10. THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF KNOWLEDGE

Philosophia Realis

Having overcome the most difficult period of imprisonment (a period that surprisingly gave rise to remarkable texts such as the *Senso delle cose*, the *Poesie*, and the *Ateismo trionfato*), Campanella dedicated himself to the systematic refoundation of the sciences in the years that followed. As he would emphasize in a beautiful passage in the dedicatory letter addressed to Chancellor Pierre Séguier that precedes the *Philosophia realis*, even the long years in jail could be reread as elements in a providential design:

> Spending my life in the prisons of ungrateful masters, God, through whose wisdom all things are made and ordered, wanted that I be shut up for the time required to refound all of the sciences, a refounding that (always following his divine inspiration) I have conceived in my mind. This was a feat that I would not have been able to complete in a condition of ordinary happiness or without solitude. Deprived of the world of the body, I travelled through the world of the mind which is a great deal more vast and is therefore the infinitude of that Archetype that rules over every thing with the word of its virtue.[1]

After the frustrated expectations caused by Schoppe's reluctance to publish his works, Campanella's experience with Tobias Adami was much happier and more profitable. Adami had returned home after a long journey and would dedicate himself to publishing the works of his friend with alacrity. In view of such expectations, Campanella reworked his texts and translated them into Latin. The first of the four parts of the *Philosophia realis* is the *Physiologia*, which is a reworking of the *Epilogo magno* and to which the *Ethica* is added, after being rendered autonomous from natural philosophy. After that follows the *Politica*, developed and reorganized from the earlier *Aforismi*, to which he added as an appendix the *Civitas Solis*.

[1] *Lettere*, p. 379.

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The volume closed with a section dedicated to *Oeconomica*, concerning running of the household and the family, which he considered a constitutive part of society. Society could, in turn, be organised like a family with the same ends of preserving the individual and the species (as elaborated in *The City of the Sun*). The text opens with interesting questions on whether other communities can be considered families, communities such as, for example, religious orders or the communities of the Brahmans, the Bhikkhus, and the modern African Amazons, or those of the priests of Muhammad, the Marabouts, who live in North Africa, 'in monasteries closed on every side by walls, in each of which a lord commands who has four wives and more than forty concubines, each of whom is closed in her own cell and has a multitude of children.'[2] Even as they had an important role to play in society, in Campanella's opinion religious communities could not be considered families. He had words of lively reproach for the Marabouts. Life dedicated to pleasure distanced them from contemplation and knowledge, such that they were extremely ignorant and superstitious. Their relationship to society was similar to that of 'a worm born in the limbs or in the stomach, which devours the body and is not useful but rather harmful to the whole because it invades it and extracts nourishment from it.'

Many suggestions made in this text echo principles articulated in *The City of the Sun* – rules on the suitability of location, of climate and air, on distance from noise (which, even if it sometimes serves to purify the air, distracts from contemplation). Emphasizing the nobility of agriculture, Campanella encouraged an attitude of respect towards 'mother' earth, which offers nourishment. He argued that it is necessary to avoid the violation and excavation of the earth that comes from greedy searching for metals, lest we make ourselves similar to the matricide Nero. All the arts and crafts are praised for their utility, while lazy and harmful gaming such as playing cards and dice was condemned. The author offered sensible advice on every aspect of the organization of the household and domestic economy – on the roles, the activities, and the functions of the persons who lived together in the family, from fathers to wives, children, and servants, as well as on the prudent administration of wealth owing to profitable investments (something that was to be achieved without involving oneself in usury). Campanella also recommended avoiding superfluous expenses, such as those for sumptuous weddings, banquets, and the purchase of livery; in general, he discouraged indulgence in all wasteful things that aim at pointless display.

With regard to marriage, monogamy was held to be more respectful for a woman. Moreover, monogamy led to stronger and tighter affective ties

[2] *Oeconomica*, p. 1039.

both between the marriage partners themselves and between the parents and children. Campanella came to this conclusion about monogamy even though he did not consider polygamy against nature. The wife, a companion to be loved and respected, ought to be an object of great respect within the family, given that she was a participant in and co-principle of generation. She was not merely a 'container in which the seed is deposited, which produces fruit by itself, without the participation of the container (something that works only for onions).' In turn, the wife has to love her husband; she must not give him any reason to be jealous, and she must stand by him even in adversity. That said, it is a deplorable excess to be buried alive alongside a dead spouse (as was customary among the Scythians) or to burn oneself on a pyre (as in the kingdom of Narsinga). The wife had to lead a wise and active life, without indulging in laziness, which notoriously produces the worst evils. The wife was to be irreproachable in her conduct and also in her person. From here came the condemnation of inappropriate clothes and shoes, and above all, as mentioned also in *The City of Sun*, the artifices of make-up. Applying ointments and colorations to the face was not so much diabolical (as the Fathers say, given that it was equivalent to 'corrupting the divine image'), as it was unhealthy. In fact, such beauty treatments lead to bad breath and headaches, while also inducing darkening, weakness, and painfulness in the teeth. They make women pallid and horrible like corpses, and so they are forced to apply make-up upon make-up, time and again. They make it so that the woman is no longer the same woman, something that is equivalent to the annihilation of self. Moreover, when they kiss their husbands they transfer the poison of the pigment, dirty their lips, and induce nausea. Beyond that, the thickness, weight, and height of their shoes make it such that the woman is no longer able to take physical exercise. If she wants to move, she requires the assistance of a servant on whom to lean, as if she were a paralytic. This image elicits disdain and disgust in whoever sees her as well as a kind of stupefaction – just as when we look upon something that is dead or ugly or sick.[3]

This style of life had very negative consequences for women themselves, for their children and for society as a whole. In contrast, 'Calabrian women, who are not afflicted by such raised shoes or beauty treatments or laziness, are tall of stature, agile, robust, vivacious in their movements, in their coloring, and in their voices.'

In the years that followed, these sections would be provided with a dense apparatus of *quaestiones*. Already announced by Tobias Adami in the 1623 Frankfurt edition of the *Philosophia realis*, these *quaestiones* would only appear in the monumental tome published at Paris. There were three questions in the

[3] Ibid., p. 1062.

Oeconomica: regarding the relationship between society and family, marriage, and the acquisition and preservation of riches. Highly impenetrable (and largely unexplored) are the *quaestiones* that were added to the first part. Surveying and discussing classical and contemporary authors, the sixty-one *Quaestiones physiologicae* took up a good 570 pages of the massive folio volume. It is in these pages that one finds references to, among others, Galileo, whose doctrines on sunspots, comets, the buoyancy of bodies, and the tides are discussed.[4]

The three *quaestiones* added to the *Ethica* are rich in suggestions, considering the chief good, free will, and the virtues. Likewise, the four *quaestiones* attached to the *Politica* are also very rich. In the question on free will, Campanella confronted the heart of the problem of human freedom, which is decisive for every moral doctrine: virtuous action (and the merit that follows from it) depends in fact on the possibility of a choice, which is independent of both the co-existence of a decree that has already been established and the presence of an external force. Human liberty constitutes one of the peculiar qualities that distinguish man from other living beings. Campanella holds this opinion against those who tend to exclude or curtail human freedom in significant ways – whether because they only want to accept the role of chance (like the atomists) or because they want to insist on the exclusiveness of divine initiative. For Campanella, he is free 'who moves himself at will and with intent, and who can desist from such acting by himself, not pressed into it by others: this person is called master of his actions, and this person is responsible regardless of whether he acts well or ill.'[5] Animals and servants act spontaneously, but not freely, in that they are moved by passionate solicitations from external objects, or from masters. They are not able to choose to stop something when they want to, but only when someone or something outside of them decides it. Man, on the other hand, initiates an action and desists from it through his own choice. He is free both before and after deliberation. He can resist the passions and even the most atrocious sufferings cannot change his will. As Campanella had argued elsewhere, if a man is able to set himself against the violent passions that assault him from outside, so much more will he be able to control those rather less intense passions that are impressed upon him by the stars and the heavens. He is overcome by the passions only when reason is destroyed by serious diseases, such as epilepsy or as in other kinds of madness. But in this case there is neither sin nor merit. Man is not responsible for the first carnal passions that he suffers. He

[4] See ch. 9, notes 3, 4, 48.

[5] Cf. *Quaest. mor*., quaest. secunda *De libero arbitrio*, p. 27. On Campanella's conception of liberty, see Germana Ernst, 'Libertà dell'uomo e *vis Fati* in Campanella,' in *Humanistica. Per Cesare Vasoli*, ed. F. Meroi and E. Scapparone (Florence, 2004), pp. 207–229.

is responsible instead for his responses. Even as he experiences desire, he can resist amorous flattery and the songs of Sirens, as Ulysses did when he bound himself to the mast of reason. In contrast, an animal is disturbed from its food or from another passionate activity only by a stronger passion.

But the more interesting question is the first, entitled *De summo bono*, in which the author surveys the doctrines of the Aristotelians, Epicureans, and Stoics so as to confute their positions with his own, according to which the chief good is to be identified with the preservation of being.[6] The position most compatible with that doctrine was the Stoic one, which identified the good with virtue, the bad with vice, and held all other things to be indifferent. If virtue is the true good, then the virtuous man alone is happy, in that he is able to convert every evil into good while no external evil can cause him harm or alter his interior condition. Without doubt Socrates is happier 'dying for virtue than were his killers who were living in vice.' The Stoics were right when they asserted that the virtuous man is a king by right, because his spirit is regal and because he masters his own passions and rules in a rational and appropriate way.[7] By way of confirmation of the fact that no one, as Seneca and Chrysostom had asserted, can injure the virtuous man whose interior virtue cannot be tarnished by any external evil, Campanella evoked his own tragic experience of torture and asserted that even the most atrocious sufferings inflicted on the body are not able to nullify virtue or to force the virtuous man into an internal assent to evil, which he is always capable of rejecting.

