

# Chapter 11

## Jiang Qing's Arguments on the Inevitable and Permanent Conflict between the Christian Faith and Chinese Culture and on Establishing Confucianism as the State Religion

Ping-Cheung Lo

### 11.1 Introduction

In *Political Confucianism*, Jiang Qing discusses the Christian faith and Chinese culture at some length. His arguments are distinct in that, rather than comparing the thoughts and institutions of the two, he discusses them from the perspective of nationalism, national spirit, national life, and the “sole supremacy” of Confucianism, with the purpose of pointing out the inevitable and permanent conflict between them.

Although the book is written in a clear and well-organized manner, the subject is repeated because the volume brings together several overlapping essays (Jiang 2003, p. 8). In this article, Mr. Jiang's view on the inevitable and permanent conflict between Confucianism and Christianity are analyzed in four arguments with responses developed from the standpoint of Christian theology.

### 11.2 The Argument that Nationalism Requires Total Loyalty

Mr. Jiang's general argument revolves around the goal of “modernizing China” (Jiang 2003, p. 401), to which there is no objection. He then argues for the necessity of nationalism for the realization of that goal. He states this clearly:

Nationalism is a positive driving force for the establishment of a modern country. Judging from the development of modern nationalism, it can be justified as long as it does not degenerate into racialism or aggressive expansion. Contemporary research of comparative politics and politics of development has proven that substantial nationalism is an absolute essential for a developing country that wants to modernize its politics. The meaning of “substantial nationalism”, according to Professor Lucian

---

P.-C. Lo (✉)

Department of Religion and Philosophy, Center for Applied Ethics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, China  
e-mail: pclo@hkbu.edu.hk

W. Pye, is a pure, healthy nationalism that can overcome the conflict between tradition and modernism and that contains cultural ideals (Jiang 2003, p. 396; all English translations in this article are mine).

Mr. Jiang then explains the elements of nationalism and the meaning of Chinese nationalism.

Nationalism is, by definition, a national consciousness based on tradition. As French nationalist Ernest Renan said, nationalism consists of two parts: 1) a rich tradition to remember; 2) many people living together and hoping to develop their common tradition. . . . It is for this reason that I consider the Confucian tradition, which has been passed down through generations, as the very basis for Chinese nationalism. That is to say, it is utterly impossible to have substantial nationalism in China without the Confucian tradition, which represents the core values of Chinese history and culture (Jiang 2003, p. 397).

He then reiterates the value and importance of nationalism:

It is nothing but the history, culture and spirit of a nation that make it see what distinguishes it from other nations and enables it to modernize itself in a firm and stable manner. . . . To encourage its citizens to maintain their loyalty, a developing country must awaken their national awareness and make them remember its historical and cultural tradition, recall its past greatness and glory, and realize their obligation to their ancestors and posterity. To do this, nationalism must be based on the nation's historical and cultural tradition (Jiang 2003, pp. 402, 406).

Thus, although Sun Yat-sen emphasized nationalism in his Three People's Principles, Jiang finds this a "rootless" nationalism because:

Sun Yat-sen saw traditional Chinese culture as a means of unifying the country for a fight against humiliation by foreign countries instead of recognizing it as the core value and fundamental source of Chinese nationalism (Jiang 2003, p. 399).

Finally, Jiang proposes that a "pure and healthy" nationalism should not only have roots, but must also be "nationalism in its full sense" of demanding total loyalty to the nation state and its cultural tradition:

The rootless nature of Sun Yat-sen's nationalism is also manifested in the separation of personal faith from the national spirit among nationalists who believed in Sun's Three People's Principles. As we know, most of these people, especially those in power, were Christians but respected the Chinese cultural tradition, especially the Confucian tradition, where the nation was concerned. They drew a clear line between their personal faith and the spiritual life of the nation instead of imposing the former on the latter. This, which should be attributed to their humility and generosity, is praiseworthy. However, it cannot be denied that such separation was rather regrettable, for it means that the nation's life was torn apart and that its spirit failed to receive loyalty from all its members. . . . Strictly speaking, a Christian could not be a nationalist in the full sense, because the latter must not deviate from the Chinese cultural tradition either in personal or in national life – his personal faith should not be separated from the nation's spiritual life. In other words, a nationalist in the full sense must anchor his

or her life in the nation's cultural tradition and dedicate his or her full loyalty to it (Jiang 2003, pp. 399–401, see also p. 431).

To put it simply, the reason for the inevitable and permanent conflict between the Christian faith and Chinese culture is, according to Mr. Jiang, that Chinese nationalism demands that all Chinese unconditionally devote their full loyalty to the native Chinese culture. This is an exclusive demand. Thus, to believe in Christianity, a foreign religion, is to betray Chinese culture, as is to believe in Buddhism. “Liang Shuming chose Buddhism as his personal faith but chose Confucianism with regard to the nation” (Jiang 2003, p. 430), which according to Mr. Jiang was also regrettable (Jiang 2003, p. 431). This seems to be an echo of the old idea that “one more Christian or Buddhist means one Chinese less.”

In my opinion, this nationalist demand is rather dangerous, because it holds the country, the nation, and its native culture as the exclusive objects of loyalty, making the finite infinite, the relative absolute and the multicultural unicultural.<sup>1</sup> We must be wary of such ultimate nationalism, which was the foundation of Nazism and Fascism (Dahbour and Ishay 1995, pp. 222–237).

*[Jiang Qing's comment: By “pure, rooted, and healthy nationalism,” I mean nationalism based on Confucian values, which honor the Kingly Way and the “Distinction between the Chinese and the Foreign.” The essence of the Kingly Way is to rule by virtue rather than coercion, and the essence of the distinction concerns morality rather than race. Thus, full loyalty to nationalism based on Confucian values will not lead to Fascist rule or Nazi racial persecution. Instead, it will result in the rule of Confucian values, in which people are convinced by good deeds and other cultures are respected. This is determined by the content of Confucian values. Mr. Lo does not have to worry.]*

Christians have always stood for the idea of rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's (Matthew 22: 21). Each Christian is simultaneously loyal to one's country-nation and to God, with the former being restricted by the latter. Thus, loyalty to one's country, nation, and government is neither ultimate nor absolute. That is why Christians such as Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Yu Bin, and Luo Guang also advocated nationalism. Mr. Jiang criticizes such nationalism for being “rootless,” yet it seems simplistic to evaluate the different forms of Chinese nationalism by a binary distinction between having or not having roots. It may be fairer to evaluate them by the depth or quantity of roots.

