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Waismann as Spokesman for Wittgenstein

In 1929 Wittgenstein left Vienna for Cambridge, and Waismann grew into the role of spokesman for his absent hero. The story of his relation with the man so greatly esteemed by his much-admired mentor Schlick contains dramatic elements: there were moments of friction and of coldness, announcements of withdrawal from a shared project, accusations of plagiarism or, at least, insufficient acknowledgement. What we know of this story has been told by Brian McGuinness and Gordon Baker.[1] If one wishes to gauge the extent to which Waismann succeeded in fulfilling his task as spokesman for Wittgenstein, one must start from the basic fact that between 1929 and 1936 the two men collaborated, trying to realize the common plan of producing a systematic exposition of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

As we know, the only constant element in Wittgenstein's thought was its tendency to evolve continuously. Moreover, it would be hopeless to try to describe the development of his thought in linear fashion. For what was discarded today could turn into an important insight tomorrow, while yesterday's self-evident truths could become today's obvious falsehoods. No one has characterized the attitude behind this more vividly than Waismann, who wrote in a letter to Schlick dated 9 August 1934:

> [Wittgenstein] has the marvellous gift of always seeing everything as if for the first time. But I think it's obvious how difficult any collaboration is, since he always follows the inspiration of the moment and demolishes what he has previously planned.[2]

We as readers of this tale may wonder whether the people involved should not have understood early on that the enterprise was doomed from the beginning. But whatever the correct answer to this question may be, the results of this collabora-

1 McGuinness, 'Vorwort des Herausgebers' (Friedrich Waismann, *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1967, pp. 11-31; tr. by Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness, *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1979); McGuinness and Baker, ‚Nachwort' (Friedrich Waismann: *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie*, Stuttgart: Reclam, 1976, pp. 647-662); Baker, 'Preface' (Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann, *The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle*, London: Routledge, 2003, pp. xvi-xlviii); Baker, '*Verehrung und Verkehrung*: Waismann and Wittgenstein' (*Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives*, ed. by C. G. Luckhardt, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979, pp. 243-85); cf. McGuinness, 'Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle' and 'Relations with and within the Circle' (*Approaches to Wittgenstein*, London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 177-183, 184-200).

2 Quoted in McGuinness, 'Editor's Preface' (*Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, p. 26).

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tion – Waismann's posthumous book *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie* and the astonishing number of drafts of its chapters and sections – may count as a sufficient reward for all the difficulties and troubles borne by those concerned.

In this paper, I want to examine certain aspects of Waismann's role as a spokesman for Wittgenstein. My method is simple: I shall look at one specific example, Wittgenstein's notion of meaning-bodies, and compare it with what became of it at Waismann's hands. Comparison, I expect, will help us understand the nature of Waismann's contribution to the picture we have come to draw of Wittgenstein's thought. Naturally, given the space at my disposal and the complexity of the task, the significance of whatever conclusions will be reached is bound to be limited. But they may nevertheless be of some assistance in forming a judicious conception of the value of Waismann's work.

I

Readers of Waismann's *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie* or Gordon Baker's compilation *Voices of Wittgenstein* (VoW) will be familiar with the idea of *Bedeutungskörper* (meaning-bodies). To quote one of Waismann's formulations:

> … let us imagine a number of bodies: cubes, prisms, pyramids, made of glass and thus invisible[3] in space, except for the bases of the pyramids and one surface – say a square – of each prism, which are to be coloured and therefore visible. We shall then perceive only a number of coloured surfaces distributed in space. These surfaces cannot be arbitrarily joined together, because the invisible objects of which they are parts prevent certain configurations. The laws according to which surfaces can be joined seem to be embodied in those invisible objects. This simile brings out, I think, what we have at the back of our mind when we say that the rules should conform to the meaning of the words. It seems as if behind the word there is an imperceptible body which constitutes the meaning of the word, and determines whether a series of words fit meaningfully together or not.[4]

The idea goes back to Wittgenstein, but as regards discursiveness and clarity, there is no discussion in his writings that could compete with Waismann's exposition. To appreciate Waismann's contribution it will be helpful to proceed in two stages: as a first step, we shall take a brief look at the development of Wittgenstein's own

3 The fact that in his middle-period writings Wittgenstein himself mentions *Glaskörper* and stresses their invisibility fits his principle of the 'transparency' of grammatical rules, as I have called it in my paper 'Phenomenology and Grammar' (*Le Ragioni del Conoscere de dell'Agire: Scritti in onore di Rosaria Egidi*, ed. by Rosa M. Calcaterra, Milano: Franco Angeli, 2006, pp. 228-240). This paper contains an attempt to describe at least some of the features of Wittgenstein's notion of grammar, whose general intractability is deplored below.

4 Waismann: *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, ed. by Rom Harré, London: Macmillan, 1965, p. 235 (*Logik, Sprache, Philosophie*, ed. by Gordon Baker and Brian McGuinness, Stuttgart: Reclam, 1976, p. 340-1).

ideas; and only after we have gained an impression of what Wittgenstein may have been up to shall we go on to compare his ideas with Waismann's account.

In view of the relative popularity of the notion of meaning-bodies[5] it may come as a surprise to realize that there are only a few occurrences of the word '*Bedeutungskörper*' in Wittgenstein's writings. The earliest of these seems to be his handwritten change, or correction, of the word '*Wortkörper*' into '*Bedeutungskörper*' in a passage of TS 213 (published under the title *Big Typescript* [BT]) where he discusses his standard example of the word 'is', which can be seen as having (at least) two meanings (= and ∈), whose distinct roles may be represented as different transparent bodies (e.g. a prism and a tetrahedron) with a single coloured and hence visible side, which would be a triangle in both cases.[6] The different bodies would then permit certain combinations and preclude certain others, where these bodies are intuitive ways of symbolising different rules or sets of rules of permissible word combination.

