7 European Turks in between Local and Transnational Islamic Networks —The Hizmet Movement as a Translocal Actor in the Religiosity of Turks in France and Germany

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Abstract This chapter retraces the development of the *Hizmet* or Gülen movement from a small group in Turkish İzmir into a transnational network operating in several countries, one offering a wide range of services such as remedial teaching schools, media channels, and NGOs and that is highly attractive for second-generation Turks of Europe. The first part of the chapter explores the history of Turkish immigration to France and Germany and the structures of Muslim organizations existing among Turkish immigrants in these countries. It describes how associational life among the first generation of Turks focused on the mosque, on various informal services gathered around it, and on a "cultural folk Islam" tied to Turkish ethnicity. It was only later that some transnational, but also fundamentalist, Muslim organizations such as *Süleymancilar*, IGMG, or *Kaplancilar* appeared. Following on, in the second part of the chapter I outline the historical development of the *Hizmet* movement and its current structures in France and Germany. By using several interactions between *Hizmet* representatives and members of the national governments in France and Germany as examples, we show the degree of acceptance and institutionalization that the movement currently enjoys. As a general conclusion we suggest that *Hizmet* offers an alternative religiosity because of its transnational orientation, its decentralized, bottom-up structure, and its combination of secular and pious practices, allowing young Turkish Muslims to become involved in society, to be successful, and to live their faith in a way that suits them and their values.

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7.1 Introduction

This chapter is an attempt to explore the local and transnational ties to Islamic networks of the second and third generations of immigrant Turks[8] in Europe, with particular attention being given to those living in France and Germany. With the focus of the paper being on the *Hizmet* ("service," academically known as Gülen) movement, we will explain how within the space of 30 years this movement has turned into a transnational and global organization from its origins as a local group based in İzmir, Turkey. Given that the movement has transformed into a global network, it is interesting to investigate how and why many youngsters in Western Europe's Turkish Diaspora respond to the movement's new ideas regarding a modern form of piety, educational strategies, and dialogue with non-Muslims. Based on our doctoral research[9] within the formal institutions and *sohbets* ("informal circles of religious conversation") of the movement in France and Germany, this chapter will first give detailed information on the Euro-Turks' religious organizational structure—and particularly on the *Hizmet* movement and its relations to the state. The chapter then finishes with a discussion of the *Hizmet* movements as a form of alternative religiosity in the Islamic worldview of Euro-Turks.

7.2 Ethnic, Local, and Transnational Networks within the Framework of European Islam

Within the 15 million Muslims already existent (such as in the Balkans) alongside the descendants of Muslim immigrants in Europe, the Turkish population therein is estimated to be around 4.5 million people. Therefore, Turks are one of the main components of immigrant Muslims in Europe—alongside North Africans, "Black Muslims" from the Horn of Africa, and Pakistanis (who mostly reside in Britain).

The Turkish presence in France and Germany started in the 1960s in the form of "guest workers" (*Gastarbeiter*). Turkish labor immigration to France was enabled by a joint treaty between Turkey and France and continued until 1974, when France put a stop to the immigration of foreign workers to the country.

8 We use the term "Turk" as a social entity throughout this paper, regardless of people's definition of themselves as German, Kurd, etc.

9 This is qualitative research based on the socioanthropologic methods of in-depth interview and participant observation, conducted with more than 60 young girls and women. It started in spring 2010 in France and is now continuing in Germany. Our participant observation takes place in weekly *sohbets* as well as in relevant educational, cultural, and leisure settings. Our interlocutors are 15 to 30 year old high school and university students, mostly second generation Turks in France and third generation ones in Germany. Nearly half of them are veiled, and are either sympathizers with or activists in Gülen movement organizations in their local context.

From 1974 until today immigration has continued with new facilities that arose for refugees, especially after the military coups of 1971 and 1980 and in light of the Kurdish issue in the southeastern and eastern parts of Turkey. The Turkish population in France currently amounts to around 400,000 people (Danış and Üstel 2008). In Germany, the first wave of Turkish labor immigration was realized illegally in 1957 and became legal with a treaty concluded in 1961. The recruitment of such workers continued to be widespread until 1970, and slowed down considerably after the 1980s. But immigration from Turkey to Germany still continues today for different reasons. There are now 3 million Turks living in Germany, 800,000 of whom are German citizens.

After the second generation started to attend school and to work in Europe, the descendants of Turkish immigrants permanently settled, became citizens, and thus now are an integral part of Europe's demography. As the French political scientist Kepel (1997) has noted, new generations of immigrants create hybrid identities between the ideas of "settlement and exclusion" and "the myth of return."[10] As a result, they form an alternative identity that respects religious duties and prohibitions while also affirming a community-based Islamic one. For some scholars, Turks seem to be part of a closed community that maintains a relationship only to the country of origin (Tribalat 1998). Being community-based is not only a fact of life for Turks. Even if the expression "Muslims of France" refers to a multiethnic, multicultural, and multisectarian community (Subaşı 2008), there is always a differentiation therein on the basis of religious, political, and ethnic differences—something that results in what some scholars have called a "ghettoization" or "marginalization" of Islam (Karlsön 2000).

