

Analysis and Improvement of an Authentication Scheme Using Smart Cards

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Abstract. In 2010, Sood et al [16] proposed a secure dynamic identity based authentication scheme using smart cards. They claimed that their scheme is secure against various attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate that their scheme is completely insecure and vulnerable to outsider attack as well as insider attack. An outsider attacker can obtain the common session key between the user and the server, while an insider attacker can get not only the session key but also the secret key of the server. Therefore, the entire system collapses. To remedy these security flaws, an improved scheme is proposed to withstand these attacks.

Keywords: cryptanalysis, authentication protocol, smart cards, dynamic identity, password.

1 Introduction

With the rapid increasing need of remote digital services and electronic transactions; authentication schemes that ensure secure communication through an insecure channel are gaining popularity and have been studied widely in recent years. In 1981, Lamport [9] proposed first remote user password based authentication scheme by employing a one way hash chain, in an insecure and untrusted network, but this scheme has a major drawback of its dependency on verification table. Smart cards implementation solved this problem of dependency on verification tables and ensures secure communication. That is why, Smart cards based authentication schemes are becoming day by day more popular. In 2001, Hwang et al [6] proposed first smart cards based authentication scheme. As Security and efficiency are the main factors for any authentication scheme from the user's perspective. In view of the fact, several smart cards based remote user authentication schemes [1,2,3,5,8,11,12,15] have been proposed.

In 2004, Das et al [4] proposed a dynamic identity based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards that preserves user's anonymity. However, their scheme is vulnerable to various attacks. In 2005, Liao et al [10] proposed an improved scheme that achieves mutual authentication. In 2006, Yoon and Yoo [17] cryptanalyse the mutual authentication of Liao et al's scheme. In the same direction in 2010, Sood et al [16] proposed an improved protocol of Liao

et al's scheme and demonstrated that improved protocol is secure against various attacks like malicious user attack, impersonation attack, offline and online dictionary attack, denial of service attack and so on.

Recently, Pelaez and Novella [14] demonstrated that Sood et al's scheme is vulnerable to malicious user attack, man-in-the-middle attack, stolen smart card attack, off-line ID guessing attack, impersonation attack and server spoofing attack. In this paper, we also pointed out few weaknesses of the scheme. This paper shows that an insider attacker who has access to server can obtain the secret key of the server, which makes this scheme totally insecure. To remedy these security flaws, we proposed an upgraded authentication scheme, that preserves some properties of Sood et al's scheme, resolves all the identified weaknesses of their scheme and makes it more secure and efficient for practical applications.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews Sood et al's authentication scheme. Section 3 describes the weaknesses of Sood et al's scheme. Our proposed scheme is presented in Section 4, followed by security analysis in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.

2 Review of Sood et al's Scheme

In this section, we examine the dynamic identity based authentication scheme proposed by Sood et al in 2010. This scheme consists of four phases: registration phase, login phase, verification and session key agreement phase and password changing phase. The notations used throughout the paper are summarized in table 1.

Table 1. Notations and Symbols used in paper

U_i	Legitimate i^{th} user
ID_i	Identifier of U_i
PW_i	Password of U_i
S	The Server
x	Secret key of the server S
y_i	Server's random value
sk_i	Session Key
T	Current date and time of input device
T'	Current date and time of the server S
δT	Expected time interval for a transmission delay
$H(\cdot)$	Secure one way Hash Function
\oplus	Bitwise Exclusively or (XOR) operation
\parallel	Bitwise concatenation operation

2.1 Registration Phase

To register itself to the server S , the user U_i chooses his identity ID_i and password PW_i and sends it to server S via a secure communication channel. Then the server S chooses random value y_i for i^{th} user and computes:

$$\begin{aligned} N_i &= H(PW_i) \oplus H(y_i \| ID_i) \oplus H(x), \\ B_i &= y_i \oplus H(PW_i), \\ V_i &= H(ID_i \| PW_i) \oplus PW_i, \\ D_i &= H(y_i \| ID_i) \end{aligned}$$

The server S stores $y_i \oplus x$ and $ID_i \oplus H(x)$ corresponding to D_i in its database. Then S stores $(N_i, B_i, V_i, H(\cdot))$ into smart card and sends it to U_i via a secure communication channel.

2.2 Login Phase

When the user U_i wants to login, he simply inserts the smart card into the card reader and keys in ID_i^* and PW_i^* . The smart card computes

$$V_i^* = H(ID_i^* \| PW_i^*) \oplus PW_i^*$$

and verifies it with the stored V_i . After verifying the legality of the user, the smart card computes:

$$\begin{aligned} y_i &= B_i \oplus H(PW_i), \\ H(x) &= N_i \oplus H(PW_i) \oplus H(y_i \| ID_i), \\ CID_i &= H(y_i \| ID_i) \oplus H(H(x) \| T), \\ M_i &= H(H(x) \| H(y_i) \| T) \end{aligned}$$

and sends the login request message (CID_i, M_i, T) to the server S .

