

Examining Cultural Narratives and Celebrating Diversity – Can Europe Slow the American Cultural Juggernaut?

Claire Burnill-Maier

“The earth is in effect one world, in which empty, uninhabited spaces virtually do not exist. Just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography.”

Edward Said (1994: p. 6) “Culture and Imperialism”

Introduction

European cultural output of the late 20th and early 21st centuries has struggled – drowned out by prolific production and the huge success of America’s cultural offerings. Whilst writing this chapter, planned trade talks between the US and the EU are in jeopardy as some European nation states seek a ‘cultural exception’ to bilateral trade talks in a bid to ‘protect cultural diversity’ from the American cultural ‘juggernaut’. As European cultural managers seek to find ways to compete on the global market, is there a requirement to address the profound influence of the past, in order to find a more positive outlook for Europe’s cultural output?

This chapter seeks to explore the notion that when examining the mechanisms for the success of US cultural output, with a view to applying them to a successful European cultural strategy, it is vital to consider the cultural narratives of the two regions. In Edward Said’s “Culture and Imperialism” he states:

“The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them. Most important, the grand narratives of emancipation and enlightenment mobilised people in the colonial world to rise up and throw off imperial subjection; in the process, many Europeans and Americans were also stirred by these stories and their protagonists, and they too fought for new narratives of equality and community.”¹

In this chapter it is argued that it is the success of America’s new narrative that has set it apart from Europe. America has succeeded in creating a grand narrative in which the nation itself fulfils the role of lead protagonist promising visions of freedom, equality and human community via capitalism. In contrast, Europe’s narrative is secured in the past by ties of elitism and imperialism, whose conno-

1 Said (1994) p. xiii.

tations for newly emerging nations embody the very structures from which they have sought independence.

Gramsci's notion of cultural hegemony² has been used to criticise the overwhelming dominance of US (popular) cultural output on the global market. America's economic power has enabled it to influence and shape the values of a growing global audience. Gramsci's argument has been used to express a helplessness of other cultures to compete against the American 'cultural juggernaut'. This chapter however, seeks to look beyond this and argues that, cultural production and output in Central Europe is subject to a 'comprehensive conservatism', that prevails, which is holding back its ability to make its voice heard in the global cultural market. This conservatism is rooted in the cultural narrative of Europe, and is therefore difficult to challenge. In the European cultural sector itself, lies a history to which it is inextricably joined. At the very core of Europe's cultural production is a conservatism, dating back many hundreds – indeed thousands of years, from which it cannot separate itself. In contrast to this, the USA, whose (modern) history spans only a short period, has, until now had fewer of these historic ties with which to grapple. It can therefore be argued that America has successfully projected a notion of economic, political and cultural freedom to the world, which has, paradoxically, created a situation in which it has been able to, coupled with its economic domination, subjugate and exert enormous power and influence throughout the globe. In order to challenge current US hegemony in the cultural sector, European cultural output needs either to embrace a fresh stance and find ways in which to throw off some of the 'cultural-historical shackles' that hinder the success of its global cultural output or learn how to harness it and adapt it to increase its appeal on the global stage.

This chapter will consider the ways in which the two narratives differ and the effect this has on the success of their respective cultural output. It will question the longevity of US cultural dominance and what, if any, are the implications for the way Central European cultural output is received on the global stage.

“Until the lions have their own historian, the tales of the hunt will always glorify the hunter.”³

The socio-cultural histories and narratives used for the purposes of this chapter are those that western historians have taught us. They are the 'standard' western histories of one time European hegemony, and subsequent US hegemony. This chapter does not discuss in detail the other histories that are an important part of European and US histories – neither the voices of Native Americans nor the

2 Gramsci (1968): *Prison Notebooks*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, p. 182.

3 African proverb – source unknown.

voices of the African diaspora are examined, though neither can they be ignored. What this chapter seeks to illustrate is the argument that it is the suppression of these other narratives that has contributed to Europe's faltering competitiveness on the global cultural market.