For the Muslim youth in Europe to whom "entry to the club" is refused because of their immigrant origins, and who are divided within their community because of ethnic and sectarian differences, Islam offers a space that protects him or her from an "alien" outside world— neutralizing, moreover, its differences (among others, Khosrokhavar 1997; Wieviorka 2001). It gives such youth strength to face society in such a way as to be able to cast off or reverse the stigmata of racism and discrimination (Göle 2003). At this point, two major sources intervene that supply the need of belonging to a larger community: one is of a national and local kind, meaning formal networks organized and provided by the host country. In order to minimize the risk arising out of migration some European states sponsor the Muslim organizations representing their migrants. We can

10 The myth of return stands for either the ideal of the immigrants to make money and then return to their home country, or the illusion of the host country's politicians that the immigrants will eventually go back home so it is not necessary to invest in them while here.

even observe denominational Muslim RE being taught in public schools in countries like Belgium and Germany. The other source is of a transnational kind, mostly transferred from the country of origin in the form of associative structures. Some Muslim countries send imams abroad in order to fulfill the religious needs of their nationals living overseas, or have even gone as far as to founded mosques and Quran schools on European soil.

As for Turkish migrant associational activities both in France and Germany, powerful transnational organizations—far more than local factors—have an influence on the Turkish community, serving as sources of information and political motivation (Yalçın–Heckmann 2007). The most important of these is the DİTİB, a branch of the Turkish *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* (henceforth, *Diyanet*)—the presidency of the Turkish Ministry for Religious Affairs. *Diyanet* is a national instrument of control over religion as well as an ideological tool of political power to promote Sunni Islam (Çitak 2012). *Diyanet's* transformed role as a transnational actor started with its foundation of ten consulates of religious services in the Turkish embassies of Europe in 1978. The real change in *Diyanet's* role though has taken place since the 1980s, when it first began to establish bilateral agreements with various European countries in order to send imams to them (Çitak 2012). According to Çitak, this new settlement of *Diyanet* can be explained, first, as a way to fulfill the religious needs of immigrant Turks and, second, as the Turkish state's quest to combat the political and religious currents that are considered a threat to their activities in Europe. Third, this represents the using of Islam as a practical tool to strengthen unity and national solidarity, by preserving and enforcing the ethnic-national consciousness of Turkish immigrants in Europe (Çitak 2012: 11–12). Even if host country officials perceive *Diyanet* activities as being those of a "benign" form of Islam, especially after September 11, this organization does not answer always all the needs of the second and third generations of Turks living in Europe. This is because only since very recently have the imams sent from Turkey been required to speak at least one European language and young European Turks invited to Turkey to receive education as imams. Before, even the text of the *khutba*[11] read to the audience in weekly Friday prayers was the same as the one read in mosques in Turkey, and imams spoke only Turkish with their communities (Bruce 2012).

Associational activity has always been important for the Turkish diaspora in Europe, in order to create social networks, help find work, and generate solidarity among themselves as a response to the stigmatizing forces of the host country. For the first generation, Islam was a tool with which to protect their children from

11 *Khutba* is the Muslim sermon read/pronounced during the weekly Friday prayer in the mosque.

the vices of the outside world, ones that they had never faced in their small towns and villages in the country of origin—so they welcomed and participated in branches of Turkish transnational Islamic movements in Europe. The religiosity of Euro-Turks, especially for the first generation, centered around the mosque complex. The coffeehouses, barber shops, shopping centers around the mosque enable retired people to make friends, socialize, and fulfill their daily needs. Most frequently, the cultural role of the mosque still outweighs its religious one. For the first generation, the mosque stood for a protector of their "cultural folk Islam" or Turkishness rather than of their conscious piety. In that sense, their piety can be summarized as a mixture of "popular religiosity, national customs, Islamic rules of conduct, mysticism, folk knowledge, folklore and magic with Islamic elements" (Thoma–Venske, cited in Tetik 2012: 121). This is more a local, ethnic type of Islam closed to any global or transnational interpretation of the faith, one which gained ground after the Islamist renewal in Muslim societies of the 1980s.