2.3 Verification and Session Key Agreement Phase

Upon receiving the login request, S first check the validity of time stamp T by checking $(T' - T) \leq \delta T$ to accept/reject the login request. If login request is accepted, the server S computes $D_i^* = CID_i \oplus H(H(x) \| T)$ and extract $y_i \oplus x$ and $ID_i \oplus H(x)$ corresponding to D_i^* from its database to obtain y_i and ID_i . Then the server computes $M_i^* = H(H(x) \| H(y_i) \| T)$ and verifies it with the received M_i . If it finds true, then U_i is authenticated. Finally, S and U_i computes common session key $sk_i = H(ID_i \| y_i \| H(x) \| T)$ for further communication.

2.4 Password Change Phase

Whenever U_i wants to update his password, he inserts his smart card into card reader and presents the credentials such as identifier ID_i and password PW_i . After verifying the legality of the user by verifying V_i , the smart card ask U_i to input the new password PW_i^{new} to replace the value of N_i, B_i and V_i with the N_i^{new}, B_i^{new} and V_i^{new} where $N_i^{new} = N_i \oplus H(PW_i) \oplus H(PW_i^{new})$, $B_i^{new} = B_i \oplus H(PW_i) \oplus H(PW_i^{new})$ and $V_i^{new} = H(ID_i \| PW_i^{new}) \oplus PW_i^{new}$.

3 Security Flaws in Sood et al's Scheme

Here, we consider an outside attacker is one who has no direct access to the server. An user with valid identity and password also comes in outside attacker

category. On the other side, Insider attacker is one who is having administrative access of the server. It is the basic requirement of the authentication scheme that any insider can not get the secret key of the server or any attacker can not compute the common session key between the user and the server. Sood et al's scheme is highly insecure as the basic requirement is not fulfilled. In this section, we demonstrate that Sood et al's scheme is vulnerable to outsider attack and insider attack.

3.1 Outsider Attack

The secret information stored in the smart card can be extracted by some means, such as monitoring the power consumption [7] or analyzing the leaked information [13]. So, any outsider U_a , who is the legal user and owns a smart card, can get information $(N_a, B_a, V_a, H(.))$, that is stored on his smart card, where

$$N_a = H(PW_a) \oplus H(y_a \| ID_a) \oplus H(x),$$

$$B_a = y_a \oplus H(PW_a),$$

$$V_a = H(ID_a \| PW_a) \oplus PW_a,$$

then he compute: $y_a = B_a \oplus H(PW_a)$ and $H(x) = N_a \oplus H(PW_a) \oplus H(y_a \| ID_a)$. Thus, an outsider can get $H(x)$ which is same for each legal user and is very sensitive information, the hash value of secret key of the server.

An the attacker extracts security parameters $(N_i, B_i, V_i, H(.))$ from other legitimate user U_i 's smart card. During the login transaction between U_i and the server, the attacker intercepts login request message (CID_i, M_i, T) that the user U_i sends to the server S . The attacker uses his knowledge of $H(x)$ and computes the following

$$y_i = CID_i \oplus N_i \oplus B_i \oplus H(H(x) \| T) \oplus H(x)$$

In such a way an outsider U_a obtains $H(x)$ as well as y_i , just by using his own smart card and the legitimate user's smart card. Then, an outsider attacker (the user U_a) can easily compute the session key for the transmission between server and the user U_i , as,

$$sk_i = H(ID_i \| y_i \| H(x) \| T)$$

and thus, he can get the unauthorized access to the services provided by the server to the user U_i .

3.2 Insider Attack

The system manager or a privileged insider user, who has direct access to the server, simply apply for registration and gets a valid smart card. Now he may adopt the procedure like outsider attacker to get $H(x)$ as well as y_i . He computes $D_i = H(y_i \| ID_i)$ and extracts the information $y_i \oplus x$ and $ID_i \oplus H(x)$ from server's database. With this information he can easily compute the secret key of the server as

$$x = y_i \oplus (y_i \oplus x)$$

Thus any privileged insider user of the system, after getting the secret key of the server can purposely leak the information or impersonate the legitimate user or

may modify the information. He can also issue an illegal smart card to some fake user. Thus, Sood et al's proposed scheme is insecure and vulnerable to various attacks and is not secure and efficient for practical applications.

4 Our Proposed Scheme

In this section, we propose an upgraded authentication scheme, that preserves the properties of Sood et al's scheme and resolves all the identified weaknesses of their scheme and make it secure and efficient for practical applications. The scheme consists of four phases: registration phase, login phase, verification & session key agreement phase and password changing phase.