Along with the great ethical traditions of the past, Campanella also presented and discussed the doctrines of the modern 'political writers' and the 'Machiavellians,' who identified the chief good with dominion and power. They affirm that all the actions of man are directed at ruling and there is nothing that he is not willing to do in order to obtain power. Thus, every prince violates religion and morals in the name of reason of state, in the hope that power will make up for all the evils and losses incurred, even those impugning virtue and reputation. When finally he comes to power (even if by means of fraud or violence), he becomes at once famous and glorious. He comes to be praised and not referred to as a violator of the common good or virtue. He is instead praised as courageous and magnanimous for have risked so much.[8]

Campanella did not tire of admitting that the practices of dominion of which Machiavelli spoke had not been invented by him and that such practices could be detected in times both ancient and modern. It is indeed true that

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[6] *Quaest. mor.,* quaest. prima *De summo bono,* pp. 1–23.

[7] Ibid., pp. 6f, 20–21.

[8] The exposition of the doctrines of political leaders is there, pp. 2–3; the response, at pp. 8, 11–13.

many men are ready to do anything in order to exercise power and, above all, that they embrace with enthusiasm those doctrines that present themselves as justifications of their passions. But for Campanella it was certainly not enough to concede that happiness and the chief good can be indentified with the crimes or preoccupations of power. With regard to the positions of the 'politicians,' Campanella could not but repeat his own point of view: the value of power – just like that of glory, riches, or any other kind of external good – depends always on the use that is made of it, and virtue resides always within us. That happiness does not coincide with power is also demonstrated amply by the unhappiness of tyrants and Machiavelli's heroes, who most often 'meet a base and sudden end, with the loss of their kingdom.'[9] Tyrants and princes can appear happy only after a superficial and vulgar examination, one that limits itself to seeing only the external ornaments and ephemeral pleasures of power. The gaze of the philosopher, who penetrates into the interior of things, reveals that they are akin to 'whitened sepulchers' or 'an apple that looks very nice on the outside, but is all eaten up by worms on the inside.' In the first political question, going back to traditional elements that are somewhat moralistic yet not without efficacy, Campanella added further touches to the gloomy portrait of the tyrant dominated by the horrible monsters of vice and ambition that disfigure life and render man servile. The tyrant is represented as the protagonist in a tragic farce generated by the unbearable gap between appearance and reality, pulled apart by the conflict between the parts recited on the stage of the world, dressed in the royal mantle, and the consciousness of his own unworthiness, which is the harshest of punishments – a consciousness of being 'a dog dressed up in imperial purple.'[10]

Of the four questions added to the *Politica*, the first investigates the nature of power, the second and third confront various aspects of the political opinions of Aristotle (denouncing their contradictions and insufficiencies), while the fourth – *De optima republica* – lingers on the problems and objections attendant to proposing an ideal city.[11] The first, the most complex, is titled *De dominio et regno* and it is divided into two articles. The first concerns the issue of whether dominating and ruling are to be identified with one another. The second deals with the subject of whether 'a man can

[9] Ibid., p. 11.

[10] *Quaest. pol.*, *quaest. prima De dominio et regno*, pp. 80, 83–84. On the relationship with the doctrines of Machiavelli, see ch. 4.3.

[11] A modern edition, with Italian translation, of the third political question in *Città del Sole* (1997), together with subsequent reprintings, pp. 112–137 (Italian trans. by L. Firpo); there is likewise a modern edition of the fourth question in *Città del Sole* (1996) and subsequent reprintings, pp. 96–173 (Italian trans. by G. Ernst). Regarding the fourth question, see ch. 6, pp. 102–103.

be the lord of other men on account of some right that is natural or divine, or whether every dominion is derived from violence or art.' It is in this context that once again the Machiavellians play a leading role. Against those who hold that every dominion of men over men is violent, the new politicians maintain that dominion is to be pursued as the chief good and that this is completely in line with nature. According to the politicians, war and violence are natural and all kingdoms in the world have been acquired and maintained with arms. It is for this reason that every legislator is careful to make the republic strong and dominant and careful to bestow the greatest honors on those who fight, erecting for them, posthumously, the most splendid memorials, as if all virtue consists in military valor. Nature seems to confirm the supremacy of the strongest. Indeed, clashes and conflicts among elements and animals are themselves natural. Heat battles against cold; the wolf sheep; the falcon preys on doves; the eagle dominates all birds and the lion is universally considered the king of beasts.[12] But Campanella emphatically rejected the arguments of the political writers, Aristotle, and all those who sought to justify the legitimacy of the dominion of the strongest or to sanction the inequality of men with an appeal to nature.[13] Campanella denied firmly that there was any distinction between the free and the enslaved and above all he rejected the pretext of justifying it on a natural basis. He affirmed that no one is a slave by nature, because all men are participants in reason and in Christ, who is first reason. He reaffirmed that the only true slavery is that of sin, on account of which only tyrants are true slaves, while the wise man and the virtuous man are free.

In light of such positions, Campanella vindicated once again the full and equal dignity as citizens of peasants or artisans. They are political animals in precisely the same sense as any nobleman. They contribute as does any other part of society, and constitute the 'body of the republic.' Aristotle's exclusion of these categories of men from virtue and blessedness is completely absurd: Jewish society was made up of shepherds and peasants; the Roman republic (whose most illustrious men even took their names from vegetables) held agriculture in the highest esteem. This also suggested that the moral virtues are to be found more often and more copiously in illiterate people or in people with simple spirits. So, it is necessary to distrust those who with excessive subtlety and sophistry seek to obfuscate the transparency of truth. Cato the Censor was right to be alarmed by the avidity with which the young people of Rome listened to the discourses of Carneades for and against justice. Among those young people were Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus – and Campanella could not

[12] *Quaest. pol.*, p. 72.
[13] Ibid., pp. 78–79.

help commenting that it would have been better for the republic if they had remained in the countryside and occupied themselves with vegetables.[14] To Aristotle's notion that from the natural excellence of some men and from the natural inferiority of others derived the natural right of some to command others, Campanella opposed the organic model set out in a famous passage from St. Paul's Letter to the Corinthians, according to which every member of the body plays a part of equal dignity, and all together contribute to the unity and to the good functioning of the entire organism.[15] On this account, it is not people who carry out duties that are commonly considered vile and distasteful who are unworthy of qualifying as citizens, but rather the parasites and all those who do not contribute to the common good. The latter deserve to be excluded from citizenship, since they live in laziness and dedicate themselves to pointless and harmful pleasures.

The Books on Medicine

Campanella's interest in medicine was both constant and important. This interest was already present in his first readings and works. It manifested itself in a number of treatises (which are unfortunately lost, for the most part) and which were later gathered and organized into the seven books of the *Medicinalium* edited by Jacques Gaffarel and published in Lyon in 1635.[16] In dedicating the volume to Prince Odoardo Farnese, Gaffarel called this a new and incomparable medicine. In a letter to the readers, he asked them not to be amazed if the author turned out to be a 'monk and theologian,' recalling the illustrious predecessors in that tradition and recalling that Ficino, physician and theologian, had tried to connect the study of the remedies and ailments of both mind and body.[17] And it is precisely Ficino who is one of the authors upon whom Campanella called most often in his work, a work in which, as in many others, the role of *spiritus* is central.

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[14] Ibid., p. 97: 'si autem in rure de oleribus tractassent, melius reipublicae fuisset.'

[15] Ibid., p. 92 (see 1 Cor 12, 14–26).

[16] On l'*Apologia pro Telesio*, see ch. 2, pp. 27–28; there is a tract of the plague in *Lettere*, pp. 112–117; there is also another on ways of avoiding summer heat (ibid., pp. 124–130); lost, however, are short works on hernias, on how to extract mercury from internal organs, and on how to avoid excessive cold.

[17] Regarding medicine, see Michael Mönnich, *Tommaso Campanella: Sein Beitrag zur Medizin und Pharmacie in der Renaissance* (Stuttgart, 1990); Marie-Dominique Couzinet, 'Notes sur les *Medicinalia* de Tommaso Campanella,' *Nuncius*, 13 (1998), pp. 39–67; Guido Giglioni, 'La medicina di Tommaso Campanella tra metafisica e cultura popolare,' in *Laboratorio Campanella*, pp. 177–195; Id., 'Healing and Belief in Tommaso Campanella's Philosophy,' *Intellectual History Review*, 17 (2007), pp. 225–238.

In the exordium to the book, medicine is defined as 'a species of practical magic' (*quaedam magica praxis*), which works on man in so far as he is susceptible to disease in order to restore him to health. In order to achieve such an end, the good physician has to know man well in his totality and his particular parts, as well as in terms of the environment in which he lives. That human 'totality' is made up of four parts: the incorporeal *mens*; *spiritus*, luminous, hot, and mobile, made up of the most subtle matter; the humors and the solid parts. Regarding the humors, Campanella distanced himself from traditional medicine, increasing the number of them and ruling out supposed correspondences with the four elements. Furthermore, he emphasized the centrality and the preeminence of blood, of which the other elements are but waste (*excrementa*). They execute the function of aides (*comites auxiliarii*) and concern only the part in which they are contained, not the whole of the organism. Campanella paid particular attention to the *atra bilis* or melancholy. Here, as in other texts, he wanted to specify the correct relationship between this humor and prophecy. Constituted by a sediment of dark and heavy blood that is the residue of heat and cooking, black bile was collected in the spleen, just like in a vase that collects impurities. It functioned as a stimulus for hunger and, when necessary, for fear. In modest quantities, black bile could also be of use to contemplation, but certainly not on account of the fact that it was 'wise and prophetic and meditative' or because it was a direct cause of contemplative activity (as Aristotle and Galen had mistakenly maintained). That physiological explanation had no foundation: how could an insensate thing, Campanella asked himself, be the origin for wisdom?[18] It is, instead, true that the presence of this humor is a sign of an intense heat in the spirit, which renders it extremely subtle and thus particularly ready to receive the impressions of the passions. It is therefore the subtlety of the spirit (and not its sootiness) that renders it well adapted to prophecy. For when it is plentiful such sootiness tends to obscure and terrorize the spirit, interrupting its discourse and disturbing its notions.