For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'culture' is used in its broadest sense. Academics and organisations such as UNESCO have sought a definition for the concept of 'culture' many times, resulting in many definitions, however, should we need a definition for it here, Geertz' definition may be applied:

"Culture is a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which people communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life."⁴

Geertz's definition is particularly helpful in this instance as it does not seek to differentiate between 'unique cultures', but acknowledges the fluidity and continuity of culture with which this chapter deals.

When discussing and comparing the US and Europe's cultural *output*, the term is also taken to mean cultural production in its broadest sense. UNESCO's 'culture cycle' encompasses cultural output that goes beyond institutionalised forms and includes cultural activities that are unrelated to social and market activity⁵.

"The culture cycle captures all of the different phases of the creation, production, and dissemination of culture. In this approach, culture can be viewed as resulting from a cognate set of processes. These activities may or may not be institutionalised, and they may or may not be governed by the state. The broad conception of a sector that includes non-formal, amateur and activities unrelated to the market is termed a 'domain' in order to indicate that the concept covers social and non-market related activity, as well as economic, market-related activity."⁶

Cultural output in this sense therefore includes forms of entertainment including digital output, television, film, books, magazines and other printed material as well as food and fashion. In using these definitions, I endeavour to avoid the narrow view of culture which is limited to high-culture but to go beyond this view in order to include the symbols and values that culture also encompasses.

The term 'European Culture' is a highly problematic and hugely complex concept. Within the work of the European Union, it has been a central challenge to try and forge the notion of a European identity, but in spite of the uniqueness of nation states, there is commonality to be found throughout Europe:

4 Geertz (1973): p. 89.

5 UNESCO (2009): Framework for cultural statistics. Montreal.

6 UNESCO (2009): p. 19.

“The idea of a ‘European culture’ is a complicated one, on which it is possible to take a number of standpoints. One point of view is to emphasise the shared heritage of the continent’s countries, based on a long shared history of democracy, liberal economic regimes and value-sources such as the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the continent’s status as the fulcrum of two global wars in the last century.”⁷

In order to discuss European culture and cultural output, it is necessary to adopt the viewpoint that there is a strong degree of cultural homogeneity that links Europe.

Cultural Narratives

Anthony Smith argues that Europe’s shared history dates back as far as the Holy Roman Empire⁸, an era which has been reflected and glorified repeatedly across cultural genres throughout European history, including through literary works, architectural styles, fine arts, and theatre. The ideals of empire and dominion are recurring themes in European history and are reflected in the narrative that it projects.

The beginnings of the European capitalism began to emerge around the 16th century. Territories began to develop economies beyond an agrarian model which were controlled by land owning aristocracies. However, disputes for sovereignty, peasant uprisings, the emergence of new states, and spiralling costs forced states to find new sources of income⁹. The European aristocracy and the increasingly powerful body of merchants sought to gain new territory in order to secure commodities for the European market. Rich, powerful elites emerged dictating the cultural landscape and shaping European tastes.

Over the three centuries that followed, in spite of the emergence of a growing school of thought which moved away from the idea of divine rule towards that of enlightened rule, many traditional practises remained and whilst new systems of ownership emerged so too did new groups of wealthy elites who tended to emulate the practises of the aristocracy. The ideology of imperialism dominated much of 18th and 19th century Europe, and whilst enlightenment teaching had brought about political change domestically in Europe, the same enlightenment teaching was being used as justification for the imposition of European cultural values throughout the European colonies. What is crucial here is that whilst domestically European nations were undergoing the political and ideological changes encapsulated by ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’, throughout Europe’s colonies

7 *Eurobarometer 278 (2007): p. 63.*

8 Smith, Anthony D. (1992): *National Identity and the Idea of European Unity*. Blackwell Publishing.

9 Bernstein, Hewitt and Thomas in Alan and Thomas (1992) *Poverty and Development in the 1990s*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

oppression and a policy of suppressing local cultures was firmly in place¹⁰. The title of ‘Emperor’ adopted by European rulers in the 19th century bears testament that although the role of an absolute monarchy had largely been removed from the European political landscape, a strong sense of traditionalism and an elite ruling class was, and in many cases still remains, in existence.

