then reduced to a form of dualism, the thesis that there are two orders of reality and only one of them figures in explanation of behaviour. Then the maintenance of the uselessness of the supposedly epiphenomenal opens another front.

Much of the discussion, strikingly modern as it appeared to be in the 1950s, has ancient roots. Democritus (460–370 BC) wrote: ‘by convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot and by convention cold, by convention colour: in reality atoms and the empty’ (Barnes 2001, p. 208). Lucretius (*c*.99–51 BC) filled in some detail:

> All nature as it is in itself consists of two things, bodies and the vacant space in which the bodies are situated and through which they move in different directions.
>
> Replicas or insubstantial shapes of things are thrown off from the surface of objects. These we must denote as an outer skin or film because each particular floating image wears the aspect and form of the object from whose body it has emanated.
>
> These films, as I call them, are moving about everywhere, sprayed and scattered in all directions. Since we can see only with our eyes we have only to direct our vision towards any particular quarter for all the objects there to strike it with their shapes and colours. Our power of perceiving and distinguishing the distance from us of each particular object is also due to the film. For as soon as it is thrown off it shoves and drives before it all the air that intervenes between itself and the eyes. All this air flows through our eyeballs and brushes through our pupils in passing. That is how we perceive the distance of each object: the more air is driven in front of the film and the longer the draught that brushes through our eyes, the more remote the object is seen to be. (Lucretius 1951, pp. 39, 131, 137)

The archaic physics of vision need not obscure the dialectical similarities, including, in the more extended contribution by Lucretius, initial bafflement in discerning whether what is being proposed is ‘disappearance’ materialism or not. This sort of question turned out to be a difficult problem in the twentieth century as well.

Another close analogy with ancient philosophy is the parallel between Place’s discussion of the meaning-composition distinction and Aristotle’s application of the four causes, particularly formal cause and material cause, to the discussion of the soul; this discussion also bears on the disappearance move:

> Hence a physicist would define an affection of soul differently from a dialectician; the latter would define, e.g., anger as the appetite for returning pain for pain, or something like that, while the former would define it as the boiling of the blood or warm substance surrounding the heart. The one assigns the material conditions, the other the form or account; for what he states is the account of the fact, though for its actual existence there must be embodiment of it in a material such as is described by the other. Thus the essence of a house is assigned in such an account as ‘a shelter against destruction by wind, rain and heat’; the physicist would describe it as ‘stones, bricks and timbers’; but there is a third possible description which would say it was that form in that material with that purpose or end. Which, then, among these is entitled to be regarded as the genuine physicist? The one who confines himself to the material or the one who restricts himself to the account alone? Is it not rather the one who combines both? (Aristotle 1984, pp. 403a29–403b8)

Are there two elements to be correlated or can we get away with one? The long history of Western philosophy prefigures some of the questions that the local brand of materialism would have to deal with. It would be a serious mistake to think that a theory’s possession of an ancient lineage is a defect. Democritus had his reasons for thinking that there is nothing but atoms and the void, and contemporary materialists might possibly share them. But they have their own reasons, stronger and more integrated into a broader background of knowledge, for their somewhat similar position. If philosophy, considered on the large scale, is the attempt to articulate a comprehensive vision of human beings and their place in the universe, there can be no possibility of its being definitively completed. The material to be integrated continues to grow and change and with it the work of articulating the vision.

References

Anderson, J. (1932). Some questions in aesthetics. In J. Anderson, G. Cullum, & K. Lycos (Eds.), *Art and reality: John Anderson on literature and aesthetics* (pp. 23–45). Sydney: Hale & Iremonger.

Anderson, J. (1962). Empiricism and logic. In *Studies in empirical philosophy* (pp 204–238). Sydney: Angus & Robertson.

Anderson, J. (1982). Further questions in aesthetics: Beauty. In J. Anderson, G. Cullum, & K. Lycos (Eds.), *Art and reality: John Anderson on literature and aesthetics* (pp. 263–269). Sydney: Hale & Iremonger.

Anonymous. (1994). Unsigned obituary. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy,* 72, 548.

Anschutz, R. (1955). In memoriam. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 33*, 139–142.

Aristotle. (1984). De Anima. In J. Barnes (Ed.), *The complete works of Aristotle: The revised Oxford Translation, vol. 1* (Trans. J. Smith). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Baker A.J. (1986). *Australian realism*: *The systematic philosophy of John Anderson*. Cambridge University Press.

Barnes, J. (2001). *Early Greek philosophy* (2nd ed.). London: Penguin.

Barrowman, R. (1999). *Victoria University of Wellington 1899–1999: A history*. Wellington: Victoria University Press.

Belshaw, H. (1956). *Population growth and levels of consumption*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Biggs, J., & Davis, R. (Eds.). (2002). *The subversion of Australian universities*. Wollongong: Fund for Intellectual Dissent.

Boyce Gibson, A. (1951). Nature and convention in the democratic state. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 29*, 1–20.

Brown, R., & Rollins, C. (1969). *Contemporary philosophy in Australia*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Buckley, V. (1983). *Cutting green hay: Friendships, movements and cultural conflicts in Australia's great decades*. Melbourne: Penguin.

Caro, D., & Martin, R. (2010). Leslie Harold Martin 1900–1983. http://www.science.org.au/fellows/memoirs/martin.html

Copeland, B. (1996/2007). Arthur Prior. In E. Zalta (Ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy*. Stanford University. http://plato.stanford.edu/.

Cornwell, J. (2010). *Newman's unquiet grave: The reluctant Saint*. London: Continuum.

Davis, R. (2002). The battle for collegiality in Tasmania: The 1955 royal commission and the Orr aftermath. In J. Biggs & R. Davis (Eds.), *The subversion of Australian universities* (pp. 41–51). Wollongong: Fund for Intellectual Dissent.

Docker, J. (1974). *Australian cultural elites: John Anderson and the Sydney freethought tradition*. Sydney: Angus & Robertson.

Donagan, A. (1969). Introduction. In R. Brown & C. Rollins (Eds.), *Contemporary philosophy in Australia* (pp. 15–19). London: George Allen & Unwin.

Eddy, W. (1961). *Orr*. Brisbane: Jacaranda Publishers.

Evans, T, Macauley, P., Pearson, M., & Tregenza, K. (2003). A decadic review of Ph.Ds in Australia. *Educational research, risks and dilemmas: NZARE AARE conference proceedings 2003*. New Zealand: NZARE, pp 1–15.

Findlay, J. (1985). My life: 1903–1973. In R. Cohen, R. Martin, & M. Westphal (Eds.), *Studies in the philosophy of J. N. Findlay* (pp. 1–51). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Franklin, J. (2003). *Corrupting the youth: A history of philosophy in Australia*. Sydney: Macleay Press.

Gasking, D. (1949). Anderson and the Tractatus logico-philosophicus. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 27*, 1–26.

Gasking, D. (1954). The philosophy of John Wisdom (parts I and II). *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 32*(136–56), 185–212.

Gasking, D., & Jackson, A. (1951). Ludwig Wittgenstein. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 29*, 73–80.

Grave, S. (1984). *A history of philosophy in Australia*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Grey, D. (1951). Subjectivity and the aesthetic use of symbols I and II. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 29*(98–108), 164–174.

Grundy, D., & Yuan, F. (1987). Education and science. In W. Vamplew (Ed.), *Australians: Historical statistics* (pp. 328–329). Broadway: Fairfax, Syme & Weldon Associates. Vol. 10 of Australians: A historical library.

Hasle, P. (1998). *The life and work of Arthur N. Prior*: *An interview with Mary Prior*. Workpaper 72–98. Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus. www.hum.au.dk/ckulturf/pages/publications/ph/life.htm.

Hope, A. (1992). *Chance encounters*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Jackson, F. (1996). Foreword. In I. Oakley & L. O'Neill (Eds.), *Language, logic and causation: Philosophical writings of Douglas Gasking* (pp. v–vi). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Lucretius. (1951). *On the nature of the universe*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Trans. R. Latham.

Malinas, G. (2010). Queensland, university of. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 477–480). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Monk, R. (2000). *Bertrand Russell 1921–70: The ghost of madness*. London: Jonathan Cape.

Morrell, W. (1969). *The University of Otago: A centennial history*. Otago: University of Otago Press.

Mortensen, G., & Nerlich, G. (2010). Adelaide, university of. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 1–6). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Murray, K. (1957). *Report of the committee on Australian universities ('the Murray Report')*. Canberra: AGPS.

New Zealand. (1925). *Report of royal commission on university education in New Zealand*. Wellington: Government Printer.

New Zealand. (1960). *Report of the committee on New Zealand universities*. Wellington: Government Printer.

New Zealand. (1963). *A union list of theses of the universities of New Zealand: Supplement 1955–1962*. Wellington: New Zealand Library Association.

O'Neill, J. (1970). *Pocket compendium of Australian statistics, No 55*. Canberra: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics.

Old, M. (Ed.). (1997). *Australia through time* (5th ed.). Milson's Point: Random House.

Orr, S. (1945a). Some reflections on the Cambridge approach to philosophy (parts I and II). *Australasian Journal of Psychology Philosophy, 23*(34–76), 129–167.

Orr, S. (1945b). Symposium: The alleged metaphysics in the republic. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 19*, 207–229. Supplementary Volume.

Passmore, J. (1997). *Memoirs of a semi-detached Australian*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Pigden, C. (2010). Obituary for Kurt Baier (1917–2010). Otago Bioethics Centre website. http://bioethicscentre.posterous.com/obituary-for-kurt-baier-1917–2010

Place, U. (1956/1970). Is consciousness a brain-process? *British Journal of Psychology*, *47*, 44–50.

Polya, J., & Solomon, R. (1996). *Dreyfus in Australia*. Erskineville: Dr R. J. Solomon.

Prior, A. (1951). The ethical copula. *Australian Journal of Philosophy, 29*, 137–154.

Pybus, C. (1993). *Gross moral turpitude*. Port Melbourne: Heineman Australia.

Russell, B. (1969). *The autobiography of Bertrand Russell*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Ryle, G. (1950). Logic and Professor Anderson. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 28*, 137–153.

Scarlett, B. F. (2005). Eric D'Arcy. In: Brown, S. (Ed.), *Dictionary of twentieth century British philosophers*. Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum.

Shaffer, J. (1994). Calvin D. Rollins 1918–1993. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 67*, 49–50.

Sinclair, K. (1983). *A history of the University of Auckland 1883–1983*. Auckland: Auckland University Press.

Smart, J. (1959). Sensations and brain-processes. *Philosophical Review, 68*, 141–156.

Smart, J. (1975). My semantic ascents and descents. In C. Bontemps & S. Odell (Eds.), *The owl of Minerva: Philosophers on philosophy* (pp. 57–72). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Smart, J. (1976). The philosophical Andersonians. *Quadrant, 20*, 6–10.

Smart, J. (1989). Australian philosophers in the 1950s. *Quadrant, 34*, 35–39.

Wikipedia. George Edward Hughes. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Edward_Hughes.

Political Polarisation: 1960s

6

John Burnheim and Paul Crittenden

Contents

Introduction 150
Philosophy and the Postwar Period 150
  Problems of Analysis 151
  The Rejection of Foundationalism 152
  The Radical Academy 155
  The Orr Case 158
Democratisation and Radicalisation in Two Departments 159
  The Knopfelmacher Dispute at Sydney 159
  The Left Turn at Flinders 160
  The Sydney Split 160
  General Philosophy in the Early Years: Althusserianism, Staff Turnover and the End of Participatory Democracy 162
  Radical Disagreements 166
  Maoism 167
  Developments at Flinders 168
  Feminism, Freud, Nietzsche and Foucault 169
  A Focus on the History of Philosophy: Markus, Heller and Others 170
  Varieties of European Philosophy 171
  Towards Reunification by Degrees 172
Changing Perspectives 173
References 174

J. Burnheim (✉)
Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: jburnheim@bigpond.com

P. Crittenden
School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: paul.crittenden@sydney.edu.au

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_7,

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Introduction

Philosophy has always been politicised. Philosophers have believed that public affairs should be conducted in a way that is congruent with the correct view of humanity and its place in the cosmos. Very often their views have been quite critical of the political regimes under which they lived, but only a few philosophers have thought that the key to changing the beliefs, attitudes and aspirations of people in the appropriate direction was political change. Most philosophers have tended to believe that the deficiencies of political regimes and of the attitudes and aspirations associated with them are the result of false beliefs. Correct those beliefs and political change will follow.

Philosophy and the Postwar Period

Anglophone philosophers in the immediate postwar decades mostly shared the assumption that once the public culture was purged of nonsense, political discourse would shed its ideological excess and concentrate on people's real interests. Substantive political and moral philosophy was banished, while attention was concentrated on 'metaethics', the logical and epistemological character of moral discourse. Although few philosophers held on to the dogmatic positivism of the 1940s that dismissed unverifiable statements as devoid of genuine meaning and incapable of being false, let alone true, the prevailing hope was that philosophy could contribute to a better world by exposing the pretensions of emotive or obfuscating discourse.

In taking this view the philosophers were largely in tune with the views about the disasters of totalitarianism that prevailed in the 1950s. Hitler and Stalin were tyrants, to a great degree personally responsible for the regimes that sustained them and the crimes they committed. They achieved their dominance by violence and by manipulating desperate fears, naive hopes and groundless beliefs. The way to prevent the recurrence of such regimes was to insist on the traditional liberal freedoms, especially freedom of speech, which would make it possible to expose false and nonsensical beliefs. Political philosophy for the most part contented itself with refining John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*. The major figures in Australian political philosophy, such as H. J. McCloskey, S. I. Benn and later Peter Singer, were primarily moral philosophers, concerned particularly about the rights and duties of individuals. Along with this there was some critical interest in Marx and Marxism, mainly with a view to understanding the enemy, as in the work of Eugene Kamenka.

It was not until the mid-1960s that there emerged a radically different view of the magnitude and malignant character of the forces the tyrants manipulated. The power of oppression arose not out of people's opinions, of a kind that might be corrected by better information or argument, but from oppressive social relations that produced a conformist and myopic consciousness. Many radicals began to claim that these forces were still at work behind the apparently bland facade of 'the Free World'. Herbert Marcuse, a member of the prewar Frankfurt School of Hegelian Marxism, supplied a rationale for a new militancy in *One-Dimensional Man* (1968). He dismissed the prevailing liberal consensus as ‘repressive tolerance’, which refused to face up to the intractable conflicts of the age. The main focus of this kind of thinking was not on the economic exploitation of the proletariat but on their corruption by consumerism, commercialised entertainment and mystification. How it became possible for this view to emerge is a complex story. Developments in Anglophone philosophy facilitated radical challenges to traditional conceptions of the tasks and methods of philosophy. An entirely novel radicalism took hold among many students and staff in universities throughout the Western world in the late 1960s. There were specifically Australian reactions to that radicalism.

Problems of Analysis

Developments in Anglophone philosophy in the 1960s were freeing up accepted views of the task of philosophy. In the 1950s the general assumption was that the prime task of philosophy was to achieve a clear account of *the concept* of mind or matter or evidence or any other important philosophical concept and that the high road to elucidating that concept was linguistic analysis. In Oxford the appropriate object of analysis was ‘ordinary language’, which was supposed to incorporate the basic structure of all conceptualisation. In Harvard one focused on the methods of modern logic, with the aim of teasing out the necessary and sufficient conditions of a term’s applying to an object. Young Australian graduate students flocked to these centres and returned to enlighten and enthuse their fellows.

However, both versions of linguistic analysis soon ran into difficulties. The Whiggish assumption that what counted as good English in North Oxford was the basis of all philosophical analysis was difficult to sustain in its homeland, let alone in the colonies. The North American model ran into both technical and substantive difficulties. The substantive difficulties arose out of the way in which counterexamples emerged to even the most plausible sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept, such as the Gettier counterexample to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. It was often possible to construct modified formulae that avoided some particular problem, but only at the cost of giving rise to another or appearing merely ad hoc. It often appeared that the pursuit of generality led to peripheral and imaginary cases determining the analysis at the expense of attention to more important aspects of a concept. The more technical difficulties came from the development of logic itself.

It became increasingly accepted that logic could only be a tool kit from which models could be constructed that might or might not prove useful. Various possibilities of systematising logical concepts and procedures emerged, none of which had the prescriptive force that had traditionally attached to logic in the days when it was assumed that logic was a single formal system that was true a priori. Indeed, many denied that there was such a thing as necessary truth. The intractability of the paradoxes of self-reference and of the limitations of self-justification within systems of logic following Gödel’s work on proofs of consistency undermined the status of logic as necessarily true.[1] Moreover, no truth-functional or extensional system could offer anything like a plausible analysis of counterfactual assertion or intensional concepts, which now assumed much greater importance, even for the tough-minded.

Materialist theories of mind, for example, often argued that there is no clear difference between dispositional concepts, which are indispensable in physics, and intensional concepts such as those used to describe psychological states. More generally, the development of mathematics and its applications showed the dangers of attempting to impose a rigid form of 'regimentation' on the languages of science, if only by displaying the variety of possible forms of regimentation. So, for example, traditional deductive models that represented logic and mathematics as derived from axioms by certain procedures were undercut by demonstrating the possibility, not only of different axioms and rules of inference but also of other forms of systematisation.

The Rejection of Foundationalism

A very broad agreement emerged that philosophy should abandon 'foundationalism', the view going back to ancient times that sound knowledge must rest ultimately on self-evident propositions. In the early twentieth century, the consensus was that such propositions must be either necessarily true (true in all possible worlds) or supported by irrefutable empirical evidence. Philosophy was concerned with necessary truths, while the sciences produced empirical truths. W. V. Quine, the most prominent defender of 'regimentation' and an important logician, was at the same time the most trenchant critic of the dogmas of empiricism, especially any rigid distinction between necessary and contingent truths and any claim that there is some set of incorrigible data into which the content of assertions should be analysed. Citing the work of the French philosopher of science, Pierre Duhem, he insisted that our theories be understood and assessed as wholes, not as mere conjunctions of discrete statements, and that there were no universally applicable criteria of assessment. While Quine's (1953) radical pragmatism met strong resistance, it problematised the whole conception of what philosophy was about.[2] The philosophy of language, especially theories of meaning, began to assume increasing importance just as it became an area of increasingly significant differences of approach and of substantive theory, ranging from the scepticism of the later Wittgenstein about all general theories of meaning to theories of possible worlds as referents of certain expressions.

---

[1] Douglas Gasking of Melbourne, one of Australia's most influential philosophers, attacked the doctrine of necessary truth, which he had previously defended: see Gasking (1972).

[2] *From a Logical Point of View* was the most influential statement of his position; it gained ground in Australia after his Gavin David Young Lectures in Adelaide in 1959.

For most professional philosophers these developments led not to radical change, but to a more modest and flexible conception of what they were doing. The traditional idea that philosophy addressed eternal questions and sought eternal truths, true in all possible worlds, was still widely respected, but as an idealised aspiration rather than a realistic description of their professional activities. Nevertheless, they mostly continued to see their role as that of standing outside contingent partisan conflicts, bringing the impartial light of reason to bear on the more fundamental problems that too narrow a perspective occluded.

A small but increasingly influential minority took a radically opposed view. Not only did philosophical questions change in a way that made nonsense of the aspiration to eternally true answers, but the sense of a particular set of questions could only be understood in their historical context, including their social and ideological affiliations. Philosophy could not be just a matter of logical analysis, abstracting from history. This view was linked with a corresponding change in historiography. Where traditional history of philosophy and of 'ideas' concentrated on tracing the development of various conceptions, stressing the internal logic of the ways in which consequences drawn from old doctrines led to new doctrines, the new historiography, often called 'structuralist', stressed the contemporaneous interconnections between ways of posing and answering problems and the cultural contexts in which they arose. It emphasised the radical discontinuities between successive epochs in the development of both forms of discourse and their social contexts.

From the traditional viewpoint this was blatant relativism. Many feared that, applied to contemporary concerns, it opened the way to a cynical manipulation of philosophy in the service of political ideologies, an accusation that the more radical philosophers sought not to deny but to hurl back on the traditionalists. Traditionalism was simply a means of misrepresenting the real problems of the age and stifling attempts to address them. Restricting philosophical discussion to the quest for mythical a priori truths involved abstracting from anything of relevance to human destiny. Insisting on 'eternal questions' begged the question against all the evidence that the questions posed in different epochs changed fundamentally.

Few were comfortable with either of these extreme positions. The traditionalist position was out of kilter with the general direction of development in the social sciences and humanities, in which older paradigms of history as a record of progress or of variants on certain basic themes were being replaced by attempts to understand the specific character of particular cultures. Serious attention to the problems that had to be faced in theory or in practice always involved attention to the specific frame in which a problem posed itself. The idea that some general methodological, metaphysical or ethical principles were the key to solving any and every problem was completely discredited. Ideological entanglements were inevitable in most matters, even in the sciences. The honest and productive approach, then, was not to suppress but to elucidate them while recognising that they were never simple and rarely unambiguous. So it was not surprising that traditional foundationalists felt that their whole enterprise was under threat from the *Zeitgeist*, in much the same way that traditional moralists thought that current opinion had abandoned morality and religious traditionalists felt that people no longer took religion seriously.

Particularly in philosophy of science, traditional assumptions about scientific method were called into question, even by many who were politically and culturally conservative. Popper's (1935) claim that scientific theories could only be refuted, never verified or even confirmed, became widely accepted.[3] The history of twentieth-century science, which saw Newtonian physics (the most highly confirmed of all scientific theories) supplanted by Einstein's general relativity, seemed to support this view. It was further consolidated when Einstein refused to accept the indeterministic account of quantum mechanics on the ground that a satisfactory theory must be deterministic, only to be dismissed by most scientists as dogmatising. On the one hand, most philosophers came to emphasise the importance of theory in scientific practice, especially in the light of the world-shattering reality of the results of the physics of subatomic particles. On the other, they became acutely aware of the disagreement among scientists about fundamental questions.

One of Popper's most resolute critics was David Stove, who was to play an important part in the division of the Sydney philosophy department as David Armstrong's staunchest supporter. Stove insisted that we do have very good inductive evidence for most of our beliefs about matters of ordinary experience and that even the most sophisticated scientific knowledge is dependent on inductive evidence, especially from particular pieces of evidence to general conclusions. He argued that the fatal flaw in all forms of scepticism about induction from Hume onwards was the assumption that all evidential connections must be strictly deductive. On the contrary, he argued, they are clearly probabilistic. Confirming instances never prove a generalisation, but they can, and usually do, provide evidence that it is more probably true than it would be in the absence of that evidence. It is up to philosophers to elucidate these relationships, not to reject them a priori. What is wrong with older forms of foundationalism is their insistence on rigorous deduction from irrefragable premises. The remedy is not to abandon foundationalism but to recognise that inductive logic is always a logic of probabilities (Stove 1973).[4] To abandon foundationalism was to abandon the fight to put reason in charge of belief and leave the door open to irrationality.

Stove took this instance of the refusal of philosophers to accept what to him seemed obvious as showing how easily even the most sophisticated could be blinded by prejudice. His conservatism inclined him to the view that most radical positions involved similar attempts to ignore obvious truths in the pursuit of simplistic, emotively attractive solutions to complex problems. Another tendency he detected and deplored was that of changing the question to suit the answer one wished to give. This became an important topic in the light of the views of Kuhn and others that scientific progress crucially involved just that kind of move. Kuhn claimed that periods of normal science, in which there is general agreement about the main questions and what would count as an answer to them, are separated by revolutionary breaks that are so radical that the very questions change and the answers they require are 'incommensurable' with those required in the earlier period.

---

[3] As a refugee from the Nazis, Karl Popper held a senior lectureship in the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, during the war years; he accepted the offer of a senior lectureship in the Sydney department in 1945 but was released from this to take up a readership at the London School of Economics where he built up an enthusiastic following. Popper (1945) names Plato, Hegel and Marx as the outstanding enemies of liberal democracy.

[4] Stove was an isolated figure. While many agreed with his insistence on nondeductive connections, attempts to give a systematic or formal account of them proved unconvincing. Nevertheless, he continued to attack those who were sceptical about the a priori validity of 'statements of logical probability' as 'irrationalists': see Stove (1982).

The Radical Academy

Throughout the 1960s, following the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the escalation of the Vietnam War and the general increase in international political tension, people became increasingly anxious about the absurdity of the contemporary Cold War, in which the greatest and most pointless catastrophe ever to befall mankind was said to be staved off only by the threat of 'mutually assured destruction', MAD. The political leaders on each side were hardly fanatical ideologues. Most of the people who supported the conflicting regimes were neither hostile to each other nor in the grip of fanatical delusions. The idea gained ground that something was radically wrong with the social and political cultures and structures that made this absurd situation possible and that the remedy was not to be found in traditional political action directed at seizing state power, whether legally or illegally, but in a massive popular refusal to accept the demands of the political power structure, making it impossible for the state to impose its will on people.[5]

The Vietnam War gave a dramatic focus to such radical concerns. Especially as young men were conscripted to 'go out and kill', students felt they had to take up a stance against conscription. Antiwar movements, defiantly linked to the sexual revolution in the slogan 'Make Love not War', enlisted the support not only of the rock stars and their enormous popular following but of many of an older generation who felt that a change of epoch-making importance was taking place before their eyes. The political institutions of the major powers—even, it seemed, the Chinese Communist Party—were being held accountable to entirely new forms of popular rebellion: cultural revolutions. Most people, including most commentators, remained bewildered by what was happening. They were nevertheless reluctant to be seen as failing to appreciate its novel possibilities. They were increasingly inclined to take a favourable view of attempts at participatory democracy in education, worker participation in management and the abolition of all forms of elite status. Such standard radical demands accorded with traditional liberal values.

---

[5] The most comprehensive account of the movement, emphasising just how widespread and diverse it was, can be found in Gerd-Rainer Horn (2007).

Even when they were uncomfortable with the ways in which these demands were made, most academics found it difficult to resist them.

Although the radical movements of the late 1960s were not based on any developed theory, a small, very diverse, but increasingly influential number of theorists endorsed the new movements enthusiastically. They undertook to show that what was radically wrong on both sides of the Cold War could be put right only by a worldwide cultural revolution that would destroy the social roots of the kinds of political regimes that demanded that people face annihilation rather than submit to another regime. What was needed was a critique of power. People must have direct control over the social context of their lives, especially their work. For many of them, Marx's thesis that 'up to now Philosophers have only interpreted the world; the task is to change it' summed up the revolution that had to take place in social action. Philosophy itself must become primarily critical, not from some Olympian standpoint, but from within the revolutionary perspective of radical action. A parody of Marx's dictum became popular: 'Up to now the world has only interpreted philosophers, the task is to change them'. Very few, however, were Leninists or Trotskyites of a traditional sort. While some turned to the Hegelian young Marx and to the Frankfurt School[6], for most on the new left, there was no question of traditional constructive theory. That led to Stalinism or some other form of authoritarian prescription. What mattered was relentless critique of all dogmas and all covert assumptions. In a bewildering variety of forms, especially under the influence of French thinkers, from Sartre through Foucault and Baudrillard to Derrida, this orientation was to persist in some philosophy departments and throughout the arts and social sciences until beyond the end of the century.

The conservatism of the right rested mainly on a consciousness of the fragility of the social and political freedoms they valued, rather than on any reverence for or attachment to any particular rationale of existing institutions. Precisely because social conventions were mostly arbitrary, it was fatally easy to reject them. But there was no non-arbitrary way of replacing them with an agreed set of new conventions. In a revolutionary situation, where each proposal was 'outflanked on the left', a new regime could be established only by the arbitrary use of force. Existing liberal institutions were important because the alternative was chaos leading to tyranny. They saw very clearly the dangers of utopian aspirations and thought of their philosophical activity as a contribution to the formation of a culture that would be resistant to the blandishments of radical ideologies. In the ideological frenzy of the time, they lacked any inspiring vision with which to counter revolutionary enthusiasm. A prominent feature of most of their work was a reliance on science, especially physics, as the ultimate account of the nature of everything that exists. But at the same time they were resistant to scientistic programs such as logical positivism and all claims that some science of society might provide a basis for reshaping institutions. There was no a priori guarantee that present scientific concepts and procedures were adequate to explain everything. That must be demonstrated item by item. Similarly, political change should proceed cautiously and for specific purposes.

---

[6] The Frankfurt School suffered from its preoccupation with high culture, especially in the work of Adorno. Marcuse escaped such criticism because he remained in the USA when most of the School returned to Germany after the war and was not identified with Adorno's pessimism.

The radicals often shared most of the theses that the conservatives held. But they had a quite different attitude to risk and to the direction philosophical activity should take. They, too, thought that existing institutions were fragile and sought to administer the blow that would topple them. They might agree that the question of what things are ultimately made of was primarily a question in physics, but they rejected the reductionist view that social structures are the product of chance conjunctions of physical forces. From a progressive philosophical point of view, the interesting questions are not about what things are made of, but about what we can make of ourselves. Philosophy should serve to free us from the shackles of conventional assumptions and suggest possibilities of new thinking and acting. New forms of social relations will emerge in the struggle against oppression. If that struggle is conducted openly and freely, the danger of arbitrary power can be minimised. The intellectual resources for pursuing this goal were to be found not in the methods and doctrines of analytical philosophy but in social, semiotic and literary contexts. Only a small minority thought that social theory could be scientific in the robust sense of official Marxism-Leninism, and even they were sympathetic to the critique of ideology by innovative but less rigorous methods. Ideology could not be dismissed merely on the ground of its being unscientific nor even on moral grounds. It had to be transcended by imaginative thinking in the context of struggle against oppression in an atmosphere of the greatest possible freedom of information and discussion.

Both radicals and conservatives were predominantly atheists but in differing perspectives. Philosophically, the conservatives were pleased to debate ultimate questions with serious theists. It confirmed the point that their focus on what really exists was not just an academic matter and that even the most contentious questions could be debated calmly. On the other hand, they naturally distrusted religious ideologies and authorities. Holding to a strict distinction between fact and value, they thought that philosophy could not provide a basis for substantive moral positions. It was dangerous to pretend that it could, because it encouraged persecution of unbelievers as enemies of truth. There is no substitute for individuals taking full responsibility for their decisions, honestly accepting the consequences of their choices.

The radicals often included people from a religious background who were reacting against dogmatic religion but who wanted to preserve their aspirations towards more personal and meaningful forms of life. Traditional metaphysical questions about the God of philosophy were of no great interest from this point of view, but religious thinkers like Kierkegaard might have interesting insights into dimensions of life that more scientific approaches, especially reductionist ones, occluded. In ethics they tended to deny the fact-value dichotomy where social facts are concerned. If one promises to do something, it is a fact that one thereby assumes an obligation to do it in virtue of the ‘illocutionary force’ of one’s speech act. Social reality has effects that are quite as ineluctable as physical properties but irreducible to them. In a conservative perspective this doctrine was seen as consecrating the status quo, the complex of institutionalised practices that constituted civilised society, but for the radicals it underlined the importance of a vigorous critique of social realities with a view to allowing new practices to emerge.

For most of the 1960s, these divergent programs coexisted peaceably enough in philosophy departments, especially because in the rapidly expanding universities of the period, competition for appointments was not severe and there was a considerable overlap of interests between philosophers who eventually lined up on opposite sides of a certain dividing line. The conservatives had often been radical, especially in moral and aesthetic style, in their younger days and feared that their successors would not ‘come to their senses’, as they had done. What brought conflict to a head was the irruption of political conflict and particularly the fears that it generated among a minority of conservatives. The sexual revolution of the 1960s showed how what had been the libertarianism of an elite might become generalised, no longer a matter of cocking a snook at the petit bourgeoisie, but of an anarchist surge aimed at destroying all restraint. For them, it was imperative to take a stand before it was too late.

The Orr Case

The Orr case was important in this respect mainly because it resulted in a line being drawn between opposing factions that influenced the way in which later conflicts were orchestrated. Sydney Sparkes Orr, professor of philosophy at the University of Tasmania, was not a figure who represented any major controversial position in philosophy or politics. In March 1956 he was constrained to resign from his chair, having been accused of seducing a student, the daughter of a prominent Hobart businessman. Orr vehemently denied the charge, insisting that he was being framed and dismissed because he had been critical of the governing body of the university on sound academic grounds, most of which had been upheld in May 1955 by a Royal Commission appointed to enquire into the running of the university. Orr sued the university for wrongful dismissal, but the suit was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Tasmania in October 1956, and that judgement was upheld by the High Court of Australia.

The great majority of the philosophers who took an active interest in the case supported Orr, not necessarily believing that he was innocent, but that he had been denied natural justice. In June 1958 the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) placed a ban on the chair and insisted that Orr be reinstated, at least pending a fair trial. The supporters of this position were a very diverse group, but the relatively small group of opponents was closely associated with the Australian branch of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which, in radical eyes, was tainted by having received material assistance from the American CIA. They strove to shore up the authority of the university council against the attacks of a moralistic liberalism. The liberals were being manipulated by radicals who, wittingly or unwittingly, were on the other side in the Cold War, undermining legitimate authority in a way that weakened the capacity of the West to stand up to Soviet aggression.

The effect of the dispute was to draw a line between a small group of ‘Cold Warriors’, who were seen to be importing a dubious and authoritarian political orientation into a question of justice and academic propriety and the entrenched liberalism of academia. A presumption became established that the ‘Cold Warrior’ group was ‘extremist’ and that liberal academics were opposed to them. The practical question was resolved eventually after Orr’s death in 1966 when it became clear that the effect of the ban was to deprive students of the opportunity to study philosophy. The AAP agreed to the appointment of Bill Joske, a well-regarded philosopher, as professor, in spite of the university making only a token gesture to Orr before his death. But a line had been drawn and philosophers were constrained to take sides in what was seen as a political issue. Many who opposed the intrusion of political considerations into questions of professional ethics and of natural justice were soon to find themselves embroiled in quite different attempts to bring politics into academia.

Democratisation and Radicalisation in Two Departments

Debate about the Orr case ran across every philosophy department in Australia and New Zealand and was a focus of concern for the AAP. In the next decade, most departments were also caught up in the fairly general agitation in universities throughout the world for non-professorial staff and students to have an effective say in determining the policies of universities. The agitation eventually met with a good deal of success, to some extent in such formal changes as student representation on governing bodies but more importantly in wide-ranging discussion of matters of curriculum, assessment and the allocation of staff positions. For the first time votes were taken on such matters, and staff and students expected that their decisions would not be rejected simply on the traditional authority of the professor, even in the role of head of department, especially in a multi-professorial department. Moves in this direction occurred in a largely untroubled way in most Australasian departments. Sydney and Flinders proved to be notable exceptions.

The Knopfelmacher Dispute at Sydney

Nowhere was the expectation of democratisation stronger than in Sydney, where staff drew on a libertarian atmosphere that went back to Andersonian traditions. And nowhere was there a professor more committed to resisting the radicalisation of his department than David Armstrong, who was strongly identified with the ‘Cold Warrior’ label. In a series of disputes over matters of curriculum and appointments, Armstrong was in a minority in the department and was on several occasions overridden by the Faculty of Arts or the Academic Board. The most public early conflict arose out of the attempt to appoint Frank Knopfelmacher to a senior lectureship in political philosophy in 1965. At the time he had been a lecturer in psychology at Melbourne University since 1955. His family had been destroyed by the Nazis and he had in turn fled Czechoslovakia after the Communist takeover. After graduating with first class honours in psychology and philosophy at Bristol, he gained a PhD in psychology at London. Such publications as he had in political theory were in cultural magazines rather than academic journals, but he had conducted lively extracurricular seminars on Marxist theory that attracted a lot of attention at Melbourne.

The recommendation of the selection committee, with one abstention, that Knopfelmacher be appointed came to the Academic Board in March 1965 amid strong opposition from the left. Opponents of the appointment drew attention to the tone of Knopfelmacher's publications, especially an article in *Twentieth Century* early in 1964. In a widely quoted statement, he declared that 'the position of an anti-communist in an academic institution is not very different from that of one, say, in the Seamen's Union' (1964). The recommendation was rejected by the Board, not referred back to the committee, as would usually be the case, and the position was readvertised. The selection committee was the same, except for the new chair of the professorial board, but this time only three of its members voted for Knopfelmacher and his appointment was not recommended. One dispute had been settled but others were to follow in the wake of a growing divide between radical and conservative parties.

The Left Turn at Flinders

The first and most thoroughgoing shift to the left in a philosophy department occurred, not at Sydney, but at the new Flinders University in South Australia, where the professor, Brian Medlin, senior lecturer S. G. O'Hair and lecturers Rodney Allen and Ian Hunt, all highly regarded in the profession, became converts to Maoist Marxism—or were at least sympathetic to it. Medlin shocked the 1970 conference of the AAP in Sydney when he festooned the rostrum with the red flag and the *Little Red Book* of the sayings of Chairman Mao just prior to delivering the presidential address on the topic of political argument. In 1971 about half of the courses at Flinders were explicitly Marxist-Leninist, including a course on Applied Philosophy devoted to the political significance of the Vietnam War. The example of Flinders stirred their sympathisers in Sydney to action. This set in process a long chain of events that shaped philosophy at Sydney for the rest of the century. The developments at Flinders, by contrast, were less complicated and considerably less fraught.

The Sydney Split

On the retirement of A. K. Stout from the second chair at Sydney, C. B. Martin, an American from Harvard by way of Adelaide, had been appointed. He and

Armstrong, who remained head of department, initially enjoyed good relations, until the middle of 1971, when a dispute over proposed courses in Marxism erupted. Wal Suchting, well established in the department as a scholar with a special interest in philosophy of science, had long been involved outside the university in Trotskyite groups, but not prominent in leftish politics in the university. In conjunction with Michael Devitt, recently returned from Harvard, where he had been converted to Maoism by his mentor, Hilary Putnam, he proposed for 1972 and 1973 courses entitled 'Marxism-Leninism I and II', closely resembling courses of the same name at Flinders. In a letter to their proponents, Armstrong criticised the courses as politically tendentious, based on a philosophically weak interpretation of Marxism, and giving undue attention to Stalin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh and others who were not thinkers at all. This drew a spirited reply from Suchting and Devitt. Soon afterwards a department meeting adopted their proposal. Armstrong immediately vetoed this decision but declared himself willing to accept a course on Marxism given by Suchting and Devitt, provided it had a properly academic content. Negotiations on the issue broke down, however, and at the end of June, most of the staff signed a letter to Armstrong asking him to 'resign the headship forthwith'. Finally, on 22 July the Faculty of Arts approved a revised proposal for a course on Marxism with an innocuous description to be offered in 1972.

When Martin, largely for personal reasons, left for Canada at the end of 1971, G. C. Nerlich was appointed as his successor and undertook to be head of department. But other disputes soon arose in which Armstrong opposed decisions taken by the department, especially on the ground that they had been taken improperly on a vote that included as voters part-time tutors who were still students. The eventual staff response, in November 1972, was to go further and accord all students a vote in matters of departmental policy, in imitation of the 'participatory democracy' on several American campuses. A few months later, in February 1973, a staff-student meeting, including most of the full-time staff but not its most senior members, endorsed a proposal for a course on 'Philosophical Issues in Feminist Thought' to be given by two tutors, Jean Curthoys and Elizabeth Jacka. In a close vote, the Faculty of Arts accepted the proposal.

A great deal of manoeuvring followed until, in June 1973, the Academic Board rejected the proposal to appoint the two tutors as part-time lecturers and reiterated that, as tutors and students, they could not be responsible for teaching and assessing a course. This decision prompted a strike of most staff and students in philosophy, with considerable support from several other departments as well as from large numbers of students, especially women. The strike, built around a strategic sit-in in the Philosophy Common Room, went on for several weeks until a compromise was reached in July. The arrangement was that John Burnheim accepted responsibility for the course on the understanding that the two tutors would do most of the work. The result put paid to any prospect of peace in the department, especially as the promise of more change was in the air. With Nerlich away on leave at the time and soon to go to Adelaide to replace Jack Smart in that chair, Keith Campbell was the head of department. By this point Campbell had come to regret his recent support for the radical changes that he now saw as destructive.

Ultimately, in a deal brokered by Keith Campbell in October 1973, to come into operation from the beginning of 1974, Armstrong and five other senior members of staff were given a separate department, called ‘Traditional and Modern Philosophy’. The more numerous rump of the old department took the name ‘General Philosophy’, having rejected Campbell’s suggestion of ‘Critical and Contemporary Philosophy’. At that point General Philosophy endorsed recent departmental policy on a constitution in which all staff and students could attend meetings and vote on policies and recommendations, while Traditional and Modern Philosophy returned to more traditional procedures. Formally, the two departments constituted the School of Philosophy. An academic from elsewhere in arts, usually the dean of the faculty, was appointed head of school. David Armstrong served as ‘the Professor most concerned’ for both departments, giving him a substantial say in appointments.

The task of making the best of the situation in General Philosophy fell to John Burnheim, whom the Vice-Chancellor, without consulting the staff, appointed head of department. While a Catholic priest and rector of St John’s College, Burnheim had lectured part-time in the Sydney department since 1960, mainly in logic and semantics. At the end of 1968, he resigned from St John’s, took a full-time appointment in philosophy and subsequently left the church. He published very little but took a close interest in most of the topics discussed in the department. Addicted to conciliation and compromise, he strove to avert the split and then to hold together the disparate individuals consigned to General Philosophy, largely without success. His experience of the problems of participatory democracy is reflected in his idiosyncratic proposals in *Is Democracy Possible*? (Burnheim 1985).[7]

General Philosophy in the Early Years: Althusserianism, Staff Turnover and the End of Participatory Democracy

Initially, in keeping with the revolutionary orientation of the activists, much attention was devoted to a critique of the social sciences, with the explicit intention of attacking the assumptions that were thought to be involved in the methodologies and theories prevalent in other departments in arts and economics. Half of the first-year course was devoted to this critique, eventually assembled in a set of articles of almost 300 pages of foolscap entitled *Paper Tigers* (1978). The central philosophical position embodied in this work was a critique of empiricism, taken in a very broad sense (derived from French usage) to include all kinds of foundationalism and intuitionism, even those of a rationalist character. In part this critique carried on the widespread reaction against granting any epistemological privilege to the allegedly incorrigible 'data' of private experience, echoing both the later Wittgenstein's insistence on the indispensability of public criteria of meaning and truth and the general concern with the ways in which languages 'carve up' and interrelate experience. But the distinctive thrust of the critique went much further, following Louis Althusser, who developed a very distinctive view of the production of knowledge.[8]

---

[7] The main thrust of the argument is that each authority responsible for producing a particular public good should be representative of those whose legitimate interests are most directly and substantially affected by its decisions. The representatives should be chosen by a statistical procedure designed to produce a genuinely representative sample. To allocate a share in the power over all decisions in the public domain to professional politicians means that what is decided depends on power trading among them, and this leads to ‘political’ decisions in which the political strategies of politicians often prevail over the interests of many who are affected by them. Power must be disaggregated and, as far as possible, decisions reached by direct negotiation among conflicting interests.

Applying to the unrefined raw material of experience the procedures that turn it into something that can be systematised and applied in social practice produces objective knowledge. The approach presses the analogy with physics as a process of production of knowledge. In physics, facts are established by careful procedures of measurement that are designed both to exclude interfering factors and subjective appearances and to relate the facts to other facts with clearly calculable and testable consequences. It is precisely this objectivity and systematisation that is the source of the spectacular successes of the physical sciences, and it is diametrically opposed to all kinds of subjectivism and intuitionism. That subjectivist approaches still hold sway in the social sciences is attributed partly to the illusion we all share that our intuitions are a guide to understanding social processes and partly to the power of socially entrenched forms of representation that reflect the self-presentation of the existing power structure. These twin sources of ideology cannot be overcome simply by looking at social relations, any more than the structure of a chemical compound can be discovered simply by passive observation or even by the intuitions of some 'genius'. Objective knowledge of social relations depends on social practices.

However, it is important not to be misled by the analogy with physics into the view that some technological or methodological set of procedures will unlock the dynamics of social reality as behaviourists in psychology or econometric theorists have imagined. Such methods are inevitably superficial in a way analogous to records of the trajectories of constellations of stars that have no connection with each other except that they are grouped together in our visual field. Again, the physical sciences treat their theoretical objects as invariant, but social reality undergoes revolutionary changes, analogous to, but going beyond, organic evolution. In organic evolution the origin of genetic variations is largely exogenous and unpredictable. Even the context of functional selection is changed from time to time by external events such as collisions with asteroids that cause radical climate change. The key to understanding any social formation is to understand the processes by which it reproduces itself and at the same time undermines itself in virtue of the contradictions to which it gives rise.[9]

---

[8] See Althusser (1969, 1971) but especially Althusser and Balibar (1970). The dates are significant. It would appear that Suchting's embracing Althusserianism dates from about 1972 and that he agreed to abandon the description 'Marxism-Leninism' in 1973 because he now had a view that needed to be distinguished from most of what went under that description.

In the context of the activist enthusiasm of the early years, there was little interest among students in relating these theses to other philosophical problems. Slogans were often invoked without much understanding. For some it was reminiscent of the dogmatism of certain of Anderson's disciples. But there were deeper problems.

There was in fact no constructive program to match the Althusserian critique, and the expectations it generated were soon disappointed. Attempts to give a precise form to radical concepts of social dynamics foundered on the inescapable vagueness and unquantifiability of basic social relations. Marxist historians did achieve significant insights into hitherto neglected aspects of various changes, but never the sort of definitive explanations that analogies with the physical and biological sciences promised. The connection with revolutionary praxis, far from supplying a clear orientation, proved a source of further confusion as the revolutionary left split into a bewildering assortment of representatives of revolutionary authenticity. It was inevitable, then, that the issue of how social processes were to be conceptualised should become more and more contentious. Attempts to insist that there is such a thing as radical scientific truth about society came to be dismissed as Stalinist dogmatism, while such figures as Foucault and the poststructuralists came to be welcomed precisely because their interventions could not be taken as science.

There were tensions from the beginning in General Philosophy running on from divisions in the former single department. The most common source of dissatisfaction among the staff who were assigned to it was the power of the radicals, especially in the allocation of resources. The program of courses on offer was quite wide, but mainstream academic philosophy was not of much interest to the students who now had the numbers in policy decisions. Within 18 months, Michael Devitt, Michael Stocker and John Mills asked to be transferred to Traditional and Modern Philosophy, despite Burnheim's attempts to placate them. Much was made of accusations that the popular vote was being manipulated by a Marxist caucus, but there was in any case an inevitable conflict between the short-term goals of student revolutionaries and the long-term goals of academic research and teaching to which the permanent staff were devoted.

An interesting exception was George Molnar, a young lecturer who had arrived from Hungary as a boy, studied under Anderson and moved to an appointment without a higher degree on the strength of his brilliance in debate. He became best known for his work on causality and dispositional properties, but his contribution to seminar discussion on a wide variety of topics was also important. Until his conversion to libertarian radicalism in the late 1960s, Molnar had been an elitist libertarian. Scorning the moves to expand university education, he endorsed the slogan ‘More means worse’, fearing that the relentlessly critical role that Andersonian tradition assigned to universities could not be sustained if they were swamped by careerism and mediocrity. Swept up in the revolutionary mood, he became the major figure in the drive to radicalise pedagogical practice in the early years of General Philosophy. Within a few years he became so critical of the timidity of many of his colleagues that he resigned his lectureship and went to England, where he made a precarious living making wooden toys. Eventually he returned to Australia and became a public servant in the Department of Veterans Affairs. In later years he resumed active participation in Traditional and Modern Philosophy seminars and worked on his book on dispositions. Not long after retirement he was appointed the first Anderson Research Fellow at Sydney in 1998 but died unexpectedly the following year. The book on dispositions was published posthumously.

---

[9] The question for scepticism is addressed by Suchting (1978), in which the question of production and scepticism is discussed in detail.

Early migrations and resignations left General Philosophy grossly understaffed by 1976, with less permanent staff than Traditional and Modern Philosophy but nearly four times the students. Eventually the university agreed in 1977 that four permanent positions should be advertised, resulting in the appointment of György Markus, Paul Crittenden, Lloyd Reinhardt and Jean Curthoys. The selection was heavily influenced by Armstrong and strongly resented by many in General Philosophy. Eventually both Reinhardt and Curthoys were to move to Traditional and Modern Philosophy, while Markus and Crittenden came to be influential figures in General Philosophy and in wider circles in arts, the latter becoming head of department and in time dean of the faculty.

The conflict between the aims of radical students and those of staff came to a head in 1979 when Alan Chalmers was head of department. After months in which decision-making was paralysed by rivalries between certain of the feminists and certain of the Marxists, Chalmers rescinded the student-staff democratic constitution in October that year in favour of normal staff democracy. Chalmers took this step, with the support of the staff, because the mutual intransigence of groups who did not represent the majority of the students had made the department unworkable. At the same time, he promised to look for a new democratic constitution which would avoid the problems inherent in the old order. Over the following months Paul Crittenden and Irmingard Staeuble developed a number of draft constitutions, each of which failed to get wide support among students and staff when put to a vote. The more radically inclined were committed to the restoration of the old constitution or nothing, while others wondered whether any constitution would be effective or whether any was needed. By that time, revolutionary ardour had cooled throughout university campuses just about everywhere. Increasingly from 1978, especially with the influence of Markus, General Philosophy developed a pluralist, broadly Continental approach across the primary fields of philosophy with a focus on the natural and social sciences, political philosophy, the history of philosophy and contemporary European movements.

Radical Disagreements

Radicalism at Sydney among staff and students—not all staff, much less all students—took different forms and degrees in the 1970s and into the 1980s. There were humanist as well as scientific versions of Marxism, elements of Maoism, anarchist and libertarian ideas, non-Marxist radical feminism as well as Marxist feminism, structuralist and poststructuralist approaches, new readings of Nietzsche and radical approaches in psychiatry and psychoanalysis. In connection with psychiatry, for instance, Denise Russell taught a pioneering course on madness and civilisation from the early 1980s and later published in the field (and established the journal *Animal Ethics*). She also had a prominent role in establishing the Australian division of the Society for Women in Philosophy in the early 1980s.

The dominant figure on the variegated radical side of the Sydney divide was Wal Suchting, who exercised a strong influence on General Philosophy in the first few years, only to be somewhat marginalised later on. A Marxist since his student days, of a somewhat anarchist but scientistic stripe, he was not a believer in participatory democracy or feminism or most of the aspirations of the radical students, hoping rather that the conflicts they generated would link with a proletarian revolution focused on the basic issue of control of the forces of production. A scholar of formidable, almost pedantic, erudition in all aspects of philosophy of science and in Hegel, he drew heavily on French philosophy of science, emphasising that only when the data of the sciences are correctly conceptualised is genuine scientific work possible. Without Newton's concept of inertia, there is no classical physics. That this is the correct concept is by no means obvious to intuition or common sense. Nor can it be guaranteed by any a priori procedure. A scientific concept may be superseded in the subsequent development of science, but at particular junctures it is indispensable. Suchting conferred a similar status on the basic concepts of Marxism, only to be rejected eventually by many of the younger generation as too dogmatic and scientistic.

Suchting's closest ally in the revolt against Armstrong that began in 1971 had been Michael Devitt. Devitt's views in his chosen field of philosophy of language were similar to those of Armstrong in philosophy of mind, stressing causal relationships as the ground of meaning and looking to scientific study of brain processes to fill in the details. His Marxism was, like Suchting's, scientistic and out of tune with most of the radical thinking in General Philosophy. It was not surprising that he soon found it preferable to join Traditional and Modern Philosophy to work in his primary fields of interest than to face opposition in General Philosophy. In doing so, he alleged that General Philosophy had fallen under the tyranny of a highly organised radical clique that was suppressing all opposition to its own agenda. That accusation was to be repeated on a number of occasions whenever a group of members of staff found themselves outvoted on questions of the allocation of resources. It was true that the more radical tended to be more passionate and more adept at mobilising support in the early years of General Philosophy, but their complexion changed a great deal over a relatively short time. If ever they were tools of a covert conspiracy, it was not for very long.

Maoism

The Maoist phenomenon was both a symptom and a cause of the extraordinary turbulence of those years. The sexual revolution had already demonstrated how easily traditional assumptions and prohibitions might be subverted. The anarchist spirit of 1968 was contagious, and Mao's Cultural Revolution was interpreted as expressing the spontaneous will of the people to be rid of bureaucracy and repression. Pictures of Mao and Che were displayed everywhere students gathered. Even figures with substantial establishment credentials were swept up in the enthusiasm for change. Most others looked on anxiously, unwilling to repress what might be a creative social change.

In vain, the conservatives harked back to the ancient and well-tested belief that an excess of democracy always degenerated into mob rule, which in turn led to dictatorship. The radicals believed that the key to progress was to push conflict to extremes. In its more sophisticated guise, this conviction was justified by a Hegelian confidence in 'the cunning of reason'. The outcome of conflict would only be fruitful when it accomplished a radical subversion of the underlying sources of that conflict. Compromise only repressed the symptoms of the problem and obscured the possibility of transcending it. At the same time, proponents of this view acknowledged that there was no guarantee that exacerbating conflict would have happy results. Radical failure was always a real possibility. They also disavowed any claim that all conflict could or should be transcended, endorsing Mao's dictum that 'a society without contradictions is a dead society'.[10] Moreover, as the fashionable interpretation of Hegel emphasised, what would count as progress could be assessed only by the new standards that emerged from radical change.

Powerful though it was in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Maoism was a transitory phenomenon. Its contempt for authoritative decision procedures meant that it was incapable of coherent, much less constructive, collective action. The obvious inconsistency and superficiality of so many radical slogans soon became obvious. The illusion of being swept on by a cresting wave of revolutionary change petered out as the wave broke into a mass of foam, leaving the wave riders to head out to sea again in the fading hope that the next wave would be a better ride. It soon became clear that the Cultural Revolution was a ploy in the power struggles within the Chinese Communist Party and that it caused untold arbitrary suffering. The clearest radical cause that survived the disillusionment of the radicals was Feminism, and most feminists reacted strongly against the 'macho' attitudes of the radical leadership in the Maoist era.

---

[10] This had been a major theme of Anderson's political philosophy.

Developments at Flinders

Members of the Flinders philosophy department who had adopted Maoist Marxism did not do so uncritically or all to the same extent.[11] Greg O'Hair and Ian Hunt joined a Maoist political organisation called the 'Worker-Student Alliance', whose members were predominantly students but also included some factory workers. They saw the key issue raised by the Vietnam War as the global dominance of US capitalism, sustained by wars and interventions to suppress independence movements around the globe. In this light they objected to Australia's involvement in the War as a symptom of Australia's political and economic subservience to US interests.

Brian Medlin and Rodney Allen were more eclectic in their Marxist philosophy, taking on Maoist ideas when these seemed fruitful, but drawing also from other discussions of Marxist ideas. Medlin developed a popular and rigorous course titled 'Politics and Art', which directly or indirectly helped stimulate creative works with revolutionary themes in Adelaide. These included Anne Newmarch's realist paintings of aspects of working class and communal life and the songs of the rock-folk band 'Redgum', whose members had first performed some of their pieces as a project for this course. Medlin saw himself as a revolutionary socialist who took the revolutionary elements of Marxism as a guide for political practices that would build opposition to capitalism. Rodney Allen taught popular courses in moral philosophy based on leading developments in the field, which were not peculiarly Marxist at all, although they gave attention to moral and social philosophers influenced by Marxism, such as Habermas.

With strong staff support, Medlin took responsibility for a Feminism course, the first to be introduced in an Australian university. Then at an early stage, Jean Curthoys was appointed as a tutor to take effective management of the program. While the staff at Flinders might not have been immune to the 'macho' attitudes attributed to radical leaders in the Maoist era of student politics, they took criticisms of these attitudes seriously. In particular, they rejected the view that feminism must subserve a wider Marxist movement. Nor did they suppose that feminists should wait for an anti-capitalist revolution or that socialist societies, whatever their potential, could succeed without a vigorous feminist political movement.

While the Flinders Marxists came to recognise the enormous injustices of the Cultural Revolution along with the undemocratic and utopian elements of Marxist political movements and the confusion and recriminations that beset the student radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s, they did not become disillusioned with the goal of replacing capitalism with a more just society. Unlike the Sydney department, the radical side of the Flinders philosophy department was not split by factional conflict. Nor were the Flinders radicals much influenced by the Althusserian fashion that swept Marxist philosophy in the mid-1970s.

---

[11] We are indebted to Associate Professor Ian Hunt for detailed comment on developments in the philosophy department at Flinders University.

They did not, on the whole, publish books or articles inspired by their radical views. By way of exception, however, Ian Hunt published a significant number of articles in Marxist philosophy relating to economics and historical materialism and a book dealing with the debates in Marxist theory generated by the Analytical Marxism movement.

Feminism, Freud, Nietzsche and Foucault

The great guru of scientific Marxism, Louis Althusser, linked Freud with Newton, Darwin and Marx as the great explorers, each of whom opened up a new continent to science. Interest in Freud flourished, particularly among feminists anxious to get beyond merely biological conceptions of sex and gender. But Freud and Marx were not to be easily united, and the Freudians soon struck out on their own, following French interpreters, particularly Lacan. The dominant theme of this group as it emerged under the leadership of Elizabeth Grosz in the early 1980s was embodiment, conceived in a manner reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty, but with the overarching requirement to seek the sources of the differentiation of bodies in the processes of the unconscious. This kind of feminism rejected as radically misguided the traditional liberal demand for equality with men, not only because it risked forcing women to conform to male stereotypes, but also because it failed to understand the variability and complexity of the determinants of gender. These feminists were much more at home with Nietzsche than John Stuart Mill, sharing Nietzsche's perspectivism and his affirmative attitude to power.

Such approaches proved very much more attractive to students, including graduate students, than of either the Althusserians or mainstream Anglophone philosophy, especially because they linked up with the developments in other areas of the arts and social sciences. The conflict now had a new focus as Marxism lost ground. Attacks were concentrated on feminism and relativism. Grosz provided the perfect target for a campaign by David Stove. Grosz (1986) wrote:

> Feminist theory cannot be accurately regarded as a *competing* or rival account, diverging from patriarchal texts over what counts as true. It is not a true discourse, nor a more objective or scientific account. It could be appropriately seen, therefore, as a *strategy*, a local, specific intervention with definite political, even if provisional, aims and goals. In the 1980s, feminist theory no longer seems to seek the status of unchangeable, trans-historical and trans-geographic truth in its hypotheses and propositions. Rather it seeks effective forms of intervention into systems of power in order to subvert them and replace them with others more preferable. (Grosz 1986, p. 196; Stove 1986, pp. 8–9; see also Burnheim 2011, pp. 119–20)

This modest and clear disavowal of pretensions to objectivity, as contrasted with commitment to a point of view, rested on two major theses: first, that every philosophical or historical account is inevitably extremely selective in the picture it constructs, especially in the way it chooses to abstract from differences and relationships that are either ignored or dismissed as irrelevant to the questions addressed, and, second, that claims to comprehensive and overriding Truth are epistemically unwarranted and socially coercive. So, women are sometimes assumed to be just the same as men or, on the other hand, inferior to men, because of not measuring up to male standards. More fundamentally, the point of Grosz's stand is that there is no essence of femininity but rather a host of unstable connections and possibilities to be explored. Exploring them is political, because entrenched assumptions about what the 'real questions' are constitute the cultural foundations of political power. In this perspective a foundationalist like Stove is just as dogmatic as any religious fundamentalist and just as ready to use political power to suppress opposition in the name of a Truth of which they are the privileged interpreters.

A Focus on the History of Philosophy: Markus, Heller and Others

From the mid-1970s, Australian philosophy came to benefit from repression in Hungary. Agnes Heller, one of the most prominent of a group of humanist Marxists associated with Georg Lukacs, came to the sociology department at La Trobe in 1977 and soon established herself as an important influence well beyond the bounds of academic philosophy. Heller's work comprised an extraordinarily broad range of themes, attempting to draw together literary, historical, sociological and psychological reflections to construct a philosophical anthropology and a humanist ethics. Through her influence György Markus, then at the Free University in Berlin, applied for a lectureship in General Philosophy in Sydney in 1978. In the ensuing years their critiques not just of classical Marxism but of the political, economic and historical theses associated with Hegelian Marxism contributed decisively to undercutting the remnants of dogmatic radicalism. More positively, Markus introduced new approaches to the history of philosophy, especially Hegel, which had a strong influence on many of the younger generation. Reading philosophers in historical context, he downplayed the systemic and dogmatic presentation of the classics from Descartes onwards in order to display the complexity of their concepts and the dialectical tensions within them. His work has been published in German, French, Italian and Spanish, as well as English and Hungarian.

Markus became best known for his exploration of 'the paradigm of production', an attempt deriving in part from Marxist themes to understand cultures as social products. This exploration issued not in any grand theory of cultural production but in a cautious historicism that insisted on understanding particular historical formations in their own terms. On this point there was a significant difference from Heller, who clung to a more universalist conception of values and rationality, especially after she moved to The New School in New York in 1986. Markus's position was not a sceptical one. The exploration of historical differences itself presupposed that the past could be understood by building up particular bridges of understanding, in much the same way as one might learn a foreign language without having access to a grammar by interaction with native speakers. In this, his stance was not unlike that of the later Wittgenstein in denying the possibility of any overarching philosophical theory while insisting on the importance of getting a correct understanding of particular concepts and their relations to a particular form of life. Prominent among those influenced by Markus, as well as by Burnheim's Wittgensteinian concerns, was Paul Redding, eventually also a professor in Sydney, whose *Hegel's Hermeneutics* (1996) did much to introduce contemporary German approaches to Hegel to English-speaking philosophy.

An earlier and somewhat convergent though different approach to the history of philosophy concentrated on the relations between feminist concerns and the history of Western rationalism. The major expression of this was Genevieve Lloyd's *The Man of Reason* (1984), which argued that classical conceptions of reason from Plato to the present incorporate a dichotomy in which the 'female' is counterposed to the rational 'male'. The point of Lloyd's critique was not to exalt supposedly female sensibility over reason, but to develop a more adequate conception of reason. Lloyd, a graduate of Sydney and Oxford, was appointed to the chair at the University of New South Wales in 1986 but had taught for many years at the ANU in a department that included other Sydneyites, Kim Lycos, Paul Thom, Richard Campbell and Bill Ginnane. These all, in different ways, sought to go beyond the rationalism of a good deal of the Sydney tradition.

In the 1980s, Lloyd and Lycos joined with Crittenden and Stephen Gaukroger from General Philosophy in bringing out *Critical Philosophy*, a short-lived journal that sought to encourage philosophical reflection from a historically informed perspective. Gaukroger, already an established scholar at the time of his appointment to General Philosophy in 1981, moved to Traditional and Modern Philosophy in 1984. He was to become, before long, a leading international authority in the history and philosophy of science and intellectual history more generally.

Varieties of European Philosophy

In connection with the joint history of philosophy strand between the two Sydney departments, General Philosophy also developed a strong program in modern and contemporary European philosophy. Ongoing General Philosophy courses in Marxism and Feminism were elements, in different ways, in this emphasis. For many years from 1978, Paul Crittenden gave courses in nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought related especially to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as well as the phenomenological movement associated with Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre. Developments of this kind were, of course, going on elsewhere: at much the same time at nearby Macquarie, Max Deutscher cultivated a strong interest in Sartre and in phenomenology more generally. In General Philosophy Markus and Redding in particular worked in post-Kantian German idealism and hermeneutics, and at a later point John Grumley, also much influenced by Markus, introduced courses on theories of modernity in the writings of Weber, Arendt and members of the Frankfurt School. A focus on contemporary French philosophy also became more prominent from the mid-1980s. This was strengthened further when Paul Patton, a graduate of Sydney and Paris and an international authority on Deleuze and twentieth-century French philosophy generally, returned to Sydney from the ANU. Moira Gatens, who developed a fruitful interest in Spinoza and collaborated with Genevieve Lloyd in several important publications, also returned to Sydney from the ANU at this time. Gatens later became a professor at Sydney, while Patton succeeded Lloyd on her retirement from the chair at the University of New South Wales.

Towards Reunification by Degrees

Keith Campbell, the architect of the 1974 split, saw it as an inevitable but undesirable way of containing conflict. Over the years he tried persistently to reunite the departments. His own philosophical work was characterised by a willingness to accept unpalatable consequences. In *Body and Mind* he accepted the irreducibility of living experience to brain states, assigning it a unique status, lacking independent causal powers, but still indispensable as consciousness. He contributed to many debates about metaphysics and language and also published a book of substantive ethical theory in the Stoic tradition (Campbell 1970, 1986).

Late in 1984, in the course of an acrimonious dispute between the departments over whether Elizabeth Grosz and Denise Russell might be appointed to continuing lectureships, Campbell was made head of school with a commission from the Vice-Chancellor to bring the split to an end within a year. Negotiations in the course of 1985 failed to lead to consensus, and the proposed reunification failed. Not long afterwards, Campbell left Sydney for the University of Maryland, but returned to take up the Challis Chair in Traditional and Modern Philosophy, following David Armstrong's retirement, in 1992. That year too, Paul Crittenden was appointed to a chair in General Philosophy. The appointments opened the way to increasing cooperation.

Over the years both departments flourished in publications, research students and reputation. The development of Traditional and Modern Philosophy is part of the mainstream history of Australian philosophy, in the work of Armstrong, Stove, Campbell, Devitt, Gaukroger and, at a later point, Huw Price and others. Moreover, Traditional and Modern Philosophy came to offer an increasingly varied range of courses from 1984 as it welcomed former members of General Philosophy: Stephen Gaukroger, Lloyd Reinhardt and Jean Curthoys, one of the original Marxist feminists, who became increasingly critical of her earlier positions and of much French-inspired philosophy, from a liberal point of view.

In the years after 1985, political differences were no longer a significant factor. Cooperation on the curriculum increased, and personal relations among most staff were reasonable. There were nonetheless large differences of perspectives on philosophy among many of the major players. One other great obstacle to unification was concern about access to resources, especially new appointments, in the context of relatively severe cuts in federal funding of universities. Staff in Traditional and Modern Philosophy feared that the force of student numbers favouring General Philosophy would lead to erosion of their claims on resources, while staff in General Philosophy feared that their interests would be dismissed as peripheral in the context of the overwhelmingly ‘analytic’ orientation of Australian philosophy. However, with the adoption of a common constitution in 1993, a common curriculum and a general broadening of interests among both staff and students, reunification proceeded gradually until in 2000 Stephen Gaukroger, as head of school, declared it completed. A few months later, the unified department was swept up in a large school with history, classics and several other departments, in a major restructuring of the faculty of arts.

Changing Perspectives

Concern with political questions did not disappear with the triumph of capitalism and political neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s. Feminists continued to explore the ideological substratum of many women’s issues. Others devoted close attention to the need to take account of the communal rights of Aboriginal peoples and their culture, stressing the importance of genuine intercultural negotiation to overcoming the destructive, unilateral imposition of Western legal and social categories on them that was still prevalent even among their sympathisers.

In the 1960s and 1970s, conservative thinkers were influenced strongly by the pessimism of Orwell’s *1984*. They often claimed that totalitarian systems were almost invulnerable and argued that to risk precipitating the sort of chaos from which such a system might emerge was utterly irresponsible. On the radical side, many agreed that authoritarian regimes could be subverted only by force, either in the spirit of the old anarchist prescription of ‘the propaganda of the deed’ or by provoking the kind of repression that would stir people to resist. What both sides underestimated was the need of even the worst regimes to claim both legitimacy and beneficence. In the ensuing years the military regimes of South America, Spain and Greece crumbled from within, usually without a fight. And finally the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe also crumbled quickly and irretrievably. Most of the more extreme positions on both sides in the 1970s proved to be wrong.

The radical drive of the 1960s and 1970s in both theory and practice had been towards ‘liberation’, understood primarily as a matter of attitudes rather than specific political objectives and encompassing a host of diverse concerns about the scope for individuals to ‘do their own thing’. The very diversity of the aspirations that claimed to be ‘liberating’ undermined any unitary political action, but the social force of the movement for change was overwhelming. Traditional moralities of propriety gave way to moralities of sensibility. Liberation also came in a form that the activists did not expect, with the global triumph of market freedom. At the turn of the century, in the context of concerns about ecological disaster and about the protection of the vulnerable, the heirs of the old radicalism now emphasised the need for control over the exploitation of both natural resources and people and animals unable to protect themselves. While nobody heeded arguments that we need to develop better ways of protecting and producing public goods than our present political processes, there had been genuine progress in the discussion of many of the immediate issues.

In many ways the changes in philosophical activity mirrored the changes in social attitudes. Attempts to confine philosophical reflection within the bounds of a scholastic methodology were abandoned, together with belief in some unitary Truth, but so were efforts to harness it to projects of liberation, as if all problems were in some way caused by repression. The grand questions about what is 'really real', what we can know and what we can hope for came down to a host of particular questions about aspects of these themes, treated not with the aim of providing answers that could be reduced to a formula, much less a political line, but as issuing in a complex reflective understanding of issues of common concern and of the variety of ways of constructing our lives.

References

Althusser, L. (1969). *For Marx*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Althusser, L. (1971). *Lenin and Philosophy*. London: New Left Books.
Althusser, L., & Balibar, E. (1970). *Reading 'Capital'*. London: New Left Books.
Burnheim, J. (1985). *Is Democracy Possible? The alternative to electoral politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Burnheim, J. (2011). *To Reason Why: From Religion to Philosophy and Beyond*. Sydney: Darlington Press.
Campbell, K. (1970). *Body and Mind*. Garden City: Anchor Books.
Campbell, K. (1986). *A Stoic Philosophy of Life*. Lanham: University of America Press.
Gasking, D. (1972). The analytic-synthetic controversy. *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50*, 107–123.
Grosz, E. (1986). What is feminist theory? In C. Pateman & E. Grosz (Eds.), *Feminist challenges*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
Horn, G.-R. (2007). *The Spirit of 68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America 1956–1976*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Knopfelmacher, F. (1964). The situation at the University of Melbourne. *Twentieth Century, 18*, 196–207.
Lloyd, G. (1984). *The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy*. London: Methuen.
Marcuse, H. (1968). *One-Dimensional Man*. London: Sphere.
O'Donnell, R., et al. (1978). *Paper Tigers: An introduction to the critique of social theory*. Sydney: Department of General Philosophy, University of Sydney.
Popper, K. (1935). *Logik der Forschung*. Vienna: Julius Springer Verlag.
Popper, K. (1945). *The Open Society and its Enemies* (2 vols). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Quine, W. (1953). *From a Logical Point of View: Nine logico-philosophical essays*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Stove, D. (1973). *Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism*. Oxford: Clarendon.
Stove, D. (1982). *Popper and after: Four modern irrationalists*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stove, D. (1986). A farewell to arts: Marxism, semiotics and feminism. *Quadrant, 30*, 8–11.
Suchting, W. (1978). Rising up from downunder. *Inquiry, 21*, 337–361.

Turbulent Times: 1970s

7

Aubrey Townsend

Contents

Introduction 175
Australian Materialism 177
  The Causal Theory of Mind 177
  Perception: Armstrong and Jackson 183
  Belief and Propositional Content 188
Logic and Language 191
  Logic in Australia and New Zealand Before 1970 191
  Entailment and Relevant Implication: Australian Deviations from Classical Logic 192
  Conditionals: Mackie and Jackson 194
  Stove's Defence of Rationality 196
Practical Ethics 201
  Animal Liberation 202
  Environmental Ethics 205
  Moral Theory 207
References 208

Introduction

My task is to survey the development of analytic philosophy in Australia and New Zealand from around 1965–1980. At first I found this an intimidating task: there was just too much to cover, especially as I wanted to read everything I was to discuss. I had to find a way of restricting the task and chose to do so by focusing on work that was distinctively antipodean, so passing over work that had a more 'cosmopolitan' character. I count work as distinctively antipodean where it contributes to a discussion in which the principal players are philosophers living or

---

A. Townsend
School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia
e-mail: aubrey.howittsend@gmail.com

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_8, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

working in Australia or New Zealand. So work in what is known as 'Australian Materialism' counts as antipodean. I count as cosmopolitan work that contributes to a discussion originating overseas, that conforms to paradigms derived from overseas philosophy, and where the principal players were located overseas. In our period, discussion of philosophical issues brought into focus in the work of Quine, Davidson and Kripke counts as cosmopolitan; though antipodean philosophers have made important contributions to the discussion of these issues, I choose mostly to ignore their work. That was a hard decision since it led me to ignore work in areas where I was most occupied in the period and that I knew best: especially work on Davidson's program by Lloyd Humberstone, Martin Davies and Barry Taylor. I considered adding a section in which I could discuss their work, but it would have had to be too brief to do them justice, and anyway it is well covered in an essay by John Burgess (1992) in the collection, *Essays in Philosophy in Australia*, edited by Jan Srzednicki and David Wood.

There has been some debate about whether philosophy should be cosmopolitan or regional. Alan Donagan, in an introduction to a collection of essays edited by Robert Brown and C. D. Rollins, *Contemporary Philosophy in Australia*, wrote that 'philosophy is a cosmopolitan subject, and its contents are cosmopolitan' (1969, p. 19). I think he was the first to use the term this way. Anthony Flew, reviewing that book in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (*AJP*) in 1971, mocked the idea that there was any point to such a collection: 'Have we now to await, with well-concealed impatience, the filling of corresponding gaps for collections of good work, "without restriction of topic", by philosophers who happen to be bald, or black, or women, or over 50, or poker-players?' (1971, p. 97).

Years later Richard Sylvan (né Routley) took a contrary view in his paper 'Prospects for Regional Philosophies in Australasia' (1985). He lamented the influence of the northern hemisphere on philosophy in the antipodes —New Zealand he thought had suffered more than Australia—and urged the nurturing of regional philosophies.

I think it was a silly debate. In 1970 there were around 150 philosophers in full-time employment in Australian and New Zealand universities. Of them, 41 % had been educated solely in Australasia, 30 % had a first degree in Australasia and a higher degree from overseas and 29 % were educated wholly overseas (I base my count on listings published in the *AJP*). It could not be claimed that antipodean universities were dominated by philosophers from, or trained in, the northern hemisphere. And one would expect that in this environment, and given the relative isolation still in place, distinctive intellectual positions and projects would evolve. It is true that there were strong overseas influences, especially in Melbourne, and that increasing numbers of philosophers were appointed from overseas. But note that the most influential of the northern hemisphere imports—Anderson, Smart and Goddard—were from Scotland (not Oxford or Princeton) and played a major role in the growth of distinctively Australasian programs and positions. It would be astonishing and worrying if this environment did not produce a mix of local and cosmopolitan work or if both sorts did not in turn influence trends overseas.

Beginning in the 1960s, American philosophy gradually displaced British influences. The Gavin David Young Lectures in Adelaide brought Quine (1959), Davidson (1968) and Lewis (1971) to Australia. I remember the stir that two of these events created. I read *Word and Object* for the first time in 1961, without much comprehension, but Mackie recommended it. I was bowled over by Davidson and Lewis when they came to Monash following the lectures in Adelaide. Their influence on the styles and paradigms of philosophy in vogue in Australia in the 1960s and 1970s was both profound and surely beneficial. It is hard to take seriously Sylvan's deprecation of these developments. Yet I shall ignore them.

Sylvan mentioned three areas where he thought the local product was superior and to be encouraged. He mentioned Australian Materialism, of course, to which he added work in non-classical logic and Australian environmental philosophy. The areas I have chosen to discuss include all of these, though my net is cast a good bit wider. Though I do not endorse Sylvan's claim that local product is superior, I do think that it has been an important component in the growth of analytic philosophy worldwide, worthy of its own history.

Australian Materialism

David Armstrong was appointed to the Challis Chair of Philosophy at Sydney University in 1964, following John Mackie who had succeeded John Anderson in 1959. Mackie and Armstrong had both been students of Anderson, and Armstrong especially had absorbed a broad philosophical outlook from Anderson. So a long Sydney tradition was continued in the work of Anderson's successors, a tradition robustly independent of the mainstream elsewhere. Metaphysics took central stage, not epistemology or philosophy of language, or even logic.

The Causal Theory of Mind

The view Armstrong advanced in *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (1968), his first book after moving to Sydney, was that, 'The concept of a mental state is primarily the concept of a state of a person apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour' (p. 82). In some cases he allows as well for states of the person apt for being brought about by a certain sort of stimulus or apt to bring about other mental states. But, he insists, 'the analysis of mental states must ultimately reach mental states that are describable in terms of the behaviour they are apt for'.

There is a radical departure here from the sort of theory proposed in the first phase of Australian Materialism, exemplified in the work of Place and Smart. That mental events or states may be causes of behaviour was not part of their view. They accepted from Ryle the thesis that the main mental 'states' should be analysed as dispositions to behave, not causes. The materialist thesis was advanced only to accommodate 'an intractable residue of concepts clustering around the notions of consciousness, experience, sensation and mental imagery, where some sort of inner process story is unavoidable' (Armstrong 1968, p. 80). But Armstrong held that dispositions *always* require grounding in categorical states of the individual, states which causally explain the behaviour in which the disposition issues. Brittleness, for example, is a disposition to break or shatter when sharply struck; its categorical basis must be some structural feature of the material that constitutes the brittle object. Moreover, Armstrong held that dispositions can be *identified* with their underlying categorical basis. For a brittle object, brittleness is just that state that causally explains the behaviour issuing from the disposition. Combine this view with the Rylean view that dispositions are crucial to the analysis of the mental, and a more general causal theory of mind results. Not just a residue of conscious events but also 'states' that are typically not conscious occurrences—beliefs, thoughts, desires and feelings—all turn out to be actual states apt for a certain causal role. So, though the influence of Ryle is still very strong, the underlying theory is now something Ryle would see as a reversion to the sort of view he had attacked, the view that sees the mental as a special field of causes.

Let's trace the development of the broader causal theory of mind up to the mid-1960s when Armstrong was writing. Max Deutscher (1969) had defended a causal theory of inferring. Though not published until 1969, Deutscher evidently developed the view much earlier in the decade, since Armstrong remarks in his 'Self-Profile' (in Bogdan 1984) that he had been led to a causal theory by discussions with Deutscher in Oxford during 1964. (Deutscher had taken up the foundational chair at Macquarie in 1966, so one can assume that he continued to influence Armstrong for a little longer, though their philosophical outlooks were soon to break apart.) According to Deutscher, for it to be true that someone has at some time *t* inferred that-*q* from a prior belief that-*p*, it must be the case both:

(i) That the person then came to believe that-*q*
(ii) That a prior belief that-*p* was an operative condition for his coming to believe that-*q*

The basic argument was that only the causal hypothesis can explain what distinguishes beliefs *actually* in play when someone infers that-*q* from other beliefs held at the time and from which one *might* have inferred that-*q*. Inference occurs when one is moved to believe something on the basis of a proper subset of one's beliefs. What puts a belief into that subset? Only that it is causally active in generating the belief. One might have beliefs from which *q* is rationally inferable, and recognise that it is so, yet fail to be moved to believe that-*q*. One might then come to believe that-*q*, but not *because* one thinks that it follows from those beliefs, even while thinking that-*q* is inferable from them. One might even infer that-*q* on coming to believe that-*p*, though aware that other beliefs one has already adequately support that belief. All these possibilities are defended with finesse. The conclusion then has to be that all that can distinguish the operative belief in inference is its causal efficacy.

The conditions just given are not alone sufficient, for there can be deviant causal chains leading from one belief to another where we should not say that one had been inferred from the other. So Deutscher has to add:

(iii) That the person then believed the fact (or supposed fact) that-*p* makes it at least not completely unreasonable to believe that-*q*

I think this is an implausible suggestion and that there are better ways of dealing with the deviant causal chains problem, but that need not detain us. For our purposes, it is sufficient to acknowledge that beliefs can act as causes, even deviant causes, of other beliefs. For if that is so, beliefs must be the sort of thing that *can be causes*. The Rylean account had held that mental events and states are not a field of causes to rival physical causes, because a category mistake is involved in supposing that beliefs are that sort of thing—they are purely dispositional, not states at all. But that is already a very implausible view. Someone might believe that a certain girl is attracted to him, and, because he believes that, he might blush when she enters the room. Blushing is not an action, and it is not made rational or appropriate by the belief, so the alternatives that are sometimes suggested to a causal account are not available here. The connection between the belief and the blush can only be causal. So Armstrong came to think 'that the key concept in the analysis of psychological concepts was that of causation... The stone that Cambridge and Oxford had rejected had become the corner-stone of the building' (1984, p. 26).

Others had reached the same view about the same time. Donald Davidson had defended the view that reasons are causes in 'Actions, Reasons and Causes' (1963), and David Lewis made causality central to the account of the mental in his paper 'An Argument for the Identity Theory' (1966). It is worth looking briefly at Lewis' argument (he counts as an Australian anyway):

> My argument is this: The definitive characteristic of any sort of experience as such is its causal role, its syndrome of most typical causes and effects. But we materialists believe that these causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences belong in fact to certain physical states. Since those physical states possess the definitive characteristics of experiences, they must be the experiences. (p. 100)

Here is the basic framework for an identity theory in the Australian style: first an analytic claim that mental events and states are necessarily characterised by their causal role, then a factual claim that 'physical phenomena have none but physical causes'. In fact, the analytic claim does not have to be that strong: that mental states have a causal role need only be a defensible 'Moorean' claim about experiences, namely, that they do characteristically have a causal role connecting them to physical happenings. Ryle's view is wrong, but it need not be unintelligible. Lewis' argument need only be that the causal role thesis can only be reconciled with the materialist commitment if every mental state or event is in fact identical with some physical state or event. And even that may be too strong. U. T. Place, who first framed the materialist theory, formulated it in terms of a relation of *constituting* rather than *identity*. The conclusion need only be that every mental state or event is constituted by some physical state or event and inherits its physical causes and effects from the physical states or events that constitute it. We still need an argument for choosing identity over constitution. I shall come back to that shortly.

The crucial step in Lewis' argument was the commitment to the thesis that 'physical phenomena have none but physical causes'. That was, of course, a commitment that Armstrong shared, but Armstrong had a richer set of basic commitments. He was attempting to work out a position that was consistent with all of the following commitments, mostly inherited from John Anderson. They are explained in two papers published in *The Nature of Mind* (1980), 'Naturalism, Materialism and First Philosophy' and 'Epistemological Foundations for a Materialist Theory of Mind'.

1. *Naturalism*. As Armstrong explains it, this is the view that reality consists of nothing but a single causally self-enclosed spatio-temporal system (1980, p. 149): there is a spatio-temporal system, a single such system, and nothing else. Armstrong had attended and been excited by Anderson's lectures on Samuel Alexander in 1949, where a naturalist position had been developed. Armstrong's notes from these lectures were published in 2007 (Anderson 2007).
2. *Realism*. The things that exist are the things that are causally efficacious. To be real is to have a part in causal processes. To show that things of a certain sort exist, it does not suffice to show that we must postulate them in order to account for the meaningfulness of certain areas of discourse; if they have no causal role, postulating them is empty. So linguistic analysis is not a guide to metaphysics.
3. *Empiricism*. Actually, there are two doctrines working together here. First, we should take seriously the fundamental commonsense view that there is a world of things existing in space and time and not allow a priori philosophical arguments to move us to deny this or to understand it otherwise than in realist terms. There really are such things. Secondly, we should take seriously the developing product of science and resist a priori arguments for an instrumentalist or irrealist view of the entities science postulates. Insofar as it is rational to believe more or less than is contained in the commonsense view of the world, the verdict of a scientific consensus should be decisive.

A very similar set of commitments is to be found in the work of Jack Smart, e.g., in his *Philosophy and Scientific Realism* (1963). Smart put special weight on the importance of considerations of scientific plausibility as a constraint in metaphysics and correspondingly less weight than Armstrong on commonsense certainties: 'plausibility in the light of total science is the best touchstone of metaphysical truth' (1987, p. 46).

Materialism—for Armstrong the view that the world contains nothing but the entities recognised by physics, realistically construed—is the inevitable outcome of these initial commitments: 'everything there is is wholly constituted by such entities, their connections and arrangements. God, transcendent universals, numbers, sense data, propositions, possible worlds, immaterial minds, souls or spirits, all are excluded' (1980, pp. 156–157). There are tensions, however. The Moorean commitments of the first part of the view I have labelled 'Empiricism' support belief in entities not obviously sanctioned by respectful deference to science—mind in particular. Armstrong mentions as especially difficult for materialism the irreducible intentionality of mental processes and the apparent irreducible simplicity of the secondary qualities (pp. 157–158).

Armstrong's characteristic way of arguing for a philosophical view is to try to show that by adopting it we can solve philosophical problems in a way that is consistent with adherence to these opening commitments. The materialist theory of mind is just one such case. But the solution he finds there opens new problems about the nature of belief and knowledge, for example, or about properties and universals, or about laws and causation. A way out of them has to be found that remains faithful to the opening commitments. That is his program.

We can return now to the issue about constitution and identity. There are two models we might take for understanding the difference between them, if there is one. One is the relation holding between, say, a statue of Paul Keating and the lump of clay from which it is formed. The statue and the clay, it may be suggested, have different modal properties—one might survive events that would destroy the other. David Lewis and Dennis Robinson, among others, have argued against distinguishing identity and constitution on the basis of apparent differences in modal attributes; their arguments are examined by Mark Johnston in 'Constitution Is Not Identity' (1992). An alternative model is the relation holding between, for example, the various physical movements that, in a certain context, constitute the sale of a house and the event of the sale. Again there is point to distinguishing constitution from identity only if we have to say that, though objects of a certain sort are wholly constituted by things physical, they have different properties from the cluster of their constituents.

There are, I think, two different ways of dealing with this issue in Armstrong's philosophy. The first and most straightforward is to insist on the idea of a 'topic-neutral' analysis of mental concepts. This was Smart's suggestion. For this approach to succeed, it must be possible to fully analyse mental concepts using only logical apparatus and predicates that will apply equally well whether we are dealing with manifestly physical things or mental entities, whatever they turn out to be. The attempts in Part Two of *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, designed to give a purely causal/dispositional account of mental concepts, conform to this approach. Success here would indeed provide an easy argument for identity. If mental states just are states apt to cause certain behaviour or to be caused by certain stimuli, and if physical states are found to play that role, then the identity claim is thereby established. But many critics, to whom I shall shortly turn, have maintained that the causal analysis cannot successfully be completed—either that our understanding of the mental cannot be exhaustively captured by such an analysis or that something might satisfy the analysis and yet not be mental.

The second approach is to allow that mental states are identified by the applicability of descriptions that are distinctive to the mental, phenomenal descriptions perhaps, but to strive to show that the properties in virtue of which these predicates hold are identical with certain complexes of physical properties. I think this is a different approach because it requires more elaborate conceptual apparatus and might work where the simpler topic-neutral analysis strikes trouble. It requires not only realism about properties but also a strong distinction between properties and predicates. Armstrong came to stress that distinction as his views developed through the 1970s. It is fundamental to his theory of universals.

At one point in ‘Epistemological Foundations’, Armstrong suggests that his theory requires ‘a contingent identification of properties’ and, what’s more, that ‘a state is presumably a species of property’ (p. 35). But this is an aberration. What he should have said, and possibly meant, is that a state is constituted by the exemplification of a property by something at or through some time. States are identical if they involve the exemplification of the same property by the same object at or during the same time. This is to take him as accepting a view like that advanced by Jaegwon Kim concerning the identity of events. But there is an important difference. Kim took properties to be coextensive with predicates: every well-formed predicate designates a property. That laid him open to charges of a profligate multiplication of events. Armstrong does not have that view. In *A Theory of Universals* (1978), he distinguished sharply between properties and predicates and held that multiple non-synonymous predicates may correspond to the same property and that there are meaningful predicates that fail to pick out any real property. So Armstrong can allow that two descriptions may pick out the same state in at least two ways not open to Kim. We may identify a state without identifying the constitutive property of the state, as we do if we identify it by its causal connections or dispositions; but we may also do so by identifying a state using descriptions that, though not synonymous, in fact designate the same property. To illustrate, Kim held that a stabbing and a killing cannot be the same event; though the stabbing causes the death, the killing is identical with neither the stabbing nor the killing. But Armstrong is not caught in this trap, so there is room to argue that the contingent identity of mental and physical events need not turn on the holding of a contingent identity of mental and physical properties—there may be no mental properties. What properties there are is to be settled by scientific research, not semantic analysis.

Let’s look at some of the critics now.

Keith Campbell argued (originally in lectures given at Monash University to a summer school organised through the Council of Adult Education, I think it was in January 1969, published in his *Body and Mind* in 1970) that the causal analysis of the mental advanced by Armstrong and Lewis left out something crucial to the mental as we experience it—in the case of pain, it left out the *hurtfulness* of pain, what it is like to be in pain and what makes pain awful. To make the point, he suggested the hypothesis of an *imitation man*, a being whose behavioural dispositions are just those required by the causal analysis. In circumstances where a burned finger would prompt us to behave in certain ways, so would the imitation man behave—but the thought that something is wrong in the finger and the urgent desire to do something about it just pops into his head, without anything like the awareness of hurt we experience. This was an early version of the zombie objection to the causal theory that became common later.

Campbell’s view is sometimes misconstrued, e.g., by William Lycan in the *Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*, as an argument against the identity theory—the imitation man is taken to be a being that meets the requirements of a causal analysis without possessing mental states at all. But the lesson Campbell drew was something else and much stranger. He did not think his argument threatened the identity theory. He accepted that mental events have a characteristic causal role and that the causal role was in fact achieved by the workings of physical processes in the brain. He accepted, moreover, the Lewis/Armstrong argument for identifying mental events with whatever plays that causal role. He even accepted that the imitation man had a mental life. Yet he held that there is an important difference between normal humans and the imitation man. Our mental life has an inner aspect; that of the artificial man does not. But, Campbell claims, the inner aspect is not causally potent. Though our pains are hurtful and the imitation man's are not, that feature does not do anything to account for our aversion to pain—we do not avoid pain *because* it is hurtful. Campbell described his position as a 'new Epiphenomenalism':

> The new Epiphenomenalism. . .holds that some bodily states are also mental states, and that the causal mental properties are physical properties of these bodily states. It insists only that the enjoying or enduring of phenomenal properties is not a physical affair. The new view allows, indeed requires, that mental states be causes, and allows, indeed requires, that different mental states be distinguished by reference to their differing links with behaviour.... This being so, one who holds to the theory must grit his teeth and assert that a fundamental, anomalous, causal connection relates some bodily processes to some non-material processes. He must insist that this is a brute fact we must learn to live with, however inconvenient it might be for our tidy world-schemes. (1970, pp. 113, 118)

It would be hard to find a more unattractive position, but we shall encounter one shortly.

It is doubtful whether Armstrong and Lewis had the resources to deal with the worry about phenomenal properties that moved Campbell. The causal analysis worked at a level of commonsense: it was supposed to be something that one might, on reflection, assent to as a correct analysis of how we understand mental concepts. It was, to borrow a term from the linguistic theory of the time, a theory at the level of 'surface structure'. Moreover, though it was meant to be concordant with science, the causal analysis was not informed by any serious acquaintance with work being done in neuroscience. Analyses of a different sort, yet still consistent with the materialist opening commitments, were possible for those interested in functionalism. Functionalist theories could explore conjectures about the deep structure of cognitive processes and so had more room to account for differences between the experiences of an imitation man and a normal person. The discussion of pain in Daniel Dennett's 'Why You Can't Make a Computer that Feels Pain' (1978) illustrates the possibilities. But that takes us offshore and away from the Australian paradigm.

Perception: Armstrong and Jackson

I turn now to Armstrong's account of perception, which I shall contrast with that proposed by Frank Jackson in his *Perception*: *A Representative Theory* (1977).

Armstrong considered himself a direct realist. In *Perception and the Physical World* (1961), he described direct realism as the view that 'the immediate object of awareness is never anything but a physical existent, something that exists independently of the awareness of it'. The opposing views, representationalism and phenomenalism, by contrast hold that the immediate object of awareness—a *sense impression* or *sense datum*—is something that cannot exist independently of our awareness of it. The three theories have in common that there must be an immediate object of awareness and differ over its status, whether independently existing or mind dependent. Jackson also accepts this way of characterising the competing positions but devotes the first chapter of *Perception* to an explanation and defence of the view that perception requires that there be an immediate object of perception. The defence is needed because, Jackson holds, the distinction between immediate and mediate objects is commonly made in ways that involve some confusion. In particular, mediate perception is commonly thought to involve an element of *suggestion* or *inference*. Berkeley, for example, held that when I hear a coach drive along the street, what I hear is just a sound, but the sound suggests a coach to me because of my experience of their connection. Jackson argues that this way of making the distinction is confused:

> Inference is a notion definable in terms of belief... So to claim that mediate perception, by contradistinction to immediate perception, involves inference is to claim that mediate perception involves certain beliefs that immediate perception does not; and this is false. Hearing the coach does not require any beliefs that hearing the sound does not... If the sound is the sound of a coach, then hearing the sound is hearing the coach regardless of what one believes about whether the sound is that of a coach. (Jackson 1977, p. 8)

Jackson makes the mediate/immediate distinction for object perception in a different way, with the aid of the notion of one thing's holding *in virtue of* another. Arriving home at night I might lament that I hit a wombat on the road. In fact, the car I was driving (or a part of it) hit the wombat, and it is true that I hit a wombat only *in virtue* of the fact that I was driving the car. In mediate perception, I hear one thing (the coach) in virtue of the fact that I hear something else (the sound it makes) which is suitably related to it. The immediate object of perception is an object perceived, but not in virtue of perceiving something else.

Inference might be used to distinguish mediate from immediate *perception that* (something is the case), but not mediate and immediate *perception of* objects, and the latter is what is required for the debate regarding perceptual theories. By the time he wrote about perception in *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, Armstrong had come to agree on this point, and in his latest venture into the discussion of immediate perception, a paper from 1976 included in *The Nature of Mind and Other Essays* (1980), he argued that the immediate/mediate distinction cannot be drawn for what he now calls 'object-perception statements'. Object-perception statements are referentially transparent and non-cognitive. 'Jones saw a fox' may be true though Jones has no idea that what he saw was a fox; he may have mistakenly thought he saw koala. But 'the distinction between the uninferred and the inferred', Armstrong insists, 'is a cognitive distinction. The uninferred is something known or believed, while the inferred is something known or believed on the basis of what is inferred' (1980, pp. 122–123).

There is a deeper point here. Classic theories of perception treat perception as a *relation* holding between a perceiver and an object, and Armstrong's initial account of the differences between theories as a difference over what the immediate *objects* of perception are was cast in relational terms. The direct realist holds that immediate perception involves a relation between the perceiver and an object that is not mediated by a relation to any middle term. But that is not the sense in which Armstrong accepts a direct realist account. Armstrong's view was always that perception is to be analysed as the acquiring of beliefs about the current state of one's body or environment through the operation of the senses. Perception, on this view, is a mental occurrence whose *content* has a propositional structure—it is not primarily a relation at all. 'Veridical perception is the acquiring of true beliefs, sensory illusion is the acquiring of false beliefs' (Armstrong 1968, p. 209).

Some caveats are needed. Armstrong is uneasy about speaking of 'beliefs' here. The beliefs acquired through perception, or at least the most primitive among them, do not require linguistic expression. Animals may have perceptual beliefs: the donkeys are huddled in their shelter because they perceive that it is raining heavily outside. Armstrong toys with other ways of expressing the point, in terms of acquiring 'information', or developing a representation that is more like a map. But the basic point remains that, on his view, it must be possible to describe the content of a perception in terms that allow the ascription of truth or falsity to it. And if that is the case, then talk of inference in perception is perfectly in order—whether it is an important distinction is another matter. Jackson, on the other hand, accepts the relational view and his defence of the claim that on every theory there must be something that is immediately perceived simply assumes that position as if no other were available.

The deep point, then, is this: some theories of perception take it that what is fundamental in perception is the holding of certain relations to objects—for such theories, *perceiving that* is a derivative notion. Other theories treat perception as the acquisition of a propositional attitude and take the relational sense of perception to be derivative. Jackson takes the former view and Armstrong the latter. Armstrong remarks on this difference in styles of theory, though not of course on Jackson's version, in *A Materialist theory of the Mind* (pp. 227–29), while Jackson discusses the contrasting styles and defends the claim that the relational view is basic in the final chapter of *Perception*. Jackson's argument exploits the idea that propositional perception statements are referentially opaque, whereas relational perception statements are transparent. He then easily shows that a reductive analysis of object perception in terms of propositional perception cannot be achieved. But Armstrong's position was not that we could dispense with relational statements or analyse them wholly into propositional perception statements. It was that propositional perception statements are cognitive, whereas relational ones are not, and in a sense the propositional are more fundamental.

An example to illustrate: Suppose in the half-light of dusk I glimpse an animal moving quickly across the ground 50 m away. Suppose I don't see it distinctly but something about its shape or the way it moved, I'm not sure which, makes me think that it might be a koala. When I go out and look, I find a koala there, climbing a tree, just where I lost sight of the animal whose movement I saw, and so I conclude that, as I suspected, it was a koala that I saw. On the relational view, I see a moving shape which, as I suspected, belongs to a koala, and so that is what I have seen though at first I did not know it. Or perhaps better, I saw an event, the koala's moving across the ground. (Events are objects and can be seen. We even have an idiom for describing relational event perception statements, as in 'Peter saw Judas kiss Jesus'.) Relational perceptual statements provide a transparent context, so the transition from seeing an animal moving to seeing a koala moving is straightforward. On the alternative propositional attitude view, my perception is *that* something, an animal, moved across the ground, with the impression (not quite a perception) that it looked and moved like a koala. On checking, the impression is confirmed. I cannot properly now say that I *saw that* it was a koala, but I *can* say that *what* I saw was a koala. The move from the initial propositional perception to the transparent relational construction is straightforward, though it involves some weakening of the perceptual content.

Armstrong's theory is a direct realist theory only in this sense that on his account the content of a perception is a proposition about ordinary material things, their properties and relations. The contrast between mediate and immediate perceptions has little role to play. Jackson, however, defends a Lockean representational theory for which the mediate/immediate contrast is crucial since the conclusion is to be that the immediate objects of perception are sense data: seeing a material object depends on seeing a sense datum that (in a sense to be defined in the final chapter) belongs to the material object. And sense data are mind-dependent, but external, entities distinct from the material objects to which they belong. Let me briefly outline the argument.

Jackson concentrates on visual perception, and the first step is to argue that in all cases where there is indisputably an object of visual perception, there is something immediately perceived, namely, a coloured shape. The case of hallucination is more difficult because on several accounts hallucinatory perception does not involve perception of an object. Jackson's argument in Chap. 1 is that if hallucinatory perception is the perception of an object, then what is immediately perceived is a coloured shape. Then in Chap. 3 he argues, by eliminating the alternatives, that hallucination does involve the perception of an object. A relatively easy path leads from there to the conclusion that in the case of hallucinatory perception, the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent entities that really do have all the properties they appear to have. An afterimage, for example, is a coloured mind-dependent entity at some distance in space from the perceiver. There is some careful argument to show that when we say an afterimage is 'blue', we use colour language in the same sense used when we speak of the colour of the objects of veridical perception. Now, to complete the argument for sense data, it has to be shown that the immediate objects of perception in veridical and illusory perception are also mind dependent. Jackson moves first to show that in these cases, too, the immediate objects of perception cannot be misperceived, that things immediately perceived really do have the properties they appear to have. That is the task of Chap. 4. But the properties they appear to have include colour, and colour (Jackson argues in Chap. 5) is a property that physical things do not have. It follows that the immediate objects of visual perception are things distinct from the physical objects with which they are associated, call them 'sense data'. It is a small step now to the conclusion that they are mind-dependent entities. Yet they appear to be located in space, and they appear to be three-dimensional. So that is how they really are.

This last and rather surprising thesis that sense data are spatially located and three-dimensional is crucial to the account of what it is for a sense datum to *belong to* a material object and what makes seeing the sense datum a case of seeing a material object. A necessary condition for that relation to hold is, of course, that a causal connection ties the material object to the existence of the sense datum—more precisely, where *M* is a material object and *D* is a sense datum, *D* belongs to *M* only if an event involving *M* causes the immediate perception of *D* (Jackson 1977, p. 167). But there are many events in the causal chain linking *M* to the perception of *D*, so something more is required to make the immediate perception of *D* a mediate perception of *M* rather than of the other things involved down the chain. Having eliminated various initially more plausible alternatives, Jackson settles on 'the functional spatial dependence of the sense datum on the object, a dependence which is consequent on the causal connection between the object and the sense datum' (1977, p. 170). Suppose I watch the moon rise, then the size, shape, distance and direction of the sense data I perceive are a function of the size, shape, distance and relative direction of the moon, and they are so in a way that is consequent on the way the moon and my perception of the sense data are causally connected.

Jackson's book presents a single, tightly connected and very rigorous argument for a version of the representative theory of perception. It is also a rigorous argument against the fundamental commitments that defined Armstrong's metaphysical program. If Jackson is right, there are things that are not physical things, there are properties of those things that are not physical properties and there are causal relations from the physical to the nonphysical and things that have no causal role. Let us say that a theory is *metaphysically extravagant* insofar as it countenances the existence of more things than could be accepted by one who accepts Armstrong's opening commitments; then Jackson's theory, like Campbell's, is highly extravagant. Rosenthal, whose review of the book in the *Journal of Philosophy* I have found illuminating, remarks on the extravagance of Jackson's theory and attempts to explore ways in which it might be made less so.

What room is there for Armstrong, or any of us with a more 'robust sense or reality', to evade these conclusions? In the self-profile published in Bogdan (1984), Armstrong remarked that Ayer had persuaded him that treating veridical perception as a form of knowledge was the only plausible way of working out a direct realist view. John Anderson had defended a view of this sort, so Armstrong was returning to home. We might take Jackson's careful argument as confirmation that this is the right way for the realist to go. The main difficulty for the theory, and what according to Armstrong gave impetus to the sense datum theory, was the fact that the propositional theory of perception did not seem to take adequate account of the phenomenal character of experience. Armstrong remarks:

> Whatever problems and paradoxes may be solved by equating perceptions with the acquiring of belief, perceptions on the one hand and acquirings of belief on the other seem introspectively so different. Could one not be acquiring all the beliefs we do acquire by using our senses and yet have no perceptions at all? The theory will not be wholly satisfactory until more can be done to meet this difficulty. (Bogdan 1984, p. 17)

Recall Campbell's artificial man example. The crux of the issue is the problem of secondary qualities. The case for postulating sense data is, Armstrong remarks in 'Perception, Sense Data and Causality' (1980, p. 139), precisely that they can be made to serve as the bearers of secondary qualities. In this paper, written after the publication of Jackson's book, Armstrong makes his final attempt to deal with a problem that had worried him since writing *Perception and the Physical World*. He considers a trio of possible views about secondary qualities, all alternatives to Jackson's view that secondary qualities genuinely qualify sense data. The first is a reductionist view, which Armstrong himself tends to favour, that secondary qualities are identical with their physical correlates—perceived colours are identical with the light-reflecting properties of objects and so may qualify physical objects. The argument for sense data only gets going if this view is rejected. Second, an eliminativist view holds that secondary qualities do not qualify material objects *or anything else*. They are unanalysable properties that objects appear to have, though nothing in fact does have them. (On Armstrong's account of properties, there can be no properties that nothing has, but it may yet seem that there are.) Thirdly, there is a view according to which secondary qualities are qualities of the events or states that constitute perceptions but appear to qualify the objects of those perceptions. Armstrong does not offer any argument for adopting the first alternative and notes that it is phenomenologically implausible. But the other two views are pretty unattractive. Here Armstrong is content to argue that treating secondary qualities as genuine properties of sense data is no help, since no satisfactory account can be given of their place in the causal sequence leading to perception. (Actually there is a later discussion of secondary qualities in 'A Defence of the Cognitivist Theory of Perception' (Armstrong 2004), but it is beyond the scope of this discussion.)

Belief and Propositional Content

I have now to consider Armstrong's account of belief in *Belief, Truth and Knowledge* (1973), where he tackles the second of the two great problems for a materialist theory: the intentionality of the mental. A brief summary:

(i) Beliefs are states, not conscious occurrences and not pure dispositions. For a state, we require an object and some accidental or changeable feature instantiated by the object. Armstrong's view is that dispositions too are states, for states are to be identified with their categorical basis. But whereas a disposition may be characterised wholly in terms of relational features of the object, its relation to the events that initiate it or in which it issues, the categorical basis must be some non-relational property of the object concerned. To say that a disposition is a state is to imply that there is a non-relational basis, but what it is is something to be determined only by scientific research yet to come.

(ii) Beliefs are distinguished from dispositions by the fact that they do not have a specific kind of initiating condition and do not issue in a standard kind of behaviour. More importantly, belief states require a certain kind of internal structure within which can be distinguished elements that may be common to diverse beliefs—the beliefs that the cat is on the mat, that the cat is asleep and that the cat is black all share an element indicated here by the word 'cat'.

(iii) There can be beliefs without language, and so having a language is not a necessary condition for having a belief. Armstrong wants to be able to say that the donkeys believe it is raining outside (my example, not his), but he does not think that in saying this we are attributing that specific content to their beliefs. When we say that the donkeys believe it is raining outside, our description is cast in referentially transparent terms that do not exactly render the content of the belief. The ground for saying that the donkeys have beliefs is just that we want to say that they have perceptions and that we use the content of their beliefs, roughly specified, to explain aspects of their behaviour.

(iv) Notwithstanding the points just made, 'beliefs must have an internal complexity, a complexity corresponding to the content of the proposition believed' (1973, p. 38). The proposition involved is what distinguishes one belief from another and what several believers may have in common. It is better to make the point in terms of propositions than sentences or statements because two believers may have the same belief but not one they express in the same words and maybe not expressed in words at all. But here we have a problem, for propositions are extravagant entities. We, Armstrong thinks, cannot take them to be physical entities, situations or states of affairs on Anderson's suggestion or relations between thinkers and physical entities as Russell proposed. Moreover, propositions are capable of being true or false though truth and falsity are not physical properties. So Armstrong needs an account of propositions, truth and falsity that is consistent with his materialist commitments. That is the task undertaken in *Belief, Truth and Knowledge*.

(v) Just a sketch: we shall have a materialist account of the sort required, without postulating extravagant entities, if we can identify the structural elements in belief states and explain their correspondence (or otherwise) to situations in the world. Anderson had attempted to identify true propositions with states of affairs. But Armstrong suggests:

> If instead we consider belief-states, thought-episodes and assertions, we may well find that it is possible to develop an account of the correspondence or non-correspondence of their structure to portions of the world… Propositions cannot correspond to reality, but belief state thought-episode or the speech act of assertion, whose natures determine what proposition is believed, thought or asserted, may well correspond to reality. We can even reintroduce the word 'true' to describe this correspondence *provided we are clear that the word is not receiving its ordinary employment*. (p. 48, italics in the original)

The way Armstrong develops this sketch in Chaps. 5, 6, 7, and 8 has not been well received or even thought promising by philosophers since. Armstrong begins with an analogy, which is that of a map. In a map, complex states of affairs are represented, but not stated, by the placement of marks and the relations between them. So the relative positions of Perth, Melbourne and Sydney are represented by marks on the map, relative distances between them and a pattern of distribution, and from this we can read off how Perth, Melbourne and Sydney are related in the world. If the map is accurate, then we get a true representation of the world in these respects. The map is not a collection of sentences, and it contains more extractable information than can be conveyed by even a very long string of sentences. The arrangement of the elements of the map determines the propositions represented in the map.

So think of the totality of our beliefs as a kind of internal map representing features of the world, drawn from our perspective. It needs to be an imperfect map, inaccurate in some ways, and with fragments not properly connected to the rest, like a partially completed jigsaw of a medieval map. What are the elements of the map? Armstrong has a theory of ideas and concepts. On the map I might have icons to represent towns and things within the town, castles, churches, etc. The same icon, that is, tokens of the same type, might represent churches in different locations. Ideas are like icon tokens and concepts are like icon types. (To be strict, for Armstrong concepts are capacities to respond to tokens of the same type in a discriminatory way.) Relations among things are represented in a similar way, for if two towns are separated by the same distance on the map as two other towns, then the towns are represented as being the same distance apart. Here too we have a token and type distinction for the representation of distance intervals. So Armstrong can extend the terminology of ideas and concepts to cover this case.

I have not space to pursue this theory any further, and indeed Armstrong does not go much further. But already enough is present to allow me to draw attention to some points of interest, which are mostly made by Max Deutscher (1976) in a rather hostile review of Armstrong's book.

First is a worry about the map analogy. An important advantage of the analogy for Armstrong is that a map is something we steer by, and so the analogy makes the link between belief and action. To steer by a map, we have to be able to interpret it, but Armstrong insists that in the case of belief, there is no room for a distinction between the map and the map reader's interpretation: 'Beliefs are to be thought of as maps which carry their interpretation within themselves... They have an intrinsic power of representation' (Armstrong 1973, p. 4). Deutscher complained that this idea is obscure and commits Armstrong to a very passive account of the connection between belief and action. The self-interpreting map analogy suggests an automated navigation system with no real role for the navigator. The role of language in belief is also compromised. Armstrong's analogy makes room for beliefs without language, but it also makes it hard to account for the range of beliefs or their expression in language. We have many beliefs whose content takes a form that may not be represented in a self-interpreting map, since only particular facts can be represented there. General beliefs are a problem. Armstrong accepts that universal propositions cannot be represented in this way, and so he offers a special treatment for general beliefs: they are treated as 'dispositions to extend the original belief-map according to certain rules' (p. 5). To hold a general belief is just to be disposed to make certain inferences, and thus, to believe that all donkeys are stubborn is just to be ready to infer that Dusty is stubborn from a belief that Dusty is a donkey. But other sorts of beliefs are also problematic—existential beliefs, conditional beliefs and inconsistent beliefs all require special treatment which would not be needed where language allowed a more significant role. So it is far from clear how far the map analogy has taken us.

Logic and Language

Logic in Australia and New Zealand Before 1970

In Anderson's vision of the architecture of philosophy, logic occupied a foundational position, intricately tied up with metaphysics. So logic was taught at Sydney through all the long years when it was neglected elsewhere in Australia. But it was the traditional Aristotelian logic, pretty much in the form it was passed on by J. N. Keynes, that Anderson defended; modern symbolic logic was scorned. Logical form, Anderson held, was the form of the facts or states of affairs that make propositions true or false—just as there are no conditional states of affairs, or disjunctive states of affairs, or necessary states of affairs, so there is no room in logic for such things. But even if we concede this much to Anderson, the choice of traditional syllogistic logic was a strange one, for surely there are basic states of affairs with the structure of singular propositions, or relational propositions, or multiply quantified propositions, and Anderson's logic had difficulty with them all.

Things were otherwise in New Zealand. A.N. Prior succeeded Karl Popper in Canterbury in 1946 and held a chair there from 1952 until 1958. Throughout that time, and after, his main philosophical interests were in logic but always logic with a strong philosophical motivation. The particular focus was on issues to do with time and tense, which Prior sought to make precise by developing tense logic as a branch of modal logic. Prior's influence in New Zealand was profound—his impact as strong as Anderson's in Sydney, but wholly in logic and modal logic at that, when modal logic was in disrepute elsewhere.

By the early 1960s interest in modern logic had picked up in Australia. Jack Smart introduced logic teaching in Adelaide in the 1950s. Len Goddard, appointed to a chair in New England in 1956, moved quickly to build up a strong logic program there. John Mackie, after a spell in Otago, succeeded Anderson in Sydney in 1959, and the New Zealand influence on Australian philosophy began to spread. Symbolic logic was introduced as a third-year-level subject in 1959, taught by Mackie using Copi's *Symbolic Logic*. Richard Routley was appointed to a position in Sydney in 1961 and for a while was a daunting presence there; he moved to New England to work with Goddard and David Londey in 1963. Charles Hamblin introduced logic to the curriculum at the University of New South Wales and began a period of fruitful research in information theory, informal logic and the logic of questions. There were also early developments in Queensland led by Malcolm Rennie.

In Melbourne, logic had been part of the course at Monash from a very early stage, a mix of traditional logic of terms and truth-functional sentential logic at first-year level, followed by a symbolic logic subject introduced in 1965 by John McGechie. But the important development there came when John Crossley was appointed to a chair in Mathematics in 1969, establishing a strong sub-department in mathematical logic. Crossley's arrival was celebrated by a major international conference, attended by some spectacular people. About the same time Richard Routley took up a 2-year research appointment at Monash. Routley's interests were then in relevance logic and entailment, an area in which Crossley took no interest. I remember an occasion, it must have been soon after Crossley's arrival, when Routley read a paper in which he presented a system for entailment but without any suggestion for its semantics. Crossley was scathing: a logical system without semantics was not something to be taken seriously. Routley moved to the ANU when his term at Monash expired; joined there by Malcolm Rennie, Bob Meyer and others; and established an important program in non-classical logic. A major schism developed in Australian logic between schools conducting research in classical logic at Monash and those researching non-classical logic in Canberra, a divide across which there was little respect or communication. Goddard (1992) has remarked on the effects of the schism in a paper reflecting on the development of deductive logic in Australia. No less remarkable is the difference in the way logic has developed in New Zealand, where research continued the tradition in modal logic initiated by Prior. Work by George Hughes and Max Cresswell (1968, 1979, 1984, 1996) continued the development of modal logic in a way that is continuous with its past and without regional eccentricity.

Entailment and Relevant Implication: Australian Deviations from Classical Logic

The mission of the non-classical program in Canberra was to develop logics free from the counterintuitive results familiar in mainstream logic. When the conditional operator, $\supset$, is given the usual truth-functional analysis making $p \supset q$ equivalent to $\neg p \vee q$, we get the 'paradoxes' of material implication, among them:

$p \supset (q \supset p)$	If it's raining, then if the sun is shining, it's raining.
$\neg p \supset (p \supset q)$	If it's not raining, then if it is raining, Pluto is a planet.
$(p \supset q) \vee (q \supset p)$	Either if it's raining then Pluto is a planet or if Pluto is a planet, then it's raining.

The examples are meant to strike you as somewhat strange. And where entailment (or logical consequence) is taken to be strict implication, i.e., a necessarily true material implication, we get the paradoxes of strict implication:

1. Any necessarily true proposition is entailed by every proposition.
2. Any necessarily false proposition entails every proposition.

3. All logically true propositions are logically equivalent.
4. All necessarily false propositions are logically equivalent.

Relevant logics propose systems with a conditional operator free of the paradoxes of material implication, and non-classical entailment logics propose systems free of the paradoxes of strict implication. By the late 1960s it was clear how to construct logical systems meeting these requirements. But at a cost, the counterintuitive theses can be avoided only if we are prepared to dump certain highly intuitive forms of inference. C. I. Lewis had shown that the paradoxes of strict implication result if our logic lets us move freely from p to $p \vee q$ (Add) and from $p \vee q$ and $\neg p$ to q (DS). So, though we can get systems that avoid the paradoxes, the question arises whether these systems are more than fragments missing theorems that should be present in any satisfactory rendition of the logic of conditionals and entailment. In a sense, any logic must be 'paradoxical', for it must either include intuitively implausible or exclude intuitively plausible theorems. How can we decide which way to go? That, in part, is the task to be met by providing a semantics for these systems. We should be able to establish plausible soundness and completeness results so that the choice between competing classical and non-classical systems can be made in reflective equilibrium. If we are to reject the thesis that $p \vee q$ and $\neg p$ together entail q, for example, the semantics must make it intelligible why this should be judged invalid, given the classical meanings assigned to the connectives for disjunction and negation.

Now notice how hard it must be to provide semantics for a paradox-free system of entailment. For strict implication, the semantics could be provided within a possible world framework that seems to capture powerful intuitions about necessity: a sentence counts as necessarily true if it is true in every possible world, necessarily false if it is true in no such world, and contingent if it is true in some but not other possible worlds. Possible worlds can be thought of as maximally consistent sets of formulae. Now consider the third of the paradoxes of strict implication listed above. Suppose that A and B are any two logical truths that we want to count as logically independent of each other in our system, i.e., where neither is a logical consequence of the other: then our semantics must give us a way of evaluating A as true and B as false, and vice versa, in some semantic setup. That's a big task.

In 1972 Richard and Val Routley published a paper giving a solution to the semantic problem for first-degree entailment, a fragment having the entailment connective, ➡, as the main connective in all theorems. In subsequent work, by Richard Routley and Bob Meyer, the result was extended to cover full entailment systems R and NR. There is not space, and it is not appropriate here to go into the technical details. The Routley's had provided a formal model that could be tweaked to provide semantics for a range of competing entailment systems. But was the model capable of doing what was required of a semantic theory? Copeland (1979) stressed a distinction between 'an illuminating and philosophically significant semantics' and a merely formal model theory. The Routley-Meyer semantics, he argued, is a theory of the latter sort because it involved a series of ad hoc measures that yield the intended results, in particular the fallaciousness of DS, but only by arbitrarily changing the meaning of negation. Similar points had earlier been made by Charles Kielkopf (1974):

> In particular, they do not show how we could consistently accept the premises while rejecting the conclusion of a disjunctive syllogism. Their semantics shows only that, without contradicting ourselves, we can specify what it would be like for someone, or some theory, to accept the premises while rejecting the conclusion of a disjunctive syllogism. It still turns out, though, that to describe accepting the premises, while rejecting the conclusion of a disjunctive syllogism, is to describe accepting a contradiction. And certainly a classical logician can consistently describe someone, or some theory, accepting a contradiction. (p. 106).

I claimed above that that what we want from a semantic theory should be, in part anyway, that it put us in a position to choose between competing theories where neither can give us all we might like intuitively. The question raised by Copeland and Kielkopf was whether any purely formal model can do this.

Conditionals: Mackie and Jackson

I will next briefly consider strategies for dealing with the paradoxes of material and strict implication that offer a way of coping with the ‘paradoxes’ that does not require drastic logical reform. I shall concentrate on work by John Mackie (1973) and Frank Jackson (1979) on conditionals. Mackie examines six alternative accounts before settling on a seventh of his own. I shall comment on just three of these accounts.

Let’s start with what Mackie calls the ‘Logical Powers Account’. On this view, the meaning of conditional sentences is given and totally explained by their logical powers, by the way they function in inferences. Mackie dismisses this suggestion rather swiftly, but perhaps he is too swift. He is right to suggest that the logical powers story—that what is important about conditionals is that they allow *modus ponens*, *modus tollens* and so forth—cannot be the whole story. But it might be that we get to grasp the meaning of conditional constructions operationally, through their use in inferences, and that later logical study reveals, surprisingly, an equivalence that forces the material conditional analysis upon us. It may be argued, for example, that if we start with a grasp of the intuitive natural deduction rules for $p \rightarrow q$, using the arrow for an unanalysed natural conditional, then we can prove first that $p \wedge \neg q$ entails $\neg(p \rightarrow q)$ —not a surprise—and then that $\neg(p \rightarrow q)$ entails $p \wedge \neg q$, a big surprise. Very natural inference principles yield this result, and so one might conclude that the semantics for the natural conditional must be that given by the standard truth table. That the result is so surprising then goes some way to explaining the discomfort produced when we notice the paradoxical consequences of this discovery.

This first suggestion combines quite comfortably with another that Mackie considers, namely, Grice’s suggestion that to the material conditional account of the truth conditions for ‘if… then’ we must add an account of the assertion conditions for conditionals, that is, conditions for the appropriate or non-misleading assertion of conditional statements. It is obvious that something of the sort is needed, for consider the statement:

(1) If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, then somebody else did.

This is commonly offered as an example of an indicative conditional, to be contrasted with counterfactuals like:

(2) If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, then somebody else would have.

The thing to notice about (1) is that it is simply equivalent to ‘Somebody shot Kennedy’; the truth of the consequent suffices for the truth of the conditional, as you would expect on the material analysis—indeed, we have here exploited one of the paradoxes, though it does not seem so strange to us now. But if (1) is equivalent to ‘Somebody shot Kennedy’, then (1) must also be equivalent to:

(3) If Elvis did not shoot Kennedy, then somebody else did.

But though (1) and (3) are both true, they are not equally assertable: if there is no suggestion that Elvis is or has been a suspect, then (3) unlike (1) is not properly asserted. Having noticed this, it is very plausible to suggest that to get a satisfactory theory of the meaning of conditionals, we must add to the truth conditions an overlay of assertability conditions. A common suggestion is this: if A and B are statements such that A is logically stronger than B, A entails B and A and B are just about equiprobable, then one should assert A rather than B. The pragmatic rule involved is that one should always assert the stronger of two propositions where doing so gives the hearer more useful information. Unfortunately, this suggestion does not account for the discrepancy between (1) and (3), and so there has to be something else going on. In this case it is simple to find, for if Elvis has never been a suspect, then there is no point to asserting (3) rather than any of the multiplicity of other such conditionals.

Mackie rejected the Gricean account, for not very convincing reasons. But Jackson has found a series of counterexamples that are convincing. Jackson offered a different suggestion about the assertability conditions for conditionals. Let’s say that our confidence in a certain belief A is *robust* relative to a piece of information I if our confidence in A would not be significantly reduced on learning that I. Then Jackson’s suggestion is that a conditional p ➞ q is true if $p \supset q$ is true and assertable if our confidence in the conditional is robust relative to p, i.e., where $\Pr(p \supset q)$ and $\Pr(p \supset q/p)$ are close and high. Where this condition is met, the conditional is available for *modus ponens* should we learn that p, a point that further links the present account to the view that the logical powers of conditionals are primary.

The account Mackie favoured was very different; it used the notions of supposition and assertion within the scope of a supposition. His suggestion was that ‘to say ‘If p, q’ is to assert q within the scope of the supposition that p’ (Mackie 1973, p. 93). To explain: think of what is going on when we use an assumption introducing strategy, such as Conditional Proof, in a natural deduction argument. In such a proof, when we discharge the assumption, we get $p \supset q$, but Mackie’s suggestion is that a conditional is not to be identified with the material conditional so derived but with the situation *before* the assumption is discharged. There is then no statement to be analysed as a conditional, nothing to be ascribed a truth value, and so the material conditional suggestion misses the point: indicative conditionals are not true or false. Mackie had long favoured accounts of this sort; it was part of the Andersonian heritage. There is, however, a problem for accounts like his, namely, that they cannot easily be extended to sentences in which conditionals are embedded in a larger context. Given (p ➞ q) ➞ r, where a conditional is embedded in the antecedent of a conditional, and wanting to apply *modus ponens*, we must be able to find the same statement in the antecedent of the conditional and in the premise, and they must have the same meaning. Mackie attempts to deal, not very convincingly, with this difficulty. I think the path taken by Jackson is the better way to go if we want an account of conditionals that deals with the paradoxes without abandoning classical logic. Jackson has an extended discussion of the matter in his book *Conditionals* (1987).

Stove's Defence of Rationality

We should look next at a debate that provoked more discussion in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* than any other in our period: the debate about David Stove's dissolution of the problem of induction. In 1970 Stove published a paper called 'Deductivism' in the *AJP*. Philosophers, Stove claimed (and I guess he meant analytic philosophers), divide over the answer to this question: are there arguments that provide positive rational support for their conclusion, but which are not completely conclusive?

An argument provides rational support for a conclusion if an ideally rational being who knew or believed only the premises of the argument would have a positive degree of belief in the conclusion equal to his belief in the premises. If an argument gave positive but not conclusive support for its conclusion, the ideally rational being would have a positive degree of belief in the conclusion, but one less strong than his belief in the premises. (The ideally rational being is, of course, male.) Now Stove claims that those who have read Hume and have been persuaded by him will hold that there are no such arguments: an ideally rational believer will not be led by argument to give credence to a conclusion unless it has been conclusively supported by valid arguments. Philosophers who have read both Hume and Keynes, on the other hand, and who have been persuaded by the latter will answer that there are rationally credible conclusions supported by inconclusive arguments. Inductive arguments are probable but not conclusive, and it is rational to believe the conclusions of probable arguments *to the degree that* they are supported by credible premises. The great scandal of analytic philosophy, Stove claims, is that most contemporary philosophers fall into the former group: they are Deductivists, rejecting the suggestion that there are degrees of reasonableness among arguments falling short of validity. The prevalence of Deductivism is a scandal because those who hold this view are committed to a denial that science progresses in a rational way and thus to a denial that the progress of science has resulted in a gradual growth of knowledge. Analytic philosophers characteristically are deferential towards science, yet most hold a view that entails that it is irrational to be so.

So Deductivism leads to irrationalism, scepticism and relativism. Stove's project was to defend the minority view, which he calls 'Probabilism'.

Stove returned to the attack in *Popper and After*: *Four Modern Irrationalists* (1982). It is worth quoting a bit from the introduction to this book:

> Much more is known now than was known fifty years ago, and much more was known then than in 1580. So there has been a great accumulation or growth of knowledge in the last four hundred years.
>
> This is an extremely well-known fact, which I will refer to as (A). A philosopher, in particular, who did not know it, would be uncommonly ignorant. So a writer whose position inclined him to deny (A), or even made him at all reluctant to admit it, would almost inevitably seem, to the philosophers who read him, to be maintaining something extremely implausible. Such a writer *must* make that impression, in fact, unless the way he writes effectively disguises the implausibility of his suggestion that (A) is false.
>
> Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend, are all writers whose position inclines them to deny (A), or at least makes them more or less reluctant to admit it. (That the history of science is not 'cumulative', is a point they all agree on.) Yet with a partial exception in the case of Feyerabend, none of these writers is at all widely regarded by philosophers as maintaining an extremely implausible position. On the contrary, these are the very writers who are now regarded by most philosophers as giving an account of science more plausible than any other. So if what I have said is true, they must write in a way which effectively disguises the implausibility of their position. My object in Part One of this book is to show how they do it. (p. 3)

I shall return to Stove's defence of Probabilism shortly, but first let's look at what justification there is for claiming there is a scandal in analytic philosophy.

Popper was a Deductivist and perhaps many in the 1960s and 1970s followed him. (Popper had held a position in Christchurch from 1937 until 1945; he had applied for a position in Sydney, but the appointment was obstructed by opposition from the RSL, and Popper went to London instead. He visited the ANU in 1963 or 1964, and there I met him.) There is, according to Popper, no logic of discovery; the processes by which new theories are invented are largely irrational. What makes science a rational activity is that it proceeds by hypothesis and testing, and deductive logic suffices for the testing phase. This is not strictly true, as Popper was aware and Stove insists, for falsification requires more than the acceptance of a single negative observation. But waiving that point, we still need an answer to the question of how a process that turns up only decisive refutations, never confirmations, can count as progress. When a falsified theory is replaced, the new theory rarely (if ever) turns out to be true. So Popper's epistemology has somehow to accommodate a discriminating approach to false theories: he has to maintain that one false theory may be preferable to another by being 'closer to the truth' or 'more like the truth'.

Popper's solution was to try to define a notion of truth-likeness, or *verisimilitude*, that might be used to measure progress through successive refutations. Arguably, Stove's indictment of Popper will stand or collapse with this suggestion; if Popper can give a satisfactory account of verisimilitude, then Stove's charge of irrationalism fails. In fact, the way Popper explained verisimilitude was defective. Pavel Tichý (1974), then at Otago, demonstrated that neither of Popper's two definitions of verisimilitude could do the job: either, following the logical definition, all false theories must be equidistant from the truth or, following the probabilistic theory, blatantly wrong results are obtained. However, in a later paper (1976), Tichý showed how Hintikka's theorem on distributive normal forms could be used to get an intuitively correct analysis of the information content of a theory, thereby allowing for discriminations in verisimilitude between false theories. Popper's account may still contravene (A), but it can support a robust account of scientific progress and an important one if it is accepted that broadly inductive inferences do not strictly support a claim to knowledge.

Popper thought that Hume's argument had shown that inductive reasoning cannot be regarded as a reliable way of advancing to true conclusions, even most of the time or often enough, and so his conclusion was that we must do without inductive logic. An alternative view that had wide support in the 1970s was to adopt a suggestion from Feigl that it might be possible to provide a *vindication*, as opposed to a *validation*, of induction. The suggestion would be that while Hume had shown that we cannot get a proof that induction must be reliable, we might yet be able to show that induction is a *rational policy*, the best way of trying to discover truths about the future. A theory of this sort was suggested by John Clendinnen (1966), a Melbourne-based philosopher. Let's say that a way of predicting the future is 'objective' if those who apply it will agree in their conclusions and that it is 'concordant' if applying it never leads to contradictory conclusions. Then, Clendinnen argued, induction can be vindicated 'by showing that it is the only possible way of predicting that is objective, and further that, while objectivity is not a necessary condition for success in predicting, objective methods are the only methods which we could have any possible reason to believe possessed a property which is a necessary condition for success' (p. 218). Clendinnen (1970) was subsequently forced to weaken his claim in an exchange with Frank Jackson (1970a, 1970b), and it is doubtful whether an adequate vindication survived the exchange. (On this point, see Fox 2010.)

A different defence of inductive reasoning, made popular by Strawson in *An Introduction to Logical Theory*, was to maintain that a justification of induction is neither necessary nor possible—the whole project of justification is ill conceived. Our most basic modes of reasoning cannot be justified because the attempt to justify them will inevitably break down in circularity. Clendinnen began his defence of the vindication of induction by arguing that induction does need justification:

> The reason, very briefly, why the former position [Strawson's view] is unsatisfactory is as follows. There are alternatives to induction that are all too often employed in forming expectations about the future; for example relying on hunches, accepting the prejudices and superstitions current in various social groups, and generalising from obviously limited and atypical samples. Thus it is not possible to say that induction simply is the method used in predicting. Various people use various methods; those who adopt and advocate the inductive method do so believing that it is in some sense clearly superior to any of the alternatives. Thus it would be extraordinary if it were not possible to say why this is the proper procedure, or at least to explicate the sense in which it is superior to the alternatives. (Clendinnen 1966, p. 215)

Though Stove would not have liked the suggestion, I think his approach to the problem of induction turns out to be a sophisticated proposal of this sort. He aimed to show, first, that Hume's argument for inductive scepticism provides no support for Deductivism, because the argument simply presupposes that rational support for a conclusion can only come from a deductively valid argument. He then attempted a proof that Deductivism is false. The basic argument was that Deductivism: (a) is in conflict with very strong intuitive judgments that certain invalid arguments are not irrational and (b) leads inevitably to scepticism. If I buy a ticket in a fair lottery with only a tiny a chance of winning, it is rational to believe, though not with complete confidence, that I won't win. Perhaps I don't know that I won't win, because I still might, but it is surely rational to bet that I won't and irrational to take costly decisions in the hope that I will win. As Hume said, 'a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence'. Finally, Stove maintained that probability theory must be regarded as a generalisation of deductive logic to accommodate partial entailments: probabilities capture degrees of entailment holding between premises and conclusion. Probability theory is a branch of logic, and so it is a priori. I shall comment briefly on each of these stages in Stove's case, drawing on the unusually large number of discussion articles generated by Stove's successive publications.

Stove's first attempt to analyse and refute Hume's argument was in his paper 'Hume, Probability and Induction' (1965), where he offered a painstakingly careful analysis of the argument that is supposed to establish inductive scepticism. The crucial move in Hume's argument was the claim that probable arguments 'presuppose' (Stove's term, but a good one) that the future resembles the past, yet that proposition (the Resemblance Thesis) is a 'matter of fact' and one that goes well beyond what can be known by simple observation. Any attempt to justify the presupposition must itself involve a probable argument. Any attempt to justify induction must therefore be viciously circular. Now Stove asked, what can plausibly be meant by saying that this principle is 'presupposed'? His suggestion: the only possibility is that this is what we must add to the premises of an inductive argument to make it valid. If that is right, then Deductivism is presupposed by Hume's argument. The possibility that inductive inference is a form of probable reasoning, good but not conclusive, is never considered by Hume. Of course, Hume speaks of probable reasoning in this context, but the contrast he has in mind is with demonstrative reasoning, i.e., deductive inference from premises known a priori; for Hume, any argument from contingent premises counts as probable.

In Stove (1970) and in his later book, *Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism* (1973), Stove repeats much of the argument, only now the claim that inductive reasoning presupposes the Resemblance Thesis is simply *translated* as:

> All arguments from observational premises, such as the predictive inductive inference, are invalid as they stand, and the least addition to their premises necessary and sufficient to make them valid is the Resemblance Thesis.

Hume's phrase, 'the inference... is not one that reason determines us to make', used in formulating his conclusion, now becomes 'the inference is absolutely irrational' (p. 84). From here it is again easily shown that Hume's argument has assumed Deductivism. But is this right? Stove thinks that all that can be meant by claiming that the Resemblance Thesis is necessary to *validate* inductive inference is that inductive inferences are made valid by taking it as a suppressed premise. But those who have thought they could find a powerful argument in Hume have usually interpreted him as holding that the Resemblance Thesis is what we must believe if we think inductive inference are reliable, and so it is what we must prove to validate induction in the sense of showing that it is apt to yield true conclusions. The view that Stove foists on Hume, and by implication on those who have found his argument compelling, is absurd. It conflicts with two fundamental insights about the nature of inductive reasoning, namely, (a) that inductive arguments vary in strength and (b) that even strong inductive arguments sometimes fail to yield a true conclusion from true premises. If Stove's suggestion were right, then Hume's claim that induction presupposes the Resemblance Thesis is to claim that it presupposes something that must be false, a stronger claim than Hume ever ventured.

Let's turn now to the intuitive arguments that made up the second stage in Stove's response. Hume's conclusion is counterintuitive. Indeed it is. Stove could claim that we can safely rely on intuition here because he thought his analysis of Hume's sceptical argument removed the only argument for questioning our intuitions. Without that argument, the demand for a justification is unmotivated. But that is mistaken. Intuition can go wrong. We have seen that not all intuitions about what inferences are deductively valid can be saved, and so a question can always arise as to whether some intuitive way of reasoning should be taken as valid. This is obscured in Stove's discussion by the way he characterises deductive validity, which was, you will remember, given in terms of what an ideally rational agent would believe if he were to accept just the premises of an argument. This makes it easy to assimilate deductive and inductive reasoning in a single story. But the point that needs to be stressed concerning deductive arguments is that validity is defined in terms of truth (it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false), not in terms of belief. If we think of inductive logic in a similar way, if a sound inductive inference must be reliable, then there is room again to ask whether intuitively acceptable inductive inferences have that property. Thus, the demand for a justification of induction gains traction. And it is because Stove dodges the issue of validation that I think his position is a version, though far more sophisticated, of the Strawsonian approach.

Much of the argument in the literature has concentrated on Stove's use of the probability calculus to construct an argument against inductive scepticism. I will look briefly at what I think has emerged from these discussions. I shall adopt a simplified form of the argument suggested by Stove in 'Hume, Induction and the Irish' (1976). Stove claimed:

A. The sceptical thesis which Hume maintained about inductive arguments was or entailed that for any inductive argument from e to h and any tautological t, $P(h/t.e) = P(h/t)$.

But this thesis must be false since, for example, the argument from

E: All the Australian swans observed so far are black to

H: All Australian swans are black

is inductive, yet (where t is some tautology)

B. $P(h/t.e) > P(h/t)$.

(The emboldened letters ‘A’ and ‘B’ here are my labels for these theses to allow easy reference.) Now, we should concede that B is true and incompatible with the sceptical thesis formulated in A. This is to concede no more than that the probability of a finite conjunctive proposition, a & b &... w, given that the first three elements are true and that $10 > 9$, i*s greater* than the probability of that conjunction, given just the tautology $10 > 9$. But having conceded this much, we may still dispute whether Stove is right in claiming that A states something equivalent to, or entailed by, Hume’s inductive scepticism. Most in the discussions argued that it is not. And we may dispute whether the refutation of the claim in A gives any ground for thinking that the supposed fact that all Australian swans observed so far have been black raises the probability that the next one will be. Hume’s argument, remember, concerned predictive inductive inference. We have still to refute Hume’s argument.

Practical Ethics

> Philosophy ought to question the basic assumptions of the age. Thinking through, critically and carefully, what most people take for granted is, I believe, the chief task of philosophy, and it is this task that makes philosophy a worthwhile activity. Regrettably, philosophy does not always live up its historic role. Philosophers are human beings and they are subject to all the preconceptions of the society to which they belong. Sometimes they succeed in breaking free of the prevailing ideology; more often they become its most sophisticated defenders. (Singer 1976, pp. 156–7)

The distinctive thing about Australian work in ethics during the 1970s was the turn towards applied ethics and a readiness to engage with a wider readership. Peter Singer was the leading figure. The credal statement I have just quoted occurs in an early paper, ‘All Animals Are Equal’ (1976), which gave the philosophical underpinnings for the case for animal liberation in the book of that title (1977). The ideal of the philosopher that Singer endorsed has distinguished his own thought throughout his career and brought him more attention and notoriety than philosophers normally expect.

An earlier paper, ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’ (1972), displays the same attribute. There he advanced a blunt argument, to which he has often returned, concluding that the traditional moral distinction between duty and supererogation, at least for those in circumstances of affluence, cannot be drawn. Singer is a utilitarian and a common objection to utilitarianism in the 1960s and later was that it is too demanding, a morality for saints, not ordinary people. Kurt Baier (1958) had made that point in *The Moral Point of View*, and Mackie was later to make it in *Ethics*: *Inventing Right and Wrong*. But the argument Singer presents here does not obviously draw on utilitarian assumptions; it needs only the premise: ‘If it is in our power to prevent something bad without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do so’.

I shall not attempt to survey the controversies surrounding Singer’s views concerning affluence, abortion, euthanasia and infanticide. Instead, I shall focus on his case for animal liberation and let the discussion of it do duty for the rest.

Animal Liberation

Animal Liberation is Singer's most influential book, the only true best seller in recent philosophy. Thirty-five years after it was first published, it remains in print in hardback, paperback and a mass market cheap edition. It is also his most notorious. Though it stimulated reforms in many parts of the world, for example, in the regime governing animal experimentation, it is still often viewed by working scientists with hostility akin to that shown by farmers to greenies. People have noticed the radical side of Singer's philosophy, but often not noticed the extent to which it is moderated by his utilitarianism. *Animal Liberation* does not commit him to a total ban on killing animals or to the claim that animals have rights.

In the article from which I quoted above, Singer cites the way the problem of equality is invariably formulated in terms of human equality as evidence of the failings of contemporary philosophers to challenge accepted beliefs. He discussed two examples, a paper by William Frankena, 'The Concept of Social Justice' (1962), and one by Stanley Benn, 'Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of Interests' (1967). I shall quote from the latter a passage that Singer took to be a clear expression of the attitude he called 'speciesism', but perhaps I should say that Singer chose to omit the discussion of Benn's essay in the abridged version he reprinted in *Applied Ethics* (1993).

> . . .not to possess human shape is a disqualifying condition. However faithful or intelligent a dog may be, it would be monstrous sentimentality to attribute to him interests that could be weighed in an equal balance with those of human beings. . . .
>
> This is what distinguishes our attitude to animals from our attitude to imbeciles. It would be odd to say that we ought to respect equally the dignity or personality of the imbecile and of the rational man. . .but there is nothing odd about saying that we should respect their interests equally, that is, that we should give to the interests of each the same serious consideration as claims to considerations necessary for some standard of well-being that we can recognise and endorse. (Singer 1976, pp. 160–61)

Benn attempted to defend this form of discrimination by distinguishing between what justifies the peculiar moral status of a class, the class of morally considerable persons, and the criteria for membership of the class. The moral status of the class of humans is determined by the characteristics that distinguish a normal man from a normal dog (e.g., rationality). But what makes an individual a member of a class should be an essential attribute, as species membership is, for moral status should not depend on characteristics that are normal to a species but yet possibly transitory.

Common morality assigns only an intermediate moral status to the other animals: from a moral point of view, they count for more than mere things but less than persons. Singer maintains that this common view is indefensible—our ordinary attitudes towards animals exemplify a moral failing of the same kind as do the attitudes of a racist or sexist—and so Singer speaks of 'speciesism':

> The racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of another race.... Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of other species. The pattern is identical in each case. (1977, p. 9)

Singer's starting point is what he calls the 'Principle of Equality': 'the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being' (1977, p. 6). Benn and Singer agree that acceptance of this principle does not presuppose that the beings involved are in fact equal in attributes, such as intelligence, nor does it enjoin actual equality of treatment. Rather, what it requires is just equal consideration of like interests. Singer easily shows that a recognition of something like this point underlies much of the historical argument against racism and other discriminatory moral attitudes. So if it is allowed that non-human animals also have interests, Singer argues, then the denial of equal consideration to them arbitrarily violates the equality principle.

Two questions are pressing now. First, do animals have interests, and if so in what sense? And second, what is involved in giving equal consideration to the interests of all animals? To the first of these questions, Singer's answer is that animals have interests just because they are sentient:

> The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaningful way. . . . If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. . . . The limit of sentience... is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. (1977, p. 9)

We may grant that a being has interests provided it is possible to distinguish actions that promote its welfare from those that are neutral or harmful to it, and it is plausible to hold that the possession of sentience is both necessary and sufficient for the possession of interests in this sense. Some writers have suggested that more is needed for moral discourse; that talk of interests presupposes at least rudimentary cognitive equipment, beliefs and desires; and that this may be more than we should assume for most animals. That looks plausible where talk about interests is linked with talk about rights and obligations. But Singer does not deploy those notions. For him the notion of interests is needed solely for a distinction between cases where injury or damage to a being can be said to be wrong because of the harm done to it, i.e., because its interests are injured, and cases where it is wrong because in damaging one being, harm is done to the interests of another. Singer's notion of interests seems the appropriate one to employ here.

More serious difficulties arise over the answer to our second question. What the equality principle requires is that animal interests should not be sacrificed except to achieve some greater human good. Thus, moral reasoning must involve comparisons, across species, of satisfactions and suffering and requires that equal weighting be given to like interests. Singer tends to concentrate on cases where actual pain is involved, so that the idea of rough estimates of degrees of suffering does not seem absurd. But he also requires that estimates of the harm done to animal interests, for example, in factory farming, should take into account the frustration and deprivation of natural pleasure, as well as actual pain. Regulations governing animal experimentation in Australia and the UK have also come to insist on this. But the suggestion that these might be objectively weighed and balanced against human benefits is highly problematic.

The problem of interpersonal, or inter-species, utility comparisons becomes less severe where utilitarian calculations are constrained by a system of overriding individual rights. If there is a right to life, for example, which overrides any utilitarian assessment of the advantages to be gained from killing, then questions of the relative worth or magnitude of interests becomes simply irrelevant. The question of animal rights, then, cannot simply be put aside, and a case for animal liberation developed without deciding it. If humans are allowed the rights normally recognised as just, this alone will work to prevent equal consideration of animal interests unless like rights are assigned to them. Otherwise the principle of equal consideration of interests, applied to animals, tends to reduce to the minimal principle that animal interests are not to be sacrificed except for some significant good, where significance is measured by human interests and values.

This rather minimal principle, whatever its difficulties, is, I think, the one that underlies the common approach to the morality of animal welfare. But it is emphatically not one to which we conform in dealing with other people. For on this account it does not matter if the individual whose interests are sacrificed to secure some good is distinct from the individual who benefits from the good, and hence, it is allowed that the interests of an individual may be wholly sacrificed to secure the good of others. It should be clear that we do not normally reason in this way for persons. In general, where cost-benefit analysis involves interpersonal comparisons, the consideration of interests has to take account not only of the net balance, so to speak, of satisfaction over suffering—it must also pay heed to various considerations of justice and fair play. A strengthened version of the equality principle results when we build in the principles of justice that normally operate in the consideration of interpersonal interest conflicts. If we recognise the same constraints in considering the interests of other animals, then very radical results indeed quickly follow—any form of animal exploitation, whether or not suffering is involved, will be wrong in the same way slavery is. By these standards, even what now counts as humane and responsible behaviour towards animals comes out as immoral—or at best (though seldom even that) misguided paternalism.

Singer would not accept the strengthened equality principle. Adopting it would have the consequence that, from the fact that it would be better, all things considered, if a certain state of affairs were to come about, it does not follow that anyone has morally good reason to act to bring it about. It is, in any case, far from obvious that the constraints of the strengthened equality principle should be extended to our treatment of the other animals. Sentience alone provides a sufficient foundation for the application of the minimal, or utilitarian, form of the equality principle; but because the strengthened form goes beyond anything that can be defended on strictly utilitarian grounds, it is arguable that more than mere sentience is required before it applies. The alternative commonly suggested is that the strengthened principle applies only to persons, that is, to beings who are not only sentient but also capable of intentional autonomous action, beings that must be ascribed not only states of consciousness but also states of belief, thought and intention. This was the view defended by Stanley Benn and by Townsend (1979) in a review of Singer's *Animal Liberation*.

In ‘Freedom, Autonomy and the Concept of a Person’ (1976), Benn listed several requirements for what he called a condition of ‘autarchy’, i.e., of being self-governing, which he claims is normal for persons. Somewhat condensed, the conditions are these:

(i) It must be possible to identify a single person corresponding over time to a single physically acting subject.
(ii) The person must recognise canons of evidence and inference warranting changes in his beliefs and be capable of changing his beliefs accordingly.
(iii) He must be capable of formulating preferences and projects with reasonable constancy, so that decisions can be taken now for the sake of a preferred future state.
(iv) He must be capable of making decisions in the light of his beliefs and preferences and of conforming his action to them.

Benn’s conditions may be summed up in the requirement that an individual is to count as autarchic only if he is capable of acting for reasons in a minimally rational way. The conditions are fairly strong; most non-human animals do not satisfy them, yet for mature humans they are normal. Most people meet the requirements, and our ordinary attitudes towards them presuppose it. If someone fails to meet any of the requirements, he is, in an important sense, incapacitated as a person, and it becomes impossible or inappropriate to respond to him as we normally do to a person.

The suggestion that the apparatus of rights extends only to persons bumps up against a problem Singer stressed, for we recognise the rights of immature or incapacitated people who do not, in some phase of their life, satisfy Benn’s conditions. Benn’s defence was to argue that personhood is not a phase attribute of individuals. Fundamental moral status should not be tied too closely to the present and changeable attributes of the individual. Consider Benn’s condition (i). The person persisting through time is a four-dimensional object, of which the phases are parts; fundamental moral status attaches to the whole and should not depend at any time on what attributes the individual has at that time. The problems surrounding this view are most often explored in the discussion of issues to do with abortion, because it seems to entail that a foetus must have the same moral status as a child or mature human; the issue comes up, for example, in Michael Tooley’s paper, ‘Abortion and Infanticide’ (1972).

Environmental Ethics

Environmental ethics emerged as a philosophically important matter in the early 1970s. At the annual conference in New Zealand in 1973, Richard Routley posed the question, ‘Do we need a new, an environmental ethic?’ Routley answered ‘Yes’. The next year, John Passmore’s *Man’s Responsibility for Nature* (1974) was published advocating the ‘No’ answer. Passmore’s book was remarkable, as might be expected, for its historical survey of views about other animals and the environment. For us, however, what matters is the stance Passmore adopted on current environmental issues and thus his negative answer to Routley's question. The book was reviewed in the *AJP* by Val Routley, in a penetrating discussion that laid out the issues with striking clarity. The exchange put environmental philosophy firmly on the philosophical agenda.

Passmore's contention was that present environmental problems—pollution and environmental degradation—can *only* be solved within the framework of the Western ethical tradition. There is no need for a new ethic and indeed there is no rational alternative to the established human-centred ethics of the West. The only moral constraints on human manipulation of the environment are those that arise from obligations to other humans, yet they suffice to demonstrate the need for a change in environmental attitudes and policies. Call this the 'Dominion View'. The alternatives suggested by 'deep ecologists' are, Passmore argued, irrational and mystical and present a greater threat to Western civilisation than that posed by the environmental problems they seek to address.

The view advanced by Routley, let's call it the 'Environmental Values View', is that environmental entities—forests, ecosystems, species and even rock formations—have intrinsic value that is ethically important, independently of human interests. Routley's view is to be distinguished from that of the deep ecologists that Passmore had in mind: it is not mystical, it does not attribute rights to non-human things and it is not irrational. The claim is just that there are values that must be weighed in environmental deliberations that do not reduce to human concerns. Routley's view does not involve assigning rights or obligations to non-human entities, but it does contest some rights claimed for humans.

Plainly, there is room for an alternative between the positions adopted by Passmore and Routley. One is implicit in Singer's extended utilitarian view, though Singer did not publish on environmental issues until much later. There is no mention of the environment in the first edition of *Practical Ethics* (1979), but the second edition (1993) has a chapter dealing with the environment that occupies ground between Passmore and Routley: other sentient beings have interests that must count in environmental deliberations. The expanded circle of moral concern undermines the Dominion View but still makes all values dependent on the interests of sentient beings.

Compare the way the three views we have distinguished would respond to Routley's 'Last Man on Earth' example. Imagine the last human living on Earth soon to die. Suppose he has the chance to go out in a big bang, destroying the biosphere. Does he act wrongly if he chooses that course? Are there reasons that should move him to restraint, though obviously not reasons drawn from human interests? Routley's answer is plainly 'Yes', and he thinks that is the intuitive answer. Passmore's answer would probably be that there is no reason not to make the bold exit. It might be possible, however, to appeal to considerations of the sort that figure in virtue ethics—a man should preserve his integrity to the end—and that might give Passmore a way out. Singer has an easy answer: as long as there are other sentient animals remaining, or the possibility of their evolving, restraint is called for.

Passmore's defence of environmentalism is remarkably weak. He can see no ground for concern for other animals, except insofar as they affect human concerns. He can see no ground for concern about the long-term future of humanity or for people a thousand years from now whose position is so remote from ours that we can feel no love for them. He can see no reason for wanting to preserve rather than conserve areas of wilderness—here preserving is something we do without thought of human benefit. On all these points, Routley's seems the more plausible view. What of Singer? He argues against depreciating the long-term consequences of our actions. Concerns, for example, about the future impact of nuclear waste are easily accommodated by him, and he can defend the importance of the preservation of wild habitats for the sentient beings that live there. Yet Singer can find no intrinsic value in forests, or the preservation of species, or in biodiversity. Routley's position, expanding the range of things that have intrinsic value, accords better with the way many environmental arguments are conducted. Is this a philosophically defensible view?

Moral Theory

Moral theory in Australia in the 1960s and 1970s was dominated by two themes. One was the issue of non-cognitivism, the metaethical view that there are no moral facts and so there is no room for anything that might be called moral knowledge. There were opponents of course, H. J. McCloskey, for example. But variations on the non-cognitivist theme were far more common. D. H. Monro had defended a non-cognitivist view in his *Empiricism and Ethics* (1967). J. L. Mackie had argued, in *Ethics*: *Inventing Right and Wrong* (1977), that the suggestion of a class of facts that somehow entail prescriptive conclusions is so decidedly queer that it could not be countenanced. J. J. C. Smart defended an act-utilitarian ethic, in *Utilitarianism for and Against* (1973), and did so within a non-cognitivist metaethic. Utilitarianism cannot be proved, he held, but it can be developed in a form that is coherent and persuasive—and that is no small thing. The suggestion that there are non-utilitarian values attaching to non-sentient entities, independently of human valuers, challenges that tradition.

The second dominant theme in Australian moral theory was utilitarianism. Again, there were opponents, such as McCloskey and Mackie. Yet in normative ethics, utilitarianism had strong appeal. Smart defended a no-nonsense version where actions are judged by their consequences and the value of consequences is judged solely by their pleasantness or unpleasantness. The common criticism, that this form of utilitarianism cannot do justice to our strong moral intuitions (about justice, say) and sometimes results in actions that a moral person should find repugnant, was met with 'bite-the-bullet' resolution. If our best theory has consequences we find difficult to accept, we should follow the theory rather than intuition unless there is a better theory on hand. Intuition is not infallible in ethics or logic. Singer's form of utilitarianism was different. He defended preference utilitarianism, the view that the best outcomes are those that best accord with the preferences of everyone affected. Preference utilitarianism had two advantages. First, and obviously, it accords better with the choices people commonly make and so is less paternalist than the hedonistic form. Secondly, it makes possible a prima facie justification of utilitarianism by a generalisation of rational decision theory. The argument for this conclusion was offered in the first chapter of *Practical Ethics* (1979). All we need to add to rational prudence to get to utilitarianism, as a first stop position at least, is the principle that ethical reasoning must adopt a universal stance. The catch is that the argument leaves open the possibility that other theories might be found that require us to go beyond the minimal utilitarian position. Singer cannot imagine what they might be. But again, the fact that utilitarianism regularly leads to consequences that are strongly counterintuitive lends support to a search for alternative theories that achieve a better balance of intuition and theory. A rights-based theory, for example, imposing constraints on interpersonal trade-offs, may provide a better fit. The problems in environmental ethics push us to look for a theory that accommodates intrinsic values other than pleasure or preference satisfaction. Why not? But it is a big step, not because values outside the domain of sentient beings are queer, but because this poses a difficult problem for ethical theory.

An ethical theory needs two parts: a theory of what is valuable and a theory about how values may be brought within the scope rational decision-making. Classical utilitarianism of the sort Smart defends has a lovely simple solution for both tasks. Preference utilitarianism, extended in the way Singer suggests, can be defended as an extension of rational decision theory, but it encounters problems with interpersonal and inter-species utility comparisons. Rights-based theories reduce the problem of utility comparisons by imposing limiting constraints that complicate the decision theory. If intrinsic environmental values are admitted, then what looks like a minor and intuitive extension of the value component in ethical theory leaves us without a plausible account of how the decision theory should work. Neither utilitarian nor rights-based theories can cope.

References

Anderson, J. (2007). In C. Cole (Ed.), *Space time and the categories: Lectures on metaphysics 1949–50*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Armstrong, D. (1961). *Perception and the physical world*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Armstrong, D. (1968). *A materialist theory of the mind*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Armstrong, D. (1973). *Belief, truth and knowledge*. London: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Armstrong, D. (1978). *Universals and scientific realism*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Armstrong, D. (1980). *The nature of mind and other essays*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Armstrong, D. (1984). In R. Bogdan & D. M. Armstrong (Eds.), *Self profile* (pp. 3–51). Dordrecht: Reidel.

Armstrong, D. (2004). A defence of a cognitivist theory of perception. *Harvard Review of Philosophy*, *12*, 19–26.

Baier, K. (1958). *The moral point of view*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Benn, S. (1967). Egalitarianism and equal consideration of interests. *Nomos IX*: *Equality* p. 66ff. New York: Atherton Press

Bogdan, R. (1984). *D. M. Armstrong*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Brown, R., & Rollins, C. (1969). *Contemporary philosophy in Australia*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Burgess, J. (1992). The influence of Quine and Davidson on Australian philosophy. In J. Srzednicki & D. Wood (Eds.), *Essays on philosophy in Australia* (pp. 94–124). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Campbell, K. (1970). *Body and mind*. Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books.

Clendinnen, J. (1966). Induction and objectivity. *Philosophy of Science, 33*, 215–219.

Clendinnen, J. (1970). A response to Jackson. *Philosophy of Science, 37*, 444–448.

Copeland, B. (1979). On when a semantics is not a semantics. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8*, 399–413.

Cresswell, M. (1979). *Logics and languages*. London: Methuen.

Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons, and causes. *Journal of Philosophy, 60*, 685–700.

Dennett, D. (1978). *Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psychology*. Sussex: Harvester Press.

Deutscher, M. (1969). A causal account of inferring. In R. Brown & C. Rollins (Eds.), *Contemporary philosophy in Australia* (pp. 97–118). London: George Allen & Unwin.

Deutscher, M. (1976). Critical notice of Armstrong's belief, truth and knowledge. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 54*, 162–182.

Flew, A. (1971). Critical notice of contemporary philosophy in Australia. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49*, 97–103.

Fox, J. (2010). The problem of induction. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *Companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*. Melbourne: Monash University Publishing. http://books.publishing.monash.edu/apps/bookworm/view/A+Companion+to+Philosophy+in+Australia+and+New+Zealand/56/xhtml/chapter09.html#chapter09sec03.

Frankena, W. (1962). The concept of social justice. In R. Brand (Ed.), *Social justice* p. 19. Englewood Cliffs.

Hughes, G., & Cresswell, M. (1968). *An introduction to modal logic*. London: Methuen.

Hughes, G., & Cresswell, M. (1984). *A companion to modal logic*. London: Methuen.

Hughes, G., & Cresswell, M. (1996). *A new introduction to modal logic*. London: Routledge.

Jackson, F. (1970a). A reply to 'induction and probability'. *Philosophy of Science, 37*, 440–443.

Jackson, F. (1970b). Reply to a response. *Philosophy of Science, 37*, 449–451.

Jackson, F. (1977). *Perception: A representative theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Jackson, F. (1979). On assertion and indicative conditionals. *Philosophical Review, LXXXVIII*, 565–589.

Johnston, M. (1992). Constitution is not identity. *Mind, 101*, 89–105.

Kielkopf, C. (1974). Critique of the Routleys' first degree semantics. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 52*, 105–120.

Lewis, D. (1966). An argument for the identity theory. *Journal of Philosophy, 63*, 17–25.

Mackie, J. (1973). *Truth, probability and paradox*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Mackie, J. (1977). *Ethics: Inventing right and wrong*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Mares, E. Relevance logic. In E. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Stanford University. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/logic-relevance/

Monro, D. H. (1967). *Empiricism and ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mumford, S. (2007). *David Armstrong*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Passmore, J. (1974). *Man's responsibility for nature*. London: Duckworth.

Routley, R. (1973). Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic? *Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, 1*, 205–210.

Routley, V. (1974). Critical notice of Passmore's man's responsibility for nature. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 53*, 171–185.

Routley, R., & Routley, V. (1972). The semantics of first degree entailment. *Nous, 6*, 335–358.

Singer, P. (1972). Famine, affluence and morality. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1*, 229–243.

Singer, P. (1976). All animals are equal. In T. Regan & P. Singer (Eds.), *Animal rights and human obligations* (pp. 73–86). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Singer, P. (1977). *Animal liberation: A new ethics for our treatment of animals*. New York: New York Review.

Singer, P. (1979). *Practical ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Singer, P. (1993). *Practical ethics* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smart, J. (1963). *Philosophy and scientific realism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Smart, J. (1987). *Essays metaphysical and moral*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Smart, J., & Williams, B. (1973). *Utilitarianism for and against*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Srzednicki, J., & Wood, D. (Eds.). (1994). *Essays on philosophy in Australia*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Stove, D. (1965). Hume, probability and induction. *Philosophical Review, 74*, 160–177.

Stove, D. (1970). Deductivism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *48*, 76–98.

Stove, D. (1973). *Probability and Hume's inductive scepticism*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Stove, D. (1976). Hume, induction and the Irish. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *54*, 140–147.

Stove, D. (1982). *Popper and after: Four modern irrationalists*. Oxford: Pergamon.

Stove, D. (1986). *The rationality of induction*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Sylvan, R. (1985). Prospects for regional philosophies in Australasia. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 63*, 188–204.

Tichý, P. (1974). On Popper's definitions of similitude. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *25*, 155–160.

Tichý, P. (1976). Verisimilitude redefined. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *27*, 25–42.

Tooley, M. (1972). Abortion and infanticide. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2*, 37–65.

Townsend, A. (1979). Radical vegetarians. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 57*, 85–93.

8

Achievements of the 1980s

Lynda Burns

Contents

Introduction 211
Institutions and People 214
  Philosophy in New Zealand: The Fortunes of Departments, Large and Small 214
  Philosophy in Australia: The Fortunes of Departments, Old and New 216
Research Directions 224
  An Overview of the 1980s: Trends and Influences 224
  Research into Alternative Logics: The Automated Reasoning Project 226
  Bioethics at Monash 228
  Work in Metaphysics: Universals, Laws of Nature, Possible Worlds and Tropes 229
  Philosophy of Mind and Jackson's Critique of Materialism 232
  Environmental Philosophy 233
  Feminism and the History of Philosophy 234
Conclusion 237
References 237

Introduction

Philosophy flourished in Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s, despite tensions within some departments and increasing difficulties imposed from without. A generation of philosophers who had got jobs in the 1960s were reaching the peak of their careers and producing substantial publications, some of which are still a focus for research and debate. A list of these would include Frank Jackson's article 'Epiphenomenal Qualia' (1982) and his 'What Mary Didn't Know' (1986), David Armstrong's book *What is a Law of Nature?* (1983) and Genevieve Lloyd's 1984

L. Burns
School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
e-mail: 35lburns@gmail.com

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_9, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

The Man of Reason. Jackson's 'knowledge argument' is often cited in current work in philosophy of mind[1]; Armstrong's account of natural laws as relations between universals is now one of the standard accounts of laws of nature [2] and has led to an ongoing debate in metaphysics,[3] and Genevieve Lloyd's book is regarded as a foundational text in contemporary feminist theory.[4]

Philosophy as a discipline was expanding, as it had been doing throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The colonising of new areas of research led to further developments in the 1980s in applied philosophy, relevantist and paraconsistent alternatives to classical logics, bioethics, feminist theory, environmental philosophy, Continental philosophy and Asian philosophy. Several collections were devoted to these developing areas: Routley, Meyer, Plumwood and Brady's *Relevant Logics and their Rivals* appeared in 1982; Priest et al. *Paraconsistent Logic* in 1987; and Norman and Sylvan's *Directions in Relevant Logic* in 1989. In environmental philosophy, chapters in Elliot and Gare's 1983 collection and Mannison et al. 1980 collection argued for an expansion of the scope of ethics to take in the natural world. There was a special issue of the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* devoted to feminist theory and an issue of the new journal *Critical Philosophy* on nuclear disarmament. Also in the 1980s Max Charlesworth published the first philosophical investigation of Australian Aboriginal thought (Charlesworth 1984, 1987). Prior to the 1980s, there was very little research in the area of indigenous philosophy in either New Zealand or Australia.[5]

There were large changes to the philosophy curriculum in some departments where the course content expanded to include feminist philosophy, Continental philosophy, Marxist theory, environmental philosophy and applied ethics. This excursion of philosophy into new areas was not only an Australasian phenomenon, of course: the resurgence of French philosophy, the environmental movement and the feminist second wave were international movements. In Australia, the changes in subjects offered were a source of internal tension in some departments, and there was much debate about Marxism and feminism, about the scope of philosophy, about what ought to be taught in a philosophy department and the relative merits of analytic, non-analytic and applied philosophy. Such disputes in the Sydney department had led to a split in the 1970s, and despite heroic efforts, this split did not heal during the 1980s.

Philosophers were becoming more active in the public world. They wrote in the press and spoke in public meetings on nuclear disarmament, euthanasia and the sanctity of life. Australian philosopher Peter Singer was embroiled in debates about infanticide of handicapped infants and the new reproductive technology of in vitro fertilisation (IVF). The Monash Bioethics Centre, started by Singer in 1980, was the first of its kind in Australasia and a model for other bioethics centres. Another very significant development in this decade was the establishment of ethics units in some large public hospitals, which led to increased public recognition of the role of philosophy.

---

[1] See, for example, Muller (2009), Howell (2007), Alter (2007) and articles in Ravenscroft (2009).

[2] See Cartwright et al. (2005).

[3] See Kalhat (2006), Williams (2007), Bolander (2006) and Forrest (2006).

[4] Colebrook's (2000) article provides a useful review of Lloyd's contribution to feminist thought.

[5] This research took different directions in each country. In Australia, it has been developed within philosophy of religion and in particularly within the area of comparative religion, while in New Zealand, the central focus has tended to be on ethics, comparing Maori and Western values.

Yet despite all this activity and increased public awareness of the profession, there were signs of difficult times ahead. In Australia, there had been a decline in demand for university places from the mid-1970s, partly for demographic reasons, but also because of the increase in the number of Colleges of Advanced Education (CAE). After the rapid expansion of the 1960s and 1970s, government funding decreased in real terms. The Federal government was increasingly taking over funding of universities from state governments and used this as an opportunity to introduce greater regulation of the sector. The education minister in the Labor government, John Dawkins, introduced a series of unpopular reforms in 1987, which included fees for students under HECS (the Higher Education Contribution Scheme) and a policy of forced mergers of Colleges of Advanced Education. The effect of the merger of CAEs with universities was to spread available funding over an extended group of institutions. By the end of the 1980s, there were three times as many CAEs as universities, but the funding for the sector had not increased in real terms. Class sizes increased, recruitment of new staff slowed, retiring staff were not automatically replaced and young philosophy graduates had become more pessimistic about their future in philosophy. While revenue from government sources dried up, real costs increased. These included the cost of installing and maintaining the computer equipment appearing on academics' desks in the 1970s and 1980s. The universities were forced to find new revenue sources and the end of the 1980s saw the introduction of full fees for overseas students. New structures of 'accountability' were introduced at the same time, requiring universities to justify research and new courses, with the consequent increase in administrative costs and in time spent filling out forms.

In New Zealand, even larger economic reforms and restructuring of social policy was occurring in the 1980s and was having a similar impact on tertiary education. New Zealand, unlike Australia, experienced an unexpectedly high growth in student numbers at universities during the 1980s and a corresponding deterioration in the staff-student ratio. The Labor government of 1984 imposed a market-based policy which had the effect of undermining institutional autonomy even more than in Australia. As in Australia, state funding for the education sector declined in real terms, and free tertiary education was replaced with a system of fees and student loans.[6]

Although philosophy as a discipline was expanding, staff numbers in many Australasian philosophy departments were dropping. The figures for retention of staff at lecturer level or above in Australia were not good: by the end of the decade, Australian philosophy departments had, overall, lost over a dozen full-time staff.

---

[6] http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3965/is_200201/ai_n9034417/pg_8?tag=artBody;col1.

Although the number of full-time staff did not decline as much during these years in New Zealand, by the end of the 1980s, philosophers there were also under pressure from cuts to funding and other destructive government policies.

So it may be that the confidence to publish new ideas and the conditions for their reception as serious philosophy were already in place, thanks to the years of growth and secure funding in earlier decades. This is suggested by Richard Routley's comments in the preface to his massive 1980 work, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*. He states that parts of the essays in the volume had been read at various places since 1965 and some of the material had already been published. He goes on to say: 'It is a pleasure to record that much of the material is now regarded as far less crazy and disreputable than it was in the mid-1960s, when it was taken as a sign of early mental deterioration and of critical irresponsibility' (Routley 1980, p. vii).

There is, however, more to be said about the reasons for the successes of the 1980s, as we will see in the later sections of this chapter.

Institutions and People

Philosophy in New Zealand: The Fortunes of Departments, Large and Small

At the start of the 1980s, Auckland had just appointed Swedish logician Krister Segerberg to the chair. He published on propositional operators for classical logic (Segerberg 1982) and a series of articles using modal logic and possible world semantics to formalise propositions about action.[7] John Bishop was also publishing on action theory in the 1980s, though from a different angle. His book, *Natural Agency* (1989), argues that the ethical perspective on action which takes us to be responsible for our acts is compatible with a naturalist, causal theory of human behaviour. Logic, metaphysics, philosophy of science and the philosophy of language were the main interests of other members of this large department. Martin Tweedale was publishing on medieval logic, and Robert Nola and Fred Kroon wrote on reference fixing for theoretical terms as well as numerous articles on the philosophy of science. Denis Robinson, who joined the department in 1985, published on identity, matter and Humean supervenience. Jan Crosthwaite's publications in the 1980s included a paper on metaphor, one on the representation of linguistic ability and another, jointly authored with Graham Priest, on Davidson's account of meaning and relevant logic. Crosthwaite also wrote on sexual harassment with Christine Swanton, who published on ethical intuitionism and on Rawls during the decade. Continental philosophy was represented by Julian Young's publications on Schopenhauer.

---

[7] Of the published works of philosophers mentioned in this section, only books are listed in the Bibliography.

At Otago, Alan Musgrave was working on a range of issues including realism, various topics in the philosophy of science and a critique of Wittgensteinian instrumentalism. While on leave in the UK, Musgrave invited Pavel Tichy, a refugee who had escaped from Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring, to a lectureship in Otago. Tichy's appointment was a great boost for logic and philosophy in New Zealand. During the 1980s, he published on a diverse range of topics, including the logic of temporal discourse, freedom and responsibility, necessity, ability statements and subjunctive conditionals. In 1981 he was appointed to a personal chair in logic. But the most prolific publisher at Otago was not Tichy but Gregory Currie, another 1980s appointee, who produced seven articles, a book on Frege (Currie 1982) and a book on the ontology of art (Currie 1989), as well as an anthology on Popper and the human sciences, edited with Musgrave (Currie and Musgrave 1985).[8]

Max Cresswell, at Victoria University in Wellington, published perhaps the most substantial body of work written in New Zealand in the 1980s. It included the books *Structured Meanings* and *Adverbial Modification*, both appearing in 1985, and a collection of his work entitled *Semantical Essays: Possible Worlds and their Rivals*, which appeared in 1988. In the same department, Ismay Barwell was publishing on aesthetics, while Jay Shaw published on Frege and on Indian philosophy. In the late 1980s, Kim Sterelny joined the department and also contributed a substantial body of publications, mostly in the philosophy of biology. These included his 1988 article in the *Journal of Philosophy* with Phillip Kitcher entitled, 'The Return of the Gene'. He also wrote articles on Fodor's nativism, the debate about imagery, Davidson on truth and reference, conversational implicature, natural kind terms and mental representation.

The fortunes of the smaller departments in New Zealand varied. In Waikato, Alister Gunn was publishing on the moral status of animals and why we should care about rare species. He also wrote on political thought in the eighteenth century. David Lumsden was the one appointment to this department in the early 1980s. He published on God and sociobiology, as well as intentions and convention in determining reference.

Canterbury saw the completion of the project, begun by Bob Stoothoff and taken on by Dugald Murdoch and John Cottingham, of a three-volume translation of Descartes' philosophical writings. This has now become the standard edition of Descartes' works. In the mid-1980s, the department's research output increased greatly after the appointment of David Novitz and Jack Copeland. During the 1980s, Novitz contributed a book on knowledge and imagination and a dozen articles on the philosophy of art. One theme developed in his book was that literary fiction is a source of knowledge. Other articles argued against relativism and criticised Davidson's account of metaphor. The appointment of Jack Copeland as professor greatly enhanced the department's offerings in logic. Copeland published on substitutional semantics for quantifiers and also on the meaning of logical symbols. He was a major critic of the relevant logics which were gaining ground among logicians in Australia.

---

[8] Ex-students from the Otago department were also doing significant work in this decade. In the mid-1980s, Annette Baier published *Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals*, as well as her influential articles 'What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory' and 'Trust and Anti-Trust'. Another ex-student, Jeremy Waldron, published *The Right to Private Property* and a book on Bentham and human rights entitled, *Nonsense upon Stilts*.

Another small department in New Zealand benefited from a professorial appointment during the 1980s: Graham Oddie at Massey University. Oddie revitalised interest in a range of philosophical issues, producing papers on aesthetics, incommensurability and verisimilitude. His book, *Likeness to Truth*, appeared in 1986. He also co-authored a paper with Pavel Tichy on abilities and powers and encouraged work on Maori philosophy by another staff member, John Patterson, who published in this area in the 1990s.

Overall, universities in New Zealand remained stable in terms of staff numbers. Auckland lost two over the decade, while Otago and Victoria gained two each.

Philosophy in Australia: The Fortunes of Departments, Old and New

Philosophers at Australian universities founded in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Deakin, Murdoch, Macquarie and Swinburne Institute of Technology, were spearheading the expansion into the new territories. At several of these younger universities, there was no philosophy department. Murdoch had an interdisciplinary program with a philosophical bent, established in 1987, where units on existentialism, technology and society and environmental ethics were taught. At Swinburne, Arran Gare was publishing work in environmental philosophy. He edited a book on that topic with Robert Elliot in 1983. Continental philosophy was taught there by Paul Healy and also by Maurita Harney. Her 1984 book, *Intentionality, Sense and the Mind*, argued for a similarity between the concerns of Husserl and Frege and developed an account of intentionality using Frege's notion of sense.

Deakin was established in 1977, modelled on the British Open University and committed to an interdisciplinary and teamwork approach in teaching and research. The program was led by Max Charlesworth and staff included Doug Kirsner, Stan van Hooft and Jocylyn Dunphy. Students were introduced to Asian philosophy, Freud, Marx, Sartre and religious studies. In the late 1980s, Kevin Hart and Purushottama Bilimoria also worked at Deakin. Bilimoria published on Indian philosophy and comparative religion. The most well-received Continental work of the decade was Kevin Hart's volume on deconstruction, *Trespass of the Sign*, published in 1989. Max Charlesworth delivered the Boyer lecture on developments in bioethics (later published as *Life, Death, Genes and Ethics*) and wrote articles on science, the philosophy of religion, the Aboriginal land rights movement and the previously neglected area of Aboriginal religions in Australia.

In New South Wales, Macquarie University maintained a strong tradition in ethics, feminism and Continental philosophy throughout the 1980s. Max Deutsher wrote on Ryle, and on the role of imagery in philosophical argument, as well as publishing *Subjecting and Objecting* in 1983. Luciana O'Dwyer worked on phenomenology, and Raoul Mortley, Ross Poole, San McColl and Val Plumwood published in ethics, environmental issues and feminism. Ross Poole edited a collection, with Paul Patton, on war and masculinity. Val Plumwood (known as Val Routley in the early 1980s) contributed to collections on relevant logic and environmental ethics, as well as writing on feminism: her 1989 article on the sex/gender distinction remains one of the clearest pieces of work in this area.

This is not a complete picture of the Macquarie department: philosophy of language and history and philosophy of science were also very well represented by Vic Dudman, who published mainly on conditionals during the 1980s, and by Alan Olding who wrote several articles on theories of evolution. John Kleinig's book, *Paternalism*, came out in 1984, and he also published on academic freedom and on a range of issues in applied philosophy. These included two books: one on ethical issues in psychosurgery and the other on education.

The Flinders philosophy department had seven permanent staff through the 1980s. They included Brian Medlin, Greg O'Hair, Ian Hunt, Lawrence Johnson, Rodney Allen, Ken Sievers and Dene Barnett. Ian Hunt produced several articles on Marxist theory, continuing a tradition in the Flinders department, which had taught Marxist-Leninist theory during the 1970s. Members of the department published a jointly authored three-volume *Materialist History of Philosophy* in 1981. They were also instrumental in setting up a Women's Studies department at Flinders, which had close ties with the philosophy department for some years. Dene Barnett was a philosopher with an unusual range of other talents. A self-trained logician and musicologist, he also published on eighteenth-century theatre and founded the theory of gesture in acting. Laurence Johnson published on environmental philosophy, Greg O'Hair on epistemology and philosophy of language and Rodney Allen on ethics. Allen contributed an article on nuclear disarmament to a 1986 special issue of *Critical Philosophy*.

In Sydney, political strife in the 1970s over the teaching of Marxist and feminist philosophy had led to a split into two departments: the department of General Philosophy with John Burnheim as head, which taught courses on Marxism, feminism, philosophy of science and phenomenology, and the department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy headed by Challis Professor David Armstrong, which offered courses in analytic philosophy. The appointment of Stephen Gaukroger to General Philosophy in 1981 introduced an approach to history of philosophy acceptable to both, and this led to a proposal for a joint program to be offered by both departments. But the 1980s did not bring peace to Sydney: continuing disagreements concerning appointments in the area of French feminist philosophy led to staff members from General Philosophy transferring to Traditional and Modern during this decade.

Through most of the 1980s, the department of General Philosophy consisted of John Burnheim, Wal Suchting, Alan Chalmers, Jean Curthoys and Paul Crittenden. Elizabeth Grosz, Denise Russell, Paul Patton and Moira Gatens were appointed to continuing positions in General Philosophy later in the 1980s. John Burnheim, a former Catholic priest, tried without success to conciliate between the warring factions. This experience influenced his 1985 work, *Is Democracy Possible?* Wal

Suchting wrote on Marxist theory, while Stephen Gaukroger and Alan Chalmers published prolifically in the history and philosophy of science. The revised edition of Chalmers' much translated book, *What Is This Thing Called Science?*, was reprinted in 1982, containing six new chapters. Gaukroger's publications included articles on Aristotle and two books: one on Descartes' philosophy, mathematics and physics in 1980 and another on Descartes' logic in 1989. Hungarian Marxist and Hegel scholar, György Markus, was an important influence in the 1980s, tempering the more dogmatic elements in the department. His historically oriented approach made use of Marxist ideas to develop an account of the social production of culture (Markus 1986). Lloyd Reinhardt published on a wide range of issues, including free speech, warrant for action, freedom and on use and mention. The General Philosophy department hosted a conference on Continental philosophy in 1987, which included papers by Max Deutscher, Robin Small, Paul Crittenden and Luciana O'Dwyer.

Meanwhile, in the department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy, David Armstrong was publishing numerous articles and book chapters, as well as three books: *What is a Law of Nature?*, *Universals*, and *A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility*, and also a collection titled *The Nature of Mind and Other Essays*. There was an article on sets with Storrs McCall, one on truthmakers, another with Peter Forrest on numbers, an argument against Lewis on possible worlds, and a reply to Lewis' critique of his views. In the same department, Keith Campbell published a book on the Stoic philosophy of life. He was also working on a theory of abstract particulars, or 'tropes', as the ultimate constituents of the universe. Michael Devitt, who had transferred from General Philosophy in the 1970s, published two books on the philosophy of language: *Designation* in 1981 and *Language and Reality* (written with Kim Sterelny) in 1987, as well as articles on reference and on realism. He left for the United States in the late 1980s. David Stove defended science against irrationalism in *Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists*. Another book titled, *The Rationality of Induction*, was a critique of Humean scepticism. John Bacon published articles on supervenience, on Armstrong's theory of properties and on Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. Peter Menzies' work on causation was attracting notice in the 1980s. His 'Unified Account of Causal Relata' appeared in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* in 1989. By 1989, the department included Lloyd Reinhardt, Stephen Gaukroger, Jean Curthoys, Elizabeth Prior Johnson and Adrian Heathcote. Others had left, and overall the department had gained two members by the end of the decade.

Several other older and well-established philosophy departments shared much the same range of research interests as Traditional and Modern. Logic was particularly strong at Monash, where Aubrey Townsend published his text *Primary Logic* in the 1980s and Lloyd Humberstone produced a large number of articles on logic, necessity and possible worlds, epistemology and philosophy of language. John Crossley, in the mathematics department at Monash, is one of the few mathematicians in Australia to take a serious interest in the philosophy of logic. His interest encouraged interdisciplinary research at Monash through the 1980s involving postgraduate students in philosophy and mathematics. He chaired a discussion of the work of Arthur Prior at the 1981 conference of the Australasian Association for Logic at Wellington, New Zealand. Elizabeth Prior Johnson published 'Three Theses about Dispositions' with Pargetter and Jackson in the *American Philosophical Quarterly* in 1981; also, her book *Dispositions* appeared in 1985. C.L. Ten published his book *Mill on Liberty* in 1980. Monash also established a Centre for Bioethics in 1980, headed by Peter Singer. As well as numerous articles on animal liberation and other ethical issues, Singer published a book on Hegel and another on the sanctity-of-life doctrine. Monash had no appointments at lecturer level in the 1980s, and overall, the department lost two staff members.

At Adelaide University, Graham Nerlich, the Hughes Professor, was working on the philosophy of physics. Most of his publications were on the ontology of space and time and on relativity and motion. Logic also flourished at Adelaide, with publications by Chris Mortensen and Michael Bradley. Mortensen also published articles on universals, the scope of the possible, the limits of change, and explaining existence. John Chandler was another active researcher, publishing on God and morality. In 1984, Daniel Dennett visited Adelaide University and gave the Gavin David Young Lecture on the topic of consciousness. Overall, the department at Adelaide University lost one staff member over the decade.

A similar pattern of research was evident at the University of Melbourne, but there was also an interest there in philosophy of language, political philosophy and applied philosophy. Some Continental philosophy and feminist theory were also taught during the 1980s. Len Goddard in the Boyce Gibson Chair of Philosophy published on classical logic and the paradoxes. Graeme Marshall published on rational action and Bruce Langtry on Mackie on miracles. Barry Taylor's book, *Modes of Occurrence*, published in 1985, developed a linguistically oriented account of events. Taylor also edited a collection on the philosophy of Michael Dummett in 1987. Jan Srzednicki published on political philosophy (*Democratic Perspectives: Political and Social Philosophy*), as well as a work on Kant's first Critique (*The Place of Space*), and two edited collections on logic, one devoted to Lesniewski. Tony Coady published work in applied philosophy (on terrorism, the idea of violence and on just war theory) and the philosophies of Descartes and Hobbes. Len O'Neill published 'Corroborating Testimonies' in a 1982 issue of *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*. By 1983, the department included Allen Hazen, who published on logic, abstract entities, Platonism and modality. Mary McCloskey published articles on aesthetics and a book on *Kant's Aesthetic*, while Lynda Burns published an article on vagueness and added feminist philosophy to the department's teaching offerings.

Melbourne lost several valued staff members in the 1980s: Vernon Rice died during the 1980s soon after retiring, and Brenda Judge, who had been appointed early in the decade, died in 1986. Judge had taken over the very popular 'Contemporary European Philosophy' course introduced by Max Charlesworth. Her book, *Thinking About Things*, discussed the work of Frege, Husserl, Sartre and Pierce on signs and signification. She also published an extended article with Len Goddard on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Marion Tapper, who had introduced Continental philosophy to Queensland University, was then appointed to teach the 'Contemporary

European Philosophy' course and quickly established a large group of honour students and postgraduates in that area. Father Eric D'Arcy left the department in 1981 to become bishop of Sale, in Victoria. By the end of the 1980s, the Melbourne department was down by one member.

At the University of Western Australia, Selwyn Grave, author of the 1984 *History of Philosophy in Australia*, retired from the chair. He was replaced by Michael Tooley, who was working on causation in the 1980s. His book, *Causation: A Realist Approach*, appeared in 1986 with a number of articles on laws of nature and causal relations around the same time. Hartley Slater published on vagueness and also on Wittgenstein's aesthethics. Graham Priest was also a member of this department in the first half of the 1980s. He published a book and 22 articles in total, including seven on the logic of paradox, contradiction and rationality, several on time, an anti-realist account of mathematical truth, several on medieval logic, an article on the argument from design and one on realism in quantum mechanics. Priest also worked collaboratively, writing an article with Jim McKenzie on paraconsistent dialogue, an introduction to paraconsistent logics written with Routley in *Studia Logica* in 1984 and a chapter in *Directions in Relevant Logic* written with Jan Crosthwaite. Another member of the Western Australian department, Stewart Candlish, wrote articles on a range of topics, from F. H. Bradley, basic actions, and the private language argument, to one on the *Euthyphro*.

In other Australian universities, a variety of research interests flourished, often including logic, philosophy of science and metaphysics as well as environmental and Continental philosophy. This mix was evident at the University of Queensland. Professor Holborow was replaced in the late 1980s by Graham Priest. Rod Girle published on informal and formal logic, and Dominic Hyde defended modal logic against Quine's attack and also worked on alternatives to classical logic. Ian Hinckfuss' main interests were in the philosophy of science, and he published criticisms of the traditional distinction between absolutism and relativism in theories of space and time. Don Mannison published on cognitive relativism and also on Wittgenstein, arguing that he cannot be regarded as a Humean sceptic as claimed by Kripke. In the late 1970s, Mannison organised a conference on environmental philosophy, the source of a later collection. Gary Malinas published an article on pesticides, which discussed alternative policies and formulated principles to govern their use. Andre Gallois, who had arrived in Australia in the 1970s, worked on rigid designation and contingent identity, as well as on Locke on causation. From the mid-1980s, the department began to offer courses on Continental philosophy, which were taught by Tuan Nuyen, Marion Tapper and Michelle Walker. Nuyen published several articles on Hume, one on a Kantian theory of metaphor and another on feminism and sociobiology.

Similar diversity is evident at La Trobe University, in Victoria. The *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* was based there during the 1980s under the editorship of Brian Ellis. By this time, the department had grown to be one of the largest in Australasia. It included Frank Jackson, John McCloskey, Ross Brady, Behan McCullagh, Ray Pinkerton, Tom Richards, Dorothy Mitchell, Michael Stocker, Freya Matthews, Alec Hyslop, Robert Pargetter, John Bigelow, Janna Thompson, Robert Young, Ian Kesacodi-Watson, John Fox, Robert Farrell, Moshe Kroy, Melvyn Cann, Andrew Giles-Peters, Manfred Von Thun, Ross Phillips, John Campbell and Tim Oakley.

Some of the most influential articles of the 1980s were written by these philosophers, including Jackson's paper on the 'knowledge argument' (to be discussed in the next section). La Trobe philosophers also produced a large number of jointly authored articles. John Bigelow, Barbara Davidson, Robert Pargetter, John Campbell, Elizabeth Prior, Sue Dodds and Frank Jackson published between them 31 co-authored works during the 1980s on topics in the philosophy of science, ethics and metaphysics.

Tom Richards, Ross Brady and Manfred Von Thun all published work on various areas of logic. Work on philosophy of science and metaphysics included papers by Brian Ellis on the ontology of scientific realism, induction, conditionals and truth; by Dorothy Mitchell on deviant causal chains; by Robert Farrell on metaphysical necessity; and by John Fox on truth and truthmakers. Also, work in epistemology, and specifically on scepticism and epistemic justification, was published by Tim Oakley.

There was also substantial research done in environmental philosophy, ethics and political philosophy at La Trobe in these years by Janna Thompson, Freya Matthews and John McCloskey. As well as publications (including a book) on environmental ethics, McCloskey wrote on the nature of coercion, limits to freedom of expression, experimentation on animals and the right to privacy Andrew Giles-Peters published on Marx; Robert Young's book on personal autonomy came out in 1986; and Janna Thompson published on the morality of war. Michael Stocker worked on many topics on ethics and philosophical psychology, including the emotions, moral conflicts, akrasia, responsibility for beliefs and the ends of friendship. Behan McCullagh's research on relativism and the philosophy of history and Alec Hyslop's on literary works of art added to the diverse output from this department.

In spite of all this excellent research, times were becoming more difficult for La Trobe. The philosophy department lost many of these staff members during the 1980s and early 1990s: Frank Jackson, Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow went to Monash, John McCloskey retired, Tom Richards transferred to Computer Science at La Trobe and Alwynne Mackie to the School of Art in Canberra. None of these staff were replaced.

At Newcastle, the staff-student journal *Dialectic* produced several special issues in the 1980s. John Lee edited one on Greek philosophy in 1985 and Bill Doniela on Hegel. Doniela also organised a conference on Hegel in 1984 and reviewed work on Hegel for the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. In 1980, Cliff Hooker was appointed to the chair and succeeded in attracting a number of grants which sustained the department financially during the rest of the decade. He published on theories of evolutionary epistemology and edited several books on quantum theory. Another book published in 1987 developed a naturalistic and realist theory of science. Hooker also published a series of articles on intertheoretic reduction.

Richard Kearney, at the University of Tasmania, contributed a large number of articles and several books in the Continental philosophy area. He wrote an introductory work on modern movements in European philosophy, a series of dialogues with Continental thinkers, several anthologies edited with others and a book on imagination. Other staff at Tasmania had a variety of research interests. Paul Simpson published two articles in *Analysis* entitled ‘Here and Now’ and ‘Lyons and Tigers’. Winston Nesbitt wrote on whether philosophy should be applied, on Locke and compatibilism, and on Kohlberg on understanding reasons. Peter Singer gave the Martineau Lecture in Tasmania in 1981 on animal liberation. By the end of the decade, the Tasmanian department had lost one staff member.

Charles Hamblin, who was in the chair at the University of New South Wales in the early 1980s, had a large influence on many young logicians and philosophers. His book *Imperatives* was published in 1987, and another book *Fallacies* was reprinted in 1986. Genevieve Lloyd replaced Hamblin in the chair during the late 1980s, becoming the first female professor of philosophy in Australia. She introduced an emphasis on history of philosophy, feminism and Continental philosophy to the New South Wales department. Lisabeth During, also a member of the department in the late 1980s, and also working in Continental philosophy, published on Hegel’s critique of transcendence. Other members of the department had very different interests. Frank Vlach, at the department in the early 1980s, published on semantics for perception and speaker meaning, while Stephen Cohen worked on civil liberties. Others made a significant contribution to philosophy of education and the Philosophy in Schools movement in Australia. Phillip Cam published material for use in the classroom and also presented a paper during the 1980s to a UNESCO conference in Paris on philosophy for children. As in Sydney, there was some discord in this department during this time due to the differing research directions and teaching policies of staff.

At the University of New England, Richard Franklin wrote on epistemology and also on mysticism, science and religion. David Londey published on ancient philosophy, and B.C. Birchall published several articles on Hegel and also on Frege on objects and concepts. In the late 1980s, there was a large turnover of staff here, with new staff members working on a wider range of issues. Peter Forrest published on logic and divine command theory in ethics, as well as several articles on God and the problem of evil. Fred D’Agostino published 20 articles over the decade on topics ranging from political theory (Rawls on reflective equilibrium), to Mill and modern psychiatry, the history and philosophy of science and Chomskian linguistics. The last interest led to the book *Chomsky’s System of Idea*s published in 1986. Drew Khlentzos developed an argument from the problem of other minds to criticise anti-realism, and Jeff Malpas published several articles on the philosophies of Davidson and Quine. Robert Elliot wrote 14 articles in total, including two on environmental philosophy, several on animal rights, two on the rights of future generations and two on personal identity. Overall, this department gained one member during the 1980s.

In Woollongong, the new professor, Lauchlan Chipman, concentrated on building up the department during the 1980s and published an article on reference and singular terms. Others in this department were working on a variety of issues.

Harry Beran published in political philosophy, on the problem of self-determination and on rightful secession. Barbara Davidson wrote on a number of areas, including modal predicate logic and challenges to Hume's criticism of the efficacy of reason. Lawrence Splitter wrote on secondary properties and natural kinds and was also involved in the development of programs for philosophy in schools. Sue Uniacke published in the *Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy* on the principle of double effect. Karen Neander, who joined the department towards the end of the 1980s, published on natural selection and teleological notions of function. This department grew to seven, gaining two members during the 1980s.

There were two philosophy departments at the Australian National University, as well as a History of Ideas unit and a Centre for logic. One department, known as 'the Faculties', was resistant to the division between Continental and analytic philosophy. This divide was significant for the self-identity of other Australian philosophy departments, but here, the teaching of phenomenology, Marxist philosophy and feminist theory was not thought incompatible with introducing students to logic and analytic approaches to metaphysics. This renegade attitude was due in part to the influence of Peter Herbst, who, as head of department, encouraged an interest in the history of philosophy as central to a critical understanding of current philosophical issues. Kim Lycos published his book *Plato on Justice and Power* in 1987, and Tom Mautner published articles on Locke and Kant. Richard Campbell criticised ahistorical approaches to philosophy, while Paul Thom wrote on ancient philosophy, art and also on logic. His 1981 book argues that the syllogism can represent principles of inference. Peter Roeper published work on probability functions, on events and processes and on semantics for mass terms. In 1980, William Godfrey-Smith published an article on change and actuality in the *Philosophical Quarterly* and one on time travel in *Analysis*. Neil Tennant joined the department late in the 1980s, having published over the decade a book entitled *Philosophy, Evolution and Human Nature* and another on anti-realism and logic, in addition to nine articles on logic and a series of articles on evolutionary epistemology and theories of rationality. Genevieve Lloyd also taught in the Faculties during the 1980s and published on a wide range of topics while she was there, including work on Iris Murdoch, Spinoza's environmental ethics, Rousseau on nature, reason and women and the self- and autobiography.

At the Australian National University's other philosophy department, known as the 'Research School of the Social Sciences' (RSSS), Jack Smart was chair with Phillip Pettit appointed to a Professorial Fellowship in 1983. In 1989, Pettit was made professor of social and political theory. Researchers at the RSSS produced many of the influential books of the 1980s, including Stanley Benn's *Theory of Freedom*, Michael Tooley's *Abortion and Infanticide* and Jack Smart's *Ethics, Persuasion and Truth*. Later in the 1980s, Smart published two works on ethics and the book, *Our Place in the Universe*. He also published three articles on realism, verificationism, Wittgenstein and Davidson, as well as four on ethics and several on the philosophy of science.

Another of the most prolific and interesting philosophers of the 1980s, Richard Routley, published articles on relevant logics, pacifism, ontology, ancient logic and the problem of attributing beliefs to animals. Later in the 1980s, Routley changed his name to Richard Sylvan. Together with Phillip Pettit and Jean Norman, he edited volume of Smart's papers, *Metaphysics and Morality*, which appeared in 1987. With Val Routley and others, he edited *Relevant Logics and their Rivals* and, at the end of the 1980s, *Directions in Relevant Logic* with Jean Norman. His work, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, is a defence of Meinong's intuition that 'there is' does not mean 'exists'. Routley points out that *there are* many things which do not exist, but which are not nothing. They are proper objects of discourse and thought, not just concepts or Platonic forms, and they are known to have properties (in the case of mathematical objects, for instance). On these grounds, he rejects the view that truth and meaning are a function of reference.

John Passmore was also a member of the RSSS. He delivered the Boyer Lecture on the limits of government and wrote articles on the concept of applied philosophy, on narratives and events, on academic ethics and on cultural universals. Passmore also published two books: *The Philosophy of Teaching* in 1980 and *Recent Philosophers* in 1985. In the area of logic, Michael McRobbie published on relevant implication and, together with Paul Thistlewaite and Bob Meyer, published a decision procedure for nonclassical logics. Peter Forrest criticised David Lewis' theory of possible worlds. Frank Jackson, also at the RSSS in the late 1980s, published his book *Conditionals*. Robert Goodin arrived in 1989 and contributed to the School's research strength in political and social philosophy.

In 1989, Bond University, Australia, first private university opened, with Philosophy contributing courses on Ethics to a core curriculum taken by all students.

Research Directions

An Overview of the 1980s: Trends and Influences

The sketch given in the section above indicates the main areas and particular issues philosophers were working on in the 1980s. Judging simply by numbers of publications, the research strengths of both Australian and New Zealand departments in the 1980s were in the areas of logic, metaphysics and philosophy of science. Publications in logic were evenly divided in Australia between classical and alternative logics. The most popular topics in metaphysics were identity, causation, realism, possible worlds, truth, universals and philosophy of mind, and in philosophy of science, articles on philosophy of biology, laws of nature and space and time topped the list. After that came ethics, aesthetics and philosophy of language, with most articles in ethics being on environmental issues, bioethics and applied ethics. Continental philosophy, political philosophy (with a large number of works on freedom), then feminism and history of philosophy were next, followed by epistemology and philosophy of religion (with several articles on the argument from design).[9]

---

[9] This is based on a rough count only. There are obvious overlaps, and boundaries to the 'areas' could be disputed.

There were some differences between Australia and New Zealand in research directions. Work on logic in both countries diverged, with developments in classical logic being the main focus for research in New Zealand and a growing interest in alternative logics in Australia. In New Zealand, the volume of research in the philosophy of science was on scientific methodology, much of it a response to the work of Karl Popper. Nola, Musgrave, Tichy and Currie were all working in this area. In Australia, there was an abiding interest, articulated by Smart and Armstrong, in the scientific worldview and its relation to the commonsense conception of the world. There was substantial work done on the nature of science in this period by Chalmers, Gaugroger and Hooker; on the ontology of quantum theory by Krips and Forrest, on induction by Stove; on philosophy of biology and theories of evolution by Neander, Olding, Sterelny and D'Agostino; and on space and time by Nerlich and Hinckfuss.

While publications in metaphysics, philosophy of science and logic dominated the journals, numbers of publications do not tell the whole story about research trends and interests in the 1980s. There was great interest, particularly in Australia, in applied ethics, feminism, environmental philosophy, Marxism and Continental philosophy. This is evident from the emergence of several new journals in the 1980s: *Critical Philosophy* (first issued in 1983), *Australian Feminist Studies* (which appeared in 1985), *Applied Philosophy* (1984), *Bioethics* (1980) and *Thesis Eleven* (1980). A special issue of *Critical Philosophy* on nuclear disarmament was published in 1986 with the support of the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. This followed a meeting of the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) in 1983, in which motions were passed condemning the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a conference sponsored by the AAP in 1985 on philosophical problems arising from nuclear armament.

There were also several well-attended conferences in the areas of environmental philosophy, applied philosophy and Continental philosophy. A 'Women in Philosophy' movement sprang up at an AAP conference in the early 1980s, and this led to a separate annual conference, running alongside the AAP. As well as providing a space in which women were able to discuss their philosophical interests and difficulties encountered as women doing philosophy, it provided a forum for the discussion of feminist theory.

Some of the publications of the 1980s were the outcome of earlier research done in the 1960s and 1970s. In environmental philosophy, one of the collections which appeared in the early 1980s contained papers from a conference which had taken place in the previous decade. But the story is not always one of continuity. Some of the influential publications of the 1980s were reactions against the dominant research directions of earlier decades. For example, Frank Jackson's influential publications were a reaction against the dominant materialist theories of mind developed in the 1960s and 1970s.

More specific factors influenced research in some areas. The visits of David Lewis provided a stimulus to debates and the development of new ideas in analytic philosophy and particularly metaphysics. An account might be written of the developments in metaphysics during the 1980s revolving solely around the interactions of various Australasian philosophers with Lewis. This network of friendships provided part of the reason for the successes of the 1980s, perhaps offsetting some of the negative effects of stresses and tensions evident in other quarters.

There were also some institutional changes that channelled energies in particular directions. The success of departments of History and Philosophy of Science in gaining a foothold in universities during the 1970s and 1980s provided an impetus for work in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of science and shaped the direction of research in those areas. Another institutional development in the 1980s which accounted in part for the success of new research directions was the founding of 'Centres' which were relatively independent of departments. The development of small, institutionally recognised research units filled a gap between the established philosophy department and the informal reading groups and pub discussions. Small cohesive research units of this kind breed confidence and have some institutional backing (and funding) but are more flexible and focused than departmental structures. While philosophy departments are designed for many purposes (teaching, administration, etc.), centres have a unified purpose and coherent research direction. The Automated Reasoning Project and the Monash Bioethics Centre were two outstanding examples. Both shaped research directions in the 1980s and provided models for other centres. Some of the centres launched in the 1980s are fixtures (such as the Monash Bioethics Centre); others, such as the Automated Reasoning Project at the ANU, have since disbanded. But their achievements remain, and they have had a lasting effect on research in Australasia.

Finally, the 1980s was a period of expansion in ideas and theories in many other places apart from Australasia. A resurgence in Continental philosophy, the feminist second wave and the environmental movement were stimulating debate around the world. Many Australasian philosophers were swept into the currents and supported the new journals and popular conferences, which of course led to further research. The 'Women in Philosophy' conferences were one instance, and a major reason why the 1980s were the most productive decade to date in Australia in the area of feminist theory.

This brief overview of trends indicates the main areas in which there was research activity. We will now take a more detailed look at some of these.

Research into Alternative Logics: The Automated Reasoning Project

The Automated Reasoning Project developed out of a logic group at the ANU run by Richard Routley and Robert Meyer. This centre for research into relevant logics quickly developed an international reputation, attracting visitors such as Kit Fine and Newton da Costa. The research that emerged has a claim to be distinctively Australian, but it is a contested claim. 'There is no Australian Logic', says Errol Martin in his contribution to Srzednicki and Wood's *Philosophy in Australia* (Martin 1992, p. 190). Nevertheless, in his chapter, what Martin describes is the development of a unique way of resolving some problems in logic.

The study of logic divides into classical (as developed by Frege and Russell) and nonclassical logics, the latter including logics of relevance and paraconsistent logics. In classical logic, a contradiction is taken as entailing any proposition whatever. Relevance logicians reject this as paradoxical since there is no connection (and so no relevance relation) between the contradiction and what it is taken to entail. But as Bob Meyer and Errol Martin in 'Logic on the Australian Plan' point out (Meyer and Martin 1986, p. 305), inconsistency in our data is a fact of life and one which does not stop us from reasoning. We do not conclude that anything goes. Therefore, they say we ought to reject the classical principle of *ex falso quodlibet*: '(A & ∼ A) → B', where 'B' may be any sentence, true or false.

A system of entailment which preserved relevance (in this sense) had been worked out in the United States by Anderson and Belnap in the 1950s, but the consequences for truth-conditions remained unclear. One significant change from the truth-conditions for classical logic concerns negation. The American approach was to argue that 'A & ∼ A' may be true, and so when B is false, the quodlibet principle is refuted. Anderson and Belnap's nonclassical system is based on four truth values, allowing some sentences to take both true and false and others neither true nor false. The Australian plan developed by the Routleys, Meyer and Martin treats each sentence as corresponding to a proposition and makes use of the notion of *a dual* of that proposition, understood as the proposition to which one is committed if one does not deny the original. On the Australian plan, the necessary change from the classical truth-conditions for negation consists in taking ∼A to be true in circumstance c iff (if and only if) A is false in some circumstance c^* which is related in a certain way to c. In classical logic $c = c^*$, but this is not always so in semantic systems for relevant logics. Bivalence is saved, and the usual truth-conditions for '&' and 'v' prevail, but what must be rejected is the principle that ∼ A is true at a world w iff A is false at w. Instead, according to relevance logicians, ∼A is true at w iff A is false at the dual world w^*. To hold that A is the case is not the same as not denying that A is the case (Double Negation fails), for we may simply be suspending judgement. We may lack the grounds for denial, or assertion, of A. It is this possibility of suspending judgement, rather than the paradox concerning implication, that makes the Australian plan appear to be original and of continuing interest.

New Zealand critics disagreed. In 1983, Jack Copeland published an article critical of the use made by Meyer, Martin and Routley of the notion of a dual (Copeland 1983, pp. 197–204). Copeland claims that until the notion of a dual is explained further, the semantics is of no more than technical interest. No meanings have been given to the logical constants, and therefore the system is of no real philosophical significance.

At the end of the 1980s, the editors of *Directions in Relevant Logic* express regret about the lack of a well-organised Relevance program in Australia. A plethora of relevance systems had emerged by the end of the decade, with choices between them seemingly arbitrary. Also, some of the promised philosophical applications (to conditionals, deducibility and various epistemic purposes) had proved unsatisfactory. This left the position of relevant logic uncertain at the end of this period, with divergent views on whether it is just an extension of classical logic or something else, and what its philosophical justification and applications might be.

Bioethics at Monash

The first bioethics research centre in Australasia was founded in 1980 by Peter Singer. There was concern in the community around this time about developments in the area of in vitro fertilisation (IVF). Pioneering research by Carl Wood and his medical team at the Monash University Victoria Medical Centre made possible the first IVF birth in Australia in 1980, and in 1982 Monash ran the world's first workshop on IVF techniques. Some of these techniques, such as embryo freezing which was developed at Monash, opened up the possibility of donor eggs and birth by women without ovaries or with genetic or chromosomal disease. These developments in reproductive technology led to public debate, in which philosophers such as Singer took a leading part. By 1989, there was a postgraduate program in bioethics at Monash. Singer and Helga Kuhse had founded a new journal devoted to bioethics, and both had published extensively in this area. Kuhse published on the sanctity-of-life doctrine in medicine and, together with Singer, wrote a book entitled *Should the Baby Live*?, which appeared in 1985. Publications like these led to vigorous and occasionally acrimonious debates both in philosophy journals and in the media about infanticide of handicapped babies. Articles on these issues by Singer, Kuhse, John Kleinig and Stanley Benn appeared in the new *Journal of Applied Philosophy*. Rosalind Hursthouse's *Beginning Lives*, Michael Tooley's book on abortion and Max Charlesworth's *Life, Death and Genes* are a few of the volumes which were published in this area later in the decade.[10]

Other bioethics centres soon followed the lead of Monash, some, such as St Vincent's in Melbourne, associated with hospitals. The Southern Cross Bioethics Centre in Adelaide, the John Plunkett Centre in Sydney and the University of Otago Bioethics Centre in Dunedin, New Zealand, were all founded in the 1980s.

---

[10] Experimentation on humans had became an issue of public concern in New Zealand following the revelation in Auckland in 1987 of the selective nontreatment of women with cervical cancer. Articles written around this time reflect concerns in medical ethics about patient rights and informed consent. In Australia, the National Health and Medical Research Council adopted a recommendation in 1985 that any institution eligible for its research funds must submit research on human subjects to review by an institutional ethics committee. By 1990, there were over one hundred such committees in Australia.

Work in Metaphysics: Universals, Laws of Nature, Possible Worlds and Tropes

We have seen that much of the research in the 1980s was built on work done in earlier decades. This does not mean that there were no new developments. There certainly were in metaphysics. One instance is the account of laws of nature as relations between universals, developed by David Armstrong and Michael Tooley. Armstrong states that he and Tooley discussed this topic in the 1970s but arrived at their published views from different angles, Tooley from considering laws of nature and deciding that a satisfactory account of them would involve universals and Armstrong from thinking about universals and wondering whether laws might be relations between universals (Armstrong 1983, p. 85).

Armstrong's account of laws was founded on the theory of universals developed in his 1978 book, *Universals and Scientific Realism*. Universals must be instantiated, so any property is the property of some real particular. Properties are *the same* in each instance, and what properties, and hence what universals, there are, is up to science to determine. Universals, Armstrong says, may be regarded simply as the repeatable features of the world. In *What is a Law of Nature?*, Armstrong argues that laws must involve irreducible relations between universals. An adequate account of laws ought to distinguish them from coincidental regularities and make some headway with the problem of induction. Since the Humean regularity theory of laws does not meet these requirements, some kind of physical necessity must be countenanced. Laws of nature should be seen as necessary connections between properties. *It is a law that Fs are Gs* must mean that it is in some sense necessary that Fs are Gs. The ontological ground of that necessity has to be found in the Fs and Gs themselves: *being an F* necessitates *being a G*. Since the necessity is of a physical kind, the connections hold a posteriori. Nominalists, who reject universals, are driven back to the unsatisfactory regularity theory and can find no ontological ground for the uniformities in nature: it is just a wild coincidence that they hold and continue to hold.

Armstrong's account raises a few questions. It might be asked what this relationship is between the universals and why it produces uniformities. The notion of necessitation involved, where a thing's being F necessitates its being G, is just that of one universal 'bringing another along with it', as Armstrong puts it (Armstrong 1983, p. 92). The notion of nomic necessity (necessitation in nature) is not explained further, being left as a primitive notion.

These problems were aired in correspondence with David Lewis, an interaction which stimulated much further research in this and related areas. Lewis had been attending some AAP conferences during the 1970s after meeting Jack Smart in Harvard in 1968. After 1979, he visited Australia annually and did much of his work at philosophy departments in Melbourne, Canberra, Sydney and Victoria University at Wellington, New Zealand. While on leave in various Australasian departments in the 1980s, he wrote a series of articles including the following: 'What Puzzling Pierre does not Believe' (1981), written while at ANU; 'What Experience Teaches' (1988), written at La Trobe; 'Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation' (1983), written at ANU and La Trobe; 'Reduction of Mind' (1994), written in the Boyce Gibson Library at Melbourne University (see Lewis 1999); and 'Index, Context and Content' (1980) and 'Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics for Counterfactuals' (1981), both written at Wellington University, New Zealand (see Lewis 1998). Most of these papers were read at the host departments and Lewis frequently acknowledges the value of discussion there in the final published versions. Ian Hunt introduced him to the idea of 'Finkish dispositions'; Frank Jackson is credited with influencing his views on conditionals in 'The Probability of Conditionals and Conditional probability' (Lewis 1998); Philip Pettit and Michael Smith are thanked for helpful discussion of 'Desire as Belief' (Lewis 2000); and Max Cresswell, for helping to develop his views on logic and the semantics for counterfactuals (Lewis 1998). Allen Hazen, Jack Copeland and Graham Priest are mentioned in the two papers, 'Logic for Equivocators' and 'Relevant Implication' (Lewis 1998), which represent Lewis' response to the Australian brand of relevantism as discussed above.

Lewis was critical of Armstrong's account of laws. A regularity is lawful, Armstrong holds, when it is entailed by a second-order state of affairs of physical necessitation between universals. But why should this entailment hold? It seems possible that $N(F,G)$ and Fa should hold without Ga, Lewis thought. Lewis endorses a regularity theory of lawlikeness, though one which admits as laws only those regularities that deserve to be included in an ideal system. Of course, problems remain about defining the features (such as simplicity) of that system.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, Lewis says Armstrong's theory of universals was significant for him. He cites his own 1983 paper, 'New Work for a Theory of Universals', as a turning point for his philosophy (Lewis 1999, p. 1). This is because Armstrong had convinced him that a category of 'natural' properties must be accepted; however, difficult it may be to ban gerrymandered candidates for those properties. Natural properties came to play a central role in Lewis' philosophy thereafter: they are needed for an account of causation, dispositions, laws and induction.

Properties for Lewis are sets of possibilia rather than universals (Lewis 1999, pp. 9–10). His view of possibilia as classes of actual and nonactual things seems unexceptional, but his realism about the possible set him apart from most Australasian philosophers. His view was that if something could have been different from the way it is in actuality, there is a possible world where it is that way. Most Australasian philosophers did not accept realism about possible worlds, but those with an interest in metaphysics appreciated the ingeniousness of Lewis' philosophical system. As well as providing a satisfying account of modal notions and dispositions, he used possible worlds to construct accounts of causation, counterfactual conditionals and laws. One concern during the 1980s, then, was to find an alternative way for a scientific realist to meet the metaphysical needs served by the possible world theory. Lewis was a generous critic of such attempts by scientifically minded metaphysicians to find ersatz versions of possible worlds.

Among these attempts, Peter Forrest's is one of the most well developed (Forrest 1986a, b). He denies that possible particulars exist, but agrees with the realist that possibilities are independent of us. He takes them to be uninstantiated properties. Conjunctions of these may be called 'world natures', but they must be complex structural universals to be metaphysically useful for the purposes served by Lewis' worlds. Things that instantiate structural universals have parts which instantiate other universals.

Forrest's account, therefore, requires structural universals. For it to be an account of ersatz possible worlds, he also needs uninstantiated structural universals. There is a problem for this case, Lewis thinks, for what makes them universals? Universals may unite many actual instances where those things are 'of a kind', but what can this mean in the uninstantiated case? There must be at least a possibility of repetition, and this should not be regarded just as a brute modal fact. If we were to make kindhood primitive, there would be no need to posit universals.

There are problems for structural universals in general, according to Lewis. If, as Tooley and Armstrong argue, universals are needed to provide an account of the laws of nature, then these problems are serious, since most laws are complex. In his paper, 'Against Structural Universals' (1986), Lewis suggests several possible accounts. One promising suggestion, which he calls the 'pictorial conception', holds that there is an isomorphism between a structural universal and its instances, as in a model. This won't work, Lewis thinks, because the parts may be repeated: hydrogen is a universal involved in the structural universal methane: as well as carbon there are four hydrogen atoms. But hydrogen occurs several times over in this complex, and it is unclear what it can mean to have a universal several times over. A universal is one thing, but complex universals seem to involve multiple instances of the one universal.

Lewis' attack on structural universals resulted in a good deal of debate in the late 1980s, a debate which remains ongoing (see Williams 2007; Kalhat 2008). It turned out that, despite his Lewis' professed agnosticism about whether or not there really are universals as variously conceived by philosophers, his arguments against structural universals targeted universals more generally. Universals occur repeatedly and are wholly present wherever they occur, unlike properties, Lewis says, which are scattered about. An adequately discriminatory theory of properties is needed, but the resources of nominalism may prove as useful as realism about universals.

Tropes emerged in the 1980s as a serious third alternative to Lewis' nominalist brand of Humean supervenience and Armstrong's universals. Like Armstrong's work on universals, this theory was developed during the previous decade. In his 'Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars' (1981), Keith Campbell argues that properties and relations are particulars, not universal entities. If we take a specific shade of colour which is regarded as a universal, recurrent entity we may ask just what it is that is multiple. The quality itself which is supposed to be common to particulars is a single entity (the universal). The objects which have that colour are multiple but do not recur. He points out that a specific shade of colour which appears somewhere is surely locatable and may come into existence and be destroyed. Therefore, it is a particular, he says: a 'trope'. Tropes are 'abstract' in the epistemic sense of being arrived at by us by abstraction from other features but are entities in their own right. Basic particulars should be regarded as collections of co-located tropes.

Philosophy of Mind and Jackson's Critique of Materialism

The most interesting developments in the philosophy of mind during the 1980s decade were challenges to the dominant physicalist theories developed in the previous two decades by Smart and Armstrong. In his 1980 book, *Nature of Mind*, Armstrong argues that the identification of mental states with physical states of the brain is at least intelligible, given a causal analysis of mental states, as states with characteristic causes and effects. In his debate with Malcolm, Armstrong was concerned with two criticisms of this materialist theory of the mind: first, that sensations, 'raw feels' and other mental phenomena seemed irreducible to the terms of physical theory and second, claims about the intentionality of the mental (Armstrong 1984, p. 157). Critics such as Keith Campbell had argued in the 1970s that difficulties of this kind should make philosophers prefer epiphenomenalism. The second edition of Campbell's popular work, *Body and Mind*, appeared in 1984 with a new chapter on functionalism, which he argues is an improvement on the causal theory. But he doubts that the felt quality of sensations can be analysed along functional lines.

Frank Jackson also developed an epiphenomenalist critique coming from another direction. In his 1977 book, *Perception*, he had defended a sense-datum theory of perceptions as having objects which are non-physical and represent the physical world. In 1982, he published 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', in which he argued against physicalism—the thesis that the world is entirely physical. Jackson argued for features of our sensations and perceptual experiences which are not deducible from purely physical information about our bodies and the world and how the two are related. We know how pain feels, how roses look and how lemons taste. Knowledge of this kind about how things look and feel could not be derived even from complete physical information about the environment, brains and the functional roles of their states. We cannot deduce what it is like to see red, for example, from the facts of physical theory.

In this article and his 'What Mary Didn't Know', which appeared in 1986, he defends this claim using the example of a scientist, Mary, who is confined to a black-and-white room where she learns all there is to know about neurophysiology and human vision. When released into the world of colour, Mary will learn something new and therefore her knowledge must have previously been incomplete. If this is so, we must accept the existence of 'qualia', Jackson says, but it seems they have no causal role with respect to the physical world: they explain nothing for us, but then much of the universe is inexplicable.

Jackson has since rejected these arguments (Jackson 2003). The interesting issue he now thinks is to identify the point at which this plausible line of thought developed in the 1980s goes astray. He suggests there is an illusion (or several illusions) which lead us to wrongly arrive at the conclusion that physical theory is necessarily incomplete. The physicalist is surely right that how things look to us is determined by the physical facts. Why then should there be a difficulty about an *a priori* deduction from physical theory of how things look from those facts? Jackson argues that the experience of 'what it is like', which Mary has when released from the room, is not acquaintance with a new property of an instantiated object. People are just in states that represent things as being a certain way or as having some non-physical property. Redness is how we represent certain things as being, and it is possible to deduce *a priori* all the properties of seeing red from the physical facts. What is not possible is the deduction of a purely sensory nonrepresentational component.

Jackson's pair of papers from the 1980s stimulated huge international interest, and despite Jackson's rejection of the argument, they continue to do so. Lewis' response to Jackson's 'knowledge argument' was that Mary does not acquire some new knowledge on her release from the black-and-white room (Lewis 1983). What she acquires is a new representational and imaginative ability. Factual knowledge of physics is not incomplete since the relevant knowledge is ability based: knowledge-how, not knowledge-that. Jackson objected that this is not all she gains: she will also acquire some factual knowledge of other people's experiences. However, Jackson's 2003 article, in which he repudiates the knowledge argument, is in substantial agreement with Lewis.

Environmental Philosophy

What Australasian philosophers had to say about the value of the natural environment changed during the 1970s and 1980s. At the start of the 1980s, the developments were often focused on responding to John Passmore's views in *Man's Responsibility for Nature* (reprinted in 1980), where he argues against the view that ecological crises can only be solved by abandoning Western traditions. We do need to change the ways we live and, in particular, our destructive use of resources and exploitative technologies, if we are to survive. But this does not mean we have to abandon the critical analytical methodology or adopt a new ethics or metaphysics. He argues that Western traditions are complex and offer useful insights into our responsibilities for nature. Ideas of stewardship may introduce better management of resources, for instance, and ideals of the perfectibility of nature may restore harmony and bring nature's potential to fruition. If we work together with nature, we can achieve a more orderly world, as in a well-planned park or garden.

A stroll in a nicely laid out park is not what other philosophical bushwalkers had in mind. One reaction to Passmore's arguments was to argue for a more thorough overhaul of ethics and also metaphysics. Our relation to nature has to be rethought and the resources of Western culture are not adequate to the task. A deep ecology, as developed by philosopher Freya Matthews, is concerned with the metaphysics of nature and its relation to the self. Matthews stresses the interconnectedness of things (Matthews 1988). Since the self is constituted by its relation to the environment, our identities are connected to that of other beings. Conservation of nature is in our interests, not just for self-preservation, but for self-realisation. She thinks that other, more primal cultures which recognise that the universe is a harmonious and integrated system may provide the basis for an improved ethic.

On this type of view, nature has an intrinsic value. It is not merely instrumentally valuable because of its necessity for our survival. Some bushwalking philosophers took a different track. Janna Thompson rejects the claim that nature has an intrinsic value but wants to argue that there is still a value in preserving wilderness and other species (Thompson 1983). If the value is a psychological one, to do with the mental states produced in human beings, then the case for conservation is not strong. The value of experiences had by a few bushwalkers seems insignificant compared with the economic interests represented by forestry, agriculture and mining industries. A new ethic seems to be required if we are to be able to argue for the value of wilderness. But there is a problem: if this new ethic appeals to existing values and views people have already accepted about their interests, it will not provide a strong enough case to preserve wilderness. If it does depart from existing ideas and values, it will not be persuasive.

Thompson thinks this dilemma rests on an ahistorical conception of ethics as a sphere divorced from science, political change and social life. It goes with a view of ethics as issuing in a set of rules we impose on ourselves. If we saw ethics, rather, as coming from our experience of the human and natural world, the dilemma dissolves. A new ethic may introduce unfamiliar ideas about social existence and the good life, but they are ones which are needed at this time. Seeing ethics this way makes it possible to recognise a unique kind of value which wilderness has, in between instrumental and intrinsic values. Human happiness and human needs and desires are central in this ethics, but they can only be achieved by respecting other species and natural systems and not using them for our own ends. We do not have to choose between a human-centred ethic and one that rejects ‘human chauvinism’.

Interactions with wild nature, rather than with the views of other philosophers, sometimes affects the direction of theory. In 1985, Val Plumwood encountered a crocodile when canoeing by herself in Kakadu National Park. Knocked out of the canoe and seized by a crocodile, she was rolled underwater three times before she managed to escape up a slippery embankment. She had to walk several kilometres, suffering from serious injuries and loss of blood, before she was able to contact a ranger. On the 13 hour trip to Darwin hospital, she argued against her rescuers’ plans to track down and shoot the crocodile. To accept our identity within an ecological system, she says, we should be able to coexist in a world with large predators. The recognition that we may be food for others is a shock to our complacent assumption that animals exist to be used, and consumed, by us. Our identity as eaters rather than edible beings rests on a dualism of a realm of culture in which we exist as supreme, and a realm apart from us, of nature. It is this assumption which makes it possible to treat animals unethically, she thinks. It also distorts our vision of the world and may lead eventually to our demise.[11]

Feminism and the History of Philosophy

By the1980s, there was a growing concern in philosophy departments that academic philosophy in Australia was on the whole a masculine activity. Why were there almost no female staff in philosophy departments when over half of the students in first-year philosophy lectures were women? The most important publication of the decade for feminists was Genevieve Lloyd's 1984 book, *The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy*, a book which offered a complex answer to this question. It was significantly different to answers that had been given previously by feminists. In Australia, the book also had an impact on philosophy in general as a result of the new approach Lloyd developed in understanding the relation of philosophy to the wider culture.

---

[11] See http://www.aislingmagazine.com/aislingmagazine/articles/TAM30/ValPlumwood.html.

There was a broad interest in Australia through the 1980s in the cultural and historical conditions in which philosophy, and ideas in general, is produced. This interest in philosophy's relation to its historical origins and current context found expression in the journal *Critical Philosophy* of which Genevieve Lloyd was a founding editor. This short-lived journal, associated mainly with Sydney philosophers, first appeared in 1983 with, as its other founding editors, Kim Lycos, Paul Crittenden and Stephen Gaukroger. Its aim was to foster critical reflection from a historically informed perspective.

Such an approach to philosophy and the interest in the history of cultural ideals are what drives Lloyd's investigation into women's situation in *The Man of Reason*. Other feminist books of this era, such as Alison Jaggar's *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (published in 1983) and Susan Moller Okin's *Women on Western Philosophical Thought* (1979), argue for a misogynist bias operating within the philosophical tradition. There appear to be grounds for this claim, which should be of particular concern to philosophers who are committed to ideals of rational thought. Reason is commonly supposed to have no sex, and minds as distinct from bodies are alike at least in their capacity for reasoning. Feminist complaints that women have not been given the opportunities to use and develop their equal rational capacities have usually been grounded on this idea of likeness and the ideal of gender-neutral reason. Lloyd argued that this view of the problem that women face is unsatisfactory and that a feminist investigation of the texts of Western philosophy must delve deeper. Her investigation went beyond the shallow accusations of bias to a deeper analysis of social inequality and, as part of that analysis, to an account of the disadvantage women face as philosophers.

In Western culture, the feminine has been defined as passive and close to nature, while masculinity is associated with activity and control or 'mastery' of nature. This conception of masculinity and femininity is also caught up in other cultural ideals and dualisms which have their roots in the Greek division of mind and matter, the soul or intellect on the one side and the body on the other. These dualisms came with value weightings: mind and knowledge are associated with reason and taken to be superior to matter, the senses, and emotions. Hence, the structures of superior and inferior (mind, control and knowledge versus body, passivity and the unknown) have become attached to the symbolism of masculine and feminine. Masculinity came to be seen as an achievement and femininity something to be transcended. The achievement of masculinity is seen most directly as one which involves transcendence of the feminine because it requires moving out of the sphere of the mother, of emotional attachments and into the public realm. That realm is idealised as one of rational order, law and scientific endeavour, as opposed to the realm of love and disorderly passions: forces the man of reason must struggle to overcome. Woman is associated with the unknown forces of nature which reason attempts to dominate. Lloyd argued that these dualisms and cultural ideals have been assimilated by philosophical accounts of human nature, knowledge and reason, and philosophical theories have served to articulate and reinforce them.

Her surprising and controversial thesis was that reason is a masculine enterprise. There is more than superficial bias operating here, and unless the conceptual complexities are recognised, women's social status is unlikely to improve. There is a positive side to this story, however. A careful reading of philosophy may reveal what we have not recognised or thought out. In this way, the history of philosophy can be useful as a means of engaging with current social and political issues. Though philosophers cannot transcend their cultural and social context; they can become aware of how they write and become more reflective about the language and culturally constructed imagery they employ.

Lloyd's central focus on the history of philosophy was not properly appreciated for some time. A paper she read on the philosophy of Philo, presented as the presidential opening address at an AAP conference, was greeted with incomprehension. Her examination of broad cultural themes combined with her interest in the 'literariness' of philosophical texts simply puzzled many philosophers at the time. Her historical and literary focus was designed to force reflection on the intellectual and imaginary conditions under which philosophy is currently done, and in the longer term, her strategy may have succeeded. She was able to show how associative and metaphorical uses of language by philosophers reveal their cultural attachments and how this can reinforce cultural prejudices. Using this technique, she was able to provide the diagnosis needed of the absence of women from philosophy departments.

Lloyd's work is often seen as presenting feminists with a dilemma: if philosophy is about reason and reason is defined as masculine, where does that leave the female philosopher? Lloyd states that 'an affirmation of the strengths of female difference which is unaware of the ways it has already been structured as complementing masculine characteristics is…doomed to repeat some of the sad subplots in the history of western thought' (Lloyd 1984, p. 105). Work in the 1990s by Karen Green suggests a more optimistic answer to the problem (Green 1995). But it is fair to say that Lloyd's main lesson has been learned, at least by Australasian feminist philosophers: without a grasp of the history of philosophical thought about the body, difference and human nature, there cannot be an adequate explanation of women's social disadvantage.

