

# Chapter 7

## National Context and Logic of Social Distancing: Children of Immigrants in France and Germany

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### 7.1 Introduction

This paper presents a comparative analysis of the socio-economic incorporation of immigrants' descendants in France and Germany, focusing in particular on their outcomes in education and employment. Schooling is a key institution in the life course (Mayer 2005) and different education systems lead to differential outcomes among children of immigrants (Crul and Vermeulen 2003). Cross-national differences in labour market structures can also be expected to translate into different types of labour market participation: a relatively high youth unemployment rate (as exists in France) will probably lead to high competition for jobs among the younger population. A wide array of institutional and structural parameters thus delimits the opportunities and constraints affecting groups and individuals, shaping their life courses. In the case of immigration, traditions of citizenship, philosophies of integration (Favell 2001) and institutional practices relating to the treatment of the 'other' play a key role as parameters defining 'national conceptions of integration'.

The migration background and membership in an ethnic or religious minority can be considered as one influence on the life trajectories of immigrants' children. In this paper, I focus on the descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany and North African immigrants in France, applying a concept I refer to as social distancing – *mise à distance sociale* – to explain from a theoretical perspective the differential patterns of incorporation that have emerged among these groups. I argue that the differential outcomes found in cross-national research can be analysed not only in terms of national modes of integration but also in terms of national-specific logics of social distancing, that might cause immigrants' children to follow different life trajectories in different countries. The concept of social distancing defines a process of exclusion that can perpetuate or change life trajectories. By studying how children

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of immigrants move through important life course institutions such as school and the labour market and by analyzing their outcomes in these domains, it is possible to identify the moments in their lives at which social distancing occurs. Using German and French survey data – the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for Germany and, *inter alia*, the Family History Survey (EHF) from INSEE for France – I present results on educational outcomes, unemployment, and positioning on the labour market. Based on the theoretical concept of social distancing that I develop at the beginning of this contribution, I conceptualise two specific logics of social distancing that emerge from the empirical results on France and Germany as well as the mechanisms underlying them.

### ***7.1.1 Immigration and Integration in France and Germany***

France and Germany are important immigration countries in Europe, in spite of the fact that they did not traditionally consider themselves to be. There is no doubt, however, that immigrants and their children are part of both countries' histories and that they have made a significant contribution to the economic success of their host countries after the Second World War. The recruitment of foreign workers to France and Germany was intended as a temporary solution to post-war labour shortages, but the immigrants stayed on. It took successive government administrations some time to understand that steps needed to be taken to integrate immigrants and their children. The main difference between France and Germany lies in the degree of political integration of the immigrants' descendants. In France, second- and later-generation immigrants become French citizens when they reach adulthood and receive the right to vote. In spite of the fact that Germany added elements of the *jus soli* – i.e. 'right of the soil' – to its citizenship legislation in the year 2000, a large share of immigrants' children still do not have German citizenship: for example, 63% of the German-born children of Turkish and Italian migrants do not have German citizenship (Statistisches Bundesamt 2010). In France: 80% of the immigrants' descendants between 18 and 50 of age are French citizens since birth (Borrel and Lhommeau 2010).

The exclusion of many immigrants in Germany from political life has led to the establishment of numerous immigrant associations. The foreign citizenship status of many young adults born in Germany has contributed to the intergenerational consolidation of this network of small organizations. The status difference between young adults with an immigration background in France – who are French nationals – and those in Germany – who remain foreigners – is reflected in the integration debates in these two countries. Whereas the debate at the institutional level in France tends to focus on social class and social exclusion, in Germany it focuses on the integration of the 'cultural other' into German society. Issues related to the cultural dimension of integration and to immigrants' identification with the receiving country are much more prevalent in Germany than in France, and are very

frequently used as evidence of polarization in the public debate on integration and immigration. In France, the goal is to reach or maintain a certain degree of societal integration or cohesion. The school system is quite important in this process. French policies, in contrast to German ones, are characterized by a denial of difference, as Ersanilli (2010: 44) correctly notes. Having citizenship and attending school – the main instrument of integration in France – immigrants' children are accepted into the community of French citizens and become political individuals. In Germany, the debate is centered on the issue of integration into German society in cultural terms rather than on the issue of social cohesion. This discourse is, in a sense, evidence of the focus on cultural difference. Despite the differences between the French and the German debate on integration, one can observe a culturalisation of the discourse and of the symbolic boundaries in both countries (Bail 2008), where the integration of young adults with an immigration background continues to present a significant challenge.

Immigrants account for 8% of the total population in France (Borrel 2006) and 13% of the population in Germany<sup>1</sup> (Statistisches Bundesamt 2007). The overall percentage of foreigners in the population is also higher in Germany than in France (9% compared to 6%). Immigrants from the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco) constitute the largest group in France, followed those from Portugal. In Germany, the so-called Ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*, *Spätaussiedler*) constitute the largest group, followed by Turkish and Italian immigrants. It is not easy to estimate the number of descendants of immigrants living in each country due to the complexity of immigration histories and the wide range of conditions in which the descendants of immigrants live. According to new estimations (Borrel and Lhommeau 2010), France has about 6.5 million children of immigrants, i.e., people born in France with at least one immigrant parent born without French citizenship, of whom 1.3 million in the 18–50 age group are of North African origin. The number of German-born children of immigrants was estimated in 2008 to be about 4.9 million, of whom 1.8 million were in the 15–45 age group (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008). Descendants of Turkish immigrants constitute the largest group in Germany (approx. 1 million, Statistisches Bundesamt 2010).

