

Chapter 3

On Not Doing One's Part

Dissidence and the Normativity of Collective Intention

Looking at the illustrations and examples that are usually chosen to discuss the structure of joint action in the literature on collective intentionality, one might sometimes feel magically disburdened of the troubles of mundane interactions and transferred into an idyll of smooth cooperation. Thus John Searle, in his writings on the topic, treats us to some homey scenes, with people dexterously preparing a meal or playing music together (Searle 1990). Out on the street, Raimo Tuomela has a traveling choir joining their forces to push their broken-down bus up the hill (Tuomela 1995: 137–138). In the park nearby, some of Robert Sugden's team-thinkers are engaged in a game of football (Sugden 2000), while beneath the trees, Margaret Gilbert's committed couple of friends are out on their Sunday afternoon walk (Gilbert 1996). Michael Bratman, finally, takes us farther out into the woods. Here, we meet Abe and Barbara, who are patiently and diligently working together to pump water to their weekend cottage (Bratman 1999: 150–151).

As has already been noted (Baier 1997b), this is a world of cooperation between keen and capable contributors, in which the exceptions to the rule are few indeed. Thus there is a disabled person in Tuomela's group of car pushers. But even he is doing his best to promote the collective venture by making encouraging remarks from his wheelchair (Tuomela 1995: 138; Tuomela 1991: 272ff.). With all these willing volunteers and keen contributors, the world to which our philosophers of collective intentionality invite us is an attractive place. At the same time, however, it might appear to be somewhat unreal. Even if we accept such limitations as the concentration on small-scale cooperation among adults, something is missing. Where have all those negligent, sloppy, unfocused, forgetful and weak-willed people gone whom we know from real life, all those who for some reason or another fail to do (or even fail to intend to do) their part in their collective projects? And where are those recalcitrant, fractious and unruly fellows who not only fail to do their part, but even have the intention *not to do their part*, in a shared cooperative activity?

These people and their role in collective intentionality analysis will be the focus of the following considerations. I shall argue that their absence in the received accounts has led to a skewed view of collective intentionality. This chapter is in three parts. In the first section, some remarks concerning the possibility and limits of not doing one's part shall be made, and some conjectures will be offered as to why the phenomenon in question is widely left out in the received view on collective inten-

tionality and shared cooperative activity (§9). The second part addresses the question of how our view of the structure of collective intentionality should be changed in order to make room for this phenomenon (§10). The third section is on a special (and especially important) kind of 'not doing one's part', i.e. the case of dissidence (§11). Here, as already in §2, I shall focus on Raimo and Maj Tuomela's analysis of the structure and role of dissident participation. Some concluding remarks sum up the considerations made in this chapter and open up a perspective on social ontology.

§9 Joint Intention and Individual Participation

The bias towards smooth cooperation that is found in much of the literature on collective intentionality is hardly just a matter of the examples chosen. Rather, it seems to be a direct consequence of a very basic feature of how collective intentionality and collective intentional activity are approached. The emphasis on active participation naturally results from the fact that, according to most of the received accounts, the intentionality of actively participating individuals is what collective intentionality analysis is all about. Indeed, this might seem to be quite natural as a starting point, for how could a collective intention (or even a shared intentional activity) ever come into being without single individuals committing themselves to doing their share? And how could individuals commit themselves in this way without forming an intention to act accordingly? What other than some form of conditional personal commitment of the form "I will if you will" (cf. Gilbert 1989) should be at the origin of collective intentions? And how should a collective intention, once it is formed, persist over time, let alone become effective, without the corresponding participatory intentions in place? Thus Raimo Tuomela puts forth an account in which the participating individuals' intentions to do their part, together with a mutual belief concerning the other participants' intention, play the central role (cf. Tuomela and Miller 1988). Similarly, the building blocks of Michael Bratman's analysis of shared intentional activity are individual intentions of the form "I intend that we J", together with some common knowledge of these individual intentions (Bratman 1999: 105). In John Searle's view, too, the intentionality of the participating individuals is the focus of the analysis. In the Searlean version of the story, the participating individuals have some irreducible intention of the we-form kind in their mind (Searle 1995: 26). Regardless of the considerable differences between these accounts, the common thread is that whatever collective intentionality might be, it is somehow built of (or supervenes on) the keen contributors' and eager participants' intentionality.

