Chapter 9
Martin Heidegger and the 'Cartesian Brainwash'

Towards a Non-individualistic Account of '*Dasein*'

Intentionality is usually taken to be a kind of solitary object-representation in the mind of individuals. That might explain why intentionalist approaches are so often criticized for being anti-social. To choose intentionality as a starting point of philosophical analysis necessarily seems to lead to a rather under-socialized picture of our cognition and agency. It is a widely held opinion in current philosophy that it takes a radical shift of paradigm to correct this picture, a shift from intentionality to communication (cf. e.g. Habermas 1987), from representation to discursive practices (Brandom 1994), from the analysis how mental phenomena refer to the world to the analysis of the normative social practices and institutions that make utterances *count as* expressions of intentional states such as beliefs or plans for action. Some German philosophers – among these Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel – call this shift of paradigm the *intersubjectivist turn*.

This correction of the under-socialized intentionalist picture of the mind, however, comes at a price – or so I shall argue. By reducing the ontological question of *what there is* to the question of the normative practices and institutions within which something *counts as* something, intersubjectivism loses sight of the *objective* aspects of intentionality. If it is true that our mind is not to be understood without taking notice of the social customs, norms, and institutions within which we think and act, it seems no less important to be aware of the fact that we measure our cognitive or practical intentional states not only by social propriety, but also by objective truth or instrumental success. And there is no 'prestabilized harmony' between the two: there is no guarantee that in a given instance the communal practices and institutions within which we think and act help us to see the world as it is. Whereas the former is a question of social normativity, the latter is not. Simply put, social normativity cannot account for all of our cognitive and conative competence. So it seems that we are caught in a dilemma between an under-socialized (intentionalist) and an over-socialized (intersubjectivist) concept of mind. Against this background, I find those recent attempts particularly appealing which try to accommodate sociality in a revised and widened theory of intentionality instead of discarding intentionality as a starting point of philosophical analysis. My conjecture is the following. If most received accounts of intentionality take intentionality to be a kind of solitary object-representation in the mind of individuals, this is the effect of what Annette Baier calls the 'Cartesian Brainwash', and not of some conceptual limitation of intentionality as such. The problem is not intentionality, but rather our standard view thereof.

H.B. Schmid, *Plural Action: Essays in Philosophy and Social Science*, Contributions to Phenomenology 58,

Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes apparent that the effect of the Cartesian brainwash even extends to our current theories of collective intentionality, we-intentions, or shared cooperative activity. Most of these theories stick to the assumptions of methodological individualism for fear that intentionality which could not be reduced to intentionality of single individuals in one way or another would then have to be attributed to some kind of a single group mind over and above the minds of the participating individuals. It's for fear of the group mind that most theorists of collective intentionality endorse one or another version of individualism. I have argued above that there is no reason to be afraid of the group mind (cf. Chapter 2). The specter of the group mind arises from the mistaken Cartesian assumption that *cogitationes* require one single cognizing mind, one single ego – which leaves the collective mind as the only alternative to the individual ego. Thus the anti-collectivist reservations of current theories of collective intentionality and the view of intentionality as a monological matter seem to have the same source. It is the Cartesian brainwash that prevents us from seeing that it is not only single minds, but also interrelated individuals (in terms of "minds-in-relations") who have intentions.

In the following, I shall discuss these issues within an interpretation and critique of Heidegger's concept of *Being-with* (Mitsein). The reason for this apparent detour is that Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* and its critique contains all the relevant issues and controversies in a nutshell, as we shall see. In many respects, Heidegger's views on the matter are rather ambivalent. Without doubt, the traditional view has its point in claiming that Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* is just as 'monological' as any of the received theories of intentionality, and that Heidegger, too, cannot account for the social preconditions of cognition and action, thus stepping into the intentionalist trap in which Husserl's transcendental phenomenology ended up before him (cf. e.g. Theunissen 1964). Some American philosophers, however, have recently pointed out that there are some traits in Heidegger's thoughts which cannot be fitted easily into the traditional view. These interpreters have started to portray Heidegger in quite a different hue, depicting his analysis of *Dasein* as a sort of proto-intersubjectivist thought. The ambiguities stretch even further. In most respects, Heidegger's concept of *Dasein* has deeply entrenched individualistic features; but then again, Heidegger at times also seemed to subscribe to a collectivist point of view, calling not the individual, but the total of 'the people' a *Dasein*.

Yet there is more to Heidegger's view on the sociality of *Dasein* than these ambiguities and ambivalences. Above all, Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* – not so much in its exposition in *Being and Time* as in some of his lectures around that time – includes some elements of a theory of collective intentionality (or inter-intentionality, as I shall call it) that goes beyond subjectivism and intersubjectivism and beyond the alternatives of individualism and collectivism. It is this trait of Heidegger's thoughts on the sociality of *Dasein* on which I shall try to shed some light in the following. I will first turn to the most basic ambivalence in Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* and the dilemma of the received interpretations (§§29–30 below), before gathering some elements of a solution and relating my reading to current collective intentionality analysis (§§31–32).

§29 The Rift in Heidegger's Concept of Everydayness

In division I of *Being and Time*,[1] Heidegger introduces the term *falling* (Verfallen). *Falling* characterizes *Dasein*'s everydayness – i.e. *Dasein* as it is "at first and for the most part". On the one hand, Heidegger describes *falling* as one of *Dasein's* positive or structural features. As *fallen*, *Dasein* is *concrete*; it is involved with the world and with other *Dasein*. In this sense, the concept of *falling* expresses Heidegger's fundamental insight against Husserl: there is no pure ego and no pure reflection that is logically prior to the 'naïve' straightforward-attitude of everyday life, there is no "subject" over and above the practical involvement with "the world". This is the line in Heidegger's analysis of everydayness that was taken up by Gilbert Ryle (cf. Schmid 2003c: 156–9) and developed into *ordinary language philosophy*. Here, the ordinary – in Heidegger's term: the *falling* – has a thoroughly positive meaning.

On the other hand, Heidegger is not only Husserl's critic, but also his student. As such, he does not simply discard Husserl's reservations against the everyday "natural attitude". This is shown by the fact that, in spite of Heidegger's repeated claim to the contrary, there is always a slight note of depreciation in Heidegger's remarks on the *falling*. In *Being and Time*, the *falling* plays not just the positive role of an integral part of *Dasein*'s existence. It also plays the role of a fatal tendency of *Dasein* somehow to "misunderstand" itself and to live past its own life, as it were (Let's call this the *negative* or *inauthentic* role of *falling)*. Even though these two roles are not strictly incompatible, they make, as we shall see, Heidegger's analysis of everyday *Dasein* at least ambivalent.

To introduce *Dasein's* everydayness, Heidegger uses two famous pictures. The first picture is the one of the craftsman in his workshop. It illustrates the fundamentally pragmatic character of the world and of our intentionality – a term which Heidegger does not make use of because of its Cartesian and intellectualist connotations. He replaces intentionality with the term *taking care with circumspection* ("umsichtiges Besorgen"). With this reformulation of intentionality as purposive, goal-oriented, instrumental action, Heidegger emphasizes that *Dasein*'s self-reference on the one hand and its "being-in-the-world" on the other are closely intertwined, and cannot be separated.

The other picture shows *Dasein*'s everydayness in a much less favorable light indeed. It is the picture of the *One* (das Man). The *One* – or, as it is sometimes translated, the *They* or *Anyone* – epitomizes the sphere of social normativity in terms of norm-oriented action. As *Dasein*'s norm-orientedness, the *falling* has, following Heidegger, fatal consequences for *Dasein*. It leaves *Dasein* no chance to *be itself*. Whether *Dasein* conventionally sticks to the norms, or purposively breaks them, it always does what *one* does. Instead of being *him- or herself*, Dasein is a mere *One*-self (Man-selbst (Heidegger [1927] 1996: 129)). It is not really *me* who does what *one* does, but merely an exchangeable *anyone*. Social normativity thus seems to

[1] If not otherwise indicated, longer quotes from *Being and Time* are based on the translation by Joan Stambaugh (Heidegger [1927] 1996); the pagination indicated follows the original German edition.

distract *Dasein* from its *own* being, i.e. its *own* possibilities (Heidegger [1927] 1996: 42), making it fall prey to what Heidegger calls *inauthenticity*.

Comparing the two pictures, Heidegger chooses to illustrate *Dasein*'s everydayness – one standing for intentionality, the other standing for social normativity – to the two roles of the concept of *falling* (the "structural" and the "negative" one), the following interpretation imposes itself: obviously, the distinction between the craftsman's shop (the sphere of *taking care with circumspection*) and the public sphere (the *One*) directly reflects the ambiguity of the concept of falling. While the workshop illustrates the positive or structural meaning of the *falling*, the public sphere stands for the negative or inauthentic meaning of the term. Thus one might even think that there is a kind of a *division of labor* between Heidegger's reformulation of intentionality on the one hand, and his account of social normativity on the other. Intentionality qua goal-oriented, instrumental action is assigned the role of the positive, structural sense of the term *falling*, whereas social normativity (qua norm-oriented action) is left with the role of the negative or inauthentic sense.

