

Phänomenologische Erziehungswissenschaft

Malte Brinkmann · Johannes Türstig ·
Martin Weber-Spanknebel *Editors*

Emotion – Feeling – Mood

Phenomenological and Pedagogical
Perspectives



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Editors

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We would like to dedicate this book to Vasiliki Karavakou, who tragically died in 2019. Vasiliki Karavakou was Professor of Philosophy at the Department of Educational and Social Policy, School of Social Sciences, Humanities and the Arts at the University of Macedonia (Thessaloniki, Greece). She was a regular and most welcome guest as well as an accomplished speaker at our Symposium on Phenomenological Research in Education in Berlin. Her contributions to these conference proceedings bear witness to her dedication to phenomenology as well as to her commitment to social justice. We are very sad that she is no longer with us.

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Introduction

Malte Brinkmann, Johannes Türistig,
and Martin Weber-Spanknebel

Emotions, feelings, and moods are omnipresent in pedagogical processes and practices of learning, education, teaching, Bildung, and socialization. Curiosity, enthusiasm, surprise or anger, desperation, wrath, disappointment, fear, envy, shame, jealousy or outrage as well as love, compassion, and thankfulness are central moments of experiences of learning and Bildung in engagement with the self, with others and the world. Since the late 1990s, ‘forgotten connections’ between emotion and education are rediscovered in the course of the so-called emotional turn in philosophy (Nussbaum 2001; Demmerling and Landweer 2007), in neuro-sciences (Damasio 2007), in history (Plamper 2012), in sociology (Senge and Schützeichel 2013), in anthropology (Frevert and Wulf 2012) as well as in pedagogy (Reichenbach and Maxwell 2007; Schäfer and Thompson 2009; Seichter 2007; Huber and Krause 2018). Phenomenology and phenomenological research in education has made important contributions to a qualitative, concise, and substantial description and specification of feelings, emotions, and moods since its beginning more than 100 years ago (Brinkmann 2018). Well-known representatives are Scheler’s study of the “grammar of emotions”, Copei’s work on “fruitful moments in the process of Bildung”, Sartre’s study of nausea, Heidegger’s and Bollnow’s analyses of moods from the angle of existential phenomenology, Dietrich von Hildebrand’s phenomenology of value-feeling, Plessner’s

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study of laughing and crying, Michel Henry's phenomenology of incarnation or Günther Buck's work on "negative experiences".

In contrast to the phenomenological approach, feelings, emotions, and moods were mainly considered as an adversary of reason, rationality, and discourse throughout the twentieth century. As a result of the logocentric dualism, they were mostly ignored. Especially in pedagogical contexts, they were considered a disturbance of *Bildung* and education, which were oriented towards rationality and competence. Here as well, feelings, emotions and moods were overlooked in the best case. Yet more often, they were put into service of an alleged higher reason, rationality, or power of judgment and were disciplined and suppressed. Within this perspective, neither their inner logic nor their fundamental relevance for *Bildung*, learning, education, and teaching was recognized.

Yet, philosophy and pedagogy can equally look back on a long tradition respecting the relevance of feelings. For the "elders" in philosophy (Aristotle, Plato, Seneca, Spinoza, Nietzsche) as well as in pedagogy, feelings, emotions, and moods were always seen as obvious requirements and important elements of a relation to oneself, to others, and to the world. This notion can be found in the pedagogy of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, for example in the works of Rousseau (*amour de soi, amour propre, pitié*), Pestalozzi (pedagogical love), Schiller (aesthetic education), and Herbart (pedagogical tact).

Feelings, emotions, and moods are difficult to access, especially because of their volatility, subjectivity, and their unpredictability but also because of their overpowering and affective character as well as their persistence. They are structured implicitly and a discursive specification of feelings, emotions, and moods is only possible in an *ex-post* rationalization. The conceptual and categorical distinction between these phenomena, their epistemological status, their genesis, and the methods, methodology, and aims of researching them still is unclear. The relation of emotion, cognition, and body or corporeality as well as the culturality and situativity on the one hand or universality on the other (Ekman 2004) are still controversially discussed. Phenomenological approaches of researching feelings, emotions, and moods can introduce important distinctions and contributions to these questions.

Phenomenological analyses are able to avoid and dismiss the Eurocentric dualism of body and mind or the dualism of passion and cognition. They highlight the corporal and social dimensions and they can distinguish between intentional correlatives of feelings and emotions and the specific relations to others and the world in certain moods. They are also able to focus on the process-, act- and experience-character of emotions as well as on passivity and vulnerability in their experience.

Against this background, phenomenological research on education has opened a perspective on *Bildung of* emotions and *Bildung through* emotions (Stenger 2012), which takes a stance against a logic of optimization, regulation, and normalization. By this, the dualism between a spaceless inner world of emotions and the visible behavior, which means between an inner mind and a visible body, can be overcome in a productive way. This dualism is especially dominant in biological, medical, and psychological models. On the other hand, a phenomenological theory of intentionality – in its non-positional or pathic dimensions – can introduce important differentiations. On this basis, a phenomenological pedagogy of emotions is able to identify feelings, emotions, and moods as a significant and essential basis and process of *Bildung*, learning, and education. In addition, the characteristics and qualities of experiencing emotions can be described and analyzed and can be made fruitful for pedagogical processes.

Starting from a phenomenological approach to the subject of emotions, feelings, and moods, a variety of connections can be found. These connections are first taken up in this volume from an interdisciplinary point of view by elaborating relations to theories of *Bildung*, education, learning, upbringing, and to aesthetic and medial experiences in a fundamental analysis. In the course of the phenomenological methodology, emotions, feelings, moods, and atmospheres can be distinguished and described more precisely. In addition, descriptions and analyses of emotions, feelings, and moods or atmospheres are presented in empirical studies from a phenomenological perspective. From an intercultural perspective, connections are sought between Western and Eastern world views, especially to Confucianism of Asian cultures in Korea and China. A further perspective opens up when we aim at differentiating particular emotions, feelings, and moods and describe and analyze them in their respective specific quality of experience. Connections for pedagogical and educational research are established when systematic relations to the concepts and practices of education, upbringing, learning, and growing up are developed. Finally, these can be differentiated and specified again if they are explored within particular pedagogical fields and institutions.

In this volume, we trace different approaches of phenomenological educational science and seek further perspectives on an educational phenomenology of emotions.¹ The book is divided into five parts.

In Part I, the fundamental role of emotions and feelings for rationality and education is elaborated from different perspectives. The metaphor of the heart as the center of emotions and feelings is the main focus of this part. First, the

¹ We sincerely thank Samira Trummer and Katrin Klees for their accurate and dedicated editing, proofreading and formatting of the contributions.

significance of emotions and feelings for a theory of education is developed in a fundamental theoretical perspective (Bruzzone). Then the significance of emotions as an expression of human nature through the mind for moral education in Korean Confucianism is explained (Chung). In a methodological and pedagogical perspective, commonalities and differences between practice-theoretical and New Phenomenological approaches to affects and their systematic relation to education are explored (Wicke). Finally, “Thinking with the heart” is presented as the central topos in the Hebrew paradigm of pedagogy (Koerrenz).

Daniele Bruzzone opens the first part with his article on “The Strength of Emotions and the Weakness of Feelings” to give a “Phenomenology of Affectivity as a Pedagogical Challenge”. To tackle this venture, he starts by problematizing the separation of emotionality and rationality, a perspective that he traces back to Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Scheler. Bruzzone then points out the relationship between feelings and values, emphasizing the ethical dimension of emotions. Following Scheler’s idea of the *ordo amoris*, the author places emotions in their relevance for a theory of Bildung. He does so by stating that the education of the heart is the very core of Bildung since it is responsible for the formation of a person’s moral character and personality. Concluding his article, Bruzzone hints at possible methodological consequences that could be useful in the context of the education of prospective teachers.

In his study on “Humanity and Emotion in Korean Confucian Tradition”, Ki-Seob Chung shows that the Confucian tradition places emotion above intelligence. Education as the condition of humanity is based on the relationship between humanity and emotion. The first part of this study shows that moral emotion is the criterion of humanity, focusing on the concept of *ren* (仁) of Confucius and the four moral emotions of Mencius. Also, Zhu Zi’s thoughts on the relation of mind nature, and emotion, presented in a second step, emphasize the extraordinary importance of emotions in Korean Confucianism. Emotion is here considered as the expression of human nature through the mind. The author then focuses on the Four-Seven debate between Confucian scholars of the Chosun dynasty in Korea. In a last step, Chung elaborates on the fact that education in Korean Confucianism was self-cultivation to preserve the original state of mind that contains human nature. Finally, he makes clear that the self-controlling appearance of the body as a method of self-cultivation is still meaningful for modern education.

Lars Wicke takes perspectives from Practice Theory, New Phenomenology, and New Materialism into consideration and addresses the relationship between “Affects and the Intelligibility of Education”. To do so, he starts with affects and points out their role for the performativity of the social as a basic condition of being-in-the-world. Wicke states that focusing on affects makes it possible to

grasp the relational structure of a phenomenon as said affects appear as a condition of the possibility of perceiving social phenomena as specific ones. From this perspective, he compares the approach of new materialism with the new phenomenology in the tradition of Schmitz. He then addresses the relevance of affects for educational research and concludes that a perspective that focuses on affects may lead to a new way of conceptualizing the relation between a researcher and the subject he or she is researching, in his example education.

The contribution “The Breath and the Heart. Phenomenological Perspectives From the Hebrew Paradigm” concludes the first part. Ralf Koerrenz takes a systematic, historical and cultural look at another aspect of the relation between emotion, mind respectively reason and education. In an classical European perspective, the author unfolds the Hebrew paradigm of pedagogy based on guiding motifs of the anthropology outlined in the Hebrew Bible. The breath and the heart play a special role in understanding the unity of feeling and understanding in reason. In Hebrew thought, the determination of Being Human can never be understood without the integration of history. In Hebrew thought, history refers above all to the exodus with its dialectic of enslavement and liberation. The heart as the seat of a holistically conceived reason beyond the juxtaposition of *ratio* and *emotio* is referred to as a hearing of the story of the exodus. Thinking with the heart is an expression of the relationship between mood and emotion. It always contains a critical reason – critical under the conditions of the exodus. It is always connected with the mood of memory on the one hand and the passion for liberation on the other which means a liberation of mankind to a critical view of his presence.

Part II of this book focuses on the relevance and relation of emotions in and to learning, *Bildung* and understanding. The first two contributions examine the relationship between learning and emotions from a foundational theoretical perspective, focusing on interruptive, discontinuous, and pre-predicative – on the one hand with regard to the significance of negative experiences (Buck) and negative emotions for learning (Rödel), and on the other hand concerning the significance of non-proportional consciousness (Husserl) and its pre-reflexive and pre-predicative dimensions. The two following contributions deal with the phenomenon of understanding and its relation to emotions – once with reference to Augustine and experiences of *Bildung* (Murillo), and secondly with regard to a phenomenology and pedagogy of atmospheres with Heidegger and Bollnow (Friesen).

Severin Sales Rödel focuses on the relationship between emotions and learning. He starts from the claim that so-called negative emotions are the ones being

most fruitful for learning and challenges this assumption by taking a life-world-perspective. Rödel criticizes that emotions, in general, have long been viewed as separated from a process of learning that was understood as a cognitive or intellectual process. In doing so, he draws on the theory of negative experience according to Buck and Meyer-Drawe. He uses the phenomenological methodology of description, variation and reduction by analysing an example from videographic classroom research. Rödel points out that a phenomenological analysis makes it possible to reveal the complexity of a life-world experience in learning and can show how both learning and emotions are rooted in a pre-predicative relation to the world that includes embodied, emotional as well as intellectual elements.

The second article in this section also focuses on the pre-predicative and discontinuous events in the learning experience. Sang-Sik Cho opens up “A New Dimension of Learning Through the Concept of ‘Non-Positional Consciousness’ in Phenomenology”. His starting point is an analysis of the limitations of cognitive model theory on learning phenomena. With Husserl’s emphasis on the pre-reflexive and pre-predicative operating dimension of consciousness, Cho raises new and fundamental perspectives for a theory of learning that always includes processes of consciousness. He claims that Husserl’s concept helps to understand learning phenomena such as products of creative ideas, an emergent leaping discovery, and an unexpected insight. These abnormal learning events can’t be explained through traditional cognitive learning theories as ‘unilinear progressive models’. But the question remains whether the concept of non-positional consciousness can be a general conceptual instrument to explicate the phenomenon of learning.

Based on Sartre’s emphasis on the existential significance of emotion, in his article “Affects in Bildung: Notes for an Analogical Understanding of Emotions” Fernando Murillo focuses on the question of the significance of emotions and affects for processes of Bildung. Especially with reference to St. Augustine’s Confessions, he tries to work out the formative function of emotions, which is localized between the external world on the one hand and the inner dispositions considering self-world on the other hand. In doing so, the author is guided by the theological concept of *analogia entis*, which for him means that the approach to the transcendent is analogous to the examination of the things in the world themselves. For this, he conceives emotions as a kind of sign, which already refers to something else and which in its affects builds the ground for Bildung. Murillo assigns a special importance to the emotion of love as the most fundamental one.

In his article “Atmospheres and Understanding: Past, Present, and Future”, Norm Friesen points out the relevance of atmospheres, moods, or *Stimmungen*

for processes of understanding, especially in classroom interactions. With reference to Heidegger and Bollnow, he asserts that a shared mood or atmosphere strongly affects the way the world is disclosed to us. In doing so he points out the hermeneutic dimension of moods. Friesen also shows that moods are able to connect past, present, and future. In this capacity, they can be seen as a key to address the classical pedagogical paradox of freedom and constraint, in which the question of the necessary sacrifice of the child's present for the sake of the future arises. Friesen then discusses the implications of such a perspective for pedagogical research and practice. Using an illustrative video example from classroom research, he describes practices of teaching and learning as fundamentally atmospheric experiences and discussed what makes an atmosphere specifically pedagogical.

The third part of this volume focuses on the existential qualities of experiences of emotions and moods focusing on the examples of shame, disquiet, and anxiety. The productive possibilities of the experience of shame for *Bildung* are discussed and thus the orientative, evaluative and educative functions of emotions are elaborated (Brinkmann). Then, the mood of anxiety in the experience of adventure and detour is made fruitful for education in an existential-philosophical perspective (Madrusan) and finally, an intergenerational perspective on upbringing under conditions of existential anxiety and care is sketched (Shechytsova).

Malte Brinkmann initially explores the orientative, evaluative, and *Bildungs*-effect of shame. He focuses on the connection between emotions and *Bildung* and takes a closer look at the possibility of a *Bildung of* emotions and a *Bildung through* emotions. His article is based on a fundamental critique of the dualism of reason and emotion and elaborates on the life-world orientation function of emotions. First, emotions, moods, and atmospheres are systematically distinguished in a phenomenological analysis. Going further, Brinkmann examines the function of emotions for social and moral judgment and evaluation, which makes it possible to evaluate their relevance for processes of learning. Based on the example of the emotion shame, which he illustrates using an example from classroom research, he shows that emotions can initiate negative experiences. Negative experiences are framed in terms of a phenomenology of emotions and identified as existential experiences. With such an expanded theory of negative experiences, emotions can then be understood as the starting point of a reflexive process of learning and *Bildung* in which the possibility of a transformation of the self-world-relation arises.

Elena Madrusan focuses on the relationship between mood and education in an existential-philosophical perspective. In her contribution on "The Mood of

Disquiet and Education”, mood is understood fundamentally as a relationship between subject and world. She identifies the mood of disquiet in this context as a crucial existential situation that is particularly fruitful for a pedagogical discussion. First, the author acknowledges that disquiet is accompanied by negative features, but with reference to Kierkegaard, Freud and Jaspers, she elaborates that disquiet can also have positive aspects, while also being existentially arduous. Disquiet then enables the search for oneself, for knowledge, and for new interpretations of reality. Madrussan discusses the positive possibilities of two educational experiences that she sees as addressing the mood of disquiet: adventure and detour. She argues that disquiet should be reinvigorated as an extraordinary source of formative vitality, especially because it can be exhibited as meaningful from an educational perspective.

In the third contribution in this part “Anxiety and Upbringing: Rethinking Existential Anthropology From the Intergenerational Perspective”, Tatiana Shchytsova poses a fundamental question about the existential difference between being-an-adult and being-a-child. She starts from an intergenerational perspective with Eugen Fink, in which the coexistence of adults and children is seen as an interplay of non-hierarchical, equal forms of life that cannot be reduced to one another. In order to pursue her question, the author deals with Heidegger’s, Fink’s, and Kierkegaard’s answers to the question of the human being from a primarily philosophical perspective. Thereby Shchytsova focuses on the phenomenon of anxiety. She emphasizes the fundamental difference between the existential anxiety experienced by adults and the existential anxiety experienced by a child. Finally, this difference is illuminated from a pedagogical perspective as the primary task of upbringing, whereby upbringing, in turn, comes into view as an intellectual-emotional nourishment.

In Part IV of this volume, representatives of phenomenological emotion research are introduced and made fruitful for educational contexts: Dietrich von Hildebrand, Max Scheler, Agnes Heller, and Michel Henry. The first two contributions deal with the relationship between feelings, values, and education. This is explained on the one hand with Dietrich von Hildebrand’s ethical personalism and his phenomenology of value-feeling for a theory of education (D’Addelfio) and on the other hand with Max Scheler with regards to the feeling of love for teacher practice (Qiao and Zhu). Then Agnes Heller’s theory of feelings is made fruitful for educational theory and care theory contexts (Schneider-Reisinger). In the fourth contribution, Michel Henry’s theory of incarnation and especially his ‘pathological’ decentering of intentionality is made fruitful for education in the context of a redefinition of emotional intelligence (Koopal and Vlieghe).

Giuseppina D'Addelfio opens this part with an account of Dietrich von Hildebrand's ethical personalism under the title "Value-Feeling and Moral Education: Pedagogical Remarks on Dietrich von Hildebrand's Phenomenology". She discusses the pedagogical relevance of the intentional act of value-feeling (*Wertfühlen*). Namely, as Husserl and some of his disciples showed, our first relationship to value is emotional and, therefore, involves a pre-theoretical apprehension that von Hildebrand calls value-feeling. This recalls the main claims on emotions shared by the members of the Munich and Gottingen Circle: i.e., the stratification of emotional life, the intentionality of emotion and feeling, and, most of all, their moral dimension. After briefly portraying von Hildebrand's early life, his references to Edmund Husserl's ethics is depicted to define possible links between feeling, ethical experience, and moral education. Finally, the author highlights how such an account entails the seminal personalism to be found in von Hildebrand's later works as well as an implicit theory of education.

Robert Schneider-Reisinger dedicates his article to an analysis of "Agnes Heller's Theory as a Snatch of Thought of an Educational Theory of Emotions". For this purpose, he first locates Heller within Marxist, praxeological, and personalist thoughts. Feeling, emotion, and mood are worked out as terms in Heller's theory. The author then reads Heller's theory as an educational theory and argues that this becomes possible according to two aspects: he understands "being involved" as a *Bildungs*-relation or -movement and contextualizes his thoughts within the setting of a theory of care in pedagogy.

In their contribution about the "Meaning and Practice of Teachers' Love towards Learners", He Qiao and Xiaohong Zhu present a perspective on emotions and feelings that makes Max Scheler's phenomenology fruitful in terms of the practice and theory of teaching and learning in China's schools. In Scheler's theory and phenomenology of love, love is characterized as the essence of human existence and as an intentional act toward values. Love as the heart's openness to someone or something is then related to the teacher's attitude and "feeling of values" of the teacher. Teacher's love is presented as a way of opening the heart to the learners' growth and development, even the academic achievements of learners. The thesis is that for teachers, the responsibility "towards learners" is of higher value than "towards duty" because the role of educating people is more important than the role of imparting knowledge.

Wiebe Koopal and Joris Vlieghe explore "The Intelligent Pathos of Education" in their article on the productivity of Michel Henry's phenomenology. They connect the conventional understanding of emotional intelligence with the phenomenology of Michel Henry. To begin, they take a look at the popular discourse on emotions. Henry is then chosen because his theory of incarnation and his

renversement de la phénoménologie offer, as the authors argue, a more ‘pathological’ decentering of the concept of intentionality than classical phenomenological positions such as those of Husserl, Heidegger, or Merleau-Ponty. Henry’s ‘pathological’ decentering of intentionality is then made fruitful for educational contexts in a second step. By situating education in the Henryan tension between subjectivity’s pathic life – reality’s absolute, immanent interiority – and (the) world(s) made up of transcendent, intentional relations to exterior objects, the authors try to establish emotional intelligence as a fundamental educational agency, that keeps world and life connected while at the same time leaving their ontological difference intact. The paper concludes with an analysis of a concrete example in which the collective side of pathic intelligence as lived, post- or pre-intentional consciousness of life shows up.

The relevance of emotions in specific pedagogical institutions and fields is the center of attention in the concluding Part V of this volume. The specific relations between emotion and education and thus also specific pedagogical practices are examined. Topics discussed here are aesthetic education and upbringing in the field of dance education (Westphal), feeling in and for nature in early childhood education (Stenger), Bildung and education in sports education (Cacchiarelli), the complex relationship between image, emotion, and movements or embodiment in schools (Zambaldi) and finally, in the context of adult education, the relationship between vulnerability, emotion, and education for homeless people (Karavakou and Antoniou).

The final part of this volume opens with Kristin Westphal’s contribution from the field of cultural and aesthetic education. ““Affectos Humanos”. Affects in Dance, Theatre and Education” examines affects and emotions in the field of theatre and dance education. Against the background of a pedagogical and phenomenological approach, she mainly discusses two examples: A contemporary dance theatre piece for two- to five-year-old children called *minimax* and a rework/remake of the dance cycle *Humanos Affectos* called *Urheben.Aufheben*. In doing so, she focuses on affects as corporeal expressions and reflects on the extent to which contemporary performance art works with affects artistically and pedagogically.

Ursula Stenger investigates the meaning and relevance of feelings in the field of kindergarten. From the perspective of early childhood research, she asks in a phenomenological perspective about the significance of perceptions and feelings for understanding the constitution of reality, especially the nature, in which we live. Using the example of drawings and stories of children from a Russian day-care center, this question is first elaborated taking into account Rombach’s and Nancy’s thoughts on the soul. This approach is then made fruitful for the analysis

of feeling nature using the example of practices and concepts of experiencing and exploring nature in Russian day-care centers and German early education. Finally, in a posthumanist perspective with Braidotti, the emotional opening to the living beings on earth is developed as an important and necessary value for a life with and in nature. Children's connectedness with nature is described as a soulful experience in day-care center practices.

Matteo Cacchiarelli takes a closer look at the relationship between learning and emotions from a sport-pedagogical and sport-philosophical point of view. He argues in his paper "Learning of and Through Emotions. The educational Specificity of the Sport Context" that emotions play a fundamental role in sports, which for him implies a 'sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome', meaning an uncertainty of succeeding or failing, of winning or losing. Sports from this perspective can be seen as emotional experiences for the athletes as well as the spectators of a sports event and implies a potential for learning in both the embodied learning of technical or tactical skills, but also in the intersubjective competition with others during a contest. It is mainly the uncertainty of the contest's outcome that provides the participating athletes with a possibility of breaking with the familiar and opening up to unfamiliar horizons and experiences. In this aspect of opening-up to something new, the author sees not only a potential for learning but also for processes of *Bildung*.

Nazario Zambaldi offers in "E-MOTION: an "Imaginative Variation"" a perspective on the relation between emotion, image, and movement as a particular aspect of embodiment in classrooms. His reflections stem from the videographic research project entitled "Embodied Education through art and theatre" which focuses on classroom research from the perspective of embodiment. The approach focuses on the aspect of motion against the background of both a phenomenological and neuroscience perspective on embodiment and above all theatre perspective. It is precisely the connection and relationship between emotion, image, and movement as a particular aspect of the embodiment that the author calls "E-Motion". The empirical analysis shows that in the space that opens between image and movement or image and action, a visual, imaginative thought is proposed on different theoretical levels.

In the final contribution of this volume, Vasiliki Karavakou and Konstantinia Antoniou present an "Emotionally Responsive Phenomenology in Adult Education" in the context of "Educating the Vulnerable". This approach not only shows the field and field-specific possibilities of a phenomenologically oriented pedagogy but also the social and humane engagement of the authors and especially of Vasiliki Karavakou, to whom this entire volume is dedicated. The authors show for adult education that in contrast to the dominant theories of constructivism,

cognitivism, and behaviorism, a phenomenologically driven proposal appeals to the world of the people's involved inner experiences including their emotions. Here again, it becomes clear: Modern phenomenology has gone far beyond a conceptually primitive understanding of nature or an emotionally deprived and fully calculative sense of rationality. Addressing vulnerability within adult education procures immense problems which are tackled with great difficulty despite all the progress that has been made on the institutional and educational fronts. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the decisive role of emotions in adult learning and educational programs that refer to the needs of socially vulnerable people as it emerged from the outcomes of a pilot program of an educational intervention for homeless people of Greece.

This volume goes back to the fifth International Symposium on Phenomenological Research in Education, which took place under the title "Feeling – Emotion – Mood. Phenomenological and Pedagogical Perspectives" on 1st till the 3rd of April 2019 at the Humboldt-University of Berlin.²

The contributions show that phenomenological approaches to emotions, feelings, moods, and atmospheres in their relation to education, learning, and teaching enable and open up culturally different and productive connections. Emotions and feelings represent an important focus of phenomenological research that can open up theoretical, methodological, inter-disciplinary, and intercultural perspectives. The volume also makes clear that phenomenological educational studies can draw on a rich tradition in emotion research (cf. Brinkmann 2018; Brinkmann and Friesen 2018). The productivity of phenomenological emotion research in pedagogy proves itself above all against the background of a rejection of representationalist, colonialist and cognitivist approaches that subordinate emotions and feelings under a universal rationality. In contrast, phenomenological approaches make it possible to highlight the ethical, existential, educational and Bildung-potentials of education through and of emotions.

The editors hope that this conference volume will provide a good overview of the current state of research on these areas within German and international phenomenological educational studies for researchers as well as students and practitioners from different disciplines and professions.

Berlin, January 2021

² <https://www.erziehungswissenschaften.hu-berlin.de/de/allgemeine/forschung-1/phaenomenologische-erziehungswissenschaft/internationale-symposien>

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Foundational and Cultural Perspectives on an Education of the Heart



The Strength of Emotions and the Weakness of Feelings: The Phenomenology of Affectivity as an Educational Challenge

Daniele Bruzzone

*Die Differenzen zu sehen ist die Leidenschaft der
Phänomenologie.*

(Geiger 1933, p. 4)

The phenomenological research and training group at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore was established more than 15 years ago as an offshoot of the pedagogical movement founded by Piero Bertolini (Iori 2016; Tarozzi 2017) with the aim of studying the emotional life and developing the practitioners' existential and relational competence in healthcare, education, and social work contexts. We felt that there was a lack of education and training regarding the emotions in the lived experience of the helping professionals, despite the affective involvement and the personal vulnerability that the daily contact with human frailties produces. For 6 years, we ran a Master's programme in *Relationships and feelings in education and care professions*, targeting educators, psychologists, social workers, nurses, speech therapists, physiotherapists, and so on: people who worked with other people, and who in the course of their everyday interpersonal experience felt the need to care for themselves and to develop their own sensibility as a personal and professional resource. Since then, we have worked in many different settings (early childhood education, rehabs, and therapeutic communities, facilities for older adults and persons with disabilities, hospitals, especially oncology departments, hospices, and palliative care units) and in all these highly diverse

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places we tried to correspond the need for self-care and the search for meaning that is widespread and deep-rooted even in skilled and experienced practitioners.¹

In light of this experience, we tried to develop a deeper understanding of the emotional life through the lenses of phenomenology. This attempt allowed us to distance ourselves from the psychological approach, which is widely predominant in the emotional and relational training of helping professionals. In the following paragraphs, the opposition between rationality and emotionality is discussed, in order to acknowledge the connection between the capacity to think and ability to feel; emotions and feelings are distinguished as different phenomena in the articulated spectrum of human affectivity, and some insight is provided about the refinement of the perceptiveness of the “heart” as the core of education.

1 Emotional Experience and the Disclosure of Meaning

The cause of this need can probably be attributed to a cultural paradigm that views emotions and feelings mostly as unessential and even dangerous, especially in the workplace. This mistrust of emotionality, which has relevant educational implications, is deeply rooted in our tradition. From Aristotle’s distinction between *nous pathethikos* and *nous poiетikos* to the opposition between *res cogitans* and *res extensa* proposed by Descartes, Western culture has pursued the ideal of a rationality that is free of interference from the senses and the emotions and capable of acquiring a kind of knowledge that is exact, impassive and neutral. Within this disjunctive paradigm, *knowing* and *feeling* have traditionally been hierarchically ordered and framed as in opposition to one another: sensibility has been considered the antagonist of reason; passion and feeling have ultimately come to be associated with irrationality. Consequently, imagination, art, and poetry, which are closely bound up with the emotional life, have been viewed as precarious and subjective forms of knowledge, while science and technology, allegedly being

¹ On the basis of this experience, we have collected professional tales on the emotional side of the work of care (Bruzzone and Musi 2007) and, more recently, I have conceived a four-steps method for the development of emotional competence in health care professionals and social workers (Bruzzone 2020). The first step (*Activation*) consists in arousing emotions through autobiographical or projective materials (narratives, paintings, movies); the second one (*Expression*) is an attempt to put in words one’s own feeling (even in analogical forms, like images and metaphors) and to communicate it to others; the third step (*Reflection*) is oriented to analyzing and understanding the meaning of what is felt and its implications; finally, the last step (*Consolidation*) is dedicated to learning and sharing skills and tools for self care in professional contexts (through exercises, action maze, role play, and so on) in order to promote a long term fallout of the training experience.

governed by logic, have been seen as unconditionally certain and objective. The emotional dimension of the self, from this perspective, is reduced to a blind, unpredictable, and fallacious drive. We need to get rid of – or at least control and moderate our emotions – if we are not to be perturbed or led astray by them. And indeed, the greater part of pedagogical and ascetic scholarship over the centuries has revolved around attempts to uproot or dominate the passions (Bodei 2003). And vice versa: in this same tradition, educating the intellect has mainly meant not attending to emotional life. Nevertheless, today we are much more aware of how much emotional states affect learning processes and moral development; and neuroscience findings confirm that emotions are an indispensable part of intelligent behaviour (Damasio 1994).

Besides, in his interesting book entitled *A Sentimental History of Science*, a French physicist and science writer demonstrates, drawing on several examples, that scientific progress has always been bound up with the passions of the women and men who have achieved it (Witkowski 2003). In fact, if we were more aware of this deep connection of intellect and emotion, we could resolve the opposition between the two: we would be able to acknowledge the *emotional life as the original source of knowledge*, not as its rival. From this perspective, emotions and feelings would no longer represent the *àlogon* part of our soul – a troubling irrational dimension undermining our capacity for lucid thought and action – but rather the deep root, the primal stratum, and the necessary pre-condition underlying our thinking and acting.

Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement wrote, as early as in his *Lectures on Ethics and Value Theory*, that the emotional acts (*Gemütsakte*) belong to a general rationality (*allgemeine Vernunft*) extending far beyond the intellect (*Verstand*). Nevertheless, these different regions (*Regionen*) of rationality are not conflicting, but rather interdependent and deeply interwoven (Husserl 1988).

Martin Heidegger then claimed that feeling (*Gefühl*) is the basic way of our openness to the world, or better to say, it is the fundamental condition for the disclosure of the world.²

In feeling, a state opens up, and stays open, in which we stand related to things, to ourselves, and to the people around us, always simultaneously. Feeling is the very state, open to itself, in which our Dasein hovers. Man is not a rational creature who also wills, and in addition to thinking and willing is equipped with

² As Heidegger explains in *Being and Time* (1977 [1927]), the openness to the world is originally rooted in an emotional (ontological) disposition (*Befindlichkeit*) which determines each particular way of being-in-the-world: in other words, one's possible emotional (ontic) dispositions, which he called *Stimmungen* (moods).

feelings, whether these make him admirable or despicable; rather, the state of feeling is original, although in such a way that thinking and willing belong together with it (Heidegger 1985, p. 60).

This is the first fundamental reason why education must take serious account of feelings: because every human understanding (*Verstehen*) of the world is always rooted in an emotional situation (*Befindlichkeit*) (Heidegger 1977); and the second one is that the affective perception of something (*Wertnehmung*) precedes its representation (*Wahrnehmung*) so that our judgments and choices are made possible by an emotional intuition of values (Scheler 1954). In short: knowledge and conscience spring originally from the affective side of our existence; thought and emotion, long held separate and in opposition to one another, are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin: thought is never devoid of emotion, and emotion is itself a form of thought.

The Dutch psychiatrist Jan Hendrik van den Berg, who studied at the Medical School of the Utrecht University,³ explained this phenomenon by the example of a bottle of wine, which has a meaning when I put it on the table waiting for a dear friend of mine, but is completely different when he calls to say he will not be able to come. In material terms it is still the same bottle, but if the emotional horizon changes (disappointment instead of expectancy), its *meaning* is radically subverted. In his *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, Jean-Paul Sartre explains the way emotions transform reality (Sartre 2007) or, better to say, our *experience* of reality: not the world-in-itself but the world-for-us, which is the only possible human world: “Intentional feelings disclose the possibility to live in a human world, rather than in a mere world of things, and without feelings, no humanly habitable world would appear” (Costa et al. 2002, p. 214).

From this viewpoint, the repression of the emotional life in a certain sense deprives our cognitive and moral of its lifeblood: because, in the end, “what is called thinking should be first all to decipher our feeling” (Zambrano 2014, p. 87). This denial of emotions has harmful consequences: it produces inauthenticity, impersonality, even dehumanization, in the very places where humanity should be guarded and nurtured, like education and care. And even when there have been efforts to recover the emotional life from the oblivion and to restore some kind of education of the emotions, very often we have only gone halfway: legitimizing

³ The origin of the Utrecht School of Phenomenology dates back to 1928, when Hendrick J. Pos invited Husserl to give a lecture in the “Amsterdamer Vorträge” on phenomenological psychology. In 1939 Martinus J. Langeveld was called on the chair of Pedagogy, which became an independent discipline in 1946, when van der Berg completed his doctoral dissertation in neurology and psychiatry. One year later Dr. van der Berg was appointed Head of Department of the Psychiatric Clinic of the Utrecht University.

some emotions at the expense of others and suggesting that ‘positive’ emotions should be reinforced, but ‘negative’ emotions should be eradicated. This is a very common misunderstanding of the concept of ‘well-being’ that is promoted nowadays in schools, workplaces, and so on: does well-being coincide with the absence of the so-called ‘negative’ emotions? I would call this a narrow and short-sighted perspective, as the study on the role of ‘negativity’ in the experience of learning has recently shown (Meyer-Drawe 1982; Benner 2005; Brinkmann 2012; Rödel 2017).

Splitting and polarizing the emotions is misleading and even dangerous:

- first, because it prevents us from accepting and expressing unpleasant or ‘bad’ emotions, making us forget that they too can fulfil a constructive role (for instance, how could there ever be justice without anger or indignation, or search for meaning without boredom and doubt?);
- second, because it makes it more difficult for us to recognize the dark side and potential degeneration of feelings that we tend to unconditionally view as ‘good’ and desirable. This is a risk that is constantly present in educational relationships: the affection of a parent, for example, can become possessiveness, love can become overprotectiveness, care can become dominance, and so on. In other words: even ‘good’ feelings have some shadows (Iori and Bruzzone 2015) that must be recognised and prevented.

2 Emotions Flow, Feelings must be Cultivated

Emotions, feelings, passions, and moods are often confused. Maybe the first point that phenomenology allows us to clarify is that these phenomena are not the same thing. Given that this article is about emotions and feelings, we can distinguish between them primarily in terms of their *depth* and *duration*: while emotions are variations in mood that occur relatively suddenly and are usually fleeting, feelings are habitual patterns, which usually develop more slowly but are more persistent.⁴

⁴ In this paper I keep the distinction between ‘emotions’ and ‘feelings’ in order to stress the difference between the two. Sometimes (possibly also in this book) the term emotion includes feeling, or vice versa. Anyway, if a choice should be made, I think that from a phenomenological viewpoint the word *feeling* would be preferable, because it recalls the verb *to feel* (same as the German *fühlen*), thus preserving the intentionality and responsiveness of the affective act, whereas *emotion* reminds mostly its passivity (*to be moved* by something or somebody). Still, when speaking about feelings I mean spiritual feelings (*geistige Gefühle*, in Scheler’s terminology), while by emotions I mean psychic feelings (*psychische*

In light of this distinction, Michel Lacroix argues that, in our time, the emotional life displays an evident imbalance: in contemporary western societies we can see a widespread *emotionalism* on the one hand, and a sort of *aphasia of feeling* on the other. Today's intense quest for strong emotions is fulfilled in various ways: the spectacularization of violence, the rhetoric of hate, risk-taking behaviours, even the artificial induction of euphoria with psychotropic substances. It's a sort of degeneration of the aesthetic quality of our experience: people nowadays prefer shock-emotion, which is of the order of the "yell", to contemplation-emotion, which is of the order of the "sigh" (Lacroix 2001). In other words, our emotional lives have become more hectic, but also more superficial. Thus, we are all at risk of being *over-aroused* and yet *insensitive*: the proliferation of the emotions is associated with a relative desiccation of feelings, the bulimia of strong sensations goes hand in hand with the anesthesia of feelings. Perhaps these are not two concurrent phenomena; it is reasonable to assume that these two phenomena may be mutually related and that the *excess of emotions* serves to fill a *vacuum of feelings* – or even that the growth of certain emotions is responsible for the decreasing of certain feelings. For that matter, Zygmunt Bauman (2006) taught us that it is precisely fear that today makes us all feel more insecure and vulnerable and prevents us from experiencing feelings of key importance to our society: such as a feeling of solidarity, for example, and – more basically – a feeling of respect. If the others become strangers to us, we may perceive them as a threat, and the fear of those who are different from us will prevail over concern for those who are similar to us, despite all.

In this regard, the parable of the Good Samaritan from the Gospel of Luke reminds us that the presence of the other calls us to responsibility and that helping behaviour is inextricably bound up with feeling (Darley and Batson 1973). The situation is well-known: a man traveling from Jerusalem to Jericho encountered robbers on the way, who stole his clothes and belongings and abandoned him naked and wounded at the side of the road. A priest and a Levite, who were traveling along the same way, saw him but passed on; in contrast, the Samaritan saw him and stopped and took care of him. *Why?* What led these characters to react so differently to one another? The Gospel says that the Samaritan "*was moved with compassion at the sight*" (Luke 10:33). The Greek term *esplanchnisthe* is highly significant and indicates, in a certain sense the perception of a profound belonging: the Samaritan *feels* the other person, almost physically, to be a part of himself. Without this feeling, he would never have acted to care for the man in

Gefühle), underlying a dimensional gap which is meaningful in view of the philosophical and pedagogical anthropology.

trouble. This story tells us something that phenomenology has always recognized: that ethics has an emotional root. But what is most relevant here is maybe something else: namely, that a sense of solidarity wins out over the emotion of fear. This is important from a pedagogical viewpoint: only *learning to recognize* the other as an other-me can counteract our *tendency to miscategorize* him as other-than-me. This question is of huge relevance nowadays – in Europe and the world at large, and it is a matter of emotional education.

During an interview in 2012, Zygmunt Bauman was asked about the secret of his long love story with his wife Janina, his partner for over 60 years. The famous sociologist, then 87 years old, replied: “Love is not an object – mixed and ready to use. It is entrusted to our care, needs constant commitment, to be created, re-created and resurrected every day” (De Santis 2012). In contrast, we know that in our times dominated by market logic, bonds have been replaced by “contacts” and “connections”, faces have been replaced by “profiles”, and emotions have become leverage to exchange – like any other commercial goods (Illouz 2007). Extremely intense emotions are rapidly “consumed” and leave no trace behind them. Is it still possible, in this context, to experience lasting feelings? Bauman’s answer to this question is summed up in this statement: *Emotions pass, but feelings need to be cultivated.*

I would like to dwell for a moment on this principle because it seems to me to be rich with educational implications. It tells us that emotions necessarily *flow*, while feelings need to be able to *take root*. Given that emotions, properly speaking, are psychophysical reactions to the objects of our experience, we normally cannot choose them: hence, emotional education does not concern the emotions in themselves, but rather how we accept (or deny) them and how we express (or repress) them. More specifically, we must learn to recognize, name, understand, to appropriately communicate the emotions that we feel, and finally to take a stance towards them and to “use” them constructively. If we do this, they will “pass”. Otherwise, if we “block” them or cannot find an outlet to let them flow, they will stagnate – and eventually become toxic. So, we urgently need to develop the ability to manage our emotions, of course. From this point of view, the popularization of the concept of Emotional Intelligence (Goleman 1995) has probably been positive because it has fostered emotional literacy in an era when few people display even the basic awareness of what they feel.

Max Scheler, in his book on *The Idols of Self-Knowledge*, wrote that the challenge in acquiring self-knowledge is overcoming the distance between *experiencing something* and being able to *say what one has experienced* (Scheler 1955). Today, the lack of an appropriate emotional lexicon reduces the communication of emotions to a limited set of simplified and childish *emoticons* that we can type

with a simple ‘click’ on our smartphones. But finding the appropriate words to express what we feel is much more complicated, so people tell they feel ‘up’ or ‘down’ but don’t have the capacity to translate their emotions into language. This inability to express and communicate emotions sometimes leads to uncontrolled *acting out*: “feeling is not in tune with thinking anymore, and thinking with acting” (Galimberti 2007, p. 51). In these cases, violence becomes a way of blowing off steam or dumping unprocessed emotions, such as anger, frustration, or a sense of inferiority, or whatever.

Learning to recognize and express emotions is therefore indispensable; however, it is not enough. We also – and especially – need to educate our feelings, which means to cultivate the capacity to perceive values through the cultivation of our affective sensibility – and this is a completely different task. We cannot choose our emotions, but we are responsible for our feelings. Educating our feelings means deciding what feelings we want to cultivate and care for, and waiting patiently for them to grow, flourish, and bear fruit. We might say that, in a certain sense, we are *subjected to* our emotions, but are the *subject* of our feelings. And this means, probably, that emotional education cannot be considered as a merely psychological task. It is, in fact, a spiritual and ethical matter, because feelings are like virtues: they grow to the extent that they are *acted* and *exercised*. So that affective education and moral education partly overlap.

3 The Education of the Heart: Heart of Education

Thanks to phenomenology, we know that emotions and feelings reveal the axiological plane of reality: they reveal to us the value of the things we perceive. But, at the same time, they allow us to take awareness of ourselves. Edith Stein says that our emotional lives simultaneously encompass a scale of *inner states* through which we experience ourselves and a variety of *intentional acts* through which we grasp values that transcend us (Stein 2004). In this stratification of the emotional life, feelings represent the most intimate and profound level: they concern a person’s ‘heart’, so to speak. But at the same time, they reveal to us the extent and height of our world, that is to say, of the values we get in contact with. I would dare to claim that (paradoxically) the depth of our *inner experience* is directly proportional to the degree of *transcendence* that we can reach. In other words: our *deepest* feelings correspond to the *highest* values.

Feelings are self-transcendent. This appears to me to be a key point for pedagogy: whereas emotion is a *reaction*, feeling is a *response* to someone or

something. Thus, educating our feelings always involves deepening our spiritual life and broadening our “field of experience” (Bertolini, and Caronia 2017).

Lets’ take the so-called “Maslow’s pyramid” of needs (Maslow 1943). Actually, it is *not* a pyramid: it is in fact a two-dimensional figure, it’s a triangle. By drawing it, Maslow represented the psycho-physical organism but did not include our spiritual dimension. That triangle displays *needs*, but not *values*. Yet we know that what is specifically human *exceeds* this representation. For example: according to this figure, physiological needs are primary needs that precede all others, because our physical survival depends on them. Nevertheless, a human being can decide to forgo even his basic needs for a more important cause, for a superior aim and purpose. This is actually the meaning of religious or political fasting or any other sacrifice: we don’t have any *need* to make a sacrifice, but we have *motives* or good reasons to. And, as the phenomenology of will has argued extensively, motives always imply values (Pfänder 2018). The so-called pyramid represents the individual and his strives, but what is left out is the world and its demands. Indeed, at the top, we find nothing more than ourselves (self-actualization). Viktor Frankl, the Viennese psychiatrist who survived the concentration camps, discussed this point thoroughly: he believed, based on his dramatic experience, that the purpose of human life is not actualizing oneself, but aiming to something beyond oneself: self-transcendence is “the essence of existence” (Frankl 1967, p. 74).

The more we transcend ourselves by focusing on ever-higher values, the more our inner life reaches its ever-deeper levels. For this reason, we might say that “a person’s maturity is [...] the maturity of their feeling” (De Monticelli 2003, p. 77). It is through feeling that we grasp the very nature of things and, at the same time, perceive the affordances that they impose on us: for example, a fragile thing must be protected, a living being must not be treated as an inanimate object, and so on. In feeling, we come into contact with the world and at the same time with the deepest layers of our soul. Thanks to our feeling, we develop an inner hierarchy of axiological preferences, a value system that makes us what we are and endows us with a sort of personal ‘style’. Max Scheler called this inner structure the *ordo amoris* (Scheler 1957), which constitutes our personal, unique, and unrepeatable identity and way of being. Education, at the bottom, means educating this “order of the heart”, so much so that Scheler himself called it *Bildung* (Scheler 1979). This is of greatest importance to education: far from being limited to mere teaching-and-learning processes, the educational act regards the possibility of helping someone to sharp his/her emotional perceptiveness and sensibility (as a capacity to grasp values), and to shape his/her “heart”, which means: the order of preferences that will lead his/her entire existence.

The education of the heart is thus the heart of education. Nevertheless, the education of feeling is not a merely subjective or introspective task. It is crucial, in fact, to our collective destiny. Many years ago, Richard Sennett, in his book *The Fall of Public Man*, warned us that our society was becoming “intimist” and alerted us to the possible consequences of this change: the end of the sense of community will lead to the loss of civilization (Sennett 1977). Christopher Lasch defined the progressive narrowing of our interest in ourselves as *The Culture of Narcissism* (Lasch 1979).

Unfortunately, after a long time, we must admit that these predictions were mostly correct. We live in an era of individualism, in which the liberation of emotions is in some way a response to our need to be ourselves and live more authentically. But this response relies on an illusion, as we can see from the fact that our emotions are systematically manipulated and even instrumentalized by television and social media, market, and advertising, politics, and propaganda. The search for authenticity can’t be reduced to expressing emotions (which represents the psychic level of the emotional life) but relies on cultivating the capacity to *feel* what is *good* (which is the proper spiritual level of the emotional life). In so far as education allows us to proceed from the surface of emotions (*psychische Gefühle*) to the depth of feelings (*geistige Gefühle*), we become capable of transcending ourselves and our needs towards the world and its requirements. Affective education concerns *ethics*, ultimately. There is no authentic existence without affective maturity because authenticity requires choices and choices imply values, and values are perceived through feeling.

Of course, affective education needs both appropriate educators and appropriate settings. Concerning the latter, it’s important to take the phenomenological analysis of the *Stimmungen* or ‘moods’ into serious account. Moods do not concern specific objects, but rather the horizon within which objects appear to us. Moods, therefore, provide a unified ground against which we may experience things (Bollnow 2009). What is more: moods allow us to experience or prevent us from experiencing, certain things as opposed to others, because they *disclose* or *preclude* possibilities of experience. This, of course, is of key importance to education and care. Places of education, for example, have their own particular mood, which can either help or hinder learning and change. In this regard, the analysis of “atmospheres” (Böhme 1993; Griffero 2016) has become a central concern for phenomenological aesthetics in recent years, with significant pedagogical implications.

But, as a matter of fact, the quality of the educational atmosphere relies mostly on the educational relationship. Our affective sphere is aroused or numbed by contact with other people, especially when someone is “overflowing with energy and

freshness” and exercises an “invigorating influence” which makes me capable of a “higher spiritual activity” (Stein 2004, p. 113). Thus, the affective quality of educators is a terribly relevant – and mostly neglected – condition of education. The only thing that can help a person to become a person, is another person (Bruzzone 2012). But the extent to which others can help us to attain full personhood likely depends on the extent of their own personal growth.

4 Concluding Remarks

Karl Jaspers referred to the leading educators of humanity as “decisive personalities” (Jaspers 2013): the greatness of Socrates or Confucius or Jesus lay in their uniqueness, but especially in their capacity to help other people to reach their own uniqueness in their turn. In this regard, I would recall Scheler’s theory of exemplarity: the exemplary person (*Vorbild*) does not teach, nor is he simply to be imitated, rather its function is to “light up” his disciples. This lighting up (*Einschaltung*) is the essence of education. But – no need to remark – only something that is burning can light up something else. Scheler writes: “Exemplary persons should set us free and they set us free to the extent that they themselves are not slaves but free” (Scheler 1979, p. 106). Similarly, a person who has not developed a broad and deep emotional life of their own, will not be able to help another person do the same, nor will he be able to develop the proper “pedagogical tact” (van Manen 2015) that his professionalism requires.

For this reason, in the training curriculum of the helping relationship, we should insist more on interpersonal experience than on merely intellectual learning (Rogers 1962). Maybe, we should get back to choosing educators not only for their knowledge or expertise but primarily for their proclivities and *vocation*. In any case, we should provide appropriate training in the personal and interpersonal attitudes that are indispensable to a significant and well-balanced educational relationship.

In other words: good education always begins with a good education of the educators. And because educators have often received an intellectual education, sometimes a practical training, but almost never an emotional education (except for their own affective and biographical background, of course), we need to offer them the opportunity to learn about and cultivate their ability to sense and feel (Bruzzone 2016) as a personal and professional resource.

In our experience (Iori 2006; Iori et al. 2010; Bruzzone 2014), educating the educators to emotional life implies at least three conditions:

- promoting a phenomenological stance towards educational situations, using *epoché* and *Einfühlung* as professional tools, so that the focus of attention can shift from objective performances and standards to intentionality and meaning;
- accrediting lived experience as a source of learning and knowledge, in order to replace impersonal and technical thinking (that usually considers emotional implications as dangerous “drawbacks”) with interpersonal and reflective thinking (that enhances emotions as a source of knowledge and intuition);
- providing appropriate places and times, even in complex organizations, where emotions can be legitimated, shared, and elaborated in a group, and (professional) feelings can be recognized and powered for the individual and collective well-being.

This circumstantial sketch of a method requires deeper insight and further investigation, but the aim is extremely relevant. Because in educational practice, what matters is not just what we *know*, but also what we *are*, and *personal* attitudes are indispensable *professional* requirements. Probably they are the most important of all.

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Humanity and Emotion in Korean Confucian Tradition

Ki-Seob Chung

1 Introduction-Confucianism and Korean Traditional Education

Even though Confucianism originally came to Korea from China, the relation between human nature and emotion was deeply studied and developed by Confucian scholars of the Chosun dynasty. Although it is not possible to determine precisely when Confucianism spread in Korea, records show during the three kingdoms period (fourth to the seventh century) that a national school called Taehak was established in Goguryeo in 372 and the Confucian classics were educational contents in this school. From the Goryeo dynasty (918–1392) to the Chosun dynasty (1392–1910), Confucianism has been the core educational content of Korean traditional education.

The Silla dynasty, which unified the Three Kingdoms, established a Confucian shrine in the school which lasted until the Chosun dynasty. The establishment of the Confucian shrine shows the will to learn and practice Confucius' thoughts, and that schools performed both the educational function and the ancestral service/rite function. The state examination for the selection of officials was first introduced in the Goryeo dynasty and continued until the Chosun dynasty, and contents of the test were also Confucian classics.

In 1290, An Hyang (1243–1306), a Confucian scholar of Goryeo, went to the Yuan dynasty in China and introduced the writings of the famous Chinese Confucian scholar Zhu Zi (1130–1200) to Goryeo. This Neo-Confucianism became a

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dominant thought of the Chosun dynasty for 500 years. In particular, in the sixteenth century of the Chosun dynasty, the theoretical debate about the nature of the human mind was actively developed in the framework of Neo-Confucianism and established Korean Confucianism. Lee Hwang (1501–1570) and Yi Yi (1536–1584) can be seen as representative figures. For this reason, Confucianism has been an important learning content of Korean traditional education for more than 1000 years and has greatly influenced Korean consciousness and lifestyle.

Today, the evaluation of Confucianism in relation to education is controversial in Korea. On the one hand, there is an argument that Confucianism, which emphasizes character education, can be an alternative as a clue to solve the problems of school education such as youth crime, derailment, violence and suicide. On the other hand, there is criticism that the cause of knowledge – and memorization – based education, which is known as one of the problems these days, is originated from the classics (books)-based Confucian education that has dominated schooling for a long time.

The focus of this study is not on defending or criticizing Confucianism. However, this study aims to clarify that the understanding of education in Korean traditional education, influenced by Confucianism, is based on the relationship between humanity and emotion. In the following, we first deal with the main idea of Confucianism from Confucius through Mencius to Zhu Zi.

2 Innate Emotion: Criterion for ‘Humanity’

2.1 *Ren* (仁): Keyword of Mencius

Confucianism is a school of thought established by Confucius (B.C. 551–B.C. 479). This way of thinking was succeeded and developed by Mencius (B.C. 372–B.C. 289) and Zhu Zi (1130–1200). Confucianism is not created by Confucius, but Confucius was a successor to the ancient Chinese traditional thought and arranged it with his own insight. In *Analects of Confucius*, Confucius said, “(I) transmitted and did not make, believing in and loving the ancients...” (*Analects*, VII-1).

In *Analects*, the word *ren* (仁) appears 105 times considering ‘what is humanity?’ It shows that Confucius valued *Ren* as a human virtue (德, *de*). According to Mencius, “*Ren* is a human being” (Mencius, XIV-16) and “humane mind” (Mencius, XI-11-1). From these references, we can know that Confucius defined *Ren* as human moral nature, and nature as being a human attribute distinguished from instinct. Confucius puts the difference between human beings and animals

in *Ren*. This is not to say that a human being does not have the instinct such as biological desires and sensory pleasures. It means that instinct is not regarded as human nature, because, “if instincts are included in the category of human nature, the boundary between human and animal disappears” (Ryu 2007, p. 285). In the days of Confucius and Mencius “the distinction between ‘moral nature’ and ‘physical instinct’ was the main theme, and the distinction between nature and instinct served as a standard for distinguishing between humanity and beast” (Kim 2017, p. 32). Confucius and Mencius acknowledged all human instincts, sensory pleasures, and social desires, and stressed that it should be wary of excess.

According to the dictionary of Chinese characters, the meaning of *Ren* is ‘be benevolent’ and ‘be kind’, which developed from the friendship of two people. The popular view is that the Chinese character of *ren* (仁) is a combination of a man (人) and two (二). These meanings show that *ren* is closer to warm emotion between humans than to intelligence. In other words, Confucius saw humane emotion as the condition of humanity. If *ren* is the essence of human beings, it should be a universal emotion that goes beyond personal feelings.

What *ren* is based on emotion in a human relationship, it can be confirmed through the dialog between Confucius and disciples in *Analects*.

When Fan Chih asked about *ren*, Confucius said, “It is to love all men” (*Analects* XII-22); Yan Yuan asked about *ren*, Confucius said, “To subdue one’s self and return to *li* (禮, propriety) is *ren*” (*Analects*, XII-1).

What is remarkable in the quotation is that *Ren* is love and *li*. *Li* (禮) is a form in which the human mind is expressed out through the body, and it is a natural attitude that one should have to others. In this sense, *Li* is different from artificial courtesy that does not come from a loving mind. Because *Li* is words and deeds in a human relationship in which the purely loving mind is expressed out through the body. This interpretation is clarified in Confucius’ answer to the question of other disciple Zi Gong.

“Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practise for all one’s life? It is probably *shu* (恕). *Shu* means that you do not tell others to do what you do not want” (*Analects*, XV-23).

If a man does not want to do something and has taken an attitude toward others, a man is deceiving himself because it is not his original mind. In Confucius’ view, the reason why *Ren* does not purely appear in human relationships is that individual desires interfered with it. A false attitude toward others in order to satisfy one’s individual desires can be damage to others. In this sense, in Confucianism, “the concept of *ren*, *li*, *shu* is based on the relationship of people and emotional solidarity” (Kim 2014, p. 29).

In this context, Confucius says that learning/cultivating is about restoring *Ren* “so as to give rest to others” (Analects, XIV-42). After all, *Ren* as innate nature of all humans has something to do with emotion, and the *li* is an external form of *Ren*. The reason why *Ren* is not shown purely in human relationships is because of individual desires. Confucius’ thought of “To subdue one’s self and return to *li*, is *ren*” can be interpreted in relation to his time. The time of Confucius was a time of great political and social turmoil and the collapse of the order and authority of traditional society. In this situation, *li* would have been related to individual desires rather than human nature. In these times, Confucius would have expected that the education of believing in human nature and realizing it would be the driving force to restore harmonious social order based on human relations.

2.2 Four Universal Emotions Verifying that Human Nature is Good

Mencius intended to support Confucius’ ideas by presenting the clue of *ren* which Confucius defined as human nature. Mencius tried to prove Confucius’ definition of *Ren* as true. Mencius argued that a human being is naturally good. According to Mencius, a human being has a mind which cannot be suppressed (不忍人之心). This mind is a pitiful and painful emotion that arises to see the sufferings of others, and this emotion is natural. Mencius regards this mind as the basis for human goodness. This mind is a clue for which we can confirm that human being has the innate virtue (moral nature) called *ren*.

Mencius included not only *ren* but also *yi* (義), *li* (禮), *zhi* (智) in moral nature. It means that in one word, human nature is *ren*, when divided, *ren*, *yi*, *li*, *zhi*. In other words, the four innate virtues (*ren*, *yi*, *li*, *zhi*) as human attributes are given to human beings. The basis for these four human virtues lies in that the ‘mind which cannot bear’ appears, in some situations, in the forms of “the pitiful mind” (惻隱之心), “the shameful and hateful” (羞惡之心), “the mind which respects for others and give up to others without showing yourself up” (辭讓之心), “the mind which tells what right and wrong is” (是非之心) (cf. Mencius, XI-6-3).

Mencius exemplifies a situation in which a young child is about to fall into a well to probe that a human being has innately ‘pitiful mind.’ Anyone who sees this young child may be surprised and feel pitiful. This emotion is innate (a priori), so it arises instantly and purely without any calculating benefits and losses.

“We can say that all men have a mind which cannot suppress emotion. Now when people suddenly see a child crawling into the well, they are all surprised and full of pity, which is not to associate with the parents of the child, nor to

seek honour from the friends in the city, and not to want to be called cruel.” (Mencius, III-6-2); “From this point of view, a person without the ‘pitiful mind (piety)’ is not a human being, without the ‘shameful and hateful mind (shame and hate)’ the person is not a human being, without ‘the mind that shows respect for others and gives up to others without showing yourself up (modesty)’ the person is not a human being, and without ‘the mind that tells right from wrong (right and wrong)’ that person is not a human being.” (Mencius, III-6-3); “pitiful mind (惻隱之心) is the clue of *ren*, shameful and hateful mind (羞惡之心) is the clue of *yi*, modest mind (辭讓之心) is clue of *li*, right and wrong mind (是非之心) is the clue of *zhi*” (Mencius, III-6-4).

In this quotation, we can know what Mencius intended to emphasize is and that the emotion arising from this situation is natural, non-calculative, direct and spontaneous emotion which operates immediately before logical and calculative thinking and judgment are made. If this emotion does not arise in this situation, you are not a human being. By not calculating benefits and losses means that the response to this situation is not selective, not due to the basis of intellectual judgment and will. Rather, it is based on pure emotion itself without learning and thinking. Therefore, this emotion is beyond the individual, it is transcendental. If the response in this situation comes after having considered the acquaintances of the child’s parents and the praise of friends, etc., it is something to do with a private emotion with individual desire, not with pure emotion. Mencius claims that the four moral emotions mentioned above are universal because it is given to anyone. That tells us that Mencius elicits the universality of moral emotions from the pure (sincere) emotions given as an a priori to all men.

Mencius did not give examples of the other three, but there is pure human emotion such as emotion that arises spontaneously against injustice, spontaneous emotion when dealing with others, and spontaneous emotion when distinguishing between right and wrong. Emotion acting on discerning right and wrong is not about “what to decide true and false of logical and scientific propositions”, but about “innate emotion acting on discerning moral right and wrong” (Kim 2001, p. 44 f.). The four moral emotions prove that a human being has human emotion, unlike animals. Therefore, to live humanly is to preserve human emotions and express them in human relations.

3 The Relation Between Nature, Mind, and Emotion

3.1 Nature and Mind as *Li*(理) and *Qi*(氣)

If Confucius defines human nature and Mencius finds its basis in moral emotions, Zhu Zi asks about the source of such moral emotions. By answering to this question, Zhu Zi attempts to clarify the thought of Confucius and Mencius, that all human beings have a good nature, and this nature does not change in any case, in the relation between mind, nature, and emotion.

Zhu Zi is a figure who developed Neo-Confucianism by collecting the previous materials. In Neo-Confucianism, all things are composed of *li* (理) and *qi* (氣). According to Zhu Zi, *Li* is the nature of all thing and *Qi* is the shape of all things. *Li* is the essence which is intangible and odourless, and so cannot be experienced, while *Qi* is to change (variable). The basic premise of Neo-Confucianism is that ‘nature is just *li*’. This means that human nature is *li*. Zhu Zi reveals that the four moral emotions mentioned above have the universal character as a criterion for moral judgment beyond individual limits, dealing with the relation between *li* and *qi*. In Neo-Confucianism, nature is *li* and mind is *qi*. Zhu Zi said, “(human) nature in *li* in the mind.”; “Emotion is an appearance of nature through the mind” (Lee 2017, p. 64). The nature as *Li* is intangible and stationary and thus cannot reveal himself by himself. On the other hand, the mind, which is *qi*, moves and changes from time to time, creating “perception, emotions, and will” (ibid., p. 64). In this sense, nature cannot express itself, but nature can only be expressed through the working of the mind.

If so, the question arises, why is a good emotion and a bad emotion occurring? The reason is the working of the mind. As we can see in the relation between *li* and *qi*, nature is inherent in the mind and influenced by the mind. From this point of view, the mind is understood as a subject revealing nature to emotion. While Mencius said that *Ren*’s ground was ‘pitiful mind’, Zhu Zi insisted that *ren* was the basis of emotion ‘piety’ expressed by the mind. Emotions as an appearance of nature must be purely human. If not, because the mind has not played its part.

Zhu Zi likens nature to water and mind to a bowl. He explains why human nature is not expressed in pure emotions depends on working of mind, just as the water looks different depending on the clean or dirty bowl. The water stays as it is. In this case, the water does not change. Another example is a jade bead in a water bowl. Even if the water turns clear or muddy, the jade bead remains the same. Although the bead appears differently, bright and cloudy, through the water, it is phenomenal and the essence remains the same. In this context, the Zhu

Zi differentiates the unaffected nature (intrinsic nature) from the mind-affected nature (cf. *ibid.*, p. 80).

What can be seen in this example is that the mind and the nature are undivided and combined, that the reason why humans fail to realize a moral nature depends on the mind, and that the original mind was a clean bowl, but the nature is not expressed as it is, if the bowl (mind) is affected by something. Zhu Zi sees factors that becloud mind in its disposition and personal desires. The human nature is the same, but those who have clean innate mind will be able to display their nature itself properly, and those whose innate minds are clouded and dirty will not be able to expose their nature itself properly.

Another factor, personal greed is derived from the physical instincts, such as wanting to eat food when being hungry, and missing a partner when a sexual desire occur. Growing of personal greed is because the physical senses are passively attracted by the temptation of things. Mencius said, “because sensory organs like eyes and ears cannot think... when they meet external objects, they are attracted by them” (Mencius, XI-15-2). Therefore, if the sensory organs continue to be attracted to things, a human becomes a thing. When a human being is attracted to physical greed, it becomes difficult to express the nature as it is, because the original clean mind is tinged with being attracted. From this point of view, we can know that determining the difference of personality depends on whether the mind follows the senses or the nature.

The emphasis in Neo-Confucianism is that emotion is the influence of the mind on nature. Since nature as *Li* was contained in the mind as *Qi*, “emotions are the result of having managed the mind” (心統性情) (Lee 2017, p. 71). It is because of the mind which man cannot live according to his good nature. Education, therefore, is to cultivate the mind in order for personal desires not to arise.

3.2 Four-Seven Debate

In the sixteenth century Chosun dynasty, the controversy over human mind was developed actively among Korean Confucians influenced by Zhu Zi. A prime example is the Four-Seven debate. Neo-Confucian thinkers in Korea tried to formulate the subject of the nature of the mind more precisely and theoretically, and emphasized the practice of the mind through the body. Representative Korean Neo-Confucians are Lee Hwang (1501–1570) and Yi Yi (1536–1584). The so-called “Four-Seven debate” began with a debate through the letters of Lee Hwang and Ki Dae Seung (1527–1572), which began for 8 years from 1559, and since then, it has been actively developed by many scholars.

Four represents the four basic moral emotions (four clues) presented by Mencius as the clues of human goodness, and Seven represents the seven general human emotions (joy, anger, sadness, pleasure, love, hate, desire) described in *Li Ji* (禮記). According to *Li Ji*, “Man has a great desire for food and men and women and hates death and poverty greatly” (*Li Ji*, II-1). “What is human emotion? Joy, anger, sadness, pleasure, love, hate, desire. These seven emotions are to know without learning” (*Li Ji*, VIII-5-4). The reason for having it without learning is because it is caused by the body. Seven emotions caused by the body are different from four innate moral emotions which are universal. Being caused by the body means personal.

The issue of the Four-Seven debate was how to identify four basic moral emotions and seven general emotions in the structure of the human mind and nature (cf. Jeon 1993, pp. 152–154).¹ That is, can the two types of emotions be requested as the same or different? This debate began with questions that were not solved by the theory of Zhu Zi’s mind and nature. Zhu Zi took the view that “pity (惻隱), shame and hate (羞惡), modesty (辭讓), rightness and wrongness (是非) are emotions, *ren, yi, li, zhi* are nature, and mind takes charge of nature and emotions” (朱子語類, vol. 40). However, Zhu Zi said in another place, “joy, anger, sadness, pleasure are emotions, and they are nature which has not been played yet” (中庸章句, 1).

In this way, both Four and Seven are to be interpreted as emotions. Zhu Zi said, “emotions are based on nature, nature becomes emotions if nature plays” (周子文集, Vol. 32). If so, both Four and Seven are based on nature which is only goodness. So where comes the evil emotion in the seven emotions from? Can evil come from the absence of evil? A logical contradiction arises. Confucians in Chosun dynasty tried to dig into this problem theoretically with the relation between *li* and *qi*.

Lee Hwang insisted that both Four and Seven are emotional, but Four clues are based on *Li*. Thus, Four are only good, not evil. Besides, Seven emotions are based on *Qi*, so that Seven can be either good or evil. Lee Hwang divided, the source of Four and Seven into *Li* and *Qi*, so that Four is rooted in human moral nature (*Ren, Yi, Li, Zhi*) and Seven arise from contact between external objects and sensory organs.

On the contrary, Ki Dae Sung (1527–1572) argues that the Seven emotions refer to the whole human emotion and that the Four clues refer to ‘good emotions’

¹ Zhuziyulei (朱子語類), zhongyongzhangju (中庸章句), zhuziwenji (周子文集). Quoted in Jeon, H.-G. 1993. The First Conflict for Korean Development of Zhu Zi’s Theory of Mind and Nature.

of the seven emotions, and that there are no Four clues outside the range of Seven emotions (cf. Shin and Seo 2003, pp. 166–172). Yi Yi has a basic view of understanding the Four in the Seven. In general, all human emotions are seven emotions, and in particular, the good side of them is Four clues. Even though our mind comes out of the pure human nature at first, if it is mixed on the way with personal greed, then it began with the mind which follows the human nature given from heaven and ends with the mind which follows personal desires. In the sense of Yi Yi, what comes from the human body is also not wrong, only if the mind is following human nature (cf. Oh 2014, pp. 376–378). In other words, if it is an essential desire for survival, it is not against *li* (天理), but luxury and debauchery beyond essential desires are against *li*.

