RESEARCH

Ilse Helbrecht *Editor*

Gentrification and Resistance

Researching Displacement Processes and Adaption Strategies

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We dedicate this book to displaced people,

for their voices too often go unheard.

Acknowledgements

When it succeeds, the unity of teaching and research can be so rewarding! This book speaks to the possibility of uniting the academic duty of lecturing and the joy of research. I would like to thank the wonderful former students who accompanied me on the long journey from seminar to seminar to book publication. Beginning in the summer semester of 2012, we explored gentrification and displacement in a series of modules in the Masters program "Geography of Urbanization" at the Humboldt University of Berlin. These seminars—in which there was intense debate and collaboration in the classroom—led to the chapters in this collection. During these classes I was, time and time again, deeply impressed by the persistence and commitment of the students to work hard and transform their project reports into publishable papers. This inspiring experience will remain with me, and help me to continue searching for the synergies between research and teaching. A heartfelt thanks also goes to Matthias Bernt, Daniel Förste, Andrej Holm, and Guido Schulz for enriching what was originally a student project with their contributions. For the English edition of the book I am very much indebted to a group of talented translators who were assembled by Sandra Lustig. And last but not least: I am enormously grateful for the kindness, prudence, reliability and all encompassing support of Francesca Weber-Newth. She was so valuable in the production of this English edition, that it simply would not have been possible without her. She is a postdoc in my wonderful cultural and social geography department at the Humboldt University of Berlin. I am grateful and humbled to have such gifted young scholars around me.

Ilse Helbrecht

Contents

Gentrification and Displacement

Ilse Helbrecht

Gentrification, displacement, skyrocketing rents—aside from the ever-present topic of refugees, no other issue in urban development in Germany has attracted as much attention in recent years as this. Since the 2008 financial crisis—and with the new-found, old love of investors for (residential) real estate as a lucrative investment, real estate prices in many cities have been spiraling upward, with many critics warning of the risk of a speculative bubble. Accelerated by the ongoing trend toward metropolitanization and reurbanization, the urban housing markets in conurbations such as Munich, Hamburg, Cologne, Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, and Leipzig are suffering from intensifying competition. Debates on the problem are widespread throughout the world, focusing on cities such as London, New York, Hong Kong, Seoul, and Santiago de Chile (Smith 2002; Ley and Teo 2014; Lees et al. 2016). High-income groups are displacing lower-income residents, especially from neighborhoods in city centers. Against the backdrop of an income gap that is widening in many Western countries and that has made social polarization a tangible aspect of the everyday city life, good, inexpensive housing is not only scarce in urban areas, but is fiercely fought over (Holm 2010).

For more than fifty years, urban researchers have been explaining the underlying processes in pleasingly context-sensitive and theoretically nuanced ways. Beginning with Ruth Glass (1964) and her seminal definition of gentrification, researchers have produced a large number of empirical studies and conceptual findings worldwide. However, despite all of this scholarly insight and expertise, they have focused on only one side of this urban revitalization process. For a long time in urban research, gentrification has been competently examined solely from the perspective of renewal (see Helbrecht 1996; Ley 1996). A variety of questions have been posed and answered: Who are the pioneers of gentrification? What factors make a neighborhood attractive for the gentrifiers? Who arrives after them? What real estate conditions are prerequisites (rent gaps, etc.)? What forms and phases of gentrification can be observed? How does gentrification change a neighborhood's commercial structure ("commercial gentrification")? Common to all of these questions—and

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also to the answers formulated by the international research community—is the exclusive interest in the social, functional, and architectural renewal of urban spaces. Whether from a sociological, geographical, ethnological, or urban planning perspective, the field of urban studies has long been preoccupied with *explaining* gentrification and thus with elucidating the root causes of its processes, forms, and phenomena.

What is almost entirely overlooked are the *consequences* of gentrification for the displaced population (Slater 2009; Atkinson et al. 2011; Butler et al. 2013). Courageous pioneering attempts in the 1980s to shed light on the demographic characteristics of the displaced people and the scope of displacement (Henig 1980; Gale 1985) attracted almost no followers—and thus had no impact. More than 30 years ago, Peter Marcuse extensively defined and differentiated various forms of displacement (Marcuse 1985, p. 204ff.), yet empirical studies and valid findings in this field are a rarity today. As Tom Slater succinctly writes, "There is next to nothing published on the experiences of non-gentrifying groups living in the neighborhoods into which the much-researched cosmopolitan middle classes are arriving en masse" (Slater 2006, p. 743). And just as we know little about the people who have remained in their old neighborhoods, we know even less about those who were forced out as a result of renewal and displacement. The only recent study to look at the consequences of gentrification for the low-status groups who remain in their neighborhoods was undertaken by the Australian geographers Kate S. Shaw and Iris W. Hagemans. Using Melbourne as a case study, the two researchers conclude that even in places where low-status populations are able to remain in a gentrified neighborhood because of public housing, they nevertheless suffer from a sense of alienation and uprootedness due to gentrification pressures. In summary, the authors write: "This research shows that secure housing is not sufficient to alleviate the pressure of displacement on low-income residents in gentrifying areas. Although these residents remain in place, the class remake produces a sense of loss of place: of entitlement to be there and be catered for" (Shaw and Hagemans 2015, p. 33).

Thus, as a displacement process, gentrification has grave consequences for the people affected. However, we have far too little scholarly knowledge about both extent and nature of these consequences. Urban research is a one-eyed cyclops that operates with an enormous intellectual bias because it observes only the upgrading aspect of the gentrification process while ignoring the aspect of displacement. From a scholarly perspective, this is both untenable and has no basis in reason. Furthermore, for urban policy, this (thematic) "displacement" of displacement is just as tragic as it is consequential. After all, gentrification is by no means a smooth, conflict-free process that we can observe only from a scientific remove. Rather, it is a process of displacement, a process in which

power is wielded, one that discriminates against the poor segments of the population. From the start of the scholarly debate on the topic (and even in Ruth Glass's original definition from 1964), gentrification has been seen as a *displacement process* in which high-status segments of the population displace low-status groups and existing buildings are upgraded (Blasius 2004, p. 23). This type of social-spatial process, which consists exclusively in the assertion of the locational interests of the economically stronger groups at the expense of the economically weaker, is per se political. It is per se explosive. And it is per se a threat to the urban life of a city. After all, as the classical urban theorist Henri Lefèbvre (1990) pointed out, segregation and separation are the enemies of urbanization.

Gentrification displaces and separates. It segregates the social strata of a city along the social-spatial axis of wealth. As a result, the peripheries of many city centers are now gentrified—they have become home to the new middle and upper classes. A "city of enclaves" is threatening to form (Helbrecht 2009).

Two important questions remain: Where do the displaced residents go? And what does it mean for them to be displaced from their traditional neighborhoods? It is precisely these two questions that we examine in this collection.

In contrast to previous international urban research, which includes few empirical studies on the destinations of the people displaced from gentrified neighborhoods (Atkinson 2001; Slater 2006; Atkinson et al. 2011), our team in Berlin—the current gentrification capital of Germany, where, over the last five years, real estate prices and rents have increased more rapidly on a percentage basis than in any other city in the country—set out to identify the areas that have attracted the displaced residents and the housing forms they have chosen. Using methods typically used in the field of criminology, drawing on methodologically innovative tools as well as traditional instruments (e.g., questionnaires and official statistics), we determined the whereabouts of the displaced residents and studied their housing biographies and their distribution patterns both before and after gentrification. I write “we” because, as part of this project, the students in a master's program at Humboldt University of Berlin produced unique empirical findings together with me as their professor.

Where do displaced residents move? This was the question that guided our study. The different essays in this collection illustrate a central finding from a variety of perspectives:

1) Yes, gentrification is a displacement process that forces people to move involuntarily.
2) This displacement is often perceived as an enormous burden because, with the loss of their neighborhood, the residents lose many neighborly

ties, social networks, forms of support, familiar routines and experiences, and even vitally important emotional security.

3) The displaced residents actively attempt to fight gentrification and remain in their neighborhoods as long as possible using sophisticated "remain" strategies.
4) These remain strategies lead them to accept poorer housing conditions. Their determination to remain in the neighborhood is linked to a significant reduction in housing quality, taking the form, for example, of over-occupied apartments.
5) We can empirically describe a clear social-spatial spiral of gentrification in Berlin that is spreading from the center outward.
6) The "bow waves" of this displacement process are engulfing the entire city center, neighborhood by neighborhood, in which around one million people live.
7) The government is playing an increasingly important role not only as a cause of these displacement processes but also as the provider of potential solutions.

In the area of subsidized rental housing, regional policies in Berlin have been a major cause of a new type of rent gap, which we call the "state-made rental gap" (see Ertelt et al. 2017 in this collection). The concept of a state-made rental gap is new to the literature and describes an earnings gap that results not from free market processes, but is created by the state (albeit unintentionally) as a result of certain conditions in subsidized rental housing, which is currently causing extensive displacement processes in Berlin. Thus, displacement has its roots not only in the free market processes of supply, demand, and price formation, but also in (misjudged) policy decisions.

Gentrification is contested and controversial. There are political and academic opponents—as well as advocates—of the process. Nevertheless, I believe that as long as our academically rigorous, comparative international studies are focused exclusively on the causes of gentrification—as has predominantly been the case so far—we will not get to the heart of the political problem associated with it. We can view gentrification comprehensively only if we broaden the focus to include the consequences of gentrification processes for the displaced people. Only then can we evaluate it from both a scholarly and political perspective as an urban development process with two components: the renewal of neighborhoods and the displacement of people. Anyone who fails to recognize the significance of displacement will not be in an analytical position to describe and understand gentrification processes in a comprehensive fashion or to politically shape them: "Underestimating displacement involves high costs

for theoretical understanding of neighborhood change and even higher tolls for poor and working-class residents" (Newman and Wyly 2006, p. 51).

Where do the displaced people move to? And what does displacement mean for them? These are two central questions in gentrification research that have been almost completely ignored in the debate so far. There are certainly good scholarly reasons for the researchers' current blindness to the perspective and plight of the displaced people. As the main reason for this oversight, researchers are correct to emphasize the considerable empirical difficulties that immediately crop up in attempts to study displacement and the displaced (Atkinson 2000). After all, it is the very nature of the beast that the displaced people leave a neighborhood as a result of gentrification dynamics. It is therefore difficult to find and question them. How can we interview the people who lived in a neighborhood three or eight years before it was gentrified? How can we find them in the first place? And how can we distinguish those who were unwillingly displaced from those who were willing to go?

An additional reason that this important empirical research field has been neglected is that a number of urban researchers have minimized the problem of displacement. Chris Hamnett (2003), for example, vehemently argues that gentrification in London has not involved a displacement process, but has been caused by the overall shrinking of the working class in relation to the growth of the new middle classes. According to him, what has taken place is not a "displacement" of socially weaker groups in the city, but rather their "replacement" by the new, upwardly mobile middle classes (Hamnett 2003, p. 2424). This theory correctly emphasizes the change in both employment and social structures as a result of tertiarization and globalization. Even David Ley described this transition from the industrial to the postindustrial city as a cause of gentrification (Ley 1996). However, what Hamnett overlooks in his argument is that the dynamics of social-structural change and social-spatial displacement unfold simultaneously.

It is thus the conceptual (and at times even ideological) challenges, combined with nearly insurmountable methodological and practical problems, that are responsible for the dearth of studies about the displaced people. It is much easier to emprically investigate the urban pioneers and gentrifiers who come, often remain, and visibly change neighborhoods.

For precisely this reason, in the seminar accompanying the "Geography of Urbanization" Masters program at the Humboldt University Berlin, we took it upon ourselves to explore new avenues in our quest to find the displaced residents. This book seeks to shed light on the other side of gentrification. Our hope is that scholars and policymakers will increasingly consider both aspects of gentrification in the future, viewing it as a revitalization *and* a displacement

process in their theoretical reflections and in practical decisions concerning urban development.

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Gentrification Hotspots and Displacement in Berlin A Quantitative Analysis

Christian Döring and Klaus Ulbricht

1 Introduction

"We will create more affordable apartments for all Berliners. To this end, we will increase the state-owned housing stock of Berlin to 300,000 units" (SPD election platform, 2011). The SPD embarked on the election campaign for the Berlin Senate with this campaign promise in 2011. It refers to a problem that has intensified in Berlin and elsewhere, namely an increasingly strained housing market.

Berlin's housing market is currently characterized by a surge in demand in all market segments and a significant shortage, especially in the lower rental price segment (IBB 2012, p. 15ff.). The result is declining vacancy rates, higher rents, and a tightened supply of affordable housing for lower-income households, especially in central locations (Krajewski 2013, p. 22). In addition, supplementary expenses (for utilities etc.) are rising and increasing the financial pressure on Berlin's renters (Fröhlich and Schönball 2012).

The reasons for these developments are many and diverse; both birth rates and net migration into Berlin are developing in a positive direction. As a result, the population is growing. It will increase by 254,000 by 2030 according to the median population projection, provided Berlin's economic development remains positive, the city consolidates its image as an attractive place to live and work, and new housing is provided through new construction (SenStadtUm 2012a; SenStadtUm 2012b). Another global cause for population growth in city centers is their increasing economic importance and, with respect to residential preferences, their high attractiveness for various population groups (Dangschat 1990, p. 69ff.; more extensively: Helbrecht 1996, p. 16ff.). The processes and developments mentioned do not, however, result in an even distribution of social groups in city centers, but rather their fragmentation along socioeconomic characteristics (Krajewski 2013, p. 21). There is a danger that this may bring about a segregation process that displaces people with a weaker socioeconomic status

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from their previous places of residence, simultaneously excluding them from participation processes for spatial reasons and undermining the integrating function of the urban social mix; consequently, it must also be considered a process of exclusion (Häußermann et al. 2004, p. 33). Helbrecht (2009) calls this danger of social exclusion on the basis of spatial segregation processes a "city of enclaves."

At this point, the term gentrification is unavoidable. Gentrification has become a buzzword in discussions about substantial sociospatial changes within cities and urban neighborhoods. Besides its academic meaning there is now an emotional charge to the term. This is caused by concerns about rent increases induced by property value appreciation and residents' fear of displacement, investors' and speculators' expectations of higher returns, and politicans' hope of attracting residents with a stronger socioeconomic status to stabilize problem areas (Sumka 1976, p. 480f.). Especially fear of displacement motivates residents to resist and protest against planned gentrification projects, as expressed by the initiative "Mediaspree versenken!" ("Sink the Mediaspree project!" http://www.ms-versenken.org/) or the renters' group "I love Kotti" (see Scheer 2017 in this volume).

Much is known about the causes and driving forces of urban redevelopment and its actors; in contrast, the group of people displaced and negatively affected by this process, and the places to which they relocate, provide considerable potential for academic examination (see Helbrecht 2017 in this volume).

The goal of this chapter[1] is to study the places from which the displaced are driven out and the places to which they relocate. We carried out a comprehensive analysis that views the entire urban space of Berlin, using the work by Atkinson et al. (2011) for orientation in terms of methodology. A statistical secondary analysis and a migration analysis were performed in an attempt to answer the following research questions:

- In which areas of Berlin are the gentrification processes most intensive?
- Accordingly, what are potential places where displacement occurs?
- To which areas do the potentially displaced relocate, and can displacement to Berlin's urban fringe be proven?

1 We thank Felix Czarnetzki for his dedicated support in the conceptual phase and when reviewing and gathering data for the present work.

2 Clarification of Terms: Gentrification and Displacement

2.1 Gentrification

Many different, complementary, or partly contradictory definitions of gentrification, each with a particular focus depending on the research interest, are to be found in the literature (Friedrichs 1996, p. 13ff.). They range from very simple and stripped-down definitions naming just one key element to holistic definitions attempting to grasp gentrification in all its dimensions (Glatter 2007, p. 7).

This chapter considers gentrification to be a multidimensional, multistep process in which the value of urban neighborhoods is increased. Thus, it is in the category of the holistic definitions. The four dimensions are architectural, social, functional, and symbolic gentrification (Glatter 2007, p. 7; Krajewski 2013, p. 23). The aspect of social gentrification, to which other authors legitimately reduce the concept of gentrification, is ascribed an integral role here: the displacement of lower-status population groups by higher-status ones (Helbrecht 1996, p. 3; Friedrichs 1996, p. 14; Holm 2010, p. 7; Marcuse 1985, p. 198f.). Some authors use the neutral term 'exchange' in place of displacement and shed doubt on the notion that this aspect is an inherent element of gentrification (Glatter 2007, p. 8f.; Holm 2010, p. 7).

The designation of the four dimensions of gentrification was the first stage in an attempt to structure the various processes along the course of events that constitutes gentrification. Social gentrification subsumes the processes of exchanging residents and the resulting consequences regarding the social and demographic structure for the area in question. The architectural dimension includes the processes of renewal and increasing the value of the existing building stock through upgrading, the conversion of rental apartments to individually owned ones, and the improvement of the residential infrastructure. Functional gentrification refers to the changing structures of commercial activity within a neighborhood, especially the influx of high-quality service and retailing businesses, flagship stores, restaurants, and cultural institutions. Symbolic gentrification refers to the image generated and conveyed by political and business communities, residents, culture, tourism, and media (Krajewski 2013, p. 25; Holm 2010, p. 9).

The concept of a progression of phases was the second stage in attempting to structure the processes of gentrification. According to the highly simplified ideal type, the process of gentrification takes place in a double cycle of invasion and succession. In the first step, pioneers, usually students, artists, and people with a high amount of cultural capital, move into a residential area and displace some of the long-established population groups or move into vacant units. Gentrifiers follow in a second step, generally people with considerable economic capital,

and in turn displace longtime residents as well as pioneers (Helbrecht 1996, p. 5; Friedrichs 1996, p. 16; Holm 2010, p. 9ff.). The model has been criticized widely. The main arguments are directed toward the strict sequence of the phases as well as the insufficient description of the groups furthering the gentrification process, namely the pioneers and the gentrifiers (Helbrecht 1996, p. 5ff.; Friedrichs 1996, p. 16f.). However, no alternative has emerged that would better model gentrification in its chronological sequences with the actors involved. For this reason, we reverted to the model of the double invasion-succession cycle as an explicitly simplified representation of the gentrification process.

2.2 Displacement

The concept of displacement must be conceptualized in the context of gentrification. According to Grier and Grier (1978), displacement occurs "when any household is forced to move from its residence by conditions that affect the dwelling or its immediate surroundings, and that: 1) are beyond the household's reasonable ability to control or prevent; 2) occur despite the household's having met all previously imposed conditions of occupancy; and 3) make continued occupancy by that household impossible, hazardous, or unaffordable" (Grier and Grier 1978 as quoted in Marcuse 1985, p. 205).

Besides defining the concept of displacement, identifying the most vulnerable groups is also important. In their study on measuring gentrification and displacement in Melbourne and Sydney, Atkinson et al. (2011) describe groups they consider most vulnerable. These groups include households with just one employed person in unskilled employment, households of older retired persons, and unemployed persons under 65 (ibid.). This corresponds to the groups often mentioned in the academic literature as those displaced by gentrification, whereby they are often spoken of generally and with little differentiation as "lower-income groups" (Sumka 1976, p. 485), i.e., poorer households (Holm 2011, p. 18).

3 Methodology

The works by Atkinson (2000) and Atkinson et al. (2011) provided the key impulse for the methodology in our approach to answering our research questions. Atkinson et al. (2011) performed a two-step analysis to measure displacement. First, gentrification areas were defined, then the areas to which the displaced relocate were identified through migration analysis.

These two steps were adopted and modified here. The first step involved an analysis, supported by indicators and indices, of the urban area of Berlin, in

order to localize the areas with the most intensive gentrification. This was followed by the second step, a migration analysis of an area which the calculated indices showed to be particularly affected by gentrification and which was thus presumably also impacted by displacement.

We used Berlin's 60 prognosis areas as the spatial reference units. All parts of the city had to be included in the comparison to enable proper assessment of the extent of gentrification. For this reason, all 60 prognosis areas were examined (see Friedrichs 1996, p. 35).

3.1 Indicators and Construction of the Indices

Capturing the multidimensional concept of gentrification required consideration of more than one indicator in the study. The construction of multiple indices enables conflation and structured assessment of the indicators (Schnell et al. 1999, p. 160). For this reason, three additive indices that take account of the dimensions of gentrification were formed here.

In order to assess the gentrification processes, the selection of indicators integrates demographic and housing-sector aspects as well as socioeconomic ones (Friedrichs 1996, p. 21; Holm 2010, p. 62). The following indicators were used for this purpose:

1. Average volume of migration 2006 to 2009 (SenStadt 2006 and 2011a),
2. Percentage of the population resident for at least 5 years 2005 to 2010 (SenStadt 2011b),
3. Development of the 18-to-35 age group 2007 to 2011 (StatIS-BBB 2013),
4. Development of the 35-to-45 age group 2007 to 2011 (StatIS-BBB 2013),
5. Development of the number of long-term unemployed 2006 to 2009 (SenStadt 2007a and 2010),
6. Development of the percentage of foreign nationals 2006 to 2011 (Senstadt 2007b and StatIS-BBB 2013),
7. Development of purchasing power 2008 to 2011 (GSW Immobilien AG 2009, 2012),
8. Development of rents (excluding heating and utilities) for new rentals 2008 to 2011 (GSW Immobilien AG 2009, 2012),
9. Conversion of rental apartments to individually owned apartments 2005 to 2010 (SenStadt 2011b).

The percentage change compared with the relevant base year was calculated for each indicator and each prognosis area from the data gathered. The Berlin aver-

age was calculated from the percentage changes of all the prognosis areas in Berlin. When transforming the percentage changes into points, the Berlin average was assigned zero points, for orientation (Figure 1). Positive point values were assigned to signify the development of an indicator that implies gentrification.



Figure 1: Method for assigning points (source: authors)

The indicators were synthesized to form three indices by adding the relevant points. The mobility index I(M) was formed from indicators (1) and (2); the index for the change in population structure I(B) from indicators (3) to (7); and the housing-sector index I(W) from indicators (8) and (9) to enable observation of the changes separately. The indices were oriented toward the dimensions of gentrification mentioned in section 2.1. The two dimensions mentioned last, functional and symbolic gentrification, could not be examined in this way, however, because symbolic gentrification cannot be captured through secondary statistical analysis and small-scale data was not available for functional gentrification.

The results are shown in maps generated using ArcGIS software. The data for the basemaps were derived from the geo-database of the GIS server of the Geography Department of the Humboldt University of Berlin.

3.2 Migration Analysis

The migration analysis was conducted for the prognosis area Kreuzberg Ost using data from DEGEWO,[2] which owns housing in this area. The reasons for selecting this prognosis area lay in the results of the indices on gentrification as well as data availability.

The numbers of households moving into and out of the area were recorded. The destinations of the households moving out were identified and presented in maps. Studying this process at the level of postal codes permitted documentation of small-scale changes too.

2 DEGEWO is one of the leading housing companies in Berlin. We thank DEGEWO for providing us with the data and for processing it.

4 Assessment of the Indices

The thematic structuring of the indicators in three indices enabled differentiated observation and interpretation of the overlapping processes comprising the complex gentrification process.

4.1 Evaluation of the Mobility Index I(M)

The mobility index I(M), shown in Figure 2, is a measure of relocations within a prognosis area. The following indicators were used to calculate it:

1. Average mobility volume 2004 to 2009: Areas with the most registrations and deregistrations in the official population registry have the most points.
2. Percentage of the population resident for at least five years 2005 to 2010: Areas with the lowest percentages have the most points.



Figure 2: Mobility index I(M) (source: authors, on the basis of the authors' own calculations)

The areas with the highest I(M) values are Neukölln, Wedding, and Friedrichshain Ost. Zentrum, Kreuzberg Ost and Süd, Moabit, Gesundbrunnen, Nördlicher and Südlicher Prenzlauer Berg, as well as Treptow-Köpenick 2 also show high mobility. The prognosis areas of the third category, with an I(M) of one to three points, still have above-average mobility in relation to the average of 0.7 points. They include, among others, Kreuzberg Nord, Friedrichshain West, Schöneberg Nord and Süd, CW (Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf) 3, Reinickendorf Ost, Pankow, and Lichtenberg.

The mobility index depicts a disparity between the center and the periphery in terms of population mobility, i.e., as a rule, mobility is higher in the center than at the urban edges. The reasons for this lie in the higher percentage of renters in central locations compared with owners (of houses) at the urban edge as well as in the demographic compositions of the prognosis areas.

Mobility is an important sign of changes in an area (Atkinson et al. 2011, p. 2), but says nothing about the direction of change. In the sense of revitalization and displacement, gentrification is linked most of all to increasing incomes and enhancing population status.

4.2 Evaluation of the Index for the Change in Population Structure I(B)



Figure 3: Index for the change in population structure I(B) (source: authors, on the basis of the authors' own calculations)

The index for the change in population structure I(B) is a measure of the socio-economic and demographic changes toward gentrification in the population of an area (Figure 3). It includes both changes from relocations into and out of an area and changes in the existing population (e.g., reductions in unemployment or increases in income).

The index was calculated using the following indicators:

3. Development of the 18-to-35 age group 2007 to 2011: Areas with the highest increases of this age group's percentage have the most points.
4. Development of the 35-to-45 age group 2007 to 2011: Areas with the highest increases of this age group have the most points.

5. Development of the number of long-term unemployed 2006 to 2009: Areas with the greatest reductions have the most points.
6. Development of the percentage of foreign nationals 2006 to 2010: Areas with the greatest reductions have the highest number of points.
7. Development of purchasing power 2008 to 2011: Areas with the highest increases have the most points.

The area with the largest changes is Gesundbrunnen. The second category includes Kreuzberg Nord and Ost, Neukölln, Moabit, and Wedding, the third Nördlicher Prenzlauer Berg, Kreuzberg Süd, and Schöneberg Nord. In contrast, the changes in the population structures of Friedrichshain Ost and to a somewhat greater degree Südlicher Prenzlauer Berg are below-average or low.

4.3 Evaluation of the Housing-Sector Index I(W)

The housing-sector index I(W) serves as a measure of changes in the situation in the housing sector (Figure 4). It shows on the one hand that conditions for private investments are improving, and on the other hand that conditions for low-income households are worsening precisely for this reason.



Figure 4: Housing-sector index I(W) (source: authors, on the basis of the authors' own calculations)

The index includes the following indicators:

8. Development of rents (excluding heating and utilities) for new rentals 2008 to 2011: Areas with the highest increase of rents for new rentals have the most points.
9. Conversion of rental apartments to individually owned apartments 2005 to 2010: Areas with the most points have the highest percentage of apartments converted from rentals to individually owned ones.

The highest value is found in Kreuzberg Süd. With the average at 1.3 points, above-average values are also to be seen in Kreuzberg Ost, Zentrum, Friedrichshain Ost and West, Nördlicher and Südlicher Prenzlauer Berg, Moabit, Schöneberg Süd, Friedenau, Neukölln, Lichtenberg Nord, and Buch. Kreuzberg Nord and Gesundbrunnen are average, Wedding is below-average.

4.4 Conclusions

Table 1 shows the ranking of the prognosis areas for the three indices I(M), I(B), and I(W). Those prognosis areas were selected for in-depth analysis of spatially differentiated phases of gentrification between 2007 and 2011, the period under consideration, which display a high value (rank 1 to 8) for at least one of the three indices and which are located within or on the Berlin S-Bahn ring—in other words, in the area described by urban researchers as Berlin's "inner-city area."



Table 1: Ranking of the indices I(M), I(B), and I(W) (source: authors)

These prognosis areas are shown in Table 2. The following groups were formed to differentiate the phases of gentrification:

a) Initial Phase of Gentrification: Early Pioneer Phase

This gentrification phase is characterized by a high I(B), a medium to low I(W), and a high to medium I(M). There is a large change in the population structure, strong to medium mobility, and the weakest change of underlying conditions in the housing sector observed in the areas in Table 2. This group of prognosis areas includes Gesundbrunnen, Kreuzberg Nord, Wedding, and Schöneberg Nord.

These areas are in an early gentrification phase which we call the early pioneer phase. It is probable that pioneers are moving in and displacing low-status households, whereby rent increases and conversions from rentals to individually owned units have not yet progressed much. This is surely still true, to a lesser degree, of Schöneberg Nord since the change in the population structure is not quite as strong there.

b) Middle Gentrification Phase: Pioneer to Gentrifier Phase

In this gentrification phase, I(B) and I(W) are high, and I(M) is high to medium. These areas are characterized by large changes in the population structure and the underlying conditions in the housing sector as well as strong to medium mobility. The large change in the population structure supports the notion of pioneers moving in, and the large change of I(W) toward rent increases and conversion of rental units to individually owned ones is an indication of gentrifier households with higher incomes moving in. In other words, the gentrification status in these areas extends from the pioneer phase to a beginning gentrifier phase during the period under examination from 2007 to 2011. An influx of pioneers and gentrifiers, displacing low-income and low-status households, is probable here. This is true of the prognosis areas Neukölln, Moabit, Kreuzberg Ost, Nördlicher Prenzlauer Berg, and Kreuzberg Süd. It is difficult to differentiate between these areas, but given the gradation of I(B), it can be concluded that Neukölln, Moabit, and Kreuzberg Ost are more in the pioneer phase, and Nördlicher Prenzlauer Berg and Kreuzberg Süd are more in the gentrifier phase.

Prognosis area	**I(M)** Mobility [+9 to -4 points] Points (rank)	**I(B)** Change in Population [+16 to -9 points] Points (rank)	**I(W)** Housing sector [+7 to -5 points] Points (rank)
Early pioneer phase			
Areas with	high to medium	high	medium to low
Gesundbrunnen	5 (6)	16 (1)	3 (13)
Kreuzberg Nord	3 (12)	13 (2)	2 (18)
Wedding	7 (2)	10 (4)	0 (37)
Schöneberg Nord	3 (12)	5 (8)	2 (18)
Pioneer to gentrification phase			
Areas with	high to medium	high	high
Neukölln	7 (2)	12 (3)	4 (8)
Moabit	5 (6)	10 (4)	4 (8)
Kreuzberg Ost	5 (6)	10 (4)	5 (4)
Nördlicher Prenzlauer Berg	6 (4)	5 (8)	5 (4)
Kreuzberg Süd	2 (10)	7 (7)	7 (1)
Gentrification phase to supergentrification			
Areas with	high	medium to low	high
Zentrum	5 (6)	3 (10)	4 (8)
Friedrichshain Ost	9 (1)	-3 (41)	6 (2)
Südlicher Prenzlauer Berg	6 (4)	-6 (58)	6 (2)
Cannot be clearly assigned to a category			
Areas with	medium	medium	high
Friedrichshain West	3 (12)	2 (13)	4 (8)
Schöneberg Süd	3 (12)	3 (10)	5 (4)

"high": ranks 1 to 8; "medium": ranks 9 to 20; "low": ranks 21+

Table 2: Phases of gentrification in the prognosis areas, 2007 to 2011 (source: authors)

c) Later Gentrification Phase: Gentrifier Phase to Supergentrification

This gentrification phase displays medium to low I(B) and high I(W) as well as high I(M). Compared with the other groups, the changes to the population structure are smallest, despite high mobility, and the underlying conditions in the housing sector show large changes concerning rent increases and conversion of rental units to individually owned ones. This is true of the prognosis areas Zentrum, Friedrichshain Ost, and Südlicher Prenzlauer Berg.

In these areas, the gentrification status is partly in the gentrifier phase, and partly already in the phase of supergentrification (Lees 2003, as cited in Holm 2011, p. 218). In this late gentrification phase, middle- to high-income households are displaced by households with very high incomes and high status. This is true in particular of Friedrichshain Ost and Südlicher Prenzlauer Berg, which show the smallest changes in the population structure.

d) Prognosis Areas that Cannot Be Clearly Assigned to a Category

Friedrichshain West and Schöneberg Süd. These areas are characterized by a medium I(B), a high I(W), and a medium I(M). Such index values may mean a small amount of migration that does not imply large changes to the population structure as well as large rent increases and numerous conversions of rental units to individually owned ones. They cannot be assigned to a particular gentrification phase.



Figure 5: Gentrification phases 2007 to 2011 (source: authors)

The gentrification phases from 2007 to 2011 are summarized in Figure 5. It also becomes clear here that the three prognosis areas in Kreuzberg display different amounts of change, whereby the degree of gentrification increases from Kreuzberg Nord to Kreuzberg Ost to Kreuzberg Süd. Kreuzberg is also the object of more in-depth examinations in this volume.

Following Holm's analysis of gentrification in Berlin, the process occurs temporally in the form of waves and spatially clockwise, as a gentrification circle (Holm 2011, p. 215f.). Accordingly, the pioneer phase of gentrification began in Kreuzberg (1987), then shifted to Mitte (1992), Prenzlauer Berg (1997), Friedrichshain (2002), and Neukölln (2007), and took hold of previously

modernized Kreuzberg last (ibid.). In addition to these areas, we identified Moabit, Wedding, Gesundbrunnen, and Schöneberg Nord as impacted by gentrification during the period under examination from 2007 to 2011, thus going beyond the gentrification circle described by Holm. Accordingly, these areas must be included in the gentrification circle, which must be expanded to a gentrification spiral as shown in Figure 6.



Figure 6: Berlin gentrification spiral (source: authors, changed following Holm 2011)

5 Migration Analysis

One area with high values for all three indices, in which gentrification and displacement are therefore likely, was studied in more detail. This enabled us to complement the findings from the area data with an analysis of the people moving in and out, and to pursue the question as to the destination of those displaced.

The analysis was based on data from the municipal housing company DEGEWO, which has 1,128 apartments in the prognosis area Kreuzberg Ost in the postal code area 10997 near Mariannenplatz. From 2006 to 2011, an average of 125 households per year moved in, and 110 households moved away; the

vacancy rate was reduced from 4.3 to 0.6%. It must be taken into account that DEGEWO as a municipal housing company must apply certain prescribed rules when renting out apartments and working with tenants e.g., those with *Wohnberechtigungsscheine* (documents certifying eligibility to rent subsidized rental units). Consequently, DEGEWO's rental strategy is different from those of private landlords. For example, rent increases for new rental contracts were significantly more moderate than those prevailing in the area: for new rentals in Kreuzberg Ost, DEGEWO charged €5.36 rent (excluding heating and utilities) per m² in 2008 and €5.77 in 2011; the average in the area was €6.25 in 2008 and €7.77 (ranging from €5.05 to €11.74) in 2011. However, there were also apartments in Kreuzberg Ost which were offered for rent at a lower price than DEGEWO apartments (GSW Immobilien AG 2009, 2012).

Since only a very small number of households moved from Kreuzberg Ost to other DEGEWO housing (just two households in 2011), we can assume that the destinations of those moving out were practically not influenced at all by the housing company.

5.1 Destination Areas of People moving out of DEGEWO Housing in Kreuzberg Ost, 2006 to 2011

From 2006 to 2011, a total of 660 households moved out of DEGEWO housing in Kreuzberg Ost. Averaged across these years, 90.9% of the households remained in Berlin, 5.2% moved to Germany's western *Länder*, 2.0% to Germany's eastern *Länder*, and 1.9% out of Germany.

The postal codes of the destination areas were available for those moving within Berlin. Figures 7 and 8 show the destination areas within Berlin, both at the level of prognosis areas and at the smaller-scale level of postal code areas.



Figure 7: Destination areas of people moving out of DEGEWO housing in Kreuzberg Ost (2006 to 2011) in % (source: authors, with DEGEWO data)

The main destinations were the prognosis areas Kreuzberg Ost (38.4%), Kreuzberg Nord (14.5%), and Neukölln (8.9%). A total of 25.8% of those moving out relocated to the prognosis areas with 1.01 to 5.0% each; and a total of 12.4% to the prognosis areas with 0.01 to 1.0% each.



Figure 8: Destination areas of people moving out of DEGEWO housing in Kreuzberg Ost (2006 to 2011), in %, at the level of postal code areas
(source: authors, with DEGEWO data)

The following percentages at the level of postal code areas emerge from the analysis of people moving out (Figure 8):

Kreuzberg Ost	postal code 10997	29.8%
	postal code 10999	8.6%
Kreuzberg Nord	postal code 10969	12.5%

This means that roughly 30% of the households moving out remained in the same postal code area. In Kreuzberg Nord, the preferred destination is the area with the postal code 10969. Apartments were offered for rent in this area in 2011 with an average rent (excluding heating and utilities) of €6.40 per m² (ranging from €4.82 to €10.36) (GSW Immobilien AG 2012).

In total, what emerges is that households that relocated—whether or not they were displaced—remained in the same or neighboring parts of the city. Reasonably priced rental offers obviously played a decisive role. It cannot be proven that moving to the urban edge was common, since only a total of 10.5% of the households moving out relocated to prognosis areas there. Of these, the prognosis areas Gropiusstadt (2.6%), Britz/Buckow (1.6%), and Buckow Nord/Rudow (1.3%) alone, which are at the urban edge of the district of Neukölln, comprised 5.5%. A total of 5% of the households moving out relocated to the other prognosis areas at the urban edge.

6 Interim Conclusion, Migration Analysis

The high number of households moving in and out of the DEGEWO apartments in Kreuzberg Ost confirms what emerged from the area data, namely the high mobility in the prognosis area Kreuzberg Ost.

Gentrification is described as a process "concerning an urban neighborhood" (Helbrecht 1996, p. 3), whereby the question as to the size of the "urban neighborhood" has not been answered to date. The example of the DEGEWO renters shows that more than 50% of the households moving out relocated to a new apartment not more than two kilometers away (Figures 7 and 8: Relocations within Kreuzberg Ost and to Kreuzberg Nord). Another 10% remain within just five kilometers (Figures 7 and 8: Relocations to Neukölln). More than 20% of those moving out even stay in their postal code areas (Figure 8). In other words, gentrification and displacement have occurred to a considerable degree at a small spatial scale. It is possible that even postal code areas are too large for examining these processes. When explaining the methodological problems of

previous displacement analyses, Holm (2010, p. 62) points out, among other things, that relocations to the immediate surroundings are not taken into account.

Atkinson defines gentrification areas in Melbourne and Sydney with a diameter of roughly five kilometers (Atkinson et al. 2011, p. 18f.). He studies the households moving out of these areas, but not those relocating within the "G locations." Yet depending on the household type (e.g., employed or unemployed renters, owner-occupiers), 40 to 60% move to neighboring areas, and 14 to 27% in Melbourne and 4 to 12% in Sydney move to the urban edge (ibid., p. 30, 36).

Of the DEGEWO households moving away, only a small fraction totaling about 10% (60 of 600 households) moved to the 24 prognosis areas located at Berlin's urban edge. The only cluster (2.6%) was in the prognosis area Gropiusstadt, where these households obviously found a neighborhood similar to that in Kreuzberg Ost.

7 Conclusion and Outlook

Where in Berlin is the process of gentrification currently most intense? And to which areas are the displaced being displaced? To answer these questions, we analyzed the change processes from 2007 to 2011 on the basis of area data for all prognosis areas in Berlin. Each of the values for the changes in the indicators were related to the Berlin average, and three indices—for mobility, changes in population structure, and changes of the underlying conditions in the housing sector—were synthesized from the indicators. This enabled us to identify areas with above-average gentrification tendencies in various stages of the process of gentrification, which were thus the areas with the highest probability of displacement (Figure 5). They included the prognosis areas Neukölln, Kreuzberg Ost, and Kreuzberg Nord. The present analysis shows—for the first time for Berlin –that intense gentrification processes are taking place in Moabit, Wedding, Gesundbrunnen, and to a lesser degree in Schöneberg Nord. These areas go significantly beyond the gentrification circle described so far by Andrej Holm, which includes only neighborhoods in Mitte, Prenzlauer Berg, Friedrichshain, Northern Neukölln, and Kreuzberg in the spatial shifts of pioneer phases of gentrification in Berlin (Holm 2011, p. 214; Krajewski 2013, p. 25). Accordingly, we expanded Holm's gentrification circle to what we call a "Berlin gentrification spiral" (Figure 6). Further analyses are required for the prognosis areas Moabit, Wedding, Gesundbrunnen, and Schöneberg Nord to more precisely characterize the early pioneer phase of gentrification occurring there.

For a later gentrification phase characterized by the construction of luxury apartment complexes and the influx of more elite and globally networked individuals with very high incomes, we found high values for the housing-sector index, whereby the population structure no longer showed large changes. This was true of the areas Friedrichshain Ost, Südlicher Prenzlauer Berg, and Zentrum. Holm (2011, p. 218) described this gentrification phase for Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg as the phase of "supergentrification."

A clear differentiation emerged for the prognosis areas in Kreuzberg: the degree of gentrification increases from Kreuzberg Nord to Kreuzberg Ost to Kreuzberg Süd. The analysis of data from the 1990s for Berlin's districts showed both upgrading and downgrading occurring in Kreuzberg (Krätke and Borst 2000, p. 263). By now, significant gentrification is taking place here, the intensity of which differs between the three areas of Kreuzberg.

In a second empirical step, we conducted a differentiated migration analysis for the housing stock of the DEGEWO housing company in Kreuzberg Ost in an attempt to describe the gentrification process, which is discernable from the changes in the area data for the prognosis area Kreuzberg Ost overall, in more detail with respect to the spatial displacement processes it entails. The result is that more than 50% of those moving away relocated into a presumably cheaper or more fitting apartment no more than two kilometers away—that is, in the same or a neighboring part of the city. This means that gentrification and displacement are (still) to a considerable degree processes taking place at a small spatial scale. People want to remain in the surroundings they are accustomed to or to move to similar neighborhoods. Only a small percentage of households relocated to more distant places in Berlin. Direct displacement from central locations to the urban edges could not be proven on a wider scale. However, this cannot be ruled out in the future if rental and real estate prices continue to rise and the housing market in central locations is increasingly in the high-priced segment (on "bow waves" of gentrification in Berlin, see the contribution by Förste and Bernt 2017 in this volume).

The insight remains that, if displacement of low-status population to the urban edge occurs in the context of gentrification, then it must take place in multiple relocations. In other words, chains of relocations must be analyzed in order to study the phenomenon in more detail. The extent to which relocation behavior is specific to particular demographic and socioeconomic characteristics is examined in "Where Do They Go? Where Do They Want to Go? Displacement from Kreuzberg" (Koch et al. 2017 in this volume) through surveys of residents of Kreuzberg. It emerged that age, form of household, and educational level certainly would influence the choice of the location of residence in case of displacement.

Many Berlin neighborhoods are experiencing a rapid process of change. Suitable data is insufficient for proving, explaining, and guiding this process at a sufficiently small scale. For example, small-scale data on educational level and professional status of the population does not exist.

By conducting the area and migration analyses, we were able to identify areas with intensive gentrification and to describe the spatial behavior of relocating households. We were not able to differentiate between voluntary and forced relocations; the quantitative analysis reaches its limits here. An in-depth examination of displacement requires inclusion of aspects at the individual level as well. Not only are the changed conditions of the residence or the residential surroundings decisive, but the personal preferences of those on the demand and the supply sides also influence relocation decisions (Krätke and Borst 2000, p. 159). How does a household respond to the pressure arising from a gentrification process? Such questions can be answered only through the individual method on the basis of surveys. In the chapter "The State-Made Rental Gap" (Ertelt et al. 2017 in this volume), this topic is examined using buildings in subsidized rental housing in Kreuzberg and Neukölln where the effects of gentrification and displacement are particularly striking because of the discontinuation of follow-on financing for subsidized rental housing. "Basic financing" (*Grundförderung*) to subsidize loans for the construction of housing for low-income tenants was limited to a period of 15 years, with an additional 15 years of "follow-up financing" (*Anschlussförderung*) granted if certain criteria were fulfilled. In 2003 the Berlin Senate voted to phase out all follow-up financing.

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The Black Box of Displacement
Do People Remain in their Neighborhoods or Relocate to the Periphery?

Daniel Förste and Matthias Bernt

Ever since gentrification has been debated in Berlin, it has been accompanied by heated exchanges over where the displaced residents move. There are essentially two positions. The first is exemplified by the assessment offered by a senior government official in 1991. In a *Spiegel* interview, this official predicted that Berlin would experience "a new period of economic expansion, both striking and brutal"—a period in which the prefabricated concrete-slab housing developments on the northern and eastern peripheries of the city would serve as "vacuum cleaners" sucking residents from the city center (Spiegel 1991, p. 112–114). The thesis that poor households would migrate to peripheral areas has persisted ever since and continues to be cited as a menacing scenario in the current debate—often with reference to the French *banlieues*. The second position, which stands in sharp contrast to this, has been defended by scholars such as Häußermann and Kapphan (2002) and Häußermann et al. (2002) in the debate on gentrification in Prenzlauer Berg. According to this thesis, due to the markedly different quality of housing in most of the central areas of Berlin, lower-income households are more likely to be displaced to poorer-quality apartments (e.g., in rear buildings, on ground floors, and in new buildings constructed on vacant lots) than to areas farther away. Instead of a displacement to the outskirts of the city, there is a "lifestyle displacement" (Häußermann et al. 2002).

So far, both positions have been insufficiently supported by data, for which there are various reasons. First, the study of migration processes within cities is generally a difficult undertaking in German urban research. This is presumably due to the high level of abstraction and the multivariability of the individual relocations. In addition, migration research faces the problem that spatial links can be established only indirectly and selectively and the theoretical foundations explaining migration processes can be applied only to migration between cities (Friedrichs and Nonnenmacher 2007). Thus, in analyses of migration, we cannot automatically draw conclusions about individual motives. Second, the majority of essays about gentrification processes focus on one specific neighborhood and

I. Helbrecht, *Gentrification and Resistance*,
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on classifying the new arrivals (for a critical discussion, see Bernt et al. 2010). These essays only examine the changes in the neighborhoods suspected of being gentrified and thus direct attention to the groups entering the areas. Both types of studies are undertaken with the help of a grid defining the different groups of actors. They often ignore the question of where the displaced residents move, although this question is crucial for a critical perspective on gentrification processes. Additionally, the studies often have a short temporal perspective. Interval-based studies such as those carried out by Karin Wiest and André Hill in Leipzig (Wiest and Hill 2004) are more the exception than the rule. In this context, we only rarely see a research approach that links developments in parts of the city with those in the entire city and looks at migration movements in the entire city from the perspective of a single neighborhood over a longer period of time.

This is the starting point of our research, which examines out-migration from the district of Prenzlauer Berg between 1994 and 2010. Its goal is to gain insight into the direction of displacement processes. In order to answer this question, we drew on the data on relocations from the local population register (*Einwohnermelderegister*), which were analyzed with respect to destinations, migration volumes and share of total migration. What emerged were the most important migration flows and their dynamics. Because we used aggregate data that contained all the possible relocations from Prenzlauer Berg, it was not possible to generate clear findings about the displacement of low-income households.[1] However, it is beyond dispute among researchers that modernization and the accompanying displacement processes must be seen as "mobility catalysts" (Holm 2006). In the course of modernization and renovation in Prenzlauer Berg, between 60 to 80 percent of residents moved out of the affected residential buildings (Häußermann et al. 2002; Holm 2006). Thus, a high intensity of modernization is probably reflected in the migration statistics. In addition, based on the direction of migration, it is possible to assess the capacity of the destination areas to absorb new arrivals. For financial reasons, poorer households, in particular, face limitations when selecting areas to live. This is why changes in the destinations of migration from Prenzlauer Berg must be examined in relation to the development of rents in the destination neighborhoods.

Prenzlauer Berg is best suited to this type of study because it was one of the first areas to be gentrified in Berlin, which means it can be investigated in a extended time series study. In addition, it can be linked to the heated scholarly debate on the consequences of gentrification.

1 Particularly because the quantitative measurement of displacement processes is generally a difficult task from a methodological and conceptual perspective (Atkinson 2000).

If we analyze migration from Prenzlauer Berg over the course of time on the basis of destination areas, we see that neither of the positions outlined above truly hits the nail on the head. What emerges is a complex picture in which various migration flows converge, each subject to different conditions.

1 Gentrification Phases in Prenzlauer Berg

Given this complex situation, it is important to adopt a temporal approach that views migration dynamics against the backdrop of changes in modernization activities, the number of available apartments, tenant protection regulations, and so on. In this regard, there has been enormous upheaval over the past 20 years, particularly in Prenzlauer Berg, which provides the context for migration. Andrej Holm has played an important role in demonstrating that the gentrification of Prenzlauer Berg has not followed a simple market model, but has taken place in partially overlapping phases that are closely linked to changes in government redevelopment policy (Bernt 2003; Bernt and Holm 2005, 2009; Holm 2006, 2010, 2013). Roughly speaking, four phases can be distinguished:

In the first phase, lasting approximately until the mid-1990s, publicly funded modernization measures predominated. Because the process of restituting real estate to its original owners began only slowly, a backlog of investment ensued and the total volume of renovated buildings was rather small. In areas where modernization took place, it was financed chiefly by public funds and was subject to related rent and occupancy restrictions. In this period, lower-income groups were not displaced because of unaffordable rents. Quite the contrary—the ongoing migration was attributable to poor housing conditions. Migration was encouraged not only by the suburbanization process that started rapidly just after the fall of the Wall (Brake 2004; Matthiesen and Nuissl 2002), but also by the large scale construction of new apartments, especially in Pankow and Weißensee, which was rooted in expectations of a large population increase after German reunification.

The second phase, which began in the mid-1990s, was marked not only by a broad symbolic gentrification and the rapid influx of "pioneers" to Prenzlauer Berg, but above all by the enormous increase in privately funded renewal measures. These were often financed by tax write-offs and were thus not subject to rent or occupancy regulations. As a result, a strong focus on returns became the norm in the renewal investments in Prenzlauer Berg and resulted in clear differences in social structure between renovated and non-renovated buildings. As Häußermann et al. (2002) have shown, only a small percentage of residents remained in their apartments in the course of modernization. It was above all the

socially disadvantaged, less educated households that were displaced. As a result, the social structure of the neighborhoods changed significantly. Similar processes could be observed in other East Berlin redevelopment areas, though with a certain time lag. For example, the Spandauer Vorstadt in the district of Mitte, which borders Prenzlauer Berg, underwent a more sweeping gentrification process at an earlier stage than Prenzlauer Berg. Friedrichshain to the east, by contrast, became the focus a bit later.

With the start of the new millennium, there was an even stronger focus on returns in renewal projects in Prenzlauer Berg, for which there are various reasons. On the one hand, due to the worsening government budget crisis in the wake of the Berliner Bank scandal, the state of Berlin ended all of its funding programs for modernization and maintenance measures. On the other hand, in 2003, the Federal Administrative Court ruled that the maximum permissible rents (*Mietobergrenzen*) applicable to modernization measures in the district of Prenzlauer Berg were illegal. Hence, two key instruments for restricting rent rises after modernization had become invalid. This was especially problematic because modernization measures were increasingly being carried out in conjunction with the conversion of rental apartments into individually owned apartments. As a rule, the financing models were based on the sale of the tenantless apartments, meaning that this transformation process put enormous pressure on existing tenants. According to tenants' organizations and tenants' rights counseling centers, the result was that almost all of the residents were expelled in the course of modernization and the apartments were rented out at market rates. This development is reflected in studies of the social structure of different neighborhoods in Prenzlauer Berg, which demonstrate clear income differences between the tenants who came both before and after 2000 (e.g., asum 2012; PFE 2008). Due to the rapid population growth from 2007 onwards and the simultaneous increase in the number of households, almost all of Berlin experienced a housing crunch. Today, similar developments can be observed in the other areas of Berlin in which the gentrification processes of the 2000s increasingly became a mainstream phenomenon in urban development. Holm (2013) even speaks of a "gentrification circle" in which broad swaths of the center of Berlin have successively undergone gentrification (see both Figure 1 and also Döring and Ulbricht 2017 in this collection for more on the "Berlin gentrification spiral").

Over the past few years, renewal processes in Prenzlauer Berg have more or less ground to a halt. Most buildings have already been renovated and construction is taking place mainly in the luxury-building segment (Holm 2010) and in conjunction with co-housing projects, linked primarily to the development of vacant lots between existing buildings. The rent and occupancy restrictions that resulted from the funding programs of the early 1990s are successively expiring and the rents that are being asked are among the highest in Berlin. The niches

for low-income households are rapidly shrinking and the district is generally considered "closed" for poorer residents. These developments have gone hand in hand with both a rapid rise in rents throughout the city (Gewos 2012; GSW 2011; IBB 2011; Kholodilin and Mense 2012) and with the expansion of the initial gentrification and upgrading processes to include areas that were previously characterized by downward social mobility (e.g., Nord-Neukölln, Wedding, and Lichtenberg).