Lloyd's thesis raised issues about how the body should be conceived. The critical factor here is the dualism of mind and body and the associated division between reason and the emotions, regarded by many feminists of the 1980s as the source of problems for any positive revaluation of sexuality and the feminine. Elizabeth Grosz's work in the 1980s developed in this direction, bringing to bear psychoanalytic theory and the work of Derrida on the critique of these dualisms (Grosz 1987).

Conclusion

The 1980s were an exciting era for Australasian philosophy. We have seen that there were particular reasons why research flourished in Australasia in this decade and also why difficulties were emerging in academic life. The expansion of philosophy into new areas had reached its peak, producing a crop of new journals, well-attended conferences and new teaching subjects in many places. A new area of indigenous philosophy emerged and contemporary issues, such as the development of IVF techniques, led to new debates in bioethics and other areas of applied philosophy.

Many research programs begun in earlier decades produced their definitive publications at this time, and a substantial amount of research was done in the areas of metaphysics, philosophy of science and logic. Publications from the 1980s are still stimulating debate on universals, feminist theory, philosophy of mind and alternative logics, and in some cases, issues and debates of the 1980s appear to dominate much current work. The structure of reasoning, our relation to the natural environment and theories about sexual difference are all issues which remain of central concern to some philosophers; the knowledge argument still engages researchers in philosophy of mind, and a range of issues in metaphysics which emerged in debates of the 1980s remains one of the most fruitful and original areas in Australasian philosophy.

References

Allen, J., & Patton, P. (1983). *Beyond Marxism? Interventions after Marx*. Leichhardt: Intervention Publications.

Alter, T. (2007). Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument? In T. Alter & S. Walter (Eds.), *Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: New essays on consciousness and physicalism* (pp. 65–76). New York: Oxford University Press.

Armstrong, D. (1980). *The nature of mind and other essays*. St.Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Armstrong, D. (1983). *What is a law of nature?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Armstrong, D. (1989a). *A combinatorial theory of possibility*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Armstrong, D. (1989b). *Universals: An opinionated introduction*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Armstrong, D., & Malcolm, N. (1984). *Consciousness and causality*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Barnett, D. (1987). *The art of gesture: The principles and practices of 18th century acting*. Heidelberg: Carl Winter Press.

Benn, S. (1988). *Theories of freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bilimoria, P. (1988). *Sabdapramana, word and knowledge*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Bishop, J. (1989). *Natural agency*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bolender, J. (2006). Nomic universals and particular causal relations: Which are basic and which are derived? *Philosophia, 34*, 405–410.

Brennan, A. (1988). *Thinking about nature*. London: Routledge.

Burnheim, J. (1985). *Is democracy possible? The alternative to electoral politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Campbell, K. (1971). *Body and mind*. London: Macmillan.

Campbell, K. (1981). The metaphysics of abstract particulars. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 6*, 477–478.

Cartwright, N., et al. (2005). Laws. In F. Jackson & M. Smith (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of contemporary philosophy* (pp. 792–818). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, A. (1982). *What is this thing called science?* (2nd ed.). St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Charlesworth, M. (1987). Australian aboriginal religion in a comparative context. *Sophia, 26*, 50–57.

Charlesworth, M. (1989). *Life, death and genes*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Charlesworth, M., et al. (1984). *Religion in aboriginal Australia: An anthology*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Chipman, L. (1982). Reference and singular terms. *Mind, 92*, 96–101.

Coady, C. (1985). The morality of terrorism. *Philosophy, 60*, 47–70.

Colebrook, C. (2000). From radical representation to corporeal becomings. *Hypatia, 15*, 76–93.

Copeland, B. (1983). Pure semantics and applied semantics. *Topoi, 2*, 197–204.

Cresswell, M. (1985a). *Structured meanings*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Cresswell, M. (1985b). *Adverbial modification*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Cresswell, M. (1988). *Semantical essays: Possible worlds and their rivals*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Currie, G. (1982). *Frege: An introduction to his philosophy*. Brighton: Harvester Press.

Currie, G. (1989). *An ontology of art*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Currie, G., & Musgrave, A. (1985). *Popper and the human sciences*. Boston: Nijhoff.

D'Agostino, F. (1986). *Chomsky's system of ideas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Descartes, R. (1988). *Descartes: Selected philosophical writings* (trans: Cottingham J, Stoothoff R, Murdoch D). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Deutscher, M. (1983). *Subjecting and objecting*. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Devitt, M. (1981). *Designation*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Devitt, M. (1984). *Realism and truth*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Devitt, M., & Sterelny, K. (1987). *Language and reality*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Elliot, R. (1982). Faking nature. *Inquiry, 25*, 81–93.

Elliot, R., & Gare, A. (Eds.). (1983). *Environmental philosophy*. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Forrest, P. (1986a). *The dynamics of belief: A normative logic*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Forrest, P. (1986b). Ways worlds could be. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64*, 15–25.

Forrest, P. (1988). *Quantum metaphysics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Forrest, P. (2006). The operator theory of instantiation. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84*, 213–228.

Gatens, M. (1983). A critique of the sex/gender distinction. In J. Allen & P. Patton (Eds.), *Beyond Marxism? Interventions after Marx* (pp. 143–163). Sydney: Intervention Publications.

Gaukroger, S. (Ed.). (1980). *Descartes: Philosophy, mathematics and physics*. Sussex: Harverter Press.

Gaukroger, S. (1989). *Cartesian logic*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Godard, L., Judge, B. (1982). *The metaphysics of Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Monograph no. 1, June 1982, of *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*.

Goodin, R. (1985). *Protecting the vulnerable*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Goodin, R. (1989). *No smoking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Grave, S. (1984). *A history of philosophy in Australia*. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Green, K. (1995). *The woman of reason*. Oxford: Polity.

Grosz, E. (1987). Notes towards a corporeal feminism. *Australian Studies, 5*, 1–15.

Hamblin, C. (1986). *Imperatives*. New York: Blackwell.

Harney, M. (1984). *Intentionality, sense and the mind*. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Hart, K. (1989). *The trespass of the sign: Deconstruction, theology, and philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hooker, C. (1987). *A realistic theory of science*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Howell, R. (2007). The knowledge argument and objectivity. *Philosophical Studies, 135*, 135–147.

Hursthouse, R. (1987). *Beginning lives*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Jackson, F. (1977). *Perception: A representative theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 32*, 127–136.

Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn't know. *Journal of Philosophy, 83*, 291–295.

Jackson, F. (1987). *Conditionals*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Jackson, F. (2003). Mind and illusion. In A. O'Hear (Ed.) Minds and persons. Cambridege: Cambridge University Press.

Judge, B. (1985). *Thinking about things*. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press.

Kalhat, J. (2008). Structural universals and the principle of uniqueness of composition. *Grazier Philosophische Studien, 76*, 56–77.

Kearney, R. (1984). *Dialogues with contemporary continental thinkers*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Kearney, R. (1986). *Modern movements in European philosophy*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press.

Kesacodi-Watson, I., Bilimoria, P., & Fenner, P. (1988). *Religions and comparative thought: Essays in honour of the late Dr. Ian Kesacodi-Watson*. Dehli: Sri Satguru Publications.

Kleinig, J. (1982). *Philosophical issues in education*. London: Croom Helm.

Kleinig, J. (1984). *Paternalism*. Totowa: Rowman & Allenheld.

Kleinig, J. (1985). *Ethical issues in psychosurgery*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Kuhse, H. (1987). *Sanctity-of-life doctrines in medicine*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Lewis, D. (1983). *Philosophical papers* (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, D. (1998). *Papers in philosophical logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, D. (1999). *Papers in metaphysics and epistemology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, D. (2000). *Papers in ethics and social philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lloyd, G. (1984). *The man of reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in western philosophy*. London: Methuen.

Lloyd, G. (1986). Texts, metaphors, and the pretensions of philosophy. *The Monist, 69*, 87–102.

Lycos, K. (1987). *Plato on justice and power*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Mannison, D., McRobbie, M., & Routley, R. (Eds.). (1980). *Environmental philosophy*. Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.

Markus, G. (1986). *Language and production*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Martin, E. (1992). Logic in Australia. In J. Srzednicki & D. Wood (Eds.), *Essays on philosophy in Australia* (pp. 182–225). Dordecht: Kluwer.

Mathews, F. (1988). Conservation and self-realization: A deep ecology perspective. *Environmental Ethics, 10*, 347–355.

McCloskey, H. (1983). *Ecological ethics and politics*. Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield.

McCloskey, H. (1987a). The moral case for experimentation on animals. *The Monist, 70*, 64–82.

McCloskey, M. (1987b). *Kant's aesthetic*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Meyer, R., & Martin, E. (1986). Logic on the Australian plan. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15*, 305–332.

Muller, H. (2009). More troubles for epiphenomenalism. *Philosophia, 37*, 109–112.

Nerlich, G. (1989). *Values and valuing*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Norman, J., & Sylvan, R. (1989). *Directions in relevant logic*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Novitz, D. (1987). *Knowledge, fiction and imagination*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

O'Neill, L. (1982). Corroborating testimonies. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 33*, 60–63.

Oddie, G. (1986). *Likeness to truth*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Passmore, J. (1974). *Man's responsibility for nature*. London: Duckworth.

Passmore, J. (1980). *The philosophy of teaching*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Passmore, J. (1985). *Recent philosophers*. London: Duckworth.

Passmore, J. (1992). Australian philosophy or philosophy in Australia? In J. Srzednicki & D. Wood (Eds.), *Essays on philosophy in Australia* (pp. 1–18). Dordecht: Kluwer.

Patton, P., & Poole, R. (1985). *War/masculinity*. Leichhardt: Intervention Publications.

Plumwood, V. (1989). Do we need a sex/gender distinction? *Radical Philosophy, 51*, 2–11.

Priest, G. (1987). *In contradiction*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Priest, G., Routley, R., & Norman, J. (Eds.). (1989). *Paraconsistent logic: Essays on the inconsistent*. Munchen: Philosophia Verlag.

Prior, E. (1985). *Dispositions*. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.

Ravenscroft, I. (2009). *Minds, ethics and conditionals: Themes from the philosophy of Frank Jackson*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Routley, R. (1980). *Exploring Meinong's jungle and beyond*. Canberra: Research School of the Social Sciences.

Routley, R., Meyer, R., Plumwood, V., & Brady, R. (1982). *Relevant logics and their rivals*. California: Ridgeview.

Segerberg, K. (1982). *Classical propositional operators*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Singer, P. (1983). *Hegel*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Singer, P., & Kuhse, H. (1985). *Should the baby live?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Singer, P., & Walters, W. (Eds.). (1982). *Test tube babies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Singer, P., & Wells, D. (1984). *The reproduction revolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smart, J. (1984). *Ethics, persuasion and truth*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Smart, J. (1987). *Essays metaphysical and moral: Selected philosophical papers*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Smart, J. (1989). *Our place in the universe*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Srezednicki, J. (Ed.). (1987). *Initiatives in logic*. Dordrecht: Nijhoff.

Srzednicki, J. (1983). *The place of space and other themes*. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Srzednicki, J. (1987). *The democratic perspective*. Dordrecht: Nijhoff.

Srzednicki, J., & Wood, D. (1992). *Essays on philosophy in Australia*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Stove, D. (1982). *Popper and after: Four modern irrationalists*. Oxford: Pergamon.

Stove, D. (1986). *The rationality of induction*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Suchting, W. (1983). *Marx: An introduction*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.

Suchting, W. (1986). *Marx and philosophy: Three studies*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Swain, T. (1993). *A place for strangers: Towards a history of Australian aboriginal being*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sylvan, R. (1985). Prospects for regional philosophies in Australasia. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 63*, 188–204.

Taylor, B. (1985). *Modes of occurrence*. New York: Blackwell.

Taylor, B. (Ed.). (1987). *Michael Dummett: Contributions to philosophy*. Dordrecht: Nijhoff.

Ten, C. (1980). *Mill on liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ten, C. (1987). *Crime, guilt and punishment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tennant, N. (1987). *Antirealism and logic: Truth as eternal*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tennant, N., & von Schilcher, F. (1984). *Philosophy, evolution and human nature*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Thom, P. (1981). *The syllogism*. Munich: Philosophia.

Thompson, J. (1983). Preservation of wilderness and the good life. In R. Elliot & A. Gare (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy* (pp. 85–108). Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.

Thompson, J. (Ed.). (1986). Women and philosophy. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (Suppl. 64).

Tooley, M. (1983). *Abortion and infanticide*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tooley, M. (1987). *Causation: A realist approach*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Williams, J. (2007). The possibility of onion worlds. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85*, 193–203.

Young, R. (1986). *Personal autonomy*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

The Canberra Plan and the Diversification of Australasian Philosophy: 1990s

9

John Quilter

Contents

Introduction 241
The Mind: Intentionality and Mental Causation 242
  Representationalism and the Language of Thought: Kim Sterelny 243
  Jackson et al.: Content and Mental Causation 247
Philosophy of Religion 256
  Scientific Theism: Peter Forrest 256
  Other Arguments About God 261
Morality and Method 267
  Public Ethics 269
  Metaethics 271
Other Work in Australasian Philosophy in the 1990s: Some Highlights 286
References 287

Introduction

I expect that if one were to seek a characterisation of philosophy in Australasia prior to the 1990s from someone in the know outside the region, one would expect the focus to be on 'Australian materialism'. Were philosophy of religion to figure in the characterisation at all, I imagine that Australian philosophy would be thought of as predominantly atheistic or at least naturalistic, supposing that God is by definition a supernatural being. In moral philosophy, the impact of Peter Singer among others would suggest that utilitarianism would count strongly in the characterisation. Of course, these points would involve something of an abstraction from what was to be found on the ground: there always have been plenty of theistic and other kinds of religious philosophers in Australia; there have been anti-utilitarians and

---

J. Quilter
School of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, Strathfield, NSW, Australia
e-mail: John.Quilter@acu.edu.au

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_10,

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

anti-materialists also. However, the international image of Australian philosophy would be along the lines sketched.

Something I would emphasise in this chapter is that the 1990s saw a diversification of philosophy in Australia, even in the presence of the rather challenging conditions of the Australian university scene during this decade (surely part of any adequate account, more than I can give here). And in particular, perhaps surprisingly, dualism, God and Platonic/Kantian ethics got something of a rehabilitation. Dualism will have to be ignored here unfortunately. For the main and most influential dualist argument during the 1990s came from the Australian philosopher, David Chalmers. However, he worked in the United States until 2004, and so I omit discussion of his work. Instead, I will focus on intentionality and mental causation in the philosophy of mind, arguments for God in philosophy of religion and on Plato (and Kant) in the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita.

In the 1990s, Australian philosophy was still mainly quite sanguine about metaphysics—a continuing feature since the 1950s. Generally, its temperament was naturalistic—even if we include Chalmers' dualism, the arguments for God and the ethics of Raimond Gaita. Philosophical research was predominantly pursued within the analytic tradition, involving work in philosophy of science, epistemology and philosophy of language and logic. However, we also see during this period the establishment of a society for the study of European philosophy, an energetic Women in Philosophy association and an emerging lively interest in comparative philosophy and the establishment of schools of philosophy at two Catholic universities. Further, in my view, work deepened and matured in the history of philosophy, a discipline (as it was done increasingly in the 1990s) that was not always central to Australian analytic philosophy. I will not be able to cover all this. As I said, I will focus on philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion and moral philosophy—and I will not do anything like justice to all the high-quality work done in these areas during the decade in Australasia. So, this chapter has a section on each of these areas in turn. I will use the discussion of metaethics to include some reflections on, for want of a better term, 'philosophical method' worth turning over in the light of some of work in the 1990s. I would, however, stress (something which I cannot substantiate here) that a fuller story will include the wide range of diversification to be found in the discipline and, of course, an accounting of the emergence of various institutions of philosophy outside the standard university department. For during this decade, much work was done of signal importance both for the inner workings of the discipline and its place in the broader society, in centres of various kinds, interdisciplinary entities and the like. But now, I turn to the mind, then God, then the good.

The Mind: Intentionality and Mental Causation

During the 1980s, arguably the most influential and distinctive contribution of Australasian philosophy to debates concerning the nature of the mind was made by Frank Jackson's well-known argument about Mary. Having lived all her life in a monochrome environment and knowing all there is to know about physics, human physiology and particularly the materialist science of the senses, Mary learns something she did know not know before when she first steps into the polychromatic world the rest of us are familiar with. That is, the phenomenology of the world's sensible qualities is a fact further to the facts detailed in the complete materialist science of perception and its physical causes. The so-called knowledge argument seems to show that the reductivist physicalist consensus about the mind stumbles across this fact that human mental life is replete with qualia. The implication would seem to be some kind of property dualism—presumably, an epiphenomenalism wherein this aspect of mind is causally impotent, the physical world being causally closed. So it seemed to some during the 1980s. If there wasn't an adequate alternative, materialistically acceptable, way to capture what Jackson was pointing to in the Mary example, either materialism was in trouble or eliminativism had more going for it than most wanted to admit. Neither option seemed palatable: if epiphenomenalism is true, the stabbing pain doesn't cause us to wince; if eliminativism is true, the gulf between science and commonsense seems to widen to a point even those who are not real friends of commonsense would not welcome.

On the other hand, Australasian philosophers are often thought to be bold and brash in the theses and arguments they defend. Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny could be seen this way in their work in philosophy of mind and language during the 1980s Devitt and Sterelny (1987). Heavily influenced by Quine's view of philosophy as continuous with science and his arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction, they advocated putting metaphysics before either philosophy of language or epistemology (Devitt 1997). Theirs was a naturalistic program in the theory of content or intentionality. They argued for a 'language of thought' as the syntactically structured medium in which inner belief and desire states proximately caused behaviour against the background of the causal account of representational meaning. Devitt, in particular, defended an aspect of this representationalist theory of mind in which not only the 'broad' semantics of truth-conditions but also the 'narrow' semantics of states' internal conceptual-role played a part.

In what follows, I will lay out the development of the views of Sterelny and Jackson on intentionality during the 1990s. One might also discuss David Chalmers' work on consciousness in *The Conscious Mind* (1996) and the two-dimensional semantics integral to it, but as mentioned earlier, until 2004 he worked in the United States, and I therefore omit to discuss his work here.

For some time now, the unifying theme of analytic philosophy of mind has been functionalism. More or less, this is so in 1990s Australasian philosophy of mind. However, it has been taken in different directions. I will start with Sterelny.

Representationalism and the Language of Thought: Kim Sterelny

Sterelny's is a form of functionalism where beliefs and desires are internal states of a subject which consist of relations, of the right kind (one for belief, one for desire), of the subject to internal, syntactically structured symbols which, in turn, represent ways the world is or could be by virtue of the right kind(s) of causal relations of the elementary parts of the structured symbols to the world. This is a version of functionalism in the sense that the relation, to inner representations, of which the state consists (i.e., that it is a belief state that *p* rather than wondering whether *p* or desiring that *p*) is a matter of how the state is involved in the causal network of perceptual inputs and relations to other contentful states which causally produce the behavioural outputs of the subject. Sterelny is often careful to avoid claiming for this account of the mind that it is 'functionalist' in other senses. For instance, he avoids the thought that what makes the belief that *p*, the belief that *p*, in general has anything to do with the evolutionary history of the species to which the subject belongs—though in other ways, being a self-confessed 'born again Darwinist (Sterelny 2001, p. xiv), his large program is to defend a conception of the mind as a particular kind of representational system (an intentional agency system) which has evolved as an adaptation to solve problems of environmental complexity (Sterelny 2001, Chaps. 8–9). But such a broad role for biological function will not work as a general theory of mental content (Sterelny 1990).[1] Nor is Sterelny sanguine about the prospects of a theory of propositional attitudes in terms of functional role interpreted as inferential role. For inferential role theories miss the point that it is the reference of *concepts* that demands explanation (and inferential role is of sentence-like representations 'made out of' concepts). And, further, the frame problem(s) arises sharply at the stage where perceptual inputs end and belief takes over, if content is individuated by inferential role (Sterelny 1990, p. 136ff.).[2] If what we are put in mind of to believe under the pressure of perceptual inputs is inferentially individuated, then, because in principle any kind of knowledge we have could be relevant to determining what to make of what we 'seem to see', it is hard to see how one is to assign determinate content to perceptual beliefs at all—too much, of indeterminate domain, *could* matter in too many different kinds of circumstances of being appeared to, for the inferences we should draw from perceptual inputs (Sterelny 1990, p. 137).[3] We would lose grip on individuating contents entirely.

Instead, Sterelny proposes a program for an updated concept empiricism as a naturalistic theory of content. He distinguishes between kinds of concept: base level concepts (relatively few), concepts completely defined in terms of other concepts and concepts whose content is fixed by a combination of causal relations to the world and descriptive conditions associated with the concept whether directly keyed to the base level concepts or less than directly keyed to the base level concepts.

---

[1] See Sterelny (1990), Sects. 6.5 and 6.6, for an argument for a limited role for biological function in explaining the possession of innate structures in the cognitive architecture of organisms and Sect. 6.7 for an argument why this strategy cannot be generalised to explain the propositional attitudes.

[2] See Sterelny (1990, Chap. 10) for an unoptimistic understanding of the significance of the frame problem for naturalistic philosophy of mind.

[3] In Sect. 7.4.3, Sterelny (1990) urges that there are four 'frame problems' and that they plague cognitive psychology, not just sententialist cognitive psychology. This argument is further developed in Sects. 10.2–10.5.

This is an empiricist theory of content because the base level concepts are the products of perceptual input devices which are modular in nature and the meanings of these products are fixed by the environmental sensitivities for which evolution selected them. Their modularity yields innateness and so furnishes independence from learned concepts, avoiding holism and permitting them to act as basic contents. Relatedly, the modularity yields determinacy of content, solving the *qua*- or depth problem: why our face recognition module recognises *faces* and not *faces or retinal pattern X or*. . .: recognising retinal patterns has no evolutionary advantage while face recognition does in the circumstances under which the face recognition modules developed and were selected for. And it solves the misrepresentation problem because the concept of green developed to recognise green objects under normal visual conditions and had evolutionary advantage in *them*, but does not work in the dark or under abnormal light conditions such as the light cast by sodium lamps (Sterelny 1990, p. 138). The evolutionary role for which the module was selected furnishes those states with the environmental reference which are partial determinants of content. Causal relations to the immediate occasion have a role too: a particular episode of the activation of the facial recognition module feeds into the perception of *Melanie*'*s* face because it is Melanie who, then, caused the activation (Sterelny 1990, p. 137).

Central to these solutions which this suggestion proposes are the constancy mechanisms involved in the operation of the perceptual modules. Things don't look like they have changed colour when the light changes because a cloud has passed over them, nor do they seem to change shape as they move across the glade. Marr's theory of vision proposes such mechanisms (Sterelny 1990, Chap. 4). Sterelny offers Marr's theory as a kind of model of the representational theory of mind he favours, without being overly dogmatic about it. The constancy mechanisms of the visual system have clear evolutionary advantages. In terms of Sterelny's later ideas,[4] the tracking of environmental features and objects (the representational content of the states into which we are put by our tracking operations) which the constancy mechanisms afford is robust over variations in the routes information from the world takes into the mind and the cues by which it is registered (Sterelny 2001, pp. 207–211, 262–266).

Non-base concepts mostly will not be definable completely in terms of other concepts. Only some will be. Instead, for most non-base concepts, their reference conditions will be provided by a combination of causal and descriptive conditions. *S* has the concept of tigers, **tiger**, partly because of his causal contact with tigers and partly because of his descriptive knowledge of tigers. For such natural kind concepts, Sterelny suggests an advantage of his new proposal over what he and Devitt had proposed in their (1987). He now suggests that some clarification is possible of the descriptive conditions for such concepts. A clue is taken from Marr's account of the way information borne by light incident on the eye permits the construction of 3-D object-centred representations prior to recognition of the object itself: e.g., animals can be represented as a hierarchy of generalised cones with major cones representing the trunk of the body and others, the head and limbs. The 2-D projection of the light encodes this geometry (Sterelny 1990, p. 71). To be sure, the details of Marr's theory may be incorrect. However, it makes the point that if the basic idea of the modularity thesis is right, there will be some coarse-grained representation of tigers that is part of the visual perception of them. So Sterelny suggests that the descriptive condition that helps tie down the content of natural kind concepts is bound up in it: the descriptive condition can be understood as given in terms of this *Gestalt* representation (whatever more exactly that is) yielded by the operation of the perceptual inputs.

---

[4] For the notion of robust-process explanations, see Sterelny (2001, p. 207ff.), with acknowledgement of Jackson and Pettit (1992). For the application of robust-process explanation to tracking the environment as part of a capacity for flexible response to its changes, see Sterelny (2001, p. 208ff.). On the role of environmental complexity and clarifying the notion of it (e.g., environmental translucence), in the evolution of representational and intentional systems, see Sterelny (2001, pp. 244ff. and 262ff.).

Hence, some concepts can be acquired on the basis of causal links and modular representations, and others can be acquired on the basis of these concepts. But all concepts bottom out in the perceptual modular representations. However, this account is importantly different from traditional versions of concept empiricism. First, Sterelny's stress on the importance of our perceptual systems' constancy mechanisms grounds taking the content of the representations they produce not to be our experiences but rather objective features of the world, those features of the world which the constancy mechanisms are keyed to robustly under variations of environmental conditions and so on. Second, Sterelny invests no stock in the importance of definitions in terms of base concepts as traditional concept empiricism generally did. Very few concepts are genuinely definable in terms of other concepts. Rather, most non-base concepts get their semantic properties from causal relations to the world (Sterelny 1990, p. 139ff.).

Sterelny maintains that his proposal also illuminates concept acquisition. He discusses Patricia Churchland's (1986) criticism of Fodor's nativism about concepts, which she sees as a reductio of the whole idea of a language of thought. Sterelny makes the point that if the language of thought hypothesis is not committed to Fodorian nativism about the possession of concepts, nor is it so committed about the acquisition of them. For the reasons Fodor has for his nativism can be undercut with Sterelny's theory of content. That is, Fodor had argued that to learn a concept is to acquire the ability to form a hypothesis in the language of thought which specifies the extension of the concept and so requires a rich conceptual stock to be in place. Nativism seems unavoidable to Fodor. In contrast, Sterelny's theory of content requires that possession of the concept is the result of the right kind of causal contact with a specimen instance of the concept. To be sure, for many or most concepts, a descriptive element is required. But no *definition* is required which will serve to specify extension. If sententialism can avoid the need for definitions, it can avoid nativism. If it can avoid nativism for possession of a concept, it can avoid it for acquisition. Though some concepts are innate—those of the modular perceptual systems whose explanation is adaptationist (Sterelny 1990, §6.9, 2001, Chap. 8, §3)—most are not. They are acquired by the right kind of causal commerce with the world together with a modicum of non-definitional description based in the perceptual system (Sterelny 1990, p. 162).

Jackson et al.: Content and Mental Causation

One very natural way to introduce the functionalist idea about the mental is to characterise mental states such as beliefs and pain as internal states which occupy a certain kind of role in the causation of behaviour. This causal role connects a mental state to perceptual inputs and other mental states in the production of behaviour. Imagine Joe who is thirsty after a hard day's work in the paddock. He would like to quench his thirst and wonders where he might get a beer. After talking to Jack, he goes to the fridge out the back, pulls out an ale and. . . and so on. Joan shows up and wonders out loud why Joe has gone to the fridge out the back. Given his other mental states (thirst, desire to slake it, etc.), we would explain his going to the fridge out the back to get the beer, by explaining that he believed there was a drink in the fridge out there. So, it seems natural to think, given his thirst, that his belief caused him to go to the fridge out the back to look for a beer. Thus, the functionalist thought would seem to be that, for instance, a subject S has the belief that *p* if and only if S has an inner state which occupies a certain kind of role (the belief role, to be specified) which involves it in mediating between inputs from the senses and output in behaviours, interacting with other mental states, such as the thirst and his desire to slake it, in doing so. Since the inner state in question is causal, it seems natural to say that the belief is that inner state, as belief is causal. And after all, to reclaim the idea that mental states are real, causally operative internal states of subjects is a very natural way to understand the motivation of functionalism in moving away from behaviourism.

This is pretty much how Sterelny understands the main point of functionalism. Contentful inner states cause what we do by virtue of their content. Jackson and his fellow authors (Jackson et al. 2004; Jackson 1996; cf. Jackson and Pettit 2004a, c; Jackson 1998c, 1998d) demur importantly from this more or less straight reading of the basic idea of functionalism. Sterelny describes the view of Jackson *et aliorum* as 'Dennettish',[5] apparently meaning that it is somewhat less 'realist' about content than he is comfortable with. And yet, though Jackson notes that Dennett (in *The Intentional Stance*, 1989) defends a version of the 'map-like structures' account of mental representation (just as Jackson means to), this is glossed as 'the less instrumentalistic reading' of (some of) Dennett's papers in that collection (Jackson 1996, p. 405, n36). So, Jackson sees his account of content and mental causation as broadly 'realist' (cf. Jackson 1996, p. 377f.), though others are not so sure.

---

[5] Sterelny (1990, p. 109), commenting on Jackson and Pettit (2004b).

Jackson's view is carefully constructed. He distinguishes what might be called 'minimal functionalism' from the various more detailed versions of functionalism which take diverse positions on various questions, especially the more controversial ones, in philosophy of mind. Minimal functionalism is simply the thought that 'to have beliefs and desires is to have internal states playing certain common-sense functional roles' (Jackson and Pettit 2004c, p. 16). Or again, '. . . the folk conception of belief and desire is that of internal states playing *inter alia* certain kinds of causal-explanatory roles with respect to behaviour' (Jackson and Pettit 2004a, p. 38); and 'common-sense functionalism defines mental states holistically by their place in a network. . . for a subject to be in any particular mental state is (a) for there to be a set of states interconnected in a certain way, and (b) for the state the subject is in to be in the relevant place in that network' (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996, p. 52). Minimal functionalism, then, leaves open many questions. For instance, it is an open question for functionalism so understood whether it is the functional role that is the state referred to in such formulations or the realising state which occupies this role (Jackson and Pettit 2004b, p. 99; Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996, p. 100ff.). Again, it is a question further to minimal functionalism how exactly functionalism ought to account for the content of propositional attitudes—what to make of the 'externalist' arguments of Putnam, Burge and others; what to make of arguments for so-called narrow content; and so on. More particularly, there are various strategies functionalists could take towards the question of the place of mental states, especially propositional attitudes precisely as contentful, in causal explanations of behaviour (Jackson 1996, 1998d). All that minimal functionalism requires is that there is *some* internal state of the subject which is causally involved in the production of behaviour. It does not require any particular characterisation of the internal state—whether as beliefs and other intentional states or in terms of content or some other set of terms. Putting it another way, assigning content to a belief is a matter of describing the overall causal role of the belief rather than the nature of any particular element in that causal role. If content assignments assign sets of possible worlds to beliefs, then 'the set of worlds that is the content of the belief is a way of describing the causal role of the head states: the head state produces behaviour which is such that were the way things actually are a member of the content set, the behaviour produced would tend to satisfy the subject's desires in the sense of bringing about a world that is the way the subject would like things to be' (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996, p. 182ff.). In minimal functionalism, we abstract both from the intrinsic nature of the internal state and from those of its properties which cause the bodily movements of behaviour.

Jackson's motivations for characterising functionalism minimally are twofold: (a) to place functionalism strategically in order to defend it against eliminativism as a genuine empirical theory of mind with highly entrenched epistemic credibility (see esp. Jackson and Pettit 2004a, c; Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996, Chaps. 3, 13) and (b) to defend the essentials of a view of ordinary understanding about the mind as in good order and more or less continuous with emerging scientific knowledge about the causation of behaviour in human beings and the possibilities of cognitive life in other kinds of creature or (possible) artefact. The second of these raises the question of the so-called Canberra Plan for philosophy which no account of Australasian philosophy in the 1990s can ignore. However, I will postpone discussing this until the section dealing with philosophical method below. For now, I resume the account of content.

In going beyond minimal functionalism, Jackson's view of the content of mental states combines a number of moves which, in combination, seem to be in tension. For, on the one hand, he defends the following propositions:

1. The internal states which are the mental states such as belief that *p* or desire that *q* are the brain states which occupy the functional roles of mediating between inputs, other mental states and behaviour—the *realiser* states, rather than the second-order states of having a state which fills the functional role, the *role* states.
2. Causal explanations of behaviour which appeal to functional states involve this claim:
   (a) It is the (internal) categorical basis of the functional state which causes the bodily movement involved in the behaviour (cf. Jackson 1996, p. 397).
3. Psychological explanations cannot proceed autonomously vis-à-vis neuro-physiological explanations. The truth of physicalism shows that there must be a relatively smooth way, even if its details are beyond us, of typing psychological states in terms of neuro-physiological-cum-physical types. Supervenience and causal closure of the physical require this.
4. The explanation of human behaviour in terms of the categorical basis of functional psychological properties of internal states will be given in the neuro-physiological details about the realiser states which are the mental states, specifically in the neuro-physiological explanations of bodily movements as caused by the brain states.
5. These detailed neuro-physiological explanations will not mention, nor need to mention, the content/intentionalistic characteristics of the states which are our mental states. The movements of the body have proximal causes in the neuro-physiological properties of the brain states.
6. Functionalists should accept the moral from 'externalist' arguments concerning content that the content of many mental states is 'broad': that is, they have content which is (at least in part) constituted by such facts about the mental states as what it is in the subject's environment that causes them, the word usage of the subject's linguistic community, the effects in the world of the subject's action, how things are in the subject's environment and so on.

Together, these propositions suggest that there is no role for mental content in adequate causal explanations of behaviour. Content is an aspect of the specification of *functional* roles cited in belief-desire explanations of behaviour. But beliefs and desires are the internal neuro-physiological states of brains, and the causes of the bodily movements involved in behaviour will be the internal, intrinsic neuro-physiological properties of these brain states. As the categorical basis of the functional properties involved in having beliefs and desires, these neuro-physiological properties will do the casual explaining. Content is therefore redundant in the explanation of behaviour. Functional properties, like dispositions, do not cause. Further, the intentional content of propositional attitudes is a matter of their relations to the environment, the linguistic community of the subject and so on. Being in this way relational and keyed to the external world, these intentionalistic properties cannot be causes involved in the production of bodily movement. They could be different without making a difference to the subject or her behaviour (as in Twin Earth and like thought experiments). To be sure, ascribing beliefs individuated by the criteria of broad content implies that the internal state possessed of the content causes the behaviour: Joe believes that there is beer in the fridge out the back if there is in Joe an internal state which causes behaviour that would satisfy Joe's desire for beer if there is beer in the fridge out the back. Thus it seems a necessary truth that having *this* belief will, absenting other considerations, typically cause *that* sort of behaviour. Yet if Hume is right, it is no part of the nature of a genuinely causal connection that the nature of the cause is, even in part, to be such as to cause the effect it explains: the nature of a thing—the thing which is the cause—may be taken in abstraction from its relations to other things, such as the causal relation. Causes, understood in terms of their intrinsic natures, are contingently related to their effects. But the belief that there is a beer in the back fridge is, for want of a better term, *internally related* to behaviours of seeking beer in the back fridge. Its causal powers with respect to such behaviour are necessary. So, the causally explanatory properties of the internal state which causes the bodily movements involved in such behaviours must not be those of the content of the state, but must be others which can be taken in abstraction from content and which characterise the internal state intrinsically. Again, content has no causal role.

On the other hand, Jackson also defends the following propositions:

7. Commonsense functionalism is true, or for the most part is, and is well enough epitemically entrenched for there to be no serious threat to it from the eventual development of the neurosciences.
8. Commonsense functionalism states, among other things, that beliefs contribute causally to the production of behaviour, and do this by virtue of the beliefs they are, that is, by virtue of their content.
9. Causal explanations of behaviour which appeal to functional states involve also this claim, in addition to 2a above:
   (a) The functional state picked out by the specification of the inputs and behavioural outputs distinctive of the functional state was involved in the production of the explanandum.
10. And by six above, what belief a belief is is, often, a matter of its broad content.

Taken together, these theses, 7–8, 9a (ignoring 2a) and 10, suggest that there is an autonomous kind of psychology which proceeds in broad semantic terms but independently of the micro-explanations of neuroscience. Given the broadness of mental content, its taxonomisation of mental states could, in principle, cut across those of neuroscience. However, three above makes it clear that Jackson does not want to go in this direction. How, then, does Jackson render coherent the apparently eliminativist tendency of his emphasis on neuroscience and physicalism with his confidence in the content-causal picture of commonsense functionalism together with broad content?

There are a number of ways to approach Jackson's solution. One is as follows. A crucial move is his idea of the 'here-and-now' intuition. For, he argues, it is an intuition of commonsense that when Joe heads for the fridge out the back, it is something in him that has to have changed, after talking to Jack, to explain his behaviour. It isn't enough that there be shifts in his relationship to things in the environment, as if he could remain exactly as he was before talking to Jack. *He* has to change. If the properties of the resulting change to his neuro-physiological state which cause his bodily movements are neurological properties, what causal role is there for the content, that there is beer in the fridge out the back, to take up?

Jackson suggests two strategies to save a causal role for mental content. The first is derived from a distinction between causal relevance and causal efficacy and an argument that there is a way for a property to be causally relevant and crucial in certain kinds of causal explanation, without being causally efficacious. Take some chemotherapeutic concoction. It is a medication. But describing it this way is to assign it a functional property in relation to human beings. Explaining a person's warding off a malignant tumour in terms of her taking the chemotherapeutic substance as a medication, we cite a causal-relational property of the substance. However, chemotherapeutic concoctions can be used to control the pain of otherwise unmanageable arthritis. In its use in reducing tumours, we understand the causal pathways which explain its effects. There is a detailed aetiological story tellable about its efficacy. Simply describing the concoction as a medication does not yield such a detailed aetiological story. However, by specifying the medical indications for (there being a certain kind of tumour in certain tissues, etc.) and the effects of the concoction, one brings out that the concoction is causally relevant to the reduction or death of the tumour. However, the same explanation implies that there is a more detailed explanation of exactly how the concoction produces that effect on the tumourous cells. In contrast, we do not have such an aetiology of the efficacy of such a substance in managing the pain of arthritis. However, it is obvious that there must be one. It will be an explanation which explains exactly how, in detail, the chemical attributes of the concoction, perhaps, block the nerve pathways by which the pain is experienced. Of course, this explanation which I am presuming could be wrong—perhaps, for instance, the concoction's chemical structures actually destroy problematic cells involved in the actual dysfunction of the painful joints. But there must be such an explanation of the causal efficacy of the chemotherapeutic concoction. However, even without this explanation of efficacy, the explanation in terms of the analgesic functional powers of the concoction is an explanation. Jackson and Pettit call such explanations 'program explanations' because, though at an abstract level, they 'program for' the micro-level explanation which brings out the causal efficacy of the chemical properties of the concoction (cf. Jackson and Pettit 2004e, f).

The important point about such programming explanations is that they aren't excluded by the micro-level explanation. Indeed, argue Jackson and Pettit, the micro-level explanations which bring out the causal efficacy of the causally relevant item described in functional level, more abstract terms, include these functional properties. For instance, to say that such-and-such a chemical structure in the concoction causes certain changes in certain cells along the nerve pathways between some joint and the brain, preventing the transmission of certain electrical signals to the brain, is to include the analgesic effect of the chemotherapeutic concoction on the pain of the arthritis. The items referred to by the functional explanation are not rejected but are included in the micro-level explanation.

Similarly, the functional role played by the internal states of the brain which are belief states is not ‘disappeared’ by the discovery of a detailed aetiology of the production of bodily movements involved in behaviour. That detailed aetiological story of the production of bodily movement, told in terms of the brain state’s neurophysiological properties, just as much includes the causal role played by the belief-cum-content in causing behaviour as does the detailed biochemical explanation of the efficacy of the chemotherapeutic concoction, chemically described, on certain cell structures (those of arthritic joints), which includes the concoction’s causal role as an analgesic for arthritis pain. Just as it is a mistake to think that the analgesic effect is an addition to the biochemical aetiological story, it is a mistake to think that the belief-cum-content is an addition to the neuro-physiological causal story. The posits and the properties of program explanations are not excluded by aetiological explanations; they are part of them. So, commonsense explanations of behaviour are safe, in principle, from progress in neuroscientific explanations of bodily movement. Though beliefs and their content themselves may not be causally *efficacious*, they are casually *relevant*, as is brought out by the program explanation at the more abstract, functional level.

Further, there are good reasons for taking program explanations as important for bringing out various relations of the causally efficacious states to factors in their environment and to behaviour. Consider, for instance, Lewis’ example of a metal whose microstructure is the categorical base of its optical opacity, its thermal conductivity and its electrical conductivity. Intrinsically, the metal’s microstructure is what it is regardless of whether it is put in a field of electric potential difference, between two regions of different temperature, or between a light source and a receiver. Yet, this same intrinsic microstructure provides the stuff of the detailed micro-causal explanation of any light absorption, any electrical current, or any heat transfer that the metal becomes involved in. Intrinsically, the metal is what it is. But electrical conductivity, opacity and thermal conductivity are different dispositions of the metal. Further, it is importantly different to explain the death of someone due to the metal in terms of its opacity, its electrical conductivity or its thermal conductivity. If it is the metal’s opacity that caused the person’s death, the person did not see something behind the metal which turned out to kill her. If it was the electrical conductivity that was relevant, her death was by electrocution. If it was the thermal conductivity, she was burnt to death. Even if the properties cited in them are not causally efficacious, program explanations pick out different causal powers as the relevant ones by specifying what happens in terms of the relevant inputs and outputs. So, program explanations are not rendered redundant by the explanations for which they program. The same point applies to explanations of behaviour in terms of beliefs and their contents, in relation to neuro-physiological explanations of bodily movements. As we saw in discussing Jackson's idea of minimal functionalism, content ascription is a way of describing the relations of behaviour caused by internal states in terms of inputs and other internal states: the content of a belief is the way the world would have to be for the behaviour caused by the state to make the world to be the way the subject desires it to be (Jackson 1996, p. 401; Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996, p. 182ff.). Thus, the belief that there is a beer in the back fridge is causally relevant to the explanation of the direction of Joe's movement, for that movement is what will contribute to causing the slaking of Joe's thirst by drinking beer. Had Joe drunk some lemonade from the back fridge, his belief would have to have been that there is lemonade there. Of course, there is a problem here to which I will return shortly—how to distinguish which of two beliefs that could explain behaviour actually does. For now, it suffices that content ascription relates inputs and outputs and other internal states abstracting from aetiological details and thereby picks out functional roles that are played in the production of behaviour within a subject. These functional properties are not excluded by detailed micro-explanations in neuro-physiological terms but are included as parts of them; nor are they rendered redundant by these detailed aetiologies for they (these broad-content relations of the internal states) serve to locate the internal story of the aetiologies against their environmental causal background and history and so on, which helps to capture important aspects of the causal goings-on in the world—what beliefs and desires are involved, what their content is and so on.

However, Jackson is concerned that this concession that content is causally *relevant* though *not* causally efficacious in a complete aetiology of bodily movements may not be enough to save commonsense functionalism. It may involve too much repudiation of commonsense's 'here-and-now' intuition. This is the intuition that it takes some change in *Joe* to get him moving towards the fridge out the back. In contrast, broad-content ascriptions and the explanations going with them involve setting Joe into various relations with his environment, and though the explanations built on these relations to the environment program for detailed internal state aetiological stories in terms of neurophysiology, this notion of causal relevance may not suffice to capture the thought that it is precisely a change *in Joe* which literally causes his movement towards the fridge out the back. For the change in Joe could be the same and produce the same bodily movements (and raw behaviours) even though the environment to which he is related, and the semantic properties consequent upon these relations, be very different (e.g., if a Twin Earth was done on Joe). The point is clearer perhaps in terms of Joe and his doppelganger. Joe and his doppelganger will undergo the same changes internally and their bodily movements be the same though their broad semantic environments differ radically. Jackson, therefore, holds out for the possibility of a notion of content that is narrow and truth-conditional. This way, internal states with truth-conditional, representational properties are shared by a subject and her doppelganger. This intentional content is narrow because it is shared with the doppelganger. It is truth-conditional since content explains behaviour because the content is taken to be true or because her desire is for what is desired to become true. Whether this narrow content is causally efficacious or not depends on how close to the categorical base of belief it is. Jackson writes that, ‘if we can identify this narrow local fact with a relatively intrinsic feature, presumably a neurological property of some kind, or something of a more structural kind that supervenes on the neurology, then the narrow content that underlies broad content will be causally efficacious; if we cannot, then the narrow content will be causally relevant without being efficacious, but at least it will be local’ (Jackson 1996, p. 403).

There are two points here. The first is that this notion of narrow content substantially deflates the significance of broad content. For Jackson suggests that the combination of an internal state’s narrow truth-conditional content and its causal and certain other relations to the environment determine broad content. As Jackson notes, this is controversial and requires a theory of narrow, truth-conditional content to show that it is possible. Inferential role semantics is a possible model here. (See Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996, Chap. 12, for Jackson’s reasons for this deflationary account of broad content).

For my purposes, however, it is a second point that is more relevant to Jackson’s thinking about the causal efficacy of content. This is that the local, narrow fact on which narrow content, if it is to be causally efficacious, supervenes is either one about a neurological property or a more structural fact supervening on the neurology. Obviously, this is a somewhat speculative matter. Be that as it may, Jackson’s support for the map metaphor of mental representation against the language of thought hypothesis seems important to note in this connection.

Jackson generally discusses the map metaphor for mental representation by introducing it to explore what implications it has for mental causation, should it turn out that brain states represent ways the world is or could be in a manner more like a map than like the sentences of a language (Jackson 1996, p. 403; Jackson 1998d, p. 113). In another place, he (and Braddon-Mitchell) argues for the advantages of the map metaphor over the language of thought approach though presents the map proposal as neutral on the neurophysiology of representation in the brain (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996, p. 188). I take it that there is some ground clearing necessary to defend the possibility of map-like mental representation as opposed to anything else. The question as to whether mental representation is map-like or language-like (or something else if there is mental representation as conceived in these debates) is an empirical one. In the ground-clearing connection, Jackson argues that maps, holograms and such are systematic and productive representational systems. Thus far, they fare no worse than language of thought views. They are systematic and productive because they are structured representational systems. But it is not clear that proponents of map-like representation are neutral about the neurophysiology of representation in the brain. Nor do Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson argue in their 1996 book in such a way as to retain neutrality about ‘the neurophysiology of representation in the brain’. For they argue for the advantages of the map metaphor over the sentences-in-a-language metaphor. Further, I would have thought that the map-like representation hypothesis fits very naturally with the idea of narrow, truth-conditional content supervening on neuro-physiological structure. That is, if mental representational content is (a) narrow, (b) truth-conditional and (c) causally efficacious, Jackson can quite naturally put the map-like representation hypothesis to work. For (a) maps are structural representations and as such are at least candidates for supervening on structural neurological properties. So, they should be systems of narrow representational content. (b) They can have content assigned them in the usual minimal functionalist way—that is, in terms of inputs and behavioural outputs—'we match head states that are beliefs with possible states of the world by the rule that each state of the head gets assigned the possible state of the world which is such that if it were the way things actually are, the behaviour that head state causes would realise what the subject desires' (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996, p. 181). As such, individual beliefs fall out of systems of belief in the light of input-behaviour specifications assigning content first to the belief system, holistically (Jackson 1998d, p. 117ff.). The model here is the metal which is opaque, thermally conductive and electrically conductive even though the intrinsic nature of the metal does not distinguish between these functional properties as such. In light of this, the possibility seems clear that mental representational content is truth-conditional given the right correspondence relation between internal states and possible states of the world. And (c) if the right kind of relation of supervenience is found to exist between such map-like representational systems and the structural neuro-physiological properties of the brain states, presumably the mental states can be not only causally relevant but also causally efficacious.

Is Jackson's view of content and mental causation 'Dennettish'? Kind of. Individual beliefs are, as it were, ontologically consequent upon content assignments to the system of belief in the light of input-behaviour connections and intentional systems theory (on which cf. Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996, p. 145ff.). Is this incompatible with realism about mental causation? Apparently not. For just as the dispositions of opacity, electrical conductivity and thermal conductivity are real features of metal, different from each other though all based on the single molecular structure and so on of the metal, their different linkages between inputs and outputs are not just a matter of pretending that the metal is opaque, electrically conductive and so on. Similarly, distinguishing individual beliefs from each other in the light of different input–output linkages attributed to a holistic intentional system is not a matter of pretending that human beings believe that, for instance, there is a beer in the fridge out the back, merely for predictive purposes but not taking this seriously as a causal explanation of what the subject does. For on Jackson's picture, there are individual contents incorporated into the intentional, representational, map-like system in Joe's head, even if talk of individual beliefs is something of a hypostatisation. Is there an element of instrumentalism about mental states in this? To be sure. It is an instrumentalism about individual beliefs and desires, for they are not 'basic' in the way whole systems of intentional content are—there is an element of 'reporting relativity' involved in the characterisation of individual belief contents, and this characterisation is keyed to the description and prediction of behaviour in ways that some intentionalist realists will not be entirely comfortable about. Is this an objection to Jackson? I doubt it.

Philosophy of Religion

Scientific Theism: Peter Forrest

In his 1996 book, *God without the Supernatural: A Defense of Scientific Theism*, Peter Forrest seeks to defend a version of the thesis that God exists. His is a distinctive line of thought because it seeks to steer a course between the metaphysical naturalism that is pretty much orthodoxy in Australian analytic philosophy and the more traditional religious understanding that God is a supernatural being transcending nature in ways inaccessible from a scientific outlook on the world and from a perspective furnishable from precedents in our common experience of the world. He characterises metaphysical naturalism as the view that nothing exists except what is that for which well-confirmed science provides precedent. Supernaturalism, on the other hand, posits things and properties which neither science nor common experience provides precedent. The concept of God which he defends is one of a personal God, who creates the natural order and does so for the sake, at least in part, of ourselves in it—and for the sake of ourselves in it not just as so many elements of an aggregate whose good is to be maximised, but for us as individuals whose good is a target of divine concern. Forrest's theism is, then, an anthropic theism. While he is prepared from within this theistic view to posit things or properties for which science provides no precedent (common ground with supernaturalism), he will not posit anything for which no precedent can be found in common experience (departing company from traditional supernatural religion).

The argument for this theism is, in the broad, a kind of abductive one. Forrest styles it 'inference to the best explanation' apologetics. Three obligations are incurred by adopting this approach. First, it has to be shown that anthropic theism is a better explanation over a wide(r) range of phenomena than naturalistic explanation; second, it has to be shown that the hypothesis that God exists is epistemically possible, that the probability is not too low that God exists prior to the consideration of the explanatory power of the hypothesis; and third, it has to be shown that the strongest objection to it is not so strong that, despite its explanatory power, we are not entitled to it. Once all these debts are discharged, it can be concluded that anthropic theism is a better hypothesis to believe than naturalistic atheism. In this way, anthropic theism is warranted and atheistic naturalism is not. However, the possibility has to be allowed for that an even better hypothesis than anthropic theism might exist. To the extent that it is, anthropic theism is not warranted to the exclusion of agnosticism, based on the possibility of a better hypothesis. Hence, both agnosticism and anthropic theism are warranted on intellectual grounds. On the other hand, since there is value in commitment on important matters such as the existence of God, Forrest offers other, non-theoretical, reasons for being an anthropic theist rather than an agnostic.

Such an argument is clearly ambitious within the scope of a single work. Explananda for which Forrest defends anthropic theism as a good explanation include the following: the fitness of the universe for life, the regularity of the laws of nature, our capacity for intellectual progress, the overridingness of moral obligations, beauty and the serendipity of mathematics. Then, each of these involves its own subsidiary topics. Further, Forrest's strategy requires him to enter the lists of the philosophy of mind as he characterises the God for which he argues in terms of consciousness: God is 'unrestricted consciousness'. Since consciousness here is about the appearances of things, all the usual conundra arise about the accommodation of qualia and so on in the physicalist-cum-functionalist picture of the mind. Then, even if all this is made good, Forrest has to fend off the objection to accepting the theistic hypothesis from the problem of evil. This is no small philosophical garden just on its own. So it is very clear that the argument of the work is very ambitious.

I think it has to be owned that in such an ambitious project, a trade-off is inevitable between the philosophical conscience on matters of detailed argument on narrowly focused topics and achieving the kind of broad vision of the sweep of the argument that this kind of project requires. To his great credit, Forrest's discussions of topics consistently introduce thoughtful observations, insightful ideas, carefully trod paths between opposed views, creative suggestions and so on. Many problems are offered a variety of anti-supernaturalist theistic conceptions (for instance, there are five suggestions for what the anti-supernaturalist might think the afterlife is like: Forrest 1996a, Chap. 2, §4). Further, he brings to bear on familiar topics in philosophy of religion helpful insights from philosophy of science as well as general metaphysics and epistemology. In this it is arguable that compared to, say, Swinburne's comparably ambitious project over his entire career, Forrest's book genuinely gives the naturalist approach an open-hearted hearing. However, the trade-off will be inevitable for such an ambitious project as Forrest's. Many will read the back-and-forth of arguments, the numerous theses, principles and speculations and feel that many important topics have been treated too cursorily or that particular theses have been dismissed too peremptorily or their resources for meeting challenges taken with inadequate attention and so on. For in each of the subordinate topics he broaches (e.g., the explananda mentioned above), the best explanation epistemology raises a complex set of questions and responsibilities concerning theories rival to his own. These sets of questions and responsibilities will be parallel to those for which he is responsible, in the large, if he is to defend anthropic theism at the most general level of the overarching issue of God's existence or nonexistence. If, as it has always been a virtue of analytic philosophy to insist, 'God is in the details' (pun intended), it cannot be granted that Forrest convincingly achieves what he sets out to. Despite the wealth of ideas, the frequent subtlety of argument and the width of argumentative mastery, the ambition and the epistemology pull in opposite directions. There is just too much debate about each of the topics addressed in the book for anthropic theism to achieve a defence in the comprehensive way Forrest seeks here.

However, an equally critical problem is the force of the conclusion if it does eventually, given the details, work. For there are (at least) two quite central features of Forrest's theism that deserve attention. One is the objective though *non-objectual* reading of God's existence that he prefers. For there is no entity or object which is the God to which we conclude from this argument: better to say 'there is a God' than that ‘God exists’ (Forrest 1996a, p. 209f.). God is unrestricted consciousness, and consciousness is the (intransitive) appearing of things. Being unrestricted, God is the consciousness of all things—God is the appearing of all things. Although the fact that things appear is an objective fact, God is not an *entity* in any sense involving the ‘collecting’ of all consciousness (or appearing) in a unifying self. Nevertheless, it is an objective fact that God exists.

There are important questions this thesis raises, many of which Forrest addresses. However, many he does not address, such as: how is one to reinterpret more traditional claims such as that God is an agent? Or that God is a necessary being? These more traditional formulae need reformulation. Further, Forrest admits that the non-objectual view he advocates is ‘peculiar enough’ (p. 209) but, in a very brief discussion, suggests that the peculiarity is removed by observing that emotional states (such as devotion to God) take propositions as content rather than persons or other objects and that it is possible to have a *relationship* with such a God in near enough to ‘the popular sense’ without strictly being in a *relation* to God (logically). In the abstract, the logical point might be fair enough. In this logical context, the point of such a propositional (de dicto) rendering of the emotions of relationships as Forrest suggests seems to be to avoid rendering talk about God transparent to quantification. Forrest’s preference for ‘there is a God’ (i.e., $(\exists x)\ Gx$) over ‘God exists’ (i.e., $(\exists x)\ x = g$) suggests something like this, as only the latter strictly quantifies over God in the domain of quantification. Moreover, since one can worship non-existent objects, reading a context such as ‘s worships g’ de dicto closes it off from existential generalisation on ‘g’ (i.e., it blocks inferring from ‘$W(s, g)$’ to ‘$(\exists x)\ W(s, x)$’) and so avoids treating God as a member of the domain of quantification, in the way a de re reading would permit (which would permit inferring from ‘$R(s, g)$’ to ‘$(\exists x)\ R(s, x)$’). Alternatively, or perhaps complementarily, Forrest may be alluding to a non-objectual interpretation of quantification over God, and this may fit naturally with God conceived as the appearing of all things in some way.

Whatever the correct interpretation is, the non-objectual character of God raises some questions. First, does this mean that earlier speculations about God as ‘the unified consciousness to which all things appear’ (p. 177) are *façons de parler*? On Forrest’s view, it seems that one does not love *God* or stand in right relation to her in the grace of the sacraments or when convicted in guilt by her in her unfathomable goodness (these sound like relations to me). Rather, one is lovingly mindful that there is the forgiveness of God, that there is the divine grace available in the sacraments, or the like. To my religious ear, this sounds like a parody of religious devotion. To be sure, as Forrest says, when one fears death there isn’t a *thing*, death, as it were, ‘out there before one’ which one fears; rather, one fears (say) that one will be dead soon (p. 210). But that is because of ‘the sort of thing’ death is. We all know that. In contrast, in loving relationships, one’s love isn’t just possessed of loving thoughts that, say, one’s son is a good man and he makes one proud. It is a relationship with *him*. One is confronted by him, and (for want of better language for it—substance language doesn’t help here either) one’s love for him opens one out to him precisely in his otherness. In mature relationships with one's son, when you say you love him and are proud of him, and you mean this, he knows you mean it. When you don't mean it and are just being conventional or not rising to the challenge of honesty in the relationship, he can't be conned. There is real encounter here that gets below the shields we put up in ordinary social interactions—real encounter in the knowing recognition by him of one's pride and love and by oneself in seeing that he recognises it. One is in a relationship with *this man*. The issue doesn't primarily concern logical form, but it is not without implications for logical form. Or rather, we can recast bits of natural language in different logical forms till the cows come home. If we are talking about ontological categories in something like Aristotle's sense, it should be recalled that we can quantify over and render transparent to inferences of existential exportation not only 'objects', but events, processes, non-existent Meingongiana, first-order properties, states of affairs, things expressed by lambda or epsilon operators... whatever we like or not—in which case we represent apparent natural language quantifications over such things very differently without quantification. Our view of the metaphysics (or ontology) of the domain under investigation rules on such matters.

Arguably, Forrest's de dicto reading of religious attitudes fails to carry conviction. For, at the very least, the appearings of a totality of things, uncollected by some sort of focal Other, lack the kind of separate, unified, self-consciousness that eludes one but that is capable of moments of truth for oneself, putting one on notice and the like. Appearings, and so consciousness, even though they escape materialist explanation, are nevertheless epiphenomenal and so not part of the causal story about what happens. But a wife could not have 'such fury as a woman's scorn' were she not an other, like I am trying to evince. But such *is* God. It seems to me that religious talk about the nature of devotion and relationship with God is not doable entirely propositionally, de dicto, with the quantificational (or referential) opacity apparently intended. Forrest's God might be epistemically possible, but it isn't clear such a God is worth having. Or, should I say, it isn't clear that all things appear and there is unrestricted appearing which is worth taking as the content of a propositional pro-attitude of devotion, taken *de dicto*? One might hope that more of the religious phenomena were saved.

All this said, however, Forrest's work is of great value for its resolute relocation of the conduct of religious apologetics in an abductive epistemology which takes into account the broad canvass of issues and human experience as well as the power and possibilities of contemporary naturalism. Religious sensibility, even if in 'good order' as a type of form of life, cannot stay where it used to be given these two factors.

As a transition to the next section, I will outline the debate between Peter Forrest and Mark Wynn concerning the anti-supernaturalism of Forrest's project.

I said above that there are (at least) two features of Forrest's project which deserve attention. The second feature is that his overarching aim is to get a theism which takes us beyond naturalism though without supernaturalism. Wynn questions whether Forrest's anti-supernaturalist theism is ultimately stable, given his accounts of both divine ineffability and the nature of emergent orders of things in the world (cf. Bishop 1999, p. 107).[6] I will only treat the ineffability point. The anti-supernaturalism which Forrest defends is the idea that we should not believe in entities (a) for which there is no precedent either in science or in the familiar and (b) whose operation violates the laws of nature (Forrest 1996a, p. 2ff.). He justifies this by arguing that there is an Ockhamist presumption in favour of positing only entities of kinds we are familiar with or entities, even if unfamiliar, which are required posits of well-confirmed scientific theory. The latter part of this presumption is weak if a posit is precedented in the familiar; it is strong if the posit is not precedented in the familiar (Forrest 1996a, p. 4).[7] The intellectual cost of positing such an unprecedented entity may be balanced if the explanatory gain is high. Anti-supernaturalism, then, must argue that for any highly explanatory supernaturalist explanation, there is a better, anti-supernaturalist, perhaps even naturalist, one (Forrest 2001, p. 101).

Wynn's argument can be put quite briefly. In relation to divine ineffability, Forrest wants to maintain some version of the idea that we are unable to know the divine nature, even though we may know some things about God. His acceptance of this modest ineffability thesis arises from the concern that the requirement of precedence in either science or common experience could undermine divine transcendence. Yet, accepting our ignorance of the divine nature means that the divine nature is at least epistemically unprecedented. Forrest uses various gambits to clarify how his views work in relation to this thesis. What is clear is that the characterisation of God as unrestricted consciousness is speculative. This speculation is coherent with the anti-supernaturalism to no small extent (though one could urge that the disembodiment of the divine consciousness is unprecedented). An alternative is the supernaturalist's suggestion that a more plausible hypothesis regarding our ignorance of the divine nature is that God is unprecedented in our world. Wynn's main point, however, is that if, as it seems Forrest concedes, we cannot identify the precedents of the divine *nature* or, once they are identified, are unable to trace the extension from the familiar to the divine, the difference—i.e., the difference between the supernaturalist's insistence that the divine nature is unprecedented and Forrest's acceptance that we do not know the divine nature even if we are warranted in his unrestricted consciousness hypothesis—becomes vanishingly small. In reply, Forrest concedes the point that the ineffability he accepts and his position of anti-supernaturalism are in tension. He moves to treating anti-supernaturalism as methodological rather than as a substantive constraint on our conception of God. He suggests two reasons for this: one, respect for the theistic tradition's view that we cannot know the divine nature; second, epistemic modesty: it is presumptuous to assume God to be the kind of entity of which there is not much we are ignorant (Forrest 2001, p. 102). On the other hand, one might have reservations about how important the distinction is between a methodological principle and a substantive constraint on a concept of something.

---

[6] Similarly, Bishop suggests that Forrest underestimates the 'boldness' of his speculation that God is unrestricted consciousness. While not explicitly a worry about whether this speculation slides into supernaturalism, Bishop worries that Forrestian unrestricted consciousness ought to be a single integrated system of appearances of all things; as such, there is nothing that this unrestricted consciousness could be a part of. And yet, worries Bishop, consciousness, as known in nature, is a proper part of some wider system. God, then, is a very different kind of consciousness from that known from nature, if Bishop is right. The 'boldness' of Forrest's hypothesis could be taken to be that it unwittingly invites such a move away from naturalism and what is precedented in common experience that the anti-supernaturalism is strained.

[7] Wynn discusses four lines of thought he finds in Forrest for the preferability of anti-supernaturalism over supernaturalism (Wynn 1999b, p. 479).

Other Arguments About God

Wynn and the Design Argument

This is a good opportunity to introduce another important contribution to Australasian philosophy of religion in the 1990s: the work of Mark Wynn. Wynn attempts a revival of the design argument along the lines of the abductive epistemology that Forrest develops.

Wynn's basic endeavour is to revitalise the design argument by means of two moves. The first is to situate it as a tenable hypothesis for some, as a better explanation of certain features of the universe—in particular, the pervasive beauty of the world and the universe's propensity for richer and more complex forms of material organisation—than naturalism. The second is to formulate his design arguments or hypotheses so as to bring out this emphasis on the goodness of the world. For the central idea of his arguments is that the world exists because it is good that it exist. Hence, God as designer is argued to be a better explanation of the goodness of the world than naturalism.

In connection with the first move, his book *God and Goodness* (1999a) has four sections. The first spells out the explanatory superiority of the theistic design hypothesis over its naturalist rival. The second considers the force of disvalue in the world as evidence against the design hypothesis and argues that it is not decisively against it. The third part takes it that the argument so far cannot be claimed to show that the hypothesis that the world exists because it is good that it does is more likely true than not. So instead, in this part, Wynn seeks to offer certain moral considerations to show that the balance of probabilities is not clearly against the hypothesis. Central here is his argument that trust in the basic goodness of the world is reasonable, taking moral considerations about trust into account. The final section takes up Wynn's concern to connect the concept of God to which design-from-goodness arguments give rise to themes in religious life such as worship and salvation. The central thrust here is to articulate a concept of God which extends the conception of him as good from the first three parts and as a religiously adequate object of devotion and ultimate commitment.

The second move—the arguments that design hypotheses are better explanations of goodness in the world—is crucial. Without them, the design hypothesis does not pull its weight. The first consideration concerns the pervasive beauty in the world and builds on an argument of F.R. Tennant's 1930 *Philosophical Theology*. The basic thought is that nature's capacity pervasively to induce in us positive aesthetic responses is better explained if there is a God who makes the world to be this way pervasively beautiful than it is on the assumption that such aesthetic responsiveness is caused by selective mechanisms in evolutionary history (the biophilia hypothesis). Moreover, the universe's being such that it develops towards richer and more complex material structures is better explained by the design hypothesis than by naturalistic explanations. Wynn seeks also to bolster this inference with a design hypothesis to explain the suitability of the universe for life.

The biophilia hypothesis claims that preferences for biodiversity and natural environments are likely or expected to be coded for in the genes as we evolved in settings with many species and in natural environments. Wynn carefully discusses various empirical works which purport to support and extend this line of thought. I would note that one does not have to be impressed by such attempts to explain our aesthetic preferences (for savannah, no less, if some of this empirical work is to be believed). In relation to the emergence of richer and complex material structures in the universe, Wynn is careful to state his target: he seeks to explain why it is that by the operation of natural laws the universe develops towards richer and more complex structures, when, as it were, for all that the operation of laws of nature requires such developments would have no significance.

Further, Wynn argues that the design hypothesis is a better explanation of the goldilocks facts about the universe that make it suitable for life, since naturalism either has no explanation at all or, with the multiple universes hypothesis, is more extravagant and less clearly explanatory. I find his arguments here less than convincing overall. I will start with the last claim, regarding the multiverse hypothesis. The goldilocks universe is one of the many, many possibilities for the way the Big Bang would develop. I take it that part of the force of trying to think of the physics of the initial singularity from which the Big Bang emerged in quantum-mechanical cosmological terms is to represent this idea. Roughly, there is a state vector for the Big Bang which incorporates a probability distribution over possible ways the universe could emerge to be from the Big Bang. This does not require multiple universes, it seems to me. What we have is simply a statistical explanation. Individual events in statistical explanations do not have explanations. The requirement for an explanation is rejected by the claim that all there is the state vector of the initial singularity. The universe with our goldilocks facts is one of those events in the space of possibilities over which there is a probability distribution. That we emerged is just chance. It is not that chance fails to explain, as if this itself is a failure and the emergence of our universe from the Big Bang should be explained. It is rather that there is no explanation for this kind of event—it is one possible event in the probability distribution. And that's all there is to say.

Of course, we have reason to be grateful that this world is pretty good (or as good as it is, indeed a gift) and mostly exquisitely beautiful. But this is not weird or in need of special explanation. That what is good and beautiful is good and beautiful is not at all undermined by its origins in chance or in the brute bumping and grinding of subatomic particles up through long-chain proteins according to the laws of nature. We are what we are even if we descended from apes—but we aren't apes.

Just so, the sunset is exquisite even though the reds and so on are effects of light refraction and our visual systems. The point here seems to weaken the force of Wynn's arguments for he requires that the God of the design hypothesis act through the causes of nature and their laws. Wynn complains a number of times that naturalism lacks explanations for transitions in the world—from chemicals to life, from life to sentience, from sentience to sapience. But *naturalism* does not pretend to have such explanations—it is a philosophical thesis and it is *science* which tries to explain these things nowadays inasmuch as they have explanation. *That* is what naturalism says.

There is a telling passage on p. 54 of Wynn's (1999) book, where he describes his approach (as following Holmes Rolston's) and points out that he is not arguing that God intervenes at these junctures to 'upgrade' the chemical soup to being a self-replicating, living system. Instead, he aims to try to explain why nature is such as to *develop* as it does given that, as far as the laws of nature are concerned, there is no necessity that life, sentience, etc., should develop. However, this God does not act so as to intervene and override the laws but acts *through* them: 'there must be some naturalistic account of the tendency of the world to act as a value generator, since this tendency is deep-seated, and accordingly, somehow written into the material order itself'. So Wynn's approach 'is not committed to the insufficiency of scientific explanations of these matters'. Yet, within a few lines he goes on to say: 'Rolston's [and Wynn's] view invites us to suppose that scientific explanations of natural value generation can take what forms they may, providing we recognise the insufficiency of Darwinian accounts' (p. 54). But the sufficiency of Darwinian accounts, give or take some details of evolutionary biology, is exactly what Wynn's approach is committed to if he is committed to scientific explanations and God's working through them, not against them. One has to fish or cut bait here. For once we have the explanations from these scientific principles, we understand how goodness and beauty came about.

Now, that is not to say that goodness and beauty somehow 'aren't there', or are not objective, or are 'nothing but' electromagnetic radiation displaying the effects of scattering through the atmosphere. 'Objective' is said in many ways. Goodness and beauty do not have to be 'reducible' to be 'out there'. And they can arise from natural causes and be what they are—just as we arise from the apes but are what we are. So there *is more* to say about goodness, beauty and even the holy, after we have given naturalistic explanations of them. For goodness is not an illusion, nor is beauty, nor, I think, is holiness and the sacred. We need to describe them and limn their structures from within the perspective they furnish us on the world. But natural explanations are enough explanation of their origins. God does not seem to add further intelligibility to their explanation. It seems to me, her role, if she exists, is different. Again, this is not to say that there is not value in the kind of natural theology Wynn and others do. But that value arises after one believes in God: God casts a light to see the natural order *in*. But she does not add lumens to the light nature casts on itself so that we see it.

Oppy and Ontological Arguments

The ontological argument received detailed and very thorough attention from Graham Oppy during our period. He presents his 1995 work, *Ontological Arguments and Belief in God*, as an instalment in a large project of expounding and defending agnosticism on religious questions. In this book he argues that ontological arguments do not provide agnostics with good reason to change their view about God's existence. His view is therefore negative about the value or persuasiveness of ontological arguments.

Ontological Arguments and Belief in God consists of 12 chapters of 199 pages and a 136-page appendix of 'Literature Notes' mainly discussing in some detail recent literature on ontological arguments. In Chap. 1, Oppy provides an historical overview of the argument and its detractors, covering Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant and the positivists. Oppy distinguishes six kinds of ontological argument: definitional, conceptual, modal, Meinongian, experiential and 'Hegelian'. The distinction is based to some extent on the character of the crucial moves in the argument but also, in the main, on Oppy's diagnosis of their characteristic weaknesses. Each kind of ontological argument is given a chapter. There follow chapters on applying the fruits of these discussions to the arguments of Anselm and Descartes, including a characterisation of a general objection to ontological arguments (Chap. 8); on an examination of miscellaneous alleged general objections to ontological arguments (Chap. 9); on whether existence is a predicate (10); on parodies of the ontological argument (11); and on whether there might be other uses to which ontological arguments might be put. Oppy formulates his conclusion; thus, (i) 'I conclude that there are no ontological arguments that provide me with a good reason to believe that God…exists' (Oppy 1995, p. 198); (ii) 'I also conclude that there are no ontological arguments that provide me with a good reason to believe that God…does not exist' (1995, p. 198); (iii) 'I conclude that there are perfectly general grounds on which I can dismiss the possibility of a dialectically effective ontological argument' (1995, p. 198); and (iv) 'I conclude that there is no other use to which ontological argument can be adapted by theists or atheists: Given their dialectical impotence, there is no other purpose that they can successfully achieve. Thus I conclude that ontological arguments are completely worthless…' (1995, p. 199). These different conclusions are based on different aspects of the discussion in the book.

The basic problem, according to Oppy (in §8.4), from which ontological arguments suffer is this. The terms (names: 'God'; definite descriptions: 'the maximally perfect being', 'that than which no greater being can be conceived', etc.) which occur in such arguments range over the collection of things that are supposed to include God, and either do or do not occur within the scope of a sentential operator such as 'according to the definition…' or 'according to the theistic story…'. Where the argument occurs within the scope of such an operator, the non-theist can agree that the conclusion ('according to the definition of "God", God exists') follows from the definition ('according to the definition, God is that than which none greater can be conceived'). However, she is not thereby given reason to move from her non-theism or to think that her non-theism has to this point been irrational. For one can accept that something exists according to its definition or in some story about the universe, without accepting that there is anything that satisfies the definition or that that story about the universe is true. Of course, the theist wants more of this argument: they want to ‘detach’ the proposition that God exists from the operator ‘according to the definition’ and assert it free of such a limitation. But if the operator is intensional, this kind of detachment will not be valid. However, if the operator is extensional, the non-theist can complain that the argument begs the question on the point at issue between her and the theist—that is, whether there is a thing satisfying the definition (. . .the story is to be believed. . .). On the other hand, if the terms do not occur within the scope of such a sentential operator, the situation is similar. The non-theist can resist the thought that she has to accept the unqualified premise of the argument.

It is rather a cavil to complain that occasionally Oppy gives too short a shrift to some moves that the theist could make so that the ontological argument could fare better under criticism. The book is a wealth of highly detailed, sophisticated and fair discussion of as wide a variety of ontological arguments as has ever been collected. This comprehensiveness alone assures the study its place as the starting point for future examination of ontological arguments. One may have reservations about its account of begging the question in the dialectic of debates over the argument (1995, p. 53ff.). One may have the view that there is more value to be wrung from ontological arguments for theism than Oppy takes seriously (cf. Gale 1998, p. 717; Taliaferro 1997, p. 553f.). One might have the view that there is a version of the argument which Oppy does not take seriously enough and which escapes the basic kind of critique (Wierenga 1998, p. 164). Or one may not find Oppy’s epistemological sympathies convincing.[8] But such reservations about Oppy’s argument do not undermine its fundamental achievement.

Pantheism

Lest it be thought that theism was the only doctrine of God which received attention in our period, we note the defence of pantheism propounded by Michael Levine and further discussions of pantheism by Oppy and Forrest later in the decade.

Levine laments the focus on Judeo-Christian theism in English-speaking analytic philosophy of religion. In *Pantheism: A Non-theistic Concept of Deity* (1994), he seeks to defend a doctrine of God which represents a genuine alternative to this concentration on theism (see Levine 2000, in which he argues that contemporary Christian analytic philosophy of religion ‘lacks vitality, relevance and “seriousness”’). He seeks to develop a doctrine of pantheism which is defined in an open enough way to include thinkers whom he takes to be paradigmatic pantheists, such as Spinoza, Walt Whitman and Lao-tse. However, he also takes Hegel, Plotinus, some pre-Socratics, John Scotus Eriugena, Giordano Bruno and Shankara to be more or less pantheistic in their thinking. Quite some burden of his discussion is to distinguish pantheism from confusions about it and to make clear its difference from atheism and theism (1994: Part I). To this end, he delineates a form of pantheism in which the existence of God is insisted upon, thus distinguishing it from atheism (cf. Spinoza's treatment as an atheist by many theistic critics of the seventeenth century). Further, it is argued that God is not to be understood as a being with personal attributes, thus distinguishing pantheism from theism as well as panentheism (1994, pp. 11–12, 148; panentheism being the view of Forrest 1996a, pp. 202, 233ff.). Rather, God is the (impersonal) all-encompassing Unity of the world. The universe, in its unity, has a divine character ('character' here having nothing to do with virtue). This unity does not involve any monism, as it might if the universe is taken to be a single substance (1994: §2.3). Instead, the unity of the world is evaluative in nature. This is not to say that God, as the unity of the world, is morally good (1994, p. 316), though it does seem that the unity of the world is the moral good (cf., e.g., 1994, pp. 209, 238, 242).

---

[8] Gale (1998, p. 718ff.) complains about Oppy’s ‘language-game fideism’, while Oakes (1998, p. 381f.) accuses Oppy of ignoring the distinction between being provided with a justification or reason to believe that *p* and its being irrational if one does not accept that *p*.

Levine argues, convincingly, that pantheism is not implied by theism and that it is no claim of pantheism that the world is God's body. He discusses some 'problems of pantheism'—creation, evil, ethics and ecology and salvation and immortality (1994, Chap. 4). The pantheist, Levine argues, does not obviously need a doctrine of creation (p. 180), but if he is to have one, it is not unexpected that it would be emmanationist (p. 196). Evil is not a problem for pantheism, as it is for theism. Critics who have suggested that it is more of a problem for pantheism than for theism have assumed that pantheism must be monistic, which is false; they have imported assumptions about divinity which are properly theistic (1994: §4.2). Pantheists may not even choose to use the concept of evil widely at all, preferring to speak of moral right and wrong and perhaps reserving 'evil' for particularly egregious wrongs (pp. 197f.). Pantheists, like theists, will tend to be 'moral realists' in metaethics (p. 219). Also, pantheism can be the basis of a more adequate and much needed ecological ethics which is in no way anthropocentric (1994, §4.3). Pantheists, further, reject the notion of personal immortality (pp. 242, 248ff.). Achievement of the human good involves 'a certain kind of relation to the Unity in order to live "properly"' (p. 242).

Of particular importance is Levine's aim to bring out the religious, moral, and spiritual significance of pantheism as an alternative to theism and not merely leave it as an abstract intellectual hypothesis about God or nature. Since divine Unity is non-personal, worship is not appropriate (1994, p. 362). Prayer is particularly misplaced (p. 315), though a respect, reverence, or honour towards divine Unity is apt, as found in, for instance, devotion to the universe, nature observation, or art (p. 314). Pantheist practice is aimed at establishing 'right relation' to the Unity. The means for this are partly individualistic (pp. 346, 352) but generally will be 'contemplative or meditative' (p. 342). And while achieving the right relation to the Unity involves other people (p. 348), it is no accident that pantheism has not been practiced as a church-style community (pp. 357ff.).

Levine's discussions of pantheism are developed in a careful dialectic with numerous thinkers and ideas. His aim is not to define a new kind of pantheism but to achieve clarity about it and to locate it as a viable alternative to theism for modern thinking and informed people. He does not argue for his substantive positions as often perhaps as one would like. His careful articulation of a distinctive doctrine of God that avoids certain of theism's challenges, while showing that the pantheistic God can take up quite a few of the theistic God's roles while simply abandoning others not worth having played, is of the first importance. Levine's work requires serious engagement and debate. Such serious attention has been paid by Forrest (1997) and Oppy (1997), but space precludes discussion of it.

Morality and Method

The 1990s might be thought of as the decade of ethics. For during this period, the field of 'applied ethics' became a distinct area of work for philosophers or a specialism with a somewhat complex relation to philosophy but typically involving philosophers. New 'centres of ethics' grew up and became involved in the professional moral cogitations of various professions, notably medicine and other healthcare-related professions. But also, teaching, research and consulting work with other professions were to be found. In addition to the (pre-existing) Centre for Human Bioethics at Monash University, we find the Plunkett Centre for Ethics in Healthcare at Australian Catholic University, with support from St. Vincent's Hospital in Sydney; the St. James Ethics Centre, working with the business (and later the sporting) community; the Caroline Chisholm Centre for Ethics; the Southern Cross Centre for Ethics in Adelaide; and the Centre for Philosophy and Public Issues in Melbourne (which later developed into CAPPE, the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, funded in 2000 as an ARC Special Research Centre with branches at the University of Melbourne and in Canberra). Philosophers were the directors of all these centres. The mission of each centre involved addressing some area of particular ethical pressure in the wider community, and the centres put philosophers into fruitful and challenging dialogue with the professions and other groups. Philosophers such as Phillip Pettit and Bernadette Tobin worked on the Australian Health Ethics Committee's various subcommittees on developing important statements of policy and protocol for the handling of sensitive ethical topics in the delivery of healthcare. Others, such as Max Charlesworth, worked with the NHMRC on topics such as resource allocation and its challenges under the impetus of downward pressures on healthcare spending by government. Such work became more mainstream in the profession. Some philosophy PhD graduates went on to work as clinical ethicists in hospitals around Australia, and the phenomenon became much more widespread of individuals who already were qualified in various professions—but especially medicine—returning to university to take philosophy, and particularly ethics, courses to become qualified participants in the ethical debates of their professions. Many, such as the neurologist Grant Gillett of Christchurch, became a philosopher in his own right (see Gillett 1992).

This continued a wave of interest among the professions in philosophical ethics that began in the 1980s. It developed to a peak in the 1990s. Many new courses in applied ethics appeared in the listed offerings of departments around Australasia, along with informal courses, intensive courses, and the like. New associations for the debate and study of ethics in the public and professional life of the region were founded. The Australasian Bioethics Association began life in the early decade, though it has merged since into the Australasian Association of Bioethics and Health Law. The Australian Association of Professional and Applied Ethics was founded at a conference held in Newcastle University in 1993, which had in turn developed out of a conference in Sydney the year before on ‘Teaching Applied Ethics’. Over time, however, the involvement of philosophers in these associations has waned somewhat.

There were, no doubt, various influences behind these developments. One was simply the importance and difficulty of the questions which society was facing after the 1980s ‘greed is good’ mania and the challenges of new biomedical technologies. One might suspect there was something of a wave of ‘ethics-chic’ after the perceived amorality of some public players during the 1980s (Bond, Skase et al.). Particularly, the challenges of new biomedical technologies led to the rise of ethics committees to oversee the ethical quality of biomedical and other research. Additionally, the economic reforms of the 1980s under Labor and the recession of the early decade (which we ‘had to have’, if Keating was right) probably enlivened the sense that ever-escalating public spending had to be halted. Given the political consensus then for smaller government and the intrinsic justification and voter popularity of Australia’s and New Zealand’s systems of healthcare funding, the problems of resource allocation became prominent. Traditional ethical voices on questions like these—the churches, legal opinion leaders and political commentators—were having less traction with the public. Philosophers had already been contributing to academic and popular debate about such social questions, though in small numbers. The call grew for greater public engagement by philosophers and others to act as public intellectuals. Philosophers prominent in this connection were Peter Singer and Raimond Gaita.

Other matters arose during the 1990s which attracted philosophers’ attention: with the Mabo Decision, the push towards Aboriginal reconciliation gained momentum (cf. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2000); there was the Ormond College sexual harassment case, the matter of Helen Demidenko’s *The Hand that Signed the Paper* (1994), and so on. Thus, philosophy was beginning to have a greater role in engaging public ethical debates and influencing the ethical thinking of the wider community and of opinion-formers outside academia. Perhaps a less noble, but no less real, influence on these developments was the felt need to make philosophy more *relevant* to the wider public for reasons of protecting the discipline from the depredations of funding cuts imposed by government, especially after 1995. If a case could be made for the discipline’s value to the public as a contributor to public debate about ethics, social issues, and public policy, there might be less blood drawn by the cuts. Bioethics boomed but so did applied ethics quite generally. One way or another, all these influences, and no doubt others, led to a greater role during the 1990s for philosophy in the public sphere, principally in ethical debate, but not only there (cf. e.g. Malpas and Solomon 1998; Schmidtz and Goodin 1998). There is an interesting fuller history of this aspect of our period to be written.

In what follows, however, I am not going to attempt even the beginnings of this history. Rather, I will summarise three important contributions to the discussion of public ethics. I will then explain two lines of development in metaethics during the period which represent very different conceptions of what philosophy is.

Public Ethics

Max Charlesworth has defended a pluralist, multiculturalist liberalism as a suitable public philosophy to inform decisions needing to be made about bioethical issues in society. In *Bioethics in a Liberal Society* (1994), he deplores the tendency towards paternalism and undue interference of the state, the medical profession, and others into areas of decision-making which are the proper arena of individual freedom and autonomous choice. Utilitarian thought comes in for severe criticism in this connection. Charlesworth argues that autonomy is fundamental to social ethics because without autonomy informing action, one does not perform ethical acts (1994, p. 11). People should be as free as possible to make their own choices without state, legal, or other interference. Charlesworth discusses death and dying, assisted reproduction, and resource allocation in the light of this fundamental conception. He is not unaware, however, of various challenges to this kind of liberalism. But he argues that his variety of liberalism does not lead to relativism and does not require a kind of autonomy which does not demand of us to live altruistically. However, in his view, the state has no role in making us good or in unduly cutting off options for our autonomous choice. He therefore defends the right of homosexual couples to have access to assisted reproductive technology to form their families, at taxpayer expense. He also argues against the use of quality-adjusted life years, the WHO, and the New Public Health approach, as well as the Oregon experiment of 'community consultation' for solving problems of resource allocation—and his main concern with these approaches is that they do nothing for individual autonomy.

A second significant contribution to thinking about public ethics was Robert Goodin's 1995 *Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy*. Goodin's conception of the place and justification of utilitarianism is quite distinctive. Less a comprehensive moral doctrine about the nature of right and wrong and what is morally relevant, Goodin's book argues for the justification of utilitarianism precisely as a public philosophy: other things besides the consequences for individuals' welfare matter in the private life and for ethics as a task for each one of us in living our lives well, but for public policy and public officials, utilitarianism provides the most satisfactory framework. In this argument, Goodin is still concerned to fend off criticisms against utilitarianism and the claims made for its rivals—his particular targets are libertarianism and the deontological emphasis on intentions. However, the fundamental question concerns public policy and the role of the state. Here he defends an important role for the state and the public official in shaping individual conduct and, in particular, protecting individuals from each other and themselves. He therefore argues in favour of certain paternalistic laws such as the requirement on motorcycle riders to wear helmets and the prohibition and control of dangerous substances. Arguably, on this point, he underestimates the place of the idea of individual liberty—of the freedom to do things that risk or cause harm to oneself. Goodin argues that paternalistic laws are justified in those instances where we are not in fact the best judges of what is best for ourselves (even though generally we are the best judges of what is good for ourselves)—e.g., due to weakness of will, common psychological mistakes judging probabilities, and a bias towards the present. He doesn't fully address the liberal (more than libertarian) idea that even so, the individual has the right to be silly, self-negligent, and so on. Sometimes, we value noninterference ahead of thriving more fully and wish the state to butt out when it seeks to interfere on our behalf. Goodin's principal focus is particular problems rather than finding unifying principles to deal with them. His discussions are often insightful and illuminating.

In *How Are We To Live*? (1995), Peter Singer addresses an educated general public on the alternative to living in the manner extolled by the 1980s: a life of materialistic self-interest and greed. Part of the book's discussion is to make the point that the 'greed is good' credo is historically specific—to the West of the recent past—and therefore not compulsory, and, further, that living ethically is in no way blocked by our genetic endowment (1995, Chap. 5) or by rational decision-making (1995, Chap. 7). He discusses how not living an ethical life can cause harm to others and oneself (Chaps. 2–3), and he points to the possibility that capitalist societies (e.g., Japan) can be based on values other than self-interest (Chap. 6). He urges that what recommends making the 'ultimate choice' (1995, p. 4) to live ethically rather than any other way is that it provides the firmest foundations for genuine self-esteem and for being all we can be (1995, p. 218). He provides a number of examples of people who have made this choice and he brings out the satisfactions it has furnished them with, precisely in how their attention is dominated by the values themselves which they serve rather than the pay-offs such service afforded them. Of course, examples of some people for whom living ethically was satisfying in this way are hardly an argument that it would also be satisfying for all of us.

Singer's book is not for philosophers. Too many points remain unargued—e.g., why contrast an ethical life with one lived serving a specific community or a noble tradition, where this may involve raising a family, contributing to knowledge, beautifying the world, or living a religious life? It isn't as if the only options are either living the ideally (negative) utilitarian life (i.e., a life dedicated to the removal of suffering) or being a crassly materialistic, self-absorbed go-getter. Why must my life, if it is to be ethical, involve imagining 'myself in the situation of *all* those affected by my action (with *the preferences that they have*)'? (Singer 1995, p. 174, emphases mine). Maybe some preferences themselves are horrid and unethical. And, though all human beings are my fellows, my responsibilities in life cannot extend very far. Surely I must make the best of the choices afforded me by my special responsibilities and relationships, even if other choices could produce more overall good for the world. Why is it not the vice of moralism to prejudge negatively those whose informed choices lead them to engage focally with things other than solving the world's problems, important as this is? They may have talents suiting them for these other things (of course, it matters that it is, e.g., art, political service, or some real excellence rather than, say, being the best hit man in the state), and they may have enough to deal with in their lives (e.g., a difficult family, a history of poverty, and low expectations), or they may simply feel that their own community has supported them and they wish to give something back to it. So, why do they do wrong not to think of a group who has done nothing for them, even though they are their fellow human beings? Still, Singer's book represents an important expression of the idealistic spirit of the 1990s after the self-absorption of the previous decade, and it calls people's attention to the importance of living morally well for living well *simpliciter*.

Metaethics

Jackson, the Canberra Plan, and Smith on the Moral Problem

In many areas of philosophy, the principal dividing line over method has been over whether there is anything worth calling 'conceptual analysis' that has a serious stake in what philosophers ought to be doing. For instance, Devitt and Sterelny, inter alios, have championed the view (roughly) that since there is no real distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, and since 'pre-philosophical linguistic intuitions' are hardly determinate or stable on the kinds of problems philosophers worry about, there is no serious reason to be concerned with 'conceptual analysis'. Proponents of the Canberra Plan differ.

The term 'Canberra Plan' was first used in a pejorative way in drafts of a paper by O'Leary-Hawthorne and Price (1996). The term was reclaimed over time by exponents of the Canberra Plan with the aim of collecting some shared aspects of their approach to philosophical analysis (cf. Nolan 2010). The shared approach consists of the following ingredients.

First, some background. One takes a fundamental ontology of what exists. The typical fundamental ontology among practitioners of the Canberra Plan is physicalism. One then examines the place one can find in the fundamental ontology, in its own terms, for the items from some other vocabulary. Typical examples of 'problematic' vocabularies include semantic properties: truth, meaning, reference; psychological vocabulary: intentional states with their content, qualia, free will, and so on; and moral properties: right, wrong, good, bad, and so on. The basic question, then, has the following form: Given the fundamental ontology of physics which includes volume and mass, is density something further to these two properties or does it, more or less, 'come for free' once we have those two properties? Is having a natural motion away from the centre of the earth like density, or should we dispense with it entirely? Since density comes for free, we can keep it. And since natural motion away from the centre of the earth does not fit with our physics, we eliminate it. So, does intentional content 'come for free', or is it more like natural motion away from the centre of the earth? Density makes the cut because we can express just how it supervenes upon mass and volume, without being identical to either of these alone. How do reference, intentional content, right and wrong, etc., fare by this criterion?

The Canberra Plan is a way of addressing this problem. In general, its aim is conservative, that is, to keep as much of our familiar worldview as possible. We have seen Jackson in section "The Mind: Intentionality and Mental Causation" above developing his theory of intentionality. The background to that theory is this idea that we find in the Canberra Plan. The method being proposed, then, is this. First, we need an understanding of what is being attributed to something when we attribute the problematic property to a subject. That is, we need to articulate the implicit theory underlying commonsense practice in our ordinary use of the relevant terms for the item. The terms involved are taken to be treatable as implicitly definable by a defining theory which can be teased out through thought experiments (Jackson 1998e, f). This process of explication involves the collection of 'platitudes' which capture the ordinary use of the term. 'Platitude' here does not have its ordinary meaning—the theses or claims about the items being defined need not be trivial or obvious, they need only be well entrenched. This means, roughly, that they are claims about the analysandum and related concepts with which all, or most, competent users of the vocabulary being analysed will agree, even if this agreement may take some reflection and deliberation in the light of possible cases (Jackson 1998a, p. 46ff.).

Once one has assembled enough platitudes, one manipulates the claims in the collection of platitudes to formulate a role for the problematic concept. Part of the power of the method is derived from the fact that because any given term is taken to be implicitly defined by a defining theory underlying the relevant conceptual practice of competent users of the vocabulary in question, there is no need for explicit definition, and the analysis can be perfectly relaxed about interconnections among concepts in the network of concepts to which the analysandum belongs. The concept is located holistically by its interconnections with other concepts. Such a strategy of articulation invites an analysis of a given concept in terms of its *role* in the network of concepts, including relations to entry-level concepts, relations to other theoretical terms in the network, and relations to exit-level concepts. The identity of the concept is its place in this network. In the case of mental items like belief, the entry-level concepts are to do with perceptual inputs; connections with other theoretical concepts are to do with how the concept of belief is related to other concepts such as desire; and the exit-level concepts are some specification of behaviour. In the case of mental theoretical terms like belief and desire, the role derived from the collection of platitudes is a causal one: beliefs cause or would cause behaviour which, if they are or were true, will or would satisfy desire. In more general terms, the role is quite abstract and is expressed in terms that are neutral relative to the fundamental ontology or any of its rivals.

Once we have the role specified, we seek the things in the world, from our best knowledge of it, which actually fill the role given in the analysis. The identification of what it is that occupies this role goes to the matter of fundamental ontology. For Canberra Planners, this is physicalism, so they will look to fundamental science (however more exactly that is defined) to fill the roles specified by the analysis. However, this is not necessary in order to execute the basic strategy of the Plan (Jackson 1998a, p. 26). Typically, Canberra Planners take the implicit theory articulated by means of a role in a conceptual network as giving the meaning of the analysandum. Further, this role will generally fix the referents of the analysandum concept. At this stage, the possibility arises that there is not something in the resources of the fundamental ontology which exactly fills the role in all its clauses as specified by the articulated commonsense theory embedded in the practices of competent speakers of the vocabulary. However, Canberra Planners do not require purity in this matter. Near enough filling of most important or enough clauses of the implicit theory articulated in the analysis suffices. (How much of the implicit commonsense role is required is another question).

Once the referent in the actual world is fixed, in typical examples the analysandum is taken to be (or becomes) a modally rigid term. Hence, (simplifying) the way things are with the best deserving role filler from the fundamental ontology entails the way things are with the analysandum item and its related concepts in the theoretical network implicit in the competent use of the vocabulary. This secures supervenience[9]—incorporation in the ontology without extravagant postulation (cf. density). Thus a place for the problematic vocabulary within the fundamental ontology of the metaphysics is assured. Insofar as the analysis of concept C in terms of role R furnishes analytic truths, we could say that it represents a kind of commonsense functionalism about C. Further, inasmuch as we can argue that it is analytically true that C is whatever in fact best fills R, the method provides a way of doing a priori metaphysics. The role of conceptual analysis in yielding R is modest, however, and exposes C to the risk of elimination if it turns out that nothing in the fundamental ontology is a best deserving filler for the role conceived in commonsense.[10] Important elements of the commonsense worldview—intentional content, truth, meaning, free will, moral properties, etc.—get to stay in the worldview provided by complete science for, or if, they are entailed by it.

The term ‘Canberra Plan’ is also sometimes used for a set of views commonly associated with philosophers connected to the philosophy program at the Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS) of the Australian National University. The doctrines include physicalism, two-dimensionalism in semantics, four-dimensionalism about material objects and time, and (for some) metaethical descriptivism.

---

[9] There are some fine points of (a) defining physicalism and (b) how best to be precise about the nature of the supervenience thesis required to give expression to the physicalist idea that there can be no difference of the (supervenient) problematic properties without a difference of physical basis properties. See Jackson (1998a, pp. 6–8, 11–14, 22ff.).

[10] Cf. Jackson (1998a, pp. 42–44) and Jackson and Pettit (2004a, c). Part of the point of describing the folk understanding that is articulated in the conceptual analysis as a *theory* is to leave room for deferring to science’s epistemic right to correct prescientific thought.

Two-dimensionalism is quite important here, but discussion would take us too far afield.[11] It clarifies that the entailment of the ways things are in terms of the problematic vocabulary by the way things are in terms of the fundamental ontology is not an a priori deduction (as if by a conceptual connection between primary and secondary intensions). Rather, it is necessary truth preservation where such necessary truths depend on the way things turn out to be in the actual world, as a finding of empirical discovery (Jackson 1998a, p. 25ff.). That said, the Canberra Plan strategy does not *require*, for all the vocabularies it is applied to, that the identification of items referred to by the terms of the problematic vocabulary with items in the vocabulary of the fundamental vocabulary be parsed modally as rigid designation. For the question of the rigidity of folk terms is not always determinate (see Jackson 1998a, p. 144, in connection with moral terms).

We saw earlier (in section "The Mind: Intentionality and Mental Causation") Jackson's way of implementing the Canberra Plan for intentional content. We will now move to the application of the strategy to morality. To do so, I will discuss Michael Smith's *The Moral Problem* (1994) and make certain comparisons with Jackson's moral functionalism.

Smith argues that morality present us with a problem. When we reflect on our ordinary practices with moral terms, two lines of thought emerge very naturally:

1. (Objectivity of moral judgement) Moral judgements of the form 'It is right that I φ' express a subject's beliefs about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for her to do.
2. (Practicality of moral judgement) If someone judges that it is right that she φ then, ceteris paribus, she is motivated to φ.

   In addition to this, there is 'the standard picture of human psychology that we get from Hume':
3. (Humean psychology) An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an appropriate desire and a means-end belief, where belief and desire are, in Hume's terms, distinct existences.

Together, these three give us 'the moral problem': if one and two are both true, there are at least some beliefs that are necessarily connected with desires, which, if three is true, is impossible (one standard solution: so reject 3 as philosophical dogma: Platts, McDowell). one and three imply that two is false and moral judgements are not essentially practical (second standard solution: externalism).

---

[11] Suffice it to observe that it helps to clarify the a priori character of conceptual analysis and the proper place of *a posterior* discovery about the world informing this kind of metaphysics. The extension of a concept C in possible worlds, w_i, under the hypothesis that they are the actual world is a priori (such thought experimentation yields one notion of intension associated with C, its primary intension), whereas extensions in possible worlds under the hypothesis that they are counterfactual is determined by what we know to fill the role R in the actual world (a different kind of intension, C's secondary intension). Cf. Chalmers (1996, pp. 57–70) for the development of the corresponding concepts of necessity, conceptual truth and conceivability. Two-dimensionalism has been thought to be implicit in Kripke's *Naming and Necessity* (1980) and developed under the hand of Stalnaker, Lewis, Davies, Humberstone and Chalmers—see Jackson (1998a, pp. 47, n28) for some references.

And two and three imply that one is false and that nothing in morality requires the idea of moral facts (third standard solution: expressivism). Yet, as far as our understanding of morality and its place in the natural order is concerned, it seems desirable to hang on to all three in some way (Smith 1994, Chap. 1, esp. 11ff.). Moreover, each of the standard solutions fails to do justice to all the platitudes about morality or reasons explanations of action (Smith 1994, Chaps. 2–4).

Smith's solution has a number of steps. The first is to distinguish two aspects in the Humean picture: a picture of motivation and a picture of the nature of our normative reasons for doing things. The former is the standard account of the explanation of action in terms of beliefs and desires. This psychological Humeanism stays. Smith argues that only a Humean theory of human motivation can account for why (motivating) reason explanations for action are a species of teleological (goal-oriented) explanation (1994, §§4.6, 4.7).

The latter is the idea that desires are beyond rational criticism: desires are basic and, being distinct existences from beliefs, are aspects of ourselves we find ourselves with in ways that elude rational evaluation (cf. Smith 1994, p. 9, §4.2). This goes. Instead, Smith develops an anti-Humean conception of normative reason for action. It is based on the thought that normative reasons are the deliverances of deliberation on our values, and valuing is a species of believing something desirable (Smith 1994, pp. 147–151). Proposition C2 is central: if an agent believes she has normative reason to φ, then she should rationally desire to φ (1994, p. 148). A platitude Smith finds in Korsgaard (1986) provides the key: what it is desirable that we do is what we would desire to do if we were fully rational. The analysis, then, goes like this: one has normative reason to φ in circumstances C if and only if, were one completely rational, one would desire to φ in C. (C2, he argues, follows from this).[12] Facts about normative reasons are facts about what we would desire to do if we were fully rational (Smith 1994, pp. 151–180).

Thus, practical rationality, which is intrinsically connected to motivation but can break down, explains action as far as it does—depending on how rational we are. And it is facts about what we would desire in the circumstances that are the objects of the beliefs which are our normative reasons. This is anti-Humean because (i) it means that our normative reasons, our values, beliefs and so on, can play a proper role in the explanation of behaviour; (ii) it furnishes us with a critical perspective on our basic, actual desires, showing us that we can have reason to change them; (iii) it brings out the categorical character of our normative reasons—their rational force is independent of the desires we actually have; and (iv) this fact alone shows that moral judgement is a social matter in the sense that no one person is more likely than others to be able to work out authoritatively what we have best normative reason to do in a given set of circumstances. Next, Smith has to distinguish the specifically moral reasons from other normative reasons. This he does in terms of the kinds of substantive considerations which enter into specifically moral deliberation (avoiding harm, keeping promises, telling the truth, and such) as yielded by the relevant platitudes. Additionally, Smith argues in Chap 6 that there are moral reasons. I shan't rehearse this. The last bit of work here is to explain how this solves the moral problem. How does this theory account for the consistency of one, two, and three?

---

[12] For a challenge to this part of Smith's argument, see Swanton (1996) and the reply by Smith (1996).

The central move is this. Moral rightness in circumstances C is what we would desire in C if we were completely rational, where this is a desire for something of the right substantive kind for the normative reason to be a *moral* reason. Thus, one is true as what we would desire in C if we were completely rational is an objective fact of the sort that can be expressed in the beliefs about normative questions which we have. Further, such beliefs are connected appropriately to motivations, so that to have such a belief is to be such that one would desire the relevant thing, action, attribute, or whatever, if one were fully rational. So, two is true. Finally, one and two imply that what explains one's φ-ing, where one believes that it is right to φ, is this belief and the motivation to φ, if one is completely rational. This is consistent with the motivation in question being the desire to φ, which one will have if one is rational, given the belief. Of course, one might not be rational, in which case one will have some counter moral desire which is a distinct existence form the belief that one should φ. So three is true. The moral problem is solved.

Jackson and Pettit's so-called moral functionalism is a more abstract account of morality than Smith's (Jackson and Pettit 2004d; Jackson 1998a, pp. 129–38, 140–50).[13] It is committed to fewer substantial claims. Both accounts are committed to cognitivism about moral judgement—that it is belief and so represents ways things might be, and so is apt for truth (Jackson et al. 2004; cf. Jackson 1998a, pp. 115–17). Smith's one, above, says this. Both accounts share a general naturalism about reality. Smith is interested in developing a conceptual analysis of moral concepts, as is Jackson (and Pettit). The two theories both collect platitudes in the service of doing so. More substantively, Jackson finds much that is congenial in Smith's analysis of moral concepts. (a) Convergence in the maturation of folk moral theory is important (Jackson 1998a, p. 137; Smith 1994, §6.3). (b) Jackson favours identifying the moral property, for instance, of rightness with the realiser of the rightness role which moral functionalism characterises and sees this as echoing Smith's insistence that the target of moral judgement and motivation is not so much what is right as such but the goods that make something right (Jackson 1998a, p. 137; Smith 1994, pp. 75f., 83–91). (c) Jackson prefers a Humean version of the content strategy for explaining how taking up a moral judgement about some matter is to take up an essentially directed attitude in relation to it. He sees affinities between this and Smith's theory of normative reasons which directly connects a deliberator to what she has motivation to do, if she is rational (cf. Jackson 1998a, pp. 155–57; Smith 1994, §§5.4, 5.8–5.10).

---

[13] In terms of Jackson's systematic philosophy, moral functionalism is analogous to commonsense psychological functionalism. There are three important differences. First, the supervenience of the moral on the descriptive has no analogy to multi-realisability about the functional role of mental concepts. Thus, ethical terms are not only entailed by the totality of descriptive facts, but they also entail the latter, understood as a disjunction of the total descriptive ways things are (Jackson 1998a, pp. 118–125). Second, the principles of moral functionalism are not causal principles. Third, the principles of folk morality are more controversial than those of commonsense psychological functionalism.

However, despite important similarities and considerable shared ground concerning method, Smith demurs from Jackson's 'analytical descriptivism'. Jackson's moral functionalism leads him to an identification of moral properties, via reductive analysis, with descriptive properties. Indeed, against the Cornell moral realists (such as Boyd and Railton), Jackson argues that the metaphysical descriptivism they share furnishes sufficient materials to construct analytical descriptivism (Jackson 1998a, pp. 146–50). In contrast, Smith argues against Jackson's position when he rejects definitional naturalism (1994, pp. 44–56, 161–64 [fifth question]) because it is vulnerable to what he calls the 'permutation problem'. Instead, Smith argues that we can get the following from his 'summary-style, non-reductive' analysis:

Conceptual Claim: Rightness in circumstances C is the feature we would want acts to have in C if we were fully rational, where these wants have the appropriate content.

Substantive Claim: Fness is the feature we would want acts to have in C if we were fully rational, and Fness is a feature of the appropriate kind (as shown in the platitudes regarding the substance of moral judgements).

Conclusion: Rightness in C is Fness. (Smith 1994, p. 185.

This, Smith suggests, is a broadly naturalistic analysis of moral properties in two senses. First, it permits the identification of the moral property with a natural property in the circumstances. Second, since fully rational creatures are naturalistically realised, the properties referred to in the analysis do not require any non-natural properties, even though it involves a certain idealisation and full rationality may not itself be naturalistically definable (Smith 1994, p. 186). However, it is non-reductive and eschews definition.

The Canberra Plan is not a monolithic approach to philosophy. Smith is not an instance of it in this last point. And while this is important, so much else of his view ticks important boxes in the Canberra Plan model. Perhaps we should say that the school is more loosely defined than most of us think? Perhaps we should not consider Smith's metaethics a good enough example. Not much depends on such matters. What is perhaps interesting is the shared resistance to particularism in metaethics among Jackson and Smith (see Jackson et al. 2004, read at a conference held at Australian Catholic University, Ballarat, in April 1998 concerning how thin moral philosophy can afford to be). It is not obvious that one like Smith who resists naturalistic *reduction*, though not naturalism, about morality, need have any scruples about particularism. Jackson's reductive take on the supervenience of ethics needs to resist particularism. I do not see why Smith needs to. Indeed, if he shares the view expressed in the joint paper with Pettit and Jackson, his resistance to reductive naturalism in *The Moral Problem* would seem to be undermined, and he could represent a less qualified place in the implementation of the Canberra Plan. Perhaps the question is whether one wants to do 'serious metaphysics' (Jackson 1998a, pp. 4–5) or get the understanding of morality right.

Raimond Gaita

Gaita is clear what he wants to do, and it is not serious metaphysics in the sense of the Canberra Plan or in any sense for that matter. Gaita arrived back in Australia to be the foundational professor of philosophy at Australian Catholic University in 1994. He is best known for his prize-winning memoir occasioned by the death of his father, *Romulus, My Father* (1996). His major works of philosophy during the decade were *Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception* (1991) and *A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice* (1999).

I will try to work my way into Gaita's conception of moral philosophy by beginning with his examination of Plato's *Gorgias* (Gaita 1991, Chap. 15). The question he poses is: what is it that distinguishes Socrates from Gorgias? The conventional philosophical answer is that Socrates, being a philosopher, is concerned with truth and reason, whereas Gorgias, being a rhetorician, is concerned with persuasion with an eye to inducing his audience to believe what will help Gorgias achieve his ends. However, this answer, though true, doesn't explain why Plato works so hard to distinguish them. What explains this goes to what Socrates' being concerned with (or for) truth and reason amounts to. It is this latter that Gaita wants to reclaim for moral philosophy and more generally for philosophy itself.

Callicles, like Polus, is impressed by Gorgias. Callicles is impressed that Gorgias is always able to answer any question he puts to him. He is impressed by the fact that Gorgias cannot be surprised by any question. It seems he has a 'mastery' of all subject matters and is quick on his feet. Still, Socrates is unimpressed and continues to claim that oratorical quickness and the masterful command of knowledge should not be taken as the criterion of worthiness. He chides Polus for giving speeches instead of answering briefly and to the point and with what he really believes, not 'mere words'.

It is clear from the Alcibiades' speech in the *Symposium* that Socrates was capable of 'casting a spell' over his associates. It left Alcibiades somewhat disconsolate that he himself was unable to rise to what it was in Socrates that exerted such attraction that made him compelling to Alcibiades. It is tempting to see the difference between the force of Socrates' presence and that of Gorgias in terms of the former's 'concern for truth and reason' and the 'latter's concern for persuasion in the service of achieving his ends, come what may'. Indeed, Socrates presents Polus with an argument that it is better to suffer evil than to do it. Polus remains unconvinced. He agreed to the premises, to the steps of the argument and to its conclusion, but he suspects that he has been tricked. Assume Socrates' argument is sound (for here that is not so much the issue). Let's say Polus accepted its soundness. Let's say that he professed the argument to whoever was prepared to listen and that he affirmed its conclusion. Given the *man* Polus is, this profession can be expected not to go deep. His acceptance of the argument is of a piece with his being impressed by what it is in Gorgias that impresses him. Polus' profession of the argument would be 'mere words'.

Compare a story Arendt tells about Eichmann in the last moments before his execution. Eichmann had always been 'elated by' what he called 'winged words' of oratory:

> He began by stating emphatically that he was a *Gottgläubiger*, to express in common Nazi fashion that he was no Christian and did not believe in life after death. He then proceeded: 'After a short while Gentlemen, *we shall meet again*. Such is the fate of all men. Long live Germany, long live Argentina, long live Austria. *I shall not forget them*'. In the face of death, he had found the cliché used in funeral oratory. Under the gallows, his memory played him one last trick; he was "elated" and he forgot that this was his own funeral. (Arednt 1964, p. 252, cited in Gaita 1991, p. 278.

This disconnect between the reality facing Eichmann and his words and the reality of what Polus has assented to and Polus' words is radical. However, 'the reality facing Eichmann' and what I've expressed as 'the reality of what Polus has assented to' are not on all fours. It can be required of one to think a long time about and explore the implications of some claim one has come to believe. But this isn't like 'the reality facing Eichmann'. Eichmann's error is not one of failing to see what the proposition expressing his death sentence implies or what its truth-conditions are. His error is that he fails to rise to the gravity of his situation as a convicted murderer about to be executed for his deeds. His failure is that he can only manage cliché, that he fails to see what he has done and been convicted for, and that he continues to wish for the prospering of Nazi Germany, with all that means for the Jews. Eichmann either is unable or unwilling to face the reality of his situation in all these ways. He has failed the test of being open to the repentance his crimes demand and to being exposed in this to his captors, his victims. He has failed to hear the voices of the dead in his conviction and sentence.

Polus is similar. If we thought of philosophy and so the power of Socrates' presence, in terms of the concern for truth and reason, and contrasted this with oratory and so the power of Gorgias' charm and personality as being concerned merely for persuasion in the service of achieving his ends, whatever they are, we will miss the important similarity of Eichmann's and Polus' relation to their situation. Polus has understood the argument and assented to it, where the argument is conceived as a series of propositions and reasoning on propositions. But it doesn't 'go into him'. His uptake of it is shallow and at the same level as 'mere words'. He doesn't 'get it'. His grasp of the propositions does not imply that he is to be expected to think he should lay down his life for Socrates if that is what not doing evil meant. Yet, one imagines, Alcibiades *would*, even though in so many other ways he is a ratbag (and even if we have qualms about Alcibiades' doing this, these will be out of concern for whether he would rise to the kind of sacrifice for Socrates that would be worthy of him, rather than merely offering a self-preening grand gesture). Something more has to happen to Polus for him to get the argument in the way Socrates intends.

This is not to say that Polus cannot change, that the conviction that it is worse to do evil than to suffer it could not become something deep for him, that he couldn't come to 'get it'. But it would not be the force of the proposition, its truth-conditions, or the rationality of the argument (all of which can be abstracted from the fact that it was Socrates that led him to accept the proposition or argument in question) that pulled off this change in him. Of course, in a person who cares about philosophy, argumentation would not be irrelevant to any change that person undergoes. Part of the concern for reason and truth is a concern for truth-conditions, validity of reasoning and so on. A philosophical Polus (which he isn't) would see such concern for the argument as part of what he is open to learning from Socrates in their conversation. But it is not the whole of it. For Polus 'grasps the proposition' involved. Or more precisely, he 'kind of' grasps it. He clearly does not see it for what it is—he thinks he may have been tricked, he either cannot or refuses to trust it. In a sense, he clearly does not understand it, as is shown up in precisely his thinking he may have been tricked even though he accepted the premises, recognises that the steps in the reasoning are valid, and 'grasps the proposition' expressed in the conclusion. To become a 'real philosopher' he has to come to see that what he experienced as a trick is not a trick, and that what he understands when he 'gets it' is not the same thing as what he had thought had tricked him. But to see this, to change in this way, is to see that he has to learn from Socrates—that man who could make a good speech but in doing so argued for the rightness of his deeds as what he had to do even if it meant receiving the condemnation of others. Understanding what the reasoning and the proposition mean involves Polus in being moved to see the authority in Socrates' life—he brooks no bullshit, he thinks hard and he means it. No Gorgias, this fellow. He's not about getting his way by manipulating his audience with fine speeches and taking advantage of their gullibility. Philosophy is more than simply a concern for truth and valid reasoning, as that could be prised off what Socrates stood for. It is standing for the good that *as the man or woman you are* you stand for. It is standing by the authority of one's life as an interpretant of one's moral claims. That's what Alcibiades gets and it is what he sees in Socrates but cannot live up to. That is what Polus cannot see and so he thinks he may have been tricked even though he grasps all the propositions and valid steps of reasoning.

If Polus comes around to trusting the reasoning, it matters that it was Socrates, *that man*, whose authoritative example moves him to this understanding. For *what* he is convinced of and that it was Socrates who convinced him of it are inseparable. It is *as much* the authority of Socrates' *life* (standing up against the Athenians when they violated their own law to convict the generals after the debacle of Salamis; refusing to escape from his death sentence for to do so would be to betray his mother Athens, even though it had unjustly condemned him; never afraid of personages and reputation in discussion and always after the truth; and so on) as what he formulates as his sincere belief (the proposition) that Polus doesn't understand and would have to come to understand if he were to change and no longer suspect that he has been tricked. And indeed, in Polus' situation, what reason and truth are is not a separate part of philosophy to trusting Socrates and his call to Polus to be the man, that is, the best and most intellectually honest man, he is (Socrates' 'call to seriousness') (Gaita 1991, p. 282). Socrates does not complain that Polus refuses to reason and pursue truth—though this is clearly what he expects of him. Rather, he complains that he refuses to *converse*, that is, to be open to be engaged with Socrates *himself*, rather than hiding behind fine words which ring hollow and are not his own and which ultimately miss the point. Truth and reason are more than propositional in this picture. They involve putting oneself at the mercy of earnestly engaged conversation and putting *oneself* into one's thought. This is what Eichmann's words fail to do, and it is what Polus is finding too challenging to do.

So, the form of understanding that it is better to suffer evil than to do it does not (merely) consist in grasping a disembodied proposition whose meaning can be abstracted from Socrates' life and is utterable in all semantic seriousness by, say, a political spin doctor on the job. One also has to see what it means in the sense of what it comes to in the life of one whose belief in it is informed by his living up to it, as is the case with Socrates. One has to understand what it means to do evil to another and what it means to suffer such evil at another's hands. One has to see what it comes to in a *life* which testifies to its force. The reason why Plato works so hard to distinguish Gorgias from Socrates is that they are so easily confused: both can speak well, both are good reasoners, both are quick on their feet, both understand difficult and technical propositions as they need to, both can get others to see things their way and so on. And if it suited him, no doubt Gorgias would argue for the view that it is better to suffer evil than to do it. Still, at the end of the day, the force of Gorgias' expertise and the power of his charm and personality are a false semblance of Socrates (Gaita 1991, p. 280ff.), for they differ in precisely what matters to the genuine understanding that Socrates has of what it is to suffer evil and to do it.

Gaita works hard to bring out in several ways what this understanding consists in. Examples are central to bringing it out. Gaita refers, for instance, to the remorse eventually felt by Raskolnikov in Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*, which reveals to Raskolnikov the significance of his murders, what they really are, as contrasted to corrupt forms of understanding. Remorse is central for this understanding. The ambition of typical philosophical moral theories to provide disciplined and explanatory accounts of moral thinking is shown to fail by such moral emotions. In his remorse, Raskolnikov's lucid understanding of the horror of his murders would be parodied if understood in terms such as these: 'My God what have I done. I have been a traitor to reason. I have violated rational nature in another!' or 'My God what have I done. I have violated my freely chosen and universally prescribed principle that one shouldn't kill people under circumstances such as these' (Gaita 1991, p. 33). Instead, what remorse (not its counterfeits or corruptions) reveals is the enormity and horror of one's action in taking another's life. In religious terms, it is natural to put this in terms of the sacredness of human beings. Whether or not this is the best way to put the thought, the thought is a general one which extends to what is evil in (certain forms of) racism, what is evil in rape and so on. Another human being is a precious centre of irreducible value that engages one and represents a particular kind of limit on one's will, of a kind that is unconditional (Gaita 1991; cf. esp. 282). It does not matter how morally wicked they are, how little their lives have any prospect of meaning or of contributing to their fellows, how pathetic and compromised their life and abilities have become, or how beneath contempt we think them. They are our fellow mortal human beings. This thought conditions everything. Remorse and this sense of the unconditional preciousness of each human being as one with whom we share the great facts of life (being born of a woman, suffering, sexuality, mortality, etc.) are mutually elucidating.

Of course, just as with a philosophical conversation with Socrates, the meaning of things and the emotional tone of our understanding of things can go awry. There are false semblances of remorse; remorse has its corruptions. Correspondingly, there are false renderings of the 'moral content' of what is understood in moral understanding. This is the wisdom in Socrates' dictum that one who knows the good must do the good. Thus, consider the typical contrasts between the person of virtue, the strong-willed person and the weak-willed person. All three *in some sense know*, for instance, that 'it is wrong to lie to another to avoid trouble'. The weak-willed person will fail because she fears the trouble. Her fears 'override' her moral knowledge. The strong-willed person will not lie because doing so is wrong even though she fears the trouble and is sorely tempted to lie. The virtuous person will not lie even though she understands the trouble involved and would rather avoid it, but she is not tempted to lie and so does not lie. True, her reason is that it would be wrong to lie. True, she differs from the strong-willed person in not being tempted to lie. True, there is a sense in which all three understand the same thought. However, there is more to it in the case of the good person. To be sure, one difference is the shape of her motivation compared to the strong-willed person—she has no temptation to lie. But, many are inclined to say, that difference in the shape of her motivation does not go to a difference in the content of what the three understand. The fact that the same proposition 'it is wrong to lie to another to avoid trouble' is understood by all three and yet the three differ motivationally shows that the motivation and the moral understanding are distinct.

Though Gaita probably would not credit Aristotle with what I'm going to observe (1991, p. 25, 239 ff.), even Aristotle, who is the source of these distinctions, does not think of the relation between motivation and understanding like this. For him, in the virtuous person, it is one state of the soul that is 'orektikos nous or orexis dianoetike'—that is, appetitive understanding or deliberative desire (*Nicomachean Ethics*, book 6, ch. ii, 1139b 4–5). That is to say, weakness of will is as puzzling for Aristotle as it is for Socrates precisely because intellectual understanding of what morality demands and the moral motivation to do it are the same thing in the good person and explain each other. There is something about lying to another to avoid trouble that the virtuous person grasps but which eludes even the strong-willed person. Aristotle does not serve making this point well with his talk of 'not using the knowledge' in his account of akrasia—as if the virtuous person uses something that the weak-willed person understands but fails to. But this overlooks the fact that that contrast is between the strong-willed person and the weak-willed person, not the virtuous person and both of them. The virtuous person, lacking temptation, is one in whom, as Gaita would put it, (proper) emotion *is* a form of understanding. What they see in virtuously grasping that it is wrong to lie to avoid trouble is not simply a proposition, it is rather the meaning of telling a lie in these circumstances—what it shows about what one thinks of the person one lies to, what it shows about what one thinks of the meaning of what one has done which causes the trouble and so on. One who understands this is one who is struck by the reality of the other, engaged by that reality and by what having done what one has done means and what lying to them would mean to them. It is to be moved by this and thus to be so unimpressed by the prospect of lying even to avoid the trouble that it has no force for one.[14]

To summarise, Gaita argues that if we are to understand how ethical thought works, we cannot deal merely with thin moral concepts such as ‘ought’, ‘should’, ‘x is right’ and ‘x is obligatory’. We need to draw from the rich fund of thick moral notions familiar from virtue-talk and from our language for various kinds of actions and sentiments. Among other things, these notions furnish us with a vocabulary of genuine virtue, and the counterfeits of virtue, and vice. To limit our critical vocabulary to the language of propositional evaluation and thin moral concepts, in abstraction from the ways we live that are embodied in thick moral concepts, is radically to distort moral understanding (e.g., witness the parody of Raskolnikov’s remorse above).

Secondly, these concepts require interpretants from life. This has two dimensions. It means that moral concepts are ineluctably social and interpersonal, though in a particular way that is easy to lose sight of if we resort to the theoretical mode too quickly. For what is required is that sense of the reality of another human being by whom one is engaged and who, as precious, is a limit on one’s will. Further, this understanding requires the authoritative example of those whose understanding of the moral meaning of things reveals this meaning for us. Socrates’ expectation of Polus in philosophical conversation is one kind of example. Gaita’s famous example of the nun non-condescendingly caring for the mentally ill is another (1999, p. 18ff.). What is understood in such examples is conditioned by the authoritative example—of Socrates or of the nun. The social nature of moral understanding, then, is not just that ‘moral concepts are social creations’ (as if other concepts are not) or that ‘morality is a solution of social coordination problems’. It is, more fundamentally, that our exposure to others in engaged dialogue, their call to us to be morally serious, and their revelation to us by their example of a goodness that goes beyond virtue are central to what we understand in ‘grasping moral concepts’.

Third, this understanding is a matter of being moved emotionally. Moral meaning is not merely propositional in the sense of what can be abstracted and formulated in a proposition as to what, for instance, the virtuous, strong-willed and weak-willed person can all be described as understanding. Rather, emotional responses *are* forms of understanding (or misunderstanding). Raskolnikov’s (clear sighted, non-corrupt) remorse reveals for him what he had done.

Fourthly, this line of thought opens up a notion of understanding in which what is understood and the one who understands it and reveals it for us in her authoritative example (like the nun or Socrates) cannot be prised apart—a realm of meaning as authentic individuality answerable to the thick concepts of appraisal but understood in one's own voice (cf. Gaita 1991, Chap. 9, 308ff., 1999, pp. 237–58).

---

[14] Gaita’s view, however, is even more complex than this. For he allows that what deliberatively has no force for the good person may have motivational force for them and may lead to a serious conflict between what gives sense to our moral notions and the requirements of those moral notions—see Gaita (1991, Chap. 13, esp. 238ff.), where Gaita discusses McDowell’s (1978, p. 27) notion of how virtue ‘silences’ countermoral temptation as his (McDowell’s) way of defending the Socratic thought that one who has ‘a clear perception of the requirements of virtue’ could not be tempted to do evil.

So, the question is what difference this makes to doing philosophy or, more particularly, to how to do moral philosophy. I will approach this question by considering how far Smith and Jackson might go in appropriating aspects of Gaita's view of the nature of moral understanding.

Smith's anti-reductivism perhaps gives him more scope than Jackson has to accommodate the various claims about moral thought that Gaita makes. For instance, Smith's summary analysis of moral rightness in circumstances C appeals to the feature we would desire acts to have in C if we were fully rational. There is no aspiration in Smith to achieve more than circumstance-bound identifications of what moral rightness is (1994, p. 185). Presumably, then, in a case-by-case way, Smith could exploit the detailed sensitivities of concepts such as courage, venality, sentimentality and so on, in order to determine what the features are which make acts right. This could seem natural given that Smith puts a certain stress in the analysis of moral rightness on the substantive appropriateness of the features, given the circumstances. And it seems obvious that a similar 'relevance to circumstances' condition characterises the virtues and like concepts—e.g., patience is not the relevant virtue to be engaged when a quick decision has to be made about how to protect someone from an imminent danger. Jackson, on the other hand, makes clear that moral functionalism leaves it an open question whether thick or thin moral concepts are 'central' to moral understanding (Jackson 1998a, pp. 135–37). Both Smith and Jackson may see the motivational internalism of Gaita's view congenial, though to be sure they would put more emphasis on desire than on emotion as constituting the essential connection of the 'content of moral thought' to motivation (Smith 1994, but cf., e.g., 127ff. and Jackson 1998a, pp. 154–60). Again, Gaita clearly rejects the theory conception of our understanding of moral language. This might put him closer to Smith, who also rejects the network analysis of analytic descriptivism that Jackson defends. Gaita's account of our understanding of moral concepts puts great emphasis on the revelatory power of authoritative examples such as the nun and Socrates. This resonates to some extent with the role Smith gives to paradigms in the acquisition of concepts, including normative concepts (Smith 1994, p. 55; cf. 163ff.). Finally, Gaita's insistence that moral goodness is sui generis has certain echoes with Smith's claim that 'very little outside the sphere of the normative is required to define the normative' (Smith 1994, p. 163).

However, as compared to the differences between Gaita and both Smith and Jackson, these similarities are relatively superficial. Fundamentally, Gaita insists that moral judgement does not stand in need of the kind of grounding which either Smithian metaethics or Jacksonian metaphysics seeks to give it. In particular, commonsense moral understanding does not require the kind of convergence on a future mature moral outlook that both Smith and Jackson posit as if the morality we have in our moral traditions is not 'mature'. Further, the conception of sensibility as a form of understanding opposes the Humean understanding of intellectual knowledge of semantic meaning as a distinct existence from motivation, desire and so on. Again, Gaita's conception of moral goodness as sui generis distances Gaita from Smith's and Jackson's naturalism and descriptivism. Gaita writes:

> I would argue that the epistemic grammar of moral descriptions involves what I have been calling 'authoritative disclosure', as I tried to instance it in the example of a woman whose love for her unborn child had the authority to reveal to another what it would be to have an abortion. This is at least in harmony with an important empirical truth: our thought is thought in a tradition, and shaped by those we respect and admire: we learn by being moved and we learn, or try to learn, when we may trust what moves us and ourselves in being moved. To be sure, that is (or ought to be) critical respect and admiration but that does not mean that we seek a transcendental vantage point in order to assess all opinion. If there is no such vantage point from which we can 'see the world as from no place within it' and all moral thought is not a reductive elaboration on what is indisputable, then our thoughts are inescapably, dialogically, in the midst. There is no other place from which we can have anything to say, or anything to learn. (Gaita 1991, pp. 141–42)

Moral philosophy, then, can only proceed from the middle of things so as to articulate a moral point of view or form of life by reflection on a rich fund of examples of authoritative disclosure of the moral shape of things. This might be thought of as explanation by careful description rather than explanation by metaphysical analysis or addressing particular problems set by the dialectical context in the literature. Art and creative imagination have a constitutive place in doing such philosophy rather than an accidental, external role of furnishing examples (though they can do that). Indeed, art and creative imagination ground and inform the interpretation of critical concepts, bringing out moral and conceptual possibilities as a constraint on whatever theorising might be thought necessary to do, rather than being criticised by or founded on theory (cf. Gaita 1991, Chap. 17). Theory—understood as a corrective, explanatory external set of principles that explains, measures or evaluates our practices—does not figure significantly in this. Rather, it is the truthful, lucid articulation of what is revealed in authoritative examples that matters.

The point could be extended to other branches of philosophy, especially those most closely connected to moral philosophy, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of religion. It is an important alternative to the mainstream in philosophy of mind, for instance, to think of pity as a *form of understanding*, a cognitive achievement itself, rather than as an emotion contingently associated with the cognitive understanding of what someone did, or to think of understanding what someone said as a form of engagement with an individual whose virtuous life informs what he said. Similarly, it is an important alternative to the way in which the afterlife is understood in mainstream philosophy of religion to think of pitying the dead and wanting to act for their sake as something whose rationality does not depend on an 'ontology of the dead' unless it is superstitious (Gaita 1991, pp. 137–140) and to think of the fear of death as something requiring a clear-eyed personal response to one's own mortality (1991, pp. 306–309) in which the reality/appearance distinction concerns a lucid and authentic individuality more than the grasping of facts.

Other Work in Australasian Philosophy in the 1990s: Some Highlights

This chapter is already long. I want to acknowledge before ending something more of the range of philosophical work done by many philosophers in the region during our period. I apologise to those I do not mention.

In other contributions to the philosophy of mind, Paul Redding's work on the nature of emotion should be mentioned (Redding 1999). It is also worth mentioning that the functionalist materialist consensus did not have it all its own way. Both Peter Forrest and Grant Gillett contributed papers to Howard Robinson's 1996 collection, *Objections to Physicalism* (cf. Forrest 1996b; Gillett 1996).

In other work in moral philosophy, Catriona Mackenzie was developing a feminist line of thought concerning autonomy as relational autonomy (cf. MacKenzie and Stoljar 2000). Karen Green's work on feminist themes in history of philosophy and ethics is worth mentioning here. Justin Oakley sought to relocate the emotions in the centre of our understanding of morality in part through his work on virtue ethics (Oakley 1992), and with Dean Cocking, he published widely on friendship. As with Oakley, Christine Swanton was one of a number of Australasian philosophers working on virtue ethics (see, e.g., Swanton 1992, 1997).

In epistemology, Tony Coady's book, *Testimony: A Philosophical Study* (1992), was a significant contribution to the revival of debate concerning the epistemic value of testimony. Also, Stephen Hetherington (1992, 1994, 1998) began a series of papers critical of mainstream debates and positions in epistemology, developing a somewhat revisionary conception of the place of sceptical arguments in epistemology.

The history of philosophy was particularly well served in the 1990s. Work by Gaukroger on Descartes continued, culminating in *Descartes: An Intellectual Biography* (1995). Stephen Buckle emerged as a further important scholar of modern philosophy. He published *Natural Law and the Theory of Property* (1991) and began work on Hume's philosophy. Udo Thiel's work on Locke is also noteworthy. Research in ancient philosophy flourished with Harold Tarrant, Rich Benitez and Dirk Baltzly all producing important work. Also worth mentioning are Roy Perrett's work on Indian philosophy (1998) and Martin Tweedale's on medieval philosophy (1999a, b).

In philosophy of language and logic, Graham Priest's work on true contradictions was extended into an account of the concept of limits of thought in *Beyond the Limits of Thought* (1995). Also, Greg Restall emerged during the 1990s as a new talent in logic, in particular developing substructural logics.

In metaphysics, David Armstrong continued his work of the 1980s on the actualist account of possibility and extended it to the idea of truth making, based on an articulated ontology of states of affairs (Armstrong 1989a, b, 1997; Campbell et al. 1993). John Bacon published his work on tropes and property instances as an alternative to taking universals as primitive (Bacon 1995). Further, Peter Menzies' work on causation, laws of nature and related topics was being published during this decade (Menzies 1993, 1996; Menzies and Price 1993).

In philosophy of science, Bigelow and Pargetter's *Science and Necessity* (1990) opened up the decade along with Brian Ellis' *Truth and Objectivity* (1990). In Newcastle, John Wright and Cliff Hooker made important contributions—Wright on realism and explanations (1997), Hooker on a systems approach to understanding scientific reason (1995). Alan Chalmers extended his work (Chalmers 1990).

Finally, I will mention Phillip Pettit, whose work in the 1990s ranged across the philosophy of mind and metaphysics, the theory of explanation and moral theory and also included the political foundations of republicanism (1997) and social ontology (1993).

There is much more that one should have commented on than I can manage here. Limitations of space and the knowledge and ability of the author preclude discussion of further topics or authors. This should be taken as no indication of anyone's significance to the Australasian scene in the 1990s. Suffice it to say that philosophy in Australasia during the 1990s thrived, and did so even though conditions in Australian universities, at least, were not always easy (arguably, New Zealand universities underwent similarly difficult conditions in the 1980s). Philosophers took up more public roles during the 1990s than had been the case before. Moreover, as I have tried to stress, a certain maturity has developed in Australasian philosophy, as is evidenced by the enhanced diversity and the continued vigour and rigour of the discipline. I think this is reflected in the very fact that there is a concern for our own history as a discipline (cf. Pybus 1993; Franklin 2003). Far from the history of philosophy being a nicety of 'merely historical' interest, knowing how we got to where we are is internal to knowing who we are and to giving it significance (cf. Campbell 1992; Passmore 1993; Smart 1993).

References

Arednt, H. (1964). *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil*. New York: Viking.

Armstrong, D. (1989a). *A combinatorial theory of possibility*. Melbourne: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Armstrong, D. (1989b). *Universals: An opinionated introduction*. Boulder: Westview.

Armstrong, D. (1997). *A world of states of affairs*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy. (2000). 78. *Special issue (Number 3) on aboriginal reconciliation*.

Bacon, J. (1995). *Universals and property instances: The alphabet of being*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1990). *Science and necessity*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Bishop, J. (1999). Review of P. Forrest's God without the Supernatural. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77*, 106–108.

Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Jackson, F. (1996). *Philosophy of mind and cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Buckle, S. (1991). *Natural law and the theory of property*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Campbell, R. (1992). *Truth and historicity*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Campbell, K., et al. (Eds.). (1993). *Ontology, causality and mind: Essays in honour of D. M. Armstrong*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Chalmers, A. (1990). *Science and its fabrication*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Chalmers, D. (1996). *The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Charlesworth, M. (1994). *Bioethics in a liberal society*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Charlesworth, M. (Ed.). (1998). *Religious business: Essays on Australian aboriginal spirituality*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Churchland, P. (1986). *Neurophilosophy*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Coady, C. (1992). *Testimony: A philosophical study*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Demidenko (Darville), H. (1994). *The hand that signed the paper*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Dennett, D. (1989). *The intentional stance*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Devitt, M. (1997). *Realism and truth* (2nd ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Devitt, M., & Sterelny, K. (1987). *Language and reality*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ellis, B. (1990). *Truth and objectivity*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Forrest, P. (1996a). *God without the Supernatural: A defense of scientific theism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Forrest, P. (1996b). Difficulties with physicalism, and a programme for dualists. In H. Robinson (Ed.), *Objections to physicalism* (pp. 251–269). Oxford: Clarendon.

Forrest, P. (1997). Pantheism and science. *The Monist, 80*, 308–319.

Forrest, P. (2001). Mark Wynn's defence of 'The Supernatural'. *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 75*, 101–104.

Franklin, J. (2003). *Corrupting the youth: A history of philosophy in Australia*. Sydney: Macleay Press.

Gaita, R. (1991). *Good and evil: An absolute conception*. London: Macmillan.

Gaita, R. (1999). *A common humanity: Thinking about truth and love and justice*. Melbourne: Text.

Gale, R. (1998). Review of ontological arguments and belief in God. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58*, 715–719.

Gaukroger, S. (1995). *Descartes: An intellectual biography*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Gillett, G. (1992). *Representation, meaning and thought*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Gillett, G. (1996). Actions, causes, and mental ascription. In H. Robinson (Ed.), *Objections to physicalism* (pp. 81–101). Oxford: Clarendon.

Goodin, R. (1995). *Utilitarianism as a public philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Hetherington, S. (1992). *Epistemology's paradox: Is a theory of knowledge possible?* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hetherington, S. (1994). Sceptical insulation and sceptical objectivity. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72*, 411–425.

Hetherington, S. (1998). Actually knowing. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 48*, 453–469.

Hooker, C. (1995). *Reason, regulation and realism: Towards a regulatory systems theory of reason and evolutionary epistemology*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Jackson, F. (1996). Mental causation. *Mind, 105*, 377–413.

Jackson, F. (1998a). *From metaphysics to ethics*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Jackson, F. (1998b). *Mind, method and conditionals: Selected essays*. London: Routledge.

Jackson, F. (1998c). Mental causation I. In *Mind, method and conditionals: Selected essays* (pp. 80–112). London: Routledge.

Jackson, F. (1998d). Mental causation without the language of thought. In *Mind, method and conditionals: Selected essays* (pp. 113–130). London: Routledge.

Jackson, F. (1998e). Metaphysics by possible cases. In *Mind, method and conditionals: Selected essays* (pp. 133–153). London: Routledge.

Jackson, F. (1998f). Armchair metaphysics. In *Mind, method and conditionals: Selected essays* (pp. 154–176). London: Routledge.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (1992). In defence of explanatory ecumenicalism. *Economics and Philosophy, 8*, 1–21.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (2004a). Folk belief and commonplace belief. In F. Jackson, P. Pettit, & M. Smith (Eds.), *Mind, morality and explanation: Selected collaborations* (pp. 36–44). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (2004b). Functionalism and broad content. In F. Jackson, P. Pettit, & M. Smith (Eds.), *Mind, morality and explanation: Selected collaborations* (pp. 95–118). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (2004c). In defence of folk psychology. In F. Jackson, P. Pettit, & M. Smith (Eds.), *Mind, morality and explanation: Selected collaborations* (pp. 13–35). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (2004d). Moral functionalism and moral motivation. In F. Jackson, P. Pettit, & M. Smith (Eds.), *Mind, morality and explanation: Selected collaborations* (pp. 189–210). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2004.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (2004e). Program explanation: A general perspective. In F. Jackson, P. Pettit, & M. Smith (Eds.), *Mind, morality and explanation: Selected collaborations* (pp. 119–130). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2004.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (2004f). Structural explanation in social theory. In F. Jackson, P. Pettit, & M. Smith (Eds.), *Mind, morality and explanation: Selected collaborations* (pp. 131–162). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2004.

Jackson, F., Oppy, G., & Smith, M. (2004). Minimalism and truth aptness. In F. Jackson, P. Pettit, & M. Smith (Eds.), *Mind, morality and explanation: Selected collaborations* (pp. 233–251). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Korsgaard, C. (1986). Skepticism about practical reasons. *Journal of Philosophy, 39*, 59–77.

Levine, M. (1994). *Pantheism: A non-theistic concept of deity*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Levine, M. (2000). Contemporary Christian analytic philosophy of religion: Biblical fundamentalism, terrible solutions to a horrible problem, and hearing God. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 48*, 89–119.

MacKenzie, C., & Stoljar, N. (Eds.). (2000). *Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency and the social self*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Malpas, J., & Solomon, R. (Eds.). (1998). *Death and philosophy*. London: Routledge.

McDowell, J. (1978). Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives? *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement, 52*(13–29), 31–42.

Menzies, P. (1993). Laws of nature, modality and humean supervenience. In K. Campbell et al. (Eds.), *Ontology, causality and mind: Essays in honour of D. M. Armstrong* (pp. 195–225). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Menzies, P. (1996). Probabilistic causation and the pre-emption problem. *Mind, 105*, 85–117.

Menzies, P., & Price, H. (1993). Causation as a secondary quality. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44*, 187–203.

Nolan, D. (2010). The Canberra plan. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 98–100). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

O'Leary-Hawthorne, J., & Price, H. (1996). How to stand up for non-cognitivists. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74*, 275–293.

Oakes, R. (1998). Review of ontological arguments and belief in God. *Faith and Philosophy, 15*, 379–383.

Oakley, J. (1992). *Morality and the emotions*. London: Routledge.

Oppy, G. (1995). *Ontological arguments and belief in God*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Oppy, G. (1997). Pantheism, quantification and mereology. *The Monist, 80*, 320–336.

Passmore, J. (1993). Demarcating philosophy. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement, 19*, 107–125.

Perrett, R. (1998). *Hindu ethics: A philosophical study*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Pettit, P. (1993). *The common mind: An essay on psychology, society and politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pettit, P. (1997). *Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Priest, G. (1995). *Beyond the limits of thought*. Melbourne: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Pybus, C. (1993). *Gross moral turpitude: The Orr case reconsidered*. Melbourne: William Heinemann.

Redding, P. (1999). *The logic of affect*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Robinson, H. (Ed.). (1996). *Objections to physicalism*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Schmidtz, D., & Goodin, R. (1998). *Social welfare and individual responsibility: For and against*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Singer, P. (1995). *How are we to live?* Amherst, NY: Prometheus.

Smart, J. (1993). Why philosophers disagree. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement, 19*, 67–82.

Smith, M. (1994). *The moral problem*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Smith, M. (1996). Normative rationality and full rationality: Reply to Swanton. *Analysis, 56*, 160–168.

Sterelny, K. (1990). *The representational theory of mind*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sterelny, K. (2001). *The evolution of agency and other essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Swanton, C. (1992). *Freedom: A coherence theory*. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Swanton, C. (1996). Is the moral problem solved? *Analysis, 56*, 155–160.

Swanton, C. (1997). Virtue ethics and the problem of indirection: A pluralistic value-centred approach. *Utilitas, 9*, 167–181.

Taliaferro, C. (1997). Review of ontological arguments and the existence of God. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75*, 553–555.

Tweedale, M. (1999a). *Scotus vs Ockham: A medieval dispute over universals: Texts*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

Tweedale, M. (1999b). *Scotus vs Ockham: A medieval dispute over universals: Commentary*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

Wierenga, E. (1998). Review of ontological arguments and the existence of God. *The Review of Metaphysics, 52*, 163–164.

Wright, J. (1997). *Realism and explanatory priority*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Wynn, M. (1999a). *God and goodness: A natural theological perspective*. London: Routledge.

Wynn, M. (1999b). In defence of 'the Supernatural'. *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 73*, 477–495.

Philosophers in Schools: 2000s

10

Graham Oppy

Contents

Introduction 291
Higher Education 293
Humanities 295
Philosophy in the Academy 298
  Teaching 302
  Research Grants 306
  Philosophy Rankings 309
Supporting Philosophy in the Academy 310
Philosophy Beyond the Academy 314
Changes in Philosophical Practice 318
Teaching Philosophy 321
Domains of Inquiry 323
Concluding Observation 327

Introduction

The 2008 Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) Conference in Melbourne was attended by 345 delegates: 245 from Australia, 27 from New Zealand, 8 from Singapore, and 55 from a range of other countries.[1] Over the course of the conference, there were 265 papers presented in 13 different subject

---

[1] There were 32 from the USA (from 24 different institutions), 12 from the UK (from four different institutions), nine from Europe (from eight different institutions and seven different countries: Finland, Hungary, Israel, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey), and six from Asia (from six different institutions and five different countries: China, Japan, Korea, Pakistan, and Taiwan). 130 of the delegates did not already hold PhDs; almost all of these delegates were currently enrolled higher degree by research (HDR) students.

G. Oppy
School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University,
Clayton, VIC, Australia
e-mail: Graham.Oppy@monash.edu

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_11, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

streams[2] and at a diverse range of symposia.[3] The conference concluded with an overlapping 3-day mini-conference on relations between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy.[4]

By way of contrast, the 1999 AAP conference was also held in Melbourne. This conference was attended by 275 delegates who presented 213 papers. The papers were not streamed, though there were three special themes for the conference: Wittgenstein, Fictionalism and ‘Beyond Analysis’. Among the delegates who presented papers, there were 164 from Australia, 11 from New Zealand, and 38 from a range of other countries.[5] This conference served as an umbrella for conferences of the Australasian Association of Logic (AAL), Women in Philosophy (WiP), and the Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy (ASACP), and 74 of the 213 papers presented were to these associated conferences.[6]

Comparison between these two conferences suggests that philosophy in Australasia has prospered in the first decade of the twenty-first century. On almost every measure, these numbers indicate an increase over the course of the decade: more conference delegates, more conference papers, and more focussed debates on matters of contemporary concern. In what follows, we shall look more closely at the current state of Australasian philosophy, to see whether this optimistic view can be sustained.

We begin with a brief overview of the state of higher education in Australia and then a similarly brief overview of the state of the humanities. This overview establishes the context that is necessary for a proper evaluation of the performance of philosophy in the past decade.

---

[2] These streams (with number of papers appended) were: Applied Ethics (18); Epistemology (20); European Philosophy (8); History, Philosophy, and Social Study of Science (41); Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics (15); Metaethics (13); Metaphysics (27); Normative Ethics (12); Philosophy of Language (12); Philosophy of Mind (28); Philosophy of Religion (5); Political Philosophy (12); and miscellaneous (29).

[3] These symposia were on: time, reconciliation, moral rationalism, rethinking empiricism, Rudolf Virchow, and Kant.

[4] All of the information in this paragraph is taken from the conference booklet *AAP2008*, published by the conference organising committee, and distributed to all delegates.

[5] There were 17 from the USA (from 14 different institutions), three from the UK (all from different institutions), seven from Europe (from six different institutions and five different countries: Italy, Germany, Hungary, Israel, and Sweden), three from Asia (from three different institutions in three different countries: Japan, Hong Kong, and India), one from South America (Chile), two from Canada, three from South Africa, and one from Guam.

[6] Note that the 2008 conference did not serve as an umbrella for AAL, WiP and ASACP conferences. All of the information in this paragraph is taken from the conference booklet *AAP’99*, published by the conference organising committee, and distributed to all delegates.

Higher Education

In 2008, in Australia, there are 39 universities (two private), one branch of an overseas university, three self-accrediting higher education institutions, and around 150 non-self-accrediting higher education institutions (mainly profession-specific colleges, faith-based institutions, and colleges that provide preparatory courses for students going on to further studies at university).[7]

In 2007, in Australia, export earnings from education were $12.5 billion, of which over $7 billion belonged to the higher education sector. (To put this in its proper perspective, only coal ($21 billion) and iron ore ($16 billion) are higher export earners than education.) In 2006, there were more than 250,000 international students enrolled in higher education in Australia, and total student enrolment in the higher education sector amounted to nearly one million people. At that time, the higher education sector in Australia employed 92,000 people and generated total revenue of more than $16 billion.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, there was rapid growth in the number of academic staff in Australian universities—mostly young, early career researchers. From the mid-1970s onward, there was a dramatic slowing of growth and recruitment. In 2008, Australian universities have an ageing workforce: more than 30 % of staff are aged over 50, and nearly 25 % of lecturers and tutors are more than 55 years old.

Up until the end of the 1980s, there were very few private higher education providers in Australia, and publicly funded universities received most of their revenue from the Commonwealth. By 2008, however, 'publicly funded' universities received less than half of their revenue from the Commonwealth, and there had been enormous growth in fee revenue from both international and domestic students.

The costs involved in running universities have increased dramatically in the past decade. Factors that have played a part include the increasing costs and rapid obsolescence of research equipment and facilities; the costs of participation in international research projects and access to international facilities; the enormous leap in costs of research journals; the movement to computer-mediated electronic and flexible delivery modes; the creation of digital libraries; the establishment of new electronic infrastructure; and the continuing impact of the Commonwealth decision, in 1995, to end the practice of adjusting university grants to cover the consequences of agreed salary movements. Here, for example, is the annual research expenditure at selected Australian universities in 2002:

University	Expenditure	University	Expenditure	University	Expenditure
Melbourne	$363 Mil	Monash	$243 Mil	Latrobe	$74 Mil
Sydney	$347 Mil	UWA	$166 Mil	Macquarie	$66 Mil

(*continued*)

---

[7] Data in this section is drawn from the *Review of Higher Education* discussion paper June 2008 http://www.dest.gov.au/HEreview. In this section—and in the following section on the Humanities—I focus on Australia; however, the general situation is very similar in New Zealand.

University	Expenditure	University	Expenditure	University	Expenditure
ANU	$335 Mil	Adelaide	$142 Mil	Tasmania	$65 Mil
UQ	$331 Mil	Griffith	$87 Mil	UNE	$44 Mil
UNSW	$246 Mil	Wollongong	$76 Mil	CSU	$19 Mil

Where these increased costs have not been met with increased revenue from other sources, they have been met by gains in 'productivity' and 'efficiency', i.e., by having staff work harder. Between 1990 and 2005, student-staff ratios in Australian universities rose from 13 to 21, and they continue to rise.[8] Moreover, even though Commonwealth funding has steadily declined, Commonwealth regulatory arrangements have become steadily more onerous (e.g., through the establishment of the Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA) in 2001 and measures introduced in the Higher Education Support Act, 2003); and other new, independent legislative constraints—e.g., the 2001 amendments to the 1988 Privacy Act and the 2006 amendments to the 1968 Copyright Act—have also led to greater compliance demands upon academics.

Government funding for universities comes in various packages. Some funding is tied to teaching: most to student load but some according to teaching performance under the Learning and Teaching Performance Fund (LTPF). Other funding is tied to research: some according to a formula that takes account of research income, quantity of publications, and number of higher degree by research students, the rest according to competition for research grants (particularly through the Australian Research Council (ARC) and National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC)).[9]

During the middle years of the decade, the Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) spent 2 years working on the implementation of a Research Quality Framework (RQF)—modelled in part on the UK Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)—designed to measure the quality and impact of research in Australian universities and research institutions.[10] A change of government at the end of 2007 saw the RQF scrapped; under a new Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) initiative, the ARC and the Department of Innovation, Industry,

---

[8] Of course, student-staff ratios vary across institutions, and within institutions across faculties, and within faculties across disciplines; in particular, many 'departments' of philosophy in Australia have student-staff ratios that exceed the national average.

[9] Yet another part of the funding—which provides scholarships for higher degree by research students—is determined by a formula that takes account of research income, quantity of publications, and the number of successful completions of higher degree by research students.

[10] In preparation for the RQF, some universities ran their own research assessment exercises. For example, at ANU, in a university-wide mock RQF, the Philosophy Program at RSSS was identified as perhaps the flagship research enterprise in the university. See p. 26 of the review report http://info.anu.edu.au/ovc/Media/Media_Releases/_2004/pdf/Committee_Report.pdf ('ANU: University with a Difference'), which shows that 62 % of assessors ranked the program in the top 5 % in the world, while physical sciences had the next best ranking with 42 % of assessors ranking that program in the top 5 % in the world.

Science and Research (DIISR) are developing a different exercise for the measurement of the quality of research in Australian universities and research institutions. In preparation for a system 'based on metrics and expert review by committees',[11] learned academies in Australia have been engaged in a journal-ranking exercise.[12]

The first decade of the twenty-first century has also seen massive growth in the significance of international league tables which seek to rank the performance of universities. Some of these league tables—e.g., the *Times Higher Education Supplement* World University Ranking—seek to take account of performance in teaching and research. Others—e.g., the Shanghai Jiao Tong University annual index—look only at performance in research. While these league tables are very controversial, it seems likely that we are in only the very earliest phases of a process that will see the development of comprehensive international measures of the performance of universities.

Given the facts about government funding and international league tables, most Australian universities have introduced policies that aim to increase quantity and quality of publications, research income (with emphasis on ARC and NHMRC grants), recruitment of higher degree by research (HDR) candidates, and completion of HDRs. In particular, many universities have 'performance management' systems that involve individual targets for staff across these categories (and often also across teaching categories based on student satisfaction surveys and the like). This has been one significant factor cited in reports of increased frequency of stress and burnout among Australian academics.

Humanities

In Australia, a Council for the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (CHASS) was established in mid-2004. CHASS is a representative body for organisations in the humanities, arts, and social sciences: member bodies include, for example, the Australian Academy of Humanities (AAH),[13] the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia (ASSA), and the Australasian Council of Deans of Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities (DASSH). The aims of CHASS are to increase the influence of the

---

[11] Kim Carr, press release, 26 February 2008 http://minister.industry.gov.au/SenatortheHonKimCarr/Pages/NEWERAFORRESEARCHQUALITY.aspx

[12] Naturally, journal ranking is a controversial exercise. In a letter to *The Australian* on 9 July 2008, Stephen Buckle argued, among other things, that the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* is clearly not in the top 5 % of philosophy journals in the world. After examining a list of 2,500 philosophy journals provided to me by the subject librarian at Monash, I'm inclined to disagree: I reckon that the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* falls within the top 50 journals worldwide, hence within the top 2 %. (More on this issue later.)

[13] The AAH is divided into ten sections, each with one-tenth of its total membership. As of 26/12/06, the AAH had 454 fellows, of whom 45 were philosophers. Of the philosophers, ten are international members, and ten have retired from their university positions. This information is derived from http://www.humanities.org.au/About/Overview.htm (the AAH website).

HASS sector in the setting of policy objectives and to agitate for the allocation of greater financial resources to the arts, humanities, and social sciences.[14] Reports that CHASS has produced to date include ‘Commercialisation of Research Activities in the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences in Australia’, ‘Measures of Quality and Impact of Publicly Funded Research in the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences’, and ‘Collaborating across the sectors: the relationships between the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (HASS) and Science, Technology, Engineering and Medicine (STEM)’.[15] In response to CHASS submissions to an Australian Productivity Commission inquiry into public investment in science and innovation, the Productivity Commission included the following comments in its final report:

> The Commission shares the view put by CHASS that research in [the creative arts, humanities and social sciences] is critical to innovation. It plays an important role in many government activities and in those instances it is routinely funded by government. It is also increasingly important in business as the service sector expands and as less technological activities play a larger role in innovation generally (such as business activities that require understanding of complex human behaviours—marketing, business reorganisation, and human resource management).[16]

While the view accepted by the Productivity Commission is surely correct in the case of the social sciences—economics, political science, behavioural studies, business studies, education, sociology, demography, and so forth—it is simply not clear that the arts and humanities are important for the kind of ‘innovation’ that is of primary interest to government and business. This is but one manifestation of a more general fact: the almost universal conjunction of the expressions ‘humanities’ and ‘social sciences’ in public discourse has led to a situation in which many people—both within and outside government and the public service—are unable to think clearly about the current role and value of the humanities.[17]

Uncertainty about the role and value of the humanities—at the level of government, at the level of university administration, and at the level of the general public—has been an important factor in the vulnerability of the humanities in Australian higher education in the recent past. Many Australian universities have experienced rounds of forced redundancies in the past 2 decades in which the humanities have borne a disproportionate number of casualties.[18] Factors that have contributed to this burden on the humanities include government funding policies which provided much less *per capita* support for the teaching of humanities than for teaching of other disciplines and which made it difficult to access funding for the conduct of research in the humanities; perception among university administrators that the humanities are an irrelevant luxury; and movement in student preferences in faculties of arts to what are perceived to be more ‘vocationally oriented’ subjects (typically in the social sciences: criminology, behavioural studies, media studies, communications studies, and the like). Moreover, to compound the stresses that arise in organisations in which there are rounds of forced redundancies, it has often been the case that these rounds of forced redundancies have been accompanied by administrative restructurings: combining of departments into schools, dissolution of schools into departments, and the like. In turn, these administrative restructurings often served to create further disadvantage, particularly in the case of disciplines that lost all of their professoriate.

---

[14] See http://www.chass.org.au/speeches/SPE20071201TG.php (Gascoigne, T. ‘A Brief History of CHASS’).

[15] http://www.chass.org.au/papers/index.php?id=dat (List of CHASS papers)

[16] From http://www.chass.org.au/about/agm/2007/AGM20071002SC.php (CHASS president’s report)

[17] Of course, this is not the *only* reason why people find it hard to think about the role and value of the humanities; however, it is a reason to which insufficient attention has been paid.

An interesting development in the Australian academy during the first decade of the twenty-first century has been the increased attention that has been paid to what have come to be called ‘graduate attributes’. Most Australian universities have developed ‘mission statements’ that make reference to ‘generic skills that are to be acquired by their graduates. Typically, these ‘generic skills’ include attributes that might plausibly be thought to be the special provenance of the humanities or, at any rate, to be particularly closely related to study in the humanities: critical thinking, written and verbal communication, analysis of archival materials, construction of an argumentative case, sensitivity to considerations of value, and so forth. There has been widespread debate about the extent to which these ‘generic skills’ can be ‘embedded’ in curricula in professional faculties—medicine, engineering, pharmacy, and the like—but, at the very least, the emergence of this debate has directed some attention to what can plausibly be argued to be the most significant role and value of the humanities in the education of tomorrow’s workforce.[19]

Apart from external pressures, the humanities have also been subject to tensions from within. One of these tensions is of particular significance for philosophy: the divide between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy marks a separation that gets played out in different ways in different institutions. At some universities, there is a single ‘department’ that houses both ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy: this is true, for example, at Sydney, UNSW, and Melbourne—though, of course, there was a time in the 1970s when this was certainly not true of Sydney. At other universities, there is a department that is almost exclusively ‘analytic’, but there is a dispersion of staff with an interest in ‘continental’ philosophy throughout other parts of the faculty. So, for example, at Monash, Andrew Benjamin and Alison Ross are current members—and Kevin Hart, Liz Grosz, and Claire Colebrook are former members—of the Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies, which is now housed in the School of Languages, Cultures and Linguistics.

---

[18] In some cases, entire departments disappeared: for example, classics programs were closed down in many faculties of arts. Thus, for example, in the city of Melbourne, Melbourne University was the only university to maintain a program in classics at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

[19] There is some anecdotal evidence that many employers now value ‘generic skills’ above ‘technical skills’: the acquisition of ‘technical skills’ is a lifelong process that requires underlying ‘generic skills’. Of course, it should not be forgotten that study of the humanities has value over and above the value that is has in preparing people for work roles: people are citizens and community members as well as workers, and study of the humanities can also have an important formative influence for these roles.

Philosophy in the Academy

In 2008, the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) website lists 27 ‘departments’ of philosophy in Australia—including two ‘departments’ at ANU and also including CAPPE (a cross-institutional research centre)—and seven ‘departments’ of philosophy in New Zealand. Taking account of Web presence and staff numbers, it seems to me that there are 20 institutions with a strong claim to have a ‘department’ of philosophy in Australia and six institutions with a strong claim to have a ‘department’ of philosophy in New Zealand. These are as follows:

Australian institution	Continuing staff[20]	Professors[21]
Australian Catholic University (ACU)	10	1
Australian National University (ANU)	26	7
Bond University	4	2
Charles Sturt University (CSU)	5	1

(*continued*)

---

[20] This information was taken from the relevant university website on 26/06/08; in some cases, there was guesswork involved.

[21] It is worth noting that, on these figures, in Australia, there are 31 professors of philosophy, of whom two (Sue Dodds and Moira Gatens) are women, and, in New Zealand, there are ten professors of philosophy, of whom one (Rosalind Hursthouse) is a woman. The question of participation of women in the philosophy profession has been much considered in the past 30 years. In May 2008, a Committee of Senior Academics Addressing the Status of Women in the Philosophy Profession released an executive summary (*Improving the Participation of Women in the Philosophy Profession*) http://www.aap.org.au/women/reports/IPWPP_ExecutiveSummary.pdf which, among other things, updates reports given to the AAP Council in 1982 and 1990. While the representation of women in the profession—23 % of continuing positions were held by women in 2006—has improved markedly since 1970 (4 %), and somewhat since 1996 (17 %), it remains the case that there is very poor representation of women in senior positions (Level C and above), even by comparison with other disciplines in the academy. Moreover, on these numbers, there is a marked overrepresentation of women in contract and casual positions (31 % of casual and contract positions were occupied by women in 2006). And it is also worth noting that there is a very large decline from the proportion of women undergraduate students (55 % of undergraduate students were women in 2006) to the proportion of women doctoral students (36 % of doctoral students were women in 2006). In some measure, these features are not unique to the philosophy profession in Australasia—see, for example, Sally Haslanger’s ‘Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone)’ http://www.mit.edu/%7eshaslang/papers/HaslangerWomeninPhil07.pdf—but they clearly do indicate pressing problems for the profession in Australasia that might be alleviated by serious adoption of the recommendations in the executive summary.

Australian institution	Continuing staff[20]	Professors[21]
Flinders University	4	–
La Trobe University	11	2
Macquarie University	14	1
Monash University	12	2
Murdoch University	4	–
University of Adelaide	9	1
University of Melbourne	7	1
University of New England (UNE)	6	1
University of New South Wales (UNSW)	12	2
University of Newcastle	5	–
University of Notre Dame	3	1
University of Queensland	9	–
University of Sydney	20	7
University of Tasmania	15	2
University of Western Australia (UWA)	5	1
University of Wollongong	8	1

Other universities in which philosophy has some presence include Central Queensland University (CQU), Deakin University, Edith Cowan University (ECU), Griffith University, James Cook University, Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Swinburne University, University of Ballarat, University of South Australia, and Victoria University of Technology (VUT). Other institutions—providers of higher education—in which philosophy has some presence include Brisbane College of Theology, Catholic Institute of Sydney, Catholic Theological College of South Australia, Evangelical Theological Association of the Melbourne College of Divinity, Saint Mark's National Theological Centre, and Sir Joseph Banks College.

New Zealand institution	Continuing staff	Professors
Massey University	4	–
University of Auckland	22	5
University of Canterbury	8	1
University of Otago	11	2
University of Waikato	5	–
Victoria University of Wellington (VUW)	13	2

There is also a philosophy presence at Lincoln University, in its Environmental Management and Design Division.

On these figures, in total, there are 189 continuing staff in philosophy in Australia and 63 staff in philosophy in New Zealand.[22] However, many

---

[22] The *International Directory of Philosophy and Philosophers 2001–2002* lists 272 philosophers in Australia and 64 in New Zealand, including 39 staff at ANU, 13 at CSU, 11 at Flinders, 20 at La Trobe, 7 at Murdoch, and 17 at Melbourne. Some of these institutions have had large reductions in

'departments' of philosophy have a significant number of 'non-continuing' research and honorary staff who are not included in these figures (e.g., La Trobe claims 12 research staff, Sydney claims 17 research fellows, and Melbourne claims 23 honoraries and 16 members of CAPPE). Getting an accurate fix on the current number of these staff across all of the institutions in our lists is very difficult.

It is worth noting that the AAP does have a set of figures on changes in *continuing and contract* staff numbers in 'departments' of philosophy in universities in Australasia, for the period 2000–2005:

Australian institution	2000	2005
Australian Catholic University (ACU)	8.5	6.5
Australian National University (ANU)	13	15.7
Deakin University	6.0	5.5
Flinders University	5.6	5.1
Griffith University	3.5	4.0
La Trobe University	12.5	9.5
Macquarie University	9.0	11.0
Monash University	10.1	8.9
Murdoch University	3.5	3.0
Swinburne University	2.0	2.0
University of Adelaide	7.0	7.0
University of Melbourne	9.0	11.5
University of Newcastle	5.0	5.0
University of New England (UNE)	7.6	6.5
University of New South Wales (UNSW)	9.0	11.0
University of Queensland	9.8	8.875
University of Sydney	12.5	12.5
University of Tasmania	9.0	10.5
University of Western Australia (UWA)	5.7	5.7
University of Wollongong	5.0	5.0
University of Auckland	12.0	16.0
University of Otago	7.0	7.0
University of Waikato	6.95	6.15
VUW	8.5	10.5

On these figures, from the beginning to the middle of the decade, there were nine 'departments' who lost staff overall and eight 'departments' that gained staff overall. Across all of the 'departments' on our table, there was a net gain of around seven continuing and contract staff in the period from 2000 to 2005. However, on *these* figures, the previous estimate of continuing staff numbers in 'departments' of philosophy in Australasia seems to be rather on the high side.

---

staff numbers since the data for this issue of the directory was collected. However, it should also be noted that the directory draws no distinction between continuing and non-continuing staff nor between part-time and full-time staff.

A number of Australian ‘departments’ of philosophy have experienced serious difficulties in the 2000s, including La Trobe, Melbourne, UNSW, Queensland, and UWA. The nature of these difficulties has varied. At La Trobe, retirements and departures contrived to empty the professoriate at a time of severe financial pressure. At Melbourne, restructuring of the university to greatly increase the ratio of postgraduate to undergraduate students at a time when the Faculty was in financial difficulty led to a huge reduction in continuing staff numbers. At UNSW, there have been serious conflicts within the department. At Queensland, dispute with the Faculty led to the departures of two leading research professors (Mark Colyvan and Paul Griffiths). At UWA, there were difficulties much like those at La Trobe: lack of a senior voice at Faculty level at a time of severe financial pressure.[23]

Other ‘departments’ of philosophy have flourished. At the time of writing, Auckland is one of the most successful ‘departments’ in the southern hemisphere, supported by massive first-year enrolments in logic and critical thinking. Sydney is flourishing, in part because, in the face of the then prospective Research Quality Framework (RQF) exercise, the University took the decision to create a large number of research chairs, and recruited Colyvan and Griffiths from Queensland to fill two of those chairs. Tasmania appears to be doing very well, in part because it has pursued a distinctive path under the leadership of Jeff Malpas, with strong appointments in ‘continental’ philosophy. And—despite the departures of some of its most senior staff[24]—the Philosophy Program in the Research School of the Social Sciences (RSSS) at ANU is also in very good health, partly because of a number of excellent new appointments that it has been able to make: Daniel Stoljar, David Chalmers, Alan Hájek, and Jonathan Schaffer, to name a few.

For yet other ‘departments’, the 2000s have been a time of business as usual. For example, at Monash, there was an enormous upheaval in 1998, when just over 30 % of academic staff in the Faculty of Arts were made redundant and departments were forced into a new School structure. As the dust settled, philosophy found itself part of a very small School of Philosophy and Bioethics, with a complement of around a dozen staff that has remained pretty stable throughout the decade.[25] However, at the time of writing, there is a new budget model being adopted in the Faculty of Arts that may prove to have serious consequences for the future of the School.

---

[23] These are examples: there are other cases of hardship that might also have been mentioned.

[24] Philip Pettit and Michael Smith went to Princeton, Martin Davies went to Oxford, and Peter Godfrey-Smith went to Harvard. Frank Jackson has ‘retired’ (partly to Princeton and partly to Latrobe). Richard Sylvan’s death was also a big loss.

[25] In the mid-1990s, there were six professors of philosophy at Monash: Robert Pargetter, John Bigelow, Frank Jackson, Chin Liew Ten, Kevin Hart, and Liz Grosz. Of those, only Bigelow was still there in 2000, and he was then the sole professor of philosophy at Monash.

Teaching

‘Departments’ of philosophy earn most of their revenue through their teaching activities.[26] In most universities, the bulk of this income is derived from traditional face-to-face teaching in undergraduate lectures and tutorials. The typical profile for a ‘department’ of philosophy has large numbers at first year, dropping to a fairly select group in the fourth year. In many ‘departments’, much of the tutoring, and even a substantial amount of lecturing, is carried out by staff employed casually or on short-term contracts: many—but not all—of these staff are currently enrolled or recently completed higher degree by research students. The range of unit offerings in ‘departments’ of philosophy is determined by the weighing of competing considerations. On the one hand, more and bigger classes mean more income from undergraduate teaching; on the other hand, more and bigger classes mean more intensive labor for teachers and may not serve to attract students to further studies in the discipline (particularly if the curriculum must be adapted to permit more and bigger classes).

The following table lists the number of units that were offered in the first 3 years, and in the fourth year, of undergraduate philosophy teaching programs at a range of Australasian universities in 2008[27]:

Institution	Years 1–3	Year 4	Staff
ANU	22	6	7
Flinders	12	6	4
La Trobe	22	3	11
Monash	27	6	17
Adelaide	15	6	10
Auckland	47	24	22
Melbourne	22	9	14
UNE	10	2	6
UNSW	34	6	10
Otago	12	4	11
Queensland	24	2	8
Sydney	26	13	14
Tasmania	25	10	14
Waikato	20	8	5
UWA	12	6	8
VUW	17	7	13

---

[26] One exception here is the Philosophy Program in the Research School for the Social Sciences at the Australian National University: the Philosophy Program has no undergraduate teaching and receives most of its funding as part of the block allocation to the Institute for Advanced Studies.

[27] The figures for the numbers of units were taken from university Web pages on 17 July 2008. The figures for staff record the total number of people who are listed on those Web pages as having *some* lecturing or coordinating responsibility in the units on offer.

At most universities, a standard unit in the first 3 years of an undergraduate degree has three contact hours per week: two lectures and one tutorial. At some universities, there are just two contact hour per week—one lecture and one tutorial, or one 2-hour seminar—in the second and third years of the undergraduate degree.[28] At some universities, a single unit may be offered in different locations—for example, some Monash units are taught at Clayton, Caulfield, and Gippsland—and at some universities, a single unit may be offered in different 'modes of delivery'; again, at Monash, there are eight units that are also taught in 'flexible delivery' or 'off-campus' mode and two that are taught as part of a VCE Enhancement program. Moreover, at some universities—including Queensland, UNSW, Sydney, Melbourne, and Monash—there are also independent postgraduate units that are taught by the same staff who are engaged in teaching of undergraduate units. And there are some universities—including Macquarie and Griffith—that also teach into Open Learning Australia programs in philosophy.[29]

There has been some variation in student load across institutions during the 2000s. Here is the AAP data[30] on student load across institutions for the years 2000 and 2005, beginning with the data for undergraduate teaching across the first three undergraduate years[31]:

University	2000	2005	Change
ANU	94.0	118.8	+24.8
Adelaide	128.2	182.3	+54.1
ACU	128.2	133.3	+5.1
Deakin	145.1	139.5	−5.6
Flinders	104.3	114.6[32]	+10.3
La Trobe	258.0	153.7	−104.3

(*continued*)

---

[28] For example, this is true at Monash, where it is universal practice in the Faculty of Arts.

[29] In 2008, the OLA undergraduate philosophy program is taught from Macquarie (with one unit on Applied Reasoning taught from Curtin), and the OLA postgraduate philosophy program is taught from Griffith. There were several changes in provider of philosophy programs to OLA during the 2000s and significant changes in the curriculum. In 2008, the undergraduate subjects are: Philosophy, Morality and Society; Critical Thinking; Mind, Meaning, and Metaphysics; Practical Ethics; Body and Mind; Business and Professional Ethics; Philosophy and Cognitive Science; and Philosophy and Cinema. And the postgraduate subjects are: Plato and Aristotle; Advising the Prince: Thinking Critically about Political Advice; Varieties of Enlightenment European Philosophy 1680–1832; and Contemporary European Philosophy. In 2000, the undergraduate subjects were: Life, Death and Morality; Thinking about Science; Origins of Modern Philosophy I - (Descartes); Origins of Modern Philosophy II (Leibniz and Hume); Ethics; Stoics and Epicureans; Thinking about Science; and Indian Philosophy.

[30] Some 'departments' of philosophy failed to report data across the full period; these 'departments' have not been included in the following tables.

[31] Figures are in equivalent full-time student units (EFTs). To convert these figures to numbers of students, we need to multiply by the number of units that a student typically takes in a year (a figure that varies from one institution to the next).

[32] This figure is actually for 2003, the latest year for which data had been supplied.

University	2000	2005	Change
Macquarie	252.0	188.0	−64.0
Monash	258.9	203.3	−55.6
Murdoch	38.0	31.0	−7.0
Melbourne	200.0	181.3	−18.7
UNSW	166.3	153.9	−12.4
Queensland	201.9	189.0	−12.9
Swinburne	51.9	70.1	+18.2
Sydney	306.0	332.1	+26.1
Tasmania	214.5	221.6	+7.1
UWA	102.5	95.6	−6.9
Wollongong	123.3	133.9	+10.6
Auckland	495.6[33]	561.5	+65.9
Otago	144.3	172.3	+28.0
Wellington	192.0	214.0	+22.0
Waikato	116.6	123.9	+7.3

Across all of the institutions mentioned in this table, the variation in undergraduate load is +10.1 EFTs. *On average*, then, there was next to no increase in the number of undergraduate students taught by Australasian ‘departments’ of philosophy across the first half of the 2000s.

Next, here is the data for fourth-year undergraduate teaching:

University	2000	2005	Change
ANU	7.5	7.8	+0.3
Adelaide	9.0	5.3	−3.7
ACU	0.0[34]	0.7	+0.7
Deakin	10.6	5.4	−5.2
Flinders	8.9	7.4[35]	−1.5
La Trobe	7.0	6.9	−0.1
Macquarie	8.0	6.0	−2.0
Monash	5.0	10.5	+5.5
Murdoch	2.0	2.0	0
Melbourne	7.0	2.4	−4.6
UNSW	1.3	3.0	+1.7
Queensland	12.3	7.0	−5.3
Swinburne	2.5	6.0	+3.5
Sydney	7.8	17	+9.2

(*continued*)

---

[33] This figure is for 2001, the earliest year for which data has been supplied.

[34] This figure is for 2001, the earliest year for which data has been supplied.

[35] This figure is for 2003; no figure has been supplied for 2005.

University	2000	2005	Change
Tasmania	12.5	6.4	−6.1
UWA	5.0	2.9	−2.1
Wollongong	2.0	0.5	−1.5
Auckland	ns	18.6	n/a
Otago	15.5	12.2	−3.3
Wellington	6.3	13.0	+6.7
Waikato	4.9	3.5	−1.4

The numbers for enrolments at fourth-year undergraduate level are small and, within any given university, have a distribution with large variance. In this case, the variation across all of the institutions mentioned in the table, over the first half of the 2000s, is −9.2 EFTs. It is not clear whether this is a large enough variation to raise concern.

Finally, here is the data for higher degree by research candidates:

University	2000	2005	Change
ANU	34.1	33.4	−0.7
Adelaide	7.8	7.0	−0.8
ACU	14.0[36]	6.7	−7.3
Deakin	14.1	18.8	+4.7
Flinders	8.5	9.4[37]	+0.9
La Trobe	15.0	11.0	−4.0
Macquarie	11.0	17.0	+6.0
Monash	21.7	18.0	−3.7
Murdoch	0.0	7.0	+7.0
Melbourne	28.0	38.0	+10.0
UNSW	19.8	22.8	+3.0
Queensland	23.3	18.0	−5.3
Swinburne	5.5	6.0	+0.5
Sydney	31.5	27	−4.5
Tasmania	15.0	27.2	+12.2
UWA	6.5	3.8	−2.7
Wollongong	5.7	2.5	−3.2
Auckland	50.2	34.4	−15.8
Otago	4.6	10.2	+5.6
Wellington	11.0	10.0	−1.0
Waikato	2.1	4.8	+2.4

Across all of the institutions mentioned in this table, the variation in higher degree by research load is 0.2 EFTs, which represents a negligible variation in this load across the first half of the 2000s. Over the academy as a whole, higher degree by research enrolments have varied little throughout the 2000s.

---

[36] This figure is for 2001, the earliest year for which data has been supplied.

[37] This figure is for 2003; no figure has been supplied for 2005.

Research Grants

Above, we noted that the regime of funding research in Australia has not been particularly friendly for the humanities. Nonetheless, philosophers in Australia have been very successful in attracting research funding during the first decade of the twenty-first century. In particular, philosophers in Australia have been very successful in attracting competitive funding under the major ARC schemes: Discovery Projects (DP), Linkage Projects (LP), and Federation Fellowships (FF).

The largest single source of funding for research in Australian philosophy is the Discovery Project scheme, introduced in 2002. Since its introduction, the performance of philosophers in this scheme is as follows[38]:

Scheme	No. of grants	Value of grants
DP02	7	$833K
DP03	11	$1,686K
DP04	11	$1,520K
DP05	12	$2,141K
DP06	19	$4,385K
DP07	19	$4,647K
DP08	12	$2,831K

Broken down by institution, over the period 2002–2008, performance is as follows[39]:

Institution	No. of grants	Value of grants
ANU	9	$2,062K
Bond	2	$213K
CSU	2	$285K
Griffith	1	$510K
La Trobe	3	$417K
Macquarie	6	$698K
Monash	10	$2,190K
SCU	2	$270K
Adelaide	9	$1,082K

(*continued*)

---

[38] Here, we record grants awarded under the RFCD code for philosophy. We ignore any grants won by philosophers under other codes. Figures were derived from the ARC selection reports http://www.arc.gov.au/ncgp/dp/dp_outcomes.htm

[39] Note that the Philosophy Program at RSSS at ANU was not eligible to participate in DP in the early years of that scheme. Note, too, that institutions would have received slightly more money than is recorded here, because there is some ‘topping up’ of budgets in later years of award. The total amount of money awarded under DP08 was around $300 million; for DP07 it was around $275 million.

Institution	No. of grants	Value of grants
Melbourne	10	$2,578K
UNE	1	$106K
UNSW	5	$1,177K
Queensland	8	$1,848K
Sydney	13	$3,181K
Tasmania	6	$1,039K
UWA	3	$763K
Wollongong	1	$340K

The Discovery Project scheme is aimed primarily at fundamental research. By contrast, the Linkage Project scheme is aimed at research that is conducted in cooperation with 'industry' partners.[40] Over the period 2002–2008, philosophers have obtained ten grants from this scheme, worth $2.1 million. Breakdown by institutions is as follows:

Institution	No. of grants	Value of grants
ANU	1	$233K
CSU	3	$885K
Griffith	2	$345K
Melbourne	2	$207K
Monash	1	$138K
UNSW	1	$251K

There are interesting differences between DP and LP. In total, there have been 148 CIs on the 91 DP grants, at an average of 1.6 per grant. By contrast, there have been 41 CIs on the 10 LP grants, at an average of 4.1 per grant. There are a couple of people who have been CIs on at least three different LP grants; rather more people have been CIs on at least three different DP grants; and there are some people who have been CIs on grants under both of these schemes.[41]

---

[40] Industry partners for LP grants awarded to philosophers: Transparency International Australia, Office of Public Service Merit and Equity, ACER, DEST, Professional Standards Council, Total Environment Centre Inc., National Portrait Gallery, The Johnston Collection, Australian Computer Society, Kunexion, TIRI, NSW Department of Commerce, and NSW Roads and Traffic Authority.

[41] Charles Sampford and Seamus Miller have been CIs on three LPs (and Sampford has also been a CI on a DP). David Braddon-Mitchell, Mark Colyvan, Garrett Cullity, Frank Jackson, Jeanette Kennett and Daniel Stoljar have all been CIs on at least three DPs. John Bigelow has been a CI on at least three grants across the two schemes. Again, we refer here only to grants awarded under the philosophy RFCD code. Particularly large grants have been won by Marguerite LaCaze (DP03, $446K, University of Queensland); Charles Sampford et al. (DP03, $509K, Griffith University); Stephen Gaukroger et al. (DP04, $587K, University of Sydney); Huw Price et al. (DP05, $750K, University of Sydney); Moira Gatens (DP06, $515K, University of Sydney); Laura Schroeter, John Bigelow, and Lloyd Humberstone (DP07, $483K, Monash University); James Phillips (DP07, $494K, University of Sydney); Jeff Malpas (DP07, $490K, University of Tasmania); and Graham Priest (DP08, $950K, University of Melbourne).

The Federation Fellowship scheme was introduced with the aim of luring stellar expatriate researchers to return to Australia. Over time, it has mutated into a scheme which aims to foster large-scale research focussed around stellar individual research leaders. The standard award under a Federation Fellowship is $300K per year for 5 years, which pays the salary and on-costs of the Fellow. The award is matched by the host university, and the matching funds are used to establish a research centre in the host university based around the activity of the Fellow. In the period 2002–2008, there were 159 Federation Fellowships awarded. Of these, there were 15 awarded to the Humanities and Creative Arts; and, of those 15, five were awarded to philosophers. In FF02, Huw Price won an award for a project on the physics of possibility; in FF07, Price won another award for a project on factual information. In FF04, David Chalmers won an award for a project on the contents of consciousness; Paul Griffiths won an award for a project on the bio-humanities; and Phillip Pettit won an award—which he subsequently did not take up—for a project on democracy. Price's award led to the establishment of the Centre for Time at the University of Sydney; and Chalmers' award led to the establishment of the Centre for Consciousness at the ANU. Griffith's award was transferred from the University of Queensland to the University of Sydney, where a Centre is about to be established.[42]

Apart from these expenses in DP, LP, and FF, the other major government investment in philosophical research in the first decade of the twenty-first century has been the ARC Special Research Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE), which was established at CSU in July 2000, with Melbourne as a joint partner, under the leadership of Seamus Miller and Tony Coady. CAPPE has thus far received about $1 million per year though to the end of 2008. ANU joined with CAPPE in 2003 as a collaborative partner. Research at CAPPE has been focussed in six core programs: criminal justice ethics, ethical issues in biotechnology, ethics of IT and emergent technologies, business and professional ethics, welfare ethics, and ethical issues in political violence and state sovereignty.[43] In 2008, CAPPE claims 47 academic staff and eight adjunct staff.[44]

---

[42] While the FF program did succeed in bringing some stellar philosophers back to Australia, there are many stellar philosophers who have not returned: Mark Johnston, Brian Weatherson, Daniel Nolan, Rae Langton, Richard Holton, John Collins, Liam Murphy, Roger White, David Oderberg, Kevin Hart, and Liz Grosz, to name but a few. Moreover, as noted in footnote 24, there are stellar philosophers who have left since the inception of this scheme (and there are others—e.g., Graham Priest, en route to CUNY—who are in the midst of leaving). Of course, it is a *good* thing that stellar Australian philosophers occupy posts in major overseas universities; in general, there is less mobility in the Australian academy than in its international counterparts.

[43] Information in this paragraph is taken mostly from the ARC 2005 CAPPE review report http://www.cappe.edu.au/docs/reports/ARC-review.pdf

[44] http://www.cappe.edu.au/staff/index.htm

Philosophy Rankings

While the university league tables do not make discriminations at the level of disciplines, the past decade has seen the introduction of rankings that are specific to philosophy. In particular, Brian Leiter's *Philosophical Gourmet Report* ranks graduate programs in philosophy on the basis of the quality of their faculty, as determined by an online survey of philosophers. For the 2006–2008 report, Leiter invited 450 philosophers from around the world to examine 99 faculty lists from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand and to rank these faculty lists for quality on a numerical scale. The names of the 300-plus philosophers who completed the surveys are listed at the guide's website.[45] To date, there have been four reports, and they have provided the following 'overall' rankings for Australasian universities[46]:

2001: ANU (11), Monash (29), Auckland (29), Melbourne (29), Canterbury (49)
2002–2004: ANU (12), Melbourne (30), Monash (39), Auckland (39), Sydney (40)
2004–2006: ANU (3), Melbourne (23), Sydney (25), Auckland (32), Monash (35), Queensland (35)
2006–2008: ANU (13), Sydney (31), Melbourne (32), Monash (44), Auckland (44)[47]

This set of rankings is no less controversial than the league tables for universities.[48] Nonetheless, at the time of writing, it seems pretty uncontroversial that ANU,

---

[45] http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/reportdesc.asp

[46] The figure in brackets indicates where the university would have placed in the rank of the top 50 US universities, given the score that was assigned to it by the assessors. Where several US universities are tied on the same score, I have selected the highest possible ranking number to assign to the Australian institution (e.g., if universities ranked 25th to 30th on the US list have the same score, then I have assigned a rank of 30 to any Australasian institution with that score).

[47] Australasia-based assessors in 2006–2008 were David Braddon-Mitchell (ANU), Mark Colyvan (Sydney), David Chalmers (ANU), Alan Hájek (ANU), Frank Jackson (ANU), Julian Lamont (UQ), Fred Kroon (Auckland), Huw Price (Sydney), Graham Priest (Melbourne), Greg Restall (Melbourne), Denis Robinson (Auckland), Howard Sankey (Melbourne), Kim Sterelny (ANU), and Julian Young (Auckland).

[48] The report also provides rankings by 'speciality'. In the 2006–2008 report, **ANU** was ranked: 24–36 for Philosophy of Language 1–3 for Philosophy of Mind, 5–7 for Metaphysics, 17–37 for Epistemology, 30–50 for Normative Ethics and Moral Psychology, 9–16 for Metaethics, 14–27 for Political Philosophy, 19–42 for Applied Ethics, 30–42 for Philosophy of Science, 3–7 for Philosophy of Biology, 3–8 for Philosophy of Cognitive Science, 16–39 for Philosophy of Social Science, and 5–9 for Decision, Rational Choice, and Game Theory; **Melbourne** was ranked 25–46 for Metaphysics, 5–12 for Philosophical Logic, 7–18 for Applied Ethics, and 4–9 for Mathematical Logic; **Sydney** was ranked 25–42 for Philosophy of Mind, 25–46 for Metaphysics, 4–12 for Philosophy of Science, 3–7 for Philosophy of Biology, 4–10 for Philosophy of Physics, 12–33 for seventeenth-century Early Modern Philosophy, and 15–39 for eighteenth-century Early Modern Philosophy; **Monash** was ranked 25–46 for Metaphysics, 22–36 for Philosophical Logic, and 23–27 for Feminist Philosophy; and **Auckland** was ranked 13–19 for Philosophy of Action, 19–42 for Applied Ethics, 14–21 for Philosophy of Art, 15–25 for Medieval Philosophy, 16–25 for nineteenth-century Continental Philosophy after Hegel, and 8–16 for twentieth-century Continental Philosophy.

Auckland, and Sydney are the three preeminent universities for philosophy in the southern hemisphere. In particular, it is worth noting that no other universities in Australasia have more than two professors, while each of these three universities has at least five. It is also worth noting that these rankings align with the results suggested by success in the ARC DP scheme: the top four by both number and volume of grants are Sydney, Melbourne, ANU, and Monash.

Overall, the data on staffing, teaching, research, and rankings suggests that there has not been significant change in the global health of academic philosophy in Australia during the 2000s. Of course, there have been many significant local fluctuations in fortune; but, on the whole, philosophy appears to have held its ground, both relative to the other humanities and relative to the overall performance of disciplines across the entire academy.

One final point that should be made here is that, in the second (partial) round of the Performance-Based Research Fund (PBRF) assessment in New Zealand in 2006, philosophy emerged as the discipline with the best international ranking in the country. Giving due acknowledgement to the controversial nature of any such assessment exercise, it is nonetheless the case that this data strongly supports the claim that academic philosophy in New Zealand is performing very well indeed as the 2000s draw to a close.[49]

Supporting Philosophy in the Academy

The Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) is the peak body that supports philosophy in the Australasian academy. The AAP promotes the study of philosophy in Australasia (Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore) and coordinates professional activities. It is run by an annually elected Council. During the 2000s, there has been an expansion of the membership and role of Council, under the chairmanship of Graham Priest, who has held that position from 1998 through to 2008. Other positions on Council include president,[50] secretary,[51] treasurer,[52] editor of the *AJP*,[53] and—during the 2000s—data collection officer,[54] media officer,[55] information officer,[56] New Zealand representative,[57] and other occasional or unspecified roles.[58]

---

[49] The average quality score for disciplines in the 2006 PBRF assessment was 2.96. Ten of 42 disciplines scored over 4; seven scored less than 2. Philosophy scored 5.15; the next highest scores were for Earth Sciences (4.77), Physics (4.65), and Pure Mathematics (4.40).

[50] The president of the AAP has a 1 year term; the chief duty of the president is to give the presidential address at the annual AAP conference. Presidents of the AAP during the 2000s have been Chris Mortensen (2000–2001, University of Adelaide), Kim Sterelny (2001–2002, RSSS and VUW), Jeff Malpas (2002–2003, University of Tasmania), Graham MacDonald (2003–2004, Canterbury), Andrew Brennan (2004–2005, UWA), Stewart Candlish (2005–2006, UWA), Mark Colyvan (2006–2007, University of Queensland), David Chalmers (2007–2008, RSSS), and Susan Dodds (2008–2009, University of Wollongong).

[51] Marion Tapper (University of Melbourne), 1998–2003; Tim Oakley (La Trobe University), from 2003.

[52] Peter Forrest (University of New England)—assisted by Ross Brady (La Trobe University)—1997–2002; Garrett Cullity (University of Adelaide) from 2002.

Initiatives of council during the 2000s include development and maintenance of the AAP website as an important resource for Australasian philosophers,[59] introduction and maintenance of an AAP list of philosophers available for expert comment, tracking of philosophy in the media, hosting lunches with media representatives,[60] introduction of a media prize for the best media contribution by a philosopher and a media professionals' award for the best coverage of philosophy by a media professional, introduction and maintenance of a list of Australasian philosophy conferences and workshops, introduction of an annual prize for the best paper published in the AJP,[61] provision of information on mailing lists that service

---

[53] For information about editors of the *AJP* in the 2000s, see the subsequent discussion in the main text.

[54] Eliza Goddard (University of Melbourne), from 2001 to 2006. From 2006, Eliza has been executive officer for the AAP (and has continued her data collection activities in this new role).

[55] Caroline West (University of Sydney), from 2002.

[56] Deborah Brown (University of Queensland), 2000–2002; Aurelia Armstrong (University of Queensland), from 2002. Deborah Brown was also appointments monitor from 1998 to 2000.

[57] Colin Cheyne (University of Otago), from 2003.

[58] The roles have included the following: appointments monitor, vigilance officer, and public lobbyist. Other members of Council during the 2000s included Stewart Candlish (UWA), Mark Colyvan (University of Sydney), Jeff Malpas (University of Tasmania), Michael Smith (RSSS), David Chalmers (RSSS), and Clare McCausland (University of Melbourne, postgraduate student representative).

[59] Eliza Goddard has had prime responsibility for the maintenance of the AAP website since 2006. Prior to 2006, the website was maintained by Aurelia Armstrong. I think that the website was initially made and maintained by RSSS, but I have no date for this or for the initial handover.

[60] Speakers at AAP press lunches have included Rai Gaita (Australian Catholic University), Tony Coady (University of Melbourne), David Chalmers (RSSS), Susan Dodds (University of Wollongong), and Tim Dare (University of Auckland).

[61] The journal prize and the two media prizes are all sponsored by the journal's publisher, Taylor and Francis. The inaugural (2007) journal prize was won by John Heil (Washington University in St. Louis) for his paper 'The Legacy of Linguisticism' (*AJP* 82, 2, 2006, 233–44). The inaugural (2007) media professional's award was won by Alan Saunders for his weekly ABC Radio National show *The Philosopher's Zone*; the 2008 media professional's award was won by Natasha Mitchell for her program 'The Mind-Body Problem Down Under', originally broadcast on ABC Radio National on 23 September 2006. The media prize has been won by Chandran Kukathas (1999, for a lecture on 'Tolerating the Intolerable' delivered to the Senate Department's Occasional Lecture Series at Parliament House, June 24, 1998), Tamas Pataki (2000, for an article on 'Narcissism Incarnate' in the *Australian Review of Books*), John Sutton (2002, for a weekly radio program 'Ghost in the Machine'), Tim Dare (2003, for a weekly column on philosophy in the *New Zealand Herald*), Stan van Hooft (2004, for an interview on 'Socratic Dialogue' with Phillip Adams on *Late Night Live*), Kim Atkins (2005, for an article on 'Matters of Personal Preference' in the *Australian Financial Review*), Simon Clarke (2006, for a series of newspaper columns on 'Clear Thinking' in the Christchurch Press), Jeremy Moss (2007, for 'The Ethicist', a series of columns in the *Sunday Age*), and Geoffrey Levey (2008, for an article titled 'A Healthy Dose of Multiculturalism', published in the *Australian Financial Review*).

Australasian philosophy—including the Aphil-l mailing list maintained by Di Crosse at ANU — and so forth.

Perhaps the most important responsibility of the AAP Council is to supervise publication of the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (*AJP*) which, in turn, is the chief source of income for the AAP. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the journal saw two changes of editorship. At the beginning of the decade, it was located at UNE, under the editorship of Fred D'Agostino, Peter Forrest, and Jerry Gauss, with Adrian Walsh and Tony Lynch as reviews editors. In the middle of 2002, the journal shifted to Victoria University Wellington, under the editorship of Maurice Goldsmith, with Ken Perszyk as reviews editor. Finally, at the end of 2007, the journal moved to UWA, under the editorship of Stewart Candlish, with Nic Damnjanovic as reviews editor. Between 1998 and 2004, the AJP was published by Oxford University Press; since the beginning of 2005, it has been published by Taylor and Francis (under its Routledge imprint). The partnership with Taylor and Francis has been very important in securing the longer-term future of both the journal and the AAP itself.

In 2006, the *AJP* had 781 subscriptions—of which 588 were institutional and 193 were individual—and 5,412 online sales agreements. Institutional subscriptions came from Australia (48), Canada (26), Germany (26), India (12), Italy (12), Japan (13), New Zealand (10), South Korea (10), UK (48), USA (296), and 31 other countries (280). There were more than 25,000 downloads in the year; the most downloaded article was a piece by Stephen Darwell (University of Michigan) on virtue ethics. The *AJP* was given an A ranking (the top possible) in the Europe Science Foundation's ranking exercise and an A* ranking (again, the top possible) in the preliminary Excellence in Research for Australia rankings.[62] While it is not the best philosophy journal in the world, there is no doubt that the *AJP* has a very strong international reputation. (In 2008, its rejection rate runs at nearly 95 %, not much less than the rejection rate for *Mind*.)

On a rough and ready reckoning, the distribution of articles, discussion notes, and critical notices in the *AJP* across the various subject areas of philosophy in the period 2000–2007 was as follows:

Subject area	Articles	Notes	Notices
Metaphysics	109[63]	16	2
Epistemology	28	4	2
Philosophical logic	27[64]	3	1

(*continued*)

---

[62] Mark Colyvan ranks the *AJP* in the top 2 % of generalist philosophy journals—see http://homepage.mac.com/mcolyvan/journals.html

[63] The number of articles classified as metaphysics was swelled by two special editions, one on the philosophy of David Lewis (12 articles on metaphysics, two on philosophy of mind, and two on other topics), and one on the philosophy of David Armstrong (nine articles on metaphysics, together with nine replies from Armstrong not included in our count).

[64] Ten of the articles classified as philosophical logic were in a special edition on logic (and seven of these ten had Australasian authorship).

Subject area	Articles	Notes	Notices
Moral philosophy	25	2	1
Philosophy of mind	22	8	1
Political philosophy	11[65]	0	1
Philosophy of language	6	2	2
Aesthetics	5	0	0
Moral psychology	5	0	0
Decision theory	4	0	0
History of philosophy—modern	3	0	0
History of philosophy—ancient	2	0	0
Philosophy of mathematics	1	0	0
Philosophy of religion	1	1	0
Asian philosophy	0	0	1

In total, over these 32 editions, there were 249 articles, 36 discussion notes, and 11 critical notices. Of these, 50 of the articles, eight of the discussion notes, and seven of the critical notices had authors with Australasian institutional affiliations (and five of the critical notices were of books written by philosophers with Australasian institutional affiliations). Thus, over the period 2000–2007, roughly 20 % of the content of the journal—not counting reviews and book notes—was supplied by Australasian philosophers; the remaining 80 % came from overseas (mostly from the USA and the UK).[66]

There are a number of other philosophy journals that continued to be edited in Australasia in the 2000s, including the *Australasian Journal of Legal Philosophy* (launched in 1975), the *Australasian Journal of Logic* (launched in 2003), the *Journal of Political Philosophy* (launched in 1993), the *Monash Bioethics Review* (launched in 1981), *Philosophy and Literature* (launched in 1976), and *Sophia* (launched in 1962[67]). CAPPE has a number of journals under its aegis, including the e-journal, *Res Publica* (launched in 1990),[68] *Criminal Justice Ethics* (launched in 1981, published jointly with John Jay College, CUNY), *Ethics and Information Technology* (launched in 1998), *Nanoethics* (launched in 2007, under the editorship of John Weckert), and *Neuroethics* (launched in 2008, under the editorship of Neil Levy).

---

[65] Seven of the articles classified as political philosophy were in a special edition on land rights and native title.

[66] It is interesting to compare the subject data with the data about the range of papers presented at conferences (see footnote 2). The *AJP* has had a greater concentration on metaphysics than would be predicted from the concentration of papers presented at the AAP conferences—and, indeed, the *AJP* has something of an international reputation as a place in which to publish good papers on metaphysics.

[67] *Sophia* underwent a major facelift at the beginning of the 2000s when it began to be published by Acumen. It has been edited by Purushottama Bilimoria and Patrick Hutchings through the University of Melbourne and Deakin University since 1991.

[68] http://www.cappe.edu.au/publications/res-publica-past-issues.htm

Other academic associations that have helped to support philosophy in the Australasian academy during the 2000s include the Australasian Association for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science (AAHPSSS); the Australasian Association for Professional and Applied Ethics (AAPAE); the Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association (APRA), the Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy (ASACP), the Australasian Society of Ancient Philosophy (ASAP), the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP), the Australasian Society for Legal Philosophy (ASLP), and Women in Philosophy (WiP). Mention should also be made of the Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy (MSCP), an independent teaching and research unit located at the University of Melbourne, which was established in 2004 by a group of 'mildly disaffected' postgraduate students with the aim of 'resisting the spirit of hidebound conventionality prevalent in the modern day Australian academy in general and in university philosophy departments in particular'.[69]

Philosophy Beyond the Academy

The 2000s witnessed some major developments in the teaching of philosophy to secondary school students in Australasia and also further initiatives in the teaching of philosophy to primary school students in the region.

The Victorian Curriculum and Assessment Authority (VCAA) introduced philosophy as a Victorian Certificate of Education (VCE) subject in 2001; the Senior Secondary Assessment Board of South Australia (SSABSA) introduced philosophy as a South Australian Certificate of Education (SACE) subject in 2002. Around the same time, the ACT Board of Senior Secondary Studies (BSSS) introduced theory of knowledge as a subject for senior secondary school students.[70] Australian academic philosophers were involved in curriculum development for these subjects and have subsequently been involved in curriculum revision.[71] Given reliance on first-year enrolments in many 'departments' of philosophy, there were fears that the introduction of philosophy into late secondary school curricula might lead to financial problems for 'departments' of philosophy at universities: to date, however, there is no evidence that this has happened. Moreover, in fact, some 'departments' have turned this development into a new revenue stream: for example, La Trobe offers an annual 4-day intensive workshop to teachers of the VCE philosophy program.[72]

---

[69] This quote was taken from the MSCP website http://www.mscp.org.au/information.html on 27/07/08. Founders of MSCP include Matt Sharpe, David Rathbone, Jon Roffe, Sean Ryan, Craig Barrie, and Cameron Shingleton.

[70] Not all Australian states followed suit. The Queensland State Authority (QSA) has offered a boutique course—now called 'Philosophy and Reason', but previously called 'Logic'—since about 1978. (See http://www.abc.net.au/rn/philosopherszone/stories/2008/2121580.htm: Alan Saunders' interview with Peter Ellerton. It appears that the *Australian Logic Teachers Journal*, launched in 1977, arose with this course). In NSW, there has been a distinction course in philosophy taught in distance mode through UNE since 1994. But, as far as I could discover, Victoria, South Australia, and the ACT are the only states to offer broad-based Year 11 and Year 12 courses in philosophy; and there are no broad-based later-year courses in philosophy in New Zealand secondary schools.

The 2000s has also witnessed continued growth in the philosophy for children movement. The Federation of Australasian Philosophy in Schools Associations (FAPSA) is the umbrella organisation for the development and promotion of philosophy in schools in Australasia. It is linked to the International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC), established in 1985.[73] Active associates of FAPSA include the Canberra Society of Philosophy for the Young (SOPHY), the Philosophy for School Association of New South Wales, the Queensland Association for Philosophy in Schools (QAPS), the Association for Philosophy in Schools in Western Australia (APIS), and the Victorian Association for Philosophy in Schools. There is a nascent Philosophy for Children Association of New Zealand (P4CNZ) founded in 2006, as well as a South Australian Association for Philosophy in the Classroom (SAAPC) and an Association for Philosophy in Tasmanian Schools (APTS). These associates of FAPSA are in turn linked to other local and national organisations, such as the ACER Centre of Philosophy for Children.

While the introduction of philosophy units in the later years of secondary education transfers methods of teaching philosophy from universities to secondary schools, the methods for teaching philosophy to younger children endorsed by FAPSA and its associates are very different. The guiding idea behind the philosophy for children movement is that young children can develop philosophical skills—the ability to analyse and assess arguments, the disposition to value good reasoning and intellectual honesty, the ability to give and take impersonal criticism of ideas, the willingness to listen to the ideas of others with an open mind, the capacity to identify and tackle problems—in monitored discussions of issues that are important to them. Moreover, the received view at FAPSA seems to be that philosophy can be introduced to younger children with great success by teachers with no formal university training in philosophy. Nonetheless, many of those who are most active in FAPSA and its associates are professional philosophers, or have previously been professional philosophers, or have completed higher degrees by research in philosophy.[74]

---

[71] The curriculum for the Victorian course is typical. In 2008, the first semester course—'The Good Life'—uses the following texts: Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (Book I, 1–5, 7–9, Book II), Plato's *Gorgias* (480e–509c), Iris Murdoch's *The Sovereignty of Good* (15 page excerpt), and Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil* (ten page excerpt). And the second semester course—'Mind, Science and Knowledge'—uses the following texts: Descartes' *Meditation II*, David Armstrong's *The Nature of Mind* (one chapter), Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (chapters 7 and 13), Plato's *Republic* (475d–487a, 506d–521b), and Karl Popper's *Conjectures and Refutations* (chapter 1).

[72] The later part of the 2000s has seen the introduction of philosophy as a Year 10 elective in some secondary schools in the state of Victoria (e.g., at Caulfield Grammar School and Glen Waverley Secondary College). It remains to be seen whether this further incursion of philosophy into the secondary school curriculum gets taken up more widely (both within Victoria and across the Australasian region).

[73] The oldest associate of ICPIC is the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children in the United States (IAPCUS), formed by Matthew Lipman in 1975.

Among its activities, FAPSA maintains a house journal—*Critical and Creative Thinking* (launched in 1992)[75]—and runs an annual conference. The 2007 *Philosophy in Schools* Conference was held in Melbourne and witnessed the presentation of 28 papers over 2 days (including presentations by delegates from England, France, and Singapore). This conference saw the production of a *FAPSA Report to UNESCO*,[76] occasioned by the release of the *UNESCO Intersectoral Strategy on Philosophy* in 2006.[77]

The 2000s also witnessed interesting developments in philosophy beyond the confines of educational institutions (primary, secondary, or tertiary). These developments included the emergence of philosophy discussion groups in pubs, cafes, and other private venues[78] in some major metropolitan centres, and a widening range of media events involving philosophical discussion and philosophical debate.

In 2008, in Melbourne, Michelle Irving is the Director of *Heart of Philosophy*, a 'boutique philosophy events company dedicated to creating interesting, informal and fun philosophy events for the public'.[79] These events include Philosophy Cafés at bars in the Melbourne CBD[80] and philosophy lectures and other philosophy events hosted by academic philosophers (in partnership with galleries, local councils, Centres for Adult Education, and the like). Heart of Philosophy also runs Philosophy Tours, in which small groups travel to locations in Greece and Turkey that are particularly significant in the history of philosophy.[81]

---

[74] For example, Winifred Lamb (SOPHY), Phillip Cam (NSW), Vanya Kovach (P4CNZ), Janette Poulton (VAPS), Alan Tapper (APIS), Gilbert Burgh (QAPS), Laurence Splitter (now at the Institute for Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) at Montclair State University), and San MacColl (now Coordinator, TAFE Educational Strategy, TAFE NSW).

[75] Other journals in this field include *Analytic Teaching: The Community of Inquiry Journal*, *Questions: Philosophy for Young People*, and *Thinking: The Journal for Philosophy of Children*. (See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/children/ ('Philosophy for Children' *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, accessed on 23/07/08).

[76] http://www.fapsa.org.au/files/conference/2007/fapsa_report_to_unesco.rtf This is a very useful source of information about FAPSA and its associates.

[77] http://www.fapsa.org.au/files/conference/2007/unesco.pdf The 33rd General Conference of UNESCO, on 19 October 2005, accepted the resolution that the third Thursday in November each year shall be UNESCO's 'World Philosophy Day'; the first marking of UNESCO's 'World Philosophy Day' actually occurred in 2002.

[78] One example is John Howes' *Learning Guild* based in Brunswick, Melbourne. A different example is provided by Universities of the Third Age (U3A), which are located in all of the major cities in Australasia and which provide many courses on philosophy. (For background information on U3A, see R. Swindell and J. Thompson's 'An International Perspective of the University of the Third Age' http://www3.griffith.edu.au/03/u3a/includes/linked_pages/file_downloader.php?id = 306&prop = 5&save =1 (accessed 23/07/08)).

[79] http://www.heartofphilosophy.com/ (accessed 23/07/08).

As we have already noted, there have been interesting forays in the media by academic philosophers and by people outside academic with an interest in philosophy. Examples of the former include regular columns in newspapers (Tim Dare, Simon Clarke, Jeremy Moss) and regular radio shows (John Sutton) or radio appearances (Caroline West). Perhaps the best-known example of the latter is Alan Saunders' 'Philosopher's Zone', a weekly broadcast on Australian Radio National.[82] Since the beginning of 2005, Saunders has presented something like 180 shows, mostly interviews with local and international philosophers. For example, in the first half of 2008, Saunders presented interviews with, or public lectures given by, Matt Carter, Susan Dodds, David Chalmers, Rai Gaita, Stephen Gaukroger, Philip Pettit, Jennifer McMahon, Rick Benitez, Karyn Lai, Jean-Philippe Deranty, Val Plumwood, Tariq Ramadan, James South, Gary Malinas, David Miller, David Braddon-Mitchell, Tony Coady, Robert Wolff, Michael Cholbi, Michael Selgelid, Simon Critchley, Larry Temkin, and John Gray. The transcripts for these interviews and lectures are available at the Radio National website.[83]

At the beginning of the 2000s, there was some international interest in philosophical counselling.[84] However, it seems that this interest did not take hold in Australasia: I have not discovered any cases of Australasian philosophers who were motivated to hang out their shingles. Nonetheless, there are entrepreneurial Australasian philosophers who have moved into the business world during the 2000s. In particular, Tim van Gelder's Austhink[85] has been strongly backed by local and international investors attracted by the development of argument mapping software and training in decision-making efficiency for senior leaders.[86]

---

[80] In the second half of 2008, there are monthly Philosophy Cafes at Terra Rosa restaurant and bar. The speakers are Mark Colyvan (on game-theoretic analysis of mating and dating), Graham Priest (on the possible collapse of capitalism under the impact of environmental catastrophe), Steve Curry (on business ethics and commonsense), Gilbert Burgh (on some of the shortcomings of democracy), and Philippa Rothfield (on Nietzsche's philosophy of body).

[81] Earlier in the 2000s, Michelle Irving was engaged in a similar enterprise in Brisbane.

[82] See the website for the program: http://www.abc.net.au/rn/philosopherszone/

[83] During the first half of 2003, Yvonne Adele (aka Ms. Megabyte) ran a weekly interview/talkback session—up to an hour—with philosophers on 3AK in Melbourne. During 2004 and 2005, Joanne Faulkner hosted the Latrobe Radio Philosophy Show, a weekly program broadcast on the campus radio station SubFM. From 1 May 2001 until 27 January 2005, *Ghost in the Machine* aired on Eastside Radio 89.7 FM in Sydney on Thursdays from 5:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. During this time, John Sutton led a team of presenters that also included Caroline West, Doris McIlwain, Tim Bayne, Rick Benitez, and Jean Barrett.

[84] See, for example, Le Bon, T. (2001) *Wise Therapy: Philosophy for Counsellors* New York: Sage

[85] http://austhink.com/ (Austhink's website, accessed 30/07/08).

Changes in Philosophical Practice

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, there have been interesting changes in the behaviour of professional philosophers, both in connection with their teaching activities and in connection with their research activities. Some of these changes have been the results of new policies in the management of higher education (at the level of government, universities, faculties, and 'departments'); other changes have been the results of new technologies that have been adopted in the higher education sector. Few of these changes are local to Australasia; but at least some of them have had a regional inflection.

Anecdotal evidence strongly supports the claim that, on average, as a result of a range of developments in information technology, professional philosophers spend much more time at their computer keyboards than they did in the 1990s. In part, this is due to increased time spent on activities that were already in place in the 1990s: e-mail correspondence, word processing, Internet searches, and the like. But, in part, this is due to additions to the range of things that can now be done at desktop computers: accessing university library catalogues; browsing most current philosophy journals; reading published journal articles and books that are available online; reading prepublication manuscripts that are available online; making entries in online discussion lists and blogs; ordering philosophy books from online suppliers; preparing PowerPoint presentations for classes; posting lecture summaries for students; listening to audio recordings of lectures that have been given in classes in which one is a tutor; and so forth.

One important driver in changing the way that philosophy is taught has been the wide-scale adoption of virtual environments for learning—such as WebCT and Blackboard—in universities. Virtual environments for learning are intended to support teaching and learning in educational settings and typically provide tools for assessment, communication, posting of lecture notes and reading materials, return of students' work, peer assessment, administration of student groups, collection and organisation of grades, administration of questionnaires and feedback surveys, and so forth. Often, these virtual environments for learning embed mail, discussion lists, wikis, blogs, and the like. One consequence of the adoption of these virtual environments for learning to support face-to-face instruction is that there are many fewer face-to-face meetings between teaching staff and individual students: most communication outside of the classroom is electronically mediated. Another consequence is that students are typically provided with much more supporting material than was previously the case: virtual environments for learning at most universities provide direct access to recordings of lectures, lecture notes, PowerPoint slides, course reading materials, course information, at least one course discussion list, and so forth. While virtual environments for learning clearly do have an important role in distance education—Open Learning, university on-line units, and the like—and while students who are engaged in 'part-time' work for upwards of 40 hours per week in order to meet the costs of their education often welcome the blurring of boundaries between face-to-face instruction and distance education, it is not entirely clear that these consequences of the adoption of virtual environments for learning do anything to improve learning outcomes for students who have signed up for face-to-face instruction.

---

[86] On 3 December 2007, it was reported that Austhink Software had raised $4.1 million for 'implementation of international sales and marketing initiatives, entry to industry verticals, and delivery of a Web-based solution' http://www.crn.com.au/News/66188,austhink-raises-41m-for-desktop-offering.aspx

The ways in which professional philosophers use the Internet has changed considerably during the 2000s. Most professional philosophers now have an institutional homepage that provides biographical information and a publication list. Some philosophers use their homepages for Web publication, including the posting of work in progress or work that might otherwise remain inaccessible to anyone else.[87] A small number of professional philosophers maintain blogs or participate in collective blogs.[88] Towards the end of the 2000s, most philosophy journals have moved—or are in the process of moving—to Web-based systems for upload and review of submitted papers. During the 2000s, the *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (SEP) has grown into a very substantial resource, with a mirror site at the University of Sydney: on my count, in mid-2008, SEP contains 74 entries by philosophers currently based in Australasia. At the end of the 2000s, philosophers routinely use Google—or other Internet search engines—in the battle to detect instances of student plagiarism. And so on. (An exhaustive list of the ways in which the Internet has changed the face of academic philosophy would be very extensive indeed).

It is well-known that the number of students in Australian universities who are not native speakers of English has increased dramatically since the mid-1980s and that this number continued to increase during the 2000s. While these increases have made some differences to the teaching practices of Faculties of Arts—e.g., by driving the provision of larger and more sophisticated language support services—it is not clear that these increases have led to significant changes in teaching practices, curricula, and so forth, in 'departments' of philosophy. It may be true that, in the 2000s, there has been some slight increase in the total number of courses on Asian philosophy—Chinese Philosophy, Indian Philosophy, and the like—and it may also be true that, in the 2000s, there has been some slight increase in the total number of courses which can be accessible to students who draw on the resources of language support services—Introductory Logic Introductory Critical Thinking and the like—but, even if these things are true, it is not clear that these increases are properly attributed merely to the increase in the number of students in Australian universities who are not native speakers of English over this time period.

---

[87] Some philosophers have a very substantial Web presence. For example, David Chalmers (RSSS)—http://consc.net/chalmers/—maintains a significant annotated bibliography of papers in philosophy of mind, a regularly updated set of links to online papers on consciousness, and, among other things, a nice set of links on philosophical humour.

[88] There are other 'philosophy blogs' that seem to be quite independent of the academy; see, for example, http://www.philosophyblog.com.au/

During the 2000s, most Australian universities have sought ‘partnerships’ with international universities—mutual arrangements to further the research, teaching, and administrative functions of universities. While arrangements brokered at the university level have rarely had significant consequences for staff in ‘departments’ of philosophy, it is nonetheless true that the discipline of philosophy in Australasian universities has maintained very significant research links with the rest of the world. As the cost of aviation fuel rises dramatically towards the end of the 2000s, one might be given to wonder whether these research links will be increasingly mediated by computer technology—and less frequently supported by face-to-face encounters during international visits—in the coming years.

There is some evidence that academic philosophers are engaging in more collaborative research, and in more interdisciplinary collaborative work, than was the case a decade ago. Above, we noted that philosophers have formed partnerships to obtain research funding (41 of 91 funded grants in the period 2002–2008 had more than one CI). Examination of lists of journal publications by philosophers also suggests that there is more co-authorship, both with other philosophers as co-authors and with non-philosophers as co-authors. Among the generation of philosophers to which Jack Smart and David Armstrong belonged, co-authorship appears to have been rare. In the next generation, some philosophers—e.g., Frank Jackson and John Bigelow—engaged in a substantial amount of co-authorship but typically with a small number of philosophical co-authors.[89] However, in the current generation of philosophers, there are many philosophers who engage in a substantial amount of co-authorship, often with many different partners and sometimes with partners who are not themselves philosophers. So, for example, in the period from 1998 to 2008, Mark Colyvan published 47 papers, of which 21 were co-authored. In this period, he had 21 different co-authors, of whom nine were philosophers and 12 were non-philosophers (including applied mathematicians, ecologists, botanists, and environmental scientists). For another example, in the period from 2001 to 2008, Alan Hájek published 33 papers, of which 11 were co-authored with ten different philosophers. While there is room for a more detailed study, it seems to me that there has clearly been a trend among younger philosophers towards much greater promiscuity, both in respect of kind and number of publishing partners.[90]

---

[89] Jackson is well-known for his writings with Philip Pettit, Michael Smith, and David Braddon-Mitchell, though he has also co-authored papers with John Bigelow, Elizabeth Prior, David Chalmers, Robert Pargetter and Alec Hyslop, among others. Bigelow is well-known for his writings with Robert Pargetter but has also co-authored papers with Frank Jackson, Elizabeth Prior, Laura Schroeter, Neil McKinnon, and Walter ten Brinke, among others.

[90] Some readers might be interested in having a look at Toby Handfield’s depiction of Erdös numbers for Monash philosophy staff: http://home.iprimus.com.au/than/toby/erdos2.html. This might also be taken to be evidence of a kind of burgeoning promiscuity.

Teaching Philosophy

On a broad perspective, the nature of the philosophy major in Australasian universities has not changed much in the 2000s: the typical philosophy major still involves a couple of introductory units in first year—usually involving introductions to metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, philosophy of mind, and, perhaps, critical thinking or elementary logic—and then a selection of specialised units in the second and third years. However, when we look more closely, we find that there have been some changes.

First, many ‘departments’ of philosophy offer a range of first-year units, some of which are clearly designed to attract a different range of students from those who typical enrol in Philosophy 101. These units include courses in critical thinking or reasoning and argument, introductory courses in formal logic, and introductory courses in bioethics and/or applied ethics. Some of these courses have involved innovative teaching techniques; in particular, there have been several attempts to investigate the efficacy of diverse techniques for teaching critical thinking and reasoning.

Second, most ‘departments’ of philosophy offer all—or nearly all—of their later-year undergraduate units at both second- and third-year levels. While the reason for this is clear—more students can be taught in fewer classes—it seems plausible to think that there is loss in the lack of real differentiation between these 2 year levels (a loss that it is not plausibly made good by the inclusion of a token third-year-only unit for intending honours students).

Third, there are no ‘departments’ of philosophy that have an ‘honours stream’ in the first 3 years of the undergraduate degree. Thus, students entering the honours year typically have a different educational background from that possessed by students entering the honours year a generation or two back. Given distribution requirements, and constraints on course overloading, it is typical for a beginning honours student to have completed just eight one-semester subjects in philosophy (together, perhaps, with some ‘cognate’ subjects in other disciplines). By way of contrast, a student entering honours in philosophy a generation back might have done the equivalent of about 20 one-semester subjects in philosophy at that point in his or her career.[91]

Fourth, there have been some changes in the range of subjects that are offered at second and third year. A generation ago, it was not common to find undergraduate courses on Chinese Philosophy, Indian Philosophy, Buddhist Philosophy, and the like; now, such courses are commonplace. A generation ago, it was common to find a range of undergraduate courses in technical analytical philosophy—advanced courses in logic, decision theory, and the like. But now, there tend to be fewer such courses available. Reasons for changes in subject offerings are diverse. One driver is student interest. Another driver is the research interests of staff, which are typically accorded more weight when it comes to considerations of curriculum design than was previously the case.[92]

---

[91] ‘Equivalent’ because, a generation ago, it is likely that some of the units that a beginning honours student would have already done would have been year-long units.

Fifth, there are interesting differences between subject offerings across institutions. For example, in 2008, there is at least one second- or third-year course in philosophy of religion at only 7 of 19 Australian universities that I surveyed[93] but in six out of six New Zealand universities that I surveyed.[94] Of the remaining universities in Australia, six included some philosophy of religion in their first-year courses, and six offered nothing that I could identify as philosophy of religion.[95] Moreover, in Australia, there are three universities that offer more than one second- or third-year course in philosophy of religion[96]; and there is just one university (in New Zealand)[97] that offers a course in philosophy of religion at the honours level. While larger universities—and larger 'departments' of philosophy—might be expected to have the capacity to make a more diverse range of subject offerings, it is interesting to note that the seven Australian universities with at least one second- or third-year course in philosophy of religion in 2008 are ACU, Melbourne, UWA, UNSW, Monash, Newcastle, and Bond.[98] It would be interesting to investigate other subject offerings across 'departments' of philosophy in Australasian universities—but such an investigation is beyond the compass of the present work.

Sixth, there are features of the teaching of philosophy in Australia (and in New Zealand) that seem to be distinctive local inflections. In particular, many people have observed that there is a stark contrast in the weight that is accorded to the teaching of philosophy through its history in Australian universities when compared to universities in the USA, the UK, and Canada. Certainly, examination of subject offerings in ancient philosophy at Australian universities seems to bear out this observation. In 2008, 4 of 20 Australian universities (and two of six New Zealand universities) offered courses in ancient (or ancient and medieval) philosophy; another four of the Australian universities had courses in ancient (or ancient and medieval) philosophy on their books, but were not offering those courses in 2008.[99]

---

[92] Other areas where there has been a proliferation of courses in philosophy 'departments' in Australasia during the 2000s include philosophy of art and aesthetics, philosophy of film, and gender/sexuality studies.

[93] Data taken from websites at Adelaide, ACU, Melbourne, UWA, UQ, UNSW, Sydney, ANU, Monash, UNE, Wollongong, Newcastle, La Trobe, Tasmania, Swinburne, Flinders, Murdoch, Bond, and Griffith, on 27/07/08.

[94] Data taken from websites at Auckland, Waikato, Otago, VUW, Canterbury, and Massey, on 28/07/08.

[95] The University of Tasmania's offering was hard to classify, since it has a gender studies course on religious and gender, and a Philosophy of Science course on science and religion, both offered from within the school to which the 'department' of philosophy belongs, but not from within the 'department' itself.

[96] ACU offers a range of subjects that could be classified as philosophy of religion; Bond and Melbourne both offer one traditional subject on philosophy of religion and another subject on science and religion from a 'history and philosophy of science' perspective.

[97] In 2008, Auckland had a fourth year course on philosophy of religion on the books, though it was not offered in this year.

[98] For what it is worth, philosophy of religion attracted more students than any other later-year undergraduate subject at Monash for at least half of the 2000s (typically somewhere between 50 and 85 students).

From a similarly broad perspective, it can be argued that there have been more significant changes in the philosophy honours year in the 2000s. In 2008, almost all ‘departments’ of philosophy have an honours year in which no more than 50 % of the study is based on face-to-face lectures in traditional philosophical subjects. By contrast, a generation or two back, in a typical honours year, at least 84 % of the study was based on face-to-face lectures in traditional philosophical subjects. Moreover, in 2008, the rest of the honours year is taken up with a large dissertation (up to 20,000 words) and—in at least some cases—an honours seminar on research methods, or research methodology, or the like. Of course, these differences further expand the difference in the range of subjects that have been studied by a current typical honours graduate compared to the range of subjects studied by a typical honours graduate a generation or two ago.

The 2000s also saw periodic bouts of organisational enthusiasm for postgraduate coursework degrees in philosophy and for the teaching of coursework units in higher degrees by research in philosophy. This enthusiasm raised difficult practical questions about the means of teaching subjects at postgraduate level. In many cases, these practical questions were solved by the teaching of four fifth subjects to combined classes of honours and postgraduate students. However, in some cases, programs have mounted stand-alone postgraduate courses, either to meet the interests of niche degrees (e.g., postgraduate coursework degrees in bioethics) or else because a very large staff base makes it possible to do so (as at the University of Auckland).

Domains of Inquiry

There are various ways in which one might try to work out what Australasian philosophers were thinking about during the 2000s: one might look at large grant awards, one might look at journal publications, one might look at claimed areas of expertise, and one might look at conference and seminar presentations. Here, I propose to have a look at the books that were published by Australasian philosophers in the 2000s. The raw data for this analysis was taken from ‘departmental’ website on 27 and 28 July 2008. While that data might not be perfect, there is no reason to suppose that it will be systematically distorted (in favour of particular sub-specialisations, particular orientations, or the like).

---

[99] This data was derived by a search of Australasian university websites on 05/09/08.

On my reckoning, Australasian philosophers published on the order of 180 books[100] between 2000 and 2008. Broken down by 'department', these books were distributed as follows:

University	Books	University	Books	University	Books
ACU	3	Monash	8	Otago	6
ANU	19	Murdoch	–	Queensland	5
Bond	–	Adelaide	2	Sydney	12
CAPPE[101]	29	Auckland	19	Tasmania	2
Deakin	3	Canterbury	3	Waikato	3
Flinders	3	Melbourne	21	UWA	4
La Trobe	9	UNE	5	Wollongong	1
Macquarie	3	UNSW	10	VUW	7
Massey	–	Newcastle	3		

On a rough and ready reckoning, the books were distributed across subject areas as follows:

Subject area	Books	Subject area	Books
Continental Philosophy[102]	33	Philosophy of Biology	6
Moral Philosophy	31	Indian Philosophy	4
Political Philosophy	30[103]	Moral Psychology	4
Philosophical Logic	16	Philosophy of Science	3
Aesthetics	9	Epistemology	2
History of Modern Philosophy	9	History of Ancient Philosophy	1
Philosophy of Religion	9	Philosophy of Mathematics	1
General Philosophy[104]	9	Philosophy of Language	1
Metaphysics	8	Chinese Philosophy	1
Philosophy of Mind	6		

While there are features of this table that require further explanation, it is worth noting that, on my data, more than half of the books that were written by philosophers working in Australasia during the 2000s were in the areas of Continental philosophy, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. This fact does not correlate particularly well with the Gourmet Report 'speciality' rankings—see footnote 42—but perhaps rather better with anecdotal evidence about undergraduate and postgraduate student interests and subject preferences.

---

[100] Here, we ignore edited works, second editions, etc.: for the purposes of this classification, a 'book' belongs to DEST Category A1.

[101] We treat CAPPE as a separate institution, primarily to highlight the number of books that are claimed for it (and to avoid hard questions about how to allocate its books over the participating institutions).

[102] This category could be broken down into subcategories in various ways.

[103] Seventeen of these books were published by members of CAPPE.

[104] This category includes books that are hard to assign to any other category on the table.