The immigrant groups considered in this paper are therefore the largest within the young population with an immigrant background in these two countries. Their parents came to France and Germany for the most part as labour migrants, and although they do not share the same cultural background, the majority of these young people are Muslims. Young people of Turkish and North African origin are not only what we call 'a visible minority' but have also become, due to the increasing public suspicion towards Islam in both countries, the target of negative sentiment.

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<sup>1</sup>Immigrants are persons born abroad without French or German citizenship. In some cases they have since acquired French or German citizenship.

### 7.1.2 *Participation and Social Distancing: Theoretical Framework*

According to the classical theory of assimilation, immigrant success is inevitable in the long run. However, research conducted in the US has uncovered several problems with this idea. By introducing the concept of segmented assimilation, Portes and co-authors (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2006) offered a more nuanced view of what the outcomes of integration might be, identifying factors that explain the different patterns of incorporation among immigrants' children, i.e., their paths of cultural, economic and social participation. The factors identified include: (a) skin colour, (b) concentration in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, (c) structure of co-ethnic community, (d) relationship between the country of origin and country of immigration, and (e) state of the economy in the country of immigration. Although the between-country variations in these factors would be of particular interest for the present study, it will not be possible to look at all these dimensions here. However, the role these dimensions in the production of social inequality play can be presumed to vary from country to country. Bogardus (1930) already identified cultural heritage and skin colour as possible sources of the difficulties experienced by immigrants' descendants, and he considered their *partial acceptance* by the majority to be the last phase in the cycle of assimilation. Nevertheless, the issue of skin colour does not have the same significance in Europe as it does in the USA, and its significance also differs between EU member states. In France, the skin colour issue is much more often the subject of discussions on racial discrimination than in Germany.

The extent to which *institutional arrangements* shape the modes of participation available to immigrants' descendants and the processes of their inclusion and exclusion are only touched on by the segmented assimilation approach. Yet several cross-national studies focusing on EU countries have shown that different cultural, institutional, and socio-structural contexts lead to cross-national differences in the integration of immigrants and also in second-generation integration (see Heckmann et al. 2001; Silbermann and Alba 2009; Schnapper 2007; Heath and Cheung 2007; Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Heath and Brinbaum 2007; Ersanilli 2010). By linking a life course approach to integration theory, it becomes possible to gain important new perspectives on the impact of the national context and on the integration processes. The arguments for linking both approaches are, first, that if integration is to be seen as both an individual and a group process, it is important to analyse the temporal sequencing of integration steps. Second, the national context in which immigrants and their children settle plays a crucial role in the process of their integration. Elder (1996) pointed to the importance of time and place, i.e., to the influence of environment and social institutions, in life course. Particularly in international comparisons, institutional differences can be pivotal in understanding life course outcomes (Mayer 2004, 2005). Comparing Germany, the US, and Sweden, Mayer shows how different life course institutions such as school, vocational training, school-to-work transitions, but also labour market

regulation shape life course outcomes and create different life course regimes. Historical, structural, and institutional parameters create a structure of opportunities and constraints for individuals:

the institutional contexts [...] narrow down to a large extent which life avenues are open and which are closed (Mayer 2004: 165).

A connection can be made between Mayer's idea of "open and closed life avenues" and the concept of social distancing used in this paper. Studying the adaptation of natives and immigrants in the United States, Bogardus (1930, 1933) used the concept of social distance, defined as the proximity between individuals or groups of individuals (occupational groups, religious groups, educational groups, etc.). Bogardus' concept describes a state, whereas social distancing describes a process occurring at the societal, group, and individual levels. The idea of social distancing used in this paper refers also to the work of Shibutani and Kwan (1965). According to these authors, social distance can be institutionalized. The same might hold true for the mechanisms underlying social distancing. Through restricted access to citizenship, stratification systems within which ethnic demarcations shape access to certain positions can be perpetuated (see also Alba and Nee 2003: 43). According to Shibutani and Kwan, when it is stable, ethnic stratification functions like a moral regime. If it spans generations, that is only because it is based on social consensus regarding the mechanisms inherent in it. This idea is similar to Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence (1977, 1997). The moral regime that is created or maintained in this way is perceived by the whole of society as 'natural':

Objections that someone is acting improperly imply a set of norms as to what constitutes his rights *vis à vis* other people. There are unwritten rules – and sometimes written ones as well – as to what is appropriate for people of each sort. (Shibutani and Kwan 1965: 28)

If institutions, through the divisions they might create, are at the core of the social order, social distancing as a – not necessarily conscious – practice might be a way for institutions, organizations, groups, and individuals to maintain this social order. Finally, prejudice has also a function in this process of social distancing:

Prejudice [...] is a sort of spontaneous conservation which tends to preserve the social order and the social distances upon which that order rests. (Park 1924: 344)

This paper proposes the hypothesis that inherent to each national approach to integration is one specific form of social distancing that operates at the structural, the institutional, and the symbolic levels.

I use the concept of social distancing here for two reasons. First, as has been shown consistently in the research, an international comparison on the integration of immigrants has to take national modes of integration and of boundary making into account. According to Wimmer (2009), any piece of research dealing with integration should make empirical evidence on the effect of ethnicity on different indicators its starting point. The theoretical concept of social distancing can be used to explain the persistence and significance of this 'ethnicity effect' since it addresses mechanisms of differentiation or establishing boundaries. As noted by

Alba (2005), the concept of boundaries is useful in the analysis of immigrants' assimilation and exclusion. In his comparison of the types of boundaries that characterize the situation regarding descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany, of North African immigrants in France, and of Mexican immigrants in the United States, Alba (2005) identifies religion for France and Germany, and also citizenship for Germany, as the main factors that contribute to the creation of a clear boundary, while race is more significant in the creation of divisions in the United States. The production of boundaries refers to the relationship to the 'other' in each national context, i.e., to institutional and/or symbolic factors.