*[Jiang Qing's comment: Christians are only loyal to God in faith, and their loyalty to the secular nation is subordinate to their loyalty to God. In this sense, they dedicate full loyalty to God. In a Western Christian country, there is no conflict between a Western Christian's full loyalty to God and his or her loyalty to the nation. However, in the same country, there would be conflict between a Western*

*Christian's full loyalty to Confucian values and his or her loyalty to the nation, because Confucian values are not that country's historical or cultural tradition and have no historical or cultural legitimacy in a political sense. For the same reason, in China, a country with a Confucian tradition, there will be conflict between full loyalty to God and loyalty to China, as was the case with such politicians as Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, because the Christian faith is not part of the Chinese historical or cultural tradition and has no historical or cultural legitimacy in a political sense. Admittedly, Sun and Chiang respected Chinese historical and cultural tradition more than any other politicians. That is why Mr. Lo argues that their nationalism was not without roots, but that it was a matter of the depth or quantity of roots. This is a cogent argument that I can accept. However, in this context, "roots" concern faith rather than practical engagement. Sun and Chiang did not have roots in Confucian values because they believed in Christianity. However, I do not mean to deny their actual adoption of the Confucian tradition for government, which was manifested in, for example, "the power of examination" and "the power of supervision" in Sun's Five-Power Constitution.]*

### **11.3 The Argument of the Inevitable Conflict Between Two National Spirits**

Mr. Jiang's other novel approach to the issue of the Christian faith and Chinese culture invokes the idea of the *Volksgeist* or national spirit. First, he stresses that individual faith must be linked to the national spirit:

Abstract individuals do not exist, for everyone exists in the form of a particular country and nation. Thus, humankind's faith cannot be purely individual beyond country and nation. As long as God's City is yet to come, as long as humans have to face God as members of a nation, and as long as humans exist in history, human faith will inevitably be expressed as a national spirit (Jiang 2003, p. 424).

Second, he accepts that all nations are equal and infers that all national spirits should exist on an equal footing and none should be eliminated (Jiang 2003, pp. 424–427). Third, he concludes that every national spirit has its limitation:

National spirit has its limitation, which is reflected mainly in the fact that it cannot transcend the limited existence of a nation and acquire absolute universality. This is because national spirit is a historical phenomenon. . . . Though an individual of a nation may believe that his or her faith is an absolutely transcendent truth of life, his or her faith is immediately expressed as a national spirit when he or she encounters another nation in the capacity of a member of his or her nation. Such limitation makes it impossible for the absolutely transcendent truth of life to be free of national characteristics during its propagation, thereby greatly reducing the universality of that truth (Jiang 2003, p. 428).

Thus, once more he reaches the conclusion of inevitable conflict:

Since national spirit is limited by a specific national identity, tensions and conflicts are inevitable when two national spirits meet, though fundamentally both embody the absolutely transcendent truth of life. Such tensions and conflicts cannot be dissolved unless there exists no nation any more and people understand and spread the truth of life as individuals only instead of members of nations. Thus, from a historical perspective, any truth of life is expressed as a national spirit during its existence. It will be strongly resisted by other national spirits, which seriously hampers its spread and prevents it from becoming entirely universal.

We may then draw a conclusion: since the Christian faith is expressed as a national spirit (the spirit of Western nations) when it meets Chinese culture, there will be inevitable tension and conflict between it and the national spirit representing Chinese culture, or, more specifically, the Confucian faith. Such tension and conflict are not only between two faiths, but also between two national spirits (Jiang 2003, pp. 428–429).

Finally, he states that the conflict between national spirits, which is the inevitable result of the spread of religion, can never be resolved.

While intra-person tension of faiths can be resolved by individual conversion, intra-nation tension and conflict of national spirits cannot be resolved by national conversion. This is because the national spirit is the soul of a nation and the fundamental sign of its existence. It would be the most immoral act to destroy a national spirit by national conversion, because that would destroy the nation (Jiang 2003, p. 429).

I have several comments to make regarding this complex argument. First, although individuals are limited by particular historical and cultural conditions, the spread of religion is not necessarily accompanied by the spread of a particular national spirit, because this differs among individuals and depends on the intensity of an individual's awareness of that spirit. National spirit is not an independent, self-subsistent entity, but rather the habits of a community preserved in their mode of thought, value judgments, and the ways in which the members interact with each other. As the members of the community differ, so too does the intensity of their common habits. In other words, national spirit is merely a general description of a community, and is expressed with different degrees of intensity by its members. During the spread of religion, it is possible that both the giver and the receiver have a strong sense of national identity or that neither does. If the latter is true, then there will neither be attempts to convert another national spirit nor strong resistance from that national spirit.

Second, as national spirit is not an independent, self-subsistent entity, we cannot deduce “the equality of national spirits” from “the equality of nations.” Equality is not a factual judgment, but a value judgment. That everyone should be treated equally does not mean that the behavior and values of everyone should be treated equally, because behavior can be good or bad, as can value commitments (e.g., sacrificing oneself for the benefit of others versus harming others for one's own benefit). Thus, there is no moral basis for the equal treatment of habits of behavior or value commitments. National spirit

represents the collective behavioral habits of a nation, [*Jiang Qing's comment: National spirit has an upper level and a lower level. At the lower level, it is "the collective behavioral habits of a nation," as Mr. Lo says. At the upper level, however, it is the spiritual value expressed by a nation's cultural tradition. Mr. Lo's interpretation of national spirit is incomplete because he overlooks the upper level. Although national spirit can be divided up and elements added or subtracted at the lower level, it is unified and interconnected at the upper level. It can be changed at the lower level, but not at the upper level, for otherwise it would not be the national spirit.*] hence one national spirit can be superior or inferior to other national spirits. Mr. Jiang is wrong in saying that "no national spirit is inferior to another, for all the differences are due to historical and cultural reasons" (Jiang 2003, p. 427).

Third, because Mr. Jiang acknowledges the historical limitations of national spirits, he should also admit that every national spirit is a contingent rather than necessary product of history. National spirit is not normatively immutable and can be altered by us as we see fit. No national spirit is perfect, and there is always room for improvement. It is thus inappropriate to consider national spirit to be "the soul of a nation."

*[Jiang Qing's comment: There would be no national spirit if there were no nations. According to Gong Yang's "theory of the three worlds," in the "peaceful world" there is no distinction between nations and consequently no national spirit. Until the coming of the Great Harmony, there will be nations and national spirits. National spirit is the fundamental trait of a nation, and serves as the fundamental sign that distinguishes it from other nations.<sup>2</sup>]*

Fourth, two national spirits cannot meet unless through two persons. Whether there will be tension or conflict depends on their attitude. It depends on whether one party tries to impose his or her national spirit on the other or tries to persuade the other with reason. It also depends on whether the receiver responds with arrogant inapproachability or with rational deliberation and assimilation of what is being offered.