Whatever one might think of this arrangement, it has one consequence that appears to be particularly dissatisfying. The result is an overt depreciation of *Dasein's* sociality. With a grain of salt one could say that Heidegger's recommendation for everyday *Dasein* is to withdraw from the public sphere of communication and social norms, and to take refuge in his or her lonely black forest workshop, where social relations are strictly functional, i.e. confined to occasional transactions with customers and suppliers (Heidegger [1927] 1996: 105). A consequence of the division of labor between the two aspects of everydayness is that the concept of *Dasein*'s authenticity seems to exclude sociality. This lack of sociality in Heidegger's idea of authenticity has been criticized ever since the earliest interpretations of *Being and Time*. This is not to say that there are no traces of authentic sociality at all. There is, of course, Heidegger's theory of *caring-for* (or *concern*, as the German term Fürsorge is sometimes translated), within which he distinguishes an inauthentic, dominant mode (einspringend-beherrschende Fürsorge) from an authentic, freeing version of *concern* (vorspringend-befreiende Fürsorge; Heidegger [1927] 1996: 122). But, insofar as *Dasein's being-with* (Mitsein) is conceived of in terms of *concern*, it is limited to interaction, i.e. to direct face-to-face-encounters. The theory of *concern* does not answer the question of the relation of authentic *Dasein* to social normativity. Leaving aside for the moment the infamous page 384 of *Being and Time*, authentic *Dasein* does seem to be capable of instrumental action and to relations with concrete others in direct encounters which are mediated by instrumental actions, but it remains utterly estranged from any kind of social norms, customs, institutions, and normative communal practices. Perhaps this apparent lack of a full-fledged concept of authentic sociality is the most often mentioned of the conceptual problems of *Being and Time*.

Thus far the classical view of the problem. This interpretation places the author of *Being and Time* among those philosophers who, because of their preoccupation with intentionality neglect the role and scope of sociality for human cognition and action. By contrast to this, some American interpreters, among them Hubert L. Dreyfus, Mark Okrent, John Haugeland, and Robert B. Brandom, have pursued a different

line of interpretation. Their core claim is the following. In their view, Heidegger's concept of practical intentionality does not in any way disregard or even exclude, but instead *presupposes* the sphere of social norms, institutions, and communal practices. There is, following this reading, no intentionality without social normativity, and there is no instrumental human action that is not, at the same time, action guided by social norms. And Heidegger's theory of *Dasein'*s everydayness is seen as the most important witness for this. The argument for this interpretation runs as follows. In his analysis of circumspective 'taking care', Heidegger shows that the traditional question of epistemology was wrongly put. Just to ask how our subjective consciousness comes into contact with the objective ontological structure of the world means to ignore the fact that in our most basic practical dealings the subjective and the objective aspects cannot be separated, but genuinely – 'always already', as it were – belong together. On this Heideggerian line, all representational theories of the relation between mind and world are accused of ignoring the fact that prior to any mental representation we are *in immediate contact* with the world on the fundamental level of our intentionality. In our practical everyday dealings, intentionality is nothing purely mental. On the basic ontological level, the world is not a "whole of things", which are represented in the minds of rational animals like us, and to which we then ascribe functions within our subjective plans for actions. 'Something' is – epistemologically as well as ontologically – always already 'something *as* something.' Entities are always given to us as situated in the pragmatic connections of our courses of action. Following the American interpreters, this always involves social norms. As they see it, this basic 'taking something *as* something' cannot be (and in Heidegger *is not*) conceived of as a monological activity of single individuals, as the traditional reading of Heidegger's concept of *taking care with circumspection* would have it. Rather, the original bridge between world and mind is here seen as consisting in "public performances which accord to social practices", as Brandom puts it (1992: 48–9). Social norms and institutions rather than monological instrumental projects of action constitute what Heidegger calls the *functionality contexture of the surrounding world* (umweltlicher Bewandtniszusammenhang). With reference to these normative social conditions of possibility of intentionality (in Heidegger's sense), Dreyfus speaks of "social background practices" (1991: 149). Haugeland, in turn, calls this the "common institutional framework" of the "customs and practices of a community" (1992: 38, 32). But whatever it is called, it is always Heidegger's *One* or *Anyone* these authors have in mind. Regarding their claim to interpretative correctness, Dreyfus et al. rely on some of Heidegger's remarks where he does seem to ascribe to the *One* something like the structural role of a condition of possibility of *any kind* of disclosedness of the world, i.e. not just *Dasein*'s inauthenticity (cf. Heidegger quoted in Carman 1994: 219). On an argumentative level, too, this reading of the relation between intentionality and social norms has its strengths. For, if it is along the guidelines of social norms that we learn to interpret our surrounding world, and to use the tools in the way we do, it might seem quite plausible to credit these norms with a constitutive role for the structure of our surrounding world, and for the very functioning of our tools. It is only a very short (if fatal) step from saying "what counts as proper and successful use [. . .] is a function of what

the community itself endorses as such" (Carman 1994: 211) to saying "the very functioning of equipment is dependent upon social norms" (Dreyfus 1991: 154), or "something actually plays a role if, according to the customs and practices of a community, it is taken to play that role" (Haugeland 1992: 32).

We shall come back to this shortly. Let me first point out the effect of this reading on the problem of the rift in Heidegger's concept of everyday *Dasein*. By embedding intentionality in social normativity, the original problem of Heidegger's analysis, the tension between intentionality and social normativity, between instrumental action and norm-oriented action simply *disappears*. For it now seems that Heidegger's concept of intentionality itself is thoroughly imbued with sociality right down to its very base. And since the most basic feature of *Dasein*, its "being-in-the-world", can already only be understood as a kind of a social being-with which is embedded in normative communal practices, it would seem rather pointless to complain about any alleged social deficit in Heidegger's analysis. As this line of interpretation takes the norms and conventions of the *One* to play so prominent a role in Heidegger's reformulation of intentionality, I shall refer to it as the *conventionalist interpretation* in the following.

§30 Conventionalism and Its Limits

In a first step, I shall try to cast some doubt on the conventionalist understanding of the connection between Heideggerian practical intentionality and social normativity. There are, in my view, good reasons to insist on a fundamental difference between the sphere of *circumspective taking care* (i.e. practical intentionality) on the one hand and the sphere of the *One* (i.e. the sphere of social normativity) on the other. The 'classical' view is right in pointing out that there is a deep rift in Heidegger's analysis of everydayness, a rift that is simply overlooked in the conventionalist interpretation. Contrary to both the classical view and the conventionalist interpretation, however, I think there is some good argumentative reason why there *should* be such a rift. Here is why. If we take *circumspective taking care* to mean instrumental, goal-oriented action (see, e.g., Okrent 1988: 41ff.), and if we take the *One* to refer to norm-oriented action, one important difference between these two types of action immediately hits the eye. Goal-oriented action is aimed at (and measured by) *instrumental success*. By contrast, the aim and measure for norm-oriented action is *social propriety*. And these are two different sets of criteria. To put it simply: whether an instrumental action is successful or not depends on the real world whereas in norm-oriented actions, it is *up to us*, as it were, since social propriety is a question of conventions and their interpretation, i.e. of social acceptance. The conventionalist interpretation, claiming that the very functioning of tools depends on social norms, eliminates this distinction and identifies what is an "instrumentally successful use" with what is a "socially proper use" of a *thing at hand* (Zuhandenes).

How could this difference slip anyone's notice? I think there is a simple reason for this. The reason is that Heidegger did not distinguish clear enough between two

types of *things at hand*. There is indeed one particular type of *things at hand* for which the conventionalist interpretation is correct. Examples for this type are traffic signs, banknotes, and chess figures. It is, however, not true for *all things at hand*, and especially not for the paradigmatic kind of *things at hand* Heidegger uses to illustrate his concept of *circumspect taking care*, i.e. for tools like hammers, bridges, or drugs.

