Chapter 2
Theorizing Governability – The Interactive Governance Perspective

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Abstract This chapter presents the conceptual foundations of governability and interactive governance upon which it is based. Interactive governance is a theoretical perspective that emphasizes the governing roles of state, market and civil society. Interactions between these realms are argued to be an important factor in the success or failure of whatever governance takes place. Governability refers to the quality of governance in a societal field, such as fisheries. Diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale are argued to be major variables influencing the governability of societal systems and their three components: a system-to-be-governed, a governing system and a system of governing interactions mediating between the two.

Keywords Complexity • Diversity • Dynamics • Governability • Governance • Interaction • System

Introduction

This chapter introduces two concepts. The first, 'interactive governance', emphasizes solving societal problems and creating opportunities through interaction between civil, public and private persons and organizations. Testing its feasibility has begun with work on capture fisheries and aquaculture. The second concept,

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'governability', provides a conceptual basis for assessing and improving the governance of societal systems, such as fisheries. There is a close relationship between the two terms. An attempt to improve governance inevitably results in the need to explore and assess governability. Vice versa, the governability of societal systems can only be understood in/with reference to their basic qualities. Building upon the earlier *Fish for Life* volume (Kooiman et al. 2005), this chapter first discusses the main characteristics of the interactive governance approach in the context of other perspectives on governance. This is followed by an overview and elaboration of the governability concept.

The Range of Governance Theory

Ideas about governance have been around for a long time and few are therefore entirely unfamiliar with its significance. Traditionally governance has been related to governments and what governments do. In more recent social science interpretations, however, governance has acquired a broader meaning. Here, government is not the only institution acting as governor. Private enterprises, civic organizations, communities, political parties, universities, the media, and the general public, among others, are all in one way or another involved in governance.

As is the case with other concepts in the popular vocabulary, the term 'governance' has different meanings for those who use it (for overviews see Pierre 2000; Kjær 2004; Ezzamel and Reed 2008; Lockwood et al. 2010; Osborne 2010; Torfing et al. 2012). These differences often revolve around the perceived role of the state, viewed in a normative or in an analytical sense. In the more normative approaches, such as those offered by the World Bank (1989, 2004) and the oft-quoted book, 'Reinventing Government' (Osborne and Gaebler 1992), governments are often seen as failing to live up to the expectations of those whom they govern. This is shown in particular by analyses of weak, unstable, collapsing or failed states. Where the state is unable to govern effectively, other actors from market and civil society move into prominent governing positions. The recent financial crisis may, however, reverse this trend, as governments have been recognized as playing a crucial role in maintaining public services and preventing disorder.

Governance theory comes in different versions and schools, all of which share the view that governance is beyond government. This implies that it is possible to have more governance but less government, and that the solution to many present day challenges must involve other sectors of society in some form of a public-private partnership arrangement. This state of affairs is caused by societal realities of diversity, dynamics and complexity, which preclude the state from acting as a sole governor.

But there are also more analytically based conceptions of governance to which we add the one developed in this book. Among such approaches are those who view governance as networks (Rhodes 1997; Sørensen and Torfing 2007), and perspectives that distinguish governance according to the scale-level at which it

takes place. See for example the journals *Governance, Global Governance*, and *Public Management Review.*

Interactive Governance

In line with other approaches, the interactive governance perspective applied here proceeds from the assumption that societies are governed by a combination of efforts (see Torfing et al. 2012 for a related conception of interactive governance). These governing mixes respond to ever growing diversity, dynamics and complexity, as well as major concerns such as poverty and climate change. The main sources for discussions of 'governance', as conceptualized in this book, are, 'Governing as Governance' (Kooiman 2003), and its application in fisheries (Kooiman et al. 1999; Bavinck et al. 2005; Kooiman et al. 2005).

Governance is the aggregate of governing activities carried out by societal actors in response to public needs and visions. It is generally organized and routine, rarely harmonious but typically interactive. Kooiman and Bavinck (2005, 17) thus define interactive governance as:

> The whole of interactions taken to solve societal problems and to create societal opportunities, including the formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them.

The emphasis on interactions constitutes the main innovation of this approach. Governing interactions are exchanges between actors that contribute to the tackling of societal problems and opportunities. The adjective 'societal' refers to everything that has a common or public dimension; it stands opposed to 'private' activities. The definition includes a reference to institutions and principles, considered vital for any governance interaction. Our supposition is also that governance arrangements lacking a normative basis ultimately suffer from ineffectiveness and illegitimacy.

The interactive perspective on governance proposes that society is comprised of a large number of governing actors, who are constrained or enabled by their surroundings. Actors are any social unit possessing agency or power of action. This includes individuals, associations, firms, governmental agencies and international bodies. The surroundings are captured by the concept of structure. Structure refers to the social frameworks within which actors operate, including culture, law, politics and economics, but also natural conditions such as geography and ecosystems. According to sociological reasoning, actors are continuously making changes to these structures while at the same time being subjected to their influence (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Giddens 1984). The analysis of governance therefore requires that we pay attention to both of these dimensions.

