

JUHA MANNINEN

BETWEEN THE VIENNA CIRCLE AND LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN –
THE PHILOSOPHICAL TEACHERS OF G. H. VON WRIGHT

I

Georg Henrik von Wright always mentioned that his academic teachers had been Eino Kaila and Ludwig Wittgenstein. He even spoke of the two as his “father figures”. Georg Henrik was a sunny boy, but his “fathers” appear to be quite enigmatic. An industry of philosophical literature is needed to interpret Wittgenstein. Kaila seems to be at most a minor figure with some contacts to the Vienna Circle. It is not wrong to see von Wright as a follower of Wittgenstein, and von Wright’s life-long work was decisive for the fact that all of Wittgenstein’s *Nachlass* is now available.

In what follows, I will concentrate more on Kaila and his Viennese connections than on Wittgenstein. I make an attempt of trying to see the two “fathers” from a perspective that was or at least could have been von Wright’s contemporary view. Vienna – or, more accurately – the recent past of Vienna was also von Wright’s city of dreams. Kaila is an interesting case as concerns the networking typical of the Vienna Circle, especially as an example of Rudolf Carnap’s rich scientific contacts at that point of his career. It was Kaila who made the start of von Wright’s career possible and determined a number of his philosophical interests and orientations, including the specific way in which von Wright’s work can be said to be linked to the Vienna Circle and logical empiricism. Of course, after World War II “analytic philosophy” was the acceptable designation for that kind of work that von Wright was pursuing in Cambridge, but his story can not be told without attention to the impulses from Vienna.

When von Wright began his studies at the University of Helsinki in 1934, he had a discussion with Kaila who was responsible for an undivided chair for philosophy and psychology. Without any preparation he had to answer a question: Would he be more interested in psychology or logic? Von Wright explained that in the recent years he had been reading Bergson, Nietzsche, some of Plato’s dialogues and also Kant. Kaila was not satisfied and when pressed von Wright gave the answer: Logic.¹ The answer proved to be significant for all of von Wright’s career.

1 G. H. von Wright, *Elämäni niin kuin sen muistan*. Helsinki: Otava 2001, p. 57. A number of the following informations are drawn from these memoirs by von Wright.

II

In practice, the textbook for logic in Kaila's courses was Rudolf Carnap's *Abriss der Logistik*. It was accompanied by *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*. Kaila had obviously heard that his new student, von Wright, was not completely uninitiated in philosophy. Kaila even mentioned to him the new *Die logische Syntax der Sprache*. But this was something that could be read only later on. In fact, Kaila would himself be struggling painfully through the book for a long time.

During the first year of studies Kaila directed von Wright's interest towards induction and probability. It meant the writings of Richard von Mises and Hans Reichenbach. Karl Popper's brand new *Logik der Forschung* was read immediately when it appeared. In Kaila's opinion, this was not enough. He gave to von Wright his own copy of *A Treatise of Probability* by J. M. Keynes. Von Wright complained that he could not read English. Kaila's reply was simply that after reading the book he would be able to do so at least to some extent. Von Wright, of course, followed the advice. In the final examination, there was only one small book, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

Kaila was promoting modern logic and its applications to philosophical questions. During the latter half of the decennium he chaired a Logic Club with such advanced students as Max Söderman, Oiva Ketonen, Erik Stenius and von Wright. Simultaneously, he was leading other students to empirical and experimental psychology. Kaila's influence was not restricted to his own country. In 1932, he delivered an expert's evaluation to the Uppsala University, pointing out how old fashioned he found the work of the then fashionable local school:

It is a curious state of affairs that the 'Uppsala philosophers' who prefer to be seen as logicians do not seem to possess any knowledge of the enormous width and development of logical research in the recent decades [...]; I mean the exact research which has its best known exponents in Frege and Russell as regards the elder generation, and among the younger probably in Wittgenstein and Carnap.²

These Swedish philosophers were entangled in an unacceptable psychologism: "They always talk about 'conceptions', 'judgements', 'mental images' etc. without sharply enough separating from these acts the sole interest of logic, the *objects* of these psychological acts."³

Only in 1945 Kaila was pleased to write to the Uppsala university concerning its candidates for a philosophical chair:

Docent *Konrad Marc-Wogau* [...] has begun partially to find his own ways. His latest works show that he has intensively studied the English Cambridge School, and not even the Vi-

2 E. Kaila, 'Till Filosofiska Fakultetens Humanistiska Sektion, Uppsala', 15 August 1932, p. 2, Archives of the Uppsala University.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

enna Circle and its logically motivated epistemology are any longer unknown to him. In his work, likewise in that of another candidate docent [Ingemar] Hedenius, one can now see a developing Uppsala philosophy.⁴

The isolation in Sweden was at last broken.

In 1939, Kaila and Professor Jørgen Jørgensen from Copenhagen, another logical empiricist, succeeded in convincing the faculty that the most promising candidate for the only chair of philosophy in Norway, Oslo, would be the 27 years old Arne Naess despite his still lean publication profile. His programmatic empiricist orientation, developed with studies in Vienna and communications within the Vienna Circle, would promise a bright development. Admittedly, there was a youthful radicalism in the philosophical writings of Naess. For instance, during the Paris conference of the Unity of Science movement he had joined Otto Neurath's defence of empirical semantics against Carnap's logical semantics. He had even done research among the Norwegian population in this sense, especially as concerned the concept of truth among ordinary people. According to Kaila and Jørgensen, together with the Norwegian psychologist, Professor Harald Schjelderup, Naess was the philosophically most gifted among the candidates.⁵

III

Eino Kaila was born in 1890. His family was theologically oriented, but he chose his own ways. He belonged to the same generation as Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Instead of gaining war experience, he was able to complete at the University of Helsinki a Ph.D. thesis entitled *Über Motivation und Entscheidung* (1916). It was an experimental-psychological study mainly connected with the Würzburg School of thought psychology, quite different from the Wundtian mainstream.⁶ Later on, Kaila was fascinated by the Berlin School of Gestalt psychology.⁷

In 1923, Kaila began a correspondence with Reichenbach⁸ who advised him

4 E. Kaila, 'Till störr akademiska konsistoriet vid universitetet i Uppsala', 7 November 1945, p. 12, Archives of the Uppsala University.

5 *Universitetet i Oslo, Årsberetning 1939*. Oslo 1940, pp. 66-116.

6 For a study of the Würzburg School, see M. Kusch, *Psychological Knowledge: A Social History and Philosophy*. London: Routledge 1999.

7 Cf. M. G. Ash, *Gestalt Psychology in German Culture 1890-1967: Holism and the Quest for Objectivity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995.