In the following, I shall use the label *participation theory of collective intentionality* in order to refer to this common feature of the received accounts of collective intention. It is true, though, that the participatory element is a matter of degree. One can find accounts that seem to require much less intentional activity, commitment and dedication to the common cause from the part of the participating individuals than the abovementioned accounts seem to do. But even in the cooperatively least demanding account I know of (Kutz 2000a), collective intentional activity is ultimately based in some "participatory intention" of the individuals involved.

In the following, I shall try to present some rather tentative considerations, which are meant to cast some doubt on the participatory view. It seems to me that the participation theory of collective intentionality is at odds with some strands of our intuitive, pre-theoretic understanding of what it means to share an intention. There seem to be everyday cases where in ordinary language we refer to collective actions or collective intentional states without implying any appropriate individual contribution or contributive intentions, or any individual *we*-intending. Such examples have even been discussed in the literature. Thus Annette Baier quotes the case of some member of a family gathering, sitting on the porch of the venue where the gathering is held. Asked about what she is doing, she replies “*we* are dancing a reel, but I quickly had enough of it, so I am sitting out” (Baier 1997b: 26; my emphasis). From the perspective of ordinary language at least, Baier’s non-dancer appears to be fully justified in using the word “*we*” rather than “*they*” to refer to the dancers, even though, obviously, she herself does not participate in the joint intentional activity any more, and may not intend to participate again in the future. How do such examples square with the intuition that lies behind the participatory approach? How do we identify those justified to use the term “*we*” from those not justified to do so if not by means of their appropriate contributive mental states? After all, even Baier will have to admit that the “*we*” in question isn’t open to anyone. So what is it that distinguishes those belonging to the “*we*” in question from the outsiders? Baier’s example seems to suggest that the “*we*” of the person’s statement is not the group of dancers really, but rather the family, of which she is a member independently of whether or not she takes part in the dancing. Thus it would seem that individuals are justified in using “*we*” with reference to a group jointly doing (or intending to do) *x* without participating (or having the intention to participate) if and only if their use of “*we*” is justified in some other context, i.e. *independently* of the collective intention or joint activity in question. Upon closer look, however, one might find that this need not necessarily be the case. Imagine the dancing in Baier’s example to be the joint intentional activity of a spontaneous group rather than that of a family. In the course of hours-long intense performance of social dances, all participants have come to see themselves as members of this spontaneous group of dancers; there is, however, no “*we*-ness” beyond the context of the ongoing activity. Even now, it does not seem obvious why some member that decided to stop and chill out on the porch should not refer to the ongoing dancing activity in the ‘*we*’-form. In this case, the identity criteria of the group are set by the history of the social practice itself rather than by external factors.

Baier seems to think that such apparently *nonparticipatory uses of ‘we’*, as one might call them, are possible only in collective activities involving larger groups, where the shared intentional activity in question does not immediately break down just because one single individual decides to opt out (Baier 1997b: 26). It seems, however, that something similar is true of smaller group (and even dyadic) activities. Consider the following case. The two of us are walking across campus to have lunch at the cafeteria. After a short while, we find ourselves in the middle of a lively discussion, and without stopping to walk, we are more and more drawn into the topic of our debate, forgetting all about the world around us. After a while, I ask you, as if