Figure 1: "Gentrification circle" in Berlin

2 Analysis of Migration Movements According to Destination Areas

This chapter examines the following questions:

1. What were the geographical patterns of migration from the Berlin district of Prenzlauer Berg between 1994 and 2010?
2. Are there links between the spatial-temporal migration patterns and the different gentrification phases in Prenzlauer Berg?
3. How can the different migration phases be explained? What role is played by changes in government modernization policies? What influence was exerted by the different developments on the apartment markets in the entire city?

The analysis is based on data from the comprehensive survey used to compile the population register statistics. In other words, the results have not been derived from estimates and can thus be considered representative. The analytical level was that of "statistical areas" (*statistische Gebiete*) with officially defined spatial structures. For Prenzlauer Berg, we analyzed the statistical areas of Schönhauser Allee-Nord (106), Prenzlauer Allee-Nord (107), and Schönhauser Allee-Süd (110), which form the core of the district. We first added together the relocations within and out of these three areas. Only relocations within the city were considered. The second step was to identify the 25 most frequent destination areas at the start (1994) and at the end (2010) of the 16-year investigation period. Because the data pertaining to the top 25 destinations include only some of the relocations and there were migration focuses within these areas, the third step was to define coherent influx areas. The basis of this work was the information on the predominant type of development structure that can be found in the development structure map in *IBB-Wohnungsmarktbericht 2009* (IBB 2010). This information was collected in a separate survey. The destination areas that were defined on the basis of this data are characterized by a similar residential development structure and account for around two-thirds of all migration from Prenzlauer Berg. In addition, we attempted to define areas that had approximately the same number of inhabitants and were roughly of the same size. This is why the areas of Hohenschönhausen-Lichtenberg and Marzahn-Hellersdorf, for example, were observed separately.

How did out-migration from Prenzlauer Berg develop? What were the destinations of the relocations and how did the list of destination areas change over time?

The analysis of migration data from the population register statistics makes clear that throughout the investigation period most of the examined relocations

took place within Prenzlauer Berg and thus within the same district. The second most popular destination for relocations away from Prenzlauer Berg was the southern section of Pankow and the district of Weißensee, which account for a large share of relocations in relation to total migration. The area of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg also absorbed a significant share of migration. Less relevant as destinations were Wedding and Neukölln, where a higher share of total migration can be observed only at the end of the investigation period. Nor was migration to the peripheral areas of Lichtenberg-Hohenschönhausen and Marzahn-Hellersdorf of importance. In contrast to Wedding and Neukölln, it even decreased over time.

Area under investigation	Share of migration in 1994 as a percentage of total migration	Share of migration in 2010 as a percentage of total migration
Prenzlauer Berg	30.8	34.1
Pankow-Weißensee	11.8	14.3
Lichtenberg-Hohenschönhausen	6.2	2.2
Marzahn-Hellersdorf	5.7	0.9
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg	5.0	6.9
Wedding	3.2	4.9
Neukölln	1.9	4.1
Other	35.3	32.6

Table 1: Areas under investigation and their share of total migration in 1994 and in 2010

The next section discusses migration in greater detail according to the destination areas. It focuses primarily on the question of whether there is a connection between the above-described changes in Prenzlauer Berg, the migration activities, and the apartment markets in the destination areas.

3 Relocation within the District of Prenzlauer Berg

As mentioned above, relocations within Prenzlauer Berg dominated migration activity during the entire 1994–2010 period. However, there were significant variations in the volume of migration. Initially, between 1995 and 1998, there

was a rapid increase in the number of relocations within the district. This ran parallel to the modernization activity that slowly got underway in 1994/95 and peaked just before the expiration of the special depreciation rules for real estate investments in eastern Germany in 1998. The modernization measures financed in this way apparently led to increased mobility, but this was largely confined to the district. Between 2001 and 2007, there continued to be a large number of relocations. In this phase, the old residents still managed to find living space within the district, though this appears to have started changing in 2007. The absolute number of relocations and their share of total migration declined. Here there is a close link to the modernization activities in Prenzlauer Berg and to developments on the district's apartment market: in the late 2000s most of the apartments in the district had already been renovated, so the number of new modernization measures fell off sharply. Relatively speaking, modernization became less important as a "mobility catalyst" (Holm 2006). At the same time, Prenzlauer Berg solidified its reputation as an attractive location on the apartment market, meaning new leases became unaffordable for lower-income groups. This is also why, even today, there are very few relocations within Prenzlauer Berg—people who are forced to leave their apartments are more likely to move out of the district than in the past. In summary, it can be said that during the entire period under investigation, residents who moved out of Prenzlauer Berg first made an attempt to stay and had less and less success as the apartment market became increasingly tight.



Figure 2: Relocation (moves) within the area of Prenzlauer Berg (absolute and in percent) (source: Berlin-Brandenburg Statistics Office, authors' calculations)

4 Relocation to Pankow-Weißensee



Figure 3: Migration from Prenzlauer Berg to the area of Pankow-Weißensee (absolute and in percent) (source: Berlin-Brandenburg Statistics Office, authors' calculations)

A characteristic feature of migration to Pankow-Weißensee is the sharp increase evident until the late 1990s, followed by a leveling off of migration numbers. Here, too, the increase in migration in the period up to 1998 can be linked to the peak of modernization activities in Prenzlauer Berg. Evidently, for the residents "mobilized" by modernization, the areas of Pankow and Weißensee, which adjoin Prenzlauer Berg, were a viable alternative that made it possible for them to remain close to their old neighborhoods. At the same time, in the 1990s, a significant number of new buildings were constructed in Pankow-Weißensee (even in the subsidized housing segment). In the mid-1990s, this led to a growing number of vacant apartments that could be rented by people moving out of Prenzlauer Berg. The number of completed buildings in Pankow-Weißensee, particularly in Area 153 (Pistoriusstraße) peaked at exactly the height of modernization in Prenzlauer Berg between 1996 and 1998.

A rapid decline in the number of relocations can be seen in the 1998–2002 period. On the one hand, this was due to the downturn in modernization measures in Prenzlauer Berg. On the other, it is attributable to the decline in the number of vacant apartments in the destination area after the termination of the Berlin government's funding program for new buildings. As can be seen in the continued slight decline in relocations (in terms of both absolute numbers and share of total migration), this trend gained further momentum between 2001 and 2007, when apartments became more scarce throughout Berlin. Since 2007 migration has remained nearly constant.

In summary, it can be said that Pankow and Weißensee have been comparatively popular residential areas for people moving from Prenzlauer Berg, but

that, at the same time, the importance of these areas as alternative neighborhoods has declined over time.

5 Relocation to Lichtenberg-Hohenschönhausen



Figure 4: Migration from Prenzlauer Berg to the area of Lichtenberg-Hohenschönhausen (absolute and in percent) (source: Berlin-Brandenburg Statistics Office, authors' calculations)

An examination of the relocations to the area of Lichtenberg-Hohenschönhausen, which is dominated by prefabricated housing, shows that the volume of migration was highest in the mid-1990s. The peak of out-migration coincided with the first development phase in Prenzlauer Berg, when modernization slowly got underway and poor housing conditions continued to be widespread. Apparently, at this time, the large housing developments continued to represent an attractive alternative to the rundown buildings with poor living conditions in many parts of Prenzlauer Berg. We can also assume that the population of Prenzlauer Berg, the majority of whom came from East Germany, had fewer cultural reservations about living in the prefabricated housing blocks on the edge of the city when facing a decision about where to move.

After 1997, there was a sharp decline in migration figures for Lichtenberg-Hohenschönhausen. This is true of both the absolute number of people moving to the district and their share of overall migration, which dropped by 4 percent. Since 2005 both values have remained low. As a result of the ongoing modernization of Prenzlauer Berg and the gentrification underway in the district, the importance of Lichtenberg-Hohenschönhausen as a destination area did not increase but declined.

6 Relocation to Marzahn-Hellersdorf



Figure 5: Migration from Prenzlauer Berg to the area of Marzahn-Hellersdorf (absolute and in percent) (source: Berlin-Brandenburg Statistics Office, authors' calculations)

Although Hellersdorf and Marzahn are farther away from the district of Prenzlauer Berg, similar patterns can be observed. In these areas, too, the highest values were reached in the 1990s and declined until 2001. In the ensuing period, seen as a share of total migration from Prenzlauer Berg, the number of relocations leveled off at around 2 percent. In this area, too, there was a very low level of alleged "poverty migration" from Prenzlauer Berg, despite perceptions of the general public and the media.

7 Relocation to Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg

What is noticeable about the relocations to Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg is the increase between 1994 and 2001. Here, too, there is a clear connection to the peak of modernization activities in Prenzlauer Berg. The destination of most of the relocations was the neighboring area of Friedrichshain, and until 2000 moves to Kreuzberg played only a secondary role. In the years up to 2007, the number of moves from Prenzlauer Berg to Friedrichhain-Kreuzberg remained stable at a high level. However, internal differentiation shows that moves to Kreuzberg became more important in this phase.

Interestingly, this shift was concurrent with the gentrification circle described by Andrej Holm. As modernization progressed in Prenzlauer Berg in the late 1990s, Friedrichshain was discovered as a new trendy neighborhood. However, in the further modernization process, the area was increasingly seen as "too slick" and the appeal of Kreuzberg increased by comparison.

Thus, migration to Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg appears to be based on two different mechanisms. On the one hand, the pattern observed in the analysis of migration to Pankow and Weißensee repeated itself here: most relocations were made to nearby neighborhoods as opposed to distant areas. On the other hand, an important factor for urban neighborhoods is their attractiveness for use by pioneers. At the very least, in the case of the pioneers leaving Prenzlauer Berg in the course of modernization, the symbolic gentrification and the enhancement of the cultural value of an area determined its attractiveness.



Figure 6: Migration from Prenzlauer Berg to the area of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (absolute and in percent) (source: Berlin-Brandenburg Statistics Office, authors' calculations)

8 Relocation to Wedding

Migration to Wedding has been subject to wide fluctuations that reflect the four gentrification phases in Prenzlauer Berg described above. Thus, there was an initial peak in the number of relocations from Prenzlauer Berg between 1994 and 1998, a period coincides with the peak of the mostly private modernization activities between 1996 and 1998. Migration figures declined until 2003, only to increase in the period afterward. Particularly striking is the rise in the number of people leaving Prenzlauer Berg for Wedding from 2007 onward. This development is surprisingly synchronous with the decrease in moves both within Prenzlauer Berg and to the areas of Pankow-Weißensee and Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. We can thus assume that, after 2008, the apartment market in Prenzlauer Berg—as well as the traditional alternative locations in Pankow, Weißensee, and Friedrichshain—was so full that even the Wedding neighborhoods that were previously seen as unattractive became more relevant.



Figure 7: Migration from Prenzlauer Berg to the area of Wedding (absolute and in percent) (source: Berlin-Brandenburg Statistics Office, authors' calculations)

9 Relocation to Nord-Neukölln



Figure 8: Migration from Prenzlauer Berg to the area of Nord-Neukölln (absolute and in percent) (source: Berlin-Brandenburg Statistics Office, authors' calculations)

The number of the people leaving Prenzlauer Berg for Nord-Neukölln has also been subject to fluctuations, yet as a whole it remained quite low until 2007. However, the period afterward saw a continuous increase, lasting almost until the end of the investigation period. Even if there was increased use by pioneers in individual neighborhoods that today bear resemblance to Prenzlauer Berg in the 1990s, Nord-Neukölln, like Wedding, has a difficult social structure. The rise in migration coincided with the third development phase in Prenzlauer Berg and there thus appears to be a connection to the shortage of living space in the

city center. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the new arrivals included the relatively non-homogenous group of artists, freelancers, and students who are typically described as pioneers of gentrification and for whom Prenzlauer Berg had become too conventional and boring. By contrast, Neukölln is highly attractive for this group, especially with its new bar scene and wide range of artists' activities (e.g., in connection with the opening of Tempelhof Airport as a public park).

10 Migration Structure

The aim of this study was to define geographical migration patterns on the basis of the different relocations from Prenzlauer Berg and to formulate theses about migration. The analysis has made it possible to formulate four theses concerning the relocations from Prenzlauer Berg:

10.1 Attempts to Remain in the Area

The first thesis assumes that renewal and modernization processes lead mainly to relocations within the district. This thesis was put forward by Hartmut Häußermann and Andreas Kapphan in the late 1990s (Häußermann and Kapphan 2002) and is based on the assumption that a local mix of different social groups was able to establish itself in Prenzlauer Berg.

This thesis is less relevant to the first phase of gentrification from 1994 to 1998 than to the other phases. However, we can assume that, even if suburban relocations to Brandenburg are left out of the equation, an important role was played not so much by the rents but by the still existing possibility of moving from Prenzlauer Berg to other areas.

The "remain" thesis can be verified above all for the second and third phase of gentrification. The share of residents remaining in the area during this period climbed to more than 40 percent of total migration. This changed once again during the fourth phase beginning in 2007. At that time, fewer people were able to find living space in Prenzlauer Berg and instead left the area. Hence, as modernization progresses, the remain thesis has increasingly less explanitary power.

In summary, it can be said that the thesis of an area-neutral displacement is tenable only as long as there is a corresponding supply of inexpensive apartments and reserve living space in an area. When this supply is exhausted—which was apparently the case for Prenzlauer Berg since the late 2000s—the explanation loses its power. All things considered, the thesis that people remain in their neighborhood is more applicable to the early phases of gentrification and becomes increasingly contrafactual as gentrification proceeds.

10.2 Migration to the Periphery

As discussed above, the second thesis concerning migration from Prenzlauer Berg is based on the assumption that people were displaced to the large housing developments on the city periphery.

This thesis assumes that due to the large amount of subsidized rental housing and the low appeal of living on the periphery, rents there can be kept at a level that is affordable for the displaced people. This displacement to the periphery is often seen as problematic because it can lead to a growing concentration of poorer households in specific areas where those from Prenzlauer Berg are moving.

However, the analysis of migration conducted in this study shows that this thesis is not empirically verifiable. It cannot be argued, with respect to any of the four gentrification phases, that a significant portion of residents of Prenzlauer Berg were directly displaced to the housing developments on the periphery of Berlin. Even in the early 1990s, the share of the people moving to the periphery stood at just 12 percent, and over the entire period under investigation it declined to 3 percent. This effect of migration was already relatively insignificant in the 1990s and became even less so in the period investigated.

Migration to areas characterized by many new buildings never accounted for more than a fraction of the total volume of migration and reached its peak before modernization had fully begun in Prenzlauer Berg. Relocations from Prenzlauer Berg to the large housing developments in the east occurred primarily during the first phase of modernization, but these moves were not so much the result of a displacement process as a reflection of a modernization backlog in the stock of old buildings in Prenzlauer Berg.

Since then, the number of people moving from Prenzlauer Berg to the city periphery has steadily declined. This number remained stable and low even in the third and fourth phases of gentrification. Since the mid-1990s, there has apparently been no group in Prenzlauer Berg that has considered living in the large housing developments in the east. So far, these large developments, known for their low rents, have played at best a secondary role as a refuge for the residents who have been displaced from Prenzlauer Berg by rising rents.

10.3 "The Bow Wave" of Modernization

A nuanced alternative to the dichotomy between "peripheral migration" and "relocations within the neighborhood" is the interpretation that views the moves from Prenzlauer Berg as a "bow wave of modernization." This metaphor was already in use in the 1970s to describe the developments set in motion by the large-scale urban redevelopment projects implemented at that time. The thesis of a bow wave assumes that low-income population groups are pushed outward

by modernization activities like the bow waves of a ship and that these groups move to the nearest buildings they can afford. The displaced residents search for a residential neighborhood where rents approximate those of their previous apartments, that have a similar character, and that, if possible, lie close to their old buildings. The explanatory approaches at the heart of this thesis view the preservation of the residents' lifestyle—or rather, their proximity to the previous centers of their lives and to the location of their social networks—as a key criterion for selecting a future place to live (Butler and Robson 2003; Häußermann and Siebel 1996).

In our analysis of the migration data, the great significance of relocations within Prenzlauer Berg and the large number of relocations to Pankow-Weißensee, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, and Wedding show the validity of this interpretation. All three areas are generally located in the direct vicinity of Prenzlauer Berg and have a similar urban structure. Moves to these areas can therefore be interpreted as an attempt to maintain existing spatial links and social networks and to avoid abandoning connections to the former place of residence.

It is above all the moves to Pankow and Weißensee that were significant in the first phase of gentrification. However, these moves were probably not so much a displacement as an escape from non-modernized buildings. Moves to Pankow and Weißensee also played a central role in the second phase of gentrification, with Friedrichshain serving as an additional destination. More than a quarter of the people leaving Prenzlauer Berg went to these areas. Inexpensive living space was apparently still available there at this time, which meant that some of the people leaving Prenzlauer Berg were able to avoid moving to socially problematic neighborhoods. In both phases, relocations to Wedding were an exception, as the social problems in this district evidently diminished its appeal. This changed as modernization progressed in Pankow, Weißensee, and Friedrichshain, which also became increasingly “tight” for those wanting to move from Prenzlauer Berg. Conversely, Wedding assumed growing importance as an alternative area. This was a novelty because Wedding—though situated in close proximity to Prenzlauer Berg—has a different social character than the other bow wave areas. It is a socially fragile district with many old buildings, where the problems of the poorer population are joined by the challenge of integrating migrants. Thus, the growing attraction of Wedding for people moving from Prenzlauer Berg points most of all to the difficulties of finding adequate apartments in the traditional alternative neighborhoods.

10.4 Pioneer Thesis

However, the bow wave thesis cannot explain how the housing biographies of the individual groups continue after they move to bow wave areas. This is where the concept of pioneers comes in as our fourth thesis. It examines the logic governing the relocation decisions of the groups of pioneers who are at the center of discussions in gentrification literature today.

Even early studies (Berry 1985; Clay 1979) assign a central role to artists, students, and creatives in the gentrification process. These urban pioneers are seen as a group with a high risk tolerance and a strong need to distinguish themselves, one that is constantly discovering new urban spaces. The pioneers establish a cultural infrastructure in these newly discovered spaces and thus prepare them for gentrification processes. In much of the work on the subject, the pioneers are seen as tragic figures because they are part of the renewal process in its early phase, but are later displaced by the developments that they themselves initiate.

The assumption of a highly mobile group of pioneers has explanatory power mainly for the changing destinations of the moves within the city center. Over time, the destinations of the people leaving Prenzlauer Berg underwent a shift, which proceeded along a semicircular arch from Friedrichshain and Kreuzberg to Nord-Neukölln.

In the areas we studied, we can demonstrate an initial phase of pioneer migration to Friedrichshain. As the migration figures make clear, the number of moves to Friedrichshain increased in the second gentrification phase between 1996 and 1998, when modernization initially peaked. By contrast, in the third phase between 2000 and 2005, there was an increase in the number of relocations to the Kreuzberg neighborhoods under study. After 2003, the number of people moving to Friedrichshain declined at the same time. This finding is consistent with the observations by Andrej Holm, who sees 2002 as marking peak use by pioneers in Friedrichshain.

The value of the pioneer thesis also becomes evident when we look at the migration figures for the neighborhoods in Neukölln. After 2007, these figures rose sharply. Here, too, there is a link to Andrej Holm's findings.

11 Conclusion

One finding of our study is that the two theses discussed in the general public and the research community—"remain in the area" versus "migration to the periphery"—have tended to lose their explanatory power as developments have progressed. They only describe snapshots in time. The hope that residents of

Prenzlauer Berg would remain in the district were never fulfilled, and nor did the extremely negative fears of a "banlieuization" come true. The model that offers significant explanatory power is the bow wave thesis—i.e., the idea that residents were displaced to affordable buildings nearby. Furthermore, our analysis of migration activity provides evidence for the pioneer thesis, according to which at least some of the displaced residents followed the caravan of symbolic gentrification processes.

While it would be useful to expand the inquiry to include other gentrified areas in Berlin, unfortunately it was not possible in this study due to the need to reduce complexity. This wider picture would have enabled us to draw a more complex picture that gives adequate consideration to the different temporal focuses of modernization, the different rent regulations, and the different priorities of funding policy. Furthermore, an analysis that encompassed multiple areas could provide reference points for an improved evaluation of the chain migration processes that are overlooked when the focus is limited to the out-migration area. Such an analysis could further flesh out the bow wave thesis.

The data we analyzed only point to the likelihood of developments. They do not include the social attributes of the people who left the district; hence, there is a lack of detail on household, social, and educational structures. As a result, the analysis of migration can provide only limited information on the social-structural characteristics of moves out of the district (for a qualitative analysis of housing biographies in Prenzlauer Berg, see Betancourt 2017 in this collection). The future could bring additional interpretations that differ from those proposed here. Another flaw in the data is that they do not allow us to recognize chain moves. These are relevant because it is quite conceivable that, although low-income households may not have been directly displaced from Prenzlauer Berg to the areas of large housing developments on the periphery, these households may have been displaced in several relocations across the city by the bow waves preceding modernization—only to end up in Lichtenberg-Hohenschönhausen or Marzahn-Hellersdorf. Currently, data privacy laws in Germany prohibit combinations of migration and social data that are not based on a data estimation method and that exist as a time series.

These analytical problems cannot be remedied by using the currently available data set. A deeper understanding of gentrification processes requires a research design that relies more heavily on primary surveys that link the collection of social attributes to the respective residential histories. Moreover, future studies should more closely interrelate gentrification cycles. For this purpose, it would be useful to combine migration analyses from all known gentrification areas. However, these methods are time-consuming and cannot be adopted without additional resources.

What our analysis makes clear, though, is that the use of an approach that focuses solely on changes in certain neighborhoods in its examination of gentrification is limited. What has become evident is that the processes of change in different urban areas are closely intertwined.

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Where Do They Go? Where Do They Want to Go? Displacement from Kreuzberg

Simon Koch, Marrike Kortus, Stephanie Schramm and Christine Stegner

The purpose of German urban planning law is to "take seriously the needs of a population and protect the people living and working in an area" (Tietzsch 1996, p. 19). That this goal is not always achieved is demonstrated by the effects of the gentrification processes currently observed in many German cities such as Munich and Berlin. Structural improvements to buildings and the development of entire areas have an influence on the conditions of adjoining buildings and neighboring quarters. Rising rents lead to price pressure, which long-established companies, stores and residents generally cannot afford, as a result of which they are forced out of their residential areas (Tietzsch 1996, p. 17).

For many of these people, the local neighborhood was the heart of their economic, social, and cultural life as well as their home (Tietzsch 1996, p. 12). Although the world is changing—networks are improving, more and more women are in full-time employment, technical and social services are developing ever faster—the home is not losing its importance. For many people it still represents the center of their private life (Häußermann and Siebel 2000, p. 44; Helbrecht 2013). The revitalization or upgrading of urban areas has a positive impact in terms of economics and urban development, but it also has a massive impact on the lives of inhabitants. Merely stopping houses decaying or renovating them would likely be considered desirable by many people, and of little relevance to their social situation. But the revitalization of whole areas, financed by private investors and public measures, exposes residents to the risk of displacement (Helbrecht 1996; Ley 1996; Holm 2012).

In this chapter we investigate the process of displacement in more detail. Unlike other research, which focuses on the reasons behind gentrification and the procedures involved, we concentrate here on the effects of the gentrification process. One particular question stands at the heart of our investigation—a question that has not been sufficiently addressed in the past (see Helbrecht 2017 in this volume): Where do displaced people move to in a process of gentrification?

Thanks in large part to the media, it is widely assumed that many less well-off households can no longer afford to live in inner-city areas and are being forced to move to outlying districts. It is argued that these displaced people risk

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stigmatization in the areas they move to (Rada, taz 2012). However, little scientific evidence exists for these assumptions (see Förste and Bernt 2017 in this volume). Indeed, no research exists into where residents affected by displacement move to. The aim of this chapter is to help close that gap.

The focus of our study is the Berlin district of Kreuzberg. Here, rents are currently rising faster than in any other district of Berlin. This is due to processes of revitalization previously observable in many other urban areas. Even in parts of Kreuzberg where rents remain low—for the time being, at least—residents are increasingly worried that they will be forced out of their apartments (Bax, taz 2012). Our research looks at the question of where they would move to were their fears to be realized.

To provide a clear basis for our investigation, we first discuss exactly what is meant by "gentrification" and "displacement", two theoretical terms widely used in the literature. We draw on the discourse about gentrification and research on emigration. Next we attempt to answer the research question, formulating a number of hypotheses and testing them against our empirical data. We also illustrate our results with maps. Finally, we critically discuss our findings.

1 Gentrification and Forced Mobility

Gentrification is currently a hot topic both in the press and among the general public. The term itself refers to the qualitative upgrading of urban residential districts and the accompanying displacement of low-income households by high-income households (Helbrecht 1996; Arikas 2004, p. 3; Atkinson et al. 2011, p. 1). Damian Arikas (2004) explains qualitative upgrading as meaning the modernization of existing housing, the creation of individually owned apartments, and the improvement of infrastructure (ibid., p. 3).

In the United States gentrification processes are generally explained by reference to market forces; in Europe, by contrast, a demand-based model is commonly employed (Marquardt 2006, p. 37). The European model refers to changing lifestyles and accompanying changes in living preferences, which in turn give rise to changes in demand for housing. New types of households, for example increasing numbers of single-person households and "DINKYs" (Double Income, No Kids Yet) create greater demand for city-center apartments. In addition, jobs have changed greatly in recent decades. Most working people are now employed in the service industry, which is mainly located in city-center areas. These population groups prefer to live in parts of the city that are both close to their place of work and have the necessary infrastructure to satisfy their consumer, cultural, and leisure needs (Ley 1996, p. 10; Marquardt 2006, p. 37f.).

Arikas (2004) and Howard Sumka (1979) find that the causes of the gentrification process lie in the development of post-Fordian society. "The revitalization of innercity neighborhoods is the result of macro trends in housing market economics and in demographic and lifestyle changes" (Sumka 1979, p. 482).

Peter Marcuse (1989) adds that gentrification is not just due to a shift in living preferences and lifestyles, but also changes in processes within the labor market:

> The demand for the specific form of housing that gentrified neighbourhoods and gentrified houses represent thus is a response to changes in the nature of work for a particular group; changes that create a need which the new form of housing fulfils. The need is not one that arises out of some unpredictable and arbitrary swing of popular taste, nor is it solely an economic response in housing to changes in wage patterns or job location in the labour market. Rather, gentrification, in its specific social, aesthetic, and cultural forms, is internally linked to changes in the work processes in which gentrifiers are engaged (Marcuse 1989, p. 215).

Marcuse argues that reduced demand for low-qualified workers leads to reduced demand for low-cost accommodation in the city center, while at the same time increasing demand arises for accommodation close to the city center from highly educated, high-earning people. This causes the above-mentioned process of displacement, says Marcuse (Marcuse 1989, p. 214). He adds that these new, highly qualified inner-city residents want to live in a specific type of environment that he calls "gentrified living" (ibid.). Häußermann and Kapphan (2000) call these individuals "urbanites"—people who consciously choose to live in the city center although their financial resources would allow them to live elsewhere. "[They] differ from people migrating from the city to suburban areas in terms of their lifestyle, which is closely related to their professions or urban cultural institutions" (Häußermann and Kapphan 2000, p. 129).

2 Where Do the Displaced People Go?

The debate about gentrification often focuses exclusively on the "gentrifiers". In this chapter, however, we are primarily concerned with one of the consequences of gentrification, namely the displacement of low-income residents. "Residential displacement is one of the primary dangers cited by those concerned about the exclusionary effects of market- as well as state-driven gentrification" (Newman and Wyly 2006, p. 27).

Kathe Newman and Elvin K. Wyly (2006) point out that residents can be displaced for various reasons, including the demolition of buildings, changes in

the ownership of apartment buildings, rent increases, arbitrary decisions by the owners, and forced evictions (ibid., p. 27). In this chapter, for the sake of simplicity, we define economic pressure to relocate out as the result of increasing rents. "Household displacement results where the increased costs of a dwelling and insufficiency of any relevant regulatory regime allow people to be dislodged by these pressures" (Atkinson et al. 2011, p. 4). However, pressure to move out is not necessarily only economic in nature. Friends or family moving away can also create social pressure to relocate (Slater 2009, p. 303f.).

Rowland Atkinson et al. (2011) examine the question of how households with low incomes are impacted during the gentrification process. They find that rising rents in particular put lower-income households under enormous pressure. This has three effects (Atkinson et al. 2011, p. 1):

1. Rising rents put cost pressure on low-earners and force them either to pay the higher costs or move to areas where rents are lower.

2. Moving to non-gentrified areas leads to the loss of social networks.

3. The changing neighborhoods and service infrastructures in gentrified areas are often no longer targeted toward low earners.

In gentrified areas—or "G-locations", to use Atkinson et al.'s terminology (Atkinson et al. 2011, p. 2)—research shows that mobility rates are above-average. Furthermore, the rate of households moving from G-locations to non-gentrified areas is also very high. The proportion of displaced people moving away from G-locations was found to be approximately 50% higher than the rate of households with a similar level of income moving away from non-gentrified areas (ibid.). Newman and Wyly (2006) reach a similar conclusion in their analysis of data for people moving house in New York between 1991 and 2002. Here, the displacement rate for all relocations by people renting within the city was between 6.2% and 9.9%, and the vast majority of households investigated also moved for cost reasons (ibid., p. 29). "Cost drives the overall trend, with fluctuations in unemployment, income and rental inflation combining to force households into various relocation or adjustment strategies" (ibid., p. 30).

The people who were displaced generally moved to neighboring suburbs, a process that Atkinson et al. (2011, p. 2) describe as a "desperate attempt to maintain a foothold near the locations they have come from". Sumka (1979) reaches a similar conclusion, summarizing his findings as follows:

> Two general patterns are implied by these case studies. First, displaced persons tend to move very short distances. […] The second, and related, point is that dislocated families often move more than once as the boundaries of the revitalization area expand (Sumka 1979, p. 485).

These findings by other researchers lead us to our first hypothesis, namely that Kreuzberg residents want to remain living close by, even in the event of forced migration.

3 Residential Mobility

The aim of this chapter is to identify a pattern for where displaced persons move to in a process of gentrification. Residential mobility[1] is a common object of study in research into migration, representing as it does "an important mechanism for adapting to economic [and] social […] change in specific regions" (Bähr 2010, p. 240).

Robert Kecskes (1994) provides a suitable approach for describing and explaining this process of migration. In his model of residential mobility, relocating is viewed as one of several possible reactions to dissatisfaction with the housing situation. It is thus possible to draw conclusions about the socio-demographic and economic factors that influence specific reactions.

Before we look at this model in more detail, we should first explain what we mean by the term "housing satisfaction". Housing satisfaction refers to a person's satisfaction with their current housing situation, including both the physical and spatial conditions (size and layout of the accommodation) and the surrounding conditions (neighborhood relations, infrastructure; Flade 2006, p. 51ff.). Housing satisfaction is also closely linked to a person's emotional connection with the local area, which manifests itself through social networks, memories, and a feeling of security (ibid., p. 30). The strength of a person's attachment to the local area is indicated by the length of time they have lived there and their particular housing situation. Thus, on average, owners have a closer connection with the place where they live than tenants. "Just as there are many reasons for moving, there are many reasons that strengthen the desire or decision to remain in a specific location" (ibid., p. 31).

Antje Flade (2006) includes among these reasons the amenities and resources available at the place of residence, stating that above all contacts with

1 "Residential mobility" is a form of spatial mobility and refers to the change made by an individual between defined units within a spatial system. A change of residence is an appropriate criterion for residential mobility (Bähr 2010, p. 239; Kemper and Kuls 2002, p. 184).

neighbors strengthen a person's attachment to their place of residence. "When one identifies with a place, it becomes part of one's own personality" (Flade 2006, p. 32).

In line with this, Häußermann and Siebel (2004) argue that people need serious reasons in order to leave a neighborhood where they have lived for a long time, as people often develop social networks after they have lived somewhere for a long time (Häußermann and Siebel 2004, p. 158f.). A change in place of residence brings with it a change of the entire "human-environment system", and acclimatizing to a new environment is usually associated with a high degree of stress. This includes isolation and a lack of social integration, especially in the case of involuntary relocations (Flade 2006, p. 31). On this point, Atkinson et al. (2011) add that:

> […] these households suffer significant stress in relocating some distance away from the supporting networks of local family and friends. This can affect psychosocial health, educational outcomes, household dissolution and homelessness (Atkinson et al. 2011, p. 5).
>
> For those who were priced-out of their neighbourhoods, they often found that this had a knock-on effect on their relationships and social networks (ibid., p. 44).

This leads us to our second hypothesis, namely that people's attachment to their place of residence and social environment determine their choice of location where displacement pressure exists.

The model proposed by Kecskes mentioned above is fundamentally a behavioral model (Bähr 2010, p. 260). As a result of various factors, the housing satisfaction of actors is disturbed beyond a specific individual threshold. These factors may be exogenous, such as rent increases, or endogenous, such as the decision to start a family. According to Kecskes (1994, p. 129f.), when the specific individual threshold has been passed, actors will react in order to put an end to the stressful situation. They can do this through passivity, resigning themselves to their situation and lowering their expectations. They can choose resistance, getting involved in demonstrations or action groups. Or finally they have the option of relocating. These three strategies are not final in nature: If resistance fails, relocation or passivity are still options (Kecskes 1994, p. 132). However, most behavioral models have the disadvantage that they assume that individuals have free choice with regard to their decisions (Bähr 2010, p. 263), whereas in reality "even migrations within cities [...] are usually not free from external influences" (ibid., p. 263).

Nevertheless, the hypotheses developed by Kecskes (1994) refer to those influences to which individuals are subject, and which strongly influence their decisions. His first hypothesis relates to the household's material resources,

which may make a potential relocation impossible: "Finally we assume that the less financial resources are available, the less often an intention to move is actually realized, as there is not enough money to do so. Frequently the only option remaining for households with low financial resources is to adjust their expectations" (Kecskes 1994, p. 134).

A further factor suggested by Kecskes (1994) is education, which gives rise to two patterns of behavior. On the one hand, a high level of education makes it simpler for people to develop an extensive social network covering a larger geographical area. Assuming that in a tight housing market many apartments are passed on exclusively through social networks, the result is that people with a high level of education find it easier to move than people with a lower level of education. At the same time, people with a high level of education have more cultural capital and consequently a better understanding of their rights and the possibility of adaptation. These assumptions balance each other out. It is therefore not the case that a higher level of education is automatically linked to more frequent relocations, but rather that a higher level of education is more likely to lead to the desire to move being realized as a result of better financial means (Kecskes 1994, p. 134). William A. V. Clark and Frans M. Dieleman (1996) add that "[the] higher the level of education of the individual or in a household, the greater the chance of moving at all age levels" (Clark and Dieleman 1996, p. 44).

As a third factor, Kecskes (1994) suggests age. He assumes that older age leads to fewer moves. On the one hand, older people generally no longer have the above-mentioned financial and social resources; on the other, they usually have a strong attachment to their apartment and their local area. Kecskes (1994) assumes that this group of people is therefore more likely to adapt their expectations to their environment (Kecskes 1994, p. 134).

From these hypotheses it is clear that individuals' decisions to act are not entirely free. In the field of population geography, external factors of this type are called "constraints". They are often used in action-oriented models. Constraints limit the room for maneuver and can make certain objectives impossible when choosing where to live. They may be the result of housing market dynamics, for example, or relate to an individual's lifestyle or cultural, social, and economic

capital[2] (Bähr 2010, p. 263; Häußermann and Siebel 2004, p. 158). According to Kecskes (1994), constraints first and foremost affect the individual's choice of strategy and where they actually live. However, an individual's capital can, for example, influence which factors are perceived as disruptive in the first place, or where the individual's specific threshold lies. This again points to the importance of social, cultural, and economic capital. Katharina Manderscheid (2012) rightly speaks of mobility as capital, in the sense suggested by Pierre Bourdieu. "Mobility capital" can transform into other types of capital. Thus, a high level of social and/or economic capital leads to a high level of "mobility capital". But this not only means that such individuals are more mobile: A high level of "mobility capital" also enables individuals to avoid mobility constraints. For example, if individuals have a high level of economic capital, gentrification does not force them to migrate because they can cope with the increase in rent (Manderscheid 2012, p. 555).

In his empirical investigation, Kecskes (1994) is able to prove all his hypotheses except for the assumption that financial resources influence a relocation. He finds that people with high incomes do not differ from people with low incomes with regard to the relocations that take place (Kecskes 1994, p. 143). On this point, however, there is disagreement in the literature: "Clearly, income is the enabling or constraining variable in the mobility process" (Clark and Dieleman 1996, p. 51).

Clark and Dieleman (1996) also investigate factors explaining the mobility behavior of households: "[...] mobility behaviour and tenure choice are influenced by household type, including age, size of the household, and income" (Clark and Dieleman 1996, p. 34).

These findings lead us to our third hypothesis, namely that the socio-demographic and socio-economic factors age, net household income, household type, and level of education have an influence on where people choose to live.

2 Bourdieu distinguishes three types of capital: economic, social, and cultural. "Economic capital is immediately and directly convertible into money, and is particularly suited to institutionalization in the form of property rights" (Bourdieu 1992, p. 1). "Social capital is the totality of the current and potential resources associated with the possession of a permanent network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition; or, in other words, it is about resources based on belonging to a group" (Bourdieu 1992, p. 5). "Cultural capital can exist in three forms: (1) in an internalized, incorporated state, in the form of permanent dispositions of the organism; (2) in an objectified state, in the form of cultural goods, pictures, books, encyclopedias, instruments or machines (...); and finally, (3) in an institutionalized state" (Bourdieu 1992, p. 2).

4 Interim Conclusions

Our review of the literature shows that displacement as a result of rising rents in a process of gentrification leads to intra-regional residential mobility. As argued by Sumka (1979) and Atkinson (2011), the direction of relocation away from gentrified areas is usually toward neighboring districts, in order to stay as close as possible to the previous place of residence. The reasons for this are emotional attachment to the location and the existence of local social contacts. Furthermore, our review of the literature reveals that socio-demographic and socio-economic factors have an impact on relocation decisions. Clark and Dieleman (1996) and Kecskes (1994) provide important insights here. Based on these findings we formulate the following hypotheses, which we will subsequently investigate empirically:

- *Hypothesis 1:* Kreuzberg residents want to remain living close by, even in the event of forced migration.
- *Hypothesis 2:* Connection to place of residence and social environment determine choice of location, where displacement pressure exists.
- *Hypothesis 3:* The socio-demographic and socio-economic factors age, net household income, household type, and level of education have an influence on where people choose to live.

5 Empirical Investigation: Kreuzberg

The West Berlin district of Kreuzberg has received much media attention since the phasing out of "follow-up financing"[3] for subsidized rental housing and current protest movements against increases in rental rates and displacement (see Scheer 2017 in this volume). Kreuzberg is characterized by a mixture of buildings dating from the *Gründerzeit* and new buildings from the 1970s (see Figure 1a: Kreuzberg Nord and Figure 1b: Kreuzberg Ost).

3 "Basic financing" (*Grundförderung*) to subsidize loans for the construction of housing for low-income tenants was limited to a period of 15 years, with an additional 15 years of "follow-up financing" (*Anschlussförderung*) granted if certain criteria were fulfilled. In 2003 the Berlin Senate voted to phase out all follow-up financing.

Figure 1a: Kreuzberg Nord. View looking down Prinzenstraße (image: Stephanie Schramm)

Figure 1b: Kreuzberg Ost. View of Gründerzeit buildings on Görlitzer Straße (Görlitzer Park on the right) (image: Christine Stegner)

The Amt für Statistik (Office for Statistics) divides Kreuzberg into three "prognosis areas": Kreuzberg Nord (01), Kreuzberg Süd (02), and Kreuzberg Ost (03) (AfS Berlin-Brandenburg 2008, p. 9ff.). As of 2011 these three areas together account for approximately 124,730 inhabitants (see Bezirksamt Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg von Berlin 2013a, 2013b). In this chapter, given the substantial dif-

ferences in how rental prices developed between 2010 and 2011, we only focus on two small areas (IBB 2012, p. 85). These residential areas showed high or low rental price increases, and thus allow us to collect as wide a variety of residential data from Kreuzberg as possible. They also differ from a socio-demographic and socio-economic point of view. Our area of investigation is limited to the Kreuzberg Nord and Kreuzberg Ost prognosis areas (see Figure 2), specifically the residential areas along Prinzenstraße (in the Südliche Friedrichstadt quarter) and around Görlitzer Park (Nördliche Luisenstadt and Südliche Luisenstadt quarters).



Figure 2: Areas investigated and place of residence of interviewees in Kreuzberg (source: own research)

Prinzenstraße (Kreuzberg Nord) experienced a 4.7% increase in rents in the period 2010 to 2011. The average for Berlin is 4% (IBB 2012, p. 59). This compares with an increase in rent of between 10% and 50% during the same period in the area around Görlitzer Park (Kreuzberg Ost) (IBB 2012, p. 85).

As discussed in the theoretical section above, it is fair to assume that Kreuzberg Ost is an area undergoing a process of gentrification, attracting young, high-income population groups. By contrast, Kreuzberg Nord has so far been little affected by the gentrification process (see Holm 2012, Döring and Ulbricht 2017 in this volume; Holm and Schulz 2017 in this volume).

6 Methodology

We used a quantitative-analytical approach to test the three hypotheses, which we generated from the literature. Specifically we carried out an oral survey, which makes it possible to create a broadly consistent interview situation and subsequently quantify the statements elicited (Meier et al. 2005, p. 90). This method is suitable for testing the hypotheses presented above (Wessel 1996, p. 42). We applied a systematic random principle, approaching every second person we encountered in Kreuzberg with a semi-standardized questionnaire, and asked them if they would like to participate in the survey. To avoid bias in the selection of subjects arising from the place and time at which the survey was performed, we carried out our investigation in different seasons, on different days of the week, and at different times of the day (ibid., p. 127f.). This ensured a wide range of interviewees in terms of age, gender, income, education level, and other factors. Additional advantages of our quantitative-analytical approach were that we could immediately explain any questions if necessary, and could make sure that the passers-by had understood the questions correctly. Moreover, it is easier to encourage subjects to respond in personal interviews than, for example, in postal or online surveys (ibid., p. 117f.).

The net sample size[4] of the survey was 199 Kreuzberg residents. The total population of Kreuzberg relevant for the investigation consists of residents aged 15 years and older[5] in the prognosis areas examined (Kreuzberg Nord and Kreuzberg Ost)—a total of 72,783 people. The net sample size therefore amounts to 0.28% of the relevant population (see Bezirksamt Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg von Berlin 2013b). While this cannot be considered representative, and no claim to completeness is made, the results provide a number of insights that may in turn open up new avenues of research.

For the purposes of the quantitative investigation, we developed a special questionnaire based on the hypotheses discussed above. We used a filter question to determine whether passers-by lived nearby and, if so, roughly where. By this means we could ensure that only residents from the two areas under investigation took part in the survey. We also asked subjects about the date and reason for their most recent move, or their intentions to move in the near future. The main part of the questionnaire consisted of action-based questions. Questions of this type elicit information about respondents' subjective attitudes and "action

4 Net sample size = total number of interviews, less refusals (individuals who did not wish to participate), less completion errors (individuals who then did not want to respond or who were unable to) (Wessel 1996, p. 202).

5 For example, young people who are currently engaged in vocational training and have their own household were also included in the survey.

constructions" (Reuber and Pfaffenbach 2005, p. 72). The central questions asked were; where the passers-by would choose to live if there were no financial constraints (their "desired location"), and where they would be forced to move to if they could no longer afford their current rent (their "displacement location"). These two open questions, relating to imaginary situations, allowed subjects to name various locations in response. It is important to remember that their answers, especially when relating to future actions, merely refer to possible intentions and should not be taken as definitive. Other questions concerned their current housing situation (for example, how long they had been living at their current address) and socio-demographic and socio-economic issues, such as net household income, educational attainment, and year of birth (ibid., p. 70ff.).

Using the survey we were able to test all three of our hypotheses. To this end, we processed the data using statistical programs, analyzed the results, and then illustrated them with graphics and maps.

The methodology has great potential, but also a number of problems and weaknesses that need to be taken into account during the investigation, namely:

- The large amount of time, costs, and organizational activity required; this limits the size of the sample,
- The difficulty of controlling the survey environment—for example, preventing interference from third parties,
- Questions being formulated in different ways, language problems, communication skills, omissions or changes where different interviewers are involved; all of these factors can influence the responses given by interviewees (subjective influence despite objective questions),
- Failure to understand the difference between net income per person and net household income,
- Lack of trust and failure to cooperate on the part of some passers-by,
- Subjects reacting to the interviewers in different ways and this having an impact on their answers; whether the subjects personally liked the interviewers or not.

7 Statistical Evaluation of the Survey

As mentioned above, we interviewed a total of 199 people in Kreuzberg in the survey. Of these individuals, 42.2% live in the residential area Prinzenstraße and 57.8% live in the area around Görlitzer Park. 53.3% of respondents are female. The gender balance is therefore correct, and roughly reflects that of district investigated (see Bezirksamt Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg von Berlin 2013b).



Figure 3: Median net household income in € per month by location (source: own calculations; IBB 2012, p. 84)

The average age of interviewees is 42.7. However, the largest age groups proportionally are young adults aged up to 27 (17.6%) and middle-aged adults between 28 and 45 (46.2%). This reflects the average age split for Kreuzberg (see Bezirksamt Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg von Berlin 2013a).

Only 182 subjects answered the question about their monthly net household income. In some cases they did not want to give these details, in others they did not know the figure. Although the income data was recorded as ranges, we calculate the approximate arithmetic mean for both districts in order to illustrate it better and allow for comparisons. For Prinzenstraße, net household income is thus €1,700.50 per month (n = 105) and for the Görlitzer Park area €2,150.50 per month (n = 77). For comparison, the average for the district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg as a whole is €1,888.00 per month (2011) and the average for Berlin is €2,107.00 per month (2011) (IBB 2012, p. 85) (see Figure 3).

With regard to the two locations in Kreuzberg, it should be noted that interviewees from Prinzenstraße often report a lower net household income, at less than €2,000 per month (75.3%), than those living in the area around Görlitzer Park (51.4%). In the area around Görlitzer Park, by contrast, significantly more people have a net household income of €2,000 per month or more (48.6% vs. 24.7%) (see Figure 4).



Figure 4: Distribution of median net household incomes in € per month by location (n1: Görlitzer Park = 105; n2: Prinzenstraße = 77) (source: own research)

As regards education, proportionally more interviewees from Prinzenstraße have a lower level of educational achievement. For 22.9% of these residents, graduating tenth grade (German system) was their highest educational achievement, while 31.3% completed vocational training (*Ausbildung*). In the case of people from Görlitzer Park, only 3.5% got no further than tenth grade, while 26.1% completed vocational training. The proportion of people with a high level of education—by which we mean university (*Hochschule* or *Fachhochschule*)—is much higher for subjects from Görlitzer Park (67.0%) than for those from Prinzenstraße (33.7%) (see Figure 5). Some 41.4% of all subjects in both areas of Kreuzberg achieved this high level of education; vocational training comes in second place, completed by 28.3% of subjects; and just 7.1% of subjects have not (or not yet) successfully completed any level of education.



Figure: 5: Educational achievement by location
(n1: Görlitzer Park = 115; n2: Prinzenstraße = 83) (source: own research)

As regards type of household, 34.7% of interviewees—a clear majority—live together with their families. In second place come single-person households, accounting for 31.7% of our interviewees, followed by couples (19.6%) and shared apartments (14.1%). Clear differences exist between the two locations in Kreuzberg: In Prinzenstraße there are more families (+8%) and single-person households (+13.2%), while in Görlitzer Park there are many more shared apartments (+22.2%) (see Figure 6).



Figure 6: Distribution of household type by location
(n1: Görlitzer Park = 115; n2: Prinzenstraße = 84) (source: own research)

The survey asked about monthly household rent (including utilities) in bands of €200. The largest band of Kreuzberg residents interviewed pay between €401 and €600 (37.9%), the second most common band being €601-800 per month (28.4%). In terms of differences between the two areas, 50% of the people from Prinzenstraße pay €401-600 and, in second place, 20.7% pay under €400. By contrast, people from Görlitzer Park most often pay €601-800 (35.2%), followed by €401-600 (28.7%) (see Figure 7).



Figure 7: Monthly rent (including utilities) by location
(n1: Görlitzer Park = 112; n2: Prinzenstraße = 82) (source: own research)

We asked the interviewees to tell us about their perceived level of rent—that is, whether they personally felt that their rent was "very low", "low", "appropriate", "high", or "very high". Most said that they felt it was "appropriate" (46.6%). Slight differences are found between the two locations. Proportionally, people from Prinzenstraße more often feel that their rent is "appropriate" (+3.8%), "high" (+2.9%) or "very high" (+0.3%) than people from Görlitzer Park. Those from Görlitzer Park more often feel their rent is "very low" (+2.8%) or "low" (+4.3%).

How long people have lived somewhere—their "duration of residence"—is very important with regard to their spatial and social attachment to their place of residence. To investigate this issue, we asked interviewees when they last moved house. Some 33.0% of them have lived in Kreuzberg for more than ten years. For the most part, these individuals live in the Prinzenstraße area (45.0%). A larger proportion of those who have lived in their current place of residence for shorter periods of time live near Görlitzer Park (less than 2 years: +9.8%; 3-5 years: +12.4%) (see Figure 8). On average, interviewees have lived in their current place of residence for the last 12.2 years: 9.5 years for those living near

Görlitzer Park, and 15.7 years for those living on Prinzenstraße. Some people have never moved, so their duration of residence is the same as their age; this may lead to some distortion of the data.



Figure: 8: Duration of residence by location
(n1: Görlitzer Park = 105; n2: Prinzenstraße = 80) (source: own research)

With regard to the descriptive socio-demographic and socio-economic factors age, household type, net household income, level of education, rent (utilities included), and duration of residence, significant differences exist between Prinzenstraße and Görlitzer Park, the two areas under examination. In some cases these differences are highly significant; however, they vary in strength. In the case of perceived level of rent, no significant difference is found to exist between the two locations (see Table 1).

Difference between locations with regard to:	Corrected contingent coefficients (strength of correlation[6])		Spearman's correlation coefficient[7] (strength and direction of correlation)	
Duration of residence	0.454	**	0.286	**
Age group	0.449	**	0.252	**
Educational achievement	0.468	**	-0.337	**
Household type	0.364	**	-	
Rent (utilities included)	0.321	*	-0.192	**
Net household income	0.281	*	-0.214	**
Perceived level of rent	0.173		-0.062	

Table 1: Strength and direction of significant[8] differences between locations for selected variables

This confirms that the range of data collected in the survey varies widely for the two selected areas. The bigger the significant difference, the greater the difference between the two areas for individual factors.

8 Results and Discussion

The statistical evaluation of the empirical data consisted of three stages. After processing the data, we first used descriptive methods to give an overview of the data. Next, we carried out a bivariate analysis. The focus of the evaluation was on identifying the relationship between alternative residential locations in a situation of displacement and various independent variables derived from our hypotheses. Because the frequencies of specific answers were in some cases too low to meet the requirements for statistical tests, we did a certain amount of recoding.

We group the "displacement locations" into three categories: first, Kreuzberg; second, areas within the S-Bahn ring (the ring formed by the rapid transit railway system), that is, the inner city area excluding Kreuzberg; and third, areas outside the S-Bahn ring. Our use of the S-Bahn ring in Berlin as the border

6 Significant differences: 0-0.3 = weak; 0.3-0.5 = medium; 0.5-1.0 = strong.

7 Dichotomous, nominal variables are considered quasi-ordinal (Bühl 2012).

8 * corresponding α=5%; ** corresponding α=1%; no * corresponding no significance.

between two spatial categories is based on Gebhardt (2012, p. 84). According to Gebhardt, migration trends are strongly influenced by whether people are located in the inner city or outer areas of Berlin, and the S-Bahn ring forms a suitable demarcation line between the two (Gebhardt 2012, p. 84). Furthermore, we convert people's origins (that is, the location they are moving from) into a dichotomous variable indicating whether the last place they lived was inside or outside Kreuzberg. Similarly, we collapse the perceived levels of rent into two distinct categories, namely "low/appropriate rent" and "high/very high rent". We also have to bundle the wide range of net household incomes into three categories: "low" (€0-1,500), "medium" (€1,501-3,000) and "high" (more than €3,000). And we combine the educational levels "no educational achievement" and "10th grade" into a single category. Table 2 presents the results of this bivariate analysis.