8 E. Kaila to H. Reichenbach, 1 March 1923: "Ich habe mit grossem Interesse ihre Schrift über *Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis a priori* gelesen und möchte sie zum Bedeutundsvollsten zählen, was über diesen Gegenstand von philosophischer Seite geschrieben worden ist." – Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Hillman Library, HR-015-56-02 (=ASP). In the book Kaila had found references to Reichenbach's writings about probability. Now he was asking for reprints on these

to contact Schlick, Kaila's first connection with the Vienna Circle in formation. In his book *Die Prinzipien der Wahrscheinlichkeitslogik* (1926), Kaila quoted Schlick's interpretation according to which Mach and Einstein had been guided by the "principle of observability": "... if the principle is recognized and evaluated in its true significance, it can, I believe, be elevated to the supreme principle of all empirical philosophy..."⁹ In the very same monograph, Kaila once used about the new philosophical standpoint the name "logical empiricism".¹⁰ Kaila was himself still leaning towards critical realism.¹¹

After an exchange of publications and letters, read critically in Vienna, Kaila was invited early in 1929 to the meetings of the Circle by Carnap, also quite officially by Schlick. The background was that Kaila had sent to Schlick a manuscript about Carnap's *Aufbau*. In a letter, Kaila explained that Carnap's book had moved him to reconsider critically his earlier views. He now agreed with Carnap that a traditional philosophical controversy had no longer any point. Still a number of disagreements remained. This was something that Carnap and Schlick could see this from the manuscript he enclosed. They could consider its publication. Presently, it would be difficult to find space for it in any of the few journals. The manuscript, entitled 'Die Logisierung der Philosophie und die Überwindung des Gegensatzes zwischen Realismus und Phänomenalismus', could also be published as a small book, even together with Carnap's objections.¹²

matters. This was the beginning of the contacts from the Nordic countries to the proponents of a new philosophy, developing later on quite frequently.

- 9 M. Schlick, 'Kritizistische oder empiristische Deutung der neuen Physik', *Kant-Studien* 26, 1921, p. 107; transl. in: M. Schlick, *Philosophical Papers*, Vol. I (1909-1922), ed. by H. L. Mulder and B. F. B. van de Velde-Schlick. Vienna Circle Collection, 11. Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1979, p. 331.
- 10 Kaila meant that all knowledge about reality should be seen as a logical, probabilistic function of the experiences: "Dieser *logische* Empirismus scheidet sich aber scharf von dem klassischen *psychologistischen* Empirismus." E. Kaila, *Die Prinzipien der Wahrscheinlichkeitslogik*. Annales Universitatis Fennicae Aboensis, Ser. B, Tom. IV, No. 1. Turku 1926, p. 35. Kaila's use of this designation was drawing on the earlier context of the *Psychologismusstreit*. For the background, see M. Kusch, 'Psychologism', in: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/psychologism>. For a short introduction to Kaila's thought in the mid-twenties, see his 'On Scientific and Metaphysical Explanation of Reality', in L. Haaparanta and I. Niiniluoto (eds.), *Analytic Philosophy in Finland*. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 80. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2003, pp. 49-67.
- 11 See I. Niiniluoto, 'Eino Kaila and Scientific Realism', in: I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen and G. H. Von Wright (eds.), *Eino Kaila and Logical Empiricism*. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 52. Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica 1992, pp. 102-116.
- 12 E. Kaila to M. Schlick, 28 September 1928: "Sie haben mir seit Jahren so freundliche Briefe geschrieben ..." – Wiener-Kreis-Archiv, Noord-Hollands Archief, Haarlem (=WKA). Kaila asked for a publication possibility for his paper inspired by Carnap's *Aufbau*. This paper came a surprise to Carnap, see R. Carnap to M. Schlick, 27 October 1928: "Du wirst auch wohl ein MS von Kaila vorgefunden haben. Er schreibt

After reading the text, Carnap wrote to Kaila: “You are right to say that the constitution theory should pay more attention to the inductive method of empirical science, and that to do this, it would have to give an account of the logical character of the concept of *probability*. I’m clear about the ‘that’, not about the ‘how’.”¹³ However, contrary to Kaila and Reichenbach, probability inferences should be just as analytic and tautological as all other inferences. Carnap ensured that in Vienna Kaila would find an atmosphere that was congenial, in contrast to Germany, to strictly scientific philosophical endeavours. Actually, during his stay in Vienna in the following May and June, Kaila met Carnap repeatedly, some 20 times, often in the company of Feigl,¹⁴ once also with Gödel. In Vienna, Kaila discussed his plan of a book concerning the *Aufbau* together with Schlick, accompanied by Carnap.

In a meeting of the Circle, after Schlick had left for the U.S.A., Kaila defended probabilistic thought and “possible protocols” against Carnap’s by now strict truth-functional positivism. All could not be reduced to the given, he emphasized. However, Kaila’s opinions were not fixed, a fact that Feigl described excellently in one of his letters to Schlick.¹⁵ Kaila wavered between his earlier realism and Carnap’s, Feigl’s and Friedrich Waismann’s definite denial of it, shocking the lecturing Waismann with a defence of realism. The others tried to assure Kaila that in addition to science there was room for poetry. When Kaila left Vienna, he felt helpless. He had not been able to formulate where the “surplus meaning” of probability consisted. In a letter to Reichenbach Kaila explained Carnap’s argument that nothing else but the content of perceptually given could be expressed. He disagreed with this restriction:

I am inclined to think that the matter concerns here primarily the thought construction of the “protocol” on the given. Carnap accepts it as self-evident that the “protocol” can be thought as “self-contained” [*geschlossen*]. For me it appears equally self-evident that the

mir, dass er anstatt einer brieflichen Antwort (wir hätten zunächst in sehr erfreulicher Weise korrespondiert) einen Aufsatz geschrieben habe und um Dich um Vermittlung zur Veröffentlichung bitten wolle.” – ASP RC 029-30-23.

- 13 R. Carnap to E. Kaila, 28 January 1929, – G. H. von Wright’s collection. The National Library of Finland, Helsinki (= GHvW). For a discussion of this phase in the development of Carnap’s philosophy, including Carnap’s replies to Kaila, see A. W. Carus, *Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007.
- 14 In his Ph.D. thesis in 1927, Feigl had considered among others even Kaila’s views, see H. Feigl, ‘Zufall und Gesetz: Versuch einer naturerkenntnistheoretischen Klärung des Wahrscheinlichkeits- und Induktionsproblems’, in: R. Haller and T. Binder (eds.), *Zufall und Gesetz: Drei Dissertationen unter Schlick: H. Feigl – M. Natkin – Tscha Hung*. Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie, 25. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1999.
- 15 Quoted in J. Manninen, ‘Beginning the Logical Construction of Cognition’, in: S. Pihlström, P. Raatikainen and M. Sintonen (eds.), *Approaching Truth: Essays in Honour of Ilkka Niiniluoto*. London: College Publications 2007; and www.filosofia.fi/aineistoarkisto/tekstit/, p. 6.

