Chapter 4
Cultural Violence

4.1 Introduction

'Cultural violence'[1] are those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) that can be used to justify, legitimize direct or structural violence.[2] Flags, military marches, the portrait of the Leader everywhere, inflammatory speeches, many national anthems, come to mind. However, let us postpone the examples (see Sect. 4.4 below), starting with conceptual analysis.

Thus, mentioned above are 'aspects of culture', not entire cultures. A person encouraging a potential killer, shouting 'Killing is self realization!' may prove that the English language is capable of expressing such thoughts, but not that the English language as such is violent. Entire cultures can hardly be classified as violent, a reason for preferring the expression 'Aspect A of culture C is an example of cultural violence' to cultural stereotypes like 'culture C is violent'.

On the other hand, cultures could be imagined and even encountered with not only one aspect but a set {A} of aspects so extensive and diverse, spanning all cultural domains that the step from talking about cases of cultural violence to

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[2] Thus, 'cultural violence' follows in the footsteps of another concept, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", in: *Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. 1, ch. 2, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1974 (originally in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6 1970, pp. 167–91) where 'structural violence' was introduced for the first time (not the same as institutionalized violence, like vendetta). (For a recent very constructive critique and effort to develop the idea further see Michael Roth: "Strukturelle und personale Gewalt: Probleme der Operationalisierung des Gewaltbegriffes von Johan Galtung", *HSFK Forschungsbericht*, 1/1986; Frankfurt am Main, April 1988.) A similar concept is introduced by Hans Saner in Personale, "strukturelle und symbolische Gewalt" in: *Hoffnung und Gewalt. Zur Ferne des Friedens* (Basel: Lenos und Z-Verlag, 1982), pp. 73–95.

violent cultures may be warranted. For that a systematic research process is nee-
ded. This article is about that process.

One place to start would be to clarify 'cultural violence' by searching for its
negation. If the opposite of violence is peace, the subject matter of peace research/
studies, then the opposite of cultural violence would be cultural peace, meaning
aspects of a culture that serve to justify, legitimize direct peace and structural
peace. If many and diverse aspects of that kind are found in a culture we can refer
to it as a 'peace culture'. A major task of peace research, and the peace movement
in general, is that never ending, search for peace culture, problematic because once
identified there will be the temptation to institutionalize that culture, making it
obligatory with the hope of internalizing it everywhere. And that would already be
violence.[3]

Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel right, or
at least not wrong. Just as political science is about two problems, the use of power
and the legitimation of the use of power, violence studies are about two problems,
the use of violence and the legitimation of that use. The psychological mechanism
would be internalization.[4] The study of cultural violence highlights the way in
which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized
and thus rendered acceptable in society. One way cultural violence works is to
change the moral color of an act to green/right or at least to yellow/acceptable
from red/wrong; an example being killing in the name of the country as right, in
the name of oneself as wrong. Another way is by making reality opaque, per-
mitting us not to see the act or the fact, or at least not as violent. Obviously this is
more easily done with some forms of violence than others'. An example being
abortus provocatus. Hence, peace studies is in need of a violence typology; much
like pathology for health studies.

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[3] There are many efforts to create the 'new man' (and woman?). In the West each new branch of
Christianity is an effort, so is humanism, so is socialism. But any inculcation in others of any
single culture is in itself an act of direct violence (meaning intended by the actor), usually
implying desocialization from one culture and resocialization into another; including the very
first socialization of the young (defenseless) child. But if culture is a *conditio sine qua non* for a
human being, we are born with none (only predispositions) and inculcation is an act of violence
then we are faced with the basic problem of education: is 'educate' a transitive or intransitive
verb? Of course it is both, related hermeneutically. Peaceful education, including socialization
would probably imply exposure to multiple cultures and then a dialogue, as argued below.
Neither Christianity, nor humanism is good at this; in fact, we still do not know *how* to do this.

[4] We then schematically divide control mechanisms into internal and external, positive and
negative; identifying 'internal, positive and negative' as good and bad conscience respectively;
external positive as reward and external negative as punishment. 'Internalization' is deeply rooted
(in the person system) conscience, 'institutionalization' is deeply rooted (in the social system)
punishment and/or reward. Both serve to make the act come forth: 'naturally, normally,
voluntarily'. This piece of elementary social science serves to locate cultural and structural
violence centrally in general social science theory construction.

Table 4.1 A typology of violence. *Source* The author

	Survival needs	Well being needs	Identity needs	Freedom needs
Direct violence	Killing	Maiming	Desocialization Resocialization Secondary citizen	Repression Detention Expulsion
Structural violence	Exploitation A	Exploitation B	Penetration Marginalization	Segmentation Fragmentation

4.2 A Typology of Violence

If we see violence as avoidable insults to basic human needs lowering the real level of needs satisfaction (far) below what is potentially possible, then one typology can be obtained by combining the distinction between direct and structural violence with four classes of basic human needs. The four classes used here are the outcome of extensive dialogues in many parts of the world[5]; viz., *survival needs* (negation death, morbidity); *well being needs* (negation misery, morbidity); identity, *meaning needs* (negation: alienation) and *freedom needs* (negation: repression).

The result is eight types of violence with some sub types, easily identified for direct violence, more complex for structural violence (Table 4.1).

A first comment should be that this table is anthropocentric. A fifth column could be added for the rest of nature. 'Ecological balance' is probably the most frequently found term used for environment system maintenance. If not satisfied the result is ecological degradation, breakdown, imbalance. Ecobalance corresponds to survival + well-being + freedom + identity as very broad terms for human basic maintenance. If not satisfied the result is human degradation. The sum of all five, for all, defines 'peace'.

