Chapter 8
Three Types of Heterotropic Intentionality. A Taxonomy in Social Ontology

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Abstract I will focus on the phenomenon of heterotropic intentionality, on its role in the creation of social reality and on its relation to social ontology. I will argue *five theses* on heterotropic intentionality: (i) the heterotropism thesis identifies a great divide within the vast domain of intentional phenomena: solitary ones (which need just one individual in order to exist) *vs*. heterotropic ones (which need at least two individuals in order to exist); (ii) the three-types-of-heterotropic-intentionality thesis maintains that there are at least three types of heterotropic intentionality: collective, intersubjective and social intentionality; (iii) the three-modes-of-intersubjective-and-collective-intentionality thesis claims that, like solitary or individual intentionality, collective and social intentionality also involve different modes of intentionality: practical, affective and cognitive; (iv) the sub-personal-and-personal-level thesis maintains that collective and intersubjective intentionality are both sub-personal and personal intentionality, while social intentionality is always a personal intentionality; (v) the ontological-efficacy thesis claims that all three types of heterotropic intentionality create social entities, and that social entities are ontologically dependent on heterotropic intentionality, and not on solitary or individual intentionality. Moreover, I will integrate my theses by putting forward a taxonomy which points out the family resemblances and the strong diversities of these types of heterotropic intentionality.

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1 Introduction

1.1 On the Expression "Heterotropic Intentionality"

"Heterotropic" is a neologism composed of two ancient Greek words: the more familiar "*héteros*" which means "*other/another* [*autrui*, *fremd*, *altro*]" and the less familiar "*trépō* which means *turn towards* [*se tourner vers*, *sich wenden an*, *rivolgersi a*]".[1]

"Heterotropic intentionality" refers to intentional states, acts and actions, which are in some way turned towards other subjects and which also need other subjects to exist. Examples for this are collective intentions, acts of empathy, social/speech acts like promising or commanding. They are all turned towards other subjects in order to be performed. Thus, in a larger sense, by "heterotropic intentionality" I mean each type of intentionality which involves at least two subjects.

1.2 On the Idea, Theses and Taxonomy of This Paper

The basic idea grounding my chapter is that the intentionality types which inhabit our social and institutional world and play a constitutive role in it include more than—the most famous—type of collective intentionality. I claim that collective, intersubjective and social intentionality are all intentionality types we experience and perform in our social and institutional everyday lives.

A lot of work has been done in analyzing collective intentionality and explaining its role in the creation of social reality and its relation to social ontology.[2] In contrast, much less effort has been spent on the analysis and explanation of intersubjective

[1]I would like to be precise that the adjective "heterotropic" and the noun "heterotropism" are neologisms born in the philosophy of law and social ontology group of the Universities of Pavia and Milan (members of the group are: Amedeo Giovanni Conte, Giampaolo Azzoni, Paolo Di Lucia, Giuseppe Lorini, Lorenzo Passerini Glazel, Stefano Colloca, Francesca De Vecchi and others). "Heterotropic" and "heterotropism" are "variations on the theme" of "nomotropic" and "nomotropism", which are neologisms by A.G. Conte and P. Di Lucia, and which are, in their turn, "variations on the theme" of "heliotropic" and "heliotropism". "Heliotropic" and "heliotropism" are constituted by the ancient Greek words "*hēlios*" [*sun*] and "*trépō*" [*turn towards*] (think of heliotropic plants such as sunflowers). "Nomotropic" and "nomotropism" are composed by the ancient Greek words "*nomos*" [*rule*] and "*trépō*" [*turn towards*]. "Nomotropism" means an acting which is in some way turned towards rules and implies ontological dependence on rules (nomotropism is not conformity to rules; the cardsharper is an example of nomotropic acting), see Conte (2000) and Di Lucia (2002). Similarly, "heterotropism" means turning towards other subjects and implies ontological dependence on other subjects (see also De Vecchi and Passerini 2012).

[2]See the works of Searle (1990, 1995, 2010), Tuomela and Miller (1988), Tuomela (2007), Bratman (1992), and Gilbert (2002), among others.

and social intentionality. A main reason for this might be the tendency in the social ontology debate to subsume the phenomena and the meanings of "intersubjective intentionality" and "social intentionality" under the phenomenon and the meaning of "collective intentionality".

Moreover, in the domains of philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and neurosciences we frequently find the expression "social cognition" referring to both, phenomena of intersubjective and of collective intentionality. In other terms, there is some confusion regarding these different intentional phenomena.

Starting from this philosophical picture and its *lacunae*, I intend to focus in this chapter on the distinction of collective, intersubjective and social intentionality as three types of heterotropic intentionality, and to shed light on the nature, the "family resemblances" and the strong diversities of these three types, as well as on their role in the construction of social reality.

From this perspective, I will argue five theses on heterotropic intentionality and also present a taxonomy of heterotropic intentionality. I will defend my theses both through phenomenological and conceptual arguments. The five theses are the following:

(i) The heterotropism thesis.
(ii) The three-types-of-heterotropic-intentionality thesis.
(iii) The three-kinds-of-collective-and-intersubjective-intentionality thesis.
(iv) The sub-personal-and-personal-level thesis.
(v) The ontological-efficacy thesis.

The heterotropism thesis identifies a great divide within the vast domain of intentional phenomena: solitary ones *vs.* heterotropic ones; in contrast to solitary intentional phenomena, heterotropic intentional phenomena relate to and ontologically depend on at least two individuals.