foundation must be provided by a “not-closed” [*unabgeschlossenes*] protocol, i.e. that one can imagine elementary matters of fact that can not be designated as false although they do not appear in the protocol.¹⁶

Kaila’s and Reichenbach’s objections to Carnap were reminders that the *Aufbau* was without any theory of probability and induction, so important for the practice of science. Carnap was sure that no realistic metaphysics was needed, but he had to tackle with these problems. How could inferences from the given to the not-given be justified? Carnap had coined a new concept, the “analytic equivalence”, which he explained to Kaila in Vienna and later on also in a letter.¹⁷ In October 1929, Carnap was lecturing in Reichenbach’s seminar in Berlin on the constitution of the non-given. He extended the analyticity principle to an analysis of the given:

Empirically equivalent concepts (functions) need not have the same meaning [...] But *analytically equivalent* concepts and propositions do. Put differently: If two propositions P and Q are to have different meanings, a form of the world [*Weltgestalt*] (a form of the given) must be *thinkable* in which one holds and not the other. This is the *decisive argument against every form of realism!* And not the popular slogan of ‘verifiability’ [...] (now please do your best to forget my pamphlet [*Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie!*])¹⁸

During the next weeks Carnap continued to write an extensive study *Über die Konstitution des Nicht-Gegebenen*, called in his diary also as the “Kaila-essay”, only a small part of which has survived.¹⁹ The matter was one of continued interest. In March 1930, Carnap discussed it with Feigl, Albert Blumberg and C. G. Hempel. The task was one of complementing the theory of constitution, only re-organization, and adding an axiom of induction.²⁰ Carnap returned to this writing process again in October, again with important additions: a metric for ranges [*Spielräume*] and contents.²¹ The Kaila-essay was never completed. It is not known when exactly Kaila’s book on the *Aufbau*, his *Der logistische Neupositivismus*, appeared, or whether Carnap’s return to the theme of not-given was occasioned by the receipt of it.

Beginning with the fall of 1930, Kaila was nominated for a professorship at the University of Helsinki, responsible for philosophy as well as psychology. In an official document to the university he described himself as allied to the new method of the Vienna Circle consisting in Kaila’s words of “Schlick, Carnap, Wittgenstein,

16 E. Kaila to H. Reichenbach, 7 August 1929. – ASP HR 014-09-12.

17 R. Carnap to E. Kaila, 12 December 1930. – GHvW.

18 R. Carnap, ‘Über die Konstitution des Nicht-Gegebenen (für Vortrag in Berlin)’, 8 November 1929. Yough Research Library, University of California at Los Angeles, Ms Coll. 1029, Box 4, CM13, item 3. Quoted according to Carus, *op.cit.*, p. 201.

19 Carus, *op.cit.*, p. 217.

20 R. Carnap, Tagebücher 1927–1930, 22 March 1930. – WKA 585/X.47-1.

21 R. Carnap, Tagebücher 1930–1933, 29 October 1930. – WKA 585/X.42-2.

Zilsel, Kraft and others”, a Circle he believed would in the end be victorious in the philosophical world.²² Kaila even related that he had been part of the founding of the Vienna Circle which is not true as such, though he participated in preliminary planning sessions sketching the agenda to inaugurate the Circle’s public phase in connection with the Prague conference under the new name coined by Otto Neurath. On 24 June 1929, Carnap had explained to the Circle the plan for the pamphlet containing in compressed form their leading thoughts, ‘Leitgedanken’,²³ which would later become known under its final title, *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis*. But Kaila’s own booklet on the *Aufbau* was still published in the series of his old Turku university.

IV

One of Kaila’s and Carnap’s main disagreements concerned the knowledge about other minds. They had an extended discussion on three days in June 1929 about the *Fremdpsychische*. Kaila denied the primacy of “I”, the methodological solipsism of starting from “my” experiences, *i.e.* Carnap’s auto-psychological world construction. In addition, the perception of *Gestalts* was for Kaila an innate capacity and consequently not a product of learning or inferences by analogy.

Kaila’s book on the *Aufbau* was the first one of its kind. However, much of its contents can be understood only against the background of the discussions in Vienna and Kaila’s correspondence with Carnap: the strict Wittgensteinian truth-functionalism and a new understanding of analyticity were not yet to be found in the *Aufbau*. Kaila explained with references to psychology why he could not accept any autopsychological basis:

Studies of ‘*Gestalt* theory’ and ‘developmental psychology’ [...] have led us to views such as that a human being from the very beginning experiences himself as being embedded in a ‘field’ and, moreover, does so in such a way that the very ‘center’ of the field, all that which contains the germs of the later-developing ‘ego’ with his thoughts, remains *unconscious* first; the first specific reactions, including recognition, are directed on phenomena on the ‘periphery’ of the field: recognition of faces, instinctive imitations of expressions, and the like. Once these have arisen, the field of experience will already have differentiated into a *social* field – long before there can be any question of awareness of the ego, or ‘auto-mental’ states. The famous saying ‘the thou is older than the I’ is to the point: one is aware of the mental states of others *earlier* than his own. The inference-by-analogy [to one’s own mental states] theory is wrong ...²⁴

22 E. Kaila, *Valitut teokset*, 1 (1910–35), ed. by I. Niiniluoto. Helsinki: Otava 1990, p. 536.

23 R. Carnap, *op.cit.* For this aspect in the initiating of the public phase, see T. Uebel, ‘Writing a Revolution: On the Production and Early Reception of the Vienna Circle’s Manifesto’, in: *Perspectives on Science* 16 (2008), 1, pp. 70-102.

24 E. Kaila, *Der logistische Neupositivismus: Eine kritische Studie*. Annales Universitatis

The *Gestalt* theory was apparently a late and insubstantial addition to Carnap's *Aufbau*. It was easy for Kaila to point out that the choice of unanalyzable elementary experiences as basic elements did not agree with the views of *Gestalt* theorists who in fact rejected earlier "atomistic" phenomenologies of perception but considered the *Gestalts* as exhibiting original internal manifolds. They could not be described as utterly simple *quales* in the sense of Carnap's elementary experiences.

Much more should be taken into account at the basic phenomenal experiential level. The quasi-analysis was in Kaila's opinion applied at a too low level, to a wrong kind of units. Carnap's logical methods were excellent as concerned the most advanced contemporary science, but at the level of lived experiences [*Erlebnissen*], principles such as the extensionality thesis, the principle of analytic equivalence or the requirement of decidability led to a great impoverishment, not unlike the traditional empiricisms. Instead of that, a radically anti-empiristic psychology of knowledge was needed in this specific sense. Experienced time and experienced space, all of the experienced world, should be taken seriously in the psychology of knowledge. Accordingly, Kaila explained the results of recent research into their constitution with references to David Katz, Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Koffka and others, even to Edmund Husserl.