The conventionalist theory is true for *things at hand* of the first type. In the case of things such as traffic signs, banknotes, and chess figures, the function is indeed constituted by social norms and conventions. This can easily be made clear by a test John R. Searle introduced to distinguish between what he calls agentive functions and non-agentive functions (Searle 1995: 20–23). The test hinges on the fact that there is a way such *things at hand* simply cannot malfunction. Consider the following question: "Are the pieces of wood we move around on the board when we play chess *really* chess figures, or could it be that we were wrong treating them as chess figures according to the rules of chess?" This is a question anyone who is at least loosely familiar with chess games will immediately recognize as utterly nonsensical. For the function of these pieces of wood as chess figures is *constituted* by the communal practice of playing chess and its rules; there is no real fact of the matter hidden somewhere behind the conventionally ascribed function. Therefore, the conventionalist interpretation is right: the function of these *things at hand* is indeed wholly a matter of social norms and conventions. But this distinguishes such things as chess figures, banknotes, and traffic signs from another type of *things at hand*, i.e. from things such as hammers, drugs, and bridges. This is revealed if we run the test again, this time with an example of this second type. With reference to drugs, it is in no way nonsensical, but indeed a sign of prudence to ask: "Does this pharmaceutical product *really* function as a remedy or does it only *count as* a remedy according to the norms and practices of our medicine?" For it could very well be that the Food and Drug Administration or the norms of folk medicine *ascribe* a function to this substance x it *really* does not have. Without us knowing, it could be a substance that is ineffective or even detrimental to health, even though it passed the FDA or has been in use in folk medicine for centuries. The functioning of *things at hand* of this second type, as opposed to the function of *things at hand* of the first type, is not or not exclusively determined by social norms and practices. Heidegger himself seems to have had no clear understanding of (or simply no interest in) this distinction, even though in the important paragraph on the *handiness* (Zuhandenheit) of signs he discusses not only conventional signs (such as traffic signs), but also signs that are linked to the signified by means of a causal nexus (e.g. the west wind as a sign for a change in the weather) (Heidegger [1927] 1996: 76ff.). The conventionalist interpretation, however, completely covers up the distinction between these two types of *handyness*. Thus, Haugeland explicitly holds that even a substance that is really ineffective can be *at hand*, just as long as it is *believed* to be an effective remedy within a community (Haugeland 1992: 32). It seems to me that the conventionalist interpretation gives up the important option to interpret Heidegger's concept of *circumspect taking care* in a way that is compatible with realism. It would probably be wrong to claim Heidegger for any form of epistemological realism, but it is certain

that there is an anti-idealist side to his thinking about *Dasein* that is simply lost in the conventionalist interpretation. As mentioned above, one of the basic insights of his reformulation of intentionality is that, on the fundamental level of intentionality, the subjective side and the objective side (in Husserl's parlance, the "intentional act" and its transcendent "object") belong together. Thus there is no talking about *taking care with circumspection* without at the same time talking about the ontological structure of the world. *Taking care with circumspection* is not a mode of representation of the world, but rather a matter of *being-in-the-world* in the sense of being in immediate contact with or totally immersed in the world.

Similarly, a Heideggerian view of communal practices should take them to be, not only a matter of what a group *believes*, but *also* a matter of what there *really is*. Therefore, it seems to be inconsistent with Heidegger's view to ascribe to groups and communities ways of *taking care with circumspection*, and uses of *things at hand* that are really ineffective. For this perspective presupposes a distinction Heidegger's concepts are designed to undercut. In this view, *taking care with circumspection* does not appear as a mode of disclosedness of the *world* (as it is), but only as a practice within the framework of a culturally relative world-*view*.

Intentional practices can be instrumentally unsuccessful, i.e. ineffective, even though they conform to the social norms or conventions (imagine the artful treatment of an illness according to some community's practices of medicine that is ineffective as a means to the end). And conversely, such practices can be instrumentally successful without properly following the normative standards of a community (imagine any effective use of a tool for a purpose for which the tool is not designed). In both cases, instrumental success and social propriety come apart in one or the other way. The question is: which of these cases should be seen a as case of *taking care with circumspection?* Let's first hear the conventionalist's reply. Concluding from the above example, Haugeland's reply to the first question seems to be clear: in spite of all ineffectiveness, a practice can be an instance of *taking care with circumspection*. In the latter case, the conventionalist reply seems to be in the negative. Thus Dreyfus states that "a hammer is for hammering and not for opening paint cans" (Dreyfus 1995: 425) (even though, with some hammers at least, this can be done very successfully).[2] Thus it seems that, on this view, whoever deviates from the normative communal practices thereby lacks the proper *circumspective care*, however successful she or he might be.

I think, however, that the reverse replies are closer both to the fact of the matter and to Heidegger's views. As argued above, intentional practices which conform to

[2] When the conventionalist interpreters consider the difference between instrumental success and conformity with norms, they often project it onto the distinction between primates and humans, thereby devaluating "mere" instrumental success as a criterion for the use of tools in higher animals. If a primate uses a stick to fetch some bananas hanging high in the bush, his action is either successful or unsuccessful. Human "taking care with circumspection", on the other hand, seems, following John Haugeland, to be measured by higher standards: it is either "proper" or "improper", something that cannot be said of animal instrumental action (Haugeland 1982: 18). Heidegger, as I see him, would respond: social norms or not, the question about "taking care with circumspection" is whether in the end you get the bananas or not.

social norms but are instrumentally ineffective should not be called instances of *taking care with circumspection*. Intentional practices, however, which are "improper" with regard to the social norms, but instrumentally successful, should not be denied this title. For the latter case, think of a prisoner in his cell who uses his fork and knife to dig a hole in the ground to prepare his escape. The conventionalist interpretation cannot seem to see beyond the fact that he uses these tools improperly. And of course they are right – but only from the perspective of the community whose conventions constitute the normative standards, which define what counts as proper and improper prisoner behavior. It's the warden's view, so to speak. Heidegger, by contrast, allows for a less biased view of the practice in question, and this is done by the very distinction between intentional practices and the sphere of communal norms. As far as the prisoner is not hallucinating, as long as, in other words, 'world' is disclosed in his working towards escape using his spoon as a tool for digging, there seems to be no reason not to credit his practice with the title of *taking care with circumspection*. For circumspective care is primarily a matter of instrumental success, and not of social propriety. Therefore, a distinction has to be made between action of the type of circumspective care on the one side, and norm-oriented action in the sphere of the *One* on the other. The rift in everydayness opens up the room to do justice to such socially improper and idiosyncratic perspectives such as the one of our prisoner.[3]

As far as I can see, the first round of the conventionalist interpretation started with a paper by Haugeland in 1982, followed by contributions to the debate by Brandom (1992) and Mark Okrent (1988) (among others), culminating in Dreyfus' book on division one of *Being and Time* in 1991. With Dreyfus' more recent papers (1999, 2000) and the contributions to the first volume of his *Festschrift* from 2000 (Wrathall and Malpas, eds.), however, it seems that a new round of the debate has started. While the earlier interpretations were focused on division one of *Being and Time*, i.e. the analysis of everyday *Dasein*, the debate has now moved on to division two and the idea of *authenticity* (Eigentlichkeit). Now, the conventionalists see themselves faced with the possibility of authenticity as a form of disclosedness of the world that is not – or not *exclusively* – caught up in social norms. *Dasein*'s authenticity implies a form of critical distance to the sphere of customs, conventions and other rules. While the conventionalists try their best to allow for this possibility, it is not always obvious how the possibility of authenticity squares with the earlier thesis that any form of intelligibility rests on an *a priori* foundation of social normativity. Understandably, the conventionalists were not originally attracted to the idea of

[3] That this is indeed Heidegger's view can be made evident by quoting some of the many passages from *Being and Time* where Heidegger seems to imply that the "they" does not so much disclose as *veil* the world. The conventionalist thus correctly quotes from page 127: "Publicness (i.e. the "they", H.B.S.) initially controls every way in which the world and Da-sein are interpreted", but this is, as he continues, "not because of an eminent and primary relation of being to "things", not because it has an explicitly appropriate transparency of Da-sein at its disposal, but because it does not get to "the heart of the matter" (auf Grund eines Nichteingehens 'auf die Sachen') [...]. Publicness obscures everything, and then claims that what has been thus covered over is what is familiar and accessible to everybody." Heidegger [1927] 1996: 127).

authenticity, and rarely talked about that concept. Where they did talk about the idea of authenticity, they usually twisted the concept beyond recognition. Thus, in his earlier interpretation, John Haugeland claimed authenticity to be no more than the possibility to decide which role to choose in the case of role-conflicts (Haugeland 1982: 23–4) – which was consistent with the idea of the *a priori* of social norms and normative practices, but at the same time meant pulling the teeth of the idea of authenticity, to say the least. Authenticity is more than decisiveness in the handling of occasional role conflicts. Rather, authenticity implies a critical stance on the role-character of one's life as a whole. Or, put differently, authenticity is not just about finding out which role to play, but about living beyond the framework of social roles.

In the second round of interpretation, the conventionalists see themselves forced to acknowledge at least some of this anti-conventionalist edge of the idea of authenticity. Thus, in his new interpretation, Haugeland now seems to allow for some distance from the context of social norms and conventions. Authenticity, he now states, implies something like the capacity to become aware of what he calls the *anomalies* generated by our everyday practices of blindly following the rules and convention of the *One*. Still, however, Haugeland sticks to the claim that the disclosedness of the world is always imbued with social normativity in something like the way in which the scientific experiments designed to test a theory are always based on that very theory itself. Indeed, Haugeland models his reading of authenticity on the theory of scientific progress. What attracts Haugeland to this model is that, in Thomas S. Kuhn's theory, the quasi *a priori* status of scientific theories does not rule out the possibility of "anomalies" within normal science, which become the occasion for scientific revolution. Similarly, the fact that the *One* is a condition of possibility of the world's disclosedness does not rule out the possibility that the conventional practices fail. Transferring Kuhn's theory of science to everyday life, Haugeland now calls 'inauthentic' *Dasein's* tendency to stick to the familiar rules and practices even if there are clear hints for their failure (cf. Haugeland 2000), instead of looking for alternative practices.

