# Concepts of Religion and the State: An Application to South-Eastern Europe

*Jochen Töpfer*

This chapter provides an overview of theoretical concepts between church and state, and examines the divergent cases of Slovenia and Macedonia. Slovenia and Macedonia, as relatively small countries of Eastern Europe, represent examples of constantly changing relationships between religious communities, the state, and the population since the initial post-socialist transition two decades ago. A common feature of social change is that religious communities are in search of their role within society and politics. Developments in Slovenia offer insights into the dynamics of the cleavage between traditional religions and new movements of indifference towards religious feelings. In Macedonia, the population is represented by two traditional religions (Christian Orthodoxy and Sunni Islam) that are interrelated with ethnic identity. Thus, following major political intervention, religion became a strong source of identity.

## Introduction: Religion and State in South-Eastern Europe

Analyzing the relationships between religion, state, and society in Eastern Europe from the perspective of sociology means to enter areas of expertise of theology, cultural studies, history, anthropology, political science and even economics (see Segal 2006:vii). Researchers dealing with the topic should be aware of the academic context in order to facilitate and encourage open discussion among the scientific disciplines. Nevertheless, all share that most attention is focused on circumstances within the dominant societies of the region, such as the Russian Federation or Poland. In contrast, this chapter is concerned with the two cases of Slovenia and Macedonia. In these relatively small societies, religious communities reemerged as actors in the civic and political spheres after 1991. Therefore, they provide two useful cases for sociological analysis.

In Slovenia, a traditional religious community, the Roman Catholic Church (RKC[1]), is challenged in the public and political arenas by personal indifference to

1 RKC—Katoliška Cerkev v Sloveniji.

J. Gerlach, J. Töpfer (eds.), *The Role of Religion in Eastern Europe Today,*
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-02441-3_2, 

religion, and even atheist developments. Having no clear competitor in the religious sphere, the Catholic Church faces declining attention to its position in public, in politics, and on an individual level. The cleavage is manifest in attitudes among the population towards religion and religiousness, as well as in the political system, where parties can be localized near the two poles of the religious–atheist dimension. In Macedonia, several traditional religious communities inhabit a pluralist sphere and compete for attention in politics and society. Religion and ethnicity (and additionally social status) mostly coincide, which contributes to societal separation. The Macedonian Orthodox Church–Ohrid Archbishopric (MPC[2]) claims to represent the major ethnic community, the Slavic Macedonians. On the other side, a pluralist Islamic community represents mostly Albanians, Turks, and Muslim Macedonians. Ethno-religious alliances are translated into the political system, where the dominating political parties focus on members of one particular ethnic group as their voters.

A comparative analysis of recent processes in Slovenia and Macedonia promises to reveal interesting insights into two central cleavages of South-Eastern European societies: first between traditional religion and secular movements and, in the second case, between two historical religious communities actively seeking to influence identity. Which general processes and consequences can be revealed, which are important also to larger societies and other regions in Europe?

## Historical Remarks

A short historical overview of general developments in Europe is necessary in order to classify the two cases with respect to the relationship between religion and state. The roots of sociology at the end of the 19th century are strongly connected to the first steps of distant scientific reflection of religion in society. Authors of the period were concerned with developments in Western Europe (France, United Kingdom, western lands of present-day Germany) and rearrangements of these relationships within this sub-region of the continent.

The religious–political sphere gradually separated here, within the context of modernization. The successive enforced retreat of traditional religion meant permanent subordination of the church to the state. The Catholic Church lost its function of legitimation of rule in formerly Catholic areas of Europe with the replacement of monarchic by democratic political systems. Today, the relations within these countries follow several models, ranging from official (and established) state churches via systems of cooperation to diverse patterns of separation of state

2 MPC—Makedonska Pravoslavna Crkva (Македонска Православна Црква—Охридска Архиепископија).

and church (Minkenberg 2003). Nevertheless, societies in Western Europe have in common that traditional as well as new religious communities share a relatively high degree of autonomy. The states mostly regulate the relationship to—but generally do not interfere in the internal affairs of—the organized religious associations. In Western European countries, the majority of the population has today developed a distinctly distant but overall tolerant attitude towards religion. It is assumed that this is connected to the finding that religion no longer plays a central role in the political sphere. Processes in societies beyond Western Europe differ from these developments.

Historically, the second major religious region of Europe is the Catholic South—a group of countries including Italy and Spain. Societies in this region are characterized by a close relationship between the church and the state—a long tradition of mutual collaboration and support, and a pattern surviving even monarchist rule by its application in modern dictatorships and later democracies in the 20th century.

The current consequence is that the formerly dominant traditional religious community lost its standing among significant groups of the population, especially among the young. Even if the majority of people ostensibly identify themselves as Catholic, young generations clearly distance themselves from respective major religious institutions. The Catholic Church faces a far-reaching loss of active members, and it remains uncertain whether the organization will ever again attract and influence significant groups within these societies.

The third part of Europe, described as Central Europe in this context, had a significant experience with the Protestant challenge to the Catholic Church. Examples here include large—mostly northern—parts of Germany, in addition to the Czech Republic and the Netherlands. Due to the tension between religious actors and modernization, a significant proportion of the population gradually developed an indifferent attitude towards religion and religious institutions. The pluralization of the religious sphere manifests as a pattern of distance but cooperation in the relationship of religion to present-day politics: The state variously subsidizes traditional religious communities, but otherwise does not significantly interfere in the religious sphere. Religious communities in the region have generally accepted their role as one player among several others within civil society. This position, to some extent preserved the reputation of mainstream religion within society, even if religiousness in its traditional form is declining on an individual level.

The fourth group of societies is located in Eastern Europe, with the core states of the Russian Federation, Poland, and Serbia. They share a long tradition of close relationship between political rule and a single dominant religion. As in the countries of Southern Europe, both spheres overlapped strongly. The important difference

between the four groups is the period of socialist rule in Eastern Europe. Here, religion and its institutions were equated to symbols of the old, monarchist regime; Socialism, as the counter-reaction to the proximity of state and church, encouraged the prosecution, destruction, and expropriation of traditional religion and its organizations. Positioned in an oppositional role to the socialist regime, traditional religious communities were, among others, important actors at the beginning of the transition to democracy in the region; in many cases, they provided crucial parts of the infrastructure of oppositional movements (Pollack 2010:11). Nevertheless, the scale and rapidity of change surprised religious leaders in 1990 (as well as scientists and other groups involved in demanding democracy).

In contradiction to the transitional countries in Central Europe, such as the former East Germany and the Czech Republic, the respective Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Eastern Europe were able to develop permanent access to institutions of political power (Russian Federation) or at least to decisive parts of the established political parties and their elites (Poland). On the side of the population, the most recent data show—in contrast to other regions of the Continent—signs of increasing religiousness in Eastern Europe during the last twenty years (Pollack 2009:37). The process was also briefly observed in the transitional societies of Central Europe[3]. In Eastern Europe, further development is yet unclear, but the level of religiousness remains high.

When positioning Macedonia and Slovenia in this general, historical–religious classification of European societies, it is necessary to acknowledge that both cases are located in border regions. Slovenia has a strong Catholic background, similar to the second group of Southern European countries. It was a Crown land of the Habsburg Monarchy and located not far from its imperial capital, Vienna. Additionally to Austria, two other neighboring countries—Italy and Croatia—have long traditions of connecting their nationhood with Christian Catholicism. Nevertheless, two shifts in the history of Slovenia laid the basis for indifferent thinking towards religion and its traditional institutions, in this case the Catholic Church. The first shift was the local rise of the Protestant movement after 1550, which was fiercely suppressed by the Catholic Church. The leaders[4] of the movement were expelled from the Habsburg territories and exiled to ambitious Protestant duchies within the

3 See respective answer patterns in the World Values Survey for the Czech Republic and Eastern Germany, wave 1991/1992 and later. (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org, 28/01/13; questions A006 “Religion important in life” and F025 “Religious denomination”).

4 Primož Trubar (1508–1586) and Jurij Dalmatin (1547–1589) are the most prominent bearers of the Protestant movement in Slovenia. They published several books in Slovene and translated the New Testament, which also represented the first steps in establishing Slovene not only as a spoken, but also written language.

Holy Roman Empire. Consequently, in the Duchy of Carniola (*Herzogthum Krain*) itself, parts of the Slovene population increasingly associated Catholicism with a foreign, intruding power.

The second shift resulted from the constellations during the Second World War. The wartime movements in Yugoslavia fighting for liberation from the fascist occupiers were very diverse in structure, background, and thus their goals. Apart from external influence of the Allies, leftist partisans grew to become the key player of the liberation movements, also because they were distinct from the other groups in one significant way: Their ideology was not based on exclusive forms of ethno-religious nationalism. All other relevant groups seriously seeking political power in Yugoslavia during the war—whether collaborating with the occupiers or not—based their ideology on a mono-ethnic nation connected to a single national religion. Consequently, a significant proportion of the population in Yugoslavia and in the small Slovenian lands, exhausted by ethnic conflict from monarchist Yugoslavia and the Second World War, sympathized with the partisans. After their success in Yugoslavia, the Catholic Church was blamed for its role during the war when it did not support the liberation movement. Thus, a distance between people and the Catholic Church was prescribed during the time of socialism by the state.