One of the most important religious communities, *Süleymancilar* (who claim to have been the first religious organization for immigrant Turks in Germany), appeared in the form of mosques and Quran schools in the second half of the 1970s. It holds an exclusivist point of view vis-à-vis the host society. *Süleymancilar* seems to be a traditionalist community, with its idealization of the Ottoman state and an inverted community with little interest in the local issues of the host society (Caymaz 2002). On the contrary, founded around a political Islamic perspective and an Islamic extremist party of Turkey, *Millî Görüş* is more open to the host society as well as to the other Muslim communities of Europe. Holding the name IGMG, it is now the largest Islamic organization in Germany. Castigated at first for being anti-Semitic and anti-Western, it transformed its structure and image with members drawn from the young generation in the 1990s, who hold more open perspectives toward modernity and Westernization. However, that did not change the minds of the officers in the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), who continued to monitor their activities for fear of the organization's possible inclination toward radicalism. The IGMG seeks to play the role of intermediary between Islamic countries and Islamic organizations in order to form an Islamic union in Europe, as well as the role of official representative of Muslims in Europe. This is why it is partly in alignment with *Diyanet*, partly with other Islamic religious communities (Caymaz 2002: 255). Even if it has a lesser influence with regard to other religious institutions, we should also name the fundamentalist movement *Kaplan-*

cilar[12] among the transnational Islamic communities existing for Turks in Europe. These transnational religious structures have been preoccupied mostly with building mosques, Quran schools, and dormitories in which Islamic instruction can be provided to young immigrant Turks.

As the French sociologist Amiraux (2003) states, these associations compete with each other for investment in various realms of activities such as sport, teaching, social aid, and *halal*-oriented business and over the reconstitution of especially the first generation's basic needs to practice religion, construct mosques, and organize Islamic funerals. These cleavages can even be observed in the names such as "the mosque of *Süleymanci*" or "the mosque of *Millî Görüş*" given to these buildings by Turkish immigrants, which is ironic enough given that in Islam all the soil on Earth belongs to God—so it is possible to pray anywhere and everywhere. Amiraux (2003) argues that the *Refah Partisi*, by using the associational structures of *Millî Görüş* in Europe, has succeeded in using migration as a "transnational social space" for organizing some steps toward its conquest of political Islam in Turkey. This argument verifies also the testimony made by some of my interlocutors, who believe that some religious organizations (such as *Millî Görüş*) in their early years did not try to fulfill the interests of the immigrant Turkish population but rather used them only for the benefit of their own agendas and politics in Turkey.

Especially after September 11, the idea of a "transnational Islam" having an effect on the European Muslim youth and global Islamic networks with their implementation of the Western perception of Islam have gained ground. As Vertovec defines it, "transnationalism refers to the existence of communication and interactions of many kinds linking people and institutions across the borders of nation-states and, indeed, around the world" (2003: 312). By the same token, the concept of an Islam that transcends the frontiers of the nation-state has been the subject of great debate in transnationalism theories. These theories failed to take into account religious issues for a long time, something that is difficult to understand given that the earliest versions of transnationalism came either from the activities of Christian missionaries or from the ideal of a global *umma* for Muslims.

12 A Turkish extremist group founded in Cologne, Germany in 1985 by Cemalettin Kaplan, and led by his son Metin. It was created with the aim of furthering the internationalization of Islam, by giving itself the name "Union of Islamic Societies and Communities" (*İslami Camiler ve Cemaatler Birliği)* while its leader claimed to be the caliph. This group and its activities have been banned in Germany since 2001.

> "Although concentrations of Muslims in Europe are based on a mutual relationship between a specific European country and corresponding geographical area (France–North Africa, Germany–Turkey, Britain–Indian subcontinent), the transnational nature of the Muslim population in Europe plays a role in the process of European integration. Many Muslim organizations see in the construction of the European Union an opportunity to bypass their own ethnic and national cleavages and to create something closer to what an *umma* should be," (Roy 2004: 103).

The *umma* doctrine asserts the unity of Muslims as a transnational, transethnic community. Once a historical-theological ideology,[13] it has since been reinterpreted by some transnational Islamic organizations among which can be named the *Tablighi Jamaat,*[14] the *da'wa* societies, and some Sufi communities (Lubeck 2001). Globalization and Muslim cosmopolitanism have facilitated the spread of transnational Islamic networks through the provision of new global transportation and communication capacities. Therefore, these opportunities for communication and associational activity have reunified once isolated and dispersed Muslim societies in the global *umma* (Lubeck 2001). In contrast to their parents' nation-based, traditional, and ethnic or sectarian perceptions of Islam, the new generation of Muslims has turned to Muslim thinkers and scholars who stress a more universalist and critical interpretation of religion (among others, Saint–Blancat 1997; Tietze 2002). According to Mandaville, this highly educated youth creates and renovates spaces and spheres—such as reading groups, new associations for the interpretation of the Quran, and new activities of leisure or art in *halal* conditions—in order to live their religion in conformity to the conditions of European secularist daily life. They use new media channels like satellite television or the internet, all of which have resulted in the creation of a new Muslim public sphere. These new Muslims are participating in social movements' activities and are creating new frameworks for living a social life in the cosmopolitan, transnational environment of big European cities, in contrast to their parents who preferred to live in more isolated places and who reduced Islam to the memorizing of the rules of the daily prayers. This next generation emphasizes dialogue and communication, thanks to the transcendings of the borders of nation-states (Mandaville 2003). As Tarrow (2005) argues, younger people are more likely to participate in issues at the continental or global levels than their elders.