Secondly, if social distance describes a status, social distancing describes a process that is shaped by mechanisms at different levels. On the basis of these theoretical approaches, three levels of social distancing mechanisms can be constructed: the structural, the institutional, and, closely linked to these, the symbolic level. While Mayer (2004) includes occupational structures in the institutional framework, I distinguish between the institutional and the structural level of the social context, even if the two are closely linked. The institutional level refers to the state and its authority to define the status of its residents, and the structural level refers to market mechanisms and the economic sphere. The symbolic level is related to the institutional one and refers to how institutionalized boundaries are interiorized by individuals. As a result, social distancing as defined in this contribution is not necessarily the product of individual action but can be the product of institutions (e.g., school, labour markets, and citizenship). Looking at how immigrants' children fare in terms of school achievement and labour market position enables us to identify the points in the life course when these individuals experience social distancing and how the social and institutional context shape their patterns of incorporation. This brings the issue of the sequencing of exclusion mechanisms during the life course to the fore. I hypothesize that descendants of migrants in France and Germany experience social distancing at different moments in their life course. Before presenting the empirical results, in the following section I address the cross-national differences that might be of relevance in understanding this difference and formulate some hypotheses.

## 7.2 Germany and France as National Contexts: Opportunities and Constraints

The national framework in which children of immigrants grow up can be seen as a structure of opportunity but also as a structure of limitations or constraints that are prevalent at different junctures in an individual's life course. When comparing Germany and France, one must bear in mind the distinct mechanisms of differentiation that take effect through two important *institutions*: citizenship and school. In France, *jus soli* has existed for 120 years and, to a certain extent, with citizenship (*citoyenneté*), descendants of immigrants are given the promise of equality (Castel 2007; Tucci and Groh-Samberg 2008). In Germany, *jus soli* was only introduced in the year 2000, which means that descendants of immigrants, as

foreigners, grew up being different. Access to citizenship is also relevant for the analysis of individuals' trajectories, as nationality places conditions on access to certain categories of jobs such as those in the civil service.

Schooling or the educational system can also engender difference and shape educational careers. In France, since the establishment of the *collège unique* in 1975, all children attend the same educational institution up to the age of 15. The three-tiered school system that continues to exist in Germany, on the other hand, results in earlier tracking and selection among pupils. In France, particular importance is attached to general educational attainment: in the 1980s the political aim was for 80% of a generation to be awarded their *Baccalauréat*. This resulted in a substantial increase in 25–34-year-old graduates of higher education in France from 20% to 37% between 1991 and 2002, while, in Germany the percentage remained stable at 22% (OECD 2004a, 2005). In Germany, vocational training is not only more widespread than in France; it also has a higher status. Based on the aforementioned differences, one would expect that the French educational system would be in a better position to achieve equality of access to educational attainment, particularly with regards to higher education. Recent research on social selectivity in access to tertiary education in France and Germany indicates that selectivity occurs in France between elite universities and other tracks while, in Germany, it occurs between universities and vocational training (Duru-Bellat et al. 2008). As a result, it can be hypothesized that ethnic inequalities in access to higher education are stronger in Germany than in France.

From a *structural point of view*, descendants of immigrants have grown up in an era of mass unemployment and industrial decline. The life courses of young adults correspond to these post-Fordist life course regimes marked by a delayed entry into the labour market and unemployment. Periods of unemployment after entering the labour market tend to be longer in France than in Germany (see Quintini et al. 2007), which can possibly be traced back to lower youth unemployment rates (21% for France versus 12% for Germany in the first quarter of 2009, see Eurostat 2009). Thus, competition between young applicants is greater in France than in Germany. The risk of unemployment for immigrants' children compared to natives may be higher in France than in Germany. The opportunity structure in the different industrial sectors has also changed, and this change shapes the occupational careers of the younger generations. The shock of de-industrialization was particularly significant in France: between 1965 and 2004, France lost, in total, 25% of all jobs in the manufacturing sector. West Germany lost only 14% of jobs in this sector during the same period (OECD 2004b). The majority of foreign citizens in Germany are still employed in industry, and, in France, in the service sector, which indicates the more pronounced labour market segmentation along 'ethno-cultural' lines in Germany. This means, *inter alia*, that children of immigrants in Germany have a better chance of finding employment in this sector than in France.

To analyze the paths of incorporation or the modes of participation in society among children of immigrants in the two countries and to understand when social distancing occurs in their life courses, I use four indicators. The first two deal with school achievement, and I differentiate between the two extremes in the educational

structure that play a determining role in their later employment careers: (1) leaving school with a low certificate or no qualification at all and (2) leaving school with a university degree. The third and fourth indicators are related to the labour market: (3) industrial sector of occupation and (4) unemployment experience.

