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CHAPTER 1

THE RISE OF POST-HEGEMONIC REGIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Domestic politics and institutions, in particular the state, were for long thought to be a hindrance to regional integration (Milner and Mansfield 1999). At times regional agreements were thought to 'lock in' structural reforms overcoming the limits of domestic politicization (Haggard 1997). In this view, regionalism and globalization were inherently intertwined in a causality where regionalism was often seen as subordinate to the dictates and constraints of globalization, or at best as a supplementary layer of governance (Söderbaum and Hettne 2005: 4). A new wave of scholars subsequently argued that the construction of regions is fundamental to the structure of the global order (Hettne 2005; Katzenstein 2005; Acharya 2009; Fawn 2009). However, as the long-term wisdom of excessive market freedom and extreme financial deregulation has come under fire with the eruption of the global financial crisis in 2008, rapid transformations in the governing of the regional space demand rigorously intellectual and new critical interrogations about causal influences on regional developments.

Even before the systemic quake, political renewal was underway in Latin America, and mostly in South America, where a tide of Left/Left of Centre and governments championing ideas to improve redistribution of income and social services gained political purchase in Venezuela (1998), Brazil (2002, 2006 and 2010), Argentina (2003 and 2008), Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2005), Ecuador (2006), Paraguay (2008) and more recently Peru (2011). The rallying cry, 'Que se vayan todos' (out with them all) that ended the government of President Fernando de la Rúa in Argentina in December 2001 has been a tipping point of the 'will to renew politics' (Arditi 2008: 57) towards a reversal of conventional wisdom with regard to the locus and practice of 'good' economic policy-making. Several of these governments have moved to free themselves of direct oversight from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by repaying loans early. In December 2005, Argentina and Brazil announced that they would pay off $9.8 billion and $15.5 billion respectively. Uruguay, Panama, Ecuador and Venezuela followed suit. In 2006 Ecuador ended the operating contract with the US oil company, Occidental Petroleum. A year later President Rafael Correa ordered the expulsion of the World Bank's representative in the country. The rejection of external oversight was coupled with social mobilization, a new focus on empowerment of indigenous people, and the call to enact solidarity on a regional scale. Whatever one's views, South America became a ready platform for the reignition of regionalism incorporating the normative dimensions of a new era moving beyond American-led patterns of trade integration and that cannot be dismissed as passing.

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The effort to recapture the development potential of South America is the clear manifestation of a historical change, a '*change of era*' (rather than simply an era of change) as claimed by the President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, in his inaugural speech as president of Ecuador in January 2007.[1] This change of era is aptly expressed 'at the edges of liberalism' (Arditi 2008), adding social development, community action and new forms of politics and organization onto existing practices. This book is concerned with these transformations as they manifest in new regional constructions. Our aim is thus twofold: to better understand the current analytical formulations of regional policies; and to discuss what new developments mean for how we theorize regional agreements that are grounded in different system of rules from those erstwhile championed by the US market-driven open regionalism.

We argue that alternative institutional structures and cooperation projects are, although embryonic, part of a complex set of alternative ideas and motivations affecting polities and policies across the region. But we also argue that to understand the significance of the current regional projects we also need to rethink the regional space. Regionalism is not only the institutionalization of trans-border practices but also reflection of transformations of the regional space. What region means for state and non-state actors can be signified and resignified as motivations, interests, ideas, narrative and political economic policies undergo changes. Region is, paraphrasing Wendt (1992), what actors make of it. Regions are a function of formal and informal exchanges and practices sometimes reflecting 'network societies' (Castells 1996; Bøas et al. 2005).

How far can we genuinely discern new regional governance at a time when trade has ceased to be the mechanism for the transmission of neoliberal principles? What does this post-trade regime look like? What do we know about these processes and the new terms of politics that are simultaneously regional and national? In what ways do they affect the given causality between globalization and regionalization? Is it theoretically and analytically misleading to analyse regionalism in terms of success or failure, as Dabène argues (Chapter 3)? Is the imaginary of regional projects mere endurance? Or politics by another name? That is precisely what theory struggles to explain. How can we dissect forms of regionalism expressed rather than in formal institutions in cooperation, social mobilization and 'informal networks' (Jayasuriya 2008)?