Governance is and can be based on a broad range of principles, none of which have an inherent primacy over another. Our approach to governance does, however, contain normative elements, chief among them the notion that 'interacting' is often a more effective way of governance than 'going it alone'. Broad societal participation in governance is an expression of democracy and a desirable state of affairs.

Interactive governance therefore advocates wide participation in governance from a normative as well as from a practical point of view.

Rather than being fixed, interactive governance suggests that values, principles and goals are simultaneously crafted and expressed as actors engage in social-political exchange. Goals are then not given but negotiated, and are not stable but vary according to the relative strength of the participants that come and go. Furthermore, governance rarely starts from a grand plan. To the extent that such plans do exist, they are an outcome that is typically arrived at through an incremental process of interactive, experience-based learning. As a research tool, governance theory insists that goals are treated as an empirical question rather than assumed. What are the goals? How do they come about? Whose are they? What do they mean? Similar questions are asked of the various groups of governors or stakeholders active in the governance process: Who are they? What exactly is it that they have at stake? Who defines who they are? How do they come forward and make themselves heard (Jentoft et al. 2011)?

Governability

Within the interactive governance perspective, governability is defined as "the overall capacity for governance of any societal entity or system" (Kooiman et al. 2008, 3), whereby a societal system is understood to consist of a combination of human and natural characteristics. This definition draws attention to governors' differential ability to solve societal problems and to create societal opportunities. What these problems and opportunities actually are depends on societal perceptions and is therefore subjective. But problems and opportunities can also be determined on the basis of scientific analysis.

The definition of governability is built on the notion that societies, or parts thereof termed societal systems, are made up of three related components: a system-to-be-governed, a governing system, and governing interactions (See Fig. 2.1). Our approach suggests that governability depends on qualities of the object of governance (the system-to-be-governed), its subject (the governing system) and the relationship (governing interactions) between the two (Kooiman et al. 2008, 2010). Governors, the governed, and their interactions all contribute to the available governability.

This perspective has important consequences for an assessment of governing capacities. Rather than attributing failure to a shortcoming of only the governing system, it urges for a holistic assessment of the situation at hand. Governability depends on the ability of a governing system to deliver on the challenges that the system-to-be-governed raises. The latter, however, may well exceed the governors' capacities. There are thus limitations to governability (Jentoft 2007). In other words, not every situation is equally governable.

Governability also refers less to a state than to a variable process – it is not a capacity that is given once and for all. Rather, governability changes in response to internal as well as external conditions. Fisheries, for example, are often regarded as



Fig. 2.1 Interactive governance perspective of a societal system

complex adaptive systems in which unpredictability is a key factor (Mahon et al. 2008). External factors are also beyond the control of governors. A Marine Protected Area (MPA) may therefore be well-governed, but still lack sufficient governability due to the interference of outside disturbances (Jentoft et al. 2007, 2012). Governability thus comes not only with limitations but also with vacillating potentialities. It is therefore argued that the act of governing necessitates flexibility and learning, and must account for the possibility of disappointment and failure.

Societal Systems

Systems theory has a rich pedigree, both in the natural and in the social sciences. Recent attention for issues of complexity, chaos and resilience has contributed to a resurgence of interest in this academic stream. In the field of fisheries, for example, scholars are now making fruitful use of complex adapted systems theory (Rammel 2007).

In the following, we use the systems concept as a heuristic tool, without teleological or functional connotations. A general and, for our purposes, workable definition of a societal system is the whole of interrelations among a given number of entities belonging to the natural and social worlds (Kooiman et al. 2008). This formulation contains the notion that systems can be circumscribed in different ways and at different scale levels. Moreover, it contends that no one approach is intrinsically better than another. Instead we suggest that the designation of a system's contours depends on the nature of the research enquiry.

Irrespective of the way we define systems, they are always part of larger events and structures. It is therefore useful to conceive of systems as divisions of other entities rather than solitary units. A particular capture fishery is nested within a

larger fishery, as well as within larger coastal dynamics. Its governing system too is nested in larger administrative units that scale up to the international level. What happens in any one system at a particular level has consequences for other levels.

Societal systems are 'rich' in the sense that their parts and their interrelations have many facets and histories. Systems also tally with the adage that the whole is more than the sum of its parts – they possess qualities that go beyond the features of the individual units. In keeping with this understanding, interactive governance considers governability as a composite property. Phrased differently, the governability of any societal system depends on the nature of the system-to-be-governed, the governing system, and the governing interactions taken together.

Diversity, Complexity, Dynamics and Scale

Interactive governance theory argues that societal systems are inherently diverse, complex and dynamic, and that these traits pose fundamental challenges to their governability at different scales. Although diversity, complexity and dynamics are crucial, their intensity varies from one system to the next. One societal system may therefore be less diverse, complex and dynamic than another, with important consequences for their overall governability. That this is true also for fisheries is illustrated by Bavinck and Kooiman (Chap. 8, this volume).

