Kyriakos N. Demetriou *Editor*

Democracy in Transition

Political Participation in the European Union

Springer

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Introduction

Kyriakos N. Demetriou

We come of a tribe that asks questions, and we ask them remorselessly, to the bitter end.

Jean Anouilh, Antigone (1944)

1 Democracy and Participation

Political participation is universally acknowledged as the core element of democracy since classical antiquity. The Greek noun "demokratia" has become the etymological basis for naming modern political systems in hundreds of languages worldwide, despite its sharp breaks and discontinuities from modern representative democracy. Originally being devised by its Athenian inventors as a form of government or a system of rule it has, since the last three centuries, been overwhelmingly dominating western societies and civilization, reaching a widespread appraisal and almost cosmopolitan legitimacy.[1] Prior to the French Revolution, however, it was the Spartan tradition and the Platonizing republic that allured the imagination of political elites and the world of intellectuals. The Athenian democracy was largely considered by its detractors as ochlocracy (mob rule), anarchy, orderlessness and anomie. With the French Revolution of 1789, democracy acquired a distinctive political momentum and was first invoked in a fundamentally transformed way to depict a grand plan for "democratisation", practical as opposed to utopian – i.e., refashioning politics and society in their entirety in order to put into operation the principles of popular self-rule and the sovereignty of the demos, reconciling individual freedom and the pursuit

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[1] As A. Weale puts it, "[d]emocracy – it would seem – has ceased to be a matter of contention and has become a matter of convention", *Democracy*, 2nd ed. (Macmillan: New York), p. 1.

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of one's own good with public order, in accordance with the ideals expounded by the thinkers of the Enlightenment.[2]

As John Dunn, a modern theorist of democracy argues, for us today "democracy is both a form of government and a political value", yet when "any modern state claims to be a democracy, it necessarily misdescribes itself".[3] Democracy indeed appears to be deceptive and elusive if one expects its institutional and legislative mechanisms to reproduce the innate characteristic of ancient democratic culture, grounded in its material conditions, i.e., direct engagement in political activity "by the ordinary people"[4]; the exercise of free and equal citizenship as substantive qualities towards security from elitist or tyrannical subjection, and a means in the pursuit of legitimate authority and eudaimonia. Modern representative democracies, as a mediated form of governance, have evolved in such a way as to create a framework which in effect presupposes a considerable amount of alienation of judgment and value perceptions as well as political and economic coercion. Such enforced alienation and obedience to various forms of constrains on human action, increasingly deepening by the irregular fluctuations of capitalist economy, have taken the form of systemic characteristics endemic to representative democratic regimes.

Today "democracy" and "democratisation" generally suggest a political (primarily constitutional) framework that guarantees freedom from civil subjection; public security threats are supposed to be met and fundamental civil rights – such as freedom of expression, movement, religion, property ownership, etc. – are to be respected. The idea of an active citizenship within a self-governing community is virtually considered unrealistic, not to say utopian. Self-governance does not any longer imply a system of vigilant and dynamic citizenship aiming to alter fundamental policies, but it mainly revolves around, on the one hand, the absence of coercion and on the other the consent of the governed, through holding regular elections that bestow legitimacy on democratic governments. Nevertheless, the modern idea of citizenship is still theoretically attached to the notion of political participation broadly conceived as to include a range of participationist devices such as voting, lobbying and protesting, but "active participation" and citizen control is utterly channelled through elaborate systems of political representation and delegation, imposing multiple, derivative constraints.[5] Consequently, modern citizenship is much more passive in as much as

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[2] See Fontana (1992).

[3] Dunn (2005). As A.H.M. Jones argued, "The Athenian Democracy and its Critics", *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, 11.1 (1953), pp. 1–26, there was no democratic political theory in antiquity. Cf. Farrar (1988). For a most recent fully-fledged discussion of the theory and practice of Athenian democracy see, Osborne (2010).

[4] The words *demos* "people" and *kratos* "rule" are conjoined together to mean, literally, rule by the people. See Ober (1994).

[5] Schumpeterian liberal constitutionalists like A. Przeworski define minimalist democracy – which is desirable – as a system in which rulers are selected by competitive elections. Only if considerable restraint is imposed on popular control democracies will act in responsible ways. See Adam Przeworski (1999), Joseph Schumpeter [1942] 1962.

"action" is eventually delegated to executives and other agencies and citizenship paradoxically turns out to be a constraint on acting instead of an impetus to act.[6]

From a revisionist perspective, however, political engagement as a key component for enacting citizenship needs to be disentangled from traditional conceptualizations of liberal/individualist democratic culture and conventional indicators (such as electoral turnout, associational unionism, party membership) and expand on the realm of "informal politics" or spheres of political democratic activities that present the "political" as a dimension "inherent to every human society . . . that determines our very ontological condition".[7] Thus the assumption of a vicious circle of political apathy, leading inescapably to the demise of civic activism, is today vigorously challenged. This new vision introduces a new perspective that includes presumably equally valid spheres of political involvement and mobilization which are rapidly evolving in post-industrial societies, such as the media, the club, new social movements and associations and NGOs, internet activism, and multiple structures of associationist experience that promote communication and coordination.[8] Consequently, contemporary liberal democracies are characterized by the infusion of alternative forms of civic engagement – a new participatory culture among individuals and within communities – aiming at influencing the decisions of public authorities and at the same time undermining loyalties to rapidly eroding structural entities (e.g. political parties and religious associations). People, in other words, are not turning increasingly apathetic in the context of a "thinning" political community (that would inevitably result in less effective and less responsible governments), but they are turning towards "cause-oriented participation".[9] This new trend calls for a more comprehensive understanding and re-conceptualization of democratic participation and citizenship that would encompass multi-dimensional and multi-interactive social and cultural perspectives.

2 New Turns in Democratic Deficit in the EU

Defining and conceptualizing "democratic deficit" is a much contested, recurrent theme in academic debate, but it is not accidental that the term's origins can be traced back to the 1970s when David Marquand used this specific expression to elaborate on the weakness of the democratic legitimacy of the European

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[6] For an excellent brief introduction to the scholarly debates pertaining to citizenship, with a particular focus on the political nature of citizenship, see Bellamy (2008). See also, Bohnam (2008). See further, Heater (2004), Hamlin and Pettit (1997).

[7] Mouffe (2005). See also J. Habermas' model of "discursive democracy", with focus on the normative requirements of a noncoercive public discourse that are crucial to establishing an ideal democracy, "a self-organizing community of free and equal citizens"; *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 7.

[8] For an extensive discussion on the revisionist literature see Li and March (2008).

[9] Norris (2002). See further, Pattie et al. (2004).

Community institutions.[10] A broad-spectrum assumption is that a democratic deficit exists whenever there are obvious discrepancies between the principles and standards of democratic rule and institutional rules and political practices. In the face of (a) low popular interest in the EU among Member-States, (b) consistently decreasing turnout in elections to the European Parliament, (c) the divide between politicians and national citizenry on European Integration, and (d) the complicated and technocratic nature of EU decision-making processes and legislative procedures - remaining too distant, too obscure and virtually impenetrable to "outsiders", i.e. the European citizens - it has become a commonplace or "a received orthodoxy" that there is a democratic deficit in the EU.[11] As Weale has succinctly put it "if the European Union itself applied to become a member state, it would be rejected because its political system was insufficiently democratic. Moreover, it is clear that this is not simply an oversight or accident of history, but that executive government by a political elite was integral to the Monnet method of European integration in the post-war years".[12]

A sceptic wave towards Europeanism is growing fast as a result of the current global recession and financial crisis, the bailout schemes and the politics of austerity measures imposed on member states for the reduction of public debts and the recovery of the collapsing banking system. Such scepticism is to a certain extent a manifestation of a nostalgia "for the good old days", in terms of looking back to pre-integration times with a perspective closer to the authority of traditional organizing assumptions and values of the liberal democratic nation-state. Contemporary pragmatic euroscepticism (despite its diversified forms) is in fact embedded in social structures and sociopolitical contexts that pose a real and unprecedented threat to the EU's quest for legitimacy.[13] According to Ari Rusila's pessimistic outlook, with "the Stability and Growth Pact, the political choices of national parliaments are limited. Besides killing the democracy the Pact will kill growth too so putting people in misery and dismay. The Pact is new tool for the plundering of the public services and the destruction of social rights in all EU countries".[14]

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[10] Marquand (1979). See further Chalmers et al. (2010) for multiple references to all aspects of EU's democratic deficit. See further, Eriksen (2009), Hix (2008), Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (2007); and for a general discussion on democratic deficit features in the EU see, Azman (2011).

[11] Mény and Knapp (1998), and Thomson (2011). Cf., however, Dinan (2010) on the reforms designed by the EU to make it "more accountable, appealing, and comprehensible to its citizens" (Introduction). The Treaty of Lisbon, which completed the process of ratification and came into force on December 1st 2009 tried to minimize the effects of the democratic deficit, stating in the Preamble that the aim of the treaty was "to complete the process started by the Treaty of Amsterdam [1997] and by the Treaty of Nice [2001] with a view to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and to improving the coherence of its actions".

[12] Weale, *Democracy*, p. 3 and Featherstone (1994).

[13] A Eurobarometer survey of EU citizens in 2009 showed that support for membership of the EU was lowest in Latvia, the United Kingdom, and Hungary, but the Eurozone crisis will naturally boost Euroscepticism, so the results would be quite different in 2012. For a broad perspective on Euroscepticism see, Krisztina Arató and Petr Kaniok (2009), and Brack and Costa (2012).

[14] Rusila (2012).

Elements of democratic disempowerment within the context of Europeanization could be much more disturbing if one considers that the European Union is neither a federal state, nor even an intergovernmental organization, but a *sui generis* political entity.[15] As incongruities and inefficiencies are amplified, as for example on the present economic crisis that plagues the eurozone, the EU, being both utterly remote from democratically elected national governments and inaccessible to their people exercising their sovereign rights, is exposed to criticism for lacking democratic legitimacy – in simple words, it cannot ensure the accountability and responsiveness a central government promises to people, neither could it allow the pluralist dimension of procedural democracy.[16] Apparently, as long as the trend is to transfer more competencies to the EU, the decision-making capacity of national governments is considerably circumscribed. So, a widely accepted definition of the EU's "democratic deficit" is explicitly based on the lack of democratic controls and accountability mechanisms in the Community.[17]

> The democratic deficit is a concept invoked principally in the argument that the European Union and its various bodies suffer from a lack of democracy and seem inaccessible to the *ordinary citizen* because their method of operating is so complex. The view is that the Community institutional set-up is dominated by an institution combining legislative and government powers (the Council of the European Union) and an institution that lacks democratic legitimacy (the European Commission) [emphasis added].[18]

The idea of sovereignty combined to active citizenship, which emerged alongside the nation-state, faces today an unprecedented crisis in the EU.[19] Citizens of the European South are getting frantically fearful against the supposedly "faceless bureaucrats" who are accustomed to function on a complex multi-level system of governance – bureaucrats who meet together to determine the people's future without their expressed consent (e.g. via national referenda or regulatory negotiations). Judging from recent popular reactions that include nationwide strikes

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[15] See Schmidt (2006), who prefers the denomination "a regional state in the making".

[16] See Dahl (2006), for democracy as polyarchy or "a process of control over leaders", and Bealey (1988), on Dahl's idea of "public contestation" and on the distinguishing figures of democracy, "inclusiveness" among them, i.e. "the right of all adults to be included in the political process".

[17] Konstadinides (2009). On the other hand, monetary and fiscal union should have gone hand in hand with efficient political union, something that never happened, thus the "Eurocrisis": see McNamara (2010).

[18] http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/democratic_deficit_en.htm Emphasis on "ordinary citizen" is added because it was the foundational principle of ancient Greek participatory democracy (See the "Protagorean Myth", in Plato's *Protagoras*.)

[19] According to Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*, pp. 4–5, "[f]or some people, the EU is anathema precisely because it involves the sharing of sovereignty", to add that opponents of "European integration naturally exaggerate the threat that they think the EU poses to national identity, independence, and interests". In the UK, for instance, Eurosceptics are extremely concerned with the apparent loss of Parliamentary Sovereignty due to the expansion of EU powers and the growing number of legislative powers delegated by the sovereign "Crown" to the EU. See Gifford (2008).

in the public and the private sector and massive street protests and rallies against certain policies, a citizen resistance movement and uncontrollable social unrest within the EU does not appear to be such an oxymoronic scenario as it would appear by the end of the twentieth century.[20] Arguably, EU doesn't simply suffer from an institutional democratic deficit, but it has implicitly developed an elitist oligarchic ideology embracing the idea that ordinary people – attached to conventional loyalties and affiliations – are incapable of self-governance and thus governments among Member-States (such as the non-democratically appointed governments of Italy and formerly of Greece) must be protected from public pressure. In effect, this development replicates a dominant element in the dynamic structure of globalization, where multinational economic actors essentially curtail the ability of national governments to control economic forces that have a direct impact on the financial well being and employment of citizens.[21]

What we witness today is not just an absolute reversal of participatory democracy as a ideal for public engagement but most emphatically a distortion in self-proclaimed representative democracies which are bound to be accountable to their electorates and not to distantly "impartial" and "knowledgeable" technocratic policy-makers. Thus even if people's pace of political engagement-activities may show signs of re-invigoration after a long period of stillness and apathetic estrangement, the demotion of the institutional role of national member-states appears to be also a rampant attack on popular sovereignty by a sort of bureaucratic despotism, or by a formidable European, as it would be, centrally designed and intrinsically authoritarian Leviathan.[22]

3   Participation as Democracy

The present collection of essays deals with an inherently mainstream political discourse issue, namely *civic disengagement*, decrease in mobilisation and citizen withdrawal or alienation – not only of the form affected by a suprastatal entity like the EU and its multi-complex mechanisms (as indicated above), but also at the national level. Activating or re-activating the citizen has been an overriding theme in social and political discourse during the last two decades, since intensely declining levels of citizen participation (directly affecting voter turnout, party

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[20] Ètienne Balibar, *Guardian*, 23 November 2011 talks about the "citizens" revolt against the dictatorship of markets that instrumentalise governments'. The core problem is "sovereign" peoples submitting to a supranational structure. Recent Spanish civil unrest over new austerity measures (Summer and Autumn 2012) does not only threaten fragile eurozone but also poses dilemmas about the very idea of European political union, EU policymaking and democratic politics.

[21] See the discussion in Marden (2003).

[22] About the "precariousness of democracy in the EU", see H. Spiegel, "Die Bürokratie frisst ihre Bürger", *Frankfrurther Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 March 2011: "Die Europäische Union ist auf dem Weg, ihre Bürger zu entmündigen. Aufhalten können sie dabei nur wir Europäer". See also Howarth and Loedel (2003).

membership and other forms of civic activism) would pose a menace to the foundational premises of democratic governance.[23]

Explaining patterns and aetiologies of citizen disengagement and abstentionism is a complex enterprise – as it entails analysing and understanding the particular attitudes and motivations of individuals and social groups (such as the elderly and the youth) within certain political societies by employing a variety of assessing methodologies[24] – yet a general exegetical assumption must be that modern western democracies face an unprecedented crisis of public confidence in the efficacy of political participation. In this regard, for example, one should take into account the growing scepticism surrounding political parties as vehicles of public opinion, and the breakdown of the traditional party-structures that cannot effectively respond to changes in a rapidly evolving knowledge-based and technologically transformed environment. Confessedly, financial crisis generates an even more intense distrust in political parties in many European countries, unveiling a deep and serious lack of confidence in the political leaders the system supplies and alienation from a wide range of social and political institutions and processes.[25] Politics is most often looked on as a particularly dirty business, exercised by corrupt politicians with sinister agendas; hence the idea of the formal authorisation of legitimate representatives is being steadily tarnished.[26]

Consequently, citizen disengagement appears quite often to involve a more or less focussed reaction to party pathologies, which in turn has a negative effect on the political system as it potentially reduces the legitimacy of central decision-making. Other causes behind increasing political apathy or political disengagement might include low self-confidence ("my vote does not count") and weak motivation resulted from the substantive requirements for practising deliberative or discursive democracy, political unawareness, ideological contexts and long-established dogmatic cultures, regime transition, absence of institutional opportunities for political participation within existing representative democracies, material deprivation, the attitude that government's decisions do not affect personal interests, educational mechanisms leading to inefficient civil socialization and even depoliticization and isolationist social fragmentation,[27] ill-defined concepts of individual autonomy and self-realization/fulfilment, political inefficacy and generally pessimism and low expectations for social, economic and political changes.

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[23] See e.g., DeBardeleben and Pammett (2009) for recent discussions and bibliographical guides.

[24] For a recent discussion on deliberation and social choice with regard to democratic theories, see Estlund (2005). See also, Arrow (1963); Buchanan (1993); cf. Bohman and Rehg (1997); Dryzek (2000).

[25] See Webb et al. (2002), and Semetco (2006). The 2010 Global Corruption Barometer by Berlin-based watchdog Transparency International (TI) showed that 79 % of respondents in a global study believed parties were "corrupt or extremely corrupt", up from 69 % in 2009.

[26] Carothers (2006).

[27] Törnquist et al. (2009).

It can be argued that a valid perspective on defining liberal democratic legitimacy should largely depend on the establishment of institutions through which citizens can be engaged in the implementation, monitoring and evaluating public policies and processes of government.[28] The body of the people, that is, is the only safe depository of liberty and power. A principle that remains vital in the making for modern democracy is well-informed participation in political activities and freedom from alienation through renewed mechanisms for attaining effective political representation. Fragmented, splintered or degraded citizen participation undermines democratic governance, leads to elitist (bureaucratic or technocratic) institution building – and increases dramatically the level of democratic deficit. This volume is concerned with citizen engagement in the European Union from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective and is an attempt to analyse the grounds and reasons behind the high rates of civic apathy as well as the changing modes of political participation and the new facets in the development of contemporary democratic capacities and civic culture.

4   The Organization of the Volume

The essays in this collection, written by a cross-regional group of experts, provide illuminating insights into the causes of declining levels of citizen participation and other distinct forms of civic activism in Europe and explore a range of factors contributing to apathy and eventually disengagement from vital political processes and institutions. At the same time, this volume examines informal or unconventional types of civic engagement and political participation corresponding to the rapid advances in culture, technology and social networking. The contents of this volume are divided into three essentially interrelated parts. Part I consists of critical essays in the form of theoretical approaches to analysing weakening political participation and citizen estrangement; Part II is dedicated to an exploration of the role and deployment of technologically advanced media, such as the Internet, as determinants of changing patterns of political participationist behaviour. Finally, Part III contains studies based on the findings of well-designed empirical research on the issue of political participation. The essays in this volume, combining theoretical and rigorous empirical perspectives, is a contribution towards a better understanding of the disquieting trend of voter apathy and disenchantment with politics in the context of the ongoing process of European integration, while it offers analytical tools for decoding both the emergence of alternative conceptualizations of citizenship and other forms of meaningful civic and political engagement.

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[28] Citizens' engagement is the core element of all definitions of democracy, thus the decline of voting turnout and disengagement is often interpreted as the main malady of modern democracy: As S. Verba, S. and N.H. Nie, put it "where few take part in decisions there is little democracy". See *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality* (New York: Harper Row Publishers, 1972), p. 1.

Iasonas Lamprianou in chapter "Contemporary Political Participation Research: A critical Assessment" explores a number of different approaches to "conventional" and "unconventional" forms of political participation mainly from a sociological perspective. He presents a general discussion on different conceptualizations and definitions of political engagement, raising serious doubts as to the suitability of the customary typological division between conventional and unconventional mobilisation and participationist activities – showing why this "dichotomy" mostly represents an artificial and elusive construct.

Political participation can take very diverse forms such as being a member of a political party, lobbying, contacting a politician to express concerns or ideas or signing a petition. While conventional forms of participation (e.g., party membership and voting) have been steadily declining during the last decades, unconventional – or less "orthodox" – forms of political participation are clearly on the rise in most European countries, such as internet campaigns, unplanned protests, roadblocks, political consumerism and lifestyle politics. We live in an era where spontaneous and unplanned protests can take place within a few hours by means of social networking communication, as for example when people want to demonstrate against austerity measures in Southern Europe. Political involvement is a dynamic and constantly evolving social phenomenon. At times, people seem to be more or less politically active, so participation rates can vary across time and places. Further, alienation from politics or political disengagement does not affect all people and all societies in the same way, at all times. A number of factors have been identified as being related to the intensity of political participation: e.g. gender, education and age.

Maria Markantonatou in chapter "The Post-Welfare State and Changing Forms of Political Participation" starts from Colin Crouch's concept of "post-democracy" to examine changing practices and discourses of political participation, as well as the consequences for political participation of the deregulation of the Keynesian welfare state during the last decades across Europe. She forcefully argues that the diffusion of neoliberal policies is having severe implications at the level of political participation. Traditional forms of participation based on collective action and state regulation give place to individualistic forms of action, networking and to struggles for symbolic recognition instead of struggles for social rights. The dismantling of national economic regulations, the new emphasis on economic growth based on private investment, an increasing market-individualism, the ideology of competition and the "precarisation" of working and living conditions, are now framing new forms of social exclusion. Within the ideology of free-market competition caused by the demise of the welfare state, unprivileged social groups and individuals are now "responsible" for their position. In the frame of this neoliberal "responsibilisation process", poverty and inequality are no more reduced to the economic system or to inadequate welfare, but to individual pathologies. In this frame, discontent around political parties and governmental policies, electoral abstention and apathy are combined with new forms of both communitarian and individualistic social action, in which collective social conquests are fainting, in favour of strategies of flexibility, free-market and competitiveness.

In chapter "The Rise of the 'Pleasure Citizen': How Leisure Can Be a Site for Alternative Forms of Political Participation", Sarah Riley, Yvette Morey and Christine Griffin revisit youth political participation and argue that many young people are limited in their ability to effect large scale social change. Young people's concerns – such as not going to war, protecting the environment, domestic violence, racism, homophobia, decriminalizing drugs, and safe and inexpensive places to socialize or party – are not, from their perspective, addressed by their political representatives. In this context, it makes sense to turn away from mainstream politics and try to affect change at a local or personal level. And the logic of this "turning away" has been further reinforced by decades of neo-liberal government policies that have focused on individual responsibilities and solutions to what were once considered collective problems.

One site where young people can exercise sovereignty and create alternative social spaces is in their leisure spaces, and in chapter "The Rise of the 'Pleasure Citizen': How Leisure Can Be a Site for Alternative Forms of Political Participation" authors explore some of the relationships between contemporary forms of citizenship and consumption through an analysis of club culture as a site where young people are actively creating alternative forms of political participation. To do so authors examine the values and behaviours characteristic of these events, how participants made sense of these, and how the present analysis of their sense making can inform our understanding of contemporary notions of citizenship and political participation. Young people make sense of their engagement through collectivist discourses of sociality and belonging, but also with individualist discourses that constructed their partying as an exercise of personal freedom, individual responsibility and consumer choice. Combined, these somewhat contradictory discourses produced a new subject position, the "pleasure citizen", a person with rights and responsibilities to no one but themselves, but who gained a sense of value and belonging by being part of extended networks of communities associated with club culture.

This chapter concludes that leisure may be a site for political participation and should not be dismissed as "merely" entertainment. Instead, it is suggested that while there may be diminishing levels of political engagement in Europe in relation to traditional participationist forms, this does not necessarily represent political apathy or indifference in young people. Rather one can identify a move to find ways of social and political participation within the less than ideal contexts for political participation in which young people find themselves.

In chapter "'Parties with No Members?': How to Ensure Political Participation in East Central Europe", Ladislav Cabada examines the role of political parties in the new post-Communist democracies now belonging to the EU. Recent studies have shown that the political or more generally civil participation in the new democracies embodies essentially lower grades than in the majority of EU-15 countries, Cyprus and Malta. Such results might be observed in the case of getting involved in the activities of political parties – but also with regard to other societal organisations such as labour/trade unions, professional associations, non-governmental organisations and church groups.

In fact, in most of the new democracies of East Central Europe party membership is just over 1–2 % of the eligible to vote adult population. This is problematic not only because it has a detrimental impact on recruiting new political elites, but also because it is negatively related to a participatory, engaged approach to politics. Apparently, low party membership and decreasing electoral turnout generate networks creating new political actors strategically aiming to develop ties for broadening and deepening political influences. For example new social movements and voluntary associations emerge in the new democracies of East Central Europe, but there is also a strong diffusion of media and media-staff into politics (media magnates established their own relevant political parties, as for instance in the Czech Republic and Slovakia); new political parties emerging from business environments (political parties functioning as a private company); there is further a tendency towards the formation of "single-issue" political parties (for example in Lithuania, Slovakia, or the Czech Republic). Such developments can be sources of governmental instability and usually produce distinctively unpredictable electoral results. Further, they have an essentially negative impact on the individual and institutional logic of political involvement.

Cabada's chapter analyses low party membership rate in the new EU-member states from East Central Europe, and explores its underlying causes and especially its impact on the character and functioning of political parties (the existence of the so-called cartel parties, the strengthening relation between politics and business, the interconnectedness between the political parties and the state etc.) as well as on other types of political and societal actors.

In chapter "Gender and Political Participation in Western and Eastern Europe", Hilde Coffé argues that gender remains a meaningful source of inequality in the field of political participation. Indeed, most previous research has looked at post-industrialized Western democracies or has taken a global perspective, and the gender gap in different types of political participation among Western and Eastern Europe has rarely been compared in detail. Yet, given the unique experience with communism, the trend of re-traditionalization after the fall of communism, and the lower levels of modernization in Eastern Europe, we may expect to find larger gender gaps in Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe.

Coffé examines how gender gap in electoral participation and political activism differs across Western and Eastern European countries. Even today, more than 20 years after the fall of communism and when more and more Eastern European countries are entering (or expected to enter) the European Union, such regional comparison is relevant since Eastern European countries are still lagging behind in economic development compared to Western Europe and a country's previous regime type is known to be still influencing public participation. In addition to describing the gender gap in electoral participation and political activism, Coffé examines whether this gap differs between generations. As younger generations in Eastern European countries have experienced less of communist ideology in their (adult) daily life and have grown up in a political, cultural and economic environment that differs fundamentally from the context in which older generations were raised, it may be expected that there are substantial generational differences in the

extent of the gender gap. In addition, as differences between Eastern and Western Europe have narrowed over the past decades, regional differences in the gender gap may be smaller among younger generations compared to older generations.

Sofie Marien and Henrik Serup Christensen in chapter "Trust and Openness: Prerequisites for Democratic Engagement?", examine the credibility of a basic assumption, namely that high levels of political trust are a prerequisite for an active and vigilant citizenry. This assumption has been challenged with the arrival of a range of new, less formal, forms of political participation that occur in the outskirts of the political sphere. The advent of these participatory activities has frequently been connected to feelings of political distrust. It is therefore argued that rather than leading to political apathy, dissatisfied citizens will engage in alternative forms of activism to signal their discontent to the political decision-making authority. It may be contended that these feelings of distrust are positive for democracy, since critically-minded citizens help keep the decision-makers accountable for their actions.

Consequently, the link between political trust and political participation is no longer self-evident. The state of confusion is amplified by the noticeable variation in Europe in levels of discontent and the popularity of certain political activities. It cannot be presumed that similar activities are always manifestations of discontent – the context in which the activities take place is an important factor. Nevertheless, the contextual aspect has frequently been disregarded when examining the links between political trust and various forms of political participation. Marien's and Christensen's study aims to rectify this omission by examining how these linkages are affected by the central contextual factor made up by the institutional structures of representative democracy. The institutional openness of the political system has been argued to affect both political attitudes and levels of political engagement, but little is known of how the institutional openness and political trust allow for an interaction effect relative to political participation. The results of this study suggest that the institutional context mediates the effect of political trust on political participation, but the specific effect depends on the form of participation under consideration.

Finally, Luca Asmonti in chapter "From Athens to Athens. Europe, Crisis, and Democracy: Suggestions for a Debate", addresses the issue of how democratic regimes can handle crisis and internal and external threats from a comparative perspective. Drawing on current debates on the principles of democracy, its global reach, and inevitable transformations, this chapter takes on the issue of the origins of democracy and whether ancient Athens can still represent a model of democratic culture and practice. Hence, the paper presents Athenian democracy as a comparative model to discuss how democratic regimes can articulate its internal and external threats. In this respect, three issues are highlighted: Athenian democracy flourished in spite it was constantly menaced by internal divisions. The Athenians saw it as central to their collective identity. At the same time they were aware of the contingencies and practical factors that allowed it to succeed. Finally, they never assumed that democracy could become a global language or value outside the Athenian sphere of influence, and were aware that the international environment was largely hostile to it.

Indeed, the handling of the financial crisis in Greece, Spain and Italy has sparked intense debate on the endemic "democratic deficit" within the EU, the growing political ascendancy of institutions such as the European Central Bank, and the dwindling sovereignty of local elected governments, not to mention that of the voting citizens. The problems with democratic accountability in Europe are perhaps the most visible symptom of a wider crisis of democratic decision-making and representation, calling into question the idea of democracy as "the pre-eminently acceptable form of government", which had been so dominant since the end of World War II, particularly following the fall of the Iron Curtain. All of a sudden, democracy looks vulnerable and imperilled; it is no longer the "dominatrix" that it used to be, and its future looks uncertain. Asmonti intends to contribute to this debate by posing the question as to whether the current crisis of democracy might have anything to do with its idolization and the idea of its supposed invulnerability. Has our "democratic faith" made us overlooked the internal and external risks that may imperil democracy? Can we still conceive of democracy operating in a hostile environment?

Part II, The Internet and Political Participation, includes two chapters. Lorenzo Mosca in chapter, "The Internet as a New Channel for Political Participation?" argues that despite growing dissatisfaction with institutional politics, the last decade has been marked by frequent waves of protest which have increasingly become more transnational. In fact, the crisis of conventional forms of participation has freed resources which in turn feed unconventional forms of political engagement. These have also been favoured by the spread of information and communication technologies (ICTs). The internet in particular provides inexpensive means to coordinate, organize and mobilize protest. This chapter explores new forms of participation facilitated by new media, and provides evidence from qualitative and quantitative research carried out by Mosca during the past years. Both limits and opportunities provided by ICTs to collective action are critically assessed with reference to forms of action, organizational structures and identities. Chapter "The Internet as a New Channel for Political Participation" also considers theories of unconventional political participation which are challenged by the advent of new technologies.

Fernando Mendez, in chapter "EU-Democracy and E-Democracy: Can the Two Be Reconciled?", argues that e-democracy does not exist in any meaningful sense. Most of the countries in the EU and its orbit are liberal democracies and even if we were to extend our horizon further afield there are no e-democracies – neither are they likely to appear in the near future. For that to occur a new "e-democracy" paradigm would have to replace our current "liberal democratic" paradigm. Instead, what we are witnessing is innovative experimentation with information and communication technologies (ICT) in the democratic realm. Whilst some of the tools and applications may transform aspects of the political process, they do not entail a transformation in the democratic paradigm. It is with this narrower conception of e-democratic experimentation, rather than an "elusive" e-democratic paradigm, that this chapter is concerned. Furthermore, the chapter focuses on the prospects of e-democratic experimentation in a special political setting, the EU.

In this connection, the conventional wisdom is that the EU suffers from democratic deficit. To what extent, then, could ICTs reduce that democratic deficit, if at all? In providing some tentative answers to this question the chapter surveys some recent experiments involving the use of ICTs in connection to EU democracy. Specifically, Mendez looks at three dimensions of the subject: Techniques aimed at improving mechanisms of (1) representation, (2) participation and (3) deliberation and their broader EU-democratisation potential.

Part III consists of four case studies. Chapter "Transnational Citizenship as Status, Identity and Participation: A Comparative Assessment" by Mari-Liis Jakobson and Leif Kalev examine how "transnationalisation" of individual lifestyles calls for reassessing the *modus operandi* of popular engagement modes in the processes of decision-making. Migratory experience can be a process of political learning. This has resulted in the positive spill-over effect of democratic values, giving a hard time for the states of origin that exercise non-democratic measures. But also well-established democracies face new challenges, since their citizens are not fully capable of participating in decisions that affect them most, whereas governmental mechanisms increasingly encompass citizens or nationals of other states. What are the challenges and what could be the substitute for the modes of civic engagement characteristic to modern statehood?

This chapter compares transnational citizenship in four transnational spaces: (1) Estonia and Finland, (2) Germany and Turkey, (3) Morocco and France, and (4) Indian Punjab and UK. The material for tracking down transnational citizenship have been drawn from migrants' discourse and practices, but also from the socio-economic context and legal framework, which form the opportunity structures of the transnational space.

Andrej Kirbiš in chapter "Political Participation and Non-democratic Political Culture in Post-Yugoslav Countries and Europe" argues that understanding patterns of political participation in Post-Communist and especially post-Yugoslav countries is crucial for their integration in the European Union. Many areas of political culture and value orientations of post-communist citizens have previously been studied, yet relatively few studies have dealt with patterns of political participation. This especially holds true for post-Yugoslav countries, since only a small number of systematic cross-national studies have analyzed and compared political participation of *all* post-Yugoslav countries. Even though levels of political participation and political culture are important in the process of consolidating the new democracies, one aspect is especially understudied in Post-Communist states: the association between political participation and political culture. Kirbiš analyzes the levels of political participation, non-democratic political culture and the link between political participation and political culture in post-Yugoslav states within the wider European context. The results of his study indicate that (1) post-communist citizens are more non-democratically oriented than their Western counterparts; (2) in European context surveyed "authoritarians" are less likely to be politically engaged; (3) Implications of the results and future research suggestions are discussed.

Steve Schwarzer and Dylan Connor in chapter "Political Engagement Among the Youth: Effects of Political Socialization Across Europe" challenge the

assumption that young people in the Western World are becoming increasingly disengaged from conventional politics. They argue that this does not hold true for political interests generally, as young people still remain interested in politics, political discussion and engage themselves in politically-orientated activities. This chapter focuses on political socialization patterns that foster students' political engagement, and provide a starting point for considering political participation in the future. The necessary conditions under which people become involved with politics, Schwarzer and Connor argue, still remains a puzzle; much pioneering work on political culture has demonstrated differences between similar contextually-situated individuals. A number of these studies have typically pointed to political socialization as a plausible suspect for these differences.

Thus the political socialization of adolescents has been high on the agenda of governments and researchers over the past decade. This chapter focuses on younger students and this is particularly appropriate, in light of revisiting youth participation among European stakeholders, politicians and academics and suggestions to institute voting rights from a lower age. This is particularly true for academia where the changing discourse of political socialization regarding children and young adults has gathered momentum. Aside from questioning what is implicit in creating good citizens, research has increasingly focussed on the agents of political socialization; is it all about family or are other factors, such as the schools, real and virtual friends also of importance? This chapter sheds further light on the political engagement of school pupils across Europe and explores the relationship between engagement and the current political participation of young students.

Chapter "The Impact of Socio-economic Status on Political Participation" by Ellen Quintelier and Marc Hooghe explores the relationship between political participation on the one hand and parental/adolescent socio-economic status on the other hand. Quintelier and Hooghe analyze this research question using the Belgian Political Panel Survey 2006–2008, a representative panel study among 4,235 young Belgian adolescents (aged 16 at time-point 1). The structural equation model reveals that young people's socio-economic status has more influence on political participation than the parental socio-economic status. Adolescents' socio-economic status does not only affect the level of political participation at the time of measurement itself, but also 2 years later. This indicates that higher educated or in higher tracks, people are not only more likely to participate in contemporary politics, but also more likely to participate in the future: the gap between the activists and non-activists seems to be growing over time.