The three-types-of-heterotropic-intentionality thesis maintains that there are at least three types of heterotropic intentionality—collective, intersubjective and social intentionality—, i.e. three intentionality types which depend on and relate to at least two individuals.

The three-kinds-of-intersubjective-and-collective-intentionality thesis claims that, like solitary intentionality, collective and social intentionality also involve different kinds of intentionality: practical, affective and cognitive.

The sub-personal-and-personal-level thesis argues that collective and intersubjective intentionality can be both on a sub-personal and a personal level, whereas social intentionality is always on a personal level.

The ontological-efficacy thesis claims that all three types of heterotropic intentionality create social entities, even if each of them creates social entities of different kinds. Social entities ontologically depend on heterotropic intentionality; contrary to what many philosophers in social ontology traditionally assume, they do not depend on solitary intentionality.[3]

[3]See, among others, Searle (1995, 2010), Thomasson (2003), and Ferraris (2009). More precisely, Searle maintains that social and institutional facts depend on collective intentionality, but according

My taxonomy will bring into focus 12 distinctions, based on phenomenological data and on phenomenological contributions to collective, intersubjective and social intentionality and to social ontology.[4] The 12 distinctions are the following:

(i) Solitary intentionality *vs.* heterotropic intentionality.
(ii) Collective intentionality *vs*. intersubjective intentionality.
(iii) Collective intentionality *vs.* social intentionality.
(iv) Intersubjective intentionality *vs.* social intentionality.
(v) Social acts *vs.* heteroscopic states, acts and actions.
(vi) Cognitive *vs*. practical *vs.* affective collective intentionality.
(vii) Cognitive *vs.* affective *vs*. practical intersubjective intentionality.
(viii) Affective collective intentionality *vs.* affective intersubjective intentionality.
(ix) Practical collective intentionality *vs.* practical intersubjective intentionality.
(x) Sub-personal cognitive collective intentionality *vs.* personal cognitive collective intentionality.
(xi) Sub-personal intersubjective intentionality *vs.* personal intersubjective intentionality.
(xii) Social entities created by social intentionality *vs.* social entities created by collective intentionality *vs.* social entities created by intersubjective intentionality.[5]

2 The Heterotropism Thesis: Heterotropic Intentionality *vs.* Solitary Intentionality

The fundamental idea which grounds the concept of "heterotropic intentionality" is that we may divide the *vast domain of all intentional mental states, all intentional acts and actions* into two classes:

(i) The *solitary intentionality* class.
(ii) The *heterotropic intentionality* class.

to Searle collective intentionality can also be the intentionality of a very solitary brain in a vat. About Searle's individualism, see infra, footnotes 6, 8 and 27.

[4]See: Husserl (1905–1935: XIII, 1912–1928), Reinach (1911a, 1913), Stein (1917, 1922, 1925), Scheler (1923), Hildebrand (1930), and Walther (1923); about the early phenomenological accounts, see Mulligan (1987), Smith (1990), and De Vecchi (2010, 2012, 2013). My claims also refer to some of the recent accounts of collective intentionality and social cognition. See: Searle (1990, 1995, 2010), Bratman (1992), Tuomela and Miller (1988), Gilbert (1989, 2002), Ferraris (2009), Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), Gallese (2005), and Goldman (2005).

[5]This taxonomy is not to be considered exhaustive. It rather attempts to give a sample of the varieties of heterotropic intentionality within the framework of its three main types.

Solitary intentional states, acts and actions are characterised by the fact that they may be performed and experienced by one single individual without referring to and depending on other individuals.

There is a great deal of solitary states, acts and actions. For instance: cognitive experiences like perceiving or imagining or remembering the sea in front of me, or believing that the seawater in front of me is warm; conative or practical acts like having the intention to go to the sea, and deciding to do it; actions like swimming in the sea; affective experiences like feeling good and happy when I swim in the sea, *etc*. These are manifestly all intentional states, acts and actions that can be performed and experienced by myself alone, without any reference to or interaction with other subjects. Thus, they are all cases of *solitary intentionality*. Only single individuals can be the subjects of solitary states, acts and actions.

In contrast, heterotropic intentional mental states, intentional acts and actions cannot be performed and experienced by a single individual: heterotropic states, acts and actions necessarily refer to and depend on other individuals, i.e. they involve at least two individuals.

There is also a great variety of heterotropic intentional states, acts and actions. For instance: practical acts, like intending to go to the movies together; actions, such as going to the movie together; social or speech acts, such as my promising to go to the movies with you; affective experiences, like my feeling that you are enthusiastic about the film we have seen, *etc*. These are all cases of *heterotropic intentionality*: a solitary subject cannot perform any of them; they need to be performed and experienced by at least two subjects, although the role of the subjects involved may change in each of them.

These considerations bring into focus the first phenomenological distinction of my taxonomy:

Taxonomy

(i) Solitary intentionality *vs*. heterotropic intentionality.
Ex.: I swim in the sea *vs*. I see you are enjoying swimming in the sea.

3 The Three-Types-of-Heterotropic-Intentionality Thesis

I claim that there are at least three types of heterotropic intentionality: collective, intersubjective and social intentionality. As types of heterotropic intentionality, they all necessarily involve and depend on at least two individuals, even if each of them is heterotropic in its own specific way.