### 7.3 Data and Methods

The following results are based on the 1999 Family History Survey, INSEE, for France and the 2002 Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) for Germany. The surveys differ in terms of sample size but are representative for both the French and German populations (see appendix). The French Family History Survey was drawn in 1999, in the same year of the national census. This survey provides information on respondents' nationality and birthplace as well as on their parents' birthplace. Our focus is on young adults between 18 and 40 years old who were either born in Germany or France or moved there when they were 15 or younger. The immigrants' descendants included in the analysis have German, French, or foreign citizenship. This is particularly important for France, where the majority of immigrants' descendants are French citizens. If they are not foreign citizens, their country of origin is determined, for France, based on parental information and, for Germany, based on naturalization information (information available in the 2002 wave of the SOEP) and their country of birth. The descriptive statistics in the appendix show that more children of immigrants are 'naturalized' in France than in Germany. Immigrants' descendants are defined for France as having at least one parent of foreign origin. This means that descendants of North African immigrants also include children of French repatriates, who have, on average, better school and work trajectories (Alba and Silberman 2002; Silberman and Fournier 2007). In the sample, 28% of the young adults with both parents born in North Africa have a high education level, compared to 35% of those with only one parent born in North Africa (see appendix). Descendants of South European migrants in both countries are also included in the analysis as their parents also moved to France and Germany as guest workers.<sup>2</sup> More of the immigrants' descendants living in Germany were born abroad than is the case in France. Since migration experience might lead to different integration patterns, the birthplaces will be taken into account in all analyses. Children of immigrants in both countries are characterized by a lower social background; this might explain their lower educational achievement on average. One could expect that differences between young natives and immigrants' descendants disappear when controlling for the father's occupational status (when the respondent was 15 years old), in particular in the case of immigrants' children who were not born abroad.

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<sup>2</sup>This group includes the following countries: Spain, Portugal, and Italy for France, and Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Italy for Germany.



### 7.3.1 Differences in Educational Achievement

As mentioned in the theoretical section of this paper, school, as an institution, offers different opportunities depending on the national context that shape and define educational careers (Mayer 2004). Here, I decided to look at both extremes in order to assess the degree of inequality between the groups of origin: leaving school with no educational certificate or at a lower secondary level and leaving school with a university degree. If one looks, in both countries, at the probability of leaving school without educational attainment, after controlling for social origin, one can see that all groups considered are disadvantaged (Table 7.1).<sup>3</sup>

Young adults of Turkish origin born in Germany have a 2.5 times greater chance of leaving school without educational attainment or only a certificate of the lower secondary level compared to young people of German origin. In Germany, being born in Germany significantly reduces the chance of having relatively poor qualifications or no qualification at all, whereas the difference between being born in or outside France makes no such difference. The effect for young people of North African origin born in France barely differs from the effect for those who were born abroad. One reason might be that the educational system in the former North

**Table 7.1** Risk of leaving school without diploma or at a lower secondary level (odds ratios)

	France		Germany	
	I	II	I	II
<b>Women</b> (Ref.: men)	1.030+	1.025	1.086	1.086
<b>Age</b>	1.024**	1.028**	0.882**	0.880**
<b>Origin</b> (Ref.: France/Germany)				
North Africa/Turkey, born in France/Germany	1.375**	1.315**	3.254**	2.539**
North Africa/Turkey, born abroad	2.014**	1.475**	7.175**	5.704**
Southern Europe, born in France/ Germany	1.266**	1.054	1.821**	1.524*
Southern Europe, born abroad	2.144**	1.587**	4.544**	3.899**
<b>Father's occupational status</b> (Ref.: White collar)				
Blue-collar		2.195**		2.489**
Self-employed		1.177**		0.916
Inactive/Unemployed		4.739*		3.495**
Missing		2.978**		2.854**
<b>Constant</b>	-2.157**	-2.677**	1.821**	1.514**
<b>Observations</b>	98,400	98,400	6,885	6,885
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> (McFadden)</b>	0.01	0.03	0.12	0.13

Source: SOEP 2002 and Enquête Histoire Familiale 1999

+  $P < 0.1$ ; \*  $P < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $P < 0.01$

Excluding those surveyed who remain in education

<sup>3</sup>The odds are higher for migrants' descendants in Germany than in France, which indicates a stronger disadvantage in Germany for this population. But this might also be related to different sample sizes.

**Table 7.2** Chance of receiving a higher education degree (odds ratios)

	France		Germany	
	I	II	I	II
<b>Women</b> (Ref.: men)	1.368**	1.397**	0.857*	0.866*
<b>Age</b>	0.999*	0.995**	1.108**	1.117**
<b>Size of household</b>	0.755**	0.774**	0.778**	0.786**
<b>Married</b> (Ref.: no)	1.289**	1.274**	1.349**	1.337**
<b>Origin</b> (Ref.: France / Germany)				
North Africa/Turkey, born in France/Germany	0.945*	0.967	0.194**	0.310*
North Africa/Turkey, born abroad	0.536**	0.877	0.357**	0.567*
Southern Europe, born in France/Germany	0.679**	0.916*	1.161	1.551*
Southern Europe born abroad	0.388**	0.636**	0.490*	0.674
<b>Father's occupational status</b> (Ref.: civil servant)				
Blue-collar		0.275**		0.317**
Self-employed		0.619**		0.805*
Inactive/Unemployed		0.211**		0.415**
Missing		0.293**		0.388**
<b>Constant</b>	-0.719**	-0.161**	-3.676**	-3.411**
<b>Observations</b>	98,400	98,400	6,884	6,884
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> (McFadden)</b>	0.03	0.08	0.08	0.12

Source: SOEP 2002 and Enquête Histoire Familiale 1999

$P < 0.1$ ; \*  $P < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $P < 0.01$

Excluding those surveyed who remain in education

African colonies is quite similar to the French one. The selection and orientation that occurs at an early age in Germany might mean that young immigrants have much less time to catch up with their German counterparts. Educational selection at age 15 in France makes immigrant children's catching-up processes easier. Bearing this in mind, immigration as a child is not a source of disqualification to the same extent in both countries. This, of course, has repercussions for an individual's later life course, i.e., on labour market participation and occupation.