Haugeland is not the only conventionalist interpreter to develop a new interpretation of authenticity. Dreyfus comes up with a somewhat different interpretation (Dreyfus 2000). Following up on Theodore Kisiel's reading of *Being and Time*, he now talks about the possibility of an authentic disclosedness of the world that reaches well beyond the sphere of social norms and conventions. Dreyfus' example for the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity is the difference between an expert and an apprentice in their respective relation to the social norms and practices of their trade. It is in grasping and then blindly following the social norms that we learn using our equipment, Dreyfus observes. By contrast to the apprentice, the expert in her field just *knows how to do it* without necessarily following the rules of a communal practice. Her actions are not norm-oriented in the sense in which the apprentice's are, indeed experts' ways of handling things are typically quite unconventional, for the expert can tell when, how, and why something has to be done conventionally, and when, how, and why it is possible and indeed useful to depart from the conventional standard procedures. Thus the expert finds her own style of skillful coping.

These and similar (Carman 2000) interpretations of authenticity thus open up a perspective on a form of "intentionality" (disclosedness of the world) that is not completely caught up in social normativity. I think Dreyfus et al. are right in moving in this direction. Yet it is an open question whether or not these theories can be made consistent with the earlier reading of the relations between intentionality and social normativity. It is not obvious how the *a priori* of "anonymous social normativity governing intelligibility at large" (Carman 2000: 20) can be made consistent with the idea of a form of "authentic" intentionality, which in one way or another transcends the realm of social normativity. In my view, the conventionalist line of interpretation is caught in a dilemma, being faced with the choice between two equally repellent alternatives. Either the conventionalist line is rejected, or the idea of authenticity loses its anti-conventionalist teeth. The conventionalists follow the second line. It seems to me, that the conventionalist interpretation of authenticity, though moving in the right direction, is thus flawed by the shortcomings of the earlier interpretation of everyday *Dasein*, especially the theory of the relation between social norms and practical intentions in everydayness. All the conventionalists can find in authenticity is what they left out in their earlier descriptions of everyday *Dasein*. I think that the conventionalists should have chosen the first horn of their dilemma instead. But this would have meant to give up the conventionalist stance, and re-open the rift in everyday *Dasein*.

Let's have a closer look at what seems to be at stake here. In the case of *things at hand* such as chess figures and banknotes, an act of intentional *circumspective care* (such as a move in a game of chess, or an act of payment) can indeed be successful if and only if it conforms to the social rules (with the exception of unnoticed cheating, i.e. moves that do not conform to the chess rules, and the use of forged banknotes, which are parasitic cases we do not take into account here). In these cases, there is indeed an *a priori* of social normativity, in the strictest sense of the word, at play. But this does not hold for all *circumspective care*. The relation between success and conformity is radically different in other cases. It is true that our use of hammers, pharmaceutical products, and the construction of bridges usually conforms to the respective social rules and norms governing these practices, too. We usually do all of these things the way *One* does it (or should do it). But still, these cases differ fundamentally from our playing by the rules in moving chess figures. The difference is this: normally (i.e. with the exception of unnoticed cheating) our moves in games of chess succeed (in terms of counting as a move) only if – and only and because – the moves conform to the social norms. This is different with *things at hand* such as drugs. Here, the relation between success and conformity runs precisely the other way around. Successful use is not constituted by social norms, but the norms are constituted by successful use. (The exception to consider here is the case of norms based on wrong assumptions. But this case, just as the case of unnoticed cheating, is parasitic and can be disregarded for the present purpose.) It is only *insofar* and *because* we believe that the norms secure instrumental success that our use of drugs and our constructing bridges conforms to the respective norms. In other words, the difference at stake here is that between constitutive and regulative norms or rules. Things like drugs are not constituted by the social norms regulating their use, but the

social norms have to comply with their successful use, while in the case of things such as chess figures the relation runs the other way around. The conventionalist *a priori* of social normativity holds for the status of things of one kind only. In the case of *things at hand* for which it does not hold – i.e. the status of things such as hammers – we stand in a relation to the success of our actions that is *mediated*, but not *constituted* by social norms. What we have here is a form of intentionality that is not completely caught up in social normativity, but typically remains at a critical distance to conventions. This is not, however, just a feature of some authentic *Dasein* which somehow extends beyond the sphere of everyday life. Rather, it is an integral part of everyday means to have an intuitive and implicit understanding of this basic difference. A person who does not understand that the function of chess figures is constituted by the rules of the game could hardly be called a competent player. Conversely, a person who takes the function of hammers to be constituted by social norms (and therefore concentrates on using the hammer *properly* instead of doing with the hammer whatever is needed to make sure that the nail is driven in), we might perhaps call a continental philosopher, but certainly not a hobby craftsman, let alone a competent hammerer.

Thus the conventionalist interpretations of authenticity in the second round of the debate make the impression of a belated compensation for the earlier misreading of the analysis of everyday *Dasein*, ascribing exclusively to authenticity what seems to be an integral part of everyday *Dasein* as such. But let's come back to our initial problem, i.e. the relation between intentionality and the social character of cognition and action. With respect to this question, the main flaw of the conventionalist interpretation of authenticity is somewhat different. Remember that the conventionalist reading of the first division of *Being and Time* was aimed at eliminating the rift in Heidegger's analysis of everyday *Dasein*. True to the matter and to Heidegger's views or not: the claim was that there is no rift between monological *circumspective care* and the inauthentic sphere of social normativity, because there is no skillful coping outside the *One*. By contrast to this, it seems now that under the title "authenticity" a no less monological form of intentionality is re-introduced by the conventionalist interpreters themselves. For authenticity, understood as a sort of awaking from the dogmatic slumber of conformity (in Haugeland's interpretation), or as outgrowing the straitjacket of social norms in becoming an expert (in Dreyfus' interpretation), does indeed seem to be a rather lonely and monological affair. In both interpretations, authenticity is conceived of as something that explicitly concerns us as *single individuals*. So the initial problem simply reappears. Whereas the conventional disclosedness of the world in the *One* is something genuinely social, the authentic disclosedness of the world is not. Thus Haugeland as well as Dreyfus (at least to some degree) seem to fall back into the old division of labor. The scandal is still there: Heidegger's monologism of authenticity, his inability to allow for any genuinely social dimension of authenticity. And the intuition of the first critics of *Being and Time* still holds: authenticity does concern us not only as single individuals in our solitary *being-in-the-world*, but also in our *being-with* others in our communal lives. The question is: how can we conceive of the social dimension of authenticity?

§31 Joint Action and the Social Dimension of Authenticity

In what follows, I shall try to gather some elements for a different solution to the problem. As I see it, it's not Heidegger's distinction between practical intentionality and the sphere of social norms that is at fault, as the conventionalists think. Heidegger was right in drawing this distinction, and indeed in calling the conventionalism of the *One* inauthentic. To some degree at least, even the conventionalist interpreters now seem to make Heidegger's reasons for this view of the *One* their own. I will propose the following interpretation: the main problem of Heidegger's analysis of everyday *Dasein* is not that he kept the innermost of *Dasein*'s intentionality clear of social normativity, but that he conceived of it in individualistic, indeed atomistic terms. So the solution to the problem lies in a non-individualistic conception of intentionality.

In his introduction of the principal distinction between *Dasein* on the one hand and *beings unlike Dasein* (nichtdaseinsmäßiges Seiendes) on the other, which marks the beginning of his analysis of *Dasein* in *Being and Time*, Heidegger already ties *Dasein* down to an individualistic mode of existence. The basic *existential* is deeply imbued with individualism. "*Da-sein* is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned *about* its very being" (Heidegger [1927] 1996: 12). Here, a special kind of *self-reference* is claimed to be the innermost feature of *Dasein*, a view that culminates in the thesis of *Dasein*'s famous *always-being-my-own-being* (Jemeinigkeit) (Heidegger [1927] 1996: 42). It is quite typical of Heidegger, though, that an alternative to his individualistic concept of intentionality and *Dasein* can be found in his own work. Interestingly, Heidegger, in his series of lectures from 1929/30 (published as Vol. 27 of Heidegger's collected works in [1929/30] 1996), Heidegger starts out from the same principal distinction that marks the beginning of the analysis of *Dasein* in *Being and Time*, but he draws it somewhat differently. Here, what distinguishes *Dasein* from other beings is not the way *Dasein* is related to *itself*, but rather the way it is related *to other beings of its kind*. The basic feature of *Dasein*, in other words, is its *being-with*. Here is how Heidegger conceives of the basic difference. It is characteristic of *beings unlike Dasein* that they *occur among* other such beings (i.e. other beings that are unlike *Dasein:* "nicht daseinsmäßiges Seiendes kommt neben anderem nicht daseinsmäßigem Seiendem vor"). *Dasein*, by contrast, does not 'occur among' other *Dasein*. Rather, it *is with* other *Dasein* ("Dasein und Dasein *sind miteinander*") (Heidegger [1929/30] 1996: 85). Based on this fundamental distinction between entities that *occur among* other things and entities that *are with* other entities, Heidegger here introduces *community* (Gemeinschaft) as the most fundamental of the *existentials* of *Dasein* (Heidegger [1929/30] 1996: 145). Most significantly, it is only in passing, as it were, and towards the end of the series of lectures that Heidegger finally turns to the issue that occupies the center stage in *Being and Time*. With the focus on *Dasein's* communal being, the question of how *Dasein* is revealed to itself (Heidegger [1929/30] 1996: 134), which is the dominating topic in exposition of the analysis of *Dasein* in *Being and Time*, loses much of its interest (Heidegger [1927] 1996: 15–40).