These historical roots indicate the positioning of Slovenia in a border region between the Catholic Southern- and a more secular Central Europe. Protestantism differentiated and qualified traditional religion (even though to a small extent); later political ideologies abused, oppressed, excluded, and replaced traditional religious organizations. Thus, the main cleavage in the society of Slovenia today is between the conservative position represented by the Catholic Church and a secular perspective of political and other public issues.

Macedonia, as the second case study, is located in the center of the Balkan Peninsula. Here, mainly two traditional religious denominations, Sunni Islam and Orthodox Christianity, have shaped cultural development and personal identity over centuries. Although significant proportions of the population converted to Islam during the long historical rule of the Ottoman Empire in the region, the majority of Slavic people maintained an association with Orthodox Christianity between 1400 and 1900. The Ottomans, following the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, applied a form of rule based strictly on guidelines written in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Formally a religious state, Ottoman rule consequently distinguished people mainly by their faith, regardless of ethnicity or other (previous) forms of identity. Christianity and Judaism are explicitly mentioned in the Qur'an as sharing some common sources with Islam, and therefore were not wiped out but officially acknowledged and granted relative autonomy by the Ottomans. Overall, religious denomination played a crucial role in identifying the Self and the Other, and there

was no significant distinction between the arising ethnic peculiarities within the Empire until the mid-19th century (Karpat 1985:116).

The beginning of the 20th century was marked by the final withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the European continent. The consequences in the religious sphere were twofold: Firstly, many Muslims fled towards core Ottoman regions, thereby drastically changing the religious balance in favor of Orthodox Christianity. Secondly, there were frequent changes in the national denomination (e.g., Bulgarian, Serbian) of the institution representing Orthodox Christianity in the territory of today's Macedonia. Finally, the Macedonian appellation after the Second World War was independently organized in 1959 and granted autocephaly in 1967 by political will. Nonetheless, from a long-term historical perspective, it seems to be common that political power determined the name of the Orthodox Church and the faith of people within a territory. Of first interest in the context of this chapter is that Islam was represented as an intruding force by successive nation states of South-Eastern Europe, although it became an autochthonous religion within the Balkans during the preceding centuries. The binding force of Orthodox Christianity was the central contradiction to Islam in order to legitimate the expulsion of Ottoman rule and dominate the area. Secondly, succeeding powers (Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece) quickly transformed religion into a nationalist instrument, declaring the Orthodox population within the territory of today's Macedonia as belonging to their respective ethnic group, national church, and therefore to their only nation (Ibid:50) in order to claim territory for their newly founded states.

The period from the end of the 19th century until the end of the Second World War was marked by permanent and violent ethnic rivalry, combined with religious elements; throughout the area of Macedonia, a repeated process of 'Serbization' and 'Bulgarization' took place. The effect on the attitude of the population in 1945 towards traditional religion and its relation to politics was similar to the situation in Slovenia—the vast majority of people were tired of ethno-religious conflict, and socialism was seen by many as a new chance to overcome rather than simply obscure the separation between societal groups. The following decades of a relatively high level of inter-ethnic cooperation in Yugoslavia demonstrated these intensions. After the collapse of socialism, Macedonia was constituted as an ethnically-defined nation of the Macedonian people[5]. This decision renewed tensions between social groups based on ethnic and religious sentiments, and revitalized the political focus on this issue. Hence, post-1991, people were focused on the question of ethno-religious

5 The Constitution of The Republic of Macedonia, adopted 17/11/1991, emphasizes in its preamble "[…] the historical fact that Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people […]". Other ethnic groups are mentioned as nationalities living in Macedonia, but not as constituting groups of the nation. Source: http://www.verfassungsvergleich.de/, 28/01/12.

belonging, and the proportion of the population with indifferent attitudes towards religion has subsequently declined to an insignificant level today.

The described historical path-dependencies also imply the positioning of Macedonia in a border region, yet between the Orthodox Eastern Europe and the former Ottoman-ruled region which is characterized by Islam today. Individual identity within this society is based predominantly on ethnic reference with constituting religious elements. Consequently, Macedonia shares main characteristics with the Orthodox Eastern countries regarding the development of religion after 1991: A revitalized role of religion in politics and the public spheres, as well as an increasing level of religiousness at the individual level.

## Theoretical Approaches of Religion and the State

These historical path-dependencies frame the following reflection of theoretical approaches, which are concerned with the interplay of religion and politics. Established concepts of social science classifying the relationship between church and state mostly focus on developments in societies in Central- and especially in Western Europe. Here, a central problem of Christianity—the division between the Earthly and Heavenly kingdom, and thus the two powers ruling in the respective 'worlds'—shaped power struggles for centuries (Robertson 1987:153). Unique in comparison to other parts of Europe (and the world) was the successive separation, cumulating in their radical schism during the course of the French Revolution. The leap meant the final subordination of church to the state in the region until today. These developments constituted the framework for theorists who created the concepts of church and state described now. It is also necessary to acknowledge the Christian context, because religions and respective organized communities have various organizational structures and differing mental orientation. While the first dimension describes the organization of the hierarchic form of the institution representing a religion, the second distinguishes religions via their inner- or otherworldly orientation[6]. When focusing on Macedonia, where approximately 30% of the population follows Sunni Islam, it is important to emphasize that this religious confession has generally the same inner-worldly orientation as Christianity, but an

6 A typology of religions on the basis of the two dimensions `structure` (weak/developed) and `orientation` (inner-/otherworldly) was developed by Smith (1974) and replicated by Robertson (1987:157). While the structural dimension is self-explanatory, the mental dimension of orientation means the sphere with which the central religious-based activity of respective adherents is identified. Innerworldliness describes a group ethos that emphasizes reshaping the contemporary world according to traditional doctrines, whereas otherworldliness is the view that existing worldly circumstances are largely to be accepted.

entirely different structure—less hierarchical in the earthly organization, connecting the believer more directly to God compared to the Christian counterpart. The consequence is that religious dignitaries as the 'earthly' representatives cannot claim an absolute and final interpretation of the religion for today, as within the ecclesiastical Christian structures of Catholic, Orthodox, or Evangelical confession.

When reviewing classical concepts of religion and the state, one experiences that early sociologists like Max Weber followed what today would be described as an interdisciplinary approach. Weber combined sociologic, economic, cultural, and theological findings in his work at the beginning of the 20th century. Of primary importance regarding the issue of religion and the state is Weber's description of three general, ideal types (*'Idealtypen'*) of rule: the traditional, the charismatic, and the legal-rational form. Within each ideal type, institutionalized religion has a specific position towards the state, which makes the approach promising in the context of this paper.

The *traditional* ideal type of rule is generally characterized by a very close relationship between religion and the state. The spheres give mutual legitimation and mostly overlap. Here, Weber divides the category into two subunits: *hierocracy* or *theocracy*[7] on one side, in which earthly power is dominated by religion; and on the other *caesaropapism*, in which there is close subordination of church to political power (Weber 1922:200). This general category of traditional rule describes the traditional European monarchies that governed in Europe throughout the Middle Ages.

The second ideal type, *charismatic rule*, historically emerges directly after—and as the fierce counterpart to—the traditional form. Here, established religion and religious communities are excluded from political and civic life, and are replaced by doctrines of a movement with a charismatic leader, comprising an independent ideology[8]. Religion is tolerated by politics only during the first steps of establishing the charismatic rule if that serves the political goals of including wider parts of the population in the political movement, and to support and contribute to the legitimation of its leadership.

In terms of the relationship between religion and the state, the third ideal type, *legal-rational rule*, is positioned between the two forms described above. Here, politics and religion are not identical or mainly overlapping, but are separated, and religious communities enjoy relative autonomy. The state bases its legitimation not

7 Theocracy is subdivided into *incarnate*, direct rule of the founder of the religion; and *theocratic*, direct rule of priests of a small religious circle.

8 The political ideologies were constituted in contrast to religion with 'earthly-based' sources of legitimation. The historical background in this case was fascist Italy and the Socialist Soviet Union in the 1920s.

exclusively on religious or ideological foundations: the main characteristics of the ideal type are a constant confirmation of—and back-coupling to—the population as the source of legitimation of rule. Traditional religious communities may be acknowledged or slightly supported, although not necessarily. Subsumed within the category of legal-rational rule, the societies of Western Europe developed various forms of a general separation of church and state during the 19th and 20th centuries within the structures of democracy.

Weber set the three described ideal types into a chronological continuum, where the charismatic form overthrows the traditional and will be finally succeeded by legal-rational rule. These assumptions were accompanied by the observation that the relationship between religion and state in the societies of Europe became more diverse via the specific character of modernization. Following Weber's differentiation, monarchy was succeeded by charismatic rule; however, after 1945, the conflict line dividing the continent was between the democratic capitalist and the 'charismatic' socialist regimes. Consequently, charismatic and legal rule became a matter of more specific differentiation; social science now concentrated on the various political dominations of religion (Murvar 1967:71). In his description of forms of religious legitimation of the state, Roland Robertson advanced the concept of Weber and added *Eratianism* as a fourth ideal type (Robertson 1987:157), characterized by a separation of church and state and a low degree of autonomy on the part of religion.