But 'ecological balance' is a very broad category treating abiota and biota alike. Moreover, there are such difficult and important questions as 'balance for whom?' For human beings to reproduce themselves? At what level of economic activity and what numbers? Or, for the environment to reproduce itself? All parts, equally, at what level, what numbers? Or both combined?

Second, the extreme versions of the pale words in Table 4.1 should be contemplated. For 'killing' read *extermination, holocaust, genocide.* For 'misery' read *silent holocaust.* For the types of alienation read *spiritual death.* For 'repression' read *gulag.* For 'ecological degradation' read *ecocide.* The words would sound like someone's effort to be apocalyptic were it not for the fact that we have experienced all of this during the last 50 years alone; closely associated with the names of

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[5] See my chapter "Basic Human Needs", in: Lederer, Antal, Galtung, *Basic Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate* (Königstein: Hahn 1980).

Hitler, Stalin and Reagan[6] and Japanese militarism.[7] In short, violence studies, an indispensable part of peace studies, may be a horror cabinet, but like pathology reflects a reality to be understood.

Then some comments on the content of Table 4.1 as it stands. The first category of violence, killing, is unproblematic. So is maiming. Added together they constitute 'casualties' used in assessing the magnitude of a war. But war is only a particular form of orchestrated violence, usually with at least one actor a government. To see peace as the opposite of war, and limit peace studies to war avoidance studies, and more particularly to avoidance of big wars or super-wars (defined as wars between big powers or super-powers), and even more particularly to the limitation, abolition or control of super weapons, is rather narrow. Important interconnections among types of violence are left out, particularly the way in which one type of violence may be reduced/controlled at the expense of increase/ maintenance of an other. Like 'side-effects' in health studies, rather important, but easily overlooked. Peace research should avoid that mistake.[8]

Included under maiming is also the insult to human needs brought about by siege (classical term) and boycott (modern term). To some this is nonviolence; to the victims it may mean the slow but intentional killing through malnutrition and lack of medical attention, hitting the weakest first, the children, the old, the poor, women. By making the causal chain longer the actor does not have to face the violence directly; he 'gives the victims a chance', usually to submit, meaning loss of freedom and identity. In other words, trading the last two for the first two types of direct violence, today in the form of economic sanctions.

The category of 'alienation' can be defined in terms of socialization, meaning the internalization of culture. There is a double aspect: to be desocialized, away from own culture, and to be resocialized into another culture; like the prohibition and imposition of languages. One of these does Dot presuppose the other. But they often come together in the category of second class citizenship with the subjected group (not necessarily a 'minority') being forced to express dominant culture and not their own, at least not in public space. The problem is, of course, that any socialization of a child, in the family, at school, by society at large is also forced, brainwashing, giving the child no choice. Consequently, we might get to the conclusion, not that far fetched, that nonviolent socialization is to give the child a choice, e.g., by offering him/her more than one cultural idiom.

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[6] For an effort to compare the three systems (not only Hitlerism and Stalinism as is now very common with *glasnost* revisionism) see my *Hitlerism, Stalinism, Reaganism: Three Variations on a Theme by Orwell*, in Norwegian edition 1984, Spanish edition 1985 and German edition 1987; English edition forthcoming 1990. Not three persons but three political systems are being compared for their origins.

[7] There are strong similarities built around *shinto* themes of chosenness. For an analysis see Sabura Ienaga, *The Pacific War: 1931–1945*, Random House 1978, particularly p. 154 for the *hakko ichiu* (the eight corners of the world under one roof) concept.

[8] The easy approach is to dump all 'side-effects' at the doorsteps of some other disciplines demanding that they shall clean it up conceptually, theoretically, practically-like economists do.

The category of 'repression' has a similar double definition, the 'freedom from' and the 'freedom to' of the International Bill of Human Rights,[9] with historical and cultural limitations.[10] Two categories have been added explicitly because of their significance as concomitants of other types of violence: detention, meaning locking people in (prisons, concentration camps) and expulsion, meaning locking people out (sending them abroad or to distant parts of the country).

To discuss the categories of structural violence an image of a violent structure, and a vocabulary, a discourse, is needed in order to identify the aspects and see how they relate to the needs categories. The archetypical violent structure, in my view, has exploitation as a centre piece, simply meaning that some, the topdogs, get much more (here measured in needs currency) out of the interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs.[11] There is 'unequal exchange', a euphemism. The underdogs may in fact be so disadvantaged that they die (starve, wither away from diseases) from it; exploitation A Or they may be left in a permanent, unwanted state of misery, usually including malnutrition and illness; exploitation B And here we should not only think in terms of the way people die in the Third World, from diarrhea and immunity deficiencies; but also of the way people die in the 'developed' countries, avoidably and prematurely, from cardio-vascular diseases and malignant tumors. But all of this happens within complex structures and at the end of long and very ramified causal chains and cycles.

But a violent structure does not only leave marks on the human body but also on the mind and the spirit. The next four terms can be seen as parts of exploitation or as reinforcing components in the structure. They function by impeding consciousness formation and mobilization; two conditions for effective struggle against exploitation. Penetration, implanting the topdog inside the underdog so to speak, combined with segmentation giving the underdog only a very partial view of what goes on will do the first job. And marginalization, keeping the underdogs on the outside, combined with fragmentation, keeping the underdogs away from each other will do the second job. However, these four should also be seen as structural violence in their own right They have all been operating in gender contexts even if women do not have lower (but in fact have higher) life expectancy than men, provided they survive gender specific abortion, infanticide, the first years of childhood.