This change in perspective is not without consequences. The fundamentally communal character of *Dasein* requires yet another fundamental change in the concept of intentionality. The view Heidegger comes up with is remarkably different from the one put forward in *Being and Time*. Now, he has yet another reason to distance himself from earlier conceptions. It is no longer just the representationalist and intellectualist implications of the traditional concept of intentionality that stand in the way of an adequate understanding of *Dasein*'s *being-in-the-world*. The additional obstacle Heidegger now has to overcome is the *atomistic individualism* of the theory of intentionality. Against this limitation to individuals, Heidegger here outlines a non-individualistic account of intentionality to which I will refer as *inter-intentionality* in the following[4] (as mentioned above, Heidegger himself does not make use of the term intentionality). What he now comes up with is a concept of an engagement with the world that does not depend on social normativity in terms of conventions, normative communal practices or social institutions, but is not an affair of single individual minds nevertheless. It is social, but not conventional. So what is the structure of this sociality? As he does so often, Heidegger starts with a negative characterization. Against possible intersubjectivist or conventionalist misunderstandings,[5] Heidegger here states clearly that the fundamentally communal character of *Dasein* does not mean that it is *only as a member of some community of communication* that *Dasein* is engaged with the world. Rather, the point is that *Dasein* has intentionality not *only* as a solitary individual (even though Heidegger seems to allow for this possibility), but sometimes *shares* intentionality with other *Dasein*. Heidegger does his best to fend off possible individualistic and collectivistic misunderstandings. The following picture emerges. Inter-intentions are neither collective phenomena that are somehow supervenient on individual intentions, nor are they simply social in terms of Max Weber's individualistic concept of social action (social action qua based on individual intentions that are at least partly social in content, i.e. directed towards other individual agents). Inter-intentionality is not a matter of any intentional state that has the other as its object. To put it in Heideggerian terms, inter-intentionality is not a mode of *concern*. Rather, it is *shared intentionality*. In this view, shared intentionality (in terms of acting and experiencing together) does not entail any thematic and explicit relationship to others whatsoever.[6] It is no form of regular individual intentionality, to which some form of knowledge of the other (and the other's experience of the object, and the other's knowledge of one's own experience of the object, and so on) is added, as was first claimed by Gerda Walther in the early phenomenological thinking on social theory (Walther 1923:

[4] It was only after I published this paper that I finally became aware of the true extent to which Heidegger, in the non-individualistic turn described in this section, relied on Max Scheler's insights. Scheler's influence is clouded by the fact that it is not acknowledged by Heidegger.

[5] Heidegger almost seems to address his later intersubjectivist interpreters when he explicitly states that "community" should not be taken as the "only principle" *(alleiniges Prinzip)* of the disclosedness of the world (Heidegger [1929/30] 1996: 146).

[6] Heidegger ([1929/30] 1996: 86–7). This is one of the features of inter-intentionality that Heidegger seems to have taken over from Scheler.

esp. p. 86), and as it is still sometimes claimed in current collective intentionality analysis in general and game theoretic discussions on the topic in particular.[7] The intersubjectivity of inter-intentionality is neither made of social normativity, nor of experiences of or beliefs about the other. So what is it made of, then?

Turning from the negative characterization to the theory, Heidegger introduces an example that is meant to illustrate the phenomenon. The example is the following: two hikers are *carried away* and *dazed* by the sight of the sunset they are jointly watching (Heidegger [1929/30] 1996: 86, 88). They experience the sunset *together*, without their attention being drawn to each other in any sense whatsoever. Significantly, Jean-Paul Sartre uses a similar example to discuss Heidegger's concept of *being-with*. It is well known that in his own theory, which he set off against Heidegger's, Sartre insisted vehemently on grounding sociality in explicit relations between individuals. In this sense, Sartre is at the same time Heidegger's fiercest opponent, and his best interpreter. More clearly than any other of Heidegger's interpreters and critics, he saw that it is possible to read Heidegger in an inter-intentionalist way. Sartre's own example for inter-intentionality is the joint experience of a stage performance. The people in the audience are experiencing the performance *together*, without, however, having any explicit experience of *each other*. The relation between individuals sharing a joint experience, while being essential for the jointness of that experience, is of the non-objectifying kind. *Dasein* is, as Sartre puts it, "non-thetically engaged in a 'we'" (Sartre [1943]1991: 485). In the words of John R. Searle, the intersubjective relation in question is of "pre-intentional" character (Searle 1990: 415). Leaving aside the fact that the Cartesian infallibility does not apply – in contrast to individual intentions, it is possible to be mistaken about our own common intentions[8] – this inter-intentional relation between individuals structurally resembles, indeed is structurally *identical* with Sartre's famous "conscience (de) soi"; just that it is not "(de) soi", but "(de) l'autre", as it were. Like all individualist philosophers, Sartre would like to reserve that innermost of intentionality for the relation of the individual to *itself*, thereby privileging self-reference over all other kinds of relation. But *pre-reflective*, *non-thematical and non-objectifying relations* are not limited to our contact with *ourselves*. Our relations to *each other* are made of the same stuff.

Along this line of thought, a different concept of *Dasein* emerges: *Dasein* as engaged in inter-intentional practices does not have the existential form of an individual *always-being-my-own-being*. Rather, it is a genuinely *communal Dasein*. In more traditional terms, Sartre calls it the *we-subject* ('nous'-sujet) (Sartre [1943] 1991: 498).

Before defending this inter-intentional concept of *Dasein* against Sartre's individualistic criticism, a critical remark on Heidegger is in order. It is remarkable that,

[7] The authoritative text on this topic still is David Lewis' *Convention. A Philosophical Study* (1969); concerning the more recent debate on "common knowledge" see Gilbert (1989: 191ff.); Nozick (2001: 154ff.).

[8] It may well be that I am mistaken about *our* (the gospel choir's) intention to meet for a rehearsal tonight (perhaps I got that wrong), whereas I cannot be mistaken about my individual intention to participate.

in his series of lectures *Introduction to Philosophy*, Heidegger developed a reformulation of intentionality that avoids the shortcomings of individualism. But it is also true that even here he shied away from the consequences of his own insights. Thus even the above-mentioned example he uses is quite telling. The paradigmatic case is a strangely passive group of co-experiencers (the two hikers jointly experiencing the sunset) instead of an active group of co-actors. This might be due to Scheler's influence (who chooses a similar example), but it can also be taken as a clear sign of Heidegger's *profound reservations* about non-individualistic forms of intentionality. Remember that, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger identifies our practical skills as the basic feature of what used to be called intentionality. Intentional stances such as experience and belief are, as Heidegger shows convincingly, *derivative* forms of the intentional. In illustrating inter-intentionality with the example of joint experience, Heidegger seems to keep the innermost of intentionality clear of sociality. Heidegger does not discuss *cooperation* or *joint action*, but joint experience. This is more than just a consequence of some contingent choice of example. Heidegger makes quite explicit in his remarks that inter-intentionality does not disclose *things at hand* (Zuhandenes), but only *things in their objective presence* (Vorhandenes). Thus it seems that the communal form of intentionality takes place not on the basic, but only on a secondary (derivative or even "deficient"; Heidegger [1927] 1996: 61) level of intentionality (cf. Heidegger's convincing analysis of the relation between *things at hand* and *objective presence* in *Being and Time*). Even where Heidegger finally takes the inter-intentional givenness of a *thing at hand* as an example – he chooses a piece of chalk in the classroom – he explicitly *rejects* the idea that the inter-intentional givenness of this thing lies in its *use* within some *joint activity* (Heidegger [1929/30] 1996: 108). Thus, on the basic level of intentionality, everything remains the same. Heidegger is not ready to accept that *taking care with circumspection* is more deeply imbued with sociality than individual instrumental activity, which is instrumentally or strategically linked to other individual's instrumental activity (remember the craftsman's relations to his customers and suppliers). The inter-intentional givenness of things requires that we refrain from using them – that we *let* things *be* (sein lassen), as Heidegger says explicitly.[9]

Also it seems that Heidegger still maintains here what he said earlier in his *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time*. *Things at hand* are either tailor-made for one particular individual's use – or they lie about publicly, as it were, being there for anybody's use, so that whoever uses them thereby turns into a mere *Anybody*, thus entering the inauthentic mode of existence.[10] But this alternative between one particular individual's circumspection and anyone's use is not

[9] Heidegger continues, though, that this "letting be" is not in any way *deficient* as compared to practical use, but lies "before any interestedness" (Heidegger [1928/29] 1996: 102).