Against the backdrop of a struggle for economic supremacy, and the emergence of liberal economics it has been argued that a lack of modernisation amongst the British and continental European powers contributed to their respective declines in global economic dominance. Perry Anderson (1992) cites the traits of ‘traditionalism and empiricism’ as two of the elements that have legitimised and perpetuated a conservatism that has hindered (British) economic development.

“Traditionalism and empiricism henceforth fuse as a single legitimating system: traditionalism sanctions the present by deriving it from the past, empiricism binds the future by fastening it to the present. A comprehensive conservatism is the result, covering society with a pall of simultaneous philistinism (towards ideas) and mystagogy (towards institutions)...”¹¹

It could be argued, that these same traits, have prevailed throughout central European cultural output and have, as a result, hindered its ability to achieve cultural dominance in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Whereas Europe’s long history seems to serve to tether its cultural output and hinder its success. American culture has the youth, fluidity, and capacity to grow and to flourish.

The beginning of modern American history may be considered as one that began with Columbus’ discovery of the Bahamas in 1492 followed by the establishment of the tobacco colonies. With a history that begins only a little over five hundred years ago, it is comparatively young. Modern America is a nation that was developed by settlers and immigrants who arrived in the so called ‘New World’ in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. Significantly, those who made the journey, largely from Europe, were often those seeking to make economic fortunes, or to escape religious persecution. The pull factors of the Americas, even in its earliest days, were those of wealth and crucially – freedom. Freedom has proven to be a recurring theme in America’s cultural dominance.

At the outset, America formed part of the mercantilist struggle for land. The French, Spanish and British all endeavoured to secure land in order to achieve global dominance. With the voices of Native Americans subdued by the new colonists, and with the slave trade and shipments of commodities Europe’s power

10 See Saliha Belmessous (2013) *Assimilation and Empire Uniformity in French and British Colonies pp. 1541-1954*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

11 Anderson (1992): p. 29.

and wealth grew. Whilst each settler brought with them their own narratives and their own histories, the will to ‘begin afresh’ and to find ‘new fortunes’ was a driving force for many. Slowly the new entrepreneurial inhabitants of America began to shape a new culture.

Unfettered by the conventions of the past, the settlers of early colonial America deliberately sought a new way of life, often as an attempt at leaving behind their own histories and the constraints of religious dogma in Europe. The eighteenth century saw the colonising powers defeated, the declaration of independence and the newly independent America emerge and with that the birth of a new period of global primacy led by the United States. With independence and the establishment of a political system based on post-enlightenment values, for the new American nation, the notion of freedom took on more weight. Escape from religious dogma, and freedom from dominant European powers was now also joined by an economy driven by the ideal of free-trade.

The influence of European history in America, of course remained. Ideas, artefacts and symbols of Europe were imported and adapted and it wasn’t until the Anglo-American wars of 1812-1814 that a new beginning for American cultural output began. Up to this point painters and artists in post-independence America were required to produce images and artworks that reflected and celebrated the fortunes of the new colonists – portraits were required to adorn the walls of those who had successfully established lucrative businesses. Architects had been imported from Europe and much of the culture in evidence had its roots still firmly in Europe. Following the Anglo-American wars however, there was a desire amongst Americans to establish a uniquely American culture. A new spirit of American patriotism was born and it sought its own identity. Even then however, European dominance still prevailed and many writers and artists were still looking to Europe for inspiration.

