The Changing Context of Global Governance and the Normative Power of the European Union

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1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) is a novel type of entity in global politics. Its distinct nature has raised debates concerning the EU's possible status as an actor,[1] as well as debates on how to best characterize this specific 'actorness'. The EU's singularity is also considered to produce exceptional behavior. The most famous definition of the European Union claims that it is a *normative power* in the sense that it changes the 'normality' of global politics. However, there seems to be no agreement on the precise meaning of this power or its relation to other forms of power. The Normative Power concept has been used to refer to normative identity, normative interests, normative behavior, normative means of influence and normative ends.[2] This chapter studies why and in what sense the EU can be considered a normative power. It also reflects how the current global order challenges the legitimacy and relevance of this kind of role conceptualization.

   This chapter asserts that the *external* environment is the most important conditioning factor to set the possibilities for the development of a certain role or identity.[3] The external context also largely influences how the role of an actor will shift over time. Different role perceptions depend on power and its distribution. The Normative Power Europe (NPE) argument is a product of a certain time and environment, where several factors supported the development of the normative power role. Currently the circumstances of Europe have changed, which have

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[1] Bretherton and Vogler (2006).

[2] These criteria do not presuppose each other (Forsberg 2011a, p. 1191).

[3] This fact does not diminish the value of internal conditions, like the internal political context and capability in determining the role of an actor (see Tocci 2008).

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influenced the relevance of the normative power formulation, and posed new challenges for its implementation. At the same time, the entire concept of power, the relevance of different forms of power, as well as the distribution of power seem to be on in flux. This calls for a reevaluation of the EU's power role and practices.

This chapter offers an overview and evaluation of the relevance of the EU's normative power in this changing global context. In this chapter, first a short historical overview will show how the concept of normative power evolved and how different historical conditions supported it. Then the more precise meaning of normative power claims is analyzed through a wider power analysis. This analysis assesses the relationship between different forms of EU power, and locates its normative power claims. In the conclusion, the relevance and possible potential of normative power formulation in future global politics is discussed.

2 Civilian, Military or Normative Power

To understand why the EU is currently characterized as a normative power, we examine how previous ideas have contributed to the evolution of this idea. There is a long tradition of characterizing the role of the EC/EU in a distinct manner. If we consider the emergence, success and decline of these concepts, it seems evident that the *Zeitgeist* of certain historical moments has much to do in explaining them.[4] Changes in the external global environment as well as in the internal European integration process have influenced the interplay between more Realist vs. more Idealist perceptions of Europe's possible roles. In a similar way, the normative power notion is a product of certain time, and its current challenges are related to the changing global environment.

Debates about the EC/EU's international role date back to 1970s, when the atmosphere of global détente raised discussion about Europe's possible potential and role in the world.[5] François Duchêne called the European Community a *civilian power* in the sense that it preferred non-military means when influencing others. Duchêne never described civilian power in any precise way, but it included at least civilian means and ends, a sense of common responsibility, and a built-in sense of collective action, which expressed social values of equality, justice and tolerance.[6] This kind of civilian power role was considered exceptional and progressive;

> *Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth century citizen's notion of civilized politics. In such a context, Western Europe could in a sense be the first of the world's civilian centres of power.*[7]

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[4] Gerrits (2009).

[5] Dinan (2004, p. 125).

[6] Duchêne (1973, pp. 19–20).

[7] Duchêne (1972, p. 43).

Duchêne noted that recent developments in Western Europe were largely dependent on exceptional external circumstances, and because of that the EC could not work as a model for others. However, the EC could shape the international *milieu* with the help of its own experiences in ways that went beyond mere self-interest.

Changes in the nature and distribution of power in international relations during the 1970s seemed to point to the diminution of the importance of traditional military power. But the civilian power idea lost its attractiveness[8] in the 1980s thanks to the Second Cold War, as realist power conceptions became more dominant.[9] Hedley Bull's famous realist contribution to the discussion of Europe's global role argued that the "civilian power Europe" concept was a contradiction in terms. According to Bull, the neo-idealist or neo-progressive thinking of the 1970s was constructed on a weak foundation. The power or influence exerted by the European Community was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which it does not control. Bull argued that Western Europe should be more self-sufficient in security and defence, and not so dependent on the United States.[10] Bull's suggestion was unimaginable in the Cold War context, but the trend towards military power was strengthened through the agreement to a common European security and defence policy in 1999. Many neoconservatives like Robert Kagan continued to believe that the only way for Europe to be a credible global force was to develop its military capabilities.