Residential locations subject to relocation pressure with regard to:	**Corrected contingent coefficients (strength of correlation[9])**	
Household type	0.386	**
Perceived level of rent	0.108	
Age (in classes)	0.446	**
Educational attainment	0.525	**
Duration of residence	0.448	**
Origins (Kreuzberg)	0.286	*
Net household income	0.174	

Table 2: Strength of significant[10] correlations between displacement locations and selected independent variables

For the third and final stage of the evaluation, we use multi-nominal, logarithmic regression analysis. This allows us to estimate the size of the impact of individual variables on people's choice of place to live. The regression model looks at age (as a metric variable), level of education, duration of residence, origins, and household form. It does not look at income and perceived level of rent, because the bivariate analysis does not show any clear correlation here. One disadvantage of regression analysis is multicollinearities, which cannot be completely ruled out between the independent variables. Duration of residence and age show the strongest correlation, at 0.7,[11] but this is still within reasonable

9 Significant differences: 0-0.3 = weak; 0.3-0.5 = medium; 0.5-1.0 = strong.

10 * corresponding α=5%; ** corresponding α=1%; no * corresponding no significance.

11 Pearson's correlation.

limits (Mayerl and Urban 2008, p. 230). We use Kreuzberg as the required reference category for the procedure, which allows us to determine the probability of a site being selected inside or outside the S-Bahn ring as opposed to Kreuzberg. In addition, we need to select reference categories for polychotomous variables. Here, the categories "couples" (for household type) and "vocational training" (for level of educational achievement) were chosen randomly using SPSS. Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis.

	Factor	Significance	Exp-B	Probability[12]
Inside the S-Bahn ring	Age	0.016	0.944	-5.6%
	Duration of residence	0.814	0.991	-0.9%
	Single-person households	0.034	0.210	-79.0%
	Shared apartments	0.191	0.307	-69.3%
	Families	0.012	0.150	-85.0%
	Origins (Kreuzberg)	0.351	0.633	-36.7%
	Abitur/Fachabitur	0.189	2.739	173.9%
	10th grade	0.269	0.378	-62.2%
	Hochschule/Fachhochschule	0.464	1.518	51.8%
Outside the S-Bahn ring	Age	0.832	1.004	0.4%
	Duration of residence	0.476	0.983	-1.7%
	Single-person households	0.007	0.142	-85.8%
	Shared apartments	0.446	0.499	-50.1%
	Families	0.011	0.148	-85.2%
	Origins (Kreuzberg)	0.010	0.290	-71.1%
	Abitur/Fachabitur	0.818	0.827	-17.3%
	10th grade	0.425	0.607	-39.3%
	Hochschule/Fachhochschule	0.148	0.466	-55.4%

Table 3: Probabilities of the choice of residential locations outside Kreuzberg depending on selected factors

12 Probability = ((Exp-B)-1)*100.

The regression analysis reveals that age, origins, and household type have a significant influence on place of residence where displacement pressure exists. Following Nagelkerke, we used pseudo R^2 to assess the model's fit. The value of 0.332 can be considered acceptable; 0.4 and above is considered a good fit (Janssen and Laatz 2007, p. 470).

Our first hypothesis was that Kreuzberg residents want to remain living close by, even in the event of forced migration. Here the findings for "desired location" and "displacement location" are of primary importance. The frequencies show that for the majority of residents, the district of Kreuzberg is the favored location both as "desired location"[13] (67.9%) and "displacement location"[14] (42.9%). Regarding differences depending on where subjects currently live, 65.1% of subjects from Prinzenstraße say they would want to stay in Kreuzberg even if they were displaced; by contrast, just 29.9% of Görlitzer Park residents would stay in Kreuzberg. In addition, 67.1% of subjects from Prinzenstraße and 68.4% from Görlitzer Park say Kreuzberg is the ideal place to live (see Table 4).

	Görlitzer Park	**Prinzenstraße**	**Kreuzberg**
"Displacement location"	29.9% (n=107)	65.1% (n=63)	42.9% (n=170)
"Desired location"	68.4% (n=130)	67.1% (n=85)	67.9% (n=215)

Table 4: Popularity of Kreuzberg as a "displacement location" and "desired location"

Thus, the majority of subjects would prefer to stay in Kreuzberg if they moved, rather than relocating to a different district. From this it can be inferred that Kreuzberg residents predominantly wish to remain living close to their current location. The frequency with which Kreuzberg was named as both "displacement location" and "desired location" support our first hypothesis.

This is further confirmed by the fact that the other districts frequently named by subjects border directly on Kreuzberg, namely Neukölln (9.4%), Schöneberg (4.7%), Alt-Treptow (4.7%), Friedrichshain (4.1%), and Tempelhof (3.5%).

Figure 9 shows where Kreuzberg residents would move to in the event of forced migration.

13 "Desired location"—where subjects would choose to live if they could decide freely.

14 "Displacement location"—where subjects would choose to live if forced to migrate.



Figure 9: Target locations in Berlin where displacement pressure exists (source: own research, map based on data from the Office of Statistics for Berlin-Brandenburg. District geometries as per 2011)

Interestingly, the district of Wedding does not border Kreuzberg but is nevertheless relatively frequently (5.2%) named as a "displacement location". This is because there is an assumption that social and cultural similarities exist between these two districts. It is therefore insufficient to define "proximity" purely in terms of physical distance, as social and cultural proximity can also play a role (Bähr 2010, p. 255f.).

This also explains the strong polarization between districts in East and West Berlin with regard to choice of place to live. Some 82.1% of the "displacement locations" named are in West Berlin. Even if we exclude Kreuzberg, West Berlin accounts for 68.4% of the displacement locations named. This means that Kreuzberg residents still favor residential areas in the "West"; they would sooner move to Spandau (1.2%), for instance, than Marzahn (0.0%). The invisible but apparently still persistent boundary between East and West Berlin is one of the most important categories for regional planning with regards to residential mobility in Berlin (Gebhardt 2012, p. 85).

It is also striking that, apart from Kreuzberg, the majority of "displacement locations" named lie within the S-Bahn ring (67.0%) (see Figure 9). According to Gebhardt (2012), the city is divided by the S-Bahn ring into two areas: an inner area and an outer area. This is associated with different preferences for certain residential areas. Thus, neighborhoods within the S-Bahn ring are "closer" for the Kreuzberg residents in the survey than other districts outside this dividing line, because here, again, cultural proximity is more important than geographical proximity (Gebhardt 2012, p. 84).

Besides geographical, cultural and social proximity, our second hypothesis suggests that people have an attachment to their place of residence and social environment. This loyalty then determines where they choose to move to. To determine people's level of attachment, we can look at their "duration of residence", as described above. It is assumed that the longer people live in Kreuzberg, the greater their attachment will be to this district. This attachment is clear from the number of times Kreuzberg is named as a destination in the event of forced migration by duration of residence. Our second hypothesis is therefore confirmed (see Figure 10). The relationship between duration of residence and choice of a place to live is highly significant (see Table 2).



Figure: 10: Target locations by duration of residence (source: own research)

For a duration of residence of up to two years, the area within the S-Bahn ring is the location most frequently named (62.5%), not Kreuzberg (25.0%). Kreuzberg residents who have lived at their current residential location for at least three years prefer this as their future place of residence in the event of displacement (3-5 years: 42.6%; 6–10 years: 54.5%; 10 years: 61.0%). This leads us to the following conclusion: The longer the duration of residence in Kreuzberg, the more likely it is that the displacement location corresponds to the desired location. The data shows that as the duration of residence increases, so the desire to remain living nearby becomes stronger (up to 2 years: 56.7%; 3–5 years: 72.2%; 6–10 years: 70.0%; more than 10 years: 71.6%). Where the duration of residence is up to two years, however, clear differences are found. In these cases, other residential locations within the S–Bahn ring are preferred in the event of displacement. The regression analysis (see Table 3) also shows that the probability of choosing a place to live outside Kreuzberg decreases with each additional year. However, it is important to note that this is not significant: it is caused by the close correlation with age.

Beside duration of residence, previous place of residence plays an important part in determining people's attachment to the place where they live. People who have lived in Kreuzberg in the past have necessarily been living in the district for some time, and are therefore more closely attached to it (see above). The multinominal, logarithmic regression analysis tells us about the probability of people selecting particular locations (see Table 3). It shows that there is no significant difference in the choice of location between Kreuzberg and districts within the S-Bahn ring; people who have lived in Kreuzberg in the past will, in the event of displacement, look for an alternative place to live in this district or in another district within the S-Bahn ring. The probability that Kreuzberg residents will look for apartments outside the S-Bahn ring in the event of displacement is 71.1% lower than the probability that they will search for alternatives within Kreuzberg itself.

To summarize, we find that attachment to Kreuzberg as a place to live—characterized on the one hand by duration of residence, and on the other by previous place of residence—has a clear influence on people's choice of where to live.

As described in the theoretical discussion and expressed in our third hypothesis, the socio-demographic and socio-economic factors age, net household income, household type, and level of education have an influence on where people choose to live. With respect to age, it may be assumed that residential mobility decreases as people get older. This assumption proves to be predominantly true: There is a significant relationship between age and choice of place to live where displacement pressure exists (see Table 2, Figure 11).



Figure 11: Age and target location where displacement pressure exists (n=170) (source: own research)

In situations of forced migration, people aged 46 to 65 prefer residential locations in Kreuzberg (age 46–55: 60.0%; age 56–65: 72.2%). From age 66 upward, however, mobility toward locations outside the S-Bahn ring increases (Kreuzberg: 50.0%; areas outside the S-Bahn ring: 43.8%). This may have to do with people reaching pension age and the associated phenomenon of "retirement mobility"[15] (Kemper and Kuls 2002, p. 239). The results of the multinominal, logarithmic regression analysis also support this finding. With each additional year of life, the probability of choosing somewhere to live within the S-Bahn ring and of choosing not to live in Kreuzberg declines by 5.6%[16] (see Table 3). However, this only represents the average probability for the sample. We may therefore assume that changes take place corresponding to the lifecycle. Young adults up to the age of 27 prefer residential areas within the S-Bahn ring to locations in Kreuzberg (45.7% vs. 34.3%), as do middle-aged adults (49.4% vs. 34.6%). This may be related to changes in mobility with regard to age: Younger population groups are more mobile (Bähr 2010, p. 245).

In terms of net household income, our assumption is that people with smaller financial resources are more likely to be displaced than high-income households, which are able to act more flexibly. However, we did not identify a significant correlation between net household income and place of residence in cases

15 "Retirement mobility" is a form of residential mobility that begins when people retire. It may involve choosing a retirement home or moving into housing adapted to the needs of older people, or a nursing home (Kemper and Kuls 2002, p. 239; Schnur 2010, p. 35).

16 Because age is used as a metric variable in the calculation, people aged over 66 are overrepresented here.

of forced relocation (see Table 2). Kreuzberg residents would therefore likely choose Kreuzberg in the event of displacement irrespective of their income.
The situation regarding type of household is different. Household type is very much related to the individual's lifecycle. Our assumption is that single-person households prefer inner-city areas, and families tend to prefer to move outside the Berlin S-Bahn ring. And indeed, a significant correlation is found to exist between household type and choice of residential location (see Tables 2 and 3). Single-person households would prefer residential locations in Kreuzberg (58.8%) to locations within the S-Bahn ring (29.4%) (see Figure 12). Contrary to expectations, however, a similar probability distribution is found for families (Kreuzberg: 57.4%; within the S-Bahn ring: 27.8%). The locations named by people in shared apartments and couples are similar, although there is a clear preference for locations within the S-Bahn ring (shared apartments: 55.9%; couples: 51.6%).



Figure 12: Types of households and target locations where displacement pressure exists (n=170) (source: own research)

The figures confirm that single-person households are focused on the inner-city area Kreuzberg, but that families also prefer this as a place to live. Living within the S-Bahn ring (including Kreuzberg) is just as important for all types of households.

With regard to level of education, our assumption is that people with a high level of educational achievement are more mobile due to to their social and cultural capital, and that in the event of forced migration they will more often name locations outside Kreuzberg. A "high level of education" here means at least *Abitur/Fachabitur*, while a "lower level of education" means not (or not yet) having successfully completed any level of education, or only graduating tenth grade. Table 2 reveals the existence of a significant correlation. Figure 13

shows that the higher the level of education, the less important Kreuzberg as the preferred place to live (no educational achievement: 100%; 10th grade: 58.8%). Subjects with a high level of education tend toward locations outside Kreuzberg (*Abitur/Fachabitur*: 83.3%; *Hochschule/Fachhochschule*: 66.2%) and are thus more flexible in their choice of location (Kecskes 1994, p. 143).



Figure: 13: Level of education and target location where displacement pressure exists (n=169) (source: own research)

This confirms our assumption that people with a high level of education are more flexible in their choice of place to live in the event of displacement. However, the regression analysis shows (see Table 3) that level of education plays a smaller role than other factors in the choice of location, and at 5% it is not significant.

We thus find that the socio-demographic factors age, household type, and level of education do indeed have an influence on the place of residence in the event of displacement. Contrary to expectations, however, net household income does not (Kecskes 1994, p. 143).

9 Conclusion

In the public discourse on gentrification, the concept of "displacement" is frequently presented as the flipside of the process of revitalization or upgrading. However, what is said about those who are displaced is usually little more than assumptions. Where the displaced individuals go and what the consequences are for the city has not yet been adequately studied. Indeed, Ilse Helbrecht describes existing urban research as "a one-eyed cyclops that operates with an enormous intellectual bias because it observes only the upgrading aspect of the gentrification process while ignoring the aspect of displacement" (see Helbrecht 2017, p. 2, in this volume). Areas affected by gentrification can be identified, but not the locations where those who have been displaced now live. Where do Kreuzberg residents go—and where do they want to go? The snapshot that we present here of Kreuzberg, an area currently undergoing gentrification, shows that local residents would not in fact move to the outskirts of the city in the event of displacement—contrary to what is often assumed in the literature and by the media.

Difficulties arise, however, when we try to adequately capture the reality of individual mobility. We asked Kreuzberg residents where they would hypothetically move to, both voluntarily and under pressure of displacement. Their hypothetical answers may differ from their future actions, of course. Yet those answers reflect highly subjective strategies, which tell us about target locations and the related determinants of mobile mobility, such as age and level of education.

The results of our investigation clearly demonstrate that a significant majority of those questioned want to live in Kreuzberg. This is also clear from the fact that in the event of forced displacement, the majority of Kreuzberg residents do not want to leave their district either; if possible, they would stay living close by. The second most popular place to move to in the event of displacement are neighboring districts such as Neukölln, Schöneberg, Alt-Treptow, Friedrichshain, and Wedding. From this we may conclude that "proximity" means not just spatial (geographical) proximity but also cultural and social proximity to other districts (see Förste and Bernt 2017 in this volume). Overall, we find a strong focus on districts lying within the S-Bahn ring. As attachment to the place of residence increases, characterized among other things by having lived in the area for a long time, so the desire to stay in Kreuzberg in the event of displacement intensifies. However, the extent to which it will be possible for people to realize this desire in the future depends very much on how Berlin's fast-moving housing market develops. It is possible that it will become increasingly difficult to secure somewhere to live within the S-Bahn ring, as cheaper housing market segments continue to shrink.

Socio-demographic factors such as age, household type, and level of education have a significant impact on future residential mobility. As they get older, Kreuzberg residents prefer to stay where they live at the moment. However, our study shows clearly that when they reach retirement age, from 66 upward, areas outside the Berlin S-Bahn ring become more attractive as a result of "retirement mobility." People aged up to 45 prefer to move to areas within the S-Bahn ring in the event of displacement, regardless of whether it is within Kreuzberg or not.

This attachment to inner-city areas applies to both single-person households and families. This contradicts the assumption found in population geography that families generally tend to migrate toward the suburbs (Fassmann et al. 2010, p. 912; Kemper and Kuls 2002, p. 247). A preference for an urban lifestyle among families may be a possible reason for this, and it can be seen as an indication of (re-)urbanization (Helbrecht 1996). Furthermore, as people's level of education increases, so does their potential for residential mobility, and so Kreuzberg becomes less important as the preferred place to live. Our findings on the influence of economic factors on the choice of where to live show an identical tendency to that identified by Kecskes (1994), discussed further above. Thus, economic factors such as net household income hardly play any role in residential mobility in the event of dislocation: Even people with a lower net household income want to stay living nearby, and would presumably be prepared to pay more for their current housing or accept a smaller or lower-standard apartment in Kreuzberg. This has far-reaching implications. On the one hand, households then have less financial resources to spend on other things. On the other, the entire district is impacted. Thus, despite processes of revitalization, Kreuzberg is one of the districts with the lowest purchasing power in Berlin (BSM 2012, p. 38).

It should be noted that residential mobility in the context of displacement, as well as of gentrification, is a process. A single survey such as ours provides only a limited snapshot of the reality of how people choose where to live. Changes are very likely to occur here over the coming months and years, not least because some places where people might have moved to, such as Neukölln, are themselves undergoing processes of revitalization. In terms of the model of migration, opposition and passivity still appear to predominate over intentions to move in Kreuzberg. This is important because, according to Kecskes (1994), people only consider the real possibilities, and their own criteria, when they actually intend to move. As displacement pressure persists, we can assume that responses about target locations will become more concrete and geographically specific. Nevertheless, we should not expect target locations to change so much that—unlike what we found in the survey—the city's outskirts become the major destination. Forced migration of this type occurs in stages. It is therefore impos-

sible to say conclusively whether those who are displaced ultimately end up living in the city outskirts or not.

Nevertheless, the methodology chosen for this study is useful in that it provides us with insights into where people would move to if displaced. Possible extensions of the research include expanding the data basis by increasing the sample size or repeating the survey at regular intervals. This would engender a better understanding of migration as triggered by gentrification, and allow us to differentiate it more clearly from other movements of people, which often overlap within cities.

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The State-Made Rental Gap
Gentrification in Subsidized Rental Housing

Greta Ertelt, Carlotta-Elena Schulz, Georg Thieme and Christiane Uhlig

1 Gentrification in Subsidized Rental Housing: A Thematic Approach

The term "gentrification" has become a catchphrase in the current discourse on the development of international cities, including Berlin. It is also increaingly popular outside the circle of those actively involved with urban development issues from the spheres of policy, academia and civil society: Gentrification has become an established concept in Berlin's daily newspapers, and has entered into the everyday speech of the city's residents. Since "gentrification" was mentioned for the first time in the early 1990s, in the context of the economic boom expected for Berlin and the trends underway in Berlin's redevelopment areas (as, for instance, in Bernt and Holm 2009), the term has become increasingly associated with the increasingly strained housing market in the new capital.

To begin this chapter it should be noted that gentrification is understood as a "*process* of appreciation and displacement" (Holm 2011a, p. 213, original emphasis) and not as a *state*. Considering gentrification as a process makes it possible to distinguish the different stages underway simultaneously in various inner-city districts of Berlin, which, according to Andrej Holm (2011a, p. 213ff.), can be located as spatial-temporal developments. Proceeding from the redevelopment areas in Kreuzberg, what Holm calls the "Berlin gentrification circle" runs further across Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg up to the current developments in (northern) Neukölln, and currently leads back to a renewed wave of upgrading in Kreuzberg. As the findings of the research by Christian Döring and Klaus Ulbricht (2017, in this volume) show, by now this wave also includes additional districts of Berlin like Moabit, Gesundbrunnen and Wedding, which is why these authors—going even further than Holm—speak of a "Berlin gentrification spiral".

Holm explains the wave-like progression of this upgrading, similar to Neil Smith's rent-gap theory (1979), with the economic valorization strategy of the

I. Helbrecht, *Gentrification and Resistance*,
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real estate industry, which invests in modernizations as soon as a yield gap emerges between current and potential future use (Holm 2011a, p. 216f.):

> Gentrification is defined as all residental valorization strategies and politically desired revaluations in neighborhoods, which require for their success the direct or indirect displacement of lower-status population groups and/or cause a reduction of inexpensive housing stock (Holm 2011a, p. 213).

This logic emphasizes the economic and political roots of the process, which is described in greater detail in the following sections. Yet, it neglects the influence of the growing interest group in the last decades, which has demanded inner-city residences. In the development of the "post-industrial society" as postulated by Daniel Bell (1973), for which "the centrality of theoretical knowledge and the expansion of the service sector as against a manufacturing economy" is characteristic, the system of social stratification is changing (Bell 1985, p. 13f.). Many authors speak of the aspiration of a "new middle class", shaped by the highly skilled, by managers and engineers. These are the conveyors of the specific knowledge that constitutes the fundamental resource of a service society (see, among others, Bell 1980; Giddens 1973; Gouldner 1979). At the same time, the places the employees in the service sector work are "highly selectively" concentrated in the inner-city areas of urban business centers, so that these urban spaces undergo an extreme functional shift (Helbrecht 1996, p. 16). Within this new social stratum, according to David Ley (1996), the social group of the "cultural and social professionals" plays a decisive role in the process of gentrification. With their preference for a life in the inner city as opposed to the suburban region, they support the emergence of new inner-city cityscapes/environments, in which they act in equal measure as producers and consumers (Ley 1996, p. 15). Those seeking cheap living and development space, the so-called 'pioneers', consume the existing alternative milieu of certain inner-city areas, which are more in line with their cultural values and aesthetic sensibilities than a suburban residental area. In so doing, these creative social groups develop the city spaces further, thus producing a shift that comprises in the upgrading of the social and cultural infrastructure, and thus a change in image as well as an increase in the market value of these areas (Helbrecht 2011). These developments generate a rise in rents as well as growing demand by higher-status population groups, the so-called 'gentrifiers', who want to benefit from the social and cultural infrastructures (Blasius and Dangschat 1990, p. 11ff.). They use inner-city locational advantages, including vicinity to the workplace, to cultural institutions like theater, cinema and concert halls, as well as to restaurants, bars and to "the scene" (Blasius 1994, p. 408).

Consequently, the gentrification process does not originate in the real estate business alone; it is actually part of a comprehensive economic and urban structural transformation. This is connected with the tertiarization of the labour market, changes in the social structure, and the cultural orientation of new lifestyle groups (Helbrecht 1996).

In recent years Berlin has experienced especially strong growth in the "creative" interest group, as evinced in the constantly growing service sector of the creative and cultural economy as well as in the media attention focused on this group of society (see IHK 2012; Schönball, Tagesspiegel 2010; Müller, Berliner Morgenpost 2011; Paul, Berliner Zeitung 2012a). Growing national and international migration was attracted by the image of the city of Berlin, which was composed of the cultural values of a tolerant creative scene, in particular, and by a special attitude towards life, and is correlated above all with living in inner-city Wilhelmian quarters (see Berlin Partner GmbH 2012; Hank 2012).

In addition to the in-migration, a surplus of births is also providing for constant population growth, so that the pressure on the Berlin housing market is growing (see AfS Berlin-Brandenburg 2013; SenStadt 2012).

As a result, even less-attractive residential areas in inner-city locations are in demand by the relevant interest groups and the real-estate industry. Such residential properties also include subsidized rental housing, in which private modernization measures have intensified for nearly a decade now, and where conversion into individually owned apartments is taking place, such that much of the settlement of higher-status population groups is coupled with the concomitant displacement of the previous tenants. These developments are the research interest of the study introduced here.

The investigation of a gentrification and displacement process in Berlin's subsidized rental housing has become particularly explosive because this segment of the housing market, especially intended for low-income population groups, is actually presumed to be immune to transformation processes like gentrification. Yet this study shows that, as a consequence of state deregulation measures, gentrification phenomena can be ascertained in precisely these residential properties.

Through political decisions made by the Berlin Chamber of Deputies, a yield gap was created in subsidized rental housing, so that a number of actors in the real-estate industry were given the opportunity to use this gap for their valorization strategies and close it through rent increases. We have called this politically created yield gap the "*state-made rental gap*".[1]

1 The term "state-made rental gap" comes from Ilse Helbrecht, who developed it in the framework of shared oral discussions on our empirical study.

With the Senate resolution of February 2003 on phasing out follow-up financing for subsidized rental housing in Berlin, the initial 15-year funding which expired after 1 January 2003, the Senate basically created the possibility for owners to raise rents in their properties to what is called "cost rent" (Abgeordnetenhaus 2012a, p. 7). This cost rent amounts to an average of €13/m², made up of the financing costs determined during construction of the building plus the operating costs, whereby the former makes up the lion's share of the cost rent (Kotti & Co and Sozialmieter.de 2012, p. 19f.). By phasing out the subsidies stipulated in the support program, which were designed to reduce the cost rent to a "social rent", lawmakers legitimized rent increases on the cost rent calculated when the building was constructed (Kotti & Co and Sozialmieter.de 2012, p. 19f.). As a consequence, from this time on owners were allowed to charge rents far higher than "comparative rents" for non-rent-controlled housing of a similar standard in similar locations.[2] Phasing out follow-up financing has affected a total of 27,786 housing units in Berlin (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2012a, p. 2). At the same time, by the end of 2013 subsidized housing was freed—in principle—from *tenancy controls*, so that landlords could seek out a wealthier clientele.

We classify these resolutions by the Senate and their consequences as a new facet of upgrading inner-city areas in Berlin. Observing multiple dimensions of the gentrification process makes it possible to comprehensively investigate the phenomena of gentrification in subsidized rental housing. Besides economic and sociocultural dimensions, the process also has a decisive political dimension. Political (de-)regulation measures can precede a gentrification process and/or actually initate it (for studies in this vein, see, among others, Atkinson et al. 2011; Badcock 1989; Helbrecht 1996; Holm 2011a, 2011b; McCarthy 1974). Only since the mid-1990s has this conviction increasingly begun to penetrate the scientific debate about gentrification (Holm 2012b, p. 663). The fact that displacement processes are often made possible only by dismantling mechanisms that protect affordable rents and through other economic incentives has already been the subject of several studies carried out in the US, Great Britain, Australia and Germany (see, among others, Bernt 2011; Davidson 2008; Hackworth and Smith 2000). From the perspective of city planning, the displacement of low-income households is countered, above all, by the positive effect of an emerging social mixture in a residential area (see Davidson 2008; Holm 2012b). Aside from the fact that this conviction is contradicted by many empirical investiga-

2 The "comparative rent" (*Vergleichsmiete*) is the rent customary in the given location, calculated from the usual rents charged in the city in the past four years for housing of a comparable type, size, furnishings, condition and location, including its energy efficiency and facilities. The comparative rent does not take publicly subsidized housing into account.

tions (Holm 2012b, p. 674f), whether there is a 'right' replacement rate for residents remains an open question.

In Berlin the debates about political (de-)regulation measures and an increasing threat of displacement of residents from inner-city areas has brought a new dynamic and urgency to the housing policy discussion. Many initiatives and associations of tenants have been founded, and the social activism of these organizations has shifted the discussion about Berlin's subsidized rental housing back onto the political agenda and into public focus (see Scheer 2017 in this volume). A wide spectrum of such organizations can be found, ranging from associations of tenants within certain buildings, all the way to tenants and advocates active throughout Berlin. The groups Kotti & Co. and Sozialmieter.de, with support from the group mietenpolitisches Dossier, attracted great publicity with a conference on subsidized rental housing held on 12 November 2012. The striking characteristic of this event was that it took place in the Berlin Chamber of Deputies, with politicians involved in housing policy participating.

Our empirical study investigates the displacement phenomena of the gentrification process in subsized rental housing with regard to these new dynamics. Here *displacement* is not only restricted to the moment when the long-established social tenants are forced to change their place of residence involuntarily, but is understood to be a procedural conflict inherent in the gentrification process, which is manifested in various phenomena. Describing these phenomena is the content of the following remarks.

Correspondingly, we focus on the following research question: Which phenomena of displacement occur in the framework of the gentrification process in Berlin's subsidized rental housing buildings that are affected by the phasing-out of follow-up financing? Subsequently, does it matter which fundamental factors cause the gentrification and displacement processes in Berlin's subsidized rental housing?

With this chapter we would like to make a contribution to extracting empirical data on the issue of gentrification in subsidized rental housing blocks in Berlin. To do so, quantitative data on three (former) subsidized rental housing blocks in the district of Kreuzberg and in the northern part of the district Neukölln were collected, and the former and current tenants of these properties interviewed to acquire qualitative findings.

A major problem in previous qualitative studies on displacement has been the difficulty of gaining access to displaced tenants (see, e.g., Atkinson 2011). To alleviate this problem, we developed and tried out an approach we call the 'micro-perspective of the apartment building' (*Mikroperspektive Mietshaus*). Concentration on the microcosm of the apartment building entails researching the fluctuation in residents of individual buildings as well as interviewing current and former residents. With this approach, which is introduced in greater

detail in the second section, we can gain profound insight into concrete gentrification and displacement processes. Its concrete implementation entails operationalization in terms of the thematic focus of the problem of gentrification in subsidized rental housing. Beforehand, the housing policy mechanism discussed above, and the yield gap it generates, are discussed in greater detail. The interplay between these two factors underlies the developments presented in the following sections.

On the basis of the research and interview results, we first depict the process of gentrification in the three investigated subsidized rental housing properties in detail, we then reflect upon the phenomena of displacement detected there. We are able to distinguish the phenomena of displacement, fear of displacement, discrimination and resistance.

2 Temporarily Subsidized Rental Housing

The subsidized rental housing buildings at the focus of this study started out as publicly funded housing. In Berlin, the term subsidized rental housing designates various state programmes to support the construction of private rental housing since the end of World War II, which were financed in part by public funds. Around one-tenth of the housing stock in Berlin (according to statistics from 2010, with 190,000 residential units) is subsidized by the state (Oellerich 2010, p. 4).

The buildings studied were built from the early 1970s on, with the help of state funding through degressive investment loans and subventions. The structure of this support scheme, and the political decisions described in the following, constitute the explanatory foundation of a yield gap in subsidized rental housing created by the state—the *state-made rental gap*.

Public funding contains, first, the guarantee of loans by the state-owned Investitionsbank Berlin for the construction of subsidized rental housing. Second, the high cost rent was reduced to what is called the 'social rent' through expenditure subsidies to the owners. Cost rent is the sum of the owner's capital costs and operating costs, and amounts on average to €13/m² net ex services,[3] with peaks of up to €21/m² (Kotti&Co and Sozialmieter.de 2012, p. 18). Because the state had declared its support, investors did not economize on their building or business strategies, with the consequence that construction costs and the resulting rents to cover these costs turned out be quite high. The public authorities made this practice possible, as they accepted "pretty much everything the devel-

3 All of the rent prices below refer to rents (utilities excluded).

opers, the banks, the building materials suppliers charged" (see Holm 2010; Oellerich 2010, p. 4). In 1987, for instance, the subsidized, socially acceptable rents were considered to equal €3/m² (Oellerich 2010, p. 5). An annual rent increase generally amounting to 13 cent/m² was supposed to at least minimize this difference (Kotti&Co and Sozialmieter.de 2012, p. 19).

Originally planned for a funding period of only 15 years (basic financing),[4] these subsidies were extended for another 15 years. The decisive reason for the decision in favour of follow-up financing was that the investors had yet to finish paying off their loans to commercial banks. This decision made it possible to ward off, or at least postpone, a drastic rent load when the basic financing was over, as when the basic financing ran out, owners would be able to demand the entire cost rent from the social tenants (see Sethmann 2010).

In many subsized rental housing blocks, depending on the year of construction, basic or follow-up financing has since been phased out. Against the backdrop of the drastically increased level of public debt since reunification, and the fear of potential paralysis because of unbearable interest rates, the city-state of Berlin felt it necessary to cut its expenses in all areas (see SenFin 2006). In order to determine the possibilities and consequences of savings in expenditures in subsidized rental housing, in 2002 the Senate Department for Urban Development and Housing appointed a commission of experts. At this point in time the decision to grant follow-up financing for the subsidized rental housing built in the years 1987 to 1989 was pending. As authorization for housing construction programmes in the years after 1987 would have meant around €2.5 billion in spending for the Berlin budget (Empirica 2003, p. 2), the commission's proposal was accepted and the decision made to phase out housing subsidies. The consequence is that no follow-up financing is available to those owners of subsidized housing whose 15 years of basic financing ran out after 01/01/2003. This affects all housing units built as part of the housing construction programme from 1985 on, whereby the subsidies for the last buildings ran out in 2016 (see SenStadt 2015). This affected a total of 536 building companies with 713 residential properties and 27,786 rental units in Berlin. For the majority of the properties (23,631 apartments), basic financing ran out by 2011, whereby the subsidies for 4,155 apartments continued until 2016. In the period from 2003 to 2011, subsidies expired for 2,009 apartments in the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg district. By 2016 another 236 apartments in this district were affected (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2012a, p. 2f.). Without follow-up financing owners are no longer

4 "Basic financing" (*Grundförderung*) to subsidize loans for the construction of housing for low-income tenants was limited to a period of 15 years, with an additional 15 years of "follow-up financing" (*Anschlussförderung*) granted if certain criteria were fulfilled. In 2003 the Berlin Senate voted to phase out all follow-up financing.

granted the state subsidy to cover the high costs of the properties and thus can no longer pay off their loans. For this reason the previously mentioned provision now allowed owners to raise rents "to above the comparative rent for residential space that is not subject to price controls in compliance with the Berlin rent index (*Mietspiegel*),[5] up to the level of the complete cost rent" (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2012a, p. 7). Many of the owners were no longer able to cover the higher costs, however, and had to declare bankruptcy (see Kotti&Co and Sozialmieter.de 2012).

The buildings affected were sold at a low price, as most of them initially retained their "publicly subsidized" status, so that the new owners were able to collect the cost rent. What is more, the tenancy controls, which were supposed to apply until 31/12/2014 even if no follow-up financing was granted, were repealed—and this took effect not when the basic financing ran out, but a full five years beforehand (see SenStadt 2015). Thus the publicly subsidized units could be rented not only to tenants possessing a *Wohnberechtigungsschein* certifying their eligibility for such housing,[6] but also to wealthier tenants. The apartments in question are thus incorporated into a general decrease in price-controlled rental apartments in Berlin (Mücke 2012, p. 2). The new owners can earn especially high yields: first through the low purchase price, and second by means of the high income that became possible through the unparalleled rise in rental prices (interview 6[7]). The new owners took advantage of the *state-made rental gap*. Through the cancellation of follow-up financing and the exemption for tenancy controls, the gap between the social rent sought by the tenants and the rent that covered the previous owners' costs, which had previously been bridged by state incentives, became a yield gap for the new investors. They can use the *state-made rental gap* in two ways. First, the social tenants whose rents offer little in the way of yields can be forced out of their apartments by abrupt rent increases, so that new clientele can be attracted. Second, the owners can demand from these new tenants above-average prices for new rentals, which may be as high as the cost rent. Two other possibilities are to convert rental units into individually owned apartments, or to opulently restore properties built as subsidized rental housing—and both of these phenomena are taking place.

5 The *Mietspiegel* is more than just a guideline for tenants and landlords, it is one of the most important tools for adjusting (i.e., increasing) rents and also helps investors to identify where the greatest potentials for rent increases exist. The Senate Department for Urban Development and Housing publishes the rent index every second year.

6 A *Wohnberechtigungsschein* (WBS) is a document issued by the state Housing Authority to people who can document that their income is below a certain level. Apartments that have been built using state subsidies can only be rented to tenants with a *Wohnberechtigungsschein*.

7 The data collected from the interviews were anonymized, designated with the abbreviation Int x, and numbered consecutively.

To combat the clearly evident negative consequences of this mechanism, in 2011 the Senate passed a resolution stipulating that buildings which were sold to new owners as a result of their previous owners' bankruptcy could no longer enjoy the status of "publicly subsidized" and, accordingly, that "cost rent" could no longer be charged to their new tenants (Senatsverwaltung für Justiz 2011b, §5). This regulation was too late to affect the buildings investigated in the framework of this study, as changes in ownership had already taken place before it came into force.

The commission of experts established in 2003 assessed Berlin's housing market as relaxed. They concluded that increases to cost rents were generally unlikely, and would only affect the customary rents for comparable, non-rent-controlled apartments. The Senate Department for Urban Development and Housing stands by this assessment as the reason why follow-up financing was phased out. Since 2012 Senate reports have included an annual survey of property owners for whom basic financing expired at the end of the previous year. All three of the surveys published so far boasted participation rates of at least 60%.[8] Of the rents provided by respondents in 2011 and 2012, nearly 60% were concentrated at a rental price between €5.50 and €6.50/m². In 2013, 69% of the rental prices of affected residential units were already between €5.50 and €7.00 €/m². Generally speaking, an upward shift in rental prices is clearly evident. While the rents for 13.07% of the properties covered by the survey were still between €5.00 and €5.50/m² in 2011, only 4.30% of the rents were in this range in 2013. Demands for cost rent reduced over the three-year period; according to those responsible to dispose of the properties in question, cost rent was demanded for 106 residential units in 2011, for 97 residential units in 2012, and for eight residential units in 2013 (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2012a, p. 7f.; Abgeordnetenhaus 2013, p. 7; Abgeordnetenhaus 2014, p. 7).

However, our study makes clear that the effect of phasing out follow-up financing cannot be described by snapshots of rent levels, and that the numbers in the Senate's study must be scrutinized critically. In connection with the gentrification process in Berlin, Holm (2010) speaks of "publicly supported displacement management", through which undesired tenants are forced out of their publicly subsidized rental housing by a lack of tenant controls in subsidized flats and the principle of cost rents. The reason for this is the *state-made rental gap*, which makes it possible for investors to transform housing that was publicly subsidized for decades into speculative properties on the Berlin housing market (see Holm 2011b). In the process, the flats, as mentioned above, can fetch lucra-

8 Survey participation rates by the persons authorized to dispose over residential units with controlled tenancy up to the end of the previous year reached 61% (2011), 65% (2012) and 76% (2013).

tive prices when sold as individually owned apartments or offered (in renovated form) on the rental market, once the social tenants have been pushed out by rent increases or the application of other means of pressure (ibid.). Of the properties that emerged from the "Social Urban Renewal Programme" (*Programm der Sozialen Stadterneuerung*), a total of 64 buildings with 1,398 units have been converted into individually owned apartments, of which 18 properties with 478 units are located in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (as of November 2012; Gothe 2012b, p. 2f.). The housing pressure on the neighborhoods in the midst of the gentrification process encourages investors to realize their valorization strategies for buildings constructed as subsidized rental housing.

On the part of the Senate, several decisions were made through which the consequences of phasing out follow-up financing were (supposed) to be made socially sustainable: For instance, the Senate drew up a hardship provision for tenants as well as a provision for temporary rent compensation and an allowance to help with moving costs. In addition, the Investitionsbank Berlin informs tenants beforehand that the basic financing for their block of flats will be expiring.

The Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Sozialplanung und angewandte Stadtforschung e.V. (*Association for Social Planning and Applied Urban Research, abbreviated to* AG SPAS) was commissioned to support tenants affected by the phasing out of follow-up financing (see Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2012b: Drucksache 17/10951, p. 1). Of the 1,223 households assisted, a majority of 714 are located in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (Gothe 2012b, p. 1). As of 31/08/2012, of the 113 wishing to move out, a total of 80 households had been been referred (ibid.). The work of AG SPAS is generally regarded quite sceptically by active tenants, who refer to it sarcastically as 'AG SPASS' ('AG JOKE').

The state support measures can be described as temporally restricted management of the legally protected displacement of social tenants through the political deregulation measures described above.

In addition to the fundamental political decisions, the individual determinants for the gentrification processes taking place in the buildings affected by the discontinuation of follow-up financing are: The year the building was constructed, the date the basic financing ended, the different objectives of the investors, and the activism of the tenants. To study the consequences of the financing system for the tenancy structure and the tenants, we decided to analyse the effects on the building level. The advantages of this micro-perspective focused on the apartment building are elucidated in the next section.

3 The Micro-Perspective of the Apartment Building

Empirical research on gentrification and displacement, which started in the 1970s, has become ever more spatially and thematically differentiated over the course of its development in Great Britain and the US. The first studies followed quantitative approaches, with which the transformations in a neighborhood were investigated on the basis of census data and other kinds of household surveys (see Cousar and Sumka 1978, 79; Grier and Grier 1980; LeGates and Hartman 1981, 1986; Marcuse 1985). One of the goals of this kind of research was to identify gentrification areas ('G-locations'), among others, by proving that a significant number of residents was replaced. This is done by comparing the number of higher earners with a high education level moving in, to the number of lower earners with a lower education level moving out. This comparison offers a first indication of possible displacement, but is not sufficient as a sole indicator. More recent quantitative studies therefore investigate the reasons residents move out of areas affected by gentrification (see Freeman and Braconi 2004; Newman and Wyly 2006).

Qualitative studies frequently build on the quantitative identification of gentrification areas, yet are primarily concerned with the personal consequences for those affected by displacement, or the consequences for the upgraded area in connection with the socioeconomic shift (see, among others, Atkinson et al. 2011). A considerable advantage of the quantitative portrayal of gentrification is its persuasiveness in calling for, or legitimizing, political regulatory measures. However, the numbers recorded can be subject to significant inaccuracies (see Marcuse 1985). On the other hand, qualitative research can provide a more detailed picture of the consequences of redevelopment processes, albeit often one depicting only changes within the gentrified areas. Therefore it is extremely difficult to include in the investigation those displaced tenants who have moved out of the gentrified area. Atkinson et al. (2011) thus attempted to contact former residents, mainy via advertisting in newspapers (Atkinson et al. 2011, p. 21). However, this approach had the disadvantage that only those former residents feel addressed who define themselves as "displaced". The majority of those affected, however, do not identify themselves as "displaced" (see Atkinson 2001, 2011) and thus disappear from the surface of research. In his study of gentrification and displacement in London, Atkinson (2000) speaks of "measuring the invisible". The difficult research conditions for studying displacement processes could be one reason why there is not yet any qualitative description of the subject (Holm 2012b, p. 679).

4 The Microcosm of the Apartment Building

A possible solution for the problem of making contact with displaced residents is offered by the *investigation on the building level*. This approach makes it possible, first, to capture the consequences of redevelopment processes for the resident structure in greater depth on a small scale, and second, to locate the former residents who have already moved away. The study of gentrification on the basis of a data analysis on the building level was already described as desirable in Harald Rohlinger's reflections on empirical social research (1990): The changes in a neighborhood or even on a single street can be characterized by very different residential properties and residents (Rohlinger 1990, p. 235). The apartment building, in contrast, serves as the given framework within which residents are unified under relatively similar conditions: All residents of a multi-storey apartment building are located in the same neighborhood and subject to generally similar residential conditions such as, for example, the architectural history and renovation conditions, as well as the same building management companies and owners. These framing conditions are of vital importance for a differentiated treatment of the gentrification and displacement processes. Through household surveys with semi-open-ended questionnaires, three kinds of information can be acquired in particular:

- Substantiation and tracking of the development stage of gentrification via statistical information like education level, income, age, household size and occupation.
- The tenants' situation with regard to the changing residential environment and possible effects on housing conditions such as rent increases, different treatment by the landlord or the building manager.
- Pointers on the current places of residence of displaced tenants and the possibility of making contact with former residents.

Investigating the gentrification process via one building means conducting research on the micro-level. The decisive advantage of this approach is its potential for capturing displacement and the fear of displacement: It allows the relocations from one apartment building to be tracked and then visualized. Further, on the level of the microcosm of the building it is also possible to trace back any changes in residential quality and the resident structure retrospectively. In so doing, it is also possible to draw conclusions about the strategies of the building managers and or owners, which, according to Holm, have not yet received sufficient attention (Holm 2011a, p. 222).

5 The Research Process

The schematic diagram of our research process, illustrated in Figure 1, shows how the approach of the micro-perspective of the apartment building described above was *operationalized* in the framework of this qualitative study. The concrete implementation of this perspective is to be described here and visualized by means of the schematic, ideal-typical course of research.

Determining the spatial plane of reference and the thematic focus are two steps that define the substantive content. As the investigations like that by Holm 2011 and the further studies by Döring and Ulbricht (2017 in this volume) show, the Berlin district of Kreuzberg has once again become a current gentrification hot spot (Holm 2011a, p. 215; Holm and Schulz 2017 in this volume). At present Kreuzberg and parts of Neukölln are experiencing a major shift in population structure as well as many conversions from housing for rent into individually owned apartments.

Moreover, the share of rental apartments in Kreuzberg is far above average (see Niendorf 2011), and there is a great deal of low-income housing in the district.



Figure 1: Operationalizing the micro-perspective of the apartment building (source: own diagram)

In a second step, the spatial plane of reference (Berlin-Kreuzberg) is to be examined for concrete indications of the thematic concentration (investigation of phenomena and consequences of the gentrification process in subsidized rental housing).

Applying the snowball principle, we recorded information on the buildings that had to do with the thematic and spatial concentration. By means of comprehensive media research, direct data about the the buildings were determined, and information on disseminators like neighborhood organizations and tenant delegates collected. Brief conversations conducted with these external disseminators added to this store of information. The focus of these conversations was on both acquiring information on potential buildings and on already displaced tenants, as well as on the search for any key persons involved with the given investigated properties.

Media research yielded an important reference in the website www.sozialmieter.de and the list published there of subsidized rental housing affected by gentrification as of September 2011. Above and beyond this, important information was gleaned from conversations with representatives of various accommodation management offices, silent participation in protests by local citizens' initiatives in Kreuzberg against the current rent policy, and subsequent conversations with participants. On this basis it was possible to compile an initial overview of which buildings were actually affected by gentrification at the time of the investigation. In order to draw case studies from this aggregate of potential properties to investigate, contact to key players in the given buildings was determined to be a significant selection criterion. These key players, caretakers, long-term tenants, and tenant delegates, function as important information sources for the subsequent analysis of the former resident structure. In the step of selecting the buildings to be investigated empirically, the subsidized rental buildings at Lindenstraße 36–37, Schöneberger Straße 5–6a and Maybachufer 18 were chosen, all of which are located in the Berlin district of Kreuzberg or the neighboring district of Neukölln.

The investigation of subsidized rental apartments at Maybachufer 18 is an exception in that it is located in Neukölln, and thus not in the previously specified spatial plane of reference Kreuzberg. However, through the public relations work of the district initiative *Café Reiche* in Kreuzberg, along with direct contact to a key resident of the building, there was a strong basis for further research. The property investigated is located directly on the southern boundary of the specified spatial plane of reference (location in the neighborhood straddling Kreuzberg and Neukölln, 'Kreuzkölln'), so that residents of Maybachufer 18 are also active at Café Reiche. The research results of Döring and Ulbricht (2017, in this volume) further demonstrate that the indices in these two districts frequently exhibit the same characteristic values.

The objects of investigation at Lindenstraße 36 and 37 are located in the northern part of the investigated area and have reached a relatively advanced stage of the gentrification process. While this may make investigation more difficult, at the same time it justifies research interest.

	Maybachufer 18	**Lindenstraße 36–37**	**Schöneberger Straße 5–6a**
State of research	July 2012	December 2012	February 2013
Gentrification period[9]	2009	2008/09	2010
Residential units[10]	**16**	**23**	**44**
of these:			
- for rental	4	1	37
- individually owned	12	22	-
- holiday flats	2	-	5
- vacant	1	-	2
Interviewed residents	**6**	**12**	**34**
of these:			
- former	2	-	11
- current	4	12	23
of these:			
- previously tenants	3	1	12
- new tenants	1	11	11
Interviewed key players	former caretaker	last tenant before gentrification	tenant delegate

Table 1: Overview of empirical data collection (data basis: own survey)

The investigation of the subsidized rental housing at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a constitutes the centrepiece of this paper. The activities of a committed tenant delegate directed toward social policy, tenancy law and media impact, and the size of the housing complex, were categorized as two characteristics that prom-

9 The gentrification period is the time during which the subsidized rental property investigated underwent gentrification. This is usually accompanied by abrupt rent hikes and/or conversions into individually owned apartments, and a subsequent wave of previous tenants moving out, succeeded by new tenants moving in.

10 The number of housing units is composed of vacant, rental, individually owned and holiday flats, whereby individually owned apartments are also used as holiday flats.

ised a wide range of information and data. It became clear that the residential estate was undergoing an acute transformation process.

By selecting these three properties we were able to study subsidized rental housing at various stages of the gentrification process and thus collect the widest possible variety of data. We interviewed a total of 39 current tenants or owners from all three properties under investigation. Table 1 summarizes the results of the conducted interviews. A further 13 former tenants were also interviewed. Moreover, key players associated with all three properties were interviewed as experts on their given properties.

6 Subsidized Rental Housing in the Gentrification Process

We first demonstrate that there are typical characteristics of gentrification in the three properties we investigated—these are important as a basis to understand the analysis on gentrification and displacement processes further below. For each property in the study, the categories *rent development*, *change in resident structure* and *restructuring and upgrading processes* are used to trace the gentrification process that took place or is still underway as a consequence of phased-out follow-up financing. The decisive moments that can be identified as the cause of considerable changes in *rental prices* in the buildings we investigated were the expiration of basic financing, and as a consequence, the change in ownership. At these junctures different rent increases were determined at all of the buildings we examined.

In the properties at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a, the owner declared private bankruptcy when the basic financing ran out, as a consequence of which the property was sold in 2009. In November 2009 the new owner increased rents for the first time, but tenants were able to prevent this increase due to a procedural error. In February 2010, however, there was an abrupt rent increase from €5.33 to €7.04/m² (+32%). Furthermore, in April 2010 an additional rise in the rents of individual tenants selected by the building management company was implemented, to the cost rent level of €13.02/m² (see BMV 2010; Dunger-Löper 2010; Int 6).

In the buildings at Lindenstraße 36 and 37, as a consequence of the end of basic financing in 2007/08 and a change in ownership after a bankruptcy proceedings and foreclosure in 2008, considerable rent increases were introduced in that year and the next. Due to the foreclosure, tenancy controls were also eliminated. The only tenant residing in the building with an ‘old’ rental contract (i.e., contract from the previous owner) pays €10/m², while new rentals after the sale range from €10 to €17/m², or purchase prices between €1,690 and €2,100/m².

The building at Maybachufer 18 was completed in 1991, so that basic financing ran out in 2006. Until it changed owners in 2008 there were only moderate rent increases, but afterward rents were increased by up to 80%, up to a rate of €12/m². After nearly all previous tenants moved out, the units were converted into individually owned apartments, the purchase prices of which were between €3,000 and €3,500/m², depending on the storey.

In all of the buildings we investigated, the upgrading process was marked by structural modernizations, some of which are described as luxury upgrades, followed by conversion into individually owned apartments. This is where the phenomenon of secondary residences or holiday flats emerges. The renovations that took place when tenants moved out, and the conversion into individually owned apartments, can be interpreted as an indication for targeted displacement of the previous tenants.

At Schöneberger Straße 5–6a renovation began in 2010. Potential new tenants were able to view a show apartment and then choose a flat which would then be renovated. The previous tenants' apartments remained unrenovated, with only minor damage repaired and touched up, and larger problems like mold remedied only insufficiently and with long delays. At Lindenstraße 36 the owner's attempts to let the renovated apartments were unsuccessful, with only one new tenant moving in during 2010. Therefore the owner changed strategies, letting unrenovated flats and gradually selling those that had been renovated by 2011. For the apartments at Lindenstraße 37 a similar process can be assumed.

At Maybachufer 18, renovation work took place each time a tenant moved out, and conversions to individually owned apartments also took place.

In all three blocks of flats there was a nearly complete substitution of residents, accompanied by a social shift in the residence structure. Of the surveyed tenants who moved out, around one half are unemployed or retired, or participating in a training course. In addition, two of those who are gainfully employed rely on state support to suppplement their income. With a few special exceptions (pensioners and students) the new tenants are employed, with only the remaining tenants from previous ownership receiving state support.

Over the course of 2010, nearly 40% of the tenants at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a moved out. The old tenants who remained, listed their monthly incomes as between €1,500 and over €3,000, and claimed either a secondary school certificate or vocational training as the extent of their education. Most of the new tenants have higher incomes, and the majority has completed a university degree or post-secondary qualifications. At Lindenstraße 36 two waves of tenants left: The first directly after the rent increase in 2007/2008, the second as a consequence of impending renovations with the goal of luxury upgrades in 2009. Afterward all flats were vacant except for three, whereby only one of these three tenants is still residing there. This tenant describes the new resident structure

with the words that there are "no more neighbors from precarious sitiuations" (interview 10). With a single exception, all of the new residents here have a general qualification for university (*Abitur*) or have completed university degree or a post-secondary qualification. The remaining social tenant is the only resident who does not work, aside from a few households of students or pensioners. At Maybachufer 18 only three of the previous social tenants have stayed; the others moved out in 2008.