Yi Yi accepts that *qi* moves but does not accept *li* moves. Thus, he claims that “all the work of the human and nature worlds is only based on the *qi*, so *Li* rides on *qi*” (ibid., p. 374). It is said that good and evil depend on clear and cloudy of *qi*: If *qi* is clear, then good; if *qi* is cloudy, then evil. Yi Yi emphasizes, therefore, that cloudy *qi* must be transformed into clean *Qi* with self-cultivation, not to remove *qi*.

Lee Hwang and Yi Yi’s views appear to be in opposition, but what is common to them is “to overcome *qi*’s covering up *li* and to return to *li*’s purity” (Cho 1993, p. 133). The value of the Four-Seven debate is that this debate led to the development of Korean Neo-Confucianism, and that “the combination of mind-nature theory and *Li-Qi* theory was not only the first attempted but also clearly defined the concept of four clues and seven emotions” (ibid., p. 150).

4 Mind and Education

4.1 An Educated Man

As we have seen so far, the relationship between emotion and humanity shows that education is a process of self-learning, self-discipline and self-cultivation which constantly strives to preserve and practice human a priori nature. What is clear from the discussion on the relationship between mind, nature and emotion is that it depends on the mind to reveal the nature, so education is to keep the mind unwaveringly to control over personal desires which influence on the mind. This understanding of education is based on premise that the nature given to human beings is good, but if we neglect our efforts to preserve it, we can have lost it by the environment or individual greed.

Education as self-cultivation is like the process of wiping off stains from the mirror and paying attention to the water in the bowl in order not to get dirty. Self-cultivation is to release the mind from the dominance of greed formed by sensory experience and to keep the mind from being infected with personal desires. It is not easy to resist the temptations of the senses and to preserve the innate nature, so self-discipline requires effort. This learning process is impossible without voluntary participation and constant effort.

Self-cultivation is “restoring the perfect human nature already in place” and “the subject being responsible for it is myself” (Hwang 2017, p. 99). That does not mean learning should be selfish to self. As we have seen before, the result of learning is to help others. An educated man is therefore the one who controls well his personal feelings with the universal ones, the moral ones, and strives for the realization of nature. In other words, an educated man is one who embodies the pure moral emotion in a humane attitude (*Li*, 禮) in social relations.

4.2 Education Through Body

Restoring moral nature through learning in Confucianism means overcoming personal greed and realizing the moral nature through the body in social relations. Hence, “the body is the form of expressing the humanity of the person” (Go 2005, p. 38). For humanity to be revealed through the body, man must always be conscious of moral nature. It is not possible without it. In this sense, the body is distinct from the functional body. The body is to understand that is not only a sense organ but integrated with the mind. Hence, the self-governing body affects the mind. Confucius referred to the form of human nature as an outward form, *Li* (禮).

“*Li* (human attitude) has an external character, but the importance of appearance as *Li* is not for the ‘appearance’ itself, rather for the valuable internal resources that can be preserved through the ‘appearance’” (Kim 2001, p. 78 f.).

Lee Hwang, a representative Confucian scholar of the Chosun dynasty, emphasized ‘*Jing*’ (敬) as a method of learning through the body. The meaning of *Jing* refers to a godly attitude in dealing with people and things. Godly attitude means the concentration of the mind on a goal. *Jing* is to rule over mind in order to control personal desires. In other words, it can be said to be self-controlling so that the mind expressing the nature as emotion is kept pure. Lee Hwang wrote the *Ten Diagrams on Sage* (聖學十圖) at the age of 68, 2 years before his death. *Ten Diagrams on Sage* is summarized with the 10 pictures and commentary for easy

understanding of Neo-Confucianism. In this book, we can see how important Lee Hwang considered *Jing* as a way of learning.

“The single word *Jing* is the beginning and the end of learning to become a man who has perfect virtue.” (Hwang 1568, p. 84); “All ten pictures show the importance of the *Jing*” (ibid., p. 85).

In the Confucian tradition, nature is the command of heaven, which humans should follow and realize. *Jing* is the mind-cultivating method for preserving and restoring human nature. As a method of self-discipline, it is to try to keep a godly attitude without laziness from when one awakes until one goes to the bed, thus keeping mind undisturbed. Lee Hwang describes one specific way to practice *Jing* in everyday life: to make the appearance of the body right so that the mind becomes solemn and not disturbed (整齊嚴肅). This specific way premises that self-controlling the body affects the mind. From this point of view, the attitude of life, which always guards against arising the personal greed in the mind through self-controlling appearance of the body, is very important. Lee Hwang said that this is the best way for the beginner to learn, and he gives concrete examples of the practice of *Jing* in *Ten Diagrams on Sage*.

“Be neat your dress, keep your eyes dignified, and calm yourself as if you worship God. Make steps prudently, place your hands courteously, and step on the ground to avoid ant’s nest. When you deal with some works, be careful just like you greet a guest and perform the ancestral rite and don’t neglect to do your work. Keep your mouth closed like a bottle cap, prevent distracting thoughts distracted like defending a castle. Do not be rash by any chance and always keep respect and refrainment” (ibid., p. 129).

Why did he say this is the best way for someone who is a beginner of learning? The answer to that can be found in following reference of Lee Hwang.

“In the dark and secret places that no one else sees, if you are alert and refrained from indulging and distracting your mind, you will naturally get to know after a long time and will not tolerate any stuff in your mind” (The Toegye Studies Institut 1994, p. 34).

A beginner in learning is likely to be a young child. Lee Hwang said, “If children’s education is not right, they grow and become more frivolous and extravagant” (*Ten Diagrams on Sage*, 73). Young children are more inclined to do what they want to do than adults. However, there is a limit to understanding the children by explaining in words how the child should not behave. Therefore, children need to practice by the body before understanding, and then they will realize when practice by the body will have been accumulated. Of course, what is important here is not the mechanical practice, but the practice combined with the mind. At

this point, the study of the relationship between the appearance of the body and the mind seems to be more important in today's pedagogical research.

5 Summary and Conclusion

Confucian thought premises that the criterion of humanity lies in the human emotional nature and emphasizes to 'preserve' it. In contrast, Western ancient philosophical thought that leads to Socrates, Plato, Aristotle is intelligently trying to 'find' the criterion of humanity. In other words, in order to be an authentic human being, humans must first recognize what is humanity, which is a moral criterion, and then possible to practice it.

In the Confucianism, as the condition of humanity places emotion above the intelligence. In Confucianism, the person who realized the moral nature inherent in himself is to be an authentic human being. The clue that humans have a moral nature is because there are moral emotions that naturally arise in some situations. Four moral emotions are understood as universal emotions given to all human beings. *Li* (禮) is a human attitude in which pure human emotions emerge out in social relations.

To be authentic human being in Confucianism is to live according to the given nature, the command given from heaven, and this is the way (道, *tao*) of human being. For this purpose, the role of the mind that contains nature is important, and learning is understood to cultivate one's mind so that it will not be disturbed. What is important in the learning theory of Korean Confucian scholars is especially that the body and the mind are not separated and influence each other. The view that the mind can be changed through the appearance of the body, not just as a means of expressing the mind, is indicative of the school education dominated by knowledge- and memory-based education.

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Affects and the Intelligibility of Education

Lars Wicke

1 Introduction

At the 5th international symposium on phenomenological research in education, I started my presentation with a short description of how I was emotionally affected by the situation of presenting. While standing in front of the audience, I thematized my nervousness and related it to doings central for the situation, for example, ‘trying to cover up my insecurity’ or ‘aiming to get the audience’s attention’. By referring to the affects in the concrete situation, I wanted to point out that the constitution of every social phenomenon is linked to its inherent affectual structure. Furthermore, I argued that the affectual dimension is central to get an understanding of the social phenomena we – in the case of a presentation the audience and the speaker – are participating in.

On this basis, in this article, I follow the thesis that affects play a decisive role in the constitution of social phenomena. In contrast to *emotions* and *feelings*, which are often attributed to subjects as their inner qualities, I refer to *affects* in the sense of the affective turn in the social sciences (Reckwitz 2016, p. 170). Taking up the critical attitude towards the dichotomization of materialism and culturalism, I understand affects as a part of social practices which is physically experienced. Thus, affects link the perception of the (social and material) world and being (socially and materially) located in the world. According to that, the affectual dimension of a phenomenon is not (only) to be understood by the means of psychology. Affects rather refer to a relational structure of social phenomena, which is conveyed by its atmosphere as a spatial intensity (Böhme 2001), and

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point to the performativity of their constitution, which affects in a specific way. This goes along with the thesis that the specific characteristics of a phenomenon are conveyed through affects: on the one hand because affects as a physical sensation point towards the directionality of social practices. On the other hand, because affects as atmospheres point towards the interrelatedness of a phenomenon.

Turning to affects by the means of educational sciences, I do not focus on the question if the educational shows itself through visible practices. I rather ask: What relevance do affects have for the intelligibility of specific social phenomena and, in particular, for education? Doing that, for one thing, I look at affects regarding to the performative constitution of education and, for the other thing, regarding to the possibility of the perception of the educational linked to an “onto(epistemo)logical” (Barad 2015) status. In short, I am interested in the affectual dimensions of social practices that make social formations intelligible as educational phenomena.

However, the intention to get a grasp of education by referring to its affectual dimension is not new in the tradition of German educational science. Already in the “Geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik”, affects, emotions and moods have a prominent position regarding the question of how education can be understood. According to Erich Weniger (1990), to get a grasp of what education is, it is necessary to be emotionally involved in acts of education. The possibility of understanding education is linked to the emotional attachment of the researcher, as if he was the educator himself.

I explicitly do not want to take on this tradition of thought with its premise that there is something like a true understanding of education. I rather focus on the meaning of affects regarding to affect-studies as a specific branch of cultural science and the humanities (Pfaller and Wiese 2018). In these studies, socio-theoretical, neo-phenomenological, and postmodern perspectives are closely intertwined. Affect-studies suggest that affects refer to the performative and relational constitution of the social (von Scheve and Berg 2018). My idea is that this perspective on affects might open up interesting perspectives for educational research. I follow the thesis that an affect-related perspective alters the understanding of the relation between a researcher and an addressed phenomenon.

In the following, three theoretical frameworks are presented, which on the one hand have a common interest in the decentration of the subject and which thus make it possible to thematize affects non-psychologically. On the other hand, they each thematize affects in different ways. I *firstly* ask about the relevance of affects in Practice Theory. *Secondly*, I turn to a phenomenological understanding of affects as atmospheres. *Thirdly*, I refer to Karen Barad’s Agential Realism, with which I relate the performative and the ontological dimension of affects with

each other. *Fourthly* and as a conclusion, I argue that the combination of these different approaches to affects offers an epistemological potential for research in educational science.

2 Affects and the Performativity of the Social

Sociological Practice Theories address social practices as a fundamental theoretical category to describe the constitution of the social (Schäfer 2016, p. 11). They explore sociality as a practice (Hillebrandt 2014, p. 7) or, as Andreas Reckwitz puts it in an often-cited paper, in Practice Theory social practices represent the ‘emergent level of the social’ (Reckwitz 2003, p. 289). As practices are physically performed, they are socially accessible, intelligible, and, thus, describable (ibid.).

However, to get an understanding of what makes it possible to perceive social practices as specific ones in Practice Theory, we need to ask, what is a social practice? Theodor Schatzki describes practices as the smallest units of the social, as a “nexus of doings and sayings” (Schatzki 1996, p. 89) or more specifically as “a temporally evolving, open-ended set of doings and sayings linked by practical understanding, rules, teleoaffective structure, and general understanding” (Schatzki 2002, p. 87). Without addressing the categories of practical and general understanding any further, it is to be said that one of the main concerns of Practice Theory is to turn away from the idea that social actions imply subjective awareness. Practice theory rather focuses on the implicitness of the connection of doings and sayings, through which social phenomena are performatively constituted.

Regarding affects, Practice Theory focuses on dynamic processes of becoming affected as a part of the performative constitution of the social. According to Reckwitz (2016), the relevance of affects relates to their dualistic character, which means that they are both material and cultural. In the sense of being cultural, affects refer to the historic structures of a society. In the sense of being material, affects have effects on bodies as well as they can be generated through artefacts (ibid., 2016, p. 165). Affects are experienced physically and hence they refer to the materiality of doings. In this sense, affects provide an understanding of how we are involved in social circumstances which, referring to Bourdieu (1987), shape our bodies and dispose the way we move and behave. Margeret Wetherell’s term of ‘affective practice’ captures the essence of this practice theoretical understanding of affect, as she sees “affective practice as a moment of recruitment and often synchronous assembling of multimodal resources, including, most crucially, body states” (Wetherell, as quoted in Slaby 2018, p. 67).

In order to explain affects as a part of the processual constitution of the social, Practice Theory embraces the conceptual interest to pursue the decentration of the subject (Wiesse, and Pfaller 2018, p. 17). Thus, affects are no properties of subjects but inherent in social practices (Reckwitz 2016). The understanding that social practices entail a teleoaffective structure that marks the directedness of a respective practice regardless of the intentions of its participants' points towards the significance of affects in Practice Theory. Schatzki (2002) understands the teleoaffective structure as a "range of normativized and hierarchically ordered ends, projects, and tasks, to varying degrees allied with normativized emotions and even moods" (ibid., p. 80). Thus, as emotion/motive complexes, affects are related to the teleoaffective structure of a practice (Reckwitz 2003, p. 293), but they don't merge into it. Affects rather convey the directedness of a practice and open up room for manoeuvre concerning its limits. According to that, every social order, as it emerges out of a specific configuration of social practices, can also be understood as an affectual order because every practice entails affective dimensions (Reckwitz 2016, p. 166 ff.).

Against this background, the practice theoretical perspective makes it possible to understand social phenomena in regard to the performative connection and relation of practices. Affects relate to the directionality of a phenomenon and are thus linked to its performance. To be affected in a practice theoretical sense thus implies to take part in social practices. However, according to affect theory, affects also relate to the historical and cultural embeddedness of a phenomenon. Therefore, affects also mark the possibility of experiencing the meaning of a phenomenon. In this sense, affects do not punctually evolve from concrete practices as someone is concretely affected, but they provide an (embodied) understanding of a phenomenon in a general way (von Scheve and Berg 2018, p. 30 f.).

To get a grasp of *this* dimension of a phenomenon, I step aside from practice theoretical premises and turn to a phenomenologically informed perspective that allows me to focus on the affectual structure of a phenomenon in a holistic sense (Wiesse and Pfaller 2018, p. 7 f.). I thus turn to the question: How can being affected be understood as a basic condition of social phenomena?

3 Affects as a Basic Condition of Being-in-the-World

The assumption that Practice Theory and Phenomenology can be fruitful to each other results from a shared premise in their different perspectives (Bedorf and Gerlek 2017). Both find their access to phenomena in their concrete materiality and therefore in the visibility and perceptibility of the world. However, in Practice

Theory affects are linked to a telos of a practice. Therefore, affects are tied to their function in the constitution of the social. In contrast, Phenomenology allows us to focus on the affectivity of phenomena as an underlying intensity. In this sense, affects relate to the “Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger 2006).

The significance of asking phenomenologically about the affectual dimension of a phenomenon is to understand affects as permeating and overlapping and not as punctually evolving. In this sense, they are owned neither by subjects nor by practices, but they refer to the interrelatedness against the background of which the specificity of a phenomenon can show itself. Regarding affects, two aspects are important concerning the phenomenological perspective.

Firstly, affects are not only to be understood as discretely and concretely performed but also as a basic potential located in the in-between of bodies as they relate to each other (von Scheve and Berg 2018, p. 31). They point towards a preconscious embodied understanding and therefore towards the engagement of subjects in phenomena (Dreyfus and Taylor 2016, p. 174 ff.). *Secondly*, affects are in this sense located neither outside of subjects nor inside of subjects. As parts of phenomena, subjects, as well as practices and things, are permeated through affects. Moreover, as subjects are affected in this sense, they can answer as an act of taking part in the world. The phenomenological perspective allows focusing on affects regarding the intentionality of actors in phenomena as an affective engagement with the world (Slaby 2011).

In his work towards the characteristics of moods, Otto Friedrich Bollnow describes this fundamental dimension of being-affected in discussion with the work of Heidegger. From Bollnow’s point of view, moods or atmosphere are the bass against the background of which the melodies of experiencing the world can take their forms (Bollnow 1968, p. 36). Therefore, they can be understood as a basic mode of being-in-the-world that points towards a unity of I and the world (ibid., p. 41 ff.). As moods are directly linked to the ‘Dasein’, they convey the unity of body and soul in being-in-the-world (ibid., p. 54). Saying that it can be emphasized that affects can be reduced neither to subjects nor to objects, but rather make it possible to experience the world in its entirety (Waldenfels 2004).

If you take the concept of atmosphere as a basis, it is possible to understand the affectual structure of phenomena not only as a connection between the subject and the world but also as a reference towards the unity that embraces both. According to Böhme (1995), the environment gives off an atmosphere as a quality of mood. Subjects participate in this atmosphere and take part in its construction at the same time (ibid., pp. 33, 96). The specific atmosphere or ‘Gestimmt-Sein’ of a phenomenon, which is marked by the material presence of objects and subjects, makes it possible to participate in a specific manner. Moreover, the atmosphere

of a phenomenon invites one to relate to oneself as a physically situated part of it (ibid., p. 34). In consequence, with Hermann Schmitz, affects as atmospheres can be described as “transsubjective phenomena” (Gugutzer 2013, p. 304), which means that they can be located in-between subjects and objects. In this sense, affects refer to a range of possibilities to act within the world (Slaby 2011).

If one understands affects as essential for an embodied understanding of the world, they refer to the relational structure of a phenomenon and provide the possibility to sensually experience a phenomenon’s meaning. Thus, on the one hand, phenomena are physically tangible and therefore distinguishable (Gerlek, and Kristensen 2017, p. 119). On the other hand, they are contingent in the sense that they own a surplus of opportunities (Meyer-Drawe 2010, p. 9). The meaning of a phenomenon is therefore not determined. Because it is procedurally enacted and physically experienced in a specific, differentiating way, other potential meanings are dimmed off but stay in the background (ibid.).

4 Affects and the Realization of Boundaries

Up to this point, I have shown that Practice Theory understands affects in regards to the performativity of the social. In this perspective, affects are linked to a teleological structure and therefore tied to a possible direction of doings. On the other hand, Phenomenology understands affects as an intensity, a condition of the possibility of being itself. In this regard, affects convey the relations of subjects and objects as a mode of being-in-the-world and tie affects as atmospheres to the ontological dimension of a phenomenon (Böhme 1995, p. 30). As a third option to frame affects out of a social-theoretical interest in education, new materialist approaches do not only share the skepticism towards the figure of a strong modern subject, they carry it to its extremes by denying the (epistemological) predominance of a somehow human subject at all. Regardless of the problems associated with this, Agential Realism provides an interesting perspective on affects not by psychological means but in order to connect the ontological and the performative dimensions respectively addressed in Phenomenology and Practice Theory.

One of the main representatives of New Materialism is Karen Barad. In her agential realistic approach, she criticizes constructivist perspectives which emphasize the relevance of culture to the detriment of materiality when trying to grasp a phenomenon (Barad 2015, p. 46 f.). Instead, she pleads for a position that undermines the dualism between culturality and materiality and therefore acknowledges the dynamic power of matter in the process of constituting the world as a becoming (Barad 2012, p. 13). Doing so, she focuses on the performativity

of phenomena which she links to the being of phenomena by the means of a relational ontology (ibid., p. 18) or an onto-epistemology. Thus, Barad critically addresses the separation of the ontological and the epistemological dimension of a phenomenon and understands the process of perceiving a phenomenon as a part of the phenomenon itself.

In consequence, Barad does not ask how or if explanations of the world fit to their supposed original character. Rather, she addresses the problem, how a phenomenon emerges in its materiality and gets to its meaning. That goes along with the assumption that phenomena are intra-actively enacted via agential cuts (ibid., p. 20), which Barad understands as discursively and practically enacted realizations of boundaries. As such, agential cuts are differentiations and distinctions in phenomena through which phenomena come into being (Barad 2015, p. 48). This means neither that a phenomenon does result from a somehow unique connection of different and distinguishable parts or practices. Nor do matter or practices take precedence over each other. Much more, phenomena are relations that do not refer to preceding relata (Barad 2012, p. 19). Thus, practices, discourse, and matter are entangled within one another through agential cuts.

Although affects do not play a decisive role in Barad's perspective, they are not a foreign topic in new materialist theories. Mostly in reference to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, affects are related to assemblages as a "collective of elements, a multiplicity, in the relationships of the constituent parts and in their intersections with other bodies/matter" (Mitchell 2016, p. 236). Thus, the Deleuzian term *assemblage* refers to the process of fitting unformed matter, destratified forces, and functions (Deleuze and Guattari 1992, p. 699.) in a discontinuous process of becoming (Fox, and Alldred 2017, p. 9 f.). With regard to the affective turn in social science, Deleuze's and Guattari's ideas are important because they prime the possibility of focusing affects as a "force, that achieves some change of state in a relation" (Fox, and Alldred 2017, p. 10; cf. also Angerer 2014, p. 30).

That points towards parallels in the way of thinking between affect studies and New Materialism and between Barad's understanding of a phenomenon and the Deleuzian idea of assemblages, which open the possibility of framing affects through Barad's Agential Realism. Both Barad's concept of a phenomenon and the Deleuzian concept of assemblage refer to the simultaneity of the arrangement of matter and its performative constitution. Both stress the productive forces of matter. However, the advantage of Barad's perspective on phenomena over the Deleuzian understanding of assemblages lays in the possibility of grasping the specific of a phenomenon by relating affects to agential cuts. Thus, Agential Realism allows us to think about affects regarding the performative and the ontological dimension of a phenomenon at the same time. In other words, affects relate

to the procedurally enacted boundaries which constitute a phenomenon. They are closely linked to the meaning of a phenomenon that is not to be understood as separated from its performative forthgoing. The other way around, the processes of realizing boundaries, and thus meanings are conveyed through affects. In that sense, the affectual dimension of social practices refers to an affectively permeated relationship between subjects, objects, practices, and discourses, which takes its form in the creation of differences (Deleuze and Guattari 1974, p. 47). This goes along with the assumption that affects are not only qualities of social practices. Much more, they also mark the capability of potential actors to be affected which is linked to the possibility of taking part in phenomena and perceiving them as specific ones (Deleuze 1988).

In the following, it will be outlined that the consequence of the agential realistic framing is that the intelligibility of a phenomenon is conveyed through affects because they refer to the agential realistic cuts. Thus, affects may lead to an answer – or much more to another way of questioning – how education can be intelligible. The thesis here is that education can be traced against the background of the agential realist connection of the ontological and the performative dimension of a phenomenon. Thus, focusing on affects through Agential Realism takes on the shared skepticism of practice theoretical and phenomenological perspectives towards a representationalist view of the world. The agential realist account on affects complements both perspectives and leads to a re-thinking of the relation between the researcher and the phenomenon – not towards the division of two separated spheres, but as one and the same phenomenon.

5 The Relevance of Affects for Educational Research

Addressing the relevance of affects for educational research, I follow up the reflection that phenomena of education cannot be reduced to one single feature, as for example “pointing” in the sense of Klaus Prange would be (Stenger 2015, p. 64). However, if education is carried out on the back of other practices and thus cannot be directly identified, how can it be intelligible? Owing to the affect-related perspective, I propose to see the ontological dimension of education in its direct interrelatedness with the process of educating. By framing education through affect studies and Agential Realism – which both combine central practice theoretical and phenomenological assumptions related to affects – I argue that its ontological dimension is to be understood by means of a process ontology (Braidotti 2013, p. 172). Against the background of practically and discursively

enacted boundaries, phenomena can take an educational form and can thus be perceived as educational.

In the following, I discuss the epistemological potential to perceive education as a specific phenomenon that lays in the practice theoretical, phenomenological, and agential realistic framing of affects. In doing so, I focus on the respective relationship between researcher and object that differs in each case.

1. Because of the endeavour to critically deal with accustomed dichotomies in modern western thought, practice theories deal with the tension between theory and practice and are skeptical about the primacy of theory (Hillebrandt 2014, p. 8). To explore social practices appropriately, theoretical premises cannot be brought onto social constellations from an outside perspective. Much more, it is necessary to develop theoretical assumptions against the background of the ambiguities and irritations that social life provides (*ibid.*, p. 11). This is understandable if we assume that practice theories constantly play with the relation between theory and practice. Schmidt's (2016) understanding of theorizing locates practices of theorizing and observing within the social world, which dissolves the separation of an observation and an observed practice to the extent that they are not assigned to two different epistemological spheres. However, the praxeologic construction of the object observed requires a 'double operation of distancing' (Schmidt 2018, p. 22) through which the researcher is located within an ensemble of practices, but never in the one he observes at the same time.

If we now come back to the question of what makes social phenomena intelligible as specific ones, the possibility of getting a grasp of the inherent logic of a phenomenon is linked to this understanding. It results from the directionality and performativity of practices being connected. Thus, the intelligibility of social phenomena is strongly tied to its affective dimension, as affects convey the directedness of practices. Therefore, to address education as a specific social phenomenon means trying to get an idea of its logic through its teleoaffective structure. The possibility of asking about the distinctiveness of educational practices results from their affectively conveyed directionality, which is different from the directionality of directly visible doings. In other words, education can be perceived because of its practical and affect-mediated directionality, which is twofold: On the one hand, there is the directionality of the concrete doing that can never be educational by itself. On the other hand, education needs to be understood as a conveying directionality, which cannot be directly seen, but which is revealed from the specific affective structure of the relation of doings and sayings.

2. Very similar to practice theory, the epistemological point of Phenomenology is that phenomena cannot be recognized in an intellectualistic way, which structurally ties the possibility of perception to the things observed. In contrast to

Practice Theory, Phenomenology understands affects independent of the functional directionality of social phenomena and therefore acknowledges the affective dimension of perception as an ontological presupposition. Thus, phenomena need to be experienced in their being. According to that, Phenomenology has developed a methodology that focuses on phenomena as they show themselves (Brinkmann 2015a, p. 34). At the same time, it considers the problem of representation, which relates to the assumption that physical experience is not reflexively accessible in a direct way (Brinkmann 2015b, p. 531).

According to this phenomenological methodology, the relation to affects is implied to the extent that the researcher needs to get an actual connection to the phenomenon in question. This connection cannot be prescribed by a theoretical framework. Rather, affects precede perception, since they are related to the being-in-the-world (Stenger 2019). As a result, Phenomenology demarcates from a way of thinking that supposedly can determine things and that places scientific observation on an ontological level other than that of the things considered (Böhme 1995, p. 32). On the contrary, the phenomenological account of atmospheres shows that the things observed are dependent on their perceivability (ibid.). Thus, affects as atmospheres refer to a physical dimension of perception as an embodied understanding of the world, which is inevitably connected to the possibility of experience. In other words, the world is conveyed through its affectual dimension. The human body is an opening through which the world is experienced (Merleau-Ponty 1994; Magyar-Haas 2017, p. 47).

For educational research, the phenomenological perspective on affects opens the possibility of relating to education regarding its constituting relations (Stenger 2015, p. 75 f.). For example, if we follow the assumption that the meaning of an educational situation opens up through the focus on the constitution of inter-attentionality (Brinkmann 2019, p. 545), the affective intentionality (Slaby 2011) within the phenomenon – and therefore, the condition of possibility of the participants to educationally relate to each other – affects the researcher at the same time (Brinkmann 2019, p. 552).

Focusing on education from a phenomenological perspective through its affective dimensions may lead to a profound understanding of the relational dimension of its constitution. However, even though phenomena can be grasped in a physical and affective way, the dependence between a phenomenon and its perception is tied to an ontological level which precedes the phenomenon observed in terms of time. Thus, a performative level of construction gets out of sight that brings forth the distance between the researcher and the phenomenon: There are educational phenomena from which sense is formed and given (ibid., p. 549), but they do not change through the researcher's gaze.

3. Like the practice theoretical and the phenomenological perspective, Barad's agential realistic approach starts, where representationalist views claim that the meaning of the world is only revealed in human reflection (Barad 2012, p. 9). However, Agential Realism also restricts radical constructivist positions by attributing its own power to the materiality of the world (*ibid.*, p. 13). As a result, to grasp phenomena Barad turns to the performativity of the world that is to be understood as material. According to that understanding, the intelligibility of a phenomenon emerges out of the differentiating, boundary realizing performance of material-discursive practices that cut into the unity of a phenomenon and therefore constitute the unity at the same time. Barad understands this movement as "cutting together apart" (Barad 2014).

The point of Agential Realism is that the view of the researcher on a phenomenon via specific theories, practices, discourses, and materialities (apparatus) is not an outside perspective on the phenomenon. It rather is an enacted cut, through which a phenomenon is reconfigured in a specific manner (Barad 2012, p. 22). That means that observation is not an act of distancing the researcher and the phenomenon, but a cut which constitutes a phenomenon of its own by performatively relating the researcher and an object.

Although Barad's Agential Realism does not include a theory of affect – in this regard affects might mark the epistemological problems of theories that radically focus phenomena as emergent – it could contribute to linking the practice theoretical and the phenomenological perspectives and thus the performative and the ontological dimension of phenomena through affects. Regarding this, to focus on affects relates to material-discursive cuts through which on the one hand phenomena are performatively constituted and on the other hand – as affects relate to the materiality of being – phenomena can be perceived.

When asking about the educational, the connection of both, a performative and an ontological dimension, conveys the respective educational meaning. As affects make the intersection of practices comprehensible against the background of the proceeding realization of boundaries, education cannot be reduced to specific practices, but rather refers to specific connections of intra-related practices. Therefore, education cannot be seen in an empiricist sense, but, from an affect-focussing perspective, it needs to be perceived in its intrarelations. Thereby, affects, as a condition of the possibility of taking part in education and to perceive education at the same time, make it possible to grasp that at first glance non-educational practices can take an educational turn or be educationally re-turned (Barad 2014). Referring to the dimension of being educationally affected therefore implies turning away from an understanding of educational research that takes on a spectator

perspective on a situation. The understanding, to be related to educational phenomena opens the possibility to ask about their inherent relational structure and about their inner workings of power in a different way.

6 Conclusion

If one follows the thesis that phenomena performatively constitute themselves and their meaning without saying that their performatively evolved specifics are arbitrary, focusing on affects makes it possible to follow a phenomenon's track. Therefore, focusing on affects means neither looking at the obvious, nor reconstructing something underlying, but aiming at the perceptibility of procedurally realized boundaries that are located in between both, a realistic understanding of the world and an acknowledgement of the idea that meaning is performatively constructed. Thus, to ask about the educational through affects can be taken up from an agential-realistic perspective. This perspective neither aims at the representation and identification of phenomena in an empiricist sense nor does it follow radical constructivist premises. Rather, the perspective raises the question of the extent to which affects have to lead to a new way to conceptualize scientific observation and thus the relation between a researcher and a phenomenon in question – in our case, education.

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The Breath and the Heart. Phenomenological Perspectives from the Hebrew Paradigm

Ralf Koerrenz

Here is my secret. It is very simple: It is only with the heart that one can see rightly; what is essential is invisible to the eye.

(de Saint-Exupéry 2018, Chap. XXI)

1 First Approaches: Talking about Being Human

When we hear, read or talk about Being Human, we are always guided by certain concepts. We have concepts about what constitutes Being Human. We have concepts about what Being Human should be, and we have such concepts of what actually is.

Our concepts are always pre-judgments with regard to our understanding. Our concepts are not just preconceptions but pre-judgments because we are responsible for our understanding. How we look at our pre-judgments is, methodologically speaking, a normative decision. My decision is: There is no access to phenomena without pre-judgments (Koerrenz 2014). We never approach reality without that. We cannot purify or free ourselves from conditions of our awareness. Never. We cannot escape responsibility for our pre-judgments.

I am interested in thinking about these pre-judgments. I am interested in how they are logically justified. But what interests me most is why we keep which pre-judgments. Why do we let ourselves be guided in our understanding by certain

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aspects? In the background is always the assumption that we are responsible for our perception of the world. So my interest in dealing with phenomena is ethical.

Particularly with regard to the relationship between mood and emotion, the following applies: The doctrine of understanding phenomena is the anthropological basis of ethics. And at the same time: The ethical question of the free responsibility of the individual is the basis for all understanding. Ethics and understanding or – to put it another way– ethics and hermeneutics are mutually determined as the basis for dealing with phenomena.

This also applies when we think about moods and emotion. If we turn to moods and emotions, then we always have a concept of Being Human in us. We have to make ourselves aware of this concept and we have to take responsibility for it. This is where what I call the Hebrew Paradigm of pedagogy comes into play. My thesis is that in European cultural history there is a largely suppressed cultural pattern of the political, the cultural, and also the educational. I call this repressed cultural pattern the “Hebrew Paradigm” (Koerrenz 1998). The term “Hebrew” is used by me as a pattern, a principle. This is similar to how Paul Tillich (1962) used the term “Protestant”. With this pattern I describe – spoken with Max Weber (1914) – a type which does not exist in reality in such a pure form. This cultural pattern has an opening and orienting function. The cultural pattern opens up knowledge because it demands our attention. We should engage with the reality of phenomena. We should open our eyes and ears, our breath and our heart. The cultural pattern also has an orienting function because it pre-determines the content of our approach to phenomena. In a certain way, the cultural pattern gives us pre-judgments as to how we can see the world. The cultural pattern gives us pre-judgments as to how we should see the world. We always live with this double function of cultural patterns. This approach to cultural patterns is similar to the philosophy of Wilhelm Schapp, a student of Edmund Husserl. Schapp has emphasized that we are involved in histories as contemporary memories (Schapp 1976). Our lives and our perception of reality are shaped by these histories. If we were to talk about our cultural patterns today, motives such as capitalism, consumption, colonialism, and postcolonialism would come into discussion. But that is not our theme.

Let us look at the Phenomenological Perspectives from the Hebrew Paradigm. The frame of reference for the “Hebrew Paradigm” is the Hebrew Bible and in particular 5th Books of Moses. This Paradigm is a possible concept of Being Human, a possible pre-judgment, a possible choice of looking at the reality. This “Hebrew Paradigm” opposes the traditional narrative that the development of Europe is based primarily or even exclusively on the reception of ancient Greek

and Roman culture. Today, the characteristic of the Hebrew Paradigm is explained by the relationship between mood and emotion.

Let us first take a look at the concept of Being Human (Janowski 2019) in Hebrew thought. First, it can be pointed out what Being Human does not mean. There is no dualism of body and soul. There is no soul settled in the head and there is no soul divided into several soul parts. Being Human is not thought from the head. If we look at the concept of Being Human, three aspects can give us a first impression: the function of the breath of life, the meaning of body parts for the understanding of the person, and finally the question in which way the Being Human perfects itself.

The idea of the creativeness of man is a complex process in Hebrew tradition. The basis of life is described in Genesis 2,7:

“JHWH Elohim formed man out of earth from the ground and blew the breath of life into his nose. Then man became a living being.”

It is the breath of life that gives life to man. At the centre of the determination of life is the motif of נפש (näfäsch). נפש (näfäsch) refers to the breath and power of life. נפש (näfäsch) has often been wrongly translated as a soul in the Greek sense: ψυχή (Psyché). But this is a wrong fitting into Greek thinking that has consequences for the understanding of mood and emotion. נפש (näfäsch) is the vitality, the life force of man. This vitality is illustrated by the breath, the ability to breathe. The נפש (näfäsch) can pass. It is not about an immortal ψυχή (Psyché) as the centre of life. Body and נפש (näfäsch) are both mortal. נפש (näfäsch) is also thought beyond the supposed opposition of ratio and emotio. The breath is the life force that permeates the whole body. נפש (näfäsch) preserves man and turns the body into the corporeality in which man can perceive himself. The breath controls the biological functions. If the נפש (näfäsch) escapes from the body, man dies. Without נפש (näfäsch), man is dead. Being Human is a phenomenon that can be understood from the point of view of breathing.

But there is no such thing as body- ψυχή (Psyché) dualism. This can also be seen in the fact that the limbs of the body are regarded as communication bridges. We communicate with ear, nose, hand, and foot. While the ear in the Hebrew context is the acoustic centre of knowledge (cf. Spr 18,15 etc.), the function of the hand is determined differently. This is about action, power, strength, violence (cf. Ri 7,2 etc.). The foot expresses mobility, power, presence (cf. Sam 23,22 etc.). The face, the panim, has a quite central function. The mimic expressiveness aims at social communication (cf. Kön 21,4 etc.). The eye stands for attention and visual cognition (cf. Ps 54,9, etc.). The head as a whole represents the whole individual, his rank and status (cf. Gen 49,26 etc.). Every part of the body speaks for man and testifies to his vitality. It is the communication message of the body

part which moves into the foreground. The body thus becomes the fundamental medium of the representation of the whole human being and his social ability to communicate. A disdain for the body contradicts Hebrew thinking. A search for any inner soul does not lead to the centre of Hebrew anthropology. In addition to a positive appreciation of the body, there is a second point of view which has a quite essential meaning for the understanding of emotions: memory.

2 The Mood of Memory

Let us begin with a metaphor: we can raise the question of when man's creation is actually completed in the Hebrew Bible. We are accustomed – if we know the beginning of the Bible at all – to the completion of this creation in the first three chapters of Genesis. The conclusion is the expulsion from Paradise because Eve had picked a forbidden fruit from the Tree of Knowledge for Adam. But if by creation we also mean man's becoming social, the process comes to its conclusion at a completely different point.

Let us reconstruct the narrative to trace the mood. The narrative creates the great pre-judgment with which all phenomena of this world are to be perceived. Following the expulsion from Paradise, there are the great symbols of human alienation. They are archetypal symbols in which the fragility of Being Human is explained:

- It is about the microstructure of coexistence (Cain and Abel),
- It is about an incomprehensible, split relationship to nature (Noah),
- It is about man's social inclination to set himself absolute, to want to be like God.

Thinking in absoluteness and unambiguity is the basic disease of Being Human. This applies to the Tree of Knowledge (Eve and Adam) as well as to the project of the Tower of Babel.

Murder of people, driven by envy and jealousy; lack of sensitivity to read the signs of nature properly; arrogance in the desire to take an absolute position in relation to nature and history.

They are impressive images of human interaction. What is decisive for the Hebrew Paradigm and for the mood of memory, however, is that the description of Being Human does not stop there. With a view to humanity, it rather only begins.

Decisive for the Phenomenological Perspectives from the Hebrew Paradigm is the mood of memory. It is about a basic experience without which the entire cultural history of the Western world would not be comprehensible: the Exodus. The Exodus is the mood of memory.

The Exodus is about a double memory. On the one hand, there is individual alienation and collective slavery in Egypt. On the other hand, the Exodus stands for an experience of liberation from slavery. This is connected with the fact that social rules are given. These rules, the Torah, are to make a life possible with which the Being Human is to be preserved on earth. In the Exodus-Covenant possibilities of dealing with the factual alienation of the human being in the inner world are designed, chosen in Israel, representative of the human being par excellence. The covenant has to prove itself through the actions of the people, each and every individual, in the course of history. Although history is generally under the sign of the universal alienation of human existence, after the Exodus it is also under the sign of the political experience of slavery and liberation. All this cannot be understood without learning and education. Because from generation to generation it is about the great challenge to keep alive the experience of enslavement and oppression on the one hand and hope and liberation on the other hand. This is the core of the sch^ema Israel in Deuteronomy 6,4 ff.: “These words which I command you today, you shall take to heart and you shall teach them to your children and talk about them when you sit in your house or are on your way when you lie down or get up.”

So it is obvious that learning is understood as a lifelong, never-ending process. According to the Hebrew tradition, learning does not find its limits at a certain age. “One never stops learning”– this proverb refers in the Hebrew context to the lifelong educational need of man. There is a lifelong human need for learning because man can never fully reach and internalize the framework of his God-given life-possible boundaries.

At the same time, it is a matter of daily practice and not of an abstract, unique and conclusive knowledge of truth because truth will always only manifest itself in history. The situations in which God’s words are to be ‘appreciated to the heart’ (“when you sit in your house or are on the way when you lie down or stand up”) refer to the entire everyday life and the entire life span. With this list of everyday situations, God is finally proclaimed as the decisive point of reference for thinking and acting in all phases of everyday life. The Exodus-Covenant is founded in the individual and collective memory of liberation and the associated proclamation of the rule of a particular social and legal order (Walzer 1988). It is the Hebrew narrative of an everyday pedagogy. This pedagogy has a very specific curriculum. Exodus is the mood of learning.

The recollection of the double history of alienation and liberation creates the pedagogical connection between generations. It is about the connection between generations, between grandparents and parents and children. This connection is created by remembering God's history with man. The tradition of creation, alienation, covenant and liberation from Egyptian slavery forms a mood. So this memory is not neutral. Temporarity and fragility refer – politically translated – to the permanence and irreversibility of diversity, of differences of opinion and interpretation, of the insurmountable conflict in the struggle as to how concretely the provisions of the traditional social and legal order can or should be translated into political action. The fragility of creation is under the sign of the post-paradise condition of all human existence that life will be trouble, that the protection of life must be ensured only by work and by the social arrangement of the imperfect and must be defended against dangers. Being Human is thus always under the sign of the provisional, of alienation, of the post-Paradise, under the condition that there can never and will never be a form of domination in the world that will be able to overcome this post-paradise situation by creating a Paradise on earth (Koerrenz 2019a). This memory represents the mood of world perception. The creation of the human being is completed in social regard in the passion for liberation. There is no neutral relationship to the world. The relationship of man as a social being to the world is always carried by a mood of scepticism towards inner-worldly power structures. The mood of the Exodus, however, is only captured if it is understood not only as “liberation or freedom from something” but also as “liberation or freedom to something” (Walzer 1988, p. 91). It is about a Passion for Liberation. This Passion for Liberation asks for existing exclusions, marginalizations, oppressions in the particular present. It is about looking for the slavery of the particular present. It is about analysing and criticising this slavery (Marcuse 1969). In the end, it is a matter of arriving at well-founded forms of rebellion and protest.

The Exodus frames all emotions as mood. Emotions get their place in the perception of man only in the memory of oppression and liberation. Emotions have to fit into the mood of the world. There are no pure emotions that stand alone. Emotions are integrated into the concept of wholeness.

- into the wholeness of the individual human being in his bodily constitution as נפש (näfäs) and
- into the wholeness of man as a social being through the memory of the Exodus.

In his book “Das Wesen des Judentums” (“The Essence of Judaism”), the important philosopher of religion Leo Baeck (1967) made a distinction between two

basic emotions. Baeck distinguishes between devotion and reverence and describes a dialectical relationship of mystery and commandment. The difference between Judaism and Christendom in Baeck's typology is marked by activity and an orientation towards life on the one side and passivity and self-sufficiency on the other side. In the context of Christianity, the human being understands itself only as an object of divine action and at the same time freed from responsibility. The consequences of this described form of passivity especially influence the understanding of the political. Because of the manifestation of religion as a stance of passivity in Christianity instead of an active-procreative responsibility, the deification of inner worldly authority became possible (Koerrenz 2019b). If a religion's key point is characterized as the passive reception of mercy then, according to Baeck, the necessary distinction between the world of God and the human world of influence could not be maintained anymore. The accountability for one's own action motivated by religion is blocked by a relationship between God and the human being that is only based on humility. A consequence of this relationship however, is for example the transfer of the passive attitude onto the belief in a nation like a self-contained religious value. Reference point of a religious attitude as this becomes the inherent value of power structures, which the individual agrees with in a passive way.

At this point, it becomes visible that the logic of pedagogic in Baeck's dialectic Judaism carries aspects of cultural criticism. The systematic premise already negates the possibility to come to an agreement or even a consensual position with culture. This would be against the logic of the learning process which the human being has to perform. Additionally, the present social and political conditions with their mechanisms of power and repression are not in order with the core teachings of Jewish commandment. Insofar, the basic argument of cultural criticism is not only linked to the dialectical relationship of mystery and commandment on a systematic level but also with regards to the content. This dialectic guides the human being as a learning entity – assuming the reception of the covenant with God in his mystery as a foundation – into the world he has to recognize again and yet again in all its deficient profanity with his religiously motivated responsibility.

The "Humility" in the face of the "Mystery" of God protects the human being to reduce himself in his learning on a mere formism. By following such formism the human being would also miss itself, even though the responsible action would be the guiding principle of daily action. The foundation of human learning is the dialectic of mystery and commandment, concretized in the attitudes of devotion and reverence. From this point, the social dimension of learning has to be defined because the aspect of "Reverence" indeed includes the mission of a permanent and lifelong process of self-education in the face of God. However, self-education

cannot happen away from the community, even though learning always addresses the single individual. The struggle for concrete consequences of responsibility is the object of the never ending learning process. Baeck grasps this structure as a threefold responsibility: “We are to be holy because the Lord our God is holy (Lev. 19.2); this is man’s responsibility to God. Toward our neighbour we have an equal responsibility: we must know his heart (Exod. 23.9) and we are to honour the image of God in him. He is to live with us and we are to love him, for he is like us. Lastly is our responsibility before God to mankind: we are to be the witness of God on earth, to sanctify his name and thus prepare the way for the recreation of the world as the kingdom of God” (Baeck, 1967, p. 88).

Emotions are integrated into the dialectic of mystery and commandment. Baeck makes it clear that Hebrew thinking can be understood as a lifelong process of learning and self-education. Lifelong learning never reaches a final conclusion. In the face of the mystery of God, life and learning must always be risked anew on the basis of the commandment of reverence that is clear to human beings. From this interpretation of man as a systemic whole, from the mood of memory, and from the passion for liberation it follows that man is always on the way. On this path, he can and must learn – in reference to the Exodus.

3 The Heart as the Centre of Reason

Emotions are always integrated into the mood of world perception. Let’s return to the beginning at the end.

“It is very simple: It is only with the heart that one can see rightly; what is essential is invisible to the eye.” (de Saint-Exupéry 2018, Chap. XXI)

Or put differently:

The Lord said to Samuel, “Don’t look at his shape and high growth; I have rejected him. For it is not as a man sees it: A man sees what is before his eyes; but the Lord looks at his heart.” (Samuel 16:7)

When we hear, read, or talk about Being Human, we are always guided by certain ideas. We have conceptions about what constitutes Being Human. We have such conceptions of what Being Human should be, and we have such perceptions of what actually is.

If Hebrew thought has no idea of the soul in the Greek sense, it cannot reach a dualism of soul and body. From a holistic conception of Being Human, however, a question arises: Is there such a thing as a centre of world relationship? Here we come across an image that has always fascinated and convinced me: the image of the **לב** (heart).

The לֵב (heart) is – similar to the life principle of the נַפֶּשׁ (näfäsč) – an organ of relationship. In the systemic whole of the body, the לֵב (heart) becomes recognizable as a kind of centre from which a certain path starts. The concept of “לֵב (heart)” constitutes the person. The concept of “לֵב (heart)” refers to the fact that rational and emotional perception are intertwined in every turn towards the world.

The לֵב (heart) can learn, the לֵב (heart) can hear, the לֵב (heart) can speak. The ability of man to learn, however, is based on the fact that man has a hearing לֵב (heart)—a hearing לֵב (heart) as the seat of reason.

The Hebrew image of the hearing לֵב (heart) describes a front against which the Hebrew tradition distinguishes itself. It is about the answer to the question in which ways and in which contexts a person comes to truth: about himself, about God and about the world. The answer is: Man does not attain truth first and foremost through the capacity for thought of a reason settled in his soul. He arrives at truth with the hearing and seeing לֵב (heart). Metaphorically speaking: Man does not think with his head but with his לֵב (heart). In the לֵב (heart), however, thinking is always integrated into a mood. The concrete emotions that guide thinking are also connected with it. The emotions are connected with a heavy or a light לֵב (heart), with a happy or a sad לֵב (heart). Man is not autonomous. Man is referred back to the experience of Exodus.

In all this, it must always be stressed that according to Hebrew tradition, education is never directed against human reason as such. The image of the hearing לֵב (heart) describes the centre of man in which the seat of reason is located. In his “*Anthropologie des Alten Testaments*” (“*Anthropology of the Old Testament*”) Hans Walter Wolff (1984) has worked out the far-reaching meaning of the speech of the לֵב (heart). Wolff writes: “In Hebrew tradition, the heart is understood above all as the centre of the aware living human being. The decisive characteristic is that the heart is sufficient for reason and especially for hearing the Word of God” (Wolff 1984, p. 90). It is the image of a heartly reason. This heartly reason is to guide the perception of all phenomena.

If we summarize the line of thought once again, thinking with the לֵב (heart) is an expression of the relationship between mood and emotion. The לֵב (heart) as the seat of reason is at the same time – spoken with Max Horkheimer (1970) – the basis for the critique of an instrumentally understood reason. The לֵב (heart) always contains a critical reason – critical under the conditions of Exodus. The לֵב (heart) carries the mood of alienation, slavery, and liberation. The לֵב (heart) thus expresses thinking in emotions. The formula of the request for a “wise heart” refers to the fact that thinking with the לֵב (heart) is always connected with the mood of memory on the one hand and the passion for liberation on the other. The לֵב (heart) as the basis of wisdom indicates that we cannot separate our emotions

from thinking, speaking, and acting. Otherwise, we would negate ourselves in our Being Human. To what extent this expression of the understanding of being in the Hebrew Paradigm is still worth considering today, must each decide for himself. The basic figure of not being able to separate thinking from mood on the one hand and emotion on the other has the fascination of its own realism. Last but not least, this figure of thought is a basis for a certain engagement with phenomena. Metaphorically speaking: the description of phenomena counts on alienation and oppression. And the description of phenomena aims at the everyday Exodus. We are responsible for all this with our hearts. That is the hebrew narrative.

Well – “Men have forgotten this truth,” said the fox. “But you must not forget it. You become responsible, forever, for what you have tamed.” (de Saint-Exupéry 2018, Chap. XXI)

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Pedagogical Relations: Emotions in Learning, Bildung and Understanding



Negative Emotions and Learning

Severin Sales Rödel

Introduction

When Socrates and his friend Meno discuss the question of how we can learn something of which we do not have any prior knowledge (Plato 2006a, Meno), Socrates uses a living example to prove his point: He tells a slave to solve a mathematical task, which consists in calculating the surface of a geometrical shape – a task, the mathematically illiterate slave naturally cannot solve. By cross-examining him, Socrates lures the slave into a cognitive trap or *aporia*, a situation where he doesn't know what's right or wrong anymore and the slave cries out in despair: "Well, on my word, Socrates, I for one do not know!" (ibid., 84a). The philosopher has deprived the slave of his self-confidence, of the feeling of knowing something (or anything at all). He has humiliated the boy in front of spectators and, as Socrates calls it, has "caus[ed] him to doubt and [gave] him the torpedo's¹ shock" (ibid.), i.e. he has induced strong emotions and pathic experiences in the poor slave. But, being self-righteous as most experienced educators, Socrates sees no problem in inflicting such an emotional state on his student. He reassures himself: "And we have certainly given him some assistance [...] towards finding out the truth of the matter: for now, he will push on in the search gladly, as lacking knowledge; whereas then he would

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¹ The "torpedo" Socrates is speaking of is not a means of marine warfare but a kind of electric ray, which numbs its prey by emitting electric shocks. Earlier in the conversation, Meno has compared Socrates' rhetoric technique (and his looks) to the features of such a fish: "I consider that both in your appearance and in other respects you are extremely like the flat torpedo sea-fish; for it benumbs anyone who [...] touches it, and [this is what] you have done to me now." (Plato 2006a, 80a).

have been only too ready to suppose he was right...” (ibid.). Meno, his friend, does what Socrates’ dialogue partners mostly do: he wholeheartedly agrees.

This brief episode, which might or might not have taken place in the fifth century BC in the *agora* of Athens is still considered a founding stone of philosophical inquiries in the nature of learning and also a blueprint for all didactical art (Bühler 2012, p. 132). It shows how closely emotions and learning are connected: The beginning of learning lies in a negative emotion – negative in the sense of an emotion (here: despair and shame) which we normally try to avoid and which does not leave us unchanged. However, we could argue that from a life-world-perspective, Plato’s story doesn’t make much sense: After going through an experience of inability (he can’t solve the task), a major disappointment of his self-image (he is not a capable mathematician) and finally being put in a public situation of humiliation – why should the slave “push on in the search gladly” (Plato 2006a, 84a) instead of just resigning and giving up, especially as what can be learned through solving the task – mathematics – has no practical value for him?

In this paper, I will try to address these questions, avoiding to regard the relation of negative emotion as a simple problem of the transition from ‘emotion’ to ‘cognition’. I will argue, that negative emotions (and emotions in general) have been separated from learning as a cognitive or intellectual process on a discursive level and that the two elements have been forced into a temporal order (1). In a phenomenological analysis of a short example from classroom research (2), I will try to show that both hermeneutic and psychological learning theories perpetuate this separation and temporalization of emotion and learning and thus fail to cover life-world emotional experience in learning in its complexity (3). In a phenomenological variation, I will point out alternative concepts of emotion, learning, and sociality to create a different picture (4). I will argue that learning and emotions are both rooted in a pre-predicative relation to the world, which combines embodied (emotional) and intellectual elements. Negative emotions in learning can then be seen as anchor points for disruptions in this pre-predicative world-relation, and also as starting points for understanding the Other and thus interacting pedagogically (5).

1 (Negative) Emotions and Learning—Inventory of a Discourse

To understand how the whole range of affective and emotional phenomena are related to learning, knowledge, and scientific rationales, we have to take a closer look at the changeable history of this relation.

While affects, emotions, and the pathic dimension of life had been an integral part of learning and knowledge in Ancient Greece, they got more and more neglected and driven out of the spheres of knowledge, as modern scientific thinking emerged in the wake of Descartes' philosophy. In Greek mythology, the Gods often inflict pain upon men as a reminder of right and prudent action. In the Hellenistic era, learning through suffering and negative emotion was superior to other learning since it was thought to penetrate "into the space of the heart" (Dörrie 1956, p. 325). For the Greeks, a man who acted imprudently could not be instructed by rational arguments, since his actions indicated a lack of *sophrosyne*, prudence, and rationality. In such cases, learning by suffering was the means of choice (ibid.). In Greek philosophy and mythology, we can find an example for the close connections of emotion or the pathic dimension of learning in the proverb or phrase *pathein – mathein*, suffering, and learning (Röde 2019, p. 58). We even find traces of emotion and pathic learning in Plato's allegory of the cave (Plato 2006b, Republic, 514–517a), which was later to become the great narrative for all acquisition of knowledge and even the Enlightenment: The man escaping from the cave is painfully blinded by the light and goes through all kinds of emotional pain when he realizes, that all he believed to be true and real were just shadows and illusions. And, not to forget: The other prisoners in the cave react with hatred and violence as the fugitive returns to the cave and tells them what he saw (ibid., 517a). So, learning something new (and being forced to give up old ways) can also be a quite emotional and painful process (see also Plato 2006c, Theaetetus, 150a).

Beginning with Aristotle's epistemology, this ancient understanding of 'higher' learning through emotions gives way to a reflexive and formalistic understanding of learning, as the rational element is put in the foreground and learning is seen as a mere activity of the *logos* (Meyer-Drawe 2013, p. 68, referring to Aristotle's *De Anima*, Aristotle 1931). In the centuries to follow, emotions and affects are considered unfathomable for the mind, hard to control, and potentially dangerous to virtue and rationality. With the rise of Christian morality, which set the aim of all learning in man's approximation to the ideal of Christ, emotions were finally banned from contexts of learning for good. As they were considered to be rooted in the darker, animalistic regions of human personality, they seemed to be an indicator of potential sinfulness.

Looking at modern notions of the relation between (negative) emotions and learning, it is no wonder that the two spheres are clearly separated, as German phenomenologist Meyer-Drawe (2013) argues. In Western societies and economies aiming at performance and self-optimization, the affective and non-controllable elements of human learning – i.e. emotion – do not fit into the

picture. According to Meyer-Drawe, learning through *pathos*² or emotion as a synesthetic experience must first assert itself against a rational concept of learning. By bringing together pathos and emotion as a bodily moment with learning and knowledge, the occidental dual of mind and body, of active intellect and the passive-receptive, sensory dimension is called into question. Thus, arguing for a close relation between emotions and learning not only challenges a modern logic of knowledge, but also the concept of the modern subject itself (ibid., p. 68).

As we can see from this all too brief overview, emotions were not altogether expelled from the sphere of learning. With Foucault,³ we could claim that in this specific discourse on negative emotions and learning, the sphere of rationality, logic, the mind, knowledge, and systematic learning was first clearly separated from the sphere of emotion, pathos, affect, and the lived body, in order to relate and to re-construct the relation between the two spheres anew.

If we are looking at contemporary discourse on negative emotion and learning, we find a variety of approaches which underline the importance of making negative experience and emotions in learning. In the Anglophone discourse, this encompasses Dewey's theory of experience, in which discontinuity and difficulty play a very prominent role (Dewey 2008; English 2013; Waks 2017). In cognitivist learning theories – e.g. Piaget (2003) – disruption and emotions of dissonance have a prominent place, as well as in constructivist theories of learning (Glaserfeld 2002; Neubert and Reich 2006). Not to mention all the pseudo-scientific and guidebook-literature, suggesting that we learn from failure, and that failure brings us forward (for a critical synopsis, see Rödel 2019). All these theories suggest, that failure, aporias, setbacks, and disappointments are inevitable in learning and even promote it in a special way. However, they are all built on a separation of negative emotion and cognitive-intellectual learning activity and a 'temporalization' of the relationship of the two processes – i.e. they cannot occur at the same time but stand in a relation of (causal) succession. As I will show in the following, this notion of negative emotion and learning goes hand in hand with a neglect of the sphere of the lived body and the social sphere. Both these dimensions are of major relevance for the experience of emotions, and by giving them away, learning would lose its connection to and foundation in the life-world, as the emotions

² Following German phenomenologist Waldenfels (2007), Friesen has rendered *pathos* as that which "touches, affects and even violates" us (Friesen 2014, p. 72).

³ Foucault mentions the process of "classification, ordering and distribution" (Foucault 1971, p. 12) which the elements or constituents of a discourse undergo in the formation of this specific discourse. These processes are again subject to change, however they delimit with a certain rigor which elements of the discourse are to be combined, and which aren't: "...discourse exercises its own control" (ibid., see also Foucault 1979, p. 15ff.).

in learning would have to be considered specific emotions, disconnected from the ones we are normally experiencing.

2 Emotions in Learning: An Example from Video Classroom Research

In the following, I will present an example from video classroom research, which serves as the starting point for a brief phenomenological analysis. Phenomenology as a mode or style (Merleau-Ponty 1966, p. 4) of thinking and inquiry uses examples to create a richer picture of experiences and situations. We can suggest that in this example, an emotion of shame is central.

We find ourselves as observers in a German lesson of a sixth grade in a German comprehensive school. The students sit in a circle of chairs and are physically close to each other, everyone is visible to everyone. The subject of the lessons is Aesop's fable of the crow and the jug.⁴ The teacher has just read a part of the fable, but without reading it to the end. She now asks the students in a class discussion to suggest solutions to the problem the crow is facing in the fable – it is thirsty but can't reach the water level in the jug. We are focusing on one student, who raises his arm and as the teacher calls upon him, he suggests that the crow in the fable should get some help. The teacher responds: "What should this help look like?" The student responds: "Other crows?" The teacher inquires again: "And what should the other crows do?"; whereupon the student suggests: "Eeeh, they could help thinking?" The other students start to laugh and the teacher hurries to comment: "Aha, okay, that's not so bad at all. We have often done the same, getting together, asking ourselves how to solve a problem. We have collected our ideas and mostly, at some point, we found a good solution."

Looking at the student's posture, we notice that after the pretty extensive gesture of raising his arm (Fig. 1), waiting to be called upon, he draws back further and almost 'withdraws into himself'. His shoulders are lowered and pulled inwards, his view is directed to the floor, his hands lie motionless in his lap (Fig. 2). His facial expressions are unstable – parts of the conversation with the teacher are accompanied by an insecure smile that quickly disappears again, his gaze moves restlessly between the teacher, his hands in the lap, and the classmates. Most of them are turned towards the boy and the laughter of the classmates, which follows the boy's last answer, draws even more attention to the conversation between him and the teacher: Some students now bend forward and literally stare at him.

⁴ In this classical fable by Aesop, the crow eventually solves the problem by throwing several stones into the jug—the water level rises and it can drink.



Fig. 1 Begin of the discussion, student raises arm to contribute (© S. Rödel)



Fig. 2 Student in a pose of shame, peers laughing and staring (© S. Rödel)

3 Questioning What We Take for Granted: A Phenomenological Reduction

I will now briefly suggest two ‘classical’ ways of reading this example through the lens of learning theory, in order to carry out what is called a reduction in phenomenological terms (Fink 1957; Brinkmann 2015). In a reduction, we are taking our subjectivity or “first-person-perspective” (Zahavi, 2007, p. 132) into question and critically examine it. Reading an example like the one above (or experiencing phenomena in general), goes along with thousands of subjective pre-judgements

and expectations, based on our life-world understanding of (pedagogical) situations, on scientific and pseudo-scientific theories, or biographical experience. In this context (and with myself being a researcher in educational theory), it is especially pre-judgments rooted in pedagogical theory, that come to mind naturally. For the sake of the argument, I will thus start with two theories of learning and try to put them ‘into brackets’ (Husserl 1950–2004, Vo. I, p. 56), in order to be able to describe the phenomena in more detail.

3.1 Learning and Negative Emotions in Hermeneutic-Phenomenological Learning Theory

The first reading is based on a hermeneutic-phenomenological theory of learning, which in the German discourse is closely related to Buck (Buck 1989, 2019). For Buck, experience (and thus learning) is a temporally structured process between prior knowledge or prior experience, anticipations, and new elements. In order to learn, we have to go through a so-called “negative experience” (Buck 1989, p. 57), which functions as a negation of anticipations or expectations. Through this first negation, a horizon of questions and problems is opened up – the learner cannot relate the new situation or experience to any previous experience. To complete the process of learning, the openness of the first negation is closed again in a “second, absolute negation” (Buck 1981, p. 73) and the new experience is dissolved in a changed, newly consolidated horizon. When we learn, patterns of meaning and assumptions about the world, which feed on previous experiences, are first interrupted and ‘disappointed’, then rearranged and transformed. Thus, Buck also speaks of ‘re-learning’ (*Umlernen*⁵). This also means that the negative experience in learning is turned into a positive one: “The actually instructive experiences are those in which, as they say, one pays dues, i.e. the so-called negative ones” (Buck 1989, p. 15). Negative experience (and negative emotion) becomes “productive” (ibid., p. 80) precisely because it affects the whole person and goes beyond the correction of false assumptions or knowledge; it broadens the whole horizon of learning and knowledge. In a quite platonic manner, Buck speaks of a ‘reversal’ of the consciousness (ibid.), that takes place when we learn through a negative experience (in Plato’s words: “turning round the soul”, Plato 2006b, 521c). Re-learning through negative experience is then a higher form of learning,

⁵ The German prefix *um-* indicates, that something changes. Insofar, the translation of *Umlernen* with re-learning is not exact, as the prefix *re-* (not exclusively, but mostly) suggests, that something is simply repeated or restored.

in which the way of future experience changes and the learner gains a new form of self-awareness and self-relation.⁶

Applied to the example given, such a perspective would suggest that the student is experiencing the negation of his knowledge or his prior way of thinking, has to re-structure his horizon of experience and – going along with this – the structure of his self-relation. The emotion that was ascribed to the boy for the sake of the argument would then be a mere effect of the confrontation with a negation of his prior knowledge ('first negation'). Following this negation, the feeling of shame could be attributed to the insight and the massive deception of his earlier self-concept as a student, who is able to contribute relevant ideas: If shame is a reaction to the "failing relation between an individual and his/her ideal self" (Schäfer and Thompson 2009, p. 9), a protective mechanism for the "fragility of our existence" (Meyer-Drawe 2009, p. 49), the boy goes through a 'second negation'. With Buck, we would have to interpret the emotion of shame as a follow-up of a reflective process. Emotion would then be secondary to reflective learning, both in terms of temporality and hierarchy. And, if we furthermore assume that the student actually learned something (about crows or about himself), the negative emotion would have to be considered as something 'positive', whereas if learning didn't take place, it remains a 'negative' negative emotion. Labelling a painful emotion as 'positive' leads to similar problems of life-world incongruences as mentioned in the story of Meno's slave – why should something painful be motivating? On the other hand, the life-world congruency of emotional experience and pedagogical labelling (a negative emotion is negative for learning) is only to be had at the price of a failure in learning.

3.2 Learning and Negative Emotions in Educational Psychology

In a second perspective, I will take a look at psychological theories which try to connect learning to negative emotions. Hascher and Brandenberger (2018) describe emotions as related to "a cause or an incident" as well as "interrelated with cognition". In addition to the cognitive sphere, they also influence motivation and acting (ibid., 291). When it comes to learning, emotions do not affect learning directly (Efklides and Petkaki 2005, as quoted in Geppert and Kilian 2018, p. 234). Rather, (positive) emotions are considered to influence metacognition, motivation, and self-efficacy-beliefs and thus for example encourage students

⁶ This notion is closely connected to theories of *Bildung* (see Rödel 2019, p. 188).

to stay on task (Hascher 2010, p. 14). Negative emotions, on the contrary, lead learners to focus on themselves and their emotional experience, which hinders learning, as the necessary attention for learning and task solving is lacking: According to Hascher (*ibid.*, p. 15) learners cannot focus both on the task or object of learning and on themselves. In order to foster learning (and learning skills), students should consequently try to avoid negative emotions or – if they arise – cope with them in a way so learning is not impeded. Also, students should be trained in emotion-regulating and coping strategies and in productive failure-processing strategies (Hascher and Brandenberger 2018, p. 303).

However, there are also opposite notions of negative emotion in educational psychology. Pekrun for example suggests, that negative emotions such as fear, anger, and shame can be potentially “activating” emotions (Pekrun 2018, p. 216f.). He argues, that the anticipation of shame after failure can work as a driving force for learning and motivate students to pursue their “performance goals” (*ibid.*, p. 226). Similarly, D’Mello et al. (2014) classify confusion as a ‘positive’ negative emotion. They define confusion as an “epistemic” or knowledge emotion (*ibid.*, p. 154, see also Pekrun and Stephens 2012), as it arises out of a cognitive operation. In this operation, learners determine whether new information aligns with existing knowledge structures or whether there are discrepancies in the information stream (D’Mello et al. 2014, p. 154). In the case of discrepancies, an affect – mostly surprise or confusion – in learning occurs and a learner can become “metacognitively aware of the state of his or her knowledge” (*ibid.* 166). What defines this process as an emotional one is the simple fact that an incident disturbing the regular cognitive processing of information cannot be considered as part of cognition itself. It has to be something else – an emotion (*ibid.*). Students then have to “effectively self-regulate their confusion”, i.e. their emotion (*ibid.* 155). Otherwise, they are likely to fail or be frustrated after numerous unsuccessful attempts to solve problems, which then results in “negligible or poor learning” (*ibid.*, p. 154). Broken down to a simple formula, D’Mello et al. speak of “the confusion-engagement transition” (*ibid.*, p. 166), which means the leap from an experienced emotion or confusion to a (cognitive) engagement with the source of confusion. Thus, negative emotion (in this case: confusion) can be seen as an agent triggering a process of “deeper learning” (*ibid.*, p. 154), as not only the information acquired is questioned, but the existing knowledge structures themselves.⁷

⁷ For a complete description of the ‘flow’ and dynamics of different affective states during processes of deep (or shallow) learning, see the elaborate model of D’Mello and Graesser (2012).

If we are taking a look at our example from the psychological perspectives presented here, the boy would have to evaluate the incoming information first and check for incongruences, before experiencing an emotion. If we take one step further, his behavior could also be described as a struggle for a transition between the emotion experienced, and new metacognitive strategies of reorganizing his knowledge – he obviously fails to do so and according to D’Mello et al., this results in poor learning. Following Hascher’s perspective, the experience of confusion and maybe even shame is so overwhelming that the boy focuses on himself, his individual experience, and strategies of escaping from the emotion so that he is not able to focus on the task anymore. Being overwhelmed does not go along with the idea of a strong subject who willfully engages with negative emotions and autonomously chooses to activate cognitive resources. If educational psychology were to explain what happens to the student, it had to introduce an artificial separation between cognitive aspects, meta-cognitive mechanisms of control, and emotional experience which is rendered as completely different from the two other aspects – both in its temporal succession and its nature: what is cognition cannot be emotion and vice versa.