High educational attainment can be seen as an indicator of educational success. If we look at the chances of achieving higher education certificates, it seems that young people of North African and Turkish origins are similarly disadvantaged (Table 7.2, first model). If one controls for social origin, then the effect for the descendants of North African immigrants loses statistical significance, independent of birthplace. Thus the disadvantage experienced by young people of this origin can be completely explained by their social origin. This holds not true for young people from Southern Europe. Brinbaum and Kieffer (2005) demonstrated that the latter prefer to pursue relatively short vocational training and the former a more general and longer education. Preferences, parental orientations, and community networks might explain the inter-group differences observed. Young people of Southern European origin who attend school in Germany have a statistically significant higher chance of being awarded a university degree compared to native Germans.

Social origin is not the only explanation for the disadvantaged position of descendants of Turkish migrants in Germany. Their relegation to lower tracks of the educational system that do not lead to university study probably also plays a role in this outcome. As shown by Kristen et al. (2008), young people of Turkish origin completing the *Gymnasium* have a higher chance of going on to attend university than young adults of German origin. Nevertheless, early orientation and selection in Germany reduces their chances of acquiring the university entrance qualification since they face a double disadvantage at an early age, due both to their limited social resources and to their bi-cultural situation (Geißler and Weber-Menges 2008). Finally, the results indicate that the situation of descendants of North African immigrants in France is characterized by polarization, whereas, the situation of children of Turkish origin in Germany is characterized by a relegation to the lowest tracks of the educational system. From a life course perspective, one can say here that social distancing occurs much earlier in the life course of immigrants' descendants in Germany than in France. If the educational system as a life course institution promotes the exclusion of immigrants' children in Germany, their exclusion from German citizenship exacerbates this difference. The institutionalized boundary legitimizes discrepancies in access to certain opportunities (such as civil service employment). In contrast, the more or less automatic acquisition of French citizenship of immigrants' children in France has served to conceal the different treatment of the 'other' there. Not only do children of immigrants belong to the community of French citizens; their social origin also fully explains their lower chances of completing tertiary degrees. In Germany, relegation to the lower educational tracks and massive exclusion from tertiary study leads to the accentuation of difference or boundary. Through the displacement of descendants of Turkish immigrants to the lower educational tracks, a situation is created that may perpetuate the segmentation of the labour market along ethno-cultural lines.

### ***7.3.2 Labour Market Participation***

If social distancing does not occur early in the life course in France, how do children of immigrants position themselves on the labour market in the existing structural context with the resources available to them, and which segments of the social structure do they occupy in the two countries? In the analyses that follow, the dependent variable refers to the current labour market and occupational status of survey respondents.

In light of the cross-national differences in the level of deindustrialization and size of the service sector in the two countries, I proposed the hypothesis that children of immigrants in Germany continue to occupy positions in the manufacturing sector while those in France tend to gravitate towards the service sector. As the multivariate results indicate, young people of North African origin in France have left the industrial sector and are over-represented in the service industry. Controlling for educational level, social origin, and gender, descendants of North African

**Table 7.3** Chance of working in the manufacturing and service sector (odds ratios)

	France (manufacturing sector)	Germany (manufacturing sector)	France (service sector)	Germany (service sector)
<b>Women</b> (Ref.: men)	0.435**	0.349**	3.369**	4.521**
<b>Age</b>	1.111**	1.099	0.916**	0.939
<b>Age squared</b>	0.998**	0.999	1.001**	1.001
<b>Origin</b> (Ref.: France/Germany)				
North Africa/Turkey, born in France/Germany	0.649**	1.778+	1.673**	0.852
North Africa/Turkey, born abroad	0.726*	2.797**	1.471**	0.583*
Southern Europe, born in France/Germany	0.902*	1.750+	1.131**	0.960
Southern Europe born abroad	0.999	2.111*	0.829*	0.551+
<b>Educational level</b> (Ref.: low)				
Middle	0.741**	1.014	1.422**	0.884
High	0.710**	0.762+	1.884**	1.515**
<b>Constant</b>	-1.485**	-2.208+	0.153	0.873
<b>Observations</b>	70,280	4,512	70,280	4,512
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.04	0.06	0.09	0.11

Source: SOEP 2002 and Enquête Histoire Familiale 1999

+  $P < 0.1$ ; \*  $P < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $P < 0.01$

Without self-employed respondents

Control variable: Father's occupational status

immigrants have a statistically significantly higher chance of being employed in the service sector and a significantly lower chance of being employed in the manufacturing sector (Table 7.3). This holds true regardless of their place of birth.

Immigrants' descendants born in France do not differ significantly in this respect from those who migrated as children or adolescents. The overrepresentation of young people of North African origin in the service sector might be partially explained by the rapid decline of the manufacturing sector, but also by the French employment policy introduced in 1998 (and discontinued in 2001). This policy aimed to help young people get jobs in the social sector (Kirszbaum et al. 2009: 39).<sup>4</sup> The results presented here also confirm findings from qualitative studies (Beaud and Pialoud 2004) that highlight the desire of young people of North African origin for 'clean' jobs, which entail different kinds of work than their parents did but also mean competing for jobs with French natives.

The situation for descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany is almost the opposite. Also, after controlling for education and social origin, their chances of

<sup>4</sup>Results from logistic regressions based on the French survey "Generation 1998" indicate that young men and women of North African origin have a significantly higher probability of working as a social worker even after controlling for region, educational level, and branch of study. The results from these regressions are available from the author upon request.

being employed in the manufacturing industry are almost twice as high, but their chances of working in the service sector do not differ significantly from native Germans. Interestingly, the chance of working in the manufacturing sector in France depends on educational level: the lower the educational qualification, the higher the chance of working in this sector. In Germany, no statistically significant effect of education can be found.