13 Literally meaning "nation" or "community," *umma* is used especially by Islamic extremists to designate a (political) reunion of all Muslim believers.

14 Literally meaning "Community of Predication," it was founded in India at the end of the 1920s with the aim of reinvigorating the belief of Muslims of the world through a literal Quran interpretation.

Yet one cannot simultaneously neglect the peril of radicalized Islam (such as al-Qaeda),[15] which has gained more ground by traversing boundaries as well. By and large, transnational Islam has also deepened existing tensions and controversies between diverse Muslims, as well as created ambiguities between local and transnational interpretations of the faith. In other words, it has been hotly debated whether the local public sphere should complete the transnational one—because while the latter gives access to ways of belonging to the European sphere, some Muslims play down its importance and instead advance the benefits of merging themselves into the transnational *umma* ideal (Salih 2004). Thus, young European Turks are faced to three kinds of Islamic way of life, corresponding to their family tradition or the current political ideologies: The first is the choice to be part of the Muslim global *umma* and to fight for the good of Muslims in the host society or the entire world as a political Islamic extremist. The second way is to become an isolated Muslim and neglecting contemporary developments in his/her society. The third way is to adhere to a moderate and/or transnational version of Islam and, at the same time, to be aware of the issues at the local level of the host society, as the *Hizmet* movement suggests to do.

7.3 The Hizmet *Movement, a Brief Introduction*

The *Hizmet* movement—generally known in the academic world as the Gülen movement—is a civic social movement rooted in moderate Islam (Ebaugh 2010), being initiated and inspired by the Turkish Muslim scholar, educational activist, and preacher Fethullah Gülen (born 1938). Founded in İzmir at the end of the 1960s as a small local group centered around him, the movement turned into a global one after its initiation of founding schools in the Turkic world of the ex-Soviet Union in the 1990s. People from the movement have initiated centers of education and dialogue, schools, universities, and media structures both in Turkey and in over 140 countries worldwide. Activism within the movement is mainly carried out by volunteers such as students, academics, business owners, professionals, public officials, men and women, and younger and older people who all contribute to *Hizmet's* various organization structures and activities throughout the world.

The *Hizmet* ideal is based on the Sufi principle that sees the virtuous human being as a tolerant individual, as an altruistic person who makes sacrifices for humanity in general (Ergene 2009). Gülen promotes a worldview of activist

15 Especially since the Syrian war began, young European Muslims have been the target of recruitment drives by radicalized Islamic extremist groups as warriors for a so-called "sacred jihad."

pietism (Özdalga 2003), which shows also his view on the possibility of the new Islamic model harmonizing Islamic principles with modern values (Ergene 2009)—or what can be called a "(re)Islamization of modernity" (Park 2009). This is the example of a devout Muslim who sacrifices him or herself for the sake of humanity and with the motivation to please God in this life so that God would be pleased of him or her in the afterlife. The ideal virtuous human or his concept of an *altin nesil* ("golden generation") for Gülen is shaped by good manners, a high valuing of humanity, and a culture of ethics in one's everyday behavior in order to be a *temsil* ("good representative") of Muslims.

Gülen has been the inspiration for building secular educational institutions, undertaken by those who have keenly followed his ideas. This has been done in order to nurture "the representatives of the understanding of science, faith, morality, and art who are the master builders of those coming after us" (Gülen 1998: 128), who reunite science and religion as in the golden times of Islam—with the representatives thereof being that golden generation. The teachers who work all over the world in these institutions even in the most difficult situations see Not merely based on educational activities, *Hizmet* is the name of all kinds of secular or religious activities undertaken in service of the people regardless of religion or ethnic origins.

Based also on Sufi principles, this ideal human has also a pro-democracy and pro-dialogue perspective. In Gülen's words: "We expect love and respect, tolerance and forgiveness, and liberality and affection, especially from God. But can we expect these if we do not first offer them to others?" (2002: 43). He has for years been actively promoting interfaith and intercultural dialogue, long before the September 11 attacks happened, by for example gathering people from different ethnic, religious and ideological background around *Journalists and Writers Foundation* founded in 1994 in Turkey, by his initiatives. Known as a modern-day Rumi,[16] he has always condemned every kind of violence—even if committed in the name of Islam. He argues that if a Muslim kills a human being from the perspective of jihad, he or she cannot be considered a Muslim any more (Gülen 2009).

After this brief introduction to the *Hizmet* movement we will first outline the institutionalization and social capital of the movement as a translocal structure in Europe, and afterward explain why young European Turks consider it attractive to be active within the movement.