4.1 Registration Phase

When the user U_i wants to register, he chooses his identity ID_i and password PW_i , and send it to the server S via a secure communication channel. Then, the server S chooses random value y_i for i^{th} user and computes:

$$\begin{aligned} N_i &= H(y_i || PW_i) \oplus H(y_i || ID_i) \oplus H(x), \\ B_i &= y_i \oplus H(PW_i), \\ V_i &= H(ID_i || PW_i) \oplus PW_i, \\ D_i &= H(y_i || ID_i) \end{aligned}$$

S chooses the value of y_i in such a way that the value of D_i must be unique for each user. The server S stores $y_i \oplus H(x || ID_i)$ and $ID_i \oplus H(x)$ corresponding to D_i in its database. Then, S stores $(N_i, B_i, V_i, H(.))$ into smart card and sends it to U_i via a secure channel.

4.2 Login Phase

The user U_i inserts the smart card in to the card reader and keys in ID_i^* and PW_i^* , then the smart card computes

$$V_i^* = H(ID_i^* || PW_i^*) \oplus PW_i^*$$

and checks whether computed V_i^* is equal to the stored V_i or not. If they are equal, the requested user is the legitimate bearer of the smart card otherwise rejects the login request. To resist offline password guessing attack, the card reader locks the card if U_i enters either wrong identifier or wrong password more than limited number of times. After verifying the legality of the user, the smart card computes:

$$\begin{aligned} y_i &= B_i \oplus H(PW_i), \\ H(x) &= N_i \oplus H(y_i || PW_i) \oplus H(y_i || ID_i), \\ CID_i &= H(y_i || ID_i) \oplus H(H(x) || T), \\ M_i &= H(H(x) || H(y_i) || T) \end{aligned}$$

and sends the login request message (CID_i, M_i, T) to the server S .

Table 2. Registration Phase

U_i	S
Choose ID_i and PW_i	
$\xrightarrow[\text{Secure}]{ID_i, PW_i}$	
	Choose random value y_i $N_i = H(y_i PW_i) \oplus H(y_i ID_i) \oplus H(x)$ $B_i = y_i \oplus H(PW_i)$ $V_i = H(ID_i PW_i) \oplus PW_i$ $D_i = H(y_i ID_i)$
	Store $y_i \oplus H(x ID_i)$ and $ID_i \oplus H(x)$ for each D_i Store $(N_i, B_i, V_i, H(\cdot))$ into smart card
$\xleftarrow[\text{SmartCard}]{(N_i, B_i, V_i, H(\cdot))}$	

Table 3. Login Phase

U_i	Smart card	S
Input ID_i^* and PW_i^*		
	Compute $V_i^* = H(ID_i^* PW_i^*) \oplus PW_i^*$ Verifies $V_i^* ? = V_i$	
	Compute $y_i = B_i \oplus H(PW_i)$ $H(x) = N_i \oplus H(y_i PW_i) \oplus H(y_i ID_i)$ $CID_i = H(y_i ID_i) \oplus H(H(x) T)$ $M_i = H(H(x) H(y_i) T)$	
	$\xrightarrow{(CID_i, M_i, T)}$	

4.3 Verification and Session Key Agreement Phase

Upon receiving the login request, S first check the validity of time stamp T by checking $(T' - T) \leq \delta T$ to accept/reject the login request. If it finds incorrect, the login request is rejected else the server S computes

$$D_i^* = CID_i \oplus H(H(x) || T)$$

and extract $y_i \oplus H(x || ID_i)$ and $ID_i \oplus H(x)$ corresponding to D_i^* from its database and recompute ID_i and y_i using its secret information x . Then the server computes

$$M_i^* = H(H(x) || H(y_i) || T)$$

and verifies computed M_i^* with the received M_i . If it finds true, then U_i is authenticated and the login request is accepted else the connection is interrupted. Finally, S and U_i computes the common session key $sk_i = H(ID_i || y_i || H(x) || T)$ of the transmission.

4.4 Password Change Phase

Whenever U_i wants to update his password, he inserts his smart card into the card reader and presents the credentials such as identifier ID_i and current password PW_i . After verifying the legality of the user by verifying V_i , the smart card

Table 4. Verification and Session Key Agreement Phase

U_i	S
	$\xrightarrow{(CID_i, M_i, T)}$
	Verifies $(T' - T) \leq \delta T$
	Compute $D_i^* = CID_i \oplus H(H(x) T)$
	Extract $D_i^*, y_i \oplus H(x ID_i)$ and $ID_i \oplus H(x)$
	Obtain ID_i and y_i
	Compute $M_i^* = H(H(x) H(y_i) T)$
	Verifies $M_i^* ? = M_i$
	Session Key $sk_i = H(ID_i y_i H(x) T)$
Session Key	
$sk_i = H(ID_i y_i H(x) T)$	

ask U_i to input the new password PW_i^{new} to replace the value of N_i, B_i and V_i with the N_i^{new}, B_i^{new} and V_i^{new} where $N_i^{new} = N_i \oplus H(y_i||PW_i) \oplus H(y_i||PW_i^{new}), B_i^{new} = B_i \oplus H(PW_i) \oplus H(PW_i^{new})$ and $V_i^{new} = H(ID_i||PW_i^{new}) \oplus PW_i^{new}$. To resist offline password guessing attack, the card reader locks the card if U_i enters either wrong identifier or wrong password more than limited number of times.