4 Variation: Broadening Perspectives, Approaching the Phenomenon

After having presented two ‘classical’ perspectives of learning theory and having pointed out the shortcomings of these perspectives in terms of describing the phenomenon of emotion in learning, I will now try to create a richer picture of the experience reported in the example. In a phenomenological analysis, this step is connected to a so-called ‘variation’– the act of “playfully” (Husserl 2012, p. 46) trying out different perspectives and pluralizing meaning. The researcher thus tries to open new approaches to the phenomenon or example. Applying different perspectives also helps in achieving a temporary estrangement from one’s own point of view and an opening up for the world in a mode of passivity. In the following, I will present three theoretical angles to re-conceptualize emotions, learning itself, and the social dimension of emotions.

4.1 Philosophy and Phenomenology of Emotions

According to German philosophers and phenomenologists Landweer and Demmerling (2007), emotions in a narrower sense have intentional correlates and are

related to the world. Intentionality in the context of feelings and emotions should not be misunderstood as intentionality in the sense of a theory of agency or purposefulness. Being intentional here just means: being directed towards something, relating to something.⁸ We feel shame for an inappropriate remark in a social conversation, we envy a sense of ambition and determination someone else shows or we grief over the death of a loved person. In their intentionality, feelings and emotions can also be distinguished from physical sensations such as heat or cold and pleasure or pain. In such sensations, we experience a certain quality or stimulation in all its immediacy, without the correlative structure. Furthermore, we can distinguish emotions from moods: Moods have no intentional objects or at least are related to diffuse objects and ends – such as the mood of angst (ibid., p. 5).⁹ The backside of the intentional structure is the propositionality of emotions (ibid., p. 6): In their intentional relationality, emotions not only are directed towards something, but they add a certain quality, statement, or proposition to this directedness: We are not only neutrally relating to our departed grandfather or the event of death itself, but we also relate to him in a certain mode – the mode of grief – and thus give this relation the nature of a proposition (ibid.).

When it comes to the question of cognition and emotions, Landweer and Demmerling argue that we have to assume a simultaneity of physical or embodied experience and cognition. When we look at emotions on a phenomenal level, they are interwoven with cognition in an almost chiasmatic structure, much more than, say, a structure of succession, where one process precedes the other. Emotions are experienced holistically, not as the sum or dynamics of individual processes. It would therefore be misleading to raise the question, how embodied emotions and cognitions ‘interact’ in feelings, as if they were ontologically delimitable phenomena. According to the authors, “an ontological separation of the two spheres is phenomenally not possible” (ibid., p. 21).

If we read our example from this perspective, it becomes obvious that the emotion of shame has an intentional correlate: The boy is ashamed of the gaze

⁸ Husserl’s concept of intentionality is central to phenomenological thinking. In an intentional act of perception, we perceive the intended phenomenon *as something specific*. Perception is neither an act of reception nor of construction, but something in between: In its intentionality it is (actively) directed towards the world and at the same time (passively) open to experience and impression (Waldenfels 1992, p. 16).

⁹ Moods can be defined as being of longer duration, having a more encompassing social dimension and – most importantly – as being foundational for understanding (in the sense of a hermeneutic of *Dasein*). Moods in learning can thus be said to pre-determine how we communicate, how we understand given learning contents and which possibilities for learning in general open up or close (Rödel 2020).

of the others resting upon him, of being the center of attention in an unwillingly comic situation. The intentional character of the emotion does not need to have an ‘objective’ correlate. In this situation, the others as a source of shame and the shared, social norms as a means of comparison (Schäfer and Thompson 2009, p. 9) are not explicitly given, they emerge and become relevant over the course of the interaction and the embodied relations of the participants. Taking the perspective of embodied emotions, i.e. the chiasmatic connection of emotion and cognition into account, the posture and mimics of the boy can be read as ‘embodiments’ (Plessner). Embodiments are bodily expressions of a certain self-relation, which is itself based on relations to others and their embodied expressions.¹⁰ The boy in the example – or, more precisely – his gestures, mimics, and posture show us a certain emotional engagement, which becomes accessible and understandable through “taking part in each other’s feelings” (Scheler 1923, p. 1): We all know the emotion of shame and the embodied reactions such as blushing, sweating or tunnel vision, and sometimes observing someone else living through this emotion even triggers it in ourselves. Given this, one could not claim (as in the perspectives presented before) that negative emotions are secondary to the intellectual elements of the situation, or that they are hindering or supporting learning. Negative emotions are built on a wholly different logic, and at the same time, they are fundamental and pre-predicative to the situation as they are *embodied emotions*.

4.2 Learning and ‘Not-Readiness-To-Hand’

The next variative perspective invites us to cast a different light on learning by referring to Heidegger. In his lecture “What is a thing” (Winter Semester 1935/36), Heidegger briefly talks about the nature of learning and describes it as the “taking of what one already has” (Heidegger 1967, p. 73). A famous quote from this lecture reads: “The μαθήματα [*mathémata*, S.R.] are the things insofar as we take cognizance of them as what we already know them to be in advance, the body as the bodily, the plant-like of the plant, the animal-like of the animal, the thingness of the thing and so on”. (ibid., p. 72f.) Heidegger calls this kind of learning *mathesis* and describes it as the transition from knowing things in a life-world sense to knowing things in the sense of questioning and going to the bottom of them. Heidegger’s view of learning as “taking of what one already has” (ibid.,

¹⁰ Embodied expressions cannot be grasped with a simple hermeneutic approach or a semiotic notion of signifier and signified. For a theory of pedagogical understanding of embodied expressions see Brinkmann (2020).

p. 73) also functions as a link between a phenomenology of hermeneutics of the *dasein* and a phenomenology of the lived body, in which being-in-the-world (or ‘being towards the world’¹¹ with Merleau-Ponty) is mainly mediated by things and us dealing with them (Meyer-Drawe 2000).

In this concept of learning, negative moments and maybe negative emotions play a decisive role. The transition from a simple, lifeworld knowledge to “taking cognizance of things” is marked by moments of negativity. According to Heidegger, we normally see and deal with the surrounding world in the mode of “in-order-to” (Heidegger 1996, §15, p. 65), and things are given to us in a certain “handiness” (ibid.) or ‘readiness-to-hand’ (“*Zuhandenheit*”, Heidegger 2006, §15, p. 69). This status can be interrupted by experiences of not-readiness to hand, i.e. when something is missing or something doesn’t function the way it is supposed to according to its status as ‘equipment’ or “useful thing” (Heidegger 1996, §15, p. 68). In these moments of “unhandiness” (ibid., §16, p. 68) or ‘not-readiness-to-hand’ (Heidegger 2006, §16, p. 73),¹² our attention is drawn to the world as a whole. Breaking the routine and the everyday use of things, they become “present” or “objectively present” (Heidegger 1996, §16, p.70) and the world or being as such shows or announces itself in inner-worldly, everyday modes of concern (ibid., § 15). Coming back to learning, we can see how experiences of not-readiness-to-hand can help us to look differently at what we already take for granted. This can lead to a broadening of horizons, which can be described as a special form of learning and as an extension of experience.

Applied to our example, we can ascribe a moment of not-readiness-to hand to the boy: based on a *Dasein* that is always already interwoven in structures of understanding and being-towards-the-world, he relies on a certain structure of in-order-to and according to this structure he answers the teacher’s question: to find a solution, we can ask fellow students to ‘help us think’. The teacher’s reply and the reaction of the classmates mark a moment of (intersubjective) “conspicuousness” (ibid., p.68), as Heidegger calls it (*Auffälligkeit*). The boy has to ask himself why his solution to the problem seems valid to him, but not to the others. In this short episode, an opportunity opens up to question the things in the world – in this

¹¹ English translations of Merleau-Ponty’s *Phénoménologie de la perception* translate the ambiguous French phrase “puisque exister c’est être au monde” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, p. 414f.) with “to be in the world” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 378) or “being in and of the world” (Merleau-Ponty 2005, p. 421). I stick to the German translation (*Zur-Welt-Sein*, Merleau-Ponty 1966, p. 413).

¹² Heidegger’s distinction between different modes of “unhandiness” – i.e. “conspicuousness” (*Auffälligkeit*), “obtrusiveness” (*Aufdringlichkeit*), and “obstinacy” (*Aufsässigkeit*) (Heidegger 1996, §16, p.68) – is hard to present unambiguously in translation.

case, the nature of the task and the kind of solution(s) marked as relevant by both teacher and fellow students. The emotion of shame can be attributed to the elementary experience of difference the boy goes through. By being exposed to laughter and the gaze of the others, he feels alienated in what he considered as a most stable state – his existence as an interpretation of Dasein, and – in the words of Meyer-Drawe – shame can be considered a “shield to the fragility of our existence” (Meyer-Drawe 2009, p. 49).

4.3 Emotions as Social and Valuing Experience

In a third and last perspective, I will refer to Scheler and put the focus on the sociality of emotions. For Scheler, emotions are a pre-condition for experiencing and understanding the Other. The experience of the Other is only possible because we can relate to his state of mind and participate in his feelings and emotions. Feeling with the Other creates the Other as a human being that is both similar and different from ourselves (Scheler 1923, p. 69). However, this specific process of relating to and creating the other is not based on a notion of intellectual or rational understanding, but rather on the experience of ‘encountering’ the Other (ibid.). According to Scheler, an encounter as a special form of inter-subjectivity is created by unconsciously imitating the expressive movement of the other and thus creating the same or a similar emotion within oneself (Schloßberger 2013, p. 299). This makes the experience of the Other an original and immediate one (Scheler 1913), and – what puts Scheler clearly in the phenomenological tradition of Husserl – does not allow to break apart this experience in an internal (psychological) and external (physical) sphere. It is the experience of an embodied expression of the Other (Schloßberger 2009, p. 256; Brinkmann 2020). Scheler thus rejects a Cartesian division of inner and outer spheres and conceptualizes understanding the Other by a process of intercorporeal conclusion (Scheler 1923, p. 281).

However, Scheler does not fall back into a simple, esoteric theory of empathy. He suggests a systematics of emotions, of which only the higher classes qualify as emotions leading to understanding the other. By using a distinction Husserl introduced – between the sensory and intentional qualities of emotions – he ranks emotions according to the relation between these two qualities. The emotion of shame, for example, would be a “psychological emotion”, which means that the sensory elements stand in a direct correlation to the intentional ones, thus enabling our social surroundings to take part in this emotion (Scheler 1916, p. 344–357).

The specific social quality of emotions guarantees that they are not only solipsistic sentiments or experiences but are tied to a judgmental function. Unlike Kant – and unlike the psychological theories of emotion mentioned earlier – Scheler combines emotions and judgments. He argues that judgement does not take a detour via justifications such as the *categorical imperative*, but must be thought of lying within emotion itself. In an emotion, we are not only relating to the world (which would be intentionality, see above), but we are judging the correlates of our perception before we cognitively dissect, categorize and legitimize them. In analogy to the epistemological term *Wahrnehmen* (to perceive something, which translates directly as ‘taking the truth’) he speaks of “*Wertnehmen*” – ‘taking the value’ – (ibid., p. 209f.) through emotions. Experiencing an emotion is, in Scheler’s phenomenology of affects, an act of evaluating the world around us, and vice versa: Judgments and the formation of values are only possible when they are connected to emotions.

If we take one last look at the example, applying Scheler’s theory of emotions, we can describe the relation between teacher, student, and classmates in more detail. The answer of the student can then be re-framed as a potentially shaming remark, and the reaction of the classmates can be interpreted as an expression of them experiencing the boy as the Other on the level of emotions. Of course, this sounds somewhat cruel because it would imply that the classmates laugh at the boy because they feel his emotion of shame and not the other way round (he is ashamed because they laugh). But the simultaneity of the events and the fact that there is no other communication between them suggests that the students are somehow connected to each other on a sphere of emotions. A similar interpretation applies to the relation of teacher and student: The teacher can try to rehabilitate the student on a level of contents – she tries to make what he said look relevant and meaningful. But she can only do so because she already understood his experience on a level of shared emotions and is primordially connected to his subjective, emotional dimension. And finally, Scheler’s idea that we are ‘evaluating’ (*Wertnehmen*) through emotions, can also be applied to the example – the student is somewhat overwhelmed by his emotions before he can actually value or justify on a rational level what was awkward or special about his answer. The classmates, who burst into laughter, also judge the remark without analyzing or criticizing it on a linguistic level.

5 Summary

At the beginning of this paper, we could see how negative emotions and learning have been separated from one another over the centuries, only to bring them together afterwards in different discursive manifestations. Thus, the relation of the two spheres can be described as a separation and temporalization, i.e. an artificial introduction of a formalistic, processual logic. In a short phenomenological reduction of an example from classroom research, I have hinted towards two of the discourses relating negative emotions and learning in the mode of separation and temporalization. To put it in other words: The hermeneutic theory of negative learning presented by Buck and psychological theories on negative emotions and learning (Hascher, Pekrun, etc.) can only relate the two components in a causal structure. Either, emotions are the consequence of cognitive processes or a cognitive pre-conditioning or the emotions work as a trigger or impediment to motivational processes leading to learning. Both these ways of relating emotion and learning have their roots in the notion of a strong subject, being in full awareness of his/her reflective processes and in control of metacognitive strategies to suppress emotions or to turn them into productive learning processes. As a consequence, these perspectives not only neglect the lived body, but they are generally not appropriate when taking the phenomenal level into account, i.e. the way we experience emotions in a life-world setting. The shortcomings of a separation and temporalization of emotion and learning have been localized in the discrepancies between certain qualities of an experienced emotion and their value in learning theory as well as in the neglect of the pathic and overwhelming dimension of emotions.

Following this critique of 'classical' views on learning and emotion, I suggested three changes of perspective: a philosophical theory of emotions, an alternative theory of learning by experiencing what Heidegger calls 'not-readiness-to-hand' and Scheler's socio-emotional theory of understanding and judgement. When applying these theories, it becomes apparent that emotions in learning have a pre-predicative and pre-reflective feature. We have seen that emotions touch the lived body and at the same time, they become alive in embodied expressions and enable others to connect with these emotions in a process of embodied understanding¹³ that does not follow the logic of grammar and language. In analogy to the concept of readiness and not-readiness-to-hand, where learning does not begin with a rational negation of previous knowledge but with disruption and uncertainty, the negative emotion in learning is not fully transparent to the learner and

¹³ For a theory of embodied pedagogical understanding see Brinkmann (2020).

even though the emotion has an intentional correlate it might be hard to pin it down as it is based in embodied structures. But in both cases, negative emotions and experiences of not-readiness-to-hand point to a deeper understanding of the process of learning: be it in Heidegger's phenomenology, where not-readiness-to-hand can be the cause for raising questions or in Scheler's philosophy, which suggests that we can explore the process of valuing that lies within emotion.

Thinking of social interaction – which in this case means teaching and interaction with peer learners – negative emotions can provide the key to understanding the other and feeling-with-one-another. And, as I have pointed out, understanding the emotion of the other is a first step to understanding how the other understands, learns, and thinks – in my opinion, this is one of the most important and most difficult tasks in becoming a good teacher.

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A New Dimension of Learning Through the Concept of ‘Non-positional Consciousness’ in Phenomenology

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1 Horizon of the Problem

Learning is a key concept in educational research and practice, as it is in the top concept among all educational efforts (cf. Giesecke 1991, p. 47). Human learning has been explained not only in the field of education but also in the field of psychology and philosophy, which are the adjacent studies of pedagogy. Whether it is a cognitive model or a behavioural model, there are various approaches to human learning problems, but there are common assumptions as follows. These assumptions say that the process of learning is going on from easy to complicated, from simple to complex, from simple knowledge to difficult theories or laws. This is the learning task, and each learning unit reflects the educational goal of the teacher. In this way, there are three elements: “relatively fixed curriculum, a series of integrated learning tasks, and students to be evaluated” (Hwang 1988, p. 162). In this assumption, the theorization of learning phenomena has gone to the ‘modelling attempt’ to match the instructor’s intentional educational goals and the characterization analysis of the learner reaching them. Bloom’s ‘mastery learning theory’, Bruner’s teaching theory, and Ausubel’s cognitive learning theory are classic examples of such attempts, and CAI, IPI, ATI theory and the information theory about memory which aim to further individualized learning, were intended to improve the practice of learning from these theoretical assumptions.¹

However, it is hard to say that despite the practical efforts to improve the learning problem by systematically explaining the human learning phenomenon,

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¹ As a general theoretical overview of learning, see Chap. 5 and 6 of Slavin (2003).

it has not actually provided a satisfactory answer. For the learning theoretical traditions of various approaches, that “the learning phenomenon (of the human) is much more complex than we think” (Meyer-Drawe 1982a, p. 511) is a sceptical general review, and despite the scientific attempts of all existing learning theories to make the learning phenomenon assumed, “the intellectual level is still at the point level” (Weinert 1989, p. 389).

In this situation, we have also met learning phenomena that are not explained by model learning such as ‘individualization approach’ or ‘creative thinking’ based on the life history of learners today, and they threaten the paradigm of traditional learning theory based on normalization and standardization. Even if we do not mention the tradition of ‘genius aesthetics’ that dominated the 18th and 19th centuries, breakthrough discoveries and creative thinking patterns are not explained by cognitive models. The following words come out in the book *Spark of Genius* written by the Root-Bernsteins.

Knowing is a vague and unclear way of finding out, and the learner himself has a serious question. Every process of solving the problem is done in a blink of an eye. I run when the answer comes to mind, and then I start thinking one by one, and the process is very complicated. It takes time for me to know how I got the answer. (Root-Bernstein and Root-Bernstein 1999, p. 22)

The quote provides a clue to understand the emergence of so-called ‘creative thinking’. Recent neurobiologists have tried to explain the sudden revelations and insights of creative thinking through the structure of the brain and the connection between neural synapses, but they cannot be said to have obtained a complete answer. Interestingly, the explanations are rather going back to concepts such as intuition or the super-logic which means the traces of the traditional philosophy. For example, the famous word from the physicist Max Planck used to be quoted as follows, “scientists need artistic imagination” (ibid., p. 30). In general, this explanation uses feelings, emotions and intuitions as tool concepts in the assumption that the thinking process of scientists and artists is surprisingly similar. In short, the discovery of new facts, advances and leaps, and conquest of ignorance are possible by imagination and intuition, not by theoretical reason (in Kant’s term).

This recent alternative explanation focuses on explaining the source of genius discovery or creativity. It seems to have a theoretical alliance with ‘genius aesthetics’ since 18th centuries and to show the return to the humanistic tradition

of genius aesthetics.² Therefore, naturally, we criticize the hierarchical structure of the existing curriculum and the mutual exclusion of knowledge and propose a curriculum reform covering all knowledge. However, there is a limit to explaining the general learning phenomenon of human beings in this way. Such an approach has weaknesses that are limited to explaining specific learning phenomena such as the flash of genius or the process of deriving creative ideas.

An alternative approach to this is found in the theory of consciousness in philosophical phenomenology, which is the concept of ‘non-positional consciousness’ (*nicht-thetisches Bewusstsein*). When we understand the learning phenomenon through this concept, we can get the following meaningful explanation. First, this concept can be applied not only to special thinking processes such as creative discovery but also to explain general learning phenomena. In addition, while educational studies that have accepted phenomenology have been mostly realistic, such as ‘lifeworld phenomenology’, the research through the concept of non-positional consciousness can be an example of the possibility of transcendental philosophical approach of pedagogy. In this sense, the approach of this study is in the form of ‘generative transcendental pedagogy’ (Lee 2009, p. 55).

2 Positional Consciousness and Non-Positional Consciousness

The act that consciousness sets an object as its target is called positioning (*These* or *Setzung*). Positioning refers to the thinking function that affirms the existence of an object or defines a certain content in a specific way, such as the proposition that ‘A exists’ or ‘A is B’. When my consciousness is aimed at a desk and forms a perception of it, my consciousness is a positional consciousness of this desk. I am setting the desk as a fact with a certain reality. In this way, almost all human consciousness can be said to be a positional consciousness of something rather than simply consciousness of something. This idea is related to Husserl’s famous concept of intentionality (*Intentionalität*) of consciousness. This means that our consciousness is always directed at something (*Gerichtet-sein-auf-Etwas*). According to Husserl, “all consciousness is a positional consciousness (*thetisches*

² Although it is a topic that goes beyond the scope of the paper, ‘conciliation theory’ is also included in this category. The book *Consilience, the Great Integration of Knowledge* by the social biologist Edward O. Wilson (1998) is also an attempt to integrate humanities and natural sciences. Of course, it is a controversial question whether it is a subordinate to the biology of humanities, but it must be a modern trend of theoretical alliance attempts.

Bewusstsein), both realistically and potentially” (Husserl 1950, p. 288).³ In other words, “every [conscious] action (*Akt*) is an objectification that constitutes the object” (ibid., p. 290). Here we can see that the positional consciousness, which means “intentionality of consciousness,” is associated with the old philosophical theme of objectification. This can be explained as follows.

The essence of conscious action is to infuse the soul into the material (*Stoff* or *hyle*) given from the outside into the meaning construct (*beseelen*) that we can understand. For Kant, this is the same process as understanding (*Verstand*), which triggers emotions (*Sinnlichkeit*) and gives order to sensory data that come in inside (*affiziert*). Thus, the function of our consciousness can be explained in two ways: In other words, consciousness is a kind of meaning-giving (*sinngebende Funktion*) that owns meaning or owns something in meaning (*Sinn zu haben* or *etwas im Sinne zu haben*), and it also has a meaning-giving or constructive relationship with something (ibid., p. 233). For Kant’s epistemology, innate subjectivity organizes sense data through concepts (*Kategorie*). For Husserl, subjectivity constitutes also objects.⁴ The characteristics of this conscious action are called objectification. In this sense, the learner’s consciousness in the sense of pure cognitivism can be said to be a one-sided composition of learning materials (contents) as a material object.

On the other hand, according to Husserl’s intentionality of consciousness, the original object is the word “standing in opposition” in the process of grasping.⁵ If you understand this, you can always see that the object is transcending consciousness (noesis). The problem here is that consciousness shows a two-sided attribute. In other words, consciousness reveals itself only in the world outside of itself, and at the same time, it looks back on itself. This process is often called reflection in philosophy, which is characterized by being exposed to the world and appearing toward oneself. The reflective moment of consciousness inevitably leads to a contradictory situation in which our consciousness is independent of consciousness beyond consciousness, just like all other external objects. Husserl calls it the duality of subjectivity: “Consciousness is the absolute who constitutes all transcendent, the whole mental and physical world, also the real event in this world on the other hand” (ibid., p. 130). The former refers to the fact

³ The notation quoted from Husserl’s books follows the shorthand title described in the reference.

⁴ For the epistemological commonalities and differences between Kant and Husserl, see Han’s paper (1984, p. 74).

⁵ This is object in English word. But in the sense of philosophical phenomenology, it accords to *Gegenstand* in German term. This means that we are facing each other in etymology (*Gegen-stand*).

that our subject is a priori and the latter is an objective physical world within our subjectivity.⁶ Because of this dual mode of existence, our consciousness is ‘consciousness of something’ when we face external transcendental objects, but ‘self-consciousness’ when we question ourselves.

At this point, consciousness of the outside object is called a positional consciousness because it establishes the object as fact, but self-consciousness is a consciousness of a different type from the positional consciousness because it is not conscious of itself. The latter is often called a non-positional consciousness (*nicht-thetisches Bewusstsein*). This non-positional consciousness refers to the dimension of consciousness already given before the objectification of consciousness. Husserl already assumed this aspect of consciousness in a different way. In *Logik* he argues that the experience of consciousness cannot always be a positional consciousness, and takes examples such as the experience of passiveness or functioning association (*fungierende Assoziation*) or time-based consciousness (cf. Husserl 1974, p. 22). As to what each of these means learning theoretically, the next section will be explained. Anyway, we can see that Husserl recognizes the concept of consciousness that cannot be received by the transcendental idealism that gives philosophical identity to his phenomenology. This is a non-positional consciousness. In his early phenomenological studies, for example in *Logische Untersuchungen* this concept came out. According to him, it should not be understood that the object represented in the intentional experience was experienced side by side with the two representations of the object aimed at the object and the oriented experience toward the object.

As a dual dimension of this consciousness, the positional and non-positional consciousness developed into the concept of the potential intentionality (*l'intensionnalité d'acate*) and the operational intentionality (*l'intensionnalité opérante*) by Merleau-Ponty (1966) (cf. Cho 2002, p. 117). Potential Intentionality means constitutive action of an object as the intentionality of our judgment. On the other hand, operational intentionality is more prominent in our desires and evaluations than in objective perceptions. This is the “fungierende Intentionalität” (Han 1984, p. 104), where the constructive subjectivity is not involved at the bottom of the action-intentional nature. In other words, operational intentionality refers to the aspect of anonymity, which is already pre-predicate, before subjectivity is involved in the world. This meaning-giving action was called ‘passive synthesis’ by Husserl. In *Zeitbewusstsein* he said as follows.

⁶ G. Brand describes the duality of subjectivity as “a fundamental contradiction between the empirical psychological self and the a priori self, or the inevitable identity and the inevitable difference between psychological and a priori abilities” (Han 1984, p. 96).

All of the mental activities are always conscious of something, but they are also conscious (themselves). But not all experiences are positional thought. It sometimes 'sensed' and 'perceived' internally. Perceived here does not mean that it is thoughtfully grasped in that direction. (Husserl 1962, p. 126)

If the 'always conscious of something' is a positional consciousness ('self-consciousness'), then the inner consciousness is a non-positional consciousness. If there is such a non-positional dimension of consciousness, it cannot be denied that there is such a dimension inside the learner who goes through the process of targeting the learning contents. The non-positional consciousness can explain the dimension of the remarkable consciousness phenomenon that occurs inside the learning process.

3 Non-Positional Consciousness and Learning

As mentioned earlier, Husserl's concept of non-positional consciousness shows that human consciousness is dual. The consciousness is a spiritual and physical being that exists in a psychologically objective world, and at the same time is a transcendental subject that constitutes this world. This same self is divided into a natural understanding and a transcendental understanding. This dimension of consciousness needs to be understood from a transcendental extended point of view, not from a traditional understanding of bowls. Therefore self-consciousness is described as something that intersects with a functional integration in which self-consciousness (*Ich-Bewusstsein*) extends vertically and horizontally. Understanding this self-consciousness is deeply related to the representation in phenomenology. If horizontal transcendence means the intentional action of conscious functioning, vertical transcendence means in-depth psychological dimensions such as memory, imagination, unconsciousness etc. As an intentional experience for Husserl, consciousness has a complex structure (cf. Yoon 1987, p. 34). It is associated with the realm of emotion and is as well as representations related to perception and judgment. The representation here refers to the formation of a unified conscious object (noema) by giving meaning to the sense data (noesis). The conscious function inherent in this consciousness and the unconscious object are the correlated elements that constitute the intentionality. However, if attention (the mind-oriented gaze) shifts direction, the nature of consciousness are not changed, but the core aspect of consciousness shifted from the original transparent activity to the background activity. This conscious action changes into memories and imaginations of various stages, and as the nature of

beliefs of various stages changes, the nature of the existence of the consciousness object changes.

This multidimensional, over-stratified character of self-consciousness provides important implications for how to deal with transcendence issues in learning and education. The problem of transcendence is inherent in the problem of ontology and the value of education. As P. Phenix (1971) noted, ‘upward transcendence’ means that human existence is the process of moving from present existence to possible. In other words, the learner’s inner consciousness has a dimension related to transcendence and upward transcendence, not only in the activity of transparent consciousness. Just as Husserl used the ‘noesis’ analysis to identify the internal performance of the experience, to reveal intentional implications means that consciousness itself is a deposited history of meanings. The ‘history of the settled meaning’ inherent in the learner’s consciousness has an over-stratified structure that is not explained through a single-layer confrontation with the learning contents. The so-called ‘mainstream’ learning theory, which considers learning as a “one linear process of progressive rationality” (Meyer-Drawe 1982b, p. 37), does not take into account the transcendent and over-stratified structure of these learners’ inner consciousness. On the other hand, the aspect of consciousness identified from a phenomenological point of view includes not only positioning an object to pay attention but also non-positional activities that occur without paying attention, so it also covers various meaning dimensions such as beliefs and emotions. Polanyi’s tacit knowledge and Merleau-Ponty’s bodywork (*schéma corporel*) are also concepts that are understood in the non-positional aspect of this consciousness.

Husserl explains a conscious action that does not have meaning-giving action, such as a fundamentally passive experience, a potential functioning association, and an internal time experience in which fundamental time consciousness is taking place. In other words, if the meaning-giving consciousness function is positional, the aspect of consciousness shown in the previous example is a passive consciousness function. The passive aspect of consciousness means that there is a dimension that shows the world as it is, or the object that is not affected by the active function of the self (cf. Han 1984, p. 97). Husserl’s passive consciousness is the same as the perception of the letters written in white chalk on the blackboard, in terms of the perception theory of Gurwitsch (cf. Cho 2005, p. 176).

The passive and non-positional dimensions of consciousness are the fundamental basis of cognitive activity, which allow us to understand learning phenomena in terms of pre-predicate and pre-reflective aspects. This idea can be found in Husserl’s attempt to reduce predicate evidence to pre-predicate one in his book *Logik*. Of course, this is the idea that already appears in Husserl’s note based on

the 1920/21 lecture. This is often referred to as a generative analysis, which is closely related to the “analysis of passive synthesis” (*Passive Synthesis*, Husserl 1966). This idea has been extended to a realistic basis in life world phenomenology. This is the earlier idea of the generative analysis of consciousness, which has been extended to the categories of body, motor sense and inter-subjectivity in relation to the things after the ‘realistic turn’.

Merleau-Ponty, who has developed Husserl’s later phenomenological ideas more radically, considers the pre-predicate dimension as the basis of all cognitive activities as follows.

Reflection can therefore be understood only when the following facts are taken into account: Reflection should not forget the non-reflection that it presupposes. Reflection grows in the soil, and something is made up of something that is simply not representable. (Merleau-Ponty 1966, p. 283)

For Merleau-Ponty, the pre-reflective dimension is a unique world that gives the learner’s perception, behaviour and thought an ‘impressive meaning’, and at the same time is the ground on which reflection itself stands (cf. Meyer-Drawe 1982a, p. 515).⁷ If we ignore the pre-reflective dimension of these learners, “the learner (child) as a world-oriented being can be seen only in the view of logical thinking and miss its own meaning” (ibid., p. 516). The fact that Husserl puts the original evidence of consciousness upon the direct emotional experience of these conscious objects refers the pre-reflective dimension. For Husserl, the concept of experience is the simple experience (*schlichte Erfahrung*) that is based on all other grounded experiences (*fundierte Erfahrung*). Perhaps this is the type of learning by acquaintance among the complex dimensions of learning. This is the principle of intuition that emerges in modern Western education, such as perceptive knowledge or impressive knowledge of H. S. Broudy or aesthetic experience. The process by which this kind of experience is accepted and constituted by learners is a passive process in the dimension of self-consciousness, but it is an active action based on the fundamental doxa (internal consciousness experience) as Husserl

⁷ What Merleau-Ponty called ‘motor sensory a priori’ or “*catégories pratiques*” in *The Structure of Behavior* is the body’s pre-reflective dimension to consciousness in learning (Cho 2004). From the physical side, it may be ‘body subjectivity’, but from the point of view of consciousness, the body can be seen as a non-positional consciousness expanding into objective order. Merleau-Ponty doesn’t see learning as a purely cognitive mind. Learning for him means the ability to properly confront unfamiliar objects once acquired. This is possible because the body can structure itself into the objects to deal with, or the forms (or forms) required by the situation (ibid., p. 301).

concept. In other words, the deeply underlying doxa is the unified entity of identity (*Einheit der Identität*) in which beings exist beforehand passively. In addition, the process of acquiring knowledge by acquaintance is the receptive stage of self-activeness, as it is a pre-predicate of perception, and is a fundamental active process in consciousness or before consciousness from the view of objectification of perception itself.

The typical concepts of understanding the process of learning in this Phenomenology's 'passive synthesis' from the pedagogical perspective are the not-thematization (*Unthematisierung*) and the concept of relearning (*Umlernen*). First, the not-thematization as a concept of learning is that learning processes are not easily understood by a clear linguistic approach, and the subtle phenomenon of learning is in the achievement of learning itself (*Zustandekommen*) (cf. Buck 1967, 2019; recited by Cho 2002, p. 126). In other words, we cannot simultaneously thematize the 'achievement itself' of learning and 'what is learned' in it.

Of all human accomplishments, learning is always an unknown, hidden in its nature; we learn most of the crucial things, as we often say, 'unconsciously'. So we can't think about how learning was done in principle. (Buck 1967, p. 133)

Since many learning theories ignore the not-to-be-thematized aspects of learning, they have only focused on the results rather than the learning process, and have been modelling the learning process technologically. In this way, most of the theoretical models of learning can be seen as an attempt to theorize them in reverse order (with the result of learning).

On the other hand, the learning concept as relearning refers to learning as a confrontation between previous knowledge and new perspectives and experiences, not an integrated one-line process. In this sense, learning is not about quantitative accumulation of the experience process, but about the moment of negativity (which overthrows the horizon of experience itself for a moment). In short, the process of learning is more like "inconsistent and unexpected" (Meyer-Drawe 1982a, p. 519). As a relearning, the concept of learning implies an aesthetic meaning, such as artistic creative acts. In Kant aesthetics, it is similar to the creative act that emerges from "the originality of art creation, the conflict between free will and judgment of taste" (Teichert 1992, p. 151). If we extend this aesthetic meaning, this means that the learner's learning process is not unilaterally involved in the category of universal cognitive structure or ideas, but is described as a leap from the 'source' within the learner consciousness and a crisis process.

This allows us to understand the process of creating a newness in which creativity wriggles within the learner. Meyer-Drawe describes the “rich moment” of this learning experience as follows.

(The experience of negativity) is mainly due to the frustration of opinions and expectations based on ahead of scientific consciousness in the process of confronting the questioning of methodically. In Hegel’s words, there is an experience that deviates from consciousness of self and behaviour that has been trapped in the early days of scientific experience. (Meyer-Drawe 1982b, p. 39)

The phenomenological understanding of this learning process can be found in Husserl’s idea of “an associative emergency that dominates the territory of passive pre-giveness” (Han 1984, p. 257). The area of passive pre-giveness is the basis for which objects in the original sense are defined. This is a systematic unified realm because there is an inherent legality that governs it, the law of association. The reason why this association is a synthesis action is not the active action of the self but the mutual affinity with the impressions. According to Husserl, this passive synthesis is the result of the synthesis action of internal time consciousness. In the time domain, there is a unity of identity that lasts over time, which has the nature of passiveness in activeness. This is the process of development of the past, present and future of the experience understood as a phenomenological time zone. In other words, the flow of consciousness has a dual continuity of horizontal orientation as a series of vivid presents leading from the past to the future, and orientation as a sedimentation and maintenance direction that is now passed. Because of this continuity, the flow of consciousness is a unity that leads to a past-oriented (Retention) that presents and perceives what has just been experienced, and a future-oriented (Pretention) that intuitively anticipates the future from a vivid present and present perspective.

4 Conclusion

The theoretical nourishment of Husserl phenomenology, which has been accepted in the field of pedagogy so far, has come from the latter part of phenomenological concepts of life, body, (motor) sense and perception. It could have corrected a small portion of the ‘localized’ approach of education theory (cf. Cho 2002, p. 63) but it also left the phenomenon approach of educational behaviour, resulting in a gradual distancing from the original transcendental philosophical idea of phenomenology. Of course, there is also a point within the pedagogy itself that there

is a fundamental limitation in accepting Husserl's transcendental phenomenological basis educationally. "How can we provide a rigorous epistemological basis if the basic ideas of phenomenology abandon their original meanings and relationships?" (Danner 2006, p. 234). This question points out the general limitation in the educational intention. In other words, as a fundamental reason for the decisive break away from Husserl, most of the educational approaches are not interested in the a priori reduction, the regression to the self that constitutes the pre-psychic world, nor do they pay attention to the phenomenological reduction, the return to the intentional consciousness (cf. *ibid.*, p. 235). Because of the limitations of these educational phenomenological studies, phenomenology in their field was often used in 'realistic horizons', such as contextual understanding of educational actors and body-related meaning analysis.

In the research tendency of phenomenological pedagogy, which has been neglected by the fundamental differences between educational phenomenology and Husserl transcendental philosophical phenomenology, it is meaningful to try to explore the possibility of understanding a new dimension of learning through the concept of non-positional consciousness.⁸ So in this paper, I tried to overcome the limitations of cognitive model theory on learning phenomena and to understand the 'not-illocutionary' and pre-predicative aspect of learning phenomenon by focusing on the concept of non-positional consciousness. It gave us some implications for explaining phenomena such as 'the production of creative ideas' or 'learning as a not-linear process'.

However, there is a problem that must be explained in the future. It may be argued that all existing learning theories are based on a set consciousness model, which is caused by a somewhat rough dichotomous distinction. There is still a question in that the theoretical development of learning through the concept of non-positional consciousness of phenomenology would be a general theoretical approach that explains all complex human learning phenomena. This part can be an important task of phenomenological pedagogy in the future. In this respect, this study is only an exploratory study and I think that it will be possible to conduct in-depth research on learning phenomena through the philosophical phenomenological ideas. It is clear that such an approach should go in the direction of accepting the positive achievements of the existing learning theories.

⁸ Of the few studies that focus on the generative consciousness analysis of Husserl phenomenology, Loch's attempt (1981) is remarkable in this perspective (see Cho 2002).

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Affects in *Bildung*: Notes for an Analogical Understanding of Emotions

Fernando Murillo

In 1939, Jean-Paul Sartre presented a compelling case for the need for a specifically phenomenological study of emotion, as opposed to a psychological/empirical account of particular emotions. This call, which required a close alignment to the phenomenological tradition as established by Husserl and extended by Heidegger, contained an important warning to keep in mind in phenomenological research: to gather and discuss “facts” and “experiences” of emotions is to prefer the accidental over the essential. Phenomenology, on the contrary, relying on the reduction, entails studying affectivity in terms of its existential significance, and inquiring into the structures of the conditions for the appearance of emotion in the sphere of consciousness.

To do this, and taking as a starting point Sartre’s phenomenological emphasis on the significance of emotion over and against facts of behaviours, in this paper, I set out to interrogate the significance of the phenomenality of emotion for our process of formation (*Bildung*) by examining the descriptive account of emotion in St. Augustine’s *Confessions* (particularly in book 10) in juxtaposition with that of René Descartes in his *Meditations on First Philosophy*. As an exegetical key, the selection of these authors rests on the fact that, while working from a worldview ordered by God, Augustine anticipates central themes to phenomenology, emphasizing a descriptive method, one that is extended and developed by Descartes.

Through this examination, I want to propose two main points. The first is that, as a phenomenon experienced in the body but concerning what is beyond

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it, emotion functions as a mediator between sense perception and rationality, between *Umwelt and Innenwelt* (world and self). In its mediating function, emotion appears like a basic condition for the most central aspect of *Bildung*: the formation of subjectivity. Closely related to this regulatory notion, the second point is that emotion can be further understood as an analogical phenomenon. Following the Augustinian impetus, and inspired in the theological notion of *analogia entis* (the idea that access to revelation of the transcendental comes from an engagement with the things themselves in the world, that is, by analogy), the paper will attempt to delineate a preliminary proposition for the intelligibility of emotion in its formative function as something that, in giving itself, it announces and reveals particular aspects about ourselves and the way the world appears to us.

Engaging in this work, one quickly finds that the topic is far from unproblematic. Views on what emotions are and what status they are given have been the theme of passionate disagreements.

In a paper given at the meeting of the Aristotelian Society in 1976, Lois Arnaud reminded his audience that “from the time of the Enlightenment in Germany, the soul was divided into three parts: thinking, willing, and feeling. This third region of the psyche, like Plato’s third class of men, was inferior” (Arnaud 1976, p. 165). He further clarifies the status given to feelings: “this bag of feelings was always in opposition to thinking” (ibid., p. 165). In his commentary, Arnaud seems to be missing the impetus of the work from early German Romanticism where emotions were given primacy. For Friedrich Schlegel, for example, it is “feeling and inspiration and impulse” (Schlegel 1991, p. 8) that define *poiseis*, over and against the technicalities of the making. What was at stake, however, for the Romantics and the inspiring figures of the *Sturm und Drang* movement, such as Goethe, Schiller, and Herder? Certainly, it was not only a revindication of emotion in and of itself, as a reaction to a more severe rationalism, but arguably, the very possibility of subjectivity, of becoming a well-rounded person. This is clear in Herder’s description of the signs of *Bildung* in a person: “an enlightened, educated [gebildet], sensitive, reasonable, virtuous, and *enjoying* man” (my emphasis, Horlacher 2016, p. 11). As can be gathered from the intellectual history represented in Romanticism, and later on in *Geisteswissenschaft Pädagogik*, feeling and rationality cannot be assumed as separated, much less antagonistic. As Malte Brinkmann has pointed out, emotion is ubiquitous in the processes of *Bildung*, as it is an embodied, intentional phenomenon that is at the base of self-world relations. For Brinkmann, “this relation [of emotion and self-relations] can be seen as a formation of the self in the interplay between expression and internalization” (pre-published manuscript), an interplay that comes to define *Bildung*, as Humboldt suggested.

Furthermore, as we see in the Rhetoric of Aristotle, for example, emotion appears as a constitutive element of the triad of the art of persuasion (i.e. logic, character, emotions). The persuasive effect in oratory is unattainable without recourse to some kind of emotional affectation. "Persuasion may come through the hearers" Aristotle points out "when the speech stirs their emotions" (Aristotle 1984, p. 25). The relation of emotions to thinking is made clear when Aristotle further explains that "our judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile" (ibid., p. 25).

Facing such opposing views on the matter one cannot but wonder how was it that the decoupling of emotion and reason became such a normalized attitude in modernity.¹ In approaching the problem, a first clearing to be done is that the separation of reason and emotion (along with everything that goes with it, including embodiment) is all too often pinned on the Cartesian *ego cogito*. Such is a hasty and simplistic prejudice. On a closer examination of the passages often partially quoted of the Mediations on First Philosophy, one finds that the accusation does not stand. In meditation III we read: "I am a thing that thinks, that is to say, that doubts, affirms, denies, that knows a few things, that is ignorant of many [that loves, that hates], that wills, that desires, that also imagines and perceives" (Descartes 1911, p. 12). In the original text in Latin, this last term "perceives" is actually "*sentiens*", i.e. to feel. Feeling, along with thinking, doubting, imagining, and so on, are all part of the Cartesian "I am". Even though the unity of the sensual, the bodily, and the rational in the constitution of the person is thus established, the essence of the phenomenon of emotion as such and its relation to intellect remains unclear.

The problem has not remained untouched. It is not difficult to come across approaches to therapy and education that attempt to decipher or rather use emotions. One example is the contemporary rise of the discourse of neuroscience and its possibilities for classroom manipulation. However, as an approach that reduces the phenomenon to a mere physical-psychical synthesis, ignoring its more inward, human dimension, one can be sure that such an explanation is inadequate for an understanding of the phenomenality of emotions and must therefore be ruled out. In contrast, from the descriptive stance of phenomenology, the problem of emotions is necessarily approached in terms of the essence that animates their appearance rather than gathering facts about the particular accidental forms of their expressions.

¹ Consider here the value that positivistic science gives to the elimination of any trace of "subjectivity" in data, or the sheer absence of any mention of emotional aspects in international educational policy and standards, such as those from the World Bank.

1 An Analogical Understanding of Emotion

From classic literature on *Bildung*, we are familiar with the distinction between interiority and the external world, and the dialectical relationship that must exist between the two for the process of *Bildung* to take place. Wilhelm von Humboldt makes it clear when he asserts that *Bildung* “can be fulfilled only by the linking of the self to the world to achieve the most general, most animated, and most unrestrained interplay” (Humboldt 2015, p. 58), an interplay through which both self and world transform each other.

A question one might ask is how is that interplay experienced existentially. Furthermore, one wonders if there might exist something in-between the exteriority of sense perception and the interiority of rational cogitations that modulate the transitions between the two, defining the particular mode in which the encounter is experienced, or rather, felt. After all, we can usually define our engagements with the world and with others in terms of varying degrees of pleasure and unpleasure. The question for what might be in between begs for an answer, particularly when the lines of demarcation between sensing and thinking seem to be blurred. In Meditation II, Descartes affirms that “sensing...precisely so taken, is nothing other than thinking”. Is feeling simply a particular way of thinking? The notion seems to find confirmation in St. Augustine’s *Confessions* when, in Book 10, section XIV, he declares that “desire, joy, fear, and sadness are four movements of the mind”.

Faced with such evidence, one must first elucidate whether it is actually the case that affects are indistinguishable from mind or reason. In other words, do they have an existence in themselves? Then, one must be able to determine what is the nature (essence) and function of affects in relation to thinking. In section VI of book 10 of the *Confessions*, we find evidence of Augustine establishing a distinction, one which he quickly qualifies with a normative evaluation: “clearly there is a body and a soul in me, one exterior, one interior (...) but the interior part is better” (Augustine 2006). The evaluation of interiority as better is given in that it can interrogate, judge, and keep in check the messages delivered from the outside world through bodily senses.

We are encountered once again with an inside/outside distinction, but towards the end of book 10, Augustine introduces an important new element when he refers to the “emotions of my spirit”. In section XXXIII, Augustine shows that emotions are stirred from the outside and they have a very particular role: to aid reason. This notion has an antecedent in Aristotle. In book II of the *Rhetoric* he defines emotion as “all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments”. Described as an entity distinct from the senses of the outside and from

the judgments of reason, emotion appears then with an ontological affirmation of its being: it exists. In existing, emotions must be made to accommodate to an order in relation to other things. In the same way, in which a carriage must be placed after the horses, emotions must follow reason and not the other way around. When the reverse order happens, they become problematic. Augustine warns that the emotional charge of the senses “does not accompany the reason as following after in its proper order, but having been admitted to aid the reason, strives to run before and take the lead. In this matter I sin” (ibid.).

If subjectivity is formed in a process of synthesis (outside/inside, *Umwelt/Innenwelt*, self/world), I claim that such synthesis operates in and through the analogic mediation of the affects. What we gather from the accounts seen so far is that the transit between body and mind, senses and reason, cannot in and of itself contain the complexity and the lasting impressions that such dialectic leaves on the self. The fact that we experience enjoyment or repulsion from what we encounter in the world shows that there is a third element that mediates the relation of self-world. It is the affects. Seen as such, the linking of the self to the world is then not a dialectic as it first seems, but rather a trinitarian phenomenon. In this sense, I am claiming a different role and status of the affects: certainly not in opposition to reason, but as a constitutive component of a triangle, a mediating factor between sense-perception and consciousness.

This third element of the affects appears in the description with which Augustine speaks of the affective imprint that the senses leave on the mind. In book 10, section XXXIV we read: “Light (...) entices me as it flows before my sight in all its variousness (...) it works its way into me with such power that if it is suddenly withdrawn (...) and it is absent too long, it saddens my mind” (ibid.). The relation of the outside of the senses with the inside of the mind is mediated by a phenomenon that, in this case, entices and saddens: the phenomenon of the affect. Our subsequent encounters with objects or situations perceived as similar to previous ones will be treated by analogy according to the predominant affect with which we first encountered them. Anyone who presently feels uncomfortable with numbers, for example, can likely trace such discomfort or sense of inadequacy back to an early form of suffering under a math teacher in primary school who lacked a sense of humanistic vocation.

But beyond aspects pertaining to learning, the analogic function of affects has other and perhaps more important implications for the process of subjective formation, as they relate to transcendence, desire, and love. In the letter of dedication with which Descartes first presented his *Meditations*, he makes a literal reference to the book of Romans, chapter 1, a key passage that provides the foundation for the doctrine of *Analogia Entis* – the notion that we gain access to the transcendent

by paying attention to the things themselves. The meditations are thus framed in an ontological and metaphysical inquiry, an elucidation of what Descartes calls the “mysterious I”. When Augustine declares that interiority is better than exteriority, he invokes the same text from Romans to affirm the responsibility that we have in interrogating and judging inwardly the information from the senses, since “man...should be able clearly to see the invisible things of God understood by things which are made” (ibid.). In this task of discerning what lies both within us and outside beyond ourselves, emotions play the role of announcing something about the world and also about ourselves. Emotions, like symptoms, demand recognition, and can thus be interrogated about consciousness, analyzing our own being-in-the-world.

Here lies the potential for the phenomenologizing of emotions understood in their analogic essence. In their manifestation, they give themselves as the truth about the state of our inner selves in relation to the world, showing aspects that reason does not yet know. In appearing as a pre-rational phenomenon, emotions can have a pedagogical role in making manifest to reason that which produces suffering, resistance, enjoyment, and love.

It is in this light that we can begin to appreciate that the analogic impressions that emotions establish in the self can be an aid to reason. At the same time, however, they can also be an impediment and a resistance that precludes our own subjective reconstruction and perfection. This is what Augustine experienced when, in his effort on focusing on hearing the voice of Truth, he confesses that he could “scarcely hear it for the tumult of my unquieted passions” (ibid., book XII, section x). The Augustinian notions of order and measure apply here to the engagement with the affects. As Scripture warns, “the heart is deceitful above all things” (ibid.), something that Descartes also registered in Meditation I, when he verified that the senses are deceptive.

Our capacity for sound judgment and responsible decision-making cannot be taken for granted when we are overconfident with joy, or when we feel we are at the end of our rope. Anyone who has experienced having a broken heart can attest how easily reason gets overwhelmed. That is why we need *Bildung*, the discipline of learning academic knowledge *and* the discipline of regulation of the affects, so that we can discern the invisible movements of interiority and ascend to a refinement of character that is enabled to, above all judgment, love.

2 Methodical Implications: A Return to Love

The phenomenon of emotion reveals the inner state of our being, the stance from which we engage – or disengage – with the world, the other, and with ourselves. The movement of emotion through which, in given situations, we experience affects associated with pleasure or displeasure, point to inner dispositions that are often unconscious or unknown, and do not relate to the situations or objects that supposedly produced them. Emotion is the royal road to the repressed. In this sense, as an analogic phenomenon, emotion is always a manifestation of something else. Like a symptom, it points to a meaning that, taking on the form of a sign, wants to be recognized. This is why, returning to Sartre’s warning, when it comes to the study of emotion *qua* phenomenon, it is a mistake to remain content with a compendium of facts or definitions about different types of emotions and the way we perceive or experience them. A phenomenological understanding of emotion requires a descriptive engagement with the universality of the phenomenon as such. Such engagement, however, is demanding and, potentially, uncomfortable and even painful. The universal aspects of emotion, such as desire, the erotic, aggressivity, and suffering, eventually places me right in front of a reality that is my own. Facing such reality demands our openness to the potential consequence of a hermeneutic stance, or what Jean-Luc Marion refers to as a “*conversion* of one intentionality into another” (Marion 2016, p. 42). Having the openness, indeed the courage, to take this risk of formation and change is an act of love. Love as a drive that propels our formation is pointed out by Scheler in his essay *Ordo Amoris*, where he notes that “love is the tendency...the act that seeks to lead everything in the direction of the perfection of value proper to it (...) Thus we determined the essence of love as an uplifting and constructive action in and over the world (...). Love, in his [Goethe’s] account was always a dynamic becoming, a growing, a welling up of things in the direction of their archetype, which resides in God” (Scheler 1973, p. 109).

Out of all possible affects, the only one that is given primacy in Scripture is love. As it is written in the book of Songs “stronger than death is love”. This is perhaps not too surprising, considering that love is the one affect that, transforming the self, shows a true mark of transcendence into perfection and the absolute realm of spirit. In the process of formation of subjectivity to which *Bildung* thrusts us – a process that inevitably entails moments of devastation, heartbreak, and subjective shattering – it is the eros of love and its affects that bring our pieces back together, reconciling us with ourselves and with the other.

It is in this radical understanding of love and its relation to reason that one can say, along with Augustine, that after all is said and done in our process of

education, “*nemo est qui non amet*” – without love, one is nothing. Without the erotic power of the emotion of love, there is no self and no education. Love is the affect that edifies, that endures all, that hopes, that is patient, that remains perseverant. It is, in synthesis, the emotion that makes *Bildung* possible in the first and last place.

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Atmospheres and Understanding: Past, Present and Future

Norm Friesen

We are always in a mood of some kind, even if it is a “pallid... lack of mood,” as Heidegger writes in *Being and Time* (cf. Heidegger 1962, p. 173). But these are not moods in the sense of whims or caprices; nor are they *emotions* that tend to have a specific “thing” (e.g., fear or love of something) as their object; they also are not arbitrarily good or bad feelings or moods – with the latter being called “*Launen*” in German (cf. Bollnow 1956, p. 57 ff.). Heidegger and phenomenologists in his wake¹ instead use the term “*Stimmungen*” and its variants (e.g., *Gestimmt* for attuned; *Verstimmt* out of tune or annoyed). *Stimmung* is a term that is both vocalic (*Stimme* is voice) and musical (*stimmen* is to tune) in its connotations, and it is one which places significant emphasis on both the shared and the relatively persistent nature of such attunements (cf. Krebs 2017, p. 1420). In German scholarship, the word “*Atmosphäre*” has competed with *Stimmung* only in the last few decades, and it is still generally regarded as being semantically vague and indistinct (cf. Bollnow 1962, p. 11; Bulka 2015, p. 11f.). All the same, *Stimmung* is frequently rendered in English simply as “atmosphere”. I

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¹ In the case of this paper, the phenomenologist following Heidegger of principle concern is Otto Friedrich Bollnow, who worked with Heidegger in Marburg and Freiburg at the end of the 1920s. Whereas the entanglement of Heidegger and his thought with the Nazis and their ideology has been well documented – from Farias (1991) to Trawny (2019) – Bollnow’s involvements appear less substantial, but have also been less researched. Hubertus Tellenbach, a phenomenological psychiatrist, is another student of Heidegger referenced in this paper. He worked as a doctor behind the Russian and French fronts during the War.

sometimes follow this usage below in using the notion of *Stimmung* to guide my phenomenological² discussion below.

Heidegger speaks of a type of “*Gestimmtheit*” or attunement as nothing less than “primordially disclosive” of the world. He says that it is nothing less than characteristic of a “primordial disclosedness which is Being-in-the-world itself” (Heidegger 1962, p. 188). This “disclosedness” in other words, is primary to the disclosure that happens through intentionality, purposes, and instrumentalities, but that it is nonetheless “existentially constitutive of Dasein’s openness to the world” (ibid., p. 176). It is also constitutive of Dasein’s openness to *itself*, Heidegger emphasizes. This is because Dasein finds itself, comes to know itself, in the mood or moods that it typically experiences Heidegger speaks of a “*gestimmtes Sichbefinden*” (ibid., p. 174). “Understanding,” as Heidegger puts it, “always has its mood” (ibid., p. 182). These characterizations are from *Being and Time*; but in his early lectures on *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger goes further. He explains that a given *Stimmung* is not something that comes to the fore as explicitly known or experienced, nor is it something that necessarily penetrates us; it is instead the ground on which any “knowing,” understanding, or experience appears as a figure. As Heidegger puts it, it is the “how” or “way” (the “*Wie*”) of our being and, importantly, of *our being with one another* (*Miteinander-Dasein*). Heidegger illustrates his point first by evoking one’s being-with another who is in mourning, and later, by imagining a similar being-with a person who is perennially jovial: “They themselves are precisely a fundamental manner and fundamental way of Being, indeed of being-there, and *this always directly includes being with one another*” (“*Sie selbst sind gerade eine Grundart und Grundweise des Seins, und zwar des Da-seins, und darin liegt unmittelbar immer: des Miteinanderseins;*” emphasis added in the English; Heidegger 1995, p. 67).

² In Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (and his other early works), what he calls “phenomenology” is not grounded in the Husserlian transcendental ego. It also does not work eidetically to identify essences in order to produce a “transcendental theory of knowledge” (Husserl 1960, p. 81). Instead, Heidegger emphasizes the existential rather than the transcendental. For Heidegger, phenomenology is the study of *being* or *Dasein*, an anti-subjectivist ontological-hermeneutic analysis of what it is to be in the world (e.g., see Schacht 1972).

Stimmung is thus the basic way, the fundamental mode or medium of both our understanding and our being together. It is a kind of shared but largely invisible atmosphere that determines the way that the world is disclosed to us, not so much as individuals going our separate ways, but as people who are always (in one way or another) *with* one another. It is constitutive of “our” common openness – or, one might add, our common closedness – in relation both to ourselves and to the world. Otto-Friedrich Bollnow, a student of Heidegger’s, put this in slightly different terms – ones indispensable for my analysis in this paper:

In every *Stimmung*, the world is already interpreted (*ausgelegt*) in a very particular way; and all understanding is always already guided by this original interpretation of life and world in a *Stimmung*. There are thus... certain kinds of knowledge that human beings cannot gain on their own accord, try as they might; rather, such knowledge “dawns” (*aufgehen*) on them only in a *Stimmung* suitable to it. (Bollnow 2017, p. 1414; 1956, p. 57)

Stimmung or atmosphere, in other words, provides a way of disclosing, of understanding the world, one-another and oneself. If one does not share or participate in this atmosphere, Bollnow suggests, then one also cannot share the knowledge that is thus disclosed. Only when a *Stimmung* suitable to such disclosure has been cultivated and/or encountered, Bollnow adds, will the sought-after knowledge “dawn” on one. Of course, such a statement has enormous implications for pedagogy, for teaching, and learning. It comes from Bollnow’s book, *The Nature (Wesen) of Stimmungen* (originally published in 1941). In this and his other existential works, Bollnow at once relies and builds on the early work of his former teacher, Martin Heidegger. For example, I take Bollnow’s use of the term “understanding” and “dawning” here and elsewhere in his *Nature of Stimmungen* to be broadly consistent with Heidegger’s own discussions of “understanding” and “disclosure” in *Being and Time* and *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. Also, the notion of atmosphere-as-*Stimmung* developed by Heidegger and later adapted by Bollnow will serve as the effective definition of “atmosphere” in this paper – as the “how” or the modality of our understanding, of our being and also,

of our “being together.”³ However, unlike Heidegger and in congruence with Bollnow, I do not see this “atmospheric” modulation of understanding as manifest in only one of two modes. For Heidegger, such understanding is either *inauthentic* – and devoted “primarily to disclosedness of the *world*” – or it is just the “authentic” *Stimmung* of *Angst* that “arise[s]” as Heidegger says, “out of one’s *Self* as such” (Heidegger 1962, p. 186; emphases added). Rather than being confined to these two possibilities, I follow Bollnow in regarding human beings’ understanding as emerging through a range of atmospheres and *Stimmungen*, arising to varying degrees in relation to both oneself and the world to the present and the future. I begin this paper, however, by first considering the question of how invisible but pervasive *Stimmungen* can actually be known to us. Then, taking on Bollnow’s emphasis on the types of temporal awareness associated with various *Stimmungen*, I focus on the examples of both a nostalgic and a felicitous *Stimmung*, and with the way that each connects past, present, and future. Finally, using a video example, I highlight the connection of such *Stimmungen* specifically with the purposes and priorities of *pedagogy*. I show how a particularly felicitous *Stimmung* is able to address the classical pedagogical paradox of simultaneous freedom and

³ More recent explorations of atmosphere both in German and in English give emphasis to other aspects of this communal phenomenon. For example, Hermann Schmitz, whose “new phenomenology” is based on the idea that all emotions are essentially atmospheres, defines atmosphere as “a total or partial, but in any case comprehensive, occupation of an area-less space in the sphere of that which is experienced as being present” (Schmitz 2016, p. 4). An atmosphere for Schmitz can arise corporeally through relaxation in a bath or in the sun, or through the contagious nature of emotions like anger, joy or sadness. It is one of many emotions, as Schmitz explains, that is “poured into” a space (“*räumlich ergossen*”). This general understanding of atmosphere serves as the basis for Gernot Böhme’s famous *Aesthetic Theory of Atmospheres*, which sees aesthetic atmospheres as “spatial carriers (*räumliche Träger*) of *Stimmungen*”. Böhme also emphasizes the aesthetic “production” of atmospheres, for example, through design, or the construction of advertising displays. Unlike Heidegger and Bollnow, both Schmitz and Böhme see atmospheres in terms of emotions and look to particular objects and intentionally devised arrangements as providing the grounds for the creation of specific types of atmosphere. Tonio Griffero, finally, has produced multiple books on atmospheres, and following Schmitz, has emphasized their undeniable but at the same time intangible presence: Atmosphere, Griffero says, is “a something-more, a *je-ne-sais-quoi* perceived by the felt-body in a given space, but never fully attributable to the objectual set of that space.” Griffero concludes that such an atmosphere is “*a logos in statu nascendi*” 2010, p. 1), a characterization important to this chapter. Understanding the “becoming-present” of atmosphere in this way is indispensable in pedagogy, in which many key phenomena are similarly in a state of becoming. At the same time, this paper rejects the equation of atmosphere with emotions in general, and the idea that an atmosphere can be something intentionally or directly produced or manipulated.

constraint as well as the question of the necessary sacrifice of the child's present for the sake of the future.

1 The Epistemology of the Atmospheric

If Stimmungen are the “wie,” the “how” or *the modality of our understanding*, they are ground against which the figure of knowing or understanding can emerge. They are more about a modality of our being in the world than about any knowledge or understanding in and of itself. But still, we *know* ourselves to be affected by an atmosphere or a mood. Like Brinkmann, I see these types of situated and embodied knowledge(s) as being of a special kind (cf. Brinkmann 2019, p. 29f.). However, unlike Brinkmann, I do not argue, perhaps paradoxically, that embodied “subjective expressions” – such as those associated with certain atmospheres – “can be described in their non-linguistic dimensions” (ibid. 2019, p. 32). Instead, I briefly make the case here that atmospheres and their dynamics are intimated *indirectly*, through comparison to related kinds of knowledge and experience. Taking my cue from Gernot Böhme and F.J.J. Buytendijk, I describe atmosphere as something we know in the way we know and experience *smells* or *odors*. Such olfactory sensations, they say, are “atmospheric more than any other sense phenomenon” (Böhme 1998 p. 50) – providing “the most original relation of humans to the atmospheric” (Buytendijk 1968, p. 7).⁴

Imagine, if you will, arriving at home to the smell of baking bread or enjoying the scent of an ocean breeze on holidays: In such sense-experiences, one is *receptive*. But this does not mean that one's awareness is entirely *passive*. We are also involved and active in these atmospheres. Through smell, we literally breathe in, breathe out, communicate and become part of the atmosphere that surrounds us. Atmosphere, in this sense, “*coalesces* (verschmelzt) *the subject with the world*” (Tellenbach 1968, p. 27; emphasis in original). At the same time, smell is the most involuntary and least intellectual of our senses, belonging to the “field of lower sensuality” (Henning, as quoted in Tellenbach 1968, p. 28) This is a place where “there exists no concrete image of memory or imagination, but only aesthetic experiences” (Henning, as quoted in Tellenbach 1968, p. 28).

Perhaps because of its unrepresentable but monolithic character, smell has a subtle and powerful relationship with *memory*. Walter Benjamin has characterized “scent [as] the inaccessible refuge of the *mémoire involontaire*. It is unlikely that it will associate itself with a visual image” he says; but “of all sensual impressions

⁴ This translation and all others from texts cited in German are the author's own.

it will ally itself only with the same scent” (Benjamin 1969, p. 184). Smells reminiscent of diverse places or experiences – whether of an old classroom or someone’s perfume or aftershave – can cause us to be flooded with memories, sometimes taking us far back in time. Like atmospheres themselves, reminiscent smells can sometimes give us the strange sense of reliving a previous experience, of the uncanny familiarity of *déjà vu* or that which is *unheimlich*. Bollnow, who emphasizes that “every particular *Stimmung* has its own temporal structure, its own particular experience of time” (Bollnow 1956, p. 171), describes this kind of atmospheric nostalgia or anamnesis as a coalescence, fusion, or “*Verschmelzung*” (ibid., p. 208) of the present with the past. Working from Proust, Bollnow observes that the pleasure we have in such moments of “fusion” is generally not related to the pleasure contained within the memories thus relived. Instead, he explains that such pleasure arises from the fact that the memory has a completeness or perfection (*Vollkommenheit*) that it did not possess in its original experience. This can be understood to designate nostalgia as “a wistful or excessively sentimental yearning for return to... some past period or irrecoverable condition” (Merriam-Webster 2020, n.p.).

But however palpable, overwhelming, or expressive an atmosphere may be, like smells, atmospheres are not actually *about* any one thing in particular; they have no distinct visual, audible, or semantic correlative.⁵ The smells and noises of a first-grade classroom just after recess or the tension in the room where students are writing an exam hardly point to a single clear meaning or understanding. Tonio Griffero says that an atmosphere in this sense represents “a *logos in statu nascendi*” (Griffero 2010, p. 1). Indeed, if it were to go beyond this emergent or nascent condition, it would simply cease to be atmosphere.

But perhaps *unlike* smells, atmospheres *can* be cultivated, sustained, or extended. From the perspective of the observer, this occurs largely through habit and mimesis. The habitual boisterousness of one classroom, for example, can rub off on another nearby. This is especially clear in the case of activities like clapping, applause, and laughter: Think of the infectious nature of laughter – and how it can also sharply exclude those not sharing in it. Or think of the enthusiasm of those who jump to their feet for a standing ovation, or conversely, of one’s sense of obligation to join in polite or forced applause. These things are all a question not of explicit knowledge and self-control but of mimesis and habit. We do them because we have reached a conscious decision, but simply because others do them, because we are from time to time so moved, because we are part of

⁵ Again, unlike atmospheres or *Stimmungen*, emotions and feelings generally arise in relation to a specific object: I love or am afraid of *something*.

Fig. 1 Teacher points, waves, and asks Jeremy: “What is ONE part of a complex sentence?”, © Norm Friesen



an audience. Such collective responses are in these and other senses also atmospheric. Speaking specifically of shared laughter, Bollnow again gives emphasis to its hermeneutic dimension, describing it as a process of “coming-into-contact (*Kontaktgewinnung*) between individual persons [that] starts immediately... They *understand* each other in their approval. It is as if there is a kind of feeling that they are confidants... [who are ‘in on the joke’] There is in this enjoyment a characteristic that one cannot at all resist, even if one wants to” (Bollnow, 1956, pp. 103–104; emphasis added; see also Vlieghe 2019, p. 71).

Laughter, applause, and other non-verbal forms of communication also play a central role in the short video clip to which this chapter now turns as an example (Fig. 1).

2 *Stimmungen* in the Classroom: A Video Segment

The video segment described and analyzed here is neither the product of a methodological approach to sampling nor a reflection of a specific analytic method; it is provided for illustrative purposes only. The clip was recorded in from an all-boy’s middle-school classroom of about 15 students in inner-city Detroit.⁶ The instructional focus is on complex sentences – ones that use a *conjunction* to join a *dependent clause* together with an *independent clause*. In introducing this topic, the teacher gets one student in particular, Jeremy, to answer most of her questions. She undertakes all of this initial question-and-answer from her desk, projecting her voice and gesturing (e.g., Fig. 2).

⁶ It is temporarily available at: <https://youtu.be/PCa-M9qFEuc>.

Fig. 2 Teacher starts clapping: “Look at you Jeremy! I’ve got a lot to tell your dad!”, © Norm Friesen



- Teacher: Complex sentences. What is a complex sentence somebody? Look on page 28.
- Teacher: Jeremy? [waits... signals the number “two” with an outstretched hand] Just tell me what it is, Jeremy. First of all, how many parts does it have?
- Student nearby: Two.
- Teacher: [pointing to student] Has two parts, doesn’t it Jeremy? Okay. [holding hand high and pointing upwards, waving it as she speaks; see Fig. 1] What is ONE part of a complex sentence? [now pointing with emphasis towards Jeremy] It’s an independent... what else?
- Jeremy [almost inaudibly]: Clause
[Camera swings to Jeremy at the far end of the room. Jeremy is looking at teacher, smiling.]
- Jeremy [barely audible]: Subordinate
- Teacher: Oooh Oooh [in a sing-song voice]. I’ve got a lot to tell your dad. I’ve got a lot to tell your dad! I guess you’re [an] A today class. I guess you’re [an] A. Right there. [Student behind Jeremy starts clapping with scattered applause following. Jeremy, smiling, faces forwards and raises his two hands showing the sign for peace/victory in an exaggerated movement; see Fig. 3]. Jeremy got your A for you! Jeremy got your A. [scattered clapping by students. Student beside Jeremy offers hand in congratulation to which Jeremy responds; see Fig. 4]
- Teacher: “Jeremy got your A for you. Go on. Excellent.”