waking from a dream: “*What in the world are we doing here?*” It would seem quite natural if you were to reply: “*We are going to the cafeteria together!*”, even though you know that there is no suitable participatory intentionality on my part involved here, since I do not even seem to be aware of what we are doing. How, then, is this everyday language use of ‘we’ justified? One possibility is to give it a *performative* reading.¹ Sometimes the word “we” creates its own conditions of propriety. In Margaret Gilbert’s sense, your use of “we” would then have to be considered *initiatory* (Gilbert 1989: 178–179) rather than *constative*, turning the half-conscious coordinated behavior that was going on during the time of my oblivion back into a case of proper shared intentional activity again. While this might well be the case, however, it seems obvious that there are legitimate uses of “we” in this situation which are not initiatory, or performative. Just consider the third-person equivalent. Even before your use of “we”, a distant (but appropriately informed) observer of the scene could veridically report that *we* were walking to the cafeteria together, and that I simply had forgotten what we were doing. How does this second example square with the participatory view? One way to make this case fit the standard view seems to be to say that I *did* intend to do my part all along, even though I had forgotten about this intention temporarily. My participatory intentionality was there all along – unconscious intentionality, as it were. This claim is not as strange as it might first appear. Not all intentional states need to be *conscious* states (cf. Searle 1983: chap. 1). Thus the fact that I did not know what we were doing, in itself, does not seem to prove that I didn’t intend to do my part. But this does not pull the example’s teeth, as we might modify it so as to exclude the case of unconscious participatory intentionality. There is a difference between the case where I am *currently unaware* of my intention (such as in the case where I intend to walk to the cafeteria with you, even though I am not conscious of this intention right now, because my focus is fully on our discussion), on the one hand, and the case where I *have forgotten about* and *am unable to recall* my intentions (such as in the case of our example), on the other hand. Whereas the former case poses no problem for the participatory view, it seems that the extension of ‘unconscious intentional states’ to the latter case simply overstretches this concept. It is true that one need not be currently *aware* of one’s intentions. One might argue, however, that these intentions should at least be *accessible* under appropriate circumstances. It seems to fit nicely with this line of thought that, in ordinary language, we would probably be more likely to refer to my participatory intention (i.e. my intending to go to the cafeteria with you) as something that simply *ceased to exist* at the point where I was not just concerned with our discussion, but *forgot* all about the whole project, rather than to treat it as something that continues to exist in some unconscious form.

The tentative and rather sketchy character of these considerations notwithstanding, it appears that, in a pre-theoretic sense at least, it is true of the two of us that we indeed *collectively intend* to go to the cafeteria together, even though, under the given circumstances, you might be alone in actually having the appropriate

¹ I am grateful to Frank Hindriks for pointing this out to me.

intentionality. Once again, the result is that, as compared to the standards of the participation theory of collective intentionality, the strict participation requirements have to be relaxed in order to accommodate such intuitive cases.

Similar cases can be found for the other types collective intentional states, i.e. cognitive and affective attitudes. In a variation of an example originally put forward by Edith Stein in a short passage on shared emotions (Stein 1922: 120), let us consider the case of some professional association's official gathering, during which the president expresses "our" deeply felt grief at the sudden death of a senior honorary member. Imagine that some overly critical investigative journalist wanted to check out the truth of this statement. He arranges for a short private conversation with each participant, asking her or him whether she or he really felt grief (or a similar emotion) when the president made his statement. As it turns out, all but a few answer in the negative. Some felt sympathy with the bereaved, others simply felt dissatisfaction with the president's poor performance as a speaker. Hardly anyone actually felt any grief. The question is: should we think that this little survey proves the president's statement wrong? I think we should not; if anything is wrong here it is the journalist's understanding of the truth conditions of the statement in question. References to such shared emotions do not, for their truth, depend upon what the majority of the individuals in question actually happen to feel. "Our" grief is a collective intentional state, but it does not seem to be of the simple participatory kind. In this case, as in the other cases mentioned above, it simply seems to be *misleading* to approach the collective intention in question from the side of the intentions of the participating individuals.

Admittedly, these considerations are of an explorative character and do not extend beyond the phenomenological level of the description of pre-theoretic intuitions. It seems, however, that if we accept at least some of these phenomenological descriptions as adequate to our pre-theoretic intuitions, and if we take these pre-theoretical intuitions to be a touchstone for our theories, the conceptual requirements of individual participation for the existence of collective intentions have to be relaxed. Shared intentionality is compatible with much more individual non-contribution – much more *deviance* or *dissidence*, as it were – than the participatory theory of collective intentionality suggests. This is the line Raimo and Maj Tuomela have taken when they set out to liberalize the participation (and "pro-attitude" requirements) so as to make room for dissidents in their account of acting as a group member (cf. e.g. Tuomela and Tuomela 2003a: 15). The aim of the following chapters is to contribute to this a discussion of some of the issues involved in this move from a phenomenological point of view.

