3 Does Islam belong to Germany? On the Political Situation of Islam in Germany

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Abstract This chapter addresses the question of to what extent Islam can be considered a part of the German ecclesiastical law system and of German society, from the perspective of religion policy. After a historical overview of the development of contemporary German ecclesiastical law I analyze the considerations that have led religion policy in different time periods since the German Empire. The second part discusses the current landscape of Islam, and policy toward it, in Germany. The focus herein lies on the *Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat*, the first Muslim organization in the whole of Germany to be established according to a uniform organization model. However, it holds pariah status within worldwide Islam and is considered to be heretical. We conclude that religion and integration policy are two different and separate policy fields that have to be examined both on the analytical level and within practical policy making. We agree with the hypothesis that if the *Ahmadiyya* was granted the status of a corporate body in public law so quickly, this was because its leadership mostly consists of German converts to Islam. Since the Salafists and several other movements belonging to the realms of Islamic extremism are also made up of German converts, we judge such a policy to be highly questionable. We conclude that most Muslim organizations in Germany and the religion policy pursued by them, are the projects of the elites in society, which neither fit with German ecclesiastical law nor include the majority of the Muslim population in the country. Nor are they accepted by the majority of the German population. In summary, we can observe that the Muslim community in Germany has grown more heterogeneous both with regard to its ethnic composition and to its legal status. Any German religion policy of the future will have to take these developments into account.

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3.1 Introduction

"Does Islam belong to Germany?" This question was answered by former German *Bundespräsident* Christian Wulff with a "Yes," which caused strong reactions from among German public opinion. However, if bodies from public administration, the Federal or *Land* governments, and their parliaments and parties are asking themselves this question, we first have to clarify what is even meant by it. Does the term "Islam" designate the so-called "cultural Muslim" who believes in but hardly practices at all his religion? Or, does it rather refer to the Islamic extremists who plan to abolish the German constitution, with its division of powers, and replace it with the sharia? Does the term "Germany," meanwhile, denote the German population and society wherein Islam is supposed to reside, or the German legal system of institutionalized religion as it applies to the two large churches? Would this mean that Islam also has to become as institutionalized as the latter in order to obtain the same rights and duties? This chapter discusses these questions from the perspective of religion policy. The first part analyzes the situation surrounding current religion policy in Germany; the second deals with the landscape of policy toward Islam in Germany. The concluding part, meanwhile, takes up the question of whether Islam does indeed belong to Germany or not.

3.2 Religion Policy in Germany

Before dealing with these important questions, some central terms have to first be defined and discussed. Religion policy is a term that in the past has often been understood as being synonymous with *Staatskirchenrecht* (ecclesiastical law). The use of the term *Kirche* ("church") in *Staatskirchenrecht* shows that this area of law was targeted first and foremost at regulating the relationship between the Christian churches and the German state. As early as during the years of the German Empire, the churches were important actors in areas such as school education, hospital care, welfare services for the indigent, the elderly, and the disabled, care for widows and orphans, and marriages and divorces. This made any intervention by the state in these domains redundant. This distribution of responsibilities between the public authorities and the churches has been passed on for centuries in Germany and in its predecessor states. This arrangement had been called into question from the late 19th century onward, and at the latest with the founding of the Weimar Republic. The secularization process brought some radical changes to the political and socioeconomic structures of Germany, a development which had begun some years earlier in other European countries such as France. Otto von Bismarck introduced civil marriage and a public welfare system

for social insurance, which in many policy fields provoked the shifting of competences from the churches to the state. The *Weimarer Reichsverfassung* (Weimar Constitution) includes the so-called *Kirchenartikel* ("church articles"), art. 136–140. Ecclesiastical law was thus elevated to the level of constitutional law, done with the purpose of repressing the country's religious communities. In this way these articles caused an increasing loss of power and influence on the part of the churches.