Fig. 3 Jeremy victorious.
 “Jeremy got your A for you[, class]. Jeremy got your A.”, © Norm Friesen



Fig. 4 Student beside Jeremy offers his hand in congratulation. Teacher: “Go on. Excellent.”, © Norm Friesen



Two separate students: “Thank you Jeremy.”
 “Thank you Jeremy.”

This clip presents many conspicuous cultural and linguistic elements. There are also certainly many questions one might ask about Jeremy, about the teacher’s precise aims and expectations, and about the larger socio-economic context. But these are not the point of my analysis here. My point instead is to look to the affective, even aesthetic qualities of the myriad verbal and non-verbal communications of both students and teacher. For example, one can identify two points of shared clapping or applause. The first is initiated by the teacher, and the second, apparently by the student sitting behind Jeremy, suggesting, however indirectly, as Bollnow says, that “they understand each other in their approval” (1956, p. 103). There is also an episode of laughter coming from Jeremy’s corner of the classroom; and when the camera turns to this area, it shows Jeremy’s neighbors to be attentive and supportive.

Jeremy is thanked verbally at least twice by his peers and is offered a congratulatory hand by his neighbor. The teacher repeats seven different verbal forms

of congratulation in the 70s clip and uses the collective “you” in addressing her students six times. These and other repetitions underscore the regular, iterative, habitual, and mimetic nature of both the teacher’s and students’ affective involvement. There is a kind of spontaneous but cadenced communication and shared affectivity in evidence here. The students are invited to participate in a kind of rhythmic game. And as befits both an atmosphere and a game, the students are indeed taken up in it. They can be said to become coalesced parts within a larger, quasi-aesthetic process or flow. The rhythmic and ludic nature of this involvement forms the playful background against which the figure of understanding can arise, to borrow from Bollnow. The mood in this classroom, in other words, is the way that both the class interrelates (*eine... Grundweise des Miteinanderseins*) – namely in the form of mutual support and congratulation. This mood is also the way that Jeremy finds himself (his *gestimmtes Sich be-finden*) – namely as supported and successful, not only in the eyes of his teacher (and possibly later, his father), but also of his peers.

3 A Pedagogical *Stimmung*

Given that “every particular *Stimmung* has its own temporal structure,” as Bollnow has said, the *Stimmung* in this classroom is obviously very different from the atmospheric nostalgia or anamnesis described above. The students are clearly *not* experiencing a coalescence of the present with some striking memory from the past. Rather, both the mood and the primary temporal orientation here is just the opposite. It is a happy, bright, felicitous, or in Bollnow’s terms, a “*glückliche Stimmung*.” Bollnow describes this *Stimmung* further through a critique of Heidegger’s notion of *Angst* as the only fully developed basic affective mode in *Being and Time* (cf. Bollnow 1956, p. 34). Bollnow insists that the experience of time accessible through *Angst* – namely resoluteness in the face of one’s own mortality – is hardly the last word on *Stimmung* and temporality:

The present moment ...[need] no longer stand, remote and isolated, at the point of decision. Instead it is [or can be] integrated into a *temporally unifying continuity in the context of a greater whole* [...] and the future is now no longer something that hangs over one as a threatening fate that requires a decisive response. Instead, it appears as an infinitely extended horizon, one that offers itself through the timeless perpetuation of one’s present felicitous condition. (ibid., p. 170)

The *glückliche Stimmung*, then, binds us not with the past but with the *future*. It connects us seamlessly with what is to come and expands our view of this

future to constitute the widest of horizons. One might go so far as to say that in this condition, time is no longer the story of our inescapable mortality. Instead, it appears as open and inviting, allowing us to recognize our potentiality and possibilities. And this interconnection of present and future leads me to the first distinctly pedagogical characteristic of this *Stimmung*.

To understand this character and exactly how it is *pedagogical*, we must turn to one of “the founders of pedagogy as a discipline” (Böhm and Seichter 2018, p. 413), Friedrich Schleiermacher – specifically to a question he raises in his lectures “On Education” from 1826. In his introductory lecture, Schleiermacher has parents, teachers, and other educators in mind when he asks: “Is one allowed to sacrifice one moment for another” (Schleiermacher 2000, p. 51; forthcoming) in the life of the child? Children, especially the very young, tend to live in the present moment. And whether we might need to teach them traffic safety or take them to the dentist, these interventions frequently take them out of the present moment for the sake of a future moment or benefit. (For example, for the sake of a future in which they can walk safely on the street or have learned to effectively care for their teeth.) As Schleiermacher puts it, “in all purely pedagogical moments” like these, adult interventions interrupt the immediate preoccupation of the child in order to “encourage something to appear that has not yet come into appearance” (ibid., p. 51). Pedagogy, Schleiermacher is effectively saying, brings with it a particular temporality, one that is oriented not so much to the past or present as it is to the *future*. In this context, it becomes the educator’s task to reconcile the opposed temporalities represented by present desire and future benefit, to merge present fulfillment with future demands. Schleiermacher proposes that this can best take place through what he calls “exercise,” something that “even when...the life of the child... is interrupted in a period of education,” “becomes the satisfaction of [the child in] their very way of being” (ibid., p. 54; forthcoming). An exercise that balances present satisfaction with future benefit for the child, Schleiermacher adds, “develops [in her] an appreciation for the exercise and rejoices in it for what it is” (ibid., p. 54).

Such a merging or reconciliation of past and future can be seen to be realized both in Bollnow’s felicitous *Stimmung* and in the classroom “exercise” described above. In the latter, the students are led to believe that they both *can* and *will* succeed. An exercise – especially one as potentially dry and boring as a grammatical exercise – can ultimately be said to serve the students’ “satisfaction of [their] very way of being.” (ibid., p. 54). No matter how modest these moments of academic success are and in some future moment might still be, they are in this moment all but available and guaranteed to these students, even for Jeremy. To

use Schleiermacher's words, it appears that they are able to appreciate the labor of "the exercise" – and to "rejoice in it for what it is" (*ibid.*, p. 54).

Of course, for Bollnow, the future-oriented temporal structure of the felicitous *Stimmung* brings with it its own epistemology and hermeneutics. Speaking of felicitous *Stimmungen* (plural), Bollnow says that they not only lighten perception, but also make possible qualitatively new insights that belong to this [*Stimmung*], that no longer need to be verified through a "critical thinking" (that is grounded in its own particular underlying *Stimmung*) but *can only be reached through these felicitous Stimmungen* (cf. Bollnow 1956, p. 126). Only in this way do these bright *Stimmungen* prove themselves to be an organ that opens up new knowledge (*neue Erkenntnisse erschließendes Organ*) (cf. *ibid.*, p. 126).

The fact that there is knowledge that can only "dawn" on one when in a good mood of course is no secret to psychology. Studies in this discipline have concluded, for example, "that a buoyant mood [can offer] a fundamental shift in the breadth of information processing, the result of which would be to cultivate a more open and exploratory mode of attention to both exteroceptive and interoceptive sources of information" (Rowe et al. 2007, p. 386). But what we witness in the video clip goes well beyond questions of the modes of processing internal and external information.

A second potentially *pedagogical* attribute comes to light when the video and the mood it captures is seen in relation to the Kantian educational paradox of freedom and educational constraint – namely: "How do I cultivate freedom" in the child, Kant asks, "under constraint?" (Kant 2007, p. 447). As Bollnow points out, the felicitous *Stimmung* entails not only an *apparent* freedom from future obstacles but also presupposes an "inner satisfaction," an *actual* freedom from immediate wants and demands. Only in this way is it able to allow us to "see things in terms of their own nature (Wesen)" (1956, p. 127), Bollnow says. The opening that the felicitous atmosphere provides for students like Jeremy can be seen as one in which he is free to share his responses – however haltingly – within the considerable restraints of a lesson on dependent clauses. To return for a moment to Tellenbach and his analysis of smell, one might say that the freedom implied in such an atmosphere is like taking a deep, vitalizing breath of fresh air – a moment in which "...one feels oneself in accord with the world, elevated, expanded, freed," as Tellenbach puts it. "*Here the mode of communication,*" Tellenbach continues, "*stands in continuous correspondence with the mode of freedom – specifically as conviviality (Geselligkeit).*" (Tellenbach 1968, p. 25; italics in original). Both the teacher's effusive praise and the students' own congratulatory responses attest to a conviviality that is clearly focused on Jeremy's freedom: For even though Jeremy's contributions are relatively minimal and formal, the teacher

leaves no doubt, both through her words and their tone, that she sees his actions as exercises in responsibility and individual achievement – and thus, in terms of his freedom as well. A third pedagogical aspect can be found in what is perhaps the evident *weakness* of this example specifically one that is *pedagogical*. This is the emphatic, even extreme degree of the teacher’s congratulation and celebration of Jeremy’s very modest accomplishments – his reading of a couple of words from a textbook. By leading us to wonder whether such praise might be ill-judged or indiscriminate, the teacher’s words may be taken to endanger the very atmosphere they initially cultivate. The danger here is that this *Stimmung* ceases to be “a logos in *statu nascendi*” but that it finds its correlate in the very determinate image of the teacher’s deliberate plans and goals. Seeing the felicitous *Stimmung* in this way runs the risk of breaking the temporal and convivial bonds of this atmosphere and revealing the harsh reality of “the sacrifice of a present moment for a future one,” as Schleiermacher has made clear, that necessarily underlies any pedagogical intervention. However, I believe this points to the risk evident not only in *this* classroom, but any pedagogical situation in which a similar atmosphere might be enjoyed. To have the present be experienced as nothing less than the realization of future possibility is always, in a way, to teach *in extremis*.

4 Conclusion

If *Stimmungen* are the “*wie*” or “*how*” of our being, the ground upon which disclosure and understanding arises, then they are of clear importance to education. However, their deep grounding in ontology places such *Stimmungen* – and the question of whether they may be nostalgic, convivial, or even profoundly anxious – well beyond deliberate control and manipulation. Nonetheless, the habitual and mimetic nature of the dynamics that they manifest can be decisive, not only in the experience of a student like Jeremy, but also in the success or failure of his teacher.

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Phenomenology of Existential Emotions: Shame, Disquiet and Anxiety



Bildung of Emotions and Bildung Through Emotions: The Orientative, Evaluative and Bildungs-Effect of Shame

Malte Brinkmann

In the following, I would like to highlight some aspects of the connection between emotions (*Gefühle*) and Bildung, by using the example of shame. I will try to show that emotions have their own reason. I will criticize the dualism between reason and emotion, as constructed by our European tradition. On the contrary, emotions serve the function of a life-world orientation as well as a function for social and moral judgment and evaluation. Finally, they also have a function of Bildung – as I will show. The reason of emotions makes Bildung through emotions possible because educational experiences are always emotionally structured. Emotions in their anticipatory structure can be the beginning of possible experiences of Bildung and education. The willful reason of emotions, however, also enables a Bildung of emotions to the extent that emotions have a special status within the learning experience. Building on the example of the feeling of shame (*Schamgefühl*), I would like to show that emotions can be seen as a starting point for a reflexive process of Bildung: a starting point in which the relation of self and world is put into mood (*Stimmung*) and resonance in a special way, so that a transformation or a process of re-learning becomes possible. In the experience of learning, the reason for the feeling of shame (*Schamgefühl*) is combined with a reversal of the person, to an experience of Bildung. In this “forming” interplay of feeling and reason, corporeality, sociality, and strangeness are important dimensions of experience.

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1 The Return of Emotions¹

In processes and practices of learning, education, teaching, Bildung, and socialization, emotions and feelings are omnipresent. Across all professions and disciplines, curiosity, enthusiasm, surprise or anger, desperation, wrath, disappointment, fear, envy, shame, jealousy or outrage as well as love, compassion, and empathy are central moments of experiences of learning and Bildung. Emotions give a structure to our engagement and relation with the self, with others, and the world. Since the late 1990s, the ‘forgotten connections’ between emotions and education are being rediscovered in the course of the so-called emotional turn in philosophy (Nussbaum 2001; Demmerling and Landweer 2007), in the neurosciences (Damasio 2007), in history (Plamper 2012), in sociology (Senge and Schützeichel 2013), in anthropology (Frevert and Wulf 2012) as well as in pedagogy (Reichenbach and Maxwell 2007; Schäfer and Thompson 2009; Seichter 2007; Huber and Krause 2018).

Emotion-Research also shows that feelings are often subordinated to the primacy of reason or cognition. This restitutes a dualism between mind and body or between reason and feeling, which goes back to the Cartesian separation between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. Cognitivist theories of emotion assume that it requires beliefs, desires, or values to create a feeling. Some cognitivists even claim that feelings are judgments or that parts of judgments exist in feelings (cf. Demmerling and Landweer 2007, p. 4). These parts then supposedly make it possible to differentiate between the different feelings and to investigate them (cf. *ibid.*, p. 4). Cognitivist theories also often assume that feelings are composed of different proportions such as somatic, voluntary and cognitive. However, these theories do not succeed or only inadequately succeed in precisely distinguishing feelings from one another. They are also unable to name the social and mundane preconditions of feelings and to describe and analyse them in their breadth, diversity, and particular meaning. All in all, the productive character of feelings, their inner logic, is not seen. Under cognitivist auspices, they are rather seen as the antagonist or the opposite of reason, which is dependent on its orders, modes of functioning (the judgement) and rules, and is subordinate to them (cf. *ibid.*, p. 4; Senge and Schützeichel 2013).

For a long time, pedagogy has overlooked the important and productive relevance of emotions, their specific meaning for the individual, or the “raison du coeur” (Pascal). They were and still are regarded as adversaries to reason and rationality. As a result of this logocentric dualism, they were mostly ignored. They

¹ I use the terms emotion and feeling synonymously.

also were and still are regarded as a disturbance of rationality and of competence-centered processes of *Bildung*, learning, and education. Emotions are placed in the service of a supposedly higher reason, rationality, or judgement and thus are being disciplined and subordinated.

Phenomenology tries to reverse this European logocentrism by describing and researching emotions. Based on Husserl's concept of intentionality (the fundamental relation of humans in acts to the world and the associated definition of experience as the experience *of* something and *as* something), Scheler and Heidegger claim the priority of emotions over thought and will. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger emphasized the *Stimmung* (mood) of fear (*Angst*) as a basic state of being (Heidegger 2001). In contrast to Heidegger, Max Scheler gave priority to love and emotions of sympathy (Scheler 1986, 2015). From a phenomenological perspective, emotions bear an outstanding priority and significance for relations between the self, the world, and others. Emotions and feelings are seen as embodied, subjective, and eventful lived experiences. In phenomenological educational studies, the significance of emotions for *Bildung* is emphasized (Stenger 2012).

2 Shame: The Three-Fold Structure of Emotions and Feelings

To illustrate these thoughts, I would like to present an example which deals with the feeling of shame (*Schamgefühl*). I will first use this example to point out some general characteristics of emotions. I will deal with the specific quality of the feeling of shame and its implications for a theory of *Bildung* later (Chap. 7).

The example originates from our research in the context of pedagogical-phenomenological videography, in which we particularly study the phenomenon of attention in teaching and learning.² It was recorded in a ninth-grade chemistry class. The girl in the back row on the right is called upon by the teacher to present the results of an experiment to the class (Fig. 1–6).

Within a few seconds, one clearly sees a bodily reaction or 'answer' to the teacher's request: widened eyes, her gaze is surprised and fixed; she smiles; her cheeks redden; her gaze sinks downwards. The girl gets up and pulls her sweater down. Her body tension increases and her body tone becomes rigid. The teacher encourages her to come forward to the blackboard. There she presents the results of her experiment in front of the other mostly male students. At the teacher's

² <https://www.erziehungswissenschaften.hu-berlin.de/de/allgemeine/forschung-1/videografische-unterrichtsforschung>.



Fig. 1–6 Images from videographic classroom research from left to right: Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, copyright by M. Brinkmann; for data protection reasons the faces of the persons are made unrecognizable

request, she explains the chemical process (it is a matter of determining bases or acids).

We are all familiar with situations like these from our own experience at school. One will probably say: The girl is ashamed. She is ashamed to have to answer in front of others, to have to stand up, to have to present herself at the blackboard in front of everyone, and maybe demonstrate her lack of knowing that and knowing how (*Wissen und Können*).

Shame and – as I will show – all emotions and feelings are characterized by a three-fold structure: Firstly, they express themselves in an embodied way and thus they are perceptible. This process cannot be controlled – neither by will nor by rationality. The feeling of shame (*Schamgefühl*) is overwhelming. It resembles

an unexpected and pathic event. One avoids the gaze of others, wants to hide, sink into the ground. In the feeling of shame, a self-relation appears. Feelings overwhelm us as experiences. They decentre the subject in a certain way and show that – as Sigmund Freud says – the ego is not “master in its own house” (Freud 1917, p. 7). Self-confidence, self-control, and self-transparency slip away. The self-relation is thus withdrawn from one’s own disposal. Strangeness and foreignness emerge in the lived self-experience and in the views of others. A space between the self and the foreign opens up (Waldenfels 2003). The existence of autonomy or an autonomous subject in feeling and through feelings is thus questionable. The self-relation in feeling is experienced before and through others, it is an immediate bodily gesture (*Gebärde*).

Secondly, in the feeling of shame a fundamental sociality becomes manifest. The self-relation I mentioned is experienced in front of others and through others. It is a feeling of oneself (*Selbstgefühl*) that remains related to others. The embodied feeling of oneself arises from the lived experience of having to show oneself as someone in front of others. This creates an unpleasant, tense, and finally crisis-like lived experience. The self-control, the social mask, and the role of the student slip away and something very personal appears. In anger, to refer to another example, one rages over what one has suffered or experienced by others. Here, too, emotions are expressed in front of others, just like in love, which is elementarily related to others. Thus, feelings are related to others and a relationship between self and others manifests itself in feelings.

The girl in our example is ashamed of herself in front of others – about something. The girl turns red, she blushes because she anticipates the judgement of the other students at the very moment she is confronted with the gazes of the others. Therefore, the feeling of shame, thirdly, has an object, a correlate. It is directed at something specific that is experienced at the very moment or that is at least being anticipated. Emotions are intentionally directed at something. The intentionality of feelings directs them to a correlative or an object (cf. Demmerling and Landweer 2007, p. 12).

To sum up: Feelings have a propositional content. They are an experience. The above-mentioned character of a feeling as an overwhelming happening testifies to this. I experience joy, envy, and shame in an emotional situation that is difficult to describe.

Against this background, and given the overwhelming and withdrawing character of the experience of feelings, the question emerges how Bildung through emotions and Bildung of emotions can be shaped without repeating the cognitivist subordination under the banner of a restituted Cartesianism? To answer this question, I would first like to make some phenomenological distinctions.

3 Emotion, Mood, Atmosphere

In phenomenology, especially in the works of Scheler, but also in more recent theories of emotions (Demmerling and Landweer 2007; Schmitz 2007) more precise conceptual distinctions are being made. With Demmerling and Landweer (2007), I first want to distinguish a broader concept of emotion, that contains all forms of affects, from a more narrow concept. Emotions in a more narrow sense are firstly intentionally directed at something and have a propositional content, as I pointed out before. I am happy about a bouquet of flowers, I envy some one's success or I am ashamed of something.

The lived experience-character of emotions is an unmistakably personal experience. Emotions can only be experienced from the first-person perspective. I may be able to participate in the joy or shame of another person, I can "empathise" with them, as Scheler says, and be infected by these feelings so that the other person becomes present to me in sympathy. However, understanding or empathising with an emotion of another doesn't have a propositional content. Compassion or sympathy for someone else's toothache, shame, or grief does not mean that I have a toothache myself, or turn red or mourn the loss of a close person. Nevertheless, incompassion or sympathy, joy or grief can be shared and pain can be experienced without experiencing these emotions directly.

Compassion or sympathy, like the lived experience of emotion itself, is not intended by the ego but emanates from the other. The primacy of emotion over thinking and will corresponds with the primacy of the other in emotion. This first-person perspective implies a rejection of the traditional European notion of the sovereignty and autonomy of the subject. The emotional experience is rather based on a passivity, a lived experience and a state of mind that marks the fundamental heteronomy of the subject. In this way, phenomenology can decenter the notion of the autonomous subject without having to abandon subjectivity in the first-person perspective, or without having to deconstruct it all together.

In this context, another characteristic of emotions becomes clear. The experience of emotion is to be distinguished from sensory perceptions. All emotions are embodied but they transcend sensual perception by being directed towards something and/or someone and thereby receive their quality and intensity. Emotions are sensory lived experiences as a correlate of an act. In joy, shame, or envy, I experience myself in front of others by feeling joy about something, by being ashamed of something, or by envying someone.

Moods (*Stimmungen*) and atmospheres can be distinguished from emotions. Moods such as fear, worry, melancholy, euphoria, serenity, thoughtfulness, boredom or sadness, displeasure or despair are in phenomenology regarded as basic

states of being-in-the-world (Heidegger 2001; Bollnow 1995). In contrast to emotions and feelings, a mood can be seen as an affect.

Moods are, with Heidegger, felt states of being-in-the-world (*Befindlichkeiten*). They are bodily experiences of the implicit lived body. Here, the body is the “place of condensation of the state of being” (Fuchs 2013 p. 5), which qualitatively colours our relationship to the world: “Discomfort, such as sensitivity to the weather, tiredness or exhaustion, immerses the environment in a harsher, more monotonous colouring. Things lose richness and interest, become boring or annoying, without the bodily origin of this change first becoming conscious” (ibid., p. 5).

In other words: Moods generate an affective foundation against the background of which emotions can stand out. Moods such as fear, worry, melancholy, euphoria, serenity, thoughtfulness, boredom or sadness, displeasure or despair are in phenomenology regarded as basic states of being-in-the-world (Heidegger 2001; Bollnow 1995). In contrast to emotions and feelings, mood can be seen as an affect. Moods, unlike emotions, have no correlate, no object. A Mood is diffuse and of longer duration, not bound to a certain situation or place (Fuchs 2013). The German word *Stimmung* comes from music. Strings of a violin or a piano are “*gestimmt*”, tuned. They are then linked together in resonance with others. A mood, therefore, needs a resonance and thus an answer to others or to the Other. Mood (*Stimmung*) feels, grasps, and evaluates without speech and rational judgement. Moods, as well as emotions, create a fundamental responsiveness to the world, to oneself, and to others on a pre-rational and pre-conceptual level. They open up the world to us and at the same time close it off.

Thirdly, atmospheres can be distinguished from emotions and moods. Atmospheres are also affects but in a spatial and material context. Like moods, atmospheres are diffuse. In atmospheres, space is not perceived as an objective, measurable space, but in a non-objective way in the mode of being affectively touched. Atmospheres can be experienced as holistic qualities of spatial and/or social environments that condense into an experiential “*Gestalt*” (Lewin): “the exuberant mood of a party, the oppressive mood of a funeral, the reverent aura of a cathedral or the eeriness of the forest” (Fuchs 2013, p. 6) can be felt in bodily resonance.

The non-objective impression of space, the things and people in it constitute the atmosphere. Böhme describes atmosphere as an intermediate phenomenon between man and space, between the self and the world (Böhme 2013), in which the perceptible is transferred to the feeling of being together (*Mit-sein*). Atmospheres therefore are also characterized by a state of being tuned like moods.

They respond to colours, smells, things, constellations, people and architectures in space.

4 Description and Epoché

A special challenge for the exploration of emotions and feelings is their ephemeral and ambiguous character as well as their overwhelming and pathic character. They are implicitly structured and discursively determinable only in an ex-post manner. Moreover, feelings do not appear “pure and undisguised”. We experience (*erleben*) them in situations in which several emotional dimensions are intertwined. The “pure” feeling of shame is rather exceptional. Shame usually occurs together with other emotions such as shyness or embarrassment. Phenomenology has developed a method of description to peel the phenomena out of their life-worldly entanglement. On the one hand, this can be achieved through precise, rich, and concise descriptions of the qualities of meaning and lived experiences as well as the different levels and intensities of emotions (Brinkmann 2020).

On the other hand, it can be achieved by the methodology of variation, in which the feeling of shame is differentiated from other related feelings in varying ways and thus refined as a phenomenon. In their studies on shame, Max Scheler and Hans Lipps vary the feeling of shame in comparison with and in distinction from feelings like pride, humility, remorse, sense of honour, prudishness, zeal, vanity, shyness, coquetry and frivolity (cf. Lipps 1941, pp. 29–43). The diversity of feelings in their specific meaning is thus preserved and the respective phenomenon is exemplified (Buck 2019). Descriptions are exemplary as they emphasize a generality that does not derive its legitimacy from logical or experimental rules. Rather, they point to a generality that can be made comprehensible and plausible in intersubjective experience. Thus, examples do not subsume their object to an abstract rule. They show the general in the individual. Examples demonstrate, visualize, and orient. With the phenomenological Epoché, which I understand here with Heidegger as a “delaying or pausing a movement of experience”, experiences of *Bildung* can also be initialized in exemplary descriptions (Brinkmann 2021a).

Later I will develop a more precise phenomenology of shame using the example of school. I will clarify the specific meaning and function of emotions as a life-world orientation and as dimensions of evaluation. Above all, I will also work out the function of *Bildung* of shame. Before I come to this, I will briefly present some information on Phenomenological Research in Education and on a theory of *Bildung*. This step is first required to explain the conceptual and theoretical

background of phenomenological pedagogy against which I will develop the later thoughts on Bildung of shame.

5 Phenomenological Perspectives on Bildung and Learning

Lived body, sociality, and foreignness, as they appear in the example of shame, are important categories of Phenomenological Research in Education, as it has been practised in Germany for over 100 years (Brinkmann 2016a, 2019).

Since its beginnings, Phenomenological Research in Education has systematically linked the topics of Husserl and his successors Scheler, Lipps, Fink, Heidegger, Plessner, Bollnow, Rombach, Schütz, Waldenfels, Meyer-Drawe, Lipitz with a theory of Bildung, learning, and education (*Erziehung*) (Brinkmann 2016a, 2019). Topics such as corporeality, temporality, foreignness, and the attitudes of intentionality, passivity, and responsivity play an important role in this context. Phenomenological research is based on a regional ontology (Husserl). It refers to the question of principles, categories, and models. It also refers to the question of the object of our discipline and profession (*Gegenstandskonstitution*) in comparison and in contrast to other disciplines and professions. Phenomenological research in Education has systematically and empirically redefined traditional pedagogical theories such as those by Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Herbart, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Progressive Pedagogy and Education (*Reformpädagogik*). It combines the question of the object of research with the question of the methodological approach and thus asks, whether certain methods are capable of capturing the object they claim to research (*Gegenstandsangemessenheit*). Phenomenological Pedagogy proceeds both theoretically and empirically. Pedagogy is thus defined as an empirical and theoretical science (*wissenschaftliche Pädagogik*, Schleiermacher 2000) or more precisely as a science of experiences (*Erfahrungswissenschaft*) (Brinkmann 2016b). Learning, Bildung and education (*Erziehung*) are examined as modes of experience in their physical, emotional, sensual, and social dimensions.

In this context, the concept of Bildung plays a major role. For Humboldt, Bildung means an interplay between man and the world in which an experience through alienation takes place that changes man as a whole (Humboldt 1969): a transformation or a reversal (*periagoge*). While language is an excellent medium of education in Humboldt's work, from today's view embodiment, sociality and alienation resp. negativity are seen as important further dimensions of experiences of Bildung and education (Brinkmann 2021b, c).

Phenomenological theories of Bildung and learning are based on the idea of a decentralised subject. In the intergenerational relationship between child and adult, aspects of foreignness and otherness step into the foreground (Lippitz 2019). In the experience of Bildung, in transformation and in learning as re-learning, great importance is attributed to negative experiences.

6 Negative Experience in Learning

Phenomenological Research in Education developed a genuinely phenomenological theory of learning as relearning (Buck 2019; Meyer-Drawe 2008; Lippitz 1989; Brinkmann 2012). Here, learning is regarded as an experience, in which someone makes an experience through something specific or through someone specific (Meyer-Drawe 2008). Negative experiences play a prominent role in this theory of learning. They are not to be understood in the everyday sense as bad experiences that are opposed to good or positive experiences. Rather, they describe a specific understanding of negativity, that lies beyond the dualistic notion of good and bad and that emphasizes the productive potentials of negativity.

Buck (2019), referring to Hegel, Husserl and Gadamer, describes this structure in the process of learning as anticipation and fulfilment – or disappointment or *negation*: “Anticipation means precisely the openness to new experiences that belongs to said experience” as “preceding interpretation” and “understanding in advance” (Buck 2019, p. 69). The disappointment of anticipation in the negativity of experience “does not manifest itself in the fact that a deception is simply seen through and a correction or deletion takes place...” (ibid., p. 69). While a fulfilled anticipation explicates the horizon (not reinforcing it), a non-fulfilment or contradiction leads to a change in the horizon of experience and new anticipations. This negation brings a moment of discontinuity into the continuity of experience.

In learning through experience, these negative instances are encountered as moments of not-knowing-that, not-knowing-how, as failures, interruptions, moments of forgetting and unreadiness-to-hand (“*Unzuhandenheit*”, cf. Heidegger 2001, p. 72). An interspace or a space in-between emerges. This space should not be seen from the endpoint but from the presence of the experiencer and learner himself. An interspace opens up between knowing that and not knowing that and between knowing how and not knowing how. It is a lived experience of “foreignness” (Benner 2020). This experience of foreignness as a negative experience, a pathic experience, as something that happens to someone occurs, it steps out of the order, befalls oneself, and irritates what is familiar to us, what we know of or what we know how to do (cf. Waldenfels 2004, p. 164). It is a fleeting experience,

as Gadamer makes clear with reference to Aristotle's metaphor of the fleeing army in *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Learning thus takes place in the tension between knowing that, knowing how (*Wissen und Können*) and not-knowing that and not knowing-how (*Nicht-Wissen, Nicht-Können*) (Rödel 2019). By undergoing a "negative" experience that is in this sense a determinate negation or a specific disappointment of anticipations, we not only experience something, but we also experience ourselves reflexively.

Negative experiences as well as irritating and disappointing experiences point back to the self- and world-relation of the learner. The horizon of experience is changing (Gadamer). As our horizon is changed in an experience, future anticipations change, as do experiences from the past. This also means that the structure of sedimentalization and habitualization is changing. They are not deleted but provided with a new "index" (Husserl). In other words: The relation to the world and the self-relation is transformed. The experience of *Bildung* is therefore a transformational experience based on negative moments of disappointment and irritation. It is fundamentally connected with a sense of foreignness and with the temporally indicated space in-between. In this temporal and social perspective, the phenomenological and hermeneutic theory of learning differs significantly from traditional psychological theories of cumulative learning or from cognitivist competence theory.

7 Phenomenology of Shame

In the following I would like to take up the example of the chemistry lesson from the beginning of the text again in order to further reflect on the relation between *Bildung* and shame.

7.1 Self-Relation in the Feeling of Shame (*Schamgefühl*): Masked Personality

As soon as the girl in the example is called to the blackboard, physical reactions become apparent: Widened eyes, tense smile, redness of the cheeks, lowered gaze. These are known to all of us as possible expressions of shame. We said earlier: In the feeling of shame, one's own relation to oneself is experienced. The self-relation is experienced in a pathic way: one wants to sink into the ground. This embodied self-feeling experiences the vulnerability of one's own self. At the same time, it arises in front of others who are present or in front of imaginary others,

more precisely: in the face of and in response to the gaze of others (Sartre 1991). Shame is both – a subjective-personal and a social feeling. In the lived experience of shame, one’s self-relation is experienced as a crisis. The feeling of wanting to sink into the ground thus indicates an affect of concealment. Something is drawn into view and visibility, something is presented to the gazes that prefers to hide. Gazes can penetrate, they can undress someone, they cause a feeling of nakedness.

Shame is related to one’s own nakedness, to the bodily experience of “nudity” that is hidden from the gaze of others. This embodied self-relation characterizes and distinguishes shame as an imposition and burden. The student is expected to present herself, to show herself, to present her knowledge and skills to the public. She is expected to show herself in front of the gaze and remarks of the other students. But one’s own (*das Eigene im Unterschied zum Fremden*) does not want to enter the public sphere (cf. Lipps 1941, p. 33). One’s own does not want to be displayed and judged, or even to be exposed. It must be hidden or masked. Here, the anthropological meaning of the mask is revealed. The mask (Latin: *persona*) prevents the private from becoming public, the hidden from becoming visible. The mask guarantees the person’s own (*das Eigene*). Without a mask, there is no personality (Plessner 1970). From Plato to Lipps, the feeling of shame is therefore seen as the beginning of self-consciousness (cf. Lipps 1941, p. 43). Shame has an elementary function in the formation of identity, that always remains volatile, precarious, and unstable. The reversal of the Eurocentric prejudices I mentioned before manifests itself at this point: it is not reason and autonomy forming the beginning of self-relation and identity, but the feeling of shame as the “guardian” of the ego and one’s identity.

The reserve of those who are shy and shameful illustrates not only the embodiment of shame but also the gender aspect of shame. The crisis-like nature of the embodied and gender-based self-relation is experienced as particularly strong in times of physical maturation and development in adolescence – the reactions of the boys, their suggestive smirks, and their shouts reinforce this once again. The student tudies her sweater, she feels, as we say in German, “uncomfortable in her skin”. Embodiment, its gender aspect, and its visibility as central moments of shame are closely interwoven.

7.2 The Explorative and Evaluative Function of the Feeling of Shame

I would like to extend this phenomenological analysis further with regard to the temporality of the feeling of shame (*Schamgefühl*). The presence of the feeling

of shame in its embodied-sexually delicate character is apparent in the gaze of others – we have seen this in our example. The presence of shame is thus related to a possible future: as a feeling of a border, of not wanting to reveal one's own in public and one's hiding from the gazes of others. The feeling of shame is preventive, sometimes even prohibitive. Shame can therefore occur in the preliminary stages of a possible embarrassment in order to prevent it. In this respect, shame is also a sense of anticipation of which no representational concept is possible. This is where the above-mentioned orientation function of feelings becomes obvious.

We said earlier that the norms and values of culture, society, or institutions articulate themselves in the gaze of others. If I am ashamed of others, then I am ashamed of myself through experiencing their values as my own. The student experiences a social norm without being its author. The social and institutional norms of the school are performance standards that the teacher, but also the other students, reconstitute. They are also norms of knowing that and knowing how (*Wissen und Können*), that are ought to be presented here publicly. By experiencing these norms and values in shame as one's own, they are evaluated. They are experienced as something offensive (in the embodied-genderly sense) or as something valuable (in the sense of performance) or unworthy (mistake, not knowing how or that). The potential evaluation by others and the anticipation of the potential failure creates an embarrassment of not being able to fulfil these demands (on the difference between embarrassment and shame see Lipps 1941, p. 31 f.). The impending nakedness is therefore not only an embodied-genderly one, but also morally-evaluative. The situation can therefore be grasped in regard to senses or feelings, which are experienced as possible threats to one's self-esteem. This development refers to values and norms, in our example of the school classroom to performance standards of knowing and not-knowing, of knowing how or not-knowing how. The feeling of shame thus also has an evaluative function concerning one's own evaluations of a situation in the face of cultural and social norms and values. The student seems to be ashamed (self-relation) of something (not knowing that, not knowing how) in front of others (norm and value reference).

To summarize: The experience of shame is at the same time a subjective-personal and a social feeling, that orientates lifeworld experiences. In shame, foreign norms are experienced as one's own. Shame plays between visibility and concealment: the self wants to hide and conceal itself from the public. It is defined as embodied-sexually and morally-valuing. In the moment (*Erlebnis*) of shame, it can be seen as the beginning of self-consciousness and identity because it refers to self-esteem in a crisis-ridden and reflexive way. Shame acts in an anticipatory, exploratively, and potentially prohibitive way.

7.3 Negativity of the Feeling of Shame (*Schamgefühl*)

Let's try to describe the feeling in further variations. How exactly does the judgement take place in shame? Or to put it another way, what is the relation between one's own and the foreign, between one's own self-esteem and the evaluation of others who embody foreign norms in their gazes? The self-relation is also a self-esteem due to the evaluative character of the situation. This is experienced in a crisis-like and emotional-reflexive way. The feeling of shame thus exhibits a basal reflexivity or a proto-reflexivity that is pre-rational and pre-predicative (Brinkmann 2019).

In general, the crisis of the self or self-esteem in the feeling of shame is interpreted as failure. The self-esteem in this sense “fails” (Schäfer and Thomson 2009, p. 10), an “alienation” takes place in the objectifying gaze of the other (Sartre 1991). These interpretations are based on a Hegelian reading of recognition and negativity. Then, in a certain or specific negation (*bestimmte Negation*), a position (the subject) is challenged, crossed, and dialectically put into a new state or condition. According to the logic of the dialectic of master and servant, that Hegel develops in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* and that he identifies as the basic structure of recognition, shame is associated with submission to others (cf. Hegel 1986, p. 145, p. 155). The gaze is thus the medium of non-recognition and an expression of power or social inferiority. Most theories of shame and recognition stand in this Hegelian tradition – from Norbert Elias' *Process of Civilization* (1997), Sartre's analysis of shame in *Being and Nothingness* (L'Être et le néant, 1991) to current theories of recognition for example by Axel Honneth (2014). This perspective is also frequently invoked in phenomenology, for example in Demmerling's and Landweer's work (2007).

But shame, the feeling of shame, and the constitutive ambiguity of the space in-between cannot be adequately captured neither with the model of hierarchizing subordination and submission nor with the model of socio-political struggles and fights (Benner 2017). One can, for example, be ashamed in front of others without “knowing what one has done wrong”. The key factor is “that one does not feel perceived by others in the way one wants to be perceived” (Schlossberger 2006, p. 269). There is no dialectical turnover due to a certain or specific negation. Instead, I would like to argue: There is an existential negativity, a crisis, a conflict in self-esteem and the sense of the self: a foreignness that is existentially experienced in the gaze of others and then transformed into the foreignness and otherness of one's self. Foreign perspective and self-perspective become intertwined. The imposition of shame consists precisely in exposing oneself to foreign

values against the background of one's own values, these don't have to be dialectically conveyed or suspended in a simple submission. The non-dialectic negativity of the feeling of shame plays between one's own and the foreign, between (non-)recognition of others and (non-)recognition of one's own, between the visible and the hidden in an interspace. The feeling of shame is therefore more the awareness of a border, of a difference in an intermediate area. It is "the feeling of one's own existence in its dichotomy" (Bernet 2003, p. 30).

This axiological function of the feeling of shame is based on a fundamentally embodied and existential structure of reflection: the relation to oneself in the face and response to others (Brinkmann 2019). This proto-reflexive relationship also "plays" in an intermediate area. No logical or rational judgement is made here about a non-rational feeling or about "body sensations". The cognitivist appraisal theories (e.g. Scheerer) treat feelings as the counterpart to reason, that is submitted to a cognitive evaluation and reflection process (cf. Huber and Krause 2018, p. 96). This can't grasp the specific inner logic of shame in its personal, social, and pedagogical dimensions. Against the background of the phenomenological analysis I just presented, it should have become clear that feelings and emotions – in contrast to cognitivist views – have their own rationality, which manifests itself in their orientational and evaluational function. The intermediate and existential sphere of which we are talking here must therefore not be closed off in a rationalistic way. The Bildungs-function of feelings is closely related to the more precise definition of this intermediate area in relation to learning experiences. In the now following last chapter I will try to make this clear by coming back to the example of shame.

The non-dialectic negativity of the feeling of shame opens multiple spaces in-between, between self and foreign, between (non-)recognition of others and (non-)recognition of one's own, and finally between the visible and the hidden. It also enables a proto-reflexive and existential reference to self-esteem and to a feeling and sense of the self.

7.4 Negativity of Shame: The Beginning of Bildung and Learning

We have explored two functions of the feeling of shame: the social function of shame, to be able to prohibitively deal with a extential vulnerability, as well as the moral and existential function of shame, to experience a difference between bodily-genderly and one's own norm values. Now they are to be expanded by a perspective on Bildung. I would like to point out a connection between the

overwhelming feeling of shame as a pathic one on the one hand and the negative experience of learning described above on the other.

The student's feeling of shame in our example is socially structured by the situation, the institution, and the gaze of others. The social field (Bourdieu) proves to be one of social distinctions under the special conditions of the school in which the students' provided academic performance is evaluated and certified. If we now look at the first-person perspective, it becomes clear that these norms are experienced existentially as one's own. They immediately provoke embodied reactions (blushing). In shame, the own articulates itself in response to the foreign, to foreign demands and gazes, from which it tries to hide itself and from which it tries to evade.

In the feeling of shame, not only judgements are experienced in the horizon of a social, societal, or institutional norm, but also evaluations are carried out. In the case of the student from our example, these evaluations relate to her relation to knowledge and ability. Against the background of the theory of negativity, it now becomes clear that the prohibitive function of shame can also be defined with regard to the experiences of knowing-that, knowing-how and not-knowing-that or not-knowing-how (*Wissen und Können*). The student is embarrassed because she does not "know" whether what she knows is wrong or right. In the feeling of shame, the possibility of not-knowing-that or not-knowing-how is experienced and anticipated as one's own.

In our example, the feeling of shame is not caused by an insult or a diminution in value by the teacher. It rather arises immediately with the "call". This call is a conventional form of "counteracting education" (*entgegenwirkende Erziehung*, Schleiermacher 2000) which, while preserving the personality of the person to be educated, opens up the possibility of revealing mistakes, ignorance, and incompetence. This happens because we know that the process of learning begins with a negative experience. In this sense, the possibility of *Bildung* opens up in the context of shame. The feeling of shame can thus be described as the effect of an educational practice. This educational practice can be described not as a submission or as non-recognition. I want to argue that it can be seen as a practice of care, which deals tactfully and adequately with the individual personality. It does not evade the responsibility to initiate the learning process. Education as care knows that learning begins with negativity and that shame therefore has a constitutive and productive significance for the process of learning and *Bildung*.

This care (*Fürsorge*) does not aim to determine a student's not-knowing-that or not-knowing-how with the aim that the student is forced to confess this publicly – as Socrates does in the Platonic dialogues. Rather, care intends to open up a negative experience as the beginning of a motion of *Bildung*. The one who is

ashamed knows that he or she might be missing certain knowing-that or knowing-how. Yet, he or she also does not know what the right knowledge is, although he or she anticipates it. Here, too, the earlier mentioned intermediate and existential space between one's own and the foreign open up. This can be described in a pedagogical situation as a space between knowing-that and knowing-how and not-knowing-that and not-knowing-how (*Wissen, Nicht-Wissen, Können, Nicht-Können*). It can therefore be said: The Bildungs-function of shame is “mediated through a negativity that is still open and undefined (...)”, which “proceeds from an acceptance of the negative. Neither can negativity be simply seen a simple turn to a positive outcome” (Liebsch, quoted from Benner 2017, p. 143). In this interspace of shame between knowing and not-knowing, the possibility of a lived experience of Bildung opens up. The educational function of shame therefore corresponds with its orientation function in the social field and the moral evaluation function in the embodied-genderly field. In this way, it becomes clear: In the feeling of shame, Bildung arises through emotions and at the same time, the specific meaning of the feeling of shame enables a Bildung of emotion insofar as a learning experience can begin with “negative” experiences.

Finally, it can be stated: The Bildungs-function of shame consists of opening up a space between knowing-that and knowing-how as well as not-knowing-that and not-knowing-how. It can be seen in a negative experience as the beginning of a motion of Bildung and is evoked by an aspect of care, which tactfully and adequately responds to the respective personality and therefore knows that learning begins with negativity.

Thus, shame can have a constitutive and productive meaning for learning.

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The Mood of Disquiet and Education

Elena Madrussan

1 About Disquiet as Original Mood: Kierkegaard, Freud, Jaspers

Starting from the idea of *Stimmung*, or mood as the mode in which the subject relates with the world, I intend to observe its implications for a phenomenological and existential pedagogy that particularly takes into consideration the mood of disquiet.¹

Referring to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, *Stimmung* is the mode of existence with which the subject positions him/herself in view of the way in which the world offers itself to him. As is well known, according to Heidegger, *Stimmung* has nothing to do with the exercise of individual rationality and neither is it the product of the context of belonging. It is rather the result of the relationship between the way the subject experiences the world and how the world is made present to the subject (Heidegger 1962, pp. 225–273). In this sense, according to Heidegger, “the existential ‘mode’ of the *not-at-home*” in relation to being-in-the-world (ibid., p. 233), that is the “state-of-mind” (ibid.) of bewilderment (*Unheimlichkeit*), “must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon” (ibid., p. 234).

According to Merleau-Ponty, *Stimmung* is exactly what stands between the subject and the world: it is the mode of relating between the subject-object

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¹ The results of the study into this philosophical and educative connection are collected in my book (2017) *Educazione e inquietudine. La manœuvre formativa [Education and disquiet. The formative manœuvre]*. Como-Pavia: Ibis.

poles, and it describes their reciprocal interpenetration. In reference to this matter, Merleau-Ponty speaks of the subject as a “cavity” in which the world “resounds” starting from perception (Merleau-Ponty 2002; Carbone 2010; Lisciani-Petrini 2007). This means that what we are considering as *Stimmung* does not depend exclusively on either the subject or the world, but on how they intertwine in the lived experience.

Mood is then the mode whereby the individual and the world come together. It is not a psychological state, nor is it either a permanent or transitory condition. It is not a rationalisation described. It is not a feeling or an emotion. And yet, mood characterises and influences the psychological state; it activates the intellectual abilities and can awaken emotions and feelings. It is a kind of preliminary mode of one’s own individual personality.

Thanks to the phenomenological-existential horizon, the subject’s way of being reveals itself as a decisive element in understanding on a pedagogical level *how* the subject becomes what he is. For those in an educational role, this means reaching a higher degree of sensitivity and attention towards the manner through which the subject is formed.

The hypothesis taken into consideration is the exploration of disquiet as a mood, that is a decisive existential situation in the educational sphere. Confused with insecurity, fragility, the inability to take decisions, unsociability, or the restlessness of youth, in short with a passing and/or inopportune feeling, disquiet currently assumes negative connotations, even becoming an actual social disease of our times. From this viewpoint, which here we shall critique, education is called on to correct or ‘cure’ disquiet.

From the angle of the philosophy of education, on the other hand, it is possible to rediscover the profound reasons that identify the subject’s original condition in disquiet, subtracting it from the psychological simplification that endeavours to medicalise it or relegate it to areas on the margins of existence. In this case, the mood of disquiet denotes, on the contrary, a subjective intelligence that is positively unfulfilled, searching for itself, for knowledge, for new interpretations of reality. In this sense, from a historical and philosophical viewpoint, there are at least three rather significant perspectives: Kierkegaard’s ethical disquiet, Freud’s uncanny, Jasper’s limit-situation.

The first perspective is Kierkegaard’s: the disquieted conscience forms the subject’s ethical horizon. In *The Sickness unto Death*, Kierkegaard sees the disquiet of conscience as the only possibility of becoming aware of the need for an inner-education. Indeed, the formation of the individual’s ethical personality rises from his existential task to search for the possible. This is not the task of choosing from already available opportunities, which are a simple adaptation to the existent, but

a solitary – and for Kierkegaard, distressing – task, constituted predominantly by the moral necessity to choose the possibility that is not yet visible, the possibility of becoming someone who is not content to adapt to him/herself, or as Kierkegaard puts it, “does not will to be himself” (Kierkegaard 1980, pp. 154–155). For the Danish philosopher, choosing the possible is an act of real transformation and inner-education.

Here, in no way does disquiet rise from the fear of choosing, or of making the wrong choice, which are feelings, but it corresponds to the exercise of ethical doubt, which denotes how important the stakes are for the subject. Disquiet is the mood that gives the individual leverage in claiming his/her own freedom. In this sense, it is a sign of the determination to be transformed, not to take for granted one’s own moral personality. It is the opposite to a sign of the personality’s weakness. On the contrary, the personality is weak when the subject is distressed because he/she is unable to correspond to the world’s expectations, when it passively adapts to the will of others without ‘being educated’ in the responsibility of the possible (Bertin 1968; Bertolini 1988).

The second perspective taken into consideration is Freud’s uncanny, including its reinterpretation by Lacan. According to Freud, the *Unheimlich*, or the uncanny experience, consists of the revelation of something dreadful that is hidden within what is more familiar to us. Freud, in fact, places the uncanny on the border between reality and fantasy, because it is the real experience of what ought to be (rationally) impossible. In the essay *The Uncanny* (2011 [1919]), Freud states that the revelation of what should remain hidden and that is instead perceived and experienced by the subject represents the betrayal of an expectation. The uncanny turns the familiar into the mysterious, the known into the unknown. Yet, for the same reason, the uncanny is also what has been removed and that, instead of remaining hidden in the shadowy area of individual conscience, unexpectedly emerges, forcing the subject to face his fears and, according to Lacan, his most unspeakable desires (Lacan 2014). In other words, it forces the subject to reckon with a knowledge of him/herself that previously he/she did not have and did not foresee. The uncanny becomes, therefore, an opportunity for self-revelation. No matter how disorientating this experience might be, it does lay bare a deeper ego, one that is less comfortable, but more fecund (Berto 1988; Rella 1977; Žižek 2007; Roudinesco 2014).

Here the disquiet of the uncanny unveils the most intimate subjectivity, which is unattainable in the life of real objectivity. For this reason, this disquiet acts as a doorway giving access to what the subject is without knowing it. It is a doorway to self-awareness. Much worse is the fear of the unknown that has been removed and that the subject continues to refuse to see.

The third perspective is the experience of the limit-situation expressed by Jaspers. According to Jaspers, when the individual finds him/herself facing a situation bordering on the unbearable, which cannot immediately be fully perceived, the effect is one of radical disorientation, in which existence remains deprived of “a fixed point, an element that gives firmness and stability” (Jaspers 1950).² In *The Psychology of Worldviews* (1950 [1919]) and *The Atom Bomb and the Future of Man* (1961 [1958]), Jaspers identifies as limit-situations the lived experience of struggle, death, chance, guilt, violence, and he insists on the fact that they are limit situations not only because of their actual occurrence but above all, because of the subject’s awareness of them. With respect to limit-situations, then, education can have two fundamental functions. In the first case, Jaspers speaks of education as a “shell” that constitutes the support, external to the limit-situation, thanks to which the subject can rely on what he/she has always been, on internalised traditions, on a worldview that he/she has developed over time. Thus, education is an anchor that rescues the individual from the shipwreck of the limit-situation, while leaving him/her an unaltered view of the world and feeling of self: it is an escape route from the unbearableness of the limit. In the second case, Jaspers examines the event in which education itself becomes “uncertain and fragmentary” (Jaspers 1957, p. 134), and does not offer the subject the opportunity to escape from the tragic nature of the limit-situation through external loopholes. Here, self-formation as transformation comes into play, according to which the subject educates him/herself to face the limit and the tragic, becoming someone different from what he/she was, activating a “transforming knowledge” that transcends the fact of reality and produces a new worldview. In Jaspers’ words: “In struggle he becomes aware of that power for which he stands, that power which is yet not everything. He experiences his guilt and puts questions to it. He asks for the nature of truth and in full consciousness acts out the meaning of victory and of defeat” (Jaspers 1952, p. 75). This formation of the ego occurs, then, through a disquieted mood, which is aware of the world and its own personality in a new sense, which, in turn, produces new knowledge and new meaning.

If we just take into consideration these three angles of the many possibilities³ at our disposal, disquiet assumes a positive aspect, despite being existentially arduous. It is a kind of existential condition thanks to which it can actually become possible to learn and to change. It is this disquieted Self-Bildung that our contemporary times seem to have completely forgotten and that a

² The English translation of the Work is not available. The English translations of the extracts quoted here are mine and they are based on the Italian translation of the book.

³ See also Bollnow 2008; Brinkmann et al. 2019; Brinkmann 2016a, b.

phenomenological-existential approach in pedagogy (Erbetta 2011) can reconsider, in particular focusing on “interbodily resonance” (Merleau-Ponty 1964) as a flowing encounter between the subject and the world (Lisciani-Petrini 2007; Carbone 2010), on the one hand, and focusing on the Heideggerian condition of bewilderment as potentially revealing a new meaning of experience, on the other. In fact, according to these original conditions, through which the common view of disquiet is overturned, the subject becomes able to re-discover the meaning of his/her personality in its relationship to his/her experience of the world. This kind of “personal knowledge” (De Monticelli 1998) is a crucial formative path, that can come to light considering “education as lived experience of human being as culture” (Erbetta 2011, pp. 19–53). In this context, mood is that particular “existential ‘mode’” (Heidegger 1962, p. 233) that can be enlightened (by teachers and educators) as a significant experience thanks to which subject and world can re-connect, in a new meaningful way.

2 Two Educational Practices for the Mood of Disquiet: Adventure and Detour

If we attempt to turn our gaze out of the subject and into the world, we shall find forms of disquiet, but of a different kind. The world, according to many contemporary scholars, is not disquieted in the sense we have given it so far, but it appears to the individual as disquieting, and the risk is that it may deform subjective lives with feelings of fear and indifference. This happens especially if the relationship between the ego and the world weighs towards the world and lacks a link of knowledge and action with the subjects. In Sennett’s view, ours is the time of indifference (Sennett 1998); in Bauman’s of uncertainty (Bauman 2005); in Beck’s of risk (Beck 1999); in Sloterdijk’s of neo-cynicism (Sloterdijk 1987). Here, it is not possible to pursue these views of reality further. However, thanks to them not only are we able to recognise a non-pacified condition of contemporary man, but we can also see the pedagogical need to use this condition as the occasion for *personal* and *reflexive* knowledge which might render the subject more aware and more responsible and hence less adherent to the current version of reality. Particularly according to the deconstructive perspective (Mariani 2000, 2008) of a phenomenological-existential approach in pedagogy (Erbetta 2010), the role of education stands in a critical set of practices (e.g. *formative manoeuvre*) which encourage the subject to take his/her distance from the self-mirroring temptations (cf. *ibid.*, p. 23). In fact, exploring the lived experience as the favoured place for personal knowledge becomes crucial not only of becoming

aware of one's attitudes but, above all, in conceiving the differences between the self-representation the subject aims for and the self-knowledge he/she overcomes. Hence, in this critical-pedagogical approach, the main purpose is "pensare la differenza, la distanza che separa l'interpretazione dagli oggetti a cui essa si applica" (Mariani 2008, p. 41),⁴ acting through the "writing as a break", "the issue as a questioning occasion" (Erбетта 2010, pp. 29–75). In other words, "decostruire significa agire entro contesti convenzionali destabilizzandoli, rendendoli perturbanti non secondo un'architettura sistematica, ma piuttosto in forma, per così dire, rapsodica" (Mariani 2008, p. 40).⁵ Overall, then, it does not appear useless to reconsider disquiet as a fecund cypher of the relationship between the subject and the world even from an operational point of view. When we act within the educational practices, it is necessary to start from a preliminary attitude of attention to the dissonant ways of confronting reality, so as to seek an increasingly greater degree of historical and cultural awareness of the processes of human standardisation. This is possible particularly if we become familiar, in the various educational contexts (i.e.: secondary schools; extracurricular and social working settings; adult education activities) with those spaces of inner experience and of sensitivity that are usually underestimated because considered unproductive. It is not by chance that they are the educational spaces that provide access to the choice of the unthought-of possibility (of which Kierkegaard speaks), to deeper personal knowledge (as indicated by Freud), and to the courage to confront, rather than avoid, the limit situations described by Jaspers.

Some of these marginal educational spaces may be used, for example, both in school, through the teaching of literature and philosophy, and outside of school, through the use of personal writing activities or reading as opportunities to reflect and reconsider one's personal life story. At the same time, these educational practices contribute to defining disquiet as an instrument of pedagogical interpretation. One such tool, I might call "formative manoeuvre" (Madrussan 2017). Indeed, this term in French has a dual meaning: firstly, it indicates a change of course typical of yachting, in our case, a change of direction and of perspective that saves the subject from predicting his/her personality, from stereotyping and from the standardisation of the subject's awareness; secondly, *manoeuvre* indicates work of the hands, it is the real task of individual transformation and pedagogical action. This, then, could be the pedagogical task of the educator who intends to re-discover and

⁴ "Thinking the difference, the distance that separates the interpretations from the objects they refer to" (my trans.).

⁵ "To deconstruct means acting within ~~to~~ formal contexts destabilising them, making them uncanny not along an architectonic systematic approach, rather what might be termed a rhapsodic form" (my trans.).

give value to individuals' intelligent sensitivities, making individuals more autonomous in their judgement and in their choices, in the sphere of personal ethics and commitments in the subjective relationship with the world. Choosing activities and reflection practices that focus on those experiences of life involving disquiet, both teachers and educators can fruitfully work on mood as crossing point of self-perception and its unforeseen meaning.

So, to come to the educational spaces of inner education, conceived as Self-knowledge, I will briefly propose a couple examples, which are adventure and detour. Indeed, they seem to work as common experiences through which people experience a turning point in self-perception.

According to the French thinker, Vladimir Jankélévitch, who follows Georg Simmel (2015), adventure is a completely unexpected experience that, because it is not part of ordinary life, connects with it (Jankélévitch 1963). In this sense, adventure cannot be sought, nor desired, nor defined. In other words, one cannot 'look for' adventure. It simply happens. The surprising occurrence of an experience as an adventure means that it does not have precise connotations and that it cannot be defined a priori, because that would make it a 'kind' of experience that can be imagined or expected. Every experience, however, can be adventurous, because it is characterised as such by its actual separation from everyday life, interrupting it and suspending the common interpretative categories. Its pedagogical sense is given by the fact that the subject who experiences the adventure will have to necessarily reckon with the disorientation that it provokes, which is both scary and exciting. According to Jankélévitch, "l'englobement éthique, le détachement esthétique sont les deux pôles entre lesquels aventures s'échelonnent" (ibid., p. 15).⁶ He adds: "c'est une chose bien simple: pour pouvoir courir une aventure, il faut être mortel, et de mille manières vulnérable" (ibid., p. 19).⁷ It is only this condition, in fact, that renders subjects capable of confronting the unexpected. It is adventure that offers the subject the chance of the unthought of, the self-trial, which can be a limit-situation, and/or an experience of something perturbing, and/or the ethics of the disquieted conscience.

Distinguishing the *adventurous* from the *adventurer's* spirit, Jankélévitch stated that the second one fits with the taste for risk, dictated by existential *ennui* (boredom), which has no ethical or formative value because it simply describes the attempt to "jouer en marge des règles", that is "survive on the edge of the rules"

⁶ The English translation of the Work is not available. The english translation of the quotation is mine: "ethical involvement and aesthetic detachment are the two poles between which adventures unfold".

⁷ "It is very simple: to be able to experience an adventure, it is necessary to be mortal and vulnerable on a thousand sides".

(ibid., p. 9), with a previous guarantee of being safe from any consequences. Hence, the idea that learning to see and recognise adventure in the pages of literature might be a way to bring together the feeling of the adventurous person to his own existence, instead of living the same experience as the adventurer does. In fact, unlike the adventurer's style, that of the adventurous person allows the subject to discover and to be discovered. It is, therefore, a very previous cognitive experience (Massa 1998; Madrussan 2017). Learning to recognise it means learning to accept it, should it occur, as an instrument of personal formation.

In this sense, travel literature can be a useful instrument in demonstrating the difference between the educational journey, in which the programmed intention of the departure is opposed to the lived experience of the unexpected, and journey merely described. Even in some of the Bildungsromane, particularly among the less 'canonical',⁸ the existential turning point comes after the disorientation produced by a break with the norm or compared to the expectations (Madrussan 2019a).⁹

As well as reading, a most significant instrument in the educational sphere is writing about oneself, writing in its various, even brief or fragmented forms: short stories, pages of a diary (Gusdorf 1991; Demetrio 1995; Dominicé 2007; Cambi 2002; Madrussan 2009). Writings such as these contribute to the emergence of reflection upon one's own experience and/or upon one's desire for 'adventure'. As Claudio Magris says, "ci sono luoghi che affascinano perché sembrano radicalmente diversi e altri che incantano perché, già la prima volta, risultano familiari, quasi un luogo natio. Conoscere è spesso, platonicamente, riconoscere, è l'emergere di qualcosa magari ignorato sino a quell'attimo ma accolto come proprio. Per vedere un luogo occorre rivederlo. Il noto e il familiare, continuamente riscoperti e arricchiti, sono la premessa dell'incontro, della seduzione e dell'avventura" (Magris 2005, p. XXI).¹⁰

⁸ For example, *The Adolescent* by Dostoyevsky, *The Confusions of Young Törless* by Musil, *The Age of Reason* by Sartre, *Ragazzi di vita* by Pasolini.

⁹ Some similar considerations, but focusing on feeling/emotions and not on mood, are proposed by Rödel (*Negative emotions and learning*, infra). In this case, going through Buck, "negative experience" is considered as an experience "which functions as a negation of anticipations or expectations" in the horizon of learning, so they are about a kind of expected outcomes in learning performance. Instead, the kind of lived experiences I refer to are not necessarily situated in the particular field of teaching/learning, because literature, adventure, detour are arranged across many situations of life: they may be available in the large field of life. Therefore, their focus is not about the emotional reaction they can disclose, but about the mood that leads them to awareness.

¹⁰ The English translation of the Work is not available. The English translation of the quotation is mine: "there are places that are fascinating because they seem radically different and others

The most profound encounter with one's own lived experience is, not by chance, a fundamental element of phenomenological pedagogy (Bertolini 1988, 2001; Brinkmann 2016a; Erbetta 2011; van Manen 2018), the theoretical and operational proposition of which aims at structured self-knowledge starting from the relationship of meaning between subject and world. A relationship for which perception and description are essential elements on which it is necessary to focus and work in a manner that is not preconditioned. In this direction, the practices of personal writing provide subjective elaboration with the space deprived of any 'reckoning' with one's self, since there is no need for those filters that are usually active in social dynamics, or those that are associated with acceptable and comfortable self-representation. It is, then, certainly the task of the educator to render the dialectical confrontation with otherness fruitful, where the acknowledgement of one's own and of the other's experience of adventure is the pretext for giving importance to the origins of disquiet as a common feature (De Certeau 1990; Cambi 2010). Hence if literature about adventure can easily disclose to the reader the disquiet mood related to the experience of the unknown, this allow the teacher/educator (or the reader by him/herself) to structure a work-of-thought to re-elaborate the relation between the useful meaning and mood for the unknown *and* the personal meaning arising from one's own experience of them (Madrussan 2019a). Similarly, the personal writings about one's own disquieting experiences can be profitably re-worked by teachers and educators pointing out how that mood can be considered as something that describe each one's personality and attitudes towards the unknown (Demetrio 1995; Cambi 2002; Madrussan 2009; Erbetta 2010).

Detour, according to the German philosopher, Hans Blumenberg, is equivalent to an "oblique path" (Blumenberg 1989) which crosses the meanings of a reflection. So, detour does not follow a logical and consecutive path of reasoning, but it follows the association of ideas as dictated by even the symbolic or metaphorical meanings of things and that he has retraced in the great tales of the Myth. It is, indeed, the Myth that has constructed the early *Stimmung* of European civilisations. And we also know how the great accounts of the Myth are linked with adventure as the "exorcism" of the unknown (Cometa 1999).

An Italian philosopher, Aldo Gargani, wrote that exercising detour is fundamental because "intelligence is found in the circumstance of having to overcome

that are enchanting because, even on the first visit, feel familiar, almost like home. Knowing is, platonically, almost like recognising; it is the emergence of something perhaps unknown up until that moment, but accepted as one's own. In order to see a place, it is necessary to see it again. What is known and familiar, continuously rediscovered and enriched, is the premise of the encounter, seduction and adventure".

oneself and to accomplish the most courageous act which is to allow oneself to be led where one does not expect to find oneself” (Gargani 1992, p. 123). And Blumenberg claims that “if everyone were to take the shortest path, only one would arrive. From a departure point to an arrival point, there is only one short path, whereas there are very many indirect paths. Civilisation consists of discovering and opening, describing and recommending, enhancing and rewarding detours. Therefore, on the one hand, detour appears to be characterised by an insufficient rationality, since in the most rigorous sense, only the shortest path obtains the brand of quality of reason [...]. On the other, however, detours are what give civilisation the function of humanising life. The claimed ‘art of living’ of the shortest path is, in the consequentiality of its exclusions, barbarities” (Blumenberg 1989).¹¹

Practising detours, at school and in extra-scholastic educational contexts, means, then, legitimising the alternative and unusual path that individual intelligence feels most its own, thus finding the space, not only for its own reflexiveness, but also the opportunity to express and try out divergent intelligence.

Although it might seem difficult, practising detour simply means exploiting associations of ideas that deviate from the usual reflexive routes as proposed by subjects in education, giving them space and encouraging in them the search for meaning in such associations. Interrogating the sense of detour means, in similar situations, giving space to the emergence of a form of thought and experience with respect to one’s own way of reasoning that is usually kept in the shadows and is useful, however, to a more profound knowledge of one’s self. The opportunity becomes, then, one of reflexive pause, which combines the value attributed to the deviation from linear thought with the need to establish casual or non-casual relations with it, so long as the relations produce a constantly renewed awareness of how dynamic and generative the subjective personality is.

In this regard, in a recent work some Italian secondary school teachers in Foreign Languages and Literature have pointed out how practicing detour can disclose to the students their prejudgements about themselves and their own personalities or abilities. Just one example, extracted from a few described there: in a Professional Technical High School, where the teaching of literature has no place, a group of teachers (including teachers of both Italian and English) proposed to students in the final year to participate in a theatre workshop about *Turandot*, supported and organised by Turin’s Teatro Regio. In spite of some general opposition to this project, justified by the strangeness of its subject and the bewilderment of

¹¹ The English translation of the extracts quoted here is mine and they are taken from Italian version of Blumenberg 1987, that is Blumenberg 1989, p. 115.

the students, facing their supposed inability to comprehend and appreciate the Opera, the teachers led the class into this detour from their usual self-perception about the Arts, working on something they would surely be able to comprehend: the idea of enigma. The English teacher, in particular, worked on Shakespeare's enigmas, showing the students that their negative responsiveness to that proposal was misplaced, because they were able to prove their finest ability to grasp the implicit meanings of words, their ability to catch the line of reasoning, and their sensitivity for the beauty of discovering a previously unseen sense. So that the formative result of this displacing experience was quite satisfying: "considerando la necessità della loro distanza dall'arte come un pregiudizio che andava messo alla prova, il lavoro formativo dell'insegnante ha riguardato proprio la sperimentazione *fiduciosa* di qualcosa di inusuale" (Simoncin2019, pp. 87–88). And the students' formative gain was that "abbiamo scoperto un mondo che ha cambiato la nostra prospettiva" (ibid., p. 94).¹²

Another possibility is that of identifying examples of detour in culture. To remain within our sphere of relevance, that is philosophical culture, there is no lack of suggestions. When Bertrand Russell, in autumn 1922, met Ludwig Wittgenstein in his study at Trinity College, the two men held a long conversation on the relationship between reality and truth in language, until Wittgenstein surprised Russell by refusing to assert that there was *not* a rhinoceros in the room since the "the propositions of existence have no sense!" (Jaccard 1998, p. 36). The detour, here, confirms how the rigour of logical inference can become abstract rigidity. At the same time, the disorienting and subtly comic effect of Wittgenstein's claim highlight the revealing (and desecrating) force of the use of detour.

One effect of this kind must have been proved by Helmuth Plessner while conversing with Edmund Husserl when, in front of the door to his house, the latter confessed his aversion for German idealism, maintaining that he had searched for reality all his life. "As he said this, he took his thin silver-handled walking stick and forcefully pressed it, leaning forward, against the doorpost. [...] With insuperable plasticity, the stick represented the intentional act, and the door its fulfilment" (Blumenberg 1989, p. 43). Here, Husserl's attitude of detour from the theoretical reflexivity is particularly effective in rendering the sense of the former. As if only through detour is it possible to effectively understand the appropriate sense of thought.