I will point out that here I am not taking position for externalism in the internalism *versus* externalism debate on collective intentionality.[6] By distinguishing between solitary intentionality and heterotropic intentionality, on the one hand,

[6]As it is well known, Searle maintains an internalist collective intentionality account (Searle 1990, 1995, 2002, 2010), while other philosophers argue for an externalist collective intentionality account (Meijers 2003; Pacherie 2007; Schmid 2003, among others). For a very clear presentation

and identifying collective, intersubjective and social intentionality as three types of heterotropic intentionality, on the other hand, I intend to catch, according to phenomenology, an essential character shared by these three types of intentionality. Phenomenology is neither externalist nor internalist, indeed; phenomenology merely attempts to catch the essential, a priori structure of phenomena. Now, it is phenomenologically manifest that collective, intersubjective and social intentionality involve more than one individual, whereas solitary intentionality need not involve more than one individual.

More precisely, *collective intentionality* is constituted by states, acts and actions shared by two or more persons, for instance: collective feelings, beliefs, intentions, and collectively intended bodily movements (e.g. playing tennis or a piano/violin duet together). *Intersubjective intentionality* is constituted by states and acts of one or more persons directed towards an understanding of the experiences of other subjects, for instance my understanding of your feeling joyful or sad. *Social intentionality* is constituted by social acts performed by one or more persons in the very acts of speaking, turned towards one or more persons and grasped by them. Among the acts of social intentionality are promising, commanding, informing, demanding, promulgating, *etc*. Social acts are *speech acts*[7]—most of them are declarations, and in particular *status functions declarations* (Searle 2010). John R. Searle would not agree with the distinction between collective and social intentionality I make. According to Searle, social and speech acts have to be subsumed under collective intentionality.[8] But phenomenologically, the essential character of social acts is their need to be communicated to and grasped by their addressees, who play a counterpart role in the performance of the act, and this is not an essential character of collective intentionality (and of intersubjective intentionality), too. Hence, on the basis of this essential difference, I state that social acts are not reducible to collective states or acts.

These considerations bring into focus three further phenomenological distinctions of my taxonomy:

Taxonomy

(ii) Collective intentionality *vs*. intersubjective intentionality.
Ex: *We* intend to go to the movies together *vs*. *I* see that *you* intend to go to the movies.

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of the salient issues of the internalism versus externalism collective intentionality debate and also a defence of Searle's internalism see Gallotti (2010, ch. 3).

[7]Social acts were discovered and defined by Adolf Reinach, a phenomenologist and philosopher of law who was a pupil of Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the twentieth century (Reinach 1911a, 1913). Before Reinach, Thomas Reid had already spoken of "social operations" (Reid 1788). Reinach's social acts anticipate by some 50 years the discovery of Austin's speech acts (Austin 1962). About the history and theories of social and speech acts, see Smith (1990), Mulligan (1987), Schuhmann and Smith (1990), Searle (1969, 1995, 2010), and De Vecchi (2010).

[8]This is a very significant point characterising Searle's individualism and internalism, see Searle (1990, 1995, 2010), Meijers (1994), Bratman (1999), and Schmid (2009).

(iii) Collective intentionality *vs.* social intentionality.
Ex: *We* intend to go to the movies together *vs*. *I* promise *you* to go to the movies with you.
(iv) Intersubjective intentionality *vs*. social intentionality.
Ex: *I* see that *you* intend to go to the movies *vs*. *I* promise *you* to go to the movies with you.

Moreover, it is worth highlighting that we could also identify another type of heterotropic intentionality which is similar to (but nonetheless different from!) social intentionality: I will call it "heteroscopic" intentionality. Examples of heteroscopic states, acts and actions are: I envy you; I forgive you (see Reinach 1913: § 3); I focus my webcam on you. I call them "heteroscopic" (according to the ancient Greek "skopós" which means "target") because in this case the addressee is also the target of the act. Like social acts, heteroscopic states, acts and actions have an addressee, but unlike social acts, they do not need to be communicated to the addressee and grasped by her/him in order to be performed, i.e. they do not need the addressee to play a counterpart role. In order to be performed, heteroscopic states, acts and actions only need to be addressed to someone else. In other terms, simply in addressing to someone else they reach their target. So, we can focus on a fifth phenomenological distinction of the taxonomy:

Taxonomy

(v) Social acts *vs.* heteroscopic acts (states and actions).
Ex: I ask you to do P *vs*. I forgive you for P (I envy you for P; I take a picture of you).[9]

3.1 On the Phenomenological Account of States, Acts, and Actions

I will now point out a very relevant phenomenological issue: the distinction among *intentional states*, *acts* and *actions* and the correlated account of *persons as subjects of acts*. This issue is crucial to understand because in contrast to many philosophers I do not speak only of intentional collective and intersubjective mental states and actions, but also of intentional collective, intersubjective and social *acts* (see *supra* § 2, where I spoke of collective, intersubjective and social acts).