After the Second World War, the *Kirchenartikel* were incorporated into the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law). These articles continued to grant both churches the privileged status of corporate body in public law, bestowing tax privileges for the building of churches and social institutions such as retirement homes, schools, and kindergartens (by the Protestant *Diakonie* and the Catholic *Caritas*)—as well as giving them the right to impart denominational religious education in public schools as a part of the standard curriculum. These measures were taken for the following reason: on the one hand, the state needed the churches as supporters for the reconstruction of the German political system and society, on the other, the Christian and Conservative government led by Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union needed the Christians and the churches in order to guarantee the political stability of the nascent Federal Republic. The laicist and nonreligious politicians insisted on the *Bremer Klausel* (a clause which allowed for a more independent religion policy for the *Länder* and for a stricter separation of church and state). Since this kind of religion policy existed already in Bremen before the Basic Law with the *Kirchenartikel* was passed, it was allowed to persist.

This historical overview allows the interpretation to be made that prior to the Second World War German religion policy had rather a laicist background, and aimed at rolling back the churches' influence in society. In contrast, after the Second World War the privileges granted to the latter by their holding of the status of corporate bodies in public law encouraged them to found social institutions and to provide the teachers in public schools. Although a further motivation for this measure was surely an overall lack of available teachers, the main reason for it was the intention to transmit Christian values to the country's children so as to undermine any Nazi or Communist thinking. Presumably, during the Cold War the danger of Communism was perceived as more of a threat than National Socialism was. During these years, there still was no mention of the dangers of Islamic extremism however.

3.3 Muslim Religious Communities in Germany

Having described this framework of religion policy in Germany, the question of how Muslim communities fit into it now arises. Most of the country's present-day Muslim communities came into existence after the Second World War. The *Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat* (hereafter, *Ahmadiyya*) was one of the first Muslim communities to be formally organized, since it began as soon as in the 1950s as a movement to build mosques and to publish Quran translations. With the mass immigration of Muslim guest workers, several loose mosque associations were founded— these later merged into larger umbrella organizations. In the chronological order of their foundation, these are: the *Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş* (IGMG, 1972),[1] the *Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e.V.* (VIKZ, 1973), the *Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V.* (IR, 1986), the *Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği* (DİTİB, 1984), the *Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu* (AABF, 1989), and the *Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V.* (ZDM, 1994). Along with the foundation of these umbrella organizations, more regional or local ones were also established in several different parts of Germany—these are in some cases independent from the umbrella organizations. Some of them also have their own names despite their membership in a particular umbrella organization, while some were already founded earlier than the relevant umbrella organization was and only became members thereof later on.

Most Muslim religious communities in Germany are Sunni Orthodox: from the largest to the smallest, their ordering is the DİTİB, IR, VIKZ, and ZDM respectively. By contrast, the *Ahmadiyya*—which founded its first congregation in 1953 in Hamburg and today has about 35,000 members in Germany (with a total of 200 million followers worldwide according to its own figures)—is ostracized for being heretical, persecuted, and excluded from the Muslim *umma* by Orthodox Muslim groups. The reason for this is that *Ahmadis* worship Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the eschatological messiah predicted by Mohammed and Jesus Christ, as the *Mahdi*—the incarnation of Jesus and an apocalyptic prophet—and the Califs as his successors. For a detailed analysis of the *Ahmadiyya* movement and its religious beliefs, see Schröter (2002) and Olgun (2014).

1 The name's literal translation is "national view." The Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş is a political association of Turkish migrants found in several European countries, and is affiliated to the conservative and religious Turkish party Saadet Partisi (formerly, Refah Partisi, Welfare Party). It is perceived as controversial because of its Islamist and antidemocratic tendencies.