A number of Australasian philosophers produced three or more books properly classified as philosophy during the 2000s, including **Peter Singer** (*Writings on an Ethical Life* (2000), *Unsanctifying Human Life* (2001), *One World: Ethics and Globalisation* (2002), *Pushing Time Away: My Grandfather and the Tragedy of the Jews* (2005), *How Ethical is Australia*? *An Examination of Australia*'*s Record as a Global Citize*n (2005, with Tom Gregg), and *The Way we Eat: Why our Food Choices Matter* (2006)); **Philip Pettit** (*A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency* (2001); *Rules*, *Reasons and Norms: Selected Essays* (2002); *The Economy of Esteem* (2004, with Geoff Brennan); *Mind*, *Morality and Explanation: Selected Collaborations* (2004, with Frank Jackson and Michael Smith); *Penser en Societe* (2004); and *Made with Words: Hobbes on Mind, Society and Politics* (2007)); **Julian Young** (*Heidegger*'*s Later Philosophy* (2002), *Heidegger*'*s Philosophy of Art* (2002), *Schopenhauer* (2005), *Nietzsche*'*s Philosophy of Religion* (2006), and *The Death of God and the Meaning of Life* (2008)); **Neil Levy** (*Being Up-to-Date: Foucault*, *Sartre and Postmodernity* (2002); *Sartre* (2002); *Moral Relativism* (2002); *What Makes us Moral* (2004); and *Neuroethics* (2007)); **Kim Sterelny** (*The Evolution of Agency and other Essays* (2000), *Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition* (2003), *From Mating to Mentality: Evaluating Evolutionary Psychology* (2003, with Julie Fitsen), *Dawkins* vs. *Gould*: *Survival of the Fittest* (2005), and *What is Bio-Diversity*? (2008, with James Maclaurin)); **John Armstrong** (*Move Closer: An Intimate Philosophy of Art* (2000), *Conditions of Love: The Philosophy of Intimacy* (2002), *The Secret Power of Beauty* (2004), and *Love*, *Life*, *Goethe: How to be Happy in an Imperfect World* (2006)); **Stephen Davies** (*Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration* (2001), *Themes in the Philosophy of Music* (2003), *The Philosophy of Art* (2006), and *Philosophical Perspectives on Art* (2007)); **Robert Wicks** (*Nietzsche* (2002), *Modern French Philosophy: From Existentialism to Postmodernism* (2003), *Kant on Judgment* (2007), and *Schopenhauer* (2008)); **Jay Shaw** (*The Nyāya on Memory: A Commentary on Pandit Visvabandhu* (2003), *Some Logical Problems Concerning Existence* (2003), *Swami Vivekananda as a Philosopher* (2004), and *Causality and its Application: Bauddha and Nyāya* (2006)); **Stephen Gaukroger** (*Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early Modern Philosophy* (2001), *Descartes*' *System of Natural Philosophy* (2002), and *The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity* (2006)); **Bob Goodin** (*Reflective Democracy* (2003), *What*'*s Wrong with Terrorism*? (2006), and *Discretionary Time: A New Measure of Freedom* (2008, with James Rice, Antti Parpo and Lina Eriksson)); **Stan van Hooft** (*Life*, *Death and Subjectivity* (2004); *Caring about Health* (2006); and *Understanding Virtue Ethics* (2006)); **Alastair Gunn** (*Engineering*, *Ethics and the Environment* (2000, with Aarne Vesilind); *Hold Paramount: The Engineer*'*s Responsibility to Society* (2003, with Aarne Vesilind); and *Buddhism and Environmental Ethics in Context* (2003, with Ruth Walker)); **Greg Restall** (*Introduction to Substructural Logics* (2000), *Logical Pluralism* (2006, with J. C. Beall), and *Logic* (2006)); **Graham Priest**

(*An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic* (2001), *Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality* (2005), and *Doubt Truth to be a Liar* (2006)); and **Rod Girle** (*Modal Logics and Philosophy* (2000), *Introduction to Logic* (2002), and *Possible Worlds* (2003)).[105]

While this information about books provides some insight into the diverse nature of philosophical research in Australasia during the 2000s, it tells us nothing about the quality and impact of that research nor does it tell us anything about how philosophical research in Australasia during the 2000s compared with philosophical research in Australasia in earlier decades (on counts of quality, impact, and per capita performance).[106] Assembling data that would plausibly ground an answer to these questions about the quality and impact of philosophical research in Australasia during the 2000s falls well outside the scope of this chapter, not least because much of the important data could only be collected in the future (and then only if we could figure out good ways in which to collect it).[107] However, I can provide here one small example of the kind of data that might contribute to such an assessment. The following table contains information about publications by philosophers with Australasian institutional affiliations in *Mind*, *Journal of Philosophy*, and *Philosophical Review*, for the periods 1991–1996 and 2001–2006. Because these journals differ in the kinds of articles that they carry, there are some parts of the table that are empty:

Journal and time period	Articles	Discussion notes	Authors of critical notices	Subjects of critical notices	Subjects of book reviews
Mind 1991–1996	18	9	0	1	16
Mind 2001–2006	4	8	0	0	30
JP 1991–1996	8	–	2	3	–
JP 2001–2006	9	–	6	1	–
PR 1991–1996	1	–	–	–	20
PR 2001–2006	4	–	–	–	8

---

[105] We see from this data, that, for example, eight of the nine books on aesthetics were written by just two people: John Armstrong and Stephen Davies. We see, too, that 9 of the 16 books on philosophical logic were written by three people: Greg Restall, Graham Priest, and Rod Girle. And we see that five of the six books on philosophy of biology were written or co-written by Kim Sterelny!

[106] There is some data that allows us to compare the per capita performance of philosophers during the 2000s with the per capita performance of scholars in the other humanities, the social sciences, the arts, and the rest of the disciplines in the academy. Thus, for example, the Australian Group of Eight (Go8) universities—ANU, Melbourne, Monash, Sydney, UNSW, Queensland, Adelaide, and UWA—engaged in an annual research benchmarking exercise throughout the 2000s. The Go8 benchmarking figures clearly show that, per capita, during the first half of the 2000s, Go8 philosophers have earned much more competitive grant income and produced many more research publications than have Go8 scholars in the other humanities and the social sciences.

[107] Reliable citation data—and, in many cases, review data—for books published in the 2000s would not be available until well into the next decade, even supposing that we had some reliable method for collecting citation data for books. Much the same is true for journal articles published in the 2000s.

On these—admittedly very small sample—figures, there has been a substantial decrease in the number of articles by Australasian philosophers published in *Mind* accompanied by a significant increase in the number of books reviewed by Australasian philosophers in that journal, and a small increase in articles by Australasian philosophers published in *Philosophical Review* accompanied by a significant decrease in the number of books reviewed by Australasian philosophers in that journal. Perhaps, then, there are some initial grounds here for suspicion that, relative to the rest of the world, there has been *some* decrease in the quality of publications by Australasian philosophers from the 1990s to the 2000s (though it is unclear what could explain the difference in the review rates of books by Australasian philosophers across the two journals).[108] However, as I noted above, what is really needed here is investigation on a larger scale than my current project supports.

Concluding Observation

Given all of the foregoing considerations, it seems fair to conclude that—at least on the close-up perspective that is the only perspective available at the time of writing—philosophy is in pretty good shape in Australasia as we approach the conclusion of the 2000s. There is manifestly excellent teaching and research being conducted by many philosophers across a large range of universities, and there is healthy interest in philosophy in schools and beyond the realm of academic institutions. Moreover, while there are many local institutional stresses, and while there are numerous ways in which the practice of academic philosophy is being changed by external influences, the place of philosophy in the Australasian academy seems to be not merely secure but also a place of very high regard.[109]

---

[108] A quick scan suggests that there have been more reviews of books by Australasian authors in *Philosophical Books* in the 2000s than in the 1990s. This might be taken to suggest that the *Philosophical Review* figures for 2001–2006 are somehow anomalous.

[109] Research for this paper was supported by an ARC DP06 Grant (DP0663930). I am grateful for the support and assistance of the members of the research team that was established by this grant: Lynda Burns, Steve Gardner, Fiona Leigh, and Nick Trakakis. I am indebted to Eliza Goddard for her careful correction of earlier drafts of this paper and to Graham Priest for advice and encouragement.

From Conventionalism to Scientific Metaphysics

11

Brian Ellis

Contents

Introduction 329
Conventionalism 331
From Conventionalism to Holism 336
Scientific Epistemology 342
Scientific Realism 346
Scientific Metaphysics 350
References 357

Introduction

By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the most urgent problem for philosophers of science appeared to be that of reconciling their philosophies with the astonishing discoveries in space-time theory and electromagnetism. Albert Einstein had written his remarkable paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies, better known as the Special Theory of Relativity (STR); Max Planck had introduced his counterintuitive quantum hypothesis to explain the empirical laws of black body radiation; and Einstein had used Planck's theory of atomic resonators to explain the photoelectric effect. The world of physics, which until then had seemed so solid and well ordered, was shaken and in some disarray. For these developments appeared not to be reconcilable with the Newtonian worldview that had, until then, dominated the scientific image of reality.

B. Ellis
School of Communication, Arts and Critical Enquiry, La Trobe University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
e-mail: brian.ellis8@bigpond.com; B.Ellis@latrobe.edu.au

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_12,
 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Many of the leading physicists at this time were conventionalists. They were inspired by the writings of Ernst Mach, Pierre Duhem, Henri Poincaré, and Einstein himself to think of successful theories as being nothing more than the intellectual constructions of scientists—constructions that proved to be more or less useful for organising and systematising the results of experiments. But, as such, they argued, they can have no special claim to be representative of the world itself or to describe it as it truly is. In defending this view, Duhem argued that to claim any more for a theory would always be to take a step into metaphysics. To explain, he said, is to 'strip reality of appearances, covering it like a veil, in order to reveal the bare reality itself' (1954, p. 7). But scientists cannot do this, he said, without abandoning their chosen profession. They can only observe, record, and make mathematico-logical models of reality and seek to bring all of these facts and artifacts together into a coherent system. But they cannot explain anything, he said. That is the function of the metaphysician. And, in the eyes of these philosophers, metaphysics is, at best, just an idle pursuit.

Twentieth-century philosophy of science has been dominated by the consequences of this upheaval and the issue of what science can or should aim to do. The moderate conventionalism of Mach and Poincaré required philosophers to distinguish carefully between empirical facts and conventions, presumably so that they could see more clearly what must be preserved and what may be varied, in any future theory. The anti-metaphysical stance that these same philosophers took led to the more radical philosophical programs of the Vienna Circle, whose purposes were (i) to define the empirical contents of our scientific laws and theories and (ii) to rid the sciences of metaphysics. The first of these aims was to be achieved by logico-empirical analysis, i.e., by representing the laws and theories of science as universal propositions in a first-order predicate language, in which the variables and constants range over observables and the predicates are all observational. Thus, they became known as 'the logical empiricists' or, sometimes, as 'the logical positivists'. The second of these aims was to be achieved by means of the principle of verifiability, which was offered as a criterion for distinguishing between the meaningful and the meaningless.

Philosophers of science pursued these programs vigorously in the first half of the twentieth century. But in the second half, they reacted strongly against them. Conventionalism was overcome by epistemic holism, verificationism was largely replaced by falsificationism, logical empiricism fell to scientific realism, logico-empirical analysis was replaced by 'possible worlds' analyses, and finally, the demand for metaphysical explanations has become respectable again, but perhaps in a way that it never was before. This chapter traces the history of these movements in the second half of the twentieth century, as seen from the perspective of one who has been involved in all of them. We shall see that the advent of scientific realism was a significant turning point in philosophy in Australia. It effectively ended the dominance of ordinary language philosophy in Australia and shifted the emphasis away from questions of meaning to questions of being.

Conventionalism

Duhem's anti-metaphysical, and ultimately anti-realist, view of the aim of physical theory did much to define the agenda for the philosophy of science in the first half of the twentieth century. It enabled the phlogiston and caloric theories that had been overthrown in the nineteenth century to be seen as premature attempts to model reality. The empirical data on which these theories were built were mostly sound, he argued. The fault lay in the concrete models of reality that were constructed to explain them. Therefore, he argued, we should not put any faith in such models. They were, he argued, simply aids for the construction of formal theories and should be abandoned once they have served their purpose.

The conventionalists of this period, including Mach and Ostwald, and many scientists of the time accepted this line of argument. But, as a student, almost half a century later, I was more inclined to accept Norman Campbell's compromise with process realism. In *Physics: The Elements* (1921), Campbell argued that a physical theory always has three parts: an abstract model structure, a dictionary, and an analogy. The abstract model structure was the formal part of the theory, within which all necessary deductions could be made. The dictionary linked elements of the abstract model structure with observable things or properties, thus enabling any deductions or calculations carried out within the abstract model to be interpreted. And the analogy is the notional basis for the construction of the model. In the case of a process theory, it is the physical process that is postulated to explain the physical states or processes that are to be explained. In the case of a non-process theory, it is a formal analogy of some kind that is suggestive of the abstract model that is to be used for the purposes of explanation. But unlike Duhem, Campbell argued that analogies 'are not "aids" to the establishment of theories; they are an utterly essential part of theories, without which theories would be completely valueless and unworthy of the name' (Campbell 1921, p. 129). This was Campbell's compromise with Duhem on the issue of scientific process realism. It was a position one could sensibly take without rejecting scientific process theories. For it left the question open as to why process analogies were manifestly as useful as they were.

Meanwhile, I was convinced that there was still much work to be done in the conventionalist program. If Mach, Poincaré, Einstein, and his great interpreter Hans Reichenbach were basically right in their analyses, a great deal of scientific theory must be seen as depending on theoretically untestable assumptions, which, because they were untestable, had to have the status of mere conventions. Mach had argued, however, that what is true as a matter of fact, as opposed to what is true only by convention, is not always clear. Truth by convention often masquerades as factual. Poincaré (1952), for example, had argued that Euclid's axioms were 'neither synthetic *a priori* intuitions nor experimental facts' (p. 50). They are, he said, just conventions. He also argued that the law of inertia and other laws of mechanics are, in reality, only conventions. Reichenbach had argued that even 'the geometrical form of a body is no absolute datum of experience' but, he said, is dependent on the conventions involved in measuring space (Reichenbach 1958, p. 18). Einstein himself had argued that the principle that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions is not, as it had always been thought to be, empirically testable, but is true only in virtue of the conventions for measuring space and time. As a student, I found all this pretty heady stuff—much more exciting than the linguistic philosophy that was all the rage in Oxford when I was there.

Conventionalism is, of course, a kind of positivism. For conventionalists would certainly have agreed that for a proposition to tell us anything about the world, its truth or falsity would have to make some observable difference to the world. I certainly thought that. I also thought that if a proposition were true by convention, then this could only be because it was definitional in nature, or a consequence of definitions, or otherwise part of a logical or mathematical system, such as an axiom or theorem. Such propositions were, as we conventionalists used to say, 'factually empty'. But we did not think these factually empty propositions were of no importance. After all, we supposed the propositions of mathematics to be all factually empty, and we had no desire to eliminate mathematics from science. We just thought it was important to distinguish the formal or conventional truths of science from the factual ones, because the conventions could be changed by changing the formal bases of our theories, and/or our coordinating definitions, but the factual truths that we adhered to were empirically certified, and so could not be changed, without sufficient empirical warrant to overthrow that certification.

But this attitude was contrary to the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle. For these philosophers had a different program and employed a different methodology. The Vienna Circle philosophers cast their mission as being the elimination of metaphysics from science. They saw themselves as warriors engaged in a crusade to rid science of the scourge of metaphysics and thus to establish science once and for all on a firm empirical foundation. Their chosen weapon in this crusade was the verificationist theory of meaning, and the banner under which they marched was the slogan: 'The meaning of a statement is the method of its verification'. As an adherent of the older conventionalist school of philosophy, I never had much time for this crusade or for its slogan. Nevertheless, this was the form of positivism that became best known to the English-speaking world. For this was the positivist theory that was most directly concerned with questions of meaning and hence was most in tune with the sort of linguistic philosophy that became fashionable after WWII. The one book on positivism that every student read when I was at Oxford was A.J. Ayer's *Language*, *Truth and Logic* 1936. The falsificationist theory of empirical significance developed by Sir Karl Popper in his *Logik der Forschung* in 1934 was much more plausible to me, as a conventionalist, than Ayer's verificationism. I also preferred his theory of the metaphysical as meaningful, but empirically vacuous. Unfortunately, I did not know the details of Popper's theory as a student, because Popper's book did not appear in English translation until 1959, when it was published as *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*.

Upon my appointment to a lectureship in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science (then called 'History and Methods of Science') at the University of Melbourne, conventionalism became my passion. I worked diligently on the conventionalist program, convinced that Mach's project of distinguishing fact from convention in science was about the most important thing that one could do in the philosophy of science. It was interesting for all of the reasons that I found Mach's, Poincaré's, and Reichenbach's works interesting. And it was important, because whatever is true only by convention must be subject to change. New conventions could obviously yield new insights, as Einstein's STR had so clearly demonstrated.

At the time, I was working pretty much on my own in this area. But I learned a lot from Douglas Gasking. Gasking was a student of Wittgenstein whose writings were a model of clarity and whose methodology was thorough and persuasive. In his essay 'Mathematics and the World', Gasking (1940) defended the conventionalist thesis that one could get along quite well with an arithmetic in which

$$(a\mathrm{x}^{*}b) = ((a+2)\times(b+2))/4,$$

and hence that

$$4\mathrm{x}^{*}6 = 12,$$

provided that one used different techniques for counting and measuring. And what I learned from this paper was a methodology of testing conventionalist claims: if you think that p is conventional, then to prove your point you must be able to show that for some q that is incompatible with p, a theory in which q is presupposed is no less viable empirically than one in which p is presupposed. This was the test that I used in all of my papers on conventionalism written while I was still working in the University of Melbourne's Department of History and Philosophy of Science. It was also the test that I used in my book *Basic Concepts of Measurement* (Ellis 1966). In this period, I never willingly accepted a conventionalist claim, unless I thought I could show that another, empirically no less viable, convention could be adopted in its place.[1]

It needs to be stressed that the conventionalist claims that have been made over the years are not necessarily analyticity claims, although every analyticity claim is ultimately a conventionalist one. For, as every conventionalist since Mach has argued, all conventions worthy of note depend on the existence of abstract theories linked to reality through coordinative definitions, i.e., propositions linking the abstract terms of the theory (e.g., numbers, addition operations, functions) with observables (e.g., spatial or temporal coincidences, meter readings). Adolf Grünbaum calls them 'Riemannian' conventions. These are the propositions that are contained in what Campbell called the 'dictionary' of a theory. But as Campbell had argued in 1921, a pure abstract theory T tells us nothing about the world. It is just an abstract logico-mathematical system. To be informative, he said, there needs to be a dictionary D that links the theoretical terms of T, or perhaps certain functions of these terms, with observables. In the case of analytic propositions of the most trivial kind (such as 'A bachelor is an unmarried man), there is no theory

---

[1] John Fox (2007) has recently convinced me that I did make one serious error of this kind. My 'dinch' scale for the measurement of length leads to inconsistencies, given the way in which I proposed to use it.

T involved, and the convention to name an object or property in one way rather than another is, from a scientific point of view, completely arbitrary. There might be aesthetic reasons or reasons of convenience for naming things as we do, but no good scientific ones. Grünbaum calls all such conventions 'trivial semantic' ones.

In the 1950s, while I was working on conventionalism, many of my colleagues in Philosophy Departments around the country were working on the analytic-synthetic distinction, which had apparently been demolished in W.V.O. Quine's (1953) *From a Logical Point of View*. But I never felt obliged to defend the concept of analyticity against Quine, despite my commitment to conventionalism. For none of the propositions that I argued were conventional could possibly be mistaken for the trivial semantic ones that are thought to be analytic. As Grünbaum and I and most other philosophers of science at the time understood it, analyticity was a problem for 'ordinary language' philosophers, not one for conventionalists.[2] It was not a problem for us, because we were studying scientific practice, not ordinary language. We were concerned with the possibilities of defending alternative $T+D$ (Theory + Dictionary) combinations to account for the same ranges of facts as existing theories. We would, almost all of us, have said that if T_1+D_1 and T_2+D_2 could both adequately explain the same set of facts about the world, and could not in principle be separated experimentally, then it is conventional in the nontrivial Riemannian sense that we should accept T_1+D_1 rather than T_2+D_2, or conversely. And, echoing Reichenbach, what most of us would have said is that 'there is no truth of the matter' whether T_1 or T_2. T_1 might be said to be true given D_1 or T_2 given D_2. But in the absence of the required coordinating definitions, there is no truth to be found.

In developing my conventionalist theories, I worked mostly on my own. For there were very few other philosophers in Australia engaged in the same program. George Schlesinger, who was a graduate student of mine in the late 1950s, was one with whom I could talk about conventionalism, and, among other things, we did some good work together on Moritz Schlick's bizarre claim that there is no fact of the matter whether the universe and everything in it either did or did not double in size overnight. Schlesinger and I thought that there clearly was a fact of the matter in this case, and we set about to prove it. We both argued (Ellis 1963, Schlesinger 1964) that there would be a great many observable consequences of such an occurrence. We argued that even in a Newtonian world, in which space-time would be Euclidean, quantities that vary nonlinearly with length would be differentially affected. And we all know that there are many such quantities. But Grünbaum, the world's most revered defender of conventionalism, would have none of it, and a humorous, but not very enlightening, debate followed in the journals on what became known as 'the nocturnal doubling hypothesis'. Grünbaum (1964, 1967) defended Schlick. Schlesinger (1964, 1967) argued against him.

---

[2] I remember Grünbaum saying to me once something to the effect that 'The analytic-synthetic distinction [i.e., the distinction between what is true in virtue of the meanings of words, and what is not] is one thing, and may well be untenable, but the fact-convention distinction is another, and is absolutely fundamental'.

In 1962–1963, I spent 8 months of my study leave in the Philosophy Department at the University of Pittsburgh, where I was required to teach two courses—one graduate and the other undergraduate. I also worked closely with the philosophers in the Andrew Mellon Center for the Philosophy of Science, where Adolf Grünbaum was the Director and Nicholas Rescher the Deputy Director. As a result of these arrangements, I was thoroughly involved with both teaching and research in philosophy of science in Pittsburgh and found myself working closely with other members of staff in this and other areas. The Department had as good a group of graduate students as you could possibly wish to have. As an added bonus, George Schlesinger was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the centre while I was there. I saw a lot of Bruce Aune, who was a fellow staff member involved in the graduate program, and Brian Skyrms, Ernie Sosa, and Kent Wilson were three of the graduate students that I remember well.

While in Pittsburgh, I wrote a long paper 'On the Origin and Nature of Newton's Laws of Motion' for Robert Colodny's (1965) book, *Beyond the Edge of Certainty*, and defended my conventionalism concerning the law of inertia against all comers. I also finished a paper that I had begun in Melbourne, called 'Universal and Differential Forces', in which I signalled that I no longer accepted some of the more outlandish conventionalist claims that had been made by Reichenbach and others. There was a difference, I thought, between the kind of geometrical conventionalism that Reichenbach and Grünbaum defended and the kind of conventionalist program that Schlesinger and I were pursuing. But, at that time, I had not appreciated just how deep this rift really was. The first clear symptom of this was the seemingly absurd dispute over the nocturnal doubling hypothesis. As I recall, this dispute did not surface while we were in Pittsburgh.[3] It broke with the publication in 1964 of Schlesinger's 'It is False that Overnight Everything has Doubled in Size'. But, even then, I did not understand its full significance. I thought that Schlesinger was obviously right. But I also thought that this was just one of those little in-house disputes that one can expect to find in any philosophical movement. I was wrong, however: it went much deeper than that.

On my return from Pittsburgh, I completed work on my manuscript, *Basic Concepts of Measurement*, and saw it through to publication. At about this time, I began work on the philosophical foundations of STR, which I considered to be a topic that every conventionalist would have to examine at some stage. I was familiar with the views of the Pittsburgh school, but I was not at all sure what my own attitude would be to some of Einstein's more extravagant conventionality claims. I was particularly interested in Einstein's claim that there is really no way of determining whether the speed of light in any one direction in space is the same or different from the one-way speed of light in any other direction. Consequently, we are free to adopt it as a convention that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions. This thesis is known as that of the conventionality of distant simultaneity. In 1965, Peter Bowman, a graduate student from America, came to work with me on the philosophy of space and time, and, in due course, we began to work on this topic. In the following year, I was fortunate to have some very able young philosophers of science in my honours and graduate classes, including John Fox, Greg Hunt, Robert Pargetter, and Barbara Marsh. The paper that Bowman and I eventually published owes a lot to the contributions they all made.

---

[3] My 1963 paper was not published until November of that year.

From Conventionalism to Holism

In the 1920s, in the early days of positivism, philosophers were given to making startling pronouncements, which they defended brilliantly by narrow geometrical conventionalist arguments. Consider, for example, the following propositions:

1. The universe and its contents did not double in size overnight.
2. The sun is a roughly spherical object many times the diameter of the earth.
3. The one-way speed of light in a vacuum is the same in all directions.

These would all appear to be straightforwardly true propositions. But, according to Schlick and Reichenbach, there is no truth of the matter concerning any of them. The last of these claims that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions was held with great conviction to be a mere convention. On this, my conventionalist colleagues had the authority of Einstein himself. It is a fact, Einstein said, that the average speed of light (in vacuo) over an out-and-back path is always the same. But there is no fact of the matter whether the one-way speed of light is always the same. The one-way speed of light, Einstein argued, depends on our definition of simultaneity, which in turn depends on what we assume the one-way speed of light to be. The standard definition makes the speed of light in a vacuum the same in all directions, but, he thought, other definitions that make the speed of light a function of direction could equally well have been chosen.

The arguments for these conventionality claims all have the same form. Each argument points to some preceding definition or definitions, which, it is said, would have to be accepted before any measurements of shape, size, distance, or speed could begin. To measure shape, size, or distance, for example, we must have criteria for determining whether one thing is, or is not, the same size as another, where these things are at different places or exist at different times. But such criteria cannot be established experimentally, because they would have to be accepted before any relevant experimentation could begin. We would need criteria for comparing lengths or time intervals in order to judge whether any proposed new criterion for establishing these relationships is satisfactory.

I do not propose to go into details concerning these arguments. But if you keep asking yourself the question, ‘How could we possibly establish that this is equal in length (or distance) to that, when the objects concerned are not close together in space and time (so that the relationship between them could be directly observed)?’, you will quickly get the idea. For you will soon find yourself arguing in circles and getting nowhere. You will find, for example, that measurements of distance depend on measurements of length, which depend on assumptions about what is fixed in length, which cannot be checked without making further assumptions about lengths or distances. Likewise, if you follow the same lines of questioning, you will find that measurements of speed depend on measurements of distances and travelling times, which depend on assumptions about clocks, which cannot be checked without making other assumptions about distances, clocks, or speeds. Ultimately, say the old-fashioned conventionalists, you cannot break out of any of these circles. You will have to make some decisions somewhere about what you will count as being the same in length, or ticking at the same rate, or occurring at the same time. That is, you will have to make a number of stipulations about these things, and, in the final analysis, the stipulations you make will have to be made on grounds such as those of descriptive simplicity or convenience. Truth does not come into it.

The common assumption of all of these arguments is that our spatial and temporal concepts are purely comparative, i.e., they depend entirely on the procedures we use for comparing these quantities directly. However, I was beginning to think that this assumption must be false. Length and time interval are two of the most basic physical concepts, and there are few physical laws that do not involve one or other of them. Consequently, changes of length or time interval will affect behaviour in a whole lot of different ways and will not only affect the results obtained by direct comparisons of length or time interval. When one object expands relative to another, the effect can be established directly by measurement. But the change of relative size that would be noticeable is not the only effect. There will be hundreds of other effects, depending on how the change of size is brought about. Consequently, even if we could not observe any changes of relative size, it should be perfectly obvious to us that a change of size has occurred. There are, consequently, many good reasons for believing that there has been no catastrophic expansion of the universe overnight and no good reason for believing it has. And, as George Schlesinger and I argued, the hypothesis that the universe and everything in it has doubled in size overnight is not meaningless: it is simply false.

Similarly, it is undeniable that the sun is a roughly spherical object that is many times the diameter of the earth. There may be some ways of measuring what might be called the ‘shapes’ and ‘sizes’ of things, and of comparing them at different places, that yield a different result. But these new ‘shapes’ and ‘sizes’ would not be the ones we need, or could plausibly use, for describing the world. The price of adopting a system of conventions for measuring length (or what will now be called ‘length), according to which the sun is not roughly spherical or is smaller than the earth, would therefore be very great. If, given a new definition of ‘length’, such an undoubted truth as the proposition that the sun is roughly spherical and very much bigger than the earth must be considered to be false, then that definition of ‘length must be unsatisfactory. For this is surely a fact about the world, if anything is.

The realisation, evident in my ‘Universal and Differential Forces’ (1963), that there are such tight constraints as these on what definitions are acceptable was a turning point in my philosophical thinking. For it led to my abandonment of the old conventionalist program and the adoption of a more sophisticated philosophical position. If such constraints exist, I argued, then the definitions we accept are by no means arbitrary. We may, for theoretical purposes, try to define terms that are already in common scientific use. But our acceptance of these definitions must always be tentative, and we should be willing to abandon them, if the price of persevering with them is too high. Any proposed definitions of terms like ‘length’ or ‘time interval’, which are deeply involved in our theoretical understanding of the world, must pass some very severe tests. If a proposed definition would force us to deny what is obviously true, according to accepted theories about the nature of reality, then this definition must be rejected. So, definitions turn out to have a theoretical status not significantly different from other hypotheses. They can be shown to be unsatisfactory, if they can be shown to have clearly unacceptable consequences.

The old conventionalism was based on the belief that there is a clear distinction between what is true as a matter of fact and what is true by definition or convention. But I no longer believed that there was any such clear distinction. So the old conventionalist program of sorting the empirical facts from the conventions in science had to be abandoned. I still thought it was important to be clear about why we should accept or reject the propositions we do. But from now on I would expect there to be a spectrum, ranging from arbitrary definitions at one extreme to hard empirical data at the other. In between, I supposed, there would be the accepted body of scientific theories and hypotheses, for which the evidence would be just more or less compelling.

This change of perspective had many consequences, which I could hardly begin to think through. Firstly, if the body of scientific knowledge is a complex integrated structure of laws and theories that cannot be analysed into propositions that are true by definition or convention (which signal how we are proposing to use language to describe the world) and propositions that are true as a matter of fact (and so, presumably, correspond to reality in some way), then what is the concept of truth that is needed for science? This is a question that I would later take up and return to several times, before reaching an answer that I could feel reasonably happy with.

Secondly, if scientific concepts, like mass, length, charge, and time interval, are not normally definable, except in ways that are already consistent with the laws and theories we accept, then what does this tell us about these concepts? It implies, for one thing, that many of our most important scientific concepts are defined implicitly by their roles in the laws and theories in which they occur. And, if any of these concepts should be defined explicitly, then this explicit definition has no special status. It is, at best, just a tentative agreement to axiomatise or formalise the system in one way, rather than in another. But it remains as open to adjustment in the light of experience as any of a number of other propositions that have not been declared to be true by definition. The stance that I was forced to adopt, therefore, implies a kind of holism about scientific knowledge and understanding. As Quine (1953, p. 42) remarked in his important paper ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’:

> The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions adjustments in the interior of the field... But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single contrary experience.

In 1960, Douglas Gasking, in one of his more Wittgensteinian papers, argued that many of our kind concepts are ‘cluster’ concepts. For many recognisable kinds of things, such as games, exist but have no defining characteristics, i.e., no sets of characteristics that would distinguish them from things of other kinds. They are, he argued, defined only by the overlapping clusters of characteristics by which they might be identified. In 1962, Hilary Putnam argued that many of the quantitative concepts of science are also cluster concepts of a sort. Where two or more different kinds of procedures for measuring a quantity exist, and these procedures (when properly carried out) are guaranteed by the laws of nature to yield the same results, no one of them can be singled out as defining the measure of the quantity. For this would be tantamount to making one of the laws involving the quantity true by definition, and all of the others true only as matters of fact (which would be arbitrary). Putnam (1962) argued that where a quantity might equally well be defined in any of a number of different ways, depending on which law is chosen to define it, what we have is a ‘law cluster’ concept.

The movement towards Quinean holism, and hence away from the empiricist distinction between facts and conventions, was certainly in the air by 1962 and was gathering strength. So I cannot claim any great originality for my belated discovery of this basic flaw in the foundations of conventionalism. In fact, as a committed conventionalist until the mid-1960s, I was rather slow off the mark. Perhaps this was because measurement theory, on which I had been chiefly engaged for many years, is one of the few areas in which the distinction often seems to be both clear and justified. But Quine’s attack on the assumptions of conventionalism had hardly touched the philosophy of science establishment in America, which remained as wedded to the empirical fact-convention distinction as it had ever been. And this was the source of our disagreement with Grünbaum about the nocturnal doubling hypothesis. It would also prove to be the source of the much more virulent disagreement with the American philosophy of science establishment that arose later about conventionality in distant simultaneity.

For my honours and graduate class in philosophy of science in 1966, we decided to look at the alleged conventionality of distant simultaneity. This particular conventionality claim had been made originally by Einstein and was argued for at length by Reichenbach. The thesis was very widely accepted by philosophers of science, and it had become something of a cornerstone of conventionalist theory. According to Reichenbach’s analysis, there are no empirically establishable facts about the one-way speed of light other than those that are already implied by the fact that its speed (*in vacuo*) over any out-and-back path is always the same. For there is no way of defining distant simultaneity that does not already depend on what assumptions we make about the one-way speed of light. This was argued specifically by Reichenbach. But I was sceptical. If it is not a matter of fact that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions, but is just a consequence of a decision to define distant simultaneity in such a way as to make it so, then we should be able to vary that decision and construct what is plausibly still a reasonable definition of simultaneity that makes the one-way speed of light a function of, say, direction. That this could be done had never been demonstrated.

We proceeded, in accordance with normal procedure, to consider the possibility of constructing a version of the STR that would be equivalent to the STR empirically, but based on a different convention regarding the one-way speed of light. We put certain constraints on the definitions of distant simultaneity that would be acceptable, some formal and some empirical. Firstly, we argued, it should be consistent with all of the known facts about light signals: the average speed of light over any out-and-back path must be a constant c. Secondly, it must be causally consistent: signals should not be able to arrive at their destinations before they are sent. Thirdly, it must satisfy certain formal requirements. In particular, the relationship of simultaneity that is defined must be formally an equivalence relationship, i.e., one that is reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. The standard signal definition of synchrony, according to which the one-way speed of light between any two objects A and B is at rest in a given inertial system, clearly satisfies all of these requirements. The question is: Are there any others? To simplify the question, we chose to consider whether it would be possible to construct a formal definition of synchrony which made the one-way speed of light a continuous function of direction—one that is symmetrical about the X-axis of a rectangular coordinate system. We proved that there is indeed a way of doing just this.

Let $e_\theta = {}^1\!/_2\left({}^c\!/_{c_\theta}\right)$, where c_θ is the speed of light in the direction θ from the X-axis. Then, demonstrably, the various requirements on a non-standard signal synchrony relationship in a given inertial system are satisfied, if

$$e_\theta \ = \ \left(e_\theta - {}^1\!/_2\right)\cos\theta + {}^1\!/_2,$$

where $(0 \leq e_0 \leq 1)$.

We called this 'the distribution law for light velocities' (Ellis and Bowman 1967). So, we concluded, the conventionality thesis passes the first test. Next, we considered whether we could use this definition in the standard way to derive a non-standard version of the STR. But we were able to prove that this would require a sacrifice. In deriving the Lorentz transformation equations from the standard signal definition of synchrony, it is normally assumed that (1) a uniform straight line motion in any one inertial system always appears as a uniform straight line motion from the perspective of any other inertial system (we called this the 'principle of linearity') and (2) the velocity of A with respect to B as measured by B must always be minus the velocity of B with respect to A as measured by A (we called this the 'principle of reciprocity of relative velocities'). John McPhee, a Melbourne mathematician who helped us on this project, proved that if these two assumptions are added as requirements on a non-standard signal synchrony definition, then no such definition is possible. The only possible one that would preserve both linearity and reciprocity is the standard one. Moreover, if we were prepared to pay this price, then we should be faced with other difficulties. For acceptance of any non-standard definition of signal synchrony would require us to postulate the existence of universal forces to explain what we must then suppose to be the odd behaviour of slowly transported clocks.

(They would be found to get out of synchrony as they are moved apart but would come back into synchrony as they are brought back together again).

Thus, we discovered, after we had already done most of the work of testing Einstein's conventionality claim, that his original justifying reason for making this claim in the first place is simply false. For there is, contrary to what Einstein and Reichenbach say, a way of synchronising widely separated clocks without making any prior assumptions about the one-way speed of light. Given the STR, it is demonstrable that clocks can, in principle, always be synchronised (to any desired degree of precision) in any inertial system just by moving a standard clock around sufficiently slowly and synchronising all other clocks in the reference frame with this standard. The method is known as that of 'slow clock transport'. There is no dispute about this: it is a clear and unequivocal prediction of the STR that this can be done. And, as we later discovered, the method had already been described by P.W. Bridgman in his little book, *A Sophisticate's Primer of Relativity* (1962). There is, therefore, a perfectly good way of measuring the one-way speed of light empirically, viz., by Römer's method, using Jupiter's moons as clocks, and measuring the times of successive occultations and re-emergences (Jupiter's moons being, effectively, slowly transported clocks). Moreover, this method enables us to measure the one-way speed of light in many different directions in space (depending on the direction of Jupiter from earth). And the empirical finding is that, to a high degree of precision, the one-way speed of light is the same in all of these different directions.

We published these results in 1967 in *Philosophy of Science*. The paper produced a strong reaction. Most of the March 1969 issue of *Philosophy of Science* was given over to what can only be described as a concerted attack on our paper by three of the leading philosophers of science in America (Grünbaum, et al. 1969), viz., Adolf Grünbaum, Wesley Salmon, and Bas van Fraassen, all of whom were in Pittsburgh at the time. Their papers made up the bulk of an 81-page 'Panel discussion of simultaneity by slow clock transport in the special and general theories of relativity'. Included in this panel discussion was also a paper by the physicist Allen Janis, which dealt with the possibility of using slow clock transport as a way of synchronising clocks in non-inertial frames, i.e., systems of a kind that can only be described adequately using the apparatus of the General Theory of Relativity. This was not an attack on our paper, however, since the more general question is not one that we considered, and was not relevant to the point we were making.

I did not mind the attack. In fact, I thought it was all good fun. John Fox and I were the two people most concerned with the issue who were still working in Melbourne, Peter Bowman having returned to America. It was obvious to us that the Pittsburgh Panel had misunderstood, and systematically misrepresented, our philosophical position. And for a long time I wondered why. The panel had no quarrel with our understanding of the STR, or with what we took to be its factual basis, or with any of our proofs concerning the theory's implications. The main argument was with our claim that there are 'good physical reasons' for preferring a definition of simultaneity that makes the one-way speed of light always the same. But what is wrong with that? Isn't the existence of a coincidence of at least two logically independent, isotropic, and formally satisfactory criteria for distant simultaneity, and the absence of any comparable reasons for adopting any other possible criterion, good reason enough? And isn't it an empirical fact, one establishable by observation and experiment, that such a coincidence of isotropic criteria exists? If so, then surely there are good physical reasons for adopting such a criterion. What was all the fuss about?

The fuss was all about conventionalism itself. The dispute about the conventionality of distant simultaneity was not just one about the status of Einstein's definition; it was about a core doctrine of the conventionalist program. If this conventionality claim were agreed to be lacking in substance, as Bowman and I had argued, then the program of conventionalism must itself be discarded as lacking in substance. The trouble, although I was not fully aware of it at the time, was that I had ceased to think as a conventionalist. I spoke and understood the language of conventionalism, but I was thinking as a Quinean holist.

My new way of thinking is well illustrated by the following passage taken from my reply to the Pittsburgh Panel:

> There is no foundation of hard empirical fact in science, only a choice between competing theories and conceptual frameworks, which, at any given time, seem adequate for the description and prediction of events. Any theoretical statement which occurs in any theory may come to be rejected if a better or more promising theory comes to replace it, and it is simply irrelevant whether the statement in question is, relative to some particular axiomatisation of the theory, definitional or not. The conventional-empirical distinction, as it has come to be used, has been a plague on the philosophy of science since the rise of Positivism. (Ellis 1971, p. 199)

Fox and I completed our replies and sent them to *Philosophy of Science*. But the editor of the journal rejected them. It was not because they were not up to standard, he explained, but because 'too much journal space had already been occupied by the issue'.

Scientific Epistemology

In 1962 Thomas Kuhn published *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, a book that had a profound effect on our understanding of scientific method. For the logical empiricists, the method of science was thought to be essentially inductive. Hence, for them, the problems of induction, and of inductive logic, were the main ones in scientific epistemology. But there was another very different view of scientific method that had not, as yet, had much impact in the English-speaking world. This was Sir Karl Popper's anti-inductivist methodology of conjectures and refutations. Popper did not share the logical empiricists' view that verifiability is the hallmark of empirical significance. So, he had no interest in trying to show that the laws and theories of science are true or even probable. On the contrary, he argued that what distinguishes science from non-science is the falsifiability of its laws and theories. So, he argued, scientists should not be seeking to confirm their theories. Rather, they should always expose them to falsification as much as possible in their pursuit of knowledge. If their laws and theories are corroborated, i.e., pass severe enough tests, then they may be provisionally accepted. Otherwise, they must be rejected.

But Kuhn's book challenged both methodologies. Normal science, i.e., the kind of scientific work that most scientists are involved in most of the time, involves commitment to a program that satisfies the broad parameters of what he calls a 'research paradigm'. And the aim of scientists working within such a paradigm is to show what it can do. Their aim is not to refute the main tenets of the theoretical stance they have taken (as Popper thought it should be), but to articulate the position, with the aim of showing how, consistently with these tenets, it can be adapted to deal with the outstanding problems of the area. So, Kuhn's methodology of normal science was not Popperian. It was not inductivist either, although, naturally, the more successful a research program was at handling the empirical data, and solving the problems that fell within its ambit, the more highly it was regarded. Empiricists thought that science required a theoretically neutral observation language as a foundation for their work. But normal science operated under no such constraints. It was research that proceeded from an overall position that interpreted the data, defined the main problems of the area, and explained how one should go about trying to solve them and what would constitute a satisfactory solution. Within this theoretical framework, normal science was discovery oriented, but the soundness of the framework was seen to depend on its problem-solving ability, not on the inductive evidence for it or on the severity of the tests that it had passed.

Kuhn argued that scientific revolutions are paradigm shifts that are normally brought about by paradigm failures. When a research program gets into difficulties, he argued, scientists working in the area begin to explore other ways of conceptualising the data and thinking about its problems. And, when they begin to do this, he said, the science enters an abnormal phase. New ideas are thrown around, and the tenets of the old program are cast into doubt. Of course, one cannot create a new paradigm overnight. One has to work at it and gather colleagues around one to develop new ideas. And, typically, one will see the development of different schools of thought, each seeking better ways of understanding and researching the troubled area. The methodology of abnormal science is thus very different from that of normal science. It is much more philosophical and reflective, and the results are much harder to evaluate, because, in the area affected, there is no longer any general agreement about how the data should be read, or what it shows, and there may not even be agreement about what the main problems are, or what would constitute solving them. Consequently, defenders of different paradigms will often misunderstand and talk past each other. Where this happens, Kuhn argued, the problem may be one of incommensurability, i.e., the different perspectives on the world may be so different that they do not have even a common observation language.

But the Popperians at the London School of Economics (LSE) did not take this attack on their position lying down, and Imré Lakatos and his colleagues took up the challenge. Lakatos had earlier extended Popper's methodology into the field of mathematics in his seminal papers of (1963–1964) entitled *Proofs and Refutations* and showed clearly how counterexamples to alleged proofs could (and did) lead to the development of new concepts and theories. But despite the attractiveness of Popper's scientific methodology, and Lakatos' extension of it into the field of mathematics, Popperians really had no answer to Kuhn's methodology of normal science. It was clearly conservative of core doctrines, in a way that Popper's own methodology of conjectures and refutations was not. If the experimental evidence seems to contradict the theory that is being used to make predictions, about all that one can say is that something is wrong somewhere. It might be in the observations that are being made, or in the theory of the instrumentation involved, or in any of the many subsidiary hypotheses made in the design of the experiment, or in the more frustrating cases, it may be supposed that there must be unknown forces (e.g., due to dark matter) or extraordinary processes (e.g., that of global inflation) occurring, whose mechanisms are as yet unknown. Lakatos was, in fact, very familiar with some of the many strategies that can be used to deal with counterevidence, as he demonstrated in *Proofs and Refutations*, and some of them, such as those of 'monster barring' and 'monster adjustment', are often referred to in philosophical literature on subjects other than the philosophy of mathematics. Lakatos' (1970) considered reply to Kuhn's critique is to be found in his major paper on the methodology of scientific research programs.

In 1972 I was fortunate enough to be able to spend a period of study leave in London and work with the exciting group of philosophers of science there, particularly those at the LSE. I found myself torn between the Popperians and the Kuhnians. I liked Popper's forthright anti-inductivism, but was enough of a historian to think that the methodology of science was not so rigidly falsificationist, or tied to the project of increasing the empirical content of our theories, as Popper had supposed. I thought it was to increase our understanding of the world, although I have to admit that I did not have a very clear idea of what that involved. The 'conjectures' part of Popper's methodology might well be the mechanism of growth, I thought. But the 'refutations' part of it was manifestly inadequate. It would be more accurate to speak of a methodology of 'conjectures, articulation, development, and testing'. But somehow it does not have quite the same ring to it. Kuhn, on the other hand, was historically well informed and honest in his reporting of scientific methodology. But Kuhn's theory provided no simple answer to the question of method. As a Quinean holist, I was inclined to think that this was as it should be and that the important features of scientific belief systems are their explanatory power, elegance, rational coherence, and general compatibility with observational and experimental evidence, not how they were arrived at. Presumably, scientific method would have to be one that was guided by our epistemic values and which allowed a good deal of latitude in the making and development of scientific hypotheses.

At the time of my visit to LSE, I was working on a paper I called the 'Epistemic Foundations of Logic'. In fact, by 1971, I had drafted a book with this title and sent copies of it to colleagues at home and overseas for comment. This project was based on the following assumptions: (1) logic is, or ought to be, part of the general theory of rational coherence. For the logic of the truth and falsity claims that can be made in a given formal language L is just the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the rational coherence of any subset of such claims. (2) The logic of subjective probability is, likewise, part of the general theory of rational coherence. For the logic of the subjective probability claims that can be made in a given formal language L is just the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the rational coherence of any subset of such claims. (3) The logic of truth and falsity claims is derivable from that of subjective probability simply by restricting the range of possible subjective probability values to 1 and 0. It is demonstrable, for example, that the set of all valid formulae of the propositional calculus is the set of all propositional formulae Z such that $P(Z) = 1$ is a theorem of the probability calculus. I called this 'the logical correspondence principle'.

My aim was to use the logical correspondence principle, and the full apparatus of the probability calculus, to derive a much more comprehensive system of logic than any that had so far been developed. The classical propositional calculus corresponds to just the absolute fragment of the probability calculus. But what was needed, I thought, was a propositional calculus with an 'if' connective that corresponds to the 'given' operator in an enhanced probability theory. For it seemed to me that this would be a much better way of representing conditionals formally than the usual one using the material conditional. But there were two major problems to overcome. (1) $P(q/p)$ is undefined, if $P(p) = 0$. That is, there was a problem of how to deal with counterfactual conditionals. (2) $P(r/(q/p))$ and $P((r/q)/p)$ are undefined in the probability calculus. That is, nested conditionals are undefined in the probability calculus. But, as far as I could see, the probability calculus worked well as a system of logic, provided that there were no counterfactual or nested conditionals. And, I could see no reason why an augmented probability calculus with counterfactual and nested conditionals could not be developed. It was my project to do just that.

My manuscript 'Epistemic Foundations of Logic' was never published. Robert Stalnaker (1968) had done much better than I had in developing a logic of the required kind with strong conditionals. I suppose that Stalnaker's theory could also have been used to derive a probability calculus with counterfactual and nested conditionals, although I have never seen this idea explored. Such a logic was needed, I argued, because the material conditional was a manifestly inadequate representation of 'if…then', especially within the context of a probability claim. The only plausible representation of 'if', I argued, was the conditionalisation operator '/'. But my own logical system based on this identification, which I had hoped would prove to be infinitely many valued, proved not to be. I had a proof that it was at least 4-valued. But that did not count for much. David Lewis wrote to me with his famous triviality proof and showed that it was at most 4-valued. So, in the end, I just gave up. I had been gazumped in doing what I had hoped to do and proven wrong about what I had done. Possible worlds semantics was indeed a powerful tool, which Lewis and Stalnaker used to considerable advantage in constructing their modal and conditional logics. But I did not believe in merely possible worlds, and at the time I had nothing to put in their place. I did not even have a theory of why possible worlds semantics worked as well as they did. I now think I know. But it was not until I had written *Rational Belief Systems* that I could identify clearly the equivalents of possible worlds in my meta-logical framework. The equivalent of a merely possible world in my meta-logic is just a world that would correspond to a kind of rationally completed belief system, if everything believed to be true in it was indeed true (Ellis 1979, Chap. 3).

Scientific Realism

In 1963 Smart published his important book *Philosophy and Scientific Realism*. This book is important in the history of Australian philosophy for a number of reasons. Firstly, it represented a significant change in emphasis in Smart's own philosophy, from one of conceptual clarification to one of seeking a more comprehensive understanding of the world. When he first arrived in Australia in 1950, he brought the Oxford conception of philosophy with him and so tended to see philosophy as a form of intellectual therapy, as a clearing up of muddles created by common misunderstandings of ordinary language. Something of this same attitude also existed in Melbourne's Department of Philosophy, where the influence of Wittgenstein was supreme. Sydney had long had a very different tradition, due to the charismatic influence of John Anderson, who was a realist of sorts. Smart's book on scientific realism (1963) was not in the Andersonian tradition, but it was a clear break with the Cambridge/Cambridge one of ordinary language philosophy and was a significant attempt to elaborate a new worldview. Secondly, the book bridged the gap between Cambridge philosophy and Sydney realism and helped to end the dominance of Melbourne philosophy. It also did much to define the nature of Australian philosophy. Following the publication of this book, Australian philosophy was often referred to overseas as 'Australian materialism', and the scientific realism that characterised it was often thought of as a 'down to earth', 'no nonsense' sort of philosophy that was based on a layman's understanding of the science of our times, which is what *Philosophy and Scientific Realism* was.

The publication of Smart's book also marked the beginning of an Australia-wide shift away from the philosophical method that was characterised by Richard Rorty (1967) as 'the linguistic turn'. For few of the arguments in this book were ones that could possibly have been defended in ordinary language philosophy or by arguments that depended primarily on semantic analyses. On the contrary, arguments from considerations of meaning would seem to count decisively against Smart's basic thesis of mind/brain identity. The book was concerned primarily with what there is, not with what our linguistic practices may presuppose there is. In what follows, I wish to say something about how this played out and led to the kind of scientific metaphysics that now dominates the philosophy of science in Australia.

For my part, I found Smart's scientific realism to be compatible with my generally physicalist outlook. I was no longer anti-realist—if, indeed, I ever was. My main concerns about Smart's scientific realism were (1) that the identity theory, i.e., the theory identifying sensations with brain processes, did not give an adequate account of the qualities of our sense experiences (the qualia) and (2) that his theory accepted theoretical entities too indiscriminately. I addressed the first of these two concerns in my essay on ‘Physicalism and the Contents of Sense Experience’ (Ellis 1975). My other main concern about Smart’s scientific realism was its casualness in attributing reality to theoretical entities. Smart admitted that some of the theoretical entities of science, such as lines of force, are fictions. But, in general, his attitude appeared to be that we should believe in whatever the scientists do—at least in their capacity as scientists. While being sympathetic to this attitude, I thought we should be a bit more discriminating.

My starting point for developing a more discriminating scientific realism was the Maxwell-Bridgman theory of the real as that which may have several different kinds of effects. If, for example, a theoretical entity such as a field of force is postulated, then the question of whether it is real is just that of whether it is capable of manifesting itself in any way other than as a field of force. That is, does it have any kinds of properties other than those it has by definition? If not, then it is fictional, and, ontologically, it would be better to accept action at a distance (as Bridgman said in 1925). Or, we may ask, are Newtonian forces real? Must we admit them into our ontology just because scientists generally seem to believe in them? As one who had written extensively on the subject, I thought not. For Newtonian forces cannot do anything other than have the kinds of effects they are defined as having, and nothing other than a Newtonian force is capable of having just these kinds of effects. So such forces fail the Maxwell-Bridgman test.

In 1976 I published a paper entitled ‘The Existence of Forces’, in which I developed independent criteria for physical reality. In that paper, I argued that mass-energy appeared to be the defining characteristic of the physically real. A physical object, for example, is anything that has mass-energy. A physical event is any change of energy distribution in the universe. A physical causal process is any causally connected sequence of physical events. A physical property is any property that makes a difference to some physical causal process. But forces, as they are understood in Newtonian physics, are none of these things. For they do not have energy, do not, in virtue of their existence, involve any change of energy distribution in the universe, are not physical causal processes, and are not physical properties. So, if they are physical entities at all, then they are *sui generis* physical entities. I was more inclined to believe that Newtonian forces simply do not exist and argued that there were a number of independent reasons for holding this.

This theory of the physically real is the one I had in mind when I remarked rather cryptically in *Rational Belief Systems* that I was a ‘scientific entity realist’. I did not believe, as most of my colleagues evidently did, that scientific laws are just empirical generalisations that are true in some naïve correspondence sense. For I thought that laws were mostly universal counterfactual conditionals, i.e., statements of the form: ‘If anything were an X in circumstances of the kind K, then X would do Y’. But if laws really do have this form, then any analysis of their truth conditions will require reference to sets of possible worlds. And, since I did not believe in possible worlds other than this one, I did not believe that any such statements could be understood simply as descriptive of reality. Rather, I thought that, in some sense, the laws must be understood as describing the underlying structure of the world.

I did not, at that time, have a very clear idea of how the phrase ‘the underlying structure of the world’ should be understood. I was sure, however, that it could not reasonably be understood as referring only to the most convenient, or even the axiomatically most elegant, approximation to the truth. For if this were what laws of nature were, they would be less fundamental ontologically than the messy facts or crude empirical laws they allegedly explained. But, in any case, I did not think that I had to believe in this absurdity to be a scientific realist. I thought it would be enough if one just believed in the reality of those theoretical entities that passed the Maxwell-Bridgman test for reality (Bridgman, 1927). For the only respectable theoretical entities that failed this test were things such as numbers, sets, forces, geometrical points, perfectly reversible heat engines, and ideal incompressible fluids in steady flow in uniform gravitational fields. And these all seemed to me to be things that no good scientific realist ever seriously believed in.

The major challenges to scientific realism that surfaced in the early 1980s created some heated discussion. Laudan’s historical argument (Laudan, 1981) that the laws and theories of the mature sciences are probably not true, and, in many cases, not even approximately so, created problems for those scientific realists who had based their case for realism on the success of science in making the world more predictable. But I will not have anything much to say about this dispute, for it does not deal with the main issue. The main issue is how scientific theories are to be understood. Should they be understood primarily as more or less useful instruments for prediction? Or should they be understood as attempts to describe the underlying reality, on which what is seen to happen in the world ultimately depends? Predictive success does provide an argument for realism, because the simplest explanation for it would be just that the proposed laws and theories are true of the underlying structures of the world. But realism concerning our understanding of the aims of science could survive on quite a modest degree of predictive success. For all that is required for the belief that the scientific picture of reality is the most rational one to accept is that it should be better at predicting what will happen than any other picture. And this, I am sure, has been the case for centuries.

Van Fraassen’s philosophical challenge to scientific realism was more to the point, although it was, essentially, just a revival of Duhem’s empiricism. Duhem (1914/1954) thought that the aim of science is necessarily limited to describing the world as it appears to us, i.e., to what Kant calls ‘the empirical world’, and to synthesising our knowledge of it, e.g., by making logico-mathematical models of the observable things or processes. Like Van Fraassen, Duhem believed in the existence of a transcendental reality, i.e., a world beyond appearances that is the real world. But, like many before him, he argued that it is not the task of science to reveal the nature of this reality. That is the task of metaphysics, he said.

Van Fraassen (1980) thought the same. Science, he stated, can never do anything more than 'give us theories which are empirically adequate', and, therefore, acceptance of a theory should never do anything more than 'involve as belief that it is empirically adequate' (p. 12). Van Fraassen's theory was clearly at odds with the philosophies of many of the later positivists, for he did not deny the existence of a transcendental world that science is incapable of describing. In an essay entitled 'What Science Aims To Do', written for a volume of essays on Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, I argued for the pragmatic thesis that 'Science aims to provide the best possible scientific account of natural phenomena, and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it belongs to such an account' (Churchland et al. 1985, p. 169).

In retrospect, I think that Duhem, Van Fraassen, and I were all wrong about what science could tell us about the world. Duhem and Van Fraassen were both wrong in thinking that science itself could tell us nothing about the world, other than what accounts of reality are empirically adequate. Science does much more than this: it selects and endorses the best of the empirically most adequate accounts. And the best of these accounts are, for reasons I gave in (Ellis, 1957), normally process theories. I argued then that if the explanations that these theories offer are sound, then they tell us more than their non-process equivalents. They do so by making it possible to establish links between theories that would otherwise not be linked. And, by establishing these links, they increase the connectivity of our knowledge in ways that non-process theories generally cannot match. As I said in my contribution to the Van Fraassen volume, realistic process theories increase the field of evidence for a theory, e.g., by allowing cross-theoretic identifications. As a result, evidence for or against one theory may become evidence for or against another that is linked to it theoretically. To illustrate, the null result of the Michelson-Morley experiment, which was designed to detect differences in the speed of light in different directions, counted decisively against Newton's absolute theory of space and time. But Newton's theory itself had *nothing whatever* to say about the speed of light. It was a system of dynamics for corporeal bodies. The relevance of the Michelson-Morley experiment was due to certain cross-theoretical linkages (viz., between the Newtonian concept of absolute space and the nineteenth-century one of the luminiferous ether).

But I too was wrong about what science can tell us about the world. I had thought that the envisaged scientific worldview would include all of the knowledge that it was possible to have about reality, and so I left no place in my epistemology for any kind knowledge of reality other than scientific knowledge. I did not believe, for instance, that our understanding of the world could be increased by metaphysical speculation. On the contrary, I thought that all such speculation was pretentious. But I no longer think that this is so. On the contrary, I would now say, metaphysics has the same kind of role in improving our knowledge and understanding of the world as scientific theorising. Its methods are not those of the empirical sciences. Metaphysical inquiries can, nevertheless, increase the connectedness of our knowledge and hence contribute usefully to the project of seeking the truth (in both the epistemic and metaphysical senses of this word).

Scientific Metaphysics

Science is limited by what scientists are able to do. In practice, it is restricted by lack of resources, failure to make the required observations, the intellectual limitations of scientists, and in other ways. But let us imagine a world in which all such limitations have been overcome, as if by magic, and let us call the theory of the natural world that science would ideally deliver in such a world 'the scientific worldview'. Then, plausibly, this worldview has some claim to be considered the true one—the one at which we should aim. For, by definition, this is the view of reality that would rationally be accepted on the basis of the best and most comprehensive set of observations that human beings could possibly make. Nevertheless, most philosophers would probably say that even this ideal scientific worldview might not be true. There might be parts of reality that we cannot ever know about. Or, we might, either by accident or design, be systematically deceived about the nature of reality. Or, perhaps, we are just not biologically programmed in the right sort of way to discover the objective truth about the world—even in ideal circumstances. We can, no doubt, discover by scientific investigation many of the things that we (i.e., we human beings) ought rationally to believe and rule out a great many things that it would ultimately be irrational for us to believe. So, even if there are limits to what it is possible for scientists to discover, the aim of discovering all and only those things that it would, in ideal circumstances, be rational for us to believe about the world would seem to be a plausible objective of scientific inquiry.

For many years I assumed that these doubts about the limits of science were not well founded and reflected badly on the metaphysical theory of truth that gave rise to them. Consequently, I accepted the pragmatist theory that identifies truth with what it would ideally be rational to believe and called myself an 'internal realist', as others before me had done. I embraced this position, because the empiricist in me identified science with rational inquiry about the nature of reality. I did not believe that there was any other kind of rational inquiry about reality that could take over where science left off or that scientific knowledge was essentially limited in any way. There might be a theory of science, a logic of science, or an inquiry into the language of science, or into the various kinds of concepts employed in science. But these inquiries were not, I thought, continuations of the scientific quest to understand the nature of reality. They were just meta-scientific inquiries, i.e., inquiries about the nature of scientific inquiry, which philosophers of science were at least as well equipped as anyone else to undertake. The idea that one could continue the inquiry into the nature of reality by rational means that were not essentially scientific was one that struck me as preposterous. It would be better to abandon the concept of truth as a metaphysical correspondence relationship. I was reinforced in this stance by my conviction that what I called 'the metaphysical concept' was not required for any of the purposes of logic. In *Rational Belief Systems*, I demonstrated that the standard deductive logics, including all of the quantified, modal, and conditional ones, could all be founded adequately in a theory of rationality. No semantic concept of truth is required for this purpose, just some more or less self-evident principles of rationality based on a conception of truth as epistemic rightness.

In retrospect, I now recognise that it was a mistake to abandon the metaphysical concept of truth. For there are important questions about the nature of reality that cannot, even in principle, be resolved by the methods of science. But I did not see this at the time. Analytic philosophy, which dominated twentieth-century philosophy of science, was largely the attempt to explain the nature and structure of scientific laws, theories, and explanations and to specify empirically adequate truth conditions for the various kinds of claims that scientists make in expressing their conclusions. These inquiries were not scientific ones. They were just attempts to understand better the work that scientists do and the nature of their achievements. This does not necessarily make them metaphysical inquiries of the sort that I thought were pretentious. But they did presuppose theories of knowledge and understanding that were not themselves scientific findings. They depended, for example, on Frege's conception of logic as the theory of truth preservation. According to Frege's theory, arguments are valid if and only if there is no possible world in which their premises are true and their conclusions false. Therefore, it was argued, if we are to understand any statement sufficiently for all of the purposes of logic, it is necessary to know the truth conditions of its premises and conclusion in all possible worlds.

These inquiries also depended on the acceptance of certain paradigms of knowledge and understanding. In the early days of logical positivism, basic observation statements, e.g., the statement that the object A has the characteristic C (where A and C are both directly observable), were held to be both transparently clear and knowable. Therefore, any statement of truth conditions acceptable to the generation or so of philosophers of science involved in the positivist program of analysis would have to have been a simple truth function of basic observation statements. The statements of the analysans were required to be both formally adequate and empirically ascertainable, i.e., ones that could in principle be discovered to be true or false directly by observation. In practice, however, such analyses were rarely attempted. Usually, it was thought to be enough if formulae for producing such analyses could be specified. How, for example, was a statement of the form 'A causes B' to be analysed? What, in general, are the empirically adequate truth conditions for such statements? Most philosophers of science were convinced by Hume's arguments that no such statements could ever be accepted as truly basic, i.e., as atomic propositions. Therefore, the attempt had to be made to discover their empirically adequate truth conditions.

But propositions attributing causal connections were not the only problematic ones for the logical positivists. Counterfactual conditionals describing the ways in which ideal objects would behave in certain possible circumstances were also problematic. So also were propositions assigning causal powers, capacities, or objective probabilities to things. And what were logical positivists to make of the physical necessities and possibilities that evidently do exist in nature? According to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, it is impossible to build a perpetual motion machine (of the second kind). What are the empirical truth conditions for this statement? Indeed, what are the truth conditions for ‘X is a law of nature’? A great deal of work went into trying to answer these questions. However, answers acceptable to the logical positivists were not to be found. Consequently, their program of empirical analysis was largely abandoned in favour of one of semantic analysis, which was much less demanding. Semantic analysts still looked for formally adequate truth conditions, but they abandoned the requirement of empirical adequacy that logical positivists had formerly insisted upon.

To accept the semantic analyses of modals and conditionals of the sorts that have been widely used in philosophical logic since the 1960s, it seemed necessary to accept that the truth or falsity of such propositions depends not only on what there is in the actual world but also on what exists in other possible worlds and on how these other possible worlds are related to the actual one. It is possible to think of this theory as just a formal model that happens to be useful for developing logics of modals and conditionals. But to do so would be to deprive the semantic theory of any explanatory power. If the model has no basis in reality, why be guided by it? David Lewis and his many followers in Australia all boldly accepted realism about possible worlds. That is, they embraced the idea that the actual world—the one we happen to inhabit—is just one of an infinity of possible worlds, all of which are real. Moreover, they accepted that these possible worlds all exist necessarily. And, having accepted this incredible thesis, they had to suppose that the truth or falsity of modal and counterfactual conditional propositions couldn’t in general depend only on what exists in the actual world. In most cases, they are required to say that the truth or falsity of a modal or conditional depends on what there is in other possible worlds and on how these other worlds are related to this one.

For me, there are no real possible worlds other than the actual one. But there are many more or less rational belief systems concerning it, and, using the theory of rational belief systems, we can easily construct ideally rational belief systems that have just the kinds of properties we seek. For example, if we wish to consider an ideally rational belief system that is as much like our own limited one as we can make it, but in which p is accepted as true, then we may easily do so, even if we ourselves believe that not-p. And, we may then use the theory of rational belief systems to determine whether q could rationally be denied in such a system. If not, then, according to the theory, the conditional ‘$p \Rightarrow q$’ must rationally be accepted by us as true. In general, to found a satisfactory propositional logic or predicate calculus, or to introduce modal operators and conditional connectives into a logical system, all one needs to do is develop appropriate axiom systems for rational belief systems on languages that have the relevant structures, and, effectively, to define the connectives and operators by the acceptability conditions for propositions that include them. Thus, acceptability conditions can replace truth conditions in the foundations of logic, and ideally completed rational belief systems can replace possible worlds in the theories of modals and conditionals. The only price one has to pay for this is that one has to abandon the implausible idea that logic is the theory of truth preservation. It is not: it is, both intuitively and in reality, just a basic part of the theory of rational belief systems.

In developing the theory of rational belief systems, I approached the question of how people ought rationally to think about the world as I imagined a scientist would. I was fully aware that ordinary human belief systems are incomplete, messy, confused, and contradictory and that human reasoning is often fallacious. Indeed, it is not just fallacious in random ways, but systematically so, as cognitive psychologists have convincingly shown. Nevertheless, there appear to be certain underlying patterns of human thought and reasoning that are universal. And, I thought that these deep structures might be used to construct a model-theoretic ideal of human rationality. It is, after all, standard scientific practice to look for such patterns and, where possible, to use them like this for such purposes. The resulting scientific theory, I argued, is one that enables us to develop epistemological foundations for all of the standard logical systems. So, as a theory, it was highly successful. But despite the success of this project, I found myself becoming increasingly isolated philosophically. No one else, to my knowledge, ever accepted that the theory of rational belief systems provides an adequate foundation for standard logical theory. Yet, this thesis was not refuted in the literature or even much criticised. In fact, it was all but ignored. Philosophers went on believing in real but non-actual possible worlds or that someone would someday tell them what these theoretical entities really are, without them having to give up on the Fregean conception of logic as the theory of truth preservation. The main influence that the theory of rational belief systems had in philosophy was just that it served as a springboard for the development of theories of the dynamics of belief. Peter Forrest (1986) and Peter Gärdenfors (1984) led the way in this area.

I was also more or less alone in Australia in defending the theory of truth as epistemic rightness. Richard Rorty liked this theory and wrote to me after the publication of my paper (Ellis, 1970) ‘Truth as a Mode of Evaluation’ to congratulate me. But most Australians were wedded to the idea of truth as a semantic relationship, i.e., a relationship between words and the world. For this was the theory of truth they thought a realist would just have to accept. Nevertheless, I defended the evaluative theory (a) because the theory of rational belief systems evidently required a concept of truth as a mode of epistemic evaluation; (b) because the pragmatic contradictions in ‘It is true, but I don’t believe it’ and ‘I believe it, but it isn’t true’ are best explained this way; and (c) because I could not see that anything would be lost if we were all to use such a conception. Nevertheless, from the mid-1980s, I began to have serious doubts about the adequacy of the theory of truth that I had embraced. For it was, essentially, an intersubjectivist theory. If truth for me were just what I thought it was right for me to believe, then that would be purely subjectivist. But is the intersubjectivist theory that truth is what is true for us at the limit of experience really much better? It might be better than the best we can ever hope to achieve through scientific inquiry. But it is still not an objective concept of the sort demanded by Australian realists.

In my book *Truth and Objectivity* (Ellis, 1990), I made a final attempt to rescue the theory of truth as a mode of evaluation and hence to justify the concept of truth that I required for my theory of rational belief systems. The consensus is that I failed in this attempt, and in retrospect, I also think I failed. For I now think that there are two quite legitimate, but related, conceptions of truth with similar logics, just as there are two or more legitimate but related conceptions of probability (empirical, logical, rationalised subjective) that satisfy the axioms of the same probability calculus. The concept of truth as epistemic rightness is the one that is required for human belief systems and hence for logic and science. The metaphysical concept of truth is the one required for truthmaker theory. Consider John Fox's 'Truthmaker' axiom, viz.,

> If *p*, some *x* exists such that *x*'s existing necessitates *p*. (Fox 1987, p. 189)

or John Bigelow's supervenience thesis:

> [T]here is no difference in what is true without a corresponding difference in the inventory of what is; that what there is determines what is true; that truth is supervenient on being. (Fox 1987, p. 205)

These two theses are both very plausible. But neither is suggested nor even rendered plausible by the theory of truth that I had been defending. For my theory of truth has no obvious implications concerning existence. It is, for example, as readily applicable to the theorems of mathematics as it is to the fundamental laws of physics. For example, to decide the question of whether a given mathematical proposition is true in, say, Euclidean geometry, one only has to consider whether it has a sound Euclidean proof. One does not have to think about what exists in reality. If there is such a proof, then the proposition is true in my sense. No further argument. Whether and if so how it corresponds to reality are other matters.

Until about 1990, I had thought it was sufficient to argue for realism as an extension of the argument for physicalism. If you accept a scientific worldview, then you are bound to be a realist about most of the causal processes that are supposed to occur in nature. If the effects to be explained are real, which they undoubtedly are, then so must be their causes. The scientific worldview thus contains an ontology of its own, independently of any theory of truth. And, it certainly implies realism about all, or nearly all, of the sorts of things that scientific realists say they believe in. I called myself 'a scientific entity realist' in the early 1980s—mainly to distinguish myself from those who thought that scientific realism necessarily involves the belief that the established laws and theories of science are mostly true in a substantial correspondence sense of 'truth'. I was, for the most part, willing to accept that the established laws and theories of science were true in my weak evaluative sense of 'true'. But I was not willing to accept that the theoretical entities of abstract model theories (e.g., Newtonian forces, geometrical points, inertial frames, perfectly reversible heat engines) had anything like the same status as the atoms, molecules, and electromagnetic waves of the established causal process theories of physics and chemistry. But I could still be a scientific realist, I argued, because no theory of truth was required for realism about the established causes of things. And this, for me, was enough, because there was no plausible theory of truth, of which I was aware, that would imply realism about the theoretical entities of abstract model theories.

I further explored the idea of deriving one's ontology from the scientific worldview in my paper (Ellis, 1987) on 'The Ontology of Scientific Realism', which I wrote as my contribution to a volume of essays written in honour of Jack Smart. What sort of ontology, I wondered, do Smart's original arguments for scientific realism really imply? As well as realism about the causal mechanisms proposed in successful scientific theories, and hence about the theoretical entities postulated as being involved in these mechanisms, I argued that they also require realism about the causal powers that these things are supposed to have, about the spatiotemporal relationships that the parts of these mechanisms are supposed to bear to each other, and about the numerical relationships that are supposed to hold between various groups of elements occurring in these mechanisms. The more I thought about what acceptance of the scientific worldview implies for ontology, the richer my ontology became. So, I concluded that Smart's original arguments for scientific realism should have led him, as it eventually led me, to reject the austere Humean ontology that he persisted with throughout his career.

The ontology required for a scientific worldview appears to be a highly structured one. For one of the most striking facts about the world is the extraordinary dominance of natural kinds. Every different chemical substance (and there are hundreds of thousands of them) is a member of a natural kind: (a) each kind of chemical substance is categorically distinct from all others, and (b) each has its own essential properties and structures. Moreover, the chemical kinds all belong in a natural hierarchy, the more general ones having essences that are included in those of the more specific. Plausibly, the existence of this hierarchy of natural kinds is a significant fact about the world that should be reflected in the ontology of scientific realism. The world is evidently not just a physical world, as I had assumed in the 1970s, but a highly structured one. Perhaps the world itself is a member of a natural kind. John Bigelow, Caroline Lierse, and I published a joint paper on this topic in Bigelow et al. 1992.

Shortly after our collaboration on this paper, John Bigelow was appointed to a chair at Monash University, and I inherited Caroline Lierse as a graduate student. Caroline was enthusiastic about the kind of work I was doing on essentialism and natural kinds and was keen to collaborate on other projects in this area. The issue that interested me most at the time was the status of dispositional properties. Most philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition regarded dispositions as second-grade properties. They were second grade, it was argued, because they had ultimately to be grounded in categorical properties. But even a quick survey of the kinds of properties that have significant roles in the causal process theories of the sciences reveals that most of them are dispositional. Indeed, the most fundamental properties of objects would all appear to be dispositional. Massive bodies always appear to have certain gravitational and inertial powers and to manifest themselves to us in the ways in which they exercise them. So, we may ask: What is it that makes a body massive? The standard answer is that massive bodies all have the quantitative property we call 'mass' to some degree. But if we inquire further what gives a body mass, we may find ourselves without an answer. Is it, for example, the numbers of atoms of the various kinds that make up these bodies, multiplied by the masses of these atoms? No, it is not that. But even if it were, we should only have explained the masses of the bodies by reference to the masses of their constituents. But then how should we account for the masses of the most fundamental constituents? A causal power, like the mass of a body, can be dependent on the causal powers of its constituents. But a causal power can never be dependent on anything that does not have any causal powers. And if matter has an ultimate atomic structure, then we must eventually get down to things that have causal powers that do not depend on the causal powers of their parts. Perhaps causal power dependencies go all the way down—to the parts of the parts of the parts, and so on. Or must we say, as Hume would have said, that the causal powers of things are illusions due to regularities? I think the best answer is that causal powers such as mass are not illusions and that if the question ‘Why do things have mass?’ can eventually be answered, it will be because the causal powers of massive bodies can be shown to be dependent on other causal powers. Therefore, at the most fundamental level, there must be some irreducible causal powers.

Accepting this conclusion, Lierse and I wrote a paper on dispositional properties, (Ellis, et al. 1994) i.e., properties, such as causal powers, that dispose their bearers to behave in certain ways or ranges of ways. We approached the subject believing that there are, in reality, two kinds of properties, dispositional and categorical. But we did not accept any of the theories of dispositional properties that were then currently on offer. Specifically, we argued against Armstrong’s strong categorialism, i.e., the thesis that all basic properties are categorical, and also against Shoemaker’s strong dispositionalism, according to which all genuine properties are dispositional. Our position was dispositionalist about causal powers, capacities, and propensities, but categorialist about spatiotemporal and numerical relations. We argued against the three theses concerning dispositions (Prior et al. 1982) that had been proposed and defended by Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter, and Frank Jackson, and we defended the following more radical theses: (a) that there are real irreducible dispositional properties in nature, e.g., causal powers; (b) that causal powers necessarily dispose their bearers to produce effects of certain kinds in certain kinds of circumstances; (c) that such properties are among the essential properties of the natural kinds and are not necessarily grounded in other properties; and (d) that if P is a causal power that is an essential property of things of the natural kind K and L is the law of action of P, to the effect that things that possess P are necessarily disposed to have the effect E in the circumstances C, then it is metaphysically necessary that things of the kind K will act as L requires. We called our position ‘dispositional essentialism’.

In my most recent books (Ellis 2001, 2002), I have elaborated and defended an essentialist ontology, which builds upon this earlier work. In these two books, I argue that the world is a physical one that is structured into hierarchies of natural kinds. There are three categories of such kinds, I argued: substantive, dynamic, and tropic; and within each category, there are various genera and species. The substantive category includes all of the natural kinds of objects or substances; the dynamic category, all of the natural kinds of events or processes; and the tropic category, the natural kinds of tropes (i.e., property or relation instances) of the properties or relations that hold of or between things. At the summit of each category, I supposed there to be a global kind, i.e., a natural kind that includes all of the more specific natural kinds within the category. The global kind of substance, for example, would be the class of physical systems, while the global dynamic kind would include the whole category of physical events or processes. I then argue that the laws of nature may reasonably be identified as true descriptions of the essential properties of the natural kinds. Granted this, it follows that there must be natural hierarchies of laws of nature, with the global laws describing the essential properties of the global kinds and the more specific laws describing the essential properties of the more specific kinds. Thus, if all physical systems are essentially Lagrangian (i.e., obey Lagrange's Principle of Least Action), then the Principle of Least Action will be a universal law of nature. And, because of this, it will be metaphysically necessary, not contingent as most philosophers suppose. In a similar way, the essential properties of the more specific kinds will give rise to the more specific laws of nature, e.g., those relating to particular kinds of substances or particular kinds of fields. And these laws too must be metaphysically necessary.

This theory of the laws of nature has a number of profound implications. Firstly, it implies that the laws of nature are firmly grounded in the hierarchically structured physical world we see around us. They are not, as Hume thought and most other philosophers still think, imposed upon an intrinsically passive world, as if by God. They are grounded in the things that exist in nature. And, if you could somehow change what there is, you would thereby change the laws of nature. But it is metaphysically impossible to change the laws of nature without changing the world's ontology.

References

Ayer, A. (1936). *Language, truth and logic*. London: Gollancz.

Bigelow, J., Ellis, B., & Lierse, C. (1992). The world as one of a kind: Natural necessity and laws of nature. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43*, 371–388.

Bridgman, P. (1927). *The logic of modern physics*. New York: Macmillan.

Bridgman, P. (1962). *A sophisticate's primer of relativity*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Campbell, N. (1921). *Physics: The elements*. New York: Dover. Republished 1957 as Foundations of Science: The Philosophy of Theory and Experiment.

Churchland, P., & Hooker, C. (Eds.). (1985). *Images of science: Essays on realism and empiricism, with a reply from Bas C. Van Fraassen*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Colodny, R. (Ed.). (1965). *Beyond the edge of certainty: Essays in contemporary science and philosophy*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Duhem, P. (1954). *The aim and structure of physical theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Trans. P. Wiener.

Ellis, B. (1957). A comparison of process and non-process theories in the physical sciences. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 8*, 45–56.

Ellis, B. (1963). Universal and differential forces. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 14*, 177–194.

Ellis, B. (1966). *Basic concepts of measurement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ellis, B. (1971). On conventionality and simultaneity: A reply. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49*, 177–203.

Ellis, B. (1975). Physicalism and the contents of sense experience. In C.-Y. Cheng (Ed.), *Philosophical aspects of the mind-body problem* (pp. 64–77). Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii.

Ellis, B. (1979). *Rational belief systems*. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Ellis, B. (1980). Truth as a mode of evaluation. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1*, 85–99.

Ellis, B. (1985). What science aims to do. In P. Churchland & C. Hooker (Eds.), *Images of science: Essays on realism and empiricism, with a reply by Bas C. Van Fraassen* (pp. 166–193). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ellis, B. (1987). The ontology of scientific realism. In P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, & J. Norman (Eds.), *Metaphysics and morality: Essays in honour of J. J. C. Smart* (pp. 50–70). Cambridge: Blackwell.

Ellis, B. (1990). *Truth and objectivity*. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Ellis, B. (2001). *Scientific essentialism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ellis, B. (2002). *The philosophy of nature: A guide to the new essentialism*. London: Acumen.

Ellis, B., & Bowman, P. (1967). Conventionality in distant simultaneity. *Philosophy in Science, 34*, 116–136.

Ellis, B., & Lierse, C. (1994). Dispositional essentialism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72*, 27–45.

Forrest, P. (1986). *The dynamics of belief*. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Fox, J. (1987). Truthmaker. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65*, 188–207.

Fox, J. (2007). Why we shouldn't give Ellis a dinch. *Analysis, 67*, 301–303.

Gärdenfors, P. (1986). The epistemic importance of minimal changes of belief. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62,* 136–157.

Gasking, D. (1940). Mathematics and the world. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 18*, 97–116.

Gasking, D. (1960). Clusters. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 38*, 1–36.

Grünbaum, A. (1964). Is a universal nocturnal expansion falsifiable or physically vacuous? *Philosophical Studies, 15*, 71–79.

Grünbaum, A. (1967). The denial of absolute space and the hypothesis of a universal nocturnal expansion. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 45*, 61–91.

Grünbaum, A., et al. (1969). Panel discussion of simultaneity by slow clock transport in the special and general theories of relativity. *Philosophy in Science, 36*, 1–81.

Kuhn, T. (1962). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lakatos, I. (1963–1964). Proofs and refutations. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *14*: 1–25, 120–39, 221–45, 269–342.

Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programs. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), *Criticism and the growth of knowledge* (pp. 91–196). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laudan, L. (1981). A confutation of convergent realism. *Philosophy in Science, 48*, 19–49.

Poincaré, H. (1952). *Science and hypothesis*. New York: Dover.

Popper, K. (1959). *The logic of scientific discovery*. New York: Basic Books.

Prior, E., Pargetter, R., & Jackson, F. (1982). Three theses about dispositions. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 19*, 251–257.

Putnam, H. (1962). The analytic and the synthetic. In H. Feigl & G. Maxwell (Eds.), *Scientific explanation, space, and time* (pp. 358–397). Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.

Quine, W. (1953). *From a logical point of view: Nine logico-philosophical essays*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Reichenbach, H. (1958). *The philosophy of space and time*. New York: Dover. Trans. M. Reichenbach and J. Freund.

Rorty, R. (Ed.). (1967). *The linguistic turn: Recent essays in philosophical method*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Schlesinger, G. (1964). It is false that overnight everything has doubled in size. *Philosophical Studies, 15*, 65–71.

Schlesinger, G. (1967). What does the denial of absolute space mean? *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 45*, 44–60.

Smart, J. (1963). *Philosophy and scientific realism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Stalnaker, R. (1968). A theory of conditionals. In N. Rescher (Ed.), *Studies in logical theory* (pp. 98–112). Oxford: Blackwell.

van Fraassen, B. (1980). *The scientific image*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Metaphysics

12

John Bigelow

Contents

Introduction 361
God 363
Freedom 364
Immortality 365
  Dualism 365
  Materialism 366
  On God, Freedom and Immortality 367
Is Metaphysics Impossible? 368
Space and Time 373
Australian Realism 374
References 376

Introduction

Metaphysics is an academic discipline, taught at universities. As such, it arrived in Australia and New Zealand when European settlers began to set up academies in the nineteenth century. There were early settlers from other parts of the world as well as Europe; but in tracing the history of academic metaphysics, we must think mainly of the European settlers, since that is where the institutions of universities came from.

These European settlers met with peoples in Australia and New Zealand who were wrestling, in their own ways, with many of the same metaphysical questions that are studied at universities. In Australia, the settlers met with a geologically very old continent and many very old human cultures with myths of a 'dreamtime'; in New Zealand, they met with geologically very young islands and relatively young

---

J. Bigelow
School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia
e-mail: john.bigelow@monash.edu

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_13, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

human cultures with an 'arrival myth'. When the Europeans set up universities, academic studies in metaphysics paid little heed to the metaphysical theories of the Aborigines or Maoris; yet this was not because they had none.

The Aborigines and Maoris had oral teachings that were passed on from generation to generation. In some ways, at least to some degree, their teaching practices were different from those pursued in academic disciplines at universities. In universities, there is an official, explicit aim of finding out *new* things and of giving *reasons* to support alleged discoveries. Sometimes these 'reasons' might include the citation of texts written by other human beings, but this is backed by an assumption that there should be a good reason for believing these texts—and furthermore this assumed good reason should not be that these texts are *sacred*, with a source that is divine or supernatural rather than merely human. Insofar as they succeed in this, European universities were a little different from European religious orders, who teach from sacred texts without any explicit aim of questioning the truth of these texts and without any explicit aim of finding out new truths beyond those to be found in the texts.

This does not mean that European religious orders were free from argumentation. There was always room for disagreements about the interpretation, and the application, of the sacred texts. These texts, furthermore, were deeply concerned with metaphysical questions. In particular, the teachings of religious orders often included two wings: there were metaphysical doctrines (as, for instance, that God created the world); and there were moral injunctions (as, for instance, that we should do what God tells us to do). The academic study of metaphysics aims to deal with all the same questions that are addressed in religious traditions, though without the same kind of reliance on sacred texts. Hence, there is considerable overlap between academic disciplines and religious traditions, in both the metaphysical and the ethical issues debated within the universities. Likewise, there is overlap between academic metaphysics and the concerns of traditions of thought among the Aborigines and Maoris.

The teaching methods used by the Australian Aborigines and the Maoris were often a little more like those of religious orders in Europe, and less like the methods aspired to by universities. There was more stress on learning traditional lore, and less on questioning whether these teachings are really true, or on finding new things, not to be found in the traditional teachings. But apart from this difference in teaching methods, there is an overlap in content between Aboriginal or Maori metaphysics and the issues debated in academic metaphysics.

European metaphysics had been dominated for centuries by the ancient Greeks, Plato and Aristotle, and by Christianity. By the time settlers came to Australasia, however, Immanuel Kant had subjected metaphysics to an enormously influential critique. The upshot of this critique, for many, was to separate the concerns of academic metaphysics from those of religion. Many took their metaphysical *religious* beliefs to be a *personal* concern—not to be appealed to, or criticised, in public pursuit of academic disciplines. Some went further and took metaphysical questions to be meaningless, to be pursued neither in academic life nor in religious observances in private life. They preached the death of metaphysics, particularly in logical positivism, existentialism and other philosophical movements of the twentieth century. This separation helps keep the peace; but, intellectually, it is not sustainable. In the longer term metaphysics cannot be kept out of the academies, even though it does sometimes tread on the toes of many traditions of thought, by questioning and mounting rational criticisms of doctrines that have been traditionally taught in ways that discourage that kind of questioning.

As Kant said, the key questions of metaphysics are ‘God, freedom, and immortality’. The first of these is framed in a Eurocentric way, as the question of the existence of ‘God’—but in fact it comes from a deeper source: Why is there something rather than nothing? Why is there any world at all? And why, more specifically, is there a world like *this* one? These questions can prompt answers that cite the existence of an intelligent designer; but they can also lead to the philosophy of science, as uncovering laws of nature, which give at least a partial answer to the question why there is a world *like this* one.

Kant’s second question, of ‘freedom’, asks what our *place* is, within this world, and whether our actions spring from a *will* that lies somehow outside the realm of the mere chemistry and physics of the human body.

The question of ‘immortality’ concerns our relation to time—both to future times and to what might be called ‘timeless’ truths.

All these questions are of widespread human concern, well beyond the bounds of an academic discipline of metaphysics, and very similar questions are of central concern within many (perhaps all) Aboriginal and Maori traditions. They have also furnished the backbone of academic studies in metaphysics, within Australia and New Zealand.

Neither academic, nor European religious, nor Aboriginal or Maori traditions will speak with one voice on any of the issues of metaphysics. Nevertheless, we may ask about some of their views on the three Kantian questions.

God

It seems that many Aboriginal Australians and Maoris did think the world had a beginning in time, but perhaps not all did. It is possible, for instance, that the Aboriginal concept of ‘the dreamtime’ is not simply that of a time long ago, but might be a little more like the notion of ‘timeless truths’, which are not ‘in’ time at all, but are true with respect to all times equally.

It also seems to have been a widespread view in both Aboriginal Australian and Maori traditions that the world came to be the way it is through the action of supernatural agents, each of whom had their own beliefs and desires, not altogether unlike those of human beings. In some ways these theories are like that of an ‘intelligent designer’ in a monotheistic religion. Some of the Aboriginal Australians or Maoris may indeed have thought there to have been one initial creative agent—followed by other supernatural agents, who are in some ways analogues of the ‘angels’ and ‘demons’ in European traditions. There are both differences and similarities.

What carries over, from these issues, into the academic discipline of metaphysics is the question of whether there is at least *one* supernatural agent, beyond human beings. The question of whether there is a God has been a live one in Australasian academies, but not of whether there are angels or demons or, for that matter, extraterrestrials.

The question of whether there are 'timeless' truths has also continued, in Australasia, as a live issue. Under European historical influence, this question has taken a distinctively Platonic direction, turning largely on theories about the nature of mathematics. Some have argued that there are timeless truths in mathematics, concerning mathematical entities (like numbers) that do not exist 'in time' at all. Platonists hold that when we say that seven and five equals 12, we are not saying that seven and five 'are equalling' 12 at the moment but that these mathematical objects exist and stand in the specified relationship to one another, without respect to time in any way at all. Others say otherwise. For instance, the very influential Professor John Anderson, at the University of Sydney, argued that *there is nothing* outside space and time. Quite a lot of academic metaphysics in Australasia echoed this 'naturalistic', this-worldly theory that there is nothing but what exists in space and time.

A metaphysics that acknowledges *nothing* outside space and time can address the question 'Why is there a world like *this* one?' but cannot answer it by reference to a supernatural agent who created the world. A natural bedfellow of such a metaphysics will be a 'scientific realism', which takes the physical sciences as the best guide we can have for answering 'why' questions. If there is to be an answer, it would come from physical theories about how the world began with a 'big bang', and how the laws of nature explain why such a 'big bang' would occur, and why it would lead to a world like this one. Academic metaphysics in Australasia often took a tack like Anderson's, dealing with the same issues as European religions and Aboriginal and Maori traditions, but coming to contrary conclusions.

Freedom

It seems that many Aborigines and Maoris held a broadly 'dualist' view, that human actions spring from a 'mind' or 'soul' or 'will'—and that our actions are to be explained by what might be called broadly 'teleological' explanations, appealing to our beliefs and desires—and not by what you might call merely mechanistic, chemical or physical causes. Thus, many Aboriginal and Maori traditions seem to have incorporated views that would seem to be broadly 'dualistic'—distinguishing the 'mind' or 'soul' from the 'body'.

However, one should be careful to respect differences and not to overestimate similarities. It is not altogether obvious that Aborigines and Maoris were 'dualists', since they did not have the same conception of 'chemistry' and 'physics' as the one that emerged out of the rise of the sciences in Europe. Some may have held 'animist' theories, which applied more or less the same teleological explanations to everything, and did not distinguish the 'body' as 'mechanical' and as opposed to the 'mind'. It is misleading to call such theories 'dualist'. Nevertheless, even if they did not (all) think dualistically of the body as *distinct* from the mind, they did seem to think of the human agent in a manner akin to the European dualist conception of the 'mind-body'.

These metaphysical issues all carried over into debates within academic metaphysics, in Australasia. The 'mind-body problem' has been one of the central issues in academic metaphysics. There have been 'dualists', who have defended the theory that human agency is something apart from the mere chemistry and physics of the human body. There have also been 'materialists', who have taken the opposite point of view. The academies have included defenders of metaphysical views broadly like those of many European religious traditions and of many Aboriginal Australian and Maori traditions. But they have also included those who have argued against those traditional metaphysical theories.

Immortality

The question of immortality is closely bound up with the preceding question, of whether the 'mind' is distinct from the 'body'. The doctrines of *materialism* and *dualism* carry consequences, concerning immortality.

Dualism

Some academic dualists have defended the view that the mind or soul continues to exist after the death of the body. However, even those who believe this have not often defended it as part of their academic work in metaphysics. They have defended dualism, but although they have been aware of course that this opens the door to the *possibility* of a life after death, they have usually left this open possibility outside their academic work.

Furthermore, and somewhat surprisingly, many academic dualists in Australasia have been fairly confident that, in fact, there will be *no* personal survival after death. Indeed, many academic dualists have defended a version of dualism that makes it virtually certain that there will be no survival after death.

Distinguish a 'dualism of *substance*' from a 'dualism of *properties*'. The former claims that the mind and body are two distinct *things*; the latter claims only that a living human body has two distinct kinds of *properties*, namely, physical properties and mental properties. Many academic dualists have defended only a dualism of properties, not a dualism of substances. On this view, there is no 'soul' or 'mind' that can leave the body and continue to have mental properties. Mental properties are properties *of the body*, and when the body decays, it is very unlikely that it continues to have those mental properties;

and indeed when the body ceases to exist, then the person's body is no longer there to *have* those mental properties, and so a person's mental life will almost certainly cease.

Many property dualists admit that it is possible, in principle, that some *other* body might come to have the required mental properties, so that the required pattern of mental properties that used to be instantiated by one body might come to be instantiated by another body. That is, according to this metaphysical theory, it would be possible, in principle, for the person to be 'reincarnated', according to this version of property dualism. Yet many academic dualists think that there are laws of nature that constrain the ways in which mental properties come to be linked up with physical bodies. They think there are laws closely correlating mental properties with very specific kinds of brain activity. Consequently, they think there are reasons for thinking reincarnation to be very unlikely.

Hence, although Australasian academic metaphysics has included some who defend kinds of 'dualism', even these dualists have not, uniformly, defended survival of bodily death, of the kind that has been important to many Australian Aboriginals and Maoris and to adherents of many religious traditions from many parts of the world.

Materialism

You would have expected materialists to deny the possibility of survival of bodily death. And yet, paradoxically, some do not.

It is possible for a metaphysical materialist to believe in immortality, by believing in *bodily resurrection*. There have been religious traditions with a bent in this direction. However, this has not been a strong current within academic metaphysics in Australasia, especially among metaphysical materialists.

Nevertheless, many metaphysical materialists have developed theories that make it at least *possible*, in principle, for a person to continue to exist after bodily death. Here is how this possibility arises.

Academic materialists hold that mental properties are in fact not distinct from physical properties, but are constituted by congeries of physical properties. When the body dies and the brain ceases to function, this brain will no longer have the right properties to constitute this person's mental life. As things stand, up to the present, laws of nature make it virtually certain that the required pattern of properties of a brain could never be transferred from that brain to any other brain, with high fidelity, in such a way as to constitute survival of the entire mental life of the person. However, according to this materialistic theory, it is not completely impossible, *in principle*, for such a pattern of properties to be transferred from one brain to another. Indeed, it is not impossible, in principle, for such a pattern of properties to be transferred from a brain to a computer. According to this version of materialism, if the required pattern of physical properties *were* to have been transferred from one brain to another, or from a brain to a sufficiently sophisticated computer, then a *person* would have been ‘re-embodied’. Hence, according to this metaphysical theory, it would be possible, if the technology were to become available, for a person to survive the death of their body.

Thus, somewhat surprisingly, some Australasian academic materialists have defended the possibility of a kind of ‘immortality’. In a slim respect, therefore, these materialists have defended a metaphysical theory that has been important to many Australian Aboriginal and Maori traditions and to many religious groups that have come to Australasia from many parts of the world. Nevertheless, for those traditions, this would not be a congenial defence of survival of bodily death.

Hence, little mainstream Australasian academic metaphysics, whether ‘materialist’ or ‘dualist’, has defended the theory that human beings survive bodily death, in any sense which has been important in many Australian Aboriginal and Maori traditions and in many religious traditions from many parts of the world.

On God, Freedom and Immortality

In sum, on Kant’s three questions of ‘God, freedom, and immortality’, academic Australasian metaphysics has included the intensive examination of a number of key *arguments* that can be mounted—both for and against—some (but not all) of the key metaphysical concerns, not only of traditional Maori and Aboriginal beliefs, but also of the doctrines of European and other immigrant religious traditions. These academic ‘arguments’ attempt to address metaphysical questions by ‘reason’: either by ‘pure reason’, which aspires to be analogous to the reasoning found in pure mathematics, or else by reasoning from premises drawn from ‘experience’, from ‘common sense’ or from the sciences.

In this respect, the methodology used in academic metaphysics differs, at least in emphasis, from the methods used in transmitting traditional lore in Aboriginal and Maori cultures or in European (and other) religious traditions. The conclusions reached by academics, however, sometimes overlap with the doctrines of other traditions: sometimes partially endorsing those traditional doctrines, sometimes contesting them.

There is potential here for friction between academic metaphysics and traditional systems of thought. Such friction as there has been, however, has created little heat. Mostly, people outside the academies have not been much aware of the opinions of the academics, and the academics have made little attempt to influence those outside the academies. Furthermore, the academics do not speak with one voice on any of the key metaphysical issues that are of deep concern to people outside the academies. The academics argue among themselves. Yet this has had its benefits. It has left academics free to follow the arguments wherever they think these arguments take them—without worrying too much about what others might think. In this environment, academics in metaphysics in Australasia have played a very prominent international role in the development of metaphysics, on the world stage, out of proportion to the size of the population.

Is Metaphysics Impossible?

Is metaphysics possible, as a respectable academic pursuit? When Kant raised the questions of ‘God, freedom, and immortality’, he was a Lutheran, and he thought that there is a God, we do have free will, and we will have a life after death in either heaven or hell. Yet he argued that these faith-based answers to these questions are not to be defended by an academic pursuit of metaphysics, as an exercise in what he called ‘pure reason’. They cannot be settled by appeal to things that commonsensically *seem* to be self-evident, nor by our everyday experiences in life. Nor are they to be supported by advances in science.

One way to put Kant’s view is by saying that he cleared away ‘Reason’ in order to make way for ‘Faith’. Yet this is not quite right. Kant thought that it is *reasonable* to believe in God, freedom and immortality. He argued only that these things cannot be established by either ‘empirical science’ or ‘pure reason’. They can, however, be justified by ‘practical reason’.

The European settlers who arrived in Australasia brought with them the echoes of Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ in metaphysics.

As I have been suggesting, metaphysics is ubiquitous and important in all cultures. In the wake of Kant, through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, metaphysics came under sustained attack from professional philosophers. In the later twentieth century, the attack was mounted under several banners, including ‘pragmatism’, ‘positivism’, ‘logical positivism’ (including much ‘analytical philosophy’) and ‘postmodernism’.

Instead of helping us to try to find answers to our metaphysical questions, many twentieth-century philosophers systematically set out to persuade themselves, and one another and their students, that the whole enterprise of metaphysics is entirely wrongheaded. We should stop asking these ‘metaphysical’ questions, and we should stop trying to answer them. Instead of asking about Reality, we should content ourselves with articulating the textures of our own texts, and exploring the patterns we weave with words, and our social networks of political power. We should publish books with titles like *The Social Construction of Reality*. We should recognise—echoing (perhaps misinterpreting?) the French philosopher Derrida—that ‘there is nothing outside the text’.

At the end of the twentieth century, however, some professional philosophers have come to believe that there are signs of a possible rebirth of metaphysics, even within those very parts of the academy where formerly were heard the longest and loudest sermons preaching the death of metaphysics. In this process of rebirth, Australian philosophers are perceived, by some, to be playing a surprisingly prominent role. I will give a few vivid examples.

In these examples, I will highlight some Australasian philosophers and completely ignore others, equally worthy. I will focus on a handful of Australian philosophers who are perceived, by some philosophers overseas, as forming a distinctive family that can be grouped under some such heading as 'Australian Realists'. Not all philosophers, of course, are working on metaphysics; and of those working on metaphysics only some fall into the loose family that might travel under some such name as 'Australian Realism'. My narrative will be partial and partisan. But it will help me to paint a picture that conveys some very important truths about the history of metaphysics in Australasia.

In 1999 there was a conference on Australian philosophy held in France. Fares were paid for many Australians, who came and gathered in Grenoble. Some papers by French speakers were delivered in French, papers by Australians were delivered in English, but simultaneous translation was available through headphones. The papers in English were translated into French, edited by Monnoyer (2004) and published by one of the leading academic publishing houses in Paris, Vrin. The title of this book is, in translation:

> *The Structure of the World:*
> *Objects, Properties, and States of Affairs,*
> *The Rebirth of Metaphysics in the Australian School of Philosophy*

The title of this book pays special homage to the work of Professor David Armstrong, of Sydney University, especially Armstrong (1997). Here in Australia it does not feel at all as though there is any such thing as '*the* Australian school of philosophy'. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, from the distant vantage point of France at that time, certain broad similarities among several prominent Australian philosophers are more visible than the detailed disagreements that loom so large for those philosophers themselves, in their own local dealings with each other here in Australia. It is also an extraordinary fact that Australasian philosophers did not review this book in prominent journals, or otherwise celebrate or promote it, which also says something about Australasian philosophy, though it is not clear what.

Consider a second example. A few years later there was a very lively conference at the University of Manchester, and from it came a book published by the prestigious academic publishing house, the Clarendon Press of Oxford University: *Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate* (ed. Beebee and Dodd 2005). In this book, professional philosophers debated about a proposed new way of approaching metaphysics. Pervasive references are made to Australian philosophers, especially David Armstrong, but also several others, including for instance John Fox (1987) at La Trobe University. There are frequent citations of a metaphysical thesis, that: Truth supervenes on being, from Bigelow (1988). Don't worry what it means. Just notice: doesn't it sound *metaphysical*? Isn't it the very sort of 'metaphysical' claim that logical positivists, existentialists, and other preachers of the death of metaphysics had hoped to sweep away forever? The Beebee and Dodd collection of papers on 'truthmakers', like the Monnoyer collection, highlights both a 'rebirth' of metaphysics and the prominent role Australasians have played in that rebirth.

Consider a third example. Under the shadow of logical positivism, one of the metaphysical topics that lay furthest beyond the pale was a doctrine known as *essentialism*. This is a theory tracing back to Aristotle, according to which things have what might be called ‘essential natures’. These ‘natures’ include properties that determine *what* a thing is. Once these properties have determined *what* is there, other so-called ‘accidental’ properties determine *how* that thing happens to be at a given time. The accidental properties may change, but the essential properties remain the same.

Essentialism became extremely unfashionable in professional philosophical circles in the twentieth century. This is to be expected, given that so many were preaching the death of metaphysics and given that essentialism is quintessentially metaphysical. In recent years, however, there have been several international conferences in Britain, for instance, in Reading and in Bristol, at which young professional philosophers have been debating essentialism with gusto. Repeated reference to several Australian philosophers has permeated these debates, especially to Brian Ellis (2002).

How did it come about that Australian philosophers should be playing so salient a part in this attempted rebirth of metaphysics, after a century of sustained attack from pragmatism, positivism and postmodernism? Is it due to our climate? Or our lack of old buildings? Maybe in London or Paris it is possible to think that ‘there is nothing outside the text’. Yet on the beach at Bondi, or in the baking sun back of Burke, maybe it is more obvious that the world has a structure that is not of our making. Maybe in Australia it is more obvious that things have their own essential natures, which may be radically different from the ways we conceive them to be in our thoughts and in our texts.

Yet, instead of a climatic theory of the history of ideas, I will trace trajectories for just a few sample careers, which have been especially instrumental in bringing Australasian philosophy up to ‘critical mass’ in the twentieth century.

I will begin with Samuel Alexander. He was born in Sydney and studied in Melbourne and then went to Oxford (where he was the first Jew to become a Fellow) and then to Manchester. Alexander wrote a large book of metaphysics called *Space*, *Time and Deity* (1920). This book contains one of the best chapter titles in philosophy: ‘Time is the Mind of Space’. I don’t really know what it means, but whatever it means it is clearly ‘metaphysical’. I will gesture towards a glimmer of understanding shortly.

Alexander defended a metaphysics according to which everything there is exists in space and time. There is no supernatural world outside space and time. There is, for instance, no transcendent God or angels, at least if they are supposed to exist outside space and time. There is no Platonic realm of timeless, abstract objects, of the sort that Platonists allege to be studied in pure mathematics. There are only the things that exist, either earlier or later than us, at some particular location in this same world that we live in.

Yet Alexander was not a crass ‘reductionist’, like the ancient Greeks who said that all that exist are ‘atoms and the void’. Alexander was what is called an *emergence theorist*. He held that when atoms of hydrogen and oxygen come together in the right way, something new emerges that did not exist before, with properties that are very different from the properties of the ingredients from which it was made, namely, *water*. Likewise, when water and various carbon compounds come together in the right way, *life* emerges. When living things develop in the right ways, *mind* emerges. And when and if the whole universe attains the right kinds of harmonies, then what emerges is a new property of the world as a whole: the property of *divinity*. This is, it would appear, a form of pantheism: the world of space is (as it were) God's body, and in this body a property of divinity can emerge in something like the same way that consciousness emerges from electrochemical activities within the human brain.

With this broadly pantheistic conception in mind, it might be possible to tease out some of the meaning in Alexander's statement that 'Time is the Mind of Space'. Under ancient conceptions, the mind or soul was thought of as the source of motion and, more generally, of change. When a mop sits in the corner, it does not move unless something pushes it. When you see a mouse, however, and you see it moving without anything pushing it, it is clear that there is within it some source of movement. What makes motion possible is, of course, the passage of time. Space, then, is a body, and Time is what makes it possible for there to be motions of smaller bodies within the all-encompassing body of Space itself. This, then, is one respect in which Space is like an all-encompassing counterpart of our body, and Time is like an all-pervading counterpart of our minds.

For Alexander, although there is no transcendent God (outside space and time), it is possible to wonder whether the world itself is worthy of worship. Or at least, parts of it might be—for instance, perhaps some of the wildernesses that have not yet been despoiled by human mistakes. And perhaps some human domains might be worthy of an aesthetic response somewhat like 'worship'—some gardens, some chapels, some poems, and so on.

This is a paradigm of metaphysics, of the sort that many in the twentieth century tried to eliminate. In Britain, one of the young philosophers who was deeply impressed by Alexander's metaphysics was John Anderson, who went on to become professor of philosophy at Sydney University. Anderson brought with him to the job a passionate love of metaphysics and, more particularly, a belief that everything that exists is in space and time and that there is no supernatural world beyond space and time.

Anderson had an enormous impact on intellectual life in Sydney. Andersonians were rumoured to be believers in free love, for instance. And among the Andersonians was David Armstrong, who became professor of philosophy at Sydney University after Anderson. Armstrong, like Anderson and Alexander before him, loved metaphysics and believed that everything that there is exists in space and time. Armstrong calls this doctrine *Naturalism*.

The image of Australian philosophy overseas, among those professional philosophers for whom Australian philosophy has a high profile, is closely tied to a this-worldly metaphysics of this kind, a metaphysics which descends from Samuel Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity*.

There is another trajectory that I will describe, which helped to bring Australian philosophy to its current perceived role in an alleged rebirth of metaphysics. A young philosopher, J.J.C. ('Jack') Smart, was appointed to a chair in Adelaide and brought with him the doctrine of *Scientific Realism*. This was a metaphysics that harmonised well with Armstrong's naturalist metaphysics in Sydney; and Brian Ellis and others who knew Smart in Adelaide brought this doctrine to Melbourne University's newly created department of the History and Philosophy of Science, and to La Trobe University, and to other places. For instance, C. B. Martin worked with Smart in Adelaide and then went to Sydney, where he had a deep influence on Armstrong and others there.

In addition, Jack Smart was a friend of the leading American philosopher of the time, W. V. Quine at Harvard. At Harvard, Smart met the then young philosopher David Lewis, who went on to be a professor at Princeton and to become the leading systematic metaphysician of his generation. Very early in Lewis' career, Smart organised for Lewis to give a prestigious series of Gavin David Young Lectures in Adelaide. Following this visit to Australia, Lewis travelled around Australia for the entire Princeton summer; and then he returned for an extended visit to Australia and New Zealand nearly every year throughout his career.

The regular, lively presence of Lewis in Australia and New Zealand had an enormous impact on metaphysics in Australasia. Lewis, like Smart, was a dedicated defender of Scientific Realism. He not only talked about metaphysics to Australian philosophers, but he also talked about Australian philosophers in America and Europe. Scientific Realism, like Naturalism, looms large in the image that many professional philosophers overseas have formed of 'the Australian school of philosophy'.

This trajectory for Scientific Realism, stemming from Smart and Lewis, leads to a beehive of later work in this vein. A prominent example is furnished by that of Frank Jackson at the Australian National University, whose John Locke Lectures at Oxford some years ago became the influential book, *From Metaphysics to Ethics* (1998). Notice the way the title moves us from metaphysics to ethics—and many traditional religions do exactly that, beginning with a metaphysical creation story and proceeding on to give us guidance for how to live our lives.

Here is one more trajectory leading to the present state of the art in Australasian metaphysics. The great twentieth-century philosopher Karl Popper worked in New Zealand early in his career before he went to London. One of his best students was Alan Musgrave, who became professor of philosophy at the University of Otago in Dunedin. Musgrave, like Smart, Lewis and Armstrong, was a staunch defender of his own Popperian version of Scientific Realism (see, for instance, Musgrave 1999; Cheyne and Worrall 2006).

These several trajectories have all contributed to the prominent role Australasian philosophy is currently perceived, by some, to be playing in a rebirth of metaphysics after the Dark Ages of twentieth-century pragmatism, positivism and postmodernism. Thus, a core stream in the metaphysics that is being reborn is, very broadly speaking, a form of ‘naturalism’ akin to the metaphysics of Samuel Alexander’s *Space*, *Time and Deity* (1920).

Space and Time

Smart, Lewis, Armstrong and others have defended a materialist theory of the mind, a theory that breaks down the traditional dichotomy between the mind and the body. They have also defended a theory that breaks down the traditional dichotomy between Time and Space. Australian Realists characteristically defend the thesis that time is a fourth dimension that is much more like spatial dimensions than common sense would have us believe. See, especially, Nerlich (1994) for a path-breaking Australian Realist four-dimensionalist theory of spacetime.

When people we love are distant from us in space, it is consoling to know that although they are far from us, and we are far from them, at least we both exist. They do not exist *here*, that is, at *our* spatial location; nevertheless, it is *true*, and it is *true here*, that they exist at their own spatial location.

According to the four-dimensionalist, temporal relations are just like spatial relations in this respect. Imagine that some people you love are distant from us in time, rather than space. Imagine that someone does not exist now, but existed long ago. Then, according to the four-dimensionalist, you can take consolation in the fact that although these people are distant from us, and we are distant from them, at least we both exist. These people do not exist *now*, that is, at *our* temporal location; nevertheless, it is *true*, and it is *true now*, that they exist at their own temporal location.

For absolutely everything that ever did, does or will exist, it is *true now* that these things exist. They are spatiotemporally related to us, and we to them. There is no difference between time and space in this respect.

If this were right, it might be thought that this four-dimensionalist metaphysics could, and should, affect some the ways we think and feel about the world. One New Zealand philosopher who resisted four-dimensionalism ironically had the name Arthur Prior. He was a presentist. He thought that nothing exists except what is present. Prior said nothing prior exists.

Prior wrote an article with the title ‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’ (1959). We seem to find it consoling, sometimes, to think that certain examples of suffering lie mercifully in the past. And it would seem as though this consolation may not rest on an entirely selfish desire that the suffering be distant *from us*. One can feel compassion *for the sufferers* and take comfort in the thought that their suffering now lies mercifully in the past. Yet surely this way of thinking should be irrational, if it were still true (as the four-dimensionalist says) that the suffering *exists*. It should not be consoling to think the suffering is East rather than West of us. Why should it be consoling to think the suffering lies in one direction rather than the opposite direction along one of the *other* dimensions of the four-dimensional spacetime manifold? The four-dimensionalist metaphysics seems to stand at odds with our ordinary ways of thinking and feeling about things.

Likewise, consider the fact that we do not think it a tragedy that there might be *no life* in *spatially* distant parts of the universe. Yet compare space with time. It does seem to matter to us, much more, if we imagine that there might be *no life* in temporally distant parts of the universe, especially if those temporally distant parts lie in the future. Yet if time were just a fourth dimension, metaphysically on a par with the other three dimensions in the spacetime manifold, then it is hard to see how it could be rational to feel differently about a lack of life in the future, from the way we feel about a lack of life in spatially remote regions.

It would seem, then, that the four-dimensionalist metaphysics seems to stand at odds with our ordinary ways of thinking and feeling about things. This could cut two ways. You might use this as a reason for rejecting the metaphysics. Or conversely, you might use this as a reason for changing your life. The Buddhists, for instance, argue that if we cast away our common sense and adopt the metaphysics of ‘momentariness’, this will help us to achieve inner tranquillity. The ancient Greek school of Epicurean philosophy used arguments, very like those I have sketched from four-dimensionalism, to support the conclusion that if we can find a correct metaphysics, it may help us to achieve release from anxiety and a state of lasting tranquillity. Australian metaphysicians characteristically make much more modest claims for their metaphysics. Nevertheless, I submit that their metaphysics, just like the metaphysics of the past, is not wholly disconnected from the ways we think and feel about the world.

This discussion of space and time illustrates the fact that there have been persistent, deep disagreements, among Australasian philosophers, even over core questions, like that of space and time. Likewise, there have been persistent, deep disagreements over such core questions as mind-body dualism. Prominent materialists, like J.J.C. Smart (1959) and David Armstrong (1968), faced forceful arguments for dualism, from other Australasians, like Keith Campbell (1970), Frank Jackson (1982) and David Chalmers (1996).

If you were to look for any ‘common threads’ running through Australasian philosophy you would not find them in any particular doctrines on which there is any kind of universal consensus. Nevertheless, there is some value in separating out, and naming, some core feature embodied in what might be called ‘Australian Realism’. This has played a significant role in intellectual history within the discipline of metaphysics. Even prominent Australasian anti-realists, like Barry Taylor (2006), have to contend with it.

Australian Realism

Australian Realists are addressing the very same questions that lie behind many of the great religions of the world, and it is disingenuous to pretend that there is no potential for friction between academic philosophy and religious belief. Academic philosophers address the same questions and often come up with different answers. Furthermore, the methods used by academic philosophers are often different from those used by followers of religious faiths.

Australian Realists tend to assume that we should all be genuinely curious about the world we live in. We should be concerned to find out, for instance, why sugar dissolves in water. What causes rainbows? Why are rock formations often found in horizontal layers, but sometimes these layers seem to be ‘buckled’? Why are there marsupials (and no monkeys) in Australia and in some of the islands to the north of Australia—but only up to the ‘Wallace line’, where there is a sudden change to monkeys and other Asian animals? Why do the planets seem to move in the ways they do, through the constellations of the Zodiac? Why is the sky black at night? And so on.

Australian Realists assume that if you are genuinely curious about these things, you will be impressed by the answers that science has developed. Any rational person’s metaphysics at any given point in history should include, as a very large chunk, both common sense and the contemporary sciences. Anything else in the metaphysics should fit in, consistently, with common sense and the sciences. As a result of this approach, many Australian metaphysicians arrive at a metaphysics that lies perilously close to the ‘reductionism’ of the ancient Greek philosophers who said that nothing exists except ‘atoms and the void’. Insofar as this metaphysics draws back from this extreme, it does so in something like the spirit of Samuel Alexander’s doctrine—that somehow mind and divinity ‘emerge’ out of patterns of atoms in the void.

The method used in this kind of current Australian Realist metaphysics is, roughly, something that might be called ‘inference to the best explanation’. Philosophers like Smart and Armstrong characteristically argue that a naturalist metaphysics, Scientific Realism, furnishes us with a good explanation of many of the things we hunger to explain in this world of ours. They argue that this is an economical explanation, a simpler explanation than those offered in many of the rival metaphysics that draw wide adherence around the globe, the doctrine of reincarnation for instance. Because their explanation is arguably simpler than rival ones, they argue that it is reasonable to believe that it is likely to be closer to the truth. This does not establish certainty, but it does make a case for reasonable probability, and probability is the guide of life.

Many twentieth-century philosophers were hostile to metaphysics—and, one may well suspect, not entirely without reason. Metaphysics has been pursued for centuries, and philosophers have never come to any consensus on the answers to the questions they ask. The same old debates go on and on and show no signs of reaching any resolution. Surely, one might wonder, it is pigheaded to keep on debating the same old issues in the same old fruitless ways, without any prospect of reaching settled answers to any of the questions you are asking. Why should we pay any attention to Australian throwbacks, who replay old metaphysical debates like cracked recordings from the early days of vinyl discs? Is it not possible that Australian philosophers have just failed to *understand* the devastating critiques of twentieth-century critics like Heidegger in Germany and Wittgenstein in England?

No, the new Australian metaphysics neither ignores nor willfully misunderstands the critiques that have been mounted against metaphysics. In particular, Australian metaphysicians are under no illusion that they will be able to furnish *proofs* that will compel rational agreement and lead to universal consensus. It is fairly obvious that belief in a transcendent God, in reincarnation or the immortality of the soul, in the doctrine of momentariness, and many other metaphysical doctrines will continue to attract believers all over the globe. The metaphysical theories of professional philosophers are never going to command universal agreement even among professional philosophers in the academies, let alone in the wider world outside the academies.

Yet why should that prompt either modern despair or postmodern ‘playfulness’? Recognition that no-one can *prove* (finally and absolutely) that we are wrong should not lead to the complacent conclusion that we could not *be* wrong—or that there is no longer any need to keep striving after ‘truth’ as a regulative ideal. Australian Realists embrace fallibilism. But notice that the idea that ‘you might be wrong’ is inconsistent with the postmodern thesis that there is no such thing as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. The postmodern thesis stops people from arrogantly saying that they, and they alone, are ‘right’; but it also stops anyone from ever having to humbly admit that they might have been ‘wrong’.

The Australian Realist hopes that a broadly naturalist metaphysics is roughly right, but is mindful of the possibility that it could be wrong. To be an Australian Realist, you need to be satisfied with the suspicion that you are probably getting closer to the truth, even though you know it is also possible that you are continually moving ever farther away. You should not expect to find a consensus, even among fellow Australian Realists—not even over what you regard as ‘core’ issues, like materialism and dualism, or four-dimensionalism. It is better to travel hopefully than to arrive. When Alexander of Macedon reached India, it is said he fell to his knees and wept because there were no more lands to conquer. Few of us should be so lucky.

Whether Australasian philosophers are ‘Realists’ or not, many have been involved to some degree in a rebirth and growth of metaphysics in the region around the end of the twentieth century. This historical development brings back, into the Academies, some of the abiding metaphysical concerns that are widespread among peoples all over the world—and that had been of concern to the peoples in the region even before the Europeans brought universities, and academic disciplines, to this end of the Earth. It is worth remembering that the academic discipline of metaphysics is not unconnected to the traditions of thought that have always been, and will continue to be, deeply and personally important to many people outside the universities. We cannot avoid the potential for conflict, if anyone outside the academies were to object to the way the academics often argue against metaphysical views that some regard as sacred and not to be questioned. Yet the potential for friction should not deter us from asking the questions and arguing about the answers.

References

Alexander, S. (1920). *Space, time, and deity*. London: Macmillan.

Armstrong, D. (1968). *A materialist theory of the mind*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Armstrong, D. (1978). *Universals and scientific realism* (vols. 1, 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Armstrong, D. (1997). *A world of states of affairs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Beebee, H., & Dodd, J. (Eds.). (2005). *Truthmakers: The contemporary debate*. Oxford: Clarendon.
Bigelow, J. (1988). *The reality of numbers: A physicalist's philosophy of mathematics*. Oxford: Clarendon.
Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1990). *Science and necessity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Campbell, K. (1970). *Body and mind*. Garden City: Doubleday.
Campbell, K. (1990). *Abstract particulars*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Chalmers, D. (1996). *The conscious mind*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Charlesworth, M. (Ed.). (2005). *Aboriginal religions in Australia: An anthology of recent writings*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Cheyne, C., & Worrall, J. (Eds.). (2006). *Rationality and reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave*. New York: Springer.
Devitt, M. (1996). *Realism and truth*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Ellis, B. (2002). *The philosophy of nature: A guide to the new essentialism*. London: Acumen.
Fox, J. (1987). Truthmaker. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65*, 188–207.
Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. *Philosophical Quarterly, 32*, 127–36.
Jackson, F. (1998). *From metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis*. Oxford: Clarendon.
Kant, I. (1961). *Critique of pure reason*. London: Macmillan.
Lewis, D. (1986). *On the plurality of worlds*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Lewis, D. (1999). *Papers in metaphysics and epistemology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Monnoyer, J.-M. (Ed.). (2004). *La Structure du Monde: Objets, Propriétés, États de Choses: Renouveau de la Métaphysicque dans l'école Australienne de Philosophie*. Paris: Vrin.
Musgrave, A. (1999). *Essays on realism and rationalism*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Nerlich, G. (1994). *The shape of space*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Patterson, J. (1992). *Exploring Maori values*. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.
Popper, K. (1972). *The logic of scientific discovery*. London: Hutchinson.
Popper, K. (1983). *Realism and the aim of science*. London: Hutchinson.
Prior, A. (1959). Thank goodness that's over. *Philosophy, 34*, 12–17.
Reed, A. (1978). *Aboriginal myths, legends and fables*. Wellington: A. H & A. W Reed.
Smart, J. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. *Philosophical Review, 69*, 141–56.
Smart, J. (1968). *Between science and philosophy*. New York: Random House.
Smart, J. (1989). *Our place in the universe*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Stanner, W. (2009). *The dreaming and other essays*. Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda.
Taylor, B. (1987). The truth in realism. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 160*, 45–63.
Taylor, B. (2006). *Models, truth, and realism*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Epistemology

13

Stephen Hetherington

Contents

Introduction 380
Elements of Knowing 380
  Experience and Inner Incorrigibility 380
  Perception as Knowledge 383
  Reasons and Inference 384
  Truth 385
  Belief 386
  Justification and Conjecture 387
Analyses of Knowing 389
  Reliabilism 389
  The Gettier Problem 391
  Knowledge-Gradualism 394
  Contextualism 395
  Understanding and Knowing-How 396
  Testimony 397
  A Priori Knowledge and Self-Knowledge 398
Sceptical Thoughts 400
  Other Minds 400
  Inductive Scepticism 401
  Radical Scepticism 403
  Sceptical Arguments: Deriving Them and Defusing Them 404
  Naturalism and Realism 405
  Scepticism About Epistemology Itself 407
References 408

I am grateful to André Gallois and Tim Oakley for their comments on a draft of this chapter.

S. Hetherington
School of Humanities and Languages, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: s.hetherington@unsw.edu.au

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_14, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Introduction

Imagine being confronted with this challenge:

> Construct a personal epistemology, a philosophical theory of yourself as a knower or justified believer, but do this using only ideas as they have been proposed or developed, in books or articles, by Australasian philosophers.

Could you meet that challenge? This is an application of the question of what it is that (published) Australasian epistemology has contributed to epistemology as a whole. And that is a question of significance for any depiction of Australasian philosophy, given how central epistemology has traditionally been to both the history and the content of philosophy.

So, picture yourself as a person who wants epistemological self-understanding but who is armed only with Australasian philosophical reserves. You are about to begin this conceptual enterprise; with what initial move, though? Should you start by thinking about pure reason? Or would sensory foundations be a preferable aim? What about reflecting upon whether knowledge, say, is possible in the first place? Or upon what knowledge is, if it is possible at all?

In 1976, Selwyn Grave published *Philosophy in Australia since 1958*. Although a brief book, there would have been room within it to discuss work on epistemology. Alas, no substantial mention was made. Scattered remarks, bearing upon some epistemological work, appeared in sections on philosophy of mind and on philosophical logic and the philosophy of language. That was an insufficient treatment even at the time, as this chapter will make apparent. Since then, much else has happened within Australasian epistemology, as this chapter will also explain. (And there is a particular need for it to do so. No treatment of Australasian epistemology appeared, too, in Grave's 1984 book, *A History of Philosophy in Australia*; in the 1992 collection edited by Jan Srzednicki and David Wood, *Essays on Philosophy in Australia*; or in the 1988 paper by Robert Brown. An overview is overdue).

Elements of Knowing

Experience and Inner Incorrigibility

We may begin with introspection and sensations. Empiricist traditions would approve of this. After all, typically they regard most favourably the senses, plus awareness of sensory data, as being the initial epistemic source, the primary epistemic basis, of knowledge as a whole. And empiricism has had a prominent presence within Australasian epistemology. I will say more in the section 'Naturalism and Realism' about that presence. For now, let us focus directly upon how the grasp of one's experiences has been discussed within Australasian philosophy.

Do inner mental experiences and states allow there to be incorrigible knowledge of them? These days, this question is not so evident within epistemological writing; for a while, though, it was. And Australasian epistemology encompassed a range of reactions to it. Most notable was David Armstrong's contribution (1963a, 1968, pp. 100–113). He argued that there is no logical incorrigibility (or indubitability; he did not distinguish between these epistemic properties) in one's beliefs about one's mental states at a time. Any such belief *could* be false. Here are four of Armstrong's arguments:

(1) *Statements*. Try formulating an introspective belief, using some statement—'I'm feeling pain', for example. This need not be a publicly audible statement; it might only be 'inner'. In any case, formulating it takes some amount of time. It is an event with a start and a finish. Now imagine yourself in the course of formulating your statement. Its beginning is past; still, you need to be able to remember that beginning if you are to hold the statement as a whole in mind. But then the fallibility of memory enters the story. Incorrigibility departs. This is so, even if you formulate your introspective belief using the word 'now' (or some equivalent): 'I'm now feeling pain'. When exactly is now? If it is a period of time with even some duration (a beginning and at least one distinct further moment, such as an ending), again you fall foul of memory's fallibility. Yet, conversely, if there is no duration at all, there is no real report.

(2) *Classifications*. To describe an inner experience or mental state is to use at least one classificatory concept (saying how the experience or state is, identifying a feature of it). However, classification is forever fallible. Wherever genuine classification lives, there is an associated possibility of misclassification. Correlatively, corrigibility is present.

(3) *Distinct existences*. Are there any wholly nonverbal awarenesses of the inner (such as of a passing pain)? If so, then (1) and (2)—by applying only to awarenesses that are verbal in form—need to be supplemented by further arguments. Consider, then, what feels like a nonverbal apprehending of something inner. You seem, to yourself, to have an experience *E*. You seem, to yourself, to be aware of *E*. But you cannot describe *E*, even to yourself. Your apparently being aware of *E* is (in Hume's sense) a *distinct existence* from *E* itself, apparently the object of that apparent awareness. Yet wherever there are distinct existences, there was a logical possibility of just one of the two having come into existence. So, the existence of what feels like an apprehending of something inner does not guarantee the existence of whatever feels like it is being apprehended. Even in the case of pain, say, this is so, according to Armstrong.

(4) *Logically privileged access*. Is it possible, nonetheless, that people have logically privileged (even if not logically indubitable) access to their inner experiences? Not if Armstrong is correct: If you could be mistaken about your inner experience, another person could be right about it, by being better placed to discern it accurately.

Armstrong's approach to this issue was similar to John Mackie's (1963). Mackie was less impressed than Armstrong, however, by considerations about language. Even if there are no incorrigible empirical statements (he argued), there could be incorrigible empirical knowledge. At any rate, there could be—except that, on independent grounds, Mackie offers a version of (3).

He notes this (Mackie 1963, p. 22): ‘It is one thing to have an experience and it is another to reflect on it, to notice what sort of an experience you are having’. Nothing is ‘an awareness of itself’ (Mackie 1963, p. 24). To suggest otherwise is to generate ‘an infinite system of cognitions’ (Mackie 1963, p. 24)—for instance, an awareness wholly or partly of being cold and *thereby* being aware of being cold and *thereby* being aware of being cold and *thereby* being aware of. . . .

Armstrong and Mackie were powerful opponents of the incorrigibility thesis (as it came to be called). Was it therefore dead? Not clearly; Frank Jackson (1973) came to its defence, aiming to defuse several arguments against it, especially Armstrong’s. Was the incorrigibility thesis therefore alive? Again not clearly; Brian Ellis (1976) accepted Jackson’s refutations of those arguments—but provided an argument of his own against the thesis. Let us gain some sense of these further contributions to the debate.

(not-1) *Statements*. Jackson rejected (1). He denied that Armstrong was right to present the issue in terms of statements whose formulation takes time. Rather, according to Jackson (1973, pp. 52–53), what is at stake are propositions; and these are abstract. They do not depend for their existence upon there existing spatio-temporal manifestations of them in particular languages—written inscriptions, spoken utterances, conscious thinkings. Jackson was directing us towards the idea of propositional knowledge’s being literally knowledge of a proposition’s truth, not merely knowledge whose content is best represented via a propositional form. (This is a larger epistemological controversy, not yet settled. Probably most contemporary epistemologists would agree with Jackson. In the section ‘Reliabilism’, we meet Armstrong’s fuller views on knowledge. The section ‘Understanding and Knowing-How’ will also comment on the nature of propositional knowledge).

(not-2) *Classifications*. How *could* misclassifications be part of the content of an introspective belief, say? Yes, predicates are used, but, again, these need not be from a specific language. Yes, they could involve a comparison with other instances; yet these need not be held in mind, potentially to be misremembered in their details. Instead, the comparison can remain indeterminate—not so informative, perhaps, but not an impossibility either (Jackson 1973, p. 54).

(not-3) *Distinct existences*. A husband and his wife are distinct existences. Even so, no one can *be* a husband unless there is a correlative wife: ‘two things may be both necessarily distinct and logically dependent’ (Jackson 1973, p. 59). Presumably, for example, Jackson is arguing that (i) believing oneself to be in pain and (ii) one’s being in pain are numerically distinct yet logically interdependent. The dependence is at least one-way: (i) entails (ii).

Notwithstanding Jackson’s defence of the incorrigibility thesis, Ellis (1976) believed there to be a further reason for discarding that thesis. Recall Armstrong’s (4), regarding privileged access. He asked whether someone else might have better epistemic access to the inner happenings or states of a person (call him or her *S*) than *S* has. Ellis wondered whether, if other people do not have such access, *S* never has a chance to be corrected (hence trained) by others, in making judgements about *S*'s inner life. This would not be a problem if *S* has 'a special innate capacity to make such judgements [about his or her sense experience] which renders intensive and exacting training unnecessary' (Ellis 1976, p. 121). But do we have such capacities? Ellis presumes not; instead, we have 'false confidence'. (Think of the confidence people had, prior to Freud's insights, in their ability to know their own motives).

Thus proceeded that important debate, regarding the incorrigibility thesis. I have provided many details, because the debate featured some of Australasia's best philosophers in a closely focused discussion of a classic issue within epistemology—a discussion that was among the first prominent and extended-in-print Australasian epistemological debates. It was also as philosophically productive a discussion of this issue as there has been. We are left with a sharpened sense of the following questions and possibilities. Is there empirically foundational knowledge? If so, it could well be introspective. If so, could it be incorrigible? If so, this would be what many philosophers have wanted it to be; and certainly much post-Cartesian epistemology sought to make such an epistemological vision manifest. But epistemologists these days tend not to seek that outcome. As a prospective feature even of epistemic foundations, the prospect of fallibility is now tolerated by epistemologists. (Why so? An acceptance of naturalism is often part of the story: see the section 'Naturalism and Realism'. There can be a lingering longing for empirical infallibility, though, even if not for logical infallibility: see the section 'Reliabilism'—on Armstrong on knowledge).

Perception as Knowledge

For argument's sake, suppose that empiricism is right to require knowledge in general to be founded upon perceptual knowledge in particular. But suppose, too (from part of the section 'Experience and Inner Incorrigibility'), that there cannot be incorrigible perceptual foundations for knowledge. Then how is perception to supply knowledge? This might depend upon the nature of perception. Does that nature, for example, make perceptual knowledge difficult to have, especially as a basis for knowledge in general?

Armstrong argued from the outset, in his book *Perception and the Physical World* (1961), that perception is particularly well suited for providing knowledge of the world. This was not because it is incorrigible, as we saw. It was because perception *is* knowledge. More strictly, Armstrong said this: To perceive is to acquire knowledge—in the act of perceiving, but not as a causally or even conceptually separate result. The moment of perception is a moment of acquiring knowledge—because the event of perceiving is an event of gaining knowledge. In general, the knowledge is of aspects of the immediate spatio-temporal environment—a physical object, a specific state of affairs. Most likely, this knowledge is acquired via bodily senses.

'But sometimes no belief at all arises during perception', it will be objected. Armstrong replies that, in such a case, there is nonetheless an inclination to believe. This inclination is to be understood counterfactually (Armstrong 1961, p. 86): If not for an alternative belief already in place, the perceptual belief would have arisen.

And this analysis may be generalised. Knowledge is at least a true belief. So, perception is at least a true belief. But sensory illusion is mistaken, in detail at any rate. Hence, it is at least a false perceptual belief. The famed argument from illusion compares—and finds phenomenologically indistinguishable—a true perceptual belief and a false one. Therein lies both the conceptual challenge and its solution. We thus gain, as Jackson calls it in his book *Perception* (1977, p. 37), an epistemic analysis of sensing or perceiving.

Slightly surprisingly, Armstrong's analysis included no detailed account of what knowledge is. (Not until 1973, in *Belief, Truth and Knowledge*, did he fully formulate such an account. The section 'Reliabilism' will begin by outlining it.) He felt no need to do so. In *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (1968, Chap. 10), he refined the analysis somewhat, in the light of a (1963b) revision which purported to relinquish such reliance upon the notion of knowledge. That revision was responding to criticisms by Max Deutscher (1963). Armstrong decided that perception is still at least the acquiring of a true belief—where this true belief did not need to be knowledge. In a given case, it might—or it might not—be knowledge. Armstrong left this open while agreeing with Deutscher that a mere true belief is not knowledge. They took themselves to be on conceptually solid ground there, for, admittedly, it is epistemologically standard to assume that a mere true belief could not be knowledge. (But see the section 'Knowledge-Gradualism', on whether Armstrong, Deutscher, and others are correct in that standard assumption).

A fallibilist foundationalism thus takes shape. Perceiving is believing, which can be knowing. This could be immediate perceiving, which is non-inferential believing, perhaps non-inferential knowing. Or it could be mediate perceiving, which is inferential believing, perhaps inferential knowing. When there is perceiving without congruent believing, this is only because the inclination so to believe remains a mere inclination: The belief in question 'is held in check by a stronger belief' (1968, p. 221). Sense-impressions are possible, but they are not 'perceived items or objects' (1968, p. 221). And, of course, incorrigibility continues not to be part of this story. Humans are natural parts of a natural world. So, thereby, is human perceptual knowledge. Naturalism reigns. (What does this mean and imply? The section 'Naturalism and Realism' will comment further).

Reasons and Inference

You are investigating (from the 'Introduction') the chances of attaining an adequate epistemology, using only Australasian resources. The sections 'Experience and Inner Incorrigibility' and 'Perception as Knowledge' discussed possible sensory beginnings. Where might these lead? Armstrong's dispute with Deutscher ('Perception as Knowledge') was partly about the need for, and role of, reasons within knowing. And this dispute foreshadowed what is now known as the debate between epistemic externalism and epistemic internalism. (For details of that debate, see Kornblith 2001).

As mentioned above, Deutscher (1963) objected that Armstrong's theory of perception allows perceiving to be the acquiring merely of true belief, rather than knowledge. Why so? The perceiver was not required to be using or acquiring epistemically supportive reasons for the perceptual belief's truth. Although that belief would be true if veridical perception was occurring, the perceiver need not have epistemically good reason to believe in its being true.

To which Armstrong (1963b) responded, as we saw, by not requiring those true beliefs, acquired in the event of perceiving, to be knowledge. Still, he said more than that. He also presaged his later (1973a) theory of knowledge. He noted that there could nonetheless be an actual reliability—'a law-like connection' (1963b, p. 248)—in the perceiver's relation to the perceived aspect of the world. Would this connection thereby be a 'reason' for belief? In terms proposed later by Deutscher (1973), it could be both a ground and a reason: The former is a reason that allows other reasons to function as reasons. But Armstrong does not insist on the perceiver's being aware of the law-like link 'between belief and fact' (1963b, p. 248). In this sense (he concludes), knowledge need not be based on reasons.

Contemporary epistemologists would call this reply by Armstrong externalist—especially because (as he would later argue) the law-like connection as such can be epistemic, making the difference between a true belief's being knowledge and not being knowledge. In the 1960s, however, this mode of interpretation—linking externalism and the realm of the epistemic—was not yet part of the epistemological vernacular.

What was also yet to be appreciated, in the exchange between Armstrong and Deutscher, was some of the potential difficulty in understanding causal dependence relations involved in having a reason for a belief. Tim Oakley (2006) has since stressed this issue, importantly so, because the issue is pivotal for some traditionally central epistemological debates, such as between foundationalists and coherentists. Recall (from 'Perception as Knowledge') that Armstrong's theory is foundationalist. According to it, there is knowledge at all only because some knowledge is foundational; and perceptual knowledge not based on reasons exemplifies the latter idea. Yet Oakley argues that 'no satisfactory account of epistemic dependence has been given, and probably none is capable of being given' (Oakley 2006, p. 20). He assays analyses in terms (respectively) of inference, necessary conditions and support relations. None succeeds. A challenge has thus been issued.

Truth

Epistemologists often parse the logical form of the phrase, 'knowing that *p*', as 'knowing the truth that *p*'. Even when admitting that aspects of knowing's nature are obscure, epistemologists never weaken their commitment to this claim about knowledge: Having knowledge that *p* is, in part, being correct as to *p*. (One has a belief that *p*, say, which is true.) However, epistemologists offer scant commentary on the nature of truth. Debates about this are usually left to philosophers of language and, increasingly, philosophical logicians.

Australasian philosophy conforms to that trend. Armstrong (1973a, Chap. 9) offered a preliminary version of a correspondence account. More recently (2004), he has provided a comparatively detailed analysis in terms of truthmakers. Because the details of that analysis are metaphysical, though, not epistemological, I will not comment on them here.

What does merit epistemological comment are some comparatively epistemic Australasian views on the nature of truth. These come from Brian Ellis (1969, 1979, 1990, Chaps. 4, 5, 6, and 7) and Huw Price (2003). Ellis, most extensively, rejects correspondence and redundancy theories of truth. We should (he argues) replace such theories with an explicitly value-laden conception—because no correspondence or redundancy theory does justice to truth's value (1990, p. 217). Which value is that? Truth is belief-worthiness, akin to ethical rightness. It 'is a kind of limit notion of reasonable belief' (Ellis 1990, p. 269). This is a Peircean realism, but naturalistic nevertheless (Ellis 1990, p. 272). It is grounded in human nature, biologically explicated (Ellis 1990, p. 243), not in abstract rules (Ellis 1990, p. 218). Truth is not a property beyond the satisfaction of various values governing apt belief-adjustment; it *is* a blend of such values.

Ellis' analysis is thereby pragmatic (Ellis 1990, p. 213). So is Price's way of thinking about truth. However, for Price, although truth is a norm of assertoric discourse, it is stronger than the Peircean norm of equating truth with a kind of justified or warranted assertibility. Without this norm, speakers will feel no need to resolve disagreement among themselves, motivated by a feeling of disapproval not characterisable merely in Peircean terms. Insofar as truth is normative, it is motivational and immediately so. But Peircean talk of ideal limits is hardly motivational in that way.

Ellis and Price thus challenge some views taken for granted by epistemologists in general, including most Australasian ones. Yet because Australasian epistemology has not been noticeably pragmatist in its general leanings, Ellis' and Price's approach remains less discussed by epistemologists than is perhaps merited.

Belief

Truth is usually thought to be only one of knowledge's properties or elements (see the section 'Truth'). Another of these is belief. The belief is what *has* the property of being true. The belief is the entity that gets to *be* knowledge (so long as it has various further features, of course). Now, epistemologists in general have not said much about the nature of belief. They tend to use, but without also analysing, a concept of belief when formulating analyses of knowledge. Armstrong (chiefly in *Belief, Truth and Knowledge*: 1973a) is again the main Australasian exception to that trend. We have already found him (in the section 'Perception as Knowledge') conceiving of perception as a kind of believing. How, in turn, did he conceive of believing?

Beliefs are mental states, argued Armstrong (Armstrong 1973a, Chap. 1). They have the following features. They can be dispositional; still, they need not be, in the sense that this is not their conceptually primary nature (Armstrong 1973a, Chap. 2). They can be present unconsciously, unexpressed. When they *are* expressed, there need not be just one specific form this could have taken, even for a particular belief with its particular content. (For example, there need not be merely one specific linguistic expression of a particular belief.) The content of a belief is propositional. It thereby involves concepts, which can be simple or complex. Simple concepts are 'certain sorts of selective capacity' (Armstrong 1973a, p. 66), in principle discoverable by discrimination-experiments (Armstrong 1973a, pp. 62–63). Indeed, suggests Armstrong (Armstrong 1973a, p. 63): 'in theory at least, discrimination-experiments could elicit the possession of quite sophisticated and abstract concepts, including even the concepts of logic'. Note, too, that there is scope for vagueness in this: 'it seems clear that there are degrees of belief' (Armstrong 1973a, p. 108). (We should bear this in mind in the section 'Contextualism'.)

Following Hume (Armstrong 1973a, p. 70), Armstrong also distinguishes beliefs from thoughts. Here, the concept of action enters his analysis (Armstrong 1973a, p. 74): '*beliefs are*, *mere thoughts are not*, *premisses in our practical reasonings*'. In general, beliefs are action-directed. So, Armstrong's is a causal story. As such, it is naturalist.

Again, epistemologists have not yet analysed belief as fully as could be desired. Few try to determine what it is to have a specific belief. Stephen Stich (1984) argues forcefully that Armstrong's attempt fails, although he concedes that it 'is the fullest—and to my mind by far the best—statement of the 'causal role' or 'functionalist' analysis of mental concepts' (Stich 1984, p. 121). The problem, in Stich's view, is that no such theory can satisfactorily isolate any belief's specific intentionality, its content. Armstrong allowed there to be different forms of expression for a particular content. But if Stich is right, the content is not satisfactorily determined in the first place. For example, he contends, Armstrong's analysis overlooks such reference-determining factors as (Stich 1984, p. 128) '[t]he long term causal history of an expression, the current linguistic practices prevailing in the speaker's linguistic community. . . .'

Stich is expressing an externalism about mental content, an approach which has subsequently gained in philosophical popularity. And although Armstrong's account is somewhat externalist, it is less so than most epistemologists would wish. The section 'A Priori Knowledge and Self-Knowledge' will say more about this topic.

Justification and Conjecture

The putative element of knowing which has occasioned the most theorising among epistemologists is usually called the justification condition—more fully, the epistemic justification condition. Australasian epistemologists have not written so much about the nature of justification. I will mention two notable contributions, by Tim Oakley and by Alan Musgrave.

Oakley (1988) sought to reconcile (i) with (ii):

(i) the power of some classic sceptical reasoning, doubting the existence of epistemically justified beliefs (see the section 'Radical Scepticism' on this sceptical thinking);

(ii) the apparently commonsensical confidence that people (including epistemologists) routinely have in there being some epistemically justified beliefs.

Can (i) and (ii) be reconciled? 'Yes', urged Oakley: we need only pay attention to how variegated a concept is that of epistemic justification. It encompasses several distinct 'strands', each of which could be termed a bona fide conception of epistemic justification. And (Oakley 1988, p. 270) 'the sceptic may be seen as denying justifiedness *of one sort*, while leaving intact ascriptions of justifiedness of other sorts'.

Moreover, the sceptic need not be focusing on odd or recherché kinds of justification. Only 'good, standard, common uses' of the terms 'justified' or 'reasonable' need be at stake (Oakley 1988, p. 279). Thus, for example (Oakley 1988, p. 278):

> The sceptic can easily accept the sensibleness of holding beliefs relative to local or short range aims; it may be sensible to hold a belief relative to the immediate goal of the elaboration of a pre-existing belief system. The very same belief may be unjustified, in the sceptic's view, relative to the aim of holding a belief which is not merely derivable from other unquestioned beliefs but from other justified beliefs, or from a set of beliefs which may be regarded as in some way better than any possible alternative set.

Would Oakley's pluralist way of understanding the concept of justification also embrace Musgrave's approach? The latter seeks to develop a Popperian critical rationalism (e.g. 1999, 2006, pp. 293–295). Karl Popper (who taught briefly in New Zealand) has been vastly influential within several areas of philosophy and beyond, less so within epistemology. His critical rationalism is more commonly featured in philosophical discussions about science. Mainstream epistemologists tend not to investigate Popperian epistemological ideas. But Musgrave has done so; and part of his contribution has been a precisification of Popper's idea of conjectural knowledge (1999, pp. 331–332). Any instance of conjectural knowledge that p is a case of someone's having a true and conjecturally justified belief that p; and to be justified conjecturally is to be justified in accord with critical rationalism.

What does that mean? For Musgrave, critical rationalism is this thesis (Musgrave 1999, p. 324): 'It is reasonable to believe that P (at time t) if and only if P is that hypothesis which has (at time t) best withstood serious criticism'. That picture of justification is not to be equated with justificationism (Musgrave 1999, p. 331), which says this: 'A's believing that P is reasonable if and only if A can justify P, that is, give a conclusive or inconclusive reason for P, that is, establish that P is true or probable'.

Musgrave's emphasis is on the justification of believing as an inquiring action, rather than the justification of a belief content as such. In each case, the justification is epistemic because truth is sought, evidence is used, and when falsity is encountered further inquiry ensues. But if justificationism is false, one's believing that *p* could be reasonable even if one cannot justify *p* itself as either true or probably true. Sceptics try to show that the latter sort of justification is beyond us (as the sections 'Sceptical Thoughts' explain in general). Musgrave's approach is thus anti-sceptical. (And the section 'Inductive Scepticism' will mention his approach's application to a specific kind of scepticism.) Note that here, as in other aspects of epistemic justification (such as Oakley's), degrees or grades are possible. There can be more *or* less serious criticism, which can be withstood best but still more *or* less well. (This flexibility is relevant to the section 'Knowledge-Gradualism'.)

Australasian epistemology has also included questioning of a different thesis that is likewise called 'justificationism'. *Is* justification needed within each instance of knowing? In two main places (2001, Chap. 4, 2011a, Chap. 4), I offer arguments against justificationism—the epistemologically standard view that any instance of knowledge is constituted partly by the presence of supportive justification. The more recent of those arguments (Hetherington 2011a, Chap. 4) proceeds as follows.

Epistemologists typically follow Socrates' lead (within Plato's *Meno*), by thinking of justification-within-knowledge as a tether. Socrates proclaimed that a true belief which lacked such a tether would be like one of Daedalus' statues. These marvellously life-like creations could walk away (it was said). Analogously, a justified true belief is a true belief which is not lightly lost. Because the justification 'holds' it in place, its usefulness *qua* true belief continues for that believer: He or she retains it, deferring to its evidential tether. Nevertheless, suppose for a moment that this world is causally fluky, structured by no causal rhyme or reason. Then a tether of good evidence, for instance, would not function so desirably. A 'static' body of evidence would restrict a believer's ability to continue mirroring the (causally fluky) world. Luck, not evidence, better serves a believer within any such world. And do we know that this is not a causally fluky world? Not if Hume was right to deny us insight into this world's causal underpinnings. (And was he? See the section 'Radical Scepticism'.) In which case, we also fail to know that knowledge must include justification, as this is generally conceived of by epistemologists. Maybe Musgrave's conjectural justification—a belief's having *so far survived* critical rationalist rigours—would remain acceptable. Is that the most we should demand from any instance of knowledge?

Analyses of Knowing

Reliabilism

Musgrave (we saw in the section 'Justification and Conjecture') offers a Popperian analysis of knowing as conjectural. By being part of inquiring, knowing is part of how people proceed as epistemic *agents*. I remarked that Popperian ideas have been influential within philosophy, albeit less so within mainstream analytic epistemology. Now consider what has been probably the most influential Australasian contribution to mainstream analytic epistemology. It is Armstrong's reliabilism; and in a few respects it is starkly different to Musgrave's proposal. Armstrong's is very much a picture of knowledge as the preserve of epistemic subjects, not agents. Also, knowledge as he understands it is as far from being conjectural as is realistically possible.

Primarily, Armstrong provided a theory of non-inferential knowledge. At any rate, this was the influential component of his theory. Non-inferential knowledge that *p* is present when (with all else being equal) no inference has been directed specifically at forming and justifying the belief that *p*. Such an inference need not be conscious and temporally protracted. The question is that of whether such an inference is present in *any* form. If it is not, can the belief that *p* nonetheless be knowledge? The belief would not be supported by reasoning from evidence. Could it enjoy an alternative form of epistemic backing?

Armstrong claimed so. In *Belief, Truth and Knowledge* (1973a, Part III), he produced his full theory of knowledge. Details of it had appeared, without being developed, in earlier publications. His (1963b) contained a proto-proposal. In *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (1968, Chap. 9), the proposal is extended. In (1973a), the complete theory appears. One of the first reliabilist theories, it remains among the clearest and most precise of them. When epistemologists think about reliabilism, Armstrong's is one of the two or three key theories cited.

And epistemologists think often about reliabilism. It has become the most readily mentioned exemplar of the externalist approach to understanding epistemic phenomena. Although different conceptions exist of externalism, probably its usual rendering is this: An epistemic property (such as those of being justified or being knowledge) could be possessed by a belief, say, even if the believer neither is nor realistically could be aware of the property's being possessed by that belief.

For example, a belief could be knowledge without all the features that make it knowledge being easily noticeable by the believer. (Even its *being* knowledge need not be within his or her ken).

Armstrong's theory perfectly exemplified that approach. It was motivated by an externalist metaphor, comparing (i) a non-inferential knower, such as someone possessing simple perceptual knowledge of the physical surroundings, with (ii) a reliable thermometer. When the thermometer functions properly, reliability is present—reliability in registering or 'reporting' a pertinent aspect of the immediate physical surroundings. The same is true of a person. He or she literally—like the thermometer metaphorically—perceives the surroundings in a specific respect at a given time. And the person has knowledge by being like the thermometer. In each case, reliability is the key—a truth-directed form of reliability. The thermometer functions properly by being correct, as does a knower. But in neither case is a fluky correctness sufficient. A properly functioning thermometer is reliably right, as is a knower.

Armstrong explicated the relevant kind of truth-directedness along the following lines. (A more general account, talking of epistemic justification rather than knowledge, was provided by Alvin Goldman, the other epistemologist most generally associated with reliabilism: 1979.) A person has non-inferential knowledge that *p* just when he or she is in physical circumstances which are such that, as a matter of nomic necessity, any belief (with that content) formed within them will be true. Nomic necessity is natural-law-like necessity. A knower's physical circumstances render him or her certain to be correct in believing that p—where this certainty instantiates the world's causal compulsion, not a logical or metaphysical necessity and not a psychological urgency. Armstrong's non-inferential knower that *p* at a time is a highly successful natural phenomenon, as regards *p* at that time.

Note the form of infallibilism in this proposal. It could be called nomic infallibilism, rather than logical or evidential infallibilism. And it is noteworthy because a naturalistic analysis, especially, might be expected to regard even knowers as fallible—as *able* not to have gained knowledge that *p*, even when in fact they *have* gained it. Not Armstrong, though; for him, knowledge that *p* is a wholly reliable state of affairs, in both its signification and provenance. Its existence is a nomically conclusive sign of how the world is, as regards *p*. (Yet there is not incorrigibility even when there is knowledge, if Armstrong is correct in the section 'Experience and Inner Incorrigibility'.)

As I said, Armstrong's theory was influential. When Laurence BonJour (1985, Chap. 3), for instance, presented his much-discussed critique of externalist foundationalisms about knowledge, Armstrong's was one of the two paradigmatic reliabilist theories of knowledge or justification (the other was Goldman's 1979) upon which he focused. Armstrong's respected place within contemporary epistemology would be sufficiently established by his reliabilism alone, even if he had not also contributed in other ways.

The Gettier Problem

Reliabilisms, such as Armstrong's (see the section 'Reliabilism'), are usually offered as analyses or explications of part of what it is for a belief to be justified or knowledge. Completing such an analysis or explication has proved to be singularly difficult for epistemologists. In the case of knowledge, this difficulty is standardly called 'the Gettier problem'. Australasian epistemology has not escaped its grip.

It is the challenge of defining knowledge—propositional knowledge—in response to such puzzle cases as were formulated by Edmund Gettier (1963). Supposedly, those cases were counterexamples to paradigmatic versions of what came to be termed the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge. Such cases—Gettier's and similar ones—were quickly called 'Gettier cases'. Within each such case, someone forms a belief which is true, which is also well-but-fallibly justified by evidence and circumstances, yet which is not knowledge. So said Gettier about his own examples; so have agreed most epistemologists, then and since. Why? The most popular informal explanation says that each Gettiered belief (to use another term from this stanza of epistemological history) combines *only luckily* the properties of being true and of being justified. Because this flukiness is present, the belief is not knowledge. (Peter Unger provided the first published version of this form of analysis in 1968).

What, then, is knowledge *if* not simply a well-but-fallibly-justified true belief? ('Maybe knowledge always requires *in*fallibility'. That suggestion sparks sceptical thoughts, because infallibility is rarely if ever attained. See the section on 'Sceptical Thoughts'; until then, put them aside.) The question of what, exactly, it is to know a particular truth—a question given increased urgency by Gettier's intervention—has spawned many ideas, mainly as to what *else* is needed if a well-but-fallibly justified true belief is to be knowledge. I will not recount them here. (See Hetherington 2011c for an overview.) However, I will mention some Australasian reactions to the Gettier problem.

The standard interpretation of Gettier cases receives explanatory support from Jackson, in *From Metaphysics to Ethics* (1998, pp. 28, 32, 36–37, 47). What is at stake in the debate, he says, is 'our folk theory of knowledge in the sense of revealing what governs folk ascriptions of knowledge' (Jackson 1998, p. 28). People both make and withhold such ascriptions. These are widely withheld from Gettiered beliefs, thereby rejecting the justified-true-belief analysis, condemning it as not doing justice to 'our folk theory of knowledge'. Of course, the frustrating history of philosophers seeking improved analyses of knowledge should make us wonder whether, in the end, philosophical analysis of such a concept is possible. Undaunted, Jackson believes it is. So, he (2002) deflects Timothy Williamson's arguments to the contrary in *Knowledge and its Limits* (2000). Does Jackson then provide a philosophical analysis of knowledge? In his (2005), he gestures at there possibly being several equally good ways—using epistemologically standard ideas—of analysing knowledge. These include the informal idea of knowledge's being a belief which non-flukily combines the properties of being justified and being true. Which ideas have Australasian epistemologists favoured, in reacting to the Gettier problem?

Note first a 'minimal' solution from Armstrong (1973a, pp. 152–153). It aims to solve Gettier's challenge without moving beyond the traditional analysis of knowledge. Armstrong says that the reason why the Gettiered beliefs in Gettier's own cases are not knowledge is that each is based upon evidence, some of which is false and therefore not knowledge; and (inferential) knowledge comes only *from* knowledge. Armstrong reaches here for a traditional epistemological idea, concerning regress and knowledge. But its applicability to the Gettier problem as a whole is limited. Arguably, not all Gettiered beliefs are inferential: A directly perceptual belief might be only luckily both true and formed (due to fluky molecular fluctuations). Moreover, some Gettiered beliefs, even when inferentially formed, do not clearly involve *false* evidence. (For the latter kind of case, see Feldman 1974.)

So, let us consider alternative proposals. André Gallois (2006) looks to A. J. Ayer's instance, in *The Problem of Knowledge* (1956), of the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge. Ayer articulated knowledge's justification condition as one's having the right to be sure. And Gettier took himself to have falsified Ayer's analysis. But if Gallois is right, epistemologists have not taken Ayer's analysis seriously enough: One's knowing just *is* one's having the right to be sure; the belief condition and the truth condition fall away. Gallois calls this a normative analysis of knowledge.

Adrian Heathcote's (2006) approach is quite different. Truthmaking, not normativity, is his focus. Which state of affairs is the truthmaker for the Gettiered belief? Is the believer aware of that state of affairs? And is this awareness functioning as evidence within his or her justification for the belief? In Gettier cases, it is not; yet it needed to be, if the belief was to be knowledge.

Is Gallois correct? Is Heathcote right? It is too early to say. Many suggested solutions have failed to win general epistemological approval. What is clear is that no easy solution is possible for the Gettier problem. A difficult conceptual decision needs to be made somewhere, if that problem is to be solved. John Bigelow (2006) makes this apparent—uncovering the problem's complicated conceptual structure and comparing the problem's conceptual impact to that which Russell's Paradox had upon Frege's set-theoretic logicist project.

How much impact should the Gettier problem have had? Perhaps the conceptually difficult solution will involve reconceiving either (i) the standard interpretation or (ii) the strength of Gettier cases in the first place. I have attempted the former task (1998, 2001, Chap. 3, 2011a, Chap. 3, 2012), by asking in a few ways whether there *is* a lack of knowledge within Gettier cases. Brian Weatherson's (2003) focus is on (ii): Even *if* there is a lack of knowledge within Gettier cases, must we relinquish the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge?

The simplest version of my suggestion was that Gettiered beliefs need not be seen as failing to be knowledge. We may regard them, instead, as knowledge-*although-luckily-so*. Any instance of justified true belief is still knowledge; but some are luckily so, with most not having needed such luck to be constituted as knowledge. Normally, then, knowledge is normal: It is knowledge without having needed such luck or flukiness to be so. But the fact that normally knowledge is constituted normally does not entail that always it is. (For more on knowledge and luck, see Hetherington 2011b, forthcoming 2013.)

Weatherson proposes that we need not regard the justified-true-belief conception of knowledge as false, even given epistemologists' professedly intuitive assessments of Gettier cases as including well-but-fallibly justified true beliefs which fail to be knowledge. We have this conceptual freedom because the justified-true-belief analysis is a theory and because theory choice is sensitive to several factors, not only so-called intuitions.

That is controversial. Conceptual theories in particular are highly vulnerable to counterexamples, as Jackson (2005, pp. 131–135) explains. Conceptual patterns abound, and (Jackson 2005, p. 135):

> [w]hat the counter-exampler refutes is the view that there is a single, fixed concept which we all, or nearly all, use the word 'knowledge' for. It remains true, however, that for every candidate concept, there is an analysis, and that by giving the analyses of these candidates we can show how to avoid commitment to implausibly many *sui generis* properties.

The Gettier problem is testament to the difficulty of conceptual progress. Vulnerability to counterexamples is perennially present.

Mackie's (1969–1970) view of the concept of knowledge is apt here. Perhaps presaging Jackson's (2005) openness to a plurality of Gettier-inspired ideas about knowledge, Mackie regarded the concept of knowledge as being sufficiently broad to encompass several comparatively specific conceptions. In particular, he talked of reliability and of autonomous reflective inquiry—each of those a phenomenon which may be thought to reflect the heart of knowing. (In the section 'Reliabilism', we observed Armstrong thinking of reliability in such terms.) The Gettier problem stimulated epistemologists to create more ideas, each of which Mackie might have been willing to include within a broader concept of knowledge. Obviously, there could be even further possible ideas as to knowledge's nature, ones which have not yet occurred to epistemologists.

Knowledge-Gradualism

Those ideas—the past actual ones and possible future ones—amount to suggestions about the nature of *fallible* knowledge. Such fallibility is usually interpreted as the fallibility of knowledge's justification component—something which, in itself, admits of degrees, we saw (in the section 'Justification and Conjecture'). As soon as knowledge is admitted to be fallible, therefore, a further conceptual option becomes apparent. We may ask, 'How fallible can some knowledge be, before ceasing to be knowledge?' (That is, how fallibly could a belief be supported without thereby falling short of being knowledge?) And we may answer, 'There are many possible degrees or grades of fallibility that might be part of a particular instance of knowledge'. This answer gives us a gradualism about knowledge. I have argued for it in a few places (e.g. 2001, 2011a).

According to knowledge-gradualism, even knowledge of a particular truth admits of degrees or grades. Clearly, there can be better or worse knowledge of a topic, a person, a place and so on. Knowledge-gradualism extends that observation, also encompassing knowledge that *p* (for any specific '*p*').

The idea of gradualism arises occasionally among epistemologists. Gershon Weiler (1965) advocated it in some detail, while Tony Coady (2002, pp. 359–360) and David Lewis (1999, pp. 438–439) did so in passing. It may arise as a partly theoretical move, rather than purely as an expression of intuition.

We might try applying knowledge-gradualism to Gettier cases. We would claim that Gettiered beliefs are knowledge, but epistemically *poor* knowledge. How poor? Very poor. Poor in what way? Let me count the ways. Or perhaps not. Maybe (as suggested in the section 'The Gettier Problem') they are instances of poor knowledge by being luckily or flukily knowledge—by therefore being knowledge abnormally.

This is a heterodox interpretation of Gettier cases. Is it therefore mistaken? That depends, once more, on what is at stake. Is epistemology's proper goal, when talking about knowledge's nature, a folk conception of knowledge (as, in the section 'The Gettier Problem', we noted Jackson claiming)? This meta-epistemological point is currently debated by epistemologists.

Contextualism

That debate has included discussions of a kind of epistemic contextualism. This involves theorising about *claims* of a person's having or lacking some piece of knowledge (i.e. about knowledge-attributions or knowledge-denials). But epistemologists have been treating this form of contextualism as a way of theorising about knowledge itself—about *facts* of (and not only claims as to) people having or lacking knowledge.

I say 'this form of contextualism' because, before the mid-1980s, the term 'contextualism' was used to designate a roughly Wittgensteinian (1969) line of thought, according to which epistemic contexts are distinguished largely by linguistic norms. (Those would determine whether it made sense, say, to attribute or to deny some particular piece of knowledge.) Since that time, however, the term 'contextualism' has referred more generally to a way of thinking in which epistemic contexts are distinguished by whatever epistemic standards they include, *however* these are determined. (Linguistic features of a context could play a role here, but so might much else).

Contextualism has recently attracted attention because of how context can, it seems, affect the impact of those epistemic standards that seem to lead, speedily, to *sceptical* knowledge-denials. Even non-sceptical epistemologists often concede that a sceptical standard may be appropriate in one context for a particular belief that *p*—yet inappropriate in another context for that same belief that *p*. Accurately, you could say 'He knows that *p*' in one setting; in an alternative setting, you might aptly deny what seems to be that same knowledge to that same person. Is this inconsistent on your part? Contextualism says 'No', claiming that there is no conflict if the assessments reflect different epistemic standards, with each standard being apt within its respective context of assessment.

We will discuss forms of scepticism in the section 'Sceptical Thoughts'. Right now, I offer two observations on this anti-sceptical gambit:

(1) Contextualism is not gradualism (see the section 'Knowledge-Gradualism'). Perhaps, accordingly, one of them is more successful than the other as an anti-sceptical idea. Contextualism is *absolutist* about knowledge that *p* within each given context. That is, inside a context, just one epistemic standard applies; and this standard needs to be perfectly satisfied, if contextualism is to accord knowledge there. In contrast, gradualism is non-absolutist. That is, even inside a context, different epistemic standards can apply to a single belief that *p*, allowing even within that single context for there to be different grades of knowledge that *p*. (On this contextualist absolutism, see Hetherington 2011a, Sect. 2.8.3).

(2) Australasian epistemology has contributed in disparate ways to this part of contemporary epistemology. A *counterpart* Australasian philosopher, David Lewis (1999), offered one of the most-discussed instances of contextualism. Tim Oakley (2001) has responded critically to Lewis' contextualism, while Brian Weatherson (2006) offers critical remarks about contextualism in general. Is contextualism linguistically accurate? Is it correct in its alignments of

context and epistemic standard? Research continues. Meanwhile, Adam Dickerson (2006) argues for a return to the older-fashioned form of contextualism, inspired by J. L. Austin's writings on knowledge and linguistic standards of inquiry and response.

Understanding and Knowing-How

Let me mention two basic epistemological presumptions about the nature of knowledge. Each is a thesis usually called upon at the start of epistemological inquiry, as a way of organising epistemology's basic *explananda*, prior to epistemological *analysans* subsequently being articulated.

Presumption 1: Knowledge-that and knowledge-how are distinct in nature. (A terminological variant: Propositional knowledge and practical knowledge are distinct in nature.) More fully, we must distinguish between knowing-that(-a-particular-truth-obtains) and knowing-how(-to-perform-a-particular-action).

Every so often, epistemologists seek to understand knowledge-how as a kind of knowledge-that. More often, though, epistemologists are content to keep the two conceptually apart, maintaining Presumption 1.

Presumption 2: Knowing-that and understanding are fundamentally distinct in nature.

Few epistemologists even try to analyse understanding, let alone to ask whether it might be more similar to knowledge than they presume.

Nevertheless, Australasian epistemologists have qualified or questioned each of those epistemologically pivotal presumptions.

Richard Franklin (1981) has qualified Presumption 2, by offering a partial analysis of understanding as '*discernment of significant structure* in the situation' (Franklin 1981, p. 202). How similar to knowledge does this render understanding? More so, according to Franklin, than epistemologists have assumed (Franklin 1981, p. 206): 'Often *understand* is normally equivalent to *know*. Do they ever mean the same? … we may combine them into the notion of an assertion rationally based on the discernment of significant structure. And it seems to me that this is what we do.'

I have questioned Presumption 1, by arguing (2011a, Chap. 2) that knowing-that is a kind of knowing-how. That is a conceptual reduction of propositional knowledge to practical knowledge. The basic idea is this: To know that p is to have the cognitive know-how to represent accurately that p, and/or inquire accurately as to p, and/or explain accurately how it is that p, and so on. Such a reduction's availability would imply that epistemologists have needlessly narrowed, and perhaps inaccurately focused, their searches for an accurate analysis of propositional knowledge. For they would have ignored some of its fundamental features—those that allow this reduction.

Reducing knowledge-that to knowledge-how could also bear upon Jackson's (1982, 1986) 'Mary argument' or 'knowledge argument'. At the core of his argument is a thought-experiment about an accomplished neuroscientist (originally Fred, then

Mary). Jackson was challenging the capacity of physicalism to be a complete metaphysics. Mary has been raised from birth to experience only black, white and grey—her room, her books, etc. Because she is extremely intelligent and studious, though, she comes to know all there is to know about the world's physical aspects, including the neurophysiology of colour experiences. What will happen when she first leaves her black-and-white room? Will she gain new knowledge, by learning what it is to see various colours for the first time? Jackson's conclusion was that this would be new knowledge for Mary—hence that some truths are not about what is physical.

To which, one possible reply—it was Lewis' (1988)—is that what Mary gains is only knowledge-how, not knowledge-that. She is not learning new truths about the world (truths not reported by physicalism). Mary is able to *recall* various experiences she would formerly have been unable even to imagine. Now she can also *imagine* new kindred experiences. If these occur, she can *recognise* their nature, their similarity to others she has now had. In short, Mary acquires new cognitive skills, new knowledge-how.

Yet if all knowledge-that is knowledge-how, the claim that Mary acquires only knowledge-how does not entail her not gaining knowledge-that. For the kind of knowledge-how she gains would be one she could gain *by* gaining knowledge-that (if all knowledge-that is knowledge-how, along the lines I have described). (And for more discussion of Jackson's challenge, see Ludlow et al. 2004.)

Testimony

Part of analysing knowledge's nature is understanding what kinds of knowledge there are. It is especially important to ascertain what kinds of knowledge exist that cannot be conceptually reduced to other forms of knowledge. Thus, for instance, the section 'Understanding and Knowing-How' indicated how there could be one less such kind than epistemologists routinely assume there to be: Maybe knowledge-that is really just a form of knowledge-how. Even if that is not so, the question still arises of whether one kind of knowledge-that is really just another kind of knowledge-that. For example, testimonial knowledge—that is, knowledge acquired through testimony—is potentially a kind of knowledge about which that sort of issue arises. And here, an Australasian philosopher has led the debate. Tony Coady's book, *Testimony* (1992), sparked contemporary conceptual treatments of this issue. (In that book, he presents his conceptual framework. Elsewhere, he applies it: 2002, 2006.)

The main theme in his 1992 book is indeed one of irreducibility. What is it to acquire knowledge through testimony from others? A traditional epistemological answer (such as Hume's) tells us about perception, memory, and ways of combining these. In other words, testimonial knowledge is thought of as reducible to some arrangement of these other forms of knowledge. (Jackson would ask, also, for knowledge of representational content to be involved [2000, pp. 325–326].) Acquiring testimonial knowledge would be nothing beyond acquiring perceptual and/or memorial knowledge.

But Coady rejects that traditional answer. In trying to rely just on perception and/or memory, say, when gaining testimonial knowledge, one fails. For one cannot experience enough observations and memories to account for the epistemic force of most testimony. Nor in general does one need such experiential immersion within a situation, in order to gain knowledge. Testimony frees one from that requirement. Is mathematical knowledge, for example, gained only by exercising individual intellectual autonomy? Must one construct the associated proof oneself? Not according to Coady (1981—reprised in 1992, Chap. 14). Reliable testimony is sufficient, all else being equal.

Still, even that need not be manifestly available. Elizabeth Fricker (1995) argues that Coady does not engage adequately with the question of how a person knows in the first place that he or she is encountering testimony. For Coady, testimony per se includes a nontrivial and apt epistemic status on the part of the testimony's provider. So, your hearing testimony as such—even prior to evaluating its epistemic worth—is not immediately transparent to you. Does this open the door more welcomingly to sceptical ideas than Coady would wish? (Maybe so; and we discuss sceptical ideas in the section 'Sceptical Thoughts'.)

A Priori Knowledge and Self-Knowledge

People talk no less freely of some forms of self-knowledge than of testimonial knowledge. Admittedly, we are often loath to claim profound insight into our psychologically most obscure or cloaked dimensions—*that* form of self-knowledge. What, though, of a person's knowing what he or she is consciously feeling or thinking (desiring, intending, believing) at a particular time—*this* form of self-knowledge? The section 'Experience and Inner Incorrigibility' asked whether such knowledge would be incorrigible-because-introspective. More recently, epistemologists have been wondering whether such knowledge is available as a priori.

André Gallois has contributed notably to epistemological accounts of this form of knowledge. (See especially his 1996 book, *The World Without*, *The Mind Within*, in which his 1994a appears.) He sharpens a traditional idea, which is that each of us has a first-person authority regarding our own consciously held propositional attitudes. (This is not to concede that each person has a privileged access to the existence and nature of these. A unique authority is available, though.) For Gallois, your knowledge of what you are thinking and feeling is a priori. Grant its not being observational; but why is it knowledge at all? Answer: Once you believe that *p*, say, you are non-observationally justified in believing that you believe that *p*.

To deny so is to conceive of yourself in what Gallois calls *Moore-paradoxical* terms. You would be open to accepting instances of the form, '*p* but I do not believe that *p*' (a supposedly paradoxical utterance or thought, introduced into philosophical parlance by G. E. Moore). Why is that so flawed? It conceives of you as being what Shoemaker (1988) labels a *self-blind* person. Yet how is it possible for there to be someone who

> lacked the ability to attribute to oneself beliefs, thoughts, suppositions, conjectures and the like except on the basis of [observational] evidence? We are considering someone who has the concept of belief, and is still able to rationally form and revise beliefs. It is just that she is unable to form justified second-order beliefs without consulting her behaviour. (Gallois 1996, p. 64).

Gallois argues that what we call changes in such a person's beliefs would be viewed by him or her as changes in the world. That is a serious problem. To the self-blind person, the world will appear afflicted with 'pervasive indeterminacy, factual instability and inconsistency' (Gallois 1996, p. 110). Gallois believes that this conception of the world could be rejected a priori (Gallois 1996, p. 110).

He has subsequently applied and clarified that line of thought. In his (2000b), it is applied to Descartes' *Cogito*, arguing thus:

> To doubt at all, one cannot be self-blind; for one would be doubting the truth of (what one recognizes to be) one's beliefs. So, once one believes that *p*, one knows that one does—so long as one is a *Moore believer*.

A Moore believer is 'an individual who is disposed, and considers themself rationally entitled, to move, without supplementary evidence, from consciously thinking that *p* to consciously self-attributing that thought' (Gallois 2000b, p. 371). The indubitability of the *Cogito* for an inquirer is thus a sign of his or her being a Moore believer. But so, too, is a person's engaging in Cartesian doubt. Self-blindness is anathema to both Cartesian indubitability and Cartesian doubt. Being a Moore believer is necessary for the kind of self-knowledge which Gallois discusses. (And such self-knowledge is not a kind of perceptual knowledge: 2000a).

Gallois (1996—including Gallois and O'Leary-Hawthorne 1996) also confronts a fundamental challenge to his project, stemming from the doctrine of content externalism. According to that doctrine, the content of a person's thoughts is partly a function of aspects of the surrounding world. Then this challenge arises: How do you know even what you are thinking, until you know physical aspects of the surrounding world? Indeed, the latter knowledge would be part of the former knowledge. In which case, though, how can your self-knowledge—your knowledge of what you are thinking—be a priori? (For knowledge of the surrounding world's physical aspects would not.) Thus, maybe the self-knowledge is absent; and even if present, maybe it is not a priori.

Well and good, except that then, as Gallois (like Martin Davies 2000) realises, we face this challenge: If content externalism is true (and you know this), you could know the nature of the physical external world—simply by knowing what you think it is like. Yet this is a suspiciously easy way of refuting external world scepticism.

So much so, that we should again ask whether this implies, instead, that you do not even know what your beliefs are in the first place. Do you lack self-knowledge, by lacking external world knowledge?

Epistemologists are reluctant to concede this. Jeff Malpas (1994), for example, argues against it on Davidsonian grounds. Gallois, too, strives to defuse these concerns. But epistemology as a whole is yet to decide how to defuse various sceptical thoughts, and that is no less true of this sceptical suggestion.

Note a further debate into which Gallois' account leads us: Is a priori knowledge possible in the first place? Australasian philosophers have possibly contributed significantly to our understanding of what a priori knowledge is (hence, whether there is any). Consider clarifications and refinements, especially by Frank Jackson in *From Metaphysics to Ethics* (1998, pp. 46–52) and David Chalmers in *The Conscious Mind* (1996), of the idea of intensional two-dimensionality. They advocate our distinguishing between a concept's A-intension and its C-intension. (Here, I am using Jackson's, not Chalmers', preferred terms.) Each of these is a function of extensions in possible worlds. An A-intension treats each such world in turn as if it is the actual world. A C-intension treats each such world in turn as a counterfactual world (with this world remaining the only actual one).

For example, the A-intension of 'water' might pick out *watery stuff* in each world—stuff playing a particular functional role there. Maybe different kinds of stuff play that role within different worlds. And maybe that role is all we can specify a priori about each such instance of stuff. In contrast, we may suppose, the C-intension picks out H_2O within each world—in other words, that which is water in *this* world. But only a posteriori could we know which stuff—H_2O, as it happens—within this world is watery stuff here. A priori knowledge of water would be knowledge only of the A-intension of 'water'. Even if you know a priori that water is whatever has a generally characterisable functional role within worlds, at best you know a posteriori that water is H_2O.

Some philosophical progress is measured in distinctions. This one is potentially useful, as epistemologists continue reflecting upon the nature of the a priori. Note, incidentally, that elements of it had also been anticipated by Douglas Gasking, in a paper he did not publish: 'Criteria, Analyticity and the Identity-Thesis' (now in Oakley and O'Neill 1996, Chap. 6). Gasking distinguished reference-analyticity from sense-analyticity, a similar distinction to that between A-intensionality and C-intensionality. (It also anticipated some theories later made famous by Saul Kripke 1980.)

Sceptical Thoughts

Other Minds

We saw, in the section 'A Priori Knowledge and Self-Knowledge', how questions about knowledge of one's own mind may turn sceptical: When self-knowledge is knowledge of mental content, is it absent if content externalism is true yet we do not know the external world? Sceptical questions also arise about knowledge of *other* minds.

Thus, how is a person to know, or even to have epistemically justified beliefs, about another's mental life? This question, too, may become more urgent if there is no knowledge of the external world; for if the only way to know of another's mental life is by knowing how he or she acts and speaks, and if (because it would be external world knowledge) we do lack the latter knowledge, then we lack the former knowledge. Nonetheless, the classic sceptical problem of other minds is not quite that one. It is this: Even if external world knowledge is available (so that one person can know how another is behaving and speaking, for example), is knowledge of other people's mental lives still unavailable? Indeed so (concludes other minds scepticism).

Epistemologists attend less to that sceptical problem than they might. Still, Gasking proffered part of a solution—a Wittgensteinian one—by deploying the distinction (which ended the section 'A Priori Knowledge and Self-Knowledge') between reference-analyticity and sense-analyticity. He argued that 'People engaged in pain-behaviour are normally in pain' is reference-analytic, not sense-analytic. It is 'in a *weak* sense, "true in virtue of linguistic convention"' (Oakley and O'Neill 1996, p. 102). Because it need not have been true, though, it is at most contingently true. Is it at all knowable, then? Gasking does not supply *this* part of the solution.

But Alec Hyslop, in *Other Minds* (1995), offers an extensive (and more overtly epistemological) treatment of this sceptical problem. In particular, he explains how the problem arises for all philosophical theories of mind. On any such theory (says Hyslop), an epistemic asymmetry obtains between (i) knowledge of one's own mind and (ii) knowledge of other minds. Each of us, it seems, has direct knowledge of ourselves, but not of others, as a locus of 'phenomenal features of experience' (Hyslop 1995, p. 26). Even if you were to know that you do not have direct knowledge of your mind's being like that, you would need to know that other minds are the same in this respect. Yet how are you to do so? In one way or the other, therefore, we confront a sceptical question about other minds. How might we hope to escape that danger?

By analogical inference; at least, that is Hyslop's favoured approach (1995; Hyslop and Jackson 1972). He dismisses a Wittgensteinian 'attitudinal' approach to the problem, likewise for a Strawsonian response. Or should we think of the inference to other minds as a scientific one? Hyslop believes that this is not how we should conceive of the situation (and here he is opposed by Robert Pargetter 1984). Nor is the argument from analogy defeated by being a poor *inductive* argument (Hyslop and Jackson 1972). Is the argument poor (ask Hyslop and Jackson) because it uses only one case? No (they answer). Is it bad because its conclusion cannot be checked? Again, no.

Inductive Scepticism

The section 'Other Minds' ended by inviting us to reflect optimistically upon uses of inductive reasoning. Yet is induction ever epistemically helpful? Often, it feels so, but is that feeling misleading? With this question, we encounter what epistemologists usually call the 'problem of inductive scepticism'. Australasian philosophers have enriched such talk in a few ways, helping us to understand both what the problem may be and how it might be solved.

First, then, what *is* the problem? It is standardly attributed to Hume, although perhaps not always with strict historical accuracy. Someone who sought historical thoroughness was David Stove (1973, Part 2, 1998 [1982], Chap. 4, 1986, Chap. 3). And for a while, his interpretation was accepted as accurate. According to it, Hume's inductive scepticism conjoins two premises, deriving a sceptical conclusion. The two premises are (i) the fallibility of inductive inference and (ii) deductivism. The latter claims that only deductive inference ever imparts epistemic justification. Hence, once we combine (i) with (ii), we derive this sceptical conclusion: No inductive inference ever imparts epistemic justification. Stove formulates this conclusion in different ways, such as 'No proposition about the observed is a reason to believe a contingent proposition about the unobserved' (1998, p. 159) and 'For all inductive arguments from e to h, $\mathrm{P}(h, e.t) = \mathrm{P}(h, t)$', where '$t$' is a tautology (1973, p. 62). The latter formulation uses the language of logical probability—overtly Carnapian language, not Humean. But Stove saw in it some needed rigour—along with potential for rigorously refuting inductive scepticism. He also offered a Laplacean solution, inspired by Donald Williams (1947).

Were these efforts successful? If they have not attracted as much attention as they deserve, this might be partly because in the 1980s scholarly interpretations of Hume began moving away from Stove's exegesis. For Stove, what is at stake in Hume's thinking is inductive inference's rationality; and this remains the philosophically popular interpretation of Hume. But scholars now view Hume's argument differently. They see his concern not as that of whether inductive predictions are epistemically justified. Instead, it is that of whether such predictions constitute *scientia*—insights of reason into necessary features of the world, features lurking behind and explaining observations we experience. When we reason inductively, is this an expression of a distinct or sovereign faculty of reason? That is a deeply and definitively empiricist question. Stephen Buckle, especially, has helped to make clear how Hume was asking it, in both the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (2001, Part 2, sections iv–v; 2007b) and the *Treatise of Human Nature* (2007a). (See also Hetherington 2008).

The significance of that clarification of Hume is not only historical. It broadens our awareness of which epistemological problems—rather than just a single 'problem of induction'—could apply to inductive reasoning. This enlivens our sense of which epistemological questions we need to answer. Even if Stove undermined one philosophical challenge that may arise about induction, are there others still to be confronted? And might the further ones be more psychologically pressing, for instance—more substantial challenges, realistically speaking? It is often observed how psychologically *un*pressing and *un*realistic is the sceptical idea of there never being rational force at all to inductive projections. But this objection applies less clearly to the revised interpretation of what it is that Hume was claiming. His putative sceptical challenge might simultaneously be less a sceptical argument yet more a pressing challenge.

Other Australasian reactions, too, suggest ways of not being so perturbed about what they take to be potentially more substantive conceptions of inductive scepticism.

(i) Ellis (1988—mostly reprinted in 1990, Chap. 8) conceives of inductive quests for true belief as inductive attempts to satisfy various epistemic values. Which ones? Ellis mentions these: reductiveness, comprehensiveness, simplicity, explanatory power, connectivity and corroboration. These are not instrumentally derivative from, or generative of, truth. Collectively, they *are* inductive truth. (Recall, from the section 'Truth', Ellis' remarks on truth as a value.) At base, the importance of these is biological (1990, p. 243).

(ii) Musgrave (2004), supposedly on Popper's behalf, accepts that we may reasonably believe whatever has passed critical testing—even if the belief's content is not thereby shown to be true or even probably true. For Musgrave, the key epistemological aim is that of reasonable believing, not probable truth. Epistemologists tend to collapse these into each other, accepting that a belief is reasonable if and only if it is probably true. (They thereby accept what Musgrave calls 'justificationism', which we met in the section 'Justification and Conjecture'.) But a Popperian epistemological emphasis upon the practice of testing could be thought to undermine that putative equivalence. So, even if Hume has shown that no inductive extrapolation is true or probably true, this does not entail that the extrapolation is not reasonably believed. An inquirer can do no more than believe reasonably.

Certainly, more needs to be said by epistemologists about relations between assessments of an inference's strength (such as in inductive or probabilistic inference) and whatever evidential strength there is for a proposition's truth. Gasking, in both a 1969 talk called 'Tenable Opinions' (Oakley and O'Neill 1996, Chap. 2) and a paper 'Subjective Probability' (Oakley and O'Neill 1996, Chap. 3), articulated some of the related complexities. One significant implication he described is that 'objectivity admits of degrees', where an 'opinion might usefully be called *objective* where the agreement upon it is the result of, and to be explained in terms of, features of the objects classified' (Oakley and O'Neill 1996, p. 40). Why is that relevant here? This is why (Oakley and O'Neill 1996, p. 41):

> The importance of the matter lies in the sheer number of cases where human beliefs are matters of opinion in this sense [i.e. placed 'midway between matters of perception and recognition . . . and guesses and speculations and expressions of personal reaction'], and, more significantly, the philosophical centrality of some such matters of opinion. I have in mind of course ethical and aesthetic judgements, and judgements appraising the degree of support to be found in inductive arguments.

Radical Scepticism

Occasionally, epistemologists propose arguments for there being *no* epistemically justified beliefs (and therefore no beliefs being knowledge). This is a radical scepticism. Its conclusion is not merely that no beliefs are epistemically *well* justified (and that therefore no beliefs are knowledge). Thus, this is not a mere 'high standards' scepticism. Rather, it denies that there is ever any epistemic justification, supporting any of our beliefs. Two Australasian philosophers have advocated such a scepticism—Tim Oakley (1976) and André Gallois (1994b).

Oakley's version of radical scepticism is as clear a statement as there has been of such a position. He reflects upon aspects of justificatory structuring—what is needed for one belief to impart justification to another. Oakley works with the classic choice offered between foundationalism, coherentism, and scepticism. Once we regard justification as being transmitted, we face the threat of a vicious infinite regress. How may that outcome be avoided? It cannot be, according to Oakley's reasoning, at the heart of which is a focus on the phenomenon of epistemic dependence. In the section 'Reasons and Inference', we noted Oakley's later account (2006) of this phenomenon. Presumably, the uncertainty he now expresses as to how well we understand that phenomenon applies, retrospectively, to his earlier (1976) sceptical argument.

Oakley was then, and still is, a sceptic. Gallois has been less wedded to scepticism. Still, he has been more attracted to it than are most epistemologists. In his (1993), he responds vigorously to Oakley's scepticism. At times, people wonder whether sceptical views are self-refuting. Gallois argues that Oakley's is, because no one could be justified in believing that the Oakleyan radical sceptic's argument is sound. Gallois' argument is abstract, too much so if Michaelis Michael (1995) is right. Michael argues that the sceptical position considered by Gallois is not really a *position*, with Gallois overlooking scepticism's ad hominem nature. Nevertheless, Gallois (1994b) does seek to conceive of scepticism as realistically available. There, he tries linking radical scepticism with a consideration of epistemic agency. The idea is that 'if an individual is justified in believing *p* to be true, he is justified in desiring that he should ignore any future evidence that counts against *p*' (Gallois 1994b, p. 353), but, of course, one 'is not at all justified in adopting such an attitude, whatever grounds [one] has for believing' that *p* (Gallois 1994b, p. 356). Radical scepticism follows.

Sceptical Arguments: Deriving Them and Defusing Them

Sceptical arguments rarely convince, intellectually or psychologically. Always the question lingers of how psychologically pressing or realistic a particular sceptical argument is. Indeed, this might always be a fundamental question about sceptical thinking, about all kinds of scepticism.

Focusing especially on external world scepticism, David Macarthur (2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2006) believes that there is a correlatively strong reason why scepticism is perennially a philosophical issue, even if it is not perpetually felt to be so. Macarthur highlights a bifurcation in attitudes that people take towards beliefs. An awareness of sceptical thinking's reasonableness is inevitable when 'standing away' from one's beliefs—no longer 'fused' with them by taking responsibility for them. This detachment allows one to regard one's beliefs as natural phenomena, able to be studied from a comparatively objective standpoint. Note Macarthur's accompanying explanation of the psychological instability of sceptical thinking—its uncertain grip upon us. People return to being believers, identifying with their beliefs, using these by taking responsibility for them—being committed to their truth. And once this is one's stance, a sceptical attitude no longer has psychological, indeed cognitive, hold upon one.

Nevertheless, this would not entail that sceptical ideas are not true. How may we defuse their claims to truth? Here is a suggestion of mine (2001, Chap. 2). As Oakley (2001, pp. 321–322) notices, there are *better or worse* sceptical arguments—stronger or weaker sceptical ideas, more or less good sceptical reasoning. This observation might remind us of a gradualism about knowledge—see the section 'Knowledge-Gradualism'—even though Oakley himself was not intending to advocate gradualism. Indeed, it shows us how to develop that gradualism to anti-sceptical effect. (i) Consider some putative knowledge that *p* which is supported by justification that engages with a notably strong sceptical argument (strong, compared to other sceptical arguments bearing upon that sort of subject matter). If that justificatory support was to win this battle with the sceptical argument, the piece of knowledge that *p* would not only *be* knowledge. It would be correlatively *better* as knowledge that p—better (other things being equal) than if its justificatory support had triumphed only over a weaker sceptical argument. (ii) Now extend that thought. We may infer that any piece of putative knowledge that *p* is correlatively better as knowledge that *p* (other things being equal) if the justification supporting it has bested *any* proposed sceptical argument. More precisely, the knowledge that *p* is better, as knowledge that *p*, to some extent or degree that reflects the quality of the particular sceptical argument(s) its justificatory support has bested. (iii) Now extend *that* thought. We may infer that any sceptical argument (regardless of whether it overpowers the justificatory support for a putative piece of knowledge that *p*) functions as part of the *point* of our gathering or testing some of our support for a particular piece of putative knowledge that *p*. More precisely, a specific piece of knowledge that *p* is better as knowledge that *p* (other things being equal) if the justification supporting it has won the battle against a particular sceptical argument, one of some greater or lesser *quality* as a sceptical argument. (iv) This implies that sceptical arguments need not only ever be interpreted as—if successful at all—preventing a belief's being knowledge. (That is not the only potential form of success for a sceptical argument.) Maybe only the specific belief's *quality* as knowledge that *p* is lowered by a successful sceptical possibility.

Naturalism and Realism

Something recurrent within Australasian epistemology could make sceptical thoughts a continuing presence. If Macarthur is right (in the section, 'Sceptical Arguments: Deriving Them and Defusing Them'), this might be so; now I will extend his point a little. For naturalism is a persistent theme within Australasian epistemology; and naturalism has long nurtured at least some—not all, but some—sceptical seeds. Buckle (2007a, 2007b, p. xxvii) explains how this was so for Hume; and so it still is. As Quine puts the point (1975, pp. 67–68): 'Scepticism is an offshoot of science. The basis for scepticism is the awareness of illusion, the discovery that we must not always believe our eyes . . . Rudimentary physical science, that is, common sense about bodies, is thus needed as a springboard for scepticism . . . [S]ceptical doubts are scientific doubts'.

An epistemological naturalist accepts the primacy, indeed the exhaustiveness, of naturalistic explanations of pertinent phenomena. Knowledge, for example, is to be understood as a natural aspect of the natural world. Might there be an accurate and wholly physicalistic description of any instance of knowing? Perhaps what it *is* to have a piece of knowledge would be retrievable as a scientific theory. But, with that thought, a spectre of inductive scepticism drifts into the epistemological room.

A number of philosophers whose work has been described in this chapter are naturalists. Notably, Armstrong and Ellis are; recently, so too is Jackson. Perhaps the most distinctive Australasian naturalism is Cliff Hooker's (1995; see also Hahlweg and Hooker 1989). He argues in detail for an evolutionary conception of knowing. His focus is on scientific knowledge, with science's methods being 'regulatory recipes for delivering theories' (Hooker 1995, p. 28). Gone is 'the logic-based model of induction'; in comes 'a dynamic process model' (Hooker 1995, p. 30). Hooker's overall aim is that of 'developing a general dynamic systems framework and . . . characterizing epistemology and rationality within it' (Hooker 1995, p. 32). *All* reason is to be embedded within this picture (Hooker 1995, Chap. 6). Ellis, we saw (see the section 'Inductive Scepticism'), regards induction as biologically justified. Hooker views both reason and knowledge (Hooker 1995, p. 296) 'as natural phenomena while at the same time retaining their essential normative characters. How is this to be achieved? Essentially, by treating both of them as theories'. Knowing is not a simple and observable property. It is a complex reflection of many theoretical desiderata.

Yet notice how readily Hooker's approach moves us into a realm where scepticism may pursue us. Wherever such complexity exists, there is potential for mistakes, both in our conception of knowing and in our assessments of applications of that conception. Hooker is a fallibilist; and fallibilism, if it can be developed adequately, is perhaps epistemology's ultimate defence against scepticism. But it is notoriously difficult to develop an adequate fallibilist conception of knowledge. The Gettier problem (see the section 'The Gettier Problem') is a striking manifestation of that difficulty in general. Should it even make us sceptical about the need for epistemologists to talk about knowledge at all? Colin Cheyne (1997) has argued so. And he has developed such thinking into a scepticism about the existence of 'platonic entities' (2001). The idea is that we need to blend fallibilism with a Gettier-inspired aversion to luck within knowing, plus a naturalistic respect for causality within knowing. Fallibilism thus flirts with scepticism in many ways.

Scepticism can also enter more surreptitiously, in the slipstream of commitments to metaphysical realism. If we decide that many of the world's features obtain without regard to whatever it is that we take them to be, we are metaphysical realists. But we will probably proceed to ask the epistemological question, too, of how we ever know the world's features—particularly those of which metaphysical realism is true. How are our answers to this epistemological question constrained by our metaphysical realism? To accept metaphysical realism is to be open to the idea that attempts to know the world remain answerable to details which are as they are, irrespective of what we believe them to be. So (we would accept), no matter how hard we concentrate or reason or observe, we could be mistaken about the world—about features that can be as ever they are, regardless of what we take them to be. Buckle (2007a) shows how Hume's sceptical materialism instantiated this general pattern. Rae Langton's book, *Kantian Humility* (1998), presents a similar interpretation, *mutatis mutandis*, of Kant on knowledge of things in themselves: We do not know objects' intrinsic properties. (If Langton is right, this is not only because such properties really exist. It is also because we would know them only receptively.) In various ways, therefore, fallibility is a natural epistemological companion of metaphysical realism.

And metaphysical realism has been a dominant commitment among Australasian philosophers. Again we may think of Armstrong in particular. His work shows the influence of his teacher, John Anderson, a few of whose papers—'The Knower and the Known', 'Realism and Some of Its Critics' and 'Mind as Feeling' (all in his 1962 collection, *Studies in Empirical Philosophy*)—bear upon this issue. Anderson was concerned to delineate 'the logic' of realism. He stressed that knowing is a relation, *a*R*b*, with each of *a* and *b* thereby being independent of each other, as well as of R. Knowing is not identical with the knower; being known is not identical with the known. Metaphysical independence potentially fragments the knowing relation; and this, we may see, has sceptical potential.

That sceptical potential is not an aspect of Anderson's epistemology emphasised by either Mackie (1962, 1965) or Baker (1986), in their studies of Anderson. Is it latent, nonetheless?

Perhaps so. Yet most Australasian epistemologists, at least the more obviously naturalist ones, have been loath to investigate sceptical ideas in detail. Armstrong (1973a, pp. 218–219), for example, includes a brief Davidsonian argument, from some claims about the nature of our concepts to our having knowledge of the external physical world. In a few places (1973b, 1999—expanded in 2006), Armstrong voices a more general anti-sceptical naturalism. Methodologically, his epistemology is Moorean. Rational consensus is lauded, as are science and commonsense (including mathematics and logic). For Armstrong, knowledge begins here; scepticism has already failed.

Scepticism About Epistemology Itself

Still, given those programmatic remarks about naturalism and scepticism ('Naturalism and Realism'), should naturalists take sceptical ideas more seriously? Well, Armstrong does express scepticism about *philosophical* knowledge: 'philosophy. . .contains *no* knowledge at all, or at least a vanishingly small amount' (1999, p. 79). Where does that leave sceptical ideas as doctrines? Epistemologists do not regard them as knowledge. Can these nonetheless be rational? Indeed, what of epistemology in general? It is part of philosophy. Is there therefore little, if any, epistemological knowledge?

That is an idea for which I have argued (1992, 2010). That argument claimed to find all epistemological claims self-refuting. (This conclusion, once derived, was admittedly self-refuting, too.) Anyone being epistemological is applying *some* epistemic standard within that context of epistemological inquiry. Does he or she satisfy it themselves at that time? I argued that this never occurs; in which case, the person's epistemological claims are failing the only epistemic standard they could be asked to pass in that setting (without question-beggingly imposing an 'alien' epistemic standard upon them in that context). People routinely fail epistemic standards to which they owe no allegiance, of course. They are not thereby being self-refuting, though. But epistemologists, of all people, owe allegiance to some epistemic standard, certainly within any context of being epistemological. (They must be trying to be rational in that sense, as part of being epistemological within a given context.) Do they succeed in satisfying their own epistemic standards in their own contexts of epistemological inquiry? If I am right, we will never know. (And am I right? I hope not).

References

Anderson, J. (1962). *Studies in empirical philosophy*. Sydney: Angus & Robertson.

Armstrong, D. M. (1961). *Perception and the physical world*. New York: The Humanities Press.

Armstrong, D. M. (1963a). Is introspective knowledge incorrigible? *Philosophical Review, 72*, 417–432.

Armstrong, D. M. (1963b). Max Deutscher and perception. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41*, 241–249.

Armstrong, D. M. (1968). *A materialist theory of the mind*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Armstrong, D. M. (1973a). *Belief, truth and knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Armstrong, D. M. (1973b). Epistemological foundations for a materialist theory of the mind. *Philosophy of Science, 40*, 178–193.

Armstrong, D. M. (1999). A naturalist program: Epistemology and ontology. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 73*, 77–89.

Armstrong, D. M. (2004). *Truth and truthmakers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Armstrong, D. M. (2006). The scope and limits of human knowledge. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84*, 159–166.

Ayer, A. J. (1956). *The problem of knowledge*. London: Macmillan.

Baker, A. (1986). *Australian realism: The systematic philosophy of John Anderson*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bigelow, J. (2006). Gettier's theorem. In S. Hetherington (Ed.), *Aspects of knowing: Epistemological essays* (pp. 203–218). Oxford: Elsevier.

BonJour, L. (1985). *The structure of empirical knowledge*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Brown, R. (1988). Recent Australian work in philosophy. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 18*, 545–578.

Buckle, S. (2001). *Hume's enlightenment tract: The unity and purpose of* An enquiry concerning human understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Buckle, S. (2007a). Hume's sceptical materialism. *Philosophy, 82*, 553–578.

Buckle, S. (2007b). Introduction. In S. Buckle (Ed.), *David Hume's* An enquiry concerning human understanding (pp. 9–31). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chalmers, D. (1996). *The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cheyne, C. (1997). Epistemic value and fortuitous truth. *Principia, 1*, 109–134.

Cheyne, C. (2001). *Knowledge, cause, and abstract objects: Causal objections to Platonism*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Coady, C. A. J. (1981). Mathematical knowledge and reliable authority. *Mind, 90*, 542–556.

Coady, C. A. J. (1992). *Testimony: A philosophical study*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Coady, C. A. J. (2002). Testimony and intellectual autonomy. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 33*, 355–372.

Coady, C. A. J. (2006). Pathologies of testimony. In J. Lackey & E. Sosa (Eds.), *The epistemology of testimony* (pp. 253–271). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Davies, M. (2000). Externalism and armchair knowledge. In P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke (Eds.), *New essays on the a priori* (pp. 384–414). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Deutscher, M. (1963). David Armstrong and perception. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41*, 80–88.

Deutscher, M. (1973). Regresses, reasons and grounds. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 51*, 1–16.

Dickerson, A. (2006). A reasonable contextualism (or, Austin reprised). In S. Hetherington (Ed.), *Aspects of knowing: Epistemological essays* (pp. 115–131). Oxford: Elsevier.

Ellis, B. (1969). An epistemological concept of truth. In R. Brown & C. Rollins (Eds.), *Contemporary philosophy in Australia* (pp. 52–72). London: George Allen & Unwin.

Ellis, B. (1976). Avowals are more corrigible than you think. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 54*, 116–122.

Ellis, B. (1979). *Rational belief systems*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ellis, B. (1988). Solving the problem of induction using a values-based epistemology. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39*, 141–160.

Ellis, B. (1990). *Truth and objectivity*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Feldman, R. (1974). An alleged defect in Gettier counterexamples. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 52*, 68–69.

Franklin, R. (1981). Knowledge, belief and understanding. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 31*, 193–208.

Fricker, E. (1995). Telling and trusting: Reductionism and anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. *Mind, 104*, 393–411.

Gallois, A. (1993). Is global scepticism self-refuting? *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71*, 36–46.

Gallois, A. (1994a). Deflationary self-knowledge. In M. Michael & J. O'Leary-Hawthorne (Eds.), *Philosophy in mind* (pp. 49–63). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Gallois, A. (1994b). True believers and radical scepticism. *Philosophia, 14*, 349–368.

Gallois, A. (1996). *The world without, the mind within: An essay on first person authority*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gallois, A. (2000a). First-person accessibility and consciousness. *Philosophical Topics, 28*, 101–124.

Gallois, A. (2000b). The indubitability of the Cogito. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81*, 363–384.

Gallois, A. (2006). Is knowing having the right to be sure? In S. Hetherington (Ed.), *Aspects of knowing: Epistemological essays* (pp. 169–181). Oxford: Elsevier.

Gallois, A., & O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. (1996). Externalism and scepticism. *Philosophical Studies, 81*, 1–26.

Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? *Analysis, 23*, 121–123.

Goldman, A. I. (1979). What is justified belief? In G. Pappas (Ed.), *Justification and knowledge: New studies in epistemology* (pp. 1–23). Dordrecht: Reidel.

Grave, S. (1976). *Philosophy in Australia since 1958*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Grave, S. (1984). *A history of philosophy in Australia*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Hahlweg, K., & Hooker, C. (1989). Evolutionary epistemology and philosophy of science. In K. Hahlweg & C. Hooker (Eds.), *Issues in evolutionary epistemology* (pp. 21–150). Albany: State University of New York Press.

Heathcote, A. (2006). Truthmaking and the Gettier problem. In S. Hetherington (Ed.), *Aspects of knowing: Epistemological essays* (pp. 151–167). Oxford: Elsevier.

Hetherington, S. (1992). *Epistemology's paradox: Is a theory of knowledge possible?* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hetherington, S. (1998). Actually knowing. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 48*, 453–469.

Hetherington, S. (2001). *Good knowledge, bad knowledge: On two dogmas of epistemology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hetherington, S. (2008). Not actually Hume's problem: On induction and knowing-how. *Philosophy, 83*, 459–481.

Hetherington, S. (2010). Elusive epistemological justification. *Synthese, 174*, 315–330.

Hetherington, S. (2011a). *How to know: A practicalist conception of knowledge*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Hetherington, S. (2011b). Abnormality and Gettier situations: An explanatory proposal. *Ratio, 24*, 176–191.

Hetherington, S. (2011c). The Gettier problem. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), *The Routledge companion to epistemology* (pp. 119–130). New York: Routledge.

Hetherington, S. (2012). The Gettier illusion: Gettier-partialism and infallibilism. *Synthese, 188*, 217–230.

Hetherington, S. (2013). There can be lucky knowledge. In M. Steup & J. Turri (Eds.), *Contemporary debates in epistemology* (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. forthcoming.

Hooker, C. (1995). *Reason, regulation and reason: Towards a regulatory systems theory of reason and evolutionary epistemology*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Hyslop, A. (1995). *Other minds*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Hyslop, A., & Jackson, F. (1972). The analogical inference to other minds. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 9*, 168–176.

Jackson, F. (1973). Is there a good argument against the incorrigibility thesis? *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 51*, 51–62.

Jackson, F. (1977). *Perception: A representative theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 32*, 127–136.

Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn't know. *The Journal of Philosophy, 83*, 291–295.

Jackson, F. (1998). *From metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Jackson, F. (2000). Representation, scepticism, and the a priori. In P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke (Eds.), *New essays on the a priori* (pp. 320–332). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Jackson, F. (2002). Critical notice of knowledge and its limits by Timothy Williamson. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80*, 516–521.

Jackson, F. (2005). Ramsey sentences and avoiding the *Sui Generis*. In H. Lillehammer & D. Mellor (Eds.), *Ramsey's legacy* (pp. 123–136). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kornblith, H. (Ed.). (2001). *Epistemology: Internalism and externalism*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Kripke, S. A. (1980). *Naming and necessity*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Langton, R. (1998). *Kantian humility: Our ignorance of things in themselves*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lewis, D. (1988). What experience teaches. *Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 13*, 29–57.

Lewis, D. (1999 [1996]). Elusive knowledge. In *Papers in metaphysics and epistemology* (pp. 418–445). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ludlow, P., Nagasawa, Y., & Stoljar, D. (Eds.). (2004). *There's something about Mary: Essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Macarthur, D. (2003a). McDowell, scepticism, and the 'veil of perception'. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81*, 175–189.

Macarthur, D. (2003b). The seriousness of doubt and our natural trust in the senses in the first meditation. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33*, 159–182.

Macarthur, D. (2004). Naturalism and skepticism. In M. de Caro & D. Macarthur (Eds.), *Naturalism in question* (pp. 106–124). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Macarthur, D. (2006). Skepticism, self-knowledge, and responsibility. In S. Hetherington (Ed.), *Aspects of knowing: Epistemological essays* (pp. 97–113). Oxford: Elsevier.

Mackie, J. L. (1962). The philosophy of John Anderson. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 40*, 264–282.

Mackie, J. L. (1963). Are there any incorrigible empirical statements? *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41*, 12–28.

Mackie, J. L. (1965). Rationalism and empiricism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 43*, 1–12.

Mackie, J. L. (1969–1970). The possibility of innate knowledge. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 70*, 181–196.

Malpas, J. (1994). Self-knowledge and scepticism. *Erkenntnis, 40*, 165–184.

Michael, M. (1995). The dialectics of scepticism: Comments on Gallois. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73*, 123–128.

Musgrave, A. (1999). Critical rationalism. In *Essays on realism and rationalism* (pp. 314–350). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Musgrave, A. (2004). Responses. In C. Cheyne & J. Worrall (Eds.), *Rationality and reality* (pp. 293–333). Dordrecht: Springer.

Musgrave, A. (2006). How Popper (might have) solved the problem of induction. *Philosophy, 79*, 19–31.

Oakley, I. T. (1976). An argument for scepticism about justified belief. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 13*, 221–228.

Oakley, I. T. (1988). Scepticism and the diversity of epistemic justification. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 38*, 263–279.

Oakley, I. T. (2001). A Skeptic's reply to Lewisian contextualism. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31*, 309–332.

Oakley, I. T. (2006). A problem about epistemic dependence. In S. Hetherington (Ed.), *Aspects of knowing: Epistemological essays* (pp. 17–33). Oxford: Elsevier.

Oakley, I. T., & O'Neill, L. (Eds.). (1996). *Language, logic and causation: Philosophical writings of Douglas Gasking*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Pargetter, R. (1984). The scientific inference to other minds. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62*, 158–163.

Price, H. (2003). Truth as convenient friction. *The Journal of Philosophy, 100*, 167–190.

Quine, W. (1975). The nature of natural knowledge. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), *Mind and language: Wolfson College lectures 1974* (pp. 67–81). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Shoemaker, S. (1988). On knowing one's own mind. *Philosophical Perspectives, 2*, 183–209.

Srzednicki, J., & Wood, D. (Eds.). (1992). *Essays on philosophy in Australia*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Stich, S. (1984). Armstrong on belief. In R. Bogdan (Ed.), *D. M. Armstrong* (pp. 121–138). Dordrecht: Reidel.

Stove, D. (1973). *Probability and Hume's inductive scepticism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Stove, D. (1986). *The rationality of induction*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Stove, D. (1998). *Anything goes: Origins of the cult of scientific irrationalism*. Paddington: Macleay Press. First published [1982] as *Popper and after: Four modern irrationalists*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Unger, P. (1968). An analysis of factual knowledge. *The Journal of Philosophy, 65*, 157–170.

Weatherson, B. (2003). What good are counterexamples? *Philosophical Studies, 115*, 1–31.

Weatherson, B. (2006). Questioning contextualism. In S. Hetherington (Ed.), *Aspects of knowing: Epistemological essays* (pp. 133–147). Oxford: Elsevier.

Weiler, G. (1965). Degrees of knowledge. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 15*, 317–327.

Williams, D. C. (1947). *The ground of induction*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Williamson, T. (2000). *Knowledge and its limits*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1969). *On certainty*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Philosophy of Language

14

Frederick Kroon and Denis Robinson

Contents

Introduction 414
Language and Analytic Philosophy 414
Early Influences and the Davidsonian Revolution 417
Intensional Semantics 419
Naturalising Semantics 425
Anti-realist Tendencies 426
Language and Vagueness 429
The Return of Conceptual Analysis 430
Conclusion 435
Appendix: The University of Melbourne, Philosophy of Language and the Oxford Connection 436
    Melbourne 436
    Oxford 437
    Intellectual Traffic 438
    The ‘Melbourne Semantics Group’ 439
References 440

Frederick Kroon is the author of the main chapter and Denis Robinson is the author of the section ‘Appendix’

Thanks to Graham Oppy for helpful advice on this project and to Denis Robinson and the late Barry Taylor for useful comments on preliminary drafts.

F. Kroon (✉) • D. Robinson
Department of Philosophy, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
e-mail: f.kroon@auckland.ac.nz; dj.robinson@auckland.ac.nz

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_15, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Introduction

Philosophy of language is a 'philosophy *of*' discipline, concerned with conceptual issues centring on the nature, origin and purpose of language, in all its multifarious uses. As such, it is a relatively new part of philosophy, unlike, say, metaphysics or ethics. The present chapter focuses on philosophy of language in Australasia, but because philosophy of language is a field with an impressive prehistory/early history, we begin our discussion by looking at central features of that early history. Later sections cover major themes in philosophy of language as it has developed in Australasia.

Language and Analytic Philosophy

As a discipline, philosophy of language is continuous with, and arose out of, the preoccupation with the notion of an ideal language that helped to inaugurate analytic philosophy. That preoccupation, notably in the work of Frege and Russell, was characterised by a suspicion of ordinary language and its failure to conform to various logical norms. This suspicion continued with the work of the logical empiricists and even that of a successor of logical empiricism like Quine, with his insistence that language should be regimented if it was to be of use for the expression of a properly scientific worldview. These philosophers were, to a lesser or greater degree, reformers. Another reaction to the work of Frege and Russell took the view that language was not so much to be reformed as understood for what it was: an instrument of communication and much else that was well suited to its many purposes and whose articulation was not beholden to formal logic. This was the view of Peter Strawson, who attacked Russell on just such grounds and along the way made use of a notion—presupposition—that had played a role in Frege's account of some of the failures of ordinary language but was now refashioned to support the idea that meaning was use. (The latter doctrine was integral to the later Wittgenstein's philosophy, although Wittgenstein himself was notoriously unwilling to develop a *theory* of meaning as use.)

Strawson's critique of Russell and his defence of ordinary language appeared in 1950s, and it is not unreasonable to trace the emergence (or, if you prefer, the *maturing*) of philosophy of language as a discipline in its own right to roughly this time—a discipline with its own set of problems and agendas, overseen by a reflective attitude to its own subject matter. This was a decade that saw not only Strawson's response to Russell on behalf of ordinary language (as well as Russell's response to Strawson on behalf of ideal language) but also Quine's sceptical attack on the notion of meaning, including such attempts as Carnap's *Meaning and Necessity* (1947) to set up a scientifically rigorous account of meaning, as well as Strawson and Grice's influential critique of Quine's arguments. Orthogonal to these developments, the 1950s also saw the first remarkable stirrings of the new linguistics, in the work of Noam Chomsky. From its earliest manifestations, the new linguistics had a very different picture of the role that the notion of meaning might play in a scientific account of language.

In short, this was a time when a number of starkly different, indeed incompatible, views of the nature of language and the relation of language to logic as well as psychology began to appear: the reformist approach, the ordinary language approach and the psychological approach. It is fair to say that the USA headquartered the reformist wing, at least in part because of the influence of the logical empiricists who had moved there prior to the advent of WWII. Quine, while a critic of the logical empiricist 'dogmas' of reductionism and the analytic/synthetic distinction, retained the belief that logic was the appropriate vehicle for 'limning' the structure of the world—*first-order* logic, however, not second-order logic, since the latter involved the notion of an attribute, which he thought required the philosophical legitimacy of the notion of meaning. In Britain, things were rather different. Because of the influence of Wittgenstein and the work of Strawson, formal logic was seen as having a more limited role. In addition, the theory of meaning began to occupy even more of the centre stage with the work of Paul Grice, who initiated a bold program that tried to understand the notion of linguistic meaning in terms of a notion of intention based utterance meaning. The decade that followed saw an explosion of work on this and other topics, inspired by a new-found confidence in ordinary language, its manifold uses and our ability to discuss these rigorously. In particular, John Austin inaugurated speech act theory, and this development meant that (apparently) non-descriptive uses of language were also made subject to rigorous study. The successes of such a preoccupation with language helped to foster the movement in British philosophy known as 'ordinary language philosophy', with its ideological belief that philosophical problems in general could be solved through a study of the way we actually use language—a movement that should be distinguished from the more sober view that language is something that deserves philosophical investigation in its own right.

The linguist Chomsky had stressed the productivity of natural language in his defence of the psychological conception of language: the way speakers can construct and recognise a potential infinity of grammatical strings. A new phase in the debate about natural language meaning came when Donald Davidson inaugurated a new kind of truth-conditional theory of meaning that appealed to productivity in the context of a theory of meaning. Davidson wanted to explain the capacity of agents to grasp the meanings of a potential infinity of sentences on the basis of a finite learning process but in a way that was not compromised (as far as Quine and his followers were concerned) by its association with Fregean notions. Instead, Davidson appealed to Tarski's account of truth and, in particular, Tarski's convention T. More even than Grice, Davidson thereby inaugurated an entire research program for understanding the nature of meaning for natural language, and he did so in a way that respected the role of formal logical frameworks while allowing for modes of speech that were not purely descriptive.

While Davidson was prepared to work within the strictures of Quine's sceptical perspective on intensional notions, Richard Montague, a student of Tarski, developed a far richer truth-conditional approach to the issue of meaning, one that was based on intensional logic with a rich type theory and a possible-worlds model-theoretic semantics. So Montague used tools that Davidson, following Quine, rejected on ideological grounds. All this was taking place in the 1960s, a particularly rich, innovative period for the burgeoning field of philosophy of language because of the way an emphasis on the theory of meaning was combined with a renewed commitment to formal techniques. The late 1960s saw an integration of some of this work with certain other concerns, such as the question of the meaning of names and descriptions that had initially ushered in the analytic turn in philosophy at the hands of Frege and Russell. Kripke launched his influential attack on descriptivist accounts of names, presenting an alternative 'causal' picture of reference and defending the view that names were (de jure) rigid designators, while Keith Donnellan, Hilary Putnam and David Kaplan used related arguments to distinguish names and other 'directly referential' terms like demonstratives from descriptions. (Kripke also appealed to rigidity to argue for a category of a priori contingent truths as well as a posteriori necessary ones, and gave an influential argument against the identity of mental and physical states based on the failure of such identities to fit the pattern of a posteriori necessary identities).

All of these authors were committed to the use of modal notions, especially that of possible worlds—notions that had been anathema to Quine. But from the point of view of Australasian philosophy, the most influential American philosopher to wield such notions in the service of philosophy of language as well as other parts of philosophy was David Lewis, who not only connected intensional Montague-style truth-condition theories with Gricean theories of languages as social practices (Lewis 1975) but who had also developed an influential early argument for the mind-brain identity theory that was later connected to a certain elaboration of the Ramsey-Carnap picture of theoretical terms (Lewis 1966, 1970, 1972). For many, the former work succeeded in showing how one might answer the broadly pragmatic question of what it is to *use* a language whose meaning is described in intensionalist terms (significant, since intensionalist semantics became an important enterprise in Australasian philosophy of language), while the latter work became an important plank in the platform of the Canberra Plan. (Lewis also developed a new logic and semantics of counterfactuals, and much more, all set within an account of possible worlds that he himself construed in famously realist terms).

Early Influences and the Davidsonian Revolution

To understand the history of philosophy of language in Australasia,[1] it is important to understand the foregoing more general history of the philosophy of language and its antecedents. It would be a mistake to think that there is a distinctive Australasian philosophy of language that arose and developed independently of this history. What is true, however, is that trends in Australian philosophy slowed the reception of philosophy of language as an important field in its own right. On the one hand, Andersonian philosophy (centred on Sydney) treated metaphysics as paramount; the preoccupation with language fostered by the rise of ordinary language philosophy in Britain was regarded with disdain. On the other hand, the Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy was dominant in Melbourne in the 1950s. Practised by such figures as Douglas Gasking, Camo Jackson and George Paul, such an approach favoured ordinary language philosophy but tended to be suspicious of the professionalisation of philosophy, and that included the kind of disciplinary specialisation found in the burgeoning field of philosophy of language. In New Zealand, by contrast, formal logic had been used by Arthur Prior to study the phenomenon of temporal and modal language, but this work was regarded as logic (or perhaps logic in the service of metaphysics) rather than as an attempt to develop a theory of meaning for (parts of) ordinary language.

What changed such attitudes and set philosophy of language on course to becoming an important and respected field of teaching and research in Australasia was the increasing internationalisation of philosophy. Melbourne may have been a centre of Wittgensteinianism, and Sydney an island of Andersonianism, but other universities were not so bound. In particular, the University of Adelaide appointed J. J. C. ('Jack') Smart in 1950, and Smart combined a respect for the sciences with a respect for the need to attend to and understand ordinary language. His work on the incoherence of talk of the passage of time, for example, is a model of conceptual clarification through linguistic analysis. Jonathan Bennett, reporting on Smart's paper on time at the first New Zealand congress of Philosophy, commented that 'Professor Ryle of Oxford (whose form of linguistic philosophy seems to be that to which Professor Smart owes most) has been accused of doing metaphysics while pretending to do linguistic analysis; Professor Smart goes one better: he does both and disguises neither' (Bennett 1953, p. 197).

---

[1] Note that this chapter is concerned with the history of philosophy of language *in* Australasia. I will not discuss work by Australasians whose careers have taken them away from Australasia. For the most part, I will also not discuss the work of logicians studying the logic of this or that natural language operator, for example, relevance logicians working on conditionals. I also do not consider work on certain topics that are often thought to fall within philosophical logic rather than philosophy of language, such as work on truth and truth-aptness, even though I accept that my way of drawing the border may be arbitrary. I apologise in advance to authors whose work certainly deserved comment, but where decisions about focus and constraints of space made inclusion difficult.

Smart was no closet philosopher of language, however—he was more interested in showing how language can mislead, thus highlighting the need for reform. The development of philosophy of language in Australia came later, and not just as a result of the impact of new books and articles or the views expounded in lectures by visiting philosophers (important though these were) but, increasingly, as a result of the weight added to such views by young lecturers appointed as a result of the expansion of the university system in the 1960s who had gained their postgraduate degrees abroad.[2]

One event that had a considerable impact on Australian philosophy was the 1968 visit of Donald Davidson, who was invited by Jack Smart as Gavin David Young lecturer at the University of Adelaide and later toured the country introducing the truth-theoretic conception of a theory of meaning that he had begun to advance in the 1960s (e.g. Davidson 1967). Interest in Davidson's work in Melbourne had been fuelled by a paper on adverbs read by Gary Malinas, visiting Melbourne soon after his arrival from the USA. Not surprisingly, perhaps, Davidson's work proved especially influential in Melbourne—not only did it continue the (Wittgenstein-inspired) emphasis on ordinary language found in British philosophy but it combined this with the rigour that logic could provide, and all in the course of dealing non-sceptically, and in a principled way, with the thorny issue of the nature of meaning. (Sydney was less impressed.) One local Melbourne product influenced by Davidson was Barry Taylor, who subsequently went to Oxford for his DPhil before returning to Melbourne. His arrival was timely since it coincided with the start of the Davidsonian revolution at Oxford, and Taylor's writings in the 1970s and 1980s reflect his immersion in the Davidsonian framework. In Taylor (1980), for example, he tackles the problem of constructing a truth-theory for a language containing simple and complex demonstratives, opting for a certain hybrid account that invokes relativity to utterer and time as well as points of reference, while Taylor (1985) builds on his DPhil work to provide a sophisticated Davidsonian truth-theory for a language containing adverbs, using a formal account of the notions of change and fact to develop a theory of events that is a reconstruction of Aristotle's idea of events as changes of various types.

Another Australian deeply influenced by Davidson was Martin Davies, currently Wilde Professor of Mental Philosophy at Oxford, who went to Oxford in the mid-1970s after attending Monash University in Melbourne. Davies (1981) not only presents a detailed and influential interpretation of Davidson's general position but also considered the technical problems facing a truth-theory able to accommodate quantification, anaphora and modality. Because of the influence of Quine, Davidson himself remained sceptical of modal notions and had not extended his project to languages with modal operators. Davies' work thereby showed the influence of an Oxford perspective on Davidson's project (in particular the influence of Gareth Evans and John McDowell). Around this time Davies also studied other aspects of truth-theory, in particular the vexed question of the relation of truth-theory to meaning and semantic competence (cf. Davies 1981).

---

[2] For an account of how all this impacted on Melbourne in particular, see the appendix to this chapter by Denis Robinson.

One of the most intriguing of Davies' contributions to Davidsonian truth-theory, and one which is discussed in the final chapter of Davies (1981), is based on joint work he did with the Monash logician Lloyd Humberstone on the logic and truth-theory of the modal operators 'A(ctually)' and 'F(ixedly)' (Davies and Humberstone 1980). Given a sentence *s*, the effect of applying 'A' and then 'F' is a sentence 'FAs' that says: whichever world had been actual, *s* would have been true at that world considered as actual. (An example of a sentence *s* such that FAs is true at an arbitrary world is 'If anyone invented the zip, then the actual inventor of the zip invented the zip'.) Davies and Humberstone thought that the kind of necessity expressed by 'FA' corresponded to Gareth Evans' 'deep' necessity, and discussed the idea that it might be used to explain the phenomenon of the Kripkean contingent a priori (they believed it could; that such statements were superficially contingent but deeply necessary) as well as the Kripkean necessary a posteriori (here they were more tentative—see especially the discussion at pp. 19ff of the suggestion that 'Water is H_2O' is deeply contingent; for their more recent views, see Humberstone 2004 and Davies 2004). The issue returns with the work of Frank Jackson, to be discussed later.

The Davidsonian revolution provided a truth-theoretic perspective on the notion of meaning. It did not provide a full truth-conditional perspective on meaning, if by the latter is meant an approach that aims to identify, in compositional terms, something—some semantic value—that might be said to be the truth-condition of a sentence. For Davidson, truth-theories provide truth-conditions only in the sense of generating instances of the T-schema's is true iff p' as theorems of some metalanguage (making appropriate allowance for indexical expressions and the contribution of context), where the metalanguage is the language of the interpreter. Davidson thus makes it clear that his theory of meaning is a theory of *interpretation*, and, if so, it seems that there can be no requirement that we identify something extralinguistic that might count as the meaning of a sentence.

This has been one of the most contentious aspects of the Davidsonian program, and it has been rejected by many philosophers of language working on the notion of meaning and truth. In particular, it was rejected by intensionalists who followed Montague in his reformulation of Carnap's appeal to intensional foundations for the semantics of language.

Intensional Semantics

In contrast to Davidson's truth-theoretic account of meaning, Montague's work in the late 1960s and 1970s provides a full truth-conditional perspective, with truth-conditions understood as generated from the semantic values of constituent expressions (see, e.g. Montague 1970). The most widely known development of this alternative perspective in Australasia is due to the New Zealand logician, Max Cresswell, who had studied under Arthur Prior after Prior's departure for

Manchester and then, at the insistence of David Lewis, attended Richard Montague's lectures on English as a formal language while on leave at UCLA in early 1970. Underscoring how little the debates were seen as debates within a discipline of philosophy of language, Cresswell has this to say [personal communication]:

> Until then we all knew that there were two kinds of philosophers, logicians and ordinary language philosophers. And we all knew that the 'languages' of formal logic and ordinary language were quite different. We disagreed about which kind of language was best for addressing philosophical problems. Then came the Chomsky revolution, and Montague showed us that the linguists were on the side of the logicians rather than on the side of the ordinary language philosophers.

Where Montague had considered a range of formal representations (universal grammar being the most abstract), Cresswell took the underlying structure of a natural language to be that of a lambda-categorical language. Sentences in such languages are represented as being composed out of functors and terms. At the level of semantics, these expressions are assigned appropriate semantic values (for instance, a function from entities to propositions, if the functor is a one-place predicate), with the semantic values of entire sentences determined by appropriate functional composition of the values of component expressions. The values of sentences at contexts of utterance are propositions, taken as corresponding to sets of possible worlds (the role played by possible worlds is less direct than their role in Montague's framework; for a recent defence of this understanding of possible worlds). Cresswell (1973) sets out the basic framework, while later works discuss the proper treatment in this framework of such natural linguistic phenomena as anaphora, tense, prepositions and points of view, adverbial modification (Cresswell 1985a) and the propositional attitudes (Cresswell 1985b). The latter work defends the view that the meanings of propositional attitude verbs like 'believes' are sensitive not only to the proposition expressed by a whole sentence but to the meanings of its separate parts; the ensuing logic and semantics he calls 'hyperintensional' since such contexts do not respect intensional identity. (The theory admits other complications; for one thing, attitudes can be iterated, as in 'Mortimer believes that Natasha believes that the earth is flat'. But to let the meaning/intension of (the first occurrence of) 'believes' operate on an agent plus something that includes the meaning of (the second occurrence of) 'believes' seems to involve a kind of vicious regress, and to handle these cases Cresswell allows the complement-forming word 'that' to be category-ambiguous; see Chap. 10, esp. pp. 89–92.) Cresswell defends his framework and analyses against rival accounts in Cresswell (1988), while Cresswell (1990) is an extended argument for the claim that possible worlds are more than theoretical posits of formal semantics—like times, they belong to the things that natural language assumes. (In this and other work Cresswell makes it clear that natural language is his starting point and destination and that he invokes an intensional formal semantics because natural language can and should be represented as an intensional language. A less committed approach was taken by Malcolm Rennie, a young philosopher and logician whose premature death in 1974 robbed Australasia of one of its rising stars and whose important monograph, Rennie (1974), sets out to show ‘that Church’s formulation of the simple theory of types provides a comprehensive and workable framework in which to deal with the logic of predicate modifiers and various aspects of intensional logics’ (p. 156), without, however, arguing that natural language should be represented as an intensional language.)