¹² The teacher stated that "considering the need of their distance from Arts as a prejudgement that has to be put on the test, the formative work of the teacher has just concerned the *confident* trial of something unusual". The students said that "we've discover a world that changed our perspectives"(my trans.). Such experiences are described and analysed in Madrussan (2019b).

Yet there are certainly abundant examples in other spheres of knowledge, both humanistic and scientific.¹³

Practising the representations of adventure and exercising detour are only two examples of how formative *manoeuvre* can become the concrete experience of a personal act of reversing the pre-established course, without forgetting – actually working explicitly on – one’s own formation and knowledge. In addition, overturning common sense on disquiet, transforming a limit into a resource, means, pedagogically, showing that each subject can be worth what he/she is, so long as he/she becomes capable of putting to good use his/her own abilities without indulging in the idea that disquiet may be simply a narcissistic stance, that is a static, fetishised condition of the personality.¹⁴

Thus, from superfluous and unproductive experiences, adventure and detour can become instruments of knowledge (and of teaching and learning) that safeguard and enhance a mode of experiencing the world and of constituting with it a network of meanings that allows education itself to escape from the tight mesh of both technicism and reparation to become, in turn, a disquieted exercise of self-searching and existential planning.

So that finding one’s own *Heim*, or home, in disquiet is equivalent to choosing a possibility of meaning that makes mood a pedagogically rich condition, supported by one’s own intelligence and sensitivity, allowing the relationship that each individual activates with the world to be entrusted to his own mode of experiencing reality. And this can, perhaps, be one of the attempts, on the part of education, to reconquer the original sense for each human being at the time when this appears to be lost.

3 Some Further Considerations on the Relevance of an Education of Disquiet as Original Mood

Among the many possible declinations of ‘living the present’, the formation of the subjective personality as disquiet is one of the questions requiring increasingly punctual cultural awareness. Starting with the specularity of the relationship between the subject and his/her time, it will not be unuseful to pay attention to the shadowy area – on the whole, rarely debated in the pedagogical sphere – which

¹³ In this sense, the whole work of Michel Serres is valuable, with particular reference to Serres 1985, 1991.

¹⁴ About the “fetishized condition of the personality”, the earlier most relevant italian thinker is Enzo Paci, who focused his work on this risk of drift in 1963. As regards transformative learning experiences, see also Brinkmann 2016c, 2018.

corresponds to a future. The homogenisation on the present may end up consecrating a past – again, very recent – that is considered as being already acquired and a future time as exclusively utopian, while making education the action conforming to a misleading “here and now”.

In a first sense, reference is made to the paradoxical schism between the subject and his/her time, characterised by the individual’s perception of living in a strange world, in which the need for reciprocity, correspondence and encounter between the two poles of the relationship are frustrated both in reality and in imagination. In Erbetta’s view, this is the “*epoca di un no future che conosce l’esclusività del now come cifra destoricata di una soggettività puntiforme, plurima e scomponibile*” (Erbetta 2006, p. 40).¹⁵ In the second sense, on the other hand, that ‘way’ of being a subject in relation to history is determined as a dialectical oscillation, in a fruitfully conflictual manner. Thus, the subject, far from ‘feeling part of the world’, will wish to form his/her own personality and imagine his/her own existence going beyond both the mere contingency of the fact and the *Zeitgeist*. On the one hand, the subject is rejected by his/her world, which ‘reads’ him/her as inadequate, forcing him/her to define him/herself in terms of solitude and exclusion. On the other hand, it is the subject who rejects his/her world, defining him/herself by opposing it.

It is worthwhile putting oneself in this second prospect – which still envisages dialectics, unlike the first position, where the prospect is unique and functions by ‘absorption’ – in order to attempt to see how the dialectics between the subject and history have constituted and constitute the duplicity of not feeling part of one’s own time that, for some important scholars, seems to be a widespread condition (Benasayag and Schmit 2003; Galimberti 2013; Borgna 2011). This condition is of particular interest when it is reflected in the relationship between the desire to plan and existential impossibility. From this perspective, the personal/public duplicity easily becomes a cypher of one’s own stance towards others, the world, one’s own existence and, above all, the subjective perception of one’s ability to become in a future prospect.

This is why it is pedagogically urgent to question first of all the ego-world relationship in its aspects that are most explicitly linked to uncertainty, indifference, laceration, which distance the current ego and world from self and from future worlds, creating a true schism between subjectivity and historical accuracy. In this horizon, even the dimension of disquiet as a real cypher for the interpretation of subjectivity deserves to be investigated with greater care.

¹⁵ “In the age of *no future*, which knows the exclusivity of *now* as the de-historicised cypher of a pointed, multiple and modular subjectivity” (my trans.).

Indeed, the subject identifies the expression of his/her formation precisely in the openness towards the dimension of possibility – and possibility of planning – but it is also and still in the same openness that he/she comes to terms with disquiet. And he/she does this in two interconnected ways: on the one hand, forming subjectivity is per se a disquieting experience, since into it fall expectations, insecurities, prospects, errors and anything else that is demanding and relevant to his/her existence. On the other hand, the relationship between disquiet and education replicates and declines the more general relationship between life and culture, which prevents an effective schism – definitely psychologically in the balance – between the individual and collective form making and the *Umwelt* of belonging. According to this perspective, at the same time, the reference to phenomenological and existential schools of pedagogy, educating in complexity and the deconstructive horizon is practically immediate and in at least two evident senses.

The first sense brings into relation education and dissent and has to do with the disquiet in relation to one's own time, with the impossibility of or the fatigue encountered in conforming to the dominant culture. The second sense brings together education and thought and has to do with the need to rooting the problem of formation in the individual personality, in the heart of one's own inwardness. As seen above, those educational practices (like writing, discussing, programme changes, etc.) that work as “liberating denial” (Erbeta 2010, p. 20) from predetermined meanings which claim to describe one's own personality, bring with them a wide range of formative possibilities: from disclosing hidden aspects of subjectivity to the re-elaboration of obvious worldviews; from rehangng the forms of relation self/otherness/world to the need to overcome the usual comprehension of reality. According to this approach, it is the disquieted subject who describes disquiet, even by means of a symptomatic analysis of attitudes and behaviours, such as the dichotomy between camouflage and divergence, between reassurance and danger. In order to identify the ways of disquiet that are congenial to a formative reflectiveness which does not wish to avoid the problem, but that, at the same time, does not yield to the temptation to reduce it to a psychological or psychosocial deformation, it will be useful to highlight how the temptation to tame the question of disquiet corresponds, in reality, to an ethical-pedagogical limit.

It is a question, however, of returning weight and substance to disquieted thought as an extraordinary source of formative vitality. This is possible by means of that “formative manoeuvre” which changes course both in relation to the current conception of disquiet and, above all, in relation to its *Stimmung*.

In this sense, practising manoeuvre on that mood becomes a way of education for the possible and for planning, establishing a more fecund relationship – albeit conflictual – between the individual and his/her time.

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Anxiety and Upbringing: Rethinking Existential Anthropology from the Intergenerational Perspective

Tatiana Shchytsova

...to bring up human beings is a very rare gift

S. Kierkegaard

...task of upbringing and Bildung...is

a debt owed by the adult generation to children

K. Mollenhauer

In the existential-phenomenological philosophy, human being is conceived of in terms of its essential relation to the realm of possible (*choice* in Kierkegaard, *Entwurf* in Heidegger, *project* in Sartre). It implies that the existing self is understood as an open process i.e. as the process of becoming-a-self. Such a general (“transcendental”) approach, precisely because of its claim for universality, cannot be sufficient for pedagogical theory and practice because it does not take into account the existential difference between being-an-adult and being-a-child. To speak of ‘the existential difference’ in this context may sound as a kind of philosophical heresy given the definition ‘existential’ is understood as ‘existential-ontological’ that is as something related to the very essence (to the constitutive principles) of human being. Traditionally, all essential (ontological) statements about human being had been related to adult human subject whereas child had been conceptualized as a deficient form of human being, as a yet-not-an-(adult)-subject. Contrary to such an adult-centered position, the fundamental philosophical premise of this article is an intergenerational decentration of the subject (Shchytsova 2016)

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which means an attempt to approach co-existence of different generations – of adults and children – as a correlation of different forms of life none of which can be reduced to another one or explained in terms (in light) of another one.

In suggesting to (re-)read some texts in existential phenomenology from the perspective of intergenerational decentration of the subject I take my bearings first of all from Eugen Fink whose late philosophy is on the one hand an overcoming of Heidegger's transcendental attitude presented in *Being and Time*, on the other hand a fruitful critical appropriation of Heidegger's existential ontology. Besides, I would like to point out that Klaus Mollenhauer makes a promising step towards thematization of the existential difference between being-an-adult and being-a-child by saying that for the young, "that which is possible outweighs that which is real" (Mollenhauer 2014, p. 17). This statement implies that the different periods of life are characterized by respective configurations of the conceptual pair the Real – the Possible. It indicates that Heidegger's definition of Dasein as *Möglichkeitsein* (*Being-possible*) can be elaborated in a more concrete way in accordance with the different *stages* in human life (cf. Heidegger 1979, p. 143; 1962, p. 183). In a sense, this article is an inquiry into the existential-ontological foundations of Mollenhauer's thesis. For this purpose, I will address Heidegger's and Kierkegaard's interpretations of human existence focusing on its affective grounds, primarily on anxiety. A comparative analysis of their positions shall allow to clarify a fundamental difference between the existential anxiety experienced by adult human being and the existential anxiety experienced by child. It will be shown that this very difference defines a primary task of upbringing.¹

Thus, the analysis to be presented further is carried out at the level of an existential a priori for philosophical anthropology (cf. Heidegger 1979, p. 45). However, it must be stressed that what is at issue here is not just a further elaboration of Heidegger's approach, but its radical reconsideration due to the intergenerational decentration – i.e. pluralization – of the concept of Dasein.

¹ The chosen approach addresses thus anxiety as a fundamental existential feeling which must be taken into consideration in order to understand both existential task and co-existential (intergenerational) constitution of upbringing. The approach differs thereby from pedagogical studies on anxiety that place anxiety in educational contexts and treat it as a psychological state (potentially) having negative outcomes for learning process. Pedagogical theories either focus on various forms of anxiety (from generalized 'Bildungsangst' and 'Schulangst' to very particular school phobias related to different practices) or discuss anxiety reducing strategies in the classroom basing on the difference between normal (adaptive, protective) and excessive (maladaptive) anxiety. Pedagogical perspective appears to be strongly linked to educational psychology which means that anxiety is seen in terms of its negative or positive function and correspondingly in terms of mental disorder and its prevention (getting control over anxiety) (see e.g. Buchler 2013; Schäfer and Thompson 2018; Zeidner 2014).

Correspondingly, the phenomenon of upbringing will be considered not from the perspective of pedagogical theory, but from the perspective of philosophical anthropology based on the plural vision of human being.² Upbringing (to be more precise: a certain mode of upbringing) will be thematized as a genuine intersubjective – intergenerational – experience which arises out of a constitutive asymmetry in how adult and child experience existential anxiety. It is noteworthy in this regard that there is a number of convincing psychological researches on ontogeny which, contrary to the theories of Freud and Piaget, reveal firstly primordially of the interpersonal dimension in the ontogeny of thinking and language (Vygotsky, Mead) and secondly the affective grounds of infant intersubjectivity including mutual subject-subject attunement in earlier infant-adult engagements (Bråten 1998; Fuchs 2000; Stern 1985). In this article, adult–child co-existence and its affective dimension will be approached from the point of view of a critically revised version of the existential-phenomenological anthropology which suggests a relational ontology of human being, that is an ontology which conceptualizes human being in terms of co-existence and relation to other.

The article has four parts. The first one opens a perspective for an anthropological (age-related) relativization of Heidegger's existential analytics of Dasein. The second and third parts consider phenomenon of anxiety in adult's existence and in child's existence correspondingly. The fourth part is devoted to Kierkegaard's concept of intellectual-emotional nourishment which grasps a co-existential task of upbringing as a relational activity originating in response to child's existential anxiety.

1 A Perspective for an Age-Related Relativization of Heidegger's Existential Analytics of Dasein

The idea that every period of human life has its own irreducible worth in the context of the individual's existence was clearly formulated in continental philosophy already in the nineteenth century, namely in Kierkegaard's existential philosophy (Kierkegaard 1992) and in Dilthey's philosophy of life (Dilthey 1894).³ It is well

² The philosophical (phenomenological) perspective differs from the phenomenological-pedagogical one in that regard that the former allows for understanding structures and phenomena that constitute upbringing as a pre-theoretical intergenerational experience whereas the latter thematizes pedagogical experience and learning process as a special practical field that presupposes corresponding theoretical reflections (Brinkmann 2019; Lippitz 2019).

³ It is noteworthy that the above mentioned idea is not identical with approaching childhood as something own and special in Rousseau and his numerous followers. Kierkegaard and

known that Kierkegaard and Dilthey are two authors whose works were a significant source of inspiration for the early Heidegger's thought, in particular, for his hermeneutics of factual life and existential analytics of Dasein. Trying to understand the process of becoming-a-person in its anthropological concreteness and immanent historicity, Kierkegaard and Dilthey expressed one and the same vision according to which childhood as an earlier phase in the individual's life must not be interpreted from the perspective of a mature age. Both thinkers stressed that development of human being is not about reaching a maturity (which would be seen then as an ultimate purpose of child's development), but about maintaining a vivid interrelation – a kind of simultaneousness – of different ages in a dynamic structure of self. This pathbreaking approach appears crucial to understanding of social life as well since it implies a possibility of a radical rethinking of principles of intergenerational co-existence in society. Heidegger, although he followed some of the basic ideas of Kierkegaard and Dilthey, ignored their idea of immanent historicity of human being as a living entity. It was conditioned firstly by his arbitrary separation of the ontology of existence from the ontology of life and secondly by subordination of the latter to the former (cf. Heidegger 1979, p. 50). The envisaged relativization of Heidegger's analytics of Dasein is therefore a part of a critical revision of existential phenomenology aimed at overcoming such a dualistic hierarchy in comprehension of human being.

Since we address Heidegger's analytics of Dasein, two aspects in our consideration of the conceptual pair the Real – the Possible are to be differentiated: the ontic aspect (which is thematized in pedagogy and psychology) and the ontological one (which is thematized in philosophical anthropology). In the ontic sense, Mollenhauer's thesis means that the child has yet to realize himself/herself in the world through realization of certain possibilities. Therefore the child's life path – as well as his/her personal identity – is defined only in a very preliminary way. Correspondingly, the child perceives the world as a field of possibilities which vary in degree of clarity and distinctness: from the very clear and concrete perspectives (like "I will go to school soon") to much more vague perspectives – until the horizon of the unknown marked with a formal signifier "I will become an adult in a future". It can be added that child's future self-realization as realization of certain possibilities is essentially correlated with his/her step by step becoming acquainted with the world – with the life-world (to speak with Husserl) the child lives in.

Dilthey had in mind the question of a vivid historical and existential relation between different stages of life within the individual's life way.

Seen from the ontological angle, the thesis of the overweight of the Possible over the Real in child's existence implies that being-in-the-world of the child must differ from that of the adult's Dasein which presumably was conceptualized in *Being and Time*. In the Dasein of child, the world is given as a horizon of unknown and unexplored possibilities par excellence. Unlike the Dasein described by Heidegger, the child's Dasein is not familiar with the surrounding world as a pre-given meaningful context. As an existing individual the child is related to the world as a field that is to be opened i.e. is to be practically examined and creatively interpreted. Thus, in order to clarify the existential-ontological implications of the outlined overweight of the possible over the real, we have to address Heidegger's analysis of the modes of disclosedness of Dasein. In what follows, I will try to show that the a priori statements of the existential analytics of Dasein can only partly characterize the Dasein of child. In other words, I would like to relativize the transcendental claims of some of the Heidegger's statements. The relativization to be carried out is, to a large extent, encouraged by the cosmological theory of Eugen Fink which opens an alternative perspective for philosophical anthropology (Fink 1970, 1987, 1992). The fundamental difference of Fink's cosmology from Heidegger's ontology is that the former in defining the essence of human being takes into account fundamental bodily-vital differentiations determined by human biology, that is by the fact that existing individual is a living entity. Contrary to Heidegger, philosophical anthropology is developed by Fink not within the framework of the question of the meaning of Being, but within the framework of the question of world as a cosmological event. Correspondingly, human being is viewed by Fink as a cosmological entity, which means: it is considered from the point of view of the existing individual's participation in the event of the world. Various vitally-bodily differentiations are seen by him as constitutive parameters of such participation. Therefore Fink's basic anthropological formula sounds as follows: *man is essentially a plural* ("der Mensch eben als Weltwesen <ist> wesenhaft ein Plural") (Fink 1987, p. 211 f.).

Thus, Fink disagrees with Heidegger regarding that part of Heidegger's analytics, where it is stated that "the basic ontological state of 'living'... can be tackled only reductively and privatively in terms of the ontology of Dasein" (Heidegger 1962, p. 238). Without totally rejecting Heidegger's vision of the existential-ontological constitution of human being (incl. Heidegger's conception of the world as a transcendental project of Dasein), Fink rethinks Heidegger's conception of Dasein from the point of view of his cosmological approach according to which human being is primordially a cosmological entity and the event of the world cannot be reduced to transcendental subjectivity. It is a cosmological turn of Fink that enables and justifies the above-suggested relativization of the

existential analytics of Dasein and inspires to introduce the “heretical” (from the Heidegger’s point of view) designation “Dasein of child”.

2 Anxiety in adult’s Existence: Guilt and Care

Let us return to the modes of ontological disclosedness of Dasein in Heidegger’s analytics. Heidegger distinguishes two equally original modes – understanding and state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*). “An understanding state-of-mind” is thus a basic formal description of how Dasein – as being-in-the-world – is disclosed to itself. At the same time, Heidegger emphasizes that primary disclosure of the world is carried out precisely through a state-of-mind, or mood (cf. Heidegger 1962, p. 177). In other words, ontological primacy in how the world is initially revealed to the Dasein must be ascribed to Dasein’s affective involvement. In this connection, Heidegger singles out some exceptional “understanding state-of-mind, in which Dasein has been disclosed to itself in some distinctive way” (*ibid.*, p. 226). That exceptional state-of-mind is anxiety. So far about the systematic place of the issue of affect (emotion) in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. I believe, what was said until now is valid regardless the distinction between adult and child.

Further, I will try to show that relativization of Heidegger’s existential analytics becomes necessary when one explores a concrete phenomenology of the experience of anxiety and an existential structure that is revealed in/through anxiety. According to Heidegger, in anxiety “Dasein’s Being reveals itself as care” (*ibid.*, p. 227). I would like to pay attention to the duality of the notion of care. On the one hand, it designates a structure of human existence: “Being-ahead-of-oneself – in-Being-already-in ... –as Being-alongside...” (*ibid.*, p. 241); on the other hand, the notion is taken from a dictionary of emotions. In the very preliminary and formal way, the word “care” means a non-indifferent relation to something or someone. In the context of *Being and Time*, it means a non-indifferent relation of Dasein to itself. This non-indifference is expressed in the basic formula of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology: Dasein is an entity which is distinguished by the fact that “in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it” (*ibid.*, p. 32). In other words, Dasein is a being which, according to its very structure, is characterized by such a being-concerned about itself. Therefore, it can be said that its own constitution is revealed to Dasein through anxiety and experienced as the (individuating (*vereinzeln*de)) being-concerned about itself or care. Anxiety and care as affects are shown in Heidegger’s description as if “pushed” into each other. Indeed, they intertwine with one another and are mutually grounding.

In Heidegger's analytics, I want to question not the Dasein's ontological structure as such, but designation of this structure by the word "care". What is at issue now, is, thus, the ontological generality and ultimate primacy of care as a fundamental existential affect. It is Heidegger's statement about the transcendental "generality" of the phenomenon of care which is to be relativized (cf. *ibid.*, p. 244). I suggest to relativize it insofar as the statement presupposes the transcendental generality of care as an affective dimension of the structural wholeness of Dasein. Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard is the author, who, being a significant inspiration for Heidegger, gives at the same time the important reasons for problematization of the transcendental status of Heidegger's notion of care from the perspective which is of interest for us. In his famous work *The Concept of Anxiety*, Kierkegaard develops a rich existential analysis of anxiety which in many essential aspects anticipates Heidegger's reflections on this topic. Both thinkers thematize anxiety as an affective experience that in some exceptional way reveals the very constitution of human existence. According to both of them, anxiety originates from that the existing self is related to itself as a capability of Being.

However, there is a significant difference in their interpretations of anxiety. The difference is related to the phenomenon of guilt (a being-guilty) –, to be more precise, to a role this phenomenon plays in constitution of the individual's existing (*das Existieren*). According to Heidegger, Dasein, in experiencing anxiety, is disclosed to itself as a thrown potentiality-for-Being (cf. *ibid.*, p. 233). Anxiety reveals that Dasein is "always already" given/delivered over to itself and has to take this burden over (cf. *ibid.*, p. 330). It means that Dasein, in its very existing, is a basis of its potentiality-for-Being, although Dasein has not laid that basis itself (cf. *ibid.*, p. 330). Heidegger describes here a circular structure that helps to comprehend an essential connection between anxiety, guilt, and care (care as an affect). The circle lies in the fact that Dasein can be its own basis "only in that it projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown" (*ibid.*, p. 330). As Heidegger further shows, this circular structure, both in the aspect of thrownness and in the aspect of projecting, is characterized by nullity (*Nichtigkeit*). Nullity is that constitutive feature due to which Dasein is conceived of as essentially guilty. Thus, "to be its own thrown basis" is that "heavy" task which is a subject of ontological concern for Dasein and which shows itself as an essential being-gilty. This brief reconstruction helps to understand why it is care that is defined as an affect "complementary" to anxiety. Anxiety, as it is described by Heidegger, discloses that Dasein has to do with the "heavy" – burdened with the being-guilty – task. Dasein's being-concerned about the task – i.e. Dasein's being as care – is a primordial affective dimension of the Dasein's existing.

3 Anxiety in child's Existence: Innocence and Curiosity

Before starting a discussion of Kierkegaard's reflections on anxiety, some justifying remarks as for relevency of carrying out a comparative analysis of Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's interpretations of anxiety may seem not redundant (especially taking into account Heidegger's reference to Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety* in *Being and Time* (cf. Heidegger 1979, p. 190)). Despite the fact that the principal theoretical frameworks of their interpretations are indeed different (in the first case, we deal with the theological framework, in the second case with the ontological one), both thinkers focus on the structure and characteristics of the existing self. In this connection, both of them investigate a phenomenon of primordial being-guilty as the basis (as the condition of possibility) for the very distinction of morally good and evil, for morality in general (cf. Heidegger 1962, p. 332; Kierkegaard 1980, p. 44). In the context of Biblical mythology, the primordial being-guilty is portrayed as the original sin. Referring to the Biblical story of the Fall, Kierkegaard calls however to "attempt to dismiss the fixed idea that it is a myth" (Kierkegaard 1980, p. 46) and develops a detailed analysis of transformations of human spirit which happen due to its transition from innocence to sinfulness. The phenomenon of anxiety plays a pivotal role in these transformations. Kierkegaard means by spirit a distinctive constitution of human existence which is defined by him also as self (cf. Kierkegaard 1941, p. 17). Spirit or self is thought of by him not metaphysically-substantially, but rather in terms of an open dynamics conditioned by a unique dialectical structure of self-relation. Further, I will touch upon Kierkegaard's description of anxiety peculiar to the human spirit (self) in state of innocence. Innocence as a special mode (stage) of existence is analyzed by Kierkegaard predominantly on the example of the Biblical Adam – Adam *before the Fall*.

Kierkegaard interprets innocence as "an ignorance quillified by spirit" (Kierkegaard 1980, p. 44). Anxiety is revealed as an affective dimension of the relation of the spirit to its own possibility of being able (Kierkegaard 1980). The last one is a possibility that fills with anxiety due to its obscurity – obscurity in a sense that Adam "has no conception of what he is able to do" (ibid., p. 44). What is crucial here is that Kierkegaard describes human existence in a very particular condition, namely in the condition which takes place before the spirit's being-guilty is actualized (becomes a reality) as an ultimate basis for morality. Like subsequently Heidegger, Kierkegaard builds his phenomenology of anxiety on the relation of spirit (self) to nothing. Strictly speaking, anxiety is an affect that manifests the relation of spirit to nothing. But, unlike Heidegger, Kierkegaard thematizes nothing which is characteristic of innocence as a mode of existence.

Innocence, says Kierkegaard, is anxiety “because its ignorance is about nothing” (ibid., p. 44). By nothing is meant, thus, a principal reference point for “the anxious possibility of being able” (ibid., p. 44). The last quotation is a precise description of innocent spirit which – unlike potentiality-for-Being of Heidegger’s Dasein – cannot be burdened with the being-guilty described by Heidegger. Dasein’s being-guilty due to the irrevocable nullity of its factual existing is an existential condition which is not relevant to the existential mode described by Kierkegaard as “an ignorance quillified by spirit”. As Kierkegaard puts it: “The anxiety that is posited in innocence is in the first place no guilt, and in the second place it is no troublesome burden...” (ibid., p. 42).

It follows that Heidegger’s existential dialectics built on the opposition of the pole of authenticity and that of inauthenticity cannot be valid as well if we address the innocent mode of existence thematized by Kierkegaard. Instead of the dramatic dilemma described in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (Dasein, being faced with anxiety, either resolutely takes its own being over or escapes this task, dissolving into anonymous everydayness),⁴ Kierkegaard shows that the existential condition at issue is characterized by a different existential dialectics. He defines anxiety as “a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy” (ibid., p. 42). This definition describes relation of the innocent spirit to nothing, namely “to the enormous nothing of ignorance” (ibid., p. 44). Thus, anxiety combines two opposite affective aspirations: affective turning away from, and being-attracted to the “anxious possibility of being able”. In other words, Kierkegaard describes the mode of existence in which that which fills with anxiety (the possibility of being able) is at the same time a subject of passionate interest or curiosity. The word ‘curiosity’ – especially in its German (*Neugier*) or Russian (*liubopytstvo*) versions – seems a little bit more appropriate because it corresponds very well to the situation of ignorance whereas the word ‘interest’ tends to relate to some concrete object. In Russian language, one can use also a very good expression for grasping such a state of mind: ‘uzhasno liubopytno’ i.e. ‘anxiously curiously’. The expression is the shortest and most accurate description of the affective dimension of the innocent mode of existence considered by Kierkegaard. Spirit which faces “the enormous nothing of ignorance” is anxiously curious about its being-in-the-world.

Biblical Adam, although being a paradigmatic figure for Kierkegaard’s analysis of anxiety peculiar to the spirit (the existing self) in the state of innocence, is not the only example he explicitly discusses. Because his investigation is not merely theological, but focuses on existential anthropology, Kierkegaard goes beyond

⁴ As well known, Kierkegaard himself analyzed a similar dilemma in his famous work *Either—Or* (Kierkegaard 1944).

mythological-theological context and highlights that the described phenomenon of anxiety “belongs so essentially to the child” (ibid., p. 42). Child (being-a-child) is shown as a worldly embodiment of the innocent mode of existence mythologically represented (symbolized) by Adam. Moreover, Kierkegaard addresses the experience of children in order to provide a more reach phenomenological description of the existential mode at issue. He notes: “In observing children, one will discover this anxiety intimated more particularly as a seeking for the adventurous, the monstrous, and the enigmatic” (ibid., p. 42).

4 Upbringing as an Intellectual-Emotional Nourishment

We started with the overweight of the possible over the real in child’s life. It was shown that regarding its existential-ontological foundations this overweight presupposes a characteristic “state of mind”: anxiety which simultaneously pushes away and attracts. It means (to put it now in Heidegger’s terms) that its own existence is disclosed to the Dasein of child not as a heavy task, but as an attractive obscurity – as a “possibility to be able” – which can only inspire to dream and thereby can only make the child to search for “the adventurous, the monstrous, and the enigmatic”. At this life-stage, Dasein’s anxiety is not only “freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility”, but it is the freedom’s actuality which is not burdened by guilt. In the contemporary pedagogical discourse some authors focus on positive meaning (productivity) of children’s ignorance and inability as constitutive elements of learning (Benner 2005; English 2012), others inquire into the ways of cultivating and promoting curiosity (Lindholm 2018; Clark 2017; Lucas and Spencer 2020). This paper aims to reveal (co-)existential affective preconditions of pre-theoretical educational relation.

The phenomenon of upbringing can be considered now from the point of view of the intergenerational difference in the primordial “states of mind”: on the one hand the intertwinement of anxiety and curiosity characteristic of existence of child (Dasein thrown in ignorance), on the other hand the intertwinement of anxiety and care characteristic of existence of adult (Dasein thrown in being-guilty). In the concluding part, I will touch upon the question: How should upbringing look like in order to correspond to the child’s fundamental affective disposition described above? In Kierkegaard’s *Journals and Papers*, there are several notes in which he tries to approach the question posed. In these fragmentary meditations, an important role belongs to three notions united by one and the same two-part adjective – intellectual-emotional. These three notions are: intellectual-emotional nourishment (it is what adults should provide

children with), then intellectual-emotional way of appropriation of knowledge by child, and intellectual-emotional mobility (a quality which can be nurtured in the child by the adult's specific way of communication and interaction) (cf. Kierkegaard 1967, p. 113). Again, what is important about Kierkegaard's approach is that he traces the pedagogical implications of the affective asymmetry between being-a-child and being-an-adult.

Intellectual-emotional nourishment is thus a formal designation of what is required from adults insofar as they have to do with children whose existence is characterized by the affective disposition (state of mind) described earlier. Intellectual-emotional nourishment means, first of all, that a content offered to the child must be communicated in such a form that a whole message could satisfy the affective need implied in the child's primordial state of mind. It follows one should avoid a dualistic interpretation of the concept under consideration. Intellectual-emotional nourishment is not about artificial conjunction of two separate contents or mediums, but rather about the way of communication that corresponds to the child's existential need implied in his/her primordial affective disposition. The state of mind "anxiously curious" is an existential a priori which implies the child's existential need to have such experiences that will tranquilize his/her anxiety. While talking about the existential need and tranquilization, we must always keep in mind the exceptional character of anxiety – it is a state of mind that discloses Dasein (to Dasein itself) in its wholeness. Care and curiosity are the notions which designate how Dasein originally relates to its own wholeness – Dasein of adult and Dasein of child respectively. Correspondingly, intellectual-emotional nourishment is a way of communication/interaction which addresses child's existence in total – not some separated faculties. That is why the notion of intellectual-emotional nourishment is precisely about upbringing given the last one cannot be reduced to merely cultivation of some competences and faculties and skills. In order to address – to approach – child's anxiety, intellectual-emotional nourishment must correspond to the dialectics of anxiety. It means, adult's communication addressed to a child can only tranquilize child's anxiety by satisfying child's "seeking for the adventurous, the monstrous, and the enigmatic" that is by providing the child's anxious seeking with nourishment.

As for the question of an appropriate nourishment, Kierkegaard pays special attention to children's "deeply rooted desire to hear < fairy > stories" (ibid., p. 113) and, correspondingly, to the art of telling stories to children. As he stresses: "Children crave fairy stories, and this alone is sufficient proof of their value" (ibid., p. 118). Thus, masterful storytelling is considered a significant mode of providing children with that intellectual-emotional nourishment which is needed to support children's existential constitution. Kierkegaard warns in this concern:

“Not to tell children such exciting imaginative stories and tales leaves an unfilled space for an anxiety which, when not moderated by such stories, returns again all the stronger” (ibid., p. 118). We already know what is behind the phrase “an unfilled space for an anxiety”, – namely, “the enormous nothing of ignorance” that makes the child’s spirit (self) equally-originally anxious and curious.

Thus, interpretation of upbringing as intellectual-emotional nourishment makes explicit a significant existential function of adult–child communication. Upbringing has to respond – ideally, correspond –, to the primordial affective disposition of child as a being-in-the-world. In this regard, a short comment on a child’s age to be considered relevant to the state of mind ‘anxiously curious’ is necessary. Until now, I have been talking of child rather as an ideal type without focusing on specific phases systematically reflected in developmental psychology. Indeed, the theoretical frame and purposes of my article presuppose a certain abstraction from all detailed concreteness of child’s psycho-biological development. However, we do need and, actually, can indicate some minimal, at least schematic, definition of the child’s age that might be recognized corresponding to the affective disposition discussed above. Such a definition of some more or less concrete age-line must be based on the empirical data which prove certain existentiell independence of the child i.e. which are manifestations of child’s individuation. I suggest that the lowest boundary in this sense can be set around the second year of life. At this age, the individuation of the child is already manifest in many aspects. Above all, I would like to emphasize a child’s mastery of the “No” (in gesture and word). According to René Spitz, “this is perhaps the most important turning point in the development of the individual... with the appearance of semantic symbols it becomes the origin of verbal communication” (Spitz 1967, p. 204; cf. Fuchs 2000, p. 280).⁵

To conclude, let me refer back to Kierkegaard’s words used in the epigraph to the article. They indicate that intellectual-emotional nourishment as an ultimate existential function of upbringing is a difficult task that needs a very particular mastery. The perspective of the intergenerational decentration of the subject proposed in this text implies that such a masterful upbringing must be thought of as a mode of co-existence which presupposes a kind of asymmetric complementarity at the level of the affective dispositions of adult and child respectively. By having

⁵ Cf.: a whole passage in German translation: „vielleicht der wichtigste Wendepunkt in der Entwicklung des Individuums und der Art. Hier beginnt die Humanisierung der Art, hier beginnt das *zoon politikon*, hier beginnt die Gesellschaft. Dies ist der Anfang des wechselseitigen Austauschs von intentionalen und gerichteten Mitteilungen; mit dem Erscheinen der semantischen Symbole wird er zum Ursprung der verbalen Kommunikation“ (Spitz 1967, p. 204).

differentiated the existential anxiety of the child from that of the adult, we have made an important step in this direction.

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Representatives of Phenomenological and Pedagogical Emotion Research



Value-Feeling and Moral Education: Pedagogical Remarks on Dietrich Von Hildebrand's Phenomenology

Giuseppina D'Addelfio

1 Dietrich Von Hildebrand and the "Munich and Göttingen Circle"

By nearly all accounts, Dietrich von Hildebrand was a Catholic philosopher and theologian and, mostly, a master of Christian ethics. However, the relevance of his ethical perspective does not depend on his religious experience and can be fully understood only by presenting him first of all as a disciple of Husserl.

In order to highlight von Hildebrand's role in the phenomenological movement and his perspective in his ongoing development as a genuine phenomenology of ethical life, a biographical sketch of his early life can be useful.

Dietrich von Hildebrand was born in 1889 in Florence, the son of the German sculptor Adolf von Hildebrand and Irene Schäuuffelen. He grew up in Germany and, at the age of fifteen, moved to Munich, where he attended the Gymnasium; there it became evident to him that philosophy would be his own vocation.

In 1906 he entered the University of Munich and became especially enthusiastic about the courses given by Theodor Lipps. However, von Hildebrand was disappointed by Lipps' introspective approach, which he gradually considered as a kind of psychologism.

This understanding – and the very label "psychologism" – is to be regarded as the specific fruit of his encounter with Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* (1975), which precisely stemmed from von Hildebrand joining the "Akademischer Verein für Psychologie", established by Lipps around 1895.

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Actually, Lipps had gathered a few outstanding and gifted students, such as Johannes Daubert, Adolf Reinach, Alexander Phäender, Theodor Conrad, Moritz Geiger and, indeed, von Hildebrand, who met together weekly to discuss philosophical issues – a very formative experience for all these young philosophers. Lipps and his students discussed about consciousness and unconsciousness, motivation, will, aesthetic experiences, and so on, “from a descriptive psychological viewpoint. There was a strong feeling of the need for accurate descriptions of psychological states” (Moran and Parker 2015, p. 15).

When, in the spring of 1907, Geiger gave a lecture on Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* (1975) – which includes anti-psychologistic and anti-subjectivistic arguments – it upset the group, insofar as reveals Lipps' account as a form of empiricism.

This was the beginning of what would be later known as the “Munich and Göttingen circle” since many young philosophers – mostly after Husserl had given a lecture in Munich in 1904 – progressively moved to Göttingen to attend Husserl's lectures and seminars.

Von Hildebrand arrived in Göttingen in May 1909 and stayed until 1911. Through the “Munich and Göttingen circle” he came to know Max Scheler and other early phenomenologists engaged in the analysis of emotional experiences, interpersonal relationships, social acts, and so on (Salice 2015).

Actually, in this period, von Hildebrand made several relevant acquaintances for his philosophical pathway as well as for his personal development. He obtained, under Husserl's supervision, his PhD with a thesis entitled *Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung* (*The Idea of Moral Action*), which was to be published in 1916 in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*.

Husserl deeply appreciated his young disciple's work as “giving evidence of a rare talent to draw from deep sources of phenomenological intuition, to analyze with intelligence and precision what he has seen, and to express it conceptually in a most rigorous way”; in particular, he was “astonished at the incomparably intimate knowledge that the author has of the various formations of affective consciousness” (Husserl 1992, p. 4f.).

Therefore, a brief account of Husserl's ethics is, at this stage, needed to have an insight into the presence of Husserlian legacy in von Hildebrand's idea of moral action, as closely linked to affective consciousness. In general, Husserl envisaged the idea of formal axiology – which can be considered crucial in the stemming of von Hildebrand philosophical perspective.

Indeed, Husserl was delivering lectures and seminars about ethics precisely during von Hildebrand's Göttingen year. Specifically, his seminar on “Philosophical Exercises in Connection with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

and the Critique of Pure Reason of Kant” dates back to 1909 summer semester, while Husserl’s first course on ethics and the theory of value (*Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre*, 1988) had been held in the previous year. Then, in the summer semester of 1911, he gave another course of ethical issues (*Grundprobleme der Ethik und Wertlehre*), which von Hildebrand most likely attended.¹

2 On Husserl’s Ethics

For our purposes, Husserlian ethics will now be considered at first through its critical approach to Kant.

According to Kant, in order to establish the morality of an action, emotions, desiring, and most of all willing are to be intended in a purely formal way, that is without taking into account their concrete contents. Indeed, Kant claims that only a pure reason, determining a pure will, can be the source of a good action. So, Kantian ethics entails a deontological ethical theory whereby an action can only be good if its maxim is rooted in the moral law. Central to such ethics, therefore, is the categorical imperative, that is an unconditional demand to a person regardless of his/her emotions and feelings. Therefore, in this perspective, the entire realm of affectivity is reduced to a mere material fact of human psycho-physical life, which can only compromise the possibility of a truly ethical experience.

In doing so, in Husserl’s view, the Kantian approach to ethics precisely rules out the basic phenomena of human moral life: namely, values. In particular, Husserl deemed that Kant was mistaken in limiting the notion of “a priori” to the purely formal sense, like Scheler (1921), he meant “a priori” as given in intuition and not independent of the experience. Therefore, he envisaged the idea of a formal axiology, claiming that ethics, with a theory of value at its foundation, requires an a priori phenomenology of the sentient (*fühlende*), desiring (*begehrende*), and volitional (*wollende*) consciousness – where our emotional experiences play a key-role.

The premise of such claim is that an authentic theory of knowledge cannot be limited to the purely theoretical dimension, i.e. to the intentional acts governed by the logical reason; rather, it must be extended to the practical realm as well, that is to those intentional acts that are governed by the practical reason with a pivotal function performed by emotions.

¹ The next course in which Husserl focused on ethical questions was the “*Einleitung in die Ethik*” at the University of Freiburg in 1920 and repeated in the same University in 1924. Although von Hildebrand certainly did not attend those lectures, we can suppose that he knew of them.

More precisely, as stated by Husserl, there are three forms of reason and rationality corresponding to the fundamental classes of intentional acts: acts of thinking, acts of feeling, and act of willing. In the first ones, objects are given as conceived; in acts of feelings objects are given with value-characters; in acts of willing, they are given in their practical aspect.

According to Husserl however, intellectual, emotional and volitional acts are interwoven (Melle 2002). Therefore, it is worth stressing here that it is precisely in this framework that he envisages our primordial relationship with values as an emotional value-perception.

To sum up, Kant considered the entire realm of our emotional life to a mere material fact not to be viewed in a moral perspective, whereas Husserl precisely sees the origin of ethical experiences in the emotional acts and in their intentional character. Therefore, in a phenomenological approach, the study of the affective sphere is a part and parcel of a phenomenological ethical theory.

Such legacy seems to be crucial for many of Husserl's disciples. In particular, two aspects are worth noticing here, insofar as they were further developed in von Hildebrand's writings:

1. values are given in specific intentional experiences, which pertain to the emotional sphere;
2. as in the logical sphere, laws are also present in the emotional sphere, thus providing the latter with its own normativity.

Regarding the second aspect, as Husserl speaks of the "correctness" (*Richtigkeit*) of judgments referring to cases in which we experience such "correctness" and "see" the truth, in the same way, he speaks of the correctness of value judgments referring to cases where "we see" the value as objectively worthy of recognition.

In this framework, Husserl considers that our valuing (*werten*) is "correct", that is "appropriate" (*konvenient*), when it acknowledges what has a positive value in itself. In addition, every appropriate valuing is valuable in itself. This implies that emotions cannot be considered as separated from, or worse, as opposed to our genuine ethical life, insofar as we "see" values first of all thanks to the emotions.²

² However, according to Husserl, feeling value is not properly responding to value. On this point, see Mulligan (2004).

3 The Idea of Moral Action

The text of von Hildebrand's PhD thesis opens with the following question: what are the possible bearers of moral action? As a first answer, it is immediately stated that the Kantian idea of pure will as the only bearer of ethical experience represents a serious limitation of the moral domain (cf. von Hildebrand 1916, p. 126). Likewise, von Hildebrand does not agree with Kant when he recognizes feelings in morality only as "indicators" (*Anzeichen*) of the value (cf. *ibid.*, p. 128, p. 203).

Along the text, through rigorous arguments, the reason behind such statements is disclosed. Namely, as von Hildebrand explains, in order to appropriately respond to a value and realize a moral action, a clear knowledge of this value, which remains at a certain distance from the core of the person, is not enough. Clarity is, therefore, to be related to depth.

Such depth is made possible by value-feeling as shown by von Hildebrand's conclusions: as we can see in a virtuous person, not only the will, but also some affective experiences, such as enthusiasm, fear, admiration, gratitude, love, etc., are to be considered as possible value-bearers. Eventually, the author affirms that the whole being of the virtuous person becomes a bearer of morality.

For our purposes, the key part in the theoretical pathway sketched above is where von Hildebrand pinpoints that, in order to refer to value-grasping, Husserl uses the term *Wertnehmen* while Scheler (1921) uses the term *Wertfühlen* – stressing that they both consider value grasping as an emotive act. As for von Hildebrand, he agrees on the fact that emotion and mainly feelings – the latter being better highlighted by the author in his later works – are apt to draw our attention to something valuable.

However, he adds that the phrase "to feel value" may be misunderstood as it may be as a renewal of the eighteenth century "theory of feeling". He explains this by stressing that the term "feeling" (*Gefühl*) refers to both the act of grasping a value and the related position-taking act. So, he implicitly recalls and expands on another Husserlian critique, the one against the "morality of feeling", mainly represented by Hume.

Such claim entails that the main deficiency of this moral approach consists in the naturalization of human consciousness, thus leading to the loss of the peculiarity of the latter – as compared to the kingdom of mere nature. This precisely implies that kind of reductionism that Husserl labels as "psychologism". As a matter of fact, in the eighteenth century "theory of feeling" the focus is only on the psychophysical aspects of human life so that the spiritual dimension of the

person is overlooked. As a consequence, like in Kant, affectivity is bound to be reduced to a mere material and empirical fact.

In order to avoid this way of approaching emotions and personhood, von Hildebrand distinguishes between position-taking (*Stellungnahme*) and cognitive apprehension (*Kenntnisnahme*).³ In doing so, he describes the intentional structure relevant to emotions, arguing that, while intellectual position-takings, like beliefs, are to be responsive to “the true”, emotions are intended as position-takings possibly responsive to “the good” – as in the apprehension of the beauty of an image, that conveniently leads to the response of admiration.

This example helps us to understand that, in being intentionally directed at something, position-taking represents a response (*Antwort*) to certain qualities of its object. Therefore, emotions presuppose grasping the importance of things, and can possess moral relevance, thus allowing us to see the correctness or incorrectness of emotional experiences.

Indeed, according to von Hildebrand, affective responses to value can be appropriate or inappropriate on the basis of an axiological perspective, whereby there are different ways in which one can recognize something as important (and not as neutral or insignificant). In other words: Hildebrand's crucial claim about the emotions is related to the distinction between different kinds of axiological property of reality that they can respond to, that is the importance (*Bedeutsamkeit*) that different aspects of reality have, or do not have, as such. Actually, “the most significant not of value for von Hildebrand is that a being is worthy of a right response in virtue of its value. [...] an elementary justice is fulfilled when the valuable being receives the due response” (Crosby 2002, p. 479). As the young von Hildebrand writes: “Every value possesses an ideal response that is due to it, independently of whether any such response takes place” (von Hildebrand 1916, p. 164).

These words show von Hildebrand's seminal moral realism, which he will increasingly develop later (Vendemiati 1992).

In the second part of the Doctoral Dissertation, von Hildebrand particularly focuses on value-feeling, as the intentional act where value is given in an experience, likewise color is “given” in our sensorial perception. So, the experience of value is meant by the author as being touched, indeed affected.

He argues that in feeling, value is given in a very different way from what happens in mere knowledge where a person holds something in his/her consciousness as known and clear but not really close to him/her – i.e. as something that does

³ With regard to the notion of position-taking (*Stellungnahmen*), also the crucial influence of Adolph Reinach (1911) on the young Dietrich can be detected.

not penetrate deeply and, therefore, fails to motivate the person, also failing to move him/her to an action.

A person can know what he would do, what is necessary, what is prescribed, or is a duty and, however, does not change his/her behaviour. According to von Hildebrand, indeed, if there is only knowledge, consciousness remains empty and opaque, does not have the material basis of a moral experience (cf. von Hildebrand 1916, p. 206). Such a person thus remains blind to value.

Instead, true proximity to value is possible thanks to value-feeling. So, the value becomes “more objective” and “more proper” for that person (cf. *ibid.*, p. 207). Moreover, the closer a relationship with a moral value is to a person’s “centre” (*Kern*) (*ibid.*, p. 248f.), the more such value determines what the author calls the fundamental attitude of this person, deeply and durably rooted in him/her. When values take roots in a person, they become part of their essence, as well as this person, becomes a genuine value-bearer.

4 Morality and the Knowledge of Ethical Value

After obtaining his PhD and further to the publication of the relevant thesis, von Hildebrand completed his academic habilitation, with a work on *Morality and the Knowledge of Ethical Value* (*Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis*, 1922), addressing moral epistemology issues.

The questions that open and shape this text are about the relationship between the knowledge of values and actual virtues, namely: Can an intellectual knowledge of moral values be considered as the ultimate foundation of the person’s moral being? Is such knowledge the necessary and sufficient condition for a virtuous life? And finally, as in the pedagogical question posed by Socrates which is always topical, “Can virtue be taught”?

Specifically, posing a question about what he calls a “*Fundierungs-relation*” , the author wonders whether the knowledge of values is the foundation of virtuous behaviour or whether, on the contrary, a certain habit of virtuous behaviour or familiarity with values are needed to acquire it. On the one hand, it seems that the knowledge of ethical value is the pre-requisite of moral action, i.e. of actual virtues; on the other hand, however, without a certain familiarity with virtuous behaviours it is not possible to recognize values as such.

Thanks to his phenomenological analysis, however, the author shows that the question is ill-placed. Actually, we will not get out of that vicious circle unless we clarify the nature of the knowledge of value and, then, begin to think about understanding values in terms of different possible levels of depth – in other words,

unless we reflect on the different possible levels of personal ethical experiences. In this perspective, the author recognizes a “complex relationship of mutual interdependence between moral knowledge and moral virtue” (Catjthaml and Vohánka 2019, p. 127).

This account recalls some passages in the author’s doctoral dissertation, namely when he describes the difference between simple knowing values and grasping them thanks to value-feeling. Actually, it is highlighted that the evidence of value is to be meant first of all in terms of a self-giveness which takes place in human affectivity. This is the reason why, according to von Hildebrand, clarity is not enough for moral development and a deep personal contact with the value is required.

In his early writing as later, the author repeatedly says that we really live a value only in feeling since it is only thanks to emotions that a value can enter into a direct relationship with a person and it is thanks to the depth of the feeling that it remains as a rule for our concrete behaviour.

In other terms: only thanks to emotions and feelings, values really touch us, vividly speak to our heart and, then, motivate ourselves; otherwise, values – and, we can add, moral education – leave us cold and remain silent in our lives.

In this perspective, in his *Habilitationsschrift*, von Hildebrand first of all quotes Socrates and his identification between virtues and knowledge. Then, he moves on to Aristotle and seems to agree with his critique of Socratic intellectualistic approach, and on the Aristotelian teaching that moral good and bad are known not just by an intellectual effort but, rather, thanks to an appropriate education of emotions, desires and, then, moral character (D’Addelfio 2008).⁴

The main claim of von Hildebrand’s moral epistemology is thus that our knowledge of values is not primarily a theoretical act, insofar as the “object” must be grasped in its importance but also as desirable and concretely achievable. This is why the author stresses that value response is a voluntary as well an affective act.

Moreover, this double response stems from an act of deep intuition in which a value is “immediately given”. In other terms, according to von Hildebrand, affective value responses are founded in intentional acts in which values are intuitively given and the subject *receives* them (cf. von Hildebrand 1991; 1972, p. 208). Actually, each value is an intentional object and, as such, requires an appropriate response.

⁴ It is also worth noticing that in his later works von Hildebrand was critic to the Aristotelian eudaimonism as well as to the Greek philosopher idea that our moral choice is about means and not about ends (cf. Crosby 2002, p. 484 ff.).

As in his first paper, also in *Morality and the Knowledge of Ethical Value*, the author pinpoints that values are offered first of all intuitively, i.e. in acts of intuitive knowledge (*intuitives Kennen*), and again he speaks of *Wertsehen* and *Wertfühlen*, referring to Husserl and Scheler respectively, so to emphasize that both of these acts differ from pure knowing that something has value. With regard to this, we can say that “[...] both terms underline the intentional fullness of a personal relationship with values that cannot be reduced in a rationalistic sense” (Dell’Oro 1996, p. 105).

Therefore, the main epistemological question addressed in the *Habilitationschrift* is the problem of the possibility of such intuition, that is of the conditions necessary for this first recognition of a value by a person. This question is specified as the problem of the moral level necessary for that original act of intuition. At this point, the author focuses on the issue of value blindness (*Wertblindheit*), which he will develop further in other works.

Here, the phenomenological analysis of this category shows that the inability to see moral values, is never an original characteristic of the person, almost this person was missing a natural disposition since birth, but rather it is the consequence of a certain way to behave that has generated a certain “moral condition” of the person, his “moral being” (*sittliches Sein*) and his “fundamental attitude” (*Grundhaltung*). Therefore, even blindness to value, in its various forms, depends on the responsibility of the person (cf. Dell’Oro 1996, p. 106 f.; Catjthaml and Vohánka 2019).

Here again, as at the beginning of the text, the author refers to Aristotle and, precisely, to that passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in which it is made explicit that not all bad actions, but only the ones that depend on us and are voluntary, i.e. that are not carried out by compulsion or ignorance, are to be blamed and punished. However—Aristoteles argues—there are forms of ignorance for which we are responsible, as happens in the case of drunkards, who are, indeed, severely punished by the legislators because they could not have been drunk (see: Aristotle 2002, p. 112 ff.).

Likewise, von Hildebrand argues for a moral accountability of value blindness, meant as a form of culpable ignorance.

For von Hildebrand as for Aristotle, therefore, we are responsible for the kind of person we become insofar as our moral character is the result of our commitment and exercise. This view implicitly contains several pedagogical consequences.

Moreover, in the second part of his *Habilitationschrift*, von Hildebrand again stresses that only the feeling makes a personal encounter with the “world of values” possible.

He also points out that each advancement in virtue implies an advancement in value-feeling, meant as a greater deepening and a greater familiarity with value.

Depth, in particular, is differentiated based on either one of the two following perspectives. The first perspective revolves around the individual person, insofar as – von Hildebrand explains – in a person some experiences do not go deep, that does not grasp his/her centre, and instead in other ones go very deep; for example, when two friends split, some people will be deeply affected, whereas other ones will not: they probably feel pain but this pain remains relatively peripheral and it does not touch that person at the centre of their emotional life. Namely, some people are characterized by the fact that everything touches them very deeply and really speaks to their heart, whereas other people by the fact that everything remains on the surface or in the periphery of their soul. Then, the author stresses that if an experience does not touch the centre of a person's emotional life, it does not touch their life.

With these arguments, von Hildebrand provides hints for an increasingly accurate insight of personhood and, more specifically, of the interiority peculiar to human beings. It is relevant for education.

However, such relevance can be fully appreciated if the author's account on human interiority is considered as closely linked to his moral realism – hence the second perspective anticipated above.

According to this second perspective, each value-feeling is characterized not only by the level of depth (or superficiality) at which it is rooted in a specific person (which would imply that value-feeling and moral value are bound to be entirely subjective), but also by the qualitative rank of the considered value.

Actually, Hildebrand's focus on a different kind of axiological property to which emotions can be responsive, has crucial implications not only for their normative significance but also for their role in personal flourishing. With regard to this, the author makes an important pedagogical point, when he stresses that the "centre" of can also remain empty or occupied by a kind of usurper, that is by "value" not objectively relevant. Actually, we may recognize that someone is touched by something more deeply than he/she should, considering the specific essence of the content of the thing.

Here again we can see a link between personhood and realism which is particularly precious for envisaging education as moral education today, namely insofar as it challenges the current idea of value as a mere subjective preference.

5 Emotions and Affectivity in Later Ethical Works

Von Hildebrand's account on affective knowledge of values has led us to deal with the human capacity to "be touched by" and, then, "respond to" values. Here several fruitful links with von Hildebrand's later works can be detected. As far as I see it, indeed, in the ongoing development of his ethical perspective, the author always argues for the irreducibility of the immediate and emotional presence of value for to a reflective awareness of it – the latter being possible only based on the former (contra: Mulligan 2009).

In his theoretical pathway, therefore, he always focused on emotions as well as on values as closely interwoven. Always wondering about "the things themselves", he examined the basic structure of virtue and the different occurrences of several virtues (and their *counterfeits*), and how our affective life functions in the moral life. More precisely: "he insisted that affective responses such as envy, malice, delight in the good, grief over the loss of the good, admiration for a good person, veneration for a saint all play a major role in the formation of moral character" (Crosby, quoted in Catjthaml and Vohánka 2019, p. XI).

In many of his works, von Hildebrand developed the phenomenological analysis of emotional acts and its intentional correlates, so challenging the low place reserved for affectivity in large part of traditional philosophy.

For example, in his 1965 work remarkably entitled *The Heart*, the author wrote:

"The heart has not been given a real place in philosophy. Whereas the intellect and the will have been made the object of searching analysis, the phenomenon of the heart has been largely neglected. And whenever it has been analyzed, the heart has never been given a standing comparable to that of the intellect and the will, a standing that would do justice to the genuine importance and rank of this centre of the human soul" (von Hildebrand 2007, p. 135).

Von Hildebrand claimed that the ultimate reason for many philosophical errors about emotions can be recognized in the lack of a focus on their intentional character. Therefore, his ethical perspective was strongly characterized by his effort to show that the emotional and, mostly, the affective sphere is not to be empirically reduced to emotional states, superficial moods, or passions. If this were the case, precisely affective spiritual experiences like value-responses would not be considered, nor would it be considered that these affective responses can be correct or incorrect, i.e. adequate or inadequate according to the value to which they respond. In this sense, he speaks about a possible *adaequatio cordis ad valorem* and, so, highlights the heart as our spiritual centre. This view recalls other

early phenomenologists and, in particular, Edith Stein's account on the structure of human person and empathy (D'Addelfio 2016).

In this framework, the value was increasingly shaped by von Hildebrand as something worthy of the appropriate response in virtue of itself: as Crosby stresses in his introductory study on von Hildebrand's masterpiece, the *The Nature of Love* (2009), i.e. Socrates is worthy of admiration; human dignity is worthy of respect; God is worthy of adoration. And love, in turn, is highlighted first of all as an affective response to the intrinsic value of another person.

At the same time as von Hildebrand envisaged value as worthy of receiving the appropriate affective response, he increasingly shaped value as having the power, or better the authority, to bind the human person in the manner of moral obligation: the call stemming from a value can motivate deepest possible personal freedom and elicit a kind of obedience in responding to it and authentically sanctioning it.

In his aesthetic writings, he also recognized analogically sanctioning in our "being affected" by works of art insofar as it belongs to the beautiful not only to appeal the will, but also to move the heart. This represents also an important hint for educators, that should use this analogy and try to move a young heart thanks to a fascinating educative proposal (Bellingeri 2019).

All these accounts on emotions and affective experiences in von Hildebrand's path, can be considered as developments of the personalistic meaning of what he envisaged, from his early writings on, as "value response".

Actually, a personalistic ontology of values can be here detected. In this phenomenological perspective, the notion of "value-response" can be considered not only from the side of value, which merits the response, but also from the side of the human person, who gives the response and so realizes himself/herself precisely and fully as person (Crosby 2017; Montes 2019; Melle 2007).

It is also worth noticing that, according to von Hildebrand, in doing so the person transcends himself/herself. Indeed, the author spoke of self-transcendence because a person who grasps a value is "caught up" in it, caught in something that is stepping beyond his own needs and superficial emotions (von Hildebrand 1972). Therefore, instead of seeing the world only from the point of view of satisfying such need and emotions, he starts to see the world for what it is, according to its own value. He starts to respond to it in a way which is proportioned to and measured by the value. Responding to value implies overcoming every form of self-centred attitude. In the *Nature of Love*, he explained this, by comparing two kinds of person:

- one lives by value-response; this person does not let his interest in the subjectively satisfying interfere with his actual recognition of the world of value. Of course, he experiences things subjectively satisfying and feels emotions and desire toward them, but he does not search them at the expense of the call of value;
- the other kind of person lives primarily for the subjectively satisfying; finally, he ceases even to care about, even to see, what is “precious in itself” (von Hildebrand 2009).

Here, for von Hildebrand, lies the fundamental moral freedom of persons as well as the true goal of ethical formation: the most radical self-determination of which we are capable is disclosed when we choose between the two radically opposed forms of existence. Actually, when we are blind and do not respond to values, we remain prisoners of ourselves, locked in our immanence. And when we do not transcend ourselves, we give less evidence of existing as persons.

In his *Ethics* (1972), the author presented this view on personhood, highlighting that the deepest actualization of our freedom is not free will but, rather, “cooperative freedom”, meant as the personal response and cooperation with something given or, better, “gifted”. At this stage, the phenomenological analysis of the nature of human affectivity allows us to recognize another “serious defect in Kant’s moral psychology, particularly his unreasonable denial of the compatibility of higher-order affectivity and human freedom”; on the contrary, von Hildebrand’s notion of “cooperative freedom” is “not only is a higher-order spiritual affectivity compatible with freedom and morality, but it is essential to it” (Lu 2017, p. 703).

In the work devoted retrieving the heart from the neglect in which he has long abandoned, von Hildebrand recalled this account as follows:

“The highest manifestation of cooperative freedom is to be found in sanctioning – in the “yes” of our free spiritual centre which forms from within our “being affected” by values and, above all, our affective response to them [...]. These affective experiences which are gifted from above become fully ours, that is to say, they become ultimately a valid expression of our entire personality only when they are sanctioned by our free spiritual centre.” (von Hildebrand 2007, p. 70 f.)

6 Conclusions

Among the possible pedagogical remarks to be made further to the current account, we can stress what follows:

- A value is an intentional object that requires an affective response. Indeed, from our affective response, i.e. from consent or dissent, motivation stems. This is a first crucial point for moral education that, therefore, cannot neglect emotions.
- Going further in this direction, the ethical and pedagogical issue of different levels of depth emerges insofar as it is only thanks to emotions that a genuine relationship with value is possible and it is thanks to the depth of the feeling that such value can remain as a rule for a concrete behaviour as well as a durable personal attitude.
- However, it is worth developing in a pedagogical perspective that each value-feeling is characterized by a certain depth not only for the level of depth (or superficiality) in which the affective response to that value is rooted in the person, but also for the real height of the considered value. Actually, according to von Hildebrand, as well as to his colleagues and friends of the Munich and Göttingen circle, emotions always have a twofold reference, precisely due to their intentionality: a subject-side and an object-side. So, since emotions have an objective reference, the theme of phenomenological realism is to be considered.
- Finally, according to von Hildebrand, in value-response lies the possibility of revealing, or not revealing, ourselves as persons, whereby the need for an accurate phenomenological personalism.

In this perspective, more pedagogical studies are needed to explore his Ethics and, mostly, his account on the different meanings of “importance” would deserve more attention insofar as the author uses this term to denote the specific respect under which an object, an event, or a person, is apt to motivate a specific emotional response. In other terms, importance is what awakes the interest of a person and, then, motivates and moves him/her toward a specific action. From a pedagogical point of view, it is worthy focusing on the fact that an unjust act not only is a moral disvalue, but also compromises and harms our personal essence.

Certainly, many people spend their entire life without any genuine value response attitude and take an interest in things (as well as in persons) mistakenly considered as “valuable” only insofar as they are only subjectively satisfying, i.e.

useful. In doing so, they fail to experience things which are good for themselves (and to love others as valuable for themselves), but this approach – far from expanding the subjective possibilities – trivializes the person. Actually, von Hildebrand may help us to see that there is a more serious and rich way in which the good is good, for the person – precisely addressing a person as a person. Here the need for an “ontology of person” – beyond any psychological account – is even more clear, insofar as such account on value-feeling, indeed, implies an analysis of what Edith Stein calls *the structure of the human person* (2004) and mainly of his/her interiority, that is of personhood and his/her formative development.

In general, the analysis of the concept of value-feeling offers many meaningful hints in order to envisage moral education as a formative care of all the levels of depth of human being, aimed at a fully personal human life.

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A Critical (Personalistic) View of Feelings – Agnes Heller’s Theory as a Snatch of Thought of an Educational Theory of Emotions

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Overview and Structure

This article first introduces Agnes Heller as a person and her central work on phenomenology and sociology of feelings (1). Subsequently, it is asked to locate and differentiate the terms ‘feeling’, ‘emotion’ and ‘mood’ in the theory of feelings (2) in order to interpret Heller’s theory as an educational one towards the end and to attribute a specifically meaning in two selected aspects (3)

1 Agnes Heller and Her “Theorie Der Gefühle” (Theory of Feelings)

First, an approach to the person of Agnes HELLER and her *theory of feelings* (Heller 1981).

1.1 About Agnes Heller

Agnes Heller was born in Hungary on May 12th, 1929, experiences the Holocaust as a child and can survive the turmoil of war and the persecution of the Jews – especially through well-meaning fate. This time leaves its mark and she turns to Zionism, Marxism and, politically, communism. At the beginning of the 1950s she married the later literary critic Ferenc Fehér and enters with him into

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the philosophical sphere György Lukacs' so-called 'Budapest School'. She also became Lukacs' assistant and will – throughout her life – remain marked by his reading of Marxist philosophy.

Due to a lack of 'line loyalty', she repeatedly gets into conflict with the real socialist system, so that she and her husband eventually emigrate to Australia. In 1984, Heller was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research in New York, which she held until her retirement. In the 1990s, she turned to the idea of biopolitics, especially following Michel Foucault. Until her death in the summer of 2019, the Hungarian philosopher and sociologist lived in Budapest and New York.¹

1.2 First Try to Locate the *Theory of Feelings*

The study *Theory of Feelings* (Heller 1981), published in 1981, arranges the argument by starting with the thesis that thought and feeling constitute a unity of order and that this can be derived from the anthropological constitution of humanity/practice of being human (Mensch-sein). In addition, there is an inner link of people's behavior to their practice of being human and the awareness of it (for both movements: *ibid.*, p. 15). Similar to (critical) personalist philosophies (Stern 1923, 1924), Heller assumes human beings as 'wholes', as autonomous and at least idiosyncratic systems (individuals), who are directed towards preservation (Erhaltung)² and progression (Erweiterung) (cf. Heller 1981, pp. 33–41). Stern refers to the preservation of a person as a "personal basic principle" (personales Minimalprinzip) – similar in the considerations here (cf. Stern 1923, p. 358). Heller calls this "silent mankindness" (stumme Gattungsmäßigkeit), which is located in the individual and has an effect as an apriori of action/practice (Praxis) (cf. Heller 1981, p. 33). As well as Arendts (2014, p. 215; also: Plessner 1975, pp. 316–317) "second birth" (zweite Geburt) the "actual/real mankindness" (eigentliche Gattungsmäßigkeit) articulates on the outside (cf. Heller 1981, p. 33). Both concepts combine the already existing social plurality with that of each born person, so that personality is always social and sociality personal/individual. Like Heller may say mankindness is developed in

¹ See <http://www.fembio.org/biographie.php/frau/biographie/agnes-heller/>, read on March, 18th in 2019.

² All German-language texts are translated by the author himself, whereat the German original is given in brackets or—for longer sections—as footnotes.

tasks, which people face through ‘world’³ although practice must repeatedly steadi- ed in preserving-mechanizing ways (for the personal dialectics of motion see Stern 1923, pp. 173–175, 353–357).

Agnes Heller calls these practical relations and their realizations as movings “to be involved in something” (Heller 1981, p. 19: in etwas involviert sein), which is a synonym for with *practice*. Historically, since Aristoteles (1985, 2012) a real- istic, almost praxeological accent has resonated, when it comes to activities as practice. These are realized through the interaction (actualization) of substance (material) and form (action) or in other words: of dynamis (capability) and ener- geia (effect), which materializes in a cultured attitude and in so far as habitus (Aristoteles 2014; Bourdieu 1993). In doing so, the question of the correctness and usefulness of practice is transformed into one according to adequacy (virtue in terms of good-naturedness). Its standard must first be specified by the activity itself. Both an inner and outer plurality and alterity are included, what Arendt (2014) in her *vita activa* and Benner (1980, 2005) has worked out for a praxeolo- gical pedagogy. In this way, practice can be developed as an “Bildungsbewegung” (Mollenhauer 2008, p. 103),⁴ in which the mover and moved one are constituted from the open-undefined unity of the motion itself (see Marx 2005, 2018; Marx and Engels 1990). Therefore, we can understand practice and theory of Bildung as two sides of one action which essence lies in the attempts to negotiate the unde- fined through social relations. Similarly, possible capability and real impact of action can be brought together as “process-matter” (Bloch 1985: Prozessmaterie).

But let’s go back to Heller’s concept of practice: being involved in something (Heller 1981, pp. 19–32), which “something” is “everything” (ibid.). This relation of subject and world serves the homeostasis of the individual (the personality) as a social organism. In any case, Heller draws on Marx’ (2005, pp. 83–97) early anthropological writings and relates individual and historical development to each other. Being involved is – to put it in a nutshell – a regulatory practice, which means that “starting from a social organism, the regulation of the appropriation

³ Weischedel (1976, p. 80) conceives ‘World’ as human contemporaries (german word *Mitwelt* is written in the singular) and objective environment of things, which he both develops as concrete occasions of encounter.

⁴ ‘Bildungsbezug’ or ‘Bildungsbewegung’ is used to insist on the nucleus of Bildung as a real dynamic relation(s) of human(s) and environment(s). Of course the term ‘Bildungsbewegung’ accents that this relation is some kind of motion, what is part of Bildungstheorie since at least Leibniz’ (2014; for english version with Strickland 2014) “Monadologie”. Bildung therefore fits in the mathematical metaphor of motion respectively power/energy: we call this a vector. Both terms are used with emphasis on a Marxist’ philosophy of science, which reads theory as theory-practice or to put it this way: theory is always meant to be varying reality/realities and by that revolve itself (if necessary).

of the world with regard to the preservation and progression of the self is done. With being involved, the subject evaluates the actual man kindness for himself” (Heller 1981, p. 39).⁵

Being involved leads to a hierarchy of heterogeneous feelings, which, however, ensure the unity of homeostasis (ibid.). Feelings therefore represents a *form* of practice or being involved (ibid., p. 19), which are not *merely* an experience (Erfahrung), but an expression of personal expressivity and experience (Erleben: ibid., pp. 75–78; supplement: Plessner 1975, pp. 288–340; Stern 1930, pp. 113–140). At the same time, it is said that feelings can also be learned, i. e. not only, but also, spontaneously. Furthermore: as articulation of *practice* (Arendt 2014, pp. 212–265; Benner 2005, pp. 63–92) this can not only be ‘reconciled’ with thought but *can also* be presented as willful (Heller 1981, pp. 39–52).