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Part I

Theorizing Political Participation

Contemporary Political Participation Research: A Critical Assessment

Iasonas Lamprianou

1   Introduction

The issue of political participation has been a substantive area of interest for both sociologists and political scientists, mainly because it pertains to the quintessential act of democratic citizenship – voting at election for the House of Representatives. While elections and voting behaviour attract the attention of many social science researchers, various manifestations and forms associated with political engagement in a broader sense have also received extensive study.

This chapter aims primarily to critically present a selection of contemporary approaches and methodological tools for investigating political participation. Granted that this is already an enormous area of research being conducted, it is unrealistic to expect a fully-fledged examination of all works published so far. For the twofold purpose of this paper it suffices (a) to discuss a wide range as possible of quite different conceptualizations and definitions of political participation, while (b) attempting to show that the typological division between conventional and unconventional political participation is often artificial and elusive.

Discussion about extremist and often aggressive forms of political participationist activism (as they are described in contemporary research), might be contrasted to the perceptions cherished by the ancient Greek democrats as to citizen roles and civil duties within their community, showing that classical Athenian democracy (in theory and practice) did not draw any sharp distinction between diverse or conflicting types of participation. The chapter concludes with a short section whereby the principal findings from this critical assessment are briefly summarized along with some reflections on the foundational role of sociological perspectives on political participation analysis.

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2   Conceptualizing Political Participation in Contemporary Research

As liberal democratic culture and values have blossomed in Western societies, it increasingly became axiomatic that broad participation in the decision-making processes is a prerequisite for proper democratic governance (Dahl 1971, 1998; Pateman 1970). Political theorists claimed that all individuals ought to have an appropriately equal opportunity to influence decision-making processes (Verba et al. 1978). While electoral turnout and voting, which is the cornerstone of the democratic political process, has been reportedly decreasing over the last decades in almost all European states (O'Toole et al. 2003), academic experts and technocrats have been exploring alternative participationist activities that could influence and shape decision-making processes, within a variety of social and cultural contexts. As a result, political participation have been proven to take incredibly diverse forms such as being a member of a political party or community-based organizations, displaying an active role within a range of cultural or leisure interactions, contacting a politician to express ecological concerns, suggestions or ideas, signing a petition, setting public buildings on fire (!) and even shooting at policemen during demonstrations and riots (Bourne 2010).

Providing a final definition of political participation is not an easy task, especially if one employs both teleological (i.e. focusing on goal-oriented political behaviour; derived from the Greek word *telos*) as well as praxialist arguments or procedural engagement (i.e. focusing on the relevant procedures involved; derived from the Greek work, *praxis*). For example, the world has recently witnessed the riots of young people in the UK in August 2011; would one classify these riots as a form of political participation or it is just suitable to dismiss them as acts of "pure criminality" as the current Prime Minister David Cameron suggested on the 15 of August 2011 in Oxfordshire (Cameron 2011)? A working definition of political or citizen participation is essential before moving on to the next step of the present analysis.

Although there is no universally accepted definition in this particular research area (see Uhlaner 2001), political participation is often being referred to as "political engagement" or "public involvement in decision making". As Riley et al. (2010) have pointed out, political engagement has traditionally been thought of as "a set of rights and duties that involve formally organized civic and political activities (e.g., voting or joining a political party)". Diemer (2012) referred to political participation as an "engagement with traditional mechanisms in the . . . political system, such as voting in elections and joining political organizations" (p. na). Munroe (2002) defined political participation in terms of the degree to which citizens are exercising their right to engage in political activities (e.g., to protest, to speak freely, to vote, to influence or to get more energetically involved). Such definitions capitalize on the lawful nature of political praxis, in other words, they clearly establish a frame of reference with the available repertoire of political praxis within the conventional political norms, although these norms are not necessarily uniform across countries or across time.

Alternatively some researchers do not focus on the praxis but only on the telos, primarily by defining political participation as a set of activities aiming to influence political authority. For example, Huntington and Nelson (1976, p.3) defined political participation as an "activity by private citizens designed to influence government decision-making" whereas Verba et al. (1995, p.38) characterized it as an "activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action – either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies." The praxis does not seem to be important enough in the context of these definitions in as much as they are mainly teleological in nature.

Such definitions, therefore, may imply that the telos is achieved through some form of "pre-specified" praxis which is acceptable and lawful. According to such a definition the Prime Minister, David Cameron, was almost certainly correct when he stated that the recent riots in the UK were sheer criminal acts because the methods used by the rioters were unlawful and went clearly beyond the acceptable boundaries of the political establishment and its institutional norms. On the other hand, the Labour Party (i.e. currently the opposition in the UK) condemned the acts of violence even though he argued that there was an "in-convenient truth", i.e. a message passed by the riots which had to be addressed by politicians (Miliband 2011). Consequently, the riots can be seen as events charged with a visible form of political engagement and the rioters as conveying a political message, even though they were acting unlawfully. In other words, their political praxis was illegal albeit symbolically effective even though they justifiably drew wide condemnation from many quarters.

Arguably, being able to voice a group's demands in the public sphere is one of the indications of a sustainable democratic system and may be seen as a desirable form of political participation. Much has been written over the last decades about the rights of individuals and groups to enter the public sphere as actors who are able to legitimately voice their demands. For example, Jasiewicz (2011) examined how ethnic minorities in Poland participate in the political spheres of society by articulating their views through the mass media, speaking their native languages although this "provokes negative reactions of parliamentary representatives and of common Poles" (p. 736). According to Jasiewicz, the opportunity given to ethnic groups to openly express their claims coincided with Poland's process of democratic consolidation, following the events of 1989 when minority actors "seized on conventional forms of action including public statements, letters, interviews and conferences" and gave up "confrontational forms of action" (p.750). In this case, democratization process co-exists with an explicit commitment to disallow non-institutional ("confrontational") methods and to comply with more predictably conventional political methods.

Interestingly, the distinction between the teleological and praxial nature of political participation can be very important and intriguing, although this is not always adequately addressed in relevant literature. For example, does occupying or burning public buildings during a demonstration (i.e. the telos being to influence decision-making via demonstrating aggressively or confrontationally), constitute

an acceptable method of political participation? That is, would such acts count as "political participation engagement" even though they are apparently outside the legal frame and the institutional practices a society is accustomed to? Some researchers stick to a hierarchy of political engagement by drawing a sharp distinction between "legal" and "illegal" political participation, and suggesting that evaluating the nature of the praxis determines its qualitative place on the participationist map. This dichotomous distinction between formal and informal (or legal and illegal) political action has an academic prehistory of many decades. Thus the orthodox approach referred to "democratic participation (conventional and unconventional methods of legal political activity in democracies) and aggressive participation (civil disobedience and political violence) . . . [as] analytically distinct types of political behaviour" (Muller 1982, p. 1). Similarly, scientists employed an analogous terminology to capitalize on the differences between democratic and aggressive participation (see Opp et al. 1981), yet newer studies also lay emphasis on the distinction between legal and illegal activities (see Lavrič et al. 2010). So the dilemma remains: Should European democracies proceed to accommodate the political telos of an activity ignoring the potentially violent nature of the praxis? In other words, is the telos sufficiently important to excuse the unpredictability and impulsiveness of any praxis? Let us try to illuminate this issue by referring back to the genesis of democracy.

The ancient Athenians – the people who invented democracy – did not consistently or necessarily distinguish between the praxis and the telos of political participationist actions. In fact, they seemed to have projected the value of the telos behind political engagement over the praxis. It appears that in classical Athens even man-slaughter could be an acceptable form of political participation. For example, Athenian citizens considered it their duty to assassinate those who were planning to take control of the polis without respect for law and democratic institutions. According to Gagarin and Fantham (2010), after the oligarchic revolutions of 411 BC, all Athenians passed a decree initiated by Demophantus to the effect that the killer of any overthrower of the democracy might not be held liable for any penalty. The decree was publicly inscribed and displayed and an oath was taken by all tribes and the demes swearing to kill any tyrant or overthrower of democracy – an oath that led many oligarchs to withdraw from the city. In fact, the sons of any man killed in the process of prosecuting potential tyrants would receive benefits such as "proedria" (front-row seats in the theatre), "sitēsis" (free public meals) and "ateleia" (exemption from certain taxes). Several ancient sources (e.g. Thucydides in his "History of the Peloponnesian War" (VI, 56–59) and the Aristotelian "The Constitution of the Athenians" (XVIII)) recount the story of the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who were killed on the spot while stabbing to death the tyrant Hipparchus. With their action to assassinate the tyrant, Harmodius and Aristogeiton "were increasingly woven into the fabric of Athenian ideology and institutionalized as the very essence of Athen's democratic polity" (Gagarin and Fantham 2010, p. 130). After the establishment of democracy, Cleisthenes commissioned the sculptor Antenor to produce a bronze statue of the two heroes who were considered the champions and founder spirits of Athenian

democracy. That was the very first statue to be paid for out of public funds, because Harmodius and Areistogeiton were the first Greeks considered by their countrymen worthy of having statues raised to them. Such was the social apotheosis they enjoyed that a special law was issued prohibiting the erection of any other statues around! On their statue, the Athenians inscribed a verse by the poet Simonides: "A marvellous great light shone upon Athens, when Aristogeiton and Harmodius slew Hipparchus."

Of course, acts of violence (i.e. praxial activism) cannot be considered as legitimate forms of political participation. Indeed certain activities have been characterised in the literature as unorthodox or extreme forms of political engagement. In the case of Athens, however, one should consider that the ancient Athenians' fundamental concern was the survival of democracy itself: the whole political system was designed, with many safety-valves introduced, in such a way as to minimize the risk of a new tyrannical power exploiting the people. For example, many officials were not directly elected by the people but chosen by lot, so that the influential and rich would be prohibited from seizing the most important branches of government. The foundational logic of Athenian democracy and the democratic constitution in general was that all citizens should have taken an active part in the decision making and at the same time being eligible to public office. The underlying telos was safeguarding democratic rule and to that end almost any praxis, even manslaughter, could be permissible and even legitimate.

Research on political participation since the 1970s has often distinguished conventional and unconventional political actions depending on the qualitative attributes of the praxis. As shown above, a specific praxis can qualify as an act of political participation if it serves the concept of "telos" in the decision-making process or, at least serves the need of publicizing information or views related to an issue of public concern. Conventional forms of participation are far more structured and normally lawful, e.g. being a member of a political party, voting, lobbying, campaigning, attending political meetings, contacting officials, etc. In this context, one refers to forms of participation which are intrinsically embedded in the accepted boundaries of institutional politics. Such activities, in this respect, might be called "formal" (Henn and Foard 2012). Yet, less traditional or non-institutional forms of participation such as participating to a protest march, signing a petition or boycotting products have also received much attention in the past few decades. Recently, Bourne (2010) presented the following list of participation activities as being unconventional: protests, demonstrations, barricading a community, firing at the security forces, blogging and using the social commentaries on talk radio. Marsh (1990) described such activities as "elite-challenging", probably insinuating confrontational participation, although unconventional practices do not necessarily have to be illegal or unlawful. Opp et al. (1981) and Muller (1982) defined some of those activities as "aggressive", whereas other scholars simply called activities such as "writing graffiti" and "damaging property at political gatherings" as illegal (Lavrič et al. 2010).

Based on some qualitative characteristics of the praxis and judging from their consequences, some forms of unconventional participation were considered on a

scale of a more or less extremism and thus less acceptable, both socially and legally: for example, Bourne (2010) characterized firing at security forces as "unorthodox" political participation because it goes one step further than simply being unconventional. A distinction is sometimes drawn between unconventional and unorthodox participationist methods with the latter being more extreme or violent in nature. Despite the anachronism, one might assume that the praxis of Harmodius and Aristogeiton to murder the tyrant Hipparchus would most likely be classified as unorthodox or a form of extreme and thus unlawful political engagement. It would most likely be characterised as an "illegal" activity. Understandably, such extreme actions as manslaughter have not found their way into institutional (or conventional) politics in the modern world, although it is not clear how Western democracies would react if they had to face a dilemma between an imaginary democratic decline (because dictators get to power) and assassinating ambitious usurpers to power. The Athenian democrats had had no hesitation: for the sake of democracy, not only the tyrants themselves, but anyone who was related to them could face the death penalty. The orator Aeschines, in a famous speech, written during a court trial against his political opponents (*Against Timarchus*), about 50 years after the trial of Socrates, asked the Jury: "Did you, O men of Athens, execute Socrates the sophist because he was shown to have been the teacher of Critias, one of the Thirty [tyrants] who put down the democracy...?" According to Wilson (2007), Aeschines "clearly expected the obvious reply to his rhetorical question to be Yes: Socrates was killed for teaching Critias" (p. 83) assuming that Critias' mentor should be held accountable because his former student ended up being a tyrant. But there is also a between-the-lines message: arguably, Aeschines would not hesitate to ask the Athenians to pursue the Socratic example and take the life of Demosthenes, his political opponent. No praxis for the citizens of Athens would have appeared unlawful had it served the telos of protecting the vitality of democracy. No sharp distinction was drawn between conventional and unorthodox or illegal political praxis as long as the demos (the assembly of the citizens) believed that it was serving the democratic system.

Today, in addition to the categorization of political activities as conventional and unconventional (including unorthodox, aggressive, extreme, illegal activities, etc.), other forms of participation have been specified and characterized in terms of "alternative participation" because they take an "aloof" stance towards official institutions. For example, Riley et al. (2010) explore electronic dance music culture as an alternative (and certainly unconventional) form of political participation which does not have a social change agenda. Such alternative forms of participation have also been defined as unofficial and informal by other researchers (Gill 2007; Harris 2001). This development, however, introduces a minor complexity in our original definition of political participation because it asserts that operating within the context of changing things does not always have to be the telos of a political activity. Reconsidering this minor complexity should be integral to redefining "political participation" in as much as there is already an accumulated literature regarding unofficial/informal/alternative political participation. Drawing on existing literature and on what has been discussed above, Fig. 1 is a visualization

Fig. 1 One (out of many possible) conceptualizations of political participation, as it is usually presented by contemporary research

of different conceptualizations and classifications of political participation. Significantly, this is just one out of many different figures one could construct; other researchers might present these classifications of political participation activities in a slightly different way.

The frequent distinction drawn between conventional and unconventional participation is, nevertheless, often contested on pragmatic grounds. As Linssen et al. (2011) comments, the distinction between certain acts as unconventional or conventional remains a controversial issue because some unconventional acts such as petitioning or demonstrating are getting more and more generally accepted and differently conceived in the public sphere as time passes (Dalton 2008; Norris et al. 2005). Thus it would be wrong to classify such acts as participating in demonstrations or signing a petition as modes of unconventional political engagement as they have increasingly become acceptable – and definitely much more widespread across the political spectrum. According to published estimates, around one million people took part in demonstrations and marches against the war in Iraq in London in February 2003 (BBC 2003). Around two million people demonstrated in Spain over a weekend alone against the war, and millions of people demonstrated in other large cities across Europe. Even in the United States where political participation follows a pattern of general decline, one comes across a variety of examples of mass participation in protests, especially of young people (see Gonzales 2008). Of course massive protesting has been a major form of participation even earlier in Europe: according to Van Aelst and Walgrave (1999) from 1990 to 1997, newspapers archives and police announcements and reports referred to more than three million protesters in Belgium out of a population of ten million. Consequently, on the basis of the new trends and forms of political engagement the distinction between conventional and unconventional participation – to the extent it subsists in contemporary research agenda – is probably outdated and needs to be radically redefined.

Although achieving a consensus on an explicit definition of political participation has proved to be a complex enterprise, this did not prevent researchers from

trying to identify how political participation (in light of a variety of definitions and tools of measurement) relates to other important variables, such as age and gender. In the next section, we will discuss how political participation was investigated in relation to other important variables.

2.1   Political Participation and Social Contexts

Political participation is not static; it is a very dynamic and evolving social phenomenon. At various times, people are more likely to be more or less politically active. For example, Riley et al. (2010) suggested that we are currently experiencing a period of alienation from traditional politics. They cited Colman and Gøtze (2001) and Griffin (2005) to suggest that distancing from traditional politics and structures is part of the rapid transformation of the political landscape. Alienation from politics does not seem however to be such a wide-ranging phenomenon: it does not affect uniformly all people and all societies at the same time. A number of factors have been identified as being related to political participation. Vecchione and Caprara (2009) found that gender, education and age are significant factors affecting participation levels. More specifically, they found that more educated people, along with males and older people are more likely to engage into political activities as compared to other groups. Further, they found that income rate was not significantly related to political participation. Stolle and Hooghe (2009) – in agreement to previous research – identified relevant variables like gender, education and age that have an impact on political participation. Also, Verba et al. (1995) suggested that education is a dynamic predictor of political participation whereas Conway (2001) claimed that, although gender gaps in political participation are shrinking, male population is still more actively engaged than females.

   Age as a determinant of political involvement has been a very popular theme in participation research. It has been argued that a number of young people may feel isolated and even excluded from a political system which tends to be self-reproduced and often self-serving. Lister (2007) argues that since young people are often considered to be immature and continue to be financially dependent on their parents, they are often not treated as equal members of the planning process and power arrangements. However, marginalisation by adult political structures seems to a certain extent to be enforced on young individuals – they do not distance themselves out of a voluntary choice. It has been argued that existing political systems cannot decode how alienation mechanisms work in relation to young people (see Russell et al. 2002; Power Commission 2006; Youth Citizenship Commission 2009). Along the same lines, Smith et al. (2005) maintain that many young people are led to understand political participation as predominantly the province of adults. There is a steadily increasing corpus of research which suggests that young people are not generally "disengaged" from politics, but instead that they have a critical attitude towards institutional politics (Briggs 2008; Henn et al. 2002, 2005; O'Toole et al. 2003; Phelps 2004, 2005). It has been suggested that "feelings of political efficacy are ineluctably bound in with perceptions of the

responsiveness of political institutions to the presence of citizens as significant actors in the political process" (Coleman et al. 2008, p. 772).

Participation perceptions never exist in a vacuum. There is evidence that young people did not enjoy a high status when affiliated with mainstream political parties as compared with other age groups, e.g. more mature voters (Kimberlee 2002). For example, Mycock and Tonge (2012) mentioned emphatically that:

> Political parties ... have ... been historically reluctant to engage with young people or represent their interests ..., instead prioritising older voters. However, the political resonance of issues linked to youth citizenship and democratic engagement has risen recently as political parties have sought to address steep declines in levels of civic and civil activism and the preparedness of young people to vote in elections (p. 138).

One of the complexities related to younger people civic and political engagement actually revolves around the definition of "young" and "youth". According to Mycock and Tonge (2012), different parties in the UK have different membership criteria for the youth wings of their parties, ranging from a ceiling of 26 years for the Young Labour and Liberal Youth (in the UK) up to a ceiling of 35 years for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Different criteria apply in other countries as well, even amongst parties with similar or even identical ideological affiliation; for example, the Young Liberals in Australia have an acceptable membership age range of 16–30 (Young Liberals 2012) while in the UK some parties set the lower limit at the age of 18, that is when people get their right to vote. The discussion may become even more complicated if one considers that an individual's actual maturity and ability to act in politically meaningful ways may not strictly correspond to her or his biological age, as immature and irresponsible individuals could exist at all ages. It is also likely that various societies may have different standards for determining the status of social, economic and emotional independence of young people from their parental families. Even international organizations have not widely agreed upon a definition of "youth": the United Nations and the World Bank consider individuals under the age range of 15–24 as youths whereas the World Health Organization defines youth in the age range of 15–34.

It appears incontestably that investigating the conceptual parameters and factors determining political participation and civic engagement is a multi-complicated task. In this chapter, I maintain that there is stereotyping due to over-generalization and over-simplification when summarizing results from field research. One cannot, for example, talk about "the young people" as if they were a single-minded biological entity. Young people are not a homogeneous group of people attached to the same behavioural attitudes towards participation in political activities. For example, Geniets (2010) has showed that young women from low socio-economic backgrounds are among the least politically engaged compared to other groups. In-depth interviews with young women of lower socio-economic status in the UK showed that the political disengagement of those women cannot be explained away as a condition of apathy but must be viewed in a wider context of techno-social and cultural change. Geniets (2010) concluded that "it has been established that traditional political media do not reach young women from low socioeconomic status

backgrounds" (p. 409). Rossi (2009) gives a good account of different perspectives on who may be considered as "young" and cites Alexandra Vidanovic, a youth specialist of the Balkan Children and Youth Foundation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM): ". . . young people have been turned into young-old people . . . having grown up and matured too soon" [because of the war turbulence in the Balkans] (p. 472). Age or gender alone cannot apparently help us predict a person's mode of reasoning or growth of social habits, unless we know many more details about his or her contextual background, such as the environment in which he or she has grown up.

The following two sections elaborate on the premise that theories of political engagement should not mainly focus on specific variables such as age or gender, unless these are studied within a wider sociological context. Although one cannot expect to generate "a grand theory of political participation", I will try to show that existing research has been defragmented (and on certain occasions lacking theoretical grounding) and may need to capitalize more frequently on comprehensive social theories.

2.2   Theorizing Political Participation

Let us first examine significant demographic variables in the research field of political participation, such as age. Hitherto published research has not always provided conclusive results on the relationship between political participation and other demographic variables. For example, although Vecchione and Caprara (2009) found that older people may exhibit increased political participation, previous studies (e.g., Jennings and Markus 1988) had discovered that older people tend to be less politically active (with reference to specific forms of participation). Therefore, it is plausible that not all variables affect political participation activities in the same way, so one would naturally expect to come across changing patterns and levels in political engagement, which appear to be closely correlated with specific contexts and social backgrounds.

A theory proposed to describe the relationship between political participation and age is that of "political disengagement" (Cumming and Henry 1961). This theory asserts that the elderly tend to maintain lower involvement with the "outside world" (and this includes involvement across the political spectrum as well). Disengagement, of course, may be self-initiated or may be imposed on people through a mixture of societal factors; this is a controversial issue but, in broad terms, political disengagement theory suggests that there is a direct relationship between the elderly and "political atrophy". It is not certain, however, that there is a causal relation between the two. Such causal associations can be oversimplified and thus deceptive, especially if other variables are not included into the analysis.

This leads us to a challenging and more general theory, namely that of "selective withdrawal" in an age-appropriate participation (Streib and Schneider 1971). In agreement with the self-initiated political disengagement mentioned above, this theory suggests that as people get older they progressively adjust the level and

nature of their political activity on the basis not only of personal but also of contextual-situational factors (e.g., social pressure, health condition, leisure time, etc.). This theory seems to be more flexible than disengagement theory because it implies that some people (depending on personal and situational factors) may choose to strengthen rather than reduce their political participation (when they have enough free time, for example).

Jennings and Markus (1988) focus on the relationship between socio-demographic variables (such as age, marital status and gender) and levels of political participation from an equally interesting perspective. Their approach is defined as the "cohort composition theory", emphasizing the importance of cohort deprivation. The general idea is that lower participation rates found among older age groups compared to younger people (for example on on-line political partici-pation) may be a consequence of the fact that older people generally become less well equipped, less educated and less prepared to participate (as time advances and the means of participation are changing). According to some researchers (e.g., Verba and Ni 1972), education is conceived as an integral component of the patterns of political participation. This approach is constructively flexible since it can explicate how certain social groups are inclined towards more intense (or diversified) political engagement compared to other groups, especially with regard to specific participatory activities and in light of their differential attitudes (rooted in their educational backgrounds) towards politics.

Let us discuss the three theories just mentioned in the context of the riots that occurred in the summer of 2011 in the UK. It has been a widespread speculation that the social media, such as Twitter and text messaging, have played a significant role in the riots (Baker 2012). Although social media, such as Twitter, have been blamed for sparking and coordinating the unrest, recent research has shown that "there is little overt evidence that Twitter was used to promote illegal activities at the time, though it was useful for spreading word about subsequent events" (Tonkin et al. 2012). Indeed, social networking services such as Twitter are disproportionally used by specific population groups, such as young people. Getting real-time infor-mation through Twitter about upcoming events (not related to illegal activities such as looting) and getting actively involved at very short notice, demands that a person can actually use technology effectively, has the physical strength to join the others in the streets and has no other serious commitments (such as having to be at the office, having to look after small children or dependent's health, etc.). Arguably, participation in subsequent events during the riots must have been easier for some younger or unemployed people and students, simply because they could afford to be there. The fact that older people were not as visible as younger people during the riots cannot be simply explained in light of the "political atrophy" concept expounded by the political disengagement theory. According to the age-appropriate participation theory, older people might choose to participate in the riots using other methods which might have suited them more, for example by voicing their views in the press or by contacting local politicians. Cohort composition theory postulates that it was easier for younger people to follow the Tweets because they make use of technology media more frequently, whereas older generations cannot benefit from contemporary technological developments.

In effect, all three of the theories presume that people make a decision at some point in their life (or a decision is forced upon them by other determining factors) about re-adjusting their activities and political participation. When that occurs, it is not unnatural or alarming however. Apprehensions about the effects of a progressively declining political participation is not a new phenomenon – actually it is as old as the democratic system itself. For example, the ancient Athenians took measures to encourage their fellow citizens to attend as participating members the workings of the "ekklesia tou demou" because various contingencies could be an impediment to an equal chance to participate. According to Aristotle, in ancient Athens "all the citizens actually take part in ... [the democratic procedures, elections, etc.] and exercise their citizenship, because even the poor are enabled to be at leisure by receiving pay" (Aristotle, *Politeia*, 1293a). Only the tyrants and the oligarchically-minded elites favoured popular apathy and the ordinary people's alienation from politics. Political participation in classical Athens, along with transparency and accountability, were the cornerstones of democracy. It is worth mentioning that in the fourth century BC, when Timocrates (an Athenian politician) had proposed that the Athenians loosen enforcement of penalties against those who owed debts to the polis, the orator Demosthenes asserted that such a decision would deprive the treasury of funds and consequently the state could not reimburse the citizens for attendance at the Assembly. Demosthenes went on to equate such an outcome (i.e. limited participation in the Assembly), with the end of democracy (Demosthenes, "*Against Timocrates*", 24.99).

Various other theories have been developed (in addition to those discussed above) to analyse the determinants of political behaviour and engagement and consequently enable predictions about civic participation levels. For example, granted that individuals are rational thinkers, Riker and Ordeshook (1968) elaborated on the work of Downs (1957) in order to develop a decision-theoretical framework for explaining why people vote (or don't vote). This theory has been presented in a calculus form as "$U = P \times B - C$" where U is the utility of voting, B is the expected benefit when the preferred candidate or party wins, P is the probability that the vote cast will decide the outcome of the election and finally C is the costs of voting. It is therefore claimed that an individual is more likely to vote when $P \times B > C$. Indeed there is a rich literature related to this theory, e.g. for group membership see Moe (1980), for rebellions see Muller and Opp (1986), for party activity see Whiteley (1995) and for political participation in general see Nagel (1987). Even very recent studies continue to elaborate on this theory which seems to be enduring (e.g. see Back et al. 2011). However, many sociologists would be rather sceptical about the idea that a simple formula can explain such a complex mechanism as human behaviour, let alone the concept that humans are really rational thinkers!

Interestingly, political participation has been thought to refer to a paradoxical phenomenon by the proponents of rational or positivistic theories of human behaviour. Why people do bother to vote if the effect of their vote is eventually negligible in a large country among millions of registered voters? Or, why should an individual undertake costs of participating in a democratic process

(i.e. participation requires time and energy, plus it may incur some financial or other expenses) if the outcome will eventually benefit everyone, even those who did not bother to participate? Indeed, more research has been done along the lines of the rationalist theory of human behaviour (an action being the product of rational calculation) in order to expand a more realistic analysis model (for more information, see Back et al. 2011). However, any enterprise along these lines cannot overcome the philosophical dispute over the rationality or irrationality of human thinking and acting – thus from the sociological perspective one would be reluctant to accept such a deterministic view of human behaviour.

The main assumption of the present critical assessment is that providing explanatory patterns for such a complex phenomenon as political participation we are in need of a more versatile theory based on sociological foundations. That political participation has many layers of complexity has been well demonstrated by the typology of engagement offered by Snell (2010). Political engagement typology indicates that young people approach politics with more or less information, more or less trust in politicians and the political parties, more or less sense of efficacy and more or less sense of civic duty. It appears from this analysis that a lack of any one of these characteristics may cause a growing adult to remain politically inactive, thereby tipping the scale toward a majority who are disengaged and a minority who have enough of each of the characteristics to be semi- to fully politically engaged.

But as young people are growing up in specific contexts, they naturally become active agents within their cultural settings and experience. In the next two sections, I will discuss political participation through sociological theories which are embedded in the research sub-field of the "theory of practice". More specifically, I will apply Bourdieu's concept of "habitus" to suggest that political engagement may be the manifestation of a habitus within the field of political and social life of "evolving adults". Further, I will introduce ideas deriving from the post-modernist school of thought and analyse the nature and the limitations of contemporary research in the field of political participation.

3   Theorizing Political Participation: Bourdieu's Concept of "Habitus"

Pierre Bourdieu coined the notion of "habitus" in order to describe "the permanent internalisation of the social order in the human body" (Eriksen and Nielsen 2001, p. 130), while observing that individuals have a capacity for invention and improvisation (Bourdieu 1990). According to Bourdieu's theory of action, the world is surrounded by structural constraints which form "permanent dispositions" representing various schemes of perception which are very generic and often originate from conventional categories, like male/female or young/old. However, these internalized dispositions also regulate the way an individual behaves or takes decisions (Bourdieu 1977, p. 15). Social life may be perceived as an on-going effort on the part of the individual to find equilibrium in a world full of formidable social constraints, drawing on his or her cultural resources in order to survive. The concept

of "balancing" implies a non-deterministic view on the formation of the facets of social life (thus the space available for generating new forms of action, invention and improvisation).

In the same context, Bourdieu also coined the notion of "fields" which are related to specialist domains like the medical profession or politics. Each field has its own logic and rules and consists of a distinctive combination of different types of capital, such as financial (monetary) capital, symbolic capital (such as prestige) or social capital (e.g. social network). Individuals may be motivated by any or by a combination of these capital forms. According to Bourdieu, the habitus is the mechanism by which an individual

> ...produces strategies which, even if they are not produced by consciously aiming ... turn out to be objectively adjusted to the situation. Action guided by a "feel for the game" has all the appearances of the rational action that an impartial observer...would deduce. And yet it is not based on reason. You need only think of the impulsive decision made by the tennis player who runs up to the net, to understand that it has nothing to do with the learned construction that the coach, after analysis, draws up ... The conditions of rational calculation are practically never given in practice: time is limited, information is restricted.... (Bourdieu 1990, p. 11)

Following this line of reasoning, the idea of humans as rational beings, i.e. calculating, balancing and rebalancing costs and benefits, appears highly disputable. However, the toolbox of the Bourdieun theory is even richer: derived from the Hellenic term "doxa", Bourdieu defined term to represent deeply internalised societal or field-specific presuppositions that are taken for granted and are not up for negotiation (Bourdieu 1998, 66–7). In other words, these are things which "go without saying", i.e. they are accepted by default by agents who act in a specific field of social activity. For Bourdieu, practice is constructed on the dispositions which are inherent in habitus and unfolds as "strategic improvisations – goals and interests pursued as strategies – against a background of doxa that ultimately limits them" (Parkin 1997, p. 376).[1]

Having said that, habitus should neither be considered as a result of free will nor determined fully by other external forces and constraints, but is shaped by a kind of negotiation and moderation over time. The key-word here is the term "over time" which implies that a habitus takes time to negotiate and crystallize. This is in agreement with Snell (2010) who suggests that "social scientific explorations of political engagement among emerging adults need to take into account the levels of materialism or individualism, trust or distrust, hope or pessimism, and moral convictions and capabilities for principled thinking" (p. 266). These are individual character traits which appear in childhood and mature in adulthood. In many cases, society would expect these "traits" to be affected and steered by education, although an individual's character is also affected by his or her immediate environment. Consequently, a habitus pertaining to political participation is gradually being constructed, within the constraints of actuality. Once the "political

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[1] For more information, the interested reader is redirected to Postill (2010).

participation habitus" is built, it may be considered as crystallized, although it can change over long periods of time depending on external stimuli (e.g., a long period of unemployment and poverty).

All theories of political engagement described in previous sections draw on the assumption that, at some point in life, people start making a decision (or a decision is forced upon them) to adjust their political participation activities (or habits). Bourdieu's concept of habitus, however, has the advantage of flexibility allowing us to consider individuals as agents who, within the field of civil polity, can dynamically shape their behaviour in light of their "capital" and within specific constraints (see the discussion about "class" in the next section). The leading idea of habituated forms of conduct in the terrain of political participation acknowledges that individuals act as innovative agents within the same field and may well share predispositions and constraints. Habitus (to put simply, a system of dispositions) is dynamic, never crystallizing fully – thus the occasional changes across the lifespan of individuals, in as long as habitus "is not fixed or permanent, and can be changed under unexpected situations or over a long historical period" (Navarro 2006, p. 16).

The role of "doxa" in structuring an associated habitus of political participation is significant in the sense that individuals often explain their political behaviour as a reflection of shared predispositions within their social environment. Collective predispositions can generate strong feelings which in turn shape individuals' behaviour: Sloam (2007) presents interesting responses from individuals during interviews; "I couldn't trust any politician" and "...they are known for lying [the politicians]" (p. 556). The response "they are known for lying" means that, everybody knows that, we do not even need to discuss it. One can well imagine the individual who gave the above responses asking: "Why should we trust the politicians if we know that they are lying?" Bourdieu's theory does not imply that all individuals will develop the same life-strategy even if they share the same doxa, since all draw on their various forms of capital which can differ significantly (the concept of class, under cover). Young members of a renowned and powerful political family, for example, may choose to become politicians and engage full-time in politics because they have sufficient capital to do so, even if they know that politicians are not trustworthy (see the Bush dynasty or any other political dynasty, for example). Other people with much less social or cultural capital may choose to disengage from politics because they cannot see how this could help them improve their life or affect change; see another extract from an interview from Sloam (2007): "It's very hard to do [to affect change] unless you're persistent... It's a full-time job" (p. 560).

Studying the irregularity displayed in people's enthusiasm for political participation is of vital importance as it directly relates to the question of a well-functioning democracy. I have so far suggested that political participation is a form of social engagement or activity and cannot be investigated outside this contextual parameter. However, sociological practice theories are not frequently analysing political participationist behaviours, although some interesting work does exist within the field of political sociology (see for example, Dobratz et al. 2002). The work of Quintelier and Hooge (2011) is an interesting example of a very

well-written published research, investigating the relationship between trust and participation (among other things). Indeed, it might be challenging to explore "the relationship" between trust and participation as if there was one single and specific relationship between the two. Quintelier and Hooge (2011) found that "apparently, political trust is not related to individual participation, at least not among [a specific] age group" (p. 73) and that "the relationship between collective political participation and trust is rather disappointing" (p. 73). But why one can expect to get different results? One could suggest that lack of trust might lead a group of people to apathy, but might lead another group of people to political engagement in order to affect change. The reverse may also hold true: political trust may motivate a group of people to actively participate, but may induce another group to disengage from politics because they may feel that everything is fine and their involvement is unnecessary. As a result, the overall effect of trust on participation may be negligible and a researcher may find a minor causal link between the two variables.

Thus revisionist approaches within the standard theoretical literature on political participation would be profoundly useful. However, because of lack of space, I would like to draw the attention of the interested reader to some additional work by Pierre Bourdieu, "The Logic of Practice". Bourdieu's work has not been widely applied in the context of political participation research. I have tried to remedy this omission, even though it is obviously only one amongst many constructive theories that can be employed to re-contextualize and re-interpret political participation and participation mechanisms. Last section is designed to present a few theories for explaining political participation, and to this effect references will be drawn to some recent key concepts which have been introduced during the past decade.