While Cresswell has been the most influential Australasian contributor to the Montague-inspired program of an intensional formal semantics for natural language, there have been others, among them John Bigelow, who was a colleague of Cresswell’s at Victoria University of Wellington. Bigelow (1975) argues that the best way to handle the contribution of context in formal semantics—for example, non-shiftable indices such as the utterer-index in sentences employing ‘I’—is by means of a certain ‘quotation device’ (work by David Kaplan on the notion of character has famously taken mainstream intensional semantics in a very different direction), while Bigelow (1978) is an influential paper on the semantics of propositional attitudes. This paper, published around the same time as Cresswell’s first attempt at a ‘structured meanings’ approach to hyperintensionality, lets the embedded clause in a propositional attitude ascription refer to what Bigelow calls its ‘semantic structure’, a fine-grained abstract representation containing ‘markers’ and symbols that, he argues, is nonetheless sensitive to the phenomenon of quantifying into hyperintensional contexts while allowing for the representation of the iteration of attitudes.

Bigelow’s research following his departure for Australia (first La Trobe, then Monash) took him in the direction of metaphysics rather than the philosophy of language. The problem of the logic and semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions, however, has been the subject of a number of papers by some of his current Monash colleagues, including Karen Green while still at Melbourne University following her Sydney PhD under Michael Devitt. In Green (1985), she raised the sceptical worry that the very possibility of a logic of propositional attitude ascriptions was under threat if we adopted either the Quinean or Davidsonian conception of logical form. Graham Oppy, who had been a student of Green’s at Melbourne before completing his PhD on the semantics of propositional attitudes at Princeton University, returned to the topic in a number of papers in the early 1990s. While suspicious of the argument for semantic innocence made by neo-Russellians (Oppy 1992a), Oppy claimed that neo-Fregean and neo-Russellian approaches to propositional attitude ascriptions were structurally alike at least to the extent that neither could avoid dealing with the role, content and compositional structure of the modes of presentation that featured in the (neo-Fregean) semantics or (neo-Russellian) pragmatics of such ascriptions. Using a neo-Fregean theory as his working model, Oppy then provided an account of the way context furnished such modes of presentation (Oppy 1992b). It should be noted that this working model is a kind of ‘hidden-indexical’ theory. Like neo-Russellianism, such an approach is very different from the intensionalist approach favoured by Cresswell and Bigelow.

Another New Zealand philosopher who advocated an intensionalist semantic framework was Pavel Tichý, a Czech philosopher who spent the second half of his life in New Zealand as a political refugee, where he taught at the University of Otago. Early in his career he invented a version of intensional logic, simultaneously with Richard Montague's invention of such a logic, but published slightly after Montague's papers of 1970. Tichý's theory, which he called 'Transparent Intensional Logic', is a logical semantics for the analysis of sizeable fragments of both natural and artificial languages. Like Montague's approach, it belongs squarely to the research paradigm of possible-worlds semantics but differs from it by ignoring pragmatic and other contextual features of language. And unlike Montague's approach or Cresswell's development of this approach, the lambda-expressions of Tichý's language do not stand for functions and the results of functional application but for the very procedures of forming functions and applying functions, respectively. Such procedures or *constructions* constitute a third semantic tier in Tichý's system (after the two tiers of extensions and intensions). Indeed, construction constitutes the single most important notion of Transparent Intensional Logic, playing a crucial role in his account of hyperintensionality and much else. (Tichý 1988 provides a mature statement of the foundations together with applications, while Tichý 2005 is a posthumous collection of papers that traces the development of his ideas.)

Probably the philosophically most radical version of intensionalism advanced by an Australasian philosopher (or by any other philosopher, for that matter) is that of the New Zealand-born logician Richard Routley, most of whose professional life was spent as a Research Fellow at the ANU. But before turning to Routley's work, I want to describe the distinctive contribution to intensionalism of another Australasian philosopher, Charles Hamblin, who taught philosophy at the University of New South Wales and during his career was responsible for a number of important innovations in computer science (such as reverse Polish notation and the notion of a stack). In his 1957 London School of Economics PhD, Hamblin had presented a critique of Shannon's theory of information from a semantic perspective and developed a possible-worlds semantics for question-response exchanges. He returned to the topic of questions in Hamblin (1973) but this time adopted Montague's framework, showing how one might give a complete syntactic-semantic set of rules for the kind of fragment of English discussed by Montague, but supplemented with questions and using the fact that the basic interrogative words fit more or less neatly into Montague's categories. (According to Hamblin's influential account, the intension of an interrogative is a function from possible worlds to sets of answers, where answers are propositions). This preoccupation with the logic and semantics of non-declarative sentences continued with his work on imperatives (Hamblin 1987, published posthumously). Hamblin assigned to each imperative a set of possible worlds in which it was satisfied, with worlds construed as chains of states connected by deeds and happenings, able to accommodate both physical and agent causation; this rich underlying model allowed Hamblin to develop a contrasting notion of 'wholehearted' satisfaction that characterised an agent's involvement and responsibility in fulfilling an imperative. Like much else of Hamblin's work, Hamblin's theory of imperatives has had consequences for computer science, in this case for developing protocols governing the delegation of tasks between software agents (McBurney 2003).

The contribution of Richard Routley, later 'Sylvan', to philosophy in Australasia is hard to overestimate. Routley/Sylvan was one of Australasia's most prolific and systematic philosophers, and his work on relevance and paraconsistent logics has influenced numerous logicians, inside and outside of Australasia. His work inevitably impacted on the philosophy of language, even though his logical and metaphysical ideas really hold centre stage (see Hyde 2001). Following his collaboration with Len Goddard in the 1960s and early 1970s on the logic of meaningfulness or significance (Goddard and Routley 1973), he began to explore some themes thrown up by that early work, in particular the phenomena of intensionality, semantic paradox and failure of reference. On the basis of joint work with Val Routley, he came to think that much work in philosophy was the subject of a pervasive error, the reference theory of meaning, which holds that all truth-valued discourse is referential (i.e. is true or false depending on the reference of constituent expressions, with reference construed as an existence-entailing relation). In its place, Routley urged the adoption of what he termed a *noneist* framework, a version of Meinongianism that holds that every term whatsoever is about, or designates, something, in many cases something that has a range of properties but is incomplete (for some properties, it lacks both the property and the complement of the property) and doesn't exist (only things occupying actual regions of space and time exist). The description 'the non-square square' (i.e. 'the x such that x is square and ∼[x is square]'), for example, designates something that we can think and talk about, and that is both square and not square—but it doesn't exist and is incomplete. Not only that, it is also an impossible object: it infringes the law of non-contradiction. The truth-theoretic semantics of ordinary language is thus very different on Routley's view from the standard view. Some sentences are true in *impossible* worlds, not just possible worlds. Not surprisingly, this has an impact on the theory of meaning. Routley's work belongs to the general intensionalist camp—he takes his work on universal semantics to show that *every* logic has a designative theory of meaning (Routley 1980, p. 335), but in particular the notion of meaning for a rich lambda-categorical language is taken to be designative in a highly intensional sense. For Routley, expressions in a language of this kind are interpreted by means of functions on the class of situations and contexts, but such a meaning-specifying interpretation for the language is furnished with a domain of individuals and a class of situations and contexts that are far richer than those admitted by other intensionalist frameworks. They comprise individuals and worlds that can be complete or incomplete, possible or impossible. In addition, Routley rejects the reduction of functions to set-theoretic entities, and he argues that this allows him to avoid some common problems facing intensionalist theories of meaning, including the problem of propositional attitude contexts (for Routley, the semantics of the verb 'believes' relates agents to propositions—no need to invoke hyperintensionality; Routley 1980, pp. 343–345).

Routley tended to present his ideas in a rather combative fashion. A more recent, and rather more reader-friendly, attempt to apply a version of Routley's liberal semantic machinery to the analysis of language occurs in Priest (2005), the first part of which is concerned with the semantics of intentionality (including both intentional predicates and operators) and which accepts a noneist framework of possible/impossible/open worlds and existent/non-existent objects. This account is then applied to a range of topics, including the topic of fictional and extra-fictional discourse (the latter including claims like ‘Holmes is admired by readers of the Doyle stories’ and ‘Holmes doesn’t really exist’). Contrary to Routley’s version of noneism, Priest holds that Holmes is not a detective at the actual world but only at worlds that are the way Doyle’s stories represent them as being: in particular, at worlds, including impossible worlds, where he exists. At the actual world, however, Holmes has such properties as being non-existent and being admired by readers of the Doyle stories.

By contrast, a more traditional intensionalist like Cresswell rejects any appeal to impossible objects and impossible worlds (Cresswell 1994, pp. 61–62) and takes fictional and extra-fictional discourse to be about merely possible objects. But there are other Australasian philosophers who have taken rather different approaches to Meinongianism or intensionalism when writing on the topic of the semantics of fiction. The British-born philosopher Greg Currie, for example, who was a colleague of Pavel Tichý at Otago University before moving back to the UK, has advanced an influential Gricean theory on which the author of a work of fiction intends her audience to make believe the content of the work and to recognise that she intends them to do this (Currie 1990). On Currie’s account, fictional names should be understood as bound variables when they occur within a work, as abbreviated descriptions (generated Ramsey-style from the work in question) in statements *about* the work (in which case they occur inside the scope of an ‘in the fiction’ operator), and as names of *roles* in extra-fictional contexts, where roles are partial functions from worlds to the individuals in those worlds who satisfy the abbreviated descriptions (Currie takes these to be versions of Pavel Tichý’s ‘offices’). Other authors have taken a different approach. Stuart Brock, for example, is a fictionalist about fictional characters. He eschews realism about fictional characters (even Currie’s role-realism), and he thinks that we can defuse realism about such characters by interpreting extra-fictional statements (the most difficult category of fiction-involving statements) as shorthand for statements that certain things are so according to the realist’s theory of fictional characters (Brock 2002). As Brock acknowledges, such a fictionalism still does not make room for negative existence statements like ‘Holmes doesn’t exist’, and Brock has argued that there are serious difficulties confronting the analysis of such statements even for those who think that fictional and other empty names are to be understood descriptively (Brock 2004). Kroon (2004) is an attempt to solve these difficulties by combining a pretence account of fictional language with a descriptivist account of the reference of names in general. (Note that these critics of intensionalist attempts to deal with fictional language tend to think that fictional language is a rather special phenomenon; they do not see their challenges as challenges to intensionalism as such).

Naturalising Semantics

The intensional approach to formal semantics of natural language is a way of doing theory of meaning. Proponents of such an approach were usually not particularly concerned with the epistemological question of how *knowledge* of meaning was possible (although this question played a prominent role in Tichý's work); still less did they worry whether its theoretical articulation of the notion of meaning could be meshed with a broadly naturalistic philosophy. The attempt to understand semantic notions in broadly naturalistic terms became an important part of the motivation of another well-known Australasian philosopher of language, Michael Devitt. As a student in the mid-1960s at the University of Sydney, Devitt's interest in the philosophy of language was kindled by the work of C. B. ('Charlie') Martin, whom Devitt recalls as urging a thesis for names and demonstratives that was, in effect, like the rigidity theses to be made famous by Saul Kripke and David Kaplan, and a view of definite descriptions that was similar to the view that Donnellan was about to publish. In his Harvard PhD and later works such as Devitt (1974) and (1981a), Devitt developed a version of Kripke's causal account of reference for proper names and natural kind terms (Kripke 1972) but one that was far more specific about the kinds of grounding events and causal connections that determine this kind of reference (or, as Devitt prefers, *designation*). He also argued for a semantic account of the role played by Donnellan's 'referential' descriptions (Devitt 1981b) and gave a causal theory of the way their reference was determined. What was distinctive about these causal theories was that, unlike Kripke's much more tentative account, they were placed squarely within a naturalistic philosophy. Devitt later argued (in Devitt 1989) that his causal framework could be used to give an account of the *meaning* (not just the mode of reference determination) of names, sharply disagreeing with the most popular post-Kripke way of understanding the meaning of names, namely, the Millian 'direct reference' approach of such philosophers as Nathan Salmon and and Scott Soames: (Unsurprisingly, not all Australasian philosophers of language have been convinced by Devitt's causal approach to reference and meaning, even though they might have shared his naturalistic outlook and his disaffection for Millianism. Some have even argued for a return to a descriptivist account of names, albeit a broadly causal version; cf. Kroon 1987 and Jackson 1998b.)

Note that Devitt's account is a theory of the reference and meaning of ordinary names, and the meaningfulness of fictional and other empty names may look problematic from this perspective. But Devitt thinks that these problems are tractable (Devitt 1989), unlike the problems faced by Millians. He thinks that even empty names have underlying causal networks, although these fail to be grounded in an actual individual (Devitt 1981a, Chap. 6). In the case of the metafictional statement 'In the fiction, Holmes is a detective', for example, the causal network underlying 'Holmes' points to the parts of the Holmes stories that help to make it true in the fiction that Holmes is a detective. And the negative existential statement 'Holmes doesn't exist' is true to the extent that the causal network underlying tokens of the name 'Holmes' is not grounded in any individual.

Some of Devitt's views show the influence of work by his erstwhile student Kim Sterelny (see, e.g., Sterelny 1983), with whom he also published a popular and influential textbook on the philosophy of language (Devitt and Sterelny 1987, 2nd edition 1999). This book clearly shows their disenchantment with much of contemporary philosophy of language, and later works by Devitt elaborated on his reasons for this disenchantment. In Devitt (1994), for example, he proposed answers to three questions: 'What are the semantic tasks?' 'Why are they worthwhile?' and 'How should we accomplish them?' urging a methodology to escape from the kind of intuition mongering he took to be rife in the philosophy of language. Devitt (1996) uses this methodology to criticise, inter alia, semantic holism and two-factor theories and to support a truth-referential semantics. More recently, Devitt has mounted an extensive critique of the Chomskian 'psychological conception' of linguistics, arguing instead for a 'linguistic conception' (see especially Devitt 2006).

Devitt left Australia for the USA in 1987, and work after this period should not be strictly construed as Australasian philosophy of language. There can be little doubt, however, that it is work done in the same naturalistic spirit as his earlier work, a naturalistic spirit encouraged by his early training in the Sydney philosophy department and fostered by teachers (Quine) and friends (in particular Hartry Field) at Harvard. There is also another sense in which we can see Devitt's work as particularly fitting, giving this early training. As I mentioned earlier, the metaphysical orientation of Sydney philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s meant that it was bound to be suspicious of the linguistic turn in philosophy and that might further suggest that it would be less receptive to the burgeoning field of philosophy of language than, say, Melbourne philosophy. That has not been so. Instead, the kind of philosophy of language practised by Devitt and his students simply rejects the imperial ambitions of the linguistic turn in philosophy. Unlike Michael Dummett in particular, Devitt denies philosophy of language any claim to pre-eminence in philosophy. Nowhere is this more clear than in Devitt's influential *Realism and Truth* (1984), where Devitt argues that realism is a metaphysical doctrine, not a semantic one, and that much damage is done by the thought that the task of philosophy is to 'analyse our concept of X' rather than to 'explain the nature of X'. For Devitt, we should 'Put Metaphysics First'. John Anderson would have been pleased.

Anti-realist Tendencies

Each of the three theoretical perspectives I have discussed so far—Davidsonianism, formal intensional semantics and Devitt-style causal semantics—has been the subject of criticism by other Australasian philosophers. Devitt in particular has been vociferous in his criticism of other approaches to the topics of reference and meaning. One significant critic of the presuppositions rather than the detail of these approaches has been Huw Price, who rejects truth-oriented accounts of meaning because they depend on what he regards as the unsustainable assumption that there is a viable distinction between assertoric and other discourse (Price 1988). Unlike expressivists, who have tended to prefer appropriateness conditions rather than truth-conditions for what they see as non-assertoric discourse, Price advocates a bifurcation between two notions of representation (an 'external', world-tracking notion and an 'internal', inferentialist notion) and a generous notion of assertion on which assertion functions as a coordination mechanism but where what gets coordinated depends on the practice or functional task of the utterances in question (and so on their style of representation). Price takes himself to remain a naturalist on this picture (Price 2008; see also Price 2004, which rejects the representationalist idiom). But the picture leaves the notion of truth-conditions as in a sense functionally ambiguous and certainly not well equipped to play a central role in a theory of meaning. Price, in fact, thinks that the best kind of theory of meaning does not yield a non-semantic *reduction* of statements of the form 'x means F', but—as is done by deflationists in the case of truth—explains the *function* of such a statement in terms which don't require that it refers to substantial properties (Price 1997).

Price embraces a form of naturalism (perhaps nothing less could be expected of someone who was a Challis Professor at the University of Sydney) but resolutely rejects the kind of naturalistic referential semantics that someone like Devitt espouses. He thinks that such views result in an unsustainable kind of object naturalism (Price 2004). Still, he does not reject truth-conditions in favour of, say, Dummettian verification or justification conditions in a semantics of language. So he would not count as an anti-realist in the sense made famous by Michael Dummett. (Devitt, of course, thinks that the term 'anti-realism' is a misnomer when used in this way).

For the most part, Australasian philosophers have not been kind to such forms of anti-realism. Notable among works discussing Dummett's philosophy is Green (2001a), which is a comprehensive account of how Dummett's views about objectivity, normativity, systematicity, publicity and the dependence of thought on language developed from views found in Frege and Wittgenstein, and which sympathetically explains the anti-realist worry that 'truth' cannot be expected to be bivalent for a language in which meaning is use. But Green is at the same time careful to distinguish Dummett's objectivist anti-realism about this or that discourse from subjective idealism, arguing that such objectivist forms of anti-realism are perfectly compatible with realism about common-sense physical objects or even realism about the entities of science (Green 2001a, p. 203; Green reinforces this point in Green 2005, which explains and criticises Dummett's later view that a denial of bivalence always leads to a form of anti-realism). Green therefore shares Devitt's scepticism that such semantic doctrines have much to do with the *metaphysical* issue of realism while being sympathetic to the underlying *themes* of Dummett's program in the philosophy of language. (Green even supports the central Dummettian theme that language is prior in an account of thought, a view she defends in her critique of Davidson's seemingly contextualist 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' (Green 2001b), although in a form that insists on the priority of the existence of conventions of language rather than of the attribution to speakers of knowledge of such conventions).

Two other Australian philosophers who have discussed anti-realism in its various forms are Drew Khlentzos (2004) and Barry Taylor (2006). Khlentzos endorses naturalistic realism, with realism characterised in familiar metaphysical terms, but he accepts that there are apparently compelling arguments against such a realism which deserve a response. This includes Dummett's argument against verification-transcendent truth-conditions, although Khlentzos is more impressed by Putnam's model-theoretic argument. For Khlentzos, the most serious challenge to realism is one we derive from Putnam's argument: the problem of explaining how the mind can form an adequate representation of a mind-independent reality.

While Khlentzos sees this as a challenge rather than a reason to reject realism, Barry Taylor draws the opposite conclusion (2006). Like Dummett, Taylor believes that the best way to formulate realism is as a claim about truth; specifically, that truth is objective, that is, public, bivalent and epistemically independent. After attempting to justify this characterisation of realism in the face of Devitt's arguments for an explicitly metaphysical characterisation, Taylor argues at length that no known and defensible notion of truth preserves these realist theses, whether it be a notion of correspondence truth (here Putnam's model-theoretic argument plays an important role) or a non-correspondence notion such as Wright's superassertability, Tarskian truth or the notion of truth at play in McDowell's 'quietist realism'. But he resists opting directly for a Dummettian anti-realism, with its rejection of bivalence, and insists that less radical anti-realist options involving the rejection of the epistemic independence dimension of truth remain on the table. (Presumably Taylor came to think that the Davidsonian program he championed earlier in his career could only be defended if some such anti-realist revision of the notion of truth is adopted).

While anti-realism is one option for those who take Dummett's version of a use theory of meaning to heart, another prominent view inspired by Wittgenstein's work is sceptical rather than metaphysical. This is the scepticism about rule-following that Kripke's 1982 work *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* finds in Wittgenstein's work. The so-called paradox of rule-following—that no course of action, such as using words with a certain meaning, can be determined by a rule because any course of action can be made out to accord with the rule—has generated a huge literature, one to which the (Irish-born) Australian philosopher Philip Pettit has made a seminal contribution. According to Pettit's 'straight' solution to the paradox, cast far more widely than as a solution to a problem of linguistic meaning alone, a rule can be exemplified by cases if these give rise to an inclination in an agent to go on in a certain way, where the rule is the one that the inclination corresponds to in the actual world provided the inclination operates under favourable conditions (Pettit 1990). Importantly, Pettit thinks that if such rule-following is to be public, then the rule-followers must interact with one another as well as with their earlier and later selves, and that this has implications for our understanding of mental and social life in general. In particular, he argues in *The Common Mind* that rule-following marks off thinking subjects from other intentional systems, before going on to situate this picture of thinking subjects in a larger framework for social and political theory (Pettit 1993).

Language and Vagueness

Green, Khlentzos and Taylor engage directly with Dummett's challenge to realism. Other Australian philosophers have engaged with certain Dummettian challenges to classical logic that don't have such a direct bearing on the realism debate. The role of vagueness in the sorites paradox seems an obvious example, as even Dummett thought (Dummett 1975). Linda Burns (1991) offers an influential criticism of the case that Dummett and his follower Crispin Wright develop against standard models of language based on the alleged incapacity of such models to handle vagueness and the sorites, in particular their charge that observational predicates induce incoherence (see, e.g. Dummett 1975). Her solution is an example of a contextualist solution to the sorites: in context, a sorites-generating predicate is always interpreted in such a way as not to distinguish between a pair of items in a sorites series, and this produces contextual shifts along a sorites series since things do not remain the same as one moves along the series (technically, Burns advocates the view that the relevant predicates are governed by *loose* tolerance principles rather than Wright's strict tolerance principles). Unlike the first contextualist, Hans Kamp, Burns uses this idea to provide a purely pragmatic analysis of the sorites paradox: classical logic and semantics are left intact, and the crucial induction premise is declared false.

Whether such techniques can be used to solve every instance of the sorites is in contention. In any case, there are well-known attempts by Australian philosophers to deal with vagueness by rejecting classical logic and semantics. Dominic Hyde, in particular, has written extensively on the topic (see especially Hyde 2008). Hyde rejects classical semantics, but he also rejects the widely accepted supervaluationist approach, which he sees as no more—and no less—compelling than the dual subvaluationist approach (the latter is a paraconsistentist approach that posits truth-value gluts where the former posits truth-value gaps). While Hyde professes a degree of uncertainty about the relative merits of gaps and gluts, he prefers the associated logic of vagueness to be a truth-functional logic: If, for example, A and ~A are both gappy, then the same should be true of $A \vee \sim A$, contrary to supervaluationism. Hyde combines this view with a tolerance for ontological vagueness and, indeed, thinks that the best defence of supervaluationism is based on the thought that vagueness is a merely semantic, representational phenomenon.

Burns and Hyde are just two of a number of Australian philosophers who have worked on vagueness. John A. Burgess and Lloyd Humberstone, for example, have argued for a variation on supervaluationist logic that abandons the latter's logical conservatism by rejecting the law of excluded middle in the face of seeming counterexamples presented by vagueness (Burgess and Humberstone 1987).

More recently, Burgess has presented a new objection, based on principles about the metaphysics of content, against the epistemicist view that there are sharp, but unknowable, boundaries to the extension of vague expressions (Burgess 2001). And not surprisingly, perhaps, given the Australian logical tradition, there is a growing body of work arguing for a paraconsistent approach to vagueness, beginning with Priest and Routley (1989). Beall and Colyvan (2001), for example, argue that a subvaluationist solution to the sorites paradox is superior to a supervaluationist approach, at least to the extent that it achieves uniformity with paraconsistent solutions to semantic paradoxes, while Hyde and Colyvan (2008) provide further reasons for pursuing the paraconsistent option.

The Return of Conceptual Analysis

The foregoing has highlighted the role played by formal semantic approaches as well as naturalistic approaches in the work of Australasian philosophers engaging in debates in the philosophy of language. The final major strand to be discussed combines elements of both an intensionalist approach to the theory of meaning and a naturalistic approach to the nature and function of language. It also returns us to the philosophical outlook that helped to spawn the philosophy of language in the 1950s and 1960s, an outlook—the linguistic turn—in which philosophical problems were regarded as (by and large) problems that could be solved through attending to the correct use of language, whether in its ideal form (ideal language philosophy) or in its natural form (ordinary language philosophy). For in the case of ordinary language philosophy, this outlook involved the methodology of conceptual analysis as broadly understood by Ryle, Grice, Strawson and Austin; and the preoccupation with conceptual analysis, seen through the lens of a naturalist, representationalist account of language and interpreted from within a two-dimensional modal semantic framework, has been an important part of the recent work of Frank Jackson.

Before discussing Jackson's contribution to the philosophy of language, I will first turn to the topic of indicative conditionals, another area to which Jackson has made a signal contribution (Jackson 1987). Jackson's contribution exploits a distinction for which Australasian philosophy is less well known: the Gricean distinction between what is said and what is implicated. (Indeed, as applied to such topics as relevant implication and entailment Australasian philosophy—in particular Australasian logic—is better known for a reluctance to understand these in pragmatic terms.) Jackson presents a theory that explains certain conflicting intuitions about indicative conditionals, among them the principle that one can pass from a statement involving the classic truth-functional connectives 'and', 'or' and 'not' to conditional statements (e.g. that '*A or B*' implies '*If not-A then B*') and the principle of the paradoxes of implication (that '*Not-A*; *therefore*, *if A then B*' and '*B*; *therefore*, *if A then B*' are both invalid). Jackson's solution is to reject the latter principle, proposing instead that an indicative conditional and the corresponding material conditional have the same truth-conditions but not the same assertibility conditions. (Jackson thinks that subjunctive conditionals are very different and are to be understood in the manner made famous by Stalnaker and Lewis.) According to Jackson, the indicative conditional ‘If A then B’ is assertible iff (if and only if) the conditional probability Prob(B/A) is high, a principle due to Ernest Adams which Jackson supports by linking assertibility with a notion of robustness; that is, if the indicative conditional is assertible, it should remain assertible upon learning that A is true. Jackson thinks of such robustness as a matter of conventional rather than conversational implicature.

It should be said that while Jackson’s work on conditionals is particularly widely known, it is not the only influential work done by Australasian philosophers on the topic of conditionals. The Macquarie philosopher, Vic Dudman, initiated a wholly different research program in the 1980s on the impact of tense on the classification of ‘if’ statements. His work, which influenced Jonathan Bennett and a number of other prominent researchers, placed grammar before semantics and drew the line between various types of ‘if’ statements at a very different point from the dominant tradition followed by Jackson. For Dudman, the theoretically important dividing line among the statements (1) ‘*If Oswald hadn*’*t killed Kennedy*, *someone else would*/*could have*’, (2) ‘*If Oswald doesn*’*t kill Kennedy*, *someone else will*/*might*’, and (3) ‘*If Oswald didn*’*t kill Kennedy*, *someone else did*’ falls below (2) rather than—as the tradition has it—below (1), on the grounds, roughly, that (1) and (2) but not (3) display a forward time-shift. When they are interpreted this way, Dudman calls the former statements ‘conditionals’ and the latter ‘hypotheticals’ (Dudman 1989, 1994a). Using detailed grammatical analysis on such cases, Dudman argues that the subjunctive-indicative divide is vacuous, that the antecedent-consequent distinction is inapplicable to a vast range of ‘if’ statements (or, as he prefers, to the *messages* encoded in a vast number of English ‘if’ sentences), and that what he calls ‘conditionals’ are simple sentences that don’t have truth-values (Dudman 1989, 1994a, and 1994b). Another prominent critic of the standard distinction among indicative and subjunctive conditionals is La Trobe’s Brian Ellis, although his arguments rely far less on grammatical considerations and he certainly does not deny the antecedent-consequent distinction or accept Dudman’s conditional-hypothetical distinction (Ellis 1978, 1984: fn 9). For Ellis, both kinds of conditionals have truth-conditions but are non-truth-functional, with mood being a device for signalling what beliefs are being retained as a basis for reasoning from the antecedent supposition—a very different view from Jackson’s.

Jackson’s more recent work has been on the role and nature of conceptual analysis and is driven by his interest in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and metaethics. Of particular significance is Jackson (1998a), based on Jackson’s John Locke Lectures at Oxford University in 1995.[3] The focus of this work is ‘serious’ metaphysics and the ‘location problem’. ‘Serious’ metaphysics ‘is the attempt to give a comprehensive account of some subject-matter—the mind, the semantic, or, most ambitiously, everything—in terms of a limited number of more or less basic notions’ (p. 4), and the ‘location problem’ for an everyday property (whether it be artifactual, mental, semantic, social, economic, etc.) is to say how and why the property does or does not ‘get. . .a place in the scientific account of our world’ (p. 3). Jackson maintains what he calls ‘the entry by entailment thesis’: that ‘the one and only way of having a place in an account told in some set of preferred terms is by being entailed by that account’ (p. 5), where by ‘entailment’ he means ‘simply the necessary truth-preserving notion’ (p. 25). According to Jackson’s novel spin on this linguistic version of a supervenience claim, such a commitment to entailment theses requires serious metaphysicians to do conceptual analysis, since ‘conceptual analysis is in the very business of addressing when and whether a story told in one vocabulary is made true by one told in some allegedly more fundamental vocabulary’ (p. 28).

---

[3] Another Australian who had the rare professional honour of being chosen as John Locke Lecturer was Frank Jackson’s father, Camo Jackson (in 1958)—to this day, the only case of a father and son to have received this honour (Smart 2000).

For Jackson, much as for early champions of conceptual analysis like Austin and Grice, to do conceptual analysis is to reflect on which possible cases fall under which descriptions; one’s intuitive judgements about hypothetical cases manifest one’s ‘theory’ of the relevant subject matter, and to the extent that one’s intuitions coincide with the folk, they reveal the folk theory. For example, conceptual analysis reveals that, according to our folk theory of water, water is ‘whatever *actually* is both watery [i.e. is found in rivers and lakes, falls from the skies, etc.] and is what we are, or certain of our linguistic forebears were, acquainted with’ (p. 39). Jackson thinks that such a conclusion amounts to a kind of description theory of the terms in question, although one that properly accommodates the Kripke-Putnam intuitions underlying causal theories of reference. (Jackson 1998b, a paper that clearly shows Jackson to be a descriptivist about proper names as well, provides more specific responses to Kripke’s arguments against descriptivism).

Conceptual analysis of this kind is what also underlies Jackson’s account of two kinds of intension that a sentence or term may have. What is ordinarily taken as the intension of a kind term like ‘water’ is a function from possible worlds to a substance that exists at those worlds; the intension of ‘water’, for example, takes a world to the substance H_2O at that world. Jackson calls this the term’s C-intension because it is what we get when we consider ‘what the term applies to under various counterfactual hypotheses’ (p. 48) about this, the actual, world; and under any such counterfactual hypothesis, the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance remains H_2O. But the term also has an A-intension, which is what we get when we consider ‘for each world w, what the term applies to in w, given or under the supposition that w is the actual world, our world’ (Jackson 1998b), that is, when we consider for each world w what instances there are of ‘the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance’ when those words are understood under the supposition that w is the actual world. (Using the terminology of Davies and Humberstone 1980, we might say that this shows the truth of ‘F(ixedly)A(ctual [water is the watery stuff of our acquaintance]’, and hence that ‘water is the watery stuff of our acquaintance’ is deeply necessary. Note, however, that Davies in particular has been critical of Jackson's appeal to such a two-dimensional modal framework; see especially Davies 2004.)

Having argued that conceptual analysis provides us with a priori knowledge of A-intensions, Jackson is now able to argue that the entry by entailment thesis is best construed as an a priori deducibility thesis, and that physicalism, for example, is committed to the existence of conceptual entailments from the physical to the psychological. The case of 'water'-talk again provides the model: '[W]e will be able to move a priori from. . .sentences about the distribution of H_2O *combined* with the right context-giving statements, to the distribution of water.' (p. 82). Thus, the sentence (i) 'H_2O covers most of the Earth', together with (ii) 'H_2O is the watery stuff of our acquaintance', conceptually entails (iii) 'Water covers most of the Earth', in view of the a priori status of 'Water is the watery stuff of our acquaintance' (p. 82). Jackson's ambitious plan in Jackson (1998a) is to use the same methodology to solve the location problem for both colour and ethics—that is, to place both colour-talk and ethical-talk in the physical or descriptive picture of what the world is like.

Jackson's work has been extremely influential, but also highly contentious, in large part because it goes against two widely accepted views in Anglo-American philosophy: the rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, made popular by Quine's work (Jackson responds in 1998a, pp. 44–46), and the wholesale rejection of descriptivism about names and natural kind terms made popular by the work of Kripke and Putnam. Although Jackson is a naturalist, his attitude to conceptual analysis makes him a very different kind of naturalist from Michael Devitt, say, who accepts the anti-descriptivist causal theory of reference and is sympathetic to Quine's attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction. He is also a very different naturalist from someone like Huw Price, who combines his naturalism with a bifurcated notion of representation and truth-conditions and a consequent denial that truth-conditions are central in a theory of meaning. Jackson, on the other hand, thinks that meaning settles how sentences represent things as being, in a single, standard sense of representation, and that how a sentence represents things as being determines truth-conditions. (This includes ethical sentences; in joint work with Philip Pettit (Jackson and Pettit 1998), he uses considerations from Lockean philosophy of language to argue that an alternative expressivist metaethics has independent problems.) Truth-conditions thus remain pivotal, even if we need two-dimensionalism to tell us what kind of truth-conditions are in play.

Jackson is not the only Australian philosopher to have made a contribution to the revival of conceptual analysis. Significant work has been done by David Braddon-Mitchell on the nature and role of folk-theories (see, e.g., Braddon-Mitchell 2004a and the argument in Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 2006 for analytic functionalism), on the virtues of descriptivism as understood in two-dimensional terms (Braddon-Mitchell 2004b), and on the virtues of conditional analyses (Braddon-Mitchell 2003 claims that in the case of the term 'quale' such an analysis allows one to accept zombie intuitions while resisting a dualist conclusion). There is even a recent anthology, edited by Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola, on this style of conceptual analysis and its embedding in naturalism

(Braddon-Mitchell and Nola 2009), a program that is often known as the *Canberra Plan* because many of its proponents have been associated with the Australian National University in Canberra and which counts among its most prominent and influential proponents the late David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith and Philip Pettit. (The name 'the Canberra Plan' makes it sound as if we here have a home-grown philosophical program—something to rival Andersonianism in its Australianness. But of course this is far from being the case. Philosophy like so much else has now become truly globalised; and while some of the main players were Australians, David Lewis counts as one of the most important proponents of the Plan, among other things for the manner in which he combines physicalism with the idea that theoretical terms (including folk-psychological terms) can be defined via the Ramsification of theories. In general, Lewis' influence on Australian philosophy—on philosophy in general, of course, but Australian philosophy in particular—has been immense.)[4]

As the Canberra Plan is normally portrayed, it embeds conceptual analysis in a materialist form of naturalism. Jackson aside, however, the best-known Australian proponent of conceptual analysis, especially as seen through the lens of two-dimensionalism, is someone who is best known for his commitment to a *non-materialist* form of naturalism. This is the philosopher of mind David Chalmers, who used the machinery of two-dimensionalism in his influential *The Conscious Mind* (1996) to argue for mind-body property dualism. Chalmers' work ranges widely over the philosophy of mind and metaphysics, but my focus here will be his contributions to the philosophy of language and in particular the distinctive way in which he understands two-dimensionalism. Like Jackson, Chalmers accepts two kinds of intensions: primary intensions, corresponding to Jackson's A-intensions, and secondary intensions, corresponding to C-intensions. A primary intension is a function from scenarios (initially to be conceived of as centred worlds) to extensions. A secondary intension is a function from possible worlds to extensions. According to Chalmers, a sentence token S is metaphysically necessary iff the secondary intension of S is true at all worlds, while a sentence token S is a priori, or epistemically necessary, iff the primary intension of S is true at all scenarios. To justify the latter claim in particular, Chalmers argues for what he calls *epistemic two-dimensionalism*, according to which the scenarios that are in the domain of a primary intension represent highly specific epistemic possibilities and not, for example, contexts of utterance. The value of an expression's primary intension at a scenario reflects a speaker's rational judgments involving the expression, under the hypothesis that the epistemic possibility in question actually obtains. (For details, see Chalmers 2004, 2005.) For example, it is epistemically possible that our world is the XYZ-world (that is, that the liquid in the oceans and lakes is XYZ rather than H_2O), and if it is, we should rationally endorse the claim ‘water is XYZ’, and we should rationally reject the claim ‘water is H_2O’. So the primary intension of ‘water is H_2O’ is false at the XYZ-world, and the primary intension of ‘water is XYZ’ is true there. Chalmers insists that this is not to say that names like ‘water’ are equivalent to (rigidified) descriptions, as Jackson suggests; rather, names have a normative inferential role that makes certain claims rational or irrational, given enough information. (Chalmers and Jackson 2001 set various doctrinaire disagreements aside to say why Chalmers and Jackson both think that conceptual analysis and a priori entailments are required if reductive explanation of the phenomenal in terms of the microphysical is to work).

---

[4] Indeed, non-Australasian philosophers frequently assumed that Lewis was Australian; not only were Lewis and his wife Steffi known to be regular visitors to Australia (and to Melbourne in particular), but it was obvious that he shared the philosophical outlook of many Australian philosophers (he also published numerous articles in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, including one that explicitly celebrates Australia's bicentenary by discussing—in a serious vein—a deontic paradox due to Australian folk hero Ned Kelly).

Even more than Jackson, Chalmers thinks that two-dimensionalism is naturally combined with a semantic pluralism, according to which there are numerous entities which can play some of the explanatory roles that the notion of a proposition, for example, is supposed to play: not just primary propositions and secondary propositions (Jackson’s A-intensions and C-intensions for sentences) but also structured entities containing the primary and secondary intensions of component expressions of the sentences in question. He thinks that primary intensions, perhaps structured versions that combine with extensions, can be used to capture something like Frege’s notion of sense (Chalmers 2002a), while an appeal to a combination of structured primary and secondary intensions can help provide the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions. Chalmers (2002b), for example, suggests that an utterance of ‘S believes that P’ is true just when the referent of S has a belief with the structured secondary intension of ‘P’ (in the mouth of the ascriber) and with an appropriate structured primary intension, where the range of what is ‘appropriate’ may depend on the context of utterance. As Chalmers acknowledges, such a view is closely related to ‘hidden-indexical’ analyses of belief ascriptions, with primary intensions playing the role of ‘modes of presentation’.

Conclusion

This review has inevitably been partial and to a degree biased—there has been significant work done by Australasian philosophers on particular issues in the philosophy of language that I have not tried to cover here. But even though the coverage has been partial, I think it has shown that Australasian philosophy of language has managed to develop a voice of its own or rather voices of its own. For it is abundantly clear that there is no Australasian or even Australian orthodoxy in the philosophy of language: no Australasian semantics, say, in the way there is—or was—a Californian semantics. Not only does the work of Australasian philosophers range widely, but even if we focus only on the theory of meaning we find many differences. While it is true that there is a widespread commitment to finding a naturalistic understanding of the phenomenon of meaning, it is also true that the concept of naturalism tends itself to be in contention, as is shown by the striking differences among the conceptions of meaning and of the representational nature of language found in the work of philosophers like Jackson, Devitt and Price. Another common theme is the way in which Australian philosophers in particular tend to have strong and distinctive views about the relation of philosophy of language to areas like metaphysics, although here again the views vary considerably. Jackson and Chalmers in particular think that armchair metaphysics is a possible and productive enterprise. Devitt thinks that this is a vain hope that 'conceptual analysis' at best yields folk-theories that may deserve rejection and that the philosophy of language cannot settle problems in metaphysics or even ethics. Barry Taylor demurs, insisting that sceptical worries about the semantic properties of language argue for a form of anti-realism. The voices, then, are many, and the noise they make discordant. Given the origins of philosophy of language in Australasia (and perhaps the nature of Australasian philosophy in general), we could hardly have expected anything less.

Appendix: The University of Melbourne, Philosophy of Language and the Oxford Connection

Melbourne

Although the University of Melbourne is sometimes portrayed as a hotbed of Wittgensteinianism in the 1950s and 1960s, not unnaturally given the presence of Wittgenstein's students A. C. Jackson and D. A. T. Gasking, in the course of the 1960s this became progressively more of an oversimplification. (What remained true, however, was that Melbourne maintained a tradition of sending graduate students to Oxbridge, primarily to Oxford, rather than to North America—though this tradition faded out around 1980 when Mark Johnston (now at Princeton) and Neil Lewis (now at Georgetown) went from Melbourne to Princeton and Pittsburgh, respectively).

In the mid-1960s a lot of philosophy of language was being taught at Melbourne, and much of it was non-Wittgensteinian. Keith Campbell arrived around 1964, after studying at Oxford, and gave honours seminars on topics in semantics, beginning with Peirce, Frege and Carnap. Len O'Neill had gone from Melbourne to study at Cambridge, where he worked with Jonathan Bennett on the analytic/synthetic distinction, after which he returned in the mid-1960s to a lectureship at Melbourne (Keith Campbell having moved on to Sydney). Douglas Gasking, despite his Wittgensteinian background and tendencies, was very interested in Quine's work and published a useful paper on the analytic/synthetic controversy. (Gasking and, in his footsteps, O'Neill were also big fans of Peirce.) BA(Hons) students were encouraged to study *Word and Object* (Quine 1960): The focus was often on Quine's linguistic behaviourism and the indeterminacy of translation, but *Word and Object*'s exploration of the theory of reference in relation to a range of different grammatical categories of ordinary language was also noted. Gasking's interests were wide-ranging, but in philosophy of language he was also particularly interested in Wittgenstein's notion of 'criterion' and in the analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions.

In 1968 Donald Davidson gave the Gavin David Young Lecture at Adelaide University, on 'Agency and Causality'. (Among his predecessors was Quine, who in 1959 spoke on 'Terms and Objects'.) Davidson visited Melbourne on that trip and gave various talks. At one of these talks (possibly 'On Saying That', but my memory is uncertain), at La Trobe University, he began by outlining the 'Davidson program' for adapting Tarski's semantic methods to giving recursive truth-definitions for natural languages. Interjections from the audience, some asserting that Tarski's theory of truth 'just relies on a trick', led to Davidson giving a heated impromptu lecture on Tarskian semantics. The debate prefigured issues which were later to be much discussed in the literature, over whether substitutional quantification using propositional variables could provide a very quick way of deducing instances of Tarski's T-schema, whether if so the result should be counted as a way of meeting Davidson's demands for a recursive truth-theory for natural language, and whether if so this should be taken as a *reductio* of Davidson's proposal. Vociferous irreverent participants in this debate included Brian Ellis and John F. Fox—the latter was, some years later, to write the seminal article 'Truthmaker' (Fox 1987).

One of those present was Barry Taylor, who became an enthusiast for the Davidson program. Taylor had around the same time heard Richard Routley, as he then was, discussing the problem of giving a semantical treatment (in terms of 'setups') for relevant disjunction, and had found the talk interesting, though opaque. Taylor had already, after only one year of university study, worked through the entirety of Carnap's *Logical Syntax of Language* (1937), and by the time he encountered Davidson, he had also made a close study of *Word and Object*. Building on these foundations, Taylor decided to write his MA thesis on Quine's views on ontological commitment: The rather formal treatment, in a Davidsonian spirit, brought Tarskian tools to bear on the topic. Taylor was thus exceptionally well prepared for the intellectual milieu he was to encounter in Oxford. Some others who went to Oxford had picked up some elements of the same influences.

Oxford

In the early 1970s Oxford saw an increasing ferment of interest in the philosophy of language. Davidson had given the 1969/1970 Locke Lectures ('The Structure and Content of Truth'), and his influence grew steadily in the ensuing years. But the familiar joke about the 'Davidsonic boom' greatly oversimplifies things. In 1970 Kripke gave his 'Naming and Necessity' lectures, soon to be published in the same *Synthese* volume as Lewis' 'General Semantics', and papers by Montague, Geach and Harman. All of these drew significant attention in Oxford, so that much discussion there in the early 1970s touched on such topics as categorical grammars, the notion of logical form, intensional versus extensional truth-theoretic semantics, the theory of reference and other central topics in philosophy of language. Strawson and Ayer were among those whose graduate seminars touched on Truth and Meaning (topic and article both). Dummett, though he had published little of what was to come, had been very influential in the years leading up to the 1973 publication of *Frege*: *Philosophy of Language* (Dummett 1973), and his influence grew further after that publication. Lewis made visits to Oxford in this period; he was ensconced in St. Catherine's College during some of the time he was writing *Counterfactuals* (Lewis 1973), and photocopies of his handwritten chapter drafts were in circulation (Mackie was lecturing on counterfactuals at this time and metalinguistic accounts were not yet regarded as beyond salvation). He also presented his paper 'Language and Languages' at Oxford during this period.

Quine visited at least twice between 1971 and 1974. On one visit he gave a named lecture, with much ritual formality, on 'Semi-Substitutional Quantification'. Early in 1974 he gave one of the Wolfson College Lectures, other lecturers including Davidson, Dummett and Geach. Kripke was the 1973/1974 Locke Lecturer ('Reference and Existence'). Participants at a memorable conference at Great Windsor Park around that time included Quine, Davidson, Kripke, Dummett, Evans, McDowell, Geach and Anscombe. Much of the material from this conference and lecture series wound up either in Guttenplan (1975) or Evans and McDowell (1976). (The title of the latter collection, *Truth and Meaning*, reflects the 'Davidsonic boom', but Dummett's influence in that context is evidenced by, for instance, his inclusion in both collections, not to mention McDowell's paper title in the latter: 'Truth-Conditions, Bivalence, and Verificationism'.) In the following semester Davidson and Dummett ran a joint seminar. Also involved in philosophy of language in this era were Dana Scott (who participated in discussion groups on Dummett's *Frege*: *Philosophy of Language*), David Wiggins (who particularly explored connections between Frege's work and Davidson's project), and Crispin Wright, though from the point of view of a graduate student he was more of a reclusive *eminence grise* than a visibly influential figure like Evans. Chris Peacocke entered the BPhil in 1972 and was already recognised as frighteningly intelligent, learned and precocious.

Evans had spent the 1969/1970 academic year in America, attending lectures by Kripke and Quine among others while there, and returned in 1970 with a strong interest in the indeterminacy of translation, theories of reference and the Kripkean thoughts which saw publication as 'Naming and Necessity'—topics on which he was soon lecturing in his joint graduate seminar with John McDowell. (McDowell had, around the time of Davidson's Locke Lectures, begun an intellectual journey, by way of logical atomism, from ancient philosophy to Davidson, philosophy of language, and, subsequently, beyond).

Intellectual Traffic

There was a to-and-fro traffic between the city of Melbourne and Oxford in the 1970s. A number of philosophers of language who wound up teaching in Australian universities covered one or both parts of this journey. The direction of intellectual influence was predominantly from Oxford to Melbourne, but perhaps not wholly so.

Taylor's arrival in Oxford in 1970, armed with a good foundational knowledge of the niceties of writing Tarskian truth-theories, was (fortuitously) perfectly timed to coincide with Evans' and McDowell's developing interest in the Davidson program. He became a close intellectual confidant of the two of them and (an unusual compliment to a graduate student) was at least once a guest lecturer in their joint semantics seminar, the must-attend seminar for many graduate students in early-1970s Oxford. Excellent graduate students with an interest in philosophy of language were not lacking at Oxford in those days, and they all attended the Evans/McDowell seminar. As well as Christopher Peacocke they included Lloyd Humberstone, who was to make his career at Monash University, and Martin Davies, who arrived at Oxford from Monash in 1973 and was for a time later, between Oxford appointments, at the ANU.

Others who came from Melbourne during this time of philosophy of language ferment at Oxford included Lynda Burns, who arrived in 1970 to write a BPhil thesis with John Mackie on counterfactuals, and a year later Denis Robinson, who worked with John McDowell and wrote a BPhil thesis on semantics, logical form and the Davidson program. Taylor took up a lectureship in Melbourne in 1974 (revisiting Oxford in the late 1970s), and Robinson and Burns taught there throughout the remainder of the 1970s and into the early 1980s. Davies visited Melbourne for about a semester around the end of the 1970s, close to the time of his publication with Humberstone of 'Two Notions of Necessity', and discussed associated formal and semantic issues with Leonard Goddard, co-author with Routley of *The Logic of Significance and Context* (1973). Karen Green wrote a Monash honours thesis on 'The Relation of Truth to Meaning' in 1973 and took the Oxford BPhil with a thesis on 'Truth and Substitutional Quantification' in 1977, before completing a Sydney PhD (with Michael Devitt as unlikely supervisor) on 'Sense and Psychologism: Frege to Dummett'. She then taught at Melbourne and Hobart before winding up back at Monash. John A. Burgess wrote a Davidson-program-influenced MA in the mid-1970s, supervised by Taylor, before going to Oxford to be supervised in his DPhil by Evans, until the latter's sadly premature death in 1980.

The 'Melbourne Semantics Group'

One or two mid-1980s publications refer to the 'Melbourne Semantics Group'. The name was applied, mainly retrospectively, to an extremely informal discussion group, of varying composition, which met once every week or two in term time, in the evenings, at the University of Melbourne, starting late in the 1970s and running for at least several years into the 1980s. The group was partly coextensive with a group formed to discuss Dummett's 1976 William James Lectures, circulated in a typescript photocopied from a copy available in the Harvard Departmental Library. Most people arrived carrying a bottle of wine, meetings began at 7pm, and ended at an indeterminate time around 10:30 or 11, when it was deemed that serious philosophical discussion had more or less come to a halt for the evening. The general agenda was mostly to read recent or important journal articles on semantics, construed in a broad and wide-ranging way, but including some fairly technical articles. Someone was always assigned to introduce the discussion with comments on the night's reading: this might take as little as 20 min or as long as an hour. Allen Hazen once presented a brilliantly clear and knowledgeable 2-hour summary, without notes, of the history of post-Tarskian antecedents to and rivals of Kripke's theory of truth. Energetic debate usually followed the initial presentation. For variation, occasionally people read draft papers of their own. (On a memorable evening, Frank Jackson read a draft of what later became a chapter of his *Conditionals*, on the Paradox of the Surprise Examination. David Lewis laconically remarked afterwards, 'I think Frank seriously underestimates what he has accomplished'.) Regular members of the group in that era included Taylor, Robinson, Hazen (after his arrival in 1983), Monash's Humberstone, and La Trobe's John Bigelow and Robert Farrell. When they were in town (which might be only occasionally), participants also included Mark Johnston, Neil Lewis, John A. Burgess, Errol Martin, Frank Jackson, David Lewis, Martin Davies and Michael Smith. Melbourne graduate students usually helped to swell the numbers somewhat. Evenings often began—or ended—with a toast 'to semantics'. In the early 1980s, however, the commitment of some participants to the linguistic turn waned somewhat, and some meetings of the same people became meetings of what we might in retrospect dub the Melbourne Metaphysics Group; on such occasions the toast would be 'to metaphysics'. People's level of discomfort with this development seemed roughly proportional to their sympathy with Putnam's 'just more theory' defence of his anti-realist model-theoretic argument, against objections based on causal theories of reference. One of those who came to think the linguistic turn less than mandatory was Robinson, who applied semantic descent to his Davidsonian PhD topic 'The Semantics of Mass Terms', yielding the substitute topic 'The Metaphysics of Material Constitution'.

References

Beall, J., & Colyvan, M. (2001). Heaps of gluts and Hyde-ing the sorites. *Mind, 110*, 401–408.

Bennett, J. (1953). Philosophy in New Zealand. *Landfall, 7*, 196–198.

Bigelow, J. (1975). Contexts and quotation I and II. *LinguistischeBerichte, 38*, 1–21; 39: 1–21.

Bigelow, J. (1978). Believing in semantics. *Linguistics and Philosophy, 2*, 101–144.

Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2003). Qualia and analytical conditionals. *The Journal of Philosophy, 100*, 111–135.

Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2004a). Folk theories of the third kind. *Ratio, 17*, 277–293.

Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2004b). Masters of our meanings. *Philosophical Studies, 118*, 133–152.

Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Jackson, F. (2006). *Philosophy of mind and cognition: An introduction* (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.

Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Nola, R. (Eds.). (2009). *Conceptual analysis and philosophical naturalism*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Brock, S. (2002). Fictionalism about fictional characters. *Nous, 36*, 1–21.

Brock, S. (2004). The ubiquitous problem of empty names. *Journal of Philosophy*, *101*, 277–298.

Burgess, J. (2001). Vagueness, epistemicism and response-dependence. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79*, 507–524.

Burgess, J., & Humberstone, I. (1987). Natural deduction rules for a logic of vagueness. *Erkenntnis, 27*, 197–229.

Burns, L. (1991). *Vagueness: An investigation into natural languages and the sorites paradox*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Carnap. R. (1937). *The logical syntax of language* (trans: Smeaton A). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Carnap, R. (1947). Meaning and necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chalmers, D. (1996). *The conscious mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D. (2002a). On sense and intension. *Philosophical Perspectives, 16*, 135–182.

Chalmers, D. (2002b). The components of content. In D. Chalmers (Ed.), *Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings* (pp. 608–633). New York: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D. (2004). Epistemic two-dimensional semantics. *Philosophical Studies, 118*, 153–226.

Chalmers, D. (2005). The foundations of two-dimensional semantics. In M. Garcia-Carpintero & J. Macia (Eds.), *Two-dimensional semantics: Foundations and applications* (pp. 55–140). Oxford: the Clarendon Press.

Chalmers, D., & Jackson, F. (2001). Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation. *Philosophical Review, 110*, 315–361.

Cresswell, M. (1973). *Logics and languages*. London: Methuen.

Cresswell, M. (1985a). *Adverbial modification*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Cresswell, M. (1985b). *Structured meanings*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Cresswell, M. (1988). *Semantical essays: Possible worlds and their rivals*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Cresswell, M. (1990). *Entities and indices*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Cresswell, M. (1994). *Language in the world*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Currie, G. (1990). *The nature of fiction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Davidson, D. (1967). Truth and meaning. *Synthese, 17*, 304–323.

Davies, M. (1981). *Meaning, quantification, necessity: Themes in philosophical logic*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Davies, M. (1981). Meaning, structure, and understanding. *Synthese, 48*, 135–161.

Davies, M. (2004). Reference, contingency, and the two-dimensional framework. *Philosophical Studies, 117*, 83–131.

Davies, M., & Humberstone, L. (1980). Two notions of necessity. *Philosophical Studies, 38*, 1–30.

Devitt, M. (1974). Singular terms. *Journal of Philosophy, 71*, 183–205.

Devitt, M. (1981a). *Designation*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Devitt, M. (1981b). Donnellan's distinction. In P. French, T. Uehling, & H. Wettstein (Eds.), *Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Vol. 6. The foundations of analytic philosophy* (pp. 511–524). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Devitt, M. (1984). *Realism and truth*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Devitt, M. (1989). Against direct reference. In P. French, T. Uehling, & H. Wettstein (Eds.), *Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Vol. 14. The philosophy of language* (pp. 206–240). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Devitt, M. (1994). The methodology of naturalized semantics. *Journal of Philosophy, 91*, 545–572.

Devitt, M. (1996). *Coming to our sense: A naturalistic program for semantic naturalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Devitt, M. (2006). *Ignorance of language*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Devitt, M., & Sterelny, K. (1987). *Language and reality: An introduction to the philosophy of language*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Dudman, V. (1989). Vive la révolution! *Mind, 98*, 591–603.

Dudman, V. (1994a). On conditionals. *The Journal of Philosophy, 91*, 113–128.

Dudman, V. (1994b). Against the indicative. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72*, 17–26.

Dummett, M. (1973). *Frege: Philosophy of language*. London: Duckworth.

Dummett, M. (1975). Wang's paradox. *Synthese, 30*, 301–324.

Ellis, B. (1978). A unified theory of conditionals. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 7*, 107–124.

Ellis, B. (1984). Two theories of indicative conditionals. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62*, 50–66.

Evans, G., & McDowell, J. (Eds.). (1976). *Truth and meaning: Essays in semantics*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Fox, J. (1987). Truthmaker. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65*, 189–207.

Goddard, L., & Routley, R. (1973). *The logic of significance and context* (Vol. 1). Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press.

Green, K. (1985). Is a logic for belief sentences possible? *Philosophical Studies, 47*, 29–55.

Green, K. (2001a). *Michael Dummett: Philosophy of language*. Malden: Polity Press.

Green, K. (2001b). Davidson's derangement: Of the conceptual priority of language. *Dialectica, 55*, 239–258.

Green, K. (2005). The context principle and Dummett's argument for anti-realism. *Theoria, 71*, 92–117.

Guttenplan, S. (Ed.). (1975). *Mind and language*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Hamblin, C. (1973). Questions in Montague English. *Foundations of Language, 10*, 41–53.

Hamblin, C. (1987). *Imperatives*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Humberstone, L. (2004). Two-dimensional adventures. *Philosophical Studies, 117*, 17–65.

Hyde, D. (2001). Richard (Routley) Sylvan: Writings on logic and metaphysics. *History and Philosophy of Logic, 22*, 181–205.

Hyde, D. (2008). *Vagueness, logic and ontology*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Hyde, D., & Colyvan, M. (2008). Paraconsistent vagueness: Why not? *Australasian Journal of Logic, 6*, 107–121.

Jackson, F. (1987). *Conditionals*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Jackson, F. (1998a). *From metaphysics to ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, F. (1998b). Reference and description revisited. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), *Philosophical perspectives* (Vol. 12, pp. 201–218). California: Ridgeview.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (1998). A problem for expressivism. *Analysis, 58*, 239–251.

Khlentzos, D. (2004). *Naturalistic realism and the antirealist challenge*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and necessity. In D. Davidson & G. Harman (Eds.), *Semantics of natural language* (pp. 253–355). Dordrecht: Reidel.

Kroon, F. (1987). Causal descriptivism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *65*, 1–17.

Kroon, F. (2004). Descriptivism, pretense, and the Frege-Russell problems. *Philosophical Review, 113*, 1–30.

Lewis, D. (1966). An argument for the identity theory. *Journal of Philosophy, 63*, 17–25.

Lewis, D. (1970). How to define theoretical terms. *Journal of Philosophy, 67*, 427–446.

Lewis, D. (1972). Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50*, 249–258.

Lewis, D. (1973). *Counterfactuals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, D. (1975). Languages and language. In K. Gunderson (Ed.), *Language, mind and knowledge* (pp. 3–35). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

McBurney, P. (2003). This month in automated decision-making. 3. http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/~peter/this-month/this-month-3-030303.html

Montague, R. (1970). Universal grammar. *Theoria, 36*, 373–398.

Oppy, G. (1992a). Why semantic innocence? *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70*, 445–454.

Oppy, G. (1992b). Semantics for propositional attitude ascriptions. *Philosophical Studies, 67*, 1–18.

Pettit, P. (1990). The reality of rule-following. *Mind, 99*, 1–21.

Pettit, P. (1993). *The common mind: An essay on psychology, society, and politics*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Price, H. (1988). *Facts and the function of truth*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Price, H. (1997). What should a deflationist about truth say about meaning? *Philosophical Issues, 8*, 107–115.

Price, H. (2004). Naturalism without representationalism. In D. Macarthur & M. de Caro (Eds.), *Naturalism in question* (pp. 71–88). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Price, H. (2008). Three themes in contemporary pragmatism. The Rene Descartes lectures at the University of Tilberg.

Priest, G. (2005). *Towards non-being*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Priest, G., & Routley, R. (1989). Applications of paraconsistent logic. In G. Priest, R. Routley, & J. Norman (Eds.), *Paraconsistent logic: Essays on the inconsistent* (pp. 367–393). Munich: PhilosophiaVerlag.

Quine, W. (1960). *Word and object*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Rennie, M. (1974). *Some uses of type theory in the analysis of language*. Canberra: Department of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.

Routley, R. (1980). *Meinong's jungle and beyond*. Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.

Smart, J. (2000). Douglas Gasking: A review and an appreciation. *Australian Rationalist, 55*, 34–41.

Sterelny, K. (1983). Natural kinds terms. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 35*, 9–20.

Taylor, B. (1980). Truth theory for indexical languages. In M. Platts (Ed.), *Reference, truth, and reality*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Taylor, B. (1985). *Modes of occurrence: Verbs, adverbs, and events*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Taylor, B. (2006). *Models, truth, and realism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tichý, P. (1988). *The foundations of Frege's logic*. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Tichý, P. (2005). In V. Svoboda, B. Jesperson, & C. Cheyne (Eds.), *PavelTichy's collected papers in logic and philosophy*. Dunedin: Otago University Press.

Philosophy of Religion in Australasia

15

Peter Forrest, John Bishop, and Ken Perszyk

Contents

Philosophy of Religion in Australia 446
  Indigenous Philosophy of Religion 447
  Eucken's Influence on Boyce Gibson 447
  John Anderson and Australian Philosophical Atheism 448
  Taking Religion Literally 450
  Australian Atheism After Anderson 450
  Further Work on the Problem of Evil 452
  Scientific Realism, Physicalism, Naturalism, Atheism 455
  Arguing for Theism 456
  Oppy, Trakakis and Nagasawa 459
  Other 'Western' Topics 460
  Hinduism and Buddhism 461
  Faith and Reason 461
  The Contemporary Scene 462
Philosophy of Religion in New Zealand 463
References 470

Peter Forrest is the author of the section 'Philosophy of Religion in Australia' and John Bishop and Ken Perszyk are the authors of the section 'Philosophy of Religion in New Zealand'.

Many thanks to Nick Trakakis for his helpful editorial comments.

P. Forrest (✉)
School of Humanities, University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia
e-mail: pforrest@une.edu.au

J. Bishop
Department of Philosophy, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
e-mail: jc.bishop@auckland.ac.nz

K. Perszyk
School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
e-mail: ken.perszyk@vuw.ac.nz

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_16, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Philosophy of Religion in Australia

My aim is to survey Australian philosophy of religion, putting greater emphasis on the more distinctively Australian contributions, without any implication that it is good for there to be distinctively Australian contributions.[1] In addition, I exhibit connections between the philosophy of religion and Australian contributions to other areas of philosophy.

I am concentrating on philosophy of religion that aims, where possible, to turn religious assertions into philosophy by means of clarification and explicit argument. This is in turn a means to an achievable but not yet achieved egalitarian goal in which all normal adults are genuinely educated and so can make up their own minds, informed by clear arguments. That is philosophy of religion in the narrow sense. My slogan is: philosophy is more like cutting up cadavers than painting nudes. A broader sense of philosophy of religion would include all intellectual discussion of religion including a great deal of theology.[2] Controversially, I consider 'Continental' philosophy to be philosophy, although only in the broader sense.

Another borderline case is the writing on religion by scientists such as Paul Davies, who might be considered an Australian philosopher, or, outside Australia, Richard Dawkins. A further borderline case is historical writing that explicates some religious subject, such as Raoul Mortley's *From Word to Silence* (1986a, b).[3]

Philosophy of religion in this broader sense is something philosophers of religion in the narrow sense can and should learn from, and I begin by making an exception to my stipulation that philosophy is to be understood narrowly, and consider indigenous philosophy of religion. One reason for making the exception is that the editors requested me to; another is that it might need to be emphasised that this is a source from which philosophers in the narrower sense can learn.

Another matter for stipulation is just who counts as 'Australian'. My criterion is that work done in Australia and only such work counts as Australian. So, for instance, Mackie's *The Miracle of Theism* (1982) does not count because he wrote it after he left Australia, while Alan Hájek's 'Waging War on Pascal's Wager' (2003) and John Lamont's *Divine Faith* (2004) do not count because they were written before they returned to Australia.

---

[1] For an alternative account of Australian philosophy of religion before about 1980, see Grave (1984).

[2] See, for instance, Lamb and Barnes (2003). I also note Australian process theology. In addition, it should be recalled that there is a strong tradition of teaching philosophy in seminaries, especially Catholic ones (see Franklin 2006).

[3] Yet again, there is work of a somewhat poetic kind such as that of Anthony Palma (1986, 1988).

Indigenous Philosophy of Religion

There are significant geographic variations in indigenous culture and, we might suspect, significant historical ones. Nor has Australia, excepting Tasmania, ever been isolated from the rest of the world. But as far as we know, indigenous Australian cultures, like most cultures, made no explicit distinction between the sacred and the secular, and so no distinction between the sacred as such and the philosophical reflection upon it. There are, however, distinctive philosophical presuppositions in much indigenous culture that remain live options, in the sense of hypotheses we should not dismiss without argument. One of these is the importance of *place* when considering right action, right emotion and even right thought. Whereas in 'Western' culture we take seriously, even if we reject, the idea that what is right is relative to an *epoch*, the idea that what is right is relative to a place is less popular but should also be considered. (Places and epochs may both be treated as regions of Space–Time.)

Another presupposition of much indigenous culture is the importance of paradigms that cannot be related temporally to current events even though they occupy familiar but sacred places. These are taken as existing in the *Dreaming*, which by convention is treated as long ago. Although more dynamic in character, and not moral exemplars, they should remind us of Plato's Forms. They could be analysed in terms of relations, with one relatum a *place* but not otherwise instantiated.[4]

There are other interesting theses that might more contentiously be read into some indigenous culture, such as that of a reincarnating self that does not count as the same person unless occupying the same role in society. But I hope these remarks show that there is interesting work to be done to make explicit and take seriously the presuppositions of indigenous thought. Max Charlesworth (1987) has pioneered this field, but apart from his introduction to Charlesworth et al. (2005), the work remains to be done.

Finally, worth noting is the Australian contribution to Emile Durkheim's famous sociological deflation of religion in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, which drew support from the work of Baldwin Spencer and F. J. Gillen (1899, 1904) on the peoples of central Australia.

Eucken's Influence on Boyce Gibson

Not surprisingly in colonial times philosophy was largely exported from Britain, with some American influence. In academic circles idealism, and in particular Absolute Idealism, reigned supreme in Australia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, just as it did in Britain. Absolute Idealism does not require philosophy of religion as a sub-discipline, for it has itself a religious character.

---

[4] For some further remarks on Platonist and other interpretations of the *Dreaming*, see Charlesworth's introduction to Charlesworth et al. (2005).

As Grave puts it, there is 'great affinity between a doctrinally deliquescent Christianity and a Hegelianized idealism' (Grave 1984, p. 25; see also Stove 1991). Its philosophy of religion was of radical demythologisation, identifying the non-mythological core of religions with Absolute Idealism itself.

In this time of idealist dominance, the most distinctively Australian episode was the influence of Rudolf Eucken's 'philosophy of life' on Boyce Gibson (1906). Eucken lacked analytic precision, but he was refreshing in that, although himself given to demythologising Christianity, his philosophy-cum-religion was not spineless, believing as he did that life was a struggle to grow 'spiritually'. It was based on a non-Hegelian dialectic of *oppositions*, such as realism versus idealism and personal freedom versus incorporation of the individual in the absolute. Eucken seems to have held that unresolved oppositions resulted in practical dilemmas, and how we resolve those dilemmas then results in a, presumably ineffable, synthesis. Although Boyce Gibson criticises Eucken's anti-intellectualist way of resolving dilemmas in practice, he was impressed by the importance of oppositions, and by the need for individuals to resolve them. We can read into Boyce Gibson here a secular but not anti-religious role for academic philosophers as improving and handing down the arguments on both sides of each question, and not, *qua* academic philosophers, telling students how to make up their minds. This answer to the Stove question—'Why feed philosophers?'—would have been congenial to Boyce Gibson's contemporary, Frances Anderson, in Sydney.

John Anderson and Australian Philosophical Atheism

One of the things that angers me about philosophy is its slavery to fashion, something from which the right sort of historical approach should rescue us. This is illustrated by the rapid rise and even more rapid fall of the idealist empire. There was nothing distinctively Australian about its rise, but its fall had a local flavour in Sydney due to John Anderson. Anderson was an enemy of religion, his views being summed up in his 1943 remark on religious education, likening that topic to 'snakes in Iceland'. His position, as with many secularists, was based upon the premises that education is opposed to indoctrination and that religious schools indoctrinate. Now there is a sense of 'indoctrinate' which just means to teach that something is the case rather than teaching how to do something. And in spite of the influence of Dewey, education cannot occur without indoctrination in this benign sense, and the pretence that it can is hypocritical. There is also a less benign sense in which to indoctrinate is to teach in ways that tend to prevent subsequent critical reflection. Most religious schools used to, and many still do, indoctrinate in this sense. So there was and still is something to Anderson's case for secularism as required by genuine education.

Anderson was not just a hater of religion but a God-bashing atheist, of the same religion as Richard Dawkins today. Why an atheist rather than an agnostic? His case for atheism was not the familiar Argument from Evil, but relied on the premise that there is only one way of being, that of objects in Space and Time. This is in turn derived from the observation that if, as many idealists liked to say, there were levels or degrees of truth, then characteristically philosophical assertions, such as that there are many levels of truth, must be proposed as true without qualification, so the thesis of many levels of truth cannot coherently be said. The argument then proceeds as follows. If God is just another such object, then, Anderson says, we have got nowhere explaining the world as God's creation. This is the familiar 'Who designed the designer?' gibe. But if God is supposed to be out of Space, out of Time, necessary or in some other way different from ordinary objects, then theism is ruled out by the *one way of being* premise.

We have, then, the story of an arrogant philosopher reacting against the previously fashionable idealism and indoctrinating his students in his own peculiar metaphysics that left no room for God. Is that all there is to it? Not quite. Anderson was quite innocent of self-directed irony. He thought he knew. It was once said that, like Hegel, he had in his philosophical system an answer to every traditional philosophical question. (And the story goes the answer was always 'No!'). Typically, idealists thought that their answers had some degree of truth but were not 100 % true. Then, as now, there were any number of relativists, drunk on anthropology or in the thrall of 'concupittance'.[5] And of Anderson's famous British contemporaries, Russell and Moore, also reacting against idealism and neither of them lacking in self-confidence, Russell kept changing his mind and Moore late in life seemed to reject his objectivism about goodness that Anderson defended. None of that for Anderson! He claimed to know and he never changed his mind.

There is an important lesson in Anderson's arrogance that was not lost on his abler pupils and that informed Australian philosophical atheism. Although philosophy is characterised by a love of clarity and a concern for reasoned argument, those are merely means. The goal of philosophy is to separate the true from the false. Philosophy is not an inane pursuit of the fashionable; philosophy is not an abstract art form whose medium is ideas, philosophy is not self-expression; it is not a game in which you get more points for defending more bizarre positions; it is not even a matter of sorting out the rational from the irrational. It is an attack on the false and a defence of the true. Postmodernists, may they rest in peace, used to call this 'Platonism'. If so, then Whitehead was right: philosophy *is* a series of footnotes to Plato.

If like Victorian idealists you blather on about degrees of truth, if like your common or garden relativist you talk of what is true for me or true for us, if even like Russell you keep changing your mind, or if you are concerned merely to show that no good case can be made for the irrationality of Christianity, then you have not, I submit, taken seriously the fundamental question: 'But is it true?'

---

[5] 'Concupiscence' is the tendency to satisfy your appetites even when it is contrary to reason to do so, as it might be to eat the whole cake. 'Concupittance', coined in honour of the theologian Don Cupitt, is the desire, contrary to reason, to eat the whole cake and still have a slice or two.

Taking Religion Literally

Whether or not it was the influence of Anderson, Australian philosophers have tended to take religious claims literally. (Of course they recognise obvious metaphors such as describing God as a mighty fortress.) This is noteworthy because the 'ineffability thesis'—namely, that we cannot speak literally about God—is one of those philosophical strange attractors that cannot be held without self-refutation but which intuition pushes us towards. Australian philosophers have largely rejected the idea that there is anything special about religious language, including complaints about supposed lack of verifiability or falsifiability.[6] The Andersonian tradition lived on in Alan Olding (1970), who, although a vigorous critic of theism, took religious language quite literally, even arguing against Flew that it was quite meaningful to talk of angels.

One traditional response to the 'ineffability thesis' is the doctrine of analogy. Discussions are to be found in Murray (2005) and Gleason (2004). These authors present the scholastic version of the doctrine, which takes various relational terms as applying literally to God and then analyses all other truths about God in terms of these relations. The consequence is Kantianism restricted to the divine, although historically we should think of Kant as applying the worries about knowing God to all objects of knowledge. Alternatively, we could think of it as treating God in the same way as we treat the fundamental theoretical entities of physics. The resulting account might seem to undermine theism in favour of the I-know-not-what-ism of Hick in, say, *An Interpretation of Religion*, but I think this can be avoided by replacing the scholastic idea of causation with agency, on the grounds that scholastic philosophers projected agency onto the rest of the world to derive their ideas of efficient and final causation.

Australian Atheism After Anderson

Mackie, one of Anderson's famous students, provided much more incisive criticisms of theism than his teacher. In his later work, *The Miracle of Theism*, there is a detailed examination of various ways of arguing for theism, but it is his earlier, widely cited article, 'Evil and Omnipotence' (1955), from his Sydney days, that I shall comment on. Mackie reworks the traditional Argument from Evil in an interesting way. It is no use defending the existence of a good, omnipotent God from the existence of evil simply by appealing to human freedom if, as Mackie assumes, omnipotence implies that God can bring about any possible situation. For in that case, God can ensure that in any actual situation where there is a free choice to be made, God can bring it about that we choose one way rather than another. The obvious response is that in actual situations where there is a choice between

---

[6] See, however, Duff-Forbes (1961) for some criticisms of various defences of religious language from the charge of unfalsifiability.

incommensurable evils (or incommensurable goods), it is absurd to suppose that God can ensure that we freely choose the outcome God wants.[7] But that does not affect Mackie's point. Whether absurd or not, this is a consequence of omnipotence as Mackie defines it.

Later, Plantinga (1974) was to call this analysis of omnipotence 'Leibniz' Lapse', so Mackie is in good company. What Plantinga in effect points out is that omnipotence would be better characterised as the ability to perform any possible type of act rather than to bring about any possible situation.[8] Although there is a possible situation where many human beings always freely do what is right even in a world like ours, bringing that situation about is not a possible act of any individual, not even God. Should we then say that Mackie just made an understandable error in analysing omnipotence? Mackie states clearly that religious beliefs are irrational because the 'several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another'. Suppose Mackie's analysis of omnipotence had been precisely what theists had in mind and call the ability to perform any possible type of act being *almighty* to distinguish it from omnipotence. In that case, theists who continued to insist that God was omnipotent would have been irrational. Most would have just shrugged and said, 'Sorry! We should have said "almighty" as Peter Geach suggests, but so what?' This situation would have been analogous to the reaction of most logicians to the Liar Paradox, generated by the assertion: 'What I am now asserting fails to be true'. Logicians do not say 'Gotcha! There is no such thing as truth', but 'Sorry! The rules governing truth are not quite what we thought'.

Mackie misses the point by attributing to religion a precision prior to philosophical reflection that, for instance, no philosopher would require of a physical theory such as Relativity or Quantum Theory.

The problems of characterising omnipotence resurfaced as the Stone Paradox stated by Engelbretzen in 'The Powers and Capacities of God' (1979). Here is my formulation of it: if an agent x is necessarily omnipotent then x cannot create a stone that no agent can move, so there is something that is conceivable that x do but which x cannot do. Several Australian responses make in different ways the point that not every conceivable act is a possible act (see Londey et al. 1971; Khamara 1995).

There is a sequel to the discussion of omnipotence, although many years later. Yujin Nagasawa (2003a, b, c, 2005, 2007b), replying to objections to divine omniscience due to Patrick Grim and others, analyses omniscience as the exercise of God's intellectual powers.[9] In his *God and Phenomenal Consciousness* (2008a), Nagasawa goes on to draw a parallel between these arguments against omniscience and knowledge arguments such as Jackson's Mary argument against physicalism (Jackson 1986), reaching the conclusion that although physicalism is correct, there are physical truths that cannot be communicated by a physical theory.

---

[7] Evils X and Y are incommensurable if it is neither the case that X is worse than Y nor that Y is worse than X nor that X and Y are equal. While equality is transitive, incommensurability is not. Here is an example of incommensurable evils adapted from Bernard Williams' story of Jim and the Indians. The police chief first offers Jim a choice between killing two Indians or himself shooting all ten. When Jim hesitates, the police chief 'generously' offers him the choice between killing just one Indian or himself shooting all ten. When Jim still hesitates, the police chief berates him for irrationality on the grounds that if his dislike of killing two Indians is roughly equal to his dislike of allowing ten to be killed, then, surely, his dislike of killing just one must be significantly less than his dislike of allowing ten to be killed. I judge, and invite readers to judge, that Jim is not irrational and that this is an example of incommensurable evils.

[8] Types of act should be characterised in a language without proper names, and a type of act performed by an agent x should have x and only x as a free variable.

Further Work on the Problem of Evil

The debate over the problem of evil has been characterised by increasing sophistication by both sides, and much of the work has been done by Australian philosophers, starting with four papers in *Sophia* by M.B. Ahern (1963, 1965, 1966, 1967) and his *The Problem of Evil* (1971), work which was published about the same time as Plantinga's criticisms of Mackie in *God and Other Minds*. Both Ahern and Plantinga stress that the non-prevention of evil is sometimes morally justified and that, therefore, proponents of the Argument from Evil need subtler premises than they had resorted to. McCloskey takes up this challenge in his *God and Evil* (1974) and makes it clear that the Argument from Evil need not be expressed as a valid deduction from self-evident premises for it to be cogent. Thus, he and a little later Michael Tooley (1989), at the time working in Australia, may be taken as proponents of what is now called the 'Evidential Argument from Evil' (see also Pargetter 1992).

McCloskey criticises the Free Will Defence by showing that freedom as such cannot be the greater good for which evil is permitted by God because, in many cases, human freedom is compatible with God ensuring the outcome of free choices. These cases occur when (1) God protects us from *akrasi*a, so we act rationally, and (2) the reasons for one of two choices clearly outweigh the reasons for the other. For instance, those Christians who believe in both Heaven and Hell may take the blessed in Heaven to be free to go to Hell but to have no reason whatever for so doing. Therefore, God ensures they will freely stay in Heaven. Debates over whether such free acts are, strictly speaking, determined are not relevant to the problem of evil: even if they are not determined, God can ensure the outcome. As a consequence, the Free Will Defence requires that in some way a choice between equal or, more plausibly, incommensurable goods is required for something of enormous value.

Although it is easy to criticise some Australian atheists as being religiously insensitive, some Australian theodicies may be criticised as morally insensitive, such as George Schlesinger's thesis that if, as may well be, there is no possible act of creation that would maximise desirable attributes, then it is quite arbitrary which possible act of creation God would perform (Schesinger 1977). Even with the proviso that the result be on balance better than not creating at all, this is a rather tough-minded assertion. Much the same can be said for my own suggestion that

---

[9] See, for instance, Grim (1983, 1985, 2000).

God would create instances of all species of on-balance good universes, whose sum is then the best of all worlds (Forrest 1981, 1996; see also Franklin 2002). I later acknowledged that this sort of defence would only succeed if the universe was created by a God who, for whatever reason, behaved as a consequentialist and not as a morally righteous or loving agent (Forrest 2007a). Another tough-minded response is to be found in McCullagh (1992), who argues that we overestimate the significance of suffering.

A noteworthy recent defence of theism against the Argument from Evil is Bruce Langtry's *God, The Best and Evil* (2008) (See also Langtry 1989, 1995, 1998). Langtry argues against the thesis that God should bring about the best world that God can, even assuming there is a best, and he presents a partial theodicy, adequate for all but horrendous evils. This is combined with a qualified reliance on 'sceptical theism', the position that we are in no position to understand God's purposes in creating. An interesting corollary of Langtry's case is that he considers Theological Determinism and Molinism to be refuted by the Argument from Evil.[10]

The unqualified sceptical theist response of Wykstra in 'The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering' (1984) and others has been criticised by Oppy and Almeida (2003, 2005) as undermining our moral reasoning. Nagasawa and Trakakis disagree (2004), though they agree with Oppy in seeing a problem for the freewill defence in the idea of an afterlife in which human beings are still free to disobey God but never do so because it would be irrational (Nagasawa et al. 2004).

In a series of articles, Trakakis has provided an analysis of the Evidential Argument from Evil (Trakakis 2003a, b, c, 2004, 2005). It is hard to summarise these contributions because many of them are aimed at clarifying the arguments rather than presenting a position. In his book *The God Beyond Belief* (2006), however, Trakakis reaches the conclusion that the Free Will Defence succeeds as a response to the argument from moral evil but not to the argument from natural evil. There is partial agreement, therefore, between Trakakis and Langtry. For a protest against the tough-minded (see Drum 1996).

Recently, Trakakis (2008) has joined those such as Phillips and Surin who consider that there is something offensive about theodicy. This is similar to the case that Gaita (1991) makes about the moral offensiveness of much philosophical discussion of ethics, but it is also influenced by Rowan Williams' complaint about anthropomorphic conceptions of God as just another agent. That complaint brings us back to the incoherent but fascinating ineffability thesis that we cannot say anything literally true of God. Less radically, the anthropomorphism complaint can and has been made by sceptical theists. Theists may reasonably respond that the anthropomorphism lies in any assumption that God, even if characterised as a perfect being, would be good in anything other than a consequentialist manner. Although we have a fairly good grasp of how a kind and loving God would act, it is not possible to say in any detail how a consequentialist creator would act, so this results in a qualified version of sceptical theism. It is relevant that Gaita, who (over) emphasises the morally offensive character of much ethical reasoning, is highly critical of consequentialists such as Peter Singer (1993).

---

[10] Further discussion of whether God would create the best of all possible worlds is to be found in Levine (1996) and Nagasawa and Brown (2005b, c).

The thesis of a consequentialist creator undermines ordinary moral reasoning only if (1) we hold that ordinary moral reasoning is non-consequentialist and (2) we reject the divine command theory, according to which a good, but not morally righteous, God would command us to act in various ways for consequentialist reasons, and these commands are the grounds for objective truths about morally right actions (see Forrest 1989; for a critique, see Levine 1994a). In a series of papers, Nagasawa, with Brown and Bayne, argues that even if otherwise acceptable, the divine command theory is incompatible with the obligation to worship God (Nagasawa and Brown 2005a, b; Nagasawa and Bayne 2006, 2007).

The thesis of a consequentialist creator does not, however, solve all problems of evil especially for orthodox Christians, who hold that the life and death of Jesus revealed the divine nature as loving (agapic), albeit an uncomfortable way of loving. We might argue that prior to creation possible creatures are not individuated but form a continuum, and so are not the right sort of thing to love (Forrest 2007a). I now believe this solution fails, for a consequentialist God might well deceive both Jesus and us about the divine nature for the sake of the divine purpose. So the consequentialist theodicy undermines Christianity just as Oppy and Almeida argued that sceptical theism undermines ordinary moral reasoning. My speculative solution to this further problem is based on the assumption that a consequentialist God would want to become loving (Forrest 2007a).

There are several variants on the problem of evil. One due to David Londey (1986, 1992), replied to by Andrew Brien (1989), is that it is morally wrong to temper justice with mercy, as the Abrahamic God is supposed to do. A related variant is the problem of whether a good God could grant an undeserved eternal life to some but not to others. This is important not as an objection to theism but because the widespread belief that if there is a good God then all are saved is based on the premise that a good and loving God would not grant an underserved gift to some but not all. The problem may be obscured if we think the alternative to eternal life is a miserable state. So, to give it force, we need to consider a purely natural fulfilment for human beings (Limbo) versus one that involved the supreme good of the divine presence. Peter Drum (2003) discusses this fairness issue in the context of divine self-revelation and argues that there is nothing unfair about God giving an undeserved gift to those who are prepared to receive it while refraining from the further interference of forcing that preparedness upon us.

Another variant is the problem of animal suffering, which is a prime candidate for gratuitous evil. Before I note the Australian contributions to this problem, I shall draw connections with other topics discussed by Australian philosophers. Suppose you decide that the suffering of innocent human beings (or guilty ones for that matter) would not be justified for the sake of a purely natural human fulfilment. Then you might draw the further conclusion that non-human animals themselves have a heavenly afterlife. I, for one, see no problem with ‘doggy heaven’, as its opponents derisively call it. An obvious objection is that this is not possible because some animals that genuinely suffer lack the potential for personhood required for a relationship with God. There is a connection between this and Peter Drum's response to the unfairness objection if God does not give an underserved eternal life to all. For if preparedness is required, only a being with the potential for personhood could be prepared. So there is an argument from 'doggy heaven' to salvation for all. The other interesting connection is with Tooley on abortion and infanticide. Consider Tooley's famous kitten example (Tooley 1983). He says that kittens are potential persons because with suitable medical intervention their brains could develop to become humanoid. If you find that convincing, then you have no objection to 'kitty heaven', and, by parity of reasoning, 'doggy heaven' too.

A direct response to the problem of animal suffering is to deny the suffering of non-human animals. This has been argued by Peter Harrison (1996). A wilder response, due to Forrest (1996), is that those who are innocent in the sense of being unable to sin are parts of God, and so it is God who suffers when the hare is torn to pieces by the hounds. For a more sober response (see Scarlett 2003).

Scientific Realism, Physicalism, Naturalism, Atheism

There is a tendency, illustrated by Jack Smart's intellectual history, for scientific realists to become physicalists and then naturalists and atheists. Or atheists tend to be physicalists, naturalists and scientific realists. Because of the Australian contributions to scientific realism, physicalism and naturalism (notably by Jack Smart and David Armstrong), it is worth commenting on the package. Scientific realists who are atheists are unlikely to find idealism attractive (for it is unlikely that any creature could perceive a quark), but they might be dualists. Nor is there any pressure on scientific realists to be atheists or agnostics, even if the sciences require methodological atheism or, more plausibly, methodological agnosticism. There is, of course, an inconsistency between scientific realism and fundamentalism, over geology and over evolution. Whether theists may be physicalists depends on the definition of physicalism. There is something of a consensus that it should be defined as the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical. That is compatible with classical theism that holds that God is a necessary being and so supervenes on anything or nothing (Forrest 2007a; Nagasawa 2008). Maybe a definition that better explicates the semi-theoretical materialist tradition would be that everything exists *in virtue of* the physical, in which case the physical should explain the mental. And the only sort of theism compatible with physicalism in that sense would seem to be pantheism, as defended by Michael Levine in his *Pantheism* (1994b).[11] Interestingly, the aspects of the universe that Levine considers to make it divine are its, hopefully unified, laws of nature. This, I take it, requires that we reject the Humean 'one damned thing after another' theory that was once the orthodoxy. Here, then, is a further Australian connection, David Armstrong (1978, 1983) and Michael Tooley (1977) being notable opponents of the Humean position and—together with Fred Dretske (1977)—exponents of the theory of laws as relations between universals. An alternative anti-Humean theory of laws as essential characteristics of our universes also has an Australian origin (see Bigelow et al. 1992).

---

[11] Although a defender of pantheism, Levine resists the thesis that standard theism collapses into pantheism (Levine 1984).

As for the case of physicalism, it is possible to characterise naturalism in such a way that makes it congenial to theism—namely, the rejection of the supernatural. Such anti-supernaturalism, as I prefer to call it, by denying God's capacity to violate the natural order helps the theist solve one of the problems of evil—specifically as to why God has not repeatedly put things right whenever they go wrong.

The naturalist tradition is better explicated, however, as the thesis that everything that can be understood can be understood in scientific ways. This would seem hard to reconcile with theism—once again excepting pantheism. It is equally hard to reconcile it with the use of inference to the best explanation to reach conclusions in metaphysics, relegating that sub-discipline to the task of drawing out the ontological and other metaphysical implications of the sciences.

Arguing for Theism

There has been a curious emphasis on the ontological argument among philosophers of religion generally, and especially Australian philosophers of religion. But before I turn to the ontological argument, there are some contributions to discussion of the cosmological argument and the design argument worth recording. The cosmological argument in the version that argues to a necessary being requires a sense of necessity not defined in terms of conceivability: either strong necessity (in David Chalmer's terminology—see Chalmers 2006) or nomological necessity. One of the strange consequences of taking a sceptic, Hume, as an authority was that there was a time in the twentieth century when such necessity was widely dismissed. Some Australian contributions to the debate over the required sense of necessity are due to Richard Franklin (1964), David Londey (1963a, b, 1978) and Frank White (1973).

That God is essentially non-contingent differs from the claim that God essentially exists, or, more obscurely, the scholastic thesis that the divine being is identical to its nature. As part of his trilogy on the existence and nature of God, Barry Miller (1992, 1996, 2002), inspired both by Aquinas and Frege, presents a carefully formulated version of the cosmological argument, reaching the scholastic conclusion that there is a being whose existence is identical to its nature. Central to Miller's subtle but difficult work is his account of existence as not merely a genuine property but one that is 'full'. As I understand this view, Miller considers the essence of a creature not as a positive way of existing but as a privation, a lack in various respects of the sort of being God has or, if there is no God, the sort of being God would have.

The defiance of the authority of Hume has been furthered in a different way by David Stove (1978) and James Franklin (1980) in their discussions of Hume's treatment of the cosmological argument in the *Dialogues*.

On the other side of the debate, Graham Oppy has criticised several versions of the cosmological argument, but his chief target has been William Lane Craig's *The Kalam Cosmological Argument* (1979), which requires the premise that the universe had a beginning. This premise coheres well with, but is not strongly supported by, the Big Bang theory that the whole visible universe has arisen from a grapefruit-sized hot state of low entropy. To make a convincing argument, Craig has therefore to rely on paradoxes that arise if there has been no beginning. The most intriguing of these is that if Tristram Shandy had lived an infinity of years, he could have just completed a book predicting his life, written at the rate of one year for each day predicted. Oppy claims that this merely shows how peculiar the infinite is, not that it is a paradox (Oppy 1991, 1995a, 2001, 2002). Oppy has criticised various other versions of the cosmological argument (1999, 2000) and provided a more general critique in his *Arguing about Gods* (2007). Among other points, Oppy notes that a non-contingent being does not have to be God or a god (2007, p. 98). As he would agree, there is then a question of what a necessary first cause might be: Space, Time and laws of nature are all candidates. I would claim that the God of Aquinas isn't God either, although it is properly called divine in an extended sense, and easily 'turned' into God by replacing efficient causation by its special case, agency. Oppy also relies on criticism of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, a principle required to ensure the deductive validity of the cosmological argument. It should be noted, however, that the probabilistic version of the cosmological argument merely requires the injunction not to multiply kinds of mystery, something almost invariably, but implicitly, assumed by those arguing for determinism.

The design argument has received rather little attention in Australia. Alan Olding, who was a student of Anderson, argues in his *Modern Biology and Natural Theology* (1991) that Richard Swinburne's and other versions of the design argument are undermined by what biology has shown us about human nature. Thus, Olding goes beyond the familiar point that the theory of evolution undermines Paley's argument. He argues that biology has explained human agency and hence left no room for explanations of the universe as the result of divine action. He also argues that the law-governed character of the universe, something that design-theorists such as Swinburne rely upon, itself undermines any need for God as the sustaining cause. I shall sketch how both these criticisms may be met, but meeting them leaves the design-theorist vulnerable to Olding's 'empiricism', that is, his naturalism. Thus, agency may be treated as the basic source of the direction of causality, there being nothing in fundamental physics that requires any qualitative distinction between futurewards and pastwards temporal directions, or so, following Price (1996), I claim. Hence, the biological explanation of agency must fail if biology is reducible to physics. Likewise, agency is thoroughly entwined with non-deflationary objective accounts of right action and with libertarian freedom. So, I dispute the undermining of agency by biology alone, without further substantial metaphysical theses.

The design argument is even more varied than the cosmological argument. Forrest (1996, 2007a) follows Swinburne in relying heavily on agency explanations and avoids reliance upon finetuning. A well-known criticism of the design argument is that the god they establish is not sufficiently transcendent or awe-inspiring to count as God. This, combined with the widespread atheist rejection of revisionary conceptions of God, would seem to imply that we are rationally constrained to have a higher *a priori* degree of belief in a traditional, classical even, God than in any other. In *Developmental Theism*, Forrest (2007a) attempts to combine the classical and revisionary conceptions by positing divine change.

In his *God and Goodness*, Mark Wynn (1999) stresses the aesthetic character of the natural world and notes how a design argument from these aspects coheres well with religious attitudes to God as creator. Earlier, Hutchings (1995) had brought out the significance of the sublime for religious belief.

Recently, a spirited criticism of the finetuning version of the design argument has been made by Mark Colyvan, Graham Priest and Jay Garfield (Colyvan et al. 2005) on the grounds that the required judgements of probability are subject to a version of Bertrand's Paradox. Given any theory in which there are fundamental constants d, d', etc. that must take a very precise value for the universe to be suited to life, we can provide a logically equivalent theory in which there are instead fundamental constants e, e', etc. that must take a very precise value for the universe *not* to be suited to life. Shades of grue and bleen! The moral is clear: among the hypotheses that meet the usual criteria for theory choice, *including naturalness of predicates*, we should select those in which the fundamental constants require the least amount of tuning before considering explanations of finetuning.[12]

Max Charlesworth (*St Anselm's Proslogion* 1965), Richard Campbell (*From Belief to Understanding* 1976) and Graham Oppy (*Ontological Arguments and Belief in God* 1995b) have produced books on St Anselm's ontological argument some years apart. Grave (1952) and Charlesworth (1962) were among those who noted that Anselm argued both to the existence and the necessity of the being than which a greater cannot be thought. There may well be a persuasive ontological argument to the non-contingency of such a being even if there is no persuasive ontological argument to its existence. This would provide a plausible candidate, although not the only one, for the necessary being, the existence of which is the conclusion of the cosmological argument.

Campbell's reconstruction of Anselm's argument relies heavily on a free logic designed for statements about things that are not presupposed to exist (Campbell 1976; see also Campbell 1995). This logic was based on the work of Richard Routley (1969). Such logics restrict the predicates that can be used to describe non-existents, excluding, for instance, 'exists'. Unless we are genuine neo-Meinongians, we would exclude all non-intentional predicates, allowing only such predicates as 'is thought of as a golden mountain' and not 'is a golden mountain' when describing non-existent entities. While it might well be ad hoc for neo-Meinongians to exclude the predicate ‘than which a greater *cannot* be thought’, the rest of us may do so, merely allowing the predicate ‘is thought of as that than which a greater cannot be thought’, which will not serve.

---

[12] Worth noting is the Intelligent Design conference, held at the Australian Catholic University in 2006.

In *Ontological Arguments and Belief in God* (1995b), Oppy has thoroughly examined and criticised all known versions of the ontological argument, finding none such as would persuade someone otherwise unconvinced of the conclusion (see also Oppy 1996a). One general point that Oppy emphasises, and I find persuasive, is the importance of parodies. Although there are problems with Gaunilo’s most perfect island, a more prosaic example will do: the universe than which no greater universe can be conceived of must be infinite, but we should leave it up to scientists to decide if there is an infinite universe.

An Australian contribution worth mentioning due to Jim Douglass (2004) is that Platonists in mathematics complete various mathematical objects, such as the rational numbers, to discover (so they say) other mathematical objects, such as the real numbers. Suppose we grant that they should also, as part of the completion, adjoin $\pm\infty$ to the real numbers. Then there would be an analogy between this Platonist discovery of new mathematical objects and the discovery of a perfect being. This might well be persuasive to those already persuaded of Platonism in mathematics.[13]

Even if all ontological arguments fail, the idea of a perfect being is intuitively appealing and Perfect Being Theology has been championed by Thomas Morris in his *Anselmian Studies* (1987). An Australian contribution due to Nagasawa is his argument that a perfect being need not be the traditional omniGod (2008b).

Oppy, Trakakis and Nagasawa

If philosophy is cutting up cadavers, Graham Oppy is the pathologist. His program is carefully to analyse arguments for and against theism, exposing defects. Similar work, often in collaboration with Oppy, has been done by Trakakis and Nagasawa. Oppy’s *Arguing about Gods* (2007) is a comprehensive work of this kind, reaching the dismal conclusion that reason cannot decide on whether there is a God, and that reason does not even require agnosticism. Call this the ‘Impotence Thesis’.

This work of stating the arguments clearly is the central task of philosophy, and Oppy, Trakakis and Nagasawa deserve praise for giving it their attention even though coming up with speculations and with novel arguments is more fun. There are some dangers, though. The more comprehensive the program, the more care is required in deciding which arguments to consider and where the chain of objections, replies, rejoinders, etc. is to be terminated.[14] (Who gets the last word?) Moreover if, like Oppy, you make an inference from the survey of arguments then, of course, that inference is itself a proper topic for philosophical scrutiny. So the Impotence Thesis suffers self-refutation if the inference to it fails to meet the standards that are applied to arguments for and against theism. The issue here concerns the probabilities prior to empirical observation. That in turn is influenced by, among other considerations, the answers to these questions: (1) Is the hypothesis of a perfect being of negligible probability? (2) Is divine perfection incompatible with a utilitarian, non-loving, moral character? (3) Can agency and consciousness be explained in physical terms? Negative answers to all three should push the prior probability significantly away from the 0 % end. Then the confirmation provided by the aesthetic character of the universe and the life-friendly character of the laws of nature should push the probability of theism into either the agnostic or the theism range. Individual religious experiences would then confirm theism for those that have them, but given these three negative answers, no one should be an atheist. Or so I say.

---

[13] A further contribution: Nagasawa (2007a) has defended the ontological argument against Millikan’s criticism that existence is not a perfection.

[14] Although Oppy’s (1995b) work on the ontological argument makes (accurate) claims about its comprehensiveness, he explicitly notes in his *Arguing about Gods* (Oppy 2007) the difficulty of a similarly exhaustive survey of cosmological and teleological arguments.

Other 'Western' Topics

Some of the miscellaneous topics that Australian philosophers of religion have attended to include: the Trinity (Forrest 1998, 2007a; Gleason 2004), the Incarnation (Forrest 2000, 2007a) and Atonement (Young 1970; McCullagh 1988; Forrest 2007a; Restall and Bayne 2009).

Three topics that have been given more sustained attention by Australian philosophers of religion are survival of death, miracles, and mystical and religious experience. Robert Young (1970), Bruce Langtry (1975b, 1982) and Robert Elliot (1976) have all defended the claim that a person could have a temporal gap corresponding to the period from death to resurrection. Forrest (2007a, b), however, exhibits speculations as to how we might survive, in bodily form, without any discontinuity.

Langtry (1972, 1975a, 1985) has contributed to the discussion of miracles by using Bayesian considerations to argue that, contrary to Hume, reports of miracles from different religions tend overall to increase the probability of theism, rather than undermining each other. John Gill (1977) argues for the position that miracles do not violate laws of nature because these are always ceteris paribus laws.

The need to consider miracles in the context of probabilities is brought out by Morgan Luck's (2005) case against there being any conclusive evidence for miracles. Although in this respect he follows Hume, Luck considers a range of different accounts of laws of nature.

A related topic, that of testimony, has received book-length treatment by Tony Coady in *Testimony* (1992), who argues that reliance upon testimony should not be assimilated to an inference from evidence (S says p) to a hypothesis (p).

Some Australian philosophers of religion who have given mystical and religious experience a favourable interpretation have been Phillip Almond (1979, 1988), Reg Naulty (1992) and Richard Franklin (1996). Religious experience, the ineffability thesis and the topic of divine transcendence overlap. Some reflections on this last topic are to be found in papers by Campbell (1981, 1982) and Hutchings (1995).

Hinduism and Buddhism

For some years, there has been an Eastern philosophy stream at the annual Australasian Association of Philosophy conference, and the journal *Sophia* publishes articles in these areas. Because of the identification of atman (Self) with Brahman (the Absolute) in the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara, atman is properly considered a topic in philosophy of religion. Two rather different Australian contributions are Ian Kesarcodi-Watson's most important work before his untimely death, *Approaches to Personhood in Indian Thought* (1984), where he argues that the atman is not identical with the body and mind, including all personality and character, and Bilimoria's *The Self and its Destiny in Hinduism* (1990), originally prepared as course notes.

Kesarcodi-Watson argues in a manner reminiscent of Descartes' case for body–mind dualism, but takes the further step of using the conceivability of the person's consciousness existing without discursive thought or details of any kind to make the case for the distinction between Self and all that a person usually thinks of as their 'self'. This argument, like Descartes', may be defended in the style of Chalmers (2006). The conclusion is not as mind-blowing, however, as one might think, for similar arguments show that a statue is not the same as the lump of metal that constitutes it, one being capable of continuing to exist without the other (the metal may be recast into a different statue, or it might be radioactive and decay into lead, thus leaving the statue in place).

Kesarcodi-Watson (1976) also helped philosophers of the Western religion to hesitate before categorising Hinduism as pantheistic. In a somewhat similar reminder, Bilimoria (2001) argued that one of the most orthodox Hindu schools, the Mimamsa, while asserting the foundational character of the Scriptures, is nonetheless agnostic about the existence of God. Another of Bilimoria's interests is the problem of suffering in Hinduism (1995, 1997), a topic also discussed by Monima Chadha and Nick Trakakis (2007).

In Australia, as elsewhere, Nagarjuna exerts the same horrible fascination as Kant does for Western metaphysicians. Distinctively Australian is the interaction between Nagarjuna scholarship and dialetheic logic in the work of Garfield and Priest, cohering with Priest's thesis that we run into contradictions at the boundary of the conceivable (2002). Although that might sound familiar from the writings of mystics, Priest means it literally, whereas mystics speak figuratively. Garfield should be mentioned also for establishing the study of Tibetan Buddhism at the University of Tasmania.

Faith and Reason

The faith and reason debate is in principle as much concerned with Hinduism and Buddhism as with the Abrahamic religions. It came into prominence in Western philosophy of religion about the same time as worries about religious language declined, and like that debate it has not been central to Australian philosophy of religion (but see Chipman 1970). A recent exception is the volume of papers edited by Anthony Fisher and Hayden Ramsay, *Faith and Reason* (2004), responding to the papal encyclical *Fides et Ratio*. Related to the faith and reason debate is Pascal's Wager, criticised by Oppy (1990) but defended by James Franklin (1998). Comparable to Pascal's Wager is McCullagh's (2007) pragmatic justification of religious belief.

This century has seen an interest in the epistemology of disagreement, much of it coming out of that Australian colony, Princeton. Although not from Princeton, Richard Feldman has been a notable contributor to that debate, and he acknowledges the importance of religious disagreement (Feldman 2007). The problem here is obvious: How can sincere, intelligent people of different faiths disagree? Should not we all suspend judgement? One notable recent Australian contributor to the debate is Graham Oppy, whose *Arguing about Gods* is, in part, a case for the inability of philosophy to reach a consensus in philosophy of religion.

An exception to the earlier neglect of this topic has been the work of Winfred Lamb, which deserves further mention. In her *Living Truth—Truthful Living* (2004), Lamb responds to the sort of criticisms of Christianity that are common among those contemporary intellectuals who are not philosophers, but she does so in a way that meets high standards of clarity. The three objections she responds to are: (1) the Nietzschean criticism of the pious as self-enclosed, self-loathing and self-deceiving, which she argues are general human tendencies that Christianity has the resources to fight; (2) the postmodernist criticism of metanarratives, which as soon as it is taken as a general rather than piecemeal criticism is self-refuting; and (3) the claim that Christianity is at fault because it is incapable of dialogue which she sees as characteristic only of fundamentalist Christianity. Lamb (1996, 1998) has also provided a more sympathetic critique of fundamentalism than most philosophers think it deserves.

The Contemporary Scene

The Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association (APRA) held its first annual conference in 2008 at St Mark's National Theological Centre in Canberra. Since 1996, biennial conferences in the area of 'Philosophy, Religion and Culture' have been convened at the Catholic Institute of Sydney, with quite enough papers on philosophy of religion to keep someone busy who was not interested in the cultural, historical or theological content of the conferences.[15] And, as already mentioned, there is a flourishing Eastern philosophy stream at the annual Australasian Association of Philosophy conferences.

The journal *Sophia*, founded by Max Charlesworth in 1961, although international in its contributions, is, not surprisingly, well patronised by Australian philosophers of religion. It contributes a great deal to the ethos of Australian philosophy of religion by publishing a broader range of papers than such journals as *Religious Studies*, *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* and *Faith and Philosophy*.

---

[15] These conferences arose out of an occasional series that dates back to a 'Christianity and Platonism' conference in Melbourne in 1977.

The future looks bright for philosophy of religion in Australia. There is increasing interest in philosophy and in the discussion of religion in Australia, where, no doubt because of the decline in organised religion, there is an openness on religious topics that is by no means universal. Although the history of Australian philosophy of religion illustrates slavery to fashion, this is no more so than the history of philosophy generally. There has, in addition, been progress in the degree of understanding of religious topics by Australian philosophers. Provided we retain the concern for truth shown, in however crude a fashion, by John Anderson, Australia should continue to make significant contributions to this field.

Philosophy of Religion in New Zealand

In 1955, SCM Press published a collection of papers entitled *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, edited by Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre. Despite the 'Philosophical Theology' in its title, this volume's publication was a seminal event for philosophy of religion within the 'analytical' tradition. In particular, the debate on 'Theology and Falsification', with contributions from Flew, R. M. Hare and Basil Mitchell, became the *locus classicus* for discussion of the logical positivist critique of the meaningfulness of religious claims.[16] To contemporary ears, 'Philosophical Theology' usually suggests inquiry conducted with philosophical rigour but with substantive theological presuppositions, whereas the kind of inquiry to which Flew and MacIntyre's (1955) volume was devoted—the examination of the meaningfulness and justifiability of religious claims and beliefs—belongs to the proper subject matter of what we now call 'philosophy of religion'.[17] Philosophy of religion is open to participants with differing commitments and may be in engaged as much by passionately convinced atheists as by those of religious faith. In New Zealand, intellectual rejection of theistic religious belief has been prominent, while theist philosophers have often been cautiously reticent, keeping their religious commitments firmly in the background of their professional work. Philosophy in New Zealand has not seen anything like the equivalent of the US phenomenon represented by the flourishing of the Society of Christian Philosophers, founded in 1978.

---

[16] Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell have recently identified Flew and MacIntyre's edited collection (1955) as a 'transitional document' beginning a movement towards 'lines of inquiry that had been blocked by the positivists' (2005: 7–8). For an account of why the resurgence of interest in philosophy of religion in recent decades occurred within the analytical—and not Continental—tradition, see Wolterstorff (2009).

[17] For the explanation of their choice of the term 'Philosophical Theology', see Flew and MacIntyre's (1955) preface, viii.

In particular, the idea that Christians have a right to philosophise from a perspective which assumes 'the great truths of the Gospel' has not taken root among New Zealand philosophers of religion, though, of course, it would not be rejected as a characterisation of what is proper to philosophical theology.[18] Any tendency for philosophy of religion to 'hive off' as a sub-discipline has generally been resisted by New Zealand philosophers of religion—this may explain why, in the teaching of philosophy, dedicated courses on the philosophy of religion are relatively recent.

New Zealand–based philosophers were well represented in the Flew and MacIntyre collection. The book begins with Arthur Prior's article 'Can Religion Be Discussed?' which deals with the 'Logician's' concern that '[t]he real intellectual difficulty for the believer or would-be believer is not the problem of proof but the problem of meaning' (Prior 1955, p. 3). Prior, later renowned for his development of tense logic, was at the time Professor of Philosophy at Canterbury University College, before moving to the University of Manchester in 1958 and then, in 1966, to Balliol College, Oxford.[19] Prior was taught and influenced by J. N. Findlay, who held the Chair of Philosophy at Otago from 1933 to 1945. Findlay's 'Can God's Existence Be Disproved?' is reprinted in *New Essays*, which also includes George Hughes' reply to Findlay's argument that Anselm 'not only laid bare something that is of the essence of an adequate religious object [viz., having the status of a necessary being], but also something that entails its necessary non-existence' (Findlay 1955, p. 55).[20] Findlay's 'ontological disproof', as Hughes dubbed it, contends 'that all necessary propositions are tautologies and no tautology can be existential', but this 'if it has been shown at all, has been shown to hold only of the necessary propositions of logic and mathematics', so that—Hughes concludes—'what we have here is simply the sad story of a useful but limited technique over-reaching itself—and over-reaching itself by an assumption it can do nothing to justify' (Hughes in Findlay 1955, pp. 64–65). Hughes held the Chair at Victoria College, later Victoria University of Wellington, from 1951 to 1983; he too had a distinguished career as a logician, particularly in modal logic. In J. J. C. Smart's (1955) contribution to the Flew and MacIntyre volume, another seminal event in analytical philosophy of religion is referred to, namely, J. L. Mackie's 'Evil and Omnipotence', published in *Mind* in 1955, the year Mackie moved from Sydney to take up the Otago Chair (which he held until 1959).[21] There were thus significant New Zealand connections in developments in analytical philosophy of religion in the mid-twentieth century: this has been maintained throughout the remainder of that century and into the twenty-first.

---

[18] For an influential defence of the right of Christian philosophers to philosophise from Christian presuppositions, see Alvin Plantinga's 1983 inaugural lecture 'Advice to Christian Philosophers' in Plantinga (1984).

[19] Mary Prior reports (personal communication to Max Cresswell) that the problem of free will and divine omniscience was 'in the air' in their discussions, and it may be that Prior's initial interest in the logic of time was motivated by an interest in formalising theological arguments on this topic. That Prior had deep theological interests is, anyway, clear from his earlier published writings. Mike Grimshaw remarks that 'if Prior the man is to be understood, then we need to look at his early published work which locates him as potentially one of New Zealand's greatest theologians – if he had chosen that route of study' (2002: 480).

[20] Findlay's paper was originally published after he went to King's College, London; Hughes' reply was originally published before he arrived in Wellington.

The question of the meaningfulness of religious utterances and beliefs, made prominent by logical positivism, has remained on the agenda for New Zealand philosophy. A notable influence here is the work of Sir Lloyd Geering, ONZM, tried for heresy when Principal of Knox College, Dunedin, in 1967, and later Foundation Professor of Religious Studies at Victoria University of Wellington from 1971 to 1984. Geering is that rare bird in New Zealand (and for that matter Australian) culture—a genuine public intellectual. He has played a signal part in keeping debate about religion at a remarkably high standard in New Zealand public life.[22] In *Tomorrow's God* (1994), Geering supports a non-realist understanding of religious language of the kind a positivist might approve. He argues that the concept of God is a human construct that serves to symbolise and secure commitment to crucial community values. Traditional supernaturalist theism, he maintains, needs revision to yield a conception of God better fitted for the environmental values crucial to sustaining the Earth's ecology. (The ecological implications of religious worldviews are also taken up by Douglas Pratt (1992).) Geering's work has been widely discussed—for example, in a volume of critical essays edited by Raymond Pelly and Peter Stuart (2006). Geering's theological non-realism links him to influential work by the English philosophical theologian Don Cupitt, whose non-realism is critically discussed by Ruth Walker (2006): she argues that, while some of the foundations of Cupitt's non-realism are rightly rejected by realists, his biological naturalism should have prompted reliance on evolutionary psychology which, she claims, *does* support a non-realist interpretation of religious belief.

Attention to the meaning and function of religious beliefs remains important, even if non-realism is kept at arm's length. When Ken Perszyk introduced a course in philosophy of religion at Victoria in the early 1990s, he asked George Hughes, by then in retirement, how he would have chosen to begin such a course. Hughes replied that he would get the class to think about the idea of a holy place. Sensitive curiosity about just what it is we are doing when we use religious language and engage in the related practices, Hughes evidently thought, was indispensable to philosophical inquiry into religion. Several New Zealand philosophers have similarly seen merit in this anthropological, Wittgensteinian, approach to understanding religion and the content of religious belief.[23] Jim Thornton's article on 'reductionism' (1966) deals with the question of the 'core' content of theistic belief, brought into the limelight by John Robinson's popular presentation of Rudolf Bultmann's demythologising of Christianity in *Honest to God*. Thornton emphasises that discerning the genuine content of theistic belief is no straightforward matter—an emphasis in need of reaffirmation now that influential contemporary philosophers of religion (such as Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne) take virtually as given the 'personal omniGod' conception of God as an all-powerful and morally perfect immaterial person. More recently, John Bishop (1998) has considered whether there can be 'alternative' concepts of God, and what methodology should be used to determine the adequacy of candidate conceptions, and has suggested (2007b, 2009) that Christian theism may be better expressed as belief in a God who is Love.

---

[21] Mackie's (1955) article and Flew's (1955) article set a framework for contemporary discussion of the Argument from Evil in the philosophy of religion.

[22] For an account of Geering's work and career, see Paul Morris' introduction to *The Lloyd Geering Reader* (2008).

[23] Note, however, John Owens' (2004) critique of a common interpretation of the Wittgensteinianism of D. Z. Phillips.

The wider theme of revisionary forms of religion is taken up in Julian Young's *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Religion* (2006), which interprets Nietzsche's thinking as communitarian and religious 'in that it holds that without a festive, communal religion, a community . . . cannot flourish'. Whether such a communal religion need, or could, be theistic is an interesting question, which obviously depends on what can count as a viable conception of the divine. In earlier work (2003), Young draws attention to Heidegger's notion of the self-disclosing of Being as a possible surrogate for divinity. Douglas Pratt's *Relational Deity* (2002) builds a novel relational understanding of the concept of God, based on a study of the work of Charles Hartshorne and John Macquarrie. Earlier, George Hughes, in a paper on the logic of the Trinity (1963), argued that 'The Father is God', 'The Son is God' and 'The Holy Spirit is God' use the 'is' of predication, not the 'is' of identity, and that the one God must be understood as (presumably, relationally) constituted by the three Persons. In another article, on C. B. Martin's argument for the inconsistency of the doctrine of the Incarnation (1962), Hughes remarks that 'the language of religion, and not only of the Christian religion, is full of what might be called non-standard assertions of identity. Professor Ninian Smart taught me this, and I think it is of the greatest importance'. For Hughes it was vital to be clear about just what it was that religious claims assert, and to avoid misdirected criticisms resting on misunderstandings, often born of the prior conviction that religious beliefs must be false.

This caveat is arguably not respected by 'the new atheists' of our present decade: the 'God' of *The God Delusion* may not, perhaps, be the God of believers in the theist traditions.[24] Nevertheless, the contemporary 'God debate' raises important issues about the relationship between religion and science, and the epistemology of religious belief. The question whether, and in what way, religious beliefs are explanatory is the subject of Greg Dawes' *Theism and Explanation* (2009): he regards theistic explanations as intended to function like high-level scientific explanations, though he thinks they fail in that role. This contrasts with Gavin Ardley's earlier view, worked out in his book (1950) on Aquinas and Kant and their influence on the emergence of modern science, which is close to Stephen Jay Gould's later account of science and religion as 'non-overlapping magisteria' (see Gould 2002).

---

[24] This kind of response to Richard Dawkins (2006) is exemplified by Terry Eagleton (2009).

Though Fr Forsman taught Thomist philosophy at Auckland for some years from 1957 (‘the most colourful figure the department has ever had’ [Ardley 1982, p. 26]), natural theology is not a major theme in the published work of New Zealand philosophers. Jim Thornton has a paper on Hume’s case against the possibility of a well-attested miraculous event (1984), in which he suggests that—short of the success of some form of design argument—good evidence for miracles provides the only possible grounds that could justify belief in a personal God. John Bishop’s *Believing by Faith* (2007a) defends a ‘doxastic venture’ account of religious commitments along the lines of William James’ ‘justification of faith’ in ‘The Will to Believe’ (1956): this account presupposes that the truth of theistic belief is ‘evidentially ambiguous’ in the sense that our total available evidence may be equally viably interpreted both on the theistic and on the naturalistic/atheistic hypothesis. Bishop here continues his criticisms of ‘Reformed’ epistemology, following his paper with Imran Aijaz (2004) on Plantinga’s treatment of the ‘*de jure*’ question about Christian belief—which he and Aijaz interpret as the question whether Christians are entitled to take their religious beliefs to be true when they come to act. But these criticisms of Plantinga’s epistemology only continue the cautionary notes sounded by George Hughes (1970) in his, generally admiring, review of Plantinga’s *God and Other Minds* (1967). Of course, Plantinga’s later work (2000) supplies the—externalist—criterion of rational (or ‘warranted’) belief that Hughes noticed was lacking at this earlier stage. It is not so clear, however, that Plantinga (or any other Reformed epistemologist, such as William Alston [1991]) has dealt satisfactorily with the obvious point of disanalogy to which Hughes drew attention: there are no serious non-believers in other minds, but this is clearly not the case with belief in God. Indeed, this ‘divine hiddenness’ can provide the basis for an argument for atheism—or, at least, for personal-omniGod-atheism: J. L. Schellenberg’s (1993) defence of this argument is discussed by Aijaz (2007, with Markus Weidler). Aijaz has further argued (2008) that taking God’s existence to be universally evident and therefore non-belief as due to culpable resistance is not warranted; nevertheless, he suggests, a revisionary theistic account of divine providence in relation to belief may be constructed.

The most widespread argument for atheism—the Argument from Evil—has received considerable attention. Raymond Bradley (1967) presented a version similar to J. L. Mackie’s (1955), but with a twist that allegedly makes appeal to the actual existence of evil otiose. Fred Kroon (1981) provides a critique of Plantinga’s ‘Free Will Defence’ offered in response to Mackie’s dismissal of free will theodicy on the grounds that an omnipotent agent could bring it about that free creatures always but freely choose the good. Plantinga’s defence assumes libertarianism: John Bishop (1993b) argues that a compatibilist can offer a free will theodicy under an ‘upgraded’ version that affirms the outweighing value not just of freedom itself but of higher goods for which freedom is necessary, such as the good of genuinely loving relationships. In reply, Kenneth Perszyk (1999a) claims that Bishop implicitly appeals to libertarianism, at least with respect to *fully* free and autonomous agency. This debate raises the question whether God has ‘middle knowledge’, as Molinists claim. In a series of papers, Perszyk has explored the coherence of Molinism (Perszyk 1998b and Mares and Perszyk 2011) as well as its application to the problem of evil—specifically dealing with its role in Plantinga's Free Will Defence (1998a), William Hasker's claim that Molinism makes theodicy harder if not impossible (1998c), and its place in Eleonore Stump's theodicy of redemptive suffering (1999b). The force of the Argument from Evil does, of course, place pressure on the question of the concept of God—for example, Bishop (1993a) suggests that a God who recognises that the best plan for creation involves serious suffering may need to give up power in order to preserve his goodness while actually carrying out that plan. More recently, Bishop and Perszyk (2011) argue that there is a version of the Argument from Evil that shows that God cannot be the personal omniGod, given the ethical commitments theists typically have for assessing the moral perfection of persons. A personal being who first causes or sustains horrific suffering and then—as sophisticated theodicies maintain—brings the participants in horrors into eternal relationship with himself could not *overall* have the most perfectly loving relationships with them.

Perszyk has further explored Molinism and the metaphysics of free will in two recent papers (2000, 2003) and, in 2008, hosted a workshop at Victoria University bringing together the main contributors to the contemporary debate on Molinism.[25] And there have been other contributions relating to divine providence and the divine attributes: Graham Oddie and Roy Perrett (1992) reject a common argument against understanding God as timeless and aware of all moments of time 'at once', and Fred Kroon (1996) uses a puzzle of belief-instability to criticise a conception of God's knowledge under which God is not only ideally rational but also has infallible knowledge of his ideal rationality.

Philosophy of religion has important connections with ethics. Recent work by Glen Pettigrove (2007, 2008) deals with conceptual and normative issues related to theological understandings of forgiveness, and a number of philosophers have dealt with arguments from morality to theism. Robert Wicks (2007) provides commentary on the moral argument for God's existence in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*; Bishop (1985) defends a theological version of ethical egoism and, earlier (1983), had an exchange on the *Euthyphro* question with Robert Nola (1982) in the Auckland-based Classics and Ancient Philosophy journal *Prudentia*. The possibility of 'arguing from theology to ethics' was of interest to George Hughes, though his published article on this topic dates from before he came to New Zealand (1947). Others have appealed to morality to establish atheism: Ray Bradley (2003) argues that, if there are objective moral truths, the God of 'biblical theism' does not exist, since one who deliberately slaughters those innocent of any serious wrongdoing could not be morally perfect, and yet if the Scriptures are accepted as revelatory, God has done precisely that.[26] On the political side, Pettigrove (2005) discusses Habermas and Scanlon on the place of religion in public debate; Bishop (2006) considers Dole and Chignell's detection of a 'political turn' in recent philosophy of religion; and Douglas Pratt (2007) emphasises the importance, in our contemporary context of religious pluralism, of a carefully thought-out account of how inter-religious dialogue can authentically occur. There are some notable New Zealand contributions to religious normative ethics—for example, Chris Marshall's (2001) study of a New Testament ethics of punishment—but these are perhaps not strictly within the scope of philosophy of religion.

---

[25] Perszyk's (2011) edited collection on Molinism grew out of this workshop.

[26] In Bradley's own words: 'God himself drowned the whole human race except Noah and his family [Gen. 7:23]; he punished King David for carrying out a census that he himself had ordered and then complied with David's request that others be punished instead of him by sending a plague to kill 70,000 people [II Sam. 24:1–15]; and he commanded Joshua to kill old and young, little

In the analytical tradition, philosophy of religion has overwhelmingly been the philosophy of *theistic*—and, indeed, Christian—religion. It is thus refreshing that some recent work (Aijaz 2008) has an Islamic focus. Earlier work by Perrett (e.g. 1985a, 1987a, b) has a Hindu focus, especially on Indian conceptions of karma and rebirth. Philosophers have not, however, worked on the philosophy of indigenous religion—although John Patterson (1992) has published a study of Māori ethics (see also Perrett and Patterson 1991).

Much work in other areas of philosophy bears on questions about religion without counting as philosophy of religion: here we mention only work in the field of medieval philosophy (particularly logic), noting the contributions of Christopher Martin (e.g. 1992, 1998, 1999, 2004) and, earlier, George Hughes (1982, 1990). There are, of course, other channels for philosophical communication than the 'refereed' academic ones—and these have been utilised by New Zealand philosophers of religion. Philosophers (including John Bishop, Ray Bradley and Ruth Walker) have addressed conferences of the New Zealand Sea of Faith Network.[27] Ray Bradley has a notable history of public debates with theist opponents—while he was Professor at the University of Auckland in 1964 with botanist Professor Val Chapman and in 1965 with classicist Professor E. M. Blaiklock. Later, after returning to New Zealand following retirement from Simon Fraser University, Bradley continued his sustained advocacy for atheism through Internet publications on *The Secular Web* (http://www.infidels.org/) and in *The Open Society* (journal of the New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists). Of particular interest, given our starting point in this brief history, is Bradley's 'Open Letter to Antony Flew'[28]—and his subsequent exchange with Flew—following Flew's much publicised renunciation of atheism.

One should not forget that some influential teachers in philosophy of religion in New Zealand never published in the area—in particular, Clive Pearson, who taught

---

children, maidens and women (the inhabitants of some 31 kingdoms) while pursuing his genocidal practices of ethnic cleansing in the lands that orthodox Jews still regard as part of Greater Israel [see Josh., chapter 10 in particular]'. See also Michael Tooley's remarks on revealed religions and the argument from evil (in Plantinga and Tooley 2008: 73–76) and Lewis (2007).

[27] Describing itself as 'an association of people who have a common interest in exploring religious thought and expression from a non-dogmatic and human-oriented standpoint', the Sea of Faith Network was founded in the wake of Don Cupitt's 1984 BBC television documentary series and book with that title, taken from Matthew Arnold's poem 'Dover Beach'.

[28] *The Open Society* 78.1 (2005).

at Auckland from 1959 to 1984, impressing on his students that to think seriously about religion is to think about matters of great existential importance. But, if existential engagement is a mark of good philosophy generally, then perhaps—in an unconventionally broad sense—there is something 'religious' about a commitment to philosophising. Readers of Alan Musgrave's recent essays—*Secular Sermons: Essays on Science and Philosophy* (2009)—may at least agree that the ecclesial metaphor is apt. In any case, whether philosophising is 'religious' or not, the history of philosophising about religious questions in New Zealand witnesses to its practitioners' dedication to semantic clarity and logical rigour, and their due regard to following the arguments where they lead.

References

Philosophy of Religion in Australia

Ahern, M. (1963). An approach to the problems of evil. *Sophia, 2*, 18–26.
Ahern, M. (1965). A note on the nature of evil. *Sophia, 4*, 17–25.
Ahern, M. (1966). The nature of evil. *Sophia, 5*, 35–44.
Ahern, M. (1967). God and evil—A note. *Sophia, 6*, 23–26.
Ahern, M. (1971). *The problem of evil*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Almond, P. (1979). On the varieties of mystical experience. *Sophia, 18*, 1–9.
Almond, P. (1988). Mysticism and its contexts. *Sophia, 27*, 40–49.
Armstrong, D. (1978). *A theory of universals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D. (1983). *What is a law of nature?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bigelow, J., Ellis, B., & Lierse, C. (1992). The world as one of a kind. *British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 43*, 371–88.
Bilimoria, P. (1990). *The self and its destiny in Hinduism*. Geelong: Deakin University.
Bilimoria, P. (1995). Duhkha and Karma: The problem of evil and God's omnipotence. *Sophia, 34*, 92–119.
Bilimoria, P. (1997). On Sankara's attempted reconciliation of 'You' and 'I'. In B. Matilal, J. Mohanty, & P. Bilimoria (Eds.), *Relativism, suffering and beyond* (pp. 252–77). Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Bilimoria, P. (2001). Hindu doubts about God: Towards a Mimamsa deconstruction. In R. Perrett (Ed.), *Philosophy of religion* (pp. 87–105). New York: Garland Publishing.
Boyce Gibson, W. (1906). *Rudolf Eucken's philosophy of life*. London: Adam & Charles Black.
Brien, A. (1989). Can God forgive us our trespasses? *Sophia, 28*, 35–42.
Campbell, R. (1976). *From belief to understanding: A study of Anselm's Proslogion argument on the existence of God*. Canberra: Australian National University.
Campbell, R. (1981). Transcendence and the scope of philosophical reflection. In R. Mortley & D. Dockrill (Eds.), *Via Negativa Prudentia* (Supp. Vol. 1). Auckland University.
Campbell, R. (1982). Philosophical reflection and the impulse towards transcendence. In E. Dowdy (Ed.), *Ways of transcendence: Insights from major religions and modern thought* (pp. 148–69). Bedford Park: Australian Association for the Study of Religion.
Campbell, R. (1995). Anselm's three stage argument—Twenty years on. *Sophia, 34*, 32–41.
Chadha, M., & Trakakis, N. (2007). Karma and the problem of evil: A response to Kaufman. *Philosophy East and West, 57*, 533–56.
Chalmers, D. (2006). *The character of consciousness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Charlesworth, M. (1962). St Anselm's argument. *Sophia, 1*, 25–36.
Charlesworth, M. (1965). *St Anselm's Proslogion*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Charlesworth, M. (1987). Australian aboriginal religion in a comparative context. *Sophia, 26*, 50–57.

Charlesworth, M., Dussart, F., & Morphy, H. (2005). *Aboriginal religions in Australia: An anthology of recent work*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Chipman, L. (1970). Faith, reason and truth. *The Australian Rationalist, 1*, 111–18.

Coady, C. (1992). *Testimony*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Coghlan, P., & Trakakis, N. (2006). Confronting the horror of natural evil: An exchange between Peter Coghlan and Nick Trakakis. *Sophia, 45*, 5–26.

Colyvan, M., Priest, G., & Garfield, J. (2005). Problems with the argument from fine tuning. *Synthese, 145*, 325–38.

Craig, W. (1979). *The Kalam cosmological argument*. London: Macmillan.

Douglass, J. (2004). *Logic and God: A thesis claiming that there is a link between God and mathematics* (PhD Thesis). University of New England.

Dretske, F. (1977). Laws of nature. *Philosophy of Science, 44*, 248–68.

Drum, P. (1996). An implausible theodicy. *Sophia, 35*, 79–81.

Drum, P. (2003). Supernatural religion and the problem of providence. *Sophia, 42*, 27–29.

Duff-Forbes, D. (1961). Theology and falsification again. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 39*, 143–54.

Durkheim, E. (1965). *The elementary forms of the religious life* (trans: Swain, J). New York: The Free Press.

Elliot, R. (1976). Resurrection and retrocognition. *Sophia, 15*, 28–31.

Englebretsen, G. (1979). The powers and capacities of God. *Sophia, 18*, 29–31.

Feldman, R. (2007). Reasonable religious disagreements. In L. Antony (Ed.), *Philosophers without God: Meditations on atheism and the secular life* (pp. 194–214). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fisher, A., & Ramsay, H. (Eds.). (2004). *Faith and reason*. Adelaide: ATF Press.

Forrest, P. (1981). The problem of evil: Two neglected defences. *Sophia, 20*, 49–54.

Forrest, P. (1989). An argument for the divine command theory of right action. *Sophia, 28*, 2–19.

Forrest, P. (1996). *God without the supernatural*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Forrest, P. (1998). Divine fission: A new way of moderating social trinitarianism. *Religious Studies, 34*, 281–98.

Forrest, P. (2000). The incarnation: A philosophical case for kenosis. *Religious Studies, 36*, 127–40.

Forrest, P. (2007a). *Developmental theism: From pure will to unbounded love*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Forrest, P. (2007b). The tree of life: Agency and immortality in a metaphysics inspired by quantum theory. In D. Zimmerman & P. van Inwagen (Eds.), *Persons, human and divine* (pp. 301–18). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Franklin, R. (1964). Some sorts of necessity. *Sophia, 3*, 15–24.

Franklin, J. (1980). More on Part IX of Hume's *dialogues*. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 30*, 69–81.

Franklin, R. (1996). Interpretations of mysticism. *Sophia, 35*, 47–62.

Franklin, J. (1998). Two caricatures, I: Pascal's wager. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 44*, 109–14.

Franklin, J. (2002). Two caricatures, II: Leibniz's best world. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 52*, 45–56.

Franklin, J. (2006). Traditional catholic philosophy: Baby and bathwater. In M. Whelan (Ed.), *Issues for church and society* (pp. 15–32). Strathfield: St Pauls Publications Australia.

Gaita, R. (1991). *Good and evil: An absolute conception*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Garfied, J., & Priest, G. (2003). Nagarjuna on the limits of thought. *Philosophy East and West, 53*, 1–21.

Gill, J. (1977). Miracles with method. *Sophia, 16*, 19–26.

Gleason, G. (2004). Speaking of persons, human and divine. *Sophia, 43*, 45–60.

Grave, S. (1952). The ontological argument of St. Anselm. *Philosophy, 27*, 30–38.

Grave, S. (1984). *A history of philosophy in Australia*. St. Lucia: Queensland University Press.

Grim, P. (1983). Some neglected problems of omniscience. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 20*, 265–76.

Grim, P. (1985). Against omniscience: The case from essential indexicals. *Noûs, 19*, 151–80.

Grim, P. (2000). The being that knew too much. *International Journal of Philosophy of Religion, 47*, 141–54.

Hájek, A. (2003). Waging war on Pascal's wager. *Philosophical Review, 113*, 27–56.

Harrison, P. (1996). God and animal minds: A response to Lynch. *Sophia, 35*, 67–78.

Hick, J. (1989). *An interpretation of religion*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hutchings, P. (1995). The old and the new sublimes: Do they signify? God? *Sophia, 34*, 49–64.

Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn't know. *Journal of Philosophy, 83*, 291–5.

Kesarcodi-Watson, I. (1976). Is Hinduism pantheistic? *Sophia, 15*, 26–36.

Kesarcodi-Watson, I. (1984). *Approaches to personhood in Indian thought: Essays in descriptive metaphysics*. Delhi: Satgara.

Khamara, E. (1995). Mackie's Paradox and the free will defence. *Sophia, 34*, 42–48.

Lamb, W. (1996). Beyond tolerance: On describing the fundamentalist. *St. Mark's Review, 164*, 10–15.

Lamb, W. (1998). 'Facts that stay put': Protestant fundamentalism, epistemology and orthodoxy. *Sophia, 37*, 88–110.

Lamb, W. (2004). *Living truth—Truthful living: Christian faith and the scalpel of suspicion*. Hindmarsh: ATF.

Lamb, W., & Barnes, I. (Eds.). (2003). *God down under: Theology in the antipodes*. Adelaide: ATF Press.

Lamont, J. (2004). *Divine faith*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Langtry, B. (1972). Hume on testimony to the miraculous. *Sophia, 11*, 20–25.

Langtry, B. (1975a). Hume on miracles and contrary religions. *Sophia, 14*, 29–34.

Langtry, B. (1975b). Similarity, continuity, and survival. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 53*, 3–18.

Langtry, B. (1982). In defence of a resurrection doctrine. *Sophia, 21*, 1–9.

Langtry, B. (1985). Miracles and rival systems of religion. *Sophia, 24*, 21–31.

Langtry, B. (1989). God, evil and probability. *Sophia, 28*, 32–40.

Langtry, B. (1995). Reply to Chrzan's comments. *Sophia, 34*, 74–78.

Langtry, B. (1998). Structures of greater good theodicies: The objection from alternative goods. *Sophia, 37*, 1–17.

Langtry, B. (2008). *God, the best and evil*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Levine, M. (1984). Why traditional theism does not entail pantheism. *Sophia, 23*, 13–20.

Levine, M. (1994a). Adams's modified divine command theory of ethics. *Sophia, 33*, 63–77.

Levine, M. (1994b). *Pantheism: A non-theistic concept of the divine*. London: Routledge.

Levine, M. (1996). Must God create the best? *Sophia, 35*, 28–34.

Londey, D. (1963a). God is the (a) necessary being. *Sophia, 2*, 15–16.

Londey, D. (1963b). Necessary being again. *Sophia, 2*, 30–32.

Londey, D. (1978). Concepts and God's possibility. *Sophia, 17*, 15–19.

Londey, D. (1986). Can God forgive us our trespasses? *Sophia, 25*, 4–10.

Londey, D. (1992). God and forgiveness. *Sophia, 31*, 101–9.

Londey, D., Miller, B., & King-Farlow, J. (1971). God and the stone paradox: Three comments. *Sophia, 10*, 23–33.

Luck, M. (2005). Against the possibility of historical evidence for a miracle. *Sophia, 44*, 7–23.

Mackie, J. (1955). Evil and omnipotence. *Mind, 64*, 200–12.

Mackie, J. (1982). *The miracle of theism*. Oxford: Clarendon.

McCloskey, H. (1974). *God and evil*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

McCullagh, C. (1988). Theology of atonement. *Theology, 91*, 392–400.

McCullagh, C. (1992). Evil and the love of God. *Sophia, 31*, 48–60.

McCullagh, C. (2007). Can religious beliefs be justified pragmatically? *Sophia, 46*, 21–34.

Miller, B. (1992). *From existence to God: A contemporary philosophical argument*. London: Routledge.

Miller, B. (1996). *A most unlikely God: A philosophical exploration of the nature of God*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Miller, B. (2002). *The fullness of being: A new paradigm for existence*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Morris, T. (1987). *Anselmian explorations: Essays in philosophical theology*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Mortley, R. (1986a). *From word to silence* (Vol. 1, The Rise and Fall of Logos). Bonn: Hanstein.

Mortley, R. (1986b). *From word to silence* (Vol. 2, The Way of Negation, Christian and Greek). Bonn: Hanstein.

Murray, A. (2005). Talking about God: Analogy revisited. *The Australasian Catholic Record, 82*, 29–40.

Nagasawa, Y. (2003a). Divine omniscience and experience: A reply to Alter. *Ars Disputandi, 3*. http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000098/index.html

Nagasawa, Y. (2003b). Divine omniscience and knowledge de se. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 53*, 73–82.

Nagasawa, Y. (2003c). God's point of view: A reply to Mander. *The Heythrop Journal, 44*, 60–63.

Nagasawa, Y. (2005). Omniscience and physicalism: A reply to Beyer. *Sophia, 44*, 55–58.

Nagasawa, Y. (2007a). Millican on the ontological argument. *Mind, 116*, 1027–40.

Nagasawa, Y. (2007b). A further reply to Beyer on omniscience. *Sophia, 46*, 65–67.

Nagasawa, Y. (2008a). *God and phenomenal consciousness: A novel approach to knowledge arguments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nagasawa, Y. (2008b). A New defence of Anselmian theism. *Philosophical Quarterly, 58*, 577–96.

Nagasawa, Y., & Bayne, T. (2006). Grounds of worship. *Religious Studies, 42*, 299–313.

Nagasawa, Y., & Bayne, T. (2007). The grounds of worship again: A reply to Crowe. *Religious Studies, 43*, 475–80.

Nagasawa, Y., & Brown, C. (2005a). I can't make you worship me. *Ratio, 18*, 138–44.

Nagasawa, Y., & Brown, C. (2005b). Anything you can do, God can do better. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 42*, 221–27.

Nagasawa, Y., & Brown, C. (2005c). The best of all possible worlds. *Synthese, 143*, 309–20.

Nagasawa, Y., & Trakakis, N. (2004). Skeptical theism and moral skepticism: A reply to Almeida and Oppy. *Ars Disputandi, 4*. http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000178/article.pdf

Nagasawa, Y., Oppy, G., & Trakakis, N. (2004). Salvation in heaven? *Philosophical Papers, 33*, 95–117.

Naulty, R. (1992). J. L. Mackie's disposal of religious experience. *Sophia, 31*, 1–9.

Olding, A. (1970). Flew on souls. *Sophia, 9*, 11–12.

Olding, A. (1991). *Modern biology and natural theology*. London: Routledge.

Oppy, G. (1990). On rescher on Pascal's wager. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 30*, 159–68.

Oppy, G. (1991). Craig, Mackie, and the *Kalam* cosmological argument. *Religious Studies, 27*, 189–97.

Oppy, G. (1995a). Inverse operations with transfinite numbers and the Kalam cosmological argument. *International Philosophical Quarterly, 35*, 219–21.

Oppy, G. (1995b). *Ontological arguments and belief in God*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Oppy, G. (1996a). Gödelian ontological arguments. *Analysis, 56*, 226–30.

Oppy, G. (1996b). Pascal's wager is a possible bet (but not a very good one): Reply to Harmon Holcomb III. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 40*, 101–16.

Oppy, G. (1999). Koons' cosmological argument. *Faith and Philosophy, 16*, 378–89.

Oppy, G. (2000). On 'a new cosmological argument'. *Religious Studies, 36*, 345–53.

Oppy, G. (2001). Time, successive addition, and the Kalam cosmological argument. *Philosophia Christi, 3*, 181–91.

Oppy, G. (2002). Arguing about the Kalam cosmological argument. *Philo, 5*, 34–61.

Oppy, G. (2007). *Arguing about Gods*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Oppy, G., & Almeida, M. (2003). Sceptical theism and the evidential argument from evil. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81*, 496–516.

Oppy, G., & Almeida, M. (2005). Evidential arguments from evil and sceptical theist responses. *Philo, 8*, 84–94.

Palma, A. (1986). Notes towards a God. *Sophia, 25*, 4–17.

Palma, A. (1988). Religious icons, prayers and practices. *Sophia, 27*, 26–39.

Pargetter, R. (1982). Evil as evidence. *Sophia, 21*, 11–15.

Plantinga, A. (1967). *God and other minds: A study of the rational justification of belief in God*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Plantinga, A. (1974). *The nature of necessity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Price, H. (1996). *Time's arrow and Archimedes' point: New directions in the physics of time*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Priest, G. (2002). *Beyond the limits of thought*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Restall, G., & Bayne, T. (2009). A participatory theory of the atonement. In Y. Nagasawa & E. Wielenberg (Eds.), *New waves in philosophy of religion* (pp. 150–66). Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke.

Routley, R. (1969). A simple natural deduction system. *Logique et Analyse, 46*, 129–52.

Scarlett, B. (2003). God and animal pain. *Sophia, 42*, 61–76.

Schesinger, G. (1977). *Religion and scientific method*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Singer, P. (1993). *Practical ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Spencer, B., & Gillen, F. (1899). *The native tribes of central Australia*. London: Macmillan.

Spencer, B., & Gillen, F. (1904). *The northern tribes of central Australia*. London: Macmillan.

Stove, D. (1978). Part IX of Hume's *dialogues*. *Philosophical Quarterly, 28*, 300–09.

Stove, D. (1991). Idealism: A Victorian horror story. In *The Plato cult and other philosophical follies* (pp. 83–179). Oxford: Blackwell.

Tooley, M. (1977). The nature of laws. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7*, 667–98.

Tooley, M. (1983). *Abortion and infanticide*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Tooley, M. (1989). Plantinga and the argument from evil. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58*, 360–76.

Trakakis, N. (2003a). What no eye has seen: The skeptical theist response to Rowe's evidential argument from evil. *Philo, 6*, 250–66.

Trakakis, N. (2003b). On the alleged failure of free will theodicies: A reply to Tierno. *Sophia, 42*, 99–106.

Trakakis, N. (2003c). God, gratuitous evil, and van Inwagen's attempt to reconcile the two. *Ars Disputandi, 3*. http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000124/article.pdf

Trakakis, N. (2004). Second thoughts on the alleged failure of free will theodicies. *Sophia, 43*, 87–93.

Trakakis, N. (2005). Is theism capable of accounting for any natural evil at all? *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 57*, 35–66.

Trakakis, N. (2006). *The God beyond belief: In defence of William Rowe's evidential argument from evil*. Dordrecht: Springer Publishing.

White, F. (1973). The contingency argument again. *Sophia, 12*, 29–34.

Wykstra, S. (1984). The Humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering: On avoiding the evils of appearance. *International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 16*, 73–94.

Wynn, M. (1999). *God and goodness: A natural theological perspective*. London: Routledge.

Young, R. (1970). The resurrection of the body. *Sophia, 9*, 1–15.

Philosophy of Religion in New Zealand

Aijaz, I. (2008). Belief, providence and eschatology: Some philosophical problems in Islamic theism. *Philosophy Compass, 3*, 231–53.

Aijaz, I., & Weidler, M. (2007). Some critical reflections on the hiddenness argument. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 61*, 1–23.

Alston, W. (1991). *Perceiving God: The epistemology of religious experience*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Ardley, G. (1950). *Aquinas and Kant: The foundations of the modern sciences*. London: Longmans.

Ardley, G. (1982). *Sixty years of philosophy: A short history of the Auckland University Philosophy Department, 1921–1983*. Auckland: Department of Philosophy, The University of Auckland.

Bishop, J. (1983). The reasons of the gods: A reply to Robert Nola. *Prudentia, 15*, 13–26.

Bishop, J. (1985). Theism, morality and the 'Why should I be moral?' question. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 17*, 3–21.

Bishop, J. (1993a). Evil and the concept of God. *Philosophical Papers, 22*, 1–15.

Bishop, J. (1993b). Compatibilism and the free will defence. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71*, 104–20.

Bishop, J. (1998). Can there be alternative concepts of God? *Noûs, 32*, 174–88.

Bishop, J. (2002). Faith as doxastic venture. *Religious Studies, 38*, 471–87.

Bishop, J. (2006). The philosophy of religion: A programmatic overview. *Philosophy Compass, 1*, 506–34.

Bishop, J. (2007a). *Believing by faith: An essay in the epistemology and ethics of religious belief.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bishop, J. (2007b). How a modest fideism may constrain concepts of God: A Christian alternative to classical theism. *Philosophia, 35*, 387–402.

Bishop, J. (2009). Towards a religiously adequate alternative to omniGod theism. *Sophia, 48*, 419–33.

Bishop, J., & Aijaz, I. (2004). How to answer the *de jure* question about Christian belief. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 56*, 109–29.

Bishop, J., & Perszyk, K. (2011). The normatively relativised logical argument from evil. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 70*, 109–26.

Bradley, R. (1967). A proof of atheism. *Sophia, 6*, 35–49.

Bradley, R. (2003). A moral argument for atheism. In M. Martin & R. Monnier (Eds.), *The impossibility of God* (pp. 157–81). Amherst: Prometheus Books.

Dawes, G. (2007). What *is* wrong with intelligent design? *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 61*, 69–81.

Dawes, G. (2009). *Theism and explanation*. New York: Routledge.

Dawkins, R. (2006). *The God delusion*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Dole, A., & Chignell, A. (2005). The ethics of religious belief: A recent history. In A. Dole & A. Chignell (Eds.), *God and the ethics of belief: New essays in philosophy of religion* (pp. 1–30). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eagleton, T. (2009). *Reason, faith and revolution: Reflections on the God debate*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Flew, A. (1955). Divine omnipotence and human freedom. In A. Flew & A. MacIntyre (Eds.), *New essays in philosophical theology* (pp. 144–69). London: SCM Press.

Geering, L. (1994). *Tomorrow's God: How we create our worlds*. Wellington: Bridget Williams Books.

Gould, S. (2002). *Rocks of ages*. New York: Ballantine Books.

Grimshaw, M. (2002). The prior Prior: Neglected early writings of Arthur N. Prior. *Heythrop Journal, 43*, 480–95.

Hughes, G. (1947). An examination of the argument from theology to ethics. *Philosophy, 22*, 3–24.

Hughes, G. (1955). Response to J. N. Findlay, 'Can God's existence be disproved?'. In A. Flew & A. MacIntyre (Eds.), *New essays in philosophical theology* (pp. 56–67). London: SCM Press.

Hughes, G. (1962). Mr Martin on the Incarnation: A reply to Mr Plantinga and Mr Rowe. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 40*, 208–11.

Hughes, G. (1963). The doctrine of the Trinity. *Sophia, 2*, 1–12.

Hughes, G. (1970). Plantinga on the rationality of God's existence. *Philosophical Review, 79*, 246–52.

Hughes, G. (1982). *John Buridan on self-reference: Chapter eight of Buridan's Sophismata, with a translation, an introduction, and a philosophical commentary*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hughes, G. (1990). *Paul of Venice. Logica magna, Part II, Fascicule 4, Capitula De Conditionali et De Rationali, edited with English translation and notes, The British Academy Classical and Medieval Logic Texts, VI*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

James, W. (1956). *The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy, and human immortality*. New York: Dover.

Kroon, F. (1981). Plantinga on God, freedom and evil. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 12*, 75–96.

Kroon, F. (1996). God's blindspot. *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 35*, 721–34.

Lewis, D. (2007). Divine evils. In L. Antony (Ed.), *Philosophers without gods: Meditations on atheism and the secular life* (pp. 231–42). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mares, E., & Perszyk, K. (2011). Molinist conditionals. In K. Perszyk (Ed.), *Molinism: The contemporary debate* (pp. 96–117). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marshall, C. (2001). *Beyond retribution: A New Testament vision for justice, crime, and punishment*. Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans.

Martin, C. (1992). The logic of the 'Nominales', or, the rise and fall of impossible 'Positio'. *Vivarium, 30*, 110–38.

Martin, C. (1998). The logic of growth: Twelfth-century nominalists and the development of theories of the Incarnation. *Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 7*, 1–15.

Martin, C. (1999). Non-reductive arguments from impossible hypotheses in Boethius and Philoponus. In D. Sedley (Ed.), *Oxford studies in ancient philosophy* (Vol. 17, pp. 279–302). New York: Oxford University Press.

Martin, C. (2004). Logic. In J. Brower (Ed.), *The Cambridge companion to Abelard* (pp. 158–99). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morris, P., & Grimshaw, M. (Eds.). (2008). *The Lloyd Geering reader: Prophet of modernity*. Wellington: Victoria University Press.

Musgrave, A. (2009). *Secular sermons: Essays on science and philosophy*. Dunedin: Otago University Press.

Nola, R. (1982). Morality and religion in Plato's *Euthyphro*. *Prudentia, 14*, 83–96.

Oddie, G., & Perrett, R. (1992). Simultaneity and God's timelessness. *Sophia, 31*, 123–7.

Owens, J. (2004). The God whereof we speak: D. Z. Phillips and the question of God's existence. *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 78*, 83–97.

Patterson, J. (1992). *Exploring Māori values*. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.

Pelly, R., & Stuart, P. (Eds.). (2006). *A religious atheist? Critical essays on the work of Lloyd Geering*. Dunedin: Otago University Press.

Perrett, R. (1985a). Karma and the problem of suffering. *Sophia, 24*, 4–10.

Perrett, R. (1985b). Dualistic and nondualistic problems of immortality. *Philosophy East and West, 35*, 333–50.

Perrett, R. (1987a). *Death and immortality*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

Perrett, R. (1987b). Rebirth. *Religious Studies, 23*, 41–57.

Perrett, R. (Ed.). (1989). *Indian philosophy of religion*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Perrett, R., & Patterson, J. (1991). Virtue ethics and Māori ethics. *Philosophy East and West, 41*, 185–202.

Perszyk, K. (1998a). Free will defence with and without molinism. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 43*, 29–64.

Perszyk, K. (1998b). An anti-molinist argument. *Philosophical Studies, 90*, 215–35.

Perszyk, K. (1998c). Molinism and theodicy. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 44*, 163–184.

Perszyk, K. (1999a). Compatibilism and the free will defence: A reply to Bishop. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77*, 92–105.

Perszyk, K. (1999b). Stump's theodicy of redemptive suffering and molinism. *Religious Studies, 35*, 191–211.

Perszyk, K. (2000). Molinism and compatibilism. *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 48*, 11–33.

Perszyk, K. (2003). Molinism and the consequence argument: A challenge. *Faith and Philosophy, 20*, 131–51.

Perszyk, K. (Ed.). (2011). *Molinism: The contemporary debate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pettigrove, G. (2005). Rights, reasons, and religious conflict: Habermas and Scanlon on the role of religion in public debate. In J. Rowan (Ed.), *Human rights, religion, and democracy* (pp. 81–93). Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center.

Pettigrove, G. (2007). Forgiveness and interpretation. *Journal of Religious Ethics, 35*, 429–52.

Pettigrove, G. (2008). The dilemma of divine forgiveness. *Religious Studies, 44*, 457–64.

Plantinga, A. (1984). Advice to Christian philosophers. *Faith and Philosophy, 1*, 253–71.

Plantinga, A. (2000). *Warranted Christian belief*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Plantinga, A., & Tooley, M. (2008). *Knowledge of God*. Malden: Blackwell.

Pratt, D. (1989). Aseity as relational problematic. *Sophia, 28*, 13–25.

Pratt, D. (1992). Religious concepts of 'world': Comparative metaphysical perspectives. *Sophia, 31*, 74–88.

Pratt, D. (2002). *Relational deity: Hartshorne and Macquarrie on God*. Lanham: University Press of America.

Pratt, D. (2005). Religious plurality, referential realism and paradigms of pluralism. In A. Plaw (Ed.), *Frontiers of diversity: Explorations in contemporary pluralism* (pp. 191–209). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Pratt, D. (2007). Pluralism, postmodernism and interreligious dialogue. *Sophia, 46*, 243–59.

Prior, A. (1955). Can religion be discussed? In A. Flew & A. MacIntyre (Eds.), *New essays in philosophical theology* (pp. 1–11). London: SCM Press.

Schellenberg, J. (1993). *Divine hiddenness and human reason*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Smart, J. (1955). Metaphysics, logic and theology. In A. Flew & A. MacIntyre (Eds.), *New essays in philosophical theology* (pp. 12–27). London: SCM Press.

Thornton, J. (1966). Religious belief and 'reductionism'. *Sophia, 5*, 3–16.

Thornton, J. (1967). Reductionism: A reply to Dr Mascall. *Sophia, 6*, 6–8.

Thornton, J. (1984). Miracles and God's existence. *Philosophy, 59*, 219–30.

Walker, R. (2006). Rescuing religious non-realism from Cupitt. *Heythrop Journal, 47*, 426–40.

Wicks, R. (2007). *Routledge philosophy guidebook to Kant on judgement*. London: Routledge.

Wolterstorff, N. (2009). How philosophical theology became possible within the analytic tradition of philosophy. In O. Crisp & M. Rea (Eds.), *Analytic theology: New essays in the philosophy of theology* (pp. 155–68). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Young, J. (2003). *The death of God and the meaning of life*. London: Routledge.

Young, J. (2006). *Nietzsche's philosophy of religion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aesthetics and Philosophy of Music in Australasia

16

Ismay Barwell and Justine Kingsbury

Contents

Aesthetics in Australasia: 1945–2005 479
  Kant's Aesthetics, Aesthetic Value and Aesthetic Experience 481
  Interpretation, Representation and Depiction 487
  Definitions, Evolutionary Theory and Appreciating Nature 495
  Conclusion: State of the Art 500
Philosophy of Music in Australasia 501
References 505

Aesthetics in Australasia: 1945–2005

Aesthetics was taught in many Australasian philosophy departments after the Second World War. However, there were few publications until the expansion of the universities in 1970s and 1980s. In this chapter, my focus is on work done in Australasia by academics based in philosophy departments, rather on the work done in other countries by philosophers born in Australasia. This means that I will not discuss the work of philosophers like Samuel Alexander, whose books, *Art and The Material* (1925) and *Beauty and Other Forms of Value* (1933), were published while he was professor at Manchester, and I will not discuss work published either before or after someone took a position in Australasia. Moreover, I will focus on

---

Ismay Barwell is the author of the section 'Aesthetics in Australasia: 1945–2005' and Justine Kingsbury is the author of the section 'Philosophy of Music in Australasia'

I. Barwell (✉)
Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
e-mail: Ismay.barwell@clear.net.nz

J. Kingsbury
Philosophy, Religious Studies and Ethics, The University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand
e-mail: justinek@waikato.ac.nz

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_25, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

books rather than articles, so when someone has written articles on issues discussed in their books, my account is an account of the book version.

In ‘The Integrity of Aesthetics’ (1990), David Novitz identifies issues that he sees as crucial to the coherence of aesthetics as a philosophical area, because they constitute its core. These issues lead to others, which form a constellation around the core. From the core, we can follow threads which lead to ontological, epistemological, political, ethical and semantic issues or to issues in philosophy of mind and action. I will not pursue those at the end of these threads unless they have a direct bearing on one that is clearly aesthetic. For example, I have decided to omit publications whose focus is on the semantic problems presented by fiction.

A survey of aesthetics in Australasia requires a map of this kind since it cannot be represented as a conversation amongst practicing philosophers in that geographical area. Aestheticians in Australasia are more involved with philosophers in other countries than they are with each other. Moreover, there are two deeply divided philosophical approaches, both of which have Kant as one of their ancestors, but which have developed in very different ways. These are the analytic tradition, which is sometimes called the Anglophone tradition though it is not all written in English, and the continental tradition. The continent in question is Europe, but this tradition is also followed in Britain, the United States and Australasia. My chapter focuses on the analytic tradition.

Although analytic aestheticians rarely engaged with each other in print, they did engage with the work of a similar range of British and North American philosophers. The same names appear either as partners or opponents or, very often, simply as those whose ideas are useful. They include Monroe Beardsley, Noel Carroll, Arthur Danto, George Dickie, Nelson Goodman, Herbert Grice, Jerrold Levinson, David Lewis, Joseph Margolis, Robert Stecker, Kendall Walton and Richard Wollheim.

Given the number and size of universities in Australasia, a disproportionate number of Australasian aestheticians have been based in New Zealand philosophy departments. Amongst these some stand out. For example, David Novitz was the first to achieve an international reputation. He had placed eight articles in international publications before he published *Pictures and Their Use in Communication* in 1976. *Knowledge, Fiction and Imagination* followed in 1987 and *The Boundaries of Art* in 1992. Other stars include Stephen Davies, Gregory Currie and Denis Dutton.

Stephen Davies’ aesthetic publications fall into two main categories. Most concern music. These and works by other philosophers in the aesthetics of music are covered in Justine Kingsbury’s essay in this volume. Davies was, and continues to be, interested in definitions of art. Two articles preceded the publication of *Definitions of Art* in 1991 and two have succeeded it. Other enduring interests have been interpretation and non-Western art, in particular Balinese art. He has edited two anthologies, *Art and Its Messages* (1997) and *Art and Essence* (2003), with Ananda C. Sukla. His most recent books are *The Philosophy of Art* (2006c) and *Philosophical Perspectives on Art* (2007). At the time of writing, Davies is president of the American Society for Aesthetics, a position never before held by an Australasian.

Denis Dutton is a rare beast amongst philosophers—a media star. As well as editing *The Forger's Art: Forgery and the Philosophy of Art* (1993) and *Philosophy and Literature*, Dutton edits an arts and literature website http://www.aldaily.com. He has also published on the universality of art and evolutionary aesthetics. His latest book is *The Art Instinct* (2008).

During his time at the University of Otago, Gregory Currie published *An Ontology of Art* (1989) and *The Nature of Fiction* (1990). When *Image and Mind* came out in 1995, he was professor at Flinders. Like Novitz and Davies, Currie published many articles on issues he discussed in his books. In addition, he has written about aesthetic properties ('Supervenience, Essentialism and Aesthetic Properties', 1990a), how we acquire moral knowledge from reading fiction ('The Moral Psychology of Fiction', 1995b), imagination and in particular simulation, which is a specific exercise of imagination ('Visual Imagery as the Simulation of Vision', 1995) and narrative and narration in movies and fiction ('Unreliability Refigured', 1995c).

Paul Thom was the only aesthetician in Australia comparable to Currie in the 1990s, and it is worth noting, since it is so uncommon, that in *For An Audience* (1993), Thom acknowledges Currie's work, even though he does not exactly engage with it. Apart from his work on music, Thom's other major book in aesthetics is *Making Sense* (2000).

Since 2000 the balance between the two countries has changed. Amongst rising stars, Elizabeth Burns Coleman and Jennifer McMahon are in Australian academic departments, and Catharine Abell was until 2006.

In 'The Integrity of Aesthetics', Novitz suggests that the coherence of aesthetics follows from two preoccupations. The focus of one preoccupation is 'the problem of explaining the rational basis of aesthetic evaluation' (Novitz 1990, p. 9). The focus of the other preoccupation is a distinctive value which Novitz calls 'artistic value' and a distinctive experience which he calls 'aesthetic experience'. These preoccupations make up the theme I pursue in my first section. I discuss publications on Kant's aesthetics and on aesthetic value and experience more generally. In the second section, I deal with books and articles on interpreting works of art and, in particular, attributing depictive and representational content to those which have either or both types of content. In the third section, I discuss conceptions of art and the aesthetic as they have been discussed in the first decade of the twenty-first century in connection with debates about the universality of art and the appropriate way to aesthetically appreciate nature.

Kant's Aesthetics, Aesthetic Value and Aesthetic Experience

Immanuel Kant's foray into judgments of taste left twentieth-century critics and theorists with a marvelous theory in terms of which to explain the nature of aesthetic experience and the objectivity of aesthetic value (Novitz 1990, p. 9). In 'The System of the Arts' (1993), Hartley Slater explores Kant's suggestions for systematising the arts. Slater begins, as he says Kant did, from the 'unquestionably correct assumption that the arts are *expressive* and so must have the dimensions in which language is expressive' (Slater 1993, p. 612). These are word, gesture and tone. Slater adds perceptual structure to locate the 12 main arts along the six sides of a tetrahedron. He claims that this pyramid 'surely contains the whole of our culture' (1993, p. 617). This kind of systematisation would have delighted Kant, but it has not generated much contemporary interest.

The earliest book on Kant's aesthetics published in Australasia was Mary McCloskey's *Kant's Aesthetics* in 1987. The latest are Robert Wick's *Kant On Judgment* published in 2007 and Jennifer McMahon's *Aesthetics and Material Beauty* also published in 2007. Although McMahon deals with more than Kant's aesthetics in this book, she devotes several chapters to an interpretation of him.

Mary McCloskey undertakes to defend Kant against three objections. She defends him against Wollheim's objection to any aesthetic theory which approaches aesthetic appreciation of art through aesthetic appreciation of nature. Wollheim claimed that aesthetic appreciation of art involves a judgment about skilfulness that is irrelevant to the appreciation of nature. She defends him against Goodman's objection to understanding aesthetic value exclusively in terms of beauty and pleasure and against Collingwood's objection that Kant trivialised aesthetic experience.

Kant distinguished three kinds of aesthetic experience: pure beauty, dependent beauty and the sublime. All involve feeling and evaluative judgment. In the experience of pure and dependent beauty, the feeling is pleasure. In that of the sublime, the feeling is awe. In all three cases, the feeling is *a reason for* the evaluative judgment.

The feeling component in an experience of pure beauty is distinctive because it is disinterested. In this respect, it is unlike the delight involved in experience of the good and the agreeable. These are both interested pleasures. Pleasure in the good is a response to objects and events that meet standards they should meet. For example, human actions should meet moral standards. Pleasure of this kind unproblematically provides *a reason for* a judgment such as 'This action is good!' just because there is a standard involved. Pleasure in the agreeable is interested because it is a response to satisfied desire. For example, the pleasure a hungry person feels in eating her dinner is a response to the satisfaction of his desire for food. In this case, the pleasure does not constitute *a reason for* a judgment such as 'This meal is delicious!' because there is no rule or standard to which the dinner should conform.

Kant did not argue that aesthetic experience was disinterested. Although he argues that the pleasure involved in an experience of pure beauty is disinterested, he did not argue that aesthetic appreciation required an attitude in which attention was disengaged from all personal, practical or cognitive concerns. The latter claim was attributed to him by theorists in the Art For Art's Sake strand of Modernism and also by McCloskey, Wicks and Dutton (1994b) and Slater (1997), but not by McMahon. In section 2 of *The Critique of Judgment*, Kant says that the delight involved in an experience of pure beauty is 'an estimate we form of it on mere contemplation', but he does not say that this delight entails that the contemplation be disinterested.

Because the pleasure involved in an experience of pure beauty is not a response to objects that meet standards, its ability to provide a *reason for* an evaluative judgment needs explaining. In section 56 of *The Critique of Judgment*, Kant suggests that the explanation requires the recognition of an 'indeterminate concept'. This is the concept that he called the 'Form der Zweckmassigkeit', and that in English is called the 'form of finality' or the 'form of purposiveness'. These terms refer to the unified structure that any complex object whatsoever must possess, if we are to make any judgment whatsoever about it. An object must be unified if we are to judge that it belongs to a particular class (a person or a cow, an attack or a journey), or that it has a particular attribute (is blue eyed or three legged, caused by an argument or over before it began), or that it is honourable or sickly, murderous or hazardous.

For Kant, the relations constituting the unity of an object are produced by us in the process of perceiving and thinking about it. The unifying is done by psychological activities in which imagination works with principles supplied by understanding. These principles are determinate concepts. Sometimes unifying and contemplating what we have unified are pleasurable activities. When they are, this is because our imagination and understanding are working together harmoniously in an interaction that Kant calls 'free-play'. When free-play occurs, we feel pleasure. We feel the object is particularly suited to our perceptual and cognitive capacities. The pleasure we feel supplies a reason for the judgment that the object is beautiful because it is pleasure taken in structures that every human being can produce and contemplate.

McCloskey defends Kant against Wollheim by arguing that the pleasure we experience in looking at or listening to some objects is an effect that they have on us by virtue of their perceptual structure. Like Dutton (1994b) and Wicks, she thinks the form of finality is not a structure that all complex objects of judgment must have. Only some objects have this structure, and they have it by virtue of their visual and auditory structure rather than their conceptual structure. 'How the calyx, corolla, stem, etc., of a daisy are put together is distinct from how the gold colour of the circular centre, the radiating band of white petals and the green stem are configured' (McCloskey 1987, p. 62). The latter is the structure in which the pleasure involved in the experience of pure beauty is taken.

For both McCloskey and Wicks, 'free-play' is a *consequence* of the finality of some perceptual forms but not an interaction involved in the production of them. Pure aesthetic pleasure is the effect of either looking at an object whose form is lovely to look at or listening to an object whose form is lovely to listen to. A daisy is lovely to look at because it is *made* to produce pleasure in the sense that by virtue of its visual form, it lends itself to this, even though it is not *made* for this purpose in the sense of being intentionally produced for this purpose. A beautiful painting of a daisy is made in the second sense as well. The adaptiveness of its sensory structure is a product of skill or art.

In 'Dependent Beauty as the Appreciation of Teleological Style' (1997) and in *Kant On Judgment* (2007), Robert Wicks offers an analysis of judgments of pure beauty that is incompatible with that offered by McCloskey. Wicks suggests that the pleasure expressed in a pure judgment of beauty involves an awareness of a range of possible purposes the object might serve (Wicks 1997, p. 392). Pure aesthetic pleasure is the result of looking at an object which could be put to a range of purposes, not a response to the way in which it lends itself to being looked at.

McCloskey takes Goodman's objection to be a claim that the experiences we have in response to paintings or plays about appalling, horrifying or tragic things are not pleasurable. The effects of representations of these kinds of things are often painful or unpleasant. McCloskey does not defend Kant very well against this objection. Although she notices that Kant explicitly claims that beautiful representations of ugly things are possible and that the beauty of the representation lies in the skill with which it was made, she interprets Kant as saying that a representation can only be beautiful if it represents what it represents as beautiful. A representation can only be lovely to look at if it represents an object as beautiful. This defence leads to the criticism that fine art and aesthetic appreciation are trivialised. If aesthetic experience depends only on interrelations between sensory qualities that make the object lovely to look at, then how something looks is more important than what it says or even how it says what it says. Moreover, it becomes very difficult to see how works of literature can be objects of aesthetic judgment and thus of aesthetic appreciation.

In *Aesthetics and Material Beauty* (2007), Jennifer McMahon offers an interpretation of Kant that constitutes a much better defence against objections of the kind offered by Wollheim, Gombrich and Collingwood than McCloskey's. Earlier I said that according to Kant anything that can be the object of a judgment must be unified and that being unified entails a structure that is an instance of the form of finality. McMahon agrees with this interpretation. According to McMahon, the crucial feature in Kant's theory is that beauty supervenes on some structures (some forms of finality) possessed by natural objects and works of art. These structures are products of synthesising that occurs at a sub-personal or non-conscious level. They are imaginary configurations or perceptual constructs. Some mountains, motorbikes and movies possess a structure of this kind. Those that do are beautiful.

Structures that make objects beautiful constitute aesthetic ideas. An aesthetic idea is the counterpart of a rational idea. For Kant, rational ideas are ideas that do not apply to any object we experience. They are ideas like freedom, immortality and infinity. They do not apply to the objects we experience because every event has a cause, everything changes and passes out of existence and everything has its limits. For McMahon, rational ideas also include ideas like unity, harmony and order. They include ideas like being part of a larger whole and being perfectly integrated with nature or a community. Although these ideas do not apply to things we experience, they have enormous emotional power.

Kant's 'ingenious theory' (McMahon 2007, p. 3) was that rational ideas are activated by the imaginary configurations that please us and that we judge to be beautiful. When an imaginary configuration activates rational ideas, no determinate concept can capture all its aspects. The rules or principles supplied by determinate concepts are inadequate. Structures that activate rational ideas cannot be fully described. These structures constitute aesthetic ideas because they are perceptual constructs to which no determinate concept is adequate. When mountains, motorbikes or movies possess such structures, they please us because they express aesthetic ideas. If mountains and motorbikes can express aesthetic ideas, then the expression of these ideas is not confined to works of art or other representations that have *content*. Mountains and motorbikes are not *about* anything.

The objection that Kant trivialised beauty had a great deal of influence. For several decades, beauty was an unfashionable value. In 'The Dreariness of Aesthetics' (1959), John Passmore is scornful of beauty because it is trivial and irrelevant to judgments about 'good' literature and 'good' paintings. Helen Knight explains that 'on the whole we commend the works of man for their goodness, and the works of nature for their beauty' (Knight 1959, p. 147).

However, beauty has made a comeback. In *The Secret Power of Beauty* (2004), John Armstrong offers an account of beauty in which it is a 'holistic feature' of objects (p. 37). It supervenes on relations of friendship between an object's parts. The parts of a beautiful object work together in the way that friends work together in a friendship. In a (perfect) friendship, each friend helps the other(s) to bring out 'the best in them' (p. 37). If beauty supervenes on relations between all parts of an object, then none can be isolated from others and there need be no 'part' that every beautiful thing possesses. Armstrong claims that all historical theories of beauty fail because they were attempts to identify a 'part' that all beautiful objects possess. Passmore (1959) offers a similar reason for the dreariness of aesthetic theories. There is no feature which all works of art have in common and which supply reasons for their 'goodness'. However, Passmore thinks that all good literary works have features which are peculiar to literature and which supply reasons for evaluations of them. Armstrong does not.

Some of Armstrong's examples of failed theories appear to be quite similar to his own. Both Kant's account of artifacts whose beauty depends upon the organisation of their parts so that they fulfill well a function they should fulfill (dependent beauty) and Palladio's account of the beauty of buildings in terms of ratios between their parts are holistic accounts of beauty. The beauty of the whole depends upon interrelations between their parts. They do not isolate a particular feature, such as the colour or the serpentine curve. Although Armstrong claims that all previous accounts of beauty fail because they tried to identify one feature, it is not clear that they all do suffer this defect.

Armstrong gives several examples of friendship between parts. Some, but not all, fit his definition of friendliness. For example, the music and the images of Venice in Visconti's *Death in Venice* work together to make both the image and the music more beautiful. In other examples, the friendliness of the parts seems to follow from their enabling us to see something lovely about the object they represent or from their being 'user-friendly'—they are making it easy for us to acquire an important insight about the object they represent.

The parts of Delacroix's portrait of Louis-Auguste Schwiter relevant to its beauty are relations between the sad-looking young man wearing formal clothes and his setting. He stands outside a well-lit room on a terrace overlooking a dark and deserted garden. The background—the garden, the light from the room he stands outside and the dark sky—is friendly towards the subject of the portrait. Their friendliness consists in the way in which 'they bring forward and allow us to see what is attractive in him' (Armstrong 2004, p. 44). The parts of this painting are friendly because the relations between what it represents enable us to see something appealing about the young man. They provide us with a reason for liking him. This account of the beauty of a beautiful representation is similar to that which McCloskey attributes to Kant.

Armstrong gives a different account of the beauty of the last stanza of Tennyson's poem, 'Lycidas':

And the stately ships go on
To their haven under the hill;
But O for the touch of a vanished hand,
And the sound of a voice that is still!

The words 'the stately ships go on/To their haven under the hill' are juxtaposed with 'O for the touch of a vanished hand,/And the sound of a voice that is still!', and so the ships' return home is juxtaposed with an expression of grief. The friendliness of this juxtaposition consists in the way in which it enables the reader to make a connection between the ships returning to a haven and the poet's yearning from which there can be no haven, and by so doing the reader acquires both a deeper understanding of the poet's grief and a reason for pitying him.

The beauty of 'Lycidas' supervenes on the user-friendliness of its elements. Relations between its words enable the reader to make connections between the events the words are about and so perceive these events to have a significance that she did not appreciate before. Perceiving this significance supplies the reader with a reason for an emotional response to, and an evaluative judgment of, the events and the speaker. Relations between the words enable her to recognise, if not share, the perspective expressed in the poem on the events to which its words refer.

In both examples, the beauty of the poem and the painting supervenes on relations between a configuration of words or lines, shapes and colours that constitutes the structure in its material and a configuration of people, objects and events that the poem or picture is about. The latter configuration constitutes the structure in the content of the poem or the painting. Structure in a poem or picture's material enables the reader or spectator to recognise structure in its content and so perceive the significance of the people, objects or events the poem or picture is about. Typically, a beautiful poem or picture enables us to see the emotional significance of what it is about because the significance it enables us to see supplies a reason for an emotional response to, and an evaluative judgment of, the people, objects or events it is about.

Insofar as appreciating the beauty of a poem or painting or any other object with content depends upon recognising structure in its content, an account of what is involved in the aesthetic appreciation of these things presupposes an account of content.

Interpretation, Representation and Depiction

Apart from abstract paintings and sculpture, most pictures, sculptures, poetry, dramatic performances, operas and novels have content. They are about gods, kings and ordinary people, what they do and what happens to them. They are about actions, events and states of affairs, conflicts which arise and are resolved, triumphs, losses, celebrations and bereavements. They *represent* things as belonging to particular kinds, having particular properties, standing in particular relations, being of particular value and making particular emotional and behavioural responses appropriate. Kant did not offer a theory of content. In that respect, he was typical of his age. In the eighteenth century, philosophers were not greatly preoccupied with meaning of that kind. However, in the twentieth century and particularly in the decades after the Second World War, they were. These were the decades which saw what used to be called 'the linguistic turn'. The turn was taken in the hope that attention to language would solve or dissolve some of the most enduring philosophical problems. A good theory of language and linguistic meaning would provide the basis for theories of just about everything else.

All five 'stars' mentioned earlier have defended theories of content and interpretation. Denis Dutton did so in 'Why Intentionalism Won't Go Away' (1987). In this essay, he argues that an artist's intentions determine the genre to which a work belongs, they enable the detection of certain types of irony and they enable the detection of 'some mistakes in interpretation'. Gregory Currie offers his theory in a series of articles such as 'Work and Text' (1991c) and 'Interpretation and Objectivity' (1993), as well as *The Nature of Fiction* (1990b) and *Image and Mind* (1995a). In *Pictures and Their Use in Communication* (1976), David Novitz offers a theory of depictive content. In *Knowledge, Fiction and Imagination* (1987), he focuses on literature. In 'True Interpretations' (1988), 'Relativism in Interpretation' (1995), 'Interpreting Contextualities' (1996), 'Author's Intentions, Literary Interpretation and Literary Value' (2006b) and chapter five of *The Philosophy of Art*, Stephen Davies offers a theory of interpretation of literature and pictures. In *For An Audience* (1991), Paul Thom offers a theory about the interpretation and appreciation of the performing arts. In *Making Sense* (2000), he offers a theory of interpretation that is more comprehensive than the others, and I will begin with it because it enables me to place the others.

Thom argues that making sense is the point of what scientists do in their laboratories, what ordinary folk do in the course of their everyday lives, what readers do when they read novels and histories, what directors and actors do when they put on a play or make a movie and what audiences do when they watch plays, movies and opera or listen to music. They all interpret.

For Thom, the goal of interpretation is making sense, but there are two ways in which this goal can be achieved. Thom uses a distinction drawn by Joseph Margolis in *Interpretation Radical But Not Unruly* (Thom 2000, p. 16). Margolis distinguished adequational from constructive interpretation (Margolis 1995, p. 24). The goal of adequational interpretation is to discover the meaning that an object already has. This is the kind of interpretation that scientists, ordinary folk, readers and audiences are traditionally understood to be practicing.

Constructive interpretation is a productive practice. Intentional technologies such as painting and sculpture are used to construct an entire world (Margolis 1995, p. 26). In this case, sense is made or invented. At its most extreme, a constructive interpretation reduces the object to a sequence of words, or movements, or projected images and recorded sounds with which the reader or spectator plays. Their play is constrained by their abilities and their pleasure, but not by how the makers of the sequences of words, images and movements might have intended those sequences to be used or by how the audience for whom they were made was likely to have used them.

Thom argues that musicians and actors engage in constructive interpretation and ‘are content to amplify on their objects’ (Thom 2000, p. 68) rather than understand either the use for which the composer or playwright intended them or the uses to which they were put by the audience for whom they were made. Moreover, ‘transgressive’ adequational interpretations may deliberately set out to make a sense that is different from the understanding of their makers and the audiences to whom the work is directed. They aim to misunderstand.

Analytic philosophers tend to offer theories of interpretation in which there is no place for unconstrained constructive interpretation, and Australasian analytic philosophers are no exception to this rule. Currie and Novitz offer theories in which constructive interpretation is not a possibility. Their theories are about discovering meaning. Davies offers a theory of interpretation in which a special importance attaches to interpretations that aim to understand a work as its author’s creation. In the articles I mentioned and in chapter five of *Philosophy of Art*, Davies claims that adequational interpretations of this kind have a special significance because they are likely to be the most rewarding and because the ongoing practice of art relies on our giving priority to them. Our practice of making and appreciating art depends upon giving priority to the intentions of novelists, artists and musicians, because those engaged in the practice understand the objects to be *works*: products of human intentions. However, within that constraint, the goal of interpretation is to maximise enjoyment.

For Thom, the goal of interpretation is ‘to endow a given object with a particular type of significance by subsuming a representation of it under a governing concept’ (Thom 2000, p. 71). This concept unifies the object as represented. In other words, sense is made of an object when it is represented in a way that enables it to be understood as falling under a concept that unifies it.

In Thom’s account of the interpretive process, it involves four moments. The first is the identification of an object. The second is the realisation that this object does not make sense. Some synthesising may have occurred, but either more is needed or it should be done differently. In the third moment, the object is modified by being represented. Typically, the modifications include what Thom calls ‘restructuring’ and ‘selecting’. In restructuring, some features that were not salient become so. In selecting, some features are excluded and others substituted. The specific modifications that are made depend upon the fourth moment. This is the choice of a governing concept. For an interpretation to be successful, the third and fourth moments must be successful. For the third to be successful, a representation must be suitable ‘in the sense that it preserves significance; that is, if the governing concept applies to the object-as-represented then it applies to the object’ (Thom 2000, p. 84). For the fourth to be successful, the concept chosen to govern must unify the object—it must make of it an intelligible, because coherent, whole. For Thom, this is the only criterion that a governing concept must meet. For example, it need not be appropriate for the kind of object to which it is applied.

Thom discusses two interpretations of Van Gogh’s ‘The Potato Eaters’. In that offered by H.P. Bremmer, perceptual form is salient (Thom 2000, p. 40). That offered by H.R. Graetz highlights features such as the direction and expressive content of the subjects’ gazes and the wall separating the older woman and man (Thom 2000, p. 40). The concept employed in the first is ‘interrelated unity’ and in the second ‘expression of isolation’.

Just from these examples, it is clear that there is more than one way to interpret works with content. The first appears to use a concept similar to Kant’s form of finality in that it can be applied to objects that do not have content. However, if the goal of an interpretation is to understand a representation as a representation and thus as having content, only some governing concepts will be appropriate. Moreover, if the goal of an interpretation is aesthetic appreciation of a representation *as a representation*, then the governing concept must highlight features of the representation that supply reasons for the judgment of aesthetic value that is an essential component of the appreciation of it.

Graetz’ ‘expression of isolation’ is a useful concept for those interpretations whose purpose is aesthetic appreciation of Van Gogh’s painting, because it enables us to recognise, if not share, the perspective expressed in the painting. It enables this because when we use it, the relations between the people—such as the way in which they do not look at each other—become salient. It helps us to see how structures in its material—such as strong contrasts between light and dark patches—affect the emotional significance of the relations between the people depicted (structure in its content). When we see how structures in the material and the content of this painting enable us to see the people as isolated from each other, we see relations upon which the beauty of this painting supervenes and which supply reasons for aesthetic judgment of it as beautiful.

The conception of a perspective required here is one in which features—such as the kinds or categories to which objects belong, the properties they have and the relations in which they stand—are significant from a point of view defined by beliefs and values. How features of objects are significant is constituted by the reasons they supply for emotional and behavioural responses to the objects. This conception of a perspective allows objects to have features such as causal relations whose existence is not dependent upon a point of view, but whose significance is.

Conscious subjects are things which have perspectives of this kind. If the point of interpreting someone’s behaviour is to see it as an expression of her perspective, then it requires recognising how she perceives and judges people, events and states of affairs to be significant. It requires recognising perceptions and evaluative judgments as well as propositional attitudes. For example, appreciating someone’s perspective might involve understanding that she perceives moving from one house to another to be scary and difficult, a newly baked pie to be yummy, sexual abuse to be appalling, or an argument to be compelling. These perceptions are appraisals. Appreciating someone's perspective also involves recognising judgments she makes, for example, that leaving rotten food in the fridge is unhygienic, that visiting your father in hospital is showing him the proper respect, that being required to keep a record of every expenditure is inconvenient or that spitting and singing on the ferry are forbidden. How people and events are perceived or judged to be significant is identified by the emotional and behavioural responses which express that significance, because they are appropriate, given it.

In 'Narrative, Identity and Moral Philosophy' (2003), Raimond Gaita argues that understanding intentional actions involves understanding the perspective of their agents, and understanding an agent's perspective involves appreciating it in the way I have just described. Understanding someone's perspective entails understanding what their experiences mean to them or being able 'to see dignity in faces. . .to see the full range of human expressiveness in them, to hearing suffering that lacerates the soul in someone's cry or in their music, or to see it in their art, to hear all the depth of language in sounds' (Gaita 2003, p. 267). Gaita claims that when we understand a perspective in this way, we have entered 'the realm of meaning', a realm that is 'partly defined by the fact that reflection in it is in idioms in which form and content cannot be separated', and so it is 'more like understanding in literature than in science and metaphysics' (Gaita 2003, p. 271). His last statement implies that the point of interpreting is not the same when scientists do it and when readers of literature do it, and that 'expression of a perspective' should be the governing concept used by readers of literature and by those who seek to make sense of behaviour as action done for reasons. If interpretation of novels, movies, pictures and other works with representational content is done in order to appreciate them as representations, then 'expression of a perspective' is the appropriate governing concept.

Thom understands Currie to be offering a theory of interpretation in which the governing concept involved in interpreting both the behaviour of a conscious agent and the content of a work is 'explanation by intentional causes'. In 'Feminine Perspectives and Narrative Points of View' (Barwell 1993) and 'Who's Telling This Story, Anyway? Or, How to Tell The Gender of a Storyteller' (Barwell 1995), I adopted a position similar to that offered by Currie, but I abandoned it for reasons which I give in my critique of him.

For Currie, the product of interpreting is a theory. If the object to be interpreted is an utterance, then the theory is a theory about the propositions constituting the content of the 'communication intention' of a speaker. Currie models his account of the meaning of speech acts and the utterances that are their products on Grice's model of 'non-natural speaker meaning' (Grice 1957, 1969). The propositions constituting the content of the communication intention are those the speaker hoped his audience would believe.

According to Currie, interpreting utterances involves formulating hypotheses about the propositions that the speaker hoped his audience will believe. These propositions explain the words he spoke or wrote because if he says what he means, the words he used are appropriate. Writing or speaking the words he did is a reasonable or appropriate thing to do, given his designs on his audience's beliefs. Moreover, if a speaker says what he means, the propositional content of his utterance is the same as the content of his communication intention. As a consequence, a theory about the propositions constituting the content of a communication intention is a theory about both the 'intentional cause' of a speech act and its product, if the speaker says what he means. The interpreter's reason for believing that a communication intention with a specific propositional content causes an utterance is the 'fit' between the content of the hypothesised cause, the content of the product and the words used to perform the speech act.

Interpreting a novel or a movie is like interpreting an utterance. The interpreter formulates a hypothesis about the propositions that are the content of a communication intention. These are the propositions that someone intended her readers or listeners to *imagine*, rather than believe. This is the mark of fiction. The propositions to be imagined constitute the world of a novel or movie because they constitute the content of the product of the speech act performed by the author or movie-maker. However, interpreting literary works, movies and operas is like interpreting utterances with respect to the first, but not the second, moment. This is because authors, movie-makers and directors do not always say what they mean or mean what they say. The contents of their communication intentions and their utterances are not always the same. In *The Nature of Fiction* (Currie 1990b), the communication intention whose propositional content is identified with that of the world of the novel is that of a 'fictional storyteller'. He is an inhabitant of the world of the fiction who is telling his story as known fact. In *Image and Mind* (Currie 1995a), the role of the fictional storyteller is given to the 'implied author' who is not an inhabitant of the world of the novel or movie. Both the fictional storyteller and the implied author are constructs. This means that the role of their communication intention cannot be causal. The constructed communication intentions are relevant, not because they are *causes* of speech acts, but because they supply *reasons* for writing the sequence of words constituting the text of the novel. The explanation is after all an explanation not in terms of intentional *causes* but in terms of *reasons*.

In *Pictures and Their Use in Communication* (1976), Novitz accepted the account of depictive content that Nelson Goodman offered in *Languages of Art* (1968). In this account, the depictive content of a picture is an essential, because identifying, property of it. Novitz applies this to literary works. The point of interpreting them is to discover properties which constitute their identity. The product of interpreting a novel is not a theory but a set of identifying descriptions.

Apart from their agreement that interpreting is a process whose point is to discover the meaning that an object already possesses, Currie and Novitz agree about five other important things. (i) They agree that interpreting is a process which essentially involves formulating and testing hypotheses about the meaning of the work. (ii) They agree that there are objective facts which supply evidence and confirm, or fail to confirm, these hypotheses. (iii) They agree that there are objective standards for measuring the degree to which the evidence confirms a hypothesis. (This agreement means that neither are relativists as Currie understands relativism. The relativist, according to Currie's definition denies claims (ii) and (iii).) (iv) They agree about the nature of the facts that provide evidence. These are facts about the author, the meaning of the text and features of the social environment in which the text was written. The latter include 'cultural stabilities: enduring beliefs, theories, values, in terms of which we perceive all manner of objects' (Novitz 1987, p. 102). 'Cultural stabilities' include conventions, practices and traditions of one sort and another (Novitz 1987, pp. 113–114).

(v) Finally, Novitz and Currie are both anti-realists where interpretations of works of art are concerned. As Currie defines anti-realism, the anti-realist does not recognise a 'gap' between evidence and truth or correctness. For him, the theory that is best supported by the evidence is the best explanation of the work. Because there is no gap between confirmation and truth, it is the true theory about the work. Currie accepts that there are some works for which equally well-supported but conflicting theories exist. Theories conflict if they attribute contradictory propositions to the work. An example is provided by Henry James' short novel, *The Turn of the Screw*. According to one interpretation, the governess is delusional. According to another, she is not. The interpretations are equally supported by the evidence, and so they provide equally good explanations of the propositions true in the world of the novel and thus of its meaning.

Because Novitz thinks an interpretation is a set of identifying descriptions of a work, he does not understand the conflicting interpretations of *The Turn of the Screw* in this way. Given that identifying descriptions are descriptions of essential properties of the work and given that a work has either a property or not, the correct description of *The Turn of the Screw* is that it is ambiguous.

Novitz offers no account of the cognitive processes involved in interpreting beyond the claim that they involve formulating and testing hypotheses. Currie, on the other hand, gives a careful and comprehensive account of these processes. I am not able to give the details, but from the brief description I offered earlier, it should be clear that he thinks that interpreting novels and movies is like interpreting utterances that are the product of speech acts with one salient difference: the speaker or writer is an 'implied author' rather than the actual author.

Wayne Booth first invented the 'implied author' to avoid attributing stupid and morally repulsive opinions to the actual author. The implied author opens a logical gap between the perspectives of the actual author and that expressed in the work. The relevant concept of a perspective is the one I described earlier. It is defined in terms of values and preferences and not just in terms of beliefs. However, sets of propositions true in possible worlds are essentially non-perspectival and so the function the implied author fulfills in Currie's theory of interpretation cannot be that for which it was first invented. The 'implied author' is a constructed perspective from which reasons for writing the words of the novel follow. It need not be the perspective of the actual author.

In *The Philosophy of Art* (2006c), Davies states that interpreting narrative and representational works requires recognising 'the way in which the use of the medium structures or otherwise affects the content that is narrated or represented' (Davies 2006c, p. 110). In 'Sculpture and the Sculptural' (1995), Erik Koed writes:

'In appreciating an artwork, we attend to the medium of the work. That is to say, we attend to the way in which materials are used toward the end of content and, at the same time, to the content realised through that use of materials, rather than solely to the material construction or the content of the work' (Koed 1995, p. 150). These statements imply that interpreting narrative and other works as works with content requires recognising structure(s) in sequences of words, images or painted lines and patches of colours that constitute the material or medium of the work because it is from structure(s) of this kind that structure(s) in the content follows. There is an intimate connection between material and content. In the earlier example of *The Potato Eaters*, the second interpretation described a way in which relations between the people depicted (structure in its content) followed from properties and relations of the painting's lines and colours (structure in its material).

Currie's approach to interpreting content is unable to recognise intimate relations of this kind. If recognition of them is essential to aesthetic appreciation of works with content, then a theoretical approach of Currie's kind is inadequate. Moreover, if the content of novels, movies, paintings and other works constitutes a perspective on the people, objects and events they are about, then interpreting it requires recognising significance that depends upon a point of view defined by values as well as beliefs and that supplies reasons for emotional responses to, and evaluative judgments of, the people, objects and events that the works are about. Interpretations of content in terms of sets of propositions are not able to recognise significance of this kind.

As a consequence, theories of interpretation in which sets of propositions constitute content are unable to explain aesthetic pleasure in works of this kind insofar as it is pleasure in relations between structures in the medium of the work and structure in the content with essentially perspectival significance. In addition, insofar as structure in the medium, structure in the content and the relations between them are those on which the beauty of a representation supervenes, and these structures supply the reasons for an aesthetic judgment about the beauty of the work qua representation; theories that understand content as propositional cannot explain the beauty of a beautiful representation or the reasons that justify aesthetic judgments of this kind. Currie's theory of interpretation cannot explain beautiful representations of ugly, wicked or appalling things.

In the theory, Novitz offers in *Knowledge, Fiction and Imagination* (1987) perceptions of significance are an important component of the understanding on which we rely to negotiate our environment and the knowledge we can acquire from reading fiction. However, in his theory, these perceptions do not supply reasons for actions or emotional responses but reasons for beliefs. Novitz appears to recognise perceptions which are essentially perspectival, but he thinks of them as attitudes to propositions and thus non-perspectival.

Earlier I said that Novitz accepted Goodman's proposal that the content of both pictures and novels is to be understood in terms of a set of essential, because identifying, properties. In *Languages of Art*, Goodman argued that depictive content could not be understood in terms of resemblances between the arrangement of lines and colours that constitutes a picture and whatever the picture is a picture of.

This is because any picture resembles an indefinitely large number of objects in some respects and any picture resembles other pictures in more respects than it resembles other kinds of objects, without being a picture of a picture. Novitz takes up this challenge.

In *Pictures and Their Use in Communication* (1976), Novitz argues that depictive content is to be understood in terms of resemblances between pictures and what they are pictures of. However, recognising that a picture is a picture requires knowledge of picture-making practices, and recognising what resemblances are relevant for determining what it is a picture of requires knowledge of pictorial conventions. Novitz claims that picture-making presents what David Lewis in *Convention* (1969) called a 'coordination problem'. A coordination problem arises when agreement is required about a method to avoid undesirable results (such as collisions between cars), and there is more than one method which would have the same result (everyone agrees to drive on either the left- or right-hand side of the road). A solution to such a problem requires agreement about what would count as a desirable outcome and widespread acceptance of the solution. A solution to such a problem is a practice that is governed by rules and that constitutes a method or technique for bringing about the desirable outcome. The solution to the picture-recognising problem involves rules which must be known before relevant resemblances between pictures and what they depict can be known.

In 'Pictorial Representation: A Matter of Resemblance' (1987), Karen Neander also defends an account of depictive content in terms of resemblances between pictures and what they are of. A successful picture must supply visual information which enables a viewer to recognise the object it depicts (Neander 1987, p. 213). In other words, a successful picture must look like what it is a picture of. However, there is no one way in which the spatial arrangement of a picture must resemble the object it pictures (Neander 1987, p. 215) and there are no systematic principles of relevance. Our criteria alter along with our judgment of the kind of picture it is (Neander 1987, p. 216). Recognising what a picture is of requires knowledge of 'modes of representation' (Neander 1987, p. 216). These modes operate in the way that Kendall Walton (1970) argues categories of art operate—they determine which resemblances are relevant.

Almost 20 years later, Catharine Abell argued against convention-based accounts of resemblance like that developed by Novitz (and others). In 'Against Depictive Conventionalism' (Abell 2005c), she argues that depictions are not governed by conventions of the kind described by David Lewis. According to Abell, depictive conventions must be conventions for depicting basic colour, shape and textural properties, while Lewis' conventions must be recognised as solutions to coordination problems by those who comply with them. However, the parts of a picture that depict the basic properties of the objects they depict are 'not salient as bearing the depiction relation to such properties because they are not independently interpretable' (Abell 2005c, p. 24).

In 'Pictorial Implicature' (Abell 2005b), she presents an account of depictive content that depends on intention-based resemblances. The relevant resemblances are those that the picture-maker 'intended to pictorially implicate'

(Abell 2005b, p. 65). Her model of pictorial implicature is based on H.P. Grice's model of conversational implicature (Grice 1975, 1978). In so far as conversations and pictures involve communication, they presuppose a principle of cooperation. This principle is not a convention adopted to facilitate conversational exchange but a rational means for conducting cooperative exchanges. In the case of picturing, it implies that one of the following alternatives is true: Given background knowledge that includes knowledge of picture-making techniques, *either* enough visible information to recognise what a picture depicts has been supplied, *or* the information supplied should be supplemented so that the picture-maker is seen to be adhering to the principle of cooperation, *or* the information should be revised to overcome the fact that the artist has deliberately flouted the principle of cooperation.

In both *The Nature of Fiction* and *Image and Mind*, Currie denies that recognising pictorial content requires knowledge of pictorial conventions, modes of representation, or pictorial techniques. All that is required to see a picture as a picture of an object is the ability to recognise objects of the kind it depicts. For example, all that is required to see a picture of a young blond woman holding a baby as a picture of a young blond woman holding a baby is the ability to recognise young blond women and babies.

Like Alec Hyslop, Currie rejects the claim made by Walton, in articles such as 'Fearing Fictions' (1978), that the role of the audience for pictures, plays and movies requires imagining seeing the people, objects and events the picture, play or movie is about and imagining hearing what they say. However, Hyslop and Currie have very different reasons for rejecting this claim. In 'Seeing-as' (1983), Hyslop argues that the logical structure of seeing a picture as a picture of an object rules out imagining seeing the object. In *Image and Mind*, Currie argues that if the role of a member of a movie audience is understood to require her to imagine seeing the characters and events in the movie, then she must imagine she is located in the space of the movie, and sometimes she must imagine she sees events which no one saw. He denies that audiences for movies imagine these or any other logical consequences of imagining seeing. The normative element in Currie's claim that someone who imagines seeing characters and events must imagine other unacceptable things appears to follow from standards of rationality. However, it is not at all clear that standards which are appropriate for belief are also appropriate for imagining. Should we, or must we, imagine the logical consequences of anything we imagine?

Definitions, Evolutionary Theory and Appreciating Nature

For Kant, identifying works of art did not present a problem because at that time in Europe, there was widespread agreement about how to classify and evaluate them. This state of affairs was disrupted by the invention of new technologies that enabled the emergence of new art forms and by the way in which artists working in established art practices pushed the boundaries of what was possible in those practices. Artists made objects which resisted classification and evaluation because they failed to meet criteria that had previously been perfectly adequate for both purposes.

When Stephen Davies' *Definitions of Art* was published in 1991, the point of defining the term 'art' was to settle issues about classification that arose from developments within the Western art world during the twentieth century. In this book, Davies opts for an institutional definition that emphasises the procedures by which an artifact acquires the status of a work of art. This status is achieved when and only when it is 'appropriately placed within a web of practices, roles and frameworks that comprise an informally organized institution, the artworld' (Davies 2006c, p. 38).

Davies continued to be preoccupied with definitions whose point is classification, although by the time *Art and Essence* was published in 2003, new issues had emerged. These were whether 'our' concept of art could be applied to the products (objects and performances) of small-scale traditional societies and whether art production and appreciation occurred universally. These issues are connected. If 'our' concept of art can be applied to the products of small-scale traditional societies, even if they do not classify any of their products according to 'our' criteria, then this supplies a reason for claiming that art production and appreciation are universal. A universally applicable concept need not be universally applied.

In his contribution to *Art and Essence* (2003), Davies distinguishes questions about the meaning of the term 'art' from questions about the meaning of art. The second is a request for a theory of art; the first is a request for criteria that determine the extension or reference of the term 'art'. The point of the first question is classification. A good answer to it supplies criteria for belonging to a class. These criteria must pick out all and only members of the class. Davies claims that a good answer to the first question can be as surprising as the definition of gold as an element with a specific atomic structure was to people who used the term 'gold'. If criteria for membership of a class constitute a concept, then the concept of gold captured in the definition of it as an element is not the concept that people had before the discovery of atoms and the construction of the periodic table. Moreover, if criteria for *identifying* members of a class constitute a concept (as they did for Frege), then the concept of gold captured in the best definition for classificatory purposes is not the same concept as that captured in a definition whose point is to articulate criteria used to identify members of the class. For example, neither the colour of gold nor its tendency to not tarnish is included in the best classificatory definition. Moreover, the extension fixed by the new criteria might not coincide with that fixed by the old criteria.

Davies' claims imply that a good definition for purposes of classification need not include uses to which people thought that the thing defined could and should be put, what it symbolises or is a sign of for them, or how it is appropriate to respond emotionally to it. A good definition need not capture that community's understanding of the class of things defined.

In 'But They Don't Have Our Concept of Art' (2000), Denis Dutton argues not just that our concept of art is universally applicable but also that small-scale traditional societies possess this concept. They classify some of their products as art in the way we classify some of ours. According to Dutton, the concept of art present in all societies is a concept that implies the same standards and values. It applies not just to those arts that we in the West call ‘The Fine Arts’ but also to religious arts, functional objects like furniture and pottery and decorative crafts like embroidery.

‘Our’ concept of art can only be so comprehensive if it constitutes what Beryl Gaut has called a ‘cluster concept’ (Gaut 2000) and if some of the criteria in this cluster capture the value and significance art has for us. In a cluster concept none of the criteria are necessary, but anything that meets a ‘certain number’ (Davies 2006c, p. 33) of them counts as a work of art.

A dozen criteria relevant for our concept of art, and which have been offered in definitions of art, are as follows: (i) the object is intended to be a work of art, (ii) it belongs to an established category of art, (iii) it is produced for disinterested contemplation, (iv) it is the expression of cultural values (e.g. spiritual values), (v) it is the expression of individual vision, (vi) its production requires skill, (vii) it is able to communicate complex meanings, (viii) it is lovely to look at or listen to, (ix) it is primarily (or solely) produced for aesthetic appreciation, (x) it fulfills an aesthetic function (whether intended or not), (xi) it is created to be presented to an art world and (xi) it can be fitted into a true and coherent narrative that ties it to past art.

The universal applicability of our concept of art is less likely if some of these criteria are necessary. This observation is supported by Elizabeth Burns Coleman’s discussions of Aboriginal art in ‘Aboriginal Painting: Identity and Authenticity’ (2001) and *Aboriginal Art, Identity and Appropriation* (2005). In her 2001 article, Coleman begins with a documentary about Aboriginal paintings made for the art market. In the documentary, the charge was made that ‘the paintings under question were fakes in the sense that they are not “traditional aboriginal art” and in the sense that they are not “art”’ (Coleman 2001, p. 285).

The reasons given in the documentary for the first claim were that the painters were not spiritually motivated but were producing their paintings for sale, some of the painters were not of Aboriginal descent and some of the paintings were done in acrylics on canvas. The reason given for the second claim was that the people who signed the paintings were not those who had painted them. The first charge presupposes that authentic works of indigenous art cannot be made from nontraditional materials, or by people who are not members of the community, or for commercial motives. The second charge presupposes that a work of art must be the product of individual vision, and the individual whose signature is on it must be the person who made it.

The makers of this documentary are not alone in making claims of these kinds. In ‘Authenticity in the Art of Traditional Societies’ (1994a), Denis Dutton makes a distinction between ‘nominal authenticity’ which is merely a question of correct provenance and ‘deep authenticity’ which entails the expression of spiritual values. He claims that being produced for sale to tourists, collectors or art museums is incompatible with being an authentic work of indigenous art because that entails being the expression of spiritual values. Dutton also argues that works produced for sale are unlikely to be of aesthetic value because little care is taken in their production.

Coleman argues that once the point of view of the Aboriginal painters and their communities is understood, neither the claim made in the documentary nor the reasons given for it are valid, because the concept presupposed by the documentary is not the concept guiding the practice of the Aboriginal artists. All the paintings in question use traditional images or designs. These designs are like heraldic devices or insignia. They are symbols that belong to a community and are associated with control over a territory. The authority to produce and use them and the instructions for making them correctly are passed down from generation to generation through specified kinship relations. Those with authority to produce them are permitted to authorise their production by other people, even by people who are not of Aboriginal descent.

The paintings involved in the controversy are art according to ‘our’ cluster concept of art because their production involves skill, they are able to communicate complex meanings, they are lovely to look at, they fulfill an aesthetic function and they are created to be presented to an art world even though the art world in question is not theirs but that of the West. If Coleman is right, they are also authentic examples of indigenous art because they are expressions of their community’s cultural, if not spiritual, values. The paintings were of traditional designs which belonged to a community, had symbolic value and were painted correctly by people authorised to do so by those with the appropriate authority. They are works of art rather than fakes because the signatures were those of people who had authority over the production of the design and their signatures expressed that authority. Moreover, since traditional designs need not be made in traditional materials, their being painted on canvas in acrylics is appropriate.

In several of the criteria in the cluster constituting our concept of art, there is an intimate connection between art and aesthetic experience. ‘It is primarily (or solely) produced for aesthetic appreciation’ and ‘it fulfills an aesthetic function (whether intended, or not)’ that connects them explicitly. ‘Being produced for disinterested contemplation’ does so implicitly because it was a criterion included in the Art For Art’s Sake strand in modernist conceptions of art and of aesthetic appreciation. As I said in Section I, this criterion was wrongly attributed to Kant.

‘Disinterested’ required the detachment of all knowledge, practical concerns, values and interests from the contemplation of an artwork and implied a distinction between its internal and external relations. Only internal relations were relevant to aesthetic appreciation. For two paradigmatic modernists, Clive Bell and Clement Greenberg, only structure in the medium of painting was relevant to aesthetic pleasure taken in paintings. Only visible relations between a painting’s colours, lines and shapes supplied reasons for aesthetic judgments of it because its aesthetic qualities supervened only on that kind of structure. Structures in the content and relations between structures in the material and structures in the content are irrelevant to aesthetic appreciation because knowledge of cultural values and beliefs are needed to recognise these aspects. For example, knowledge of cultural beliefs and values is needed to recognise the point of view from which objects represented in a painting or poem are significant, knowledge of a culture’s stories is required to perceive the significance of people (historical figures, gods, ancestors, characters in fairytales, etc.) and events (the Battle of Waterloo, the Transfiguration, the Honey Ant Dreaming, The Clock Striking Midnight, etc.), and knowledge of cultural categories and genres is needed insofar as these supply criteria for identifying aesthetically relevant structures.

The model of aesthetic appreciation to which disinterested contemplation is essential has problematic implications for understanding aesthetic experience. It suggests that aesthetic pleasure is trivial rather than an expression of 'deep' human values or the effect of exercising psychological capacities which have been crucial for us as a species. This model is empirically inadequate since it omits crucial features of the way in which people do experience works of art, and it is completely inadequate as a model for aesthetic appreciation of natural objects and environments.

Some arguments offered by Davies and Dutton imply that making and appreciating art is universal because aesthetic appreciation is universal. These arguments presuppose a concept of art in which a close connection between art and aesthetic appreciation is crucial and a concept of aesthetic appreciation in which aesthetic pleasure supplies a reason for aesthetic judgments, because it is pleasure in structures on which aesthetic qualities supervene. In 'Tribal Art and Artifact' (1993), Dutton argues that small-scale societies share our concept of art because some of their artifacts have 'aesthetic qualities which have intentionally been placed in the objects to be seen' (Dutton 1993, p. 20). In 'Universalism, Evolutionary Psychology, and Aesthetics' (2003), he includes natural objects such as the markings on cows in a list of objects aesthetically appreciated by people in small-scale traditional societies.

Supervenience is a relation that allows a range of structures to be beautiful. All beautiful objects have a structure in the range, but they need not have the same structure. If beauty supervenes on a range of structures, then there is space for cultural and individual tastes to play a role. Aesthetic preferences might have cultural bases.

Both Davies and Dutton are committed to the view that the range of structures on which beauty supervenes is to be explained in terms of psychological capacities that human beings have as a result of their biology. They reject explanations in terms of social conditions such as that offered by Novitz in *Boundaries of Art*. Novitz argues that the development of the fine arts as autonomous practices with distinctive goals and values and the distinction between high and low art which this development entails were the product of the rise of the bourgeoisie, the ideological belief that every individual was unique and free to pursue their goals and a tighter connection between wealth and social status.

In *The Philosophy of Art*, Davies formulates the issue in this way. Does art have 'a universal ancient basis in our evolved biology', or is it 'an invention, unconstrained by biological directives, of the Enlightenment and modern age of European culture?' (Davies 2006c, pp. 42–43). Davies opts for the first alternative. Art-making practices are cultural practices, but 'the pleasure we gain from making and consuming art derives from, without being the target of, biological dispositions and cognitive structures that were generated for other evolutionary payoffs they deliver' (Davies 2003, p. 6).

Dutton, like Jennifer McMahon, ties the structures of the objects we produce for aesthetic pleasure or which give us aesthetic pleasure to the survival needs of our ancestors. Although Kant's psychological explanation of aesthetic delight was murky, it was an explanation of the right kind. McMahon claims that the range of things we can know and love is determined by what our common ancestors needed to do to survive in the environment in which they found themselves. Pleasure serves to reinforce experiences. If we experience pleasure in producing and contemplating some structures, then we are more likely to notice them. In some unspecified way, noticing those that activate ideas such as unity, community, freedom and immortality helped us to survive. Our love for such structures was adaptive. Kant called these ideas 'rational ideas'. McMahon thinks of them as human values with enormous emotional power. For both McMahon and Kant, natural objects and artifacts such as buildings, which are not objects with representational content, as well as paintings, poems and sculptures, which are objects with content, can activate these ideas.

The aesthetics of natural environments emerged as a major new area in aesthetics during the 1990s. It involved a critique of both Art For Art's Sake Modernist accounts of art and aesthetic appreciation and also the theories of art and aesthetic experience which were popular in the 1990s. In the 1990s, art was understood in terms of the criteria in the cluster defining art that include a reference to art history, traditions and institutions such as the art world. Davies in *Definitions of Art* offered a conception of this kind. Aesthetic appreciation, on such a model, is appreciation of art qua product of the self-conscious practices of specific cultures. Under the influence of this model, Don Mannison (1980) argues that nature and natural environments are not proper objects of aesthetic appreciation at all.

In a series of articles published during the 1990s, Stan Godlovitch argued that aesthetic appreciation of nature is appropriate and that appreciating natural objects and natural environments in the appropriate way entails seeing 'their proper naturalness, their reality as natural things' (Godlovitch 1998, p. 181). This latter claim implies that we should not see nature and natural environments as either paintings or sculptures, we should not imaginatively 'frame' nature so its formal features can be seen as a composition, and we should not contemplate it disinterestedly. It also meant that our ordinary commonsense categories are sufficient for aesthetic appreciation. This claim conflicted with the model for aesthetic appreciation of nature that was advocated by Allen Carlson and led to a debate in 1997 in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* (Godlovitch 1997a).

Conclusion: State of the Art

Aesthetics of the environment is only one major new area to have emerged over the last two decades. The invention of digital technologies has raised ethical, ontological and aesthetic questions about the objects it has made possible. In 'Towards an Ethics of Videogaming' (2007) and 'Definitions of Videogames' (2008), Grant Tavinor discusses some of these.

In the first decade of this century, the trickle of interest in the political dimension of art continues, but its focus has changed. In the 1990s, San McColl (1993) and I contributed to feminist debates in aesthetics, and David Novitz argued that the fine arts and the distinction between high and popular art are both products of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century social and ideological conditions. In the 2000s, John Armstrong (2004) argued against Bourdieu and others who have suggested that our sense of beauty is a social product, while Elizabeth Burns Coleman (2001, 2004) argued that the commercial use of traditional Aboriginal designs by the West is a direct appropriation of their identity.

Both traditional and new issues concerning interpretation and content continue to be discussed. For example, in 'Towards a Metaphysical Historicism' (2005), Sondra Bacharach argues that the properties of an artwork change over time, and in 'Collaborative Arts and Collective Intention' (2008), she and Deb Tollefsen argue that no current accounts of collective intention can make sense of the intentions involved in certain types of collaboratively produced art.

The range, quantity and quality of this small sample, together with those I discussed in previous sections, shows that even if Passmore's complaint about the dreariness of aesthetics may have had some plausibility in 1959, 50 years later it has none.

Philosophy of Music in Australasia

The philosophy of music occupies a distinctive position within the philosophy of art. Most philosophy of art is either philosophy of visual art or philosophy of literature. As Stephen Davies argues (Davies 1994b), theories of art in general tend not to be easily applicable to music. Music is a performing art and an abstract art, and it is usually non-representational: in all of these respects, it is anomalous. Some of the questions addressed by philosophers of music have no analogues in the philosophy of art more generally: for example, questions about musical movement—we hear music as involving movement, but what moves, exactly, when what you are dealing with is a sequence of pitched tones, and if nothing does, what gives rise to the illusion? Other questions addressed by philosophers of music look like the same questions that arise in the philosophies of visual art and literature, but the discussion of them plays out very differently in the case of music: for example, questions about representation, expressiveness, interpretation and ontology.

Many of the big questions in the philosophy of music are inextricably intertwined with each other. A musical performance presents to us the performer's interpretation of what? The score? The composer's intentions? The musical work? What is the musical work? How we answer this basic ontological question will make a difference to what we say about further questions concerning musical performance such as what it is to interpret a musical work, what constitutes an authentic performance of a musical work and why authenticity matters.

Another cluster of questions concerns responses to music, and what the relationship is between the properties of the music and the listener's response. When we hear music as sad, is there some property of the music, its sadness, which we are detecting? If so, what is that property? Or is it that the music causes *us* to feel sad, and we project our emotion onto the music? If so, what is it about the music that causes our sadness? If it is expressive music and a listener does not respond to it emotionally, can that listener be fully appreciating it? How much do we need to know about a piece of music and its genre, era and composer before we can appreciate it properly?

Modern technology raises new questions in the philosophy of music. Is the ontology of rock music the same as the ontology of classical music? Can you properly appreciate a musical work intended for performance if you listen to a recording rather than a live performance?

The philosophy of music is a small field internationally, and its 'stars' can be counted on the fingers of one hand. One of them is Stephen Davies, originally from Australia but at the University of Auckland since 1983. Davies has written two influential books in the area, *Musical Meaning and Expression* (Davies 1994d) and *Musical Works and Performances* (Davies 2001), and more than 30 articles, some of them collected in *Themes in the Philosophy of Music* (Davies 2003c) and in *Musical Understandings and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Music* (Davies 2011). Davies covers a wide range of topics within the philosophy of music. He defends a cognitivist view of musical expressiveness according to which when we hear music as expressive, we are not projecting our own emotional responses onto the music but rather perceiving resemblances between dynamic characteristics of the music and aspects of human expressive behaviour (Davies 1994d, 1997d, 2005). Davies also writes on emotional responses to music (Davies 1994c, 1997c, f), authenticity (Davies 1987, 1988b, 1990, 1991b, 2001), what a musical work is (Davies 1991b, c, 1992, 2001, 2003a, 2008), interpretation (Davies 2002b, 2011), representation (Davies 1993, 1994d), the value of music (Davies 1994f, 2003b), musical understanding (1994e, 2011), the difference between rock music and classical music (Davies 1999), the impact of modern technology on the presentation and reception of musical works (Davies 1997e) and profundity in music (Davies 2002a).

Paul Thom (at the University of Sydney) has written extensively about musical interpretation (Thom 1993, 2003, 2006, 2007) and also writes on authenticity (Thom 1990, 1993b). *For An Audience: A Philosophy of the Performing Arts* (Thom 1993b) is an extended discussion of these issues, and of the nature of performance and works for performance, along with the role of the performer, as these apply not just in the case of music but in drama and dance as well.

Apart from Thom's work, most of the action in Australasian philosophy of music has been in New Zealand. Stan Godlovitch was at Lincoln University from 1994 to 2002 and, during his time there, wrote about musical performance (Godlovitch 1997b, 1998). Roy Perrett (then at Massey University) has a paper in the *British Journal of Aesthetics* about musical unity (Perrett 1999). Justine Kingsbury writes on musical expressiveness in the same cognitivist vein as Davies (Kingsbury 1999, 2002). Jonathan McKeown-Green and Andrew Kania (both former students of Davies: Kania now works in the United States) write about issues to do with the effect of modern technology on music listening (McKeown-Green 2007, Kania 2009a). Kania has a piece (Kania 2009b) on the philosophy of music in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* and is coeditor (with Theodore A. Gracyk) of *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*. He also writes on the ontology of music (Kania 2006, 2008a, 2010) and on meta-questions about the methodology and purpose of the field of musical ontology (2008b, Kania 2008c). In the remainder of this section, I will briefly discuss a few of these debates in the philosophy of music and point out how Australasian philosophers have contributed to them.

When the Auckland Philharmonia takes the stage at the town hall and plays Mozart's Jupiter Symphony, what makes it the case that they are performing *that* work rather than some other? On one view, it is because they are producing an instance of a particular sonic structure—a set of notes with specified relative pitches and relative durations. This view implies that the same work could have been performed by a different combination of instruments, or on a synthesiser, or, in principle, in 1700: sonic structures are abstract and eternal.

This is a very thin characterisation of a musical work. We can arrive at a range of richer characterisations depending on which other properties of performances we take to be essential to their being performances of that very work. Timbre and tempo might be added; instrumentation might be added; composer and date of composition might be added, along with the existence of a causal chain connecting the act of composition to the present performance, via the published sheet music on the APO's music stands.

Kania (2008c) has recently defended the study of the ontology of music against an attack by Aaron Ridley (2003), who claims that it has no consequences for musical aesthetics or musical practice. Kania argues that confusion or disagreement about musical ontology leads to evaluative mistakes or evaluative disagreements. This is surely right: depending on our ontology, we may classify the same performance as a bad performance of one work or a good performance of a different one. Davies' paper 'The Ontology of Musical Works and the Authenticity of Their Performances' (Davies 1991b) might also be marshalled in defence of the practical importance of musical ontology. Davies points out the connection between ontology and authenticity. Authenticity is normally taken to be a virtue in a performance (by musicians as well as by theorists and philosophers of music). But what is authenticity, and with respect to which features should we be trying to be authentic (if indeed we should be aiming at authentic performances at all)? The gender of the musicians performing the Jupiter Symphony and whether or not they are wearing the kind of clothes musicians wore in Mozart's day presumably have no bearing on the authenticity of the performance. Most think that listening conditions (the modern concert hall is probably the most hushed and reverent environment for the performance of secular music ever) are irrelevant to the authenticity of a performance as well. At the other end of the scale, almost everyone thinks that in order to be authentic a performance must be consistent with tempo and phrasing indications explicitly marked in the original score. In between, there are more contested features; for example, the size of the orchestra, tuning and whether the instruments should approximate the instruments of Mozart's day or whether modern instruments will suffice (or indeed are to be preferred). Which features of a musical work are constitutive of its being the work that it is makes a difference to what contributes to the authenticity of a performance of that work. Thinking about it the other way around, what we count as contributing to the authenticity of a performance reveals something about what we think essential to the work.

Davies suggests that there is considerable agreement about what we count as contributing to authenticity and that what we do count shows that we operate with a fairly rich notion of what a musical work is:

> Consistently performers have tried to achieve authenticity by the use of the instruments for which the composer wrote, by the adoption of styles of playing and by the adoption of the performance practices for reading and interpreting notations which held at the time of composition, and so on. If we consider the kind of ontology presupposed by such a view of authenticity, it appears that we must favour a thicker rather than a thinner characterization of the nature of the musical work. (Davies 1991b, p. 36)

However, he goes on to say, this depends a lot on the conventions operative at the time the music was composed. Mozart specified instrumentation and phrasing and dynamics, and a performance of the Jupiter Symphony cannot be authentic if it does not follow his specifications. But a century earlier, these things were often not specified. A score which only specifies pitches and rhythms might be a specification of a work which is much closer to our initial very thin characterisation: a sonic structure. And if that is right, we might think that we are free to play it on any instruments that will do the job and that the resulting performance will not thereby be inauthentic. (Paul Thom (1990) also defends the view that authenticity consists in faithfulness to the composer's directives, though he thinks that some of these directives may not be explicit in the score.)

The upshot is that what features of a musical work are essential to its identity depends on facts about its genre and date of composition and what conventions (including conventions of notation) were operative at that time. This is even clearer when one looks at more recent music. One might think it is of the essence of music that it is a *performing* art. However, Davies (2001, p. 25), Godlovitch (1992), Kania (2006, p. 401) and McKeown-Green (2007) point out that modern music is often composed not for performance but for playback, and yet no one has any inclination to deny that it is music—at least, not for that reason. Kania (following Gracyk 1996) suggests that in the case of rock music, the musical work is not an abstract sound structure or a song composed and notated at a particular time. Rather, the work of art in rock music is a track constructed in the studio: tracks usually manifest songs which can also be performed live, and a cover version is a track which is intended to manifest the same song as some other track and succeeds in doing so. If something like this is right, this bears out the idea that there is not going to be an across-the-board answer to the question of what kind of thing a musical work is.

As well as making possible new kinds of musical works, recording technology has given us new ways of accessing music. The vast majority of musical experiences nowadays are not experiences of live performance, even when they are of music that was composed for performance. It is common to think that listening to live music is somehow better than listening to recordings (consider how much we are prepared to pay to hear The Rolling Stones play the same songs, and pretty much the same versions of them, as we can hear in our living rooms for nothing). Jonathan McKeown-Green (2007), also following Gracyk (1996), argues that if what we are concerned about is just appreciating the music, then this is a mistake: recordings provide us with access to the qualities of the music that is just as good as the access provided by live performances, and possibly better.

I have here provided only a taste of a few of the major debates in philosophy of music and how Australasian philosophers have contributed to them. As is obvious from this sampler, philosophy of music is alive and well in Australasia, and it is noteworthy that while for most of the last 25 years, Stephen Davies and Paul Thom have been the only Australasian philosophers for whom the philosophy of music was a major focus, in the last few years a new generation of philosophers of music has emerged.

References

Aesthetics

Abell, C. (2005a). Against depictive conventionalism. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 42*, 185–197.

Abell, C. (2005b). On outlining the shape of depiction. *Ratio, 18*, 27–38.

Abell, C. (2005c). Pictorial implicature. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 63*, 55–66.

Alexander, S. (1925). *Art and the material: The Adamson lecture for 1925*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Alexander, S. (1933). *Beauty and other forms of value*. London: Macmillan.

Armstrong, J. (2004). *The secret power of beauty*. London: Allen Lane.

Bacharach, S. (2005). Towards a metaphysical historicism. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 63*, 165–173.

Bacharach, S., & Tollefsen, D. (2008). Collaborative arts and collective intention. In H. Schmid, K. Schulte-Ostermann, & n. Psarros (Eds.), *Concepts of sharedness: Essays on collective intentionality* (pp. 21–40). Piscataway: Rutgers University.

Barwell, I. (1993). Feminine perspectives and narrative points of view. In H. Hein & C. Korsmeyer (Eds.), *Aesthetics in feminist perspective* (pp. 93–104). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Barwell, I. (1995). Who's telling this story anyway? Or, how to tell the gender of a storyteller. In S. Davies (Ed.), *Art and its messages* (pp. 89–100). Philadelphia: Penn State University Press.

Coleman, E. (2001). Aboriginal painting: Identity and authenticity. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 59*, 385–482.

Coleman, E. (2005). *Aboriginal art, identity and appropriation*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Currie, G. (1989). *An ontology of art*. London: Macmillan.

Currie, G. (1990a). Supervenience, essentialism and aesthetic properties. *Philosophical Studies, 58*, 243–257.

Currie, G. (1990b). *The nature of fiction*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Currie, G. (1991a). Photography, painting and perception. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 49*, 23–29.

Currie, G. (1991b). Visual fictions. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 41*, 129–143.

Currie, G. (1991c). Work and text. *Mind, 100*, 325–340.

Currie, G. (1993). Interpretation and objectivity. *Mind, 102*, 413–428.

Currie, G. (1994). Imagination and simulation: Aesthetics and cognitive science. In M. Davies & T. Stone (Eds.), *Mental simulation* (pp. 151–169). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Currie, G. (1995a). *Image and mind*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Currie, G. (1995b). The moral psychology of fiction. In S. Davies (Ed.), *Art and its messages* (pp. 49–58). Philadelphia: Penn State University Press.

Currie, G. (1995c). Unreliability refigured: Narrative in literature and film. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 53*, 19–29.

Davies, S. (1988a). True interpretations. *Philosophy and Literature, 12*, 290–297.

Davies, S. (1991a). *Definitions of art*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Davies, S. (1994a). *Musical meaning and expression*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Davies, S. (1995). Relativism in interpretation. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 53*, 8–13.

Davies, S. (1996). Interpreting Contextualities. *Philosophy and Literature,* 20, 20–38.

Davies, S. (1997a). First art and art's definitions. *Southern Journal of Philosophy, 35*, 19–34.

Davies, S. (Ed.). (1997b). *Art and its messages: Meaning, morality, and society*. Philadelphia: Penn State University Press.

Davies, S. (2000). Non-Western art and art's definition. In N. Carroll (Ed.), *Theories of art today* (pp. 217–238). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Davies, S. (2006a). Aesthetic judgment, artworks and functional beauty. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 56*, 224–241.

Davies, S. (2006b). Author's intentions, literary interpretation, and literary value. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 46*, 223–247.

Davies, S. (2006c). *The philosophy of art*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Davies, S. (2007). *Philosophical perspectives on art*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davies, S., & Sukla, A. (Eds.). (2003). *Art and essence*. Westport: Praeger.

Dickie, G. (1974). *Art and the aesthetic: An institutional analysis*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Dickie, G. (1984). *The art circle*. Michigan: Haven Publications.

Dutton, D. (1983). *The Forgers' art: Forgery and the philosophy of art*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Dutton, D. (1987). Why intentionalism won't go away. In A. Cascardi (Ed.), *Literature and the question of philosophy* (pp. 192–209). Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Dutton, D. (1993). Tribal art and artifact. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 51*, 13–21.

Dutton, D. (1994a). Authenticity in the art of traditional societies. *Pacific Arts, 9–10*, 1–9.

Dutton, D. (1994b). Kant and the conditions of artistic beauty. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 34*, 226–241.

Dutton, D. (2000). But they don't have our concept of art. In N. Carroll (Ed.), *Theories of art today* (pp. 217–238). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Dutton, D. (2001). Aesthetic universals. In B. Gaut & D. Lopes (Eds.), *The Routledge companion to aesthetics* (pp. 203–214). London: Routledge.

Dutton, D. (2003). Universalism, evolutionary psychology, and aesthetics. In S. Davies & A. Sukla (Eds.), *Art and essence* (pp. 312–326). Westport: Praeger.

Dutton, D. (2008). *The art instinct*. New York: Bloomsbury Press.

Gaita, R. (2003). Narrative identity and moral philosophy. *Philosophical Papers, 32*(Special Issue on Narrative Understanding), 261–279.

Gaut, B. (2000). Art as a cluster concept. In N. Carroll (Ed.), *Theories of art today* (pp. 25–44). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Godlovitch, S. (1994). Ice-breakers: Environmentalism and natural aesthetics. *Journal of Applied Philosophy, 7*, 15–30.

Godlovitch, S. (1997a). Carlson on appreciation. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 55*, 53–55.

Godlovitch, S. (1998). Evaluating nature aesthetically. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 56*, 113–125.

Goodman, N. (1968). *Languages of art*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Grice, H. (1957). Meaning. *Philosophical Review, 66*, 377–388.