Campanella insisted upon the importance of prevention and the necessity of adopting every possible remedy for conserving the innate heat of which life consists. Old age occurs precisely when the relationship of solidarity and exchange between spirit and body is altered, when the spirit produced by the organism is not able any more to be retained and utilized properly and tends to exhale away. Natural death, which happens without pain, takes place when the entire spirit expires, just as the fire from the candle flies away when the wax and oil have been consumed. The spirit abandons the organs that, having become dry and hard, are no longer able to elaborate and assimilate the new heat produced by food, just as the old walls of a house are no longer able to

[18] *Medicina*, p. 16: 'quomodo enim res stupida sapientiam pariat?'

assimilate fresh plaster. And the house, having become creaky and full of fissures, opens the way to the aggressions of its enemy – namely, the cold – and permits the escape of vital heat.

The remedies suggested emphasize the importance of the adequacy of food and drink, location and climate, the limpidness of water and the purity of air, which should be rarefied, luminous, temperate, and far from infected places. Campanella reaffirmed the importance of music, which excited the spirit to motion, its natural operation, which can induce various actions and states of mind, and can pacify madness and restore serenity to the turbulent motions of the spirit. Regarding sexual activity, the author, just like Ficino, affirmed that in very old people it is harmful, even if frequenting young men and young women and 'chastely lying down with them' (*casta cubatio*) is helpful in postponing old age: 'the joy of Venus (but pure, without sin) is much more useful than many medicines.'[19] Insisting on the importance of healthy physical exercise, Campanella deplored the excessive use of carriages on the part of Neapolitans, with the resulting risk of a weakening of sexual activity. Above all he denounced the grave effects of laziness on women. [20]

One question that fascinated Campanella was that of whether medicine might offer remedies that could delay old-age and restore youth.[21] Even if it is as extremely rare as the alchemical transformation of iron into gold, the possibility did not seem to him to be excluded in principle. Even if the best medicine against old age consisted in 'interior serenity with a victory over the passions' and in occupying oneself with happy things and philosophy and avoiding sadness (which is worse than poison), one of the secrets of youthfulness is that of keeping the liver soft. Campanella provided recipes for pharmaceuticals and ointments that were apt to favor a general renewal of the organ. Other profound alterations are possible in animals and men – some for the worse (as happens in the person who is bitten by a tarantula), others for the better (as happens in the person who, in order to be cured of syphilis, is subjected to a cure that works a complete transformation of his *temperies*). Therefore, the possibility of restoring one's youth ought not to be excluded.

In the central books of the work, Campanella set out remedies for curative medicine that are always displayed in the light of his own philosophical principles. He insisted on the importance, on the part of the good physician, of an attentive and all-encompassing diagnosis that is dedicated to identifying the seats and causes of disease and to interpreting their signs and symptoms

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[19] *Medicina*, p. 56: 'Veneris laetitia, sed pura absque peccato, multis praevalet medicinis.'

[20] Ibid., pp. 63–64; see note 3 above.

[21] 'De retardando insigniter senio et de reiuvenescentia,' ibid., pp. 66–70.

correctly. Many pages are dedicated to the *pulsus*, the pulsations connected to the continual actions of compression and dilation to which the lungs, the heart, the arteries, and the brain are subjected. This is an action that constitutes the very rhythm of life and that is the vital action of the spirit, whose nature is continual motion. This is not an action of the organs, but rather their 'preservative being acted upon,' through which life is preserved and restored.[22]

The question of the hidden powers of herbs, animals, and stones is treated in the fifth book. Campanella explained those powers in the light not only of celestial influences, but also of the bonds of antipathy and sympathy present in the entirety of nature. In one passage, Campanella observed that he who fights does so not only because he has a body and armor, but because he recognizes an enemy and wants to kill him.[23] He reiterated the doctrines of Ficino and of the Platonists on the properties derived from the stars and he intended to gloss them in the light of his own principles. He insisted that everything acts on account of the properties that is has, and that the marvelous power of certain stones or herbs is not dependent on the stars or on demons only, but depends also on the enduring in things themselves of passions and sensibilities that have been communicated to them by a common sense. He appreciated the doctrine of *signaturae*, in virtue of which every herb, metal, and animal that presents some analogy with regard to figure or color or consistency with some part of the human body is without doubt of use to that part.[24] On this subject, Campanella recalled with appreciation the *Phytognomonica* of Giovan Battista della Porta. Holding the connections between terrestrial and astral beings (which are universal causes that act in the inferior world) to be undeniable, Campanella spent some time discussing the seven kinds of beings – animals, plants, stones, odors, tastes, ages, seasons, diseases – that are connected with the planets and their properties. He began with the two considered to be malicious (Saturn and Mars), and then passed on to the two considered beneficial (Jupiter and Venus). From there, he dealt with the Sun and the Moon and finally with Mercury. Regarding Saturn – to which is connected black bile, animals that are solitary, slow, or cold (such as badgers, dormice, mice, toads, and lice), sterile and dry plants, heavy metals and dark stones – he emphasized the ambivalence of its influences. Saturnine people can be both extremely wise, aware of secret and prophetic things, and 'stupid, rough, and impious.' Likewise, the solar man (precisely like the star to which he is orientated) is the expression of dignity and of true regality:

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[22] Ibid., p. 142.

[23] Ibid., p. 244.

[24] On signatures, see Massimo L. Bianchi, *Signatura rerum. Segni, magia e conoscenza da Paracelso a Leibniz* (Rome, 1987).

he loves the whole more than the part, he is beneficent, generous, ambitious, and delights in all the sciences, loving to dedicate himself to great undertakings. But it is the moon that administers and executes all the celestial virtues. Inferior things depend on the moon to such a degree that it is not possible to operate correctly 'with regard to movement, sense, birth, growth' in anything without observing of the moon's aspects. This is so much more true in medicine, moreover, where proceeding without having first observed the position of the moon is like being blind and acting entirely by chance, in that it is the moon that governs the 'critical days,' the stages of a disease and the passions of the humors.[25]

The sixth book deals with the diseases of the *spiritus*, neglected or interpreted in an erroneous manner by traditional medicine. The seventh and last book is dedicated to an analytical treatment of fevers, interpreted in an original fashion not as diseases but as positive symptoms of the reaction of the body and the war that the organism is waging against the aggressions of disease.

Psychological suffering can be explained as a blundering or mistaken reaction to passions elicited by external objects. The avaricious man kills himself when he loses money; likewise, the person who is in love takes his own life if his desire is frustrated. The violence of certain passions can be fatal, just as a light that is too dazzling can cause blindness. One can die from the joy of seeing a son believed to be dead, and a strong fear can turn one white with shock. Remedies consist in detaching oneself from obsession, even if in a deceitful way. Even the illusory satisfaction of desires can assuage fears and lessen interior tensions. Above all, the important thing is to purify and purge the spirit affected by damaging passions, comforting it with appropriate foods and remedies, reconstituting it little by little. To this end, Ficinian remedies will be highly useful – such as looking upon or frequenting amenable places such as gardens filled with plants and flowers. It is extremely important to breathe fresh and pure air, which contributes to a reconstituting of the good qualities of the spirit. If it is not possible to live in contact with nature, it is advisable to recreate a domestic garden inside the house itself, with flowers, plants, and fountains.[26]

Campanella expressed a very negative opinion on black bile and pathological melancholy.[27] If some are melancholic by nature, others can become melancholic in the wake of particular circumstances, such as prolonged fasting,

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[25] *Medicina*, p. 275.

[26] Ibid., p. 317.

[27] On the relationship between melancholy and prophecy in Campanella, see also Germana Ernst, '"Contra l'ombra di morte accesa lampa." Echi ficiniani in Campanella,' in *Forme del Neoplatonismo. Dall'eredità ficiniana ai Platonici di Cambridge,* ed. L. Simonutti (Florence, 2007), pp. 147–175.

insufficient sleep, excessive application to studying, living with anxiety, or deep pain at the loss of things or people they loved a great deal. In any case, the personality affected by melancholy lives in a condition of great suffering.[28] The interior light of the spirit – which by virtue of its nature enjoys the light of the sun, reinforcing and amplifying it – comes to be dimmed by murky, sooty vapors that stain the spirit in the same way that ink colors paper. From here comes a melancholic delirium that is characterized by constant sadness, fear, aversion to relations with human beings, a disturbed imagination, and a desire for death. In serious cases, when obscurity completely invades the spirit, remedies can be extremely difficult. If it is not possible to separate water from ink, how will it be possible to distill the spirit? In the event that the shadows invade the interior only in part, there is some hope, thanks to the possibility of consuming suitable food and drink and in general thanks to the possibility of turning to jovial, venereal, and solar remedies while avoiding everything saturnine. One can also make use of the therapeutic powers of music, which can settle the disordered motions of the spirit and purify blood that has been harmed and poisoned by bile.[29]

On the basis of this conception of black bile, Campanella criticized harshly what Aristotle affirmed in the *Problemata*. There, he had attributed poetic inspiration and the prophecies of the Sibyls to precisely this humor, instituting an analogy with the effects induced by wine that Campanella held to be superficial and false. For him, prophecy can be of several kinds. There are forms that are natural and shared with animals, who sense the coming of rains and storms or notice in the air the premonitions of events before they come to pass. Man can be endowed with particular dispositions that are apt to perceive in the air the causes of events that are in the process of forming. But natural divination does not exclude prophecy communicated by God to human minds, and indeed this form of prophecy is one of the signs that distinguish the human level from the animal one. Campanella rejected with disdain the affirmation that the presumed divine inspiration of the prophets and the Sibyls is to be ascribed to humoral imbalance and is reducible to causes and explanations that are entirely physiological. Again, Campanella held in greater esteem the positions of Ficino, who did not limit himself to connecting black bile and prophecy, but explained the modest proportions of melancholic humor that need to be present in the blood in order not to damage it. Ficino correctly took account of the spirit and its characteristics, something that had been ignored by Aristotle who attributed to wine and to black bile something that in fact ought to be attributed to the subtlety of spirit. He who has such subtle spirit can foresee the future in that he

[28] *Medicina*, p. 319.
[29] Ibid., p. 338.

perceives in the air the causes of future events that are already present, just as birds foresee the rain. Certainly, those who are affected by a melancholic humor cannot do this, for in the most serious cases such victims are sordid, stupid, and love graves, cry, and desire death; because, when it becomes gloomy, the spirit desires things similar to itself. Black bile is not useful to science except if the spirit, frightened by the darkness, pulls back into the interior to contemplate. Indeed, in the worst cases, there is the possibility of demonic possession. The melancholic person is the victim of the intervention of demons, who make use of this humor to torment he who has fallen into the shadows – and that person believes himself a wolf and becomes a game for the devil (*ludus daemonum*).[30] For poetic inspiration and distinguished works is required, on the contrary, a pure, lucid, tenuous spirit, in which sootiness is scarce or absent. This is a spirit that permits impartial judgment and a healthy memory that is thus capable of forgetting or letting rest those memories that are too painful due to their association with unberable emotions.