The diversity, complexity and dynamics of the relations between parts ensure uncertainty and unpredictability in system behavior. There is nothing unusual about this. Uncertainty and unpredictability are simply the consequence of actors or units acting and interacting without anyone having the chance to make out what the impact of these actions and interactions are on the system as a whole. In many cases the outcomes of actions or interactions are indirect and delayed because of system effects. In other cases there may be all kinds of unexpected side effects (Jervis 1997).

Mechanisms like these have important consequences for those taking part in a system, but also for their study. Reductionist approaches, which focus on specific actors or interactions, fail because they lack a larger (system) picture. But holistic approaches, in which the system as a whole is the unit of analysis, are also fruitless. Combinations need to be made. In the meantime it is necessary to keep in mind that, citing Cilliers, "we never can know complex, dynamic and diverse things completely" (2002, 79). Uncertainty therefore always qualifies our assessments of governability, thereby suggesting a precautionary approach.

We noted above that systems rarely exist in isolation, and that it is useful to view them as part of bigger wholes. This directs us to further examine the relevance of 'scale' for governance and governability. Fisheries and coastal zones, as natural systems and the social and governance systems related to them, function on varying spatial and temporal scales. The matching of scale in the operation of these systems is therefore an important aspect affecting governability.

In previous publications we pointed to scale as an essential characteristic of societal systems, next to diversity, complexity and dynamics. Scale was defined as referring "to time and space dimensions of systems to be governed as well as to governing systems" (Kooiman and Bavinck 2005, 14). The spatial dimensions of fisheries are easily illustrated. Some fish species only occur in limited geographical areas, while others span the globe. Additionally, some fishers – like the ecosystem people referred to by McGoodwin (1990) – make a living from resources in their immediate environments. 'Biosphere people', however – such as the 'roving bandits' referred to by Berkes et al. (2006) – operate on a far larger geographical scale, seeking out the target species where it is to be found. Governance too takes place at various geographical scale levels, from the village councils or *panchayats* of southern India (Bavinck 2001) and the *cofradias* of Spain (Pascual-Fernandez et al. 2005) to global institutions such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Law of the Sea Tribunal (Suarez de Vivero et al. 2005). Each set of governors and governing arrangements thus matches a particular geography.

Time scales are also relevant to the governability of societal systems. Time plays a role in ecology (for example, the life cycle of a fish species or the time needed to destroy or rebuild an ecosystem), as well as in practices of capture, trade, and processing. Such scales also include the time perspectives of the human actors involved – the periods over which they assess, judge, plan and expect things to happen. In fisheries, for example, seasonality is an important phenomenon – fishers adapt their gear and fishing practices according to the species that prevail in certain seasons. The rhythm of fishing seasons thereby forms a unique time scale, unfamiliar to outsiders.

System-to-Be-Governed

In this volume we are mainly interested in societal systems belonging to the category of 'primary processes'. That is, those activities that meet basic human needs. In addition, we focus specifically on systems that connect natural and social phenomena. Capture fisheries – which include harvesting, processing and marketing – is thus a social process that is integrated with, and relies on, specific sets of ecological and geophysical conditions. The same is true for aquaculture. In line with this understanding, the system-to-be-governed of capture fisheries and aquaculture has frequently been depicted as a fish chain leading from the ecosystem to the consumers' plates (Johnson et al. 2005; Thorpe et al. 2005; Bush and Oosterveer 2007)

Fish chains run from marine ecology, through harvesting, processing, marketing and distribution, to the end consumer and, in so doing, generally cross multiple scale levels. It follows that the shrimp extracted from a particular ecosystem in, for example, South India, proceeds – through transactions at local, national and international levels – to the consumers' plates in Europe, North America, or East Asia. Another species, one of little international demand, is destined more for the local market, and follows a different chain route with its own configuration of actors. As Johnson et al. (2005) point out, fish chains have tremendous range of variation

and complexity. Their drivers may reside within the market or, conversely, within the local dynamics of a fishery.

There are ways other than a fish chain to conceptualize the system-to-be-governed, and in the course of this book we will highlight at least two of these other perspectives. The first is the Social Ecological Systems approach, which, focusing on a territorial entity, distinguishes between two parts – a socio-economic and a natural subsystem (Berkes et al. 2003; Walker et al. 2004; Armitage and Johnson 2006). The Complex Adaptive Systems approach, which emphasizes the capacity of complex systems to self-organize or adapt, is a variation hereof (Wilson 2006; Mahon et al. 2008). The second approach informs Part II of this book: the respective chapters focus on societal concerns such as ecosystem health, social justice, livelihood and employment, and food security. Concerns differ from principles in that they emerge not from analysis but from political and social debate (Chuenpagdee et al. 2005). This vantage point therefore possesses the advantage of poignancy. We consider the discussion of such concerns – which could even be considered as sub-systems of system-to-be-governed – worthwhile for determining governability issues. In addition, such norm-driven approaches to systems-to-be-governed bring some order to the otherwise unlimited number of potential factors relevant for asking governability questions.