The developments outlined here portray the gentrification process in subsidized rental housing, which occurred as a two-stage process of displacement: In the first stage the rent increase directly compels those tenants to move out who receive either a low income or state support. In the second phase, after the first wave has moved out, renovation measures are performed and some of the apartments are taken off the rental market as individually owned apartments. Through these valorization strategies in the the real-estate market, the formerly subsidized rental housing is no longer accessible for the majority of the former tenants. Thus both dimensions of the gentrification of a neighborhood according to Holm (2011) can be identified: "direct or indirect displacement of lower-status population groups" and the "reduction of affordable housing stock" (Holm 2011a: 213).

7 Phenomena of the Displacement Process in Subsidized Rental Housing in Berlin

As has already been demonstrated above, the gentrification process in Berlin's subsidized rental housing is the consequence of the interplay between the structures created politically by the Berlin Senate and the valorization strategies of the real-estate sector designed to take advantage of these structures.

The transformation process of gentrification has far-reaching effects on the (former) residents of subsidized rental housing. On the basis of empirical research results, a multi-dimensional process of displacement can be detected, which is categorized on the basis of four phenomena. In addition to basic *displacement* from the living area, these are *fear of displacement*, practices of *discrimination* and *resistance,* each of which will be discussed in greater detail below.

8 Displaced out of Subsidized Rental Housing

In the framework of the process of gentrification described above, various forms of displacement from the subsidized rental housing properties investigated in Berlin can be differentiated from each other analytically: Abrupt rent increases were introduced in all of the buildings studied, as a consequence of which many tenants had to move out because the new rents demanded were higher than they could pay. Marcuse designated this form of displacement *economical displacement* (Marcuse 1985, p. 205). It was legally possible to impose the rent increases in subsidized rental housing to such a large extent only because of the cost rent regulation described in the first section. The alignment of rent prices up to cost rent was deployed as a targeted form of leverage in order to carry out a selective displacement of certain groups of tenants. The "Discrimination" subsection below will discuss this in greater detail. Under general tenancy law, which links rents to the rent index, neither such extreme increases to the rents for existing flats nor the extent of economical displacement described thereafter would have been possible.

At Schöneberger Straße 5-6a, nine of the eleven former tenants surveyed said that the rent increase(s) in early 2010 was/were the reason they moved out. The rent increases indicated by the former tenants amounted to 20–30%, and in one case even 45%. Tenants were unable to pay these additional monthly costs of €130 to €400.

At Lindenstraße 36 and 37, according to the only tenant who has remained after gentrification, "all previous tenants [were] displaced by extreme rent increases" (interview 10). This was confirmed in a statement by the new owner: "everyone [moved out] except the tenant in the handicapped-accessible flat, all of them because of the higher rents" (interview 16).

The three former residents of Maybachufer 18 who we surveyed also state that the rent increase was the reason they moved out. One old tenant spoke of a "rapid rent increase to €12/m²" (interview 5) and another claims that her rent rose by €230, forcing her to move out after eviction proceedings. Another respondent received a rent increase of 51%, such that the rent (utilities included) rose from €581 to €881. According to the key informant's testimony, displacement was a consequence of increased rents for at least two further former residents of Maybachufer 18.

For a number of the former tenants surveyed, economical displacement is further influenced by an external factor: Depending on the number of persons and entitlement to benefits, the *Jobcenter* (office for unemployment benefits and

job placement[11]) takes over payment of a specified amount of rent for tenants dependent on social benefits (Senatsverwaltung für Justiz 2011a). For two of the former tenants of Schöneberger Straße 5–6a, we surveyed, this amount had already been exceeded before the rent increase, so that they were adding their own capital to the maximum housing benefit from the Jobcenter in order to cover the cost of rent. After the abrupt rent increase, six of the former tenants we surveyed were indirectly encouraged by the Jobcenter to move out, as the cost of rent exceeded the amount it would pay and thus needed to be reduced. This was also the case for at least one of the former tenants of Maybachufer 18. Nelly Grotefendt et al. (2017, in this volume) provide an insight into the residential changes of unemployment benefit recipients that are the result of a Jobcenter request to reduce rent costs.

Those social tenants whose capacity to pay was exhausted had to decide within 14 days whether they would accept the rent increase or terminate their leases and find a new place to live within a stipulated period of eight weeks (interview 6).

All of the former tenants we surveyed decided to reduce their rent costs by relocating. They sought a new apartment in the immediate surroundings, so that they could continue to benefit from the familiar social infrastructure, especially schools and nursery schools. Yet as they searched for a new place to live, they were confronted by the "increasing reduction of housing stock" in Berlin-Kreuzberg for social groups with lower incomes (Holm 2011a, p. 221). This development in the rental price levels is confirmed by the responses of the tenants displaced from Schöneberger Straße 5-6a. Four of those surveyed pointed out not only the excessive prices of rents, but also the difficulty of being able to find a flat large enough for their families under these financial limitations. One of those surveyed commented: "I looked in the area with my family of seven, but the building managers refused to give us anything we could have afforded because the flats were too small for so many people. All of the larger flats that would have been suitable for us were too expensive" (interview 64). One of the tenants we surveyed, who had been forced out of Maybachufer 18, commented in a similar vein: "Where am I supposed to find a handicapped-accessible flat for €378? I have my pension, but that doesn't cover €300 more. Where am I supposed to find a flat *here*?" (interview 3). These phenomena can be described analytically with the term *exclusionary displacement* from Atkinson et al. (2011): Due to the ever smaller supply of housing for those with low-incomes, these households are prevented from finding a suitable flat in their preferred

11 German "Jobcenters" are run jointly by the Federal Labour Office and local authorities, and are responsible for deciding on and dispensing benefits to the unemployed, and for providing opportunities for them to re-enter the labour market through training measures and job.

location and surroundings (Atkinson et al. 2011, p. 50). Tendencies toward segregation and polarization of social groups within the city are thus reinforced by gentrification and displacement processes (Holm 2005, p. 4ff.; LeGates and Hartman 1986, p. 217ff.). Accordingly, five of those surveyed stated that despite their wish to remain in the district, they were not able to find a suitable flat. On the other hand, six of the surveyed tenants forced out of Schöneberger Straße 5–6a and the three former tenants of Maybachufers 18 stated that they were ultimately able to find a flat in their preferred part of town.

Two of the affected families were not able to meet the three-month deadline for vacating their flats. As a result, the building management initiated eviction proceedings, although the Jobcenter had promised to pay the entire rent along with the increase for as long as it took them to find a new flat. One of the tenants had already been promised a new flat, but because he would not be able to move in until after the deadline, he was sued nonetheless. For the tenant in question, the €20,000 in dispute would have meant not only losing a place to live due to displacement, but also bankruptcy. Ultimately these lawsuits were averted and the deadline for moving out extended for another three months. These examples illustrate the owner's rigorous methods and his attempt to exploit the existing legal framework to the fullest.

At Schöneberger Straße 5–6a the displacement of social tenants was also due to the failure to renovate flats infested by mold. As a result, in this context a case of *physical displacement* can be analytically detected. According to Marcuse (1985), physical displacement is when tenants are forced to move out due to "physical" interventions in their housing units (Marcuse 1985, p. 205). The occurrence of mold may not be a direct physical intervention on the part of the landlord, yet an appraisal performed by the construction supervision authority for Schönebergerstraße 5–6a in 2007 found "causes of damage related to both construction and use" (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2010, p. 2). The landlord is thus at least partially responsible for the "physical influence" of the mold on the health of the tenants. "Following a court settlement, a construction schedule [for the removal of the causes of mold growth related to construction] was submitted, which stipulated that renovation would be performed between September 2007 and June 2008. The board of partners as owners, however, refused to give its consent" (ibid.). A comprehensive renovation of the affected flats rented by social tenants was, accordingly, deferred. The building was sold in 2009, as already described in the previous section. The new owners did not perform any renovations in the flats either; instead, the social tenants received the above-mentioned rent increases and were in some cases accused of causing the mold infestation.

Those two of the eleven surveyed former tenants of Schöneberger Straße 5–6a who did not list the rent increase as the reason for moving out were forced to

move out exclusively due to the continued failure to remove the mold in their flats. According to a statement by the former social tenant, her children were suffering from adverse effects on their health—which disappeared after they moved out. This is confirmed by another former social tenant, whose daughter suffered from symptoms of asthma.

A further five of the social tenants surveyed also stated, in addition to the rent hike as the main reason, that the failure to remove the mold was another reason they moved out. The combination of deliberately poor living conditions hazardous to their health and a high rent increase is unjustifiable in the eyes of the former residents. Appropriate renovation measures, which would have justified a moderate rent increase, were not initiated until after the social tenants moved out. There is thus reason to presume that this neglect was intentional, which means it can be interpreted as a further means of exerting pressure on the social tenants. At Schöneberger Straße 5–6a it is therefore possible to identify a combination of economical and physical displacement. Marcuse, too, already noted that "in most cases both [forms of direct displacement] occur simultaneously" (Marcuse 1985, p. 205).

It becomes clear that not only the rent increase(s) is/are to be regarded as the cause(s) of displacement for the social tenants surveyed. In-depth analysis reveals that individuals relocated due to the different ways they were affected depending on their various life circumstances, and because of deficiences in the building.

9 Where Do the Displaced Relocate?

As Figure 2 shows, the residential locations of the displaced reveal an ambivalent picture. Despite the above-mentioned indications of exclusionary displacement or a reduction of housing stock for socially disadvantaged groups in Kreuzberg, the new places of residence are apparently concentrated in the close surroundings of their former neighborhoods. Eleven of the displaced social tenants we located had moved into flats close to their previous residence and were thus able to remain within the inner circle circumscribed by Berlin's urban ring railway (*S-Bahn ring*). This affirms a phenomenon already detected in the US, of displaced tenants relocating in the direct vicinity of their previous residences (LeGates and Hartman 1986, p. 190f.). Four of the former social tenants of Schöneberger Straße 5–6a we surveyed were able to find a flat in the immediate vicinity. Another four live in the district of Kreuzberg once again, or in the adjacent inner-city districts of Mitte or Schöneberg. All three of the former tenants of Maybachufer 18 also continue to live in the immediate vicinity.



Figure 2: Old and new places of residence of the tenants of subsidized housing (source: own diagram)

Yet distinctions must be made: Because of the large-scale public relations work by the tenants at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a, various political actors were actively engaged in finding the tenants suitable new flats. On the part of the Senate Department for Urban Development, *AG SPAS* was charged with contacting housing companies, which for their part, were supposed to submit suitable offers for flats. The tenant delegate of the estate also served as mediator and assisted in the apartment search. The housing companies went beyond sharing information to offer rent reductions for the new flats, so that displaced tenants were able to move into housing in inner-city locations that corresponded to their financial possibilities. These 'benefits' for finding a flat and this rental pricing constituted a special case. Usually only help with relocation is provided, but even this is temporally restricted and thus was unavailable to many displaced social tenants. It can be assumed that the search would have been considerably more difficult

without these special measures, and that many of the options in inner-city locations would not have been offered to the displaced tenants. The claims of two displaced tenants confirm this: "Without the assistance services we would not have found anything" (interview 61); "Thanks to the help of the Senate we found something new; fortunately we received help" (interview 66). This statement exemplifies a controversial correlation that was picked up in the polemics of opposition activists like Kotti & Co (see Kotti&Co 2012): The graditude toward those who made displacement from subsidized rental housing possible in the first place, by means of the cost rent regulation and the exemption from tenant controls, that is, the *state-made rental gap*. These Senate measures seem like mere means of limiting damage by the structures it created itself. They are reactions intended to calm tempers around the tense situation, and to keep it from attracting greater public attention (interview 6).

Furthermore, two of the three surveyed tenants displaced from Maybachufer 18 had already moved out in 2008. In recent years, new rents for flats in the postal codes of the new areas of residence (12047, 10967) have risen by about 15% each year, so that searching for a flat in the vicinity revealed considerably more alternatives for the displaced tenants in 2008 than would be the case in the meantime (data basis: GSW 2013, 2012 and 2011). Moreover, those surveyed claimed that they never would have been able to get flats in this location without personal contacts.

No data on the new places of residence could be obtained for the former tenants of Lindenstraße 36 and 37.

Yet the phenomenon of a reduced market for rental housing in Berlin, and Atkinson's conclusion, on the basis of empirical investigations in London (2000), that socially disadvantaged groups were being displaced from gentrified inner-city areas to the suburbs, cannot be confirmed on the basis of the new places of residence of several survey subjects. Three of the former residents of Schöneberger Straße 5–6a surveyed were only able to find new residences outside of the inner-city area. Another two of the displaced tenants, who did not want to participate in the survey, also found a new place to live only far away (>10 km) from their former home. This was also true for two former residents of Maybachufer 18. The new places of residence are located in Reinickendorf, Mariendorf and Spandau, and thus outside the Berlin S-Bahn ring (on this, see also Förste and Bernt 2017 in this volume).

The small number of cases means that we cannot confirm a homogenous pattern in the process of displacement from subsidized rental housing in Berlin. On the one hand, the tendencies toward segregation and polarization are clear in Berlin. On the other, the successful settlement of several displaced tenants in the immediate vicinity of their former homes, which they were able to find with the help of committed supporters and/or the assistance measures undertaken, show

that solutions can be found for the displaced tenants' problems with acquiring new housing. Yet the prerequisites for this appear to be public attention and expertise about the complex structures.

10 Individual Consequences of Displacement

Independent of the location of the new place of residence, for many of the social tenants displaced from Schöneberger Straße 5–6a, displacement meant separation from the existing neighborhood community. For socioeconomically weaker groups, in particular, social networks and neighborhood structures are especially important. "These possibilities for compensation are destroyed in cases of displacement" (see Holm 2012a). Eight of those surveyed speak of a very marked and supportive neighborhood connection, which then no longer exists. On this topic, one of the interviewees stated: "While the children played together we met up and drank coffee; we were a big family" (interview 62). One former tenant also criticized the criminal milieu in his new place of residence: "We don't open the door for anyone in the evening any more; that's not the way it used to be" (interview 66).

Two of the former residents of Maybuchufer 18 expressed different opinions in the survey. One commented: "Neighborhood relations were not very strong; now the community in the building is great. That's a gain for us" (interview 4). The other interviewee however commented that the move did not bring any social changes.

It becomes clear among those we surveyed that *how* they expressed the availability of social contacts and existing infrastructure depended on the location of their new places of residence. Fewer social contacts and further distances to friends and relatives, and to schools and nursery schools they continued to use, were mentioned by two of the former residents, whose new residences were located far (>10 km) from their old homes. Moreover, according to these respondents it is particularly difficult for the children to build up a new social environment. In contrast to this, one of the former tenants of Maybachufer 18 stated: "You know, the contacts you have, you'll still have them in Charlottenburg or Spandau as well" (interview 4). A tenant of Schöneberger Straße 5–6a expressed it similarly: "I still have good contact to my former neighbors, we still get together for coffee like we used to" (interview 66).

The individual consequences mentioned for the former residents of the properties we investigated at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a and Maybachufer 18 illustrate the wide range of social consequences and/or costs of displacement in dependence on the respondents' individual perceptions. On the basis of the ex-

amples studied, it is not possible to detect any indication of a unified trend as to what meaning displacement has for the respondents. According to the evaluation of many studies from the US, LeGates and Hartman (1986) also came to a quite strongly varying result regarding the satisfaction of displaced tenants in their new places of residence. They attribute this to the subjective perception of the neighborhood, but also to the socioeconomic diversity of the displaced tenants (LeGates and Hartman 1986, p. 181ff.; 193).

Just as strong a variance becomes apparent with reference to the size and prices of the new flats that the former residents of Schöneberger Straße 5–6a moved into. For four of the former tenants, the move has meant lower rent (utilities included) than before the rent increase. On the other hand, there are four social tenants who have to pay more since relocating. For three of the tenants surveyed, the price of rent has remained more or less the same.

Therefore the survey results offer indications that suggest a rise in rent prices as a consequence of displacement. This connection was already documented in many studies conducted in the US in the 1970s/80s (LeGates and Hartman 1986, p. 191f.). However, the reduction in rent costs for a number of former social tenants as a result of being forced out of Schöneberger Straße 5–6a suggests that the opposite can also be the case.

It is not possible to detect a clear trend in terms of flat size, either: Five of the displaced tenants have more space after the involuntary relocation, three of those surveyed have less, and another three have roughly the same amount of space as they did at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a.

The remarks paint a fairly differentiated picture of the effects of displacement on the life of the former residents: Many further consequences and their reasons could be formulated, and the connections between them established. There are some indications that the consequences of displacement are directly dependent on the location of the new place of residence, on the given life context, on social contacts and on the recognition of the problem by political authorities. As was also established by Blasius (1994) in a quantitative study on displacement in the Nippes district of Cologne, no general deterioration of living conditions for social tenants through displacement can be confirmed (Blasius 1994, p. 412). The distribution of the positive and negative effects is not homogeneous, but quite individual. There are indications that the kinds of effect also depend on happy coincidence in the search for a new flat. "We were simply lucky, in contrast to many others", stated one of the respondents (interview 62). Yet a topic as fundamental as the availability of living space for displaced social tenants should not be dependent on luck and/or coincidence.

11 Fear of Displacement

Fear of possible displacement was a psychological consequence of gentrification in one's own building, which we detected in our study. In keeping with the various forms of displacement from subsidized rental housing discussed in the previous sub-section, the reasons for feeling this fear can also be described in three forms: fear of economical displacement (following Marcuse 1985), of exclusionary displacement (following Atkinson 2011) and fear of displacement through eviction proceedings (own data collection) or physical displacement (following Marcuse 1985).

In all three of the properties studied, fear of displacement can be detected among current tenants. Eleven of the 13 tenants surveyed who had lived in subsidized rental housing before the gentrification process began, and three of the new tenants, expressed fear of displacement. By their own account, the most common reason is the concrete fear of rent increases (economical displacement). The last tenant from before gentrification at Lindenstraße 36, one of the last tenants at Maybachufer 18, and seven of the eleven pre-gentrification tenants surveyed at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a experienced the developments in their building and name this as the reason for fearing that their rent would be increased (once again). They worried that they would not be able or willing to pay the next increase and would have to move out as a consequence.

In the case of one long-term tenant at Maybachufer 18, but especially at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a, it is clear that many tenants are aware that the cost rent regulation has given landlords the possibility to realize a dramatic increase of up to €13/m² at any time. Many declare that this is being used by building management as an instrument to selectively force out unwanted tenants: "I'm scared that I'll have to move out when they charge cost rent. We have been afraid of this for six years. The people they wanted to get out were forced to leave" (interview 23). In many cases this awareness damages the relationship of trust between tenants and building management. Especially long-term tenants (those who moved in before 2010) are in a constant state of anxiety regarding the security of their lease. According to statements by a tenant of Schöneberger Straße 5–6a who is very active in legal issues, new leases include a clause that legally allows building managers to demand cost rent retroactively for up to 23 months (interview 6). This was confirmed by several new tenants; others are not aware of the clause's existence. Accordingly, it cannot necessarily be assumed that all new tenants are acutely afraid of displacement as a consequence of possible rent increases to the level of cost rent.

Two of the new tenants at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a who expressed the fear of displacement are also aware of obvious changes in their direct residential surroundings. One emphasizes the deterioration in the retail infrastructure; the

other formulated the statement: "The middle class has replaced the previous tenants" (interview 53). Both perceptions can be seen as an indication for the fact that what is felt here is a mix of perceived displacement pressure due to the change in the residential surroundings and fear of economical displacement through rent increases.

11.1 Fear of Exclusionary Displacement

Besides the fear of displacement as such, residents of Schöneberger Straße 5-6a and Maybachufer 18 express fears that they will not be able to find a suitable flat in their preferred area if they move out. This fear of exclusionary displacement (see Atkinson 2011) is expressed in statements about a change in residential surroundings or in resident structure, which results in the residents no longer being able to rent a flat in the direct vicinity, let alone in their building or apartment block. At Lindenstraße 36 the only resident of a rental unit is afraid he will have to move out: "I am the last renter in this building, all previous tenants were forced out by extreme rent increases" (interview 10), and all of the other units have since been sold as individually owned apartments.

At Maybachufer 18 an affected tenant relates that he had searched for a new flat intensively at the beginning of his legal dispute with the building manager, but had stopped looking in the meantime, as he had not been able to find anything affordable in the area for his family of five (interview 1). Similarly, a displaced tenant from the same building relates: "I believe I would no longer get an apartment today under these conditions" (interview 4). Surveyed tenants at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a, who expressed the fear that they might have to move, mention their fear of rent increases and report about changes in the housing estate, but none of their statements can be unequivocally interpreted as fear of exclusionary displacement. It merely appears to be known that the residential surroundings are changing radically: "Many hotels have popped up, lots of restaurants for tourists, not for the people who live here. Younger people, including flat-shares, are moving in, couples instead of families, primarily Germans or West Germans as opposed to foreign families" (interview 60).

11.2 Fear of Displacment through Eviction or Physical Displacement

At both Schöneberger Straße 5–6a and Maybachufer 18 there are cases where tenants fear eviction. Two of the current tenants at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a have been in litigation with building management for years. At Maybachufer 18 one of the two tenants facing legal action initially won eviction proceedings due to a formal error on the part of the building management company. However, he remains in constant fear of displacement: "With a new rent increase or something else the landlord will try to get us out of here" (interview 1). None of these

tenants is willing or able to pay the rent increases, which are unjustified in their eyes. In the case of tenants at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a, legal proceedings were still in progress in May 2015. If the trial should end with a decision that is negative for the tenants, the consequence could be an immediate demand for payment of the accumulated back rent or else imminent eviction.

At Schöneberger Straße 5–6a one tenant expressed the fear that she might have to move out due to the mold infestation in her own flat (like others before her). This condition can, as was described in the previous section, be interpreted as a form of fear of physical displacement. Yet the examples of landlords directly attempting to displace tenants they have taken to court are consciously not designated as cases of physical displacement in Marcuse's sense (1985). Essentially, the litigation was initiated by the given tenants themselves by refusing to comply with the demands for rent. This illustrates that the cases of eviction proceedings can be also be analytically categorized as fear of economical displacement.

In closing this sub-section, it must be mentioned that it was not possible to establish that any of the phenomena observed here occurred for private owners or tenants of the new individually owned apartments at Lindenstraße 36 and 37 and at Maybachufer 18.

12 Discrimination

The displacement and fear of displacement described above are reinforced in part by discriminating mechanisms on the housing market. Studies document the discrimination of people especially from immigrant backgrounds (see Kilic 2008; Barwick 2012), as well as on the basis of their social status (see Oellerich 2011; Pestel Institut 2012).

What counts as discrimination are statements and actions that achieve disadvantages for a person or a group of people on the basis of certain characteristics (Hormel and Scherr 2010, p. 7). Proceeding from terminology and the background of subsidized rental housing, which was set up by the second Housing Act of 1956 with the objective of accessibility for "broad strata of the population" (Henckel et al. 2010, p. 428ff.), the initial assumption of discrimination seems absurd. However, the majority of the respondents from all three of the investigated subsidized rental properties reports that foreigners, immigrants and recipients of social benefits face different treatment by the landlord or building managers.

According to Berlin’s Senate Administration for Integration, Labour, and Social Affairs, racial discrimination can be directed toward external characteris-

tics, or "toward an (attributed) ethnic origin, a nationality, an immigration background, a language, a religion or a world view, to the extent that these are associated with marginalizations and abasement, which have their basis in the presumption of an essential inferiority" (see Senatsverwaltung für Arbeit, Integration und Familie 2013). In an interview with the tenant delegate of Schöneberger Straße 5–6a, we discovered that, after a first rent increase directed at all tenants, a second was implemented only selectively. This affected only three flats. The addressees of this selective rent increase were families of Turkish or Arab immigrants and women who wore headscarves for religious reasons.

In the case of the properties investigated at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a, racial (or ethnic) discrimation can be determined on the basis of two crucial points: The selective rent increase, and the attribution of negatively portrayed characteristics, behaviour patterns and lifestyle that are associated with a constructed Islamic cultural space.

Thirteen of 35 respondents at Schöneberger Straße confirm the practice of allocating different rent increases to "foreigners" and "immigrants" or "Muslim residents" (interviews 6, 27, 43, 51, 55, 57, 58, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68). Five residents accused the building manager of explicit discrimination towards female residents who openly profess their culture or faith by wearing a headscarf. The different treatment is particularly obvious in the statement of one resident, who claims to have observed that one family with a Turkish name did not receive a second, selective rent increase: The only recognizable difference was that in this family no one wore a headscarf. What is more, the Polish neighbors of the Arab and Turkish families did not receive a second rent increase, either.

The landlord further expressed to several former and current residents that the mold infestation in some flats constituted personal negligence, which was caused exclusively by the lifestyle of the Turkish and Arab families. Six of the nine former residents of Schöneberger Straße 5–6a surveyed testified that, according to the landlord, they "cook too much and air too little" (interviews 43, 61, 62, 65, 66, 68). Furthermore, the children of those families were accused of making noise and running riot, and made responsible for the destruction of glass doors in the stairways, without any proof of their involvemement. The assumption of discriminating behaviour is further reinforced by the landlord's initiation of eviction proceedings for two tenants with Turkish or Arab names. Because these families did not succeed in finding a suitable flat within the prescribed period of eight weeks before the rent increase took effect, they requested the deadline to be extended. At the same time, a German family in the same situation was granted permission to contest their eviction.

In the cases of the properties investigated at Lindenstraße 36 and 37 and at Maybachufer 18 it can also be speculated that the displacement from the rented flats through their conversion into individually owned apartments is intrinsically

discriminatory behaviour. According to the statement of a long-term resident of Lindenstraße with a German name, discrimination by ethnic origin can also be presumed. According to his account, all residents had been displaced by the end of 2010, but the Turkish tenants received a rent increase five times greater than his own. At Maybachufer 18 three of the five tenants surveyed spoke of a selective rent increase, yet no precise orientation of this practice can be identified in their testimony. However, two respondents stated that the landlord did not want to take their query about the future purchase prices of their apartments seriously.

It should be pointed out that the conversion of accommodations from subsidized rental housing with tenant controls into individually owned apartments can be regarded as a targeted replacement of the old tenants with new, wealthier residents. The question seems justified as to whether discrimination is generally linked with the mechanism that emerged through the phasing-out of follow-up funding and the exemption from tenancy controls in subsidized rental housing. For in contrast to the free housing market, living space in subsidized rental housing is supposed to be accessible to everyone. In general tenancy law, rent increases are controlled and thus cannot entail the effects which have allowed for some immense cost rents in Berlin's subsidized rental housing. For example, the current rent prices at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a are currently approaching those of the first wave of rent increases. Accordingly, the argument of targeted displacement according to cultural-racist and social indications can hardly be rejected.

In the surveys of current tenants, five state that the ethnic origin of the new tenants can be classified as primarily German or Central European. Five long-term residents further claim that the tenants have been exchanged for a wealthier middle class.

Such discriminating behaviour on the part of building management can also be a hurdle when the displaced tenants seek new flats: For many landlords, a name that cannot immediately be identified as German appears to be a criterion for excluding a candidate from obtaining a free flat, as was established in a test trial[12] on renting flats in Berlin (see Kilic 2008). The result is an exclusionary effect, along with the reduction of the real housing market for people with immigration backgrounds. At Schöneberger Straße 5–6a a comparable situation is reported: One respondent had one Turkish and one German friend call the landlord, one after the other, to inquire about a free flat. The woman with the Turkish last name was informed that the flat had already been rented, whereas the German woman with the same inquiry was offered a viewing shortly thereafter. Considering that people dependent on social benefits receive differential treatment, which can be regarded as discrimatory, in some cases double discrimina-

12 A test trial can reveal discriminating actions. On this, see Yigit, Vazquez and Yazar 2010.

tion occurs due to a potential tenant's immigration background and social status. In such cases of intersectional discrimination it is not clear which characteristic leads to the denied access to housing. In the case of displaced tenants affected by racial discrimination, we can presume intersectional discrimination, although it is difficult to prove.

A further peculiarity to observe is the highly differentiated treatment of people in wheelchairs. These individuals were rarely confronted with rent increases and, in the properties which were turned into individually owned apartments, continue to enjoy the privilege of being the only renters in the building. In view of the rigour of the process of displacement process in other cases, it is striking that the handicapped-accessible flats are subject to special tenancy controls (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2012a).

13 Resistance

Resistance against the developments in the properties we investigated faced two main hurdles: First, understanding the facts of the situation requires an enormous investment of time and effort; and second, at first glance any resistance appears to have little chance of success. In addition, dealing with the legal situation is an even greater barrier for people with little knowledge of German. Nevertheless, there are a few forms of protest which were organized by those affected.

At Schöneberger Straße 5–6a there were several forms of resistance. Residents were successful in staving off the first attempt to increase rent, which affected the entire estate, due to a formal error. Further legal action regarding the rent increase implemented in late 2009/early 2010 is still pending. At least two tenants have avoided immediate eviction and found themselves in legal proceedings with the successful result of an extension to the deadline for evacuation. A further family has been involved in litigation for five years, fighting to pay reduced rent because of the serious mold infestation.

Furthermore, in January 2015 the owner of the above-mentioned buildings on Schöneberger Straße was sentenced for violating the General Equal Treatment Act (*Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz*, AGG) in the case of two families who were affected by the second, selective rent increase. According to the AGG, discrimination by ethnic origin—as regards access and provision of housing—is illegal. This law passed in 2006 has a special status, due to the compensation of immaterial damage and the reversed burden of proof. The first case where the law was implemented a landlord was required to pay €15,000 to each of her former tenants as compensation (see Senatsverwaltung für Justiz 2015).

The judgment is not yet final, however, and the defendant can still submit an appeal. This sentencing for violating the AGG in connection with residential housing could set a legal precedent, for up to now it has been applied seldom in general, and never before in the context of housing.

A further resident at Schöneberger Straße is also involved in a legal dispute with the landlord because the latter is charging the full cost rent only from him, and not from any other tenant, and is demanding that he pay it retroactively for the longest period possible. According to the tenant's testimony, he is being penalized for his activities in the neighborhood's protest organization. The residents at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a have already organized demonstrations in front of the Berlin Chamber of Deputies. The above-mentioned conference on subsidized rental housing at the Chamber of Deputies, which was entitled "Nothing is working right here" ("*Nichts läuft hier richtig*"), can similarly be assessed as successful protest work that influenced the public. Within the conference, the Fanny Hensel Estate and thus also the apartment house at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a served as an important example for the discriminatory allocation of rent increases, as the course of developments has been documented there better than in other residential properties, and because the tenant delegate has been extremely active.

As to Maybachufer 18, two of the residents actively resisted their eviction and joined the organization of the Kotti & Co group as well as the Initiative against Evictions (*Initiative gegen Zwangsräumungen*). Both were unsuccessful and ultimately had to move out. Unfortunately, it was not possible to find information about any acts of resistance in the properties we investigated on Lindenstraße.

The forms of resistance we detected that aimed to eliminate tenancy controls and the discriminatory mechanism of cost rent have had only few and small victories. Only a minority of the residents in the buildings we investigated is actively involved in protests. The bulk of the resistance, and the in part dedicated efforts by residents at Schöneberger Straße, are highly dependent on the commitment of individual activists. The first decision referring to the General Equal Treatment Act in the legal dispute of two former tenants at Schöneberger Straße was not yet final (in May 2015), but hopefully constitutes a path-breaking result nevertheless.

14 Summary and Reflections

This study demonstrates that the process of gentrification can also be identified in Berlin's subsidized rental housing. The displacement process inherent in this

development occurs in a particularly intensive and chronologically compressed form. The reason for this is Berlin's system of cost rent, in combination with the temporary exemption from tenancy controls. Through this mechanism a yield gap was created politically, which we designate here as the *state-made rental gap*. This allowed the residential properties to become objects of real-estate speculation. The landlords used the possibility created within the system to displace tenants who were unemployed, or only precariously employed, from their flats in order to make room for a wealthier clientele. It is possible to demonstrate that most of the social tenants we surveyed were displaced by rents that increased beyond their capacity to pay. In the subsidized rental housing properties we investigated in Berlin, it is thus possible to prove the displacement form known as economical displacement. The owners of the subsidized rental housing properties imposed rent increases up to the level of cost rent. The results of this research show that the rent increases are not arbitrary, but imposed selectively on those social tenants who did not correspond with the valorization strategies of the owners. In the process, owners used discriminatory practices, above all at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a and Lindenstraße 36. Many of the remaining previous tenants—and even some of the new tenants—express fear of displacement, whereby individuals have resisted by means of legal proceedings and by generating media attention against the (discriminatory) methods of the building owners.

No clear trend can be identified with regard to the locations of the new residence of the displaced tenants. Many of the former social tenants we surveyed found new flats in locations on the edge of the inner city and in geographical proximity to their previous homes. However, the search for a new flat was influenced positively by the fact that nearly all former residents received outside help. Based on the statements of residents who moved out, only limited conclusions can be drawn about the general consequences of displacement, as the assessment of the new or the former place of residence is influenced by many individual factors.

By utilizing the micro-perspective of the apartment building approach, we acquired detailed information on the issues surrounding displacement in Berlin's subsidized rental housing. By observing developments on the micro-level, the gentrification process can be traced from its emergence to its consequences on the basis of examples on the individual level. In so doing, the various levels of detail achieved for each apartment building make clear the methodological dependence of the process on individual key persons and/or other disseminators. While it was possible to locate and interview many displaced social tenants of the investigated property at Schöneberger Straße 5–6a through existing contact with the remaining long-term tenants, a lack of intermediaries precluded making contact with former residents at Lindenstraße 36 and 37. Nevertheless, by sur-

veying current new tenants and owners, it was possible to reflect on the gentrification process of the property and on phenomena of the displacement process.

The phenomena described in the residential properties we investigated serve as examples of developments taking place all over Berlin after the discontinuation of follow-up financing for inner-city subsidized rental housing. More in-depth research appears useful, especially against the backdrop of the Housing Act of 2011 and the Berlin Senate's ambitions for new subsidized rental housing. Especially from the perspective of the affected tenants and their supporters, a further systematic record could supply valuable arguments. The need for political action is apparent, above all because of the constant population influx to Berlin and the resultant increasing pressure on the housing market. Gentrification and displacement processes will continue as long as there is insufficient living space for socioeconomically weaker population groups and ineffective legal protection of these groups against displacement from inner-city areas.

This chapter was able to show that state deregulation measures, which are often underestimated in their scope, can create a *state-made rental gap*. As a result, displacement from subsidized rental housing is intensified, or initiated in the first place.

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Kotti & Co: New Forms of Displacement, New Forms of Protest

Lisa Heidsieck

> […] protests are finding greater and greater acceptance as an instrument for the articulation and implementation of demands made on society (Thomas Kern 2008, p. 15)

This chapter is concerned with the demand for affordable housing for the tenants of subsidized rental housing. The focus is the Kotti & Co[1] protest campaign in Berlin Kreuzberg. Since May 2012, Kotti & Co have initiated protests against the threat of residents at Kottbusser Tor being displaced due to drastic rent increases, which will go into effect once a period of capped rents expires. Based on an analysis of the protest structures, unique aspects and success achieved so far, this chapter will discuss the question of the actual effect on the *GSW*[2] building owners (one of the landlords), the *Hermes Hausverwaltung*, and policy at the level of district and state government. By means of interviews with Kotti & Co representatives, Hermes, GSW and local political representatives in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, the significance of the protest at different levels will be examined and, in order to clarify the effects of the process, the options for exerting influence as well as the willingness to do so will be described. Bringing together all perspectives will help provide an answer to the following research questions:

- What effect did the protest by Kotti & Co have on housing companies (GSW and Hermes) and on Berlin district and state policy?
- What changes were achieved at that time in the gentrification and displacement process?

These research questions are derived from the special influence of gentrification on subsidized rental housing which has been observed in the gentrification literature. Because of the existence of subsidized rental housing outside the private

1 "Kotti" is the Berlin nickname for the neighborhood near the Kottbusser Tor subway station.

2 The former Gemeinnützige Siedlungs- und Wohnungsbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH, now known as GSW Immobilien AG.

I. Helbrecht, *Gentrification and Resistance*,
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housing market, sections of city districts can be protected from the gentrification process. In this context, the significance of political mobilization by the local community is emphasized (see Ley and Dobson 2008). The purpose of this chapter is to examine this relationship in the context of Germany.

1 The Research Focus: Kotti & Co as Protest against Displacement

A possible explanation of why precisely the topic of gentrification is leading to numerous protests is that it raises questions regarding social, political, and economic equality of rights. In Berlin, the debates are particularly intense. For example, recently even the increased tourism in the city has been made the scapegoat for gentrification. This kind of tourist bashing can be seen in the broader context of the cultural consequences of social polarization in the urban context and its significance for new forms of discrimination and prejudice (Dirksmeier and Helbrecht 2015). Added to this is that gentrification often leads to displacement and spatial exclusion of certain groups of people (Naegler 2012, p. 10f.). Displacement leads not only to spatial marginalization, but can also cause cultural exclusion and exclusion from an urban lifestyle (ibid., p. 42). However, empirical studies of actual displacement caused by gentrification are rare (see Helbrecht 2017 in this volume). Such research is methodologically very difficult to carry out, because it requires longitudinal observation of displaced individuals and not of the gentrified areas. If an area becomes interesting for researchers because gentrification tendencies have become visible, displacement is often already well advanced and can only be partially reconstructed (Holm 2010, p. 59f.).

With Kotti & Co the question arises: Why the protest is attracting increased attention? The initiative is receiving heightened attention both from the media as well as from many researchers. This is made apparent by the declaration of support signed by 73 researchers, planners, authors, and others (not only from Berlin) (see Kotti&Co 2012b). From these statements and declarations of support it is evident that Kotti & Co is regarded not only as a protest against excessive rents and gentrification, but also as a contemporary form of political participation. For example, Andrej Holm writes in his gentrification blog:

> Social urban policy does not need any hybrid concepts from above, but instead redistribution and annexation strategies from below. In this perspective Kotti & Co with its demands and protests is less a problem of urban planning and more the solution approach of a repoliticized urban society (see Holm 2012).

Figure 1: Kotti & Co protest camp in July 2017 (source: Francesca Weber-Newth)

This statement makes it clear that the protest is being interpreted as a counter-model to state housing market strategies. Through its localization and the occupation of public spaces (see Figure 1) and its simultaneous presence on the Internet and in social networks, the structure of the protest is reminiscent of the occupy movement (see Skinner 2011, p. 3ff; Helbrecht et al. 2015). Both protest forms supplement each other and thus reinforce their effects.

In addition, new media makes coordination of national or international protest rallies easier (Höfler 2012, p. 2), such as the demonstrations against rising rents in several German cities, especially Hamburg and Freiburg (see Askari, Tagesschau 2012). This applies in particular to the many different forms of protest. For example, Kotti & Co was involved in the demonstration "for a social urban policy" on 10 November 2012, three days later hosted a conference on subsidized rental housing, and is continuing its local protest in the form of a *gecekondu* (see Kotti&Co 2012a). In Turkey, informal camps consisting of houses put up overnight on public land are called *gecekondu.* In the case of Kotti & Co, this involves a *gecekondu* set up in a public space as a protest camp (see Figure 1). Because gentrification is always also influenced by the local context it makes sense to look at the local embedding of the phenomenon (Shaw 2005, p. 168).

2 Background to the Protest at Kottbusser Tor

Protest strategies against displacement are influenced by the local context. They depend, among other things, on the situation in the rental market, the local political climate and the possibilities open to local organizations (Levy et al. 2006, p. 1). Thus, every protest against displacement represents a unique case whose analysis can yield insights in connection with understanding such movements. However, Kotti & Co is a special case. The residents who are threatened with displacement are the tenants in subsidized rental housing (see Figures 1 and 2). These buildings now belong to private owners such as GSW, which received state subsidies for a long time to make affordable housing available. The expiration of caps on rent in 2010 has led to annual increases in monthly rents of €0.30/m^2. Only in the case of "problematic large-scale housing as part of subsidized rental housing" and social housing projects of municipal residential construction companies are rental rates still capped at €5.35 or €5.75 per square meter (SenFin 2011, p. 3). According to Kotti & Co, after limits on support-related rent increases expire (a cap on rent), rents will increase annually (see Kotti&Co 2012c). The demands by the tenants thus target subsidized rental housing, and more specifically support for existing tenants.

Since privately financed subsidized rental housing was abolished by the Senate in 2003, the state of Berlin no longer pays the difference between cost-based rents and socially acceptable rents (Ertelt et al. 2017 in this volume). Cost-based rents are often higher than rents for apartments not subject to rent controls (see SenStadtUm 2013a). This difference comes about as a result of the makeup of cost-based rents specified in the *Second Calculation Ordinance*[3]. This is based on profitability calculations which take account of total costs (see BMJ 2007). Total costs include depreciation, interest on financing both borrowed and private capital, maintenance and administration costs, and estimated periods without rental income. The profitability calculations are based on conditions in the year building is completed (Kirchner 2006, p. 151). On this legal basis, cost-based rents are developing independently of the remaining rental market. With increasing demand, this can cause problems for tenants. Disadvantaged households are suffering under short- or medium-term increases in demand for rental properties—especially in connection with expiration of occupancy restrictions (Kirchner 2006, p. 115). Basically, a rent increase can quickly become a problem for low earners, because their income often does not rise to

3 The regulation on housing-related calculations in accordance with the Second Housing Act is applied, among other things, to calculate "[the] profitability, the environmental effect, the residential capacity or the appropriate pricing for publicly subsidized housing in accordance with the Second Housing Act or Controlled Tenancies Act" (see BMJ 2007).

the same extent (Levy et al. 2006, p. 1). According to the Senate Department for Urban Development and the Environment, the high cost-based rents in Berlin are mainly a result of the high construction and land costs deriving from the isolated situation of West Berlin prior to 1990 (SenStadtUm 2012a, p. 6). Frequently, the expiration of occupancy restrictions does not lead to neglect of social aspects in renting by municipal housing societies. Rather, this point becomes a problem after privatization (Kirchner 2006, p. 161). However, many of the buildings at the Kottbusser Tor belong to GSW Immobilien AG. In 2004 this former municipal subsidized rental housing organization was sold to the private investment companies Whitehall (Goldmann & Sachs) and to Cerberus. The buyers were obliged to maintain social and housing policy goals, but at the same time wanted to transform GSW into a competitive, high-performance enterprise (GSW 2012, p. 13). Consequently, "measures to increase value" were an explicit goal of restructuring following its sale. These were followed in 2010 by a change in its legal structure to a real estate company and, finally, in 2011 by it going public (ibid., p. 14f.).

Figure 2: Hermes Hausverwaltung and the Südblock café (source: Francesca Weber-Newth)

The construction of the apartments administered by Hermes (see Figures 2 and 3) was financed by a private investment company (Hermes interview). Figure 3 shows the GSW buildings and the investment company as well as the Kotti & Co protest camp.

A further special characteristic of Kotti & Co is the social and cultural mixture of the tenants. This involves, for example, numerous people with varying migration backgrounds. The basis for this mixture is among other things the settlement of former Turkish guest workers, who moved to Kreuzberg because of the favorable rents close to the Berlin wall in the 1960s. With facilities often of poorer quality and, as a result, less competition and discrimination in this less popular sector of the housing market, the chances of obtaining an apartment were often better (Kil and Silver 2006, p. 96f.). Many of the Turkish migrants now feel at home in Kreuzberg and the many Turkish societies and organizations are evidence of the communal life that has emerged (Kil and Silver 2006, p. 98).



Figure 3: Position of the GSW residential buildings, Hermes administration and the protest camps at Kottbusser Tor (map based on: SenStadtUm 2013b, FIS-Broker) (source: prepared by the author using information provided by GSW and Hermes)

3 Gentrification and Protests in Kreuzberg

Gentrification literature has been discussing differences between so-called gentrification areas for a long time (see Helbrecht 1996). For example, different situations can lead to different forms of protest. Expressly for Berlin a theoretical system already exists for classifying the many upgrading or gentrification strategies and the forms of protest they lead to (see Holm 2011). In the case of Kreuzberg with its delayed renewed gentrification tendencies, it is a matter of so-called "rental gentrification" (ibid., p. 216ff.). In Kreuzberg, symbolic gentrification is leading to rising rents (ibid., p. 214). This form of valorization is based on rent increases for new tenancies and the laws stipulating fixed rents in subsidized rental housing expiring (ibid., p. 221f.). The protest by Kotti & Co is directed at the high cost-based rents in subsidized rental housing, especially at Kottbusser Tor, but also all across Berlin. Other recent protests against gentrification are often directed at specific projects and less at overarching housing policy processes (Holm 2011, p. 228). Thus, the demand by Kotti & Co for a general solution for existing tenants in subsidized rental housing in Berlin must be seen as unusual. Nonetheless, in other German cities too wide-ranging protests against the background of the profit-making mechanisms of the real-estate market are also taking place; the Hamburg network *Recht auf Stadt* [Right to the City] can be mentioned as an example (see Birke 2010).

In connection with protests in Kreuzberg, there is a certain tradition, both in terms of personnel—this becomes clear in the case of the participant in interview 1—and also in terms of the content of the protests (Holm 2011, p. 223). This can be traced back to the autonomous left-wing scene which already existed in Kreuzberg in the 1970s before German reunification. At that time, planned urban renewal and extension of a motorway, together with the planned demolition of houses from the 19th century at the Kottbusser Tor, led to the occupation of vacant houses by the alternative scene. After a conflict lasting five years, the Berlin Senate changed its plans for new construction strategies to pursue a more careful urban renewal combined with greater participation by local residents (Kil and Silver 2006, p. 97). A further example of the Kreuzberg protest culture is the citizens' initiative *Mediaspree Versenken* [Sink Mediaspree]. In 2008 the initiative instigated a successful referendum against the privatization of the riverbanks of the Spree and excessively intense development. The resistance can be attributed to, among other things, fear of displacement and fear of gentrification of the neighborhood (Ahlfeldt 2011, p. 33ff.). The background to the protest was possible displacement of local cultural institutions and a resulting concern about changes to the neighborhood (ibid., p. 43).

Regardless of what triggered the protests, a politically active society can lead to increased willingness of local government to be responsive (Shaw 2005, p.

182). Protest movements can bring about local change by presenting themselves as "mobilized networks of groups and organizations" (Kern 2008, p. 13).

According to Marcuse, displacement can be defined in terms of the neighborhood, households, residential units or individuals, as well as the result of physical or economic changes (Marcuse 1985, p. 204). "Physical" and "economic displacement" are two forms of "direct displacement." They differ in terms of the reason for moving out. The case of Kotti & Co involves the attempt to prevent "economic displacement," in other words, increases in rent to a level which is no longer affordable for tenants (ibid., p. 205f.). The resistance to this displacement also derives from the fear of being faced with no alternative possibilities. "If households under pressure of displacement do not choose to move, it is probably because of lack of alternatives, rather than a lack of pressure" (Marcuse 1985, p. 214). For this reason, in following sections existing actions will be examined which help to prevent gentrification and displacement.

4 (How) Can Gentrification be Stopped?

Gentrification can only be stopped by a small number of factors—and then only in certain locations (Ley and Dobson 2008, p. 2471). These factors are reduced availability of desirable accommodation, political intervention and public resistance. Limited availability of accommodation is only a significant factor when demand is (still) moderate (ibid., p. 2473; Marcuse 1985, p. 202). A district without architectural character, access to green spaces or cultural offerings, but close to industrial operations, with a high proportion of poverty among residents and relatively far away from existing elite areas is, as a rule, not a potential site of gentrification (Ley and Dobson 2008, p. 2475). In addition, a certain degree of secure living and ownership conditions can be significant for the stability of a district (Shaw 2005, p. 173). New construction and maintenance of subsidized rental housing are cited as particularly effective interventions from the political side (Ley and Dobson 2008, p. 2476). The following applies in this regard: "State intervention may be encouraged by the impacted community itself through political mobilisation that draws attention to the injustice of gentrification, notably the displacement of vulnerable poorer populations" (ibid., p. 2475).

Public resistance is relevant for local politics and can take many different forms. Its success depends on supportive sympathizers, on greater public awareness and on the government, or also court rulings. An important task for public protest is to make it clear that the neighborhood does not need restructuring, but instead that it possesses strengths that deserve support (Ley and Dobson 2008,

p. 2477). Thus, in order to stand up to the pressure of the housing market, exceptionally strong and resourceful neighborhood movements are necessary (ibid., p. 2478). In their study, Ley and Dobson showed that in the long term no possibility of stopping gentrification and displacement exists other than a reliable supply of accommodation outside the private market (ibid., p. 2494; Levy et al. 2006, p. 74). The Kotti & Co protest targets this with a strategy of maintaining the supply of affordable housing. Tactics of this kind mostly aim at rent control and the maintenance of affordable state-subsidized apartments. Because this requires knowledge of relevant laws and their local implementation, close collaboration of tenants' associations with local organizations can be helpful (Levy et al. 2006, p. 7). Long-term residence resulting from secure tenancies in the private, public or communal sector or acquisition of ownership also play an important role in reducing gentrification by preventing displacement and promoting development of a community with strong local roots (Shaw 2005, p. 177). In turn, the solidarity of the community can have an influence on the success of local protest movements (ibid., p. 179).

Local protest movements against displacement often only come into existence when gentrification is already so advanced that shortages are already clearly evident on the local housing market (Levy et al. 2006, p. 81f.). This often restricts the ability of local protest movements to exert influence. The question arising from this in connection with Kotti & Co is whether their protest can have such an influence on landlords and political decision makers that they use their negotiating powers to achieve reductions in cost-based rents in subsidized rental housing.

5 Methodology

The examination of the topic began with open participatory observation in order to define the issues to be investigated and then specify the methodology more precisely (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr 2010, p. 53). To do this, I participated in the protest—which has been going on since May 2012—by taking over shifts[4] at the protest camp. I gained further insight by participating in a demonstration organized by Kotti & Co and in a conference organized together with Sozialmieter.de. Sozialmieter.de is a Berlin alliance focused on tenants in subsidized rental housing who are threatened with the loss of their apartment. This participant observation made it possible to enter into direct contact with poten-

4 Initially there were six four-hour shifts each day. In the winter this was reduced to four three-hour shifts between 10:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.

tial interview partners. Between 5 December 2012 and 16 January 2016 I interviewed six protest participants as experts on the procedures, rules, mechanisms, etc. of Kotti & Co, using structured interviews (ibid., p. 134). The willingness of participants in Kotti & Co to give interviews varied. A low level of willingness was expressed particularly by people who had already been interviewed frequently. Precisely the members of this group are especially interesting as experts, because they possess more information about the structure and origins of the protest. The people interviewed included two who regularly participated in meetings of the core group and four others who were involved to a varying degree. However, in view of the fact that many of the actively participating tenants are not involved in the work of the core group, insights into their motives and opinions in connection with the protest are very important.

Following these interviews, one interview each took place with representatives of Hermes Hausverwaltung (25 January 2013) and GSW Immobilien AG (14 February 2013) in order to cast light on their views on the demands being made by Kotti & Co. The views of a local political representative on the situation of Kotti & Co were examined by means of an interview with a member of the Pirate Party Germany and the *Ausschuss für Stadtentwicklung, Soziale Stadt und Quartiersmanagement, Mieten* [Committee on Urban Development, Social City and Neighborhood Management, Rents] in Berlin Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg on 9 February 2013.

6 Characteristics and Structure of Kotti & Co

Only two of the people interviewed had previously taken part in similar protests. This is relevant in view of the argument that protest movements are able to establish themselves more easily if local government is more willing to cooperate due to a community having been active in the past. One participant, who had already participated in the occupation of houses in Kreuzberg in the 1980s, directly compared the two protests and emphasized the after-effects of the earlier protests on the emergence of Kotti & Co by describing the results of the earlier protests as “humus” (interview 1, p. 6) for Kreuzberg. In addition, the participant gives particular importance to earlier successes nourishing hope for the current protest: “Well, as an old squatter I have, after all, been waiting for something like this” (ibid., p. 1).

Long residency in a previously less popular part of Kreuzberg and ties to the district are mentioned as something special on the Kotti & Co (2012b) website as well as by some of the people interviewed. Although only half the people questioned had been living in Kreuzberg for more than 10 years, other partici-

pants also emphasized the long period of residency of many tenants. Precisely this, together with the broad makeup of the structure of participants, is regarded as unusual.