Like Ficino, Campanella knew well that Saturn could kill his own children, on account of an excessive dedication to studying. Too concentrated a spirit heats up and becomes embittered, giving rise to hardness, infesting vapors, and all the negative consequences of the passions, when they become exclusive and obsessive. Remedies against the harms done by saturninity would be those that we know: suspension of studies, mollification of anxieties and fears, inducing serenity and faith, satisfaction (even if illusory) of frustrated desires, abandoning occasions of excessive effort, the defusing of obsessions and fixations.[31] But the best things to do, above all, are breathing in the serene and open air, walking in green gardens full of flowers, listening to music, dedicating oneself to light and playful things, returning to all that which is venereal and jovial in nature, nourishing oneself with white, sweet, and soft foods – the opposites of black, bitter, and dry bile.

There are frequent autobiographical insertions in the *Medicina* that offer to the scholar interesting and curious information regarding Campanella's life.[32] He recalled a host of things: the remarkable eyewash with which della Porta treated him for inflamed eyes, causing great astonishment in those who were looking on because of the immediate beneficial effect; sciatic pains he suffered as a result of a long horse-ride combined with the luxurious kitchen at the Del Tufo palazzo; the terrible consequences of torture and the years spent in subterranean prisons; the pains due to a hernia from which he suffered when

[30] Ibid., p. 345.

[31] Ibid., p. 348.

[32] See the original contribution from Romano Amerio, 'Autobiografia medica di fra Tommaso Campanella,' *Archivio di Filosofia,* special issue *Campanella e Vico* (Rome, 1969), pp. 11–19.

he was almost fifty years old and from which he was cured after drinking iron filings in an egg every morning for a month and wearing an iron belt with a poultice for three months (although the hernia returned after the interruption of the cure); the curious observation, recalled in several passages, that lice did not take root in his person 'due to the nobility of his temperament' and the non-greasy quality of his sweat;[33] the buzzing and hissing in his ears, apparently caused by the dampness of his cell (even though in general he was naturally blessed with an extremely acute power of hearing). Those noises persisted for years; he heard them always as a hissing and blowing of the wind, as 'when it passes through narrow passages'; or they were like the sounds of reels on which is wound thread taken from the cocoons of silkworms that is being transferred onto larger reels. Attacks of 'canine hunger' are then recalled, attributed to the consumptiveness of his body after the fasting of Lent or when, in extreme poverty, he had been nourished by bread and adulterated wine only. He treated such hunger by eating vegetables cooked in milk and by sleeping on a straw mattress, so as to combat the wave of heat by which he felt himself consumed and almost dismembered – something 'not so very different from leaves as they are being burnt.' [34]

Arts and Sciences of Language

The collection of the five parts that constituted the *Philosophia rationalis* – that included the *Grammatica*, the *Dialectica*, the *Rhetorica*, the Latin *Poëtica* (fully reworked from the Italian version), and the *Historiographia* – would be published at Paris in the projected *Opera omnia*.[35] The *Dialectica* (not reprinted after the seventeenth-century edition) still remains to be studied, but we should at least comment on the exordium, where dialectic is defined as an 'art or rational instrument of the wise man with which to regulate the discourse of every science,' so that we can account for why dialectic is termed an *ars* and not a *scientia*:

> Science is of God and of the things made by God (such as the world, the animals, the elements that exist before the actions of the human intellect). Art, however, because it is made in the wake of human reason, is both external to soul (like clothing, an abode, or an astrolabe) and internal to it (such as a word, a syllogism, a fable). Therefore the object of every art is the being of reason, and its end is utility. The object of science on the other hand

[33] *Medicina*, pp. 125, 218, 223, 395, 422, 433, 517–518.

[34] Ibid., pp. 398–399, 433.

[35] On that work, see the contribution of Lina Bolzoni, 'La *Poetica* latina di Tommaso Campanella,' *Giornale storico della letteratura italiana*, 149 (1972), pp. 481–521.

> is the being of the thing and its end is understanding. The being of reason is constructed from art in a useful manner, both for teaching and for acting, as the fable, the letter, the sword. That, however, which is useless or harmful, … one ought to refer to as the being of irrationality and deceit – whether it is active (as in the case of liars, nonsense, sophistry, and stories that do not teach anything) or passive (as in the false proposition of a heretic that God be body or that the sun does not shine with its own light). In fact, the useful parable to teach is the being of reason, not that of deceit. Therefore in a unwise manner the majority of the logicians hold that the Capricorn, the chimera, and the false proposition that "man is an ass" are all beings of reason. These are in fact beings of irrationality – active, passive, or both combined …. Therefore logic is the art that deals with the beings of reason and the beings of deceit, just as the physician deals with the healthy and the sick.[36]

Grammar is defined as an 'instrumental art used for expression that is coherent, rational, and simple; as a consequence, it is used for writing and reading all that which our spirit has perceived through all its means of knowing.'[37] Campanella addressed the distinction between 'civil' and 'philosophical' grammar in a beautiful passage, written against the pedants and rule-fetishists and in defense of the permissibility of coining new words and inventing new languages that are well-suited to the expression of new concepts:

> Civil grammar is an ability, not a science, because it is founded on authority and on the usage of famous writers …. Philosophical grammar, by contrast, is founded on reason and achieves the status of a science. In fact, it is the method of the intellect that investigates and it notes how much it has investigated; among the things that are found in nature it establishes relationships and distinctions.… Grammarians condemn it … and they harass us when we derive words from things instead of from authors.… What terrible thing do they not say when we have discovered something new that we cannot express in terms that were used by Cicero (which is a situation in which we mould new words)? … Instead, the conceited want to impose laws on us, and thereby imprison science too.[38]

If, with respect to the *Poetica*, we can refer to what was said with regards to the early Italian text,[39] we ought not to fail to comment here on the important *Rhetorica*, listed as the fourth of the 'arts of talking.'[40] By way of definition,

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[36] *Dialectica*, I, 1, in *Philosophia rationalis* (Paris: I. Dubray, 1638).

[37] *Grammatica*, in *Scritti letterari*, p. 435.

[38] Ibid., p. 439.

[39] See ch. 3, 2, bearing in mind that the Latin text, as usual, develops the material more amply and organizes it more systematically.

[40] The initial core of the work dates to the period spent in Padua.

the author emphasized the differences between rhetoric and dialectic with reference to object, method, and purpose. If dialectic is concerned with the true and the false and makes use of rational demonstration, rhetoric has to do with good and evil and recourses to verbal persuasion, and does not work by means of logic. If the first 'has its seat in the schools and is orientated to philosophers,' with brief and incisive discourse, rhetoric is at home 'in the piazzas and temples and is orientated to the people,' making use of longer and more easily understood arguments, often using examples and proverbs. In a certain way, legislators, priests, prophets, and generals can all be considered orators. No society – whether made up of soldiers, bandits, or saints – can do without two doctrines, namely grammar, which is 'the tongue of the community,' and rhetoric, which speaks on behalf of that which is good for the community. When Campanella then defined rhetoric as the instrument 'by means of which to advocate that which is good for us and to dissuade us from that which is bad,' he was sure to make a number of specifications that distanced him from the doctrines of the 'pagans.' Not only and not so much a simple art of speaking well, rhetoric ought to be understood as an 'instrumental art dedicated to inducing us orally to the good and distancing us from evil.' Upholding this thesis, Campanella had to defend it both from philosophers such as Socrates and Plato (who condemned it as an embellished whore, set apart from the virginal beauty of science) and also from those who, on the contrary, permitted recourse to every kind of lie and deceit, admitting the possibility that rhetoric might be used to defend and justify scoundrels, tyrants, and those who had committed the worst crimes. For Campanella every true art is, as such, always the daughter of wisdom, on account of which the purpose of true rhetoric could not be anything other than persuasion towards the good, irrespective of whether it achieves its aims of not. If it happens that rhetoric leads us into evil, then it is no art, just as the physician who kills out of ignorance or malice is not employing the art of healing. Lying is never permissible. It is, however, true that in order to defend oneself from violence and from injustice, or to save one's own life, one may recourse to reticence or equivocation, making use of dissimulation – not so as to deceive or do evil, but as a stratagem, following thereby the example of numerous episodes from the Bible.