How about ecological balance? The direct violence is obviously slashing, burning etc., like in a war. The structural violence against nature would be more insidious, not intended to destroy nature: the pollution and depletion associated

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[9] A document consisting of the Universal Declaration of 1948, the two Covenants of 1966 and an Optional Protocol. The Bill has not yet attained the stranding it deserves, among other reasons because of U.S. failure to ratify the Covenants.

[10] See Johan Galtung, "How Universal Are the Human Rights? Some Less Applaudable Consequences of the Human Rights Tradition", Paper prepared for the Nobel Symposium on human rights, Oslo, June 1988.

[11] For many variations on structural violence, see my *Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. III, Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1978, Parts I–III.

with modern industry, leading to dying forests, ozone holes, global warming etc. What happens is transformation of nature through industry, leaving non degradable residues and depleting non-renewable resources, combined with a world encompassing commercialization that makes the consequences non-visible to the perpetrators.[12]

4.3 Three Types of Violence

With these comments 'violence' is defined in extension by the types given in Table 4.1, using direct and structural violence as overarching categories or 'super-types'. 'Cultural violence' can now be added as the third super-type and put in the third corner of a violence triangle. Stood on its direct and structural violence feet the image invoked is cultural violence as the legitimizer of both. Stood on its direct violence head the image is structural and cultural sources of direct violence. Of course, the triangle always remains a triangle. But the image produced is different and all six triangles (three pointing downward, three pointing upwards) tell somewhat different stories.

There is a basic difference in the time relation of the three concepts of violence. Direct violence is an event; structural violence a process with its up and downs, and cultural violence a 'permanent',[13] remaining essentially the same for long periods given the slow transformations of basic culture. Put in the useful terms of the French _Annales_ school in history: _evenementielle, conjoncturelle, la longue duree._ This means that the three forms of violence enter time differently, somewhat like the difference in earthquake theory between the earthquake as an event, the movement of the tectonic plates as a process and the fault line as a more permanent condition.

This leads to a three-strata image (complementing the triangle image) of the phenomenology of violence, useful as a paradigm generating a wide variety of hypotheses. At the bottom is the steady flow through time of cultural violence, a substratum from which the other two can derive their nutrients. In the next stratum the rhythms of structural violence are located. Patterns of exploitation are building up, wearing out, or torn down, with the protective accompaniment of penetration-segmentation preventing consciousness formation and fragmentation marginalization preventing organization against exploitation and repression. And at the top, visible to the unguided eye, is the stratum of direct violence with the whole record of direct cruelty perpetrated by human beings on each other. Barefoot empiricism carries that far.

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[12] Hence it is at this level environmental degradation has to be counteracted, through de-industrializing and dc commercializing processes, not by converting one type of pollution or depletion to another through patchwork approaches to this major global problem.

[13] For this distinction between types of variables see Johan Galtung, _Methodology and Ideology_, Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1977, chapter 9, "Generalized Methodology for Research".

Generally, a causal flow from cultural via structural to direct violence can be identified. The culture preaches, admonishes, eggs on. Direct violence is used to establish structural violence; then come the efforts to use direct violence to get out of the structural iron cage, and to keep the structure intact. Ordinary, regular criminal activity is partly an effort by the underdog to "get out", to redistribute wealth, get even, get revenge ('blue collar crime'), or by somebody to remain or become a topdog, sucking the structure for what it is worth ('white collar crime'). Both direct and structural violence deprive people of needs. When this happens suddenly we can talk of trauma. When it happens to a group, a collectivity, we have the collective trauma that can sediment into the collective subconscious, and become raw material for major historical processes and events.

The underlying assumption is simple: 'violence breeds violence'. Violence is needs deprivation; needs deprivation is *serious*; one reaction to needs deprivation is direct violence. But that is not the only reaction. There could also be a feeling of hopelessness, a deprivation/frustration syndrome showing up on the inside as self-directed aggression and on the outside as apathy and withdrawal. Given a choice between a boiling, violent and a freezing, apathetic society as reaction to massive needs deprivation, the topdogs tend to prefer the latter. They prefer 'governability' to 'trouble, anarchy'. They love 'stability'.

However, this should not be seen as the only causal chain in the triad. There are linkages and causal flows in all directions, a reason why the triangle may sometimes be a better image than the three-tier stratum model. Africans are captured, forced across the Atlantic to work as slaves, millions killed in the process, in the Americas. This massive direct violence over centuries quickly seeps down and sediments as massive structural violence, with whites as topdogs and blacks as underdogs and equally massive cultural violence with racist ideas everywhere. After some time direct violence is forgotten, slavery is forgotten and two labels show up, mild enough for public consumption: 'discrimination' for massive structural violence and 'prejudice' for massive cultural violence. Such sanitation of language is itself cultural violence.

But the vicious violence cycle can also start in the structural violence corner. Social differentiation slowly takes on vertical characteristics with increasingly unequal exchange, and these social facts would then be in search of social acts for their maintenance, and cultural violence for their justification. Or, the vicious cycle cold have its origin in direct and structural violence together, with one group treating another group so badly that they feel a need for justification and eagerly accept any cultural rationale handed to them. More than one thousand years ago Nordic Vikings attacked, cheated and killed Russians; would that not be good enough reason for formulating the idea that Russians are dangerous, wild and primitive, meaning that one day they may come back and do the same to us as we did to them?[14]

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[14] Rather, it is almost incredible how peaceful that border high up in the North has been between such a small and such a big country, supposed by some to be eager to fill any 'power vacuum'.