As the change of wording in TS 213 indicates, in Wittgenstein's manuscripts '*Bedeutungskörper*' was a – perhaps stylistic – variant of '*Wortkörper*', which is indeed the expression used in two earlier manuscript passages. The first of these (MS 110, p. 112) was written on 25 February 1931, and hence roughly two years earlier than the BT correction, the second (MS 112, p. 111v) is dated 22 November 1931 and comments on the previous one. Apart from straightforward repetitions in typescripts, there seem to be no further occurrences of '*Wortkörper*'.

In a way, however, these are not the earliest examples of the idea which interests us in Wittgenstein's writings. The notion of a *Wortkörper* is anticipated by the earlier idea of a *Beweiskörper*, which figures in two manuscripts written shortly after Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge in 1929. In the first of these manuscripts he says that a mathematical proposition is 'only the immediately visible surface of a whole proof-body' and that 'this surface is the boundary facing us'. In the second passage he claims that a mathematical proposition 'is related to its proof as the outer surface of a body is to the body itself. One might talk of the proof-body belonging to the proposition. Only on the assumption that there's a body behind the surface, has the proposition any significance for us'.[7] In their context,

5 In Hanjo Glock's *Wittgenstein Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) an entire entry is dedicated to meaning-bodies (pp. 239-41), and in the commentary to *Philosophical Investigations* by Baker and Hacker the notion crops up again and again, even though the word is mentioned only once in the whole book – and there (§559) it occurs in double brackets, thus signalling a gap rather than anything that might fill it.

6 BT, p. 166 (§39). *The Big Typescript* has been edited and translated by C. Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian A. E. Aue (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005; page references are to the original typescript). The numbers of Wittgenstein's manuscripts (MS) and typescripts (TS) are given in accordance with the catalogue of Wittgenstein's papers by Georg Henrik von Wright. See his book *Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982, pp. 35-62.

7 MSS 105, p. 60, and 106, p. 98. Both passages were later transferred to TSS 208 and 209 (published as *Philosophische Bemerkungen*). The translations are taken from *Philosophical Remarks*, ed. by Rush Rhees, trans. by Raymond Hargreaves and Roger

these remarks can be seen to foreshadow a number of points coming to the fore in later passages involving word-bodies or meaning-bodies. For present purposes it is sufficient to acknowledge that the relevant body image was playing a role in Wittgenstein's thought as early as spring 1929.[8]

There are various ways of connecting the first remark on word-bodies (MS 110, p. 112) with different strands of Wittgenstein's discussions of grammatical rules – an extremely tangled matter about which nothing helpful can be said in a few sentences, so we have to make the completely unrealistic assumption that this notion is sufficiently well-understood. What Wittgenstein adds to the by now familiar image of meaning-bodies is the question whether such a body could serve as a notation for a rule and in this capacity enshrine an account of how to use the word whose body is in question.

One may well want to argue that this is not quite the question Wittgenstein articulates in these pages, but it seems to be what he took himself to have said when he returned to word-bodies ten months later.[9] For in the later passage he claims that what he had then written about word-bodies is a clear expression of an error he has just been discussing. And the error he has just been discussing is spelled out as follows:

> … it can easily seem as if the sign contained the whole of the grammar; as if the grammar were contained in the sign like a string of pearls in a box and we had only to pull it out. (But this kind of picture is just what is misleading us.) As if understanding were an instantaneous grasping of something from which later we only draw consequences which already exist in an ideal sense before they are drawn …[10]

White, Oxford: Blackwell, 1975, p. 192. A fruitful understanding of these passages would require a good deal of contextualisation and an open mind for various possibilities of interpretation, and hence translation. In the last sentence, for instance, it might be better to replace 'on the assumption that' by 'if' and 'significance' by 'meaning'. But that would make it difficult to retain 'proposition', as the latter term seems to imply the meaningfulness of the relevant signs. It appears that however one chooses to translate these passages, one will prejudge some questions of interpretation. So, the only change I decided to make was to substitute 'proof-body' for 'body of proof'.

8 At this point I leave aside another interesting use of the body idea. In MS 108, p. 190 (the only entry written down on 20 June 1930) Wittgenstein says that there must be some kind of continuity between an order and its execution: the execution cannot be more than the front surface of the command or command-body. [*Die Ausführung muß, sozusagen, nur die Endfläche des Befehls (Befehlskörpers) sein*.]) Here the image of a command-body is used in a way which suggests that in Wittgenstein's eyes there was nothing strange about it. In particular, there is not even a hint of anything in the nature of a criticism.

9 Of course, there is no guarantee that in MS 112, p. 111v, he is really referring back to MS 110, p. 112, but as far as I can tell this is the only earlier passage in his extant papers containing the expression '*Wortkörper*', and it is a passage which *can* be read as being exposed to the criticism formulated later.

10 MS 112, p. 111v, also in *Philosophical Grammar*, ed. by Rush Rhees, tr. by Anthony Kenny, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974, p. 55.

Again, I am simplifying matters to make things clearer than they really are in the manuscripts, but it needs to be understood that we are dealing with two different points here. On the one hand there is the image of word-bodies which Wittgenstein has been writing about, and on the other hand there are the things he has said about this image. And these things, he now claims, contained an 'error' – the error of attributing to the word-body *qua* sign the capacity to epitomize all the rules ('the whole grammar') governing the correct use of the word in question in such a way that these rules can be extracted from the body by contemplating it.[11] What he does *not* say in this passage is that this (or any other) error is inherent in the image of word-bodies itself.