3.4 *The Recognition Process*

Despite—or perhaps because of—this pluralism of Muslim religious communities in Germany, several representatives of Islamic organizations in the country are each demanding their own formal recognition as a Muslim community by German politics and society so that they may be integrated into majority society and represented in politics. This strong desire for recognition also stems from these representatives' wish to demonstrate to the Muslim population in Germany who stands for "the real Islam." We have to distinguish here though between being given factual recognition in the sense of the public's perception and acceptance of them as a religious community and receiving recognition in formal law, such as being granted the status of a corporate body in public law. The former type of recognition as a spokesperson for Islam is tied to the claim to "value its involvement in society as a provider of services" (interview with Bekir Alboğa, DİTİB, U.O., March 22, 2013). The Muslim communities aspire to being accepted as official dialog and negotiation partners by the German state. One of their most important claims is the right to impart denominational RE in public schools as part of the standard curriculum, according to art. 7 para. 3 of the Basic Law. The granting of the status of corporate bodies in public law would also bring tax privileges to these organizations—such as the right to be exempt from property tax for mosque buildings, or to receive subventions for the foundation of welfare associations as is already the case for *Diakonie* and *Caritas*—and would lend support for their foundation and running of Islamic retirement homes, hospitals, and kindergartens.

The common request made by Muslim and other non-Christian religious communities in Germany is to be treated on the same basis as the two large churches are. This point applies to the more established Muslim communities to an even higher degree. In order to make the way easier for such equality of treatment, the Muslim communities have taken to modeling themselves on imitating the churches. For instance, they have taken over some elements from the Catholic Church's clerical hierarchy or from the regional structures of the Protestant synods. Such organizational structures are unknown in traditional Islam: the Quran does not give any directions on political or religious organization, while traditional Orthodox Islam recognizes the prophet as the only authority and later also the Calif—which does not exist anymore. For this reason, we can speak of a clericalization of Islam in Germany. The large number of interviews that have been conducted with the functionaries of different Muslim organizations show that the churches are mentioned as ideals to which they aspire. They even go so far as to use Christian Latin and Greek terms like "synod," "diocese,"

"clergy," or "diaconic." However they nevertheless also underline that the alleged clericalization of Islam only concerns the organizational forms and structures of Islam in Germany, and not the religious content of its doctrine. This assertion is probably made in order to defend themselves from being reproached by Muslim countries for being "Westernized," "European Muslims," or "deviant Muslims."

3.5 From Integration Policy to Security Partnership

When most of the early Muslim religious organizations were founded in the 1970s and 1980s, their dominant paradigm was "integration." In contrast, today the most frequently mentioned idea in connection with Muslim religious organizations is "security policy." German Islam policy has thus undergone a paradigm change. At a time when Muslims were still mostly perceived as an "integration problem" for being individuals who were ignorant of the German language and rejected the Western way of life, the functionaries in Muslim organizations stood out in their leadership by their excellent knowledge of German and their acceptance of the Western way of life. They made public appearances as political actors and approached politicians, entrepreneurs, newspaper editors, and Muslim and non-Muslim citizens alike. While the early Muslim religious communities were mostly busy dealing with their own organizational structures and statutes, today they are open to contact with their non-Muslim environment—for example by organizing "days of the open mosque," exhibitions on Islam, and book fairs. The more established Muslim umbrella organizations such as the DİTİB, IGMG, or VIKZ are practically forced to challenge the mission activities carried out by the newer and fundamentalist organizations such as the Salafists or the *Ahmadiyya* with something, since the latter work on a highly professional level. Examples of this are free Quran distributions, a massive presence in all social networks, or remedial teaching for children. As distinguished from the established Muslim organizations, the ultimate goal of these newcomers is not formal recognition as spokespersons for Islam, but rather the replacement of the legitimate democratic order by the sharia. Muslim organizations being involved in German politics and society in these ways has led to resentment and gradually caused a paradigm shift so that Islam policy is no longer understood as a part of integration policy, but now of security policy instead.