The experienced world was not a chaos. It had laws and principles of its own. They could be studied without rejecting the specific amount of realism necessary for the practice science. To make his point, Kaila quoted Leibniz:

Yet the most powerful criterion of the reality of phenomena, sufficient even by itself, is success in predicting future phenomena from past and present ones [...] Indeed, if this whole life were said to be only a dream, and the visible world only a phantasm, I should call this dream or this phantasm real enough if we were never deceived by it when we make good use of reason.

Kaila's agreement with this was complete: "This means nothing other than that 'reality' is defined only in terms of the '*successus praedicandi*' and its presuppositions – the interpretation of perceptions as *samples from a probability field*."²⁵ In the natural scientific observations, on the other hand, the experienced qualities were replaced by the corresponding spatio-temporal real-dimensional relations, "tones with various string lengths oscillating with correspondingly different frequencies, colors with various thicknesses of light-refracting layers, etc."²⁶ The same applied to measurements.

But what was it that made possible this move from the perspectival world

Aboensis, Ser. B, Tom. XIII. Turku 1930, p. 38. Quoted according to E. Kaila, *Reality and Experience: Four Philosophical Essays*, ed. by R. S. Cohen. Vienna Circle Collection, 12. Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1979, p. 20.

25 Kaila, *op.cit.* (the English translation), p. 57.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 50.

of lived experiences to the world of real-dimensional spatio-temporal relations? Kaila did not attempt to give any transcendental arguments or other a priori reasons:

From a logical viewpoint, [...] it is a curious ‘lucky accident’ [*ein merkwürdiger ‘glücklicher Zufall’*] that anything can be natural-scientifically observed and measured at all. For it is conceivable that tones and colors, for instance, while occurring in lawful manner, still were not lawfully (*i.e.*, in a sufficiently simple extrapolatable way) dependent on *spatio-temporal* relations. That this is not so, that on the contrary qualities apparently without residue exhibit knowable dependences on spatio-temporal relations is for philosophy of nature one of the most significant properties of reality. For it follows from this that, on the one hand, the natural-scientific approach to reality, the definition of reality as a system of ‘*nudae quantitates*’, becomes possible, while this system, on the other hand, is only a certain aspect of total reality, a projection, as it were, of the latter onto the real manifold.

It is particularly important in the present context that the *method of physical science*, as it is actually given, gives *the real manifold a privileged position in principle*.²⁷

There is a puzzle concerning the mention of the ‘lucky accident’ permitting the shift from a language type into another. The very same designation can be found in Carnap’s first draft of his presentation of physicalism, ‘Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft’, written in June 1930. This draft was not yet informed by Carnap’s metalogic, unlike the published version that was completed in January 1932, and the first draft presented *two* universal languages, the phenomenal and the physical.²⁸ The coincidence of an experienced quality on a physical state depended on an empirical fact, on a ‘lucky accident’ about the orderliness of the world [*einem glücklichen Zufall, nämlich einer gewissen Ordnungsbeschaffenheit der Welt*].²⁹ Not only intersensuality but also intersubjectivity depended on a ‘happy regularity of nature’.³⁰ Probably this convergence between Carnap’s and Kaila’s views was not only a ‘happy accident’. As no documents on the matter seem to survive, one can only surmise that the possibility was discussed between the two during Kaila’s five weeks in Vienna.

In the *Physikalische Begriffsbildung* (1926), Carnap had written:

27 *Ibid.* Kaila was speaking all the way about *naturwissenschaftliche* observations and measurements. In the translation this was rendered as “scientific”, but I have changed the translation, because psychological observations were “scientific” for Kaila as well.

28 T. Uebel, *Empiricism at the Crossroads: The Vienna Circle’s Protocol-Sentence Debate*. Full Circle, 4. Chicago: Open Court 2007, p. 192 ff.

29 R. Carnap, ‘Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft’, p. 16. Ms written on 3 June 1930, based on lectures in Verein Ernst Mach, 20 May, and in Karl Bühler’s colloquium, 28 May 1930. The name “physicalism” was occasionally used by Bühler in his *Krisis der Psychologie* (1927) as the designation for a trend in psychology and the humanities.

30 Carnap, *op.cit.*, p. 17, 19.

One could think that the possibility of measuring the pitches at all would depend on the availability of the mentioned fact [that the pitch is uniquely correlated to the vibration of a string], consequently, so to say, on a happy accident. However, this is not the case.³¹

If the metric scala was not possible, there would be some scala anyway. Kaila agreed with this but he emphasised that the case of perceived qualities was different from the spatio-temporal measurement: “The difference between two distances and the distance between two such line segments are themselves distances. [...] The difference in pitch of tones is not itself a tone.”³² According to Kaila, the experienced qualities could have regularities diverging from the physical ones. Thus the kind of measurement that was possible depended on facts of the matter.

The very same two *glückliche Umstände*, now adopted by Carnap, are to be found as explanations for intersensuality and intersubjectivity in the final, published paper on physicalism. Furthermore, these two features were responsible for making the physical language universal.³³

V

Kaila’s book was discussed both in Reichenbach’s colloquium in Berlin and in the Vienna Circle. In Berlin, the young C. G. Hempel presented an objection to Kaila’s attempt to understand relations directionally. In Vienna, Rose Rand gave a summary of Kaila’s book.³⁴ Hempel’s letter about his objection was read in the discussion, followed by comments by Gödel, Carnap, Hans Hahn, Felix Kaufmann and others.

The very next day after the discussion in Vienna, 12 December 1930, Carnap wrote a five pages letter to Kaila.³⁵ After presenting Hempel’s refutation of Kaila’s “directed” relations, the Kuratowski definition of an ordered pair, and Gödel’s clarificatory remark, Carnap went on to Kaila’s psychology of knowledge. Carnap was quite prepared to admit that Kaila could be right as concerned these matters, but he reminded that his logical method was not affected at all by the possible corrections to the constitutional system. In all empirical matters discussed, also in those that concerned their earlier discussions with Waismann, he admitted that there was not yet a definite answer about the atomic sentences and that he had an

31 R. Carnap, *Physikalische Begriffsbildung*. Karlsruhe: G. Braun 1926, p. 48.

32 Kaila, *op.cit.*, pp. 49-50.

33 R. Carnap, ‘Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft’, in: *Erkenntnis* 1931, p. 445-447 (appeared in 1932) and R. Carnap, *The Unity of Science*. Psyche Miniatures, Vol. 63. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1934, p. 61, 64, 65.

34 See F. Stadler, *The Vienna Circle. Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism*. Wien: Springer 1997, pp. 242-244.

35 R. Carnap to E. Kaila, 12 December 1930. – GHvW.

open mind. His earlier comments about the limitedness of the phenomenal world should not be understood dogmatically.