[10] Heidegger, in the "Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time", speaks of "things at hand" that are "in ihrer eigentümlichen Anwesenheit nicht auf einen einzelnen, auf ein bestimmtes *Dasein* als solches zugeschnitten [...], sondern [die, H.B.S.] jeder in derselben Weise wie der Andere gebraucht ([die, H.B.S.] 'man' im gleichen Sinne verfügbar hat), was für 'einen' schon da ist" (Heidegger 1979: 270).

exhaustive. It is not just within my individual plans of action or within the plan of action of the mere average *anyone* that things are *at hand*. To give an example: if you and I jointly carry a large sofa from the removal truck up to the new apartment on the third floor, the surrounding world of our joint activity – the corners and handrails of the staircase, for example – is not disclosed in the light of my or your *individual* circumspective *taking care* nor in the light of any average individual's *circumspection*. Rather, the surrounding world with all its possibilities, tools and other features is disclosed in the light of *our joint activity*. Inter-intentionality is not just a matter of passive experience. It is, above all, a matter of *joint activity*. Joint action implies a form of disclosedness of the surrounding world, and an individual's participation in a joint action is neither a mode of being towards *his or her own (individual) possibilities* nor a mode of being towards an exchangeable individual *anyone*'s possibilities. In the individualistic sense of the world, common action is neither authentic nor inauthentic. For *Dasein*, as engaged in joint action, neither *chooses* nor *loses* its own individual being (Heidegger [1927] 1996: 42). This becomes particularly obvious if we take into account that the innermost of *Dasein* is conceived of in terms of *possibility* (Möglichkeit). The reason why we have to go beyond the two alternatives of either grasping or covering up *Dasein's* individual possibilities is that, in joint action, we do not act towards our individual possibilities at all. Joint action is about *our shared* possibilities, and these are not merely a sum or an aggregate of the individual possibilities of the participating individuals. There is no way of accounting for shared possibilities in terms of individual possibilities. The reason is not that individuals do not have individual possibilities when acting jointly, but that, in most cases, the individual possibilities they have are *based on* the shared possibility, and not the other way around. To quote a trivial example, it's only within the shared practice of an election that individuals can cast their votes. The possibilities that shape our shared being are the base and frame of many of the possibilities we have as individuals. As observed by Heidegger, possibility is what *Dasein* basically *is*, the very being of *Dasein* is not only *my own being*, but *our common being*. *Dasein* is not – or not *exclusively* – the being of an individual, as the individualistic setting of *Being and Time* makes us believe.

It is true, of course, that joint intentions and actions, too, require individual intentions and actions. There is no such thing as joint action unless there are individuals who act. But this does not mean that shared intentionality and action is something that only emerges (and is thus ontologically dependent on) some underlying individual level. On the contrary, it is the individual intentions and actions involved in collective intentions and actions that are dependent on the collective level of intentionality. Our jointly carrying the sofa up the stairs does not emerge from two independent individual actions. Rather, my individual lifting my side of the sofa above the handrail and your individual slowly stepping around the turn of the stair holding your end of the sofa are intended *as parts* of our joint action, and it's the whole that gives the parts their meaning. Thus my and your individual actions are – in their intentional content, mode, and perhaps subject – to be understood as individual *contributions* to a common intention and action, and are thus dependent on

the shared intention. Within this joint intention, our *contributive actions* are interdependent. They have to mesh in order to be effective as contributive actions. Thus, in the example of two participants, the structure of common action could be viewed as a triangle, its corners being a) our joint intention, b) your individual contributive action and c) my individual contributive action, the line between a and b and the line between a and c standing for the derivative relation between our individual contributive actions and the joint intention – I'm lifting my end of the sofa *because* we intend to move the sofa – and the line between b and c symbolizing the interdependence between your and my contributive action – my "lifting my end of the sofa" constitutes an individual contribution to our common action *only if* it meshes with your individual contribution. These features are currently discussed under labels such as we-intentions, collective intentionality, or shared cooperative activity. The general aim of this debate meshes seamlessly with Heidegger's aim in *Introduction to Philosophy*. The goal is to open a perspective on the genuinely social character of intentionality.[11] Moreover, it seems to me that, to some degree at least, the current debate could learn from Heidegger's thoughts on the matter.

§32 Collective Intentionality: Heideggerian Inspirations

It has repeatedly been noted that the analytic debate on collective intentionality is marked by an individualistic bias (Baier 1997b: 21ff.; Stoutland 1997: 45–74). Part of the reason for this setting seems to be fear of the group mind. Understandably, John Searle finds the assumption of some group mind over and above the individuals an idea that is "at best mysterious and at worst incoherent" (Searle 1990: 406, 1998a: 118). Yet it seems no less incoherent and mysterious to take this as an argument for methodological individualism and even methodological solipsism, as Searle does. The fact that there is no group mind does not mean that all intentionality is to be found in the brains of individuals (as Searle suggests with his reading of methodological individualism), or even that it makes no difference to the structure of the intentionality in question whether those brains are in contact with the real world or just dreaming in a vat (as methodological solipsism has it) (Searle 1990: 406). For it is clear that single brains in vats cannot have collective intentions. An intentional state of the form *we intend* in a single mind, which is not connected to other minds in a suitable way, is not just a collective intention that has somehow gone wrong. It is *no collective intention at all*. This is just another way to say that it is not individuals, but only *individuals-in-relations* that can have collective intentionality. In contrast to Searle, Michael E. Bratman is well aware of this point. "Shared intention is not an attitude in any mind" (Bratman 1999: 122), he says, but an "interrelation" of the "attitudes" of several individuals. Yet Bratman, too, thinks it necessary to endorse individualism (Bratman 1999: 108, 129) in order to avoid the group mind (Bratman 1999: 111). This he does by making the collective intentional activity the

[11] In addition to the titles mentioned below see, for example, Gilbert (1989) or Tuomela (1995).

propositional content of intentional states of the form *I intend*. Thus shared cooperative activity, as he calls it, consists in an *interrelation* of individual intentions of the form *I intend that we J* (J standing for the joint activity that is being planned) (Bratman 1999: 142ff.). This form of individualistic reductionism (Bratman 1999: 109), just as Searle's, has counterintuitive consequences. Annette Baier has argued convincingly that in order to have an intention of the form "I intend that we J" one has to take oneself to be somehow "in control" of what the others do, since one cannot intend to do something one takes oneself to be unable to perform (one cannot intend to spend the afternoon in the library, if at the same time one is aware of the fact that it is closed all day) (Baier 1997b: 15–44). In his reply to this objection, Bratman stated that it is not necessary to take oneself to be in full-blown control of the relevant others. As he points out, it suffices to assume that there is a sufficient chance that one's intention will *influence* others so as to go along with the joint venture. In the paradigmatic case, an expression of one's intention will motivate the relevant others to cooperate (Bratman 1999: 155ff.). This seems to open an alternative to my being in total control of the relevant others in intending that we J, namely our (however latent) collectively intending to J that is just somehow activated by my individual intending that we J. In this latter case, however, it seems obvious that the *collective* intention to J is already presupposed in my *individual* intending that we J.

Looking at this debate, I think there is an important lesson to be learned from Heidegger. It is not to cling to individualism for fear of the group mind. Heidegger once remarked that the idea of a collective mind (to which the individuals belong as mere parts to the whole), though it might superficially seem to contradict individualism, is nothing else than one of the "most dangerous consequences" of the very obsession of modern philosophy with the individual "I" (Heidegger [1936–38] 1989: 321). This, however, did not prevent Heidegger from committing this very same mistake himself. Shying away from the idea of inter-intentionality (that could have filled in the gap, as we shall see), Heidegger had to leave empty the place of authentic sociality in his analysis of *Dasein*, until he finally followed the steep downhill road to collectivism, a development already laid down on the infamous page 384 of *Being and Time*, by filling in the gap with the collectivist notion of *Volks–Dasein* (*Dasein* of the people). Heidegger now answers the question "who are *we?*" with: "the people" (Heidegger [1934] 1998: 59). He now calls the people a collective *Dasein* to which he ascribes the capability to self-responsibility and self-reflection (cf. Heidegger [1933] 1983: 10; see also Thomä 1990: 550). Reading Heidegger's ontology of the people's *Dasein*, one can hardly help getting the impression that Heidegger, in his fixation on individual self-reference, here just replaces the monological self-reference of the single individual with the no less monological self-reference of a collective. In other words, the concept of *Dasein* is simply transferred from the individual to the collective level; Heidegger's individualism thus seems to turn into its opposite within a basically collectivist conception of *Dasein*.