Fifth, in terms of the motive for becoming a Christian, I have learned that some Chinese, especially in large cities, believe in Christianity because it is "Western enough." However, as far as the result is concerned, many people, especially those in the countryside, still maintain the traditional national spirit. The Chinese Protestant Church and the Catholic Church have practiced self-administration, self-propagation, and self-support (the so-called "three selves") for over 50 years. They have been so successfully indigenized that the form of religion adopted by many rural churches is not much different from traditional Chinese folk religion. Just as most Chinese-speaking Buddhists show no significant Indian national spirit and most Chinese-speaking Muslims show no significant Arabian national spirit, so few Chinese Christians are likely to show a significant Western national spirit.

*[Jiang Qing's comment: Despite the indigenization of Christianity, its cultural symbols are, after all, Western. The Old and New Testament and the "Four Books and Five Classics" represent two disparate faith systems that are impossible to reconcile completely. The indigenized Christian faith is still about the Jesus and God of the Old and New Testament, rather than the Heavenly Way and "xing-li" of the "Four Books and Five Classics." In this sense, the indigenized Christian faith is still ultimately Western and its fundamental faith system will not change. Indeed, the Western faith system of Christianity will not change even if the Old and New Testament are translated into Chinese and Jesus and Mary are depicted in paintings as ancient Chinese figures.]*

Sixth, admittedly, many Chinese Christians may choose to integrate the Western national spirit and the native national spirit of China. This is not immoral, because it is the result of free and rational choice. Rather than disappearing, a national spirit will change for the better or for the worse. Change for the better will renew and re-invigorate the national spirit, which is a renewal and regeneration of the nation. This is not the same as destroying a nation; Mr. Jiang has exaggerated the threat.<sup>3</sup>

*[Jiang Qing's comment: If, like ancient Buddhism, Christianity respects the orthodoxy of Confucianism and interacts with it in a constructive manner, consequently expanding its theoretical structure and enriching Chinese culture, then this will be the most successful paradigm in resolving the "clash of civilizations." I hope that the encounter between Confucianism and Christianity will result in this ideal solution. However, even if this is realized, it does not mean that the fundamental characteristics and ultimate faiths of the religions have been eliminated. There will remain a deep yet implicit difference and conflict, for otherwise Song and Ming Confucians would not have repeatedly criticized Buddhism on the basis of its faith.]*

Finally, I would like to respond to Mr. Jiang's appeal to Christians. Based on his argument of the inevitable conflict between national spirits, he makes an earnest appeal to Chinese Christians in terms of Christian theology:

For millennia, the Confucian faith has represented the national spirit of the Chinese races, endured their sufferings, maintained their unity, and anchored their life. For all the setbacks and damage it suffered in modern times, the Confucian faith now seems likely to be revived. I can confidently affirm that the Confucian faith will be restored to its original proper status and re-emerge as the symbol of the Chinese national spirit. This privileged status cannot be taken over by any other faith, for such authority was won through competition with other faiths over history. Thus, the Christian faith should respect the historical status and unique glory of the Confucian faith and pray for the restoration of its orthodoxy in the spirit of fraternity and humility. This is because God will never destroy Chinese culture and the Chinese national spirit. It is the obligation of all God's people to restore with commiseration what God has created (Jiang 2003, p. 429).

Mr. Jiang appeals only to the doctrine of creation in Christian theology, which, in fact, also contains the doctrine of redemption. If we agree that contemporary Chinese culture is not in a desirable state, then rather than destroying Chinese culture, God will renew and regenerate it. God will also renew the Chinese national spirit rather than destroying it. In Christian theology, all that was created by God is in a postlapsum disorder, and needs redeeming and renewing, which is the obligation of all God's people to participate. Chinese Christians should neither destroy the Chinese national spirit nor replace it with a Western national spirit. Instead, they should make it healthier, richer, and more brilliant. [*Jiang Qing's comment: That is my greatest wish, which I hope will come true.*]

The Western national spirit also needs renewing. Robert Neville, an advocate of "Boston Confucianism" and a non-liberal theologian, proposes the use of Confucian ritual culture to renew the US nation (Neville 2000). He and his colleagues do not consider this assimilation a disrespect of the American spirit.

#### **11.4 The Argument of the Inevitable Conflict Between Two Distinct and Particular Historic Cultures**

Mr. Jiang follows the same line in his next argument. He insists that Christian faith does not exist outside of history and culture, and that any Christian faith we see and meet is incarnated in a particular history and culture. Thus, the spread of religion is also the spread of culture. Based on this notion, he reiterates the inevitability of conflict:

Since a universal truth must be expressed in a particular history and culture, from which it cannot be isolated, its form of expression is in fact that of a particular history and culture. Thus, there will be tension and conflict when the universal truth expressed in one kind of history and culture meets one expressed in another kind of history and culture. Such tension and conflict do not stem from universal truth itself, but from its historical and cultural nature. In other words, though humankind can perceive but one universal truth ("there is only one Great Way" and "all laws have the same origin"), it is expressed in different historical and cultural forms. The encounter of universal truth in different kinds of history and culture is not only the encounter between abstract and transcendent minds, but also the encounter between particular kinds of history and culture. Thus, when two faiths meet, the uniqueness of history and culture will cause tension and conflict between them. This is determined by the finitude of human existence because human's faith cannot be free from history and culture and be completely transcendent and absolute. That is why the spread of one advanced religion will be resisted by another advanced religion, which greatly limits its universality (Jiang 2003, pp. 421–422).

Applying this general law of the inevitable clash of civilizations to the Christian faith and Chinese culture, Mr. Jiang draws the following conclusions.

When the Christian faith comes to China, there is inevitable tension and conflict between it and Chinese culture, and its universality is destined to be resisted by the



latter. This is because what encounters Chinese culture is not a faith completely beyond history and culture, but a historical and cultural form of that faith. The tension and conflict between the historical and cultural forms of the two faiths can be anticipated. I am sure that as long as humankind's history has not come to its end and the Christian faith continues to appear in a historical and cultural form, there will be permanent tension and conflict between it and Chinese culture, and no effort toward the creative synthesis of the two will succeed (Jiang 2003, p. 422).

Although Mr. Jiang does not use qualifiers such as “all” and “none” in the first quoted passage, the tone of the book and other arguments in it show that he considers the proposition of the inevitable conflict between two distinct cultures that encounter one another to be universal (Mr. Jiang, who admires Samuel Huntington's theory on the clash of civilizations, states that Huntington is “truly insightful” in pointing out that “the clash of civilizations is an eternal one” (Jiang 2003, pp. 436, 439). We can simplify the argument in the form of a syllogism. Premise 1: Conflict is inevitable when different cultures meet. Premise 2: the Christian faith and Chinese culture are different cultures. Conclusion: there will be inevitable and permanent conflict between the Christian faith and Chinese culture.