“tastemakers continued to look abroad for classical and then revival styles. While folk painters roamed rural areas to provide portraits for middling Americans, the European tour and grand historical themes remained critical to the work of academic painters and sculptors. At the same time, new cultural institutions on home soil provided opportunities for artists to study and exhibit. The artistic career of Samuel F. B. Morse (1791–1872) is exemplary. He began as a rural portraitist, took the Grand Tour of European capitals and art collections, and, upon returning to New York, sought commissions for high-style portraits and historical studies. In 1825, he co-founded the National Academy of Design and served as its first president.”¹²

Whilst the fledgling nation of the United States of America began to seek, and carve its own cultural identity with independence, the turning point for the switch

12 Jaffee (2007): http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/pram/hd_pram.htm.

from European cultural hegemony and the beginnings US cultural dominance is found with World War I. According to Elisabeth Currid's 'The Warhol Economy' (2007), it was the influx of European refugees in 1915 to New York that 'invigorated' the cultural scene in the USA. The effect of this, it can be argued, is twofold; not only does the influx of talent begin to secure a livelier cultural scene but it reinforces the notion of freedom within America's cultural narrative. The United States already established as a haven for those seeking a new way of life, re-emerges more forcibly than ever.

The instability of post-World War I Europe opened up huge opportunities for America. America, reluctant to enter the conflict, but instrumental in the defeat of Germany, emerged victorious and thereby able to add 'victor' to its narrative of freedom. In the period leading up to the Second World War America saw huge economic growth – as well as the great depression. Mechanisation, the development of electrical goods, radio and film became hugely important sources of cultural production. The infrastructure for the blanket production of mass cultural goods was in place and the geo-political shift resulting from the Second World War would ensure American cultural products would become some of the nation's most successful exports.

Whereas Europe's centuries long mercantilist struggle had resulted in Europe holding approximately 85% of the earth as colonies from the mid-19th Century up to the beginning of the First World War¹³. The Second World War was to bring an end to colonialism. Decolonisation, a process spanning largely from 1945 into the 1970s, created new nations each representing new economic opportunities for a global capitalist system. One which America has been able to exploit and where American imports of cultural goods from all aspects of the cultural spectrum can be found in huge numbers, including (though by no means limited to), clothing, foods, music, and business models.

13 Harry Magdoff, *Imperialism: from colonial Age to the Present* (New York Monthly review, 1978), pp. 29 and 35 in Said E. (1993) *Culture and Imperialism* p. 6.

The Commodification of Culture and the Promotion of Ideals

In Jameson's critique of the postmodern, he uses the argument:

“‘culture’ has become a product in its own right; the market has become a substitute for itself and fully as much a commodity as any of the items it includes within itself”¹⁴

This being the case, then there are no reasons why European culture cannot be as competitive as those cultural goods offered by America. In part, the success of American cultural output can be attributed to aggressive marketing, certainly. But going beyond that, it is important to consider what it is about American popular culture that makes it so marketable. At the heart of America's success lies the cultural narrative that it is projecting. That American cultural output is still tied to a strongly appealing cultural narrative, ensures its success.

By way of introduction to John Fiske's 'Understanding Popular Culture' (1989) he makes the compelling case for understanding the meanings that jeans convey. He makes the case that through the wearing of jeans, an actor aligns himself with an ideal. Central to this argument is a notion of jeans representing freedom, naturalness and 'Americanness'. He goes on to suggest that the ideal can be subverted through designer jeans or by wearing faded or ripped jeans – but the act of wearing jeans, as opposed to a different form of comfortable, durable clothing, has a cultural meaning beyond practicality.

Fiske's argument is persuasive and can be used to build a case, not only for jeans, but for the global success of American cultural export. Extrapolating Fiske's understanding of what drives popular culture, it is easy to see why American popular culture has found such a huge market. US cultural output is a substitute for itself. Those buying into American goods are, in effect, buying into and promoting the 'American Dream' – a concept that America has perpetuated throughout its short history.

On re-examination of the geo-political climate of post-Second World War we can argue that American cultural goods are not simply commodities, but representations of its own narrative. As a result of social revolutions across the globe, newly decolonised nations were faced with the daunting prospect of choosing between political ideologies. America's success, based on a short period of post-colonial history, provides a model with the apparent qualities of freedom and economic success based on capitalist values, has broad appeal. For the peoples of the newly emerging nations, consuming American cultural goods can be compared to buying into America's narrative and taking up that narrative for themselves.