Could there be still a deeper stratum, human biology, with genetically transmitted dispositions or at least predispositions for aggression (direct violence) and domination (structural violence)? The potential for direct and structural violence is certainly there. But so is the potential for direct and structural peace. In my view the most important argument against biological determinism, postulating a drive for aggression and dominance comparable to drives for food and sex, is the high level of variability in aggressiveness and dominance, but not in the pursuit of food and sex. We seem justified in postulating drives for food and sex because we find people seeking them under (almost) all external circumstances. But aggression and dominance occur with tremendous variation, depending on the environment, including the structural and cultural conditions. Of course, the argument may be that the drive is still there, only not always strong enough to assert itself under all circumstances. In that case the concern of the peace researcher would be to know those circumstances and explore their removal or modification.

Let us reap an immediate harvest from this taxonomic exercise, using it to clarify the concept of militarization as process, and militarism as the outcome of that process. Obviously, one aspect is a general inclination toward military action, whether provoked or not, whether to settle or initiate conflict. This inclination brings in its wake the production and deployment of appropriate hardware and software. However, to study militarization only in terms of past military activity records, and present production and deployment patterns is superficial,[15] leading to facile conclusions in terms of personnel, budget and arms control Good weeding presupposes getting at the structural and cultural roots, as suggested by the three strata paradigm. Concretely this means identifying structural and cultural aspects that would tend to reproduce the readiness for military aggression, such as mobbing of young boys at school, primogeniture,[16] unemployment and exploitation in general; heavily nationalist and sexist ideologies,[17] etc. The combination, building military teaching components into high school and university curricula,[18] and

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[15] This, of course, is the general approach taken by SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the yearbooks and other publications; very useful as documentation at the surface level but not deepening the understanding of the phenomenon so much that real countermeasures can be imagined and enacted.

[16] These factors are very often held to be important in explaining Japanese aggressiveness, e.g., by Ruth Benedict in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*. Ienaga, *op. cit.*, is also quoting these factors. Obviously, the aggressiveness displayed in a major war is a multi rooted phenomenon. 'Explaining' aggressiveness is best done to the enemy, not to oneself where 'justified indignation' is the word.

[17] When the tram passed the Imperial Castle in Tokyo the passengers used to stand up and bow to the Emperor. And the *shinto* Yasukuni shrine is still a major center of the national and nationalist constructions in Japan. After their defeat in the 23 July 1989 elections the new LDP Prime Minister, Kaifu, did not visit the shrine on the anniversary of the capitulation 15 August 1945, well knowing that the winds were blowing more from the left.

[18] Personally I have not seen any country with such a deep integration of the military into the university as the U.S. (R.O.T.C.) F even permitting the military to buy students with scholarships and to give classes filled with militarist propaganda.

disseminating militarism as culture, should merit particular attention. But structure and culture are usually not included in arms control studies, both being very sensitive areas.

4.4 Examples of Cultural Violence

Let us now return to the six cultural domains mentioned in the introduction religion and ideology, language and art, empirical and formal science with one or two examples of cultural violence from each domain. The logic of the scheme is simple: identify the cultural element and show how it can be used to legitimize direct or structural violence.

Religion. In all religions there is somewhere the sacred, *das Heilige*; let us call it 'god'. A basic distinction can be made between a transcendental God outside us and an immanent god inside us, maybe also inside all life.[19] The Judaism of the Torah, founded almost 4,000 years ago, visioned God as a male deity residing outside planet Earth. A clear case of transcendentalism from which many consequences follow, taken over in the derived religions of Christianity and Islam. With god outside us, as God, it is not inevitable but certainly likely that some will be closer to that God than others. A catastrophic idea. Moreover, in the general occidental tradition of not only dualism but manichaeism, with sharp dichotomies between good and evil there would have to be something evil corresponding to the good God: Satan. Again transcendental and immanent representations are possible, with God and Satan possessing or at least choosing their own, and with god or satan not to mention god and satan being inside use.

But whom does God choose? Would it not be reasonable to assume that He chooses those most in His image and leaves to Satan to choose the others? This would give us a double dichotomy with God, the Chosen Ones (by God), the Unchosen Ones (by God, chosen by Satan) and Satan; the chosen heading for salvation and closeness to God in heaven, the unchosen for damnation and closeness to Satan in hell. However, heaven and hell can also be reproduced on earth, as a foretaste or indication of the afterlife. Misery/luxury can be seen as preparations for hell/heaven, and class as God's finger.

With a transcendental God this all becomes meaningful. An immanent concept of god as residing inside us would make any such dichotomy an act against god The first three choices listed in the Table are found already in Genesis. The last one is more typical of the New Testament with its focus on right belief, not only on right deeds. The other two are found as scattered references to slaves and to giving

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[19] Another theological distinction of equal importance is whether we are born with original sin (as some Christians would claim), original blessing (as others would claim), both (a Hindu Buddhist karmaist position?) or neither (an atheist position). The combination (transcendental God; original sin) has tremendous implications for controlling people, fully understood by Luther.

to God what is of God and to Caesar what is Caesar's. The upper classes referred to as being closer to God have actually traditionally been three:

- Clergy, for the obvious reason that they possessed special insight in how to communicate;
- Aristocracy, particularly the *rex gratia dei*, and
- Capitalists, if they are successful.

The lower classes and the poor were also chosen, even as the first to enter Paradise (the Sermon on the Mount) F but only in the afterlife. The six together constitute a hard Judaism Christianity-Islam which can be softened by giving up some positions and turned into softer Islam, Christianity and Judaism by adopting a more immanent concept of god (Francesco d'Assisi?).

