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Empiricism, Pragmatism, Behaviorism: Arne Næss and the Growth of American-styled Social Research in Norway after World War II[1]

I

Arne Næss is conventionally portrayed as the seminal character of modern Norwegian philosophy. Equally important, however, is his status as a founding father of the social sciences as a distinct academic field in Norway. Shortly after the German invasion Næss gathered an interdisciplinary group of students and junior scholars to scrutinize the foundations of their respective fields of study. After the war the agenda of this group drifted from philosophy toward social research. To introduce a new interdisciplinary complex, known from the United States as the "behavioral sciences", into the national university system became its highest priority. In late 1949 these efforts led to the formation of the *Institute for Social Research*, which would prove seminal to the development of social psychology, sociology, and political science throughout the following decades.

It seems to be a common characteristic of the intellectual situation in all the Nordic countries that Vienna-style empiricist philosophy tended to operate as a gateway to American-style social science. In my master's thesis, now fifteen years old, I studied how this transition from philosophy to social research came about in the Norwegian setting.[2] My focal argument was that Næss' distinctive epistemological program and the social experience of Fascism and resistance both proved decisive, and that the group's intellectual development could be analyzed in terms of an intriguing dialectic between basic epistemological, ethical, and political attitudes. From 1943 Næss and his students increasingly addressed the practical and normative challenges of postwar society as a special responsibility of philosophers and social scholars. Similar to such proponents of unified science as John Dewey and Karl Popper, they came to see the ethos of empirical research as intrinsically relevant to the basic norms and methods of democratic politics.

This fascinating interplay of epistemological and political ideas will not be explored in much detail here. Instead I want to focus on a contribution by the young Stein Rokkan, one of Næss' most distinguished students. Rokkan's masters' thesis on David Hume (1948) was never published and exists merely as a rather

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mistreated *Nachlass* in his archives. However, in what follows I would argue that it could be read as an attempt to explore the philosophical genealogy of Næss' radical empiricism. By constructing Hume as the philosophical father of radical empiricism, Rokkan indirectly challenged Popper's theory of piecemeal social engineering, which represented a competing interpretation of the ethical-political implications of unified science. In order to appreciate Rokkan's early work, I will first sketch some major features of Næss' program in the theory of science and his wartime attempts to extrapolate it into a program of ethical and political education.

II

Næss' distinctive approach to unified science was often referred to as "radical empiricism". This program was first presented, or rather demonstrated, in his doctoral dissertation *Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten* (Cognition and Scientific Behavior), written during his sojourn in Vienna in 1933-34.

Erkenntnis was a rather eccentric contribution to the discourse of the Vienna Circle, and to ascribe model status to it among his philosophical followers would be somewhat exaggerated. Still it expressed a view of the principles of unified science which helps explain why Næss became quite a gate-opener to the social sciences. What he set out to do was to replace "subjective" epistemology with an objective psychology of scientific cognition. The aim was to overcome what he saw as a fundamental inconsistence in the movement for unified science: When the logical empiricists drew their sharp line of demarcation between science and metaphysics, they applied epistemological doctrines which were themselves ultimately metaphysical rather than scientific in nature. Næss' alternative was a naturalistic and radically action-oriented model of human cognition. The behavioral sciences were here invoked to produce a characteristic alienation to the object of study and thereby facilitate the transition from philosophy to science. This ambition was typical of the movement for unified science. But while Carnap and Neurath based their theory of science on highly formalized disciplines such as physics and mathematics,[3] Næss was more inclined to look to such disciplines as biology, psychology, sociology, and cultural anthropology. This difference had far-reaching implications. The physicalism of Carnap and Neurath led to a model of unified science as a one-way avenue leading from the social and cultural sciences via psychology down to physiology, biochemistry, and ultimately physics. Næss' approach suggested a more flexible, non-hierarchical cooperation between various disciplines involved in the study of man, from biology and psychology to anthropology and sociology. While diverging from prevailing modes of thought within the Central-

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3   Cf. Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations for the Unity of Science, *International Encyclopedia of the Unified Sciences* 1 (1), Chicago 1938.

European movement for unified science, this thinking had certain affinities with American pragmatism. Næss, like the pragmatists, conceived of science and the pursuit of knowledge in general as *activity* or as modes of behavior, and believed the growth of scientific and other forms of knowledge could be most adequately reconstructed by examining the evolution of these behavioral systems.