A clear sign of this paradigm shift was the foundation of the *Deutsche Islamkonferenz* (German Islam Conference, DIK) in 2006. This measure did not come about as the result of the National Integration Program introduced by the Federal Government in 2005 for the purpose of further "integrating" Muslims or Islam, as one might have expected, but as a reaction to the heightening of Islamic extre-

mism that began with the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. According to the Muslim communities interviewed, after these terror attacks even more Germans converted to Islam than ever before. Both for the established and for the new Muslim organizations, these attacks offered an opportunity for rebutting the portrayal of Islam delivered by Al-Qaeda and the Western media respectively and thus for intensifying their mission activities. The media's Islamophobic attempts to exclude this religion from society thus actually had almost the reverse effect, since it caused a conversion of many atheists and agnostics to Islam and sometimes even their recruitment for Islamic jihad. Pictures and videos of German and European jihadists fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan would cause outrage in both Germany and abroad.

The DIK's orientation toward the security paradigm also becomes clear from the names chosen for its different working groups, such as: "Security and Islamism"; "German Society and Value Consensus"; or, "Religious Issues in the Light of the German Constitution." This focus is also evident from the fact that the DIK has been led by the Federal Ministry of the Interior right from the beginning. It has come as no surprise that the debates in the DIK's working groups and plena have thus far mainly focused on the dangers stemming from certain parts of organized Islam in Germany, and on possible ways for Muslims to subdue them.

The only thing that has been remarkable is the outrage of some DIK participants—among them also the representatives of the Coordination Council of Muslims—regarding certain statements made and initiatives taken by then Federal Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich, which were largely covered by the German media. Some examples of these sources of controversy were the "Initiative for a Security Partnership" and the campaign "Missing," which is targeted at parents and friends of teenagers radicalized by *da'wa*[2] actions and who try to make a reconciliatory approach to them.

On the other hand, the controversies around the DIK have caused every criticism voiced of extremist or criminal movements within organized Islam to be labeled as "Islamophobia" or "attacks on Islam." This hypersensitivity and lack of tolerance by sections of organized Islam in Germany in the face of their mere criticism is due to such questioning being perceived as an attack against Islam and the Muslim *umma.* This both creates new concepts of the enemy and genera-

2 *da'wa* literally means "invitation to God's path," and designates the Quranic mandate for Muslims to call on non-Muslims to adopt Islam (Sura 16, Verse 125; Sura 25, Verse 52). Some Muslim organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the Muslim World League, conduct large-scale *da'wa* campaigns. Since the first international *da'wa* conference in Medina in 1977, an extensive literature has developed on this subject.

tes feelings of solidarity with competing Muslim organizations for the collective fight against that enemy. The Organization for Muslim Cooperation, led by former IGMG members and by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has made several attempts to ban Islamophobia by law both nationally and internationally, and furthermore to place it on the same level as anti-Semitism and racism. It may be doubted whether this is reconcilable with the basic human right to religious freedom, both in its positive and negative dimensions.

These Muslim organizations reject a historical-critical analysis of both the Quran and the *hadiths* as Islamophobic. This applies also to a critical perspective being taken of Muslim organizations, unless it is directed toward one that has already been labeled as "un–Islamic" and thus excluded from the *umma*, such as the *Ahmadiyya*. The *Ahmadiyya* has been persecuted and excluded from the *umma* ever since its foundation in 1889. This ostracization sharply contrasts with its own self-understanding, according to which it alone represents the "true Islam." However, this is a self-understanding that is held by every Muslim religious community. The *Ahmadiyya's* exclusion from Islam has happened in quite drastic terms, ones that have never been the case for any other Muslim religious community in Germany: *Ahmadis* are labeled *kuffar* ("nonbelievers") by other Muslims. By using the term in this way, it gains a new quality: The prophet Mohammed still used *kuffar* to designate those who had not pronounced the *shahadet* ("testimony"): "There is no god apart from Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet." To this group belonged the members of the "falsified" book religions, the Jews and the Christians, and all polytheists, pagans, and nonbelievers. Today, this term is mostly used as an aggressive term of hostility and insult. By contrast, the *Ahmadis* actually repeat the *shahadet* several times a day when reciting the Quran, during ritual prayer, and during sermons. They reply by using *kuffar* to refer to all other Muslims, because the latter deny the messiah that was announced by the prophets Mohammed and Jesus. For instance, the *Ahmadi* Abdullah Uwe Wagishauser interprets the term *kafir* (singular of *kuffar*) as meaning a "denier of the announced messiah" instead of a "nonbeliever."