§10 Participation and Normativity

One might think that the abovementioned examples for seemingly 'non-participatory' collective intentions are unfit for the analysis of the structure of collective intentionality, because they are non-standard cases. There is something

special, *extreme*, or even to some degree *pathological* about most if not all of these cases. When, in the first of the abovementioned examples, Baier's non-participant on the porch uses "we" to refer to the group of dancers, she seems to owe us an explanation. Asked about what *she* is doing, she cannot just say "we are dancing a reel inside" without further comment. What she needs to explain is why, then, she is not taking part herself. Indeed, Baier herself has her adding "but I quickly had enough of it, so I am sitting out" (Baier 1997b: 26). Obviously, that explanation would not have been needed if she had either referred to the dancers in the third person plural form, or taken an active part in the dancing. This shows that our non-participatory case is a *special*, *non-standard* one; and something similar seems to be true for all of the abovementioned examples.

The fact that non-participatory cases are non-standard does *not* mean, however, that such cases are *marginal* or *irrelevant* for the study and analysis of collective intentionality. Here, as in so many other examples, it is in the light of *non-standard* cases that normality reveals its basic traits. These cases confront us with the decisive question: *why*, precisely, is it that in the deviant, non-participatory cases some extra explanation is needed? The most obvious answer is: when people share an intention, they can be *expected* to have the appropriate participatory intentionality. If *we* are dancing, I can be expected to intend to do my part. "Expectation" is meant not in a purely cognitive, but in a *normative* sense (cf. Chapter 10 below), meaning that we do not cease to expect people to take part in their collective activities just because in some cases, such as the ones mentioned above, these expectations are not met. Baier's non-dancer on the porch needs to explain her behavior, because if she refers to the dancing as something "we" do, she can be *expected* to be taking part herself, which she is not.

All of the abovementioned cases seem to be conceptually possible. This goes against the participation-based approach to collective intentionality. However, it has to be admitted that something is not as it *ought* to be with these non-participatory cases. If we are going to the cafeteria, I *ought* to intend my walking to the cafeteria as a part of our going there together. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same is true for the other cases. This is why the other participants as well as external observers of the scene will *expect* me to do my part. If this is true, it seems to follow that the relation between the participating individuals' intentionality and the collective intention is not a *constitutive*, but a *normative* relation. If, in the "normal" case, those involved in a shared intentional activity have the appropriate intentionality, this is not because, in some sense, these participatory intentions are what collective intentions are "made of", or because they (in some loose sense of the word) *constitute* collective intentions, or because collective intentions *supervene* on individual intentions, but because the individuals involved in shared intentional activities *ought* to (intend to) do their part. To put it bluntly: the stuff collective intentions are made of is *normativity*.

This raises further questions. *In what sense* are collective intentions normative? In the existing literature, there is a controversy between *normativist* and *non-normativist* accounts. Margaret Gilbert (Gilbert 1989, 1996) and Anthonie Meijers (Meijers 1994: 89, 104ff.) claim that collective intentional activities are based