Næss' behavioral epistemology was an avant-garde experiment of thought, but impracticable as an empirical research program. His so-called empirical semantics was an attempt to translate his epistemological naturalism into a more applicable methodology. But empirical semantics also helped bridge the gap between Næss' radical empiricism and the more general cultural task he had been entrusted as Norway's only professor of philosophy: to introduce all university students to the ethos of academic scholarship. Næss' original contribution to the *examen philosophicum*, an introductory exam in psychology, logic, and the history of philosophy which was mandatory for all academic students in Norway, was to transform the curriculum in formal logic into a course in the use of natural language in everyday reasoning.[4] The aim of this course was to study how particular concepts and formulations were actually used as instruments in different kinds of communication. Næss held such investigations to be seminal to the growth of science, but he also found them valuable for general educational purposes. By sensitizing students to the pitfalls of communication he hoped to immunize them against demagoguery and manipulation. Scientific objectivity had a general cultural value, which expressed itself in an attitude that Næss, with a favorite term of his, called *saklighet*.[5] *Saklighet* could be described as the capacity to assume a distanced and disinterested perspective, even in matters where one's own interests or identity were at stake. It was fundamentally a question of decency in communication and thus involved ethical values.

Næss' epistemological naturalism and ethos of *saklighet* gave a clue to his wartime reflections on the problems of Fascism, resistance, and postwar democratic reconstruction. He thus sharply rejected the widespread view that democracy, in order to become resistant to totalitarian ideologies, had to be grounded on a set of absolute values, a strong unifying ideology, or firm communitarian solidarity. Næss instead defended an approach he called *ethical trivialism*: a conscious translation of pretentious moral ideals into norms which were closer to actual human behavior patterns and habits. This principle had, according to his argument, two great advantages vis-à-vis a high-flown ethical idealism: It reduced the psychological drives that led to moral hypocrisy and a distorted self-image, and it represented a more effective form of motivation and learning, since the reduced distance between behavior and ideals would make for less punishment and

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4   Arne Næss, *Endel elementære logiske emner*, Oslo 1941 (and ten later editions), English version: *Communication and Argument: Elements of Applied Semantics*, Oslo 1966.

5   This term, which is untranslatable into English, is known to the English-speaking world in its German version: *Sachlichkeit*.

more reward. Where moral alarmists found abundant evidence of moral decay and confusion, Næss saw rather signs of moral *evolution*: an ongoing transition from a "moral preaching with major emphasis on duty and punishment, on relations of authority and submission, toward ethical clarification with primary regard to social attitude, welfare, and personal development". And this transition entailed a shift from simple, pointed imperatives to complex, enlightened moral supervision and education, in short, to a more conditional, scientifically and philosophically enlightened discourse.[6]

Trivialism, when extrapolated from ethics to politics, was tantamount to ideological secularization. It was therefore more than a coincidence that the seminar in which Næss first presented his ethical trivialism, autumn 1947, drifted into a discussion of Popper's recent magnum opus, *The Open Society and its Enemies*. Popper's piecemeal social engineering aimed precisely at "trivializing" contentious issues by translating unconditional normative claims into conditional hypotheses or means-ends clauses. But there were also striking differences between Næss and the position Popper outlined in his grandiloquent narrative of the eternal philosophical struggle between the principles of the open and the closed society. Some of the most basic principles of the open society, according to Popper, followed from the Kantian dichotomy between the sphere of necessity and the sphere of freedom. In Popper's formulation this amounted to a fundamental distinction between *facts* and *decisions*. To blur this distinction inevitably led to the suspension of enlightenment and reason, and was therefore a basic constituent of the philosophies of the closed society. This criticism did not only apply to the three great villains in Popper's narrative, Plato, Hegel, and Marx, but also to what he labeled sociological naturalism, represented, among others, by John Stuart Mill.[7]