Governing System

A governing system includes the total set of mechanisms and processes that are available for guidance, control and steerage of the system-to-be-governed in question. Interactive governance theory distinguishes three governing realms, state, market and civil society, each with specific governing characteristics and features.

Realms of Governing

In almost all parts of the world, *states* are still the most central governing entity. Governments intervene in society all the time, and try to influence, steer and control from the local level to the international. Their governing activities vary from sector to sector, and are in constant flux. Recent tendencies have been described under headings as ‘regulatory’, ‘enabling’, ‘supermarket’, ‘corporate’ or ‘bargaining’ states (Kooiman 2003). A major division in state performance is the one between South and North. Not only do the life stories of states in these two regions vary substantially, the challenges they face differ enormously as well. Politics is obviously a major part of the governing system. Without a political dimension, in which the goals of governance are negotiated and established, the governing system will remain an empty shell. This aspect is often ignored or taken for granted in studies of fisheries governance.

Governance cannot exist without bureaucracy either. All major organizations, public or private, make use of bureaucratic styles of management in one way or

another. Public bureaucracies seldom have a good reputation, although recently there is a revived interest in their positive contributions (Olsen 2005). Bureaucracies are here to stay and certainly deserve a place in our thinking about governability. This also applies to phenomena such as corruption and non-compliance. These phenomena are not temporary, incidental or limited to specific parts of the world, as was thought for a long time (Williams 2000). Of course they also occur in fisheries (Hauck 2008; Hanich and Tsamenyi 2009).

How can we conceptualize the *market* as part of governing system and assess its contribution to governability? Answers to this question depend heavily on one's disciplinary vantage point. Shipman (1999), for example, views the market as productive and efficient in the allocation of resources; it makes full use of capacity as well as employment, and aims at optimum growth. Lindblom (2001), on the other hand, considers the market to be a system of society-wide coordination with mutual interactions in the form of transactions. It is not competition that coordinates the market, but instead a combination of competition and social cooperation. Fligstein (2001) views markets through the lens of politics. In his opinion, firms desire stable markets; they defend and control their positions not only through exchange transactions but also by using power (also Swedberg 2005). All three perspectives (and there are many more) emphasize the part played by markets in the governing process. The first highlights markets' capacity to self-organize competition, the second stresses the role of competition and cooperation, and the last one draws attention to competition and power. But markets also have their limitations, as is brought out by the term 'market failure', and the economic crises of the past decade. Market approaches prevail in contemporary fisheries management, such in the promotion of transferable quotas and seafood labelling.

While much debated, civil society is not a very clearly defined entity. Non-profit organizations such as religious bodies, professional associations, social movements and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are generally considered to make up its core; academic institutions and the media are boundary cases (Müller 1996). Observers frequently consider civil society to make a positive contribution to governance and governability, for example by providing a moral foundation (Wolfe 1989). But there is criticism as well (Lewis 2002; Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 2006). Changing normative criteria on effectiveness and even legitimacy, as well as predilections to 'bring the state back in', play a role in this re-evaluation. From the interactive governance viewpoint, civil society's main contribution to governability is the channeling of societal activities for governance purposes. However the central role of user-groups as part of civil society in the governance of fisheries must also be critically reviewed (Jentoft and McCay 2003; Mikalsen et al. 2007).

The distinction between three realms of governing we have made here is of course an analytical one. Moreover, it is a simplification of societal reality. The boundaries between state, market and civil society are permeable and constantly changing. For a long time the state has been considered to interpenetrate the other two realms, but recently the market has regained some of its lost territory. There are also many so-called hybrid institutions, and their role in governance appears to be growing (Van Tulder and Van der Zwart 2006).

Elements of Governing

In order to execute their governing tasks or activities, governors have three resources available, which we have called governing elements: images, instruments and action. Images are sets of governing ideas, instruments give these ideas substance, and action puts these instruments to work.

Anyone involved in governance, in whatever capacity or authority, makes use of *images* (see Kooiman 2003, 29–44; Boulding 1956; Jervis 1989). Such images can consist of visions, knowledge, facts, judgments, presuppositions, wishes, goals, hypotheses, theories and convictions. The form of an image thereby helps to identify the governance challenges and tasks ahead (Jentoft et al. 2010). In contemporary society, the production and utilization of knowledge for governance is a vast social process in which scientists, politicians, opinion leaders, and others all play a role. These processes are of course open to various forms of manipulation, and the end result may either be enlightenment or confusion.