Nevertheless, the EU's "softer" power role became more predominant in the debates. In 2002 Ian Manners took Hedley Bull's argument as a starting point for his discussion of the international role of the EU. Manners wrote that the developments of the 1990s in international relations had led us to reconsider both of the notions of civilian and military power. These notions shared some common basic assumptions, which had lost their relevance in the post-Cold War context.[11] There was a need for a new kind of role concept that would go beyond the state-centric perspective and refocus on the ideations and power of norms. In Manners' view, normative power was a result of the EU's transformative impact on the very dynamics of international politics. Europe's transcendence of the nation-state was reproduced at the global level,[12] and the normative power formulation offered holistic, 'outside-the-box' thinking about the purposes of agency, power and policy in world politics

Manners famously defined the EU as a *normative power* in terms of its ability to shape the conceptions of the '*normal*' in international relations,[13] by changing

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[8] Civilian power concept was developed at least in three "waves" during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. In the end there were several different perceptions of what this civilian role was actually about.

[9] Orbie (2008, p. 7).

[10] Bull (1982, pp. 151–153).

[11] Manners (2002, pp. 236, 238).

[12] Bickerton (2011, p. 26).

[13] Manners (2002, p. 240).

norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics. The EU pursues the spread of particular norms and values, rather than overt self-interested economic or military superiority. Normative power creates a certain kind of EU-identity vs. the image of ("other") states. Manners wrote that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or says, but what it is[14]: an exceptional power that is based on ideas and conscience.[15] The normative power argument also had a normative purpose: it was conceptualized to increase normative theorizing and normative approaches to the European Union[16]—it was not only about what the EU is, but also what it *should* be.

In Manners' view, the EU's unique difference derives from its historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution, which have in the post-cold war period accelerated a commitment to centrally place universal norms and principles in its relationships with its Member States and the world: The EU would build its power and 'greater legitimacy' on fundamental norms. The EU's normative engagement can be attributed to the founding principles of the Union: *peace*, *liberty*, *human rights*, *rule of law* and *democracy*. These values have been given a central focus in the EU's official documents, most recently within the Lisbon Treaty. Besides these core values it is possible to find four minor principles: *social solidarity*, *good governance*, *non-discrimination/equality*, and *sustainable development*.[17] These values are considered to be universal, gaining their inspiration from established international conventions, treaties or agreements, particularly those significant within the UN[18]: Projecting the values externally is a core principle that guides the EU's external relations.

Manners also argued that this particular difference compared to pre-existing political forms predisposes the EU to act in a normative way.[19] The EU not only promotes norms, but does it normatively. Beyond focusing on the empirical study of the impact of EU norms in different policy areas, the debate has also considered the appropriateness of the particular means the EU has employed: Normative power may use different kinds of mechanisms of power, though these have not been studied extensively in the NPE literature.[20] According to Manners, the EU's normative power stems from six factors that shape norm diffusion in international relations: *contagion* (diffusion of ideas), *informational diffusion* (result of strategic communications), *procedural diffusion* (institutionalization of the relationship between the EU and a third party), *transference* (exchange of goods, trade, aid or

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[14] Manners (2002, p. 252).

[15] Diez and Manners (2007, p. 175).

[16] Manners (2006a, p. 184) and Manners (2007).

[17] Manners (2002, pp. 242–243; 2009, p. 12; 2006b).

[18] Manners (2009, p. 12).

[19] Manners (2002, p. 242).

[20] Forsberg (2011a, p. 1196).

technical assistance), *overt diffusion* (EU's physical presence in third states and IOs) and *cultural filter*.[21] These mechanisms help illuminate how the EU shapes norms—and normalizes international relations in a normative manner.