Another major difference between France and Germany lies in the openness of the public sector and civil service to children of immigrants. The state is an important employer in the service sector in France, where the public sector size is twice as large as in Germany (ILO 2010). Results by Tucci (2009) suggest that the public sector in France is a significant employer of young people, including those of foreign origin. In particular, the proportion of young adults of North African origin working in this sector is as high as the proportion of French natives. Nevertheless, the former are underrepresented in the French civil service.<sup>5</sup> In Germany, the inequality is high and young adults of immigrant origin are hugely underrepresented in both the public sector and the civil service (Tucci 2009). The introduction of elements of the *jus soli* into German citizenship legislation might open up new employment opportunities in the civil service. The limited chances for young people of immigrant origin to get jobs as civil servants due to their foreign citizenship promote the segmentation of the labour market along ethnic or immigration-related lines. This shows how institutional and structural mechanisms of social distancing go hand in hand, reinforcing each other's effects. Not only are descendants of Turkish immigrants excluded very early in the life course; they are also assigned to positions in the labour market that are similar to those of their parents and where they do not really compete with German natives.

This strong presence of migrants' children in the service sector, coupled with a high youth unemployment rate, may be one of the causes of high competition for jobs on the French labour market. Young adults of North African origin in France experience particular difficulties entering the labour market (Table 7.4). Controlling for education level and social background, young adults of North African origin have almost twice the chance of being unemployed as young French natives. No significant effect can be found for the descendants of South European migrants.

Young people of Turkish origin in Germany are equally disadvantaged. If one only controls only for demographic variables, the chance of these young people being unemployed is more than double that of their German counterparts. After controlling for social origin and educational level, both effect and significance decline, in contrast to the findings on the young adults of North African origin in France. However, the effect for the young adults of Turkish origin who are born in Germany is still marginally significant, whereas the effect for those born abroad is

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<sup>5</sup>This can, *inter alia*, be attributed to their social backgrounds. Research shows that having a parent in the civil service significantly increases the chance of a child also becoming a civil servant. Furthermore, cultural aspects such as the amount of information, orientation, and preparation for the entry tests to the civil service might play a role (Pouget 2005).

**Table 7.4** Risk of unemployment (odds ratios)

	France		Germany	
	I	II	I	II
<b>Women</b> (Ref.: men)	2.016**	2.162**	1.228*	1.213*
<b>Age</b>	0.751**	0.840**	0.660**	0.709**
<b>Age squared</b>	1.004**	1.002**	1.006**	1.005**
<b>Size of household</b>	1.159**	1.115**	1.137**	1.105*
<b>Married</b> (Ref.: no)	0.555**	0.559**	0.470**	0.479**
<b>Origin</b> (Ref.: France / Germany)				
North Africa/Turkey, born in France/Germany	1.909**	1.790**	2.679**	1.709+
North Africa/Turkey, born abroad	2.562**	2.164**	2.345**	1.454
Southern Europe, born in France/Germany	1.130**	1.031	0.414+	0.341*
Southern Europe born abroad	1.272*	1.011	0.178+	0.118*
<b>Educational level</b> (Ref.: low)				
Middle		0.525**		0.491**
High		0.277**		0.262**
<b>Father's occupational status</b> (Ref.: white collar)				
Blue-collar		1.060*		1.751**
Self-employed		0.780**		1.065
Inactive/Unemployed		1.630**		2.001**
Missing		1.314**		2.012**
<b>Constant</b>	2.152**	1.230**	3.817*	-2.256**
<b>Observations</b>	89,329	89,329	5,160	5,160
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> (McFadden)</b>	0.07	0.10	0.04	0.07

Source: SOEP 2002 and Enquête Histoire Familiale 1999

+  $P < 0.1$ ; \*  $P < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $P < 0.01$

Excluding those surveyed who remain in education

no longer significant. This leads to two conclusions. First, for the groups observed, migrants' descendants born in France and Germany do not systematically fare better than those born abroad. Cross-national research analyzing the economic situation of immigrants in France, Germany, and the UK from an intergenerational perspective shows that the situation in terms of employment of the second generation of immigrants of North African origin in France is much worse than that of the first generation, in particular for men (Algan et al. 2010). For immigrants of Turkish origin in Germany, the authors did not find such a pattern: there is neither an improvement nor deterioration in the employment situation from one generation to the next. Second, the results for the children of North African immigrants in France indicate that other factors might play a role in explaining the labour market exclusion of these individuals. Discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin or place of residence might be one explanation. According to new research for France based on the so-called 'testing method', candidates with Arabic names and those stating membership in a muslim religious organization on their resume are significantly less likely of being invited to a job interview (Cedey and Feroni 2007; Adida et al. 2010).

These findings indicate that, in France, ethno-cultural origins only begin to play a role in the labour market, whereas in Germany, the immigration background and in particular a Turkish ethno-cultural origin are already correlated with specific disadvantages in school. Social distancing thus occurs much earlier in the life course for immigrants' descendants in Germany than for those in France, where the educational system plays a key role in levelling the inequalities created by social background. The French example supports the argument that formal legal equality of migrants' children does not systematically translate into increased participation in the labour market. The promise of integration that citizenship and schooling offer is broken on the labour market. In essence, two situations emerge here: on the one hand, descendants of North African immigrants are present, and in a certain sense 'visible' on the labour market – they compete for jobs in the service branch with young people of French origin. On the other hand, the situation for young people of Turkish origin is effectively characterized by 'invisibility' because of their concentration in the same branches of the industry as their parents and their massive exclusion from the civil service. Not least of all due to their lower average educational attainment, they tend to work in sectors of the labour market where they do not really compete with natives – as was the case for their parents as well.