Governors wishing to move from one state of affairs to another need *instruments* to do so. A wide array of instruments – or tool boxes (Hood 1983) – is available to public and private governing organizations alike (for an overview of the tools of fisheries see Charles 2001 and Degnbol et al. 2006). Traditional instruments consist of rules and regulations, taxes, fines and subsidies, while more recent ones include covenants and certification. A worrisome aspect is the piling of instruments, which sometimes contradict one another. For this reason, one can notice the law of diminishing returns at work in many areas of governance.

The *action* element of governance conveys the fact that without sufficient will or support, images and instruments – however convincing and applicable – remain up in the air. Governance action and reaction are best seen as chain processes – one governing entity takes the initiative and is followed by others. The chaotic nature of societal processes ensures that small incidents can have major consequences (the butterfly effect), and even non-action may have certain unintended ramifications. Due to the interconnectedness of modern societies, it is more appropriate to speak of complexes of societal action than of collective action (Kooiman 2003). Moreover, the diversity of modern societies means that the action potential for governance is not only a societal attribute, but a political one as well. The two are related because in the long run no political action can be taken without societal support; vice versa societal activism cannot flourish without some kind of political expression.

Orders of Governing

In the first order of governance, governing actors try to tackle *problems* or create *opportunities* as a day-to-day exercise. Globally, two perspectives of problem-solving can be distinguished. One takes a linear path and reasons from a problem to

its solution. The advantage of this model is its simplicity. Its limitation on the other hand is that one particular characteristic is taken as dominant for problem definition as well as for the solution offered. In the non-linear alternative, problem-definition and solution-finding are seen as an iterative and dynamic process with scope for identifying different forces at work. The disadvantage is a perceived lack of clarity and available stopping rules.

Many efforts have been made to design typologies of problems, such as between highly, moderate or ill-structured problems; distributive, regulatory and re-distributive problems; or problems with a few or many dimensions (Kooiman 2003). Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009) have noted that governance problems are often 'wicked', meaning for instance that the idea of the solution tend to inform the definition of the problem (Rittel and Webber 1973; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009).

Problem-solving and opportunity-creating activities are embedded in a second order of institutional settings, which enable governance, sustain it and give it focus. Although many scholars and policymakers consider governance to be synonymous with institutions (many definitions of governance are in institutional terms), the systematic care for institutions as a category of governance activities is neglected. Institutions are considered to consist of relatively enduring sets of rules stimulating, enabling, regulating or controlling human behaviors. They can do this in formal or informal ways. They will surely be changed over time, although the faster they change the less influence they may have. But institutions are also made up of the organizations that decide, effectuate and monitor the implementation of rules.

Meta governance is the third order of governance. It is where decisions on the values and principles of the governing of governance are made (Kooiman 2003; Kooiman and Jentoft 2009; Peters 2010). Such principles and values often remain in the curtains and unvoiced. When they are made explicit and deliberated upon, however, principles are rarely absolute – they guide rather than prescribe. Applying them in governance means making choices. Choices that can be difficult because the normative notions confined in them are often in conflict. As governance choices can be differentiated, so too can governance norms, principles and maybe even values. Some values, such as those pertaining to human rights, are universal and part of substantive governance everywhere. Other values are specific to certain situations, settings, and cultures. The *Fish for Life* volume (Kooiman et al. 2005) sets forth a series of meta governance principles applicable to the elements, orders and modes of governance.

Governing Interactions

Governing interactions are mutually influencing relations between two or more actors or entities in a governance setting. Theoretically, we distinguish between two levels, an intentional (actor) level and a structural level of governing interactions, as well as a set of interaction modes. These are discussed below.

Governing Interactions at the Actor Level

The minimal condition for governance interactions is the willingness or ability of actors to participate. The opportunity for participation is not at all obvious, however, a fact that clearly emerges against the background of empowerment movements – for the poor and women in some parts of the world, and for consumer empowerment in other regions. Nor is it difficult to understand that governance also involves the need for people involved in a system-to-be-governed to pro-act or re-act to activities by governing institutions – public as well as private – and thus make governing a process of interaction.

Citizen involvement or public participation has always been part of the theory and practice of democratic institutions, particularly at local levels (see for an overview Special Issue *Public Administration Review* 2005, 5). The classical example is the 'participation ladder', where the essence is located in power-sharing (Arnstein 1969). Under the influence of new thinking about direct, participatory and deliberative democratic thinking, as well as the ideas and practices of empowerment and inclusion, the analysis of participation has been given a new impulse (Parkins and Mitchell 2005; Papadopoulos and Warin 2007), also in fisheries (Gray 2005).

Scholars generally recognize the advantages of citizens participating in public affairs. They identify positive effects such as development, education, learning, integration, improvement of results, better understanding and control, legitimacy, and accountability. But disadvantages are noted as well: participation is thus argued to be a false notion, inefficient, politically naïve, unrealistic, disruptive and dangerous. It frequently results in excess time consumption, costs, hostility, worse outcomes, loss of control and complacency (Roberts 2004). A paradox may arise when more participation results in less influence as seems to be the case in European fisheries governance under the influence of devolution (Suarez de Vivero et al. 2008)

Governing Interactions at the Structural Level

Interactive governance theory suggests that the central features of system-to-be-governed and governing system are normally reflected in governing interactions. A well-organized and powerful societal sector will thus find these qualities represented in governing interactions. Highly developed connections between state, market and civil society are mirrored in a multitude of participatory interactions (Lovan et al. 2004). However, two concepts deserve special attention for their mediating and structuring contribution: public sphere and social capital.