3 Historical Conditions for the Success of the NPE

Just like the previous conceptualizations of the EU's role, the normative power is a product of a certain time.[22] It is easier to understand why the EU was characterized as a normative power, if the external and internal factors that supported this new interpretation of the EU's global role in the early 2000s are considered in greater detail. This chapter does not attempt to offer an exhaustive list of factors which did or might have contributed to this normative power role, but reflects via a few examples. Even if the idea of the EU as a normative power had been an internal pursuit to offer legitimacy for EU power, reasons and inspiration for this effort may have external motivation.

3.1 Post-Cold War Period's Effect on the EU Global Role

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism led to a reconsideration of the EU's regional and global status. As Whitman notes, it was only after the fall of the Berlin Wall that the EU started to define the principles it stands for further, and the role it was prepared to play on the international stage.[23]

The context of normative globalization enabled the EU to also assume a more proactive international role by drawing on international ethics, largely institutionalized within the UN: Aggestam has noted that the EU might better be characterized as an '*ethical power*' in these changed circumstances. The emerging normative international context emphasized responsibility beyond borders, and brought issues like human rights, humanitarian intervention, international criminal justice, international economic justice and democracy promotion onto the agenda of foreign policy.[24] It is thus not at all surprising that the EU's global role at the time was considered in a normative manner, and the development of its foreign policy was constructed to support the values of democracy, human rights and good governance at the global level. In the 1990s it seemed that the EU's promotion of democracy and human rights would have a bright future. In this sense the EU would be a significant force for good.

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[21] Manners (2002, pp. 244–245).

[22] Aggestam (2009, p. 27).

[23] Whitman (2011, p. 1).

[24] Aggestam (2008, p. 4).

3.2 Influence of Enlargement on the EU's Global Role

The enlargement policy especially was considered to be a good example of the EU's normative power in practice. It was important to shape Europe's neighbourhood or milieu by taking central and eastern European countries 'back to Europe', and to strengthen democratic processes within them. These countries were also keen to accept EU norms and values and transform their entire systems to match the EU standards. European integration was also considered to offer a successful regional example which other regions could eventually follow. Yet scepticism towards this kind of global transformative role and capacity of the EU endured. It seems that normative power works best with those countries that already share similar basic values with the EU—or hope to get remarkable benefits from accepting them. But with countries like Russia and China the normative power may not be that successful.

3.3 The Transatlantic Relationship and Its Effects on the EU's Global Power

The transatlantic relationship also influenced the development of the normative power formulation. The terrorist attacks in 2001 and the unilateralism of US foreign policy under the George W. Bush administration increased the popularity of the idea of the EU's normative power. The EU was characterized as a more attractive partner that respects international law and organizations.[25] According to Hyde-Price, the idea was that the American approach to international politics was more prone to the use of military means while the European approach preferred diplomacy, persuasion, negotiation and compromise.[26] The US thus became the 'other'[27] against which Europe's identity and normative vision of world politics was, at least partly, articulated.

3.4 EU Internal Factors Affecting Its Global Actorness

Internal conditions[28] for the development of normative power formulation, however, should not be dismissed. There was a clear internal willingness to develop the EU's capabilities to better cope with different crises that seemed to threaten the

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[25] In reality, the EU was not a unitary actor and there were divisions between Member States.

[26] Hyde-Price (2006, pp. 217–218).

[27] Diez (2005).

[28] Natalie Tocci separates three conditions for actor's normative behaviour: internal political context, internal capability and external environment (Tocci 2008). Even if I consider the external factor most important in the construction of roles, it is not to deny the relevance of different internal conditions.

EU's interests and security. The Gulf War and the collapse of Yugoslavia strengthened the momentum already developing in the EC toward a common foreign, security, and defence policy.[29] The development of a common foreign and security policy from the 1999 onwards emphasized the ambitions to develop a political union and a global 'force for good' as the EU's Security Strategy stated.[30] The EU's global actorness or 'presence' had great symbolic value. But as Toje notes, the normative flair of the EU's foreign policy was a response to, rather than a function of a unique historical context, namely unipolarity.[31] Currently the changes in global power patterns have affected its ability to influence. The results obtained have not really reflected the efforts made.