14 Jameson (1990): section ix.

If we then apply Anderson's argument to cultural output, the effect is two-fold. The first effect of Europe's ties to the past, which include elitist class systems, that were at their height during the period of Europe's global domination, is that European culture is unlikely to appeal to the very peoples who were oppressed by it. Throughout the colonial period, it is French and British cultural output that can be seen as being the most successful – though it was forcibly imposed, even prior to Jules Ferry's 'Assimilation' initiative whereby French cultural values were imposed upon the peoples across its empire including compulsory schooling and uniform and a standard curriculum including the history of France as grand narrative¹⁵ colonial powers had attempted 'civilise' the work forces of the south. Even where cultural works were acknowledged, if there was no demand for them in Europe, then it was seen as having no worth. Bujra, in Allen and Thomas (1992) uses the example of the Baganda craft production of bark-cloth, soap and pottery in the mid-nineteenth century. Although the skill of the craftsmanship was acknowledged as superior, the apparent lack of demand for such goods meant that those manufacturing such goods were instead put to work on coffee plantations, and with that, production of local cultural goods all but died out. The second effect is that without the ability to extricate itself from its past, it becomes difficult for Europe to create truly new forms of cultural output. In addition to Europe's colonial past, the horrors of the Second World War left an indelible stain on the narrative of Europe's 'glorious past'. For Germany in particular and to a lesser extent for Austria, the narrative became one of guilt and shame (a narrative that was encouraged and perpetuated by the narratives of the British and American allied forces). It is a narrative that has permeated the countries' cultures. The cultural narrative of a post-war Europe has become increasingly fragmented and the will of individual nation states to assert their own cultural narrative over the other narratives of Europe has resulted in an incomprehensible clamour. A growing tendency towards nationalism – which in itself is rooted in the past – and in parts of Europe a growing sense of anti-European feeling, are projecting conflicting messages to the globe. These conflicting narratives are, in essence, unmarketable.

If Fiske's case holds true across all aspects of (popular) culture, then it seems clear that in order to compete on the global market, there is a need for Europe to promote a united narrative that reflects a more positive attitude towards it. It needs to be one to which a global audience can relate and have positive associations with. The idea of a united European voice is not a new one, in his work 'The Meaning of Europe' Denis De Rougemont states:

15 Saliha Belmessous (2013) *Assimilation and Empire Uniformity in French and British Colonies* pp. 1541-1954, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

*“Europe is much older than the European nations. Their lack of unity and their ever more illusory claims to absolute sovereignty endanger its very existence. If only they could unite, Europe would be saved, and with it all that remains valuable in its richly creative diversity.”*¹⁶

It seems that Europe should be seeking greater emphasis on its collective narrative and taking a more positive attitude towards its heterogeneity. For it is the heterogeneous nature of Europe, which is not limited to heterogeneity with regard to individual nation states and segregations of language but also from a shared history of colonialism resulting in a rich variety of ethnic groups. There is a need to begin to move its narrative forwards; whilst recognising the past, unforgivable actions of colonial powers, Europe now needs to embrace the diversity that directly, and indirectly resulted from it. The increasing trend towards seeking to protect and preserve national cultures – at the expense of trying to form a more united European culture seems ill-advised. The net result is pockets of insular cultures that are unmarketable globally. One of the most problematic issues of trying to create a more united cultural narrative for Europe is that the growing trend towards nationalism is reflected in national media. The language surrounding ‘the other’, particularly within the framework of immigration, is largely negative and the language of patriotism, which depends upon looking into and reiterating historic narratives of perceived former national strengths and the and notions of nation states’ unique identities are emphasised¹⁷. Increasingly negative language surrounding a united Europe can only serve to exacerbate the problem and fragment the shared narratives further.