In order to persuade, therefore, rhetoric has truck with the passions and the affects. It is for this reason that it has certain similarities to magic, as Campanella had already maintained in the *Senso delle cose* (where he emphasized the magic power that words exert over the imagination of he who listens). It was thanks to the spoken word that Menenius Agrippa was able to pacify the Roman plebeians who were rebelling against the senate and it was thanks to speech that preachers had been able to convert innumerable peoples. Rhetoric acts on the passions in order to elicit 'love and hate, anger and fear, docility

and amazement' in the most efficacious way. Yet orators do not persuade like physicians who achieve their results with medications, nor do they 'call upon devils to raise up those passions that move the fantasy with incantations; instead, rhetoric makes use of argumentations, movements, potent incitement, and a fascination with words that is almost magical.'[41]

All persuasive speech pertains to rhetoric, even that speech which is spontaneous and uncultivated. Even the apostles taught thanks to rhetoric, although it was a rhetoric very different from that of the schools, in that it was alive and divine – and a word from Solomon, Isaiah, or Paul was more convincing than the prolix discourses of the sophists, as the author said he had experienced for himself. Yet, it is true that the orator makes use, in a proper sense, of a 'refined technique rich in artifice.' The central and final chapters of the work dealt with every possible aspect of the art with vividness and argumentative richness. With regard to the prerequisites of the good orator, he has to be endowed with natural predispositions that are to be perfected with exercise, among which are ingeniousness, style, and voice (but 'if he stammers a little, sometimes this adds grace, as I have often been able to confirm'), vividness of expression, a strong memory, apt gesture (which is a 'second language of the body').[42] Above all, a kind of identification with the sentiments that are to be induced is important: 'he does not persuade who is not first himself persuaded. As the heated object heats and as the cold object cools on contact, just so he who is sad communicates to his auditors his own sadness, while he who hopes communicates his hope, and the angry man communicates anger; in this way the efficacy of this magic is great.'[43] If it is true that the soul is free and can always follow the orders of reason, it is also true that 'usually men are governed rather by the passions than by reason.' It is for this reason that the orator has success, 'communicating to his auditors his own sentiment with the impetus of discourse, since by nature men cry with he who is crying, laugh with he who is laughing, become irate with he who is irate, yawn with he who is yawning.'[44]

In reading these pages, it appears almost as if one is seeing from behind the scenes some 'secrets' of Campanella's oratorical talent, which impressed both Campanella's interlocutors and the public for its passion and vivacity. Or perhaps it is almost like catching sight of technical aspects of argumentation to which he himself would turn, as when he suggested listing arguments for and against in cases of doubtful questions. In making an example of the question

[41] *Rhetorica*, pp. 742–745.
[42] Ibid., p. 749.
[43] Ibid., p. 751.
[44] Ibid., p. 763.

of whether the conquest of the New World had been a good thing, arguments that raised doubts and perplexities about the enterprise followed those that justified it; thus, they give voice to a kind of inner debate. One has a similar feeling when Campanella advised that, in order to attract the good-will of the listeners, one ought to praise them as 'prudent, just, lovers of truth, saying that one is turning to them with confidence, hopeful of success. Then it will seem to them that they are unworthy of such praise if they do not act in that way.' This is not simply an acute observation, but a kind of insight that enables us to understand better why, for example, in the letters Campanella turned to illustrious persons and praised them for their merits, even when they were anything but benevolent towards him and certainly not worthy of the tributes he paid them. This is not a courtly adulation. Rather it is a philosophical praise given so as to transform a personality into what it should be.

In the brief text of the *Historiographia*, one also finds plenty of sharp judgments. Defined as 'the art of writing history well so as to establish the foundations of the sciences,' the author specified that history consists in a narrative discourse that is clear, truthful, and 'well adapted to providing the bases of the sciences.' On account of this function of 'first light,' it ought not to be hazy, because that would offend the eyes without being of any use to the view. Among the prerequisites required in the good historian, three are fundamental: that he be well informed on the basis of direct testimony or at least reliable testimony regarding the subject he narrates; that he possess a virile spirit, such that he is not induced to lie or alter the truth out of the impulse of the passions; that he be honest and motivated to tell the truth. As for the second prerequisite, recalling a judgment from Jacopo Sannazzaro (who described Poggio Bracciolini, who excessively praised the Florentines, as 'neither a bad citizen nor a good historian'), Campanella made a brief and bitter allusion to the unjust judgment of Tommaso Costo. As he put it, Costo was 'neither a good citizen nor a good historian' when he related the events of Calabria in an extremely hostile tone.[45] The need for veracity (in contrast to the 'lies' of the Greeks) was fundamental and Campanella railed against the judgment (which in truth he held to be unfounded) attributed to Paolo Giovio, according to whom the historian did not need to worry himself about lying, since 'a hundred years hence, lies will not be recognizable.' Those 'adulators of God' are wrong, however, who invent miracles that never took place. They are addressed in harsh tones: 'Thus, it is not enough for you to play games with men, so you dare to adulate God in a derisory fashion, as if he were a fraudster like you?' History can be divided into sacred, natural, and human. Natural history can be of a universal kind (as in Pliny) or of a particular kind (as in

[45] *Historiographia*, p. 1232.

Aristotle's history of animals or in modern authors such as Guillaume Rondelet and Georg Agricola, who had written of fish and metals). With regard to the moderns, Galileo's *Sidereus nuncius* is recalled, of which it is said that 'it is a historical work; indeed, it does not explain why around Jupiter four planets orbit and two around Saturn, but it concerns itself with whether the matter has been so confirmed. The mode of investigation was scientific; narrative was the mode of rendering it. Yet on these facts, as on a new foundation, will be built a wondrous astronomical doctrine of the heavenly systems.'[46]

Civil, or human, history is fundamental 'for politicians, moralists, orators, and poets.' From histories of the past, we can in fact learn what is useful and what is damaging, derive rules from so many experiences, and reform the sciences and the law – 'so that he who knows well the history of all nations from the origin of the world to our times can boast of having lived from the primordial beginnings of the world right up until today and of having lived all over the face of the earth.'[47] According to its extension in space and time, such history can be universal or particular – of a single city, of an epoch, of individual events, or a biography of a single life. Campanella underlined the importance of an intelligent organization and selection of materials; it is important to omit trivia, avoid digressions, the speeches of persons, and false celestial prodigies. On the other hand, it is useful to refer, with clarity and brevity, to some particulars: 'do not omit foods, medicines, arms, money, buildings, or technical inventions.'[48] A biography ought to set out all the qualities of its subject. It ought to 'describe the lineage, the day and hour of the birth, under which dominant planet, and then physical appearance; thereafter the subject's actions, one by one, the events, the most signal undertakings, both good and bad.'[49] Excellent examples of brevity and clarity are Suetonius, Diogenes Laertius, and Plutarch. Rather more suspect, however, is the life of St. Francis of Paola narrated by Paolo Regio, which instead of offering precise information to its readers, is limited to connecting 'a great number of miracles almost with a single thread.'[50]

The New Metaphysics

At Paris, in the summer of 1638, less than a year before the death of its author, the imposing folio of the *Metaphysics* would be published as the fourth tome

[46] Ibid., p. 1244.
[47] Ibid., p. 1246.
[48] Ibid., p. 1248.
[49] Ibid., p. 1250.
[50] Ibid. The work in question, by Paolo Regio (1541–1607), Bishop of Vico Equense, was titled *La meravigliosa vita di San Francesco di Paola* (Naples, 1581).

in the series of projected *Opera omnia*. In the dedication to Claude Bullion de Bonolles, Superintendent of the Finances of France, Campanella displayed justified pride in his own principal work, presenting it as both a foundation and a crown for every kind of knowledge:

> Most honored Sir, … one might call this book a Bible for the philosophers, wisdom of the sciences, treasure-chest of things human and divine, solution to every problem regarding all matters both actual and possible that can stimulate the minds of men, in such a way that each man is able to explore for himself the truth and errors of human sciences and laws from the ground up. … I, who have never praised my own works, feel compelled to praise this work alone on account of its utility for all, for it will be discovered that in comparison to this work all other human books are nothing but puerile musings paling in comparison to a mature understanding, and that all those who put themselves to the test of metaphysics gave rise, more than to a metaphysics, merely to an insipid logic or grammar without order.[51]

Campanella showed the greatest satisfaction in finally seeing completed a work the redaction of which had occupied almost the entirety of his life.[52] In the work, in which almost all the themes that he had addressed in all his other works came together, he confronted all the doctrines of the entire philosophical and theological tradition, adopting an attitude of full liberality with respect to the diverse schools. Extremely rich, the *Metaphysica* has remained in large part unexplored and here it is possible to give only an extremely general idea of the structure of the work and to take note of some essential themes.

The proem begins by underlining that the fullness of *veracitas* is completed in God alone, while all men are mendacious in some measure and in some particular respects, either out of fear or ignorance. Or they may be mendacious on purpose, so that they lie in an 'officious' manner (for ends that are held to be useful) or because they are driven by passions such as ambition, avidity, jealousy, or hate. On the one hand, God is exempt from any passion whatsoever that can occlude or deform the truth that he communicates. On the other hand, as the creator, he is not ignorant of even the smallest thing. God alone is the true master, and it is to his school, and not to those of human

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[51] *Lettere*, p. 395.

[52] According to the *Syntagma* (pp. 48f), the initial core of the work – which would eventually be divided into eighteen books in three parts (where the chapter list alone takes up around thirty pages) – goes back to the years of his youth. After that first draft was lost, Campanella, in the first years of his incarceration, prepared an Italian version. But that version, given to an unfaithful disciple was also lost and then Campanella began the Latin redaction, which, sequestered in 1610, was rewritten and continually enlarged and revised.

beings, that Campanella intends to recall men, with whom God communicates through two means – by creating things and through the medium of revelation. With reference to the first means, 'when God makes things, he makes or augments a living book, from the observation of which we learn,' on account of which the Church Fathers and saints called the world both "wisdom" and "the book of God." And they did so with reason, 'because God has written all his concepts in it and he explains them with his Word, so that there is nothing in the world that does not express something present in an ideal way in the divine mind. But the saying and the writing of God is his manner of making things real.' Men read this book with their senses, from which the successive moments of the cognitive processes take their beginning: memory, accumulation of multiple sensations, and gradually the *experimentum* to the point of reaching general principles and definitions. It is important never to forget the sensible origin of all understanding, and in case of doubt it is to sense that one must return in order to check and verify.