This short and incomplete list of different conditions shows how a favourable constellation for the development of the EU's normative power role existed. It is also easy to note that the current and future circumstances for normative power will be quite different. The more post-Western, multipolar world order sets greater challenges for normative power. It is not at all evident that the EU's normative power claims will have legitimacy in the changed world order, or that the EU really would have the capability to shape and determine 'normality' in different issue areas. As Manners noted, the normative power thesis was written in a different era, crystallizing the European Union at the end of the twentieth century. It was, and remains to be, a statement of what is believed to be good about the European Union, a statement which needed to be made in order to stimulate and reflect on what the EU *should* be (doing) in world politics.[32] It fits well with the post Cold War idealistic and liberalist narrative about the prospects of future global order, but the current global setting is more demanding. The challenges that different risk assessments today mention include transnational and complex issues like climate change, terrorism, organized crime, energy security and weapons of mass destruction. According to Manners the EU should make creative efforts to promote peace, prosperity and progress through prioritizing normative justification over material incentives and physical force.[33]

4 Taxonomic Overview of (EU) Normative Power as a Distinct Power Category

If the EU is in fact what the title of this book suggests—a global power in the making—it is important to be more precise on what type of power it is. Whatever adjective we put in front of the word 'power': civilian, military, normative, ethical,

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[29] Dinan (2004, pp. 233–234).

[30] A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003, p. 13).

[31] Toje (2009, p. 37).

[32] Manners (2006c, p. 168).

[33] Manners (2009, p. 23).

responsible etc., it cannot hide the fact that we are dealing with a certain kind of power. The EU is not merely characterized as a normative actor or player,[34] but as a normative power. According to De Zutter, the categorization of a political entity as *normative* follows the identification of the power potentials of the entity in the international system.[35] In order to understand the Normative Power Europe-claim, normative power must be separated as a distinct power category, and its relations to other forms of power must be outlined.

The debate about the Normative Power Europe has mixed two different meanings of power: 'power as a powerful actor', and 'power as ability to cause effects'.[36] In the efforts to find a distinctive power role or identity for the EU, the first meaning has been much more highlighted. Different criteria are set for an actor to deserve normative power status: normative power must have *normative identity*, *normative interests*, *normative behaviour*—"normative" means of *power*, and normative *outcomes*.[37] These criteria do not necessarily presuppose each other, but together they set the bar so high that normative power can eventually be considered as an ideal type that an actor can only approximate, as Forsberg suggests.[38] The EU might have many of the characteristics of a normative power, and normative power formulation can explain the distinctiveness of the EU's power, but it is *not* a "perfect type" of normative power in the sense that all of these criteria would be fulfilled. The question then turns out to be how much is sufficient for the normative power status—definition?

On the other hand, the more general definition of power as a potential *capacity* to cause effects[39] seems to match with the efforts of current debates on the EU's future power. We are concerned about the EU's ability to influence[40] the future global order. Also, the definition of normative power as an ability to shape normality in global politics is more about this meaning of power. But of course, the manner in which different effects are projected will determine the power role of an actor.

The EU as a normative power tries actively to shape the normality of global politics through the spread of norms. Shaping or determining norms or normality is still closely associated with power—and not necessarily a good thing as such: all major powers have the ability to shape norms, and in this sense they are all normative powers. De Zutter claims that the central question separating different kinds of normative powers is how norms are diffused. The instruments chosen will

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[34] European Security Strategy (2003) speaks only about the EU as a global player. Is the concept of 'power' avoided because of its possible negative connotations or because of the uncertainty about the EU's power capabilities?

[35] De Zutter (2010, p. 1115).

[36] Forsberg (2011a, pp. 1190–1191).

[37] Forsberg (2011a, pp. 1191).

[38] Forsberg (2011a, pp. 1199–1200).

[39] Lukes (2007, pp. 83–84).

[40] The relationship between the concepts of 'power' and 'influence' is also difficult to define. Power has been treated as a subcategory of influence and influence has been considered as a specific form of power.

be related to the acceptance or rejection of an actor's constitutive norms as universal, universable or particularistic.[41] The EU defines its constitutive norms (previously mentioned) as universal. Much depends on the attitudes of norm-takers—do they conceive these norms as universal or not? It is also possible that an actor is not at all interested in the promotion of universal norms.