A decade after Robertson, Juan J. Linz acknowledged the plural forms of treatment of religion by the two societal and political systems in Europe within one typology and generated five categories of church/state relations, organized according to an increasing distance of both spheres: theocracy/caesaropapism, politicized religion, friendly separation, hostile-laicist separation, and political religion as substitute (Linz 1996:134). Linz emphasized that the framework was not an ordinal dimension with end points; rather, it was arranged as a circle wherein the categories of political religion and caesaropapism are connectable because of the high level of integration between religion and state in both systems, regardless of the origin of the first element. Linz' typology is open for a wide range of forms of rule and therefore valuable to the context of this book, which is concerned with societies in transition. Linz' concept was applied to Eastern Europe in an analysis of church/state relations in Russia over a long-term historical perspective, and comprehensively advanced for this case (Riedel 2006:326).

Thus, the concept proposed by Linz proved useful for qualitative analysis of transitional societies in the region. In order to compare recent state/church relationships in Slovenia and Macedonia, additional quantitative assessment tools should be considered. Which concepts permit the evaluation of recent patterns?

The collapse of socialism left only democratic regimes in Europe, and therefore the concept of a general separation of politics and religion. The consequence for theoretical approaches to religion and state was the development of typologies focusing on the status of religion within democratic systems (see Fig. 1.1). Most prominent in this context is the categorization of Chaves and Cann, who provide a continuum between the three categories of: a) An established state-church; b) systems of cooperation between state and church; c) the complete separation of the two spheres (Chaves and Cann, 1992:280). They used six indicators that are similar to a Christian understanding of the interplay between the two spheres, of religion itself and of institutionalized religious communities[9].

Their concept was slightly modified by Detlef Pollack, who applied the approach to the classification of patterns in post-transition societies of Eastern Europe. He used the variable of the relations between state and church (plus the degree of religious plurality) in a society to explain the tremendous differences in religious vitality across Eastern Europe (Pollack 2002:18). Pollack retained the three general categories of Chaves and Cann, but focused the indicators more specifically on aspects of the involvement of traditional religious organizations in state institutions[10].

In 2003, Michael Minkenberg analyzed religion and politics in Western European democracies. While keeping the three general categories in state/church relations of Chaves and Cann as the basis for classification, Minkenberg widened the pool of indicators in regard to their concept and the one of Pollack, and thus expanded the scope (Minkenberg, 2003:128). The mentioned approaches represent approved concepts of social science, measuring the interdependence of religion and state within democracies (Kippenberg and Schuppert 2005:173). Nevertheless, the last decade was marked by developments in Eastern Europe in which the degree of democratic legitimation of the state significantly decreased or at least varied to a great extent (cf., Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova). Notwithstanding the multiple reasons, it is currently the case that traditional religion achieved unexpected but meaningful access to political power in several societies of Eastern Europe.

---

9 The six indicators are: a) the existence of a single official state-church, b) the official recognition of selected denominations, c) state interference in the appointment of religious dignitaries, d) the personnel of a religious community are paid (fully or partly) by the state, e) the existence of a church tax, and f) state investment in constructing/maintaining buildings of religious worship (see also Kippenberg and Schuppert, 2005:173). Each indicator is coded yes/no, so that the range of the variable is between zero (full separation) and six points (established state-church).

10 These are: a) existence of a state-church (two points), b) theological faculties at state universities, c) state-financed religious education at school, d) pastoral care in prisons and the military, and e) financial support (via taxes, etc.) of religious communities by the state (Pollack 2002:18). Coded as Chaves and Cann (1993), except indicator a), which is coded 0–2. Range 0 to 6.

In fragile transitional societies, religion re-entered the space of legitimation of the state. As mentioned in the section on historical path-dependencies, the majority of societies in Eastern Europe also have a long tradition of close ties between politics and religion. These processes leave the impression that theoretical concepts based exclusively on democratic forms of governance are not sufficiently broad to adequately encompass phenomena emerging recently across the region.

| Weber (1922) | Robertson (1987) | Linz (1996) | Chaves/ Cann, Pollack, Minkenberg (1992–2003)[11] | Fox (2008) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hierocracy | Theocracy | | | |
| (Theocracy), Caesaropapism | Hierocracy Caesaropapism | Theocracy / Caesaropapism | | Religious state |
| Traditional rule | | | | Active state religion |
| | Eratianism | | | State-controlled religion |
| | | Politicized religion | | |
| | | | Established state-church | Cultural state religion |
| Legal rule | | | | Preferred treatment |
| | | | Cooperation | General support |
| | | Friendly separation | Separation | Moderate separation |
| | | Hostile-laicist separation | | Nearly or full separation |
| Charismatic rule | | | | Hostility |
| | | Political religion | | |

Fig. 1.1: Concepts of State/Church Relations 1922–2008[11]

The latest theoretical concept, which addressed also this methodological gap, was the 'World Survey of Religion and the State' by Jonathan Fox (2008). Fox conceptualized an index of *Government Involvement in Religion* (GIR), which is a quantitative study on global level. Fox developed a differentiated pattern of nine categories for classifying state/church relations, including the group of Eastern European societies (Ibid:147). The categories range from a 'religious state', which can be equated to theocracy and caesaropapism in the previously mentioned concepts; five different forms of 'preferred treatment of specific religious communities'[12]; two forms of 'separation' (moderate and full) 'hostile' relationship (see Fig. 1.1). Contrary to the concept of Chaves and Cann (1992), the last category of 'hostility' is broader and additionally includes the system of an established political religion; here, Fox explicitly mentioned the former USSR (Fox 2008:48) and present-day countries of the Caucasus, which, during the last two decades, have shown strong indications of erecting new political religions with ideologies centered around a strong leader (Ibid:147, see Azerbaijan as an example).

Fox developed the variables for the classification in reviewing a broad set of other studies that measure the relationship between religion and the state (Ibid:39–45). He noted that previous concepts employ relatively few indicators and, consequently, measure single aspects (Ibid:46). The method proposed by Fox is, therefore, to collect numerous proven indicators from previous studies to create five variables measuring the relationship: a) the official role of religion in the state, b) state restriction and preferential treatment, c) restrictions on minority religions, d) regulation of the religious sector, and e) religious legislation. These five general variables, each normalized to a range 0–20, are combined, where their sum represents the 'General GIR' index (see Fig. 1.5).

An additional measurement, which also includes up-to-date data, is provided by The Religion and State Project (RAS)[13]. The project measures four independent indexes, a 'Government Regulation of Religion Index' (GRI), a 'Government Favoritism of Religion Index' (GFI), 'Social Regulation of Religion' and 'Religious Persecution'. Here, single aspects of the relationship are in focus. Slovenia and Macedonia are included in the study, and will be discussed later.

---

11 The concepts of Pollack (2002:18) and Minkenberg (2003:128) are based on Chaves and Cann (1993). Therefore, these are integrated into one column here. Chaves and Cann used six indicators, Pollack reduces the measurement to five factors, and Minkenberg expands it to eight characteristics. The differing number of indicators induces a different factor weighting in the evaluation (e.g., Minkenberg focuses on financial support).

12 The five categories are active state religion, state-controlled religion, cultural state religion, preferred treatment, and general support of one or more religions. See Fig. 1.1.

13 http://www.thearda.com/ras/, 28/01/13.

Figure 1.1 attempts to integrate the presented theoretical approaches for the categorization and analysis of the relationship between state and religion. The grid is not organized according to Weber's chronological dimension. Rather, it follows the concept of Fox, in presenting a continuum from a high/identical overlap of the spheres on the top (beginning with theocracy), to the greatest possible degree of separation—a situation of institutionalized hostility between religion and politics. Therefore, the ideal type of 'charismatic rule' (or category of 'political religion' in the concept of Linz) at the bottom of the figure is a specific case. The political system entirely replaces religion with a political ideology that is not a traditional but a newly created form of belief system[14]. Hence, this category does not exactly describe a relationship between two protagonists, since one—religion—is completely eliminated in its traditional sense. In established political ideologies[15], the center of orientation and behavior of the population is directed towards earthly issues by the doctrine (mostly in the form of nationalism towards a culturally and biologically coherent "nation of people"). It mostly omits issues of otherworldly transcendence or unsolved 'last' questions exceeding human capacity for recognition—all matters are to be resolved in this world. Thus, ideology attempts to substitute, but cannot equate to, traditional religion in this context. The category is not identical to that of caesaropapism; nevertheless, since religion and politics are merged into one unit, many common characteristics can be revealed and the categories are combinable by matching several characteristics[16].

Examining Fig. 1.1 in this sense, Weber's work can be interpreted from the perspective that charismatic rule succeeded traditional regimes as the polarized counterpart reacting to the former combination by eliminating and substituting religion. Later, consensus-oriented legal regimes balanced the relationship between state and church, and developed secular models of mutual understanding and consensus.