After this (that is, after the end of 1933) we find practically[12] no further mention of the idea of meaning-bodies until we reach the last stage of the composition of *Philosophical Investigations* and the first two manuscript volumes chiefly dedicated to what Wittgenstein himself used to call the philosophy of psychology. As a matter of fact, there are more occurrences of the actual term '*Bedeutungskörper*' in his writings from 1945-6 than in his earlier manuscripts. These later remarks are of some, but chiefly of indirect relevance to our story. For this reason I shall content myself with a brief description.

(1) There is the addition of the word '((*Bedeutungskörper*))' to the main body of §559 of *Philosophical Investigations* (TS 227). This addition must have been made at the very last stage of the composition of the typescript, as it does not occur in either *Bemerkungen I* (TS 228) or *Bemerkungen II* (TS 230) both of which contain the rest of §559, the first version of which was written much earlier (1933). Double brackets were presumably meant to indicate that Wittgenstein considered adding a remark, or part of a remark, on the subject alluded to by the expression enclosed in brackets.[13]

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11 The criticism mentioned above is retained in the revised BT version of our remark, but the typed reference to the passage criticised is crossed out at this stage. The reasons for this are not obvious, as the (slightly corrected and expanded) substance of the earlier material (i.e. MS 110, pp. 112ff.) is kept both in the typescript and in the subsequent manuscript version (MS 114_{ii}, pp. 32-3, cf. *Philosophical Grammar*, pp. 54-5). This part of the story is likely to be particularly relevant to our present concerns, as Waismann can be assumed to have had access not only to the (revised?) Big Typescript, but also to parts or the whole of the revision contained in MSS 114_{ii}-115_{i}.

12 At some stage, probably in the autumn of 1937, Wittgenstein copied one remark on *Bedeutungskörper* from the Big Typescript (TS 213, pp. 166-7) into MS 116. But that is not significant: it was simply part of the task he had set himself at that time of selecting a number of remarks from what he called his *alte Maschinschrift*.

13 Peter Hacker, in Volume 4 of his (and Gordon Baker's) commentary on the *Investigations*, suggests that Wittgenstein may have had in mind adding part of remark (2) below, from MS 130, pp. 68-70 (= *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. I, §42-3). This may be so, if TS 227 was completed late enough for Wittgenstein to have thought of this remark.

(2) In MS 130, p. 69, the image of meaning-bodies is used to illustrate our feeling that certain combinations of word-meanings cannot be held in thought because these meanings have a kind of shape that does not permit fitting them together (as in a puzzle). The image can be misleading if it goes together with an erroneous picture of meaning something by individual word-meanings in such a way that they add up to a sense expressed by a corresponding sentence.

(3) A similar point is made in MS 131, p. 40, where Wittgenstein comments on the idea that 'These meaning-bodies don't yield – or result in – a sense-body' (*Diese Bedeutungskörper geben keinen Sinnkörper*). He writes that this idea is not suitable for explaining what claims to the effect that certain combinations of signs make no sense may amount to. Again, it is the amalgamation of the meaning-body image with a psychological account of the impossibility to think certain expressions (*Denkunmöglichkeit*) which is criticized.

(4) In MS 131, p. 166,[14] Wittgenstein points out that the inclination to think in terms of meaning-bodies may simply be a feature of our way of thinking, just like the tendency to assume that there is a locus of thought ('thinking [or calculating] in the head'). At any rate, the inclination may be there – independently of how it has come about.

(5) The last occurrence of the image (MS 131, p. 182-3) is different from all previous ones. Here, Wittgenstein talks about a poet's or a painter's ability to suffuse his work with a certain atmosphere and our capacity to pick up on this and describe it. Such a description, he insists, cannot be given in a few words, for here we are dealing with a connection with a whole way of living 'which as it were forms its meaning-body' (p. 183). Obviously, this is not the same notion of a meaning-body as in the earlier passages mentioned, but it is a related idea which also involves the image of a firmly attached body with a certain shape determining the position of the object in question and thereby our chances to understand the work.

Not all the uses of the image[15] of meaning-bodies are of the same kind. In the earliest cases, in particular where he employs the notion of a proof-body (and that of a command-body), he uses it to illustrate a feature of his own view. In some of the later ones he suggests that, together with erroneous ideas about thinking or meaning something, it may actually mislead us. But as far as I can see, there is not a single passage in his writings where he says that there is something inherently wrong with the image, or that this image taken by itself is bound to lead us astray.

14 *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. I, §349.

15 Wittgenstein speaks of a 'metaphor' or a 'comparison', and he uses a standard formulation to indicate an analogy: *es verhält sich wie* … (MS 106, p. 98).

II

Against the background of this brief account of Wittgenstein's remarks on meaning-bodies I should now like to take a glance at some passages in Waismann's writings where he makes use of Wittgenstein's ideas. I shall first look at a short section from Notebook I in Gordon Baker's *Voices of Wittgenstein* and then briefly move on to a longer section (entitled *Bedeutungskörper*). Much of this material can be found in *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie* as well, but I shall generally refrain from pointing out such parallels. Basically, I shall try to list a number of differences between Wittgenstein's remarks and the story told by Waismann.