Some of Carnap's remarks to Kaila can only be interpreted with a reference to the status of his constitutional system at the end of 1930, not with a reference to the *Aufbau* or the previous common discussions in the summer of 1929:

Every proposition about the past as well as about the future (both concerning the physical world about which the science speaks) are in the constitutional system presented exactly as in the empirical science [*Realwissenschaft*] only as probabilistic propositions.³⁶

Carnap's review of Kaila's book in the *Erkenntnis* was very much along the same lines.³⁷ Carnap readily admitted that there could be an internal structure on the ground level with consequent corrections to the constitutional system but the logic to be used remained the very same. Kaila's proposals about the "realism" of science were too unexact to be discussed. Even so, Carnap welcomed the book.

When Hempel heard from the discussion in Vienna through a letter of Carnap's, he sent Kaila a friendly letter of his own where he presented in six pages of logical demonstrations mainly a warning against a tacit glide from psychological propositions to physical ones.³⁸ In the practical use of relation theory, the direction of a relation was needed, although it could not be expressed in the extensional language of quasi analysis. Hempel was not opposing the constitution theory as such, merely explaining to Kaila different logical possibilities.

The next year, after a lecture on the Circle in Marburg, Kaila was again for a week in Vienna. Now Carnap noted, probably to his surprise, that Kaila at last agreed with him in the denial of realism and in the adoption of behaviorism. Kaila suggested a conference together with philosophers from the Scandinavian countries and discussed the difference between mental images and theoretical content.³⁹ A radicalization of Carnap's own views was also going on, towards what would soon be known as physicalism. Most importantly, he was developing his "metalogue", the embryo of the logical syntax of language.

On 26 June 1931, Kaila and Viktor Kraft were Carnap's guests, together with Feigl, and asking questions about the phenomenal and physical languages. Did the new metalogue mean that there no longer could be verification by comparison

36 *Ibid.*

37 The review is in *Erkenntnis* 1931, pp. 75-77.

38 C. G. Hempel to E. Kaila, 3 January 1931. – Eino Kaila's collection. The Archives of the Finnish Literature Society, Helsinki (=FLS).

39 R. Carnap, *Tagebücher*, 24 June 1931. – WKA 585/X.42-2, 1930-1933. Actually, Carnap made a preparatory lecturing tour to Copenhagen, Gothenburg, Stockholm, Oslo and Lund presenting a lecture 'Über den Charakter der philosophischen Probleme', dated 2.-7. November 1932, ASP RC 110-07-26:1. These notes were also the draft for Carnap's first publication in the U.S.A., badly translated by the editor of *Philosophy of Science*, at least in Schlick's opinion.

with the states of affairs? Carnap admitted that the exclusion of metaphysics was now more difficult, because there could only be internal syntactical methods for it. There would be no more questions about states of affairs.⁴⁰

After a meeting with Carnap again one year later in Vienna, Kaila expressed his doubts about Carnap's expanding metalogic project in a letter to Åke Petzäll. He did not believe that it was the right way to overcome the problems of earlier extreme positivisms. The Humean problems were extremely serious, but what was needed, in Kaila's opinion, was "a *new Kant*".⁴¹

VI

Kaila had founded the first Finnish psychological laboratory in Turku and activated another one when he got the chair in Helsinki. It was natural of him to be in contact also with the Viennese psychologists, Charlotte and Karl Bühler, who were just then extremely influential.⁴² Karl Bühler had his intellectual roots in the Würzburg School and Gestaltism. His student and wife Charlotte advanced in Vienna to chair in child and youth psychology, against many prejudices.

During the spring of 1932, Kaila was in Vienna studying mainly three month old infants in Charlotte Bühler's Kinderübernahmestelle der Gemeinde Wien. He was able to establish what could be called the "Kaila effect". The positive attention of the infant is focused on the area of the two eyes of a moving people. Seeing only one eye, a mask or a picture did not produce a similar effect. Kaila excluded the possibility of imitation, attempts at which appeared only at a later stage. All in all, Kaila's book was a study of the birth of intentionality.⁴³ But in Kaila's opinion intentionality, understanding or rule following did not exclude a causal approach in the humanities or social sciences.

In the spring 1934, Kaila was again in Vienna, now writing a theoretical work as a philosopher-psychologist. The result was a book on personality in Finnish which many have considered as Kaila's best. It received a wide audience in the Nordic countries, but for some reason a planned English translation failed to materialize. The central idea focused on the symbolic function of language. Kaila was using the concepts of "signal" and "symbol" very much in a similar way as Karl Bühler.

40 Carnap, *op.cit.*, 26 June 1931.

41 E. Kaila to Å. Petzäll, 24 March 1932. – The archives of Lund's university library.

42 See G. Benetka, *Psychologie in Wien: Sozial- und Theoriegeschichte des Wiener Psychologischen Instituts 1922-1938*. Wien: WUV-Universitätsverlag 1995.

43 E. Kaila, *Die Reaktionen des Säuglings auf das menschliche Gesicht*. Annales Universitatis Aboensis, Ser. B, Tom. XVII. Turku 1932. This was Kaila's last and in his own opinion best empirical study. The results were presented in later handbooks, see e.g. C. Bühler, *Psychologie im Leben unserer Zeit*, München: Knauer 1962, and J. Sants, *Developmental Psychology and Society*, New York: St. Martin 1980.

VII

As we have seen, von Wright selected “logic”. This was in close connection with Kaila’s lectures on the theory of knowledge which was on his agenda in 1934-35. Much of Kaila’s discussion culminated in David Hume’s problem of induction. Eventually he even prepared and introduced a Finnish translation of Hume’s *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding* which appeared in 1938. The problem of induction would also be the theme that occupied the young von Wright. Kaila initially suggested that von Wright should write his Ph.D. thesis on Galileo.⁴⁴ But von Wright was already well on his way towards a clarification of the philosophical problems connected with induction and probability.

Kaila’s fixed point was that the frequency theory of probability should be preferred, because otherwise the ‘uniformity’ of processes can not be justified.⁴⁵ Kaila admitted the reduction of concepts to conscious experiences. A similar reduction of propositions he found untenable. Science should be explanatory, not purely descriptive. It was permissible to transcend the factual phenomena, presupposing that the theories had empirically observable consequences. Every single “thing” was more than the phenomena connected with it..