Against this background, it becomes even less comprehensible that German religion policy or Islam policy has only recognized and granted the status of a corporate body in public law to the *Ahmadis*, who are denigrated as un–Islamic and heretical by all other strands of Islam both in Germany and worldwide.

3.6 The Recognition of the Ahmadiyya

In the first part of this chapter, the framework of German ecclesiastical law was revealed. The application of the so-called *Kirchenartikel* presents a problem when

it comes to the recognition of religious organizations, since they do not define further the term "religious community." This has led to a debate within German constitutional law regarding under which conditions one can speak of a religious community. The debate has come to a head regarding denominational religious education as a part of the standard curriculum, since art. 7 para. 3 sentence 2 of the Basic Law states that: "Independently of the state's regulatory law, religious education is imparted according to the religious community's doctrine and principles." The debate covers such questions as whether the religious community imparting religious education has to be officially recognized by German law, and, if this is the case, whether it has to be a corporate body in public law or just an association in private law. The range of opinions held by the various Muslim organizations span from the view that not even a status as an association in private law is needed to the one that the religious community demonstrably has to represent all Muslims living in Germany.

The situation is complicated even further by the *Bremer Klauseln*—that is, by the *Länder* laws with their own directives on RE which were in force before the Basic Law came into being. This is the case in the *Länder* of Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, and Hamburg. However, in the last few years most of the *Länder* governments have adopted the legal opinion that a religious community does not have to hold the status of a corporate body in public law, and that as such the status of an association in private law is sufficient. Such a religious community does not have to represent all Muslims living in Germany, but it should have enough registered members in the *Land* where RE has to be imparted. In some cases, this process has come to pass quite smoothly—such as for Alevi religious education in Hesse, Lower Saxonia, and North Rhine-Westphalia. Both the Orthodox Muslim organizations and the Alevis agreed on the fact that it was not about Muslim religious education but about an Alevi one. In contrast, the Orthodox Muslim organizations have been trying for at least 30 years to impart Muslim religious education in German public schools. This has failed because of the competition between the different Muslim organizations and because of the catalog of criteria to be met as established by the Federal and the *Länder* governments. Here is an example drawn from the DIK's catalog of such criteria:

> "A religious community consists of natural persons, with the exception of umbrella organizations. A community is characterized by the minimum requirement of an organization structure. A group of people must have united with the goal of practicing their religion together. Common worship according to a certain religious denomination is the objective of the religious community. Any other goals, such as the cultivation of a certain culture or customs, do not constitute a religious community and may thus only be classed as the secondary goals of a religious community. Religious communities distinguish themselves from religious associations by the fact that they fulfill all tasks assigned to them by the religious denominations. In contrast, a religious

association only covers some aspects of religious life," (Bundesministerium des Innern 2008: 1 f., editor's translation).

All *Länder* not based on the *Bremer Klauseln* stipulate an almost identical list of criteria. While the DİTİB and some other such organizations have been able to establish themselves in certain *Länder* and have thus begun to impart RE as a part of the standard curriculum, the *Islamische Föderation Berlin*, a member of the IR, has been fighting for this status for 20 years in front of the Berlin judiciary. The *Ahmadiyya's* situation is completely different. No sooner than in 2010—in the context of the Hessian government's Round Table, to which some selected Muslim organizations had been invited to get to know each other—did it apply for the first time for permission to impart RE in Hessian schools. This application was approved at the end of 2012, and the *Ahmadiyya* was henceforth granted the right to impart Muslim RE along with the DİTİB. Other Muslim organizations—such as the IGMG or the *Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft Hessen*, another member of the IR—felt betrayed by this decision, given that since decades they have repeatedly failed in their efforts to assert this right. Several Muslim congregations in Hesse have already threatened to boycott Muslim religious education because of the *Ahmadiyya's* participation.