Grice, H. (1969). Utterer's meaning and intentions. *Philosophical Review, 78*, 147–177.
Grice, H. (1975). Logic and conversation. *Syntax and Semantics, 3*, 41–58.
Grice, H. (1978). Further notes on logic and conversation. *Syntax and Semantics, 9*, 113–127.
Hyslop, A. (1983). Seeing-as. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 43*, 533–540.
Knight, H. (1959). The use of 'good' in aesthetic judgments. In W. Elton (Ed.), *Aesthetics and language* (pp. 147–160). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Koed, E. (1995). Sculpture and the sculptural. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 63*, 147–154.
Lewis, D. (1969). *Convention: A philosophical study*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mannison, D. (1980). Comments stimulated by Rheinhardt's remarks: A prolegomena to a human chauvinistic aesthetic. In D. Mannison, M. McRobbie, & R. Routley (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy* (pp. 212–216). Canberra: ANU.
Margolis, J. (1995). *Interpretation radical but not unruly: The new puzzle of the arts and history*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
McCloskey, M. (1987). *Kant's aesthetics*. London: Macmillan.
McColl, S. (1993). A woman on paper. In H. Hein & C. Korsmeyer (Eds.), *Aesthetics in feminist perspective* (pp. 150–168). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
McMahon, J. (2007). *Aesthetics and material beauty: Aesthetics naturalized*. New York: Routledge.
Neander, K. (1987). Pictorial representation: A matter of resemblance. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 27*, 213–226.
Novitz, D. (1976). *Pictures and their use in communication*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Novitz, D. (1987). *Knowledge, fiction and imagination*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Novitz, D. (1990). The integrity of aesthetics. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 48*, 9–20.
Novitz, D. (1992). *The boundaries of art*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Passmore, J. (1959). The dreariness of aesthetics. In W. Elton (Ed.), *Aesthetics and language* (pp. 36–55). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Slater, H. (1993). The system of the arts. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 51*, 611–617.
Slater, H. (1997). Art and aesthetics. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 37*, 226–231.
Tavinor, G. (2005). Videogames and interactive fiction. *Philosophy and Literature, 29*, 24–40.
Tavinor, G. (2007). Towards an Ethics of Videogames. Proceedings of Futureplay Toronto: ACM Digital Library.
Tavinor, G. (2008). Definitions of videogames. *Contemporary aesthetics, 6*, 24–40.
Thom, P. (1993a). *For an audience: A philosophy of the performing arts*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Thom, P. (2000). *Making sense*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Walton, K. (1970). Categories of Art. *Philosophical Review,* 79, 334–367.
Walton, K. (1978). Fearing fictions. *The Journal of Philosophy, 75*, 5–27.
Wicks, R. (1997). Dependent beauty as the appreciation of teleological style. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 55*, 387–400.
Wicks, R. (1999a). Can tattooed faces be beautiful?: Limits on the restriction of forms in dependent beauty. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 57*, 361–363.
Wicks, R. (1999b). Kant on beautifying the human body. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 39*, 163–178.
Wicks, R. (2007). *Kant on judgment*. London: Routledge.

Philosophy of Music

Davies, S. (1987). Authenticity in musical performance. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 27*, 39–50.
Davies, S. (1988b). Authenticity in performance: A reply to James O. Young. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 28*, 373–376.

Davies, S. (1990). Violins or viols? A reason to Fret. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 48*, 147–151.

Davies, S. (1991b). The ontology of musical works and the authenticity of their performances. *Noûs, 25*, 21–41.

Davies, S. (1991c). I have finished today another new concerto. *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 25*, 139–141.

Davies, S. (1992). Mozart's 'requiem'? A reply to Levinson. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 32*, 254–257.

Davies, S. (1993). Representation in music. *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 27*, 16–22.

Davies, S. (1994b). General theories of art versus music. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 34*, 315–325.

Davies, S. (1994c). Kivy on auditors' emotions. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 52*, 235–236.

Davies, S. (1994d). *Musical meaning and expression*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Davies, S. (1994e). Musical understanding and musical kinds. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 52*, 69–82.

Davies, S. (1994f). The evaluation of music. In P. Alperson (Ed.), *What is music?* (pp. 303–325). New York: Haven.

Davies, S. (1997c). Why listen to sad music if it makes one feel sad? In J. Robinson (Ed.), *Music and meaning* (pp. 242–253). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Davies, S. (1997d). Contra the hypothetical persona in music. In M. Hjort & S. Laver (Eds.), *Emotion and the arts* (pp. 95–109). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davies, S. (1997e). So, you want to sing with the Beatles? Too late! *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 55*, 129–137.

Davies, S. (1997f). John Cage's 4′33″: Is it music? *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75*, 448–462.

Davies, S. (1999). Rock versus classical music. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 57*, 193–204.

Davies, S. (2001). *Musical works and performances: A philosophical exploration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davies, S. (2002a). Profundity in instrumental music. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 42*, 343–356.

Davies, S. (2002b). The multiple interpretability of musical works. In M. Krausz (Ed.), *Is there a single right interpretation?* (pp. 231–250). Philadelphia: Penn State University Press.

Davies, S. (2003a). Ontologies of musical works. In S. Davies (Ed.), *Themes in the philosophy of music* (pp. 30–46). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davies, S. (2003b). The experience of music. In A. Sukla (Ed.), *Art and experience: Studies in art, culture, and communities* (pp. 109–120). Westport: Prager Publishers.

Davies, S. (2003c). *Themes in the philosophy of music*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davies, S. (2005). Artistic expression and the hard case of pure music. In M. Kieran (Ed.), *Contemporary debates in aesthetics and the philosophy of art* (pp. 179–191). Oxford: Blackwell.

Davies, S. (2008). Musical works and orchestral colour. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 48*, 363–375.

Davies, S. (2011). *Musical understandings and other essays on the philosophy of music*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Godlovitch, S. (1992). Music. What to do about it. *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 26*, 1–15.

Godlovitch, S. (1997b). Innovation and conservatism in performance practice. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 55*, 151–168.

Godlovitch, S. (1998b). *Musical performance: A philosophical study*. New York: Routledge.

Gracyk, T. (1996). *Rhythm and noise: An aesthetics of rock*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Kania, A. (2006). Making tracks: The ontology of rock music. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 64*, 401–414.

Kania, A. (2008a). New waves in musical ontology. In K. Stock & K. Thomson-Jones (Eds.), *New waves in aesthetics* (pp. 21–40). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kania, A. (2008b). The methodology of musical ontology: Descriptivism and its implications. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 48*, 426–444.

Kania, A. (2008c). Piece for the end of time: In defence of musical ontology. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 48*, 65–79.

Kania, A. (2009a). Musical recordings. *Philosophy Compass, 4*, 22–38.

Kania, A. (2009b). The philosophy of music. In E. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford enyclopedia of philosophy*. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/music/

Kania, A. (2010). Silent music. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 68*, 343–353.

Kania, A., & Gracyk, T. (Eds.). (2011). *The Routledge companion to philosophy and music*. London: Routledge.

Kingsbury, J. (1999). Why the arousal theory of musical expressiveness is still wrong. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77*, 83–88.

Kingsbury, J. (2002). Matravers on musical expressiveness. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 42*, 13–19.

McKeown-Green, J. (2007). What's so great about the real thing? *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 41*, 25–40.

Perrett, R. (1999). Musical unity and sentential unity. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 39*, 97–111.

Ridley, A. (2003). Against musical ontology. *Journal of Philosophy, 100*, 203–220.

Thom, P. (1990). Young's critique of authenticity in musical performance. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 30*, 273–276.

Thom, P. (1993b). *For an audience: A philosophy of the performing arts*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Thom, P. (2003). The interpretation of music in performance. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 43*, 126–137.

Thom, P. (2006). Toward a broad understanding of musical interpretation. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 60*, 437–452.

Thom, P. (2007). *The musician as interpreter*. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Moral Philosophy in Australasia

17

Justin Oakley

Contents

Introduction 511
Utilitarianism and Consequentialism 514
Virtue Ethics 519
Other Approaches 523
Bioethics and Applied Ethics 526
Metaethics and Moral Psychology 531
Conclusion 533
References 533

Introduction

Before returning to Australia from Oxford, Peter Singer (1973) concluded one of his earliest papers with the timely comment that ‘It is . . . necessary, before embarking on a discussion of morality, to make quite clear in what sense one is using terms like “moral judgment”, and what follows and what does not follow from such a use of the term. This is an essential preliminary; but it is only a preliminary. My complaint is that what should be regarded as something to be got out of the way in the introduction to a work of moral philosophy has become the subject-matter of almost the whole of moral philosophy in the English-speaking world’ (Singer 1973, p. 56). The preoccupation with linguistic analysis bemoaned by Singer would shortly give way to a global renaissance of work in normative and applied ethics, and philosophers in Australia and New Zealand have figured quite prominently in these developments while also producing cutting-edge work in metaethics and moral psychology.

J. Oakley
Centre for Human Bioethics, School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies,
Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia
e-mail: Justin.Oakley@monash.edu

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_21, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Although Australasian philosophy was traditionally much better known for its contributions to metaphysics than to moral philosophy, the emergence of influential work in normative ethics, metaethics and moral psychology over the last two decades has done much to raise the profile of Australasian moral philosophy internationally.[1]

A number of observers of Australasian contributions to normative ethics have remarked upon the predominance of work in the Utilitarian tradition, which philosophy in Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand inherited from Britain.[2] This emphasis has been changing over the last two decades, with much work being done by Australasian moral philosophers on virtue ethics (in whose contemporary revival several New Zealand philosophers have been particularly prominent), feminist perspectives and various deontological approaches to ethics. Nevertheless, Utilitarian ideas caught on in Australasia some time ago, and it is interesting to speculate about why this occurred (though a full analysis and explanation of this would be a major undertaking). The emerging view of certain European settlements in Australia as social laboratories made them quite receptive to the reformist emphasis of Utilitarianism, which was being developed by Bentham and Mill at the same time that Australia was being colonised by the British. Indeed, very early examples of the direct influence of Utilitarianism in Australasia are Bentham's panopticon-style prisons at the penal settlements of Port Arthur (Tasmania) and Fremantle (Western Australia), in which guards at the hub could efficiently monitor prisoners in the cells which radiated out like the spokes of a wheel.[3] Australasia's receptiveness to the pragmatism of the Utilitarian approach may also be in part due to organised religion being less dominant here than in some other parts of the world, such as the United States (see also Tobin 2005).

---

[1] In this chapter I focus on work in moral philosophy done by philosophers working in Australia and New Zealand at the time they produced it, and so I therefore mostly exclude work done overseas by Australian- or New Zealand-born philosophers. Also, I concentrate primarily on work in the analytic rather than the continental tradition, and particularly on major developments in Australasian moral philosophy since 1950. The period in Australian philosophy prior to 1950 has been ably covered by others, such as Grave (1984), Scarlett (1992), Coady (1998), and Franklin (2003), and in Australasian philosophy more broadly, in the various entries under individual departments and topics, in Oppy and Trakakis (2010).

[2] In his preface to the 1981 Hackett reissue of Sidgwick's 1874 *Methods of Ethics*, John Rawls comments that English moral philosophy has been dominated by Utilitarianism for over two centuries.

[3] For discussion of Bentham's panopticon and its use in Port Arthur, see Driver (2007, pp. 42–43). Also, a little-known fact here is that Cambridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick, whose 1874 book *The Methods of Ethics* is hailed by many contemporary moral philosophers as the most fully and systematically worked out form of utilitarianism thus far developed, graduated from Rugby School in the same class as Tom Wills, who is credited with creating Australian rules football in the late 1850s by blending the rules of rugby with those of the Australian indigenous game known as 'marn-grook'. It is intriguing to speculate about whether Wills, who also became a star cricketer for Cambridge University (and later founded the Melbourne and Geelong football clubs), consulted Sidgwick about the rules for the new game that he was devising. Sidgwick refers to various games (and especially cricket) in his writings, including in his discussion of pleasure, but there is apparently no mention of Australian football in Sidgwick's published writings.

Within philosophy itself, this pragmatism of Utilitarianism echoed the traditional 'no-nonsense' mood of much Australasian metaphysics, which tended to take its lead from the physical sciences (see Coady 1998).[4]

Australasian moral philosophy's emphasis on practicality is seen not only in the prominence of Utilitarianism but also in the heavy involvement by moral philosophers here in applied ethics. This seems partly due to government priorities in allocating large research grants, which (at least initially) moral philosophers seemed more likely to secure if their project aimed to make a practical difference more than at purely theoretical innovation. But there has also been a prevailing sentiment that the plausibility of one's ethical theory is to be judged primarily by its applications to practical issues. It therefore seems not entirely coincidental that the world's largest concentration of philosophers working in applied ethics over the last decade has been in Australia, at Charles Sturt University's Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, established in 2000, and subsequently affiliated with both the Australian National University and the University of Melbourne. Thus, there has also been a healthy dialectic in Australasian philosophy between theory and practice in ethics. Indeed, the work by Australasian philosophers in ethical theory and applied ethics in the last 50 years is among the highest-impact writing by philosophers in any of the sub-disciplines of the field.

Key figures in the immediate postwar years of Australasian moral philosophy were David Falk and Kurt Baier and later Alan Donagan, Hector Monro (1967), Eric D'Arcy, Julius Kovesi (1967) and Eugene Kamenka. The influence of Wittgenstein on many areas of philosophy loomed large at the University of Melbourne, whereas the Sydney University Philosophy department had been dominated since the late 1920s by the realist philosopher, Professor John Anderson (see Coady 1998). One particularly important moral philosopher during this period, whose work is still very influential today, is J.L. Mackie. While Mackie's classic 1977 book, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*, appeared after he had been working in the UK for some time, the basic idea of the book was presented in a paper published in 1946 while Mackie was still working in Australasia. A short history of Dunedin's Otago University Philosophy Department, where Mackie had a position during the 1950s, explains well the initial impact of his 'error theory' of morality: 'In 1955, [John] Passmore left for a post at the ANU, to be succeeded by another critical Andersonian, J.L. Mackie. Mackie (a graduate of Sydney and Oxford) had missed out on the Chair at Tasmania partly because of his first article "A Refutation of Morals" (1946), in which he advocated the view for which he subsequently became famous, that moral judgments are cognitive (and so capable of being true-or-false) but are false.... Sir Frederick Eggleston, who had some influence with the

---

[4] Note that Peter Singer's interest in Utilitarianism and its strong commitment to impartiality, along with his wariness of any objectivist metaethic, seems to have been influenced by his strong sense of the horrors of Nazism, which directly impacted on his parents and grandparents. See Singer's replies in Jamieson (1999). Also, an important contribution to discussions of moral relativism is Levy (2002a).

Tasmanian Vice-Chancellor, was appalled: “Have you read Mackie’s paper on the refutation of morality? It is a typical example of the superficial way in which present-day students dispose of questions of such importance” (Otago University: website). Also, Adelaide University philosopher Brian Medlin published a brief but important critique of ethical egoism (1957), an approach which enjoyed more popularity at the time than it does currently.

Mackie’s and Medlin’s articles were published in the same journal, originally named the *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*, but from 1947 known as the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. A number of important articles by Australasian moral philosophers have appeared in this journal, though at times its content has tended more towards other areas of philosophy. Other refereed Australasian journals publishing work in moral philosophy and applied ethics are *Monash Bioethics Review*, the *Journal of Bioethical Inquiry*, the *Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics* and *Res Publica*. Articles published in these journals often originated as papers presented at conferences organised by the Australasian Association of Philosophy, the Australian Association for Professional and Applied Ethics, the Australasian Bioethics Association, and the Australian (later Australian and New Zealand) Institute of Health Law, with the latter two organisations merging in 2009 to form the Australasian Association of Bioethics and Health Law.

Utilitarianism and Consequentialism

One of the most influential Australasian contributions to normative ethical theory in the second half of the twentieth century was J. J. C. Smart’s ‘An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics’. Originally published as a booklet in 1961 when he was professor of philosophy at the University of Adelaide, Smart revised his essay to form the first half of the well-known book, *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (1973), with Bernard Williams’ critique of utilitarianism comprising the second half of the book. Smart was concerned that normative ethics had ‘fallen into some disrepute’ due to the dominance of noncognitivist metaethical theories such as those of C. L. Stevenson and R. M. Hare, whose analyses of the uses of moral language implied that ‘ultimate ethical principles . . . lie within the field of personal decision, persuasion, advice and propaganda, but not within the field of philosophy as such’ (1961, p. 1). Smart hoped his essay would contribute towards a rehabilitation of normative ethics, by providing a systematic account of act utilitarianism that deserved to be taken more seriously than the ordinary ethical thinking debunked by noncognitivists. Although he retained a noncognitivist metaethic, Smart wanted to give a ‘clear statement of act utilitarianism in such a way as to show that it can be defended against the frequent, and in my opinion sophistical, objections that are still being brought against it’ (1961, p. 2).

Although Smart was willing to use the term ‘happiness’ in describing what an act utilitarian is to maximise, he was one of the first utilitarians to argue that this goal is best understood in terms of preference satisfaction (1961, pp. 9–15, esp. p. 14),[5] and his interpretation of the act utilitarian dictum as demanding that we seek the happiness of all sentient beings anticipated Peter Singer's subsequent views on animal liberation. Also, while Smart held that the rightness of a given act depends on its *actual* consequences, he argued that an act being rational depends on its *likely* consequences, and he helped to pioneer applications of decision theory and game theory to assist with performing the utilitarian calculus in decisions involving uncertainty and reliance on the actions of other parties.[6] Drawing on his 1956 *Philosophical Quarterly* article, 'Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism', Smart also argued against rule utilitarianism as involving a form of 'rule worship', insofar as its advocates prioritise 'conformity to a rule [over] the prevention of avoidable human suffering' (1961, p. 3, see also 1961, p. 5), a charge he also levelled against deontological approaches. Smart (1973, pp. 10–12) went on to develop further an influential form of the argument that, in making successive modifications to rules in order to accommodate exceptional circumstances, rule utilitarianism collapses into act utilitarianism.

The University of Melbourne philosopher H. J. McCloskey (who was subsequently appointed to a chair at La Trobe University) made important criticisms of Smart's act utilitarianism, and particularly its counterintuitive implications for the morality of punishment. McCloskey argued that act utilitarians must condone the punishment of an innocent person where, for instance, the perpetrator of a rape in a racially divided town cannot be found and the only way riots and lynchings by a vengeful mob can be prevented is for the town sheriff to frame an innocent person who is widely thought guilty (1957, pp. 468–469), or for a visitor who was in the vicinity to bear false witness against an innocent person (1965, pp. 255–256).[7] Smart responded to such criticisms by admitting that act utilitarianism might require us to act unjustly in certain circumstances (1973, pp. 70–71), but along with many utilitarians (like Peter Singer and R. M. Hare), he emphasised that our intuitive reactions to particular examples can be misleading and are sometimes best discarded: 'Our general principle, resting on something so simple and natural as generalised benevolence, seems to me to be more securely founded than our particular feelings, which are subtly discovered by analogies with similar looking (but in reality totally different) types of cases, and with all sorts of hangovers from traditional and uncritical ethical thinking' (Smart 1961, p. 41; see also Scarlett 1992, p. 63). Smart also sought to reintroduce into contemporary discussions of utilitarianism important points made by the late-nineteenth-century exponent of this approach, Henry Sidgwick. These points included the distinction between utilitarianism as providing a criterion of the rightness rather than the motive for all our actions, and the distinction between the utility of an act itself and the utility of praising or blaming an agent for their act (indeed, Smart regarded most attempts to refute act utilitarianism as fallacious because of their failure to recognise this latter distinction). In doing so, Smart wanted to demonstrate that 'act utilitarianism, as a normative theory of ethics, is not so simple minded a doctrine as its critics seem to suppose, and that it escapes the usual refutations' (1961, p. 42). Whether or not he fully succeeded in achieving this goal, Smart's clear and sophisticated exposition of act utilitarianism became the standard reference point for international debates about the approach for several decades. His 1961 booklet became a set text in ethics courses at many universities in Australasia and elsewhere during the 1960s, and his two-hander with the internationally renowned Bernard Williams in *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (1973) has been required reading in the years since for many ethics students across the globe.

---

[5] Also important here are Chin Liew Ten's (1980) criticisms of Mill's 'proof' of the principle of utility.

[6] A good example of more recent Australian work on decision theory and consequentialism is Colyvan et al. (2010).

[7] In his subsequent book, McCloskey (1971) discusses these criticisms in relation to Mill's utilitarianism, and demonstrates how Mill is an act utilitarian rather than a rule utilitarian.

Another Australian utilitarian, Peter Singer, has become famous internationally for his groundbreaking work on animal ethics, bioethics and our obligations towards the impoverished. Influenced by the Oxford philosopher R. M. Hare (1963, 1981), who developed preference utilitarianism further than Smart had, Singer argued in his widely discussed essay 'Famine, Affluence and Morality' (1972) that affluent people have a moral obligation to give money to help with famine relief in developing countries. Singer based this conclusion on the ethical principle that 'if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it' (1972, p. 231). Singer illustrated this principle with a straightforward example of how we think one ought to help save a child one realises is drowning in a shallow pond, and he argues that our failure to help people in the grip of famine is analogous to a failure to save the child in the pond. This analogy has been the focus of much subsequent discussion. For example, in *The Moral Demands of Affluence* (2004a), University of Adelaide philosopher Garrett Cullity challenges many of the implications Singer draws from this analogy (while admitting its forcefulness), arguing instead for moderately demanding obligations of beneficence that do not require the affluent to altogether sacrifice life-enhancing goods such as friendship and personal achievement.[8] Singer's subsequent book, *Practical Ethics* (1979, 1993, 2011), which became one of the most widely used textbooks in this area at universities around the world, argues for a 'principle of equal consideration of interests' (1979, pp. 19–20), whereby the interests of all sentient beings, including both human and non-human animals, in avoiding suffering, are equally considered in determining what action is right. This echoed Bentham's idea of impartiality, where 'each is to count for one and none for more than one'.

---

[8] The 2008 Australian Catholic University Eureka Prize for Research in Ethics was awarded to Cullity for this book, and he decided to donate the $10,000 prize money to charity (see *The Age* 12 October 2010).

Other important Australasian contributions to the development of Utilitarian and Consequentialist approaches in recent years have been made by Philip Pettit and Robert Goodin, and by New Zealand philosopher Tim Mulgan. Pettit wrote a number of key articles on consequentialism and related themes while at the Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences, where Goodin currently has a chair. Pettit's influential essay 'Consequentialism' (1991) draws on his other work in outlining how best to characterise the essential differences between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist ethical theories. Normative ethical theories can be understood as incorporating a theory of goodness or value and a theory of rightness. Pettit argued that whatever account is given of what is ultimately good or valuable (such as pleasure, happiness, or preference satisfaction), consequentialist theories are distinctive in holding that rightness requires us to respond by *promoting* such value(s), whereas nonconsequentialist theories hold that rightness requires us to *honour* or *exemplify* certain values in our actions.[9] Pettit elaborated and defended consequentialism further in his contributions to the innovative *Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate* (1997), which included essays by Marcia Baron on Kantian ethics and Michael Slote on Virtue ethics, bringing these three approaches into extended dialogue with each other for the first time.[10] In a series of articles culminating in his book *Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy* (1995), Robert Goodin provided an important elaboration and defence of utilitarianism as an approach to public policy, despite the various problems that he acknowledges bedevil utilitarianism in matters of personal morality (see also Goodin 1989). Tim Mulgan's book, *The Demands of Consequentialism* (2001), published while he was working at the University of Auckland, develops a form of consequentialism that avoids the unreasonable demands of its predecessors, by providing a more plausible analysis of well-being and then distinguishing between the moral realms of reciprocity and necessity, each of which are to be understood as governed by distinct types of consequentialist demands.[11]

An important feature of utilitarianism and consequentialism is their fundamental commitment to impartiality, and philosophers in Australasia have also figured prominently in recent critiques of this aspect of those approaches. While at the ANU Michael Stocker published his seminal article 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories' (1976), which argued that a life guided by any of the most common forms of utilitarianism (or by various deontologies) is incompatible with goods such as friendship and loving relationships. In his now well-known example, Stocker suggests that we would find it alienating to discover that someone we regarded as a friend was visiting us in hospital out of the desire to maximise utility:

---

[9] Michael Smith (2005) has argued that virtually all ethical theories can be understood as forms of consequentialism, at least when it is construed in a minimalist way as telling us that we ought to do that which we have most reason to do. See also Smith (2009) for a discussion of how the idea of rights as side-constraints can also be understood in consequentialist terms, and Jackson and Smith (2006).

[10] This book, published as part of Blackwell's 'Great Debates in Philosophy' series, originated as a mini-conference on 'Consequentialism, Kantianism, and Virtue Ethics' held at Monash University in 1995, and featured the authors along with local speakers. The three authors cite Smart and Williams' *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (1973) as 'the closest predecessor' to this volume.

[11] Mulgan currently has a chair in philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and he has recently published *Understanding Utilitarianism* (2007).

> Suppose you are in hospital, recovering from a long illness. You are very bored and restless and at loose ends when Smith comes in once again. You are now convinced more than ever that he is a fine fellow and a real friend—taking so much time to cheer you up, traveling all the way across town, and so on. You are so effusive with your praise and thanks that he protests that he always tries to do what he thinks is his duty, what he thinks will be best. You at first think he is engaging in a polite form of self-deprecation, relieving the moral burden. But the more you two speak, the more clear it becomes that he was telling the literal truth: that it is not essentially because of you that he came to see you, not because you are friends, but because he thought it his duty, perhaps as a fellow Christian or Communist or whatever, or simply because he knows of no one more in need of cheering up and no one easier to cheer up. (1976, p. 462)

Stocker argued that being visited from the desire to maximise utility cannot be an act of friendship, for friendship conceptually requires that the agent acts out of friendship, rather than out of such a desire. Of course, when faced with such concerns, many utilitarians appeal to the distinction drawn by Mill (1962, p. 269) and Sidgwick (1981, p. 413) between utilitarianism as a decision procedure or motive, and utilitarianism as an underlying criterion of rightness that we are committed to meeting, and argue that being guided indirectly by such a criterion does not preclude one acting out of friendship.[12] However, Stocker anticipates and rejects such a response, arguing that one who was guided indirectly by a utilitarian criterion of rightness could achieve friendship only at the cost of a serious psychic disharmony and moral schizophrenia.

A well-known response to Stocker's alienation worries was given by Peter Railton (1984), who argued that a sophisticated consequentialist agent guided by a standing disposition to maximise the good would not be found alienating, as they could act from motives proper to friendship and could do so without inner disharmony. However, Australian philosophers Cocking and Oakley (1995) challenged the suggestion that moving from a direct to an indirect form of consequentialism enables the theory to overcome the problem of alienation and so to coherently allow one to engage in genuine friendships. Highlighting the crucial role that governing conditions play in defining various kinds of relationships, Cocking and Oakley argue that in other cases where we regard a relationship as in conflict with friendship, a similar strategy of making the governing conditions of that relationship less obtrusive is not thought to redefine it as a genuine friendship—the governing conditions, after all, remain unchanged—and so why should we believe that such a move succeeds where one's relationships are governed by the condition that they must maximise the good overall?

---

[12] See also here Pettit and Brennan (1986) and Kilcullen (1983).

A different line of response to worries about the compatibility of consequentialism and friendship assumes that a relationship with someone committed to consequentialism would not be alienating, and tries to make plausible the empirical claim that favouring the interests of one's friends over those of others will (up to a point) most likely maximise the good. Such a response has been provided by the eminent Australian philosopher Frank Jackson (1991) (son of well-known University of Melbourne philosopher—and subsequently Monash professor—Camo Jackson), who argues that generally speaking, we can benefit friends more reliably than we can benefit strangers, as we usually understand better what will benefit a friend than what will benefit a stranger, and we tend to be better placed to confirm that our beneficent efforts have actually succeeded in the case of friends than with strangers (see also Mill 1962, p. 270; Godwin 1968, pp. 321–323; Hare 1993). However, many have found such empirical claims highly questionable, in light of the dire needs of many others in the world and how much of a difference to their welfare one could make with relatively little effort.

Another important contribution to these debates is Victoria University of Wellington philosopher Simon Keller's book *The Limits of Loyalty* (2007a), which provides an illuminating analysis of the nature of loyalty and its diverse manifestations.[13] Keller argues that loyalty is not plausibly regarded as a foundational value and that while certain loyalties involve special goods that the parties involved are uniquely placed to give and receive, subjecting one's loyalties—to friends, family members and country—to critical scrutiny in light of a larger moral schema need not be alienating and may reveal how acting on them can be morally unjustifiable.

Virtue Ethics

Australasian philosophers have also been very prominent in the revival of virtue ethics over the last 35 years and, indeed, have recently been among the leaders in developing virtue ethics approaches and applying them to a range of practical issues. New Zealand philosopher Rosalind Hursthouse has become the most widely known and influential virtue ethicist. Hursthouse's pioneering book *On Virtue Ethics* (1999) provides a sophisticated and compelling Aristotelian account of how virtue ethics can be understood and has become the standard reference on this approach. *On Virtue Ethics* was published towards the end of Hursthouse's period working at The Open University in the UK, but she wrote the penultimate draft of the book on visits to New Zealand and shortly thereafter took up a chair in Philosophy at the University of Auckland, where she currently works. Over the last decade Hursthouse has engaged with a range of commentators and critics, further clarifying her account of virtue ethics, and she has also applied this account to some important questions in environmental ethics, along with various issues in personal and professional life.

---

[13] This book won the 2009 American Philosophical Association prize for the best book by a young philosopher published in the previous 2 years.

On Virtue Ethics expands and develops Hursthouse's earlier work (e.g. 1987, 1991) on this approach, drawing on her extensive knowledge of the ethics of Aristotle, among other philosophers. Hursthouse provides a clear virtue ethics account of right action which she illustrates with some rich and detailed examples, thereby addressing concerns about whether virtue ethics can be action guiding. On Hursthouse's account, a virtue ethics criterion of right action holds that an action is right if and only if 'it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances' (1999, p. 28). Hursthouse also distinguishes between action *guidance* and action *assessment* and argues that the criterion she states can provide action guidance in a wide variety of cases, except for tragic moral dilemmas—i.e. 'situations from which a virtuous agent cannot emerge having acted well' (1999, p. 77), when only action assessment may be possible.[14] Taking virtues as character traits that human beings need to flourish or live well, Hursthouse argues that what makes a character trait a virtue in human beings is that it serves well the following four 'naturalistic' ends: individual survival, individual characteristic enjoyment and freedom from pain, the good functioning of the social group, and the continuance of the species (1999, pp. 200–201, 208, 248).[15]

Another innovative feature of *On Virtue Ethics* and of Hursthouse's subsequent work in this area is her explanation of how, contrary to some characterisations, virtue ethics can provide various virtue and vice rules (or 'V-rules'). That is, 'Each virtue generates an instruction—"Do what is honest", "Do what is charitable"; and each vice a prohibition—"Do not . . . do what is dishonest, uncharitable"' (1999, p. 17). Hursthouse also provides a helpful account of how acting virtuously involves practical wisdom, or what Aristotle called *phronesis*. She explains clearly how *phronesis* includes perceptual capacities to be able to see which of various considerations are (and are not) relevant to a particular situation and how people with practical wisdom have (as we sometimes say) 'got their priorities right'. In doing so, she brings a sophisticated understanding of Aristotelian moral psychology to bear on elaborating a contemporary version of virtue ethics and to showing how this approach could be applied to issues Aristotle did not consider. More recently, Daniel Russell (2009) has developed an Aristotelian conception of *phronesis* in his book *Practical Intelligence and the Virtues*, written largely during his time at Monash University, whereby the virtue of *phronesis*, or practical intelligence, is understood as excellence in deliberating about and choosing means and ends in action, and so as a constituent of every virtue. Russell also argues that a virtue theory which restores *phronesis* to its central place among the virtues helps show how virtue ethics can be vindicated by the very empirical research in social psychology that many philosophers have thought undermines it.

---

[14] In cases of tragic dilemmas Hursthouse holds that a *decision* about what to do in such a dilemma is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would (acting in character) decide, 'but the action decided upon may be too terrible to be called "right" or "good"' (1999, p. 79). Here Hursthouse also makes a valuable contribution to debates in moral philosophy about what are often called 'evaluative remainders' (see Stocker 1990, 1996), and about what the emotions which are usually thought appropriate in regard to such remainders (e.g. regret, remorse, or even guilt) might show about utilitarian and consequentialist approaches, which find it difficult to recognise how such emotions could be appropriate, if what the agent did was the right course of action to take.

[15] Hursthouse acknowledges that certain traits may serve some of these ends better than other of these ends. See also Perrett and Patterson (1991).

Hursthouse (1999) also demonstrated, in more detail than previously, that a number of the objections commonly raised against virtue ethics also face deontology and utilitarianism, and that such problems may prove equally difficult to resolve from any of these three ethical perspectives. (Justin Oakley (1996) had identified a series of claims common to all forms of virtue ethics then extant, and used those claims to distinguish between virtue ethics and utilitarian and Kantian conceptions of virtue.) However, Hursthouse says the fruitful developments of virtue ethics throughout the 1990s led her to modify her earlier 'more combative' stance towards deontological and utilitarian approaches, and so she has become less concerned with whether some form of deontology or utilitarianism can agree with what she says about particular examples and more interested in showing how virtue ethics can be applied in illuminating ways to some important examples from life: 'Let us by all means stop caring about how we distinguish ourselves and welcome our agreements' (1999, p. 7). Thus, she argues that the accounts of moral motivation given by Aristotle and Kant are substantially closer than is usually assumed—a theme which other philosophers have also taken up (see, e.g. Sherman 1997; Jost and Wuerth 2011). Overall, Hursthouse has contributed a great deal to the development of virtue ethics and its applications, and in showing how it offers a promising alternative to Utilitarian and Kantian perspectives, Hursthouse's account of virtue ethics has become a touchstone for much subsequent work in this field.

Hursthouse's Auckland University colleague Christine Swanton has also worked extensively on virtue ethics and has produced some innovative work in this area, drawing on her earlier publications on satisficing, plural values and profiles of various virtues. Swanton's 2003 book *Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View* develops a 'target-centred' version of the approach, whereby a virtuous action is one that hits the target—realises the proper goal—of the virtue which is relevant to the context the agent finds themselves in, and right actions are those which are *overall* virtuous in the circumstances. In grounding the virtues, Swanton rejects Aristotle's eudaimonist claim that the virtues are given by what humans need in order to flourish, arguing that virtues are dispositions to respond to morally significant features of objects in an excellent way, whether or not such dispositions are good for the person who has them. Thus, the creative drive of a great artist such as Van Gogh can count as a virtue, even if it led him to suffer bipolar disorder, since such drive is an excellent way of responding to value and can be part of a life that we can justifiably regard as successful in some sense (2003, pp. 82–83). While Swanton's virtue ethics retains certain other Aristotelian features, her approach moves towards that of Nietzsche and other philosophers.[16]

Significant contributions have also been made by other Australasian philosophers to theorising about particular virtues and their associated moral psychology, without this necessarily being part of a larger effort to develop a form of virtue ethics. For example, while at La Trobe University, Michael Stocker (1980, 1983a, 1990) published influential studies on Aristotelian moral psychology, intellectual virtues, courage and the emotions involved in various virtues, and University of WA philosopher Robert Ewin (1981) developed an account of justice as a foundational virtue (see also Ewin 1991, 1992). Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze and Michael P. Levine (2003) provided a penetrating analysis of the virtue of integrity, as a complex quality of character that requires finding a balance in avoiding vices in distinct spheres, such as dogmatism and hypocrisy. Flinders University philosopher Craig Taylor (2002, 2011) has written illuminatingly about the nature and moral significance of sympathy and has recently completed a book on the vice of moralism, while Karen Jones has continued her widely known work on the nature and value of trust, since she arrived at the University of Melbourne in 2002 (see Jones 2004). University of Sydney philosopher Keith Campbell (1986) elaborated a contemporary version of a Stoic ethic, including accounts of such virtues as courage, temperance, wisdom and justice, and Monash University philosophers Dirk Baltzly (2003) and Karen Green (2012) have demonstrated the relevance of ancient and medieval forms of virtue ethics to important issues of current concern.[17]

The return of virtue ethics to contemporary moral philosophy has also sparked much critique and debate, and Australasian philosophers have been among the key participants in many of those discussions. La Trobe University philosopher John Campbell's (1999) discussion of the philosophical implications of John Darley and Batson (1973) Good Samaritan experiment helped usher in the situationist critique of virtue ethics. Campbell suggests that philosophical accounts of altruism commonly make implausible assumptions about the existence of powerful altruistic motives and about the relevance of character-based considerations in explaining helping behaviour. Campbell argued that the findings of this experiment—that being slightly hurried turns out to be a better predictor of whether one helps a distressed stranger than the character one seems to have—are difficult for standard philosophical accounts of altruism to accommodate. Another line of objection was put by Garrett Cullity (1999), who argued that standard virtue ethics accounts of right action in terms of what a fully virtuous agent would do fail to capture those oughts that apply to us less than fully virtuous individuals, such as that we ought to make amends to those we have let down, and that we ought to do things that would help us become more virtuous.[18] In response to that objection, University of Waikato philosopher Liezl van Zyl (2011) has drawn attention to the morally deficient aspects of such 'oughts', and questions whether the actions in question really do warrant being characterised as 'right actions'. Simon Keller (2007b) has argued that virtue ethics turns out to be a self-effacing theory in the same way as the consequentialist and Kantian theories that its advocates attack. Christopher Cordner (1994) criticised the Aristotelian basis of much virtue ethics for neglecting virtues such as compassion, humility and the importance of philanthropic love, and argues that Aristotle's megalopsychos is self-absorbed and unsuitable as any kind of moral exemplar. And Stephen Buckle (2002) has argued that understanding Aristotle's ethics as part of a larger project that is completed by his work on politics shows that he holds that living well requires living in accordance with laws and not only the virtues, and so virtue is less foundational in his account of the best life for a human being than many contemporary virtue ethicists have supposed (see also Browne 1990). In applied ethics, University of Auckland philosopher Tim Dare (1998, 2009) has criticised a virtue ethics approach to legal ethics as allowing lawyers to act on their own personal values, in circumstances when those values conflict with what their professional role requires them to do, and that this leaves clients too vulnerable to being let down or betrayed.[19]

---

[16] Swanton's work has also influenced, and been influenced by, other non-eudaimonist approaches to virtue ethics, such as that developed by Michael Slote (see, e.g., Slote 1992, 2001), who has been a regular visitor to the University of Auckland—though Slote's agent-based approach differs significantly from Swanton's target-centred account. For recent Australasian work on agent-based virtue ethics, see Cox (2006) and van Zyl (2009). In 2002 the University of Canterbury held a conference on 'Virtue ethics: Old and New', in which many of the world's most prominent virtue ethicists participated, and this resulted in an important edited collection: Gardiner (2005). See also the contributions discussing virtue ethics in Pigden (ed) (2009). Other examples of Australian books on virtue ethics are van Hooft (2006, 2013).

[17] See also Green and Mews (eds) (2011) and Broad (forthcoming). University of NSW philosopher and mathematician James Franklin led an ARC-funded research project from 2006 to 2008 on restraint and the virtue of temperance, while Australian Catholic University philosopher Bernadette Tobin has written extensively on Aristotelian virtue and moral education: see, e.g. Tobin (1989, 2000).

Other Approaches

There have also been important contributions made by Australasian moral philosophers to the development of other perspectives, such as Kantian ethics, Feminist ethics and Natural Law approaches. Despite a strand of utilitarian ethics inherited from Britain, much of the earlier work in Australasian moral philosophy took some form of deontological approach. For example, Kurt Baier's influential book *The Moral Point of View* (1958) provided a rationalist, neo-Kantian justification for morality over noncognitivist approaches, and demonstrated the important role of reasoning in moral deliberation (see Oderberg 2010).[20] Alan Donagan was also prominent in the development of deontology, but his published work in moral philosophy appeared after he had left Australia. More recently, Jeanette Kennett (1993) defended the Kantian continent person from criticisms by Aristotelians, and Garrett Cullity (2004b) evaluated the objection that acting from sympathy is morally on a par with acting from Kantian duty, a claim Cullity endorses in certain cases. Two particularly noteworthy challenges to central aspects of Kantian ethics by Australian philosophers are John Campbell's (1983) systematic critique of various arguments for Kantian notions of moral goodness, and Rae Langton's (1992) sketch of a more subtle and plausible Kantian account of the ethics of deception, through her discussion of the arid vision which the lovelorn young Maria von Herbert took from Kant's writings in ethics, and of Kant's inadequacies in attempting to console her with his moral philosophy.

---

[18] See also Das (2003). This line of objection was developed in more detail by the US philosopher Robert N. Johnson (2003). A useful discussion of related issues can be found in Moore (2007).

[19] For responses to such concerns, see Cocking and Oakley (2010) and Oakley (2011).

Taking a somewhat different tack, Raimond Gaita (1999, 1991/2004) has developed a distinctive absolutist view of good and evil, drawing on Plato's non-naturalist approach and Wittgenstein's anti-essentialism, along with the work of other philosophers such as Simone Weil, Peter Winch and Roy Holland. Raised in rural Victoria and working for many years at Kings College London, Gaita returned to Australia on secondment to Australian Catholic University in 1993, where he subsequently gained a chair in Philosophy, and divided his time equally between Kings and ACU.[21] Gaita argues, using powerful real and literary examples rather than abstract moral theory, for a form of absolutism which holds that all human beings, even those who have committed terrible evils, are owed an unconditional respect. In a series of articles and books, Gaita has also explored how certain forms of moral understanding are necessarily emotional, and he demonstrates how emotions such as remorse and guilt can greatly illuminate not only evil and evildoing but also the idea that every human being is irreplaceably precious. Gaita's ACU colleague Peter Coghlan (2005) has also made important contributions on moral absolutism and the importance of philanthropic love.

Other innovative work on wickedness, the nature of evil, and evildoers has been published by Stanley Benn (1985), Dean Cocking and Jeroen Van Den Hoven (forthcoming) and Luke Russell (2007). These recent accounts also seem likely to spark renewed work in moral psychology and its bearing on theories of good and evil.

Several Australasian philosophers have also played a significant role in the development of natural law approaches to ethics. For example, John Finniss has been an influential contributor to this tradition, though his major works on natural law appeared after he had left Australia for Oxford. Eric D'Arcy (1963) wrote an important book on action theory and ethics, which made an impact for many years afterwards, and Stephen Buckle (1991) published a significant study of the influence of seventeenth and eighteenth century' work in natural law on Locke and Hume (see also Haakonssen 1996).[22]

---

[20] Also, Janna Thompson (1998) wrote an important book on the related, though somewhat different, perspective of discourse ethics. See also Joe Mintoff's (1997) criticisms of contractarian approaches to ethics.

[21] Gaita also wrote a best-selling memoir about his childhood, *Romulus My Father* (Melbourne: Text, 1998), which subsequently became a highly acclaimed film.

Australasian philosophers have also been among the leading proponents of feminist approaches to ethics. Many Australasian philosophy departments began in the 1970s to teach feminism as a distinct subject, which proved to be very popular with students.[23] An influential philosopher who helped shape the development of feminist ethics here is Genevieve Lloyd, whose pioneering book *The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy* (1984) challenged what she saw as an historical masculinising of philosophical ideals of reason.[24] An annual 'Women in Philosophy' conference began to be held in conjunction with the Australasian Association of Philosophy conference and became renowned for its lively exchanges on issues in ethics and applied ethics. In 1986 a feminist philosophy supplement to the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* was published. An important theme in Australasian feminist ethics is the nature and significance of embodiment, which has been explored in the context of abortion debates (e.g. Mackenzie 1992) and reproductive ethics more generally (see, e.g. Mills 2011; Dodds 2010). The advent of IVF and other reproductive technologies in the 1980s also brought forth robust feminist critiques from Robyn Rowland (1992) and Renata Klein, among others. There have also been important challenges to an overly individualist conception of autonomy which has been prominent in US bioethics, such as the important work by Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (2000) and others on the development of relational conceptions of autonomy, moral agency and the self (see also Stoljar 2011). Further, Helga Kuhse (1997), Murdoch University philosopher Peta Bowden (1997), and others contributed to debates about care ethics approaches, particularly in the context of nursing.[25] Other important Australasian contributors to the development of feminist philosophy and ethics are Moira Gatens (1996), Val Plumwood (1991), Jan Crosthwaite (2009; see also Crosthwaite and Priest 1996), Tong et al. (2004) and Marguerite La Caze (2005, 2010).

---

[22] See also Ramsay (1997) and Oderberg and Laing (eds) (1997).

[23] For instance, La Trobe University philosopher Janna Thompson began teaching a semester-length subject on feminism that was widely known for its popularity.

[24] In counterpoint to Lloyd, see Green (1995), which contests the claim that philosophical ideals of reason have excluded the feminine.

[25] See also the influential work of expatriate New Zealand philosopher Annette Baier, whose article 'The Need for More than Justice' (1987) was a key stimulus for these debates. In her widely cited article 'Trust and Anti-Trust' (1986), Baier comments that the great moral philosophers have, by and large, been single males who had minimal dealings with women. They were, she says, mostly 'clerics, misogynists and puritan bachelors' who focused 'single-mindedly on cool, distanced relations between more or less free and equal adult strangers' (1986, p. 248).

Bioethics and Applied Ethics

Australasian moral philosophers have made valuable contributions to the discussion and resolution of many practical issues, but bioethics is undoubtedly the area of applied ethics in which they have been most active. Bioethics had been at the forefront of the applied ethics revolution in academic philosophy since the early 1970s, and Australasian moral philosophers participated in early debates about abortion, contraception and organ transplantation, among other things. Bioethics in Australasia really took off in the 1980s, in response to the development of IVF and other new reproductive technologies. Centres such as Monash University's Centre for Human Bioethics and the University of Otago Bioethics Centre were set up during that decade to promote bioethics research and education. Australasia is also home to some of the key journals in the field, including *Monash Bioethics Review* (which began in 1981 as *Bioethics News*) and the *Journal of Bioethical Inquiry*, and indeed, top journal *Bioethics* was edited at Monash University for the first 14 years of this journal's existence, from 1987. The interdisciplinary Australasian Bioethics Association was formed in 1990, and its inaugural conference was held in Melbourne in 1991, and the International Association of Bioethics was initially based at Monash University, from its inception in 1992 (see Oakley 2003). The influence of advances in biomedical science and reproductive technologies on the development of bioethics in Australasia mirrored somewhat the influence of science on the development of the much-discussed school of thought dubbed 'Australian materialism'—associated with philosophers such as David Armstrong and Jack Smart—which saw a 'need to locate philosophy within the perspective of the physical sciences' (Coady 1998: Sect. 5). Bioethics in Australasia, as elsewhere, was influenced by the sciences not only through new biomedical and reproductive technologies helping to set the agenda for ethical debates, but also in the important role that relevant empirical research came to play in many philosophers' contributions to those debates. Indeed, philosophers working in bioethics were engaging in forms of 'empirically informed ethics' long before the advent of 'experimental philosophy' and its use in moral philosophy.

During the formative years of Australasian bioethics, debates tended to be dominated (especially in Australia) by utilitarianism, where empirical questions and empirical research play a more pivotal role in answering ethical questions than they do on other approaches. Although Australasia inherited a strong Utilitarian tradition in ethics from Great Britain, the dominance of this approach in the emerging field of bioethics owed much to the influence of utilitarian philosophers such as Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse, who in 1980 established Monash University Centre for Human Bioethics, Australasia's first research centre in the field. A major focus of the Centre's early research projects was the novel ethical issues raised by IVF, in the context of groundbreaking work by Monash IVF researchers Carl Wood and Alan Trounson, and these projects resulted in some of the first published work on the ethics of IVF and embryo research (e.g. Walters and Singer 1982; Singer and Wells 1984; see also Singer et al. 1990; Buckle 1988). With the renaissance of applied ethics in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of Australasian philosophers began to feel it important to take ethical debate beyond the academy and into the community and so became ‘public philosophers’. Thus, reflecting on their reasons for establishing the Monash Centre, Singer and Kuhse (2006) noted that:

> If the media had asked a professor of philosophy for a comment [about a scientific breakthrough such as IVF], they would most likely have been told that the branch of philosophy known as ethics was concerned with more abstract issues about the meaning of moral terms, and large questions about normative theories such as utilitarianism or Kantian ethics. Most philosophers, even those working in ethics, had nothing to say about the ethics of the new reproductive technology. It was simply not something to which they had given much thought. (2006, p. 11)

This impetus to contribute to public discussions about the ethical aspects of emerging issues was also gathering pace around the world, but the emphasis on putting ethics into action seems to fit well with the sort of ‘can-do’ attitude often thought characteristic of Australians and New Zealanders, and appealed to an Australasian public who are, arguably, particularly suspicious of hypocrisy in academics insofar as one is unwilling to ‘practice what one preaches’. As Singer (1972) commented in a very early article: ‘Discussion, though, is not enough. What is the point of relating philosophy to public (and personal) affairs if we do not take our conclusions seriously? In this instance, taking our conclusion seriously means acting upon it’ (1972, p. 242). This sort of commitment seems to appeal to a form of pragmatism quite common in Australasia (Tobin 2005), according to which an idea is only as good as its applications in practice.

Kuhse and Singer subsequently investigated the ethics of end-of-life decision-making, producing an innovative and controversial study into the justifiability of withholding treatment from infants born with severe disabilities (Kuhse and Singer 1985; see also Kuhse 1987, 1994). Singer and Kuhse developed high academic and public profiles in challenging aspects of existing medical practice and familiar assumptions in debates about reproduction, and they made trenchant criticisms of a reliance on sanctity-of-human-life views by health professionals and lawmakers in justifying medical decisions at the beginning and end of life. Singer’s work in bioethics, along with the success of his best-selling book *Animal Liberation* (1975) and his international reputation as a philosopher who follows the directives of his theory in his own life, have led to his becoming the best-known philosopher around the world.[26] During his time at Monash, Singer produced some of the most widely used textbooks and anthologies in applied ethics and ethical theory, including *Practical Ethics* (1979/1993/2011), *Applied Ethics* (1986), *A Companion to Ethics* (1991) and *Ethics* (Oxford Readers Series 1994), along with several anthologies edited with Kuhse, including *A Companion to Bioethics* (1998/2009) and *Bioethics: An Anthology* (1999/2006), and many of these books have been translated into foreign languages. Singer left Monash in mid-1999 to take up a chair in bioethics at

---

[26] Martha Nussbaum engaged in a memorable exchange with Peter Singer when she gave the 2003 Tanner Lectures in Human Values at the Australian National University. Nussbaum’s lectures subsequently formed the basis of her (2006) book.

Princeton University's Center for Human Values, but in recent years he has spent regular periods at the University of Melbourne branch of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, where he has a visiting appointment and has continued to be prolific (see Singer 2009). Kuhse retired from her position at the end of 2000, remaining as an honorary researcher thereafter.

A striking feature of Singer's approach is his avowed willingness to follow the reasoning in his arguments wherever it may lead, even if the conclusions seem counterintuitive and, perhaps, shocking to many.[27] For example, he has argued, along with Michael Tooley (1972),[28] that a newborn infant has no moral status independent of the preferences of others until it becomes aware of itself as a continuing subject of experiences (and thus becomes a person, in this philosophical sense), and so the wrongness of killing such an infant is explained in terms of the impact that this would have on the preferences of the infant's parents and others who care about it (see 1979, pp. 78, 122–126). This conclusion, and the sort of intellectual tough-mindedness evident in this approach, has stirred much controversy and has led to memorable exchanges in print, public debates and on radio (such as the ABC radio program 'Late Night Live', hosted by Philip Adams) with critics such as Raimond Gaita (1991/2004, 1999, pp. 182–183; for discussion, see Franklin 2003, pp. 399–430), among other Australasian philosophers (e.g. Uniacke and McCloskey 1992). Also, the empiricist orientation of Australasian utilitarianism is clearly evident in their suspicions about concepts such as potentiality, moral responsibility and intending evil as a means, which they tend to regard as obscurantist. Nevertheless, Singer's commitment to the central role of reason in ethics and to setting a new reformist agenda for utilitarianism has won him many converts, and seems to appeal to those who value being 'direct' with people, which seems to be a quality that is especially admired by Australians.

Another prominent contributor to early Antipodean debates in bioethics was Melbourne's St Vincent's Bioethics Centre, whose founding Director was Nicholas Tonti-Filippini. This Centre was later succeeded by the Caroline Chisholm Centre for Health Ethics, whose foundation Director Rev. Norman Ford wrote an important book *When Did I Begin?* (1988), which controversially argued that a human individual does not begin to exist until 14 days after conception. Sydney's Plunkett Centre for Ethics, whose foundation Director was Bernadette Tobin, has also been a long-standing participant in debates about issues of public concern in bioethics, as have staff from the University of Sydney Centre for Values, Ethics and Law in Medicine, such as Ian Kerridge (Douglas et al. 2008; Lipworth et al. 2008) and Catherine Mills (2011). Other Australasian philosophers and bioethicists who made important contributions to discussions in these formative years include three members of the University of Otago Bioethics Centre—Grant Gillett (see especially his 1987, 1990, 1994 and 1999 works, among many other publications), Gareth Jones (1991; see also Jones and Whitaker 2009) and Alastair Campbell (1995)—and Deakin University philosopher Max Charlesworth (1989), who published an influential book (1992) on liberal bioethics, drawing on his extensive experience as a member of various bioethics expert advisory committees of the government. A major catalyst accelerating the development of bioethics in New Zealand was the revelation of Professor Herbert Green's experiment involving selective nontreatment of women with cervical cancer at the National Women's Hospital in Auckland from 1966–1981, which was subsequently the focus of the influential Cartwright Inquiry by the New Zealand government (see Campbell 1989; Manning 2009).

---

[27] Also, Singer has inspired many of his graduate students to become leading bioethicists in their own right (such as Julian Savulescu and Udo Schuklenk), and he has shown himself very capable of helping his students to develop arguments which conflict with his own views.

[28] Michael Tooley subsequently worked for some time in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Western Australia, as did Mary Anne Warren, who made important contributions in applied ethics and feminist perspectives on ethics.

More recently, high-impact bioethics research has also been carried out by philosophers at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE). For example, Thomas Pogge (who has a fractional visiting appointment at CAPPE) established an important research program known as the 'Health Impact Fund', which involves a proposal for a scheme whereby pharmaceutical companies would be financially rewarded for new drugs in accordance with the impact of those drugs on the global burden of disease (see Pogge 2005). Michael Selgelid (2007; Selgelid and Miller 2008; see also Selgelid et al. 2006) has published several innovative studies of the ethical issues raised by efforts to deal with infectious diseases, and on dilemmas regarding dual use, where an emerging technology can be used for beneficent or malevolent purposes. Also, Steve Clarke and Justin Oakley (2004, 2007) have been prominent commentators on the ethics of publishing performance information about individual surgeons.[29]

High-profile Australian bioethicist Julian Savulescu has published widely on the ethics of genetic testing and on many other topics in bioethics, including his provocative and widely cited 2001 article, written while he was Director of the Ethics of Genetics Unit at Melbourne's Murdoch Childrens Research Institute, advocating that embryo selection in preimplantation genetic diagnosis should be guided by a principle of procreative beneficence (see Savulescu 2001; see also Savulescu 2006; Savulescu and Bostrom 2009). Savulescu was subsequently appointed Uehiro Chair in Practical Ethics at the University of Oxford, where he is Director of the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics within the Faculty of Philosophy, Director of the Wellcome Centre for Neuroethics and Director of the Program on the Ethics of the New Biosciences, and he now also has a fractional appointment as Sir Louis Matheson Distinguished Visiting Professor at Monash University Centre for Human Bioethics. A number of other Australasian philosophers and bioethicists have made important contributions to debates about the ethics of human enhancement, including Rob Sparrow (2010, 2011), Nicholas Agar (2004, 2010) and Russell Blackford (2006a, b). There have been lively discussions about the meaning and moral significance of genetic parenthood (see Levy and Lotz 2005; Lotz 2009; Sparrow 2006), the ethical justifiability of prebirth testing (Sparrow 2005; Levy 2002b; McDougall 2005, 2007) and other issues in reproductive ethics (Dodds and Jones 1989; Rowland 1992; Cannold 1998; Coleman 2004), and organ donation (Wilkinson 2007). Neil Levy has been an especially prominent philosopher in the development of the emerging field of neuroethics (see Levy 2007), and his diverse output includes a number of articles in leading journals on autonomy, addiction and related issues of moral responsibility.[30] Another important area of research is the ethics of pharmaceuticals, and a key work here is Paul Biegler's 2011 book *The Ethical Treatment of Depression: Autonomy through Psychotherapy*, which argues that doctors have an ethical obligation to use cognitive behavioural therapy rather than antidepressant medication in treating patients with depression.[31]

---

[29] Clarke and Oakley were awarded the 2004 Australian Catholic University Eureka Prize for Research in Ethics for this work.

A number of Australasians have also been particularly active in research ethics. Colin Thomson and Susan Dodds worked tirelessly on the development of Australia's *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* (2007), which is viewed by many in other jurisdictions as an excellent example of a substantive yet somewhat flexible set of guidelines for researchers and human research ethics committees. Other Australasian philosophers and bioethicists who have made important contributions to research ethics include Paul McNeill (1993), Deborah Zion (1998; see also Zion, Briskman and Loff 2010), Bebe Loff (see e.g., Loff and Black 2000), Lynn Gillam (see e.g., Gillam et al. 2009), Wendy Rogers (see e.g., Rogers and Ballantyne 2008; Lange et al. 2013), Angela Ballantyne (2008a, b), Paul Komesaroff (2002), Martin Wilkinson and Andrew Moore (1997) and current *Bioethics* coeditor Udo Schüklenk (1998), while he was working at Monash University. Bioethical issues involving children is emerging as another area in which Australasia has particular research strengths, with the recent establishment of the Children's Bioethics Centre, at Melbourne's Royal Children's Hospital, by Lynn Gillam, who has carried out significant research in this field (see Gillam and Sullivan 2011), along with colleagues such as Merle Spriggs (2009). Influential work in neonatal ethics has also been done by Dominic Wilkinson (2009), and by Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse (as mentioned earlier), who also joined with John McKie and Jeff Richardson as authors of a series of articles and a book (McKie et al. 1998) on ethics in health care resource allocation. Issues concerning informed consent, patient autonomy and medical paternalism have been another focus of Australasian philosophers and bioethicists, with significant work being done here by La Trobe University philosopher Robert Young (1986) and by Merle Spriggs (2005), among many others.[32] Young has also been an important contributor to ethical debates on end-of-life issues (see, e.g. Young 2007).[33]

---

[30] Levy's 2007 book, *Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century*, won the 2009 Australian Catholic University Eureka Prize for Research in Ethics, and Levy is also the founding editor of the international refereed journal, *Neuroethics*, which began in 2008.

[31] This book won the 2011 Australian Catholic University Eureka Prize for Research in Ethics.

[32] Stanley Benn's (1975, 1988) work on autonomy and freedom has also been important here. See also Gaus (1989).

[33] See also Malpas and Solomon (eds) (1998) and Perrett (1987).

Nursing ethics has also seen some fine work by Australasians, including Megan-Jane Johnstone (2009), Helga Kuhse (1997).

Australasian philosophers have also made contributions to the development of applications of virtue ethics. For example, Waikato University philosopher Liezl van Zyl (2000) provided a helpful virtue ethics perspective on euthanasia, emphasising the virtues of compassion, benevolence and respectfulness, as medical virtues that are particularly important in end-of-life decision-making. And Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking (2001) provided an account of how a stand-alone Aristotelian virtue ethics could be applied to a range of ethical concerns in medical and legal practice. Aristotelian virtue ethics, because of its teleological structure, provides a natural basis for developing an ethic of professional roles, and so this approach draws a close connection between virtues in a professional context and role morality. While many who accept the idea of role morality are not virtue ethicists, Cocking and Oakley linked virtue ethics in professional roles to the notion of role-differentiated virtues, where traits can count as virtues in professional life, even if they are neutral—or even perhaps vices—in ordinary life, so long as they help the practitioner serve the good needed for humans to flourish. This approach can deliver an attractive analysis of the virtue of professional integrity, which involves having and acting with a commitment to serve the proper goals of one's profession.

Apart from bioethics and professional ethics, Australasian philosophers have also made influential contributions to discussions of many other applied issues, such as those arising in business ethics (see, e.g. Cohen 1999; Grace and Cohen 2005), police ethics (Miller et al. 2006), computer ethics, the ethics of nanotechnology (Allhoff et al. 2007) and ethical issues in economics (Walsh and Lynch 2003; Lamont 1997). These efforts were assisted by the establishment of various research centres in applied ethics, such as the University of Melbourne Centre for Philosophy and Public Issues, founded by Tony Coady in 1990; the Flinders University Centre for Applied Ethics, founded by Ian Hunt in 1994; and the abovementioned Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics. There is also a strong body of work on military ethics, with notable contributions by Igor Primoratz (2002), Jessica Wolfendale (2007) and Robert Sparrow (2009), along with Tony Coady's (1988, 2004) work on nuclear deterrence and on terrorism, and Suzanne Uniacke's discussions of the ethics of killing, and of the doctrine of double effect (1984, 1994). Other notable Australasian works in applied ethics are Rae Langton's (1993) innovative critique of free speech arguments regarding pornography, Janna Thompson's (2009) book on intergenerational justice and Gillian Brock's (2009; Reader and Brock 2004) important body of work on human needs, and a conception of global justice.

Metaethics and Moral Psychology

Complementing Australasian philosophers' contributions in normative and applied ethics has been a strong and ongoing tradition of work in metaethics and moral psychology. J.L. Mackie's error theory of morality (mentioned earlier) and his argument that any non-natural conception of goodness would be metaphysically queer have influenced several generations of philosophers here (see, e.g. Joyce 2001; Pigden 1990). The scientific and pragmatic orientation evident in utilitarianism is also seen in the ethical naturalism that characterises much work by local philosophers in metaethics, and underpins some of the recent work in virtue ethics.[34] There have also been fruitful related discussions about cognitivist and noncognitivist accounts of moral judgement and its connections with moral motivation. A particularly noteworthy contribution here is Michael Smith's book, *The Moral Problem* (1994). Drawing on his earlier work on dispositional theories of value and Humean accounts of motivation, Smith develops a cognitivist theory of moral judgement which analyses valuing in terms of rational desires. He argues that such an account can resolve the problem of providing a theory that meets the apparently conflicting criteria of the practicality and the special authority of moral judgements, and that all of us will tend to converge in our moral judgements if we take this perspective on our desires. Smith has gone on to develop this theory further and to investigate its implications for other issues in metaethics and normative ethics. Local philosophers have also provided important critiques of other emerging international trends in metaethics, such as François Schroeter's (2006) critique of contemporary moral sentimentalist approaches.

Another area of recent activity is value theory. Australasian philosophers have been active participants in debates about subjectivist versus objectivist theories of value (see, e.g. Oddie and Menzies 1992; see also Elliott 1996, on related issues). There have also been important contributions to discussions about the limits of morality. For example, Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett (2000) have argued that friendship is inherently morally subversive, because good and true friends are especially receptive to direction and interpretation by each other, even where this leads the friend to participate in certain sorts of immoral activities. On this kind of view, morality and friendship represent two incommensurable sorts of values—there will be cases where friendship is plausibly thought to trump morality, and vice versa.[35] These sorts of considerations have thereby led some philosophers to reject the long-standing assumption in these debates that the capacity to accommodate true friendship is a legitimate test of the adequacy of an ethical theory.

Australasian philosophers have also contributed much highly regarded work on many topics in moral psychology, such as weakness of will (see, e.g. Dunn 1987; Kennett 2001; Jones 2003; Holton 1999; Stocker 1979), psychopathy and moral agency (Kennett and Fine 2004), love (Lamb 1997; Brown 1987) and a series of insightful articles by Michael Stocker on emotions (see, e.g. Stocker 1983b, 1987;

---

[34] See also Jackson and Pettit's (1995) development of a moral analogue to functionalism in philosophy of mind, analysing terms such as good, right, and fair in terms of the role that they typically play in 'folk morality'. This sort of approach to philosophical analysis more generally is an important part of what is sometimes referred to as the 'Canberra Plan'. See also Hamilton (2008).

[35] In her well-known paper 'Moral Saints', Susan Wolf (1982) uses a different argument to support a similar view about morality.

see also Oakley 1992; Marshall 1980). Regular visits to philosophy departments at universities in Melbourne and Auckland by prominent US philosopher of emotion Robert Solomon also helped ensure plenty of vigorous debate among Australasian philosophers on the nature and moral significance of certain emotions, and of emotions generally.

Conclusion

As this survey indicates, the somewhat fragmented and parochial nature of earlier Australasian moral philosophy has given way to a much broader and more international outlook. 14 years ago Tony Coady (1998, Sect. 5) wrote of various Australian materialists' indifference to ethics, with 'one of them famously sneering that "ethics is for girls"—a delicious combination of sexism and philistinism'. But whether or not any such attitudes towards ethics still exist, Australasian moral philosophers are gaining increasing global recognition for their theoretical and practical innovations in ethics. The local emergence of a variety of non-utilitarian approaches to ethics over the last 20 years has also brought a welcome diversity to the field. The rapid expansion of applied ethics here has no doubt helped prompt this wider theoretical investigation, but the increased influence of international debates on Australasian moral philosophy has also helped to broaden horizons in moral theory. While the historical influence of utilitarianism and consequentialism persists, the lively participation of local moral philosophers in contemporary discussions about the nature, merits and applications of a range of ethical perspectives has brought a richness and depth to moral philosophy in this region that had been conspicuously absent in earlier years.

Acknowledgments Thanks to Nick Trakakis and Graham Oppy for their advice, and to Keith Campbell, Roger Crisp, Satoshi Kodama, and Barry and Carmel Oakley for their comments and suggestions.

References

Agar, N. (2004). *Liberal eugenics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Agar, N. (2010). *Humanity's end: Why we should reject radical enhancement*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Allhoff, F., Lin, P., Moor, J., & Weckert, J. (Eds.). (2007). *Nanoethics: The ethical and social implications of nanotechnology*. Hoboken: John Wiley.

Baier, K. (1958). *The moral point of view*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Baier, A. (1986). Trust and anti-trust. *Ethics, 96*, 231–260.

Baier, A. (1987). The need for more than justice. In M. Hanen & K. Nielsen (Eds.), *Science, morality and feminist theory: Canadian journal of philosophy supplementary volume* (pp. 41–56). Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

Ballantyne, A. (2008a). 'Fair Benefits' accounts of exploitation require a normative principle of fairness: Response to Gbadegesin and Wendler, and Emanuel et al. *Bioethics, 22*, 239–244.

Ballantyne, A. (2008b). Benefits to research subjects in international trials: Do they reduce exploitation or increase undue inducement? *Developing World Bioethics, 8*, 178–191.

Baltzly, D. (2003). Peripatetic perversions: A Neo-Aristotelian account of the nature of sexual perversion. *The Monist, 86*, 3–29.

Benn, S. (1975). Freedom, autonomy and the concept of a person. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 76*, 109–130.

Benn, S. (1985). Wickedness. *Ethics, 95*, 795–810.

Benn, S. (1988). *A theory of freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Biegler, P. (2011). *The ethical treatment of depression: Autonomy through psychotherapy*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Blackford, R. (2006a). Dr. Frankenstein meets Lord Devlin: Genetic engineering and the principle of intangible harm. *The Monist, 89*, 526–547.

Blackford, R. (2006b). Sinning against nature: The theory of background conditions. *Journal of Medical Ethics, 32*, 629–634.

Bowden, P. (1997). *Caring: Gender-sensitive ethics*. London: Routledge.

Broad, J. (forthcoming). Mary Astell and the virtues. In P. Weiss and A. Sowaal (Eds.), *Feminist interpretations of Mary Astell*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Brock, G. (2009). *Global justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brown, R. (1987). *Analyzing love*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Browne, D. (1990). Ethics without morality. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68*, 395–412.

Buckle, S. (1988). Arguing from potential. *Bioethics, 2*, 227–253.

Buckle, S. (1991). *Natural Law and the theory of property: Grotius to Hume*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Buckle, S. (2002). Aristotle's republic, or why Aristotle's ethics is not virtue ethics. *Philosophy, 77*, 565–595.

Campbell, A. (1989). A report from New Zealand: An 'Unfortunate Experiment'. *Bioethics, 3*, 59–66.

Campbell, A. (1995). Ethics in a bicultural context. *Bioethics, 9*, 149–154.

Campbell, J. (1983). Kantian conceptions of moral goodness. *Canadian Philosophical Quarterly, 13*, 527–550.

Campbell, J. (1999). Can philosophical accounts of altruism survive experimental data on helping behaviour? *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77*, 26–45.

Campbell, K. (1986). *A Stoic philosophy of life*. Lanham: University Press of America.

Cannold, L. (1998). *The abortion myth*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Charlesworth, M. (1989). *Life, death, genes, and ethics*. Sydney: ABC Books.

Charlesworth, M. (1992). *Bioethics in a liberal society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clarke, S., & Oakley, J. (2004). Informed consent and surgeons' performance. *The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 29*, 11–35.

Clarke, S., & Oakley, J. (Eds.). (2007). *Informed consent and clinician accountability: The ethics of report cards on surgeon performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Coady, C. (1988). Deterrent intentions revisited. *Ethics, 99*, 98–108.

Coady, C. (1998). Australia, philosophy in. In E. Craig (Ed.), *Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy* (pp. 574–584). London: Routledge.

Coady, C. (2004). Terrorism, morality, and supreme emergency. *Ethics, 114*, 772–789.

Cocking, D., & Van Den Hoven, J. (forthcoming). *Evil online*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Cocking, D., & Kennett, J. (2000). Friendship and moral danger. *Journal of Philosophy, 97*, 278–296.

Cocking, D., & Oakley, J. (1995). Indirect consequentialism, friendship, and the problem of alienation. *Ethics, 106*, 86–111.

Cocking, D., & Oakley, J. (2010). Professional interpretation and judgment, and the integrity of lawyers. In T. Dare & W. Wendel (Eds.), *Professional ethics and personal integrity* (pp. 68–78). Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press.

Coghlan, P. (2005). The prodigal and his brother: Impartiality and the equal consideration of interests. *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 26*, 195–206.

Cohen, S. (1999). 'Good Ethics is Good Business'—revisited. *Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 18*, 57–68.

Coleman, S. (2004). *The ethics of artificial uteruses: Implications for reproduction and abortion*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Colyvan, M., Cox, D., & Steele, K. (2010). Modeling the moral dimensions of decisions. *Nous, 44*, 503–529.

Cordner, C. (1994). Aristotelian virtue and its limitations. *Philosophy, 69*, 291–316.

Cox, D. (2006). Agent-based theories of right action. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9*, 505–515.

Cox, D., La Caze, M., & Levine, M. (2003). *Integrity and the fragile self*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Crosthwaite, J. (2009). Gender and bioethics. In H. Kuhse & P. Singer (Eds.), *A companion to bioethics* (2nd ed., pp. 36–45). Oxford: Blackwell.

Crosthwaite, J., & Priest, G. (1996). The definition of sexual harassment. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74*, 66–82.

Cullity, G. (1999). Virtue ethics, theory, and warrant. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2*, 277–294.

Cullity, G. (2004a). *The moral demands of affluence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cullity, G. (2004b). Sympathy, discernment, and reasons. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64*, 37–62.

D'Arcy, E. (1963). *Human acts: an essay in their moral evaluation*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Dare, T. (1998). Virtue ethics and legal ethics. *Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 28*, 141–156.

Dare, T. (2009). *The counsel of rogues? A defence of the standard conception of the lawyer's role*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Darley, J., & Batson, D. (1973). From Jerusalem to Jericho: A study of situational and dispositional variables in helping behaviour. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27*, 100–108.

Das, R. (2003). Virtue ethics and right action. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81*, 324–339.

Dodds, S. (2010). Feminist bioethics. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 181–184). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Dodds, S., & Jones, K. (1989). Surrogacy and autonomy. *Bioethics, 3*, 1–17.

Douglas, C., Kerridge, I., & Ankeny, R. (2008). Managing intentions: The end-of-life administration of analgesics and sedatives, and the possibility of slow euthanasia. *Bioethics, 22*, 388–396.

Driver, J. (2007). *Ethics: The fundamentals*. Malden: Blackwell.

Dunn, R. (1987). *The possibility of weakness of will*. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Elliott, R. (1996). Facts about natural values. *Environmental Values, 5*, 221–234.

Ewin, R.E. (1981). *Co-operation and human values: A study of moral reasoning*. Brighton: Harvester Press.

Ewin, R. (1991). *Virtues and rights: The moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Ewin, R. (1992). Loyalty and virtues. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 42*, 403–419.

Ford, N. (1988). *When did I begin?* Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

Franklin, J. (2003). *Corrupting the youth: A history of philosophy in Australia*. Sydney: Macleay Press.

Gaita, R. (1999). *A common humanity: Thinking about love and truth and justice*. Melbourne: Text.

Gaita, R. (1991/2004). *Good and evil: An absolute conception*. London: Routledge.

Gardiner, S. (Ed.). (2005). *Virtue ethics: Old and new*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gatens, M. (1996). *Imaginary bodies: Ethics, power and corporeality*. London: Routledge.

Gaus, G. (1989). Practical reason and moral persons. *Ethics, 100*, 127–148.

Gillam, L., & Sullivan, J. (2011). Ethics at the end of life: Who should make decisions about treatment limitation for young children with life-threatening or life-limiting conditions? *Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health, 47*, 594–598.

Gillam, L., Guilleman, M., Bolitho, A., & Rosenthal, D. (2009). Human research ethics in practice: Deliberative strategies, processes and perceptions. *Monash Bioethics Review, 28*, 07.1–07.17.

Gillett, G. (1987). AIDS and confidentiality. *Journal of Applied Philosophy, 4*, 15–20.

Gillett, G. (1990). Consciousness, the brain, and what matters. *Bioethics, 4*, 181–198.

Gillett, G. (1994). Killing, letting die, and moral perception. *Bioethics, 8*, 312–328.

Gillett, G. (1999). *The mind and its discontents: An essay in discursive psychiatry*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Godwin, W. (1968). Thoughts occasioned by the perusal of Dr Parr's Spital Sermon. In J. Marken & B. Pollin (Eds.), *Uncollected writings (1785–1822) by William Godwin* (pp. 281–374). Gainesville: Scholars Facsimiles and Reprints.

Goodin, R. (1989). *No smoking: The ethical issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Goodin, R. (1995). *Utilitarianism as a public philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grace, D., & Cohen, S. (2005). *Business ethics: Problems and cases* (3rd ed.). Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Grave, S. (1984). *A history of philosophy in Australia*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Green, K. (1995). *The woman of reason: Feminism, humanism, and political thought*. London: Polity Press.

Green, K. (2012). Virtue ethics and the origins of feminism. The case of Christine de Pizan. In E. O'Neill & M. Lascano (Eds.), *Feminist history of philosophy: The recovery and evaluation of women's philosophical thought*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Green, K., & Mews, C. (Eds.). (2011). *Virtue ethics for women 1250–1500*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Haakonssen, K. (1996). *Natural law and moral philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish enlightenment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hamilton, R. (2008). The Darwinian Cage: Evolutionary psychology as moral science. *Theory, Culture and Society, 25*, 105–125.

Hare, R. (1963). *Freedom and reason*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hare, R. (1981). *Moral thinking*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hare, R. (1993). Moral problems about the control of behavior. In R. Hare (Ed.), *Essays on bioethics* (pp. 50–66). Oxford: Clarendon.

Holton, R. (1999). Intention and weakness of will. *Journal of Philosophy, 96*, 241–262.

Hursthouse, R. (1987). *Beginning lives*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hursthouse, R. (1991). Virtue theory and abortion. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20*, 223–246.

Hursthouse, R. (1999). *On virtue ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, F. (1991). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. *Ethics, 101*, 461–482.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (1995). Moral functionalism and moral motivation. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 45*, 20–40.

Jackson, F., & Smith, M. (2006). Absolutist moral theories and uncertainty. *Journal of Philosophy, 103*, 267–283.

Jamieson, D. (Ed.). (1999). *Singer and his critics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Johnson, R. (2003). Virtue and right. *Ethics, 113*, 810–834.

Johnstone, M.-J. (2009). *Bioethics: A nursing perspective*. Sydney: Churchill-Livingstone.

Jones, D. (1991). Fetal neural transplantation: Placing the ethical debate within the context of society's use of human material. *Bioethics, 5*, 23–43.

Jones, D., & Whitaker, M. (2009). *Speaking for the dead: The human body in biology and medicine*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Jones, K. (2003). Emotion, weakness of will, and the normative conception of agency. In A. Hatzimoysis (Ed.), *Philosophy and the emotions* (pp. 181–200). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jones, K. (2004). Trust and terror. In M. Walker & P. DesAutels (Eds.), *Minds, hearts, and morality: Feminist essays in moral psychology* (pp. 3–18). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Jost, L., & Wuerth, J. (Eds.). (2011). *Perfecting virtue: New essays on Kantian ethics and virtue ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Joyce, R. (2001). *The myth of morality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keller, S. (2007a). *The limits of loyalty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keller, S. (2007b). Virtue ethics is self-effacing. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85*, 221–231.

Kennett, J. (1993). Mixed motives. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71*, 256–269.

Kennett, J. (2001). *Agency and responsibility: A commonsense moral psychology*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Kennett, J., & Fine, C. (2004). Mental impairment, moral understanding and mitigation: Psychopathy and the purposes of punishment. *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 27*, 425–443.

Kilcullen, J. (1983). Utilitarianism and virtue. *Ethics, 93*, 451–466.

Komesaroff, P. (2002). Response to Susan Dodds: Is the Australian HREC system sustainable? *Monash Bioethics Review, 21*, S68–S71.

Kovesi, J. (1967). *Moral notions*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Kuhse, H. (1987). *The sanctity-of-life doctrine in medicine: A critique*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Kuhse, H. (Ed.). (1994). *Willing to listen—wanting to die*. Melbourne: Penguin.

Kuhse, H. (1997). *Caring: Nurses, women and ethics*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Kuhse, H., & Singer, P. (Eds.). (1985). *Should the baby live?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kuhse, H., & Singer, P. (Eds). (1998/2009). *A companion to bioethics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Kuhse, H. and Singer, P. (Eds) (1999/2006). *Bioethics: An anthology*. Oxford: Blackwell.

La Caze, M. (2005). Love, that indispensable supplement: Irigaray and Kant on love and respect. *Hypatia, 20*, 92–114.

La Caze, M. (2010). Feminist philosophy. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 184–188). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Lamb, R. (Ed.). (1997). *Love analysed*. Colorado: Westview Press.

Lamont, J. (1997). Incentive income, deserved income and economic rents. *Journal of Political Philosophy, 5*, 26–46.

Lange M., Rogers W., & Dodds S. (2013). Vulnerability in research ethics: A way forward. *Bioethics, 27*, 333–340.

Langton, R. (1992). Duty and desolation. *Philosophy, 67*, 481–505.

Langton, R. (1993). Speech acts and unspeakable acts. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22*, 293–330.

Levy, N. (2002a). *Moral relativism: A short introduction*. London: Oneworld.

Levy, N. (2002b). Reconsidering cochlear implants: The lessons of Martha's Vineyard. *Bioethics, 16*, 134–153.

Levy, N. (2007). *Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levy, N., & Lotz, M. (2005). Reproductive cloning and a (kind of) genetic fallacy. *Bioethics, 19*, 232–250.

Lipworth, W., Carter, S., & Kerridge, I. (2008). The 'EBM movement': Where did it come from, where is it going and why does it matter? *Social Epistemology, 22*, 425–431.

Lloyd, G. (1984). *The man of reason: 'Male' and 'female' in western philosophy*. London: Methuen.

Loff, B., & Black, J. (2000). The declaration of Helsinki and research in vulnerable populations. *Medical Journal of Australia, 172*, 292–295.

Lotz, M. (2009). Procreative reasons-relevance: On the moral significance of why we have children. *Bioethics, 23*, 291–299.

Mackenzie, C. (1992). Abortion and embodiment. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70*, 55–136.

Mackenzie, C., & Stoljar, N. (Eds.). (2000). *Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency and the social self*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mackie, J. (1946). A refutation of morals. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 24*, 77–90.

Mackie, J. (1977). *Ethics: Inventing right and wrong*. London: Penguin.

Malpas, J., & Solomon, R. (Eds.). (1998). *Death and philosophy*. London: Routledge.

Manning, J. (Ed.). (2009). *The Cartwright papers: Essays on the cervical cancer inquiry of 1987–88*. Wellington: Bridget Williams Books.

Marshall, G. (1980). Overdetermination and the emotions. In A. Rorty (Ed.), *Explaining emotions* (pp. 197–222). Berkeley: University of California Press.

McCloskey, H. (1957). An examination of restricted utilitarianism. *Philosophical Review,* 66, 466–85.

McCloskey, H. (1965). A non-utilitarian approach to punishment. *Inquiry, 8*, 249–263.

McCloskey, H. (1971). *John Stuart Mill: A critical study*. London: Macmillan.

McDougall, R. (2005). Acting parentally: An argument against sex selection. *Journal of Medical Ethics, 31*, 601–605.

McDougall, R. (2007). Parental virtue: A new way of thinking about the morality of reproductive actions. *Bioethics, 21*, 181–190.

McKie, J., Richardson, J., Singer, P., & Kuhse, H. (1998). *The allocation of health care resources: An ethical evaluation of the 'QALY' approach*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

McNeill, P. (1993). *The ethics and politics of human experimentation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Medlin, B. (1957). Ultimate principles and ethical egoism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 35*, 111–118.

Mill, J. (1962). *Utilitarianism*. Cleveland: Meridian Books.

Miller, S., Blackler, J., & Alexandra, A. (2006). *Police ethics* (2nd ed.). Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Mills, C. (2011). *Futures of reproduction: Bioethics and biopolitics*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Mintoff, J. (1997). Rational cooperation, intention, and reconsideration. *Ethics, 107*, 612–643.

Monro, D. (1967). *Empiricism and ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moore, A. (2007). Ethical theory, completeness, and consistency. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 10*, 297–308.

Mulgan, T. (2001). *The demands of consequentialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mulgan, T. (2007). *Understanding utilitarianism*. Stocksfield: Acumen.

Nussbaum, M. (2006). *Frontiers of justice: Disability, nationality, species membership*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Oakley, J. (1992). *Morality and the emotions*. London: Routledge.

Oakley, J. (1996). Varieties of virtue ethics. *Ratio, 9*, 128–152.

Oakley, J. (2003). Medical ethics, history of: Australia and New Zealand. In S. Post (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of bioethics* (3rd ed., pp. 5–1553). New York: Macmillan. vol. 3.

Oakley, J. (2011). Justice, post-retirement shame, and the failure of the standard conception of lawyers' roles. *Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 36*, 177–184.

Oakley, J., & Cocking, D. (2001). *Virtue ethics and professional roles*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Oddie, G., & Menzies, P. (1992). An objectivist's guide to subjective value. *Ethics, 102*, 512–533.

Oderberg, D. (2010). Deontology. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*. Melbourne: Monash University Publishing. http://books.publishing.monash.edu/apps/bookworm/view/A+Companion+to+Philosophy+in+Australia+and+New+Zealand/56/xhtml/chapter04.html#chapter04sec02.

Oderberg, D., & Laing, J. (Eds.). (1997). *Human lives: Critical essays on non-consequentialist bioethics*. London: Macmillan.

Oppy, G., Trakakis, N., Burns, L., Gardner, S., & Leigh, F. (Eds.). (2010). *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*. Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Otago University. (n. d.). Philosophical history: The Otago Department. *Otago Philosophy*. http://www.otago.ac.nz/philosophy/history.html

Perrett, R. (1987). *Death and immortality*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Perrett, R., & Patterson, J. (1991). Virtue ethics and maori ethics. *Philosophy East and West, 41*, 185–202.

Pettit, P. (1991). Consequentialism. In P. Singer (Ed.), *A companion to ethics* (pp. 230–237). Oxford: Blackwell.

Pettit, P. (1997). The consequentialist perspective. In M. Baron, P. Pettit, & M. Slote (Eds.), *Three methods of ethics: A debate*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Pettit, P., & Brennan, G. (1986). Restrictive consequentialism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64*, 438–455.

Pigden, C. (1990). Geach on 'Good'. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 40*, 129–154.

Pigden, C. (Ed.). (2009). *Hume on motivation and virtue*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Plumwood, V. (1991). Nature, self, and gender: Feminism, environmental philosophy, and the critique of rationalism. *Hypatia, 6*, 3–27.

Pogge, T. (2005). Human rights and global health: A research program. *Metaphilosophy, 36*, 182–209.

Primoratz, I. (2002). Michael Walzer's Just War theory: Some issues of responsibility. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 5*, 221–243.

Railton, P. (1984). Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13*, 134–171.

Ramsay, H. (1997). *Beyond virtue: Integrity and morality*. New York: St Martin's Press.

Reader, S., & Brock, G. (2004). Needs, moral demands and moral theory. *Utilitas, 16*, 251–266.

Rogers, W., & Ballantyne, A. (2008). When is sex-specific research appropriate? *International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, 1*, 36–57.

Rowland, R. (1992). *Living laboratories: Women and reproductive technologies*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Russell, L. (2007). Is evil action qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing? *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85*, 659–677.

Russell, D. (2009). *Practical intelligence and the virtues*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Savulescu, J. (2001). Procreative beneficence: Why we should select the best children. *Bioethics, 15*, 413–426.

Savulescu, J. (2006). Sex selection: The case for. In H. Kuhse & P. Singer (Eds.), *Bioethics: An anthology* (2nd ed., pp. 145–149). Malden: Blackwell.

Savulescu, J., & Bostrom, N. (Eds.). (2009). *Human enhancement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scarlett, B. (1992). Moral philosophy 1945–1980. In J. Srzednicki & W. David (Eds.), *Essays on philosophy in Australia* (pp. 51–77). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Schroeter, F. (2006). The limits of sentimentalism. *Ethics, 116*, 337–361.

Schüklenk, U. (1998). *Access to experimental drugs in terminal illness: Ethical issues*. New York: Pharmaceutical Products Press.

Selgelid, M. (2007). Ethics and drug resistance. *Bioethics, 21*, 218–229.

Selgelid, M., & Miller, S. (2008). *Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Selgelid, M., Battin, M., & Smith, C. (Eds.). (2006). *Ethics and infectious disease*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sherman, N. (1997). *Making a necessity of virtue*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sidgwick, H. (1981). *The methods of ethics* (7th ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett.

Singer, P. (1972). Famine, affluence, and morality. *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* 1, 229–43.

Singer, P. (1973). The triviality of the debate over 'Is-Ought' and the definition of 'Moral'. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 10*, 51–56.

Singer, P. (1975). *Animal liberation*. New York: Random House.

Singer, P. (1979/1993/2011). *Practical ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Singer, P. (Ed.). (1986). *Applied ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Singer, P. (1991). *A companion to ethics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Singer, P. (1994a). *Rethinking life and death*. Melbourne: Text.

Singer, P. (Ed.). (1994b). *Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Singer, P. (2009). *The life you can save: Acting now to end world poverty*. Melbourne: Text.

Singer, P., & Kuhse, H. (2006). 1980–2005: Bioethics then and now. *Monash Bioethics Review, 25*, 9–14.

Singer, P., & Wells, D. (1984). *The reproduction revolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Singer, P., Kuhse, H., Buckle, S., Dawson, K., & Kasimba, P. (Eds.). (1990). *Embryo experimentation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Slote, M. (1992). *From morality to virtue*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Slote, M. (2001). *Morals from motives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smart, J. J. C. (1956). Extreme and restricted utilitarianism. *Philosophical Quarterly, 6*, 344–354.

Smart, J. J. C. (1961). *An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press (on behalf of the University of Adelaide).

Smart, J. J. C. (1973). An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics. In J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams (Eds.), U*tilitarianism: For and against*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, M. (1994). *The moral problem*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Smith, M. (2005). Meta-ethics. In F. Jackson & M. Smith (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of contemporary philosophy* (pp. 3–30). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, M. (2009). Two kinds of consequentialism. *Philosophical Issues, 19*, 257–272.

Sparrow, R. (2005). Defending deaf culture: The case of cochlear implants. *The Journal of Political Philosophy, 13*, 135–152.

Sparrow, R. (2006). Cloning, parenthood, and genetic relatedness. *Bioethics, 20*, 308–318.

Sparrow, R. (2009). Building a better warbot: Ethical issues in the design of unmanned systems for military applications. *Science and Engineering Ethics, 15*, 169–187.

Sparrow, R. (2010). Better than men? Sex and the therapy/enhancement distinction. *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 20*, 115–144.

Sparrow, R. (2011). A not-so-new eugenics: Harris and Savulescu on human enhancement. *The Hastings Center Report, 41*, 32–42.

Spriggs, M. (2005). *Autonomy and patients' decisions*. Maryland: Lexington Books.

Spriggs, M. (2009). Consent in cyberspace: Internet-based research involving young people. *Monash Bioethics Review, 28*, 32.1–15.

Stocker, M. (1976). The schizophrenia of modern ethical theories. *Journal of Philosophy, 73*, 453–466.

Stocker, M. (1979). Desiring the bad: An essay in moral psychology. *Journal of Philosophy, 76*, 738–753.

Stocker, M. (1980). Intellectual desire, emotion, and action. In A. Rorty (Ed.), *Explaining emotions* (pp. 323–338). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stocker, M. (1983a). Affectivity and self-concern: The assumed psychology in Aristotle's ethics. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64*, 211–229.

Stocker, M. (1983b). Psychic feelings: Their importance and irreducibility. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61*, 5–26.

Stocker, M. (1987). Emotional thoughts. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 24*, 59–69.

Stocker, M. (1990). *Plural and conflicting values*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Stocker, M. (1996). *Valuing emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press (with Hegeman, E.).

Stoljar, N. (2011). Informed consent and relational conceptions of autonomy. *The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 36*, 375–384.

Swanton, C. (2003). *Virtue ethics, a pluralistic view*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, C. (2002). *Sympathy: A philosophical analysis*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Taylor, C. (2011). *Moralism: A study of a vice*. Durham: Acumen.

Ten, C. (1980). *Mill on liberty*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Thompson, J. (1998). *Discourse and knowledge: Defence of a collectivist ethics*. London: Routledge.

Thompson, J. (2009). *Intergenerational justice: Rights and responsibilities in an intergenerational polity*. London: Routledge.

Tobin, B. (1989). An Aristotelian theory of moral development. *Journal of Philosophy of Education, 23*, 195–211.

Tobin, B. (2000). The virtues in John Wilson's approach to moral education. *Journal of Moral Education, 29*, 301–311.

Tobin, B. (2005). Australian consequentialism: An Australian critique. *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 26*, 165–173.

Tong, R., Donchin, A., & Dodds, S. (Eds.). (2004). *Linking visions feminist bioethics, human rights and the developing world*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Tooley, M. (1972). Abortion and infanticide. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2*, 37–65.

Uniacke, S. (1984). The doctrine of double effect. *The Thomist, 48*, 188–218.

Uniacke, S. (1994). *Permissible killing: The self-defence justification of homicide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Uniacke, S., & McCloskey, H. (1992). Peter Singer and non-voluntary 'Euthanasia': Tripping down the slippery slope. *Journal of Applied Philosophy, 9*, 203–219.

van den Hoven, J., & Weckert, J. (Eds.). (2008). *Information technology and moral philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

van Hooft, S. (2006). *Understanding virtue ethics*. Chesham: Acumen.

Van Hooft, S. (2011). Caring, objectivity and justice: An integrative view. *Nursing Ethics, 18*, 149–160.

van Hooft, S. (Eds) (2013). *The handbook of virtue ethics*. Durham: Acumen.

van Zyl, L. (2000). *Death and compassion: A virtue-based approach to euthanasia*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

van Zyl, L. (2009). Agent-based virtue ethics and the problem of action guidance. *Journal of Moral Philosophy, 6*, 50–69.

van Zyl, L. (2011). Right action and the non-virtuous agent. *Journal of Applied Philosophy, 28*, 80–92.

Walsh, A., & Lynch, T. (2003). The development of price formation theory and subjectivism about ultimate values. *Journal of Applied Philosophy, 20*, 263–278.

Walters, W., & Singer, P. (Eds.). (1982). *Test-tube babies: A guide to moral questions, present techniques and future possibilities*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Wilkinson, D. (2009). The window of opportunity: Decision theory and the timing of prognostic tests for newborn infants. *Bioethics, 23*, 503–514.

Wilkinson, M. (2007). Individual and family decisions about organ donation. *Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24*, 26–40.

Wilkinson, M., & Moore, A. (1997). Inducement in research. *Bioethics, 11*, 89–373.

Wolf, S. (1982). Moral saints. *Journal of Philosophy, 79*, 419–439.

Wolfendale, J. (2007). *Torture and the military profession*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Young, R. (1986). *Personal autonomy: Beyond negative and positive liberty*. London: Croom Helm.

Young, R. (2007). *Medically-assisted death*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zion, D. (1998). 'Moral Taint' or ethical responsibility? Unethical information and the problem of HIV clinical trials in developing countries. *Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15*, 231–239.

Zion, D., Briskman, L., & Loff, B. (2010). Returning to history: The ethics of researching asylum seeker health in Australia. *The American Journal of Bioethics, 10*, 48–56.

Environmental Philosophy

18

Freya Mathews

Contents

Introduction 543
Beginnings 544
The Romantic Antecedent 546
The Critique of Anthropocentrism 550
Ecophilosophies 562
  Deep Ecology 562
  Ecofeminism 571
  The Process Perspective 576
Environmental Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century 578
Aboriginal Perspectives 581
An Australian Panpsychism? 585
References 588

Introduction

Environmental philosophy examines our relation, as human beings, to nature or our natural environment: it reviews our philosophical understandings of nature and our conception of nature's value and entitlements; it explores how we are to live with and in nature and to what degree nature is or is not implicated in our own human identity. The question whether *nature* and *environment* are useful concepts at all, or merely contribute to attitudes that pathologise our relations with our world, is also considered. Environmental philosophy includes in its scope all the core discourses of philosophy: metaphysics, our assumptions about the basic stuff and structure of things; epistemology, how we come to know and understand nature and how

---

F. Mathews
Department of Politics, Legal Studies and Philosophy, School of Social Sciences and Communications, La Trobe University, VIC, Australia
e-mail: F.Mathew@latrobe.edu.au

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_22,

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

different epistemologies reveal different aspects of the natural world; aesthetics, the patterning that may or may not be taken to confer meaning or value on nature; and ethics, the morality of our treatment of living things and systems. Environmental inquiry also overlaps with other disciplines, such as environmental psychology and environmental politics, and is furthermore cross-cultural, since different societies understand and relate to their natural environments in different ways. In Australia two major well-articulated streams of philosophical thought concerning the natural world can be identified: the indigenous and the non-indigenous, specifically the Western. Australian Aboriginal culture is explicitly organised around ‘country’ and the care of it. But it is only in recent decades that Western thought, though equally deeply permeated by assumptions about nature, has started to bring these assumptions to light for analysis and review. Clearly Australia provides a fertile context for intercultural dialogue in this connection. The promise of this dialogue is yet to come to fruition, though the influence of indigenous thought on environmental thought here has arguably been profound.

The main focus of the present chapter will be on the Western stream of environmental philosophy that has developed in the universities over the last 40 years, since philosophy in such an academic sense is presumably the intended object of the present volume. However, the parallel stream of indigenous ‘environmental’ thought needs to be borne in mind throughout, and in the final section some promising new directions for indigenous/non-indigenous dialogue will be indicated.

Beginnings

The stream of thought currently known as environmental philosophy emerged in the 1970s. Three flash points for its emergence may be pinpointed: the USA, Norway and Australia. While I won’t detail the political culture that produced environmental philosophy in the USA and Norway, I would like to say a little about the political context of its emergence in Australia.

Conservation movements had begun earlier in the twentieth century, emanating in native garden and tree preservation societies, and, amidst much greater struggle, a number of national parks (Lines 2006). (The first two national parks—on the outskirts of Sydney and Adelaide, respectively—were in fact created in the late nineteenth century to provide amenity for urban populations, but in the first half of the twentieth century, lobby groups, drawn from bushwalking clubs and scientific organisations, increased the pressure on governments to expand the conservation estate for strictly faunal and floral purposes.) ‘Environmentalism’, however, as a large-scale social movement, burst onto the scene in the late 1960s/early 1970s in a flurry of battles and campaigns to save specific natural sites and systems in eastern Australia. These included the Great Barrier Reef, Colong Caves, Lake Pedder and, most importantly, eastern old growth forests, such as Terania Creek.

The birth of the environment movement in Australia at this particular historical moment was in many ways an offshoot of the 1960s counterculture, environmental activists of the period being predominantly young counterculturalists. The values that motivated their environmental campaigns were entangled with the values that informed the emerging culture of 'hippiedom'. These values revolved around the idea of freedom from authority and from repression and a preference for the spontaneity and creativity of nature and 'the natural' over the standardisation and conformity that accompanied a techno-scientific social and economic order[1] (Altman 1980). The counterculture of the 1960s may be seen as a resurgence and reinvention, for a different place and time, of the Romantic consciousness of late eighteenth-/early nineteenth-century Europe, and young counterculturalists, like the young Romantics of an earlier era, valorised nature, whether in themselves or in the wider world, as a force of creativity and eros not to be subordinated to the tyrannies of an overly regimented, rationalised and authoritarian society. They championed the free expression of sexuality via the sexual revolution; of imagination via hallucinogenic drugs; of emotionality via a rhetoric of love and peace; of the body via whole foods and practices such as yoga, meditation and natural therapies; and of nature itself via a back-to-the-land ethos and an enthusiasm for living in rural subsistence communities. Many of these communities were located in fertile pockets, suitable for horticulture, in the midst of the remaining forests of the eastern seaboard. It was witnessing at firsthand the unregulated industrial destruction of these forests—forests to which the young counterculturalists had, through the rural commune movement, formed custodial attachments—that politicised many of them. Sometimes joining forces with an older, more backroom generation of conservationists, they quickly turned to environmental activism, and dramatic conflicts erupted up and down the eastern coast (Lines 2006; Ajani 2007; Watson 1990).

Another source of environmental activism in Australia in the 1970s however also needs to be noted. Trade unions in cities in NSW, led by the Builders' Labourers Federation (BLF), also mounted conservationist campaigns of their own, refusing to work on development projects located on environmentally or historically sensitive sites. Known as Green Bans, these actions helped save 42 sites from inappropriate development between 1971 and 1974.[2] They had the support of a strong socialist and New Left movement that flourished in academic circles in the 1970s and included the environment in its reform agenda.[3] Environment however was generally a subsidiary of social justice in these Left circles, and the impulse for nature conservation as an end in itself arose more from the romantic ideologies of the counterculture.

It is an irony of history that in Australia, as well as in the rest of the English-speaking world, the philosophical instrument used to articulate the new environmental sensibilities was not Romantic philosophy itself, ready-made for the purpose, but the rigidly rationalist and scientistic analytical philosophy of the mid-twentieth-century academy, a style of thinking as opposed as any style could be to the romantic sensibilities of the counterculture. This particular irony of history was not to be short-lived: environmental philosophy, as defined in those English-speaking philosophical cultures, remained for several decades relatively unmindful of its Romantic antecedents.

---

[1] Interview with Joan Staples, an environmentalist with a long and distinguished activist track record

[2] See interview with Jack Mundey, *Earthbeat*, ABC Radio National, 5/12/1998.

[3] Personal communication with Janna Thompson

It is worth, I think, taking the time here to recapitulate briefly the main ideas and sentiments of Romanticism, because Romanticism was a reaction to an earlier version of the same kind of scientific instrumentalism to which environmentalism was also reacting, and the cultural legacy of Romanticism was still intensely active—albeit subconsciously—in the countercultural milieu in which the environment movement largely took shape. Moreover some of the unresolved dilemmas and failures of Romanticism—failures with sometimes grave political consequences—were unwittingly recreated and re-enacted in the philosophy that grew out of the environment movement. Situating environmental philosophy within a larger history of ideas may help us to avert some of the pitfalls of an unconscious and uncritical romanticism while also appreciating how greatly environmental philosophy might be enriched by reclaiming this particular intellectual heritage.

The Romantic Antecedent

When we cast our eyes back to late eighteenth-century Europe, we find no particular doctrine identifying Romanticism as a movement, any more than we do the countercultural movement of the 1960s and 1970s. What we find instead is a loose collection of themes, themes expressed primarily in poetry and art, though also in philosophy. Principals of Romanticism included the poets Goethe and Herder in Germany; Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Southey and Shelley in England; and the philosophers Schelling, Schleiermacher and Schlegel, and, to some extent, Hegel in Germany. All these thinkers contributed, in their different ways, to a powerful reaction against the European Enlightenment that had, until that time, defined the outlook of the eighteenth century. Though radical in its inception, being entangled at its origins with the French Revolution, Romanticism nevertheless threw a long reactionary shadow down through European history.[4]

The Enlightenment itself was of course the cultural outcome of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. The ‘new science’ that emanated from this revolution, whose architects included Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Francis Bacon and—the one who ultimately pulled it all together—Isaac Newton, entrenched a strictly materialist worldview that was atomistic, mechanistic and dualistic in its ontology and analytical, quantitative and mathematical and inductive and empiricist in its methodology. While I do not have space here to detail all these aspects of the ‘Newtonian paradigm’, I shall briefly sketch some of its major outlines.[5] From an *atomist* perspective, physical reality is divisible into ultimate constituents or units: particles. Since objects are formed through aggregations of these logically discrete units, whose properties fully determine the nature of the wholes they constitute, the material phenomena we encounter in everyday experience can be fully explained by *reductive analysis*—by theoretically breaking those phenomena down into their constituent elements. Moreover, since the ultimate elements may be characterised in strictly quantitative—and hence measurable—terms, such reductive analysis lends itself to *mathematical* formulation. Measurability as a criterion for inclusion also entails empiricism: a thing can figure in scientific theory only if it can be measured, and it can be measured only if it can be observed. When we add to atomism the perspective of *mechanism*, according to which particles and the bodies made up of them are *inert*, imbued with no intrinsic principle of motion, and moving only under the influence of external, deterministic forces, then explanation is further coded as *extrinsic* and *lawlike*: nature is explained in terms of extrinsic, mathematised laws. The entire visible universe of bodies in motion then amounts to little more than a machine—a big mechanical apparatus which has to be in some sense ‘wound up’ in order to run. We cannot escape the conclusion that such a universe is in its essentials inanimate, insentient and ‘dead’ (Merchant 1980).

---

[4] The discussion of Romanticism in this section is drawn from a variety of sources but principally Randall (1965, 1976), Willey (1965) and Thomas (1984).

While this does not mean that certain material aggregates may not become sufficiently complex to develop sentience and eventually even consciousness, it does mean that matter *in itself*, and hence the universe under its most basic and essential aspect, is devoid of mind and hence of any of the various modes or functions of mentality, such as meaning, purpose, agency, intentionality, will, freedom or value. Matter is the fundamental datum of reality, from this point of view. It can exist entirely independently of mind, rendering mind an optional extra in the mechanistic scheme of things. Mind/matter *dualism* is thus intrinsic to mechanism and is definitive of *materialism*: matter may be characterised without reference to mind (though mind may or may not be theoretically reduced to matter, depending on whether mind is posited as a distinct category in addition to matter). Since mind in its largest sense is not inherent in matter and since meaning, purpose and value enter the world as functions of mind, a natural world from which mind is fundamentally excluded, or present only in exceptional circumstances, is a world which is in itself without meaning, purpose and value. In other words, although loci of life and sentience might exist in such a world, the world in itself is not a living thing. It is a ‘dead’ world, with at most tiny islands of life and sentience occurring in it.

Such a universe is in principle transparent to reason. It passively, inertly, lays itself out for rational dissection. There is nothing beneath the appearances, no ‘occult’ interiority that cannot in principle be exposed to the scientific gaze.

---

[5] For a fuller account of Newtonian science, see, among many available histories of ideas, the following classics: Randall (1965, 1976), Burtt (1932), Merchant (1980), Tarnas (1991).

Stripped of the possibility of freedom or spontaneity, responsiveness or communicativity, this universe becomes entirely predictable, entirely amenable to scientific analysis. Where nature had throughout history eluded our human grasp, it seemed, in the eighteenth century, that reason had finally found the key that would unlock all that had hitherto been mysterious and baffling in the universe. That key was science, and in the wake of the scientific revolution, the influence of science spread to all aspects of culture: art, literature, politics and morality were all expected to yield to scientific method. The human heart itself would, it was assumed, ultimately prove as amenable to scientific decoding as planets and particles had. Social life would be understood and reorganised according to a ‘science of man’ just as nature had been understood and was in the eighteenth century being rearranged, according to physical science. In this moment of the triumph of reason over nature, humanity became categorically identified with reason. It was through our reason, and reason alone, that we, and only we, were able take possession of our own destiny and indeed that of the rest of nature, redirecting the course of both human life and nature to suit ourselves.

In an upsurge of protest and reaction against this supremely confident Age of Reason, Romanticism made its appearance in various parts of Europe in the late eighteenth century. The reaction took a number of different forms and subsumed a number of different tendencies. These tendencies included an emphasis on the emotional, imaginative and intuitive rather than the purely rational side of human nature; a focus on the particularity and uniqueness of individuals rather than on universality, standardisation and lawlikeness; and an imputation of mind to matter or spirit to nature, with a consequent insistence on dynamism, growth and organic process rather than static mechanical order. Nature was no more the world-machine proposed by Newton, from the new Romantic point of view, than human beings were the calculators proposed by the Age of Reason. Experience, and not reason, was the essential human modality; in its infinite richness, immediacy, vividness and complexity, experience eluded theoretical reduction or codification, and science, philosophy, art, literature, morality and religion all captured different and partial aspects of experience. This meant, among other things, that in face of the plainly atheistic implications of science, Romantics appealed to the authority of religious experience: faith and mysticism, revealing aspects of reality inaccessible to scientific empiricism, could withstand the secularising tendencies of science. Morality, similarly, was seen as a matter of moral feeling, properly emanating from a natural sympathy for our fellow humans rather than from the deliberations of reason (Randall 1976).

It is a noteworthy fact about Romanticism, important for our later understanding of environmental philosophy and its position on the political spectrum, that Romantic reliance on sentiment and sensibility over reason, together with the foregoing of objective standards in ethics, was conducive to moral and political conservatism, despite the fact that Romanticism originated as youthful rebellion and revolt against rational convention and social order. The reason for this drift towards conservatism was of course that ‘feeling’, lauded by Romantics as somehow innate and authentic, is clearly as socially conditioned as is belief. The ‘inner self’ that Romantics imagined, in Rousseauesque fashion, as original, unspoiled and authentic, and in need of liberation from the strictures and constraints of social convention, was merely a result of conditioning that occurred earlier than the conditioning that produced the social self. Equating the inclinations of the inner self with a more authentic kind of self-expression therefore risked legitimising our earliest-imbibed prejudices and our more immature and parochial impulses, where this did lead in due historical course to reactionary consequences.[6]

The rejection of reason in favour of immediate experience, the 'golden tree of life', as Goethe's Faust put it, also resulted in the celebration of all that could not be reduced to universality in human nature, all that was unique, spontaneous, unpredictable, unconventional and extreme. This taste for psychological extremis, combined with disdain for middle-class respectability, was associated with the Romantic substitution of aesthetic for utilitarian standards. A thing was judged not according to its usefulness but its beauty. A human life was judged according to its richness of experience rather than its social virtue and utility, and landscape was appreciated for its strangeness, wildness or dramatic quality rather than its economic productivity. The pastoral scenes which had been so admired in art during the period of the Enlightenment gave way to dramatic and elemental scenes of wilderness (Thomas 1984).

In their overall approach to nature, Romantics tended to rely on intuition rather than reason: intuition could reveal deeper aspects of the nature of reality than science could. Intuition seemed to point to a certain rapport between nature and the human soul because the fundamental drives or impulses of human nature were thought to be akin to, or in some way sourced to, the fundamental forces of nature. In light of this common source, it made sense for people to 'commune' with nature, and it was in this communion rather than in science that Romantics, such as the English poet, Wordsworth, found 'truth'.

Indeed for Wordsworth, nature was the source not only of authentic understanding but of faith. Of a character in a poem who represents Wordsworth himself, the poet says that though he had learned, early in life, to reverence the Bible, 'in the mountains he did *feel* his faith. . .../nor did he believe/—he *saw*' (quoted in Willey 1965, p. 272). As historian of ideas Randall puts it, for Wordsworth Romanticism was not merely a *substitute* for religion—it *was* religion.

Many Romantics agreed that a greater will or force could be intuited as dwelling within nature. Emanating as they did from societies that were still very much in the grip of Christian ideologies, they conceded that such a will or force might be named 'God' and serve as an appropriate object of religious feeling. Far from being a mere machine then, the world was alive, and God was not so much its external creator as its indwelling soul or principle of life. While this idea resonated with earlier versions of pantheism, such as that found in Spinoza, it was, more strictly speaking, panentheistic, representing God as *in* the world rather than *as* the world. However, in the work of philosophers such as Friedrich Schelling, panentheism took a distinctively Romantic twist: while all things were an expression of the indwelling principle that was God, this principle attained its highest and purest expression in humanity. It was the manifestation of a creative power generated by a primordial principle of polarity; this power struggled up from unconsciousness through continuous, dialectical development until it culminated in self-conscious Spirit—a notion that was made famous by Hegel but originally authored by Schelling. In Schelling's *naturphilosophie*, the world was shaped not by the blind force of causality, as in mechanical science, but by an organic, teleological and holistic principle of organisation in the service of life. Because this primordial impulse was creative, it expressed itself, at the human level, through the activities of the creative artist: it was the artist, rather than the scientist or the philosopher, who entered into closest rapport with, and therefore acquired the deepest insight into, nature (Randall 1965, Chap. 13).

---

[6] See Bertrand Russell's scathing attack on Romanticism in his *History of Western Philosophy*, 1946.

In the briefest of nutshells then, Romanticism represented a wholesale rejection of the rationalism and materialism of the Newtonian paradigm. Reality was, for the Romantic, an unfolding, inspirited unity, of which we were an integral part. Indeed, our destiny as humans could only be understood against the background of this larger life and purpose. Although this outlook is generally described as pantheist or panentheist, it could really be more accurately described, at least in some instances, as *panpsychist*, since the *naturphilosophien* of Romantics such as Schelling were essentially metaphysical rather than religious, their notion of an unfolding, inspirited unity involving little or no essential reference to theism.

Since the natural world was not, in the late eighteenth century, as visibly endangered, at any rate on a global scale, as it was in the twentieth century, relatively little attention was given by Romantics to the question of the protection of nature,[7] though when the wilderness preservation movement emerged in America in the late nineteenth century, it was deeply informed with romantic sensibilities. In the original Romantic period, the focus was on nature as necessary nourishment for the human soul and ground of authentic culture rather than on nature as endangered. Had the Romantics been faced with environmental destruction on the scale witnessed later in the twentieth century however, there is little doubt that they would have been found chained to trees among other long-haired activists on the front lines of environmental resistance.

The Critique of Anthropocentrism

Returning now to those front lines, and in particular to the fight for the native forests in the eastern states in the 1970s, we find in full swing a counterculture deeply if unwittingly imbued with the sensibilities of a latter-day romanticism. Intrinsic to that romanticism was a feeling for the beauty and inspiritedness of nature and a sense of outrage at its rapid and wholesale desecration and destruction by an increasingly mechanised industrial state, whose most conspicuous instruments were at this juncture the Forestry Commissions of various Australian States. With the opening up of a market for woodchips in Japan in the early 1970s, the State forest services, which exhibited little regard for eucalypts, set themselves the task of 'total utilisation' of Australian forests, dedicating, by a few years into the decade, one quarter of the continent's forest and one half of all publically owned coastal forests to woodchipping. The States moreover committed themselves to replacing over a million hectares of native forest per year with pine plantations (Lines 2006, p. 143).

---

[7] The great exception to this statement is the English poet, John Clare, whose entire oeuvre laments the destruction wrought on the English countryside by the Enclosures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

From the thick of the struggle that erupted between this insular and short-sighted forestry industry and its environmental opponents—an alliance of older conservationists with younger activists—stepped two young activist-philosophers who took it upon themselves to devise a philosophical defence of the new environmentalism. Academic philosophy at the time in Australia—and especially at the Australian National University in Canberra, from whence the two young philosophers, Richard and Val Routley, hailed—was, as I have already mentioned, almost exclusively analytical (though a small dash of Marxism was often added to the curriculum). Analytical philosophy was, of course, nothing if not 'Newtonian', modelled quite consciously on science and its methods—empiricism and logical analysis. The Enlightenment lived on, unabated, in the philosophy departments of the 1970s! Materialism, in the sense of a view of reality that divested matter of mind, was orthodoxy, and so committed to such materialism were Australian philosophers that their most notable contribution to international philosophy was the so-called identity theory, a view of mental phenomena that identified them ontologically with brain states, thereby effectively expunging the mental as a distinct category from ontology. Since it was precisely such a materialist outlook that had created an instrumental attitude to the natural world in the first place, it is hard in retrospect to see how the tools of such a philosophy could have been used to construct a defence of nature.

Looking back in 1999 on the academic milieu in which she and Richard had hammered out a framework for Australian environmental philosophy, Val (who was by then, after her divorce from Routley, known as Val Plumwood) commented on the extreme 'hardness and reductionism' of the exclusively analytic philosophy of the period (Plumwood 1999). She admitted the inappropriateness of the analytical approach for the task of constructing an environmental ethic but at the same time expressed a certain resignation at the historical inevitability of this approach: she and Richard had done the best they could with the tools available to them.[8]

---

[8] Plumwood diagnosed the 'hardness and reductionism' of analytical philosophy at that time as a bad case of masculinism, specifically ex-colonial masculinity, in which the colonial 'sons', Australian philosophers, sought to outdo the imperial 'fathers'—philosophers in the Oxbridge tradition—in rigour and intellectual virility (Plumwood 1999).

In any event, the Routleys' participation in the fight for the eastern forests brought to their attention a conflicted ideological terrain of obfuscation, presupposition, prejudice, and sentiment that positively cried out for philosophical sifting and sorting. Embarking on this sifting and sorting, they soon recognised that the environmental problems that had by this time come starkly into public view were the upshot not merely of vested interests, incompetent administration and inappropriate technologies but of underlying, barely conscious attitudes to the natural world that seemed to be built into the very foundations of modern thought. In a series of papers, they circulated to colleagues at the Australian National University, they analysed these attitudes as the expression of *human chauvinism*, the groundless belief, amounting to nothing more than prejudice, that only human beings mattered, morally speaking; to the extent that anything else mattered at all, according to this attitude, it mattered only because it had some kind of utility or instrumental value for us. Such human chauvinism, which came to be known more widely as the assumption of *anthropocentrism* or human-centredness, was a premise, the Routleys argued, not only of the forestry industry, with its narrow-minded reduction of ancient forest to timber resource, but of the entire Western tradition or at any rate the dominant strands of it. Challenging this assumption, Richard Routley posed, in clarion tones, the question: 'is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?' Is there a need, in other words, for an ethic of nature in its own right, an ethic that values the forest, the natural world at large, for its own sake rather than merely for its utility, its instrumental value, for human beings? (Routley 1973; Routley and Routley 1982).

Drawing inspiration from an earlier twentieth-century thinker, Aldo Leopold, and in dialogue with contemporary American environmental philosophers, such as John Rodman, Holmes Rolston III and J. Baird Callicott, the Routleys rapidly worked out the elements, as they saw them, of such a new environmental ethic. They argued that any such ethic must rest on the *intrinsic value* of natural entities, where intrinsic value was precisely the value that attached to those entities in their own right, independently of their utility or instrumental value for us. Intrinsic value, they thought, would confer moral considerability. But how exactly was the hypothesis of intrinsic value to be understood? Did it imply that natural entities would be valuable even if (human) valuers did not exist? Richard Routley assumed that intrinsic value did imply this. He set out the 'last man' argument, according to which it would be wrong for the last person left alive on earth, after some imagined terminal human catastrophe, to destroy the remaining natural environment, even if that environment consisted only of vegetation, rocks and rivers and other insentient elements (Routley 1973). But how *could* value exist without a valuer? Since, the Routleys conceded, the activity of valuing requires some form of mind or consciousness, non-conscious natural entities could not confer value on themselves. The Routleys were by no means prepared to extend consciousness, in some larger sense, to all natural entities. That was the route taken by those inclined towards 'mysticism' or 'pantheism', anathema to the 'hard-nosed' analytical philosophers of their circle, who were for the most part either oblivious or dismissive of Romantic antecedents. Indeed so oblivious or dismissive of such antecedents were they that they considered any imputation of mysticism or pantheism demonstrably a *reductio ad absurdum* of any argument that led to it.

Against such a background of dogmatic materialism then, how was the purported intrinsic value of non-conscious entities to be accounted for? Uncomfortably, the Routleys plumped for a view of value as tied only to possible rather than actual human valuers: if actual human beings did in fact value natural entities for their own sake, as the last man argument purported to demonstrate, then even if human beings ceased to exist, it would still be true to say that, were they to exist, they would value those entities, and this was sufficient, according to Richard Routley, to confer intrinsic value and hence moral considerability on nature (Routley 1973).

Clearly this was a defence of the intrinsic value of natural entities that was not going to convert sceptics. The thinking behind these baffling remarks can only be discovered via fairly deep penetration of the voluminous writings of the early Routleys. Clues are encrypted in Richard Routley's mighty tome, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, but the full argument does not become clear—to this reader, at any rate—until Val provided an account of it in her 1993 monograph, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, which preserved and elaborated, while also greatly extending, many threads of the work she had co-authored with Richard in earlier decades.

The gist of the Routleys' position then seems to be something like the following. Nature is denied intrinsic value in the Western tradition because it has been drained of mind. The reductive materialism that we have inherited from the mechanistic science of the seventeenth century represents the latest and most extreme version of this stripping of mind from nature, but this has been a persistent tendency of the Western tradition since its origins in classical Greece. Mind, or something analogous to mind, the Routleys agreed, must be present in things if they are to be accorded intrinsic value: the aggregations of blind particles that make up the world of mechanistic physics afford little scope for ascriptions of intrinsic value to matter. However, partly in deference to the sensibilities of their academic milieu and partly out of their own conviction, the Routleys were loath to ascribe mind to nature in the literal way Romantics did—the way dismissed by their colleagues as mystical and pantheistic. So they looked for another way—and found it, true to their vocation as logicians, in the logical concept of i*ntensionality*. (Intensionality was the topic of Richard's thousand-page monograph on Meinong.)

In order to understand intensionality, let us consider the following. There are aspects of nature that, while not indicative of mind in the sense of consciousness, nevertheless express properties that are not, and cannot be, manifest to observers. These aspects are not, in other words, part of the *extensional* order of nature, accessible to ordinary empiricism; they cannot be fixed by ostensive reference. Such aspects include the causal powers and dispositions of things, where a disposition is the tendency of a thing to behave in a particular way in particular circumstances. Powers or dispositions cannot be observed in the way that ordinary empirical properties, such as shape, size and colour, can. At the level of appearance all that indicates the presence of a causal power is the fact that whenever event E_1 occurs in certain specified circumstances, it is followed by event E_2. Whenever a billiard ball, A, strikes a second billiard ball, B, for example, that event, E_1, is followed by another event, E_2, viz, the motion of B. It may be *inferred* from observations of this type that there is something in the first billiard ball—a certain power—that causes the movement of the second billiard ball, since otherwise why would the second billiard ball invariably move in predictable fashion or indeed move at all? This power itself however is not observable; it is not manifest in the appearances but is hidden and can only ever be inferred from the appearances, just as the presence of consciousness in sentient beings is hidden to observers, and can only ever be inferred from appearances. Whatever is hidden but ascribable to things in this way, whether it pertains to thought or merely to matter, logically belongs to the realm of the *intensional*.

Intensionality is puzzling to logicians because it does not fit the extensionality of their semantical model, a semantics designed to corroborate an empiricist epistemology and a materialist or mechanistic metaphysic. The semantical model in question is extensional in the sense that the meaning of a term is generally given by its extension, the class of referents the term picks out. So, for instance, the meaning of the term ‘red’ is given by the class of all red things. We learn what ‘red’ means by having red things pointed out to us. We cannot however learn what the expression ‘the causal power of billiard balls to move other billiard balls’ means by having such causal powers pointed out to us. Causal powers cannot be pointed out because they are not empirically manifest. Even the class of all instances of billiard balls moving other billiard balls does not constitute the extension of the expression, ‘the causal power of billiard balls to move other billiard balls’, because causality presumably involves an element of necessity: billiard balls do not just happen to set other billiard balls in motion; there is, or at least seems to be, a certain necessity in such causal sequences. Necessity, together with other modal properties, such as possibility and contingency, categorically goes beyond the appearances: we cannot directly observe the necessities, contingencies or possibilities of a thing’s nature. The meaning of modal terms accordingly also cannot be given extensionally.

In order to explain how modal terms can be meaningful, given that they do not conform to the extensional approach, logicians resort to the apparatus of possible world theory. The meaning of modal concepts is then explained by reference to events not only in the actual world but also in possible worlds. So, to revert to billiard balls, when we say that billiard ball A possesses the causal power to move billiard ball B in specified circumstances, we mean that in all possible worlds in which A strikes B in the circumstances in question, B will be set in motion. It is the holding of this particular sequence of events across all worlds, or across all worlds in which the first event occurs, that indicates the presence of necessity. This is an example of the lengths to which logicians have to go to provide a semantical analysis of intensional concepts: the meaning of such concepts cannot be ‘read off’ the appearances in the way the meaning of straightforwardly empirical concepts can.

However, as Richard Routley pointed out in *Exploring Meinong’s Jungle*—a book that was partly though ‘cryptically’ co-authored by Val—the hidden or non-manifest aspects of the world indicated by intensional terms are not rare and exceptional. Physics is full of them, inasmuch as many of its variables can only be defined dispositionally or via laws which are implicitly modal. When we turn to the sphere of living organisms, the biosphere, such properties abound: telos, purpose and goal directedness; all these properties of living things and systems are cryptic in the intensional sense (Sylvan 1980, pp. 781–789).

Eschewing both mechanism and Romantic-type panpsychism—towards which they occasionally gestured hazily as German Idealism—the Routleys had found in the notion of intensionality a way to affirm that there was something 'inside' nature that could not be accounted for by way of the exclusive externalities countenanced by mechanism. But nor could this mysterious aspect of things be equated with fully-fledged mentality, insofar as mentality was taken to connote the psychological capacity for consciousness. Intensionality, they argued, was an 'intermediate' category, situated in between the two Cartesian categories of mind and matter and permeating thought and nature indifferently (Routley 1980, p. 768).

Why intensional phenomena ought to be regarded as loci of intrinsic value however remained a further question. The fact that sticks and bits of clay and old scraps of plastic are invested with causal powers, for instance, and that causal powers are modal and hence intensional properties does not on the face of it show why we should ascribe intrinsic value to these items.[9] Val clarified the argument later when, in her 1993 book, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, she shifted the emphasis from intensionality to *intentionality*.

Intentionality was a category originally introduced within the discourse of phenomenology as the indicator of the mental: the occurrence of intentional phenomena served to mark the mental off from the non-mental or purely material. Intentionality was defined by the phenomenologist, Franz Brentano, as the property of directedness, of pointing beyond what was given. This, Brentano explained, was a peculiar logical characteristic of psychological phenomena—they did not exist merely ‘in themselves’, so to speak, but were always ‘about’ something else, something beyond themselves. So in our psychological life we think *about*, say, cats or theories or the future or our own potential; we feel grudges *towards* people; we believe *in* gods or ghosts; we have percepts *of* sticks or stars. For Brentano, it was this mysterious ‘aboutness’ or directedness-towards-something-beyond-itself, rather than awareness or consciousness per se, that distinguished the mental from the merely material, the given, the ‘in itself’. Intentionality is clearly an instance of intensionality, inasmuch as it shares in the hiddenness, the crypticness and the ungivenness, of the intensional, but it was understood by Brentano only to occur in psychological contexts.

---

[9] Insofar as I can decode the theory of intrinsic value that was implied in the earlier texts, it is as follows. Intrinsic value was an 'intermediate', intensional property or aspect of things, not empirically manifest but not merely subjective on that account: 'nonjective' was the descriptor the Routleys used for its status, meaning that it was not a straightforwardly empirical property but nor was it merely a function of subjective judgment. The semantic analysis of value terms must thus have recourse to possible world theory, they argued: the fact that an item has intrinsic value may be missed by subjects in this world but will be noticed by valuers in some possible world. Commenting on this theory in a later work, *The Greening of Ethics*, Sylvan explained that intrinsic value was not reducible to some naturalistic property (in a Moorean sense), such as life or sentience, but was a property in its own right, though it might be related to naturalistic properties. Valuers discover 'raw values' in things by *feeling* them. The epistemology of intrinsic value depends on the 'emotional presentation' of intrinsic values to valuers, on the 'environmental sensitivity' of valuers (Sylvan and Bennett 1994, pp. 145–146). Environmental sensitivity, like sense perception, may be warped or skewed or diminished by adverse conditions, epistemological dysfunction or conditioning, but when these compromising conditions are not present, valuers will simply feel the intrinsic value of natural entities and be morally guided by these feelings. 'For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems.' (Sylvan and Bennett 1994, p. 147).

This, at any rate, is the best sense I can make of the Routley's original theory of 'nonjective' value. The theory is always delivered, in the early Routley writings, with technical impenetrability, treating the whole question of intrinsic value as a technical subproblem of a particular branch of semantics.

As a concept which is explicitly invoked as a marker of mind but which marks mind in a nonpsychological way, intentionality served Val’s purpose very well. She pointed out that research in logic over the last 100 years had attempted, by applying the test of intentionality, to demonstrate a categorical distinction between mental and merely material phenomena but had consistently failed to do so: intentional phenomena persistently turned up in nature as well. Properties such as growth, flourishing, function and self-directedness, for example, possess the quality of pointing beyond the given that Brentano had characterised as intentional; hence, they cannot be extensionally defined, any more than psychological phenomena can. In other words, the properties that characterise mind also turn up in nature, and these properties cannot be reductively analysed in terms of the purely extensional—despite the best efforts of logicians so to analyse them. The attempt to restrict analysis to extensional forms of discourse was, Val observed—in line with Richard’s argument in *Meinong’s Jungle*—the corollary, in logic, of mechanism in science, and the failure of this program signalled the failure of mechanism. The mind-like cannot be dispelled from nature.

This argument, which delivered what Val described in 1993 as a weak form of panpsychism (though it eschewed the ‘psychological’ nature of the psyche in question), went some way towards answering the question why intensional phenomena ought to be regarded as loci of intrinsic value, or, since she no longer relied on the notion of intrinsic value by the time of *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, of moral considerability. It was that subclass of intensional phenomena—the intentional ones, the ones that serve as markers of mind—that should be regarded as such loci, though there was no longer any sharp divide between the intentional and the intensional. And it was a particular subset of the intentional, namely, the teleological—properties such as growth, flourishing, function and self-directedness—that Val used to illustrate the argument for moral considerability. All beings and systems with such teleological properties may be said to possess a good or interest of their own and a capacity to direct their own unfolding in response to the conditions of their life.

It is not hard to see how one might find a basis for moral significance in intentionality when intentionality is understood largely in terms of teleology. 'In the intentional stance we open ourselves to possibilities and exchanges which are not just of our own devising. We can encounter the earth other as a potential intentional subject, as one who alters us as well as we it, and thus can begin to conceive a potential for a mutual and sustaining interchange with nature. . ...the intentional stance makes possible the conception of our relationship to earth others in ethical and political terms, where ethics is defined as the domain of response to the other's needs, ends, directions, or meaning.' (Plumwood 1993, pp. 137–138).

In finding a basis for moral significance in the teleological aspects of nature, Plumwood, in this later articulation of her position, joined what was by then a host of other environmental philosophers. What made her approach—and Richard's, to the very considerable extent that he shared in it—distinctive was the way she arrived at teleology through intentionality, an argument for teleology far more subtle and less dubious than most.

Returning now to our historical timeline, the Routleys, armed with at least the rudiments of a new theory of environmental ethics, took on the NSW Forestry Commission with their seminal 1973 book, *The Fight for the Forests*, a comprehensive economic, scientific, sociopolitical and philosophical critique of the forestry industry in Australia (Routley and Routley 1973; Orton 1997). Environmental historian William Lines makes no bones about the impact of this publication: 'No Australian author or authors had ever combined philosophical, demographic, economic, and ecological analysis in one volume as part of one connected argument. The Routleys were unique. They challenged conventional academic boundaries as barriers to understanding and dismissed claims to objectivity as spurious attempts to protect vested interests. They exposed both woodchipping and plantation forestry as uneconomic, dependent on taxpayer subsidies, and driven largely by a "rampant development ideology".' (Lines 2006, pp. 144–145). Their contribution was indeed unique, ranging as it did from the rarefied logical explorations of *Meinong's Jungle* to exposure of the shoddy internal accounting and faulty science of the Forestry Commission.

Meanwhile, others within the small circle of Australian philosophy had begun to respond to Richard Routley's declaration of a 'new, an environmental, ethic'. The flavour of this early debate is captured in a volume, simply entitled *Environmental Philosophy*, published by the Australian National University in 1978. It contained two long discussion papers by the Routleys and several papers responding to them, most of which were gleaned from two national conferences on environmental ethics, one at the University of Queensland in 1977, the other at the Australian National University in 1978 (Mannison et al. 1982, pp. 3–4). Few of the respondents concurred in the need for a specifically environmental ethic, an ethic that broke with the entrenched anthropocentrism of the West. John Passmore (who was unable to attend either of the conferences) had already argued, in his 1974 book, *Man's Responsibility for Nature*, that while the natural environment did indeed stand in need of protection from unfettered exploitation and degradation, a case for such protection could be made in traditional Western terms. He identified several

Western traditions of human/nature relations of varying degrees of anthropocentricity: the despotic tradition, according to which humans were permitted to dispose of nature as they saw fit; the stewardship position, according to which they were entitled to cultivate nature for their own purposes but were also charged with its custody; and the cooperative tradition, in which the task of humanity was to increase the productiveness of raw nature. While despotism, the major tradition, was patently unqualified to serve as a basis for environmentalism, both stewardship and cooperation could be adapted, Passmore argued, to environmental ends. Passmore also conceded that other traditions had at times been influential in the West, traditions he described, respectively, as primitivism, romanticism, and mysticism. All of these were however dismissed by him out of hand, without argument, as inconsistent with science—and hence with reason—on account of attributing mind-like properties to non-sentient natural entities.[10] Like the rest of that early circle, he characterised such positions as *pantheist*, and 'pantheism' was for him, as it was for them, a term of opprobrium and last resort, requiring little in the way of refutation.[11]

Stewardship and cooperation, the Routleys pointed out in response to Passmore, might serve as a basis for the conservation of natural resources for human benefit but would not serve as the basis for an environmentalism that valued nature for its own sake: stewardship and cooperation were both compatible with a total (albeit, in today's parlance, sustainable) makeover of the earth's environment and by no means guaranteed the protection of wilderness that environmentalists of a deeper green persuasion particularly sought (Routley and Routley 1982).

The notion of anthropocentrism, with its implied question of moral considerability—who could claim it and what conferred it—was the axis around which the new discourse of environmental philosophy turned in the 1970s and 1980s. Moral considerability was generally tied to the notion of intrinsic value: an entity was granted moral considerability if it or its properties could be assigned intrinsic value. Peter Singer was already arguing, independently of the Routleys and in response to different questions, that any creature that possessed sentience

---

[10] But Passmore acknowledges, at the very end of his book, that an implicitly ecological paradigm is possible and need not be inconsistent with science: he gestures towards an alternative metaphysics, 'dating back in essence to Heraclitus, [according to which] the world consists of complex systems of interacting processes varying in their stability. Each such system—of which a human being is one—can survive, like a flame, only so long as it can interact with surrounding systems in certain particular ways, drawing upon and giving out to the systems around it.' (Passmore 1974, p. 183). From such a perspective it is clear that human beings are internally related with their environment and that we stand or fall with that environment. Why, we might ask, did Passmore not recognise this as a foundation for a new environmental ethic? It seems that the spectre of 'pantheism', of giving religious or mystical sense to relationality, was what stood in the way.

[11] Passmore in fact made very little reference to Romanticism in his book, though he also, like the Routleys, made occasional vague references to German Idealism, for which Fichte stood as representative. He assimilated German Idealism to the 'cooperation tradition', on the grounds that though Idealists such as Fichte saw nature as animated by Spirit, Spirit found its ultimate and most evolved expression in humanity.

(by which he meant the capacity for experiencing pain) could claim moral considerability, since, according to his utilitarian perspective, wrongness consisted in nothing other than the inflicting of suffering on those capable of experiencing it. Suffering, in other words, was intrinsically bad and pleasure, or at any rate the absence of suffering, intrinsically good. Little stretching of conventional Western moral categories was required then to bring sentient animals into the moral fold, and the publication in 1975 of Singer's concise, tightly argued but accessible and amply illustrated book, *Animal Liberation*, had already helped to launch a worldwide animal liberation movement. On Singer's criterion, non-sentient natural entities, such as insects, plants, rivers, ecosystems and landscapes, failed the test of moral considerability but to the extent that sentient creatures depended on such entities for their existence, a case for their protection could still be argued (Singer 1979).

Among other early respondents to the Routleys' challenge were some who also, like Passmore, rejected the imputation of moral considerability to nature and others who accepted it, though on varying grounds. Janna Thompson, who came to Latrobe from the USA (via a stint of teaching at Manchester) in the mid-1970s, considered anthropocentrism to be inevitable and any attempt to disengage value from human valuers to be incoherent. However, following critical theorist, Herbert Marcuse, she argued for an *enlightened* anthropocentrism, according to which a way of social life premised on appreciation for and receptivity to the joy and, as Marcuse put it, the 'erotic energy' of nature would be conducive to harmony and creativity in society and hence to human fulfilment. The psychology that led to the domination of nature was, from this point of view, indicative of a larger *political* psychology of domination and was therefore ultimately opposed to human welfare (Thompson 1983). In later work, Thompson elaborated this view in two directions, the first attacking non-anthropocentric criteria of intrinsic value and the second offering anthropocentric criteria in their stead. The first direction was exemplified in an influential article entitled 'A Refutation of Environmental Ethics' (1990). The main thrust of her argument there was that however any non-anthropocentric criterion of intrinsic value might be defined, it must prove unsatisfactory. So, for example, the criterion proposed by American environmental philosopher, Paul Taylor, that a thing was intrinsically valuable if and only if it possessed a good of its own, failed to distinguish ethically between organisms, the intended objects of Taylor's ascriptions, on the one hand, and mere parts of organisms, such as their kidneys, heart or cells, on the other. For wasn't it possible to identify conditions that were good for the heart, or good for individual cells, without these conditions necessarily being the same as those that were good for the organism as a whole? So why organs or cells should not be regarded as intrinsically valuable, and hence as morally considerable, in their own right? And why leave out inanimate things such as rocks? Couldn't conditions conducive to the preservation of particular rocks be identified, and wouldn't it follow that such conditions were good for those rocks, where this would imply that the rocks indeed possessed a good of their own? And social institutions and societies? Didn't they also have a structure, a potential, a way of operating that could either be preserved or destroyed, and couldn't they thereby also claim a good of their own? Couldn't such a good be claimed in fact for any thing or system? And didn't it follow that the attribution of intrinsic value was either vacuous, in the sense of applying to everything, or, if not vacuous, undecidable, in the sense that no practical way of deciding to whom or what it did or did not apply was available or, if not undecidable, then inconsistent, allowing intrinsic value to certain entities in accordance with a selected criterion but withholding it from other entities which satisfied the same criterion.

The second direction in which Thompson developed her anthropocentric approach was mapped out in a later paper, 'Aesthetics and the Value of Nature' (1995). There she outlined a notion of intrinsic value that, though dependent on the human viewpoint, did nevertheless, she thought, afford an adequate basis for environmental ethics. Such intrinsic value was *aesthetic*, and Thompson's argument for it rested on two prior assumptions: firstly, that the aesthetic value normally ascribed to great works of art is objective, meaning that viewers well versed in the history of art and well trained in artistic modes of perception can agree on the greatness of the work, and secondly, that appreciation of the aesthetic value of such great works entails a moral obligation to preserve them. With these assumptions as her premises, Thompson argued that aesthetic value might be found in natural landscapes or environments just as it might be found in works of art, and as in works of art, it is present in different landscapes or environments to different degrees. So, just as the Chartres Cathedral is more beautiful than the average suburban church, so the Grand Canyon in North America is more beautiful than, say, an undistinguished bluff on the Mississippi River. Nor is aesthetic value purely a function of beauty: meaning plays an important role. A landscape that is not especially beautiful may nevertheless possess extraordinary aesthetic value on account of its evolutionary or historical significance—its status as remnant grassland, for instance. It is the fact that we must *understand* environments—we must grasp their significance in larger historical or ecological or other contexts—in order to appreciate them aesthetically that makes their aesthetic value objective. Thompson concluded the article with the observation that 'an aesthetics of nature must appeal to what human beings, situated as they are, can find significant, enhancing, a joy for the senses, or a spur to the imagination and intellect', the ethical obligations that follow from such appreciation being accordingly tied to human ways of perceiving and judging (Thompson 1995, p. 305). In more recent work on intergenerational justice (Thompson 2000, 2009), Thompson argues for the importance of preserving and passing on to future generations an environmental heritage that present generations have learned how to value.

More sceptical than Thompson concerning the prospects for 'a new, an environmental, ethic' was John McCloskey. He systematically advanced counterarguments to all the tenets he regarded as core to the notion of environmental ethics defined in opposition to anthropocentrism. These tenets included the claim that living systems are teleological in nature and that the interests or ends of nature must accordingly be respected; that there exists a balance of nature, a natural harmony of things that prevails when nature is left undisturbed; and that nature is an organic whole, every element interdependent with every other, so that disturbance in one part of the system results in cascading ill-effects through the system. Against these claims McCloskey argued that teleology was simply unsubstantiated—an onus of proof lay on those who availed themselves of this claim; the notion of a balance of nature flies in the face of evidence of natural disasters, plagues and devastating diseases that wipe out whole populations and ecosystems; and the supposed organic wholeness of nature is only partial: a degree of interconnectedness does indeed obtain but only a degree; parts of nature can be destroyed without the whole thereby being destroyed. In addition to his objections to the purported metaphysical presuppositions of environmental ethics, McCloskey also rejected the attribution of intrinsic value to *species*. The basis of this rejection was, firstly, that certain ecological entities, such as the tapeworm and the malaria organism, were self-evidently neither intrinsically nor instrumentally valuable, and secondly that at the metaethical level the argument for the intrinsic value of species proffered by the Routleys was basically intuitionist; as such it was as mysterious and rationally indefensible as other instances of intuitionism (McCloskey 1982, 1983).

Another member of this early circle, William Grey (also known as Godfrey-Smith), was well disposed towards the notion of the intrinsic value of nature (Godfrey-Smith 1982), but eventually adopted a position not unlike Thompson's, finding the basis for an environmental ethic in an enlightened anthropocentrism. According to Grey's argument, human goods and goals are inextricably entwined with nature but not with nature under its largest, evolutionary aspect: the successive waves of extinction and planetary adjustments that characterise the process of evolution render nature under its evolutionary aspect beyond the scope of ethics altogether. Human goods and goals are rather entwined with the particular biological fabric of our own immediate world, the world of the present evolutionary era. That present and immediate biological fabric requires protection if the shape and meaning of our own human purposiveness is to be preserved (Grey 1993).

Robert Elliott also appeared to embrace the notion of the intrinsic value of natural entities, though analysing it precisely as a function of the origins of such entities in long and deep evolutionary and ecological processes, in contradistinction to artefactual entities, which originate in abstract human conceptions and intentions. Elliott brought out the force of this distinction by a comparison between fake and original objects: a fake work of art, for instance, is regarded as of little value compared to the original. By similarly contrasting instances of 'ecological restoration' with original and intact ecosystems, Elliott revealed an important aspect of what it is about 'nature' that environmentalists find intrinsically valuable (Elliott 1982; for further discussion see Lo 1999). However, Elliott's position, later developed at book length (1997), also had considerable affinities with Thompson's position, inasmuch as the notion of intrinsic value espoused by him was not, as it turned out, independent of the human viewpoint. It was the valuer's cognitive appreciation of the deep evolutionary and ecological provenance of natural entities that rendered them valuable. Insofar as such cognition was a component of the aesthetic value that Thompson ascribed to natural entities, Elliott's notion of intrinsic value was quite comparable with Thompson's (though he did not discuss Thompson's views in his book).

Early debate over intrinsic value generally would have benefitted from a distinction made somewhat later between the *anthropogenic*, on the one hand, and the *anthropocentric*, on the other. (For a discussion of this distinction, see Plumwood 2004.) All our thinking, including our thinking about value, is of course *anthropogenic*, in the sense that it is an outcome of human neurology and the specificities of human perception and cognition. But it is not for that reason necessarily *anthropocentric*, in the sense of serving exclusively human interests. The specificities of our human cognitive apparatus have certainly been biologically selected, in a general way, to serve human interests, but as a condition for effectively serving human interests they attain a degree of objectivity in their representation of the world, and it is by virtue of this objectivity that we are enabled to appreciate the independent ends of other existents and value them accordingly.

Ecophilosophies

By the late 1980s, early 1990s, arguments for the moral considerability of nature and for a specifically environmental—which is to say, non-anthropocentric—ethic were tending, in an international context, to fall into distinct streams of ecological philosophy. These ecophilosophies—where I shall use this term to indicate philosophies based on a broadly biocentric as opposed to anthropocentric premise—included deep ecology (inspired by the Norwegian philosopher, Arne Naess), ecological feminism, socialist ecology (generally known as social ecology), the land ethic (associated with Aldo Leopold), and bioregionalism. Australian philosophers, including new players who had not been part of the Routley circle of the 1970s, made significant contributions to several of these streams. Environmental philosophies cognisant of the Romantic tradition and its affinities with ecological thought also came onstream in this decade, notably via the contributions of process philosopher, Arran Gare, and philosopher-biologist, Charles Birch.

I shall consider several of these streams of ecological philosophy, firstly in their own right and then in terms of significant contributions made to them by Australian scholars.

Deep Ecology

Deep ecology was launched in a paper by Arne Naess entitled ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement’, published in 1973, the same year Richard Routley threw down the gauntlet with his paper, ‘Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?’ The shallow ecology movement, according to Naess, was the resource conservation movement—the movement to protect and preserve the natural environment for purely anthropocentric reasons, which is to say for the sake of its utility for humanity. The deep ecology movement, by contrast, was a movement to protect nature for *biocentric* reasons—for nature’s own sake: non-human beings and systems were regarded as entitled to live and flourish in their own right, independently of their use-value for us. Deep ecology was moreover 'deep', according to Naess, inasmuch as it asked deeper questions, searching questions about the human relationship with nature. It questioned basic presuppositions concerning society, human identity, the meaning of life and the metaphysics of nature, whereas 'shallow' or 'reform' environmentalism addressed environmental problems from within the frame of reference of the status quo, where, in the modern West, this equated to an anthropocentric, basically Newtonian frame of reference.

Deep ecology was intended by Naess to function not merely as a philosophy but as a social movement. In fact, he distinguished four levels of deep ecology: level 1, consisting of ultimate or metaphysical premises, derived from philosophy or religion (Naess dubbed such metaphysical premises *ecosophies* and elaborated his own, 'ecosophy T'); level 2, consisting of a set of platform principles (see below); level 3, general prescriptions, as formulated in policy or adopted as life style; and level 4, practical decisions made in specific situations. Naess welcomed diversity at levels 1, 3 and 4, but agreement with the platform principles, at level 2, was necessary if one were to count oneself a deep ecologist. It was the platform principles that were taken to define the deep ecology movement.

The first version of the Deep Ecology Platform appeared in the 1973 paper. It was as follows:

1. Rejection of the human-in-environment image in favour of *the relational, total-field image*. Organisms as knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation between two things A and B is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constitutions of A and B, so that without the relation, A and B are no longer the same things. The total-field model dissolves not only the human-in-environment concept but every compact thing-in-milieu concept—except when talking at a superficial or preliminary level of communication.
2. *Biospherical egalitarianism*—in principle. To the ecological field-worker, *the equal right to live and blossom* is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans themselves.
3. *Principles of diversity and symbiosis*. Diversity enhances the potentialities of survival, the chances of new modes of life, the richness of forms. And the so-called struggle of life, and survival of the fittest, should be interpreted in the sense of ability to coexist and cooperate in complex relationships, rather than ability to kill, exploit and suppress. 'Live and let live' is a more powerful ecological principle than 'Either you or me'.
4. *Anti-class posture*. (This might be glossed as a principle affirming anti-hierarchical forms of organisation, whether in human society or in nature.)
5. Fight against *pollution* and *resource depletion*.
6. *Complexity, not complication*. (This may be glossed as another 'ecological' principle according to which *integrated* diversity—diversity that fits together into systemic unities—is favoured over ad hoc diversity or the mechanical diversity of aggregation.)

7. *Local autonomy and decentralisation*. (This is again a basically 'ecological' principle whereby Naess points to a form of organisation, whether in society or nature, that is anti-hierarchical and multicentric and therefore more resistant to destabilisation than 'top-down' forms of organisation.) (Naess 1973; comments in parentheses mine).

In an updated version of the platform that appeared in 1985, the doctrine of 'biocentric egalitarianism' was replaced with a more noncommittal attribution of intrinsic value to all life. A principle of 'vital needs' was also introduced: human beings have no right to reduce the richness and diversity of non-human life except to satisfy their vital needs, the needs that must be satisfied if people are to enjoy a healthy and fulfilling, but not materially extravagant, existence. To this—effectively a call to reduce human consumption—a call to decrease human population was also added (Devall and Sessions 1985).

Naess counted anyone who agreed with these deliberately vague and open-textured principles a deep ecologist, and while deep ecology never became a mass movement, it steadily gained traction through the 1990s as a radical sub-stream of the environment movement.

Within the philosophical literature however, Naess' own ecosophy, or underlying philosophy of ecological self-realisation, called by him ecosophy T, tended to be treated as synonymous with deep ecology. In an article entitled 'Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World' (1995), Naess explained that a biocentric, or more properly ecocentric, approach to the world was not so much an ethical stance as an attitude to the *self*. It was not merely the result of a rational recognition of the entitlement of other life forms to our moral consideration—as argued in environmental ethics—but also the result of a certain view of what constitutes self-realisation for human beings. In other words, ecocentrism was not so much a response to the question, 'What are my duties?' as to the question, 'What is the goal or purpose of my life?'.

In answer to the question, 'What is the goal or purpose of human life?', Naess advanced his theory of Self-realisation: the goal of one's life is to actualise the potentials of the human self as fully as possible. The Self, Naess argued, is not a fixed entity but has a shifting terrain—it is that with which one identifies. Self-realisation is achieved through a process of widening and deepening our identifications—we identify firstly with our own body, then with our family, our neighbourhood, our profession, our various affiliations, our country, our nation and finally humanity itself. However, this process of identification need not stop when it encompasses the whole of humanity; it can continue, taking in still greater wholes or relational unities, such as one's ecological community or bioregion, the entire biosphere, the planet and eventually the universe at large.

For practical purposes though, Naess' greater whole, or Self, was the ecosystem or biosphere, and the Self attained through the developmental process of self-realisation was an *ecological self*. Self-realisation in this sense then inevitably led to ecological consciousness, to a protective attitude to the biosphere. For when I identify with my ecosystem or biosphere, its interests will become my interests; my self-love will expand to encompass it. I will care for it because it has become, through my acts of identification, a part or extension of myself. When this occurs, protection of the environment is no longer an exercise in altruism but a matter of *self-defence*.[12]

Naess was at pains to emphasise that we should seek self-realisation not merely for the sake of the environment but for our *own* sake: it is in our own deepest, truest interests to do so. Self-realisation represents the actualisation of our greatest potentialities for being. Our self is richer to the extent it encompasses wider circles of being, and if we take the basic impulse of the self to be—as Naess, following Spinoza, did—to preserve and increase our own being, then Naess' notion of self-realisation represents the maximal fulfilment of the impulse towards selfhood.[13]

In his own ecosophy then Naess departed from the mainstream of environmental ethics, enjoining us to become environmentalists not from a sense of moral obligation but from inclination. He considered this tack likely to be more effective than the traditional moral one, pointing out that exhortations to moral conduct have not prevented an endless succession of wars, atrocities and injustices down through the ages.

While it was from his own particular ecosophy of self-realisation that Naess derived the platform principles of deep ecology, he invited others to arrive at these principles from ecosophical starting points of their own. In this manner Naess avoided the more coercive, argumentative approach that was characteristic of conventional versions of environmental ethics.

Australian philosophers were among the earliest to pay serious attention to deep ecology. Naess delivered his seminal lecture, 'Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World' at Murdoch University in Perth in 1986, at the invitation of Patsy Hallen, who had been teaching pioneering courses in environmental philosophy there, without contact with the Routleys and their circle, since the 1970s. Under Hallen's supervision, Warwick Fox wrote a doctoral thesis, published in 1990 as *Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism*, in which he provided the first truly systematic philosophical defence of deep ecology, arguing that the idea of the ecological self at the heart of Naess' own ecosophy received confirmation, as developmental psychology, from the field of transpersonal psychology. Transpersonal psychology had been developed in the 1960s by psychologists, Abraham Maslow and Anthony Sutich, who were disillusioned with conventional psychology on the grounds that it was oriented towards pathology. In other words, with therapeutic ends in view psychologists had directed their efforts towards analysing psychological dysfunction rather than providing accounts of psychological flourishing or optimal psychological function. Maslow and Sutich attempted to rectify this via an account of human psychological development premised on a distinction between higher and lower needs. Lower needs, which pertained to physiology, safety and security, love and belonging and self-esteem, were met through successful adaptation to society, and it was the province of traditional psychology to assist individuals to accomplish such adaptation. While higher needs, described by Maslow and Sutich in terms of *self-actualisation*, could not be satisfied until lower needs had been met, self-actualisation itself exceeded the purely adaptive function that was the aim of conventional psychotherapy. In fully actualising their creative potentials, individuals were inevitably carried beyond the expectations of society, transcending purely personal concerns in favour of transpersonal identification with larger constituencies and the goals of such constituencies. Maslow spoke of 'identification-love' and 'transcendence of the selfish Self' and 'a wider circle of identifications……with more and more people approaching the limit of identification with all human beings'. (Fox 1990, p. 201). As Fox remarked, this was 'pure Naess', except for the fact that the limit defined by Maslow was 'identification with the human species', rather than with ecosystems or the biosphere or the universe as a whole (p. 201).

---

[12] Australian activist and deep ecology educator, John Seed, is often quoted in this connection.

[13] Naess does not equate self-realisation with happiness. Happiness is a subjective state, a feeling. Self-realisation is a condition which is objectively either achieved or not achieved. We either do or do not actualise our potentials. Naess thinks that though this state is experienced as positive, and basically joyful, it may not entail the feeling of happiness.

In other words, Naess' theory of ecological self-realisation paralleled but also potentially extended transpersonal psychology. To demonstrate this was indeed Fox's aim. In revealing the parallels between the two discourses, he was seeking to ecologise transpersonal psychology on the one hand, exposing and correcting the arbitrary, anthropocentric limits it had placed on self-actualisation, while also psychologising ecophilosophy, on the other. Psychologising ecophilosophy involved, firstly, demonstrating that Naess' schema of self-maturation was aligned to a major contemporary school of psychology from which it could gain considerable normative force. Secondly, it emphasised Naess' preference for a psychological over an axiological approach to environmentalism, where an axiological approach generally predominated elsewhere in ecophilosophy. Not that Naess' approach was exclusively psychological. His own ecosophy also furnished certain holistic—Spinozist and Gandhian/Hindu—metaphysical underpinnings for the idea of ecological selfhood. Frequently, however, his strategy was to offer his readers an appealing vision of psychological fulfilment rather than attempting to prove, by argument, that nature was a locus of intrinsic value and therefore entitled to moral consideration, at whatever cost to our own self-interest. As Fox put it, Naess *invites* the reader's allegiance rather than *demanding* their compliance (Fox 1990, 243). Transpersonal ecologists—as Fox now renamed deep ecologists—did not need to *prove* the correctness of their approach because they were not laying down the law for readers. They were rather seeking to redraw the schema of self-in-reality in ways that would conform to people's intuitive sense of the fitness of things.

Other philosophers in Australia also joined the deep ecology debate. In 1991 Andrew Brennan moved from Scotland to the University of Western Australia to take up the Chair of Philosophy there. In his book, *Thinking about Nature: an Investigation of Nature, Value and Ecology*, published in 1988, Brennan had tried to draw out the implications of scientific ecology in a way consistent with the normative thrust of deep ecology yet eschewing what he took to be its holistic metaphysical commitments. Brennan was seeking to do justice to the moral claims of ecology without taking the step, clearly considered illiberal by him, of subsuming individuals under greater wholes. He offered various analyses of part-whole relations which preserved the functional autonomy of parts: individuals, though parts of larger systems, were not to be individuated, he argued, in terms of their functional roles in greater wholes; they were not to be understood as essentially ‘good for something’ other than themselves. Individuals were intrinsically functionless; they just were what they were. They were thus to be defined in terms of certain essential properties, such as anatomy and physiology, which made no reference to entities beyond themselves, though these individuals could also be inessentially characterised in terms of relations to external entities, where these relations included ecological ones.

In order to defend the autonomy of individuals, Brennan argued—against the popular or ‘folk’ ecology to which he saw deep ecologists as misguidedly adhering—that scientific ecology is neither holistic nor teleological. Ecosystems are not teleological entities unfolding, intentionally, towards a good of the system; they are rather contingent biological populations or communities whose presumed systemic properties, such as diversity, stability and equilibrium, are either non-existent or the result of stochastic processes. It made no sense then to assert, as Warwick Fox did, that there were ‘no firm ontological divides’ in reality: reality did indeed consist of individuals. If ontological holism made no sense however, then neither did Naess’ notion of ecological self-realisation, the recognition by the self of its essential continuity with a greater systemic unity, or Self. Yet Brennan did, at the same time, wish to acknowledge the normative significance of ecology: scientific ecology did imply, he argued, that individual organisms possess ecological properties, properties that supervene on their relationships with external entities. It was just that these properties were supervenient rather than essential to the individuals in question. So, for example, our human dentition, being anatomical, is essential to our identity as humans, yet it has evolved in response to the foods we eat and is thus a product of a certain set of relationships with other species. This specific set of relationships is not *internal* to our identity, in the way that deep ecologists had suggested—such relationships are not part of what makes us who we are—but the fact that we stand in such relationships is indeed a property of ours. Moreover, some such external relations, and the properties that supervene on them, are inevitable concomitants of our biological existence, as scientific ecology attests: we necessarily exist in, and are shaped by, external populations and communities. It makes sense, in light of this bio-existential condition, that we should ally ourselves with larger populations or communities, not as an abrogation of our autonomy but as an acknowledgment of this basic fact of our existence. Indeed, far from being an abrogation of our autonomy, such an act of *choosing* is an exercise of that autonomy: in choosing to assume solidarity with wider populations or communities, we both *assert* our autonomy, as choosers, and qualify it, through ethical commitment to an external environment.

Freya Mathews also approached the idea of ecological interconnectedness from an explicitly metaphysical rather than psychological point of view. Recognising that identification of self with a wider nature was only sane, as opposed to delusional, if there were indeed some kind of ontological continuity between self and nature, she argued, in her 1991 book, *The Ecological Self*, that nature could be seen, counter to the mechanistic paradigm, both as a field-like unity and as a manifold of individuals. Drawing on cosmological physics, systems theory and—like Naess—Spinoza, she argued that while the cosmological texture of reality was field-like, internal differentiation of the primal field allowed for the configuration of relatively stable particulars. Among these were systems-formations, and among systems a special class could be identified, namely, self-realising systems. Self-realising systems were those that were so constituted as actively to seek their own self-preservation and self-increase by way of directed exchange with elements of their environment. Paradigmatic among self-realising systems were organisms, but certain other kinds of formation, such as ecosystems, the biosphere and the cosmos at large, might arguably also qualify as self-realising systems, or 'selves', as Mathews dubbed them. The disposition of selves to preserve and increase themselves was seen by Mathews as constituting a *conative* impulse; the conativity of selves set them apart from purely mechanical systems and constituted self-value. Selves were intrinsically valuable because their reflexive efforts at self-preservation were an exercise in self-valuing. Intrinsic value could indeed be figured as the value that things possessed independently of human valuers, but it was not value that was independent of valuers: selves possessed intrinsic value because, by virtue of their essential conativity, they valued themselves.

Mathews' argument sought to show then that holism was not inconsistent with relative individuation; indeed, it was only by way of the essential interactivity of selves with elements of their environment that the processes of individuation that gave rise to them could occur: individuation in this dynamic, systems-sense actually *required* interrelationality. However, although individuation was possible within, indeed required, a relational-holistic context, it was nevertheless selective: true selves were the exception in the realm of physical particulars. Entities that did not themselves actively create or secure the conditions for their own existence—such as kidneys and rocks, to refer back to Thompson's argument—did not qualify. This systems-context, which made sense of value without a (human) valuer, also provided a foundation for the deep ecological identification of the human self with wider wholes. The human self was indeed continuous with, and constituted by its relations with, elements of its environment, so the interests of those elements were indeed implicated in the interests of the self, but this in no way implied absolute ontological subsumption of self into whole.

Mathews later developed the idea of conativity—the animating principle of selves, including the cosmic self—into a more full-blown cosmological panpsychism. In her 2003 book, *For Love of Matter: a Contemporary Panpsychism*, the manifest world, as described by physics, was represented as the outward appearance of an inner field of 'subjectivity', in an expanded sense of subjectivity.

Reality was again, from this viewpoint, both a unity and a manifold of differentia, a One and a Many. Viewed from within, it was a field of subjectivity, with a conativity of its own and a capacity for communication; from the viewpoint of its finite modes or those of them constituted as selves, it was an order of extension, as represented by physics. As a locus of subjectivity and conativity in its own right, the universe, as One, was capable of and actively sought communicative engagement with finite selves, the Many. Wherever such engagement occurred, it was manifest in a *communicative* order that unfolded alongside the *causal* order. This communicative order, or order of meaning, exceeded the causal order but in no way contradicted it.

From within the framework of such a cosmological metaphysics a normative modality emerged. It was a relational modality of conative engagement that enabled the world to persevere and cohere through creative change. Mathews called it *synergy* and defined it as an energic exchange 'in which each party adapts its own rhythm, in some activity, to that of another, producing, in consequence, a new energic synthesis harmonious with the rhythms of both parties'. (Mathews 2003, p. 144). Synergy enables us proactively to engage with the world, and to change it, but in a way that does not disrupt its own nature: the change we bring is *with* the grain of the world's own conativity rather than against it, and such change simply represents a further unfolding of world, rather than the subordination of its ends to ours. Synergy then, according to Mathews' account of it, furnished a normative modality: it afforded a way of acting on the world that did not reduce to the instrumentalisation characteristic of the West (Mathews 2005, 2006).

Another book that appeared in 1991, *A Morally Deep World*, by Lawrence Johnson from the University of Adelaide, also argued along 'deep' lines. Johnson, like Paul Taylor, construed the good, morally speaking, in terms of well-being. Any life process with a degree of organic unity and self-identity sufficient to endow it with well-being interests qualified as morally considerable. Such life processes could be identified at a number of levels—not only at the level of the individual organism, ecosystem or biosphere but also at the level of species: things can turn out better or worse for a species just as they can for an individual organism. Some species flourish while others decline. Something can thus be defined as a life process with interests (in the case of species, a 'genetic lineage') without being in any way a subject of sentience or consciousness. Johnson emphasised that there was no neat way of tying up the various levels of value via strict rules and rankings. Like so many other environmental philosophers, he was critical of the—perceived—holism of deep ecology. The interests of both individuals and wholes needed to be taken into account, and no simple flattening out of the interests of all into a presumptive 'biocentric egalitarianism' could do justice to the multi-layered, multi-valent nature of the moral terrain. Appropriate morality was a matter of *attitude*, of respect and consideration for all entities with interests. We should aim to forge a *modus vivendi* consistent in a general way with the overall balance of nature.

Richard Routley, who was by this time, after his divorce from Val in the early 1980s, known as Richard Sylvan, took strenuous exception to deep ecology. In several papers in the 1980s, he positively ranted against it, excoriating it as a 'conceptual bog', 'rubbish', 'afflicted' and 'degenerate', by which he meant that he found it insufficiently rigorous (Sylvan 1985a, b). The fact that deep ecology implied, for all practical purposes, 'a new, an environmental, ethic' such as Sylvan himself had called for and that it did indeed converge with his own project at many, perhaps most, points, did not succeed in endearing it to him. Nor did it seem to occur to Sylvan that Naess, who could himself write with extreme technical pedantry when he so chose, was intentionally writing not primarily for an audience of logicians but for the general reader, with a view to creating a social movement for change. Most of Sylvan's voluminous work in environmental philosophy had been scholastic in the extreme and impenetrable to the general reader or indeed to any reader other than the professional analytical philosopher interested in semantics. A great deal of it had been published in-house, apparently unedited, by the Research School of Social Sciences at the ANU where Sylvan was a research fellow. Little of his work accordingly had currency outside narrow academic circles. (*The Fight for the Forests* was an exception in this respect.)

In the early 1990s, Sylvan attempted to rectify this with a book, *The Greening of Ethics*, co-authored with David Bennett, setting out his own position relatively concisely and readably and distinguishing it from deep ecology. Appropriating Naess' shallow/deep distinction, he characterised his position as deep green theory. He conceded that deep green theory concurred with deep ecology on the latter's platform principles, particularly in respect of its commitment to the 'intrinsic value' of natural entities, but he dissociated deep green theory from Naess' notion of the ecological self and the norm of Self-realisation. In place of Naess' environmental psychology or phenomenology, Sylvan opted squarely for ethics proper as the motivating force for environmental activism, giving careful attention to the axiological and logical aspects of ethical theory.

Whether or not this did strictly mark a departure from deep ecology is open to question, since the notion of ecological self-realisation belonged to Naess' ecosophy rather than to the deep ecology platform. Naess himself would presumably have been happy to embrace Sylvan's ethics as simply one ecosophy among others lending support to the platform. However, as I have already remarked, Warwick Fox had nominated ecological self-realisation as the distinctive feature of the deep ecology approach, so to this extent Sylvan could legitimately claim that the axiological emphasis of deep green theory distinguished it from deep ecology. Among other points of difference from deep ecology that Sylvan claimed for deep green theory was its eschewal of the supposedly extreme holism of deep ecology. However, to characterise deep ecology in terms of extreme holism was to caricature it, since, as Mathews had demonstrated and as Fox again noted, 'the fact that we and all other entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality means neither that all entities are fundamentally the same nor that they are absolutely autonomous, but rather that they are relatively autonomous—a fact that emerges not only from ecological science but also from physics, evolutionary biology, and recent systems-oriented work on autopoietic systems and dissipative structures'. (Fox 1990, p. 232).[14] Further seeking to distinguish his position from deep ecology, Sylvan substituted a principle of eco-impartiality for that of biocentric egalitarianism, again ignoring the fact that Naess had already by that stage removed biocentric egalitarianism from the deep ecology platform.[15]

The major substantive difference between these two 'deep' positions seems really to lie in the more exclusionary temper of deep green theory. Sylvan was particularly anxious to dissociate deep green theory from the pagan and spiritual perspectives that claimed affinities with deep ecology, favouring instead a sceptical and anti-spiritual orientation aligned with science. Once again, this would not, for Naess himself, have set deep green theory apart from the deep ecology movement, since Naess was open to any 'worldview' (ecosophy), from the spiritual to the scientific, provided it subtended the deep ecology platform (and several Australian ecophilosophers sympathetic to deep ecology, such as Fox himself, Hallen and Mathews, regularly referenced science in their writings). But this was clearly an important line of demarcation for Sylvan and harked back to the aversion of his earlier circle for views dismissed by them, without argument, as 'mystical' and 'pantheist'.[16]

Ecofeminism

Ecofeminists approached the question of the moral considerability of nature from a different quarter. Why, they asked, had nature in the Western tradition been instrumentalised, stripped of moral considerability and subjugated, in the first place? Their answer was that this subjugation was conceptually tied to other, political subjugations, particularly the subjugation of women. The category of nature was the cornerstone of a conceptual system organised around inter-defining pairs of mutually exclusive and differentially ranked categories, such as nature/culture, mind/matter, spirit/matter, mind/body, reason/nature, reason/emotion, human/animal, civilised/primitive, theory/practice, science/superstition, mental/manual, white/black and masculine/feminine. This gendered conceptual system, to which ecofeminists referred as *dualism*, had evolved over the course of Western civilisation but culminated in classical science. Its ideological purpose was to legitimise the domination of women but also the domination of a number of other groups, including the working class and colonised peoples. The dualistic construction of 'nature' as mere matter, as sheer mechanism, devoid of any self-animating principle, rendered nature a moral nullity. Being identified as 'closer to nature' than a presumptive (implicitly masculinist) human norm, women could then be assimilated to this moral nullity, where such moral nullification implicitly legitimated their subordination. The rationale for representing women as closer to nature than men was that women's role in reproduction placed women in the biological service of their own bodies and of the species, in a way that was not true for men. Moreover, the social practices of women in the private sphere, like those of other subordinated groups in other marginalised spheres of work, had traditionally been menial, repetitive, immediate, unreflective, implicated in the mess or grit of sheer physical, often biological, process rather than pitched at the more abstract level at which the professional projects of white middle-class men tended to be conceived and executed in the public sphere. It followed from this analysis that the deconstruction of the dualistic conception of nature was key not only to the emancipation of the natural world itself but also to that of women and other subjugated groups. The deconstruction of the dualistic conception of nature ultimately involved restoring mentality or inner directedness, in some not necessarily psychological sense, to nature, thereby restoring its moral status.

---

[14] In later work Val Plumwood also insisted on the extreme holism of deep ecology, ignoring detailed accounts of systems-theoretic criteria of individuation, such as appeared, for instance, in Mathews 1991.

[15] In *Towards a Transpersonal Ecology*, Warwick Fox pointed out that Naess did not intend *biocentric egalitarianism* as a formal philosophical position but merely as a statement of non-anthropocentrism. 'The abstract term 'biocentric egalitarianism in principle', and certain similar terms that I have used, do perhaps more harm than good. They suggest a positive *doctrine*, and that is too much. The importance of the intuition is rather its capacity to counteract the perhaps only momentary, but consequential, self-congratulatory and lordly attitude towards what seems less developed, less complex, less miraculous.' (Naess quoted in Fox 1990, p. 224).

[16] On the other hand, it could admittedly be frustrating for thinkers to be subsumed under deep ecology and deprived of their own position, just because they were of a broadly anti-anthropocentric orientation. Individuals with strong commitments to other social or philosophical agendas in addition to anti-anthropocentrism might well balk at being blithely included in a broad church that included some of their major opponents. So, for example, ecofeminists might not want to be identified with a movement that included hunters and shooters such as Aldo Leopold; and neither green Christians not green scientists might want to be popped into bed with pagans and witches. In this sense, Naess' 'inclusiveness' could be seen as co-optive and incorporating rather than genuinely respectful of difference.

The definitive treatment of this ecofeminist argument was furnished by Val Plumwood in her 1993 classic, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*, but Plumwood was also building on the work of Australian scholars, Ariel Salleh and Patsy Hallen, among many others in the international ecofeminist movement.

Patsy Hallen, a Canadian philosopher who had taken up her position at Murdoch University in the mid-1970s, after a stint of teaching in Africa, drew on the relational epistemologies and critiques of science that feminism was providing through the 1980s in order to argue for a new science that would bring knowers into relationship with the natural world, rather than separating them from it. Feminist standpoint theorists such as Evelyn Fox Keller and Sandra Harding had argued, from feminist psychoanalytic premises, that the objectifying stance of science, its requirement of emotional distance from the object of investigation and its deployment of an invasive experimental method ('torturing the secrets out of nature', as Francis Bacon had notoriously put it in the seventeenth century) expressed a masculine orientation of self to other. This was an orientation of dissociation and domination formed in the early psychodynamics of the individuation of a male child from a female primary parent. Science was a masculine project in which male practitioners acted out a profoundly unconscious agenda of separating from and triumphantly overcoming the primal ground of existence—nature—figured as feminine. Hallen argued that ecology, as a story about the intrinsic interrelatedness of things, could never be served by a form of science guided by such a psychosexual orientation and that a new science, expressive of a new, relational orientation to the world, was required to enable the relational promise of ecology to be fulfilled, epistemologically, ethically and in our social practice. Feminism, Hallen argued, could supply the relational epistemology that would underpin such a science, an epistemology that would emanate from a psychology that would in turn be formed in the early psychodynamics of non-patriarchal families (Hallen 1995).

Ariel Salleh was an Australian sociologist who made important contributions to ecophilosophy. Her article, ‘Deeper than Deep Ecology’, represented the first salvo fired in the great deep ecology-ecofeminism debate of the 1980s–1990s (Salleh 1984). In this article Salleh accused deep ecologists of masculinist bias both in their general approach and in many of their central tenets. She argued that, in taking anthropocentrism as their target, deep ecologists had missed the mark. In advocating a psychology of identification with nature, rather than the kind of opposition to it that anthropocentrism implied, deep ecologists—predominantly men—had overlooked the fact that such opposition to nature, though characteristic of men in Western societies, was not characteristic of women. Women, by reason of their reproductive biology and their historical positioning as domestic and care workers, were already relatively attuned to the rhythms and rhymes of nature and could not generally be classed as anthropocentric in outlook. In their social relations and gender identity, they already instantiated many of the values Naess was advocating: women were not conditioned to a psychology and practice of domination as men were, so they were non-hierarchical in their basic attitudes—egalitarian, decentralised and relational in the organisation of their own social formations and in the same sense anti-class and open to diversity in their orientation. In Western society it was men, not people generally, who were in need of deep ecological reform. *Androcentrism* then, rather than anthropocentrism, was the proper target for ecological critique. To end the domination of nature, overthrow of *patriarchy* was required.

On the question of whether women were *actually* closer to nature than men, or whether this was merely a patriarchal construction of femininity, Salleh maintained a complex ambivalence (Salleh 1992). While both genders were of course, in an absolute sense, equally part of and subject to nature, women’s reproductive biology and enforced social practice in the private sphere really did leave less room in their lives for the kind of abstractly premeditated, self-individuating, world-transforming projects whereby men, acting in the public sphere, sought to ‘make their mark’ on a nature figured as theirs to manipulate. This difference in orientation was furthermore imprinted in feminine consciousness by value-laden patriarchal conditioning. In insisting on this difference and re-valorising it, Salleh was espousing the kind of 'gynocentrism' which had originated in the cultural feminism of the 1970s and 1980s but which became unpopular in the more deconstructive academic climate of the 1990s and beyond. Indeed the anathematisation of the gynocentric stance, coded as 'essentialism', became one of the driving forces of later feminist theory. Nor was this stance preserved in many later versions of ecofeminism itself, being rejected by Plumwood, for instance, as the ineffective strategy of 'reversal', of merely reclaiming and re-valorising the terms on the inferiorised, 'feminine' side of the dualistic table of opposites, without dismantling the dualisms themselves (Plumwood 1993). As an ecosocialist, however, Salleh has continued, in her later work, to hold to this 'separate standpoint' position, representing it as indispensible, in an international framework, to the historical materialism that must ground any defensible program of ecosocialist reform. Women in the West may, as a result of the gains achieved by feminism itself, have lost the sense of a distinctive feminine experience, but the majority of women in the world today are still enmeshed in complex patriarchal formations: 'the majority of women are oppressed, both as gendered feminine and as sexed female bodies'. (Salleh 2005, p. 11). This feminine and female experience orients them very differently than men to their societies and to nature. Any attempt to change the consciousness of societies internationally along ecological lines must take account of, and draw upon, the different orientation of women in those societies: 'as primary care givers and community food producers, women are also the quintessential experts in precautionary wisdom and practitioners of sustainability' (Salleh 2005, p. 12). Ecological reform must, like other movements for political reform, be configured within a prism of historical materialism, and the materialist base of social identity and consciousness must be acknowledged to include, in line with feminist insights, the experience of the body. Such an 'embodied materialism' will of course also include in its analysis the experience of other differently economically, culturally and corporeally situated groups, such as indigenes and variously deployed classes of workers. Ecofeminism and ecosocialism must thus ultimately be subsumed, for Salleh, under a more encompassing *embodied materialism*.

The ecofeminist critique of deep ecology identified many other instances of masculine bias. Just as liberal and deep green theorists did, ecofeminists took issue, for example, with the supposedly absolute holism of deep ecology, accusing deep ecologists of incorporating and obliterating otherness in their pursuit of the expanded sense of self rather than engaging with the variegated multiplicity of nature as a community of life (Plumwood 1993). Warwick Fox was singled out for criticism on the grounds of a purportedly masculinist over-abstraction in his approach—for his favouring of 'cosmological' identification with nature, in the pursuit of ecological selfhood, rather than affective engagement with near-to-hand particulars—the kind of 'care perspective' preferred by ecofeminists (Plumwood 1993).

Ecofeminists were joined worldwide in their attack on deep ecology not only by deep green and liberal theorists but by social ecologists, led by Murray Bookchin in the USA, as well as by postcolonialists and critical theorists. Deep ecologists were castigated as misanthropic, since deep ecology seemed to prioritise the interests of nature over those of the world's poor and dispossessed. Marxists often equated the supposed 'mysticism' of deep ecologists with religion, which they saw, in historical materialist terms, as an expression of the class interests of middle-class radical environmentalists, who placed their feelings for and recreational interests in wilderness above the livelihood of forestry workers and impoverished constituencies of developing nations (Watson 1990). By social ecologists, deep ecology was also dismissed as politically naïve, its prescriptions for change being deemed to lack any analysis either of political power or of consciousness formation. (For a spirited Australian defence of deep ecology against some of these charges, see Eckersley 1989, 1992.) Everyone, it seemed, took a swipe at deep ecology, and Fox, for one, spent a lot of time defending it (Fox 1986, 1989, 1990). But the perceived essentialism of some strands of ecofeminism caused it, too, to be widely disparaged, both by other feminists and by social ecologists (Biehl 1991).

In more recent years Fox, who took up a position at the University of Central Lancashire in the UK in 1998, has distanced himself from deep ecology. He has developed a unified ethical theory of his own—a General Theory of Ethics (with a nod to the General Theory of Relativity in physics)—designed to cover all fields of ethical concern, from the environmental through the interpersonal and social to the ethics of design for the built environment. This theory turns around the central category of 'responsive cohesion', an elegant term signifying the relational (and systems-theoretic) quality of mutual accommodation and responsiveness that enables things—in whatever domain, whether physics, biology, ecology, neurology or architecture—to hang together, to cohere. Responsive cohesion exists 'whenever the elements or salient features of things can be characterized in terms of interacting (either literally or metaphorically) with each other in mutually modifying ways such that these mutually modifying interactions serve. . ..to generate or maintain an overall cohesive order—an order that "hangs together" in one way or another'. (Fox 2006, p. 72). Responsive cohesion is the fundamental 'good' that ensures the ongoing integrity of the world. It is accordingly what we as moral agents should be dedicated to preserving and cultivating in our practice. The biosphere itself, as the ultimate exemplar of and condition for responsive cohesion, is the prime object of moral concern. The category of responsive cohesion, it may be noted, has striking affinities with Mathews' category of synergy, a normative modality, available to us, which also 'makes the world go round'. As Mathews puts it, 'in joining together two or more existing patterns of energy to create a new pattern, synergy allows for the emergence of new form in the world, but this is new form which, like the offspring of two parents, carries within it the story of the old, the story of those from whom the new has arisen. In this sense, the new that springs from synergistic interactions is. . .. . ..a new which in no way rests on a repudiation or destruction of the old. As an existential modality then, synergy. . ...ensures that the world continues to cohere, to hold together as a unity through creative change.' (Mathews 2006, p. 104).

The Process Perspective

Most of the debate which occupied environmental philosophers, raging in the pages of journals such as the US-based *Environmental Ethics* in the 1980s and 1990s, was mildly analytical in style, and there was little engagement with Continental thought or awareness of historical antecedents of ecological perspectives, such as those that flourished in the Romantic period. A stream of environmental philosophy that constituted an exception to this rule was one derived from process philosophy. Among philosophers in Australia, Arran Gare was the pre-eminent exponent of this approach.[17] In a series of books in the 1990s, but perhaps most importantly in *Nihilism Inc.*, Gare provided a broad analysis of the metaphysical foundations of modern civilisation and the political and environmental implications of those metaphysical presuppositions, evoking in truly compelling terms the socio-environmental crises to which they had given rise. At the same time he proffered an alternative in the shape of the process tradition, a tradition that originated in Romantic thought and continued into the twentieth century in the work of Henri Bergson, Samuel Alexander, Alfred North Whitehead and others. The process perspective, defined in contrast to the mechanistic perspective of classical science, represented the world dynamically, as intrinsically in-process, its differentia interfusing and self-becoming rather than ontologically discrete, inert and set in motion only by external forces, as the particle manifold of classical physics was. From such a perspective, reality was more analogous in its structure to music than to a machine, with both the past and the future actively, morphogenetically, immanent, as unfolding form, in the present. Reality could not, in other words, be conceptually arrested at a single moment, frozen in a Newtonian snapshot of the universe, any more than a symphony can be arrested in a single note. Both time and space were, in this sense, emanations of form rather than antecedent containers for it. Form did not enter a preexisting space and time but created space and time, as parameters, from an origin in *feeling*; feeling was the fundamental datum of reality. From such a perspective, we ourselves are already implicated in the self-unfolding of the world, and so it makes no sense to try to separate ourselves from 'nature' with a view to instrumentalising and dominating it. To compromise the self-unfolding of the world is to compromise our own existence (Gare 1996).

In order to overcome the perceived 'idealism' (in the Marxist sense) of most Anglo-American environmental philosophy, Gare combined process thinking with a Marxist perspective. Environmental philosophy had typically called for fundamental value change in Western societies without providing an historical account of the material conditions that had produced the prevailing values. Not only values but human identities, from a Marxist perspective, reflect the means and relations of production in a given society: hunter/gatherer economies, for instance, produce identities and values very different from the identities and values that arise in agrarian economies. The anthropocentric values identified by environmental philosophers as informing modern societies were the product of the capitalist means and relations of production in those societies. As Ariel Salleh had also insisted, philosophical critiques of anthropocentrism, and injunctions to switch to ecological values or ecological identities (such as the 'ecological self' of deep ecology), would be so much wasted breath as long as people remained economically entrapped in praxes that produced experiences conducive to anthropocentric outlooks. Ecological ethics then required an historical materialist dimension and a feasible account of the techno-economic reorganisation of modern societies that would be required to produce ecological identities and outlooks.

---

[17] Gare's contributions to environmental philosophy began earlier than this. He was editor, along with Robert Elliott, of one of the earliest anthologies in the field, *Environmental Philosophy* (1983).

In his more recent writings, Gare has sought to bring such an historical materialist dimension to ecological philosophy by focusing on the nature of *work* in modern societies and on the kind of reorganisation of work that might induce a sense of ecological responsibility (Gare 2008). The fragmentation of work, and of experience generally, consequent on professionalisation and occupational specialisation in modern societies has, he thinks, resulted in a loss of people's sense of the productive and social wholes in which they participate. This loss of a feeling for wholes is in turn associated with a decline in people's sense of agency: without any feeling for the outlines of the larger social projects to which they are contributing, people experience a lapse of expectation that it is possible to make a difference. Such a decline in a sense of agency is accompanied by a loss of sense of responsibility. Disempowered, deprived of the possibility of action, people lose interest in politics, including the politics of environmental sustainability, no matter how compellingly they are presented with evidence of environmental crisis. All the scientific evidence and all the philosophical arguments in the world cannot rouse people from indifference if they are unable to perceive any pathways for intervention. In light of this Gare advocates a general restructuring of work to restore to people a feeling for the larger social and ecological wholes to which their efforts are contributing, whether positively or negatively. One thinker to whom he looks for an account of the kinds of work that induce in agents a feeling for such larger wholes and the agent's implicatedness in them is architect, Christopher Alexander. Alexander's models for whole making may be referenced to architecture, but Gare considers them generalisable across the field of praxis. They involve stepping back from the managerial ethos of working from a master plan, a large-scale, abstract prefiguration of the productive task—so characteristic of modern 'development' projects—and returning instead to older, craft modalities, in which the craftworker creates a product in situ, so to speak, guided by a feeling for the processes that intersect in that particular context, and proceeding recursively and adaptively, in step-by-step fashion, as the productive activity itself changes that context. It is only via such holistic modes of work, or more generally praxis, Gare argues, that a shift in ethical perspective will be achieved.

Environmental Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century

Although Gare drew on the Continental tradition in his articulation of an ecological philosophy, he noted in scathing terms the nihilistic and hence anti-ecological tendencies of contemporary postmodern perspectives. In this respect his project illustrated well the rather uncomfortable place of ecophilosophy in late twentieth-century academia. Whether in Australia or elsewhere, ecophilosophy was often taken to imply, as we have seen, a return to metaphysics. The materialist premise of Western civilisation, enshrined in classical science, was clearly an underlying factor mandating reckless instrumentalisation of nature, and any significant reorientation would require a more relational outlook, consistent with the import of ecology. Yet metaphysics was, in the latter quarter of the twentieth century, anathema both to analytical philosophy and to Continental philosophy. Analytical philosophy had by and large become unconscious of its materialist premise and resistant to any challenge to this premise; it tolerated metaphysics only marginally, in the service of the sciences or logic. Continental philosophy, in the postmodern or poststructuralist guise which had become *de rigueur* in the late twentieth century, was deconstructive and hence, like analytical philosophy, adamantly anti-metaphysical. Any attempt rationally to disclose, in true-or-false fashion, the actual nature of things was seen, from the postmodern perspective, as inevitably co-optive and colonising in intent, a grand narrative strategy designed to discredit the ontological perspectives of subjugated others.[18] From such a viewpoint, normative ecology was clearly suspect. Analytical philosophy and deconstructive thought were thus, in their different post-Kantian ways, concerned with the analysis of discourse qua discourse, choosing, again in different ways, to ignore the metaphysical condition for discourse per se, namely, the mutualism intrinsic to a thriving biosphere. Ecological philosophy, on the other hand, had an entirely different mission. It was a wake-up call, a call to action. Its task was to cut straight to the ontological chase; just as when we cry ‘help!’ or ‘fire!’ we do not wish our hearers to become analytically fixated on our words and their political loadings but to respond to an emergency, so ecophilosophy sought directly, perhaps naively, but necessarily, to reorient readers to reality. This clash of missions resulted in ecophilosophy occupying, in the late twentieth century, a rather marginal, less-than-prestigious place in the academy. Perhaps, in the twenty-first century, the intellectual as well as the physical climate is changing. Postmodernism has almost run its course and leading deconstructionists, such as Derrida, have themselves begun to problematise anthropocentrism (Derrida 2008). In analytical philosophy metaphysics has become not only permissible but fashionable as a field of research. Moreover no one, any longer, needs convincing of the veridical status of environmental warnings. So perhaps the ecological perspective can at last begin its warranted transit to the centre.

---

[18] Such postmodern/poststructural disavowals of metaphysics arguably overlooked the metaphysical presuppositions of their own basically liberal position (see Mathews 2005).

Such a transit is indeed arguably already under way, though diffusely, in the humanities and social sciences at large rather than merely in a dedicated discourse, such as ecophilosophy. The old focus on value questions *in abstracto* is giving way to an approach which sorts through issues in a more empirically engaged, ethnographic—or *ecographic*—fashion, via case studies or studies of significant particulars. As Plumwood pointed out in 1999, environmental philosophy had been stuck, since its inception, on the question of whether or not natural entities were morally considerable; until this was settled, there was no point in going ahead and working out how we ought to be treating nature or resolving moral conflicts, in particular instances. There was no point, in other words, in actually beginning the task of constructing a detailed normative ethic. The question of intrinsic value had constituted, as Plumwood put it, a sort of gateway into environmental ethics, but environmental philosophers had remained outside the gate, arguing about whether or not to go through (Plumwood 1999). Other scholars have now taken the plunge, and are indeed going through, with philosophers joining them. In the field of inquiry dubbed the *ecological humanities* by anthropologist and cultural theorist, Deborah Rose, ecophilosophically informed ethnographies of particular rivers, plants, places and animal communities are being undertaken. Indeed animals—their place and meaning in human cultures rather than the abstract ethics of our treatment of them (as explored by Peter Singer, e.g. in earlier decades)—have become a major preoccupation (Franklin 2006; Van Dooren 2011; Rose 2011). A large international conference on the cultural studies of animals, *Minding Animals*, was held at Newcastle in 2009, and two successor conferences, *Global Animal* and *Animals, People—a Shared Environment* will take place in Wollongong and Brisbane, respectively, in 2011. As the planet enters the sixth great extinction event in its history, the significance of extinction, particularly animal extinctions, has emerged as a topic of urgent philosophical and ethnographic inquiry (Rose and Van Dooren 2011).

Place as a locus of identity, spirituality and conservation has also been added as a key category of environmental thought. Jeff Malpas has written extensively on place from a Heideggerian (and Kantian) perspective, figuring it as a transcendental condition of possibility (Malpas 1999, 2001). A place studies network has been established by him at the University of Tasmania. John Cameron of the University of Western Sydney organised a series of ecologically oriented ‘Sense of Place’ gatherings in the late 1990s and early 2000s. (Val Plumwood, on the other hand, problematised the valorisation of favoured places, though in a way that bypassed the provisions for sustainability integral to environmental place philosophies such as bioregionalism (Plumwood 2008a.)) Nick Trakakis has argued that a deeper understanding of divinity in terms of place would tie people spiritually into the world in a manner conducive to true dwelling (Trakakis 2013).

The legacy of Romanticism for environmentalism has finally received the scrutiny it deserves in a pioneering ecocritical study by Kate Rigby, *Topographies of the Sacred: the Poetics of Place in European Romanticism* (2004). In this monograph Rigby explores Romantic literature as a resource for ecophilosophy, detailing, through close attention to poetry and other eighteenth–nineteenth-century texts, the specifics of the Romantic re-enchantment and resacralisation of nature and its role in human redemption. Aware of the ambiguousness of the Romantic legacy, she draws particular attention to the ‘Promethean temptation’ it harbours. This temptation is exemplified most dramatically in Goethe’s Faust, an archetypal hero of modernity who starts out embracing the unknowable and primordial both in himself and in nature but eventually competes with and outdoes nature. As a property developer and geo-engineer reclaiming real estate from the sea, the later Faust, at the end of his long romantic voyage towards personal fulfilment, becomes a force rivalling, indeed exceeding, the forces of nature: Faust seeks to reshape the natural environment not for utilitarian nor even for crypto-political reasons but out of sheer personal hubris. In this sense the story of Faust reveals the environmental perils inherent in Romanticism: tapping in ourselves, for the sake of romantic self-actualisation, the sources of primordial creativity that we share with a re-enchanted nature can lead us to conquer nature just as surely as the objectifying outlook of disenchanted Newtonian science does. Even on a purely poetic level, Romantics such as Schelling tended, as we have already observed, to reserve for human creativity a higher regard than they extended to the creativity of nature, thereby risking again a subtle reinstatement, even in the midst of a new metaphysical context of anthropocentric values.

From other quarters other themes have come to the fore. The earlier preoccupation of environmental philosophy with forests and wilderness preservation has come under fire with a new emphasis on cultures of sustainability in the suburbs and the city (Davison 2005; Fox 2000). In a departure from the traditional assumption of environmental ethics that anthropocentric worldviews give rise to bad environmental behaviour and ecocentric worldviews to good, Andrew Brennan and Norva Lo are investigating the relation between worldviews and behaviour, calling for an ‘empirical philosophy’ that sociologically investigates the correlations between worldviews and action (Lo 2009; Brennan and Lo 2010). Ocean ethics has finally commanded the attention of philosophers too with the publication of Denise Russell’s *Who Rules the Waves? Piracy, Overfishing and Mining the Oceans* (Russell 2010). Val Plumwood, before her own death in 2008, 8 years after Richard Sylvan’s, published a series of influential essays on the ecological significance of death (see, e.g. Plumwood 2000, 2008b). Such themes, among many others, are being addressed in transdisciplinary though ecophilosophically literate ways across the academy and journals such as *PAN Philosophy Activism Nature* and the ‘Ecological Humanities Corner’ of *Australian Humanities Review* have been launched to cater for them. In 2010 a workshop entitled *Ethics for Living in the Anthropocene*, organised by geographers Katherine Gibson and Ruth Fincher together with Deborah Rose, was sponsored by the Australian Academy of Social Sciences, and its *Manifesto for Scholars* was launched in the *Australian Humanities Review*.[19]

---

[19] www.ecologicalhumanities.org/manifesto.html

Aboriginal Perspectives

Aboriginal voices, long referenced in ecological philosophy but seldom heard, are also now making their own representations. In her 1999 article, ‘Some Thoughts about the Philosophical Underpinnings of Aboriginal Worldviews’, Murri philosopher and Aboriginal advocate, Mary Graham, pithily laid down, as the two ‘axioms’ of Aboriginal thought, the propositions that ‘the Land is the Law’ and ‘you are not alone in the world’. (Graham 1999, p. 105). Vicki Grieves, ARC Indigenous Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, has substantially elaborated on this formulation. In an authoritative survey of Aboriginal thought entitled *Aboriginal Spirituality: Aboriginal Philosophy*, Grieves has defined Aboriginal philosophy as a holistic worldview with spirituality at its core. Philosophy in this sense, be it noted, is not so much a mode or method of inquiry—as philosophy is in the Western tradition—as a particular way of understanding reality, inextricable from spirituality. Spirituality is conceived generally as the relation of self to a larger, meaningful whole, a whole that lends direction to individual life. In the Aboriginal context this relation of self to whole is one of interconnectedness, whereby ‘people, plants and animals, land forms and celestial bodies’ are interrelated both with one another and with humankind. Such interrelatedness derives from common descent, descent from a common source, specifically the metaphysical source implied in the notion of Dreaming, or, in Central Australian languages, *Tjukurrpa* or *Altjira*. *Dreaming* indicates the occasions and events of creation, the laws laid down during the process of creation as well as the ancestor spirits whose activities initiated differentiation of the primal Undifferentiated into stable order and form. This moment of creation does not precede the history of the world but is immanent in it, an eternal, sustaining dimension of the phenomenal, the phenomenal being that which is perceived by us as forever coming into being and passing away. Ancestor spirits, after leaving a trail of features and beings across the terrain of Dreaming, are absorbed back into the sites their actions have created, but their conscious presence within those ancestral sites continues to release life force—inclusive of spirit children—into the landscape.

Grieves describes the pivotal significance of Dreaming in Aboriginal thought as follows: ‘In intense bursts of activity, [the ancestors] were able to transform and develop formless matter into a landscape. The features of the land they brought into being hold in their names the stories of their own creation. And the ancestors in the same way gave rise to living forms, the animal species, all manner of plants, the landforms, water courses—which, though inanimate, are understood to have their own spirit or being—and, of course, people. Each person, or specific plant or place is linked to the spirit of its creation and thus to each other.’ (p. 9). This relationship of mutual spirit-being which connects all the elements of the Aboriginal universe is, Grieves points out, what is often referred to as totemism. In the totemic scenario, everything in the natural world is alive and shares the same soul or spirit with people. Everything is sacred, because derived from the spirit activities of the ancestors. Everything is meaningful, its existence contextualised to the primordial stories. Nothing is nothing (Grieves 2009; Rose 1996).

Sometimes the notion of Dreaming is taken to imply the coexistence of two superimposed realities—ordinary reality and dream reality—but it can also be understood as a single reality that has 'inside' and 'outside' truths and stories. Grieves quotes Sansom (2001) as arguing that 'Dreamings and people are co-presences in one world' and that people have the opportunity, if circumstances permit, to develop the faculty of *seeing right through* to the *inside* of things. Life can become a process of progressive revelation, such that 'anyone who lives a fortunate life should come to participate more and more fully in the unity of the Dreaming'. (Sansom quoted in Grieves, p. 11).

In the totemic scheme of things, in which people share an identity with the particular ancestor spirit from which they are descended, Dreaming stories prescribe the relationships and responsibilities that attend each such identity. Totemism requires that people 'take responsibility for relationships with the species and the totemic, sacred site, which is connected to the totemic ancestor'. (p. 12). It is these custodial relationships and responsibilities, encoded in Dreaming stories and passed on to appropriate individuals, that constitute Dreaming Law. Such law however is not merely a discursive construct—the stories belong not merely to the people: they are held in the ground, the sentient ground, the sentient sea; the ancestral spirits are still in the land, in the sea, 'watching for lawbreakers'. (Kenneth Jacobs, Wellesley Islands Native Title claim 1997, quoted in Grieves, p. 14). Moreover, the stories are renewed, and the Dreaming itself ontologically reinscribed, through ceremonial performance at sacred sites.

The obligation that emanates from the Dreaming is to 'sustain the cultural landscape as it is set down from the creation stories'. The mission, in sum, is simply to 'keep all alive'. (Grieves, p. 15). The metaphysics of the Dreaming is thus one which subtends ecology, inasmuch as ecology maps the functional relationships that 'keep ecosystems alive', but it also greatly exceeds ecology, inasmuch as it posits, as the ground of the empirical world, a moral universe already steeped in meaning and spiritual presence. 'The one set of powers, principles and patterns runs through all things on earth and in the heavens and welds them into a unified cosmic system.' (Edwards (2002; quoted in Grieves, p. 19). Humans are indeed enjoined by the law to attend to the way living systems are organised and, in all their cultural transactions, to nurture the life of those systems. But this is not merely a matter of 'extending moral considerability' to select non-human entities, as in Western environmental ethics. It is rather a matter of taking one's place—a place of responsibility—within a richly ceremonial, poetic and communicative universe. In other words, such a metaphysics calls forth a mode of being deeply counter to the modes implicit in the materialist metaphysics of modernity or even the theological metaphysics of the premodern West. Western philosophy is deeply deficient in concepts required for the elaboration of such a mode of being, but examples of such philosophical concepts are gradually coming to light as dialogue between Aboriginal and Western cultures (slowly) matures.

The prime such concept is, of course, that of *Tjukurrpa* itself, or its cognates, the philosophical implications of which permeate the entire fabric of Aboriginal thought. To take just one instance of a direction in which this concept might point, cultural psychoanalyst Craig San Roque has, in a paper entitled 'On Tjukurrpa: Painting Up and Building Thought' (San Roque 2006), considered how a general theory of meaning might look if the concept of *Tjukurrpa*, rather than the metaphysics of materialism, were taken as a starting point.

Another richly resonant philosophical category is that of *motj*, introduced into Western discourse by Yolngu Lawman, David Burrumarra. *Motj* is the source of all life but is not merely biological in its significance. It is what allows 'a tree to take water inside itself from the leaves and roots and to flourish' but it also 'directs our thinking to a purpose. We speak to the wind, clouds and the earth, and Motj speaks to us through them'. (Burrumarra and Macintosh 2002, p. 10). Motj connotes a certain kind of directedness in things, a directedness towards realisation—towards growth, towards truth, towards wisdom—and as such connotes a force of creativity that may be active in us and all things, at all times, whatever we are doing and wherever we may be doing it, whether in thought or in the flesh, whether in 'nature' or the 'city'. There is no nature/culture dualism at work here nor confinement of ethics to the domain of the merely 'ecological', in the narrowly scientific sense of that term—as ecological thinkers such as Deborah Rose have noted (Rose 2004, p. 192).

The notion of *le-an* from the Kimberley region is another philosophically numinous category, introduced into environmental literature by initiated but non-indigenous Kimberley Lawman, Frans Hoogland (Sinatra and Murphy 1999; La Fontaine 2006). *Le-an*, which, like *motj*, is impossible to translate directly into English, concerns a feeling for the spirit which is in us and all things alike—the spirit which, to borrow the words of another Kimberley Lawman, David Mowaljarlai, makes everything 'stand up'. (The title of a book that recounts Mowaljarlai's thought is *Yorro Yorro*, meaning 'everything alive stand up'.) To have this feeling is to be attuned to what is going on around us on a different level from the merely empirical; it is to be immersed in the world and moved by it on the level not only of causation but of meaning/Dreaming (Mathews 2007). Mowaljarlai himself has spoken of the gift of *pattern thinking* as the essential contribution of Aboriginal culture to the Australian episteme, and the patterns in question are not merely physical systems but patterns of meaning (Mowaljarlai quoted in Grieves p. 7).

Miriam-Rose Ungunmerr-Baumann identifies another such gift. Many Australians understand that Aboriginal people have a special respect for land, she writes, and that they have a strong sense of community, but there is another quality of Aboriginal people which is more important. 'In our language, this quality is called *Dadirri*. It is the gift that Australians are searching for.' (quoted in Grieves p. 7). *Dadirri* is 'inner deep listening and quiet still awareness. *Dadirri* recognises the deep spring that is inside us. It is something like what you call contemplation. The contemplative way of *Dadirri* spreads over our whole life. It renews us and brings us peace. It makes us feel whole again. In our Aboriginal way we learnt to listen from our earliest times. We could not live good and useful lives unless we listened. We are not threatened by silence. We are completely at home in it. Our Aboriginal way has taught us to be still and wait. We do not try to hurry things up. We let them follow their natural course—like the seasons.' (p. 7). Clearly there are resonances here with both *motj* and *le-an*: *Dadirri* connotes attentiveness to an inner creative well-spring in things that results in our feeling connected to, and guided by, larger unfoldings.

Famous 'Kakadu Man', Bill Niedjie, also spoke of this *feeling*, a feeling for the inner life of trees and grass, rocks and eagles, that was the same as one's own inner life.

> I'm telling you because earth just like mother and father or brother of you. That tree same thing. Your body, my body, I suppose. (Neidjie and Taylor, 1989; see also Plumwood 1990)

Concepts such as *motj*, *le-an* and *Dadirri* of course belong in their own cultural contexts and cannot be appropriated by non-indigenous thinkers or cobbled together for Western philosophical purposes. But they do serve to highlight the philosophical deficiencies of Western thinking in its assumptions about humanity in relation to the natural world, the narrowness of Western terms of reference. In doing so they signpost directions for further philosophical development in Western thinking. And, just as Aboriginal concepts are increasingly permeating Australian culture in other contexts, so too an indigenous/non-indigenous dialogue about our custodial responsibilities towards the continent we share might be expected eventually to produce a uniquely Australian discourse and practice of 'environmentalism'.

In this connection however we should not forget the wise warning of Mary Graham who long ago pointed out that environmentalism is just another Western *ism*, just another ideal in the long succession of ideals in accordance with which the West has reshaped the world. Westerners, Graham points out wryly, are never so Western as when they are critiquing the West and enthusiastically adopting other people's cultures in preference to their own. In the process of adopting those cultures, she implies, they turn them into ideas; those cultures become the West's latest ideals, their latest sticks with which to beat the world. Ideas, any ideas, are grist to the Western mill which, perhaps thanks to philosophy itself—originally a Western invention, after all—has been fixated from the start on the dazzling, ever-changing world of ideas rather than on the plain old world of things. Westerners, Graham says, live in this world of ideas; they confuse it with reality. For Aboriginal people, in contrast, ideas are not reality. All that really exists is land, the concrete particularity of the world itself (Graham 1992). Any indigenous/non-indigenous dialogue is accordingly not going to result merely in a straightforward endorsement of environmentalism as we currently understand it.

In recent work Graham has emphasised that *place*, being a central moral category of Aboriginal thought, must play a role both in theoretical representations of Aboriginal cultures and also in research methodologies themselves (Graham 2009). Research oriented towards Aboriginal culture—where this would include any presumptive indigenous/non-indigenous dialogue concerning 'environmentalism'—needs itself to be *emplaced*, situated in and somehow referenced to specific places, and subject to the moral and spiritual influences of those places.

There is much to consider here, not only in relation to our attitudes to 'nature', but in relation to philosophy itself, its provenance and its function as an orienting compass within a culture.

An Australian Panpsychism?

Ecophilosophy in Australia has evidently come a long way since its origins in a search by logicians for a criterion of intrinsic value that would not offend the positivist sensibilities of analytical philosophers for whom any suggestion of 'panpsychism' (or, in their terms, pantheism) was anathema. Indeed, at the intersection of the ecophilosophical, on the one hand, with its echoes of the panpsychist *naturphilosophien* of the Romantic period, and the Indigenous, on the other hand, with its assumption of a common spiritual root of self and land, a certain *zeitgeist* is arguably currently taking shape in Australian thought. A language of sentience and agency, consonant with indigenous perspectives, has pervaded discussions of nature (Rose 1996; Rigby 2004; Plumwood 2009; Read 2000, 2003; Tacey1995, 2000, 2011 and many of the articles in PAN). Attributions of sentience to the natural world are popping up in Australian scholarship in many contexts. Following a recent work by British theologian, Graham Harvey, *Animism: Respecting the Living World*, which seeks to reclaim the anthropologically debased term, *animism*, Rose and Plumwood have adopted the label *philosophical animism* to cover a position that construes nature as a community of other-than-human 'persons'. (Rose 2009; Plumwood 2009). According to Harvey's definition, 'animists are people who recognize that the world is full of persons, only some of whom are human, and that life is always lived in relationship to others. Animism is lived out in various ways that are all about learning to act respectfully (carefully and constructively) towards and among other persons.' (Harvey 2006, p. xi). Rose testifies to deriving her understanding of philosophical animism from living in the field as an anthropologist in Aboriginal Australia. 'I learned how to understand myself in a world characterised by widespread personhood', she writes. She quotes one of her Aboriginal teachers, Doug Campbell: 'birds got ceremony of their own—brolga, turkey, crow, hawk, white and black cockatoo—all got ceremony, women's side, men's side,. . ..everything'. Plants as well as animals, Rose continues, are sentient, and, according to many Aboriginal people, 'the Earth itself has culture and power within it. In this line of thought, we are all culture-creatures, we're intelligent, we act with purpose, we communicate and take notice, we participate in a world of multiple purposes. It's a *multicultural* world from inside the earth right on through.' (Rose 2009). (Along these lines, a soon-to-published doctoral thesis authored by botanist-philosopher, Matthew Hall and supervised by Rose, entitled *Plants and Persons: a Philosophical Botany*, provides the first book-length study of the moral significance of plants (Hall 2011).)

Different ways of conceiving of and allocating mind in nature underlie the various animisms and panpsychisms that are currently finding expression in Australian scholarship and literature. In some instances they stem from Aboriginal influences; others are more theoretical in tenor, ranging, in their conceptions of the animating principle in nature, from intentionality without phenomenal awareness to feeling, sentience, conativity or some other variant of phenomenal awareness as a basic attribute of matter. In view of the way such outlooks, broadly conceived, are currently finding expression across the ecological humanities, it is not too much, I think, to declare the emergence of an *Australian panpsychism* as part of our national discourse, an ironic rejoinder to the *Australian materialism* of yesteryear, which has in any case been offset by a recent resurgence of panpsychism in philosophy of mind itself, led by Australian philosopher of consciousness, David Chalmers.

Yet still an aura of romanticism—in the popular, pejorative sense, which is nevertheless traceable to the historical sense—hovers around a panpsychist perspective and to many people this perspective is as distasteful today as it was to the philosophers of the original Routley circle (see, for instance, Peterson 2009). By describing such a perspective as romantic, critics imply that it is sentimental, unrealistic, nostalgic, apolitical or, worse, allied with reactionary race-and-soil traditions, unable to deliver progress or development for the poor and disenfranchised, including the indigenous people to whom such perspectives are often referenced. In the Aboriginal community in Australia, certain spokespersons take this position. Noel Pearson, for instance, resents the green assumption that Aboriginal land holders will turn their back on opportunities for economic development and play the role of ecologically correct custodians in face of lucrative offers from mining companies and other instrumentalities of resource extraction and development. Pearson was a leading opponent of the recent Wild Rivers legislation enacted by the Queensland government to afford strong environmental protection for rivers in Aboriginal lands on Cape York Peninsula.[20] Instances of Land Councils and other indigenous parties embracing exploitation of their lands in exchange for economic returns are not uncommon.[21]

Ecophilosophers would surely be well advised to take the charge of romanticism seriously. To do so would require a reappraisal by environmental philosophers of Romanticism itself, with its ‘re-enchantment’ and ‘resacralisation’ of nature. Kate Rigby, together with her circle of graduate students at Monash University, has helped to pave the way for such a reappraisal, but further important questions remain. Why *did* Romanticism, so influential in its time, fail to check the progress of modernity or temper its deadly assault on the natural world? Why have the sensibilities associated with Romanticism, which still to a certain extent inform green values today, remained perennially the preserve of a counterculture rather than infiltrating the mainstream? Has Romanticism, with its affinity for feeling rather than practicality, aesthetics rather than utility, neglected to consider how actually to administer mass societies, on the scale initiated by modernity, in a way that preserves the integrity, and affirms the inner spirit, of the biosphere? Is it after all even possible so to reconcile civilisation on such a scale with the rest of life? Or is the problem rather expressly political? Has Romanticism, by virtue of its own proclivities—its penchant for organicism, trust in natural processes, preference for spontaneity over calculation, Eros over force—simply failed to grasp the nettle of power, thereby leaving itself perennially marginalised? Indeed, is it those proclivities which have led to such disastrous results when Romanticism, or its successor movements, *have* in fact been allied with power, as in the National Socialist experiment of the 1930s? Trust in the authenticity of instinct and the innate goodness of feeling provide no checks or balances for a political authority whose impulses have turned violent and whose goals have proved evil.

---

[20] See Noel Pearson’s piece, ‘Decision is in: Wild Rivers Laws Stink’ in *The Australian*, 2 Oct 2010. www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/decision-is-in-wild-rivers-laws-stink/story-e6frg6zo-1225933011207

[21] The Kimberley Land Council, for example, has recently defied environmental groups to strike a deal with the West Australian government that will, if it is approved federally, deliver a stretch of coastline north of Broome for major development as a 30 billion dollar gas processing plant—a plant that, once established, will open up the relatively ecologically intact Kimberley to wholesale industrialisation.

It is beyond the scope of the present chapter to offer answers to these questions, but their importance for the future of environmental philosophy looms large. Should environmental philosophy continue down the path of ecophilosophy, seeking a wholesale 'change of paradigm', rather than merely tinkering at the edges of a scientific materialism that is inherently anthropocentric? Can it do so in a way that is, on the one hand, consistent with the extraordinary explanatory thrust and technological genius of science without, on the other hand, capitulating to the normative neutrality demanded by science, where such neutrality appears to occlude any normative significance in nature? Can a 'new paradigm' incorporate reason, as a necessary check on arbitrary authority, while nevertheless out-reasoning scientific reason in its arrival at a post-materialist metaphysic and the affective response appropriate thereto? Can reason liberate itself into the service of such a larger metaphysic rather than remaining indentured to materialism, with the instrumentalism that such indenturement entails? Can reason ally itself with indigenous formations without in its turn suffering the colonisation, the marginalisation, that has already befallen the indigenous, and all those who espouse eros in the face of force, relationality in the face of domination and community with life in the face of the acquisition of wealth and power? These are some of the tormentingly difficult questions with which environmental philosophy must in the future wrestle.

Indeed, as the *environmental crisis* of the twentieth century deepens into the *planetary crisis* of the twenty-first century—with climate change and mass extinctions and the adulteration of large-scale life systems rapidly changing the biophysical context of earth—scholarship itself acquires new horizons of relevance and responsibility. The conditions of biophysical stability that formed the backdrop to the founding presuppositions of Western civilisation can no longer be taken for granted. The philosophical script laid down in classical times and progressively elaborated over centuries presupposed those conditions of stability. In a world in which those conditions no longer obtain, the old script may no longer fit. New questions, new disciplines of thought, may be thrown up by the upheavals of our times. Culture itself may need to be recalibrated. This is a task not merely for environmental philosophers but for all philosophers. Nor is it a task merely for philosophers but for all scholars, indeed for all analysts and architects of culture. The axis of relevance, of significance, is turning, and this unprecedented turning will henceforth affect all the questions we ask, all the answers we see fit to proffer.

Acknowledgments Val Plumwood was originally invited to write this chapter but sadly passed away before doing so. In honour of the enormous contribution she made to environmental philosophy not only in Australia but internationally, I have devoted a significant proportion of this chapter to her work.

My thanks to Janna Thompson for kindly commenting on an earlier draft of this chapter.

The present chapter contains passages adapted from Freya Mathews, 'Environmental Philosophy' in Graham Oppy and N.N. Trakakis, *Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*, Monash University Publishing, Melbourne, 2010.

My sincere thanks to the editors, Nick Trakakis and Graham Oppy, for their patience and graciousness in awaiting the long-delayed submission of this chapter.

References

Ajani, J. (2007). *The forest wars*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Altman, D. (1980). *Rehearsals for change*. Sydney: Collins/Fontana.

Biehl, J. (1991). *Rethinking ecofeminist politics*. Boston: South End Press.

Brennan, A. (1988). *Thinking about nature*. London: Routledge.

Brennan, A., & Lo, Y. S. (2010). *Understanding environmental philosophy*. Durham: Acumen.

Burrumarra, D., & Macintosh, I. (2002). *Motj* and the nature of the sacred. *Cultural Survival Quarterly, 26*(2).

Burtt, E. A. (1932). *The metaphysical foundations of modern science* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Davison, A. (2005). *Urban nature and Australian environmentalism: The urban experience of members of environmental groups in Hobart and Perth*. UTas E-prints: eprints.utas.edu.au/1524.

Derrida, J. (2008). *The animal that therefore I am* (trans: Wills D). New York: Fordham University Press.

Devall, B., & Sessions, G. (1985). *Deep ecology: Living as if nature mattered*. Salt Lake City: Gibs Smith.

Drengson, A., & Inoue, Y. (Eds.). (1995). *The deep ecology movement*. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books.

Eckersley, R. (1989). Divining evolution: The ecological ethics of Murray Bookchin. *Environmental Ethics, 11*, 99–116.

Eckersley, R. (1992). *Environmentalism and political theory*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Edwards, W. (2002). *Recovering spirit: Exploring aboriginal spirituality*. Adelaide: Charles Strong Memorial Trust.

Elliott, R. (1982). Faking nature. *Inquiry, 25*, 81–93.

Elliott, R. (1997). *Faking nature: The ethics of environmental restoration*. London: Routledge.

Elliott, R., & Gare, A. (Eds.). (1983). *Environmental philosophy*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Fox, W. (1986). *Approaching deep ecology: A response to Richard Sylvan's critique of deep ecology, environmental studies*. Occasional Papers 20. Hobart: Centre for Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania.

Fox, W. (1989). The deep ecology-ecofeminism debate and its parallels. *Environmental Ethics, 11*, 5–25.

Fox, W. (1990). *Towards a transpersonal ecology: Developing new foundations for environmentalism*. Boston: Shambhala Press.

Fox, W. (Ed.). (2000). *Ethics and the built environment*. London: Routledge.

Fox, W. (2006). *A theory of general ethics: Human relationships, nature, and the built environment*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Franklin, A. (2006). *Animal nation: The true story of animals and Australia*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Gare, A. (1996). *Nihilism Inc: Environmental destruction and the metaphysics of sustainability*. Como: Eco-logical Press.

Gare, A. (2008). Process philosophy and ecological ethics. In M. Dibben & T. Kelley (Eds.), *Applied process thought: Initial explorations in theory and practice* (pp. 363–382). Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

Gare, A., & Elliott, R. (Eds.). (1983). *Environmental philosophy*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Godfrey-Smith, W. (1982). The rights of non-humans and intrinsic values. In D. Mannison, M. McRobbie, & R. Routley (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy* (pp. 30–47). Canberra: Australian National University.

Graham, M. (1992). Interview on aboriginal perspectives. In C. Jones & S. Godley (Ed.), *The search for meaning*, ABC Radio.

Graham, M. (1999). Some thoughts about the philosophical underpinnings of aboriginal worldviews. *Worldviews, 3*, 105–118.

Graham, M. (2009). Understanding human agency in terms of place: A proposed aboriginal research methodology, *PAN Philosophy Activism Nature, 6* (online).

Grey, W. (1993). Anthropocentrism and deep ecology. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71*, 463–475.

Grieves, V. (2009). *Aboriginal spirituality: Aboriginal philosophy/the basis of aboriginal social and emotional wellbeing* (Discussion Paper Series 9). Cooperative Research Centre for Aboriginal Health, Darwin.

Hall, M. (2011). *Plants and persons: A philosophical botany* (in press).

Hallen, P. (1995). Making peace with nature: Why ecology needs feminism. In A. Drengson & Y. Inoue (Eds.), *The deep ecology movement* (pp. 198–218). Berkeley: North Atlantic.

Harvey, G. (2006). *Animism: Respecting the living world*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Johnson, L. (1991). *A morally deep world*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

La Fontaine, M. (Compiler). (2006). *New legend, a story of law and culture and the fight for self-determination in the Kimberley*. Published by Kimberley Aboriginal Law and Culture Centre.

Lines, W. (2006). *Patriots: Defending Australia's natural heritage*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Lo, Y. S. (1999). Natural and artifactual: Restored nature as subject. *Environmental Ethics, 21*, 247–266.

Lo, Y. S. (2009). Empirical environmental ethics. In K. T. Ip (Ed.), *Environmental ethics: Intercultural perspectives* (pp. 55–73). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Malpas, J. E. (1999). *Place and experience: A philosophical topography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Malpas, J. E. (2001). Comparing topographies: Across paths/around place: A reply to Casey. *Philosophy and Geography, 4*(2), 231–238.

Mannison, D., McRobbie, M., & Routley, R. (Eds.). (1982). *Environmental philosophy*. Canberra: Australian National University.

Mathews, F. (1991). *The ecological self*. London: Routledge.

Mathews, F. (2003). *For love of matter: A contemporary panpsychism*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Mathews, F. (2005). *Reinhabiting reality: Towards a recovery of culture*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Mathews, F. (2006). Beyond modernity and tradition: A third way for development. *Ethics and the Environment, 11*(2), 85–114.

Mathews, F. (2007). The poetic structure of being: An invitation to ontopoetics. *Australian Humanities Review, 43*. http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-December-2007/EcoHumanities/EcoMathews.html

McCloskey, H. J. (1982). Ecological ethics and its justification: A critical appraisal. In D. Mannison, M. McRobbie, & R. Routley (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy* (pp. 65–87). Canberra: Australian National University.

McCloskey, H. J. (1983). *Ecological ethics and politics*. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield.

Merchant, C. (1980). *The death of nature: Women, ecology and the scientific revolution*. New York: Harper and Rowe.

Naess, A. (1973). The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement. *Inquiry, 16*, 95–100; reprinted in Drengson and Inoue 1995, 1–10.

Naess, A. (1995). Self-realization: An ecological approach to being in the world. In A. Drengson & Y. Inoue (Eds.), *The deep ecology movement: An introductory anthology* (pp. 13–30). Berkeley: North Atlantic Books.

Neidjie, B., & Taylor, K. (1989). *Story about feeling*. Broome: Magabala Books.

Orton, D. (1997). In memory of Richard Sylvan. *The Trumpeter*, *14*.

Passmore, J. (1974). *Man's responsibility for nature*. London: Duckworth.

Peterson, N. (2009). Is the aboriginal landscape sentient? Animism, the new animism and the Walpiri. Unpublished manuscript.

Plumwood, V. (1990). Plato and the bush: Philosophy and the environment in Australia. *Meanjin, 49*(3), 524–536.

Plumwood, V. (1993). *Feminism and the mastery of nature*. London: Routledge.

Plumwood, V. (1999). The struggle for environmental philosophy in Australia. *Worldviews, 3*(2), 157–178.

Plumwood, V. (2000). Being prey. In J. O'Reilly, S. O'Reilly, & R. Sterling (Eds.), *The ultimate journey*. Berkeley: Travellers Tales.

Plumwood, V. (2004). *The fight for the forests revisited* (The William Main forestry lectures series). Bekerly: UCB.

Plumwood, V. (2008a). Shadow places and the politics of dwelling. *Australian Humanities Review, 44*, 1 (Online).

Plumwood, V. (2008b). Tasteless: Towards a food-based approach to death. *Environmental Values, 17*, 323–331.

Plumwood, V. (2009). Nature in the active voice. *Australian Humanities Review, 46*, 113 (Online).

Randall, J. H. (1965). *The career of philosophy* (Vol. 1). New York: Columbia University Press.

Randall, J. H. (1976). *The making of the modern mind*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Read, P. (2000). *Belonging: Australians, place and aboriginal ownership*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

Read, P. (2003). *Haunted earth*. Sydney: UNSW Press.

Rigby, K. (2004). *Topographies of the sacred*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Rose, D. B. (1996). *Nourishing terrains: Australian aboriginal views of landscape and wilderness*. Canberra: Australian Heritage Commission.

Rose, D. B. (2004). *Reports from a wild country*. Sydney: UNSW Press.

Rose, D. B. (2009, July 17). *Philosophical animism*. In *Val Plumwood Memorial Lecture at Minding Animals Conference*, Newcastle. Available in voice edition at http://ecologicalhumanities.org

Rose, D. B. (2011). *Wild dog dreaming*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Rose, D. B., & Van Dooren, T. (Eds.). (2011). Unloved others: Death of the disregarded in the time of extinctions. *Australian Humanities Review Special Issue, 50*.

Routley, R. (1973). Is there a need for new, an environmental, ethic? In *Proceedings of the 15th World Congress of Philosophy*, Varna Bulgaria, 205–210. vol 1.

Routley, R. (1980). *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, Departmental Monograph 3. Canberra: Philosophy Department, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.

Routley, R., & Routley, V. (1973). *The fight for the forests: The takeover of Australian forests for pines, wood chips and intensive forestry*. Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.

Routley, R., & Routley, V. (1982). Human chauvinism and environmental ethics. In D. Mannison, M. McRobbie, & R. Routley (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy* (pp. 96–189). Canberra: Australian National University.

Russell, B. (1946). *A history of western philosophy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Russell, D. (2010). *Who rules the waves? Piracy, overfishing and mining the oceans*. London: Pluto Press.

Salleh, A. (1984). Deeper than deep ecology: The ecofeminist connection. *Environmental Ethics, 6*, 335–341.

Salleh, A. (1992). Class, race and gender discourse in the deep ecology/ecofeminism debate. *Environmental Ethics, 14*, 195–216.

Salleh, A. (2005). Moving to an embodied materialism. *Capitalism Nature Socialism, 16*(2), 9–14.

San Roque, C. (2006). On tjukurrpa: Painting up and building thought. *Journal of Social Analysis, 50*(2), 148–172 (Reprinted in PAN Philosophy Activism).

Sansom, B. (2001). Irruptions of the dreamings in post-colonial Australia. *Oceania, 72*, 1–32.

Sinatra, J., & Murphy, P. (Eds.). (1999). *Listen to the people, listen to the land*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Singer, P. (1975). *Animal liberation*. New York: New York Review/Random House.

Singer, P. (1979). Not for humans only: The place of non-humans in environmental issues. In K. E. Goodpaster & K. M. Sayre (Eds.), *Ethics and problems of the 21st century*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Sylvan, R. (1980). *Exploring Meinong's jungle and beyond*. Canberra: ANU Central Printery.

Sylvan, R. (1985a). A critique of deep ecology—part 1. *Radical Philosophy, 40*, 2–12.

Sylvan, R. (1985b). A critique of deep ecology—part 2. *Radical Philosophy, 41*, 10–22.

Sylvan, R., & Bennett, D. (1994). *The greening of ethics: From human chauvinism to deep green theory*. Cambridge: Whitehorse Press.

Tacey, D. (1995). *Edge of the sacred: Transformation in Australia*. Sydney: Harper Collins.

Tacey, D. (2000). *Re-enchantment: The new Australian spirituality*. Sydney: Harper Collins.

Tacey, D. (2011). Ecopsychology and the Sacred: The psychological basis of the environmental crisis. *Spring Journal, 83*, 329–351.

Tarnas, R. (1991). *The passion of the western mind*. New York: Ballantine.

Thomas, K. (1984). *Man and the natural world*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Thompson, J. (1983). Preservation of wilderness and the good life. In R. Elliott & A. Gare (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy* (pp. 85–108). St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Thompson, J. (1990). A refutation of environmental ethics. *Environmental Ethics, 12*, 147–160.

Thompson, J. (1995). Aesthetics and the value of nature. *Environmental Ethics, 17*, 291–305.

Thompson, J. (2000). Environment as cultural heritage. *Environmental Ethics, 22*(3), 241–258.

Thompson, J. (2009). *Intergenerational justice: Rights and responsibilities in an intergenerational polity*. New York: Routledge.

Trakakis, N. N. (2013). Deus Loci: The place of God and the God of place in philosophy and theology. *Sophia, 52*(2), 315–333.

Van Dooren, T. (2011). *Vulture*. London: Reacktion Books.

Watson, I. (1990). *Fighting over the forests*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Willey, B. (1965). *The eighteenth century background*. London: Chatto and Windus (First published 1940). ISBN London.

Feminist Philosophy

19

Catriona Mackenzie

Contents

Introduction 593
  Context 596
Feminism and the History of Philosophy 597
  Critical Histories 598
  Methodological Issues 602
  Feminism and the Philosophical Imaginary 607
Equality, Sexual Difference and Embodiment 609
  Equality and Difference 609
  Sex, Gender and Essentialism 612
  Sexual Difference and Feminist Philosophy 616
Feminist Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy 620
  Ethics, Bioethics and Embodiment 620
  Social Philosophy: Pornography and Sexual Harassment 625
  Race: The Blind Spot of Australasian Feminist Philosophy 628
Conclusion 631
References 632

Introduction

Feminist philosophy in Australasia has a relatively recent history, spanning the last 30 years.[1] Despite the recency of this history, Australasian feminist philosophers have made significant contributions to the development of feminist philosophy

---

[1] In this chapter the term ‘Australasia’ should be understood as referring to Australia and New Zealand. Thus, references to ‘Australasian feminist philosophy’ are inclusive of New Zealand, as distinct from references to ‘Australian feminist philosophy’. My discussion in this chapter refers mainly to the work of Australian feminist philosophers. However, I also discuss contributions by New Zealand philosophers Jan Crosthwaite, Rosalind Hursthouse and Christine Swanton.

C. Mackenzie
Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: catriona.mackenzie@mq.edu.au

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_23, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

internationally, in areas as diverse as history of philosophy, political philosophy, continental philosophy, ethical theory, moral psychology, applied ethics, bioethics, environmental philosophy and logic. In turn, the work of feminist philosophers in Australasia has been significantly influenced by developments in feminist philosophy internationally, particularly in France and the USA. My aims in this chapter are twofold. First, I want to convey some sense of the diversity and depth of the philosophical contributions of Australasian feminist philosophers. Second, I want to highlight the thematic connections among these diverse contributions and to outline the main issues and debates on which the work of Australasian feminist philosophers has focused.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. In 'Feminism and the History of Philosophy', I discuss in detail one of the central preoccupations of feminist philosophy in Australia, the project of feminist critique of the history of philosophy, including the history of political philosophy. Understanding this critical project of textual reinterpretation is crucial for understanding later developments in Australian feminist philosophy. My discussion aims to motivate this project, to discuss the work of the main contributors to it—beginning with the groundbreaking contributions of Genevieve Lloyd (1984) and Carole Pateman (1988)—and to provide a conceptual map of the main debates in the literature, from the early 1980s to the late 1990s. Methodological questions concerning the appropriate strategy for feminist interpretation of historical philosophical texts have been a central focus of these debates. For this reason, my discussion in this section is framed, in part, by the attempt to explain and analyse the points of convergence and difference on issues of methodology in the work of the philosophers I discuss. Debates about feminist methodology during this period also intersected with and were intertwined with debates concerning the relationship between the history of liberal political philosophy and feminism, centring on the question of whether feminism is compatible with liberalism. In this section therefore, I also aim to clarify some of the issues at stake in the liberalism/feminism debate.

The section on 'Equality, Sexual Difference and Embodiment', focuses primarily on issues concerning the significance of sexual difference and female embodiment. The notion of 'sexual difference', a key theme in the work of French feminist philosophers, was pivotal to debates about equality and difference in the 1980s and 1990s among Australian feminist philosophers. At the beginning of this section, I bring out the links between the liberalism/feminism debate, debates about equality and difference and the notion of sexual difference. I then discuss Moira Gatens' influential critique of the sex/gender distinction (1983), responses to this critique and the question of essentialism. Finally, I discuss differing interpretations of the notion of 'sexual difference' and its significance for feminist philosophy. In this context, I discuss Elizabeth Grosz's contributions, in the early 1990s, to the project of developing a feminist philosophy of the body.