4   Theorizing Political Participation: Class, Post-Modernism and Socialization Theories

Formal theories of sociology are very important for understanding political engagement behaviour because they provide tools for exploring determinants of participation. For example, Cainzos and Voces (2010) used data from 20 countries from the first round of the European Social Survey to demonstrate the causal relationship between social class and political participation. Hence empirical evidence seems to contest modern theories which predict the decline of social class and the generation of post-modern societies where class becomes progressively less relevant in determining political behaviour. Cainzos and Voces (2010) is thus a very important study as it employs vigorous quantitative evidence derived from an almost pan-European study, showing that the study of political participation, guided by sociological approaches, can yield fruitful and instructive results. Apparently, both the constraints and the various forms of capital at the disposal of different classes of people can constitute influential determinants of their potential participation habitus. According to Cainzos and Voces (2010),

> The main lesson that can be drawn ... is quite straightforward: in the field of political participation, class still matters. A significant and substantively meaningful association between class and political action can be observed in most European countries ... the evidence offered in this article seems most compatible with the idea of a continuing political relevance of class, contrary to the prophecies of class decomposition and in keeping with the findings of research both on class voting and on the relationship between class and political preferences which have questioned the "new orthodoxy" of the declining political significance of class ... (p. 407).

Researchers exploring the socialization aspect of political participation have elaborated on how individuals are influenced by other people so as to get politically engaged. The socialization perspective capitalizes on the significance of face-to-face interaction and it assumes that interactive experience with other like-minded actors affects motivation and attitudes (Eder and Nenga 2003; Verba 1961). This theory/conception is usually being considered along with a dichotomous classification of political participation activities to (a) collective (involving interaction with others) and (b) individual (where there is no interaction with others). Such a classification is of questionable validity. For example, the concept of "checkbook activists" (i.e. people who donate money to a cause, but do nothing else to help) has been used as a primary example of individual participation because "checkbook activists write their checks at home, not in the company of other like-minded participants" (Quintelier and Hooghe 2011, p.64), but also see Smith et al. (2002) and Stolle et al. (2005) for more information. Yet one might ask "why are the checkbook activists signing the checks?" Some of them may do so because of ideological reasons and they may never want their action to be publicized. But surely, others sign the check aiming to make a statement or to increase the odds to affect some change or simply because they want to be praised for doing so. Their aim may be to increase their symbolic capital (e.g. prestige), to increase their social capital (e.g. their social network) or to increase some amount of profit by increasing their financial capital. In this case, the interesting question is why somebody is signing a cheque, and clearly this is not a strictly individualist issue because it usually has an intended audience. Bourdieu suggests that agents within specific fields are not merely motivated or influenced by others, but invent and improvise under certain constraints. Agents possessing large symbolic or social capital can develop strategies to motivate or lead others and they may consequently increase further their capital within their field; see for example Tonkin et al. (2012) on how Tweets that were posted by popular or newsworthy people (people with large symbolic or social capital) were more frequently re-tweeted during the UK riots in the summer of 2011.

At this point, a brief reference to the action-based dissonance theory might be useful. The action-based dissonance theory suggests that once actors are involved in a form of behaviour or activity (e.g. if they are inclined to increase their level of political participation), they will have a tendency to develop similar attitudes in order to be consistent with themselves (e.g. they will develop *positive* attitudes towards political participation). Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones (2002), suggested a conceptualization of an action-based model of cognitive dissonance by which the actors are inclined to reduce the forms of cognitive dissonance, therefore demonstrating

more harmony between what they do and how they feel. Such a theory is not in disagreement with Bourdieu's theory of the gradual, over time, crystallization of a habitus of political participation whereby the individuals develop strategies based on their resources, within the frame of doxa which represents their beliefs and attitudes.

Trust is one of the traits or dispositions people develop and crystallize as they would growing up from childhood to being teenagers and adults, thus obtaining a "feel for the game", according to Bourdieu. I have already referred to Snell (2010), Sloam (2007) and Quintelier and Hooghe (2011) who have studied social and political trust. On trust, one should draw a reference to the wide-ranging work by Francis Fukuyama, "Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity". Fukuyama (1995) capitalizes on the moral bonds of social trust – the bonds that promote a cohesive society in which "collective action" is justified and the individual creativity is empowered. Although the work of Fukuyama is rather more "economy-oriented", it should be admitted that conceptualizing trust as a form of social capital is valuable. Rothstein (2005) has also investigated the lack of social capital in societies where trust collapsed, even if cooperation would eventually benefit all. Famously, Bo Rothstein maintained that people will cooperate only if they believe that others will also cooperate and suggested that trustworthy political institutions and public policies tend to build trust and thus greater social capital. Characteristically, Rothstein concluded his book by stating that trust is generated through the capacity for dialogue and effective participation.

One could go on exploring and analysing many theories and previous published work of great importance (e.g. the work by Robert Putnam and Stephen Ball) which were developed to explain, predict or describe trust and political participation. This chapter does not defend a specific theory or conceptualization of political participation, not even the work of Bourdieu on which many references have been drawn. The main thesis put forward is that relevant studies should lay more emphasis on empirical research based on solid theoretical patterns designed to explicate political participation as part of the individuals' social life. The view of a habitus of political participation is a ground-breaking analytical tool as is founded on solid sociological thinking, although post-modernist theories of diffused power and the discussion over the decline of social class have been in the march recently.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to critically explore aspects of contemporary research on political participation. To this end, I have

(a) Discussed different conceptualizations and definitions of political participation as they are presented in contemporary research;

(b) Investigated the validity of the distinction between conventional and unconventional participation and suggested that it might be redundant or in need of drastic revision;

(c) Referred to how the ancient Athenians, the inventors of democracy, conceptualized political participation and presented some evidence to the effect that they did not distinguish between extreme and conventional political participation;

(d) Reviewed available research and outlined perspectives on political participation and argued that currently relevant research suffers from fragmented typological or exegetical outlooks and, to this effect, sociological theories can help reflect on and understand better the processes and forms of political participation.

In conclusion, existing research on political participation could benefit by relying more on solid sociological theorizing. Political participation is a meaningful manifestation of social life, and as such it cannot be investigated in isolation from other aspects of life. However, the research community is by no means bound to follow the dream of Isaac Asimov, by seeking the formulation of The Grand Theory of Psychohistory.[2] There is no theory that could possibly explain or predict perfectly human behaviour. In fact, this was the distorting mirror in relevant studies during the last decades. Although Asimov was a science fiction author, many academics were inspired by his work and tried to apply the principles of Nash's Game Theory in Social Sciences. Siegfried (2006) provides a very informative and interesting account on this attempt, which he describes as "the modern quest of a code of nature".[3] One could only hope that, in the future, researchers will maintain the ideal balance between large-scale quantitative research and more theoretical research in the lively field of political participation.

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[2] For the readers who are not familiar with the work of Isaac Asimov, it is useful to say that he was an inspired author who published science fiction novels in the 1950s with the name Foundation Trilogy. In those books, Asimov foresaw the evolution of the science of psychohistory, a science which could forecast political, economic and social events. Asimov himself explained that psychohistory was "*the science of human behavior reduced to mathematical equations*" (Asimov 1983, p. xi).

[3] We have already visited, in this chapter, theories of political behaviour with foundations on concepts familiar from Game Theory such as the decision-theoretic framework.

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The Post-Welfare State and Changing Forms of Political Participation

Maria Markantonatou

1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the influence of specific social and political processes during the last decades on changing forms of political participation. The processes that have changed the political and institutional framework of political participation include: the deregulation of the welfare state, the managerialization of administration and social policy, the internationalization of decision making processes, and the localization and informalization of policy making. On the one hand, at the level of political decision making, an increasingly wide distance between state and society in neoliberalism sets in. On the other, social groups and individuals are called to undertake tasks formerly exercised by the state (through communalization, activation and responsibilisation processes) or turn to private markets. These processes reflect the shift from the Keynesian welfare nation-state to the neoliberal regime of globalization. While political participation in the Keynesian period was based on corporatist power relations around the welfare state, neoliberalism has led to social and political fragmentation, market individualism and a new emphasis on self-responsibility and self-help. At the same time, while neoliberal globalization has strengthened the role of a series of international organizations and institutions at the political decision making, political participation remains to a great extent confined within national boundaries.

Two results of these developments are here reviewed. First, the transition to the kind of polity described as "postdemocracy" (Crouch), in which social rights are diminished, political participation is limited to electoral participation, and labour is deregulated in favour of entrepreneurial interests. Second, the empowerment of New Right, a political tendency praising market individualism rather than collective action. New Right advocates a form of state that favours liberalization and

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entrepreneurialism on the one hand, and "security" in the sense of social repression, on the other. These developments have been set in motion since the mid-1970s and are closely related to the deregulation of the welfare state. However, the recent Eurozone debt crisis has intensified these processes. A series of austerity measures and labour flexibilization policies are implemented under the "state of emergency" (Agamben) which is more or less explicitly declared during the crisis and undermines democratic rights and political participation in favour of market priorities.

2 Processes of Social Transformation and Political Participation

2.1 The Deregulation of the Welfare State

In the framework of the Keynesian regulation that dominated the postwar period until the early 1970s, capitalism in the countries of Atlantic Fordism (USA, Canada, Northwestern Europe, Australia and New Zealand) was combined with welfare systems, which complemented market economy. National welfare states were responsible for macroeconomic planning; in this context, they nationalized strategic enterprises, and later on undertook the partial supervision of the industrial sector (Van Creveld 1999, pp. 356–368). At the level of domestic demand, Keynesian policies aimed at securing mass consumption. The term "golden years" that was coined to praise the era of Keynesianism (Hobsbawm 1995, p. 316) described exactly this kind of state-regulated prosperity relying on an increased consumption by broader social groups of a nationally defined population.

Gradually, a series of heterogeneous factors led to the weakening of the Keynesian welfare state: the oil crises in the 1970s, international trade stagnation during the 1980s, the increasing fall of industrial profit rate in the US and Europe, as well as the gradual internationalization and liberalization of transactions and capital flow. In this spirit, inflation had justified political choices of wage reductions already since the mid-1970s. Enterprises asked pressingly for labour regulations in their favour, while the sector of finance gained ground in comparison to the industry (Calhoun 2011, pp. 25–26). Furthermore, investment in countries with lower labour costs contributed to state revenue shortfall.

Meanwhile, the post-war "baby boom", the middle class enlargement and the improvement of its living standards thanks to industrial development and welfare services, were succeeded by a drop in birth rate in several EU countries. Insurance funds and state expenditure were burdened by an increase in life expectancy and a growing number of pensioners whose income depended on a shrinking number of working persons (Sakellaropoulos 1999, p. 49). State redistributive policies were gradually reformed according to neoliberal criteria, thus failing to assist the working population in covering social expenditures. That is why, demographic factors grew in importance and the established social contract amongst generations, which dictated that more working persons secured less pensioners, was seriously challenged (ibid.).

An additional aspect related to the crisis of the welfare state was that, during its heyday, it was harshly criticized by different social movements – Marxist or identity-centred and self-expression movements – that adopted a hostile attitude towards the state (ibid., p. 21). Likewise, at the theoretical/ideological level, the welfare state was criticized from both neoconservative and neomarxist views. Criticisms from a neoconservative and neoliberal point of view suggested that the welfare state did not respond to market needs for internationalization and that it was bureaucratic and costly, thus slowing down growth. They also claimed that it cultivated clientelism and statism. Criticisms from a neomarxist point of view, suggested that narratives of equality and prosperity served capital accumulation for the social classes which had the means to influence the articulation of power within the state. They further claimed that it acted as a mechanism of surveillance of social groups that did not fit its values system (ibid. 1999, pp. 36–43).

Therefore, within three decades, Keynesian social policies aiming at securing full employment, mass consumption and collective labour regulations, were succeeded by neoliberal measures of labour flexibilization and precarization. Consequences included but were not restricted to part-time, low-paid or unpaid and precarious labour, individualized regulations and flexible contracts. Most importantly, trade unions that previously participated as a collective actor to the regulation of labour conditions were now marginalized. Working classes that during the Keynesian period were represented by trade unions became gradually fragmented through policies that encouraged private lending (instead of social benefits), expanded individual creditworthiness (instead of increasing wages) and favoured individual consumption. These developments resulted into the fragmentation of these working classes and undermined their capability for collective action.[1]

2.2 Managerialization of Public Administration and the Entrepreneurial Governance

At the level of public administration, the deregulation of the Keynesian welfare state was accompanied by demands for a "post-bureaucratic" and "flexible" public administration. Indeed, according to the post-bureaucracy rhetorics of the 1980s and 1990s, public administration ought to disengage from costly structures that failed to meet the criteria of "efficiency", "rationalization" and "innovation".

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[1] "After the 1970s, a long period of low wages pushed workers more and more to rely on credit as the form through which they were able to maintain their standard of living. As well, they looked to a rising stock market to boost their pension funds, and those with homes cheered rising house prices because the increase in their wealth reduced the need for savings and so allowed greater consumption. This further fragmented the working class and undermined its cohesion as an independent social force. While the struggle for wages and public benefits depended on and built class solidarity, looking to credit (and lower taxes) to sustain their private lives led to an atrophy of collective capacities" (Albo et al. 2010, p. 127).

A series of emerging approaches and practices were collectively labelled as "New Public Management".[2] A new perspective of *Institutionenökonomik* (König 2001, p. 286) was introduced, based on the concept of "rational choice" made by both providers and beneficiaries of public services (rational choice theory). The "New Managerialism" approaches had an impact on current discourses of "modernization", even at a governmental policy level, beginning with the model of "public choice" during Thatcher's administration (as regards the UK, see Exworthy and Halford 1999).

The main argument of NPM proponents in the 1980s and 1990s was that the effectiveness of the state in providing services could neither be designed "rationally" nor could it be evaluated in order to achieve the optimal results with the minimum cost. Such goals would require the adoption of private-economic modes of function. On this basis, the deregulation of the welfare state should be succeeded by a "management state" while social policy should be redefined by such criteria as the "the three E principle" (Economy, Effectiveness, Efficiency), or the "S.M.A.R.T" principle, meaning that projects have to be "specific", "measurable", "achievable", "realistic" and "time-tabled" (ibid.).

Therefore, adoption of private-economic criteria regarding the administration, and a reform of the administration "from within", were not conceived merely as improving strategies serving the current administration model.[3] Rather, they were understood as the sole way the administration could survive in the environment of the new economy. This is what McLaughin et al. (2001, p. 301) describe as "modernization through managerialism". The demand for a downsized public administration that would offer "targeted" services with the participation of private, local and international entrepreneurial agents became highly influential. Demands for a "limited governance" were theorized as imperative in view of a supposedly unquestionable reality of oversized state responsibilities and public expenditures.[4]

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[2] Although NPM is often thematized as a "coherent whole of global significance" (Clarke et al. 2000, p. 7), the ways it is understood by various political leaders and administrative staff differ radically. The same can be said about its implementation. For instance, differences between the state-centric administrative models of continental Europe and the communitarian Anglo-american ones reflect the contrasting characters of legalistic and managerial bureaucracies, respectively, while in the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, institutions have been built to adjust the administration to the market economy (with regard to differences among various countries, see König 2001, p. 268).

[3] NPM ultimately advocated the self-limitation of the public administration apparatuses and the adoption of efficiency standards certified by quality assurance organizations, evaluation procedures, strategies to instigate competition, flexibilization of labour, etc.

[4] The popular book *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector* by Osborne and Gaebler set the foundations of "entrepreneurial" and "market oriented" governance. The principles of governments of this kind, which according to Osborne and Gaebler (1992, p. 25) should be "steering rather than rowing" are illustrated in the following passage: "(Entrepreneurial governments) promote competition between service providers. They empower citizens by pushing control out of the bureaucracy, into the community. They measure the performance of their agencies, focusing not on inputs but on outcomes. They are driven by their goals – their missions – not by their rules and regulations. They redefine their clients as customers

As the labour liberalization and flexibilization policies were gaining ground during the 1990s, trade unions around Europe were forced to accept privatizations, flexible working relations and reduced welfare expenditures. These defeats resulted in the shift of social conflicts from the private to the public sector (Della Porta and Diani 2006, p. 45). In France, Italy, Germany and elsewhere, social reactions against neoliberal policies during the last two decades became more intense in the public sector than in the private. Indeed, in private sector, labour rights had already been systematically violated since the early 1980s in favour of enterprises. A similar policy was to be launched with regard to the public sector. Therefore, it was crucial that NPM could be implemented, as it promoted restructuring of the public sector along the lines of "flexibility" that prevailed in the private sector. States supported such NPM policies, as long as the public sector was thought of as the last bastion for collective labour rights. In this spirit, a campaign was launched against trade unions of the public sector. Unions were "accused of defending old privileges" and also "often sought consensus in public opinion by claiming to defend public against private values, service against goods" (ibid., p. 46).

In the frame of a managerial state aligned with an entrepreneurial culture and a public sector reform obeying the pattern of private economy, what has remained from the trilateral corporatist relation amongst employees, employers and the state, is swept away. In the Keynesian period, the representation of interest groups and political participation were conducted, configured and reproduced through this trilateral corporatist relation, which was the basic pillar of the welfare state. In neoliberalism, it is this very relation that has been transformed. Entrepreneurial governance and managerialism are listed as new priorities in place of balancing corporatist interests. Labour flexibilization, concessions in favour of entrepreneurial classes and the recent fiscal crisis that requires further shrinking of labour rights, force working classes and their collective representation organizations to conform to entrepreneurial needs, criteria of market robustness and managerial indices.

2.3   Internationalization of Decision Making Processes

The post-war Keynesian welfare state was based on the nation state, reflected its economy and reproduced it. Despite the organizational and administrative differences among the welfare state variants (e.g., those of Continental European, Anglo-American, Scandinavian and Mediterranean countries according to Esping-Andersen's classification), the welfare state in general concerned economies and

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and offer them choices – between schools, between training programmes, between housing options. They prevent problems before they emerge, rather than simply offering services afterward. They put their energies into earning money, not simply spending it. They decentralize authority, embracing participatory management. They prefer market mechanisms to bureaucratic mechanisms. And they focus not simply on providing public services but on catalyzing all sectors – public, private and voluntary – into action to solve their community's problems" (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, pp. 19–20).

societies that were defined and reproduced as "national". That is to say, it constituted a "political compromise between capital and labour" (Foster 2005, p. 1), which was firmly entrenched in the democracy of the nation-state.

According to Habermas (2006, p. 76) the "affinity between the nation-state and democracy" relies on four preconditions. First, the existence of an "effective political apparatus through which collectively binding decisions can be implemented" (ibid., p. 76). Second, the existence of a "clearly defined 'self' for the purposes of political self-determination and self-transformation to which collectively binding decisions can be ascribed" (ibid.). Third, the existence of a "citizenry that can be mobilized for participation in political opinion-formation and will-formation (...)" and fourth, the existence of an "economic and social milieu in which democratically programmed administration can provide legitimacy-enhancing steering and organization" (ibid.). In other words, the preconditions whereupon modern democracy relied, are the *administrative state*, the *sovereign territorial state*, the *nation-state* and the *welfare state* (Habermas, ibid., emphasis Habermas).

The parameters that Habermas points out are crucial in order to understand the relation amongst nation state, democracy and political participation as well as the processes that undermine this relation in the framework of economic internationalization and liberalization. The impacts of these processes in the frame of Habermas's "post-national constellation" include the weakening of the nation state's ability to audit and exert an adequate taxation policy. A parallel consequence consists of a democratic deficit that emerges as "the set of those involved in making democratic decisions fails to coincide with the set of those affected by them" (ibid., p. 78). In this frame, Habermas assumes the weakening of state's legitimization apparatuses, since democracy itself and the pertaining political participation tend to be determinedly influenced by the market.

However, an understanding of globalization as a process imposed "from above" is problematic in that it underestimates the role of the state in assisting market functions and in serving the necessities of capitalist reproduction. It also disregards that globalization is intertwined with various fields of – consensual and conflictual – action at national and international level. Contrary to "minimal state" views of the 1990s, neoliberal rhetorics, postmodern deconstructions of the notion of the state and views of globalization relying on economic and cultural determinism, these developments do not imply a shrinking state.[5]

The post-Keynesian state is transformed in alignment with the new economic priorities of neoliberal capitalism. This supposedly "non-intervening" state is called upon to regulate the neoliberalization's processes and, additionally, to legitimize market values by appealing to globalization rhetorics. It is actually a "competitive, post-national state" which "aims to secure economic growth within its borders and/ or to secure competitive advantages for capitals based in its borders, even where

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[5] The post-Keynesian state not as a "weak state" manipulated by market forces, but as a powerful and well equipped one, intervening in many different ways, is treated in Hirsch (1992).

they operate abroad, by promoting the economic and extra-economic conditions that are currently deemed vital for success in competition with economic actors and spaces located in other states" (Jessop 2002, p. 96).

Whereas the full employment Keynesian state was based on nationally orientated economies that were less concerned with international competitiveness, the "competition state" draws, according to Jessop (ibid.), from Schumpeter's theoretical views on the promotion of competitiveness, flexibility, entrepreneurship and innovation. In this way, a shift takes place from the "Keynesian Welfare Nation State" (KWNS) to the "Schumpeterian Workfare Post-national Regime" (SWPR) (ibid., p. 255). This shift occurs insofar as: "(1) domestic full employment is deprioritized in favour of international competitiveness; (2) redistributive welfare rights take second place to a productivist reordering of social policy; (3) the primacy of the national state is deprivileged in favour of particular state activities on other scales; and (4) governance in a negotiated, networked society is given more emphasis than government in a mixed economy" (ibid.).

This "Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime" (SWPR) (p. 125) regards labour as a cost of production, prioritizes "flexibilization" and reproduces neoliberal workfare through social policy. In the same spirit, SWPR also promotes the establishment of a particular kind of economic "efficiency" that responds to market failures as well as to world-market demands. "Innovation" within the process of production, the political promotion of entrepreneurship and of an "enterprise culture" (p.127), a market-based state management and neoliberal governance are the new strategies of the SWPR.

Remarkably, the shift from KWNS to SWPR does not concern exclusively the national level. As Jessop (2008, pp. 212–214) argues in a more recent study, the same shift can be observed at the EU-level. The international forces of power that pursued the post-war reconstruction of Western Europe and its integration in Atlantic Fordism initially had a Keynesian orientation (for instance during the periods both of Monnet and Delors) combined with a liberal *Ordnungspolitik* for the establishment of a unified market, complementary to national industrial policies. The crisis of Keynesianism in national economies shifted EU's economic policy towards a Schumpeterian strategy with the aim "to transform the European Union into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy and to 'modernize' the European social model" (Jessop 2008, p. 224).

In the frame of economic internationalization, a power consisting of heterogeneous agents who seek to keep up with the markets' criteria, has emerged. National actors, international organizations, governments, rating agencies and banks, constitute a form of power without a well defined national or international character. This emerging nexus of power is so complex and multifarious that it cannot be located or easily identified by mainly nationally organized social movements. These movements do not possess the material, organizational and political means to confront that power on an equal footing. Thus, the boundaries between those who plan policies and those incurring them are sharper than ever in Europe's post-war history. While the fields of decision making have become internationalized, the processes of political participation follow this trend at a clearly slower pace.

2.4   Processes of Localization, Informalization and Responsibilisation

The transformations of the welfare state have also led to the transformation of social and political action. The emergence of informal pressure groups and self-organization networks in combination with the neo-pluralistic social policy have increased the role of a series of private market actors, communities, voluntary organizations, networks, but also of individuals. In this frame, as Krasmann (1999, p. 112) notes, "a process of transferring formerly state tasks and a consequent process of responsibilisation" is taking place.

The emphasis during the last decades on local administration, urban governance and regionalization is characteristic. Cities, localities and communities have become new fields for policy making and the formation of novel tasks.[6] Localities of all kinds are "increasingly being viewed as the only remaining institutional arenas in which a negotiated form of capitalist regulation might be forged" (Brenner and Theodore 2002, p. 1). Such localities, as centres of entrepreneurial activity and dissemination of economic values, have always played a paramount role in the production and reproduction of capitalism in different historical phases. Nevertheless, the renewed interest in cities as central actors of social reproduction and economic reallocation in post-national, post-welfarist states lies in the need for such an organization of social affairs that will assimilate globalization's processes through localization, what Robertson (1995, p. 25) described as *glocalization*.

At the same time, a process of informalization of social policy is taking place, through activation policies and the participation of non-state agents and various private interest groups. Informalization and neocommunitarianism, however, do not imply a weakening power of authorities, but a re-definition of the boundaries between private and public spheres. Authorities are now called upon to re-design their political strategies, to include cooperation with informal and local actors and NGOs ("joint governance"). Self-regulation demands and goals of self-help movements, informal organizations and NGOs go hand in hand with state's priorities for further flexibility and for sharing responsibility for social policy making among non-state agents. A supposedly non-intervening state aims at shifting its responsibilities and constructing social consensus by shaping social policy as a neutral field of activity, exerted by loosely defined actors.

Additionally, the new roles of enterprises are typical of the shifting of responsibilities. Such is the case for instance of "corporate social responsibility", which marks the involvement of enterprises in managing social problems and environmental issues, undertaking initiatives about global poverty, children rights, etc. The criteria of corporate social activity should conform to specific standards set by international

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[6] For instance, the recent political project "Big Society" of the British government aims at the empowerment of communities and social entrepreneurship. Similarly, the "Big Society Network" undertakes initiatives to support and guide local actors and professionals of social economy with the motto "Power to the People", see http://www.thebigsociety.co.uk/.

organizations (Campbell 2006, p. 928). Likewise, "social marketing", that is nowadays increasingly implemented dictates the adoption of marketing strategies, to achieve "non-commercial" goals that concern social life. In the same spirit, all sorts of charities and initiatives are undertaken by multinational corporations or even by multi-billionaires.[7] Simultaneously, renewed forms of philanthropy revive with the involvement of the Church, non-profit associations (cultural funds, volunteer unions, groups of professionals raising funds, etc.). At the social level, "social responsibility" actions become widespread within the "movements of one demand" and citizen initiatives that lack ideological or social coherence and aim at correcting specific issues.

At the same time, a series of policies of "self-responsibility" and "activation" of citizens are set in motion. This "activating state" (Eick 2003) is central to the social processes; it maximizes "individual responsibility" and fragments collective demands. Even the image of "society" as a collective entity is fading. "Society" is increasingly conceived as a fragmented, non-systemic space, as something that "does not exist". As M. Thatcher has suggested in 1987 "there is no such a thing as society", but "there are individual men and women and there are families". According to Thatcher, these individuals, that until then were casting their problems to the state and expected social solutions, should take care of themselves without neglecting their "obligations".[8]

Along the lines of Thatcher's argument, one of the critics of the welfare state in the US, Lawrence Mead (1986, p. 10) has suggested that "Governments must persuade people to blame themselves; the poor must be obliged to accept employment as a duty". According to Mead (ibid., p. 5), the fundamental weakness of the welfare state is its "permissiveness" and the fact that it "does not ask much from the poor" and premiums them with more freedom than it should. It is, therefore, crucial to responsibilize these social groups and eradicate the opinion "that responsibility for the poor lies outside of them, at the government or the society" (ibid., p. 46). By proposing a model of social policy that compels individuals to have low expectations from the state and "feel responsible" for their own problems, Mead justifies the values of free-market ideology.

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[7] On the one hand, such actors have been considerably benefited by global neoliberalism. On the other, they represent an ideology of globalization towards a "frictionless capitalism" (Zizek 2009, p. 28).

[8] "I think we have gone through a period when too many children and people have been given to understand 'I have a problem, it is the Government's job to cope with it!' or 'I have a problem, I will go and get a grant to cope with it!', 'I am homeless, the Government must house me!' and so they are casting their problems on society. Who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families. No government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then also to help look after our neighbor. Life is a reciprocal business and people have got the entitlements too much in mind without the obligations, because there is no such thing as an entitlement unless someone has first met an obligation". Thatcher's interview, Women's Own, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689.

Social and political participation becomes a synonym with a kind of political pluralism based on individualized responsibility. Such policies respond to what Offe (1987, p. 506) described in 1987 as the "moral crisis of the welfare state". The "remoralisation of the state" (ibid., p. 507) is realized through the vision of self-determined, "functional citizens". By participating, citizens reproduce the new economic norms and at the same time, feel responsible for the dysfunctions of the system due to this kind of political individualism.

The "functional citizen" is by no means, a new priority. On the contrary, it is inherent in modernity and part of the process that Foucault has described as the construction of the "disciplined subject" and of the "governance of the self" (Foucault 1998, p. 428). In the frame of the Foucauldian governmentality, the ways social control is diffused and internalized are not directed simply by a central power and its moral imperative. Social control is based on a more or less organized network of power relations between subjects. Through the processes of classification, disciplination and obedience, the subjects are – in the Foucauldian perspective – at the same time transmitters and receivers of power. Thus, the "functional citizen" of neoliberalism is not merely the passive subject of the state, but also, a responsibilised producer of neoliberalism. This is how the responsibilising state "governs from a distance" (Garland 1996, p. 469), without the need to guide continuously the individuals to the imperatives of power.[9]

The shifts of state power "upwards" (to supranational organizations, rating agencies, etc.), and "downwards" (to communities and informal organizations), as well as horizontally through public administration, reflect the neoliberal restructuring and the diffuse practices of political individualism. These shifts do not substitute for state repression. In other words, post-welfare, responsibilisation policies should be understood as "governing from a distance" as Garland describes, but not inversely, as "distance from governing". These processes reflect exactly that kind of "governing from a distance". Through responsibilisation according to neoliberal premises, they aim – despite their variations and contradictions – at constructing "effective" subjects. Instead of participating to collective endeavours

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[9] It should be stressed however, that the governmentality discussed by Foucault does not imply the withdrawal of the state from governance. On the contrary, it implies a transformation of politics aiming at the restructuring of social relations of power. This is why, contrary to other readings of Foucault, Lemke suggests an understanding of Foucault's governmentality as one that sheds light on the shifts of state power. The often assumed withdrawal of the state is essentially an extension of neoliberal governance: "What we observe today is not a diminishment or reduction of state sovereignty and planning capacities but a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government (e.g., nongovernmental organizations) that indicate fundamental transformations in statehood and a new relation between state and civil society actors. This encompasses, on the one hand, the displacement of forms of practices that were formerly defined in terms of nation-state to supranational levels and, on the other hand, the development of forms of subpolitics 'beneath' politics in its traditional meaning. In other words, the difference between state and society, politics and economy does not function as a foundation or a borderline but as element and effect of specific neoliberal technologies of government" (Lemke 2002, p. 58).

of resistance and democratic struggles, these subjects tend to feel responsible for their situation, de-politicize social problems and internalize the values of the "functional citizen" of neoliberalism.

3   Post-Democracy and the New Right

As Esping-Andersen (1990) has argued, the welfare state has managed to operate as the agent of "decommodification of labour". Through this process, the reliance of employees exclusively on their labour in order to earn their living was reduced, as long as a series of social rights secured a basic living standard, outside the sphere of wage labour. "Decommodification" did not contradict capitalist reproduction; in fact, it constituted a structural complement thereof. This was actually one of the main arguments of neomarxist criticisms against the welfare state. However, despite these criticisms, it is clear, as Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 37) notes, that "conflicts have mainly revolved around what degree of market immunity would be permissible", and at the same time around the "scope, strength and quality of social rights" (ibid.).

As long as the sphere of labour decommodification through the welfare state was shrinking, private health, education, social care and insurance markets emerging next to their public service counterparts have been growing at an accelerated rate since the mid-1970s. This trend was not necessarily accompanied by reduced state expenditures or less bureaucracy in these sectors, as the proponents of welfare deregulation argued. What actually took place was the adoption of "entrepreneurial governance", allowing a number of new enterprises (sometimes monopolistic) to bloom. Also, entrepreneurial interests were assisted and policies were implemented in favour of the free market by putting aside social and political rights formerly taken as granted.

This process of deteriorating social rights characterizes the political regulation referred to by Colin Crouch (2004) as post-democracy. This term describes the transition from egalitarian Keynesian democracy to the liberal regime of diminished social, labour and political rights, low political participation, privatization of public goods and the minimalization of the state as "post-democracy", although as Crouch acknowledges the term bears weaknesses, as many other "post-" (Crouch 2004, p. 20). Some features of "post-democracy" are summarized by Crouch (2004, p. 23) as follows:

> The welfare state gradually becomes residualized as something for the deserving poor rather than a range of universal rights of citizenship; trade unions exist on the margins of society; the state as policeman and incarcerator returns to prominence; the wealth gap between rich and poor grows; taxation becomes less distributive, politicians respond primarily to the concerns of a handful of business leaders whose special interests are allowed to be translated into public policy; the poor gradually cease to take any interest in the process whatsoever and do not even vote, returning voluntarily to the position they were forced to occupy in pre-democracy.

Post-democracy thus describes a specific form of democracy, mainly based on elections and a professionalization of politics centred around mass-media political communication. According to Crouch (2004, p. 3), although democratic institutions still exist and are in certain cases reinforced, modern liberal democracy "is a form that stresses (...) extensive freedom for lobbying activities, which mainly means business lobbies, and a form of polity that avoids interfering with a capitalist economy". As a result, the majority of the population adopts a passive attitude of spectator watching pre-elective campaigns, lacking the ability to participate more or less directly to policy formation, "in the manner characteristic of pre-democratic times" (ibid., p. 6).

At the same period, New Right gains influence. New Right is frequently represented as the moral victory of a supposedly marginalized argumentation that was traditionally anti-statist. Special emphasis was placed on the "individual". A "flexible" individual identity of private citizens, individual biographies, and a multitude of life styles and life politics replaced, in the framework of neoliberal theories, the traditional ways in which political participation was conceived. Whereas in Marxist theories class determination prevails over the "individual" and, in a Foucauldian perspective, the "individual" is constructed by power in a historical process of disciplination to social and political norms, in neoliberalism the "individual" gains new importance. It becomes an apolitical subject supposedly above social classes, making rational choices in order to maximize its gains and profits. Thus, it is subjected to the market and the corresponding kind of freedom allowed, meaning the freedom to choose and consume commodities.

The New Right ideology draws from a variety of premises and social values. It combines minimal state rhetorics, modernization, privatization and disciplination of labour to the neoliberal necessities with a series of "security" rhetorics. New Right's security differs from welfare and social care security. As Marvakis notes (2011, p. 38), "the concept of security is gradually shrinking down to its policing dimensions". This is evident not only as an intensified repression and social control but also due to the emergence of a "punishing state" (ibid, p. 39). The new subjects of punishment tend to include those social groups that relied upon social security and welfare, workers under precarious conditions, the poor, the unemployed (especially women and the youth) and immigrants. Contrary to the social groups that have the means to buy private services in health and education, those who depended on welfare, are now practically required to fend for themselves.

The process of post-democracy and the strengthening of the New Right have accompanied neoliberal globalization. The weakening of the political power of certain social groups and working classes, and often their political exclusion from decision making, is a process that has already begun with the deregulation of Keynesian corporatist models during the last decades. However, the circumstances of the Eurozone debt crisis have led to further weakening and exclusion of wide social groups, justified under the recent crisis and the "state of emergency".[10]

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[10] According to Agamben (2005, p. 18), declaring a "state of emergency", which "is today underway in varying degrees to all Western democracies" and reflects "an unprecedented

4   Political Participation and the Eurozone's Crisis

The post-war era has been characterized by different modes of regulation: the regulation around industrial production and labour, the welfare expenditures of the Keynesian era, then the efforts to reduce inflation, and further, a series of policies (such as promoting private debt, recapitalizing banks and increasing public debt), that constituted continuous efforts to achieve a more or less stable mode of capitalist regulation, for as long as they would be effective in resolving a previous crisis (see Streeck 2011). The crisis that outburst in March 2008 in the US and gradually spread in Europe marked the end of the regulation of the past three decades and initiated a protracted period of global slump, social conflicts and a renewed attack against public services, trade unions and the working social classes (McNally 2011). The "Great Recession" is characterized by international economic turbulence through recurrent shockwaves and chain-effects of unpredictable outcomes. Together with the "Great Bail Out"[11] of a number of banks during that period, the increasing public debts and the increasing interest rates for indebted countries that signalled their inability to borrow, the crisis spread in Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and then Italy, jeopardizing the Eurozone's future.