From these considerations, Heller (ibid., pp. 17–242) can first present a “Phenomenology of Feelings” (ibid., p. 17: Phänomenologie der Gefühle), then discuss a critical sociology of feelings and their tendencies towards alienation in the bourgeois epoch (ibid., pp. 245–333).

2 Feeling, Emotion and Mood in HELLER’S Phenomenology of Feelings

The connection of feelings and the establishment of the personal equilibrium of an individual (homeostasis) in the process of preservation and progression, enable a differentiation of emotional types (ibid., pp. 54–55) in connection with the tasks of the world (i. e. as environment [Umwelt] and fellow men [Mitwelt]; see above). In this respect, feelings do not only support the homeostasis of being involved in the sense of a tension-regulation (ibid., p. 57), but the reorganization in the sense of differentiating the personal sense-structures (ibid., pp. 61–62). This matches far-reaching with the concept of “structural coupling” (Maturana and Varela 1987, p. 85: strukturelle[r] Kopplung; more precisely: pp. 83–92, 265–268) in the biological-social-constructivist Systems Theory of Varela and Maturana.

This is the only way in which subjects constitute themselves in developing their generic history: by overcoming the tasks, which the world is giving us (as well as the chosen ones) and the awareness, that these immanence of being human are expressions and constitutions of humanity and being humans. In Hellers words:

⁵ ausgehend von einem sozialen Organismus das Regulieren der Aneignung der Welt in Hinsicht auf die Erhaltung und Erweiterung des Ichs [erfolgt]. Mit dem Involviertsein bewertet das Subjekt die eigentliche Gattungsmäßigkeit für sich selbst.

“The I rises to the actual mankindness by developing its ‘own world’ under the guidance of the objectifications of the general-social consciousness.” (Heller 1981, p. 61)⁶

Therefore, the philosopher is able to write:

“Feeling means being involved in something. The feeling guides us in the preservation and progression of our social organism (the self). Our feelings are expressed: this gives the main information about what we actually are.”(ibid., p. 84)⁷

As mentioned above, one can derive a type of feeling from the articulated, and the reason of feelings (i. e. what is expressed to us) as well as from the quality and complexity of being involved, which describes Heller as “anthropological” (ibid., p. 90: anthropologisch). This is how the following logic is broken down:

“[W]e move from feelings in which we have less freedom, towards feelings that give us greater freedom and greater freedom of movement, from the less cognitive feelings to the cognitive, from the phylogenetic-ontogenetic primary to the (...) secondary; (...) of those who are characteristic of all human beings to those who are socially and personally idiosyncratic, individual; from the inherently value-neutral feelings to the ones, which are value contented.”(ibid., p. 84)⁸

This results in the following stratification, recurring to Heller’s logic:

- Instinct (Triebgefühl)
- Affects (Affekte)
- Feelings of Orientation (Orientierungsgefühle)
- Emotions (Emotionen)
- Feelings of character and personality (Charakter- und Persönlichkeitsgefühle)

⁶ Das Ich erhebt sich zur eigentlichen Gattungsmäßigkeit dadurch, dass es unter der Anleitung der Objektivationen des allgemein-gesellschaftlichen Bewusstseins seine ‘eigene Welt’ entwickelt.

⁷ Fühlen heißt also, in etwas involviert sein. Das Gefühl leitet uns in der Erhaltung und Erweiterung unseres gesellschaftlichen Organismus (des Ichs). Unsere Gefühle werden ausgedrückt: dies gibt die hauptsächliche Information darüber, was wir eigentlich sind.

⁸ [W]ir schreiten von den Gefühlen, bei denen wir über kleinere Freiheit verfügen, in Richtung der Gefühle, die uns größere Freiheit und breiteren Bewegungsspielraum sichern bzw. voraussetzen, von den weniger kognitiven Gefühlen zu den kognitiven, von den phylogenetisch-ontogenetisch primären zu den (...) sekundären; (...) von denen, die für die ganze menschliche Gattung charakteristisch sind zu denen, die gesellschaftlich und persönlich idiosynkratisch, individuell sind; von den ihrem Wesen nach wertneutralen Gefühlen zu den über einen Wertgehalt verfügenden.

- Feeling of Life, mood (Lebensgefühl, Stimmung und Laune)
- Passion (Leidenschaft)

Here furthermore I follow Heller's approach by differentiate feeling(s), emotions and mood, as the topic of the volume here (and the past conference theme) also suggests.

We have already shown that *feelings* articulate practice and are integrated into thinking, 'seeing' (ap/perception and appetite: see Leibniz 2014) and acting. Heller presents the *concrete* feelings (in plural, because their differentiation is a task of development; from this follow the types of emotions: *ibid.*, pp. 153–154) in a more closely linked way to the withdrawal of instinct, i. e. the tasks that 'world' gives to and is accepted by human beings. In this sense, our being-involved is always *accompanied* by feelings, while not all feelings serve this (*ibid.*, p. 188). In addition, feelings – as an expression of practice (Benner 2005, p. 89) – are subjects of reflexive processes: we can behave to our feelings, differentiate them, link concrete experiences with (new) terms and vice versa, as well as value our feelings (cf. Heller 1981, pp. 153–180). This is what we do – following Heller's idea of the antinomy of being – connected with the "system and structures of a current society's requirement and habits" (*ibid.*, p. 188: Anforderungs- und Gewohnheitssystem der jeweiligen Gesellschaft; also: pp. 188–191). This is done either by feeling itself or by value the feeling that has occurred (*ibid.*, p. 221). In addition, feelings can function individually or, as with envy and vanity, only participatory (*ibid.*, pp. 221–227). More on that later. Narrowly by Heller: „The emotion of love in its particular and individual function is not the same feeling“ (*ibid.*, p. 224).⁹

What can be understood by an *emotion*? Emotions are called "cognitive-situational feelings" by Heller (*ibid.*, p. 125: kognitiv-situative Gefühle) and represent *a* type of feelings. The "actual emotions" (*ibid.*: eigentlichen Emotionen) are *both* social (like the orientation feelings) and idiosyncratic (*ibid.*). Thus, of emotions you cannot „assume that all the emotions that now exist will necessarily exist in the future“ (*ibid.*, p. 126: angenommen werden, dass alle jetzt existierenden Emotionen auch in der Zukunft notwendig existieren werden). At the same time, an emotion of the same person differentiates, depending on the situation and acting persons (*ibid.*): Emotions are *total* in sense of *entire*, i. e. "generally the emotional content itself cannot be separated from the emotional

⁹ Die Emotion der Liebe in ihrer partikularen und individuellen Funktion ist nicht dasselbe Gefühl.

trigger and from the emotional interpretation” (ibid., p. 129).¹⁰ In addition, concepts of emotions always represent categories of different, concrete feelings (cf. ibid., p. 132).

Emotions, however, have different meanings *in terms of species’ history* and history (cf. ibid., p. 127). Unlike the feelings of drive and affect, emotional alienation experiences can be made (cf. ibid., p. 132).¹¹ This applies, for example, to the emotion of joy (being happy) and the emotional feelings of contact (love, friendship, solidarity/sociality): If we cannot be involved in something emotionally as a ‘whole’ person/as a personality, i. e. joy is not intense and contact is not deep enough, then these experiences of alienation sometimes occur (to the last two sentences: see ibid., pp. 131–139). This, however, is necessarily related to social phenomena such as acceleration, multi-optionality and corresponding feelings of risk and uncertainty (see Beck 1986; Ehrenberg 2015; Rosa 2005).

Moods, on the other hand, are thought in the theory of feelings as “predispositions of feelings” (Heller 1981, p. 144) and thus specific, idiosyncratic and “genetic”, as emotions. In addition to the feeling of life and the mood – understood as “Laune” – mood is also described in this group of feelings as “Stimmung”. This is a “shorter or longer period of emotional predispositions, which always arises from or ties to a specific situation” (ibid., p. 146). If we can understand its cause, we consider our mood to be justified, otherwise as unfounded. Moods can be described as depressive (without being a depression) or as states of satisfaction, high feeling/flow or more generally as restlessness (cf. ibid., p.146–147).

3 The “Theory of Feelings” as an Educational Theory

Agnes Heller’s theory also conceals some interesting theoretical bricks that can be stimulating and continuative for educational thinking. Some are to be indicated below, but without claiming to be complete or to deplete present the depth of Heller’s thinking.

¹⁰ [D]er Gefühlsinhalt selbst kann prinzipiell von dem Gefühlsauslöser und von der Gefühlinterpretation nicht getrennt werden.

¹¹ For example in form of a reduction of drive/instinct, which then leads to a total emotional loss of individual emotional forms. Cf. Heller 1981, p. 280.

3.1 Being-Involved as an Bildungs-Relation¹²

The thrust of the emotional theory is the theoretical figure of “being involved” (ibid., p. 188: *Involviert-sein*). This refers to the antinomy of being, according to which people must balance the idiosyncratic moment in their self-determination and the tasks, the world is giving to us. These are external tasks and can back/support human beings’ *progressions* (to this paragraph: cf. ibid., pp. 33–38, 79–80, 188). Paradoxically, however, the focus on this is some kind of the immanence of human beings and their humanity; this is a constituent of their mankind/species, but in turn, human beings are only *able* to express this in inter-subjective ways. Here the maxim of Kant’s pedagogy is reflected, which we sign praxeologically: “Men can only become human” (Kant 1977, p. 699) through practice.

Heller explicitly refers to Marx (2005, pp. 86–90) when she works on *being-involved*: “By being-involved, the subject evaluates the specific mankindness for itself” (Heller 1981, p. 188).¹³ As with Marx (2005, p. 86–97) the quality or development of society corresponds to the one of individuals and their personalities so that the state of personal homeostasis always means the preservation and progression of the individual in the tasks assigned (cf. Heller 2015, pp. 9–15). The activities carried out are read as the naturalization and humanization of man (as the realization of form and matter of being human – *matter of process*), as an expression of what it means to be a human being.

“how far man’s needs have become *human needs* and consequently how far the other person, *as a person*, has become one of his needs, and to what extent he is in his individual existence at the same time a *social being*.”¹⁴ (Marx 2005, S. 86, displayed in Fromm 2017, p. 109)

These tasks of coping and preservation as well as the one of progression can also be interpreted in terms of Bildungstheorie, which means, they can be understood as vital and manifold/diverse references. We can allude to Humboldt’s idea of Bildung as one of (idealistic) *motions/movements*:

¹² Cf. footnote four on the similar term ‘Bildungsbezug’; more fundamental in Leibniz (2014) and his idea of *representatio mundi*.

¹³ Mit dem *Involviert-Sein* bewertet das Subjekt die eigentümliche Gattungsmäßigkeit für sich selbst.

¹⁴ “[I]nwiefern das Bedürfnis des Menschen zum *menschlichen Bedürfnis*, inwiefern ihm also der andere Mensch *als Mensch* zum Bedürfnis geworden ist, inwiefern er in seinem individuellen Dasein *zugleich Gemeinwesen* ist.”

The “concept of humanity [i. e. not the essence of man] in our person, both during the time of our lives and beyond the same (...) [should be materialized] by relating our self to the world to the most universal, vital, and freest interaction”. (Humboldt 2010, pp. 235–236)¹⁵

Bildung – here – is understood in a multi-perspective/plural/diversifying way, because “by the diversity of views (...) the own inherent force” (ibid., p. 237: durch die[se] Mannigfaltigkeit der Ansichten (...) die eigene innewohnende Kraft) is strengthened – but not merely to “increase his powers” (ibid., p. 238: Erhöhung seiner Kräfte) or to “grade up his personality” (ibid.: Veredelung seiner Persönlichkeit), but to capture “as much world as possible, and to connect with him- oder herself it as thightly as he/she only can” (ibid., p. 235: soviel Welt, als möglich zu ergreifen, und so eng, als er nur kann, mit sich zu verbinden). In order to understand the idea of being-involved, we have to get Humboldt’s “Ideal” going by using Bloch (1985, pp. 319–327) in the sense of Marx’s (2018, p. 64) eleventh assumption (Thesen über Feuerbach): Bildungs-motions intend to realize the “progressive consciousness[s] [and] the progressive totum/allness” (Bloch 1985, p. 326: fortschreitende[n] Bewusstsein[s] [und] des fortschreitenden Totum[s]), thereby articulate the possible in realities. Bildung is *thus* realized through activity or moved being humanity through immanence at the front of innovation and matter (cf. ibid., pp. 225–241).

The “own and new view of the world and thus (...) own and new mood of himself” (Humboldt 2010, p. 239: eigene und neue Ansicht der Welt und dadurch (...) eigene und neue Stimmung seiner selbst), can now be drawn near to Heller’s idea that, in addition to con-/preservation, being-involved also supports the derivative of man as an individual as well as part of mankindness/humans. But its like turning Humboldt upside down, when she writes: “Being-involved means regulating the appropriation of the world with a view to preserving and progressing the self, starting from the social organism” (Heller 1981, p. 188).¹⁶ And later she continues regarding the subjectivity of world: “Man is a personality with his own world, and this ‘own world’ is the one he wants to preserve and progress” (ibid., p. 189: Der Mensch ist eine Persönlichkeit mit einer eigenen Welt, und diese ‘eigene Welt’ ist die, die er bewahren und erweitern will.). It seems

¹⁵ Den “Begriff der Menschheit [also nicht das Wesen des Menschen] in unserer Person, sowohl während der Zeit unseres Lebens, als noch über dasselbe hinaus (...) durch die Verknüpfung unseres Ichs mit der Welt zu der allgemeinsten, regesten und freiesten Wechselwirkung” zu verwirklichen.

¹⁶ Involviert zu sein bedeutet die Regulierung der Aneignung der Welt im Hinblick auf die Erhaltung und Erweiterung des Ichs, vom sozialen Organismus ausgehend.

that a spark of the classical idea of self-education shines in the otherwise realistic theory of reflection following Marxist personality theories, which assume that “the individual is unique in the sociability of his personality and social in the essentially unique of his personality” (Sève 2016, p. 252: das Individuum einmalig im Gesellschaftlichen seiner Persönlichkeit und gesellschaftlich im wesentlich Einmaligen seiner Persönlichkeit ist).

Now it is *also* part of humans’ practice that they – as autopoietic processes – refer to others and can only be carried out *with* them: Being and practice become – as they see – one (as an activity) and individual structures of reality always contain moments of coupling to others (cf. Maturana and Varela 1987, pp. 55–56, 267). For Bildung this means, that “every Bildungs-process is progression and enrichment, *but also* narrowing and impoverishing what would have been possible” (Mollenhauer 2008, p. 10)¹⁷ With Rekus (2016) it is possible to additionally connect this to the current topic of ‘inclusion’: Bildungsarbeit (practice) is always conceived as “shared” (ibid., p. 50 – “gemeinsame”) and can formulate pedagogical inclusion as “inclusion in the task of Bildungsarbeit, which has to be carried out dialogically” (ibid., p. 51: Einschluss in die dialogisch zu leistende Bildungsaufgabe”). Heller’s being-involved hence describes inclusive motions of Bildung.

At least this would be exciting enough, adding that people, because of their anthropological constitution – see Plessners (1975, p. 293) *dreifache Positionalität* (threefold positioning) – experience this interaction and can not only perceive the other as a subject-object, but can also take a *common/shared* perspective: as *unity* of a shared world (cf. ibid., p. 303). Here the figure of *alterity* comes to its full meaning – even beyond pedagogical claims in the narrow sense – but also in its political one, as Arendt (2014, pp. 17, 213–240, 272–273) has shown. Because the perspective of the “We” makes it possible to step *out of* one’s body and *from* the body and to constitute a sphere that preserves the strangeness of the other, but regulates its radicality to such an extent that at the same time the plurality of perspectives becomes accessible and negotiable. This turn of view can be found in very early figures of Bildung (Platon 2008). (In this way, a primary foreignness and equality (Gleichheit) can be dispensed with in equal measure – in contrast to equality as “Gleichartigkeit” and forms of being *with* or *for* each other – in order to establish and use diversity in coexistence for the constitution of political (made) equality.)

¹⁷ Jeder Bildungsprozess (ist) Erweiterung und Bereicherung, aber auch Verengung und Verarmung dessen [ist], was möglich gewesen wäre.

Nevertheless, practice as being-involved remains a relation of an individual, therefore an I, which is – as argued – always (new)born into an existing web of social references (Arendt 2014). As explained above, inner and external practice can be related to each other and represented in a shared frame of meaning (einer verbindenden Vernunft) so that being-involved refers to the relation aligned inwards. Socrates refers to this quality of relation in his plea (apology) as “self-exploration” (Platon 2009, p. 38: Selbsterforschung) and characterizes it as a life form (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 36–37). Being-involved always targets *this* aspect and can, therefore, be thought of with Mittelstraß as “transsubjectively oriented self-determination” (Mittelstraß 2002, p. 168: transsubjektiv orientierte(n) Selbstbestimmung). In this sense, and this can be made clear from what has been discussed so far, the knowledge of orientation has to be preferred, when it comes to terms with knowledge of instruction or pure use (Mittelstraß 2002), to conceive Bildung as being-involved: which means as a web of knowledge, capability and – above all – wanting ability in the sense of (applied) ethics (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 168–170). This “educated self-determination” (*ibid.*, p. 166: gebildete(n) Selbstbestimmung) means practical, oriented and dedicated being-involved and not a lost and alienated one.

Following Heller we can add: Being involved describes the fact and sensation of being a social individual and at once an individual, which is socially structured by nature Person. Our feelings respond, how differentiated or rather distinct we are able to get aware of our nature and express/represent native inter-being (of humans and world) at a time. This line of thought refers to another interesting moment in Heller’s theory of emotions: the quality of the relation between men and world and her idea of “practical enthusiasm” (Heller 1981, p. 327: konkreten Enthusiasmus).

3.2 On the Relation of Care in HELLERS’ *Theory of Feelings*

In the chapter on “different acting towards the world” (*ibid.*, p. 214: [u]nterschiedliches Verhalten zur Welt”), Heller points out that being-involved is a differentiating act, but it is even a selective-integrating one. The “final I can never reproduce the infinite world” (*ibid.*, p. 215: endliche Ich [kann] die unendliche Welt nie reproduzieren), it must relate to the world and its values, confirm it and make it self-worth by its own. In a critical personalism point of view (e. g. Sterns) this is called the idea of ‘personal dialectics’ (Stern 1924, 1930) as the synthesis of self-absorbed (centripetal) and altruistic (centrifugal) (Stern calls this “ver- und

entziehenden”) *activities as introceptive practice*¹⁸ (cf. Stern 1924, pp. 87–88, 141, 249–250; furthermore: Leibniz’ (2014) theory of reflection, especially his idea of fittingness and interconnection, which represent and express harmony – individual and as unity at the same time). Heller calls such a link – by trend – an “individual relation” (Heller 1981, p. 215) and separates it from so-called “particular” ones (ibid., additional: pp. 215–220).

“The *individual relation*, that is, the choice of values, the distance to ourselves and the habitual norms of our surroundings based on these chosen values, is nothing more than the conscious/wilful relation to the *species*. The moment of freedom resides in this conscious relation with the species as a chosen one: (...) we choose the constituents of being human as values.” (ibid., p. 218)¹⁹

There are many considerations of *personal identity*, which may correspond to or differentiate with these thoughts (see Ricoeur 2005; Quante 2007; Rössler 2017). Interesting is, for example, the aspect of the ‘authenticity’ of a person in becoming a personality and the regulating function of feelings in it (cf. Rössler 2017, p. 372). But we are particularly interested in the importance of individual or particular relations for our *feelings*.

In *the theory of feelings*, these relations are expressed either in a feeling of self-reflection or by our evaluation of one’s own feelings (cf. Heller 1981, p. 221). For Heller, envy and vanity are typical examples of participatory feelings (ibid., p. 222), while for individuals a process of “secondary learning” (ibid., p. 225) – self-exploration in sense of Socrates as mentioned above – is characteristic. According to Heller (ibid., pp. 224–226), this is why people *can* act individually to their particular feelings by tricking them in “self-enjoyment of personality” (ibid., p. 226: Selbstgenuss der Persönlichkeit). Heller points out:

“The particulate ‘gardener of feelings’ cuts off everything that does not confirm to his uncritically accepted emotional norms; but he makes the weeds grow elsewhere. The individual ‘gardener’ cultivates his garden on the basis of his self-knowledge

¹⁸ Stern (1924, p. 243) calls this a “state in which one’s own value and world’s values are affirmed/accepted at the same time” (Zustand, in welchem der eigene Selbstwert und die Werte der Welt zugleich bejaht werden).

¹⁹ Das individuelle Verhältnis, also die Wahl der Werte, die Distanz zu uns selbst und den Gewohnheitsnormen unserer Umgebung aufgrund dieser gewählten Werte ist nichts anderes als das bewusste Verhältnis zur Gattung. Diesem bewussten Verhältnis zur Gattung als einem gewählten Verhältnis wohnt das Moment der Freiheit inne: (...) wir wählen die Konstituenten des Gattungswesen als Werte.

and knowledge of the world. He wants to produce the most beautiful flowers that the existing soil can produce at all.” (ibid., pp. 226–227)²⁰

In Stern’s (e. g. 1924) personalism this is expressed by the “axiosophical imperative” (ibid., p. 339: *axiosophische[r] Imperativ*) and its practical turn.²¹ Contrary to what many prejudices claim, *this* theory, like Hella’s, does apply to concrete human beings, but not correspond to the abstractive one, and interlaces being human in general and particular as reciprocal conditions of their actualization (cf. ibid., pp. 61–69; Stern 1923, pp. 359–369; Stern 1918, pp. 34–41; more general in Marx and Engels 1990, pp. 104–119, 142–151). A related idea is also present with Bloch’s (1985, 1963) left-Aristotelian interpretation of entelechy: becoming an Individual is therefore always also participation in the realization of *the process-matter* (Prozessmaterie) itself.

A person’s *authorship* plays a decisive role, as in the case of Arendt, etc. (Arendt 2014, pp. 215–232; Quante 2007, pp. 142–145, 159–161; Schneider-Reisinger 2019, chap. 4). Contrary to the particulate behaviour as a “mechanism of defensive” (Heller 1981, p. 227: *Abwehrmechanismus*), to put one another in relation means, to choose and to assume responsibility for these decisions: this also means to differentiate decisions made, to opt again, to vote again if necessary or to choose (cf. ibid., p. 228). Here Weischedel’s idea of the “decision to shape existence” (Weischedel 1976, pp. 127–137: *Grundentschluss zur Gestaltung des Daseins*) is expressed; moreover, even after Marx’s (2018, pp. 62–63) third thesis on Feuerbach, it becomes clear, how closely social and individual motions of *Bildung* are related: Contrary to the “particulate I who always devotes him/her only to him-/herself” (Heller 1981, p. 231: *partikulare Ich [, das] sich immer nur sich selbst hingibt*), individual relations constitute a second nature of man as a common dynamic culture, which regulates individual’s biography by balancing conservation and progression (homeostasis).

Heller calls this “new enthusiasm that ‘invests’ its feelings in realizing specific duties of a new society” (ibid., p. 327: *neuartigen Enthusiasmus, der seine Gefühle in die Realisierung der konkreten Aufgaben einer neuen Gesellschaft*

²⁰ Der partikulare ‘Gefühlsgärtner’ schneidet alles ab, was seinen unkritisch akzeptierten Gefühlnormen nicht entspricht; das Unkraut lässt er aber woanders wachsen. Der individuelle ‘Gärtner’ pflegt seinen Garten aufgrund seiner Selbsterkenntnisse und der Kenntnis der Welt. Er möchte möglichst die schönsten Blumen erzeugen, die der vorhandene Boden überhaupt hervorbringen kann.

²¹ See: Introception as “the action by which an I fulfills one’s self-worth by realizing non-I-values” (ibid., p. 403: *dasjenige Wirken, in welchem ein Ich den eigenen Selbstwert dadurch verwirklicht, dass es Nicht-Ich-Werte verwirklicht*).

‘investiert’), a “concrete enthusiasm”, which can be understood as positive passion (to demarcate: *ibid.*, pp. 300–301) and not *alienated relations* (Marx 2005, pp. 60–70) of people and their reality of world.²² Heller’s ‘proposal’ can be classified in thoughts and theories of care (cf. Schneider-Reisinger 2019, chap. 5.; Foucault 2010, 2015; Ricoeur 2005, pp. 231–235, 358–365; Heidegger 2006, pp. 199–212) and has interesting similarities to Weischedels (1976, pp. 144, 179–220) basic attitudes (*Grundhaltungen*). At the same time, with Stern (1927, p. 48; 1923, pp. 367–369; 1924, pp. 341–342), this approach can be (scientifically) interpreted as “concrete idealism” (*konkreter Idealismus*) and with Bloch (1985, p. 165) as “real realism” (*reelle[r] Realismus*). Heller in this spirit writes:

“The enthusiast of concrete ideas, on the other hand, is an albatross. It is not only able to fly high in the sky, in the thin air of border situations, but also its walk on the ground is safe and firm. It loves life, the joy of life and humans.” (Heller 1981, p. 331)²³

In this sense, *Allgemeine Bildung* should appropriate such ‘earthy’ topics as feelings, emotions and mood are, again and continue working on them increasingly in connection with theories of *Bildung* and philosophies of *Bildung*. At the same time, Heller can be admonished: never forget the individual character and the homeostatic function of people’s feelings in their prevailing situation and always interpret the pedagogical discourse as a political one – with explicit connection to social norms and values. *Bildung* is ‘practical’ (practice), even if it comes along as theory (cf. Bernhard 2011; Schneider-Reisinger 2020).

Once again and deciding with Heller: “So while reason/common sense, as well as feeling (passion) have their own pathos, by facing the alienated forms of the other principle” (Heller 1981, p. 289: [S]owohl die Vernunft, als auch das Gefühl (die Leidenschaftlichkeit) haben ihr eigenes Pathos, wenn man sie unmittelbar mit den entfremdeten Formen des anderen Prinzips konfrontiert.). Perhaps Heller’s thinking is also a plea for pedagogical thinking in a materialist and dialectic way, which is truly utopian too. This thinking is self-acting and as practice revolving at the same time.

²² See also Bloch’s (1985, pp. 238–240) idea of “Marxism as theory of warmth” (*ibid.*, p. 241: *Marxismus als Wärmelehre*).

²³ Der Enthusiast der konkreten Ideen hingegen ist ein Albatros. Er kann nicht nur im hohen Himmel, in der dünnen Luft der Grenzsituationen fliegen, auch sein Gang auf dem Erdboden ist sicher und fest. Er liebt das Leben, die Freuden des Lebens, die Menschen.

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Meaning and Practice of Teachers' Love towards Learners in the Perspective of the Phenomenology of Feelings

by Max Scheler

He Qiao and Xiaohong Zhu

For many people, it's inevitable to feel love and be loved by others whether they have a deep understanding of the essence of love or not. Many philosophers assume that love has an evident meaning, and can be observed and evaluated.

In the research on teachers' love, more attention had been paid to the ethical norms and practical values of teachers' love for learners as well as to the results of education, for example the academic achievements of learners, while the profound theoretical analysis of teachers' love actually was missing. The focus of the following article is an attempt 1) to probe into the phenomenological meaning of love; 2) to reveal the phenomenological and pedagogical meaning of teachers' love and to ask 3) what the relevance of practice of teachers' love is in pedagogical contexts.

1 The Philosophy of Love

Love is not foremost a scientific issue but also a philosophical and emotional one. There have been many theories about love, however, in China, the philosophical analysis of love appears inadequate. A reason for this is that few Chinese philosophers had chosen love as the subject of their studies since Confucius, and philosophical thinking about love had always been dominated by "Ren" (仁) of Confucianism (cf. Ni 2005, p. 167). "Ren" means benevolence, compassion,

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humanity, kindness, and mercy.¹ On the contrary, the philosophical reflection on love has always been an important subject in Western philosophy. While others worked out the canons of empiricism and logical analysis, Scheler developed a methodology whose lifeblood is the love of the world. While most of the western philosophers turned to natural science to solve its problems, Scheler pleaded for a renewal of Christian love to rebuild Western Culture (cf. Vacek 1982, p. 156). As there is a major difference between Eastern and Western philosophy, it can be found that love in the perspective of Confucius is based on human life experience, and love in the perspective of Scheler is an emotional and ethical issue. The philosophy of love proposed by Scheler presents an important and valuable academic perspective on the essence of teachers' love.

“*Realontologie*” in the phenomenological tradition of the school of Göttingen claims that the phenomenological attitude is able to grasp the world directly. Within this, Scheler discovered the fact that “love is an act of inclination or an act that comes with a tendency to try to bring everything in the direction of its own particular value and perfection and to complete this act without hindrance” (Scheler 1999, p. 750). Scheler’s basic proposition is: the human being is the existence of love, which is the pre-condition for one to know the world and take actions of will: “A man is a lover before he is a thinker or a wisher, the fullness, hierarchical structure, difference and power of man’s love determines the fullness, model of action, and power of his possible spirit and his possible way to interact with the universe” (ibid., p. 750).

Unlike the traditional rationalists and empiricists, Scheler distinguishes between *logos* and *pathos*, between reason and emotions. Reason offers access to the world of logic, and emotions offer access to the world of values. Values are accessible to us through feelings (cf. Blosser 2010, p. 253). There are four different types of feelings: sensible feelings or sensations, vital or lived feelings, psychic feelings, and purely spiritual or religious, metaphysical feelings.

All of these feelings are intentionally directed towards oneself, others, and the world, and have been the ground of the logic of love. Love is an act of openness to the world, while it also implies that certain meanings and preferences are inherent to this process. According to the Critical Theory, the cognitive rationality of love is emancipative. In the concept of the “I-Thou” relationship of Martin Buber, love asks for us to feel from the other side, therefore love concerns oneself and others, and influences how we socially present and construct it (cf. Blumenfeld-Jones 2004, p. 270, p. 272).

¹ Larry Gowdy. *Discourses and Sayings of Confucius—Legge vs. Ku Hung-ming* <http://www.larrygowdy.com/discoursesaysingsconfuciusleggeku.html>.

The human being, before being one of thinking and willing, is a being of love, and love is the foundation of all acts of consciousness (cf. Frings 2003, p. 25). In this view, Scheler inherited the views of Goethe and Pascal. Goethe said that one can only know the things one loves, and the more one loves the thing one knows, the more profound and complete one's knowledge of the object will be (cf. Scheler 1999, p. 776 f.). Pascal also said that things can only be described by perception and judged by reason if they are firstly presented in the process of love (cf. *ibid.*, p. 776 f.). Love in this sense is not a feeling of someone or something, rather we love someone or something. Love sits underneath the Husserlian consciousness "of" something (cf. Frings 2003, p. 25).

Love comes from one's heart and the heart has its own logic. "Heart" in this article refers to human's different intentional experiences and emotional activities towards various values; while "reason", and "logic" refer to the basic relations and orders among such experiences and feelings. There are two implications of "the order of the heart": one is the order of the emotional activities people experience and feel; the other refers to the value structure, direction, and sequence that one has actually acquired or been given through intentional experiences and feelings. "Heart" as the core of the order of love is not chaotic, but an orderly counterpart of all possible values, and a miniature of the value world (cf. Frings 2003, p. 49). Love as a positive and creative drive refers to the heart's "openness" to someone or something, which can be felt through values and value's order.

The order of values serves as the fountainhead of all humans' value choice. According to Scheler, love falls into four categories in a prior sense: sensory love, love of life, spiritual love, and love for the faith. The four types of love are intrinsically connected to their implied values, and this connection will not change along with the value variations. Accordingly, based on phenomenological intuition, Scheler puts forward four basic patterns of value existence: sensory value, life value, spiritual value, and divine value: "Love is a direct response to the value of an object, and in any case has nothing to do with the object and its value judgment" (*ibid.*, p. 46). Therefore, one cannot find a reason for love and will not look for its reasons until love takes place, which can never fully account for true love.

Love is an intentional and self-realized act with its inner value, and the essence of love is creativity, and strength of giving and devotion. True love interacts with the object with a higher intention of value: "The lover expects the object to be perfect and maintains a stable feeling with the loved one" (*ibid.*, p. 47). In short, as an intentional act of heart, love always goes farther when it starts and is not limited to what it grasps and possesses (cf. Scheler 1995, p. 50). The heart is "open" towards the fullness and disclosure of value and value order by loving.

The human being is the existence of love. It is due to this love that humans continue to develop towards a specific direction of ideal and perfection. In the life experience of human beings, there can be various forms of love: love of the faith, love of nature, love of the country, love of the family, love of parents, and love of children, all of which reveal the nature of values and may shape a person, an era, or even a nation. Love reflects the kind of cognitive object and concept a person recognizes, along with the different values, historical periods, national cultural system, lifestyles, value standards, and the unique spiritual temperament, all of which shapes the type of love. However, in daily life, every individual has his or her unique style of loving connected to different preferences of values that have penetrated their souls. This results in the obscureness of the value order and love order in their emotional life. It was precisely the insight of preference for sensory and practical value in modern society that Scheler adopted value subversion to generalize the disorder of human value in modern society.

As love is an intentional act towards the fullness of being, as well as a direct orientation of who one is, it permits one to disclose oneself as he is. During this process, higher values have their own intrinsic worth, their own evidence, and their own radiance, and “love” is sublimated from a biological phenomenon to the highest value (cf. Luther 1974, p. 23). Scheler’s interpretation of love and his phenomenological attitude which is shown in his thoughts of love, that is, “returning to the thing itself” in pursuit of the essence of love, provides a new theoretical perspective to re-understand the meaning of teachers’ love in a pedagogical context.

2 Teachers’ Love: Hearts Towards Learners

The standpoint of phenomenology is to first face the living things themselves, namely, to open your own eyes to see, to hear, and to feel through your intuition from which we draw the most original (cf. Zhang 2003, p. 5). According to Scheler, the phenomenological attitude refers to the honest attitude of seeking truth from facts that people should keep when facing the world, in other words, to understand the phenomenon itself or to come in direct contact with the world itself without any prejudice. Love, as an interpersonal and ethical relationship between a person and others, takes place not only in the family but also in the professional and vocational fields, it occurs for example for doctors in the hospital and teachers in schools. If we interpret teachers’ love in this perspective, we must re-define the relationship between teachers and learners, and show the most original meaning of teachers’ love.

As for learners' experiences in school, we can observe the natural emotional and ethical relationship between teachers and learners. Through the act of love, learners are immediately and directly grasped by a teacher as a person. In *The Education of Love*, written by the famous Italian writer Edmondo de Amicis, he describes the inner experience of a pupil named Enrico. At the beginning of the new school year, "I no longer have my teacher with his kind and cheerful smile, and the school does not seem so pleasant to me as it did last year" (Amicis 1995, p. 2). However, the new teacher's attitude had changed the children's life. Although the new teacher kept a straight face, he did not blame the students for breaking the rules in class. Instead, he spoke in a kind voice:

"Listen, we have one year to spend together, let us seek to spend it well! Study hard and be good. I have no family. You may be my family. I had a mother but she died last year. I have no one else in the world now but you. I have no other relatives than you. You must be my sons; I love you; you must love me. I do not want to punish anyone. Show me that you are boys with good hearts, and our school will be a family and you will be my consolation and my pride. I do not ask for a promise of you, I am sure that in your hearts you have already told me 'yes' and I thank you." (ibid., p. 3)

It is such words from the teachers' heart that give Enrico the impression that "my new teacher is adorable" (ibid., p. 3). It can be seen that the way a child feels his teacher's love is always closely related to his personal situation. From this perspective, people and the world have been connected through a dynamic and contextual way from the very beginning. Therefore, the occurrence of teachers' love depends on their professional context. Conventionally, the teacher (as the more experienced person) is responsible for protecting the learners (the less experienced person) from danger and bring a structure of knowledge to the learners' life. The learners' responsibility is to attend to the teachers' actions and to be instructed by the teacher (cf. Blumenfeld-Jones 2004, p. 276).

According to Scheler, a school or a class is itself a community, in which there lies a certain emotional understanding and in which different interactions among its members occur. In this community, teaching and learning bring the teachers' and learners' inner life and the whole world together (cf. Palmer 2014, p. 83). Both teaching and learning is an intentional and functional process, during which teachers exert direct and indirect influence on the learners' growth and development, is towards the teachers' and learners' self-enrichment, and their own initiative. There is a Chinese expression about the role of the teacher using the metaphor of the "teacher as the engineer of human souls", which means that teachers are responsible not only for imparting knowledge but also for educating

people. In many regards, the role of educating people is more important than the role of imparting knowledge.

As for the process of recognizing, teachers and learners are connected with the great contributions of human beings, such as science, philosophy, and art. In the process of teaching, teachers usually provide a platform to invite learners to engage in the learning process. During this process, learners themselves are the subjects and responsible for the class. Considering the learning process, learners are active and show initiative to improve their own achievements, capacities, and even skills. Therefore, teachers' love starts from the deep understanding and respect for the truth and subjectivity of human beings. In this regard, it is more inclusive than parental love as it aims at the relationship between human and the world.

The role of cultivating and educating people is derived from the human's indeterminacy and plasticity. Since every child is an individual and unique being, teachers can support children and provide guidance on how they grow and develop and how they realize their own powers and energy. In this regard, teachers themselves are positive role models and earn their respect from learners by showing how to be decent, caring, trustworthy, sincere, reliable individuals by what they say and by what they do for the sake of the learners whom they encounter (cf. Sonntag 2010, p. 1). In this context, teachers as loving people, are open to the learners and children. Teachers' love shows itself through the establishment of certain rules, norms, and standards for learning. It can also be seen as a voyage of discovering every learner's interest, personality, and talent and it is grounded in the teachers' personal experience and spiritual temperament.

Learners can feel that they are being loved through their teachers' eyes, gestures, words, and even the tone of their voices.

“For man, the ‘core’ of the so-called ‘essence’ of things always lies in what his affection depends on. Anything away from human affection will be ‘specious’ and ‘absent’.” (Scheler 1999, p. 751).

Etymologically, there is an interest *towards learners* in the teaching profession at the very beginning. In the English language, “teaching” and “pedagogy” are closely related. The English word for “pedagogue” comes from Greek, it refers to a slave or a guardian charged with the duty of guiding (agogos) learners (paides) to school. “Pedagogue” nowadays implies a broader meaning than “teacher”. Therefore, the original meaning of “teacher” is the child's guide, whose responsibility is to guide the child to school and to send them back home safely. According to the pedagogical and phenomenological analyses of Max van Manen on the primary meanings and significance of teachers, “leading” (agogos) means accompanying children, spending time with them, and taking care of them, which is the

very core of the relationship between teachers and learners (cf. Van Manen 2001, p. 50 f.). During the interaction between teachers and learners, "leading" means not only going ahead but also *lighting the way for others with its own light*, as it is shown in *Mencius*. Therefore, the responsibility of teachers may be regarded in both practical and ethical ways.

It can be seen that teachers' love refers to the fact that teachers' hearts are always oriented towards the learners' existence and development, leading them to find themselves in an ethical and pedagogical context. Therefore, teachers' love is an ethical and intentional act, to discover the latent value of things. Teachers' love aims at the improvement of the possibility for learners to become better, and to pursue higher or deeper values.

According to Scheler, the "evolution" of a human being is of higher value than "accumulation" of practical knowledge (cf. Frings 2006, p. 229). "Evolution" here means self-growth and development of learners. This evolutionary meaning is also the essence of teachers' love. In other words, teachers are doomed to "love" children.

"To love one's own child is instinctive; while to love the child of others is divine." (Lin 2005, p. 25).

Teachers' love shows the divine value and special mission of teachers.

Etymologically, the word "vocation" implies the meaning of "vocare". To be a teacher means to follow a calling in his life—a calling for education, that connects learners with teachers. In other words, there is an interactive relationship between teachers and learners in the sense of life, in which the learners' future is closely bound up with their teachers.

Teachers' love as a sustained potentiality, originates from the calling of learners and education and ends with a response to this calling. From this perspective, the perspective of teachers *towards learners* is implied in the intention of teachers' love that reflects who the teacher is, what they are doing, and how they face the world. *Towards learners* calls teachers to work together with learners and continuously reflect the ways of interaction between teachers and learners, which is the highest stage of teachers' state: "It can be said that it is presenting a movement, during which many new, higher and even totally unknown values are revealed" (Scheler 2004, p. 317). The intention of teachers' love is open to higher and deeper values of education, and it is positive and creative.

In the pedagogical context, the order of love shown in an individual teacher is his or her *ethos*, which places a higher value on trying their best than on the practical benefits. Teachers' love towards learners happens between teachers and learners in a shared pedagogical context. As we know, there is a generation gap between teachers and learners because of the different age, life experiences, and

social status. In order to clarify “what we should value and desire” (Blumenfeld-Jones 2004, p. 271 f.), teachers have to understand learners’ desire through an imaginative leap. True love is “to let it be”, rather than imposing one’s will or opinions on the beloved. Teachers’ love means taking children’s hands and leading their way, in other words, to invite them to engage in the world.

Teachers’ intention of love is directed towards the learners, i. e., teachers’ hearts are towards the children (cf. Van Manen 2001, p. 42). The teachers’ love has covered many pedagogical implications and it is the most valuable part of teachers’ professional life as well as the root of it. For teachers, the expression and presentation of love are shown in pedagogical practices, such as caring for students and taking responsibility in the teaching and learning community.

From this perspective, it can be found that teachers’ love is systematic and continuous. On the one hand, this means that teachers’ love runs throughout the teachers’ material life, spiritual life, vocational life as well as their leisure life, all of which constitutes a teacher’s identity (cf. Noddings 2018, p. 99). It means that teachers firstly have to care for themselves, fully understand the significance of teachers’ professionalism, and build up their own spiritual kingdom. On the other hand, teachers’ love towards learners is integrated into educational objectives, for example the relationship between teachers and learners, curriculum planning and the teaching process, and other educational practices.

3 The Practice of Teachers’ Love

The famous Chinese educator Xia Mianzun, who said that “without love, education will become a waterless pool, no matter square or round, it’s empty” (Amicis 1995, p. 2), compared “affection” and “love” with water in a pedagogical sense. In the era of Xia, the school system and the applied methods in school education in China had changed frequently. This is why Xia worried that schools neglected the cultivation of talents, which still poses a problem today when technical rationality becomes increasingly powerful. The education committee of one city in China randomly selected 100 teachers and asked them, “do you love your student?”. More than 90% of the participants answered “yes”. While the pupils of these 100 teachers were asked, “do you feel loved by your teacher?”. Only 10% said “yes” (cf. Lin 2005, p. 25). Why is there such a big gap?

According to Scheler, it is the value in the emotional experience that is important. However, in modern times, people have lost all of this essence, such as the trustful sincerity. Nowadays, the rules of human emotions are disordered and regarded as subjective and arbitrary, and modern people are forced

into the dilemma of “love confusion” and “value subversion”. Indeed, the disorder of values in modern times has spread and influenced teachers’ love in various degrees. In general, thoughts and researches on teachers’ love tend to pay more attention to its essence, functions, and methods, rather than its highest and ultimate value.

Many teachers believe that “love can melt the ice, and love can turn the stone into gold.” Such an ideal undoubtedly implies the thoughts of instrumental rationality, which regards teachers’ love as an operational tool. It is only false love if we understand teachers’ love through its usefulness, and teachers’ love will deviate from its essence and lose its direction.

In fact, there lies a profound tradition of rationalism behind the instrumental rationality. The researchers examining teachers’ love from a rationalistic perspective adopt the logic of emotional rationality, and blindly follow the rationality of a casual relationship. Much more attention has been paid to the teachers’ actions rather than their inner perception driven by love. Therefore, pedagogical love has become the subject of psychological research, and thus lost its foundation of philosophy. With the support of psychological research, teachers’ love in pedagogical practice is understood as a special love, which leads to a practical act. Therefore, teachers’ love has become a normative requirement in the context of the ethics of teaching which requires teachers to undertake the duty of love. Psychologists are primarily concerned with the understanding of emotional states, but not with concrete actions (cf. Frings 2003, p. 47). This regulated “love in practice” has deviated from its characteristics. Teachers’ love, as “love in practice”, aims at children’s spiritual intention. Therefore, love cannot be ordered and regulated, which is also an important proposition related to the practice of love proposed by Scheler.

If a teacher is required to perform the duty of love, then his or her love can be unnoticeably transferred into doing something good. Herein lies the danger that love, as an originally intentional act, must now be proven through an externally visible act. For example, according to the requirements of teachers’ professional ethics, teachers are required to do something good for the learners, then some selfish and intentional encouragement may be abused under the guise of love towards children, and love will fall into meaningless. This is the root of why there is a huge difference in love between psychologists and Scheler.

According to Scheler, “being kind” and “doing good” which could co-exist are fundamentally different acts and not love (cf. Scheler 2004, p. 272). On the one hand, teachers might show their kindness to learners out of a desire for personal honor; on the other hand, love does not necessarily lead to good intentions or results; people may be angry and bring pain because of love. For this reason, the

teachers' love can't simply be satisfied with children's sensory joy as its objective but needs to be focused on helping learners to reach the highest spiritual value. The teachers' love would be based on the improvement of a children's spiritual personality. In this sense, teachers may take strict educational measures towards children, who in return may not feel comfortable with this. However, this is the disclosure of true love from teachers.

Indeed, a teacher is willing to fulfill "obligations" and is willing to obey all the professional rules. In the perspective of teachers, the intention of "hearts towards children" is of higher value than simple "towards duty", which is also the "logic of love", as Scheler mentioned. How to nourish teachers' ethical consciousness of "hearts towards children" is enlightening to teacher education nowadays.

In a professional and ethical practice, teachers have to realize their unique pedagogical responsibility and contributions, and be conscious of teachers' profession and being. In the practice of teachers' love, teachers and learners are responsible for understanding or seeing each other for who they are (cf. Van Manen 2017, p. 822). Therefore, teachers' love is a way inethical thinking and acting, and the performance and ways of teachers' love can be disclosed in different communities in which teachers participate.

Pedagogy is informed by the ethics of teachers' love firstly through the way in which the teacher teaches within the classroom. Different knowledge and curriculum guidelines signify what knowledge is valuable and how it should be taught. Teachers are obligated to not only have a deep understanding of the knowledge and subject they teach, but also to build a connection with learners' experiences, and listen to the learners' voices.

The integrity of subject knowledge and the practice of teachers' love in schools offers a possibility of institutional education. A new logic is assumed: the more treatment there is, the better are the results. The learner is thereby "schooled" and served to confuse teaching with learning, the relationship between teachers and learners is alienated (cf. Illich 2017, p. 143). In this circumstance, the roles of schools and teachers have been transformed to respect and encourage the learners to cooperate and exchange their own ideas and experiences with their peers, as well as with the elders.

In conclusion, following Scheler, it can be found that love is the basic drive and essence of human being. As a significant part of teachers' professional ethics, teachers' love, which takes place in a pedagogical context, such as class and school, is an emotional and intentional act. It means that teachers' hearts are always oriented towards the learners. This must be emphasized as a central aspect of the teachers' profession.

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The Intelligent *Pathos* of Education. Challenging the Concept of Emotional Intelligence Through Michel Henry's Phenomenology of Incarnation

Wiebe Koopal and Joris Vlieghe

In this paper, we try to reconceptualize the popular notion of ‘emotional intelligence’ through a critical dialogue with the idiosyncratic phenomenology of Michel Henry.¹ Starting from the argument that the bulk of popular discourse on emotional intelligence in education suffers from tenacious functionalist and intellectualist prejudices, often inspired by neoliberal ideologies, we contend, with Michel Henry, that ‘traditional’ phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) is unable to provide a sufficiently radical alternative. In Henry’s *philosophy of incarnation* (2000), which departs from a *renversement de la phénoménologie* and a ‘pathological’ decentering of intentionality, such an alternative might be closer at hand. By situating education in the Henryan tension between subjectivity’s pathic life – reality’s absolute, immanent interiority – and (the) world(s) made up of transcendent, intentional relations to exterior objects, we want to establish emotional intelligence as a fundamental educational agency, which keeps world and life connected while at the same time leaving their ontological difference intact. Finally, analyzing a concrete educational example, we claim that ‘pathic intelligence’ is not a matter of individual self-expression, but rather manifests

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¹ In this paper, we rework and expand on insights already formulated in a previous article (Koopal and Vlieghe 2019), on the basis of various incisive and critical comments that we received in the meantime.

itself in experiences that *impress* us – collectively – with the lived, post- or pre-intentional, consciousness of a life that cannot be reduced to the world ‘as we already know it’.

1 Introduction: the Concept of *Emotional Intelligence* (EI) and Education

Already for some decades now, emotional intelligence (EI) is one of the most popular buzz words in the humanities, most particularly in developmental psychology and educational sciences. On the one hand the concept’s entry in wider discourse can be pinpointed quite precisely, by referring to Daniel Goleman’s 1995 bestseller *Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More than IQ*. If in the first place this book was written for either the ‘common sense individual’, following dominant trends of *lifestyle* discourses, and for the benefit of corporate management and human resources strategies,² it also quickly sparked a more scientific – and soon well-funded – interest in the empirical conditions of Goleman’s apparently bold claims. From the start, it seems, education was a major field of application for these scientific endeavours, and ever since the turn of the century studies have abounded addressing the question to what extent emotional intelligence would enhance educational success and/or specific, educationally valuable, skills and cognitions (cf. Stough et al. 2009; Allen et al. 2014; Demetriou 2018).

On the other hand, a similar interest had already been burgeoning within more speculative philosophical discourses for a much longer time. Martha Nussbaum’s seminal study *Upheavals of Thought: the Intelligence of Emotions* (2008), which in a brilliant way tries to reassess the intellectual and ethical value of emotions through the retrieval of certain Antique schools of thought, may be considered a culminating point in this respect.³ For indeed, one could think just as well of Smith’s and Hume’s notions of ‘moral sentiments’, Nietzsche’s passionate ‘affirmation of life’, or of Sartre’s *théorie des émotions* as exemplifying a profound philosophical interest in the intellectual merits of emotions. Even if most of these approaches do not altogether part with the Platonic or Cartesian mind–body dualism that is often said to lie at the root of much of Western society’s disregard

² Which became even more patent in Goleman’s next book *Working with Emotional Intelligence* (1998).

³ For another interesting, but lesser-known study of a similar scope, see Meier-Seethaler (1997).

for emotions, they at least try to envision ways in which emotions might be dealt with, related to, intelligently. That is: beyond simple rationalist strategies of ‘suppression’ or purification. Moreover, they often maintain – Nussbaum above all, but also for instance Adorno – that precisely the false dichotomy between embodied emotions and cognitive reason should be held responsible for many of the irrational and barbaric behaviours pervading contemporary (Western) society (cf. Adorno 1971, p. 101 f.).

This immediately brings us to the point that both binds and separates the different contemporary discourses on emotional intelligence, and which will constitute the point of departure for our critical reconceptualization of the notion. As someone like Eva Illouz has convincingly shown, partly revisiting some of Nussbaum’s arguments, the popular interest in emotional intelligence has not actually broken through the prevalent dualist paradigms. On the contrary, it even tends to reinforce these, by reproducing them in a capitalist logic of functionalism and efficiency (cf. Illouz 2008, pp. 211–216). By reducing emotions to measurable skills and manageable assets, they have effectively become objects that the cognitive subject – *in casu* the individual entrepreneur calculating her success in a corporate market – should strive to manipulate, control and subdue, both in herself and others, in view of a bigger productive output. When looking at the bulk of research on emotional intelligence in education, this logic is indeed omnipresent: most studies go no further than establishing supposedly self-evident empirical correlations between cognition *of emotions*, which are themselves posed as simply given, and educational success – itself mostly coined in terms of quantitative results (cf. Pekrun et al. 2017). What these studies thus conspicuously leave out of their discussions, is the ontological *nature* of both the cognition(s) and the emotions they (or those who took part in the research) deal with as given. In other words: they lack all attention for emotions’ *intrinsic* logic, including its radically embodied character, and for what would make this non-cognitive logic⁴ *intrinsically* educational. The risks of this approach are obvious: in the end, emotional intelligence will easily be subsumed again in a classical or updated, cognitivist model of intelligence. From a pedagogical perspective, this would leave experience and/in education dramatically impoverished, stripped of one its richest resources for creating genuinely *new* meanings and values, viz. meanings and values which go beyond reproducing the dominant socio-political establishment.

At the same time, there is reason to doubt whether an author like Nussbaum, despite the great effort she puts in countering the neoliberal functionalization of

⁴ From a completely different angle—that of cognitive science—the claim of such a logic is already by itself a reason for criticizing EI discourse (Locke 2005).

emotional intelligence, effectively bridges the gap between cognitive and emotional accounts of intelligence. The problem with her analyses, we allege, is the strong and direct emphasis on emotions' *moral value*. Although this attribution is in and of itself not at all problematic, one easily ends up *moralizing* emotions altogether – at least when they are not sufficiently accounted for on an ontological level first. Thus certain emotions – notably those which we generally consider to be negative or destructive (anger, jealousy, fear etc.) – may be quickly cast aside as immoral, and therefore even not 'properly' emotional (Nussbaum 2015);⁵ an argument which, in its effects, can come startlingly close to supporting the functional, manageable and perhaps profitable status-quo. To be sure, Nussbaum herself does not uphold a management approach to emotions (which on the contrary she criticizes for still being cognitivist), but from the perspective of education her straightforward moral take on emotional intelligence runs the risk of leaving the ontological implications of emotion's radically embodied nature too implicit, and of getting appropriated all too easily by socio-political discourses that fail to account for EI as a specifically *educational* agency (cf. Zembylas 2016, pp. 546–547). The proposal of this article, therefore, precisely consists in recasting EI on the level of educational ontology and phenomenology, as a *sui generis* educational experience with an enormous transformative potentiality. If the topics of emotion in general and of certain emotions in particular, have already for much longer garnered attention from within the fields of (educational) philosophy and phenomenology (Meyer-Drawe 1984; Frevert and Wulf 2012), this has not yet (to our knowledge) given rise to any direct confrontation with the ambivalent yet dominant concept of EI.

2 Michel Henry's Phenomenology: Affectivity and Incarnation

In our search for an onto-phenomenological framework that would help render an educational concept of emotional intelligence more substantial, our attention was finally caught by the thought of Michel Henry (1922–2002). This French philosopher, who is only recently really being discovered,⁶ has come up with a highly original phenomenology – often termed 'vitalist' – in which *lived experience* and

⁵ That is to say: by trying to appropriate their affects, these negative emotions end up neutralizing the affect's proper power, which for Nussbaum is positively relational.

⁶ Although it remains striking that even Bernhard Waldenfels, an authoritative phenomenologist with a pronounced interest in affectivity, still grants relatively little attention to Henry (cf. Waldenfels 2008).

affective subjectivity rise to an unprecedented prominence. Mainly inspired by the obscure nineteenth century thinker Maine de Biran,⁷ and often remindful of the early work of Deleuze (an affinity which he seems to ignore),⁸ Henry claims to propagate a phenomenological method that radically breaks with some of the basic tenets of what he deems to be ‘classical’ phenomenology, in the spirit of Husserl, Heidegger and – on a decidedly lower level – Merleau-Ponty. Henry’s last major work, *Incarnation: une philosophie de la chair* (2000), makes this abundantly clear, as it launches its argument with an emphatical *renversement de la phénoménologie*, a subversion of phenomenology (cf. Henry 2000, pp. 1–2, 13, 15).

In the eyes of Henry, traditional phenomenology, notwithstanding the enormous (and lasting) merits of its rigorous methods, has simply departed on the wrong foot. In all cases – and one is left to wonder whether Henry’s judgment is not too categorical here – it starts off from the premise of a correlation between a subjective (embodied) consciousness on the one hand, and an objective phenomenal world on the other hand; from the notion of intentionality, a meaningful reciprocity between that which appears, ‘a’ world, and everything belonging to it, and the consciousness *to* which/whom that world appears. In terms of emotions, to stick to our topic, this entails that through emotions we give shape to the way we relate to the world, to the horizon to which all our experience and knowledge of worldly appearances (existentially) intend. Certainly, Henry concedes, this is all very reasonable and true. Yet what phenomenology fails to account for is that emotions are not just selective modes of intentionality and phenomenality, through which we engage various registers of ‘world-appearance’, but that originally they *impress* and pervade us, to the extent even, according to Henry, of constituting the *appearance of appearance*, the condition of possibility of *all* appearance. We do not, as Sartre (2000) famously suggested (thereby strictly adhering to phenomenological protocols), become sad *in order to* justify or accord with the world’s unsatisfying, aching appearance; we become sad because we always, already, *live*

⁷ This is most explicitly acknowledged in Henry’s early work; cf. *Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps: essai sur l’ontologie biranienne* (1965).

⁸ Similarly, Henry rarely engages in dialogue with other well-known ‘philosophies of life’, such as that of Nietzsche (even though he does refer to Schopenhauer (Henry 2012)), Dilthey, Bergson or Scheler. For a broader comparative perspective, cf. *Studia Phaenomenologica*, vol. IX, which is completely devoted to (the reception of) Henry’s thought.

(in) a world that appears to us – and thereby makes other things appear – *in* an alternately desiring and suffering affectivity.⁹

In other words: traditional phenomenology makes the mistake of primarily situating subjectivity and objectivity – qua consciousness, but even as body (*corps*) – in the world, rather than *in life*. And this life, for Henry, is ‘transcendentally’ carnal (*chair*), affective, or path(et)ic *self-manifestation* (cf. Henry 1963, p. 1; 2000, pp. 22–25). It does not take place, appear in a world that is exterior to it (*hors de soi*) and makes it stand out, and that (objectively or cor-relatively) causes it to be affected, according to set a priori forms of affective (cor)relations.¹⁰ On the contrary: life is absolutely, immanently affective, encompassing all possible worlds and orders of appearance in the dynamic interiority of its self-affectivity, its pulsing flesh. Thus, in an almost Nietzschean vein, Henry’s concept of a univocal, radically subjective life – a non-identical, non-individual subjectivity no longer relating to objects in any pre-existing order – blows up all phenomenological horizons, and does away with intentionality’s ‘horizontal’ one-on-one correspondence (cf. Henry 2012). And are not what most of all confront us with this subjectivity the *non-objectifiable*, carnate emotions that exceed our individual bodies and horizontal understandings, and thereby render us *intelligent* of a more profound, direct and ‘open’ manifestation of phenomena, as self-affective, living subjectivities?

This is also why Henry often seems to see a strong connection (in the spirit of Husserl’s *Krisis*) between traditional phenomenology’s failure and the rise of both ‘hard’ techno-scientific objectivity and capitalist politics, as perhaps also witness in mainstream EI discourses. Their intelligence, ingenuous and creative as it sometimes may be, inevitably reduces life to world, immanence to transcendence, dynamics to stat(istic)s, flesh to body, robbing reality of its non-intentional, affective, subjectifying lifeforce (cf. Henry 1987).¹¹ If this sounds exaggerated, then at least we must admit that traditional phenomenology is incapable of coming up with interesting alternatives. Even Merleau-Ponty, who is generally believed to have exactly framed intentionality in more dynamic, intersubjective and embodied terms, eventually keeps prioritizing the ‘world’, a realm of meaningful experience and phenomena springing up from the chiasmic transcendent movements of

⁹ In fact, according to Henry, this is exactly how Descartes’ *cogito* should be understood, as life’s original, self-referential ontological affectivity (cf. Henry 2000, pp. 11–12; Henry 2012; Mehl 2012).

¹⁰ In this regard, there is some sense in comparing Henry’s ‘critique of the body’ (as an *organic form*) with Deleuze’s and Guattari’s concept of the “body without organs” (Buchanan 1997), that resists the ‘organization’ of the body in a pre-ordered, normatively significant world.

¹¹ Also notable in this regard, are Henry’s unconventional readings of Marx.

human consciousness (cf. Henry 2000, p. 21, 31).¹² And what is again overlooked, Henry (all too) confidently asserts, is the original living self-affectivity that makes the experience of these movements possible, ‘giving them to themselves’ (*auto-donation*), with a sense fully interior to their very becoming. Hence, real subjectivity, subjectivity that does not project itself in transcendent dependence on objective *percepta* or worlds, will remain unconceivable, as long as phenomenology does not take seriously the affective, fleshly life that a priori *traverses* intentionality and phenomenality (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 29–30).

As the title of his last major work indicates, Henry’s solution to this problem has consisted in the development of a *phenomenology* (or sometimes simply philosophy) *of incarnation*. By resorting, especially in his later period, to the Christian theological tradition tied to that notion (cf. *ibid.*, p. 25, 34, 48),¹³ Henry has tried to rethink – almost in the vein of Hegel’s philosophy of religion – subjectivity as a process and a movement of continuous subjectification ‘in and through the flesh’. That is: expressly *not* the body, but the transcendental flesh of life’s dynamic self-affectivity. Whereas our bodies, and all experience pertaining to them (including emotions *and* intelligence), are always already objects ‘of the world’, to speak with the apostle John, and therefore in peril of becoming *disincarnate* phenomena, Henry contends that by living the self-affective interiority of our every experience, we are once again truly incarnated, ‘given to ourselves’ as the

¹² This seems somewhat at odds with the analyses that Käte Meyer-Drawe makes in her seminal work (1984) on Merleau-Ponty’s significance for a more intrinsic phenomenological appreciation of the *embodied* and *pre-individual* aspects of education (and in which she also extensively compares Merleau-Ponty’s position with that of other phenomenologists like Husserl and Heidegger). Henry’s major issue with Merleau-Ponty, it seems, is that eventually, despite the ‘chiastic’ twist he gives to it, he keeps sticking to a one-on-one intentionality between subject and object as his point of reference, with the world reduced to a kind of ‘ek-static’ *backdrop* for human existence and signification (cf. Vlieghe 2014a). Still one could remark that Henry’s critical assessment of ‘classical phenomenology’ tends to be unnuanced at times, deliberately limiting itself to its earliest stages (cf. later Heidegger and later Merleau-Ponty). For an elaborate comparison of Henry’s and Merleau-Ponty’s respective phenomenologies of embodiment/incarnation, see also Gély (2012).

¹³ We cannot possibly go into Henry’s relation to theology more at length here. Perhaps it suffices to say that here that he considers the Christian notion of “incarnation” (the idea that God, or rather the ‘Word of God’, took flesh, became human, in Christ) to provide a powerful *philosophical* antidote for the deadlock of phenomenology, in that it goes beyond the thought of a horizontal *foundation* (the World, intentionality) of subjective experience, instead installing within subjectivity as such a movement of pathic/carnal auto-donation. For Henry therefore, the Christian God is not a transcendent principle of reality, but at best—as the Father of Son, mediated by the Spirit—a transcendental dynamism *within* reality. Cf Henry 1996: “*toward a philosophy of Christianity*”.

subjective life of the world (cf. Henry 1965, p. 134). So, rather than establishing a dichotomy between life and world (even though at times very likely), the dynamics of incarnation allow us to think a radical decentering of the world and the subjects and objects belonging to it. Just as our bodies are not genuinely (self-)affective in their objective, worldly appearance (but projected out of themselves to be measured against a supposedly self-evident horizon), so the world only gains phenomenal substance, only advances horizons for our experience, through its own incarnational ‘coming to life’. And according to Henry, this life – or Life, with capital¹⁴ – is indeed *transcendentally* given as the world’s (or our body’s) immanent interiority, its pathic flesh; not, it is stressed, in a one-off act (or series of acts) of divine creation, objectifying the bodily creature as a *product* of its creation, but in a continuous incarnatory *genesis*, giving birth, ‘flesh from flesh’, to ever new forms of subjectivity and world.

Evidently, Henry’s phenomenological shift has important implications for how we conceive of education, generally characterized by an *openness to the world*, and the educational significance of affectivity and emotional intelligence. First of all, following Henry’s line of thought, the world indeed becomes what is called in education ‘subject matter’, and we might perhaps add to it: *living* subject matter. Through the decentered dynamics of incarnation, our world is always in the process of materializing and subjectifying itself in the pathos of lived experience, of the flesh, given to itself in the transcendental plenum of life. The world is no longer an objectively or existentially ‘given’ horizon that makes meaningful human life possible since it is itself immanent to the vibrant movement of life – a life moreover that does not originally *belong to* human subjectivity. In fact, from an educational point of view, human subjectivity can only be understood and dealt with as an intentional, (inter)individual bodily existence (which Henry believes is the only one classical phenomenology can think) but *after* it has come to feel itself to be radically ex-centric, incarnated within a transindividual, self-affective and self-creative continuum (life) that does *not* submit to any transcendent horizon for measuring its value or significance.

Although Henry has said little to nothing about education per se (the reason also why hitherto he has barely been noticed by pedagogy), we would thus argue that this rationale has a very engaging educational ring to it, especially where it concerns emotions and EI. In a profoundly ontological (or rather

¹⁴ Henry has the habit of capitalizing some of his major concepts, like Life, World, Flesh, and of using certain concepts (cf. life, affectivity, pathos) both interchangeably *and* distinctly. Given the (apparent) inconsistency of Henry’s habits, however, we have opted *not* to capitalize any of these terms, and of using them as uniformly as possible.

ontogenetic) sense, Henry's logic of incarnation undergirds a dynamic of educational subjectification that is both radically immanent and potentializing. At times the Deweyan concept of experience-based learning seems most close at hand (Hohr 2012). For Henry namely, all experience, when genuinely *lived*, is (re)affected by the transcendental potentiality of life as such (Henry 2000, p. 29, 34), a (self-)transformative and (self-)affective movement whose direction we cannot objectively and technically predict (by projecting it towards a horizon), and which – highly interesting from an educational point of view – immediately relates our singular experience to a living community of other singularities-in-becoming. Again, Henry's logic of incarnation is absolutely *not* one of individual creation, but of continuous *genesis*, birth. It implies the pedagogical notion of 'generation', one that establishes a fundamental, living bond (different from the transcendent myths of blood, race or genes) between subjects that only become subjects to the extent that they *move themselves along* with each other in the common flux of affective life. This, we believe, entails an incredibly strong, acute understanding of the basic experience of education, which is one of transformation-in-relation, an intensive movement that allows for new forms of experience to materialize. And also, as we will now see, it could be seen to entail an understanding of education as a basic practice of *emotional intelligence*, one allowing all worldly phenomenality to be suspended in favour of a genesis of subjectivity and meaning that unfolds through intense, emotional experiences of life's excessive self-affectivity.

3 The Incarnational-Educational Dynamic Of Emotional Intelligence

From here it is not so hard to imagine how a Henryan concept of education would presuppose an intimate connection between intelligence and emotions. After all, the Henryan subject is not just embodied, it is incarnate, at all times and in all of its doings coming into its flesh through self-affective, pathic experience. All true understanding of the world therefore necessarily springs up from this pathos, from this basic, transcendental dynamic of 'being moved' by life. And just as Castoriadis, echoing Foucault's description of *education*, etymologically relates *e-motion* to a movement of transformative excess, Henry's notion of affectivity is essentially decentralizing (cf. Castoriadis 2007 p. 166; Foucault 2001, p. 130). True joy and suffering, the basic affective 'tonalities' of life (Henry 2000, p. 269), do not *express* a pre-existent intelligent identity; nor can they be reduced to intelligently manipulable or manageable individual capacities. Contrary to these worldly

appearances of emotion, true joy and suffering – as movements of living experience – are what originally *engenders* (in an ontogenetical rather than empirical chronology) subjectivity and intelligence, by blending their exterior appearances into the all-interior flux of life and thus making them generative of *new* experiences. If the talk of tonalities is definitely remindful of Heidegger's and Bollnow's phenomenological understandings of *Stimmung* (cf. Bollnow 2017),¹⁵ it is important to note that for Henry life's affective tonalities do not existentially determine the subject's outlook on the world, but are what subjectively makes existence, world and outlook possible at all: the immanent flesh of our lived experience (cf. Henry 1963, p. 65).