The first mention of the meaning-body theme to which I want to draw attention occurs in a section on rules and meaning (VoW, p. 132). Here, the image of meaning-bodies is not simply introduced as a separate topic; it is supplied with a context that is supposed to give its introduction a certain point. The beginning of the section is written in the first person, and the narrator is clearly supposed to be Wittgenstein (not Waismann).[16] In words reminiscent of the well-known conversation on dogmatism[17] he says that he used to hold a mistaken conception of analysis, according to which he believed that sense, or meaning, is hidden behind our linguistic expressions. And it is this hidden meaning which can, as he continues to say, usefully be compared with transparent prisms, pyramids, etc.

Of course, this is an elegant way of introducing the meaning-body analogy, but we should remember that it is not Wittgenstein's. We are given a reason for reflecting on the analogy, and the reason is from the very beginning embedded in a context of criticism – in this case, self-criticism. The reported self-criticism is strongly exaggerated. Even from the point of view of his later self, or selves, the early Wittgenstein surely did not think that *sense* was hidden. The view really ascribed to him by his later self amounts to the claim that elementary propositions (and hence, one might say, the ultimate determinants of sense) are not known but may one day be discovered. To be sure, this is a much weaker view than the one described by Waismann's Wittgenstein; and in particular it is a view which would not easily lend itself to making the transition Waismann wants to make in order to motivate the introduction of our analogy.

So, the few sentences prefacing Waismann's introduction of the meaning-body image serve to accomplish at least two things: (1) they supply a context which to some extent sets the agenda and the tone of what is to follow; (2) they link the image with a certain motive or reason for mentioning the image and thus make its introduction appear more natural.

Another noticeable feature of Waismann's account is constituted by some seemingly minimal additions which help the reader to understand Wittgenstein's

16 This *may* indicate that the passage goes back to one of their meetings where Waismann took down Wittgenstein's words. On the other hand, Waismann's use of the first person may be conventional and hence just another expression for 'Wittgenstein'.

17 *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, pp. 182-6 (9 December 1931).

analogy as part of a familiar story. Where Wittgenstein speaks of a rule in accordance with which the visible shapes may be arranged,[18] Waismann has a *law* (his italics) determining the possible ways of fitting the bodies together. The rules of grammar, Waismann continues, would then be ways of describing the invisible bodies behind their visible surfaces and a kind of unfolding of the nature or essence of these bodies.[19]

What is admirable about Waismann's version is the way he succeeds in spelling out the analogy: on the one hand there are the rules of grammar, and on the other hand there are the bodies with their various shapes. Their possible arrangements are governed by certain laws, which in their turn correspond to the rules of grammar. And so it is made (fairly) clear which elements of the image we are supposed to map onto which elements of the criticized conception of meaning.

As a matter of fact, the words chosen by Waismann come quite close to Wittgenstein's, who in a characteristic formulation writes that the rule would anticipate the nature or essence of the shape (*in ihr wäre doch bereits das Wesen der Würfelform präjudiziert*). But if one compares the two versions, one finds that, in spite of the similarity of the words used, what is going on at one end is completely different from what is happening at the other. If you look closely at the sequence of remarks in Wittgenstein's manuscript or typescript, you will notice that he has simply changed his subject.[20] He began by considering the metaphor of word-bodies, or meaning-bodies, but now he goes on to contrast physical bodies with geometrical forms and wonders whether geometrical rules can somehow be seen as encapsulated by a given shape. And it is in this sense that he asks: 'Can I read the geometry of a cube off a cube?'[21] This question gives rise to a discussion of the problem whether a cube, or a drawing of a cube, can be regarded as a sign encompassing the relevant geometrical rules. As a tentative answer, Wittgenstein then says that it (the cube, or its drawing) can serve as a notation of geometrical rules only if it belongs to a system; and in a later revision the condition is put much more strongly: it (the cube) can serve this purpose only if it functions as a sentence belonging to an entire system of sentences.

Evidently, these remarks of Wittgenstein's were an inspiration for Waismann to spell out the meaning-body analogy and its point in a way which in his view agreed with the spirit of those remarks. And to be sure, Waismann's account is much neater than Wittgenstein's: he does not stray from his original course, nor

18 See for instance BT, pp. 166-7. It is interesting to note that in the next remark (BT, p. 167), which however seems to belong to a different context, Wittgenstein *does* use the word '*Gesetz*'.

19 VoW, p. 132: ,'Ich dachte dann, dass das Wort gleichsam einen "Bedeutungskörper" hinter sich habe, und dieser Bedeutungskörper sollte durch die grammatischen Regeln, die für das Wort gelten, beschrieben sein. Es wären dann die grammatischen Regeln gleichsam eine Auseinanderbreitung des *Wesens* des Bedeutungskörpers.'

20 MS 110, pp. 112-114; TS 211, pp. 203-5; TS 213, pp. 166-7.

21 BT, p. 167, tr. p. 126e.

does he wander off in directions not announced at the beginning of the journey. What remains unclear, however, is the extent to which Waismann's story tallies with Wittgenstein's train of thought. Surely the answer to the question implicit in this description of the situation will largely depend on how we read Wittgenstein's own remarks on meaning-bodies and how well we succeed in this effort without being influenced by Waismann's persuasive account of the matter.