Much later, in 1990, von Wright remembered in positive terms a contribution of his former charismatic teacher:

Kaila’s own ‘constitution theory’ is original and rather different from Carnap’s. It is much to be regretted that it never that it never attracted the attention internationally which, in my opinion, it amply deserves. To this contributed no doubt the intervention of the war and the ‘emigration’ of a whole tradition of philosophy from the German to the English-speaking world. The only noteworthy trace which Kaila’s contributions have left are with Alfred Ayer, who in his *Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* [1940] acknowledged indebtedness to Kaila.⁴⁶

With the book *Über das System der Wirklichkeitsbegriffe: Ein Beitrag zum logischen Empirismus* (1936) testability became for Kaila the thesis of logical empiricism, accompanied by the principles of induction and simplicity together with the analyticity of the formal sciences. This book was the presentation of Kaila’s sketch for a constitution theory, intended by von Wright’s remark and in contrast to the earlier critical essay on the *Aufbau*. Indeed, it provided most of the arguments for Ayer’s constitution of the material things.

44 Cf. Kaila, *Reality*, p. 108: “Science [...] knows only one epistemology; it is contained in the method of science itself; it is logical empiricism. The basic elements of this conception of knowledge are, indeed partially in a completely clear form, already present in Galileo.”

45 E. Kaila, ‘Zur Logik der Annahmen’. A note on 26 March 1933. – Eino Kaila’s collection. Box 6. FLS.

46 G. H. von Wright, ‘Eino Kaila’s Monism’, in: Niiniluoto et al. (eds.), *Eino Kaila and Logical Empiricism*, p. 80.

For one who was acquainted with the empirical research concerning the phenomenology of perception and who had himself carried on studies of it, like Kaila, it was impossible to outrightly reject languages other than the physical scientific one. There was, according to him, the phenomenological language in which “we do not wish to make any predictions about future phenomena, but only to describe in plain manner the encountered phenomena themselves”.⁴⁷ And there was the everyday physical language in which “‘to perceive’ means encountering a so-called ‘sensual’ phenomenon of the kind that it presents a sufficiently reliable indication of a physical state of affairs”.⁴⁸ Mobility and reversibility and a number of fundamental inductive inferences together with some principles from the psychology of perception were necessary for the constitution of physical space.

An imaginary flying being living in an eternally changing smoke could not form such a concept, at least when equipped only with similar perceptual apparatuses as its human counterparts. The world of the smokeman would be without the order of our everyday life. “The fact that we have the concept of ‘physical space’ is”, Kaila concluded, “due to an ‘accidental’ empirical structure of certain of our perceptual sequences, especially the visual and tactual sequences; that some of these sequences are reversible is no more *a priori* than the fact that other sequences again are irreversible.”⁴⁹ Kaila subscribed to an invariance view of reality in a very broad sense and with different levels, beginning with the invariances of everyday perception and continuing up to those of mathematical physics. Kaila saw the aim of science to be the search for ever higher invariances.

When Kaila sent the book to Carnap, he got a polite reply: “I have read it with lively interest and also with complete agreement in the essential points. Diverging opinions in details, of course, are inevitable.”⁵⁰ In fact, now Carnap had presented in the Paris conference his new idea of the logic of science, according to which the search for the structure of science should be purified from its former psychological and epistemological elements.⁵¹ Consequently, Kaila was in his opinion on a wrong track.

On the other hand, in his review of Carnap’s *Logische Syntax der Sprache*, published in the Swedish *Theoria*, Kaila was not at all satisfied with radical physi-

47 Kaila, *Reality*, p. 68.

48 *Ibid.*

49 *Ibid.*, p. 77. Not even Carnap’s later inductive logic was possible without factual presuppositions concerning the orderliness of the world expressed by the lambda-parameter, see, for instance, J. Hintikka’s remarks in his book *Socratic Epistemology: Explorations of Knowledge-Seeking by Questioning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007, p. 199.

50 R. Carnap to E. Kaila, 21 December 1936. – GHvW.

51 R. Carnap, ‘Von der Erkenntnistheorie zur Wissenschaftslogik’, in: M. Stöltzner and T. Uebel (eds.), *Wiener Kreis. Texte zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung von Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Moritz Schlick, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Karl Menger, Edgar Zilsel und Gustav Bergmann*. Hamburg: Meiner 2006, pp. 260-266.

calism. Commenting, for instance, Carnap's use of the word "autonomous" Kaila remarked:

How can one define such a term without using the concept of 'meaning'? [...] But how can one at all talk about the 'syntax language' without presupposing meanings? The reason for this is that signs are not always distinguished from other things because of definite physical features, e.g. some geometrical forms, but because they *mean* something.⁵²

Eventually, Kaila came to accept physicalism and logical behaviorism as the intersubjective languages of science, but with the proviso that a phenomenological language dealing with subjective experiences was still necessary. He even gave a new behavioristically acceptable definition of the symbolic function as "intermodal transponability" of delayed reactions, something that was so far not found to appear in empirical studies of animals.⁵³

Kaila was accurately aware in a number of his writings from different periods that more than one method of identification is needed. He saw one of the difficulties of phenomenology in the fact, formulated by the Viennese psychologist Egon Brunswik, that "often the mere datum is already designated by the name of the corresponding object".⁵⁴ Kaila's favourite example was that of a telephone call where the other person begins by simply saying: "It's me." The person who received the call identifies exactly the subjective *quality* of the voice and the manner of speaking, but it takes a while before he can identify *who* is the person.⁵⁵ Thus Kaila was clearly aware of the distinction between perspectival and public identification.⁵⁶

VIII

After completing his Master Thesis von Wright wrote on the subject a scientific paper for the journal *Theoria*, 'Der Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriff in der modernen Erkenntnisphilosophie'. The editor, Åke Petzäll, was inclined to reject the paper, but after a strong intervention of Kaila in support of von Wright it was published in 1938.

52 *Theoria*, 1936, p. 86.

53 E. Kaila, 'Physikalismus und Phänomenalismus', in: *Theoria*, 1942, pp. 85-125.

54 Kaila, *Reality*, p. 69.

55 E. Kaila, *Beiträge zu einer synthetischen Philosophie*. Annales Universitatis Aboensis, Ser. B, Tom. IV, No. 3. Turku 1928, p. 162; *Tankens oro. Tre samtal om de yttersta ting*. Helsingfors: Söderströms 1944, pp. 161-162. *Valitut teokset*, 2 (1936-58), ed. by I. Niiniluoto. Helsinki: Otava 1992, pp. 519-520.

56 For a contemporary discussion of this distinction, see J. Hintikka, 'Wittgenstein's Times (And Ours)', in: F. Stadler and M. Stöltzner (eds.), *Time and History*. Proceedings of the 28. International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria 2005. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2006.

In the summer of 1937 von Wright was travelling through Europe with Italy as his destination. Max Söderman, another student of Kaila with research interest in Bernard Bolzano's logic and contacts to Hans Kelsen in Prague, was then in Vienna. He organized for von Wright a meeting with Kurt Gödel. News about the logical semantic developments initiated by Alfred Tarski were apparently heard. Von Wright had the opportunity to meet Viktor Kraft, probably also Bela von Juhos, the only two members of the Vienna Circle who would remain in the country during the difficult years.