The idea of the public sphere, as conceptualized by Habermas (1989), has become an important part of social and political theorizing about the nature of modern society. In Habermas' view, the public sphere is the social realm in which the public organizes itself as the bearer of public opinion by conferring and communicating in an unrestricted and rational fashion about matters of general interest. Only a few scholars in the field of fisheries have made systematic use of Habermasian thought

(Van der Schans 2001). The notion that there is a public interest in fisheries that reaches beyond the role of stakeholders deserves more attention, however (Mahony et al. 2010).

We lean on Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1990) in conceptualizing social capital (see Kooiman 2003). Both authors consider social capital to be a structural resource that is unevenly distributed and expressed at different levels of societal aggregation (Foley and Edwards 1999). This perspective enables social capital to be seen as sets of interactions, which take place within a societal context having historical antecedents and showing broad stratification patterns (such as societal sectors or 'social fields' as Bourdieu calls them). Halpern elaborates it as "societies not being composed of atomized individuals, but people connected with one another through the social fabric of intermediate social structures affecting greatly with whom, and how, we interact and co-operate" (2005, 3). The concept of social capital is widely applied in fisheries discourse today for explaining governance outcomes (Grafton 2005; Gutiérrez et al. 2011).

Modes of Governing

In the reality of societal governance an enormous variety of interactions can be observed. To come to grips with them we distinguish between three types: a self-governing mode, a hierarchical mode, and a co-governing mode of interactions.

Self-Governing Interactions

Self-governance refers to the capacity of social entities to govern themselves. While in modern societies this is seldom true in an absolute sense, it is useful to realize that without sustaining a certain self-governing capacity, societal governance is an altogether impossible task (as the history of many totalitarian regimes has shown). Forms of self-governance are found in all societies and to a much greater extent than is often realized. In fisheries, self-governance is frequently described under the labels of 'customary management' or 'sea tenure' (Ruddle et al. 1992; Bavinck 2005).

But beware, some of what is for example sold as self-regulation is actually a form of re-regulation, or changing centralized forms of public control into 'steering at a distance'. Self-organized governance varies from spontaneous types embodied by social action groups and social movements to institutionalized types representing interest groups. Such initiatives differ in organizational form, strategies applied, and styles of interaction between system-to-be-government and governing system.

What interest groups are is a matter of much debate and although insight into the phenomenon has grown considerably, there is still little accumulation of knowledge

(Coen 2007; Beyers et al. 2008). 'Stakeholder' is a related concept that is applied to private actors or entities involved in a public matter or issue (Mitchell et al. 1997; Bryson 2004; Buanes et al. 2004). In the earlier stages of debate, stakeholders were mainly seen in the context of commercial firms. In contemporary development discourse, as in other disciplinary approaches, the concept has now become widely applied.

Participation in social movements is far from commonplace, and even large movements mobilize only relatively small proportions of the population (Meyer et al. 2002; Nash 2005). The collective character of social action is not self-evident either. The manner in which social discontent is transformed into organized action has always been a key issue in social movement literature. It has been given some attention in fisheries (Sundar 2012).

Hierarchical Governing Interactions

Hierarchical governance is the usual style in which governments interact with their citizens, either as individuals or collected in groups or organizations. This governance mode, however, is also practiced in the private sector as many private organizations have hierarchical structures. The terms 'policy' and 'management' subsume much of what hierarchical governance is about. Both imply a flow moving from governing system to system-to-be-governed. It is interesting to note that fisheries management is often criticized for relying too much on a hierarchical model of decision-making (e.g. Raakjær 2009).

'Policy' has been theorized in many different ways. An overview counts at least ten policy process theories, some more popular and elaborated than others (Sabatier 1999). For a long time, actor-oriented notions of policy process were the usual mode of analysis. More recently, however, an interest has grown in the relation of policy to broader societal and governance processes (e.g. Hill and Hupe 2009). Along the way, positivist, neo-positivist, modernist and post-modernist analytical and constructivist approaches to policy studies have waxed and waned. The most classical approach is still to distinguish between stages or phases within a policy process (Kooiman 2003). Although not undisputed, this approach is still useful to "help disaggregate an otherwise seamless web of public policy transactions […] and transitions distinguished by differentiated actions and purposes" (DeLeon and Resnick-Terry 1999, 24).