Though the fourth feature of Waismann's version will be described only briefly, it is of great importance but often difficult to trace. What I mean is the addition of truly Wittgensteinian ideas to a line of thought which in Wittgenstein's own manuscripts and typescripts is developed without drawing on these ideas. The short section on rules and meaning contains at least two unmistakable examples of this sort of move. The first of these is the idea of *being guided* by a model in doing something. This idea is familiar from various passages in Wittgenstein's writings, especially from the long section on reading in his *Philosophical Investigations* (see in particular §§170-8).[22] Waismann brings it in to illustrate a certain aspect of the feeling that a model of the kind of a geometrical figure already contains all the rules that apply to it. In this way it can serve to lead the discussion of geometrical figures and rules back to the notion of meanings as spatial objects standing behind our words (VoW, p. 134). And this is a move which (as far as I can see) has no counterpart in Wittgenstein's writings.[23]

The second example of the fourth feature I want to mention concerns the idea of a surveyable or perspicuous representation (*übersichtliche Darstellung*) famously discussed in §122 of the *Philosophical Investigations* – a remark whose earliest version was written in the summer of 1931. In the section on rules and meaning which we are considering here, Waismann mentions the idea in order to connect geometrical figures with rules of grammar, thus associating these kinds of figures and rules with the discussion of meaning-bodies and their role as ostensible determinants of word-meaning. As Waismann points out, the colour octahedron, which after all is a geometrical figure or body, can serve as a surveyable representation of certain rules of grammar. And while it does not simply usurp the place of these rules, it manages to render them more perspicuous than they would be without this means of representation.

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22 Of course, there are earlier sources. Among these, see Wittgenstein's German revision of his *Brown Book* (ed. by Rush Rhees and published under the title *Eine philosophische Betrachtung* [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984]), pp. 183-9. Cf. my paper 'Reading-machines, Feelings of Influence, Experiences of being Guided: Wittgenstein on Reading', in: *Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy*, edited by Pasquale Frascolla, Diego Marconi and Alberto Voltolini, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 31-45.

23 To repeat, all or most of the individual steps of the argument as developed by Waismann can be traced back to Wittgenstein's writings, but the specific sequence of moves indicated is Waismann's.

Again, this is a truly Wittgensteinian idea: in manuscripts and typescripts written in 1930 Wittgenstein explicitly says that the colour octahedron is a perspicuous means of representation, and that it serves to elucidate grammar. He even claims that it *is* grammar.[24] Some of these remarks are repeated in writings as late as the Big Typescript, but apart from a problematic mention of the octahedron in his late manuscripts on the philosophy of psychology the whole idea seems to vanish from his thought. The other notion of a surveyable representation, however, the one discussed in PI §122, is retained. But this passage employs a peculiar sense of *übersichtlich* and is closely connected with Goethe's and Spengler's morphological ideas and insights gained through a critical examination of Frazer's *Golden Bough*. The earlier notion, on the other hand, relies on the ordinary meaning of '*übersichtlich*', but connects it with a notion of grammar which arguably disappeared from Wittgenstein's writings together with the role ascribed to the colour octahedron in 1930.

But be that as it may, the idea of an *übersichtliche Darstellung* brought into the discussion of meaning-bodies by Waismann is surely the earlier, transitory, idea connected with the colour octahedron and its alleged relevance to grammar, and should not be confused with the somewhat later morphological conception of surveyable representation.[25] And we should also remember that the idea is added by Waismann to his version of the meaning-body analogy. I am not aware of any passage where Wittgenstein himself employs it in this context.

Comparison of Waismann's writings with Wittgenstein's typescripts and manuscripts goes to show that Waismann had a great knack for coming up with general and at the same time precise reformulations of Wittgenstein's groping attempts at finding a natural expression of his inchoate and often schematic thoughts. (This is the fifth feature I want to mention.) In the pages we are concerned with this comes out in Waismann's repeated statement of the leading question in terms of which the notion of meaning-bodies should be seen. This question amounts to asking whether rules yield meaning or meaning determines rules. This is a neat alternative which surely articulates a contrast that can be identified in Wittgenstein's manuscripts, but it would not be easy to read Wittgenstein as framing his remarks in exactly this way. And it is this generality and precision of Waismann's reformu-

24 *Philosophical Remarks*, p. 52. Much is made of this passage by Gordon Baker in his article '*Philosophical Investigations* §122: Neglected Aspects' (1991), reprinted in Baker, *Wittgenstein's Method: Neglected Aspects*, ed. by Katherine Morris, Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, pp. 22-51.

25 In a way it is possible to attribute the most important changes in Wittgenstein's outlook (as he himself observed in a well-known passage [*Culture and Value*, 2nd edition by G. H. von Wright, Heikki Nyman and Alois Pichler, tr. by Peter Winch, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998, p. 16]) to the influence of Spengler and Sraffa, and these changes can be described by drawing attention to morphological and 'ethnological' elements in Wittgenstein's later approach. My feeling is that these are the chief characteristics of Wittgenstein's thought in the first half of the 1930s that are (almost) absent from Waismann's adaptation.

lations which makes it possible for him to express Wittgenstein's sketchy contrasts in words that make for clear-cut opposition and a rewriting of the original tale in terms of a conflict of antagonistic views and correct vs. incorrect opinions or theses.

This talent of Waismann's manifests itself in another distinctive feature of his account, viz. in his ability to coin persuasive slogans. An example from the relevant part of his writings is the following italicized statement, which (as we must not forget) is meant to reproduce Wittgenstein's views on the matter. Waismann writes: *'The rule is discursive and cannot be replaced by something amorphous – by the meaning*.' Not only is this a memorable claim setting discursive rule against amorphous meaning; it also manages to suggest a reason for giving priority to rules, for 'discursive' sounds like a good thing while 'amorphous' surely points the other way and makes one think of something lumpy, primitive, uncivilized. And what this part of the slogan suggests can easily be seen to hang together with the meaning-body analogy if one takes to heart Waismann's version of a truly Wittgensteinian idea: 'We do not extract rules from meanings, as if meanings stood *behind* words like objects in space.'[26]