This development was carried one step further by the *Ahmadiyya's* recognition as a corporate body in public law in April 2013, being the first Muslim organization to be granted this status. Again, the application was only made a short time before by *Ahmadi* leader Wagishauser to the Round Table. This recognition is also seen by the other Muslim organizations as being an affront to them, given that they themselves have been trying for decades to achieve such formal recognition.

The following facts illustrate further the *Ahmadiyya's* position from a Muslim perspective: In 1976 the Pakistani government passed a law on blasphemy which forbade the *Ahmadis* from calling themselves "Muslims" and from observing religious practices such as ritual prayer, fasting, and attending the mosque. The Pakistani *Ahmadis*' passports were marked with the entry "*Ahmadiyya*" in order to stigmatize them and to prevent them from going on pilgrimage to Mecca. The Saudi Arabian authorities, meanwhile, ban the *Ahmadis* from entering their territory.[3] Considering the pariah status that is held by the *Ahmadiyya* among global Islam, it seems even less understandable that this religious community has been the only Muslim organization to be granted the privileged status as a corpo-

3 Entry to Mecca and Medina is prohibited for non-Muslims, but they may travel to all other cities in Saudi Arabia. Ahmadis, however, are banned from entering the entire territory of Saudi Arabia.

rate body in public law by the German state—that is, it has been given the same privileges as the two large churches.

3.7 Religion Policy does not equal Integration Policy

Muslim religious communities were not the only ones to be astonished when the *Ahmadiyya* was granted this recognition. Politicians, the media, and the Turkish community in Germany were equally surprised by this decision, even more so given that most of them had never even heard of this organization. The Turkish community's questioning of whether the *Ahmadiyya* was granted this recognition because it is led by a German should raise some concerns, because the country's Muslim religious communities are still largely addressed in terms of integration policy—both in the DIK's context as well as by the different German parties and the media. The public discourse still depicts Muslims mainly as an integration problem (Frindte et al. 2012), a reading that is highly questionable considering the composition of the contemporary Muslim landscape in Germany.

Wagishauser is not the only German among the *Ahmadiyya's* leadership; the organization's spokesperson, Hadayatollah Hübsch (born Paul-Gerhard Hübsch), also shares this nationality. He has previously been the *Ahmadiyya's* press relations officer and imam of the Nur mosque in Frankfurt. He has the reputation of being one of the most well-known German converts to Islam and has been invited to participate in a number of talk shows, for example by Michel Friedman. His daughter, Khola Maryam Hübsch, is the president of the *Ahmadiyya's* women's organization. She is also very present in the German media, for example appearing on Sandra Maischberger's talk show.

Being led by German converts, the *Ahmadiyya* can reject the reproach that it constitutes "an integration problem." These office holders are German citizens who were born in Germany and grew up there. They speak fluent German and can demonstrate a professional record in Germany. The same goes for Abu Hamza, born Pierre Vogel, the Salafists' spiritual leader in Germany. Even by Muslim standards, Salafists are considered as being very fanatical and extremist. They favor a rigid, authoritarian, and patriarchal government system. But how can the reproach of Muslims constituting "an integration problem" be upheld when applied to a convert like Vogel who has grown up in Germany?

What about Ayyub Axel Köhler, does he also count as "an integration problem"? Köhler converted to Islam when he was no older than 25. He has been known as one of the most important actors in and propagators of Islam in Germany for decades. Among other things, he is one of the founders and the longtime president of the ZDM, president of the *Deutsche Muslim-Liga*, the first

speaker of the Coordination Council of Muslims, and a member of the board of trustees of the *Christlich–Islamische Gesellschaft*. This list of roles could be expanded much further.