## Religion, State, and Society in Slovenia

Slovenia is a small and ethnically homogenous country of two million (mil.) inhabitants. The religious sphere was dominated for centuries by one confession and the institution representing it, the Roman Catholic Church. A differentiation briefly emerged during the period of the Protestant Reformation, but the attitudes of the

14 The main difference between ideology and religion is the respective earthly and heavenly central orientation in the doctrine.

15 The term `political religion` (Linz 1996:134) is replaced here by `political ideology` as a description of the category.

16 See the arrow in the last row of Fig. 1.1.

population towards religion did not pluralize before the 20th century (see historical remarks). The traditional religious confession is Christian Catholicism. It is organized today at national level in the RKC, which claims to represent the majority of citizens in cultural and spiritual terms. However, today the sphere is appropriately described as heterogeneous.

Slovenia became independent in a gradual process that cumulated in its official secession from Yugoslavia in June 1991. At that time, it was the most economically and politically advanced society of the six republics constituting Yugoslavia. The political elite generally managed the change to democracy and a market economy by successfully applying gradual transition measures. Today, Slovenia is among the most developed countries in Europe and the most advanced transitional society of former socialist Eastern Europe. The Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme ranked Slovenia 21st, between France and Finland for the year 2011 (UNDP 2011:127). In addition to economic development, international measures of democratic political and civil rights did not report limitations on the expression of political will or religious faith during the last twenty years. The regional environment of Slovenia is marked by democratic states with a long tradition of Catholic Christianity (Austria, Italy, and Croatia). Despite the fact that the highest organizational principal of the two largest religious communities, the Catholic Church and the Islamic Community in Slovenia, is located outside the country, there are no significant external influences having a definite negative impact on the religious sphere or on social integration.

*The Population*

Christian Catholicism is the largest faith group in Slovenia (recorded as 57.7% in the last official census of 2002[17]; see Fig. 1.2). However, in relation to these data, questions about church membership numbers[18] and the understanding of being a

17 Following data for Slovenia is based on the census 2002 (http://www.stat.si/popis2002/, 28/01/13).

18 The RKC itself declared the number of Catholics in Slovenia at 1,553,497 for 2011 (http://katoliska-cerkev.si/statisticni-podatki-o-cerkvi-na-slovenskem-za-leto-2011, 28/01/13). The number is challenged on the basis of results of surveys (see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org) as well as the census of 2002, which reports 1,135,626 people declaring their religious denomination as Catholic. Since the gap is approximately 400,000 people, the difference concerns a share of 20 percent of the population in a small country like Slovenia. Here, there is an evident discrepancy in the conception of the religious institution and the people that are categorized, which has implications for the relations between religion and state.

follower of Catholicism[19] are current issues in Slovenia. Following the census of 2002, the second most widespread attitude towards spiritual belonging is those who did not wish to express an affiliation to a religious denomination (15.7%). An additional 10.1% explicitly declared themselves as atheist. In Slovenia, this is not a widespread phenomenon like the former East Germany or the Czech Republic, but is very high compared to neighboring states. Slovenia has also seen the emergence of an atheist association[20].

The fourth-largest category according to the 2002 census is the group for whom religious affiliation is not known (7.1%). Thus, it can be argued that, in total, one third (32.9%) of the population does not regard religion as a central point of individual orientation, or positions religion as not being a primary part of personal identity.

The second-largest religious denomination in Slovenia is Islam. In the 2002 census, 47,488 people described themselves as Muslim. Muslims mostly came from poorer regions of Yugoslavia, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, and immigrated to Slovenia during socialism[21]. In a predominantly Slovene and Christian Catholic environment, Islam is strongly associated with ethnic belonging, and runs within families already born in the country. In general, quantitative data and interviews reveal no signs that the number of followers of Islam in Slovenia is growing by means of conversion. However, the number increased significantly compared with the 1991 census, which reported 29,361 adherents. It can be followed that this large difference between successive censuses is due to the belated naturalization/legalization of citizenship among former Bosnian people in Slovenia during 1991 and 2002. Hence, Muslims have represented a stable 2.4% of the total population in recent decades. Internally, the Islamic sphere itself is dominated by one institution, the Islamic Community in Slovenia (ISRS)[22]. There are several other Muslim groups active within the territory, which are not included in this organization. Their memberships are relatively small, are based on family ties, and therefore predominantly concentrated in one location such as the capital Ljubljana or in industrial towns in the north. Muslim communities in Slovenia generally follow the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam.

---

19 There is a vital debate in sociology of religion within Slovenia about how to categorize people in this group between the cultural definition of belonging to Catholic faith (as a family tradition) and membership oriented understandings of belonging to the Catholic Church (as an institution).

20 ZAS — Združenje ateistov Slovenije (Association of Atheists in Slovenia).

21 Most of them were Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina or Albanians from Macedonia and Kosovo.

22 Islamska Skupnost v Republiki Sloveniji (ISRS) — Islamic Community in The Republic of Slovenia.

| Population according to ethnic affiliation (as percentage of total population) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Slovene | Croat | | Serb | Bosn.[23] | other | n.a.[24] | unkn. |
| 83.1 | 1.8 | | 1.98 | 1.51 | 2.11 | 3.09 | 6.43 |
| … native language | | | | | | | |
| Slovene | Croat | S.-C.[25] | Serb | Bosnian | other | | unkn. |
| 87.75 | 2.75 | 1.85 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.81 | | 2.66 |
| … religious affiliation | | | | | | | |
| Catholic | Atheist | Prot. | Ortho. | Muslim | other | n.a. | unkn. |
| 57.8 | 10.1 | 0.9 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 3.6 | 15.7 | 7.1 |

Fig. 1.2 Religion and Ethnicity in Slovenia, 2002 Census[26]

The third religious denomination in Slovenia that is important in the context of this chapter is Orthodox Christianity, with approximately 46,000 adherents in the 2002 census. As with the Muslim community, Slovenian Orthodox Christians mostly originate from poorer regions of Yugoslavia and immigrated during the1960s and 1970s. Orthodox Christians are either Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, or Southern Serbia; or are Macedonians. Almost 90% of Orthodox adherents are affiliated to the Serbian-Orthodox Church (SPC), the remaining to the Macedonian counterpart MPC.

The last religious confession in Slovenia—albeit very important, due to its historical role—is Christian Protestantism. The 2002 census reports 16,135 adherents; although a relatively small group, comprising less than 1% of the population, it is a traditionally rooted religious branch of Christianity in the area, which was suppressed in a conservative Catholic environment (see historical remarks). Today, the majority of adherents are organized in the Evangelical Church in Slovenia[27] (14,736 members); a further 1,399 people identified themselves as members of

23 Islamska Skupnost v Republiki Sloveniji (ISRS) — Islamic Community in The Republic of Slovenia.

24 No answer.

25 Serbo-Croatian.

26 State Statistical Office of The Republic of Slovenia, 2002 Census (http://www.stat.si/popis2002/, 28/01/13). Data as percentage of total population.

27 Evangeličanska cerkev AV v Republiki Sloveniji (ECRS)—Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession in The Republic of Slovenia. Subsequent total number of members as reported by ECRS and other groups.

other, mostly newly founded, Protestant groups.

Other religious communities present in Slovenia are predominantly new movements (mostly Evangelical Christian organizations from North America) or traditional religions that have no historical representation in Europe (e.g., Buddhism). The sphere of other religions in Slovenia is notably heterogeneous: respective organizations have in sum approximately 10,000 to 15,000 adherents, with no particular belief showing significant growth. Therefore, these groups do not have a noticeable influence on public or political debates.

*Religious Organizations*

The categorization of institutionalized religious groups in Slovenia follows that of the Office for Religious Communities in the Republic of Slovenia (ORC)[28] into: a) traditional, b) immigrated, and c) new religious communities. According to affiliates and infrastructure, the largest traditional religious community in Slovenia is the RKC. The two archdioceses that head its organizational structure, Ljubljana and Maribor, are subdivided into six bishoprics (additionally the bishoprics of Murska Sobota, Celje, Koper, and Novo Mesto). The heads of the six units constitute the Slovene Bishops Conference (SŠK[29]) as the highest organ of the Catholic Church in the country, which consists of eight members[30]. Its task is to regulate and organize relations between the community and the state. The six bishoprics host the 785 parishes of the Catholic Church in Slovenia[31], which constitute the lowest level of the church hierarchy. The bishoprics and parishes are legal persons under the Religious Freedom Act (2007, 2010).

In order to understand the attitudes of the population in Slovenia towards religion, and especially towards the Catholic Church, it is necessary to briefly highlight three current problems of the RKC concerning politics and society. The first issue is less concerned with spiritual than with economic matters. Since Slovenia's independence, the RKC has demanded comprehensive restitution of property nationalized in the former socialist Yugoslavia. If the claims would be fully accepted by political decision, it is argued that the largest religious institution would become also a key

28 Urad za verske skupnosti, http://www.mizks.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/urad_za_verske _skupnosti/, 28/01/13.