Now, readers of Wittgenstein will not be astonished to learn that nothing really corresponding to this slogan can be discovered in Wittgenstein's writings. There are indeed a few remarks about the discursiveness of thinking and understanding, and in some of these passages the more conventional contrastive term 'intuitive' is used. But the general slogan itself does not occur in the manuscripts.[27] What does occur, however, and may come as a bit of a surprise is a related way of contrasting discursiveness and amorphousness (as well as intuitiveness). In a passage from TS 211, which is known to have been in Waismann's hands, Wittgenstein writes as follows:

> … we labour under the error that believing, meaning something, knowing, desiring, looking for something, thinking etc. are *states* and that this is why something of a different kind must be hidden behind the symbolic processes of thinking – something which contains the sense of a sentence in an as it were amorphous form; that is, it would be intuitive, similar to an unchanging picture, not discursive and hence comparable to an activity (like washing).[28]

26 VoW, p. 135 ('Wir holen die Regeln nicht aus der Bedeutung heraus, als ob die Bedeutung wie ein räumlicher Gegenstand *hinter* dem Worte stünde').

27 It goes without saying that this way of putting the matter is short for 'I have not found any such occurrence'.

28 This passage originates in MS 111, p. 5 (7 July 1931). My translation is based on the version given in TS 211, p. 3: 'Wir laborieren nämlich unter //an// dem Irrtum, dass Glauben, Meinen, Wissen, Wünschen, Suchen, Denken etc. *Zustände* sind, und dass daher hinter den symbolischen Prozessen im Denken etwas von andrer Art verborgen sein muss, das den Sinn eines Satzes gleichsam in amorpher Form enthalte, d.h. intuitiv, dem Sehen eines gleichbleibenden Bildes ähnlich, nicht diskursiv, also einer Tätigkeit (wie dem Waschen) vergleichbar.' There are remarks on the next page of the typescript which repeat the words 'intuitive' and 'amorphous'.

So it is likely that Waismann got his inspiration from this passage and applied the contrast alluded to there to his task of producing an elegant version of Wittgenstein's ideas involving the image of meaning-bodies. And what he came up with was a general slogan which at the same time serves to justify a certain (critical) view of the notion of meaning-bodies.

The seventh and last item on my list of distinctive features of Waismann's (as opposed to Wittgenstein's) account of meaning-bodies is of great significance. In the first paragraph of the section entitled *Bedeutungskörper*[29] Waismann proceeds in a way which has no counterpart in Wittgenstein's manuscripts or typescripts. He traces the meaning-body idea back to Frege and quotes various passages from the second volume of *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* to support this attribution. Now, as far as I can see, neither the meaning-body analogy nor the view it has been turned into by Waismann is ever attributed to another author in Wittgenstein's own writings, nor is it ever connected with the three quotations supplied by Waismann (from *Grundgesetze* §§91, 158, 207). None of the quoted passages from Frege is mentioned in Wittgenstein's manuscripts. So, in all likelihood we are dealing with a genuine addition by Waismann to Wittgenstein's own discussion.

Of course, readers may find Waismann's attribution convincing and helpful, just as they may think that Waismann's much more critical description of the meaning-body image does more justice to the whole idea than Wittgenstein's own attitude towards it. Three eminent readers who willingly go along with Waismann's version are Hanjo Glock, Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker. Thus, Glock claims that 'Wittgenstein uses this term ["meaning-body"] to characterize the idea that behind each sign there is a non-linguistic entity, its meaning, which determines how it is to be used correctly. […] Such a view is prominent in Frege, who […] insisted […] that the rules for the use of mathematical symbols must "follow from what they stand for", their meanings.'[30] In their commentary on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigation*, Baker and Hacker heavily rely on Waismann's version of the meaning-body analogy and repeat the attribution to Frege as well as Waismann's supporting quotations. One example is their exegesis of §138. There they write that 'This picture of meanings fitting or failing to fit each other […] informs Frege's philosophy of language and mathematics […]. It is as if each word had behind it a "*meaning-body*" […].'[31]

29 VoW, p. 134, see also the following pages. Cf. *Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, pp. 234-7 (*Logik, Sprache, Philosophy*, pp. 339-45).

30 *Wittgenstein Dictionary*, p. 239. Glock goes on to cite various passages from *Grundgesetze* to support the attribution to Frege and repeatedly states his indebtedness to Waismann.

31 Baker and Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning*, Part II, revised edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005, p. 294. (Notwithstanding the great number of changes made by Hacker in the second edition, practically the same words can be read in the first edition of 1980, p. 577.) Unsurprisingly, most of the relevant references are to Waismann's writings. All three quotations supplied by Waismann are also given in the commentary.

In a sense, Wittgenstein's original version or versions of the meaning-body analogy have been put in the shade by Waismann's account. There can be no doubt that this is at least partly due to the features described above, and I am sure that my list of features could be extended.

Before I move on to the concluding part of my paper I shall briefly summarize the features that characterize Waismann's account and help to explain the success of his story:

1. A context is supplied to set the tone of the following remarks
2. A motive or reason is given to lend plausibility to what follows
3. Supplementing the account by adding new details helps to round off the story
4. Filling in of Wittgensteinian ideas where they are not used by Wittgenstein himself
5. More general and more precise reformulation of issues
6. Coining of slogans
7. Attribution to specific authors

Here, these features have been extracted from a couple of pages of Waismann's text. I am certain that all of them (as well as some further features) can be detected in many other of his writings.