Different taxonomies of the various mechanisms of power might be helpful in understanding how the EU's normative power works in practical reality. Unfortunately the six mechanisms of norm diffusion that Manners has proposed, do not offer a very precise picture of the workings of normative power. The most common taxonomy of power used in the study of international politics is based on the distinction between military, economic and cultural—or ideological—power. In the case of the EU, the division between military, trade and normative or civilian power is partly based on the same logic.[42] Manners wrote that the notion of a Normative Power Europe is located in a discussion of the 'power-over opinion', idée force, or 'ideological power'.[43] Normative power in its purest form is based on non-material forms of power like the power of ideas and ideation. The EU's influence can be based for instance on the example that it offers for others to follow.

In practical reality, however, different forms of power seldom exist in ideal or pure forms, and normative power coexists also alongside other forms of influence and power. For example the EU's ability to influence is very much dependent on its economic capacities, sanctions and rewards that may further the adoption of its norms and principles. Manners suggests that normative power may help to ensure that any subsequent or simultaneous use of material incentives and/or physical force is practised in a more justifiable and reflexive way.[44] The EU's normative power would differ from others exactly because of the way it *combines different power capacities in a normatively more sustainable manner*.[45] If the EU starts to adopt traditional power measures without normative guidance, as it has actually done lately,[46] its normative role might instead rather wane.

Another possibility is to follow Joseph Nye and separate similarly between hard (military, economic) and soft (attraction) power mechanisms. Nye claims that in a global information age the relative importance of soft power will increase and this suggests opportunities especially for the United States and Europe.[47] It is also possible to be a smart power by combining the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction.[48] According to Andrew

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[41] De Zutter (2010, pp. 1109, 1118–1119).

[42] This division was originally made by Edward Carr in 1962 (Forsberg 2011b, pp. 218–219).

[43] Manners (2002, p. 239). This categorization can of course be challenged.

[44] Manners (2009, p. 10).

[45] Diez and Manners (2007, p. 180).

[46] The EU has copied the technologies and habits of other actors for instance in the 'war on terror' and the 'securitization' of ordinary life, or in trying to rival other 'great powers' (Manners 2009, p. 15).

[47] Nye (2004, pp. 31–32).

[48] Nye (2011, p. xiii).

Moravcsik, in an era of multidimensional smart power, Europe is in most respects a preeminent power, superior even to the United States in mobilizing civilian and soft power instruments of international influence[49]: the EU's power toolbox is large, and it can use different types of power. But Diez and Manners argue that normative power and soft power should not be confused, because soft power is an empirical concept, a foreign policy tool or resource, that can be used for both good and negative purposes. In this sense there is not necessarily anything soft in soft power.

In contrast, normative power is an explicitly theoretical concept requiring an understanding of social diffusion and normative practices. The soft power dimension has been used in the US-context—a manner not considered suitable to define the EU.[50] Yet, these concepts seem to be quite close to each other, and the proposed differences offered have not convinced everybody.[51]

The above mentioned taxonomies of power deal with direct forms of *power between* actors, and concentrate on the actor's *capacities*. Barnett and Duvall have tried to merge the power debates in different disciplines with a typology of compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive forms of power.[52] This taxonomy manages to widen the perspective on power in IR by elevating the latter categories of relational power.[53] Power is thus also used when the actors are *constituted* in a certain way, as it influences also their capacities.

The EU may use these different forms of power as part of its normative endeavour. The EU's use of positive and negative conditionality for example can be considered a form of compulsory power. The EU also necessarily benefits from institutional power which makes it possible to set the agenda of international institutions. The normative power debate also constitutes the EU self in a distinct manner and as such is a form of productive power. The normative power role is not an objective categorization but a distinct effort to represent the EU in a certain way.[54]

5 The Essence of the EU's Normative Power

The different power concepts and power mechanisms may inform us about the nature of normative power as a distinct power category. Still, the EU's uniqueness as a normative power should be explained in a more detailed manner. The conceptual vagueness around the EU's normative power role makes it difficult to assess its current and future relevance and legitimacy. I claim that the essence of the EU's

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[49] Moravcsik (2010, p. 153).

[50] Diez and Manners (2007, p. 179).