16 Jalaladdin Muhammed Rumi, popularly known in Turkey as Mevlâna, was a 13th century Persian Muslim poet, theologian, jurist, and Sufi mystic.

7.4 The Hizmet *Movement in France and Germany*

The institutional consolidation of the *Hizmet* movement in Europe started rather late as compared to the other Turkish religious groups there. In the decade when Turkish immigrants first started arriving in Europe the Gülen movement was still only a local community in İzmir. On the individual level, there were sympathizers to the movement to be found among the Turkish workers who either knew of it from Turkey or through Gülen and his students, who visited several cities in Europe and gave conferences for the Turkish community. There was a "cassette distribution" period when Turkish workers handed out recordings of sermons given by Gülen to their family and friends in order to diffuse his message. Moreover, some families sent their children first to religious summer camps organized by the movement and later to its private schools in Turkey. With the engagement of the second generation of Turks in Europe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the first *Hizmet* institutions such as student dormitories and learning centers started to appear. As the children of the first immigrant generation, they perceived the necessity of a good education for themselves and for their children, who had less successful results and higher drop-off rates in school than non-immigrant students. That is the reason why they tried to build the first educational centers by taking *dersanes* ("after-school tutoring centers") as role models, which were founded by sympathizers of the movement in Turkey, which are famous for their nationwide success and ethical training. For Europe, supporters of the movement stressed the importance of secular education—despite the presence there of Turkish and other religious groups mostly interested in the foundation of mosques or Islamic schools. This does not mean that the movement organizes completely secular activities. Muslim participants in the movement emphasize being pious in their everyday life—suggesting to cultivate this through personal prayers and *sohbets*. But they prefer to create mostly secular activities based on a religious motive, such as the importance of *ilim* (science) for Muslims, equal rights of women, or ways of entertainment in *halal* conditions—all of which refer to the Quran or the *hadiths*.

In France and Germany, the most visible and successful structures founded by the movement's sympathizers are the tutoring centers and private schools. In Germany, *Pangea Bildungszentren* give remedial courses to students from elementary to high school, language courses for adults, integration courses, and schooling for parents in more than 150 cities nationwide. Its French equivalent is *Etudeplus*. It provides more or less the same kind of educational activity in more than 20 French cities. They do not have any RE in the standard curriculum, nor do they officially make any references to being Turkish or immigrant. Some years

ago, these educational centers had different names and were dispersed throughout the country. It was only recently that they decided to form an umbrella organization and to adopt a uniform name in order to create a sort of brand and gather together their different experiences. The first educational centers in Germany were opened at the end of the 1990s, and the experience and success gained from them have been transferred to newly founded private schools. The first private *Gymnasien* and *Realschulen* were established in Berlin, Dortmund, and Stuttgart. Nowadays, even more of these private schools exist in a number of cities with a large Turkish population.

In France, private schooling by the movement's participants is founded again on the tutoring centers' experiences. The first private college, the *Collège Educative*, was opened in a Parisian suburb in 2008 with another recently following in Strasbourg. Even if they are mostly frequented by students of Turkish origins, these private schools do not want to be considered as "Turkish" schools, but rather as German or French ones. The nationalities of the teachers differ, and there is a tendency in both countries to choose more than one principal of Turkish or of host country origin to manage the schools. The schools also involve parents and education experts as a board of consultants. The private schools as well as the tutoring centers are very sensitive about not being perceived as religious schools. In France, even if it is possible to establish confessional private schools *Hizmet* participants prefer to create a *laïque* school[17]—meaning there are no RE classes or religious symbols at school, not even headscarves for students and teachers. In Germany, teachers are not veiled either, but students can be as in other German public schools. As such, there is a strict adaption of the secularist educational law in Gülen-inspired schools. As Irvine observes, such an avoidance of direct controversy and playing a barely visible role in the current struggle over permission to wear the headscarf in the classroom happens in order to keep with "the general goal of the organization to avoid highly charged political battles that could detract from its educational mission" (Irvine 2010: 80). *Hizmet* educational centers and private schools prefer offering ethical training over religious instruction, by arguing that the latter is rather the job of the mosques or Quran schools. This type

17 Founding a *laïque* school in France by Muslim people, as has been the case with the Gülen movement, has been a really surprising issue for many. Because public schools forbid the headscarf, fail to take into account religious stances such as different views on evolution, only offer non-segregated swimming lessons, and their canteens do not offer *halal* food, many Muslim parents feel obligated to instead send their children to private Muslim schools or to found their own Muslim ones—as the rules for this are very loose in France. As such, it would be "smarter" for the movement's participants to open a Muslim school as other Muslims do, but they in fact seem to have preferred founding secular ones.