29 Slovenska Škofovska Konferenca — SŠK.

30 Currently, the body consists of the mentioned six bishops plus the Auxiliary Bishop of Ljubljana (Msgr. Dr. Jamnik) and a retired dignitary (Msgr. Pirih).

31 February 2012, ORC, http://www.mizks.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/urad_za _verske_skupnosti/, 28/01/13.

economic player (if not a monopolist) in various business areas in Slovenia. Due to the state's recent financial problems and mismanagement within parts of the Catholic Church, this issue remains one of intense public discussion. Secondly, the RKC remains passive in addressing its role during the Second World War. This issue marks a central source of value-normative separation between the Catholic Church and other significant groups of society. Thirdly, the RKC actively articulates its traditional and conservative position towards political and social issues. Thus, it intervenes in the political sphere by introducing its arguments to public debate. Due to these three dimensions, public trust in the institution remains low; only one third (34.8%) of the Slovenian population expressed general confidence in churches[32].

The second traditional and institutionalized religious community is the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession in the Republic of Slovenia (ECRS). This relatively small church is concentrated in the northeastern part of the country, close to the borders with Austria and Hungary. It is organized in one bishopric (seat in Moravske Toplice), which compromises 14 parishes[33] in the region. Due to its progressive role in historically important events in the formation of a Slovene identity and nation (reformation, process of establishment of Slovene as a written language) and the liberal but inclusive position of its leaders in recent political debates, the church enjoys a widespread positive reputation, while only 0.75% of the population actually members of the church.

The RKC and the ECRS represent the traditional religious communities in Slovenia[34]. The second category provided by the ORC includes immigrated religions and religious groups. Here, most members are reported for the Islamic Community in Slovenia (ISRS), which claims to represent 98.5% of all Muslims in the country. The ISRS was registered in 1976 in Ljubljana with one imam, but could not be fully active until Slovenia became a sovereign state. Following independence of the state in 1991, the ISRS organized the structure and institutional integration of Muslims in Slovenia under the influence of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina[35]. Today, it is highly integrated into the structures of the Bosnian Islamic Community and holds 3 of 83 seats in the council of the Bosnian organization[36]. Internally, the ISRS is headed by the mufti (currently Dr. Nedžad Grabus), who is

32 World Values Survey, question E069 ("How much confidence do you have in the churches?"). Data available only for year 1999, see http://worldvaluessurvey.org (28/01/13).

33 Evangelical Church in the Republic of Slovenia, see http://www.evang-cerkev.si/, 28/01/13.

34 Judaism, which is registered as the third traditional religion by the ORC, comprises a very small community in Slovenia (total 99 people in the 2002 census).

35 ISRS, http://www.islamska-skupnost.si/, 28/01/13.

36 See official page of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina http://www.rijaset.ba/.

elected for a 5-year term by the council of the ISRS, which is required to a make two-thirds majority decision on this issue. The mufti must be approved by the authorities of the Bosnian Islamic Community in Sarajevo. The 15 local communities of the ISRS are located mostly in larger industrial towns. Each community sends members to the council of the ISRS in Ljubljana. In 2006, one imam and former mufti of the ISRS formed a separate group in Ljubljana, with approximately 200 followers. Other Muslim communities report fewer members, and therefore do not play a crucial role in the religious sphere.

The Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) is the last important religious organization in Slovenia discussed in this paper. It was also registered in 1976 and faced similar restrictions to the Muslim organization during socialism. In the 2002 census, 43,285 people declared affiliation to Orthodox Christianity, most of which were within the SPC. The Serbian Orthodox Church in Slovenia is itself one of five parts of the district of the Metropolitan of Zagreb-Ljubljana[37] (a similar territorial unit to a Catholic bishopric). Internally, the church organizes eight local communities in Slovenia around its national center in Ljubljana. There are numerous other religious groups in the country, but their organizational status and infrastructure are limited by their low membership capacity. In total, there are presently 42 churches and other religious communities registered by ORC[38].

*State Regulation and Political Involvement*

Religion in general—and religious communities in particular—receive little attention in the Slovenian Constitution. Art. 7, para. 1 of the constitution notes that the state is separated from religious communities. The subsequent paragraph states that religious groups are equal and can pursue their activities in Slovenia in a free manner. Four additional articles[39] of the constitution are concerned with the issue, expressing freedom of religion in specific situations and merely on an individual level. No religious group is explicitly mentioned, and neither is the legitimation of the state based on historical or religious recourses.

The official state body responsible for religious affairs in the country, the Office for Religious Communities (ORC), registries religious groups, observes

37 See official page of the SPC http://www.mitropolija-zagrebacka.org/,

38 http://www.mizks.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/urad_za_verske_skupnosti/register_cerkva_in_dru gih_verskih_skupnosti/#c18716, accessed 28/01/13.

39 Additional articles are Art.14 (equality before the law), Art.16 (suspension and restriction of rights), Art.41 (freedom of conscience), and Art.63 (prohibition of incitement to hatred and discrimination).

religious communities, and supports the inter-religious dialogue in Slovenia. The administrative registration process is rather short and does not hinder groups from religious activities. To date, there is no instance of the ORC intervening in the internal affairs of any religious group, or rejecting an application for registration. The first registration of religious communities in Slovenia dates back to 1976. Since then, 44 religious communities enrolled in the register, of which two were recently deleted (2010 and 2012). In addition to the register, the state conducted special agreements on the legal status of six religious communities[40], most of them traditional and Christian. In these cases, the organizations have a certain size and structure that require further regulation for channeling relations with the state. Additionally, the Republic of Slovenia signed a special treaty with the Holy See on legal issues associated with the activities of the Catholic Church in the country[41].

Slovenia's political system is influenced by the religious sphere due to the specific historical path-dependencies that resulted in the cleavage of people with indifferent religious attitudes from those with traditional Catholic-oriented beliefs. Several Slovenian political parties position themselves in the tradition of the first Slovene parties, which appeared more than a century ago, and are therefore perceived as having a close relationship to the Catholic Church (Kerševan 1998:379). Links are not directed only from the political area, as parts of the RKC also expressed their preference for certain conservative parties in pre-election periods. On the other side of the political spectrum, parties explicitly canvass voters with a very distant attitude towards the Catholic Church. This major cleavage can also be observed in the party-specific handling of the key question of restitution of property confiscated from the Catholic Church after 1945. Some parties support the claims of the RKC, whereas others do not. The interests of political and religious players also coincide in the cultural and educational sector, particularly on the issue of interpretation of the role of the Catholic Church during the Second World War. Here, political actors express widely divergent views: Some adopt the position of the RKC; parties on the other side of the political spectrum accuse the church of collaboration with fascist occupiers (Ibid:381). Overall, the described basic cleavage in Slovenian society is also manifest in the political system.

The last twenty years have seen no major disputes between religious communities in Slovenia. Religious harmony is instead disrupted by political decisions

40 Ibid. Agreement on Legal Status with the Roman Catholic Church / Slovenian Bishops Conference (1999), the Evangelical Church (2000), the Pentecostal Church (2004), the Serbian Orthodox Church (2004), the Islamic Community (2007), and the Buddhist Congregation Dharmaling (2008).

41 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia 04/2004.

or inactivity, as described above. This is also obvious in the case of the year-long unsuccessful application of the ISRS to build a new place of worship in Ljubljana. Compared to the wider regional situation, Slovenia experiences few societal conflicts, and religious involvement in such is limited and non-violent. Consequently, relations between religious communities and the state are characterized by a general separation, and by tolerance from the political side. The GIR index therefore evaluates Slovenia as having general support for some religions and a low level of restrictions on minorities (Fox 2008:147).

## Religion, State, and Society in Macedonia

The second case study is that of the Republic of Macedonia, a country that was also a part of the former socialist Yugoslavia. Becoming independent in September 1991, the small state, inhabited by 2 million people, soon faced tremendous internal and external threats to its sovereignty and statehood.

### *Independence of the State and External Constraints*

The external challenges to Macedonia were and are derived from the construction and interpretations of national identity within the neighboring nations, especially in Greece and Bulgaria. These circumstances affect crucial pillars of legitimation of the sovereign Macedonian state. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, bordering in the north shortly after its independence, was involved in the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and faced a UN Security Council trade embargo between 1992 and 1995. Macedonia was therefore unable to trade via these major economic channels, which had been established for decades within Yugoslavia. In 1999, many refugees fled the Kosovo war to Macedonia, which was then one of the poorest countries in Europe. Thus, Macedonia's early independence was accompanied by a constant potential for overspill of violence from the north. Political relations with Serbia on official level were generally non-hostile during the last two decades. Nevertheless, one unresolved issue continues to have far-reaching influences on the religious sphere in Macedonia: The Serbian Orthodox Church does not recognize the autocephaly of its Macedonian counterpart MPC and therefore does not accept the decisions taken during socialist rule to split the churches and establish an institution within each federal unit to represent the spiritual interests of the majority of the population within its borders (see historical remarks). From the official perspective of the SPC, the Orthodox Church in Macedonia remains part of their institution, and the area under their spiritual jurisdiction.