on (tacit) agreement and always involve *obligations* and *entitlements*, whereas John Searle, Michael Bratman (1999), Raimo and Maj Tuomela (Tuomela and Tuomela 2003a) and Robert Sugden (2000, 2003) hold that participation in shared intentional activities does not *per se* involve obligations and entitlements. My claim concerning the normative character of the relation between collective intentions and the participatory intentions of the individuals notwithstanding, I take the *non-normativist* side in this controversy. According to the view developed in the previous chapter, non-normativist accounts are right in emphasizing that, in principle, shared intentional activities are possible without there being any *proper obligations* and entitlements involved. At the same time, however, I argued against the anti-normativists. If the sharedness of intentionality is not necessarily *in itself* socially normative, it inevitably has *socially normative consequences*. Social norms arise out of merely habitual social practices such as customs. It is inconceivable to engage in shared intentional activities over an extended period of time without our *cognitive* expectations concerning the actions of others gradually turning into *normative* expectations. It is true that people might agree not to develop normative expectations concerning each other's contributions; but if this were done, it would itself be part of the normative infrastructure of the joint intentional activity in question. I conjecture that these socially normative *consequences* of shared intentions stem from a *pre-socially* normative (or, in Tuomela's words, from an "instrumentally 'normative'") *implication* of any kind of shared intention: To the individuals involved, a collective intention provides a *reason* to form an appropriate personal intention (i.e. the intention to perform one's part, or to we-intend the collective activity). Contrary to what the existing normativist accounts suggest, the basic sense in which one *ought* to (intend to) do one's part is *not* that of *social* normativity (duty or obligation to (we-)intend x), but of *pre-social* normativity (having a *reason* to (we-)intend x). In a pre-socially normative sense, I *ought* to do my part in what we intend, and any obligation or entitlement that might come to play a part in shared intentional activity ultimately arises from this pre-social normativity.

This *pre-socially normative* relation between shared intention and individual we-intention, however, does not exclude the possibility of overriding contrary reasons or simple weakness of will (we shall come back to this in §13). Thus it is possible that *we intend x* without *me intending to do my part of x* (or without me we-intending x, or even without me having any pro-attitude towards our shared aim at all). This explains both why the abovementioned cases of shared intentional activities are conceptually possible, and why they are *non-standard* (and to some degree *deficient*) cases that need further explanation.²

² This version of normativism avoids some circularity that seems to be characteristic of the existing normativist accounts of shared intentional activity. Gilbert seems to hold that obligations and entitlements are essential to shared intentional activity because any shared intentional activity ultimately originates in some form of (perhaps tacit) *agreement*. However, for something to count as an (however tacit) agreement, some form of shared intentional activity has already to be in place, for "agreeing" is not anything single individuals can do, but something people have to do *together*. Thus shared intentional activities cannot be based in agreements, because agreements are nothing but a special kind of shared intentional phenomena themselves.

It might appear, however, that the use of the term “reason”, as applied to collective intention, and the talk of “ought” concerning individual participation is mistaken. John Broome has argued forcefully that we should not take any kind of normativity to be a matter of having reasons. Broome (2000) distinguishes between reasons and normative requirements, and he argues (2001) that intentions are not reasons. The difference between reasons and normative requirements become most obvious in the case of conflict. Sorting out conflicts between reasons is a simple matter of weighing. Reasons “add” to our decisions according to their “weight”, and they do so even when they are outweighed by contrary reasons. This is different with requirements. Reasons are “slack”, requirements are “strict”: requirements do not allow for degrees: either P is required to A or she is not. Requirements cannot be outweighed. This does not mean that one always has a *reason* to do what one is required to do. On the contrary, one might well have a reason *not* to do so, for example, if a given goal requires one to employ morally unacceptable means. In that case, one has a reason to *give up* the requirement. Thus, in the case of conflicting normative requirements, there must be something wrong in a way that has no equivalent in the case of conflicting reasons.

Broome argues that the normativity of intention is a matter of normative requirements rather than a matter of reasons because P cannot conclude that she *should* act in terms of having a *reason* to act on an intention just because she happens to have that intention; for it might well be that she does not have a reason for having that intention – or for acting on it – after all. In itself, intention is not reason-providing.