With these questions in mind, the contributions of this book focus on specific dimensions of regional formation and institutional building that account for current transformations in regional polities, policies, identities and forms of cooperation and competition. The contributions illustrate processes of regionalism and regionalization taking shape in contemporary South America. These processes must not simply

[1] The reproduction of President Correa's inaugural discourse can be found at http://www.radio36.com.uy/mensaje/2007/01/m_150107.htm. Accessed 22 June 2011

be seen as ad hoc sub-regional responses to the many crises of neoliberalism and the collapse of US-led hemispheric leadership but rather, we argue, as the visible manifestation of a repoliticization of the region giving birth to new polities or regional projects in which states, social movements and leaders interact and construct new understandings of the regional space.

The focus of this volume is on South America as this is an area where contestation and even counter-hegemonic processes of importance have been taking place at the level of the state and region (Escobar 2010: 2). By looking at a set of new foundational ideas and institutions, from new continental redefinitions under the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) to reterritorialized management of natural resources (IIRSA), security (CDS), currency and payments arrangements we ask how transformative these developments are; what are the tensions and contradictions they face and what they mean for the way we understand regionalism in its own right, as expanding the referent away from trade integration, and as a level of analysis clearly distinct from the international (Fawn 2009).

1.1. THE STUDY OF REGIONS AND REGIONALISM

Regions are formed and operate in very different ways, and are advanced by different actors. For some the presence of regional powers, emerging markets or 'middle states' with a clear position within the region and the international system, and with certain attributes that allow for leadership, are critical to explain the emergence of regional formations (Belanger and Mace 1999; Lemke 2002; Nel and Nolte 2010). Accordingly, some scholars argue that middle states will attempt to reproduce their role and interests by developing institutions and forms of cooperation in support of specific models of development (see Chapter 9). As a result, region is seen as a construction of authority and order in reflection of regional hierarchy (Lake 2009).

Although this understanding helps us to think of regions as an outcome of power politics and interests, in many ways in reflection of complex double-edged diplomacy *a la* Evans et al. (1993), there are some methodological and analytical difficulties with this approach. First, it attributes tautological significance to what the region is for, namely the means for stronger states to pursue their interests in a multiscalar way. Second, it severely overlooks the question of *followers*. According to Schirm (2010: 199) 'successful leadership depends not only in resources and ambition but also crucially upon the support of followers'. This is an interesting addition to a discussion that portrayed regions as top-down disciplinary mechanisms. The notion of *followership* adds a relational dimension to the discussion about regional powers.

In this view, other than hegemonic politics, region can be constructed on the basis of consensual views and interests that, although advanced and guaranteed by the leader, reflect the position of the followers. For some, this implies a transaction between the leading and following states securing some sort of win-win situation in which the leader can use the region as a platform for their interests on an

international scale, and the followers can benefit from 'negotiated' autonomy and otherwise restricted access to resources and markets. This interplay between self-interested actors in the construction of a common order resembles neoliberal theories in International Relations, by which regionalism is equated to regimes (see Krasner 1983). From this perspective, leaders and followers join together based on a functional definition of *the common* advantageous to all parties, even after, or despite, or even beyond hegemony (Keohane 1984). As stated by Ikenberry (2001: 28), the order is still organized around asymmetrical relations but the coercive aspects of it are 'muted'. As acknowledged by Schirm (2010: 199) while the leaders (emerging powers) provide incentives to the followers, the latter will consider the costs of following against the cost of free riding or following other leaders or established powers, such as the United States.