Bulgaria, to the west, has maintained good political relations with Macedonia since its independence. Bulgaria recognized the Macedonian state early, but yet denies a distinct ethnic and cultural Slavic identity in Macedonia (Riedel 2005:123). This point of view also influences the religious sphere in Macedonia: Part of the cultural negation from the Bulgarian side is the claim of a historical Bulgarian continuity of the Orthodox Church in Macedonia. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BPC) does not recognize the MPC. By glorifying a brief period of the Middle Ages, during which the territory was governed by Bulgarian rulers, the BPC continues to insist on its cultural supremacy over the MPC. Finally, the resulting situation for the Macedonian Orthodox Church is the same as the dispute with the SPC: external exclusion and denial of its existence. From the two sides, the MPC is in a constant state of probation to prove its legitimacy, and therefore the basis of its very existence.

Greece, in the south, immediately closed all border crossings following the declaration of the Republic of Macedonia in September 1991. It imposed various restrictions and demanded changes of official symbols of the newly founded state (including the constitution and the flag), with which Macedonia complied in most cases. The so-called 'name dispute' regarding the constitutional name of Macedonia, which was imposed by Greece at that time, continues to hinder the republic from full recognition in crucial European and global governmental organizations. The political dispute between the two countries is also present in the religious sphere. The Greek Orthodox Church does not recognize the MPC as an independent Orthodox church. There are no established interreligious consultations to resolve the status of the MPC—a situation similar to relations with the other two Orthodox churches of Serbia and Bulgaria.

Macedonia's western neighbor is Albania, the poorest country in Europe. Due to specific circumstances during socialism[42], there are only a few economic and cultural connections between the two states. On an official political level, relations are friendly but fragile, because of provocative elements within the Albanian minority in Macedonia declaring Albania as their center of national orientation. Since religion is not a primary source of identity and orientation for a majority of the Albanian population[43] and is handled very liberally there, its religious sphere provides no basis for potential negative influence on interreligious relations with Macedonia. The summary demonstrates that, with the exception of Albania, the surrounding

42 Relations between the leaders of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and of Albania, Enver Hoxha, remained fraught since 1948, when Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau).

43 Compared to European societies, there are high rates of atheism and interreligious marriage among the population of Albania.

states have continually influenced the identity of the Macedonia (Slavic) population and therefore also influenced religious affairs.

When Macedonia declared independence, the country's economy and the political elite were not prepared for sovereignty to the same degree as in the Slovenian case. Macedonia was highly dependent on Yugoslavia in economic terms, since the state budget of the republic was financed mainly by federal financial aid from the developed republics Slovenia and Croatia via a fund in Belgrade. Alongside Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia was among the poorest parts of the federation. Additionally, the markets for Macedonian products were exclusively within the borders of the collapsing Yugoslavia. The political elite, namely the first president of the republic, Kiro Gligorov, and the members of the first expert government, faced these challenges with sincere intentions but disagreed about the economic transition (e.g., measures of privatization). Partly due to the external constraints, successive governments failed to construct a functioning market economy and democratic political regime. Consequently, a vast majority of the population experienced lower living standards compared to socialist times. Economic emigration increased significantly at the beginning of 1990s. Today, Macedonia is among the least developed countries in Europe and is ranked 78th, between Mauritius and Jamaica, in the 2011 UNDP Human Development Index (UNDP 2011:128). Due to declining living standards and badly mismanaged privatization, economic wealth is now concentrated among a few. The Gini Index, which measures income equality within a country, increased dramatically during the transition period (today at 44.2)[44].

*The Population*

The 2002 census shows that 64.2% of the Macedonian population is affiliated to Christian Orthodoxy[45] (see Fig. 1.3).Since that census did not record membership in organizations such as the Serbian, Bulgarian, or Macedonian Orthodox Churches (Statistical Office 2002a:518), it is not possible to identify the exact distribution of followers.

Nevertheless, since religion and language are strongly linked to ethnic identity in Southeastern Europe, one can compare the numbers with the data on ethnic affiliation and native language in the census. In terms of ethnic distribution, 64.8% of the population identified themselves as Macedonian and 1.8% Serbian (Ibid. 2002b:62); percentages for native language are only slightly different to those for

44 Income Gini coefficient 2000–2011, see UNDP 2011:136.

45 The census of 2011 was not conducted regularly. Therefore, data from the 2002 census is presented here.

ethnicity (Ibid. 2002a:446). It can therefore be reasoned that the spiritual competence of the MPC is recognized by the majority of Christian Orthodox adherents in Macedonia[46].

| Population according to ethnic affiliation (as percentage of total population) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mace.[47] | Serb | Alb.[48] | Turkish | Roma | other | n.a. | unkn. |
| 64.2 | 1.8 | 25.2 | 3.9 | 2.7 | 2.2 | - | - |
| … native language | | | | | | | |
| Mace. | Serbian | Alb. | Turkish | Roma | other | n.a. | unkn. |
| 66.5 | 1.2 | 25.1 | 3.5 | 1.9 | 1.8 | - | - |
| … declaration by religion | | | | | | | |
| Orth.[49] | o. Ch.[50] | Muslim | | | other | n.a. | unkn. |
| 64.78 | 0.37 | 33.33 | | | 1.52 | - | - |

Fig. 1.3 Religion and ethnicity in Macedonia, 2002 Census[51]

The second-largest group according to religious affiliation is Muslims, who comprise 33.3% of the total population. The great majority follow Sunni Islam (Hanafi School), with a minority of Bektashi, a traditional Muslim dervish order. The Sunni group is ethnically highly heterogeneous, and consists of Albanians, Turks, Roma, Muslim Macedonians (Torbeshi, Pomaks), and Bosnians.

Ethnic Albanians represent 25.1% of the total population, and so dominate the Islamic sphere in Macedonia. The second-largest ethnic group of Muslim faith is the Turkish community, which, via the Ottoman Empire, has shaped Islamic religious traditions for centuries in what is present-day Macedonia. The share of 3.9% of the total population implies that the group accounts for at least 10% of Muslim believers in the country. Roma, as the third group, officially represent 2.7% of the

46 Additionally, tabular analysis in the World Values Survey for Macedonia 2001 reveals a strong overlap between of religious denomination (F025) and ethnic group (X051) variables (http://worldvaluessurvey.org, 28/01/13).

47 Macedonian.

48 Albanian.

49 Orthodox (in the census not differentiated between Macedonian and Serbian).

50 Adherents of other Christian branches.

51 State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, 2002 Census (see http://www.stat.gov.mk/, 28/01/13). Data as percentage of total population. Bulgarian is not declared separately, as ethnic affiliation or native language.

population, and therefore constitute approximately 8% of Muslims in Macedonia. Due to their marginal status in education, politics, and economy, they have little influence on major Islamic institutions within the country or on the character of their relations with the state. Thus, Roma are underrepresented in institutions of the religious sphere of society too. Recently, there have been complaints from local Muslim Roma groups that the Albanian dominated Islamic Religious Community of Macedonia (IRC) has attempted to expand its control over their communities[52].

Other religions active in Macedonia are predominantly new religious movements, such as American Evangelist Churches or Asian religions. In sum, they do not have a significant number of adherents and do not influence the political sphere. It is notable that the statistical analysis of the 2002 census omits those who did not provide an answer, identified themselves as atheist, or who chose not to declare a religious affiliation (Statistical Office 2002a:518). The census gives the overall impression that the majority of people belong to a religious denomination, and that there is no space for a predominantly indifferent attitude towards religion among the population[53].

*Religious Organizations*

The largest organized religious community in the Republic of Macedonia is the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Due to historical path-dependencies, its establishment was not accepted by the SPC or the BPC: Both tried to extend their spiritual jurisdiction over the territory of today's Macedonia following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the expansion of their respective kingdoms in the area, which started approximately 150 years go. After the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, the territory became part of Serbia and a 'cultural Serbization' took place. Together with the Bulgarian occupation during the two world wars, Orthodox Slavs in the area of today's Macedonia were frequently forced to change ethnic identity and description of their religious affiliation until 1945. By the end of the Second World War, a decision by the People's Liberation Front of Macedonia (ASNOM) introduced the foundation of the Macedonian Orthodox Church in order to end the dispute between the SPC and the BPC and to grant Macedonian Slavic people a source of their own national identity. Hence, the process of separation from the Serbian Orthodox Church was marked by political influence. Nevertheless, in 1959, under political pressure, the

52 http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2012/11/29/feature-03, 28/01/13.

53 Despite the historical experience of socialism which indicates that these attitudes could be a relevant pattern among people living in Macedonia.

SPC officially accepted an independent church in Macedonia. Eight years later, in 1967, the MPC itself declared autocephaly as the final step in the establishment of an independent Orthodox Christian church. However, the declaration was never accepted by the SPC. Despite complaints from the latter, the Macedonian Orthodox Church began to build up its own structure; it slowly established its own parishes within the territory of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, and benefited from the transfer of places of worship (especially after 1991) that were owned by the SPC before nationalization. Important for the current text is the fact that, today, the MPC is not headed by a superior institution outside the country, directly or indirectly influencing its decisions and activities.