Nearly all of von Wright's philosophical education, including the reading of *Tractatus*, was in the sense of the Vienna Circle and related philosophical developments. The influence of Kaila can be seen in the fact that von Wright did not restrict his interest to recent contributions but extended it also to a historical view of the problems. It would have been most natural for von Wright to go to Vienna and write a dissertation there. The changed political conditions had made this impossible. There was hardly anything left in Vienna of the Circle.

Von Wright's second choice was Cambridge where he arrived early in 1939. He was especially warmly welcomed by C. D. Broad who helped to open him all possible philosophical doors in England also in continuation. To his great surprise von Wright heard that Wittgenstein was teaching in Cambridge. After some initial trouble, there was enough of common cultural background to make the meeting of the two fruitful. There is no evidence that Wittgenstein ever bothered to read much of von Wright's work, but quite contrary to his attitude towards most of his students he did what he could do to advance von Wright's career. Very soon von Wright wrote to his teacher:

Then we have the great Wittgenstein whose lectures I am planning to listen during the next term. I have met him twice and I must say that he has been astonishingly friendly. [...] A discussion with him is very difficult, because he does not know any philosophical doctrines except his own, but if one can get grip of some concrete point the discussion will be very interesting. His clarity is thoroughgoing and overwhelming and for this reason one will soon feel that it is better to be silent. I believe that what he actually means is something that we must leave for coming generations to finally interpret and apply. He distances himself with an utmost condemning gesture from everything that concerns the Vienna Circle. The syntactical approach is apparently disgusting him deeply. It is forbidden to mention Russell's name. Only from Frege he is talking with real emphasis and he thinks that Ramsey had some 'good ideas'. [...] Although his philosophy is rather far apart from the traditions that we are seeking to advance in Helsinki, I believe that there still is a joint core. It would be good to try to find this core in the coming years and to emphasize it. I personally believe that a small correction of our course is needed.⁵⁷

In fact a trace of Wittgenstein appeared in von Wright very soon. He was speaking for the Cambridge Moral Science Club at the end of May. The unpublished paper, entitled 'The Justification of Induction', was not very different from the manner

57 G. H. v. Wright to E. Kaila, 5 April 1939. – GHvW.

in which von Wright explained his work in progress to Kaila. But in the end there was a remark that seemed rather independent from the rest. No proof that the future would be in uniformity with the past would be forthcoming:

I think that to realize the full amount of this truth, is to see – what I indeed have not explicitly tried to show here – that the problem of finding a justification of induction is no problem at all in the proper sense of the word, that what matters is not that the justification of induction is lacking, but rather: that there is nothing to justify at all. The inductive problem – as so many problems in philosophy – is like a mist, and to solve the problem is merely to make the mist disappear.⁵⁸

When the end of his creative and happy period in Cambridge was nearing, in a letter from 9 July 1939, von Wright was pressing Kaila harder than earlier. Kaila was having his logic group in Helsinki with Ketonen and others. Now he had to read a letter written by someone who had chosen “logic” and recently been in touch with Wittgenstein:

Of course it is us utterly important to be familiar with the modern logical calculus and the theory of the foundations of mathematics. Training in logic must in fact play a central role in our curriculum for the next ten or fifteen years. But, to speak frankly, logic is not philosophy any more than Darwin’s theory was it fifty years ago (when no philosopher could by-pass it as a material), and for this reason I suspect that the future will look upon Carnap’s *Logische Syntax* with the same pity which we now look on Haeckel’s monism. Philosophy has always become frozen when it has reached a stage where one tries to demonstrate something either deductively or with references to facts. It lives only as long as it is a fight against those unclaritys and false expectations that lie at the bottom of our systematization.⁵⁹

Philosophy was for von Wright not a doctrine, but an activity, the clarification of thoughts. Earlier von Wright had read such a description again and again from Schlick’s article that opened the journal *Erkenntnis*. Kaila definitively did not agree with the petrification component of von Wright’s letter. But the times in Europe were hard, and he answered mildly: “Your declaration of independence is for me solely a joy; jurare in verba magistri is always harmful.”⁶⁰

IX

Von Wright characterized to Kaila his stay in Cambridge, together with a very interesting visit to Oxford, as his “spiritual rebirth”. Especially Wittgenstein had opened his eyes, although he did not feel to be able to explain what was going on

58 The paper is preserved among von Wright’s letters to Kaila. – GHvW.

59 G. H. v. Wright to E. Kaila, 9 July 1939. – GHvW. Jaakko Hintikka’s translation.

60 E. Kaila to G. H. v. Wright, 13 July 1939. – GHvW. This postcard was sent from Austria, now a part of Greater Germany, where Kaila was still able to meet Viktor Kraft.

in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Back in Finland, von Wright continued his work, but there was not much time left before Soviet Union attacked Finland in agreement with Hitler in the fall of 1939, beginning the Winter War.⁶¹ This happened to be the year when Kaila's excellent book on logical empiricism appeared, entitled *Inhimillinen tieto* (Human knowledge). The very same year the book was printed also in Swedish, translated by von Wright and used for a long time as a textbook in the Nordic Countries. Still 40 years later von Wright judged the book to be the best introduction ever to logical empiricism.⁶²

When Carnap received the Swedish edition in Chicago, he was able to read it, although not without difficulty. He sent Kaila a letter, looking at the news pictures from bombarded Helsinki and commenting with great sympathy the fight of the Finns against the Russian attack, condemned by "not only by us Europeans but also by all Americans". About the book he expressed the wish that it should be published in English: "When the conditions were normal, I would think that it could fit well to our 'Library of Unified Science'..."⁶³ In addition, Carnap praised especially the broad historical stage presented in the book and he made also some logical objections and suggestions. However, the end of the Library of Unified Science came soon, when Holland, where it was published, was invaded.

During Finland's Winter War C. D. Broad published twice some of von Wright's letters about the situation in *The Cambridge Review*, actually the first writings of von Wright that were printed in English. There followed a peace between the U.S.S.R. and Finland, but it proved to be only an interim peace. Von Wright succeeded in defending in Helsinki his Ph.D. thesis *The Logical Problem of Induction* in May 1941.⁶⁴ A second revised edition of the book, published by Basil Blackwell in Oxford, appeared in 1957, now dedicated to Kaila. An added new chapter on the goodness of inductive policies shows Wittgenstein's influence.⁶⁵ In 1943, von Wright published a book, entitled *Den logiska empirismen* (Logical empiricism). It was an informed survey of the writings of the movement, although not as enthusiastic as Kaila's book.⁶⁶

61 See J. Lavery, *The History of Finland*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press 2006.

62 See his introduction to Kaila, *Reality*, p. xxxiii.

63 R. Carnap to E. Kaila, 15 January 1940. – GHvW.

64 For a survey and evaluation of von Wright's work on these topics, see I. Niiniluoto, 'G. H. von Wright on Probability and Induction', in: I. Niiniluoto and R. Vilkkio (eds.), *Philosophical Essays in Memoriam Georg Henrik von Wright*. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 77. Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica 2005, pp. 11-32.