As opposed to this oscillating between individualism and collectivism, inter-intentionality lies beyond this alternative, since the subjects of inter-intentions are neither single individuals nor single collectives, but *individuals in intentional interconnection*. The *subject-we*, as Sartre called it, has no mind of its own. But it would

be wrong to conclude that the subject-we is "nothing but" an aggregate of single individuals. It is one of Sartre's many merits that he saw more clearly than Heidegger himself the inter-intentionalist potential of the concept of *being-with*. In this respect, Sartre is Heidegger's most astute interpreter and his sharpest critic at the same time. Therefore, it might be worth taking the time to have a closer look at Sartre's possible reasons for rejecting a conception of whose potential he was so clearly aware.

Against the theory of the *subject-we* and the pre-intentional, lateral interconnection between individuals, Sartre is determined to insist on the individualist idea that on the basic level, sociality is made of nothing but individuals. Perhaps Sartre's theory of the "pour autrui" is the most consequent of the numerous attempts to base a social ontology on explicit intersubjective experience. In Sartre's theory, no lateral pre-intentional sense of the other, but the explicit experience of others serves as the basic building block of the social. Sartre does not deny the phenomenon of inter-intentionality and the subject-we as such; it's just that he does not believe that it is so important, let alone the basic level of sociality. In defense of individualism, Sartre, in his critique of Heidegger, diminishes the role of the subject-we in any respect he can. Inter-intentional action thus appears, in Sartre, only as a transitory phase, in which individuals temporarily come together only to pursue their respective individual aims. Sartre illustrates this with the example of a mass of commuters jointly using the passages of a subway station. Following Sartre, it is constitutive of joint actions that the single participating individuals "aim at individual goals beyond the presently pursued collective goal" (Sartre [1943] 1991: 497). And in Sartre's example at least, there seems to be some reason to this view indeed. It is true that hardly anyone in a mass of commuters will consider the coordinated use of the subway station an end in itself. Everybody jointly uses the subway, but ultimately goes his or her own individual way. Thus individual action seems to be more fundamental than joint action, because jointness is just a transitory phase in a venture that is ultimately purely individualistic.

Yet Sartre goes one step further in limiting the importance of the subject-we. Even in the communal phases of such actions, he says, the status of the subject-we is only that of a contingent psychological fact that does not in any way reveal an underlying ontological structure. This overt depreciation of the subject-we is so important to Sartre that he repeats it no less than eight times in his chapter on Heidegger's concept of *being-with* (Sartre [1943] 1991: 485, 496, 498–503). In situations such as the one Sartre chooses as an example, some individuals may *experience the feeling* that these are situations of some genuine intentional jointness, but this does not necessarily apply to *all* participants. As Sartre points out, it is by no means necessary that the other participants, too, perceive "us" as a "we", that, in Sartre's words, the others have "an experience that correlates with my experience" (Sartre [1943] 1991: 498). And obviously, Sartre has a point there: in collectives such as the mass of commuters in a subway station, one does not have to have the experience of inter-intentionality, and one does not have to see oneself and the others as a "we", i.e. as a group of pre-intentionally interlinked co-agents. In such situations, we normally tend to interpret ourselves not in terms of some inter-intentional we-subject of a common action, but simply as single individuals, who, in the light of their individual ends, go about their

individual business and coordinate their actions by following the given formal and informal social customs, conventions, rules, and norms.

Thus a distinction between two possible views of social action emerges, bringing us back to the initial question of the relation between intentionality and social normativity. Such situations can be interpreted either as situations of inter-intentional common action, or as situations of individual action in the context of social norms. In the first view, what matters is what we do collectively (i.e. what we do *together*), in the second the focus is on what we do distributively, or severally (i.e. what each of us does for him- or herself). It seems to me that, in light of Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein*, it is apparent that this distinction is of much greater relevance to social ontology than Sartre thinks. It is true that the mode of the individual *One*-self *(Man-selbst)* who conceives of social situations in terms of norm-oriented individual action is the standard everyday-mode of *Dasein*, and only very few people, if any at all, view such situations as situations of joint action. But Sartre is mistaken in concluding that, therefore, the subject-we is merely a psychological phenomenon of no further relevance to social ontology.

Let me explain this *non sequitur* in a direct confrontation with Sartre's own account. Sartre believes that the psychological experience of the subject-we is based on another experience. In order to experience a group of people to which one belongs as the subject of a joint action, one has to experience that group as perceived by a non-member. In other words, the subject-we is based in the object-we, i.e. the group of people is the intentional content of an experience had by an outside observer. Sartre labels this observer 'the third'. Following Sartre, there cannot be the experience of an 'us' without the experience of a 'they' as had by the third. To put it in other words, any form of we-ness and community is based in an experience of being observed in an *I-thou* interaction by a third party ([1943] 1991: 486ff.). Still, following Sartre, it is ultimately the third's view, and not any experience of joint engagement as such, that "ties us together" (Sartre [1943] 1991: 490).

At the basic level, Sartre takes sociality to consist of inter-individual relations of the *I-thou* type (the famous struggle of looks as depicted in *Being and Nothingness*), without any 'we' involved. At this level, there are only individuals and their mutual relations: individuals fighting against each other for their own respective individual possibilities. Here, there is no such thing as a community, but only face-to-face-interaction. Sartre thinks that community comes into play only when some third enters the scene, and makes the individuals and their interrelations the content of his or her own intentional states. The interrelated individuals now see the third observing them in their confrontation, and this experience is what turns them into a 'we'. They experience themselves and the others against whom they are struggling as the 'they' of the third's perception, and this is what turns them into a 'we'. Melting the I and the thou of the original confrontation into a 'we', the third also synthesizes, following Sartre, the participating individual intentions into a *joint intention*. To quote Sartre's own example: it is the synthetic power of the third's view through which my individual intention to beat you and your individual intention to fend off my attack are turned into *our joint intention to fight* (Sartre [1943] 1991: 490).

How plausible is this account? It seems to me that the claim about the fundamental status of the experience of the third clearly has counterintuitive consequences. Note that in Sartre's account it's entirely up to the third who belongs or does not belong to the we-group. The synthetical power of the third's view is strong enough to "stick me down between any other existences", apparently without there being any further criteria (Sartre [1943] 1991: 491). The answer to Heidegger's question, "who are *we*?" is simple: we are the people some third happens to have in his view. The 'we' can be the group composed by some perfect stranger, who just happens to walk down the street ahead of me, and myself, or any other selection from among humanity you might imagine, as long as it only meets the condition that there is some third who somehow "has us in his or her view". Note that this could also apply to the television announcer and me, if only I can see that the third has "us" in his field of vision, and if awareness of the third's perspective need not be mutual.

It seems clear that, while having some plausibility in such examples as children's playing in a room with the third entering the scene as a parent, this is utterly implausible in the previous cases. Here, it is inappropriate to speak of some unification or some "glueing together" of individual intentional states to joint intentionality. The fact that there is some person observing other people, and that (some of) these people are aware of this, does not mean that these people are now justified in using the term 'we' in any other than a purely distributive sense. Obviously, the third's capacity to synthesize individual intentions to joint intentions is not unlimited. There are criteria to be met that go well beyond the mere presence in the third's field of view.

So what are these criteria? I suggest the following answer. The experience of the third's view cannot *create* but only help to *reveal* or *discover* joint intentionality that was already there. A joint intention can be revealed in the third's view only if it was already *latent* in the original situation of action (i.e., before the third's appearance). There is no way my washing the dishes and the television announcer's reading the news can be turned into parts of some joint action intention just by some third's looking through the window, for the simple reason that these activities are not individual contributions to a joint action in the first place. By contrast to this example, there are other cases in which the third's view is indeed important for the interpretation of action. Thus I might interpret my trying to hit you as a purely individual intention, and your fending off my attack as a purely individual act. With the third's appearance, my perception of the situation radically changes. "I fight only if we fight" (Baier 1997: 28) – it now becomes transparent that the individual intentions and actions constitute individual contributions to a joint action. But this is no new fact. Fighting had been a joint intentional activity even before the other entered the scene. What changes with the third's appearance is that this structure becomes explicit. Concentrating on our individual contributions to our joint action, it might well be that we simply loose sight of the fact that our underlying intention, i.e. the intention to fight, is shared – or that we had never been aware of this fact in the first place. Here, the third's view might remind us, or help to bring this intentional structure to light. Thus the third's view does not *constitute* a joint intention. But it may *reveal* a subject-we. If one chooses to retain the idea of the view

of the third, it should not be allotted the task of synthesizing individual intentions, but of breaking an individualizing and over-individualized self-understanding that permeates our everyday life.