The validity of the argument hinges on the universality of the proposition in Premise 1, and a great deal of historical data is required to determine whether it is true or false. I cannot definitively resolve the issue because I am not a historian, but counterexamples do seem readily apparent. It was along the Silk Road that the Indian, Persian, and Arabian civilizations came to China. The Buddhist civilization was well assimilated into Chinese culture despite its initial rejection by the Confucian literati. Manichaeism and Nestorianism had little difficulty in reaching China and met no resistance, though neither lasted long. However, Islam was smoothly introduced into China and developed rapidly, and is now well entrenched in China.

As I have mentioned in the discussion of national spirit, a culture or civilization is not an independent, self-subsistent entity; it has no independent will. There is no encounter or conflict between two cultures per se. Whether there will be a conflict depends on the people of those cultures and the attitude they assume at the time of the encounter.

Take Professor Tang Yijie of Peking University, for example. No one doubts his affection and loyalty to Chinese culture, but his attitude toward foreign civilizations is in marked contrast to that of Mr. Jiang. He states in a recent book:

As the slogan of the Xueheng School goes, we need to “develop the quintessence of the national culture and incorporate new ideas.” Thus, we should abandon the either-or mentality of total westernization and total revive-the-past conservatism, and be tolerant and open-minded in the establishment of our cultural standpoint. . . . The highest ideal of Chinese culture is that “all things develop without harming each other and all Ways co-exist without conflict.” This is an idea of comprehensive harmony.

Today we still need to advocate Lu Xun's idea of ‘taking’ western culture instead of having it thrust upon us. Our culture cannot be renewed unless we have the ability and

courage to introduce good cultures of the West and other nations, not piecemeal, but completely and systematically (without narrow-minded pragmatism). We cannot have a full view of the strength and weakness of our culture unless we see it from the perspective of the alterity of other nations and cultures. As an ancient poet said, "I cannot see what Lushan Mountain is really like because I am trapped within it." (Tang 2007, p.1–2, 120).

For Tang Yijie, loyalty to Chinese culture does not mean hoping it will never change, but hoping it will renew and transform itself by incorporating good, foreign cultural ingredients.

*[Jiang Qing's comment: This attitude is fine on the abstract level, but the critical point is that enhancement "by incorporating foreign cultures" must be oriented toward the strengthening of existing Chinese culture if it is to be accomplished without changing the fundamental spirit and inherent nature of that culture. Thus enhanced, the culture in China must remain Chinese. Advocating the "equal and nonpreferential integration" of Western and Chinese cultures with the fashionable attitude of tolerance and open-mindedness I am afraid will result in the disappearance of Chinese culture. This is because modern Western culture is strong and dominant, and is supported by the hegemonic Western power over politics, economics, science, technology, education, and the media. It is expansionary and aggressive, whereas the Confucian culture, which has yet to recover from a century of damage, is rather weak. Considering the vast difference between their strength, "equal and nonpreferential integration" will inevitably result in the disappearance of Chinese culture. If Western culture is a vast ocean, then Chinese culture is but a small stream, which, if it does not grow into a lake, river, or sea, will be swallowed by that vast ocean. We should thus abandon the fashionable enlightened attitude of tolerance and open-mindedness and orient the absorption of Western culture only toward the strengthening of existing Chinese culture. When Chinese culture has grown into an ocean, there will be no need to stress this orientation.]*

The validity of Mr. Jiang's argument on permanent conflict thus does not depend on cultures per se, but on the people of those cultures.

*[Jiang Qing's comment: I find the opposite to be true. The critical point about cultural conflict is not people, but cultures per se. An individual with a transcendental mind can believe in a transcendental being beyond any particular culture, which is proven by the fact that some Chinese individuals with such a mind believe in God beyond Chinese culture. However, as a product of a particular history and tradition, culture cannot reach beyond itself, hence the permanent conflict of cultures. This conflict will not end until the foreign culture has completely changed the native culture and replaced it as the new orthodox, dominant culture, as has been the case in the Philippines and some African countries.]*

Conflict will be more likely if most Chinese adopt Mr. Jiang's attitude toward foreign cultures, but will be much less likely if most people agree with Tang Yijie.

*[Jiang Qing's comment: I am afraid that if most Chinese agree with Tang Yijie, then the result will not be a decrease in conflict, but the disappearance of Chinese culture.]*

At the end of the last quoted passage, Mr. Jiang further predicts that no effort toward the creative synthesis of the Christian faith and Chinese culture will succeed. I prefer to base this prediction on induction. In other words, it would be desirable for Mr. Jiang to explain why all previous efforts have failed, from Matteo Ricci in the Ming Dynasty to Lin Yutang, Xie Fuya, Zhao Zichen (T. C. Chao), Luo Guang (Stanislaus Lo), and Qin Jiayi (Julia Ching) in modern times.

*[Jiang Qing's comment: I do not believe that those people succeeded in integrating the Christian faith and Chinese culture. They were scholars who interpreted Chinese culture from the standpoint of the Christian faith, and they expressed nothing but their opinions on Chinese culture from the perspective of another culture. The so-called integration will not be realized unless a new culture is forged that harmoniously embodies the spiritual natures of both Western and Chinese culture and becomes China's orthodox and dominant culture. I believe this to be impossible, because the spiritual natures of the two cultures simply cannot be joined together without conflict.]*

## **11.5 The Argument for the Continuation of the Established Status of Confucianism in China**

Mr. Jiang claims that "the tension and conflict between the Christian faith and Chinese culture will last long and even forever (in history)" (Jiang 2003, p. 435). His final argument is that China should allow only Confucianism to enjoy exclusive supremacy, but Christianity still attempts to spread itself among the Chinese.

He proposes two reasons for the exclusive supremacy of Confucianism. The first is that "the Confucian faith represents the Chinese national spirit [...] This privileged status cannot be yielded to any other faith [...] For 2000 years Chinese culture has 'settled down' on Confucianism and it should and will remain so" (Jiang 2003, pp. 429, 435). The second is that the Confucian faith demands that the Chinese "believe in the Confucian tradition whole-heartedly" (Jiang 2003, p. 400).

There can be no more than one object of faith, and one should maintain absolute loyalty to it, because only in this way can there be an anchor for life and serenity for the soul [. . .] Specifically, in today's China, including Hong Kong and Taiwan, the Christian faith and the Confucian faith are contending for loyalty. Faced with the two, a Chinese should only choose one instead of being loyal to both. This is an either-or choice and it requires absolute earnestness [. . .] All in all, one cannot be loyal to two faiths. Many Chinese try to be Christians while keeping their faith in Confucianism, but this cannot be done. Besides endless anxieties and conflicts in one's mind, it is expressed as nothing but the lack of loyalty to either (Jiang 2003, p. 433).