### 7.3.3 *Two Logics of Social Distancing*

In this empirical analysis on educational achievement and labour market participation of second-generation immigrants in France and Germany, I have focused on two elements of the social context that are central to understanding individuals' life courses: the school system and the labour market. The findings presented indicate that disadvantage does not arise at the same point in the life course of immigrants' children in the two countries: children of Turkish immigrants in Germany are disadvantaged at a young age as they pass through the school system, while children of North African immigrants in France experience disadvantage when entering the labour market. These findings reveal two distinct processes of social distancing: *social distancing through relegation* describes the situation in Germany, while the situation in France can be described as a process of *social distancing through discrimination*.<sup>6</sup> The following theoretical conceptualization of the two social logics is a first attempt to provide a framework for the interpretation of the situation of migrants' children in distinct national contexts (see also Tucci 2010). These two social logics are not mutually exclusive. Relegation is certainly a form of discrimination, but it differs in that distancing already takes place in school, whereas distancing through discrimination takes place at a later juncture in the life course, i.e., at the transition into and positioning on the labour market. Social distancing deals with boundary-making processes and is founded on mechanisms that operate at three levels: the institutional, the symbolic, and the structural (Table 7.5).

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<sup>6</sup>This distinction was first developed in Tucci (2009) and (2010).

**Table 7.5** Social distancing: Function, mechanisms and effects

Processes of social distancing	Through relegation (in Germany)	Through discrimination (in France)
<b>Function</b>	Preservation of order	Reminder of order
<b>Mechanisms</b>		
Institutional level	School and Citizenship	School and ‘ <i>Citoyenneté</i> ’
Symbolic level	Emphasis of limits ( <i>society</i> )	Concealment of limits ( <i>society</i> )
	Internalization of limits ( <i>individuals</i> )	Loss of sense of limits ( <i>individuals</i> )
Structural level	Segmented labour market along ethnic lines	Competition for positions (legitimate competitors?)
<b>Effects</b>		
Individuals	Resignation, being among ‘my own kind’	Frustration, withdrawal
Societal	Few social tensions	Social tensions

Over the years, France and Germany have not set the same limits or created the same criteria of distinction. Social distancing through relegation refers, *inter alia*, to Hoffmann-Nowotny’s concept of ‘neo-feudal downward or upward displacement’. According to Hoffmann-Nowotny (1973), the preservation of the established order through displacement is possible by virtue of the fact that people are allocated given positions in the social structure, no longer based on acquirable criteria (e.g., education) but rather ascribed criteria (e.g., ethno-cultural origins). This shifting of the ‘evaluation basis’ leads to an acceptance of these criteria so that immigrants and natives maintain their position ‘below’ or ‘above’ in this adaptation process. This form of adaptation only works when individuals accept this evaluation basis as legitimate. We can also link this idea to that of Lamont and Molnàr (2002):

Only when symbolic boundaries are widely agreed upon can they take on a constraining character and pattern social interaction in important ways. Moreover, only then can they become social boundaries. (Lamont and Molnàr 2002: 168–169)

The institutional and symbolic levels are closely connected. Through political and educational institutions among others, categories are created that are institutionally legitimated or perceived as legitimate, constraints are put in place or removed, which, in turn, represent a basis for symbolic power. The ethnic foundations of the German nation might be the crux of the problem of rejection of the ‘other’. The German tradition presents descendants of immigrants with two alternatives: cultural assimilation or distancing. Here, the achievement of cultural assimilation in Germany is particularly problematic, since “being German” is/was based on *ethnos* and not, as in France, on individuals’ political will. The long tradition of restrictive German citizenship law supports the recognition of categories and boundaries. It is precisely this acceptance that leads to an internalization of a sense of constraints or a sense of what one is entitled to and what not. At the same time, this can also contribute to the preservation of stronger links with one’s own ethno-cultural community. In spite of the inclusion of migrants’ children in the community of



French citizens and the apparent erosion of the boundary between natives and immigrants, the boundary still persists particularly for the children of immigrants from the former French colonies in North Africa (Leclerc-Olive 1997). Police checks, discriminatory court judgments (Jobard 2006; Jobard and Névanen 2007), and above-average unemployment remind young people of North African origin that they occupy a minority position in French society and are possibly not perceived as legitimate competitors. The findings for France indicate that the disadvantage faced by children of North African immigrants in terms of educational outcomes at the tertiary level is fully explained by their social background. In this respect, they have equally high expectations when entering the labour market. However, their attempts to reach the middle class are blocked at the transition to the labour market. Social distancing through discrimination works like a *call to order* (Bourdieu 1997: 210) that contributes to the preservation of the established order.

Alongside the process of social categorization, in which people automatically tend to use distinctive traits as criteria for distinction and abasement of the other when comparing their own to other groups, other historical-collective processes may also occur, which one can discuss based on Blumer's concept of the *sense of group position* (Blumer 1958). According to Blumer, the feeling that only part of society is entitled to certain privileges emerged at one specific point in history when one group began to assert itself and dominate another, thereby consolidating a sense of the position of one's own group in relation to another. This is particularly the case in France because of its colonial history, whereas the relationship between the Turkish and indigenous population in Germany does not have a similar historically-loaded foundation. Blumer's concept helps to understand why attempts by young people of North African origin to fit into the majority meet with resistance from this very majority. Here, one can also draw on Bourdieu's idea of the sense of one's own current and potential position (Bourdieu 1997: 220). Whereas this sense of limits among young people of Turkish origin is based on the institutionalization of constraints between natives and foreigners, descendants of North African immigrants have undergone a change in their frame of reference by taking on French citizenship and embodying the value of equality fundamental to the French Republic.