The consequences in the right hand column of Table 4.2 could also follow from other premises than a theology of chosenness; the table only postulates contributing, sufficient causes.

For a contemporary example consider the policies of Israel with regard to the Palestinians. The Chosen People even have a promised land, the *Eretz Yisrael*. They behave as one would expect, translating chosenness, a solid element of cultural violence into all eight types of direct and structural violence listed in Table 4.1. There is killing; maiming, material deprivation by denying them (on the West Bank) what is needed for livelihood; there is desocialization within the theocratic state of Israel with second class citizenship to non-Jews, there is detention, individual expulsion and perennial threat of massive expulsion There is exploitation, at least as exploitation B.

The four structural concomitants of exploitation are all well developed; efforts to make the Palestinians see themselves as born underdogs, at most heading for second class citizenship by 'getting used to it'; giving them small segments of economic activity, keeping them outside Jewish society both within and outside the Green Line, and dealing with Palestinians in a *divide et impera* manner (as in the Camp David process), never as one people.

There is neither massive extermination, nor massive exploitation A of the sort found in many Third World countries under the debt burden, above all hitting children. The violence is more evenly distributed over the eight types. To some, setting their sights low, defined by Hitlerite or Stalinist extermination and

Table 4.2 The chosen and the unchosen

God chooses	And leaves to satan	With the consequence of
Human species	Nature, forests, oceans	Speciesism, ecocide
Men	Women	Sexism, witch-burning
His people	The others	Nationalism, imperialism
Whites	Coloured	Racism, colonialism
Upper classes	Lower classes	'Classism', exploitation
True believers	Heretics, pagans	Inquisition, persecution

Source T he author

Reaganite exploitation A, this means that no mass violence going on, proving how humane the Israelis are. Such perspectives are themselves examples of cultural violence, indicating how low our moral standards have become in this century.[20]

Ideology. With the decline, and perhaps death not only of the transcendental but also the immanent god through secularization, successors to religion in the form of political ideologies, and to God in the form of the modern state, would be expected to exhibit some of the same character traits. Religion and God may be dead, but not the idea of sharp and value-loaded dichotomies. The lines may no longer be drawn between God, The Chosen, the Unchosen and Satan Modernity requires only the distinction between Chosen and Unchosen; let us call them Self and Other. Archetype: nationalism.

A steep gradient is then constructed, inflating, even exalting the value of Self, deflating, even debasing the value of Other. At that point structural violence can start operating. It will tend to become a self-fulfilling prophecy: people become debased by being exploited and they are exploited because they are seen as debased, dehumanized. When Other is not only dehumanized but has been successfully converted into an 'it', deprived of humanhood, the stage is set for any type of direct violence,[21] blaming the victim. This is then reinforced by the category of the "dangerous it", the 'vermin', or 'bacteria' (as Hitler described the Jews); the 'class enemy' (as Stalin described the 'kulaks'); the 'mad dog' (as Reagan described Qadhafi) the 'cranky criminal' (used for 'terrorists'). Extermination becomes not only psychologically possible but a duty. The exterminators, like 55 guards become heroes to be celebrated for their stamina.

Using the six dimensions of Table 4.2, it is easily seen how this can be done without any transcendental god: only human beings are capable of self-reflection; men are stronger/more logical than women; certain nations are modern/carriers of civilization and the historical process more than others; whites are more intelligent/logical than non-whites; in modern society the best are at the top and hence entitled to power and privilege. Certain tenets of belief (e.g., in modernization, development, progress) are apodictic, not to believe in them reflects badly on the non believer, not on the belief.

All of these ideas have been and are strong in Western culture although the faith in male, Western and white innate superiority has been badly shaken by the struggles for liberation by women, non-Western peoples (such as the Japanese economic success over the West), and coloured people inside Western societies. The United States, the most Christian nation on earth, has served as a major battle ground, inside

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[20] For more details about this, see Johan Galtung, chapter 3, "The Middle East Conflict" in *Solving Conflicts: A Peace Research Perspective*; Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1989 and *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine*; Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1989. For an excellent study of the theme of chosenness in this connection, see Hans-Ruedi Weber, "The Promise of the Land; Biblical Interpretation and the present situation in the Middle East", *Study Encounter*, Vol. VII, No. 4, 1971.

[21] A major theme of the fascinating and scary dystopian novel by Margaret Atwood, *The Handmaid's Tale*, New York, Ballantine Books, 1987.

and outside, for these struggles. Reduction of cultural violence in the U.S. becomes particularly important to the extent that country sets the tone for others.

But these three assumptions were all based on ascribed distinctions; gender, race and nation being known at birth. They are hard to maintain in an achievement oriented society. If modern society is a meritocracy, to deny power and privilege to those on the top is to deny merit itself. To deny a minimum of "right orientation" is to leave the field open to any belief, including the challenge to power and privilege for the meritorious and to any strict borderline between human life and other forms of life. In short, residual chosenness will stay on for a while.

The ideology of nationalism has its roots in the figure of Chosen People, religiously or ideologically justified, should be seen in conjunction with the ideology of the state, statism. Chapter 9 in the post war Japanese peace constitution, that short lived effort to make some cultural peace, stipulated that 'The right of belligerence of the [Japanese] state will not be recognized'.[22] Evidently Japan had forfeited that right, whereas others, presumably the victors, exited from the war with the right intact, maybe even enhanced.