[51] Forsberg (2011a, p. 1195).

[52] Barnett and Duvall (2005, p. 3).

[53] Their framework is however, distinctively constructivist (Bially Mattern 2011, p. 696).

[54] Diez and Manners (2007, p. 183).

normative power can be found in the promotion of *certain universal principles*, and from its commitment to *multilateral* approaches.

The EU's normative power is mainly concerned with the values and norms underlying action. This would suggest that normative power may set limits for the use of power, rather than promoting self-interest[55] or strategic goals. Normative goals are concerned with the wider environment—though the promotion of values and norms may be in the interests of an actor. The EU's basic values are reflected throughout the EU treaties and declarations. The Lisbon Treaty states that;

> "*The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.*"[56]

These values are not unique to the EU, but gain their inspiration and legitimacy from previously established international conventions, treaties and agreements.[57] These values also guide the EU's action towards others, and offer a source of legitimacy for the Union's external relations:

> "*The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law*".[58]

This extract is a good illustration of the EU's normative power identity, and its commitment to apply these values also outside of its borders. Yet scholars have questioned the universal status of the EU norms. Although De Zutter notes that international documents are one indication of a norm's universal standing, a number of other factors codetermine whether a norm is ascribed the attribution of 'universal': the document's wording, the number of ratifications it receives, the exemptions attached to its ratification, its implementation, the documents historical context, and the on-going global debates at the time of norm-diffusion.[59] Hence the mere promotion of principles which the EU considers universal is not sufficient for a status as a normative power: The EU should not declare the values and await others to follow them—rather, these norms should be developed in a dialogue with others.

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[55] Manners original example of the EU's norm-driven practice was the abolition of death penalty. Because this practice did not serve any European (material) interest, it distinguished the EU from other political actors (Manners 2002, p. 251).

[56] Treaty of Lisbon, article 1.

[57] Manners mentions the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN Covenants, and the Council of Europe/European Convention on Human Rights (Manners 2009, p. 12).

[58] Treaty of Lisbon, article 21.

[59] De Zutter (2010, p. 1109).

Another normative power aspect relevant in this case is the EU's commitment to multilateralism.

"The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations."[60]

European integration itself presents the most successful example of such a multilateral arrangement, and the EU has externalized its own working methods in its foreign policy. The European Security Strategy (2003) states "effective multilateralism" to be the cornerstone of the EU's interactions with the international community. Multilateralism increases legitimacy of EU politics, which may enhance the external effectiveness of the EU. 'Effective' refers to the striving for better governance practices, and shows the willingness of the EU to be the motor of different reform processes. In particular, the ineffectiveness of the UN was in mind when the strategy was proposed. But the term "effective" might also give an aura of instrumentality to the EU's multilateral commitment.[61]

A multilateral commitment can be interest or principles based. International organizations are built to serve certain functional or issue-specific interests, which explains the widespread *functional* view of multilateralism in IR theory. The EU is an active member in many international organizations, where it usually defends the interests of its member states. But the EU's multilateral strategy can be examined also from a more *normative* perspective. Multilateral commitment can also be important principle for policy-making. Besides serving interests, the multilateral process may bring other benefits with it and be an end in itself. These benefits are intrinsic to the multilateral process, and have value regardless of the outcomes. Processional benefits include, for example, structuring interaction and ensuring a remarkable level of moderation in global politics.

It must be noted that actors often define their own interests more only during the process of interaction. Multilateralism also gives more certainty over how global policies will be adopted in the future. Multilateralism becomes a matter of routine for actors—a kind "way of life".[62] I consider this principle-based multilateralism central for the EU's normative power argument. Multilateralism seems to have an intrinsic value for the EU order, very much compatible and congruent with European values, self-images, and principles that arguably dictate European political action at the international level.[63]

One of the most obvious multilateral forums where the EU acts in a more principles-based modus is the UN. In UN forums the EU wants to promote and protect certain universal basic values like human rights. Despite the opposition, the EU considers the UN as the most important global institution that can promote

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[60] Treaty of Lisbon, article 21.

[61] Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2011, p. 8).

[62] Pouliot (2011, pp. 18–22).