> I would say that we have a protest here that you can't simply ignore anymore. It really is being carried out by people who are saying that they have worked for a long time and have lived here for a long time, and now they can't afford the rent, not even where they were, in effect, originally sent (interview 5, p. 4).

This statement implies that some long-term tenants are people with a migration background who were forced to come to Kreuzberg in those days because they could not find an apartment anywhere else. Exactly these people were the ones who first made Kreuzberg and Kottbusser Tor a popular residential area. As one interviewee stated: "I have built something here. I have built Kreuzberg, or let's say helped to build it" (interview 3, p. 4).

In summary: in Kreuzberg it is primarily two things that are highly valued. Firstly, the feeling of belonging, linked in some cases with very long residency (three of the people interviewed had lived in Kreuzberg for more than 30 years) and the familial and community relationships there, and secondly its description as a multicultural quarter.

> Of course it's really multicultural here. At the beginning I said, I can't live in Kreuzberg, but I've been here for five years. Everything is multicultural there are different religions, different colors, and so on. It's just right for me. It's great (interview 6, p. 2).

Precisely those people who have lived in Kreuzberg for more than 30 years are expressing significant lack of understanding for and even anger about the fact that cost-based rents keep rising in accordance with an agreement laid down before building began. It is these rising rents which are given as the reason for participating in the protest and are almost the only problem with the housing or the residential surroundings. This is scarcely surprising in view of the demands made upon the Senate and the building administrators by Kotti & Co.

The following demands are being made upon the Senate of the state of Berlin:

- "Immediate reduction of rent to €4.00 [per square meter] and temporary re-introduction of a rent upper limit for the 'problematic large-scale housing'!
- Long-term reduction of (cost-based) rents in subsidized rental housing through revision of the basis of their calculation, refinancing and changes in the interest rate.

- Concern yourselves with the complex problem of Berlin subsidized rental housing and stop referring constantly to state-owned apartments or planned new housing construction only. […]
- Make the construction of subsidized rental housing a municipal responsibility! […]
- Organize (with the help of the opposition parties) a working conference on Berlin subsidized rental housing for the fall of 2012 […] with the goal of finding a sustainable solution that accommodates social tenants!
- Instruct the Jobcenter to cease demanding further cost reductions and evictions" (see Kotti&Co 2012d).

Demands directed at the building administrators:

- "[…] persuade the state of Berlin to reduce rents!
- Return to the task of making affordable housing available, for which you have been receiving subsidies for decades!
- Apologize for repeatedly not accepting our invitations (as well as those of the district and the Senate) to participate in talks!
- Accept the decision of the *Bezirksverordnetenversammlung* [District Assembly Meeting] (BVV) on 28 March 2012 and, at last, enter into dialogue with tenants! [or] keep the dialogue which has now started functioning and actively seek solutions.
- […] do not allow apartments and buildings to deteriorate!
- Sit down with us and politicians (state and district) and prepare a concrete working plan for rent reductions and reductions in cost-based rents.
- Seek refinancing of loans on your own initiative in order to reduce cost-based rents" (see Kotti&Co 2012d).

Additional problem which were frequently raised in the interviews relate to operating costs and maintenance of buildings as well as to income in general being too low for people to be able to pay the rent and living expenses as well. In many cases, a rent increase means that they can no longer finance their apartment or that no further costs are accepted by the Jobcenter because the "reasonable expenses for accommodation" have been exceeded (see Senat von Berlin 2012; Kotti&Co, p. 13). At this point the way the situation in Kreuzberg is related to gentrification as displacement becomes clear. First of all, it is not only residents of subsidized rental housing who are participating in the protest, and secondly, the fear of not being able to find a suitable new apartment in the strained Kreuzberg or even Berlin housing market is being voiced. For example,

one person reported searching for an apartment for 18 months after the previous apartment had become too expensive (interview 4).

All these interview statements have the same content as the published demands of the protesters. The protest is quite explicitly independent of political orientation on other issues, and relates only to the problem of rents. Precisely this concrete problem orientation is making it possible for different groups of people with differing political views to stand together, for a shared protest can only be maintained when the group involved has a sense of belonging. This requires a collective identity or a shared self-description. The levels which need to be distinguished between are the social dimension, which serves to keep the social environment separate, and content-related topics, interests and goals, which often derive from shared concerns and can be referred to as the objective dimension (Kern 2008, p. 120f.). In the interviews there is a clear emphasis on the objective dimension resulting from the exclusive focus of Kotti & Co on the topic of rents:

> Yes, but it's quite different. Kotti & Co is completely different from the other associations. Because we are not an association. And we also say to the people that it doesn't matter what your opinion is or what ideas or what orientation you have. In your head you should concentrate on this alone. We don't want a political organization here (interview 3, p. 12f.).

Due to this clear avoidance of other (political) topics, the protest remains open to many different participants.

> And the great thing about this protest is that it is not the usual suspects. This here is really across the whole range, regardless of how old, regardless of what nationality. Regardless of their education, regardless of their ideology. So, despite this we are all fighting together somehow, and of course that is almost worth more than previously with house squatting (interview 1, p. 9).

People who are taking part in a protest for the first time, such as is often true for tenants of Turkish origin from Kottbusser Tor, do so by doing a shift in the *gecekondu*. This primarily involves keeping the protest going, maintaining a presence so interested people have somebody to talk to and providing coffee or tea and the upkeep of the camp. The function of the camp as a meeting place is a further important point, especially for the exchange of opinions and discussion of problems.

In addition, with regard to the time dimension, a kind of shared biography evolves based on a collective memory of the protest story (Kern 2008, p. 121). Kotti & Co does not place special emphasis on the social dimension, because basically anyone can participate at any time. I can confirm this through my own

experience participating in the *gecekondu* for the purposes of this study. As a result, belonging is defined solely in terms of active participation. The structure can thus be described as a loose-knit network (ibid., p. 119), which makes it difficult or impossible to define the limits of or give numbers of participants. Consequently, answers to the question of approximately how many participants there are varied widely. They ranged from 50 to 150 visitors per day all the way to 500 protest participants. Even the number of people active in the core group, that is, participating in organizational activities varied between 10 to 30 in the statements. One statement on the work of the core group was:

> But what isn't visible from the outside is really the main work; how it will proceed politically, how we can organize, what actions we will carry out, write speeches or whatever. That goes on a bit in the background, but it goes on all the time. And that is divided up somehow within the core group (interview 1, p. 3).

The core group takes over tasks such as public relations, organization of demonstrations, meetings with building management and the Berlin Senate, as well as keeping the homepage up to date and doing public relations work by distributing flyers, stickers (see figure 4) and buttons the group designed itself. Expressed differently, the core group is responsible for internal and external communications and the networking of Kotti & Co. It is the hub of the communication structure, which is of particular significance for the protest (Kern 2008, p. 117).

Some of the participants in the *gecekondu* reported that they first became aware of the protest when setting up the camp, or that building the camp inspired them to get involved. "Since May. I saw it here by chance. Then I thought, I'm interested in that, too. Then, I'm actually having fun with this" (interview 2, p. 2). Currently there is still disagreement in protest research about what is required for mobilization (Kern 2008, p. 123; Helbrecht et al. 2016). Thus, building the *gecekondu* can also be regarded as a mobilization resource. The protest's own specific history or chronological dimension becomes clear from, for example, the description of how it came into existence. Setting up the *gecekondu* on 26 May 2012 is a visible starting point of the protest. Although it already existed prior to the construction of the *gecekondu*—for example signatures were already being collected prior to setting it up—establishing a public protest with a fixed physical location resulted in significant public awareness and increased participation. "So, it arose from recognition that you can have attention from the press, you can talk, but if you don't adopt 'more drastic' measures nothing happens, isn't that right? And that's how it turned out somehow or other" (interview 1, p. 2). As with the Occupy Movement, the occupation of public space also had symbolic significance (Höfler 2012, p. 5). However, Kotti & Co does not resist the order to vacate (see ibid.). Nonetheless, the

gecekondu symbolizes the threat of homelessness (Höfler 2012, p. 8). At the same time, many of the people involved in the *gecekondu* can be mobilized for demonstrations. So-called "noisy demonstrations" have been regularly organized since the protest first started. Not only the consistently large numbers of participants—Kotti & Co has several hundred participants (see Kotti&Co 2013a)—play a role, but also the recurring symbolism. In addition to the use of its own "I love Kotti" design (see Figure 4), the participants also make reference to another protest group with the motto "We're all staying" (see Kotti&Co 2013a). Like Kotti & Co, this movement, which began in Prenzlauer Berg in 1992, organizes demonstrations against rising rents in order to reach a broader base and to unite the interests of all residents within a single movement (Papen 2012, p. 70).

The networking and support at demonstrations takes place at various levels. The Südblock café, located directly across from the protest camp in the building managed by Hermes (see Figures 2 and 3), is repeatedly mentioned as an important source of support.

Figure 4: Kotti & Co sticker ("Stop rent increases at Kottbusser Tor!")

The participation of other local companies and associations and networking with tenant initiatives is also significant.

> Hold on, something I forgot about supporters. Südblock also supports us. And the copy shop next door, too. And if that weren't the case, that is if there wasn't such general solidarity, it would have been much more difficult. […] that's something special (interview 5. p 3).

Kotti & Co receives support from the *Türkiyemspor* sports club, but also from political parties such as *die Linke* and *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*, in particular at the district level. Networking with Berlin initiatives such as the Berliner Bündnis Sozialmieter.de, the protest of the *GSW23* buildings or the *FuldaWeichsel* residents' initiative takes place for example through the *Mietenpolitisches Dossier* [rent policy dossier]. The cooperation of various individuals and organizations is necessary for protest mobilization, in order to enhance the opportunities for exerting influence (Kern 2008, p. 18). For this reason networking is important for achieving the goals of Kotti & Co and for success achieved so far.

7 Achievements from the Point of View of Kotti & Co

"[O]ne of our demands has been met, namely the conference in the parliament building" (interview 1, p. 7). This took place on 13 November 2012. Because the conference was generally assessed very positively as a success, this made people hopeful, mainly about the senate expressing its view on demands and suggestions for solutions presented at the conference by Kotti & Co. "They said that, whether positive or negative, they will give their answer this year. That means something was achieved" (interview 2, p. 6).

On 20 December 2012 the concept for subsidized rental housing adopted by the Senate Department for Urban Development and the Environment was described on the Kotti & Co website as one aspect of the protest's success (see 2012e).

> They intend to start by going over the calculation of rents. There are already indications that rents will perhaps go down a bit, but after all […] they probably won't accept our suggestion of €4.00, right? (interview 1, p. 7).

The Senate Department press release states that the increase in rents planned for April 1 2013 for approximately 35,000 subsidized rental dwellings will be canceled if the present rent already exceeds €5.50 per square meter (utilities ex-

cluded). This means that in 2013 rents cannot be raised above €5.50 per square meter (see SenStadtUm 2013c). This upper limit is still above the rent per square meter of €4.86 specified in the Housing Expenditure Regulation (*Wohnaufwendungsverordnung*, WAV) for recipients of transfer payments (Senat von Berlin 2012, p. 6). The demand articulated by Kotti & Co to the Senate Department for Health and Social Affairs is linked directly to this fact. The demand, in summary, is to adjust of the costs of accommodation specified in the WAV to the rental market and, above all, to rents in subsidized rental housing (see Kotti&Co 2012e). Even if, despite the long period the protest, only partial successes have been achieved so far and few of the demands have been implemented in practice, many of the people interviewed spoke of the feeling that by protesting they had escaped from a helpless situation.

> For many people that is inspiring, right? They thought before, hey, perhaps I'm on my own here, and sat in the corner in a state of resignation. It is always something else when you somehow start to fight and change from being a victim to, shall I say, an active participant. So, even if the situation doesn't change at first, it initially gives you a boost and self-confidence, and you simply feel better, right? And some people have actually said to me that they were really numb and depressed before and couldn't see any way out (interview 1, p. 6).

Based on this, it is clear that the protest has created awareness about the extent of the rent increase problem in subsidized rental housing in Berlin. Especially because people's personal situation often seemed to offer no way out, new hope was created by the collective protest and the interaction with other people involved. The strength of social movements is seen precisely in the fact that they focus on individual problems in connection with particular subsystems (Kern 2008, p. 19). In the case of Kotti & Co, this involves the problems of tenants in subsidized rental housing, which are articulated as involving them versus the landlords as an economic subsystem and the Senate as a political subsystem. The length of the protest is also seen as especially motivating and a personal success.

> It isn't just a flash in the pan […], there was so much determination involved. With a mentality of 'We're sticking it out now. We're doing something now, we're staying put, even in winter, even if it gets cold. We're active now, we're gonna simply go the distance.' And that's just great. Yes, in that way I'm getting something out of it—you can simply see that protest can still help (interview 5, p. 5).

The potential of social movements to exert an influence increases with the pooling of individual resources (Helbrecht et al. 2015). At the same time, undesirable tendencies in a movement can be discouraged by individuals having the

option of dropping out. In this way, through the acceptance of the principle of representation, an individual's interests can prevail over those of other people, and a feeling of community established (Kern 2008, p. 48). Persistence calls for a high level of motivation by the participants. The motivating factor mostly does not derive from shared political goals, but is more an expression of personal identity. Communities can form at exactly this point (ibid., p. 60). Many of the interviewees describe the community that forms as a personal advantage that they gain from the protest. "Well yes, we are a super community and have almost become a family somehow" (interview 1, p. 5). It already became apparent during my participation and observation in the protest camp that some participants were regularly present and used the *gecekondu* as a place for meeting to exchange views, not just in connection with rent problems. This observation was confirmed by statements of the people interviewed. For example, in response to the question of what they got out of Kotti & Co, one person responded by saying: "The very first thing is that I am not at home, but out among people" (interview 2, p. 3). In response to further questions about the protest camp as a meeting place, she explained: "I have been in Kreuzberg for a year now. I don't know many people. Helping here allowed me to, for example (points to other women in the room), get to know her, get to know them" (ibid.). Through statements like these the function of the camp as a meeting place and an important place for building up and maintaining social contacts becomes apparent. The community can thus be seen as a benefit (selective incentive), which facilitates joint action (Kern 2008, p. 113).

A benefit which Kotti & Co gained from media coverage is that fundraising is easier. Donations come from various sources. Part of its proceeds come from donations for coffee and tea they provide. In addition, benefit parties were held by various people; political parties such as The Left and Alliance 90/The Greens make financial support available. It was possible to raise additional money through prizes for social commitment. The presentation of the conference they demanded also resulted from media coverage, which was generally evaluated as very positive.

> Yes, of course, well yes, I believe we are the most filmed, interviewed, photographed or whatever else initiative. That is already quite unique. And as a result we were able to get this conference to happen at all (interview 1, p. 8).

News reporting is also considered important for the maintenance of the protest. In the opinion of one woman interviewed, Kotti & Co being in the media again and again increases willingness to participate in the protest.

> Of course, the more publicity you have as an initiative the more people know about you and come and support you, too, and the easier it is to network, the easier it is to get hold of money and people for demos, and so on. So, as a means to an end it is of course wonderful, right? It's our marketing (interview 1, p. 8).

The interviewee reflects on the role of mass media increasing the dissemination of knowledge (Kern 2008, p. 127f.). "How far can you get? Unfortunately, I can't say at the moment, but at least we have succeeded in getting noticed and getting our voice heard" (interview 3, p. 17). This leads to the final point in the way Kotti & Co sees itself—its future plans and hopes and the strategies for achieving them.

Despite the success achieved at various levels according to the self-evaluation of Kotti & Co, they have not fulfilled their demands and thus the protest continues. Assuming the protest perseveres, the expectation is expressed that Kotti & Co will become the source of a broader movement. "So, I think it is only a question of time and a bit of determination and we will have the genuine possibility of a really large-scale movement emerging again after decades" (interview 1, p. 9). On the other hand, a responsibility not only to the protest participants but also to other future protest movements is being seen from the prominence gained.

> But if we somehow didn't manage it, the Senate would somehow think that it doesn't matter what the people do, what kind of fantasy they have here, what kind of determination, the Senate can hang them out to dry. So, no doubt about it, we would close the window for future movements (interview 1, p. 9).

This also makes it clear that the demands being made to the Berlin Senate have not yet been fulfilled. Consequently, the events in the protest to date are being referred to as the first phase, to be followed by a second phase in which political demands are acceded to.

> And now it's coming, that's why I said the second phase is just starting. The really effective political action will be in the second phase. We have learned and we know who we are dealing with and what people we are working with. […] I believe that the second phase won't be as difficult (interview 3, p. 17f.).

This rests on the expectation that political representatives are willing to cooperate and will support the protest to have its demands accepted. "Not only the protest, but the politicians, too, ought to show more interest and stand behind us" (interview 2, p. 5). According to GSW Immobilien AG and Hermes Hausverwaltung, these wishes and hopes regarding politics result from their own limited scope of influence. In interviews with representatives of both com-

panies, seeking to influence matters directly was ruled out. As a result, the outcome of these interviews will be presented in detail in the following sections.

8 Options and Willingness to Exert Influence of Hermes Hausverwaltung and GSW Immobilien AG

Protests offer the possibility of drawing the attention to problems, which are new to certain societal subsystems. Structural changes and learning processes can be catalysed when deficits and limitations are recognized (Kern 2008, p. 183). As explained in the previous section, the problem being dealt with by Kotti & Co involves several subsystems. Members of the boards of GSW and Hermes were interviewed as representatives of the business subsystem, in order to establish what opportunities the companies had to influence the rising rents in their buildings at Kottbusser Tor and, above all, to investigate their willingness to find solutions for their tenants who were affected.

In the view of Hermes Hausverwaltung, the whole situation at Kottbusser Tor can be understood in terms of improved local structures. Hermes suggest that their contribution to this is leasing the Südblock café to its current operators. However, particular attention was drawn to the initiative of GSW and the cooperation of investors and the city in improving living conditions through, among other things, construction measures and stricter control of drug-related crime. The ones who have benefited from these measures are the tenants, but only those who can continue to pay the rising rents. "And that's why I would say that the tenants benefit from the environment, but they don't benefit from the changes, because their rents keep rising" (Hermes board member, p. 8). Because of the legally stipulated method for calculating cost-based rents, the tenants in Hermes buildings are exempted from this contradictory parallel development of benefits in connection with the surroundings and disadvantages in connection with rents. Nonetheless, Hermes board members admitted that rents for their apartments are relatively high. However, from the point of view of the owners and the building administration, this is not a problem as long as there are tenants who are willing to pay the rents.

> And the rents that we are demanding at the moment are definitely already high and they are automatically getting higher and higher. Though it's not yet at the level of luxury real estate, but sure, some people can't afford it anymore (Hermes board member, p. 5).

The annual rent increases of 13 cents result from the repayment contracts with the subsidy and is transferred directly to the *Investitionsbank Berlin*. "But the fact is that the rent increases are, so to speak, imposed on us. We can't do anything about them" (Hermes board member, p. 9). GSW also emphasized that the development of the cost-based rents is outside the sphere of influence of the owners. The increases were already fixed at the time the buildings were completed and can only be adjusted if administration, maintenance or financing costs change (see Ertelt et al. 2017 in this volume). Their awareness that their own tenants mostly belong to the middle and lower income groups was emphasized. In connection with this, the company's own debt counseling service was mentioned as a service available to less-solvent tenants. In addition, there is the possibility in individual cases—also at Kottbusser Tor—of declaring a rent waiver. In its own view, GSW has also adopted all possible measures against excessive operating costs. As a result, after close examination of all operating costs and renewal of the heating control system, these can only be attributed to high levels of consumption by tenants. Although the Berlin housing market is described as moderate, they agreed that there was increased demand. Linked to this increased demand, the fluctuation at Kottbusser Tor over the past ten years amounts to about ten percent. However, for people dependent on benefits, problems result especially from the pre-imposed increases in cost-based rents.

> The housing market at Kottbusser Tor has not developed in isolation from the overall housing market in Berlin. At the end of 2012 we had a vacancy rate of just under four percent; a few years ago vacancies were far higher. Consequently, also at Kotti, we are experiencing an increased demand for apartments. However, what continues to be quite striking is the discrepancy between the increases in cost-based rents on the one hand and the changes in the individual resources of benefits recipients on the other (GSW board member, p. 6).

This change is attributed to the unlinking, a few years ago, of individual benefits from the planned annual increases of about 1.5 percent in cost-based rents. Consequently, all previous subsidies policy, which has led to higher cost-based rents than current market rents, is being criticized.

> And I believe quite simply that past subsidies policy has missed its target. How is it possible to explain, otherwise, that at that time millions were invested in subsidy programs for the construction of subsidized rental housing and at the end what comes out now is cost-based rents which in some cases are significantly above local levels of rent? That is exactly the situation we have at Kottbusser Tor; it can't be rationalized anymore! (GSW board member, p. 4).

However, what is lacking is our own willingness to change things. Hermes sees its responsibility as restricted to renting out apartments at a certain price as representatives of the owners. In doing this they emphasize their job as building administrator and thus as a service provider.

> We do not have any social responsibility, but we do have the job of renting out an apartment for a particular price and actually collecting that price. And if we don't receive that any more, the person involved has to move out. Then the next one moves in, who then pays that rent (Hermes board member, p. 10).

In this position, the responsibility of Hermes towards its tenants is rejected. The tenants are seen as a means to the end of maintaining the investors' assets. Only in this sense is the tenant, who according to this approach is worthy of support, assigned any importance. "For the owners think about their assets and of course they know that tenants are important for maintaining these assets. So they say, figuratively speaking, of course you have to treat the tenants well" (Hermes board member, p. 3). GSW adopts a similar line of argument. By emphasizing its responsibilities to other groups, it qualifies its responsibility to its tenants.

> We have a responsibility to our tenants, but beyond that to other interest groups as well. For example to craft businesses that work for us, who want to be sure that their bills will be paid. And to our employees and their families. But of course to our shareholders too, who provide us with the capital to carry on business. This capital must also be protected in the interest of the company and its shareholders (GSW board member, p. 16).

Both Hermes and GSW make further arguments based on their limited ability to influence events. In the case of Hermes, these refer explicitly to Kottbusser Tor and their small share of (only) 150 apartments there. GSW, by contrast, refers to the entire Berlin housing market and its own share of about three percent or 58,000 apartments.

> When people always refer to companies like GSW as drivers of the dynamic rent increases—without taking into account the fact that our rents have not risen any more dynamically than the city-owned housing associations—then it has no basis in fact. With 60,000 apartments it is not possible to substantially influence the market of 1.9 million apartments that we have in Berlin (GSW board member, p. 2).

The approximately 15,000 GSW apartments involve publicly subsidized apartments including the approximately 900 apartments at Kottbusser Tor. The situation of the tenants at Kottbusser Tor is judged to be an unacceptable result of subsidies policy (GSW board member, p. 4). This leads to the argument that

they are in agreement with Kotti & Co's assessment of the situation.

> Yes, and we carried out a major panel discussion here at GSW with Kotti & Co, with the district mayor also present. There was an open discussion and we agreed completely in our assessment of the situation (GSW board member, p. 8).

This quotation highlights that GSW cast-off responsibility, and in doing so shift the responsibility—and the possibility of taking action—to politicians. And yet, it is also acknowledged that exerting influence by politicians is very restricted. "Politicians can and should only influence the framework conditions and not make legal representation in individual cases" (GSW board member, p. 11). In particular for new housing construction, Berlin depends upon financing from investors in order to influence the housing market. Based on this, GSW and Hermes come to the conclusion that, especially in highly indebted Berlin, politicians have no option but to cooperate with the free market.

> As the Senator for Urban Development and the Environment in Berlin, Mr. Müller[5] cannot initiate any adequate housing construction on his own. He simply does not have enough money for that; his hands are tied. Rather, he is forced to move ahead together with the housing industry, via the media, too. Only in this way can we influence every development on the housing market (GSW board member, p. 13).

Also in the case of Hermes, the justification is derived from the market economy argument that it is an ideological question whether somebody with very little money needs to live in the center of the city, that politicians are the appropriate people to speak to and the possible initiators of change. Here, too, attention is drawn to the fact that a socially acceptable (housing) market needs capital.

> It [the market] must be made socially acceptable. That is a task for the state, if it can. But it has to have money. If the state can't do it, it will soon be the case that affordable housing will only be available where demand is low (Hermes board member, p. 4).

Thus, in connection with the demands of Kotti & Co and the availability of affordable housing in Berlin, the focus is on the state as the responsible agency and contact partner. The state could, if it wished to and had the financial means, ensure the supply of affordable housing even in inner-city areas, for example through the maintenance of and new construction of subsidized rental housing (see Ley and Dobson 2008). In addition, attention is drawn indirectly to possibilities for exercising influence through legislation by the state.

5 The person being referred to is Michael Müller, Mayor of Berlin since 2014.

> If the people are ready to spend so much money on real estate, which they then buy, around the corner here in Friedrichstraße, then they buy it and then do what they can in accordance with the law, and in the right circumstances that is to raise the rent (Hermes board member, p. 5).

So, as long as there is no legal limit to rent increases, from a business point of view, rents will increase as long as tenants are willing to pay them. This line of argument involving state responsibility is also pursued in relation to the concrete case of Kottbusser Tor. A potential solution to the problem is seen in having all parties involved work together.

> This conflict between tenant and landlord now exists only because this concept that the state thought up at the time, subsidizing, unfortunately doesn't work, because things have developed differently from what was expected. Yes, you cannot blame anybody. You can only say, people ought to sit down together and try to face reality and adjust things to fit reality (Hermes board member, p. 10).

9 Options and Willingness for Politicians to Influence Events

The political will to accede to the demands of Kotti & Co is emphasized at the district level of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. For example, one of the initiators of Kotti & Co was awarded the district medal, which can be seen as a sign of support (District Council Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, Berlin 2012). The mediation of the district mayor (Franz Schulz, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) was also mentioned in the interview with GSW (p. 26). In addition, the lack of acceptance of the imbalance between the cost-based rents and the rent costs specified in the Housing Expense Ordinance (*Wohnaufwendungenverordnung*, WAV), reveals agreement with both Kotti & Co's demands and with Hermes and GSW. "That people who live in subsidized rental housing are in principle being thrown out because their rent is not paid by the public assistance, yes? There is somehow systematically and fundamentally wrong here" (member of the Pirate Party, p. 15). However, what is emphasized is the limited scope of action available to district authorities and consequent difficulty of finding a compromise at this level.

> Of course it's an ongoing process and GSW is a private company. As long as the State of Berlin retains the legal means of handling the situation, the district is left standing there and in principle can only try to negotiate something and find some-

> thing where people can say, OK we can make a deal with you (member of the Pirate Party, p. 10).

At the level of the Berlin Senate the responsibility is seen in exactly the same way as by Hermes and GSW. Due to responsibility being handed elsewhere, agreement with Kotti & Co has scarcely any relevance, for without the willingness of GSW and Hermes or the ability of the district politicians to do anything cooperation is of secondary importance for finding consensus. "On the other hand, it is of course the case that the districts have relatively limited powers in connection with many things, because there is no legal basis for this at the state level" (member of the Pirate Party, p. 3). However, the willingness of district politicians to find a consensus could have a supporting effect in the Senate. The influence of Kotti & Co built up by the media attention is regarded as a given.

> And there you see, however, what kind of mobilization has really occurred precisely through Kotti & Co. So, they really have managed to bring that before the public in such a forceful way that the issues are now being discussed. Because people have been talking about a shortage of apartments for a long time (member of the Pirate Party, p. 11).

Because of the complex interrelationships involved, a clear statement about the effects of protests on other subsystems of the society is not normally possible (Kern 2008, p. 175). Thus, it cannot be said concretely which political decisions were influenced by Kotti & Co. Certainly the topics of rental market, rent increases and subsidized rental housing have received increased attention, but whether this was due to protests or primarily came about because of Kotti & Co is speculation. One reason for this limitation is that throughout Berlin and in Kreuzberg there are currently many other protests on the subject of rents and subsidized rental housing. The *Mietenpolitisches Dossier* cited above, in which several initiatives are represented, can be mentioned in this regard. Seizing upon housing policy as an election campaign issue (see SPD 2013) seems to be a logical reaction to this public debate. One of the substantial tasks of protest movements is bringing their issue to the attention of the public (Kern 2008, p. 157). Kotti & Co has successfully carried out this task, to a large extent thanks to substantial media coverage. By framing their demands in everyday terms it is possible for protest groups to legitimize and assert these demands in the political arena (ibid., p. 180).

A €200 million Alliance for Social Housing Policy and Affordable Rent (Rent Alliance) was already passed by the Senate in September of 2012. According to this, the portfolio of municipal residential construction companies was to be increased by 30,000 apartments by 2016 through new construction and pur-

chases (SenStadtUm 2012b, p. 13). In addition, these companies committed themselves to carrying out modernizations and limiting rents to 30 percent of household income for low-income households[6] (ibid., p. 16). In the interview with GSW, this Rent Alliance was called "the wrong instrument," because, in order to really achieve anything in the housing market, what is needed is a fundamental discussion of basic principles, not just interactions with municipal housing societies. The protest group also considers this insufficient in order to reach an agreement. "Only when no tenants have to move out for financial reasons anymore and private owners such as Hermes and GSW are no longer permitted to make profits from social housing will the protest have achieved its goal" (see Kotti & Co 2013b). For this reason the demands are still being directed at the Senate, which ought to create a legal basis for this:

> But what the Senate makes of this, we will have to wait and see. We will never achieve what Kotti & Co demand, right? There will be a compromise somewhere, which will probably be a relatively long way from that. Despite everything, it is better than without Kotti & Co (member of the Pirate Party, p. 20).

This reveals on the one hand the influence attributed to Kotti & Co, on the Senate, too, but on the other hand the necessity of direct interaction.

10 Summary

The protest by Kotti & Co focused on subsidized rental housing. This positioning is described in the literature as particularly effective, because with the help of state intervention subsidized rental housing can influence or slow down gentrification processes. However, it cannot be unequivocally determined that the protest group had effects at the political level. However, in the Berlin neighborhood of Kreuzberg, which is affected by gentrification, initial steps against the displacement of people from subsidized rental housing appear to have been set in motion. Strengths of the Kottbusser Tor neighborhood worth preserving were strengthened and given a stronger profile.

Kotti & Co, suppored by media coverage, was able to exert pressure on various actors—this can be considered a success.

However, GSW and Hermes Hausverwaltung, as well as politicians at the district level emphasize their limited ability to influence the increases in cost-based rent which are being criticized. The companies are only willing to take

6 Based on the national income limit for a Wohnberechtigungsschein (document certifying eligibility to rent subsidized rental units).

action if the Senate cooperates. The Senate appears to have already reacted to the pressure with the rent pact and the rent concept. However, no overall sustainable consensus has been reached as yet. Thus, in specific terms, until now only the demand voiced through the protest for a conference on subsidized rental housing in Berlin has been met. Nonetheless, Kotti & Co can look back on other successes. It has been possible to give new hope to many participants of the protest, and many people previously hardly involved in the protest or not involved at all have been mobilized. The *gecekondu* has become a significant new form of protest and a meeting place, but its role in promoting social contacts and its symbolic meaning must also be emphasized.

Kotti & Co will continue to protest. An agreement has not yet been reached with the Berlin Senate, Hermes or GSW on solutions for existing tenants in subsidized rental housing. To achieve consensus joint negotiations would now have to take place. Despite this, together with other protest groups, Kotti & Co has succeeded in reopening discussion on rents in Berlin and Germany and putting the topic back on the political agenda. The entire city will benefit from this initiation of a rent policy discourse, even though the people affected must wait on the results.

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Unemployment Benefit Recipients: Causes, Reactions and Consequences of Housing Relocations

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"Someone who is getting Hartz IV can't make any demands."[1]

The JobCenter in Berlin Neukölln is the second biggest in Germany (image: Malve Jacobsen)

1 Said by an agent at the JobCenter in the Berlin district of Mitte to someone on ALG II unemployment benefits looking for housing.

I. Helbrecht, *Gentrification and Resistance*,
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"Berlin—poor but sexy". The famous quote from 2003 by then Mayor of Berlin Klaus Wowereit has since become a slogan for the city, shaping more than just its image. The city has enjoyed increasing popularity in recent years, not only among the local population but also with newcomers. However, the slogan also neatly sums up the financial situation of many Berliners. In October 2012, 9.3% of Berlin's working-age population received ALG II[2] unemployment benefits (see Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2013a). No other federal state in Germany has so many people on ALG II, lending the whole topic a particular relevance. Housing, especially housing within the Wilhelmine Ring—the belt of multi-occupancy housing blocks built in the second half of the nineteenth century around the Berlin's historic city center—is in great demand, and massive increases in rent are taking place, especially for new leases (TOPOS 2012, p. 7). People on ALG II are dependent upon low-cost housing. But the rapid growth of Berlin's real-estate market make the subject of available housing, especially in inner-city districts, more and more controversial for people on ALG II. Issues such as gentrification, which leads to displacement, are increasingly raised by those affected. A good example is the protest movement Kotti & Co, which campaigns for "follow-up financing"[3] for subsidized rental housing (see Scheer 2017 in this volume). The media is also increasing giving attention to this topic, as shown by recent articles and broadcasts on the mechanisms of displacement on the housing market, such as "Arme an den Rand gedrängt" ("Poor people pushed to the outskirts") (Pezzei 2011), "Hartz-IV Empfängern droht Verdrängung" ("People on Hartz IV threatened by displacement") (Zawatka-Gerlach 2012), "Deutsche Großstädte sind nichts für Geringverdiener" ("Major German cities are not for low-paid workers") (Schwarze 2012), or "Mietexplosion—verdrängt aus Wohnung und Kiez?" ("Rent explosion—displaced from apartment and neighborhood?") (RBB Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg 2012).

The focus of this chapter is the housing situation of people on ALG II in Berlin, variously affected by the real-estate market, housing policy, and social policy. After explaining the specific Berlin context, we use the following research questions, in the order presented, to investigate the processes that take place when this population group faces the threat of relocation:

2 Arbeitslosengeld II, or Type II Unemployment Benefits, also known colloquially as "Hartz IV" (a term we do not use in this chapter).

3 "Basic financing" (*Grundförderung*) to subsidize loans for the construction of housing for low-income tenants was limited to a period of 15 years, with an additional 15 years of "follow-up financing" (*Anschlussförderung*) granted if certain criteria were fulfilled. In 2003 the Berlin Senate voted to phase out all follow-up financing.

- What are the causes of potential relocation for people on ALG II?
- What action can people on ALG II take to achieve or prevent relocation?
- What consequences does this have for people on ALG II and the relevant city districts and institutions?

1 Living in Berlin: From Reurbanization to Displacement?

Since the 1990s, some major German cities that for decades had been experiencing population decline have once again begun to see an increase in population numbers. This (re-)concentration of the population within cities is known as "reurbanization" (Helbrecht 1996; Haase et al., 2010, p. 24f.). Reurbanization describes the final phase in the typical development of a nineteenth-century European city. The process is as follows: A phase of absolute population concentration in cities (urbanization) is followed by a phase of relative and absolute de-concentration (suburbanization and deurbanization). This process concludes with a new phase of concentration. The reason given for this revitalization, which in certain locations is expressed as gentrification, is socio-demographic change. The socioeconomic processes favoring reurbanization are first and foremost the rise in female employment, the tertiarization of the labor market, longer periods of professional training, and increased labor mobility. These developments bring about a structural change in private households. Nuclear families disappear and new forms of living emerge. The connection between structural changes in households, living requirements, and changes within inner cities are well researched (Helbrecht 1996, p. 2009). Haase et al. define "reurbanization" as follows:

> At the level of the whole city, it is a process of relative or absolute population gain in the core of the city compared to the surrounding area. At a neighborhood level, it means a process of stabilizing the inner city as a residential location after a longer phase of decline, both through an increase in the number of people moving in and a decrease in the number of people moving out (Haase et al., 2010, p. 25).

According to Peter Marcuse, the revitalization of inner cities leads to processes of upgrading, which alters the tenant mix and/or the population of certain residential blocks or areas (Marcuse 1985, p. 201ff.). Where increasing numbers of higher-status people or high earners move into lower-status areas where the average income tends to be low, the former "run-down" quarter transforms into a prestigious, revitalized residential area. This process is known as "gentrification" (Atkinson et al., 2011, p. 6). As identified by Marcuse as early as 1985,

there are several types of displacement resulting from processes of urban gentrification, but these are difficult to measure and can only be proven to a limited extent. Focusing on identifying people who have *already* been displaced results in gaps in the measurement of gentrification and displacement. Moreover, displacement is not necessarily the result of gentrification: Moving house or moving away may also be the result of other decisions (Atkinson 2000, p. 6f.; Betancourt 2017 in this volume).

Strong reurbanization tendencies have been observed in Berlin since as early as the 1990s. Particularly interesting in this respect are those areas of the city that allow small-scale mixed use and which have a dense structure of space utilization, such as the areas dating from the *Gründerzeit* within the S-Bahn (rapid transit railway system) ring (Brake 2012, p. 258).

The reurbanization trends seen in Berlin and other large cities in Germany and elsewhere often follow processes of gentrification. A strong population influx from the surrounding area and abroad drives the boom in real-estate markets. In Berlin, where for decades rental costs were lower than other German and European cities, this development is particularly clear, and has a great impact on the entire population of the city. People with low incomes in particular feel the tightness of the housing market, as they are dependent upon low-cost living space (Brake 2012, p. 258). For this reason, writers such as Matthias Bernt and Andrej Holm deal in depth with the topic of gentrification in Berlin and the resulting displacement mechanisms for established residents (Bernt and Holm 2009, p. 312). A gradual change in perspective can be observed here, with the focus now not only on the people responsible for triggering the gentrification process but increasingly on the impact of this process on the established population.

According to a study by urban research specialists TOPOS, the proportion of ALG II households in urban districts with high housing costs is on average "low" to "very low". However, the proportion of ALG II households whose rent lies above the official rent ceiling (*Mietobergrenze*) is no higher in these areas than in quarters with lower rents (TOPOS 2012, p. 4). A response by City Councilor for Social Affairs Dagmar Pohle to a question submitted to the District Office for Marzahn-Hellersdorf (a district of Berlin) by the local Regional Administrative Committee (*Bezirksverordnetenversammlung*) indicates that there were 7,482 households qualifying for benefits in Marzahn-Hellersdorf in 2012 that were paying above the official rent ceiling. Of these, 3,005 had been requested to reduce their housing costs. Just one year earlier, the number of households qualifying for benefits that were paying above the official rent ceiling was substantially lower, at 1,931. As of December 2012, 140 of these had moved as a result of the request to reduce their housing costs. Similar figures are found for the other districts of Berlin (see Pohle 2012). This development shows

that ALG II is a "driving force behind the restructuring of the city", with people on ALG II increasingly suffering as a result of the difficult conditions on the housing market (Holm 2007, p. 101).

The people affected are not only at risk of moving out of their homes, whether voluntarily or as a result of displacement. They are also often at risk of leaving their familiar environments and potentially losing their local social networks as a result (see Zawatka-Gerlach 2012).

The head of the *Berliner Mieterverein* (Berlin Tenants' Association), Reiner Wild, describes the situation as follows: "People receiving ALG II can no longer find housing. Calling this anything other than 'displacement' is simply a form of whitewashing" (Wild, quoted in Pezzei 2011). Wild has also written, in the *Berliner MieterMagazin*, that "the money-saving policy of the Berlin Senate is carried out on the backs of the economically weakest" (see Leiss 2012). Today, the housing available for people on ALG II is mainly substandard apartments in the inner-city area and housing projects on the outskirts of the city (Holm 2005, p. 135).

In this chapter, we build on the above-mentioned analyses of reurbanization and gentrification processes in Berlin. We examine how changes in the urban structure affect the housing situation of one of the most vulnerable groups in Berlin. Specifically, we consider the housing situation for people receiving ALG II against this backdrop, as the fixed official rent ceilings for households qualifying for benefits and dependent on social assistance remain low, despite the enormous increase in rental prices.

2 ALG II

People receiving benefits under SGB II (Volume II of the *Sozialgesetzbuch*, the German Social Security Code) represent one of the most vulnerable groups on the Berlin housing market. Berlin has the third-highest unemployment rate in Germany, at 12.3%, after Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony-Anhalt. This is higher than the average for eastern Germany (11.3%), and well above western Germany (6.3%). In September 2012, 418,146 people in Berlin were receiving benefits, of whom 166,310 (39.8%) were considered to be "unemployed" (see Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2013b). The other 251,836 were "non-unemployed

people, able to work, who qualify for benefits," to use the official language.[4] The main group that we investigate in this chapter is those receiving ALG II (that is to say, unemployed people, able to work, who qualify for benefits) and their households, such as single parents on benefits and their children.

In order to understand the situation for people on ALG II in the housing market, some knowledge of the legal context is necessary. The legal position is that as soon as the rent paid by people on ALG II exceeds the official rent ceiling, they automatically receive a request from the JobCenter to reduce their KdU (*Kosten der Unterkunft,* or housing costs). They must then take action within 12 months, during which time their rent, although over the limit, is still paid for by the JobCenter (see Spies 2012). Below, we investigate the options available to those affected and the extent to which they feel displaced. However, it should be noted that we do not use the term "displacement" as, formally, according to the JobCenters, there is no obligation to relocate: Those affected also have other ways in which they can reduce their KdU, as discussed in detail below (Breitenbach and Lompscher 2012).

Some 94% of people living in Berlin, and 98% of Berlin households receiving benefits, live in rented accommodation. Berlin is known as a "city of renters"; indeed Germany as a whole is a land of renters compared to other countries (Helbrecht 2013). The average household consists of 1.8 people, and over half of them are single-person households (Ludewig 2011, p. 65f.). The need for affordable small apartments is correspondingly large, and cannot be met in Berlin at the moment. However, as already mentioned, ALG II households qualifying for benefits are not dependent solely upon the housing market:

> Housing provision for people receiving ALG II unemployment benefits depends to a large extent upon what expenses for housing costs (KdU) the households are reimbursed for (ASUM and TOPOS 2012, p. 10).

In October 2012, there were a total of 315,591 households qualifying for benefits in Berlin who were dependent upon SGB II benefits (see Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2012). The SGB II benefits are made up of the *Regelleistung zur Sicherung des Lebensunterhaltes* (standard benefits for securing livelihood, that is, ALG II for people able to work who require assistance, and *Sozialgeld*—income

4 "Three groups of non-unemployed people able to work who require assistance may be distinguished. [...] First of all, people who are working and yet receiving benefits, whose income is not sufficient to secure their livelihood. […] Next, people who are participating in measures for the promotion of employment, who continue to receive benefits under the Grundsicherung (basic income support). [...] The final group covers all others who are able to work and who require assistance, who for various reasons are not available for the labor market" (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2008, p. 9).

support—for people not able to work who require assistance), plus housing and heating costs (Ludewig 2011, p. 64). The national *Regelsatz* (Standard Rate, on which the *Regelleistung* is based) is intended to cover the cost of living (food, clothing, electricity, and so on). Since January 2013 the *Regelsatz* has been €382 per month for one person and €345 for adult partners. Children receive between €224 and €306, according to age. While the *Regelsatz* applies to the whole country, the individual federal states are responsible for KdU. They are free to decide whether to apply the same amount across the entire federal state (as in the case of Berlin at the moment) or to delegate this task to the municipal authorities.

In principle, according to the *Bundesagentur für Arbeit* (German Federal Employment Agency), the costs of housing and heating are covered at their real level, with one significant proviso: "as long as they are appropriate" (see Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2010). There are set guidelines for deciding what is "appropriate", from which the official rent ceilings are derived and then enshrined in the WAV (*Wohnungsaufwendungsverordnung*, the Housing Expenditure Regulation) for Berlin. The introduction of the WAV in April 2012 was supposed to improve the housing situation of people on ALG II because it is based on a new calculation of the rent ceiling.

> Appropriateness is defined solely for gross rent, utilities included. The guideline is based upon the size of the household qualifying for benefits, the heated area of the house (not the apartment), the type of heating (oil, gas, or district heating), and the type of hot water supply. These parameters yield the individual rent ceiling (JobCenter Tempelhof-Schöneberg 2012).

On average the new levels in the WAV are around five percent higher than those in the *AV-Wohnen*, the former implementation regulations for housing benefits. In the first place this is an improvement. Thus, since May 2012 the rent ceilings are between €380 and €408 for a single-person household qualifying for benefits, between €456 and €489 for two people, and between €739 and €793 for five people, depending on the type of heating and the size of the building (see Table 1).

Household qualifying for benefits	To May 2012: AV-Wohnen	From May 2020: WAV	Difference between AV-Wohnen and WAV
1 person	€378	€380–408	€2–30
2 persons	€444	€456–489	€12–45
3 persons	€542	€566–608	€24–66
4 persons	€619	€641–689	€22–70
5 persons	€705	€739–793	€34–88
Each additional person	€50	€92–99	€42–49

Table 1: Permitted level of KdU by size of household qualifying for benefits (source: Adapted from JobCenter Berlin Tempelhof-Schöneberg 2012)

The KdU guideline values can be increased by up to ten percent in officially recognized "hardship cases" (see Figure 1). This applies to single parents, people living at an address for at least 15 years, people with significant social responsibilities (for example, getting children to and from school, care facilities), people over 60 on benefits, pregnant women, people who are unlikely to have sufficient income to meet their costs in the foreseeable future, and people with physical or mental disabilities (see JobCenter Tempelhof-Schöneberg 2012).



Figure 1: Officially recognized hardship cases (source: own research, based on Senatsverwaltung für Gesundheit und Soziales 2012)

Despite this "hardship regulation", many households qualifying for benefits still find themselves with rents that are above the rent ceiling, and receive a request to reduce their housing costs. Of those who received such requests, approximately half qualified under the hardship regulation in 2011 (see Breitenbach and Lompscher 2012). Another problem is that the WAV (like the *AV-Wohnen* before it) only looks at existing rents drawn from the *Mietspiegel* (the official index of rents actually paid by tenants), and not at quoted rents or rents for new contracts, some of which are much higher than existing rents. Nevertheless, the situation has improved: Under the *AV-Wohnen* (that is, prior to the adoption of the WAV), rents were above the rent ceiling in around one-third of all households qualifying for benefits (32.2%, as of December 31, 2011). This fell to 23.3% in April 2012 after the introduction of the WAV, according to projections

by TOPOS (see ASUM and TOPOS 2012). Yet the study by TOPOS immediately qualifies this success by stating as follows in its conclusions:

> The new *Wohnungsaufwendungsverordnung* (WAV) only represents a step forward compared to the *AV Wohnen* inasmuch as from 2005 onward the latter had excluded a growing proportion of people on ALG II from the full reimbursement of their housing costs, due to the fact that the rates effectively remained the same. However, the WAV only partially makes up for the sharp increases in rents since 2005. Today, with the introduction of the new regulation, there are 70,000 households qualifying for benefits, which is significantly more ALG II households above the funding limits than in 2005, when there were around 40,000 (TOPOS 2012, p. 7).

Having explained the theoretical background, legal framework, and the Berlin context, we turn our attention in the following section to the methodology used in our empirical research.

3 Methodology

To investigate the questions posed in this study, relating to the causes, consequences, and possible actions for people on ALG II facing potential relocation and their housing situation, we chose a qualitative method commonly used in empirical social research. This methodology consists primarily of guided interviews, conducted first with experts and then with those affected.

The guidelines for the interviews were divided into different thematic blocks. These blocks related to the political framework, the housing situation of people on ALG II, their options for action when faced with the threat of relocation, the process of searching for housing, and the consequences of moving house.

First, we conducted 11 guided interviews with experts. We were able to recruit experts from the fields of social affairs, politics, and academia who have long been dealing with the topic of living space as a social issue. In addition, we held discussions with representatives of a housing construction company and the JobCenters, so we could also include these perspectives in our investigation.



Figure 2: Experts interviewed (source: own research)

We then interviewed seven people receiving ALG II (see Figure 3) who had already been sent a request from the JobCenter to reduce their housing costs. These individuals were at different stages of reacting to the request: Some had already moved, others were looking for housing or trying to prevent having to move. The people we interviewed were from different backgrounds and of different genders and ages. We also made sure that they were from a variety of locations. The interviews took place in different Berlin districts, with the main focus lying within the Wilhelmine Ring. Our sole criterion in recruiting interviewees was that they should be affected by the issues under investigation.

The potential social stigmatization of people on ALG II created difficulties in accessing interviewees. Many people are unhappy about their need for assistance, and reluctant to talk about their situation. This is especially true for the

people we were interested in: people on ALG II who had problems with their housing situation. We have changed their names in the discussion below.

We also developed a guideline for the interviews with those affected. Here, unlike in the expert interviews, we paid special attention to their personal situation. Specifically, we asked about their experiences with JobCenters. We also asked about their particular housing situation and what strategies they had employed (or were currently employing) following the request to reduce their housing costs.

Our interviews with those affected provided us with detailed information. We were able to find out how people on ALG II deal with increased rental costs in Berlin and what action they can potentially take, or what strategies (if any) they devise and use when facing the threat of relocation.

Helga & Günther Bauer **Lives: Neukölln; age: 56 and 54**

- Helga and Günther Bauer, a married couple, live in a first-floor apartment in Neukölln. They have to pay their high additional property expenses out of their *Regelsatz*. So far, their house-hunting attempts have been unsuccessful. They require a barrier-free apartment.

Laura Hauptmann **Lives: Prenzlauer Berg; age: n/a.**

- Laura Hauptmann moved as a result of a request to reduce her housing costs. She used to live in Lichtenberg and would have liked to have stayed there. However, she was unable to find an apartment of the same quality at the WAV standard rate. Today she lives in a substandard apartment in Prenzlauer Berg.

Ulrike Weiß **Lives: Moabit; age: 61**

- Ms. Weiß has to leave the apartment in which she has lived for many years because it is too big and too expensive for her since her daughter moved out. She requires an apartment suitable for elderly people. Despite viewing many apartments, she has so far been unable to find a new place to live. She now lives in fear of not being able to pay the rent she owes and falling into arrears.

Florian Kühn **Lives: Kreuzberg; age: 57**

- Florian Kühn has spent a lot of time looking for an apartment in Berlin and has been to countless viewings. It was almost impossible for him to find an apartment covered by the WAV. Many potential apartments were rejected by the JobCenter. Today he lives in a small one-room apartment in Kreuzberg.

Sophie Rigot **Lives: Wilmersdorf; age: 26**

- Sophie Rigot found an apartment in Weißensee that she was able to rent without difficulty in 2008 with her *Wohnberechtigungsschein* (official document certifying eligibility to rent subsidized rental units). Two years later she wanted to move back to be close to her social network. So, she moved to Wilmersdorf – without informing her JobCenter, who would not have agreed to the move. She now lives with her daughter in a first-floor apartment (European ground floor) that costs well over the rent ceiling.

Nurdan Yilmaz **Lives: Kreuzberg; age: 43**

- Ms. Yilmaz lives with her husband and two children in a two-room apartment in Kreuzberg. The lack of living space often creates tension within the family. Moreover, the apartment has significant problems (mold, poor insulation). She cannot find an affordable apartment in the local area.

Figure 3: People interviewed for this study (source: own research)

4 Current Processes for People on ALG II in Berlin

In the event of a possible relocation (voluntary or as a result of displacement), the housing situation of people on ALG II in Berlin, as described above, consists of a multi-stage process. We discuss this process in detail below. We begin with the potential causes of relocation; next, we describe how those affected deal with the threat of relocation; and finally we discuss the consequences of their actions, both for themselves and for the districts and institutions involved in the process.

5 Causes of Relocation for People on ALG II

To explain the potential causes of relocation, we first need to discuss the various aspects of unsatisfactory housing situations. We break these aspects down further into internal and external causes. Internal causes relate directly to the individuals receiving ALG II in their capacity as tenants. Internal causes have to do with the unsatisfactory housing situation (size of the apartment, its condition, and so on); that is to say, a housing situation that does not correspond to the needs or circumstances of the person affected.

External causes refer to recent developments in the Berlin real-estate market, such as rising rents. This leads to people being sent requests to reduce their housing costs where the rent ceiling has been exceeded. External and internal causes may also be complementary or overlapping (see Figure 4). The interviews provided much evidence for this. We discuss specific causes below.