Popper's harsh criticism of naturalism in epistemology, ethics, and sociology was a challenge to Næss, who never accepted a sharp logical dichotomy between facts and decisions. Contrary to the common wisdom of Popper, the logical empiricists, and the Uppsala school of legal realism, Næss argued that norms could be clarified by the same forms of linguistic analysis that applied to descriptions. Neither did Næss share Popper's pointed critique of ethical and sociological naturalism. Næss' ethical trivialism, itself a moral philosophy, was based on the view that spontaneous reactions of empathy between humans presented deeper and more universal moral wellsprings than philosophical dogmas. Friendliness and love, Næss stated, did not seem to rely on "beliefs to which we arrive by complicated reasoning or un-analyzable intuitions, but on deep-seated, biologically well-founded tendencies to ... arouse sympathy reactions vis-à-vis other sensitive beings".[8] The key to a better world thus lay not so much in the fixation of ultimate

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6   Arne Næss, "Om noe vi kan tro på og leve for. Kulturkrisen og uinnskrenket verdipessimisme", *Samtiden* 1948, pp. 174–179.
7   Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, vol. 2: *The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath*, London 1974, p. 88 f.
8   Næss 1948, p. 170.

ethical and political principles as in the gradual expansion of benevolence from one's closest circle to ever-wider circles of humanity.[9]

This discrepancy between Næss and Popper reflected a momentous tension in the movement for unified science as such. I would argue that it might partly be seen as a tension between European-style scientism and logical empiricism on the one hand, and American-style pragmatism, behaviorism, and functionalism on the other. In this conflict Næss seems to have been more of an "American" than a "European", which might help explain the easiness with which many of his students turned to the postwar social sciences as a continuation of ethics and political philosophy with new means.

III

The tension within the movement for unified science between naturalism and transcendental reasoning constituted the backdrop of Stein Rokkan's early work on the appeal to nature in David Hume's social and political thought. Rokkan would later become a leading political sociologist and is probably Norway's most important sociologist in the postwar era. But he started out as an intellectual historian. Unlike Næss and most of his students, Rokkan was a philologist with a special interest in the history of philosophy. Shortly after the liberation he got hold of Popper's *The Open Society and its Enemies*, which he consumed with enormous interest. What particularly fascinated him was the way in which Popper related epistemology to politics. Starting out as a "passionate student of the history of ideas", he explained in a letter to Popper in early 1947, he had gradually become "more and more absorbed in the general problems of the foundations of social and political theory".[10] Rokkan was particularly interested in exploring the tension he sensed between Næss' and Popper's philosophical attitudes. As a historian of philosophy, he also had some second thoughts about Popper's historiography. His thesis on Hume addressed both of these issues, albeit in a cunning, indirect manner.

In late 1943 Rokkan had presented a paper at Næss' seminar on the character and implications of Hume's alleged epistemological skepticism. Rokkan here argued that conventional philosophical accounts of Hume had tended to rely heavily on the Kantian reception. But since Kant could not read English, he had not been able to interpret the skeptical elements in Hume in the light of his ethical, sociological, economic, historical, and political contributions. When thus contextualized, Hume's skepticism appeared not as a fundamental threat to scientific rationalism, but rather as an integral part of his central philosophical concern: to

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9   *Ibid.*, p. 181.
10 Letter from Stein Rokkan to Karl R. Popper, Paris, April 5th 1947, Stein Rokkan Archives (SRA), Ea:1.

establish a firm and endurable foundation for the sciences of "human nature".[11] Hume's skeptical dismantling of the logical basis of knowledge was but a starting-point for the foundation of an alternative epistemological paradigm, based on the "cognitive behavior of man".[12] A firm belief in the predictability of man's cognitive and social behavior in fact constituted a fundamental principle of Hume's entire philosophy. Hume's alleged skepticism, Rokkan concluded, applied only to ultimate philosophical problems, and was therefore fully compatible with scientific activity and a general science of human nature.[13]

Thus reinterpreted, Hume appeared as an obvious philosophical ancestor of Næss. Both endeavored to replace the *logic* of science as conventionally understood with an empirical science of cognitive behavior. Both sought to avoid the potentially self-defeating consequences of skepticism by maintaining the invariability of human nature as an alternative basis for epistemology, ethics, and politics. And both combined skepticism vis-à-vis philosophical doctrines and a priori knowledge with confidence in man's capacity to achieve consensus on ethical and political tenets.[14] As Rokkan construed him, Hume also appeared as a predecessor of the contemporary behavioral sciences: By founding his moral, social, and political philosophy on the invariability of human nature, he provided the basis of a science of human behavior.