[63] Lucarelli and Manners (2005), in Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2011, p. 7).

values like peace, equality, democracy, human rights and sustainable development. Even if the results are not always promising, the EU finds these areas important for the maintenance of debate and dialogue. As the European Security Strategy states:

> "*The fundamental framework for* (*the EU´s*) *international relations is the United Nations Charter. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, must be a European priority*".[64]

The reform of the UN system in particular constitutes a critical test for the assessment of the EU's principled-based multilateral credentials.

The essence of the EU's normative power thus rests on the principles and particular means for promoting them, namely principled multilateralism. This kind of definition does not take into account the outcomes or end results that normative power is capable of achieving. The EU's normative power has been criticized for failing to reach results that are proportional to the efforts exerted.[65] The EU's record of achieving normative ends is considered mixed and contested.[66] This is of course dependent on what is considered to be a result of some processes. Consequences should not be too narrowly defined, and they should also include ongoing processes like human rights dialogues. On the other hand, it is still quite difficult to evaluate the impact of the EU's normative power, because too short a time has passed since its introduction.

6 The Changing Global Context and the EU's Normative Power

Because the global socio-economic and political context has changed remarkably during the last decade, the debate over the EU's power and role in the world has intensified. The normative power role of the EU emerged under different circumstances, and now it is appropriate to ask whether it has continued relevance in these changed settings: While the European Union has traditionally promoted global governance mostly through norms, hereby contributing to the strengthening of international law and multilateral practices in different international organizations,[67] the main elements of the EU's normative power role, universal principles and multilateralism, are challenged in the current order. Traditional power politics and state sovereignty are on the rise, rather than normative issues like human rights. The unipolar world, in which the US was standing as the sole superpower, is moving towards multipolarity with various centers of power.

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[64] The European Security Strategy 2003.

[65] Toje (2009, p. 43).

[66] Forsberg (2011a, p. 1194).

[67] Jørgensen (2009) offers a good overview of how the EU supports effective multilateralism and global governance in different international organizations.

Besides the emergence of new actors globally, the distribution of power between these actors is also changing dramatically, at least in demographic and economic figures, whereby China, Russia, Brazil and India are rising, and the EU is in decline. This kind of prognosis is still dependent on what kind of power we consider to be important in future international relations. Moravcsik has stressed that power should be treated as multidimensional, focusing on the full spectrum of power capabilities that an actor holds.[68] The distribution of power has consequences for the promotion of norms and principles. Rising states are keen to hold on to their sovereignty, and less interested in defending universal principles that might justify interventions in states' internal affairs. Additionally, substantive principles, like human rights, are sometimes considered instruments of Western powers to rule others. From this perspective, the EU's normative efforts would simply be a way to enhance its position in a world, where it is actually in decline. The EU has faced severe difficulties in its efforts to promote norms for example in the UN context[69]— normative power appears to have limited tools to influence.

The global transference of power from West to East causes challenges for multilateral arrangements, leading to a debate about the crisis of multilateralism, especially in the UN context. Multilateral organizations may be challenged because they may be sabotaged by the forces of power politics, or because they have moved towards "self-marginalization" as a result of their idealism and ineffectiveness.[70] Multilateral arrangements are also very vulnerable to power politics and do not usually include credible sanctions. If a powerful state decides to make co-operation difficult in international organization, it usually succeeds quite easily. Simultaneously the role of states is increasing again, while various non-state actors challenge the existing multilateral system.

The EU's (or its member states) current status in many international organizations is a privileged one. Possible reforms in international organizations may diminish the EU's position and ability to influence the global order, as rising powers seek better representation for themselves—and the EU's powerful position is found frustrating. Such representational questions cause friction, and make the multilateral setting more demanding for the EU.

This is particularly evident in the UN context, where states are engaged in a serious reform agenda, showing UN's continued utility, which can be viewed as a process of evolution rather than as a crisis—a crisis would rather exist if states disengaged, and worked outside of the UN, as they have done far more in the past.[71] Yet there are indications that states are in need of more efficient and representational frameworks for action. This becomes most evident in dealing with the current economic crisis, where rapid and effective reaction capabilities are needed.

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[68] Moravcsik (2010, p. 153).