So much for Broome's view. He does not comment on the structure of the normativity of collective intention. At first sight, the normativity of collective intention seems to be made of the same cloth. It is plausible to assume that cases of conflicts between collective intentions and personal intentions are more than just a matter of weighing conflicting reasons. There really is something “abnormal” about those conflicts, which seems to point at the fact that the normativity of collective intentions, just as the normativity of individual intention, is a matter of normative requirements, where the connection between the premises and the conclusion is tight. At the same time, however, collective intentions differ from individual intentions in ways that resemble reasons more than normative requirements. Individual intentions break down if there is constant conflict with practical conclusions; in the collective case, the connection is less tight. Moreover, collective intentions usually involve normative expectations concerning one's behavior from the other participant's parts; these act on one's practical conclusions in the way of reasons rather than in terms of normative requirements. Thus there is a sense in which collective intentions are reason-providing in a way in which individual intentions are not.³

³ I am grateful to Juliette Gloor for suggesting this to me.

§11 The Structure of Dissidence

Focusing on the normative nature of collective intentional phenomena, it is tempting to concentrate exclusively on the ‘top down dependency’ between collective intentions and the intentionality of the individuals. This, however, might lead to an overly conventionalist view of collective intentionality phenomena, and indeed it is only half of the story. For the normative dependency goes both ways, i.e. not just from the collective to the individual level, but from the individual to the collective level, too. That “our” intentions provide a stance from which I can critically assess my own intentions and actions (Rosenberg 1980: 159) is not sufficient for establishing this relation. It is important not to neglect the fact that the converse is also true. Where the intentionality and actions of the participants do not correspond to the collective intentions and collectively intended actions, this might not just be the individuals’ fault, as a conventionalist view of collective intentionality has it. In a sense, one can say that the collective intentions *ought* to correspond to what the individuals intend or do. Just as individuals can critically assess their individual intentions and actions from the standpoint of collective intentions, practices, and projects, these intentions, practices, and projects need to be critically assessed in light of what the individual participants intend or do.

This brings us to a very peculiar and especially important way of not doing one’s part: the case of *dissidence*. In the narrow sense, the term has been mostly used to refer those oppositional intellectuals who, perhaps protected by their international reputation, were to some degree tolerated by the eastern European and Soviet communist regimes (for an account of the ethos of those dissidents cf. Tucker 2001). It seems to me that at least two features are essential to a wider concept of dissidence. The first is that dissidents are group members with a different idea of what “our” collective plans, projects, and actions should be. In this sense, dissidents are basically *dissenters*, who play an important role in any kind of communal practice (cf. Sunstein 2003). However, dissidence is not just about dissent, and not all dissent is dissident dissent. Dissidence is different from more common kinds of opposition, and is indeed an important part of any process of collective intention formation, and is even institutionalized in any democratic process in larger groups. Whereas, in expressing their oppositional views, *dissenters* simply do their part in a collective procedure of collective intentionality formation, *dissidents* find themselves to some degree *outside* of the collectively accepted communal practices and institutional frameworks. This brings us back to the topic of this chapter. Dissidents see themselves forced *not to do their part* in our communal practices in order to do justice to their views of what the collective should be. In short, to be a dissident means more than just to have a differing view about our communal plans and projects. It means to refrain from participating in some sort of communal practice, too.

Let us take a closer look at the interplay of these two core features of dissidence. It seems that the element of dissent and the refusal to do one’s part can play different roles in different forms of dissidence. Without doubt, in the paradigmatic case of dissidence, the dissident’s refusal to do her or his part in some communal practice is simply a direct consequence of her or his dissenting view. Consider the case of

David Henry Thoreau's "civil disobedience", his refusal to pay his poll tax because of his strong disapproval of the Mexican war (Thoreau [1849] 1967), or Martin Luther's famous "Here I stand, I can do no other". However, history and literature are full of dissidents of a very different and much less intellectualist kind, which I find theoretically more challenging than such principled and well-considered disobedience. Quite often, the refusal to do one's part is not a proper premeditated and principled behavior that is derived from the dissident's dissenting views, but a more or less spontaneous act. Thus, in Friedrich Schiller's play, William Tell walks by the pole with the tyrant's hat on top without bowing, not because he rejects this humiliating practice of symbolic submission, but simply because he happens to be talking to his son and does not pay attention.⁴ Or, to quote a real life example: when on December 1, 1955, in Montgomery, Alabama, Rosa Parks refused to give up her bus seat to a white man and earned herself the title of the mother of the civil rights movement, this was not meant as a gesture against race segregation. As Parks recalled the events later, she was simply weary and tired after a full day's work as a tailor's assistant, and her body ached (Raines 1977: 40–43). In these and similar cases, the dissident's deviant behavior is a spontaneous failure to conform to the communal practices rather than a principled and premeditated act.⁵ Thus one could distinguish a kind of 'principled dissidence' from this more spontaneous kind, in which the failure to do one's part plays much more important a role than that of a more or less symbolic gesture and direct consequence of one's differing views.