There is also a long list of further German converts playing a leading role within organized Islam in the country. In contrast, the list of non-German Muslims—such as Turkish or Arab ones—playing a successful and leading role in the various efforts to institutionalize Islam in Germany is a much shorter one. The time when Islam in Germany just consisted of guest workers building backyard mosques is long gone. The leading functionaries of modern organized Islam are rather either German converts or perfectly integrated Germans of Turkish or Arab descent.

Can we still speak of "an integration problem" when German Salafists call for jihad or when German converts such as Köhler explain in their publications that "(Islam's) religious principles and Islamic law (the sharia) show the total claims held by religion to man and society" (1981: 28) even though "this does not make the Muslim social structure a democracy, since this government form is completely alien to Islam" (ibid.: 33)? A German *Ahmadi* such as Hübsch fears that the introduction of a Muslim RE supervised by the German state without the participation of the *Ahmadiyya* or other Muslim organizations could lead to "Islam light." The *Ahmadiyya's* German leader states that many children and their parents still do not belong to any Muslim organization and that providing Muslim religious education at school would be an excellent opportunity to change this situation.

If being integrated designates having a fluent knowledge of German, contacts existing between migrants and Germans, or migrants having career opportunities independent of the German welfare state, Islam policy cannot be understood as a part of integration policy, since all leading functionaries of the aforementioned Muslim organizations fulfill these criteria to the same extent that non-Muslim Germans do.

In addition, the later generations of descendents of guest workers also fulfill these criteria. Mostly, the Muslim organizations label them "cultural Muslims" at best, since they hardly practice their religious customs (if at all) and do not assume any positions of responsibility in mosque congregations or umbrella organizations. This hypothesis is supported by the large studies that have been done and extensive statistics gathered. According to surveys conducted by the *Zentrums für Türkeistudien* (2009) as well as to publications such as *Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland* (DIK 2009) and *Muslime in Deutschland* (Bundesministerium des Innern 2007), as few as 30 percent of those in Germany who call themselves Muslim, religious, and attend mosque at least once a week feel

represented by the country's established Muslim organizations. This offers strong proof for the hypothesis that the Islam policy carried out by the religious communities is ultimately the project of the country's elites, and thus is one that does not reach out to the Muslim population at large. The gap between the various organizations' leadership and membership bases also seems to be increasing ever further.

3.8 Conclusion

In many ways, organized Islam does not fit in into German law, politics, and society. Furthermore, Muslim religious organizations neither fit into the German concept of ecclesiastical law nor do the concepts concerning Islam policy that they hold to match up with the ideas of the German majority population or most of the Muslims living in Germany. While the *Kirchenartikel* were introduced into German ecclesiastical law about a 100 years ago in order to promote secularization and to curtail the churches' influence, German Muslim organizations have been trying for years to profit from these articles so as to be formally recognized and to obtain the same privileges as the two large churches. When the churches were granted their privileges after the Second World War, this happened so as to include them in the reconstruction of the German state and society. However, even guest workers and "cultural Muslims" significantly contributed to this reconstruction. As such, it might now be asked what else organized Islam can do in order to "become part of Germany"? If we take into account the claims and activities of the different leaders of organized Islam around the globe, it becomes evident that their main goal is the Islamization of the West. This is declared frequently and openly in their sermons, in statements in talkshows, and in the publications that they distribute on the streets everywhere in Germany—and as such this intention is not just a reproach made up by opponents.

The Ahmadiyya's formal recognition was a first step toward the institutionalization of Islam in Germany. The introduction of Muslim religious education in Hessian public schools by the Ahmadiyya—and also by the DİTİB, despite its lack of recognition—has created some opportunities for tying children and their parents to organized Islam, for gaining new members therein, and perhaps also for welcoming some new German or Christian converts to the Islamic faith. It has been demonstrated in this chapter that German Islam policy is currently by no means an adequate tool for integrating these "foreigners." It becomes inevitable that conflicts and new forms of religious segregation within the Muslim community will arise because of the Ahmadiyya's recognition—at least until there is

formal recognition of some Orthodox Muslim organizations such as the DİTİB or IGMG as well.

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