'Management' is relatively new concept in the debate on public governance. In recent decades, the fields of Public Management and later, New Public Management have expanded enormously, with major attention being paid to matters such as efficiency, effectiveness, value for money, excellence, and performance (Ferlie et al. 2005). Although the main focus is on 'how to run a service as a business', external relations have also been highlighted. The attention given to the client or customer of services is an indication of the interest available for the field of governing interactions.

Co-governing Interactions

Collaborative and cooperative governance interactions are growing in number and in importance. This raises an important question: why are groups, organizations and authorities interested in sharing their governance responsibilities and conducting activities together instead of alone? Mutual interdependencies are often mentioned as the main reason for such interactions (Huxham 1996). In the field of social-political governing, parties may collaborate, co-operate, co-ordinate and communicate 'sideways' without any one actor playing a central or dominating role. In earlier publications we made a conceptual distinction between collaboration and cooperation, collaboration being the day-to-day interaction where actors or entities work together, and cooperation a more formal attunement of activities. Two forms of co-governing stand out: networks and co-management (see Kooiman 2003).

One of today's catchwords is 'networks'. Its definition varies in meaning from an overall theory of society (Castells 1996) to very detailed, precise and quantitative analyses of particular types of interactions between people or entities in various societal domains. Functionalist explanations for societal networks emphasize the need for resources, combating common environmental uncertainties and strategic considerations. Interactions are mainly described as being of a horizontal nature, although minor hierarchical elements can also develop by, for example, linking-pin organizations. Approaches to networks that explicitly conceptualize them as modes of governance merit special attention. Some authors in this field even consider networks almost exclusively in terms of governance (Rhodes 1997; Sørensen and Torfing 2007). See Mahon and McConney (Chap. 15, this volume) for an application of network analysis to fisheries.

Co-management differs from networks by identifying specific tasks to be carried out. Authors in this field expect that by involving stakeholders directly in the governance process, a positive feedback loop will develop. This is because: governing knowledge becomes more adequate, resulting in more satisfactory governing measures, which in turn lead to higher management legitimacy and compliance, "accepting the regulations as appropriate and consistent with […] persisting values and world views" (Jentoft 1989, 139; cf. Wilson et al. 2003).

Working with Governability

We noted above that the governability of societal systems is a function of its three components: system-to-be-governed, governing system and governing interactions. Each component possesses its own governability aspects, some of which add to overall governability, while others detract from it. In the following pages we discuss earlier contributions to the discussion, which have highlighted the relationship between system-to-be-governed and governing system. We call attention here to two different approaches: one that makes use of criteria, the other emphasizing 'match'.

In one of the concluding chapters of the *Fish for Life* volume, Kooiman and Chuenpagdee (2005) postulate an evaluative framework for governability that corresponds gracefully with the four pillars of interactive governance theory. The 'features' (diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale), which permeate the system-to-be-governed, governing system and governing interactions, are first of all to be assessed according to the criterion of representation: "the manner and degree to which the features of a fisheries system correspond with those in its governing system" (Kooiman and Chuenpagdee 2005, 347–8). The utility of this criterion has been further investigated by Bavinck and Salagrama (2008). The second pillar, 'elements' (images, instruments and action), is gauged by the criterion of rationality: are the elements in tune with or supportive of each other? For 'modes' (hierarchical, co-governance, self-governance) Kooiman and Chuenpagdee suggest using 'responsiveness' as a measuring stick: "does the mix of governing modes respond to the varying governing needs of [the variety of fishing] types?" (2005, 347). The final theoretical pillar, orders (first, second and meta), is to be evaluated with reference to the norm of 'performance'.

The framework is not elaborated further in this first writing. The authors do, however, provide a pointer for how an evaluation exercise of this kind might actually be conducted. The 'simplified version' of an evaluative framework, which they present, consists of a matrix with different fishing métiers on the vertical axis and the four evaluative criteria on the horizontal axis. Each fishery is given one of three scores (high, medium and low) for each criterion, after which the scores are totaled to form a composite quality of governability.

This assessment approach, which is based on the application of evaluative criteria deduced from the theory of interactive governance, is expanded upon in a special issue for the Journal of Transdisciplinary Environmental Studies published in 2008. After a general introduction to the concept of governability (Kooiman et al. 2008) and its application to the realms of fisheries, aquaculture and coastal zones (Chuenpagdee et al. 2008), the special issue presents two case studies on the governability of fisheries, one in the Caribbean (Mahon et al. 2008) and the other in the Bay of Bengal (Bavinck and Salagrama 2008). Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009) continue in the same vein, replacing the scoring of items in the matrix mentioned above with the formulation of questions that guide assessment.

The *Fish for Life* volume also stands at the root of another, more practical, bottom-up approach to assessing governability. Discussing the governability of fish chains and the ubiquity of diversity, complexity and dynamics, Mahon et al. emphasize that "effective fisheries governance will as fully as possible reflect its operating context" (2005, 353). This formulation, which applies the verb 'to reflect', comes close to what Kooiman and Chuenpagdee (2005) label, 'representation'. What the first authors mean by 'reflection' emerges more clearly in the remainder of the cited chapter, which deals with the dynamics and uncertainties of the fish chain and the resultant need for governing system to boost its adaptive capacity.