In philosophy, and also in common language, the meaning of "act" is ambiguous. Many analytic philosophers tend to call mental acts "mental states", and to identify acts with actions. On the contrary, phenomenologists distinguish among states,

[9]Although heteroscopic acts, states and actions are also a heterotropic intentionality type, I will not pore on them in my chapter because of constraints on the chapter's length. I will focus just on collective, intersubjective and social intentionality which are the main types of heterotropic intentionality. About heteroscopic states, acts and actions, see De Vecchi and Passerini (2012).

acts and actions, and hold this distinction to be very important. The basic idea grounding this distinction is that a person's mental life is not to be conceived as a flow of mental states; persons are subjects of states, like other animals, but they are specifically subjects of acts of different "positionality" levels. Persons have an emerging and hierarchically ordered structure constituted by states, by acts of first level positionality, and by acts of second level positionality. So, very schematically, the idea is that by acts of first level positionality (e.g. beliefs), persons take a position (yes-no) on their states (e.g. perceptions and emotions), which happen to them and are not in their power to avoid (states are understood as causal effects). By acts of second level positionality (e.g. intentions), persons take positions on their acts of first level positionality.

For instance, by believing that this movie is a good one, we endorse a certain perceptual and/or emotional state about the movie (about the existence of the movie and about some positive value of the movie): so, this is a first level position taking act. By forming the intention to go to see this movie, we take a position on our belief that this movie is a good one: so, this is a second level position taking act. By performing this second level position act, we take the belief—first level position act—as a ground for our decision to go to the movie, or also as a ground for informing (speech/social act) other friends that this movie is a good one, *etc*. Second order position taking acts are *free*, *spontaneous* acts, and they are characterised by *authorship* or *agency*.[10]

Finally, *actions* are bodily movements that satisfy intentions. So, actions are goal-directed intentional movements: they are intended bodily movements, which aim to satisfy the content of the intention.[11]

3.2 Two Criteria for the Distinction among Collective, Intersubjective and Social Intentionality

I shall now point out two phenomenological criteria for the distinction among collective, intersubjective and social intentionality I have been claiming.

3.2.1 The Different Roles of the Subjects Involved

The first criterion I put forward concerns the fact that the subjects involved in heterotropic intentionality have different roles depending on the type of heterotropic intentionality they are involved in. I shall now outline these different roles.

[10] About the phenomenological account of acts and persons as subjects of acts, see Reinach (1911a, b, 1913: § 3), Husserl (1912–1928: § 61), Stein (1922) and De Monticelli (2007a, b).

[11] About this account of action, see Searle (1983, 1990, 2010), Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), and Reinach (1913).

(i) *Collective states, acts and actions*
The subjects to whom collective states, acts and actions refer and on whom they depend are all *agent-partners*. Thus, in the case of collective intentions or actions, or collective perceptions and beliefs, or collective feelings, *etc.*, the subjects involved in them are all joint agents. Accordingly, the subjects referred to by "we" in sentences of the form "we intend to do P", "we believe P", "we feel P" are all joint agents who intend or believe or feel together P. Needless to say, I am just identifying the essential conditions about the subjects' roles for collective intentionality to exist, i.e. for collective intentionality to exist the subjects who intend, believe or feel together have to play the role of partners. Thus, I am only giving a minimal picture, which of course may be enriched and extended by introducing further roles and subjects. For example: we have the intention to prevent you to do P with respect to her/him. In this case, the subjects referred to by "we" are the agent-partners of the collective intention, while the subjects referred to by "you" and "she/he" are not the agent-partners of the collective intention at all.

(ii) *Social acts*
The subjects to whom social acts refer and on whom they depend are the *addressees* of the act. The addressee is the *counterpart* of the agent of the act. Also in this case, I just want to outline the essential structure of social acts and the minimal roles required by the subjects in this structure. For social acts to exist, the subjects to whom social acts refer and on whom they depend play necessarily the role of the *addressees* of the act. Like in the case of collective intentionality, this essential structure may be modified and enriched by introducing more subjects and roles. Take, for instance, a promise performed in the name of someone else and concerning further subjects: on behalf of you, I promise your sister to take care of her child (see Reinach 1913: § 3). Here, "your sister" plays the essential role of the addressee of my promise (without an addressee grasping my promise, my promise would not exist), while the other subjects involved in this case (you and the child of your sister) do not play the role of addressee.

(iii) *Intersubjective states and acts*
The subjects to whom intersubjective states and acts refer and on whom they depend are neither partners nor addressees. Intersubjective intentionality is directed towards other persons, and specifically it is directed towards the understanding of experiences of other persons, but these other persons do not in any way—neither as partner-agents nor as addressees—perform intersubjective states and acts. For instance, my understanding of your feeling depends on you and on your feeling, because your feelings are the *object* of my intersubjective intentionality; without them, my intersubjective intentionality cannot be performed. But my act of understanding your feeling does not require that you play either the agent-partner role or the addressee role. For the most part, you totally ignore my understanding of your feeling.

3.2.2 The Different Directions of Each Type of Heterotropic Intentionality

The second criterion I put forward for distinguishing among collective, social and intersubjective intentionality is that they have different directions.

(i) *Collective intentionality is a mono-directed intentionality towards a shared object*
Collective intentionality is directed towards a shared object that is external to the individuals' minds (*lato sensu*) and that is an object of the public, social and institutional world. For example: if we intend to walk together on the hills, and if we both believe that the Appennines are a good place for our walking together on the hills, then it is manifest that walking together in the Appennines is an intentional content which concerns the external world.

(ii) *Intersubjective intentionality is a mono-directed intentionality towards experiences of other subjects*
Intersubjective intentionality, like collective intentionality, is mono-directed intentionality but, differently from collective intentionality, it is directed towards other subjects' experiences. Hence, intersubjective intentionality is basically mind-to-mind intentionality, and not mind-to-world intentionality in the sense that collective intentionality and social intentionality are.