of training involves not only an Islamic reference to it, but also conveys "traditional Turkish values" such as respecting one's family. The emphasis on one's culture and values thus gives the student the ability to synthesize his or her two cultures, so that they might be better equipped to solve the problems that they encounter in everyday life in the host country (Irvine 2010: 70). As mentioned above, ethical training is given not always by instruction[18] but mostly by manners and role models—sometimes by offering extra hours of motivational or citizenship courses, or alternatively by spending a lot of time with the student outside of school such as in sport activities, leisure trips, or shopping excursions. The extract below from an interview conducted with a *Betreuerin* ("tutor") at the *Gymnasium* Eringerfeld in Paderborn shows how a sense of citizenship is transmitted by setting an example and how such an education changes those who participate in the movement:

> "I cannot give the child a continuous education but I can show her an event that we experience together and then she takes her lesson from it. We had last year a Germany week in which we taught them that in order to love a place one should first learn about it. Because sometimes the students come and say "I want to go away from Germany," then we say: "No, Germany is a beautiful country; we should stay here," then we encourage them with projects of citizenship. I think we should change many things. The biggest *Hizmet* for us is to change the prejudices, then the society changes already. Even if all of them think we are terrorists you will represent the contrary. No, we are a trustful community. Many Turkish people passed until now but bad events did not happen. We should talk to the Germans, then, we will learn to like them. That is why when we go somewhere with the students we greet the Germans. When they speak to us we answer immediately. We show that we are open, transparent. In the past we had German friends but it was a limited friendship. We did not go to their houses, we did not eat at their houses. Our family did not teach it to us. But now we go to them, invite them, talk to them spontaneously. It is thanks to *Hizmet* that we have changed a lot. If we taught every student and our children about it, it would be perfect in the future to live in Germany," (Zehra, 25 years old, author's translation).

This example also shows how the schools and education centers founded by the movement's sympathizers try to accommodate themselves to the political and civil culture of the host country. It seems, though, that the movement's members choose the schools that are most similar to the philosophy of Gülen—like tolerance, respect for others, and adjustment to the host country's rules. Given that the multicultural public policy approach is valued in Germany, the discourse of the *Hizmet* schools and tutoring centers seems to be arranged to be in conformity with it. The Berlin TÜDESB schools, for example, define their objectives as being:

18 Some Gülen-affiliated schools in Germany provide *Ethik* lessons in the standard curriculum, wherein students learn about Christianity, Judaism, and Islam from the perspective of their shared universal and ethical values.

> "The social integration of students and fellow citizens from immigrant families is particularly important to us: We want to create an understanding of different cultures, customs, and values, and to break down prejudices. Stimulating dialogue, promoting friendships, and strengthening values such as respect and tolerance is one of the most important tasks of TÜDESB. With a targeted intercultural education, we create the foundation for a modern society and the participation of all people therein," (TÜDESB 2014, author's translation).

In addition to the shared values that the schools defend in the German case, the French context underlines also citizenship (*citoyennété*). In France, citizenship denotes the virtue of the principle of the equality of all citizens, regardless of their origins, based on the fact that France is defined as "the Republic" and is built on "one nation" unlike other "multinational" countries. The website of *Etudeplus* in France thus puts citizenship at the heart of its educational philosophy:

> "Tutoring sessions and recreational activities are oriented in order to understand the rights and duties of each other, and so as to learn to exercise civic duty," (Etudeplus 2014, author's translation).

In order to fulfill this goal, they also organize visits to the National Assembly, participate in nationwide charity activities, and offer seminars on the prevention of drug use.

The educational structures founded by Gülen participants are first and foremost secular ones. Their curricula depend on the national and/or *Länder* (state) level instruction models. Encouragement to learn several languages is stressed very much in their discourse, with Turkish being the third after French/German and English. In most cases they partially depend on state funding, while at the same time parents pay an education fee. Even if the tutoring centers and the private schools are known in the media as "Gülen schools," their directors deny any inherent attachment to the Gülen movement—arguing that the founders of the schools are almost always inspired by Gülen's message of favoring schools, but the schoolsboard and/or staff are mostly made up of people who even do not know him. In other words, for them, some of the people who founded these educational structures have been inspired by the philosophy of Gülen or by the observation of other countries' concrete examples of successful education, and thus accept their personal connection with the movement. But there are other educational institutions, sometimes non-Muslim, that are also inspired by this new kind of personal ethical training practiced by the movement participants but that are not necessarily attached to the movement. Their directors argue that it would also be erroneous to call them Gülen schools, because although they are private covering their financial expenses still partially depends on state subventions and their application of the state model of instruction. However, in my opinion, a school called "Turkish" or "Gülen" would not count as an official title,

but just indicates its orientation like calling a school Montessori does. This kind of simplification in nomenclature is thus natural and inevitable.