The already unstable architecture of the euro which gave "the markets" a distorted image of economic homogeneity in the Eurozone (Krugman 2011), is highly disputed. Dismantling the Eurozone is suggested all the more openly (Rodrik 2011).[12] At the same time, unemployment is dramatically increasing and is now comparable to the one of the 1930s (Rosa 1999). As a response to the crisis, the leading EU forces consent to the direction of a deeper and stricter fiscal discipline. In this way, a series of austerity measures are imposed to a varying degree in such

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generalization of the paradigm of security as a normal technique of government" (ibid., p. 14), tends to become the dominant form of governance due to different reasons. Whether for the "war on terror", for financial crises or for internal social crises, such as urban riots, extreme measures are taken. Shock-therapies are imposed to maintain normality to such a degree, that "state of emergency" itself tends to become a condition of normality (Zizek 2009, p. 47). In most cases, the new threats are invisible and unclear: fundamentalist Muslims threatening the West after September 11, riots in urban areas against law and order, market speculators threatening national economies. In a short time, these threats serve to justify the disciplination of the internal society. As a result, by resorting to the "state of emergency", the state acts against the society itself that it is supposed to protect.

[11] The "Great Bailout" was a response to the collapse of some of the world's leading banks, such as Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, and Wachovia bank, or of AIG, the world's largest insurance company, followed by the meltdown of a series of European banks. As McNally (2011, p. 2) argues, this meant that "governments in the world's largest economies anteed up something in the order of $20 trillion – an amount equivalent to one and a half times the US gross domestic product – via a massive intervention without historical precedent". This "Great Bailout" was according to McNally (ibid.: 4) a way of "mutating", as he puts it, private debt into public.

[12] For instance, Rodrik (2011) notes with regard to the current Euro-crisis: "EU needs either *more political union* if it wants to keep its single market, or *less economic union* if it is unable to achieve political integration". And he suggests that "the more orderly and premeditated the coming break-up of the Eurozone, the better it will be".

countries as Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Italy. These measures include cutting down wages, pensions, benefits, increasing dismissals and reducing personnel in the public and private sector, as well as plans for "special economic zones" within the EU. As a result, managing the crisis by means of the suggested close surveillance of indebted countries (Lorca-Susino 2010, p. 181) has caused further insecurity and worsening of living conditions for millions of people in the EU.

At the same time, mass media across Europe have put the problem in terms of distinctions, such as disciplined/undisciplined nations, productive/lazy ones, powerful/failed governments. The language of economics enriched with such terms as "spreads", "collateralized debt obligations", "credit-default swaps", "selective default", etc. became more elitist and more distanced from those affected than ever. Through this mystification, economy is represented as something understandable only to experts. Consequently, political action is confronted with a complex situation: national parliaments facing global challenges, vague decision making processes with ill-defined actors, national and international elites exerting influence on the state. The complexity of these circumstances has provided political elites with an opportunity to represent political participation as meaningless.[13] At the same time, the intensity and extent of measures are justified in a loose, hardly persuading manner, including rhetorics of "good governance", "competitive modernization" and "fiscal disciplination".

In the current stage of competitive neoliberal capitalism, "societies of anxiety" emerge, as a result of a "hitherto unknown economic competition lacking social solidarity" (Nogala 2000, p. 79). Within the complex institutional setting of "international fiscal diplomacy" (Streeck 2011, p. 3), the interdependence between the Eurozone's countries is deeper than ever. At the same time, state politics are confronted with a highly competitive, finance-led capitalism. The ability of peripheral Eurozone's countries to rule their economies is dramatically reduced, as even their parliamentary functions ought not to disrupt "the markets". Whereas these countries experience the crisis more deeply, the foundations of democratic legitimization of institutions and decisions are getting weaker. Austerity and "exit from crisis" policies are implemented with hardly any participation of the broader society.

Remarkably, despite the conflicts and frictions related to opposing interests in the course of the crisis, what has remained unchanged is the economic doctrine underlying these policies. As Habermas has observed in the context of the Greek crisis: "The financial crisis has reinforced national egoisms even further but,

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[13] Even protests are now considered as obsolete and unable to put pressure on governments. In this frame, "it makes no sense to protest", as the former Prime Minister of Greece G. Papandreou has suggested. Not only because protests hinder the "general good", but also because even if states were willing, they would still be incapable of negotiating. As G. Papandreou put it "those who protest in city squares are appealing to national democratic systems, which are weak and hostage to global powers and weaknesses of a global regional system". (Speech at the Bank of Greece, 01.06.2011, http://www.naftemporiki.gr/podcast/listenclip.asp?id=38043).

strangely enough, it has not shaken the underlying neoliberal convictions of the key players. Today, for the first time, the European project has reached an impasse".[14] Apparently, two different versions of the European project are in conflict: on the one hand, the European project as a democratic-humanitarian process and on the other, as a market-friendly neoliberal one. Thus, the impasse Habermas is referring to, as a result of the dominance of "neoliberal convictions" in combination with "national egoisms", can also be interpreted as a victory of the neoliberal version of the European project upon the democratic one, putting political participation in a second place, in favour of the capitalist market.

5 Final Remarks

How political participation is organized and expressed within liberal-democratic societies, what is its extent and weight, which social groups are excluded, which ones are eventually capable of influencing power on the basis of their own interests, are issues that depend on the relationship between state and market. This relationship requires a model of social regulation aiming at economic and social reproduction, which is specific to each period. During the post-war Keynesian period, the state defended the capitalist industrial reproduction through a social policy based on public health, education, insurance and welfare provisions by the state. The employees in the sector of national industrial production were able to exert political influence through the corporatist system and trade unions. They enjoyed, in this context, support from the political parties whether in government or in the opposition. The political participation of such organized groups was important not only with regard to the bargaining of collective agreements, wages and welfare provisions, but also for the reproduction of the state itself, as long as it based its rhetorics on social egalitarianism and social democracy.

During the neoliberal period beginning in the mid-1970s, this social compromise started to fade away, and the state-market relationship changed. The state promoted regulations in favour of a liberalized economy, open markets and more efficient international fiscal transactions and the public sector was reformed in the spirit of managerialism. The priorities of this neoliberal, managerial state shifted towards policies of labour flexibilization and compelled society to gradually give up welfare expectations. Trade unions and working classes saw a series of social and labour rights toppling and their role in decision making processes deteriorating. At the same time, the identification of these social groups with specific political parties was loosened and politics gradually acquired a technocratic-managerial style.

As the neoliberalization process was getting more intensive and the post-industrial model of the economy pushed large parts of working people into deeper precarity, a number of social groups disengaged from the state and got dependent on

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[14] Jürgen Habermas, interview at the Financial Times (30.04.2010) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eda3bcd8-5327-11df-813e-00144feab49a.html#axzz1bFwBBC67.

the markets. This happened not only because it is mainly the markets that modulate labour regulations, but also because they are becoming an important provider of social services in the form of commodities. As Crouch (2004, p. 60) put it, these are the groups "that have grown in number during the postdemocratic period" and that "remain largely passive and lack political autonomy" (ibid.). As a result, political trust, both in the sense of a decaying party identification and in the sense of lower faith to the effectiveness of welfare-democratic institutions, has declined. What Baudrillard (1993, p. 72) has described as a "profound disgust for the political order", is typical for large parts of society that withdraw and fall to apathy as they remain excluded from the political sphere and are welcome to express themselves only during the elections.

These processes are already set in motion with the deregulation of the welfare state. However, they are further fuelled by the crisis. Under the "state of emergency", high unemployment, falling incomes, pensions and benefits, huge cuts to health care, education and social-welfare, privatizations and a campaign against the "laxity and laziness" of the poor (see McNally 2011, p. 25) had to be accepted as the appropriate policies and the inevitable way out of the crisis. Crisis politics subordinated to global market anxieties became a new reality, at the cost of democratic rights. As a response to different forms of social reactions that emerged during the crisis (from the "Indignants" of Southern Europe to the "Occupy Wall Street" movement) governments have tried to advocate the idea that the crisis is *everyone's* crisis, and obscure, thus, its class character. A hurricane of fiscal austerity measures in peripheral Eurozone countries and a series of welfare cuts in Europe and the US have been promoted as a necessary sacrifice for a "common good" that is now defined in terms of market needs and managerial criteria of "efficiency".

The post-welfare state is neither a "weak", nor a "minimal" state. Despite the justifications for the decline of the state put forward in a number of postmodern or cosmopolitan sociological theories, and notwithstanding the retreat of the welfare state, the crisis has shown that the functions of the state have actually never declined, either in terms of reproducing class society in favour of the ruling classes or of exercising violence and coercion in favour of the politically defined order. The ongoing attack against the working classes, the deterioration of their living standards, the dominance of a neoliberal class state that sinks present and future generations into deeper insecurity, call for a reinforcement of political participation.

But, while political participation is nowadays alarmingly necessary, it has become equally hard for the society to find the appropriate means, strategies and demands that could challenge the rules of "postdemocracy". In times of rapid changes, political instability, turbulence caused by economic crises and various forms of "state of emergency" declared for different reasons, social antagonisms and tensions have been sharpened. While neoliberal forces at national and international level gain influence over the last decades, the recent crisis provides these forces with a new opportunity to bring into completion in the most definite way possible, a series of neoliberalization's processes at the economic, political and ideological levels.

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The Rise of the "Pleasure Citizen": How Leisure Can be a Site for Alternative Forms of Political Participation

Sarah Riley, Christine Griffin, and Yvette Morey

1   Introduction

In this chapter we engage with questions of indifference and self-exclusion from political events, actions and movements with an analysis that shifts the question from "why aren't young people and adults participating in traditional forms of political participation?" to "why should they and what are they doing instead?". Our reading of contemporary subjectivity and the socio-political landscape of many young British adults suggests that there is a logic to their lack of engagement with traditional forms of politics; and that rather than read this lack of engagement as a form of apathy, we should read it as a sign that participation is happening elsewhere, at sites where people have a greater sense of autonomy and control. One site where people can exercise sovereignty and create alternative social spaces is leisure. And in this chapter we explore the idea that leisure might be a site for alternative forms of political participation – forms of "everyday politics" – that are not being picked up by traditional and quantitative measures.

Our data comes from an in-depth qualitative study on how participants in club and party cultures make sense of their leisure practices. We explore the values and behaviours characteristic of the events our participants went to and how they made sense of their participation in these events. In analysing this sense making we

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argue that social and political participation is happening, but not in the forms or the places that analysts usually investigate. Our analysis also highlights a significant shift in the way that citizenship is being constructed, since discourses of citizenship that have previously tied citizenship to employment were being re-deployed in a radical way to construct citizenship as a "right" to free, unfettered and autonomous consumption.

1.1   Young People, Citizenship and Political Participation

Our shift away from the question "why aren't people participating in politics?" to "why should they and what are they doing instead?" developed from a general dissatisfaction with traditional models of citizenship and dominant debates around young people, politics and citizenship. Dominant frameworks for making sense of political participation take a "top down" approach that constructs citizenship and political participation in limited and particular ways. Academic and policy documents construct political participation in terms of traditional forms of engagement such as voting or joining a political party; while citizenship is understood primarily in terms of a person's economic participation (Griffin 2005; Riley et al. 2010a). These constructions come to dominate a range of institutional and common sense understandings of what it means to be a citizen. For example, the core curriculum for UK school based citizenship classes place significantly greater emphasis on economic participation than on social participation (Smith et al. 2005).

Dominant discourses of citizenship therefore construct the young person as – at best – a citizen-in-waiting, a positioning that is part of a wider education-developmental discourse of young people as deficit (Griffin 1993). Since political participation is so narrowly defined, when young people reach voting age and abstain from voting, as a significant number of young adults do, the logic of the dominant framework means that non-voters are labelled "apathetic" and failed citizens. Traditional definitions of political participation therefore begin by constructing young people as citizens in development and culminate in labelling many of them as "failed citizens" if they refuse to engage with the institutions of democracy as they move into adulthood.

Our second criticism of traditional frameworks of citizenship is that they fail to reflect the diverse ways that young people understand and act upon social and political issues (Eden and Roker 2002; Griffin 2005; Harris 2001; Riley et al. 2010a, b). Research that has explored young people's sense making regarding citizenship suggest a range of alternative frameworks from which to make sense of young political participation. For example, Anita Harris argues that young people are inherently in an unequal relationship with traditional political structures; so that to engage with a system is to both endorse something you might disagree with and accept a subordinate position within it:

> ... young people may well have their own ideas about how states and citizenry should operate, and to ask to be included or to participate in the current order is to endorse a system

that may be fundamentally at odds with these other visions. Further, it is to accept one's subordinate position as a fringe dweller who can only ever hope to be invited or asked to participate, but who can never do the inviting themselves. (Harris 2001, p. 187)

From this perspective, Harris suggests that it makes sense for young people (and by implication older people who also consider endorsement problematic) to turn their political energies towards sites where they have more autonomy and control. Her analysis explored, for example, how young women used internet magazines to create their own spaces from which to negotiate, redefine and reclaim politics, citizenship and novel gender subjectivities. Harris's work also suggests that leisure-based activities can provide sites for young people to engage in practices that relate to participation and citizenship and are thus 'forms of politics, often misrecognised as entertainment' (Harris et al. 2001, p. 12).

Young people may also refuse to engage with mainstream politics because mainstream politics fails to engage with their concerns. As Kum-Kum Bhavnani argued in a study of young people's orientation towards politics in 1980s Britain, "politics" was associated with challenging racism, domestic violence and unemployment (Bhavnani 1991). Her participants did not see local or national politicians addressing these issues in an effective way – if at all – and adopted a disengaged approach to conventional politics as a result. Twenty years later Haste's (2004) study on young people and morality echoed Bhavnani's findings. In her analysis Haste (2004) argued that young people are politically motivated not by traditional forms of politics but morally engaging issues, such as the environment, the war in Iraq and issues concerned with identity and rights (e.g. animal rights, homophobia or racism).

Haste's work suggests that what appears to be apathy and depoliticization may represent a move by young people away from traditional areas of political participation as defined by government, policy and traditional academic research towards other forms of participation. This move, we would argue, is strengthened by a legitimate perception of a lack of efficacy in democracy since the issues many young and older people care about are not prioritised by the politicians who represent them. For example, a million people in London alone marched against the Iraq war in 2008, but this had no impact on Tony Blair's decision to launch an invasion (Blair 2011). Many young people therefore feel limited in their ability to affect large scale social change. In this context it makes sense to turn away from mainstream politics and try to affect change at a local or personal level, engaging instead in what we have termed "everyday politics" (Riley et al. 2010a).

The logic of "turning away" from mainstream politics towards informal "everyday politics" was been strengthened by government policies that have encouraged individual solutions to what were once considered collective problems. These policies can be read as part of a neo-liberal project that extends across successive British governments: Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government in the 1980s, Tony Blair's New Labour administration and the current Coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats (Hall 2011). Neo-liberalism in this sense is a form of governmentality that has significant implications for both subjectivity and for political participation (Hall 2011; Harris 2004; Gill 2007; Kelly 2006; Miller and Rose 2008; Riley et al. 2010c; Walkerdine 2002).

Neo-liberal governance makes sense of its citizens within values of self-management and self-enterprise, although there is variation in the ways these values manifest themselves according to the political environments in which they are located (Ong 2006). In the UK the ideal neo-liberal subject has emerged in the figure of an autonomous, rational, risk managing being, responsible for his or her own destiny, who makes sense of themselves through discourses of choice, rights and responsibility (Riley et al. 2010c; Rose 1989). This construction of the self is associated with citizenship, since a good citizen makes choices that reduce their reliance on the state in order to act as a free subject, in the sense of being free "from state protection and guidance, as well as freedom to make choices as a self-maximising individual" (Ong 2006, p. 501). The good citizen is therefore cast as an "economic citizen", and in this way neo-liberal rhetoric shifts citizenship from a set of rights the state provides to its citizens to a set of responsibilities the citizen has to the state, in particular to be responsible for their own welfare through economic participation (Harris 2004).

Analysts have also charted a further shift in constructions of citizenship that incorporate the rise of consumerism and the role consumerism and lifestyles in contemporary identity projects (Walkerdine 200; Bauman 2007). Cronin (2000) for example, maps the ways in which concepts traditionally associated with citizenship, such as individual freedoms and rights have been mobilised in relation to discourses and practices of consumerism. Consumption from this perspective "provides one of the few tangible and mundane experiences of freedom which feels personally significant to modern subjects" (Cronin 2000, p. 3) and, we would argue can extend beyond the realm of the purely material to include the consumption of entertainment and leisure practices (Riley et al. 2010b).

Constructions of citizenship are now not just about being economically active, but also about being a "consumer citizen" – a person who spends the money they earn in forms of consumption that further reduce a their reliance on the state. An ideal citizen, for example, may be identified in the economically active person, who pays for a gym membership, and who then regularly attends that gym, so that they have optimum health and are less likely to require health care. Similarly, across Europe the consumer citizen is evoked in exhortations to consume our economies into better health. For example, at time of writing a rise in consumer spending in the UK was being constructed as the singular positive note for the British economy (http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/feb/24/uk-gdp-figures-what-economists-say).

The logic of contemporary neo-liberal subjectivity, then, constitutes our consumption and leisure practices as key features that come to define us as citizens. If citizenship can be bestowed through consumption and leisure, then these practices also open up the possibility for forms of sense making that allow people to correlate individual, unofficial and local ways of being with political participation, since how we live our lives and consume becomes a marker of citizenship. Neo-liberalism therefore creates the conditions of possibility for making claims for a whole range of informal activities to be viewed as political, from recycling to free parties (Harris 2001; Riley et al. 2010a). And in doing so, it points to leisure as a site to explore new forms of political participation. There is also another theory of social organisation, completely different to that of neo-liberal analyses of governance that articulates for

very different reasons, a logic for turning away from mainstream politics for a focus on the local and informal. This theory is neo-tribalism, to which we now turn.

1.2   Maffesoli and Neo-tribal Theory

Maffesoli's (1996) neo-tribal theory rejects an analysis of neo-liberal society constructed of atomised individuals interacting only at interpersonal level and almost unable to imagine collectivism. Instead he describes contemporary post-industrial societies as deeply social, in which people move through a plurality of group memberships in the course of their daily lives. These groups are conceptualised as neo-tribes, since individuals are positioned within multiple, rather than a traditional single, tribal formation.

For Maffesoli, neo-tribes are plural, temporary, fluid and often elective. Over the course of a day people move through these groups, from an early morning exercise class, for example, to meetings at work and perhaps watching football in a bar in the evening. These groups come together through proxemics and emotions, people coalesce because they happen to live near that gym or bar (proxemics) and because they experience pleasure in being with other people, creating an emotional connection. What makes these groups potentially political is that each group has its own set of values and behaviours, for example, you might shout and scream watching football in a way you would never do at work.

Since each group has its own set of values and behaviours, participating in a group creates a shared sense of autonomy, as you collectively create your own sets of values and norms. Through this process neo-tribes give people what Maffesoli calls a sense of "sovereignty over your own existence". Having sovereignty over your own existence through the experience of temporary moments of self-governance means that neo-tribes "make it possible to escape or at least relativize the institutions of power" (Maffesoli 1996, p. 44).

Maffesoli argues that modern political institutions are "saturated" edifices that are not engaged with people, so it does not make sense for people to try and engage with them and, by definition, engage with a politics of social change. Instead from a neo-tribal theory perspective it makes sense for people to participate in a politics of survival, which occurs when people turn away from traditional forms of political participation and focus instead on the informal social networks that give them a sense of sovereignty. This process produces a form of "aloof" politics, and opens up the possibilities of theorising elective, informal, leisure/consumption based groups as offering a site for alternative forms of politics (Riley et al. 2010a).

Our reading of a rather diverse, scattered and contradictory literature suggests that taking a broader understanding of politics in order to make sense of contemporary social and political participation would be useful. This would enable us to explore how alternative forms of politics might be played out at the individual or informal level around leisure and consumption. To explore this thesis – that leisure might be a site for alternative forms of political participation not identified by traditional frameworks and measures – we turned to electronic dance music culture.

1.3   Electronic Dance Music Culture

In the UK, and across Europe, an important site of leisure based activities for a significant number of young adults (aged 18–25), and increasingly older adults, is the nightclub. In the late 1980s a new genre of dance music emerged that has had a profound impact on clubbing. Going under the names such as "Acid House", "Rave", and now fractured into a multitude of subgenres, electronic dance music culture (EDMC) emerged as a form of leisure in which people gathered to dance to repetitive beat-based electronic music, often intoxicated with illegal drugs such as "ecstasy" (Collin 1997). EDMC is now an international phenomenon, with over 20 years of history, having survived legislation against aspects of it (e.g. the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994), as well as cycles of commercialisation, co-option and trivialization (Wilson 2006).

Cultural theorists have analysed EDMC in contradictory ways. For some, EDMC is a site for the celebration of pleasure that creates alternative forms of subjectivity (Malbon 1999; Pini 2001), while others have noted the reproduction of traditional social stratifications (in relation to taste, class, income and gender) (Thornton 1995). EDMC has been theorised as apolitical escapism (Garrett 1998) and as a site for political activism (McKay 1998; Riley et al. 2010b). Analysts in general have usually concluded that EDMC cannot be considered political because it fails to meet conceptualisations of the political that associate politics with a social change agenda (Riley et al. 2010b). EDMC was and is a highly diverse phenomenon, and the apparently contradictory arguments of different analysts may partly reflect this diversity – as well as their own different theoretical agendas.

Analyses of neo-liberal forms of governance and neo-tribal theory both offer an alternative way of thinking about EDMC. For different reasons both suggest that political participation has shifted to the informal domain; while neo-tribalism offers a theoretical framework for understanding politics as practice of survival not social change, opening up possibilities for thinking differently about politics, EDMC, and leisure.

To explore the idea that leisure might be a site for alternative forms of political participation – forms of "everyday politics" that are not being picked up by traditional and quantitative measures – we undertook an in-depth qualitative study with two case studies that represented some of the heterogeneity of EDMC.[1]

We conducted 31 initial in-depth interviews with participants regarding their participation in EDMC, returning with our analysis of this data to our participants for either a second interview or a follow up focus group. In addition we conducted 10 participant observations at a range of venues/events (taking field notes, photographs and recruiting participants for subsequent interview). The 31 participants were also asked to complete questionnaires regarding their drug use and demographics.

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[1] The project was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) (ref. RES-000-22-1171) and was passed by a University ethics committee.

Participants were recruited at events or through networks associated with one of two scenes within EDMC, namely "drum and bass" or "free party" scenes. Drum and Bass originated as an urban, Black music, but is now more mainstream – for example, it would be heard on national BBC Radio 1 in the evening. It is characterised by syncopated bassy beats, and is itself a fractured scene, with variations in styles, types of venues and demographics of participants. We recruited participants living in a city in the South West of England, who had range of participation levels (clubbers/DJs/promoters/music producers); we went to a range of clubs, large and small, weekend and weekday. The majority of the clubbers we saw were white, but some events had a more mixed race crowd, and often the DJs were Black.

Free parties originated out of squat parties and hippie festivals. They are illegal parties held in places like warehouses, disused quarries, private farms and forestry commission land. Often people are associated with a particular sound system, and we recruited a group of rural based people associated with a sound system to which we give the pseudonym "MindWarp". We attended a range of parties with them – small and "multi-rig". At these parties participants were overwhelmingly white and the majority of music played was techno, electronic music that has a fast regular 4/4 beat usually in the range of 140–60 beats/min. The kind of techno played at free parties tends to have little commercial impact and was constructed by our participants as "underground" or "banned", in the sense that you would not expect to hear it on national radio.

The 31 participants were an opportunity sample, of whom 22 were male and nine female, they were aged between 20 and 41. Approximately 75 % identified as "white British", 10 % as "mixed ethnicity", 50 % as employed, 21 % as unemployed, and 25 % as "other". These demographics matched our observations at clubs and parties; with the exception of age. Our participants tended to be slightly older, in part because we recruited producers as well as consumers, and those making a living in club-cultures tend to be older. Most of the participants were regular drug and alcohol users, with patterns that broadly match previous research on normative EDMC consumption patterns (e.g. Riley and Hayward 2004). Nine participants were educated to degree level. None of the participants received any form of payment, and pseudonyms chosen by the participants were used in all reports.

With both case studies the researchers obtained permission from relevant gatekeepers (e.g. club promoters, sound system organizers) and introduced themselves to participants as researchers. The participant observations were therefore as overt as possible given that the context of a large gathering of people in a public space meant that not all people there could be informed. Care was also taken not to intrude or otherwise interrupt participants' partying (fieldnotes, for example, were not taken during the event but recorded immediately afterwards).

Interviews and focus group data were transcribed. The data were analysed using a form of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis to explore how our participants made sense of their participation in EDMC and the consequences for subjectivity of drawing on these accounts in the ways that they did. Our analysis therefore takes a social constructionist approach in which identity is conceptualised as being

constituted as discursive, as something that we do, rather than something that we are; as culturally, historically and politically located; and that has impact on what we can say, think and do (Riley et al. 2010c). Below, we focus on three themes: "sociality, belonging and being together", "sovereignty" and "risk managers". For analyses of other themes in our data that oriented around drug use or hedonism please see Riley et al. (2008, 2010a, b).

Transcription notation is as follows: (.) A short pause (less than 0.5 s approximately); (..) A longer pause between 0.5 and 1 s; Underlining represents emphasis; ↑ rising intonation; [laughs] additional information provided in brackets.

2   Analysis

2.1   Sociality, Belonging and Being Together

Our participants talked about EDMC as a deeply hedonistic and collective culture. EDMC was not just about "take the drugs, get fucked and have a wicked [fun] time" as Jenni, a drum and bass clubber, described it. It also involved a practice of hyper sociality, since being sociable was constructed as an important activity. Interacting both with people that you knew and did not know was a key value and a source of great pleasure. For Jenni, for example, it was "all about seeing my friends . . .[and] chatting to people"; while Trevor, below, compares the sociality of free parties with his everyday world:

> You wouldn't just wander up to somebody in [supermarket name] and start chatting about shopping and stuff would you? But you go to raves (.) people (.) it's like . . . the barriers to society being sort of taken down a bit like (.) not considered a bit weird to just wander up to someone that you've never met and probably never will again and just talk (Trevor, Free partier)

Maffesoli argues that neo-tribal formations are based on the pleasure people have in just being with each other – and we also saw this in our data, in which the hyper-social characteristics of EDMC are made sense of in relation to the pleasures of social immanence.

> If you'd asked me this a few years ago I would have said that it was a ritualistic thing, to me now it's more of like a celebration thing. It's more of a kind of "Hey we're alive, we're together, we're having a party. There's nothing deep in this. This is a good time" (Steve, Free partier)

In Steve's extract we see a shift in thinking about his partying, from something that drew meaning because it felt religious or ritualistic, to a construction of being together as good enough "we're alive, we're together". Being in a social system is thus good enough in itself, but as Steve hints, it can sometimes feel almost mystic, an experience reflected in Magnus' quote below:

> When you go out clubbing or when you're going to a party or just standing in a queue or just in a load of cars or something there is that kind of sense of community, even if it's just for a moment. I feel it kind of builds up and there's always a certain point where it kind of comes

up and then it drops off again ... sometimes you're lucky and it kind of stays there for a while ... sometimes you've got to hunt around to find it again. (Magnus, Drum and Bass clubber)

In Magnus' quote we get a sense of the dynamic, collective presence that can emanate from people coming together for a party. But coming together does not produce this feeling automatically; it is an elusive but deeply pleasant sensation, and so worth "hunting" for. This kind of talk resonates strongly with Maffesoli's approach, which uses the concept of the 'social divine' to describe a kind of energy/atmosphere you get from partying with other people. Maffesoli argues that the "social divine" bonds neo-tribe members with each other because it creates a sense of warmth and social connection that is deeply protective: "the divine of which we speak allows us to keep warm and provide social spaces in the heart of the cold, inhuman metropolis" (Maffesoli 1996, p. 42). Again, we find these ideas echoed in our participants' sense making, as in Lu-Lu's extract below:

Its nice to have a sense of belonging isn't it? There's pleasure in being part of a group. There's no cliqueyness, everyone's welcome and anything's welcome, so then, you know, it's really nice because it's like a sense of warmth. (Lu Lu, Free Party DJ)

Our data offers empirical support for Maffesoli's construction of contemporary society in which people can form neo-tribes that produce a sense of community through a celebration of being together, which in turn fosters a feeling of belonging.

2.2 Sovereignty

Social connections were not the only ways in which participants talked about EDMC. In their talk there was also a strong theme of self-determination, freedom and self-expression, of being able to live out one's own values and appropriate behaviours. To use Maffesoli's terms, our participants talked of sovereignty over their existence. Or to quote one free party participant Genie: "I love just being able to do what the hell I wanna do (.) when I wanna do it". Paul, a drum and bass DJ and producer, for example, also draws on the notion of sovereignty and freedom when explaining his music and clubbing career choice:

I'm a bit of a (.) what I call a non-conformist (.) um: within the system I suppose you know↑ cos I'm (.) I mean I'm involved in the music business and that is simply because I didn't want to enter the system as it stands you know a nine-to-five (.) a nine-to-fiver regime thing somebody being able to dictate (.) you know when I can get promoted when I can get (.) > d'you know what I mean < demoted or: you know what I mean I never really liked that style of doing things you know (.) so my interest was always in music and I suppose in a way that was a source of um (.) artistic freedom d'you know what I mean↑ to express yourself (Paul, drum and bass producer/DJ)

This freedom, or sovereignty, was also made sense of by some through the notion of "aloof" politics as described by Maffesoli (1996), in which participants described a turning away from traditional political institutions because it "doesn't make any difference" and instead focusing on their informal leisure based groups where they could enact agency and live out values important to them. As Trevor says:

It's easy to think of politics as just (.) Tony Blair and people voting and all that, but I think really politics is more about the way people want to live their lives and how they live their lives. I reckon that probably about two or three percent of people in the rave scene actually vote or pay a blind bit of attention to the actual English political system. I think with our generation there's very much of a "well that doesn't really make any difference let's not bother with political parties and stick to parties" [laughs] (Trevor, Free Partier).

In thinking through these themes of community and sovereignty, our data seemed to be offering strong empirical support for a neo-tribal analysis of contemporary social organisation. Our participants' talk seemed to represent a lived example of neo-tribal sense making and evidence of a form of "aloof" politics – a hedonistic community built on values around pleasure in community rather than the exaggerated individualism of neo-liberalism. And yet, when participants accounted for their drug use, which was normalised in their communities, a very different form of sense making occurred, one that appeared to draw on neo-liberal discourses of individualism, choice, rights and responsibility.

2.3   Risk Managers

it's a cliché but it is kind of living in the moment it is kind of like (.) just saying like fuck it I'm just gonna go for it and yeah (.) double drop [take two ecstasy pills together] and I don't know dance for the next six hours or whatever [laughs] um: that's basically what it stems from really yeah you know you know (..) and I think it's getting into that mind frame and letting yourself go and getting into that mind frame (.) is where the sense of freedom comes from (.) y- (..) and hey if it makes you happy [laughs] you're not doing anybody else any harm so (.) yeah that's an important aspect of it I suppose isn't it (.) as long as everybody else there's having a good time um: (.) then why should anybody stop you (Magnus, Drum & Bass clubber).

In the extract above Magnus draws on notions of freedom and sovereignty and ties these into an understanding of the pleasures of clubbing as coming from "*living in the moment*". This account at first seems at odds with neo-liberal notions of risk-management, self-scrutiny and regulation. But half way through the extract he pauses, and a different discourse is mobilised – if it makes you happy and it does not cause others harm "*why should anybody stop you*". The argument that justifies this hedonism then is that no one should stop in your consumption choices as long as you're not harming others. We posit that this is an example of consumer citizen rhetoric, in which individuals have a right to exercise individual choice in relation to consumption – in this case it happens to be double dropping ecstasy pills. We give another example below:

<if you drink coffee if you eat meat (.) if you:: eat chocolate if you>(..) run out in front of a bus (.) everything has got- it's like if I do:: if I do loads of K [Ketamine] or drink alcohol and I drink (..) it's like for every gram of K I do I make sure I have a pint of water 'cos otherwise I get kidney pain (..) and for every pint of beer I have I'll have a pint of water (.) 'cos otherwise I get kidney pain (..) um the same as if I ate chocolate all day everyday I could expect myself to get like a few problems and be very over weight you know (.) that's with the whole responsible drug taking thing (..) um (..) it's the same health risks as drinking alcohol it's the same health risk as with smoking (.) but that's your body and that's your choice (..) obviously don't kane it [use excessively] to a stupid amount that you'll make yourself ill (.) IF when you take (.) acid or whatever you have a bad time (.)

then don't do that do something else (.) or get your head around why you're having a bad time normally if people are having a bad time with drugs it's 'cos they've got problems in their head and if you try and block problems out when you're taking drugs (.) you end up going mad (..) 'cos the drugs it's there to open your mind (.) so if you're trying to close part of your mind while you're trying to be open minded it's (.) you end up going (.) loopy-lou (..) I've got a few friends with problems like that at the moment (..) u::m uh you know they're- it's freedom of choice (Lu-Lu, Free Party DJ)

In this extract we see neo-liberal discourses of choice, responsibility and risk management being mobilised to justify drug use. Drug use is constructed as just another risk to be managed, along with other everyday consumption choices including meat, chocolate and alcohol.[2] Consumption practices are constructed solely within a discourse of freedom of choice and individual risk management, with any attendant problems being located at the individual level – for example needing to deal with your psychological problems before you took drugs. This talk of individualised risk management is a distinctive aspect of neo-liberal subjectivity (see for example, Walkerdine 2002) and is used in the extract above to shut down other possibilities for understanding drug use.

Lu-Lu's talk of having friends who are experiencing problems with their drug use opens up the possibility for alternative discourses other than that of individual choice. Acknowledging that there are people with problems in their drug use could suggest that sometimes people are unable to make appropriate consumption choices or that there is a need for friends to take collective action and intervene/interfere with these "choices". But Lu-Lu does not come to these conclusions, instead, we see an apparent folding back into neo-liberal logic that closes the possibility of such thoughts in the last two lines of the extract "*I've got a few friends with problems like that at the moment (..) u::m uh you know they're- it's freedom of choice*". The relatively lengthy pause followed by an extended "um" sound that occurs after she acknowledges that she has friends not making the "right" choices regarding their drug use ("*problems like that at the moment (..) u::m*") seems to mark the limits of her discourse, she seems unable to address this issue of failed consumption, her talk breaks off and she reverts back to a "freedom of choice" argument, speaking or perhaps being spoken through her discourse, she concludes "*it's freedom of choice*".

As researchers have noted in relation to other contexts neo-liberal rhetoric reduces people's ability to think of collective solutions to collective problems (Gill 2007; Riley et al. 2010c; Walkerdine 2002). In Lu-Lu's example neo-liberal rhetoric also seems to limit thinking by absenting collective solutions to problems. Neo-liberal rhetoric thus allowed our participants to justify illegal drug use, but reduced their ability to think of ways of helping their friends who are struggling with their "choices" because people were constructed as always rational, in charge and responsible for their choices. At one participant observation we saw one of the people Lu-Lu is referring to, clearly distressed and having taken a range of drugs

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[2] For an analysis of how Ketamine (a psychoactive drug) use is made sense of at free parties see Riley et al. 2008.

including LSD (a strong psychedelic). At the party people took turns to sit with him and tried to alleviate his distress or at least make sure he didn't harm himself. Clearly there was collective action at the event, but there is no sense in the participants' talk of how the group can manage this problem outside of the party – instead all that is available to make sense of such issues is an individualist consumer discourse – its freedom of choice, and the group is left sitting with someone for hours in a way that seemed to frustrate them.