Shifting Patterns of Cultural Hegemony

Gramsci (in Barker 2008: p. 68) describes cultural hegemony as a ‘*continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria*’ likewise international post-war histories may begin to reshape the global cultural landscape. America’s post war military endeavours have served to detract from its immediate post-Second World War triumphalism. The geo-political climate is shifting and America’s economic dominance is coming into question. There is a growing call for social justice on a global scale and many of the voices which have gone unheard are asserting themselves and seeking a platform on which their story may be told.

16 De Rougemont (1965): p. xi.

17 Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Anette Heuser (2009): Public Opinion, Media Coverage and Migration. Developing strategies for immigration and Integration reforms Council Statement. Third Plenary Meeting of the Transatlantic Council on Immigration <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/transatlantic/Council-Statement-May-2009.pdf>.

Similarly, a shift in the dominating global voices is altering the American narrative. The narrative of freedom has been brought into question and a new narrative is being heard, particularly that of voices from the south. A story of oppression and the failings of America's free-market economics is emerging. Since the events of 9/11 there has been a dramatic shift in the way in which the global audience views America. America's military interventions, in particular post 9/11, in Iraq and Afghanistan have opened questions about legitimacy and in its pursuit of its war-on-terror have put it under global scrutiny. The images of freedom that America once portrayed are being replaced by visions of war and domestically one of an economy in crisis. The shift in the narrative, as in Europe, is according to Luce (2012: p. 5) causing the American nation to revert to its old narrative – and resulting in nationalism, the resurgence of Republican traditionalism and calls for tighter controls on immigration. As part of his analysis Luce quotes Fareed Zakaria, and Indian born commentator who says:

“Every visa officer today lives in fear that he will let in the next Mohamed Atta. As a result, he is probably keeping out the next Bill Gates.”

Luce's analysis of the state of the US political and economic climate is powerful and in his conclusion he states that America needs ‘new ideas’¹⁸.

Luce acknowledges that there is a shift in the way in which the globe views America's apparent success. The veneer of capitalism's success has been tarnished as the global audience recognises the failings of an ideology that has failed large numbers of people and has left a legacy of greed that has left developing nations struggling to compete against multinationals and local producers unable to gain access to markets that have been dominated by foreign producers. In a global system that has been dominated by American economic power, there is a growing awareness that the overarching dominance of the USA has exploited, and prevented the emergence of young nations and as a result there is an ever-increasing backlash of anti-American sentiment that is growing across the globe.

With this in mind, the sustainability of America's cultural dominance is clearly called into question. In the current global socio-political climate, the factors that are laid out here as being the corner-stones of America's cultural dominance are being challenged – and therefore there is little value in attempting to replicate the mechanisms, models, and business strategies that run the American cultural machine. What is crucial to Europe's success is finding a positive, collective narrative to project to the global market.

18 Luce, E (2012): Time to start thinking, America and the spectre of decline. Little Brown.

Conclusion

In order to establish and propagate a more positive collective narrative, European nations need to adopt a more positive attitude to their own heterogeneity and to acknowledge their role within it. Europe, in essence, forged the beginnings of a global, capitalist system. The global movement of people has a history inextricably rooted in Europe's early mercantilist endeavours. I would argue strongly that the diversity of peoples, religions and cultures within Europe should be placed at the heart of cultural output. A greater emphasis on listening to, and responding to global voices within Europe through meaningful consultation would help bring about a much stronger, marketable voice. Audience development strategies should be implemented, not as cynical marketing ploys, but by way of bringing about greater cultural engagement and seeking to enrich Europe's cultural landscape. Said (1994: p. 408) concludes:

“there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep insisting on their (cultural geographies) and distinctiveness, as if that was all human life was about. Survival in fact is about the connections between things ...”

By embracing and engaging diverse voices across all areas of European culture a powerful message of solidarity can be created and woven into the future narrative of Europe. Such a narrative would serve to ensure the future success of European cultural output, far more than a constant strive to seek uniqueness and promote national patriotic narratives that are based in a flawed narrative of the past.