The other widespread Gülen-affiliated institution in Europe is the dialogue society. As mentioned above, interfaith and intercultural dialogue—based on a respect of the other nurtured by seeing all people as God's creatures sharing the same values—is one of the core notions of the Gülen philosophy. The dialogue societies and associations leaning on that idea all over the world have been tools to create good relations between Gülen movement volunteers and citizens from the host country (who mostly have other religions than Islam) on the one hand and a way to promote Gülen's ideas on the other. One of the earliest and the most effective ones in Germany has been the *Forum für den Interkulturellen Dialog*, founded in 2002 in Frankfurt. Last year the umbrella organization *Bund Deutscher Dialog–Institutionen* (BDDI) was created, which includes 14 dialogue associations in Germany. The French version is *Plateforme de Paris pour le dialogue interculturel*, founded in 2005. Their activities in both countries include lectures, roundtables, and discussions among people from different ethnic, religious, professional and social statuses, trips to Turkey, intercultural dinners with Turkish, German, or French guests, and so on. These activities aim to promote intercultural dialogue and a constructive approach to cultural diversity, to eliminate mutual fears and prejudices.

The list of other Gülen-affiliated organizations in Europe is long. Some of the most important of them are the newspaper *Zaman* (a branch of the Turkey-based daily *Zaman*, printed both in France and Germany as separate versions), *Samanyolu Avrupa*, (a TV station based in Frankfurt, broadcast in Turkish across Europe), cultural centers, and entrepreneurial, youth, women, and charity associations. The idea behind such a variety of activities is first to reach out to every group in society with *Hizmet* ideas and actions, and, second, to show that Islam is fully compatible with a modern, urban, and cosmopolitan lifestyle. There is no official recognition of the movement either by the French or the German state, since it lacks a coordination center or a supranational entity. The movement does not aim to establish such a structure either, because it wants to rely instead on civil society and to be active in a decentralized, autonomous, and independent way. This insistence on an autonomous structure becomes clear in their relationship with other Turkish or Islamic groups as well. As Irvine (2010) contends, the *Hizmet* movement-affiliated centers do not maintain close relationships with the latter—because they think that it would be difficult to control the behavior and sometimes extremist inclinations of some of them.

This does not mean, though, that the movement is not seeking recognition from state or municipal authorities or looking for support or partnership from

within French and German civil society. On the contrary, the movement's members make an effort to be on good terms with local authorities and civil society members, and therefore invite members of parliament, those from the public administration, ministers, and other associations' representatives to join their organizations for partnership and cooperation. For that reason, they also adapt their structures to the existing legal status in each city or country. In Germany, all Gülen institutions are *eingetragene Vereine* (e.V., registered nonprofit voluntary associations based on the German Civil Code), whereas in France they are established according to the *association loi de 1901 à but non lucratif*, which carries the same meaning as its German counterpart. The funding of these institutions also comes in part from the state, but most of it is from voluntary donations given by sympathizers to the movement or collected via membership fees.

In the following, the relationship between the state and the movement-affiliated establishments will be exemplified by one case from each country in which the state's recognition of the activities of the movement is most visible. The first of these is the traditional French–Turkish friendship dinner held at the French National Assembly by the French–Turkish friendship group of the members of parliament. For the last five years, its guests representing Turkey and Turkish migrants in France have been *Hizmet* associations, ranging from women and student to entrepreneurial and dialogue ones. These meetings show that some French officials at the national level accept the *Hizmet* movement participants as interlocutors and allies for some common civil society projects organized for the benefits of the French community by their citizens with a Turkish background.

The second example is that in the last three years in Germany *Hizmet* members have argued that "defamatory news about the *Hizmet* movement" has been diffused and publicly debated, as initiated by the *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, several *Der Spiegel* articles, and a *Westdeutscher Rundfunk* (WDR) documentary film entitled "The silent army of the Imam" in 2013. The debate opened by the media continued with written inquiries being made about the activities and members of the movement by some members of parliament at the Federal and *Länder* levels. In one of them, namely by the leftist party *DIE LINKE*, Member of Parliament Hakan Tas wrote to the Berlin Senate—in response to questions such as what the movement's financial relations with the state are—asking whether the movement has a hidden agenda like Scientology or *Opus Dei* do. The Senate stated that there is no evidence that the *Hizmet* movement is involved in any extremist activity that would require it to be monitored by the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, referring to another report on the movement written in 2011 in Baden-Württemberg. It is also stated that neither the *Hizmet* movement nor the association TÜDESB or designated members have broken any regulatory laws in their organizational

context. They also claim that there is no clear evidence of Gülen being directly linked to these organizations, except as a thought leader (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, September 20, 2012). Realizing the ambiguity that this questioning by the media about the motivations and agenda of the movement had caused in the German public sphere, the movement's members subsequently decided to found their own information desk in Berlin—the *Stiftung Dialog und Bildung*. It works as a representative of the *Hizmet* movement in Germany. Rather a latecoming initiative, its existence still does not mean that the movement is now undergoing a centralization process. However, it is a sign that the movement acknowledges the need to become officially recognized and that this is more likely to be achieved through it having some sort of PR structure.