I will not elaborate on the first claim (that Confucian faith should and will enjoy exclusive supremacy in Chinese culture and that the privileged status is permanent) because it is such a controversial claim that it has been heatedly debated for quite some time. The second claim, that the Confucian faith demands wholehearted belief and absolute loyalty, is a novel one and deserves some discussion. Mr. Jiang states in a footnote: "Though the Christian faith and Chinese culture cannot be creatively synthesized, they may well nourish themselves by the assimilation of good ingredients in the other side. In fact, the Christian faith does contain much for Chinese culture to learn" (Jiang 2003, p. 436). Mr. Jiang's view of the exclusivity of the Confucian faith seems to have been influenced by the exclusivity of the monotheistic faiths, i.e., Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. The First Commandment states, "you shall have no other gods before me" (Exodus 20: 3; NRSV). The Shema, which observant Jews recite every day in the morning and evening, is also derived from the Holy Bible: "Hear, O Israel: The Lord is our God, the Lord alone. You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might" (Deuteronomy 6: 4–5; NRSV). These words were later quoted by Jesus, who called it the first and greatest commandment (Mark 12: 29–30). Jesus also taught his disciples, "No one can serve two masters; for a slave will either hate the one and love the other, or be devoted to the one and despise the other" (Matthew 6: 24; NRSV). Mr. Jiang's novel claim on the exclusivity of the Confucian faith sounds like a Confucian version of the exclusivity of the one and only God. It is interesting that most Chinese theologians reject neither Chinese culture nor Confucianism, because loyalty to both culture and God is acceptable in the Christian faith, in which culture is not ultimate and can thus coexist with God. However, Mr. Jiang does not allow this dual loyalty because he does consider Chinese culture to be ultimate. As he narrows Chinese culture down to the Confucian faith, he inevitably also rejects Daoism and Buddhism. None of the contemporary neo-Confucians in Hong Kong, Taiwan, or overseas, such as Liu Shu-hsien, Cheng Zhongying, and Tu Weiming, rejects Buddhism, Daoism, or Christianity. Indeed, Tu Weiming has gone so far as to say that Confucianism is but an "adjective," and can be integrated with any other faith. Mr. Jiang is the sole advocate of the exclusivity of the Confucian faith.

*[Jiang Qing's comment: The exclusive supremacy of Confucianism does not mean the exclusion of other cultures, systems of thought, or faiths. Rather, it means*

*establishing in China the orthodoxy and dominance of Confucianism, or setting it as the state religion. The orthodoxy and supremacy of the Anglican Church in Britain and of Lutheranism in Northern European countries has not resulted in the exclusion of other cultures, systems of thought, and faiths. As an individual, a modern Chinese person is free to choose his or her faith. Even if Confucianism is established as the state religion of China, Chinese citizens would not be forced to be exclusively and absolutely loyal to it, and individuals who believe in other systems of thought or religions would not be forced to have "dual loyalty." This is testified by Confucianism's history of respecting other faiths and its doctrine of tolerance. However, the Chinese are not free to not choose Confucianism as the orthodox and dominant state religion or not allow Confucian civilization to represent the historical and cultural distinctiveness of China, because this goes beyond the boundaries of personal faith into the domain of the "historical and cultural legitimacy" of a country. In this sense, the Chinese Confucian culture is ultimate, orthodox, dominant, irreplaceable and enjoys exclusive supremacy, as Mr. Lo says. Just imagine, will China still be Chinese if Christianity or Islam, rather than Confucianism, is established as the orthodox, dominant, state religion in China? The exclusive supremacy of Confucianism means the establishment of the Confucian nature of Chinese civilization, rather than the narrow-minded exclusion of other systems of thought and religions. However, Confucianism will exclude any system of thought or religion that aspires to become the orthodox and dominant state religion. Tu Weiming's idea that Confucianism is but an "adjective" cannot be accepted, because it is a form of self-deprecation. In my opinion, Confucianism cannot be revived and become an independent entity unless it is the subject.]*

## 11.6 Conclusion

Mou Zongsan wrote 50 years ago that "we do not oppose Christianity and we value the freedom of religious belief. However, we do not wish to see a Chinese who really cares for China to believe in Christianity" (Mou 1970, p. 69). Mr. Jiang agrees with Mou in this regard, but there is a difference. Mou wrote several books in which he compared the content of the Confucian faith and that of the Christian faith to prove that Confucianism, rather than Christianity, is "the perfect religion" and thus more worth believing in.<sup>4</sup> In *Political Confucianism*, Mr. Jiang repeatedly discusses the inevitable and permanent conflict between Christianity and Confucianism from the perspective of community and politics. However, none of his arguments are based on what the two faiths are actually about and, though original, they are somewhat lacking in substance. I look forward to seeing him articulate novel and more sophisticated discussions in the near future.

Although he believes in the clash of civilizations, Mr. Jiang has proposed several ways to decrease the impact.

Specifically, since the tension and conflict between the Christian faith and Chinese culture can never be eliminated, we need to draw a line between them so that each stays within its boundary instead of trying to infringe upon the other. Moreover, they should behave to each other with tolerance and respect so as to co-exist in permanent peace instead of hostility (Jiang 2003, pp. 435–436).

Put simply, Mr. Jiang’s solution for lessening the impact of the clash of civilizations is to keep all civilizations at a safe distance from one another, and to define a legitimate, sovereign sphere of influence for each with no infringement from others.

This solution is distinct in that it relegates all major world religions to the status of regional religions, and opposes the global spread of any religion. In economic terms, it means that each religion will have a monopolized market, and thus advocates protectionism. This solution is out of tune with the irreversible trend of globalization. The globalization of free trade entails the free exchange of ideas on a global basis. In today’s environment of free competition on the basis of ability and real strength, those who stick to convention will inevitably be eliminated, and flourishing can come about only through constant reform and renewal. I wonder whether it is beneficial or detrimental to the Confucian faith to adopt protectionism in relation to Confucianism in China?

*[Jiang Qing’s comment: Protectionism is the only choice in the contemporary world in which Confucianism is definitely weaker than the Western religions. When Confucianism becomes stronger, we will, of course, consider constructive interaction or even constructive competition with the major religions of the world. However, at the moment we must choose protectionism, because Confucianism is weak and in need of rescue.]*

### ***11.6.1 Epilogue: On the Benefits and Harm of the Establishment of Confucianism as the State Religion in Light of the Experience of the Church of England***

Mr. Jiang’s essay “On the Reconstruction of Chinese Confucian Religion” is highly original, and has been the subject of much discussion. Briefly put, he expresses his hope that Confucianism will rise again as “the royal and official doctrine” (the dominant ideology of the state), and that the Chinese Association of Confucian Religion will acquire exclusive supremacy through the implementation of the “upward policy (of persuading government officials)” and “downward policy (of persuading society).” The goal is that Confucianism will be the orthodox state ideology, but other schools of thought will not be suppressed.