Hume therefore seemed to present an anomaly to Popper's historiography of philosophy in *The Open Society and its Enemies*. As an epistemological and sociological naturalist, Hume would qualify as a philosopher of the closed society in Popper's sense, or at least as a skeptical dismantler of scientific and political rationalism. Rokkan's reading led to the opposite conclusion: Hume's epistemological naturalism was indeed a precondition for the scientific transformation of social and political theory. This conflict of interpretations set the stage for his analysis: How had Hume invoked naturalistic arguments in his social and political philosophy? How had he combined the appeal to nature with arguments about the social contract and consent? And how did this argumentative synthesis relate to

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11   Stein Rokkan, Hume og skeptisismen. Et fragment av et fragment (November 1943), SRA: Hb:1, cf. Stein Rokkan, Philosophy and Ideology. Notes on the Politics of David Hume (MA thesis 1948), p. 12, SRA: Hb: 2.

12   Philosophy and Ideology, p. 11, 13.

13   *Ibid.*, p. 18.

14   Rokkan quoted Hume's argument that men would have a "natural" propensity to converge in their views, provided that their deliberations addressed "any subject of common life and experience" rather than those metaphysical speculations "which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity". Hume even tended to believe, according to Rokkan, that "the vast majority of [philosophical] controversies … have 'turned merely on words' and that all men are likely to agree if induced to clarify their language: controversies are chiefly upheld through the use of ambiguous terms and will tend to vanish if their different interpretations are kept apart." *Ibid*., p. 77 f. (Quotes from Hume, probably *Treatise*, reference missing in Rokkan's manuscript.)

his central concern: to transform moral and political philosophy into a science of human nature?[15]

The character of Hume's appeal to nature was quite different from the classic doctrine of natural law. While rejecting the notion of a natural moral law in the sense of an "eternal, immutable, and universally obligatory" principle, Hume "stressed the 'naturalness' of any social norms gradually developed through human conventions and hallowed by long traditions of acceptance". This argument was consistent with his general tendency to stress the empirical uniformities in human behavior. Society, Hume argued, was "in perpetual flux, one man every hour going out of the world, another coming into it". And this continuous binding of one generation to another, which was critical to the continued existence of society, could not be produced by an original social contract. Hume therefore became concerned with those "empirical relationships that accounted for people's actual obedience, their consciousness of an obligation to obey, and the arguments they accepted or were persuaded by in matters of obedience to the laws and order of government."[16] What Hume addressed in his moral and political philosophy, Rokkan concluded, was the general problem of *social order*. Hume's original contribution to socio-political theory was his "observance of the actual system of rules, whether strictly legal or customary, which bind together the members of any society into an organic whole".[17] This synthesis of conventionalism and naturalism expressed a "realistic", "behavioral", or "sociological" transformation of older contractual paradigms of political thought.

Rokkan's analysis confirmed his expectation that there were close logical and genealogical links between eighteenth-century British empiricism, the radical empiricism of his teacher, and the realistic, behavioral, or naturalistic approach to social and political theory that characterized the contemporary, American-styled social sciences. To the extent that Hume conceived of his theory as a basis for social engineering (which Rokkan in fact suggested that he did), it was a conservative, system-maintaining engineering similar to the variety that Popper had criticized in his analysis of Plato. But Hume was no utopian engineer aiming at controlling or arresting all social change. His view of the history of mankind as a gradual readjustment of human habits, attitudes, and values *from* the primary group level *to* more encompassing institutional contexts rather suggested an incremental, "piecemeal" perspective on the social process. Here was yet another fundamental affinity between Hume and the American social-scientific tradition.

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15 Philosophy and Ideology, p. 6 f.
16 *Ibid.*, p. 122.
17 Henry Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics* (1874), London 1907, p. 440, quoted from Philosophy and Ideology, p. 86.

IV

Rokkan's thesis, while never published, presented an intellectual clarification with crucial implications for his and his fellow social researchers' scholarly project. Through an analytical effort at a highly strategic area of the contemporary discussions of scientific rationalism and its political implications, he explored a contrast between two models of social science and social engineering, each of which claimed to epitomize the true spirit of liberal-progressive democracy. By taking sides in this conflict, albeit implicitly, Rokkan indicated the direction of his own future scholarship in the sociology of politics, and substantiated the strong philosophical kinship between Næss' circle and the American-styled behavioral sciences.