Lu-Lu's talk of risk management and responsibility reflects New Labour government policy that distinguished between responsible and irresponsible drug use; and which then focused state energies on those whose drug use made them economically inactive or criminal (O'Malley 2002; O'Malley and Valverde 2004). But Lu Lu is not a government minister in charge of identifying where to spend the budget. Lu Lu is a drug user and, we argue, that when drug users take up this discourse something radical happens in terms of how citizenship and consumption become constructed because it re-works a set of understandings that associate economic activity with being a good person and uses them justify hedonistic and illegal consumption activities. This discursive move thus decouples economic activity from citizenship and instead constructs citizenship as a set of rights to autonomous consumption.

Our participants' re-appropriation of neo-liberal discourses of risk management, individualism and responsibility to account for drug use opens up the possibility of understanding citizenship as a set of rights to do what you like and consume what you like – whether that's drugs or more intangible forms of consumption such as atmosphere and experience, because you bear the responsibility of those outcomes. This talk then separates citizenship from economic activity – because citizenship becomes not something you owe to the state in terms of working, but what the state owes you – and what the state owes you is constructed as the right to be left alone to be autonomous consumers.

Conclusions

We started this chapter by proposing that questions about "why aren't people participating in traditional forms of political participation?" could benefit from a shift in focus to "why should they and what are they doing instead?" From this perspective we identified a set of diverse, scattered and often under-developed work that suggested that new forms of political participation are occurring, but at informal local level and often in the realm of leisure. Exploring these ideas with an empirical analysis of participants' accounts of electronic dance music culture (EDMC), we described communities that were characterised by hedonism and hyper-sociality, through which participants experienced freedom, self-determination and sovereignty.

Our analysis offers empirical support with Maffesoli's (1996) neo-tribal theory of contemporary social organisation, and his analysis of "aloof" politics, in which political engagement is made sense of at informal and unofficial levels, rather than through official political structures. Or, as our free partier participant Trevor describes it, living the way people "want to live their lives".

Our participants did not, however, draw solely on discourses associated with neo-tribal theory. Discourses of individualism, rights and responsibilities that are associated with neo-liberal forms of governance were also mobilised – particularly to account for drug consumption that was normalised within these communities, but also less tangible forms of consumption – such as the atmosphere and music that, as drum and bass clubber Magnus said, let you "be happy".

Our findings highlight the power of neo-liberalism as an ideological framework; its sense making appeared inescapable and unable to be destabilised by, for example, witnessing poor "choices" amongst friends or by collectivist discourses of belonging. Instead our participants were folded back into the logic of neoliberal individualism and autonomous choice discourses even within these apparently collectivist communities.[3] This re-articulation of neo-liberal discourses to account for hedonistic practices, did however open up spaces for such neo-tribes to assert their validity, since their hedonistic practices could be justified in terms of neo-liberal discourses of citizenship that are framed in neoliberal terms of "freedom to make choices as a self-maximising individual" (Ong 2006, p. 501).

What is radical about our participants' use of discourses of freedom and choice is that their talk decouples self-maximising activities from economic activity, since the self-maximising activities they are engaged in revolve around the consumption of drugs, alcohol, music and atmosphere; which are constructed as a rightful consumer choice. The use of neo-liberal rhetoric to account for drug and other forms of consumption related to hedonism, pleasure and experience thus represents a significant shift in sense making, allowing us to trace a path from economic citizen, to consumer citizen, and now to a "pleasure citizen" in which rights to autonomous consumption and personal risk management are claimed as markers of citizenship.

De-coupling citizenship from employment radically reconstructs citizenship in terms of a right for autonomous consumption. At time of writing the UK continues to reflect on the 2011 summer riots, which became focused on looting shops; although they were initiated by a range of factors including poor relationships between young people and the police. Although little research has so far been conducted on these riots they have been described as a "consumerist feast" (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/series/reading-the-riots) and associated with consumerist desires:

We have been all coerced and seduced to view shopping as the recipe for good life and the principal solution of all life problems – but then a large part of the population has been prevented from using that recipe. . . City riots in Britain are best understood as a revolt of frustrated consumers. Bauman, retrieved 27th March 2012; http://www.social-europe.eu/2011/08/interview-zygmunt-bauman-on-the-uk-riots/

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[3] For a discussion on the impossibility of de-stabilising neo-liberal rhetoric in relation to magic mushroom users discourse see Riley et al. 2010c.

We suggest that our concept of the pleasure citizen may assist in any future analyses of these riots as "consumer riots", since our analysis suggests that if autonomous consumption is being constructed marker of citizenship, then limitations on consumption are likely to be constructed as illegitimate, opening up the possibility of legitimating resistance to such limitations.

Our participants have known nothing in their adult lives other than a neo-liberal regime that has governed through "freedom" and an exhortation to be autonomous and free from any obligation the state has to take care of them as citizens. In our analysis, we show how our participants have taken up such sense making and made it their own, radically decoupling the association between citizenship and economic activity, and reframing citizenship through discourses of autonomous subjectivity and consumption practices, as a right to not have ones consumption interfered with by the state. We conclude by suggesting that the neo-liberal birds have come home to roost, so to speak, our participants live in a context where they have been told the state owes them nothing and to consume their way into existence, and that's exactly what they are doing – in creative and unpredictable ways.

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"Parties with No Members?": How to Ensure Political Participation in East Central Europe

Ladislav Cabada

1 Introduction

Political parties are among the most important institutions ensuring political partici-
pation not only through taking part in elections of representative bodies which are
identifiable with modern democratic governance, but also in the broader scope of
political functions such as aggregation or articulation of interest and political
socialization. Such assumption seems to be even more valid in the case of new
post-Communist democracies in the EU with weak or almost non-existent structures
of civil society prior to the regime change. Recent studies show that the political or
more generally civil participation in the new democracies statistically embodies
essentially lower grades than in the majority of EU-15 countries, Cyprus and Malta.
Such results might be observed in the case of political parties –but also with regard to
other societal organisations such as labour/trade unions, professional associations,
non-governmental organisations, church groups, etc.

In fact, in the majority of new democracies of East Central Europe party
membership does not reach more than 1–2 % of the eligible to vote adult population.
This is very problematic not only because it has a detrimental impact on recruiting
new political elites, but also because it is negatively related to political participation.
Apparently, low party membership and sinking electoral turnout opens the space for
other types of political actors to make their appearance in order to develop new
strategies for broadening and deepening political participation. For example new
social movements make their appearance in the new democracies of East Central
Europe, but there is also a strong diffusion of media and media-staff into politics
(media magnates established their own relevant political parties, as for instance in
the Czech Republic and Slovakia), new political parties emerging from business

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environments (political parties functioning as a private company); there is further a noticeable trend towards the formation of "single-issue" political parties (for example in Lithuania, Slovakia, or the Czech Republic). Such a development naturally results in governmental instability and distinctively unpredictable electoral results – including also the negative impact on the fundamental role of political involvement, i.e. searching for solutions to address common problems, systemic and social deficiencies, or deep-rooted structural issues.

This chapter aims to analyse the phenomenon of low party membership in new EU-member states from East Central Europe, its underlying reasons and especially impacts on the character and behaviour of political parties (the existence of so-called cartel parties, a strengthening relation between the politics and business, the interconnectedness between the political parties and the state, etc.) and other types of political and societal actors.

2   The Main Characteristics of Political Participation Development in East Central Europe

A sufficient level of political participation is generally considered the key condition and indicator of the stability and quality of democracy, or the precondition for regime change that would lead to the democratic reconstruction of the state. The democratisation of the Mediterranean and East Central European countries within the third wave of transition to the road towards democracy revitalised research and writing on political participation (also including research in Western countries, which could then be incorporated into broader comparative frameworks) and, at the same time, broadened it in connection with some specific features of new democracies. Most authors dealing with political participation in the new democracies saw one such feature in the fact that civil society – from which social and political actors should be recruited to stand for clear and aggregated interest – was weak and underdeveloped (cf. Fink-Hafner and Kropivnik 2006; Kluegel and Mason 1999; Letki 2004; Vráblíková 2009).

The pro-Soviet regimes of the so-called real socialism in East Central Europe, in spite of their divergence from a purely totalitarian ideology pertaining to the systematic political mobilisation of the masses, were still based upon a camouflage of mass political participation during 1970s and 1980s: it was used, both within the society and outside its frontiers, as a legitimisation instrument as it was presented as an outward manifestation of support and consent to the existing power structures. At the same time it served as an instrument for enforcing conformity, as the practical realities of daily life were controlled by the central state (e.g., career choice, the opportunity to study at a selected educational institution, accommodation allocation, etc.). Forced membership in Communist parties and other mass social organisations was then transformed into a less formal way of political participation – participating in demonstrations and petitions rather than political party membership, etc. – or filtered into the pattern of zero participation, i.e. entirely abstaining from taking part in interest groups.

With the exception of partial liberalisation periods (Czechoslovak Prague Spring 1968, Polish liberalisation at the turn of the 1970s), independent voluntary organisations including political parties were outlawed under the Communist regime (Letki 2004, p. 666). Political involvement rates, though, grew significantly at times of revolt and liberalisation in some pro-Soviet regimes, as evidenced by the massive support of the Polish independent trade union "Solidarity" or on the massive growth of the membership rates of both the satellite and new political parties during the Prague Spring in 1968 (Ulc 1971, p. 433). In these examples, we can observe that even the (post)totalitarian regime lacked the capability to suppress all the tendencies to political participation outside the official structures tied with the regime, and that the activity of protesting against the regime (i.e. the effort to reform it) could be linked with a considerable political involvement, which was especially the case of Polish "Solidarity", or East-German Christian opposition. On the contrary, the example of the Czechoslovak "Charter 77" demonstrates quite well that the neo-Stalinist form of Communist regime was capable of a very effective resistance to alternative political participation by making it illegal, including the use of remarkable sanctions (Ulc 1971).

The democratic transition in the countries of East Central Europe represented a substantial breakthrough in existing practices and habits, including theoretical and empirical approaches to political participation. Self-identification with any aggregated social group sharing a common interest or programme had soon proved very important and at the same time remained a rather complicated process. In societies long used to be based upon a centrally guided class struggle rhetoric, citizens could identify with the widely known (classical) socio-economic cleavages only with great difficulty. "Respondents to a national survey in Czechoslovakia, for example, had great difficulty in placing themselves on a left–right continuum . . . similar characteristics were also found in Bulgaria, and in Poland" (Evans and Whitfield 1993, p. 530). This holds true also for a large part of new political elites, unfamiliar with traditional political ideologies, dreaming of new and unique "third ways", which would constitute a compromise between liberal capitalism and socialism. Along with a temporary cleavage of continuity vs. discontinuity in relation to the *ancien régime*, other non-liberal or collectivist approaches with nationalism at their forefront firmly established themselves. "Communism deprived individuals of institutional or social structured identities from which to drive political interests, other than those of the nation or mass society" (Evans and Whitfield 1993, p. 522).

In the period of transition, the societies in the post-Communist countries of East Central Europe were quite exceptionally mobilised for political participation in the form of taking part in demonstrations, founding society-wide movements to lead the countries to their first free elections, and the spontaneous, to a certain extent, restoration or formation of political parties, etc. On the other hand, during this period of "revolution euphoria", a large part of the members of the former mass political structures (the Communist party and its possible satellites, trade unions, youth, sports, and similar organisations) had already exercised their right to withdraw their membership from those bodies. (Vráblíková 2009, p. 868). At this

point, it is worth observing two opposing processes: first, that exceptional political mobilisation resulted in the first free elections, for which a very high turnout was typical, exceeding even 90 % (Fink-Hafner and Kropivnik 2006, p. 61; Letki 2004, p. 665); and also that, in contrast, "the second and third elections under democratic rule were associated with significant declines in voter turnout" (Kostadinova and Power 2007, p. 263).

During this "post-honeymoon period", in addition to voter turnout, party membership and other forms of institutionalised participation also experienced a remarkable decline (Letki 2004, p. 666), and the significant deficiencies in the issues of the development of civil society became clear. In the cases of some social groups this "political demobilisation" is prominent. After the fall of the Communist regimes, for example, women's participation declined (Barnes 2004; Fink-Hafner and Kropivnik 2006, p. 62; Letki 2004, p. 671); however, it has to be considered that women were not appointed to the highest posts of Communist regimes and that the Communist leaderships were almost entirely made up of males. Similarly, there was a decline in the political participation of groups that contained the least educated citizens (Fink-Hafner and Kropivnik 2006, p. 69).

Declining political participation and the lack of a post-materialist, individual approach to the formation and promotion of the aggregated interests of social groups in politics might be seen as one of the more general signs of (post-) Communist political culture. The political culture created by the Communist regime was characterised by egalitarianism, the desirability of the equalisation of incomes, unwillingness to participate in official politics and the separation of private space (Bernik et al. 1995, pp. 574–575; Potůček 1997; Večerník 1998).

"The Communist system of forced political involvement . . . was not capable of socialising its citizens for voluntary participation . . . The citizens of the then non-democratic regimes had not gone through the democratic 'school of citizenship' " (Vráblíková 2009, p. 868). This fact consequently led to something resembling a "paradox". It can be observed in the fact that it is the former – or present – members of the (post-)Communist parties who stay the most exceptionally politically active. "Membership in a Communist Party before 1989 is a very good – positive – predictor of political involvement in new ECE democracies" (Letki 2004, p. 675). This fact is, in our opinion, quite a clear demonstration of the predisposition of many members of the new political parties in East Central Europe. Usually, they were pragmatic careerists whose political participation expressed through their membership in the Communist party was entirely or principally a means by which they could achieve individual success. There is a basis for the argument that their function in contemporary political parties is not associated with any kind of internalised ideological background (we shall deal with the weak ideological background of political parties in East Central Europe later in the text) or a deeper relation to society, i.e. their membership in a political party serves them most often as a route to power.

The low level of political participation in new democracies manifested itself in a remarkable overestimation – sometimes even adoration – of certain institutions or even individuals. In this context, many authors point out the excessive roles played by parliaments or political parties. "The situation in post-communist societies (particularly in the first period of transition) can be described by terms like

"overparliamentarianisation", meaning that the parliament becomes not only the central but also practically the *only* place for activities of political parties, and "overparticisation" which refers to the aspirations of political parties to exclude other actors from political life" (Tomšič 2011, p. 121; cf. Agh 1996, p. 55). This exclusion is easily carried out by political parties especially because political participation in the societies of new East Central European democracies is declining or stagnating. Political parties that have only a small membership themselves thus assume the position of the only political actor who is, through elections, legitimised to deal with the political agenda.

Weak civil society and underdeveloped tradition of individual action in East Central European countries, typically stereotyped as politically apathetic, thus contribute to political parties evolving into highly non-representative actors (considering their small party membership). Conversely, the very fact that not only political parties but also other institutions or ad hoc activities in the political process reveal a low rate of participation makes parties even stronger and, to a certain extent, monopolistic mediators between society (voters) and the state.

3   Political Parties in East Central Europe

Already since the democratic transition, East Central European party systems have demonstrated a number of significant differences compared to their Western European counterparts. The main difference, of course, refers to the termination of party system developments behind the iron curtain after 1945, when, in all the countries included in our analysis, there was created a single-party system promoting Communist (Marx-Leninist) ideology while holding full control over all the political, economic, and social sub-systems.[1] Authoritarian single-party operation is undoubtedly the reason why now, two decades after the transition to democracy, political parties in East Central European countries are still seeking a stable programme and membership base as well as stability in the patterns of their political interaction with other parties, both within their national political systems and on the level of supranational party political affiliations.

Following the end of nationwide anticommunist resistance movements, political parties in East Central Europe were formed and developed as structural entities with no distinct membership. Ágh (1992) labelled them as "elitist parties", based on their origins, their size and the methods of their internal functioning. Fink-Hafner (2001, p. 76) points out the fact that the parties, because of their weak relation to society, were very much attached to the state. They were also functioning on the model of "catch-all parties" because their financial support depends on public subsidy. Their particular connections to the state and the economy in general, however, make them displaying characteristics such as those observed in cartel parties.

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[1] In this context, we do not consider it analytically significant whether the Communist party in a particular country was complemented by so-called satellite parties (e.g. Czechoslovakia and Poland) or was really the only political party (e.g. the Soviet Union).

With a few exceptions, political parties and their satellite organizations in post-Communist countries do not have the same levels of mass membership as political parties in West European countries. Political parties in East Central European countries resemble, more or less, interest groups of several hundred or a few thousand members. "Many of the various political parties were established in East-Central Europe as tools for securing individual access to power and many existing parties split up for the same purpose. Indeed, some were called 'sofa parties' because of the limited number of members" (Kostelecký 2002, p. 154). This fact – and also their unclear and unstable programmes and strategies – might be the reason which can explicate low levels of voter loyalty to a specific political party, which in turn causes high volatility (the degree of change in voting behaviour between elections) and a high frequency of single issue parties and also of single use political parties. In Central East Europe, a strong precondition for such volatility is also the low and declining voter turnout – both at second-order and first-order elections.

Despite the aforementioned characteristics, the party political systems of the majority of East Central European countries – thanks to Europeanisation and, more generally, the supranational processes of cooperation and the patterns of successful strategies introduced– are gradually moving closer to the trends observed in West European countries. Political parties now rely more often on a modernised electoral marketing and at the same time one observes a quite strong personalisation of inter-party competitions while the processes of Westernisation and Europeanisation work together to integrate the majority of political parties into supranational party affiliations. In most countries, specific cleavages that existed during the first phase of democratic transitions (/post-/Communism vs. democracy; centre vs. peripheries) gradually decreased, and the main line of division moved into traditional social-economic differentiation on the right-left axis – which in some party political systems is also followed by other cleavages (e.g. traditionalism vs. post-modernity; city vs. country). In most of the surveyed countries, party political systems evolved with the main binary opposites, or the two main poles, being represented by two large political parties are: (1) a left-wing oriented, social-democratic, often post-Communist party; (2) a right-wing, liberal-conservative party. In some countries (Poland, Romania), this dichotomy is slightly modified and the two main poles are represented by a conservative-social and a liberal(−social) party. These parties are complemented by other secondary party political poles, which mostly lead to the formation of centre-left or centre-right coalitions; single-party governments are very exceptional. In all party systems, there exists one or more radical political parties; however, they mostly do not cross the border into extremism. Of all the countries, Hungary is the closest to bipartism, or a two-and-a-half-party system, and in some countries, moderate pluralistic systems are leaning towards extremism for a short period of time, especially when the *cordon sanitaire* is disrupted and one of the large parties accepts political radicals into the government coalition.[2]

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[2] E.g. Poland 2005–2007 with the League of Polish Families and the Self-Defense, or Slovakia, where between 2006 and 2010, the Slovak National Party participated in the government.

The ideological self-identification of particular political parties in East Central Europe is, however, often very shallow and formalistic. It is often possible to witness a remarkable interruption between a party's foundation or election success and the formation of a solid ideology or political programme. This was for example the case of the – now dominant – Slovak party Smer (Direction), that only several years subsequent to its inception it started to move towards (rhetorically and formally) the social-democratic party family. This phenomenon was generalised e.g. by Ehrke, who argued that,

> The current competition in central and southeast Europe between conservative, liberal and social democratic forces conceals a more fundamental categorisation: the parties of the left labelled "social democratic" are organised in central and southeast Europe in terms of ethnic and clan-based parties, post-communist, postmodern-hybrid and – exceptionally – genuine social democratic parties. In the wake of recent changes in the party-political landscape these central and southeast European parties could prove to be, not latecomers, but forerunners, in the event that northern and western European parties abandon the self-imposed restrictions of their traditions and mutate into ideology-free management agencies for government . . . If their names are anything to go by, the parties on the central or southeast European periphery are a reproduction of the western European political model; there too, the most important debates take place between conservatives, liberals and social democrats (so far, usually without the Greens). (Ehrke 2010, pp. 3–4)

This problematic ideological categorisation is extended also to conservative or liberal (self-)identification in East Central Europe. Many political parties in the region are able, with great flexibility, to alter their programmes and redefine their ideological foundations, and sometimes even their standpoints within certain cleavages. One of the most apparent is the pro-European vs. Eurosceptic cleavage, embracing the nationalist tendencies tied to the Eurosceptic standpoints. "Should the need arise, values can be switched for tactical reasons – for example, in Hungary, one political party (FIDESZ) was able to transform itself from a liberal into a nationalist party without much difficulty because its leadership took the view that there were more potential voters on the right" (Ehrke 2010, p. 4).[3]

As to the conditions and prospects for political participation in East Central Europe based on party identification, political parties may be viewed as structures created generally by a top-down mechanism, with no stable ideology or membership or even any ties to established social groups. A number of surveys concerning the quality of political participation and the interconnection of political parties with civil society have resulted in scepticism. Currently, it is considered an indisputable fact that political party membership is declining much more prominently in the countries of East Europe as opposed to those in the West (cf. Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Fink-Hafner and Kropivnik 2006, p. 55; Biezen 2003; Biezen et al. 2012). Similarly, the first surveys of the European Parliament elections in

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[3] Ehrke continues: "Parties are less predictable. Naturally, their practical political options are restricted, too, but by external factors, not by their own traditions and the self-restraint to which they give rise . . . In both versions of peripheral nationalism, which mirrors the old debate between Westernisers and Slavophiles, *backwardness counts as an advantage*" (Ehrke 2010, p. 4).

post-Communist countries clearly show a considerably lower voter turnout within the post-Communist territory, and on a more general level they show a boost in trends connected with the so-called second order elections (Cabada 2010; Koepke and Ringe 2006). In the following section, I shall focus on one particular specific feature of political partisanship in East Central Europe and beyond, namely low to almost non-existent party membership.

4   Party Membership in East Central Europe

The underdevelopment of civil society in most East Central European countries since 1989 has been analysed in many relevant studies. This persistence of this underdevelopment is also associated with political participation, including party membership rates. The assumption that party membership in East Central Europe would be significantly lower than in Western European countries became one of the general hypotheses of virtually all surveys dealing with a comparative analysis of party membership. Biezen et al. (2012, p. 26) support their recent analysis on the assumption that

> over and above the more general issue of the decline in party membership, we also anticipate that two general distinctions will be apparent from the data. The first, which follows in line with much of the expectations and hypotheses in the literature on post-communist Europe . . ., and which was already indicated in the membership levels recorded in the late 1990s . . ., is that party membership levels in the post-communist democracies will have remained substantially below those in the established Western polities.[4]

Any comparative analysis of the development of political party membership in post-Communist countries is substantially complicated by several factors. Among the most important factors is that there is a considerable fluidity in party-political agendas retaining their relevance during the limited terms representatives serve Parliament (often only for a single election term). Another important factor is the quite remarkable reluctance of politicians to provide undistorted and objective information (this reluctance is strongly related to the fact that many countries lack a mechanism controlling the information, including that of funding, provided by political parties; quite often the place where the data is gathered and examined is the Parliament, which is controlled by the parties). Many political agents are thus tending inflate their membership rates as compared to their party-political competitors. As an example, we may mention the most important Czech political rivals, the ODS (the Civic Democratic Party) and the ČSSD (the Czech Social Democrat Party), whose representatives repeatedly tended to quote numbers almost identical to those provided by their rivals (should one party state that it had 18,000

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[4] "The second distinction . . . is that between large and small democracies. The relationship between size and democracy was first theorized by Dahl and Tufte (1973, p. 43), who hypothesized that 'the larger the citizen body . . . the weaker the incentive to participate' – a proposition which has obvious implications for party membership" (Biezen et al. 2012, pp. 26–27).

members, the other immediately countered saying that it had "just above 18,000 members"). Some parties, by contrast, make efforts to present themselves as political structures attached to exclusive membership granted only to "proven" candidates; an example may be the Czech party *Tolerance, Odpovědnost, Prosperita 09* (Tolerance, Responsibility, Prosperity) (TOP 09), that sharply limited, or even stopped recruiting new members soon after its foundation at the turn of 2009/2010 out of a fear that potential members applied only because the polls promised the party a high percentage of the vote in the upcoming elections.[5]

In many countries there is also no legislative control over multiple party membership of a single individual (e.g. the Czech Republic or Estonia), therefore the statistics might be distorted by the fact that some persons might be simultaneously reported as members by several parties.

In their analysis Biezen et al. (2012, pp. 27–29) state that the average representation of political party members in the group of eligible voters in the 27 EU countries is 4.65 %. It is worth pointing out that among the post-Communist countries, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Estonia have an above-average political party membership. Contrariwise, among the seven countries with the lowest percentage of political party member representation, there are as many as five East Central European countries. The last two positions on the list go to Poland and Latvia, as the only two countries of the sample who did not even reach one per cent. Just a little better positioned on the list was Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics. The only West European countries to fall among them were the United Kingdom (1.21) and France (1.85).

A further element worth considering is the view of long-term development trends in the area of political party membership. Biezen et al. (2012, p. 32) offer an analysis covering approximately the last decade. We shall focus only on the countries of the post-Communist territory again; unfortunately, relevant data for all the ten EU member states are not available (Latvia, Lithuania and Romania are missing from the record).

Undoubtedly, the most remarkable deviation from the trend of political party membership decline is the case of Estonia. While political party membership was declining in all the post-Communist countries, in Estonia the number increased by more than 50 %. It is very likely that the reasons for this lies – with no deeper expert analysis based on e.g. a questionnaire survey – on the specific character of the Estonian "electronic" democracy based on substantially simplifying the processes of political participation (the opportunity to participate in elections using the Internet or a mobile phone, etc.), and more importantly with regard to the computerisation of the process of getting registered as a political party member.[6]

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[5] Interview with the Vice-Chairman of TOP09, Dr. Marek Ženíšek, December 17th, 2011.

[6] This reason was also given by Estonian political scientists in interviews carried out under the research project *Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe* – Interview with Dr. Petr Jurek, 3 January 2012.

Table 1 National levels of party membership in post-communist countries in CEE

Country	Year	Total party membership	Total party membership as a percentage of electorate (M/E)
Bulgaria	2008	399,121	5.60
Czech Republic	2008	165,425	1.99
Estonia	2008	43,732	4.87
Hungary	2008	123,932	1.54
Latvia	2004	10,985	0.74
Lithuania	2008	73,133	2.71
Poland	2009	304,465	0.99
Romania	2007	675,474	3.66
Slovakia	2007	86,296	2.02
Slovenia	2008	108,001	6.28

Biezen et al. 2012, p. 28, restricted to post-Communist countries

All other post-Communist parties have exhibited a significant decrease of political party membership over the last decade. This trend is most noticeable in the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which occupied the first two positions among the entire survey-sample encompassing 23 countries. The rapid decrease by almost half (Slovakia), or 41 (Czech Republic) per cent respectively, might be, among other possible reasons, linked to the particular developments in successor organisations, i.e. the post-Communist parties, or the successor parties of the Communist-led political party association, the so-called National Front (Národní fronta). In the case of the Czech Republic it included, apart from the Communist Party, also the Christian Democrats – the People's Party.

The case of Slovenia is also worthy of attention. If we compare the data of Tables 1 and 2, we observe, on one hand, that Slovenia has the highest political party member representation in the group of post-Communist countries (6.28 %), while, on the other, this figure has markedly decreased over the last decade – within the entire sample of 23 countries, Slovenia occupies the fourth place (thus, only the United Kingdom is found among the group of countries which experienced the greatest decrease in political party membership, being third on the list). A question that would definitely deserve further research is, whether the only EU member state that was not a part of the Soviet empire is gradually exhibiting trends analogous to post-communist countries, or if it follows the trends observed in the group of the so-called advanced industrial democracies (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). In this concern, it can be argued that the latest surveys of political party membership development trends do not offer any definitive conclusion. Biezen, Mair and Poguntke (2012) found, for example, that in some countries of the so-called Western Europe (and more so in, West Mediterranean countries) we can observe quite a marked growth in party membership.[7]

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[7] Out of 23 surveyed countries, membership grew in six – Estonia, slightly in Austria (2.28 %) and the Netherlands (3.40), markedly, by one third, in France (32.24), Italy (32.89) and Spain (35.32) (Biezen et al. 2012, p. 32).

Table 2 Party membership changes since the late 1990s

Country	Period	Change in M/E ratio	Change in number of members	% change in number of members
Bulgaria	2002–2008	–0.81	–44,479	–10.03
Czech Republic	1999–2008	–1.45	–113,560	–40.70
Estonia	2002–2008	+1.53	+14,999	+52.20
Hungary	1999–2008	–0.61	–49,668	–28.61
Poland	2000–2009	–0.16	–22,035	–6.75
Slovakia	2000–2007	–2.09	–78,981	–47.79
Slovenia	1999–2008	–3.58	–48,700	–31.08

Biezen et al. 2012, p. 32, restricted to post-Communist countries

Regardless of this fact, the reality is that political parties in East Central Europe have integrated only a negligible part of their population into their membership figures. The parties

> seem [to be] a relatively unrepresentative group of citizens, socially and professionally if not ideologically. The large majority, of course, are inactive . . . In general, they also tend to be older and better-off than the average citizen, more highly educated, more likely to be associated with collateral organisations such as churches or unions, and more likely to be male than female (Biezen et al. 2012, p. 38).

Critical reflections on the role of contemporary parties, showing that the parties' ties to civil society is so insufficient that they may be marked as "lonely protagonists" (Kunc 1999) were even more supported by the further, and quite substantial, decrease in party membership. A dangerous trend that undoubtedly correlates with the erosion of party membership is intertwining of political parties with state authorities. Although this interconnection of political parties with the state is far from being comparable with the practices of the Communist state-parties prior to the democratic transition or of the presidential parties known currently e.g. from contemporary Russia, this trend is extremely annoying. Grzymala-Busse, for example, in her analysis of the ties and interconnection between political parties and the state in post-Communist democracies claims: "Parties with weak roots and low organisational presence turned to the state as the main source of resources necessary for their survival" (Grzymala-Busse 2007, pp. 200–201).

While the author lends support to her claim by providing statistics and other facts, the parasitic model of state and public subsidies which the East Central European political parties have borrowed from Western Europe should not be overlooked. Grzymala-Busse herself, through her own calculations based on 2004 data, has arrived at the conclusion that in Western Europe (she probably means the EU-15) public subsidies represent on average 52 % of all estimated resources of the income of political parties, while in Bulgaria it is less than 20 %, in Slovakia 30 % and in the Czech Republic 35 %. On the other hand, it is obvious that political parties in East Central Europe get much less resources from membership dues compared to Western Europe. While in Western Europe, the parties obtain about 10–15 % of their estimated sources from membership fees, in East Central

European countries this is often less than 1 % (Estonia, Slovenia, Poland), and at most 5–7 % (Czech Republic, Bulgaria). It is precisely in countries with the lowest political party income received from individual members, that the parties rely on public subsidy most (Estonia – 85 %; Slovenia 70–75 %[8]; Hungary – 69 %) (Grzymala-Busse 2007, p. 191). In this context, Biezen (2003, p. 212) speaks of "étatizations through public funding".

The trend of the growing dependency of political parties on public subsidy is definitely not a positive development, yet it seems to be an all-European trend, i.e. one that is not associated exclusively with East Central European countries. Political parties have, in this case, simply taken thorough advantage of their exclusive position, given to them by their inclusion in constitutional texts as the key actors mediating between the state and civil society. In my judgment, the parties were in fact eventually brought to the position of cartel parties owing to their monopolistic role and due to the effort of states to maintain, for the sake of "institutional health" and democratic legitimacy, the plurality and fair competition among democratic political parties for power, especially when there is a lack of constant pressure coming from party memberships that would be in contact with civil society.

Cartel parties then intertwine with the media and business (and sometimes even with organised crime); they are also characterised by considerable concentration of executive power connected with the strengthening of party bodies *vis-á-vis* their small, weak, and scattered memberships.

> Party members clearly play a reduced role compared to professionals and the party leadership . . . Parties in new democracies thus tend to limit the opportunities for involvement and participation of the organized membership . . . Furthermore, it can be argued that many of the organizational changes point towards the marginalization of the membership per se, and a loss of intra-party democracy more generally . . . The overall weakness of the structural linkage between parties and societies in a sense has paved the way for a more influential role for the party elites (Biezen 2003, pp. 204–206).

Political parties in East Central Europe thus display a number of specific pathologies and problematic features usually related to their origins and subsequent transformation. Small membership is one such feature, especially when political parties are not interested in recruiting new members and thus they virtually abandon the process altogether. It is because lower membership consequently means lower pressure on intra-party competition, at the expense of quality – it is remarkable how often in East Central Europe a political party is unable to assign someone to its structural hierarchy because the party itself practically does not generate a new political generation. "Party memberships are generally too small to counteract party elites. For all or most party members, politics represents an individual career path, not an instrument for shaping society in accordance with normative principles. Political engagement is motivated by the personal prospects of lucrative party or government office or other perks, not political convictions" (Ehrke 2010, p. 5).

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[8] For a current and detailed analysis of political party funding in Slovenia from public subsidy and other sources, see (Krašovec and Haughton 2011).

Searching for new initiatives and ways to secure and empower democratic governance by means of adequate political participation has thus become a legitimate scientific and political question that has to be explored with even greater emphasis and urgency in the new democracies which originated from the third wave of democratisation than in the consolidated democracies of Western Europe. In the concluding part of this chapter, therefore, I shall try to reflect on possible alternatives to the monopolistic position of political parties in the context of Western democracies. I shall intentionally keep an appropriate level of generality so that the ideas proposed below can go beyond the territorial borders of East Central European and have something of a more general validity.

Conclusion

Political parties, which have a very long history, are the most important intermediaries between the state and the civil society. According to Schmitter,

For simplicity's sake, let us delineate three generic types of intermediaries: *political parties, interest associations,* and *social movements* . . . The distinguishing characteristic of political parties is their role in the conduct of territoriality based elections. They control the process of nominating candidates who, if they win, occupy specified positions of authority, form a government, and accept responsibility for the conduct of public policy (Schmitter 2001, pp. 70–71).[9]

Schmitter, however, builds upon the hypothesis that "these three types of intermediaries all play a significant role in the consolidation of neodemocracies" and, moreover, that "there is no longer any a priori reason to suppose that parties should be privileged or predominant in this regard" (Schmitter 2001, pp. 71–72). This thesis may be generalised both in terms of territory, i.e. beyond the territory of East Central European countries, and in terms of the phase of a democracy's development, i.e. also beyond the framework of transitional or consolidation periods (respectively) of the development of democratic political systems. This – considering the decreasing memberships of political parties and, more generally, the transformation of the roles and positions of political parties in relation to society – encapsulates also the spirit of the opinions put forward by Biezen, Mair and Poguntke. In the preliminary version of their article (presented at the ECPR Joint Session in Lisbon in April 2009, cf. Biezen et al. 2009) their discussion revolved distinctively around the implications of membership decline in Europe.

The authors build upon the premise that "party membership becomes less and less important . . . Nor are they always likely to provide a reservoir of attractive candidates". Regarding a decline in membership, political parties find

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[9] Schmitter (2001, p. 71) continues: "Interest associations seek to influence the direction of policy so that it will benefit particularly . . . their own members, without competing in elections or being publicly accountable for these policies. Social movements are also in the business of trying to exert influence over policy without competing in elections . . . but the benefits that they typically seek would accrue, not specifically to their own members, but to a broad spectrum of the citizenry – even to foreigners, plants, animals . . ."

themselves in such a situation, when, especially in elections other than parliamentary ones (especially in the case of local elections which require a high number of candidates), they are not able to fill the candidate lists with their own members or there is only slight competition among their members in contesting positions on the candidate list.[10] With reference to the practice of Italian centre-left parties, Biezen, Mair and Poguntke suggest that primaries were "opened to all citizens who are willing to register their names and addresses and who are willing to pay the small fee ... if primaries are intended to broaden the base of leadership support, it makes much more sense to extend the opportunity for participation in these primaries beyond the party itself". Let us note that a similar practice was used e.g. during the primaries of the French Socialist Party in its search for a Presidential candidate in October 2011.