Regarding things that do not enter into our field of experience, because they are distant in time or space, we recourse to the senses of others, which are similar to ours. We put faith in those who base their doctrines on testimony, which is a product of the direct reading of the book of God, and not on opinions, which derive from a form of conjecture that can be mistaken. We believe in the experience of the sailor Columbus who with his voyages falsified the arguments of Augustine and Lactantius on the non-existence of the antipodes, even though Augustine and Lactantius were saints and learned men; as a general rule 'we measure certainty by how close or how distant something is from sense. The truth is indeed the extent of the thing, as it is and not as we imagine it for ourselves: sense testifies to things as they are; imagination, as we hold them to be.' From here comes the injunction to reject books that contradict the book of nature and to confront and correct human books in the light of the autograph script of God. One of the most problematic attitudes, from which neither theologians nor saints are exempt, consists in conferring unduly the dignity of God's autograph script upon fallible human 'copies,' an attitude that gives rise to divisions and controversies. This sets one school against another, Platonists against Aristotelians, Scotists against Thomists – for the Scotists consider St. Thomas 'rough and stupid, while Scotus is subtle' and the Thomists consider Scotus 'an enthusiast and vacuous' while only St. Thomas is 'solid and free from error.' It is in this way that one substitutes a common search for the truth with the partisanship of attachment to one's own masters. Similarly, the defects of the person loved appear to be beautiful to the enamored person. Conversely, he who is animated by malevolent and hostile feelings towards someone will always and only see defects in him. In general, in a green mirror everything will seem green.

Having studied all the philosophical and theological schools, all the laws, all the sciences, and all the arts – those that are true as well as those that are false or demonic – Campanella decided to write discourses on the true wisdom, in such a manner that anyone would be capable of examining the sciences from the book of God and to gather the deep connections between the sciences in the totality of the encyclopedia, and to distinguish truth and falsehood. Thus, this doctrine would deal with both the first principles and the ends of things as well as the foundations of the sciences, and we call it "metaphysics" on account of the fact that it goes beyond physical doctrines and common philosophy, on account of the fact that it embraces all the areas of philosophy and raises itself up to the first causes and to that supreme first cause in such a way as to permit us to see the causation and the cognition of everything little by little.[53]

The work begins with fourteen *dubitationes* (doubts) that, engaging with the renewed fortunes of scepticism, set out all the possible doubts concerning the value and the very possibility of human understanding in general (and that of the senses in particular), an understanding that is described as partial, uncertain, and contradictory.[54] The ninth doubt reveals how knowledge, if it consists in alienating oneself and becoming something other than oneself, is a form of madness. In the tenth doubt, it is reaffirmed that knowing is an "un-knowing" or self-forgetting, because the soul ignores itself and under such conditions how could the soul come to know other things? Enclosed in the body, the soul completes operations it does not know how to account for, and, in order to know its own nature and its own condition, it is constrained to search and to interrogate beyond itself. The soul is like the smith who works immersed in darkness, without seeing either himself or the work that he is completing, and then approaches the window and asks for news of what he is doing, about whether he finds himself in jail or not, about who he himself is and who it is that put him in that place. Or the soul is like the drunkard who upon awaking from his slumber asks for information about himself and what he has done while he was unconscious. The many opinions on the nature of the soul cannot but confirm these doubts. On this issue, the philosophers (each one believing he is right) fight furiously amongst themselves like madmen in the hospital of incurables at Naples – without taking into account that just as such men seem mad to us, we seem mad to them.[55]

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[53] *Metaphysica*, part I, p. 4a.

[54] On the relationship between Campanella and the Scepticism see Gianni Paganini, *Skepsis. Le débat des modernes sur le Scepticisme Montaigne-Le Vayer-Campanella-Hobbes-Descartes-Bayle* (Paris, 2008); Id., 'Tommaso Campanella: The Reappraisal and Refutation of Scepticism', in Gianni Paganini and José R. Maia Neto (eds.), *Renaissance Scepticism* (Dordrecht, 2009), pp. 275–303.

[55] *Metaphysica*, part I, pp. 20–21.

Faced with such objections, Campanella adopted a Socratic attitude of learned ignorance, for which the awareness of limits, of difficulties, and of the inexhaustible infinity of true understanding represents the beginning of every genuine inquiry that wants to abstain both from presumptuous dogmatic certainties and from the sterile nay-saying of the skeptics. To the objections concerning the errors and uncertainties of sensible understanding, Campanella responded by affirming that the senses are able to correct themselves and that relativity lies not in the things themselves but rather in the mode in which they come to be learned – given that every piece of knowledge is tailored to every entity and only animals and the unlearned hold that things are precisely as they appear. Every being is affected by the same thing *pro mensura sua* (according to its own measure). Sounds, tastes, and smells are realities that come to be perceived in differentiated ways. But it is not the things themselves that are relative, but rather their mode of acting and being – that is always relative and proportionate to that which is acted upon. The same broom will seem sweet to the goat and bitter to a man; the same sound will be pleasing or displeasing according to the character of the spirit and the sense that undergoes the sensation.

But the responses of greater interest are those that concern understanding as alienation and undergoing and the paradox of the soul that understands all other things, but seems not to understand itself. Such apparent misunderstanding of itself derives in the first place from the fact that the soul understands itself in a way that is different from the way in which it knows all other things. Since it loves itself, it is beyond doubt that it knows itself, but it knows itself with an essential understanding that is not discursive (as Campanella had already indicated in the *Senso delle cose*): 'every soul knows itself, since it uses so many arts for the purpose of living, and loves itself; and that love is born from knowledge, but not knowledge of oneself with discourses, because discourse is a thing that is doubtful; instead, the soul knows itself by nature and by essence in that it senses itself in those transformations, whereas it knows all other things through discourse.'[56] Campanella distinguished thus between two kinds of knowledge, one essential that is the knowledge of itself, and another that is discursive and follows from the alterations induced by external objects. Understanding of oneself, *abdita* (hidden) and *innata* (innate), is intrinsic and coincides with the being of he who knows itself. It is what Augustine called *praesentia perennis* and Aquinas (referring to Augustine) called *notitia praesentialitatis*. Knowledge of oneself is the condition of that *addita*, which follows from the passions and all the modifications induced by objects:

> Wisdom is perception and judgment of passion and, consequently, of the object that induces the passion. Every being effuses its own proper entity,

[56] *Senso delle cose*, p. 109.

> and certainly every being knows itself in the first place; otherwise, if it were ignorant of itself, it would not love its own being. But it knows itself because it is that which it is: it then senses other things in so far as it senses itself changed in those other things.[57]

When the eye sees an external stone, it sees it in the sense that 'first it senses the stone-like color received intrinsically by the pupil, and then it displaces that color at once onto the outside'; thus

> Passion is not the active cause of knowledge that is the cause of science, but the specifying occasion of science, which derives from an innate knowledge:… one does not acquire science, but rather knowable things. Knowledge is a primality like power and will and it does not have causes in objects, but rather specifications. Indeed, the ignorant stone does not teach me that it is a stone.… Knowledge is always a knowing of oneself and this is not understood by he who does not consider that every being loves itself, in that it senses itself through itself with a hidden sense; it knows other things with an explicit sense [*sensus additus*], in an accidental and reflex way.[58]

Understanding by way of alienation or modification is a consequence of the knowledge of self that is primary and innate, which is connected with the constitutive and essential principles of its being, 'beyond time, beyond effort, beyond passion and action.' In virtue of that understanding, all beings know themselves with an *abdita* notion, which is not acquired and coincides with knowledge itself, a constitutive primality comparable to power and love: 'if all things love their own being, then they know that being also with a kind of natural indication, just as they love it with a natural love. The soul, and likewise every being, knows itself before everything, in an essential way; and after that it knows all other things, in an accidental way, in that it knows itself to be changed and in a certain fashion changed into the things that it knows.'

This distinction between the two modes of knowing permits us to understand how it is that the soul appears to be ignorant of itself:

> It knows itself because it is what it is, but it then senses other things when it senses itself transformed through other things, and it is accustomed to knowing other things with such continuous transformations that it forgets itself or it transforms its understanding of itself: and it is on this account that the soul appears not to know itself.[59]

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[57] *Metaphysica*, part I, p. 73a.

[58] Ibid., p. 73b.

[59] Ibid., p. 73a. On the relationship between Campanella and Descartes, see Gianni Paganini, 'Le Cogito et l'ame qui "se sent." Descartes lecteur de Campanella,' *B&C*, 14 (2008), pp. 11–29; see note 53.

The *superadditae* (added) understandings of external things and the incessant sequence of the passions and the modifications brought by external objects fade and induce a kind of forgetfulness of the original innate and hidden understanding: 'we are generated between contrary beings, we suffer continually from heat and cold and from innumerable objects, and in this way we transfer ourselves almost into the being of others: undergoing and being changed is becoming other, because the soul falls almost into a forgetfulness of itself and into ignorance, since it is always agitated by the forces of extraneous things.'[60]

Tobias Adami received a copy of the *Metaphysica*, but did not send it to press because Campanella had told him that he wished to work on it further. In a *Praefatio* addressed to German philosophers, however, Adami gave a very precise synthesis of the work, which suggests the hypothesis, quite probable, that these pages draw directly from Campanella's notes. He noted that in the first part of the work 'it is shown how small and meager is the human knowledge of things, how incomplete and partial; this is a knowledge not of things as they are in themselves but only according to the degree to which their being is understood by us.' He then offered a summary of the central part, which addresses difficult doctrines of the primalities and of the great influences. The summary is highly accurate and precise and doubtless echoes pages from Campanella:

> Created things are considered to be composed of Being and of Nothing. The author teaches that Being is constituted with the transcendental composition of the three primalities – namely, power, wisdom, and love – as if by a divine stamp; while Nothing is constituted by impotence, ignorance, and hate. Since every thing exists since it can be, knows how to be, and loves to be what it is, and since – losing the power of being, the knowledge of how to be, or the will to be – it at once loses its own being too (and dies when it is connected to that nothing, for indeed it was not every thing or the totality of being), it passes into another essence on account of the transformation and generation of things. Thus, only from the first and highest being – which produces all things from nothing and in which, in an ineffable manner, those primalities (with simplicity and infinitely higher and incomprehensible essential perfection, without participating in any way in nothingness) concur as in their own fount and they are the same thing, distinct only in reason – does the nature of creatures with such a composition derive. Essence, truth, and goodness are the objects of such primalities, on which they are sown and on which Necessity, Fate, and Harmony exercise their influence. In this way, the first and unitary being transports

[60] Ibid., p. 63a.