III

I am sure that some readers would want to object to what I have been saying by pointing out that there is one text by Wittgenstein which I have forgotten to take into account, and that this work not only contains the story of meaning-bodies told along Waismann's lines but quite generally displays many of the features that I have listed as typical of Waismann's way of rewriting Wittgenstein. This is the so-called *Diktat für Schlick* (D 302). This dictation has come down to us in various shapes and copies, and most scholars have not hesitated to accept it as a *bona fide* work by Wittgenstein.

As a matter of fact, I have not forgotten about these pages, nor about the fact that they contain a passage on meaning-bodies which tallies much better with Waismann's story than with anything in Wittgenstein.[32] But I see no reason to regard the *Diktat für Schlick* as a work by Wittgenstein, not even in the most extenuated sense still compatible with the notion of a dictation.

A different attribution of the meaning-body idea can be found in Stephen Hilmy's book *The Later Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, pp. 122-5). He claims that this notion comes from William James's and Russell's views on psychology. In my view, Hilmy's argument is unconvincing, even though he gives a good account of the story as it unfolds in the manuscripts (see note 348, pp. 282-3).

32 The passage on meaning-bodies can be found on p. 12 of the printing in VoW. The title of this section (*Bedeutungskörper*) has been added by the editor, Gordon Baker.

Since Gordon Baker and Brian McGuinness have clarified a number of aspects of the collaboration between Wittgenstein and Waismann, some studies have appeared in which their authors have tried to give a convincing account of the *Diktat*, its genesis and its bearing on our picture of Wittgenstein's philosophical development.[33] Georg Henrik von Wright, in his article on the Wittgenstein papers, writes that the Diktat cannot be 'earlier than 1926' and adds that 'It is improbable that any of the listed typescripts is later than 1933'.[34] Gordon Baker opts for December 1932,[35] and Iven tells an admirably coherent story dating the dictation September 1933, when Wittgenstein and Schlick spent some time together in Istria. In Iven's view, the stenographic record in the Schlick Nachlass is the *Urschrift* on which all the known typescripts that were found among Waismann's and Schlick's papers are based. In addition to these writings, a further stenographic record has turned up, or rather been unearthed by Juha Manninen from among the papers of Rose Rand.

So, on the basis of these data one may think of various scenarios, but I want to suggest that we should start at the other end, as it were, and begin with an examination of the text of the *Diktat* itself. It is quite obvious that it looks like nothing else in Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*. This has been noted by several authors, perhaps most recently by Josef Rothhaupt, who carefully lists some of the evident differences – no separate paragraphs or 'remarks', an amazing degree of discursiveness, several specific references to other authors – but does not find these uncharacteristic features sufficient to doubt Wittgenstein's authorship.[36]

Here, I should like to mention a few points that may help readers to make up their minds about the question whether or not this document is likely to be authentic:

With the help of the Bergen Electronic Edition (BEE) of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* I attempted to trace parallel passages in Wittgenstein's manuscripts. Half a day's work resulted in the identification of several dozen parallels. A few of these

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33 See Matthias Iven, 'Wittgenstein und Schlick: Zur Geschichte eines Diktats' (*Schlick Studien*, Vol. I [2008]), pp. 63-80; Peter Keicher, 'Untersuchungen zu Wittgensteins "Diktat für Schlick"' (*Arbeiten zu Wittgenstein*, ed. by Wilhelm Krüger and Alois Pichler, *Working Papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen*, No 15 [1998]), pp. 43-90; *id.*, 'Aspekte musikalischer Komposition bei Ludwig Wittgenstein: Studienfragmente zu D 302 und Opus MS 114ii/115i' (*Wittgenstein Studien* 1 [2000]), pp. 199-255. Juha Manninen has been kind enough to make the fruits of his researches into many aspects of the collaboration between Waismann and Wittgenstein available to me. I have greatly profited from his generosity and hope that his results will soon be published.

34 G. H. von Wright, *Wittgenstein*, p. 56.

35 VoW, Preface, pp. xv and xvi. In his preface, however, Baker does not mention any reasons for his decision to fix on this exact date.

36 See Josef G. F. Rothhaupt, 'Wittgensteins "philosophisches Akupunktieren" mit "Bemerkungen"' (*"Krakau zugeteilt"*, ed. By Józef Bremer and Josef Rothhaupt, Cracow: Universum philosophiae, 2009), pp. 243-293, especially 262-3.

remarks occur in relatively early manuscripts from around 1930, but practically all of them can be found in TS 211 and/or TS 213 and/or MSS 114ii-115i-140 (the last stage of the revision of TS 213 [BT]).[37] Since a fair number of particularly close parallels come from this last *Umarbeitung*, it appears likely that the *Diktat* – however it may have been produced – was not completed before 1934.[38]

The most important result of this comparison between Wittgenstein's writings and the *Diktat* is this: that the parallels are a wild mixture – one sentence comes from BT, the next from MS 115, another from TS 211 and so on. That is, if one tried to assemble the *Diktat* from Wittgenstein's writings, one would have to produce a mosaic by fitting together little snippets taken in the most discontinuous way from a large number of these writings. As far as I can see, there is no explanation for this that could be compatible with Wittgenstein's usual way of working (about which we know a lot, after all).[39] What makes Wittgenstein's authorship even more unlikely is the extraordinarily smooth discursiveness of the *Diktat*, which has no parallel anywhere among his writings and does not even seem to have been a goal he ever strove to achieve.

Another point to consider are direct and indirect references to other authors. Neither the reference to Nietzsche (VoW, p. 12) nor the discussion of Heidegger's "Das Nichts nichtet" (p. 72) are in Wittgenstein's usual style. The awkward statement about the influence of Adolf Loos (p. 76) was certainly not phrased by Wittgenstein himself. And it is unthinkable that Wittgenstein should have referred to the *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* by the absurd name '*Traktat*'[40] (which on the other hand *was* used by Waismann).