Malamud (Chapter 9) builds from this hypothesis highlighting that in a context of waning US hegemony in inter-American relationships, the emergence of Brazil, and possibly Mexico and Venezuela as leaders does not bear any teleological outcome. According to the author, despite its regional preeminence, Brazil has been unable to translate its structural and instrumental resources into effective leadership (see also Hurrell 2005). Potential regional followers have not always aligned with Brazil's main foreign policy goals, such as its pursuit of a permanent seat in the Security Council, the WTO Directorship-General, or the IDB presidency, and some have even challenged its regional influence. But if the Brazilian leadership is in question, what its double-edged diplomacy shows, in any case, is that non-hegemonic leadership is yet an important element to advance region building on the basis of a shared search for autonomous development and security, keeping extra-regional powers at bay. Many scholars have recognized that the historical legacy of Brazil teaches us that this has been a country whose political style and motivations have been guided by the goal of economic development rather than regional hegemony. In many ways, the political economic history of Brazil has been driven by a tension between the search for power and the search for development. This tension supported pragmatic policies towards regional integration and multilateralism. From this perspective, the question of leadership, and that of the role of Brazil as a 'leader without followers' (Malamud 2011), becomes important to analyse the nature of regional collective action. Do regional leaders act in recognition of collective concerns, or as simply self-interest maximizers using the regional space as platform for achieving national and global interest?

One way of tackling this question is precisely by fragmenting the notion of leadership. Leadership and power are important elements explaining state-led regional programmes and the establishment of control and coherence over certain arrangements. Yet, leadership itself, and even leadership as a tool for coherent regional integration, needs no mystification. The success of Brazil lies in the conception of a regional order that includes cooperative relations across a number of issues, such as geographical connections and security. Carciofi's analysis in Chapter 4 supports this argument when he holds that rather than a single leader advancing regional arrangements, the region is a space for the articulation of shared projects involving actors

of different magnitudes yet confluent interests. In his analysis of IIRSA, Carciofi shows how infrastructure is a part and parcel of new drivers of regionalism where 12 players come together. IIRSA is thus a manifestation of renewed efforts reasserting control over infrastructure and energy for the remapping of the regional political economy around natural resources. Coordination over natural resources is key in a context where global incentives structure is based on sustained demand and rising commodity prices in world markets. Like infrastructure, security and monetary policy are areas that shifted control from the radar and dominium of the United States and US-supported institutions to new institutions and arrangements where Brazil has been a key articulator. Thanks to oil bounties, Venezuela's drive for transnational welfarism is providing a new set of incentives away from strictly based market ones (Chapter 2, also Murh 2010).

These developments are explored in detail in the following chapters. These prove that these regional agreements are grounded in systems of rules different from those that were shaped by US-led inter-American relations, and that are part of a complex set of alternative ideas and motivations that are affecting polities and policies across the region. Pía Riggirozzi reminds us in her analysis that in a period of rapid transformation of regional policies, where the political and economic circumstances that gave substance to new regionalism in the 1980s and 1990s do not hold firm any longer, these alternative regionalist projects, together with more informal social and political inter-linkages, are also reflecting a new sense of purpose in Latin America. These practices are expressions of a redefinition of regional consensus over social and economic resource sharing, regulations, planning and financial cooperation. At the same time, these practices are laying new foundations for political and social cohesiveness that can be also interpreted as a sense of community building, or what has been identified by Söderbaum and Hettne in their many academic pieces as *regionness*.

Regionness denotes two sets of dynamics: first, a sense of identity and belonging of state and non-state actors to a particular region based on shared values, norms and institutions that govern their interaction and the ways they perceive themselves within a common polity (self-recognition). Second, regionness denotes cohesive action towards the outside (recognition by others) (see Hettne and Söderbaum 2000: 461; Hettne 1993, 2008). In other words, the idea of region as defined by its level of regionness has been portrayed by who defined regionness in terms of organized social, political and economic trans-border relations (material foundations of regionalism), supported by a manifested sense of belonging, common goals and values (symbolic foundations), and institutions and regulations that enhance the region's ability to interact autonomously in the international arena (external recognition as an actor).

Understood in these terms, regionness was often used to explain the role of the European Union (EU) as an actor in the international arena (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005), at the risk of falling in a critical comparative analysis that places the EU as the starting point to analyse other regions and their regionness (Rosamond and Warleigh-Lack 2010). Little has been explored on what determines regional identity, sense of

mission and belonging in other areas, in particular in Latin America, as regionalism beyond Europe was often seen as part of interest maximization and dependency management of developing nations vis-à-vis rather the global and regional effects of US policies. From this perspective, Latin America was the 'regional laboratory' for US policies on trade, investment, services and government procurement (Serrano 2005: 13). The level of analysis, the point of entry and the DNA to understand identity, common practices and belonging, in this view, was the global system. Furthermore, a transformative regionalism based on solidaristic practices and identity formation beyond market imperatives was expected to come from networks of non-governmental actors forming coalitions with like-minded groups throughout the hemisphere (Saguier 2007; Icaza et al. 2009; Von Bülow 2009).