Figure 4: Unsatisfactory housing situation (source: own research)

Inappropriate living space is a major cause of unsatisfactory housing situations. Internal causes relate to the personal needs of people on ALG II. When the housing does not meet the needs of these people, this represents an inappropriate housing situation. Above all, this concerns the size of the living space and the number of rooms. Often the need for more or less living space results from changes in the life situation of the person affected. Additions to the family, separation, or illness can change a person's requirements with regard to living space (Kübler 19.06.2012, p. 6). For example, when one or more children move out of a household qualifying for benefits, a "surplus of living space" can arise; this often brings in its wake a request to reduce the housing costs because the size of the household qualifying for benefits has decreased.

Another reason mentioned by some of those affected was significant problems with the apartments themselves. Issues ranged from draughty windows, severe mold infestation, and insufficient heating appliances, to construction work taking place in the building resulting in increased noise and fine-dust pollution (Hauptmann 21.11.2012, p. 7; Jung 25.06.2012, p. 5). People on ALG II also experienced serious discrimination, not just when looking for housing or renting a new apartment but also in the case of existing tenancies. One example was the case of rent increases targeted specifically at Arab and Turkish tenants in the Fanny-Hensel-Siedlung in Berlin Kreuzberg (Jung 25.06.2012, p. 9).

Besides these internal factors, there are also external factors that can lead to relocation. As already mentioned, the lack of apartments with one or two rooms in particular makes it more difficult for people on ALG II to find accommodation. This phenomenon is exacerbated by the growing demand for apartments, right across the city. Many of those affected confirmed this, stating that finding a small apartment was particularly difficult (Kühn 26.11.2012, p. 3; Weiß 22.11.2012, p. 2).

As shown by Table 2, in 2011 the number of apartments required by ALG II households qualifying for benefits in Berlin almost matched the number of apartments whose rents were below the rent ceiling (still under the *AV-Wohnen* at the time). However, apartments in this price segment are also sought after by students and people on low incomes, and are not only available to people on ALG II. It is also clear that compared to 2007 the number of available apartments has declined greatly in this segment.

Size of household	No. of households qualifying for benefits	Apartments available at AV-Wohnen rates	Change in no. of apartments vs. 2007 (absolute)	Change in no. of apartments vs. 2007 (%)
1 person	203,696	224,939	-49,063	-21.8%
2 persons	56,106	177,075	-2,925	-1.7%
3 persons	34,942	101,569	-14,680	-5.9%
4 persons	37,942	101,569	-4,431	-4.4%

Table 2: Apartments available at *AV-Wohnen* rates, *2011 Mietspiegel* (source: Based on Oellerich 2011)

The vacancy rate for Berlin as a whole has fallen to a few percent, and now corresponds to the normal fluctuation rate. Even in outer districts such as Marzahn-Hellersdorf and Spandau, vacancy rates have adjusted to the Berlin average and just a small percentage of apartments are now empty (Matz 15.06.2012, p. 5; Scholz-Thies 18.06.2012, p. 3). Payments made to people on ALG II to cover their KdU have only been adjusted marginally to the current rent situation over the past years. Thus, rents went up by an average of 2.5% a year in 1999-2010 (see SenStadt 2011) and "rents for vacant apartments are on average more than 13% higher than last year" (GSW 2013, p. 1). The low KdU level covered by the JobCenter makes it difficult for people to remain in apartments where they have lived for many years (Yilmaz 12.12.2012, p. 1). "Rents are no longer in proportion to the current Hartz IV rate" (Rigot 26.11.2012, p. 3). In some cases simply increasing the existing rent or additional property expenses leads to the rent ceiling being exceeded.

Official requests to reduce housing costs put those affected under enormous pressure. For some, the only option is to move to a cheaper apartment. But it transpires that renting a new apartment is difficult for people on ALG II (Kühn 26.11.2012, p. 4; Weiß 22.11.2012, p. 2). In the following section we describe the process of hunting for a new apartment for people on ALG II.

6 Reactions to the Unsatisfactory Housing Situation of People on ALG II

Our interviews with experts and those affected revealed two courses of action pursued by people on ALG II. On the one hand, they try everything they can to stay in or near the area where they currently live. We call this the "Remain Strategy". To achieve this goal they will accept a loss of quality of life. At the same time, we found that some of those affected were unable or unwilling to apply this strategy.

Where the JobCenter issues a request to reduce housing costs, the following proposals are made to achieve this:

- Talk to the landlord
- Sublet
- Move to another apartment

Table 3 shows the number of households in Berlin qualifying for benefits that received requests to reduce their housing costs in 2010 and 2011. Approximately 2% were able to do so independently by talking to their landlords or subletting, for example. Here, we should stress that subletting part of the accommodation was not an option for any of our affected interviewees due to lack of space or age considerations. Almost all of them had tried speaking to their landlord but had been unable to secure a rent reduction. An upward trend is seen in the number of relocations actually taking place. In 2011, 1,313 households qualifying for benefits had to move as a result of receiving a request to reduce their housing costs (see Breitenbach and Lompscher 2012). We assume that those households that did not fall under the hardship clause, did not relocate, and were not able to reduce their rent ended up paying the excess rent—that is, the amount over and above the rent ceiling—out of their own pocket.

	2010	2011
Request to reduce housing costs	71,187	65,511
- of which, hardship cases	25,132	36,335
- of which, managed to reduce costs independently	1,797	1,036
- of which, relocations	1,195	1,313

Table 3: Reaction of households qualifying for benefits to official requests to reduce their housing costs (source: Breitenbach and Lompscher 2012)

Clearly, a large part of the interviewees choose the Remain Strategy. They use any resources that they have in order to stay in the place they currently live. However, as demands on these resources grow—as described above—it becomes almost impossible for them to avoid moving. For most of the affected interviewees, looking for new housing was a lengthy process. In some cases it took many months and countless viewings before the actual move took place. Overall, it was difficult to find *any* apartment that met the JobCenter's requirements. The majority of those affected focused their search on districts close to the city center. Unlike people who have jobs, individuals living on ALG II cannot freely apply for an apartment: their JobCenter first has to approve the move, as well as the apartment. In addition to the aforementioned discrimination and stigmatization that many people on ALG II are subject to, this process has a long-term negative impact on the search for housing by people who are dependent upon social assistance (Kühn, 06.11.2012, p. 6). Figure 5 illustrates the lengthy, complicated process of looking for an apartment for people on ALG II.



Figure 5: Process of looking for housing (source: own research, based on Weiß 22.11.2012)

When those searching for accommodation find an apartment that meets the JobCenter's requirements, they cannot apply for it directly because of the process imposed by the JobCenter. Instead, they must approach the landlord and ask if they can reserve the apartment. They must also get hold of certain details,

such as the size of the building; this information is required in order to calculate the rent ceiling. This immediately "outs" them as people receiving ALG II, which may lead to further discrimination. After viewing the apartment, they need to submit a request to the JobCenter asking whether it meets the requirements. The JobCenter has to give the applicant an appointment within three days. Most landlords want a guarantee that the rent will be paid each month by the JobCenter. However, the JobCenters do not issue such guarantees. Only after the JobCenter has checked and approved the requests can the person on ALG II submit a binding application for the apartment to the landlord. In many cases the apartment has already gone to another applicant by this point—someone who was able to rent it immediately (Weiß 22.11.2012, p. 8).

Many of the affected people that we interviewed were critical of their experience with the JobCenter as regards communication. Especially when it came to looking for a new apartment or relocating, many of them had bad experiences with the person in charge of their case. They were particularly critical of the arbitrary behavior of some agents: "[…] the rent calculation is very arbitrary. If you make a good impression on the agent, you may get €10 more approved" (Weiß 22.11.2012, p. 7). Another interviewee spoke of the impotence felt when dealing with agents:

> You can make an application. And if you're lucky and get an agent who says, 'Oh, man, I really don't care, as long as I don't have to deal with this file any more', then it gets approved. But if the agent is having a bad day [...], then you're unlucky, and it gets rejected. That's really how it works at the JobCenters (Bauer 28.11.2012, p. 8).

Overall, the structures at the JobCenter appear to be rigid, and "cumbersome communication paths make renting an apartment difficult" (Kühn 26.11.2012, p. 7). Many interviewees have completely lost faith in their JobCenter and feel harassed and as if they were under surveillance, rather than supported in their search for housing: "The JobCenter really made an enormous effort to make me homeless through its decisions" (Hauptmann 21.11.2012, p. 4). It seems as if people on ALG II no longer have the right to an apartment that meets their needs. One interviewee reported that, despite her advanced age, she was not allowed to insist on an apartment suitable for the elderly when looking for housing. Furthermore, the JobCenters and courts treat Berlin as a single entity, which means that theoretically those affected should look for accommodation right across the city. This sort of uprooting can be difficult, especially for children (Szczepanski 17.12.2012, p. 7).

These are just a few examples of discriminatory situations affecting people on ALG II in their search for housing. Being dependent on a state institution that

has joint decision-making power about their place of residence, and hence their housing situation, is the reason why many of those affected are critical of the current situation. The resulting uncertainty culminates in an "existential" fear—the fear of not finding adequate accommodation, or of losing it altogether (Hauptmann 21.11.2012, p. 3).

7 Consequences for People and City Districts

Requests to reduce housing costs and the steps taken by people to comply have unforeseeable consequences—both social and spatial—for the individuals affected and for the Berlin districts in question. Often, the individuals affected must decide whether to remain in their current home or try to move to a cheaper apartment. Both scenarios have consequences.

7.1 Consequences for People Who Manage to Avoid Relocation

The Remain Strategy is a frequent choice for those affected. These individuals actively decide to remain in their current accommodation or local area. To achieve this, the only option for many of those living on ALG II is to move to a substandard apartment or remain living in inappropriate housing. Some of the affected interviewees currently live, or have lived in the past, in substandard apartments, often in "miserable circumstances" (Kühn 26.11.2012, p. 5). Many are forced to move into very small apartments or remain in apartments that are too small for them, although they actually need—and are entitled to—apartments with more square meters (Yilmaz 12.12.2012, p. 3). For some of those affected, staying in their current apartment means accepting a reduction in quality of life. Many of those affected complain about the lack of space, or their need for an additional room. This lack of space can create tensions within households qualifying for benefits (Yilmaz 12.12.2012, p. 9).

People also complain about the increased uncertainty if they stay in their current housing. Many fear the risk of further increases in rent or additional property expenses, which would make it impossible to avoid having to move (Kühn 26.11.2012, p. 11). The pressure grows as a result of the fear of financial cuts imposed by the JobCenter: "It's hard to bear the pressure from them reducing the money you get" (White 22.11.2012, p. 4). What comes across in the interviews is not so much a fear of displacement, but rather a feeling of "being pressurized". Those affected feel threatened in terms of their existence, which is not just endangered by a change in place of residence but generally by the fear of increased costs that would mean they could barely meet their living expenses any more. The existence that they have created for themselves, which is closely

related to issues of housing, is thus threatened from the outside (Kühn 26.11.2012, p. 10).

If those affected are unable to reduce their housing costs, they face an increased risk of falling into debt. This is because they often cover the additional costs themselves, paying them out of the money they have to live on. This can lead to a downward spiral ending with significant debts or even the threat of homelessness. Most of those affected are aware of this danger—for this reason they themselves do not speak of a feeling of displacement, but rather a feeling of being pressurized (White 22.11.2012, p. 12). By contrast, some others see themselves in the role of the displaced: "I feel displaced when they force me to move when I don't want to. I don't want to move" (Yilmaz 12.12.2012, p. 4).

Most of those affected would prefer to remain in the part of the city or district where they currently live. The request to reduce their housing costs, or the subsequent search for a new apartment, therefore causes problems. Apartments whose rent is in line with the guidelines are becoming increasingly scarce, and requests to reduce housing costs put additional pressure on the housing market. Consequently many families, especially those with several children, are really struggling (Szczepanski 17.12.2012, p. 6).

7.2 Consequences for Individuals Following Relocation

Where people are unable to avoid relocation despite their best efforts, the consequences for them are often serious. One of the most drastic consequences is the loss of social connections, as discussed above. Many of those affected are afraid of being forced to live a long way away from family members, friends, and acquaintances. Settling in to a new area and continuing with a part-time job or voluntary work in the previous area is difficult for many, and impossible if the distance is too great (White 22.11.2012, p. 10). In the area people move to, they often have no contact with facilities such as child day-care centers or schools. Single parents in particular may feel isolated (Scholz-Thies 18.06.2012, p. 12).

People on ALG II who had lived for a long time within the Wilhelmine Ring but then had to move to an apartment in one of Berlin's outlying districts to reduce their housing costs particularly miss the urban atmosphere and style of their former area. It is difficult for them to build a social network in their new environment and reorient themselves professionally (Scholz-Thies 18.06.2012, p. 13). They also complain about how far away they now live from potential jobs. In the Staaken housing project in Spandau, for example, there are few jobs for low-skilled workers. Given the distance from the city center, it is particularly difficult for single parents to combine caring for their family with job hunting (Scholz-Thies 18.06.2012, p. 12). Added to this is the fear of discrimination and

stigmatization, as discussed above, especially for people from a migrant background.

After moving, people on ALG II must submit a new application to the JobCenter now responsible for them. This involves a lot of bureaucracy—a long, complicated process that many of those affected do not feel competent to carry out (Kühn 26.11.2012, p. 7).

7.3 Consequences for City Districts After Relocation

In our research we were not able to establish unequivocally that people on ALG II are displaced to outlying districts of Berlin. However, we do identify a tendency toward this: The process of people relocating to outlying districts may lead to a loss of the social mix in an area. On the one hand, we have a homogenization of the population in revitalized inner-city districts; on the other, a reinforcing of the downward spiral of housing projects on the outskirts (see Helbrecht 2009). As Martin Matz observes: "The problem of gentrification is not a problem for Kreuzberg, but for Falkenhagener Feld"[5] (Matz 15.06.2012, p. 9). Matz argues that the growing number of people on benefits leads to high costs for the outlying districts of Berlin. In some parts of Spandau, for example, he says that the proportion of children of people on benefits has risen from around 65% to 80% in recent years. This affects investments in education, childcare services, and so on, which the districts are often unable to finance (Matz 15.06.2012, p. 10). The process of adjusting the social and cultural infrastructure to new demands is very slow, he says, making it almost impossible to ensure sufficient provision. JobCenters must also adjust to increased demand as the number of people on ALG II registering in districts such as Spandau grows. But expanding or extending JobCenters is in most cases a slow process. As a result, it is no longer possible to guarantee that people on benefits will receive good advice.

The influx of people with low purchasing power also influences the local economy: The retail structure adapts to the new population. This, too, strengthens the downward spiral seen in certain districts (Matz 15.06.2012, p. 9) and the image of those parts of the city that people relocate changes more and more. According to experts such as Elke Breitenbach, unless stronger political action is taken to intervene in this "traveling circus" of people being displaced from one area to another, there is even a risk of ghettoization (Breitenbach 19.06.2012, p. 11).

5 Falkenhagener Feld is a neighborhood in the Berlin district of Spandau characterized by housing projects.

8 Conclusion

In this chapter we describe the tension between the real-estate market, housing policy, and social policy with regard to the contradictions between the legal requirements imposed by JobCenters and the housing actually available in Berlin. The fears and needs of people on ALG II are often overlooked in research and policy, although precisely for this population group, housing is a core issue. Our dual approach of interviewing both experts and people affected allows us to capture different perspectives on the current situation in Berlin. The expert interviews provide an overview of the political framework and sample tendencies in specific city districts, while our interviews with those affected illustrate the emotional, personal side of this development. This dual perspective makes it possible for us to identify causes, reactions, and consequences.

We find the main cause of relocations to be unsatisfactory housing situations, for which there can be both internal and external causes. Requests from JobCenters to reduce housing costs are a key factor. We identify a variety of different reactions by those affected, aimed at achieving or preventing relocation. We call one such reaction a "Remain Strategy". By this, we mean that the people affected use all their might to try to stay living where they are. This happens partly because of the lack of attractive and above all affordable alternatives, and partly because of a fear of losing their home, their surroundings, and their social network. This not only creates an additional financial burden, as those affected have to pay the difference in rent out of their *Regelsatz* (Standard Rate) or by earning extra money, it also creates psychological stress and has an impact on people's health. Those affected and the members of their households face pressure and insecurity.

An alternative reaction is relocation or displacement. The search for affordable housing often represents an almost insuperable challenge for those affected. Difficulties include low rent ceilings, growing demand, and increasing rents in Berlin, as well as discrimination on the housing market. It has not yet been possible to demonstrate that the theory that poorer population groups are displaced to the outskirts of the city is entirely correct, as many of those affected employ the Remain Strategy, for instance. Nevertheless, experts agree that more and more people on ALG II are moving to the outlying districts of Berlin.

In summary, we should stress that our interviewees speak more of a permanent fear of losing their current existence than of a fear of displacement. In other words, they feel that they are being pressurized rather than displaced.

9 Recommendations

The debate on social and housing policy is characterized by a range of demands and calls for action. These vary according to political attitude, degree of personal involvement, and addressee—whether the Senate, JobCenters, housing associations, or the owners of apartments. They include calls for concrete action such introducing social criteria for allocating housing to create a more inclusive housing market, as demanded by urban sociologist Andrej Holm (Schumacher 2012), or ensuring a minimum proportion of housing with a rent of €5.50 per m^2 (utilities excluded) for new buildings and making the allocation of land dependent upon this (Szczepanski 17.12.2012, p. 11). There are also calls for JobCenters and social welfare agencies to provide a wide range of support. Elke Breitenbach recommends increased rent allowances for people on ALG II in areas where displacement is particularly severe (Breitenbach 19.06.2012, p. 14). These demands received support from the affected interviewees.

More fundamentally, what is needed first and foremost is a recognition of the problem in all its complexity. This demand for recognition embraces a wide range of issues: recognition that the housing market is tight, recognition that the "social city" is an illusion, recognition that current provision mechanisms are ineffective, recognition that JobCenters need to reflect carefully on their personnel policies. The topics are diverse; we have tried to illustrate some of them in this study. In conclusion, we would like to call for the shaping of a new attitude toward them. As long as the housing shortage in Berlin is not recognized as a problem, it will be impossible to start resolving it.

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Trailer Living: A Displacement Phenomenon?

Paul Neupert

The practice of living in mobile homes on a permanent basis is widespread in the US. It is a 20th-century phenomenon whose roots lie in the early 1920s and the American dream of the limitless freedom to travel in your own trailer. Over time, however, trailers, which had previously been used for camping, became a more stationary makeshift solution for homelessness in major cities. Today they are closely connected to social problems such as polarization, segregation, stigmatization, and marginalization of population groups in precarious conditions. In his book *Wheel Estate—The rise and decline of mobile homes*, Allan D. Wallis (1991) traces the development of trailer living and examines the significance of political programs, technical innovations, and historical events in depth. He makes clear that this special form of housing did not develop continuously, but in stages, and has always been a response to an insufficient supply of housing. For example, as early as 1947—during the postwar housing shortage—seven percent of the US population lived in their own or rented mobile homes, some of them subsidized by the government. It was generally young migrant workers and their families who used them as transportable housing (ibid., p. 94ff).

According to the American Housing Survey, approximately 20 million people live in just under eight million trailers, mobile homes, or manufactured homes (USCB 2013). The bulk of these transportable dwellings are in the rural sunbelt—i.e., the states south of the 37th parallel (see Figure 1). Although it is still a mostly rural phenomenon, trailer living has in recent decades developed into a reasonably priced alternative to a privately owned home, which is generally unaffordable on the edges of thriving cities (Salamon and MacTavish 2006, p. 46). On average, the price of a mobile home is only one-fifth that of a conventional single-family home (CDCB 2013). These cost savings make them especially attractive for financially weak population groups. Trailer living is often considered to be the most important non-subsidized form of housing for low-income households (Burkhart 2010, p. 428; Kochera 2007, p. 1; Schmitz 2004, p. 386).

I. Helbrecht, *Gentrification and Resistance*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-20388-7_8



Figure 1: Prevalence of mobile homes in the US (source: Salamon and MacTavish 2006, p. 47)

Figure 2: Trailer park in Detroit (1930s) (source: Wallis 1991, p.72, p. 201)



Figure 3: Elm Park in Eaglewood, Colorado (source: Wallis 1991, p.72, p. 201)

Figure 4: Double-wide mobile home (source: Wallis 1991, p. 6)

Figure 5: Manufactured home being transported (source: Parksville Mobile Home Information 2013)

About one-third of all US mobile homes are on private, parceled plots, which are usually managed by their owners to maximize profit (HAC 2011, p. 6). There are between 50,000 and 60,000[1] such trailer sites in the US today (Salamon and MacTavish 2006, p. 45ff.). Even though the derogatory term "trailer park"[2] is often still used for them, their sizes, facilities, and socioeconomic structures of the population now cover a broad range. As early as 1965, James Gillies differentiated two main types: Housing-oriented parks with their more basic facilities are favored primarily because of their relatively low leasing costs. At the same time, luxurious service-oriented parks exist whose residents—often seniors—are more affluent and can afford the additional costs for the comprehensive community infrastructure such as clubhouses, security services, or golf courses provided by these parks (Wallis 1991, p. 185ff.). The latter are the minority, however, as Americans living in mobile homes are significantly worse off than the general population. On average, their educational status and household incomes are significantly lower, they are more likely to depend on government assistance, and 25.3% of them live below the poverty line (USCB 2011a, 2011b). Studies suggest that these problems are particularly true of trailer park residents (see Baker et al. 2011; Kusenbach 2009; MacTavish 2006; Milstead et al. 2013; Schmitz 2004; Shanbacker 2007). Furthermore, a number of authors argue that examination of the underlying conditions reveals that the trailer parks provide a primarily precarious form of housing. In contrast to "traditional" rental or owner-occupied housing, this form is fraught with numerous specific uncertainties affecting its particularly vulnerable residents (see Aman and Yarnal 2010; Baker et al. 2011; Genz 2001; HAC 2005; Jewell 2001; Schmitz 2004; Yarnal and Aman 2009). Salamon and MacTavish (2006) even speak of a status of "quasi-homelessness" in this context since the people living in trailer parks are constantly threatened by the loss of their housing and are thus often on the brink of homelessness.

There is a broad spectrum of academic work on trailer living in North America, corresponding to its marked societal relevance. Various disciplines approach the subject from such perspectives as history, sociology, ethnology, geography, or the real estate industry. There are also housing policy-related publications by trade associations, advocacy groups, and government agencies. I do not know of a single expert publication for the German-speaking countries. However, mostly regional newspapers have reported in recent years on the trend for people to live

1 Since official statistics do not include data about the form of ownership of the mobile home sites, we must rely on estimates (Salamon and MacTavish 2005, p. 26).

2 The term mobile home, which is more common today, was introduced by manufacturers in the 1960s to counter the negative image of trailers (Hurley 2001, p. 271; Wallis 1991, p. 149). The term manufactured home was officially established in the HUD code in 1976 to designate modern units (HAC 2011, p. 3f.).

on campsites on a permanent basis (see Dowideit, Die Welt online 2012; Klemp et al., Berliner Kurier 2012; Pluwatsch, Frankfurter Rundschau 2012; Rhein-Sieg-Anzeiger 2012; Rytina, Esslinger Zeitung 2009; Seith, Spiegel online 2009; Turek, Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger 2012; vom Hofe, Westdeutsche Zeitung 2009). Common to them is the view that this is a new, low-priced housing alternative and that especially recipients of *Hartz IV* (type II unemployment benefits) and retirees with meager financial reserves find themselves forced to give up their housing and move to a campsite. The research interest that forms the focus of this chapter is derived from this assertion. Especially with a view to the increasing social polarization of the German population (see Aehnelt et al. 2009), the exacerbation of the housing situation of the unemployed resulting from the *Hartz IV* social legislation[3] (see Holm 2007; Grotefendt et al. 2017 in this volume), the debates about old-age poverty and the working poor (see Noll and Weick 2012; Helbrecht 2013), but also about the rising numbers of forced relocations[4] and the homeless (see BAG W 2013), the question arises whether life in a mobile home will become a common practice for the poor because of a worsening housing shortage and what the consequences will be for the people living there. This issue became evident with the Federal Social Court ruling (B 14 AS 79/09 R) of 17 June 2010, according to which municipal agencies must accept trailers as housing and must cover the housing costs in accordance with Section 22 SGB II, provided they are reasonable (see BSG 2010). But if trailer living becomes a societal reality in the future, we in academia must find out more about this form of housing.

In the following, the phenomenon of trailer living in Germany will be studied more closely using the example of Central Camping Berlin (CCB), a commercial trailer park in the south of the German capital that is increasingly being used as a main residence. The questions examined will be whether it is a consequence of gentrification, the housing shortage, and displacement from central locations, as well as the extent to which trailer living could also become established in Germany—similarly to the US—as a precarious form of housing. Consequently, comparisons will be made with the North American situation as described in the literature. Before going into the residents' motives in more detail, I will describe life at the campsite per se, that is, the perceptions and experiences of the people who live there. This is relevant for the research, because assessing

3 The relevant *Vierte Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt* (Fourth Law for Modern Services on the Labor Market) entered into force on 1 January 2005.

4 Forced relocation denotes mandatory relocation to different housing by recipients of ALG II (type II unemployment benefits) who do not (or cannot) comply with the requirement to lower their housing costs and must leave their housing. The number of people affected by forced relocation in Berlin rose from 410 in 2006 to 1,313 in 2011 (Kampagne gegen Zwangsumzüge 2007, p. 25; see Grotefendt et al. 2017 in this volume).

this form of housing and its social significance is possible only if the residents' perceptions from the inside are taken into account.

The methodological approach involved guided narrative interviews conducted with the residents on site between December 2012 and February 2013. The first part of the survey was intended to find out more about the personal circumstances of the respondents' lives, the facilities at CCB, and the advantages and disadvantages associated with this special form of housing. Their assessments of the community and communal life were also of interest in this context. The second part of the survey dealt with motives for relocating to the campsite. This question was intentionally open to avoid being suggestive. After this the survey took up the concrete topics of residential biographies, rental costs, and the question whether the difference in rent compared with the respondents' previous places of residence was relevant for the decision to relocate, or whether they would consider moving back into an apartment. The duration of the interviews varied between five and 120 minutes, depending on the respondents' willingness to provide information. In this context, the relatively high rate of refusal to participate in the survey—more than 50 percent—should be noted. Many refused my request for an interview even at their garden gates, not seldom referring to an already existing report on the RTL TV station. That station had indeed broadcast a very powerful portrait of life on the site entitled *The trailer village—Last resort campsite*, which had specifically taken up and reproduced stereotypes about people living on *Hartz IV* (type II unemployment benefits). The image of CCB and its residents suffered as a result, and some people are convinced to this day that those who appeared in the media report later had their leases terminated for doing so.[5] They did not want to run that risk. Others said that their personal fates were not unproblematic and that they were unwilling to provide any information at all for that reason. Nonetheless, it was possible to conduct 15 interviews with a total of 21 residents. In 11 cases, the respondents agreed to audio recordings. The qualitative approach suggests using direct quotations to elucidate the insights gained (for an overview see Table 1). The names of all the residents were changed to comply with the request made by many of them for anonymity. Finally, I interviewed campsite operator Markus Müller[6] on 11 February 2013 to find out more about his work and his perspective on the connection between the housing shortage and trailer living.

It must be pointed out that CCB cannot be considered representative of all permanent campsites because no data for comparison is available. Countercultural (construction) trailer sites, of which a few still exist in and around Berlin, were not considered in this study. Even though a relationship to the development

5 The operator of CCB denied this link in the interview.

6 His name has been changed.

of rents is possible in their case as well, it is assumed that they are not operated commercially, but that their residents develop them voluntarily following collectivist or political-ideological ideals.

Name	Period of residence	Name	Period of residence
Inge	Approx. 3 years	Rüdiger	Approx. 4 years
Egon	Approx. 3 years	Micha	Approx. 6 months
Bärbel	Approx. 4 years	Erwin	Approx. 1.5 years
Holger	Approx. 14 years	Yvonne	Approx. 5 years
Uwe	Approx. 3 years	Kjeld	Approx. 4–5 years
Helga	Approx. 9 months	Benny	Approx. 1 year
Fritz	Approx. 5 years	Kalle	Approx. 3 years
Lisa	Approx. 5 years	Verena	Unknown
Ole	Approx. 3 years		

Table 1: Overview of CCB residents quoted (source: author)

1 The Campsite Central Camping Berlin

CCB is a campsite covering approximately 5.5 hectares in the extreme south of Berlin in the Lichtenrade area (Tempelhof-Schöneberg district). Its elongated shape borders on the rail line of the S2 S-Bahn, and it has approximately 260 plots of which just under 200 are currently occupied.[7] The campsite was originally established as a site for West Berlin residents to park their trailers outside the vacation season. Over time, the site was increasingly used by campers as an urban recreation area. Markus Müller calls it an "allotment garden facility [...] on the basis of a campsite." The opportunity to live permanently on the campsite already existed when his father operated it, in other words, it has existed for at least ten years. For a long time, individuals occasionally made use of this opportunity. But in the last two to three years, the demand for a long-term residence on CCB has been increasing markedly. According to the operator and residents, mostly unemployed people, students, and "dropouts from civilization" take advantage of the low-priced housing. Currently, 50 to 100 people live on the

7 For comparison: in the US, mobile home parks average 150 to 200 plots (Wallis 1991, p. 16; MacTavish and Salamon 2006, p. 491). However, they vary widely in size. For example, there are also closed sites with more than 600 units and 1,600 residents that structurally resemble small cities (ibid., p. 46).

campsite year-round.[8] Strictly speaking, it would be incorrect to call them campers since the word 'camping' is derived etymologically from *campus* (Latin for field) and denotes a particular form of mobile tourism. For this reason, they will be called *residents* in the following. In addition to these residents, there are so-called *permanent campers* on CCB who have apartments of their own in addition to their plots and who are here either throughout the summer (approx. 60–70%) or irregularly or only on weekends (approx. 30-40%). CCB has hardly any capacity available for tourists and weekend vacationers. They account for approx. 1 percent. In this respect, it differs significantly from typical campsites for travelers, even though, according to Markus Müller, this characteristic does not make it a special case. It is not known how many of the 2,872 campsites or 228,660 plots (Federal Statistical Office 2015, p. 20) have permanent residents. But it is clear that there is a basic tendency "of drifting apart into two groups"—one specializing in vacationers and one mostly for long-term campers and residents (Dowideit, Die Welt online 2012, quoted in Thurn). In the US, this conceptual division has been largely completed (Salamon and MacTavish 2006, p. 46). There is no official social data available on the CCB campsite residents.

The area of CCB is declared "uninhabited" by the Senate Department for Urban Development. The legal status of long-term residency on campsites is complex. The applicable provisions are partly contradictory. In its ruling (9 TG 3588/90) of 3 September 1991, the Hesse Higher Administrative Court declared that in principle, mobile homes must be recognized as appropriate housing.[9] Registration of a primary address at a campsite is permissible in accordance with the law on registering residency. The appropriate residents' registration office must record a primary address, provided the person can receive mail there. This also applies to mobile homes in accordance with Section 11, Paragraph 5 of the Framework Registration Act (BMJV 2013a). However, Section 10 of the Federal Land Utilization Ordinance categorizes campsites as being among those areas that serve exclusively recreational purposes, thus ruling out housing as a land use (BMJV 2013b). This has been confirmed by court rul-

8 The number corresponds to the interviewed residents' estimates. Markus Müller was unable to give a precise figure here. His estimate is 10 percent of all residents. There are 85 mailboxes at the entrance to CCB, which makes it possible to estimate the approximate number of official addresses.

9 "Accommodation includes all physical structures or parts of them which are effectively suited to protect persons from adverse weather and to secure a minimum of privacy including the possibility of storing personal objects" (Berlit 2009, p. 462). Besides mobile homes, this also includes emergency housing, housing for the homeless, and rooms in hotels and boardinghouses (ibid.).

ings.[10] Most campsite ordinances at the *Land* level also prohibit permanent residency. The fact that municipalities have scope for action can be seen in their ability to acquiesce to a formally illegal land use. At this point, the opportunity exists for the campsite management and the administrative body responsible to reach an agreement about the practice of permanent residency. Such acquiescence, however, does not provide residents with the assurance that they can stay because it can be retracted at any time without reasons being provided.[11] In the case of CCB, the administrative agencies tolerate the practice of permanent residency. According to Markus Müller, an estimated 95% of registrations of residency are unproblematic. (Translator's note: In Germany, residents are required to register their places of residence with a government agency.) Refusals occur only in individual cases. The relevant *Jobcenter* (office for unemployment benefits and job placement) covers housing costs for ALG II recipients and generally pays the campsite management directly.

2 "Like a High-rise Tipped Over."[12] Living on Central Camping Berlin

Because the surveys were conducted in the winter months, only residents of the campsite were encountered. They had been living on the campsite permanently for at least six months and at most 14 years, in most cases for two to three years. They include eleven unemployed persons, one apprentice, two pensioners, one early retiree, and six employed persons: one waitress, one geriatric nurse, one carpenter, one scaffold builder, and one civil servant. I was also told about two students, but did not meet them in person.

The residents' views on the quality of life in CCB vary widely, as evidenced very clearly by their assessments of the shared toilet and shower facilities.

> Well, this isn't exactly a well-kept site with absolutely high-tech washroom, shower, and sanitary facilities. They're dirty, disgusting, old. I wouldn't want to use the toilet there voluntarily all the time. [...] Well, it's pretty much the bottom of the barrel compared with other campsites. You can't really say that this is a good campsite (Inge, resident for three years).

10 See, for example, OVG NRW, ruling of 23 October 2006 (7 A 4947/05) and VG Frankfurt (Oder), ruling of 22 August 2012 (Az. 7 K 575/09) as well as VGH Baden-Württemberg, decision of 27 July 2012 (file number: 8 S 233/11).

11 The possibility of retaining prior rights is not taken into account here.

12 Statement made by resident Helga.

> And it doesn't look nice, either. Only the drunks use that toilet over there. When you go in, you have to open the door for half an hour first to get some fresh air in there. Then we have two showers there in the front, two for 320[13] people! [...] If you want to have a shower, you have to stand in line 'til it's your turn. And on top of that, he charges a euro for a seven-minute shower. Then they installed heating in there, but it's only 13 degrees (translator's note: Centigrade; 55 degrees Fahrenheit), and that isn't all that warm for having a shower in weather like this. That isn't good, [...] as I said, I'm 51, I can't handle that any more. I need the luxury that people think is normal in an apartment, you know: warm water from the tap, a normal toilet, a shower. That's luxury, and I miss it (Egon, resident for approx. three years).

> A lot of things have improved here too. [...] And finally we had it, that you could also shower in the front in the winter, that both toilets were heated, because all the years before, the women had to use the men's room in the winter. Now we finally have two that are separate, in the winter too, the heating works and that you can shower in the winter, so it's optimal (Bärbel, resident for four years).

> [The] toilets were all modernized, the showers work. You can shower in the winter, everything that didn't work ten years ago (Holger, resident for 14 years).

Almost all the interviewees emphasized that the winter was especially hard, but that the advantages in the summer compensated for it. For example, Holger, who is now unemployed and has been living there the longest:

> In the summer: nice. You open the door, everything's nice and green, put your deck chair out, sit down and enjoy. It's quiet here. Nobody's bothered by anything. You can have parties and so on. That doesn't bother anyone, you can't do that in an apartment, right?

Winter, in contrast, means various everyday hardships. All the people interviewed mentioned in this regard that they had to get drinking water from a central place because the water supply was turned off. Depending on their location, that meant a walk of up to 500 meters. This is a problem especially for older residents. Some use a car or a handcart to transport the canisters. Residents also have to walk these distances to use the bathroom or have a shower.

> We have everything here. In the winter—as I said—you have to carry canisters, okay. In the winter, it's 80 meters to the toilet, that's a little unpleasant. [...] We have a bucket to pee in at night, and that's enough—a kind of chemical toilet. Otherwise you have to walk 80 meters to the toilet, to the shower it's 80 meters, okay. But the tradeoff is, it's cheaper. If I pay 600 euros, then everything's only two doors away.

13 Here, he refers to the number of residents in the summer, which also includes seasonal campers.

> Yes. But here I pay 175 and so I have to walk 80 meters (Uwe, resident for three years).

The largely unpaved paths were mentioned in this context multiple times. They are poorly lit, there is no snow removal, and in rainy weather or "when the snow melts, [they are covered with] mud and puddles" (Helga, resident for nine months). Uwe's statement also shows that he clearly places the adversities in a causal relationship with the significantly lower rents and willingly accepts them because of the cost advantage. This will be examined more closely in the following section. Although some accuse the operator of failing to improve the amenities, others say, "Things are happening."

Other inconveniences in the winter include, for example, laundry freezing when it is hanging out to dry, electrical appliances damaged by the cold, or having to remove snow from the tent in front of the entrances to the mobile homes. All of the residential units themselves were heated appropriately. For many, having to replace the gas cylinder for heating at night was problematic; it usually involved having to leave the mobile home, whose temperature continued to drop. On one day during the period when the interviews were conducted, multiple residents experienced gas supply failures at irregular intervals. They subsequently accused the supplier of filling the cylinders with a mixture of butane and propane unsuitable for cold conditions instead of pure propane.

Good thermal insulation is important on CCB. Some residents have recently begun to insulate their trailers, some of which have become difficult to recognize as such because of this. The quality of the individual living space also varies widely: most residents have only an average, uninsulated mobile home with 20 m^2 floor space and a tent in front of the entrance. Some are small, old, musty units on plots that appear unused or poorly kept. Some are insufficiently protected against cold and damp. One woman complained about water damage and mildew and mentioned her chronic asthma. In contrast, two couples had relatively luxurious double or even triple plots with up to 400 m^2 land with space for one or two mobile homes, wooden huts, sheds, and tents in front of the mobile home entrances. Especially the "dropouts from civilization" (see below) invest in their property and then present it proudly:

> Well, we worked out once what we have here: we have 16 rooms, 90 square meters of living space, seven toilets and um [laughs]" "... a shower, a bathtub, I don't know how many kitchens (Fritz and Lisa, residents for five years).

The two of them are also planning to install a large solar cell on the roof for stand-alone electricity supply. A few additional small prefabricated garden houses have been erected on CCB. Such construction is tolerated by the operator

provided the structures are made solely of wood and easy to dismantle. Nonetheless, there are occasional infringements of this requirement.

Only a very few have a problem with the proximity of the other residents and the spartan simplicity of 'camping life.' For some of them, it even has a certain allure:

> Many people say, how can you live like that? I don't always have to have everything ... maybe it's a question of what standards you have for yourself. You can also live with the simplest things. [...] I need this 'having nothing' and 'having everything,' yes. Then you appreciate it. That's what it's like for many people, they take it for granted (Ole).

The problem of limited storage space is documented in the Anglo-American literature (Hurley 2001, p. 230), even if the mobile homes there are significantly more spacious in general.[14] The problem arises especially when people are about to move out of their apartments and have to substantially reduce their material belongings. They have to sell or give away many items, which means a marked change in most people's lifestyles.

One significant difference from the situation in the US is the climate. Especially in the subtropical Sunbelt in the south of the US, residents are seldom confronted with problems due to cold winters: no snow-covered walkways, no freezing water pipes, and therefore a reliable water supply on the plot year-round. On the other hand, summer heat waves and hurricanes make everyday life in mobile homes more difficult (Hurley 2001, p. 244f.). In the north of the US, adversities due to the weather are similar to those on CCB in Berlin (Aman and Yarnal 2010, p. 9). In the US, the standard of infrastructure on the campsites themselves varies widely. Although there are also very small campsites with minimal facilities in the US, a comprehensive 1972 survey showed that 79 percent of all campsites had a community center, 61 percent a swimming pool, 89 percent a laundry room, 11 percent a sauna, and nine percent a golf course (Wehrly 1972, p. 26f.). CCB's facilities seem very modest in comparison. With the exception of the sanitary facilities and an old playground (see Figure 23), there are no facilities available for all to use. There are no meeting areas, sports facilities, or park benches—only plots and paths.

The residents of Central Camping Berlin assess the interpersonal relationships and the sense of community on the campsite just as differently as the ma-

14 The average size of a US mobile home is 102 m^2 (USCB 2011c), although the amount of floor space varies widely. Many (approx. 57 percent) are single-wide coaches. They include conventional mobile homes and modules that can be transported individually (up to 150m^2). Double-wide coaches (approx. 40 percent, see figure 4) consist of two, triple-wide coaches of three or more individual modules (approx. 2 percent, up to 370m^2) (USCB 2013).

terial facilities. Ole, who is currently unemployed and has been living there for three years, summarizes this fittingly:

> Social awareness is better here than in an apartment [...] We have to stick together, after all, because we're all in the same boat. Everyone benefits from everyone else, yes. [...] Sometimes it isn't even about material things themselves, but about the discussion that you have. When you live here for a while, you always know: I can talk with that guy about a certain topic. If you need someone where you need ideas and important questions and answers, well, it's like that you sort people out here too. Some people, with them, I can't ... do anything serious. But here, you might see that more than in an apartment ... is my opinion. Well? Because um ... if you go outside here, then you always meet your neighbors. That's simply the way it is. And then you start talking [laughs]. You can't just walk by and say 'bye.' [...] Well, I never had that in an apartment. And that's the good thing about being here. Well, there are also people who are in bad shape. There's no denying that. [...] Then it's like, you say, he definitely needs help. I have a very good friend, he really went downhill here. You shouldn't underestimate alcohol, either. [...] You get up in the morning and you don't feel like doing anything or ... or you sleep late and don't even get up.

Almost all the respondents confirmed that the sense of community described here and the willingness to help are significantly stronger on the campsite than in traditional apartment buildings.[15] One reason for this is that people inevitably and regularly run into each other on the walkways—when they enter or exit the campsite or fetch water—and then talk with each other. Another is that people need other people's help for various activities. But hardly any residents have enough money to pay professionals. So it is advantageous that individuals' capabilities complement each other.

> You know your neighbors and ... everybody helps everybody, and that's what's optimal here. We have everyone here: we have electricians, we have bricklayers, we have floor tilers, we have roofers, we have all kinds of people (Rüdiger, resident for four years).

In this context, Inge says that she learned on the campsite to actively ask for help and that she learned many practical skills by watching other people build extensions and make repairs. These neighborly friendships also generate security. "Everybody keeps an eye on everybody." (Micha, resident for approx. six months). This is also true of parenting. For example, Erwin says, that he appre-

15 The study by Edwards et al. (1973) on the US arrives at similar findings. Neighborly relationships are clearly stronger in trailer parks than in areas with single-family homes. On the other hand, residents of mobile home parks are involved in formal organizational structures outside the mobile home park less than half as often.

ciates this community since he doesn't have to worry about letting his daughters, who often visit him in the summer, play outside, as the others also keep an eye on them.[16] This aspect of security also refers to break-ins and theft—a relevant problem on CCB, since trailers are fairly easy to break into. Here, belonging to the group creates a feeling of protection that many residents need. Others in turn rely on their dogs for security; in the winter, it seems there are as many dogs as people.

Although the community of neighbors was praised, some respondents—such as Ole—also recognized some residents' problems: alcoholism, drug addiction, self-neglect, and isolation. Micha said that he could always rely on roughly ten to 15 people, but that he had not seen the "alcoholic" from across the way for days and did not know if he was even still alive. In the interviews, respondents did speak about people who had died in mobile homes. Egon presented a different, lonelier perspective:

> No, the campsite isn't nice. Well, I had imagined something better. A little more harmony, that you get along with your neighbors. That you can also party with a bunch of people ... but that isn't the case at all. [...] Sure, that does happen rarely, that two or three people get along. But from the main entrance all the way to the end—from there to here—there are two people I get along with. Two people! And that does tell you something (Egon, resident for two years and eight months).

> Well, I also saw how I've changed. I'm basically a clean type when it comes to the place I live, and take a look at this here! But I don't take care of anything here any more because all I want is: out, out, out, out, out! (ibid.)

This makes clear that individuals are included in the social fabric of CCB to very different degrees. The campsite as such does not offer any networking activities in this regard. There are no communal spaces. The bar named "Kiosk" was regularly closed down because it did not have a license. A successful dart club used to meet there. Community events are rare nowadays and are always organized by the residents themselves. Examples include an Easter bonfire, the children's party, a New Year's Eve party, and occasional birthday parties.

At the same time, there are also often interpersonal conflicts which in some cases even end in violence. According to four of the people interviewed, who brought up the subject independently of one another, the police came to the campsite "regularly" or "often." Müller stated that these were mostly routine checks by community police officers, but that the police often also settled disputes. Sufficient potential for conflict seems to exist on the campsite. For one

16 In contrast to the situation in the US, German law does not permit children to live year-round on campsites. Respondents spoke about cases where the youth welfare agency had intervened.

thing, especially in the summer, prosperous vacationers with their dowdy notions about camping are confronted with the permanent residents, some of whom are marginalized by society, and their quite modest and pragmatic conceptions of life. For another, the long-term residents are also heterogeneous and have different notions of order and deviance. Yet people live close together on the campsite, share the sanitary facilities, and can hardly avoid each other because of the campsite's village-like character. Yvonne (resident for five years) explained it like this: "Gossip is really bad and usually ends in war." Many residents' alcohol dependence in particular increases this potential, but for Yvonne, it's also a form of entertainment: "It's like a thriller here. You don't need a TV set. [...] There's a lot of excitement." Helga describes it similarly: "Well, it's like a high-rise tipped over: there's friction. There's backscratching. They could've made *Lindenstrasse* (translator's note: a long-running German soap opera) here too [laughs]." Especially the operator's increasing tendency to take in social 'problem cases' is becoming a point of friction:

> And those who aren't [here] voluntarily—well, anti-social always sounds so ... well, they're socially deprived, you know—and so they're not interested, they live there, they throw their garbage around and don't do anything, you know. You have to live with it, but I'm happy that I'm down here. It's nice here: quiet, nice neighbors (Kjeld, resident for four or five years)

Similar comments were also made by a few others. Interestingly, respondents always localized the conflicts elsewhere.[17] For example, Bärbel said, "Well, to be perfectly honest, normally there aren't any conflicts down here. [...] The conflicts are always up there mostly." Markus Müller justified his controversial practice of selecting new residents as follows:

> I must say it's difficult for me. Last year, we, I admitted two people on *Hartz IV*, a big alcohol problem, I could already tell it probably wouldn't work, but I have a problem if a homeless person is standing there in front of me, and he shows me a document that the government will pay the rent—and it's colder than -16° C. (roughly zero °F.) [...] in February of last year—and then I say, just because you're an alcoholic, I'll send you away, and then in the end I've signed his death sentence because he falls asleep under the next bridge and doesn't wake up again ... I can't do that with a clear conscience. That's why I took in these two [...]—I got the money from the government regularly, so, this has [nothing] to do with money—but they

17 According to Markus Müller, there is no planned segmentation of the campsite into sections. It is "completely mixed" and plots are assigned on the basis of which ones are available. In the US, internal zoning, e.g., into areas for pensioners or families, is certainly customary (MacTavish and Salamon 2001, p. 492; Hurley 2001, p. 240f.).

> really drank intensively. [...] Sometimes, we're really too socially minded—no question about that—and the other campers have to bear the burden.

In summary, it becomes clear that residents assess life on Central Camping Berlin in very ambivalent and partly contradictory ways. This is true both of the quality of housing, because of the standard of the buildings, and of community life on the site. Whereas in relation to a person's 'own four walls,' the former is strongly dependent on a person's available financial means and workmanlike skills, residents' overall assessments of the campsite apparently depend on at least three parameters: duration of residence, social participation, and voluntariness. Residents who have been living on the campsite for a long time, are well integrated in the community's cliques, and freely selected the site as 'dropouts from civilization' feel that the housing conditions are significantly better than those who do not meet these criteria. Using the example of the River Terrace Mobile Home Park, MacTavish and Salamon (2001) also show that there is a significant relationship between residents' duration of residence and their social integration or isolation. Some residents are not satisfied with their situation, others do not wish to leave the site. In particular the third criterion of voluntariness makes clear why the question of the reasons for a person's last relocation is important. What was the role of social displacement? That is the focus of the following section.


STOP


Achtung!
Achtung!
Änderung!
Gasflaschen!
Achtung!
In den kommenden Tagen wird nach Wetterlage das Wasser über den Winter hin abgestellt! Spätestens jedoch am 15. November.


VORSICHT!
Wachsamer Nachbar


DANGER!
ZICKENZONE
MAUL HALTEN!
LAND GEWINNEN!
SICHERHEITSABSTAND!




Achtung!
Auf Grund des
erheblichen Diebstahls
von Toilettenpapier und
Papierhandtücher,
wird kein Toilettenpapier
und keine Handtücher
mehr gestellt.
Bitte bringen Sie Ihr
eigenes Toilettenpapier
und Handtuch mit.
Die Geschäftsleitung


DUSCHE 1

Figures 6–23: CCB, impressions (source: all photos © Paul Neupert)

3 "That's [the] Future, Young Man!"[18] Long-term Camping as a Manifestation of Social Displacement?

The question of the residents' reasons for deciding to live on the campsite was also posed to operator Markus Müller. He classified motivations in a way that corresponds well with the explanations given by CCB residents:

- Lack of money—People who (must) decide to live this life because of their meager financial means: unemployed recipients of ALG II and pensioners whose incomes are too low to cover unbudgeted purchases or vacation once they have paid their rent. But also students who cannot find affordable housing near the university.
- Escape—People who leave 'the city' because of their noisy neighbors, annoying traffic noise, or the cultural diversity they experience as threatening. This also includes those yearning for the feeling of nature and vacation, quiet, and a 'simple life' ('dropouts from civilization').
- Social life—Some come specifically for the feeling of community. They leave their apartments in the city because they are dissatisfied with their surroundings, which they experience as too anonymous. They usually have friends or acquaintances who already live on the campsite and who convince them of its more village-like character.
- All these reasons were mentioned in the interviews with residents, and some were documented with their life stories. This shows that Markus Müller's assessment of his tenants and renters is quite accurate. The following three motives should be added to this list:
- Liberty—This is first and foremost about individuals' freedom to act as they like because deviant behavior is only minimally regulated: "You can party here as you like." "People can do what they want." (both: Helga). "You don't have this freedom anyplace [else]." (Rüdiger)
- Love of animals—Three respondents said that they moved to the campsite because the surroundings were much better for their cats or dogs than their cramped apartments in the city. Helga said that she had even been sued by her landlord because of her dogs' barking, and had even won. But she had subsequently moved out—voluntarily.
- 'Property'—For some, the trailer on the campsite plot seems to be a substitute for the single-family home they will never be able to afford:[19]

18 Statement made by resident Micha.

> "Well ... For me, it's still like this: since Berlin is kind of a metropolis, I think owning property is a privilege. Well, I don't own it. I'm a tenant, but basically it's yours." (Ole)

Almost all responses showed that two or even more of the six classes of motivation mentioned overlapped. Only rarely does one argument alone apply. It is striking that except in one case, respondents always mentioned those reasons first that imply that their decisions were voluntary; in particular points two, three, and four were often combined with one another. Only in the further course of the conversation—usually in response to the concrete question about the role of money as a factor in their decision—did they confirm that this aspect was relevant as well. For instance, now unemployed 60-year-old master baker and confectioner Holger says that he originally moved because of the beauty of nature and the significantly shorter distance to work, but then adds,

> "And then I, we had an apartment that cost 800 marks, 800 German marks at the time, and it was cheaper here, of course, [here] ... my costs were only 150 a month. So we agreed that we'd move out here for the whole year."

His savings thus amounted to more than 80 percent—when he was still working. Today, the residents who responded pay between €130 and €512, depending on the year they moved to the site, the location and size of their plots, and the form of the contractual relationship. When the contracts are concluded, the prices are adjusted to the leasing fees charged by the actual owner, which rise annually. Old contracts have lower prices. Large plots and ones closer to the sanitary facilities or further away from the railroad tracks are somewhat more expensive, as a matter of principle. In addition, there is a differentiation between leasing and renting. The vast majority of residents (95 percent, according to Müller) lease the land and live in their own mobile homes. The price for this is €1/m^2, which is relatively cheap. These residents pay €130–175 per month for an individual plot or €230–260 for a double plot. Water supply costs €20–30 per month; in the winter months, gas costs another €100–200 per month. The price of electricity on CCB is €0.51/kWh, or more than twice the price of Berlin's

19 Home ownership, as part of the American dream, is a major motivation for living in a mobile home in the US (Salamon and MacTavish 2006, p.48, p.59). But the authors also showed that the 'rent-to-own' principle, which is common there and which means that the residents become the owners of the mobile home after paying rent for a limited period of time (approx. five years), rarely results in the desired change of ownership (ibid., p. 51) On property ownership in Europe see Behring and Helbrecht 2002; Helbrecht and Geilenkeuser 2010.

default provider,[20] so costs amount to approx. €40–80 per month. Many residents have already switched to energy-saving LED lighting.