My aim in the section on 'Feminist Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy', is to highlight the work of Australasian philosophers working from feminist perspectives who have contributed to a range of debates in ethics and bioethics, and social and political philosophy. The feminist perspectives informing these contributions were crucially shaped by the debates discussed in the preceding sections on 'Feminism and the History of Philosophy' and 'Equality, Sexual Difference and Embodiment'. Much feminist work in bioethics in Australia, for example, has been informed by concerns about embodiment arising from debates about equality and difference, and sex and gender. Similarly contemporary feminist work in ethics, and social and political philosophy, is informed by earlier debates about liberalism and feminism and by critiques of dualistic thought in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, much of the work discussed in this section is more practically focused and applied, and shifts the focus of feminist philosophy from critique to engagement with philosophical debates from a feminist perspective.

The discussion in this chapter is structured around key themes, issues and debates, rather than around philosophical approaches. The contributions of feminist philosophers working primarily in continental philosophy, in analytic philosophy or across the traditions are therefore discussed in an integrated manner. Where appropriate, I also connect the work of Australasian feminist philosophers under discussion to relevant developments in feminist philosophy internationally, especially to those French feminists whose work has been particularly influential. My major focus, however, is on the development of Australasian feminist philosophy. Since I have been, and continue to be, a contributor to some of the debates discussed in this chapter, my analysis is not purely descriptive. Rather, while aiming to do justice to the philosophical work under discussion, I also engage critically with it.

The chapter endeavours to provide as broad a coverage as possible of the development of feminist philosophy in Australasia, with a particular focus on work written during the 1980s and 1990s.[2] Nevertheless, inevitably there are some omissions. One major omission is that I do not discuss Val Plumwood's important and internationally recognised contributions to ecofeminist philosophy (1993, 2002). Plumwood's work is, however, extensively discussed in Freya Matthews', ▶ Chap. 18, "Environmental Philosophy" in this volume. Another omission is that I do not discuss the work of Rosi Braidotti.[3] The reason for not including Bradotti's work is that I have followed the principle of focusing on the work of feminist philosophers whose careers have been spent predominantly in Australasia or, in the case of philosophers who spent part of their careers in Australia or New Zealand but have subsequently gone elsewhere, to focus mainly on the work they published while here. It is also important to clarify that the focus of this chapter is Australasian feminist philosophy. While women philosophers from Australasia have made important contributions to a number of different areas of philosophy, my discussion is limited to work by women philosophers that engages specifically with feminist issues.

---

[2] For this reason, while the bibliography for this chapter includes contributions to Australasian feminist philosophy published after 2002, I do not discuss these contributions in the chapter.

[3] Braidotti completed her undergraduate degree at the Australian National University and has since become a major figure in feminist philosophy internationally.

Context

Before proceeding to the main philosophical discussion, it is important to refer briefly to the broader philosophical context within which feminist philosophy in Australasia has developed over the last 30 years.

In the early phases of its history, feminist philosophy met with considerable resistance, if not hostility from the wider Australasian philosophical community. There were two broad, but interconnected, sets of reasons for this resistance. At a philosophical level, the arguments of feminist philosophers were often misunderstood and misrepresented, and the credibility of feminist philosophy as philosophy was questioned.[4] To some extent this philosophical resistance may have been due to the predominance of analytic philosophy, particularly analytic metaphysics and epistemology, within Australasian philosophy and the perceived alignment of feminist philosophy with continental philosophy. It is certainly true that, at least in Australia, psychoanalytic theory, French feminist theory, phenomenology and deconstruction have been major influences on the work of many feminist philosophers. Elizabeth Grosz, who was for many years associated with Sydney University, was a key figure in translating these currents of French thought into an Australian context.[5]

At a more sociological level, the resistance to feminist philosophy was no doubt linked to two factors. One was the internal dissension within the Philosophy Department at Sydney University, which led eventually in the 1970s to the establishment of two separate philosophy departments: the Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy, which was predominantly analytic, and the Department of General Philosophy, which was predominantly continental and became associated with feminist philosophy. The destructive effects of this split continued to reverberate throughout Australian philosophy well into the late 1990s. The other factor was the significant underrepresentation of women in Australasian philosophy, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. In the early 1970s, women held only 4 % of continuing academic philosophy positions in Australia. There were some improvements during the 1980s (women held 8 % of positions by 1984 and 12 % by 1988) and the 1990s (women held 16 % of positions by 1996). However, even today women hold less than 25 % of continuing academic philosophy positions and only 15 % of senior positions.[6]

Given the hostile context within which feminist philosophy initially developed, particularly in Australia, the annual Women in Philosophy (WIP) conference, which was usually held immediately prior to the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) conference, played an important role, especially during the 1980s, in providing a supportive environment for the exchange of ideas among the small band of women philosophers and graduate students. Nevertheless, some of the tensions within the Australasian philosophical community between analytical and continental philosophy also played out within feminist philosophy. Although these tensions have not completely dissipated, philosophy in Australasia is now a much more pluralistic enterprise. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the WIP conference became one of the streams within the main AAP conference, and in recent years the stream has become defunct. My hope is that this is because feminist philosophy has to some extent become part of the philosophical mainstream and because the philosophical environment within Australasia is now less hostile to women philosophers, whether or not they are doing feminist philosophy. The inclusion of a chapter on feminist philosophy in this history of Australasian philosophy may be an indication that this hope is not without foundation.

---

[4] A recent example is the discussion of feminist philosophy in Franklin (2003, Chap. 14).

[5] See especially Grosz (1989, 1994).

[6] These statistics are drawn from Goddard (2008).

Feminism and the History of Philosophy

One of the central preoccupations of Australian feminist philosophers has been to engage in the project of reinterpreting the history of philosophy from a feminist perspective.[7] This project is motivated by several interconnected convictions, Firstly, that philosophy as a discipline has been shaped by its history and is in many ways continuous with that history. Critically engaging with the philosophical tradition is thus essential to the practice of doing philosophy. Secondly, that although philosophical theorising has traditionally been conceptualised as a sex-neutral activity of abstract reasoning, scrutiny of the tradition reveals a male bias that is not merely superficial but deep and pervasive, structuring philosophical conceptions of human nature, mind and cognition, knowledge, ethics and sociopolitical relations. Thirdly, that broader cultural conceptions of masculinity and femininity have both helped to structure and in turn been structured by philosophical conceptions of the masculine/feminine distinction and associated dichotomies such as culture/nature, reason/emotion, mind/body and public/private. Fourthly, that both cultural and philosophical conceptions and discourses of femininity have an impact on the lived experience of women.

I shall begin this section by discussing two books that had major impacts in feminist theory internationally and that helped to set the agenda for subsequent work by Australasian feminist philosophers: Genevieve Lloyd's *The Man of Reason* (1984) and Carole Pateman's *The Sexual Contract* (1988).[8] I will then discuss some significant subsequent contributions to the project of reinterpreting the history of philosophy, focusing in particular on some of the methodological debates that have characterised the work of Australian feminist philosophers in this area.

---

[7] My discussion in this section focuses on the broad project of reinterpreting the history of philosophy from a feminist perspective, rather than feminist critical engagement with the work of particular historical figures, such as Hegel, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, or Spinoza.

[8] Although it is likely that Pateman would not identify herself as an Australasian feminist philosopher, *The Sexual Contract* (1988) was written and published while Pateman was Reader in Government at the University of Sydney. Pateman was thus a central figure in Australasian feminist philosophy during the 1980s and *The Sexual Contract* played an important role in the development of Australasian feminist philosophy.

Critical Histories

Lloyd's primary focus in *The Man of Reason* is the concept of reason, and her aim is to analyse how this concept has been conceptualised throughout the history of philosophy. Lloyd's central argument is that although the ideal of a universal, sex-neutral conception of reason has been central to philosophy since its inception, an examination of conceptions of reason within the philosophical tradition shows that philosophy has not in fact achieved this ideal. Rather, reason has been conceptualised in association with ideals of masculinity and in opposition to ideals of femininity. Lloyd argues that the association between ideals of reason and ideals of masculinity is not merely a descriptive device, nor does it operate within philosophical texts at a merely metaphorical level. Rather the distinction between masculinity and femininity functions within many texts in the history of philosophy within a wider network of dichotomies—such as mind and body, reason and emotion, culture and nature and public and private—from which it cannot easily be extricated. These dichotomies are not neutral. Rather, one term within the dichotomy is valorised, the other devalued, so that, for example, reason, mind, masculinity and culture are defined in opposition to emotion, femininity, the body and nature. Lloyd does not claim that these distinctions and associations operate in the same way throughout the history of philosophy. She is careful to show how, in the work of Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, these distinctions and associations are articulated differently. Nevertheless, she does argue that insofar as ideals of 'reason' designate what has been regarded as commendable, the commendable has historically been defined in opposition to whatever is associated with the 'feminine'. As she puts the point in a later essay: 'Past philosophers used the male–female distinction to express ideas and ideals of reason, with the consequence that features of that distinction, as it operated in the author's own cultural context, become part of the philosophical understanding of what it was to be rational...The supposedly lesser aspects of being human, what is associated with sensibility, emotion and weak-mindedness, are conceptualised as "feminine"' (Lloyd 2000, p. 28).

When it was first published, the argument of *The Man of Reason* was quite widely misunderstood as, variously, a thesis about women's historical marginalisation from philosophy, as a rejection of reason, or as a quasi-psychological claim that women have a distinctive reasoning style that has not been given due recognition within the philosophical tradition.[9] However, Lloyd is explicit that while women's historical marginalisation from philosophy *may* play some part in explaining associations between ideals of reason and ideals of masculinity in philosophical texts, the focus of her concerns is not women's exclusion from philosophy but philosophical conceptions of femininity and masculinity.[10] In other words, Lloyd's is a meta-philosophical thesis about the structure of philosophical concepts.[11] Nor does Lloyd reject reason or even the ideal of a sex-neutral reason common to all. What she does claim is that 'if there is a [concept of] Reason genuinely common to all, it is something to be achieved in the future, not celebrated in the present' (Lloyd 1984, p. 107). Lloyd cautions, however, that this cannot be achieved simply by appropriating existing ideals of reason for women—because these ideals have been structured around conceptions of masculinity and articulated in relation to a series of problematic dichotomies in which whatever is associated with femininity has been devalued. Nor can it be achieved by simply reversing old hierarchies of value and affirming the value of whatever has been identified with femininity—nature as conceptualised in opposition to culture, the body as conceptualised in opposition to mind and emotions as conceptualised in opposition to reason—or arguing that women have a distinctive style of reasoning. For this strategy just leaves intact the old conceptual structures. The challenge opened up by Lloyd's critique is therefore to loosen the grip of these conceptual structures, which requires refiguring our conceptions of reason, emotions, mind and body. In the 25 years since the publication of *The Man of Reason*, feminist philosophers working in a number of different areas of philosophy, such as moral psychology, ethics, philosophy of mind and continental philosophy, have taken up this challenge.

---

[9] See, for example, Pargetter and Prior (1986), who interpret Lloyd as engaged in much the same enterprise as Carol McMillan in *Women, Reason and Nature* (1982). McMillan criticises feminism for having uncritically accepted a rationalistic conception of abstract reason typically associated with 'masculine' pursuits, such as science and mathematics, while denigrating the kind of 'intuitive knowledge', or practically oriented styles of reasoning embodied in women's traditional domestic and childrearing activities. While Pargetter and Prior are rightly critical of McMillan's gendered distinction between 'reason' and 'intuitive knowledge', they are quite misguided in conflating McMillan's affirmation of women's distinctive styles of reasoning with Lloyd's project. For a critical analysis of McMillan, see Gatens (1991, Chap. 4).

Where Lloyd's critique of the history of philosophy is centred on philosophical conceptions of reason and the figure of the 'man of reason', Pateman's critique of the modern tradition of liberal political philosophy in *The Sexual Contract* is centred on the concept of the 'social contract' and the figure of the rational, male social contractor. Successive variants of social contract theory have been central to western political thought since Hobbes. Their basic premise is that the exercise of political authority is only legitimate if it is based on the consent, actual or implied, of the governed. In the social contract tradition, such consent is represented through the model of a contractual exchange, in which individuals agree to forfeit their natural liberty in exchange for civil freedom. While civil freedom entails restrictions on individual liberty and obligations to the body politic, the forfeit of natural liberty is rational according to social contract theorists because civil society provides protections against the insecurities of the state of nature. Pateman argues, however, that there are deep tensions within social contract theory and liberalism more generally. These tensions emerge in social contract theorists' analysis of the position of women in relation to civil society and in their views of the marriage contract. On the one hand, social contract theory is premised on the natural liberty and equality of all individuals. On the other hand, social contract theorists have traditionally attempted to justify as natural both women's subjection to men within the private sphere of the family and their exclusion from civil society. On Pateman's reading, the contract among individuals that founds civil society is founded on, and presupposes, a *fraternal* sexual contract among men that legitimates not only political authority but also the domination of women. The universal freedom and equality of contractual liberal civil society is thus a political fiction: 'Sexual difference is political difference; sexual difference is the difference between freedom and subjection' (Pateman 1988, p. 6). The marriage contract perpetuates this fiction, insofar as it represents women's subjection to men's authority within the family as voluntary. In fact, traditional marriage presupposes male sex right, a right initially acquired, according to Pateman's analysis, not by contract but by force.

---

[10] For further discussion and elaboration, see Lloyd (1993b).

[11] For further discussion, see Lloyd's preface to the second edition of *The Man of Reason* (1993a).

Pateman's boldest claim is that women's exclusion from the social contract reveals a deeper problem with the contractarian approach to social relations: that it functions by *creating* social and political relationships of domination and subordination. While the social relations made possible by contractual exchange are represented as equal and mutually beneficial, what they actually establish are relations of obedience (in exchange for protection) and inequality. For when we look at the actual contracts involving persons (rather than say material goods) which are supposed to exemplify civil freedom, contracts such as the employment contract and the marriage contract, it is clear that in such contracts a person forfeits her liberty to dispose of her person as she chooses. Pateman argues that contract theory is able to represent such subjection as freedom because it assumes a certain (fictitious) view of personhood. In particular it presumes that a person can be separated from her bodily attributes and capacities; that persons own what Pateman, following Locke, calls 'the property in their persons', and that civil personhood is constituted by such ownership. Freedom is the ability to dispose of that property, by contracting it out for use as one chooses. On the basis of this fiction, it looks as though the employer, for instance, is simply contracting with the worker for purchase of his/her labour power. In fact, however, the employer is purchasing right of disposal of the worker's body and person, from which his capacities cannot be separated, suggesting that the distinction between the employment contract and wage slavery is not as hard and fast as it first appears.

According to Pateman, a similar mystification is implicit in contemporary defences of the prostitution and surrogacy contracts. Where once contract theory declared that women, by virtue of their natural subjection to men, did not own the property in their persons, contemporary versions of contract theory occlude the specificity of women's embodiment by representing prostitution and surrogacy as contractual exchanges between supposedly sex-neutral persons for the use of 'services' rather than for the use of women's bodies. Thus, prostitution is represented as the exchange of 'sexual services' for payment, while surrogacy is represented as a contract for use of 'bodily services', as though these services are quite separate from the bodies and persons of those who provide them. Despite the representation of such contracts as equal exchanges, the fact that these services are not separable from the bodies of the women who provide them highlights the extent to which, within contemporary contractarian thought, sexual difference still marks out relations of domination and subordination.

Pateman's reading of the social contract tradition is bold and controversial and has been contested in different ways by other Australian feminist philosophers. Karen Green takes issue with Pateman's use of the Freudian claim that culture and civilisation arise from an act of parricide, to tell the story of a fraternal contract that overturns traditional patriarchal political authority (Green 1995, pp. 50–51).[12] Green rejects the Freudian claim as having no historical basis and as writing women out of any role in the formation of society. Moira Gatens does not dispute that 'the story of the social contract is a masculine fantasy of our origins and, arguably, Pateman has exposed it' (Gatens 1996, p. 87). But she is concerned that Pateman presents the story as the originary truth of contemporary social and political life. This is problematic because it represents the sexual contract, which is an effect of social and political institutions, as the historical cause or origin of those institutions. In doing so, it seems to posit contemporary social and political life as arising from an originary, biological sexual difference, and to presuppose an essentialist conception of 'woman' as referring to a natural category, rather than as historically and culturally variable and as constituted within the context of social and political institutions.

Gatens' criticism raises a broader question about the relationship between feminism and social contract theory. Even if we accept Pateman's analysis of the way in which, within classical liberal thought, social contract theory has functioned to reinforce a gendered dichotomy between public and private spheres that excludes women from full citizenship, can her more general rejection of social contract theory as deeply inimical to women's social freedom be sustained? There are substantial disagreements among feminist philosophers on this question. Green, for example, argues that despite the problems with some of its early historical versions, Rawls' version of social contract theory provides an important basis for the reconstruction of a feminist theory of justice (Green 1986). Other feminists, however, are not so sanguine that the social contract tradition can be extended to accommodate women's interests.[13] US feminist philosopher Eva Kittay, for example, argues that Rawlsian social contract theory obscures the justice claims of vulnerable dependents and their carers, who are predominantly women (Kittay 1997; see also Held 1993). In recent work, US philosopher Martha Nussbaum extends this critique, claiming that the social contract tradition is ill-suited to tackle a range of contemporary problems of justice, in particular our obligations towards the disabled, non-citizens (e.g. international obligations of justice towards the global poor) and non-human animals (Nussbaum 2006).

---

[12] Pateman discusses Freud in *The Sexual Contract* (1988, Chap. 4).

[13] For an argument that conceptions of the social contract need to be substantially revised to accommodate women's interests, see Thompson (1993).

Methodological Issues

The critical histories of Lloyd and Pateman inspired a younger generation of scholars to critically engage with the history of philosophy from a feminist perspective. Their work also instigated a lively methodological debate about feminist textual interpretation. Three distinctive positions in this debate are those of Moira Gatens (1991a), Penelope Deutscher (1997) and Karen Green (1995).

Interrogative History

In *Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Equality and Difference* (1991a), Gatens situates her readings of historical philosophical texts within the framework of an argument about the appropriate strategy for feminist engagement with philosophy. Gatens characterises the approaches of Lloyd and Pateman, as well as her own, as taking an 'interrogative stance' towards philosophical theories (Gatens 1991a, p. 3). The strategy of the interrogative stance is to analyse and criticise the operations of dichotomous philosophical concept structures and their complex relations to the masculine/feminine dichotomy. In doing so, this strategy uses a feminist perspective to analyse and expose the implicit value commitments of a philosophical theory, for example, to show how a particular theory of human subjectivity, such as existentialism, assumes the male subject as the human norm, or how a theory of political justification, such as social contract theory, implicitly (or sometimes explicitly) assumes that all citizens are able-bodied, unencumbered, adult males. The interrogative stance thus uses a feminist perspective to 'problematise the terms of the theory'. In the first half of *Feminism and Philosophy*, Gatens deploys this methodology to analyse how conceptions of nature and human nature structure conceptions of equality, difference and freedom in the work of three male philosophers—Jean-Jacques Rousseau, J. S. Mill and Jean-Paul Sartre—and three feminist writers who responded respectively to their work: Mary Wollstonecraft, Harriet Taylor and Simone de Beauvoir.[14] The central argument that connects Gatens' readings of these writers is that the feminist strategy of extending existing philosophical theories to include women's experience is problematic. Gatens argues that this strategy, which she takes to be exemplified in the work of Wollstonecraft, Taylor and Mill and de Beauvoir, ultimately fails because it does not question the conceptual structure of the theory itself. For example, de Beauvoir's attempt to extend existentialist categories, such as transcendence and immanence, subject and Other and essence and existence, to women's experience gives rise to textual tensions and contradictions because these categories are caught up within a conceptual structure in which masculinity is equated with transcendent subjectivity and femininity with immanence and otherness. In attempting to extend this theoretical framework to women, de Beauvoir ends up representing the female body as an obstacle to women's subjectivity and freedom (Gatens 1991a, Chap. 3).[15] Through her readings of past texts, Gatens thus aims to show why the methodology of the interrogative stance is a more appropriate strategy for feminist engagement with philosophy than the strategy of extending philosophical theories to include women's experience. Gatens also rejects what she calls a 'woman-centred' strategy, which rejects the relevance of philosophy for understanding women's experience. In Gatens' view, this strategy closes off the possibility of a productive dialogue between feminist theory and philosophy, whereas the interrogative stance enables such dialogue.

---

[14] Gatens is not alone in focusing on these figures. During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of Australian feminist philosophers responded both to the work of these writers and to each others' interpretations of this work. See, for example, P. Deutscher (1997), Green (1993, 1995), La Caze (1994), Mackenzie (1986, 1993, 1998).

Deconstructive History

In her book, *Yielding Gender: Feminism, Deconstruction and the History of Philosophy*, Penelope Deutscher (1997) provides a further development of the interrogative stance, deploying the methodology of deconstruction as a resource to interrogate past philosophical texts. Deutscher quite self-consciously positions her approach to feminist reinterpretation of the history of philosophy in relation to the approaches of Lloyd, Gatens and Karen Green (to be discussed below). She argues that while these authors are attentive to the tensions, contradictions, paradoxes and complexity of representations of women and femininity in historical philosophical texts, their readings tend to stabilise these textual instabilities by reconstructing coherent narratives that aim to make sense of them within the context of a philosopher's system. Green's narratives point to textual instability to mitigate a philosopher's sexism and to recuperate aspects of a theory that might be amenable to feminists. Lloyd's narratives aim to show that, although a philosophical system may be complex and subtle, nevertheless the masculine/feminine thematic of the 'man of reason' plays a structuring role in its conceptual architecture. Gatens, while attentive to the rhetorical effects produced by textual instability, nevertheless focuses on rendering the text coherent by explaining how these instabilities function within the philosophical system in question. Deutscher argues that the attempt to reconstruct coherent narratives overlooks the way in which textual instability functions to produce phallocentric discourses, discourses that are conceptually structured around a hierarchical opposition between masculinity and femininity in which masculinity is the privileged term. Drawing on the methodology of Derridean deconstruction, her readings focus directly on how textual instabilities—such as the contradictory logic of Rousseau's analysis of woman's proper role, which slips between the descriptive and the prescriptive, between actual and idealised womanhood and between multiple notions of the 'natural' and of 'reason'—function rhetorically within the text to enable and legitimate phallocentric conceptions of sexual difference.

Deutscher's readings of the texts of Rousseau and Augustine are brilliant and inventive and present a strong argument for the fruitfulness of deconstructive interpretative methodologies for feminist engagement with the history of philosophy. However, more recently some of the earlier contributors to the project of reading the history of philosophy from a feminist perspective have moved away from the more negative, critical approach that characterises deconstructive readings and the interrogative stance and have started looking to past texts as resources to open up alternative conceptualisations of philosophical problems and debates. Lloyd, for example, is one of the foremost interpreters of Spinoza's work and during the 1990s published a large body of important work on the interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy (Lloyd 1994, 1996, 2001). Her interest in Spinoza in part arises from the view that Spinoza's philosophy opens up alternative conceptual and imaginative resources for understanding the mind and its relation to the body and nature, and freedom, than the more dominant Cartesian tradition.[16]

---

[15] For a similar argument, see Mackenzie (1986, 1998).

Genealogical History

Over the last 20 years, Karen Green has developed a distinctive research program focusing on women historical thinkers.[17] In her book *The Woman of Reason* (1995), she situates her approach to feminist interpretation in contrast to the critical, interrogative histories of Lloyd, Pateman and Gatens, arguing that feminist philosophers have not paid sufficient attention to the voices of past women writers. In her view, the writings of historical women thinkers 'provide us with the basis for our becoming self-conscious *qua* women', enabling contemporary women philosophers 'to rediscover ourselves in history as subjects with a historical subjectivity which can provide the basis for the creation of a future, grounded in an attitude to the past' (Green 1995, p. 135). Green's central aim is thus to supplement the feminist critique of masculine conceptions of rationality with what she calls a 'genealogy of feminist rationality' (Green 1995, p. 23). In doing so, she reconstructs a tradition of feminist humanism within the history of political philosophy, which, she argues, provides rich conceptual resources for rethinking philosophical conceptions of reason in non-dichotomous terms. What Green means by feminist humanism 'is a conception of humans as self-conscious, social, rational and passionate beings who are both constrained by biology and circumstance and ethically responsible' (Green 1995, p. 26).

Green argues that elements of a feminist humanist view are discernible in the writings of Christine de Pisan, whose moral psychology she contrasts to that of Hobbes, and in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft. Many feminist interpreters of Wollstonecraft, for example Gatens, argue that despite the brilliance of her critique of Rousseau, Wollstonecraft's feminism is ultimately vitiated by her failure to radically question the foundational assumptions of Rousseau's philosophy.[18]

---

[16] See Susan James' (2000) interview with Lloyd and Gatens. In this interview, Gatens expresses a similar view of the relevance of Spinoza's work. See also Gatens and Lloyd (1999) and Gatens (2009).

[17] For more recent contributions to this research program by Green and Green's former student and now colleague Jacqueline Broad, see, for example, Broad (2002); Broad and Green (2007, 2009).

[18] See, for example, Gatens (1986, 1991a, Chap. 1, and 1991b).

In particular, in trying to extend Rousseau's conception of equality to women, Wollstonecraft ends up adopting ideals of reason and virtue that perpetuate traditional philosophical dichotomies between mind and body, reason and passion and public and private. Green, in my view rightly, contests this interpretation of Wollstonecraft as splitting reason from feeling, arguing that in Wollstonecraft's moral psychology 'reason, feeling and imagination were all integral elements of the moral personality' (Green 1993, p. 101) and that central to Wollstonecraft's conception of reason is the capacity for sympathetic moral imagination.[19] In her readings of de Pisan and Wollstonecraft, Green thus aims to contest the view, expressed, for example, by Gatens, that the feminist strategy of extending existing philosophical theories to include women's experience is problematic. While acknowledging the ways in which the views of de Pisan and Wollstonecraft were constrained by the exigencies of their social and historical contexts, Green argues that in trying to use philosophical theories to understand (and in Wollstonecraft's case to criticise) women's social and political situation, these writers were actually rethinking the tradition.

Green's conception of feminist humanism, and her attention to moral psychology, resonates with many of the themes in contemporary feminist ethics, which bring a feminist sensibility to bear on issues in moral psychology and moral theory. And her insistence on listening to the voices of historical women writers and attending to how women in past historical contexts exercised their agency is salutary. I do have some concerns, however, about Green's 'feminine, or "maternalist" contractualism' (Green 1995, p. 45), which she presents as an alternative gynocentric story of the origin of the social contract than that presented by the original social contract theorists.

Green argues that feminist analysis of women's oppression has been hijacked by de Beauvoir's analysis of woman as Other. According to Green, De Beauvoir's claim that women have submitted to male domination because they have internalised the status of the Other robs women of their history and their agency and fails to explain women's contributions to the formation of the social and cultural world. Further, this claim is premised on an unquestioning adoption of Levi-Strauss' masculinist analysis of kinship relations as structured around the exchange of women. Green's alternative gynocentric contractualist analysis proposes that a central concern of women in every society has been to ensure their own security and that of their offspring in circumstances of domination and oppression, arising from men's greater physical strength. In such circumstances, she argues, women have an interest in establishing reciprocal kinship exchanges which enable them to exercise some control over men's right of sexual access to women 'in order to maximize male contributions to children's survival' (Green 1995, p. 141). Green acknowledges that in situations where women have little power and where their consent is under duress, this 'compromise' solution is fraught with dangers and complications. Given this, she argues, it is in women's interests to promote 'an ideal of sexual love which emphasizes responsibility for, and commitment to, the wellbeing of the other over a long period of time' (Green 1995, p. 144).

---

[19] See also Green (1993). I argue for a similar interpretation of Wollstonecraft's views on the relation between reason and passion in Mackenzie (1993).

I have several worries about this analysis of women's role in constituting reciprocal kinship exchanges. First, Green's argument relies on a problematic generalisation from an ethnographic analysis of how real women in a specific social, cultural and geographical location negotiate their social and cultural lives with men to an ahistorical origins story that is supposed to explain how women have actively contributed to culture within the constraints of male domination.[20] Second, and in parallel to Gatens' concerns about the role played by the notion of the 'sexual contract' in Pateman's work, Green's origins story seems to rely on positing an originary biological sexual difference, which provides the key to explaining women's motivations and their submission to men. Although Green criticises essentialism 'and the attempt to forge our identity from some ahistorical given—maternity for instance, or perhaps the female body' (Green 1995, p. 134)—her analysis of women's role in exchange relations seems perilously close to assuming an essentialist conception of women's motivations arising from their role in reproduction and mothering. Third, Green's argument slides between three different levels of analysis: an analysis of philosophical concepts and distinctions—reason/emotion, public/private, subject/Other—and their shifting historical alignments with representations of masculinity and femininity; an ahistorical, explanatory and justificatory story of the origin of social and cultural structures; and the lives of real women.

For reasons already discussed, I am not convinced of the value of attempts to develop universal, ahistorical origins stories. Nevertheless, the question of what the relationship might be between the first and third levels of analysis—philosophical representations of masculinity and femininity and the lives of real women—is important. The notion of the 'philosophical imaginary', developed in the work of French feminist philosopher Michele Le Doeuff (1989) has played an important role in informing how many Australian feminist philosophers have answered this question.[21] For the remainder of this section, I discuss Le Doeuff's analysis of the 'philosophical imaginary' and Marguerite La Caze's (2000) development of this idea in her analysis of what she calls the 'analytic imaginary'.

---

[20] Green's argument draws on Australian anthropologist Diane Bell's ethnographic work with Aboriginal women from a number of sex-segregated tribal groups in central Australia. Bell's work documents how the women's groups in these societies have developed their own rituals and stories, are economically independent, and play an active role in the maintenance of kinship structures.

[21] Max Deutscher was a key figure in championing Le Doeuff's work among Australian feminist philosophers during the 1980s and thereafter. His edited collection, *Michele Le Doeuff* (2000), includes papers on Le Doeuff by many Australian feminist philosophers, including Penelope Deutscher, Robyn Ferrell, Moira Gatens, Marguerite La Caze, Genevieve Lloyd, and Michelle Boulos Walker. For other discussions of Le Doeuff's work by Australian feminist philosophers, see Walker (1993); Grosz (1989); and P. Deutscher (1997). Moira Gatens' notion of the 'socio-cultural imaginary' (Gatens 1996), discussed in the section 'Equality, Sexual Difference and Embodiment', extends Le Doeuff's notion of the 'philosophical imaginary' to the broader socio-cultural context.

Feminism and the Philosophical Imaginary

In her essay 'Maleness, Metaphor and the "Crisis of Reason"', Lloyd (1993b) argues that philosophical conceptions of 'femininity' and 'masculinity' should be understood as symbolic or metaphoric constructions. Although this symbolism can sometimes function at a superficial level as a 'mere' metaphor, in the sense that the content of the thought could be articulated without reference to the male–female distinction, it is often deeply conceptually embedded in a philosophical system, so that the operation of the metaphor is essential for the articulation of conceptual content. The problem with these embedded metaphors is that they function to constrain and regiment the philosophical imagination, closing off alternative conceptual possibilities. In another essay, 'No One's Land: Australia and the Philosophical Imagination' (Lloyd 2000), Lloyd argues that such metaphors draw on the 'broader network of images at play in a culture at any one time' and often, as in the case of the male–female distinction, they 'reflect and affect the operations of power in a culture' (Lloyd 2000, 28).

These later essays draw on Le Doeuff's notion of the 'philosophical imaginary' in order to articulate, retrospectively, the conception of philosophical metaphor that was implicitly operative in *The Man of Reason*, but not explicitly developed in that earlier text.[22] As Marguerite La Caze explains, 'the conception of the philosophical imaginary...encompasses both a particular capacity to imagine and a stock of imagery' deployed within philosophical texts (La Caze 2000, p. 20). Le Doeuff does not claim that there is a singular 'philosophical imaginary', nor does she attempt to develop a theory of the imaginary. Her methodology is rather to undertake close readings of philosophical texts to analyse how specific images operate within those texts to smooth over tensions, gaps, difficulties and contradictions within a philosophical system. Due to their rhetorical force, images can persuade the reader to overlook such tensions and to accept questionable or dogmatic assumptions or arguments. Critically analysing the function of these images is thus essential for understanding the conceptual structure of the system.

It would be a mistake to interpret Le Doeuff's critique of the philosophical imaginary as a restatement of traditional philosophical suspicions of rhetoric and imagery. In her view, philosophical thought, like all other forms of thinking, cannot do without images. The aim of her readings is rather twofold. Firstly, to prompt reflective awareness of how imagery can be both productive—opening up new conceptual possibilities—and constraining, functioning to close off alternative ways of approaching philosophical problems and to exclude or denigrate certain social groups. Secondly, to encourage the development of a philosophical practice that does not aim for systematic closure and completeness, but rather that is dynamic, interdisciplinary and open-ended, like 'Brechtian drama, which. . .produces unfinished plays which always have a missing act and are consequently left wide open to history' (Le Doeuff 1987, p. 199). Le Doeuff interprets de Beauvoir as engaging in such open-ended philosophical practice. She argues that although de Beauvoir utilises some of the problematic dualistic conceptual structure of Sartrean existentialism, she makes existentialism 'work "beyond its means"' (Le Doeuff 1979, p. 55), transforming the Sartrean individualistic ethic of authenticity into a concrete and detailed analysis of women's social oppression and a denunciation of that oppression as arbitrary and unjustifiable. In doing so, de Beauvoir not only challenges the conceptual structure of Sartre's closed metaphysical system but she also challenges the sexism of Sartre's notorious female sexual imagery.[23]

---

[22] See also Lloyd's essay 'Le Doeuff and the History of Philosophy' in M. Deutscher (2000) and her introduction to Lloyd (ed) (2002).

In *The Analytic Imaginary*, La Caze (2000) extends Le Doeuff's analysis of the philosophical imaginary to contemporary analytic philosophy. La Caze is attentive to the differences between the more piecemeal, problem-focused approach of analytic philosophy and the systematic philosophers discussed by Le Doeuff, such as Kant, Descartes and Sartre. Nevertheless she argues that images, examples and thought experiments of various kinds do play a crucial role in analytic philosophy—not only to educate the philosophical novice but also to smooth over problematic assumptions and persuade the reader to accept contentious arguments and conclusions. Further, although such images are used explicitly and self-consciously by analytic philosophers, there is little reflection within analytic philosophy about the way these images frame and constrain philosophical debates and close off alternative ways of approaching philosophical problems.

La Caze does not purport to provide a theory of the analytic imaginary. Her aim is rather to provide a contextual analysis of the way particular images function in particular philosophical debates, such as Judith Jarvis Thomson's 'violinist' analogy in the abortion debate (Thomson 1971), Derek Parfit's teletransportation and fission thought experiments in the personal identity debate (Parfit 1984), and the so-called devices of the original position and the veil of ignorance in Rawls' version of social contract theory (Rawls 1972). La Caze argues, for example, that the images of the original position and the veil of ignorance are not just methodological devices nor are they metaphors, thought experiments or allegories. Rather, they function more as myths, given the fictitious nature of these images and the purported explanatory and justificatory role played by the social contract as a story of origins within the liberal tradition. La Caze's analysis of 'contractarian myths' aims to show how these images have functioned to entrench contentious assumptions in contemporary political philosophy, such as those of abstract individualism and liberal neutrality, as well as the idea that through the exercise of impartial reasoning we can arrive at universal principles of justice that would be agreed to by all.

---

[23] Le Doeuff develops this argument in considerably more detail in *Hipparchia's Choice* (1991, Second Notebook).

The aim of La Caze's analysis of the analytic imaginary, however, is not just critique. It is rather to diagnose how certain images have constrained the philosophical imagination and through that diagnosis to open up new ways of thinking about philosophical problems. Thus, La Caze also discusses the ways in which feminist philosophers have reshaped debates about abortion, personal identity and social contract theory. La Caze's interest in looking to new ways to frame philosophical problems is indicative of a shift in focus in the work of Australian feminist philosophers, from the more negative style of critique of the philosophical tradition characteristic of interrogative and deconstructive histories to engaging with philosophical debates from a feminist perspective. During much of the 1980s and early 1990s, as we have seen, feminist philosophers in Australia were predominantly concerned with feminist critique of existing philosophical traditions, concepts and distinctions. This critical focus was quite understandable. Given the ways in which femininity and women have historically been represented in philosophy—as passive, irrational, emotional, bodily, close to nature, childlike, incomprehensible and so on—feminist philosophers needed to engage critically with the tradition, both as feminists and as philosophers. Nevertheless, over the last 15 years or so, feminist philosophy in Australia has moved beyond this more negative critical project. In my view, this shift is a positive development that marks the coming of age of feminist philosophy.

In this section of the chapter, I have focused on one of the central strands in the work of many Australian feminist philosophers, namely, critical engagement with the history of philosophy and methodological debate about the appropriate strategies for such engagement. This strand both forms the background to, and intersects with, a set of issues that gave rise to quite heated debates among Australasian feminist philosophers in the 1980s and 1990s concerning equality and difference; sex, gender and essentialism; embodiment; and the significance of sexual difference, to which I now turn.

Equality, Sexual Difference and Embodiment

Equality and Difference

The notion of 'sexual difference' is often articulated in contrast to an equality of 'sameness', which is usually associated with the liberal feminist tradition, as exemplified in the work of Wollstonecraft and Mill. Liberal feminists have typically argued that women have the same rational and moral capacities as men and so should have access to the same opportunities for participation in social and political life. The strategy of liberal feminism has thus been to insist on women's equality, and a central focus of its concerns has been to dismantle the barriers to women's equal participation in social and political life, such as sexual harassment, gender discrimination, the gendered division of labour both within the home and in the workplace, differential wage rates for men and women, lack of provision for childcare, and workplace structures that make it difficult for women to balance family responsibilities with work.

While not disputing the importance of institutional measures aimed at redressing gender based discrimination in all its forms, feminist theorists of sexual difference argue that liberal political philosophy fails to provide an adequate theoretical framework for conceptualising the political and ethical significance of sexual difference. Within the Australasian context, Marion Tapper's article 'Can a Feminist be a Liberal?' (1986) was an influential early example of such a critique. Tapper answers the question posed in the title of her paper in the negative. She argues that the insistence of liberal feminism on abstract 'formal' equality obscures the specific needs of women arising from their different embodiment, making the denial of women's sexual difference a condition of their entry into the public sphere. In her view, it is only as abstract, autonomous individuals that women can be accommodated within liberal civil society. This is why liberal societies are so slow to respond to the specific problems facing women in the workplace, such as sexual harassment, and why they are so slow to accommodate the specific needs of working women arising from pregnancy, or responsibilities for childcare or care of the sick or elderly. Tapper concedes that feminist arguments for paid maternity and parental leave, work-based childcare and so on are important and that these arguments have often appealed to liberal ideals of equality. However, she claims that such arguments are in many ways inconsistent with the main assumptions of liberalism. Strictly speaking, she thinks, liberals should see the having of children, for example, as a 'private', 'individual' choice for which women, rather than the state, should take responsibility.

Tapper also questions whether the public/private distinction has really shifted. She points out that women's entry into the public sphere has often meant not only that women do a double shift but also that much of the work that women do in the public sphere—nursing, childcare, service jobs and menial factory work—simply mirrors their roles in the private sphere. Saying this is not to denigrate this kind of work. But the problem is that work of this kind is given a secondary status within societies organised in terms of a sharp public/private split and in which the conception of the public sphere is extrapolated from certain ideals of manliness and from certain assumptions about the roles of men. The result is, firstly, that the work of women within the public sphere which does not fit in easily with those ideals of manliness is given secondary status both in terms of financial remuneration and social importance and, secondly, that women who work in so-called 'masculine' occupations are expected to do so as men. Tapper's argument then is that rather than insisting on women's 'sameness' what is required is a genuine recognition of sexual difference. Tapper's claim is that liberalism is unable to provide the basis for such recognition: 'By insisting on the non-differences between the sexes it deprives women of the very basis from which they could speak effectively in the public world. What is required is a recognition of the different social position and different experience from which women speak, and development of a political language which takes account of this' (Tapper 1986, p. 46).

I think liberal theory can and does accommodate a greater diversity of views than Tapper allows. For example, many liberal theorists would object to the view that having children is a purely 'private' affair, a matter of individual choice, and that there is no social obligation on the part of the state and employers to assist women (and men) who make that choice to balance work and family responsibilities. Susan Okin is an example of a liberal feminist philosopher who would reject Tapper's interpretation of liberalism.[24] In her book *Justice, Gender and the Family* (1989), Okin criticises liberal theories of justice for having failed to address issues of gender both within the family and in the public sphere. However, she argues that Rawlsian liberal theory does provide the resources for developing a theory of justice that can redress gender inequities and that, consistently applied, the theory would support a raft of wide-ranging social policies aimed at redressing women's economic and social vulnerability within marriage and post-divorce and ensuring family-friendly work structures to enable both sexes to care for children, the ill and the elderly.

Many feminists would support Okin's social policy recommendations. Nevertheless, there are real difficulties with her position, which help to underscore the problem raised by Tapper. A major difficulty is that although Okin concedes that there will always be certain physiological differences between the sexes, in her view the aim of feminist social and political reform should be to minimise the effects of these differences and to develop social, political and familial structures that lead to the elimination of gender differentiation and eventually the establishment of a gender-neutral society. There are two problems with this view. Firstly, Okin acknowledges that given current unjust gender structures there are significant differences between the sexes in terms of social roles, motivation and psychology. However, she also acknowledges that Rawls' original position assumes that all parties behind the veil of ignorance are similarly psychologically motivated. This leads to circularity in her argument, since in her view society will never be just until gender differentiation is abolished; however, the assumption that the parties behind the veil of ignorance are similarly psychologically motivated is only plausible on the assumption that gender differentiation has been abolished. Thus, as La Caze puts the point, 'A consequence of holding onto the original position. . .is that it would not be genuinely relevant to political theorizing until after there had been massive social change' (La Caze 2000, p. 107). The second problem is with Okin's conception of the relation between sex and gender. The idea that gender could and should be abolished assumes that the relation between sex and gender is contingent and arbitrary. However, this conception of the sex/gender relation has been seriously challenged in the work of Moira Gatens and Natalie Stoljar, as I shall discuss shortly.

---

[24] Susan Okin was born and raised in New Zealand and educated at the universities of Auckland, Oxford, and Harvard. She held academic positions at Auckland, Vassar College, Brandeis, Harvard, and Stanford. On the basis of the inclusion/exclusion principle outlined at the outset of the chapter, I am not counting her as an Australasian feminist philosopher.

Whether or not Tapper's interpretation of liberalism is too one sided then, the question raised by her critique, of how to move—both theoretically and practically—beyond the impasse of thinking that women are either equal and the same as men, or different and unequal, is nevertheless an important one, not only for feminist philosophy but for women negotiating the double shift of work and family life. One response to this issue is to criticise the sameness-difference opposition as a false opposition. As Lloyd explains, 'In some contexts, it is appropriate to demand sameness; in others, difference' (Lloyd 1993a, p. 83).[25] A related response, developed in Gatens' work, is to emphasise that the issue of concern to feminism is not equality versus difference but rather the meanings or significance attributed to bodily differences between the sexes within a culture. Gatens draws attention to the historical and social variability of these meanings and of women's lived experience of their embodiment. She argues that the focus of feminist social and political reform must be on refiguring the ways in which female embodiment is culturally constructed and lived (Gatens 1996, Chap. 5).

Sex, Gender and Essentialism

Gatens' approach to the equality-difference debate intersects with her analysis of the sex/gender relation. Whereas Okin argues that achieving equality for women requires the elimination of gender, in her highly influential article 'A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction', originally published in 1983, Gatens criticises such de-gendering proposals as misguided.[26] According to proponents of the distinction, it is important to distinguish between biological sex, which is determined by primary and secondary sexual characteristics, and gender identity, which refers to social roles and psychological characteristics and behaviours. The distinction between, on the one hand, biologically determined characteristics and, on the other, social and psychological characteristics and behaviours, which are taken to be malleable, provides gender socialisation theory with a response to biologically reductionist conceptions of the differences between the sexes. However, Gatens argues that gender socialisation theory is just the obverse of biological reductionism. Both set up a false opposition between biology and environment, and both are also implicated in a problematic body/mind or body/consciousness dualism.

---

[25] Lloyd draws here on Joan Scott's discussion of equality and difference in Scott (1988).

[26] Moira Gatens, 'A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction'. Originally published in 'Beyond Marxism? Interventions after Marx', ed. J. Allen & P. Patton, *Interventions*, 1983. Reprinted as Ch. 1 of *Imaginary Bodies* (Gatens 1996). Page references to this article in the text refer to the 1996 reprint.

Gatens presents three central objections to the sex/gender distinction as understood within gender socialisation theory. Firstly, that it is premised on a conception of the human subject as essentially a sex-neutral consciousness who is only accidentally embodied. Further, it assumes a problematic view of both consciousness and the body as passively shaped by external forces—either biological or social. Secondly, that by decoupling femininity from the female body and masculinity from the male body, it represents the relation between sex and gender as arbitrary. In contrast, Gatens insists, 'the subject is always a *sexed* subject' (1996, p. 9). Thirdly, that de-gendering proposals are naïve because they are based on the false assumption that masculine and feminine characteristics are socially valued or devalued in abstraction from the types of bodies with which they are associated. However, Gatens argues, 'The very same behaviours (whether they be masculine or feminine) have quite different personal and social significances when acted out by the male subject on the one hand and the female subject on the other' (Gatens 1996, p. 9). Thus, 'It is not masculinity *per se* that is valorised in our culture, but the masculine male' (Gatens 1996, p. 15).

In a response to Gatens' article, Val Plumwood (1989) argues that these criticisms do not provide sufficient reasons for rejecting the sex/gender distinction itself, only some versions of it. Plumwood argues that the distinction is more useful for feminists than the notion of 'sexual difference', not only because it points to the variability, among members of a sex, of certain characteristics or functions traditionally associated with that sex but also because it provides the basis for criticising stereotypical or ideological representations of masculinity and femininity and for dissociating such representations from biological maleness and femaleness. The distinction thus provides a platform for responding to biologically determinist conceptions of masculine and feminine characteristics. Plumwood argues, however, that gender theorists need not think that the body plays *no* role in shaping our subjectivities. In Plumwood's view, the appropriate way of understanding the relation between sex and gender is to see the body or sex as the foundation or basis upon which gender is constructed. Gender is a social construction, interpretation or elaboration of the meaning of masculinity and femininity on the basis of, or *from*, sex. So gender is *about* sex. This view enables a distinction to be drawn between sex and gender, while acknowledging that they interact causally, in both directions: gender is about sex, but conceptions of gender also shape our interpretations of sex or the biological data.

I agree with Plumwood that the distinction has some important conceptual and political uses. Further Plumwood's claim that gender is about sex seems not too dissimilar from Gatens' claim that the relationship between sex and gender is non-arbitrary. However, Plumwood's critique misses two important dimensions of Gatens' approach to sexual difference and embodiment. The first is Gatens' insistence that to understand sex and gender we cannot conceptualise the body simply in biological terms but must focus on the body as lived, or what she refers to as the 'imaginary body'. In her earlier work on embodiment, Gatens' understanding of the 'imaginary body' draws heavily on the psychoanalytic notion of the body image and on the idea that a unified body image is a precondition for the formation of subjectivity. Gatens' argument is that our lived experience of our bodies is structured by these psychic images or imaginary representations of our bodies. Further, because our subjectivities are necessarily formed in the context of social relations, our own body images will inevitably incorporate social and cultural representations of the meaning of bodily differences, including differences between the sexes. This does not mean, of course, that the body images of all women or all men will be the same. Because each person has a different psychic history, each individual actively constructs his/her own distinctive psychic representation of his/her body. Nevertheless, these individual representations are constructed in relation to the culturally available interpretations of the significance of bodily differences and in relation to cultural practices and institutions. So in a culture in which, for example, ideals of femininity are bound up with body shape or breast size, these ideals are likely to be incorporated, in different ways, into women's psychic representations of their bodies. The notion of the imaginary body thus undercuts any clear-cut distinction between biology and culture. The body and the individual psyche are mutually constituted through the complex interrelation of biological, social, cultural and historical determinants. Our lived experience of embodied subjectivity is the experience of this complex interrelation, as mediated by our own psychic representations.

The second important dimension of Gatens' approach to sexual difference and embodiment is her emphasis on the connections between the sexed body, the social meanings of gender identity and the qualitative distinctiveness of the way in which men and women live or experience their sexual identities. For example, Gatens argues that while a male transsexual or a 'feminine' male may identify with cultural conceptions of femininity, or certain aspects of them, and may have experiences that are socially inscribed as 'feminine', he will experience his 'femininity' in a way that is *qualitatively* different from the way in which a woman, that is, a biological and social female, experiences her femininity. The same behaviours or characteristics have different personal and social significances when acted out by male and female subjects. Think of the difference between Michael Jackson's 'femininity' and Madonna's 'femininity'. The suggestion then is that while our sex/gender identities may to some extent be performative, that is, a matter of acting out certain behaviours, gestures and styles that are socially or culturally coded as masculine or feminine, our identities are not entirely a matter of performance.[27]

Interestingly, in a brilliant and illuminating article 'Essence, identity and the concept of woman', Natalie Stoljar (1995) develops an analysis of the concept 'woman' that reaches some similar conclusions to Gatens, drawing on a very different philosophical framework. Stoljar usefully distinguishes two forms of essentialism that are often conflated in feminist critiques of essentialism. The first form identifies ‘woman’ as a class or type in virtue of some universal property or properties shared by all members of that class. The second form claims that womanness is a property which is essential to the identity of the individuals who make up the type. Stoljar distinguishes and rejects three different variants of the first form of essentialism: the view that there is an Aristotelian species-essence ‘woman’; the view that the property womanness is a natural intrinsic property or set of properties which coincides with the category female human, and the view, defended, for example, by US feminist Catherine MacKinnon (1987), that ‘woman’ refers to a universal social category, defined by the relational property of being sexually subordinated. Nevertheless Stoljar does not accept the argument, proposed, for example, by US feminist philosopher Elizabeth Spelman (1988), that the category ‘woman’ is relative to particular contexts or ways of life, so that, for example, there are no shared similarities between the category Aboriginal woman and the category middle-class Australian woman of Greek heritage. Stoljar argues that although Spelman’s view rightly recognises the diversity, it ignores the similarities among women, treating the category ‘woman’ as an arbitrary cluster rather than a type. Further, it disconnects gender from sex.

---

[27] It should be noted that Gatens' article was originally published before the publication of Judith Butler's influential analysis of gender as perfomative (Butler 1990, 1993).

Stoljar provides an alternative analysis of the concept ‘woman’ that is responsive to Spelman’s concerns about diversity but that also explains both the basis on which women constitute a type and the necessary connection between female sex and feminine gender. She argues that the concept ‘woman’ should be thought of as a cluster concept, like the concept ‘game’, comprising a cluster of different intrinsic and relational properties. The cluster picks out a resemblance class among women, based on natural and social similarities, not identities. In order for the concept to apply correctly to a particular individual, it is sufficient that the individual satisfies enough of the features of the cluster. Stoljar argues that the concept ‘woman’ involves four elements which enable us to pick out paradigm cases of the concept: female sex, a range of phenomenological features or characteristic lived experiences arising from both bodily and social factors, social roles and responsibilities, and self-identification and identification by others as a woman. On Stoljar’s analysis, female sex is a necessary component of the *concept* woman. Thus, she agrees with Gatens that gender cannot be understood as a purely social category and that the relationship between sex and gender is non-arbitrary: sex is a necessary component of gender. However, she argues that female sex is not necessary for an *individual* to count as a woman, so long as the individual satisfies the other elements of the concept.

Stoljar’s analysis of the concept ‘woman’ as a cluster concept helps clarify some of the puzzles and difficult cases relating to gender identity. It explains why, for example, a transsexual who lacks an XX chromosome but nevertheless self-identifies as a woman, dresses as a woman and has female secondary sex characteristics and characteristic female phenomenology satisfies many of the features of the concept ‘woman’. But it also explains why the same individual might also satisfy many of the features of the concept ‘man’—because ‘resemblance classes do not have precise boundaries . . .the boundaries of the types “man” and “woman” overlap’ (Stoljar 1995, p. 285). Thus, Stoljar suggests it might make sense to think that gender is a matter of degree: individuals who pass the threshold for womanness may resemble the paradigm cases of the type to varying degrees. The analysis of 'woman' as a resemblance class also explains why, even though female sex is a necessary component of the concept 'woman', the concept is nevertheless open to revision and is socially and culturally variable—because 'the class is *constructed* in the sense that there is a choice as to the exemplars of the class' (Stoljar 1995, p. 286).

Sexual Difference and Feminist Philosophy

A central theme in the work of a number of Australian feminist philosophers, as we have seen, is that cultural representations of femininity and female embodiment—whether in the history of philosophy, psychoanalysis, literature or in popular culture—have taken man as the human norm and defined woman in relation to that norm. Sometimes the relation is understood as one of complementarity, sometimes as whatever masculinity is not. There has been considerable disagreement and debate, however, about how feminist philosophers should respond to such representations and how the project of feminist philosophy should be understood. Much of this debate has centred on differing interpretations of, and responses to, the work of French feminist theorist Luce Irigaray.

Irigaray's work can be divided into three phases (Deutscher 2002, p. 74). In the first, critical phase, Irigaray's central focus is to analyse and deconstruct representations of femininity as Other, as lack or as complement to a masculinity that is assumed as the norm. For example, in *Speculum of the Other Woman* ([1974], 1985), Irigaray analyses representations of femininity in the history of philosophy and in psychoanalysis, arguing that femininity is a theoretical blind spot in the texts of Plato and Freud. The second phase of her work aims to open up the conceptual space for reimagining feminine subjectivity, specifically female embodiment. In the third phase, Irigaray aims to construct an 'ethics of sexual difference', which would reconceptualise intersubjective relations between the sexes around a recognition of the other's alterity, in place of what she characterises as 'appropriative' relations in which each relates to the other only as object or as a reflection, extension or possession of the self. Much of the debate about the implications of Irigaray's work, among Australasian feminist philosophers and elsewhere, has centred on how to interpret the conception of sexual difference at stake in the second and third phases of her work, and especially how to interpret the project of reimagining feminine subjectivity and embodiment.

On one reading, developed most subtly by Penelope Deutscher, Irigaray's conception of 'sexual difference' 'refers to an excluded possibility, some kind of femininity (open in content) that has never become culturally coherent or possible' (Deutscher 2002, p. 29), because femininity has been culturally represented only in relation to a masculine norm, as same, other or complement.[28] On this reading,

---

[28] For a related reading of Irigaray, see Whitford (1991).

‘sexual difference’ should be understood as an anticipatory concept, or ideal, referring to a hypothetical, ‘impossible’ feminine identity that does not exist, rather than to either a buried, suppressed, ‘true’ feminine identity or a utopian future feminine subjectivity. Given its paradoxical status, Irigaray adopts different strategies for referring to this identity: sometimes leaving its content empty and at other times engaging in exaggerated mimicry of traditional conceptions of femininity and female sexuality, the aim of which is to disrupt and re-metaphorise those conceptions. In some of her work, Irigaray has also adopted the language of rights and proposed a set of legal ‘sexuate rights’ for women that would rethink the conceptual basis for equality through recognition of sexual difference (1993).

These strategies have been the subject of extensive debate among feminist theorists. One concern that is commonly expressed about the strategy of mimicry is that, rather than opening up alternative imaginaries for feminine subjectivity and embodiment, Irigaray’s re-metaphorisations of female embodiment and sexuality end up entrenching the dominant imaginary. This concern underlies Lloyd’s wariness about the implications of Irigaray’s project. She writes: ‘What does the excluded feminine have to do with real women? The ironic exercise of miming, as a real woman, the speaking position to which Woman is relegated in the Symbolic order can be a powerful reading strategy. But what is supposed to emerge for the understanding of (real) sexual difference?’ (Lloyd 1993a, p. 74). A related set of concerns has been raised about Irigaray’s program of sexuate rights, for example, by US feminist legal theorist Drucilla Cornell, who argues that Irigaray ‘naturalize[s] sexual difference in sexuate rights’ (Cornell 1998, p. 30 as quoted by Deutscher 2002, p. 53) and assumes a fundamental ontological difference between the sexes that restricts women’s freedom to live their embodiment in diverse ways. Behind both criticisms is the worry that Irigaray undermines her own deconstructive strategy by fixing the content of feminine subjectivity and sexuality.

Deutscher develops a carefully argued defence of Irigaray in response to such criticisms. However, she also acknowledges that Irigaray’s texts do not always sustain her paradoxical ‘politics of the impossible’, sometimes representing sexual difference as an ontological ‘fact to be recognized’ (2002, p. 70). Deutscher also argues that Irigaray’s discourse ‘is too little informed by diverse ways in which women wish to imagine sexual difference’ (2002, p. 72), failing to take responsibility for the different ways in which her texts might be read and in particular assuming ‘a racially and culturally neutral reading subject, who is, of course, anything but’ (2002, p. 73). Gatens puts the point perhaps more strongly, arguing that although ‘representations of sexual difference are central to social imaginaries, I do not think it is helpful to reduce the complexity and variety of social imaginaries to a univocal sexual imaginary’ (1996, pp. ix–x). This criticism marks a shift from Gatens’ earlier work on embodiment, which was heavily influenced by both psychoanalysis and the work of Irigaray. Her later work on the social imaginaries of feminine subjectivity and embodiment extends Le Doeuff’s conception of the ‘philosophical imaginary’ to the broader sociocultural context and emphasises the historical and cultural variability of these imaginaries, the tensions among them and the fact that they are constantly being transformed and refigured. Gatens also rejects an ontological conception of sexual difference, drawing on the work of Foucault and Spinoza, in proposing that bodily differences are ‘constituted through relatively stable but dynamic networks of relational powers, capacities and affects’ (1996, p. 149). This view emphasises the way in which differences between and among male and female bodies and subjectivities are produced by specific cultural and historical practices and environments.[29]

In contrast, Elizabeth Grosz’s work is marked by a tendency to interpret Irigaray’s notion of ‘sexual difference’ in terms of a fundamental ontological difference between the sexes. It is this interpretation of Irigaray that seems to underpin Grosz’s conception of the project of feminist philosophy as the articulation of autonomous representations of female embodiment and sexuality. Grosz’s work had a major impact on the development of feminist philosophy in Australia, particularly during the 1980s and early 1990s. Much of her intellectual endeavour during this period was focused on bringing the work of French theorists to the attention of feminist theorists in Anglophone countries, including Australia, through a body of critical exegetical writings that had enormous influence among feminist theorists and philosophers interested in continental, particularly Francophone, philosophy.[30] One of the legacies of her influence is that Australian philosophy, in particular, continues to support a thriving culture of philosophical work informed by French philosophy. I focus here on two strands of Grosz’s work during this period. One strand is her work on a philosophy of the body. The other strand, which owes much to the work of Irigaray, is the project of articulating an autonomous representation of femininity and female sexuality.

In Grosz’s reading of the history of philosophy, two conceptual oppositions are pivotal: mind/body and masculine/feminine. She argues that the body has almost always been represented in opposition to reason, the mind or the soul as mere matter and as the source of disruptive desires that threaten the calm operations of the rational mind. In Descartes’ dualism, for example, mind and body are posited as two distinct, although interacting substances, with mind represented as the active seat of the soul, of consciousness and the understanding. The significance of psychoanalysis, in Grosz’s view, is that it challenged the Cartesian conception of consciousness as transparent to itself, rational and knowable and emphasised the importance of corporeality in the constitution of subjectivity. Nevertheless, in Grosz’s view, the legacy of Cartesianism is still with us, not only in philosophy but also in many approaches to scientific knowledge, which represent the body as a complex organic biological system that can be understood purely objectively, or as a mechanism, instrument or tool to be used to achieve our purposes (Grosz 1994, Chap. 1).

---

[29] Clare Colebrook (2000) argues that in their work, Lloyd, Grosz and Gatens have all articulated, in different ways, this conception of embodiment and bodily difference as dynamic, arguing that in doing so they have developed a distinctively ‘Australian’ feminist perspective on corporeality. In my view, the differences between Grosz’s conception of corporeal feminism and Gatens’ conception of the imaginary body are more significant than Colebrook’s reading would suggest. I also think it is a mistake to align Lloyd’s work with that of Grosz.

[30] See especially Grosz (1989, 1994).

In contrast to the primacy of mind and consciousness in philosophy, one aim of Grosz's philosophical project is to develop a philosophy of the body, building on psychoanalysis, the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault's analysis of the body as the site of disciplinary power. In Grosz's view, a philosophy of the body aims to explain how a corporeal being can also be a conscious agent, with a distinctive point of view and a psychic interiority. She is interested in showing, as she puts it, 'how the subject's exterior is psychically constructed; and conversely, how the processes of social inscription of the body's surface construct a psychical interior' (Grosz 1995, p. 104). There are clear affinities between this aspect of Grosz's work and Gatens' work on the imaginary body. Further, although articulated in very different terms, there are resonances between both projects and recent work in philosophy of cognitive science on the embodied nature of mental capacities and the role of social and cultural practices in shaping these capacities. These resonances are no doubt due to the common influence of Merleau-Ponty.

The second strand of Grosz's work focuses on the alignment of the mind/body distinction with the masculine/feminine opposition. This strand of her work is a response to the various representations of female sexuality in psychoanalysis—as a complement to male sexuality, as castration or lack, as the essentially mysterious and unknowable, as passive, as fluid, disorderly and so on.[31] Grosz argues that these cultural representations inform women's lived experience of their embodiment, their sexuality and their subjectivity. Challenging such representations and articulating alternative representations of female sexuality is thus critical to changing women's lived experience and is, in Grosz's view, the central task of feminist philosophy.

In my view, Grosz's work oscillates in the same way as Irigaray's between two ways of thinking about the relation between these alternative representations and women's lived embodiment. On the one hand, she characterises the strategy of mimicry as adopting a position of 'strategic essentialism' and claims that the aim of this strategy is not to speak the final truth about femininity or female sexuality but to reclaim such representations as possible starting points for an articulation—from women's own perspectives—of their embodiment and sexuality.[32] On the other hand, she often slips into talking about fundamental ontological differences between the sexes. Such talk suggests that sexual difference refers not to open-ended possibilities for reimagining female subjectivity and relations between the sexes but to fixed and fundamental differences between the sexes. In this context, Irigaray's representations of female embodiment, which Grosz adopts, such as that of the 'two lips' of the clitoris as emblematic of female sexuality—as polymorphous, self-caressing, "neither one nor two," excessive—in opposition to the singularity of male phallic sexuality,[33] seem perilously close to the phallocentric representations that they aim to subvert, rather than a 'new emblem by which female sexuality can be positively *represented*' (Grosz 1989, p. 116). They also seem to prescribe how women should experience their sexuality, rather than acknowledging the diversity in women's lived experiences of their sexuality.

---

[31] At various points in this chapter, I have referred to the influence of psychoanalysis on the work of some Australian feminist philosophers. However, because my central concerns in this chapter are philosophical, I have not discussed this influence in any detail. For detailed discussion of psychoanalytic theory and its relevance to the work of French feminist philosophers who have, in turn, influenced some Australian feminist philosophers, see Grosz (1989, 1994). The work of Robyn Ferrell, which I have not discussed in this chapter, is particularly influenced by psychoanalysis. See, for example, Ferrell (1996).

[32] See, for example, Grosz (1989, Chap. 4 and 1994, Chap. 8).

Grosz often represents her project as developing an 'ethics of sexual difference'. In her work, however, this project remains somewhat programmatic, abstract and utopian—looking to a future in which relations between the sexes might be different. In the work of other Australasian feminists, the project of feminist ethics is understood rather more concretely. In the following section, I discuss the contributions of Australasian feminist philosophers to feminist ethics and bioethics and to social and political philosophy, focusing primarily on contributions that have had an impact on feminist philosophy beyond Australasia. While much of this work has an applied focus, it is also characterised by a concern with thinking through the implications, for debates in ethics, bioethics and social philosophy, of women's social oppression and of bodily differences between the sexes.

Feminist Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy

Ethics, Bioethics and Embodiment

There are two different, if overlapping, strands of feminist work in ethics and bioethics. One strand lies more within the continental tradition, the other within the analytical tradition. Within the continental tradition, Rosalyn Diprose's influential book *The Bodies of Women* (1994) aims to anchor feminist ethics in a philosophy of the body and in an alternative understanding of social relations than the contractarian tradition.

Diprose defines her approach to ethics in contrast to the emphasis in much moral philosophy on the articulation of universal principles valid for all persons. Taking up the original Greek meaning of 'ethos' as habitat, or those habits and ways of life that shape our characters, she argues that ethics must be grounded in an understanding of the way our identities are shaped by our place in the world. This explains Diprose's dual focus on the significance of embodiment and social relationships in shaping our identities. Diprose's approach to embodiment draws on two main sources. One is Foucault's analysis of the way social norms and practices—which Foucault equates with the operations of power—shape our subjectivity not only through shaping our beliefs and desires but also by marking and shaping the body—for example, through the inculcation of bodily habits. Another source is the phenomenological tradition and in particular Merleau-Ponty's (1962) analysis of the lived body as the locus of our engagement with the world and the expression of our subjectivity. Within this tradition, Diprose also draws on the work of feminist phenomenologists, such as US philosopher Iris Marion Young (1990), who have tried to articulate the ways in which women's bodily engagement with the world differs from men's by virtue of both women's different embodiment and the structure of social relations between the sexes.

---

[33] The metaphor of the 'two lips' is one of the central motifs of 'This Sex Which Is Not One', in Irigaray ([1977] 1985).

Diprose's analysis of social relations draws on feminist work in ethics and moral psychology, which understands the self as relational, and on the Hegelian tradition, which similarly understands subjectivity as constituted intersubjectively. One aspect of her appropriation of the Hegelian tradition that is particularly interesting is her proposed alternative to the contractarian model of social relations. This alternative draws on the work of Marcel Mauss (1969) to argue that social bonds are constituted not so much by exchange, but by the gift. In a genuine gift relation, rather than in commodified versions of it—for example, in giving birth or in giving oneself to another in a sexual encounter—the giver gives part of him or herself to the recipient and in doing so establishes a specific relationship, involving mutual obligations, between them. For Diprose then, an ethics of sexual difference is an ethics that, because it recognises the relational and embodied nature of the self, is attentive to the ethical import of differences between persons, including sexual difference.

Many feminist moral philosophers working in the analytical philosophical tradition share Diprose's view of the self as both embodied and relational, even if they might draw, at least to some extent, on a different conceptual framework in arguing for such a view. For example, the focus of *Relational Autonomy* (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000) is to assess the implications of a relational conception of the self, and of feminist analyses of women's social oppression, for philosophical conceptions of autonomy. And, in her book *Caring*: *gender-sensitive ethics* (1996), Australian feminist philosopher Peta Bowden develops a care-based feminist ethic that shares similarities with aspects of Diprose's approach. Bowden's ethic is premised on a critique of ethical impartiality. She argues that ethical understanding involves attentiveness to the irreducibility of specific situations and to the social conditions of life. Thus, the substantive concerns of a care ethics are 'relationships, sensitivity to others and responsibility for taking care, coupled with engaged attentiveness to the context and concrete particulars of situations' (Bowden 1996, p. 10). Bowden follows Wittgenstein in arguing that ethical analysis must focus on the specificity of moral practice. Her analysis focuses on personal practices of caring that historically have been associated with women, including mothering, nursing and friendship.

Where more analytically inclined feminist ethicists are likely to disagree with Diprose is with her conclusion that feminist ethics should not try to develop an account of the good life or engage in the normative project of articulating moral principles. In her view any such project is inevitably exclusionary and denigrates some persons and modes of life. I would argue, however, that while we must be ever alert to the dangers of exclusionary ethical views, feminism by its very nature involves taking a stand on certain issues, even if there will inevitably be disagreement on what this stand should be. And I think Diprose herself takes such a stand in her analysis of surrogate motherhood, where she makes a clear normative distinction between altruistic and commercial surrogacy, as I explain below.

Feminist contributions to bioethics extend well beyond issues in reproductive ethics—for example, to issues such as physician-patient relationships and conceptions of informed consent, the ethics of organ donation, public health ethics, disability ethics, gender and medical research, to name a few. However, during the late 1980s and 1990s, reproductive ethics was the focus of much discussion among Australasian feminist philosophers, who made significant contributions to debates about surrogacy, abortion and in vitro fertilisation (IVF) technology, among other issues in reproductive ethics. More recently, the focus on reproductive ethics has continued, with contributions to debates about stem cell research, cloning, sex selection and genetic enhancement. Although feminist approaches to reproductive ethics are of course informed by mainstream moral theories, in focusing attention on the implications for women of reproductive practices and technologies and on the way female embodiment and subjectivity are often conceptualised in bioethical debates, such approaches simultaneously extend and challenge those theories.

The moral issues surrounding surrogacy and the question of whether surrogacy contracts should be legally proscribed gave rise to heated debate among feminists during the late 1980s and early 1990s, following the famous US case of Baby M in 1987. Feminist defenders of surrogate motherhood, such as US philosopher Laura Purdy (1989a), argued that, properly regulated, commercial surrogacy expands women’s reproductive and financial choices (and hence their autonomy) and supports the creation of non-traditional families. Feminist critics of surrogacy, such as Canadian philosopher Christine Overall (1987), argued that commercial surrogacy is an extreme form of alienated labour that causes both individual and social harms to women, is exploitative and undermines women’s autonomy.

Autonomy-based arguments aim to show that the choice to be a surrogate is a constrained choice that is unlikely to meet the conditions for autonomy, namely, voluntariness and fully informed consent. Among Australasian feminist philosophers, Susan Dodds and Karen Jones (1989a, b) developed an argument along these lines. They question whether these conditions can in fact ever be met in the context of a surrogacy contract, on the grounds that the surrogacy contract requires a woman to agree to give up her child *before* conception. However, given the possibly unpredictable nature of a woman’s experience of a pregnancy, they ask how ‘can a woman give fully *informed* consent to part with a child that she will have felt growing and developing inside her, that she will have given form to through her body, before she knows the feelings these experiences will have produced?’ (Dodds and Jones 1989a, p. 9). I have considerable sympathy with Dodds’ and Jones’ concerns about the voluntariness of surrogacy choices and the idea, implicit in their argument, that the experience of pregnant embodiment is phenomenologically unique and that moral reflection about issues such as surrogacy and abortion must be based on recognition of this uniqueness. However, this idea remains implicit rather than elaborated in their argument, and for this reason they leave themselves open to the objection, expressed by US bioethicist Laura Purdy (1989b), that the same lack of predictability over our feelings may arise in many contexts—for example, selling a house—yet this does not provide us with grounds for reneging on our contractual obligations.

An alternative feminist strategy is to question the appropriateness of extending contractual norms to the conception and bearing of children. In a now classic article, 'Is Women's Labor a Commodity?' US feminist philosopher Elizabeth Anderson (1990) develops such an objection on Kantian grounds, arguing that surrogacy contracts treat women and children as commodities and substitute market norms for parental norms. Although Diprose draws on a very different philosophical tradition in her discussion of surrogacy in *The Bodies of Women* (1994), there are interesting affinities between Anderson's argument and Diprose's claim that the problem with commercial surrogacy is not surrogate motherhood *per se*, but surrogacy contracts. Drawing on Pateman's critique of the social contract tradition and Mauss' argument that social bonds are constituted not so much by exchange, but by the gift, Diprose argues that what is wrong with commercial surrogacy contracts, as opposed to altruistic surrogacy, is that they transform a gift relationship into a relationship of contractual exchange. This general line of argument is familiar in bioethics, for example in debates about the ethics of donation-based versus commercial blood banks, and in debates about the ethics of selling organs and body parts. But the theoretical framework on which Diprose's analysis draws makes hers an interesting and original contribution to the surrogacy debate.

The phenomenological perspectives on embodiment that inform Diprose's work in *The Bodies of Women* (1994) also inform my contribution to the abortion debate (Mackenzie 1992). In 'Abortion and Embodiment', I challenge the terms in which the morality of abortion has been debated in much of the mainstream philosophical and feminist literature and argue that the moral issues raised by abortion cannot adequately be addressed by focusing solely on issues of foetal status. Nor should they be construed in terms of a conflict of rights between the foetus and the pregnant woman. Thus, I take issue with feminist defences of abortion, such as that of US feminist philosopher Mary Anne Warren (1975), which deny the foetus any significant moral status and uphold women's right to bodily autonomy as inviolable throughout the duration of pregnancy. I also take issue with US philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson's (1971) famous construal of the rights conflict in abortion as a question of whether, on the one hand, the foetus has any right to occupancy of the woman's uterus and, on the other hand, whether the woman has any right to demand the foetus' death. From a feminist perspective, one of the problematic aspects of Thomson's view is that she defends the right to abortion as a right to evacuate the foetus from the uterus, not only implying that the right to abortion is grounded in a kind of property right over one's body but also explicitly acknowledging that if it were possible to remove the foetus from the uterus without killing it, the woman would have no right to demand its death. In my view, this position conflicts with the fundamental motivation for abortion, which is to not bring a child into existence under these circumstances and at this time.[34]

In contrast to these approaches, I argue that the morality of abortion hinges on three issues: the responsibilities of the pregnant woman to the foetus, the changing moral status of the foetus, and the bodily inseparability of the woman and the foetus during pregnancy. I defend a gradualist account of foetal moral status—thus arguing that there is a moral difference between early and late term abortion—and a relational account of the woman's responsibilities to the foetus, arguing that once a decision has been made to continue a pregnancy, a woman has a moral obligation to protect and nurture the foetus.[35] My argument also grounds women's right to bodily autonomy during pregnancy in a phenomenological analysis of pregnant embodiment, rather than in property rights over one's body.

Questions about the extent of women's (and men's) rights and liberties when it comes to the bearing and rearing of children were also central to debates about in vitro fertilisation technology (IVF) during the 1980s and early 1990s. Although IVF technology is now widely accepted, during this period it was still regarded as experimental and there were heated debates, both in public discussions and in the philosophical literature, between liberal and utilitarian defenders of IVF and feminist critics. There were several different strands of feminist critique of IVF, but feminist philosophers were particularly focused on two issues. Firstly, that the alleged benefits to infertile women of IVF technology were being overstated, while the potential psychological and physical harms of IVF procedures were being downplayed. Secondly, feminists questioned whether allocating vast resources to IVF technology and research is consistent with a broad concern for women's interests and health.

Suzanne Uniacke (1987) developed an interesting example of the second kind of argument. Uniacke argued that defenders of IVF who appeal either to 'the right to reproduce', or to the desirability of satisfying people's desires, to justify the allocation of resources to IVF, conflate liberty rights with claim rights. While it is important to defend people's liberty rights against, for example, miscegenation or coercive sterilisation laws, it does not follow from the liberty right to reproduce that people have extensive claim rights against the state to provide them with whatever assistance they may need to have children. Uniacke does not of course rule out all such claims to assistance, but seeks to find principled ways, for example, on equity or welfare grounds, of distinguishing justifiable claims (e.g. to maternity-related health care, childcare and state-funded education) from excessive claims. Although Uniacke's position on IVF was superseded in practice by the widespread acceptance of IVF technology, her critique of the conflation between liberty and claim rights in appeals to parental rights to reproduce remains important, given widespread appeals to this right in the context of other potential developments in reproductive technology, such as human reproductive cloning and genetic enhancement.

---

[34] Cannold (1998) also develops an argument along these lines and provides some empirical support for this view, drawing on interview data with different groups of women, some of whom were pro-choice, some anti-abortion.

[35] Although Rosalind Hursthouse's (1991) virtue theory approach to the morality of abortion is not explicitly feminist, her approach converges with mine on many issues. We agree that abortion is a unique moral problem, that an adequate response to the morality of abortion must recognise the asymmetries between men's and women's embodied experiences during pregnancy, that fetal development is morally relevant and hence that there is a moral difference between early and late term abortions, and that some liberal arguments, such as Warren's (1975) comparison between having an abortion and having a haircut, trivialise the moral seriousness of an abortion decision.

As I have already indicated, the brief history I have provided here concentrates on work published in the 1980s and early 1990s by feminist philosophers, and its scope is limited to issues in reproductive ethics that link most closely with the focus on embodiment in Australasian feminist philosophy. However, feminist bioethics is a rapidly expanding field and the work of Australasian feminists continues to be influential in the development of feminist bioethics internationally.[36]

Social Philosophy: Pornography and Sexual Harassment

In many of the debates discussed in the sections 'Feminism and the History of Philosophy' and 'Equality, Sexual Difference and Embodiment', the question of how feminist philosophers should respond to phallocentric cultural representations of female subjectivity, sexuality and embodiment is posed at quite a high level of theoretical abstraction—as a question of how feminist philosophers should respond to representations of femininity in philosophical and psychoanalytic discourse. However, phallocentric and sexist representations are widespread throughout the broader culture, particularly in visual media such as advertising, film and pornography. Such representations shape women's lived experiences of their embodiment in profound and immediate ways and the question of how feminist theorists should respond to these representations has significant practical import for social policy and the law.

One of the most heated and contentious debates during the mid-1980s and 1990s was the debate over whether feminists should support attempts to legally proscribe pornography. This debate was ignited by the work of Catharine MacKinnon (1987) and by the unsuccessful attempt, initiated by MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, to introduce an ordinance through the Indianapolis legislature banning pornography on civil rights grounds. It might be thought that this debate has been superseded by the practical difficulties of enforcing any such restrictions, even if they were to find legislative support, given the pervasiveness of pornography on the internet. However, I would argue that precisely because of this pervasiveness, the issues raised in the debate about whether pornography subordinates and silences women, and whether, if it does, censorship is the appropriate response, are more relevant than ever.

---

[36] The work of Rachel Ankeny, Susan Dodds, and Wendy Rogers has been particularly influential in feminist bioethics both within Australasia and internationally. Dodds was instrumental in establishing the International Network of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics in 1992, and in 2007, Ankeny, Dodds, and Rogers were instrumental in founding the *International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics*. As one of the editors of the *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, Suzanne Uniacke, who is now based in the UK, continues to play an important role in the broader field of applied philosophy.

MacKinnon claims that pornography is a form of subordination that legitimates women's inferior civil status and hence undermines equality. In response to the 'free speech' defence of pornography, she also argues that pornography silences women. These claims have been derided by many philosophers and legal theorists as conceptually incoherent. In a brilliant article 'Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts', Australian feminist philosopher Rae Langton (1993) draws on J. L. Austin's (1962) speech act theory to provide philosophical support for MacKinnon's claims. Austin argued that all speech constitutes a kind of action but that different kinds of speech bring about actions in different ways. Illocutionary speech acts, such as saying 'I promise', or 'Watch out', use locutions to perform actions; the action is performed *in* saying something. Perlocutionary speech acts bring about actions *by* saying something, through the effects achieved by the locution. If by saying 'Watch out', I stop you from taking another step, thereby preventing you from stepping on the snake, the illocutionary force of my utterance will have brought about the desired perlocutionary effect. Langton argues that some speech acts, such as the speech act 'Whites only!' in the context of apartheid, are illocutionary acts of subordination: 'they *unfairly* rank blacks as having inferior worth; they legitimate *discriminatory* behaviour on the part of whites; and they *unjustly* deprive them of some important powers' (1993, p. 304).

Extending this kind of analysis to pornography, Langton argues that MacKinnon's subordination claim is not merely that pornography can have subordination as its locutionary content, for example, by depicting acts involving women's sexual subordination, or as a perlocutionary effect, for example, by inciting its hearers to commit acts of sexual violence against women. Rather, the claim is that pornography can have the illocutionary force of subordination because it ranks women as inferior (as sex objects), denigrates them, and legitimates discriminatory behaviour towards them (sexual violence). A challenge for this argument is that speech acts will only succeed in having illocutionary force if certain felicity conditions are met, including that the speaker is invested with the relevant authority to make it so by saying so. The utterance 'Whites only!' has the force of law if enacted by a legislator; the utterance 'Fault' has force in the game of tennis to rule a serve out if called by an umpire. The question is whether pornographic speech has this authority in the domain of sex. Liberals assume that it does not. Langton argues that it may, conceding that determining the answer to this question is an empirical matter. However, if it does have this authority, then the free speech of pornographers and consumers of pornography conflicts with women's equality.

Central to this analysis of subordinating speech acts is the idea that 'the ability to perform speech acts can be a measure of political power…Conversely, one mark of powerlessness is an inability to perform speech acts that one might like to perform' (1993, p. 314). That is, a mark of powerlessness is being silenced. Langton distinguishes a number of different ways in which the powerless can be silenced, but her particular focus is on what she calls 'illocutionary disablement'. Examples include the inability of a black South African under the apartheid regime to vote even though he makes the same marks on a voting paper as a white South African; a woman being unable to divorce her husband in countries where Islamic law is in force even if she utters the same words that, if uttered by her husband, would perform the illocutionary act of divorce; a homosexual couple being unable to marry even if they utter the words 'I do' in a ceremony conducted by a registered marriage celebrant.

Langton refers to such disabled speech acts as 'unspeakable acts'. What constitutes them as unspeakable are other illocutionary acts (e.g. laws, conventions, social mores) which prevent unspeakable acts from meeting the necessary felicity conditions for an illocutionary act. In the language game of sexual interactions, Langton argues, women's refusal is often disabled in this way, so that 'saying "no" can fail to count as making a refusal move' (1993, p. 324). This kind of disablement not only deprives women of the liberty to perform certain important speech acts, in doing so it deprives women of the power to exercise authority over their own bodies. Langton argues that MacKinnon's claim that pornography silences women should be interpreted as the claim that, in the domain of sex, pornography sets up felicity conditions which disable women's speech acts in just this way.[37]

Another topic in social philosophy to which Australasian feminist philosophers have made important theoretical contributions is sexual harassment. Providing an account of what constitutes sexual harassment and explaining why it is morally objectionable is not just theoretically important, it is crucial for the development of equal opportunity policies in the workplace and hence of central practical importance to women's working lives. However, as Jan Crosthwaite and Christine Swanton (1986) point out, the challenge in formulating an adequate conception of sexual harassment is that there is disagreement both about why sexual harassment is morally objectionable and about whether certain behaviours or actions should be classified as sexual harassment. Moreover, an adequate conception of sexual harassment must be able to distinguish sexual harassment from other forms of sexual interaction that might occur in the workplace and to explain why certain behaviours constitute harassment even in cases where a woman might have become inured to the harassment or may even collude with it.[38]

One analysis of the wrongness of sexual harassment is that it involves treating women as sex objects. However, Crosthwaite and Swanson argue that while some instances of using women as sex objects do count as sexual harassment, this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for sexual harassment. Nor can the wrongness of sexual harassment be explained in terms of unjust discrimination, for example, violation of the merit principle, since this would not explain why sexist jibes or the display of pornographic pin-ups in the workplace constitute sexual harassment. Crosthwaite and Swanton also reject the view that sexual harassment necessarily involves the misuse of power, since many cases of sexual harassment are perpetrated by co-workers who do not exercise any authority over their victims. On their preferred analysis, sexual behaviour or motivation in the workplace constitutes sexual harassment if it involves an inadequate consideration of a woman's interests, where what counts as adequate consideration is determined by interpersonal norms that give due weight to women's moral status as persons.

---

[37] For further development of the silencing argument, see Langton and West (1999).

[38] Note that Crosthwaite and Swanton do not assume that all sexual harassment targets women. However, they take male–female sexual harassment as the paradigm case on the grounds that it is the most prevalent form, due to sex-role stereotypes and differential power relations between the sexes. Crosthwaite revises this view in Crosthwaite and Priest (1996), arguing that sexual harassment is bound up with social structures that oppress women.

In an influential article, Susan Dodds et al. (1988) agree with Crosthwaite and Swanton in rejecting the view that sexual harassment necessarily involves the misuse of power. They also reject MacKinnon's view that all cases of sexual harassment are cases of sexual discrimination. However, they do not think Crosthwaite and Swanton's interest-based analysis provides necessary and sufficient conditions for sexual harassment. Rather they argue for a behavioural analysis that identifies sexual harassment in terms of typical causes and typical effects in the mental states of harasser and harassee.[39] Sexual harassment is 'behaviour which is typically associated with a mental state representing an attitude which seeks sexual ends without any concern for the person from whom those ends are sought, and which typically produces an unwanted and unpleasant response from the person who is the object of the behaviour' (Dodds et al. 1988, 120). This analysis links sexual harassment to other forms of harassment as united by certain common behavioural dispositions and distinguishes sexual harassment from legitimate sexual interaction in terms of behavioural differences. A virtue of the behavioural account is that it translates easily into clear and workable policy that stipulates what counts as unacceptable sexual behaviour in the workplace. Thus, even if a piece of behaviour does not produce typical effects in the mental state of the particular person harassed, it still counts as sexual harassment if it is behaviour that typically does produce such effects. The account also allows that there may be some degree of cultural variation in the kind of behaviour constitutive of sexual harassment—reflecting, for example, different norms of acceptable forms of physical contact.

Race: The Blind Spot of Australasian Feminist Philosophy

In contrast to the USA, where questions concerning the politics of race have been an important issue for feminist philosophy, particularly over the last two decades, one of the striking, and lamentable, features of Australian feminist philosophy is that feminist philosophers in Australia have only belatedly begun to recognise our responsibilities to reflect on the implications, for our own intellectual practice, of the historical and contemporary injustices suffered by indigenous Australians. This blind spot may reflect the fact that, in contrast to the USA, where African American and Hispanic philosophers have a presence and have been insistent in calling white feminist philosophers to account to confront questions of race and of their own privilege, indigenous women have no presence in Australian feminist philosophy and indigenous voices are quite absent in general from Australian philosophy.[40]

---

[39] In a later paper, Crosthwaite and Priest (1996) agree with Dodds et al. about the importance of a behavioural account, but they disagree with their focus on the associations between behaviour and the mental states of harasser and harassee, arguing instead that the locus of sexual harassment is oppressive social structures.

In her essay 'No One's Land: Australia and the Philosophical Imagination' (Lloyd 2000), Lloyd suggests a more subtle diagnosis for this blind spot, drawing on the notion of philosophical and social imaginaries, discussed earlier in the chapter. Lloyd argues that non-indigenous Australian understandings of Australia have been shaped by two 'dominant, organising' images or fictions: the notion of Australia as a *terra nullius*, a land belonging to no one prior to European settlement, and 'the idea of Aborigines as an inferior "doomed race"' (2000, p. 32). Though fictions, these representations are not illusions: 'They are constitutive of our collective construction of a social world, affecting how we see our past and how we take, or fail to take, responsibilities in our present' (Lloyd 2000, p. 32). They enabled the conquest and dispossession of Aboriginal people to be represented as an 'occupation' of previously unoccupied territory and successive explicitly discriminatory policies—both eugenic and assimilationist—that amounted to cultural genocide, to be represented as 'protection' of a dying race. Lloyd traces the fiction of Aboriginal people as a 'doomed race' to Enlightenment ideals of the 'progress of reason', through which indigenous people were represented as at a lesser stage of human development than Europeans. She traces the fiction of *terra nullius*, which was only overturned in Australian law in the 1992 Mabo and 1996 Wik judgments, to a Lockean conception of property. This conception enabled the fiction that Aboriginal people did not own the land, because they did not 'cultivate' it (in a European sense) to become social and legal reality.

What are the implications of this analysis for feminist philosophy? Lloyd argues that strategies of textual interpretation and analysis used by feminist critique to challenge exclusionary representations of the male–female distinction both in philosophical discourse and in social life can also be used to 'make visible the "unthought" imagery and speaking positions which have historically structured non-indigenous Australian perceptions and attitudes' (2000, p. 37). However, she cautions against any simplistic alignment between the position of indigenous Australians and the historic exclusion of 'the feminine' in philosophical discourse or the social oppression of women. With respect to indigenous people, 'non-indigenous female philosophers are on the inside, in the excluding position. It is from that position that we must now take responsibility for re-figuring our place and our present' (2000, p. 38).

---

[40] I suspect that Maori voices are also similarly absent in New Zealand philosophy. However, my discussion here focuses on the situation in Australia. Despite the lack of indigenous voices in Australian academic philosophy, there are, nevertheless, powerful and articulate Aboriginal intellectuals within Australian academic institutions and in public life. It is no doubt in large part due to their voices that feminist philosophers have recently begun to reflect on our obligations as white intellectuals.

In calling on non-indigenous female philosophers to take a critical perspective on their position as white intellectuals, Lloyd draws a link between feminist philosophy and the work of Australasian political philosophers, such as Janna Thompson, on historic injustice. Thompson's work on responsibility for the past does not directly engage, or draw explicit connections, with feminist philosophy. Rather, it engages with and responds to debates about historic injustice within contemporary analytical political philosophy, largely within the liberal tradition. Her focus is thus on issues at the intersection of ethics and political philosophy, concerning the moral obligations of present generations, for past wrongs committed by their forebears, to the descendants of those against whom the wrongs were committed, including obligations of reparation.[41] However, Thompson has been an important contributor to feminist philosophy in Australia from the outset, and her work exemplifies the shift in focus in the work of Australian feminist philosophers (mentioned at the end of the section 'Feminism and the History of Philosophy'), from feminist critique of the philosophical tradition to engaging with philosophical debates from a feminist perspective. It is not possible to do justice to Thompson's work on historic injustice without also discussing the complex debates in contemporary political philosophy with which it engages, which would take me well beyond the scope of my concerns in this chapter. Suffice to say that Thompson's work extends the feminist analysis of self-identity as relationally constituted to issues of historic injustice. Thus, she argues that historic injustices can harm individual descendants of these injustices by virtue of the special intergenerational family relations between these individuals and their forebears, against whom the original wrongs were perpetrated. These intergenerational relations are central to how individuals conceive of their identities and their relations to other members of society and to the meaning that past injustices have for present generations. This relational analysis not only seeks to explain the sense in which contemporary generations might incur obligations arising from the injustices committed by their forebears. It also seeks to make sense of the claims of those, such as present-day Aboriginal people, who feel wronged by injustices committed in the past against their forebears.

---

[41] See, for example, (Thompson 1999, 2001) and her book *Taking Responsibility for the Past* (Thompson 2002).

Conclusion

Over the last 25 years, feminist philosophy in Australasia has moved from the marginalised fringes of a fairly narrowly conceived disciplinary space to being more centrally embedded in a discipline that is now conceived, at least by many, as a more pluralistic enterprise. I think this is particularly true in ethics, bioethics and social and political philosophy. In marking this shift, I do not mean to suggest that there is no longer a place for work that is distinctively feminist in orientation. I think there is. But there are two interesting effects of this shift. The first effect is that feminist philosophy has profoundly reshaped certain areas of the discipline, such as ethics, moral psychology and political philosophy, opening up new areas of philosophical enquiry or reinvigorating old debates. As a result, the boundaries between feminist philosophy and debates in other areas of philosophy are not clear-cut. Further, many of the feminist philosophers whose contributions I have discussed in this chapter work across feminist philosophy and other areas of philosophy.

The second effect is that there are many philosophers, particularly women philosophers, whose work is informed by a feminist sensibility and who thus might be regarded as doing philosophy from a broadly feminist perspective. In the Australasian context, I would include in this category Gillian Brock's work on needs (1998) and her recent work on global justice; Jeanette Kennett's work on friendship and the self (Kennett and Cocking 1998) and her more recent work on mental illness and moral agency (2007); and Karen Jones' work on trust (1996, 2004a, b) and her recent work on the emotions.[42] The work of these women philosophers is highly influential and they have also played an important role in promoting the inclusion of women in Australasian philosophy. As I indicated in the introduction, the focus of my discussion in this chapter has been restricted to work that is specifically identified as feminist philosophy. However, in many cases, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish what counts as 'feminist philosophy' from philosophy that is written from a feminist perspective. This is particularly true of the work of the three women philosophers just mentioned. I do not see this fluidity as a problem. In my view the enterprise of feminist philosophy can only benefit from a more expansive and fluid conception of its scope. My hope for the future of feminist philosophy in Australasia is thus that while feminist philosophy continues to thrive, the boundaries between feminist philosophy and other areas of philosophy will continue to blur.

---

[42] Jones' work on trust is influenced by Annette Baier's extremely important work in feminist moral psychology (see especially Baier 1994). Baier, who until her recent death was Emeritus Professor at the University of Otago, was originally from New Zealand and worked briefly at the University of Sydney in the 1960s but spent most of her career in the US. On the basis of the inclusion/exclusion principle outlined at the outset of the chapter, I have not counted her as an Australasian feminist philosopher, although in some respects she clearly does count as one.

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Genevieve Lloyd and Cynthia Townley for their extremely helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter. Thanks also to Marguerite La Caze for a helpful discussion of the central themes in the chapter and for sharing with me her bibliography on the work of Australasian feminist philosophers.

References

Anderson, E. (1990). Is women's labor a commodity? *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19*, 71–92.

Austin, J. (1962). *How to do things with words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baier, A. (1994). *Moral prejudices: Essays on ethics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bowden, P. (1996). *Caring: Gender-sensitive ethics*. New York: Routledge.

Broad, J. (2002). *Women philosophers of the seventeenth century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Broad, J., & Green, K. (Eds.). (2007). *Virtue, liberty and toleration: Political ideas of European women 1400–1800*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Broad, J., & Green, K. (2009). *A history of women's political thought in Europe, 1400–1700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brock, G. (1998). *Necessary goods: Our responsibilities to meet others' needs*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Butler, J. (1990). *Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity*. New York: Routledge.

Butler, J. (1993). *Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of 'sex'*. New York: Routledge.

Cannold, L. (1998). *The abortion myth: Feminism, morality and the hard choices women make*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Colebrook, C. (2000). From radical representations to corporeal becomings: The feminist philosophy of Lloyd, Grosz, and Gatens. *Hypatia, 15*, 76–93.

Cornell, D. (1998). At the heart of freedom: Feminism, sex, & equality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Crosthwaite, J., & Priest, G. (1996). The definition of sexual harassment. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74*, 66–82.

Crosthwaite, J., & Swanton, C. (1986). On the nature of sexual harassment. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* in J. Thompson (Ed.) "Women and Philosophy" Supplement to vol. *64*, 91–106.

Deutscher, M. (Ed.). (2000). *Michele Le Doeuff: Operative philosophy and imaginary practice*. Amherst: Humanities Books.

Deutscher, P. (1997). *Yielding gender: Feminism, deconstruction and the history of philosophy*. London: Routledge.

Deutscher, P. (2002). *A politics of impossible difference: The later work of Luce Irigaray*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Diprose, R. (1994). *The bodies of women: Ethics, embodiment and sexual difference*. London: Routledge.

Dodds, S., & Jones, K. (1989a). Surrogacy and autonomy. *Bioethics, 3*, 1–17.

Dodds, S., & Jones, K. (1989b). A response to Purdy. *Bioethics, 3*, 35–39.

Dodds, S., Frost, L., Pargetter, R., & Prior, E. (1988). Sexual harassment. *Social Theory and Practice, 14*, 111–130.

Ferrell, R. (1996). *Passion in theory: Conceptions of Freud and Lacan*. New York: Routledge.

Franklin, J. (2003). *Corrupting the youth: A history of philosophy in Australia*. Sydney: Macleay Press.

Gatens, M. (1983). A critique of the sex/gender distinction. In J. Allen & P. Patton (Eds.), *Beyond marxism? Interventions after Marx*. Leichardt: Intervention Publications.

Gatens, M. (1986). Rousseau and Wollstonecraft: Nature vs. reason. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, in J. Thompson (Ed.) "Women and Philosophy" Supplement to vol. *64*, 1–15.

Gatens, M. (1991a). *Feminism and philosophy: Perspectives on equality and difference*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gatens, M. (1991b). The oppressed state of my sex: Wollstonecraft on reason, feeling and equality. In C. Pateman & M. Shanley (Eds.), *Feminist interpretations and political theory* (pp. 112–128). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gatens, M. (1996). *Imaginary bodies: Ethics, power and corporeality*. London: Routledge.

Gatens, M., & Lloyd, G. (1999). *Collective imaginings: Spinoza, past and present*. London: Routledge.

Gatens (Ed.) (2009). *Feminist interpretations of spinoza*. University park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Goddard, E. (2008). Improving the participation of women in the philosophy profession. Report to the Australasian Association of Philosophy, compiled by E. Goddard on behalf of the Committee of Senior Academics Addressing the Status of Women in the Philosophy Profession. www.women.aap.org.au

Green, K. (1986). Rawls, women and the priority of liberty. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* in J. Thompson (Ed.) "Women and Philosophy" Supplement to vol. *64*, 26–36.

Green, K. (1993). Reason and feeling: Resisting the dichotomy. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71*, 385–399.

Green, K. (1995). *The woman of reason: Feminism, humanism and political thought*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Grosz, E. (1989). *Sexual subversions*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Grosz, E. (1994). *Volatile bodies: Toward a corporeal feminism*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Grosz, E. (1995). *Space, time and perversion*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Held, V. (1993). *Feminist morality: Transforming culture, society and politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hursthouse, R. (1991). Virtue theory and abortion. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20*, 223–246.

Irigaray, I. (1974, 1985). *Speculum of the other woman* (trans: Gill G). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Irigaray, I. (1977, 1985). *This sex which is not one* (trans: Porter C). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Irigaray, I. (1993). *An ethics of sexual difference* (trans: Burke C. & Gill, G.). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

James, S. (2000). The power of Spinoza: Feminist conjunctions: An interview with Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd. *Hypatia, 15*, 40–58.

Jones, K. (1996). Trust as an affective attitude. *Ethics, 107*, 4–25.

Jones, K. (2004a). Trust and terror. In P. Autels & M. Walker (Eds.), *Moral psychology: Feminist ethics and social theory* (pp. 3–18). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Jones, K. (2004b). Emotional rationality as practical rationality. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), *Setting the moral compass: Essays by women philosophers* (pp. 333–352). New York: Oxford University Press.

Kennett, J. (2007). Mental disorder, moral agency, and the self. In B. Steinbok (Ed.), *The oxford handbook of bioethics* (pp. 90–113). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kennett, J., & Cocking, D. (1998). Friendship and the self. *Ethics, 108*, 502–527.

Kittay, E. (1997). *Love's labor*. New York: Routledge.

La Caze, M. (1994). Simone de Beauvoir and female bodies. *Australian Feminist Studies, 20*, 91–106.

La Caze, M. (2000). *The analytic imaginary*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Langton, R. (1993). Speech acts and unspeakable acts. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22*, 293–330.

Langton, R., & West, C. (1999). Scorekeeping in a pornographic language game. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77*, 303–319.

Le Doeuff, M. (1979). Operative philosophy: Simone de Beauvoir and existentialism (trans: Gordon C). *Ideology and Consciousness, 6*, 47–57.

Le Doeuff, M. (1987). Women and philosophy. In T. Moi (Ed.), *French feminist thought: A reader* (pp. 181–209). Oxford: Blackwell.

Le Doeuff, M. (1989). *The philosophical imaginary* (trans: Gordon C). London: Athlone Press.

Le Doeuff, M. (1991). *Hipparchia's choice: An essay concerning women, philosophy, etc.* (trans: Selous T). Oxford: Blackwell.

Lloyd, G. (1984). *The man of reason: 'Male' and 'female' in Western philosophy* (1st ed.). London: Methuen.

Lloyd, G. (1993a). *The man of reason: 'Male' and 'female' in Western philosophy* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.

Lloyd, G. (1993b). Maleness, metaphor and the 'crisis of reason'. In L. Antony & C. Witt (Eds.), *A mind of one's own: Feminist essays on reason and objectivity*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Lloyd, G. (1994). *Part of nature: Self-knowledge in Spinoza's ethics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lloyd, G. (1996). *Spinoza and the ethics: A guidebook*. London: Routledge.

Lloyd, G. (2000). No one's land: Australia and the philosophical imagination. *Hypatia, 15*, 26–39.

Lloyd, G. (Ed). (2001). *Spinoza: Critical assessments* (4 Vols.). London: Routledge.

Lloyd, G. (Ed.). (2002). *Feminism and history of philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mackenzie, C. (1986). Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophy and/or the female body. In C. Pateman & E. Gross (Eds.), *Feminist challenges: Social and political theory* (pp. 144–156). Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Mackenzie, C. (1992). Abortion and embodiment. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70*, 136–155.

Mackenzie, C. (1993). Reason and sensibility: The ideal of women's self-governance in the writings of Mary Wollstonecraft. *Hypatia, 8*, 35–55.

Mackenzie, C. (1998). A certain lack of symmetry: Beauvoir on autonomous agency and women's embodiment. In R. Evans (Ed.), *Simone de Beauvoir's the second sex: New interdisciplinary essays*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Mackenzie, C., & Stoljar, N. (Eds.). (2000). *Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency and the social self*. New York: Oxford University Press.

MacKinnon, C. (1987). *Feminism unmodified*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Mauss, M. (1969). *The gift: Forms and function of exchange in archaic societies* (trans: Cunnison I). London: Cohen & West.

McMillan, C. (1982). *Women, reason and nature*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). *Phenomenology of perception* (trans: Smith C). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Nussbaum, M. (2006). *Frontiers of justice: Disability, nationality, species membership*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Okin, S. (1989). *Justice, gender, and the family*. New York: Basic Books.

Overall, C. (1987). *Ethics and human reproduction*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Parfit, D. (1984). *Reasons and persons*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Pargetter, R., & Prior, E. (1986). Against the sexuality of reason. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. In J. Thompson (Ed.) "Women and Philosophy" Supplement to vol. *64*, 107–119.

Pateman, C. (1988). *The sexual contract*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Plumwood, V. (1989). Do we need a sex/gender distinction? *Radical Philosophy, 51*, 2–11.

Plumwood, V. (1993). *Feminism and the mastery of nature*. London: Routledge.

Plumwood, V. (2002). *Environmental culture: The ecological crisis of reason*. London: Routledge.

Purdy, L. (1989a). Surrogate mothering: Exploitation or empowerment? *Bioethics, 3*, 18–34.

Purdy, L. (1989b). A response to Dodds and Jones. *Bioethics, 3*, 40–44.

Rawls, J. (1972). *A theory of justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scott, J. (1988). Deconstructing equality-versus-difference, or the uses of poststructuralist theory for feminism. *Feminist Studies, 14*, 33–50.

Spelman, E. (1988). *Inessential woman: Problems of exclusion in feminist thought*. Boston: Beacon.

Stoljar, N. (1995). Essence, identity and the concept of woman. *Philosophical Topics, 23*, 261–293.

Tapper, M. (1986). Can a feminist be a liberal? *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* in J. Thompson (Ed.) "Women and Philosophy" Supplement to vol. *64*, 37–47.

Thompson, J. (1993). What do women want? Rewriting the social contract. *International Journal of Moral and Social Studies, 8*, 257–272.

Thompson, J. (1999). Inherited obligations and generational continuity. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29*, 493–515.

Thompson, J. (2001). Historical injustice and reparation: Justifying claims of descendants. *Ethics, 112*, 114–135.

Thompson, J. (2002). *Taking responsibility for the past*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomson, J. (1971). A defense of abortion. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1*, 47–66.

Uniacke, S. (1987). In vitro fertilization and the right to reproduce. *Bioethics, 1*, 241–254.

Walker, M. (1993). Silence and reason: Woman's voice in philosophy. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74*, 400–424.

Warren, M. (1975). On the moral and legal status of abortion. In R. Wasserstrom (Ed.), *Today's moral problems* (pp. 43–61). London: Macmillan.

Whitford, M. (1991). *Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the feminine*. London: Routledge.

Young, I. (1990). *Throwing like a girl and other essays in feminist philosophy and social theory*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Black Swan: A History of Continental Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand

20

Robert Sinnerbrink and Matheson S. Russell

Contents

Introduction 637
Pluralist Origins: Idealism as Precursor 641
Australian Vitalism: Eucken and Bergson 642
Back to the Future: Phenomenology and Existentialism in Australia 644
Living in the Seventies: Marxism, Feminism, and Poststructuralism 652
The Early Years in New Zealand: J. N. Findlay and Karl Popper 657
The Auckland Department 659
Man Alone: Existentialist Philosophy in New Zealand Literature and Theology 663
Marxist Theory in *Phoenix*, *Tomorrow*, and the *Red Papers for New Zealand* 666
Poststructuralism and the *And/Antic* Interruption 668
Conclusion 670
References 673

> Philosophy is its own time comprehended in thoughts.
> Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*

Introduction

Like the fabled black swan of early epistemological inquiry, ‘Australasian Continental philosophy’ seems a kind of chimera apt to raise doubts rather than certainty. Is there such a mythical creature? Is it nothing more than a pale reflection of more paradigmatic instances found ‘overseas’, as we say in Australia, an Antipodean

---

R. Sinnerbrink (✉)
Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: robert.sinnerbrink@mq.edu.au

M.S. Russell
Department of Philosophy, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
e-mail: m.russell@auckland.ac.nz

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_24, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

counterpart to the 'major' developments occurring in the United Kingdom or the United States? Or are there distinctive features of this phenomenon that, like the black swan, represent an unexpected variation unique to the Australasian environment? For a movement that one can date as first appearing in the early part of the twentieth century[1]—the publication of John McKellar Stewart's 1913 critical study of Henri Bergson's philosophy may serve as a convenient starting point—it is surprising that Continental philosophy in Australia has only recently become a topic of historical interest.[2] Part of the problem is the contested nature of the phenomenon in question. 'Continental philosophy' is a term that goes back to the nineteenth-century historical contrast between 'British empiricism' and 'Continental rationalism' (Bertrand Russell dates the term 'from the time of Locke' (1945, pp. 631, 640)). It emerges more explicitly, however, with J.S. Mill's essays (from 1832 to 1840) on the contrast between Benthamite philosophy and the 'Germano-Coleridgean doctrine', the latter being identified with the 'Continental philosophers', and 'the Continental philosophy' as well as 'French philosophy' (Critchley 2000, p. 42). It takes on its more contemporary meaning, however, only after WWII, especially during the 1950s (see Glendinning 2006, pp. 69–90). The term gives way to the political urgency of Marxism and feminism during the 1970s, gains a new sense of institutional valency during the 1980s and 90s (with the rise of poststructuralism), and has more recently become the subject of meta-philosophical reflection (see Critchley 2000; Glendinning 2006; Levy 2003; Reynolds and Chase 2010).[3]

For some philosophers, like Simon Critchley, the analytic/Continental divide is an expression of a deeper rift in Western culture, famously captured in C.P. Snow's distinction between the 'two cultures' of scientific versus humanistic inquiry (2000, pp. 32–53). What we today call 'Continental philosophy' emerges as a loosely associated set of traditions with the rise of German idealism, romanticism, Marxism, existentialism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, critical theory, structuralism, and poststructuralism. According to Glendinning (2006, pp. 38–68), so-called Continental philosophy is an artificial construction created by hostile British 'analytic' philosophers, who sought to define the postwar Anglophone developments in logic, conceptual analysis, logical positivism, and so on, against the 'irrationalism' of their 'Continental' counterparts (German and French phenomenologists and existentialists). Bad habits die hard, however, with Continental philosophy still construed as the 'sophistical Other' of philosophy proper (Glendinning 2006). In James Franklin's entertaining history of philosophy in Australia, for example, Continental philosophy is portrayed as a pernicious corrupter of traditional intellectual and cultural values in the academy and beyond (2003, pp. 304–312, 361–376, 377–388).

---

[1] Although there was lively literary and cultural interest in Nietzsche at the turn of the century, notably among artists like Norman Lindsay and writers like Ethel Florence Lindesay (Henry Handel) Richardson, the philosophical reception of Nietzsche remained negligible until the 1970s.

[2] See the following entries in Oppy et al. (2010): Colebrook (2010a, b), Crittenden (2010), Deutscher (2010), Harney (2010), Grigg (2010), Harney (2010), Hunt (2010), Laverty (2010), Miller (2010), Rathbone (2010), Redding (2010), Reynolds (2010), Ross (2010), Rothfield (2010), Sharpe (2010), Sinnerbrink (2010), Sinnerbrink, and Sharpe (2010).

[3] Interestingly, one of the earlier examples of the recent spate of survey studies of Continental philosophy is by an Australian, David West (currently at the Australian National University) (see West 1993, 1996).

This kind of aligning of Continental philosophy with 'corruption' is one of the recurring motifs of its history. As we shall argue, it is more accurate to comprehend Continental philosophy as a minoritarian tradition *within* the history of philosophy in Australia (in the sense of being a minority tradition of philosophy that is at the same time self-defining and semi-autonomous). Indeed, the so-called Continental/analytic 'divide' represents a division *internal* to philosophy, an irreducible part of its contested self-definition, rather than any real opposition between philosophy and its non-philosophical 'Other' (however commonly such battles may be thus represented). Indeed, Australasian Continental philosophy, as we shall see, has developed distinctive streams or currents that continue to flourish despite at times a precarious institutional existence.[4] It continues to be an important 'alternative' presence that has played a significant role in the history of philosophy in the Australasian region. While there have been some important surveys and institutional histories (Grave 1984, pp. 41–46, 211–217; Franklin 2003), including Maurita Harney's landmark essay on 'The Contemporary European Tradition in Australian Philosophy' (1992), a full account exploring the various Continental traditions in Australasian philosophy still remains to be written.

The purpose of this chapter is to add some unifying elements to this story, and in doing so to argue that Continental philosophy was and still remains a significant part of the philosophical conversation in Australia and New Zealand. Such an undertaking, however, can hardly be neutral or disinterested. In her admirable study, Harney articulates the history of the relationship between the dominant Anglo-analytic tradition and 'Continental European philosophy' by way of the Freudian concept of *repression*: Continental philosophy, Harney claims, is part of the forgotten or neglected pluralist origins of philosophy in Australia and has since become something like the 'repressed other' of mainstream Anglophone philosophy, a repressed element that threatens to return and undermine the identity of the dominant philosophical community (Harney 1992, pp. 126–127).

While agreeing with much of Harney's account, we offer here an alternative figure of thought to capture the ambivalent and often fractious relationship between Continental and analytic traditions: it is less a matter of repression (which suggests an unruly, intolerable, 'irrational' element, of which one remains largely unaware in ordinary experience or which has been forgotten or obliterated) than the exclusion of a '*supplementary*' element that occupies an anomalous or paradoxical position, usually on the margins or boundaries of the discipline, both within it and outside it. This anomalous status of Continental philosophy, marginalised yet never entirely repressed, is analogous to what Derrida conceptualises as the 'dangerous supplement' (see Derrida 1976). On this view, Continental philosophy is both co-originary with, yet excluded by, the dominant philosophical tradition; it is, both as a constitutive element internal to the whole and as a despised 'supplementary' element, excluded from it. This paradoxical status of Continental philosophy—as both internal and external, originary and derivative, and legitimate and illegitimate—is characteristic of its precarious institutional history on the margins of mainstream philosophy. What follows, then, is an open-ended attempt to narrate the paradoxical history of Continental philosophy in Australia, a story suggesting that it is perhaps now being transformed into something we might call 'post-Continental philosophy'.

---

[4] This study confines itself to philosophy associated with Departments of Philosophy within Universities in Australia and New Zealand, while acknowledging that much Continental philosophy continues to be practised in humanities departments and 'extramural' contexts, such as the early days of the Workers' Educational Association (WEA), founded in 1913 (see Grave on J. Alexander Gunn at Melbourne from 1923 to 1938 (1984, pp. 43–45), and, more recently, the Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy (see Sharpe 2010).

For the purposes of this study, we define 'Continental philosophy' as the pluralistic set of nineteenth- and twentieth-century movements, typically but not exclusively German and French in origin, often descending from post-Kantian idealism, movements which have historically been critical of, or provided alternatives to, contemporary strains of positivism, logical or conceptual analysis, or scientistically oriented philosophy—more often than not affiliated with humanistic forms of inquiry, typically with the arts, with a strong interest in history, aesthetics, social theory, and politics—and approaches that are critical of metaphysics yet paradigmatically concerned with themes such as freedom, subjectivity, temporality, existence, meaning, otherness, nihilism, creativity, and emancipation. Although vague, such a sketch captures enough traits to convey a recognisable tradition of styles or approaches in modern philosophy. Without amounting to anything like 'necessary and sufficient conditions', these features provide a pragmatic concept useful for our purposes.

What do we mean by 'Australian' or 'New Zealand' philosophers? Speaking broadly, we shall consider as 'Australasian' philosophers either those educated in Australia or New Zealand, or who taught philosophy primarily in Australia or New Zealand, or whose research is distinctively related to the Australasian philosophical scene, though it may also be significant internationally. As historians of philosophy have asked before (see Passmore 1992), does a term like 'Australian (Continental) philosophy' signify philosophers in Australia who happen to practise Continental philosophy? Or does it refer to a distinctively 'Australasian' style or strain of Continental philosophy? While opting in the main for the former, we will also point out instances or tendencies towards the latter. As we suggest in conclusion, the often contentious cultural and institutional divide between analytic and Continental philosophy is now showing signs of being overcome. Just as they made important contributions to translating, teaching, and disseminating a rich variety of currents in Contemporary European philosophy, Australian Continental philosophers are making strong contributions to the development of this trend, which heralds the emergence of what we might call 'post-Continental' philosophy.

A history of philosophy in Australia and New Zealand, for all its aspirations to context-transcending truth, cannot ignore the cultural and social reality of our post-colonialist and multiculturalist historical context.[5] The history of Continental philosophy in New Zealand, a hitherto little known story, will be featured later in this chapter, adding an important dimension to the history of Anglophone Continental philosophy. What emerges in this shared story is how persistent the presence of Continental philosophy has been over the last century, contributing a distinctive and alternative voice within the broader philosophical conversation in Australasia.

Pluralist Origins: Idealism as Precursor

Although the term 'Continental Philosophy' comes into its current usage during the 1950s, there is clearly evidence of Australian interest in European thinkers, notably Hegel and Nietzsche, going back to the nineteenth century. As Grave remarks, Nietzsche's ideas were culturally significant and influential for a number of Australian painters, poets, and novelists from the end of the nineteenth century to the 1920s (1984, p. 2), notably in the work of Norman Lindsay (see Macainsh 1975, pp. 137–42).[6] Nietzsche, however, held little interest for philosophers during this time, although J. McKellar Stewart did give lectures at Melbourne on 'Nietzsche and the Present German Spirit' during the Great War (Stewart 1915). Rather, it was the highly idiosyncratic versions of Hegelian-inspired 'British idealism' that played the defining role for the early philosophers at Australian Universities. It is worth remembering that the first professor of philosophy at the University of Sydney was a representative of late-nineteenth-century 'British Idealism', a movement inspired by 'the classically "German" philosophies of Kant and Hegel' (Redding 2010, pp. 256–257). Francis Anderson (not to be confused with his famous successor John Anderson) was appointed Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sydney in 1888, which soon became the Challis Chair in Philosophy in Mental and Moral Philosophy in 1890 (Grave 1984, p. 18). Educated at Glasgow University, Anderson was influenced by the Scottish Hegelian idealist Edward Caird (1835–1908), thus inaugurating the long tradition of Scottish idealists who established themselves in Sydney and in Melbourne. Anderson had a liberal view of the humanities and its role in the broader intellectual culture, lobbying unsuccessfully for a Chair in sociology to be established at the University and being a supportive advocate on behalf of the League of Nations (Grave 1984, p. 18). After retirement he became the first editor of the nation's first philosophical journal, *The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* (AJPP), which was established in 1923 and renamed the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (AJP) in 1947. A critic of Platonic metaphysics, and in particular of metaphysical dualism, Anderson was sympathetic to Hegel—as was the younger John Anderson (see Anderson 1932)—and to the British Hegelianism of T.H. Green, who remained 'a constant inspiration to him' (Grave 1984, p. 21). The courses from Anderson's last year as Professor (1921) give a fascinating insight into the pluralist character of early philosophy at Sydney, including figures such as pragmatist William James (1842–1910), American Hegelian idealist Josiah Royce (1855–1916), French vitalist Henri Bergson (1859–1941), and German life-philosopher Rudolf Eucken (1846–1926). It is the latter two thinkers who became popular in the 1920s, the heyday of Australian interest in Bergsonism and Eucken's life philosophy.

---

[5] We cannot deal here, for instance, with the question of indigenous philosophy or comparative philosophy (mostly focused on Asian and Indian thought). For some remarks and reflection on these issues, see Passmore (1992) and Lloyd (2000).

[6] Lindsay illustrated P. R. Stephensen's translation of *The Antichrist of Nietzsche: A New Version in English* (London 1928) and his writings also bear a distinctively Nietzschean stamp. As David Rathbone notes, there was lively journalistic discussion of Nietzsche at the turn of the century, including extracts from *Thus Spake Zarathustra* published in *The Bulletin* in 1900. See Rathbone's excellent online resource, 'Nietzsche in the News': http://australasiannietzschesociety.net.au/Nietzsche_in_the_News.html.

It is hard today to imagine the extent to which early Australian philosophy, like philosophy in England, was dominated by (British) idealism, an offshoot of Hegelianism (see Davies and Helgeby 2010; Grave 1984, pp. 24–46). Grave dates the idealist period in Australian philosophy from the 1880s (with the establishment of Chairs of philosophy at Melbourne and Sydney) to the end of the 1920s.[7] The Australian variant of idealism was eclectic but derived from two main Scottish schools: that of A.S. Pringle-Pattison (Edinburgh), which was influenced by Reid, Kant, and Hegel, and the Hegelian idealism of the Caird brothers at Glasgow (Grave 1984, p. 24), who emphasised the theological significance of Hegelian thought as a representation of Christian truth. The historicist, religious, and broader cultural interests of idealism—not only in Kant and Hegel but in figures such as Schiller and William James—suggested that early philosophy in Australia engaged in a broader cultural dialogue than was later the case (until the rise of Marxist, existentialist, and feminist thought in the 1960s and 1970s).

Australian Vitalism: Eucken and Bergson

The two most significant 'Continental' figures in the 1910s and 1920s Australia were Henri Bergson and Rudolf Eucken. Today all but forgotten, Eucken, a German personalist life-philosopher—and winner of the 1908 Nobel Prize for Literature—enjoyed 'quite a vogue', according to Grave, during the early decades of philosophy in Australia (1984, p. 29). In 1893, W.R. Boyce Gibson, who become the second Professor of Philosophy at Melbourne (1911), was drawn to Jena to study with Eucken before heading off to Paris to study under Emile Boutroux and then on to Glasgow under Henry James and Robert Adamson (Grave 1984, p. 28 ff). Prior to his appointment at Melbourne, Boyce Gibson had published two studies of Eucken's philosophy (1906 and 1909), as well as translating two of Eucken's books with his wife, Lucy Judge Peacock (who translated a further one herself). Eucken's Christian personalist approach became popular in Australia, thus earning Eucken the honour of being the first 'Continental' influence *avant le lettre*. Eucken combined Christian personalist idealism with an activist approach, bringing life and thought together with a vitalist and proto-existentialist tenor. As Gibson puts Eucken's credo, 'the measure and standard of our thought is fixed by the measure and standard of our life' (quoted in Grave 1984, p. 30), lines that could have been written by a philosopher like Gilles Deleuze. Gibson's enthusiasm for the German life-philosopher, a commonly studied author in his courses, was such that Bernard Bosanquet, the noted Hegelian idealist, urged Gibson in a personal letter to 'one day reconsider your relation to Eucken' (quoted in Grave 1984, p. 30).

---

[7] As Grave notes, by 1929 A.C. Fox could write that 'idealism had gone right out of fashion' and with it the link between idealist philosophy and 'doctrinally deliquescent Christianity' (Grave 1984, p. 36).

Gibson, it appears, ignored Bosanquet's advice, developing a personalist form of idealism strongly influenced by Eucken, whom he placed among the leading lights of contemporary philosophy. Gibson's inaugural lecture at Melbourne, dealing with 'key directions of contemporary philosophy', is quite revealing: he cites, in order of merit, William James' democratic vision of human freedom; Bergson's 'vision of going beyond and away from the [Platonist] Ideas to catch if he can the native mobility of Life itself' (quoted in Grave 1984, p. 31); Eucken's Christian personalist idealism; and finally, Schiller's aesthetic-pragmatist humanism (Grave 1984, p. 31). Gibson's lecture provides a rich, if idiosyncratic, snapshot of contemporary philosophy as seen from Melbourne in 1911. What is surprising from our perspective is the strongly pluralist character of philosophy in Melbourne and Sydney during this time, largely dominated by varieties of Kantian- and Hegelian-inspired idealism but with other currents also well represented.

For modern readers, 'contemporary French philosophy' most likely conjures up the names of the famous French philosophers of the 1960s. Scholarly interest in French philosophy within Australia, however, dates back to before the 1920s, undeniably one of the high water marks in the Antipodean interest in European philosophy (see Grave 1984, pp. 31–32, 39–40; Harney 1992, pp. 127–128). John Passmore, for example, described Australian philosophy during this time as not very interested in figures from the British scene, such as Bertrand Russell or G.E. Moore, but 'deeply interested in Continental philosophy' instead (Passmore 1988; quoted in Harney 1992, p. 127). The standout figure was Henri Bergson (Grave 1984, pp. 39–40), another Nobel laureate (for literature in 1927). Australian interest in the French vitalist was well established in the early decades of the century, thanks largely to W.R. Boyce Gibson, Professor of Philosophy at Melbourne University (1911–1935) (Grave, pp. 31–32, 39–41), who is best-known today for his landmark translation of Husserl's *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (published in 1931 and serving as the standard English translation until the 1980s) (Husserl 1967). Boyce Gibson co-taught Bergson—whom he described as one of the great thinkers of the age—in courses at Melbourne with J. McKellar Stewart (appointed as lecturer in 1912). McKellar Stewart, a key figure in the history of Continental philosophy in Australia, was the author of

A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy (1913), one of the earliest Anglophone studies of Bergson's vitalist philosophy,[8] as well as a manuscript on Husserl that was destroyed by fire in 1939 and unfortunately was never rewritten (Grave, 1984, p. 43). In 1923, the University of Melbourne appointed J. Alexander Gunn, a specialist in 'contemporary and nineteenth-century French philosophy', to be director of extramural activity (what we might today call 'adult education') (Grave 1984, p. 43). Gunn had already published two books on French thought: *Bergson and His Philosophy* (1920) and *Modern French Philosophy* (1922), the latter being a comprehensive survey of 70 years of French philosophy, from Auguste Comte to Bergson, as well as an ambitious book, *The Problem of Time* (1929), which cited Heidegger's newly published *Sein und Zeit* (1927) (Grave 1984, p. 44).[9] In 1925, Gunn also published an article on Bergson ('Great Thinkers: Bergson') in the *Australian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology*, expressing the hope that Bergson might soon visit Australia (Gunn 1925; Grave 1984, p. 44).[10]

The first decade or so of what was to become Australia's premier philosophical journal is remarkable for its philosophical pluralism and matter-of-fact inclusion of studies of the work of Bergson, Eucken, Husserl, and even Freud.[11] The journal's broad and eclectic range of topics, discussions, and reviews provide convincing historical evidence that the early decades of twentieth-century philosophy in Australia were marked by a strong interest in contemporary European philosophy, which, for a short time at least, was regarded as a contributing voice in the general philosophical culture. This stands in marked contrast to the tenor and style of the journal after the War, when it was renamed the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* and began to focus on developing currents in Anglo-analytic philosophy.

Back to the Future: Phenomenology and Existentialism in Australia

During the 1920s, Australian connections with the latest developments in European philosophy were being vigorously forged. The pioneer was W.R. Boyce Gibson, best known for his engagement with Edmund Husserl, one of the giants of twentieth-century Continental philosophy. Gibson met with Husserl in Freiburg in 1928 and faithfully recorded his experiences in his diary, which has since become a significant document in the history of the phenomenological movement (see Spiegelberg 1971). His interest in Husserl began in 1920, and he soon became a keen follower of the phenomenological movement in Freiburg (Grave 1984, p. 42). In 1923, Gibson read a paper on 'The Problem of the Real and the Ideal in the Phenomenology of Husserl' before the newly formed Australasian Association of Philosophy and Psychology, an Eucken-inspired critique of the way these poles are made 'wholly disparate' by Husserl (it was subsequently published in a 1925 issue of *Mind*) (Gibson 1925; Grave 1984, pp. 42–43). Gibson also published articles engaging with Nicolai Hartmann and Max Scheler and in other articles drew on Bergson's claims concerning 'time lived' as a precondition for 'time measured' in order to discuss the relationship between physics and philosophy (Gibson 1933–1934; Grave 1984, p. 43).[12] The publication of Boyce Gibson's translation of *Ideas* put Husserl on the map for contemporary Anglophone philosophers, J. McKellar Stewart being prompted to pen articles (Stewart 1933–1934), shortly after its translation, for the AJPP. Against the cultural stereotype, French-born Gibson's relations with Husserl were refreshingly devoid of cultural cringe. Spiegelberg notes the philosophical significance of their meetings, which were marked by Gibson's focused questioning of key aspects of Husserl's phenomenological project. He even goes so far as to praise Australia's relatively advanced engagement with phenomenology (from the viewpoint of the 1950s) compared with other Anglophone nations!

---

[8] McKellar Stewart's book was based on his 1911 dissertation on Bergson.

[9] Bergson wrote a foreword for the book, praising it as 'une information singulièrement étendue, precise et sure' (quoted in Grave 1984, p. 44).

[10] Plans were underway to have Bergson lecture at the University of Sydney in 1928 but these never came to fruition (Minutes, University Extension Board Meeting, 25 March 1927, University of Sydney Archives).

[11] See, for example, John Passmore's article 'Psycho-analysis and Aesthetics' (1936).

If phenomenology enjoyed its brief moment in the (Australian) sun, the same cannot be said for existentialist thought, which entered the academy much later, despite its enduring intellectual and cultural appeal. Indeed, with the exception of Boyce Gibson's pioneering work on Husserl, there was little institutional recognition of phenomenology and existentialism in Australia until the late 1960s and 1970s.[13] The reception of French existentialism (primarily the work of Sartre) was rather delayed compared with phenomenology. In part this was perhaps due to its less 'academic' character (the fact that Sartre was not a 'professional' philosopher but a novelist, dramatist, and political activist), but more likely because its cultural dissemination coincided with the rise of the analytic movement in Anglophone philosophy. Consequently, both phenomenology and existentialism became tarred as the kind of 'unprofessional' and disreputable work that was coming out of the continent. In his *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, for example, John Passmore, a historian of philosophy more sympathetic to Continental philosophy than most, breezily remarks that 'professional philosophers . . . dismiss it [Continental philosophy, i.e., Sartre's existentialism] with a contemptuous shrug' (1957, p. 450).[14] By the early 1960s the contemptuous shrug had become more a vigorous shove, with the clear marking of a 'gulf' or 'divide' now existing between Continental philosophy (phenomenology and existentialism) and Anglophone philosophy (analytic philosophy). In a manner reflecting the pattern in the UK (see Glendinning 2006), the 'divide' between analytic and Continental philosophy was construed less as an internal division between traditions than as an opposition between philosophy and its 'Other'. A process of institutional marginalisation was underway, leading to the rapid dissolution of the pluralist character of philosophy common in Australia before the War (see Harney 1992, pp. 131–132).

---

[12] Gibson also dealt with Scheler and emphasised how phenomenological approaches opened up a new way of thinking the a priori (Grave 1984, p. 43).

[13] An interesting exception is A. Boyce Gibson, who published an 'interim report' on existentialism in *Meanjin* (1948). See Harney (2010) for a detailed discussion of existentialism in Australia; see Bilimoria (1997) and Rathbone (2010) for an excellent account of phenomenology in Australia, situating it in a wider historical and philosophical context.

[14] One of Australia's finest historians of philosophy, as well as a famous student of John Anderson's, Passmore presents a more sympathetic account of phenomenology and existentialism in later editions of his classic work, devoting—tellingly enough—an 'appendix' to these movements in contemporary European philosophy.

Despite the increasingly monocultural philosophical milieu, a few figures bravely pursued their interests in existential phenomenology. A.M. Ritchie of Newcastle University, for example, had published work in this area during the 1940s and 1950s (including a critical review of existentialist thought in the AJP in 1947), but he never officially taught any university courses on these topics (Harney 1992, p. 134)—a pattern that was often to be repeated. Another philosopher at Newcastle pursuing Continental philosophy during the 1960s was William V. Doniela, who had studied with Anderson in Sydney before heading off to Europe in the late 1950s for his doctoral studies (at Freiburg University), specialising in Hegel but also with interests in Husserl and Heidegger (Harney 1992, pp. 134–35). As Harney notes, Doniela was the kind of 'crossover' scholar for whom the idea of a 'divide' between Continental and mainstream Anglophone traditions did not really exist.[15] Although teaching phenomenology on its own was still unthinkable, themes from Continental perspectives could be readily adapted into 'mainstream' philosophy courses. Doniela thus introduced his students in the late 1960s to Frankfurt school critical theory and during the 1970s taught 'phenomenological sociology, psychosocial aspects of existentialism, and critical Marxism' (Harney 1992, p. 135). This pattern of 'private' research interests in Continental philosophy that were subtly integrated into mainstream teaching was to prove a common one for Australian philosophers.

An exception proving the rule is pioneering Melbourne philosopher Max Charlesworth, who pursued his doctoral studies at the Husserl Archives in Louvain during the early 1950s, and upon his return to Australia was the first philosopher to teach phenomenology and existentialism at the University of Melbourne. As Harney notes, Charlesworth developed his interest in Husserl, inflected by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, independently of the growing interest in European philosophy to be found in 'Wittgensteinian Melbourne' during the 1950s and 1960s (Harney 1992, p. 133). A true solo pioneer, Charlesworth convened Australia's first course dedicated to Continental philosophy in 1967, a phenomenology and existentialism course that began with Husserl but gave major emphasis to Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Merleau-Ponty (Harney 1992, p. 133; 2010).[16] He was supported in his endeavours by the then Professor at Melbourne, A. 'Sandy' Boyce Gibson, who also lectured on existentialist philosophy at Monash in the late 1960s (Harney 1992, 2010). Despite a large student following, Charlesworth's main scholarly relations were with literary critics in the French department, existentialist theologians, and philosophically minded Freudians (Harney 1992, pp. 133–134). He also delivered a number of ABC public radio discussions on Sartre and existentialism in 1975 that proved very popular and were subsequently published as a book (1975). Charlesworth's experience of recognition from colleagues from disciplines outside of philosophy reflects the typically 'interdisciplinary' reception of contemporary European philosophy. While this kind of work elicited spontaneous engagement from theorists outside of philosophy, it also elicited indifference or hostility on the part of many academic philosophers.[17] To counteract this philosophical hostility, Robert C. Solomon, the noted American Continental scholar, delivered lectures on existentialism to philosophers at Melbourne and La Trobe in 1970s, thus beginning a fruitful exchange that greatly contributed to the acceptance of phenomenology and existentialism as legitimate forms of philosophical inquiry (Harney 2010, pp. 221–22).

---

[15] Nonetheless, his specialty area was Hegel, which could hardly be said to be a 'mainstream' philosophical interest during the 1960s!

[16] The main texts studied in this course were Sartre's *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* and Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* (Harney 1992, p. 133).

This institutional marginalisation of European philosophy began to change during the 1960s and 1970s, although it was still regarded as a rather esoteric or eccentric pursuit. In Sydney, pioneering figures included Max Deutscher, the Foundation Professor of Philosophy at Macquarie University (in 1966), who had developed an interest in French and German existentialism (Sartre, Heidegger, Jaspers) early in his career (having been a prominent figure in the materialism debates of the 1960s). While at Oxford in the early 1960s, Deutscher read a paper on Sartre 'partly because no one else there was familiar with Sartre at the time' (Harney 1984, p. 136). Deutscher's interest in Sartre deepened during the 1960s and he began introducing themes from Sartrean existentialism to his students at Macquarie University. These Sartrean elements would be incorporated into courses on philosophy of mind, for example, rather than presented as belonging to a distinctive tradition separate from 'mainstream' philosophical debates. Drawing on his training and expertise in analytic philosophy, Deutscher thus approached existentialism and phenomenology—and later on, French feminist and poststructuralist thought—as important contributions to the contemporary philosophical conversation (on mind, consciousness, agency, autonomy, language, ethics, and so forth).[18] Deutscher was joined at Macquarie by Lucian O'Dwyer, originally from Italy, who had studied with Ryle at Oxford. O'Dwyer introduced seminars on phenomenology at Macquarie and was soon regarded as 'Australia's leading Husserl scholar' (Harney 1992, p. 14). O'Dwyer's 'purist' tendencies as a phenomenologist present an interesting counterpoint to Deutscher's more 'integrationist' approach, which became paradigmatic of the way a number Australian philosophers approached Continental philosophy—namely, as an alternative source of ideas that could contribute to 'mainstream' philosophical inquiry rather than a specialised approach in its own right.[19]

---

[17] As evidence of the marginalised status of Continental philosophy during this time, Harney cites a 1962 collection of essays, edited by Catherine Berry, entitled *Ten Lectures on Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, published by the Melbourne University Philosophical Society. This publication was the result of an 'informal' seminar, organised by students rather than staff, whose aim was to introduce students to philosophers 'who are not studied in Arts courses but have nonetheless influenced many of the thinkers who are studied' (quoted in Harney 1984, p. 134). This pattern of student-initiated Continental publications, groups, and journals, with contributions from a smattering of philosophers, continued over the next forty years (the same rationale as for Berry's collection is offered for the setting up of the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP) in 1995 and of the Melbourne Society for Continental Philosophy (MSCP) in 2003).

Marion Tapper, having completed a doctorate with Deutscher on 'Dichotomies', was another key figure in the promotion of contemporary European philosophy (Harney 2010, p. 221). As an undergraduate in 1970, Tapper had studied existentialism and phenomenology at UNSW (with Barbara Roxon), completing an Honours thesis on Heidegger (under the supervision of Bill Doniela). She taught courses on Heidegger and feminist philosophy at Macquarie (in 1981 and 1982), existentialism and aesthetics at the ANU (1982), phenomenology and existentialism, as well as feminism, at the University of Queensland (1983–1985) and then at the University of Melbourne from 1986 to 2007.[20] Tapper's influence as a teacher was considerable, not only for the dissemination of various perspectives in Continental philosophy but also for French feminist theory (see Tapper 1993). Many of her students at the University of Melbourne, for example, would be instrumental in establishing the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP) in 1995 (see Sinnerbrink and Sharpe 2010) and the Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy (MSCP) (founded by Craig Barrie, David Rathbone, Jon Roffe, Sean Ryan, Matthew Sharpe, Cameron Shingleton, and Ashley Woodward in the summer of 2002) (see Sharpe 2010).

Despite the later prominence of Sydney and Melbourne as centres of Continental philosophy, the Australian National University in Canberra offered students courses in French philosophy (Foucault and Derrida) during the 1970s. Indeed, young philosophers with interests in Continental philosophy found a relatively welcoming environment at the ANU, thanks largely to the leadership of Richard Campbell. In addition to fostering a pluralistic philosophical culture, Campbell was responsible for supervising the first PhD awarded in Continental philosophy in Australia, Robin Small's thesis on Heidegger's concept of human nature, completed in 1974 (Small 1974; Harney 1992, p. 142). Small went on to teach in Education at Monash, where he introduced courses on existentialist and Marxist approaches to education, pursued his research interests in Nietzsche, and is now a Professor at the University of Auckland (see Small 2001a, 2010).

---

[18] See, for example, Deutscher (1983, 2003, 2007).

[19] This pluralist approach, however, did not prevent various colleagues from regarding Deutscher's existentialist tendencies as a kind of philosophical 'corruption'. After hearing one of Deutscher's papers on Sartre, for example, David Stove was said to have remarked: 'that's what comes of consorting with philosophically underdeveloped countries!' (Interview with Max Deutscher, 13 March 2008).

[20] Tapper was appointed to teach contemporary European philosophy in Melbourne after the untimely death of Brenda Judge. Judge had been a promising postgraduate at the ANU and a participant in the first Phenomenology conference in 1976, before taking over Max Charlesworth's Continental philosophy course after Charlesworth moved to Deakin (Harney 1992, p. 143).

During the political and cultural ferment of the 1970s, French philosophy began to flourish, at least for a while, as a legitimate area of teaching and research. While at the ANU, for example, Kimon Lycos had begun a translation of Foucault's first volume of the *History of Sexuality* (in 1976–1977), well before Alan Sheridan's version was published in 1978. During the 1970s, Genevieve Lloyd, who was to become Australia's first female Professor of Philosophy, lectured on topics in the history of philosophy, French philosophy, and feminist theory.[21] Among the Foucault and Derrida students that Lycos and Lloyd taught were Rosi Braidotti and Andrew Benjamin, who both wrote Honours and Masters theses on topics in French philosophy. Braidotti, now Professor at Utrecht, went on to become an internationally recognised authority on Deleuze and feminism, while Benjamin, now Professor at Monash, became internationally known for his work on deconstruction, Lyotard, Walter Benjamin, and Continental aesthetics. After completing his undergraduate studies, Benjamin left Australia for Paris and then for Warwick University, where he completed his doctoral dissertation (in 1990) and later became Professor of Philosophy (in 1996) and Director of the Centre for Research in Philosophy and Literature, before returning to Australia in 2002 to take up a Professorship at the University of Technology, Sydney, and then returning to Monash University as Professor of Critical Theory.

Many social, cultural, and political factors contributed to the growing interest in Continental philosophy in Australian universities during the 1970s: the emergence of newer universities and the expansion of tertiary education, the availability of French (and to a lesser extent German) philosophical works in translation, and growing student political awareness connected with the Vietnam war protests, civil rights, and feminist movements (Harney 1992, pp. 140–141). For many younger scholars, the various currents of European philosophy offered a much richer vocabulary than mainstream analytic philosophy for describing the contemporary world.[22] These social, cultural, and political factors would remain important for Continental philosophy in the following decades, with the supplanting of existential and phenomenological currents—mediated by Marxist and feminist ideas—by the growing interest in French poststructuralism and German critical theory.

---

[21] We discuss below Lloyd's importance and influence, particularly for the next generation of Australian feminist philosophers.

[22] Max Deutscher's remark typifies this growing awareness: witnessing the 1960s student demonstrations and political upheavals in the United States convinced him that 'the vocabulary of analytic philosophy was too narrow to grasp contemporary events' (interview with Max Deutscher, 13 March 2008).

The rest of the Anglophone world had established Continental philosophy societies and annual conferences by the late 1960s. Australia was much slower in organising alternative institutional networks, a process that gathered momentum only from the late 1970s, opting instead for more informal networks, isolated collaborations, and solo research efforts.[23] In part this is due to the well-known Australian 'tyranny of distance': the unavoidable isolation between individual practitioners of Continental philosophy, who in many cases had no idea that there were other scholars working on similar topics. Another factor is the stridently 'anti-Continental' animus of much mainstream 'analytic' philosophy, which only intensified during the 1970s and 1980s as a wave of Continental approaches began to assert themselves (from Marxism and feminism to critical theory and poststructuralism). Given this institutionally hostile climate, it is hardly surprising that, from the 1970s to the present, it has typically been the initiative of individual practitioners—sometimes academic staff in university departments, sometimes enthusiastic postgraduates and private scholars—who organised the first 'national' events, academic forums, and fledgling organisations for the dissemination of work in Continental philosophy within Australasia.[24]

Australia's first conference on Phenomenology, to take a historically decisive example, was held in June 1976 and organised by Maurita Harney, who also introduced phenomenology and existentialism to the ANU in 1973 (Harney 1992, pp. 142–143). The ANU conference attracted over 70 participants from a variety of disciplines eager to explore Continental thinkers (chiefly Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty).[25] Following the success of the first Phenomenology conference, the Australian Association of Phenomenology and Social Philosophy (AAPSP) was formed (organised by Max Deutscher, William Doniela, Maurita Harney, Luciana O'Dwyer, and Marion Tapper, among others),[26] followed by a second Phenomenology conference in 1980 at the University of Queensland. Papers from these two conferences formed the basis for a volume, *One Hundred Years of Phenomenology*, edited by Robin Small (2001b), which offers a striking cultural-philosophical snapshot of the state of phenomenological research in Australia at the time.[27] The AAPSP was the first academic Society for European philosophy in Australia and continued to conduct regular conferences until its demise in the early 1990s. At this time the AAPSP was reborn as the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP), launched in 1995 by a group of disaffected Melbourne postgraduate students who, in a now familiar refrain, were dissatisfied with the lack of institutional recognition of contemporary Continental philosophy.[28] This transition between the AAPSP and the ASCP marked a new phase in the history of Continental philosophy in Australia. It symbolised the shift from the older generation of scholars working on phenomenology and existentialism to a younger generation of postgraduates keenly interested in French poststructuralism and critical theory, a shift that had already been occurring in some departments from the late 1970s.[29] The ASCP has grown substantially since the late 1990s, with annual conferences regularly attracting well over 100 participants and featuring an impressive list of internationally recognised keynote speakers (see Sinnerbrink and Sharpe 2010). It played an important cultural and pedagogical role in supporting and cultivating the next generation of Continental philosophers and has become the second major philosophical association in Australia. In recent years it has grown into a key representative body for the Continental philosophy community in Australia and New Zealand, with links to international organisations such as the American Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) and the Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy (CSCP) and a strong working relationship with the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP).[30]

---

[23] Although various Marxist-feminist journals were circulated in Sydney (Marion Tapper, personal communication), the first explicitly 'Continental' journals in Australia—*Dialectic*, founded by Bill Doniela and based in Newcastle, and *Critical Philosophy*, founded by Paul Crittenden and based in Sydney—only emerged during the 1980s (*Critical Philosophy*, e.g., ran between 1984 and 1988 (Crittenden 2010). Since 2000, a number of online 'Continental' journals have appeared, with a more independent standing, including *Contretemps* (2000–2006) (see http://sydney.edu.au/contretemps/contents.html) and *Parrhesia* (2006 to present) (see http://www.parrhesiajournal.org/).

[24] This was true, for example, of all the associations, societies, or schools dedicated to Continental philosophy from the late 1970s to the present. In each case, the rationale to form such groups was to address the lack of institutional recognition of Continental philosophy in Australian universities. See the ASCP website for a brief history: http://www.ascp.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=54. The MSCP website also offers a lively account of its inception: http://www.mscp.org.au/about.

[25] The Phenomenology conference proceedings were also published (see Harney 1977).

[26] The group was originally called the 'Australasian Association for Phenomenology', but later changed its name.

---

[27] The book is a veritable who's who of Australian phenomenology, including essays by Robin Small, Max Deutscher, Maurita Harney, William Doniela, Luciana O'Dwyer, Richard Campbell, Purushottama Bilimoria, Paul Crittenden, Damian Byers, Helmut Loiskandl, and Horst Ruthrof (Small 2001a). Harney also published a scholarly book on phenomenology during the 1980s (1984).

[28] The ASCP was relaunched in Melbourne but also had a 'Sydney base', leading to the alternating conferences between Melbourne and Sydney during the mid-to-late 1990s (see Sinnerbrink and Sharpe 2010).

[29] As University of Sydney philosophy postgraduates, for example, Paul Patton and Ted Sadler began as Althusserian Marxists (both editing and contributing to the publication of the Department of General Philosophy, *Paper Tigers*) before shifting to French and German philosophy, respectively (Patton discovering Foucault and Deleuze, and Sadler embracing Nietzsche and Heidegger). Their trajectories also symbolise the internal 'divide' that began to open up within the Continental philosophy community between 'French' and 'German' schools during the 1980s and 1990s.

[30] See the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy website: http://www.ascp.org.au/.

Living in the Seventies: Marxism, Feminism, and Poststructuralism

While Marxist thought is more directly pertinent to political theory and sociology, its role in the history of philosophy in Australia is also important to acknowledge. For it is with Marxism and then with feminism (and often in conjunction) that we see the most vigorous institutional struggles this country has seen over philosophical education. At the same time, the tradition of Marxism played a significant role in the history of political philosophy. Grave, for example, identifies the two dominant themes in philosophical and social thought in Australia as liberalism (both ethical and political) and Marxism (1984, p. 156). Once again this suggests the contrast between dominant and minority traditions rather than an opposition between philosophy and its other. Although the influence of Marxism has doubtless waned since the 1990s, the 'politicisation' of philosophy and the humanities more generally that it precipitated has had an enduring effect on the local development of Continental philosophy.

In Australian philosophical circles, Marxism first came to prominence in Adelaide, rather than in Sydney or Melbourne. To be sure, the young John Anderson, upon his arrival in Sydney in 1927, quickly proffered his services to the Communist Party of Australia and served, at least for a time, as its 'theoretical advisor' (Grave 1984, p. 68; Franklin 2003, p. 8). Anderson, however, moved away from Marxism during the 1940s, just as others were being drawn towards it (Grave 1984, p. 68). The most 'Andersonian' Marxist in Australia was former student Eugene Kamenka, whose 1962 study, *The Ethical Foundations of Marxism*, draws on Marx's 1844 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* and interprets Marx's ethico-political thought, against Marxist orthodoxy, as a philosophy of freedom (Kamenka 1962). As Grave notes, however, Kamenka's ethical Marx, as critic of the state and sceptical champion of freedom, sounds suspiciously like Anderson's ethical and social theory (1984, p. 163).

The real battle between Marxism and philosophy, however, got underway at Flinders University in 1967 with the appointment of Brian M. Medlin as Chair of Philosophy (Grave 1984, p. 212). Along with his colleagues Rodney Allen and Ian Hunt, Medlin, a brilliant young philosopher who was on friendly terms with Iris Murdoch, spearheaded the radical Marxist and anti-Vietnam activism at Flinders in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Undergraduate offerings at Flinders during this time provide a revealing snapshot of the decidedly 'activist' flavour of the department: first-year courses on 'Democratic Theory', 'Civil Disobedience', and 'Revolution' are featured, as well as upper level courses on 'Marxism-Leninism' (I and II) (Grave 1984, p. 212). The radicalism of Marxist philosophy at Flinders reached a symbolic highpoint with Medlin's famous presentation to the AAP in 1970, which began with his provocative draping of a red flag over the podium before presenting (or attempting to present) a paper on 'The Onus of Proof in Political Argument' (Franklin 2003, p. 291)—a political intervention and dramatic flourish, from all accounts, that has not been repeated since.

Often lost in the dramatic and entertaining historical accounts of this period is the broader argument over the social role of philosophy that motivated Marxist activists to intervene in the academy. Against the backdrop of widespread protests over Australia's commitment to the Vietnam War, Marxists seized the moment to argue for a more activist role for philosophy as challenging prevailing social and political orthodoxies. For those influenced by Marxist ideas, philosophers were not simply public servants or private researchers pursuing their own idiosyncratic interests; rather, they were socially engaged defenders of reason and freedom or even outright cultural and political activists, depending on their particular historical circumstances. In the heated political climate of the early 1970s, with burgeoning anti-Vietnam protests, emerging feminist and indigenous rights movements, and students passionate about linking theory and practice, philosophers too had a decisive choice to make about how to relate philosophy to society. Pretending that philosophy was a simply a professional academic pursuit, one that remained neutral or indifferent towards contemporary social and political concerns, was itself a theoretical and practical stance open to question and critique.

This activist intervention was no more dramatically displayed than in the infamous dispute that rocked the School of Philosophy at the University of Sydney during the early 1970s. Certainly the most well-known episode in the politicisation of philosophy in Australia, the ‘Sydney dispute’ refers to the famous split in the School of Philosophy at the University of Sydney in 1973 that led to the formation of two separate departments, General Philosophy and Traditional and Modern Philosophy (see Franklin 2003, pp. 281–312).[31] The background to the dispute, often presented as a colourful clash of stubborn personalities, is much more than academic: the Vietnam war protests, countercultural resistance, student activism, the rise of feminist awareness, and student dissatisfaction with the seeming disconnection between the academy and society—all of these elements helped foment the heated and controversial dispute over the institutional and political role of philosophical pedagogy in the university.

The split in the School of Philosophy had two distinct phases: the first argument, starting in 1971, arose over whether Marxism should be taught as part of the philosophy curriculum (by Michael Devitt and Wal Suchting); and the second phase, starting in 1973, was triggered by the related question over whether feminism should be taught (by Jean Curthoys and Liz Jacka, then postgraduates). Both arguments were exacerbated and escalated by related disagreements over departmental procedures for collective decision making, curriculum changes, and the hiring of staff (see Franklin 2003, pp. 281–306). A general strike was held, student occupations and demonstrations were launched, and relations between the two ‘factions’ in the dispute—lead by Suchting and Devitt on the one hand and David M. Armstrong on the other—were becoming untenable (Franklin 2003, pp. 293).[32] The dispute became so heated and intractable (at one point even being mentioned in State Parliament) that a radical and unprecedented solution was called for. Keith Campbell, a 'moderate' in the melee, proposed that the school be divided into two departments, Traditional and Modern Philosophy (to be headed by Armstrong) and General Philosophy (to be headed by John Burnheim). The University senate, exasperated with the ongoing dispute, readily agreed, thus establishing what was probably the first 'house divided' in academic philosophy within the Western world.

---

[31] Franklin’s entertaining and informative account of the split between General Philosophy and Traditional & Modern is marred, however, by his dismissive approach to Continental philosophy generally and to French feminism in particular.

[32] A famous press photograph, from 24 June 1971, shows a furious D.M. Armstrong, teeth clenched, wrenching back the microphone that was taken from him by an anti-war protester during a lunchtime talk by the First Secretary of the South Vietnamese Embassy. A more dramatic image of the testy clash between academic philosophy and political activism would be hard to imagine.

The split occurred during a period in which Althusserian Marxism was making its mark in Australian political and philosophical circles, with the Department of General Philosophy rapidly becoming a hub of Althusserian Marxism (see Suchting 1986). This was well evinced by the 1978 anthology *Paper Tigers*, based upon the first-year General Philosophy 'counter-ideology' course, which criticised many of the assumptions underlying disciplinary knowledges being taught elsewhere in the university (Franklin 2003, p. 303). Always marked by the spirit of the times, the radical Marxist-feminist stance of General Philosophy in the mid-1970s soon gave way to a more distinctively Continental orientation during the late 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, until its amalgamation with the Traditional and Modern Department on 1 March 2000, General Philosophy was probably one of the most consistently 'Continental' departments in the world, including specialities in French poststructuralism (Paul Patton); French feminism (Elizabeth Grosz, Mia Campioni, Moira Gatens); psychoanalysis (Grosz, Campioni); Hegel (Paul Redding), Nietzsche (Paul Crittenden, Ted Sadler), as well as critical theory (John Grumley, György Márkus); Heidegger and classical phenomenology (Sadler, Damian Byers); history of philosophy (Stephen Gaukroger, György Márkus); and Continental aesthetics (Redding, Márkus).[33]

Emeritus Professor Márkus, a member of the 'Budapest circle' around György Lukács—including Agnes Heller (who went to Melbourne), Ferenc Feher, Mihaly Vadja, and Maria Márkus—emigrated to Sydney during the mid-1970s to escape political interference in Hungary. Having previously taught in Berlin, as a colleague and critical interlocutor of Jürgen Habermas,[34] Márkus became, over the next three decades, a profoundly influential teacher, inspiring a generation of local philosophers through his dramatic and memorable 'European'-style lecture courses in the history of philosophy (Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel), critical theory (Adorno, Horkheimer, Benjamin), theories of modernity, and post-Kantian aesthetics. Márkus' authority and experience, along with a more pluralist ethos encouraged by senior members in both camps, brought a measure of decorum to relations between the two departments in later years.[35] Indeed, Márkus once described relations between the Traditional and Modern and General Philosophy departments in later years as much like an unhappy but somehow functional marriage: although there was little love lost between the estranged partners, they both tried to make it work for the sake of the kids. After some years of defections and realignments, relations between former adversaries improved, University business was conducted reasonably efficiently, and individual philosophers were able to pursue their teaching and research interests with little interference or institutional strife. Certainly for students of the period—particularly during the 1990s—there was a smorgasbord of philosophical traditions, topics, approaches, styles, and courses to choose from: a uniquely pluralist situation that is not likely to be repeated.

---

[33] General Philosophy was to produce a number of internationally recognised scholars specialising in Continental thinkers: Stephen Gaukroger on Descartes (1995), Gatens (and Lloyd) on Spinoza (1999), Patton on Deleuze (2000), Redding on Hegel (1996, 2007), and Ted Sadler on Nietzsche and Heidegger (1995, 1996).

[34] Márkus has the honour of being the subject of an 'excursus' on the production paradigm in Habermas' landmark book, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (1987, pp. 75–82).

[35] Which is not to say that the old antagonisms had disappeared: in the late 1980s, first-year students were still being warned by some Traditional and Modern lecturers that 'only a fool' would bother with Continental thinkers like Foucault.

Elizabeth Grosz had been an undergraduate when the split happened, and went on to become a key figure lecturing in General Philosophy from 1978 until 1991. Having worked on Lacan and feminist theory during the mid-to-late 1970s, she later published two influential books (Grosz 1989, 1990) that quickly established her reputation as a maverick psychoanalytic and 'corporeal' French feminist, before turning to a Deleuzian-style queer theory and to Deleuzian philosophy more generally during the 1990s and 2000s (1994, 1995, 2001, 2004, 2008). Despite this international recognition, or perhaps precisely because of it, she also came to serve, at least for certain critics, as a symbol of the 'corrupting' influence of Continental philosophy and of poststructuralist feminist theory in particular (see Franklin 2003, pp. 367–373).

Not all feminist philosophers, however, received this kind of negative response. Over a long and productive career, Genevieve Lloyd produced path-breaking research on the history of philosophy from a feminist perspective (1984) that inspired a whole generation of Australian French feminist scholars. Lloyd studied philosophy first at the University of Sydney during the early 1960s and then at Oxford later in the decade, earning her doctorate in 1973 on the topic 'Time and Tense'. She lectured at the ANU from 1967 to 1987, developing her critique of philosophy's gendered conception of the human and of the rational, during which time she published her best-known work, *The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy* (1984). With her appointment to the Chair of Philosophy at the University of New South Wales in 1987, she became the first female Professor of Philosophy to be appointed in Australia. She later became an Emeritus Professor at UNSW and Research Associate at Macquarie and continued to publish important philosophical work (Lloyd 2008). Lloyd's celebrated *The Man of Reason* opened up an important path of critical and philosophically informed feminist scholarship that both questioned and analysed the sources of Western philosophy's traditional exclusion and devaluation of women at both philosophical and institutional levels. Her scholarship on Spinoza, in collaboration with Moira Gatens, cemented her reputation as one of Australia's foremost historians of philosophy as well as one of its most recognised and influential feminist philosophers.

The list of feminist thinkers following in Lloyd's wake is impressive: Michelle Boulous-Walker (1998), Rosi Braidotti (1994), Penelope Deutscher (1997, 2008), Rosalyn Diprose (now Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales and a key figure in the development of Continental philosophy and feminist theory in Sydney) (1994, 2002), Robyn Ferrell (1996, 2002, 2006), Moira Gatens (now Professor at University of Sydney and appointed to the prestigious Spinoza Chair of philosophy at the University of Amsterdam for 2010) (1991, 1996), Vicky Kirby (1997), Cathryn Vasselu (1998), and Elizabeth A. Wilson (1998, 2004) have all contributed to Australian 'corporeal feminism' by exploring the intersections between French feminism, psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, and political philosophy (see Diprose and Ferrell 1991, and Patton 1993).

Another key figure in the dissemination of poststructuralism during the 1980s was Paul Patton, now Professor at the University of New South Wales. As a postgraduate, Patton had travelled to Paris in order to write a doctoral thesis on Althusser, and while studying there he attended Foucault's lectures and Deleuze's seminars (between 1975 and 1979). The dramatic philosophical impact of these encounters with two of the leading philosophers of their generation inspired Patton to embark upon a series of landmark translations. Upon his return to General Philosophy in 1979, he taught a course on Foucault and translated two Foucault interviews that were published in one of the earliest English-language books on Foucault's work (Morris and Patton 1979). This was followed by translations (with Paul Foss) of Deleuze and Guattari's 'Rhizome' (published in 1981), several Baudrillard texts in 1983–1984 (co-translated with Paul Foss and Ross Gibson), another Foucault interview published in *Art and Text* (1984), and Baudrillard's keynote address for the massive 1984 Futur*Fall conference (organised by Alan Cholodenko, Elizabeth Grosz, and Edward Colless), papers from which were later edited into a book (Grosz et al. 1986).[36] With his understated but clear and compelling manner, Patton taught a number of influential courses on French philosophy during the mid-1980s (at UNSW), a fourth year/Honours course on Deleuze in 1989 (in General Philosophy), undergraduate courses in French philosophy in 1990–1991 (at the ANU), and then regular courses on French philosophy in the Department of General Philosophy from the early 1990s. He was also responsible for the long-awaited English translation of Deleuze's 1968 magnum opus, *Difference and Repetition* (1994). Australian Deleuzians and Sydney Continental philosophers owe a particular debt to Patton's measured and rigorous engagement with Deleuze, and his careful attention to articulating the relationship between Deleuze, political philosophy, and contemporary Anglophone philosophy (see 2000; 2010).

Australian philosophers such as Patton, Grosz, and Andrew Benjamin were decisive figures in the international dissemination of French poststructuralism during the 1980s. Some of their texts, however, also had a more local, pedagogical function. From the late 1970s, publications such as *Language*, *Sexuality*, *Subversion* (Foss and Morris 1978), *Michel Foucault: Power*, *Truth*, *Strategy* (Morris and Patton 1979), and *Beyond Marxism*? (Patton and Allen 1983) had been used for teaching in General Philosophy by John Burnheim, Mia Campioni, Moira Gatens,

---

[36] While the Futur*Fall conference focused particular interest on Baudrillard's work, the other keynote speaker was Gayatri Spivak, well-known translator of Derrida's *Of Grammatology*.

Grosz, and Patton. Indeed, the 1980s and 1990s were periods characterised by intensive teaching of courses on recent French philosophy (Grosz at Sydney throughout the 1980s; Rosalyn Diprose at Flinders during 1991–1994 and later at UNSW, along with Lisabeth During; Robyn Ferrell at Macquarie from the mid-1990s to 2002; Michelle Boulous Walker and Marguerite La Caze at the University of Queensland; Penelope Deutscher at the ANU, followed later by Fiona Jenkins). From local engagement to international contribution, Australian Continental philosophers have distinguished themselves by adding a distinctively Australian accent to the global philosophical conversation.

Here we should note the remarkable contribution of Australian feminist philosophy, whose work draws readily on Continental theorists and whose originality has been acknowledged internationally in a number of publications.[37] More generally, Australian philosophers have been key players for many years in the Anglophone reception, interpretation, and elaboration of contemporary European philosophy, notably in French poststructuralism. This work has been continued by an energetic generation of younger scholars (many of whom were actively involved in the development of the ASCP), drawing on the work of their predecessors and exploring in diverse ways the intersections between French poststructuralism, psychoanalysis, phenomenology, critical theory, feminism, post-analytic philosophy, post-Continental philosophy, political philosophy, and aesthetics. From institutional marginalisation and philosophical repudiation, contemporary Continental philosophy in Australia has managed to turn its 'marginal' status to advantage, establishing itself as a thriving area of original research and engaging with a plurality of contemporary philosophical debates in challenging and creative ways.

The Early Years in New Zealand: J. N. Findlay and Karl Popper

Western philosophy arrived in New Zealand much as it did in Australia: in the form of Scots schooled in Hegelianism.[38] The foundation Professorship in Mental and Moral Philosophy at the University of Otago was occupied by a succession of Scottish idealists from its inception in 1871 up to and including Francis Dunlop, a committed Germanophile and devotee of Rudolf Eucken, who was appointed in 1913 (Pigden 2010, p. 343). The first significant encounter with Continental philosophy, however, came with the appointment of John Niemeyer Findlay in 1931. As a student at the University of Pretoria under W.A. Macfayden, Findlay had taken a particular interest in Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, and Bergson, embracing a Fichtean 'ego-centric' brand of idealism. However, influenced by Russell's *Our Knowledge of the External World* during study at Oxford on a Rhodes scholarship over 1924–1927, he abandoned this early position in favour of a realist approach that still owed much to Kant and Hegel (his 'constant companion'), whom he did *not* consider idealists (Findlay 1985, p. 4). In the late 1950s, Findlay emerged as a champion of phenomenology and a revived Hegelianism, and he is still widely known today for his translation of Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* (Husserl 1970) and his editorial contributions to the standard English translation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel 1979). His time in New Zealand, however, seems to have been the *least* 'Continental' of his career. Findlay held the Chair at Otago until 1945, during which time he published one book, *Meinong's Theory of Objects*, and worked on another, *Values and Intentions*, which was eventually published in 1961. Whatever his private interests, his teaching was openly devoted to 'introducing mathematical logic to the Antipodes'—a task at which, given the distinction of many of his students, he seems to have been successful (Pigden 2010, p. 343).

---

[37] See the special issue of *Hypatia*, 'Going Australian: Reconfiguring Feminism and Philosophy' (Battersby et al. 2000).

[38] The authors acknowledge with gratitude the contribution of research assistant Mark A. Taylor, whose extensive labours (sponsored by the University of Auckland) unearthed many, if not all, of the most interesting details contained within the essay regarding the New Zealand scene.

Probably the most famous philosopher ever to grace New Zealand's shores, Karl Popper, arrived in Christchurch in 1937 to take up a lectureship in philosophy at Canterbury University College. The son of Viennese Jewish parents who had converted to Christianity, Popper's exodus from his homeland was forced by the rise of Nazism and the threat of *Anschluss*. As Derek Browne observes in his history of the Canterbury philosophy department, Popper brought 'modern European sophistication to the philosophy program, and intellectual provocation to the whole academic environment of an isolated, provincial university' (Browne 2010, p. 101); and it is known that Findlay made the trip from Dunedin many times for the opportunity to converse with him (Hacohen 2000, p. 339). Before his departure in 1945 for the London School of Economics, and in spite of a desperately heavy teaching load, Popper managed to finish two of his most important books, *The Poverty of Historicism* and *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, the latter of which contains extensive—if highly critical—explorations in the philosophy of Hegel and Marx. Just as significant, however, was the presence of Continental philosophy in Popper's teaching. As biographer Malachi Hacohen notes, Popper's main interest in the period between 1939 and 1945 was social philosophy, and this was reflected in his syllabi which included classes on the dialectical philosophy of Hegel and Marx (Hacohen 2000, pp. 369–398).

While not generally regarded as a Continental philosopher himself, Popper bequeathed to New Zealand one of its most celebrated, in the form of historian Peter Munz. The German-Jewish Munz family had fled from Nazi persecution first to Tuscany in 1933 and then in 1940 to Christchurch. Peter, already possessed of a formidable education in the liberal German tradition, studied history and German at Canterbury University College, submitting an MA thesis on the philosophy of history (Oliver 1996, pp. 28–37).[39] Through his study of German, Munz encountered Popper (thus cementing his lifelong respect for Hegel). The older man reportedly played the role of a father figure, inviting Munz to his home every Saturday, warning him about sex, and doling out relationship advice (Hacohen 2000, p. 391). After the war, Munz departed for Cambridge, where he renewed his contact with Popper (now in London) and became acquainted with Wittgenstein and Russell. After submitting a doctorate on Richard Hooker, under the supervision of David Knowles, Munz took up an appointment at Victoria University College in 1949, where he would remain for nearly 40 years. As this biographical sketch might suggest, Munz's work is a highly idiosyncratic blend of analytic and Continental traditions. Articles published in the local journal *Landfall* in 1949 and 1951 (on Proust and the philosophy of history, respectively) indicate strong early interests in Bergson, Whitehead, and Marx; reviews of Teilhard de Chardin's *The Phenomenon of Man* in 1960 and Barrett's *Irrational Man* in 1962 point to Munz's growing interest in existentialism; and later essays on Rorty and postmodernism evidence his engagement with critical theory and poststructuralism.[40] A further testament to the diversity of Munz's philosophical interests is his critique of structuralism, *When the Golden Bough Breaks*, published in 1973. Of Munz's many books, *The Shapes of Time* (1977), *Philosophical Darwinism* (1993), and *The Critique of Impure Reason* (1999) stand out for their engagement with Continental thinkers from Hegel to Heidegger and Derrida.

---

[39] Oliver recalls that Munz was 'never *quite* at ease with people who did not come to know Goethe in German and Dante in Italian at an early age' (1996, p. 31). More significantly here, Munz's early education seems to have included extensive training in the philosophies of Kant and Hegel.

The Auckland Department

After Findlay's departure, Auckland became the focal point for Continental philosophy. A Chair in philosophy at Auckland University College was established in 1920 and occupied by William Anderson (brother of University of Sydney philosopher John Anderson) from 1921 until his death in 1955. Anderson—as Charles Pigden describes him, 'an adherent of idealism which he continued to maintain long after it had died out everywhere else' (2011, p. 178)—appears to have been an uninspiring lecturer and thinker, as well as an outspoken opponent of 'Beebyist' educational reform (Sinclair 1993, p. 182). Significant during Anderson's reign, however, was the arrival in 1947 of Kazimierz Bernard Pflaum, a Polish Jew and follower of the Latvian existentialist Nicolai Hartmann (who had been Heidegger's predecessor at Marburg). Pflaum's teaching engaged a range of Continental traditions, in particular idealism and existentialism, although in his career he published little. In a series of radio lectures given in 1951 for the New Zealand Broadcasting Service, Pflaum defended what would now be called 'Continental philosophy' against positivism and scientism. 'Traditional philosophy', he declared, 'is being eviscerated on the altar of tough logic and doubtful psychology; genuine problems are being ridiculed and banished to the limbo of nonsense; honest attempts to solve perennial difficulties are being discredited as flimsy speculations and fanciful conjectures' (Pflaum 1951, p. 5).[41] He argued for philosophy as the creation of a scale of values that would allow man to know and understand himself, a philosophy that responds to 'the wider issues confronting mankind—mankind that hebetates under the spell of industrial achievements' (Pflaum 1951, pp. 5–8).

---

[40] See Munz 1949, 1951, 1960, 1962, 1987, 1992. These are, of course, only a fraction of Munz's enormous record of publications, intended to indicate the range and depth of his engagement with Continental philosophy. A full bibliography can be found in Justin Cargill's 'Bibliography of the Writings of Peter Munz' (in Fairburn and Oliver 1996, pp. 352–365).

After Anderson's death on the eve of his retirement in 1955, the much-loved lecturer Richard P. Anschutz—known to his friends as 'Dick'—took the Chair. We will address Anschutz's importance for continental philosophy *outside* the philosophy department below, but in his short time at the helm his greatest contribution was his ability to attract (if not always to retain) excellent scholars. The years 1956–1958 also saw a short stay by Melbourne phenomenologist Max Charlesworth—according to David Rathbone, the first Australian philosopher to apply the label 'Continental' to his work as an ideological (rather than simply geographical) designation (Rathbone 2010, p. 360). More significantly, Anschutz presided over the appointment of Clive Pearson, a philosopher of religion from Queensland, well-schooled in the existentialist theologies of Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Pearson, whose pupils included local cultural theorists Alex Calder and Laurence Simmons, as well as philosophers Jeff Malpas (now Professor at the University of Tasmania) and Carl Page (St. John's College), is remembered as a particularly inspiring teacher, often forbidding note-taking (essential points would be dictated at the end of class) to encourage students to think and formulate opinions through considered debate. Although neither published anything of significance throughout their careers, as lecturers Pearson and Pflaum (the latter retiring in 1979, the former in 1985) would introduce a generation of New Zealand intellectuals to the tradition of Continental thought.

In 1964, Raymond Bradley took over the Chair, following appointments at New South Wales and Oxford's Merton College, and initiated a process of 'modernisation' that would be continued by his successor, Hugh Montgomery. It was Bradley who in 1968 arranged the first visiting appointment of Robert Solomon, who had recently gained his doctorate at the University of Michigan. Solomon, an acclaimed teacher and specialist in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Continental philosophy (in particular Hegel, Nietzsche, and Sartre), would become a regular visitor to the department until his untimely death in 2007 (becoming an essential part of the program in Continental philosophy that emerged in the 1990s). Also significant was the return in 1969 of Robert Nola from the Australian National University. While not himself a Continental philosopher, Nola nonetheless possesses a substantial record of publications on Continental thinkers and topics, predominantly in the form of critique. Nola, always a man of the left, had studied Marx's philosophy of historical materialism in depth. During the 1970s he taught courses and published a number of articles on Marx, often in defence of historical materialism against the Popperian critique.[42] Nola's work in the philosophy of science led him to Thomas Kuhn and then to Gaston Bachelard and Michel Foucault. On Foucault he published a number of articles and in 1998 edited a collection of critical writings (Nola 1998).[43] A third great Continental interest was Nietzsche, whose theory of truth seems to have been very important, if only in a negative fashion, in Nola's own work on truth in science and religion (see Nola 1987, pp. 525–562).

---

[41] In fact, Pflaum seems to resist the divide between analytic and Continental philosophy and reserves his harshest criticism for the branch of positivism that alleges an insoluble antinomy between philosophy and science (1951, p. 7). 'There is nothing less philosophical', he argues, 'than pigeon-holing philosophers into "isms" and pressing them into party-lines. The "isms" are so flexible and contain so many varieties that it is almost impossible to determine rigidly their boundaries' (1951, p. 9).

After Montgomery's death in 1979, the Auckland department came under the directorship of well-known Swedish logician, Krister Segerberg. Segerberg's sense of philosophical education belonged to a more European tradition for which the legacy of thinkers like *les trois H* (Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger) could not be ignored, and he brought with him not only an ethos of research but also a new pluralistic attitude to the presence of Continental philosophy in the department. Indeed, Segerberg may have played some small part in the otherwise *sui generis* transformation of Julian Young from a promising young philosopher in the analytic tradition into perhaps New Zealand's most celebrated Continental philosopher. When Young, a graduate of Cambridge, Wayne State, and the University of Pittsburgh, joined the department in 1972, he was publishing articles on Sellars, Quine, and the theory of intentionality. Through his study of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, however, he discovered the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, and with Segerberg's encouragement this fledgling interest in the great German pessimist matured into Young's first book, *Willing and Unwilling: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer* (1987).[44] Next, he applied himself to Nietzsche, leading to the publication in 1992 of *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art*.[45] However, until the recent arrival of his acclaimed *Friedrich Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography* (2010), Young was perhaps best known as a specialist on the philosophy of Heidegger, whose *Holzwege* he translated (with Kenneth Haynes) (Heidegger 2002), and on whom he has published three books (1997, 2001, 2002). With *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism*, which appeared in 1997 at the height of the so-called Heidegger Affair, Young secured international renown as an advocate for the reading and critical discussion of Heideggerian philosophy, against its polemical characterisation as inevitably leading to Nazism.[46] In 2003, after a long battle with cancer, Young also published a moving meditation on the meaning of life and the problem of nihilism which, as well as developing further his philosophical positions with respect to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, saw him engage with Hegel and Marx, the existentialists Sartre and Camus, and postmodern philosophers Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault (2003).

---

[42] Nola indicates the close proximity of his own views at the time to Gerald Cohen's 1978 classic of analytic Marxism, *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence*. Nola's publication record on Marx is not, of course, limited to the 1970s; many more articles appeared through the 1980s and 1990s, recording his steadily growing disillusionment with orthodox Marxism, not to mention his constant opposition to the Althusserian strand of Marxism.

[43] The general tenor of Nola's position on Foucault, and postmodernism more generally, is summed up by the title of a 1994 essay: 'Postmodernism, a French Cultural Chernobyl: Foucault on Power/Knowledge'.

[44] In the 1980s, Young also published a series of articles on Schopenhauer in relation to Wittgenstein and Kant.

[45] This book has since been reprinted four times and translated into Iranian. In addition to numerous journal articles and chapters in collections, Young published a second book on Nietzsche's philosophy of religion in 2006.

John Bishop, Segerberg's successor, recalls a departmental gathering held in May of 1990 at an Ayurvedic retreat in West Auckland. In the picturesque surrounds of the Waitakere Ranges, Auckland's finest philosophers, tranquil and barefoot, discussed the possibility of establishing New Zealand's first teaching program in Continental philosophy. The decision was finalised over a Chinese meal later that night. The program was to provide a solid grounding in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Continental thought but at the same time to preserve the virtues of the Anglo-American tradition (clear writing and logical argumentation) against the perceived obscurantism of many postmodern thinkers. In 1995, after some years of flying in temporary staff (including Ivan Soll and John Atwell) to teach twentieth-century French philosophy, Julian Young (under whose direction the program was taking shape) flew to the United States to interview candidates for a permanent lecturing position in French philosophy. The person appointed to the role was Robert Wicks, a specialist in nineteenth-century philosophy who was then at the University of Wisconsin and who had been a student of Donald Crawford, William H. Hay, and Ivan Soll (the latter being one of Walter Kaufmann's students). In his time at Auckland, Wicks has published extensively on Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, as well as twentieth-century French philosophy, Buddhist thought, and aesthetics, and is now internationally regarded as an expert in the field of Schopenhauer studies. Along with the frequent visits of Robert Solomon and his Texas colleague (and wife) Kathleen Higgins, the teaching combination of Young and Wicks made Auckland the first—and to this day, the only—place in New Zealand where students of philosophy could acquire a broad education in Continental philosophy. Since the program's inception in the early 1990s, several other scholars have contributed to its prestige as a pedagogical and research institution: Stefano Franchi, a specialist in twentieth-century Continental philosophy (now at Texas A&M), and Lisa Guenther, a scholar working at the intersection of phenomenology and feminism (now at Vanderbilt University). Franchi's position was filled in 2007 by Matheson Russell, author of a book on Husserlian phenomenology (2006) and articles on Heidegger, Habermas, Merleau-Ponty, and Rowan Williams.

Following a pattern observed through the English-speaking world, however, Continental philosophy in New Zealand has over the course of the twentieth century found itself much more at home outside philosophy departments than inside. (And we refer here not only to 'Continental philosophy' in the sense of a philosophically informed creative and critical writing but also to the production of texts that ‘qualify’ as properly philosophical—despite, or perhaps precisely because of, their attempts to place in question the inscription of such limits.) In what follows, we survey three interweaving traditions that have thrived primarily outside the philosophy departments of New Zealand’s universities: existentialism, Marxism, and poststructuralism.

---

[46] On the Heidegger Affair, precipitated by revelations of Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, see Farias (1987).

Man Alone: Existentialist Philosophy in New Zealand Literature and Theology

After the Second World War, the philosophy of existentialism—all the rage in Europe—slowly began to filter into New Zealand. The first existentialist text to appear in *The Official Bulletin of the New Zealand Library Association* was a translation of Sartre’s *Intimacy and Other Stories*, acquired in March 1950, followed by *Iron in the Soul* in November of that year and *The Chips are Down* in November 1951 (Benson 2004, pp. 18–27). Perhaps a result of that great theme of New Zealand literature, the ‘Man Alone’ (‘the solitary, rootless nonconformist, who in a variety of forms crops up persistently in New Zealand writing’ (McCormick 1959, p. 130)), literary and intellectual circles experienced a great vogue for existentialism in the postwar period (albeit chiefly as a *literary* rather than strictly *philosophical* phenomenon). Writings influenced by existentialist thought—in particular Sartre and Camus—are too diffuse and varied through the period to even attempt to summarise. However, from a more narrowly philosophical perspective, two journals are particularly worthy of note: *Arachne* and *Landfall*.

The literary magazine *Arachne* ran for three issues between 1950 and 1951. James Bertram, writing in 1954, described the general tenor of the magazine as typical of

> the common post-war distrust of political solutions and collectivist methods; of a preference for private symbolism and a predilection for philosophical anarchism; more simply of a return to Art for Art’s Sake. All this, of course, with a dash of Existentialism and a strange tenderness for the significant figure of The Outsider. (Bertram 1985, p. 62)

Arachne’s editor, poet, and historian Hubert Witheford, outlined in issue 2 the ‘Background to a Magazine’, offering a *raison d’être* strongly marked by existentialist themes: ‘[t]he condition which *Arachne* is committed to explore is, from the side of the individual, his isolation—from that of the community, its disintegration’ (Witheford 1951, p. 21). Citing Kierkegaard and Buber, Witheford presents the task of his little magazine as the discovery of a ‘new ethic, or more precisely, a new view of the world that may be the basis of an ethic’ (1951, p. 22). Presumably as first forays into the new worldview, the first issue of *Arachne* included Camus’ *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* in a bootleg translation by anthropologist Erik Schwimmer (a Dutch *émigré* who would later publish a great many significant works on Maori society) and a longer essay ‘Concerning Sartre’ by theologian and philosopher Helmut Rex (1950), who would become arguably the single most important figure in the dissemination of Continental philosophy in New Zealand in the postwar period.[47]

A pastor in the Confessing Church in Germany, Helmut Rex (born Helmut Herbert Rehbein)[48] fled just prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. He found work as a tutor and then as a lecturer at Knox Theological College in Dunedin from 1940 until 1963. Through his inspiring lectures and conversations with students and colleagues, he introduced two generations of students to the masters of Continental thought—Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Bultmann, Barth, and Sartre—developing in the process his own blend of Christianity and existentialism, reflective of the condition of a European intellectual struggling to acquaint himself with exilic life in New Zealand. According to David Clark, author of a doctoral dissertation on Rex, the phrase 'our interests and Christ' might serve as a formula for Rex's philosophical standpoint, reflecting Rex's insistence that thinking must begin with the human condition (for the purposes of this essay, we might say its *local* condition) before turning to philosophy and theology to answer its many questions (Clark 2003, pp. 16–27). And this path of thinking, for Rex, is best traversed using the resources of existentialism.

Rex published two further articles on existentialism in the new publication *Landfall*—founded by Charles Brasch in 1947 and today New Zealand's longest-running and most prestigious literary and cultural journal. The first of these, 'In Defence of the Individual' (1949), is a transcription of Rex's inaugural lecture at Dunedin's Knox Theological Hall in March 1949, which focuses on the proto-existentialism of Søren Kierkegaard in the context of broader philosophical debates about the relative merits of individualism versus collectivism. Considering the philosophical contributions of Marx, Hegel, and Kierkegaard, as well as the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, it offers a qualified defence of the individual, aiming at a reconciliation between the two poles in the claim that 'the individual crystallises into individuality most effectively in the moral sphere' (Rex 1949, p. 123).[49] The second essay, which appeared in *Landfall* in 1951, addresses itself to the question of 'Existentialist Freedom', suggesting a kind of synthesis between the positions elaborated in the earlier *Arachne* and *Landfall* articles.[50] Both essays reflect the abiding theme of Rex's intellectual life: the problem of individuality. In 1961, Rex returned to this theme once again in a public lecture on Dostoevsky. Beginning with the question 'What is man?' and assuming the unacceptability of the 'traditional answers' (a rational animal, or the image of God), the lecture embarks upon a nuanced reading of Dostoevsky's contribution to this problem, specifically concerning man's freedom. The ensuing analysis of Dostoevsky's works is at the same time a meditation on the importance of the individual for Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger (Rex 1980). In Rex's attention to the irresolvable tension between the individual and the collective, one is tempted to see once again the 'reflect[ion] of the inner life of an alien in a foreign land' (Clark 2003, p. 24).

---

[47] The critical position towards Sartre taken up in Rex's essay, which is in other respects fairly conventional and indebted to Gabriel Marcel's *The Philosophy of Existence*, is noteworthy for its awareness of the implications for philosophy of *place*:

> All philosophies have what Gunkel called their 'seat in life'; if you can discover this seat a flood of new light falls on their purely verbal formulations. In other words, philosophers are always tempted to generalise from some concrete situation of limited applicability to universality… [For Sartre] it is the café. The crowded terrace of a café provides ample opportunity for looking around. Since you have not much else to do you pass your time in looking at the others who frequent the café and in 'summing them up'. Of course, you are not the only one who plays this game; the others are similarly occupied. This naturally makes you somewhat self-conscious. You start to act. You try to be what your consciousness tells you are not. This is a precarious situation, for the next moment somebody may look at you and sum you up. And that is the end of you, at least for the moment. Of course, you do not know exactly what label the other has put on you, but this makes the situation all the worse. On the other hand, you can always retaliate by defiantly looking at the other and summing him up in turn… Now, it is Sartre's contention that life is just like this. (Rex 1950, p. 20).

[48] Having gradually fallen in love with their new country since their arrival in 1939, Helmut and his wife Renate changed their surname to 'Rex' in 1946, as part of their commitment to becoming New Zealanders.

After a brief return to Germany for doctoral study at Tübingen in 1953 and 1954,[51] Rex instituted a course on philosophical hermeneutics at Knox Theological Hall. His cyclostyled notes for this class, entitled *Hermeneutics: An Introduction*, were published in hand-bound foolscap form in 1958. The book, which draws heavily on Heidegger and Bultmann, was used for some years after Rex's death as a textbook in hermeneutics classes at Knox. But, in his final years, Rex devoted his teaching and writing to eschatology and the philosophy of history, leading to the posthumous publication of his only book, *Did Jesus Rise from the Dead*? (1967). In 1967, Helmut Rex died; his wife Renate committed suicide a year later.

Rex's intellectual legacy has been carried forward in New Zealand not only by his many distinguished students from the 1940s and 1950s (including theologian Lloyd Geering and historian William Hewat 'Hew' McLeod) but also by intellectual descendants such as the current Head of Otago's Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Murray Rae, author of *History and Hermeneutics* (2005) and *Kierkegaard and Theology* (2010).

---

[49] The article draws upon the 1948 thesis that Rex had completed under the supervision of Findlay and Raphael during his early teaching years: 'The Individual in Søren Kierkegaard's Aesthetical Writings' (unpublished MA thesis, Department of Philosophy, University of Otago).

[50] If further evidence was needed of the popular appeal of existentialist philosophy, in this period Rex also gave two lectures on national radio on the subject. The first, simply entitled 'Existentialism', was broadcast on 4YC on 2 May 1951; the second, 'An Introduction to Existentialism on the Basis of J-P. Sartre's Tetralogy "Roads to Freedom"', was broadcast on 6 July that same year, as part of a series on 'Six Modern Creeds'.

[51] Helmut Rex, 'Das ethische Problem in der eschatologischen Existenz bei Paulus', unpublished DTheol thesis, Tübingen: Eberhard-Karls-Universität, 1954.

Marxist Theory in *Phoenix, Tomorrow*, and the *Red Papers for New Zealand*

The philosopher Dick Anschutz was a man deeply interested in the contemporary philosophy of art, and in the 1930s he ran an 'Aesthetic Club' from his own home in Auckland. The club included among its members Robert Lowry, James Bertram, and J.A.W. Bennett, who together represent the founding figures behind the *Phoenix*, a pioneering New Zealand literary magazine. The magazine, which ran from 1932 to 1933, was intended to 'redeem the times' through a 'prophetic' form of literary critique which aimed to stimulate an emancipatory self-consciousness in New Zealand society (Smithies 2008, p. 91). The *Phoenix* group positioned itself in explicit opposition to the aesthetic flights of fancy on the part of 'late colonial writers imbued with a Georgian method and a romantic cast of mind, easily captured by archaism, be it Maori, Ossianic or Celtic in origin' (Smithies 2008, p. 91). Instead, they offered a strain of modernist social realism intended to present New Zealand with a true reflection of itself. From the outset, the theoretical efforts of the *Phoenix* were animated by an uneasy alliance of radical left politics and aesthetic modernism (a mixture not uncharacteristic of local avant-gardism in the 1930s).[52] But the magazine's political and theoretical aspirations were further heightened when poet and communist radical R.A.K. Mason took over the editorship of *Phoenix* from Bertram in 1933. As Jean Alison remembers, Mason 'at the first committee meeting of *Phoenix*... made it clear that our former literary gods were "out"—D.H. Lawrence, T.S. Eliot, Middleton Murry, and Katherine Mansfield... The new hero was another K.M.—Karl Marx; and capitalism and the bourgeoisie were the enemy' (Alison 1971, pp. 227–228). The brevity and dogmatic politics of many articles under Mason do not vitiate their interest as early works of Continental philosophy in New Zealand. The first issue of 1933 saw J.W. Prince expound on 'Art in the World Crisis', engaging with the Marxian theorisation of art as 'a definite superstructure upon the mutual relations between men engaged in productive processes' (Prince 1933, pp. 14–16).[53] In the same issue, under the pseudonym 'Group A', Clifton Firth and Mason himself addressed the nature of 'Free Man', attempting to reconcile philosophically the insights of Marx et al. (1933, pp. 38–43). *Phoenix* came to an end after 1933, but the mantle of left-wing political philosophy was picked up by the new publication *Tomorrow* (founded in 1934), which, as Rachel Barrowman has observed, 'was the principal forum in New Zealand for the discussion of issues and international developments of left-wing culture in the 1930s' (1991, p. 27).[54]

---

[52] Anschutz himself had been involved in a controversy in 1932 occasioned by a foreword he had written to H.J. Scott's *A New Zealand Woman in Russia*, in which he expressed qualified praise for communism in the Soviet Union. The situation was exacerbated by the public support Anschutz had given to Auckland's Progressive Publishing Society, a local supplier of works in Marxist philosophy and political economy. See Sinclair (1993, p. 151) and Barrowman (1991, p. 91).

[53] 'A cultural revolution is in being', Prince opines, 'which will be of long duration but will nevertheless be all-embracing—from the method man brings to bear to wring from nature sustenance, to the setting up of academies of fine arts' (1933, pp. 15–16).

The political philosophy of Marx inspired a great deal of intellectual production again in the 1960s and 1970s. Scholarly interest in Marx as a *philosopher* (political commentators having generally viewed Marx's early efforts in dialectical philosophy as youthful flights of fancy, left behind by the mature scientist of the social) had been revived internationally by the discovery and publication in 1932 of the 1844 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* and by the compilation and publication of the *Grundrisse* in 1953. Perhaps the most famous interpreter of the rediscovered Marx was Louis Althusser, a member of the French Communist Party since 1948 and Professor of Philosophy at the Ecole Normale Superièure in Paris. A crucial dimension of Althusser's project, as Ali Rattansi notes, was 'the establishment of a genuine Marxist philosophy, a desire that should be appreciated in relation to the poverty of the Marxist philosophical tradition' (Rattansi 1989, p. 6). In New Zealand, Althusser's theoretical Marxism, as well as (roughly contemporary) parallel moves to philosophically recuperate Marx on the part of the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkheimer, Habermas) and Antonio Gramsci, inspired a generation of scholars to develop analyses of the local situation that went beyond the sterile doctrines of their predecessors. At the same time, the events of May 1968 and subsequently the Vietnam War politicised a new generation of young New Zealand intellectuals, leading them back to Marx as a touchstone for theorising the contemporary situation.

The leading figures of New Zealand's own 'New Left' were Auckland sociologist David Bedggood and the brilliant theoretician Owen Gager, who in 1962 had written an MA thesis in the history department on the New Zealand Labour Movement from 1914 to 1918.[55] In addition, an Auckland reading group created around the *Grundrisse* in the mid-1970s drew leftist academics like moths to a flame—its disparate membership including Robert Nola of philosophy, Walter Pollard of the French department (a New Zealander who had studied for his PhD in France and a leading anti-Vietnam activist), John Macrae, and Michael Stenson, a left-Labourite who tragically died in Burma late in 1977. At the same time, a conference in Marxian political economy met annually from 1978 to 1980, attracting a range of left-wing intellectuals (most non-Marxists) including feminist Sandra Coney, Donna Awatere-Huata (author of *Maori Sovereignty*), and nationalist Bruce Jesson.

---

[54] More directly political than *Phoenix*, the most philosophically interesting aspect of *Tomorrow* was Winston Rhodes' regular column, in which he discussed a wide range of subjects including New Zealand culture and politics, Victorian and modernist literature, cinema, and political and cultural philosophy. Barrowman notes that Rhodes' own philosophical standpoint, consistent across his diverse range of subjects, is best described as a 'humanist Marxism' (1991, p. 28).

[55] As a very young man, Gager also published a number of works of political analysis in the journals *Comment* and *Dispute* and in the early 1970s had been involved with the short-lived *Spartacist Spasmodical*, put out under the auspices of the Spartacist League at Victoria University.

From 1976 to 1979, the Marxist Publishing Group produced an influential journal, the *Red Papers for New Zealand*, in which the finest examples of this new movement in philosophical Marxism are to be found. Bedggood himself identifies *Red Papers* 3 as the high point of creative Marxist philosophy and a strong representative of the range of theoretical approaches existing at the time.[56] An article by the Wellington Writers Group (a collection of ex-Maoist students), entitled 'The Crisis of Social Relations', addresses the central importance of social relations for thinking about the economic crisis of the time, drawing on Lenin and the late Althusser. Rob Steven, a South African then teaching at Canterbury University, contributed notes 'Towards a Marxian Theory of "Terms of Trade" in New Zealand', displaying the influence of the World Systems Theory expounded by Immanuel Wallerstein. The centrepiece was by Bedggood and Macrae, a long essay entitled 'The Development of Capitalism in New Zealand: Towards a Marxist Analysis', which attempts a systematic adaptation of Marxian philosophy and political economy to the New Zealand context.[57]

Poststructuralism and the *And/Antic* Interruption

If Louis Althusser furnished local political theorists with a more sophisticated Marxism, more congenial to theorising New Zealand's 'semi-colonial' development, he was also an important predecessor for an intellectual tradition that Bedggood was later to denounce for its apparent anti-Marxism: postmodernism (Bedggood 1999). As always, this loose term crudely designates a range of diverse positions and practices. In New Zealand, its strongest associations probably reside in poetry, with the 'open form' style espoused (theoretically and practically) by the American poet Charles Olson. As a high point for philosophical postmodernism, however, we shall focus here on what literary critic Patrick Evans has recently called the '*And/Antic* interruption' (2007, pp. 22–25).

In 1983, *And* magazine was founded by two Auckland University English graduates, Alex Calder, at the time working on a PhD on Lowell and the long poem, and Leigh Davis, who had managed to convert a Marxist dissertation on Allen Curnow into a job at the Treasury. The cover of the first issue featured a still from the Western movie *The Man from God's Country* (two cowboys, guns at the ready) with the words 'Ready—Coming In' stencilled over the top, announcing the arrival of poststructuralist theory in New Zealand. While its participants were clear that it was specifically *poststructuralism*, they were importing (rather than postmodernism per se), as James Smithies notes 'this distinction fell on deaf ears: it appeared to be French' (Smithies 2008, p. 100).

---

[56] Personal communication, 23 November 2010.

[57] Many older Marxists had uncritically adopted Marx's rudimentary work on colonisation, assuming that the 'systematic' settlement of Wakefield had transformed New Zealand into a homogeneous capitalist country, thus ending the 'feudal' mode of production practised by the Maori. Bedggood, Gager, and others managed to produce more nuanced accounts of the 'Polynesian mode of production', a blend of capitalist and pre-capitalist elements that existed in relation to islands of capitalist hegemony created *à la* Wakefield.

And began with a statement of intent from Davis, embracing the 'littleness' of the magazine and its audience: unlike earlier 'marginal' publications like *The Word is Freed* and Alan Loney's *Parallax*, *And* had no desire to colonise the centre; rather, it was opposed to cultural hierarchy as such. 'The design of *And* in this context', Davis writes, 'is to contribute to various NZ literatures mild forms of sabotage and re-examination. Our audience is therefore factional in part, or is willing to think of factionalism as a positive' (Davis 1983, p. 1). In its short lifespan, *And* published numerous articles of literary criticism and theory, informed by Barthes, Derrida, Kristeva, Lacan, and Foucault. Roger Horrocks and Davis published highly theoretical work—Davis's 'Public Policy' (a Lacanian critique of the nostalgic residues in his *Freed* predecessor's Ian Wedde's *Georgicon*) and Horrocks's 'The Invention of New Zealand' (an examination of cultural nationalism in Allen Curnow and his 'reality gang') are standouts. Alex Calder, now a senior lecturer in the Auckland English department, portrayed (in Evans' words) 'a tradition of male poet-critics as seducers and penetrators of female landscape', and in his 'Set Up' to issue 2 elaborated the magazine's relationship to the 'theory of ideology' *pace* Althusser and Henri Lefebvre (Evans 2007, p. 23; Calder 1984).[58] Jonathan Lamb, a British-born theorist then teaching at Auckland (now at Vanderbilt), published a number of articles engaging Barthes, Freud, Derrida, Cixous, and René Girard (1985, pp. 32–45); and, in issue 4, Warwick Slinn provided a theoretical defence of deconstruction in literature, philosophy and politics (1985, pp. 65–72).

And's first issue, moreover, featured one of the magazine's most significant works of theory: Simon During's 'Towards a Revision of Local Critical Habits' (1983, pp. 75–92). In this essay, During (who has since held professorial appointments at Melbourne and Johns Hopkins, is now a fellow in the Centre for the History of European Discourses in Queensland, and has edited a number of important volumes on cultural studies and literary theory) argues for the practice of 'overreading', which names a confrontation with the 'social context and political effects of literature' (During 1983, p. 76).[59] During's pronouncement of the need for a theoretical approach attentive to the vicissitudes of the local situation, and of the need not to be afraid of the distance between Auckland and New York, holds also for this chapter on the history of Continental philosophy in Australasia:

---

[58] For instance, 'We have seen, for example, how an analysis of what can and cannot be said within the style of expressive poetry places that style within existing patterns of cultural dominance. The language centred text, on the other hand, is coded differently. This style is predicated on theories of reading and subjectivity which place it outside and in opposition to current patterns of cultural hegemony. As a language centred text, *And* takes it as axiomatic that textuality is never confined between two covers. *And* can read everywhere, and culture is its favourite, "unputdownable" text' (Calder 1984, pp. 7–8).

[59] During models the practice of 'overreading' through an examination of Frank Sargeson's short story 'The Hole that Jack Dug'. His reading of the story, however, broke an unspoken rule of discretion by identifying a homoerotic subtext to Sargeson's work (the author's homosexuality being at the time an open secret in New Zealand literary circles), thus further provoking the intellectual establishment's resistance to *And*.

> For, as we have seen, post-colonial culture operates in the tension between the desire for a self-image and an equally strong recognition that the self-image is always the image of a split self, and, more problematically still, an image formed partly in someone else's terms—the terms of international and world-historical modes. (During 1983, p. 92)

As Smithies has cogently observed, despite its overturning of the cultural hegemony of a tradition dominated by Pakeha males, '*And* did not produce a single significant female, Maori or Pacific Island literary critical essay' (Smithies 2008, p. 103).[60] By contrast, the magazine *Antic*, founded in 1986, was edited by a feminist collective consisting of Susan Davis, Elizabeth Eastmond, Priscilla Pitts, and, from issue 4, Tina Barton. Featuring both male and female contributors (many familiar from the pages of *And*), *Antic* developed the insights of poststructuralism with specific attention to questions of gender, producing the first fully theorised feminist readings of New Zealand culture. Many of the authors who first found an outlet in these little magazines, such as Sarah Shieff, Linda Hardy, and Nick Perry, remain at the forefront of local cultural theory today. Laurence Simmons, guest editor of one issue of *Antic* and author of some deeply philosophical essays on New Zealand art, is now an Associate Professor in the Department of Film, Television and Media Studies at the University of Auckland (which he co-founded in 1992). Alongside an extensive record of publications in Continental philosophy and cultural theory, Simmons has also recently organised the visits of a number of distinguished contemporary Continental philosophers to New Zealand: in 1999, Jacques Derrida; Jean Baudrillard, and Slavoj Žižek in 2001; and in 2005, cultural theorist Fredric Jameson.[61]

Conclusion

Mirroring developments in New Zealand, the generation of Australian philosophers who came to maturity during and after the 'split' between Continental and Anglo-analytic philosophy during the 1970s and 1980s specialised more in French poststructuralism than other styles of Continental theory. Post-Marxist strains of contemporary German philosophy and critical theory (recent work in phenomenology, Frankfurt school social philosophy, along with sociologically oriented readings of Habermas and Honneth) competed with French poststructuralism during this period (from the early 1990s to the early 2000s) but never quite garnered the same kind of devoted following among students and researchers. Nonetheless, during the 1990s Australian Continental philosophy became divided within itself into 'French' and 'German' schools, with distinctive, often conflicting views of philosophy and often concentrated in particular departments (with the exception of General Philosophy at Sydney, which represented both French and German strands, often at variance with one another).[62] Much like the analytic/Continental divide, here was a split that reflected an internal division, one which was sometimes represented as a clash between philosophy and its other, as though Habermasians and Derridians, or Heideggerians and Deleuzians could have little common ground for meaningful debate.

---

[60] *And* did publish, however, a great deal of literary work by women writers, including Janet Charman, Dawn Danby, Anne Maxwell, Susan Davis, Elizabeth Eastmond, Margaret Meyer, Charlotte Wright, Judi Stout, Riemke Ensing, and Marina Bachmann.

[61] Among Simmons' own publications, we list only a few recent works that are more 'philosophical' (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009).

For these reasons, perhaps, the younger generation of philosophers in both Australia and New Zealand (those who completed their postgraduate studies in the mid- or late 1990s and early 2000s) represent a new way of approaching the 'divide'. Indeed, the recent flourishing of work in Continental philosophy, paradoxically enough, might be best described as 'post-Continental philosophy' (having traversed contemporary Continental philosophy during the height of the 'Culture Wars', and developed new ways 'bridging the divide' as a consequence). The older divisions between 'French' and 'German' schools have largely broken down, and ideas from the 'canon' of Continental thinkers (Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, and so on) are freely combined with Anglo-American approaches or are brought to bear on contemporary issues or debates, often with a local inflection (in ethics, culture, aesthetics, and politics). To be sure, there is still a difference between Continental (or post-Continental) approaches and 'mainstream' Anglophone philosophy; but this difference is being used as a productive counterpoint, a way of opening up topics and debates to alternative ways of thinking, rather than as an isolated or self-referential discourse pursuing an esoteric agenda that remains somehow alien to the philosophical mainstream.

One of the most interesting developments in recent years has been the metaphilosophical exploration of the question: What is Continental Philosophy? The fact that this question is now being given serious philosophical consideration is a sure sign of the shift from Continental to post-Continental philosophy. Indeed, contemporary 'post-Continental' philosophers in Australia and New Zealand have increasingly ventured beyond single-author studies of the great European thinkers of the past in order to bring 'Continental' perspectives to bear on a range of contemporary philosophical debates, including meta-philosophy (Ferrell 2002; La Caze 2002; Reynolds and Chase 2010); history of philosophy (Lloyd 2002, Gatens 1999; Redding 2007, 2009); ethics, social, and political philosophy (Bignall 2010; Sharpe and Boucher 2010; Deutscher 2007; Diprose 2002; Deranty 2009; Fagenblat 2010; Faulkner 2011; Lloyd 2008; Mills 2008; Patton 2000, 2010; Bignall and Patton 2010); phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and deconstruction (Byers 2003; Christensen 2008; Deutscher 2003; Malpas 2006; Phillips 2005; Reynolds 2004, 2011); and aesthetics (Benjamin 2004, 2006; Falzon 2002; Phillips 2008; Ross 2007; Sinnerbrink 2011; Vardoulakis 2010). As with the earlier generation of Continental practitioners, the most original recent work has sought to 'bridge the divide' by showing how perspectives from Continental philosophy contribute actively to contemporary philosophical debates. Indeed, many post-Continental philosophers increasingly approach their work as though 'the divide' has been all but overcome, opening up new ways of thinking no longer fettered by institutional, ideological, or cultural prejudices. While still articulating a distinctive perspective, post-Continental philosophers have turned marginality into plurality, supplementarity into new ways of thinking.

---

[62] UNSW, UQ, Monash, and La Trobe have all remained 'French' in orientation; Macquarie moved between 'French' and 'German' perspectives during the 2000s, while the University of Tasmania, under the leadership of Jeff Malpas, became a German stronghold (emphasising Heidegger, Gadamer, and so on). Philosophers at the University of Sydney, UNSW, and Macquarie have also formed a 'Sydney Hegelian'/recognition theory group that has revived the tradition of interest in Hegel characteristic of early philosophy in Sydney. Melbourne has multiple informal groups, centred on the MSCP, studying philosophers such as Badiou, Agamben, and Žižek, as well as broader topics in contemporary environmental and political philosophy. Suffice to say that the 'French/German' divide characteristic of the 1990s has also begun to disappear, with increasing interest in philosophers who cross freely between Continental and Anglophone traditions.

Philosophy has many traditions and many voices, which often disagree strongly, particularly over fundamental questions concerning the meaning and manner of philosophical practice; yet these differences can also be the source of critical and creative debate, disciplinary renewal, and conceptual transformation. That this kind of conflict of interpretations over the meaning of philosophy can be productive is well demonstrated by the history of Continental philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. At the same time the relationship between Continental philosophy and mainstream Anglophone philosophy in Australasia has long involved a struggle for recognition, thwarted time and time again by misrecognition and misunderstanding. The destruction of the pluralism that marked the origins of philosophy in Australia and New Zealand doubtless generated a sense of exclusion or alienation among Continental philosophers, often expressed by a retreat into esoteric or inward-looking theorising that only exacerbated the institutionally entrenched divide separating them from 'mainstream' philosophical debates. Such a defensive response was hardly surprising given the hostility directed at times towards Continental philosophy, construed as the disreputable 'other' of philosophy proper rather than as an alternative voice within it. With the re-emergence of pluralist forms of philosophical engagement, however, and the exciting work now being done to cross the great divide, the time has come for Continental philosophers in Australasia to discard the demeaning role of 'tolerated' other and to work towards genuine recognition as equal partners in the philosophical conversation.

Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Esther Anatolitis, Max Deutscher, Rosalyn Diprose, Maurita Harney, Paul Patton, David Rathbone, Jon Roffe, Matthew Sharpe, Marion Tapper, and Mark A. Taylor for their invaluable help with the historical research conducted for this chapter.

References

Alison, J. (1971). R. A. K. Mason: Some tributes. *Landfall, 79*, 227–228.

Anderson, J. (1932). The place of Hegel in the history of philosophy. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, 10*, 81–91.

Barrowman, R. (1991). *A popular vision: The arts and the left in New Zealand 1930–1950*. Wellington: Victoria University Press.

Battersby, C., Constable, C., Jones, R., & Purdon, J. (Eds.). (2000). *Hypatia (Special Issue on Australian Feminist Philosophy), 15*(2), 1–230.

Bedggood, D. (1999). Saint Jacques: Derrida and the ghost of Marxism. *Cultural Logic*, *2* http://eserver.org/clogic/2-2/bedggood.html

Benjamin, A. (2004). *Disclosing spaces: On painting*. Manchester: Clinamen Press.

Benjamin, A. (2006). *Style and time: Essays on the politics of appearance*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Benson, D. (2004). Pop-existentialism in New Zealand. *Kōtare, 5*, 18–27.

Bertram, J. (1985). Literary periodicals at Victoria. In *Flight of the phoenix: Critical notes on New Zealand writers* (pp. 60–65). Wellington: Victoria University Press.

Bignall, S. (2010). *Postcolonial agency: Critique and constructivism*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Bignall, S., & Patton, P. (Eds.). (2010). *Deleuze and the postcolonial*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Bilimoria, P. (1997). Phenomenology in Australia. In L. Embree et al. (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of phenomenology* (pp. 39–43). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Boulous-Walker, M. (1998). *Philosophy and the maternal body: Reading silence*. London: Routledge.

Braidotti, R. (1994). *Nomadic subjects: Embodiment and sexual difference in contemporary feminist theory*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Browne, D. (2010). Canterbury, University Of. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 137–139). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Byers, D. (2003). *Transcendence and intentionality*. Seattle: University of Wisconsin Press.

Calder, A. (1984). Set up. *And, 2*, 5–8.

Charlesworth, M. (1975). *The existentialists and Jean-Paul Sartre*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Christensen, C. (2008). *From analytic philosophy to phenomenology*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Clark, D. (2003). *Our interests and Christ: The Christian existentialism of Helmut Rex* (PhD thesis). University of Otago.

Colebrook, C. (2010a). Grosz, Elizabeth. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 261–266). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Colebrook, C. (2010b). Hart, Kevin. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 267–270). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Critchley, S. (2000). *Continental philosophy: A very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crittenden, P. (2010). Critical philosophy journal. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 183–185). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Davies, M., & Helgeby, S. (2010). Idealism. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 274–276). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Davis, L. (1983). Set up. *And, 1*, 1–7.

Deleuze, G. (1994). *Difference and repetition* (trans: Patton P). New York: Columbia University Press.

Deranty, J.-P. (2009). *Beyond communication: A critical study of Axel Honneth's social philosophy*. Leiden: Brill.

Derrida, J. (1976). *Of Grammatology* (trans: Spivak G). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Deutscher, M. (1983). *Subjecting and objecting*. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.

Deutscher, P. (1997). *Yielding gender: Feminism, deconstruction and the history of philosophy*. London: Routledge.

Deutscher, M. (2003). *Genre and void: Looking back at Sartre and Beauvoir*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Deutscher, M. (2007). *Judgment after Arendt*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Deutscher, P. (2008). *The philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Deutscher, M. (2010). Philosophy of mind (continental). In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 516–523). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Diprose, R. (1994). *The bodies of women: Ethics, embodiment, and sexual difference*. London: Routledge.

Diprose, R. (2002). *Corporeal generosity: On giving with Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Diprose, R., & Ferrell, R. (Eds.). (1991). *Cartographies: Post-structuralism and the mapping of bodies and spaces*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

During, S. (1983). Towards a revision of local critical habits. *And, 1*, 75–92.

Evans, P. (2007). *The long forgetting: Post-colonial literary culture in New Zealand* (pp. 22–25). Christchurch: Canterbury University Press.

Fagenblat, M. (2010). *A covenant of creatures: Levinas' philosophy of Judaism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Falzon, C. (2002). *Philosophy goes to the movies*. London: Routledge.

Farias, V. (1987). *Heidegger and Nazism*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Faulkner, J. (2011). *The importance of being innocent: Why we worry about children*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

Ferrell, R. (1996). *Passion in theory: Conceptions of Freud and Lacan*. London: Routledge.

Ferrell, R. (2002). *Genres of philosophy*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Ferrell, R. (2006). *Copula: Sexual technologies, reproductive powers*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Findlay, J. (1985). My life. In R. Cohen, R. Martin, & M. Westphal (Eds.), *Studies in the philosophy of J. N. Findlay*. (pp. 1–51) Albany: State University of New York Press.

Foss, P., & Morris, M. (Eds.). (1978). *Language, sexuality and subversion*. Darlington: Feral Publications.

Franklin, J. (2003). *Corrupting the youth: A history of philosophy in Australia*. Sydney: Macleay Press.

Gatens, M. (1991). *Feminism and philosophy: Perspectives on difference and equality*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gatens, M. (1996). *Imaginary bodies: Ethics, power and corporeality*. London: Routledge.

Gatens, M., & Lloyd, G. (1999). *Collective imaginings: Spinoza, past and present*. London: Routledge.

Gaukroger, S. (1995). *Descartes: An intellectual biography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gibson, W.R.B (1906). *Rudolf Eucken's philosophy of life*. London: Adam & Charles Black.

Gibson, W.R.B (1909). *God with us: A study in religious idealism*. London: Adam & Charles Black.

Gibson, W.R.B (1925). The problem of the real and the ideal in the phenomenology of Husserl. *Mind, 34*, 311–333.

Gibson, W.R.B (1933–1934). The ethics of Nicolai Hartmann. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology*, 11(1)–12(1).

Gibson, A. (1948). Existentialism: An interim report. *Meanjin, 7*, 41–52.

Glendinning, S. (2006). *The idea of continental philosophy: A philosophical chronicle*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Grave, S. (1984). *A history of philosophy in Australia*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Grigg, R. (2010). Psychoanalysis and philosophy. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 581–585). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Grosz, E. (1989). *Sexual subversions: Three French feminists*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Grosz, E. (1990). *Jacques Lacan: A feminist introduction*. London: Routledge.

Grosz, E. (1994). *Volatile bodies: Toward a corporeal feminism*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Grosz, E. (1995). *Space, time, and perversion: Essays on the politics of bodies*. New York: Routledge.

Grosz, E. (2001). *Architecture from the outside: Essays on virtual and real space*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Grosz, E. (2004). *The nick of time: Politics, evolution, and the untimely*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Grosz, E. (2008). *Chaos, territory, art: Deleuze and the framing of the earth*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Grosz, E., Threadgold, T., & Kelly, D. (Eds.). (1986). *Futur*fall: Excursions into post-modernity*. Sydney: Power Institute of Fine Arts, University of Sydney.

Group, A. (1933). Free man. *Phoenix, 2*, 38–43.

Gunn, J. (1920). *Bergson and his philosophy*. London: Methuen.

Gunn, J. (1922). *Modern French philosophy*. London: Unwin.

Gunn, J. (1925). Great thinkers, II: Bergson. *Australian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, 3*, 277–286.

Gunn, J. (1929). *The problem of time: An historical and critical study*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Habermas, J. (1987). *The philosophical discourse of modernity* (trans: Lawrence F). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Hacohen, M. (2000). *Karl Popper: The formative years 1902–1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harney, M. (Ed.). (1977). Proceedings of the phenomenology conference, 1976. ANU Press: http://unimelb.academia.edu/MauritaHarney/Books/365901/_Proceedings_of_the_Phenomenology_Conference_Canberra_1976_

Harney, M. (1984). *Intentionality, sense and the mind*. Dordrecht: Martinus-Nijhoff.

Harney, M. (1992). The contemporary European tradition in Australian philosophy. In J. Srzednicki & D. Wood (Eds.), *Essays in philosophy in Australia* (pp. 121–151). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Harney, M. (2010). Existentialism. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 219–225). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Hegel, G. (1979). *Phenomenology of spirit* (trans: Miller A). London: Oxford University Press.

Heidegger, M. (2002). *Off the beaten track* (Ed. and trans: Young J, Haynes K). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hunt, I. (2010). Marxist philosophy. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 330–336). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Husserl, E. (1967). *Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology* (trans: Gibson W). London: Allen & Unwin.

Husserl, E. (1970). *Logical investigations* (2 Vols.; trans: Findlay J). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Kamenka, E. (1962). *The ethical foundations of Marxism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Kirby, V. (1997). *Telling flesh: The substance of the corporeal*. London: Routledge.

La Caze, M. (2002). *The analytic imaginary*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lamb, J. (1985). The uncanny in Auckland. *And, 4*, 32–45.

Laverty, M. (2010). Lloyd, Genevieve. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 312–314). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Levy, N. (2003). Analytic and continental philosophy: Explaining the differences. *Metaphilosophy, 34*, 284–304.

Lloyd, G. (1984). *The man of reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in western philosophy*. London: Methuen.

Lloyd, G. (2000). No-one's land: Australia and the philosophical imaginary. *Hypatia, 15*, 26–39.

Lloyd, G. (Ed.). (2002). *Feminism and history of philosophy: Oxford readings in feminism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lloyd, G. (2008). *Providence lost*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Macainsh, N. (1975). *Nietzsche in Australia: A literary inquiry into a nationalistic ideology*. Munich: Verlag fuer Dokumentation und Werbung.

Malpas, J. (2006). *Heidegger's topology: Being, place, world*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

McCormick, E. (1959). *New Zealand literature: A survey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miller, D. (2010). Existentialist discussion group and the existentialist society. In G. Oppy and N. Trakakis (Eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (pp. 225–227). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Mills, C. (2008). The philosophy of agamben. Acumen Publishing/McGill-Queens University Press.

Morris, M., & Patton, P. (Eds.). (1979). *Michel Foucault: Power, truth, strategy*. Sydney: Feral Publications.

Munz, P. (1949). Proust and philosophy. *Landfall, 3*, 334–352.

Munz, P. (1951). The use of history. *Landfall, 5*, 253–264.

Munz, P. (1960). Review of the phenomenon of man by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. *Comment, 1*, 30–32.

Munz, P. (1962). Reason, faith and existence. *Comment, 3*, 37–38.

Munz, P. (1973). *When the golden bough breaks: Structuralism or typology?* London: Routledge.

Munz, P. (1987). Philosophy and the mirror of Rorty. In G. Radnitzky & W. Bartley II (Eds.), *Evolutionary epistemology, rationality, and the sociology of knowledge* (pp. 345–398). La Salle: Open Court.

Munz, P. (1992). What's postmodern, anyway? *Philosophy and Literature, 16*, 333–353.

Nola, R. (1987). Nietzsche's theory of truth and belief. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47*, 525–562.

Nola, R. (1994). Postmodernism, a French cultural Chernobyl: Foucault on power/knowledge. *Inquiry, 37*, 3–43.

Nola, R. (Ed.). (1998). *Foucault*. Essex: Frank Cass Publishers.

Oliver, W. (1996). Petrus Contra Mundum. In M. Fairburn & W. Oliver (Eds.), *The certainty of doubt: Tributes to Peter Munz* (pp. 28–37). Wellington: Victoria University Press.

Oppy, G., Trakakis, N., Burns, L., Gardner, S., & Leigh, F. (Eds.). (2010). *A companion to philosophy in Australia*. Clayton: Monash University Press.

Passmore, J. (1936). Psychoanalysis and aesthetics. *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 14*, 127–144.

Passmore, J. (1957). *One hundred years of philosophy*. London: Duckworth.

Passmore, J. (1988). Same sky, different mind. *The Age Monthly Review, 8*, 51–58.

Passmore, J. (1992). Australian philosophy or philosophy in Australia? In J. Srzednicki & D. Wood (Eds.), *Essays on philosophy in Australia* (pp. 1–18). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Patton, P. (Ed.). (1993). *Nietzsche, feminism and political theory*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Patton, P. (2000). *Deleuze and the political*. London: Routledge.

Patton, P. (2010). *Deleuzian concepts: Philosophy, colonization, politics*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Patton, P., & Allen, J. (Eds.). (1983). *Beyond Marxism? Interventions after Marx*. Leichhardt: Intervention Publications.

Pflaum, K. (1951). *Philosophy today*: *Idealism*, *realism*, *logical positivism*, *existentialism*. Auckland University College Bulletin no.40 (Philosophy Series no. 1).

Phillips, J. (2005). *Heidegger's Volk: Between national socialism and poetry*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Phillips, J. (Ed.). (2008). *Cinematic thinking: Philosophical approaches to the new cinema*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Pigden, C. (2010). Otago, University Of. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 425–428). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Pigden, C. (2011). Getting the wrong Anderson? A short and opinionated history of New Zealand Philosophy. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *The Antipodean Philosopher: Vol. 1. Public lectures on philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 169–195). Lanham: Lexington Books.

Prince, J. (1933). Art in the world crisis. *Phoenix, 2*, 14–16.

Rathbone, D. (2010). Phenomenology. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 442–451). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Rattansi, A. (1989). Ideology, method and Marx: Contextualising a debate. In A. Rattansi (Ed.), *Ideology, method and Marx* (pp. 1–33). London: Routledge.

Redding, P. (1996). *Hegel's hermeneutics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Redding, P. (2007). *Analytic philosophy and the return of Hegelian thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Redding, P. (2009). *Continental idealism: Leibniz to Nietzsche*. London: Routledge.

Redding, P. (2010). German philosophy. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 256–261). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Rex, H. (1949). In defence of the individual. *Landfall, 3*, 111–123.

Rex, H. (1950). Concerning Sartre. *Arachne, 1*, 18–21.

Rex, H. (1967). *Did Jesus rise from the dead?* Auckland: Blackwood & Janet Paul.

Rex, H. (1980). Dostoevsky: God-man or man-God. In A. Moore & M. Andrew (Eds.), *A book of Helmut Rex: A selection of his writings with memoirs of his life and work* (pp. 198–220). Otago: University of Otago.

Reynolds, J. (2004). *Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: Intertwining embodiment and alterity*. Athens: Ohio University Press.

Reynolds, J. (2010). Poststructuralism. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 559–565). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Reynolds, J. (2011). *Chronopathologies: Time and politics in Deleuze, Derrida, analytic philosophy and phenomenology*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Reynolds, J., & Chase, J. (2010). *Postanalytic and metacontinental: Crossing philosophical divides*. London: Continuum.

Ross, A. (2007). *The aesthetic paths of philosophy: Presentation in Kant, Heidegger, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Ross, A. (2010). Aesthetics (continental). In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 31–37). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Rothfield, P. (2010). Postmodernism. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 554–559). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Russell, B. (1945). *A history of western philosophy*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Russell, M. (2006). *Husserl: A guide for the perplexed*. London: Continuum.

Sadler, T. (1995). *Nietzsche: Truth and redemption*. London: Athlone.

Sadler, T. (1996). *Heidegger and Aristotle: The question of being*. London: Athlone.

Sharpe, M. (2010). Melbourne school of continental philosophy. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 343–345). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Sharpe, M., & Boucher, G. (2010). *Žižek: A critical introduction*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Simmons, L. (2005). Heidegger and the Herringbone Cowshed. *Interstices: A Journal of Architecture and Related Arts, 6*, 20–35.

Simmons, L. (2006). Gilles Deleuze and Captain Bligh's map. In M. O'Meagher & R. Cicerchia (Eds.), *Tales of land and sea: Travel narratives of the trans-pacific south 1700–1900* (pp. 83–97). Unley: Australian Humanities Press.

Simmons, L. (2007). Shame, Levinas's dog, Derrida's cat (and some fish). In L. Simmons & P. Armstrong (Eds.), *Knowing animals* (pp. 27–42). Brill: Leiden.

Simmons, L. (2009). Towards a philosophy of the polyp. In S. McFarland & R. Hediger (Eds.), *Animals and agency* (pp. 343–371). Brill: Leiden.

Sinclair, K. (1993). *Halfway round the harbour: An autobiography*. Auckland: Penguin.

Sinnerbrink, R. (2010). French philosophy. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 242–248). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Sinnerbrink, R. (2011). *New philosophies of film: Thinking images*. London: Continuum.

Sinnerbrink, R., & Sharpe, M. (2010). The Australasian society for continental philosophy. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 92–94). Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Slinn, W. (1985). Dragons and giants: Some myths about deconstruction. *And, 4*, 65–72.

Small, R. (1974). *Martin Heidegger's account of the nature of man* (PhD dissertation). Australian National University.

Small, R. (2001a). *Nietzsche in context*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Small, R. (Ed.). (2001b). *One hundred years of phenomenology*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Small, R. (2010). *Time and becoming in Nietzsche's thought*. London: Continuum.

Smithies, J. (2008). Post-war New Zealand literary critique. *Thesis Eleven, 92*, 87–107.

Spiegelberg, H. (Ed.). (1971). From Husserl to Heidegger: Excerpts from a 1928 Freiburg diary by W. R. Boyce Gibson, edited by Herbert Spiegelberg. *The Journal for the British Society for Phenomenology, 2*, 58–81.

Stewart, J.M (1913). *A critical exposition of Bergson's philosophy*. London: Macmillan.

Stewart, J.M (1915). Nietzsche and the present German spirit. *University of Melbourne War Lectures, 5*, 125–139.

Stewart, J.M (1933–1934). Husserl's phenomenology. *The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 12*, 221–231; *13*, 62–72.

Suchting, W. (1986). *Marx and philosophy: Three studies*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Tapper, M. (1993). *Ressentiment* and power: Some reflections on feminist practices. In P. Patton (Ed.), *Nietzsche, feminism and political theory* (pp. 130–143). Allen & Unwin: Sydney.

Vardoulakis, D. (2010). *The Doppelgänger: Literature's philosophy*. New York: Fordham University Press.

Vasseleu, C. (1998). *Textures of light: Vision and touch in Irigaray, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty*. London: Routledge.

West, D. (1993). The contribution of continental philosophy. In P. Pettit & R. Goodin (Eds.), *A companion to contemporary political philosophy* (pp. 39–71). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

West, D. (1996). *An introduction to continental philosophy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Wilson, E. (1998). *Neural geographies: Feminism and the microstructure of cognition*. London: Routledge.

Wilson, E. (2004). *Psychosomatic: Feminism and the neurological body*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Witheford, H. (1951). Background to a magazine. *Arachne, 2*, 20–22.

Young, J. (1987). *Willing and unwilling: A study in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer*. Dordrecht: Nijhoff.

Young, J. (1992). *Nietzsche's philosophy of art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Young, J. (1997). *Heidegger, philosophy, Nazism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Young, J. (2001). *Heidegger's philosophy of art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Young, J. (2002). *Heidegger's later philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Young, J. (2003). *The death of God and the meaning of life*. London: Routledge.

Young, J. (2006). *Nietzsche's philosophy of religion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Young, J. (2010). *Friedrich Nietzsche: A philosophical biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Logic

21

Ross Brady and Chris Mortensen

Contents

Introduction 679
Modal Logic 685
Relevant Logic 688
Paraconsistent Logic 694
References 701

Introduction

The earliest logician in Australasia was undoubtedly Arthur Prior, who worked on modal and tense logic in the 1950s at the Canterbury University College in Christchurch, New Zealand. There, he wrote a book, *Formal Logic* (1955), where he introduced modal logic, as well as covering the Aristotelian syllogistic, three-valued logic, intuitionist logic, and the logic of classes, which included the class-theoretic paradoxes with Russellian-type theory as a solution. It was at the time one of the few postwar textbooks on logic. (For more information and other works of Prior, see the section on "Modal Logic".) He was subsequently posted to Manchester and Oxford Universities and died in 1969.

Ross Brady is the author of the sections 'Introduction', 'Modal Logic', and 'Relevant Logic' and Chris Mortensen is the author of the section 'Paraconsistent Logic'.

R. Brady (✉)
Department of Politics, Philosophy and Legal Studies, La Trobe University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
e-mail: ross.brady@latrobe.edu.au

C. Mortensen
Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_18, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Under Prior's influence, George Hughes of the Victoria University of Wellington developed a mid-career interest in logic, which also spread to his best student, Max Cresswell, who was subsequently appointed to the staff. Following Prior, modal logic was their interest, culminating in their book, *An Introduction to Modal Logic* (1968), which became a standard textbook in the area. This was followed some time later by *A Companion to Modal Logic* (1984), an advanced supplement to the *Introduction*, and then *A New Introduction to Modal Logic* (1996). Cresswell also wrote a book (1973) on logics and languages, both categorial and natural. He proved completeness in (1972) (see also (1995a)) for the weak modal logic S1, a problem which was left by Kripke due to its great difficulty. The oddity here is that S1 has the substitution of strict equivalents as a primitive rule rather than as a derived rule. Cresswell used a special neighbourhood relation to construct the canonical model for the completeness proof in his (1995a). Among his varied works on modal logic, in (1995b), he proved some interesting relationships between incompleteness and the Barcan formula for a number of quantified modal logics.

The earliest logician in Australia was undoubtedly Len Goddard, who arrived at the University of New England, Armidale, New South Wales, in 1956 and worked there up to 1967 before heading back to the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. He invented significance logic, writing with Richard Routley a joint book, *The Logic of Significance and Context* (1973), a monumental work of 641 pages. Significance logic is a three-valued extension of classical two-valued logic, the third value representing the sort of meaninglessness that results from category mistakes such as occurs in ‘Sunday is having a bath’ or ‘The number 7 is happy’. The sentences are grammatically well-formed in terms of parts of speech, but their subjects are outside the scopes of their respective predicates. Goddard argued that these kinds of expression should be within the realm of logic.

Goddard, together with C.F. Presley of the University of Newcastle, immediately established a joint teaching program in modern logic (i.e., classical Russellian logic) from 1956. This is important as almost all logic taught in Australia at that time was traditional Aristotelian logic, under the influence of John Anderson of the University of Sydney. One of the few exceptions was the University of Adelaide where Jack Smart had been teaching modern logic since the 1950s. In the mid-1960s, Goddard made two of the early logic appointments at UNE by bringing Richard Routley from the University of Sydney, a student of Alonzo Church at Princeton University and prior to that a student at the Victoria University of Wellington, and David Londey from VUW, previously a student at the University of Melbourne. Londey had written a textbook, *The Elements of Formal Logic* (1965), with George Hughes at VUW, introducing logic through Hilbert-style axiomatisations. As with many of the early logicians, Londey was self-taught, as there was very little modern logic taught in the Universities.