Also in East Central Europe, similar efforts to overcome the distinction between members and non-members may be observed. A remarkable – although not entirely plausible – example is the political formation *Věci veřejné* (Public Affairs, VV), which succeeded in the elections to the Czech National Assembly in 2010 and became a part of the government coalition. The party put its stake in direct communication with its supporters, so-called registered "Vs". So, it consulted with them both on its programme and staffing issues and the issue of participating in the government coalition by means of Internet referenda. This undoubtedly interesting attempt to overcome public distaste towards political parties was, however, torpedoed by the finding that these referenda were allegedly manipulated – that the party, including its staffing, was virtually directed by one of its members (calling himself the "super guru") by means of (among others) corrupting the party's deputies, and that this person systematically used the method of illegal eavesdropping, blackmailing, and so on against his intra-party opponents or politicians of other parties. It became apparent then, that the party had not really diverted from the trend already described above by Kostelecký, namely that of parties being a tool for securing individual access to power.

Political party membership is in East Central Europe by far the least used type of political participation. The citizens of these countries mostly participate in elections, sign petitions, donate money, and participate in manifestations and demonstrations (Vráblíková 2009, pp. 879–880). However, even in terms of these activities, the majority of the countries do not reach the statistical level of countries of Western Europe. In the middle age and older cohorts, this trend is

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[10] Let us illustrate this phenomenon with the example of the Czech Republic. In a situation where there are more than 6,000 autonomous municipalities, the largest political parties are not capable of creating a candidate list in more than half of them (and concentrate on competition in the several largest cities, which largely mimics the competition at the national level, including the topics and strategies used in the campaign). In local elections, the traditional winners are then the formations of independent candidates that may occupy even more than 50 % of all seats offered by the municipalities (Vodička and Cabada 2011, p. 393).

undoubtedly boosted by frustration and apathy originating from the compulsory political participation by the old, non-democratic political regime. This group of people still actively propagates and supports the freedom not to participate (Rose 1995) – a tendency that manifests itself not only in relation to political parties but also to other forms of civil associations and political participation. Interestingly, this political behaviour is quite common in the new democracies of East Central Europe even two decades after the transition; many citizens of the new democracies still "enjoy the freedom from politics with which they have had or have a negative experience" (Fink-Hafner and Kropivnik 2006, p. 68).

Political participation in East Central Europe is also accompanied by a strong phenomenon of ungrounded political party affiliation – not only of the voters but also of the politicians (in countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and others, there are many examples of politicians who were able to work with several political parties – and to do so at the topmost level – during their political career). This ungrounded party political affiliation manifests itself in a section of voters as a kind of a "hibernation" from which they might be awoken only by a strong stimulus, often of the PR variety. Such a stimulus is associated with the presence of new political actors who usually profess to be committed to eliminating former "cartel" parties. Following their election (e.g. in Latvia or Slovenia), those actors representing new parties become inevitably part of the "cartel" (as is unrealistic to create a coalition government) against which they had fought, thus accentuating the phenomenon of *Parteienverdrossenheit* even more.

"In Western democratic political systems, political participation should maintain two main functions: the function of selection and control of political elites or the government on one side, and the function of activation and mobilization of human resources on the other" (Fink-Hafner and Kropivnik 2006, p. 59). It is obvious that the fewer members the parties have, the more difficult it is for them to perform these functions. However, the very fact that political parties slackened their efforts in performing their crucial functions is the main reason why political parties eventually became so unattractive to citizens. In my opinion, there is only one way to escape this vicious circle and moving on to perform these major functions attached to a thorough modernisation of intra-party life. Political parties must revitalise their recruiting function, especially at the lowest, local level of government. At the same time, they must abandon the trend that was quite understandable throughout the process of transition – yet is hardly acceptable at present – i.e. the trend followed by a large number of politicians to establish themselves directly at the national level, without proving their qualifications and competences by working previously at lower party or governmental levels. Such a change also requires, of course, more knowledgeable behaviour by voters, who should be able to weed out candidates lacking experience from lower levels of government and to withhold their mandate from them. This would require the adoption of new instruments of intra-party and voting democracy, especially the preference vote, split vote, and so on. Although the personalisation of politics would thus be re-affirmed, the decision-making competence of voters would be strengthened.

Political parties themselves should struggle for a breakthrough in the area of mobilising citizens solely for the purposes of elections. As shown by the present case of Hungary (this applies to the unprecedented defeat of the socialists in 2010), failing to create strong ties with voters and establish stable voter support may result in the seizure of power by another political party with no opportunity of effective governmental control. Such a breakthrough should be connected, for example, to a shift towards e-democracy, or by employing the broadest possible new communication channels. However, established traditional forms of communication should not be abandoned.

Last but not least, the state should also influence the promotion of party membership, for example by means of party tax-reduction or membership subscription (similar methods are known in some countries in regard to church membership) or by means of financial support to political parties that would, apart from temporary – electoral – success, would also mirror the more permanent activities of political parties and trends within them. It is especially the state and the political parties who should work symbiotically to maintain another crucial function of political engagement methods, i.e. political socialisation, and, more generally, civil education. In this area, which was significantly weakened because of the infamous "politicisation methods" during the Communist period, now being exposed to the forces of the "open market" following the transition to democracy, we can also observe remarkable differences between the countries of East Central and Western Europe. After all, in many East Central European countries the most visible actors remain the German political foundations built upon the democratic traditions of political education founded after the Second World War.

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Gender and Political Participation in Western and Eastern Europe

Hilde Coffé

1 Introduction

The extent of equal political participation across all social groups is considered as a critical component of the well-functioning of democracy. However, this ideal is seldom met, with women, among other deviations, being slightly though consistently less likely to participate in politics. Indeed, even though gender differentials in one of the most important forms of participation – voting – are shrinking and in some countries even reversing (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Currell 2005; Parry et al. 1992; Uhlaner 1989; Verba et al. 1997), gender gaps persist in most other types of political participation. Men have been found to be significantly more involved than women in a number of outlets such as strikes, demonstrations, contacting political officials, and political party membership (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Marien et al. 2010). Thus, gender remains a meaningful source of inequality in political participation.

However, most previous research has looked at post-industrialized Western democracies or has taken a global perspective, and the gender gap in different types of political participation among Western and Eastern Europe has rarely been compared in detail. Yet, given the unique experience with communism, the trend of re-traditionalization after the fall of communism, and lower levels of modernization in Eastern Europe, we may expect to find larger gender gaps in Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe.

In sum, the aim of this chapter is to describe to what extent the gender gap in electoral participation and political activism differs across Western and Eastern European countries. Even today, more than 20 years after the fall of communism and when more and more Eastern European countries are entering the European Union, such regional comparison is relevant. Eastern European countries are still

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lagging behind in economic development compared to Western Europe and a country's prior regime type is known to influence public participation (Howard 2003). In addition to describing the gender gap in electoral participation and political activism, I will test whether this gap differs between generations. As younger generations in Eastern European countries have experienced less of the communist ideology in their (adult) daily life and have grown up in a political, cultural and economic environment that differs fundamentally from the context in which older generations were raised, it may be expected that there are substantial generational differences in the extent of the gender gap. In addition, as differences between Eastern and Western Europe have narrowed over the past decades, regional differences in the gender gap may be smaller among younger generations compared to older generations.

The following section introduces a short overview of existing macro-theories explaining the gender gap in political participation. It also includes insights about generational differences in the gender gap in political participation and my expectations. The second section is dedicated to the data and descriptive analyses. The final section comprises the main conclusions.

2 Theory

2.1 Context and Gender Gap in Political Participation

Whatever eagerness there was to vote after the velvet revolution in Eastern Europe, most of the current research on electoral, and more broadly political and civic participation comparing Eastern and Western European, consistently finds lower levels of engagement in Eastern European countries (e.g., Hutcheson and Korosteleva 2006; Howard 2002). These lower levels of participation among Eastern European citizens are often blamed on the historical experience with communism in Eastern Europe. The expression of democratic citizenship was frustrated during communism when the only choice of political identification was identification with the communist party and the electorate could not choose between competing political parties (Coffé and van der Lippe 2010; Rose and Makkai 1995; Wolchik 1992). In addition, communist regimes offered limited opportunities to practice and view political citizenship, and sought to repress all forms of autonomous non-state activity (Hinckley 2010). They supplanted and subverted such activity by forcing their citizens to join and participate in mandatory, state-controlled organizations (Howard 2002). Hence, citizens were more objects of politics than active political subjects (Wolchik 1992), and citizens had to (re-)learn active public engagement after the collapse of communism.

Yet, while differences between Eastern and Western Europe in the extent of participation are well documented, far less is known about possible regional differences in inequalities in political participation between social groups. In particular, little detailed comparative research is available on the extent of a gender

gap in Western and Eastern European countries.[1] Hence, the research question motivating my study is: to what extent does the gender gap differ between Eastern and Western European nations?

The gender gap in political participation among Western industrialized nations has been studied intensively. While most research shows a small but persistent gender gap in citizens' political participation, with women being less likely to be politically engaged compared to men in most types of participation, it has been argued that gender equality has increased over the past few decades (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Inglehart and Norris 2003). An important explanation for the decrease in the gender gap in Western societies has been the increasing levels of *modernization*. As more women entered the labor force and achieved higher levels of education, and more gender equal attitudes developed among the public, the gender gap became smaller (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Cross-national differences in the gender gap in political participation have also been related to different levels in modernization and related gender equal attitudes, with gender gaps generally being larger in industrial societies compared to post-industrial societies, in particular in less mainstream types of political activism (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Communism and state socialism were associated with equality, including gender equality, and achieving equality was presented as an official political goal (Crompton and Harris 1997; Hanson and Wells-Dang 2006). Amongst others equal employment and education opportunities as well as a generous childcare infrastructure, were seen as means to achieve the goal of equality between men and women. The modernization theory and related insights about the effect of gender equality in the labor force and education on women's political participation, would suggest that such characteristics and conditions of gender equality would positively affect women's political participation and thus negatively affect a gender gap in political engagement (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Yet, whereas gender equality was presented as a core part of the communist ideology, it has been argued that in practice, the ideal of gender equality was not achieved. In particular, the communist regimes promoted a full-time employment policy for the entire population but did nothing to encourage gender equality in the private space where men were little involved (Van der Lippe et al. 2006; Voicu and Tofis 2012). As a result, women were burdened with both full-time paid employment and unpaid household responsibilities, and saw there full-time employment merely as a duty ("forced" work) as a result of state socialism (Crompton and Harris 1997; Einhorn 1993; Heinen 1997). Hence, after the velvet revolution, when state socialism was discredited, women's domesticity was widely portrayed as a social virtue and women were happy to retreat to the family (Nikolić-Ristanović 2004). Women exercised their "right not to work" and a re-traditionalization of gender roles occurred (Motiejūnaitė 2010). Previous cross-national comparative research confirms that Eastern European citizens are more likely to hold more traditional

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[1] In their global study, Inglehart and Norris (2003) introduce the former communist countries within the group of industrialized nations.

and conservative attitudes towards gender roles compared to citizens from Western societies. For example, Crompton and Harris (1997) found men and women in the Czech Republic to hold more conservative gender role attitudes compared to citizens in Norway and Britain. Similarly, Panayotova and Brayfield (1997) conclude that both men and women in the United States are more supportive of women's employment than their counterparts in Hungary, despite the full employment policy of the Hungarian government during the communist era. Such traditional gender roles are known to correlate with larger gender gaps in political participation (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Furthermore, it is known that Eastern European women have been decreasingly involved in party and parliamentary politics since 1989. Even though some have questioned the *real* power of women during the communist era and have argued that their numerical representation was strictly for symbolic purposes, rates of female participation in the new parliaments are lower compared to those in the parliaments before the fall of the iron curtain and inferior to the regional average representation in the Western European countries (Hardy et al. 2008; Nikolić-Ristanović 2004; Pollert 2003; Stockemer 2008).

In sum, despite an official ideology of equality under state socialism and the resources emphasized as important means for political participation (such as high education) that Eastern Europeans women possess, I expect to find a larger gender gap in contemporary Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe. The re-traditionalization that occurred after the collapse of communism, the more traditional values in Eastern Europe which also relate to the lower levels of economic development in Eastern Europe (Heinen 1997; Inglehart 2008) are expected to result in larger gender gaps in political participation in Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe.

2.2 Generational Change in the Gender Gap

Next to describing the general gender gaps in political participation, this descriptive chapter also aims to look at differences in the gender gap between generations. Taking insights from the *cultural theories of learning*, I would expect substantial differences between generations. Cultural theories of learning emphasize the importance of early life socialization and assign particular importance to generations as the basic unit of political socialization (Mishler and Rose 2007). The main argument is that successive cohorts are socialized in a particular economic, political and social climate which influences the development of attitudes and behaviour, and results in substantial and persistent generational differences. Thus, each generation will differ substantially from the others, depending on the political, social and economic environment in which a generation grows up.

The global study of Inglehart and Norris (2003) confirms generational differences in the gender gap in political participation. They find a general declining gender gap in political participation. Such generational pattern is likely to be particularly clear in Eastern Europe where younger generations were raised in a completely different political, social and economic context compared to older

generations. Indeed, the Eastern European region has undergone rapid economic, political and social changes since the end of the 1980s when these Eastern European countries moved away from centrally planned economies and developed market-based economies (Olson et al. 2007). Even though younger generations were exposed to a trend in which being a housewife was promoted as a model, a trend towards more modernization (though still lagging behind compared to Western Europe) is likely to decrease the gender gap among younger generations in Eastern Europe. Some research has confirmed that feminism is gaining more and more supporters, in particular among younger generations (Hardy et al. 2008).

3 Analyses

3.1 Data

To answer my research question and compare the gender gap in political participation between Western and Eastern European countries, I utilize data from the 2008 European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a cross-national collaboration of standardized surveys of the adult non-institutionalized population across European countries. More detailed information about sampling procedures, questionnaires and datasets are available on the ESS website (http://ess.nsd.uib.no).

I look at 27 countries (with Germany being divided in the former Western and Eastern part). The Western European region includes the following countries: Belgium, Switzerland, (former) West Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. The Eastern European region contains the following countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, (former) East Germany, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Ukraine.

To assess the gender gap in political participation, I look at two modes of political participation: voting and political activism. Formal traditional *electoral participation*, is measured according to whether the respondent voted at the last national elections. It is a dichotomous variable with the value of 1 when the respondent voted and 0 when the respondent did not vote. *Political activism* is based on seven items asking the respondents whether in the past year they had contacted a politician; worked in a political party; worked in another organization or association; worn or displayed a campaign badge or sticker; signed a petition; took part in a lawful public demonstration; and boycotted certain products (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.66). For the scale, respondents missing on four or more of the seven items were deleted. For all other respondents, scales were divided by the total number of valid responses. The scale is coded such that higher values indicate more engagement. Including both electoral participation and political activism, allows me to investigate whether differences in the extent of the gender gap, and regional and generational differences therein occur between different types of participation. This is important as previous research showed that gender gaps and generational gaps differ according to the type of political participation

considered. For example, Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010) revealed that women among 18 advanced Western democracies are more likely than men to than men to vote and engaged in "private" activism, while men are more likely to have engaged in direct contact, collective types of actions and be (more active) members of political parties. Dalton (2008, p. 71) shows that participation in electoral politics is declining among younger cohorts, but young people are more active in direct action methods such as protest, political consumerism and internet activism. More generally, with citizens in Western industrialized nations becoming more highly educated, technologically sophisticated, and policy and issue oriented, citizens are seeking out new ways of engaging with government and politics that reflect such skills and goals. Hence, the incorporation of less institutionalized or less electorally-oriented forms of engagement when studying political participation is crucial if we want to gain a complete understanding of political engagement (e.g., Dalton 2006; Inglehart 1997). Moreover, during communism, involvement in autonomous non-state activities was not possible since these were supplanted and subverted by forcing citizens to join and participate in mandatory, state-controlled organizations (Howard 2002; Kluegel and Mason 1999). Hence, the new regimes that arose after the collapse of communism have challenged people to re-learn political behaviour (Mishler and Richard 2002). Especially in the development of less institutionalized forms of participation such as signing petitions, contacting the media, and critical consumption the Eastern Europe still lags behind (e.g., Bolzendahl and Coffé forthcoming; Yates 2011).

3.2   Gender Gaps in Political Participation

Table 1 presents mean levels of political participation among male and female in Western and Eastern European.

Regarding participation in elections, the results reveal a small gender gap among Western European countries, with women being slightly less likely to vote in elections. By contrast, among Eastern European countries, women are substantially *more* likely to participate in elections compared to men.[2] Yet, on average Eastern European women (and men) have lower levels of electoral participation. This is in line with rates of electoral turnout which are generally lower in Eastern Europe than the equivalent rates in Western Europe.

Turning to engagement in political activism, mean levels reveal that the gender difference in such engagement is substantial in Eastern Europe, with women generally being less likely to engage in such activities. Among Western European

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[2] Logistic multilevel (taking the two-level structure of the data – individuals and countries – into account) analyses including an interaction term between gender and region demonstrated that the effect of female does differ significantly between Western and Eastern Europe.

Table 1 Mean levels of political participation among men and women in Western and Eastern Europe (Standard Deviations in Parentheses)

	Range	Western Europe				Eastern Europe			
		Men	Women	Sign. test[a]	N	Men	Women	Sign. test[a]	N
Voted last elections	0/1	0.826 (0.379)	0.808 (0.394)	*	24,856	0.686 (0.464)	0.712 (0.453)	**	23,321
Political activism	0–1	0.146 (0.191)	0.139 (0.190)	NS	27,559	0.065 (0.141)	0.051 (0.122)	***	24,750
Contacted politician	0/1	0.173 (0.378)	0.131 (0.338)	***	27,538	0.109 (0.311)	0.082 (0.274)	***	24,746
Worked in political party	0/1	0.046 (0.208)	0.031 (0.173)	***	27,551	0.038 (0.192)	0.024 (0.152)	***	24,742
Worked in another organization	0/1	0.201 (0.401)	0.147 (0.354)	***	27,551	0.063 (0.242)	0.044 (0.204)	***	24,692
Wom campaign badge	0/1	0.077 (0.267)	0.098 (0.297)	***	27,551	0.041 (0.198)	0.029 (0.167)	***	24,718
Signed petition	0/1	0.258 (0.437)	0.285 (0.451)	***	27,488	0.101 (0.301)	0.095 (0.293)	NS	24,700
Took part in demonstration	0/1	0.077 (0.266)	0.075 (0.263)	NS	27,547	0.047 (0.211)	0.035 (0.183)	***	24,716
Boycotted products	0/1	0.192 (0.394)	0.204 (0.403)	***	27,534	0.061 (0.239)	0.052 (0.223)	*	24,632

Source: European Social Survey 2008

[a]Significance tests conducted through linear multilevel regressions (for the scale of political activism) and logistic multilevel regressions (for all other measures, given their dichotomous character). *NS* not significant; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

countries however, there is no significant gender gap.[3] As with electoral participation and in line with previous research (e.g., Sissenich 2010) Western European men and women are found to be more likely to engage in political activism compared to their Eastern European counterparts. Looking at the different types of political activism separately, differences in the level and direction of the gender gap occur. In both Eastern and Western European countries, women are substantially less likely to contact a politician and work in a political party or another type of organization. Compared to Eastern European men, Eastern European women are also less likely to wear a campaign badge, take part in a lawful public demonstration and boycott products. By contrast, Western European women are more likely to wear or display a campaign badge and to boycott products than their male counterparts. No substantial gender gap in taking part in lawful public demonstrations can be found among Western European societies. In Western Europe, women are more likely to sign a petition than men whereas no gender gap occurs in Eastern Europe.

3.3   Generational Differences in Gender Gaps in Political Participation

Having described general levels of electoral participation and engagement in political activism in Western and Eastern Europe, we now move onto considering possible generational differences in the gender gap. Figures 1 and 2 present mean levels of participation in respectively elections and political activism of Western and Eastern European men and women across different generations.

Starting we Fig. 1 representing the results for electoral participation, we see that Western European citizens (both men and women) are more likely to participate in elections compared to Eastern European citizens across all generations. Furthermore, the general pattern across cohorts is similar in both European regions, with older generations being more likely to participate in elections than younger generations. Yet, the results reveal some differences in the gender pattern in electoral participation between Western and Eastern Europe.[4] With the exception of the oldest generation, Eastern European women across all generations are more likely to participate in elections compared to their male counterparts. This pattern is particularly strong among the middle cohorts (1951–1960 and 1961–1970). By contrast, in Western Europe, we only find such *reversed* gender gap among the

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[3] Linear multilevel analyses including an interaction term between gender and region revealed that the effect of female is significantly different in both regions.

[4] Logistic multilevel analyses including an interaction term between gender and region showed a significant ($p < 0.05$) regional difference in the effect of female among the following three cohorts: 1941–1950, 1951–1960 and 1961–1970.

Fig. 1 Mean levels of electoral participation among men and women across different generations in Western and Eastern Europe (European Social Survey 2008)

cohort born in the sixties. Among the two youngest cohort, no statistically significant[5] gender gaps can be found in both Western and Eastern Europe.

Turning to Fig. 2, we find again Western European citizens being more likely to engage in political activities compared to Eastern European citizens across all generations. In both regions, though to a lesser extent in Eastern Europe, we find the middle cohorts being more likely to participate compared to both the older and younger generations. On average and in line with my expectation, the gender gap in participation tends to be slightly larger within Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe.[6] Yet, the gap is generally smaller among younger cohorts both in Western and Eastern Europe (with the exception of the 1971–1980 cohort of Eastern

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[5] Significant at the conventional level of significance (p < 0.05), based on logistic multilevel analyses.

[6] Linear multilevel analyses including an interaction term between gender and region demonstrated a significant (p < 0.05) regional difference in the effect of female among the following three cohorts: 1941–1950, 1971–1980, 1981 and later.

Fig. 2 Mean levels of political activism among men and women across different generations in Western and Eastern Europe (European Social Survey 2008)

Europeans). Among the youngest cohort of Western European citizens, the gap even revolves with women being slightly significantly[7] *more* likely to engage in different political activities compared to men.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to provide a general comparative and descriptive overview of the gender gap in electoral participation and political activism between Western and Eastern Europe. As anticipated based on the theory of modernization and the re-traditionalization that occurred in Eastern Europe after the velvet revolution, the results revealed a larger gender gap in Eastern Europe in political activism. Whereas we could not find a significant gender gap in a general measure of political activism among Western European countries, Eastern European women are substantially less likely to engage in political activism compared to men. By contrast, Eastern European women are substantially more likely to engage in electoral politics compared to their male counterpart. In other words, in the most traditional type of political participation which was a formal political and civic duty during communism, Eastern European women are more engaged compared to men. Yet, Eastern Europeans participate to a lower

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[7] Significant at the conventional level of significance (p < 0.05), based on linear multilevel analysis.

extent than Western European women for their part, are slightly less likely to go to the polls compared to Western European men.

Comparing different generations, this study also highlighted some important observations. On a positive note: the gender gap in both electoral and political activism and within both regions is generally smaller among the younger generations. Having grown up in a different political, cultural and social context, the differences between males and females seem on average to decrease among young people compared to older generations. Less positive are the overall lower levels of participation, and in particular electoral participation among younger generations. Hence, although the gender gap in electoral participation is declining over generations (and even reverses among the middle age cohorts), there is a pattern of each generation of women participating to a lesser extent in electoral politics compared to the previous generation. This pattern occurs in both Western and Eastern Europe.

The regional patterns in the gender gap in electoral participation and political activism revealed in this study are not to neglect substantial variation between countries within both regions. Within the Eastern European region for example, cross-national differences may exist according to the extent of communist penetration countries experienced (Coffé and van der Lippe 2010; Schwartz and Bardi 1997) or between countries that have now joined the European Union and those that remain on the outside (Howard 2011), in particular since gender mainstreaming is part of the core ideology of the EU. Future research may have a closer look at possible cross-national differences within both regions. For now, I believe the descriptive analyses provided in this chapter show that even though differences within both regions may exist, there still seems to be a relevant effect of the communist experience as well as an influence of the lower levels of economic development and modernization in Eastern Europe on shaping women's and men's levels of political participation. Furthermore, while this study focused on both electoral participation and political activism, future research may further broaden the concept of political participation and include even more diverse measures of political participation. Heinen (1997, p. 587) has argued that "women seem to appreciate more positive initiatives taken by independent associations on questions of immediate interest in their eyes (employment, contraception, help to the most deprived), compared to an engagement in so-called politics with a big 'P'." Hence, it is worthwhile to further study engagement outside the traditional political arena.

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Trust and Openness: Prerequisites for Democratic Engagement?

Sofie Marien and Henrik Serup Christensen

1   Introduction

Traditionally, it has been contended that high levels of political trust are a prerequisite for an active and vigilant citizenry (Almond and Verba 1963). However, this proposition has been challenged with the advent of a range of new less formal modes of political participation that occur in the outskirts of the political sphere (Barnes et al. 1979; Norris 2002). The advent of these participatory activities has frequently been connected to feelings of political distrust. It is argued that rather than leading to political apathy, dissatisfied citizens will engage in alternative forms of activism to signal their discontent to the political decision-makers (Barnes et al. 1979; Hay 2007). It has even been contended that these feelings of distrust are positive for democracy, since the critical citizens help keep the decision-makers accountable for their actions (Norris 1999; Rosanvallon 2006).

Consequently, the link between political trust and political participation is no longer self-evident. The state of confusion is amplified by the noticeable variation in Europe in levels of discontent and the popularity of various political activities. It cannot be presumed that the same activities are always manifestations of discontent regardless of the context in which the activities take place. Nevertheless, the contextual aspect has frequently been disregarded when examining the links between political trust and various forms of political participation. This study aims to rectify this by examining how these linkages are affected by the central contextual factor made up by the institutional structures of representative democracy. The institutional openness of the political system has been argued to affect

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both political attitudes and levels of political engagement, but little is known of how the institutional openness and political trust interact to affect political participation.

We here examine these relationships using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2008 with a total of 49,979 respondents in 26 democracies. The results suggest that the institutional context mediates the effect of political trust on political participation, but the specific effect depends on the form of participation under consideration.

2   Political Trust, Democratic Participation and the Context of Institutional Openness

Trust is a relational characteristic that can be summarised as: A trusts B with respect to X. It is always confined to a particular context (X), however broad or limited X may be (Baier 1986). The trustee is granted discretionary power over a particular – valued – good and is trusted to use this power "competently and nonmaliciously" (Baier 1986, p. 240). Hence, trust signifies an expectation about the future behaviour of the other based on an evaluation of its trustworthiness. Therefore, political trust is not based on altruism, although some scholars have argued that a society would fare better if one would trust the other more than could be expected from the assessment of its trustworthiness (Mansbridge 1999; Uslaner 2002). Even so there is a general consensus in the literature, especially with regard to political trust, that trust should only be extended to the trustworthy. This evaluation of trustworthiness is based on the evaluation of the intentions as well as the capacities of the trustee. Most scholars focus on the intentions of the trustee and it is generally assumed that bad outcomes will have less effect on political trust if these are the result of good intentions (Tyler 2011, pp. 42–44). Nevertheless, trustworthiness is also inferred from the capacities of the trustee to deal adequately with the entrusted good. The evaluation of trustworthiness is an inference about something unobserved, as a result, uncertainty about the behaviour of the other is a key characteristic of trust relations (Gambetta 1988). In effect, trust is relevant in situations in which people can act in a number of ways which are associated with different costs and benefits for the other and it is uncertain how the other(s) will behave. As a result, betrayal and defection are possible outcomes of a trust relationship (Gambetta 1988; Smith 2010).

Political trust has traditionally been considered a cornerstone of the representative democracy and an essential part of the political culture necessary to ensure the long-term stability of democratic societies (Almond and Verba 1963; Easton 1965). In line with the classic work of David Easton (1965), it has been argued that political systems need the support of their members to produce outputs and to get these outputs accepted by most members of the political system. For this reason, it was feared that rising levels of dissatisfaction documented in several countries in the 1970s would erode the legitimacy of political regimes and ultimately present a threat to the survival of the Western democracies (Crozier et al. 1975; Pharr and Putnam 2000). However, other scholars have questioned this line of reasoning.

Hardin (1999, pp. 23–24) suggests we should generally not want trust in government, since most citizens are not in a position to be able to trust any of the actors except for by mistake. Trust may mean nothing more than being gullible and is thus not desirable for a democratic society, even if it may be advantageous for the democratic rulers. The widespread belief that "we would all be better off if we were all more trusting" is a misconception, according to Hardin (2006, p. 32). Trust entails the risk of defection; the power granted to the trustee can be abused, which can have dire consequences for the truster. Consequently, one should only trust the trustworthy to avoid exploitation and in case of uncertainty about someone's trustworthiness, it is better not to trust given that: "the downside of misplaced trust is disastrous, while the loss from distrust cannot be anywhere near as disastrous" (Hardin 2006, p. 160). In effect, trust situations are generally defined as those in which the benefits from trusting are smaller than the costs (Baier 1986). Especially political systems and elites can become very powerful and consequently prone to use this power maliciously in their own interest.

Therefore, citizens should be distrustful, monitor government actions and question its decisions, although as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001, p. 18) state "[M]ost people would happily seize the opportunity to spend their time doing something other than politics if only they were convinced that elected officials would not then be able to use their positions for their own self-interest." Although this argument has attracted less attention in contemporary literature, it is central to liberal thought and democratic practice (Rosanvallon 2006; Cleary and Stokes 2006). This line of reasoning underlies the writings of classic liberal theorists such as David Hume and John Locke who consider government as a mixed blessing: government is needed for example to guarantee property rights but should not become all too powerful. Given human frailty and ensuing abuses of power, political agents should be controlled as much as possible. In practice, within democracies distrust is indeed institutionalised in order to curtail the abuse of power. In the United States this liberal thought guided the drawing up of the constitution and scepticism towards government is still strongly embedded within the political culture of the country (Hardin 2006).

Taking this argument a step further, it can be argued that distrust invigorates a democratic society. From a democratic point of view, it can be desirable to have citizens who critically assess the political authorities and hold the decision-makers accountable (Inglehart 1997; Norris 1999; Rosanvallon 2006). Critical citizens are not hostile to democracy as such, but they scrutinize the formal decision-makers thereby exerting pressure on them and make sure they serve the common good (Rosanvallon 2006). Hence, critical citizens (Norris 1999) do not spell the demise of the established democracies, even if it may present challenges to the proper functioning of the political system. Rosanvallon (2006) has made out a case for political distrust as the modus operandi in political life. In his view, a well-functioning democracy consists of, on the one hand, electoral-representative institutions and, on the other hand, a body of critical citizens, organisations and media that ensure these institutions work as they were intended to by critically examining their actions. Rosanvallon (2006) has labelled the latter "Counter-Democracy". Institutional

constraints force politicians to behave trustworthy but also monitoring institutions need to be controlled, therefore, every democracy also needs counter-powers which are not institutionalised.

Rosanvallon believes (2006) that democracy works best if citizens are not only voters but also act as quality-controllers. He sees it as a democratic duty to scrutinise government and describes various ways in which ordinary citizens and organisations can hold politicians accountable. Citizens should closely monitor government and have the power to prevent certain policy or government actions. In this view, actions such as strikes and civil disobedience are seen as powerful tools to prevent or resist government. While these actions are seen as a threat within the traditional Eastonian framework, Rosanvallon suggests that these actions are part of a well-functioning democracy. Distrust might be a challenge for the political system and its agents who want to maintain stability but it is argued that it also offers an opportunity for the further development of democratic political systems (Gamson 1968; Norris 1999).

In sum, there are strong theoretical claims regarding the relationship between political trust and engagement in political life. Traditionally, it has been assumed that citizens who are more supportive of the political authorities are also more likely to get involved in political matters (Almond and Verba 1963; Grönlund and Setälä 2007). According to this view, the positive evaluations reflect a belief that the political system is responsive to citizen demands, and articulating political demands through this system is therefore a meaningful activity (Barnes et al. 1979, p. 409). This belief pertains to traditional or institutionalised forms of participation that occur in vicinity to the formal political system (Marien et al. 2010, p. 188). Prominent examples are contacting politicians, donating money and working for political parties, which are all institutionalised forms of participation that have traditionally occupied a central role in representative democracies (Verba et al. 1995).

However, recent decades have seen a tremendous development in activities considered politically relevant. Through this, the formal political activities have been supplemented by activities such as demonstrations and civil disobedience, but also more benign activities such as signing a petition (Barnes et al. 1979; Norris 2002). These non-institutionalised acts are more episodic, less intimately connected to the political system and often elite-challenging reactions to the status quo, but they have nonetheless become important expressions of the political preferences of citizens (Marien et al. 2010, p. 188; Stolle et al. 2005). It is frequently contended that the non-institutionalised political activities are expressions of political dissatisfaction. The distrusting citizens are likely to become involved in non-institutionalised participation rather than the institutionalised political activities associated with older generations (Barnes et al. 1979; Inglehart 1997; Torcal and Lago 2006, p. 309; Hay 2007).

Despite this seemingly neat distinction, the link between political trust and different kinds of political behaviour is still contested (Torcal and Lago 2006). A reason for this may well be that the context of the activities have been neglected (Norris et al. 2006, pp. 283–284). Political activities do not occur in a vacuum, the participatory practices are placed within a specific context of historical, social and

institutional practices. When it comes to the context of political behaviour, the institutional structures of the state occupy a central position. According to the so-called political opportunity structure approach (POS) it is indispensable to be aware of the context to explain when and how social movements succeed in mobilizing citizens for political action. The extent of institutional openness has been a central concern, since the institutional structures shape how easy it is for citizens to access their representatives through the channels made available by the system (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1992; Meyer 2004). The institutional openness of a political system or a specific institution depends on the degree to which it incorporates or excludes citizen demands for influence on decisions (Morales 2009, p. 168). Researchers have examined the institutional impact at the individual level for specific types of participation such as membership of political organisations (Morales 2009) and protest (Dalton et al. 2010). Institutional openness is generally seen as furthering system-supportive engagement, whereas institutional closedness is connected to elite-challenging acts of protest or non-institutionalised participation. In this sense, the effect of institutional openness is analogous to the view of the links between political trust and participation, since both promote harmonious democratic engagement that is supportive of the political system.

However, the institutional context and its openness do not only affect rates of participation directly. Several studies have found that institutional characteristics affect various individual characteristics such as political trust, political efficacy, and satisfaction with democracy (Freitag and Bühlmann 2009; Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Karp and Banducci 2007). Furthermore, the institutional context can mediate how strongly the political attitudes affect participation (Norris et al. 2006; Christensen 2011). For example, the electoral system has been found to affect how political efficacy affects the propensity to vote (Karp and Banducci 2007). This idea is in line with the notion that the political institutions are reflections of underlying democratic ideals (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000), which is likely to have consequences for the status of various political activities and the extent to which these express discontent. Somewhat simplistically, it is possible to identify four possible situations for the interaction between institutional openness at the system level and political trust at the individual level. These four are displayed in Table 1.