Popper's critical rationalism shared three vital tenets with the American liberal-progressive tradition. First, both departed from an instrumental or technological interpretation of the natural sciences, claiming that the potential unity of science was rooted in a unity of scientific methodology. Second, both argued that scientific methodology and democratic politics constituted two potentially interrelated forms of creative-adaptive learning based on institutionalized processes of trial-and-error. The scientific spirit therefore had a general cultural and pedagogical value as a unifying, "*meta*-political*"* creed of the democratic polity.[18] Finally, by seeking to integrate and translate elements of the socialist political tradition into a distinctively liberal institutional framework and philosophical idiom, Popper placed himself close to central twentieth-century currents in American sociopolitical thought. In both cases, a new, "socialized liberalism" emerged from a fusion of politics and social science, which crystallized in a program of "piecemeal social engineering".[19] These three elements – unified science, a readiness to apply the social sciences in a gradual "rationalization" of politics, and a political creed that sought to reconcile the opposition between socialism and liberalism – were also shared by Næss and his students.

On three other, equally critical points Popper challenged the behavioral paradigm within American philosophy and social science. First, he sharply criticized any attempt to base the social sciences on assumptions about "human nature". The task of the social sciences, as Popper saw it, was rather one of explaining human actions as a function of the "logic of the situation", as economists did when they explained market behavior by means of their theory of demand and supply.[20] By

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18   The concept of *metapolitics*, which I develop in my thesis (Thue 2006), alludes to those fundamental social notions and tenets which were supposed to unify the body politic across the cleavages between particular ideologies and social interests. I argue that the postwar, US-dominated social sciences incorporated such a meta-political ambition, which made them highly attractive to Næss and his students.

19   Cf. Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science*, Cambridge 1991, p. 168

20   Popper 1974, p. 97. Popper here quoted Max Weber's argument that the psychological analysis of an action in terms of its (rational or irrational) motives presupposes that we

taking institutional economics rather than psychology as the paradigmatic social science, he distanced himself from the dominant American understanding of the social sciences as behavioral sciences.

Second, Popper defined social engineering in a manner that differed significantly from the common American usage, where the concept tended to merge with notions of democratic education and social control. As Popper saw it, the practical task of the explanatory social sciences was not to predict or control social behavior per se, but to analyze and explain the gap between our well-intentioned social actions and their objective repercussions on the fabric of society. He therefore rejected any attempt at fusing social engineering with democratic education or character-formation: Piecemeal social engineering should always mold and modify social institutions, and *never seek to re-form or re-socialize the individual*.[21] A democratic society would above all have to abstain from any attempt to "engineer" human happiness.[22] This reflected Popper's sharp distinction between the sphere of necessity and the sphere of freedom. The social engineer operated *on* society in a purely instrumental fashion, confronting the "natural" realities of social life with a set of normative standards which were seen to be the product of people's decisions qua ethically responsible subjects. By contrast, the American pragmatists tended to appreciate social engineering as a complement to "natural" processes of social integration and adaptation, and played down the Socratic-Kantian distinction between *poiesis* and *praxis* – between acting *on* and acting *in* society.

While partly attributable to conflicting epistemologies and theories of the social sciences, this difference could also be traced back to a third difference: the parties' underlying views of the "open society" or the modern social condition itself. For Popper, the open society was tantamount to an "abstract society", where interpersonal relations were predominantly rational and instrumental. Life in the open society therefore involved a loss of "tribal" collectivity, a loss which was only partly compensated for by those social affiliations that people entered into on a voluntary basis.[23] Man now found himself thrown back on his private sphere and intimate relations in his search for happiness and spiritual "meaning"; and the only decent way for him to cope with this "strain of civilization" was to endure it with-

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have previously developed some standard of what is to be considered rational in the situation in question.

21 It was a distinctive feature of the totalitarian regimes and their utopian mode of social engineering, Popper argued, that they were inclined to extend their agenda from the transformation of society to the transformation of man. If man did not "function" properly in the brave new world that the social engineer had brought about, he should be conditioned to do so. But this would remove any possibility of testing the success or failure of the new social structure, and therefore undermined the scientific attitude. Karl R. Popper, "The Poverty of Historicism II: A Criticism of Historicist Methods", *Economica* (August 1944), p. 124.