Annette Baier has pointed out that in the realm of the social, "the power of the negative is an important power, and our dissidents and awkward customers, our [...] cultural subversives provide that power" (Baier 1997: 37). Especially in the latter, spontaneous case of dissidence, this power flows not just from the dissenting views concerning communal affairs, but from the irritation that ultimately stems from more or less spontaneous failures to do one's part in normative communal practices. And such cases show how important *not doing one's part* can be even as a source of inspiration and a starting point for a whole renewal and reconstruction of communal intentions, projects, and practices.

The tendency to underrate the importance of the role of non-participation with respect to shared action seems to be so deeply seated that it even extends to some accounts that take a thoroughly positive stance towards dissidence. An especially significant example of this tendency is Karol Wojtyła's "Introduction to participation" in the appendix to his book on the Acting Person (Wojtyła 1979: 323ff.).

⁴ Later on in this decisive scene, Tell even apologizes to the tyrant, pointing out that he did not act on purpose when he failed to greet the tyrant's hat ("Verzeiht mir, lieber Herr! Aus Unbedacht, nicht aus Verachtung Eurer ist's geschehn"). It is quite revealing, however, that in the libretto to Gioacchino Rossini's famous opera, this entire scene is altered to fit the *more conventional* view of principled, premeditated heroism. Here, the tyrant's guards order Tell to bow to the tyrant's hat, which he explicitly refuses to do (act III, scene III).

⁵ It has been repeatedly pointed out that contrary to her "official" image as a quiet and observant citizen, Rosa Parks was active in the civil rights movement long before the Montgomery bus incident (Sparks 1997). The fact that she was well aware of the injustice of segregation laws, however, does not, in itself, prove false her own account of the events.

In this phenomenologically-minded analysis, the structure of shared action and its relation to the concept of a person is examined. According to Wojtyła, the essence of participation is *solidarity*, which is described as “constant readiness to accept and to realize one’s share in the community” in accordance with existing collective practices (Wojtyła 1979: 341). However, Wojtyła is far from underestimating the importance of opposition and resistance. Writing only shortly before the insurrection of the “Solidarnosc” workers’ movement against the communist rule in his homeland of Poland, Wojtyła (the later pope John Paul II) makes clear that solidarity is not incompatible with opposition: “those who stand up in opposition do not intend thereby to cut themselves off from their community. On the contrary, they seek their own place within the community” (Wojtyła 1979: 343). In contrast to this praise of the attitude of opposition, however, Wojtyła identifies two forms of “denial of participation”, which he criticizes for being “inauthentic”: avoidance and conformism (Wojtyła 1979: 346ff.). Avoidance amounts to “a lack of participation and in being absent from the community.” By contrast to this, conformism is “a mere semblance of participation, a superficial compliance which lacks conviction and authentic engagement” (Wojtyła 1979: 346–347). It seems, however, that here, as in so many other cases, the inclusion of non-participation into the concept of shared action stops half-way. It should be extended to those attitudes that Wojtyła criticizes for being *inauthentic*. For the power of change and renewal does not come only from those who *voice their dissent*, but from those who simply *refuse to participate* (and perhaps choose the “exit” option rather than the “voice” option [Hirschman 1970]), too. Our admiration for the courage and bravery of those who speak up and fight within their communities is not diminished if we pay due respect to the important role of the refugees, the boat people, and all those who under unbearable circumstances simply withdraw from participation.