Since Confucianism was and will be the state religion, the role played by the Chinese Association of Confucian Religion among Chinese religions should be equivalent to that of the Church of England among British religions. The Association should not only be privileged to have a say in politics and entitled to land, gifts and funds from the

state, it should also be privileged to design the curriculum of elementary education, to design the state's major ceremonies, and to hold grand sacrificial rituals on behalf on the state, and to have other privileges. (Note: The Anglican Church is the state religion of Britain by common law and has privileges, Lutheranism is the state religion of Northern European countries by constitution and has privileges, and the Eastern Orthodox Church is the state religion of Greece by constitution and has privileges. However, these countries remain free democracies. Thus, the privileged status of Confucianism as the state religion of China means only the consensus and unification of Chinese spirit and thought rather than spiritual and ideological dictatorship. My fellow Chinese need not to worry over this point.) (Jiang 2005).

Although I do not know much about Lutheranism in northern Europe or the Eastern Orthodox Church in Greece, I do know something about the Church of England in Britain. Thus, I will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of England's policy of establishing one religion in the hope of shedding light on the Chinese situation.

First of all, the establishment of state religions in Western European countries was a result of historical contingency rather than purposive design. The various churches of Western European countries were originally part of the One Catholic Church and were loyal to the Vatican. After the Reformation, some states replaced the Vatican as the ultimate authority over the church. Owing to subsequent religious persecution and wars, state religions were gradually abolished as church became separated from state, and those that remain established have seen their role diminish.

There are now eight major clauses governing the role of the Church of England (the Anglican Church) as the established church of England:

- (1) The monarch is "the Supreme Governor" of the Church of England.
- (2) The monarch and his or her spouse must be members of the Church of England.
- (3) All leaders of the Church of England (the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of York, all bishops, all cathedral deans, and some vicars) shall be appointed by the monarch (nowadays usually nominated by the Prime Minister and nominally appointed by the monarch).
- (4) The doctrines and rituals of the Church of England are decreed by Canon Law, which is invalid unless passed by Parliament.
- (5) The finances and property of the Church of England are managed by senior government officials called Church Commissioners.
- (6) Archbishops and bishops are automatically members of the House of Lords.
- (7) The entire England is divided into parishes, with churches and clergy in each parish. These clergy serve all the people in the parishes, not just church members only, and are thus the spiritual leaders of the parishes.
- (8) The government supports Church-run schools, and all schools, whether run by the government or the Church, hold a brief prayer session every day that students are free to choose whether to attend (Bennett 2005; McLean 2004).

These rules have brought both benefit and harm to the Church of England. On the positive side, Rules 7 and 8 certainly would benefit the spread of the religion. However, the effects and costs of these beneficial elements are uncertain. For instance, how many more people have become Christians due to Rule 8? Why has the number of British people attending church services continually decreased in recent years? (Heubel 1965, p. 653) As for Rule 7, the government has decided that all parents have a legal right to have their babies baptized in the parish church, and that divorced people who have been baptized have a legal right to wed in the parish church. The clergy cannot refuse these requests, regardless of whether or not the parents of the child to be baptized or the couple to be married are sincere about the rituals. That is the cost (Bennett 2005).

If Rules 7 and 8 may benefit the Church, Rules 3, 4, and 5 are definitely detrimental to it. Take Rule 3, for instance. Although the Church negotiates with the government before the appointment of its leaders so that most of those nominated by the consistory will be nominated by the Prime Minister, in a minority of cases the Church will be disappointed, because appointments hinge on consistency between the political stance of the candidates and that of the government.<sup>5</sup>

Rule 4 caused much trouble in the 1920s, when the law still required that rituals in keeping with the *Book of Common Prayer* be used for worship in the Church of England all over the country. However, the book was unsuitable for contemporary use because it is still the version of 1662. Blatantly breaking the law, many clergymen designed and used a contemporary version of the rituals that deviated from the approved *Book of Common Prayer*. To prevent this awkward situation from continuing, the three courts (those of bishops, clergy, and lay believers) of the consistory approved a revised edition of the *Prayer Book* and submitted it to Parliament for approval. However, in two consecutive years (1927 and 1928), it was approved by the House of Lords but voted against by the House of Commons. The veto displeased the Church of England so much that the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Arthur Michael Ramsey, vowed to resist at the cost of withdrawing from the Establishment.<sup>6</sup> Later, the consistory of the Church of England published a report called "The Church and the State" in 1935 to officially state the strong desire for the disestablishment of the Church.<sup>7</sup> Eventually, the government yielded on this matter, but future conflicts on other issues cannot be ruled out.

Rule 5 is unfavorable to both Church and government, and needs no elaboration here (McLean 2004, pp. 8–9, 19–20). As for Rule 6, the privilege is expected to be lost when the House of Lords undergoes major reform. Rules 1 and 2 are obsolete. Rule 1 exists in name only, because the British monarch has no substantial power and the church is in fact "governed" by the Prime Minister and his or her staff. Rule 2 is unnecessary, which deprives members of the royal family of the freedom of religious belief (McLean 2004, pp. 18–19).

As a state establishment, how much aid does the Church of England obtain from the government to carry out its religious mission, and what are the effects? There are no definite answers. However, although the benefits are uncertain, the



disadvantages are rather obvious, *viz.*, the Church is inevitably controlled by the government where critical internal affairs are concerned. For this reason, there are often calls for disestablishment both within and without the Church. However, disestablishment has not become the consensus within the church for other reasons. First, many worry that disestablishment will turn England into a completely secularized country. If the state church disappears, then the state religion will vanish. This concern is also shared by other denominations.<sup>8</sup> Second, the Church of England has other concerns regarding the matter. As it is a state establishment, it is not the church but the government that has the initiative; the Church has no right to unilaterally announce the end of its status as the state church. Third, if the government initiates to disestablish, it may lead to the horrible result of the banishment of the Church from all the church properties which are owned by the government (Church Assembly 1936, p. 50).

In other words, from the perspective of the Church of England, the historical legacy of establishing a religion and a church has been far from desirable. It is for other reasons that it has yet to be abolished, but that may be only a matter of time.<sup>9</sup> How can England be a good model for turning Confucianism into a state religion as Jiang Qing envisaged? Britain is a free and democratic country under the rule of law. If the government there still manipulates the Church for political reasons, then the results will be much worse under different polities.