ALG II recipients usually rent a fully furnished mobile home including the plot.[21] According to Müller, they account for approximately half of all those living on CCB year-round. The *Jobcenter* pays between €305 and €378 (including heating and utilities) for one person per month or €463 (including heating and utilities) for two. Markus Müller makes gas cylinders for cooking and heating available to them free of charge. Thus, their rents are 1% to 25% lower than the currently applicable official ceiling for housing and heating costs for ALG II recipients (see Grotefendt et al. 2017 in this volume). In the case of Benny, who moved in a year ago, the rent corresponds exactly to the then usual maximum amount of €378 (ibid.). Helga is the only unemployed person who owns her own mobile home; she pays only €298 (including heating and utilities). A direct comparison with Berlin rental arrangements is difficult; nonetheless, it is clear that there is a great potential for savings compared with the *Vergleichsmieten* (comparative rents)[22] of the Berlin *Mietspiegel*[23], which average €5.52–6.81/m^2 (*einfache bis mittlere Wohnlage*, less than 40m^2) (see Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2013). The difference is even more distinct in comparison with new rentals (see Immobilienverband Deutschland 2011).

20 Markus Müller justifies this by the fact that these fees finance all other additional property expenses (waste, maintenance, etc.), for which he does not charge residents separately—as is common practice on campsites.

21 In the US, renting a mobile home is not uncommon: 22.5% of all mobile homes are renter-occupied (USCB 2013). They are generally part of the trailer sites classified by Salamon and MacTavish (2006) as rental mobile-home communities, where both the plots and the housing units are owned by the manager of the site. They are mostly located at the edges of smaller cities, generally have a lower standard of facilities than the majority of the land-lease communities, and their residents are particularly poor (ibid., p. 46).

22 The comparative rent is the rent customary in the given location, calculated from the usual rents charged in the city in the past four years for housing of a comparable type, size, furnishings, condition, and location, including its energy efficiency and facilities. The comparative rent does not take publicly subsidized housing into account.

23 The *Mietspiegel* is essentially an index of the rents actually paid by tenants, broken down into the size, location, age and standard of housing. More than just a guideline for tenants and landlords, it is an important tool for adjusting rents and also helps investors to identify where the greatest potentials for rent increases exist. The Senate Department for Urban Development and Housing in Berlin publishes its rent index every second year. The *Mietspiegel* defines three different quality levels of residential locations, based on the criteria of building density, general condition of buildings and streets, and accessibility to green areas, shops and public transport. The "*einfache Wohnlage*" is the simplest, lowest level; the "*mittlere*" is intermediate; and the "*gute Wohnlage*" is the highest, whereby little subsidized rental housing would be found in an area with "*gute Wohnlage*."

Some respondents state that this difference in rental cost was not relevant for them, but they see its significance for other residents. For example, Helga, who is now unemployed, speaks of

> many who get the mobile home and all that [...] paid for by the government because they can't find an apartment, that's why. I don't believe that all of them live here voluntarily [...] as I said, I chose this voluntarily. I made a really conscious choice.

Egon, who lived and worked in Neukölln for many years until a motorcycle accident made him unable to work, confirms this assessment:

> What I've found out here—I know a lot of people by seeing and talking with them, most of them are really those who can't manage any more in the city or in normal life, they can't get an apartment because they still owe rent to other housing companies. This is really the last resort for these people. That's why he has so many people on *Hartz IV*.

He later explains that he has been looking for an apartment for nine months, but will presumably not get an apartment for similar reasons:

> Because I have a bad credit rating. Because I used to be self-employed, I ran bars, and then I got a bad credit rating. But that's something everybody has nowadays. Took out a loan and didn't pay it back right, you know. [And right away] you have a bad credit score. But my advantage is—I think, everybody tells me that—if the reason for your bad credit score isn't because you're a rental nomad[24] and stuff, then you still have a chance of getting an apartment, but it's hard even if you've got a bad credit score [...] But nowadays, one in three, one in four in this country are in debt. There's no other way.

Egon's estimate is incorrect; according to the SchuldnerAtlas 2013, the rate of heavily indebted persons in Germany was 9.81% (Creditreform Wirtschaftsforschung 2013, p. 4). Nonetheless, he makes clear that debts are not a phenomenon of the fringes of society, and those rental debts in particular noticeably limit access to the free housing market. They are often a reason why applicants for housing are turned down. Markus Müller, in contrast, does not require a credit score when people move in. For a long time, he accepted everybody. Recently, he has been requiring at least proof that prospective residents have no rental debts because too many have left spontaneously and without paying. "There's no way to collect" the outstanding money (Müller).

24 This is what Egon calls people who move out of an apartment without having paid rent, or regardless of the period of notice, and become indebted in this way.

Another perspective on the problem becomes clear from the interview with Uwe. He worked as a backhoe operator in Hamburg and on the Canary Islands, interrupted by periods of unemployment, before moving to CCB in Berlin with his wife. His job situation is still unstable. When he does find work, he is away in other cities. He has to advance the travel costs. His last three employers went bankrupt while he was working for them. Although he hired a lawyer and sued them, he still has not received his wages. He too says that he enjoys living on the campsite because of the calm and natural surroundings near the city, but when asked whether he would exchange his plot for an apartment, he says,

> Yes, I would, because ... at least for the winter I would exchange it if the housing is affordable, but a small two-room apartment with 40 m^2 costs 450 today—I'm now paying heating and utilities, too—then I'm at 650. I can't afford that. The *Jobcenter* pays—what do they pay here again?—4-and-63 is what they pay, including heating. You can't get a two-room apartment for that. Impossible! And if you do, then far away in the eastern part of Berlin, five stories up with coal heating maybe, single-glazed windows, those really old houses waiting for demolition, maybe you can still get that for that price. But livable, affordable housing, not for that price.

This interview excerpt also shows that the first reason given for living on CCB is motivation two, which suggests that it is voluntary. He mentions the problem of rents, which is linked to it, only in response to the question whether he would move into an apartment again. At the same time, another aspect becomes very clear: Uwe is not willing to leave his familiar surroundings. Other CCB residents have similar views. Most come from the district Tempelhof-Schöneberg, some grew up here, for example Kalle, who has also been waiting for his last wages as a concrete restoration worker since August 2012 and does not want to leave "expensive" Lichtenrade because he cares for his ailing mother, who lives close by. Berlin's "East" seems to be too peripheral, and its quality of life seems too low. Verena puts this thought more pointedly:

> Of course there are enough one-room apartments in Berlin, but of course, it always depends on the district, you know. Of course there are one-room apartments in central Berlin, very expensive, and now outside of Berlin, like in Hellersdorf and Marzahn, they're cheaper of course. But who would want to live in Hellersdorf or Marzahn?

In her imagination, the district Marzahn-Hellersdorf is not part of Berlin—it is "outside of Berlin." In fact, it is located at the edge of Berlin, and relatively reasonable apartments are still available there, for which reason unemployed people, pensioners, single parents, and migrant families are increasingly moving there from more central locations (see Schulze, Der Tagesspiegel 2011). There

are, of course, understandable reasons why such a change of residence would not be desirable, but the "houses waiting for demolition" with coal heating do not exist in the district, which has mostly prefabricated housing. Travel time to the city center is also roughly the same as from Lichtenrade. On this point, individual perceptions of the distances and housing conditions in Berlin are incorrect.

Micha is the only resident who immediately focused the interview on his financial hardship, the housing shortage in Berlin, and old-age poverty. He lived in a large apartment on Tempelhofer Damm (Tempelhof-Schöneberg district) until retirement. He has been living in his own trailer on the campsite for approximately six months:

> I'm a pensioner, since last year. I can't pay rent from my mini-pension. That means: living here. [...] 750 euros, that's nothing! Then you have to pay for space here yourself and in the winter, for heating, keep buying new gas.

Then he speaks angrily about the fact that he worked as a truck driver for a trucking company for 25 years and that his pension of €750 is just €3 above the limit for the minimum subsistence level, which is why he cannot receive *Grundsicherung im Alter* (basic income support for old age).

> The idea was ... before I retired, I already thought about it: what will I do now? Well. This basic income support, but that was ... before I get that, I had to use up everything I had, all my savings. That's the law. Well, then you submit masses of paperwork, all the stuff they ask for. That's already impossible, you know? It's about bank accounts or [incomprehensible] ... all that shit, and well, that was the only solution, nothing else would work (Micha).

Finally, he talks about his former apartment; the rent accounted for two-thirds of his income in the end. He links his current situation with social displacement in central locations:

> Yes, sure, rents keep on rising. It's crazy. My building, where I lived—here on Tempelhofer Damm—that was a nice area [...] and um, as long as it still belonged to the old owner—a private person—everything was fine, and somehow that changed: new owners and new ... and now somehow an Englishman bought it and he doesn't give a shit. He's sitting there in London someplace and the rents are going up. You can't pay that, you can't. [...] The last question my neighbor asked was: 'What, you're leaving too?' I said, 'Yes, what can I do.' That's how it is. It'll get even worse. If you look at how it's all developing.

Then he says, in reference to the campsite:

> You know exactly, everybody's had some kind of problems and that's why they're here. But that's the future, young man. Don't forget that. That's the future, believe me. Many people can't pay rent any more.

Micha is convinced that trailer living will become established as a permanent form of housing because declining incomes and increasing rents make such makeshift solutions on the housing market necessary. He finally talks about looking for a *Minijob* (limited part-time employment, up to 450 euros per month) in the spring or the summer. But he wants to remain on the campsite for the time being, because he is more concerned about money for the small comforts he used to be able to afford, especially traveling, which he misses most. In doing so, he sets distinct priorities and simultaneously makes the core problem clear. He could afford a small, low-priced apartment—and in contrast to Verena or Uwe, he could also imagine living in Marzahn or Hellersdorf one day. But he does not want to live in an apartment which costs so much that he hardly has enough money left over for everyday items, consumer goods, and services in a quality and quantity acceptable to him. He considers the resulting restrictions on his standard of living to be unacceptable. So for the time being, he remains on the reasonably-priced campsite. His decision is in a sense contrary to the Remain Strategy of ALG II recipients threatened by displacement who pay the difference between the rent and the maximum paid by the government themselves to avoid having to relocate (see Grotefendt et al. 2017 in this volume). A similar case is also described by Markus Müller as an example from his perspective as a landlord. It is also about old-age poverty:

> Well, I read about it in the papers and I also hear about it from my campers, that they say—well some of them, not the big majority, but some of them—that they can't afford to live in an apartment any more ... or they don't want to any more because they want to have a little money left over for other things. Otherwise, everything would be eaten up by the rent ... food, and then everything's gone and all they can do is look out the window—as I already said. And a lot of them don't want that any more because their pensions aren't sufficient any more.

The interviews show that the CCB residents have very different and complex reasons for living on the campsite. Almost all of them see advantages in this regard, especially for the summer. But it can be concluded from just five respondents' statements that they decided on the 'simple' life in a trailer entirely voluntarily and intentionally gave up their apartments. A lack of money was not decisive for them, and they would not want to swap their plots for apartments of their own, despite certain hardships. These residents specifically had already

experienced camping before. They had traveled to other countries with their mobile homes (e.g., Micha, Fritz, and Lisa) or enjoy thinking back to camping in their childhoods (e.g., Inge). More than half of them already had a trailer or a plot on CCB as long-term campers before moving there permanently. This suggests that a personal connection to camping increases people's willingness to adopt this way of life or at least strengthens their willingness to consider it as an alternative housing option.

The CCB's cost advantage compared with an apartment is highly relevant for many residents. Some even say quite clearly that they moved to the cheaper campsite mostly for financial reasons. An apartment of their own is often no longer affordable or so expensive that the money remaining after paying rent is too little to finance an acceptable lifestyle. This suggests a dimension of displacement. In this context, Peter Marcuse (1985) speaks of "economic displacement" (ibid., 205). As shown, this is linked to important individual deliberations and decisions. For example, residents tolerate the hardships of winter to avoid giving up the comforts of life, such as a car of their own or a good diet (e.g., Egon and Uwe).

But it also emerged from the interviews that displacement is not only an active process resulting in people having to give up their own housing, but above all entails not having access to the segment of the housing market needed. This is "exclusionary displacement" (Marcuse 1985, p. 206f.). Some admitted that they certainly do look for housing occasionally or have been actively wishing to leave CCB, but have been unable to do so (e.g., Micha). A 'real' apartment is out of reach because appropriate rental apartments in their preferred neighborhoods are too expensive or because their private debt is a reason for landlords to refuse to rent to them. The latter can also be considered the result of an imbalance of supply and demand on the liberalized housing market. The focus on particular areas—often the residents' previous neighborhoods—makes clear that displacement occurs at a small spatial scale. People do not wish to leave their familiar surroundings. In this respect, it is likely that they would not consider a campsite in the north of Berlin, either.

4 "Camping in Berlin Doesn't Make You Rich!"[25] The Perspective of CCB Operator Markus Müller

In order to be able to answer the question whether trailer living may also become established in Germany, I will now examine the assessment of the opera-

25 Quotation Markus Müller.

tor of Central Camping Berlin more closely. Conclusions about the practicability of this practice can be drawn especially in light of how the residents feel about him.

The interviews revealed highly contradictory opinions about Markus Müller as a person—most were appreciative: "Müller is a really good guy" (Uwe), but some were critical: "Müller is only concerned about money. [He] earns lots and lots and doesn't do a thing around here" (Egon). Müller himself emphasizes that he does not own the land, but only leases it. "Camping in Berlin doesn't make you rich!" [...] If you own it, you can earn a lot of money, but not as ... not in my position, I'm only leasing it. You have to pay too much money" (Müller). More than 50 percent of his revenues go to the actual owner, a major investor who bought the site up to Bahnhofstrasse from Deutsche Bahn AG several years ago and already had the neighboring allotments on Nuthestrasse vacated to build a shopping center. In the end, he had to give up the project because he could not get a building permit. CCB could remain for the time being. Müller's lease runs through 2018. It is currently unclear what will happen then; it depends mostly on new negotiations with the owner and his intentions for exploiting the site. For Müller, this means predictability is low, for which reason he is unlikely to make larger investments. The insecurity for the residents is existential, though, because of the threat of another economic displacement.

In the US, the increased risk of displacement from campsites has been documented many times. Besides NIMBY initiatives[26] and municipal efforts to impose regulation (Wallis 1991, p. 19ff), economic developments above all play a decisive role, for as cities grow, property values rise, as does the pressure to economically exploit the real estate where suburban mobile home parks are sited (ibid., p. 200ff). Once the land has been sold, more profitable land uses replace this form of living, which is usually merely tolerated by the authorities.[27] While CCB residents have a certain amount of legal certainty thanks to a three-month notice period, residents of US mobile home parks are threatened by the prospect of the sites being closed, but also by immediate termination of their contracts if they infringe on the parks' rules and regulations, some of which are very rigid (Aman and Yarnal 2010, p. 2; Wallis 1991, p. 192ff). Relocation with a mobile

26 NIMBY is the acronym for 'not in my backyard' and describes resistance to unpopular phenomena or developments in people's own neighborhood (Creel Davis and Bali 2008).

27 Municipal zoning usually forbids mobile home parks in residential areas. That is why almost all suburban parks are in industrial or commercial areas, often as interim uses (Hurley 2001, p. 256f.).

home, however, is technically difficult, very expensive,[28] and hardly feasible without assistance (Arman and Yarnal 2010, p. 8). It is usually cheaper to give up the mobile home and to buy or rent a new one elsewhere. This also explains the surprisingly high locational ties of US (im)mobile homes. Nowadays, fewer than eight percent are moved after they have been installed the first time (Burkhart 2010, p. 433; Dawkins et al. 2011, p. 5; Schmitz 2004, p. 389).

Markus Müller said the following about his practice of increasingly renting trailers year-round to unemployed people:

> Well, this *Hartz IV* business, you go along with it, it's okay, but actually it isn't ... well, if they cooperate and keep the garden neat [...] but mostly you have to say, you have to confirm the cliché because they do [incomprehensible] live it up—whatever—don't keep the garden neat, generally don't keep it clean, they're often drunk, yes. Well, not necessarily the campers, and I prefer them, except if they cooperate and really do come here for camping. If they want that, it's great, but that's the minority—unfortunately. [...] More than 50 percent of the people on *Hartz IV*, when they move out, you've got to be very lucky if you can salvage the trailer. Because mostly they don't take care of them—they don't take care of anything—so you have to throw them out afterward.

Trailers are fundamentally not designed for long and intensive residential use. They require comprehensive care and high maintenance costs and rapidly lose their original value[29] (Aman and Yarnal 2010, p. 3; Hurley 2001, p. 266). The operator is responsible for repairs, which are very expensive because of the high costs of spare parts. Markus Müller estimates that his investment in a rental mobile home pays off after roughly two to three years. For him, "*Hartz IV* camping" is still a business experiment, a "test phase." He intends to review it after five years and decide about continuing. In fact, he is considering changing the campsite to serve tourists to Berlin if his lease is extended. Although long-term residence is a secure revenue stream because it is year-round, operating a classical campsite is less complicated and simpler; when he switched two, three years ago, he was faced with new tasks and challenges:

> I have long been doing more than being purely a landlord, yes. I have to do a lot more, and sometimes that's very strenuous, but you have to mediate clearly. Sometimes, you have to sit people down together and tell them that they have to get

28 Transportation costs vary between $2,000 (single-wide coach) and $12,000 (triple-wide coach) (Aman and Yarnal 2010, p. 8; Hirsch 1988, p. 214; Wallis 2001, p. 15). Exit fees and further costs for registering at a new campsite must be added on top (Hirsch 1988, p. 214; Genz 2001, p. 404). Long-term parking of mobile homes on public land is generally prohibited.

29 On average, mobile homes lose half of their original value within the first three years, which is why they are considered a risky investment (Salamon and MacTavish 2006, p. 49).

> along and ask why he didn't do that; others come ... even things where I say that doesn't have anything to do with the landlord.

Müller, who sees himself as someone who provides a shoulder to cry on (Uwe) sees himself caught between two mutually incompatible positions—between profit-oriented businessman and philanthropic social worker:

> I had to learn from our landlord too. I'm not purely a businessman. I could make a lot more money if I were purely a businessman. But I'm not. Maybe I'm still too soft—I don't know—or too socially-minded.

Finally, he draws his personal justification for the life he offers on the campsite from the poor housing supply and the development of rents in central locations:

> Yes, the police knows about it, the public registration office knows about it, well, somehow everyone knows about it, they accept it too, but it might be that now, nobody wants it any more. So I wonder how they want to change it. They don't have that kind of housing. There's hardly any housing at all, well, affordable housing. People on Hartz IV practically can't get housing any more. Or they have to go way far out. [...] Students basically don't have the opportunity to rent a one-room apartment near the university any more. I wonder, if they want to ban living on campsites everywhere, how they want to snap their fingers and provide housing for people like that.

Müller's perspective shows that the economic feasibility of the practice of operating a campsite year-round as a landlord depends on various aspects, for example the form of ownership, predictability, or the good will of the authorities. For him, the development of supply and demand on the Berlin housing market and that of the city's touristic potential are decisive at this point. As the operator of CCB, he will need to balance the pros and cons of camping tourism, seasonal camping, and trailer living in the future. A concept combining them appears possible only to a certain extent, which is shown by the poor evaluations vacationers give CCB in the Internet forum for camping *camperpoint.de*, among other things (ibid. 2011).

5 Trailer Living in Germany? A Conclusion

This study of Central Camping Berlin shows that life on the campsite is different from 'conventional' living in many respects. Especially in the winter, the residents are confronted with various hardships. Significant reductions in quality of life become apparent here, but the people affected by them consider them and

cope with them very differently—depending on their age, personal aspirations, and capabilities. Living as a community on the campsite also proves to be ambivalent. The residents' close spatial and functional proximity reduces urban anonymity, which is otherwise typical. People know, greet, and help each other. On the other hand, this form of living together also brings about interpersonal tensions. In this context, it is problematic that many of those living on the campsite year-round have to cope with individual problems. Precarious employment and unemployment, poverty and debt, alcohol dependence and personal misfortunes are common among the CCB residents. From an urban-planning point of view, the question arises about the consequences of social segregation in the "city of enclaves" (Helbrecht 2009). Andreas Farwick (2001) showed statistically that islands of poverty—i.e., concentration of socially disadvantaged population groups in especially small areas—significantly reduced their opportunities to leave this situation of poverty. He gives three reasons for this: insufficient resources in the neighborhood, taking on 'destructive patterns of behavior' through social learning processes because of a high density of contacts, and aspects of discrimination and stigmatization. As shown in this chapter, all three points apply to mobile home parks.[30] Yet the development of 'victim parks' should be prevented for reasons of social justice.

People's evaluations of the campsite and their own situation there are particularly dependent on their own personal reasons for living such a life. This study has shown: it is not true that all residents live on CCB voluntarily, but it is also not true that they all live there involuntarily. Their motivations are generally multi-layered and complex. The purpose of this study is not to judge individuals' visions of their own lives. A good life is certainly possible in a mobile home, but especially the aspect of its voluntary or involuntary nature is immensely important for evaluating a particular situation—both from a moral and from a psychological or political perspective. Every person should have the opportunity to decide for or against such a life and the advantages and disadvantages it entails. That is why this is not about problematizing living in a trailer in general, but about questioning the underlying conditions determining the phenomenon and analyzing its social consequences.

Living on CCB is cheaper than in an apartment, but at present, nobody in Berlin is directly compelled to live a precarious life in a trailer park against his or her will by forced relocation. The *Jobcenter* does not urge or encourage anyone to take such a step. Nonetheless, besides the very individual motivations, there are also unequivocally financial reasons that suggest a dimension of dis-

30 The latter is made clear especially in the US studies of trailer parks and through the societal discourses in the US about 'white trash' and 'trailer trash,' which are closely tied to this form of housing (Harry 2004; Hurley 2001, p. 247f; Kusenbach 2009).

placement. For many, an apartment of their own in the neighborhood they are familiar with is no longer affordable, or staying in an apartment of their own would be too expensive, so that paying the rent and maintaining an acceptable lifestyle would be impossible. At this point, the people affected are faced with an often difficult decision in which personal experience with camping may prove decisive. The same is true of people newly moving to Berlin who cannot find affordable housing. Both situations were mentioned on CCB; in other words, there was evidence of both economic and exclusionary displacement. The second of these forms of displacement is additionally exacerbated in the case of private debt. This was also proven to be the case for the intention to leave the campsite again.

Comparisons with US mobile home parks and references to research findings from the US show that some parallels do exist, e.g., the relative poverty of the residents, the relationship to housing shortages, or the community of neighbors. On the other hand, it is indisputable that fundamental differences exist as well. In the US, trailer living has a certain tradition and is significantly more prevalent with a view to the question of status, which is oriented toward property ownership. The climatic conditions are different. In addition, various types have become more differentiated over time. For example, touristic campsites and purely residential ones are separate. Combined forms are exceedingly rare. The facilities provided and their quality vary widely and are adapted to the needs of the groups of residents, which are homogeneous on each campsite. In Berlin, the new practice of living on the campsite complements conventional year-round camping. Whereas the few year-round CCB residents mostly retreat into their mobile homes during the winter, they live adjacent to people seeking rest and recreation in the summer months and on weekends, which also brings about arguments because of their divergent needs. Infrastructure or events on the campsite itself which could promote harmonious relations are almost completely absent. Despite these differences from the US campsites, experiences from abroad are useful for better assessment of current developments in Germany and their social consequences, and for guiding the process accordingly.

Whether living on campsites will also become established here in the future cannot be finally assessed here. Further research is required. The most recent examples in the media—but also reports by CCB residents—suggest a general increase in this practice; although it is still in something of a gray area legally speaking, initial legal steps toward its recognition by the government have been taken. At the same time, the perspective of operator Markus Müller showed that the future of trailer living in Germany is decisively dependent on business-related conditions as well as decisions about housing policy. If affordable housing in major cities becomes increasingly scarce, such suburban makeshift solutions will become increasingly profitable and therefore surely a societal reality

in the near future. But the response must not be to prohibit campsites such as Central Camping Berlin as a matter of principle, because that would mean further worsening the situation of people threatened and affected by homelessness. Instead, the challenge is to alleviate the situation on the overpriced housing market by resuming construction of publicly subsidized rental housing.

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Residential Biographies as an Instrument of Sociospatial Displacement Analysis

Camilo Betancourt

The central East Berlin district of Prenzlauer Berg has experienced a profound transformation. Triggered by the increasing attractiveness of central locations and the unification of East and West Berlin, buildings were modernized at a large scale and commercial land uses changed, which ultimately also affected the population structure (see Förste and Bernt 2017 in this volume).

Redevelopment of urban neighborhoods is controversial; diverging debates about their challenges and problems dominate urban research and the political discourse. The literature describes the sociostructural transformation of a redeveloped central area using the gentrification approach. The term gentrification signifies the architectural, social, symbolic, and functional redevelopment of a central area in which the original and lower-income residents are replaced by a higher-income population (see Hamnet 1979, quoted in Friedrichs 1996, p. 14). Large parts of the established population are exchanged through a multifaceted process of displacement.

The phenomenon of sociospatial displacement is difficult to measure, and it is politically undesired. All the more is additional empirical research required to improve the instruments for documenting displacement and to deepen the analysis of this important aspect of gentrification.

Statistical evaluations for analyzing displacement have not been particularly instructive to date and have examined just a single relocation episode, namely the relocation out of the redeveloped area in question. The goal of this contribution is above all to determine what the respondents' motives were and which steps they took, above and beyond moving itself. The (population) change in Prenzlauer Berg is thus discussed using the analysis of detailed and highly personal residential biographies of former residents of the redeveloped area, making an alternative contribution to research on displacement.

The research approach is based on two key questions, one conceptual, the other substantial:

- To what extent do residential biographies contribute to determining the relocation behavior of former residents of redeveloped areas?

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- Where did former residents of Prenzlauer Berg move to, and why, and what did moving away mean to them?

1 Research Design

Since the question aims to discover as yet unknown explanatory models that are part of residential biographies, a qualitative approach is appropriate for gathering and evaluating the empirical material. The study is based on semi-structured interviews. Both the spatial trajectories of the biographies and the subjective meanings and reasons given for relocating are of interest as analytical dimensions for explaining processes of displacement. This is followed by an initial attempt to create a typology of the dimensions mentioned.

As shown in the first part, the decision to relocate is linked to structural and personal motivations, so they must also be taken into account when analysing the results. For this reason, the theoretical framework consists of firstly the findings of gentrification research; secondly—to determine sociospatial displacement—the displacement mechanisms developed by Peter Marcuse; and thirdly, for subjective perception and assessment of the relocations, theoretical deliberations on the residential cycle and the transformation of housing preferences.

2 Gentrification, Displacement, and Housing Preferences

2.1 Gentrification and Urban Redevelopment Processes

The "return of the cities" (see Helbrecht 1996) can bring about a conflict-laden process between sociostructurally dissimilar residents and interest groups (see Richter as quoted in Häußermann 1998, p. 60), which is aggregated and described with the term gentrification. The most general and all-encompassing definition of gentrification refers to an "architectural-economic upgrading process [...] through which households with higher incomes displace residents with low incomes from the neighborhood and change its significant characteristics and atmosphere" (Holm 2006b, p. 72).

Depending on the area, this process can have various causes and progressions, which are explained in the scientific discourse using economic, cultural, and political approaches. In the redeveloped area Berlin-Prenzlauer Berg in particular, this transformation unfolded as the interplay of all these dimensions.

People often relativize and fail to recognize the challenges posed by the redevelopment of centrally located neighborhoods under the pretense of the lesser evil. In particular displacement, which is difficult to measure, is used as a key argument against the matter itself (Holm 2010, p. 54). However, since gentrification implies sociospatial displacement and even the word *displacement* is not a nice one, people tend to ignore it if possible or better fail to acknowledge its existence, since previous problems such as decay or high unemployment rates appear at first glance to have been solved. This attempt to determine the phenomenon of sociospatial displacement at the personal micro level requires a clear conceptual definition, which will be provided in the following.

2.2 Sociospatial Displacement

Determining whether displacement has occurred is a key step that can contribute to resolving the debate around the question whether redevelopment necessarily entails gentrification. In some of the literature (see Slater 2009), but especially in urban development circles (Marcuse 1986, p. 153), sociospatial displacement of the original population is relativized or accepted as the inevitable price of redevelopment and not discussed further.

This is compounded by the problem experienced in social-science urban research of empirically examining and quantifying the phenomenon. Above all, in previous studies—Atkinson 2000, Freeman 2005, Henig 1981, and others—the personal dimension of the people moving out was not taken into account, and the conclusions drawn suffered from this omission. This contribution was thus motivated by the considerations to bridge the gap between the theoretical assumptions underlying the gentrification discourses and the stony path of quantitative research on displacement by employing a qualitative approach. The question of how the residential biographies of the impacted groups continued to develop after they left a redeveloped area cannot be answered satisfactorily using statistical data—for example data on migration between districts—since one must always assume a natural rate of relocation. "High migration dynamics are not necessarily signs of an exchange of population" (Holm 2010, p. 63). For this reason, the task of this chapter is to take an alternative path to determine the sociospatial manifestations of displacement by making use of knowledge about it.

"When it comes to ascertaining displacement, a differentiation is often made in the German debate between voluntary and involuntary relocations" (Holm 2010, p. 60). Hartman et al. (1982, p. 3, quoted in Slater 2009, p. 295) define displacement as follows: "the term describes what happens when forces outside the household make living there impossible, hazardous or unaffordable."

In his work on New York City, Peter Marcuse (1986) provides a typology of forms of displacement. He relates displacement both to individual households and to entire residential buildings, and also both to the individual and the neighborhood levels. He first differentiates between direct and indirect displacement. Direct displacement occurs as a consequence of physical or economic changes (ibid., p. 156), which may overlap. Whereas the economic challenge lies in the increasing costs of housing, physical causes of displacement include, for example, neglect of the building's heating and water supply systems or "forms of exerting or threatening violence" (Holm 2010, p. 61) by building management or owners. Direct displacement can occur in the form of *last-resident displacement* "[i]f one looks simply at the housing units involved, and counts the last resident in that unit" (Marcuse 1986, p. 156) or in the form of *chain displacement*, if households were previously displaced from the same building as well.

Marcuse discusses indirect displacement mostly in terms of neighborhood effects (Holm 2010, p. 61). *Pressure of displacement* occurs through a changed commercial structure, by relocations of people's circles of acquaintances and friends from the neighborhood, i.e., alienation in their own quarter under the "newly established neighborhood structure" (ibid.). Marcuse also established the category of *exclusionary displacement*, which occurs "when any household is not permitted to move into a dwelling, by a change in conditions which affects that dwelling or its immediate surroundings" (Marcuse 1986, p. 156). This creates "exclusive spaces" (Holm 2010, p. 62), to which households living on *Hartz IV* (type II unemployment benefits), for example, are denied access because of their social structures. A positive aspect of Marcuse's deliberations is that they consider sociospatial displacement in a multicausal way. In the second part of the chapter, the types of displacement mentioned here will serve to test the empirical material and thus to make the initial conditions for the typology of migration clear.

2.3 Housing Preferences and Housing Decisions

A city's residents are themselves important actors in urban development and the life cycle of certain residential locations—because they try to turn their housing preferences into concrete housing decisions. Therefore, it seems just as relevant to analyze—besides the causes of displacement—those aspects affecting a particular housing preference. They include subjective preferences such as well-being, security, or freedom (Lindberg et al. 1992, p. 187). Personal housing preferences and values vary depending on people's sociostructural backgrounds and along the various different phases of their lives, be it because of changes in perceptions about the importance of different values or changes in the circumstances of their lives, for example the birth of children or the death of a spouse.

In addition, it is important to differentiate between *preferences* and *decisions*. Subjects do not always decide in favor of the most preferred alternative. Preferences are not necessarily followed by decisions, either. Relocation becomes likely only when a strong trigger is present (Floor and Van Kempen 1997, p. 28). Triggers can be "states of the dwelling or location" or "the occurrence of an event in the life course" (ibid.). Whereas relocation is considered a voluntary act in the literature on housing preferences, that is not necessarily the case (ibid., p. 29). What is presumed as an involuntary relocation may in reality reflect a hidden housing preference. The aspect of voluntariness should thus be interpreted with caution.

It should also be said that the preferences of high-income households may limit the options for low-income ones (see ibid., p. 30), since social and material resources are ultimately also relevant for a satisfactory decision regarding housing. Even if it is not the decisive reason for a change of residence (Gärvill et al. 1992, p. 40), people's household budget limits their options on the housing market, which results in low-income households relocating less frequently than high-income ones (Floor and van Kempen 1997, p. 29). This is where Marcuse's approach, which describes displacement, begins, as does gentrification research in general, which deals with precisely this involuntary component of migration movements (Falk 1994, p. 68f).

Nonetheless, these theoretical deliberations are to be read with caution. Häußermann and Siebel conclude "that the respondents restrict their orientation to needs that seem within reach—as measured by their means" (Häußermann and Siebel 2000, p. 220). The satisfaction of the respondents must also be considered, taking the *satisfaction paradox* into account (see Schober 1993, quoted in Häußermann and Siebel 2000). It follows the insight that "satisfaction is the result of a comparison of expectations and reality" and that the respondents use a standard analogous to the average of their own social peer groups (ibid.).

Finally, it should be taken into consideration that according to *dissonance theory*, "every individual has the tendency to reduce discrepancies between an unchangeable and an 'actually' desired reality because the dissatisfaction arising from them cannot be borne in the long run" (Häußermann and Siebel 2000, p. 219). Passive adaptation to reality results in people becoming "more satisfied" (ibid.).

It can nevertheless be stated that housing preferences do factor into the decision about a person's place of residence and should also be contrasted with the data. At this point, it can already be asserted that the decisive factors for a particular migration movement are the voluntary nature of a relocation and the opportunities for finding a new residential situation corresponding to one's own preferences.

The question to what extent displacement and housing preferences impacted migration movements in the case of the respondents will be taken up again in the second part of the chapter. First, the transformation in Prenzlauer Berg must be described, which will also enable readers to better follow the deliberations so far.

3 The Case Study

3.1 Transformation in Berlin's Prenzlauer Berg

As mentioned above, the area covered by the following study is the district Prenzlauer Berg, formerly part of East Berlin. In the wake of German unification, both its relative location within the city and its internal structural characteristics changed fundamentally and at a drastic pace (Dörfler 2010, p. 95). Whereas widespread decay prevailed here (see Marquardt 2006, p. 11) and the local residents were granted unusually large liberties under the GDR regime (Häußermann et al. 2002, p. 52ff.), numerous politically guided efforts to redevelop the quarter, which was close to the city center and featured potentially highly attractive housing stock, ensued in the years following unification. The urban renewal policy of the *Land* of Berlin relied on designating redevelopment areas that were to make living in central locations of the city more attractive. Subsequently, urban research began to examine the transformation in Prenzlauer Berg—with various interpretations (Häußermann et al. 2002, p. 79ff.).

Characterized mostly by *Gründerzeit* buildings, the area was considered 'grimy' in the GDR days because of the run-down and below-average housing which did not correspond to the political system's notions of housing and was thus bound for demolition. A relatively high vacancy rate of roughly 20 percent enabled a certain milieu—a mix of critics of the GDR, 'antisocial elements,' and artists—to settle there and develop a counterculture (see Häußermann at al. 2002, p. 52); tolerated by the municipal housing authority, they moved into the buildings and equipped themselves with the most basic facilities. In addition, a distinct "political and artistic subculture [...] which was also taken note of in the West" (Häußermann 2004, p. 49) developed in the area, which served as a breeding ground for the time following unification.

As a consequence of reunification, the district Prenzlauer Berg was no longer up against the border to West Berlin, but became a centrally located quarter, characterized by the political work of the environmental and peace movements, and it continued to attract young people moving in from West Berlin who hoped they could live up their political and cultural ambitions there. The resulting

political milieu used the space in "uncontrolled" and "spontaneous" ways (Häußermann et al. 2002, p. 56).

Following unification, urban redevelopment policy aimed to preserve the run-down pre-World War II areas without making the local population suffer the consequences of the required financial expenditures (Häußermann 2004, p. 53). All groups of actors were to be taken into account in this process through a "cautious" and inclusive approach. The public budget difficulties and the great need for refurbishment made alternative sources of financing necessary, and they were tapped through tax breaks for private investors. The purportedly resident-friendly urban redevelopment strategy, which was subject to strong state influence, proved financially infeasible and was replaced by one based on public-private partnership,[1] which was determined largely by factors promising financial returns and made Prenzlauer Berg the largest redevelopment area in Europe (Dörries 1998, p. 47, quoted in Marquardt 2006, p. 11). The "wave of remedial maintenance and modernization investments" triggered around 1993/94 changed the appearance of the quarter and attracted both a new, more financially powerful residential population and commercial uses at a "different level" (Häußermann 2004, p. 52f.). This brought about arguments and power struggles between the so-called long-established population—those who had moved in directly following unification felt they belonged to this group—and the more recent arrivals considered "foreign to the area." People complained about increasing rents, also in areas not included in the redevelopment efforts; these areas "benefited" from their location close to the city center and the entire quarter's hipster image. Ultimately, the goal of upgrading the housing stock was achieved, but not without sociostructural consequences for the quarter. The rate of relocations, which had been very low during the GDR days, skyrocketed after unification and brought about a significant exchange of the population (see Förste and Bernt 2017 in this volume). The number of different household types changed, with single-person households increasing and large households decreasing. The age distribution shifted toward a younger population, which was simultaneously linked to an upward "leap in educational status."

Dörfler (2010) examines the transformation from the perspective of the previous and present residents' everyday worlds and speaks of a transformation of the milieu, whereby the alternative-minded people and students who mainly populated it prior to unification have moved out of the area. The refurbishments and new buildings attract a different clientele—*bobos* (bourgeois bohemians) or *Bionade-Biedermeier* (eco-aware cocooners)—(Holm 2009) that is stronger than its predecessors, especially in financial terms.

1 Häußermann (2004, p. 54) calls the first strategy Fordist, the second post-Fordist.

Not only low-income households, which are generally less mobile, but also residents with average incomes (Holm 2006, p. 243) considered moving out of the quarter (Schneider and Spellerberg 1999, p. 66). On the one hand, the motivations for these relocations arose from the freedom of mobility that was new to former East Berliners in reunified Germany (Häußermann et al. 2002, p. 51). On the other, Holm (2006, p. 243) concludes that the economic upgrading process characterized by gentrification also triggered relocations out of the area, which Marquardt confirms in her study on Kollwitzplatz (Marquardt 2006, p. 61f). The question we ask in this chapter is: How did displacement occur, and to which destination areas did the purportedly displaced relocate?

3.2 Methodological Approach

The cases were selected with the goal of gathering statements as diverse, personal, and experience-based as possible and contrasting them both with the theoretical preconceptions and with each other. In grounded theory, which is our approach here, this is called *theoretical sampling* (Dörfler 2010, p. 97; Kelle and Kluge 2010, p. 50ff.). For this reason, the cases for the qualitative approach were selected according to the following criteria relevant to the research question. The respondents were to have lived in the upgraded area Prenzlauer Berg and, if possible, to have experienced various phases of their lives while living there. Following the life-cycle hypothesis, I especially accounted for age differences when selecting interviewees. Another criterion was to gather a sample with a diverse socioeconomic composition, but this was adapted according to prior knowledge about the social structure of the area before and during its transformation.

In the end, seven individuals (three women, four men) between 23 and 51 years of age were selected; they lived in Prenzlauer Berg both during different historical epochs (1980s, 1990s, and 2000s) and during different phases of their lives (as children, youths, students, young adults (with children), and adults (with children)). The respondents selected are low to average earners. With the exception of two interviewees, the respondents live in various Berlin districts today. A call for interviewees was posted on a university e-mail distribution list with the request that it be forwarded to people with the appropriate profile.

Data was gathered through qualitative narrative interviews in order to obtain responses that were thematically comprehensive and open to interpretation, to the extent possible, in particular because of the decidedly personal character of residential biographies. The interviews followed a guide including three key requests to interviewees to tell their stories covering the entire autobiographical period between moving into the redevelopment area and their current housing and living situation today. The narrative interview was followed by a structured

interview, and thereafter a questionnaire to gather the respondents' socioeconomic data during each of the residential periods mentioned.

The seven interviews were conducted in June and July 2012, in the respondents' current apartments or in settings familiar to them; the atmosphere of the conversations was generally pleasant, relaxed, friendly, and open. They lasted for an average of one hour and 30 minutes. The interviews were transcribed and divided into thematic coding categories that were selected ad hoc. Passages with matching themes (see Kelle and Kluge 2010, chapter 4) were subsumed using text-analysis software. Besides providing information about their migration movements, the respondents also spoke in rich detail about the reasons why they moved away and the significance of their relocations. Since critics of displacement research use the subjective perception of people's changed living and residential conditions as an argument to downplay the existence of displacement, these aspects were also evaluated and contrasted with the deliberations of displacement research and those concerning residential preferences.

4 Evaluation and Development of a Typology of Migration

4.1 Partial Aspects of the Displacement Analysis

The conversations show that the trajectories of residential biographies differ widely and that they are also interpreted very differently. In order to analyze the research questions using the data, I divided the data into three parts: 1. temporal-spatial relocation behavior, 2. motivations for relocating, and 3. subjective perception of the relocations. The goal was to design the typology in such a way that it takes all three aspects into account in order to reflect the primary and the secondary research questions.

4.2 Character of the Migration Movements (Partial Aspect I of the Typology)

The data provides information about a large number of migration movements occurring both within the redevelopment area and, especially, as a result of relocating away from Prenzlauer Berg. These were to be systematized in order to answer the initial question *Where do the purportedly displaced relocate to?* Figure 1 gives an overview of the respondents' relocations since they moved to Prenzlauer Berg.

It can be seen that on the one hand, the directly neighboring areas (or districts) are attractive for the former residents (see the analogous empirical findings in Koch et al. 2017 in this volume), and that on the other hand, areas at a

great distance from Prenzlauer Berg were selected for relocation for a variety of reasons.



Figure 1: Sketch of the respondents' migration movements[2] (source: author, on the basis of Google Maps)

Whereas in some cases, relocation from the revitalized area resulted in a long-term and stable residential phase, others migrated from one apartment to another for a time before finding their current residential situation.

Three subtypes emerge from the analysis of the spatial relocation behavior, which I call devotees of the area, runaways, and nomads and characterize as follows: *Devotees of the area* move to apartments located as close to their previous ones as possible, both within the upgraded area and beyond its borders. They relocate across short distances, basically moving just by a few spatial units (blocks or buildings). The main areas receiving them are generally neighboring districts. *Runaways*, in contrast, relocate to more distant areas. They moved at least two districts away, which may also mean moving out of the centrally locat-

2 The migrations marked within the designated areas do not correspond to the precise locations to which the respondents moved and serve merely to provide visual orientation.

ed part of Berlin. The category *nomads* aims to capture the temporal dimension rather than spatial relocation behavior. Nomads' relocation behavior is characterized by multiple migration movements in short succession. The category of nomads can be combined with the categories devotees of the area or runaways. This results in a temporal-spatial description of the migration movements.

4.3 Residential Preferences and Displacement (Partial Aspect II of the Typology)

It is apparent from the summaries of the interviews that residential *preferences* and mechanisms of displacement impact each other in terms of the respondents' relocation behavior. Both aspects will be discussed in more depth in the following.

4.3.1 Displacement from Prenzlauer Berg?

Key to the typology and for answering the research question is ascertaining mechanisms of displacement as factors motivating relocations out of the area. The following section examines the composition of the sample with respect to the reasons for relocating out of the redeveloped area. Since sociospatial displacement of the respondents, if it occurred, is a complex and multi-layered theoretical construct, establishing it must take various dimensions of the story into account. Accordingly, it is not presumed that *all* the respondents were displaced; rather, the task is to show that Marcuse's typology of displacement incorporates personal and structural aspects and that they are compatible with the second level of reasons, namely residential preferences, which ultimately makes clear that voluntary relocation does not necessarily signify the absence of displacement mechanisms.

The respondents expressed various impressions, self-judgements, and opinions about displacement. I intentionally did not ask the respondents whether they felt they had been displaced; instead, I operationalized Marcuse's typology of displacement in individual questions. This complex of questions included both the economic and the physical aspects discussed by Marcuse as well as the direct and indirect mechanisms of displacement. The evaluation showed that a majority of the respondents reflected on their relocation away from Prenzlauer Berg in terms of partial aspects of the mechanisms of displacement.

The respondents gave evidence of becoming alienated from their own neighborhood. For example, the question "*Would you move back to Prenzlauer Berg?*" was answered as follows:

> I don't know, I guess I wouldn't, well, it's become a little alien to me ... [hhhmm]... well, um ... well, it wouldn't be such a big difference any more if I moved to

> Prenzlauer Berg or to Schöneberg or something, well, that isn't quite true, because in the end, I still have a few connections to Prenzlauer Berg because my parents live there and so on, but, um...well, *actually* the difference is that there's some history there, but if you look at what Prenzlauer Berg is like today, then, um, I guess [I could just as well] move to Schöneberg or something (laughs) (Freddy, paragraph 72)[3].

In another interview, I asked, "If you were looking for a new place to live now, would you look in that area?" and the answer was: "I don't think so. ... No, I don't think so. I don't feel it's that interesting any more"

> Well, I guess I can still, I was still, uh, well, lucky to experience Prenzlauer Berg like I had wished I could, and um, ... it was still like that for a few years and for me, it actually changed, well, you could see that all these buildings were renovated and that suddenly different people were walking down the street. And I noticed a totally extreme difference after I did my Erasmus year, or semester, and came back, hm, that was 2005 ... um ... it, I think it was maybe coincidental or something, it was only my building that hadn't been renovated and the people were simply different then too, um, ... and I noticed that it maybe wasn't like what I was hoping for any more (Magdalena, paragraph 10).

Many respondents' financial means determine their choice of where to live. The following quotation speaks for all respondents and also suggests that their material needs are relatively low.

> On the one hand, money plays a role, of course, money in the sense also that what I pay for housing I can't use for other qualities of life, well of course you can shift things and say okay, a nice apartment, and instead less vacation or fewer outings, but, um, I actually don't want that, either. And, um, nowadays it's hard to save money on food, even in East German times, you couldn't really save money on food (laughs) uh, well, ... bigger purchases, furnishings, maybe you could save a little, but we're actually minimalists when it comes to that because we live in practically inherited furniture that lasts forever and we only buy this or that if we need it, but we don't replace furnishings much; we're more oriented toward durability and sustainability. We can't save more when it comes to that, so money does play a role in that sense (Jürgen, paragraph 32).

The residential preferences mentioned here are by no means luxurious, and those of the other interviewees must also be considered average.

3 All such references are to the relevant paragraph in the original transcript. Names changed by the author.

Many of the residential buildings where the respondents previously lived in Prenzlauer Berg were first upgraded in terms of the building stock and then, according to the statements, economically, resulting in *economic displacement* and *last-resident displacement*. Today, only a few of them would be able to afford an apartment in Prenzlauer Berg:

> [B]ut I also found out that it's practically impossible for me to live in the area I grew up in, because even if I earn money at some point, I guess I won't earn that much money at first (Rafael, paragraph 160).

> But now I want, um, I wondered for a minute if, um, if they start renting out apartments again, I guess I couldn't afford it, but I wondered if I would actually want to go back (Magdalena, paragraph 6).

In some cases, the apartments were far below present-day standards. Although they met the residents' needs in some cases, the condition of the apartments does permit one to speak of *physical displacement*. For example, the owner of the building where Jürgen and Rafael lived gradually vacated tenants from the building; as a result, there were significant problems with the water supply during the winter, and heating costs soared. Asked what it was like to live in an empty building that was falling into disrepair, Jürgen said:

> And yes, the winter, that was always kind of hard, it also looks kind of uninviting, all the windows in the building are dark, and, well, we then put lights in the windows, so even though we didn't really like chains of lights in windows, we hung them up there (laughs), kind of like saying people still live here' (laughs). But um, since the commercial tenants were still there on the ground floor to the end and we got along well with them and we talked with each other, well, things worked, it was a kind of little community of people who stayed, um, as long as it was a community, it was okay. And then they, well, the people living on public assistance and us, we moved out within a short time so we weren't *totally* alone. (laughs) (Jürgen, paragraphs 67-75).

The mechanisms of *economic* and *last-resident displacement* become apparent here once again. The fact that the housing market was becoming increasingly tight because of the transformation of Berlin's central locations is evidenced by the following statement by Jürgen, referring to his previous and current areas of residence:

> In that sense, I can see what I was running away from here [Prenzlauer Berg], this transformation into an elite neighborhood, I can already see it there [Pankow], and I figure that I, well, I'm afraid that I can't stay there long, that the same fate that drove me out here will drive me out there, too (Jürgen, paragraph 187).

The social and architectural upgrading of his previous neighborhood is not limited to this area, but itself *migrates* to the neighboring residential areas.

When I asked the interviewees if they would have liked to stay in Prenzlauer Berg, they gave different answers.

> Yes and no (smiles). There were some things in particular that were nice, but, um, I am, well, back then, I was sure I would have stayed. Now I am happy with where I live, so I don't think it was a mistake to move away (Martin, paragraph 182).

> If, if I didn't have a child [ahem] ... yes, definitely ... (Anna, paragraph 159).

> Yes. Well, um, I would have liked it if I could have moved away for a short time while they fixed up the place and, um, if I had been able to stay and then paid a higher rent, something like the market rate. Well, if that had been an option, I would have stayed (Jürgen, paragraph 171).

> Well, in the short term, it was clear to me: I'm moving out. But I could have, well, actually, I can, I could have imagined having my own apartment in Prenzlauer Berg if I could afford it. Actually, I really would like to live in Prenzlauer Berg, I like the area (Rafael, paragraph 141).

In some cases, the landlords exerted *pressure of displacement*; Jürgen's case is the best example:

> Well, it was unmistakable, the pressure, but I think it was still kind of at the level where you could say, 'it's fair' (Jürgen, paragraph 180).

Ultimately, it was important to find out information about the people replacing the respondents in the buildings. Although only some of them were able to make precise statements, in the interviews they generally mentioned higher earners. Since most of the buildings were modernized after the previous tenants had moved out, and both a rent increase and a material and spatial restructuring of the living space must be assumed, there is a high probability of social upgrading and resulting exclusionary displacement.

Interactions can be detected between the individual mechanisms of displacement, for example between alienation and economic constraints. Marcuse's typology is mirrored in the respondents' reports, including the natural transformation of residential preferences shifting because of the pressure to move. I argue, therefore, that the two aspects can influence each other, which will be discussed in the following section. From here on, sociospatial displacement is assumed on the basis of the analysis above.

4.4 Transformation of Residential Preferences

Residential preferences change along with the circumstances of people's lives—mainly with their age—and this was also the case for the interviewees. There was a great diversity in residential preferences, owing to the variety of age groups and life stages represented by the respondents while they were living in Prenzlauer Berg. Yet these initial differences are consistent with each other when sorted according to the relevant life cycle. When they move away from the upgraded area, the respondents reorient their ideas about housing, both in accordance with their phase of life and in terms of the real opportunities for making them a reality.

The aim was to determine—both for the people who grew up in Prenzlauer Berg and those who moved there later—what they appreciate about the housing situation that existed there and at the time and to what extent their housing needs, which changed over time, impacted this.

When interviewees were asked what was positive and interesting about living in Prenzlauer Berg, or what they found appealing in the area, they responded:

> Um, well first of all, this historical feel, the old buildings, then of course, um, the people who lived there at the time, artists, people interested in culture, mostly, the fact that all generations lived there, and um, ... well, simply the flair, well, what everyone knows, what it was like in East German times. And I didn't want my daughter to grow up in one of those standard residential areas. At the time, she was 5, and she went to kindergarten in an area where there were old buildings too, and none of that existed in Hohenschönhausen (Angelika, paragraph 4).

> When I was a student, I thought it was super, well, you change, and then I thought, well, I felt, it was kind of like living at the hub of the universe, it was kind of cool, the coolest district there is, and that was what it was like for me ... well, to me, I definitely like living in Prenzlauer Berg (Martin, paragraph 28).