65 This is an observation by Ilkka Niiniluoto.

66 An up to date bibliography of von Wright's publications is included in J. Manninen and I. Niiniluoto (eds.), *The Philosophical Twentieth Century in Finland. A Bibliographical Guide*. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 82. Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica 2007, pp. 434-461.

X

Despite great losses, Finland survived the two wars as an independent democracy and without being occupied. After the wars von Wright was again able to go to England and, of course, meet Wittgenstein. The friendship with Wittgenstein did not lead to any betrayal of von Wright's promises to Kaila concerning logic. Less known is the fact that in these times von Wright did not think that logical empiricism is dead. He wrote from Dartmoor a long letter to his friend Max Söderman. It portrayed the philosophical situation in England, including also a surprising twist as regards Wittgenstein.

Von Wright arrived first to his old supporter Broad, but his three months long journey extended to the whole golden triangle of Cambridge, Oxford and London. His contacts with Trinity College were good and as an occasional member of the High Table he could meet a great number of personalities. He held lectures on 'Some Aspects of the Logic of Science', listened Wittgenstein's lectures and his seminar and participated in the meetings of the Moral Science Club where he also read a paper on the nature of philosophical activity. In London, A. J. Ayer and Karl Popper, the last one recently returned from New Zealand, were the dominating figures. Von Wright, by the way, never distanced Popper from the Vienna Circle. Von Wright had three lectures in Bedford College, entitled 'Some Problems of Methodology'. He was hosted in Oxford by C. D. Price and Gilbert Ryle and lectured on 'Induction and Probability'. Friedrich Waismann had left Cambridge and he was now influential in Oxford. Von Wright expressed his impressions:

One could say that philosophy in England is experiencing a positivistic or logico-empiristic phase. Ten years earlier Ayer appeared to be an isolated figure in the tree of British thought. Today it would be right to characterize him as quite typical among the younger English philosophers. He has and he will certainly continue to have great influence. It is curious that he has himself been very much influenced by our teacher Kaila. It can also be mentioned that Kaila's name was unknown in Oxford, when I was there in 1939, but now he is everywhere mentioned with respect. Ayer's approximative counterpart in Oxford is the somewhat elder Ryle, and Price represents a more conservative type like Broad in Cambridge.⁶⁷

The influence of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore was waning, although it could be seen "in the contemporary positivism of English thought". In Cambridge, a counterpart to Ayer and Ryle could be seen in R. B. Braithwaite. However, the most interesting of all was Wittgenstein:

His influence is behind everything, not only modern English thought, but actually also the whole of the logical empiricist stream of thought. I do not mean especially *Tractatus*, the youthful work that he has left behind himself a long time ago. Although he has not published anything since then, his thoughts penetrate the philosophical atmosphere here. This

67 G. H. v. Wright to M. Söderman, 12 June 1947. – GHvW.

does not mean that he is beloved, rather a feared and hated one.

He has researched the country of modern philosophy with a perfection, seriousness and depth that probably has counterparts only among the greatest thinkers in history. ‘Language’, ‘meaning’, ‘truth’, ‘thought’, ‘conscious states’, ‘logic’, ‘consequence’, the basic concepts of mathematics – all that he has thought thoroughly. And when one meets this enormous lifetime work, one is inclined to say: It is done. [...] This is a horrible truth for the one who sees it. It means that every attempt at improving it or developing it further will be seen as mannerism or decline. It seems to me that if something new and lasting should be created, then it should be in opposition against and not along the lines of thought that Wittgenstein has drawn.

Contrary to von Wright’s expectations, it was exactly Wittgenstein’s thought and style that invaded the British minds, not Ayer’s.

Respect and independence was an attitude that suited Wittgenstein well, as it did for Kaila. As we know, von Wright was not Kaila’s *Nachfolger* in Helsinki, but Wittgenstein’s in Cambridge, although he returned to Finland after some years. In Cambridge he met a Finnish mathematician returning from the U.S.A., with whom he had corresponded extensively about questions of logic, Jaakko Hintikka. In the summer of 1949, von Wright wrote to Kaila: “Hintikka is a very gifted young man and it would not surprise me if he will accomplish much.”⁶⁸ There is an unbroken lineage from Kaila and the Vienna Circle to present-day philosophy in Finland.

XI

When did the Vienna Circle (or: Logical Empiricism) end, if ever? One can say that the end came when Schlick was murdered in 1936. However, this is not an altogether satisfying answer, because the spirit of the Circle is still alive and even growing stronger in a number of parts of the world. Or maybe its death was the passing away of its organizing talent, Neurath, in 1945? Von Wright had another answer. In one of his last reminiscences he related how Margarethe Stonborough, Wittgenstein’s sister, had invited him and his wife to Vienna. It was the year 1952. Wittgenstein had died the previous year. Von Wrights could stay in the house planned by Wittgenstein in the Kundmannngasse.

The short period when Viktor Kraft was permitted to be a professor in Vienna was nearing its end. Von Wright wrote about the philosopher who would soon be retired:

I contacted him, and he friendly invited me to his research seminar called ‘privatissimum’. I participated in a couple of meetings. I met in them among others Paul Feyerabend who then accompanied me in Vienna.

68 G. H. v. Wright to E. Kaila, 3 July 1949. – GHvW.

Von Wright continued:

I remember especially the last meeting of Kraft's *privatissimum*. The topic was the difference between a regularity and natural law. When the end of the session was nearing, Kraft delivered a small oration. He said that the meeting this evening could be seen as the absolutely last meeting of the Vienna Circle. [...] I did not have the opportunity to get acquainted with the Vienna Circle during its time of flourishing, but in a sense I participated, if it is right to say so, in its funeral. Kraft's speech in his seminar's last meeting was deeply moving me.⁶⁹

Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies
P.O. Box 4
FIN-00014 University of Helsinki
Finland
juhamann@mappi.helsinki.fi

69 G. H. von Wright, 'Wienin piiri – henkilökohtaisia muistoja', in: I. Niiniluoto and H. J. Koskinen (eds.), *Wienin piiri*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus 2002, pp. 201-202.

For their generous help in making available unpublished materials and for permission to quote from them the author wishes to thank The Archives of the Finnish Literature Society, Helsinki; The Archives of Lund's University Library; The National Library of Finland, Helsinki; The Archives of Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Hillman Library; The Archives of Uppsala Library and the Wiener-Kreis-Archiv, Noord-Hollands Archief, Haarlem.