Thus Sartre's argument for why the subject-we shouldn't be seen as a fundamental ontological fact about sociality fails to convince on an argumentative level. But this does not mean that Sartre's analysis is worthless. Rather, our discussion of the role of the third points at a solution to our initial problem. An answer to the question of how to fill in the gap in the conception of *Being and Time*, i.e. how to fill the position of authentic *being-with*, and how to distinguish authentic *being-with* from the conventionalism of the *One* seems to emerge. The shift of perspective from an individualized self-understanding of *Dasein* to an awareness of jointness provides the key to a reading of the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity that is not flawed by an exclusion of sociality from its authentic side. What follows is a re-description of that distinction which uses the results of our discussion of Sartre's account.

In everyday social contexts, we usually act on the basis of an understanding of ourselves as single individuals who go about their individual business, following the guidelines of (and keeping within the limits of) formal and informal social norms and conventions. Thus, in everyday life, we are basically concerned with the conformity or nonconformity of our actions (Heidegger speaks of *Abständigkeit – distantiality*, or, as it is also sometimes translated, *standoffishness*). Traffic regulations might serve as an example to illustrate this. While moving about in the streets, pursuing our own individual aims, we either conventionally stick to those regulations or just strategically avoid being caught violating them, now and then getting annoyed when the regulations appear to be a hindrance or nonsensical in the light of our own or anybody's average individual plans or preferences. This is the inauthentic everyday mode of Dasein's sociality; but what is it that makes it inauthentic? Remember the basic trait of inauthenticity: *Dasein* that is inauthentic lives past its own being (i.e. lives past its possibilities) by being unaware of itself. Inauthenticity is a matter of *Dasein's* covering up its own being by covering up its own possibilities. So what is it that is covered up in the everyday public mode of *Dasein* that I have just described? What remains covered up within this individualized view of the *One*-self is not any authentic atomic self. Quite to the contrary, it is the *communal* character of the underlying situation of which *Dasein* is unaware. In other words: *Dasein* here mistakes its own being for that of an isolated individual, where it is really *joint* or *shared Dasein*.

Superficially it may look as if I did x (e.g., stick to the traffic regulations) because this is how 'one' acts, or should act. The reasons may vary widely; I may act the way I do for fear of sticking out in the crowd, or because of my personal deontologic convictions, or for fear of punishment or other negative consequences. Be that as it may, there is something that I remain unaware of. *Actually*, I do x *as my contribution to our doing y* (e.g. our organizing the traffic), i.e. *because we intend y* (e.g., for the purpose of arranging for a communal life in which everyone can pursue his or her

plans).[12] Thus social norms play an ambivalent role. On the one hand, social norms *facilitate* joint actions simply by standardizing the individual contributive actions required for the common action to take place. Where joint actions are structured by norms, everyone knows which contributions are expected from the participants. *Modern* social norms typically require *uniform* contributive actions, i.e. the same contribution from *everyone's* part. While this greatly facilitates joint action, it also has the following effect. In the self-understanding of *Dasein*, the communal character of action and of the *Dasein* involved here becomes covered up by the individual, norm-oriented *Anyone* (Man-selbst). This individualizing conception of oneself has to be disrupted if *Dasein* is to become aware of its own being and its own possibilities. With this disruption, i.e. the shift from inauthenticity to authenticity, the view of norms radically changes. In the authentic view, norms and conventions are not just restrictions and guiding lines for *Dasein*'s individual actions. Rather, norms are the infrastructure of our *common Dasein*. Norms are the *instruments* with which, with more or less circumspection, *we 'take care' of the Dasein we share*. An authentic view of norms is *sub specie communitatis*, as it were.

Thus it seems that the inauthenticity of the *One* in Heidegger should not be interpreted as standing in contrast to an *individualistic* idea of authenticity that is intrinsically alien to any form of social normativity (let alone to some "authentic *Dasein* of a people"), but in contrast to a *common* or *shared Dasein*, a *Dasein* which is transparent to itself in its common, inter-intentional practices of shared "taking care". As single individuals we can stick to the norms, ignore them, or purposively violate them. But whatever we choose to do, we have already lost our *individual* being, for in situations like these our actions go past our *own individual possibilities*, since they inevitably bear a social meaning that transcends our individual lives. It is only as *common Dasein*, however, that we can *change* or *adapt* norms according to our common aims and ends – and therewith "win our common being" (that was lost in the individualized *One*) in establishing an explicit relation to *those of our possibilities which we do not have as individuals*, *but only as a common or shared Dasein*. The fact that we tend to forget that *Dasein* is not only its individual possibilities, but its *shared* possibilities as well, is what makes our everyday *Dasein* inauthentic.

Let me conclude with some brief remarks on intersubjectivity, an idea that some phenomenological philosophers seem to entrust with the role of the basis of human sociality. I think we should not expect too much from theories of intersubjectivity. From the word 'intersubjectivity' alone it is quite apparent that there is something about this concept which one might either classify as tragical or as comical, depending on one's taste. The word appears to be saying something none of the current theories of intersubjectivity (not to mention those theories which label themselves *intersubjectivist*) actually mean to assert: that the 'inter' can be attributed to the 'subject'. These two elements do not go well together, indeed they exclude each other, at least if we take the subject to be an Husserlian ego which, in its solitary self-reflection reduces all transcendent being to the immanence of its individual

[12] For an analysis of this structure see Sellars (1992: 222); Rosenberg (1980).

consciousness. Intersubjectivity is a *contradictio in adjecto*. The whole point of the subject is that there isn't anything that cannot be reduced to it, while the point of the 'inter' seems to be that there is something that balks at this reduction to the subject. The 'inter' is something ego and alter *share*, which is not to be reduced to either ego or alter *alone*, something *communal*. By contrast to what one might think, intersubjectivity isn't a category from the *philosophy of the subject* (Subjektphilosophie). Rather, it belongs to its *critique*. Intersubjectivity is the title for the search for an alternative to the subject-philosophical *exclusion* of the 'inter' by the 'subject'.

Within this venture, many alternatives have been proposed, among these intersubjectivism, conventionalism (normative pragmatism), and deconstructivism. All these critiques of the *philosophy of the subject* share one basic conviction. In all of these views, intentionality is seen as the epitome of the main problem of the *philosophy of the subject*, i.e. its *monological structure*. By contrast to this perceived monologism, intersubjectivists and pragmatists (such as those mentioned above) claim that intentionality presupposes social normativity, and that, therefore, the analysis of the intentional *givenness* of the world should be replaced by an analysis of the customs and social practices of a community in which the world is disclosed.

Other approaches to intersubjectivity, such as some recent phenomenological, post-structuralist or deconstructivist theories, view the 'inter' as something that goes *beyond* intentionality rather than as one of its presuppositions. Much of the jargon of current French phenomenology is due to this move. Just as in Sartre's account, the 'inter' is conceived of in terms of face-to-face experiences of the other. These theories, too, are critical against earlier theories of intentionality. These critics insist on the fact that the 'inter' comes only at the price of the self-centeredness that is seen as the hallmark of intentionality. The other, it is claimed, eludes any intentional objectivation. He or she is more than what is intentionally "given"; she or he transcends or, as it were, exceeds ego's intentional capacity, thereby defeating the egocentrism of intentionality.

The conjecture exposed in this chapter goes, of course, against the grain of both of these types of theories of intersubjectivity. I find none of these conceptions of the 'inter' particularly helpful, even though both views have a sound core. I do not deny that social practices play an important role for many of our intentional states, and I certainly agree that it is important for our common lives to always be aware of the fact that those with which we share our lives are never just what we believe them to be. But both views completely fail to explain the crucial element of *sharedness* that marks us out as social beings. What we share is neither a set of quasi-*a priori* social practices, nor something that arises from (or is based on) an experience of the alterity of the other that somehow transcends the capacity of intentionality. What we share is primarily a matter of joint attitudes. The sociality of the *disclosedness of the world* is a matter of joint attention, joint intention, shared experience, and shared feelings; in short, it's a matter of joint intentional states. Therefore I propose to see the 'inter' as a feature of intentionality itself, not as one of its presuppositions, or as something going beyond intentionality, as the other theories have it.

It may appear as if the concept of inter-intentionality proposed in this chapter meant nothing else than shrinking the 'inter' to fit the subject, and in fact,

inter-intentionality requires neither an *a priori* of social norms nor any special mysterious alterity of the other. But the theory of inter-intentionality, too, requires a departure from the *philosophy of the subject*, and especially from one of its traits that is uncritically taken over even by its critics. In question is what Annette Baier calls the "Cartesian Brainwash" (Baier 1997: 18): the idea that intentionality is always a matter of the immanence of individual minds alone. Some intentionality is more than that. Some intentionality is genuinely social.