Case Study 1

London 2012 Olympic Opening Ceremony.

The opening ceremony for the 2012 Olympic Games hosted in London was directed by Danny Boyle and was received on the global stage with great acclaim. Whilst some of its subtle references to British culture were lost on the global audience, columnist Alex Wolff stated that the event ‘gave us a chance to celebrate protest and dissent’.

During the ceremony, Boyle managed to acknowledge Britain’s colonial past and reliance on its colonies to achieve its industrial transformation whilst also recognising with gratitude and humility the contribution of those who were oppressed by it. Furthermore, Boyle’s spectacle went on to celebrate the struggles and upheavals of political change and the importance of a vibrant popular cultural movement in order to win a war of attrition on elitist values. The ceremony itself was able to subtly question both the nation and the globe whilst continually emphasising a positive narrative. For further debates:

<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/30/danny-boyle-olympics-ceremony-partial-history>

Case Study 2

National Liverpool Museums – Museum of Liverpool

The Museum of Liverpool, winner of the Council of Europe prize 2013, was opened in its current form in July 2011. The museum reflects the city’s global significance through its unique geography, history and culture. Visitors can explore how the port, its people, their creative and sporting history have shaped the city. The museum is a celebration of the people of Liverpool and places a strong emphasis on Liverpool’s place in a changing global-political climate. The museum acknowledges the important contribution immigrants have made to the life of the city as well as its role on the global cultural landscape.

The museum’s exhibitions have been created in close consultation and in dialogue with a broad cross-section of the Liverpool demographic. The result is a museum that tells a narrative of everyday Liverpool and celebrates the lives, peoples, and culture of the city.

Compare: <http://www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/>

Bibliography

- Allen, T and Thomas, A (1992): *Poverty and Development in the 1990s*. Oxford, University Press
- Anderson, P (1992): *English Questions: Light of Europe*. London, Verso
- Barker, C (2008): *Cultural Studies theory and practice*. London, Sage
- Belmessous, S (2013): *Assimilation and Empire Uniformity in French and British Colonies 1541-1954*, Oxford, Oxford University Press
- Bonnell, V. E., and Hunt L (1999): *Beyond the Cultural Turn*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press
- Currid, E (2007): *The Warhol Economy, How fashion, art and music drive New York City*. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press
- De Rougemont, D (1965): *The Meaning of Europe*. London, Sidgwick and Jackson
- Fiske, J (1989): *Understanding Popular Culture*. London, Routledge
- Geertz, C (1973 [1966]): *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York, Basic Books
- Gramsci, A (1968): *Prison Notebooks*. London, Lawrence & Wishart
- Jameson, F (1991): *Postmodernism or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham NC, Duke University Press
- Kiely, R (2010): *Rethinking Imperialism*. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan
- Luce, E (2012): *Time to start thinking. America and the spectre of decline*. London, Little Brown
- Mandel, B (2005): *Kulturvermittlung zwischen kultureller Bildung und Kulturmarketing. Eine Profession mit Zukunft*. Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag
- Mandel, B (2008): *Audience Development. Kulturmanagement, Kulturelle Bildung, Konzeptionen und Handlungsfelder der Kulturvermittlung*. Munich, Kopaed
- Said, E (1994): *Culture and Imperialism*. London, Vintage, Random House
- Smith, A. D. (1992): *National Identity and the Idea of European Unity* Source: *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), pp. 55-76 Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
- UNESCO (2009): *UNESCO Framework for Cultural Statistics*, Institute for Statistics, UNESCO Montreal, Canada

Internet Sources

- European Commission (2007) *Special Euro Barometer 278* http://ec.europa.eu/culture/pdf/doc958_en.pdf
- Jaffee, David. "Post-Revolutionary America: 1800–1840". In *Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History*. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000–. http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/pram/hd_pram.htm (April 2007)