22 Popper 1974, p. 237.

23 Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, vol. 2: *The Spell of Plato*, London 1974, p. 174−75.

out escaping into any compensatory "tribalism". This argument, which echoed Max Weber, revealed Popper's kinship with the German sociological tradition and its somber reflections on the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*. By contrast, American sociology and social engineering had been shaped by confidence in the possibility of mediating traditional community values into the fabric of modern, urban-industrial society. This faith had given rise to a social theory that sought to define modern society in terms of the individual's social mobility and multiple group affiliations, rather than as the inevitable "rationalization" of all human relations.

Through his theory of piecemeal social engineering, Popper stated, he sought to replace the lost faith in natural historical progress with a modern faith in rationalism and scientific progress. The American pragmatists and their inheritors in the social sciences were, by contrast, inclined to regard scientific and historical progress as organically interrelated. They conceived of society *both* as an "organic" conglomerate of concrete social groups *and* as an "artifact" in need for constant watchfulness and management. Social engineering was seen as a way of sustaining and modifying "natural" processes of social control and integration. In the vernacular of John Dewey, social engineering was tantamount to socializing people into a democratic way of life.

In his early paper on Hume's skepticism, Rokkan had drawn attention to a feature in the "shrewd Scot's" thinking which he shared with Næss: a tendency to *replace confidence in philosophical dogmas with confidence in the social process*. This was exactly where the paths between Popper and the American liberal-progressive tradition divided. This philosophical dividing line helps explain Næss and his students' attraction to the American social sciences and corresponding alienation from Popper.

Such fundamental confidence in the social process was, as Max Horkheimer dryly remarked to Næss at a UNESCO symposium in 1947, hard to reconcile with the world of concentration camps.[24] At historical hindsight one cannot help being struck by Næss' peculiarly inadequate understanding of the most sinister phenomena of his age: the worldwide "ideological" wars and the abysmal atrocities committed in their name. Some of these shortcomings were common to large parts of the American social sciences, such as the psychological trivialization of the problem of evil, or the implicit bracketing of fascism as but a transitory regression from a continuous "secular upward trend" in the history of mankind (Julian Huxley).[25] Næss and many of his students also grossly underestimated the iron-bound reality of Stalinism and the problem of totalitarian power. This liberal innocence was perhaps exactly what connected them to liberal American social scientists at

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24 Max Horkheimer's comment to Næss, "The Functions of Ideological Convictions", in Hadley Cantril (ed.), *Tensions that Cause Wars*, Urbana, Ill. 1950, p. 296.

25 Julian Huxley, *UNESCO: its Purpose and its Philosophy*, Paris: Preparatory Commission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 1946, p. 20.

a point in time when the hot war had ended and the cold war not yet stalemated. Unlike most countries in continental Europe, the United States and Norway both came out of the war with a consolidated national self-image and tended to conceive of themselves as democratic models to the postwar world. While highly critical of Norwegian as well as American national chauvinism, Næss and his students were formed by historical experiences which differed markedly from those of the Vienna Circle. It is tempting to suggest that this showed through in their philosophical thinking.

V

Based on his studies of the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal, the Finnish historian Pauli Kettunen has argued that the Nordic welfare states were underpinned by a conception which he terms "the society of virtuous circles". The essence of this mental image was the optimistic faith that society could be progressively improved in a mutually reinforcing interplay between economic growth, social welfare, and political democracy. This appears in Myrdal's writings to be a specifically modern conception, where the old faith in natural social harmony had been replaced by the idea that social order had to be *created* by social engineering. As Kettunen sees it this break-up from the past turned out to be incomplete: Myrdal's project was in fact based on an older, protestant, and specifically Nordic image of society. This linkage between social mentality, science, and welfare state appears to Kettunen as an historical paradox, inasmuch as the society of virtuous circles was promoted by social sciences brought in from the United States, where the ideology of the "strong society" found much less cultural support that in Scandinavia.[26]

What Kettunen sees as a paradox might seem somewhat less paradoxical in the light of those underlying liberal-progressive affinities highlighted in this article. The real historical irony is rather that philosophical impulses from Vienna and Berlin became filtrated through the American intellectual tradition before they made their greatest practical impact in the Nordic welfare states.

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26 Pauli Kettunen, "The Society of Virtuous Circles", in Kettunen and Hanna Eskola (eds.), *Models, Modernity, and the Myrdals*, Helsinki: The Renvall Institute for Area and Cultural Studies 1997, pp. 153–173.