However, new forms of politics and organization, most generally under the umbrella of new regionalist projects such as UNASUR and ALBA, are currently redefining new geographical and ideological boundaries while fostering new consensuses that are defined regionally, not globally, and supported by the mainly state-led practices, institutions and funding mechanisms in new social fields such as education, health, employment, energy, infrastructure and security. Although embryonic, these consensuses are setting new regional boundaries beyond the historical hub of what defined US and market-led regionalism. From this perspective not only is the notion of region resignified to reflect new spaces for state action but more fundamentally leads to new rhetoric about what regionalism *is* and *is for*. In sum, we can – almost certainly for the first time – begin to talk about regionness, belonging and even a new DNA in Latin American regionalism as arrangements reflect new ideas, domestic policies and institutions rather than the global system.

These drivers carve South America as a distinctive region. Building on this difference, we understand regionalist projects such as UNASUR and ALBA, and other regional collaborative forums such as IIRSA or the Defense Community as spaces for action driven by the search for consensuses over practices and cooperation in politico-institutional, socio-economic and cultural arenas. What the chapters in this book demonstrate is that any formation of a sense of *regionness* needs to be understood as the outcome of the articulation of foundational ideas about what the region is for, about common goals and common space and a sense of belonging. These ideas resonate with different social groups, local and ethnic identities, along with economic programmes for the organization and management of natural resources, production and distribution. Altogether they are redefining activism and practices broadening the arena of action beyond their own communities and nation states. From such a perspective, region must be seen as socially and politically constructed, and hence an area for contestation. What we also see, however, is that this process is not lacking contradictions as the civil society organizations born from the windows of opportunity of the erstwhile liberal projects of governance under the watch of the United States now feel reasonably estranged (Chapter 8).

1.2. WHAT REGIONALISM *IS* AND *IS FOR*

The literature on regionalism since the 1980s, when significant regional integration projects took shape outside the EU, embraced the concept of 'new regionalism' to reflect regional transformations in an increasingly globalized world. New Regionalism as an approach has captured the intellectual imagination of scholars concerned with regionalism beyond neofunctionalist understandings of integration based on EU studies (Rosamond and Warleigh-Lack 2010). The evolution of the theoretical debate about regionalism since the 1980s has been driven by a proliferation of regional cooperation agreements that, unlike the previous experiences of (old) regionalism associated with post-war economic protectionism, were part of a broader process of neoliberal globalization. While the 'old regionalism' of the 1950s to 1970s was a manifestation of regionalized forms of regulated markets and high tariffs, 'new' regional formations were tied to the transnationalization of trade and production, and the progressive liberalization of markets in developing countries (Bøas et al. 1999; Hettne 1999: 7).

The New Regionalist Approach (NRA) made important contributions to understand the relation between globalization and regionalism. It emerged during the 1990s as a nuanced approach to understand the regional phenomenon in the context of economic globalization. It was conceived as a systemic approach focusing on the pressures of the international political economy on regions, and the responses of these to those pressures, rather than the intra-regional factors and interdependencies that characterized many of the so-called old approaches, especially neofunctionalism (by Ernst Haas and others), in support of EU studies. For NRA the concerns were the construction of regions and regional agents. The focus was not only on state-led regional organizations, seen important but just as one element explaining regionalism, but also on the processes of *regionalization*, thriving out of (informal) trans-border exchanges between non-state social and business actors. This means, among other things, that regions are not taken for granted, they are not unproblematic or predefined geographical spaces, as EU studies tended to propose (see Gaspare and deLombaerde 2010).