Where did that right of belligerence come from? There are feudal origins, a direct carry over from the prerogative of the *rex gratia dei t*o have an *ultimo ratio regis*. The state can then be seen as an organization needed by' the Prince to exact enough taxes (and, after 1793, conscripts) to pay for the increasingly expensive armies and navies. The state was created to maintain the military rather than vice versa. But the state can also be seen as one of the successors to God inheriting the right to destroy life (execution), if not the right to create it. But many also se the state as having the right to control the creation of life, exerting authority superior to that of the pregnant woman.

Combine nationalism with steep Self-Other gradients, and statism with the right, even the duty to exercise ultimate power, and we get the ugly ideology of the nation state, another catastrophic idea. Killing in war is now done in the name of the nation comprising all citizens with some shared ethnicity. The new idea of democracy can be accommodated with transition formulas such as *vox populi, vox dei*. Execution is also done in the name of 'the people of the state X'; but like war has to be ordered by the State. Much of the pro life sentiment against abortion is probably rooted in a feeling that abortion at the discretion of the mother erodes the power monopoly of the state over life. If anti abortion sentiment really was rooted in a sense of sacredness of the fetus (*homo res sacra hominibus*) then the pro-life people would also tend to be pacifists, and against the death penalty, and be outraged at the high mortality levels of blacks in the U.S. and others around the world. Of course, the priority for choice rather than life is another type of cultural violence, based on a denial of fetus life as human, making the fetus an 'it'.[23]

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[22] For an analysis, see my *Japan in the Pacific Community*, Japanese version 1989, English version 1990, chapter entitled "Peace Politics for Japan: Some Proposals".

[23] My own position, not very original, is this: the fetus is life, hence sacred. Everything possible should be done to avoid a situation where life is destroyed, wilfully or not. After all alternatives

Combine the ideology of the nation state with a theologically based Chosen People complex and the stage is set for disaster. Israel (Yahweh), Iran (Allah), Japan (Amaterasuokami), South Africa (a Dutch 'reformed' God), the United States (the Judeo-Christian Yahweh God) are relatively clear cases; capable of anything in a crisis. Nazi Germany (the nazi Odin/Wotan God) was in the same category. The Soviet Union is probably still laboring under its tasks as a Chosen People, chosen by History (capital h) as the first nation state to enter Socialism. And France has the same superiority complex only that any idea of being chosen by somebody would indicate that there is something above France, an intolerable idea. France chose herself, *un peuple elu, mais par lui meme*, exemplified by the archetypal act when Napoleon was to be crowned by the Pope in 1804. He took the crown from his hands, and crowned himself.

Language. Certain languages those with a Latin base such as Italian, Spanish, French and English, but not those with a Germanic base such as German and Norwegian make women invisible by using the same word for the male as for the entire human species. The important movement for non sexist writing[24] is a good example of deliberate cultural transformation away from cultural violence. The task must have looked impossible when some courageous women got started, and yet it is already bearing fruit.

Then there are more subtle aspects of language where the violence is less clear, more implicit. A comparison of basic features of Indo European languages with Chinese and Japanese[25] brings out certain space and time rigidities carried by the Indo-European languages; a corresponding rigidity in the logical structure with strong emphasis on the possibility of arriving at valid inferences (hence the Western pride in being so logical); a tendency to distinguish linguistically between essence and apparition leaving room for the immortality of the essence and by implication for the legitimacy of destroying what is only the apparition. However, this is deep culture, the deeper layers of that bottom stratum in the violence triad, and the relations to direct and structural violence become much more tenuous.

Art. Let me just make one point, important for the present emergence of a European Union as the successor to the European Community of 1967.[26] How does Europe understand itself? The myth tied to the name 'Europa' in Greek mythology is not very helpful. The understanding of Europe as the negation of the non-European environment carries us much further. And that environment at the

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(Footnote 23 continued)

have been exhausted the decision belongs to those who created that life, generally a woman and a man, with veto power to the woman and right of consultation to the man.

[24] For an excellent guide see Casey Miller and Kate Smith, *The Handbook of Nonsexist Writing*, New York, Harper and Row, 1988 (2nd edition).

[25] See Johan Galtung and Fumiko Nishimura, "Structure, Culture and Languages: An Essay Comparing the Indo European, Chinese and Japanese Languages", *Social Science Information*, 22(6), 1983, pp. 895–925.

[26] For an exploration of this process see my *Europe in the Making*, New York, Taylor and Francis, 1989, chapter 2.

time of the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Period was the gigantic Ottoman Empire to the east and the south, reaching the walls of Vienna (1683), conquering Syria and Egypt (1517), vassalizing Tripolitania, Tunisia and Algeria afterwards, leaving only the Sultanate of Fez and Morocco with the small Spanish Habsburg enclaves, two of them still there. The only non Oriental (meaning Arab, Muslim) environment was Russia, poor, vast in space, and time. Sleeping, but giant.[27]

Obviously Europe had to understand herself as the negation of the enemy to the south and southeast, and developed the metaphor of 'oriental despotism', still very much in place in the European mind, to come to grips with the 'environment'. Typical of the 'oriental despot' was callousness and arbitrariness. Like the European Prince he killed, but ruled by his own whims, not by law. Sexually he enjoyed an access (the harem) his European colleagues could only dream of sneaking out at night violating peasant girls; so did the ordinary Muslim not constrained by Christian monogamy. In France a school of painting emerged in the 19th century representing oriental despotism in a setting of sex and/or violence. Henri Regnault's *Execution Without Process* and Eugene Delacroix's *The Death of Sardanapal* are good examples. Hegel, copied by Marx, also saw oriental despotism and oriental (or Asian) mode of production as negative, homogeneous, stagnant.