A structurally similar critical point can be made with respect to the second of Wojtyła’s “inauthentic attitudes”. Conformism in terms of “a mere semblance of participation, a superficial compliance which lacks conviction and authentic engagement” can be a very effective means to bring about change and renewal. The practice of *working to rule* might serve as an example. Working to rule is indeed a retraction of “authentic engagement”, of effort and cooperation, a withdrawal of those aspects of work that go beyond the formal regulations, but are nevertheless necessary for the efficient and profitable functioning of an industry or an administration. Thus by working to rule, pressure can be exerted. In circumstances where communal practices are based on the member’s willingness to do more than just ‘their part’ in terms of their formal duties – and this is true to some degree in all organizations – conformism may sometimes be more effective in subverting an existing collective practice than any open opposition.

The positive account of the attitude of dissidence that is sometimes given in the sociological literature is deceiving.⁶ If dissidence and the other abovementioned

⁶ Thus the French sociologist Michel Maffesoli, quoting Pierre Sansot, concludes his short examination of the *dynamics of dissidence* with an overly optimistic statement that is characteristic of his entire analysis, saying that “la dissidence [. . .] a le ‘don de desserrer extraordinairement l’êtreinte des forces de répression” (Maffesoli 1978: 111).

ways of not doing one's part are virtues, these virtues are only of *secondary* status. Their value depends on the moral quality of the communal practice against which they are directed. Such ethical questions, however, need not be of our concern here. Instead, I shall conclude with a short recapitulation of the main point of this chapter, and with a remark concerning the ontology of groups.

In an earlier account of the structure of teamwork, the following claim can be found: "if a team has a goal *p*, then each member has *p* as an individual goal" (Levesque and Cohen 1991: 499). In other words, individuals not having *p* as their goal find themselves excluded from the team *on conceptual grounds* by this participatory account of shared goals. The same is true for all variants of the participation theory of collective intentionality, at least insofar as groups are taken to exist by virtue of collective intentionality (cf. Searle 1997a: 449). This seems to be at odds with our commonsensical, pre-theoretic understanding of collectively intentional phenomena. We often refer to collective intentions, where there is a great deal of *intentional deviance* on the part of the individuals in question. Our everyday use of "we" seems to show that one does not lose one's membership simply because one fails to intend to do one's part. Within his admirably detailed account of collective intentionality, Raimo Tuomela was the first to address this issue, proposing the concept of "non-operative membership" (Tuomela 1991: 272ff.) to resolve this problem. Tuomela requires his non-operative members to show some pro-attitude towards the collective venture. Here, the non-operative members, too, have to do their part in the collective venture, in order to qualify as members of the team. In his more recent analysis of group responsibility, however, Raimo and Maj Tuomela go one step further by including a thoroughly dissident sense of acting as a group member. I think that this is indeed the path that should be followed. And in my view, one main step in loosening the conceptual constraints on group membership and acting as a group member should be to switch from "is" to "ought" in the analysis of the relation between collective intentions and the intentionality of the participating individuals. It seems clear that the team members *ought* to have the appropriate intentionality when the team intends *x*. This, however, does not rule out their failure to live up to this normative requirement, as can be observed in actual cases. A normativist account of the relation between collective intentionality and the intentionality of the participating individuals, such as was proposed above, is, however, in direct conflict with the standard participation theory. That in a pre-social sense, one *ought* to do one's part in what we intend *presupposes* what is ruled out by the participation theory. To say that one *ought* to (intend to) do one's part makes sense only if it is at least *conceptually possible* that one does not in fact (intend to) do one's part. To get back to the above case: if a team has goal *p*, the members *ought* to have *p* as their individual goal (in a weak instrumental sense of "ought"). This, however, *presupposes* the *conceptual* possibility that the team has goal *p* without the single individuals having the goals they *ought* to have.⁷

⁷ Note that this need not be a real possibility. One does not have to have the actual option to do otherwise in order to be normatively required to do one's part. Deviance need only be conceivable, or conceptually possible. Thus this normativist account does not rule out a compatibilist view.