The Macedonian Orthodox Church is internally structured into ten dioceses[54]. Seven are located within the country; three are established for the diaspora in America/Canada, Australia/New Zealand, and Europe, respectively. The dioceses are organized in the Holy Synod, the highest organ of the MPC. The synod is presided over by the Archbishop of Ohrid and Macedonia (currently Archbishop Stephen), the representative head of the church. The local institutions of the seven dioceses within Macedonia are the parishes, whereas the exact number of active ones is unclear. Estimations differ widely, and often include religious buildings without mentioning levels of spiritual activity performed by the MPC (Nikolovski-Katin 1999:92). With regard to the population of the country, the MPC claims to be a central source of identity of the Slavic Macedonian people, as recently reiterated by Archbishop Stephen[55]. It is necessary to note that the church currently supervises religious places and symbols that are of central importance for the whole of Christian Orthodoxy in Eastern Europe (see the cultural heritage surrounding Lake Ohrid).

The second-largest religious organization in the country is the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia (IRC[56]). Similarly to the MPC, it is constituted independently and does not have a superior institution outside the country setting guidelines for its activities. The IRC is dominated by the ethnic Albanian group in multi-ethnic Macedonia but claims to represent all Muslims in the country, irrespective of their ethnicity. Nonetheless, especially for religious Turks and Bosnians, the Islamic institutions of their respective countries are central points of orientation. It is reported that Roma—who are also mostly Muslim—have the least religious conscience and institutionalization. This ethnic group organizes religious life at the

54 See http://www.mpc.org.mk/, 28/01/13.

55 Christmas address of Archbishop Stephen, 6 January 2013 (http://evesti.mk/2013/01/05/g-g-stefan-bozik-e-praznik-na-mirot-prazink-na-slgata-i-edinstvoto/, 28/01/13).

56 Albanian BFI—Bashkësia Fetare Islame në Republikën e Maqedonisë, http://www.bim.org.mk/, 28/01/13.

local level, and here quite independently. As mentioned earlier in the text, local Muslim communities of Roma complained about the expanding efforts of the IRC. There are no coherent data available about the number of local communities included in the IRC. The community has its own educational institutions, the Madrassa Isa Beg (a secondary school) and the Faculty of Islamic Sciences, both located in Skopje. Macedonia has another small but prominent Muslim organization: the traditional Bektashi Religious Group of Macedonia (BRG). Similarly to the majority of Muslims in Macedonia, the members of the Bektashi order are concentrated in the northwest of the country; however, in contrast to the larger Muslim communities, they follow a form of Islam which cannot be subsumed under the two main Sunni and Shia branches of the religion. Instead, Bektashi is characterized by syncretic elements of various branches of Islam. After independence in 1991, a dispute occurred between the BRG and the state, regarding restitution of places of worship that were confiscated from the Bektashi under socialist nationalization. This also included the question of ownership of an old and historically significant mosque compound (*tekke*) near Tetovo. In 2002, a radical Muslim group staged a violent occupation of the compound, in response to which the state did not intervene. More recently, the compound was partly transferred by the state to the ownership of the IRC, which clearly discriminates against the Bektashi group.

In total, there are 30 religious communities registered at the Commission for the Relations with Religious Communities and Groups[57]. Since other religious communities combined represent less than two percent of the population, they are not crucial players in the Macedonian religious sphere. Generally, religious leaders in Macedonia express interreligious understanding and cooperation. Instead, the main potential for religious disputes in Macedonia is between institutions of one religious denomination rather than between the two major organizations MPC and IRC, which claim to represent the vast majority of citizens. The conflict line within the religious denominations is located between small organizations and the dominant one, which is indirectly supported by crucial political actors. In the two cases of MPC and IRC, it is possible to identify highly significant political factors in the religious sphere of Macedonia (see 'state regulation', described below). Since independence, groups of armed rebels have sporadically proclaimed areas 'independent', often located in the northwest of the country. Such groups attempt to use religion as a divisive factor between Albanians and Macedonians, but major religious institutions distance themselves from these groups, whose activities are mostly motivated by criminal goals. In general, it is doubtful whether the activities of armed rebel groups have any form of religious motivation.

57 http://www.kovz.gov.mk/?ItemID=BFF253DF95C8884785FFD6B65A39654E, 28/01/13.

*State Regulation and Political Involvement*

The reformed 2001 constitution of Macedonia emphasizes in its preamble seven ethnic groups living in the country. It mentions issues concerning religion in six articles[58]. In five of the six, the individual right of freedom of religion is regulated. Article 19 additionally highlights the separation of religion from the state and the establishment of religious educational facilities, and therefore concentrates on collective rights of religious communities. Here, the MPC, the Islamic Religious Community, the Catholic Church, the Evangelical Methodist Church, and the Jewish Community are explicitly referenced.

The state requires religious communities to be registered via the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Groups, which is an independent government body[59]. The commission categorizes registered religious organizations into churches, religious communities and religious groups[60], yet on an unexplained basis. The first category of *churches* compromises 15 Christian religious groups, the most prominent being the MPC, the Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Church in Macedonia. The others are all very small Christian churches, both traditional and newly founded. The second category, *religious communities*, includes seven institutions: the Islamic Community (IRC), the Jewish community, as well as five others[61], yet all are of different nature. The last category is termed *religious groups*, and compromises eight associations—six Christian and two Muslim. The Bektashi order is also registered in this category, which is an indicator of an applied ranking of preference by the state, and hence of unequal treatment in comparison to the IRC. An additional indicator is the duration of registration which differed in these two cases.

Furthermore, the Serbian Orthodox Church is not mentioned in the register. Statements from representatives of the SPC in Macedonia point out that numerous unsuccessful applications for registration were launched during the last twenty years. The state also uses violent means to prevent the establishment of the SPC in Macedonia, in terms of administering places of worship. Bishop Jovan, official representative of the SPC on Macedonian soil[62], was repeatedly arrested by the police, who also damaged the place of worship and his property. He was also prevented

58 Articles number 9, 19, 20, 48, 54, and 110 of the Macedonian constitution.

59 http://www.vlada.mk, 28/01/13.

60 http://www.kovz.gov.mk/?ItemID=BFF253DF95C8884785FFD6B65A39654E, 28/01/13.

61 Jehovah's Witnesses, Islamic Community of the Holy See and the Crown, Sathya Sai Centre, Vaishnavska Religious Community Iskon, Community "Universal Life".

62 http://spc.rs/, 28/01/13.

from entering the country in religious clothing.

The next issue between religion and politics in Macedonia concerns the construction of religious buildings. In 2009, the conservative government announced the construction of an Orthodox church in the city of Skopje, which would be run by the MPC. This provoked other communities, first of all the IRC, and resulted in their claim for state funding for their places of worship. There is also criticism from smaller religious associations, who claimed that they have been repeatedly denied government permission to erect places of worship, even from their own financial budgets[63]. Here, a qualitative discrepancy in the treatment of religious communities is manifest. The issue forms part of a broader context which includes, for example, the re-shaping of the capital city of Skopje[64], where the government of Macedonia has spent 200–250 million euros[65] on new museums, monuments, and sculptures. These projects are part of the attempt of certain political actors to construct a new national Macedonian consciousness among the ethnic Macedonian citizens. Besides the antique and often odd symbols of the new architectural projects, the MPC became part of the construction of Macedonian identity. Consequently, an overlap of goals of ethno-political parties and religion can be detected. In addition to the bizarre combination of the historical background of the region and current national identity, other societal groups not targeted by these symbols are obviously excluded from the process of cultural and national construction.

The repeated discrimination and sometimes persecution of other religious groups—especially other Orthodox Churches—as well as the documented favoritism of one (MPC) and gradually a second religious organization (the IRC) indicates the establishment of 'state favored religious communities' in the case of Macedonia. The MPC is seen by decisive political parties, as well as from its own perspective, as a pillar of modern Slavic Macedonian identity. Therefore, politics is involved in defining ethno-religious identity. The reaction from the other main ethnic part of the political spectrum is favoritism of one Islamic association, the IRC. It can be followed that a system with two cultural state religions is emerging in Macedonia, because there is political support for the deep involvement of the two dominant religious organizations in the formation of identity on a national level. The structures and dynamics of the relationship of religion and politics in Macedonia are not comprehensively described here, but provide good examples of why Jonathan Fox allocated a rating of 27.17 on the scale between full separation

63 See http://www.forum18.org/, 28/01/13.

64 The project was labeled 'Skopje 2014'.

65 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-s-skopje-2%C3%A5aa4-eats-quarter-billion-euros, 28/01/13.

of religion and state (0 points) and a religious state (100 points) (Fox 2008:141). Hence, relations in Macedonia are characterized by preferred treatment for some religions, and by a high level of restrictions on minorities. Since the data series used by Fox ends in 2005 (Ibid:47), developments during the last eight years are not included in his study. Nevertheless, processes during the last decade show that the country is tending towards the category of cultural state religion (see Fig. 1.1): Other indicators, such as the Government Regulation Index (GRI) and Government Favoritism Index (GFI) of the State and Religion Project[66] evaluate the situation as having an even closer relationship between religion and state (values 3.1 and 4.1 respectively[67], see Fig. 1.5).