To deal with the general paucity of logic teaching and the total lack of it at a more advanced level, Goddard arranged with the vice-chancellor of UNE, Sir Robert Madgwick, to introduce a 1-year M.A. coursework degree in formal logic, which was taught by Londey, Routley, and himself, with topics: axiomatic classical logic, both sentential and predicate; paradoxes, types and significance; modal logic;

axiomatic set theory; arithmetic, recursion, and Gödel's theorems; and philosophy of mathematics. The entry requirement was a good honours degree in philosophy or mathematics. In 1965, it attracted the students: Martin Bunder, Val Macrae (later Routley, later still Plumwood), Alan Reeves, and Malcolm Rennie, and, in 1966, Ross Brady, Geoff Fitzhardinge, and Robert Hughes. (Bunder was half-time over the 2 years.) Unfortunately, the course ran for only 2 years, as Goddard moved to St. Andrews in 1967 and Routley took a year's study leave, after which he took up a research position at Monash University and then in 1971 at the Research School of Social Sciences, ANU.

Importantly, all but one of the listed students subsequently took up academic positions and helped to spread logic around Australia. Bunder, after completing his Ph. D. with Curry in Amsterdam, took a position in Mathematics at the University of Wollongong. Macrae married Routley, published much together up until their divorce in 1983, and subsequently held positions at Macquarie University and the ANU. Reeves, after completing a Ph. D. at Berkeley, went on to the University of Adelaide but left academia a few years later. Rennie went to the University of Auckland, University of Queensland, and finally to the ANU. Brady, after studying at the University of St. Andrews under Goddard and spending a year in Mathematics at the University of Western Australia, took a position in Philosophy at La Trobe University. Fitzhardinge was appointed to UNE but subsequently left academia.

So, the early logic centres were at VUW and at UNE. The only other logician of major note from the 1960s was Charles Hamblin at the University of New South Wales, who was largely self-taught. He was also interested in computing and the foundations of computer architecture, where he holds several patents. He worked on informal logic and produced the first programmed textbook on logic (1967) and subsequently books on fallacies (1970) and imperatives (1987). He had the students, Vic Dudman, who worked in the philosophy of logic and language and was appointed to Macquarie University; Errol Martin (previously at UQ, see below); Jim McKenzie, who worked on the logic of dialogue; and Phillip Staines, who worked on informal logic and who was appointed to the staff at UNSW.

Malcolm Rennie was not only a great researcher but also a great teacher of logic, who influenced a stream of students from the University of Queensland, in particular Rod Girle, Errol Martin, Michael McRobbie, Chris Mortensen, and Ross Phillips, all of whom went on to become academics and as such made a big impact on logic in Australasia. Girle, after studying under Geoffrey Hunter at the University of St. Andrews, was appointed to the staff at UQ. There, Rennie and Girle were quite involved in the logic teaching program in secondary schools in Queensland and produced a textbook (1973) for that purpose, as well as for university teaching. Rennie then moved to the RSSS at the ANU, where he wrote the book (1974), adapting type theory so that it could be used as a categorial grammar, particularly for predicate modifiers. Subsequently, at UQ, Girle, and Ian Hinckfuss, a student of Smart from the University of Adelaide, built a strong teaching program, with key students Gerard McGovern and Paul Thistlewaite. Girle also introduced the Australian Logic Teachers' Journal, covering both school and university teaching and subsequently introduced an academic issue of the journal, thus being the first editor of an Australian logic journal. He also wrote a popular textbook (1981) with Terrance Halpin, which was used extensively at schools and universities.

Let us follow up other students of Malcolm Rennie. Martin, after completing a Ph. D. at the ANU and a postdoctoral fellowship at University of Melbourne, took an interest in computing applications of logic and was appointed to the IT department of the University of Canberra. McRobbie also completed a Ph. D. at the ANU and, after a postdoctoral fellowship at La Trobe University, set up and headed the Automated Reasoning Project at the ANU, into which all the logicians at the RSSS transferred, except Routley. Initially, the ARP mechanised the relevant logic R without distribution (see separate section on "Relevant Logic"), but it diversified into matrix modelling of logics and general theorem proving, especially after the arrival of John Slaney. McRobbie, after heading the Centre for Information Science Research at the ANU, was appointed vice-president and recently president of Indiana University. Mortensen, after a short stint in Pittsburgh and a postdoctoral at the RSSS, ANU, was posted to the University of Adelaide, where he championed paraconsistent logic and initiated the development of inconsistent mathematics. Phillips went on to La Trobe University, where he introduced the teaching of critical thinking in 1990, being one of the first to do so.

On the mathematical side of logic, John Crossley was appointed from Oxford University to the Mathematics Department at Monash University in 1969 and quickly built up a strong following in mathematical logic. He wrote a joint book *What is Mathematical Logic*? (1972) with a fellow appointee from Oxford, Chris Ash, and a number of their students. Crossley was very influential in developing mathematical logic in Australia, but more recently he has worked in the interface of mathematics and computing and held until his recent retirement a joint Professorship in Mathematics and Computer Science at Monash.

There were quite a number of other early appointments, from a variety of backgrounds. These all helped to spread logic around the Australasian Universities. Indeed, virtually all of the pre-Dawkins universities in Australia (i.e., up to the mid-1980s) had at least one logician. Dene Barnett at Flinders University was entirely self-taught, without a degree. Jack Copeland at the University of Canterbury, via La Trobe University, came from Oxford University. Rob Goldblatt and Rod Downey were appointed to the Mathematics Department of VUW, which has extensively liaised with the group of philosophers there. Barry Taylor, Allen Hazen, and later Len Goddard at the University of Melbourne came from the Universities of Oxford, Pittsburgh, and St. Andrews, respectively. Both John McGechie and later Lloyd Humberstone at Monash University came from Oxford University, McGechie coming via Melbourne University. Robert Meyer at the RSSS, ANU, came from the Universities of Pittsburgh and Indiana. Hugh Montgomery at the University of Auckland came from the University of Canterbury. Graham Priest and Hartley Slater at the University of Western Australia were both from the UK, Priest from the University of St. Andrews. Tom Richards at La Trobe University via the University of Auckland came from VUW. Peter Roeper and Paul Thom were appointed to the faculties at the ANU. Krister Segerberg at the University of Auckland came from the Swedish-language Abo Academy in Finland. Stan Surma also came to Auckland but from the University of Cracow in Poland. Pavel Tichý at the University of Otago was from Charles University in Prague. Manfred von Thun at La Trobe University came from UNE and was a student at Sydney University.

Let us get back to the logic centres; the RSSS at the ANU was the main centre for logic in Australasia from 1971 upon Routley's appointment to about 1985, when the Automated Reasoning Project was set up. (There is much said on this in the sections on "Relevant Logic" and on "Paraconsistent Logic", to follow.) Though Routley stayed in the RSSS, the ARP took over as the centre for logical activities, despite its computational orientation. It was headed by McRobbie with Meyer providing the academic leadership. Further, John Slaney was appointed to the ARP in 1988 from the University of Edinburgh, but he had earlier completed his Ph. D. at the ANU under Meyer. Girle was also appointed here from UQ. Due to this team and their many students such as Andre Fuhrmann (from Germany), Jacques Riche (from Belgium), Tim Surendonk (from New Zealand), and Igor Urbas, the ARP gained a strong international reputation in logic, especially computational logic. Subsequently, about 1990, the ARP was subsumed into the Centre for Information Science Research, gaining an ongoing status at the ANU. Slaney started the Logic Summer School in 1991, which has provided to keen honours students and beginning post-graduates a 2-week interdisciplinary course in advanced logic. With the general lack of such advanced teaching available, it has provided a great service to the logic community over the years. Later on, in the late 1990s, CISR was transferred into the newly created Research School of Information Science and Engineering at the ANU. McRobbie went to Indiana, Girle moved to Griffith University and subsequently to the University of Auckland, but Meyer and Slaney stayed on at the RSISE. Slaney was subsequently appointed in 2005 to the National ICT Australia.

A logic teaching centre was built up at La Trobe University in the late 1970s and in the 1980s that deserves special mention. Over that time, there was a large number of staff able to teach logic. This was made up of the logicians Brady, Copeland, Richards, and von Thun, together with a host of staff willing and able to teach logic in its various forms, both formal and philosophical: John Bigelow, Brian Ellis, Robert Farrell, John Fox, Andrew Giles-Peters, Moshe Kroy, Frank Jackson, Chris Murphy, Robert Pargetter, Ross Phillips, Jack Smart, and Kim Sterelny. The peak year was 1979, when a full unit in logic was newly offered at first-year level by Richards, and there were 11 logic-related half-units offered at second- and third-year levels. Additionally, McRobbie was a postdoctoral fellow during 1980–1981 and gave a course on Gentzen systems, especially as they apply to relevant logics. In 1983, a fully computer-based introductory logic subject was offered for the first time by Richards. This was the VALID course, accessible from the University's mainframe computer. In 1986, Logic became a separate discipline (from Philosophy) within the School of Humanities, offering two first-year half-units and 5 s- and third-year half-units. Logic has remained as a separate discipline up until 2008.

There was a new breed of younger appointments after a lull in logic appointments from about 1978–1989. Edwin Mares was appointed to VUW in 1993, being previously at the ANU from 1989 to 1991 and having studied with Mike Dunn at Indiana University. Greg Restall was initially appointed to the ANU and Macquarie

University before coming to the University of Melbourne. He was a student of Priest at the University of Queensland. Lesley Roberts was also a student of Priest at UQ, after studying with Mortensen at Adelaide, and was appointed to the University of Sunshine Coast. An American, J.C. Beall was at the University of Tasmania in the late 1990s. Katalin Bimbo, a student of Dunn at Indiana, was appointed to VUW and the ANU, before heading back to Indiana and then on to Alberta. Jen Davoren was also appointed to the ANU before taking a position at the University of Melbourne. Jeremy Seligman and, more recently, Koji Tanaka were appointed to the University of Auckland. Seligman came from Taiwan and Indiana while Tanaka was a student of Priest at UQ and came via Macquarie University.

Also deserving of special mention is the rise of logic teaching at the University of Auckland. Fred Kroon, Jan Crossthwaite, and Robert Nola were the early appointees who developed the logic program. Then, Krister Segerberg's appointment to the chair, followed by the appointment of Stan Surma, in the early 1980s, gave it more focus and enabled it to be built up further. But it was the appointment of Rod Girle in the early 1990s, with all his teaching experience from the University of Queensland, which catapulted what was a good program into one of world-beating proportions. This was enhanced with the appointments of Jeremy Seligman and Koji Tanaka. There are now well over 1,000 students studying logic there.

Since the relative demise of the logic centre at the ANU, a new centre has been set up at the University of Melbourne through the efforts of Graham Priest, who was appointed to the chair in 2001. The centre consists of Priest, Restall, Hazen, and Davoren, from the University of Melbourne, Humberstone from Monash, and Brady from La Trobe University, together with a large cohort of students mainly from the University of Melbourne and with some from Monash. Restall was instrumental in setting up the online logic journal, *The Australasian Journal of Logic*, with its first issues in 2003. He is the managing editor, and Bunder, Martin, and Hans van Ditmarsch (University of Otago) are the editors for mathematical and computational logic. By mutual arrangement, a number of Adelaide-Melbourne Axis meetings have taken place over the years combining the Melbourne centre with Mortensen of the University of Adelaide and his students.

The big logical developments in Australasia have been in (i) modal logic, essentially starting with Prior's books (1955) and (1957); (ii) relevant logic, essentially starting with the announcement of the Routley-Meyer semantics at the Australasian Association of Philosophy conference in 1971; and (iii) paraconsistent logic, with the presentation by Priest of his logic LP at the Australasian Association for Logic conference in 1976. Their histories are covered in three special sections on these topics, to follow, with Chris Mortensen writing on paraconsistent logic, and Ross Brady writing the other two, together with the Introduction. Unfortunately, we do not have the space for other interesting topics, such as belief revision, largely carried out by Mares; conditionals and probability, largely carried out by Jackson and Hájek; and the study of Turing, carried out by Copeland.

Use has been made of the following sources of historical interest. Goddard (1992) gives the development of logic since 1956. Sylvan in the introduction to Norman and Sylvan (1989), pp. 1–21, gives an historical account of relevant logic. Sylvan in (1992) gives a critical appreciation of Goddard and his works. Dominic Hyde in (2001) gives an account of Routley/Sylvan's writings on logic and metaphysics. Meyer in (1998) wrote a memorial piece on Routley/Sylvan's life's work.

Modal Logic

Modal logic, in its narrower alethic sense, is the logic of necessity and possibility, that is, the logic of 'must be' and 'may be'. However, we will also consider it in its broader sense as the logic of modes of truth, as the name implies. This includes the logic of the tenses, past, present, and future; deontic logic, the logic of obligation and permission; epistemic logic, the logic of knowledge; and doxastic logic, the logic of belief.

We aim to trace the development of modal logic in Australasia, starting with its early beginnings in Christchurch in the 1950s and charting its spread over New Zealand and Australia up until more recent times. We should bear in mind that research into modal logic has become interdisciplinary. Though its beginnings were in Philosophy departments, much recent work is carried out in Mathematics and Computer Science departments. Mathematicians are principally interested in the formal aspects of modal logics and their relation to standard mathematical theories in algebra and topology, while computer scientists are principally interested in the computer mechanisation of the logics, including the hardness or easiness and the space requirements of such, and also in their use in deductive knowledge bases. However, their research often overlaps with that of philosophers, in that they do general theoretical work in modal logic, and thus we include such work in this volume.

The study of modal logic began in Australasia in the early 1950s with Arthur Prior at Canterbury College in Christchurch, New Zealand. His book, *Formal Logic* (1955), not only is the earliest textbook on formal logic from Australasia but included a chapter 'The Logic of Modality'. This included natural language representations of the alethic modalities, the '*de dicto-de re*' distinction, strict implication, and iterated modalities with the Lewis systems S4 and S5, modality and quantification, and also deontic logic. *Time and Modality* (1957) closely followed, being the John Locke lectures for 1955–1956. Here, Prior develops connections between the alethic modalities and the past and future tenses, also incorporating the present tense. At a systemic level, he compares his multi-valued tense system Q and Lukasiewicz's L with the Lewis modal systems. As a sequel, Prior's book, *Past, Present and Future* (1967), works out the detail of a number of modal and tense logics, based on different accounts or aspects of time. This includes discrete and continuous time, time with or without a beginning, and measured temporal intervals. Further, his *Papers on Time and Tense* (1968) deals with related philosophical issues and also includes the earlier-later relation and logical consequences of supposing time to have a beginning or an end. For a fuller account of Prior's work, I refer readers to Max Cresswell's piece on Modal Logic and also to Per Hasle's piece on A.N. Prior, in *The Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (2010). Indeed, in this piece, I will generally try to complement what Cresswell has written there. Also, there is a nice memorial volume by Jack

Copeland (1996) based on an Australasian Association for Logic conference in Prior's honour, held in Christchurch in 1989. Jack Copeland also wrote a long article on Prior in the Stanford Encyclopedia (see reference below), including a section on the influence of Prior on Kripke.

Max Cresswell completed his Ph. D. under Prior, while at the University of Manchester, and returned to a lectureship at the Victoria University of Wellington.

His professor George Hughes was also influenced by Prior and they together wrote the widely influential textbook, *An Introduction to Modal Logic* (1968), the first book to incorporate Kripke's possible world semantics. They used this semantics to extend the *reductio* method of validity determination to modal logics, which they then used to prove decidability for the main sentential logics. Cresswell's groundbreaking completeness theorems for some modal predicate logics (with the Barcan formula) were also included, as were the Lewis systems, both normal and non-normal. Indeed, one of Cresswell's most profound results, among his very many results in modal logic, was his proof in (1972) of completeness for the non-normal modal logic S1. Now, S1 has the peculiar feature of a primitive Substitution of Strict Equivalents rule, not establishable by the usual inductive procedure, and Cresswell had to invoke an unusually complicated truth condition in order for the completeness theorem to be proved. Even Saul Kripke had omitted S1 in his celebrated papers on the completeness of modal logics. Then, in (1984), Hughes and Cresswell published a further book, *A Companion to Modal Logic*, which included much of their original work in the area of frame semantics, which enabled them to prove incompleteness and the finite model property (and thus decidability) for some systems. They were also able to ramp up the modelling conditions to satisfy ordering properties; in particular, they showed that S4 may be characterised by frames with a partial ordering relation. Subsequently in (1996), they published *A New Introduction to Modal Logic*, taking readers up-to-date with modal sentential and predicate logic and incorporating their two earlier books. Included here too are Cresswell's proofs of completeness and incompleteness of various modal predicate logics without the Barcan formula. Hughes has worked independently on the modal logic of the medieval logician John Buridan and together with Cresswell on omnitemporal logic.

The logic seminars from the 1960s to the late 1980s at the Victoria University of Wellington provided the medium for much of the early research into modal logic in New Zealand. Apart from Hughes and Cresswell, these seminars attracted people from the Mathematics Department, mainly Wilf Malcolm and Ken Pledger in the 1960s and Robert Goldblatt from the 1970s onward. Indeed, Goldblatt's Ph. D. thesis was on modal logic, entitled 'Metamathematics of Modal Logic' (VUW, 1974), in which he studied the relationships between algebraic semantics and Kripke semantics. He also wrote five books related to modal logic, including *Logics of Time and Computation* (1987); *Mathematics of Modality* (1993), which is a collection of his papers; and *Quantifiers*, *Propositions and Identity*: *Admissible Semantics for Quantified Modal and Substructural Logics* (2011), these three being of the most philosophical relevance. Goldblatt also wrote a very comprehensive history of mathematical modal logic (2003) and, among other works, proved that S4.2 was the modal logic of special relativity, axiomatised the modal logic of some topologies, and, more recently, worked on a semantics for quantified modal logic in conjunction with Ed Mares of VUW. Goldblatt also wrote a Wikipedia entry about George Hughes (see reference below).

An early contemporary of Goldblatt's was Robert Bull, a mathematical logician working at the University of Canterbury. Bull completed a Ph. D. under Prior at Manchester and returned to New Zealand to work on modal and tense logic using algebraic methods. In particular, he proved that every normal extension of S4.3 has the finite model property, and he axiomatised the tense logics for real, rational, and discrete time. These results were proved using sophisticated ideas from universal algebra, applied for the first time in this area.

We now round out modal logic in New Zealand. Hugh Montgomery at the Universities of Canterbury and Auckland had worked in the 1960s and 1970s on a number of papers on modal logic with Richard Routley (a VUW graduate), mainly on the addition of contingency and non-contingency to modal logic. Krister Segerberg, a famed Swedish modal logician, spent 10 years as professor at the University of Auckland, during which time he worked on infinitary modal logic, the logic of action and dynamic doxastic logic, developing it from dynamic logic (logic of change). Jack Copeland from the University of Canterbury has studied the history of possible world semantics in his (2002) and (2006), as well as working on the tree method for tense logics. Hans van Ditmarsch, previously at the University of Otago, now in Spain, has worked on dynamic epistemic logic. Rod Girle, at the Universities of Queensland, ANU, Griffith, and now Auckland, has built up a huge reputation in the teaching of logic, including that of modal logic. Indeed, he has written the two textbooks *Modal Logics and Philosophy* (2000) and *Possible Worlds* (2003), both of which cover modal logic in the broadest sense, both philosophically and technically. And, he was earlier responsible for separating the non-normal logic S0.9 from S1.

The origins of modal logic in Australia rest with Charles Hamblin's work in the 1950s on modal and tense logic at the University of New South Wales, where he was corresponding with Prior. There was also some work by Richard Routley (later Sylvan) in the 1960s and 1970s, mostly with Hugh Montgomery, as mentioned above, but also with Val Routley (later Plumwood). The intensity increased with the arrival of Lloyd Humberstone at Monash University in the mid-1970s, with work in the following areas: the expressive power of actuality operators, two-dimensional modal logics, the replacement of worlds and times by regions and intervals, resp., translations between logics at least one of which is a modal logic, Halldén incompleteness, epistemic logic, and non-contingency. There has been a groundswell of more recent interest in modal logics, spread over Philosophy, Mathematics, and Computer Science Departments. Guido Governatori of the University of Queensland has worked in two main areas: labelled modal tableaux for modal logics and possible world semantics for non-normal modal logic. Mark Reynolds of the University of Western Australia has done extensive work in modal and temporal logics, covering many mathematical and computational aspects. Rajeev Goré of the RSISE, ANU, has worked on computational tableau methods for model and temporal logics. Graham Priest of the University of Melbourne has given more general symbolism for modal logics and created tableau methods for them in his textbook (2001). Greg Restall, also of the University of Melbourne, has worked on Gentzenizations and on Belnap's display logics for modal logics. And, a number of others have worked in modal logic, among their other interests: Jen Davoren, Norman Foo, Tim French, Alan Hazen, Caroll Morgan, Mehmet Orgun, Abdul Sattar, Hartley Slater, and Ron van der Mayden.

The only international conference dedicated specifically to modal logic, Advances in Modal Logic, was held at Noosa, Queensland, in September 2006, locally organised by Guido Governatori. The program contained the following Australasian papers: 'A General Semantics for Quantified Modal Logic' by Rob Goldblatt and Ed Mares, 'A Kripke-Joyal Semantics for Noncommutative Logic' by Rob Goldblatt, and 'Weaker-to-Stronger Translational Embeddings in Modal Logic' by Lloyd Humberstone. There have been Australasian participants at various other AiML conferences, including Max Cresswell, Mark Reynolds, Rob Goldblatt, and Guido Governatori as invited speakers; Greg Restall on the program committee; and Mark Reynolds and Rob Goldblatt as program co-chairs.

Another important international conference was the TIME-ICTL conference, held in Cairns in 2003, combining the 10th international symposium on Temporal Representation and Reasoning and the 4th International Conference on Temporal Logic, with Mark Reynolds and Abdul Sattar editing the conference volume.

Relevant Logic

Broadly speaking, relevant logic is the study of those logics where the content of the conclusion of an argument relates to the content of the premises, that is, where there is some meaning relationship between them, rather than just a relationship between truth-values as there is for classical logic. (These broad-based logics were later called *sociative logics* by Richard Sylvan.) This idea was formalised in a more focussed way by Anderson and Belnap with the aid of the Relevance Condition: If A→B is provable in the logic L, then A and B share a sentential variable. Such a logic L with the inference connective '→' is a *relevant logic*. The Relevance Condition is taken as a necessary condition for a good logic in that any logic without it can contain an inference of the form A→B with no common content. However, the Relevance Condition is not a sufficient condition for a good relevant logic, and other criteria need to be added or at least the meaning relationship needs to be tightened up. One such added criterion is that truth should be preserved by the inference connective '→', and thereby the relevant logic should be a sub-logic of the so-called classical logic of Frege and Russell, thus making it a *substructural logic*. One such tightening up of the meaning relationship is that of meaning containment. Whatever is adopted, there is the sensible requirement that relevant logics should satisfy the key rules of logic, namely, Modus Ponens (A, A→B ⊢ B), Adjunction (A, B ⊢ A&B), Transitivity of Inference (A→B, B→C ⊢ A→C), and Substitution of Equivalents (A↔B, C(A) ⊢ C(B)). The latter rule is normally derived with help from the Affixing Rule (A→B, C→D ⊢ B→C→. A→D).

Much of the impetus for the development of relevant logic stems from the Paradoxes of Material Implication, as they apply to classical logic. The main two Paradoxes are ‘A true proposition is implied by any proposition’ and ‘A false proposition implies any proposition’. These typify the truth functionality of classical logic, and as the propositions concerned may have no content in common, relevant logic provides a solution. C.I. Lewis developed some systems of strict implication using modal logic, intending to capture the concept of entailment, where ‘A strictly implies B’ is equivalent to ‘A necessarily implies B’, but, as Meyer showed in (1974), these systems suffer from the Paradoxes of Strict Implication: ‘A necessarily true proposition is strictly implied by any proposition’ and ‘An impossible proposition strictly implies any proposition’. So, the addition of necessity creates a similar problem, which leaves relevant logic as the principal solution.

The first system of relevant logic was due to the Russian logician Orlov in 1928, who was rediscovered by Dosen in (1992). He introduced the $\{\rightarrow, \sim\}$ fragment of what has come to be known as the logic R of relevant implication. Subsequently, Moh in (1950) and Church in (1951) introduced the pure →-fragment of R. However, it was the German logician Ackermann in (1956) who, by introducing a full sentential system, created the interest of the Americans, Anderson and Belnap, in relevant logic. It was them, together with their students and collaborators, principally Dunn and Meyer, who did a prodigious amount of work on relevant logic, focussing on the system E of entailment (just weaker than the implicational R) and culminating in their treatise *Entailment*, *volume 1*, in (1975). Much of the work was done at the University of Pittsburgh and later at the University of Indiana, when Dunn and Meyer moved there. Additionally, *Entailment*, *volume 2*, appeared in (1992) and co-authored by Dunn and with the help from Fine, Urquhart, and others. A bibliography of relevant logic up to 1990, due to Wolf, was included in this second volume.

The initial Australasian interest in relevant logic was due to a New Zealander, Richard Routley, who, after completing his first degree at the Victoria University of Wellington, studied under Church at Princeton and came to the University of New England via the University of Sydney. It was during the period 1964–1966 at UNE that he and Len Goddard got interested in changing the logic to solve not only the Paradoxes of Material Implication but also the set-theoretic and semantic paradoxes. At the time, this idea was considered quite novel, as most logicians were of the view that logic could not be changed and indeed that classical logic was *the* logic. Though Goddard was more interested in using a 3-valued significance logic to solve the semantic paradoxes, it was Routley who was in touch with the development of relevant logic through Anderson and Belnap and their collaborators, with a view to solve all these styles of paradox. He was particularly concerned at the time that their logics E and R had no sound and complete semantics. Routley married Val Macrae, who then became his main philosophical collaborator. This work continued while Routley spent 1967 on study leave, visiting Goddard who was now at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. He was then given a research position at Monash during 1968–1970, before being posted as a senior fellow at the Research School of Social Sciences at the ANU in 1971.

During this time, he was in correspondence with Robert Meyer, at the University of Indiana, concerning a truth-functional semantics for relevant logics. He put up an idea for such a semantics, based on using a 3-place relation R to capture the inference connective → and a one-place function * to capture negation. The function *, subsequently called the Routley Star, was introduced in Richard and Val Routley's paper (1972), on the simpler first-degree entailments, that is, entailments between formulae made up of negation, conjunction, and disjunction. The interesting point here is that the negation must be non-classical in order to accommodate a relevant entailment. That is, it must allow a formula A and its negation ∼A to be both true or both false, as well as allowing A and ∼A to take opposite truth-values. Such a negation is called a De Morgan negation, in that it satisfies De Morgan's laws and double negation. This is opposed to the classical Boolean negation, which satisfies not only these but also the Law of Excluded Middle and Disjunctive Syllogism as well. Meyer was subsequently able to prove this semantics complete with respect to the Anderson-Belnap axiomatisation for R and thus began a fertile partnership that produced a series of key papers and a book on the developments of this semantics, which has come to be known as the *Routley-Meyer semantic*s. At the Australasian Association of Philosophy conference at the University of Queensland in 1971, Routley presented for the first time their semantics for the relevant logical system R and announced that it could also be used to capture the logic T of ticket entailment (weaker than E) by reducing the semantic postulates. As there is just a single base world, this semantics has become known as *reduced semantics*, as opposed to the *unreduced semantics* with a set of regular worlds (i.e., possible base worlds), subsequently used to semantically capture the system E of entailment.

Routley and Meyer presented this semantics of R in their paper (1973), which was 'followed' by the extension of their semantics to the logic NR, an S4-modalised relevant logic, thought to be equivalent to E, in (1972a). (NR was later proved to be distinct from E by Maksimova.) Further, in (1972b), they extended their semantical treatment to a range of positive relevant logics from the basic B+ to R+. Then, Meyer in (1973) proved that negation can be conservatively added to a range of positive relevant logics. Finally, Routley and Meyer met at the one-and-only international conference on relevant logic, held at St. Louis, Missouri, in 1974, and organised from University of Southern Illinois by Collier, Gasper, and Wolf. Belatedly, a book of papers (1989) based on that conference, edited by Norman and Routley (now Sylvan), was published.

Importantly for the future of relevant logic in Australia, Meyer moved to the ANU in 1975 to take up a postdoctoral fellowship at the Research School of Social Sciences, which was soon converted to a senior fellowship and subsequently to a Professorship. An incredible amount of collaborative work was done by Routley and Meyer in a short time from the mid-1970s to the late 1970s. It created a lot of international attention, resulting in a number of good post-graduate students and the visitation by Fine and Goddard, from the UK, and the leading North American logicians: Belnap, Dunn, and Urquhart. The world centre for relevant logic had shifted from Pittsburgh to Canberra.

Let us first look at the remainder of the key works emanating from the ANU in the early 1970s. This basically consisted of extensions and modifications to the Routley-Meyer semantics. Meyer and Routley in (1972) introduced an algebraic semantics for the positive logic R+, based on the 2-place operator 'fusion', an intensional conjunction, definable in terms of relevant implication. This was extended to the full logic R and to other relevant logics. They also introduced classical relevant logics in their (1973) and (1974), by adding classical negation both to the positive logic R+, to yield CR, and to the full logic R, yielding CR*. Subsequently, in their (RLR1), pp. 378–379, they introduce the superclassical KR, where $a=a^*$ holds in the semantics, ensuring classical negation at all worlds. The Routleys in (1975) consider the usage of inconsistent and incomplete theories in capturing beliefs, applying the non-classical negation of the Routley-Meyer semantics. Routley also developed in (1975) a universal semantics for natural language.

Let us continue with the late 1970s. This was a very productive period of more diversified thinking about the consequences of using a relevant logic. It was a time of realisation about the properties of such a new non-classical logic and about how such a logic can be applied. After working on the notion of coherence for modal logics, Meyer in (1976a) introduced the concept of metacompleteness for a wide range of positive relevant logics, the main result of which was the establishment of the priming property: if AvB is a theorem of the logic, then A is a theorem or B is a theorem. Meyer spent a lot of energy on the application of relevant logic to arithmetic, exemplified by his (1976b). He subsequently showed that the Disjunctive Syllogism Rule is not admissible in relevant arithmetic, i.e., B need not be a theorem even if both ~A and AvB are. Routley and Meyer extended the reach of their style of semantics by showing in (1976a) that every sentential logic has a two-valued world semantics. In (1976b), they examine the relation between classical logic and dialectical logic, a logic capable of handling inconsistencies, and raise the question of the consistency of the world. Goddard in (1977) used relevant logic to obtain a solution to the paradoxes of confirmation. Routley wrote a long paper (1977) setting up a program to develop a universal logic, which applies to all situations, realised or not and possible or not. Such a logic would be a highly intensional logic, called an ultramodal logic. Then, Meyer also wrote a long paper (1978) explaining why he was not a relevantist, i.e., one who captures the concept of relevance in the logic, much like a modal logician does with the concepts of necessity and possibility. In (1979), Meyer, Routley, and Dunn argued that because the Modus Ponens axiom, $A\&(A\rightarrow B)\rightarrow B$, yields Curry's paradox and hence the triviality of naïve set theory, there is no point using a logical solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes. However, Routley, and Meyer to a lesser extent, has opposed this view in a subsequent work. Lastly, McRobbie and Belnap in (1979) introduce their so-called analytic tableaux for a decidable fragment of R, which is based on proof theory rather than on semantics. The entire work over the 1970s culminated in 1982 in the completion of the joint book, *Relevant Logics and their*

Rivals, *volume 1*, which includes philosophical motivation for relevant logic as well as the results concerning the Routley-Meyer semantics and some of its elaborations.

During the early 1980s, we see the main fruits of the various interactions between Routley, Meyer, and some of their many students and visitors at the ANU. These included the students, Fuhrmann, Giambrone, Martin, McRobbie, Slaney, and Thistlewaite, and visitors, Belnap, Brady, Bunder, Dunn, Mortensen, and Priest. Routley in (1980) set out some problems and solutions in the semantics of quantified relevant logics, focussing on the constant-domain semantics, but the problems outweighed the solutions at this point. McRobbie et al. in (1980) mechanised the Kripke decision procedure for the →-fragment of R, which was subsequently expanded to include R without distribution. Priest in (1980) introduced a semantics based on the sense for first-degree entailments. Mortensen (1980a) determined the relationships between relevant model structures and relevant algebras. Martin and Meyer in (1982) solved the P-W problem, i.e., in the →-fragment of the relevant logic TW, if A→B and B→A are theorems, then A is identical with B. Meyer and McRobbie in (1982) used multisets of antecedents (i.e., antecedents with multiplicities of elements) to better represent the properties of the logic R. Bunder in (1982) proved deduction theorems for the →-fragments of a range of relevant logics. Brady in (1983) (listed in a larger work under Routley, Meyer, et al.) axiomatised Belnap's 8-valued and Meyer's 6-valued matrix logics (both used to prove the Relevance Condition) using Routley-Meyer model structures. In (1983) he also proved the simple consistency of naïve set theory based on the relevant logic TW, thus solving the set-theoretic paradoxes using a relevant logic. Mortensen in (1983a) laid down the conditions under which the generally invalid rule of Disjunctive Syllogism can be used and, in (1983b), discussed the use of relevant logic in trying to better capture a theory of nearness to the truth. Brady in (1984a) introduced depth relevance, i.e., relevance but with the variable sharing occurring at the same depth, and showed that a number of weak relevant logics satisfy this condition. He also in (1984b) provided natural deduction systems for a large range of quantified relevant logics, building on the work of Anderson. Meyer and Mortensen in (1984) showed that one can have inconsistent models of relevant arithmetic. Routley in (1984) completed the semantics according to the American Plan, i.e., where the * function is replaced by the use of overlapping truth-values. Finally, Slaney in (1984) (together with his (1987)) extended Meyer's earlier work on metacompleteness to full sentential logics, but the property only applies to a subclass of relevant logics, including the contractionless logics. Such logics are called metacomplete logics and Slaney went on to distinguish M1-logics with no negated entailment theorems from M2-logics with negated entailment theorems.

In the late 1980s, there was a lessening of activity, continuing in the same vein, but including solutions to some problems raised earlier and some further philosophical insights. Giambrone in (1985) proved that the positive fragments of TW and RW are decidable using Gentzen systems. The Routleys in (1985) discuss various concepts of negation and their modellings. Meyer in (1985a) discussed the prospect of relevantly proving completeness for R. He also in (1985b) bid a farewell to the entailment logic E in favour of the implicational R. Slaney in (1985) proved the remarkable result that there are exactly 3008 constants definable in the logic R with the constant f added. Brady in (1989) proved (actually in 1979) the nontriviality of naïve set theory based on the logic DK, which includes the Law of Excluded Middle. Routley changed his surname to Sylvan in 1983 upon his remarriage to Louise, and so subsequent publications are under that name.

The 1990s were relatively sparse years for relevant logic, though not without some interesting developments and some new people. Mares, a student of Dunn, was appointed to the Victoria University of Wellington, and Restall, a student of Priest, was appointed to the ANU, Macquarie University, and then to the University of Melbourne. JC Beall was also appointed to the University of Tasmania during the late 1990s. Brady in (1990) and (1991) developed Gentzen systems for full contractionless logics, thereby proving their decidability. He also in (1996a) developed a more general Gentzen system for a large range of relevant logics. Priest and Sylvan in (1992) introduced a simplified semantics for the positive relevant logic B+ and some negation extensions, and Restall in (1993) extended it to a large range of full relevant logics. Mares and Fuhrmann in (1995) introduced a relevant theory of conditionals and Mares in (1997) used Israel and Perry's theory of information as a means of modelling a weak positive relevant logic. Brady in (1996b) developed a content semantics that applies to a particular logic of meaning containment, thus tightening up the meaning relationship that rather loosely defines relevant logics. Unfortunately, Richard Sylvan died in 1996 at the age of 60, ending an era as the guiding force behind Australian relevant logic. Griffin, as his literary executor, coded all his works. Brady was given charge over the archives pertaining to the second volume of *Relevant Logics and their Rivals* (RLR2) and Hyde and Priest over the archives for the application of relevant logics.

The 2000s included some books wrapping up different aspects of relevant logic. Restall wrote a textbook (2000) on relevant and other substructural logics. Hyde and Priest in (2000) edited a collection of Sylvan's works in a wide range of applied logical topics. Bunder in (2002) set up the relationship between combinators and proofs in →-fragments of relevant logics and in (2003) showed how intersection type systems for combinators relate to the positive logic B+. Brady in (2003a) edited the major portion of Sylvan's work already flagged for RLR2, together with an account of Australian relevant logic since the first volume in 1982 up to the end of the 1990s. Brady in (2003b) found decision procedures for a range of appropriate relevant logics using their Routley-Meyer semantics. Mares' book (2004a) on relevant logic covers the Routley-Meyer semantics, conditionals, and applications of relevant logics. In (2004b), he also set out two semantics for R based on Dunn's 4-valued semantics for first-degree entailments. Brady's book (2006a) finally appeared, devoted to the logic DJ^d of meaning containment and its use in providing a solution to the set-theoretic and semantic paradoxes. Also, in (2006b), he introduced a normalised natural deduction system for the logic DW, slightly weaker than DJ^d. Mares in (2006) introduced a theory of relevant conditional probability. Mares and Goldblatt in (2006) introduced a semantics for the quantified relevant logic QR without quantified distribution, but it could also be strengthened to include this distribution. Beall et al. in (2006) determined a new way of expressing restricted quantification. Brady in (2007) set up a blueprint for a good entailment system and, together with Rush in (2008), explained how Cantor's diagonal argument fails when based on a relevant logic such as DJ^d, now christened MC for meaning containment.

Paraconsistent Logic

Australia is widely recognised as one of the world leaders, if not the world leader, in the study of *paraconsistency* and *paraconsistent logic*. Thus, our story will mostly be about Australian logic. This is not to exclude New Zealand, which has a distinguished lineage in logic, as detailed earlier in this chapter.

The main locus of paraconsistent studies in Australia was the group of logicians in the Australian National University in the 1970s and 1980s, with satellites in Queensland, Adelaide, Western Australia, and the universities in Melbourne. Principals include Routley (later called Sylvan), Meyer, Rennie, Priest, Brady, and Mortensen and their students Martin, McRobbie, Slaney, Giambrone, Lavers, and Restall, though in reality much of the work done by Australian logicians since the early 1970s has had a paraconsistent flavour. International visitors to the ANU Logic Group in this period included Belnap, Dunn, da Costa, Jennings, and Schotch.

However, the term 'paraconsistent' is not well understood by philosophers. Hence, some definitions are in order. A *logic* is taken here to be a set of sentences that is closed under a deducibility relation—and having the additional property that any uniform substitution of a valid deduction is also a valid deduction. Frequently but not invariably, a logic also comes with a distinguished set of sentences, the *theorems* of the logic, which are those deducible from the null set of sentences. The theorems of a logic are therefore themselves closed under uniform substitution. Closure under uniform substitution is a kind of 'topic neutrality', which is indicated by expressing the logic formally, using variables and logical constants. If L is a logic, we also write its deducibility relation as $\vdash_L$. A set of sentences closed under the deducibility relation of a logic L, but not necessarily under uniform substitution, is said to be a *theory of* L or an L *theory*. This is the logician's reconstruction of the notion of a scientific theory. Deductively closed sets of sentences failing to be closed under uniform substitution, the general case for theories, can be regarded as expressing the distinctive contents of theories and their consequences. However, clearly any logic is one of its own theories.

The correct use of 'paraconsistent' is as a property of logics. A logic is said to be *paraconsistent* if its deducibility relation lacks the well-known rule of classical logic *ex contradictione quodlibet*, $A, \sim A \vdash B$ (*from contradictory premises anything may be validly deduced*, ECQ for short). Informally, this can be expressed by saying that a paraconsistent logic is *inconsistency tolerant* or *contradiction tolerant*. It is incorrect to speak of a theory as 'paraconsistent' (unless the theory itself is a logic). On the other hand, a theory is said to be *inconsistent*, if it contains a pair of contradictory sentences A and $\sim$A. It is rare (though not absolutely unknown) for a logic to be inconsistent. So the usage ‘inconsistent logic’ is also generally incorrect: inconsistency is a property of theories, not logics. In short, don’t talk about paraconsistent theories nor inconsistent logics. Now, a theory is said to be *trivial* if it is the whole language. Putting these notions together, then, one can then say that a logic is paraconsistent iff at least one of its theories is inconsistent but nontrivial. Many paraconsistent logics are known by the time of writing this, and logicians describing themselves as paraconsistent can be found in many countries.

There are several important motivations which converge on paraconsistency. *First*, there is the very natural intuition of *relevance*. Relevance or relevant logics are discussed elsewhere in this volume, but we can say informally that a logic is relevant iff an argument is valid only if there is a *conceptual connection* or *meaning overlap* between premises and conclusion. In the case where the logic is sentential, this can be expressed more formally by Anderson and Belnap’s relevance criterion: a logic is *relevant* iff $A_1 \ldots A_n \vdash B$ only if at least one atomic sentence letter occurring somewhere in the A_i also occurs in B. This is a natural expression of the idea of conceptual overlap at the sentential level. Note that this is a sufficient condition for conceptual overlap, another common point of misunderstanding: it is definitely not claimed that *all* arguments in which there is overlap between premises and conclusion are valid (else, e.g., $(A\vee B) \vdash A$ would be generally valid, which is implausible). An equivalent definition can be given if the logic has an implication connective → satisfying the deduction theorem $\vdash (A\rightarrow B)$ iff $A \vdash B$. Then we can say that a logic is relevant iff $\vdash (A\rightarrow B)$ only if A and B share at least one atomic sentence letter. In that case, the → is sometimes called a relevant →.

It is immediately obvious that any relevant logic with the above deducibility relation is paraconsistent, since the rule ECQ violates the relevance criterion. The converse does not hold, as we will see: failure of ECQ does not guarantee relevance, so the class of paraconsistent logics is larger than the class of such relevant logics.

An early and seminal paper on paraconsistent logic was Routley and Routley (1972). There, the Routleys were aiming to give a semantical treatment of first-degree entailment. This is a basic relevant logic whose theorems take the form: (truth function) → (truth function), where the → is a relevant arrow and the formulae on either side contain only truth-functional connectives $\{\&, \mathrm{v}, \sim\}$ and anything definable in terms of them. To ensure relevance and the failure of ECQ, the Routleys realised that they would need semantical worlds—they called them ‘set-ups’—where contradictions hold without everything holding or where theorems fail without everything failing. This led them to the definition of the *Routley Star* * (later called the *Routley Functor*): where S is a set of sentences, $S^* =_{\mathrm{df.}} \{A: \sim A \notin S\}$. This proved to be a major breakthrough, because the Routley star enabled a semantics to be written with the desired properties. This semantics could then be extended to relevant logics with a relevant → having multiple occurrences in formulae, as in the Anderson-Belnap family of relevant logics including E and R. This was done by Routley and Meyer (1973). To deal with the relevant → in these logics, a ternary accessibility relation—an extension of the binary accessibility relation of modal semantics—was employed, though this device is not by itself paraconsistent: the only connective implicated in ECQ is negation, so it is reasonable that the burden of contradiction-containment falls upon the semantic correlate of negation, that is, the Star. The Star also turned out later to be a rich source of duality theorems expressing a duality between incompleteness and inconsistency. The duality provides the additional motivation for paraconsistency that inconsistent theories are no less reasonable than incomplete theories. This is another hurdle that philosophers have to get over.

But relevance is not our main theme. Routley and Meyer also offered an explication of the Hegel-Marx dialectic in (Routley and Meyer 1976b). Here their idea was to give a rigorous account which took seriously the Hegelian claim that there are true contradictions in the world. In contrast to the common interpretation of the Marxian dialectic as the struggle of opposed tendencies, they interpreted true contradictions as true statements of the form A and ∼A. One wonders what the unprepared readers of *Studies in Soviet Thought* made of this: ramming down their throats with irresistible force a literal interpretation of their ideology.

A *second* motivation for paraconsistency is the paradoxes. Working initially independently of Routley and Meyer, Priest also realised the importance of contradiction-containment. He grasped the role of the paradoxes, semantic and set-theoretic, in the motivation for inconsistency tolerance. The Liar sentence ‘This sentence is false’ provides a prima facie case for the existence of a true contradiction. Alternative solutions, such as Tarski-style stratification of language, are not simple and moreover beg the question in that English and other natural languages represent their own truth predicates and self-reference, and these are all that is needed for the paradox. But then, if some contradiction is true, then natural logic must be paraconsistent, because the world is manifestly not trivial. Priest (1979) proposed a paraconsistent but non-relevant logic LP that would do the job.

To say that semantic paradoxes such as the Liar provide a motivation for paraconsistent logic is to understate the matter. It is a motivation for true contradictions, which is a stronger conclusion. We can distinguish here between *strong paraconsistency*, which is the thesis that there are true contradictions, and *weak paraconsistency*, which is the thesis that natural logic is paraconsistent. Clearly, the former implies the latter, but not conversely, since weak paraconsistency only requires that we take inconsistent set-ups into account in semantics. Under the influence of Priest and Routley, strong paraconsistency became known as *dialetheism*. The present author regards this neologism as a little mealy mouthed but bows to the fact that the usage has become entrenched. The distinction between strong and weak paraconsistency should also be heeded by philosophers, many of whom are still under the misapprehension that all paraconsistentists believe in true contradictions.

One more point to note is the distinction between two ways of understanding the idea of true contradictions. One way is to say that some proposition is both true and false. The other way is to say that some proposition and its negation are both true. Closely related to the latter is the thesis that some conjunction of a proposition and its negation is true. Meyer and Martin (1986) called the former ‘the American plan’ and the latter ‘the Australian plan’. In this nomenclature, they were alluding to the influence of the former at the University of Pittsburgh, where Anderson and Belnap did the bulk of their best work, and the influence of the latter, deriving from the Star semantics, among the logicians at the Australian National University. The two plans are readily interderivable given minimal assumptions. Therefore the difference between them is best regarded as one of explanatory priority only, and so henceforth we will not bother about this difference.

In case it might be thought that abandoning ECQ is simple—since intuition does not obviously support it—it should be noted that ECQ follows easily, by a well-known argument due to C. I. Lewis, from just two principles: (a) Disjunctive Syllogism AvB, ∼A |– B and (b) Addition A |– (AvB). Thus, the cost of abandoning ECQ is that one or both of Disjunctive Syllogism and Addition must also be abandoned, and both are rather better supported by intuition. Paraconsistentists have however challenged both, with the weight of opinion largely on the side of dispensing with DS. In the present writer's opinion, the cost of losing DS is not so great, since it can readily be recovered in everyday reasoning, and the intuition in its favour explained. This was extensively debated in the *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* in the mid-1980s; see, e.g., Mortensen (1983a, 1986).

Priest also saw the need for an inconsistent set theory arising from the set-theoretic paradoxes, such as Russell's Paradox. Here the case for inconsistency is a little different; Russell's paradox is provable from the simple and natural principle of comprehension in naive set theory: to every property there exists a corresponding set of all things having that property. The property that generates the Russell contradiction is that of *being self-membered*. This permits the construction of the Russell set $R = \{x: x \notin x\}$ and so the proof of the Russell Contradiction that $R \in R$ and $R \notin R$. Priest and Routley proposed to accept this as a true contradiction. As in the case of the Liar, alternative apparently consistent solutions, that is, set theories designed to avoid the Russell Contradiction, such as ZF, are not simple and give no credence to the natural intuition behind naive comprehension. Of course, these date from the early twentieth century, much earlier than the inconsistentist solution, which only emerged in the late twentieth century, after it became impossible to ignore the ugliness of attempts to make set theory consistent.

There are two things to say here. First, the situation of a contradiction being 'true in mathematics' is perhaps not so threatening, if mathematical truth isn't *real* truth. This would not be dialetheism proper. But it would nonetheless still give a case for weak paraconsistency, in that the rigorous reasoning required for mathematics would be paraconsistent. Second, it must be signalled that Brady essentially did the technical hard work before Priest and Routley. To make an inconsistent set theory containing the Russell set work, it has to be proved that such inconsistent set theory is nontrivial. This was, in effect, the result of Brady (1971). Strictly, Brady was working with a consistent incomplete set theory containing naive comprehension but lacking both $R \in R$ and $R \notin R$. But, as Brady later realised, it is a simple matter to apply the Routley Star to this construction to get an inconsistent nontrivial theory; see Brady (1989). Indeed, one would also like to prove the further result that in the inconsistent model, one can distinguish the ordinals, that is, the ordinal structure does not collapse, and this was also shown in Brady. A further straightforward consequence of Brady's techniques was that the theory of the truth predicate and the Liar can be given a similar treatment. An incomplete truth theory was displayed later by Kripke (1975), who did not reference Brady's work and so was presumably unknowing of it. Kripke's construction easily dualises under the Routley Star to an inconsistent theory of the Liar which has somewhat nicer properties than its incomplete twin.

Priest later (1995) proposed a general account of how dialethic paradox arises. The idea is that we attempt to draw a boundary or limit to some conceptual domain, but at the same time the attempt to do so forces us to transcend the limit. He called this *the inclosure schema*. A true contradiction arises if we have independent reason to think that both the boundary drawn and its transcending principle are correct. As a simple example, consider attempts, in the fashion of Russell and Tarski, to solve the paradoxes by stratification of the language. But in even setting these up, they had to stipulate some of the properties of 'all strata', which is speaking in a language that transcends the approved language. Even where the independent reasons are absent, Priest showed convincingly that many important thinkers in the history of philosophy can be described as following an inclosure schema. This lends credence to Priest's general diagnosis of the origin of paradox.

A *third* motivation for paraconsistency is the thought that just possibly an inconsistent account of some physical phenomena might be the stable outcome of long-term investigation or might be supported by a metaphysical argument. While a well-supported inconsistent physical theory has yet to emerge, philosophers should take note of the fact that anomalies abound in physics and mathematics. So it cannot be ruled out a priori that these might persist to the point of being an essential part of our best, long-term investigations of the physical world. A metaphysical defence of a Hegel-style inconsistent theory of motion was given by Priest (1987). While this remains controversial at the time of writing, it cannot be denied that it is ingenious, careful, rigorous, and well-defended and thus deserves to be taken seriously.

A *fourth* motivation for paraconsistency, specifically weak paraconsistency this time, is provided by what is called *the epistemic* or *cognitive* motivation. Irrespective of whether contradictions are true, or true in mathematics, humans show the ability to reason with anomalous data, without deductive collapse. Any halfway decent AI should therefore be able to do the same. Belnap (1977) pointed out that any information-rich control system with more than one source of information must allow for the possibility of conflict between the data sources.

Routley was in the front rank in developing of these ideas, and in a long early paper (1980, written 1976), he surveyed and foreshadowed many of them.

da Costa visited the ANU in 1977 and, in a series of seminars, acquainted the logicians there with Brazilian-style paraconsistent logic. This was based around da Costa's system C_1 and nearby logics, which he had been developing independently of Routley. C_1 is another logic that is paraconsistent but not relevant. One unsolved problem at that time was how to provide an algebraic semantics for C_1. Algebraic semantics proceed by partitioning the formula algebra by a congruence relation (an equivalence relation respecting the connectives). This forms the Lindenbaum algebra for the logic, and describing its properties gives the algebraic semantics. However, Mortensen (1980b) was able to show that C_1 cannot have an algebraic semantics. For a time it seemed to Australians that this was a serious blow to the Brazilian version of the program, because it seems to entail that C_1 cannot have a reasonable implication connective; see Mortensen (1989, written 1981). However it must be said that Brazilian logic has remained alive and well to the present, has many followers among South American logicians, and displays useful applications. Urbas, in his ANU Ph. D. thesis, took up the challenge and showed that there are logics close to the family of C-systems that do have algebraic semantics. Later, Mortensen (1995) came to see that the usual intuitionist logic, that is, the logic of open sets on a topological space, dualises topologically to the logic of closed sets which is paraconsistent and Brazilian style. This constitutes a further rehabilitation of the Brazilian project.

Now we come to an important point: banning ECQ is necessary for avoiding triviality in inconsistent theories, *but it is not generally sufficient*. Curry's paradox shows that triviality follows for naive set theory, irrespective of ECQ and the properties of negation. Curry's paradox follows from minimal properties for the connective →, including Modus Ponens and particularly the theorem Contraction $(A\rightarrow (A\rightarrow B)) \rightarrow (A\rightarrow B)$. This theorem holds in classical two-valued logic, but also in many of the Anderson-Belnap relevant logics, so nontrivial naive set theory cannot be based on those logics. This barrier must be taken into account if the idea of a mathematically useful inconsistent naive set theory is to be implemented. Meyer-Routley-Dunn (Meyer et al. 1979) surveyed this problem. Even worse, banning Contraction isn't enough. Slaney (1989) showed that if the truth-functional connectives with modest properties are allowed in the language—and they could hardly be left out—then again triviality follows. This seems to be at most a problem for *axiomatising* set theory; and at the time of writing, it is generally regarded that inconsistent naive set theory does exist and has useful properties especially nontriviality, if only because Brady's 1971 and 1989 constructions show that this must be so in some reasonable logics.

There is another major hurdle to avoiding a kind of triviality, which arises when we want to apply paraconsistent insights to the construction of inconsistent mathematical theories, particularly mathematics that includes the real numbers, as, for example, calculus does. This is an argument due to Dunn, which shows that if any false equation is added to real number theory, for example, $3=\pi$, and the result closed under substitutivity of identity, then it can be proved that every real number is identical with every other real number. That is, every atomic sentence of the equational theory of real numbers is provable. This is not quite triviality, but it renders the resulting theory useless for doing serious mathematics and was dubbed *mathematical triviality* in Mortensen (2000). How this can be dealt with requires us to look at the prospects for inconsistent mathematics in general, and we turn to this in our final remarks. What we can draw from these two problems, however, is that contradiction-containment is more difficult than a simplistic paraconsistentist abolition of ECQ might imagine.

Paraconsistent logic cries out for rich and interesting mathematical applications in inconsistent theories. Without that, paraconsistency would remain no more than a pimple on the corpus of traditional mathematics. With it, paraconsistent logics have their application *par excellence*. So paraconsistent logic and inconsistent mathematics need each other.

The first steps taken by da Costa and Brady, to create inconsistent naive set theory, were a start, but they were motivated by *foundationalist* concerns: to provide a set-theoretic foundation for mathematics, in the fashion of Bourbaki and others, but having a natural set theory. However, a major breakthrough came when Meyer (1976b) constructed inconsistent integer arithmetic mod 2, in which $0 = 2$ and $0 \neq 2$ both hold. Meyer's aims were consistentist, but not so much foundationalist. He was proving that his preferred *consistent* Peano arithmetic $R^{\#}$, which is based in the relevant logic R, is nontrivial, by providing an inconsistent model in which all theorems of $R^{\#}$ holds, but $0 = 1$ does not hold. This was an important result, because it shows that relevant arithmetic can escape the limitations of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. Indeed, Meyer saw at the time that there is a whole class of models for different moduli, which generate a whole class of inconsistent arithmetics, and that this can be turned to show by finitary means that no false polynomial equation can be proved in $R^{\#}$. The properties of this class of arithmetics were investigated by Meyer and Mortensen (1984).

This lit the torch of inconsistent mathematics. Foundationalism is irrelevant to whether rich inconsistent mathematical theories can be developed. Why develop them? In the words of the mountaineer, because they are there. This provides a *fifth* motivation for paraconsistency, the existence of interesting inconsistent nontrivial mathematical theories. The words 'inconsistent mathematics' seem to have first been used in Mortensen (1987). Order, calculus, the delta function, linear, projective and topological spaces, and category theory all proved to have interesting inconsistent aspects. Dunn's limitative result on the real numbers turned out to be no barrier for most of these theories and could even be sidestepped for those where appeal to the real numbers is essential. At the same time, it remains a caution to overenthusiastic paraconsistentists that triviality can still jump up and bite you from unexpected directions and that banning ECQ won't necessarily save you from that. These results were brought together in Mortensen's book (1995). Priest later contributed by completely characterising the inconsistent models of arithmetic; see Priest (1997, 2000).

Since then, research has moved to geometrical applications. Geometrical theories, consistent that is, can provide models for inconsistent theories. Indeed, this is how Dunn's argument is escaped: just observe how the real plane can be 'rolled up' into a cylinder. While some functionality is lost, much real number arithmetic can still be worked on its surface. But there is also a salient example of inconsistent geometrical figures, for example, in the works of M. C. Escher and the so-called Penrose triangle. The proposal is to describe these figures mathematically using inconsistent geometry, which it would seem is what the brain represents when it views such figures. For initial steps along these lines, see, e.g., Mortensen (1997, 2002, 2006). The example of 'impossible pictures' provides a *sixth* motivation for paraconsistency, a motivation with a certain cognitive flavour in that it seeks mathematical descriptions of internalised inconsistent theories.

This story is a rich chapter in Australian philosophy and world logic. The paraconsistent project is showing no signs of slowing down. A broad conception is emerging, which can be called *the theory of inconsistency*. It is for the younger generation of Australian logicians to take up the challenge and drive it as far forward as it has come to date.

Acknowledgment I have gratefully received help from most of the listed modal logicians in the writing of the section on Modal Logic, but, in particular, I would like to give special thanks to Max Cresswell, Rob Goldblatt, Guido Governatori, Lloyd Humberstone, and Mark Reynolds for supplying me much-detailed information.

References

Ackermann, W. (1956). Begrundung einer strengen implikation. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 21*, 113–128.

Anderson, A., & Belnap, N. (1975). *Entailment: The logic of relevance and necessity* (Vol. 1). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Anderson, A., Belnap, N., & Dunn, J. (1992). *Entailment: The logic of relevance and necessity* (Vol. 2). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Beall, J., Brady, R., Hazen, A., Priest, G., & Restall, G. (2006). Relevant restricted quantification. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 35*, 587–598.

Belnap, N. (1977). How a computer should think. In G. Ryle (Ed.), *Contemporary aspects of philosophy* (pp. 30–35). Stockfield: Oriel Press.

Brady, R. (1971). The consistency of the axioms of abstraction and extensionality in three-valued logic. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 12*, 447–453.

Brady, R. (1983). The simple consistency of a set theory based on the logic CSQ. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 24*, 431–439.

Brady, R. (1984a). Depth relevance of some paraconsistent logics. *Studia Logica, 43*, 63–73.

Brady, R. (1984b). Natural deduction systems for some quantified relevant logics. *Logique et Analyse, 27*, 355–377.

Brady, R. (1989). The non-triviality of dialectical Set theory. In G. Priest, R. Routley, & J. Norman (Eds.), *Paraconsistent logic: Essays on the inconsistent* (pp. 437–470). Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

Brady, R. (1990). The gentzenization and decidability of RW. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 19*, 35–73.

Brady, R. (1991). Gentzenization and decidability of some contraction-less relevant logics. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 20*, 97–117.

Brady, R. (1996a). Gentzenizations of relevant logics with distribution. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 61*, 402–420.

Brady, R. (1996b). Relevant implication and the case for a weaker logic. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25*, 151–183.

Brady, R. (Ed.). (2003a). *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals: Vol. 2. A continuation of the work of Richard Sylvan, Robert Meyer, Val Plumwood and Ross Brady (RLR2)*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Brady, R. (2003b). Semantic decision procedures for some relevant logics. *Australasian Journal of Logic, 1*, 4–27.

Brady, R. (2006a). *Universal logic*. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

Brady, R. (2006b). Normalized natural deduction systems for some relevant logics I: The logic DW. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 71*, 35–66.

Brady, R. (2007). Entailment logic—A blueprint. In J. Beziau, W. Carnielli, & D. Gabbay (Eds.), *Handbook of paraconsistency* (pp. 127–151). London: King's College Publications.

Brady, R., & Rush, P. (2008). What is wrong with Cantor's diagonal argument? *Logique et Analyse, 51*, 85–219.

Bunder, M. (1982). Deduction theorems for weak implicational logics. *Studia Logica, 41*, 95–108.

Bunder, M. (2002). Combinators, proofs and implicational logic. In D. Gabbay & F. Guenthner (Eds.), *Handbook of philosophical logic* (Vol. 6, pp. 229–286). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Bunder, M. (2003). Intersection type systems and logics related to the Meyer-Routley system B+. *Australasian Journal of Logic, 1*, 43–55.

Church, A. (1951). The weak theory of implication. In A. Menne, A. Wilhelmy, & H. Angsil (Eds.), *Kontrolliertes denken, untersuchungen zum logikkalkul und zur logik der einzelwissenschaften* (pp. 22–37). Munich: Kommissions-Verlag Karl Alber.

Copeland, B. (1996). *Logic and reality: Essays on the legacy of Arthur Prior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Copeland, B. (2002). The genesis of possible world semantics. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 31*, 99–137.

Copeland, B. (2006). Meredith, Prior, and the history of possible world semantics. *Synthese, 150*, 373–397.

Copeland, B. (2007). Arthur Prior. In E. Zalta (Ed.), *Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. Stanford University. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prior/

Cresswell, M. (1972). The completeness of S1 and some related systems. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 13*, 485–496.

Cresswell, M. (1973). *Logics and languages*. London: Methuen.

Cresswell, M. (1995a). S1 is not so simple. In *Modality*, *morality*, *and belief* (pp. 29–40). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cresswell, M. (1995b). Incompleteness and the Barcan formula. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 24*, 379–403.

Crossley, J., Ash, C., Brickhill, C., Stillwell, J., & Williams, N. (1972). *What is mathematical logic?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dosen, K. (1992). The first axiomatization of relevant logic. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 21*, 339–356.

Giambrone, S. (1985). TW + and RW + are decidable. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 14*, 235–254.

Girle, R. (2000). *Modal logics and philosophy*. Teddington: Acumen.

Girle, R. (2003). *Possible worlds*. Chesham: Acumen.

Goddard, L. (1977). The paradoxes of confirmation and the nature of natural laws. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 27*, 97–113.

Goddard, L. (1992). A personal view of the development of deductive logic in Australia since 1956. In J. Srzednicki & D. Wood (Eds.), *Essays on philosophy in Australia* (pp. 169–185). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Goddard, L., & Routley, R. (1973). *The logic of significance and context*. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press.

Goldblatt, R. (1987). *Logics of time and computation*. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

Goldblatt, R. (1993). *Mathematics of modality*. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

Goldblatt, R. (2003). Mathematical modal logic: A view of its evolution. *Journal of Applied Logic, 1*, 309–392.

Goldblatt, R. (2011). *Quantifiers, propositions and identity: Admissible semantics for quantified modal and substructural logics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goldblatt, R. (n.d.). George Edward Hughes. In *Wikipedia*. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Edward_Hughes

Halpin, T., & Girle, R. (1981). *Deductive logic*. Brisbane: Logiqpress.

Hamblin, C. (1967). *Elementary formal logic: A programmed course*. London: Methuen.

Hamblin, C. (1970). *Fallacies*. London: Methuen.

Hamblin, C. (1987). *Imperatives*. New York: Basil Blackwell.

Hughes, G., & Cresswell, M. (1968). *An introduction to modal logic*. London: Methuen.

Hughes, G., & Cresswell, M. (1984). *A companion to modal logic*. London: Methuen.

Hughes, G., & Cresswell, M. (1996). *A new introduction to modal logic*. London: Routledge.

Hughes, G., & Londey, D. (1965). *The elements of formal logic*. London: Methuen.

Hyde, D. (2001). Richard (Routley) Sylvan: Writings on logic and metaphysics. *History and Philosophy of Logic, 22*, 181–205.

Hyde, D., & Priest, G. (Eds.). (2000). *Sociative logics and their applications*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Kripke, S. (1975). Outline of a theory of truth. *Journal of Philosophy, 72*, 690–716.

Mares, E. (1997). Relevant logic and the theory of information. *Synthese, 109*, 345–360.

Mares, E. (2004a). *Relevant logic: A philosophical interpretation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mares, E. (2004b). 'Four-Valued' semantics for the relevant logic R. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 33*, 327–341.

Mares, E. (2006). Relevant logic, probabilistic information, and conditionals. *Logique et Analyse, 49*, 399–411.

Mares, E., & Fuhrmann, A. (1995). A relevant theory of conditionals. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 24*, 645–665.

Mares, E., & Goldblatt, R. (2006). An alternative semantics for quantified relevant logic. *Journal of Symbolic Logic, 71*, 163–187.

Martin, E., & Meyer, R. (1982). Solution to the P-W problem. *Journal of Symbolic Logic, 47*, 869–886.

McRobbie, M., & Belnap, N. (1979). Relevant analytic tableaux. *Studia Logica, 38*, 187–200.

McRobbie, M., Thistlewaite, P., & Meyer, R. (1980). A mechanized decision procedure for non-classical logics: The program KRIPKE. *Bulletin of the Section of Logic, 9*, 189–192.

Meyer, R. (1973). On conserving positive logics. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 14*, 224–236.

Meyer, R. (1974). Entailment is not strict implication. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 52*, 212–231.

Meyer, R. (1976a). Metacompleteness. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 17*, 184–190.

Meyer, R. (1976b). Relevant arithmetic (abstract). *Bulletin of the Section of Logic of the Polish Academy of Science, 5*, 133–137.

Meyer, R. (1978). *Why I am not a relevantist* (Research Paper No.1). Logic Group, Research School of the Social Sciences, ANU.

Meyer, R. (1985a). *Proving Semantical Completeness 'Relevantly' for R* (Research Paper No. 8). Logic Group, Research School of the Social Sciences, ANU.

Meyer, R. (1985b). A farewell to entailment. In G. Dorn & P. Weingartner (Eds.), *Foundations of logic and linguistics, problems and their solutions* (pp. 577–636). London: Plenum Press.

Meyer, R. (1998). In memoriam: Richard (Routley) Sylvan, 1935-1996. *Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 4*, 338–340.

Meyer, R., & Martin, E. (1986). Logic on the Australian plan. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15*, 305–332.

Meyer, R., & McRobbie, M. (1982). Multisets and relevant implication. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 60*, 107–139, 265–281.

Meyer, R., & Mortensen, C. (1984). Inconsistent models for relevant arithmetic. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 49*, 917–929.

Meyer, R., & Routley, R. (1972). Algebraic analysis of entailment I. *Logique et Analyse, 15*, 407–428.

Meyer, R., & Routley, R. (1973). Classical relevant logics I. *Studia Logica, 32*, 51–66.

Meyer, R., & Routley, R. (1974). Classical relevant logics II. *Studia Logica, 33*, 183–194.

Meyer, R., Routley, R., & Dunn, J. (1979). Curry's paradox. *Analysis, 39*, 124–128.

Moh, S. (1950). The deduction theorems and two new logical systems. *Methodos, 2*, 56–75.

Mortensen, C. (1980a). Relevant algebras and relevant model structures (Research Paper No. 8). Logic Group, Research School of Social Sciences, ANU.

Mortensen, C. (1980b). Every quotient algebra for C_1 is trivial. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 21*, 694–700.

Mortensen, C. (1983a). The validity of disjunctive syllogism is not so easily proved. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 24*, 35–40.

Mortensen, C. (1983b). Relevance and verisimilitude. *Synthese, 55*, 353–364.

Mortensen, C. (1986). Reply to Burgess and to Read. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 27*, 319–337.

Mortensen, C. (1987). Inconsistent nonstandard arithmetic. *Journal of Symbolic Logic, 52*, 512–518.

Mortensen, C. (1989). Paraconsistency and C_1. In G. Priest, R. Routley, & J. Norman (Eds.), *Paraconsistent logic: Essays on the inconsistent* (pp. 289–305). Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

Mortensen, C. (1995). *Inconsistent mathematics*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Mortensen, C. (1997). Peeking at the impossible. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38*, 527–534.

Mortensen, C. (2000). Prospects for inconsistency. In D. Batens et al. (Eds.), *Frontiers of paraconsistency* (pp. 203–208). London: Research Studies Press.

Mortensen, C. (2002). Towards a mathematics of impossible pictures. In W. Carnielli et al. (Eds.), *Paraconsistency: The logical way to the inconsistent* (pp. 445–454). New York: Marcel Dekker.

Mortensen, C. (2006). An analysis of inconsistent and incomplete necker cubes. *The Australasian Journal of Logic, 4*, 216–225.

Norman, J., & Sylvan, R. (1989). *Directions in relevant logic*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Oppy, G., & Trakakis, N. (Eds.). (2010). *The companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*. Melbourne: Monash University Publishing.

Priest, G. (1979). The logic of paradox. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8*, 219–241.

Priest, G. (1980). Sense, entailment and modus ponens. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 9*, 415–435.

Priest, G. (1987). *In contradiction*. Dordrecht: Nijhoff.

Priest, G. (1995). *Beyond the limits of thought*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Priest, G. (1997). Inconsistent models for arithmetic I: Finite models. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 26*, 223–235.

Priest, G. (2000). Inconsistent models for arithmetic II: The general case. *Journal of Symbolic Logic, 65*, 1519–1529.

Priest, G. (2001). *An introduction to non-classical logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Priest, G., & Sylvan, R. (1992). Simplified semantics for basic relevant logics. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 21*, 217–232.

Prior, A. (1955). *Formal logic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Prior, A. (1957). *Time and modality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Prior, A. (1967). *Past, present and future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Prior, A. (1968). *Papers on time and tense*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rennie, M. (1974). *Some uses of type theory in the analysis of language*. Canberra: Department of Philosophy, Monograph Series No. 1, Research School of the Social Sciences, ANU.

Rennie, M., & Girle, R. (1973). *Logic, theory and practice*. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.

Restall, G. (1993). Simplified semantics for relevant logics (and some of their rivals). *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 22*, 481–511.

Restall, G. (2000). *An introduction to substructural logics*. London: Routledge.

Routley, R. (1975). Universal semantics. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4*, 327–356.

Routley, R. (1977). Ultralogic as universal? *Relevance Logic Newsletter, 2*(50–89), 138–175.

Routley, R. (1980). Problems and solutions in semantics of quantified relevant logics, I. In A. Arruda, R. Chuaqui, & N. da Costa (Eds.), *Proceedings of the fourth Latin American symposium on mathematical logic* (pp. 305–340). Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Routley, R. (1984). The American plan completed: Alternative classical-style semantics, without stars, for relevant and paraconsistent logics. *Studia Logica, 43*, 131–158.

Routley, R., & Meyer, R. (1972a). The semantics of entailment, II. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1*, 53–73.

Routley, R., & Meyer, R. (1972b). The semantics of entailment, III. *Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1*, 192–208.

Routley, R., & Meyer, R. (1973). The semantics of entailment, I. In H. Leblanc (Ed.), *Truth, syntax and modality* (pp. 199–243). Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Routley, R., & Meyer, R. (1976a). Every sentential logic has a two-valued semantics. *Logique et Analyse, 19*, 345–365.

Routley, R., & Meyer, R. (1976b). Dialectical logic, classical logic, and the consistency of the world. *Studies in Soviet Thought, 16*, 1–25.

Routley, R., & Routley, V. (1972). Semantics of first-degree entailment. *Noûs, 3*, 335–359.

Routley, R., & Routley, V. (1975). The role of inconsistent and incomplete theories in the logic of belief. *Communication and Cognition, 8*, 185–235.

Routley, R., & Routley, V. (1985). Negation and contradiction. *Revista Colombiana de Matematicas, 19*, 201–230.

Routley, R., Meyer, R., Plumwood, V., & Brady, R. (1982). *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals: Vol. 1. The basic philosophical and semantical theory (RLR1)*. Atascadero: Ridgeview.

Routley, R., Meyer, R., Brady, R., & Mortensen, C. (1983). *Algebraic analysis of relevant affixing logics, and other Polish connections* (Research Paper No. 16). Logic Group, Research School of the Social Sciences, ANU.

Slaney, J. (1984). A metacompleteness theorem for contraction-free relevant logics. *Studia Logica, 43*, 159–168.

Slaney, J. (1985). 3008 Varieties: A solution to the Ackermann constant problem. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50*, 487–501.

Slaney, J. (1987). Reduced models for relevant logics without WI. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 28*, 395–407.

Slaney, J. (1989). RWX is not curry para consistent. In G. Priest, R. Routley & J. Norman (Eds.), *Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent* (pp. 472-480) Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

Sylvan, R. (1992). Significant moments in the development of Australian logic: In critical appreciation of Leonard Goddard's major contribution. *Logique et Analyse, 35*, 5–44.

History and Philosophy of Science

22

Brian Ellis, Roderick Home, David Oldroyd, Robert Nola,
Howard Sankey, Keith Hutchison, Neil Thomason, John Wilkins,
John Forge, Philip Catton, and Ruth Barton

Contents

Introduction 708
The University Departments Devoted to History and Philosophy of Science and Cognate Areas of Study 711
  The University of Melbourne Department 711
  The University of New South Wales Department 718
  The Sydney University Unit 720

Brian Ellis is the author of the section "Introduction"; Rod Home is the author of the section "The University of Melbourne Department"; David Oldroyd is the author of the sections "The University of New South Wales Department", "The Sydney University Unit", "The Wollongong School", "Deakin and Griffith Universities", and "History of Science in Australia"; the section "Philosophy of Science in Australia" was authored by Brian Ellis, Howard Sankey, Neil Thomason, Keith Hutchison, John Forge, and John Wilkins, with helpful contributions by many others, including Alan Chalmers; Brian Ellis and Keith Hutchison are the authors of the section "Probability"; Neil Thomason is the author of the section "Statistics"; John Wilkins is the author of the section "Philosophy of Biology"; John Forge is the author of the section "The Ethics of Science"; Ruth Barton is the author of the section "History of Science in New Zealand"; Robert Nola is the author of the section "Philosophy of Science in New Zealand"; Philip Catton is the author of the section "Canterbury"; and David Oldroyd and Brian Ellis are the authors of the section "Conclusion".

B. Ellis (✉)
School of Communication, Arts and Critical Enquiry, La Trobe University, Melbourne,
VIC, Australia
e-mail: brian.ellis8@bigpond.com; B.Ellis@latrobe.edu.au

R. Home • H. Sankey • K. Hutchison • N. Thomason • J. Wilkins
School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Parkville,
VIC, Australia
e-mail: home@unimelb.edu.au; chs@unimelb.edu.au; keithrh@gmail.com; neilt@unimelb.edu.au;
john.wilkins@unimelb.edu.au

D. Oldroyd
School of Humanities, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: doldroyd@bigpond.com

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_19, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

The Wollongong School 721
Deakin and Griffith Universities 722
Philosophy of Science in Australia 723
Conventionalism 723
Induction 726
Measurement Theory 727
Scientific Realism I 729
Scientific Methodology 730
The Simultaneity Problem 734
Probability 735
Statistics 736
Scientific Realism II 739
Metaphysics of Science 742
Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics 743
Philosophy of Biology 745
The Ethics of Science 746
History of Science in Australasia 748
History of Science in Australia 748
History of Science in New Zealand 755
Philosophy of Science in New Zealand 757
Karl Popper 758
Otago 759
Auckland 761
Canterbury 763
Conclusion 764
References 766

Introduction

This chapter is concerned primarily with the educational roles and academic contributions of programs in History and Philosophy of Science (hereafter HPS) in Australasia. It focuses mainly on those that are most relevant to the overall project of writing a history of philosophy in Australasia. The philosophy of science has always been an important part of philosophy and so must be given prominence

---

R. Nola
Department of Philosophy, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
e-mail: r.nola@auckland.ac.nz

J. Forge
Unit for History and Philosophy of Science, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: Jforge@science.usyd.edu.au

P. Catton
Department of Philosophy, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
e-mail: philip.catton@canterbury.ac.nz

R. Barton
Department of History, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
e-mail: r.barton@auckland.ac.nz

in this review. But the philosophy of science always needs to be discussed in relation to the history of science and the methodology of its research programs. It seeks to describe, analyse and evaluate the aims, methods and achievements of science. Therefore, it needs to be informed about the history of scientific thought and discovery and to have a good understanding of scientific research methods. The history, methodology and philosophy of science are, of course, three different enquiries, but it is hard to see how any one of them could be pursued with success independently of the others. HPS departments around the world have generally acknowledged this fundamental interdependence of aims, and have sought, with varying degrees of success, to accommodate them.

But if there is an interdependence of aims embraced by the history and philosophy of science, there are similar interdependences of aims that must be embraced by all philosophers concerned with epistemology, metaphysics, or the theory of rationality. For the history of scientific thought cannot be understood independently of the history of philosophy in these areas, or conversely. Since classical times, philosophy and science have always evolved together, each influencing, and being influenced by, the other. Plato was a Pythagorean with a deep knowledge of the mathematical and scientific achievements of this mystical sect. His *Timaeus*, for example, cannot be fully appreciated without an adequate knowledge of Pythagoreanism. Aristotle had extensive knowledge of the sciences of his day and made substantial contributions to them. Descartes was a major contributor to the seventeenth-century Scientific Revolution. His *Discourse on method*, which most students of philosophy have read, was the introduction to a scientific text, originally entitled *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason*, *and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*. The British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, and the various philosophers of the Enlightenment were all, in their different ways, responding to the Scientific Revolution. So the study of this Revolution must be an important foundation for the study of modern epistemology, as well as of metaphysics and logic.

Most, if not all, philosophers of the nineteenth century accepted something like a Newtonian worldview. But the status of humankind and the capacities of people to know or understand the nature of reality were still in doubt. Early in that century, humans were commonly thought to occupy a special place in nature, as beings created in the image of God. But the work of the geologist Charles Lyell and the naturalist Charles Darwin between them made this seem unlikely. In changing people's views about geological and biological evolution, and the time scales in which these processes took place, they radically changed the way people thought about their role and significance in the world. Therefore, to understand the philosophy of any period in Western thought, it is important to have some knowledge and understanding of the science of that time.

Arguably, the founders of HPS as an area of study were Auguste Comte (1798–1857) and William Whewell (1794–1866). Comte was a tutor and examiner at the *École Polytechnique* in Paris at the time of writing his six-volume *Philosophie Positive* (1830–1842) and Whewell a professor at Trinity College, Cambridge, when he wrote his *History of the Inductive Sciences* (1837).

These two works effectively defined the initial scope and the original research program of HPS. Comte's writings, which were grounded in an extensive knowledge of the history of science, laid the foundations of the positivist(ic) philosophy of science that was to be elaborated by Ernst Mach (Vienna), Henri Poincaré (Paris) and Pierre Duhem (Paris) and subsequently developed by the philosophers of the Vienna Circle into what we now know as logical positivism. Whewell's monumental work was a narrative history of science that attempted to explain, and thus make intelligible, the principal scientific developments in astronomy, mechanics, heat theory, optics, mineralogy and so on, from ancient times. It inspired research and scholarship into the history of scientific thinking and reasoning and gave the world a contemporary overview of the conceptual history of science up to what was then the present time. Mach and Duhem were followers of this tradition, as well as of the positivist one.

For contemporary readers, Mach's *Science of mechanics* (1902) and Duhem's *Aim and Structure of Physical Theory* (1906) are still classics (and paradigms) of the HPS genre. They are at once historical and philosophical, and the philosophy they articulated was brought to life and given significance by examples taken from the narrative histories of the sciences with which they were concerned. But, of course, the story did not end with Mach and Duhem. Their writings challenged the scientists of their day to justify their conceptualisations of reality and forced the philosophers of the period to reconsider their metaphysics. Given the timing of their works and the magnitude of the task of elaborating a philosophy of science adequate for the new scientific developments of the early years of the twentieth century, the positivist movement became both strong and influential.

But for most of the first half of the twentieth century, such studies remained the province of a select few. There was no systematic attempt to develop either the history or the philosophy of science as a university subject. Distinguished professors gave lectures on various aspects of the history or the philosophy of science to their students—mostly to science students. There were some ongoing research programs in both of these areas, and a powerful 'unity of science' movement formed in the 1930s. But in the early years of the century, there was little appreciation of the general educational or cultural value of such studies though students were often required to include science subjects in their first degrees in the USA. In Scotland, they had to include at least one science or mathematics subject in their BA; and Australia largely followed the Scottish model. Indeed, the University of Melbourne introduced this requirement on its BA degree right from the start, in 1855.

However, these requirements were evidently not enough. Science was in the ascendancy, and it was growing rapidly in influence in all parts of the civilised world. Yet it was becoming less and less intelligible and more and more foreign in its outlook, even to university-educated people. Consequently, there was a growing belief in university circles that something should be done to bridge the gulf that was perceived to be widening between the sciences and the humanities. Whether this gulf was real, or was much greater than it had been in the nineteenth century, is not clear. But the power of science was certainly real, and the creation of areas of study that sought to close the gap was a natural response to this situation.

In 1977, Diana Dyason of the University of Melbourne's HPS Department summarised the response as it developed at Harvard University as follows:

> In the mid-1940s an interfaculty committee was appointed at Harvard University to determine what form of education should be adopted if the survival and 'safety of democracy' was to be ensured. The committee scrutinised the content and presuppositions of the existing general education program provided by the first degree, then, turning to new programs, emphasised the need for courses which would make students aware of a cultural heritage to which the scientific tradition had significantly contributed. From this committee's seminal publication, *General Education in a Free Society* (Harvard University Report 1945), is it quite clear that they regarded the standard science courses as totally inadequate. Probably as a result of Conant's[1] influence the committee advocated HPS-type courses because they exemplified an extremely important strand of our heritage, because they provided insights into the distinction between propaganda and the nature of true knowledge, and because (through case studies) they could provide insights into the nature, tactics and strategies of science. These Harvard programs influenced the pattern of liberal arts courses across the United States and overseas as well; it would, for instance, be hard to overestimate the influence of Conant's works on the courses for arts students developed by the HPS Department at Melbourne during its formative period.

In what follows an account is given of how, inspired by Conant's ideas and others, studies of history and philosophy of science were established in Australasia, how they developed, evolved and differentiated, and then to a considerable extent declined.

The University Departments Devoted to History and Philosophy of Science and Cognate Areas of Study

The University of Melbourne Department

The response in Melbourne was, then, inspired by the Harvard initiatives and was similarly motivated. It was felt that Arts students, in particular, needed to have a better understanding of science as a process of discovery and intellectual achievement, such as the new Harvard approach was intended to provide, than they could obtain by studying an ordinary first-year Science subject designed for students intending to major in science.

In late 1945, Clarence E. Palmer was appointed to a senior lectureship in 'General Science and Scientific Method' at the University of Melbourne, with a brief to teach a range of courses in the history of science and in scientific method to Arts undergraduates. He taught the first course in the following year. In making this appointment, and in giving Palmer the degree of independence that it did, the University effectively established the department that was to become, after two name changes, the Department of History and Philosophy of Science.

---

[1] James Bryant Conant, author (with L. K. Nash) of the influential two-volume *Harvard Case Studies in Experimental Science* (1957).

There was also interest in the Medical Faculty, which in 1946 agreed to include a course of lectures in scientific method in the first year of the medical degree course. It was taught for the first time in 1947. Unfortunately, while attendance at the lectures was compulsory, supporters of the initiative were unable to persuade their medical colleagues that the subject should be examinable. Predictably, discipline problems emerged, and in 1953 attendance at the lectures was made optional. The course continued to be taught for another 10 years, but, as one of those involved in teaching it, Diana Dyason, later recounted, she and her colleagues 'found the experience totally frustrating'.

In the meantime, an Arts program in HPS expanded into a 3-year sequence of subjects that could constitute a major within the BA degree, while in 1954 a subject was also introduced within the Science degree, being directed primarily at intending science teachers. The first postgraduate students enrolled in the late 1950s, while an Honours school followed in 1959. What had begun as a purely pedagogical initiative was thus gradually transformed into a full-scale and distinctive academic program with its own subject matter and standards.

The growing teaching load had implications for the staffing of the fledgling department. When Palmer was offered a visiting position at UCLA for the 1947–1948 northern academic year, Gerd Buchdahl was appointed as a temporary replacement, but then when Palmer decided to stay in the USA, Buchdahl's position became a continuing one. He was joined soon afterwards by Diana Dyason, who transferred from the University's Physiology Department, primarily to teach the medical course. Two years later, John Clendinnen joined the group. Other appointments followed later in the 1950s, including Elizabeth Gasking, Brian Ellis and Leonard Trengove. When Buchdahl took a year's sabbatical leave in 1954, Stephen Toulmin, then a lecturer in philosophy of science at Oxford, was Acting Head of Department for 12 months. Then, in 1958, Buchdahl resigned to take up a position in HPS at Cambridge, and Dyason took his place as Head.

As at Harvard, though at first independently to judge from the dates, the discussions of scientific method that gave the new department at Melbourne its *raison d'être* were presented in the context of selected historical case studies built around the analysis of scientists' ideas as presented in their original writings. In Palmer's initial syllabus, four such case studies were pursued, namely, Newtonian mechanics with applications to astronomy, the electronic theory of valency and the Mendelian and neo-Darwinian theories of inheritance. In time, extensive collections of source materials—extracts from the original scientific writings—were assembled for purchase by students in lieu of textbooks.

Gerd Buchdahl had arrived in Australia in 1940 at the age of 26 on the *Dunera*, as one of the famous shipload of German Jewish refugees who had been interned in England before being sent to Australia and who were later to contribute greatly to the new society in which they so unexpectedly found themselves. Trained as an engineer, he already evinced a passion for philosophy, giving lectures on Plato and Aristotle on board ship and afterwards in the internment camp in Australia. Once freed, he studied the subject formally at the University of Melbourne and was recruited by Palmer shortly after completing an honours degree. A Master's degree followed while he was lecturing in HPS. He began publishing immediately, with papers appearing in leading journals such as *Mind*, the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* and the *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*. While his later international reputation rested largely on writings on Kant, published after his move to Cambridge, Buchdahl's concern with metaphysics in relation to science and his historically sensitive approach to philosophical questions were already evident in papers that he wrote in Melbourne.

While Buchdahl was a philosopher who looked primarily to physics for his historical case studies, Dyason's interests were chiefly historical and related primarily to biology and medicine. In time, she came to focus especially on the history of public health, including, in later years, in Australia. While she never published a great deal, the seminar she developed in the 1970s on 'Glorious Smelbourne' became a local institution. Elizabeth Gasking also worked on the history of biology, completing an MA and then a PhD on the history of ideas about generation and inheritance before publishing two books on the subject (Gasking 1967, 1970). Her untimely death in 1974 was a major loss for the Department. The Cornishman Leonard Trengove was a historian of chemistry with a PhD from University College London. He published a number of papers on eighteenth-century chemistry during his 10 years in Melbourne.

John Clendinnen studied philosophy at Melbourne before joining HPS. During the following 2 decades, he taught almost every subject offered by the Department before eventually limiting his teaching to his primary area of interest, the philosophy of science. In time, he also developed a significant international reputation, based chiefly on a series of publications on the problem of induction. The appointment of Brian Ellis, who joined the Department in 1956 after studying with J. J. C. Smart at Adelaide and H. H. Price at Oxford, brought additional strength in philosophy of science. During his 10 years in the Department before being appointed foundation Professor of Philosophy at La Trobe University, Ellis developed in his teaching many of the ideas that eventually found their way into his book *Basic Concepts of Measurement* (1966).

Two other long-serving members of staff joined the Department at the beginning of the 1960s. John Pottage taught history of mathematics for many years with a focus on classical geometry, his particular interest being the creative process involved in arriving at mathematical understanding. Monica MacCallum, one of the Department's first honours graduates, was involved in its first-year teaching for many years, initially as a tutor and later, after the University switched to semester-long subjects, as lecturer in charge of the first-year History of Astronomy unit. She later taught an upper-level unit on the history of Darwinism for a number of years.

In general, the 1960s saw specialisation within the Department and a weakening of the overriding focus on scientific method that had provided the glue that held everything together in earlier days. While the historians found challenges enough in the search for historical understanding of the science of the past, the philosophers found issues to address in the philosophy of science that had little, if anything, to do with scientific methodology.

In 1967, the vacancy created by Ellis's departure for La Trobe was filled by a historian of science, Roderick Home, a Melbourne graduate who had recently completed a PhD on eighteenth-century theories of electricity at Indiana University. He stayed for many years, being appointed the University's first (and so far only) Professor of History and Philosophy of Science in 1975, continuing in this position until his retirement in 2003. In his hands, the Department's second-year offering became a course in the history of the philosophy of science, focusing on theories of matter and change and ranging from the pre-Socratics to the nineteenth-century chemical atomic theory. But following the switch to semester-long subjects, this was reduced to a single-semester subject focused on the Scientific Revolution. Home also introduced a course in the historiography of science for third-year history of science students and regularly taught honours-cum-postgraduate seminars on eighteenth-century science.

The eighteenth-century orientation was strengthened by the appointment in 1974 of an American historian of chemistry, Homer Le Grand, a University of Wisconsin graduate whose research focused on the 'Chemical Revolution' associated with the work of Lavoisier and his colleagues in the last decades of that century. With Dyason, Home and Le Grand contributing, the Department was thus able to play a considerable role in the Arts Faculty's interdepartmental honours course in eighteenth-century studies that flourished for a number of years. In pursuit of his overriding interest in the process of theory change in science, which was also central to his teaching, Le Grand (1998) later took up research on the rise of plate tectonic theory in geology and in due course published an authoritative book on this subject. Thereafter, however, he became increasingly involved in university administration, serving a 6-year stint as Melbourne's Dean of Arts before moving in the late 1990s to the equivalent position at Monash University.

The early 1970s also saw the appointment of Henry Krips, an Adelaide graduate who had studied philosophy with Smart while working on a PhD on the foundations of quantum mechanics, to the Department's second position in philosophy of science. At Melbourne, he continued working on this topic, leading eventually to his book, *The Metaphysics of Quantum Theory* (1987). By then, however, his interests had moved in the direction of cultural studies, as had most of his upper-level teaching, and he resigned in 1992 to take up a position in communication studies in the USA.

From the mid-1970s, the number of postgraduate students in the Department, always small until then, grew rapidly. Many were mature-age students, and few came with a background of undergraduate studies in HPS. Programs of preliminary studies were devised to cater for the needs of individual students; these normally comprised a mixture of the Department's undergraduate and Honours offerings that students were required to complete before commencing work on their theses. In order to give students a stronger formal background in the field, it eventually also became standard practice to require them to do further coursework (usually research-orientated seminars keyed to the research interests of the member of staff involved) while working on their theses. Theses dealt with a wide range of topics, and, with one exception, there was little sense of a research group forming around a member of staff and focusing on a particular area of inquiry.

The exception was the history of Australian science, which Home developed in the 1980s as a second major area of interest. The rich and largely untouched archival sources available locally underpinned the research projects of a significant number of students who were drawn into working on Australian topics. When the Department introduced a coursework Master's program in the early 1990s, a locally based historical investigation also proved an attractive option for many students for the research project that constituted the final component of their course. Home published extensively in the area, and in 1984 he became editor of the Australian Academy of Science's journal, *Historical Records of Australian Science* (a position he still holds at the time of writing). In addition, he edited two substantial collections of essays: Home (1988) and Home and Kohlstedt (1991). Later, he led an international team preparing an edition of the massive surviving correspondence of arguably the most important Australian scientist of the nineteenth century, Ferdinand von Mueller. Three volumes of selected correspondence have been published (Home et al. 1998–2006), and also numerous papers. The complete surviving correspondence and a biography are still to come.

In addition to increasing numbers of postgraduate students, from the mid-1970s, the Department also witnessed a steady stream of productive postdoctoral research fellows, most of whom were funded for a period of 2 years. Among these were Aharon Kantorovitch, Stephen Gaukroger, Keith Hutchison, Andrew Pyle, Richard Gillespie, Pierre Kerszberg and Robert Stafford. But in the early 1990s, the University abandoned its scheme of centrally funded, competitively awarded fellowships, and the flow of postdoctoral fellows ceased. In due course Hutchison and Gillespie joined the Department's lecturing staff. Gillespie later moved to a position at the Melbourne Museum, but Hutchison continued in the Department until his retirement in 2006, publishing a number of significant papers on the science of the Early Modern period and others on the foundations of statistics.

During these years, a number of scholars from other parts of Australia chose to spend periods of study leave in the Department. In addition, the Department attracted many international visitors. Some of these—including such well-known figures as Wesley Salmon, Richard S. Westfall, Larry Laudan, Bruno Latour, Sally Gregory Kohlstedt, Allan Franklin and John Henry—stayed for several months and contributed significantly to the teaching program. Others came for one of the numerous conferences hosted by the Department, or to undertake collaborative research with a member of the Department, or simply as a visiting speaker.

Alarmed by the general neglect of Australia's scientific heritage and the consequent destruction of precious archival materials, Home established the Australian Science Archives Project (ASAP—later the Australian Science and Technology Heritage Centre; see further section "History of Science in Australasia") in 1985, with Gavan McCarthy as archivist in charge. With the growth of ASAP, a number of postgraduate students also found part-time employment with the Project, listing collections of records that in several cases then provided the basis for their thesis research. Though always funded with 'soft money', the Project survived and indeed became a world leader in the provision of history of science information online, while the archiving software that it developed is used in a number of countries. In 2007, it became the eScholarship Research Centre within the University's Information Services Division but retains a strong focus on the history of Australian science, technology and medicine.

During the early 1980s, during Home's term as President of the Australasian Association for History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science (see section "History of Science in Australasia"), there was discussion about the possibility of the Association's establishing a journal. However, the likely lack of focus of any journal that attempted to cover the very wide range of interests represented in the Association posed a problem. As a means of addressing this, Home in 1982 launched a monograph series, *Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, published by D. Reidel (later Kluwer Academic Publishers), in which individual volumes focused on particular themes within the broader field of HPS. With Home as General Editor, an Editorial Board made up of leading members of the HPS communities of Australia and New Zealand, and specialist editors for individual volumes, the series had extended to 17 high-quality volumes by the time Home passed the editorship to Stephen Gaukroger, now at the University of Sydney, in 2002.[2]

With the retirement of several long-serving members of the Department in the second half of the 1980s, new staff were appointed, some of whom took it in new directions. The Canadian historian of twentieth-century biology, Jan Sapp, spent six lively years in the Department (1984–1990), his work being explicitly informed by his commitment to Bourdieu's approach to the history of science. Helen Verran was hired to coordinate the Department's coursework Master's program when this was introduced in 1990. Her contributions to the teaching program, both in the Master's course and at undergraduate level and in the many postgraduate theses she has supervised, were shaped by a belief in the social construction of scientific knowledge and a commitment to ethnographic research methods and the actor-network methodology developed by Bruno Latour. Rosemary Robins and Annie Dugdale extended the Department's coverage to the sociology of contemporary science. Dugdale did not stay for long, but Robins did, until she resigned in 2010 to take up the law. Her research focused on public perceptions of the risks associated with scientific research. This gave her a public role, notably as a member for a number of years of the Australian Government's Genetic Manipulation Advisory Committee.

---

[2] In 1984, AAHPSSS also founded a general HPS journal, titled *Metascience*. It was edited in succession by Randall Albury (UNSW), Michael Shortland (Sydney), John Forge (Griffith) and Nicolas Rasmussen (University of New South Wales). However, after a promising start as an 'orthodox' journal, it seemed no longer to be an attractive outlet for the senior people in the field in Australasia, and so under Shortland's editorship, it became a review journal, or one devoted exclusively to book reviews (long or short) over the whole field of HPS (or metascience). It flourished in this form, and the editorship moved out of Australasia to Steven French at Leeds University and then to Stathis Psillos in Greece. But at the time of writing by far the majority of the members of the Editorial Board are still located in Australia. The journal was for a time published by Reidel and subsequently by Springer. It is now of good standing and the only journal of its kind in the world.

The coursework Master's program was aimed at science communicators (including teachers) and people with managerial responsibilities in technical enterprises. It attracted strong enrolments for a number of years and—something that had not been anticipated—significant numbers of those completing the course subsequently enrolled for PhDs. A change in Government policy proved fatal for the program, however, when students undertaking coursework higher degrees were no longer eligible for Government-supported places and were therefore obliged to pay much higher fees than previously. Enrolments in the Master's program collapsed and it was phased out soon afterwards.

From the early 1990s, philosophy of science was in the hands of Neil Thomason and Howard Sankey. Sankey focused on broad epistemological questions (see section "Philosophy of Science in Australia"), notably the alleged incommensurability of competing scientific paradigms. Meanwhile Thomason was more concerned to analyse instances of actual scientific practice, especially in relation to the use of statistics, on which he published a number of important papers. In time, a lively group of postgraduate students working in this area grew up around him.

In the hands of Warwick Anderson, appointed in 1995, history of medicine also remained an integral part of the Department's activities, and in 1997, with Anderson as Director, the Centre for the Study of Health and Society (now the Centre for Health and Society) was established as a joint initiative of the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences. Anderson's interests focused on the role of medicine in Western colonialism, in Australia and elsewhere. He was joined in the Centre and in the Department by Janet McCalman, an already well-established social historian with a rapidly expanding interest in medically related issues. While Anderson later moved to the USA, McCalman served for several years as Head of Department from 2001 and was promoted to a personal chair in 2003.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Department became host to a number of other teaching and research programs within the Faculty of Arts, including Social Theory, Anthropology and Computer Applications for Humanities and the Social Sciences. After an 8-year association, Anthropology was transferred in 1999 to a new School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies, but the other two programs remained linked to HPS. The lecturer in Computer Applications, Michael Arnold, developed a research program in the sociology of modern computer technology, and his appointment was eventually redefined as a position in HPS.

The Faculty of Arts was restructured at the beginning of 2007, with the traditional academic departments being merged into larger schools. The Department of HPS at the University of Melbourne ceased to exist at that time. HPS continues, however, as a teaching and research program within the new School of Historical and Philosophical Studies. A further wave of retirements, at a time when the Faculty's budget was in serious deficit, saw the number of HPS staff decline, as vacated positions (including Home's chair) were not always refilled. Several promising young scholars have, however, been appointed, on whom the future of the discipline at Melbourne depends at the time of writing.

The University of New South Wales Department

Australia's second HPS centre was established at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. This institution, founded in 1949, grew from a former Technical College and was at first largely concerned with applied science and engineering. But—under the influence of C. P. Snow's ideas on the 'Two Cultures'—the first Vice-Chancellor (Philip Baxter) thought that the Science and Engineering students would benefit from including some Humanities subjects in their programs; and a Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences was established to provide such courses, with schools of English, Philosophy and History being the first to be established therein. In 1959, following the initiative of John (Jack) Thornton in the School of Philosophy, a course on Scientific Method was introduced for Science students. The following year, a Faculty of Arts was established and became responsible for the Humanities program for Science and Engineering students, but this responsibility soon passed to a special General Studies unit.

With all the Science students by then studying some Humanities subjects, by a kind of tit-for-tat argument (also 'Two Cultures' inspired), Arts students were required to take 2 years of Science subjects. And since this requirement could be met by taking 'Scientific Thought' (or History and Philosophy of Science) units, many Arts students had little option but to take them as they were unequipped to study full science units. These subjects were presented in the first instance in the School of Philosophy, but that led to a split within the School, and in 1966 a separate School of History and Philosophy of Science was established under Professor Thornton. Three main courses were offered in three successive years: on the history of astronomy/Copernican Revolution (Thornton), the Darwinian Revolution (in which considerable attention was also given to the 'Lyellian Revolution') (William Leatherdale), and the social history and sociology/social history of science (Robert Gascoigne). Initially, Years I and II were compulsory for Arts students (unless they took some 'straight' Science subjects), but in 1967 the requirement was reduced to 1 year.

Thornton's first-year course (for about a thousand students) was a *tour de force* from the point of view of presentation, being based on his ideas about the nature of scientific knowledge and hypothetico-deductive methodology and his own collected empirical observations. Students were 'invited' (required) to make their own naked-eye observations of the heavens and then *explain* them in terms of alternative hypotheses—which, however, nearly always turned out to be the Ptolemaic or Copernican models of the cosmos! It was indeed a good introduction to 'sick thought', as many students unaffectionately dubbed the subject, but because of the element of compulsion attached to it, teaching the subject became a dead weight on the school. The second-year course also involved an element of compulsion, even after the HPS II requirement was lifted, in that if mediocre students passed HPS I but failed some other subjects, they were, willy-nilly, pushed towards HPS II and perhaps even HPS III. On the other hand, some students found a whole new interest in science from the School of HPS.

In 1970, all the Science requirements for Arts were lifted, and the following year the first-year course numbers fell from approximately a thousand to about a hundred. However, the School weathered the storm and rebuilt itself in several ways: by moving its subjects in the direction of 'history of ideas', by bringing in courses (and appointing staff) on environmental studies and science policy, by moving its philosophy of science courses in the direction of cognitive science, by introducing history of medicine, etc. Also, HPS began to be offered to Science (but not Engineering or Medicine) and Science Education students as well as Arts. With the appointment of new staff such as David Miller (from Edinburgh University) and Randall Albury (a new PhD from Johns Hopkins), it developed new work in the direction of the sociology of knowledge, the history of technology and the history of medicine. In time, the undergraduate students settled down to a ratio of about two to one, Arts to Science. The better students tended to come from Arts.

However, having lost its original 'Two Cultures' rationale, the School was pushed and pulled by the conflicting interests of its own staff, the predatory intent of other schools, the interests of higher University powers, and the attempts to achieve cost savings by school amalgamations. The School might have had considerable success in the field of environmental studies early on through the appointment in 1971 of Professor George Seddon, who had great interest and expertise in that field. But he only stayed 2 years, soon moving to Melbourne University to head a new Centre for Environmental Studies.

It was then thought (notably by Pro-Vice-Chancellor Ray Golding) that science policy work would be a good direction for the School to pursue. But it never came to much, as Professor Jarlath Ronayne, who was appointed to the chair in 1976 from Griffith University (see section "Deakin and Griffith Universities") with an informal remit to move the School in that direction, was primarily interested in promotion by administration and became successively Dean of the Faculty, then a Pro-Vice-Chancellor, and eventually Vice-Chancellor of Victoria University, Melbourne.

The School did, however, run a successful MSc program in 'Science and Society' for about 15 years, headed initially by George Bindon (appointed from Concordia University, Montreal) and then Gavan McDonell (from the business world of technological consultancy, but who had also written a PhD in Sociology at UNSW in his spare time). This evening-course program attracted many excellent students, two of whom subsequently joined the staff: John Merson from the ABC Science Unit and Paul Brown, a geologist by training who had been working for Greenpeace. But the program foundered in 1996 (as did many other part-time Master's programs in Australia) after the Government introduced heavy fees for coursework postgraduate studies.

Another postgraduate Master's program, in Cognitive Science, was also developed by Peter Slezak, one of the two philosophers of science in the School. This was very much an interdisciplinary program, with links to Philosophy, Psychology, Linguistics, Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience. It was perhaps a bit incongruous to have HPS as the centre of this web, though Slezak was assisted by two HPS colleagues, Anthony Corones and John Merson and staff from other schools participating in the program. He was convinced that cognitive science could, should and would provide the way forward for developments in philosophy of science, a view that was not generally shared by his colleagues, and his program rather distanced itself from the rest of the School. Eventually, the

MCogSci program, though attracting many excellent students, also had to close, after fees were introduced for part-time Master's courses.

Randall Albury eventually gained a chair and became Head of School, but fairly soon thereafter he went off to become a Pro-Vice-Chancellor at the University of New England. During his term of office, the School re-branded itself as the School of Science and Technology Studies, but after his departure, it reverted to HPS. Since 2007, it has been linked with the departments of Philosophy and History in a large School of History and Philosophy. By the 1990s nobody was keen to take on the ever-increasing administrative burdens of headship of a small school of uncertain identity and future, and so a succession of short-term appointments was made: David Miller, David Oldroyd, John Schuster (who joined the School from Wollongong University) and Nicolas Rasmussen (who moved from Sydney University to UNSW in 1997). After a major Faculty restructuring in 2007, HPS joined Philosophy and History in one large School ('History and Philosophy'), for which Paul Brown became its first Head, with Stephen Healy heading the HPS component.

The work done in the HPS Department at UNSW has reflected the individual interests of a disparate group of staff. Its direction and true identity have for long been uncertain, and too many of its staff have hankered after career opportunities elsewhere, or have sought to fashion the School in their own image, so to speak (but not from the position of professors of worldwide renown). The best research publications have probably come from its historians, who did not wish to occupy any other than the one they already occupied niche.

The Sydney University Unit

At the University of Sydney, a full-time position in HPS was created within the Science faculty in 1974 and the Australian Ian Langham (PhD, Princeton) was appointed. Though assisted by the philosopher of science Alan Chalmers from General Philosophy and some part-time staff from UNSW, he had an uphill task in trying to cover the many fields of HPS largely on his own. His personal interests were in the history of evolution and anthropology. But Langham suffered a tragic death in 1984 and his position was filled by Chalmers, who was joined by an Oxonian, Michael Shortland, in 1990—a manic worker and brilliant lecturer—who worked on, among other things, the histories of natural history and geology. But Shortland's stay was relatively short lived. He was succeeded by the philosopher Peter Anstey, an authority on John Locke and Robert Boyle, who subsequently moved to Otago to take up the Chair in Early Modern Philosophy. Gradually the unit grew, with the appointment, for fairly short periods, of Nicolas Rasmussen (mentioned above), the philosopher of biology Paul Griffiths, and from 2000 to 2006 by Rachel Ankeny, a PhD in HPS from Pittsburgh who specialized in bioethics. She headed the Sydney unit for a time before moving to a position in the School of History and Politics at Adelaide University. At the time of writing, the unit (or in effect a department) has seven relatively young staff: Ofer Gal (Scientific Revolution, especially the work of Hooke and Newton), Jane Johnson (ethics of biomedical research and a Hegelian theory of rights), Caroline Mills (bioethics and

Continental philosophy), Dominic Murphy (psychiatry and cognitive neuroscience), Hans Pols (history of medicine), Dean Rickles (quantum theory, especially the history of quantum gravity studies) and Charles Wolfe (history and philosophy of the life sciences in the Enlightenment). It is seemingly flourishing, aided by its contacts with Philosophy, Biology and other Science departments.

The Wollongong School

When founded in 1951, what is now Wollongong University was a branch of the New South Wales University of Technology (later UNSW), and as such it had to follow in broad terms the same curriculum as that which operated at UNSW. Thus in the 1960s it too had a compulsory science requirement for Arts students. Wollongong's HPS courses were initially taught by a psychologist, Ronald Francis, so when he went on leave, the HPS School at UNSW had to send down a visiting lecturer to do the teaching. In the early 1970s, Francis was replaced by historians of science, John Panter and Evelleen Richards, both from UNSW, who were later joined by Louise Crossley who had been teaching HPS at Sydney University before the appointment of Ian Langham (see above) and was recruited to teach a course on Science and Society. The Department continued under Panter's headship and John Forge, also from UNSW, was added to the staff. But Crossley left to join the Powerhouse Museum project and then became involved in Antarctic research. Panter moved to head up Wollongong's Audio-Visual Unit.

After Wollongong University became independent in 1975, a decision had to be made as to whether to close down the HPS program or enlarge it into a School with a Chair. After considerable debate and delay, the latter course was taken, and Ron Johnston, a man from Manchester University interested in science policy and the sociology of science, was appointed; and from 1980 he led the school in the direction of 'science and technology studies' rather than HPS per se. Nevertheless, history of science was continued by the Darwin scholar Richards and strengthened by the appointment of John Schuster, an American, who came (via Cambridge, UK) with a Princeton PhD, who had studied under Thomas Kuhn. But the philosopher of science John Forge (from Oxford and University College London, via a tutorship at UNSW) unaccountably did not have his appointment extended, and he moved to Griffith University. Other appointments were made in the STS area, including Sharon Beder, David Mercer, Brian Martin, Stewart Russell, Richard Badham and Jim Falk. Beder, originally an engineer, became a respected author on technological matters, starting from her PhD at UNSW on the sewage and sewerage of the Sydney region. She published several influential books, and her opinion was frequently sought when Sydney's sewerage system became a matter of serious public concern. Johnston subsequently went off to head a Centre for Research Policy at Wollongong (and later the Australian Centre for Innovation at Sydney University), and Falk (originally a PhD in theoretical physics from Monash University) was appointed to the Chair. He wrote on nuclear technology, the greenhouse threat and other 'modern' issues but soon felt a pull towards university administration and held a number of senior appointments before becoming Director of the Australian Centre for Science, Innovation and Society at Melbourne University.

It will be seen from the above that the Wollongong group was ‘bimodal’. It had ‘classical’ HPS staff like Richards, Schuster, Forge and Mercer (a PhD graduate from UNSW) alongside a variety of science and technology policy people. The marriage was not successful, however, and for several years, there was almost a state of warfare in the unit, with lawyers involved! Eventually most of the STS people went their ways (mostly upwards). Richards took early retirement. Beder concentrated on her writing, while Schuster moved to UNSW, in time becoming Head of the HPS School there. Several of the STS people went into university management. Russell returned to the UK and is presently Deputy Director of the Institute for Studies of Science, Technology and Innovation at Edinburgh University. Badham ended up as Professor at the Macquarie University Graduate School of Management. What remains at Wollongong is a very small unit so far as HPS is concerned, though a historian of Mediaeval science and technology, Adam Lucas (PhD, UNSW), has recently been appointed. David Mercer presently covers many historical topics over a range of fields and periods.

Deakin and Griffith Universities

Deakin University was founded in 1975, growing from the Gordon Institute of Technology in Geelong, Victoria. The first Vice-Chancellor was Fred Jevons, previously Professor of Science Policy at Manchester University. Like Baxter at UNSW, he thought it desirable that the ‘two-culture’ divide should be bridged, and his view was that social studies of science (SSS) could serve that end. Accordingly, that field became one of the ‘area studies’ established in the University’s Humanities program, an idea supported by the Philosophy Professor Max Charlesworth, who had an interest in philosophy of science. The new unit was headed by a Canadian, Wade Chambers, supported (at different times) by Struan Jacobs, Lyndsay Farrall, Jock McCulloch, David Turnbull, Terry Stokes and Barry Bucher, the last three all having PhDs from Melbourne. Deakin was for a time significantly involved in outreach teaching, like the Open University in Britain, and the SSS unit had its best days in the 1980s. But like all the HPS-type units in Australasia, it had an ‘identity problem’ and underwent various amalgamations and restructurings, at one time being linked in an unlikely marriage with Religious Studies. The group was eventually disbanded in 2003, but David Turnbull remains well known for his ideas in the sociology of knowledge and his studies of maps and their social significance, traditional navigation methods, the work of Mediaeval stonemasons, etc. (Turnbull 2000).

At Griffith University in Brisbane, a Science Policy Research Centre (SPRC) was founded in 1975 by Jarlath Ronayne (who had taught science policy with Jevons at Manchester University). But he was interested in the UNSW chair, which, as mentioned above, he gained in 1976. The historian Ann Moyal, who had interests in science, technology and society, science and government and history of science and technology (chiefly in Australia), was appointed his successor. She was energetic and successful but was severely overworked, and this led to a public row with the University's administration, which culminated in her resignation. Since then she has followed a distinguished and successful career as a private scholar, becoming a leading authority on the history of Australian science and technology.

The headship of the SPRC then passed to Ian Lowe, from the Open University, who in his retirement, become one of Australia's best-known public intellectuals and a respected commentator on science policy and environmental science. From the SPRC, there grew a Science, Technology and Society program as part of the BSc degree, which still exists at the time of writing. For some years, it had the philosopher of science, John Forge, on the staff. He taught numerous topics concerned with 'classic' HPS and also issues to do with science/technology and ethics and science and warfare. Other staff included David Burch and Martin Bridgstock, but they did not claim to be HPS aficionados. Little history of science has been done at Griffith University within the STS Program, though Richard Yeo in History has done some important work (see section "History of Science in Australasia"). Regrettably, at the time of writing HPS/STS, there appears to be on a downward path at Griffith. The appointments made were not such as to create a cohesive whole.

Philosophy of Science in Australia

The dominant issues in philosophy of science in Australasia in the 1950s and early 1960s were those of conventionalism and the problem of induction, but there was also a growing debate about the status of theoretical entities. The problem of induction that was mainly discussed was Nelson Goodman's set of variations on Hume's traditional problem. These variations, which were seen as depending on the use of nonstandard predicates such as 'grue' (= 'either green before 2020 or blue afterwards') and 'bleen' (= 'either blue before 2020 or green afterwards'), were collectively known as the 'new problem of induction', and attempts to solve it were based mainly on the idea of trying to vindicate some constraint on the use of inductive rules that would invalidate the strongly counterintuitive inferences that use of these predicates could yield. The other two issues appear to have arisen together and to have been inspired by the publication of English translations of a number of the important philosophical works of Henri Poincaré, Pierre Duhem, Ernst Mach and Hans Reichenbach, all of whom were conventionalists. The issue of realism about theoretical entities arose because the anti-realistic stance of the positivists, including the early conventionalists, was unacceptable to many Australasian philosophers. For it was incompatible with the locally entrenched Scottish tradition of commonsense realism.

Conventionalism

The problems of conventionalism that occupied philosophers of science in Australia and New Zealand were principally those of Newtonian mechanics, space and time and measurement theory. In *The Science of Mechanics* (1902), Mach argued that scientific laws and theories are made up of facts and definitions. But, he said, they are often confused, and it is sometimes hard to sort out which are which. Moreover, he argued, some propositions that masquerade as facts are really conventions, or are heavily dependent upon them, while others, which are apparently factual statements, are really empty of all empirical content, or have less empirical content than they appear to have. Accordingly, Mach argued that philosophers of science have a duty to attend to the status of the propositions of science. As philosophers, he thought, their primary task should be to analyse science, with a view to determining what is empirically testable and what is not. Like all empiricists, Mach made no distinction between what is an empirical and what is a factual matter. For he thought that what is true, and hence a matter of fact, is anything that is empirically testable, and which would be shown to be true, if it were put to the test.

Mach's program of distinguishing the empirical propositions of science from the purely conventional ones became enormously influential, not only in philosophy but also in fundamental physics. It helped Einstein to understand clearly the empirical limitations of Newtonianism, and it opened up the possibility of a wholesale reconceptualisation of our theories of space, time and motion. Newton's absolute concepts were not empirically testable, as Mach had argued convincingly in *The Science of Mechanics*. Hence, they were not philosophically satisfactory. What were needed, Einstein argued, were empirically determinable concepts that could be used in place of the Newtonian ones, just as Mach would have insisted. Einstein's own relativistic definitions of simultaneity, isochrony, length equality and length congruence were all empirically determinable relationships and, therefore, by Mach's criteria, provided a philosophically more satisfactory foundation for our theories of space, time and motion.

The immediate success of Einstein's special theory of relativity, and the conventionalist philosophy that spawned it, had a strong flow-on effect in philosophy. For Einstein's success showed convincingly that Mach's conventionalism was not just an idle philosophical pursuit. If it could lead to such fundamental changes in scientific theory as the overthrow of Newtonian absolute concepts, then the conventionalist program had to be regarded as one of fundamental importance in physical theory. And philosophers of science everywhere wanted to be involved in it. There were conventionalists before Einstein's theory—Poincaré, for example. But for most of the first half of the twentieth century, philosophers of science were mostly conventionalists. It also had strong flow-on effects in areas of philosophy other than philosophy of science.

In the philosophy of language, Mach's conventionalism, which demanded empirical determinability for the basic concepts of science, led to the verifiability theory of meaning and the conceptualisation of Mach's program as that of eliminating meaninglessness from science. But this was not how Mach himself understood what he was doing. He did not object to the Newtonian conceptions on the ground that they were meaningless. He just thought that they were not well defined from an empiricist, and therefore scientific, point of view. The verifiability theory of meaningfulness came later, with the philosophy of the Vienna Circle.

In metaphysics, the underlying empiricism of Mach's position led to scepticism about the reality of the supposed theoretical entities of science. Empirically well-defined quantities, and empirically testable propositions concerning them, may be accepted, even though we have no clear conception of the things of which these propositions are true. Mach himself was a sceptic about the reality of atoms and molecules. He believed that the empirically testable propositions of chemistry were all either true or false. But he was not sure that the models used to interpret the empirically known truths were realistic. His attitude was more like that of Pierre Duhem, for whom there was a clear distinction between the empirical *description* of reality and a metaphysical theory that we might propose to *explain* it. Scientists do not, *qua* scientists, explain anything, he said: they merely describe the world that we observe.

The issues of conventionalism that were addressed in Melbourne in the 1950s were those of Newtonian mechanics and measurement theory. Newton's laws of motion and gravitation were always fertile ground for conventionalists. Mach and Poincaré discussed them at length. But in the 1950s, their status, whether as empirical propositions or conventions, became a major issue in the philosophy of science. If any of these propositions depended on empirical facts or conventions, then the question was: How? Brian Ellis was one who entered into this debate. The key to it, as Norwood Russell Hanson once said, is the law of inertia, which was not accepted in the ancient world and, indeed, was not widely accepted until well into the seventeenth century. The question is: why was it not accepted much earlier? For it is, apparently, a very simple proposition. Superficially, it just says how a body would move if it were not subject to the action of any forces. But, on reflection, it is not so simple, for there are no clear criteria for the presence or absence of forces. The Greeks of antiquity assumed that bodies would move as their natures dictated. But since different kinds of bodies necessarily had different natures, it could not be assumed that all bodies would naturally move in the same kind of way. Naturally heavy bodies, it was thought, would move towards the centre of the universe, if they were not already as close as they could get to the centre, and light ones would tend to move away from it, i.e. towards the outer perimeter of the universe. But, according to Aristotle, there are also some bodies, namely, the stars and planets, which are naturally neither heavy nor light. So their natural tendency, he argued, can only be to move circularly around the centre.

The principal barrier to acceptance of anything like the law of inertia before the seventeenth century thus appears to have been the common belief that the world is finite and circular and that the earth is located naturally at its centre. That this was so was not just idle speculation. Descartes, who accepted Copernicanism, dared to ask (in his *Système du Monde* published after his death) how bodies would naturally move in an infinite Euclidean world. His answer was 'with uniform motion in a straight line', although he was careful not to say that this was the nature of the actual world, because that would have been dangerous (although there is not much doubt that this is what he believed).

Philosophically, then, what is the status of the law of inertia? Is it true by definition, as many have argued? That is, is it definitional of the state of not being acted upon by any external forces? Or is it a fact about the world that this is how bodies that are not acted upon by external forces really behave? Ellis thought at first that we might be able to define a concept of natural motion with respect to one of natural shape. But how could any concept of natural shape be defined without reference to any of the possible causes of distortion? What about tidal distortions due to gravity? Are these natural or unnatural? In the end, he concluded that the law of inertia is conventional. For there is a simple proof (based on Newton's law of gravity and his second law of motion) that a Newtonian world is necessarily one in which every body has an absolute acceleration towards every other body in the universe; and it is directly proportional to the mass of that other body and inversely proportional to the square of its distance away. Therefore, the gravitational accelerations and tidal distortions of bodies in orbit can, in principle, all be regarded as natural. So, instead of Newton's first law, we could easily reconstruct Newtonian mechanics on the basis of the following principle of natural motion: Every body tends to accelerate towards every other body in the universe with an acceleration that is directly proportional to the mass of the other body and is inversely proportional to its distance away, *unless it is acted upon by a force*. But, if Newtonian mechanics can be so reconstructed, then, Ellis argued, this is 'proof positive' that the law of inertia is conventional.

Induction

The 'new problem of induction' is one to which a great deal of attention was paid in the 1950s and 1960s in Philosophy and HPS departments everywhere. It was a general problem that had no special reference to scientific reasoning. But it was clearly a problem of empiricism and therefore one for the dominant philosophy of science of the period. The Melbourne HPS Department was deeply involved in its discussion. Clendinnen and Ellis both believed in the essential soundness of our ordinary inductive practices. But our rationales for defending them were somewhat different—even though they also had much in common. Clendinnen argued that sound inductive practices cannot be arbitrary, or based on principles of inductive reasoning that have arbitrary features, or dependent on predications that are arbitrarily selected from a range of equally applicable ones. For, he claimed, it is a necessary condition for the soundness of an inductive practice that no such arbitrary choices be involved, either in the construction of the relevant principle of inductive reasoning or in its application. For to rely on such choices at any point in our reasoning would entail guesswork.

Clendinnen's rationale for this (as expressed in 1996) was exemplary:

> [T]o expect the most comprehensive pattern we can detect [in the data] to change must be an arbitrary guess. On the other hand, taking it to persist enables us to make predictions using available data in the most direct way possible. We can give up trying to anticipate what will follow what, or we can use induction, or we can guess or build some policy on a guess. Those are the options. Neither reason nor anything else can assure us that any

> prediction will succeed. However we can identify the possible courses open to us and identify which are irrational. This points to the following policy of predicting as the only one which is not disqualified as irrational: Identify a pattern which persists throughout all the data, and predict in a way which will be correct if that pattern persists.

Clendinnen rejected Goodman's idea that sound inductive reasoning must depend on the use of entrenched predicates (i.e. 'blue' and 'green' rather than 'grue' and 'bleen') for two reasons: (a) because he couldn't see what entrenchment had to do with rationality; and (b) because the same paradoxes could be produced using ordinary English sentences. He also rejected the position developed in Ellis's 'A Vindication of Scientific Inductive Practices', in which Ellis defended principles of theoretical and conceptual conservatism. He argued that it would be irrational to reject our theoretical understanding of a situation solely on the basis of what we think could happen in future. For, if this were a rational procedure, he said, then all of our theoretical understanding of reality, and how the world works, could rationally be rejected out of hand. But then we should all be in the position that Hume imagined us to be, and Goodman assumed us to be, with nothing but syntax to guide us in our use of inductive rules. So we had better make sure that our inductive projections preserve our theoretical understanding of reality unless or until we are forced by experience to change it. We must do this he said, because it is a plain mathematically demonstrable fact that any inductive rule could be used to justify any of an infinity of possible projections of any sequence of events, if syntax were our only guide.

Clendinnen also rejected Ellis's vindication, for reasons similar to those he had for rejecting Goodman's. Ellis had produced a rationale for Goodman's conceptual conservatism. But Clendinnen wanted something more than this. He wanted to ground induction in a theory of what rationality necessarily involves. And, indeed, this is what he has given us.

Measurement Theory

In the 1950s, Ellis worked mainly on conventionalism in measurement theory. For measurement, he thought, is essentially the link between science and mathematics, and so fertile ground for anyone working on the conventionalist program. He developed operational definitions of quantities, of quantitative scales of measurement and of the kinds of scales that may be used in measurement and discussed the appropriateness of the various kinds of statistics for these kinds of scales. In the course of doing so, he was always mindful of what could, or should, be considered to be a question of fact, and what a matter of convention. There are conventions involved in all scales of measurement, he argued, and not just the trivial ones involving the selection of units. For not only are there infinitely many ways of mapping any consistent system of empirical relations onto the number system, there may also be different kinds of physical operations satisfying the formal requirements of addition. For example, he argued that we could, if we wished, use a right-angled addition operation for defining a scale of length that would, using the same standards, yield a measure of length that is the square of its measure on any ordinary scale. One such scale, he said, is the ‘dinch’, or ‘diagonal inch’ scale. However, this conventionality claim has not stood the test of time. As John Fox (2007) has recently pointed out, dinches do not satisfy all of the requirements on additivity.

Ellis’s most lasting contributions to measurement theory are probably those concerning the expression of quantitative laws and the theory of dimensions. First, he argued that our laws can be expressed in any of infinitely many ways, depending on what conventions we adopt. Normally, we choose to express our laws so that they will hold true, whichever scales (from within certain precisely definable ranges) are chosen for the measurement of the quantities involved. But sometimes we specify particular scales for the measurement of some of the quantities involved. Often, for example, we choose to express thermodynamic laws specifically with respect to the absolute scale of temperature, although there are infinitely many other scales of temperature that might be used instead for the measurement of this quantity. More usually, we choose to express our laws in such a way that they hold true for all choices of scales that are formally similar (i.e. related by a transformation of the form $y = mx$) to the ones normally used for the measurement of the quantities involved. We also use similar scale systems, within which the scales for the measurement of some quantities are regarded as fundamental, in the sense of being determinative of the scales that must be used for the measurement of all of the other quantities involved. In mechanics, for example, we choose to consider our normal scales for the measurement of mass, length and time interval to be fundamental in this sense, and we use derivative scales for the measurement of other quantities (such as force, momentum and kinetic energy), wherever we can.

Dimensional analysis, Ellis argued, depends on these conventions. For a dimension, he said, is just a class of formally similar scales, and a dimensional formula is a class of formally similar derivative scales within a specific similar scale system. It is a class of scales that is defined on the basis of laws that are expressed with respect to the scales for the measurement of the quantities that are considered to be fundamental within that scale system. There are no facts of the matter, he said, about which quantities should be considered to be fundamental. We could, if we wished, choose to have more highly centred scale systems. Or we could introduce new dimensions into the fundamental structure of our scale systems. For example, we could introduce a dimension of scales of angle and choose to express all of our laws of mechanics so that they would hold true for all scales of angle within this dimension. Ellis demonstrated that this would not be just an idle exercise. For if our laws of torque, angular momentum and so on were expressed with respect to all scales of angle formally similar to the radian scale, the power of dimensional analysis in mechanics would be considerably increased. For the new dimensional formulae for these quantities would inevitably contain basic information about how these quantities are defined.

Ellis’s theory of measurement was thoroughly in the positivist tradition, and so eschewed realist interpretations of laws or theories. Thus, laws were described as ‘numerical laws’, and thought of as expressing the results of ideally made measurements, rather than as describing relationships between quantities.

But John Forge saw no need for this and argued that laws should be regarded as relations between quantities. And one could do this, he argued, even accepting a theory of quantities similar to Ellis's. Using his theory of laws, Forge developed a realist account of explanation that could be set in contrast with epistemic accounts, such as Hempel's. His account shared Salmon's emphasis on real states of affairs, as opposed to arguments, and allowed for more than causal relations to figure in scientific explanations. But extending his results to the quantum realm, as always, proved difficult, and he found it hard to find there either laws or explanations.

Scientific Realism I

The issue of scientific realism was first raised in the Australasian context by the publication of John Thornton's (1953) important two-part paper on 'Scientific Entities'. Thornton argued that the demand for explanation in science can never be satisfied unless it is assumed that there are fundamental kinds of things in the world (such as forces, active principles, or intrinsic causal powers) that have a different ontological status from the events or states of affairs that they are invoked to explain. For what is required, he said, is a set of postulates that will together necessitate these events or states of affairs. He did not say that this demand is illegitimate. But he did say that it inevitably leads to the postulation of entities whose identities depend on what they do, rather than on what they are. That is, it leads to a form of essentialism. And, like the positivists of the early nineteenth century, Thornton believed that such things should be regarded as fictions. At the end of his paper, he remarked:

> Sir J. J. Thompson is entitled to the claim that he *discovered* the things which coursed through his evacuated tubes, were deflected by his electric and magnetic fields, and accumulated on his electometers . . . There is nothing the least bit philosophically alarming, and no suggestion of any hoax [about 'electrons' in this sense] . . . It is also clear that those pseudo-entities, also called electrons, which sometimes are held (along with protons, neutrons, neutrinos, *et hoc genus omne*) to be the underlying bases of things, to be the very font of all activity, to be the abiding reality behind the insubstantial flux of things—these indeed are inventions and fictions; to claim *them* as discoveries would indeed be to attempt a metaphysical hoax.

But Thornton's paper appears not to have been the catalyst for Smart's work on scientific realism. The view represented in Thornton's paper was certainly one to which Jack Smart was reacting. But neither Thornton's paper nor essentialism was mentioned in Smart's *Philosophy and Scientific Realism* (1963), and he appears to have been unaware of the paper. Nevertheless, it had some influence on Ellis's work. It was one of the principal references for his BPhil thesis on 'The Roles of Theories and Explanations in Science'. The main focus of his thesis was on the roles of the two principal kinds of theories, process and non-process, which were the subject of much discussion in works of Duhem's and Norman Campbell. The non-process theories are, if you like, phenomenalistic, for they do not postulate any mechanisms by which the phenomena to be explained come about, as process theories do. They just describe the capacities that the kinds of things involved must be supposed to have and postulate their laws of action. Ellis argued that where process and non-process theories offer alternative explanations of the same facts (and these, it seems, can always be constructed), the process theories are generally to be preferred, because ‘they say more’, and are therefore more open to independent challenge or support.

The trigger for Smart’s move to embrace scientific realism appears to have been his own and Ullin Place’s work on the theory of perception. If sensations are to be identified with brain processes, as they argued in the 1950s, then they had better be realistic about these processes and any causal powers that they might be supposed to have. For the analogy they used to explain their position was that of theoretical identification in science. Sensations are brain processes, Smart argued, just as temperature is average molecular kinetic energy. Subjectively, they are very different. But in reality, they are one and the same.

Whatever the cause, the move had a profound effect on the course of Australian philosophy. For Smart’s embrace of scientific realism established a new axis of philosophical influence. Instead of Sydney being isolated, with its own brand of realism, Smart’s acceptance of scientific realism broke the kind of behaviourist/Rylean link that had existed between Adelaide and Melbourne and laid the groundwork for the position that was to become known as ‘Australian materialism’. But the publication of Smart’s book did not create much of a stir over scientific realism, as might perhaps have been expected. It is true that most philosophers of science had some reservations about scientific realism. They were not realists about forces or intrinsic causal powers, for example. Nor were they realists about the idealised things, like perfectly reversible heat engines, that are postulated in abstract model theories. But then, Smart’s version of scientific realism did not require them to be realists about any of these things. His was just the kind of commonsense realism that you would expect from a good Scottish philosopher.

The debate that Smart’s book did initiate was over the mind-brain identity thesis, or central state materialism, as it later became known, and over physicalism, which was the thesis that all events and processes are ultimately physical events and processes, and hence explicable in the same kind of way, from the same kinds of premises, as those required to explain what everyone would agree are physical phenomena. The issue of scientific realism did not arise as a major one in the philosophy of science in Australia until the late 1970s or early 1980s. We shall return to it later.

Scientific Methodology[3]

Sir Karl Popper’s *Logic of scientific discovery* was first published in English translation in 1958. Whether as cause or occasion, it was the first of a number of important works in English on the methodology of science. Foremost among these were Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), Popper's *Conjectures and Refutations* (1963), Imré Lakatos's 'Proofs and Refutations' (1963–1964) and 'Methodology of Scientific Research Programs' (1971) and Paul Feyerabend's 'Problems of Empiricism' (1965, 1969) and *Against Method* (1970). Popper had argued in *Logik der Forschung* (1935) that the positivists were wrong in thinking that the method of science is inductive. It is not, he said; it is hypothetico-deductive, and science proceeds, he said, not by confirming its hypotheses, or even showing them to be probable, but by exploiting their capacity to survive when severely tested.

---

[3] See also the section on “Philosophy of Science in New Zealand” (below).

Popper's methodology immediately gained widespread acceptance among philosophers of science—even among many who would have called themselves 'empiricists'. For the method of conjectures and refutations, as Popper later called it, seemed to be both, more plausible as a methodology of science, and more firmly based on empirical evidence than the older inductivist one that had been endorsed by the logical positivists. The logical positivists had, in any case, been greatly embarrassed by their failure to solve the problem of induction. For given their verificationist theory of meaning, it meant that they were not able to show that the laws and theories of science were even meaningful. Their program of eliminating metaphysics from science thus seemed to be backfiring and threatening to eliminate science itself. Popper's falsificationism, as it was called, had no such consequences. It implied that one could never show the laws or theories of science to be true. But it had no consequences that needed to be embarrassing to one who just believed that all knowledge ultimately depends on experience. For there are different ways of depending. And the knowledge that some proposition has been well corroborated (i.e. passed some severe empirical tests) is empirical knowledge, even if it is not knowledge of the truth or falsity of the proposition in question.

According to Popper, the scientific method should be one of humility in the face of recalcitrant experience. If the empirical findings are contrary to the hypotheses being tested, then the proper scientific attitude requires that one should abandon one or other of these hypotheses. But which one? The empirical findings imply that they cannot all be true. But that would still allow one to have favourites, and to protect some hypotheses, while jettisoning others. According to Popper, the proper course for the scientist must be to try to eliminate such ambiguities. That is, one must design one's experiments in such a way as to put the hypothesis, or the conjunction of hypotheses, that you are trying to corroborate at maximum risk. And to do this, he said, you must (a) rely, wherever possible, on highly corroborated methods of testing, i.e. methods of testing that have themselves passed severe tests, and (b) employ as wide a range of tests as possible to try to eliminate the possibility that some of your testing procedures may rest on false premises. A hypothesis that has run the gamut of such testing successfully may, for the time being at least, be accepted. For it has indeed been well corroborated. If it passes some tests, but fails others, then a doubt may remain, and further tests may be required to find out why. If it fails all of these tests, then the hypothesis itself should be rejected. That is the proper scientific attitude, Popper maintained.

But this view of the proper scientific attitude proved difficult to maintain. In his *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Thomas Kuhn demonstrated clearly that scientists do not normally behave like this. They are much more protective of their favoured hypotheses than this method of proceeding would allow. As Alan Musgrave (1983) argued, it did not prove that Popper's methodology was at fault. For a normative thesis, such as a methodology, cannot be defeated by any value-neutral facts. But the fact that very few researchers do not practice their art, as Popper thought they should, should give us pause. Do they, perhaps, have good reason to proceed otherwise? The consensus now is that they do. Science needs scientific research programs and researchers committed to working within the frameworks that these programs define. And, to work within such a framework, they must be committed to the program's basic tenets. That is, the investigators must be prepared, for the time being at least, to accept these tenets without question, contrary to Popper's methodological prescription. Currently, the most widely accepted methodology of scientific research programs is the one elaborated and defended in Lakatos's 'Methodology of Scientific Research Programs'.

This was not the only consequence of Kuhn's historical study of scientific revolutions. The history introduced a distinction between normal and abnormal science. Normal science, he says, is research that is carried out on the basis of 'a paradigm'. The term 'paradigm' was not precisely defined. But we may take it to be any scientific work, or established research tradition, that effectively defines what the main issues are that remain to be tackled in the relevant area of study and how to go about tackling them. Abnormal science, by contrast, involves research that lacks the guidance of an established paradigm. Typically, such research occurs when a paradigm that defines a framework for normal science begins to break down. And such research clearly requires some much more radical thinking, involving rejection of some, if not all, of the tenets of the established framework. It is the kind of thinking that did in fact lead to some of the great scientific revolutions of the past.

What Kuhn had to say about normal science had a considerable impact on scientific methodology. But what he had to say about abnormal science was more important philosophically. For it threatened many of the assumptions of the empiricist philosophy of science that had, until then, informed scientific critique. First, it cast doubt on the observational/theoretical distinction. For what he demonstrated, with many examples, is that our observation statements may be more or less theory-laden. Therefore, contrary to widely accepted tenets of empiricism, the way we describe the world is not independent of our theoretical understanding of it. Second, given the theory-ladenness of our observational language, the holders of different theories may sometimes be at odds over what the facts are. There is, therefore, the serious possibility of systematic misunderstandings arising between the holders of different theories. Historically, there is not much doubt that such misunderstandings do occur. So there is a serious problem: How can one be a good empiricist in a world in which there is no theory-neutral observation language? The first of these problems is that of the supposed observational basis of empiricism. The second is known as the problem of incommensurability.

The philosopher best known for his work on post-Kuhnian problems of empiricism is Paul Feyerabend, who advocated a kind of epistemological anarchism. George Couvalis and John Fox have been two of his main Australian critics and interpreters. Another is Alan Chalmers, who tackled Feyerabend's arguments in Chalmers (1986, 1990). Chalmers has been keen to deny that there is an account of scientific methodology that would enable philosophers to sit in judgement of scientific practice. But, on the other hand, he has opposed the kind of methodological relativism that is sometimes seen as following from the rejection of any universal scientific method (see also Chalmers 1989). But Feyerabend has a point: If the tenets of established paradigms are to be challenged, then, as Feyerabend said in *Against method*, why not challenge them now? Why wait until they break down? Popper had argued that a good empiricist should always try to make the propositions of science as vulnerable to refutation as possible. Fine, says Feyerabend. But the tenets of established paradigms cannot be refuted by the methods of normal science, since they are protected by these methods. Therefore, we must either delay any attempt to develop new paradigms until their need becomes apparent, or else we must get behind programs that offer support to researchers whose principal aims are to challenge the main tenets of existing scientific research programs.

The Australian philosopher who has worked most extensively on the problems of incommensurability is Howard Sankey. In his book, *The Incommensurability Thesis* (1994), he concentrated on the semantic aspects of incommensurability, which arise due to variations in the meanings of terms occurring in different scientific theories. The phenomenon of meaning variance was highlighted by Kuhn and Feyerabend, who argued that alternative scientific theories may be incommensurable, since their content is unable to be compared on the basis of a common vocabulary with a shared meaning. While Sankey agreed that meaning variance can lead to translation failure between the vocabularies of theories, he sought to show that sufficient semantic common ground obtains between theories to ensure comparability of content. To this end, he drew on a modified version of the causal theory of reference to argue that there may be continuity of reference between theories despite variation of meaning. Such continuity of reference provides the common ground on the basis of which the content of theories may be compared.

The problem of incommensurability is not, however, restricted to the semantic realm. Feyerabend understood the issue in semantic terms. But Kuhn initially included changes at the perceptual and methodological level as aspects of incommensurability. After his work on semantic incommensurability, Sankey turned to the problem of methodological change in science, which lies behind claims of incommensurability at the methodological level, as well as claims of epistemological relativism. Rather than defend the stability of scientific method, Sankey adopted the suggestion of Larry Laudan that rules of scientific method are subject to empirical appraisal on the basis of their prior record in securing the epistemic ends of science. Laudan set this so-called normative naturalist account of method in an anti-realist framework. Against Laudan, Sankey argued in his paper, ‘Methodological Pluralism, Normative Naturalism and the Realist Aim of Science’ (2001), that this account of method may be embraced within a realist philosophy of science.

The Simultaneity Problem

In 1966, the chosen topic for Ellis’s HPS Honours philosophy of science seminar at the University of Melbourne was Einstein’s thesis of the conventionality of distant simultaneity. A paper on this topic, which was the eventual outcome of the seminar, was written up by Ellis and visiting scholar Peter Bowman and was published in *Philosophy of Science* (1967). This paper drew a strong response from the Pittsburgh Centre for the Philosophy of Science, where Adolf Grünbaum, Wesley Salmon, Bas van Fraassen and Alan Janis collaborated to reply to it in ‘A Panel Discussion of Simultaneity by Slow Clock Transport in the Special and General Theories of Relativity’ (*Philosophy of Science* [Journal] 1969). The seminar had concluded that there are at least two logically independent ways of determining distant simultaneity (a) by exchanging light signals, assuming the one-way speed of light to be the same in all directions, and (b) by slow clock transport, assuming that synchronised clocks remain synchronous when they are moved around sufficiently slowly. Synchrony, on the first definition, was called ‘standard signal synchrony’ (sss); on the second, it was called ‘slow transport synchrony’ (sts). According to the special theory of relativity (STR), sss and sts are the same.

According to Einstein, Reichenbach, Grünbaum and many others, signal synchrony is conventional. For, they said, there is no way of determining the one-way speed of light without first determining simultaneity occurring of events at a distance, and there is no way of determining this without first determining the one-way speed of light. But manifestly this is false. For slow transport synchrony can be determined without making this assumption. One only has to assume that clocks that are initially synchronised will remain synchronised (to any desired degree of precision) if they are moved around sufficiently slowly. And we know that this is consistent with all of the facts, because we already know that initially synchronised clocks that are moved around sufficiently slowly will be found to be still in synchrony (again, to within any desired degree of precision) whenever or wherever they may be brought back together again. Therefore, if we accept a slow transport definition of distant simultaneity, and synchronise our clocks according to this definition, we can determine empirically the one-way speed of light. Therefore, contrary to Einstein, Reichenbach, Grünbaum and others, there is a way of determining distant simultaneity without first determining the one-way speed of light.

But Ellis, Bowman, and the other members of the seminar had underestimated the degree of commitment of Grünbaum and his colleagues to Einstein’s original conventionality thesis. Their reply took up most of the March 1969 issue of *Philosophy of Science*. But ultimately, Einstein’s conventionality thesis is indefensible. One could, as Ellis and Bowman had argued, plausibly suppose that the one-way speed of light is a function of direction. But, as they demonstrated in their paper, one could do so only if one were prepared to (a) accept that the moons of Jupiter (which are slowly transported clocks) speed up or slow down in their orbits relative to, say, atomic clocks on Earth, depending on the direction of Jupiter from Earth, and (b) abandon the principle of the reciprocity of relative velocities (i.e. the principle that the velocity of A with respect to B is minus the velocity of B with respect to A). Ellis's reply to the Pittsburgh panel was published in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (1971).

Probability

The theories of probability have been major topics in the philosophy of science since the 1920s. Richard von Mises (1919) and Hans Reichenbach (1935) both developed theories of probabilities as long-run relative frequencies. Both were empirical concepts, and both were formally satisfactory. But they were not the same conceptions, and there was some debate about which of the two was correct. De Finetti (1937) developed his subjective theory in his famous paper 'Foresight: Its Logical Laws, its Subjective Sources'. This too was a formally satisfactory theory, but it was very different in conception from the frequency theory. For De Finetti, a probability is just any subjective degree of belief embedded within a comprehensive and fully rational belief system. Rudolf Carnap (1945) initiated a major debate about the nature of probability in his 'Two Concepts of Probability'. Roughly, they were the empirical concept (which was an application of the frequency theory) and the logical concept (in which probability was defined as a rational degree of belief). Note that Carnap's logical probability was not the same as De Finetti's subjective one. For Carnap, the bearers of rationality were individual degrees of belief. For De Finetti, the bearers were whole belief systems.

From the early 1960s, Ellis was a convinced subjectivist about probability claims. For he could not see why one needed to believe in objective degrees of belief just to make sense of coherent systems of degrees of belief. After all, one could make sense of a consistent system of truth claims, even if one could make no sense of objective truth. A consistent system of truth claims is any that contains no actual or implied contradictions. So why, he reasoned, could we not make sense of a coherent system of probability claims, even if we could make no sense of objective probabilities? A coherent system of probability claims would seem to be just any that a rational being could endorse. So all that one would need to establish a logic of probability would be, as De Finetti had argued, a suitable theory of rationality.

For all that, Ellis was not greatly impressed by De Finetti's conception of a probability as a subjective fair betting quotient, or his conception of a rational being as one who has a system of fair betting quotients such that no one could make a 'Dutch Book',[4] either for or against the holder of these beliefs, whether their role be as punter or bookmaker. But he did think that this was on the right track. Moreover, he thought that the probability calculus, however it might be founded, was a much better basis for a theory of rational belief systems than the propositional calculus. For the propositional calculus was just the absolute fragment of the propositional calculus, when the range of possible probabilities is restricted to 1 and 0. The theory of rational belief systems was his major research project in the 1970s. It resulted in *Rational belief systems* (1979).

---

[4] A set of odds and bets in gambling that guarantees a profit, regardless of the gamble's outcome.

One problem that arises within the theory of rational belief systems is the question of how to adapt them (a) to given facts and (b) to new information. Hutchison has done a lot of work on this problem, arguing in 1999 that the conditional probability p(A/B) does not give the probability that is to be assigned to A after discovery that B is true. It gives something subtly different, viz., the probability that is to be assigned to A if the condition B is true. The literature makes the error of failing to distinguish between B being true and B being discovered to be true, and this makes a big difference. The correct probability to assign to A after B is found out to be true is p(A/B*), where B* is 'B is found out to be true'. (For B* is true if and only if B is verified.) Hutchison has continued to pursue this theme, annoyed by the appearance of several books in the last few years that repeat the old error, and which ignore the distinction between truth and verification. And he has since drafted a piece pointing out that it is not true that using p(A/B) for bets on A that proceed if and only if B is discovered to be true preserves you from a Dutch Book. Indeed, he has demonstrated that one will be exposed to a Dutch Book if one bets on any ratio other than p(A/B*). He also notes that 'Jeffry conditioning'[5] also exposes one to a Dutch Book, since it does not use the 'safe' conditional probability.

Statistics

To the outsider, 'philosophy of probability' and 'philosophy of statistics' might appear to be almost synonymous. To the cognoscenti, however, they are strikingly different, although obviously covering some common ground. Philosophy of probability deals primarily with conceptual issues in probability theory, from Bernoulli's 'St. Petersburg Paradox' of the early eighteenth century to Nover and Hájek's recent 'Pasadena Paradox'.[6] Philosophy of statistics, on the other hand, deals primarily with the conceptual and other difficulties involved in statistical inference. As a rough distinction, philosophy of probability usually deals with inferences from a given hypothesis (‘direct inferences’), whereas philosophy of statistics deals with choosing the best hypotheses (‘indirect inferences’). A major topic of philosophy of statistics is what one means by ‘best’, which in turn helps distinguish philosophy of statistics from statistics. Philosophy of statistics is seriously controversial, mixing metaphysical niceties with considerable practical import.

---

[5] The direct effect of a learning experience will be to *alter* the subjective probability of some proposition, without raising it to 1 or lowering it to 0.

[6] The St. Petersburg Paradox illustrates a situation where a naïve decision criterion (which takes only the expected value into account) would recommend a course of action that no rational person would be willing to take. The Pasadena Paradox draws attention to cases where an act can fail to have an expectation despite having well-defined probabilities and utilities for each of the relevant states.

Arguably the world’s outstanding, certainly the most influential, contributor to the philosophy of statistics was the polymath Sir Ronald Aylmer Fisher. Fisher enters the present book because he left his Cambridge professorship in the late 1950s and became a Senior Research Fellow with CSIRO Adelaide. He died there in 1962. Among non-statisticians, perhaps the most famous work of this period is his series of brief articles and letters questioning the causal link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. While, as often, his rhetoric became a bit strident (‘surely the “yellow peril” of modern times is not the mild and soothing weed but the original creation of states of frantic alarm’), Fisher’s methodological points remain interesting and ingenious. For example, he wrote (1958): ‘Is it possible, then, that lung cancer—that is to say, the pre-cancerous condition which must exist and is known to exist for years in those who are going to show overt lung cancer—is one of the causes of smoking cigarettes? I don’t think it can be excluded’.

In *The Design of Experiments* (1935), Fisher made the provocative, and clearly overstated, remark that ‘[e]very experiment may be said to exist only in order to give the facts a chance of disproving the null hypothesis’. In Adelaide, he continued his bruising battles with Jerzy Neyman, Egon Pearson and others over the nature of statistical inference and appropriate statistical techniques. Calling Birnbaum ‘a very bewildered type’ over the ‘likelihood principle’ was a nice example of his rhetorical style during his Australian years.[7] Fisher died in Adelaide in 1962, but not of lung cancer.

Much Australian philosophy of statistics has focused on critiques of ‘null hypotheses statistics testing’, and its complex relationship to Bayes’ theorem. Bayes’ theorem follows from the standard axioms of probability and is, in itself, more or less unproblematic. However, there are great controversies about how one should apply the theorem and, indeed, whether it can or should be applied in practical cases at all. In recent years, philosophies sympathetic to Bayesianism have mostly been in the ascendancy in Australasia.

Perhaps the outstanding Australasian contribution to philosophy of statistics was ‘Minimum Message Length’ (MML), developed primarily by Monash’s Foundation Professor of Computer Science, Chris Wallace.[8] The fundamental idea

---

[7] As Savage wrote, ‘[Fisher] was often involved in quarrels, and though he sometimes disagreed politely, he sometimes published insults that only a saint could entirely forgive’.

[8] For Wallace’s view of the history, with an emphasis on the relationship between MML, data compression and Bayesianism, see his poignant informal 2003 talk, ‘A Brief History of MML’, delivered soon before his death at: http://www.allisons.org/ll/MML/20031120e/.

(to oversimplify wildly) is that data compression, when properly done, and Bayesian analysis, when properly done, are the same thing. Or, as Wallace put it colloquially:

> [I]t turns out that when you look at it, the strings which went into the computer which have most effect on making the predictions of future data are the strings which encoded the available data most concisely. In other words data compression. And the better the compression the more weight was given to that string in making the predictions as to what's happening next.

More technically, MML is an invariant Bayesian method of model selection and point estimation. It also is a plausible information-theoretical reformalisation of Ockham's razor, holding that the best explanation of the data is found in the shortest message, where the message length includes both the statement of the model and the data encoded most concisely in the model. For a far more technical working out of Wallace's insight, consequences and applications, see his posthumous *Statistical and Inductive Inference by Minimum Message Length* (2005). I believe that MML has been the victim of the 'tyranny of distance'. Had Wallace been at a major northern-hemisphere university, MML would be a major, perhaps *the* major, approach to statistical matters, at least in those areas where the appropriate data was available. Still, in recent years, it has been considerably developed both in Australasia, particularly at Monash University, and elsewhere.

Peter Walley's (University of Western Australia) monograph *Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities* (1991) was an influential extension of Bayesian theory of robustness, focusing that much-discussed Achilles heel of Bayesianism, prior probability distributions.

Jason Grossman (formerly at the Sydney HPS Unit and presently at the Australian National University's Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics) has reformulated Barnard's and Birnbaum's likelihood principle and provided it with its most extended philosophical defence. On this basis, he has argued that one does not have to be Bayesian to believe the (supposedly) Bayesian arguments that show that central 'frequentist' concepts such as p-values, confidence intervals, power and bias are incoherent (at least pragmatically incoherent). In her 'Exhaustive Conditional Inference' (2008), Claire Leslie (Swinburne University and a former PhD student of Thomason) follows Cox's 1958 demonstration that standard frequentist measures such as the p-value do not describe evidence, on any plausible understanding of evidence. Her work shows how frequentism can be modified to produce results that are evidentially optimal and that such results bear a greater resemblance to the likelihood measures of Hacking than to the products of conventional frequentism.

Geoff Cumming, working closely with Thomason and Fiona Fidler (Environmental Science, Melbourne University) to reform social science statistical practices, has done some interesting philosophical work on the way. In 2008, he showed that the p-value given by a replication experiment is often very different from the original experiment's p-value. For example, if your initial experiment obtains $p = 0.05$, then the 80 % p-interval, meaning the 80 % prediction interval for the p-value, is (0.00008, 0.44). That is, there is a 10 % chance that, on replication, $p < 0.00008$, and a 10 % chance $p > 0.44$! Finally, Thomason and Elizabeth Silver are critiquing the philosophical and empirical foundations of 'intention-to-treat' (ITT) analyses of medical randomised control trials. Unlike the more intuitive 'per protocol' (PP) analyses, ITT analyses all (available) data from randomised control trials, regardless of whether the subjects followed the assigned protocol (i.e. took their medicine) or not.[9] They claim that the hegemony of ITT seriously undermines medical progress by, *inter alia*, often substantially understating the intervention's effect size.

Scientific Realism II

The problem of scientific realism has changed over the years. Originally, it was a dispute about what scientific theory aims to do. Is its aim just to extend and systematise our knowledge of the kinds of things and patterns of events that exist in nature, without aiming to explain them? Or should it also seek to explain them? According to empiricism, the aim of scientific theory should be limited to systematising and extending our knowledge. It should not seek to explain anything. For to explain, said Duhem, is 'to strip reality of appearances, covering it like a veil, in order to reveal the bare reality itself'. But in his view this was not the role of science: it was the task of metaphysics. Thus, from the outset, empiricism was anti-realist and empiricists saw the proper role of scientific theory as being to describe, systematise and extend our knowledge of the world, but not to try to explain it.

But the problem of scientific realism was transformed in the late 1970s/early 1980s, for by then the alleged incompatibility between the limited empiricist aims and that of explaining what is really going on 'behind the scenes', no longer seemed plausible. How could one reasonably deny, or even doubt, the reality of the processes that explained so much? The empiricists had surely lost the argument. But there were twists and turns yet to come. One of these was the retreat to 'internal realism' (*pace* Putnam). If science does indeed aim to explain things, then it cannot do better than aim for the best possible explanation. But the realist conception of truth is supposed to be a correspondence one, which is radically non-epistemic. Therefore, there can be no guarantee that the best possible explanation is true in this sense, or even that it is probable. Clearly, a scientific realist must reject this conclusion. But to do so, a scientific realist must either reject the aim of science as being to provide the best possible explanation of events or else reject the metaphysical, radically non-epistemic, correspondence theory of truth that is normally presupposed by realists. To be a scientific realist, Ellis argued in the 1980s, one has to believe that the best possible explanation of events, and hence the existential propositions included in, or presupposed by, this explanation, must all be true. Therefore, he argued, a scientific realist must reject the correspondence theory of truth and embrace a pragmatic theory. For a pragmatic theory is the only kind of truth theory that entails realism about the entities postulated in the best possible explanation of events.

---

[9] In epidemiology, 'per protocol' (PP) analysis is contrasted with the 'intention-to-treat' analysis. It is a strategy of analysis that includes only patients who complete an entire clinical trial or other procedure analysed, as opposed to the 'intention-to-treat' analysis, which also includes the patients who dropped out (cf. Wikipedia).

The other retreat was Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. In reality, it was not so much a retreat as a reversion to the position of some of the earlier positivists, such as Duhem. It is true that the logical positivists of the 1930s and 1940s would have condemned unverifiable reality postulates concerning theoretical entities as metaphysical, and therefore meaningless. But Duhem was not a logical positivist of the Vienna school, and nor is Van Fraassen. Duhem would simply have accepted that reality postulates concerning theoretical entities, for which there is no direct evidence, are metaphysical, but none the worse for that. It is just, he said, that it is not the task of science to adjudicate on such postulates. The role of science, he said, is just to describe, extend and systematise our empirical knowledge of the world. Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is not so very different from this. For him, '[s]cience aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate, and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate' (1980). Duhem would probably have agreed with this.

In the contemporary debate, the argument that is usually regarded as the main one for scientific realism is the argument from the success of science. It is also referred to as the 'no miracles' argument and as the 'ultimate argument'. The argument proceeds on the basis of the evident fact that science manifests a high degree of empirical success. This is a striking fact that stands in need of explanation. An anti-realist who claims that our theories are neither true nor close to the truth, and that the terms of our theories fail to refer to real entities, is unable to explain the success of science. It would be a miracle for false, non-referring theories to be successful. By contrast, scientific realism provides an entirely natural explanation of the success of science. If scientific theories are true or close to the truth, and their terms refer to real entities, then it is no surprise that such theories are successful. For this is just what one would expect if our theories were true descriptions of real things.

The success argument is usually attributed to Hilary Putnam and Richard Boyd, in writings that date from the early 1970s. However, a precursor of the success argument is to be found in Smart's *Philosophy and Scientific Realism* (1963). To accept 'phenomenalism' about theoretical entities, he said, 'we must believe in a *cosmic coincidence*'. We must, he says, believe that the phenomena of the world are such as to make a purely instrumental theory yield true predictions, even though we do not believe that what the theory says about the world is true.

The success argument has broad appeal among scientific realists. But anti-realist critics of realism have not been won over by the argument. For theories that have been taken to be successful at one stage in the history of science have routinely been rejected as false at a later stage. This fact is the basis for one of the most influential arguments against scientific realism, known as 'the pessimistic meta-induction'. The argument turns on the fact that throughout the history of science, numerous successful theories have ultimately been rejected, and replaced by other theories, which have themselves subsequently been rejected and replaced. Given the past history of repeated rejection of successful theories, it seems likely that in time our own contemporary theories will suffer the same fate. For we have strong inductive grounds, based on the history of past science, to think that contemporary theories are in fact false, despite their display of success.

Much work has been done on this pessimistic meta-induction, though little of it by Australasian the philosophers of science. One of the main lines of response, due to Philip Kitcher and Stathis Psillos, has been to distinguish between the constituent parts of theories responsible for empirical success and to argue that it is these constituents that are preserved in theoretical change. In Australasia, one particularly important response was that of Alan Musgrave. He emphasised the importance of novel predictions in the characterisation of the success of science and argued that the strength of the realist explanation of success is found in cases of genuine predictive novelty in science. If the prediction of novel phenomena is made a requirement for success, then many theories that have been rejected in the history of science may be excluded from the pessimistic meta-induction since they do not enjoy the requisite degree of success.

While Australasian realism has often focused on topics of a metaphysical nature, Sankey has emphasised epistemological aspects of scientific realism. Reflection on the twin challenges of internal realism and constructive empiricism led Sankey to hold that scientific realism is confronted by what he has termed 'the problem of method and truth'. This problem arises due to the realist's commitment to the non-epistemic character of correspondence truth. If truth is non-epistemic, the methods of science provide no reason to think that scientific theories are true or approximately true, or that they should be accepted as such. The internal realist, who defines truth in terms of method, may say that sustained use of the methods of science leads to truth, since truth just is ideal rational justification. But this conception of truth is unacceptable to scientific realists. The constructive empiricist, who holds that we have no reason to believe that science achieves truth, can only say, of successful theories, that they are empirically adequate. This may be enough to justify the scientific enterprise. But the scientific realist cannot accept the constructive empiricist's sceptical view of what theoretical science has to tell us about the world.

In an attempt to develop a scientific realist solution to the problem of method and truth, Sankey made use of his realist version of normative naturalism. The methods of science are to be understood as tools of inquiry, subject to empirical evaluation. Such methods play a crucial role in the development of successful scientific theories. But, he argued, it is not possible to explain the success of the methods of science in leading to successful theories, unless the methods of science have the capacity to lead to truth. In order to explain how the methods of science lead to successful theories, it must be held that the methods are a reliable means of discovering truth. Hence, Sankey employs a meta-level version of the so-called success argument for scientific realism to argue for a realist theory of method. This theory of method resolves the problem of method and truth by presenting abductive grounds to hold that the use of the methods of science conduces to non-epistemic truth.

Metaphysics of Science

The philosophy of scientific realism took a new turn in the 1970s, due largely to the excellent work of David Armstrong, Professor of Philosophy at Sydney University, in his *Universals and scientific realism* (1978). For Armstrong began there the urgent debate about what scientific realism entails. Scientific realism certainly requires us to believe in the theoretical entities postulated as having causal roles in our established process theories, the position that Ellis called ‘scientific entity realism’. But Armstrong enlarged and defined the debate. What kinds of properties or relationships must we believe in, and what is the status of such properties and relationships? Armstrong forced us to focus on the metaphysical implications of scientific realism, and this focus has been a salient feature of Australasian concerns about scientific realism ever since. Specifically, he argued for realism about categorical properties and spatiotemporal relationships and hence for the existence of universals whose instances were tropes of such properties or relationships. These things must exist, he argued, independently of our knowledge or understanding, and therefore be part of the furniture of the world.

In a series of essays written in the 1980s, Cliff Hooker developed his theory of evolutionary naturalist realism. Hooker took the view that human beings are evolving systems with epistemic values that change and become modified by experience, not just over one’s lifetime but over the whole course of human history. Consequently, he argued, these values are likely to be changing gradually, as they become better adapted to our flourishing as a species, and these changes are likely to continue to improve our understanding of the world for as long as we continue to exist as epistemic agents. But this view did not lend itself to clear development. For it could not be used as a basis for developing an ultimately rational scientific methodology. At best, it could offer only a naturalist account of the success of science in its efforts to describe and understand the world. But Hooker’s enthusiasm for scientific metaphysics and epistemology was infectious, and he led a strong research program in the philosophy of science at the University of Newcastle where he worked.

In 1987, Ellis published a paper on the ontology of scientific realism, in which he spelt out what he took the metaphysical implications of scientific realism to be. Like Armstrong, he argued for realism about the physical properties and relations that must be supposed to exist in any world in which the relevant theoretical entities exist and have the kinds of properties and relations that they are supposed to have. But, unlike Armstrong, Ellis argued for realism about intrinsic causal powers and consequently about causal relationships involving the exercise of such powers. In this paper, he was beginning to question the adequacy of his own internalist version of scientific realism. And he now thinks that the pragmatic concept of truth that he defended in *Truth and Objectivity* (1990) is not the only one that is required for understanding the implications of science. There is also, he argued, a metaphysical concept required for truthmaker theory. When one has established, to one's satisfaction, what it is right to believe, then one has reached first base. But, as John Fox has argued, there is a further question that needs to be answered, viz., 'Is it also true metaphysically, and if so, what makes it so?'

Fox's 'truthmaker axiom' (1987), viz., 'If *p*, some *x* exists such that *x*'s existing necessitates *p*', and John Bigelow's (1988) supervenience thesis ('truth supervenes on being'), that 'there is no difference in what is true without a corresponding difference in the inventory of what is; that what there is determines what is true; that truth is supervenient on being' (Fox 1987), are both very plausible. But neither is suggested, nor even rendered plausible, by the theory of truth that Ellis had been defending, and Fox and Bigelow convinced him that there was much more work to be done, if the aim is to establish a metaphysical link between scientific theory and reality. What are the truthmakers for laws of nature, for example? Armstrong thinks that they are contingent relations of necessitation between universals, because he is convinced that the laws of nature must, in some sense, be contingent. But Chalmers and Ellis both think that the fundamental laws of nature may well be metaphysically necessary, as indeed they would be, if the truthmakers for these laws were the essential properties of natural kinds. Ellis has defended this particular thesis in his recent books, *Scientific Essentialism* (2001) and *The Philosophy of Nature* (2002), and Chalmers has argued in Cheyne and Worrall (eds) (2006) that Musgrave, whose strident defence of scientific realism once earned him the reputation of being 'a mad dog realist', should become an essentialist.

The basic questions are the following: What must exist, if the processes that we suppose to occur in our established theories were actually to occur and have the effects that they are supposed to have? What kind of world would be required to accommodate and drive these mechanisms? These questions, which Roy Bhaskar asked back in the 1970s, remain unanswered. Thornton argued, even before then, that realism about theoretical entities would require realism about causal powers, and hence a form of essentialism. It now appears that he may have been right. For the identity of a causal power depends on what it must do in the circumstances of its existence. And the identity of any theoretical entity that is assumed to have a causal power must depend on what causal power it is assumed to have. But, *pace* Thornton, this is not a decisive argument against scientific realism. On the contrary, it may be just the beginning of an exciting new field of scientific metaphysics.

Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics

The traditional problem in the philosophy of quantum mechanics is the issue of realism about Schrödinger waves, i.e. the waves described by Schrödinger's equation as being emitted when a photon or other subatomic particle is emitted and as collapsing to a point when such a particle is absorbed. *Prima facie*, one should be a realist about these waves. For the theory about them is one of the most successful in the whole history of physics. But the most commonly accepted view is probably the empiricist one, popularly known as the 'Copenhagen interpretation'. According to Niels Bohr, Schrödinger waves should not be thought of as having any significance other than an instrumental value; their only significance is that they enable us to determine accurately the probabilities of the various possible locations at which the particle will be found to exist, when, for example, a screen is imposed to absorb it. An alternative view, due to David Bohm, is that there is an underlying determinate reality; it is just that we do not know the values of the hidden variables. The difficulties with both views are substantial. How can one make any sense of a process in which a bundle of energy is transmitted as a wave but acts as a particle?

In chemistry, it is easy enough to ridicule anti-realists about atoms or molecules. But in quantum mechanics, the realists are the ones who are most often ridiculed. It is said, for example, that if you believed in the kinds of superpositions of states that quantum theorists talk about, then you are committed to believing that 'Schrödinger's cat' may be in the indeterminate state of being both alive and dead. So realism seems to be in deep trouble in this field. For no one has been able to develop a clear picture of the nature of quantum processes. On the other hand, instrumentalism, of the kind defended by Bohr, seems like an admission of defeat. Realism about Schrödinger waves seems to be an unquestionable requirement. For, without realism, there can be no explanation of interference patterns in subatomic radiation, and hence no plausible way of accounting for what happens in the famous 'two-slit' experiment. Consequently, philosophers, like everyone else, were left with what seemed like an insoluble puzzle. The early history of the philosophy of quantum mechanics in Australasia naturally reflected this. Mostly, Australasian philosophers, and their counterparts overseas, did little more than expound or defend the positions that had been taken by well-known physicists on these issues.

There are signs, however, that this position is now changing. The realism issue remains unsolved. But some independent moves are now being made. In his book, *Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point* (1996), Huw Price of the Centre for Time at the University of Sydney has defended a bold new explanation of the phenomena of non-locality, i.e. of correlated events occurring simultaneously at widely separated spatial locations. Such phenomena (concerning the directions of spin of 'entangled' particles) were predicted by the mathematical physicist John Bell in the 1960s. And these predictions have since been verified. But, as yet, they have no adequate causal explanation. For, as the experiments are described, there are no past events that could possibly be acting as common causes. Price's explanation is novel. It is based on the view, for which he argues at length, that the world is essentially time symmetric. Consequently, he says, there is no a priori reason why backward causal forks should not occur just as frequently as forward ones. The direction of causation might indeed appear to be all in the same direction. But that might be due either to our own idiosyncratic perspective, or to the low-entropy state of the early universe, or both. In the final chapter of his book, he argues for the superiority of his own explanation of these recalcitrant phenomena. Price may not be right about the

T-symmetry thesis, as he interprets it. For realism about Schrödinger waves must be rejected if the T-symmetry thesis is accepted (since there is no such thing as the instant reflation of a Schrödinger wave). He may also be wrong about the backward causation thesis that he develops. But his contribution to the debate about quantum mechanical reality is a significant one, and therefore greatly to be welcomed.

Philosophy of Biology

Philosophy of biology in Australia had its roots in the work of various historians of biology and medicine, most particularly the work of Elizabeth Gasking at Melbourne's HPS Department during the 1960s and 1970s. Gasking wrote two influential and seminal books (see section "The University of Melbourne Department"). Additionally, Diana Dyason, who oversaw the department in its early years, encouraged work on the history of biology, particularly germ theory.

The first philosophical contribution of note was that of Jack Smart at Adelaide, in an essay in *Synthese* in 1959 (later amended as a chapter in his 1963 book on scientific realism), in which he argued that biology was more akin as a science to electronics than to physics. But just as Smart was dismissing the scientific status of biological theories, the historians at Melbourne were taking it seriously.

With the rise in genetics through the 1960s, and the work of Richard Dawkins in popularising the 'gene's eye view' of evolution, the philosopher of mind and language, Kim Sterelny, began to work on evolutionary biology in the late 1980s, working with Philip Kitcher, surveying the field (1991) and arguing for multi-level selection and explanatory pluralism (1996). During this period, Sterelny was appointed to Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand, and later to a half-time appointment in the Research School of Social Sciences at the ANU. And in 1999 he co-authored the standard textbook on the field with his one-time student Paul Griffiths. Sterelny's influence on the philosophy of biology in Australia is broad, and a number of his PhD students have gone on to dominate the field locally. Recently, he accepted a full-time appointment at ANU.

Griffiths, who did his undergraduate study at Cambridge, came to ANU where he did his doctoral studies on biological accounts of emotion, which resulted in an acclaimed book (1997), but he also worked extensively in the field of adaptive explanation in the 1990s, developing a view in conjunction with psychologist Russell Gray and molecular biologist Rob D. Knight that came to be known as the 'developmental systems theory', according to which genes were developmental resources rather than the 'master molecules' of life. Griffiths taught at the University of Otago before moving to Sydney as Head of their HPS department and later to the University of Pittsburgh in the same role. After a few years at Pittsburgh, he returned to Australia as a Federation Fellow at the University of Queensland and is now back at Sydney University. His recent work has focused on the notions of innateness, gene and species. In conjunction with Karola Stotz and others, he has also undertaken an 'experimental philosophy' study of scientists' attitudes to, and conceptions of, genes.

One of Sterelny's students is James Maclaurin, who works at the University of Otago on genetic topics including innateness and informational notions of genes. Another is Nicholas Agar, who has worked on environmental ethics. John Wilkins, whose Master's thesis was supervised by Sterelny and whose PhD was from Melbourne under Neil Thomason, has worked on theory change, cultural evolution and species concepts.

Peter Godfrey-Smith, a PhD student of Kitcher, has been very active in the philosophy of biology. His honours thesis from Sydney was published in 1989 and became a classic in the literature on 'teleosemantics' (or a teleofunctional account of what determines the semantic content of mental representations). Now a professor at CUNY, Godfrey-Smith has worked at Stanford, Harvard, and at ANU. He has written on units of selection and functions (proposing a 'modern history' selected effect theory), on biological information and on adaptationism. Godfrey-Smith is a regular academic visitor to Australian philosophy departments.

Godfrey-Smith was not the only Australian philosopher to make a major contribution to the debate over biological teleology and teleosemantics. The Monash philosophers John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter published a very influential paper on functions in 1987. Their student Karen Neander, also another Sterelny student, now at Duke University, has promoted the 'selected function' or 'etiological' account of biological functions in many papers.

Work ancillary to the philosophy of biology has included many of Peter Singer's publications, beginning with his work on animal rights and 'speciesism', an analogical notion to racism and sexism (1976) and his ethical discussions of sociobiology (1981). Also, Singer (2000) has argued that left-wing political theory can be Darwinian. Singer did his initial work in the UK but spent many years as Head of Monash University's Bioethics unit before moving to Princeton, where his 'progressive' views on bioethics have attracted considerable opposition from 'rightists' and great admiration from his students.

More recently, biologically informed ethics has been the focus of the work of Neil Levy at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, in the University of Melbourne. Many feminist philosophers have also contributed to this subject.

The Ethics of Science

The ethics of science has not been a major focus of philosophers working in HPS, nor has there been a long-standing interest in the area. Nevertheless, HPS has produced some important work, and here mention will be made of Michael Selgelid, John Forge and Rachel Ankeny of Sydney University. The excellent work in bioethics done at the Monash Centre, CAPPE, and other applied ethics centres will not be discussed here. Nor will research ethics, although this is an important topic in the field. Selgelid, Forge and Ankeny were all concerned with the possible consequences of science for the wider community. There are two kinds of consequences that were widely recognised and discussed: those that affect us through technology and those that affect our beliefs. Nuclear physics, for example, made nuclear weapons possible and hence had its impact through technology; on the other hand, the Copernican and Darwinian Revolutions have changed our beliefs about our place in the natural order of things.

Selgelid (2007) has worked on the impact of research in the biological and biomedical sciences, and with Seamus Miller he has discussed the so-called dual-use dilemma in relation to the biosciences, in situations where the same piece of scientific research has the potential for both good and bad applications, often because the technology underpinned by the research has itself potentially good and bad outcomes (Miller and Selgelid 2007). One such example is genetic manipulation techniques that can be used to engineer better therapeutic agents but also increase the virulence of pathogens for use as bioweapons. At the conclusion of a careful analysis of the issues, the authors suggest five options for the conduct of research that is liable to lead to such dilemmas, ranging from complete autonomy for the scientist through to complete control by the government. Their choice is for some compromise. In a related work ('Tale of Two Studies: Ethics, Bioterrorism and Censorship of Science'), Selgelid (2007) has considered cases in which research on one, seemingly harmless, topic can provide help in solving problems that are not at all harmless. If manipulating the mousepox virus, itself harmless to humans in all its forms, creates a technique of making smallpox more virulent, and hence a more effective bioweapon, should not the 'inoffensive' work be censored?

Forge (2008) has developed a general account of the ethics of science, on the basis of which issues of this kind can be discussed. His account considers both the backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility of the scientist: what he or she is responsible for having done and what he or she is responsible for doing in the future. The latter part comprises a 'wide' position on responsibility, holding the scientist responsible not only for what is intended or foreseen but also for what should have been foreseen. The rationale for the wide position is that scientists, post-World War II, are now working in a changed context, in which all are aware that science can affect us for both good and ill. So, on this account, a scientist who undertakes 'dual-use' research is responsible for all the outcomes he or she should have foreseen, even if her or his intent is only to do pure research or research that aims only at good outcomes. The forward-looking part of the account is two tiered, in the sense that a scientist is bound not to do harmful research, for instance, weapons research (now the topic of a monongraph, see Forge 2012), but only encouraged to do 'good research'—the duty not to do harmful research is not absolutely binding; there can be exceptions. Thus, if it seems that dual-use research is evenly balanced between good and bad outcomes, this account proscribes the work because of the greater weight placed on not harming. As to censorship, the account sees the responsibilities of scientists to others as being far more important that any freedom to research and publish.

Rachel Ankeny, who was instrumental in setting up important teaching and research programs during her time in HPS at Sydney, has worked on responsibility and reproduction, stem cell research and on women's health and related policy issues. A recent example is an essay ('Individual Responsibility and Reproduction') in the *Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics* (2006) on the right to reproduce. In this essay, she has noted that the ability to control one's body is necessary for the exercise of the fundamental right of autonomy, and she then asks whether there is therefore a right, or a responsibility, to procreate or indeed not to procreate. Having canvassed the main current positions, Ankeny affirms that an individual does have a right to reproduce but concludes that this does not help much when we want to explore both what responsibilities we might have in consequence and what limits might be placed on our plans to fulfill those responsibilities.

History of Science in Australasia

History of Science in Australia

George Basalla's (1967) 'model' for the spread of science round the world, and particularly into former colonies such as Australia and New Zealand, envisaged three stages: (1) scientific work done by explorers from Europe, who made scientific observations in the countries they visited and published them 'back home' after they returned to Europe; (2) scientists who trained in Europe or America but settled in colonial societies and made their careers there, but 'where possible' tried to get their work published 'back home' as well as in their adopted homelands, and to an extent they 'took their problems' from the 'centre', rather than from the 'periphery' where they were situated; (3) those who were born in the colonies, trained and worked there, and to a large extent published there too, though sometimes sending their work to major journals overseas. Examples would be (1) Charles Darwin, (2) the geologists Edgeworth David (Australia) and James Hector (New Zealand) and (3) the Australian explorer and geologist Douglas Mawson. These divisions cannot be clear-cut. For example, Mawson was actually born in England but trained in Australia and did most of his work and much of his publishing here (when he wasn't exploring!) And in modern times, with globalisation, people are constantly moving round the world, taking up positions here and there, so that Stage 3 is hardly a distinct category. Nevertheless, the Basalla model is still quite useful as an approximation.

In the case of history of science, one can argue that, professionally speaking, the discipline is still in a 'Stage 2' situation to a considerable extent. The great majority of professional historians of science in Australia were trained overseas, at least for their doctorates (regardless of whether they were Australian born). And as a result, they have tended for a long time to work on topics that related to the study of overseas science and in ways that reflected overseas 'styles' for the writing of history. This presented considerable obstacles for them, however, in that the archives and major libraries where the historians wished to work were at great distances, so that, for many, extended research was only possible during periods of study leave or long-service leave (though opportunities for these were more generous in Australasia than in most other countries). Melbourne University, Sydney University and Canberra's National Library have fairly good research libraries for historians of science, but places like Wollongong University faced considerable difficulties. So as they tended to teach subjects like the Scientific Revolution or the Darwinian Revolution, which have a large secondary literature, and many of the standard works are available in modern editions. But ‘hands-on’ historical research was hard to sustain, and it was difficult for historians of science to achieve the appropriate academic union of teaching and research. Nevertheless, people at Wollongong and the University of New South Wales have made some significant contributions, though often having to restrict their work to the study of published texts, or using tiresome microfilm copies of rare items. (The situation in this respect has eased considerably in recent years with the advent of the internet.)

The founders of Australasian HPS grew from overseas roots. As mentioned, in Melbourne, Gerd Buchdahl came from Germany when young, with an abiding interest in Mach and empiricism and Kant, and laid the foundations for Melbourne HPS. At UNSW, Jack Thornton was also a Machian to an extent, and his paper on ‘Scientific Entities’ (1953) (referred to above by Ellis) could loosely be described as Machian. This showed itself in Thornton’s ‘positivist’ first-year course on the history of astronomy. (Though a ‘homegrown product’ of Australia Thornton spent a year attending the HPS courses at University College London, where he encountered Angus Armitage and Alistair Crombie, and, like his Melbourne counterparts, he drew on pedagogic ideas such as those exemplified in Conant’s *Harvard Case Histories*. Thornton’s ideas ‘rubbed off’ on his assisting lecturer, William Leatherdale. Neither of them published significant work in history of science, but Leatherdale’s PhD *Role of Analogy, Model, Metaphor in Science* was published as a successful book in 1974. Robert Gascoigne, a philosophically minded former chemist, taught the social history of science course at UNSW, but his principal interest was in scientific bibliographies, of which he produced several fine examples—but only after his retirement. An early associate of the School was a retired secondary-school mathematics teacher, Richard Gillings, who did some part-time teaching in the School. He made a private study of the history of Egyptian and Babylonian mathematics, and his *Mathematics in the Time of the Pharaohs* (1972) became the standard book on the topic for many years. He also provided a substantial article on the topic for the *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*.

At Melbourne, an infusion of ideas came from a visit by Stephen Toulmin in 1954–1955, when Buchdahl was on study leave. And Diana Dyason (whose large private library provided the nucleus for a fine departmental library) developed a popular course on the social history of medicine in Melbourne (known affectionately as ‘Glorious Smelbourne’), but that work was never published. On the other hand, it illustrated what could be done using Australian topics as the basis of teaching and research. Elizabeth Gasking worked up her PhD into a well-received book on the history of early theories of generation, previously mentioned. Roderick Home continued the work he had done for his doctorate at Indiana on eighteenth-century electrical theories and more generally on the history of physics. His eighteenth-century interests gave rise to numerous papers as well as to his books, *Aepinus*’*s Essay on the Theory of Electricity and Magnetism* (1979) (with the Latinist P. J. Connor) and *The Effluvial Theory of Electricity* (1981), the latter being a published version of his doctoral thesis. A collection of his papers appeared as a volume in Ashgate's Variorum series entitled *Electricity and Experimental Physics in Eighteenth-Century Europe* (1992). He (along with Dyason and Guy Freeland from UNSW) was active in the establishment of the Australasian Association for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science (AAHPSSS) in 1967 (see http://www.usyd.edu.au/aahpsss/history.html for details).

Home also began to turn the interest of professional historians (and others) in the direction of Australian science, becoming editor of *Historical Records of Australian Science* in 1984 (founded by the Australian Academy of Sciences in 1966 as *Records of Australian Academy of Science*) and establishing a program of work on conserving the archives of Australian scientists and putting much material online. He initiated the Australian Science Archives Project in 1985, which led to the establishment of the Australian Science and Technology Heritage Centre at the University of Melbourne (1999), headed by the archivist Gavan McCarthy (see http://www.austehc.unimelb.edu.au). His initial brief was to seek out historically significant collections of Australian scientific records and to sort and list these, prior to transferring them to an appropriate long-term repository. The centre has made a vast amount of information available through a website titled 'Bright Sparcs' (http://www.asap.unimelb.edu.au/bsparcs/bs_index.htm), so that one can easily access biographical information about some 4,000 Australian scientists and technologists and the relevant secondary sources. The Heritage Centre has also organised special Web-based projects, such as 'Federation and Meteorology', 'Technology in Australia 1788–1988' and 'Science in the Making of Victoria'. In recent years, Home has been engaged in a large-scale project coordinating the publication of the correspondence and papers of the botanist Ferdinand von Mueller. So from a 'Basalla 2' scholar, Home has, at least for part of his work, gradually shifted to become a 'Basalla 3' man—one of the few historians of science to have made this transition.

The American historian of science Homer Le Grand initially joined the Melbourne Department with a strong interest in the history of chemistry. But, as a result of his teaching a course on scientific change, he became interested in the plate tectonics revolution on which he published what became a well-known book: *Drifting Continents and Shifting Theories* (1988). His approach was influenced by the philosophical views of Larry Laudan, who had been a visitor to the Melbourne Department. But after Le Grand became Dean of Arts at Melbourne and then at Monash University, he dropped out of research for a considerable period.

Keith Hutchison joined the Melbourne Department in 1985 with an Oxford DPhil on Rankine and the history of thermodynamics in the nineteenth century, but over the course of time, as a result of his teaching commitments, he shifted his interests in the direction of Late Mediaeval and Early Modern science and the history of Aristotelian matter theory. He also became much interested in heraldic symbolism, and the evidence that such artefacts as early clock faces might reveal about views of the cosmos (geocentric or heliocentric). He has also had interests in statistical theory (see the section on "Statistics" [above]).

Other appointments in the area of history of science have been John Pottage (history of mathematics), Jan Sapp (history of biosciences), Annie Dugdale (history of reproductive technology), Mark Madison (history of environmental philosophy), Gerhard Wiesenfeld (history of Dutch science) and Kristian Camilleri (history of quantum mechanics). Pottage's work culminated in the publication of *Geometrical Investigations Illustrating the Art of Discovery in the Mathematical Field* (1983). Sapp published two well-received books, *Beyond the Gene* (1987) and *Where the Truth Lies* (1990). Helen Verran's researches on indigenous ways of knowing were encapsulated in her original book *Science and an African Logic* (2001). Her work with the Yolngu people in northern Australia, devising educational programs for indigenous children, drew heavily on her earlier experience as a mathematics teacher in Nigeria. Janet McCalman continued the tradition of Ding Dyason, with work on the social history of medicine, and in particular her book on *Sex and Suffering* (1998).

At UNSW, David Oldroyd was appointed in 1969 with but an MSc in HPS from University College London. On his arrival, he began a PhD on the early relations between mineralogy and chemistry and on its completion began to specialise in the study of the history of geology, though little of the curriculum in his School was in that area apart from a segment of the subject 'The Darwinian Revolution'. From his teaching in that area, he developed a limited interest in the Darwin Industry and published a successful textbook, *Darwinian Impacts* (1980), which was taken up by the Open University in Britain. But as time went on, he focused increasingly on the history of geology and produced three substantial books: *The Highlands Controversy* (1990), *Thinking about the Earth* (1996) and *Two Hundred Years of Geological Research in the English Lake District* (2002), a series of detailed papers on the idea of the Precambrian/Archaean in Britain, a Variorum collection of his principal papers (*Sciences of the Earth* 1998), and two edited volumes—on twentieth-century geology and geomorphology/Quaternary geology—for the Geological Society of London. He was also Secretary-General of the International Commission on the History of Geological Sciences for 8 years, and a was editor of *Earth Sciences History* for six years. Oldroyd enjoyed some recognition by tracing the footsteps of early geologists in the field, thus making his studies less library bound than is usual for historians of science. He can be categorised as a 'Basalla 2' historian, having only published a little on the history of Australian science and a bit on New Zealand geology.[10] He was promoted to a chair in 1995.

Another appointment at UNSW was Randall Albury, with an outstanding PhD from Johns Hopkins on Condillac's thought and the histories of the Chemical Revolution, the life and medical sciences and mineralogy, interpreted to a considerable extent on ideas from the writings of Michel Foucault. Albury had strong interests in 'Continental philosophy', Marxism and Althusser, Freud, feminist thought and the history and sociology of medicine. He succeeded in interesting others in the School in the ideas of Foucault, and, collaborating with Oldroyd, the two found that the empirical material on the history of mineralogy collected by Oldroyd for his PhD could be successfully slotted into the intellectual/historical landscape delineated by Foucault. This led to quite an influential 1977 paper in the *British Journal for the History of Science* ('From Renaissance Mineral Studies to Historical Geology in the Light of Michel Foucault's *The Order of Things*'), one of the few that really put Foucault's program into practice for the history of science.

---

[10] His colleagues correctly pointed out that his fieldwork was a pleasant way of enjoying holidays in attractive parts of the world!

In Australia, Albury's interests developed increasingly in the direction of the history and sociology of medicine and psychology, though he also published a translation of and commentary on Condillac's *Logic*. He supported the Marxist/Althusserian interpretations of scientific practice that were being developed in General Philosophy at Sydney University but did not publish substantial books in these fields as he moved in the direction of administration, eventually becoming a Pro-Vice-Chancellor at the University of New England. He was editor of *Metascience* in its early days.

Again largely as a 'Basalla 2' man, David Miller arrived at the School in 1981 from Manchester University, via a PhD from the University of Pennsylvania on the early history of the Royal Society of London, and a year's stint in the Science Studies unit at Edinburgh University. At the latter institution, he was strongly influenced by the so-called strong program of David Bloor, Steven Shapin and Barry Barnes (and the latter's notion of 'finitism') and got people at UNSW interested in such ideas. On the whole, the staff at UNSW saw the 'strengths of the strong program' and as a result Oldroyd became interested for a time in the grid/group theory of Mary Douglas, which was potentially a tool for strong program theorists. But he concluded that it was of very limited use to historians of science, and indeed it never progressed much among their community.

A philosopher in the UNSW HPS School, Peter Slezak, who developed the interdisciplinary program in cognitive science, took a dim view of the strong program, which led to certain tensions between himself and Miller and within the School more generally. Slezak pointed out that certain computer programs appeared to be able to 'do' science by propounding hypotheses to explain data, and this, he claimed, provided a falsification of the strong program. Slezak (1991, 1994) created a mini-industry out of attacks against the strong program, which the Edinburgh people ignored for some time, though David Bloor (and also Steve Fuller) eventually counterattacked.

Miller meanwhile got his ideas from his PhD into print in a series of papers on the history of the Royal Society and also developed his teaching in the direction of the sociology of science and technology (Merton, Brannigan, Latour, Shapin, Schaffer and so on). Subsequently he worked more in the direction of the history of technology and the 'story' of patents. Lately, and developing out of his interest in Brannigan's ideas on scientific discoveries, he has published extensively on Watt and the steam engine and the debates about who 'discovered' the composition of water, which led to a valuable book *Discovering Water* (2004). Interestingly, Miller has argued that Watt regarded his theory of the steam engine as a *chemical* theory, in line with the varied 'pre-paradigm' ideas about matter that were being advanced in the second half of the eighteenth century. His book *James Watt*, *Chemist* (2009) draws together the issues canvassed in some earlier iconoclastic papers on this topic and has received critical acclaim.

At Wollongong University, the two principal historians have been John Schuster, a PhD from Princeton, and Evelleen Richards, who did her PhD at UNSW (so she has been a ‘Basalla 3’ person in that she trained and gained employment in Australia, and her research interests were fairly specific to Australia). Richards was a strong feminist and a student of Darwinism. She was especially interested in Social Darwinism and Darwin’s portrayal of women (e.g. ‘Darwin and the Descent of Women’ 1983), but her main work was *Vitamin C and Cancer* (1991), which took a Marxist/Althusserian approach.

Schuster’s PhD was on Cartesian optics, and his subsequent research career related to seventeenth-century physical science, experimentation, ‘method talk’, the mechanical philosophy and scientific societies (extending somewhat into the eighteenth century). His thinking could be called ‘neo-Bachelardian’. While being sympathetic to the idea that social formations can ‘shape’ scientific knowledge, he resisted Steven Shapin’s suggestion that seventeenth-century science was fundamentally a product of ‘politesse’. In Wollongong, Schuster built up a small team of students who became enthused about such matters, and when he moved to a position at UNSW (where in time he became a successful Head of School), some of his students followed him. Slezak wrote a PhD at Columbia University on Descartes but from a philosopher’s perspective. He and Schuster had ‘contacts’ in relation to Descartes, but they did no collaborative work.

At the University of Sydney, a full-time position in HPS was created within the Science faculty in 1974 and the Australian Ian Langham (PhD, Princeton) was appointed. Though assisted by Alan Chalmers from General Philosophy and some part-time staff from UNSW, he had an uphill task in trying to cover the many fields of HPS largely on his own. His personal interests were in the history of evolution and anthropology. But after publishing his PhD on the history of British social anthropology (Langham 1981), especially W. H. R. Rivers and kinship systems, Langham spent much time trying (unsuccessfully) to prove that the Piltdown Hoax was perpetrated by Sir Arthur Keith.

Langham suffered a tragic death in 1984, so his position was filled by Chalmers, who was joined by an Oxonian, Michael Shortland, in 1990—a manic worker and brilliant lecturer—who chose to study in depth the famous Scottish geologist, writer and journalist Hugh Miller (Shortland 1996) (another clear example of ‘Basalla 2’ activity) and also had interests in the histories of Darwinism, natural history and geology, as well as science education. But Shortland’s stay was relatively brief, and he was succeeded by philosopher Peter Anstey, a scholar of John Locke and Robert Boyle, who now has a philosophy chair at Otago University.

Gradually the unit grew, with the appointment for a time of the philosopher of biology Paul Griffiths (see section “Philosophy of Biology”) and from 2000 to 2006 by Rachel Ankeny, a PhD in HPS from Pittsburgh specialising in bioethics (who subsequently moved to Adelaide University). At the time of writing, the unit (or in effect a department) has a staff of seven quite young scholars, with interests focused on the history of the Scientific Revolution (Ofer Gall), ethics and science (Catherine Mills), animal experimentation and theories of rights and punishment (Jane Johnson), philosophy of science and quantum theory, especially quantum gravity theory (Dean Rickles), life sciences in the Enlightenment (Charles Wolfe), and the history of medicine and psychiatry (Hans Pols). It appears to be flourishing, with its contacts with Philosophy, Biology and other Science departments. Its best-known 'intellectual product' has been Chalmers' textbook on the philosophy of science, *What is this Thing Called Science*? (1982), which has been translated into 19 languages. Gal has been trying to promote the ill-defined notion of 'baroque science' in the seventeenth century, stemming from his work on Hooke and Newton.

Sydney University has had the advantage of two major philosopher/historians on the campus, not specifically employed in the HPS unit: the philosopher and historian of ideas Stephen Gaukroger (in Philosophy)—a world-class Descartes scholar (e.g. Gaukroger 1995)—and Roy MacLeod, Professor of History from 1982 to 2003.

MacLeod is atypical in that he came to Australia from Harvard, Cambridge (PhD, DLitt), Sussex and London Universities, but on arriving in Australia, he determined to focus his attention on the history of science in Australia and Oceania, collaborating particularly with the late Phillip Rehbock in Hawaii. Decidedly eclectic in his interests, MacLeod has undertaken researches in 'social, economic, and cultural history; history of science, medicine, and technology; military history; nuclear history; museum studies; the history of higher education; and the history of science in the expansion of Europe in Africa, India, Asia, Australasia and the Pacific' (quoting his website). He has had innumerable overseas visiting appointments and done a huge amount of editorial work (co-founding *Social Studies of Science* and presently editor of *Minerva*). But he has made much use of research assistants, and people at Sydney University used to say that he was rarely 'on deck' when needed. MacLeod's work is enormous in scope, imaginative and meticulous, but does not seem to belong to any particular fashion, other than being concerned more with the social history of science, rather than being 'internalist' in character. Long ago, he decided that the Basalla model was inadequate and that no single model could deal adequately with all 'colonial' societies. Nevertheless, in a sense he could be called a 'Basalla 2/3 man' in that he has dealt so much with Australian science, rather than somewhat threadbare topics like the Scientific or Darwinian Revolutions. On the other hand, he has undoubtedly sought a global audience, rather than being content with an Australian reputation, though he has certainly written extensively on Australian topics and the pacific region in his numerous edited volumes, and his long-awaited biography of the nineteenth-century Sydney University science professor and general educationist, Archibald Liversidge, has finally been published (McLeod 2009). It is as much a history of sydney University's early history as a biography of Liversidge.

Among other professional historians who have given considerable attention to the history of science are John Gascoigne from the school of History at UNSW (son of the former senior lecturer in HPS there Robert Gascoigne) and Richard Yeo (Griffith University). Gascoigne J. has written magisterially on the history of exploration: *Joseph Banks and the English Enlightenment* (1994), *Science in the*

Service of Empire (1998); and *Captain Cook* (2007). Yeo has made a specialised study of encyclopaedias and scientific dictionaries (e.g. *Encyclopaedic Visions* [2001]) and is a recognised authority on the work of William Whewell (Yeo 1993).

There has also been a large amount of work done on the history of science and technology in Australia by independent scholars or scientist-historians: for example, Ann Moyal in works such as *A Guide to the Manuscript Records of Australian Science* (1966), *Scientists in Nineteenth Century Australia* (1976), *A Bright and Savage Land* (1986), *Clear Across Australia* (1984) and her 2-volume *The Web of Science* (2003). In fact, Moyal might be said to have been the founder of studies in the history of science and technology in Australia *and* of Australian science policy studies at Griffith University for which she was made a member of the Order of Australia in 1993 and awarded a Doctor of Letters for her publications by the Australian National University in 2003.

The geologists Thomas Vallance and David Branagan of Sydney University have made notable contributions to the study of the history of geology in Australia, with Branagan's (2005) *magnum opus* being a full-scale biography of the great founder of geological studies at Sydney: T. W. Edgeworth David. Ian Rae (presently a Professorial Fellow in HPS at Melbourne University, following senior appointments at Monash University and Victoria University) has been a student of the history of Australian chemistry. John Jenkin, one-time physicist at La Trobe University, has worked on the Braggs. His book *William and Lawrence Bragg* (2008) was published by Oxford University Press. Linden Gillbank has done work on the history of botany in Australia and Ronald Strachan on the zoology. Or for the history of natural history, see for example, Colin Finney, *To Sail Beyond the Sunset* (1984). Such works offer 'nothing fancy' historiographically, but many of them are lovingly produced, accurately researched, well written and a pleasure to read. They talk to the wider populace rather than HPS aficionados.

History of Science in New Zealand

The first formally trained historian of science in New Zealand was Michael Hoare, who came from Australia to hold a James Cook Fellowship from 1975 to 1978, and then became Manuscripts Librarian at the Turnbull Library (in Wellington). His annual Cook Lectures, published as pamphlets, were pioneering articles on New Zealand's science history. During this time, Hoare edited Forster's journals from the second Cook voyage, published as *Resolution Journal* (4 vols, 1982) and taught briefly in the honours History programme at Victoria University, Wellington. Before moving sideways to contract history writing and then to the Police Museum, Hoare organised a conference on the history of New Zealand science in Wellington (1983). His legacy to New Zealand's science history culminated in a collection of papers from this conference (edited with M. A. Bell), *In Search of New Zealand's Scientific Heritage* (1984). Most of the contributors were scientists and librarians rather than historians.

In this tradition, there has been significant work on the history of New Zealand science produced by scientists, journalists and librarians, many of whom were present at the 1983 conference. Publications include *The Southern Ark* (1986) by the zoologist John Andrews and *Science*, *Settlers and Scholars* (1987) by the geologist and ornithologist Charles Fleming, who was himself a president of the RSNZ. Other noteworthy contributions are *McMeekan* (1982), a biography of an eminent agricultural scientist by Gordon McLauchlan (a journalist), and a biography of New Zealand's scientific hero, *Rutherford* (1999) by John Campbell, a physicist. A mathematician, Gary Tee, is known for his accurate encyclopaedic work on NZ science history and the history of mathematics.

There has also been a prehistory of science in New Zealand. Scientists from the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (established 1926, disestablished 1992) often wrote brief accounts that drew on collective memory. Most notably, going far beyond collective memory, Ian Dick, the founding director of the Applied Mathematics Division, left a lengthy manuscript, 'A History of Scientific Endeavour in New Zealand', which survives in manuscript copies, including one at the Turnbull Library.

Since Hoare's death, the leading historian of New Zealand science has been Ross Galbreath, a zoologist who retrained in history (PhD Waikato, 1989) and presently works as a public historian. His books include *Walter Buller* (1989), *Working for Wildlife* (1993), *DSIR*: *Making Science Work for New Zealand* (1998) and *Scholars and Gentlemen Both* (2002); he has also published many articles.

Three historians of science in New Zealand were trained outside the country and could be classed as 'Basalla 2' persons. Ruth Barton (PhD Pennsylvania, 1976) returned to New Zealand to teach in the History Department at the University of Auckland in 1993. She continues research on nineteenth-century British science having published extensively on the X Club and science journalism, and is currently working on a book on the X Club. Barton teaches history of science at both graduate and undergraduate levels and has been teaching and supervising topics in the history of New Zealand science. Clemency Montelle (PhD Brown, 2005) teaches in the mathematics department at the University of Canterbury and researches ancient mathematics (see also 5.4). Jock Hoe, a mathematician and Chinese scholar, did pioneering work on Chinese mathematics in his doctorate (Paris VII, 1976), demonstrating how higher-order polynomial equations were solved in the 'Jade Mirror of Four Unknowns (1303)'. Since his retirement, Hoe has translated his thesis, originally published in French (1977), as *The Jade Mirror of the Four Unknowns* (2007).

A few New Zealand-trained historians include history of science in their work. John Stenhouse (PhD Massey 1986) at Otago University is interested in the interactions of science, religion and race theory in New Zealand. He has written extensively on responses in New Zealand to evolutionary theory and is currently working on the scientific contributions of missionaries. James Beattie (PhD Otago, 2004) has interests in history of science and environmental history in New Zealand and in Asia. Scholars who do not identify as historians 'of science' research in the field. For example, New Zealand scholars in German, such as James Bade, James Braund and

Sascha Nolden, have written many articles on German scientists in New Zealand, most importantly on Ferdinand von Hochstetter and Julius von Haast.

Various historians and geographers have turned their attention to the history of agriculture. At Canterbury (Eric Pawson, Geography) and Otago (Tom Brooking, History) a research group on grasslands has been developing an environmental history perspective on grasslands. At Auckland, Natalie Lloyd, a postdoctoral fellow in the History Department, has been developing a history of science and imperial history perspective on the animal side of agriculture in a study of deficiency diseases in livestock. Forestry history has attracted the attention of Michael Roche (Geography, Massey, Palmerston North).

History of New Zealand science continues to be followed by scientists, as in Australia. Geologists have been particularly active in a Historical Studies Group within the Geological Society of New Zealand. PhD theses on historical topics from geology departments include Heather Nicholson's 'The New Zealand Greywackes' (Auckland 2003) and A. G. Hocken's 'Early Life of James Hector, 1834–1865' (Otago 2007). In Wellington there is considerable activity around national institutions such as the Royal Society of New Zealand, the National Library and the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa. Lectures, exhibitions and conferences draw attention to New Zealand's scientific heritage. For example, in 2007 a conference was held at Te Papa on James Hector (founder of many of New Zealand's scientific institutions) on the centenary of his death. Recent books include Simon Nathan's biography *Harold Wellman* (2005) (the man who brilliantly applied the theory of plate tectonics to understanding the structural geology of New Zealand) and Mary McEwen's biography of her father, *Charles Fleming* (2005). Rebecca Priestley, a science writer and the first PhD graduate from the postgraduate Canterbury HPS program (see 5.4), took time off from her PhD to edit *The Awa Book of New Zealand Science* (2008), an anthology of New Zealand science writing.

Thus, for most of the contributors working in New Zealand, the focus has been on a history of their country's scientific and cultural heritage. Independent scholars and scientist-historians have had a higher relative profile in history of science in New Zealand than in Australia, and their contributions to the study of the history of New Zealand science have been important.

Philosophy of Science in New Zealand

Though philosophy of science has been important to philosophy in New Zealand, it was never set within the institutional framework that the subject found in Australia through specialist HPS departments. Philosophy departments in New Zealand were founded as a mixed collection of subjects including not just philosophy and logic but also psychology, political studies and even economics. It was only when these subjects found their own institutional setting in departments of their own in the immediate post-World War II period that philosophy could emerge as a distinct subject in its own right. The initial strengths in philosophy in New Zealand were in logic through the work of Arthur Prior at the University of Canterbury and George Hughes at Victoria University of Wellington and work by their students such as Max Creswell and Richard Routley among others. However, none of their work in logic impacted directly on philosophy of science, which developed much later and separately. This is true even of Prior's work on the logic of time. Though it still has current interest for philosophers, on the whole, it remains on a separate track from issues of time discussed within the philosophy of physics.

Karl Popper

Quite independently of these trends, and in fact much earlier, the first eminent philosopher of science in New Zealand was Karl Popper. He arrived from England in 1937 to take up a lectureship that he had been offered at Canterbury University College. Already he had published his *Logik der Forschung* (1934) in Vienna, but this book had little impact until its English translation in 1959 as *The logic of scientific discovery*. What impact it had was indirect through other research projects on which Popper worked during his time in New Zealand. He brought with him his preoccupations with the impending conflicts in Europe involving communism, the rise of Nazism and the Second World War. His first paper delivered at a philosophy seminar at Canterbury College in 1937 was entitled 'What is Dialectic?' (*Mind*, 1940). He also explored issues in political philosophy and philosophy of social science. His 1957 book, *The Poverty of Historicism*, had its genesis in work prior to his arrival in New Zealand. But further work on this led to a much larger manuscript, which was culled to provide a series of three articles in *Economica* (1944–1945) and these subsequently formed the basis of the book. There can be found well-known Popperian themes of a social science that is individualistic, anti-holistic and anti-historicist, alongside a case for what became known as 'situational logic' in explaining human action in social contexts.

Popper greatly expanded the culled material between 1938 and 1943 and from this emerged his major work in political and social philosophy, *The Open Society and its Enemies* (1945). Popper later said of these two books that they were his 'war effort'. Much philosophy of science is often seen to be preoccupied with issues deemed to be internal to the profession and without much wider impact. Popper is often thought to be one philosopher of science who has contributed to this 'professionalised' conception of philosophy of science. But this cannot be entirely true of the author of *The Open Society and its Enemies* (1945). Popper regarded this work as his attempt to come to terms with the errors of some of the great philosophers of the past, particularly Plato, Hegel and Marx, and the false conceptions of society that their works embodied. He argued that their errors lay behind many of the social conflicts of his time and that philosophy had an important critical role in drawing out these erroneous ideas and exposing them to criticism. Popper's understanding of these philosophers has been controversial, but his two works made contributions to the philosophy of history, society and economics and showed how a critical approach to these areas of intellectual endeavour could be developed.

In this respect, the critical rationalism expounded in his earlier *Logik der Forschung* was given an important application.

While in New Zealand Popper developed other views for which he later became well known, such as his ontology of Worlds 1, 2 and 3 and even his propensity interpretation of probability (according to those who knew Popper at the time, and remember embryonic versions of these ideas being aired in lectures and talks). Also important at this time was Popper's work on probability, especially its axiomatisation. Already Andrey Kolmogorov had developed in 1933 the now commonly adopted axiomatisation in which the formal theory is developed by taking a one-place function as a primitive and then defining relative probability in terms of it. Popper took a different approach, introducing the idea of conditional (two-place) probability as a primitive. Also in contrast to the Kolmogorov approach, Popper did not restrict the arguments of the function to the case of sets only; they could also be events, sentences and propositions. Some of this work was first published in *Mind* in 1938. Immediately after this, Popper worked on improved versions of his system, which formed the basis of later publications in the 1950s, some of which appeared in the appendices of the English edition of the *Logic of Scientific Discovery* (1959).

Otago

When Popper left New Zealand in 1945 for the London School of Economics, there were many academics working in fields other than philosophy, such as chemistry, economics and literary studies, who were strongly influenced by him. But on departing he left no immediate professional influence upon philosophy in New Zealand (nor did he intend to). However, he played a considerable role in the appointment of Alan Musgrave to a chair of Philosophy at the University of Otago in 1970. Musgrave, a lecturer at LSE, was Popper's one-time research assistant and student, who also worked with Imré Lakatos. In his research, Musgrave has supported a number of Popperian themes, best represented in his collection of papers *Essays on realism and rationalism* (1999). In the papers on realism, Musgrave criticises some of the current major opponents of realism such as the 'Natural Ontological Attitude' (NOA) of Arthur Fine, the constructive empiricism of Bas van Fraassen, and a target he identifies as 'Wittgensteinian instrumentalism'. He also takes to task various versions of idealism. One of these is a version of 'as-if-ism' or 'surrealism', in which it is only *as if* the entities postulated in science really exist. Another variety of idealism is that which, wittingly or unwittingly, falls victim to a version of 'word magic' in which language itself appears to generate a bogus ontology from within its own resources.

On the more positive side of these essays, Musgrave develops his own original account of how realism is to be defended, but taking some cues from both Karl Popper and Jack Smart. This is what Musgrave calls the 'ultimate argument for scientific realism'. What needs to be explained is a common feature of our scientific theories, viz., that they can make novel, true predictions. What best explains this novelty? Before answering, Musgrave provides an original account of the form of abductive inference that is involved here, viz., ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ (IBE). Normally this is presented as a non-deductive inference, but Musgrave interestingly recasts this as a deductive inference with some principle of rational belief among the premises. Equipped with his version of IBE, Musgrave then shows that a number of rivals to realism, such as instrumentalism, constructive empiricism and ‘as-if-ism’ (or ‘surrealism’), fail, when compared with realism, as explanations of why theories can anticipate novel facts.

It should be noted that though Musgrave defends a strong scientific realism, he argues against realism in mathematics. His colleague Colin Cheyne argued in *Knowledge*, *Cause*, *and Abstract objects* (2001) that the contentions of mathematics are useful without being true. By this expedient Cheyne avoided a commitment to an ontology of abstract objects and thus the epistemic problem of how we could ever know about mathematical entities with which we cannot causally interact.

Musgrave has also defended another of Popper’s characteristic theses, namely, that induction cannot be justified, but he does this in a way that involves a reformulation of Popper’s critical rationalism. Musgrave’s complex strategy is to replace inductive arguments by deductive arguments, which are then supplemented by additional premises containing operators such as ‘it is reasonable to believe that’ and which yield, deductively, conclusions that also include such operators. At the heart of Musgrave’s re-construal of Popper’s views is a criticism of the role of justificationalism in giving a rational ground for induction. Attempts at justification are unavailing, as Hume argued a long time ago. What is important in Musgrave’s more positive position is the distinction between propositional contents, which do not stand in any justificatory relationship with one another (thought they do stand in logical relations), and our *acts* of believing these contents. If there are rational grounds to be invoked, they apply to the *acts* of believing, not the *contents* believed. By re-construing inductive reasoning in this way, Musgrave not only changes the subject at issue (from that of induction to deduction) but also recasts ‘Popperian’ critical rationalism by supplementing it with additional principles containing the abovementioned operators. This is an internalist approach to the problems facing Popperian critical rationalism that is not readily endorsed by hard-core Popperians.

Another central Popperian theme was addressed by two other members of Otago’s Philosophy Department. When Popper visited Dunedin in 1973, Pavel Tichý presented him with a knockdown argument which showed that his definition of verisimilitude was bedevilled by a contradiction. (Others also noted this problem for Popper’s definition at about the same time.) Subsequently, Tichý, along with Graham Oddie (initially a student in the Department and then a lecturer), began to develop ways of repairing the problem. But no repair could be constructed along the lines of Popper’s original approach based on the idea of a Tarski consequence class. An entirely different approach had to be developed, drawing on quite different techniques in logic. An exploration of the issues involved can be found in Oddie’s *Likeness to Truth* (1986); and subsequent papers add to his treatment of the topic. Here the idea of a proposition being like the truth is taken as more fundamental where this is not to be cashed out in terms of the quantity of the information the proposition contains (i.e. the possibilities it rules out). Rather, it is to be understood as the 'quality of its information' (i.e. the likeness of the possibilities it allows to the actual states of affairs of the world). The Tichý-Oddie approach has also strongly influenced the approach taken by others who came to work on the problem of truth-likeness originally inspired by Popper. This approach to truth-likeness also turns on a background presupposition of scientific realism.

Auckland

Contributions to the philosophy of science at the University of Auckland have been made by Fred Kroon and Robert Nola. Nola's doctoral work was on inter-theory relations, particularly theory reduction, theory replacement and the possibility of continuity and discontinuity between theories. Kroon doctoral work was on reference and reduction, mainly in the sciences but also in mathematics. In the mid-1970s, Paul Feyerabend, who had applied for a vacant chair in Philosophy at Auckland, was subsequently asked to become a Visiting Professor in the Department. He accepted and visited for two terms, but owing to illness, this arrangement was terminated. His first visit coincided with his preparing a draft of *Against method* and his second visit coincided with his proofing of the book and adding appendices designed to deflect criticisms of his views or develop them further. His lectures and talks were electrifying, attracting many non-philosophers in the university. Feyerabend graphically illustrated the complexities of the history of science and contrasted this with some of the over-simple accounts of scientific method that were often imposed upon it. Feyerabend's target was often Popper's ideas of scientific method, but his foil was often Lakatos. Feyerabend was a hard act to follow, but he left a trail of students who became convinced that epistemological anarchism was an appealing philosophy of science.

Feyerabend sharpened issues for Nola and Kroon concerning not just inter-theory relations and the evolution of scientific theories but also issues to do with scientific realism and its rivals. Their interests lay in attempting to defend realism and rationality against the serious challenge that Feyerabend launched against these positions. Between them they wrote a number of papers that argued for an ontological continuity between many pairs of successive theories that Feyerabend, and also Kuhn, said were ontologically incommensurable. More generally, they argued for ways in which reference can be fixed for theoretical as well as observational terms, using either some version of a Kripkean direct causal theory of 'reference fixing' or a more descriptivist approach. Such theories of reference fixing allowed for ways in which reference to some item could be secured without involving a strong dependence upon theoretical beliefs about the item picked out, and in some cases no dependence at all. This enabled them to impose limits on the extent to which claims about ontological incommensurability could be made and thereby limits to claims about ontological relativism or scepticism about whether theories ever put us in contact with any independent unobservable reality. Other lines of work on Kuhn and Feyerabend were also pursued by Edwin Hung in the Philosophy Department at the University of Waikato in, for example, Beyond Kuhn (2006).

The claim that there is ontological discontinuity between theories has had a strong pull and it is has been supported by at least two kinds of consideration. The first is one or other of the various versions of the pessimistic meta-inductive argument, which cast doubt on whether our present theories, even if successful, put us in touch with some underlying reality. The other comes from considerations about the failure of arguments for scientific realism that are based on inference to the best explanation. However, these considerations do not always lead to a form of anti-realism in science, and one strongly realist position that builds on these two considerations is structural realism. This can come in many versions, one of the strongest being a version that accepts that there is no ontological continuity at the level of objects (since there really are not any), but there is continuity at the level of structure, particularly mathematical structure. While the idea that the existence of structures is an important matter for realists to consider, they need not abandon the idea that there is ontological continuity at the level of objects—the items that are meant to fill these structures. Once again, considerations based on how reference to theoretical terms can be secured amid theory change come to the fore. To this end, Nola has developed a version of Lewis's theory of how theoretical terms are to be introduced that does not depend on the whole context in which the terms occur and which allows for ontological continuity between success theories. For example, some argue that, on the face of it, there is object, but not structural, discontinuity in pairs of theories such as those of Fresnel's model of light (in which light is a mechanical vibration in a medium) and Maxwell's model of light (in which light arises from electric vectors vibrating in fields). The structural continuity arises from the preservation of Fresnel's equations for the behaviour of light within Maxwell's equations. Lewis's account of theoretical terms has also formed the basis of an approach to philosophical analysis known colloquially as 'the Canberra Plan' (the view that the first task of philosophy is not to engage with synthetic theories but to produce an a priori analysis of the categories employed by everyday thought). This is a fruitful approach to both philosophical analysis and a form of scientific naturalism that can be successfully applied to many theories of our developing sciences and the ontology to which they commit us.

A number of studies of the sciences from an historical and social point of view have undermined the commonly held 'rationalist' view that, despite a few deviations, the progress of science is to be explained by its appeal to principles of method, whatever they be. Even a supposed 'anarchist' such as Feyerabend endorses a position close to this. He admits that there can be piecemeal rationality for most of the particular moves in science, but what he denied is that there is a small set of principles (perhaps like Popper's) that are applicable, come what may, to all areas of science. Sociologists of science adopt a more extreme position and look to social, political and other external, contextualised factors as the determinants of scientific belief and changes in these beliefs. Their position is in many ways similar to that adopted by many French philosophers, in particular Foucault with his doctrine of 'knowledge/power'. On this view, the determinant of scientific belief is the power nexus that enmeshes those who entertain the beliefs.

Nola's *Rescuing Reason* (2003) criticises these 'anti-enlightenment' accounts of the development of the sciences advanced by advocates of the Strong Program in the sociology of scientific knowledge, or advocates of Foucauldian 'power/knowledge' as well as many others (such a Nietzsche with his 'will to power' doctrine). It is argued that many of these 'anti-enlightenment' approaches to the rationality of belief are based on a faulty conception of what it is to naturalise the norms of reason and method. The critical foil adopted is that of an appropriately naturalised epistemology that can take on board many of the principles of scientific reasoning. Such principles often turn out to be implicitly presupposed by many of the opponents of scientific rationality despite their explicit rejection of it. On a more positive note, Nola has written with Howard Sankey a book that casts a more positive light on methodology (*Theories of Scientific Method* [2007]). It looks at a wide range of theories that have been proposed over the last 50 years and comes out in support of a version of Bayesianism. In particular, it investigates the meta-methodological considerations that many methodologists have used to justify their particular theory of method. This includes not only the use of a particular methodology elevated to the status of a meta-methodology, an approach advocated by Popper and Lakatos; it also includes an account of how principles of reflective equilibrium, meta-inductive principles, historically based meta-principles and even an appeal to the meaning of the word 'science' (a position advocated by the later Kuhn) can be used as a means of adjudicating between those very methodological principles that we use in making choices about scientific theories themselves.

Canterbury

One strength in HPS at the University of Canterbury in recent decades has been philosophy of physics. Philosopher Dugald Murdoch produced a magisterial study of *Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Physics* (1987). In it Bohr, who is notoriously difficult, is shown, by a patient and searching discussion of his contribution, not to be a simple instrumentalist, though he adduced many reasons why we face 'kinematical-dynamical complementarity' ineluctably in ways that limit the extent to which investigation of physical reality can illuminate objective truth. It is the physical world, however, that sets these limits upon us. So according to Murdoch, Bohr's philosophy of physics is a hybrid 'realistic instrumentalism'.

Murdoch's successor, Philip Catton, has, by contrast, a special interest in philosophy of space-time physics. He has also critically discussed the deductivist conception of scientific rationality, argued for the recognition of synthetic dimensions of epistemic responsibility in science and examined Frankfurt School critical theory and environmentalism. A number of visits by Oxford philosopher of physics Harvey Brown (a Canterbury graduate) have strengthened the links between philosophy and physics at the university. Catton has helped a constructive mathematician (and Michael Dummett protégé) Douglas Bridges (in pure mathematics) to establish an honours program in Mathematics and Philosophy. He has also instigated the development of an interdepartmental HPS program, aided by some particularly auspicious appointments in other departments.

The Canterbury Philosophy Department has also counted among its academic leaders not only the Otago Philosopher, Graham Oddie, known particularly for his *Likeness to Truth* (1986), but more recently Graham Macdonald and Cynthia Macdonald, who have together approached many problems in philosophy of mind (e.g. concerning mental causation) very much as philosophers of science, as the critical engagements in their *Philosophy of Psychology* (1995) with various eminent contemporary figures in that field each serves to illustrate.

Currently the academic staff member with the most dedicated profile as a historian of science is Clemency Montelle (in Mathematics), who works on ancient mathematics and astronomy. Along with Catton she is researching linkages between histories of mathematics, astronomy and physics and the history of philosophy at selected junctures from ancient times to the present. Philosophers Jack Copeland and Diane Proudfoot head up the Turing Archive, and both are recognised researchers in the history of computing and the philosophy of artificial intelligence. Several of the university's scientists, including John Hearnshaw, William Tobin and John Campbell, have published monographs on either historical scientists or historical intellectual development of the specific scientific sub-discipline in which they work. A political scientist, Mark Francis (2007), recently published the definitive intellectual biography of Herbert Spencer. A geographer, Eric Pawson, has published widely on environmental history, mostly about New Zealand (e.g. Pawson and Brooking 2002). A chemist, Andy Pratt, an avid contributor to the teaching of philosophy of science, has published philosophical pieces on scientific controversies and their creative resolution. History of medicine is strong in the History Department where Jane Buckingham's research focuses on India and the Pacific and Philippa Mein-Smith's research on Australia and New Zealand includes the history of medicine and health.

Both history and philosophy of science greatly benefit from the University's scheme of Erskine Fellowships, which bring international visitors for 1–2 months, and NZ-US academic exchanges under the Fulbright system. Recent philosopher-of-science visitors include Harvey Brown (Oxford), William Demopoulos (University of Western Ontario), Richard Boyd (Cornell) and Alan Chalmers (Flinders). In history of science, recent visits by Margaret Osler (University of Calgary) and Sally Kohlstedt (University of Minnesota) have proved similarly stimulating.

Conclusion

The major HPS units in Australia (Melbourne, UNSW, Sydney and Wollongong) were the nurseries for both history of science and philosophy of science in Australia. They all started out with the supposed 'two-culture' problem in mind. But, by and large, *enforced* bridging of C. P. Snow's 'gap' proved to be unsuccessful.

History of science and philosophy of science can, and sometimes do, coexist well as a niche area of teaching and research, but it has been difficult to teach philosophy of science to an advanced level in an HPS unit.

However, the original location of philosophers of science in autonomous HPS units in Australia gave them the freedom they needed to develop their subject and pursue their inquiries, independently of the traditions of linguistic and Wittgensteinian philosophy that were then in fashion. This independence was a source of strength to the HPS department in Melbourne in its early years. But at the same time, it deprived philosophy of science there of the kind of student base that it needed to flourish, and it cut philosophy of science off from mainstream philosophy. When Ellis moved to La Trobe in 1966, he was effectively making this statement. And the kind of department of philosophy that he sought to build was one that, among other things, was broad enough to include the kind of teaching and research that had been done in philosophy of science in Melbourne HPS. The La Trobe Philosophy Department flourished, presumably partly as a result of this policy. By the early 1980s, those working with Ellis at La Trobe in the general area included John Bigelow, Robert Pargetter, John Fox, Ross Phillips and Kim Sterelny—a formidable line-up by any standards. Other departments of philosophy around Australia have followed La Trobe's lead, and every major department of philosophy in Australia now has one or more senior appointments in philosophy of science. At the time of writing, the University of Sydney has by far the most distinguished group of philosophers of science in Australasia. Though formally located in Science, the HPS unit is firmly linked with the Sydney Philosophy Department, and strongly supported by it. It also has contacts with some of the Science schools. This seems to provide a favourable institutional arrangement.

Australian historians of science in HPS departments may appear to have been largely unaffected by their isolation from mainstream history. For example, Elizabeth Gasking, Rod Home, Homer Le Grand, Richard Gillings, David Oldroyd, David Miller, Evelleen Richards and Nicolas Rasmussen have all made major monograph contributions to their fields. But, like their philosophical colleagues, they have had only restricted access to History majors, and so were not able to develop sustainable and integrated programs of historical teaching and research in their various fields. So, while HPS units were good nurseries for history of science work, they did not automatically provide the best environment for their mature development. Ideally, history of science and philosophy of science should have been offered its own chair in a parent department of history or philosophy, as the case may be, and encouraged to integrate their studies as far as possible into the teaching and research programs of these departments.

But instead of moving to collaborating and consolidate teaching and research in the two areas, the faculties responsible for their development have colluded with or yielded to special interest groups to dilute HPS with the addition of science policy, environmental studies, sociology of technology, anthropology, cultural studies, etc. In practice, this has proven to be unsuccessful everywhere. While university administrators seem to have supposed otherwise, history of science and philosophy of science, or HPS, are not natural partners with any, let alone all, of these additions, and the number of staff who have initially 'sought a home' in HPS, only to move on to greener pastures elsewhere (chiefly in university administration or policy work of some kind) is extraordinary. It seems that the unit that has kept its focus on HPS most clearly has been the one at Sydney University. And that is the one that has, in practice, survived most successfully to date.

It is noteworthy that in the USA and New Zealand—both relatively unconcerned about the 'two-culture' problem—history of science and philosophy of science have mostly been taught in different departments, and comparatively speaking, probably with greater success. In retrospect, it seems that the objective of university administrators in Australia should have been to subsume HPS teaching and research in parent History and/or Philosophy departments and offer these departments appropriate incentives to develop along these lines.

References

Agar, N. (1995). Valuing species and valuing individuals. *Environmental Ethics, 17*, 397–415.

Albury, W., & Oldroyd, D. (1997). From renaissance mineral studies to historical geology in the light of Michel Foucault's the order of things. *British Journal for the History of Science, 10*, 187–215.

Albury, W. (1979). *La logique = Logic/Etienne de Condillac* (trans and Intro: Albury W). New York: Abaris Books.

Ankeney, R. (2006). Individual responsibility and reproduction. In R. Rhodes, L. Francis, & A. Silvers (Eds.), *The Blackwell guide to medical ethics*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Armstrong, D. (1978). *Universals and scientific realism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Basalla, G. (1967). The spread of Western science. *Science, 156*, 611–622.

Bigelow, J. (1988). *The reality of numbers: A Physicalist's philosophy of mathematics*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1987). Functions. *Journal of Philosophy, 84*, 181–196.

Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1991). *Science and necessity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Branagan, D. (2005). *T. W. Edgeworth David: A life: Geologist, adventurer, soldier and 'Knight in the Old Brown Hat'*. Canberra: National Library of Australia.

Bridges, D., & Luminita, V. (2006). *Techniques of constructive analysis*. New York: Springer.

Buckingham, J. (2002). *Leprosy in colonial south India: Medicine and confinement*. New York: Palgrave.

Campbell, J. (1999). *Rutherford: Scientist supreme*. Christchurch: AAS Publications.

Catton, P., & Solomon, G. (1988). Uniqueness of embeddings and space-time relationalism. *Philosophy of Science, 55*, 280–291.

Catton, P. (1989). Marxist critical theory, contradictions, and ecological succession. *Dialogue, 28*, 637–653.

Catton, P. (1999). Problems with the deductivist image of scientific reasoning. *Philosophy of Science, 66*(*Proceedings*), S452–S473.

Catton, P., & Macdonald, G. (Eds.). (2004). *Karl Popper: Critical appraisals*. London: Routledge.

Catton, P., & Montelle, C. (2012). To diagram, to demonstrate: To do, to see, and to judge in Greek geometry. *Philosophia Mathematica, 20*, 25–57.

Chalmers, A. (1982). *What is this thing called science? An assessment of the nature and status of science and its methods*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Chalmers, A. (1986). The Galileo that Feyerabend missed. In J. Schuster & R. Yeo (Eds.), *The politics and rhetoric of scientific method*. Berlin: Springer.

Chalmers, A. (1989). How to defend science against skepticism. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 40*, 249–253.

Chalmers, A. (1990). *Science and its fabrication*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Cheyne, C. (2001). *Knowledge, cause, and abstract objects: Causal objections to Platonism*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Cheyne, C., & Worrall, J. (Eds.). (2006). *Rationality and reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Churchland, P., & Hooker, C. (Eds.). (1985). *Images of science*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Clendinnen, J. (1982). Rational expectation and simplicity. In R. McLaughlin (Ed.), *What? Where? When? Why?* (pp. 1–15). Dordrecht: Reidel.

Conant, J. (1945). *General Education in a Free Society*, Harvard University Report. Cambridge Mass; Harvard University Press.

Conant, J. (1947). On understanding science: An historical approach. In Conant, J. et al. (Eds.), *Harvard case histories in experimental science* (2 vols.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Cumming, G. (2008). Replication and P-intervals: P-values predict the future only vaguely, but confidence intervals do much better. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3*, 286–300.

Dowe, D., et al. (2007). Bayes not bust! Why simplicity is no problem for Bayesians. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58*, 709–754.

Duhem, P. (1953). *The aim and structure of physical theory* (trans: Wiener P). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dyason, D. (1977). After thirty years: History and philosophy of science in Australia 1946–1976. In S. Murray-Smith (Ed.), *Melbourne studies in education 1977* (pp. 45–74). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Ellis, B. (1965). A vindication of scientific inductive practices. *American Philosophical Quarterly, 2*, 296–305.

Ellis, B. (1966). *Basic concepts of measurement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ellis, B. (1971). On conventionality and simultaneity: A reply. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49*, 177–203.

Ellis, B. (1979). *Rational belief systems*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ellis, B. (1987). The ontology of scientific realism. In P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, & J. Norman (Eds.), *Essays in honour of J. J. C. Smart* (pp. 50–70). Oxford: Blackwell.

Ellis, B. (1990). *Truth and objectivity*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ellis, B. (2001). *Scientific essentialism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ellis, B. (2002). *The philosophy of nature: A guide to the new essentialism*. London: Acumen.

Ellis, B., & Bowman, P. (1967). Conventionality in distant simultaneity. *Philosophy of Science, 34*, 116–136.

Ellis, B., & Lierse, C. (1994). Dispositional essentialism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72*, 27–45.

Feyerabend, P. (1975). *Against method: Outlines of an anarchistic theory of knowledge*. London: New Left Books.

Feyerabend, P. (1981). *Problems of empiricism* (Philosophical Papers; Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Finney, C. (1993). *Paradise revealed: Natural history in nineteenth-century Australia*. Melbourne: Museum of Victoria.

Finney, C. (1984). *To sail beyond the sunset: Natural history in Australia, 1699–1829*. Adelaide: Rigby.

Fisher, R. (1935). *The design of experiments*. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd.

Fisher, R. (1957). Dangers of cigarette-smoking. Letter to *British Medical Journal, 2*(43), 297–298.