Another game facilitated by the resources of BEE can be played by searching for expressions essentially occurring in the *Diktat* but never or only exceptionally in Wittgenstein's writings. Some of these are quite striking, as for example the word '*Woge*' (wave), which is used twice in the *Diktat* (once as a noun and once in its verbal form) but never in Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*. Another example is the word '*entladen*' as used in the sense of 'express (an emotion etc.)'. Apparently, this use can be found only once in the entire *Nachlass* (MS 140!) but three times in the *Diktat für Schlick*. A third example is the word '*psychomechanisch*', which is used on one of the first pages of the *Diktat* but never in Wittgenstein's writings.[41]

37 I don't count the extracts from TS 213 copied into MS 116 and from there into later typescripts as stages of a *revision* of whatever work Wittgenstein may have had in mind around 1933–4.

38 The first entry in MS 115 is dated 14 December 1933.

39 As a matter of fact, we know about a few cases (e.g. the assembling of TS 213 or the last third of *Philosophical Investigations*) where Wittgenstein designed and prepared fairly complicated rearrangements of his remarks. In these cases, however, we are dealing with (only partially successful) attempts at reordering relatively self-contained *remarks* – not the production of an uninterrupted and relatively well-organized exposition of claims and arguments.

40 VoW, p. 6. Another occurrence of '*Traktat*' can be found on p. 128 of VoW.

41 VoW, p. 8. The inspiration for this may come from one of those passages where Witt-

Other striking expressions that occur in the *Diktat* but not in Wittgenstein's writings are the nouns '*Epigramm*'[42] and '*Weltkrieg*' as well as the common phrase '*über einen Leisten schlagen*'. I am sure that this list could be extended, but for present purposes this should be enough.

The significance of these observations should be obvious: it is extremely unlikely that Wittgenstein was the author of D 302. As we know from our discussion of meaning-bodies, this does not in the least weaken the claim that the *Diktat* should be seen as a summary of Wittgensteinian ideas. Only that this summary was not put together by Wittgenstein himself.

I have no story to tell that could serve as a scenario describing how the extant copies of D 302 were produced. I do have a hunch, however, as to the identity of the author of the *Diktat*. In view of the comprehensiveness, the coherence and the faithfulness to much of the spirit of Wittgenstein's writings I cannot see anyone in the role of author except for Wittgenstein's ablest spokesman – Friedrich Waismann. If you read the text of the *Diktat* with the seven features I listed in mind, you will find that they can be detected everywhere in this document. My guess is, however, that it was not drafted as one continuous account. The most likely course of events can be conjectured from an observation in Gordon Baker's preface to *Voices of Wittgenstein*. There he says that Wittgenstein's thoughts 'can be studied in some detail by comparing the full text of "Diktat für Schlick" with the sequence of short typescripts that Waismann excerpted from this source' (p. xxxi).[43] I think we should turn this around and say that those short typescripts were based on Waismann's knowledge of Wittgenstein's writings and his discussions with him; and at a later stage these typescripts were used to assemble the comprehensive account contained in the *Diktat*. This story has the advantage of explaining the fact that the parallels between this document and Wittgenstein's writings can be found in such extremely diverse parts of the source material: as a first step, Waismann used a fair but surveyable number of different passages to piece together short texts; and as a second step these short texts were employed to produce the *Diktat*, thus stirring up the elements of the earlier mixtures to manufacture a new patchwork.

Of course, this is just a conjecture, but it helps to explain the actual form and content of the *Diktat für Schlick* and it throws additional light on Waismann's usual practice of dealing with Wittgenstein's work as described in the previous section of my paper. Altogether this goes to show that no one was as qualified as Waismann was to act as spokesman for Wittgenstein. His accounts are faithful to much of the spirit of the latter's writings; in many cases they are more coherent

genstein speaks of a *psychophysischen Mechanismus* (MS 114, p. 163; MS 140, p. 27 – to mention two passages that Waismann may well have seen).

42 The adjective '*epigrammatisch*' occurs once (MS 137, p. 140a, apropos of Buffon's famous observation on style, printed in *Culture and Value*, 2nd edition, p. 89).

43 It was Brian McGuinness who drew my attention to this passage and its potential significance.

than the original they are based on; the reasoning is lucid; the language is clear; and arguments as well as metaphors are spelled out in a way which readers can be expected to take in at first glance.

On the other hand, such virtues have their defects – or one defect, at any rate. While the changes effected by Waismann's interventions are apt to render Wittgenstein's ideas more palatable, they proportionately diminish their value as sources giving unfiltered information about Wittgenstein's thought at a given time. If you want to find out about this, you will have to turn to Wittgenstein's own writings, whereas Waismann's accounts can, precisely because of their many virtues, easily distract your attention from essential qualifications, self-doubts and incongruities. In sum, while I disagree with Gordon Baker's conclusion that Waismann's accounts have 'a very good claim to being treated as authoritative in the exposition and critical analysis of Wittgenstein's philosophy in the period 1928–36',[44] I do share his admiration for Waismann's qualities as spokesman for Wittgenstein.

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44 VoW, Preface, p. xxxiii. Cf. the following passage from the same Preface (p. xl): 'There seems no room for doubt that much of this material [that is, Waismann's writings] consists of larger or smaller fragments of Wittgenstein's own exposition of his ideas in the period 1929–36, principally in the period 1931–34. Consequently, it constitutes what is perhaps the only remaining hitherto-unknown *primary* source material for clarifying Wittgenstein's thinking (and its development during the early 1930s).'