5 Security Analysis

In this section, we analyze the security of our scheme under the assumption that the secret information stored in the smart card could be extracted by some means, such as monitoring the power consumption [7] or analyzing the leaked information [13].

5.1 Denial of Service Attack

To resist password guessing attack, the card reader locks the card if someone enters either wrong identifier or wrong password more than limited number of times, So even if an adversary got the legitimate user smart card, but he is unable to create valid login request by guessing identity ID_i and password PW_i correctly at the same time. Thus, the proposed protocol is secure against denial of service attack.

5.2 Malicious User Attack

A legal but malicious user U_a can get the value of $H(x)$ from his own card, which is same for each user. But from $H(x)$, U_a may not be able to compute y_i , which makes the proposed protocol secure against malicious user attack.

5.3 Impersonation Attack

As both CID_i and M_i are protected by secure one way hash function, any modification in login request message (CID_i, M_i, T) will be detected by the server by verifying M_i . So, because the attacker has no way to find PW_i and y_i of the legitimate user U_i , he can not modify login request message, which makes this protocol secure against impersonation attack.

5.4 Offline Password Guessing Attack

After gathering the information on legitimate user U_i 's smart card, an attacker can intercept the login request message (CID_i, M_i, T) during the login transaction, and try to guess out ID_i, PW_i, y_i and x , but it is not possible to guess out all the parameters correctly at the same time, which makes this protocol secure against offline guessing attacks.

5.5 Stolen Smart Card Attack

An attacker can extract security parameters $(N_i, B_i, V_i, H(.))$ from legitimate user U_i 's smart card. But, this information does not help him to find out the value of server's secret x , or user's secret parameter y_i corresponding to the i^{th} legitimate user. He can not use this information to generate fake login request. He is also not able to play as man in middle by using any information on card. Thus, the proposed protocol is secure against stolen smart card attack.

5.6 Insider Attack

Any privileged insider user (a system manager as an attacker) can obtain $H(x)$ from his registered legal smart card, but without knowing the password of i^{th} user, he cannot compute y_i and secret key x of the server and can not use the secret information for personal benefit. Thus, this protocol is secure against an insider attack.

5.7 Online Password Guessing Attack

As the card reader locks the card after limited number of wrong login attempts, So it is impossible for an attacker, to pretend to be the legitimate user U_i and try to login the server by online guessing different words as identity ID_i and password PW_i of the user U_i .

5.8 Server Spoofing Attack

An adversary may not be able to masquerade server by modifying login transaction message because of verification of M_i . So, he may not be able to compute the common session key $sk_i = H(ID_i || y_i || H(x) || T)$. Moreover, the session key is session variant for the same user. Thus, the proposed protocol is secure against server spoofing or masquerading attack.

5.9 Stolen Verifier Attack

If an attacker may be able to steal the verification table from the server, then he can obtain $y_i \oplus H(x \| ID_i)$ and $ID_i \oplus H(x)$ corresponding to D_i from its database but from this, he is unable to compute the secret key x and y_i of the legitimate user.

5.10 Replay Attack and Parallel Session Attack

Our proposed protocol, can withstand Replay attack and Parallel Session Attack because replaying a login request message (CID_i, M_i, T) of one session into another session is useless as the authenticity of the login request is verified by checking the freshness of the time stamp T and also by replaying a login request message within the valid time frame window, can not give an attacker, the common session key between the user U_i and the server S .

5.11 Man-in-the-Middle Attack

Even if an adversary can intercept the session, get the login request message (CID_i, M_i, T) and authenticate himself to the server S , but he can not compute the session key $sk_i = H(ID_i \| y_i \| H(x) \| T)$ between the user and the server as there are two secret parameters $H(x)$ and y_i are included in the session key. Only registered users are able to compute $H(x)$, but they can not compute y_i for any other user until they know the password of the user U_i . Thus, either the valid user who initiated the session or the server can retrieve the original message during transmission.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we analysed Sood et al's dynamic identity based authentication scheme using smart cards and its immunity against various attacks. We got that their scheme is insecure for practical applications and vulnerable to outsider and insider attacks. To remedy these security flaws, we proposed an upgraded protocol for authentication scheme that preserves the similar properties of their scheme and resolves all the identified weaknesses of their scheme and make it more secure and efficient for practical purpose.

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