[69] See for example Brantner and Gowan (2008) for an analysis about the EU's human rights promotion at the UN.

[70] Newman (2006, p. 160).

[71] Newman (2006, p. 175).

Indeed, in this context, the UN has been eclipsed since 2009 by the rise of the G-20 as a center for informal multilateral engagement. Emergence of the G-20 provides further evidence of the coming multipolar order and declining Western influence.[72] On the other hand, the G-20 is a self-appointed group with nearly 170 states not represented, and many important perspectives bypassed—indicating the continued significance for new groupings to continue a close cooperation with UN bodies. The EU, for its part, has adopted an active role in many organizations and given remarkable economic contributions.

Strengthening and reforming the UN has been high on the EU's list of priorities.[73] The UN's multilateral context still poses challenges for the EU, especially in terms of consolidating two multilateral forums. The EU managed to enhance its status in 2011 in the UN General Assembly, though it is not easy to function in a context of state actors that has existed for years (e.g. the EU can speak only after the state representatives). However, the EU's activities in the UN show its normative commitments to principled multilateralism, despite the increased challenge.

While this chapter has emphasized the role of external factors, a number of internal EU factors will decide the extent of the EU's contribution to global governance in the future. These internal factors include i.a. how the relationships of governments and leaders in the EU will work, how the 'division of labor' between the EU and member states is arranged, how much capabilities are given to the EU institutions, how big the EU will be and how coherently and consistently the EU's institutional setting in Brussels manages to act.[74] If the member states do not wish the EU to play an active normative role and the EU is not given enough competencies and the appropriate means to act, its contributions to global governance will be rather poor. The Lisbon Treaty clarified the EU's external power and promised more coherence and consistency to the EU's foreign policy and global norm promotion. However, it seems that the developments have also received a lot of criticism.

7 Conclusions

This chapter has studied the evolution, essence and limits of the EU's normative power role. First this chapter outlined how the normative power can be traced back historically, and how the external environment supported this kind of conceptualization. Through the separation between the two meanings of power, 'power as a powerful actor' and 'power as ability to cause effects', we could see that debate on the EU's normative power has mainly considered the first meaning and left the second less studied. Today we are mostly interested in the EU's ability to affect the

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[72] Jokela (2011).

[73] Laatikainen and Smith (2006, pp. 2–3).

[74] Ortega (2007, p. 95).

future global order. The power perspective and different taxonomies showed how the EU's normative power could actually work, and how it was related to other forms of power. The challenges and limits for normative power, and its core ideas of promoting universal principles and multilateral working methods, were considered towards the end of the analysis.

The EU's normative power role has turned out to be a product of its time, supported by external and internal factors that have nowadays faded. The EU must adjust to the changed circumstances and find new creative ways to influence the world. The EU is still willing to understand itself as a normative power that shapes the normality of global politics. However, this normative power is more difficult to practice today, as the EU or its norms are not necessarily considered as attractive as in the past. Thus, the legitimacy of the EU's normative role is challenged in the changing global order and it must find ways to answer this challenge.

The relevance and future of normative power is considerably dependent on how we evaluate future global politics and issues. Opinions on the future of the EU's normative power are diverse, and while some believe in its decline, others are ready to declare it the best power combination for the future world: the EU's decline may have been exaggerated similarly as was its previous 'new superpower' role. The coming order may instead offer new opportunities for the EU, in line with its practical ability to achieve goals.[75] Perspectives that announce decline are often based on a realist worldview, which measures power capabilities based predominantly on material resources. The EU's mixed capabilities, however, might favor a more prominent role than seems probable today.[76] By using its diverse power resources more efficiently and normatively in the future, such a normative power may be able to guide and limit other power resources.

The EU as a normative power continues to be a concept which captures something distinctive, if not perfect or ideal, about the EU's foreign policy and wider relation to the world. There are a variety of power dimensions at play in EU actions, varying and depending substantially on the policy and issue area. However, the normative power role seems to be especially relevant in policy areas that include moral questions like climate change, development aid and human rights. The future legitimacy and credibility of the EU's normative power is much dependent on its success in these areas.

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[75] Youngs (2010, p. 7).

[76] Moravcsik (2010).

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