It belongs to this syndrome that the non Arab part of the semicircle around Europe, Russia, also had to be seen in terms of oriental despotism. That despotism could fit the tsars as a description is perhaps less objectionable, but oriental? The figure has probably influenced our image of Russia and the Soviet Union for centuries, and still does, as intended slurs on either.

Empirical science. One example of cultural violence would be neo-classical economic doctrine, understanding itself as the science of economic activity. Strongly influenced by the Adam Smith tradition, neo classical economics now studies empirically the system prescribed by its own doctrines, finding their own self fulfilling prophecies often confirmed in empirical reality One part of neo classical dogma or 'conventional wisdom' is trade theory based on 'comparative advantages', originally postulated by David Ricardo, developed further by Heckscher and Ohlin, and by Jan Tinbergen. The doctrine prescribes that each country should enter the world market with the products for which that country has a comparative advantage[28] in terms of production factors.

In practice this means that countries well endowed with raw materials and unskilled labour shall extract raw materials and those well endowed with capital and technology, skilled labour and scientists, shall process them. And thus it was that Portugal gave up its textile industry and became a mediocre wine producer,

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[27] For an excellent analysis see Mogens Trolle Larsen, "Europas Lys", chapter 1 in Boll-Johansen, Harbsmeier, eds., *Europas Opdagelse*, Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1988. For the paintings, see pp. 21 and 23.

[28] This was originally proposed by David Ricardo, put in the language of neo-classical economics by Heckscher-Ohlin, Jan Tinbergen, and Paul Samuel son.

whereas England got the stimulus, the challenge needed to develop her industrial capacity still further.[29] The consequences of this doctrine in the form of the generally vertical division of labour in the world are visible for most people to see. Structural violence all over the place[30]; among and within countries.

In other words, the comparative advantages doctrine serves as a justification for a rough division of the world in terms of the degree of processing the countries impart to their export products. Since this is roughly proportionate to the amount of challenge they receive in the production process, the principle of comparative advantages sentences a country to stay where the production profile has landed them, for geographical and historical reasons. Of course, there is no law, legal or empirical, to the effect that countries cannot do something to improve their production profile, a basic point made by the Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu.[31] But to do so is not easy when there are immediate gains to be made by not changing the status quo, for those who own the raw materials/commodities. And thus it is that the "law" of comparative advantages legitimizes a structurally intolerable status quo. In short, the 'law' is a piece of cultural violence buried in the very core of economics.

Formal science. But for sure this cannot be said of mathematics? Not so obvious. If mathematics is viewed as a formal game with one basic rule, that a theorem T and its negation T cannot both be valid, then assumptions are woven into the game that may have violent consequences. Even when mathematical logic explores polyvalent logic, the tool used is bivalent logic with its strict line between valid and invalid, *tertium non datur*. And it is easily seen that it has to be that way, inference being the cement of the mathematical edifice with *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* being key procedures. No inference can be made with ambiguous truth value for the antecedents or for the inference itself.[32]

This means that mathematics disciplines us into a particular mode of thought highly compatible with black white thinking and polarization in personal, social and world spaces. The either or character of mathematical thought makes it an exciting game. But as a model for a highly dialectic human, social and world reality it is far from adequate. And *adequatio* is the basic requirement for culture, symbolic space, if it is to guide us in visioning a less violent potential reality.

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[29] Joan Robinson, the Cambridge economist, has pointed this out forcefully in a number of articles.

[30] This is the basic theme of the article "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", chapter 13 in the set of articles referred to in footnote 10 above. The article is updated somewhat in *Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. VI, Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1988, as "'A Structural Theory of Imperialism' Ten Years Later".

[31] His basic point is simply this: use all surplus value accumulated to improve the factors of production, not for luxury consumption by the owners of the factors of production, to get out of the trap. Simple and wise, this is what Japan did, but hardly what Japan today would like to see too many others do today.

[32] This theme is developed in some detail in my *Methodology and Development*, Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1988, chapter 41 "Theory-formation as Development", particularly 4.4, "Contradictory Reality and Mathematics: A Contradiction?", pp. 162–75.

Cosmology. Having said this much, let us end this section returning to the problem of the transition from cultural violence to violent culture. Such global judgments could be arrived at, as mentioned in the introduction, by identifying an extensive and diverse number of cultural aspects, in religious and ideological thought, in language and art, in empirical and formal science; all of them serving to justify violence. However, there is also another approach: to explore the sub-stratum of the culture for its 'deep culture', of which there may be several.[33] We would be looking at the roots of the roots, so to speak; the cultural genetic code that generates cultural elements and reproduces itself through them. That this becomes very speculative is not so problematic; it is in the nature of science to postulate deeper layers, spelling out implications, testing the hard core of the theory around the ragged edges.

The cosmology concept is designed to harbour that substratum of deeper assumptions about reality,[34] defining what is normal and natural. Assumptions at this level of depth in the collective subconscious are not easily unearthed, leaving alone uprooted. And it is at this level that occidental culture shows so many violent features that the whole culture starts looking violent. There is chosenness and strong centre periphery gradients. There is the urgency, the *apocalypse now!* syndrome precluding the slow, patient building and enactment of structural and direct peace. There is atomistic, dichotomous thought with deductive chains counteracting the unity of means and ends. There is arrogance toward nature counteracting the unity of life. There is a strong tendency to individualize and rank human beings, breaking up unity of man. And there is a transcendental, absolute God with awesome successors. The whole culture possesses a tremendous potential for violence that can be expressed at the more manifest cultural level and then be used to justify the unjustifiable. That there is also peace in the Occident, sometimes even emanating from the Occident is something of a miracle, possibly due to the softer strands.