Although the institutional structure of the movement in Europe is not subordinated to a supra- or transnational body, as is practiced by some other Muslim or Turkish communities in Europe, it does show some features of a transnational entity because of its global distribution of social and private capital. Can a local settlement coexist with a transnational one? According to Park (2009), the movement's qualification as transnational comes from its geographically dispersed educational activities and its commitment to dialogue with other faiths. Since the 1990s the small community of Gülen followers has evolved into a movement due to globalization, and more precisely due to the new satellite technology, network connections, and media opportunities that that process has brought with it. As the world comes to rely more and more on knowledge, the movement is gaining many opportunities to act through its educational institutions by placing knowledge at the center of the ideal of *Hizmet* (Yıldırım 2011). Knowledge is also imparted by the media. The movement has its own media network with newspapers, books, printing houses, magazines, and radio and television channels, through which it imports the knowledge it creates in its educational institutions—while it is also becoming better known as a result of creating its own public sphere (Yıldırım 2011). The movement is no longer a small community closed to the outside world and committed to traditional ways of practicing Islam, but one that opens itself to public discussion and engages with critics as part of contributing to the formulation of a modern form of Islamic religiosity. As Reetz (2010) defines,

> "[…] most globalizing Muslim networks have to be seen as both translocal and transnational at the same time. The difference between the two terms is in pointing to different directions and in the qualities of the interaction. Translocality transcends the limitations and the boundaries of the local, but is not necessarily transnational, whereas all transnational interaction is probably also translocal. In comparison, the translocal will also include sociological, religious, and cultural qualities and will be a reminder of its other side, the local, as well, whereas transnational more

> points to the political dimension, and importance of crossing the borders of nation states, creating a separate grit of reference," (Reetz 2010: 296).

What makes the *Hizmet* movement transnational is mostly the perspective of its discourse, which is aimed at transcending boundaries through the books of Gülen that have been translated into more than 36 languages, his audio-video sermons, and vast numbers of people mobilizing across nations after being inspired by the *Hizmet* ideal. This means that transnationality comes from *Hizmet* ideas, as cultural capital, and from *Hizmet* actions, projects, and institutions, as social and private capital. On the other hand, as there is no central organization controlling the movement's structures, movement volunteers in each country or city decide on their own service projects and build the institutions related to that particular city's unique needs—whether they are educational, entrepreneurial, dialogue, charity building, or all of these at once—by using local volunteers' funds and personal engagement. As such, it is not surprising to see non-Muslim and non-Turkish staff and volunteers working within *Hizmet* structures all over the world. These translocal activities make the Gülen movement more like an autonomous civil society than like a small religious community, in marked contrast to other Turkish community groups in Europe.

As Agai (2010) observes, in addition to the formal organization of the movement there is also an informal network created by the life-long allegiances between former teachers and students and their families, so that although there is not a direct line between central and peripheral structures there is always a flow of ideas and people. Volunteers in the movement can either be mobile across the borders of different *Hizmet* areas (for example a volunteer can be recruited for an educational project and then move on to an activity in the movement's media) or across national borders. This latter kind of international mobility is possible because volunteers in the movement travel to visit each other, so as to learn and to exchange know how. This is how *Hizmet* ideals and people are mobilized worldwide, while they simultaneously stay at an extremely local level as well.

7.5 Conclusion

Our research conducted within the ranks of the *Hizmet* movement in France and Germany confirms that more and more young Turkish Muslims in Europe are attracted by a transnational affiliation to this global movement. As opposed to their parents' solidarity networks based on ethnicity, this new generation of Turks is creating innovative multiethnic and multireligious spaces. Within their translocal spheres they are actively participating in *Hizmet* projects, which is transforming them into members of the global-transnational community of the

Hizmet movement. This is also making Europe no longer be a place hostile to them, and rather one to fulfill *Hizmet* ideals in. The reason why they can rely on this movement is its difference to the other Turkish associations in Europe. The importance given to secular high education by the movement and its pacifist, pro-dialogue characteristics attract Muslim Turkish youths. Many of them wish to distance themselves from ethnoreligious conflicts and from the either purely religious or purely political issues that are raised and pursued by the other networks and associations. The nonviolent side of the movement protects them from the peril of becoming radicalized or marginalized, as is the case for some fundamentalist Muslim networks. The *Hizmet* community's orientation toward active involvement in society turns them into conscious and responsible actors and citizens vis-à-vis taking initiatives in the European public sphere, wherein stigmatization or racism because of their immigrant origin is still widespread. Therefore, those European actors of the *Hizmet* movement who have initiated and developed secular pro-Western institutions based on a religious motive within their local context, in conformity with the state or federal law, are a part of the ongoing transformation process of this movement from within. They are now turning it into more of a translocal civil society on European soil than a purely religious community from Turkey, as it originally was in the 1970s.

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