For New Regionalist scholars regionalism was part and parcel of global capitalist transformations, manifested regionally as meso-globalization processes (Phillips 2003b: 329). It has been well researched and highly speculated how many structural factors such as the end of communism, the collapse of economies in the developing world in the wake of the debt crisis of the early 1980s and the rise of global finance in the 1980s and 1990s contributed to the 'triumph' of liberal ideas about the centrality of the markets and the inescapable spread of capitalism (Biersteker 1990; Drake 2006). In Latin America this template explained a generalized agreement amongst mainstream thinkers and policy makers, business, international aid agencies, financial institutions and governing elites about the failure of market regulation and state-controlled economies and the promises of open economies (Babb 2009). Loosening the restrictions on finance and trade therefore fostered new trade

agreements as the hub for new regionalist projects that took place *within* the fundamental and ongoing neoliberal consensus (Riggirozzi 2011). From this perspective, earlier versions of new regionalism therefore understood Latin America as part of a North-Americanized system that posited regionalism through locking in linkages to the North American economy (Grugel 1996; Phillips 2003b). As a governance project, new regionalism unfolded as a state strategy to lock in market reforms of the Washington Consensus on a regional scale. Regionalism from this perspective was conceived as a building block to global liberalization through the interplay between state-led macro-processes of regulation and, sometimes informal, micro-processes of regionalization led by non-state actors (Hurrell 1995; 2005; Bøas et al. 1999, 2005; Mittelman 2000: 113; Breslin and Hook 2002: 8). This persuasive argument proved resistant to many claims about historical roots supporting different pathways to regionalism (Fawcett 2005); diverse dynamics of cooperation in different areas of regional policy (see Söderbaum and Shaw 2003; Gomez-Mera 2008, 2009; Tussie and Trucco 2010) or US-Latin American regional agendas post-September 2001 (Fawcett 2005). Regionalism was simply seen as manifestations of global orders, envisioned as hegemonic politics modelled by the need of countries to engage efficiently in global market activity (see Gamble and Payne 1996: 251–252).

This perception is now seriously challenged. As the collection of chapters in this volume shows, the contours of the regional arena are being defined by formal and informal trans-boundary practices that denote a rich variety of forms of regionalism(s) that are moving beyond the issue of trade and finance, contesting the wisdom of neoliberal, market-led integration, and relocating the focus of regionalism as an extension of domestic rather than global politics. In this context New Regionalist approaches are faced with at least two challenges: first, how to explain projects like UNASUR and ALBA, and other institutional structures like IIRSA, monetary and security arrangements, that embrace new discursive and ideational patterns as well as practices based on alternative interpretations of what regionalism is and is for. These developments, together with the reinvention of some principles of collectivism and socialism may even result in a deconstruction of *the* region and a reconstruction of *regions* as spaces, or arenas for debate and action.

Second, new regionalists have tended to overstate the role of informal non-state agencies embracing new forms of regionalization that either reinforce or adjust formal institutional arrangements. This is a difficult formula for the understanding of Latin American regionalism. The place for non-state actors in Latin American politics, regionally and often nationally, have been ambiguous, if not weak, and often coordinated under state initiatives (Phillips and Prieto Corredor 2011). If anything, economic and business actors have sought to influence, lobby or participate in regional forums to minimize the risks associated with global competition and insertion in the global economy (Phillips 2003a; Grugel 2004: 605; Phillips and Prieto Corredor 2011: 129) but they can hardly be seen as creating a regional space in hand with regional integration led by states, or as creating opportunities for dissent and strategies that may challenge the regional-global liberalization relationship.

But even new projects related to social security and social development are still state-led and social actors are brought in under the auspices of the state into new dynamics of integration and cooperation. According to Serbin (Chapter 8), this creates a contradiction in spaces that embraced real commitments with regional provisions for social policy. Most of the civil society actors fostering further regionalization operate within state-led institutional frameworks and, in the case of ALBA, state-led trans-societal welfarist programmes. Hence, little seems to have changed in the statist character of regionalism and formal institutions almost directly dependent on national administrations and coordination (Malamud 2003; also Chapter 9). Emerging regionalism must therefore be still understood as intergovernmental yet grounded in new conceptions of solidarity and cooperation that do challenge the relations between regionalism and globalization. Escobar (2010) has even considered some developments within the ALBA region as state-led post-capitalist integration.