Mahon et al. (2005) pinpoint mismatches of scale – spatial, temporal and organizational – as an important factor impacting on governability, and voice agreement with Costanza et al. (1998), who include the implementation of governance at the appropriate scale as one of the important ocean governance principles. Echoing Kooiman and Chuenpagdee's (2005) reference to 'performance' as a criterion for evaluating

governance orders, these authors emphasize upward and downward linkages and the integration of the overall governance system. 'Match' and 'mismatch' are important descriptors for the relationship between system-to-be-governed and governing system. Less complex fisheries chains thus require significantly different governing arrangements than do more complex chains. For example, a large commercial fishery that uses a few large vessels to exploit a few relatively stable resources with outputs that are processed and sold in supermarkets may be inherently more governable than a widely dispersed, small-scale fishery from which products are distributed freshly by a large number of middlemen with little organization of either fishers or distributors (Mahon et al. 2005, 351)

From the contrast drawn between a large-scale and a small-scale fishery one can readily imagine that a governing system may be in difficulty if it does not adapt itself. The idea ventured in this quote suggests that, because of their relative simplicity, large commercial fisheries are 'inherently more governable', is corrected some time later by another set of authors (Mahon et al. 2008) who suggest that fisheries chains of different complexities require different 'governance mixes'. More complex fisheries would thus necessitate "a large component of 'letting go' of past control systems to allow space for self-organization" (Mahon et al. 2008, 110).

Continuing along a similar train of thought, Jentoft (2007) formulates the requirement of 'match' in terms of 'compatibility'. He argues that the governing system and the system-to-be-governed should be 'isomorphic' and 'mutually responsive'. According to this author, compatibility is not a consequence of natural adaptation but instead of deliberate intervention, planning and institutional design by societal actors such as legislative bodies, planning agencies and civic organizations. This can happen alone or, preferably, in concert as governing capacity and interaction is enhanced through collaboration.

The perspective of assessing and enhancing match is explored further in a special section of the journal, *Fish and Fisheries* (volume 11, 2010). This section includes two research papers on the adjustment process between governing needs and governing capacities in Malawi and Lake Victoria (Song and Chuenpagdee 2010; Onyango and Jentoft 2010), and two applications of the governability concept from the vantage points of anthropology and economics (Johnson 2010; Sumaila 2010). One of the aspects elaborated is the determination of appropriate 'images' for governance (also see Jentoft et al. 2010).

The study of match has finally resulted in a number of papers on the limitations of governability and the chance that governability in particular fisheries situations may be restricted for reasons beyond immediate control (Jentoft 2007; Jentoft et al. 2007). This perspective highlights governance dilemmas (Jentoft 2007), hard choices (Kooiman and Jentoft 2009) and wicked problems (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009), and suggests a precautionary approach on the basis of 'sensible foolishness' (Jentoft 2007).

We have noted two approaches to the study of governability in fisheries in previous writings, based on the application of criteria, and alternatively on the study of match. These investigations have not resulted, however, in a clear choice for one approach over the other. Instead, the tendency has been to let a hundred flowers blossom. The following chapters build upon these variegated efforts at developing an assessment framework for governability.

Conclusion

This chapter had a theoretical purpose: to introduce readers to the interactive governance approach and the concept of governability, and indicate the relevance hereof for governing primary processes such as fisheries and aquaculture. It has hopefully become clear that, from the interactive governance perspective, governance is not just about the selection of appropriate tools or instruments from a standard toolbox. With every fishery representing a unique constellation of factors – located in the system-to-be-governed, the governing system as well as in the governing interactions – there is no single type of governability situation available. Instead, the governabilities of fisheries vary along many different axes, with some systems-to-be-governed being more prone to limitations than others. Stakeholders and others responsible for governance in different countries and historical time periods have dissimilar priorities – the weight they attach to concerns such as environmental health, social justice or economic progress may be quite different. Then, fisheries systems also vary greatly in the importance of and experience with varieties of governing interactions. The dissimilarities in factors influencing governability will naturally impact on the way governability is assessed, as well as on the strategies employed toward improvement.

Another reason is the fact that fisheries vary substantially as to their diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale. Interactive governance posits that these features have important implications for governability, with some fisheries facing an intrinsically 'easier' governance situation than others. More diverse, complex and dynamic fisheries are always more difficult to handle, but this does not mean that their governability level is necessarily low. After all, governability is about the governing system's capacities to handle the problems that plague the fisheries system. In many instances, as subsequent chapters will argue, these problems are 'wicked' and not at all easy to address. But some governors and governing systems are able to deal with thorny issues and arrive at acceptable solutions, while others – whose situation is ostensibly straightforward – have a more than difficult time. It is these differences, and the processes that help to assess and define acceptable ways forward, that form the topic matter of the book.

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