China's historical legacy is more similar to that of France than of Britain, which for a long time had a strong and healthy tradition of conservatism. Like France, however, China has experienced a thorough revolt against tradition, a historical trend that is very difficult to overcome. To return the historic privileges accorded to Confucianism to contemporary Confucianism, as Mr. Jiang has repeatedly advocated, seems impractical because it will meet with tremendous resistance. (I cannot imagine that the Roman Catholic Church in France will once again ever enjoy the privileges the Church enjoyed before the French Revolution.) However, if the goal is the revival of Confucianism without turning it into the established religion of China, there will be much less resistance and many more supporters.

Although the First Amendment to the United States Constitution explicitly forbids the establishment of a state religion, Christianity is a far stronger force in American society than in any other Western country. It is estimated that over half of all US citizens go to church every Sunday, and Christianity has a tremendous impact on public affairs. American Christianity has been more effective in influencing values and morals in society than would have been the case had it been the established religion.

In short, it is both unfeasible and undesirable to establish Confucianism as the state religion of China. It would be better to rely upon non-governmental Confucian groups than to pin all hopes on the appearance of another Han Emperor Wu (who established Confucianism two millennia ago), and better to join force with other Confucians than to wait for a Confucian Constantine to appear in the ruling party. Mr. Jiang wants "political power to become a vehicle of Confucian values." Should this occur, there would have to be a political deal

and the Chinese Association of Confucian Religion would in turn have to become a vehicle of political power. Mr. Jiang hopes that the Association will become “a non-governmental religious organization with political, economic, educational, and cultural privileges and governs over national religious life.” However, extraordinary privileges entail extraordinary responsibilities, including serving the government, which would transform the Association into a semi-governmental organization tasked with implementing government policies. For Confucianism, such a rise would also be its fall.

In the 1930s, “the last Confucian” Liang Shuming repeatedly appealed for the “union of government and moral inculcation” (*zhengjiao heyi*), with the purpose of “leaving the noble work of guidance of the soul to the most powerful group” (Liang 1992a, 1992b). It is noteworthy that his contemporary Qian Mu, a great scholar of Chinese history, objected to the idea: “In the West, the separation of the state from the church helps to maintain a balance between them. However, there will be trouble if we are satisfied with democracy through popular election whereas such an important institution as education is controlled by the government [ . . . ] The dignity of schools should go beyond politics [ . . . ] Lecturing should be free of manipulation by the government. The right of education should rest with individuals rather than with the government.” (Qian 1996, p. 82). In this essay Qian Mu repeatedly expresses his admiration of the Western model separation of church and state. This stance is worth pondering.

### ***11.6.2 Brief Rejoinder to Mr. Jiang’s Replies***

1. On Nationalism: According to Mr. Jiang, Confucianism has a good moral ideal. “*Thus, full loyalty to nationalism based on Confucian values will not lead to Fascist rule or Nazi racial persecution. Instead, it will result in the rule of Confucian values, in which people are convinced by good deeds and other cultures are respected.*” *Pace* Mr. Jiang, I submit that this kind of political idealism is wishful thinking. It simply does not accord with human nature, especially the nature of human groups, nor is it supported by the lessons of history. The French Revolution started with noble ideals – liberty, equality, and fraternity – but became instead a Reign of Terror. Thus, the critical danger lies not in whether the moral ideal of nationalism is lofty or otherwise, but whether we turn nationalism into the ultimate object of loyalty. As we can learn from lessons in Chinese and foreign history, when nationalism becomes a society’s sole, ultimate, and exclusive faith, its citizens lose the capacity for critical thinking and the result is human catastrophes. Furthermore, Mr. Jiang’s claim that “*In a Western Christian country, there is no conflict between a Western Christian’s full loyalty to God and his or her loyalty to the nation*” is false, because there are numerous examples of such a conflict in the history of Western Christianity. The most frequently discussed case is

that of the British politician Thomas More (1478–1535), who chose to stay loyal to the Roman Catholic Church when he could not be loyal to King Henry VIII simultaneously, and was beheaded by the King. This event inspired the movie *A Man for All Seasons*. Accordingly, when Jiang claims that “*in China, a country with a Confucian tradition, there will be conflict between full loyalty to God and loyalty to China, as was the case with such politicians as Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek,*” the conflict actually has nothing to do with the difference between England and China. The Christian faith is against ultimate or absolute loyalty to nation and country, and that applies to any culture. The Christian faith encourages citizens to love their country and nation, but such love should be sober-minded, open-minded, measured, and appropriate.

2. On National Spirit: Mr. Jiang Qing's division of national spirit into upper and lower levels does not answer my question, which is: is national spirit (at whatever level) eternal and unchangeable? Further, can we make value judgments on national spirits as good or bad? Is it permissible and necessary to renew and enhance the Chinese national spirit? Can Christianity contribute toward rendering the Chinese national spirit healthier, richer, and more brilliant? Mr. Jiang seems to be evading these questions by rejecting the Christian faith on the grounds of the inevitable conflict between Christianity and the Chinese national spirit.
3. On Heterogeneous Historic Cultures: I agree with Mr. Jiang's opinion that enhancement of the nation through assimilation of foreign cultural ingredient must be oriented toward strengthening existing Chinese culture. Thus, there is no inevitable conflict between two different historic cultures, nor is there any between the Christian culture and the Confucian culture.
4. On The Exclusive Supremacy of Confucian Religion: I will not elaborate on this point, as I have already discussed it at length in the previous section. I will add just two points here. First, I support religious pluralism and independence, and oppose the establishment of state religion, be it Confucian religion or Christianity. Second, Mr. Jiang says in his last reply to Daniel A. Bell's essay, “a state religion is not the same as an official religion [. . .] A state religion is rather independent, and is distanced from political power though connected with it, for the stress is on the superiority of the tradition of the *Dao (daotong)* to the tradition of political authority (*zhengtong*) [. . .] The state religion is not an accomplice to secular political power. Instead, it is the most powerful sacred institution for checking and taming the savage and imperious secular political power.” I find this rather utopian. Confucianism is very weak now, both in civil society and in government, yet Mr. Jiang wants to turn it into the supreme spiritual force ruling China and turn the Chinese Association of Confucian Religion into the powerful Papacy of the medieval Europe. If this ideal has never been attained or approximated in the last two millennia, then how achievable can it be in the future, when Confucianism will be bound to be far less influential than it used to be?