Intersubjective intentionality remains on the I-you level and does not reach a third objective level beyond the intersubjective level. In the case of intersubjective intentionality, my mental states or acts are always directed towards your mental states or acts, and hence towards a mind-internal object. In other terms, it is an intentionality which is fundamentally performed *intra* subjects: if I feel your joy or if I see what you are thinking about, then my intentional object is always a *mental object*, even if it is a mental object belonging to *mente tua* and not to *mente mea*. In conclusion, intersubjective intentionality is basically a face-to-face encounter.[12]

(iii) *Social intentionality is a double-directed intentionality towards both other subjects and a common targeted object*
Social intentionality is addressed to other subjects for a common object. The intentionality of the agent's act is directed both towards another subject, the addressee of the act, and towards the object of the act. The intentionality directed towards the addressee is a *medium* of the intentionality directed

[12] As Dan Zahavi claimed, there are, both in analytical philosophy of mind and in phenomenology, quite diverse accounts of intersubjectivity which transcend the face-to-face encounter between individuals and which posit the world as a common field of experiences among individuals (Zahavi 2001). I am by no means denying this. I am convinced that the encounter between individuals is the encounter between individuals that are subjects in a common world, i.e. in a common field of experiences and bodily interlacements of selfhood and otherness. But I think that this perspective is fully compatible with the attempt to outline a distinction among intersubjective, collective and social intentionality by the criteria of the directionality of intentionality: in the case of intersubjective intentionality, the direction of intentionality is always an I-you direction, even if between I and you there is, of course, the world.

towards the object: I command *you* to do x; you are the *medium* through whom x is done, and x is the *aim* of the act. Through the other subject—you, the addressee of the act—, social intentionality aims at the commanded (requested, promised, *etc.*) thing.[13]

As in the case of collective intentionality (but not in the case of intersubjective intentionality), the object of social intentionality is an object of the external, social and institutional world.

4 The Three-Modes-of-Intersubjective-and-Collective-Intentionality Thesis: Practical, Cognitive, Affective

I maintain that, like individual intentionality, also collective and intersubjective intentionality involve different modes of intentionality: practical, affective and cognitive.

4.1 Practical, Cognitive and Affective Collective Intentionality

Collective intentionality may be *practical*, *cognitive* or *affective*: hence, it becomes manifest in *intentions* (*prior intentions*, *intentions-in-actions*[14], *volitions* or *desires*), *beliefs* (or *perceptions*), or *feelings* (including a variety of feelings: moods, emotions, passions *etc.*) respectively. Thus, I focus on a sixth phenomenological distinction of my taxonomy:

Taxonomy

(vi) Cognitive *vs.* practical *vs*. affective collective intentionality.[15]
Ex: We believe that *The Apartment* by Billy Wilder is a beautiful movie *vs.* we intend to go to see *The Apartment*, or we are going to see *The Apartment vs.*

[13] See Reinach (1911a, 1913), and Mulligan (1987).

[14] About the notion of *prior intentions* and *intentions-in-actions*, see Searle (2001, 2010): "prior intentions begin prior to the onset of an action and intentions-in-action are the intentional components of actions" (Searle 2010, p. 51).

[15] The distinction between *practical collective intentionality* and *cognitive collective intentionality* is now more or less accepted (Gilbert 1989, 2002; Bratman 1999; Searle 2010; Zaibert 2003; Tollefsen 2005; Schmid 2009). The individuation of affective collective intentionality as a third kind of intentionality, internal to the type of collective intentionality, on the other hand, is much more recent (see Schmid 2009), and not widely adopted. Michael Tomasello seems still to give a priority to cognitive states: he talks about "cognitive representations" for both collective intentions and collective beliefs, without paying particular attention to affective states (Tomasello et al. 2005; Tomasello 2009).

we both are amused by *The Apartment* and we share the same enthusiasm for this movie.[16]

I would like to point out that these examples of cognitive, practical and affective collective intentionality are also cases of collective states, acts, and actions. Our *collective feeling* of being amused and enthusiastic for *The Apartment* is a mental state. Our *collective belief* that *The Apartment* is a beautiful movie is a collective mental act of first level positionality; our *collective intention* to go to see *The Apartment* together is a collective *spontaneous*, *free act*, i.e. an act of a second level positionality. Finally, our going to see *The Apartment* together is a collective action.

4.2 Practical, Affective and Cognitive Intersubjective Intentionality

Intersubjective intentionality may be *affective* or *cognitive*. Affective and cognitive intersubjective intentionality are respectively directed at the *understanding of affective and cognitive experiences of other persons*. Moreover, we may also identify a third kind of intersubjective intentionality: *practical intersubjective intentionality*.

The distinction among affective, cognitive and practical intersubjective intentionality has not yet been really adopted in philosophy: philosophers, but also and especially psychologists, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists tend to speak generically of "*social cognition*" which may indistinctly concern the understanding of cognitive, affective and practical experiences of other subjects. In other terms, "social cognition" means intersubjectivity, without distinguishing among cognitive, practical and affective intersubjectivity. Consistent with the phenomenological tradition, I distinguish, rather, among cognitive, affective and practical intersubjective intentionality: they are three different phenomena indeed.