From this perspective, we propose that the relationship between regionalism and regionalization needs to reach a new synthesis. The divide formality/informality, state/non-state is unhelpful to grasp the number and nature of alternatives, and often competing, conceptualizations of regional governance in Latin America. Furthermore, the separation between state and society is arbitrary in many cases. As illustrated in cases new welfare programmes such as 'oil for doctors' or Peoples Trade Agreement (Tahsin 2009), binary conceptualizations can overlook the complexity of broader political economic processes linked to new commitments of inclusion and citizenship (Grugel 2009). Even if embryonic the logic of regionalism led by the state but with enormous impact on new areas of social development reveals a nuance that is not fully grasped by arbitrary distinctions between what states do and what non-state actors do. In the current context of overlapping regionalisms we can even speculate on the extent to which processes of regionalisation are forming regions without regionalism. A critical analysis of ALBA is a case in point.

Finally, the emergence of new practices, institutions and trans-societal networks, together with the redefinition of what constitutes region and *regionness*, pose another challenge to the explanatory power of NRA addressing current transformations in Latin American regionalism. As an approach New Regionalism was empirically bounded by binary categorizations of 'old' and 'new' regionalism. As new regional practices, projects, institutions and networks are departing from the usual approach to regional integration to focus on the creation of new spaces for (regional) consensus building, resource sharing, autonomous development and power decentralization, the challenge for NRAs is to reach a new understanding that supersedes binary notions of 'old' and 'new' regionalism. This categorization helped to explain the relationship between regionalism and the process of globalization leveraged and supported by the political and economic authority of the United States. However, Latin America is experiencing a move away from the neoliberal project as *the* hegemonic project envisaged by the United States regionally through the FTAA and bilaterally through market access and financial support. In this context, a shift in resources of power and authority together with new practices and motivations exceed what NRAs framed as new regionalism.

Region building in projects such as UNASUR and ALBA offer new spaces for deliberation and policy implementation that are at odds with neoliberalism and embrace global solidarity rather than global liberal governance and market-driven economic policies. This does not mean that capitalism, liberalism and trade-related forms of integration cease to exist or to move the regional agenda. What this means is that their centrality is being displaced with new valid and genuine alternatives to open, neoliberal integration significantly taking precedence. In an altered context, content also changes.

1.3. TOWARDS A POST-HEGEMONIC REGIONALISM

In the 1960s, when there was a renaissance of region building, the economist Gunnar Myrdal issued a note of caution, suggesting that the regional approach has no intrinsic justification. There are no mystical qualities in geographical proximity that make neighbouring nations a 'unit' in any real sense culturally, politically or economically (Myrdal 1968: 39). True to this dictum, Latin America is a vast and uneven continent of many contrasts which escapes essentialist characterizations, such as language, Hispanic, Catholic traditions or a single civilization as Huntington would have it. The differences in size and levels of development are several times larger than those found between the actual and prospective members of the EU. But such contrasts still leave room for some more positive assertions about shared trends, common dilemmas or recurrent policy features that prompt region-building efforts. This once again manifested in the current context of rapid transformation in which the cloth of regional policies, regional identities and regional forms of cooperation, and competition has come into focus as it has significant global reverberations, with Latin America being the passive receivers (Belanger and Mace 1999). Receivers are not helpless all along. In a context where Washington is aloof, astray and busy keeping above water tending its own with financial fragility, the opportunity to recapture the region for regional processes and agendas has not been lost. In this sense this reignition of regionalism is not only post-liberal but also post-hegemonic. In Gramscian fashion, agenda-setting capacities have been set free. Changes are already under way shaping alternative spaces, relationships and identities.

Latin America today represents a conglomerate of post-trade and political integration projects, and trans-societal welfarist projects reclaiming the principles of cooperation and solidarity. In this overlapping and sometimes conflicting scenario the term regional governance is being redefined as each project is faced with substantially divergent visions of what regionalism is and is for. The reconfiguration of regional governance in a South America distinct from the wider 'Latin' America has been a major feature in the hemispheric political economy over the last decade. Regional governance is currently the result of a mosaic where different regional policies, regional identities and regional forms of cooperation and competition are transforming the cartography itself.