The problem is that this type of thinking easily leads to a sense of hopelessness. Changing the cultural genetic code looks as difficult as changing the biological genetic code. But even if this should be possible, cultural engineering could be a form of violence as problematic as genetic engineering. Should that be left to 'chance' meaning to those with power and privilege.[35] A very difficult and important field for future peace research.

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[33] An important post-structuralist position: digging deep, below the surface is not a transition from multiplicity to simplicity. Deep occidental culture, for instance, is no unambiguous. I would, for instance, argue that Christianity can only be understood in terms of at least as two varieties, a hard (more transcendental original sin oriented) and a soft (immanent/original blessing oriented). Others see a more complex variety of deep cultures.

[34] Cosmology is then defined, roughly, as "the deep culture of a civilization, including the general assumptions underlying the deep structures".

[35] When does the culture, particularly the deep culture, have sufficient plasticity (Scholem) for the culture to be molded, reshaped? In times of crises? After a deep trauma has been inflicted

4.5 Gandhi and Cultural Violence

What did the Master himself have to say about these tricky problems, open as he was to exploring alternatives to both direct and structural violence? His answer was to reproduce, from his ecumenism, two axioms that in a sense summarize *Gandhism*: *unity of life* and *unity of means and ends*. The first follows from the second if it is assumed that no life, and particularly no human life, can be used as means to an end. But even without that assumption the first follows from the second since means and ends are supposed to exhibit unity anyhow. But how do we understand 'unity'? A reasonable interpretation, using the ideas developed in the preceding sections, would be in terms of closeness, against separation. In our mental universe all forms of life and particularly human life, should enjoy closeness and not be kept apart by steep Self Other gradients driving wedges in social space. Any justification derived from the hard core of a culture, e.g., the calling as a Chosen People, would be rejected when in conflict with this even higher, even 'harder' axiom.

How can we understand unity of means and ends? As bringing other mental elements, such as acts, and facts brought about by acts, close together. They should not be kept separate by long causal chains driving wedges in social time. To initiate long social sequences leading to take off or revolution, investing in industry or the industrial proletariat, is not good enough. The means have to be good in themselves, not in terms of distant goals, way down the road as witnessed by the millions sacrificed on the altars of industrialism in the name of 'growth/ capitalism' and 'revolution/socialism'. Justification derived from empirical confirmation, 'it works', is rejected when in conflict with this even higher, even 'harder' axiom.

Any Self Other gradient can be used to justify violence against those lower down on the scale of worthiness; any causal theory can be used to justify violent means by nonviolent ends. Gandhi would be as sceptical of Marxist ideas of revolution and hard work, sacrificing a generation or two for presumed bliss the day after tomorrow, as of liberal/conservative ideas of hard work and entrepreneurship, sacrificing a social class or two for the bliss of the upper classes tomorrow, or even today.

The conclusion drawn by Gandhi from these two axioms was respect for the sacredness of all life (hence vegetarianism) and acceptance of the precept "take care of the means and the ends will take care of themselves". Thus the unity of life doctrine is very different from a doctrine of 'ecological balance' since it means enhancing all life, not just human life; and all human life, not just the categories chosen by some (to Gandhi distorted or misunderstood) religion or ideology. And the unity of means and-ends would lead to a doctrine of synchrony, calling for

(Footnote 35 continued)
including the trauma of inflicting deep traumas on others? We know little about this, but these are among the questions to be asked.

work on all issues simultaneously[36] rather than the diachrony of one big step that is assumed to trigger the *force motrice*. Archetype: the Buddhist wheel where elements of thought, speech and action tend to be at the same level of priority, not the Christian pyramid with more focus on some (e.g., faith) than others (e.g., deeds).[37]

4.6 Conclusion

Violence can start at any corner in the direct structural cultural violence triangle and is easily transmitted to the other corners. With the violent structure institutionalized and the violent culture internalized, direct violence also tends to become institutionalized, repetitive, ritualistic, like a vendetta. This triangular syndrome of violence should then be contrasted in our mind with a triangular syndrome of peace in which cultural peace engenders structural peace, with symbiotic, equitable relations among diverse partners, and direct peace with acts of cooperation, friendliness and love. It could be a virtuous rather than vicious triangle, also self reinforcing. The virtuous triangle would be obtained by working on all three corners at the same time, not assuming that basic change in one will automatically lead to changes in the other two.

But does this inclusion of culture not broaden the agenda for peace studies considerably? Of course it does. But why should peace studies be more narrow than, for instance, health studies (medical science)? Is peace easier than health, less complex? And how about biology, the study of life; physics, the study of matter; chemistry, the study of the composition of matter; mathematics, the study of abstract form; all fairly broad. Why should peace studies be more modest? Why draw borderlines at all in a field so terribly important in its consequences, and also so attractive to the inquisitive mind? If culture is relevant to violence and peace, and no doubt it is, then only the dogmatic mind will exclude it.

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[36] Look at Gandhi's life. The political agenda he took on was staggering: *swaraj*; the exploration of *satyagraha* and *sarvodaya*; the uplift of the Indians in Africa, the harijans in India, the women; and the communal struggle between Hindus and Muslims. At no point' did Gandhi say: I do one of these, and the others follow.

[37] This is explored in some detail in *Methodology and Development*, chapter 1.1, "Back to the origin: On Christian and Buddhist Epistemology", particularly pp. 25–6.