> [W]e were in Prenzlauer Berg a lot anyway, after all, we were students at the time and had a lot of friends, they lived in our neighborhood in Prenzlauer Berg and well, there was stuff going on, there were parties, and it was nice there, and we always got together there and liked it there, and *whenever* we got together, it was there. And then we said, "of course, if we move in together, then definitely in Prenzlauer Berg" ... exactly, and we were very very very happy when we moved back there (Anna, paragraph 13).

The respondents also manifested that they had reflected on their own lives and that their priorities and needs had shifted according to the phases of their lives.

> Back then, that was interesting, because I moved there and said, 'this is great, I can go out on the street at three in the morning, and people are out', and now I live in Lichtenberg and say 'I really like that it's quieter here', well, yes, my priorities have changed (Martin, paragraph 18).

> Well, overall, I'm not such a fan of the big city any more. Well, about ... ten years ago, I don't think I could have imagined really moving out of the city ... well, I guess the downside for me is living on a major road and somehow, there's a lot of traffic, a lot ... a lot of traffic noise, a lot of fumes and stuff, that's, well, road number 5, um, ... but otherwise, I kind of like it, it's kind of um, a mixed and colorful neighborhood with, somehow, well, from an organic food store to a house occupied by squatters to a hip latte macchiato café. And funny little shops and, well ... a little culture ... and so it isn't like, that I go there a lot, but it's there and so, so it's pulsating a little and it's lively and, um ... I like it and that we're among people like us, like, um, I kind of like that too, well, it can also be a disadvantage, a little isolated, you live like that, don't pick up much about other people, but on the other hand, it's also rather pleasant, not being disturbed, being left alone, being able to do your thing (Freddy, paragraph 66).

The transformation of a neighborhood may also correspond to changes in personal residential preferences, as shown, for example, by this response to the question "*and if you lived there again, would you cope with that well?*"

> Um, depends on where exactly. I'd prefer an area that's a little quieter, so not Simon-Dach-Straße or Kastanienallee, um ... but quieter, like it used to be, like Erich-Weinert[-Straße], so more a quieter residential area where you can get on your bike if you feel like it and go to Helmholtzplatz or wherever to have coffee, that you can do that (Angelika, paragraph 73).

Having children especially affects residential preferences. The respondents had difficulty imagining living in Prenzlauer Berg with children:

> But I also always said, I always said, 'if I ever have a baby, I won't live in Prenzlauer Berg any more' ... all those mothers there, they're all very old, aren't they? They kind of get on my nerves [apartment door opens] (laughs). It's so overcrowded and the children, well, they can't really move around (Anna, paragraph 16).

Whereas the importance of quiet, especially when they have children, is a factor that brings about a change in preferences, proximity to the city center is a constant among the respondents' residential preferences, regardless of whether they are currently living close to the city center or not.

The residential preferences mentioned above do not correspond to the totality of all residential preferences expressed, but they were indicated by a majority

of the respondents and serve to elucidate that they also enter into the decision to move away. It can be stated on the basis of the data analyzed that the respondents' residential preferences shifted over time and that they played a significant role in selecting a place of residence. Along with the mechanisms of displacement as external influences, a diversity of combinations of motivations for spatial migration movements emerges.

The voluntary nature of the relocations is difficult to assess. All the respondents left their apartments in Prenzlauer Berg voluntarily, whereby external factors were involved in some cases, and even thinking about moving away from the area sometimes resulted from external factors such as rent increases, noise pollution, or structural changes in the neighborhood. These mechanisms of displacement appear negative if they do not correspond with residential preferences, so the two aspects are difficult to differentiate. Therefore, I argue for an integrative perspective.

Residential preferences also contribute to the selection of a residential location inasmuch as people try to fulfill personal needs and requirements, i.e., lifestyle, household size, job. One can speak of preferences only if there actually was a choice when moving (Bodzentra et al. 1981, p. 131). Although the choice always takes place within a framework of limited possibilities, which requires the "choosers" to adapt their preferences, the opportunity arises at this point to speak of residential preferences and displacement simultaneously.

The conclusion of this part of the analysis is: the motivations for relocating stem from the interaction of changed residential preferences and mechanisms of displacement. The presence of the latter brings about a reorientation and reflection of personal housing needs, which result in a new residential situation when the pros and cons have been weighed. Individuals confronted with voluntary or involuntary relocation reinterpret their preferences within the scope of their means and can meet their needs even if they move involuntarily, whereby the presence of displacement must not be underestimated since it may function as a key trigger of deliberations to relocate.

This results in the second explanatory level of the subsequent typology, which tries to take the interaction mentioned in the context of the migration analysis into account.

4.5 Subjective Perception of Moving Away from the Area (Partial Aspect III of the Typology)

Even during the fieldwork, it became apparent that the relocations have different meanings for the various respondents. These meanings must be included and systematized in the displacement analysis.

Both new and old aspects impacting the assessment of the residential situation contribute to differentiated subjective perceptions of the resulting housing situation following a relocation.

Since some of the respondents did not give a general answer about how they assess their current residential situation compared to the one in Prenzlauer Berg, various factors contributing to an overall assessment will be discussed here. All the respondents were asked about their satisfaction with their current residential situation and how they compared it to their time living in Prenzlauer Berg. I was given very different answers.

> Yes, I feel better, I have more space, I don't have to share a room with my brother any more (laughs), even that is pretty cool, I can style my apartment the way I want (Rafael, paragraph 60).

> [O]ut here, where I have to put *loads* of effort into my social life, and I really have to invite people over now and again and whatever, then I have to cook for them or somehow lure them over here, because nobody (laughs) comes to Schöneweide voluntarily. At least not my friends who all live in the city center and that's already tough. But, well, that's the thing, to answer your question, as it were. Yes I do yearn for the life in there, well it's pleasant simply to have less or more of a social life, without having to muster so much activity or initiative (Rafael, paragraph 54).

> [W]ell, it's, it's two sides of the same coin. I always have to weigh the pros and cons, I think that if I stay living here for a while, then it could happen to me too that the social emptiness out here gets so stressful that I'd say 'okay, forget about the environment and nature, I want to go back in, I need that life', could be, I don't know (Rafael, paragraphs 157-158).

These passages from the interview with Rafael point to the hybrid nature of the respondents' assessments of their changed residential situations. Whereas some aspects are often limiting, moving out of Prenzlauer Berg often also entails an improvement in terms of living conditions.

> [F]or me it was relatively clear, okay, now we have the apartment down there anyway and now the question is simply, what do we do with the apartment as long as the rehab work has *not* started? And for me that was an optimal opportunity to say: hey cool, that's much closer to the university, or the university I'll go to in the future, well, then I'll move in there now and I'll keep the apartment so that *you* have a place to go too, as soon as the rehab work starts in Kastanienallee (Rafael, paragraph 55).

Positive and negative aspects may converge, or a balance of underlying conditions and perceptions may develop.

> [W]ell, it isn't, I couldn't say better or so, um, but now I feel, back then, I felt comfortable, comfortable, now I feel comfortable, well, from that point of view, I guess my priorities have shifted, you could describe it like that (Martin, paragraph 4).

> Yes. Um, yes, whereby, that has two sides, too, on the one hand, I would have liked to stay, out of tenacity, because of the good transportation connections you have here, because of the connection to the church congregation, um, because of the changes in the neighborhood. In the end I had to say, this isn't my neighborhood any more. And the people who live here, they have other ideas than I used to have, these commonalities with many other young people here in the neighborhood that we had when we were students, they don't exist any more (Jürgen, paragraph 175)

> What I noticed first there [Pankow], it made a good impression, people actually still live here. In the end, in all of Kastanienallee, not in my building, it seemed to me that fewer and fewer people are living here. There's a lot going on here, a lot of people on the streets, but hardly anybody still really lives here. Um, people do live in this neighborhood, and that's why the neighborhood is lively. That's positive (Jürgen, paragraph 186).

On the one hand, respondents were dissatisfied with losing the surroundings they were accustomed to and the advantages of living in an area they felt connected to for a long time. But at the same time, they spoke about their residential needs being fulfilled. Following dissonance theory, one can conclude that they looked for, and possibly also found, new housing within their means and were nonetheless displaced. It should be added that over time, they seem to have coped with moving away, since a majority of the respondents feels comfortable with the place where they currently live and their housing needs have mostly been met.

Some gave an overall evaluation; since individual aspects are difficult to distinguish, the respondents' subjective perception of relocating is divided into three intertwined categories, namely *status quo, gains*, and *losses* which the course of a residential biography may have entailed.

The assessment concerning residential preferences that have been met and the subjective evaluation of the residential situation resulting from the relocation also influence each other. Settling for the new residential situation contributes to its positive subjective perception, whereas residential preferences that were not fulfilled have a negative impact on the assessment of the current residential situation. For this reason, it can be concluded that residential preferences and displacement are mutual and compatible explanatory models for analyzing a relocation and that the subjective assessment is a major factor influencing them.

5 Three-Level Typology Explaining Migration

A number of hypotheses emerged from the evaluation and the analytical deliberations above, which I combine in a typology that describes migration movements from the upgraded area Prenzlauer Berg. A typology is a "pooling of those objects to types which are more similar to one another with respect to certain characteristics than they are to others" (Sodeur 1974, p. 9, as quoted in Kelle and Kluge 2010, p. 78). I decided on a three-dimensional typology in order to include both the temporal-spatial and the individual and subjective dimensions of migration movements in the results. In each 'type' characteristics are similar to one another, which in turn differ from the characteristics of the other types (see Kelle and Kluge 2010, p. 76). The categories of the typology explaining migration are summarized in three levels in Figure 2.



Figure 2: Three-level typology explaining migration (source: author)

The temporal-spatial relocation behavior can be described using two spatial categories and one temporal one. Former residents of the upgraded area may have either moved to nearby areas or fled to distant ones. They may display nomadic behavior with multiple relocations within a short time. The reasons given for moving out of the upgraded area include both changed residential preferences and sociospatial mechanisms of displacement.

In retrospect, moving out of the upgraded area is assessed in part positively, negatively, or unchanged. The subjective perception is thus a result of the overall weighting of these three levels of evaluation, whereby it is yet to be re-

searched how an overall assessment can be determined as impartially as possible.

As already described in depth, every level contributes to describing and explaining relocations away from the area due to upgrading of a centrally located area. The three-level typology explaining migration is well suited for the analysis of other types of upgrading processes because of its integrative nature. The individual levels can be linked with one another, and thus various profiles of former residents emerge, whereby external and subjective explanatory factors are included.

6 Final Deliberations and Answering the Research Question

Displacement research faces the challenge not only of applying its theoretical assumptions onto empirical reality, but also contesting the discourses that downplay the negative consequences of upgrading processes in central locations. This explorative contribution seeks to create an alternative to displacement analysis by using qualitative methods; its hypotheses will have to be tested in terms of their statistical relevance in the future.

Prenzlauer Berg also shows signs of upgrading. These include not only the visible changes *in the neighborhood itself*, but also the changed courses of its previous residents' residential biographies. They were the object of closer study and efforts at systematization in this chapter.

The conclusions drawn from interviews with former residents of Prenzlauer Berg can be considered an initial basis for qualitative research on displacement. The analysis of residential biographies proved to be very instructive since it revealed important descriptive and explicative information about the residential biographies of the former residents of Prenzlauer Berg due to their relocation from the area. The insights gained can thus also be used for future analyses examining other areas impacted by gentrification and the sociospatial consequences.

The residential biographies permitted me to document the migration movements of former residents of Prenzlauer Berg and to transfer them into a typological model. This is innovative as it enables analysis of the temporal-spatial course of the relocations. Compared with government statistics, the advantage is that both movements within an administrative district and further movements after crossing district boundaries for the first time can also be taken into account. The evaluation of residential biographies complements the insights that can be gained from the data from the district authorities, which permit quantitative analysis.

The advantage of analyzing residential biographies lies in generating knowledge about the motivations for relocating and the subjective perceptions of the interviewees who moved. In this respect, personal reasons and evaluations as well as structural underlying conditions can also be taken into account as factors influencing the course of residential locations. The reasons for this can be interpreted in sum as the interaction of mechanisms of displacement and subjective residential preferences, whereby the subjective assessment of the residential biography must be taken into account in order to reflect the motivations.

This displacement analysis also makes a contribution to the Berlin gentrification debate at the micro level. I ascertained the existence of mechanisms of displacement, which are considered to be key factors for gentrification. Hence, this study also takes a stand for ascertaining gentrification in Berlin's Prenzlauer Berg.

The factor of voluntariness must be taken up again here as a separate issue. Voluntariness does not mean that displacement can be ruled out, just as displacement should not be assumed for the people purportedly affected without hearing their views. This analysis has shown that, in order to explain relocation behavior as a consequence of a relocation out of an upgraded area, one must go beyond identifying relocations as voluntary.

7 Conclusion

Even in light of this study, sociospatial displacement can still be considered a phenomenon that is difficult to measure. It became clear that the multi-layered and multi-causal nature of the factors that trigger a relocation from a centrally located upgraded area speak for an open, impartial, and thus for a qualitative analysis.

The gentrification process in Prenzlauer Berg is currently in the late phase of its overall course (see Döring and Ulbricht 2017 in this volume); nonetheless, it has not been possible to date to achieve informative findings concerning the former residents' relocations. The present analysis comes closer to this goal in the respect that initial deliberations were developed systematically, on the basis of empirical data, and integrating existing patterns of interpretation. The next step is to test the typology developed here at a larger scale and to complement it with the insights gained then, or to make its characteristics more precise. It would be just as reasonable to combine the qualitative insights with the findings from quantitative analyses of the mobility of former residents of Prenzlauer Berg.

There is no reason to downplay the negative consequences of upgrading centrally located areas or to tolerate them in favor of other effects. On the contrary, the insights gained here point to gentrification—in Prenzlauer Berg—as an example of the fact that scientific and political attention should not be given only to the area itself, but also to the sociospatial consequences beyond its borders.

Prenzlauer Berg was Berlin's vanguard district in terms of inner-city upgrading processes. For this reason, insights regarding its former residents are valuable for understanding similar processes taking place elsewhere. There are many examples in Berlin and worldwide.

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GentriMap: A Model for Measuring Gentrification and Displacement

Andrej Holm and Guido Schulz

Gentrification has become a key concept in recent years for describing current urban development trends (not only in Berlin). The background is a changed geography of gentrification that is no longer limited to individual neighborhoods, but encompasses broad central areas of many cities. Urban social movements, in particular, but also some municipal governments, have put the topic of urban gentrification processes on the political agenda in recent years and are seeking suitable strategies to counter the displacement they entail. Thus, the demand for detailed, up-to-date data on gentrification is growing to legitimize their demands and to provide reasons for interventions that are as carefully targeted as possible. Despite the urgency of the topic in terms of social policy, urban research has only a few empirical studies to offer so far that attempt to measure gentrification systematically or that document the extent and the form of displacement due to gentrification. An instrument for measuring displacement that is universal and transparent has not been developed yet, either.

In this contribution, we first explain why it is necessary to perform an analysis of gentrification processes that is statistically transparent and as generally valid as possible and present a measurement tool that meets these criteria (1). Then we present existing studies on city-wide and data-based gentrification analysis in order to identify the various methodological challenges of such analytical tools (2). Building on that, we describe the GentriMap project, a model for measuring gentrification processes, first in general, then using Berlin as an example (3). In the conclusion, we summarize the potentials and limits of the model we developed (4).

1 Why Should Gentrification be Measured?

Measuring social phenomena does not have a good reputation, especially in critical research, and is under constant suspicion of positivistically ignoring the structural contexts of the object of study (Adorno 1957; Eckardt 2014, p. 84ff.).

I. Helbrecht, *Gentrification and Resistance*,
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Of course, the demand is for research that comprehends complexity and explains root causes is valid, and so empirical evidence, statistical data, and transparent methods are necessary not only for the research processes itself, but also for conveying information to society.

Numbers are not everything, but without numbers, all comes to nothing—this is true of gentrification research and the societal debates about urban gentrification processes too. The challenges for developing a methodologically sound measurement model arise from the *spatial diversification* and *global proliferation* of gentrification dynamics as well as the topic's increasing *(urban) policy relevance*.

2 Spatial Diversification and Mutation of Gentrification

As examples in New York and London show, gentrification has for a long time been identified not only in individual neighborhoods; instead, gentrification has developed from being an exceptional situation to becoming the new urban mainstream (Wyly and Hammel 1999). Comparable gentrification cascades have been described as mainstream in Berlin's urban development too (Holm 2013; Döring and Ulbricht 2017 in this volume). Gentrification has also been ascertained in recent years—above and beyond this proliferation of gentrification within cities—in a number of studies of cities outside the major metropolises, such as Bristol (Bridge 2003), Portland, Maine (Lees 2006), Newcastle (Cameron 2003), and Leeds (Dutton 2003, 2005), and in approaches to examining rural gentrification (Phillips 2005; Darling 2005; Ghose 2007; Hjort 2009). A third spatial modification of gentrification refers to the architectural contexts of gentrification processes. For example, authors draw on the concept of gentrification in their studies on the redevelopment of former industrial and harbor facilities (Davidson and Lees 2005; Visser and Kotze 2008; Rérat et al. 2009). Tim Butler and Loretta Lees point to the displacement dimension of "new-build gentrification" when circumstances relating to the neighborhood and the entire city are included in the gentrification analysis of new construction projects (Butler and Lees 2006, p. 469). In addition, examples from Newcastle (Cameron 2003) and London show that the new luxury residential complexes impact property values in their surroundings and trigger gentrification processes there. Loretta Lees and Mark Davidson use the metaphor "tentacles of gentrification" to describe these effects (Davidson and Lees 2005, p. 1186).

This spatial proliferation and diversification of gentrification poses conceptual and methodological challenges for research. In particular, the newly discovered diversity of spatial contexts and variants can no longer be analyzed appro-

priately with the classical models of the progression of gentrification (Clay 1979; Dangschat 1988) and with the established assumptions about the socio-ostructural composition of the gentrifiers (Häußermann and Siebel 1987; Ley 1996) and their specific lifestyles (Beauregard 1986; Blasius 1993; Zukin 1990).

Loretta Lees and Mark Davidson proposed a definition of gentrification at a high level of abstraction; it involves the coincidence of "(1) the reinvestment of capital; (2) the social upgrading of locale by incoming high-income groups; (3) landscape change; and (4) direct or indirect displacement of low-income groups" (Davidson and Lees 2005, p. 1187). To date, empirical testing of the indicators has been conducted mostly in case studies on individual neighborhoods. Therefore, gentrification research is still confronted with the dilemma that gentrification processes are ascertained only in places where they were hypothesized at the beginning of the research process. In light of the breakneck speed at which previously unknown variants of gentrification are being newly discovered, however, the question arises as to which variations of gentrification have been overlooked so far. City-wide processes cannot be analyzed appropriately with the methodological instrument of sociospatial analysis. A small-scale, but city-wide statistical measurement model of abstractly formulated indicators could close this gap and serve as an instrument to comprehensively identify gentrification dynamics.

3 Global Proliferation of Gentrification

Rowland Atkinson and Gary Bridge described gentrification more than ten years ago as "new urban colonialism" (Atkinson and Bridge 2005) and pointed to a dual globalization effect. For one thing, gentrification processes are no longer limited to western European and North American metropolises, but have long reached a global scale. For another, investment firms operating internationally and project developers with a global presence are increasingly being identified as key actors in gentrification (Hackworth and Smith 2001, p. 468).

The international gentrification debate has been enhanced in recent years by numerous examples beyond the previous research landscapes. They include studies on gentrification processes in eastern European cities (Badyna and Golubchikov 2005; Feldmann 2000; Kovács 1998; Ruoppila and Kärik 2003; Sykora 2005) as well as examples from Japan (Fujitsuka 2005; Namba 2000), Turkey (Ergun 2004; İslam 2010; Uzun 2003), and Brazil (Rubino 2005). In the recently published edited volume *Global Gentrifications* (Lees et al. 2015), more than 20 contributions and case studies provide insights into the manifold and very different gentrification dynamics in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In

this context, Eric Clark rightly asks the question: how can we even speak of gentrification in light of so many different contexts without falling into the trap of a universalist generalization or a particularist phenomenology (Clark 2015, p. 453f.).

Opposing assessments of the reach of the established concepts exist in the urban research community, arising not least from these conceptual uncertainties. Whereas Neil Smith and Tom Slater use their hypotheses of a "global urban strategy" (Smith 2002) and "planetary rent gaps" (Slater 2015) in their argument that gentrification is a globally dominant process of urban development, a number of authors deny that the gentrification concept has any explanatory value at all for developments in cities of the global South (Ghertner 2011, 2015; Lemanski 2014). Gentrification research thus finds itself confronted by the typical challenge of "comparative urbanism" (Conell 2007; Robinson 2003, 2013)—namely of "provincializing" Western theories, guiding the focus toward a large number of "ordinary cities" (Robinson 2006), and contributing to a revision of existing concepts by observing diverging contexts (Robinson 2011).

A prerequisite for such an inventory of gentrification theory is, however, a minimum consensus about the phenomena to be analyzed in the sense of a concept that can be grasped empirically and generalized (Whithead 1987, p. 15ff.). A reproducible measurement tool for identifying possible gentrification dynamics is the precondition for analyzing various contexts, causes, progressions, and consequences.

4 The (Urban) Policy Relevance of Gentrification

The concept of gentrification is controversial because it takes the social costs of urban change into account. People's perspectives of gentrification depend directly on their social status and their own position in the gentrification processes: the advantages, disadvantages, and limitations that the gentrification of a neighborhood involves are different for real-estate market actors, members of the political elite, the municipal authority, residents who can realize their residential preferences, people who are displaced from the areas because of increasing housing costs, tenants who have to limit their expenses in other areas of life because of the high rents, and the owners of the small neighborhood businesses who have to close down because of increased rents and customers staying away. Accordingly, their assessments of gentrification processes differ as well.

In this context, Neil Smith explains the potential of the term to provoke: "Precisely because the language of gentrification tells the truth about the class

shift involved in 'regeneration' of the city, it has become a dirty word to developers, politicians, and financiers" (Smith 2002, p. 445).

In recent years, the concept of gentrification has developed from an academic one to the object of discursive strategies and has been made a taboo in public debates; its existence has been cast in doubt through terms such as 'perceived gentrification'; it has been discredited as an ideological battle cry, invoked as an accusation against unjust urban development, and romanticized and downplayed as the revitalization of downtown areas. Especially in debates around local policy in which different interest groups often clash directly, nothing less than a fetish has developed around providing evidence for or rejecting the existence of gentrification in particular cases. Its actual social impacts are sidelined, as are its economic and political causes. An attitude seems to have prevailed in many places that considers "a bit of gentrification" a good thing and "actual gentrification" a problem. The question of when a process of urban change becomes gentrification is of concern not only to neighborhood initiatives and redevelopment agencies, but also to municipal administrations and local journalists.

Public positioning on the topic is generally characterized by interest-driven notions about what is actually to be considered gentrification. It is conspicuous that the debates, which are intense in many places, often depart widely from the academic concepts and attach great importance especially to superficial observations (fashion, lifestyles, supply patterns).

However, the vagueness of the concept of gentrification which many perceive in the public debates also goes back to research itself. First, for many years, the enthusiastically presented research focused on partly competing explanatory approaches, giving rise to the impression that no coherent understanding of the phenomenon existed (Slater 2006, p. 746ff.). Second, even after more than 50 years of gentrification research, no generally accepted measurement tool had been developed to formulate an empirically based finding of gentrification (Atkinson 2000, p. 174f.). In contrast to, for example, concepts such as relative poverty or segregation, there is neither a measure nor a set of measurement tools for analyzing gentrification processes in various contexts. The third reason for the public confusion about the concept of gentrification is that for years, research focused on individual neighborhoods in which the finding of gentrification was often taken as given and in which specific preconditions, effects, and contexts of gentrification were studied. Here too, a city-wide measurement model that is open to scrutiny could fill a gap, provide factual arguments for societal discussions, and make it possible to grasp interactions between spatial dynamics in particular areas and overarching structural effects.

Let us note for now that the spatial expansion of gentrification, increasing globalization of urban gentrification, and the intensified public discussions pose new challenges for gentrification research. One task of research is to provide

transparent data concerning urban gentrification processes not only for a deeper and comparative analysis, but also for a meaningful societal discussion. We propose GentriMap, the tool we developed using the example of Berlin, for identifying gentrification on the basis of a city-wide statistical analysis at a small scale neighborhood level.

5 Challenges in Measuring Gentrification

The fact that no consensus has been reached about a measurement tool after more than 50 years of gentrification research is likely due primarily to the lack of agreement on a definition of gentrification.[1] Regardless of the precise definition, the city-wide measurement of gentrification poses a large number of requirements regarding the amount and quality of the data and also requires their operationalization in as precise and informative a way as possible.[2]

5.1 Data Requirements

In general, consistent longitudinal data are essential for the before-and-after comparison in order to model change in individual areas. This presents a problem especially when trying to measure displacement using individual data and to determine the consequences for the people affected (Lees et al. 2010, p. 319). In contrast, informative estimates that are gained from statistical inference and are specific to spaces or subgroups require comprehensive and stratified sampling. If a suitable sample is not available, which is the case for most relevant partial household surveys, the results are not meaningful because the standard error is too great (small area estimation problem).

Demographic or social indicators are usually available as aggregate data in the form of city-wide total population surveys, so the problem of sampling is not an issue. However, proving the existence of small-scale gentrification processes requires aggregate data in the finest resolution possible. In the case of insufficient spatial resolution, local processes of decay, gentrification, and polarization within the aggregate area may cancel each other out and thus remain undetected

1 The different definitions that have been used to identify gentrification areas in empirical studies usually vary according to the methodologies selected. For example, the definition of gentrification in qualitative studies generally includes the change in social character and local culture, whereas in quantitative studies, the change in the neighborhood's sociodemographic structure is considered to be the key criterion for gentrification processes (Barton 2016, p. 93f.).

2 Some ideas and passages in this and the following sections were taken from my unpublished master's thesis (Schulz 2015); they are not explicitly designated as such.

(Glatter 2007, p. 45ff.). High-resolution aggregate data—for example at the neighborhood level—are gathered only rarely across the entire city, or access to them is limited because of data protection. This is true especially for important proxy variables such as poverty rate, household income, educational level, housing cost rate, living space per capita, and rental and housing prices.

Finally, the data should be complete, to every extent possible, or researchers should have explicit knowledge of the type and extent of its incompleteness and the distortion this causes. Depending on the survey method and the subject matter, the data gathered by public agencies may deviate from reality to differing degrees, which makes it difficult to make precise statements about the extent of displacement due to gentrification. Specifically renters in precarious circumstances are often not registered with the authorities and are therefore also not included in official statistics when they are forced to relocate. Even in household surveys, questions are posed only to the head of household, whereby renters who have already been displaced may disappear even from the most detailed surveys if they are staying with friends or relatives (Wyly et al. 2010, p. 2603).

5.2 Methodological Challenges

Besides these data requirements, the key methodological challenge in measuring gentrification lies in capturing the link between gentrification and displacement. The task is to find a suitable measurement tool to effectively identify displacement effects as such in accordance with the form of displacement. Measuring direct displacement, which requires differentiating between involuntary relocations due to gentrification and other relocations, is considered particularly complex (see Atkinson 2004, p. 112ff.). Operationalizing the data accordingly is difficult, even if people who have relocated are surveyed employing a targeted concept, and results from such surveys can be made objective only to a certain extent. For example, should a household that relocated be considered displaced if the person surveyed states that he/she received notice from the landlord that the rent was to be increased to an unaffordable amount, but indicates as the reason for relocating that he/she had desired for years to live in a leafy neighborhood? Relocation decisions are rarely monocausal, and any "differentiation in personal or professional reasons and reasons related to a person's apartment or residential surroundings [...] is always fraught with imprecisions" (Dittrich-Wesbuer and Brzenczek 2010, p. 39). In addition, assigning a relocation to the binary category "voluntary" or "involuntary" is made more difficult by the fact that the affected people tend to idealize their involuntary relocation in order to reduce cognitive dissonance (Blasius 1993, p. 211ff.). Therefore, it is problematic to categorize relocations unequivocally as "voluntary" and "involuntary" as

the basis of measuring displacement caused by gentrification—regardless of the operationalization of the concept of gentrification selected (Betancourt 2017 in this volume). Moreover, when analyzing migration data, the problem arises that various displacement effects can "neutralize" each other in relocation statistics (Freeman et al. 2015, p. 16). Whereas direct displacement increases the rate of relocation out of an area, exclusionary displacement reduces it—in sum, the effects cancel each other out.

6 The State of Research

Against the background of these stringent requirements with regard to data and methods, it is hardly surprising that only a very small fraction of the numerous academic publications on the topic are quantitative studies measuring gentrification.

Following an initial boom from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s (e.g., Grier and Grier 1980; LeGates and Hartman 1981, 1986; Marcuse 1985; Sumka 1979), quantitative gentrification research regained momentum especially in English-speaking countries only with a new wave of gentrification in the early 2000s (e.g., Atkinson 2000; Atkinson et al. 2011; Freeman and Braconi 2004; Freeman 2005; Freeman et al. 2015; Hedin et al. 2012; McKinnish et al. 2008; Newman and Wyly 2006; Wyly et al. 2010). The geographical focus of the studies was often New York City or Greater London. Although some of these more recent studies have been sharply criticized because of their diffuse conceptual framework and their partly inadequate analysis of the theory and concepts of gentrification research (see Slater 2009), the authors' innovative attempts to develop measurement tools to capture gentrification and displacement deserve appropriate acknowledgment. In the following, we will briefly recapitulate the methodologies applied in the studies mentioned.

The majority of the studies of this most recent wave of publications use similarly structured data, i.e., a combination of sampled individual data from longitudinal household surveys and aggregate data from public agencies. The studies are fundamentally also similar in the methods applied for data analysis. The first step generally involves identification of gentrification areas at the level of districts or neighborhoods. Gentrification is usually operationalized using just a single indicator for social gentrification.[3] This means that districts or neigh-

3 Freeman and Branconi (2004) are an (unfortunate) exception. They identified gentrification areas in New York City without recourse to an indicator variable, but rather simply on the basis of their subjective "familiarity with recent trends in neighborhood change" (Freeman and Braconi 2004, p. 43).

borhoods are classified as gentrification areas precisely if they have "improved" sufficiently in terms of certain sociostructural statistics during the period of observation.[4] Among the studies mentioned above, only Freeman (2005, p. 471 f.) included architectural and real-estate data in the criteria for identifying gentrification areas, besides sociostructural statistics.

In a second step, the residents' relocation behavior away from gentrification areas to non-gentrification areas is usually analyzed using the most varied instruments in order to arrive at an inferential estimate of the extent of displacement due to gentrification. Freeman and Braconi (2004), Freeman (2005), and Freeman et al. (2015) modeled a binary dependent variable using logistic regression to indicate whether or not relocation occured; Atkinson (2000) and Atkinson et al. (2011) estimated displacement using the net migration of various social groups; and Newman and Wyly (2006) and Wyly et al. (2010) operationalized displacement using the reasons for relocation given by the residents who relocated.[5]

7 Critique

Recent decades have seen substantial progress in the studies in terms of their data and methodologies. Nonetheless, it is necessary to critically examine their analytical and methodological approaches as well as the data used. The following key criticisms must be made of the most recent studies:

Even though almost all of the definitions of gentrification consider the appreciation in value of real estate to be central to the process, this dimension is usually not taken into account in the empirical identification of gentrification areas (e.g., Atkinson 2000; Atkinson et al. 2011; McKinnish et al. 2008).

The aspect of appreciation in value of real estate is also mostly disregarded in the measurement of displacement through analysis of migration data. That is, researchers do not explicitly attempt to capture the link between value increases and displacement which characterizes gentrification processes (e.g., Freeman et al. 2015; Newman and Wyly 2006).

The uncritical use of the available data and the careless or flawed application of inferential statistical methods are striking and problematic. Almost all studies use data from partial surveys and statistical inference to make statements that

4 Atkinson (2000) and Freeman et al. (2015) referred to the change in employment structure for this purpose, Hedin et al. (2012) used the change in household income, whereas Atkinson et al. (2011) combined a number of sociostructural indicators to construct their index.

5 Individual data from total population surveys were available only to Atkinson et al. (2011), so their estimates did not require any inferential steps.

are space-specific (i.e., specific to individual neighborhoods or previously identified gentrification areas) or subgroup-specific (i.e., single parents, Afro-Germans, etc.), but ignore potential small area estimation problems. Freeman et al. (2015), for example, use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which are based on a sample of approximately 5,500 households representative of the UK (ISER 2016). Whether this sample is suitable, however, for inferential statements about the relocation decisions of low-income households in gentrification areas in London (see Freeman et al. 2015, p. 11) is, at the very least, questionable.

None of the studies mentioned above that used regression analyses specified or tested the model assumptions. Since all regression analyses were based on spatial data and the models usually had only a low explanatory value, one must assume that spatial autocorrelation prevailed in the residuals, thus violating the model assumptions. This may have resulted in distorted and inefficient estimates of parameters.

What is more serious, however, is that the regression models' mostly poor goodness of fit (e.g., Newman and Wyly 2006; Wyly et al. 2010) was not sufficiently problematized in the studies or that no information at all was given about the explanatory value of the models (e.g., Freeman et al. 2015). This must be considered careless or flawed, measured against the usual academic standards for statistics.

8 The GentriMap Model

The development of a measurement tool for identifying gentrification processes that is as generalizable as possible faces conceptual, methodological, and technical challenges. A generally accepted conceptual framework—which can be transferred to very different urban contexts—must be established, in particular to ensure transparency. The methodological challenges consist mainly in operationalizing the theoretical assumptions in a way that is coherent, informative, transparent, and as reproducible as possible. The technical challenges refer to the data requirements described in the previous section; the data may exist in various georeferential systems and may have to be transformed into a common georeferential system for analysis. The following section will explain how we handled these challenges in the GentriMap model.

8.1 Conceptual Considerations regarding GentriMap

We were first faced with the task of constructing a model for statistical identification of areas with typical characteristics of a gentrification process, using the

available fundamental definitions as a starting point. The first definition of gentrification, which was formulated by Ruth Glass and is taken up frequently to this day, already provides important points of reference for the model. In her study on the London borough of Islington, she wrote, "Larger Victorian houses, downgraded in earlier periods—which were used as lodging houses or were otherwise in multiple occupation—have been upgraded once again. [...] Once this process of 'gentrification' starts in a district, it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working class occupiers are displaced, and the whole social character of the district is changed." (Glass 1964, p. XVIII)

The key concepts in her definition are *upgrading* (of the buildings), *displacement* (of the working-class population), and *change of the whole social character* (of the neighborhood). The research debates about the phenomenon of gentrification conducted since then have made these three characteristics of gentrification more specific.

For example, a notion of a dual upgrading process, which includes *architectural-physical upgrading* as well as an *increase in the value of the real estate* (Häußermann 1990), has become established. Concerning displacement, the focus on the working class, which was strongly dependent on the time and the context, has been replaced by more general classifications. Some studies speak of *low-income households* or, in even more general terms, of *low-status groups* (Friedrichs 1996, 2000). Regarding the less-defined concept of social character, ideas about the changed *composition of the social structure* (from a working-class quarter to a middle-class neighborhood) have become established as well as assumptions about changed *commercial supply patterns*, *qualities of the public space*, and *neighborhood images* (Glatter 2007).

The definition formulated by Mark Davidson and Loretta Lees uses very similar indicators, namely the four characteristics "(1) the reinvestment of capital; (2) the social upgrading of locale by incoming high-income groups; (3) landscape change; and (4) direct or indirect displacement of low-income groups" (Davidson and Lees 2005, p. 1187). The triad of aspects concerning real estate, social changes, and a change in the neighborhood is to be found here as well.

According to these definitions, gentrification would require the coincidence of these characteristics. Since it is especially difficult to describe changes of the functional and commercial activities, the design of the open spaces, and the images of neighborhoods with generalizable indicators, analyses that employ quantitative instruments are hardly reproducible (Barton 2016, p. 95). For this reason, we excluded the symbolic, functional, and lifestyle-related aspects from the concept of a statistical measurement tool and developed a model for GentriMap that is as simple, transparent, and two-dimensional as possible.

We conflated the dimensions mentioned in earlier definitions, namely architectural upgrading, increases in the value of the real estate, and capital investments, in the overarching indicator *upgrading of real estate*. We assume on the basis of the available gentrification studies that the defining features of the supply side used by Ruth Glass, Loretta Lees, and Mark Davidson are ultimately complementary manifestations of real-estate value increases that are triggered by the (re)investment of capital and become visible through architectural measures. Examples of rental gentrification (Van Criekingen 2009; Holm 2013), however, show that massive rent increases, and above all rent increases triggering displacement, can be realized even without architectural upgrading and without investments in the building stock. By focusing on the measurable effects of the real-estate value increases, we constructed a *real-estate index* for the supply-side aspects of gentrification that is independent of variations and context conditions and is thus universal.[6]

We conflated the aspects of displacement and sociostructural upgrading in an overarching indicator for the demand-side aspects of the definitions of gentrification. Using the various forms of displacement as a starting point (Marcuse 1985), we assume that the number and the percentage of poorer households decline over the course of a gentrification process. Since a reduction of low-status groups has a direct effect on the sociostructural composition of the population of the area, we assume that gentrification can be described as a process of displacement-induced social upgrading of an area.[7] Accordingly, we focus the *social index* in our measurement model on the change in the number of poorer households.

In the GentriMap model, we define gentrification as the conjunction of social upgrading and real-estate value increases (see Table 1). The simultaneous occurrence of real-estate value increases, displacement of poorer households, and a resulting upgrading of the social composition of the population of the area corresponds to the empirical core understanding of gentrification in all the studies we are aware of.

6 The development of a universal indicator does not mean that the same data must be used in all the contexts to be examined. Rather, the task is to identify suitable data for operationalizing the measurement model in the various (national and local) contexts.

7 The measurement model proposed here can generate findings at the neighborhood level. Variations of different forms of displacement were not taken into account, nor were the subjective dispositions at the individual level.

Ruth Glass (1964)	**Loretta Lees & Mark Davidson (2005)**	**GentriMap**
Architectural upgrading	(Re)investment of capital	Real-estate index for measuring real-estate value increases
Increase in the value of real estate		
Displacement of low-income households/low-status groups	Direct or indirect displacement of poorer households	Social index for measuring displacement-induced social upgrading
Shifting of the sociostructural composition toward higher-status groups	Social upgrading of locale by incoming high-income groups	
Change in local structure on the supply side, qualities of public space, and neighborhood image	Transformation of the landscape	*Not operationalized*

Table 1: Defining features of gentrification

From a conceptual perspective, the model we propose links up with the work of Peter Marcuse, who calls displacement the essence of gentrification (Marcuse 1992, p. 80). The reduction of poorer or lower-status households that we measured with the *social index* can be caused both by direct physical or economic forms of displacement (Marcuse 1985, p. 205) or by indirect, excluding forms (Marcuse 1985, p. 207).

The calculations of the indices in the two dimensions were conducted as relational analysis in order to appropriately take the general societal changes of the social structure and the developments in real estate into account. In the model, gentrification not only presupposes actual upgrading in terms of the housing market and in social terms, but also above-average upgrading in both dimensions compared with the development in the city as a whole.

9 Operationalization

The GentriMap model is operationalized in a five-step model. It focuses on the development of the *real-estate index* and the *social index*, which in combination measure the intensity of gentrification processes (*gentrification index*). In the following, the individual steps of this operationalization are explained in general and chronologically.

Selection of indicator variables: First, reasonable indicator variables for the locally specific context of the study are selected; they are later used to construct the real-estate index and the social index. The indicator variables are to effectively model the processes of real-estate value increases or social upgrading.

Calculation of the deviation from the trend: Each of the indicator variables are then examined in a shift-share analysis—i.e., in a simple analysis of structural components—in order to quantify area-specific deviations from the city-wide trend (Farhauer and Kröll 2013, p. 371ff.). A positive deviation corresponds to above-average dynamics in an area, a negative deviation to below-average dynamics in an area.[8]

Standardization: In a third step, area-specific deviations from the trend determined for each indicator variable are then standardized, weighted according to population (z transformation), to make the values comparable.

Construction of the real-estate index and the social index: Then the standardized values are conflated in the real-estate index and the social index. The index values for each area are the averages of the standardized deviations from the trends of the indicator variables.

Combination of the real-estate index and the social index to form the gentrification index: Lastly, the real-estate index and the social index generate a Cartesian coordinate system of upgrading in which each area can be clearly localized as a point on the basis of its coordinates. For example, if an area has strong positive coordinates, i.e., it has a strong positive value for the real-estate index as well as a strong positive value for the social index, then a local gentrification process of relatively high intensity must be assumed. The combination of the two indices thus serves to determine the relative intensity of gentrification processes. The intensity is shown by the gentrification index along the main diagonal of the coordinate system of gentrification. Geometrically, this corresponds to an orthogonal projection of a point onto the main diagonal. The quadrants of the

8 Schnuck (2014, p. 28ff.) provides a formal and detailed documentation of the procedure of shift-share analysis in the context of a GentriMap model. When calculating the deviation from the trend, researchers should note whether the city-wide trend is positive or negative. Finally, upgrading processes should only be designated as such if, for example, there is an absolute increase in rents or a reduction in the number of poorer households.

coordinate system or a similar division of the space into sectors can also be used to generate a typology of areas.

The construction of the gentrification index is elucidated in Figure 1. Area A, for example, has a high value for the gentrification index because of the coincidence of a high real-estate index and a high social index. In the case of area B, a below-average real-estate index and an above-average social index result in a medium value for the gentrification index.



Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the calculation of indices in the GentriMap model (source: authors)

10 Applying the GentriMap Model to Berlin

In contrast to the other measurement tools used in the Bibliography, the proposed operationalization does not require data at the level of individuals or households and is thus relatively easy to understand, reproduce, and transfer to other cities. *To implement the GentriMap model in Berlin, we therefore only needed aggregate* data that permit a consistent before-and-after comparison for all of Berlin according to the requirements formulated above, that are available at a small scale, and that fulfill scientific requirements for precision and reliability.

We obtained geographic base data and total population data (demographic data and social data) at the level of the lifeworld-oriented areas (*Lebensweltlich orientierte Räume, LOR*) (n=447) that meet these requirements from the Berlin-Brandenburg Statistics Office.[9] The Berlin authorities introduced the level of the LORs in 2007 as the "spatial basis for planning, prognosis, and observation of demographic and social developments in Berlin" (SenStadt 2013). LORs are designed to provide a spatial "representation of homogeneity of everyday life while retaining comparability of spatial planning units" and are defined, among other things, through "uniform architectural structures or formation of milieus, major roads and transport routes as well as natural barriers, but also a maximum population" (SenStadt 2013). We received real-estate data from the leading real-estate portal ImmoScout24, aggregated at the spatial level of ImmoScout24 neighborhoods, which are defined by the company (n=81). A comparison of the housing offered on ImmoScout24 every year from 2007 to 2014 (approx. 283,000 offers per year) with the sum of all in-migration from external migration and relocations within the area (approx. 490,000 instances of in-migration per year) points to the online portal having a market share of more than 60 percent of all relocations in Berlin.[10]

On the basis of the data, we selected the LORs (n=60, average population approx. 59,000) as the unit of observation. To do so, we only needed to pool the official data at the level of the prognosis areas, thanks to the hierarchical geometrical structure of the LORs; however, we had to interpolate the real-estate

9 Some of the data provided by the Berlin-Brandenburg Statistics Office is available on the Internet free of charge and can be downloaded from Berlin Open Data (daten.berlin.de/datensaetze), the Senate Department for Urban Development and Housing (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung) (www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/planen/basisdaten_stadtentwicklung/monitoring), or Geobasisdaten FisBroker (www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/geoinformation/fisbroker).

10 A plausibility check of the rental prices being asked, based on a comparison with the corresponding data of the professional services firm JLL Research, did not yield any conspicuous problems.

data to the target level of the prognosis areas using an elaborate block-based, population-weighted procedure.[11] Prognosis areas can be relatively heterogeneous in their urban or sociodemographic structures, compared with the much smaller LOR, yet this spatial level is relatively fine-grained compared with similar studies.

We selected the interval from 2007 to 2014 as the period of observation. There were several reasons for this approach. For one thing, comparable data in the LOR classification are available only from 2007 on; for another, newer social data were not available. But there was also a factual motivation for selecting this period of observation: when the global financial crisis started in 2007, Berlin's real-estate market suddenly became much more attractive to investors. This marked the beginning of a new wave of value increases in Berlin real estate that has continued to this day and which wewanted to capture with our real-estate index. We are aware of the fact that this eight-year period of observation is too long for identifying gentrification processes or short-term developments in individual areas. However, the GentriMap model can easily be operationalized for shorter periods of time—which we intend to do in the future.

When we operationalized the GentriMap model specifically for Berlin, we used four indicator variables to construct the real-estate index: the average rental prices offered (€/m^2), the average prices for individually owned apartments (€/m^2), the number of apartments offered for rent, and the number of apartments offered for sale.[12] There is a close link between the dynamics of the prices and the intensity of real-estate value increases. Whereas prices of individually owned apartments express the value of the property directly, average rental prices are considered an indirect expression of the value of a property and its expected returns—analogous to the relationship between stock prices and company value. In addition, we included the number of offers as an indicator variable since it provides an indication of the extent of real-estate value increases. By taking both intensity and extent into account, we were able to make differentiated statements about local dynamics on the housing market. Accordingly, the four indicator variables, when combined, measure the intensity of the increase in real-estate value and are suitable as an instrument to indirectly estimate the magnitude of (re-)investment in real estate in an area (see Table 1).

Just one indicator variable was used to construct the social index: the number of transfer payment recipients in accordance with Volumes II, III, and XII of

11 The procedure of block-based, population-weighted interpolation is described accessibly and in detail in Schulz (2015, pp.30 ff.).

12 If the construction of the real-estate index is limited to just a single indicator variable, namely rental prices offered, then the GentriMap model can be operationalized for Berlin for a high-resolution planning area level using the data available at the level of postal codes (n=190).

the German Social Insurance Code. This indicator variable includes recipients of various types of welfare benefits (*Arbeitslosengeld I*, *Arbeitslosengeld II* ("*Hartz IV*"), *Sozialhilfe*, and *Grundsicherung*); we interpret it as the lowest estimate of low-income people in an area.[13] We selected the sign of the social index to be positive, and thus more easily comprehensible intuitively, in the case of social gentrification, i.e., an above-average reduction of the number of low-income people. As already indicated above, the key advantage of this type of operationalization of social gentrification lies in the fact that the indicator variable mentioned takes both aspects of social gentrification into account: apart from the rare case of "incumbent upgrading," an analysis of the development of the number of low-income people permits documentation of the displacement of poorer households *and* of the change in the composition of the social structure at the same time.[14]

Even though a detailed interpretation and discussion of the results of GentriMap for Berlin cannot be included in this text, we would like to present some initial results, at least in brief, in the following. The results of the GentriMap model for Berlin are presented in Figure 2. Unsurprisingly, the real-estate index map shows that the strongest processes of real-estate value increases took place in the city center (Mitte), Nord-Neukölln, Charlottenburg, and practically the entire district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. The map also confirms the generally accepted hypothesis that real-estate values have increased throughout the entire area within the S-Bahn ring (shown as a dotted line on the maps).

The social index paints a much more heterogeneous picture in spatial terms: strong social gentrification trends can be observed not only within the S-Bahn ring, but also outside it. The areas with conspicuously high values of the social index include Südliches Pankow, Prenzlauer Berg (Pankow), Östliches Friedrichshain, Östliches and Südliches Kreuzberg, and Köpenick. For example, the high social index value of +2.0 for Nördlicher Prenzlauer Berg reflects a substantially above-average reduction in the number of low-income people by 21.4 percent in just eight years. By way of comparison: the number of low-income

13 People simultaneously receiving benefits in accordance with Volumes II and III of the Social Insurance Code would be taken into account just once in the calculation, of course. Unfortunately, children in households dependent on benefits in accordance with Volume XII of the Social Insurance Code could not be taken into account because no data were available.

14 Of course, an additional analysis of migration data can ascertain the extent of displacement with stronger differentiation. The strength of the GentriMap model lies in the fact that it does not require migration data in order to measure gentrification and to draw conclusions about the extent of displacement due to gentrification. Moreover, following empirical implementation of the model, researchers can complement it by conducting an examination of relocation behavior in order, for example, to compare gentrification areas and other areas.

people in the city as a whole had declined by just 4.4 percent during the same time period.

Finally, the map showing the gentrification index, calculated by combining the real-estate index and the social index, permits one to identify and quantify gentrification processes. The "gentrification circle" postulated by Holm (2011, p. 214ff.) and extending from Prenzlauer Berg via Friedrichshain to Kreuzberg is clearly visible on the map, which shows high gentrification index values there. A strong gentrification process must also be assumed for Charlottenburg, which is mentioned only rarely in discussions about gentrification and displacement. With the exception of a small area around Gesundbrunnen (Mitte) and Nördliches Tempelhof, practically the entire central area displays medium to high values for the gentrification index (see Döring and Ulbricht 2017 in this volume, who arrive at similar results). The obvious discrepancy between the neighborhoods in former East and West Berlin outside the S-Bahn ring is also striking. Almost throughout the former East Berlin districts Pankow, Lichtenberg, and Treptow-Köpenick, higher gentrification index values are to be observed than in comparable neighborhoods of former West Berlin.

Finally, when interpreting the gentrification index, researchers should bear in mind that the procedure we proposed operationalizes a relational definition of gentrification. In other words, it measures gentrification processes solely in relation to the rest of the city. In the context of rising real-estate prices throughout the city and declining numbers of low-income people, even medium gentrification index values can indicate significant gentrification processes for this reason.



Figure 2: Gentrification in Berlin 2007 to 2014 (source: authors)

11 Conclusion

The GentriMap model presented here is a collaborative, reproducible, and communicable basic instrument for analyzing gentrification processes.

Collaborative nature: The GentriMap model is the result of a multi-year project worked on by various teams. A total of 22 scholars and students of various disciplines, data journalists, and web designers have been involved since 2011.[15] The status of the project presented here is the essence of many and diverse attempts to develop a set of suitable measurement tools for gentrification processes. At the same time, the GentriMap model presented here is at an interim stage because there are plans to develop it further in the future and to update it annually. Progress made on the project and some of the earlier findings have been published online (gentrima.lepus.uberspace.de). The next steps planned are an update of the website and the establishment of a web-based interface through which the data we used and program codes can be shared with all interested parties (taking account of the relevant licensing provisions). GentriMap, with its complex data acquisition and processing, is an example of the necessity of collaborative academic work. We consider GentriMap as an invitation to continue working with the figures we have compiled and revised.

Reproducibility: Interest in analyzing gentrification processes has increased in many cities in recent years, and rapid internationalization of gentrification research within urban research can be observed. GentriMap offers a basic tool that can be transferred to other cities as a starting point for more in-depth, comparative studies. Depending on the available data and the local conditions, the index calculation described in the model can also be conducted with other indicator variables. For example, in cities with higher percentages of individually owned housing, a calculation of the real-estate index would have to take the prices of houses and real estate into account more strongly than in Berlin with its high percentage of rental housing. The indicator variable to determine the social index, which is derived directly from the current social legislation provisions, could be varied in other contexts, provided the principle of measuring low-status households is retained.

Communicability: The aspiration to conduct research with impacts beyond the ivory tower is widespread especially in urban research, for many of its research areas are directly connected to the residents' everyday experiences and (urban) policy debates. Making research findings accessible to a broader public

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requires appropriated forms of communication. We are attempting even now to make the insights of gentrification research as comprehensible, understandable, and accessible as possible through the GentriMap website and various visualizations.

Basic tool: GentriMap is not a completed research project, but an analysis tool. The relational identification and quantification of gentrification dynamics we have proposed can and should serve as the foundation for further analyses. Following the preparation of a typology of the areas, it is possible to examine questions about, e.g., relocation behavor, changes in demographic composition, or the development of the structure of commercial activity in a targeted fashion. Thus, hypotheses such as those about displacement to the edge of the city, increased incidence of evictions in gentrification areas, and the concentration of specialized consumption options there can be tested empirically. Moreover, more detailed standardized surveys or qualitative studies are conceivable on the basis of the typology of areas.

The GentriMap model we developed shows that gentrification can be measured quantitatively. We consider the model to be an invitation to perform further analyses in order to broaden our understanding of the conditions, trajectories, and effects of urban development to include the root causes as well.

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