The two aforementioned processes of social distancing have different individual and social effects (see also Tucci 2010). Whereas relegation might promote the preservation of ethno-cultural bonds, discrimination might lead, on the individual level, to increased frustration, which, in turn, can result in a withdrawal into one's own ethnically-shaped world or increased social tensions. The unrest in the *banlieues* could have been a consequence of the promise of political equality entailed in citizenship being broken by structural, i.e., labour market, forces (Tucci and Groh-Samberg 2008). This discrepancy between expectations and reality can also lead to a rejection of the nation itself.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>A personal experience of discrimination in France is correlated with a reduced sense of national belonging (to France) and increased religious practice among youth of North African origin (Tucci 2009).

## 7.4 Conclusion

This paper has focused on two important life course institutions – school and the labour market – in order to provide evidence on different patterns of incorporation of the most important groups of immigrants’ descendants in two major immigration countries: Germany and France. Descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany face a clear disadvantage in terms of educational achievement.<sup>8</sup> They are relegated to a considerable degree to the lower tracks of the educational system. When working, children of Turkish migrants have a higher chance of working in the manufacturing sector, just as their parents did. This finding can be interpreted as a perpetuation of a strong segmentation of the German labour market along ethnic lines. However, the low education level of these children most completely explains their higher risk of unemployment. The situation of the children of North African immigrants in France is polarized: their chances of achieving only a low-level certificate of graduation or no certificate at all are higher, but their lower social background fully explains their slightly lower chances of achieving a university degree. The difficulty for them begins on the labour market. They have a higher risk of unemployment than young French natives, even when educational level is controlled for. In contrast with the young adults of Turkish origin in Germany, young adults of North African origin in France are no longer to be found in the manufacturing sector but are clearly over-represented in the service sector.

The disadvantages that the children of immigrants experience in France and Germany take place at different junctures in their lives. The specific types of social distancing in different countries, as conceptualized in this paper, rely on mechanisms that operate at institutional, symbolic, and structural levels. The findings indicate that the openness/closedness of the educational system, the ideology behind it, and the structure of the labour market might explain the different cross-national outcomes. Social distancing through relegation characterizes the German situation precisely because the life courses of immigrants’ children are ‘set’ on a particular trajectory very early on. The closedness of the school system leads to immigrants maintaining positions in the social hierarchy that are no longer attractive for natives. Social distancing through discrimination characterizes the situation in France, where descendants of North African migrants “manage to make it” at school but experience a disadvantage in entering employment. The strong de-industrialization in France and the educational advancement of the children of immigrants seem to result in more equal sectoral distribution. The price young adults of North African origin pay for having a ‘cleaner’ job in the service sector is a significant higher chance of having a fixed-term contract than young adults of French origin (Okba and Lainé 2004; Tucci and Groh-Samberg 2008).

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<sup>8</sup>In the French case, the data analysed here are almost ten years old, but still one can say that this situation of polarization of descendants of North African immigrants in the French educational system still persists and the problems they face in accessing the labour market are still discussed heavily. For German case, migrants’ descendants have a significantly lower educational achievement than their German counterparts (Woellert et al. 2009).

Social distancing as a process focuses on the way patterns of incorporation are shaped by national contexts—and the point at which boundary making occurs in the life course. As a consequence, this raises the question of the sequencing of exclusion mechanisms in the life course. The institutional and structural order can produce or perpetuate certain types of boundaries and divisions (Wimmer 2008, 2009). But, as argued by Mayer (2004), life course outcomes are not just the result of social contexts and structural constraints. Individual action, choices, and preferences not only determine the types of careers individuals have; they also change the structure of a society and the existing boundaries. It follows, therefore, that an analysis of the country-specific construction of cultural difference as well as national parameters for integration is vital for a sociological analysis of the inclusion and exclusion processes affecting the children of immigrants in different societies. An examination of the institutional, structural, and historical contexts can help us to understand why integration on the individual and societal level progresses in a similar or different way in different countries. At the same time, migration research needs cross-national longitudinal analyses of educational and occupational trajectories in order to understand the importance of opportunity structures and “the process by which lives are lived” (Elder 1979) among children of immigrants.

## 7.A.1 Appendix

**Table 7.A.1** Descriptive statistics

	France			Germany		
	France	North Africa	Southern Europe	Germany	Turkey	Southern Europe
<b>Women (%)</b>	49.9	49.1 (47.9)	49.1	51.2	43.8	44.3
<b>Mean age</b>	30.9	29.2 (29.2)	30.9	30.4	28.8	29.2
<b>Born abroad (%)</b>	—	15.0 (27.4)	16.5	—	55.3	35.8
<b>Mean age at migration</b>	—	6 (6)	5	—	9	7
<b>French/German citizen</b>		79.2 (61.8)	62.8		19.8	23.4
<b>Married (%)</b>	64	50.0 (46.1)	63.5	35.5	62.8	38.1
<b>Education level (%)</b>						
Low	22.3	28.8 (32.4)	27.8	12.6	41	23.1
Middle	38	36.5 (39.1)	41.7	62.2	51.0	55.3
High	39.7	34.8 (28.4)	30.5	25.2	8	21.6
<b>Father was/is blue collar worker (%)</b>	35.6	46.3 (61.4)	63.1	37.9	63.8	58.8
<b>N</b>	86,258	7,009 (3,548)	6,799	6,708	333	243

Source: SOEP 2002 and Enquête Histoire Familiale 1999. Excluding those surveyed who remain in education. Weighted results

(...): values for those whose both parents were born in one North African country

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