Cells I and IV are of particular interest, since they identify the polar opposite situations. The upper-left cell I refers to a situation where a citizen with high trust in the political system inhabits a political system with high institutional openness. In this situation, the institutional context provides incentives for participation within the system, and the trusting citizen is likely to respond by channelling political demands directly into the system. This situation corresponds to the ideal civic culture outlined by Almond and Verba (1963). In such a situation with both openness and trust, the theoretical expectation is a stronger effect from political trust on system-supportive institutionalised participation. Cell IV is the situation where a distrusting citizen is situated in a system with low institutional openness, and the political trust literature (Norris 1999; Inglehart 1997) predicts that citizens opt for non-institutionalised forms of involvement, whereas the likelihood for

Table 1 Institutional openness, political trust and forms of political participation

		Individual level: political trust	
		High	Low
Country level: Institutional openness	**High**	I	II
		System-supportive behaviour: institutionalised participation	Mixed participation
	Low	III	IV
		Mixed participation	Elite-challenging behaviour:non-institutionalised participation

participation in institutionalised activities is low, since both the institutional system and the level of political trust deter this option. Hence, this situation promotes a stronger effect of political distrust on non-institutionalised participation.

The upper right cell II and lower-left cell III involves situations where there are conflicting incentives. In cell II, a distrusting citizen is in a situation where the system invites participation inside the system, but the untrusting citizen is less likely to take advantage of the opportunities since the citizen will not believe that institutionalised action is efficacious in achieving the desired goals. For cell III, a citizen in high trust is situated in a political system that deters participation, but the trusting citizen survives nonetheless content with the situation, believing that the system works for the common good. In both of these situations, the most likely outcome is intermediate levels of participation in both institutionalised and non-institutionalised activities.

Hence, we may expect there to be important contextual differences in how political trust affects political participation. Nevertheless, few empirical studies have examined whether these predictions for how the institutional context shapes the relationship between political trust and political participation hold true. This is done in the empirical analysis.

3   Research Design

The theoretical review leads us to examine the following research questions concerning the interplay between institutional openness, political trust, and political participation in both institutionalised and non-institutionalised guises:

1. Political trust promotes institutionalised participation and deters non-institutionalised participation.
2. Institutional openness promotes institutionalised participation and deters non-institutionalised participation.
3. Institutional openness mediates the link between political trust and political participation.
    (a) Institutional openness strengthens the impact of political trust on institutionalised participation.
    (b) Institutional closedness strengthens the impact of political distrust on non-institutionalised participation.

The data for examining these research questions come from the fourth round of the European Social Survey from 2008 (European Social Survey Round 4 Data 2008). This data set makes it possible to examine the links between political trust, participation and institutional openness in a European context. To avoid conceptual travelling (Sartori 1970) when it comes to the central concepts, the study only includes countries that are considered democratic. The implications and inherent meaning of concepts such as political trust, participation, and institutional openness are likely to be completely different in a non-democratic setting. It is therefore advisable to concentrate the study to a similar democratic context. The study thus includes 26 countries[1] and a total of 49,979 respondents. We exclude a proportion of the respondents since they have missing values for some of the values, leaving us with 41,177 respondents for the analyses of institutionalised participation and 44,458 respondents for analysing participation in non-institutionalised activities.

3.1 Variables

There are three central sets of variables. Political participation constitutes the dependent variable, political trust the central explanatory variable at the individual level, and the political institutional context at the country level. In addition to these, a number of individual characteristics are controlled for to ascertain that any observed effects can be attributed to the mechanisms under scrutiny. More specific information on coding and descriptive statistics for all variables is available in the appendix.

3.1.1 Political Participation

Different conceptualisations have been proposed to capture the developments in political participation (Barnes et al. 1979; Teorell et al. 2007). In this study, we use the basic distinction between institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of participation (Marien et al. 2010). The former includes activities that occur in close vicinity of the political system whereas participants in the latter circumvent the formal political sphere, opting instead for alternative ways to influence the political decisions (Marien et al. 2010, p. 188).

These two participatory modes are operationalized by two indexes that measure whether participants have performed various activities. We exclude a number of activities, where the phrasing makes it difficult to distinguish between institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation. For institutionalised participation, the activities included are contacting a politician or official, being member of a political party, working in a political party or action group and voting in the most recent national election. These activities are all firmly within the formal political sphere and refer to exchanges with the elected representatives and/or officials.

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[1] Due to a lack of appropriate weighs in the data, Lithuania has been excluded from the analyses.

For the non-institutionalised activities, we include signing a petition, taking part in lawful demonstrations and boycotting certain products out of political concerns. These activities are clearly political but they are less intimately connected to the formal political sphere and are often interpreted as manifestations that question the legitimacy of the authorities.

Since the phrasing of the questions makes it difficult to probe the extent of involvement in a satisfactory manner, given that the respondents only indicate whether they have performed the activity in question but not how often, the two indexes are coded to be dichotomous so they indicate whether the respondent is active or not in either form of political participation.

3.1.2   Political Trust

The focus of this study is on trust in political institutions. Political institutions play an important role in shaping a democratic society, and we can assume that trust in these institutions is strongly related to a more comprehensive evaluation of the political system (Marien 2011). Political trust was operationalised by means of a measurement scale routinely used in research on political trust (Marien 2011; Newton 2007). Respondents were asked to indicate their level of trust in a number of central political institutions and actors. These are the country's parliament, the legal system, the police, politicians and political parties. All five questions were scored on a 0–10 scale with 10 indicating the highest level of political trust and the answers were combined into an index for political trust.

3.1.3   Institutional Openness

Institutional openness is measured with the help of two indicators; the effective electoral threshold and fiscal decentralisation. The effective threshold gauges how easy it is for political parties to win representation in parliament (Powell 2000). As the number of effective parties competing in elections increases, the number of access points available to citizens and the fragmentation of the political elites both increases. Accordingly, low effective electoral thresholds are associated with institutional openness whereas high effective thresholds denote institutional closedness. Fiscal decentralisation is a measure for the extent of vertical decentralisation of the political system and denotes the proportion of local and regional spending in relation to the total spending (Morales 2009, p. 170). Greater regional autonomy in the form of a greater share of costs incurred at the regional and/or local levels implies institutional openness, since this disperses decision-making powers between several layers of government. These or similar measures have been used in previous studies examining the institutional effect on political behaviour (Powell 2000; Christensen 2011; Morales 2009). The factors capture the vertical and horizontal degree of institutional openness outlined by Lijphart (1999). We use the two separately and as a combined measure of institutional openness. All institutional factors have been coded to vary between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates

the greatest extent of institutional openness.[2] The main problem with the measure concerns the lack of variation when it comes to the effective threshold. Most countries in Europe adhere to some form of proportional system meaning that the effective electoral thresholds are low in most countries. Nevertheless, this deficiency is at least to some extent counteracted by combining the two measures. Although most countries are clustered around the mean value of the combined scale, the range of variation is between 0.10 and 0.88. Hence, although the extremes are not quite met, the amount of variation in the degree of openness should be sufficient for the current purpose.

3.1.4 Control Variables

Since the countries included are restricted to democratic countries in Europe and Israel, the study has a most similar systems design. Hence, it is possible to disregard a number of potential rival explanations at the macro-level. However, given the notable differences in how long the countries have been democratic, we control for this by including a dummy that measures whether the country in question is an established democracy or a newer democracy. In this case, it means having been a democracy before 1988, since this translates into 20 years of uninterrupted democratic experience at the time of gathering the data, which is a commonly used threshold for being an established democracy.

We also include a number of control variables at the individual level. The first group of control variables include socio-demographic characteristics that have been known to affect the propensity to be politically active. The items included are age, gender and education, which constitute the most important characteristics in this regard. In addition to this, we include a number of variables that probe attitudes to the political system and the surrounding society. This includes political interest, internal political efficacy, and generalised trust, all of which have been argued to be important attitudes that explain the political involvement of citizens (Verba et al. 1995; Norris 2002). In addition to socio-demographic characteristics and political attitudes, we control for media use. This has been considered an important aspect of the participatory landscape, which affects the propensity to be political active (Powell 2000).

3.2 Methods of Analysis

The research question involves explanatory factors at different levels of analysis and cross-level interactions and the dependent variable is dichotomous, therefore, the appropriate method of analysis is logistic multilevel analysis. This allows us to predict the probability of institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation given certain values of political trust, institutional openness and other independent

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[2] The values for all countries are presented in the appendix.

variables. The coefficients of the variables indicate an increase or decrease in the logit of the dependent variable (participate or not), when the independent variable increases one unit. The variables have been centred to enhance the stability of the models. This means that the coefficient of a variable can be interpreted as the effect of a one-step deviation from the grand mean.

4   Analysis

The analyses examine the link between individual level factors and the propensity to be active in institutionalised and non-institutionalised activities. The institutionalised activities are activities at the core of the formal representative system and participation in these has traditionally been considered system-supportive. The predictions for this form of participation is that political trust and institutional openness should have positive impacts on the propensity to be active in institutionalised activities, and institutional openness is expected to reinforce the strength of the association between political trust and institutionalised participation. The non-institutionalised activities are peripheral to the formal political system and are often interpreted as elite-challenging activities that express dissatisfaction with the functioning of the system. Hence, the expectation is a negative association between institutional openness, political trust, and non-institutionalised participation. Furthermore, we expect that institutional closedness reinforces the negative link between political trust and participation in non-institutionalised activities.

Before examining the research questions, we first examine the cross-national differences in levels of participation and political trust. Table 2 displays the results.

The reported figures indicate the substantial variation that exists in participation and political trust among the countries included. For the institutionalised activities, voting is by far the most popular activity in all countries. Even if the self-reported figures reported here exaggerate the actual extent of voter turnout, the participation rate far exceeds that of the other activities. The reported turnout is highest in Denmark with 94.2 % reported they voted, whereas the lowest reported turnout is found in the Czech Republic where only 57.97 % indicated they voted in the last national elections. For party membership and party work, the shares of active citizens are considerably lower in all countries; the lowest for both activities are found in Hungary, where less than 1 % indicated they were active in either activity, whereas citizens are most active in party activities in Cyprus, where 13.64 are members and 8.76 did party work within the last 12 months. Contacting is slightly more popular, since the values range from about 5 % in Bulgaria to almost 23 % in Ireland.

For the non-institutionalised activities, the less demanding activities are generally more popular. Both signing a petition and boycotting products have the highest rates of participation in Sweden, where about 47 % and 37 % performed the two activities respectively. The lowest rates for these are also in the same country, since Romania with about 3 % signing petitions and 2.77 % boycotting has the lowest attendance. Demonstrations are the least popular in Slovenia, where only 1.6 % took part, whereas Spain had the highest attendance in public demonstrations with almost 16 %.

Table 2 Levels of participation and political trust, 26 European democracies, ESS 2008

	Institutionalised participation					Non-institutionalised participation				Political trust
	VOTE	PM	PW	CONT	TOT	PET	BOYC	PDEM	TOT	MEAN
Belgium	92.08	4.78	4.32	15.30	92.97	27.57	11.17	7.39	33.31	23.49
Bulgaria	72.75	6.33	3.57	5.01	73.51	6.49	3.46	4.06	9.83	10.47
Croatia	78.94	11.59	5.13	6.52	80.26	23.61	17.14	7.97	30.02	14.80
Cyprus	93.46	13.64	8.76	20.18	93.71	6.27	6.12	2.27	11.17	26.66
Czech republic	57.97	3.50	2.32	15.52	62.35	15.18	7.38	4.51	19.00	17.89
Denmark	94.22	8.96	4.53	18.72	94.67	33.92	21.54	9.32	47.40	32.75
Estonia	64.69	5.44	2.96	11.13	68.45	7.99	5.57	2.05	12.31	21.29
Finland	83.23	6.75	4.10	21.06	85.55	32.28	30.25	2.46	47.67	30.92
France	77.60	2.20	3.79	15.44	80.16	33.57	27.74	15.29	48.43	22.29
Germany	83.69	3.39	3.81	16.83	84.79	30.82	31.06	8.13	47.74	24.28
Greece	87.87	7.56	4.17	10.61	88.53	4.34	14.37	6.05	18.27	18.13
Hungary	80.21	0.52	0.82	8.62	80.71	6.79	5.91	1.80	11.15	14.46
Ireland	79.39	4.64	4.72	22.98	82.63	24.07	13.57	9.76	33.05	21.81
Israel	74.84	4.87	4.70	7.62	76.77	10.70	5.85	6.94	14.98	19.86
Latvia	62.87	1.02	1.07	11.83	65.81	5.52	5.21	6.53	13.40	13.95
Netherlands	86.05	5.14	3.44	14.06	87.22	23.47	9.36	3.32	28.84	28.31
Norway	85.66	7.24	6.13	21.50	88.30	37.75	22.48	7.17	47.64	29.02
Poland	72.79	1.05	2.60	7.20	73.75	7.47	4.50	1.57	10.51	16.53
Portugal	73.69	2.29	1.30	6.66	74.53	4.91	3.17	3.67	8.29	17.45
Romania	67.76	6.15	5.87	11.28	70.46	3.08	2.77	4.26	7.87	18.07
Slovakia	77.76	1.87	1.89	7.12	78.48	22.12	6.87	1.65	25.60	20.13
Slovenia	72.63	4.67	3.28	11.41	74.92	8.69	5.08	1.56	12.62	20.56
Spain	81.85	1.26	2.91	10.04	83.07	17.01	7.89	15.95	26.82	22.02
Sweden	91.13	6.67	4.43	14.78	91.78	47.19	37.26	6.45	61.04	27.86
Switzerland	64.50	6.08	4.93	12.04	67.46	37.66	24.95	7.74	47.86	28.61
United Kingdom	70.29	2.41	2.19	16.93	73.28	38.23	24.18	3.80	46.52	22.90
General	**77.63**	**4.73**	**3.66**	**12.96**	**79.45**	**20.01**	**14.01**	**6.10**	**28.18**	**21.65**

Note: Entries are percentages having performed the activity in question. Data weighted with design weight. Institutionalised participation: *VOTE* voted last national election, *PM* party member, *PW* work political party or action group, *CONT* contacted politicians or officials, *TOT* total institutionalised, non-institutionalised participation: *PET* sign petition, *BOYC* boycotted products out of ethical/political concerns, *PDEM* public demonstration, *TOT* total non-institutionalised, *Political trust*: Mean score on index measuring level of trust

The variation in political trust is also noticeable. The mean score for the trust index is 10.47 in the lowest trust society i.e. Bulgaria. Translated into the 0–10 scale on which all questions were scored originally, this gives a score of 2.09. The highest level of trust is found in Denmark, where the index score is 32.75, translating into a 6.55 on the 0–10 scale. The clearest result from Table 2 is that rates of participation are generally lower in the new democracies in Eastern Europe, regardless of

whether we consider institutionalised or non-institutionalised activities. At the same time, the levels of political trust are also noticeably lower in these countries.

We first examine the impact of the individual level factors in Table 3. Two regression models are displayed for each form of participation, an empty model without explanatory factors that decompose the variance into individual level and group level to explore whether the multilevel approach is appropriate. Following this, model 1 includes all variables at the individual level to examine the impact of political trust after controlling for other factors.

For the empty model 0, the intra class correlation (ICC) for institutionalised participation indicates that about 11 % of the total variation is at the country level. For non-institutionalised participation the corresponding result is also that there is a substantial amount of variation at the country level, since about 18 % of the total variation resides at this level according to the ICC. These are substantial shares that warrant examining the questions through multilevel analysis.

Model 1 includes the variables at the individual level. The main interest here lies in the impact of political trust on participation. As expected, the result for institutionalised participation suggests that there is a positive link between political trust and engagement in institutionalised activities, which suggests that people with higher levels of trust in the political institutions are more likely to get involved in these activities. The coefficient of 0.024 indicates that holding all other values constant, the odds of being active in institutionalised activities increases with about 2.4 %[3] as political trust increases one unit. Considering the variation in political trust, this is a substantial difference between the lowest and highest levels of political trust. This finding is in line with the suggestion that these activities add legitimacy to the formal political system (Almond and Verba 1963).

For non-institutionalised activities, the effect of political trust on the propensity to be active is also significant, and as expected the sign here is negative, indicating that the propensity to be active in non-institutionalised activities is related to feelings of political distrust. The coefficient of −0.014 indicates that when holding all other variables constant, a decrease of one unit on the political trust scale increases the odds of being active in non-institutionalised participation with 1.4 %, which again indicates a substantial difference in activity levels between those with high and those with low levels of political trust. This indicates that involvement is generally driven by dissatisfaction with the political institutions, which is in accordance with the expectations (Inglehart 1997; Norris 1999).

Although less important for the present purposes, it can be noted that most of the remaining findings are in line with the expectations. An exception is the result for gender and institutionalised participation, where the link is negative after controlling for other factors, suggesting women are overrepresented. This is surprising since males are usually seen as being dominant in the formal political sphere, whereas the trend has to some extent been reversed for non-institutionalised

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[3] We obtain the odds by exponentiating the coefficient i.e. Exp (0.024) = 1.024.

Table 3 Political trust and participation, logistic multilevel analysis

	Institutionalised participation		Non-institutionalised participation	
	Model 0	*Model I*	*Model 0*	*Model 1*
Individual level variables				
Political trust		0.024***		−0.014***
		(0.002)		(0.001)
Gender (1 = male)		−0.109***		−0.251***
		(0.028)		(0.024)
Age		0.026***		−0.013***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Educational level (ref. cat: lowest)				
Lower secondary		0.018		0.289***
		(0.054)		(0.053)
Higher secondary		0.266***		0.607***
		(0.054)		(0.050)
Tertiary education		0.641***		0.973***
		(0.058)		(0.051)
Political interest (ref cat.: "not at all")				
Hardly interested		0.617***		0.569***
		(0.037)		(0.043)
Quite interested		1.187***		1.064***
		(0.042)		(0.044)
Very interested		1.598***		1.426***
		(0.071)		(0.055)
Watching TV		−0.033***		−0.064***
		(0.007)		(0.006)
Reading newspaper		0.080***		0.027**
		(0.012)		(0.010)
Internal efficacy		0.132***		0.128***
		(0.017)		(0.015)
Generalised trust		0.033***		0.050***
		(0.008)		(0.007)
Country level variables				
Constant	1.546***	0.622***	−1.080***	−2.405***
	(0.124)	(0.131)	(0.171)	(0.179)
Between country error variance	0.391 ***	0.375 ***	0.753***	0.752***
	(0.111)	(0.106)	(0.210)	(0.210)
Estimated intra-class correlation (in %)	10.63	10.22	18.62	18.61
Log likelihood	−19,330.23	−17,309.48	−24,143.08	−22,407.47
N	41,177	41,177	44,458	44,458

Source: ESS (2008–2009), 26 countries
Note: Entries are the results of a logistic multilevel regression. Standard errors in parentheses
Significance: $^*p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

activities (Marien et al. 2010). This result is caused by the control of a number of related factors. When examining percentage differences between men and women, men are still in majority. However, when controlling for factors that affect participation and are systematically different between the sexes – such as internal political efficacy and political interest – this difference is reversed. This finding involves a classic dilemma when using multiple regression techniques for examining gender differences (Burns et al. 2001, pp. 46–48). One interpretation of this is that the traditional gender gap in politics is decreasing. However, it may also be argued that it is inappropriate to control for the co-varying factors, since the differences form part of the gender gap. To disentangle these relationships go beyond our current aspirations.

The rest of the socio-demographic variables have the expected relationships with participation. Being older promotes participation in institutionalised activities and younger citizens are more likely to engage in non-institutionalised activities, whereas education promotes participation regardless of the form it takes (Norris 2002; Marien et al. 2010). The results for the political and social attitudes are also in line with expectation, since higher levels of political interest, internal efficacy and generalised trust all promote participation in both institutionalised and non-institutionalised activities. For the media attention variables, watching TV has a weak negative effect on the propensity to be active in both participatory modes, whereas reading newspapers has a positive effect, suggesting the important differences between different media when it comes to political participation (Powell 2000, pp. 216–246).

The results for the individual level variables thus confirm our expectations, since political trust is positively associated with institutionalised participation, whereas the linkage is reversed for non-institutionalised participation. This shows the importance of considering different forms of political participation when examining the link between political trust and participation.

The following models in Table 4 examine the link between institutional openness and participation in institutionalised activities. We present three models that analyse the effects of the institutional variables. For both kinds of participation, model 2 includes the effective threshold, model 3 fiscal decentralisation, and model 4 includes the combined measure based on both indicators. Since the last measure is based on the previous two, we estimate the effects separately. We also include whether the countries are old or new democracies as a control variable.

The results here suggest that the institutional linkages – regardless of what institutional aspect we consider – do not provide significant incentives for the propensity to be active in institutionalised activities. This result is most surprising for the effective electoral threshold, since it could a priori be expected that this aspect would affect such institutionalised activities as voting and party membership quite strongly (Norris 2002). Nevertheless, the institutional incentives argued to influence political mobilisation at the meso-level (Morales 2009) do not influence the individual choice to participate. This goes against our expectation, since the added possibilities of channelling demands into the formal political system that

Table 4 Institutional openness and participation, logistic multilevel analysis

	Institutionalised participation			Non-institutionalised participation		
	Model 2	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Individual level variables						
Political trust	0.024***	0.024***	0.024***	−0.014***	−0.014***	−0.014***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gender	−0.109***	−0.109***	−0.109***	−0.251***	−0.251***	−0.251***
(1 = male)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age	0.026***	0.026***	0.026***	−0.013***	−0.013***	−0.013***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Educational level (ref. cat: lowest)						
Lower secondary	0.020	0.022	0.020	0.292***	0.290***	0.291***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Higher secondary	0.267***	0.270***	0.269***	0.610***	0.609***	0.609***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Tertiary education	0.642***	0.643***	0.643***	0.975***	0.974***	0.974***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Political interest (ref cat.: 'not at all')						
Hardly interested	0.617***	0.618***	0.617***	0.570***	0.569***	0.570***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Quite interested	1.187***	1.187***	1.187***	1.064***	1.063***	1.064***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Very interested	1.597***	1.598***	1.597***	1.426***	1.425***	1.426***
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Watching TV	−0.032***	−0.033***	−0.032***	−0.064***	−0.064***	−0.064***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Reading newspaper	0.080***	0.080***	0.080***	0.027**	0.027**	0.027**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Internal efficacy	0.132***	0.132***	0.132***	0.128***	0.128***	0.128***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Generalised trust	0.032***	0.033***	0.032***	0.050***	0.049***	0.049***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Country level variables						
Established democracy (1 = Yes)	0.513*	0.544*	0.467*	1.036***	0.925***	1.087***
	(0.229)	(0.225)	(0.231)	(0.275)	(0.239)	(0.273)
Effective electoral threshold	0.537			−0.660		
	(0.453)			(0.543)		
Fiscal decentralisation		−0.760			1.610***	
		(0.461)			(0.486)	
Combined measure			−0.118			0.733
			(0.608)			(0.714)
Constant	0.302	0.278	0.333	−3.040***	−2.967***	−3.080***
	(0.187)	(0.184)	(0.189)	(0.222)	(0.195)	(0.222)
Between country error variance	0.307***	0.292***	0.323***	0.444***	0.329***	0.452***
	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.092)	(0.125)	(0.092)	(0.127)

(continued)

Table 4 (continued)

	Institutionalised participation			Non-institutionalised participation		
	Model 2	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Estimated intra-class correlation (in %)	8.52	8.16	8.94	11.90	9.09	12.07
Log likelihood	−17,306.91	−17,306.30	−17,307.57	−22,400.70	−22,396.82	−22,400.90
N	41,177	41,177	41,177	44,458	44,458	44,458

Source: ESS (2008–2009), 26 countries.
Note: Entries are the results of a logistic multilevel regression. Standard errors in parentheses
Significance: $^*p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

comes with institutional openness were expected to provide an incentive for participation in the institutionalised activities closer to the formal political system.

For non-institutionalised participation, the findings are also somewhat contrary to what POS would lead us to expect. The only significant effect is found for fiscal decentralisation, but contrary to expectations, the impact is positive. According to POS, mobilisation in elite-challenging activities ought to flourish when institutional closedness makes it harder to channel demands into the formal political system (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1992; Meyer 2004). However, contrary to this assertion, non-institutionalised participation is furthered by a greater degree of decentralisation of the political system making it easier to channel demands into the system by decreasing the distance of decision-making to citizens. The odds to participate in non-institutionalised forms of participation are five times higher in open systems than in closed systems.[4] It is not unheard of to find that the impact of the institutional context is limited at the individual level, and previous studies have found that institutional openness may advance participation in activities removed from the formal political sphere (Christensen 2011). Nonetheless, the lacking direct effects from the institutional context and the direction when found still stand in stark contrast to the expectations.

The variable controlling for whether the country in question is an established democracy or not tells us that there is a positive effect of being an established democracy on the propensity to be active in both institutionalised and non-institutionalised activities, although the effect is stronger for non-institutionalised activities.

These results do not support the relevance of the institutional context for political participation, since the direct effects are negligible or contradictory to the expectations. However, it might be that the institutional context does not affect all people in the same way. As discussed earlier, the institutional context might have a mediating effect. This brings us to the third research question and how

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[4] $\text{Exp}(1.610) = 5.003$

institutional openness affects the link between political trust and participation. To examine how the institutional context affects the strength between political trust and participation, in Table 5 we include cross level interaction effects between political trust and the three indicators of institutional openness. Model 5 examines the results for the effective threshold, model 6 fiscal decentralisation, and model 7 the combined measure. For reasons of space, we only present the results for the country level variables.

We see that as expected, there is a mediating effect of the institutional context on the link between political trust and participation. For institutionalised participation, there are significantly positive interaction terms between political trust and the effective electoral threshold and the combined measure of institutional openness. That the effect is positive means institutional openness reinforces the positive effect of political trust on institutionalised participation, so trust affects the propensity to be active much stronger when the political system makes it easier for citizens to channel their demands into the formal political decision-making. In other words, trust and openness combines to support harmonious democratic engagement, where satisfied citizens to a greater extent use the officially sanctioned activities to influence political decisions. This effect resembles the findings of Miller and Listhaug (1990), who find political systems that are open to new political parties to be able to diffuse negative trends in political trust and turn it into supportive behaviour.

For non-institutionalised participation, there is also a significant effect for the interaction between political trust and the electoral threshold, whereas the other two interaction effects are non-significant. The significant effect is positive; meaning the negative impact of political trust on non-institutionalised participation decreases as the effective threshold diminishes. This indicates that as the effective electoral threshold becomes lower, thereby increasing institutional openness, the propensity to be active in non-institutionalised is less strongly affected by the level of political trust.

To further elucidate the importance of the mediating effect of the institutional context on the link between political trust and participation, we visualise the effects in Fig. 1. The lines indicate the effect of political trust when the institutional context is at its minimum and maximum; i.e. in totally closed and open institutional contexts, when the effects of all other variables are held constant.

As can be seen, the slopes for political trust differ remarkably under these different circumstances. For institutionalised participation, the effect of political trust is stronger under circumstances of institutional openness, whereas the effect under conditions of institutional closedness is much less pronounced. This means that the propensity to be active in institutionalised activities is to a much greater extent driven by a high level of political trust when the formal system makes these activities an effective way to reach the formal decision-makers. Being active in identical activities is not to the same extent driven by trust when the institutional context makes it difficult for citizens to channel their demands into the political decision-making. This shows that institutional openness and political trust interact

Table 5 Institutional mediating effect on link between political trust and participation

	Institutionalised participation			Non-institutionalised participation		
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Country level variables						
Established democracy (1 = yes)	0.461*	0.526*	0.423	0.869**	0.732**	0.840**
	(0.228)	(0.227)	(0.234)	(0.269)	(0.227)	(0.258)
Effective electoral threshold (EET)	0.574			−0.700		
	(0.452)			(0.556)		
Interaction political trust* EET	0.027*			0.017*		
	(0.012)			(0.008)		
Fiscal decentralisation (FD)		−0.811			1.762***	
		(0.460)			(0.492)	
Interaction political trust* FD		0.017			−0.010	
		(0.014)			(0.009)	
Combined measure of institutional openness			−0.125			0.808
			(0.608)			(0.734)
Interaction political trust* combined measure			0.038*			0.007
			(0.016)			(0.011)
Constant	0.317	0.271	0.341	−2.938***	−2.841***	−2.924***
	(0.186)	(0.184)	(0.190)	(0.223)	(0.192)	(0.218)
Between country error variance	0.304***	0.289***	0.323***	0.466***	0.338***	0.476***
	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.092)	(0.133)	(0.097)	(0.137)
Political trust slope variance	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Covariance	−0.001	0.001	−0.001	−0.003	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Log likelihood	−17,280.00	−17,281.02	−17,280.70	−22,392.21	−22,388.93	−22,392.87
N	41,177	41,177	41,177	44,458	44,458	44,458

Source: ESS (2008–2009), 26 countries

Note: Entries are the results of a logistic multilevel regression. Standard errors in parentheses Significance: *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$
The models include the individual level variables, but since the substantive results are identical to the results reported previously, the coefficients for these are not reported here

Fig. 1 The *dotted line* indicates an open system; the *full line* indicates a closed system. The *lines* for institutionalised participation indicate the effect of political trust on institutionalised political participation when the combined measure of institutional openness is at the lowest (closed) and highest (open) value and holding all other significant variables constant (continuous variables at their mean values). The lines for non-institutionalised participation indicate the effect of political trust on institutionalised political participation when the effective electoral threshold is at the lowest (closed) and highest (open) value and holding all other significant variables constant (continuous variables at their mean values)

to ensure a greater extent of democratic legitimacy by ensuring greater and more benign participation in institutionalised activities.

The effect of political distrust on non-institutionalised participation, on the other hand, is weaker in an open context than in a closed context. Distrust is more likely to generate non-institutionalised participation when the institutional context is closed. The relationship between distrust and non-institutionalised participation is weaker when the institutional context makes it easier to transfer demands into the political decision-making. In other words, when the political system makes it difficult for citizens to channel demands into the political decision-making, the non-institutionalised activities are to a larger extent driven by distrust. Conversely, when the political system invites citizen input, the non-institutionalised activities are not to the same extent expressions of political distrust.

Conclusion

The link between political trust and political participation has been contested in the literature. This is to some extent due to the important differences in the manifestations that participation can take. Since this is no longer confined to formal activities sanctioned by the state, there is a need to consider the important differences that exist between institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of participation. Another factor adding to the confusion has been the lack of attention paid to the importance of contextual factors in shaping the links. For this reason, we have examined the links between political trust, participation and the institutional context in 26 democratic countries in Europe and Israel.

The results suggested that political trust as expected was positively related to institutionalised participation, whereas there was a negative link to non-institutionalised participation. This finding supports the traditional view that institutionalised participation is an expression of satisfaction with the functioning of the political system, whereas non-institutionalised participation is driven by discontent. Contrary to these supportive findings, the institutional context in the form of institutional openness did not provide the expected incentives for participation. Although a significant link was found for the effect of decentralisation on non-institutionalised participation, this ran counter to the expectation, since there was a positive effect from institutional openness on the propensity to be active in these elite-challenging activities.

This does not, however, imply that the institutional context was without relevance, since the results also showed that the institutional context mediates the effect of the relationship between political trust and participation in both institutionalised and non-institutionalised activities. Institutional openness strengthens the impact of political trust on institutionalised participation. Hence, institutional openness helps create a virtues cycle where trust drives participation in the activities closer to the core of the formal representative democracy. Furthermore, institutional openness weakens the effect of political distrust on non-institutionalised participation. This finding suggests that non-institutionalised are predominantly driven by dissatisfaction when they occur in a setting where the formal political system makes it harder to channel demands into the formal political system.

The results thus call attention to the importance of considering the context for appreciating the implications of different forms of participation. As noted by Norris et al. (2006, p. 284), a demonstration can be a tool in the political toolbox that is used to express support for the political system or it can be a mass rising against a repressive regime. To take part in a demonstration is not necessarily an unambiguous matter, since the social characteristics, system support, motivational attitudes, and the behaviour of participants differ. This argument calls attention to the importance of considering the context of political activities to appreciate their significance. In a similar vein, the results obtained here underline the importance of considering the context when determining the meaning of political behaviour. Specifically, institutional openness may affect the extent to which non-institutionalised participation is driven by political distrust. When the institutional context through closed structures makes it harder to channel political demands into the formal political system, non-institutionalised participation is to a greater extent driven by political distrust. Hence, these activities may well be elite-challenging under such circumstances, but they are not necessarily so, since the link is weaker in countries with open institutional systems.

The results may indicate that when the institutional context is open, non-institutionalised participation helps mobilize critical citizens (Norris 1999;

Rosanvallon 2006), who through their actions help keep the formal decision-makers accountable and thereby contribute to a better functioning of the representative democracy. Under conditions of institutional closedness, the same actions to a larger extent mobilise citizens disenchanted with formal politics (Stoker 2006; Hay 2007), and thereby put pressure on the political system. To examine this proposition, it is necessary to distinguish critical citizens who benefits democracy from the disenchanted citizens who have given up on the democratic project altogether. More research is therefore necessary to be able to draw firm conclusions on how the context shapes the implications of different political activities.