> its inexhaustible ideas in various modes into the duration of things (which is time, image of the eternity that remains always equal to itself) thanks to its instruments and causal agents – heat and cold – in corporeal mass (matter) suspended in space (place) which is the basis of this world, which has in God its firmness and stability.[61]

In accordance with the doctrine of the primalities, the first Being is essentialized by the infinite principles of Power, Wisdom, and Love. Every finite being, qua being, is constituted and structured by these same primalities, which essentialize it according to different modes and proportions. Therefore, given that each being is distinct and limited, it is composed of finite degrees of existence and infinite degrees of non-existence. Nothingness does not exist (neither in God nor outside of him), but such nothingness serves to constitute the finitude and the distinctiveness of beings. After the exposition of the doctrine of the primalities, Campanella explains the three great influences (Necessity, Fate, and Harmony), to which is entrusted the role of bearing the infinite inflections of the divine mind in the world and in matter. In the light of such doctrines, he revisited much discussed and fundamental problems such as the relationships between necessity and contingency, between human freedom, fate, and providence, and problems related to evil and sin.

Particularly beautiful are the pages on harmony (an effect of love), in which Campanella depicted a universal coordination of ends. These pages constitute a strong rejection of philosophical positions, among which those of the Peripatetics and the Epicureans, that limit or deny divine providence, or (not recognizing nature as an expression of the intrinsic divine skill) hold that every thing happens by chance. For Campanella, however, divine wisdom radiates from even the most slender blade of grass or from a fly. Even the slightest feature or smallest fissures in the earth have a role to play in arranging matter so that it accepts the action of heat and light in a different way. Every atom of the world is arranged in such a way that one cannot add or subtract anything from it without altering the order of the whole. So as to reaffirm how nature is a multiplicity of ends, of which not all (or rather the minority) are known to us, Campanella recourses to a childhood memory, which appeared several times in the pages of his writings. When, as a small child, he would go into the workshops of smiths, or those of watchmakers and armsmiths, he would look with amazement at the number of objects and tools that to him seemed useless (because he was unaware of how they were used), and even dangerous because if he touched them in the wrong way they could hurt him. If a frog were to enter our house, the furnishings that it would

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[61] *Ad philosophos Germaniae*, in *Opera Latina*, I, pp. 17–18; see ch. 4, note 14.

see would appear to it useless and without sense. When a mouse comes in, it twists the uses of our objects because it does not understand them. It nibbles at clothes, defaces books, and replaces food with excrement: 'this is how we are in the world, which is the house and the workshop of the prime craftsman – only much more ignorant – and on account of this we do not understand the function of things.'[62]

To the Epicureans, who deny divine art, and to those saying that divine art is incompatible with insects and pests or with evils such as wars and diseases, Campanella replied with the accusation that they were adopting egotistical and limited points of view. If one takes up the point of view of the totality instead, then beings (which to man appear to be useless or harmful) are revealed to have their own place and meaning with respect to the whole. Those beings that seem evil to us can in fact have a positive dimension: it is true not only that noxious things are integrated into the totality of the world, but also that if they did not exist then wisdom, knowledge, and vigilance would suffer. Each being, sunk deep in a continual laziness, would doze in the woods or in the fields and there would be no political association. Campanella recalled that flies and flees would often wake him and thereby call him back to studying, even as he also recalled rejoicing, as he does elsewhere, that among all of the evils that he had to endure he was not afflicted by the evil of lice.[63] Oppositions between and distinctions among beings are necessary to the order of the world, and reality would be an undifferentiated chaos if they did not exist. Every thing, even the smallest (*vel tantilla*), radiates divine art. To Aristotle (who denied that God is concerned with the negligible events of the human world, a concern that for him would constitute a self-abasement on God's part), Campanella replied that God does not abase himself in caring for such things, because there is nothing in the world that is vile or base:

> I do not know what vileness Aristotle sees in things, from which he intends to preserve God. If he is referring to lice, to dung, to urine, to snakes, then he reveals himself to be a trifling philosopher, because they are base and vile things for us, but not for nature… In the world, vileness, like evil, is relative and not essential and such baseness exists relative to the parts but not with respect to the whole. Thus, nothing is vile or evil for God and the world, except non-being and sin. Therefore our universal God does not render himself base, whereas the partial God of Aristotle does. But what is more stupid than considering God as a part and not as the whole?[64]

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[62] *Metaphysica*, part II, p. 217.
[63] Ibid.; see note 32.
[64] Ibid., part II, p. 169b.

Rejecting the image of a divinity completely enclosed in a 'higher' and more perfect world and disdainful of the baseness of the human world, Campanella offered up the image of a God whose wisdom radiates in every being, from the smallest particle to the wonders of the heavenly bodies. This is a God that, according to what Hermes Trismegistus had affirmed, is not hidden, but radiates from every natural being, sign and testimony of divinity.[65]

The third part of the *Metaphysics* lingers on themes concerning abstract substances such as angels and demons; the government and the care of things, with a close study of the doctrines of Ficino and of the Hermetic and Neo-Platonic traditions; laws and legislators, offering an entire series of "signs" aimed at distinguishing laws sent by God, those that derive from cunning, and those sent by the devil; religion, distinguishing between the religion that is *indita* and natural and that which is *addita* and historical; questions regarding prophecy, every kind of divination and miracle, with relevant distinctions aiming at differentiating natural miracles and divine ones, those that are fictitious from those that are authentic; the purpose and renewal of laws, of ages, and of worlds, so that one might achieve the holiness 'to which one comes thanks to religion and to purity, in such a way that spirits are sustained and united in it. And outside of God one cannot search, for only He is the beginning and the end of every thing that has or desires being – He who is eternal, glorious and blessed forever.[66]

The fourteenth book is dedicated to the human soul and to the problem of its immortality. This is one of the most tortuous points that went back to that distant night of his adolescence, in which Campanella burst into tears realizing the weakness of Aristotle's arguments: 'Poor us, if the immortality of the soul were to depend on these arguments! One night in my youth, taking into consideration the fragility of these arguments, I began to cry and I turned with yearning to the philosophy of Plato and Telesio, and to the doctrines of the saints, which brought me great comfort – at that point, I abandoned Aristotle.'[67] In a beautiful passage in which he asked why divine soul is united to the opaque and terrestrial body, Campanella replied that God sent the soul down to the earth for his amusement (and so that the soul might have the chance to become worthy of merit). He said the soul is similar to celestial heat that, even as it fulfils its function and unites itself with the earth so as to produce every being, secretly hankers after the heavens, its origin: 'thus, the heat of the sun also hides itself on the earth and makes many beings forgetful of themselves on account of the passions that turn up. Yet, as if by a secret force, the heat of

[65] Ibid., part III, pp. 238, 239.
[66] *Ad philosophos Germaniae*, p. 18.
[67] *Quaest. phys*., in *Phil. realis*, p. 513.

the sun senses and tends always towards that which is higher; just so, the soul of man, although ignorant of itself on account of the passions it undergoes, nevertheless senses God and tends towards him as if by a secret force.'[68]

The first book of the third part deals with cosmological and astronomical themes. The author reexamined all of the questions concerning the constitution of heavenly bodies and their motions, the duration of the *machina mundi* and the realignment of its hinges, the continual tightening of the solar obliquity, and the final transformation of the earth by fire. He who denies such transformations is similar to the ephemeral insect that does not even know the difference between day and night because it is born and dies in the course of a single day. He discussed the doctrines of Copernicus and Tycho Brahe and he addressed the new discoveries of Galileo. Several significant appendices attached to the text testify on several occasions to doubts, waverings, and reconsiderations with regard to Pythagorean doctrines, which he had discussed in his youth with the Brunian Colantonio Stigliola. Then, he had rejected them with the argument that it did not seem to him opportune to suppose the existence of other worlds and systems, multiplying the evils and sufferings of the earth. But now, those doubts seemed to reemerge and put in crisis his conception of the igneous nature of the heavenly bodies, residence of blessed spirits. In any case, whatever explanation or point of view one might adopt, there was no doubt that – in any case and above all – the variety and the harmony of celestial bodies manifested the wondrous wisdom of God. Natural principles, instruments of the divine art, 'execute the work of God, a work that they do not understand, even as they act for their own preservation,' and 'God makes use of the stars as the smith makes use of many hammers, raising them, lowering them, accelerating or slowing their motions, rendering some straight and some oblique in the workshop, so as to realize his idea. And God moves hammers of this kind not with a material hand, but with the pleasure and love of their preservation and the fear of their destruction.'[69]

Theologicorum Libri

Once again, the merit of having begun and carried forward the work of editing the gigantic *Theologia* (which consisted of thirty books that took more than a decade to complete) is due to Romano Amerio. In March 1614, Campanella told Galileo that he had gotten as far as the fourth book; only in

[68] *Metaphysica*, part III, p. 152b.

[69] Ibid., part III, p. 32b; on this issue, see Michel-Pierre Lerner, 'cosmologia,' in *Enciclopedia*, vol. 1, coll. 220–229.