Thus, I focus on a seventh phenomenological distinction of my taxonomy:

Taxonomy

(vii) Cognitive *vs.* affective *vs*. practical intersubjective intentionality.
Ex: I see that you are thinking about *The Apartment vs.* I see that you are still amused and enthusiastic about *The Apartment vs*. I see that you intend to go to see *The Apartment* again.

[16] Among these different kinds of collective intentionality, the more problematic phenomenon to grasp and to define is affective collective intentionality: what exactly does it mean that we share the same feeling, that we feel it together or collectively? In which specific sense are we both amused and enthusiastic for *The Apartment*? Or, in which sense are we both deeply sad and moved by a tragic existential event? In this regard, I will mention Scheler's famous case of *feeling-together* (*Mit-einanderfühlen*): a father and mother feel the same pain standing by the dead body of their beloved child (Scheler 1923). In this case, we properly have an example of "emotional sharing", indeed. About this issue, see Schmid (2009: § 15 "Phenomenological Fusion"), Krebs (2010), Zahavi (2008), and De Vecchi (2011), where I outlined an account of collective affective (but also cognitive and practical) intentionality in terms of shared intentionality.

4.3 Intersubjective Intentionality vs. Collective Intentionality

Affective intersubjective intentionality is not to be confused with affective collective intentionality, and practical intersubjective intentionality is not to be confused with practical collective intentionality.

I focus on an eighth and ninth phenomenological distinction of my taxonomy:

Taxonomy

(viii) Affective collective intentionality *vs.* affective intersubjective intentionality. Ex: We are both moved by *The Apartment* and we share the same enthusiasm for this movie *vs.* I see (I feel) your amusement and enthusiasm for *The Apartment*.

(ix) Practical collective intentionality *vs.* practical intersubjective intentionality. Ex: We intend to go to see *The Apartment* together *vs.* I see (I intend) your intention to go to see *The Apartment*.

The possibility of confusing affective and practical collective with affective and practical intersubjective intentionality is directly connected with the *criteria that characterise* the mode of intersubjective intentionality.

Firstly, we may characterise the mode of intersubjective intentionality through the *content* of mental states or acts and say: If I see your *intention*, this is a case of practical intersubjective intentionality; if I see your belief, this is a case of cognitive intersubjective intentionality; and if I see your *feeling*, this is a case of affective intersubjective intentionality.

Secondly, we may characterise the mode of intersubjective intentionality in a stronger way, involving not only the content but also the *quality* of the mental states or acts.[17] According to this second criterion of characterisation, I may see your intention, your belief, your feeling—the content of your experience—only if I personally have the same intentional mode you have: only if I intend your intention, I believe your belief, I feel your feeling.[18]

These different criteria of characterisation depend clearly on the account of intersubjective intentionality (social cognition) we adopt.[19] Our choice of such

[17]The distinction between content and quality of intentional experiences is a classic phenomenological distinction: we find it already in the early Husserl (1901). It is also a classic analytical distinction: Searle, for example, distinguishes between "intentional content" and "intentional mode" (Searle 1983).

[18]I think that particularly in the case of intersubjective affective intentionality it makes sense to adopt the stronger criterion: it really could be difficult to see that you are feeling joy or pain without feeling it, i.e. without having the same intentional mode you have. This is also the position of phenomenologists like Scheler and Stein: according to them, empathy (called *Nachfühlung* by Scheler and, more traditionally, *Einfühlung* by Stein), the act by which I see the feeling of the other, is characterised by an affective nuance of knowing. Scheler speaks properly of "*verstehend fühlen*" (see Scheler 1923 and Stein 1917).

[19]There are different accounts which try to describe or explain the phenomenon of intersubjective intentionality or social cognition. The crucial problem is: *how* do I understand the experiences of

an account carries over to the distinction between intersubjective and collective intentionality. Why? Well, if we adopt the second and stronger criterion that characterises intersubjective intentionality, then it is manifestly more difficult to distinguish between different types and modes of intersubjective and collective intentionality. Nonetheless, I claim that even if we adopt the stronger criteria, we are able to distinguish between these different types and kinds of intentionality. The reason for this is that they still essentially differ with regard to the intentionality direction and to the *role of the subjects* involved in them (see *supra* § 2.2.1 and 2.2.2).[20]

5 The Sub-personal-and-Personal-Level Thesis

I maintain that collective and intersubjective intentionality can appear on a sub-personal or a personal level with regard to the mental states, acts and actions of the subjects. On the sub-personal level, subjects will not have a reflexive, conscious awareness of their states and their taking a position of the first level, whereas on the personal level they always take a position of second level.

Differently from collective and intersubjective intentionality, social intentionality is always personal intentionality in the pregnant sense that it implies authorship and agency, because social acts, as we have seen, are always position-takings of second level.

I will now discuss two cases of personal *vs.* sub-personal collective intentionality and intersubjective intentionality.

5.1 Sub-personal Cognitive Collective Intentionality vs. *Personal Cognitive Collective Intentionality*

I focus on a tenth phenomenological distinction of the taxonomy:

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others? Do I understand them by *inferences* (the inference which I can make from the expressions or bodily appearance of the other and from my own experience)? Do I understand them by *simulating* them? Do I understand them by feeling them, if they are feeling, by intending them, if they are intentions, *etc.*? Can I understand the experiences of the others without engaging myself in such experiences? Neurosciences maintain that mirror neurons are the heroes of social cognition. But the neurobiological data are interpreted in many ways according to the different accounts (Simulation theory, Theory of Mind, called also Theory-theory, *etc.*). About this debate, see: Gallese (2005), Goldman (2005), Rizzolati and Sinigaglia (2006), Gallagher and Zahavi (2008). See also Lipps (1913): Lipps represents the proto theorist of the present "Simulation Theory".