Regionalism as an intensely political process is now a motivating and legitimizing tool for linked strategies and objectives whereby governments seek to coordinate the terms of competition on which rival economic and political agents confront each other. The process has gone through phases of energetic expansion, of mere trend-following, controlled stalemate, disaggregation and reconfiguration as a result of the ups and downs of policies and the changing conditions in the global scene. These factors have led to a leadership competition not only in terms of goals but also of the policies included and geographical reach. The analysis of competing projects consequently raises a number of interesting questions about the relationship between the erstwhile US ambition to lead a continent-wide project and the reactions to it. The vacuum created by Washington's detachment also offers new opportunities for a fresh look at the increasingly rich and ambivalent relationships spanning the continent.

Today the regional picture presents a complexity that challenges both the notion of defensive regionalism and US-led liberal governance. In a context where the very pillars of neoliberalism – as a political and economic paradigm, as a model of market democracy, as a sustainable and inclusive model of development – are critically questioned by academics, politicians, social actors and practitioners and many other stakeholders, there is in Latin America an effort to reassert fresh rules of regional engagement and cooperation based on the reconfiguration of alliances and new motivations that, led by new Left-leaning leaders, are redefining the contours of regional governance. As such, the configuration of Latin American regionalist map can be defined as an overlap of and sometimes competition between three main projects:

I. Projects with a strong emphasis on commercial integration as a transit to broader multilateralism, with low socio-political content (i.e. the so-called Pacific Rim with Mexico under NAFTA, Chile, Colombia and Peru in the Andean Community);
II. Projects that advance trade at its core, deepening linkages with neighbouring countries, yet seeking alternative and autonomous trade and post-trade political projects, even reaching outside the region (i.e. Central American Common Market, Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), Andean Community (CAN), Union of South American Nations (UNASUR);
III. A model that more radically emphasizes political and social aspects of integration, with new economic and welfare commitments, reclaiming the principles of socialism in direct opposition to neoliberal globalization (such as the Venezuela-led ALBA grouping Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Dominica and Honduras.

This complex backstage is unfolding in a mantle of abeyance and contestation to the US-led established model of 'open regionalism' that prevailed in the 1990s. True the current wave of regionalism represents a hybrid model, expressive of an alternative continental strategy for growth and social justice, representative of a more

political and confident 'Latin' America, suspicious of US leadership yet still largely in tune with the need for open markets. Nevertheless, new regionalist projects in Latin America are emerging as something more than a context-dependent, ad hoc reaction to the collapse of neoliberalism.

In this context, the chapters in this volume reflect on the essence of regional governance within the current milieu, the different trajectories of regional politics at odds with neoliberalism, and its mix of abeyance, adaptation, contestation, sidelining and pragmatism to a number of *realpolitik* dilemmas (Tussie 2009). In so doing we offer a discussion about institutional and ideational underpinnings of new regional agreements grounded in shifting and competing paradigms, a new flux of styles, fashions and rules contesting the open regionalism of the 1990s and proposing new, beyond-trade and post-hegemonic regional polities. The approach challenges the specific essence and permanent identity of the larger Latin American construct to dissect how a region emerges with the visible and invisible social jell of values, interests and ideologies.

By post-hegemonic we mean regional structures characterized by hybrid practices as a result of a partial displacement of dominant forms of US-led neoliberal governance in the acknowledgement of other political forms of organization and economic management of regional (common) goods. As we see it this is a relevant contribution to the study of regionalism, an issue-area that per se adds an exciting dimension to the study of international political economy for long over-focused on advanced industrial states as *the* systemic rule makers *par excellence*.

1.4. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The focus of this edited volume is twofold: to better understand current regional transformations and to discuss what new developments mean for how we theorize regionalism without obsessing with the European referent and how we analyse regionalist governance in a setting marked by the aloofness of the United States. Following this introduction Pía Riggirozzi concentrates on post-hegemonic and post-trade regional projects grounded in new understandings of development, regional cohesion and identity formation to evaluate post-trade regional governance in UNASUR and ALBA. Although there is undisputable agreement that regionalism is driven by economic calculations, the chapter claims that UNASUR and ALBA are engendering alternative political spaces for the reformulation of regional policies and practices in close relation to a search for autonomous development.