1624 would he be able to say with satisfaction to Cassiano dal Pozzo: 'I have just finished the last and thirtieth book of the *Theologia* which is *de saeculis saeculorum*.'[70] The work remained unpublished during Campanella's lifetime. He was unable to get it published at Rome and unable also to get it published at Paris with a dedication to Cardinal Richelieu, as he would have liked. After being first mentioned by Spampanato, the publication of the volumes was undertaken in a systematic and sustained way by Amerio from the beginning of the 1940s. He published twenty-four books, setting the Latin text alongside an Italian version, and dedicated numerous essays to the theological thought of Campanella, in addition to an important book.[71]

The work, which had been presumed lost, was tracked down in two voluminous exemplars: one conserved in the General Archive of the Order of Preachers (AGOP) in Rome and the other in the Bibliothèque Mazarine at Paris.[72] The Roman codex is more complete, in that it encompasses almost the entirety of the work; but the manuscript is peppered with mistakes and is not completely reliable. The Parisian codex, on the other hand, is largely incomplete. The two volumes that remain from the original six contain only thirteen books. Yet it has the advantage of being a considerably more reliable exemplar, in that it bears numerous traces of emendations and insertions in the author's own hand. Some problems derive from the number and the enumeration of the books. In the *Syntagma* Campanella spoke of twenty-nine books, but in other passages he referred in a more reliable manner to thirty. The Roman codex (= R), indeed, lists thirty books, but of the fifteenth book it only gives the title (*De legibus speciatim*), and Amerio assumed that the book was never written, since the subject is treated elsewhere in the *Reminiscentur*. The Parisian codex (= P), for its part, introduces another variation with respect to the enumeration of books. In fact, from the massive first volume is excerpted the part that began with the seventeenth chapter, *De providentia*, which is rendered autonomous as book six. As a result of that insertion, in P the sequence of books from six to fifteen differs from that found in R.[73]

Starting in the 1990s, Maria Muccillo has resumed the work of bringing the *Theologia* to press. She has edited two of the five remaining unpublished

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[70] Letter of 20 July 1624, in *Lettere*, p. 203.

[71] For a recent adjustment of the edition of the books on theology (and a detailed profile of Romano Amerio and his publications), see Maria Muccillo, *La pubblicazione della* '*Theologia*,' in *Laboratorio Campanella*, pp. 213–234.

[72] Roma, AGOP, ser. XIV, 288–293, 6 vols.; Paris, Bibl. Mazarine, mss 1077, cc. 1031 (ll. VI–XV); 1078, cc. 884 (ll. XXI–XXIII); see Firpo, *Bibliografia*, pp. 159–162.

[73] In the other three books contained in the second Paris codex (ll. XXI, XXII, XXXIII), the enumeration comes back into alignment, in that the XV P (XIV R) fills the gap of the inexistent XV R. Such specification is necessary because the volumes edited by Amerio sometimes follow the numbering from R and sometimes the numbering from P.

books.[74] Thus, three books still need to be edited before the publication of the entire work can be brought to completion: *De virtute et vitio quibus felicitas et infelicitas conquiruntur* (which is book eight in R and book nine in P), *De legibus generatim* (book fourteen in R, fifteen in P), and *De dictis Christi legislatoris regisque* (book twenty-two in both R and P). It is obviously impossible here to even barely mention to the multiplicity of themes confronted in the *Theologia*. But we can at least take note of Campanella's explanation (included in the work's general introduction) of why he had been induced to confront the limitless field of theology. The first motive was identified in the enormous recent diffusion of heresies and in the diffusion of knowledge of religions that were not sufficiently confuted by the learned men of the scholastic tradition, such as the Islamic religion. The second motive derived from the discovery of new countries and new peoples, and above all new heavens, new stars, and new celestial systems – fields in which theologians do not have particular competence and in which they 'often speak as ignorant men, proceeding amidst the derision of those who philosophize on the basis of experience.' The third motive was the need for a radical reform of the sciences and the need to emancipate them from the yoke of Aristotelianism. The fourth reason consisted in the fact that the author intended to study not one science alone, but all sciences taking into account all authors, 'always comparing what I write and read with the book of the world, written by the wisdom of God in vivid and real letters.' The fifth and last of the motives was located in the desire to go beyond the 'carnal zeal of the modern scholastics' (on account of which each was attached to his own master and to his own school), so as to reconstruct an authentic solidarity beyond every particularism and conflict between science and sanctity, which ought not to be separated. The aim was to do this without forgetting that full and complete truth belongs to God alone, while men can achieve truths that are merely partial and provisional.

Campanella was able to demonstrate all of his own theological competence in the course of the work. He had already established such competence on other occasions (consider the *Apologia pro Galileo*), and this led to the much sought after title of *magister theologiae* to be bestowed upon him in June 1629. Campanella confronted theological problems of the greatest import in the various books contained in the work. And he did so in light of the entire tradition, which from time to time he reinterpreted and reread in order to offer more

[74] *De ceremonialibus Iesu Christo observatis* (Rome, 1993), l. XX (the book, trans. by Amerio, was completed with the transcription of the text and with a set of notes and an index by M. Muccillo); *De conservatione et gubernatione rerum* (l. VI R, VII P), ed. M. Muccillo (Rome, 2000).

satisfying solutions to the problems that were to him more heartfelt – from the primalitative structure of God in the creation and organization of the world to the economy of salvation. If some books are more conventional and display some signs of tiredness, others are more personal and are closely connected to the great arguments of his philosophical and metaphysical speculation – as, for example, when he addressed the question of original sin. At one level, the Christian doctrine of the fall of Adam offers an explanation and gives an account of the 'great confusion' (*scompiglio*) of the history of humanity – that is to say, of the shattering of the harmony between man and nature, between man and reason, which stems from the arrogance of Adam who perverted the just relation between reason and sensuality. But the deeper, more tormented and unresolved issue remained the question of why and to what end God, who is infinitely good, permitted such a massive corruption, from which would derive the damnation of the overwhelming majority of his own children. As usual, Campanella rejected the doctrine shared by Muhammad and the supporters of the Reformation (according to which God is the cause also of evil for the purpose of being able to punish us, and thereby manifest his own justice). In Campanella's opinion, God could in no way either wish or cause sin. On the contrary, sin had its origin in the fact that man is limited, prone to error, and free. But even the most subtle arguments of famous learned men such as Augustine, Chrysostom, and Ambrose – arguments that were analyzed and discussed in minute detail – were not able to resolve the basic problem: 'in any case, it is not yet made clear by these sacred doctors why God might have permitted sin (on account of which the world has been so much worsened), if the world would have been better without the reprobate and the damned, better without the punishment of hell and the calamity of the present life.' The question is so crucial because the eternal ruin of so many men is without remedy even following the Incarnation of God himself. Those who will be condemned to eternal torture actually outnumber those who will enjoy beatitude. This gives rise to a temptation to believe in the audacious solution of a progressive and universal salvation proposed by Origen, 'who teaches that the damned, returning in this world again and again, during another cycle of centuries, will obtain the merit necessary to ascend to glory and that even after so many evils the damned will all in the end be saved – men and devils alike.'[75] From here too comes the temptation to adopt solutions that might result in the most ample possibilities with regard to salvation.

[75] *Il peccato originale*, *Theologicorum l. XVI*, ed. R. Amerio (Rome, 1960), p. 69; see Germana Ernst, *Tommaso Campanella (1568–1639)*, in *Il peccato originale nel pensiero moderno*, ed. G. Riconda, M. Ravera, C. Ciancio, G. Cuozzo (Brescia, 2009), pp. 189–212.

Large parts of theology are dedicated to the birth, life, and works of Christ and to the sacraments instituted by him, which are often the object of harsh criticism from heretics or from other monotheistic religions. Some books echo and take up themes from other works. Thus, there are books on the virtues that expand upon the *Ethica*, while the final books on eschatological themes take up prophetic topics and treat the end of times in the manner of the *Articuli prophetales*. This theological work seems thus to reveal continuities in Campanella's thought, rather than points of rupture. One book, in particular, has attracted a lot of interest and bewilderment in this respect. Given the title of *Magia e grazia* by Amerio, the fourteenth book deals with the problematic nature of grace *gratis data* (as distinct from merited grace, which is treated in the preceding book, titled *Della grazia gratificante*). In contrast to grace that places man in a state of moral sanctity, rendering him in that way welcome in the eyes of God, grace *gratis data* consists in a gift bestowed by God independently of moral status. Here, one is dealing with a gift thanks to which man is able to undertake extraordinary deeds to the advantage of the community. Campanella's treatment is divided into nine parts, encompassing faith, discretion of the spirits, the capacity to speak and understand different languages. In truth, however, the aspects on which he focused most the longest are those that are particularly dear to him, such as prophecy and magic.[76] He argued with such argumentative exuberance that Amerio went as far as calling the text a second *De sensu rerum*.[77] The purpose, rigorously orthodox, was to avoid the radical naturalization of these operations and prerogatives, so as to preserve the divine charisma of the Church and so as to reaffirm that not every prophecy is natural and that miracles ought not to be considered in the same way as natural prodigies. Yet, so as to distinguish the various kinds of these arts and doctrines and so as to indicate the criteria according to which one can give order to such an extremely dense mass of phenomena, Campanella discussed with great attention all the kinds and forms of prophecy and magic. He recalled facts that were true and others that were false, illusory and truthful, strange and deceitful, scientific and diabolical; he offered an extraordinary repertoire of sources and points of interest, and referred also to his own personal experiences. He stressed that it is necessary to experience everything, because speculation is not valuable without practice, for the person who actually paints is to be counted a painter and not the person who knows all the abstract rules of the art.[78]

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[76] On these topics, see Germana Ernst, *Magia, divinazione e segni in Tommaso Campanella,* in *La magia nell'Europa moderna. Tra antica sapienza e filosofia naturale,* ed. F. Meroi and E. Scapparone (Florence, 2007), vol. II, pp. 589–611.

[77] *Magia e grazia*, *Theologicorum l. XIV*, ed. R. Amerio (Rome, 1957), p. 7.

[78] Ibid., p. 153.