With Henry then, emotional intelligence becomes something of a tautology: does genuinely pathic emotion not 'contain' in its dynamic the fundamental gist of all intelligence? Certainly, this does not preclude the actual, phenomenal existence of emotions that are manipulable and manageable, and that sometimes thwart other, *formally distinct* (cognitive) modes of intelligence. Think of anger or jealousy: mostly these do not strike us as very intelligent *by themselves* when they do not strategically induce more positive emotional responses, and it may be all too reasonable that education does everything to tame them, to get them under control. Yet perhaps the intelligence of an emotion like jealousy must be assessed according to a measure other than moral value, cognitive plausibility and/or functional consequence; a measure still more immanent and impersonal.¹⁶ Naturally jealousy can be incredibly harmful and cruel insofar it regards an individual person's negative emotion vis-à-vis the property of another person. In the friction of its animosity though, it also puts at stake –or *endangers*, as Lingis (2000) says – the very idea and experience of property, the various worldly boundaries that exist between people as (political, legal, psychosocial, educational) entities. This putting at stake, this bringing to our attention, ontologically exceeds the empirical cause that we find so harmful (without dispensing with it of course), fully drawing its objective, exterior appearance into a shared – even if contrasting – experience

¹⁵ For Bollnow, whose 'theory of *Stimmungen*' explicitly unfolds as a taxonomic expansion of Heidegger's early understanding of the concept, *Stimmung* is the "basic condition of human, subjective existence", that which, in an "indeterminate" way "underlies" and "colours" all "the intentional acts of our mental life", amongst which most prominently our emotions. If the difference with Henry's position seems but a matter of nuance, we still hold that this nuance—of subjective, individual existence on the one hand, and subjectifying, transindividual life on the other hand—indeed makes all the difference.

¹⁶ That is: Henry seems to contrast the 'individual', as a static subject that is given through an a priori constituted consciousness and intentionality, with the 'personal', understood in a Christian sense, as an *incarnate* subject that is constantly given to itself *anew* while passing through a transcendently impersonal Life.

of the pathic life that *causes* the cause to appear in the first place (cf. Welten 2009, p. 278). The emotion's intelligence therefore is more collective and relational: not the individual jealousy is of any real interest, but rather the *question* it raises with regard to a certain status-quo of property, equality and value. It is through this ontological question, one might say with Henry, that the jealousy becomes incarnate, becomes lived experience, in one particular person (cf. Henry 2000, pp. 47–48).

We suggest to think of education here as a non-worldly context – in the Henryan sense of a dynamic field of non-disciplined, non-intentionalized life-forces – where emotional intelligence can be whole-heartedly experimented with. As such EI might truly become a collective practice of dealing with questions that arise – implicitly or explicitly – in our lived experience (within and without the pedagogical context); and thereby also a practice of giving *new shape* to these questions and the experiences they in turn call forth. To be sure: this is in no way restricted to 'negative' emotions like jealousy, anger, sadness or fear.¹⁷ A positive emotion, like joy, may just as well reveal an ontological dynamic with far-reaching consequences. Think of how disturbing a child can be that is not able to contain its euphoria when having managed to solve a (hitherto) difficult math problem, setting off a whole chain reaction of giggles and other affective responses (Vlieghe 2014b). Again, the emotional intelligence in this situation can never refer solely to either the teacher, who could subsequently 'manage' the situation in very different ways or the individual children, who should learn to recognize, categorize and control their budding emotions. Instead, following the incarnational logic of Henry's vitalist phenomenology, an emotionally intelligent educational response is constituted as a collective endeavour immanent to the lived situation or practice affected by a certain (positive or negative) emotion (cf. Henry 2000, p. 36, 1965, p. 134 ff.).¹⁸ In the case of the joyous child, one could say that what is at stake in the emotion is everything but a simple expression of individual self-gratification or 'immoral' disregard for the atmosphere of quiet concentration in the class. Much more interesting, it seems to us, is the dynamic process of the emotion's subjective incarnation, its becoming-flesh in the context of a collective, lived (and principally *amoral*) engagement with mathematics. That is what the child's joy – or perhaps another child's frustration – calls our attention for, and which asks for an emotionally intelligent answer in education: how can we keep

¹⁷ The latter is treated at great length by Henry, who revisits, with a phenomenological perspective, the Kierkegaardian framing of this notion (cf. Henry 2000, pp. 37–38).

¹⁸ This also calls for a comparison of Henry's understanding of 'empathy' with that of Edith Stein, another phenomenologist whom he rarely mentions but who greatly stressed the pathic dimension of human meaning (Manganaro 2017).

relating to (the learning of) mathematics in an affectively interesting way, instead of taking it for granted as a worldly, horizontal *given*, that is ‘out there’?

4 Conclusion: Education, a Shared Adventure of Emotional Intelligence

Let us, at last, elaborate this novel concept of emotional intelligence on the basis of a more complex autobiographical example, perhaps also to compensate for Henry’s lack of attention to the practical consequences of his theory of life and of affective experience in particular. Partly the example is meant as an ‘illustration’ of some aspects of Henry’s phenomenology that we already find interesting for coining an educational concept of emotional intelligence. However, retrospectively, we might also say – to speak with Günther Buck (2019) – that it provides a concrete experience that differentiates and resituates that concept and our prior understanding of it, thereby allowing it to extend the range of its pedagogical use.

At the end of every year, in the days after the final exams, which no longer serve any evident purpose but still require the pupils’ attendance, some Flemish secondary schools participate in an event organized by Amnesty International, called “Write for Rights”, which involved the copying of letters that call attention for pending human rights issues.¹⁹ Whereas generally, it takes little trouble to spark students’ enthusiasm for such a relatively easygoing event with high moral ‘reward’, we recall an incident with a student who was vigorously opposed to the whole initiative and who indignantly refused every cooperation. Most of the teachers were baffled by his reaction, especially since this student was not one of the kind that kept aloof because he ‘did not care’ and preferred to remain idle (in the knowledge that, in terms of courses and grades, nothing depended upon his effort anymore). They failed to appreciate his criticisms of ‘such a good cause’, which were simply dismissed as insensitivity, and furthermore concentrated their attention on the majority of students, that was completely drawn into the letter-writing’s frenzied activism, fueled by quasi-heroic moral sentiments. In terms of EI: if the dissenting student’s reaction was judged to attest of a lack of emotional intelligence, of proper ‘empathy with the cause’ (such as exhibited by the other students), the same became true of this judgment itself, as it failed to resort the intended effect (‘managing’ the student’s unruly behaviour).

When considering this apparent conundrum now, and in the light of our previous analysis, we are tempted to say that what was problematic (instead of

¹⁹ Cf. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/get-involved/write-for-rights/>.

wrong) about the situation (not merely the student's behaviour or the teachers' response) was the whole set-up of the project and the way it affectively shaped an experience of the principal matter at stake, namely the issue of human rights. On the one hand, what may have bothered the recalcitrant student was the suddenness and apparent gratuity with which he was called upon to show compassion and moral zeal. Held after the final examinations, students had been given hardly any substantial information about the project, no preparatory discussions had been organized, nor had anyone considered the possibility of coming up with something more creative and personal than endlessly copying the same template letter. On the other hand, the student's resistance was also clearly directed against the moral enthusiasm that most teachers and many of his fellow pupils exhibited. This probably affected him as having at least a tinge of perverse self-righteousness and prideful joy, which he *felt* was incompatible with the 'objective' value of the participants' efforts and the project itself (cf. Henry 2000, pp. 216–217). In other words, on both sides of the strife, an objectifying tendency was at work in the emotional intelligences at play, one that put different a priori 'objective' forms of appearance at odds with each other: the socialized moral emotions anticipated by the project's set-up, *versus* the individual, resentful negation of the critical student.

Still, apart from whatever motifs, intentions and 'worldly' emotions (in the Henryan sense) were at play here, the most interesting question that announced itself in the student's discontent and the correlate shock of his teachers – and which all failed to discern and/or answer, in one way or another – did indeed not regard the merit of the project as such, but the lived experience of its cause, i.e. human rights and the values they involve. To what extent did the project, in its current format, actually harbour a (collective) experience of how human rights may affect our lives and the world we share? Therefore it makes little sense priding the *parrhesiast* student on having given – against the grain of some crowd's ignorant hysteria – the 'most' emotionally intelligent response (which he did not, as his frustration ended up turning against particular, individual objects). His individual reaction simply revisited the question what was meant to be the shared concern in all of this – learning about human rights and their moral value – and why this concern was shaped in such a way that its relation to lived experience became emotionally unintelligible for one student, who in turn made himself emotionally unintelligible for others.²⁰ Hence, beyond a juxtaposition of individual standpoints and emotional states, the real emotional intelligence here was the one immanent

²⁰ As a disclaimer, it might be good to stress that most of our attention in this example has gone to the one dissenting student, on account of his 'extraordinary' reaction. A Henryan perspective, however, need not preclude the equal validity of the other students' and teachers'

to the situation as a whole (Vlieghe 2014b), to the dynamic ontogenesis of its lived educational experience. Neither strictly positive or negative, it manifested a highly nuanced spectrum of various emotional tonalities, that *all* pertained to the (lack of) becoming of a *common* matter.

In conclusion, then, we think it is fair to say that, following the “affective turn” (Zembylas 2016) of Michel Henry’s phenomenology, emotions can no longer be seen primarily as qualities of the subject’s relation to an object, appearing in a world, a noetic field, an apriori horizon that objectively, exteriorly, conditions all appearance and correlating experience. Henry’s *renversement* of traditional phenomenology is grounded in the basic experience that every possible horizon of appearance, every world *appears itself* immanently in what he calls our ‘pathic flesh’, the self-affectivity of a lived experience that overflows the individual existence. This, we propose, is what emotions, taken seriously, are all about – and what affords emotional intelligence an absolute educational preponderance. Against the temptation of merely transcending our experience in the manipulation of an exterior world, including the manageable ‘emotional objects’ that EI is often associated with, genuine emotion manifests a subjectivity that, beyond opposing objectivity, moves itself along within a transcendental life that never ceases to transform both us and the world(s) we experience. Not only does this emotion, which may be instantiated in any particular emotional tonality, challenge the solid status-quo or identity of our worlds into reinventing and reinvigorating itself; it also implies that emotion always entails a *common* concern, a shared intelligence, through the ‘archi-pathos’ of a life that ontogenetically connects all our experiences (cf. Henry 2000, p. 347). As the final example has shown, emotional intelligence thus allows education not simply to correct and discipline emotional responses, but to collectively answer to the concerns raised by particular emotions, and to bridge the gap that always threatens to divide world from life. Emotional intelligence, far from being an accessible skill, enables educational subjects – in a different sense, both educator and educand – to affirm their lived experiences of the world, in such a way as to co-constitute the conditions, the horizons, that keep that world *livable*, worthwhile experiencing.

emotional responses, since these, just as well, *could not* (ontologically speaking) simply have coincided with their generalized objective appearances.

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Emotions in Pedagogical Institutions and Fields



“Affectos Humanos”: Affects in Dance, Theatre and Education

Kristin Westphal

Affects such as crying, laughing, shame, embarrassment and disgust, and feelings like fear, anger, love, hate, etc. are not just what makes the sparks fly in life, but also in all forms of reception and production that concern theatre and/or aesthetic experience. Even Aristotle was aware of this and described it in his “Poetics” when he spoke of the impact of affects. The performative is therefore the heart of ancient rhetoric in the theatre.

Much has been said within theatre/pedagogical contexts about feelings, mostly understood as an inner disposition, but less, on the other hand, about affects as corporeal expressions, in the sense that we encounter something that corporeally and vocally opens up a space of interpersonal interaction and communication. Instead, in the conventional sense, it is more about withholding them, suppressing or controlling them: In life, at school, and in the theatre. On the other hand, we currently can observe that affects seem to reign our political and public world i.e. qua *social media*, not by arguments but through affects in a desintegrated way (Siegmond 2020). Andreas Reckwitz (2017) even argues that nowadays a society based on affection can be identified due to an alleged digitization during late modernism.

Contemporary performance and pedagogical theatre work are interested in going beyond the role of the body’s semiotic qualities, discovering it as a phenomenon and field of experimentation for a performative practice that is bound to the body and the senses (Westphal 2020, 2008).

This analysis will be carried out against the backdrop of phenomenological and educational/philosophical references, reflecting upon the paradoxes to which

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reconstructions are subject when viewed in terms of the phenomena that are inherent both to dance and affect as a fleeting, singular phenomenon. This means under the perspective of time: “For the essence of the history of dance – that is, dance itself – is absent. As soon as dance is removed from the present, it can only be retrieved from memory, from the corporeal memory of dancers and observers, from photographs, notations, videos, or reviews. In contrast, the quintessence of dance and dancing (and also affects: the author) – is only present at the moment of movement. As such, the subject of dance history, of dance as something of the past, eludes our grasp. Even if dances and choreographies are reproducible, they update themselves only in the body (of the respective dancer) and are charged with ‚now’ time” (Odenwald 2019, p. 14).

On the one hand I refer some main figures and thesis of the theory by Bernhard Waldenfels, which are important for our discussion and questions: to think pathos and response together and don’t understand as the Behaviorisms does, affection and pathos as a schema of impulse and reaction. On the other hand my article will use examples to reflect upon the ways in which contemporary performance art works with affects artistically and pedagogically. They tell us an impression how important affects as a drive for moving and dancing are for developing a corporeal memory – in an individual and a collective way –, which constitutes our fundamental relation and boundary with world and culture.

1 Between Pathos and Response

What in Greek is called *pathos* or in Latin, *affectus*, *affectio*, *emotio* and *passio* has a three-fold meaning. In the first instance, it means an experience that befalls us (Widerfahrnis). With Waldenfels “the experience that befalls us is an occurrence, but even less is it a personal act or a subjective condition, like we still assume today” (Waldenfels 2008, p. 132). Erwin Straus (1956, p. 372) takes sensing (Empfinden) as an event, which belongs neither to objectivity nor to subjectivity since the process of sensing senses itself in and with the world. He differentiates between gnostic directedness-toward and pathetic being struck-by. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) describes sensing as an original, pre-objective and re-subjective contact with the world, self and others. An “it feels in such and such a way“ or an “it touches me“ world corresponds to the “it perceives within me,“ that he contraposes to subjective perceptual acts. That means: Feelings are something that comes to us.

“Pathos is something that happens. It happens by something touching us, striking us, by something exerting an influence on us. It is not that pathos happens

without our effort, but it goes beyond our doing by overcoming us“ (Waldenfels 2008, p 32).

Furthermore, pathos means something adverse, something that is allied with suffering, but also something that admits of the proverbial learning through suffering. Finally, pathos designates the exurbance of passion (*Leidenschaft*) that leaves behind the habitual. Pathos is surprise *par excellence*. In a good way as in a bad way. It has an aspect of time. It always comes too early, as that which we could overlook; and our answer always comes too late in order to be completely at the height of the experience (see *ibid*, p. 132). Experience, which comes from that which befalls us, does not begin with itself, in the self-same, but from elsewhere, in the alien.

2 Lived Corporeality of Feelings. The Place of Feelings

The theory of Waldenfels is asking for the place of feelings as pathetic. He follows the idea, that this place can be found neither in the soul nor in the spirit. The place is neither completely outside itself like extended things of nature, nor completely within itself like pure spirit (see *ibid* p. 133). Their place is the lived-body that senses itself in and through sensing something else and someone else. One more player is our vulnerability. Sensitivity and vulnerability are inseparable. With Helmuth Plessner (1975) this lived-body refers to itself (*Bezug*) by the same time withdrawing (*Entzug*) itself from itself. For our context is furthermore interesting, that the foreignness of one’s own lived-body makes us receptive to the foreignness of others: „We are only able to be approached, touched, affected, insofar as we are never totally with ourselves “ (Waldenfels 2008, p. 134). Therefore we can say, with the expression of feeling we enter an area where the experience of one’s own self and the experience of the alien are interwoven (*ibid*, p. 136).

Behind this theoretical background, now I come to my main theme.

3 Theatre as the Space of “Shared and Reflective Affectivity”

To discuss the relation of pathos and its response in contemporary dance and theatre is an example *par excellence*. Theatre is a place, the attention is shared between the performers and their spectators: Activity and passivity, production

and reception, the foreign gesture and my own gesture are intertwined. Therefore, we have to acknowledge the theatre as a space of “shared and reflective affectivity” (Lehmann 2013, p. 604).

3.1 Example One: *Minimax*

In a contemporary dance theatre piece for two- to five-year-old children, we can observe how the process of being affected is transformed from being a strange action into an action that is their own. I propose that affects have the ability to set mimetic learning in motion. Speaking with Waldenfels (2004, p. 20), this does not mean that somebody simply *imitates* a strange movement, i.e. that the same thing emerges again through mere imitation. Instead, I am pursuing the thought that, when we let ourselves be *carried away*, without the heterogenous being submerged within the homogenous, something that is our own emerges from something that was strange.

“Minimax” (choreographed by Celestine Hennermann 2013), with one musician (Gregor Praml) and two dancers (Katharina Wiedenhofer, Albi Gika), picks up on and aestheticizes the ways in which children play. By taking note of the scenes we can see and hear the children as they watch the performers, as well as the end of the piece we can observe how the children are allowed to try by themselves the possibilities of the movements they watch and play with the big instrument Contrabass (Figs. 1 and 2).¹

What must be mentioned here is that this is not a research film as Bina Elisabeth Mohn (2012) realised it together with Geesche Wartemann (2012). However, it does tell us something about the question of reception and the significance of imitation for learning (dan Droste 2016). Even while they are watching theatre, the behaviour of the children that we see here reveals that reception has both an affective and a responsive side to it, in as much as children urge to mimetically implement that which they have seen and heard, preferably straight away: the relationship between reception and production must thus be re-questioned as an intertwining meshwork: watching does not just have a passive side, it has an active side as well. Both: the imitation as well as watching movements make a contribution to the development of a corporeal memory. In a phenomenological sight

¹ Celestine Hennermann: *minimax*: <http://www.celestinehennermann.de/tanz-fur-kinder/minima>; last: 13.10.2020.



Fig. 1 Minimax (2013) Foto © Katja Allner

this means, that events who incur in memory, are interconnected with circumstances, persons or an existing knowledge or experience. The act of remembering approaches to, what Merleau-Ponty has called as “Situationsräumlichkeit”.²

3.2 Example Two: *Urheben.Aufheben Rework/Remake of Affectos Humanos*

By looking at Martin Nachbar’s reconstruction (“Urheben. Aufheben” 2000³) of the dance cycle “Affectos Humanos” by the choreographer Dore Hoyer (premiere 1962) – to which the title of this article alludes – the focus shifts to the question

² See Siegmund 2008, p. 33–38. He writes about a difference between a semantic, episodic and implicit memory.

³ <https://vimeo.com/74015952>.



Fig. 2 Minimax (2013) Foto © Celestine Hennermann

of the body as a repository of memory⁴ and about the movements of human affects. Accepting that each affective or emotional process must be viewed as a complex phenomenon – both as a unique, individual event and as a product of its historic and cultural context (Harbsmeier and Möckel 2009) – raises the following questions: How does the tension between continuity and transformation appear in the reflective process of Nachbar’s reconstruction? What kind of differences comes about if a man reconstructs these dances and transports them into another time? How does dance convey historical meaning through sensuous form? How does danced reenactment poses the problem of history and historicity in relation to the troubled temporality inherent to dance itself?

URHEBEN.AUFHEBEN

Since 2000, Martin Nachbar has been engaging with German choreographer Dore Hoyer’s 1962-piece *Affectos Humanos* in various contexts. The first version,

⁴ See Akademie der Künste 2019 and *Was der Körper erinnert. Zur Aktualität des Tanzerbes* under: www.adk.de/tanzerbe (last: 27.08.2020).

and also: <https://Tanzfonds.De/Projekt/Dokumentation-2012/Tanz-Aller-Ein-Bewegungschor/> (last: 10.10.2020).

affects/rework, created together with Thomas Plischke and Joachim Gerstemeier, toured through Europe and South America. Dore Hoyer was one of German dance’s excellent dancers and choreographers. Her works, which she created between around 1930 and her death in 1967, deal with some of the fundamental human affects. *Affectos Humanos* is a series of five four-minute dances that each delves into one such affect (Figs. 3 and 4).

For “Urheben.Aufheben”, Martin Nachbar completed the reconstruction he began in 2000 with the help of Waltraud Luley, heir of Dore Hoyer, and integrated it into a lecture performance that focuses on the body as a repository of memory and enquires into the movements of human affects. What is special about it is that he makes issue of the reconstruction itself, dances it and verbalises/thinking it.

Gerald Siegmund gives us an impression of the different bodies. He describes the body of Hoyer and Nachbar:

Fig. 3 Dore Hoyer, rehearsal to „Fear“, Folkwangschule, Essen ca. 1962, Foto © Jacques Hartz/Courtesy of Deutsches Tanzarchiv Köln




Fig. 4 Martin Nachbar:
Urheben.Aufheben (2000),
Foto © Ludwig Gerhard



“Hoyers trademark was extreme tension in her body as she moved. She danced through her joints, making her slim build, tapering in at the extremities, as well as the flow of her movement itself, seem fragmented. Nachbar’s body, on the other hand, is extremely relaxed and fluid, his moderate muscles tone in particular giving his movement a certain smoothness. He blurs the entire kinetic paradigm, changing the movements in ways that extend beyond the joints.” (Siegmund 2018, p. 475)

Just as Walter Benjamin demanded from a good translation that it allows the original text – in our case it is the dance – to shine through, one can conceive of an indirect speaking and writing that allows the experiences that befall us and feelings that deal with them to shine through (Waldenfels 2008, p. 140).

Memory, which enjoys a special reputation as a remembrance of culture, is certainly dependent on repeatable structures, on the collective remembrance of

places, figures and rituals of memory. But these sources run dry, if something does not continually awaken our memory. Here the affects play an important role. This means for our example to ask "how does memory inscribe itself into our bodies, and how can we succeed in practice in living a critical memory which is of relevance to the present" (Odenwald 2019, p. 14).

"A form of memory which can only remain vital by undergoing transformation, reappropriation, and development: In short: A living culture memory whose fragments and interpretations operate within the social space" (ibid, p. 14).

The way, Nachbar has chosen to reenact the dances, is a special one: A self-experiment.

Movement and speaking/reflection of experiences are working in an alliance. Movement and Pathos are involved, it has also something like a self-affection in confrontation with the alien affection. Dore Hoyer shows us in movement and with her body her interpretation in a form, which is repeatable. By the way: That doesn't mean, that while she is dancing, she feels at the same time the feeling she shows. But it is nevertheless the body, who brings up the feeling in a special form, the body is itself involved. This giving in form we have to read in the context of the time of its production and reception and the background of the body language of the New German dance we called in Germany also *Freier Tanz*. She was 50 years old, as she created the *Zyklus*, in the existentialistic spirit of the 1950er years (Müller et al. 1992). According to Johannes Odenwald it makes a difference to the memory which is located in a new cultural context and in the context of the physical foundations of humanity itself: "Biological facts such as a man and a woman are readable in their historical and cultural manifestation, and open up a new creative cultural space" (Odenwald 2019, p. 15).

Behind this background the question here is: what actually happens in the act of remembering and re/construction by Martin Nachbar (Bleeker 2012, p. 13)? What becomes clear in Nachbar's appropriation and reflection 50 years later is that affects must be seen as unique, individual events and products of their specific historical and cultural contexts. Nachbar's mimetic appropriation adopts the movements almost identically, but creates something new at the same time, because the remembering bodies are different bodies than those one hundred years ago. He (born in 1971) dances movements that Hoyer (born in 1911) developed with her body, without being that body.

Nachbar's approach does not try to hide this. On the contrary: for him it is about bringing this disparity to a head. The reconstruction is shown in a different time, against the backdrop of a different upbringing, different dance techniques – Nachbar has been trained in release techniques and contact improvisation – and different tastes. In this way, he does not use any costumes, and in the scene that we

see here on the picture – Anxiety – he does not use any music either. This means that our attention is much more strongly directed towards the body, in a visual sense and also acoustical: we hear the noises of the body, breathing, clacking of the feet.

In these scenes, Nachbar invokes a twofold absence: the absence of the body of Dore Hoyer and the absence of his own body, which changes in its encounter with Hoyer's body. In this way, a third, nonverbalised entity arises between the self and the Other, which can only be articulated via the difference of the two poles. Hoyer's phantasmatic body is repeated and invoked as an absent body. At the same time, Nachbar's own body distances itself from itself. For Nachbar, it is about the difference between the two bodies and about how Dore Hoyer's dances affect and move him, and change him when they are repeated.

Nachbar himself says: "The fact that [...] Dore Hoyer's interpretation of the *Affectos Humanos* takes on the function of an original that I am using to orient myself does not mean that I want to fulfil an ideal. Instead, I am interested in traversing an Other that is foreign to me. This reciprocal traversal makes strangers familiar to one another other. Dances that make issue of affects therefore become affects themselves. Reciprocal affectation takes place, and remembering becomes a kind of viral transmission" (Nachbar 2003, p. 95).

Movements and affects are located in time and corporeal space, in this way they are an outline for the future.

4 Conclusion

Analysing the situational character of theatre and dancing is of significant relevance for educational research. It opens a space of shared and reflexive affectivity. This affectivity makes it possible to communicate knowledge about cultural practices and their discourses and provide new ideas for education as a transforming process. Especially Waldenfels' theory of pathos and response can be used to describe the phenomenon of human affects.

Theatre has the ability to reflect on the creation of affects and effects in such a way that it can alter their perception. The reflection of affect-experiences in an evidentially way could be viewed as an opportunity to determine how and where they are expressed, how we perceive affects and even which kind of interests and intentions, therefore, play an important role.

The examples show us how we are inscribed in the field of society by affects, which are coded historically. Against the background of their autonomy, affects

refer to the community space – its intensity, strangeness, responsivity, normative orders and its connection to the aesthetic field (see Zimmermann et al. 2020, p. 7).

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Feeling as a Basal Dimension of the Experience of Reality-Constitution. Explorations Using the Example of Nature Experience/Exploration in Some Russian and German Kindergartens

Ursula Stenger

1 Introduction

20 years ago, at a conference like this, I stood at the speaker's desk to give a lecture. The microphone was switched on, people sat in their seats and looked at me expectantly. I started, as planned, with a few lines of a poem by Rilke. After a few words, I felt that the words did not reach the listeners to the full extent. They were attentive, they did not talk, but something was wrong. I interrupted myself, asked for the microphone to be switched off, and started again. Now I felt with every fibre of my body how the sound of my voice created a resonance; it became possible to enter the space created by Rilke's poem.

I interpret this *event* based on emotion research as brought together by Huber and Krause (2018) in addition to Wulf (2018), Wulf and Frevert (2012) and Dattler (2019). Central here is the dynamic-interdependent interaction of body state changes, mental representations or imaginations and cognitive evaluations in the interaction with the environment (cf. Huber 2018, p. 93). My bodily reaction (something is wrong) is thus evaluated using the ideas and imaginations of "good lectures" acquired during my life in my cultural-social-institutional context (university). Through the dynamic recursive interplay of somatic processes, cognitive evaluations and interactions, I can evaluate and anticipate behaviour, regulate my behaviour and thus adapt. But does a lecture have to be read only as an interaction

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of an individual for adaption to his environment? Also, to speak with Wulf: how do imaginations, as inner images and as cultural and collective imaginary worlds, become effective at that moment (cf. Wulf 2018, p. 121 ff.)?

From a psychoanalytical perspective, as presented by Datler (2019), attention is focused on how emerging feelings inform us about our experience and the evaluation of a situation. And: the coordination process between people enables the transformation of emotions during the course of interaction. The motivational aspect means that we want to contribute to the feeling of pleasant emotions and that we have formed expectations, fears, longings and desires during the history of our previous experiences, which recommend certain reactions or forms of regulation of emotions as being helpful. The way in which we regulate or deal with emotions is shaped by experience and cannot be changed at random. Research focuses on evaluation and regulation based on evaluation (cultural, individual, in coordination, etc.). I am interested in understanding and transcending the moment of becoming aware in perception and feeling.

2 Phenomenological Perspectives on Perception and Feeling

I would like to begin with atmospheres and moods. According to Thomas Fuchs (2013), atmospheres can be understood as affective qualities of spatial environments, and moods as long-wave sentiments that permeate modes of experience. Moods are rather diffuse, in contrast to feelings such as shame or anger, which have a trigger and an object, develop their own choreography, are partly shaped by culture, open up a specific space of social reference (cf. Brinkmann in this book). But what is feeling in relation to these phenomena?

With Rombach following Heidegger, a phenomenological perspective is to be developed that explores the question of the relevance of feeling. In any case, feeling is not an inner mood that could rub off on the outside, but the whole of how we find ourselves as present in the world. It is the respective mood that opens up this perspective to us. On the other hand, as Heidegger says, the possibilities of development of recognition fall too short (cf. Heidegger 1986, p. 134). Rombach speaks of the situation in which we find ourselves, which affects us in each case and from which we come back to ourselves (cf. Rombach 1987, p. 139). This is not an external situation which is then subsequently felt inward, but we are, so to speak, “burst open by the situation” (ibid., p. 141). The situation is not temporally preceding, but constitutive. This feeling of the situation, which gapes internally, concerns me, it has preoccupied me, this is what constitutes the pathic character

of existence. This pathetic character reveals itself to us in perception, in moods, atmospheres and feelings, in being attracted or repelled by a situation. "Situation is only possible in emotional compassion" (ibid., p. 142), we are in it, we do not behave from the outside towards circumstances, we are open towards other people and issues in it. The internal constitutes itself in the experience of the situation. "Soul is the epitome of the experience" (ibid., p. 144), of wherein we are and feel ourselves.

I will give an example: In a kindergarten in Moscow, the children paint a picture in their own diary every day in all the years they attend the kindergarten and after drawing, they dictate something about it to the kindergarten teacher. These stories are not commented on by the teacher or other children, but they are read out to everyone before they go to bed for their midday nap. When I attended this reading situation, I felt a warm, interested atmosphere in the room.¹

This morning I went for a walk on the street. In kindergarten. I saw what I didn't see. They were thawing heaps of snow. The last time when I was in kindergarten, I had a feeling that winter is forever! And now, when I went here, I came to a spot and saw the green grass. And I saw young flowers. But they are only sprouts... (Marina [6 y. o.], postcard of Kindergarten Tubelsky, Moscow)

What does Marina mean when she says: "I had a feeling that winter is forever" (ibid.)? Due to the emotional consternation that she feels, it becomes her situation; others pass by carelessly and hurry to the kindergarten. For them, it is not their situation, although the surroundings are the same. This is not a subjective relation of an ego to the outside but means being approached and constituted. The subject is not present previously, thinking about what it wants to refer to now.

What lies in the feeling that winter is forever? She knows that it is not true. But it feels like it. The Russian winter lasts long – for six months – , which feels like forever: it is a statement about the temporality of experience. It is the impression created by the thousands of heaps of snow. Such an endless number. They seem to be there forever. Marina feels the situation while walking in the outside grounds of the kindergarten. She feels what is happening, is touched by it, and in being touched she perceives her emotions. The sensation is exposed, not only because it is expressed in words, but already beforehand. The feeling of winter lasting "forever" (ibid.) is not one that triggers euphoria.

¹ The educational team selected and printed a collection of about 60 stories from the many thousands that were created. They are available to professionally interested guests and serve as a kind of documentation of their work with the stories.

Feeling is the emotional interior of the situation, focusing on feelings, moods, atmospheres that spread and are given space. To speak with Nancy, it means that the body is set in motion and, via the soul, feels what is happening right now (cf. Nancy 2015, p. 103). Being moved and touched is expressed by language. The receptivity for the touch of the situation in feeling happens in the mode of perception. This is not a perceptual technique of a subject facing the world but means being torn apart, with and towards the world one perceives.

Forming a feeling and relating to it by perceiving, drawing and describing it, would be an aspect of the formation of feelings. Although in this case I did not include the drawing in the interpretation, something can be read from the level of detail in the drawing. If you would only ask each child, at that moment, when they come to kindergarten in the morning: “Please tell me something that moves you and I will write it down in your diary”, – that would be a very urgent request. The children arrive, find their book and sit down at the painting table. (This is as natural to them as washing their hands before every meal). Some think for a moment, others start immediately. The time and effort they spend on their drawing makes them move and shape what they might want to tell, even though they may not think directly about what they will dictate to the professional. Sometimes they also have to wait a few moments because another child is dictating his/her story. The teacher sits at the table and writes in the book what the child dictates. When the child pauses, she sometimes repeats, what the child has said before, but she does not ask for a conclusion to a story or anything like that. The child has the space to say whatever is important to him. The teacher signals to the child that it is welcome and appreciated.

Also, hearing all the stories of the other children in the group every day some hours later may be inspiring.

One more example:

My feeling is funny. It's kind of sad, kind of shy, kind of cheerful... kind of nervous. And many other feelings. But that's exactly what it is. But it's more malice to [feeling]. And sadness. But the main thing in this feeling – is the love and the rupture [the explosion] of my heart. The [feeling] is so beautiful. But on the other hand, the [feeling] is so terrible. And that feeling fills up with love.

(Anja [6 y. o.], postcard of kindergarten Tubelsky Moscow)

This is almost a phenomenology of love. Love is not simply *one* feeling towards a person, but a whole dynamic and an interplay of very different emotions. Anja begins with a kind of phenomenological reduction. She doesn't just give herself up to her feeling, but looks at it from a non-objectifying distance and finds it

strange and funny. And she takes a closer look at it, exposes all its facets by introducing it four times in a row with “somehow”: Somehow sad, somehow shy, somehow cheerful ... somehow nervous. It’s not simply cheerfulness or sadness, but they become somehow transformed by loving or being in love (cf. *ibid.*). Love isn’t just *one* feeling, it’s fear and hope, fearing that you won’t be loved back, being somehow shy and nervous because you risk so much and can’t be sure, and being sad because it’s serious and because there’s a possibility that everything will lead to nothing. All these feelings exist, that is the message of the picture, they are listed next to each other, jagged, they interlock, they are perceptible as such; according to Nancy they are physical tangible: “it is a presence that is realized at a distance from itself” (Nancy 2015, p. 48). Perception and feeling do not have to remain a dull emotion, it can become accessible. Besides these feelings of being sad, shy, happy, or nervous, there are “many other feelings”, as Anja says (cf. Anja, postcard of kindergarten Tubelsky Moscow). As if having to confirm it, she says: “But that’s exactly what it is” (*ibid.*). It is not rationally comprehensible how it can be so many feelings, but this is how it is. Even malice is in it, and sadness once again. But the main thing in all these feelings is the love and the rupture/explosion of the heart. All of this is love, and for love’s sake, and it is so strong that it causes the rupture, literally the explosion of the heart. You no longer know who you are, compared to who you were before. The heart breaks, explodes. Tremendous energy becomes effective, almost tearing the person apart into what is happening. This also becomes very obvious in the picture. It is not a delightful, sweet love with pink and frills, it is a strong love, almost tearing a person apart, and yet forming a structure within the tearing, chambers, in which faces can be seen that show these different emotions that are all contained here and appear at the same time. The feeling is “so beautiful” and on the other hand “so terrible” (*ibid.*), as Anja says. It is so risky. When you love, you don’t stay as you were before. You explode. And this being torn apart into so many contradictory feelings, turned towards the other person with anxiety and with the absolute endangerment of not-yet-being (sadness, shyness, nervousness) which becomes malice, due to what is demanded. All of this is filled with love. And she herself writes this sentence yet again into the picture. It is a phenomenology of love, sensing accurately how love constitutes itself: which feelings have an effect on it and determine how it comes about, the complexity and dynamics in the emergence of love – she turns toward all of this by feeling, painting and describing it.

In summary, perception and feeling are a way of paying attention that has a different form of reflection than thinking. With Rombach (1987) and Nancy (2015), the concept of the soul might help us to grasp the phenomenon. The

soul is not a thing, nothing behind a human being or tangible within; the soul is present in the body. Everyone who had to face a beloved friend as a corpse and was seized with horror knows that what is left is nothing but a body. But what is the soul, how can one grasp it in order to be able to describe the feeling? The soul impregnates the body, it stretches out its antennae, as Nancy says: “the soul feels the body first” (Nancy 2015, p. 10). And: “The body is the soul in motion” (ibid., p. 15). Here, the body is not limited to itself, as one can see and experience in dance: “It is no longer *one* body in itself. It takes up room to move [...] It dances itself, it is danced by another” (ibid., p. 43). It is an: “intermediate space of a presence: a presence which becomes present at a distance from itself. The separation of the bodies is opened and transcended at the same time” (ibid., p. 52).

How can body and soul be grasped? “The unity of body and soul [...] is the object of an evidence [...] The modality of this evidence differs in the fact that one ‘feels’ it instead of thinking or imagining it” (ibid, p. 96).

Nancy refers to perception as “a way of thinking” (ibid., p. 98), because one refers to oneself, whereby this *feeling oneself*, e.g. when dancing or when being with a group of children, does not have to be limited to one’s own body to an *ego*, but encompasses the others and the emerging and developing space for play, pleasure and perception. This emerging space only exists in becoming and in emergence and requires the soul, which feels and can follow an emerging form or shape passively, pathically, such as in art, thus participating in its emergence (cf. ibid., pp. 78–91). This occurrence is also a feeling with others that arises from the connection felt in a dance or in a children’s group (being singularly plural, Nancy): not a dialogue of the separated, but a coordination and attunement, a togetherness at stake, which is perceived as a common meaningfulness. It is a kind of “con-creativity”, as Rombach (1994) would say, or “con-motion”, as Nancy (2000) would say, which requires the distance to itself in order to be moved and touched as soul and body, but not to blindly dissolve into this feeling of affection or agitation (mood, atmosphere etc.). It is about pausing for a while, sensing and feeling what is happening in the moment of being touched, exploring what is and can become. Of course, cultural, social, historical, institutional values and imaginations are included here, having an effect on the response that has already begun before one realizes it.² “The soul marries the vibrations of the body” (Nancy 2015, p. 108), which is demonstrated in embodied movements.

² This would be a difference to Waldenfels, because the pausing feeling does not have to be a rift, followed by the response. One feels and begins oneself and what may become, before one is finished with the evaluation.

That which develops is “[...] an emotion, exposed by the soul over the whole body and to the end of the world” (ibid., p. 109). Emotion is, therefore, nothing within the body, within the human being, but the inside of an outside, perceiving and feeling itself with everything there is and may become, entrusting itself to a certain extent to the movement/vibration. One becomes a kind of soundboard, able to be open in-depth and to communicate. We know this perception and feeling as acting from the gut, as gut instinct. It is a constitutive moment of the experience of reality. It cannot replace reflexive acts of a different kind, such as thinking, developing ideas, etc., but one cannot skip feeling and feeling with impunity, because one would cut oneself off from the emergence of life.

If we go back to the two examples again, perhaps for the moment we can grasp what could be understood by body, feeling, sensation and soul. The practise of daily painting in the diary in the morning seeks with time and leisure to fathom what moves the child before telling a story, a fantasy or a kind of fairy tale to the educator, who reads it out to the others hours later. The child is moved by something that happens between him or her and others or between people and the world or nature etc. This emerging feeling (winter forever or love) has to be sensed, explored and “reflexively” directed towards it. It can be assumed that feelings are also physically. Great sadness or joy results in a physical expression, a bodily tension that is not accessible in a code, but which is always questioned in detail (Stenger 2012). Perhaps it could be said that the “feeling”, “love” is a kind of summary of biographical and cultural experiences, including insights from various media and other narratives, images and imaginations, which are also in some way co-constitutive for any current experience. For the girl, love is apparently a complex emotional event between people, by which she is moved. Focusing on this movement of her soul, she tries not to immediately classify what she senses, but to grasp it as a contradictory event in the mode of reflection, drawing and narration.

In summary, it would be a matter of not only regulating and controlling feelings but also of including them as central elements in the exploration and shaping of world- and self-relationships and forms of relationships with other people. This requires a culture of perception, communication, modulation and articulation of feelings in early childhood. Professionals do not simply stand on the outside, guiding this process, but would have to have a reflected access to their feelings themselves. However, this also means that it is not only about the education of feelings, as already stated in 2012, but also about education through feelings, which let us be careful or approach a matter full of energy (cf. Stenger 2012, p. 37). It should not be underestimated that it would also be about a critical handling of

feelings, which can tempt us, for example, not to consider possible consequences of actions.

3 Experiencing And Exploring Nature And Science In Kindergarten (in Germany and Russia): The Aspect of Feeling

In order to explore the question of the importance of perception and feeling in childhood education, I have chosen an area of early education that is currently receiving a lot of attention. I analyze concepts and research on the topic and then work with data from Russian day-care centres. The focus here is not on homogeneous cultural units or even nations, but on differentiated options in the spectrum of possibilities.

The separation of humankind and nature, subject and object is the basis of the discourses. As Heidegger remarks in his essay on technic, the mode of technical attention changes humanity as a whole. A human being who technically relates to the world, – for example to a river – is maybe looking at it as a source of energy, which can be used. When the river is being viewed as part of a technological energy production process, it no longer appears as a habitat for fish, as a local recreation area for people or as a lifeline. Its width, gradient, and flow velocity will be based on the efficiency of its controlled use as an energy source. This changes man in his humanity towards nature (cf. Heidegger 1954, p. 23ff.).

The current orientation of early childhood education follows this direction: self-regulation, self-optimization, cognitive orientation, problem-solving skills, emotions in the service of effectiveness and efficiency are important topics. This is justified and reinforced by an epistemological one-sidedness: The world should be recognized and worked on. Only what can be depicted and evaluated in the competence model is also addressed.

3.1 Natural Experience and Natural Sciences in German Early Education

The issue of nature is currently mainly dealt with in the context of science education in kindergartens. The current demand for scientifically trained workers is used as an argument (Fthenakis 2018). This strategy suggests that there can only be this one future in which there will be a primary requirement for scientific

skills, although some of our current problems may also have arisen exactly from this strategy (keyword Anthropocene).

A prominent example is the program: MINT, lately named: MINKT (mathematics, computer science, natural sciences, art and technology) for kindergartens. Here, art has the function of achieving more motivation and precursory skills for MINT (more is not intended).

“In a research-based facilitation approach, children are to be involved in active exploration and participation in the scientific process – through collecting data, dealing with emerging research questions, and verifying scientific assumptions, for example, that objects with a lower density than water are able to float.” (ibid., n. p.)

The demand on children to observe objectively, independent of their feelings, imaginations and relationships, is an expression of the objectification and scientification of early education, which should be reflected in the behaviour of children towards nature. The conversion of day-care centres should take place systematically, in order to finally raise children’s interest in MINT subjects. Metacognition as the result would then be a knowledge of one’s own cognitive processes and their control and regulation. Plants could thus be measured, examined and categorized, which is then called research-based learning.

Feelings play no part in the constitution of the experience of reality, except that they ought to motivate children or give them the security to explore (attachment). Even in Gerd Schäfer’s learning workshop (Schäfer et al. 2008), although it is a nature area with water, plants and microorganisms, as they occur in the forest, the children’s explorations are accompanied by impulse questions from the educators. For example, in front of a cave, the children ask themselves whether a beaver lives in it, but then they throw in wood to drive it away, or to make a fire in the cave. The educator takes up the topic of fire and continues working on it with the children elsewhere (cf. Alemzadah 2008, p. 23f.). Whether the beaver might be affected by throwing wood or making fire is not an issue – nature is the raw material for the child to develop his ideas and constructions about the world. An educational occasion.

3.2 A Different Beginning with Braidotti

With Braidotti (2018) I would like to point out that a continuation of our discourse circles alone does not lead any further: Either participation in the outlined future orientation by providing didactic knowledge (on MINKT etc.) or criticism

of it using critical analysis, deconstruction of inherent norms. Braidotti proposes a “nomadic-ethical–political project” to bring about a “change in the state of the kind of subjects we have become” (Braidotti 2018, p. 20 f.). How can we react to the age of the Anthropocene? Driven by the desire to persist and to pass on the world to future generations as a habitable place worth living in, she proposes to create nomadic networks of connectedness with others, to perceive the earth as a partner, to feel empathy and affection towards all living beings, and thus to develop other – affective – kinds of relationships (cf. *ibid.*, p. 56). In order to be able to face the challenges of “criticizing, acting, experimenting and inhabiting the body” (*ibid.*, p. 21) through love for the living. This is not just a social utopia but constitutes changes that bring about sensory and spiritual expansion for the people who engage in it, as well as a way of intensive living in affective connection with nature and life. This also requires natural sciences, analyses, prognoses, etc. It is not an esoteric event.

3.3 Feeling Nature in some Russian kindergartens

I now come back to my research in some non-representative kindergartens in Moscow and Siberia, especially in Buryatia (Baikal region, near Mongolia; Stenger and Thörner 2019; Stenger 2020a, b). It is also my intention to introduce into the discourse unused points of view that have so far not been heard often. These were marginalized in Spivak’s sense because what they have to say has no room in the logocentric organization of the discourse (subaltern speak).

In the kindergarten in Moscow, the children go to a forest one day per week. I select what seems special to me about this. The purpose of education is seen in the fact that the “child sees, comprehends, perceives, feels, experiences and understands what a great mystery it is to make oneself familiar with nature” (Sukhomlinsky n. d., cited by Philippova and Maramzina 2017, p. 100). Moving around, sliding, climbing, feeling, feeding squirrels, running after the stream and letting oneself be covered by a cloud (cf. Zhuravleva 2014, p. 116 ff.). “The child fills itself with mental powers if its connections are not destroyed” (*ibid.*, p. 117). But it happens “that a 3–4-year-old child does not gaze up into the sky (however different it may look), does not listen to the birds (the autumn, summer, winter and spring birds) and does not wonder about the autumn leaves” (*ibid.*, p. 117 f.). In this case, it needs companions to learn how to perceive and feel. Here, the educator is in two realities: “a sensitive and perceptible reality – blissfully stimulating (the human being is alive and not a robot!), and on the other hand in the reality of work” (*ibid.*, p. 119), i.e. paying attention that nobody gets lost, cold

or disruptive, and that an exchange of discoveries takes place. Analogous to the museum pedagogy, which I have worked on elsewhere (Stenger 2020b), the point is not to talk about a thing/work with the children, but to reach communication with them and to establish a sensitive contact with the work. Thus, with regard to nature, “to accompany the child in such a blissful state – when one fills oneself with nature, with life itself, and remains in dialogue with everything” (Zhuravleva 2014, p. 118).

Bollnow already stated in 1988 that the ability to listen and respond to nature’s voice is only possible where nature has not become an object. An object cannot “speak to me” (Bollnow 1988, p. 86). A different “mental condition” (*ibid.*, p. 86) is necessary, analogous to aesthetic experience.

In this process, is also necessary to overcome thresholds and fears: “We want children not to kill insects, not to be afraid, not to feel disgusted, instead of perceiving them as part of the biotope” (Bukina 2017, p. 124). The point is: “How can one make contact with insects and perceive a feeling of kinship” (*ibid.*, p. 124). For this purpose, they visit an insectarium full of cockroaches, larvae, beetles, butterflies with the children. After initial paralysis and a process of helpful familiarization facilitated by a biologist, the children take caterpillars and larvae into their hands, get ready for a tactile encounter of large African butterflies and learn that the butterflies also fly calmer when the children are calmer themselves (cf. *ibid.*, p. 127 f.).

In the Buryatia, I was able to observe further strategies in the kindergarten to make the connection with nature perceptible, besides what is internationally known as ecological education (Dagbaeva 2009). But where does it begin? Everything is based on a specific attitude that is articulated in the fact that Lake Baikal is perceived and treated as a Holy Sea. This perception has its background in shamanism and Tibetan Buddhism, both of which regard humans as an inseparably connected part of nature, dependent on others, and at the same time responsible for their own actions.³

And so I watched in the burjatian kindergarten, that the children ask the soul of the plant if it wants to be touched before they touch it themselves. How is such ‘communication’ possible, what precedes it?

The basis seems to be that educators at first ‘teach’ the perception of nature, plants and animals by the children’s perception of themselves. They share this feeling, giving it a space to unfold. Thus, the children of a group sit in front of a big screen and watch and listen to the lake rolling ashore. The teacher explains

³ Comp. for background Tibetan Buddhism and shamanism Karmapa Dorje (2014) and Quijada et. al. (2015).

that the children like the sound of the waves. At first, they listen and look, absorb beauty and energy, make ‘contact’ remember before they talk about what they think and know and then aesthetically design it and thematize the ecological contexts. This seeing, hearing and feeling of the waves correspond, as Prof. Dagbaeva explains in a talk, to people’s deep need for spirituality, which is not limited to themselves but connected to everything alive. First and foremost, participation means to be a part of something, and this is always more than what could be expressed; it is first experienced and then distanced, thought, reflected and translated into aesthetic practices and protective measures, for which you also need MINT.

We urge children at an early age to objectify plants and animals, to categorize them, to explore the necessity; the necessity is not denied, but as a sole strategy it reduces the possibilities of action so that the future only has a place that is narrowed and predetermined. With Braidotti (2018), one could think about whether may be time to include the limits of this world view into the design of the educational contexts of children, and to expand the scope of options there, by searching for examples of different strategies from Siberia or any other area, in order to pose the fundamental question in the sense of pedagogical anthropology: How can we think of humankind today in the diversity of experiences, phenomena, paths of knowledge and forms of perception? Perceiving the beauty of tiny blossom, developing emotions of *joie de vivre*, trust and gratitude, confidence and security, respect and friendship, grief and compassion. These are present and shared experiences that point towards the future, protrude into it, and at the same time stem from previous experiences. They are experiences that cannot be controlled primarily in a metacognitive way because they do not unfold into it. If one limits oneself to this, humankind is cut off from what can be grasped through perception and feeling, from what can arise as a rich and varied experience of the constitution of reality (Weber 2018).

Following Braidotti, feeling a connection with nature, with the living and the inanimate, is a central moment. It is neither a purely psychological process, nor a romantic idea, but a real, concrete event that can be perceived, as Helga Peskoller describes it:

“As a combination of inside and outside, subject and object are intertwined in an in-between, into which one is always already immersed because of one’s ability to perceive and feel. Or in other words: By relating to the outside - which can be humans, animals, plants, things, fog, wind and weather - and perceiving the inside, the sentiment creates a transindividual experience, in which one has always connected oneself with the environment, has always already transcended.” (Peskoller 2019, p. 133)

This shared feeling can also awaken the responsibility to care for others and for the living beings, and thus cultivate possibilities for new shared development. This means to become really engaged with working on spaces of possibility that use different perspectives, also in science.

In the first part of this article, the connection between education (upbringing) and emotion was elaborated using the example of diaries in Russian kindergartens. These findings might suggest the misunderstanding that the “education” of feelings is important exclusively for a benefiting cause, for example the development of the child as a comprehensive personality and a functioning member of society. The examples in the second part aim to add a posthumanistic perspective, which is directed towards the question of exploring the meaning of feeling and sensing nature by phenomenological analyses of nature experiences in some Russian kindergartens. This is not a wellness offer for an isolated subject. It is about the real experience of connecting with plants and animals, respecting them, communicating with them. Feeling the connection can be described as the soul dimension of the ability to feel. This appears here as the foundation on which all further ways of dealing with nature (getting to know it, knowledge, aesthetic creation) are built. It is not about a relation to nature, it is about feeling and knowing that we are all inhabitants of the earth. The emotional opening to the living beings in our environment (on earth) and not only their objectifying exploration seems to be necessary in order to consider all living things not only in terms of their usefulness for us and thus to no longer focus only on humans. This touches on the question of how such experiences can become possible with the living nature. It also touches on the question of which knowledge, which experiences, and which values are important today (in childhood) in light of the Anthropocene (Braidotti 2018).

An expansion or actually also a reconnection of humankind to nature in all its facets begins with perception and feeling. I shall end with Braidotti “How it feels to be alive constitutes the core of this definition of thinking” (Braidotti 2018, p. 15): this core must not be abandoned in thinking.

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Learning of and Through Emotions. The Educational Specificity of the Sport Context

Matteo Cacchiarelli

1 Introduction

Present society has been recently defined as an emotional or affective society (Slaby and von Scheve 2019). It seems that emotions, affects, and feelings, even though differently defined, became essential aspects to take into consideration to understand our contemporary society. In this paper, I focus exclusively on emotions involved in that worldwide spread human activity called sport. There seems to be an almost universal agreement among scholars on reckoning sport as an activity that potentially owns educational values. Instead, from an educational perspective, the matter is whether sport is capable of transmitting those values or not, or under which conditions. In that regard, although emotions are always displayed during sport competitions, the role played by emotions in sport activity from a pedagogical perspective has been overlooked. Indeed, generally speaking, sport activities and sport events are characterized by competition, agonistic spirit, will of success, fear of loss, etc. which make emotions immediately recognizable. Here, I deliberately disregard differences that might emerge considering feelings and moods in contexts of sport. Although I am confident that it might be fascinating and insightful, it would require a much broader and complex investigation which is beyond the purposes of this paper.

Traditionally, emotions have been mostly studied by psychologists. The researches mainly focused on distinct but related features, namely expressive, cognitive, neurophysiological, and interpretative processes that characterize emotions. More specifically, sport psychology dealt with the same topic trying to critically evaluate the influence of both positive and negative emotions experienced during

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sport performances (Tenenbaum and Eklund 2007). Psychologist Paul McCarthy (2011) in his paper entitled “Positive emotion in sport performance: Current status and future directions” holds that regardless of different theoretical approaches or adopted models, sport psychology mostly studied emotions from the standpoint that emotions are a kind of obstacle for elite athletes high-level performances. Therefore, most of the works focus on these so-defined negative emotions – like anxiety, stress, anger, and so on – as the primary research object.

As a consequence of that, the so-called positive emotions – like enjoyment, happiness, joy – took second place. In this regard, emotions in sport appear as objects which have to be under athletes’ control. Only in the last decade, psychologists have begun to consider the role of positive emotions in sport. Nevertheless, this renewed interest is the outcome of the same process, which considers emotions as a determinant factor that affects peak performances. In other words, as long as psychological studies showed that positive emotions are strongly correlated to high-level performances, sport psychologists moved their investigation from negative to positive emotions in sport. In both cases, the role of emotions in sport has been analyzed as a high-level performance, either obstacle or facilitator.

Considering emotions in sport only related to their influence during athletes’ performances seems at least reductive. In doing so, the role of emotions in sport results to be underestimated or even misunderstood. That is to say, emotions in sport are not just a matter of whether peak performances are influenced more by either negative or positive emotions. On the contrary, emotions are essential features of the sport activity. What follows in this work is more about a deeper comprehension of the role, the status, and the specificity of emotions in sport from an educational standpoint. In that regard, the central thesis of this article is that emotions in sport have a twofold educational role which is characterized both as a process of *learning of* emotions and as *learning through* emotions.

The aim of this paper is to shed light on the educational value of emotions within the context of sport. To do that, firstly, I take into consideration two different but related theoretical frameworks, namely sport pedagogy and sport philosophy, especially with references to their phenomenological studies. Secondly, I introduce the notion of ‘sweet tension’ (Kretchmar 1975, 2018) analyzing two different situations constitutive of sport: test and contest. It provides arguments to reckon why, I argue, the notion of ‘sweet tension’ belongs fully-fledged to the domain of emotions. Thirdly, the notion of ‘sweet tension’ analyzed through the lens of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of Embodied Learning highlights two fundamental concepts: intersubjectivity and horizon (McLaughlin and

Torres 2011). In conclusion, the result seems to confirm the undeniable bond between sport and emotions. It seems to be capable of laying the foundation for a theory of learning of and through emotions in sport.

2 Theoretical Frameworks

The theoretical frameworks within which I aim to investigate the role of emotions in sport from a phenomenological perspective is twofold: sport pedagogy and sport philosophy. The former provides us with arguments concerning whether and how sport can be acknowledged as an educational context. Furthermore, phenomenology allows us to focus on athletes' living experiences of their learning processes in the specific of sport activity. In a nutshell, it seems evident that any sport context requires different forms of relationship such as athletes and themselves (i.e. individual sensations of fitness), athletes and others (coaches, teammates, opponents), and athletes and the world (gyms, pitches, weather conditions, crowd). From the perspective of phenomenological pedagogy, it is possible to unveil crucial characteristics of those forms of relationship. Roughly, the latter entails different meanings depending on when athletes live them, as I explain later on. In that regard, the sport philosopher Robert S. Kretchmar, in his seminal work (Kretchmar 1975) assumes that two specific moments constitute the sport experience: test and contest. Here, I argue that based on the different emotional responses generated from those two sport situations, it is possible to acknowledge the educational role played by emotions in sport. That is, during a test, athletes deal with the learning of emotions, and during a contest, they cope with learning through emotions.

2.1 Sport Pedagogy

Sport pedagogy has its epistemological foundation as subject matters on three sport-related concepts: body, movement, and play/sport (Isidori 2017). It is capable of mutually intertwining theory and practice. In other words, the theoretical reflections concerning the education of the moving body at play arise and develop from the analysis of practical applications. At the same time, it is the practice of the playing human being that leads to formulating theories and theoretical models. These human and social phenomena called play and sport are considered as contexts in which individuals who engage in those activities can learn of their bodies and acquire both technical/tactical and life skills. Indeed, practicing, training, and

competing are acknowledged as educational processes through which people learn to take responsibility, be aware of their actions, improve communication, develop personal autonomy, increase decision-making capacities, understand the meaning of leadership and manage to cope with emotions (Bortoli 2016). Thus, sport and play are generally reckoned as activities that are worthy of consideration from a pedagogical perspective. I am not going to go into the differentiation between play and sport here, since it is beyond the scope of this paper. There is still disagreement among sport philosophers about the nature and definition of those social activities called game and sport. It is an interesting but open question that requires further investigation. However, on the same page of what Parry (2019) holds, it is possible to delimitate the range of sport activities, taking into account only those sport disciplines which are presented during the Olympic Games. Those sports are characterized by being institutionalized, rule-governed contests of human physical skills (Parry 2019). Nowadays, a growing number of people invest lots of time and financial resources in these activities from an early age, during the growing phases, and even later. Thanks to all the several disciplines and opportunities, sport is probably the most chosen leisure activity by kids and adults worldwide. That is an additional reason for analyzing sport from an educational perspective. From this standpoint, sport is investigated to shed light on whether or not, or under which conditions, it can be considered as relevant from a pedagogical point of view.

It is possible to highlight two main positions within the field of study of sport pedagogy. The first one holds that sport has some inherent features that are worthy of consideration from an educational perspective; it is being asked which those features are and what characteristics they have. That is to say, independently of how sport activity is lived and experienced, sport per se implies essential elements which make it educational for people. The second approach tends to consider sport as an activity among others which does not have any specificity. Its pedagogical/educational status depends on how sport is developed (for instance, coached by coaches, or lived and experienced by athletes and spectators) and so forth. Despite their differences, these two positions seem to agree when they explicit the educational values of sport. Indeed, both refer to concepts such as fair-play, respect, well-being, rules, authority, dedication, inclusion, team-work, among others. What I stress here is that all these sport-related values are sound, but they are secondary. In other words, contrary to what is stated by those sport pedagogical accounts, the above-mentioned values do not represent the essence of the sport experience from a perspective of education. Rather, in sport contexts, what emerges as constitutive from a pedagogical perspective is the possibility to

freely engage in certain activities that can generate corporeal sensations and emotions – both positive and negative – which permit the person to have first-hand experiences and to be able to acknowledge them. On the one hand, to consider emotions from a social and relational perspective means that those emotions are communicated and shared in a relational context, which is the sport contest. On the other hand, to consider emotions from the single person point of view implies to understand that emotions lived during the sport experiences move the person toward a personal commitment to keep on engaging in that sport. Such lived emotions may facilitate the motivation and activation of learning processes such as learning technical or tactical skills, resilience, coping strategies, and so on. For instance, I would argue that learning technical skills means to improve, and to improve means to become somehow better. In this process of becoming better – as an athlete – there is the ethical tension that is constitutive not only of any sport experience, rather it is essential of any educational context. Furthermore, the sport context, as much as any other educational context, has a negative dimension as constitutive of its experience. The negative is represented by the failure or the loss, which is unavoidable for any athlete or player. In other words, this is the horizon within which the subject – let us say the athlete – is called to the learning of emotions and learning through emotions in a twofold process of embodied experience. This process is twofold since it is characterized by two different sport situations: test and contest. In the former, an athlete faces a test, such as a personal challenge, the outcome of which can be either passed or failed. *Tertium non datur*. It may consist of acquiring or improving some physical, technical or tactical skills such as running 100 m in less than twelve seconds, or scoring ten three-point baskets in a row, or playing twenty longline backhands without mistakes. On the contrary, in the contest, the athlete is challenged by an opponent and they share the same goal. In that regard, one commits him/herself to perform better than the other. Through those personal and interpersonal challenges, which always demand different emotional charges, the athlete has the opportunity to get to know themselves in their process of coping with and dealing with emotions. The Socratic motto of ‘Knowing yourself’ can be understood as a process of formation of personal identity. It needs both the moment of the test and the contest. In the former, athletes commit themselves to a certain purpose. In the latter, they compete with each other and get feedback on their contextual being-in-the-world. From this light, it is possible to comprehend what Sartre (2010) means stating that emotions arise from the interaction between human beings and the world, aiming for modifying their being-the-world. Competitions with other athletes can be acknowledged as processes of formation of personal identity, both as athletes

and as persons. In contests, there is much personal identity that is at stake. Unavoidably, it produces emotional charges and stress. That is why, I argue, from a pedagogical perspective, emotions are central features of sport education.

2.2 Sport Philosophy

Philosophy of sport was institutionalized as a subject-matter by Anglo-American philosophers like Warren P. Fraleigh (1975), Paul Weiss (1969), and Bernard Suits (1967), among others. It emerged in a philosophical context in which methodologies and topics belonging to linguistic-analytic traditions were predominant. More recently, however, the contribution of Continental philosophers has begun to influence the linguistic-analytic methodology and the philosophical nature of the discipline. In this way, the Anglo-American setting of sport philosophical studies has recently been complemented with typically Continental descriptive-narrative methodologies. Scholars belonging to the Continental tradition started to investigate meanings and essential features of sport, wondering whether and how those sport-related factors could influence the understating and the meaning of this human activity called sport. “Since then, the philosophy of sport’s main aim has been to infer the best *interpretation* of sports’ current key elements in order to articulate a comprehensive *understanding* of such complex realm” [Italics by the author] (Torres 2014, p. 364). In doing so, scholars belonging to the Continental tradition reached considerable results for the philosophy of sport. They contributed to widening the analysis of sport, including concepts such as intentionality, temporality, normativity, plurality, corporeality, inter-subjectivity, otherness, and so on.

Within this framework, it is curious that already in 1975 within the analytic tradition, Prof. Scott Kretchmar refers to Prof. Fraleigh’s expression of sport as a phenomenon characterized by “a sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome” (Kretchmar 1975, p. 27).

Henceforth, the idea of sport as constituted by this ‘sweet tension’ has not been furtherly developed for a long time. More specifically, what sport philosophers missed, or what they did not refer to explicitly, was the acknowledgment that characterizing sport experiences as ‘sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome’ means to relate them directly to the domain of emotions. In other words, defining sport as characterized by an experience of ‘sweet tension’ implies that emotions are constitutive and essential features of any sport experience, from amateurs to elite athletes. As McLaughlin and Torres (2011, p. 272) explain: “‘Sweet tension’ is a rich phenomenological description of how and why sport is a meaningful

human endeavour. It is a perceptive characterisation of our experiences of sport and critical to the meaning that we derive from sport". What follows is that, without a deeper comprehension of the role of emotions in sport, we understand sport neither broadly in its various meanings, nor specifically as a context where experiences of learning of and through emotions are not only possible but enhanced and facilitated. A reevaluation of the notion of 'sweet tension' took place at the beginning of this decade. Philosophers such as Standal and Moe describe 'sweet tension' as follow: it "has been attributed to indeterminate back and forth continuation of rallies between sport contestants and to the person who faces a true test, that is, a situation that produces the ambiguous feeling of 'may-I' or 'may-I-not succeed' in achieving the desired task" (Standal and Moe 2011, p. 262). Whether that claim seems easily understandable in the case of contests, the following example might help to understand what the 'sweet tension' means in the context of tests. Let us take the instance of a beginner tennis player who is having her first lessons. It is easy to imagine that most of the time, she misses the ball or hits it badly. She feels uncomfortable with the racket, unstable, and unbalanced. The result is that the ball drops out or in the net mostly. It can last for several attempts. Through practice and repetition, she improves, even though that movement is still hard and produces fatigue. One day, perhaps without any specific reason, she has the experience of hitting the ball and feeling it exactly in the right spot of the racket, she has the perception to execute the right movement, and she experiences the ball effortlessly flying over the net with good speed and a nice trajectory. That is all that she wants! She wants to have the same experience again and again. She aims to be capable of reproducing that technical movement, which produces a nice shot and generates in the tennis player a first-hand experience of, roughly defined, positive emotion. Can we define that unique and special experience as learning? I do not think so. At least, I do not think that she properly learns anything in the sense that she is able to re-play the ball in that way, consciously reproducing that technical movement. As Merleau-Ponty (1998, p. 167) puts it: "to understand a movement is to experience the harmony between what we aim at and what is given, between intention and the performance". Surely, it is not possible to talk about embodied learning yet. Rather, it is possible to admit that the athlete has experienced a movement that produced a sense of 'I can' which generated an undefined positive emotion. This kind of emotional experience moves the athlete, it gives her the motivation to try again and again. She experienced that positive emotion, and she decides to commit herself to be capable of doing that technical movement again better and better because she wants to experience that emotion and that corporeal sensation again. Nevertheless, later on, what happens is that the following 100 forehands and backhands are completely wrong

again. Therefore, she starts to be frustrated or disappointed. Hence, she experiences negative emotions, or it is better to say, she experiences that sweet tension of I may, or I may not succeed. That is the uncertainty of the outcome, and the ambiguity lived as 'sweet tension'. On the one hand, negative experiences which generate negative emotions such as disappointment, anger, discouragement, etc., are fundamental in the learning experiences (Buck 2019): "*Negative* experiences enable us to change previous knowledge and experience, and at the same time they open us to new experiences. By undergoing negative experiences, we are able to become aware of latent attitudes and habits. Learning itself is a reflective moment within the process of experience" (Brinkmann 2020, p. 3). In sport, those experiences move the athlete to overcome a specific state of affairs toward personal improvement. On the other hand, positive emotions last, and they also move the athlete toward the learning processes. In this sense, emotions in sport, both positive and negative, move the subject toward an activity. In this sense, emotions deal with motivation. They motivate the athlete to do it again, to repeat, to train, and to commit him/herself. Emotions are, therefore able to anticipate a possible experience of education or *Bildung*, as Brinkmann (2019, p. 1) holds: "Emotions can be seen as a starting point for a reflexive process of *Bildung*".

This description highlights some concepts that are crucial for our phenomenological understanding of the 'sweet tension'. They are the following: test, contest, uncertainty, and ambiguity. An analysis of those concepts should be capable of elucidating the particular role of emotions in learning processes during sport activities. To fully appreciate the significance of 'sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome' as belonging to the sphere of emotions, it is finally necessary to determine the philosophical underpinnings that inform our sport experiences. I am going to unveil those philosophical underpinnings through a hermeneutical/phenomenological analysis of the concept of 'sweet tension' after having furtherly described differences, characteristics, and implications of test and contest.