Subsequently, Olivier Dabène's chapter reclaims that trajectories of regionalism must be seen as manifestation of a repoliticization of the region that despite stop-and-go dynamics are resilient in the understanding of common interests and a sense of Latin (or increasingly South) *Americanness*. In the redefinition of new identity and politics, new regional institutions are emerging as part of a renewed will of government leaders to redefine the terms of cooperation and solidarity to maximize the management of resources and the impact on autonomous development and social

improvements. Carciofi's analysis of IIRSA must be read in this way. IIRSA is key to understanding new consensuses, agendas and cooperation processes in the provision of infrastructure that ultimately shape a region, and the redefinition of the regional space as an arena for harmonization of public policies. This is an interesting case that challenges conventional wisdom about the state and state regulations as hindrance for regional integration (Milner and Mansfield 1999; Haggard 1997). The management and coordination of energy and infrastructure is an example of regionalization of public enterprises, an extension of public policies as a new motor of regionalism. The development of regional infrastructure is intertwined geopolitics and international political relations. The chapter by Jorge Battaglino looks at the foundational ideas of a regional security community stretching from power competition to integration and a forum for conflict resolution and peace. In turn, Pablo Trucco assesses monetary cooperation mechanisms that have been spruced up in the face of the global financial crisis and that render at the very least a buffering potential.

At a different level of analysis, Marcelo Saguier picks up the social dynamics in South America. He argues that there is a significant demobilization and fragmentation of civil society as a result of the centre-left governments which have both incorporated and restricted their demands. Yet the force of natural resource extraction has led to a multitude of environmental conflicts that require attention and force the reshaping of public-led agendas. On a more critical note, Andrés Serbin analyses the gap between the official utterances to participation in the regional process and the mechanisms for effective civil society involvement in the new regional structures. Andrés Malamud turns his eye to Brazil as the regional leader and analyses the growing mismatch between its regional and global performance. He thus questions the assumption that the regional order arises following the interests of a dominant state. Such questioning lends support to resignification of the regional projects less pegged to the whims and needs of a rising power in the global order and makes it possible to imagine the duration of some projects less related to the balancing between regionalization and globalization of the neoliberal variant. In this sense we cannot discount the uses of regionalism serving to protect fragile domestic coalitions in smaller states such as Ecuador or Paraguay, or even Venezuela, whose presidents came under fire at different points and were supported by rapid regional responses. By observing these points we hope to open a new space for an analysis of the transformative capacity and the political resilience of new regional spaces and institutional arrangements. The book offers an original contribution debating the critical question of what the current regional developments mean for how we theorize non-European regionalism and regionalist governance.

Taken together these constructions lead from the question of economic desirability to that of political sustainability. The extent to which these initiatives can consolidate centripetal resilient projects is still to be seen. Nevertheless, they need to be taken as part of valid transformative arrangements shaping new spaces for thinking and negotiating alternative models for political and social cooperation. Theoretically these developments call for new, rigorous and critical analysis that supersedes the old

categorizations of 'old' and 'new' regionalism as these are limited to explain economic dimensions of regionalism routinely assimilated to trade policies and taking place within and modelled by neoliberalism.

Pulling the threads of all chapters together the volume will thus relink the sociopolitical and institutional dimensions defining new polities in a post-hegemonic regional order. Finally, the collection will add new dynamism to the literature on comparative regionalism that despite recognition of diversity, even today, tends to perceive the EU to be by far the most 'advanced' instance of regional integration, innately superior to other regional integration projects As such the book is an 'open invitation' to engage EU and other studies on regionalism as South America matters for the knowledge it can provide on pressing questions such as flexibility, the use of informal politics and power, and the continuing widening-versus-deepening debate understanding regionalism and regionalization in all regions of the world. Even if regions remain as ongoing projects in ever-changing shapes, they are fundamental pillars of global politics as contested and contesting results of given power relations.

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