Forge, J. (2008). *The responsible scientist: A philosophical inquiry*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.

Forge, J. (2012) *Designed to Kill: The Case Against Weapons Research*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Fox, J. (1987). Truthmaker. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65*, 188–207.

Fox, J. (2007). Why we shouldn't give Ellis a dinch. *Analysis, 67* (296), 301–303.

Francis, M. (2007). *Herbert Spencer and the invention of modern life*. London: Acumen.

Gascoigne, J. (2007). *Captain cook: Voyager between worlds*. London: Hambledon Continuum.

Gascoigne, J. (1994). *Joseph banks and the English enlightenment: Useful knowledge and polite culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gascoigne, J. (1998). *Science in the service of empire: Joseph banks and the uses of science in the age of revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gasking, E. (1967). *Investigations into generation, 1651–1828*. London: Hutchinson.

Gasking, E. (1970). *The rise of experimental biology*. New York: Random House.

Gaukroger, S. (1995). *Descartes: An intellectual biography*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Gillings, R. (1972). *Mathematics in the time of the pharaohs*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (1989). Misinformation. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19*, 533–550.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (1992). Additivity and the units of selection. *Proceedings of the Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1*, 315–328.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (1993). Functions: Consensus without unity. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 74*, 196–208.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (1994). A modern history theory of functions. *Noûs, 28*, 344–362.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (2000). Information, arbitrariness, and selection: Comments on Maynard Smith. *Philosophy of Science, 67*, 202–207.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (2001). Three kinds of adaptationism. In S. Orzack & E. Sober (Eds.), *Adaptationism and optimality* (pp. 335–357). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Godfrey-Smith, P., & Kerr, B. (2002). Individualist and multi-level perspectives on selection in structured populations. *Biology and Philosophy, 17*, 477–517.

Godfrey-Smith, P., & Sterelny, K. (2007). Biological information. In E. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy*. Stanford University. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2007/entries/information-biological/

Griffiths, P. (1992). Adaptive explanation and the concept of a vestige. In P. Griffiths (Ed.), *Trees of life: Essays in philosophy of biology* (pp. 111–131). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Griffiths, P. (1993). Functional analysis and proper functions. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44*, 409–422.

Griffiths, P. (1994). Cladistic classification and functional explanation. *Philosophy of Science, 61*, 206–227.

Griffiths, P. (1996). The historical turn in the study of adaptation. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47*, 511–532.

Griffiths, P. (1997). *What emotions really are: The problem of psychological categories*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Griffiths, P. (1999). Squaring the circle: Natural kinds with historical essences. In R. Wilson (Ed.), *Species: New interdisciplinary essays* (pp. 209–228). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Griffiths, P. (2001). Genetic information: A metaphor in search of a theory. *Philosophy of Science, 68*, 394–412.

Griffiths, P. (2002). What is innateness? *The Monist, 85*, 70–85.

Griffiths, P. (2007). Gene. In M. Ruse & D. Hull (Eds.), *Cambridge companion to philosophy of biology* (pp. 85–102). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Griffiths, P., & Gray, R. (1994a). Developmental systems and evolutionary explanation. *Journal of Philosophy, 91*, 277–304.

Griffiths, P., & Gray, R. (1994b). Replicators and vehicles—or developmental systems. *Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 17*, 623–624.

Griffiths, P., & Gray, R. (1997). Replicator II—judgement day. *Biology and Philosophy, 12*, 471–492.

Griffiths, P., & Knight, R. (1998). What is the developmentalist challenge? *Philosophy of Science, 65*, 253–258.

Griffiths, P., & Neumann-Held, E. (1999). The many faces of the gene. *BioScience, 49*, 656–662.

Griffiths, P., & Stotz, K. (2004). Do genes exist? *Genomics Network: The Newsletter of the ESRC Genomics Network, 1*, 6–7.

Griffiths, P., & Stotz, K. (2006). Genes in the postgenomic era. *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 27*, 499–521.

Grünbaum, A., Salmon, W., van Fraassen, B., & Janis, A. (1969). A panel discussion of simultaneity by slow clock transport in the special and general theories of relativity. *Philosophy of Science, 36*, 1–83.

Hearnshaw, J. (2014 [1987]). *The analysis of starlight: Two centuries of astronomical spectroscopy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Home, R. (1981). *The effluvial theory of electricity*. New York: Arno Press.

Home, R. (1992). *Electricity and experimental physics in eighteenth-century Europe*. Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum.

Home, R. (Ed.). (1988). *Australian science in the making*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press and Australian Academy of Science.

Home, R. et al. (Eds). (1998–2006). *Regardfully yours: Selected correspondence of Ferdinand von Mueller* (3 vols.). New York: Pater Lang.

Home, R., & Kohlstedt, S. (Eds.). (1991). *International science and national scientific identity: Australia between Britain and America*. Boston: Kluwer.

Home, R., & Connor, P. (1979). *Æpinus's essay on the theory of electricity and magnetism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jenkin, J. (2007). *William and Lawrence Bragg, father and son: The most extraordinary collaboration in science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kitcher, P., & Sterelny, K. (1988). The return of the gene. *Journal of Philosophy, 85*, 339–361.

Kitcher, P., Sterelny, K., & Waters, K. (1990). The illusory riches of Sober's monism. *Journal of Philosophy, 87*, 158–161.

Krips, H. (1987). *The metaphysics of quantum theory*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Kuhn, T. (1962). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), *Criticism and the growth of knowledge* (pp. 91–195). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lakatos, I. (1963–1964). Proofs and refutations. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 14*, 1–25, 120–139, 221–245, 269–342.

Langham, I. (1981). *The building of British social anthropology: W. H. R. Rivers and his Cambridge disciples in the development of kinship studies, 1898–1931*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Le Grand, H. (1988). *Drifting continents and shifting theories*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leslie, C. (2008). *Exhaustive conditional inference: Improving the evidential value of a statistical test by identifying the most relevant P-value and error probabilities* (Ph.D. Thesis). University of Melbourne.

Levy, N. (2004). *What makes us moral? Crossing the boundaries of biology*. Oxford: Oneworld.

Macdonald, C., & Macdonald, G. (1995). *Philosophy of psychology*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Macdonald, C., & Macdonald, G. (Eds.). (2010). *Emergence in mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mach, E. (1902). *The science of mechanics: A critical and historical account of its development* (trans: McCormack T). Chicago: Open Court.

McCalman, J. (1998). *Sex and suffering: Women's health and a women's hospital: Royal women's hospital, Melbourne, 1856–1996*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Maclaurin, J. (1998). Reinventing molecular weismannism: Information in evolution. *Biology and Philosophy, 13*, 37–59.

Maclaurin, J. (2002). The resurrection of innateness. *Monist, 85*, 105–130.

Mays, W. (1960). HPS in the British Commonwealth universities. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 11*, 192–211.

McLeod, R. (2009). *Archibald liversidge, FRS: Imperial science under the southern cross*. Sydney: The Royal Society of New South Wales and Sydney University Press.

Mein Smith, P. (1986). *Maternity in dispute: New Zealand, 1920-1939*. Wellington: Government Printer of the New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs.

Mein Smith, P. (1997). *Mothers and king baby: Infant survival and welfare in an imperial world: Australia 1880–1950*. Basingstoke: MacMillan.

Miller, D. (2004). *Discovering water: James Watt, Henry Cavendish and the nineteenth-century 'water controversy'*. Burlington: Ashgate.

Miller, D. (2009). *James Watt, chemist: Understanding the origins of the steam age*. London: Pickering & Chatto.

Miller, S., & Selgelid, M. (2007). Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences. *Science and Engineering Ethics, 13*, 523–580.

Montelle, C. (2011). *Chasing shadows: Mathematics, astronomy, and the early history of eclipse reckoning*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Moyal, A. (1966). *A guide to the manuscript records of Australian science*. Canberra: Australian Academy of Science with Australian National University Press.

Moyal, A. (1976). *Scientists in nineteenth century Australia: A documentary history*. Melbourne: Cassell Australia.

Moyal, A. (1984). *Clear across Australia: A history of telecommunications*. Melbourne: Collins.

Moyal, A. (1986). *A bright and savage land: Scientists in colonial Australia*. Sydney: Collins.

Murdoch, D. (1987). *Niels Bohr's philosophy of physics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Musgrave, A. (1983). Facts and values in science studies. In R. Home (Ed.), *Science under scrutiny: The place of history and philosophy of science* (pp. 49–79). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Musgrave, A. (1999). *Essays on realism and rationalism*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Neander, K. (1988). What does natural selection explain: Correction to sober. *Philosophy of Science, 55*, 422–426.

Neander, K. (1991a). Functions as selected effects: The conceptual analyst's defence. *Philosophy of Science, 58*, 168–184.

Neander, K. (1991b). The teleological notion of 'Function'. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 69*, 454–468.

Neander, K. (2002). Types of traits: The importance of functional homologues. In A. Ariew (Ed.), *Functions: New essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology* (pp. 390–415). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Neyman, J. (1961). The silver jubilee of my dispute with Fisher. *Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan, 3*, 145–154.

Nola, R. (2003). *Rescuing reason: A critique of anti-rationalist views of science and knowledge*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Nola, R., & Sankey, H. (2007). *Theories of scientific method*. Montreal: McGill Queens University Press.

Oddie, G. (1986). *Likeness to truth*. Dordrecht/Boston: D. Reidel.

Oldroyd, D. (1980). *Darwinian impacts: An introduction to the Darwinian revolution*. Kensington: University of New South Wales Press.

Oldroyd, D. R. (1990). *The highlands controversy: Constructing geological knowledge by fieldwork in nineteenth-century Britain*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Oldroyd, D. (1996). *Thinking about the earth: A history of ideas in geology*. London: Athlone Press.

Oldroyd, D. (1998). *Sciences of the earth: Studies in the history of mineralogy and geology*. Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum.

Oldroyd, D. (2002). *Earth, fire, water and Ice: Two hundred years of geological research in the English Lake District*. London: The Geological Society.

Pawson, E., & Brooking, T. (Eds.). (2002). *Environmental histories of New Zealand*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Popper, K. (1935). *Logik der Forschung zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft*. Vienna: J. Springer.

Popper, K. (1945). *The Open Society and its enemies* (2 vols.). London: Routledge.

Popper, K. R. (1959). *The logic of scientific discovery*. London: Hutchinson.

Popper, K. (1963). *Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge*. London: Routledge.

Pottage, J. (1983). *Geometrical investigations illustrating the art of discovery in the mathematical field*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Price, H. (1996). *Time's Arrow and Archimedes' point: New directions for the physics of time*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Reichenbach, H. (1935). *Warscheinlichkeitslehre: eine Untersuchung über die logischen und mathematischen Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung. Translated as The theory of probability: an inquiry into the logical and mathematical foundations of the calculus of probability*. University of California Press, 1948.

Richards, E. (1983). Darwin and the descent of women. In D. Oldroyd & I. Langham (Eds.), *The wider domain of evolutionary thought* (pp. 57–111). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Richards, E. (1991). *Vitamin C and cancer: Medicine or politics?* Houndmills: Macmillan.

Sankey, H. (1994). *The incommensurability thesis*. Avebury: Ashgate.

Sankey, H. (1997). *Rationality, relativism and incommensurability*. Avebury: Ashgate.

Sankey, H. (2000). Methodological pluralism, normative naturalism and the realist aim of science. In R. Nola & H. Sankey (Eds.), *After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent issues in theories of scientific method* (pp. 211–229). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Sapp, J. (1987). *Beyond the gene: Cytoplasmic inheritance and the struggle for authority in genetics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sapp, J. (1990). *Where the truth lies: Franz Moewus and the origins of molecular biology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schuster, J., & Yeo, R. (Eds.). (1986). *The politics and rhetoric of scientific method: Historical studies*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Segelid, M. (2007). A tale of two studies: Ethics, bioterrorism and the censorship of science. *Hastings Center Report, 37*, 35–43.

Shortland, M. (Ed.). (1996). *Hugh Miller and the controversies of Victorian science*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Singer, P. (1976). *Animal liberation: A new ethics for our treatment of animals*. London: Cape.

Singer, P. (1981). *The expanding circle: Ethics and sociobiology*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Singer, P. (2000). *A Darwinian left: Politics, evolution, and cooperation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Slezak, P. (1991). Bloor's bluff: Behaviourism and the strong programme. *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 5*, 241–256.

Slezak, P. (1994). A second look at David Bloor's knowledge and social imagery. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 24*, 336–361.

Smart, J. (1959). Can biology be an exact science? *Synthese, 11*, 359–368.

Smart, J. (1963). *Philosophy and scientific realism*. New York: Humanities Press.

Snow, C. (1959). *The two cultures and the scientific revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sterelny, K. (1991). Recent work in the philosophy of biology. *Philosophical Books, 32*, 1–17.

Sterelny, K. (1996a). Explanatory pluralism in evolutionary biology. *Biology and Philosophy, 11*, 193–214.

Sterelny, K. (1996b). The return of the group. *Philosophy of Science, 63*, 562–584.

Sterelny, K., & Griffiths, P. (1999). *Sex and death: An introduction to philosophy of biology, science and its conceptual foundations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Thornton, J. (1953). Scientific entities. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 31*(1–21), 73–100.

Tobin, W. (2003). *The life and science of Léon Foucault: The man who proved the earth rotates*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Turnbull, D. (2000). *Masons, tricksters, and cartographers: comparative studies in the sociology of scientific and indigenous knowledge*. London: Harwood.

Twardy, C., & Korb, K. (2004). A criterion of probabilistic causality. *Philosophy of Science, 71*, 241–262.

van Fraassen, B. (1980). *The scientific image*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Verran, H. (2001). *Science and an African logic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Von Mises R. (1919). Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, *Mathematische Zeitschrift, 5*, 52–99.

Wallace, C. (2005). *Statistical and inductive inference by minimum message length*. New York: Springer.

Walley, P. (1991). *Statistical reasoning with imprecise probabilities*. London: Chapman & Hall.

Yeo, R. (1993). *Defining science: William Whewell, natural knowledge, and public debate in early Victorian Britain*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Yeo, R. (2001). *Encyclopaedic visions: Scientific dictionaries and enlightenment culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science since 1980

23

Elizabeth Schier and John Sutton

Contents

Introduction 773
Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem 776
  Can Consciousness be Physical? 777
  Explaining Consciousness 780
  General Worries About the Mind-Body Problem 785
Foundations and Frameworks for Cognitive Science 787
  Cognitivism, Computation and Content 788
  Dynamics, Robotics and Embodied Cognition 790
  Extended Mind and Distributed Cognition 793
Specific Topics in Philosophy of Mind and Cognition 795
  Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Philosophy of Psychiatry 795
  Other Psychological Processes 798
References 800

Introduction

If Australasian philosophers constitute the kind of group to which a collective identity or broadly shared self-image can plausibly be ascribed, the celebrated history of Australian materialism rightly lies close to its heart. An outstanding series of short articles in *A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (Forrest 2010; Gold 2010; Koksvik 2010; Lycan 2010; Matthews 2010; Nagasawa 2010; Opie 2010; Stoljar 2010a) effectively describes the naturalistic realism of

E. Schier (✉)
Departments of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: lizschier@gmail.com

J. Sutton
Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: john.sutton@mq.edu.au

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*,
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_20, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Australian philosophy of mind. In occasional semi-serious psycho-geographic speculation, this long-standing and strongly felt intellectual attitude has been traced back to the influences of our light, land or lifestyle (Devitt 1996: x; compare comments by Chalmers and O'Brien in Mitchell 2006). Australasian work in philosophy of mind and cognition has become more diverse in the last 40 years but is almost all still marked, in one way or another, by the history of these debates on materialism.

In this chapter we aim at a broad survey of more recent Australasian philosophy of mind and cognition, focusing on work done since 1980. In some of the fields we address, the boundaries between philosophy and related disciplines blur, with scientists participating actively in philosophical debates and philosophers in turn working in independent research groups in automated reasoning, Artificial Intelligence, cognitive science or cognitive neuropsychiatry. However, we make no attempt at integrating intellectual history with institutional history, as has been done effectively in parallel international scholarship on these areas by Bechtel, Graham and Abrahamsen (1998) and in Margaret Boden's extraordinary two-volume history, *Mind as Machine* (2006). The tracking of earlier interdisciplinary interactions between philosophy and cognitive science in Australia could proceed backwards from the collections of essays edited by Slezak and Albury (1988) and Albury and Slezak (1989: see also Slezak 2010). Nor do we cover the wider cultural impact of mind-body debates in Australia, as does James Franklin in his chapter 'Mind, Matter and Medicine Gone Mad' (2003, pp. 179–211). A full history of Australasian philosophy of mind and cognitive science would integrate participants' internalist perspectives on conceptual development with the more ethnographic approaches of social and cognitive studies of philosophy or science. It would require attention to local contexts and variations, to newly developing patterns of internationalisation and collaboration, to the roles of cognitive theory in managerial and economic rationalist rhetoric and practice and to changing patterns of funding and research policy at the levels both of local university strategy and of 'national research priorities'.

Within our narrower ambit, then, we try to take in philosophical work on mind and cognition done by anyone in Australasia or by Australasian philosophers working elsewhere. We apologise for inadvertent omissions and for residual Sydney-centrism (and Australia-centrism) in our field of vision. While making no pretence at exhaustive coverage even within the restricted domains on which we focus, we seek to cite a large enough array of primary sources by Australasian philosophers to give readers significant initial guidance in each area. Just because Australasian philosophy of mind and cognition has been so deeply embedded in international debates, this policy issues in a strangely partial picture. Readers of this chapter could thus usefully supplement it both with a larger-scale history like Boden's and with some of the excellent textbooks and encyclopaedias in the field. Six texts which together provide excellent coverage are Sterelny's *The Representational Theory of Mind: an introduction* (1991), Copeland's *Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical*

Introduction (1993), Armstrong's *The Mind-Body Problem*: *An Opinionated Introduction* (1999), Maund's *Perception* (2003), Ravenscroft's *Philosophy of Mind*: *A Beginner's Guide* (2005) and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson's *Philosophy of Mind and Cognition*: *An Introduction* (2006). Robert Wilson, an Australian philosopher working in Canada, coedited the authoritative reference work MITECS, the *MIT Encyclopaedia of the Cognitive Sciences* (Wilson and Keil 1999), while another important guide is *The Oxford Companion to Consciousness* (Bayne et al. 2009).

The concepts of 'mind' and 'cognition' have mostly been assumed, by both philosophers and scientists, to be clear enough at least to get a research program going. Doubts about the integrity and utility of these terms have, however, been articulated. Some have emerged from within the mainstream, as in some forms of eliminative materialism, or in Tim van Gelder's (1998a, p.76) case that 'the traditional mind-body debate is chronically unwell'. Van Gelder first identified four metaphysical assumptions behind standard ways of setting up the mind-body problem: (1) The solution to the problem must make use of only the relations of identity, reduction, realisation, supervenience and causation; (2) the mind is relationally homogenous with respect to the brain; (3) all mental entities belong to the one ontological category; and (4) that folk psychology provides the right level of analysis for individuating mental objects. By rejecting all four assumptions, van Gelder argued, we open the door for a pluralist conception of the ontology of the mind which has the freedom to appeal to a plurality of ontological kinds and relations when considering the relation of the mind to the physical. Other doubts about the mind-body debate arise in non-Anglophone philosophical traditions (Albahari 2002, 2006; Chadha 2011). As Max Deutscher puts it, for example, 'within post-phenomenological contemporary philosophy there is, deliberately, no single word for what is still called "mind" within the analytical tradition' (2010, p. 423): he points to alternative locutions, by which 'one speaks of the capacities, skills and activities—both socially expressed and personally contained—of the perceptive, thoughtful and sensitive human being'. More radical rejections of established universalising discourses of body and mind were generated in certain strands of psychoanalytic and feminist philosophy (Lloyd 1984; Grosz 1994; Diprose and Ferrell 1991; Ferrell 1992; Gatens 1995; Wilson 1998; Sharpe and Faulkner 2008). Significant historical and cultural contingency in our psychological categories (and in the very idea of a 'psychological category') has also been suggested in anthropology (Samuel 1990), in cross-cultural semantics (Wierzbicka 1992; Amberber 2007; Schalley and Khlentzos 2007) and in the history of philosophy and history of ideas (Macdonald 2003).

The term 'cognition', in turn, is sometimes taken to encourage a rationalist focus on abstract thinking and reflection, to the exclusion of affect and embodied feeling. This is a reflection of the narrower visions of cognitive science which dominated the field until at least the 1980s, by which cognition is simply information processing and the mind just a system which receives, stores and then transmits information, in a putatively unifying framework which many cognitivists hoped would one day also explain emotion, creativity, memory and subjectivity. But broader, pluralist accounts of the nature of the cognitive sciences were always available, identifying the target domain as flexible, more or less intelligent action, feeling and thought of all kinds. As well as a range of philosophical debates arising out of the materialist consensus, we examine here both the core representational and computational theories of mind and a number of alternative movements. We deal with general questions about topics relevant to many aspects of our mental life, such as consciousness and causation, with the newly diverse foundational theoretical frameworks in cognitive science and with a number of particular capacities and psychological domains.

First, then, we look in some detail at the mainstream debates about consciousness and physicalism which arose directly out of the earlier history of Australian materialism. We cover the influential arguments of Jackson and Chalmers, then a broader array of work on consciousness, self-consciousness and mental causation. We then work though, we work through the driving theories in cognitive science from its outset, through classical and connectionist versions of the computational theory of mind, and on to ideas about dynamical and extended cognition. Finally, and more briefly, we address a number of key issues or special topics with tight links to that history of foundational theories in cognitive science, looking at folk psychology and theory of mind, delusions and philosophy of psychiatry and then discrete topics such as emotion, perception and memory.

Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem

Whether or not they have seen philosophy as employing fundamentally different methods from science, philosophers of mind in Australasia have consistently been driven by a perceived need to see how certain features of the world and human existence take their place in the natural world (Stoljar 2010b). The mind is one of the central targets of such enquiry, alongside meaning, modality and morality. As Nagasawa (2010, p. 155) points out, even ‘Australian dualists adopt their version not because they are attracted to a supernaturalistic, spiritual worldview but because, perhaps paradoxically, they are attracted to a naturalistic, materialistic worldview’ which they reluctantly amend. Naturalism, however, takes many different forms. There continue to be differing views about the kind of knowledge philosophy seeks, about the existence of analytic truths and their implications for philosophy of mind and about the roles of conceptual analysis and of intuitions in solving philosophical problems. We start with some of the Australasian philosophers who have attempted to tackle the problem of fitting the mind into the physical world head-on. Can all my thoughts, dreams, hopes, loves and fears really be merely material? In this section we focus first on those who have argued that consciousness cannot be physical and on responses to this work. We then focus on some direct theorising regarding consciousness and examine discussions of the relation between the mind and the body that do not focus on consciousness specifically.

Can Consciousness be Physical?

The most famous Australasian work in philosophy of mind since 1980 responds to defences of materialism. We look at two of the leading arguments that consciousness cannot be physical, offered by Frank Jackson and David Chalmers, and at some responses to them.

The Knowledge Argument

Jackson's Knowledge Argument (1982) is one of the most influential arguments for dualism (Stoljar and Nagasawa 2004). Mary is a colour-deprived neuroscientist. She is locked up in a black-and-white prison and never sees colours. Nevertheless, she manages to acquire 'all the physical information there is to acquire about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like "red", "blue" and so on' (Jackson 1982, p. 130). What will happen to Mary when she first experiences colours? The answer seems simple—she will finally know what it is like to see colours. But given that she had complete physical information before her release, it seems then that there is more information for her to know than physical information, and therefore that physicalism is false.

One prominent early reply to the Knowledge Argument comes from David Lewis. The core idea is that Mary does not gain new information or knowledge of a new fact upon release: rather, she gains new abilities (Lewis 1990). An ability is knowledge of how to *do* something, not knowledge *of* something. In particular Lewis claims that knowing what it is like to see red is not factual knowledge about phenomenal redness, but consists in the ability to *remember*, *recognise* and *imagine* the experience of seeing red. It is only if you have tasted Vegemite that you have the ability to imagine your response to a mouthful of Vegemite ice cream. Knowing what Vegemite tastes like consists (partly) in this ability. If what Mary gains are these abilities, then her prerelease factual knowledge is complete and physicalism is safe.

Jackson (1986, p. 293) responds to this ability reply. He insists his core claim is that Mary's new knowledge is about a new fact. He admits that upon release Mary may gain various abilities. But he denies that this is all that she gains. In particular he claims that she gains new factual knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of other people's experiences. Interestingly, given his later change of heart (see below), he admits that he has no proof that Mary gains knowledge of a new fact. But he claims that he has provided the best that one can expect in this area of philosophy, namely, a valid argument from highly plausible premises.

Arguably the most popular reply to the Knowledge Argument is to accept that Mary gains factual knowledge but deny that this knowledge is about a new fact. The challenge for such 'old-fact' replies is to develop an account of Mary's new knowledge which accounts both for why she cannot gain this knowledge prior to her release and also for why it is nevertheless knowledge of a fact that she knew prior to her release. Bigelow and Pargetter (1990, 2006), Pettit (2004) and MacDonald (2004) have developed versions of this reply.

Bigelow and Pargetter (1990) claim that what Mary gains upon release is new knowledge by acquaintance of a fact that she knew prior to her release. Knowledge by acquaintance provides an epistemically direct way of knowing. For example, although you may know all of the facts about Brad Pitt or Daniel Dennett, unless you have actually met them, there seems to be a sense in which you do not know them. You are not acquainted with them. So there is a sense in which Mary gains new knowledge. But this knowledge is not of a new fact: it is just a new, more direct way of knowing facts that she knew prior to her release.

Pettit (2004) provides a different analysis of the new way of knowing that Mary gains. He accepts that Mary's new knowledge is factual but denies that it provides knowledge of a new fact. Pettit argues first that experiences (he uses the example of motion experiences) represent perfectly physical facts and secondly that they do not also provide knowledge of (potentially non-physical) phenomenal facts. The second claim is the more controversial. He argues that there is nothing to our experiences beyond their representational content, because whenever the representational content of an experience is changed, so too is its phenomenal quality. This is roughly the position that Jackson now holds (see Jackson 2009 for an account of the similarities and differences between their positions).

Finally, MacDonald (2004) argues that concepts, including our concept of red, have modes of possession and that it is a visual mode of possession of the concept red that Mary is missing. But, MacDonald argues, it would be a mistake to think that these different modes of possession underlie different concepts. This is because concepts are individuated by what they function to identify, not the means by which people identify and re-identify the object of the concept. So upon release Mary gains a new conception, but not a new concept.

The newest line of response to the Knowledge Argument is to embrace the claim that had previously only been accepted by dualists, namely, that Mary gains knowledge of a new fact (Schier 2008). Daniel Stoljar suggests (2001) that there are two distinct conceptions of the physical and that once one is clear about which conception is in use, the knowledge argument fails. There is no one conception of the physical on which it is true both that Mary knew all of the physical facts prior to her release and that this means that physicalism is false. The key to Stoljar's response is the claim that scientific theories cannot tell us about the categorical bases of dispositions, but only about the dispositional properties themselves (Stoljar 2001, p. 258). However, these categorical bases are properties of paradigmatically physical objects, and so in learning about them, Mary is not learning a non-physical fact.

Finally, we consider Jackson's new position. Although the details are new, essentially Jackson now supports an ability reply. What Jackson adds is a representational account both of the mistaken intuition that Mary gains knowledge of a new non-physical fact and also of knowing what an experience is like. Jackson now claims that we are under an illusion about the nature of colour experiences that makes the intuition that there are facts about colour experiences that are not a priori deducible from physical facts look true.

Like other representationalists, such as Pettit, Jackson denies that the phenomenal qualities of an experience outstrip its representational content (Jackson 2004a). So experiences do not represent some new non-physical fact. This is not because they represent some physical fact that Mary knew before her release. Rather this is because they are misrepresentations. Like my thought that there is a pig flying around the room, they do not correctly capture the state of the world. So what Mary gains upon release, Jackson concludes, is a new representational state. She does learn what it is like to see red. But it is a mistake to think that this new knowledge is factual. The new representational state is a misrepresentation: there is no property that corresponds to the way it represents the world as being. Instead, what Mary gains is only the ability to have this representational state.

The Hard Problem

David Chalmers' work on the hard problem of consciousness and his resulting 'naturalistic dualism' is a prime example of the way in which Australian philosophers amend their naturalistic worldview in order to accommodate problematic phenomena (Nagasawa 2010, p. 155). Chalmers aims to find the middle ground between functionalistic reductionism (which explains phenomenal consciousness in terms of something else) and mysterianism (which claims that it is impossible to understand consciousness). At the centre of his argument is the division of the problem of consciousness into easy and hard problems (Chalmers 1995; Braddon-Mitchell 2003; Albahari 2009).

The easy problems of consciousness are those that concern the objective aspects of consciousness and are amenable to functional explanation (Chalmers 1995). As Chalmers points out, 'consciousness' is used in many different ways. For example, many consciousness researchers are interested in how information from many sources is integrated into one coherent experience and thereby made available throughout the cognitive system. Although explaining the availability of information is a difficult task, it does not present a fundamental mystery, and in fact good progress has been made on the problem (Baars 1988). In contrast it seems that we have no way to even think about *how* to fit phenomenal consciousness into the world. It presents a *hard* problem because it seems that we could be psychologically the same in all other respects and yet have no conscious experiences whatsoever. Experiences therefore don't seem to *do* anything and so don't seem to be amenable to a functional, computational analysis. Where easy problems are problems about the explanation of functions, the hard problem is not. We don't know why certain cognitive tasks are accompanied by phenomenal experiences; it just seems to be a brute fact that they are.

But, argues Chalmers, phenomenal consciousness is not the only phenomenon that seems to be basic, that is, which cannot be explained in more fundamental terms. This is also the case for some entities in physics such as space-time, mass and charge. Chalmers argues that consciousness needs to be added to this list and that alongside the basic physical laws we also need to add basic psychophysical laws that specify how some physical systems are also conscious (1995, 1996a). Chalmers suggests that information may be the key to understanding the link between the phenomenal and the physical. He notes that the structure of consciousness is mirrored in the structure of information in awareness. For example, it is known that phenomenal colour can be ordered in a three-dimensional space, with similar colours, such as red and pink, near each other and dissimilar colours, such as blue and yellow, further away from each other. Although the details are not yet clear, it seems that this three-dimensional structure is mirrored in the structure of the processing in the visual system. Chalmers suggests that these observations hint at the hypothesis 'that information, or at least some information, has two basic aspects: a physical one and an experiential one' (1995, p. 99; for a very different take on the representational nature of colour experiences see Schier 2007).

Finally, a number of Australasian philosophers have worked on developing and defending modal arguments for dualism, the focus of which is consciousness. David Chalmers (1996, 2009) argues that unlike other scientific identities, the identity of phenomenal consciousness with something physical cannot be knowable a posteriori because how our experiences appear to us is not a contingent feature of them. Daniel Stoljar argues against 'a posteriori physicalism', and claims that we cannot explain the apparent contingency of the identification of consciousness with the physical in terms of a failure of imagination (2000, 2006; Doggett and Stoljar 2010).

Explaining Consciousness

Many philosophers put aside metaphysical concerns about materialism in favour of constructive theorising about consciousness. This ranges from examining difficulties facing existing scientific studies of consciousness to developing explanations of particular conscious experiences to considering whether consciousness is unified.

Challenges Facing Scientific Explanation

In this section we consider debates about the scientific explanation of consciousness. Unlike the debates regarding the knowledge argument and the hard problem, the focus here is not on the *possibility* of a scientific explanation of consciousness. Rather the concern is with current scientific research programs and methods and the problems they face. For example, one prominent approach to the scientific study of consciousness is the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). The basic idea is that there will be a difference in brain activity when a person is conscious and is not conscious. Chalmers, Tim Bayne and Jakob Hohwy have contributed to an ongoing debate about the validity of the NCC approach. Chalmers (2000) clarifies the concept of an NCC and examines the implications this has for the study of consciousness. Perhaps the most important of his claims is that lesion studies are 'methodologically dangerous' because, for example, brain architecture can change after a lesion. Chalmers himself sees the primary task of a science of consciousness as the attempt to integrate first-person data about experiences with third-person data about behaviour and neural processes, whether or not any reductive relation exists between these sources of data (Chalmers 2004a, 2010). Bayne (2007) warns of the dangers of a mistaken conception of the structure of consciousness in the work on NCCs. He argues in favour of a field conception of consciousness, against the assumption that consciousness has a building block structure, on which he suggests much work in the NCC style is based.

Hohwy (2009) expresses concerns that the current experimental techniques used in the search for the NCC have fundamental and underappreciated problems. He draws a distinction between two approaches to finding the NCC. Work on the NCC for content consciousness focuses on what is required for a specific content to become conscious. In contrast, the state-based approach to the NCC aims to find what is required for a creature overall to be in a conscious as opposed to an unconscious state. Hohwy's concerns with the content-based approach stem from its background assumption that the subject is in an overall conscious state. If a researcher assumes that all subjects in their study are conscious, then it is always possible that their experimental manipulations are not getting at what causes a content to be conscious or not. It may be that the content is conscious only because the subject is already in a conscious state and not because of the content-specific neural changes that are observed. So what the contrast in content-based experiments enables us to understand is what *selects* a content for conscious experience, not what *makes* it conscious per se.

Despite these concerns, Hohwy does not think we should reject the content-based approach, because he thinks the state-based approach is equally flawed. Many studies in this vein keep content constant and examine neural activity with or without consciousness. But, as Hohwy points out, the more content is matched in the conscious and unconscious conditions, the more likely we are to say that the supposed unconscious subject is actually conscious. Given these problems with both approaches, Hohwy concludes that we need a 'new type of experimental approach that targets the presumably causal, mechanistic interplay between content processing and overall conscious state across different contents and across different types of conscious and unconscious states' (Hohwy 2009, p. 435; 2010).

A related controversy about the logic and interpretation of results from neuroimaging has been initiated by Max Coltheart. Coltheart presents a set of explicit criteria for determining whether functional neuroimaging has told us anything about cognition or the mind. He suggests that, to do so, a neuroimaging study or research program would need to offer evidence in favour of one cognitive theory which is inconsistent with the predictions of an alternative cognitive theory. He then argues that, to date, no existing studies meet these criteria (2006a, b, 2010; compare Coltheart and Langdon 1998; de Zubicaray 2006).

Another problem that currently plagues the scientific study of consciousness is the supposed inability to operationalise phenomenal qualities independently of cognitive accessibility (Block 2007). This is a problem because it is currently an open question as to whether there are unaccessed phenomenal qualities. Levy (2008) has argued that, contrary to Block, phenomenal consciousness does not overflow access. He claims that the notion of, say, unfelt pain, is bizarre and that the evidence that Block presents is insufficiently persuasive to motivate us to accept it. The hypothesis that phenomenology does not overflow access is equally able to explain the data.

The problem that the scientific study of consciousness faces when it comes to the access/phenomenal distinction is that, currently, the only way to know what an experience is like is to ask the subject. That is, all phenomenal states that we can currently study are also accessed. So it seems that it is not possible to get data speaking to the purported independence of phenomenal qualities from access. Schier (2009) has reviewed and defended a suggestion regarding how to find evidence that phenomenal qualities are independent of access (compare O'Brien and Opie 1999a). If we can find evidence that there are neural structures that are isomorphic to phenomenal spaces, then we will have found evidence to support their identity. The goal would be to find an area, say, in the visual system, where the relations between patterns of neural activity resemble the relations between phenomenal colours. So we would hope to find that the pattern of activity that represents blue is more like the pattern that represents turquoise than the one that represents red. Importantly, the evidence for the identity is the similarity of the neural activity and colour space. The fact that colour space is (like all phenomenal spaces) measured by asking the subject becomes irrelevant.

Explanations of Consciousness

Australasian philosophers have developed theories of consciousness in general as well as theories about particular types of experiences.

Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie have developed and defended a connectionist, 'vehicle theory' of consciousness (1997, 1999a, b, 2001; see also Cam 1984). They suggest that the cognitive scientist can view mental phenomena such as consciousness as involving two basic things—representational vehicles and the processing of these vehicles. So the cognitive scientist has two basic ways of explaining consciousness. They can conceive of consciousness either as a feature of the representational vehicles or as a feature of the processing of these vehicles. O'Brien and Opie (1997) term these *vehicle* and *process* conceptions of consciousness, respectively.

O'Brien and Opie argue that we should adopt a vehicle theory of consciousness if we want to avoid epiphenomenalism about phenomenal qualities. The problem is that the process theorist identifies consciousness with the information-processing *effects* of the vehicles within the system: what makes a vehicle part of a conscious process is what it does in the wider cognitive system. But, they argue, identifying consciousness with information-processing effects means that consciousness cannot be a causal factor in bringing about those effects (O'Brien and Opie 1997). So we cannot, for example, say that I give the verbal report that the ripe tomato in front of me is red because I have a visual experience with the phenomenal quality redness. Rather, giving the verbal report is part of the set of effects that constitute the phenomenally red experience. The worry with this is that it would therefore render phenomenal experiences epiphenomenal in that they do no causal work. In contrast, a vehicle theory takes phenomenal qualities to be a property of the representing vehicles, independently of their effects on the system. This means that the vehicle theorist is not forced into epiphenomenalism. One can report that the tomato is red because of one's experience and because the experience has the property phenomenal redness independently of its computational effects, such as causing such a verbal report. So, O'Brien and Opie argue, it is only if we adopt a vehicle theory that the phenomenal quality of experience can play the explanatory role that we normally assign to it (for other work by Australasian philosophers on the relation between representation and consciousness see Cam 1989, Chalmers 2004b, Gold 2004).

So far our discussion has addressed consciousness in general. What makes a subject conscious? What is the difference between conscious and unconscious mental states (Armstrong 1991)? However, another branch of consciousness research focuses not on explaining consciousness per se, but on explaining particular conscious experiences, such as the feeling of being in control of one's bodily movements or the experience of red. Work on understanding the various feelings that underlie self-consciousness began with Frith's work on the sense of agency (1992; see also Hohwy and Frith 2004; Hohwy 2007; Hohwy and Paton 2010, and our discussion of delusions and psychopathology below). The sense of agency is the sense that you are in control of your bodily movements. Compare how it feels to kick your leg voluntarily with how it feels for your leg to move when it is hit on the knee. In the first case it feels like you did the moment, whereas in the second it doesn't. You have a sense of agency for the voluntary, but not for the reflex action. Bayne has worked with a number of researchers on the sense of agency. With Pacherie (Bayne and Pacherie 2007), he argues that a full account of our sense of agency will involve an appeal to both a domain-general narrative system and a low-level domain-specific comparator system. They suggest that judgments regarding our agency will appeal to an agent's narrative self-conception and that the sense of agency will be explained by the comparator mechanism that is responsible for action production. Bayne and Levy (2006) examine the phenomenology of agency. They argue that the experience of agency has a number of distinct experiences as components, including the experience of mental causation, the experience of authorship, and the experience of effort. Based on this analysis they argue that those such as Wegner (2002), who think that the current cognitive science suggests we don't have free will, are working with a naïve conception of the phenomenology of agency. A more sophisticated understanding of the phenomenology of agency may help reconcile the data with the claim that we have free will (Bayne 2006; compare Carruthers 2012).

Glenn Carruthers (2008, 2009) has developed an account of the sense of embodiment. Although you probably don't pay it much attention, you feel like you are bounded in your body, that you have edges that normally correspond to the edges of your body. Carruthers suggests that our sense of embodiment arises from an offline representation that represents the body as an integrated whole. He argues that we can see the role of offline representations of the body in constructing our sense of embodiment by considering body integrity identity disorder (BIID: see also Bayne and Levy 2005). People with BIID have a long-standing stable desire to have one of their limbs amputated. These people report that they want their limb amputated so that their body will fit their 'true' self—they feel like the limb is not really part of them. Despite this, they have no problems sensing the limb or controlling it. Carruthers suggests that this demonstrates that they do have intact representations of their body in the moment: the problem is with the more long-term, offline representation of the body. This is a different approach to the problem of consciousness: instead of explaining consciousness in general, the goal is to give an explanation of why people with BIID feel embodied in a different way to normal people and therefore why their experiences are like what they are like.

Unity of Consciousness

At any one time we have a diverse range of conscious experiences. For example, right now you can see the page in front of you and feel the chair (or the sand of the beach) against your body. These distinct experiences all occur at the same time: But are they in some sense unified into an all-encompassing experience? Or is there just a collection of diverse experiences whose only unity is that they happen to be occurring together?

But what exactly does it mean to say that consciousness is unified? Australasian philosophers differ on how to answer this question see also Malpas 1999. O’Brien and Opie (1998, 2000) suggest that the unity or disunity of consciousness is best understood as a claim about the nature of the ‘consciousness-making’ neural mechanisms. If there is a single consciousness-making mechanism, then consciousness is unified; if there are many, then it is disunified. Bayne (2000) takes issue with this definition of the unity of consciousness. He suggests that what is taken by many people in the debate to be at issue is not the nature of the mechanism but rather whether all of a subject’s experiences are part of a single global experience. While O’Brien and Opie agree that this notion of the unity of consciousness exists, they suggest that it does not hold up to scrutiny. The problem is that in talking about experience*s* being unified in a single experience, the definition entails that phenomenal consciousness is both plural and singular.

O’Brien and Opie argue that evidence for the disunity of consciousness comes from the *distributed* nature of the mechanisms responsible for consciousness. So, for example, the neural architecture responsible for the processing of motion is distinct from that which is responsible for processing colours, such that it is possible to lose one capacity while the other stays intact. This suggests that the mechanisms that produce experiences of motion and of colour are distinct. The problem with this argument is again that the data is interpreted differently by those who hold a different theoretical position. Bayne (2000) points out that those who claim that consciousness is unified need not be committed to the claim that there is a spatially localised consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. Instead, they could claim, for example, that consciousness is produced by temporal synchrony across a range of mechanisms.

Tim Bayne has done a range of further work on the unity of consciousness, including a recent book (2010) see also Bayne and Chalmers 2003. Here we focus on his argument that ‘split-brain’ data does not threaten the phenomenal unity of consciousness (Bayne 2008). A split-brain patient has had the subcortical connections between their hemispheres severed. (Following Bayne we use the term ‘split brain’ to cover both commissurotomy, which involves severing a number of interhemispheric tracks, and callosotomy, in which only the corpus callosum is severed.) Such patients behave almost entirely normally in everyday situations.

But in controlled laboratory conditions some bizarre behaviour emerges. The standard type of experiment involves presenting different information to each hemisphere (by presenting different information to each visual field). So the left visual field (and therefore right hemisphere) may be shown the word ‘key’, and the right visual field (and therefore the left hemisphere) will be shown the word ‘ring’. What is interesting is what happens when such subjects are asked to report what they saw. For most people language is localised to the left hemisphere. So when asked to verbally report what they see, they will say they saw a ring. But when the non-verbal right hemisphere is asked to report what it sees (by getting people to point with their left hand), it will report that it saw a key. It seems tempting to say that these people have a disunified consciousness, that their left hemisphere is conscious of the word ‘ring’ and that their right hemisphere is simultaneously conscious of the word ‘key’.

However, as Bayne points out, they aren’t as disunified as the standard type of presentations, such as that given above, would suggest. For example, although patients cannot integrate information concerning shape, colour and category across the two sides of their visual field, they can integrate information about relative motion and size of visual stimuli. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, these patients do not appear to have a disunified consciousness in everyday circumstances. Bayne argues for a ‘switch’ model: consciousness switches between the patient’s two hemispheres, but at any one time only one hemisphere is conscious. As Bayne points out, no data speaks to simultaneous but separate consciousness in both hemispheres. Instead at one point in time the patient shows awareness of the ring by talking about it; at another point in time they show awareness of the key by pointing to it. Earlier work on the perception of chimeric figures by split-brain patients (Levy et al. 1972) further suggests that their consciousness switches between their hemispheres. Subjects were shown figures that were split down the middle, such as an image where the left side was a picture of ‘Bob’ and the right side was a picture of ‘Peter’. They were asked to name the person it was a picture of. They found that at any one time only one hemisphere responded and that there was no indication, either in terms of words or facial expression, that the other hemisphere disagreed. Instead, it seemed like at one point in time they were conscious of one-half of the picture and at another point in time they were conscious of the other half.

General Worries About the Mind-Body Problem

The development of the computer model of the mind has enabled us to see how thought could be produced by a purely physical device (see below). This is why so much of the debate about how the mind could relate to the body now focuses on consciousness. Despite this general proof of principle for thought, there are still a range of concerns about the relation of the mind to the body that do not appeal specifically to consciousness.

At the heart of the problem of mental causation is the worry that the claim that mental states supervene on physical states is incompatible with them being causally efficacious. The problem is that physical states seem to have entirely physical causes and effects. And so there seems to be no room left for the somehow more than physical mental states to do any causal work (Kim 1998). Australasian Philosophers have presented a range of solutions to the problem of mental causation.

Jackson and Pettit (1988, 1990a, b) argue that it is a mistake to think that only causally efficacious properties are relevant in causal explanations. They argue that certain causally inefficacious properties play a crucial role in causal explanations. In particular, properties can causally program without actually causing (1988, p. 394). They ask us to consider, for example, how we would go about explaining why two electrons accelerate at the same rate. To do so we would say that the forces acting on them are of the same magnitude. But equality of magnitude per se is not something which actually *causes* the electrons to move: rather, the individual forces acting on the electrons do the causal work. Jackson and Pettit suggest that we appeal to such causally inert properties because these properties remain constant under variation. For example, if we were to appeal to the causally efficacious property in the electron example, we would have to talk about the precise magnitude of the force. And so we would lose sight of the fact that what matters is not the actual magnitude of the forces, but rather their equality. Jackson and Pettit argue that the equality of the forces programs for the equality of effects even though it does not cause it. Program explanations are, they argue, a viable and necessary alternative to process explanations, which are explanations in terms of the causally efficacious properties (see also Bliss and Fernandez 2010). If we are to give up on program explanations, then we must dismiss all the perfectly good explanations offered by the special sciences and even those offered by physics that involve reference to an indeterminate number of things (Jackson and Pettit 1990b, p. 112). For example, they suggest that an explanation of the formation of water vapour near the surface of water in terms of the fact that *some* of the molecules have broken free would be inadequate because it does not capture the particular molecules that are doing the causal work in any particular instance. Instead, it captures the general mechanism that all these instances have in common. Finally, they argue that type identity and supervenience responses to the problem of mental causation fail (1990a). Instead, they suggest that functional properties are crucial in explanations because they enable us to capture not only how something in fact came about but also the various other ways it could have come about (but see Jackson 1996 for a different approach to the problem of mental causation).

Pettit has also worked on understanding what physicalism requires. He argues that we can get a nontrivial and not obviously false definition of physicalism if we centre an account around two claims: first of all that the world is built out of materials that physics is in the best position to identify and secondly that the world is governed by regularities or forces that physics is best positioned to describe (Pettit 1993, p. 213).

Cynthia and Graham MacDonald argue that accounts such as Pettit and Jackson's, which accept that mental properties are only causally relevant and not efficacious, lead to the explanatory redundancy of the mental. This is because 'if there is no distinctive pattern at the psychological level, then there is nothing for the psychological properties to explain' (Macdonald and Macdonald 1995, p. 61; 2006, 2007). So they find the program explanation solution unsatisfactory. However, they think that non-reductive materialism can be saved. The details of their position take us into 'hard-core' metaphysics, regarding the weaknesses of a trope conception of events and properties and the compatibility of a particular type of property exemplification view with non-reductive materialism, that are beyond the scope of this chapter.

Peter Menzies (1988, 2003, 2007) argues against the sort of causal reductionism offered by Kim and others. He suggests that the problem in the problem of mental causation is our conception of causation. In particular he claims that in discussions of the problem, causation is viewed as a categorical absolute relation when in practice we take causal relations to be 'entities occupying certain functional roles that are defined with respect to abstract models' (2003, p. 196). Importantly, if we understand causation in terms of models, then different models may be operating at different levels: these models and the causal relations they appeal to need not be in competition. Other philosophers who have discussed reduction with relation to the philosophy of mind include Ravenscroft (1998) and Gold and Stoljar (1999; see also Hohwy and Kallestrup 2008).

Unlike the other philosophers we have considered in this section, Cliff Hooker is a radical naturalist. He attributes this to his physics training, which taught him that we can easily form erroneous conceptions of the seemingly everyday and obvious (Hooker 2006). A detailed treatment of his works belongs in a discussion of philosophy of science, but it is worth noting that one's understanding of reduction is going to directly influence one's views on the possibility of a reduction of the mind to the brain (Hooker 1981, 2004, 2006).

Foundations and Frameworks for Cognitive Science

In addition to their work on the metaphysics of mind, and often in close connection with it, Australasian philosophers contributed directly to debates on the foundations of cognitive science. In ongoing dialogue with computational modellers and Artificial Intelligence researchers, and with philosophers such as Block, the Churchlands, Dennett, Dretske, Fodor, Putnam and Searle, they joined the search for an understanding of how meaning can be realised in matter, developing and interrogating the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). We can understand CTM, at its most general, as the claim that cognitive processes are computational processes, where computational processes are causal transitions between contentful states which preserve or reflect semantic relations. Proceeding more swiftly and lightly here than above, we examine first the very idea of the mechanisation of the mind in the form of such a computational theory, then its classical and connectionist versions, before discussing more and less radical extensions of or departures from that theory in ideas about embodied and extended cognition.

Cognitivism, Computation and Content

Before discussing recent versions of the computational theory of mind, we note some contributions to the history of cognitive science. Elizabeth Wilson (2010) unearths a surprising depth and sophistication in the discussions of emotion and affect in the work of Alan Turing, Walter Pitts and other pioneers of Artificial Intelligence. Likewise, Jack Copeland's extensive work on the history and philosophy of computing has shown how broad and original were Turing's theoretical and philosophical contributions. As well as identifying, editing and interpreting a large body of neglected primary material by and about Turing (Copeland 2004, 2005), Copeland has revivified interest in Turing's work on nonclassical computability (Copeland and Sylvan 1999), argued that Turing anticipated key ideas of connectionism (Copeland and Proudfoot 1996) and corrected prevalent misunderstandings of the Church-Turing thesis (Copeland 1997). Turing's wider views on the idea that the mind is a machine (Copeland 2000a) have been discussed most in relation to the Turing Test for machine intelligence (Copeland 2000b; Proudfoot and Copeland 2009; Oppy and Dowe 2011) and John Searle's Chinese Room argument against machine intelligence (Cam 1990a; Chalmers 1992; Copeland 2002; Tanaka 2004; Coutts 2008). Both Chalmers (2011); see also Chalmers 1996b and Copeland (1996) develop foundational accounts of the nature of computation which respond to the charge made by Putnam and Searle that every physical system implements every computation. Identifying a number of ways in which finite-state automata can be implemented in a physical system, Chalmers (2011) shows that 'the implementation relation between abstract automata and physical systems is perfectly objective', such that 'computational descriptions of physical systems need not be vacuous': he argues for a kind of generic or 'minimal computationalism', 'compatible with a very wide variety of empirical approaches to the mind'.

Such computationalism was taken by Fodor and others to vindicate our ordinary or 'folk' intentional realism, our attribution of intentional states which both have causal powers in driving our actions and are semantically evaluable. Computational processes, on this view, are causal transitions over mental representations. For some time, the most detailed account of how such computational processes might be realised was offered by the Language of Thought Hypothesis (Fodor 1975). The brain contains discrete language-like symbols, in 'Mentalese' rather than natural language, each of which can both be non-semantically identified (in virtue of their form or syntax) and reliably interpreted. An inner 'code' specifies legitimate forms of combination and recombination of these representational 'atoms' in the same way that words combine into sentences. Mental processes are causal processes requiring the explicit tokening of each relevant symbol (Fodor 1987; Sterelny 1983, 1991). Like the Turing Machine, the mind-brain is a device which supports and manipulates these discrete functional elements according to appropriate rules or programs.

As well as independent critical analysis of the Language of Thought hypothesis (Sterelny 1989; Braddon-Mitchell and Fitzpatrick 1990; Maze 1991;

Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 2006), by the mid-1980s a quite different way of developing the computational theory of mind had emerged with the rediscovery of connectionism or ‘Parallel Distributed Processing’. Cognitive processes, for the connectionist, are processes of pattern recognition and pattern transformation. The mind is not a text but a process: enduring mental representations are not stored as discrete symbols, but holistically as distributed representations across the weights of a multi-layered neural network. In early work on the nature and capacities of connectionist systems employing such distributed representations, Chalmers (1990) and van Gelder (1990; van Gelder and Niklasson 1994) responded to Fodor and Pylyshyn’s charge that these networks had insufficient structure to exhibit certain alleged characteristics of cognitive systems, explaining in detail how connectionist systems could evolve unique forms of structure-sensitive processing (also Garfield 1997). Developing a fuller taxonomy of forms of representation, van Gelder defined distribution in terms of semantic superposition, where many items are represented within one representation, criticising the Language of Thought and synthesising evidence that ‘representation in the brain is distributed’ (1991, 1992).

Although connectionism is still (on most interpretations) a computational theory of mind, in that distributed representations carry content, it has a very different flavour. Learning is a continuous process of adjustment to the overall system rather than the addition of new symbols; generalisation, abstraction and automatic updating are intrinsic features of processing; ‘storage’ involves the transformation rather than the preservation of information; and remembering is therefore the reconstruction of a similar pattern of activation rather than the reproduction of a stored item (van Gelder 1991). These features were taken by some to promise dramatic new accounts of memory, self, truth and cognitive discipline (Sutton 1998a, Wilson 1998). The root of such properties, argued O’Brien (1999), lies in the *analog* nature of computation in distributed connectionism. Unlike digital computers in which abstract symbols are arbitrarily related to their representational domains (a point which allied classical cognitivism with functionalism), analog computers directly or physically manipulate ‘analogs’ of their representational domains. As O’Brien puts it, ‘a material substrate embodies an analog of some domain when there is a *structural isomorphism* between them, such that elements of the former (the representational vehicles) *resemble* aspects of the latter (the representational objects)’. With Opie, O’Brien has gone on to develop a representational and computational analysis of neural networks in terms of resemblance (O’Brien and Opie 2001, 2004, 2006, 2009). They argue that the content of both activation pattern representations and connection weight representations is grounded in this structural resemblance. While Paul Churchland (1989) had suggested that activation patterns systematically resemble what the network is representing, he did not analyse the intra-network processing which gives rise to these output patterns: O’Brien and Opie (2006, 2009) offer the first analysis of the computational and representational capacities of distributed networks by reference to the structure and functions of connection weights.

In invoking mental representations, cognitivists also required an account of the origins of meaning: how can a representing vehicle be *about* its represented object? Within a broadly computational framework, which symbols have 'meaning for the machine' (Clapin 1995, 2002)? This is the job of a theory of content determination (TCD). Australasian work has focused on teleological and resemblance TCDs. Teleological TCDs developed as a response to problems with Fodor's causal TCD and with informational semantics (Godfrey-Smith 1989). In such theories the distinction between accurate representation and error depends on the notion of biological function. So a vehicle 'represents when the token is caused by circumstances of the same kind as those selectively responsible for the existence of the type' (Sterelny 1990, p. 124 i.e. the book *The Representational Theory of Mind*) and misrepresents when not caused by the circumstances for which its type was selected. On the one hand, the development of teleological TCDs has been a key area of overlap between philosophy of mind and topics in the philosophy of biology (see Sterelny 1983, 1995; Godfrey-Smith 1992, 2006; Brown 1993; Neander 1995, 1996, 2006; and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 1997). On the other hand, because they treat historical factors as constitutive, teleological TCDs also played a central role in discussions of whether content was 'narrow', that is, independent of the world outside the individual, or 'wide', that is, partly dependent on factors outside the individual (Jackson and Pettit 1988, 1993; Devitt 1989; Jackson 2004b; Hooker and Christensen 1998).

O'Brien and Opie, in contrast, have developed a structural resemblance TCD. Resemblance TCDs are usually dismissed because the mind is capable of representing many more things that it resembles: I can represent the green leaves on the trees outside my window even though my brain is not green. But, building on parallel ideas in aesthetics (Files 1996), O'Brien and Opie point out that there is a more abstract 'second-order' notion of resemblance. In second-order resemblance, 'the requirement that representing vehicles share physical properties with their represented objects can be relaxed in favour of one in which the *relations* among a system of representing vehicles mirror the *relations* among their objects' (O'Brien and Opie 2004, p. 10). Things can share a pattern of relations '*without* sharing the physical properties upon which those relations depend' (2004, p. 13). So my brain can represent green by structural resemblance without having to be green itself. In line with their connectionist view of analog computation, O'Brien and Opie take content to be grounded in the *physical* relations between representing vehicles. In general, 'one system *structurally resembles* another when the physical relations among the objects that comprise the first preserve some aspects of the relational organization of the second' (2004, p. 15).

Dynamics, Robotics and Embodied Cognition

Among philosophers who were initially enthused, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, at the prospect that connectionism might ground a new and general approach to cognition, some grew impatient with the nature and rate of conceptual change. In radicalising further, hoping to arrive at a cognitive scientific route to 'post-Cartesian agency' (van Gelder 1995, pp. 379–381), they turned to dynamical systems theory, inspired by new movements in developmental psychology and robotics as well as older ideas from cybernetics and phenomenology. The concepts and language of dynamical systems were already in use to describe continuous-time recurrent networks (CTRNs) in computational neuroscience and in early Artificial Life research, and a few philosophers in the early 1990s saw that the new sciences of complex dynamics might pose specific challenges for understanding the mind-brain (Foss 1992). Hooker and colleagues (1992) had taken Watt's steam engine governor as a model control system and argued for a fundamental integration of dynamical control theory with connectionism. But the revolutionary version of dynamicism in philosophy was primarily driven by Tim van Gelder (1995, 1998b) i.e. the paper "The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science". For van Gelder, cognition is a continuous process of state-space evolution in a time-sensitive dynamical system. When such systems are densely interconnected, with the values of their component variables interdependent, they are 'complexes of continuous, simultaneous, and mutually determining change' (1995, p. 373). This notion of 'coupling' by way of 'continuous reciprocal causation', in which variables mutually determine each other's changes, lies at the heart of the suite of dynamical and situated approaches to cognition which have gained adherents over the past 15–20 years (Clark 1997, p. 165).

In van Gelder's coedited collection of empirical studies in dynamical systems approaches to cognition, *Mind as Motion* (1995), this constructive dynamical vision was put into practice in models not only of perception and motor skills but also of decision-making. But van Gelder also argued, in critical mode and more controversially, against the existing theoretical foundations of cognitive science. Classicist and connectionist versions of the computational theory of mind, in his later view, share significant errors. They unnaturally separate inner cognitive processes from perception and action (an error which Susan Hurley (1998) would label 'the classical sandwich'). They envision the temporal embedding of cognition in discrete steps or updatings, rather than in the unfolding dynamics of continuous trajectories in real time. Finally, they either focus solely on or still unnecessarily privilege discrete representational states. Each of these criticisms has led to ongoing debate, perhaps most notably with a different group of post-connectionist philosophers, led by Andy Clark, for whom the tools and concepts of dynamical systems theory should be entirely compatible with more liberal accounts of representation and computation (see also Christensen and Bickhard 2002; Christensen and Hooker 2004).

Parallel and related discussions occurred among philosophers impressed with new developments in robotics. The two roboticists whose work has unarguably influenced philosophy most thoroughly in the last 20 years both took their first degrees in Australia: Rodney Brooks in Mathematics at Flinders University and Barbara Webb in Psychology at the University of Sydney. Addressing a long-standing biological problem—the mechanism of phonotaxis in female crickets, their capacity to detect and reliably move towards a single sound or signal—Webb's robot models showed that adaptive success in this domain requires surprisingly little in the way of discrete internal representations of the location and nature of the sounds to which the crickets respond. Rather, the organised interactions which ground this capacity are spread across the cricket's whole body and its environment. In particular, Webb's biologically inspired robots successfully perform their task without any centralised internal model of the incoming stimuli: rather, she suggests, a full-body tracking mechanism responds to the specific temporal pattern of the male cricket song. Webb's nuanced scepticism about the need to invoke the manipulation of mental symbols (Webb 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2009) perhaps suggests some ongoing influence of the Andersonian direct realist theorists in Psychology at the University of Sydney (see below). Rodney Brooks' assault on mainstream cognitive science was more direct: 'explicit representations and models of the world simply get in the way. It turns out to be better to let the world itself serve as its own model' (1991, p. 140). The relatively simple robots or creatures in the influential early work from Brooks' lab at MIT had to do something purposeful in their world, coping appropriately in real time with changes in their environments and maintaining multiple goals. Complex behaviour emerged from simple interactions between the creature's relatively self-contained subsystems, rather than as the execution of an internally generated plan. Most importantly, the creatures had to be *physically* grounded, and thus embodied, as well as situated in a real changing world (Brooks 1990). But whereas van Gelder explicitly aligned his anti-representationist dynamicism with the phenomenological tradition in philosophy (van Gelder 1999), (Brooks 1991, p.149) took the trouble to point out that his robotics research 'isn't German philosophy' and 'was based purely on engineering considerations'. He did however accept that it 'has certain similarities to work inspired' by Heidegger and was connected not only to Artificial Life but also to Varela's approach to autonomous systems (Brooks 1992). In seeking to model perception and 'intelligence without representation', and cognition without central control, Brooks influenced later enactivist attempts to integrate phenomenology and cognitive science (Menary 2006).

Robotics in Australia has continued to flourish, with innovative technical work at a number of centres. Australian philosophers of mind and cognition, however, have not engaged as closely with recent developments as applied ethicists (Sparrow 2009) and cultural theorists (Tofts et al. 2002; Cleland 2010; Wilson 2010). The Australian performance artist and theorist Stelarc, for example, seeks to extend bodily capacities through robotic and other prosthetic technologies (Stelarc 1991; Smith 2005), in conjunction with roboticists at Carnegie Mellon and Sussex, in work discussed extensively by philosophers such as Clark (2003). In turn, uptake of the specifically 'embodied' and 'enacted' dimensions of what has become known as the '4E Cognition' movement (for 'embodied, embedded, extended and enacted' cognition; Menary 2010a) has in Australia been at the heart of interaction between phenomenology and cognitive science (O'Brien & Diprose 1996; van Gelder 1999). There has been some critical evaluation and development of enactivist and neurophenomenological research (Bayne 2004; Lyon 2004, 2006; Menary 2006), but more attention has been paid in Australasian philosophy to the ideas of embedded and extended cognition, on which we therefore shortly focus. We first note briefly a different connection with the framework of ‘embodied cognition’, which has sometimes been described at a somewhat abstract level, in links back to philosophical discussions of knowing how, tacit knowledge and skill. Some work on these topics has been inspired by themes from Wittgenstein and Ryle (Candlish 1996; Melser 2004) or by recent attacks on Ryle (Devitt 2011); other theorists make contact with neuroanthropological and cognitive anthropological approaches to embodiment and tacit knowledge (Gerrans 2005, Downey 2010a, b), with phenomenological views on skills and habit (Wrathall and Malpas 2000; Reynolds 2006; Sutton et al. 2011) or with theoretical issues arising directly from consideration of dance, sport or other bodily practices (Downey 2005; Grove et al. 2005; Davids et al. 2007; Smith 2007; Sutton 2007b; Rothfield 2008; Priest and Young 2010).

Extended Mind and Distributed Cognition

Robert Wilson argued in 1994 that the computational states of cognitive systems need ‘not supervene on the intrinsic, physical states of the individual’, so that such systems may ‘transcend the boundary of the individual and include parts of that individual’s environment’ (Wilson 1994, p. 352). Rejecting Fodor’s methodological solipsism, Wilson reinterpreted a series of results in the cognitive psychology of perception and navigation in claiming that the best taxonomies of certain kinds of computational systems will not be individualistic. Wilson’s ‘wide computationalism’ foreshadowed one of the most debated ideas in contemporary philosophy of mind, the extended mind hypothesis, which was introduced under that label by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998). Clark and Chalmers argued that both occurrent cognitive processes, such as actively remembering the location of a museum and enduring cognitive states like standing beliefs and memories, are in certain circumstances constituted partly by external, non-biological resources as well as by states of the brain. The symbols which carry reliable information in a notebook, for example, which an agent consistently relies on to supplement biological memory, have just as much claim to be vehicles of cognitive processes as do that agent’s neural states. Noting a number of dimensions on which such interactions between agent and external resource can vary, Clark and Chalmers sought to undermine the default assumption that the mind must stop, and the rest of the world begin, at ‘the boundaries of skin and skull’.

Clark’s book *Being There* (1997) offered a rich empirical background to the extended mind thesis, synthesising antecedent ideas in robotics, dynamical systems theory, developmental psychology, phenomenology, philosophy of biology and cognitive anthropology (see also Hooker 1998; Sutton 1998b). Information technology theorists like Douglas Engelbart had more speculatively articulated related visions in the 1960s: as van Gelder later wrote, ‘Engelbart’s vision of computers augmenting human intelligence is, properly understood, a vision of human self-transformation through a bootstrapping process in which our current, technologically augmented intellectual capacities enable us to refashion the spaces and practices within which we ontologically self-constitute’ (van Gelder 2005, p. 181).

A more surprising antecedent is a thought experiment considered at one point in Martin and Deutscher's much earlier work on the causal theory of memory (discussed further below). Rejecting the idea that the causal chain between past experience and present remembering 'should continue without interruption within the body of the person concerned', Martin and Deutscher argued that this would make too much of what are contingent features of memory in human beings:

> We do not want to say that we can conceive only of humans remembering. Surely it is imaginable that we might find creatures who could represent the past as efficiently as we do, in the various ways we do, but who differ from us in the following respects. They carry a metal box around with them and, if they are separated from it, then they can remember nothing, no matter how recent. They are not born with the boxes. The boxes are made in a factory, and given them at birth, after which the creatures gradually develop the ability to remember. They do not ask the box questions about the past, but when they are connected with the box they remember as we do. This case shows that the suggested criterion [that the causal chain should be entirely within the body] is not strictly necessary. (1966, pp. 181–182).

Martin and Deutscher did not go on, as contemporary extended mind theorists do, to suggest that as a matter of fact, human memory does sometimes operate like this: but their thought experiment clearly sets out the key criterion that the coupled interaction between agent and external resource should be sufficiently smooth or transparent. There are not two steps involved: just as I do not ask my brain questions about the past, these creatures do not need to interrogate their external devices. When connected with the box, they 'remember as we do': the box is not first inspected *before* remembering, but is rather just the means or medium of remembering the past. Just as the creatures can be separated from these boxes, so a notebook could of course be stolen or tampered with: but as Clark repeatedly reminds us, a whole range of mishaps and disruptions (with many different causes) can also befall our brains. The location of memory traces is inessential: what matters is instead their relation to the past experience and the role they play in driving current remembering (Sutton and Windhorst 2009).

The extended mind thesis might seem to have carried functionalism to a natural conclusion: if mental states are to be identified not by their intrinsic nature but by the roles they play in an interconnected system driving cognition and action, there is no principled reason that those roles cannot be filled in part by external resources. Yet Clark and Chalmers' suggestion, that we check for 'parity' of functional contributions across inner and outer resources, led critics to think that extended cognition could be refuted by pointing out that the representational format and computational dynamics of internal cognitive systems differed greatly from anything we find in the environment (O'Brien 1998 is a clear statement of this worry; for other critical discussion of the extended mind see Dartnall 2007). This point, of course, was not surprising to philosophers who came to extended cognition by way of connectionism. So arguments for the thesis which do not rely on functionalism and the parity principle have also been developed (and see Chalmers 2008, Drayson 2010 for doubts about the link between functionalism and extended cognition). Sutton characterised a 'second-wave' version of extended cognition based on the ‘complementarity principle’, the idea that neural and external media with quite disparate properties interface and cooperate so as to transform their particular virtues in a single, larger integrated cognitive system (Sutton 2002, 2006, 2010a). Richard Menary, whose edited collection of papers from the first international conference on the extended mind in 2001 was launched by Chalmers at the 2010 AAP (Menary 2010b), developed a similar interpretation under the label of ‘integrationism’, which also drew effectively on the pragmatist tradition and on Vygotsky (Menary 2007). In turn, Wilson expanded substantially on his earlier work in *Boundaries of the Mind* (2004), which defended and applied extended cognition in sustained discussions of topics such as realisation, nativism, intentionality and social theory. He also collaborated with Clark on an important restatement of the extended cognition view in *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*. As well as responding to criticisms, Wilson and Clark noted that key criteria against which putative cases should be assessed are matters of degree: ‘the notion of an extended mind is nothing more than the notion of a cognitive extension . . . that scores rather more highly on the [dimensions] of durability and reliability’ (Wilson and Clark 2009, p. 66). In such multidimensional frameworks, the agents and artefacts who form enduring or more fleeting coupled interactive systems need not exhibit any kind of functional parity. Attention in the field is perhaps shifting from the attempt to identify the metaphysical boundaries within which cognition is located towards empirical methods for understanding ‘the dynamics of movement in the [multidimensional] space’ and the means by which ‘resources become individualised and entrenched’ (Sterelny 2010, p. 480).

Clark and Chalmers had also briefly considered the idea of ‘socially extended cognition’, suggesting, for example, that in an ‘interdependent couple’, one partner’s mental states may play the right kind of role for the other: ‘what is central’, they argued, is again only ‘a high degree of trust, reliance, and accessibility’ (1998, p. 17). The possibility of such socially distributed decision-making, beliefs or memories, though more central in cognitive anthropology (Hutchins 1995), has been scrutinised in five distinct lines of philosophical discussion: on trust and deception in social-cognitive dynamics (Sterelny 2004; Parsell 2006); on group cognition, collective intentionality and group agency in social ontology (Miller 2002, 2005; Pettit 2003; Wilson 2004; Pettit and Schweikard 2006); on cognitive history (Tribble 2005, 2011; Tribble and Keene 2011; Tribble and Sutton 2011); on education and pedagogy (Mousley 2001); and on collective and transactive remembering (Wilson 2005; Sutton 2008; Sutton et al. 2010).

Specific Topics in Philosophy of Mind and Cognition

Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Philosophy of Psychiatry

Alongside this foundational work on cognitive architecture and cognitive processing, Australasian philosophers have also contributed heavily to research on our ordinary capacities to understand each other’s actions and minds.

These topics, going back to the traditional problem of other minds (Hyslop 1995, 2005), have cycled through several phases under a range of labels from 'folk' or common sense psychology to theory of mind (ToM) and mind reading and have been linked with a range of related debates. In making sense of human action and interaction by ascribing beliefs and anxieties, hopes and desires—a psychology—to other people, we seem to employ a subtle and reliable, though fallible, ability to read their minds (Davies and Stone 1995a; Ravenscroft 2009). In a first wave of interest, the Churchlands' claim that folk psychology should and would be eliminated, or at least substantially revised, in light of the growth of cognitive and computational neuroscience, received considerable attention (Campbell 1986, 1993; O'Brien 1987; N. Stoljar 1988). Jackson and Pettit (1990), for example, argued that once the folk conception of beliefs and desires is properly understood, by way of a commonsense functionalist approach, the possibility that it is radically mistaken is highly unlikely. O'Brien (1991) responded to the idea that connectionism might lead to eliminativism by arguing that transient activation patterns do fill the right kind of discrete functional role to match the folk conception of occurrent intentional states, while the causal holism of distributed connectionist networks offered stronger resources for a defence of intentional realism with regard to enduring beliefs. As debate about eliminative materialism and other aspects of the Churchlands' work continued through the 1990s (Stich and Ravenscroft 1992; Sterelny 1993; Gold and Stoljar 1999), new debates on 'theory of mind' also emerged.

The eliminativists had shared with intentional realists like Fodor the view that folk psychology is an internalised theory which we deploy to predict and explain other people's behaviour. Despite the availability of new alternatives in the idea of 'mental simulation' and a new focus on empathy (Davies and Stone 1995b), Australasian philosophers in general continued to defend this 'theory theory' (Jackson 1999). But distinct forms of 'theory theory' were distinguished, often involving distinct conceptions of the nature of cognitive development. In the most controversial approach, theory of mind was described as an innate, encapsulated and domain-specific module, sometimes within broader nativist agendas. As well as criticism and revision of the conceptions of modularity offered by Fodor and by more extreme evolutionary psychologists (Cam 1988; Coltheart 1999; Parsell 2005), Fodor's nativism also received sustained criticism, notably in Fiona Cowie's *What's Within*: *Nativism Reconsidered* (1998; Sterelny 1989). With specific regard to the putative theory of mind or social cognition module, critical responses ranged from the proposal of alternative, more modest forms of modularity (Currie and Sterelny 2000) to more thoroughgoing rejection (Gerrans 2002; Stone and Gerrans 2006; Gerrans and Stone 2008; Parsell 2009). This literature on the theory of mind module drew in detail on developmental psychology and psychopathology, with particular attention paid to theory of mind in autism, deafness and Williams' syndrome (Gerrans 1998, 2003; Garfield et al. 2001; Parsell 2010). Other notable work on theory of mind included Godfrey-Smith's conception of folk psychology as a model (2004, 2005), while Reynolds (2010) discussed questions of intersubjectivity and other minds in recent European philosophy.

Constructive philosophical theory building on the basis of developmental psychology (Griffiths and Stotz 2000; Sutton 2002) and of studies of animal cognition (Browne 2004; Chadha 2007; Corballis and Suddendorf 2007) overlapped with topics in the philosophy of biology. It is however appropriate to point here to the relevance for philosophy of mind and cognition of some work in this field. Ideas from developmental systems theory in philosophy of biology were put to use in criticism of existing accounts of innateness and of the 'biologicising' of the mind (Griffiths 2002; Griffiths and Machery 2008). In positive work on cognitive niche construction, the view was developed that human cognition is particularly adapted to hook up with rich environmental scaffolding which we have collectively and cumulatively engineered, including the linguistic, cultural, institutional and technological resources which augment and transform our cognitive capacities (Sterelny 1992, 2003, 2007; Griffiths 2007; Jeffares 2010; Stotz 2010). Though clearly making contact with the ideas of situated cognition and the extended mind as described above (Sterelny 2010), the philosophers of biology linked the idea of cognitive niche construction more directly to theories of the evolution of cognition (Godfrey-Smith 1996, 2002; Sterelny 2003, 2009; Christensen and Hooker 2002; Christensen 2010). Important contributions to our understanding of the evolution of human cognition and the history of tool use have also come from archaeologists (Noble and Davidson 1996; Davidson 2007, 2010; Nowell and Davidson 2010).

The increased interest in theory of mind also fed in to research on delusions and irrational or pathological belief formation, perhaps the area in which Australasian philosophers have most intensively collaborated with cognitive scientists over the last 15 years. The focus has been especially on monothematic delusions like the Capgras delusion (that a familiar person or loved one has been replaced by a stranger or imposter), as well as on schizophrenia, affective disorders and delusions of agency and control: the emergent discipline of cognitive neuropsychiatry seeks to integrate clinical, neuroscientific, cognitive and philosophical perspectives on the origin and persistence of such extraordinary and tragic cases (Coltheart and Davies 2000; Hohwy and Rosenberg 2005; Coltheart 2007; Radden 2010). Alongside studies in philosophy of science on the concept of mental disorder and on classification in psychiatry and medicine (Murphy 2006, 2009, 2010), philosophers have contributed centrally to the key theoretical frameworks in the field. Martin Davies, with Max Coltheart and colleagues (2001, 2005; Aimola Davies and Davies 2009), developed a two-factor theory of monothematic delusions, according to which an initial neuropsychological anomaly causes unusual experiences but is not transformed into a persisting delusion unless joined by a further abnormality in reasoning. Philip Gerrans (2002b) offered an alternative one-factor model of the Cotard delusion (the belief that I am dead). Subsequent debate has addressed the interplay of top-down and bottom-up factors in the genesis and maintenance of delusions (Bayne and Pacherie 2004; Hohwy 2004; Fine et al. 2005); the link between delusions, self-deception and weakness of will (Bayne and Fernandez 2009); questions of rationality and confabulation in schizophrenia and other delusions (Gold and Hohwy 2000; Langdon et al. 2002;

Coltheart et al. 2010; Langdon and Bayne 2010); the role of imagination (Currie 2000); and possible neuropsychological mechanisms of delusions (Gerrans 2007a, 2009, 2001). The attempt to identify specific forms of irrationality that might lie behind the putative second factor (McKay et al. 2007) has also driven broader inquiries into the evolution and mechanisms of misbelief (McKay and Dennett 2009).

Other Psychological Processes

We turn now to specific domains within the philosophy of mind and cognition. In the philosophy of emotion, Paul Redding's *The Logic of Affect* (1999) critically assesses some cognitive and neurobiological approaches in the course of an analysis of historical theories including those of James and Freud. In a sustained research program, Paul Griffiths has developed an integrated framework for the interdisciplinary study of emotion. Criticising standard propositional attitude theories of emotion and associated methodological commitments to conceptual analysis, Griffiths instead draws selectively on psychoevolutionary approaches, affect program theory and social constructionism, arguing that different forms of emotion have distinctive psychological bases. Locating emotion theory firmly within the philosophy of science, and employing naturalistic methods for philosophy of psychology, Griffiths suggests that the category 'emotion' may not be a natural psychological kind (1997, 2001 and 2004). In particular, he addresses the relation between the 'basic' emotions, which seem to be pancultural, and the complex emotions which play central parts in the larger emotional episodes which matter for moral psychology and personal identity (Griffiths 2003). Identifying pervasive conceptual confusions in debates over the universality of emotions, he revives the Darwinian concept of 'homology' to understand how forms of emotional response can diverge dramatically in distinct contexts even though they share an evolutionary history. This also leads him to develop a thoroughly situated approach to emotion which stresses the way organisms 'probe' their environment through initial emotional responses, so that the dynamical evolution of their emotional states is not the unfolding of an internally specified genetic blueprint (Griffiths and Scarantino 2009). A dynamical, trajectory-dependent picture of the nature and development of emotion is integrated with personality psychology by Doris McIlwain and applied to the genesis of particular personality styles including psychopathy and Machiavellianism (2006, 2007, 2010; see also Langdon and Mackenzie 2011), while Karen Jones examines questions about modularity and the emotions (2006).

Next, we can pick out five strands of philosophical work on imagery, imagination and perception (see Maund 2003; Stoljar 2009; Fish 2010). Significant interventions in the imagery debate were made by Sterelny (1986) and especially by Slezak (1990, 1995), whose conceptual contributions in favour of a tacit knowledge account of images, and against the 'pictorial' theory of mental images, were strengthened by his own psychological experiments to test predictions of the pictorial view (for other work on visual imagery and illusions, see Cam 1990b, Candlish 2001). Secondly, work by Currie and others on the philosophy and psychology of imagination made original connections across aesthetics, cognitive science and philosophy of mind (Currie 1995, Currie and Abell 2000, Currie and Ravenscroft 2002). Thirdly, among the topics significantly advanced by Jackson's *Perception: A Representative Theory* (1977), Australasian philosophers took a particular interest in colour perception, a topic which integrated developments in metaphysics and philosophy of mind (Bigelow et al. 1990; Maund 1995, 2006; Gold 1999; Menzies 2009). Fourth, questions about the nature of perceptual content have been freshly treated in Schellenberg's account of the essential situation dependence of perceptual experience, which on her view is both representational and relational (Schellenberg 2008, 2010). Finally, standard issues about direct or naïve realism have continued to be debated since Jackson's staunch defence of the representative theory of perception. In addition to new treatments of representationalism (Maund 1993, 2003) and of naïve realism (Fish 2009, 2010), an important form of direct realism in the tradition of John Anderson was maintained by theoretical psychologists at the University of Sydney (Mackay and Petocz 2011). Notably, Maze (1983) developed an anti-representationist account of perception and cognition, allied both with a sustained attack on the tacit teleology of standard theories of intention and a constructive reinterpretation of Freudian metapsychology; Michell drew out implications of this form of direct realism for issues about both method and measurement in cognitive psychology (1988, 2000); and Petocz applied the synthesis of direct realism and psychoanalysis to a general theory of human symbolic activity (1999).

In the philosophy of dreaming, O'Shaughnessy undertook an extraordinarily detailed logico-phenomenological inquiry (2002), and Sutton surveyed and pinpointed conceptual difficulties in empirical work (2009). Philosophical work on memory, in turn, continues to reveal the lasting influence of Martin and Deutscher's 'Remembering' (1966). This paper not only set a template for causal theories of mental states in general and, through its notion of 'operative causation', played an important role in the history of the metaphysics of causation: it also modelled an original and striking style of philosophical writing, revisited in Deutscher's later (1989) reflection. Against a broadly Wittgensteinian consensus that remembering was to be analysed simply as the retention of knowledge or of certain abilities, Martin and Deutscher argued that our ordinary concept of remembering in fact includes a requirement of causal continuity between the past event recalled and the present remembering. In turn, they explicated this requirement as involving 'the idea of a memory trace', an enduring state or set of states which to some context-sensitive extent constitutes 'a structural analogue of the thing remembered' (1966, p. 191; compare Deutscher 1989; Windhorst 2005; Martin 2008; Sutton and Windhorst 2009). Fernandez addressed the content of memory experience (2006a, b; 2008a, b). Sutton sought to answer criticisms of trace theory; to integrate historical, conceptual and empirical approaches to remembering (1998a, 2007, 2009); and to assess puzzles about visuospatial perspective in autobiographical memory (2010b). Memory has also emerged as a central topic in moral psychology, where philosophers increasingly draw on ideas from philosophy of psychology in theorising the temporal dynamics of our individual and collective self-understanding (Downham 2005; Jones 2008; Mackenzie 2008; Poole 2008). The cognitive psychological account of autobiographical remembering as ‘mental time travel’ (Gerrans 2007b; Suddendorf and Corballis 2007) has been put to work in research on personality and moral agency (Kennett and Matthews 2009, McIlwain 2010).

On other topics too, philosophy of mind and cognition has likewise increasingly overlapped to mutual benefit with ethics and moral psychology. Ongoing debates on personal identity, philosophy of action and moral cognition and moral reasoning are beyond the scope of this chapter, but we can point to some further points of fruitful contact between philosophical traditions and programs. Building on a tradition of investigating implications of empirical psychology and neuroscience for our understanding of agency and the will (Slezak 1986, Price 1989), philosophers have continued to develop theoretical views of the nature of agent control intended to be compatible with the best interpretation of scientific results, in particular arguing against overly dramatic claims that science shows control or the will to be illusory (Levy and Bayne 2004a,b; Bayne 2006, 2011; Ismael 2006, 2007; Pettit 2007; Carruthers 2010; Christensen 2007; for a different approach to the will, see O’Shaughnessy 1980). With the rise of ‘neuroethics’ (Levy 2007; Gerrans and Kennett 2010), ‘neurolaw’ (Vincent 2009) and ‘neurosexism’ (Fine 2010), we can expect increasing interaction between cognitive philosophy and applied ethics on topics such as addiction, responsibility and cognitive enhancement.

Some Australasian work in the history of more distant theories of mind has explicitly or critically addressed themes in philosophy of mind and cognition (e.g. Freeland 1989; Kassler 1995; Gaukroger 1997, 1998; Sutton 1998a, 2000a, b; Macdonald 2003, Brown 2006; Pettit 2009; Thiel 2011). In other works, theoretical approaches to film, literature, art or technology have been firmly based in specific frameworks from the philosophy of cognition (Currie 1995, 2010; Dutton 2008; Bullot 2009; Boyd 2010; Malpas 2000; Tribble 2011; Tribble and Keene 2011). As philosophers increasingly find points of contact between technical issues in the analysis of mind and cognition and problems of wider concern in the sciences, humanities, and in society, the history of Australasian work in philosophy of mind which we have surveyed here offers rich resources.

Acknowledgments We are grateful to Gerard O’Brien for significant input in the planning of this chapter, to Carl Windhorst for excellent research assistance, to the editors for their assistance throughout and to David Chalmers, Gerard O’Brien and Jon Opie for extremely helpful comments on the draft.

References

Aimola Davies, A., & Davies, M. (2009). Explaining pathologies of belief. In M. Broome & L. Bortolotti (Eds.), *Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: Philosophical perspectives* (pp. 285–325). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Albahari, M. (2002). *Analytical Buddhism: The two-tiered illusion of self*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Albahari, M. (2006). Against no-atman theories of Anattā. *Asian Philosophy, 12*, 5–20.

Albahari, M. (2009). Witness-consciousness: Its definition, appearance, and reality. *Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16*, 62–84.

Albury, W., & Slezak, P. (Eds.). (1989). *Dimensions of cognitive science*. Kensington: UNSW Centre for Cognitive Science.

Amberber, M. (Ed.). (2007). *The language of memory in a cross-linguistic perspective*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Armstrong, D. (1991). Searle's neo-cartesian theory of consciousness. In E. Villanueva (Ed.), *Consciousness* (pp. 65–71). Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company.

Armstrong, D. (1999). *The mind-body problem: An opinionated introduction*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Baars, B. (1988). *A cognitive theory of consciousness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bayne, T. (2000). The unity of consciousness: Clarification and defence. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78*, 248–254.

Bayne, T. (2004). Closing the gap: Some questions for neurophenomenology. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3*, 349–364.

Bayne, T. (2006). Phenomenology and the feeling of doing: Wegner on the conscious will. In S. Pockett, W. Banks, & S. Gallagher (Eds.), *Does consciousness cause behavior?* (pp. 169–186). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Bayne, T. (2007). Conscious states and conscious creatures: Explanation in the scientific study of consciousness. *Philosophical Perspectives, 21*, 1–22.

Bayne, T. (2008). The unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome. *Journal of Philosophy, 105*, 277–300.

Bayne, T. (2010). *The unity of consciousness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bayne, T. (2011). Libet and the case for free will scepticism. In R. Swinburne (Ed.), *Free will and modern science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bayne, T., & Chalmers, D. (2003). What is the unity of consciousness? In A. Cleermans (Ed.), *The unity of consciousness* (pp. 23–58). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bayne, T., & Fernandez, F. (Eds.). (2009a). *Delusion and self-deception: Affective and motivational influences on belief formation*. Brighton: Psychology Press.

Bayne, T., Cleeremans, A., & Wilken, P. (Eds.). (2009). *The Oxford companion to consciousness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bayne, T., & Levy, N. (2005). Amputees by choice: Body integrity identity disorder and the ethics of amputation. *Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22*, 75–86.

Bayne, T., & Levy, N. (2006). The feeling of doing: Deconstructing the phenomenology of agency. In N. Sebanz & W. Prinz (Eds.), *Disorders of volition* (pp. 49–68). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Bayne, T., & Pacherie, E. (2004). Bottom-up or top-down? Campbell's rationalist account of monothematic delusions. *Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 11*, 1–11.

Bayne, T., & Pacherie, E. (2007). Narrators and comparators: The architecture of agentive self-awareness. *Synthese, 159*, 475–491.

Bayne, T., & Fernandez, F. (Eds.). (2009b). *Delusion and self-deception: Affective and motivational influences on belief formation*. Brighton: Psychology Press.

Bechtel, W., Graham, G., & Abrahamsen, A. (1998). The life of cognitive science. In W. Bechtel & G. Graham (Eds.), *A companion to cognitive science* (pp. 2–53). Oxford: Blackwell.

Bigelow, J., Collins, J., & Pargetter, R. (1990). Colouring in the world. *Mind, 99*, 279–288.

Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (1990). Acquaintance with qualia. *Theoria, 56*, 129–147.

Bigelow, J., & Pargetter, R. (2006). Re-acquaintance with qualia. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84*, 353–378.

Bliss, S., & Fernandez, J. (2010). Program explanation and higher-order properties. *Acta Analytica, 25*, 393–411.

Block, N. (2007). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30*, 481–548.

Boden, M. (2006). *Mind as machine: A history of cognitive science. Two vols*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Boyd, B. (2010). *On the origin of stories: Evolution, cognition, and fiction*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2003). Qualia and analytical conditionals. *Journal of Philosophy, 100*, 111–135.

Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Fitzpatrick, J. (1990). Explanation and the language of thought. *Synthese, 83*, 3–29.

Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Jackson, F. (1997). The teleological theory of content. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75*, 474–489.

Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Jackson, F. (2006). *Philosophy of mind and cognition: An introduction* (2nd ed.). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Brooks, R. (1990). Elephants don't play chess. *Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 6*, 3–15.

Brooks, R. (1991). Intelligence without representation. *Artificial Intelligence, 47*, 139–159.

Brooks, R. (1992). Artificial life and real robots. In F. Varela & P. Bourgine (Eds.), *Toward a practice of autonomous systems* (pp. 3–10). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Brown, D. (1993). Swampman of La Mancha. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23*, 327–348.

Brown, D. (2006). *Descartes and the passionate mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Browne, D. (2004). Do dolphins know their own minds? *Biology and Philosophy, 19*, 633–653.

Bullot, N. (2009). Material anamnesis and the prompting of aesthetic worlds: The psycho-historical theory of artworks. *Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16*, 85–109.

Cam, P. (1984). Dennett on intelligent storage. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45*, 247–261.

Cam, P. (1988). Modularity, rationality, and higher cognition. *Philosophical Studies, 53*, 279–294.

Cam, P. (1990a). Searle on strong AI. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68*, 103–108.

Cam, P. (1990b). Insularity and the persistence of perceptual illusions. *Analysis, 50*, 231–235.

Campbell, K. (1986). Can intuitive psychology survive the growth of neuroscience? *Inquiry, 29*, 143–152.

Campbell, K. (1993). What motivates eliminativism? *Mind and Language, 8*, 206–210.

Candlish, S. (1996). Wittgenstein and the doctrine of kinaesthesis. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74*, 581–597.

Candlish, S. (2001). Mental imagery. In S. Schroeder (Ed.), *Wittgenstein and contemporary philosophy of mind* (pp. 107–128). Palgrave Macmillan. London

Carruthers, G. (2008). Types of body representation and the sense of embodiment. *Consciousness and Cognition, 17*, 1302–1316.

Carruthers, G. (2009). Is the body schema sufficient for the sense of embodiment? An alternative to de vignemont's model. *Philosophical Psychology, 22*, 123–142.

Carruthers, G. (2010). A problem for wegner and colleagues' model of the sense of agency. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9*, 341–357.

Carruthers, G. (2012). The case for the comparator model as an explanation of the sense of agency and its breakdowns. *Consciousness and Cognition, 21*(1):30–45.

Chadha, M. (2007). No speech, never mind! *Philosophical Psychology, 20*, 641–657.

Chadha, M. (2011). Self-awareness: Eliminating the myth of the 'invisible subject'. *Philosophy East and West, 61*, 453–467.

Chalmers, D. (1990). Syntactic transformations on distributed representations. *Connection Science, 2*, 53–62.

Chalmers, D. (1992). Subsymbolic computation and the Chinese room. In J. Dinsmore (Ed.), *The symbolic and connectionist paradigms: Closing the gap* (pp. 25–48). Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Chalmers, D. (1995). The puzzle of conscious experience. *Scientific American, 236*, 62–68.

Chalmers, D. (1996a). *The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D. (1996b). Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton? *Synthese, 108*, 310–333.

Chalmers, D. (1998). On the search for the neural correlate of consciousness. In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, & A. Scott (Eds.), *Toward a science of consciousness II: The second tucson discussions and debates* (pp. 219–229). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Chalmers, D. (2000). What is a neural correlate of consciousness? In T. Metzinger (Ed.), *Neural correlates of consciousness: Empirical and conceptual issues* (pp. 17–40). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Chalmers, D. (2004a). How can we construct a science of consciousness? In M. Gazzaniga (Ed.), *The cognitive neurosciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Chalmers, D. J. (2004b). The representational character of experience. In B. Leiter (Ed.), *The future for philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D. J. (2008). Foreword to supersizing the mind. In A. Clark (Ed.), *Supersizing the mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D. (2009). The two-dimensional argument against materialism. In B. McLaughlin (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind* (pp. 313–335). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D. (2010). *The character of consciousness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D. (2011). A computational foundation for the study of cognition. *Journal of Cognitive Science, 12*(4), 323–357.

Christensen, W. (2007). The evolutionary origins of volition. In D. Ross, D. Spurrett, H. Kincaid, & L. Stephens (Eds.), *Distributed cognition and the will: Individual volition and social context* (pp. 255–287). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Christensen, W. (2010). The decoupled representation theory of the evolution of cognition: A critical reassessment. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61*, 361–405.

Christensen, W., & Bickhard, M. (2002). The process dynamics of normative function. *The Monist, 85*, 3–28.

Christensen, W., & Hooker, C. (2002). Self-directed agents. In J. MacIntosh (Ed.), *Naturalism, evolution, and intentionality (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume XXVII)* (pp. 19–52). Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

Christensen, W., & Hooker, C. (2004). Representation and the meaning of life. In H. Clapin (Ed.), *Representation in mind: New approaches to mental representation* (pp. 41–69). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Churchland, P. (1989). *A neurocomputational perspective*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Clapin, H. (1995). Which symbols have 'meaning for the machine'? In P. Slezak, T. Caelli, & R. Clark (Eds.), *Perspectives on cognitive science: Theories, experiments, and foundations* (pp. 317–329). Norwood: Ablex.

Clapin, H. (Ed.). (2002). *Philosophy of mental representation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clark, A. (1997). *Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Clark, A. (2003). *Natural-born cyborgs*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. *Analysis, 58*, 7–19.

Cleland, K. (2010). Mixed reality interaction: Audience responses to robots and virtual characters. *Digital Creativity, 21*, 30–38.

Coltheart, M. (1999). Modularity and cognition. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3*, 115–120.

Coltheart, M. (2006a). What has functional neuroimaging told us about the mind (so far)? *Cortex, 42*, 323–331.

Coltheart, M. (2006b). Perhaps functional neuroimaging has not told us anything about the mind (so far). *Cortex, 42*, 422–427.

Coltheart, M. (2007). Cognitive neuropsychiatry and delusional belief. *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 60*, 1041–1062.

Coltheart, M. (2010). Levels of explanation in cognitive science. In W. Christensen, E. Schier, & J. Sutton (Eds.), *ASCS09: Proceedings of the 9th conference of the Australasian society for cognitive science* (pp. 57–60). Sydney: Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science.

Coltheart, M., & Davies, M. (2000). *Pathologies of belief*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Coltheart, M., & Langdon, R. (1998). Autism, modularity and levels of explanation in cognitive science. *Mind and Language, 13*, 138–152.

Coltheart, M., Menzies, P., & Sutton, J. (2010). Abductive inference and delusional belief. *Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 15*, 261–287.

Copeland, J. (1993). *Artificial intelligence: A philosophical introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Copeland, J. (1996). What is computation? *Synthese, 108*, 335–359.

Copeland, J. (1997). The Church-Turing thesis. In *Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy*. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/Church-Turing/

Copeland, J. (2000a). Narrow versus wide mechanism: Including a re-examination of Turing's views on the mind-machine issue. *Journal of Philosophy, 97*, 5–32.

Copeland, J. (2000b). The Turing test. *Minds and Machines, 10*, 519–539.

Copeland, J. (2002). The Chinese room from a logical point of view. In J. Preston & M. Bishop (Eds.), *Views into the Chinese room: New essays on searle and artificial intelligence* (pp. 109–122). Oxford: Clarendon.

Copeland, J. (Ed.). (2004). *The essential Turing*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Copeland, J. (Ed.). (2005). *Alan Turing's automatic computing engine*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Copeland, J., & Proudfoot, D. (1996). On Alan Turing's anticipation of connectionism. *Synthese, 108*, 361–377.

Copeland, J., & Sylvan, R. (1999). Beyond the universal Turing machine. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77*, 46–66.

Coutts, T. (2008). Playing chess in the chinese room. In B. Hale (Ed.), *Philosophy looks at chess* (pp. 25–38). Chicago: Open Court.

Cowie, F. (1998). *What's within? Nativism reconsidered*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Currie, G. (1995). *Image and mind: Film, philosophy and cognitive science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Currie, G. (2000). Imagination, delusion and hallucinations. *Mind and Language, 15*, 168–183.

Currie, G. (2010). *Narratives and narrators: A philosophy of stories*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Currie, G., & Abell, C. (2000). Internal and external pictures. *Philosophical Psychology, 12*, 429–445.

Currie, G., & Ravenscroft, I. (2002). *Recreative minds: Imagination in philosophy and psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Currie, G., & Sterelny, K. (2000). How to think about the modularity of mindreading. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 50*, 145–160.

Dartnall, T. (2007). Internalism. Active externalism, and nonconceptual content: The ins and outs of cognition. *Cognitive Science, 31*, 257–283.

Davids, K., Button, C., & Bennett, S. (2007). *Dynamics of skill acquisition: A constraints-led approach*. Champaign: Human Kinetics.

Davidson, I. (2007). 'As large as you need and as small as you can': Implications of the brain size of *Homo Floresiensis*. In A. Schalley & D. Khlentzos (Eds.), *Mental states: Evolution, function, nature* (pp. 35–42). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Davidson, I. (2010). The archaeology of cognitive evolution. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews in Cognitive Science, 1*, 214–229.

Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., & Breen, N. (2001). Monothematic delusions: Towards a two-factor account. *Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 8*, 133–158.

Davies, M., Aimola Davies, A., & Coltheart, M. (2005). Anosognosia and the two-factor theory of delusions. *Mind and Language, 20*, 241–257.

Davies, M., & Stone, T. (Eds.). (1995a). *Folk psychology: The theory of mind debate*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Davies, M., & Stone, T. (Eds.). (1995b). *Mental simulation*. Oxford: Blackwell.

de Zubicaray, G. (2006). Cognitive neuroimaging: Cognitive science out of the armchair. *Brain and Cognition, 60*, 272–281.

Deutscher, M. (1989). Remembering 'remembering'. In J. Heil (Ed.), *Cause, mind, and reality* (pp. 53–72). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Deutscher, M. (2010). Philosophy of mind (continental). In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand* (pp. 419–424). Melbourne: Monash University Press.

Devitt, M. (1989). A narrow representational theory of the mind. In S. Silvers (Ed.), *Rerepresentation: Readings in the philosophy of mental representation* (pp. 369–402). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Devitt, M. (1996). *Realism and truth* (2nd ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Devitt, M. (2011). Methodology and the nature of knowing how. *Journal of Philosophy, 108*, 205–218.

Diprose, R. Ferrell, R. (eds) (1991). *Cartographies*: *Poststructuralism and the mapping of bodies and spaces*. Allen and Unwin. Sydney

Doggett, T., & Stoljar, D. (2010). Does nagel's footnote 11 solve the mind-body problem? *Philosophical Issues, 20*, 125–143.

Downey, G. (2005). *Learning capoeira: Lessons in cunning from an Afro-Brazilian art*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Downey, G. (2010a). Practice without theory: A neuroanthropological perspective on embodied learning. *JRAI: Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 16*, S22–S40.

Downey, G. (2010b). Throwing like a Brazilian: On ineptness and a skill-shaped body. In R. Sands (Ed.), *Anthropology of sport and human movement* (pp. 297–326). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Downham, R. (2005). Seeking self-consistency with integrity: An interdisciplinary approach to the ethics of self and memory. *Scan*. http://scan.net.au/scan/journal/display.php?journal_id=57

Drayson, Z. (2010). Extended cognition and the metaphysics of mind. *Cognitive Systems Research, 11*, 367–377.

Dutton, D. (2008). *The art instinct: Beauty, pleasure, and human evolution*. New York: Bloomsbury.

Fernandez, J. (2006a). The intentionality of memory. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84*, 39–57.

Fernandez, J. (2006b). Memory and perception: Remembering snowflake. *Theoria, 56*, 147–164.

Fernandez, J. (2008a). Memory, past, and self. *Synthese, 160*, 103–121.

Fernandez, J. (2008b). Memory and time. *Philosophical Studies, 141*, 333–356.

Ferrell, R. (1992). *Passion in theory*. London: Routledge.

Files, C. (1996). Goodman's rejection of resemblance. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 36*, 398–412.

Fine, C. (2010). *Delusions of gender: How our minds, society, and neurosexism create difference*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Fine, C., Craigie, J., & Gold, I. (2005). Damned if you do; Damned if you don't: The impasse in cognitive accounts of the capgras delusion. *Philosophy Psychiatry, & Psychology, 12*, 143–151.

Fish, W. (2009). *Perception, hallucination, and illusion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fish, W. (2010). *Philosophy of perception: A contemporary introduction*. London: Routledge.

Fodor, J. (1975). *The language of thought*. New York: Thomas Crowell.

Fodor, J. (1987). *Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Forrest, P. (2010). Materialism, Australian. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 269–271). Melbourne: Monash University Press.

Foss, J. (1992). Introduction to the epistemology of the brain: Indeterminacy, micro-specificity, chaos, and openness. *Topoi, 11*, 45–57.

Franklin, J. (2003). *Corrupting the youth: A history of philosophy in Australia*. Sydney: Macleay Press.

Freeland, G. (1989). In quest of a cognitive historiography. In W. Albury & P. Slezak (Eds.), *Dimensions of cognitive science* (pp. 1–19). Kensington: University of NSW Press.

Frith, C. (1992). *The cognitive neuropsychology of schizophrenia*. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Garfield, J. (1997). Mentalese not spoken here: Computation, cognition and causation. *Philosophical Psychology, 10*, 413–435.

Garfield, J., Peterson, C., & Perry, T. (2001). Social cognition, language acquisition and the development of the theory of mind. *Mind and Language, 16*, 494–541.

Gatens, M. (1995). *Imaginary bodies: Ethics, power, and corporeality*. London: Routledge.

Gaukroger, S. (1997). Nature without reason: Cartesian automata and perceptual cognition. In S. Gaukroger (Ed.), *The genealogy of knowledge*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Gaukroger, S. (Ed.). (1998). *The soft underbelly of reason: The passions in the seventeenth century*. London: Routledge.

Gerrans, P. (1998). The norms of cognitive development. *Mind and Language, 13*, 56–75.

Gerrans, P. (2001). Delusions as performance failures. *Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 31*, 161–173.

Gerrans, P. (2002). The theory of mind module in evolutionary psychology. *Biology and Philosophy, 17*, 305–321.

Gerrans, P. (2003). Nativism and neuroconstructivism in the explanation of Williams syndrome. *Biology and Philosophy, 18*, 41–52.

Gerrans, P. (2005). Wittgenstein and bourdieu on tacit knowledge. *Anthropological Theory, 15*, 53–74.

Gerrans, P. (2007a). Mechanisms of madness: Evolutionary psychiatry without evolutionary psychology. *Biology and Philosophy, 22*, 35–56.

Gerrans, P. (2007b). Mental time travel, somatic markers and 'myopia for the future'. *Synthese, 159*, 459–474.

Gerrans, P. (2009). Mad scientists or unreliable autobiographers: Dopamine dysregulation and delusion. In M. Broome & L. Bortolotti (Eds.), *Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: Philosophical perspectives* (pp. 151–171). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gerrans, P., & Stone, V. (2008). Generous or parsimonious cognitive architecture? Cognitive neuroscience and theory of mind. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59*, 121–141.

Gerrans, P., & Kennett, J. (2010). Neurosentimentalism and moral agency. *Mind, 119*, 585–614.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (1989). Misinformation. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19*, 533–550.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (1992). Indication and adaptation. *Synthese, 92*, 283–312.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (1996). *Complexity and the function of mind in nature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (2002). On the evolution of representational and interpretive capacities. *The Monist, 85*, 50–69.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (2004). On folk psychology and mental representation. In H. Clapin, P. Staines, & P. Slezak (Eds.), *Representation in mind: New approaches to mental representation* (pp. 147–162). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (2005). Folk psychology as a model. *The Philosopher's Imprint, 5*, 1–16.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (2006). Mental representation, naturalism, and teleosemantics. In G. Macdonald & D. Papineau (Eds.), *Teleosemantics: New philosophical essays* (pp. 42–68). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gold, I. (1999). Dispositions and the central problem of color. *Philosophical Studies, 93*, 21–44.

Gold, I. (2004). Phenomenal qualities and intermodal perception. In H. Clapin (Ed.), *Representation in mind: New approaches to mental representation* (pp. 125–146). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Gold, I. (2010). Philosophical psychology. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 369–370). Melbourne: Monash University Press.

Gold, I., & Hohwy, J. (2000). Rationality and schizophrenic delusion. *Mind and Language, 15*, 146–167.

Gold, I., & Stoljar, D. (1999). A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22*, 809–830.

Griffiths, P. (1997). *What emotions really are: The problem of psychological categories*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Griffiths, P. (2001). Emotion and the problem of psychological categories. In A. Kazniak (Ed.), *Emotions, qualia and consciousness* (pp. 28–41). Singapore: World Scientific.

Griffiths, P. (2002). What is innateness? *The Monist, 85*, 70–85.

Griffiths, P. (2003). Basic emotions, complex emotions, machiavellian emotions. In A. Hatzimoysis (Ed.), *Philosophy and the emotions* (pp. 39–67). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Griffiths, P. (2004). Is emotion a natural kind? In R. Solomon (Ed.), *Philosophers on emotion* (pp. 233–249). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Griffiths, P. (2007). Evo-devo meets the mind: Towards a developmental evolutionary psychology. In R. Sanson & R. Brandon (Eds.), *Integrating development and evolution* (pp. 195–225). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Griffiths, P., & Machery, M. (2008). Innateness, canalization, and 'biologicizing the mind'. *Philosophical Psychology, 21*, 397–414.

Griffiths, P., & Scarantino, A. (2009). Emotions in the wild: The situated perspective on emotions. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (Eds.), *Cambridge handbook of situated cognition* (pp. 437–453). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Griffiths, P., & Stotz, K. (2000). How the mind grows: A developmental perspective on the biology of cognition. *Synthese, 122*, 29–51.

Grosz, E. (1994). *Volatile bodies: Toward a corporeal feminism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Grove, R., Catherine Stevens, C., & McKechnie, S. (Eds.). (2005). *Thinking in four dimensions*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Hohwy, J. (2004). Top-down and bottom-up in delusion formation. *Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 11*, 65–70.

Hohwy, J. (2007). The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception. *Psyche, 13*, 1–20.

Hohwy, J. (2009). The neural correlates of consciousness: New experimental approaches needed? *Consciousness and Cognition, 18*, 428–438.

Hohwy, J. (2010). The hypothesis-testing brain: Some philosophical implications. In W. Christensen, E. Schier, & J. Sutton (Eds.), *ASCS09: Proceedings of the 9th conference of the Australasian society for cognitive science* (pp. 135–144). Sydney: Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science.

Hohwy, J., & Frith, C. (2004). Can neuroscience explain consciousness? *Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11*, 180–198.

Hohwy, J., & Kallestrup, J. (Eds.). (2008). *Being reduced: New essays on reduction, explanation, and causation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hohwy, J., & Paton, B. (2010). Explaining away the body: Experiences of supernaturally caused touch and touch on non-hand objects within the rubber hand illusion. *PLoS ONE, 5*, e9416. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009416.

Hohwy, J., & Rosenberg, R. (2005). Cognitive neuropsychiatry: Conceptual, methodological and philosophical perspectives. *The World Journal of Biological Psychiatry, 6*, 192–197.

Hooker, C. (1981). Towards a general theory of reduction. part II: Identity in reduction. *Dialogue, 20*, 201–236.

Hooker, C. (2004). Asymptotics, reduction and emergence. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55*, 435–479.

Hooker, C. (2006). Reduction as cognitive strategy. In B. Keeley (Ed.), *Paul churchland* (pp. 154–174). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hooker, C. (1998). Being there: Putting philosopher, researcher, and student together again. *Metascience, 7*, 70–77.

Hooker, C., & Christensen, W. (1998). Towards a new science of the mind: Wide content and the metaphysics of organizational properties in non-linear dynamical models. *Mind and Language, 13*, 98–109.

Hooker, C., Penfold, H., & Evans, R. (1992). Control, connectionism, and cognition: Towards a new regulatory paradigm. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43*, 517–536.

Hurley, S. (1998). *Consciousness in action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hutchins, E. (1995). *Cognition in the wild*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Hyslop, A. (1995). *Other minds*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Hyslop, A. (2005). Other minds. In *Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy*. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/

Ismael, J. (2006). Saving the baby: Dennett on autobiography, agency, and the self. *Philosophical Psychology, 19*, 345–360.

Ismael, J. (2007). *The situated self*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, F. (1977). *Perception: A representative theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 32*, 127–136.

Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn't know. *Journal of Philosophy, 83*, 291–295.

Jackson, F. (1996). Mental causation. *Mind, 105*, 377–413.

Jackson, F. (1999). All that can be at issue in the theory-theory/simulation debate. *Philosophical Papers, 28*, 77–96.

Jackson, F. (2004a). Mind and Illusion. In P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar (Eds.), *There's something about Mary: Essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument* (pp. 421–442). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Jackson, F. (2004b). Representation and experience. In H. Clapin (Ed.), *Representation in mind: New approaches to mental representation* (pp. 107–124). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Jackson, F. (2009). Replies to my critics. In I. Ravenscroft (Ed.), *Minds, ethics and conditionals: Themes from the philosophy of Frank Jackson* (pp. 387–474). Oxford: Clarendon.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (1988). Functionalism and broad content. *Mind, 97*, 381–400.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (1990a). Causation in the philosophy of mind. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50*, 195–214.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (1990b). Program explanation: A general perspective. *Analysis, 50*, 107–117.

Jackson, F., & Pettit, P. (1993). Some content is narrow. In J. Heil & A. Mele (Eds.), *Mental causation* (pp. 259–282). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jeffares, B. (2010). The co-evolution of tools and minds: Cognition and material culture in the hominid lineage. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9*, 503–520.

Jones, K. (2006). Quick and smart? Modularity and the pro-emotion consensus. In L. Faucher and C. Tappolet (Eds.), *The modularity of emotions*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* (Supplementary Vol. 32, pp. 3–27). University of Calgary Press, Calgary, AB, Canada.

Jones, K. (2008). How to change the past. In C. Mackenzie & K. Atkins (Eds.), *Practical identity and narrative agency* (pp. 269–288). London: Routledge.

Kassler, J. (1995). *Inner music: Hobbes, hooke, and north on internal character*. London: Athlone Press.

Kennett, J., & Matthews, S. (2009). Mental time travel, agency, and responsibility. In M. Broome & L. Bortolotti (Eds.), *Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: Philosophical perspectives* (pp. 327–350). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kim, J. (1998). *Mind in a physical world: An essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Koksvik, O. (2010). Consciousness, metaphysics of. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 127–134). Melbourne: Monash University Press.

Langdon, R., & Bayne, T. (2010). Delusion and confabulation: Mistakes of seeing, remembering, and believing. *Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 15*, 319–345.

Langdon, R., Davies, M., & Coltheart, M. (2002). Understanding minds and understanding communicated meanings in schizophrenia. *Mind and Language, 17*, 68–104.

Langdon, R., & Mackenzie, C. (Eds.). (2011). *Emotions, imagination, and moral reasoning*. London: Psychology Press.

Levy, I., Trevarthen, C., et al. (1972). Perception of bilateral chimeric figures following hemispheric deconnexion. *Brain, 95*, 61–78.

Levy, N. (2007). *Neuroethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levy, N. (2008). Does phenomenology overflow access? *Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15*, 29–38.

Levy, N., & Bayne, T. (2004a). A will of one's own: Consciousness, control and character. *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 27*, 459–470.

Levy, N., & Bayne, T. (2004b). Doing without deliberation: Automatism, automaticity, and moral accountability. *International Review of Psychiatry, 16*, 209–215.

Lewis, D. (1990). What experience teaches. *Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 13*, 29–57.

Lloyd, G. (1984). *The man of reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in western philosophy*. London: Routledge.

Lycan, W. (2010). Functionalism. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 196–202). Melbourne: Monash University Press.

Lyon, P. (2004). Autopoiesis and knowing: Reflections on maturana's biogenic explanation of cognition. *Cybernetics and Human Knowing, 11*, 21–46.

Lyon, P. (2006). The biogenic approach to cognition. *Cognitive Processing, 7*, 11–29.

Macdonald, C. (2004). Mary meets molyneux. *Noûs, 38*, 503–524.

Macdonald, C., & MacDonald, G. (1995). How to be psychologically relevant. In C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald (Eds.), *Philosophy of psychology: Debates on psychological explanation, volume one* (pp. 60–77). Oxford: Blackwell.

Macdonald, C., & MacDonald, G. (2006). The metaphysics of mental causation. *Journal of Philosophy, 103*, 539–576.

Macdonald, C., & MacDonald, G. (2007). Beyond program explanation. In G. Brennan, R. Goodin, & M. Smith (Eds.), *Common minds: Essays in honour of Philip Pettit* (pp. 1–27). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Macdonald, P. (2003). *History of the concept of mind*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

McIlwain, D. (2006). Already filtered: Affective immersion and personality differences in accessing present and past. *Philosophical Psychology, 19*, 381–399.

McIlwain, D. (2007). Rezoning pleasure: Drives and affects in personality theory. *Theory and Psychology, 17*, 529–561.

McIlwain, D. (2010). Living strangely in time: Emotions, masks and morals in psychopathically-inclined people. *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 6*, 75–94.

Mackay, N., & Petocz, A. (Eds.). (2011). *Realism and psychology: Collected essays*. Leiden: Brill.

McKay, R., & Dennett, D. (2009). The evolution of misbelief. *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32*, 493–561.

McKay, R., Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2007). Jumping to delusions? Paranoia, probabilistic reasoning and need for closure. *Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 12*, 362–376.

Mackenzie, C. (2008). Imagination, identity, and self-transformation. In C. Mackenzie & K. Atkins (Eds.), *Practical identity and narrative agency* (pp. 121–145). London: Routledge.

Malpas, J. (1999). The constitution of the mind: Kant and Davidson on the unity of consciousness. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 7*, 1–30.

Malpas, J. (2000). Acting at a distance and knowing from afar: Agency and knowledge on the internet. In K. Goldberg (Ed.), *The robot in the garden: Telerobotics and telepistemology in the age of the internet* (pp. 108–124). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Martin, C. (2008). *The mind in nature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Martin, C., & Deutscher, M. (1966). Remembering. *Philosophical Review, 75*, 161–196.

Matthews, S. (2010). Philosophy of mind (analytic). In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 413–419). Melbourne: Monash University Press.

Maund, B. (1993). Representation, pictures, and resemblance. In E. Wright (Ed.), *New representationalisms: Essays in the philosophy of perception* (pp. 45–69). Aldershot: Avebury Press.

Maund, B. (1995). *Colours: Their nature and representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Maund, B. (2003). *Perception*. Chesham: Acumen.

Maund, B. (2006). The illusory theory of colours: An anti-realist theory. *Dialectica, 60*, 245–268.

Maze, J. (1983). *The meaning of behaviour*. London: Allen & Unwin.
Maze, J. (1991). Representationism, realism, and the redundancy of 'mentalese'. *Theory and Psychology, 1*, 163–185.
Melser, D. (2004). *The act of thinking*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Menary, R. (Ed.). (2006). *Radical enactivism*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Menary, R. (2007). *Cognitive integration: Mind and cognition unbounded*. London: Palgrave.
Menary, R. (2010a). Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9*, 459–463.
Menary, R. (Ed.). (2010b). *The extended mind*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Menzies, P. (1988). Against causal reductionism. *Mind, 97*, 551–574.
Menzies, P. (2003). The causal efficacy of mental states. In S. Walter & H. Heckmann (Eds.), *Physicalism and mental causation: The metaphysics of mind and action* (pp. 195–223). Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Menzies, P. (2007). Mental causation on the program model. In G. Brennan, R. Goodin, & M. Smith (Eds.), *The common mind: Essays in honour of Philip Pettit* (pp. 28–54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Menzies, P. (2009). The folk theory of colours and the causes of colour experience. In I. Ravenscroft (Ed.), *Mind, ethics, and conditionals: Themes from the philosophy of Frank Jackson* (pp. 141–160). Oxford: Clarendon.
Michell, J. (1988). Maze's direct realism and the character of cognition. *Australian Journal of Psychology, 40*, 227–249.
Michell, J. (2000). Normal science, pathological science, and psychometrics. *Theory and Psychology, 10*, 639–667.
Mitchell, N. (2006). The mind-body problem down under. *All in the Mind*, ABC Radio National, 23 September. http://www.abc.net.au/rn/allinthemind/stories/2006/1745477.htm
Miller, S. (2002). Against collective agency. In G. Meggle (Ed.), *Social facts and collective intentionality* (pp. 273–298). Frankfurt: Hansel-Hohenhausen.
Miller, S. (2005). Artefacts and collective intentionality. *Techne, 9*, 52–67.
Mousley, J. (2001). Mathematical understanding as distributed cognition. In S. Gunn (Ed.), *Mind, body and society: Emerging understandings of knowing and learning* (pp. 9–12). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Murphy, D. (2006). *Psychiatry in the scientific image*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Murphy, D. (2009). Psychiatry and the concept of disease as pathology. In M. Broome & L. Bortolotti (Eds.), *Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: Philosophical perspectives* (pp. 103–119). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Murphy, D. (2010). Philosophy of psychiatry. In *Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy*. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/psychiatry/
Nagasawa, Y. (2010). Dualism. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 153–156). Melbourne: Monash University Press.
Neander, K. (1995). Misrepresenting and malfunctioning. *Philosophical Studies, 79*, 109–141.
Neander, K. (1996). Swampman meets swampcow. *Mind and Language, 11*, 118–129.
Neander, K. (2006). Content for cognitive science. In G. Macdonald & D. Papineau (Eds.), *Teleosemantics: New philosophical essays* (pp. 167–194). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Noble, W., & Davidson, I. (1996). *Human evolution, language, and mind: A psychological and archaeological inquiry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nowell, A., & Davidson, I. (2010). *Stone tools and the evolution of human cognition*. Boulder: University Press of Colorado.
O'Brien, G. (1987). Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledge. *Philosophical Studies, 52*, 49–70.
O'Brien, G. (1991). Is connectionism common sense? *Philosophical Psychology, 4*, 165–178.
O'Brien, G. (1998). The mind: Embodied, embedded, but not extended. *Metascience, 7*, 78–83.
O'Brien, G. (1999). Connectionism, analogicity, and mental content. *Acta Analytica, 22*, 111–131.

O'Brien, G., & Diprose, R. (Eds.). (1996). *Exploring the interface between philosophy of mind and philosophy of the body: An annotated bibliography*. Kensington: University of New South Wales Press.

O'Brien, G., & Opie, J. (1997). Cognitive science and phenomenal consciousness: A dilemma, and how to avoid it. *Philosophical Psychology, 10*, 269–286.

O'Brien, G., & Opie, J. (1998). The disunity of consciousness. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76*, 378–395.

O'Brien, G., & Opie, J. (1999a). A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience. *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22*, 127–148.

O'Brien, G., & Opie, J. (1999b). A defence of cartesian materialism. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59*, 939–963.

O'Brien, G., & Opie, J. (2000). Disunity defended: A reply to Bayne. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78*, 255–263.

O'Brien, G., & Opie, J. (2001). Connectionist vehicles, structural resemblance, and the phenomenal mind. *Communication and Cognition, 34*, 13–38.

O'Brien, G., & Opie, J. (2004). Notes towards a structuralist theory of mental representation. In H. Clapin, P. Staines, & P. Slezak (Eds.), *Representation in mind: New approaches to mental representation* (pp. 1–20). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

O'Brien, G., & Opie, J. (2006). How do connectionist networks compute? *Cognitive Processing, 7*, 30–41.

O'Brien, G., & Opie, J. (2009). The role of representation in computation. *Cognitive Processing, 10*, 53–62.

O'Shaughnessy, B. (1980). *The will: A dual aspect theory. Two vols*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Shaughnessy, B. (2002). Dreaming. *Inquiry, 45*, 399–432.

Opie, J. (2010). Consciousness. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 123–127). Melbourne: Monash University Press.

Oppy, G., & Dowe, D. (2011). The Turing test. In *Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy*. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/Turing-test/

Parsell, M. (2005). Context-sensitive inference, modularity, and the assumption of formal processing. *Philosophical Psychology, 18*, 45–58.

Parsell, M. (2006). The cognitive cost of extending an evolutionary mind into the environment. *Cognitive Processing, 7*, 3–10.

Parsell, M. (2009). Quinean social skills: Empirical evidence from eye-gaze against information encapsulation. *Biology and Philosophy, 24*, 1–19.

Parsell, M. (2010). Williams syndrome: Dissociation and mental structure. In W. Christensen, E. Schier, & J. Sutton (Eds.), *ASCS09: Proceedings of the 9th conference of the Australasian society for cognitive science* (pp. 277–284). Sydney: Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science.

Pettit, P. (1993). A definition of physicalism. *Analysis, 53*, 213–223.

Pettit, P. (2003). Groups with minds of their own. In F. Schmitt (Ed.), *Socializing metaphysics* (pp. 167–193). New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Pettit, P. (2004). Motion blindness and the knowledge argument. In P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar (Eds.), *There's something about Mary: Essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument* (pp. 105–142). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Pettit, P. (2007). Neuroscience and agent-control. In D. Ross, D. Spurrett, H. Kincaid, & L. Stephens (Eds.), *Distributed cognition and the will: Individual volition and social context* (pp. 77–91). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Pettit, P. (2009). *Made with words: Hobbes on language, mind, and politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pettit, P., & Schweikard, D. (2006). Joint actions and group agents. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 36*, 18–39.

Petocz, A. (1999). *Freud, psychoanalysis and symbolism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Poole, R. (2008). Memory, history and the claims of the past. *Memory Studies, 1*(2), 149–166.

Price, H. (1989). Action explanation and the nature of mind. In P. Slezak & W. Albury (Eds.), *Computers, brains, and minds: Essays in cognitive science* (pp. 221–251). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Priest, G., & Young, D. (Eds.). (2010). *Martial arts and philosophy: Beating and nothingness*. Chicago: Open Court.

Proudfoot, D., & Copeland, J. (2009). Turing's test: A philosophical and historical guide. In R. Epstein, G. Roberts, & G. Peters (Eds.), *Parsing the Turing test: Philosophical and methodological issues in the quest for the thinking computer* (pp. 119–138). Berlin: Springer.

Radden, J. (2010). *On delusion*. London: Routledge.

Ravenscroft, I. (1998). Neuroscience and the mind. *Mind and Language, 13*, 132–137.

Ravenscroft, I. (2005). *Philosophy of mind: A beginner's guide*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ravenscroft, I. (2009). Is folk psychology a theory? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (Eds.), *Routledge companion to philosophy of psychology* (pp. 131–147). London: Routledge.

Redding, P. (1999). *The logic of affect*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Reynolds, J. (2006). Deleuze and Dreyfus on *LyHabitude*, coping and trauma in skill acquisition. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 14*, 563–583.

Reynolds, J. (2010). Problem(s) of other minds: Solutions and dissolutions in analytic and continental philosophy. *Philosophy Compass, 5*, 326–335.

Rothfield, P. (2008). Philosophy and the bodily arts. *Parallax, 14*, 24–35.

Samuel, G. (1990). *Mind, body and culture: Anthropology and the biological interface*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schalley, A., & Khlentzos, D. (Eds.). (2007). *Mental states, vol 2: Language and cognitive structure*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Schellenberg, S. (2008). The situation-dependency of perception. *Journal of Philosophy, 105*, 55–84.

Schellenberg, S. (2010). The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience. *Philosophical Studies, 149*, 19–48.

Schier, E. (2007). The represented object of colour experience. *Philosophical Psychology, 20*, 1–27.

Schier, E. (2008). The knowledge argument and the inadequacy of scientific knowledge. *Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15*, 39–62.

Schier, E. (2009). Identifying phenomenal consciousness. *Consciousness and Cognition, 18*, 216–222.

Sharpe, M., & Faulkner, J. (2008). *Understanding psychoanalysis*. London: Acumen.

Slezak, P. (1986). Actions, cognition and the self. *Synthese, 66*, 405–435.

Slezak, P. (1990). Reinterpreting images. *Analysis, 50*, 235–243.

Slezak, P. (1995). The 'philosophical' case against visual images. In P. Slezak, T. Caelli, & R. Clark (Eds.), *Perspectives on cognitive science: Theories, experiments, and foundations* (pp. 237–271). Norwood: Ablex.

Slezak, P. (2010). Cognitive science. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 117–120). Melbourne: Monash University Press.

Slezak, P., & Albury, W. (Eds.). (1988). *Computers, brains, and minds: Essays in cognitive science*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Smith, B. (2007). Body, mind, and spirit: Towards an analysis of the practice of yoga. *Body and Society, 13*, 25–46.

Smith, M. (Ed.). (2005). *Stelarc*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Sparrow, R. (2009). Building a better WarBot: Ethical issues in the design of unmanned systems for military applications. *Science and Engineering Ethics, 15*, 169–187.

Stelarc. (1991). Prosthetics, robotics and remote existence: Postevolutionary strategies. *Leonardo, 24*, 591–595.

Sterelny, K. (1983). Mental representation: What language is Brainese? *Philosophical Studies, 43*, 365–382.

Sterelny, K. (1986). The imagery debate. *Philosophy of Science, 53*, 560–583.

Sterelny, K. (1989). Fodor's nativism. *Philosophical Studies, 55*, 119–141.

Sterelny, K. (1990). *The representational theory of mind*. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.

Sterelny, K. (1991). *The representational theory of mind: An introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sterelny, K. (1992). Evolutionary explanations of human behaviour. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70*, 156–173.

Sterelny, K. (1993). Refuting eliminative materialism on the cheap? *Mind and Language, 8*, 306–315.

Sterelny, K. (1995). Basic minds. *Philosophical Perspectives, 9*, 251–270.

Sterelny, K. (2003). *Thought in a hostile world: The evolution of human cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sterelny, K. (2004). Externalism, epistemic artefacts, and the extended mind. In R. Schantz (Ed.), *The externalist challenge* (pp. 239–254). Berlin: De Gruyter.

Sterelny, K. (2007). Social intelligence, human intelligence, and niche construction. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 362*, 719–730.

Sterelny, K. (2009). Novelty, plasticity and niche construction: The influence of phenotypic variation on evolution. In A. Barberousse, M. Morange, & T. Pradeu (Eds.), *Mapping the future of biology: Evolving concepts and theories* (pp. 69–91). Dordrecht: Springer.

Sterelny, K. (2010). Minds: Extended or scaffolded? *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9*, 465–481.

Stich, S., & Ravenscroft, I. (1992). What is folk psychology? *Cognition, 50*, 447–468.

Stoljar, D. (2000). Physicalism and the necessary a posteriori. *Journal of Philosophy, 97*, 33–54.

Stoljar, D. (2001). Two conceptions of the physical. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62*, 253–281.

Stoljar, D. (2006). *Ignorance and imagination: The epistemic origin of the problem of consciousness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stoljar, D. (2009). Perception. In J. Shand (Ed.), *Central questions of philosophy* (pp. 51–67). Oxford: Blackwell.

Stoljar, D. (2010a). Identity theory of mind. In G. Oppy & N. Trakakis (Eds.), *A companion to philosophy in Australia and New Zealand* (pp. 219–223). Melbourne: Monash University Press.

Stoljar, D. (2010b). *Physicalism*. London: Routledge.

Stoljar, D., & Nagasawa, Y. (2004). Introduction. In P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar (Eds.), *There's something about Mary: Essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Stoljar, N. (1988). Churchland's eliminativism. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66*, 489–497.

Stone, V., & Gerrans, P. (2006). What's domain-specific about theory of mind? *Social Neuroscience, 1*, 309–319.

Stotz, K. (2010). Human nature and cognitive-developmental niche construction. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9*, 483–501.

Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M. (2007). The evolution of foresight: What is mental time travel and is it unique to humans? *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30*, 299–313.

Sutton, J. (1998a). *Philosophy and memory traces: Descartes to connectionism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sutton, J. (1998b). Being there: Putting philosopher, researcher, and student together again. *Metascience, 7*, 90–95.

Sutton, J. (2000a). Body, mind, and order: Local memory and the control of mental representations in medieval and renaissance sciences of self. In G. Freeland & A. Corones (Eds.), *1543 and all that: Word and image in the proto-scientific revolution* (pp. 117–150). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Sutton, J. (2000b). The body and the brain. In S. Gaukroger, J. Schuster, & J. Sutton (Eds.), *Descartes' natural philosophy* (pp. 697–722). London: Routledge.

Sutton, J. (2002). Porous memory and the cognitive life of things. In D. Tofts, A. Jonson, & A. Cavallero (Eds.), *Prefiguring cyberculture: An intellectual history* (pp. 130–141). Sydney: Power Publications and MIT Press.

Sutton, J. (2006). Distributed cognition: Domains and dimensions. *Pragmatics and Cognition, 14*, 235–247.

Sutton, J. (2007a). Language, memory, and concepts of memory: Semantic diversity and scientific psychology. In M. Amberber (Ed.), *The language of memory in a cross-linguistic perspective* (pp. 41–65). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Sutton, J. (2007b). Batting, habit, and memory: The embodied mind and the nature of skill. *Sport in Society, 10*, 763–786.

Sutton, J. (2008). Between individual and collective memory: Interaction, coordination, distribution. *Social Research, 75*, 23–48.

Sutton, J. (2009a). Dreaming. In P. Calvo & J. Symons (Eds.), *Routledge companion to the philosophy of psychology* (pp. 522–542). London: Routledge.

Sutton, J. (2009b). Remembering. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition* (pp. 217–235). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sutton, J. (2010a). Exograms and interdisciplinarity: History, the extended mind, and the civilizing process. In R. Menary (Ed.), *The extended mind* (pp. 189–225). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Sutton, J. (2010b). Observer perspective and acentred memory: Some puzzles about point of view in personal remembering. *Philosophical Studies, 148*, 27–37.

Sutton, J., Harris, C., Keil, P., & Barnier, A. (2010). The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9*, 521–560.

Sutton, J., McIlwain, D., Christensen, W., & Geeves, A. (2011). Applying intelligence to the reflexes: Embodied skills and habits between dreyfus and descartes. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 42*, 78–103.

Sutton, J., & Windhorst, C. (2009). Extended and constructive remembering: Two notes on Martin and Deutscher. *Crossroads, 4*, 79–91.

Tanaka, K. (2004). Minds, programs, and chinese philosophers: A chinese perspective on the chinese room. *Sophia, 43*, 61–72.

Thiel, U. (2011). *The early modern subject: Self-consciousness and personal identity from descartes to hume*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tofts, D., Jonson, A., & Cavallero, A. (Eds.). (2002). *Prefiguring cyberculture: An intellectual history*. Sydney and Cambridge: Power Publications and MIT Press.

Tribble, E. (2005). Distributing cognition in the globe. *Shakespeare Quarterly, 56*, 135–155.

Tribble, E. (2011). *Cognition in the globe: Attention and memory in shakespeare's theatre*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tribble, E., & Keene, N. (2011). *Cognitive ecologies and the history of remembering: Religion, education, and memory in early Modern England*. London: Palgrave.

Tribble, E., & Sutton, J. (2011). Cognitive ecology as a framework for shakespearean studies. *Shakespeare Studies, 39*, 94–103.

van Gelder, T. (1990). Compositionality: A connectionist variation on a classical theme. *Cognitive Science, 14*, 355–384.

van Gelder, T. (1991). What is the 'D' in 'PDP'? A survey of the concept of distribution. In W. Ramsey, S. Stich, & J. Tienson (Eds.), *Connectionism and the philosophy of mind* (pp. 33–59). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

van Gelder, T. (1992). Defining 'distributed representation'. *Connection Science, 4*, 175–191.

van Gelder, T. (1995). What might cognition be, if not computation? *Journal of Philosophy, 92*, 345–381.

van Gelder, T. (1998a). Monism, dualism, pluralism. *Mind and Language, 13*, 76–97.

van Gelder, T. (1998b). The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science. *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21*, 615–628.

van Gelder, T. (1999). Wooden iron? Husserlian phenomenology meets cognitive science. In J. Petitot, F. Varela, B. Pacoud, & J. Roy (Eds.), *Naturalizing phenomenology* (pp. 245–265). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

van Gelder, T. (2005). Enhancing and augmenting human reasoning. In A. Zilhao (Ed.), *Cognition, evolution, and rationality: A cognitive science for the twenty-first century* (pp. 162–181). London: Routledge.

van Gelder, T., & Niklasson, L. (1994). On being systematically connectionist. *Mind and Language, 9*, 288–302.

van Gelder, T., & Port, R. (1995). It's about time: An overview of the dynamical approach to cognition. In R. Port & T. van Gelder (Eds.), *Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition* (pp. 1–44). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Vincent, N. (2009). Neuroimaging and responsibility assessments. *Neuroethics, 4*, 35–49.

Webb, B. (1996). A cricket robot. *Scientific American, 275*, 94–99.

Webb, B. (2001). Can robots make good models of biological behaviour? *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24*, 1033–1050.

Webb, B. (2006). Transformation, encoding and representation. *Current Biology, 6*, R184–R185.

Webb, B. (2009). Animals versus animats: Or why not model the real iguana? *Adaptive Behaviour, 17*, 269–286.

Wegner, D. (2002). *The illusion of conscious will*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Wierzbicka, A. (1992). *Semantics, culture, and cognition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wilson, E. (1998). *Neural geographies*. London: Routledge.

Wilson, E. (2010). *Affect and artificial intelligence*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Wilson, R. (1994). Wide computationalism. *Mind, 103*, 351–372.

Wilson, R. (2004). *Boundaries of the mind: The individual in the fragile science—cognition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilson, R. (2005). Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis. *Cognitive Processing, 6*, 227–236.

Wilson, R., & Clark, A. (2009). How to situate cognition: Letting nature take its course. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition* (pp. 1–44). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilson, R., & Keil, F. (Eds.). (1999). *The MIT encyclopaedia of the cognitive sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Windhorst, C. (2005). The slave model of autobiographical memory. *Cognitive Processing, 6*, 253–265.

Wrathall, M., & Malpas, J. (Eds.). (2000). *Heidegger, coping, and cognitive science*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Index

A
Abell, Catharine, 481, 494–495
Aboriginal metaphysics, 362–364
Aboriginal philosophy, 212
Aboriginal thought, 581–584
Abortion, 205, 623–624
Absolute idealism, 41, 43, 46, 448
Academic associations, 314
Academic autonomy, 81
Academic salaries, 129
Academic staff numbers, 293
ACER Centre of Philosophy for Children, 315
Acton, H. B., 78
Act utilitarianism, 514–516
Aesthetic ideas, 485–486
Aesthetics
  aesthetic value and aesthetic experience, 481–496
  appreciation of nature, 500, 560
  in Australasia 1945–2005, 479–481
  definitions of art, 495–499
  and digital technology, 500
  of the environment, 500
  and evolutionary theory, 499–500
  interpretation, representation and depiction, 487–495
  John Anderson's theory, 64, 69–70, 77, 84, 85
  of Kant, 481–496
  political dimensions of art, 501
Agar, Nicholas, 529, 746
Agency, 365, 404, 437, 450, 457–458, 460, 467, 577, 783
Age of Reason, 548
Agnosticism, 256
Ahern, M. B., 452
Aijaz, Imran, 467
Albury, Randall, 716*n*2, 719, 720, 751–752
Alexander, Samuel, 3, 20–21, 370–371, 480
Alienation, 518
Allen, Rodney, 160, 168, 217, 652
Almond, Phillip, 460
Althusser, Louis, 163, 169
Althusserianism, 163–164, 654
Altruism, 522–523
Analytical philosophy
  from 1965–1980, 175–177
  and language, 414–416
  and masculinism, 551*n*8
  and metaphysics, 578
Analytic/Continental divide, 638–639, 650, 670–671
Analytic-synthetic distinction, 334, 334*n*2
And (magazine), 668–670
Anderson, Alexander ('Sandy'), 76, 143
Anderson, Elizabeth, 623
Anderson, Francis
  background, 18, 31–32
  career, 3, 31, 58–60, 641
  engagement with moral and social issues, 23
  idealism, 32–33, 641–642
  internationalism, 33–34
  on morality, 33
  on personality, 33
  reputation, 32
  teaching responsibilities, 19
Anderson, John
  academic achievements as a student, 57–58
  on academic autonomy, 81
  aesthetic theory, 64, 69–70, 77, 84, 85
  atheism, 448–449
  attack by Archbishop Gough, 81–82
  background and early years, 18, 19, 56, 57
  on beauty, 69–70, 85
  career, 3, 56

G. Oppy, N.N. Trakakis (eds.), *History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand*, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Anderson, John (*cont.*)
  on censorship, 66
  on classicism, 79
  communism, 65, 652
  conservatism, 80
  contribution to philosophy in Australia, 56, 68, 83
  cultural criticism, 79
  doctrinal conception of philosophy, 60, 84
  editorship of *AJPP*, 61, 141
  educational theory, 66, 73, 74
  empiricism, 87
  ethical theory, 63–64, 68–69, 84, 86
  first decade in Sydney, 60–67
  on form, 77, 85, 191
  on freethought, 67, 74–75
  on Freud, 79
  on history, 77–79
  on history of philosophy, 62–63
  on idealism, 61
  influence and legacy, 82, 83, 130–131, 135–136
  influences, 20, 58, 65
  liberal democratic theory, 71–73
  logical theory, 59–60, 76
  marriage, 58
  on medieval philosophy, 134–135
  metaphysics, 61–62, 70–71
  moral theory, 63–64
  move towards idealism, 85–86
  on mythology, 75
  narrowness, 133–134
  on philanthropy, 69
  political philosophy, 57, 65–66, 71–73, 80, 84
  positive conception of philosophy, 59
  proletarianism, 65–66, 86
  publications, 56–57, 68, 76, 84
  public controversies, 56
  public life following retirement, 81–82
  on realism, 61–62, 77, 85, 86, 134, 407
  relationship with Ruth Walker, 67, 74, 76, 82–84
  on religion, 73–74, 80–82, 448–449
  retirement, 129
  in Scotland, 57–60
  on sex and sexuality, 74–75
  social theory, 71
  son Alexander, 58, 76
  on Space-Time, 70–71, 364, 371
  on staff-student relationships, 139
  student disciples, 67, 75–76, 82–83, 135
  in Sydney, 60–82
Anderson, Warwick, 717
Anderson, William, 3, 18, 23, 26–27, 125, 659, 660
Andersonians, 67, 75–76, 82–83, 135
Andrews, John, 756
Animal liberation, 202–205, 527, 559
Animism, 585
Ankeny, Rachael, 625*n*36, 720, 746–748, 753
Anschultz, R. P., 125, 660, 666
Anscombe, Elizabeth, 98, 137
Anselm, 458, 464
Anstey, Peter, 720, 753
Anthropic theism, 256
Anthropocentrism, 550–562
Anti-realist semantics, 426–429
Antiwar movements, 155
Applied ethics
  in 1990s, 267–269
  animal liberation, 202–205
  in Australasia, 513, 530–531
  environmental ethics, 205–207
  moral theory, 207–208
  during 1970s, 203
Applied Philosophy (journal), 225
Appreciation
  of art, 489
  of music, 505
  of nature, 500
  of someone else's perspective, 489–490
A priori knowledge, 398–400
Aquinas, 134
Arachne (journal), 663
Ardley, Gavin, 466
Argument from evil, 450–453, 467–468
Aristotle, 282, 370, 521
Armstrong, David
  approach to philosophy, 177
  on belief, 188–191
  career, 112, 172, 177, 217
  on concept of a mental state, 177–178
  on empiricism, 180
  on Gettier problem, 392
  on incorrigibility thesis, 381, 382
  influence of John Anderson, 4, 76, 83, 180, 407
  on materialism, 180–181
  metaphysics, 369, 371, 407
  on naturalism, 180
  on perception, 183–188, 383–385
  publications, 218
  on realism, 180

  reliabilism, 390–391
  resistance to radicalism, 159, 161–163
  on scientific realism, 742
  Sydney dispute, 653, 653*n*32
  on truthmaking, 286, 386
  on universals, 182, 229–231, 742
  on Wittgenstein, 117
Armstrong, John, 325, 485–486, 501
Arnold, Michael, 717
Art
  Aboriginal art, 497–498
  aesthetic appreciation, 498–499
  appreciation of, 489
  for art's sake, 498, 500
  authenticity of art from traditional societies, 497–498
  as a cluster concept, 497
  definition of, 495–499
  for disinterested contemplation, 499
  evolutionary basis, 499–500
  interpretation of, 489, 492–493
  political dimensions, 501
  and resemblance, 494–495
Artificial intelligence, 787, 788
Ash, Chris, 682
Asian philosophy, 319
Association for Philosophy in Schools in Western Australia, 315
Association for Philosophy in Tasmanian Schools, 315
Astronomy, history of, 713, 718, 749
Atheism
  in Australia after Anderson, 450–452
  of John Anderson, 448–449
  scientific realism, physicalism and naturalism, 455–456
Auckland College. *See also* University of Auckland
  philosophy in the 1950s, 125
Aune, Bruce, 335
Austhink, 317–318, 318*n*86
Austin, J. L., 115, 415
Australasian Association for Professional and Applied Ethics (AAPAE), 314
Australasian Association for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science (AAHPSSS), 314, 716
Australasian Association of Ancient Philosophy (ASAP), 314
Australasian Association of Bioethics and Health Law, 268
Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP)
  ban on philosophy chair at Tasmania, 6, 138, 158, 159
  initiatives during 2000s, 311–312
  motion against nuclear armament, 225
  non-executive officers, 311, 311*n*54–59
  operation, 310–317
  presidents, 11, 310*n*50
  prizes, 311, 311*n*61
  publication of *AJP*, 312–313
  role, 11
  secretaries, 310*n*51
  support for philosophy in the academy, 310–313
  treasurers, 310*n*52
Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy, 11
Australasian Bioethics Association, 268, 526
Australasian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 313
Australasian Journal of Logic, 313
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 11, 19, 220, 295*n*12, 312–313, 644
Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy (*AJPP*), 19, 61, 141, 642, 644
Australasian philosophers
  significant international appointments, 8
  trailblazers, 8–9
Australasian philosophical thought, main strands, 16
Australasian philosophy
  in 1950s, 124–128, 150
  in 1960s, 5–6, 150–151
  in 1970s, 175–177
  in 1980s, 211–212
  in 1990s, 241–242
  in 2000s, 291–292, 323–327
  in 1930s and 40s, 4
  assessment and explanation, 12–13
  beyond the academy, 12
  conflict, 6–7
  early influences, 3, 17–19
  false start, 1–2
  gender disparity, 10
  indigenous philosophies, 1
  internal vitality, 10–11
  in postwar period, 4–5, 150–151
  prior to 1930s, 3–4
  publications in 2000s, 323–327
  universities and departments, 2–3
  on the world stage, 7–9

Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association (APRA), 314, 462
Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy (ASCAP), 314
Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP), 651
Australasian Society for Legal Philosophy (ASLP), 314
Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 716
Australian Association of Phenomenology and Social Philosophy (AAPSP), 650
Australian Association of Professional and Applied Ethics, 268
Australian Catholic University, 2, 298, 300
Australian College, 2, 17
Australian Feminist Studies (journal), 225
Australian Health Ethics Committee, 267
The Australian Highway, 65
Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics, 514
Australian Logic Teachers' Journal, 681
Australian materialism
  beginnings of, 5, 143–146, 730
  belief and propositional content, 188–191
  causal theory of mind, 177–183
  first phase, 177
  perception, 183–188
  significance, 773–774
Australian National University
  philosophy staff numbers, 298, 300
  Research School of Social Sciences
    in 1950s, 143
    in 1980s, 223–224
    Automated Reasoning Project, 226–228, 682
    Canberra Plan, 273
    central role in philosophy, 2–3
    logic, 8, 683, 690–691
    staff appointments, 301
  'the Faculties', in 1980s, 223
Australian Productivity Commission, 296
Australian realism, 373–376
Australian Science and Technology Heritage Centre, 715, 750
Australian Science Archives Project (ASAP), 715, 750
Authenticity
  art from traditional societies, 497–498
  musical performance, 503–504
Automated Reasoning Project, 226–228, 682, 683
Autonomy, 525, 530, 567, 621–624, 748
Awatere-Huata, Donna, 667
Ayer, A. J., 332, 392

B
Bacharach, Sondra, 501
Bacon, John, 286
Badham, Richard, 721
Baier, Annette (née Stoop), 125, 126, 130, 215*n*8, 525*n*25, 631*n*42
Baier, Kurt, 4, 129, 130, 140, 143, 513, 523–524
Baker, Jim, 75, 82
Ballantyne, Angela, 530
Ballarat University, 2
Baltzly, Dirk, 286, 522
Barnett, Dene, 217, 682
Barton, Ruth, 756
Barwell, Ismay, 215
Basalla, George, 748
Bayes' theorem, 737
Bayne, Tim, 780–781, 783–785
Beall, J. C., 684, 693
Beattie, James, 756
Beauty
  as an unfashionable value, 485
  experience of, 482–484
  as holistic feature of objects, 485–486
  John Anderson's conception of, 69–70, 85
  as a social product, 501
Beauvoir, Simone de, 605, 608
Beder, Sharon, 721, 722
Bedggood, David, 667, 668
Behaviourism, 102
Beliefs, 188–191, 381–395, 400, 403–405, 499, 668
Belief systems
  rational, 344, 346, 347, 350, 352, 353
  scientific, 344
Benevolence, 515, 531
Benitez, Rich, 286
Benjamin, Andrew, 649, 656
Benjamin, Bruce, 143
Bennett, J. A. W., 666
Bennett, Jonathon, 417, 431
Benn, S. I., 5, 150, 202, 203, 205, 223, 228, 524
Beran, Harry, 223
Bergson, Henri, 642–644
Bertram, James, 666
Biegler, Paul, 530

Bigelow, John
  career, 220, 221, 301*n*25, 307*n*41, 320, 355, 683
  on Gettier problem, 393
  on intensional semantics, 421
  on knowledge argument, 778
  philosophy of science, 287
  supervenience thesis, 354, 743
Bilimoria, Purushottama, 216, 461
Bimbo, Katalin, 684
Bindon, George, 719
Biocentrism, 562, 564, 569, 571
Bioethics, 269, 526–530, 622–625
Bioethics (journal), 225, 526
Bioethics research centres, 8, 228, 267, 526
Biology, philosophy of, 745–746, 797
Biophilia hypothesis, 262
Birchall, B. C., 222
Birch, Charles, 562
Bishop, John, 214, 466–469, 662
Blackburn, Simon, 5
Blackford, Russell, 529
Blaiklock, E. M., 469
Bloor, David, 752
The Body, 594, 597–600, 603–606, 612–614, 618–624
Body integrity identity disorder (BIID), 783–784
Bohm, David, 744
Bohr, Niels, 744
Bond University, 224, 298
Booth, Wayne, 492
Boulger, Edward Vaughn, 34
Boulous-Walker, Michelle, 655, 657
Bowden, Peta, 525, 621
Bowman, Peter, 335, 336, 341, 734
Boyer lectures, 216, 224
Braddon-Mitchell, David, 434
Bradley, Michael, 4, 117, 137, 219
Bradley, Raymond, 5, 467–469, 660
Brady, Ross, 220, 221, 681, 683, 684, 692, 693, 697–698, 700
Braidotti, Rosi, 95, 649, 655
Branagan, David, 755
Brennan, Andrew, 566–567, 580
Brentano, Franz, 556
Bridgstock, Martin, 723
Brien, Andrew, 454
British Idealism, 641, 642
British philosophy, 18
Brock, Gillian, 531, 631
Brock, Stuart, 424
Brooks, Rodney, 791, 792
Brown, Harvey, 763, 764
Brown, Paul, 719, 720
Brown, Robert, 5
Buchdahl, Gerd, 4, 131, 712–713, 749
Bucher, Barry, 722
Buckingham, Jane, 764
Buckle, Stephen, 286, 405, 407, 523, 525
Buckley, Vincent, 131, 132, 142
Budapest circle, 654
Buddhism, 461
Bull, Robert, 687
Bunder, Martin, 681, 684, 692
Burch, David, 723
Burgess, John A., 429, 430, 439, 440
Burnheim, John, 161, 162, 164, 217, 654
Burns, Linda, 429, 439
Burns, Lynda, 219
Burrumarra, David, 583
Business ethics, 531

C
Caird, Edward, 18, 58, 641
Calder, Alex, 660, 668, 669
Caledonian Academy, 2
Cam, Phillip, 222
Camilleri, Kritian, 751
Campbell, Alastair, 529
Campbell, John, 221, 522–524, 756, 764
Campbell, Keith
  background and education, 124
  career, 110, 161–162, 436
  criticism of causal theory of mind, 182–183
  new epiphenomenalism, 183, 232
  philosophical work, 172
  publications, 218
  and split of Sydney department, 161–162, 172, 654
  on tropes, 231
  virtue ethics, 522
Campbell, Norman, 331, 333
Campbell, Richard, 171, 223
Canberra Plan, 271–277, 416, 434
Canberra Society of Philosophy for the Young (SOPHY), 315
Canberra University College, 143
Candlish, Stewart, 220
Cann, Melvyn, 221
Canterbury College, philosophy in 1950s, 126–128
Cardno, James Alexander, 138
Care ethics, 621
Carlson, Allen, 500

Carnap, Rudolf, 735
Caroline Chisholm Centre for Ethics, 267, 528
Carruthers, Glen, 783–784
Cartwright Inquiry, 529
Categorical properties, 355, 356
Catton, Philip, 763–764
Causal power, 729, 730, 742, 743
Causal role, 247, 248, 250–252
Causal semantics, 425–426
Causal theory of mind, 177–183
Causation, 744, 745, 764
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE), 267, 513, 529, 531
Centre for Philosophy and Public Issues, 267
Cervical cancer, 228*n*10, 529
Chadha, Monima, 461
Chalmers, Alan, 165, 217, 218, 287, 720, 733, 743, 753
Chalmers, David
  career, 243, 301, 308, 317
  on computation, 788, 789
  on consciousness, 243, 301, 308
  on dualism, 242, 374, 434–435
  extended mind hypothesis, 793–795
  on hard problem of consciousness, 779–780
  on intensional two-dimensionality, 400, 434–435
  on neural correlates of consciousness, 780
  philosophy of mind annotated bibilography, 319*n*87
Chambers, Wade, 722
Chandler, John, 219
Chapman, Val, 469
Charles Stuart University, 2, 298
Charlesworth, Max
  on Aboriginal thought, 212
  applied ethics, 228, 267, 269
  bioethics, 529
  career, 125, 129, 216
  founding of *Sophia*, 129, 243, 462
  indigenous philosophy of religion, 447
  on ontological argument, 458
  phenomenology and existentialism, 646–647
  philosophy of science, 722
Children's Bioethics Centre, 530
Chipman, Lauchlan, 222
Chomsky, Noam, 415
Churchland, Paul, 789
Clark, Andy, 791, 793–795
Clarke, Steve, 529
Classicism, 79
Clendinnen, John, 131, 198, 712, 713, 726–727
Clinical ethics, 267
Cluster concepts, 339, 497
Coady, Tony, 112, 219, 286, 394, 397–398, 460, 531, 533
Cocking, Dean, 286, 518, 524, 531, 532
Coghlan, Peter, 524
Cognitive behaviour therapy, 530
Cognitive science
  cognitivism, computation and content, 788–790
  dynamics, robotics and embodied cognition, 790–793
  extended mind and distributed cognition, 793–795
  foundations and frameworks, 787–795
Cognitivism, 790
Cohen, Stephen, 222
Coherence, 344, 345
Cold War, 155, 156, 159
Coleman, Elizabeth Burns, 481, 497, 498, 501
Colheart, Max, 781
Collaborative research, 320
Colour, 186, 188, 231, 232, 245, 397, 433, 777, 778, 780, 782, 783, 799
Coltheart, Max, 797
Colyvan, Mark, 301, 320, 458
Common sense psychology, 796
Communism, 65, 73
The Communist (journal), 65
Communist Party of Australia, 65, 73, 652
Compassion, 373, 523, 531
Complementarity, 795
Computationalism, 788–789
Computational theory of mind (CMT), 787
Computer ethics, 531
Computing, history of, 764
Comte, Auguste, 709–710
Conativity, 568–569
Conceptual analysis, 430–435
Concupiscence, 449, 449*n*5
Conditionals, 194–196, 351–352, 430–431
Coney, Sandra, 667
Congress for Cultural Freedom, 158
Conjectural knowledge, 388
Conlon, Alf, 67
Connectionism, 789–793, 796, 798
Consciousness
  challenges facing scientific explanation, 780–782
  explaining, 780–785
  explanations of, 782–784
  hard problem of, 779–780

  knowledge argument, 212, 221, 233, 237, 243, 777–779
  and mind-body problem, 776–787
  nature of, 777–780
  unity of, 784–785
  vehicle theory of, 782–783
Consequentialism, and utilitarianism, 9, 514–519
Consequentialist creator, 154, 156
Conservatism, 154, 156
Constitution, and identity, 181
Constructive empiricism, 740, 741, 759, 760
Constructive interpretation, 757, 758
Content, 243–245, 258, 259, 271–274, 276, 277, 282, 284
Contexualism, 387, 395–397
Continental philosophy
  in 1970s, 652–657
  And/Antic interruption, 668–670
  Auckland philosophy department, 659–663
  Australian vitalism, 642–644
  definition, 640
  divide with analytical philosophy, 638–639, 650, 670–671
  early years in New Zealand, 657–659
  existentialism philosophy in New Zealand, 63–65
  feminism, 655–656
  idealism as precursor, 641–642
  institutional marginalisation, 645–647
  Marxism, 652–655
  Marxist theory in New Zealand, 666–668
  and metaphysics, 578
  nature of, 638, 671–672
  overview, 637–641
  phenomenology and existentialism, 644–652
  pluralist origins, 641–642
  poststructuralism, 656–657, 668–670
Contraception, 526
Contractarian approaches to ethics, 524
Conventionalism, 330–335, 338, 342, 723–726
Conventionality of distant simultaneity, 339, 342
Copeland, Jack
  career, 215–216, 682, 683, 764
  on history and philosophy of computing, 788
  logic, 193, 216, 227, 683, 686
  possible world semantics, 687
  Turing Archive, 764
Copernican revolution, 368
Cordner, Christopher, 523
Corones, Anthony, 719
Cosmological argument, 456–457
Council for the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (CHASS), 295–298
Counterculture, 545, 550–551
Counterfactual conditionals, 351
Courage, 522
Couvalis, George, 733
Cox, Damien, 522
Craig, William Lane, 457
Crawford, R. M., 99
Cresswell, Max, 124, 128, 192, 215, 230, 419–420, 424, 680, 686
Criminal Justice Ethics (journal), 313
Critchley, Simon, 638
Critical and Creative Thinking (journal), 316
Critical Philosophy (journal), 171, 225, 235
Critical rationalism, 388
Critical theory, 638, 646, 649–651, 654, 657, 659, 670
Crittenden, Paul, 165, 171, 172, 217, 235
Croce, B., 77, 78
Crossley, John, 192, 218–219, 682
Crossley, Louise, 721
Crosthwaite, Jan, 214, 525, 627–628, 684
Cullity, Garrett, 523, 524
Cultural revolutions, 155, 156
Culture, 56, 57, 72–74, 77, 79–84
Culture/nature distinction, 594
Cumming, Geoff, 738–739
Cupitt, Don, 465
Curley, Edwin, 5
Currie, George, 215
Currie, Greg, 424, 480, 481, 487, 488, 490–493, 495
Curthoys, Jean, 161, 165, 168, 172, 217, 218, 653

D
D'Agostino, Fred, 222
D'Arcy, Eric, 129, 220, 513, 525
Dare, Tim, 523
Davidson, Barbara, 221, 223
Davidson, Donald, 5, 179, 415–416, 437, 438
Davidsonian revolution, 418–419
Davidsonian semantics, 417–419, 426, 440
Davidson, John (Rev.), 34
Davies, Martin, 418–411, 439, 797
Davies, Stephen
  aesthetics, 480, 487, 492, 496, 499, 500
  philosophy of music, 501–505
  publications in 2000s, 325

Davis, Leigh, 668, 669
Davoren, Jen, 684
Dawes, Greg, 466
Dawkins, Richard, 745
Deakin, Alfred, 23, 24
Deakin University, 2, 216, 300, 722
Decision theory, 515
Deconstruction, 604–605
Deductivism, 196–197, 199
Deep ecology, 206, 233, 562–571, 573–575
Deep green theory, 570, 571
Delusions, 774, 783, 797, 798
Democracy, 67, 71–73, 80, 84, 154, 155, 161–167
Democritus, 145
Denis Dutton, 480, 481
Dennett, Daniel, 5, 219
Deontology, 512, 515, 518, 521, 523, 524
Depictions, 487–495
Depictive contect, 487, 491, 493, 494
Depression, 530
Descartes, Rene, 709
Descriptivism, 263, 277, 284, 285
Design argument, 261–263, 457–458
Deutscher, Max
  career, 4, 7, 117, 137, 178
  on causal theory of memory, 794
  on causal theory of mind, 178–179
  Continental philosophy, 7, 171, 218, 647–648
  dispute with Armstrong over perception, 190, 384–385
  on memory, 799
  on mind-body debate, 775
Deutscher, Penelope, 603–604, 616–617, 655
Devitt, Michael, 161, 164, 166, 218, 243, 425–426, 653
Dialectic (journal), 221
Dialetheic logic, 461
Dialethesism, 696, 697
Dickerson, Adam, 396
Dick, Ian, 756
Dimensional analysis, 728
Diprose, Rosalyn, 620–623, 655, 657
Direct realism, 183, 799
Discourse ethics, 524
Dispositional properties, 355–356
Dispositional theories of value, 532
Distributed cognition, 793–795
Ditmarsch, Hans van, 684, 687
Docker, John, 135
Doctrine of analogy, 450
Doctrine of double effect, 531
Dodds, Sue, 221, 530, 622, 625*n*36, 628
Donagan, Alan, 4, 100, 117, 143, 176, 513, 524
Doniela, Bill, 143, 221, 646
Douglass, Jim, 459
Downey, Robert, 682
Doxastic venture, 467
Dreaming (Aboriginal), 361, 447, 581–583
Dreaming, philosophy of, 799
Drum, Peter, 454, 455
Drury, M. O'C., 97
Dualism, 79, 242, 365–366, 374, 376, 377, 380
Dual use, 529
Dual-use dilemma, 747
Dudman, Vic, 217, 431, 681
Dugdale, Annie, 716, 751
Duhem, Pierre, 152, 330, 331, 348, 349, 710, 723, 725, 739, 740
Dummett, Michael, 427, 429, 438, 439
Dunlop, Francis W., 3, 18, 25
Dunphy, Jocylyn, 216
During, Lisabeth, 222, 657
During, Simon, 669–670
Dutton, Denis, 487, 496–497, 499, 500
Dworkin, Andrea, 625
Dyason, Diana, 711–714, 749
Dynamical systems theory, 791

E
Eastern philosophy, 461
Ecofeminism, 571–575
4E Cognition, 792
Ecological humanities, 579, 580, 582
Ecology, 562–571, 573–575, 577, 580, 582
Economic, ethical issues, 531
Ecophilosophies
  deep ecology, 562–571
  ecofeminism, 571–575
  process perspective, 576–577
Eddy, Harry, 67
Education, 56–58, 66–68, 73–76, 80–82, 84
Eggleston, Frederick, 513–514
Einstein, Albert, 154, 329–331, 335, 336, 339, 341, 734
Eliminative materialism, 775, 796
Elliot, Robert, 216, 222, 460, 561
Ellis, Brian
  career, 4, 5, 11, 117, 131, 137, 220, 683, 712–714, 765
  on conditionals, 431
  on incorrigibility thesis, 382–383
  on induction, 403
  measurement theory, 728–729

  metaphysics, 372
  philosophy of science, 221, 287, 712, 713, 725–730
  on probability, 735–736
  on scientific realism, 221, 739–740, 742–743
  simultaneity problem, 734–735
  on truth, 386
Embodied cognition, 792–793
Embodiment, 169, 525, 594, 595, 600, 606, 609–625, 783–784
Embryo research, 526, 529
Emergence theory, 371–372
Emotion, 286, 520, 522, 524, 532, 786, 789, 798
Empiricism, 63, 64, 75, 77, 78, 83–87, 180, 528, 733
End-of-life decision-making, 527, 530
Engelbart, Douglas, 793
Enlightenment, 546–547
Entailment, 190–192, 197, 689, 690, 692–695
Environmental ethics
  emergence in 1970s, 8, 205–207
  intensionality, 553–555
  intentionality, 555–557
  intrinsic value, 552, 555, 555*n*9, 559–562
  need for, 557–558
Environmentalism, 44–46, 551, 584
Environmental philosophy. *See also* Ecophilosophies
  in 1980s, 233–234
  Aboriginal perspectives, 581–584
  Australian panpsychism, 585–587
  beginnings, 544–546
  critique of anthropocentrism, 550–562
  critique of forest industry, 557
  focus of, 43–44
  romantic antecedant, 546–550, 579–580, 586–587
  in twenty-first century, 578–580
Environment movement, 544, 546, 564
Epiphenomenalism, 144, 232
Epistemology, 286
  analyses of knowing, 389–400
  belief, 386–387
  contexualism, 395–396
  deriving and defusing sceptical arguments, 404–405
  elements of knowing, 380–389
  experience and inner incorrigibility, 380–383
  Gettier problem, 391–394
  and inductive scepticism, 401–403
  justification and conjecture, 387–389
  knowledge-gradualism, 394
  knowledge of other minds, 400–401
  naturalism and scepticism, 405–407
  perception as knowledge, 383–384
  a priori knowledge and self-knowledge, 398–400
  and radical scepticism, 403–404
  realism and scepticism, 405–407
  reasons and inferences, 384–385
  reliabilism, 389–391
  and scepticism, 400–408
  scepticism about, 407–408
  testimony, 397–398
  truth, 385–386
  understanding and knowing-how, 396–397
Equality, 65, 594, 595, 600, 602, 605, 606, 609–612
Error theory of morality, 513, 531
eScholarship Research Centre, 716
Essentialism, 365, 366, 370, 594, 606, 609, 612–616, 619, 645–651
Ethical egosim, 514
Ethical naturalism, 532
Ethics. *See also* Bioethics; Feminist ethics; Metaethics; Practical ethics
  in 1990s, 267–269
  John Anderson's ethical theory, 63, 68–69, 84, 85
  public ethics, 269–271
  of science, 746–748
Ethics and Information Technology (journal), 313
Eucken, Rudolf, 42, 448, 642–644
European philosophy, 171–172
Euthanasia, 212, 531
Evans, Gareth, 418, 419
Evidential argument from evil, 452, 453
Evil, problem of, 452–453
Evolution, 481, 495–500, 794
Ewin, Robert, 522, 614–616
Existence, 450, 456, 458, 459, 461, 464, 467, 468
Existentialism, 63–65, 644–652
Experimental philosophy, 526
Extended mind hypothesis, 793

F
Faith, 446, 461–463, 467, 469
  and reason, 461–462
Falk, David, 4, 513
Falk, Jim, 721–722

Fallibilism, 406
Falsificationism, 197, 330, 332, 731
Farrall, Lyndsay, 722
Farrell, Robert, 221, 440, 683
Faulk, David, 129
Federated Council of University Staff Associations, 138
Federation of Australasian Philosophy in Schools Associations (FAPSA), 315–316
Feigle, Herbert, 5
Feldman, Richard, 462
Female emancipation, 25
Femininity, 235–236, 597–599, 603, 606, 607, 609, 613, 614, 616–619, 625
Feminist ethics, 525, 620–625
Feminist humanism, 604–606
Feminist philosophy. *See also* Ecofeminism
  context, 596–597
  and Continental philosophy, 655–656
  critical histories of philosophy, 598–601
  and embodiment, 169
  equality and difference, 609–612
  ethics, bioethics and embodiment, 620–625
  and history of philosophy, 234–236, 597–609
  hostility from philosophical community, 596
  and Marxism, 168
  methodological issues, 602–607
  and the philosophical imaginary, 607–609
  pornography, 625–627
  and race, 628–630
  and reason, 171
  sex, gender and essentialism, 612–616
  sexual difference, 616–620
  sexual harassment, 627–628
  social philosophy, 625–628
Feminist rationality, genealogy of, 604–606
Feminist textual interpretation
  deconstructive history, 603–604
  genealogical history, 604–607
  interrogative history, 602–603
Ferrell, Robyn, 656, 657
Feyerabend, Paul, 731, 733, 761–762
Findlay, J. N., 4, 47, 107–111, 123–125, 464, 657–658
Finney, Colin, 755
Finniss, John, 524
Fisher, Ronald Aylmer, 737
Fitzhardinge, Geoff, 681
Fleming, Charles, 756
Fletcher, M. Scott, 20
Flew, Anthony, 5, 176, 463, 469
Flinders University
  Centre for Applied Ethics, 531
  Philosophy department
    in 1980s, 217
    feminism, 168
    foundation, 2
    Marxism, 160, 168–169, 652
    staff numbers, 299, 300
  Women's Studies department, 217
Folk morality, 532
Folk psychology, 796
Force, 335, 337, 338, 344, 347, 348, 354
Ford, Norman (Rev.), 528
Forge, John, 716*n*2, 721–723, 729, 746, 747
Form, 59–62, 66, 69, 72, 75, 77–79, 82, 85, 86
Forrest, Peter, 222, 224, 230–231, 256–257, 286, 353, 458, 460
Foucault, Michel, 619–621, 649, 661, 751–752
Foundationalism, 152–155, 170
Four-dimensional metaphysics, 373–374
Fowler, Frank, 67
Fox, A. C., 129
Fox, John, 221, 336, 341, 369, 683, 728, 733, 743
Fox, Warwick, 565–566, 570–571, 571*n*15, 574, 575
Fraassen, Bas van, 341, 348–349, 734, 740
Franchi, Stefano, 662
Francis, Mark, 764
Francis, Ronald, 721
Frankfurt School, 150, 156, 156*n*6, 171, 646, 667, 670, 763
Franklin, James, 457, 522*n*17, 639, 774
Franklin, Richard, 129, 222, 396, 438, 460
Freedom, 363–365, 367–368, 520, 540
Free logic, 458
Free speech, 531
Freethought movement, 67, 74–75, 135–136
Freethought Society (Sydney University), 56, 66, 74, 80, 82, 84
Free Will Defence, 452, 453, 467–468
French philosophy, 638, 639, 644, 648, 649, 656–658
Freudians, 169
Freud, Sigmund, 169
Fricker, Elizabeth, 398
Friendship, 286, 516, 518, 519, 542
Functionalism
  commonsense functionalism, 248
  minimal functionalism, 248–249

  moral functionalism, 274, 276–277, 276*n*13, 284
  of Sterelny, 243–244, 247

G

Gäardenfors, Peter, 353
Gager, Owen, 667
Gaita, Raymond, 278–285, 453–454, 490, 524
Gal, Ofer, 720, 754
Galbreath, Ross, 756
Gallois, Andre, 220, 392–393, 398–399, 404
Game theory, 515
Gardenförs, Peter, 353
Gare, Arran, 216, 562, 576–578
Garfield, Jay, 458, 461
Gascoigne, Robert, 718, 749, 754–755
Gasking, Douglas
  on cluster concepts, 339
  on induction, 403
  influence of Wittenstein, 100–103, 132–133, 333, 339
  obituary for Wittgenstein, 95
  philosophy of language, 436–437
  reference-analyticity and sense-analyticity, 401
  reputation, 4
  teaching style, 132–133
Gasking, Elizabeth, 712, 713, 745, 749, 765
Gatens, Moira, 172, 217, 525, 601–603, 612–614, 617–618, 656
Gaukroger, Stephen, 171–173, 217, 218, 235, 286, 325, 716, 754
Gaut, Beryl, 497
Gavin David Young Lectures, 5, 137, 177, 219, 372, 418, 437
Geach, Peter, 98, 103
Geering, Lloyd, 465
Gelder, Tim van, 317, 775, 789, 791–793
Gender, sex/gender distinction, 612–616
General Theory of Ethics, 575
Geometrical conventionalism, 335, 336
Gerrans, Philip, 797
Gettier, Edmund, 391
Gettier problem, 391–394, 406
Gibbons, Peter, 4
Gibbs, Ben, 124
Gibson, Alexander ('Sandy') Boyce, 3, 21, 47, 131–132, 141–142, 647
Gibson, Quentin, 140, 143
Gibson, William Ralph Boyce, 3, 20, 41–46, 644–645
Gifford Lectures, 20
Giles-Peters, Andrew, 221, 683
Gill, John, 460
Gillam, Lynn, 530
Gillbank, Linden, 755
Gillen, F. J., 447
Gillespie, Richard, 715
Gillet, Grant, 267, 286, 529
Gillings, Richard, 749, 765
Ginnane, Bill, 129, 171
Girle, Rod, 220, 326, 681, 683, 684, 687
Global justice, 531
Goddard, Len
  career, 5, 6, 129, 176, 191, 219, 439, 681, 682, 690
  logic, 6, 191, 192, 219, 423, 680, 684, 685, 689, 691
God, existence of, 363–364
Godfrey-Smith, Peter, 746
Godfrey-Smith, William, 223, 561
Godlovitch, Stan, 500, 502, 504
Goldblatt, Rob, 682, 686–688
Goldman, Alvin, 391
Good/goods/goodness, 63, 64, 68, 69, 78, 84–86, 261, 284, 285
Goodin, Robert, 224, 269–270, 325, 517
Goodman, Nelson, 723, 727
Goré, Rajeev, 687
Gough, H. V. (Anglican Archbishop), 56, 81–82
Governatori, Guido, 687, 688
Graaf, Graham de, 129
Gradualism, 384, 389, 394, 395, 405
Graetz, H. R., 489
Graham, Mary, 581, 584
Grant, Len, 4, 129
Grave, S. A., 5, 129, 130, 137, 220, 380
Gray, Russell, 745
Green Bans, 545
Green, Green, Karen, 604–606
Green, Herbert, 529
Green, Karen, 236, 286, 421, 427, 439, 522, 601
Greer, Germaine, 82
Grey, Denis, 126
Grey, William. *See* Godfrey-Smith, William
Grice, Paul, 140, 414, 415
Grieves, Vicki, 581–582
Griffith University, 300, 722–723
Griffiths, Paul, 301, 720, 745, 753, 798
Grossman, Jason, 738
Grossman, J. P., 19
Grosz, Elizabeth, 169, 172, 217, 236, 618–620, 655
Grumley, John, 171

Grünbaum, Adolf, 333–335, 341, 734
Guenther, Lisa, 662
Gunn, Alister, 215, 325
Gunn, J. Alexander, 644
Gunner, Don, 4, 112, 132

H
Hájek, Alan, 320
Hallen, Patsy, 565, 571–573
Hall, Matthew, 585
Halpin, Terrance, 682
Hamblin, Charles, 191, 222, 422, 681, 687
Hard problem of consciousness, 779–780
Harney, Maurita, 216, 339, 650
Harrison, Peter, 455
Harsanyi, John, 5
Hart, Kevin, 216
Harvey, Graham, 585
Harwood, Gwen, 118
Hazen, Allen, 219, 230, 440, 682, 684
Healy, Paul, 216
Healy, Stephen, 720
Hearnshaw, John, 764
Heart of Philosophy (events company), 316–317
Heathcote, Adrian, 218, 393
Heller, Agnes, 170
Hempel, Carl, 5
Herbst, Peter, 4, 129, 223
Hetherington, Stephen, 286
Higgins, Kathleen, 662
Higher education, 293–295
Hinckfuss, Ian, 4, 137, 220, 681
Hinduism, 461, 469
Hinton, Michael, 4, 109–111
Historical materialism, 574, 575, 577
Historical Records of Australian Science, 750
Historigraphy, 153
History and philosophy of science
  establishment as discipline, 8
  in university departments, 711–723, 764–766
History, John Anderson's view of, 77–79
History of philosophy
  in 1990s, 286
  Anderson's views on, 62–63
  feminist perspective, 234–236, 597–609
  new approaches in 1970s and 80s, 170–171
History of science
  in Australia, 748–755
  in New Zealand, 755–757
  and philosophy of science, 708–711
Hoare, Michael, 755
Hocken, A. G., 757
Hoe, Jock, 756
Hohwy, Jakob, 780, 781
Holism, 330, 336–342
Home, Roderick, 714–716, 749–750, 765
Hooft, Stan van, 216, 325
Hoogland, Frans, 583
Hooker, Cliff, 221, 287, 406, 742, 787
Hope, A. D., 67, 134, 135
Horne, Donald, 76
Hughes, George
  career, 4, 98, 107, 109, 128, 464
  medieval philosophy, 469
  modal logic, 128, 192, 464, 680, 686, 758
  philosophy of religion, 464–469
Hughes, Robert, 82, 681
Human chauvinism, 552
Humanities, 295–298
Human needs, 531
Human research ethics committees, 530
Humberstone, Lloyd, 218, 419, 429, 440, 682, 684, 687
Humility, 521
Humphries, Barry, 82
Hung, Edwin, 762
Hunt, Greg, 336
Hunt, Ian, 160, 168, 169, 217, 230, 531, 652
Hunter, T. A., 20, 26
Hursthouse, Rosalind, 228, 519–521, 624*n*35
Husserl, Edmund, 644–645
Hutchings, Patrick, 4, 109, 110, 129
Hutchison, Keith, 715, 750
Hyde, Dominic, 220, 429
Hyslop, Alec, 220, 221, 401
Hytten, Torleiv, 141

I
Idealism
  absolute idealism, 46
  in Australia, 21–24, 642
  in British philosophy, 18, 46–47
  decline, 46–48
  of Henry Laurie, 27–31
  key concerns, 22–23
  key figures in Australasia, 16
  in New Zealand, 24–27
  personal idealism, 42–43
  as precursor to Continental philosophy, 641–642
  rise of, 21–22

Identity, and constitution, 181
Identity theory, 144, 179, 182, 183
Imagery debate, 798–799
Imaginary, 606–609, 612–614, 617–619, 798
Immortality
  and dualism, 365–366
  God and freedom, 363, 367–368
  and materialism, 366–367
Impartiality, 513, 516, 517
Impossible picture, 700
Impotence thesis, 459, 460
Inclosure schema, 698
Incommensurability, 532, 732–734
Inconsistent mathematics, 682, 699, 700
Incorrigibility thesis, 380–383
Indian philosophy, 286
Indigenous people, and academic philosophy, 629–630
Indigenous philosophy(ies), 1, 212
Indigenous philosophy of religion, 447, 469
Indoctrination, 458
Induction, 196–201, 401, 402, 406, 713, 723, 726–727, 731, 760
Inductive scepticism, 401–403
Ineffability, 450, 453, 560
Infallibalism, 391
Infanticide, 228, 528
Inference, 384–385, 390, 401–404
Inference to best explanation (IBS), 760, 762
Information technology, impact on philosophical practice, 318, 319
Informed consent, 228*n*10, 530, 622
Institutional definition, 496
Instrumentalism, 744, 759, 760, 763
Instrumental value, 552
Integrity, 522, 531
Intellectual virtues, 522
Intensionality, 553–557
Intensional semantics, 419–420
Intentionality, 547, 555–557, 585
Interests, 181, 182, 202–204, 206
Intergenerational justice, 531
Internal realism, 739, 741
International Association of Bioethics, 526
International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC), 315
Interpretation
  adequational vs constructive interpretation, 487–489
  and the 'implied author', 492
  and production of theories, 490–492
  theories of, 487, 488, 490, 492, 493
Interrogative stance, towards philosophical theories, 602–603
Intrinsic value, and environmental ethics, 552, 555*n*9, 559–562, 569
In vitro fertilisation (IVF) technology, 525, 526, 624–625
Irigaray, Luce, 616–620
Irving, Michelle, 316

J
Jacka, Elizabeth, 161, 653
Jackson, A. C. ('Camo'), 4, 95, 103–105, 112, 132, 431*n*3
Jackson, Ann, 103
Jackson, Frank
  career, 211, 220–222, 683
  collaborative research, 320, 320*n*89
  on conceptual analysis, 431–432
  on conditionals, 195, 196, 430–431, 440
  critique of materialism, 232–233, 777–779
  and David Lewis, 230
  on friendship and utilitarianism, 519
  on Gettier problem, 392, 393
  on incorrigibility thesis, 382
  on intensional two-dimensionality, 400
  John Locke Lecture, 372, 431
  knowledge (Mary) argument, 212, 221, 233, 237, 243, 396–397, 777–779
  on mental causation, 247–255, 786
  metaphysics, 372, 431–432
  moral functionalism, 274, 276–277, 276*n*13, 284
  on perception, 183–184, 799
Jacobs, Struan, 722
Jaggar, Alison, 235
James, Clive, 82
James, William, 642
Janis, Alan, 734
Janis, Allen, 341
Jenkin, John, 755
Jesson, Bruce, 667
Jevons, Fred, 722
John Anderson and Family Archives, 56
John Anderson website, 56
John Locke Lectures, 372, 431, 431*n*3, 438
Johnson, Elizabeth Prior, 218, 219, 221
Johnson, Jane, 720, 754
Johnson, Lawrence, 217, 569
Johnston, Mark, 436, 440
Johnston, Ron, 721
Johnstone, Megan-Jane, 531
Jones, Gareth, 529

Jones, Henry, 23–24, 58
Jones, Karen, 522, 622, 631, 798
Joske, Bill, 112, 129, 159
Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 514, 526
Journal of Political Philosophy, 313
Joyce, James, 134
Judge, Brenda, 219
Justification, 388–389
Justificationism, 388–389, 403

K
Kamenka, Eugene, 4, 5, 82, 150, 513, 652
Kania, Andrew, 502–504
Kant, Immanuel, 362, 363, 367, 368, 481–496, 507
Kantian idealism, 22
Kearney, Richard, 222
Keller, Simon, 519, 523
Kemp, Reg, 138, 141*n*9, 142
Kemp, Suzanne, 138–140
Kemp Smith, Norman, 58
Kennett, Jeanette, 524, 532, 631
Kerridge, Ian, 528
Kesacodi-Watson, Ian, 221, 461
Khlentozos, Drew, 222, 428
Kielkopf, Charles, 194
Kim, Jaegwon, 182
Kingsbury, Justin, 502
Kirby, Vicky, 656
Kirsner, Doug, 216
Kitcher, Philip, 741, 745
Kittay, Eva, 601
Klein, Renata, 525
Kleinig, John, 217, 228
Knight, Helen, 4, 105–106
Knopfelmacher, Frank, 6, 160
Knowledge argument, 212, 221, 233, 237, 243, 777–779
Knowledge-gradualism, 394
Knowledge-how, 396–397
Knowledge-that, 396–397
Knox Theological Hall, 665
Koed, Erik, 492–493
Komesaroff, Paul, 530
Korean War, 122
Kovesi, Julius, 513
Kripke, S., 416, 428, 437, 697–698
Krips, Henry, 117, 714
Kroon, Fred, 467, 468, 684, 761
Kroy, Moshe, 221, 683
Kuhn, Thomas, 155, 342–344, 731–733, 761, 762
Kuhse, Helga, 228, 525, 527, 528, 531
Kyle, W. M., 20

L
La Caze, Marguerite, 522, 525, 607–609, 611, 657
Lakatos, Imré, 343–344, 731, 732
Lamb, Jonathan, 669
Lamb, Winifred, 462
Lamont, John, 446
Landfall (journal), 663–665
Lang, John Dunmore, 2
Langham, Ian, 720, 721, 753
Langton, Rae, 407, 524, 531, 626–627
Langtry, Bruce, 453, 460
Language. *See* Philosophy of Language
Language of thought, 243–247
La Trobe University, 2, 220–221, 299–301, 683
Laudan, Larry, 733, 750
Laurie, Henry
  background and influences, 18, 27–28
  careerm, 3
  idealism, 28–29
  moral theory, 30–31
  philosophical psychology, 20
  reputation, 27
  theory of mind, 29–30
Law cluster concepts, 339
Laws of nature, 229, 286, 357, 455, 457, 460, 743
League of Nations, 33–34
Leatherdale, William, 718, 749
Leavis, F. R., 97
Le Doeuff, Michele, 606–608, 617
Lee, Lee, 221
Legal ethics, 523
Le Grand, Homer, 714, 750, 765
Leslie, Claire, 738
Levine, Israel, 140
Levine, Michael, 265–267, 455, 522
Levy, Neil, 325, 530, 746
Lewis, C. I., 193, 689, 697
Lewis, David
  and Canberra Plan, 434
  on causality and the identity theory, 179, 180
  contextualism, 395
  criticism of Armstrong’s account of laws, 230–231

  Gavin David Young Lecture, 5
  on knowledge argument, 777
  on knowledge-gradualism, 394
  at Melbourne Semantics Group, 440
  metaphysics, 372
  at Oxford, 438
  philosophy of language, 416
  visits to Australia, 225–226, 229–230, 372, 434*n*4
Lewis, Neil, 436, 440
Liberal democracy, John Anderson's theory of, 73–75
Liberal feminism, 609–611
Liberalism, 269, 594, 595, 599, 610–612
Libertarian(s), 80
Libertarianism, 135, 139, 467
Libertarian Society, 82
Lierse, Caroline, 355, 356
Lindsay, Norman, 641
Linguistic analysis, 151–152
Literary Society (Sydney University), 56, 69
Lloyd, Genevieve
  career, 171, 172, 222, 223, 655
  Continental philosophy, 649, 655
  on equality and sexual difference, 612
  feminist philosophy, 171, 212–213, 235–236, 525, 594, 629–630
  history of philosophy, 235–236, 525, 598–599, 655
  on Irigaray's project, 617
  on race and feminist philosophy, 629–630
  on reason, 171, 211–212, 235–236, 525, 598–599, 603, 607
  on Spinoza, 604, 655
Lloyd, Natalie, 757
Lo, Norva, 580
Loff, Bebe, 520
Logic
  before 1970, 191–192
  Automated Reasoning Project, 226–228
  classical logic, 227
  conditionals, 194–196
  entailment and relevant implication, 192–194
  modal logic, 679–680, 685–688
  non-classical logics, 192–194, 227
  paraconsistent logic, 9, 212, 220, 227, 423, 429, 430, 694–701
  relevant logic, 9, 193, 212, 216, 217, 220, 224, 226–227, 684, 688–694
  status of, 151–152
  Stove's defence of rationality, 196–201
Logical correspondence principle, 345
Logical empiricism, 330
Logical positivism, 330, 332, 351
Londey, David, 4, 129, 191, 222, 454, 456, 680
Loving relationships, 518
Lowe, Ian, 723
Lowry, Robert, 666
Lucas, Adam, 722
Luck, Morgan, 460
Lucretius, 145
Lukacs, Georg, 170
Lycan, William, 182
Lycos, Kim, 171, 223, 235, 649

M
Macarthur, David, 404
MacCallum, Monica, 713
Macdonald, Cynthia, 764, 786–787
Macdonald, Graham, 764, 786–787
MacGregor, Duncan, 3, 18, 24
Mach, Ernst, 330–333, 710, 723, 724
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 463
MacKenzie, Catriona, 286, 525
Mackenzie, Hugh, 3, 18, 26
Mackie, Alwynne, 221
Mackie, J. L.
  argument from evil, 450–451, 464–465
  career, 4, 6, 8, 76, 126, 129, 140, 191, 439, 513–514
  concept of knowledge, 394
  on conditionals, 194–196
  error theory of morality, 513–514, 531–532
  on incorrigibility thesis, 381–382
  influence of John Anderson, 67, 83, 131
  moral philosophy, 513
Mackie, Margaret, 67
MacKinnon, Catharine, 625–628
Maclaurin, James, 746
MacLeod, Roy, 754
Macquarie University, 2, 216–217, 299, 300
Madison, Mark, 751
Malcolm, Norman, 94–95
Malinas, Gary, 143, 220, 418
Malpas, Jeff, 222, 301, 399, 579, 660
Mannison, Don, 220, 500
Mannix, Daniel (Catholic Archbishop), 122
Maoism, 160, 161, 167
Maori metaphysics, 362–364
Marcuse, Herbert, 150–151
Mares, Edwin, 683, 684, 687, 693
Markus, György, 165, 170–171, 217, 654–655
Marsh, Barbara, 336
Marshall, Chris, 469

Marshall, Graeme, 4, 124, 219
Martin, Brian, 721
Martin, C. B., 117, 137, 160, 161, 372
Martin, Charlie, 4, 5
Martin, Christopher, 469
Martin, Errol, 226, 227, 440, 681, 682
Martin, Leslie, 122–123
Martineau Lectures, 222
Marxism, 212, 217, 225, 638, 646, 650, 652–655, 667, 668, 673
Marxist theory, in New Zealand, 666–668
Masculinity, 235–236, 597–599, 602, 603, 606, 607, 613, 616
Maslow, Abraham, 565–566
Mason, R. A. K., 666
Massey University, 2, 216, 299
Materialism, 16, 19, 21, 29–31, 36, 176, 177, 180–181, 365–367, 376, 547, 550, 551, 553, 574, 583, 587, 786. *See also* Australian Materialism
Mathematics
  history of, 713, 746, 751
  inconsistent mathematics, 682, 699, 700
  philosophy of, 710, 713, 751, 760, 761, 763, 764
Mathews, Freya, 220, 221, 233, 568–569, 571, 575
Mautner, Tom, 223
Maxism-Leninism, 160, 161
Maxwell-Bridgman theory of the real, 347, 348
Mayo, Elton, 20
McAuley, James, 67, 76
McCalman, Janet, 717, 751
McCarthy, Gavan, 715, 750
McCloskey, John, 129, 130, 150, 220, 221, 452, 515–516, 560–561
McCloskey, Mary, 130, 219, 482, 485, 503
McColl, San, 217, 501
McCullagh, Behan, 220, 221
McCulloch, Jock, 722
McDonell, Gavan, 719
McEwen, Mary, 757
McGechie, John, 192, 682
McGovern, Gerard, 681
McIlwain, Doris, 798
McKellar Stewart, John, 3, 20, 47, 638, 641, 643, 645
McKenzie, Jim, 220, 681
McKeown-Green, Jonathan, 502, 504, 505
McLauchlan, Gordon, 756
McMahon, Jennifer, 481, 482, 485, 500
McNeill, Paul, 520
McPhee, John, 340
McRobbie, Michael, 224, 681–683, 691, 692
Meaning containment, 688, 693, 694
Meaning relationship, 688, 689
Measurement, 333, 335–337, 339
Measurement theory, 724, 725, 727–729
Medical paternalism, 530
Medicine, history of, 717, 719, 721, 749, 751, 754, 764
Medieval philosophy, 134–135, 286, 469
Medlin, Brian, 4, 117, 137, 160, 168, 217, 514, 652
Megalopsychos, 523
Mein-Smith, Philippa, 764
Melbourne Existentialist Society, 12
Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy (MSCP), 314
Melbourne Semantics Group, 439–440
Melbourne *vs.* Sydney, in 1950s, 130–133, 136–137
Memory, 776, 789, 791, 794, 799–800
Mental causation, 247–255, 776, 783, 785–787
Mental content. *See* Content
Menzies, Peter, 286, 787
Mercer, David, 721, 722
Merleau-Ponty, M., 619, 621
Merson, John, 719
Metaethics
  in Australasia, 531–532
  Canberra Plan, 271–277
  problem of morality, 274–277
  of Raimond Gaita, 278–285
Metaphysical naturalism, 256
Metaphysics
  Aboriginal metaphysics, 362–364
  and analytical philosophy, 578
  and Australian realism, 9, 374–376
  and Continental philosophy, 578
  and dualism, 366–367
  existence of God, 363–364
  freedom, 363–365
  immortality, 363, 365–368
  John Anderson's views on, 61–62, 70–71
  Maori metaphysics, 362–364
  and materialism, 366–367
  overview, 361–363
  rebirth of, 368–373
  of science, 742–743
  Scientific realism, 346–349, 355, 372, 375
  space and time, 373–374
Metascience (journal), 716*n*2, 752
Meyer, Bob, 193, 224, 226–227, 682, 683, 689–682, 695–696
Milanov, Kajica, 140

The Militant (Trotskyist paper), 65
Military ethics, 531
Miller, Barry, 456
Miller, David, 719, 720, 752–753, 765
Miller, R. A., 68
Mills, Caroline, 720
Mills, Catherine, 528, 754
Mills, John, 164
The Mind. *See also* Philosophy of mind
  content and mental causation, 247–255
  intentionality and mental causation, 242–243
  representationalism and language of thought, 243–247
Mind-body dualism, 236, 364–365, 612, 618–619
Mind-body problem
  and consciousness, 776–787
  general worries about, 785–787
Mind/matter dualism, 547
Minimum Message Length (MML), 737–738
Miracles, 446, 450, 460, 467
Mitchell, Dorothy, 220, 221
Mitchell, William
  administrative contribution, 35
  background, 18, 34–35
  career, 3, 34–35
  and current philosophy, 40–41
  philosophical influences, 38
  philosophical psychology, 20
  philosophical writing, 37
  philosophy of mind, 39–40
  reputation, 36–37
  responsibilities, 19
  view of education, 35–36
Modal logic, 679–680, 685–688
Molinism, 453, 468
Molnar, George, 4, 82, 139, 164–165
Monash Bioethics Review, 313, 514, 526
Monash University
  Centre for Human Bioethics, 213, 219, 226, 228, 526
  Philosophy department, 2, 218–219, 299–301
Monro, Hector, 126, 513
Montague, Richard, 416, 419, 420, 422
Montelle, Clemency, 756, 764
Montgomery, Hugh, 660, 661, 682, 687
Moore, Andrew, 530
Moral absolutism, 524
Moral agency, 525, 532
Moral education, 522
Moral functionalism, 274, 276–277, 276*n*13, 284
Moralism, 522
Morality, 267–269, 274–277, 282–284, 286
Moral motivation, 521, 532
Moral philosophy. *See also* Utilitarianism
  absolutism, 524
  in Australasia, 511–514
  bioethics, 526–530
  deontological approach, 523–524
  feminist approaches, 525
  metaethics, 531–532
  natural law approaches, 524–525
  virtue ethics, 519–523
Moral psychology, 532–533, 799–800
Moral relativism, 513
Moral responsibility, 528, 530
Moral theory
  in 1960s and 1970s, 207–208
  of Henry Laurie, 30–31
  of John Anderson, 63–64
  non-cognitivism, 207
  utilitarianism, 207–208
Moral understanding, 524
Morris, Thomas, 459
Morris Miller, Edmund, 19–21, 138
Mortensen, Chris, 219, 681, 682, 684, 692, 698–700
Mortley, Raoul, 217
Mowaljarlai, David, 583
Moyal, Ann, 722–723, 755
Mulgan, Tim, 517, 517*n*11
Multiple universes hypothesis, 262
Munz, Peter, 658–659
Murdoch, Dugald, 215, 763
Murdoch University, 2, 216, 299, 300
Murphy, Chris, 683
Murphy, Dominic, 721
Murray Report, 124
Musgrave, Alan, 215, 372, 388, 403, 470, 732, 741, 743, 759–760
Music. *See* Philosophy of music
Mythology, 75

N
Naess, Arne, 562–566, 570, 571
Nagasawa, Yujin, 451–454, 459–460, 776
Nanoethics (journal), 313
Nathan, Simon, 757
Naturalism
  Armstrong's view of, 180, 371
  and the design argument, 262–263

Naturalism (*cont.*)
  metaphysical naturalism, 256
  and scepticism, 405–407
  scientific realism, physicalism and atheism, 455–456
  in semantics, 425–426
Naturalistic theism, 256
Naturalist realism, 742
Natural kinds, 355–357
Natural law, 523–525
Natural properties, 230
Nature
  aesthetic appreciation of, 500, 560
  dualistic construction of, 572
  moral considerability of, 555, 559–562
  Romantics approach to, 549–550
Naulty, Reg, 460
Nazism, 513
Neander, Karen, 223, 494, 746
Necessity, 685, 689, 691
Neonatal ethics, 530
Nerlich, Graham, 4, 117, 137, 161, 219, 373
Nesbitt, Winston, 222
Neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), 780, 781
Neuroethics, 325, 529, 530, 800
Neuroethics (journal), 313
Newcastle University College, 143
New epiphenomenalism, 183, 232
New left movement, 156, 545, 666–668
Newmarch, Anne, 168
New realism, 20
New South Wales University of Technology (later University of New South Wales), 123
Newtonian forces, 347
Newtonian science, 547–548, 709–710, 724–726
New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists, 12, 469
Nicholson, Heather, 757
Nicolson, Harry, 76
Niedjie, Bill, 584
Nietzsche, F., 169, 466, 641, 661
Nocturnal doubling hypothesis, 339
Nola, Robert, 434, 468, 660–661, 667, 684, 761–763
Nomological necessity, 456
Non-classical logic, 192–194
Non-cognitivism, 207, 514, 523, 532
Nonconsequentalism, 517
Normal science, methodology of, 343, 732
Normative naturalism, 734, 741
Novitz, David, 215, 480, 481, 487, 488, 491–494, 499, 501
Nuclear deterrance, 531
Nursing, 525, 531
Nursing ethics, 531
Nussbaum, Martha, 527*n*26, 601
Nuyen, Tuan, 220

O
Oakley, Justin, 286, 518, 529, 531
Oakley, Tim, 112, 221, 388, 395, 404, 405
Objectivist theories of value, 532
Obligations of benificence, 516
O'Brien, Gerard, 782, 784, 789, 790
Oddie, Graham, 216, 468, 760–761, 764
O'Dwyer, Luciana, 216–217, 648
O'Hair, Greg, 160, 168, 217
Okin, Susan Moller, 235, 611, 611*n*24
Olding, Alan, 217, 450, 457
Oldroyd, David, 720, 751, 752, 765
O'Neill, Len, 112, 219, 436
Ontological argument, 264–265, 464
Ontology, 347, 354–357, 481, 501–504
Open Learning Australia philosophy programs, 303, 303*n*29
The Open Society (journal), 469
Opie, Jon, 782, 784, 789, 790
Oppy, Graham, 264–265, 421, 453, 457–460, 462
Oral phase, 90–91, 111
Ordinary language philosophy, 415
Organ donation, 530
Organ transplantation, 526
Orr case, 6, 81, 138–140, 158–159
Orr, Sydney Sparkes, 6, 81, 126, 129, 137–141, 158
O'Shaugnessy, Brian, 129
Otaga College, 125–6. *See also* University of Otago
Overall, Christine, 622
Oxford University
  intellectual traffic to and from Melbourne, 438–439
  philosophy of language, 437–438

P
Page, Carl, 660
Palmer, Clarence E., 711, 712
Panopticon, 512
Panpsychism, 550, 555, 556, 569, 585–587
Panter, John, 721

Pantheism, 265–267, 455, 456, 549, 552–553, 559, 585
Paraconsistent logic, 9, 212, 220, 227, 694–701
Paradoxes of strict implication, 192, 193
Pargetter, Robert, 220, 221, 287, 336, 683, 778
Partridge, Percy, 4, 67, 76, 82, 143
Pasadena Paradox, 736, 736*n*6
Pascal's Wager, 462
Passmore, John
  on aesthetic theories, 485
  on beauty, 485
  Boyer Lecture, 224
  career, 4, 6, 11, 61, 75, 82, 125–126, 143, 224
  defence of John Anderson, 131
  on environmental issues, 205–207, 233, 557–558, 558*n*10–11
  on existentialism, 645
  influence of John Anderson, 67, 76, 83
  on Ryle, 114
Pateman, Carole, 597, 599–601
Patterson, John, 216, 469
Patton, Paul, 171–172, 217, 656
Paul, George, 4, 99–100, 131
Pawson, Eric, 764
Peacocke, Christopher, 439
Pearson, C. I., 125, 470, 660
Pearson, Noel, 586
Perception, 775, 776, 785, 791–793, 800, 801
  Armstrong vs Jackson, 183–188, 799
  classical theories, 185
  as knowledge, 383–384, 387, 397, 398, 401
Perfect being, 453, 459, 460
Perrett, Roy, 286, 468, 469, 502
Personal idealism, 42–43
Personality, 20, 23, 24, 30, 33, 43–46
Perszyk, Ken, 465, 467–468
Pessimistic meta-induction, 741
Pettigrove, Glen, 468
Pettit, Phillip
  applied ethics, 267
  career, 223, 230, 287
  on consequentialism, 517
  on knowledge argument, 778
  on mental causation, 786
  moral functionalism, 276
  on paradox of rule-following, 428–429
  publications in 2000s, 325
Pflaum, Kazimierz Bernard, 659–660, 660*n*41
Phenomenology, 638, 654, 657, 658, 662, 670, 672
  and existentialism, 644–652
Philanthropic love, 523, 524
Phillips, Ross, 221, 681–683
'Philosopher's Zone' (radio program), 317
Philosophical associations, 11–12
Philosophical counselling, 317
Philosophical imaginary, 606–609
Philosophical practice, changes in the 2000s, 318–320
Philosophical theology, 463, 646
Philosophy. *See also* Australasian philosophy
  cosmopolitan vs regional, 176
  and psychology, 19–20, 125
  and radical action, 156–158
  task of, 151–153, 156
Philosophy and Literature (journal), 313
Philosophy Cafes, 316–317, 317*n*80
Philosophy for Children Association of New Zealand, 315
Philosophy for children movement, 315
Philosophy for School Association of New South Wales, 315
Philosophy in schools, 314–316
Philosophy of biology, 745–746, 797
Philosophy of emotion, 798
Philosophy of language
  in 1960s, 152
  anti-realist tendencies, 426–429
  Davidsonian revolution, 418–419
  early influences, 417–418
  intensional semantics, 419–420
  language and analytical philosophy, 414–416
  language and vagueness, 429–430
  Melbourne Semantics Group, 439–440
  naturalising semantics, 426–427
  ordinary language philosophy, 415
  at Oxford, 437–439
  return of conceptual analysis, 430–435
  at University of Melbourne, 436–439
Philosophy of mathematics, 710, 713, 751, 760, 761, 763, 764
Philosophy of mind. *See also* Australian Materialism; Cognitive science; The Mind
  agency and the will, 800
  consciousness and the mind-body problem, 776–787
  explaining consciousness, 780–785
  folk psychology, 796
  hard problem of consciousness, 779–780
  Jackson's critique of materialism, 232–233
  Jackson's knowledge argument, 212, 221, 232–233, 237, 243, 396–397, 777–779

Philosophy of mind (*cont.*)
  memory, 799–800
  philosophy of dreaming, 799
  philosophy of emotion, 798
  philosophy of psychiatry, 797–798
  since 1980, 774–776
  term ‘cognition,’ 775–776
  term ‘mind,’ 775
  theory of mind, 797
  of William Mitchell, 39–40
Philosophy of music, 501–505
Philosophy of physics, 758, 763
Philosophy of psychiatry, 797–798
Philosophy of psychology, 764
Philosophy of religion
  arguing for theism, 456–459, 467
  Argument from Evil, 450–453, 467–468
  atheism after Anderson, 450–452
  atonement, 460
  in Australia, 446–453
  Buddhism, 461
  contemporary scence, 462–463
  cosmological argument, 456–457
  design argument, 261–263, 457–458
  Eucken’s influence on W. R. Boyce Gibson, 447–448
  faith and reason, 461–462
  Hinduism, 461, 469
  the Incarnation, 460, 466
  indigenous philosophy of religion, 447
  ineffability thesis, 450
  John Anderson and philosophical atheism, 448–449
  miracles, 460, 467
  mystical and religious experience, 460
  in New Zealand, 463–470
  ontological argument, 458–459, 464
  Oppy and ontological arguments, 264–265
  pantheism, 265–267
  problem of evil, 452–455
  scientific realism, physicalism, naturalism and atheism, 455–456
  scientific theism, 256–259
  survival of death, 460
  taking religion literally, 450
  testimony, 460
  the Trinity, 460, 466
  Wynn and the design argument, 261–263
Philosophy of science
  in 1990s, 286–287
  in Australia, 723–748
  conventionalism, 331–335, 723–726
  from conventionalism to holism, 336–342
  ethics of science, 746–748
  and history of science, 708–711
  induction, 196–201, 726–727, 760
  measurement theory, 727–729
  metaphysics of science, 742–743
  in New Zealand, 757–764
  philosophy of biology, 745–746
  probability, 735–736
  quantum mechanics, 743–745
  scientific epistemology, 342–346
  scientific metaphysics, 350–357
  scientific methodology, 730–734
  scientific realism, 346–349, 729–730, 739–742, 760
  simultaneity problem, 734–735
  statistics, 736–739
Philosophy Tours, 317
Phoenix (literary magazine), 66
Phronesis, 520, 521
Physicalism, 271, 347, 354, 452, 455–456
Physics, philosophy of, 758, 763
Pictures, 480, 486, 487, 490, 491, 493–495
Pinkerton, Ray, 220
Pisan, Christine de, 604
Pitts, Walter, 788
Place, 447, 461, 465, 470, 471, 579, 584
Place, U. T., 5, 117, 137, 143–144, 179
Planck, Max, 329
Plantinga, A., 451, 452, 467
Plato, 278, 281, 709
Pleasure, and experience of beauty, 482–484
Plumwood (formerly Routley), Val
  career, 6, 681
  crocodile attack, 234
  ecofeminism, 95, 572, 574
  environmental ethics, 206, 234, 551–558, 579
  feminist ethics, 525
  intensionality, 553–555
  intentionality, 555–557
  paraconsistent logic, 695
  philosophical animism, 585
  publications, 217
  relevant logics, 193, 690
  on sex/gender distinction, 613
Plunkett Centre for Ethics in Healthcare, 228, 267, 528
Plural values, 521
Pogge, Thomas, 529
Poincaré, Henri, 330, 331, 710, 723, 724
Police ethics, 531
Political philosophy
  of John Anderson, 57, 65–66, 73–75, 80, 84

  in the postwar period, 150–151
Pols, Hans, 754
Poole, Ross, 217
Popper, Karl
  career, 154*n*3, 197, 658
  critical rationalism, 388
  falsificationism, 197, 330, 332, 731
  in New Zealand, 4, 126–127, 372, 658–659, 758–759
  poem about, 82
  scientific methodology, 154, 225, 342–344, 730–731
  social philosophy, 658
  on verisimilitude, 197–198
Pornography, 625–627
Positivism, 62, 84, 332, 638, 640, 659, 660
Possible worlds, 230–231, 345–346, 352
Post-Continental philosophy, 640, 657, 671
Postmoderism, 668, 669
Poststructuralism, 638, 650–657, 659, 663, 668–670
Potentiality, 528
Pottage, John, 713, 751
Practical ethics. *See* Applied ethics
Pragmatism, 512, 513, 527
Pratt, Andy, 764
Pratt, Douglas, 465, 466, 469
Prebirth testing, 529–530
Preference, 514, 517, 528
Preference utilitarianism, 207–208, 514
Presley, C. F., 5, 117, 143, 680
Price, Huw, 172, 386, 426–427, 744–745
Priest, Graham
  career, 8, 220, 310, 682, 684, 692
  design argument, 458
  modal logic, 230, 687
  paraconsistent logic, 696–698
  philosophy of language and logic, 286, 424
  publications in 2000s, 325–326
  relevant logic, 693
Priestly, Rebecca, 757
Primoratz, Igor, 531
Principle of sufficient reason, 457
Prior, Arthur N., 4, 127–128, 191, 373, 464, 679–680, 684, 685
Prior, Mary, 127
Probabilism, 197
Probability, 735–736
Probability calculus, 345, 354
Process perspective, 576–577
Procreative beneficence, 529
Professional ethics, 531
Professional integrity, 531
Properties, categorical and dispositional, 355–356
Property realism, 742, 743
Propositional attitude, 185, 186
Propositional calculus, 345
Proudfoot, Diane, 764
Prudentia (journal), 468
Psillos, Stathis, 741
Psychiatry, 797–798
Psychic disharmony, 518
Psychology
  and philosophy, 19–20, 125
  philosophy of, 764
Psychopathy, 532
Public ethics, in 1990s, 269–271
Public philosophers, 527
Public/private distinction, 610
Punishment, 515
Purdy, Laura, 622, 623
Putnam, Hilary, 5, 161, 339, 740

Q
Quaife, Barzillai, 2, 16–17
Quantum mechanics, 714, 743–745, 751
Queensland Association for Philosophy in Schools (QAPS), 315
Quine, W. V., 5, 152, 334, 338, 372, 405–406, 414, 438

R
Race, and feminist philosophy, 628–630
Radicalism, 151, 164, 166, 168, 170, 173
Radical movements of 1960s, 155–158
Radical scepticism, 403–404
Rae, Ian, 755
Rae, Murray, 665
Railton, Peter, 518
Raphael, D. D., 125
Rasmussen, Nicolas, 716*n*2, 720, 765
Rational belief systems, 353
Rational ideas, 485–486
Rationalist Society of Australia, 12
Rationality, Stove's defence, 196–201
Raven, Jessie, 5
Realism. *See also* Scientific realism
  Armstrong's view of, 180
  John Anderson's understanding of, 61–62, 77
  and scepticism, 406–407
Reason
  and faith, 461–462

Reason (*cont.*)
  male and female, 171, 211–212, 235–236, 525, 598–599, 603, 607
Redding, Paul, 171, 286, 798
Red Papers for New Zealand (journal), 668
Reeves, Alan, 681
Reference, theories of, 761
Regional philosophies, 176
Reichenbach, Hans, 34, 331, 334, 339, 723, 735
Reinhardt, Lloyd, 165, 172, 218
Relational deity, 466
Relativism, 59, 60, 63–65, 69, 70, 86, 153, 329, 341
Relevance condition, 688, 692
Relevant logic, 8, 9, 193, 212, 216, 217, 220, 224, 226–227, 684, 688–694
Reliabilism, 389–391
Religion, 7, 56, 63–65. *See also* Philosophy of religion
  and education, 74
  John Anderson's criticisms of, 73–74, 79–82
  and morality, 468
  and science, 466
Remorse, 520, 524
Rennie, Malcolm, 192, 420–421, 681, 682
Representation, 243–247, 253–255, 481, 484–491, 500–502
Representative theory of perception, 187
Reproductive ethics, 525, 526, 529–530, 622–625
Research ethics, 530
Research grants
  Discovery Project scheme, 306–307
  Federation Fellowship scheme, 308
  Linkage Project scheme, 307
Resemblance TCDs, 790
Resemblance Thesis, 199–200
Respectfulness, 531
Res Publica (e-journal), 313, 514
Restall, Greg, 287, 325, 683–684, 688, 693
Rex, Helmut, 664–665
Reynolds, Mark, 687, 688
Rhees, Ruch, 97–98
Rice, Vernon, 130, 219
Richards, Evelleen, 721, 722, 753, 765
Richards, Tom, 220, 221, 682, 683
Rickles, Dean, 721, 754
Ridley, Aaron, 503
Riemannian conventions, 333
Rigby, Kate, 579–580, 586
Rights, 513, 516, 517, 520, 521, 523, 528, 532
Ritchie, Alec, 143
Ritchie, A. M., 646
Roberts, Lesley, 684
Robins, Rosemary, 716–717
Robinson, Denis, 214, 439, 440
Robotics, 791–792
Roeper, Peter, 223, 682
Rogers, Wendy, 530, 625*n*36
Rollins, Calvin, 129
Romanticism, 546–550, 579–580, 586–587
Ronayne, Jarlath, 719, 722
Rorty, Richard, 353
Rose, Deborah, 579, 580, 583, 585
Rose, Tom, 75, 76
Routley, Richard. *See* Sylvan (né Routley), Richard
Routley, Val. *See* Plumwood, Val
Routley-Meyer semantics, 690–692
Routley Star, 690, 695
Rowland, Robin, 525
Royce, Josiah, 642
Rule utilitarianism, 515
Rundle, Bede, 124
Russell, Bertrand, 121–122
Russell, Daniel, 520
Russell, Denise, 166, 172, 217, 580
Russell, Luke, 524
Russell, Matheson, 662
Russell, Stewart, 721, 722
Ryle, Gilbert, 4, 82, 113–114, 137

S
Salleh, Ariel, 573–574, 577
Salmon, Wesley, 341, 734
Salmond, C. F., 20, 26
Salmond, William, 3, 18, 25
Sanctity-of-human-life, 527
Sankey, Howard, 717, 733–734, 741–742
Sapp, Jan, 751
Sapp, Julian, 716
Satisfaction, 514, 517
Satisficing, 521
Saunders, Alan, 317
Savulescu, Julian, 529
Sceptical theist, 453
Scepticism
  about epistemology, 407–408
  inductive scepticism, 401–403
  knowledge of other minds, 400–401
  and naturalism, 406–407

  radical scepticism, 403–404
  and realism, 406–407
  sceptical arguments, 404–405
Schlesinger, George, 334, 335, 337, 452
Schools, teaching of philosophy, 314–316
Schrödinger's waves, 743–744
Schroeter, Francois, 532
Schüklenk, Udo, 530
Schuster, John, 720–722, 753
Science
  ethics of, 746–748
  sociology of, 721, 752
Scientific entities, 729, 749
Scientific epistemology, 342–346, 742, 763
Scientific essentialism, 743
Scientific metaphysics, 350–357
Scientific method, 154, 225, 342–344, 611–613, 715, 730–734, 761, 763
Scientific realism
  and philosophy of science, 346–349, 355, 372, 375, 729–730, 739–742, 759–760
  physicalism, naturalism and atheism, 455–456
Scientific revolution(s), 343, 709, 714, 720, 731, 732, 739, 754
Scientific theism, 256–259
Scientism, 659
Scottish philosophy, 18–19
Scriven, Michael, 4
Secondary schools, teaching of philosophy, 314–316
Seddon, George, 719
Segerberg, Krister, 214, 661, 682, 687
The Self, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 32, 43–47
Self-knowledge, 398–401, 787
Selgelid, 746, 747
Seligman, Jeremy, 684
Semantics
  anti-realist semantics, 426–429
  intensional semantics, 419–420
Sense data, 180, 186–188
Sex/gender distinction, 594, 612–616
Sexual difference
  and equality, 609–612
  ethics of, 620, 621
  and feminist philosophy, 616–620
Sexual harassment, 627–628
Sexual revolution, 155, 158
Shaw, Jay, 215, 325
Shortland, Michael, 716*n*2, 720, 753
Sidgwick, Henry, 512*n*3, 515
Sievers, Ken, 217
Silver, Elizabeth, 739
Simmons, Laurence, 660
Simpson, Paul, 222
Simultaneity, 335, 336, 339–342, 734–735
Sinclair, Keith, 125
Singer, Peter
  on animal liberation, 202–205, 558–559
  applied ethics, 527–528
  bioethics, 228, 526–528
  on environmental issues, 206, 207
  on infanticide, 528
  intellectual tough-mindedness, 528
  on living the ethical life, 270–271
  Martineau Lecture, 222
  at Monash, 219
  philosophy of biology, 746
  preference utilitarianism, 207–208, 516
  publications in 2000s, 325
  as public philosopher, 527
  reputation, 527
Slaney, John, 682, 683, 692, 699
Slater, Hartley, 220, 481–482, 682
Slezak, Peter, 719, 752, 774, 798
Slote, Michael, 522*n*16
Small, Robin, 649, 651
Smart, J. J. C. ('Jack')
  at Adelaide, 137, 191
  behaviourism, 116
  B. Phil at Oxford, 113–114, 116
  career, 3, 4, 683
  conception of philosophy, 137
  contribution to Australian philosophy, 116–117
  Gavin David Young Lecture, 5
  on John Anderson, 131
  linguistic analysis, 417–418
  metaphysics, 372, 417
  on metaphysics and science, 116
  philosophy of biology, 745
  at Research School of Social Sciences (ANU), 223
  on scientific plausibility, 180
  on scientific realism, 346–347, 372, 729, 730, 740
  utilitarianism, 514–515
Smith, Michael, 230, 274–277, 284, 440, 517*n*9, 532
Social contract theory, 599–601
Social Darwinism, 23, 25, 753
Social ecologists, 574, 575
Social theory, 717
Society for Women in Philosophy, 166
Sociology of science, 721, 752

Socrates, 278–282, 389
Solomon, Robert, 533, 647, 660, 662
Somerville, Oliver, 76
Sophia (journal), 313, 462–463
Sorel, Georges, 65
South Australian Association for Philosophy in the Classroom, 315
Southern Cross Centre for Ethics, 228, 267
Space, 364, 370, 371, 373–374
Space-Time, 56, 59, 60, 70–72, 373–384, 723, 724, 763
Sparrow, Rob, 529, 531
Special Theory of Relativity (STR), 329, 335, 340, 341, 724
Speciesism, 202
Speech act theory, 401
Spencer, Baldwin, 447
Split-brain data, 784
Splitter, Lawrence, 223
Spriggs, Merle, 530
Srzednicki, Jan, 130, 219
Staeuble, Irmingard, 165
Staines, Phillip, 681
Stainsby, Harry, 129
Stalnaker, Robert, 345
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 320
Statistics, 715, 717, 727, 736–739, 750
Stenhouse, John, 756
Sterelny, Kim, 215, 243–247, 325, 683, 744
Stich, Stephen, 387
St. James Ethics Centre, 267
Stocker, Michael, 164, 220, 221, 517–518, 522, 532
Stoic ethic, 522
Stokes, Terry, 722
Stoljar, Daniel, 778, 780
Stoljar, Natalie, 525, 612
Stone paradox, 451
Stoop, Annette (later Baier), 125, 126
Stotz, Karola, 745
Stout, Alan, 68, 76, 131, 160
Stove, David
  conservatism, 154
  on the cosmological argument, 448
  critique of Popper, 197
  defence of rationality, 196–201
  foundationalist stance, 154–155, 169, 170
  on induction and rationality, 402
  influence of Anderson, 4, 76, 83
St Petersburg Paradox, 736, 736*n*6
Strachan, Ronald, 755
Strawson, Peter, 414
Stump, Eleonore, 468
St Vincent's Bioethics Centre, 528
Subordination, 600, 601, 626
Substructural logic, 686, 688, 689
Suchting, Wal, 161, 163*n*8, 166, 217, 653
Supervenience, 214, 218, 231, 249, 255, 273, 499, 743
Surma, Stan, 682, 684
Surrogacy, 622–623
Survival of death, 460
Sutich, Anthony, 565–566
Swanton, Christine, 214, 287, 521–522, 627–628
Swinburne, Richard, 457
Swinburne Institute of Technology, 2, 216, 300
Sydney Push, 82
Sylvan (né Routley), Richard
  Automated Reasoning Project, 226–228, 683
  career, 6, 110, 191, 192, 223–224, 680, 681, 683
  contribution to Australasian philosophy, 423, 685, 693
  death, 693
  on deep ecology, 570, 571
  environmental ethics, 205–207, 551–558, 570, 571
  intensionality, 419–420, 423, 458–459, 553–557
  MA thesis, 124
  modal logic, 687
  name change, 223–224, 693
  paraconsistent logic, 695–696, 698
  on regional philosophies, 176
  relevant logics, 193, 684–685, 689–693
  sociative logics, 688
  student years, 4
Sympathy, 522, 524
Synergy, 569, 575
Systems theory, 568

T
Tanaka, Koji, 684
Tanner, Edwin, 142
Tapper, Marion, 219–220, 610–611, 648
Tarrant, Harold, 287
Tavinor, Grant, 500
Taylor, A. E., 58
Taylor, Barry, 219, 374, 418, 428, 437, 439, 440, 682
Taylor, Craig, 522
Taylor, Dan, 4, 126
Taylor, Gwen, 130

Tee, Gary, 756
Teleological TCDs, 790
Temperance, 522
Ten, C. L., 219
Terrorism, 531
Testimony, 397–398, 460
Theism, 256–265, 456–460, 467
Theodicy, 453, 454, 457, 458
Theological non-realism, 465
Theory of mind, 29–30
Thesis Eleven (journal), 225
Thiel, Udo, 287
Thistlewaite, Paul, 224, 681
Thom, Paul, 171, 223, 481, 487–488, 502, 504, 505, 682
Thomas, David Lloyd, 129
Thomason, Neil, 717, 746
Thompson, Janna, 220, 221, 233–234, 531, 559
Thomson, Colin, 530
Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 623
Thornton, Jim, 465–467
Thornton, John ('Jack'), 718, 729, 749
Thun, Manfred von, 683
Tichý, Pavel, 197–198, 215, 216, 421–422, 683, 760–761
Time, 362–364, 369–372, 374
Time's arrow, 744
Tobin, Bernadette, 267, 522*n*17, 528
Tobin, William, 764
Tollefsen, Deb, 501
Tomorrow (magazine), 666–667
Tonti-Filippini, Nicholas, 528
Tooley, Michael, 220, 223, 228, 229, 452, 455, 528, 528*n*28
Totalitarianism, 150
Toulmin, Stephen, 4, 96, 106, 749
Townsend, Aubrey, 218
Traditionalism, 153–154
Tragic dilemmas, 520
Trakakis, Nick, 453, 459–461, 579
Trengove, Leonard, 712, 713
Tropes, 231, 287
Trotskyism, 56, 65
Trotskyist Workers Party, 65
Trust, 522, 525
Truth, 382, 384–386, 389, 390, 392–394, 396, 397, 403, 405
  as epistemic rightness, 353–354, 386
  metaphysical theory, 332, 350, 351, 454
  nature of, 385–386
  pragmatist theory, 450
  as a semantic relationship, 353
  Tarski's theory, 415–416, 437
Truthlikeness, 761
Truthmaker theory, 354, 743
Turing, Alan, 788
Turnbull, David, 722
Tweedale, Martin, 214
Two-dimensionalism, 274, 274*n*11, 430, 434–435

U
Unconditional respect, 524
Unger, Peter, 392
Ungunmerr-Baumann, Miriam-Rose, 583
Uniacke, Suzanne, 531, 624–625
Unity of consciousness, 784–785
Universals, 182, 229–231
Universities in Australasia
  in the 1950s, 122–124
  academic salaries, 129
  establishment in major cities, 2
  expansion since 1950s, 2
  expenditure and funding, 293–294
  humanities, 295–298
  mergers, 213
  partnerships with international universities, 320
  performance management systems, 295
  reforms in 1980s, 213, 231
  research grants, 306–310
  research quality measurement, 294–295
  standards in New Zealand universities, 124
Universities in Australasia: Philosophy departments
  higher degree candidates, 305–306
  honours degrees, 323
  movement of philosophers between Australia and New Zealand, 128–129
  philosophy departments in the 1950s, 121–146
  philosophy majors, 321–323
  philosophy rankings, 13, 309–310, 309*n*46, 309*n*47, 309*n*48
  postgraduate coursework degrees, 323
  staff numbers, 213–214, 216, 293
  staff-student ratios, 294, 294*n*8
  subject offerings, 321–323
  undergraduate teaching programs, 302–305
University College of the Gold Coast (Ghana), 4
University of Adelaide, 2, 5, 137, 143–144, 219, 299, 300
University of Auckland, 2, 5, 214, 299–301, 659–663, 761–763

University of Canterbury, 2, 215–216, 299, 763–764
University of Lincoln, 2
University of Melbourne
  Australian Science and Technology Heritage Centre, 715, 750
  Centre for Philosophy and Public Issues, 531
  Department of History and Philosophy of Science, 131, 711–717
  Philosophy department
    in 1950s, 5, 129
    in 1980s, 219–220
    foundation, 2
    philosophy of language, 436–439
    staff numbers, 299–301
    Wittgensteinianism, 98–102, 132, 436
University of Newcastle, 2, 123, 221, 299, 300
University of New England, 2, 143, 222, 299, 300
University of New South Wales, 2, 123, 143, 222, 299, 300, 718–720
University of New Zealand, 123
University of Notre Dame, 2, 299
University of Otago
  Bioethics Centre, 228, 529
  Philosophy department, 2, 215, 299, 300, 759–761
University of Queensland, 2, 143, 196, 220, 299, 300
University of South Australia, 2
University of Sydney
  Centre for Values, Ethics and Law in Medicine, 528
  Department of General Philosophy
    in 1980s, 217–218
    Althusserianism, 163–164
    critique of empiricism, 163
    in early years, 162–165
    end of participatory democracy, 165
    establishment, 162, 653
    European philosophy, 171–172
    orientation, 654
    reunification, 172–173
    staff turnover, 164–165, 217
  Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy
    in 1980s, 217, 218
    establishment, 162, 653
    reunification, 172–173
  Philosophy department
    in 1950s, 5, 129
    foundation, 2
    history and philosophy of science, 720–721
    Knopfelmacher dispute, 6, 159–160
    reunification, 172–173
    split, 7, 96, 160–162, 653–655
    staff numbers, 299, 300
  School of Philosophy, 162
University of Tasmania
  Philosophy department
    in 1950s, 138–142
    in 1980s, 222
    ban on philosophy chair, 6, 138, 158, 159
    foundation, 2
    Orr case, 138–140, 159–160
    staff numbers, 299, 300
  Royal Commission into running of university, 81, 159
University of Waikato, 2, 215, 299, 300
University of Western Australia, 2, 5, 129, 220, 299–301
University of Wollongong, 2, 222–223, 299, 300, 721–722
Utilitarianism
  act utilitarianism, 514–516
  and alienation, 503–504
  in Australasia, 512–513
  classical utilitarianism, 208
  and consequentialism, 9, 514–519
  Goodin's view of, 269–270
  preference utilitarianism, 207–208, 516
  rule utilitarianism, 515
  during 1960s and 1970s, 107–111

V

Vagueness, 529–530
Vallance, Thomas, 755
Value theory, 532
Van Den Hoven, Jeroen, 524
Vasselu, Cathryn, 656
Vehicle theory of consciousness, 782
Verificationism, 330, 332
Verisimilitude, 197–198, 760
Verran, Helen, 716
Vices, 520, 522, 531, 532
Victoria College (Wellington), 128
Victorian Association for Philosophy in Schools, 315
Victoria University of Wellington, 2, 124, 299, 300
Vienna Circle, 102, 330, 332, 710, 724
Vietnam War, 156, 168, 652–653

Vindication, 198
Virtual environments for learning, 318–319
Virtue(s), 512, 517, 519–521, 531, 532
Virtue ethics, 287, 519–523, 531
Vitalism, 642–644
Vlach, Frank, 222
Von Thus, Manfred, 221

W
Waldron, Jeremy, 215*n*8
Walker, Michelle, 220
Walker, Ruth, 4, 67, 74–76, 82–83, 469
Wallace, Chris, 737–738
Walley, Peter, 738
Warren, Mary Ann, 528*n*28, 623
Weakness of will, 532
Weatherson, Brian, 393, 395
Webb, Barbara, 791–792
Weiler, Gershon, 394
Whewell, William, 709, 710
Wicks, Robert, 325, 468, 482–484, 662
Wiesenfeld, Gerhard, 751
Wilkins, John, 746
Wilkinson, Dominic, 530
Wilkinson, Martin, 530
William James Lectures, 439
Williams, Bernard, 517
Williamson, Timothy, 393
Wilson, Elizabeth A., 656, 788
Wilson, Jim, 127
Wilson, Robert, 793, 795
Wisdom, John, 93–94, 109, 110
Witheford, Hubert, 663
Wittgenstein, L.
    anti-woman attitude, 98
    on his own influence, 92–94
    influence at Cambridge, 91–98
    influence at Oxford, 113–117
    influence in Melbourne, 98–102, 132, 436
    influence in New Zealand, 107–111
    influence on his students' students, 111–112
    lectures and lecturing style, 93–95
    obituary, 95
    poem by Gwen Harwood, 118
    on role of philosopher, 98
    role of students in spreading his ideas, 90–91
    during Second World War, 91–92
Wolfe, Charles, 721, 754
Wolfendale, Jessica, 531
Women
    participation in philosophy profession, 298*n*21
    underrepresentation in Australian philosophy, 96, 596
Women in Philosophy (WiP), 315
Women in Philosophy conferences, 225, 226, 525, 596, 597
Women in Philosophy movement, 225
Woolstonecraft, Mary, 604–605
The Workers Weekly, 65
Wright, Georg Henrik von, 92–93
Wright, John, 287
Wynn, Mark, 259–263, 458

Y
Yeo, Richard, 723, 754
Young, Julian, 214, 325, 466, 661–662
Young, Robert, 221, 460, 530

Z
Zion, Deborah, 530
Zyl, Liezl van, 523, 531