Before summarizing the relations between religion and state within Macedonia, external constraints must be acknowledged. Since crucial neighboring states dispute the very existence of a Macedonian nation, and particularly the legitimation of the MPC as a basic pillar of the nation, the state and the main religious organization in Macedonia are in a constant state of probation. This translates into internal developments, wherein domestic politics becomes an issue of identity construction and search for legitimation. Here, political forces declare religion—and employ the two favored religious organizations for that goal—as one main source of personal identity. Other religious groups or minorities are comminuted between the two ethno-political powers of Macedonians and Albanians. This conflict already reached high levels of intensity compared to Slovenia, because violence and the threat of violence are used for political blackmail on a daily basis. According to Fox (2004), the religion variable is most likely to intensify external and internal conflicts, as can be observed in the case of Macedonia.

## Conclusions

The religious spheres of the small societies of Slovenia and Macedonia share a pluralistic character. In both countries, the population can be divided into two dominant groups: In Slovenia, between Catholic Christianity and indifferent attitudes towards religion; in Macedonia, between adherents of Orthodox Christianity and followers of Sunni Islam. In each society, on the organizational level, at least 30 religious communities are registered, comprising both traditional groups and new, mostly minor Christian, movements. Additionally, religious communities of all sizes have shown no significant growth in either country. The qualitative differences between Slovenia and Macedonia lay in the relationship between religion and state

66 http://www.thearda.com/ras/, 28/01/13.

67 The range of both values is between 0 (full separation) and 10 (religious state).

following the collapse of socialism. Developments in Slovenia over the past decade reveal consistently declining trust in the main traditional religious community, the Catholic Church. Thus, political influence by the church is not supported by the population. In Macedonia, the Macedonian Orthodox Church, representing the majority religion, became a pillar of legitimation of the state by political will; the church actively fulfills this function, also to legitimate its own existence. However, in spiritual terms, it is not representative of at least one third of the population and cannot function as a basis for national identity. The legitimation of the involvement of religion in politics remains limited in Macedonia and Slovenia, as demonstrated by the attitudes of citizens, shown in Figure 1.4.

| | Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit to hold public office | Religious leaders should not influence how people vote | Religious leaders should not influence government | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | MK 01[68] | SLO 05[69] | MK 01 | SLO 05 | MK 01 | SLO 05 |
| Agree | 32.4 | 10 | 75.1 | 69.3 | 67.9 | 65.8 |
| Neither | 16.8 | 15.1 | 8.7 | 10.7 | 12.9 | 12.3 |
| Disagree | 44.1 | 69.4 | 9.6 | 14.2 | 11.5 | 16 |

Fig. 1.4 Attitudes towards the involvement of religion in politics[70]

Figure 1.4 clearly indicates that the populations of both countries generally oppose the influence of religious leaders in politics (and elections). Nevertheless, 32.4% of the Macedonian population agrees that politicians should believe in God in order to hold public office (68.8% of Muslim and 25% of Orthodox respondents). Compared to Slovenia, both response rates are very high, even though agreement was predominantly expressed by Muslim respondents. Nevertheless, the involvement of religions in Macedonian politics is not legitimized with regard to the attitudes of the population.

The relationships between religion and state in Slovenia and Macedonia are summarized in Fig. 1.5. Slovenia belongs to the category of countries which institutionalized a generally civil separation of the spheres (with moderate political support for religion). In contrast, Macedonia is among the countries demonstrating

68 Macedonia 2001.

69 Slovenia 2005.

70 http://worldvaluessurvey.org/, 28/01/13.

preferential treatment of specific religious communities.

Since the data series does not include the most recent developments, it is assumed that the situation for Slovenia did not change significantly, whereas in Macedonia specific religious institutions are brought into the political arena by specific but crucial actors. Hence, the influence of religion in politics increases and significant characteristics of a cultural state religion legitimating the nation and state can be observed. Nevertheless, since the population largely opposes this influence, mentioned political actions lack legitimacy.

| | GIR[71] | GRI[72] | GFI | SRI | RP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 0–100 | 0–10 | 0–10 | 0–10 | 0–10 |
| MK | 27.17 | 3.1 | 4.1 | 5.8 | 1 |
| SLO | 11.96 | 0.9 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 0 |

Fig. 1.5 Summary of indices of religion/state relations

The findings on religion and state reveal further important implications for the three central theoretical paradigms of sociology of religion (secularization, individualization, or 'market of religions'). Reviewing them in the context of developments in Macedonia and Slovenia, it is noted that a 'market of religions' presumes that historical path-dependencies are weak and that state regulation of religion is low. In both cases, this assumption neglects important variables that are crucial to explain general processes in the religious sphere. Slovenia displays a consistently high level public indifference as well as a steady decline in the number of adherents of traditional religious organizations. Secularization is manifest at the public, political, and even personal levels, where indifference towards religion is widespread today. The conflict line is thus between institutionalized traditional Catholic and secular organizations, which leaves little space for other religious communities to exert public or political influence. A good example is the situation of the Evangelical Church in Slovenia, which expresses very liberal positions to societal questions but gains no new members or adherents besides reputational benefits among the population. In Macedonia, the inclusion of two religious organizations into the political arena by ethno-political parties channels the attention of the population towards the issue: religion has regained a presence in the public sphere with political intentions.

71 Fox 2008:141.

72 See http://www.thearda.com/, 28/01/13. "The GRI, GFI, and SRI values reported on the National Profiles are averages from the 2003, 2005, and 2008 International Religious Freedom reports, while the Religious Persecution (RP) measure is an average from the 2005 and 2008 reports".

## References

Chaves M, Cann D (1992) Regulation, pluralism, and religious market structure. Rationality and Society 4(3):272–290

Forum18. Religious Freedom. http://www.forum18.org/

Fox J (2004) Religion, civilization, and civil war. Lexington Books, Oxford

Fox J (2008) A world survey of religion and the state. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Karpat K (1985) Ottoman population 1830–1914. Demographic and social characteristics. University of Wisconsin Press, London

Kerševan M (1998) Religion und Kirche in der slowenischen Zivilgesellschaft nach 1990. In: Pollack D et al. Religiöser Wandel in den postkommunistischen Ländern Ost- und Mitteleuropas. Ergon, Würzburg, p 371–394

Kippenberg H, Schuppert G (eds) (2005) Die verrechtlichte Religion. Der Öffentlichkeitsstatus von Religionsgemeinschaften. Mohr, Tübingen

Linz J (1996) Der religiöse Gebrauch der Politik und/oder der politische Gebrauch der Religion. Ersatzideologie gegen Ersatzreligion. In: Maier H (ed) Totalitarismus und politische religion. Konzepte des Diktaturvergleichs, München, p 129–154

Macedonian Orthodox Church . http://www.mpc.org.mk/

Minkenberg M (2003) Staat und Kirche in westlichen Demokratien. In: Minkenberg M, Willems U (eds) Politik und Religion. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, p 115–138

Murvar V (1967) Max Weber's concept of hierocracy: A study in the typology of church–state relationships. Sociological Analysis 28(3):69–84

Nikolovski-Katin S (1999) Small religious communities and groups in the republic of Macedonia. Philosophy and Sociology 2(6):91–99

Office for Religious Communities, Slovenia. http://www.mizks.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/urad_za_verske_skupnosti/

Office for the Relations to Religious Communities and Groups, Macedonia. http://www.kovz.gov.mk/

Pollack D (2002) Religion und Politik in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (42):15–22

Pollack D (2009) Renaissance des Religiösen? Erkenntnisse der Sozialforschung. Osteuropa 06 (2009):29–45

Pollack D, Wielgohs J (eds) (2010) Akteure oder Profiteure? Die demokratische Opposition in den ostmitteleuropäischen Regimeumbrüchen 1989. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden

The Religion and State Project. http://www.thearda.com/ras/
Riedel S (2005) Die Erfindung der Balkanvölker. Identitätspolitik zwischen Konflikt und Integration. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden
Riedel S (2006) Kirche und Staat in Russland. Transitionen und Kontinuitäten. In: Bunčić D, Trunte N (eds) Iter philologicum, München, p 319–331
Robertson R (1987) Church–state relations in comparative perspective. In: Robbins T, Robertson R (eds) Church–state relations: Tensions and transitions. Transaction Books, Oxford, p 153–160
Roman Catholic Church, Slovenia. http://katoliska-cerkev.si/
Segal R (ed) (2006) The Blackwell companion to the study of religion. Wiley–Blackwell, Oxford
Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia (2002a) Census of population, households and dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia. Book IX, Skopje
Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia (2002b) Census of population, households and dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia. Book X, Skopje
Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia. http://www.stat.gov.mk/
State Statistical Office of Slovenia. http://www.stat.si/
UNDP (2011) Human development report 2011. United Nations Development Programme, New York
UNDP. Database: Human development indicators. http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/
Weber M (1922) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Mohr, Tübingen
World Values Survey. http://worldvaluessurvey.org