[20]They are also intrinsically different because collective intentionality is essentially shared intentionality, while intersubjective intentionality is not. About this argument, see De Vecchi (2011).

Taxonomy

(x) Sub-personal cognitive collective intentionality *vs.* personal cognitive collective intentionality.
Ex: We are buying some books in the bookshop and we pay with a 50 euro bill: this implies that *we recognise* that this piece of paper in my hand *counts as* a 50 euro bill *vs.* we are at the notary's to sign a property contract: before signing it, we ask the notary about the rules by virtue of which the piece of paper on the notary's table *counts* as a property contract.

These examples are built on Searle's account of collective recognition or belief: according to Searle, collective recognition has an essential role in imposing "status functions" (one piece of paper counts as a 50 euro bill and the other counts as a property contract). Collective recognition always belongs to a *Network* of conscious or unconscious intentional states and is grounded in a *Background* of pre-intentional, pre-reflexive and sub-personal abilities, attitudes, know-how, *etc.*, which is the basis of our intentional (individual and collective) mental states and actions (see Searle 1995, 2010).

The point I will focus on is that, normally, when we pay something with a 50 euro bill, we implicitly, pre-reflexively and sub-personally recognise the piece of paper as a 50 euro note: we do that without being aware of it, without having reflected on the nature of the bill or on the constitutive rules of money, and without having taken the second level position of awareness.

On the contrary, if we reflect on the nature of the property contract we are going to sign, and ask the notary about the rules which regulate and constitute the property contract, we will then be fully aware that this piece of paper on the notary's table counts as a property contract because we and all the other people in our country recognise or accept it as such. Thus, we will be aware of having taken a position on it, i.e. we will be aware that we have recognised that this piece of paper counts as a contract. In other words, we will have recognised at the personal level—i.e. have taken a position on—the constitutive rules of the institution of the property.

This example shows that sub-personal cognitive collective intentionality, when it creates social and institutional entities by imposing *status* functions, plays a very important role in the construction of social reality.

5.2 Sub-personal Intersubjective Intentionality vs. Personal Intersubjective Intentionality

I focus on an eleventh phenomenological distinction of my taxonomy.

Taxonomy

(xi) Sub-personal intersubjective intentionality *vs*. personal intersubjective intentionality.
Ex: I am swayed by your sadness *vs.* I see (I feel) that you are sad.

Here, following Max Scheler's masterpiece on *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (1923), where he presents an extremely rich phenomenological taxonomy of affective intentionality, and Edith Stein's dissertation *Zum Problem der Einfühlung* (1917), I distinguish between *emotional contagion* (*Gefühlsansteckung*) and *empathy* (*Einfühlung*, *Nachfühlen*).

In the case of *emotional contagion*, I feel the same feeling you feel without being aware of it and without having taken a position about it. In the case of *empathy*, I see the feeling of another, I know it, and I can avoid or endorse this feeling. *Emotional contagion* is a state, whereas *empathy* is an act, which implies positionality.

According to Scheler, we find at least two more kinds of affective intersubjective intentionality: *emotional fusion* and *sympathy*. Whereas emotional fusion belongs to what I call "sub-personal affective intersubjective intentionality", sympathy belongs to the opposite pole of what I call "personal affective intersubjective intentionality". *Emotional fusion* (*Einsfühlung*) is a borderline case of emotional contagion in which one self absorbs another. It belongs to sub-personal affective intersubjective intentionality because one feels another's feeling without taking a position on it. Awareness of the feeling of the other, which characterises empathy, may then become the basis for further position-taking: the compassion or fellow-feeling wherein I rejoice in your joy and I commiserate with your sorrow (*Mit-fühlen mit jemandem*), which we may roughly call *sympathy*.

We have said that intersubjective intentionality is basically a face-to-face encounter between individuals. We may now specify this claim: the encounter between individuals may take place in a personal or a sub-personal way. Thus, we may also distinguish between weak intersubjective intentionality and strong intersubjective intentionality, which I suggest calling *inter-personal intentionality*.[21]

The social relevance of the sub-personal affective intersubjective intentionality is impressive. Let us only think of all the mass-phenomena of medium and macro scale and their presence in our everyday life: we go to a party and are swayed by the gaiety of the party; we go to the football match and are affected by the rage of our fellow supporters. Or think about the famous case of the fall of the *Third Reich* in Berlin during Second World War: a soldier gives up and lays down his weapons, another soldier sees it and does the same. What has happened here? A case of *emotional contagion* has just happened: a diffused mood of fear and desperation has affected the soldiers, and thus, when one laid down his weapons, the others imitated him.[22]

[21] Gallagher and Zahavi also distinguish between *primary inter-subjectivity and secondary inter-subjectivity* (see Gallagher 2005 and Gallagher and Zahavi 2008). By "intersubjectivity" Costa means just inter-personality (Costa 2010).