## Notes

1. In China, there was heated debate on Christianity and Nationalism in the 1920s. Some proposed that the nation would be saved by nationalism, that “traitors should be eliminated and foreign powers be resisted,” and that Christians who were backed by foreign power and bullied their compatriots ranked ninth among the ten kinds of traitors. Faced with such tremendous pressure, some church leaders advocated nationalism, but most were skeptical. See (Lam 1990, pp. 195–220; 1986, pp. 465–511). Lam comments in the first book, “In fact, the antagonism between Christianity and nationalism was a ‘religious’ conflict. As Liu Tingfang remarked, ‘Nationalism has become a fervent desire and almost a religion.’ As a secularized modern religion, nationalism easily wins unreserved loyalty from the people [...] Such faith cannot tolerate loyalty to any other religion” (Lam 1990, pp. 218–219).
2. Whereas Mr. Jiang likes to emphasize the “glory and greatness” of the Chinese national spirit, Bo Yang, the famous Taiwan writer, goes to the opposite extreme in stressing its ugliness. Lin Yutang seems to hold a more balanced view, suggesting that it has both virtues and vices (Lin Y. 1995, Chapter 2).
3. Mr. Jiang states that the choice of another faith over the Confucian faith by a Chinese person “is the greatest tragedy in the life of a nation because it tears the individual life away from the national life. As a result, the national life lacks the nourishment of individual lives and no longer receives the full loyalty and support of its outstanding members. This will lead to the decline of the nation’s vitality and the loss of its vigor. This is an abnormal and undesirable state” (Jiang 2003, pp. 431–432). However, as I have said, many Chinese who have chosen other faiths have done so in the hope of increasing the nation’s vitality and of renewing the national spirit and making it thrive again. They share the end that Mr. Jiang embraces, but not the means.
4. It is noteworthy that other “overseas neo-Confucians” such as Tang Junyi and Tu Weiming have similar views. See Lo 2001, 2005.
5. It is said that a candidate was passed over to be the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1963 because he opposed the abuse of military force by the government (Heubel 1965, p. 650, Note 19).
6. “What is absolutely necessary is that the Church must have certain essential liberties, and among them the liberty to choose her own form of worship. I intend to stand for these liberties – within the Establishment if possible, but outside it if there is no other way.” (Heubel 1965, pp. 650–651).
7. “In any case we cannot admit that nowadays, whatever may have been true in pre-Revolution times, a Parliament consisting of members professing any or no religion and representing not only England, but Scotland, Wales and the North of Ireland as well, can be regarded as in any true sense the authorized mouthpiece of the laity of the Church of England. Indeed, if it were true that Establishment involves such a conclusion, that would be a conclusive argument in favor of Disestablishment. We are clear that the present position is indefensible, and that no remedy can be satisfactory which does not recognize the inalienable right of the Church to decide all matters of doctrine and ritual uncontrolled by any authority not based upon membership of the Church [...] We should misrepresent the impression made upon our minds if we did not make clear our conviction that the case for Disestablishment is strong. Some of us deliberately consider that Disestablishment should be preferred to an indefinite continuance of the present relationship between Church and State” (Church Assembly 1936, pp. 46, 48–49).
8. “For although Free Churchmen reject the State control of religion they welcome State recognition of religion. We do not desire to see a secular State in England” (Heubel 1965, p. 647). “Nor must it be forgotten that to many the Establishment is the symbol of the official acceptance of Christianity as the national religion, and that if England, by

Disestablishment, should seem to become neutral in the fight between faith and unfaith in Christianity, that would be a calamity for our own people and, indeed, for the whole world" (Church Assembly 1936, p. 49).

9. The Church of England expressed a clearer intention to change the situation in later reports on the same subject (Dyson 1985).

## References

- Bennett, B. 2005. "Some notes on the Church of England and 'Establishment.'" Online. Available <http://www.thuto.org/ubh/whist/chhist/ce-est1.htm>. Accessed October 12, 2010.
- Church Assembly. 1936. *Church & State: Report of the Archbishops' Commission on the Relations Between Church and State, 1935*. Westminster, London: The Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly.
- Dahbour, O., and M. R. Ishay, eds. 1995. *The Nationalism Reader*. New Jersey: Humanities Press.
- Dyson, A. 1985. "'Little else but the name' – Reflections on Four Church and State Reports." In *Church and Politics Today: The Role of the Church of England in Contemporary Politics*, edited by G. Moyser, 282–312. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.
- Heubel, E. J. 1965. "Church and State in England: The Price of Establishment." *The Western Political Quarterly* 18(3): 646–655.
- Jiang, Qing. 2003. *Political Confucianism (zhengzhi ruxue)*. Beijing: Sanlian Book House.
- Jiang, Qing. 2005. On the Reconstruction of Chinese Confucian Religion (*guanyu hongjian zhongguo rujiao di gouxiang*), People Net (*renmin wang*) [Online]. Available <http://culture.people.com.cn/GB/27296/3969429.html>. Accessed October 12, 2010.
- Liang, S. 1992a. "The Union of Government and Moral Inculcation." In *Complete Works of Liang Shumin*, edited by Chinese Civilization College, vol. 5, pp. 670–678. Jinan: Shandong People's Press.
- Liang, S. 1992b. "What Is the Union of Government and Moral Inculcation?" In *Complete Works of Liang Shumin*, vol. 5, pp. 689–692. Jinan: Shandong People's Press.
- Lam, W. 1986. *Modern Chinese Theological Writings (jindai huaren shenxue wenxian)*. Hong Kong: China Graduate School of Theology.
- Lam, W. 1990. *The Rise of the Chinese Church in Tumult (fengchao zhong fenqi di zhongguo jiaohui)*. Hong Kong: Tien Dao Christian Media Association.
- Lin, Y. 1995. *My Country and My People*. Translated by Z. Zhang et al. Beijing: the Writers Publishing House.
- Lo, P. 2001. "The transcendence and presence of God – God-human and heaven-human Relationships (*shangdi di chaoyue yu linzai – shenren zhiji yu tianren zhi ji*)." In *Dialogue 2: Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and Christianity (duehua 2: ru shi dao yu jidujiao)*, edited by G. He and Z. Xu, 243–277. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press.
- Lo, P. 2005. "Neo-Confucian Religiousness Vis-a?-Vis Neo-orthodox Protestantism." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 32.3: 367–390.
- McLean, I. 2004. "The Church of the England and the State – Part One: Reforming Establishment – Good for the Church, and Good for the State." [Online]. Available <http://www.unlockdemocracy.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/03-30.pdf>. Accessed October 12, 2010.
- Mou, Z. 1970. *The Learning of Life (shengming di xuewen)*. Taipei: San Min Bookstore.
- Neville, R. C. 2000. *Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-Modern World*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

- Qian, M. 1996. "Confucian Orthodoxy and Political Authority." In *Personal Views on Political Science (zhengxue siyan)*, 73–85. Taipei: Commercial Press.
- Tang, Y. 2007. *The New Axis Age and the Construction of Chinese Culture (xin zhouxin shidai yu zhongguo wenhua di jianshe)*. Nanchang: Jiangxi People's Press.