3 Test and Contest

According to Kretchmar (1975), at the basis of any sport experience, there are contraries such as winning or losing, squad A versus squad B, we and they, and so on. Nevertheless, the analysis of the North-American philosopher is more fundamental. Basically, sport activities can be described in terms of 'test' and 'contest'. The former is based on an opposition 'by cut' such as yes or not, passed or failed, true or false. The latter is characterized by an opposition 'by degree'. At first

sight, it may seem that a contest is another opposition by cut, that of winning or losing to an opponent. Nevertheless, when two individuals are engaged in a contest, they share the same project, the same underlying test. They try to do the same thing, only better than one another. It is worth to highlight that a contest always requires a valid test. That is to say, contests are established upon tests. In its turn, in the 'cut' point, a valid test has to be perceived by the person who is taking the test as ambiguous, neither an achievable 'I can do this' nor an impossible 'I cannot do this' (Kretchmar and Elcombe 2007). It is this kind of sense of ambiguity of 'may I' and 'may I not succeed' which characterizes a proper test. Hence, the cut point calls forth an ambiguous sensation of uncertainty to the person who faces a test since she/he 'lives ambiguously toward his test, acting on the one hand as if his project were destined for success but knowing on the other that his gestures may be ineffectual' (Kretchmar 1975, p. 25). It is worth highlighting that the ambiguous feeling of 'May I' or 'May I not succeed' might be associated with concepts such as 'Knowing how' and 'Not knowing how' typical of learning processes. It is precisely for this sense of uncertainty on the part of the performer that the above-mentioned philosopher uses 'the sweet tension' notion. It describes the uncertainty that creates tension in the athlete's testing act. Moreover, since the athlete is attracted to this activity – she/he likes this activity, she/he chooses to engage in this activity – the tension is interpreted as a pleasurable experience, as 'sweet'. Therefore, a test is a valid test only if it is able to produce a feeling of uncertainty and ambiguity in its 'cut' point. Another aspect of relevance is that a test becomes a valid test only if there is a project behind it. The project represents the intentionality of the person who is taking the test, in our case, the athlete. Kretchmar uses the example of the mountain. A mountain is not a test per se. It becomes a test when a subject sees the mountain and aims to climb it to the top. In other words, the project is the motor intentionality of the athlete understood as the bold between the motivation of climbing to the top and the physical ability required by the action of climbing. Furthermore, whereas a test can be a solo project, a contest requires at least one fellow competitor. Thus, one moves from a test to a contest when one finds another person to share a test with. In both cases – test and contest – an irrevocable tension of uncertainty tends to emerge in the athlete's engagement with the environment. Nevertheless, this tension does not have the same specific weight. "Test takers [...] ask themselves, 'can I do this or not?' or 'how well can I do this?' in contrast, contestants experience a more complex set of uncertainties and meanings. They ask themselves, 'even if I can do this, can I do it better than my opponent?' or 'even though both of us might be able to do this, what exactly is the difference between us?'" (Kretchmar and Elcombe 2007, p. 187). Hence, the contesteer faces a double uncertainty, that of

solving the test, and that of solving it better than one's opponent. Finally, in the contest, 'the sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome' is amplified, and it becomes more complex since an intersubjective relation between contestants is introduced.

4 Intersubjectivity, Intercorporeality, and Horizon

The comprehension of the intersubjective dimension is one of the most significant contributions of phenomenology to the study and understanding of human existence. Since Edmund Husserl developed his account of intersubjectivity, he describes the intersubjective experience as our 'living together' (Husserl 1970, p. 108), which is foundational for Husserl's epistemology as well as metaphysics and ethics (Buceniece 2005). At the basic level, indeed, within this living together, people incessantly negotiate meanings and comprehend them-selves, the others, and the world. Moreover, this living together represents a source for objectivity to any form of knowledge, and finally, it provides the human being with the possibility of existence itself (Duranti 2010).

Merleau-Ponty furtherly investigates the concept of intersubjectivity in his *Phenomenology of Perception* (1998). Here, it is the body itself that is recognized as an intersubjective body. It means that for the French philosopher, intersubjectivity is always intercorporeality. The body is essential for any ontological possibility, and it becomes the 'nexus of living meanings' (Merleau-Ponty 1998, p. 151). Namely, since meanings of the things in the world derive from human embodied experiences and our embodied perceptions, the meaning is always and necessarily embodied meaning. It is important to note that our experiences, as bodily experiences, are never isolated, but they always require a relational dimension. In other words, experiences are always relations between the body with itself, the body with the other, and the body with the world. These experiences are embodied, and the body represents the openness of the person to the world. Nevertheless, the body is not only openness to the world, therefore project, but it represents "our anchorage to the world" (ibid., p. 144). It is the point from which we perceive and receive the world and through which we project and act in the world. Therefore, the central role of the body is still acknowledged. We have a sight of neither the world as a whole nor all the things of the world. Instead, from our bodies, we perceive a horizon of possibilities. This horizon is not fixed nor pre-determined; on the contrary, our bodies provide us with bases of our engagements with other and new horizons. One paradigmatic way to widen personal horizons is through learning processes. When persons are active protagonists of authentic learning processes, they extend the familiar horizon of their know-how,

are able to do, or think towards – until that moment – unfamiliar and unexplored horizons. Furtherly, not only the limits of the horizon are unfixed, but they also create the possibility of dealing with what is not determinate, not yet given. As Russon (2003, p. 29) holds: “through our actions, we explore beyond our familiar zones of contact into what are initially the strange frontiers “beyond” our immediate grasp, and repetition of such actions allows us to establish new dimensions of familiarity within these formerly strange arenas of experience”.

When we refer to the previous example of the beginner tennis player, we can easily understand what Russon means. Only after multiple repetitions a certain movement becomes embodied, athletes acquire a given technique that opens new possibilities for them of hitting the ball in a certain way to a specific spot in the court. However, as soon as the beginner gets into a familiar horizon, they are immediately confronted with a new unfamiliar horizon. Russon (2009, p. 86) explains how “our bodily capacities particularly enable us to build upon ourselves” such that building upon our capacities, we forge new capacities and discover new horizons. The limits of the horizon delineate familiar and unfamiliar zones. To build upon ourselves means to set and reset our limits, thus continually delimitate what we are capable of and finally define our personal identity. In doing so, the latter is not a static entity but a dynamic confrontation between what I am capable of doing and what I am not capable of doing yet, familiar, and unfamiliar horizons.

This familiar and unfamiliar dialectic seems on the same page as what Merleau-Ponty (1998, p. 345) means when he argues that “I know myself only in ambiguity”. At first, it seems a paradox or at least a controversial statement. How can ambiguity be the foundation of self-knowledge? Self-knowledge would seem to require removing ambiguity related to identity. Rather, from what is stated above, it seems to result that only in engaging our horizon, we come to understand the limits of who we are and who we are not. In other words, only when we break the walls of our familiar horizon disclosing unfamiliar horizons we learn something and we acknowledge something more about ourselves. At this stage, how and why emotions deal with this process of learning and formation should be clear. However, it is furtherly discussed in the final paragraph of this paper.

Arguing that the ‘sweet tension’ is foundational of any sport experience, implies to recognize the unavoidable role of emotions. As it has been said, sport provides athletes and spectators with plenty of experiences in which emotions are lived, recognized, and challenged. By means of this dealing with emotions, athletes face a twofold process of learning. That is to say, initially, they have the possibility to live both positive and negative emotions which help them in their learning processes. Namely, positive emotions may represent a sort of

boost of their motivation, while negative emotions may activate processes of self-awareness capable of generating a commitment towards improvement. Then, the presence of the other opponent calls for a further challenge. That is to deal with the 'uncertainty of the outcome' that carries a great emotional burden. It consists of an experience in which the athlete who shares the same goal with the opponent finds her/himself con-tested into a process generating deeper self-knowledge. Those experiences, considered as a whole, lead to *Bildung* which may be defined as courses of self-recognition. From this bond between emotional and learning processes, it should be evident why sport contexts have a particular role and enhance paths of learning and formation of identity, therefore *Bildung*.

5 Conclusions

The description of the sport experience as 'sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome' has shown that emotions are essential features of any sport experience. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that any sport activity owns a specific moment, the contest, in which participants who share the same goal challenge each other to see if they can reach that goal better than their opponent. Indeed, any contest is based on a valid test which, to be sound, requires the intentionality of the athlete and the uncertain and ambiguous feeling of 'May I' or 'May I not succeed'. As we have seen, a contest not only makes possible but succeeds in amplifying the sense of uncertainty which emerges from the 'May I' and 'May I not', since it adds a further sense of ambiguity, which is: how much better than you can I do this? Finally, answering this question opens up to twofold learning processes where emotions play a decisive role.

Firstly, learning as embodied learning of new skills (like technical movements or acts) comes from a renewed sense of 'I can'. The beginner tennis player may attempt to play a longline tennis backhand. At first, this is a genuine test of executing the right technical movement to hit the ball in the right spot of the racket to send it longline. In the beginning, this test cannot be successfully passed. With practice and hours of repetitions experienced as sweet tension, which includes both positive and negative emotions, the tennis player develops a new sense of 'I can' which allows her to transcend her horizon. This new sense of 'I can' changes the athlete's being-in-the-world. She perceives herself differently, her possibilities are different, and the world is re-defined and assumes a renewed meaning.

Secondly, the contest opens up an intersubjective sphere with equally skilled athletes. The result of the contest is uncertain and ambiguous. It represents the 'uncertainty of outcome' at its best. 'Sweet tension' is lived and enhanced

through these contest experiences. Contests succeed in providing the athletes with the opportunity to break the wall of the familiar towards unfamiliar horizons where ambiguity is a central feature of their sport experiences. The ambiguity here represents the dynamic situation in which familiar horizons are not fixed and pre-determined, but especially in the contest, they are challenged toward new horizons. Nevertheless, the result is not guaranteed. Experiencing 'sweet tension' requires deep uncertainties, such as whether my 'I cans' are sufficient to meet the sport challenges. Only by engaging these uncertainties does the possibility of 'sweet tension' emerge. It is only in engaging this horizon of uncertainty that an athlete gains a sense of identity. Finally, this sense of identity is not self-generated, but it is given – let us say confirmed or tested – by the other. The other is the contestant. That is why I argue that sport implies constitutive elements that are worthy of consideration from a pedagogical perspective. First of all, it provides the athlete with the possibility of experiencing that 'sweet tension', namely learning of emotions by means of first-hand experiences of joy, happiness, sadness, hanger, and so on. Then, sport has in itself a potential negative dimension – the loss, the failure – as constitutive of its essence. The negative is always characterized by generating an emotional response, namely learning through emotions, through processes of knowing how to deal and cope with emotional charges and challenges. Those negative experiences play a fundamental role in the learning processes. Indeed, whether sport entails the negative dimension as an unavoidable constitutive moment, then it becomes a privileged context for learning experiences. Emotions in sport are the fundamental elements of the learning processes in athletes' and players' sport experiences.

In conclusion, this paper aimed to consider the educational role of emotions within the sport context. The hermeneutical/phenomenological analysis of the 'sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome' should have been able to show that emotions are constitutive features of the sport activity. Moreover, any learning process in sport – for instance, learning technical or tactical skills – is moved by several experiences of positive and negative emotions that deal with motivational aspects. Furthermore, any process of learning concerns the body, the moving body, and the emotional movements between positive and negative emotions, between the experience of 'I can' and 'I cannot do this'. This process can be interpreted as learning of emotions since the athlete has the opportunity to experience and acknowledge several emotions during their learning processes. At the same time, the 'sweet tension' unveils a further dimension, which is the 'uncertainty of outcome'. In sport, it is mostly experienced during the contest among participants. In this specific phase, the subject is called to contest with the other. In the contest, regardless of the level of the performer or the competition, the negative

experience is foundational and unavoidable. Therefore, the subject discovers itself challenging the adversity, which demands and amplifies the emotional charge. At this moment, the athlete experiences the ambiguity of their identities and is called to learn about themselves through emotions. In this way, the athlete forms, and every time challenges, develops, and transforms their identity in the process of *Bildung*.

Those are the main reasons which, I hold, make sport a specific context where processes of learning of and through emotions are not only possible but constitutive of the sport experience itself from an educational perspective. From this theoretical approach, it can be interesting to investigate the role of emotions in a team, if and how it is a factor that influences the result or the performance, how it is built, generated, or influenced. A further direction of research could be to investigate how emotions are shared and communicated between teammates, opposing teams, athletes and coaches, athletes and spectators, and so on. From an educational point of view, it can be also worth considering and studying the emotional involvement of parents watching their kids during sport competitions. As I tried to assume here, emotions are fundamental features, both of any sport experience and any learning process. As a consequence of that, educational programs to sport parenting, which aims to re-consider and re-value the role of emotions, seems not only desirable but necessary.

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E-MOTION: An “Imaginative Variation”

Nazario Zambaldi

1 Embodied Education. A Variation as Research

E-MOTION: an “imaginative variation” is the title of my contribution at the conference “Emotion – Feeling – Mood” at the Humboldt University. I took an “oblique” view to show the relationship between emotion, image and movement as a peculiar aspect of the embodiment: I call this relationship “E-motion”.

This contribution (and the following article) is an offspring of my PhD research at the Free University of Bolzano/Bozen which was entitled “Embodied Education through art and theatre” (Zambaldi 2017). During my PhD I was a visiting researcher at the Humboldt University of Berlin, Department of General Education, part of the Research Colloquium directed by Malte Brinkmann. My research begins to the development of neuroscience starting from the “Italian” discovery of the so-called mirror neurons (MNS: Mirror Neuro System) in relation to sensory-motor learning, then the meaning of imaginative variation is presented on the methodological level in a phenomenological approach. In the space that opens between image and movement, image and action, on different levels, psychological and philosophical space, a visual, *imaginative thought* is proposed on the theoretical level. This space of imagination, and of emotion, finds an empirical synthesis in the videographic analysis, where the operational concept of image movement is introduced.

The title of the research is “Embodied education through art and theatre” and indicates the perspective of the present study. In particular, Embodied Education comprises the contributions of Embodied Cognition, that is, the area of psychological research that represents a “new paradigm” for psychology, shifting from the

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abstractness of classic cognitive psychology to physicality. “Art” and “Theatre”, visual and kinesic channels, are the aspects of physicality that Embodied Cognition addresses (Rizzolatti et al. 1988; Fadiga and Craighero 2003), based on the discovery of the MNS (Gallese et al. 1996).

The subtitle “Experimentation of a multimodal interface” of my PhD research highlights a construct, or “didactic mediator” (Damiano 1994), created to integrate the three levels identified by Bruner, focusing in particular on the iconic, rather than symbolic, representative, and active stages. Its goal is to highlight if, and how, Embodiment functions in this set.

The hypothesis – or “question” at the core of the research, expressed in the title – aims to identify “Embodied Education” through didactics, on a path indicated by the research on Montessori and Embodied Education (Rathunde 2009) or, even more pertinently, on Embodied Education as a convergence between phenomenological pedagogy and Embodiment (Tarozzi and Francesconi 2012).

This objective – to add a foundational contribution to the intersections between Embodied Cognition in psychology, and Embodiment in phenomenology (and phenomenological pedagogy) – is pursued on a philosophical, epistemological, visual and physical level, in the conviction that both “Embodiment” and “Embodied Education” imply a mode of thinking as much as a mode of being physical, bodily.

1.1 Embodiment as Animation: “anima” as Movement

Husserl distinguishes between *Leib* as an animated body (in Latin *anima*, soul), alive, in motion, and *Körper*, firm, abstract, thought. Husserl trying to define how the soul’s movement can be explained recurses to Hylomorphism by quoting Aristotle. “When something is linked with something that is mobile, it moves along with its movement, and so the whole formed by the two things is also moved” (Aristotele 2008, p. 117). Aristotle believes that the psyche moves together with the living body. For Aristotle as for Husserl “The soul (psyche) is constantly [one] to the living body” (Husserl 1952, p. 167).

Inside or outside? This contribution tries to go beyond an internal or external perspective; the central point is the subjectivity – emotional, reflexive, psychological and perceptual. The phenomenological reduction could be a solution, but in our languages sub- and ob-ject are often a duplication (like body and mind, *Leib* and *Körper*). A brief dialogue in a psycho-philosophical perspective, reporting Zahavi’s theory, presents the *Ein-fühlung* – “In(side)-feeling”, concerning what Zahavi recalled as a criticism of Heidegger by phenomenological psychiatrist

Binswanger, according to which the German philosopher would have “banned entire libraries on the problem of empathy, and on the problem of the perception of the other, on the problem of the constitution of the other I” (Binswanger 1953, p. 66, Zahavi 2001, p. 154).

The crossroads of Heidegger and psychiatrist Boss (Zollikon Seminars), like the phenomenological approach of Binswanger (*Bewusstseinsgestaltungen, Daseinanalyse*) could also contribute. In the Zollikon Seminars, physicality – to which Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* (2001) paradoxically dedicated few lines – is heavily discussed, proof that philosophy is talking to psychology and psychiatry (configuring itself also as a meeting point between the spheres being discussed here). When Boss reminds Sartre’s reproach on the lack of attention to corporeality in *Sein und Zeit*, the philosopher replies by saying that “corporeality is the most difficult thing, and then I didn’t know yet what more to say” (*das Leibliche das Schwierigste ist und dass ich damals eben noch nicht mehr zu sagen wusste*) (Heidegger 1987, p. 292).

About “psychologisms” i.e. what lies under “internal” and “external”, empathy, *Otherness* (and *I-ness*) and inter-subjectivity on which Zahavi focuses (Zahavi 2001), I like to refer to its description offered by Lipps: “Empathy (*Einfühlung*) is thought [...] as perfect empathy (*Einfühlung*). It takes place when I am directly and unreservedly surrendered to the impression of the seen movements, when I empathize with the movements of the acrobat, that is, when my attention is fully focused on these movements. Assuming, however, that I step out of this full empathy (*Einfühlung*), I pay attention also to myself, the real person standing down there, to the movements that I perform there, independent of the movements of the acrobat. I reflect and feel like the one reflecting. Then there are two I’s for me, that I up there and this I down here; the self in the acrobat, and the real self, different from it. [...] So when I remember the acrobat and his movements in my memory, there is still an I and an inner activity in him, just something that is merely imagined. This imagined I and what I do is at the same time opposite to my I, namely the one who remembers the acrobat” (Lipps 1903, p. 124).

This difficulty of thinking about emotions and body in a psychological perspective of the “I” (Heidegger), or an “other I” that in Lipps becomes a “double”, or mirror, finds a pre-psychological or pre-subjective solution in Gallese.

As Gallese (2008) explains in “Il corpo teatrale”, to plan an action it is necessary to predict its consequences, both when we perform and when we simulate. The possibility of predicting what will happen (grasping its intention or purpose) would derive from the incorporated “model” of that action, that is, from its non-propositional motion “representation”. Perception, representation and action moving on the same flux, the activation of the latter (simulation) involves

a direct understanding of the action of others. We use the same modelling that we use to map our actions to understand the world of *the other*, through an unconscious, automatic and pre-reflective motion simulation mechanism: the embodied simulation. The embodied simulation would generate a specific state of “intentional attunement” (Gallese 2008) which in turn would create a state of identification with *others*.

The externalist perspective breaks in another direction the subjective, psychological determination as immanence. The theory of the extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998) is an attempt to shift the issue in the direction of “externalism” (Nöe 2004, 2010). All is outside... emotion is a movement towards the outside: ex-movere. Life is also a – not localistic – “emergence”, for the neuro-phenomenological theory (Varela 1996), for both Bergson and Merleau-Ponty, ex-sistere: laugh or cry...

1.2 A Variation as Research

“The task of Imaginative Variation is to seek possible meanings through the utilization of imagination, varying the frames of reference, employing polarities and reversals, and approaching the phenomenon from divergent perspectives, different positions, roles, or functions. [...] Describing the essential structures of a phenomenon” (Moustakas 1994, p. 97). In this, there is “a free play of fancy” (Husserl 1952); any perspective is a possibility, and is permitted to enter into consciousness.

“In a subsequent variation of possible other respects, other schemes and other theoretical models, which are applied in a playful, imaginative way, meaning can be pluralized. Husserl calls the activity in the variation a “fantasy-like fingering” (*ein phantasiemäßiges Umfingieren*) in the fictional mode of a “quasi-experience” (*Quasi-Erfahrung*) (Husserl and Landgrebe 1999, p. 416; Brinkmann 2015, p. 39).

1.2.1 A Multimodal Interface

“Art” and “Theater” both contribute to a framework for a mediation tool of the “inside” and “outside”, an “interface”. This concept, which is declined in “natural interface” and “artificial interface” can be referred in psychopedagogical terms, in the first case, to what we could name “biological interface” or a medium that connects the external world and the internal world in man: the complex (set) of perceptive capacities coordinated by biological means and brain structures (Vygotskij 1990). Or again to the transitional space: “I spoke of a transition zone

and introduced the terms *transitional objects* and *transition phenomena* to designate the intermediate area of *experience*, between the subjective and what is objectively perceived” (Winnicott 1971, p. 13). In the second case it may refer to its most common use, with the spread of digital communication media, where the “artificial interface” (Luciani and Cadoz 2007) can identify the enactive interaction between humans and world (including human beings and technologies) seen as a process of participation in the co-construction of mind with body, and the co-construction of human beings and the world through artificial systems, called *enactive interfaces*, which preserve this type of interaction.

1.2.1.1 ECO (Electronic Cooperation Online)

“The introduction of new digital technologies dethrones language from the role it has played until now as the dominant carrier of the experience of reality, placing a new visuality that is not linguistic but physical at the centre of our experience of the world” (Gallese 2014, p. 62). The first phase of experimentation, the pilot study, is aimed at syntonizing the learning environment in the visual channel, starting from Augmented Reality (AR). This is assumed to be the cognitive and experiential environment of the current generation of “digital natives” (Prensky 2001), a mixed environment that one can act upon, rather than be subjected to. Electronic Cooperation Online (ECO), is a theatrical artistic project, created and realized by director Pietro Babina. ECO addresses the forms of communication via digital, web, social network, blog, smartphone, tablet, etc. as an augmented reality in which passive participation is transformed into relational, dialogic or narrative competences, with direct involvement through teamwork, screenplay, staging and video recording. ECO¹ began as a theatrical experience with professional actors and writers who connected periodically to an online blog (a sort of second life parallel to physical life). They wrote by mixing narrative and daily life, “reality” and fiction, person and character. The “script” that was created in this way was subsequently elaborated (embodied) by the actors with the director in streaming rehearsals, and in multimedia theatrical performances and site-specific installations (with immersive experiences in video scenes shot with 360° cameras).

The objectives of the educational adaptation (Fig. 1) included relational skills, teamwork, reasoning, critiquing, active and creative knowledge of new media, of

¹ ECO also saw the collaboration of Alberto Scocco from the University of Macerata in mapping the organization of the work, the construction of the narratives (Scocco 2008), the design, graphics and online hypertext, and the information technology department of the University of Bologna.



Fig. 1 ECO, rehearsal of the interpretation of the dialogue and group proof of its efficacy, © Nazario Zambaldi

the language that characterizes it and of AR, that is, the mixed environment that characterizes contemporary “experience”.

The phases of the seminar activity were concentrated in around twenty class hours, after a methodological and theoretical introduction. They can be summarized as:

- mapping: students write their names individually on paper and then on board, visualizing the variable relationships in the group
- two groups are organized as collective identities
- a blog is opened as a shared platform
- groups work on computers in separate rooms
- the conductor posts an image on the blog, beginning an online dialogue
- each group works on a limited time to respond to the message sent by the other (in addition to words, they may use image, sound, video and whatever else is available on the platform)
- when the conductor or the participants feel they reached a meaningful dialogue, they move to the second phase, reuniting the groups
- in such transcoding phase, they re-read the text and adapt it as a screenplay that can be video recorded.



Fig. 2 EMI, movement in the classroom, meet and greet: visual contact, © Nazario Zambaldi

The phase of embodiment of the text, that is, where the incompleteness of the online communication emerges, insofar as it is disembodied. The online dialogue shows an absence of context, setting, physical characteristics, psychology. To construct a setting, characters, situations, and psychology, we use mapping, which becomes a visual tool of that connective intelligence used online but also in the physical environment (De Kerckhove 1997).

1.2.1.2 EMI (Experiential Multimodal Interface)

The actual experiment—around twenty hours distributed as weekly activities over a trimester—integrated both the ECO activity and the tools that the observations of the pilot study were based on. In particular the Experiential Multimodal Interface (EMI), construct inherited elements from ECO, such as the initial setting, the mapping to represent thoughts, images and actions, and the dialogue realized online, as the basis for a narrative embodiment, integrating it with theatrical training as a “work on the self” (Alschitz 1998). Here we revisit the aspects that integrated the EMI with a “meet and greet” (Fig. 2), a simple introductory exercise from theatrical training that translates the extended mind into physical space (Clark and Chalmers 1998), intersubjective (and intrasubjective), the mental extension of the web:

- conscious breathing in a circle, eyes closed, similar to mindfulness, yoga, relaxation visualizing the parts of the body
- free exploration of the classroom, the students are prompted with the mental image of the classroom as the board where names were written and as white paper, with eyes open, moving in the space in a relaxed manner
- visual contact and offering of hands in greetings: when the students meet, they stop in front of each other and offer their hand, looking in each other's eyes.

This – literal – contact with oneself, others and the space, opens visual channels beyond mental images, or the representation in the framework of the computer or other supports, to perception, bodily representation and visual-spatial coordination. Without going into more detail here on aspects that are addressed in depth in the thesis, multiple studies have indicated a certain continuity between graphical interfaces and natural visual communication. Graphical interfaces represent a return to a form of visual alphabetization prevalent in the ancient pictorial alphabets, favouring the development of good visual memory and intuitive-associative thought (Snyder 1999), which helps to decode visual messages. Visual contact makes this orientation of “digital natives” relational and embodied, creating a temporal space, a present experience.

1.2.2 Mixed Method as “Imaginative Variation”

I would like to mention the mixed approach here, although within the limits of this article which aims to be an initial introduction to a phenomenological videographic method. I will describe the experiential setting based on a multi-modal approach, that is, organized as visual and kinesic channels, rather than just abstract, amodal transmission, which still frames the contexts of learning at school according to traditional cognitivist training. Beyond the minimum horizon of a case study that measures effectiveness in experimentation by measuring pre- and post-test variations in those constructs that demonstrate an Embodied Education, or rather an Embodiment, such as agency, self-efficacy, self-awareness, self-consciousness, I also wish to frame this mixed methodology in a phenomenological perspective. Husserl defined this as an imaginative variation (Husserl 1960), a descriptive approach in which the things are not understood in their entirety, but rather through prospecting, exploring around them. At this level of quasi-experimental research or case study, we conducted pre- and post-test questionnaires (in stages t1 and t2, for the ECO pilot study and in stages t3 and t4, for the EMI effective experimentation) on agency (Bandura 2000), self-efficacy (Caprara 2001; Chen et al. 2001; Sibilia et al. 1995), self-consciousness (Scheier and Carver 1985), self-awareness (Govern and Marsch 2001), empathy and other

specifics on body and space (virtual or AR and material or MR). There was also an analysis of variance (ANOVA), and qualitative questionnaires were also administered, in a retrospective interview in the experimental group (Mayring 2000). Pre- and post-test questionnaires were also administered in order to conduct a sociometric analysis (Moreno 1943; Bastin 1963).

1.2.3 Phenomenological Videographic Analysis

An image is in itself a structure that recalls the main source of every form of knowledge: perception. Images are essential for the phenomenological: they refer to the fundamental element of consciousness, again: perception. The phenomenological videographic analysis introduced here starts by distancing itself from the forms of critical-reconstructive interpretation of experience. In this approach, we find “a phenomenological critique using a hermeneutic and reconstructive process” (*eine phänomenologische Kritik der hermeneutischen und rekonstruktiven Verfahren*) (Brinkmann 2015, p. 41). In particular recalling Heidegger: “and so it is a fact (...), that our simplest perceptions and appearances are already expressed, and moreover, are in some way (already) interpreted. We do not see objects and things in a primary and original way, but rather we speak of them only later, more precisely we do not express in words, what we see, but on the contrary, we see what is spoken of through language” (*Faktisch ist es [...] so, dass unsere schlichtesten Wahrnehmungen und Verfassungen schon ausgedrückte, mehr noch, in bestimmter Weise interpretierte sind. Wir sehen nicht so sehr primär und ursprünglich die Gegenstände und Dinge, sondern zunächst sprechen wir darüber, genauer sprechen wir nicht das aus, was wir sehen, sondern umgekehrt, wir sehen, was man über die Sache spricht*) (Heidegger 1994, p. 75).

We then enter a dimension of real phenomenological analysis of the video images, which are analysis of appearances. The suspension of “I” – the reductive dimension of the epochè or the suspension of judgement – in which operate the imaginative variations, deals with a theory of pedagogical experience. In this theory the experience as a pedagogical one is determined as much by the subjective praxis as by the social element of learning and education. This determination of the experience of learning is demonstrated (*gezeichnet*) via intentionality (*Intentionalität*). Merleau-Ponty role would be to reconnect phenomenological theory of the experience into a corporeal phenomenological perspective that is, in the non- and pre-verbal, pre-reflective, carrying back the transcendental subject of Husserl to a corporal, bodily, real subject (Merleau-Ponty 1965).

1.3 Results and Discussion

Speaking of results makes sense in this phenomenological perspective as imaginative, descriptive variation. In particular, the statistical analysis has furnished several significant data ($p < 0.05$), in the scale that measured aspects linked to bodily awareness (with questions such as “The quality of breathing influences my attention” or “I am comfortable if looking in the eyes”), and in the scale relative to private and public “situational” self-awareness (with items such as “In this moment, I am aware of my internal emotions” or “In this moment, I am reflecting on my life”). Several considerations in the scale related to self-consciousness were also significant (with reflections like “I am easily embarrassed”, “I am aware of my appearance”, “It’s easy for me to talk with strangers”, “In general I listen to my internal emotions”), and the perceived agency in managing positive and negative emotions. In fact, the values measured after the experimentation were actually lower. My hypothesis is that these contradictory results indicate an increase in awareness of these aspects. I validated the significance then in a frame of a Qualitative Analysis of Contents (Mayring 2000) of the interviews taken during activities, in which the textual materials – derived from questionnaire responses to open questions by the participants – were regrouped according to inductive categories, or through a generalization of the content.

The methodological frame of the sociographic analysis related to emotional-relational and organizational pre- and post-test levels (Moreno 1943; Bastin 1963) – which represents the variations based on of the involvement in the EMI – showed interesting modifications in the experimental group, in the direction of a true breakdown of personal patterns as well as real social stereotypes. The value of my investigation, which was focused on the correlation between an activity-oriented on embodiment and the adopted constructs, was in any case descriptive, given the reduced sample and the almost-experimentality of the research. This context nonetheless leaves space for a typically descriptive perspective of the phenomenological imaginative approach. As mentioned, we will look at a few examples, here briefly discussing some video observations.

The movement between theory, the empirical and praxis, via reduction and phenomenological variation identifies three moments in the videographic analysis as descriptive categories – *Verkörperung*, Embodiment; *Antwortgeschehen*, Responsivity; (*Aufmerksamkeit*) *Zeigen*, show (attention) – which guide the protocol of the videographic analysis (Brinkmann 2015).

Verkörperung, Embodiment: according to Merleau-Ponty (2011), in the habitual bodily patterns the self should emerge, the awareness more of a possibility (“I can”) than of a thought (“I think”). In this physicality and lived experience, *Leib*,

Erlebnis, the false dualism between body and spirit is overcome, with naturalism on one side and rationalism (cognitivism) on the other (cf. Merleau-Ponty 2011). The phenomenological videographic description of the physicality, *Leiblichkeit*, also suspends the dualism between interior sense and external behaviour. Therefore, we draw attention through images to these emergences, appearances, in the non-verbal language of gestures, in mimicry, attitudes. In this eccentric space of identity and presence we find an educational embodiment, from the recording of the Italian lessons in the school and classes which hosted the experiment: the roll-call, during which the teacher calls each student by name and each student answers “Here I am!” (Fig. 3). What we can see is the habitual scholastic setting, in which “one cannot change place” in the classroom. Objects are central in this emergent presence, the arrangement of desks, the projection screen pulled down in front of the blackboard. The teacher in the central position, the first row of students closest to the teacher, with their backs to the others. We can assist in a first version of what Brinkmann (2015) described as a pedagogical staging of the construction and maintenance of order in the horizon of repetition and power. As in my PhD research, the goal was to highlight the forms of embodiment at school, also in this article emerges the control (“freezing”) of bodies and emotions in the school setting.



Fig. 3 *Verkörperung* (Embodiment): the roll-call, © Nazario Zambaldi

Zeigen, show: Heidegger, in the preface to Richardson’s work on phenomenological thinking, notes “through the immediate experience of the phenomenological method, speaking with Husserl, the concept of phenomenology was elaborated, as it is explained in the introduction of *Being and Time*. In it, “retrorelation” (*Rückbeziehung*) plays a fundamental role, with the corresponding fundamental words (*Grundworte*) of Greek thought: *logos* (make manifest) and *phainesthai* (show)” (Richardson 2003, p. X). In presenting more than representing the images, the “show” and “show oneself”, *Zeigen sich-Zeigen*, is directly connected with learning and education (Brinkmann 2015). Also in Italian “show” and “demonstrate” are part of the tradition oriented toward vision and evidence of scholastic explaining. The verb *zeigen* can be translated with “indicate”, in the sense of “mark”, therefore “to teach”. In the image relative to the EMI experience (Fig. 4) in the dialogue even more than the words, the looks, the expressions of faces, demonstrate listening, attention, which seems to be reflected in the behaviour of those present.

In my following proposal, as indicated in the title, we find, in addition to the two presented above (*Verkörperung*, *Zeigen*), the third moment of the video-graphic analysis: *Antwortgeschehen*, responsivity: in the frame of a “responsive



Fig. 4 *Zeigen* (show), *Antwortgeschehen* (responsivity): a discussion during EMI, © Nazario Zambaldi

phenomenology” (Waldenfels 2007), in which intentionality (intending, grasping something as something) is transformed into responsivity (responses to claims).

The observation and analysis is proposed here as a variation, because the analysis passes from individual significant images – “still” – to “moving” images, and so we will refer to the concept introduced in the text dedicated to the cinema of philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1983). From Bergson’s movement-image, Deleuze derives three varieties of images: the perception-image, the action-image, and the affection-image. These images relate respectively, to the perception of sight, the interaction between characters and their positions, and to emotional experience. In the “images-action” (Fig. 5), thanks to the sequence “we see what we see” (we imagine it). Students meet for the “greeting”.

It deals with the exercise of theatrical training which opens the activity and which can be protracted at length, until the acquisition of a consciousness and awareness extended to the entire scene, the work environment. But what is interesting for the aims of the videographic analysis is an event (Deleuze 1975), which is differentiated from the phenomenon because it breaks the contextual framework, that is, the proposed exercise. In *Verkörperung* in a close up, one student embodies, indicating, calling the other, who responds with responsivity – *Antwortgeschehen* – made of gestures. The one on the right responds to the extended hand (*Responsivität*). Therefore, in the resting position, it falls to the person on the right to show – *zeigen* – always coming out and anticipating the event of laughing which breaks the pattern, phenomenal, physical, therefore ecological, environmental, so that the laughter communicates to the others. Bergson, whose study on duration inspired Deleuze in the cited text (Deleuze 1975), dedicates an essay to laughter as “breaking the pattern” (Bergson 1961). The paradox of seeing movement in still images next to each other, that is the cinema, or video, reveals a perceptual mechanism and together the spatial–temporal geometricization of the representation of reality. The image-action is therefore evidence of a paradox that dates back to Zenone, and at the same time in Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc (Merleau-Ponty 1965), sense of the present as movement, revealing that dynamic synthesis that is subjective perception. Image-action: imagination.

2 E-motion, Imagination as Variation

After the first part of this article that crosses various theoretical and methodological contributions starting from a research in which emotions – the topic of the conference – are at the crossroad between body and cognition, in this second part I take up some concepts that on various levels are connected to what we



Fig. 5 Images-action: **a** Visual contact from a distance. **b** Coming closer. **c** Physical contact. **d** Laughter as an event that breaks the structure of the exercise. © Nazario Zambaldi

call “emotions” starting from the etymology. The Italian verb *ri-prendere* (to shoot through the videocamera) shares the Latin etymology with *ap-prendere* (to learn): take, take hold of the world seen as movement, involvement. Also, the metaphorical language “moves”, following the Greek etymology of *meta-fora*




Fig. 5 (continued)

(“displacement”), the metaphorical communication is embodied, evokes images, perceptions, e-motioning, as the cognitive linguistics has pointed out emphasizing the essentially metaphorical – corporeal nature, motor sense – of our conceptual language (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). In the videographic analysis the freeze

frame (still image) is an analytical abstraction, a subjective frame, while the movement is pre-subjective, animated (in the video it is fiction).

2.1 Thought and Vision

The freeze frame, or photogram, corresponds to the abstraction of linear, analytical and contemplative thought, which is disembodied unlike a vision as imagination. In the premise of “I know what you do. The brain that acts and the mirror neurons” (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2006) Peter Brook, a great theater master, is called to witness: he declares that with the discovery of mirror neurons the neurosciences have begun to understand what theater has always known. So a productive imagination moves according to a thought of possibility, neither deductive nor inductive or reductive, but *abductive*, the “thought of discovery” (Peirce 1931).

Differently proceeds the “Visual Thinking” of Rudolf Arnheim (1974). According to Arnheim, the collaboration between perceiving and thinking would be incomprehensible if that separation existed. To explain this visual thought, Arnheim cites the Platonic dialogues where on the one hand the forms, ideas, stable units of objective existence are tackled through logical operations (but even here a skill is required, one that goes beyond the manipulation of concepts), on the other, Plato puts trust in actual sight, starting from the initiatory myth of the cave, in which the liberated eye becomes accustomed to light and forms (as in Menone with the doctrine of reminiscence, in which learning is memory). Even for Aristotle “the soul never thinks without an image”.

The separation of the Platonic idea in *thought and image* characterizes Western philosophy as rational thought. In this mental direction of vision goes the exercise of imagination (Brinkmann 2014) taken from the spiritual exercises of Ignatius of Loyola: “Exercise appears here as a body-based form of learning that focuses on ability. This is understood as a synesthetic ability to imagine, on the basis of varying and productive repetitions (temporal difference) and negative experiences of irritation and confrontation. The exercise of the imagination is therefore not just a skill, it is also an attitude and approach towards the “world” that can only be practised on one thing, one object or one image. It is precisely in this that emerges the aesthetic productivity and creativity of the imagination that transcend things, objects and images” (Brinkmann 2014, p. 119).

2.2 Beyond or on This Side of the Mirror: Motion, Picture

The functioning of mirror neurons is better understood using the denomination of embodied simulation, mirroring in motion, projected into intentionality (which becomes meaning). “The paradox is pathos or philosophy’s passion” (*Le paradoxe est le pathos ou la passion de la philosophie*) (Deleuze 1968, p. 293). Rather, sense moves in “both directions at once,” both toward the constitution of a full, determinate meaning, and simultaneously toward the dispersal and dissolution of any such meaning in contradiction and nonsense, with which it bears a special and “specific” internal relation. Through a remarkable reading of Lewis Carroll’s *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking Glass*, Deleuze argues that this bi-directionality is essential for understanding change and becoming. In fact, as Deleuze argues, paradoxical sense, conceived as the domain of a “pure becoming” or a category of “pure events” is the constitutive basis all kinds of change, transformation, and manifestation. For instance, as Alice becomes taller than she was before, she is also smaller than she will be (Deleuze 1975).

2.3 E-motion as “difference”. Movement as Imagination

Instead of describing individual significant images – frames – we begin with fragments of movement. In this analysis and operationalisation, we take some concepts in particular: the Movement-Image (Deleuze 1983). This was one way to return to the end of this thought on the vision and the logic of the meaning and sensation that has run through the research. Presence becomes immanence, phenomenon, event. In video, as in cinema, we see images move, how the reality that lies between mathematisation and lived experience, between theory and practice, always escapes, since the time of Zeno’s paradoxes. A fact or a perceptual effect. But revealingly, it could represent “intentional arc” as subjectivity. Image-action, imagination, can be varied, or played with. Experience, or better, a presentation rather than representation: present-action. Action present. I don’t see the movement. I imagine it. Vision is *only* in movement.

3 Conclusions

My contribution to the conference “Emotion – Feeling – Mood” wanted to see emotion as a crisis of the subject and of rational thought. On the theoretical level, I started from the emotion of the body as the foundation of cognition in which the

metaphor is the linguistic correlation of emotion (embodied education): thought and language multiplies the frames – “I”, “other”, “*Leib*”, “*Körper*”, “internal”, “external”... – which can, however, be overcome in an ecological vision in which all the elements are related to each other as well as to the environment.

I started from this environmental level, that is from an empirical study based on the contribution of neuroscience to educational psychology. On the methodological level, I reach through a variation or an imaginative movement the videographic analysis as a descriptive rather than reconstructive observation of the phenomena and of the pedagogical experience as an embodiment. I, therefore, focused on the aspects related to emotion in the variation between different tools and quantitative and qualitative perspectives.

On the theoretical level such phenomenological approach still retains a psychological element in the reductive process. Along the same line, Deleuze (1975) criticizes Husserl (and phenomenology) for being too psychological. For me, therefore, videographic analysis remains a valid observation point without even falling back into a neuro-phenomenological perspective (Varela and Thompson 1991) which uses first-person narration starting from a “phenomenological training”.

A thought in motion, a thought in action, an imaginative thinking seem to me the most suitable to overcome this crisis of an abstract subject, of a still thought in a frozen language. We can operationalize this critical vision through a phenomenological videographic analysis (Brinkmann 2015) with the concepts of *Movement Image* or *Concatenation*, without subject, maybe in the direction of a “logic of emotions”. In this direction of a differential analysis, or of difference as *differance* (Derrida 1997), between language and the world of life (*Lebenswelt*) analysis becomes imaginative movement: pre-subjective, emotional, superficial.

I found in the videographic phenomenological analysis the possibility of observing the breaking of the mentioned frames, which I call E-motion. On the level of psychological discourse it is a subjective and intersubjective breaking. This emotional rupture of the subjective frame seems to me to be expressed effectively by Gallese, when in “The Empathic Screen. Cinema and mirror neurons” (Gallese and Guerra 2015) he underlines how the tracking shot is more effective for identification compared to the fixed camera. Gallese and Guerra use a brief clip from the film “Notorious” by Alfred Hitchcock. In one scene a “first-person perspective” is used, a typical technique in the forties and fifties, in which the spectator identifies with Ingrid Bergman. The observer seems to be going to fetch a bunch of keys. In reality she is standing still in one part of the room: it is only the camera that moves. The “first-person perspective”, in Italian significantly named *falsa soggettiva* (false subjects) involves, excites (gives emotions), through the

movement of the camera, as a window or interface, reminding us of the falsehood – fictional, imaginative – of subjectivity and of the observer.

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Educating the Vulnerable: Toward an Emotionally Responsive Phenomenology in Adult Education

Vasiliki Karavakou and Konstantinia Antoniou

1 Adult Education in the New *Commercium*

In the longstanding and turbulent history of adult education, which goes back at least two and a half centuries, its development has been sealed by two major characteristics with enormous transformative power upon its theory, practice and educational policy. The first characteristic refers to the modern emergence of adult education in the clothes of lifelong learning as an organized attempt to educate consumptive subjectivities in order to meet the demands of the new commercial articulation of the modern world. Adult education, amongst other expressions and institutionally organized manifestations of modern education, is a product of the broader Enlightenment project, with which modernity sought to express the educational, social, cultural and political claims of modern individuals for the implementation of their rights and for the enforcement of the principles of justice, equality and freedom.

This educational movement which allied with the claims of a broader social movement in Great Britain and the US and with an educational activism, in the fashion of Paulo Freire (1970) for example, underwent a series of transformations during the twentieth century enhancing its acceptance and credibility as an academic field and practice by the academia and by society at large. In short, in the twentieth century, adult education emerged as an immensely disparate field of practice that had initially started from basic literacy classes and continued to range from professional education to training for a job. Theorists, coming from

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all corners of the field, have stressed in the meanwhile the need to recapture the initial imperatives of adult education, i.e. the concern for social justice, the belief that education could and should assume a reformatory mission for a better society and the commitment to the principle that the ancient claim about human beings as lifelong learners amounts to their inalienable right to all-round personal development and fulfilment (Gustavsson 2002). Undeniably, it would be the ideal of personal fulfilment that could accommodate any claim for including the emotions in education as its being articulated at the second characteristic.

2 Reclaiming Emotions in Adult Education

The second characteristic refers to the ever-growing intellectualizing or rationalistic profile of the theoretic apparatus of adult education which, not only did it remain faithful to an excessive calculative rationalism but, by doing so, it also contributed to the deepening of its first transformation, i.e. the emergence of lifelong learning as a servant of the new *commercium*. In other words, the two transformational phases are inextricably linked with one another and produce the vicious circle of what Gert Biesta (2013) has styled as “learnification of education”. This raises the plausible claim for rejuvenating the theoretical weaponry of adult education with a material consonant with its initial declarations.

Although a substantial part of an individual’s endowment is undeniably emotional in nature and Brookfield (1986) has characterized the adult educational meetings as “a psychodynamic battleground”, emotions have been grossly ignored or devalued by modern educational theory and practice. To be precise adult education has neglected to reclaim emotions paying unwarranted vindication for other aspects of learning with the notable exceptions of Boyd and Myers (1988), Cranton (2006), Dirkx (2001, 2008), Merriam et al. (2007). This betrays a concealed adherence to some longstanding and allegedly forgotten dualisms regarding the nature and the education of the human mind. As Merriam remarks “learning is more than a cognitive process, but because for centuries the West has viewed the mind as separate from the body, and because learning has been so connected with formal schooling, the activity is almost always framed from a rational, cognitive perspective” (Merriam 2017, p. 29). Mulvihill who captures the different orientation of the new theoretical trend in writing about the link between the rational mind and the emotional body refers: “there is no such thing as a behaviour or thought, which is not impacted in some way by emotions. There are no neurotransmitters for ‘objectivity;’...during both the initial processing and the linking with information from the different senses, it becomes clear that there is

no thought, memory or knowledge which is ‘objective,’ or ‘detached’ from the personal experience” (Mulvihill 2003, p. 322). For John Dirx, a disciple of this theory, embodied or somatic knowing involves senses and the emotional component: “Learning itself is an imaginative, emotional act...” (Dirx 2008) and “learning about big words or concepts, such as Truth, Power, Justice, and Love” (Dirx 2001, p. 69) is inconceivable without emotion and feelings.

It is the strong behavioristic and physiological tradition in adult education that suppressed emotions and excluded them in general and so any account that re-introduces them back into the very centre of education is, undoubtedly, a progressive and positive development. Nevertheless, when one embarks on producing a conceptual map of emotions in order to understand their ontology and role in the education of subjective identity from a rather philosophical perspective, one is compelled to take notice of their strong inextricable association with some sort of cognition which may indeed deem them as reasonable or unreasonable and discriminate them, thus, from the unruly and transient world of mere sensations and feelings. Given its pivotal importance, a conceptual map as such follows in order to be adopted a position according to which a) embodied emotions and learning may be compatible with a thin thesis that reads emotions in terms of social construction and acculturation and b) the subjective underpinnings of emotions do not warrant their unreasonableness; nor does this preclude a view that reads them as cognitive evaluations. In other words, emotions do assume an integral role in people’s rational understanding of the world.

3 Emotions as Judgments from a Cognitivist and Phenomenological Perspective

A conceptual map of emotions should accept the following contentions: emotions are intentional or directed to an object, even if the latter may not be necessarily physically present to the experiencing subject. In other words, intentionality, as a form of cognition, accompanies emotions. This has been evident since the contributions of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl, who in his *Logical Investigations* says characteristically: “... it seems obvious, in general, that every joy or sorrow, that is every joy or sorrow about something we think of, is a directed act” (Husserl 2001, p. 107). Even in cases of emotions such as those of depression or anxiety, which could be taken as counterexamples to the phenomenological obsession with intentionality, one could argue, following a Heideggerian or Sartrean pathway for example, they are directed at something general, at one’s “being-in-the-world”

(Sartre 1948). As it has been shown in the educational intervention with homeless people, who often expressed anxiety and despair, it would be at least naive to think that they lacked intentionality and were not directed to a more general socioeconomic situation that kept them alienated from the objective dimensions of the world. In the case of homelessness, it makes perhaps sense to endorse the characterization of these emotions as “situational” or “background” (Nussbaum 2001).

In regard with the question as to how emotions present their object, this is a matter of a long and bitter controversy. For the traditional non-cognitivist view of thinkers like David Hume (1896), William James (1890), the emotivists and logical positivists, having an emotion is like having a unique inner feeling or as undergoing a special inarticulable in rational terms inner experience (cf. Griffiths 1984, p. 223). Or, we could say that emotions involve an awareness of what we may call “affective qualities” that are, undeniably bonded in a special fashion with subjectivity. Although this may be true, emotions are not like sensations or inner feelings (e.g. pain), which would justify their inability to be characterized as either reasonable or unreasonable. Given that having an emotion occurs either in an occurrent or a dispositional sense, “it seems that a factual belief, or some factual knowledge or awareness, is required if a person is to have either an occurrent or a dispositional emotion” (Pitcher 1972, p. 374). For the cognitivists Martha Nussbaum (2001) and Robert Solomon (2001, 2003, 2007), emotions are not alien forces that threaten the cool order of conscious rational thought.

The understanding of emotions in terms of evaluations opens up the conceptual space to understand them as being consistently linked to our meaning making activity. In this spirit, Solomon writes that: “We live our lives through emotions” and “it is our emotions that give our lives meaning” (Solomon 2007, p. 1). Having said this, one does not over-intellectualize emotions; nor does one isolate them from the rest of our mental reservoir. To the extent that emotions are intentional, we have reasons for our emotions even if they arose from external or internal factors. In adult education emotions quite often emerge in a person’s struggles to uphold his/her relationships, deal with the mechanisms and the abuse of authority and power in their work, respond to conflicts over profound disagreements of values or interest. Finally, “occasionally curricular content stimulates powerful emotions among adult learners” (Dirkx 2008, p. 9). On this basis, they manifest themselves in positive and negative judgments, evaluations or appraisals often accompanied by facial or bodily expressions and actions providing us with information about their own nature or how they relate to one another.

Knowing the naivety to expect that a re-orientational turn in adult education could ever be achieved, should one rest on a theory that understands the human

mind, or human nature, in terms of a split between a calculative reason that enjoys its power thanks to its coolness and nobility and a volatile, ephemeral nature that remains helplessly passive, vulnerable or insincere. Besides, the traditional version of the mind is rather simplistic and glosses over its very internal complexity. David Wiggins eloquently noted that rational deliberation embraces an “agony of thinking” and a “torment of feeling” (Wiggins 1975, p. 76). Recognizing the pervasive importance of emotions implies leaving all the misconceptions behind. After Hegel, with the valuable intervention of various phenomenologically friendly thinkers such as Sartre, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, it has become obvious that we do not need a conceptually primitive understanding of human nature or an emotionally deprived sense of human rationality. In contrast to the above-mentioned theories of constructivism and behaviourism, a phenomenologically driven proposal for adult education appeals to the world of the people’s involved inner experiences including their emotions. In addition, our meeting with the world should be “clothed in human qualities”, as Merleau-Ponty put it, always on the basis of its being mediated by our embodiment and embodied activities (cf. Merleau-Ponty 2004, p. 63 f.). The case of Merleau-Ponty puts enormous emphasis on our pre-reflective and “pre-objective openness” to the world, which renders any cognitivist understanding of emotions unsustainable or extremely difficult. Nevertheless, one could re-introduce cognitivism back into one’s thinking about the emotions should one opt for a rather Sartrean account. The latter allows us to preserve both the intentionality of emotions and the involvement of evaluative judgments in the experience. Sartre contented on many occasions that emotions are accompanied by beliefs and has been mentioned at the example of snakes, our fear involves an evaluation of snakes as a threat which may equally be accompanied by a bodily phenomenology of expressions changes, actions.

So a cognitivist and, at the same time, a phenomenological account of emotions is not impossible. It needs, however, a different account of rationality, beliefs and judgments. Sartre’s position is summarized in a paragraph toward the close of the famous essay on emotions: “We will call emotion the sudden plunge of consciousness into magic.... It is false, then, to see in emotion a fleeting disorder of the organism and of the mind which would disturb psychic life from without. It is, on the contrary, the return of consciousness to the magic attitude, one of the great attitudes that are essential to it, with the appearance of the correlative world, the magic world. Emotion is not an accident, it is a form of existence of consciousness, one of the ways in which it knows (in Heidegger’s sense of “Verstehen”) its “Being-in-the-world.”” (Sartre 1948, p. 90 f.). Sartre is again very helpful by contending that a belief is not a cognitive element in the traditional sense, but in the phenomenological sense in and through which we have the experience of the

world, i.e. by a practical engagement with or commitment to the world and not by via a strict theoretical investigation. Solomon was also more recent attempt that follows the Sartrean account.

As addition to the same line of reasoning of combining cognitivism and phenomenology a) comes a theory of rationality that expresses itself in terms of responsiveness to the claims and the concerns of both the self and the Other. Waldenfels' theory of responsive phenomenology provides the necessary conceptual space to understand the educational process in terms of the responsiveness to the claims of the Other (i.e. the learner), i) by ascribing an active presence to the emotions, ii) by re-defining the meeting point of *Bildung* as a profoundly real living situation guided by the imperatives of responsive practical reasoning and iii) by shifting the emphasis from intentionality to responsivity, the conceptual traffic that develops within an evaluative judgment may be also exemplified in terms of a traffic between a demand and a response that involves utterances and judgments but does not also coincide with them (Waldenfels 1996). In particular, as our own concern lies with the case of vulnerable adult groups, the intervention helped us realize that homelessness should be interpreted in terms of the traffic that develops between certain demands and certain responses. And b) we also need a theory of emotions not as erratic and irresponsible but as what is mostly indicative of the fabric of the first person point of view and capable of speaking the language of reason. As Griffiths writes in distinguishing emotion from beliefs, we should not revert to the traditional view in thinking that they are totally unrelated (cf. Griffiths 1984, p. 224).

4 Emotions in Education

The idea that failing to include emotions in the educational process violates somehow the very essence of education itself finds additional support by the Aristotelian account of epistemology and philosophy of mind. In the ancient Greek language emotions and feelings, signified by the term *pathos* (passion), are instances of a subject (or an agent) being acted upon, of what is experienced by the subject. In thinking of emotions such as fear, anger, desire, pleasure and pain, Aristotle is thinking of a subject that is frightened, angry, desiring, in pleasure or in pain. For Aristotle, whenever I experience an emotion, there is definitely something affecting me. Or, "...I am being acted upon in some way, where the concept of being acted upon is reciprocal to that of my acting in some way" (Kosman 1999, p. 105). The oppositions between action and passion, acting and being acted upon comprise, for Aristotle, a duality of reciprocal concepts or terms that

both represent the fundamental principle of human activity. Human activity includes, apparently, both acting and being acted upon; it includes the dialectical unity of *poiein* and *paschein*, this means that an active human being is an agent when it is seen as both subject (i.e. as acting) and object (i.e. as being acted upon).

Now, if we shift the emphasis to education, in the light of Aristotle, we should stress that teaching and learning are two kinds of activity in which the realizations of their goals is not simply the transmission and the possession of knowledge and the analogous unemotional expression and mechanistic behaviour of individuals as mere transmitters or receptors. The Aristotelian idea, the *ergon*, i.e. the distinctive activity of human organisms, is not only their sheer behaviour in a certain way but also and most profoundly, that they behave that way out of a certain character, out of engaging their emotions and dispositions. Teaching and learning are modes of human activities in the fundamental dual sense of both acting and being acted upon. Education, then, should also be an issue of educating the emotions as well as of rendering the emotions key-players in the educational space. Recognizing and cultivating emotions should be seen to fall within the domain of our educational concerns. As we do not have direct control over our feelings and emotions and, in this sense, they are not chosen by us, we do have control over the actions that establish the virtues or the right dispositions as the source of our feelings and emotions in appropriate ways, times and circumstances. So although, in a rather narrow sense, we are not responsible for feelings and emotions, in a broader sense education renders us responsible for our character, as the dispositional source of our emotional life, which renders us, in its turn, responsible for our activities.

So Aristotle led us explicitly to the notion that emotions are intentional, or with a cognitive content and Nancy Sherman (1989) pointed out by looking into his *The Art of Rhetoric* (where Aristotle teaches us how to manipulate people's emotions by altering their judgments or beliefs on which they are based): "What Aristotle doesn't fully appreciate is that emotions can change and develop through continuing clarification of the stories that inform them... or tendencies to feel anger or fear or shame can shift as we make more explicit to ourselves just what the beliefs are that rationalize those emotions..." (Sherman 1989, p. 234). By adhering to a phenomenology of emotions, we deal with emotions in a way necessary and compelling for embodied historical creatures that inhabit the world.

Here comes Waldenfels' theory about responsive phenomenology, his stories of the Other, often the vulnerable and suffering Other, not in a Socratic fashion of exercising intense rational *elenchus* but as sincere demands which yearn for our responsivity. The Aristotelian pathway of *phronesis* may also clarify a lot about

human emotions and put light to the conclusions from the educational intervention with the homeless people about the need to respond their stories in a way that implies understanding, accepting, sharing viewpoints and empowering them. Avoiding any kind of criticism on their stories we received their stories and their emotions as their experiences of what happens to them, with a certain sense of “regard” (*Achtung, Beachtung*) that is not and cannot be exhausted in terms of speech act theory, i.e. in the propositional content of the claims involved. As Waldenfels suggests: “Giving an answer is not exhausted by the answer given” and some lines later “no answer is also a response” (Waldenfels 2003, p. 31 f.). Emotions are an excellent reminder that human beings are not answering machines but animals that respond.

5 The Educational Pilot Program for the Homeless

Being lost for years into the so-called conflict between rationality and sentimentalism, emotions have been in the centre of educational research, especially the one which concerns underage students in sectors like the aim and the content of education, the effects and conditions of learning and the children’s general development (Griffiths 1984). However, in adult education, the picture is almost unchanged even if the learning conditions, the teaching practices, the educator’s theoretical readiness and the constitutional establishment set a fruitful background for analogous research. Inevitably, this situation lies to the education of vulnerable adults together with the poor amount of the educational opportunities offered to them and the undifferentiated educational content they receive. Taken this for granted, one purpose of this paper is to introduce the decisive role of emotions in adult learning and educational programs that refer to the needs of social vulnerable people, in case of the homeless.

Being in the edge of existence, salient emotions such as anxiety, despair and fear are an everyday routine for most of them and closely related to their getting older, the danger of being victimized, their being accustomed to a normality of unproductiveness or meaninglessness, the loss of a positive future perspective and mainly the regret and sorrow of the missing representation of what “home” is (Αντωνίου 2014). Thus it was inevitable for someone to expect that these emotions would arise during a pilot educational intervention¹ and that they would

¹ It was a five week educational program for homeless adults held for a first time in Greece at October 2015 in the city of Thessaloniki under the scientific supervision of the Department of Educational and Social Policy of the University of Macedonia with the collaboration of Municipality of Thessaloniki and a local NGO.

intervene to the effects and findings, even if the main purpose of the project was to assess the cognitive, psychological and organizational conditions for a larger scale intervention with the same vulnerable group. Based in a core belief that in the field of adult education vulnerable groups should be treated with respect for their immanent rights and an ethos of responsivity in the fashion described earlier (Waldenfels' work), were being set the following objectives: 1) psychological and social empowerment, 2) emotional expressiveness, 3) professional and economic replacement, 4) reconnection with the social fabric and 5) acquaintance with the wide field of adult education.

For a five week period thirteen homeless people, who benefited from the municipal social welfare services, attended twenty hours of introductory courses per week on eight thematic courses i.e. Economics & Business, Art & Artefact, Adult Education, Vocational Guidance, Computers for Beginners, English as second language, Psychological Empowerment, Social & Political Education. As an attempt to reduce emotional distress given the lack of educational readiness on behalf of the homeless and the lack of any prior experience with homeless people on behalf of the educators, we set two preparatory meetings. For the educators, the academic team and the NGO provided them with guidance on the characteristics of the target group and the requirements of the program. For the target group, the concept was a smooth introduction to the principles and rules of the program.

Being one of the objectives, the inclusion of emotions in the educational process, some precautionary measures had been taken in order to secure this as best as possible. For example, all the educators were asked to re-visit the basic tenets of the phenomenological theory, i.e. the legitimacy of the subject and its experiences, the appeal to emotional and bodily expression, the importance of space (home) and time for self-identity and the belongingness to real living situations. In the aspect of the content were chosen themes such as art and artefact, history of art, drama and psychological support which encourage emotional expression. Concerning the teaching methods design they were informed of the homeless reluctance to trust other homeless and that they were being accustomed to strictly behavioristic educational environments.

All the educators were also asked to keep a journal with written accounts about their personal experience and emotional alterations during these classes but this was something that only nine out of the twenty-four educators commit to. Moreover, only four out of these nine educators remained faithful to the phenomenology of emotions and undertook, rather enthusiastically, the task of including emotions in their teaching as much as possible. Perhaps it is not accidental that these four educators were teaching art, drama, psychological empowerment and rights and citizenship. Out of these nine educators, three were emotionally

blocked or indifferent and displayed enormous concern for the cognitive part of their responsibilities. They were involved in teaching themes such as computing and vocational guidance. In fact, they responded with great care and zeal in order to transmit, rather behaviouristically, their knowledge to the students. Two educators provoked a general displeasure (confirming, unfortunately, Waldenfels' saying that "no response is also a response"), because they had, simply, failed to understand and recognize the ontological and social burdens of homelessness and vulnerability in general; therefore, they remained faithful to a cluster of prejudices about "normality" that passes to their interaction with the students. It was sheer negativity that characterized mostly their stance during the program and not simply the absence of any emotions on their behalf.

Coming to the feedback journals, they often concluded plain and ambiguous remarks about their emotions "*this climate provoked positive emotions to me also*" (Michael), "*my sense is that all this was a good introduction and a positive experience*" (Alexandra). Others end up to record only the students' point of view "*some of them are so disappointed, they believe it doesn't worth trying...in a way this belief was rather fixed*" (Sofia), or flung themselves into superficial and easy explanations about unwanted behaviours remaining focused on the cognitive aspect of the program: "*having (sic the students) differentiated cognitive level causes problems to the pace of the course*" with rare remarks about eye contact, gestures etc. Emotionally responsive was the attitude of the art educators even though they used unfamiliar teaching methods (such as the "Theater of the Oppressed" in the drama class or learning history through paintings) to this group. During a drama workshop, the educator wrote down "*some of them had fun, even if they were complaining "what are we doing now? Are we children?"*", "*I kept on encouraging them by taking part f myself till they finally participated laughingly in both spirit and body. Even when tiredness took some of them over, they complained but never gave up the effort*".

At the end of the program, a feedback meeting was held with the educators in order to compare their previous accounts to the new recorded observations. They seemed to be more expressive and emotionally involved in the process. Hence, it was necessary to take notice on: a) their concerns regarding the efficiency of the didactic methods they had chosen for the specific group; b) their thoughtfulness about the emotional impact of their appearance or image (dressing, posture etc.) on people lacking basic facilities for taking care of their personal hygiene "*I thought that if I wore perfume this would make them feel sad because this would remind them of the days when they enjoyed the same*"; c) the appropriateness of the language they used and especially the characterization "homeless" "*every time I was about to pronounce "homeless people", I stopped and wondered whether I could*

come up with another word to replace it", *"what would happen if words such as family, home, job, food slipped out of my mouth?*", *"Would that depress anyone...?"*; d) the discomfort or even fear, some of them felt, due to various misconceptions and prejudices about the homeless people, coming from dominant images in the mass media and e) the surprise they felt at the personal interaction of the homeless people and their responsivity during each class.

With regard to the students of the program, undeniably their comments did not confirm the initial assumptions about the negative emotions. Based to their assessment we must highlight the strong sense of acceptance and openness they felt which they attributed to the stability, the certainty and the regularity of the program. Emotions such as fear and despair were not witnessed by anyone at any stage. As they incessantly said, for them being in an educational set was, mainly, a *"pleasant interval"*. It filled them with excitement, kept their mind vivid, positive and interactive but at the same time brought sadness and disappointment for the forthcoming end of the procedure.

A remarkable account for their emotional involvement came from the journal of Evi, the educator of Economics which describes the progressive improvement to their relationship. Evi pointed out their lively interest in the content of her topic, the terms of their communication and their desire to express their opinion. After the first meeting Evi wrote *"They dislike to be called homeless, they asked me not to mention this word, as other educators did. They prefer to be seen only as fellow men/women. They are ready to discuss their experiences without insulting anybody. They are gentle and they ask the same back. They reacted when we talked about fictional or constructed business scenario (a usual material of case studies in teaching non-vulnerable groups) and asked for real and practical knowledge that is derived from Greek businesses reality, in the era of recession. They need somebody to encourage them and reinforce their self-confidence; they do not like a distanced and cool educator, as they told"*. After the second meeting, she expressed a friendlier and less suspicious approach as a response to her effort to establish interpersonal relationships with them. This mellowed the students' denial to be exposed to some team learning activities apart from lectures. Finally, at the last meeting, she was thrilled and pointed out that *"it was the friendliest, most familiar and the best environment ever"*, *"all of them contributed to the class, even those that were rather silent or unwilling to participate before. We have had the most constructive discussions about economics and the working sector. I noticed that they remembered what we had said in the past; they had worked on it, they had questions and reported things that had been mentioned in the program. They often made additions to what I said and drew connections upon my exposition of previous evidence"* and *"My experience surpassed all expectations!"*.

Another educator, Michael, mentioned as positive the chance he had to meet them in a city tour that was organized by the program because it worked as an ice breaker: *“At our next meeting, we met again in the classroom; it was evident that we kept on smiling to each other... this climate provoked positive emotions to me too”*. Sofia mentioned that *“firm beliefs emerged, through discussion, about their exclusion from the labour market and their difficulties due to their lack of experience and, especially, of qualified skills. Some of them are so frustrated that they believe it isn’t worth trying...in a way, they were committed to this belief. Others regarded themselves as deprived and confessed that they rest assured on this belief.”*

As far as the participants were concerned, five of them responded to a personal interview which aimed to highlight their personal point of view and were analyzed in accordance with the principles of the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). As it came forth participants were active during the educational process and they ascribed their positive emotions to: a) the pleasant socialization as were being accepted and recognized again, b) the gradual increase of their attention in class (comments, criticism and suggestions), c) the program’s variety especially with the optional cultural activities (museum and city walks, theater watching etc.) and d) their exposure to new teaching methods (team working, theatrical education practices, debates etc.).

Their frustration came upon at times when a discrepancy appeared in the daily schedule (changes in time or in the classroom), when an educator seemed to be demanding (at least more than they could handle) and when everyday worries prevented their concentration. At Alkis’ report, there is a characteristic quote: *“the brain doesn’t function...it doesn’t think. (Q: It chooses not to think?) No, it isn’t able to think, because it has to get rest (9 s. pause); it’s a difficult phase, I can say (coughing)...You can’t function because...you know why?... In order, let’s say, to turn the TV on, I have to push the button, the remote control, shouldn’t I? If the button is missing, you can’t press anything (pause). By saying “the button” I mean being relaxed”*. Of course, there were two attendants who were discreetly hostile, either by accusing the educators as misinformed about the real social and economic situation either by pursuing their still option coloured in dark. Both of them had in common that in their previous housed-life, they were living in a comfortable financial situation and they were still in the phase of disappointment, anger and denial. So, although it was earlier said that this had been a pleasant interval for them, it was also obvious that the continuing predicament of homelessness had an erosive effect upon their participation, their ability to concentrate “rest their mind” and their educational interest.

6 Conclusions

All the above delineation gave prominence to the imbalance between the crucial role that emotions should hold in the essence of Adult Education and the devaluation they are being undergone in the altar of fast-track skill improvement training programs. Even if cognitivism still overshadows the reality of teaching there is a conceptual space for meeting and engagement in a fruitful dialogue with phenomenology. The educational intervention with homeless confirmed that an emotional responsive adult education for vulnerable groups is feasible if the designers and the educators of the program embrace the basic principles of phenomenological education together with good knowledge about vulnerability and educational and social inclusion. The intervention offered valuable information on the need to: a) restore a relationship of genuine responsiveness between educators and adult vulnerable learners and b) introduce the emotional aspect in the educational procedure on two levels: Firstly, the didactic practices should be designed on the basis of a serious concern for the expression of emotions, important for self-empowerment. Secondly, educators should be also emotionally expressive, as this informed and influenced their interactions with the students. This may be, practically, exemplified: a) by acquiring an informed and richer sense of self-understanding, b) in the language they use and c) in their choice of the appropriate educational practices or “gestures” by means of which they realize their goals. Gestures of this kind may take the form of bodily contact, eye contact and emotional expressiveness.

Furthermore, any future intervention on vulnerable groups should, practically, commit itself to the following tasks: a) emphasis should be drawn on broader and artistic subjects (such as art and drama, philosophical counselling and psychological empowerment, citizenship and democratic education) that leave enough space for emotions, b) teaching methodology should be enriched with innovative techniques, c) educators must be experienced, not to say “baptized”, to phenomenologically driven educational philosophies and, finally, d) to be found sincere supporters of such a program as the current context in adult education is either emotionally indifferent or even hostile to such approaches.

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