[22] Ferraris quotes this historical case and its representation in the movie *Der Untergang* (2004) as a counter-example against collective intentionality (Ferraris 2009). Instead, I think that this case is not a case of collective intentionality, but a case of emotional contagion. Thus it is not a valid example against the collective intentionality claim.

6 The Social-Efficacy Thesis

I claim that all types of *heterotropic intentionality are socially and/or institutionally effectiv*e. Each of the three types of heterotropic intentionality—collective, intersubjective and social—contribute to the creation of social reality. An important corollary of this claim is that *social entities are ontologically dependent on heterotropic intentionality*, i.e. they do not depend on solitary intentionality but on intentionality which involves, in the different ways we have seen, at least two subjects. In other terms, in order to create social and institutional entities of any type (rights, obligations, football matches, money, corporations, marriages, parties, families, friendships *etc.*), one subject is not enough. What is required are at least two subjects who deal with one another, be it by performing social/speech acts, by sharing collective intentions, beliefs and feeling, by understanding the other in an act of empathy or sympathy, *etc.*[23]

Moreover, I also state that collective, intersubjective and social intentionality are both *praxis* and *poiesis*. Let us consider some cases:

(i) *The efficacy of collective intentionality*
Collective intentionality has a normative efficacy: it produces a *joint commitment* with respect to, for instance, a joint action (walking together) as well as to a joint creative activity (baking a cake together).[24]
It is worth noticing that collective intentionality may be both a *poiesis* and a *praxis* (baking a cake together is a *poiesis*, whereas walking together is a *praxis*). In the case of *collective beliefs* (recognitions) which impose "*status* functions", cognitive collective intentionality is generally a *poiesis*. This piece of paper in my hand is a five euro bill because we believe or accept that it is so (see Searle 1995, 2010). This case is very meaningful because it shows that also theoretical acts, such as beliefs—and not only practical acts like intentions or actions—may be poietic.

(ii) *The efficacy of social acts*
Social acts are both poiesis and praxis: asking, informing, or asserting are practical social acts, they are simply actions; promising, commanding, promulgating a law, *etc.* produce normative entities (for instance, rights and obligations), so they are poietic acts. I will highlight that poietic social intentionality is immediately effective on the normative level, while it is not immediately effective on the practical level. This becomes evident in the difference between performing a social act and satisfying this act by performing the action that realizes its content. For instance, if a government

[23] Another way to formulate this thesis is that social entities presuppose always a society in order to exist, i.e. at least two individuals which constitute a society in miniature. This is the thesis of Czesław Znamierowski (1921).

[24] On the normative significance of "walking together", see the famous account of Margaret Gilbert (2002).

promulgates a law, then some obligations and rights are immediately produced by the promulgated law; in contrast, the actions of the citizens that satisfy these obligations and rights are not an effect of the promulgated law.[25]

(iii) *The efficacy of intersubjective intentionality*
Intersubjective intentionality is *ontologically effective*, too, specifically in the case of *mutual* intersubjective experiences. Mutual intersubjective intentionality has been identified by Husserl as characteristic of interpersonal relations of knowing each other, which imply *understanding* each other, i.e. mutually understanding what the other intends, believes and feels. On the basis of this mutual understanding (be it affective, cognitive or practical) proper to interpersonal relations, we can ground the creation of the social world and the performing of collective acts and actions, as well as of social/speech acts.[26] Consider the case of mutual feelings (such as mutual love, respect and trust) or the cases of mutual beliefs and intentions: in virtue of the mutual (affective, cognitive and practical) understanding, they create interpersonal relations which are the necessary conditions—as Husserl maintains—for the creation of social world (think of social entities like friendships, families, communities, philosophical societies, political parties, *etc.*) and for the performing of collective acts and actions and social acts. In other words, in order to share intentions and cooperate, or in order to promise, inform, command, *etc.*, we need to have a mutual understanding of each other.[27]

We can now sum up this analysis of different kinds of efficacy, i.e. of the different roles played by different types of heterotropic intentionality in the creation of social reality, by focusing on this last distinction of the taxonomy:

Taxonomy

(xii) Social entities created by social intentionality *vs.* social entities created by collective intentionality *vs.* social entities created by intersubjective intentionality.
Ex: Promising creates normative entities like obligations and claims *vs.* collective recognition creates status functions of institutional entities (money,

[25] See Reinach (1913), Conte (2002), Mulligan (1987), and De Vecchi (2013), where I worked on the relation between normative and practical level in social intentionality and social ontology.

[26] On the contrary, some philosophers, e.g. Searle, hold that collective intentions could also be intentions of an extremely solitary brain in a vat. Most philosophers and cognitive scientists—with rare exceptions—pay very little attention to the inter-personal relation, and do not claim that it is a necessary condition of collective experience. See Searle (1990). For arguments against Searlian individualism in collective intentionality and in support of an account of collective intentionality based on relational intentionality, see Meijers (1994, p. 7), Bratman (1999), and Schmid (2009, p. 37).

[27] See Husserl (1905–1935, XIII, 98, 102–104), "Die für Sozialität konstitutiven Akte, die 'kommunikativen'" and "Soziale Ontologie und deskriptive Soziologie", and Husserl (1912–1928: § 51), "Die Personen in der Kollektivität der Personen". See also Hildebrand (1930), Walther (1923), Scheler (1923), and Stein (1922).

prime minister, universities, corporations) *vs*. intersubjective feelings create interpersonal relations which ground the creation of the social world (friends, families, communities, political parties).

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