Appendix 1: Country Level Distribution of Institutional Variables

Country	Effective threshold	Effective threshold 0–1 (1 highest openness)	Fiscal decentralisation	Fiscal decentralisation 0–1 (1 highest openness)	Combined scale 0–1 (1 highest openness)
Belgium	8.82	0.76	0.14	0.33	0.55
Bulgaria	4.00	0.89	0.09	0.20	0.55
Croatia	5.45	0.85	0.10	0.23	0.54
Cyprus	3.60	0.90	0.03	0.07	0.48
Czech Republic	5.00	0.87	0.15	0.35	0.61
Denmark	2.00	0.95	0.35	0.79	0.87
Estonia	7.96	0.79	0.14	0.32	0.55
Finland	5.23	0.86	0.25	0.58	0.72
France	37.5	0.00	0.14	0.32	0.16
Germany	5.00	0.87	0.33	0.76	0.81
Greece	11.98	0.68	0.01	0.02	0.35
Hungary[a]	19.82	0.47	0.14	0.32	0.40
Ireland	15.15	0.60	0.09	0.21	0.40
Israel	2.00	0.95	0.07	0.16	0.55
Latvia	5.00	0.87	0.18	0.41	0.64
Lithuania	19.41	0.48	0.13	0.29	0.39
Netherlands	0.67	0.98	0.12	0.26	0.62
Norway	4.00	0.89	0.16	0.35	0.62
Poland	5.00	0.87	0.18	0.40	0.63
Portugal	6.55	0.83	0.08	0.19	0.51
Romania	5.00	0.87	0.20	0.46	0.67
Slovakia	5.00	0.87	0.08	0.18	0.53
Slovenia	7.50	0.80	0.10	0.23	0.51
Spain	9.70	0.74	0.25	0.58	0.66
Sweden	4.00	0.89	0.35	0.80	0.85

(continued)

Country	Effective threshold	Effective threshold 0–1 (1 highest openness)	Fiscal decentralisation	Fiscal decentralisation 0–1 (1 highest openness)	Combined scale 0–1 (1 highest openness)
Switzerland	8.63	0.77	0.44	1.00	0.88
United Kingdom	37.50	0.00	0.09	0.20	0.10
Mean	9.31	0.75	0.16	0.37	0.56
Max	37.5	0.98	0.44	1.00	0.88
Min	0.67	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.10

Source: Effective electoral threshold: Lundell and Karvonen 2008; Fiscal decentralisation: IMF Government finance statistics

Note: The effective threshold ranges between 0 and 37.5 as the highest theoretical value. Fiscal decentralisation ranges between 0 (no decentralisation) and 100 (totally decentralised). Since the notion of a totally decentralised state is unrealistic, the max value is subsequently coded with the highest extent of decentralisation (Switzerland =0.44) as the maximum value

[a]Hungary has a dual electoral system where 176 members of the 386 members are elected through a majoritarian system and the rest through a proportional system with a formal electoral threshold of 5 %. The effective electoral threshold is here calculated as $(37.5*(176/386)) + (5*(210/386)) = 19.82$

Appendix 2: Coding of Variables and Descriptive Statistics

		Descriptive statistics			
	Coding	Mean	St.d.	Min	Max
Dependent variables					
Institutionalised participation	Dichotomous variable based on questions on four political activities performed: Voted last election, Member of political party, Worked political party or action group, Contacting politicians or officials (last three within last 12 months). 1 indicates having performed at least one of the activities.	0.79	0.41	0	1
Non-institutionalised participation	Dichotomous variable based on three political activities performed during last 12 months: Taking part in public demonstration, Sign petition, Boycott products (within last 12 months). 1 indicates having performed at least one of the activities	0.28	0.45	0	1
Independent variables					
Individual level					
Political trust	Question: Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0–10 how much you personally trust the following institutions. 0 means "do not trust at all"; 10 means "you have complete trust". Index based on replies to: [country]'s parliament, the legal system, the police, politicians, and political parties	21.55	10.64	0	50
Gender	Gender of respondent, 1 = male	0.46	0.50	0	1

	Coding	Descriptive statistics			
		Mean	St.d.	Min	Max
Age	Age of respondent in years	47.89	18.48	15	105
Education	Question: What is the highest level of education you have achieved?	1.81	0.96	0	3
	Answers in four categories ranging from "Less than lower secondary education" to "Tertiary education completed"				
Political interest	Question: How interested would you say you are in politics?	1.37	0.91	0	3
	Answers in four categories ranging from "Not at all interested" to "Very interested"				
Watching TV	Question: On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do you spend watching television?	4.38	2.07	0	7
	Eight categories ranging from "No time at all" to "More than 3 h", highest score indicates more time spent				
Reading newspaper	Question: On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do you spend reading the newspapers?	1.32	1.29	0	7
	8 categories ranging from "No time at all" to "More than 3 h", highest score indicates more time spent				
Internal efficacy	Index based on answers to two questions: How often does politics seem so complicated that you can't really understand what is going on? (answers in 5 categories ranging from "Never" to "Frequently")	2.93	0.93	1	5
	+ How difficult or easy do you find it to make your mind up about political issues? (Answers in five categories ranging from "Very easy" to "Very difficult"), coded so highest score indicate highest internal efficacy				
Generalised trust	Index based on answers to three questions: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? +" Using this card, do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?' + "Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?". Answers to all scored on scale from 0–10, coded so highest score indicates highest trust	5.02	2.03	0	10
Country level					
Established democracy	More than 20 year of uninterrupted democracy based on POLITY, 0 = no, 1 = yes	0.64	0.48	0	1
Effective electoral threshold	Ranges between 0 and 37.5 as the highest theoretical value. Recoded to vary between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating lowest effective threshold associated with institutional openness	0.78	0.26	0	0.98

	Coding	Descriptive statistics			
		Mean	St.d.	Min	Max
Fiscal decentralisation	Ranges between 0 (no decentralisation) and 100 (totally decentralised). Since the notion of a totally decentralised state is unrealistic, the max value is subsequently coded with the highest extent of decentralisation (Switzerland =0.44) as the maximum value 1	0.38	0.24	0.02	1
Combined measure	Effective electoral threshold + Fiscal decentralisation. Coded to vary between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating highest extent of institutional openness	0.57	0.19	0.10	0.88

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"From Athens to Athens". Europe, Crisis, and Democracy: Suggestions for a Debate

Luca Asmonti

1   Introduction: Getting Democracy Off the Pedestal

On 31st October 2011, the then Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou announced his intention to hold a referendum on whether the country should accept the financial rescue plan laid out by the troika of the European Union (EU), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB), providing for a 50 % haircut of Greece's debt owed to private creditors. Four days later, Papandreou backed down from his decision, and on the 10th November he tendered his resignation from office. Papandreou was replaced by Lucas Papademos, who had previously served as Governor of the Bank of Greece and as Vice-President of the ECB. In the same, eventful week, the Prime Minister of another debt-laden European country, Italy's

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Silvio Berlusconi, also stepped down from office, amidst growing continent-wide concern over the sustainability of the Italian public debt.[1] Following Berlusconi's resignation, President Giorgio Napolitano gave mandate to Mario Monti, a former Economics professor at Milan's Bocconi University and EU commissioner, to form a new "technocrat" cabinet.

In their respective parliaments, both the new governments of Greece and Italy relied on the support of wide "national unity" majorities, including parties traditionally at the opposite ends of the political spectrum. The task facing the technocrat governments of Greece and Italy was not an easy one. In Italy, a number of unpopular measures to tackle the financial crisis and to curb state spending – most notably a sharp rise in the retirement age and the reintroduction of a property tax – led to a decline of the government's ratings in opinion polls.[2] Local elections held on the 6th-7th, and 20th-21st of May 2012 saw all the parties supporting the Monti cabinet take a beating.[3] Six out of ten Italians accused the EU and German chancellor Angela Merkel of failing to take effective measures to foster economic growth and of acting exclusively in the interests of Germany.[4] Anti-German feelings run even higher in Greece.[5] On 21st February 2012, following a vote of approval of the Greek parliament for the rescue package, the bailout plan laid out at the EU summit of the previous October was finalised in Brussels.[6] On top of the 50 % haircut for the private holders of government bonds, the reduction of yields to 3.5 %, and the request for drastic spending cuts, politicians of the two main parties, the centre-wing New Democracy and the centre-left Socialist party, were made to sign an agreement that they would uphold their commitment to the bailout plan even after the forthcoming political election. The Greek people were called to the polls on the 9th of May. Both the New Democracy and the Socialist party saw their support collapse to the advantage of left- and right-wing forces, which had campaigned against the bailout measures.[7] Following a fruitless series of talks with party leaders to form a new coalition cabinet, President Karolos Papoulias called for a new election to be held on the 17th of June. On 20th May, German magazine Die Spiegel called for a prompt exit of Greece from the Eurozone.[8]

The financial crisis in the Eurozone has had a deep impact on the political discourse of Europe and beyond, while traditional political institutions seemed unable to cope with this unprecedented situation,[9] while a number of proposed

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[1] On the events leading to Silvio Berlusconi's resignation, see Jones (2012), pp. 83–5.

[2] http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/asp/visualizza_sondaggio.asp?idsondaggio=5454.

[3] http://www.repubblica.it/static/speciale/2012/elezioni/comunali/index.html.

[4] Mannheimer (2012).

[5] See Neate (2012).

[6] http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/128075.pdf.

[7] http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012a/public/index.html#{"cls":"main","params":{}}.

[8] 'Abschied vom Euro: Nach der jüngsten Wutwahl sucht Europa nach einem Plan B für Griechenland. Die bisherige Rettungspolitik ist gescheitert. Die Einsicht wächst, dass Athen die Währungsunion verlassen sollte', De Spiegel (20th May 2012).

[9] See in particular Featherstone (2011), pp. 194, 210–2.

measures, such as the creation of a EU commissioner with the power to veto the budget of struggling countries,[10] seemed to move towards the curbing of national sovereignty of EU states, at least the weaker ones. On 5th August 2011, exiting ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet and his successor Mario Draghi sent a letter to then-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, suggesting a series of economic and welfare reforms. The document went so far as to suggest changes in the text of the Italian Constitution.[11] Overall, the impression was that sovereign governments and sovereign peoples were losing their monitory power over the running On the day following Papandreou's resignation, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* headlined, "Demokratie ist Ramsch", "Democracy is junk".[12]

The handling of the financial crisis in Greece and Italy has sparked intense debate on the endemic "democratic deficit" within the EU, the growing political ascendancy of institutions such as the ECB, and the dwindling sovereignty of local elected governments, not to mention that of the voting citizens. The problems with democratic accountability in Europe are perhaps the most visible symptom of a wider crisis of democratic decision-making and representation, calling into question the idea of democracy as "the pre-eminently acceptable form of government", which had been so dominant since the end of World War II, particularly following the fall of the Iron Curtain.[13] In the course of the twentieth century, liberal democracy came out victorious from all the struggles against its illiberal foes, i.e. Europe's central empires in WWI, fascist authoritarianism in WWII, and the communist block in the Cold War.[14] In the second half of the century, democracy was rampant; it reached out from its traditional western realm to become a global by-word for legitimate and just governance.[15] This process gathered further momentum following the fall of the Iron Curtain. Since the end of the Cold War, as many as four American administrations have positively sought to promote democracy and free market worldwide in the belief that a world of thriving democracies would also be one of peaceful cooperation.[16] Any other form of government looked incompatible with modernity. This success of democracy, however, did not come without drawbacks. Many countries which began a process of democratisation after the end of the Cold War have shown a tendency to "belligerent nationalism".[17] The days of "democratic consensus" seem to have gone. As A. Gat observed, the triumph of democracy was so luminous that it outshone

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[10] http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/29/us-eurozone-germany-greece-idUSTRE80S0HO20 120129.

[11] http://www.corriere.it/economia/11_settembre_29/trichet_draghi_inglese_304a5f1e-ea59-11e0-ae06-4da866778017.shtml

[12] Schirrmaker (2011).

[13] Sen (1999), p. 3.

[14] See Gat (2010), pp. 2–8.

[15] Dunn (2005), p. 15.

[16] See Kissinger (1994), pp. 17, 804–5; Ikenberry (1999), pp. 56–8; Miller (2012), pp. 49–52.

[17] See Mansfield and Snyder (1995), pp. 6–8, 12–8.

the reasons why it had been won.[18] Democracy is now facing new and difficult challenges. Democracies have to operate in an increasingly hostile environment, where "nondemocratic great powers", from China to Russia, are on the rise.[19] The democratic enthusiasm of the latter part of the twentieth century has begun to wither, under the combined effects of the crisis of the traditional forms of political representation, the failure of, or at least strong resistance to US-led democratic promotion from Afghanistan to Iraq, and the stumbling of democratisation in other regions.[20] All of a sudden, democracy looks vulnerable and imperilled; it is no longer the "dominatrix" that it used to be, and its future looks uncertain. In his 2009 book *The Life and Death of Democracy*, John Keane warned the reader that democracy thrives in humility; it is not the gift of a superior, truth-giving force, but a constant exercise in monitoring the hubris of power, and the "*precondition*" for other values and different ways of life to flourish.

The time has thus come to reconsider the way we look at democracy and what is to be asked from it, and to do this, as Keane suggests, we should start from its past.[21] In the last years, scholars like Keane and Gat have been looking at the history of democracy from a less reverential perspective, by eschewing the idea that the triumph of democracy was somehow necessary or inevitable, and focusing on the historical factors that led it to global pre-eminence in the course of the twentieth century. The present paper intends to contribute to this debate by posing the question as to whether the current crisis of democracy might have anything to do with its idolisation and the idea of its supposed invulnerability. Has our "democratic faith" made us overlook the internal and external risks that may imperil democracy? Can we still conceive a democracy operating in a hostile environment? In order to address these issues, this paper will engage in a comparative study of the rise and decline of the culture of "democratic faith" since the end of World War II – with particular reference to the process of European integration – and the elaboration of internal and external threats in the Athenian democracy. Moving from an analysis of the discussion on (and the criticism of) democratic politics engendered by the debt crisis in Europe, the paper will discuss the broader issue of decline of the culture of "civilian state" and of "democratic faith" in Europe and beyond, and will engage with the current debate on democratic governance. Hence, drawing on recent works focusing on the eastern ancestors of classical Greek democracy, this paper will present Athenian democracy as a comparative model to discuss how democratic regimes can articulate its internal and external threats. In this analysis, the ability to integrate hostility and criticism within and outside Athens in the debate on democracy will be tied in with the ability to approach democracy from a practical, hands-on perspective, as the product of historical and environmental conditions unique to the city of Athens.

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[18] A. Gat., *Victorious and Vulnerable*, p. 2.

[19] A. Gat, *Victorious and Vulnerable,* pp. ix-x.

[20] Keane (2009), pp. 812–3.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 848–9.

2 Historical Amnesty: The Invention of a Europe Without Confrontation and the Post-War Triumph of Democracy. A Parallel with Ancient Greece

In the late 1980s, political scientist Joseph Nye coined the phrase "soft power" to describe the political, social and economic consequences of the third technological revolution, and to discuss the changing face of America's global dominance. As Nye defines it, soft power is "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments".[22] In a world where the interaction between information technologies was transforming the markets from physical places to planetary networks, traditional indicators such as geography, population numbers and availability of raw materials were less and less indicative of a nation's power, while the ability to set the political agenda of other players by indirectly shaping their preferences, and attracting them to your values through culture, technology and economy was becoming strategic.[23] In the last decade or so, soft power seems to have been marginalised by its traditional main practitioner, namely the US,[24] but the idea still keeps its allure. Every December, *Monocle* magazine, a well crafted digest on international affairs, culture, and design, pulls out its "Soft Power survey", where the world's foremost nations according to their ability to gain global influence through culture, humanitarian commitments, sporting prowess, and so forth. In this most charming of current-affairs magazines, power comes out as an exciting game of endless possibilities, where every country must showcase what its people do best, and know how to sell it, from the export of Turkish soap operas, "to the value of the perfect pizza or an exquisite espresso".[25] In the words of Simon Anholt, founder of the *Nation Brand Index* and one of *Monocle*'s "soft power ambassadors", "the world's only superpower is public opinion. What governments are beginning to realize is that is that they need the loyalty and respect and approval of those billions and the only way they're going to get it is by being good national citizens, but also good members of the international community".[26]

Last December, however, when *Monocle* hit the newsstand with its survey, headlines in the less trendy press were made by the crisis in Europe over debt-laden Greece, and the language there was a far cry from that of cappuccino or pop-music diplomacy. In fact, it looked like the Greek dilemma had brought up the ghosts of Europe's worst past, eliciting acrimony, tensions, and dark prophecies of forthcoming wars. Greek cartoonists portrayed German soldiers with Wehrmacht helmets, and French policemen with moustaches *à la* Inspector Clouseau, stealing food from the mouth of starved Hellenic children. Addressing the European

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[22] Nye (2004), p. x.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 5–15. See also Nye (1990), pp. 8, 29, 31–2.

[24] See Nye (2011).

[25] *Monocle*, 49 (December 2011/January 2012), p. 35.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

parliament on 14th September 2011, Polish Finance Minister Jacek Rostowski warned of the continent plunging into a war within years, were the Union to collapse.[27] In an article published by *Il Sole 24 Ore*, Italy's leading financial newspaper, on Christmas Eve 2011, Italian industrialist Carlo de Benedetti expressed his disappointment at the rescue plan for Greece by saying that "D-Day had past", and the unholy ghost of Rudolph Havenstein, the governor of the German Reichsbank during the hyperinflation of 1921–1923, was still hanging over Europe.[28] From the columns of the *Bild* newspaper, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl urged his fellow-Germans to remain committed to the integration process as "the evil spirits of the past have by no means been banished", and Europe remains "a question of war and peace".[29] 64 years since the beginning of European integration, the tensions which had marred the continent for centuries, were resurfacing, putting seriously at risk the ambitious project of giving the continent a common political identity, inspired by shared values. On an even darker historical perspective, the current financial, political and cultural crisis of Europe has also been compared with the disaggregation of the Yugoslav Federation after the death of Marshal Tito.[30]

Violence and the spectre of war – Divisions and pessimism; this kind of language is in stark contrast with the rhetoric of peace, concord, unity and harmony, which had informed the European political discourse since the end of WWII. In fact, while the phrase "soft power" was coined to discuss the changing role of the US in the post-cold-war world, one might easily see the creation of a European Union as the most ambitious attempt to put its principles into practice. This process has involved the creation of a common market and of common legislative and judiciary institutions, underpinned by a new model of political identity, which historian James Sheehan famously called "civilian state". Moving away from their "history of confrontation", the countries of Europe embraced a new idea of state, where military ethos was no longer the dominant feature of their identity and of their values. The emphasis now was on "commerce, law and culture", that is "the activities and values at the core of their civilian identities".[31] This was a completely new experience in European, and arguably world history. Deliberately retracting from the exercise of hard power and from their traditional *Machtpolitik*, the countries of Europe began to develop "a new perspective on the role of power in international relations", driven by multilateralism and negotiation.[32] A United Europe aimed to be the first global force whose ascendancy is exclusively based on the exercise of soft power.

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[27] Phillips (2011).

[28] de Benedetti (2011).

[29] Kohl (2012).

[30] See Bianchini (2012).

[31] Sheehan (2007), pp. 179–81, 187, 224 and (2008), pp. 222–4.

[32] See Kagan (2004), pp. 55–6.

Traditionally, Europe is America's main competitor in terms of soft-power potential. In the *Monocle* soft-power survey, the United States ranked first, trailed by the United Kingdom (top of the table in 2010), France and Germany.[33] Many European countries do have a wealth of some important soft-power resources such as the ability of attracting tourists, public diplomacy, the appeal of European global brands, and so forth. But it is the idea itself of the European Union, this new political space of peace, democracy and prosperity, to represent their most attractive soft-power asset. There is an objective, striking coincidence between the peak of democracy's so-called "third wave",[34] and the peak of the process of European integration in the years following the fall of the Iron Curtain. As J. Nye observed, "with the end of the Cold War, the goal of joining the European Union became a magnet that meant the entire region of Eastern Europe oriented itself towards Brussels [. . .]. The newly free countries adapted their domestic policies to conform with Western European standards".[35] If Europe fared so high in terms of global recognition of its multinational brands, democracy was to be one of these brands. Take for example the text of the Lisbon Treaty, a true soft power manifesto, stressing subtly but quite unmistakably the European roots of democracy. The Treaty describes the goal of the Union as to enhance the democratic functioning of the common institutions, to achieve a better economic integration between the member states, to establish a common citizenship and, last but not least to achieve a common foreign policy aimed at the promotion of peace, security and progress in Europe and beyond. Drawing on a vague "cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe", the signatories of the treaty claim the historical ambition of bringing to an end "the division of the European continent". For the history of Europe has not been just one of violence and conflict. Europe is the birthplace of democracy, rule of law and human rights; its peoples should leave behind their past differences, the violence and the bloodsheds, to move into a future of peace and prosperity, underpinned by shared values. Democracy ought to be the cornerstone of the new European identity.

The path to this ideal Europe was set at the Hague congress of 7th-11th May 1948, which, in a remarkable dash of political creativity amongst the ruins of WWII, laid the foundations of the European Council. In his address to the gathering, Winston Churchill urged to raise "the voice of Europe" above the chaos of war and violence. To make this voice audible, European countries should change the way they looked at their reciprocal relationship and at their tumultuous past. As the Englishman said, "we shall only save ourselves from the perils which draw near by forgetting the hatred of the past, by letting national rancour and revenges die, by progressively effacing frontiers and barriers which aggravate and congeal our divisions, and by rejoicing together in that glorious treasure of

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[33] "Tender is the might", *Monocle*, 49 (December 2011/January 2012), pp. 48–9.

[34] See Huntington (1991), particularly pp. 3–30.

[35] Nye (2004), pp. 75–83.

literature, of romance, of ethics, of thought and toleration". This was "the true inheritance of Europe", which the folly of war had imperilled. Drawing on this legacy, the process of European unity should give voice to the "democratic faith" of the peoples of the continent.[36]

To the student of ancient Greece, the effort of historical obliteration envisaged by Churchill might bring to mind the restoration of democracy in Athens just 1 year after the city had been annihilated by its arch-rivals of Sparta. Following the Spartan triumph at the battle of Aegospotami in the summer of 405, Athens was laid under siege and occupied by the Spartan general Lysander. The peace which the Athenians were forced into signing provided for the abolition of democracy. Popular government was replaced with a pro-Spartan junta of 30 men, the so-called "30 Tyrants". Growing internal divisions within the junta and its growing unpopularity with the citizens of Athens, due to the brutal repression of all whom the tyrants "had reason to fear", soon undermined the stability of the junta. In the winter of 404/403, a group of dissident exiles led by Thrasybulus defeated the troops of the 30 at a battle fought at Munichia, a mound near the port of Piraeus. At this point, the Spartans moved into Attica, but they did not provide the decisive help that the 30 were hoping for. Rather, the Spartan king Pausanias, who was afraid lest Lysander might become the master of Athens, mediated a truce between the two parties: the old democratic constitution was to be restored while Athens would remain an ally of Sparta.[37] The restoration of democracy was sealed by an amnesty for all the crimes committed under the 30, safe for those perpetrated by the tyrants themselves and their closest acolytes.[38] Hence, the whole city joined in a solemn oath, avowing to bring no grievance against any citizen save only the 30, the 10, and the 11: and even of them against none who shall consent to render account of his office'.[39] The amnesty process is encapsulated in the phrase *mē mnēsikakein*, roughly meaning "to bear no memory of the ills of the past". Politically, if the restored democracy was ever to work, the discords of the past ought not to interfere with it. In Nicole Loraux's words, the aim of this complex operation was to restore "an undisrupted continuity, as if nothing had happened",[40] but the historical memory of the community was not completely obliterated, nor did the condemnation of those responsible for the crimes of the tyranny signified the end of all divisions within the citizen body. The democratic restoration was accomplished remarkably smoothly, and with great sense of public purpose on the part of the Athenians, to the surprise of some.[41] But the city that had sworn the amnesty oath was still a fractured community, where not everybody was happy with a democratic constitution. Those who did not want

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[36] http://www.coe.int/t/dgal/dit/ilcd/archives/selection/churchill/TheHague_en.pdf.

[37] On these events, see Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.3–4; [Aristotle], *Constitution of the Athenians* 34–8; Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes* 6–24.

[38] [Aristotle], *Constitution of the Athenians* 39.6.

[39] Andocides, *On the Mysteries* 90.

[40] Loraux (2002), p. 150.

[41] See [Aristotle], *Constitution of the Athenians* 40.2–3.

to partake of the re-born democracy were given the opportunity to secede to the enclave of Eleusis, a rural district 18 kilometres from the urban centre of Athens.[42] We shall return to these events later. For now, let us observe that the amnesty thus served the purpose of establishing the necessary conditions to restore civic and political order, without however creating any "post-historical paradise", and without making democracy the object of faith. In fact, if anything else, the amnesty did acknowledge the presence of dissenting voices within the community.

3   From the Crisis of Europe to the Crisis of Democratic Faith

Albeit the idea of democracy is twenty-five centuries old, it was not until the last century that it rose to the status of universal value, a global byword for legitimate government. As A. Sen put it, the question whether a country is "fit for democracy" was replaced with the assumption that every country has "to become fit through democracy".[43] The gospel of democracy has reached out to a global audience, yet Europe continues to claim a special relationship with this most successful of ideas. As stated in the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty, democracy developed from the common "cultural, religious and humanist inheritance" which has inspired the idea of a united Europe. The discovery of "democratic faith" in the aftermath of World War II ushered in a new phase in the history of the continent; it was the watershed between a dark past of conflict and violence and a future of peace and co-operation. Europe created democracy, and democracy would create Europe.

Quite unfortunately, practice does not seem to have matched up with these noble intentions, or at least so seem to think many. In spite of all the grand declarations and the idealistic drive of the founding fathers, it has become somewhat of a platitude to speak of a "democratic deficit" within the European Union, particularly in relation to the lack of parliamentary control over the decisions taken by the EU Commission and the Council. 50 years since the constitution of the European Parliament, there is still no genuine continent-wide debate on issues of continent-wide relevance. European issues have little or no relevance in domestic politics in the various countries, while European parliament elections are treated as little more than mid-term approval polls.[44] Addressing the EU parliament in Brussels after being elected its president, Germany's Martin Schultz warned of a "crisis of confidence in politics and institutions", which might have repercussions on the integration process.[45] This growing disillusionment with democratic politics is by no means an exclusively European problem. In the current climate of political and

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[42] [Aristotle], *Constitution of the Athenians* 39.1–5.

[43] Sen (1999), pp. 3–4. Cp. Dunn (2005), pp. 14–7, 130–1.

[44] See Follesdal and Hix (2006), pp. 534–7; Hughes (2012), pp. 255–6.

[45] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/content/20120113STO35292/html/Either-we-all-lose-or-we-all-win-Martin-Schulz's-acceptance-speech.

economic impasse, no politician of any democratic government, would speak the same words spoken by Albert C. Ritchie, governor of Maryland at the time of the Great Depression: "It is my conviction that never before was faith in democracy so well justified as now in this very crisis, and that democracy alone offers the one and only medium through which the world can find fulfilment – the one route by which it can and will find its way out of the present morass".[46] Naturally, the world of Gov. Ritchie was a clear-cut environment, where America's "own democracy" stood up proud in front of the illiberal forces of "communism, socialism, Hitlerism, 'dictatorship of the unfit', the rule of autocracy, plutocracy, black shirts, red shirts and what not".[47] 12 years and one World War later, when Winston Churchill addressed the Hague Congress, his vision for a "movement for a European Unity" inspired by "common spiritual value" drew on the nascent division between a western block cohesive in its trust on freedom and democracy, and another block, whose attitude and policy were "discordant".[48]

Today, trying to define democracy, its values and its mission, if any, would be a much more challenging exercise, chiefly, many would argue, owing to the staggering identity crisis of the global democratic beacons of the last century, the United States and the uniting Europe. In the last years, the US have begun to reconsider the missionary project of becoming the world's only leading ideological, economic and geo-political player by using "democracy" as the "brand of a revolutionary utopia". On the other side of the Atlantic, the crisis of democracy in Europe is even more deep and substantial, for it is not just its "performance" of the democratic system to be put under the severest of scrutinies, but the "system itself".[49] After the integration process called into question the principles of the nation-state as a homogeneous "community of reference",[50] often seen as the deepest and truest cause of all the woes of the continent's past, the attempt to give the peoples of Europe a new common identity, seems to have lost all its momentum. Nowadays, as we have seen, democracy no longer rests on any given "first principle", be it a god, an ideology or the word of a founding hero. Also, we have said that, if democracy needs to be rethought, it is first necessary to rediscover its history from a new, lay perspective. For the way we look at democracy, and the way we look at its roots are very intertwined, and if democracy is no longer what it used to be, its past might also be thrown in a different light.

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[46] Ritchie (1932), pp. 134–5; see Asmonti (2010), p. 279.

[47] Ritchie (1932), p. 137.

[48] See above, n. 19.

[49] See Caracciolo (2012), pp. 9–10.

[50] See Morris (1997), pp. 194–5.

4   Reassessing the History and the Roots of Democracy

In 508/507 B.C., a notable Athenian nobleman called Cleisthenes promoted a series of reforms of the government and administration of the city, supposedly with the view of curbing the power of the local clans of Attica and thus giving his fellow- citizens a new, common political identity.[51] In 1994, the world, or at least part of it, celebrated the 2500th anniversary of the reforms of Cleisthenes as the event that marked the beginning of democracy for Athens and hence for the rest of the world.[52] Or did it? In the last years, the debate on the earliest forms of collective exercise of power has become increasingly complex, owing to a flow of new studies and archaeological discoveries. For instance, from the analysis of cuneiform documents from ancient Mesopotamian sites like Mari, we have learnt that some kind of "group-oriented" governance were in place in areas of the Near East at least since the III millennium BC.[53] Was this already democracy? The question is very difficult to answer, or maybe it is not. Quite wisely, D. Fleming suggested that using the word "democracy" in relation to the Mesopotamian context might be misleading.[54] Some authors, however, have drawn on these discoveries to revise common established assumptions on the history of democracy by bringing to surface the experiences of assembly government that unfolded prior to the times of Pericles and Demosthenes, and outside the "standard" narrative of western democracy, which common wisdom says began with its "discovery" in ancient Athens.[55]

In his grand *The Life and Death of Democracy*, Keane expressly calls democracy an "import from afar", like gunpowder or print, whose seeds were first sown in the city-states of Mesopotamia, around 3000 BC, then travelled eastbound towards India, before landing on Greek soil.[56] Here, the term *damos*, precursor of the classical Greek *demos*, appeared in the Linear B documents as early as in the fifteenth century BC, ten centuries before the *floruit* of classical Athens. Others have tried to use the argument of the eastern roots of assembly government to disengage the debate on democracy from what they consider western conceptions and perhaps dogmas. Deliberately rejecting the idea of a Greek invention of Democracy, Benjamin Isakhan has complained that the current discussion on democratisation in the Middle East "is underpinned by a construction of democracy that is disconnected from the region", which in his opinion would account for the resistance which the process has so far met with. Isakhan thus suggests that rediscovering these forms of "primitive democracy" might help to remove a certain

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[51] See [Aristotle] *Athenian Constitution* 20–2.

[52] Events included an exhibition at the National Archives, Washington DC, organized by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens and the Greek Ministry of Culture, 15th June 1993-2nd January 1994.

[53] Fleming (2004), pp. 14–7.

[54] Ibid., p. 16.

[55] Isakhan and Stockwell (2011), pp. 4–10.

[56] Keane (2009), pp. xi–xii, but see also Sen (1999), p. 4.

"Western stigma", and hence to feed "a sense of ownership over democracy" in the peoples of the Middle East and a de-Westernised conception of popular rule.[57]

Certainly, democracy was not a "miracle", nor did it come out of the blue, or was "invented" by a specific individual, in a specific city of Greece, be it Athens or any other place.[58] In fact, no ancient source expressly says that the Athenians invented democracy, although Pericles in his famous funeral speech in honour of the Athenian soldiers fallen in the war with Sparta tries to appropriate it to his city by calling democracy "our constitution".[59] Credit is due to scholars like Isakhan and Keane for broadening the historical and geographical context of our understanding of democracy. In the last years, Greek historians have shed a new light on the prehistory of democratic government. Most notably, K. Raaflaub and R. Wallace have analysed the "preconditions" of democracy in the social transformations and constitutional experiments of seventh- and sixth-century Greece, generally arising from periods of stark social and political crisis.[60] In his book *The First Democracies*, E. Robinson delivered an extensive analysis of the literary and material evidence concerning the development of notions of egalitarianism and early *demokratiai* in various areas of the Greek world from the southern coast of the Black Sea Pontus to Sicily, between the eighth century and the end of the Persian Wars.[61] It would be certainly very enticing to think that, before reaching Greece, the seed of democracy had already travelled through the Middle East and India. Unfortunately, at the current state of the evidence, it would be very difficult to establish any more direct link between the experiments with popular government and the forms in "group-oriented" governance in ancient Mesopotamia, or other forms of assembly government developed in other areas of the Mediterranean.[62] However, for the purpose of this chapter, it is interesting to observe that recent scholarship has called into question the whole idea of the Athenian origins of democracy as a western, normative model, which is both irreconcilable with the global, diverse, ever-changing face of democracy in the twenty-first century, and very limiting to our understanding of the history of this intricate idea.

At this point, one might ask what is the place of Athens in the history of democracy, now that our perception of democracy is being constantly redefined and ramified. Does Athens still deserve a special prominence in the history of democracy? Can it still be looked at as an inspiration, if certainly not as a model?[63] Writing soon after the celebration of the 2500th anniversary of the reforms of Cleisthenes, and of the birth of Athenian democracy, Greek historian R. Osborne

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[57] Isakhan (2007), pp. 110–111.

[58] See Ober (2007), p. 83.

[59] Thucydides, 2.37; cp. Robinson (1997), pp. 9–10.

[60] See Raaflaub and Wallace (2007), pp. 22–48.

[61] E. Robinson, (1997), pp. 64–122, 129–30.

[62] Fleming (2004), pp. xi–xii; Stockwell (2007), pp. 35–8; Pritchard (2007), pp. 328–31.

[63] See Ober and Hedrick (1996), p. 3; cp.; Samons (2004), p. 4.

that the closed, very homogeneous society of ancient Athens cannot represent a model of governance for the complex, diverse societies of today's world.[64] The issue of the roots democracy is by no means a merely academic one. Challenging President F.D. Roosevelt's vision of a world where the role of Europe would become increasingly marginal, General de Gaulle said:

> Western Europe, despite its dissensions and distress, is essential to the West. Nothing can replace the value, the power, the shining examples of these ancient peoples.[65]

Now, however, that the perception of what is labelled "West" is blurring, ancient peoples seem to have become of little use to Europe too. In the summer of 2003, a 16-member European Convention presided by former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing laid out a *Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe*.[66] The document opens with a rather magniloquent preamble outlining its inspiring principles, topped by a passage from the famous speech delivered in the winter of 430 B.C. by the Athenian statesman Pericles, to commemorate the soldiers fallen in the first year of the war against Sparta:

> Our Constitution [. . .] is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the greatest number.[67]

In the final version of the treaty, issued 2 years later under the Irish EU presidency, the preamble was sensibly reduced, and the Thucydidean quotation was scrapped altogether.[68] However, the original text hung about long enough to stir some interdisciplinary debate on the suitability of Pericles' speech to represent the democratic values of twenty-first-century Europe. In his critical and rather controversial analysis of the Athenian roots of democracy, classicist Luciano Canfora went so far as to say that the great Athenian statesman did not mean at all to celebrate his hometown's democracy, but rather to stress the contrast between it and liberty.[69] According to law scholar A. von Bogdandy, the term has not yet received a full legal definition in the European context. Hence, the decision to eliminate Thucydides' passage from the preamble of the treaty was a fortunate one, because it attenuated the potential inconsistency between the strong emphasis on democracy as a founding value of the Union implied by the choice of Pericles' words, and the "everyday experience" of European citizens.[70] Constitutionalist A. Peters wrote that the words of Pericles, with their strong emphasis on majority, are not representative of current theories of the democratic decision-making, for "a functioning democracy needs much more than majority voting, most importantly

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[64] Osborne (2010, p. 37); see also Dahl (1998), pp. 18–9.

[65] Quoted by Calleo (2011), p. 2.

[66] http://european-convention.eu.int/DraftTreaty.asp?.

[67] Thucydides, 2.37.1.

[68] See http://euobserver.com/18/16609, where the historian Thucydides is called "philosopher".

[69] Canfora (2006), pp. 7–34; cp. Hansen (2008), 15–6.

[70] von Bogdandy (2006), pp. 17–22.

a democratic infrastructure".[71] So, while the future of democracy is still to be told, it looks like Athenian democracy has lost part of its political fascination and cannot be any longer a reference for us. Classical Athens is no longer a suitable model to reflect the global transformation of democracy; it does not represent an ideal of liberty and equality, nor does it reflect current views of the democratic decision-making process, as outlined by ancient historian, political scientists and jurists. The question therefore might be asked whether ancient Athens, classical Athens, has still something to teach us. Is there still anything that makes Athens stand taller amongst other supposed examples of good democratic practice?

5   Ancient Athens, or Democracy as Crisis Management. On Three Points that Make ancient Athens Today as Relevant as Ever

Naturally, it would be redundant to explain why ancient Athens, a society highly dependant on slave labour where women had no political rights nor social visibility, cannot be a normative model for any modern popular government. What the Athenians called *demokratía* was in fact an extremely exclusive system, where citizenship was a hereditary privilege of those born of Athenian father and mother.[72] The Athenians claimed the paternity of democracy by calling themselves a "school" to the rest of Greece. In reason of that, they also claimed that whenever and wherever a democratic regime was under threat in any area of the Greek world, their city was also imperilled, and this gave them the right (and in fact the duty) to intervene militarily to restore the democratic order.[73] Dissenting voices, such as that of an anonymous Athenian pamphleteer known as the "Old Oligarch", complained that brutal imperial rule abroad was essential to maintain the democratic machinery at home,[74] and certainly, for all their boasting about liberty and equality, the Athenians had a very poor record indeed when it came to defend or at least respect the liberty of others. In fact, the foreign policy of democratic Athens was inspired by the most unashamed *Machtpolitik*; nor would the Athenians refrain from crushing a small, neutral island for the sake of asserting their military superiority, as they famously did with Melos in the summer of 416.[75] The Athenians themselves were not afraid to admit that they ruled over their supposed allies like a tyrant.[76] So, what was really democratic about ancient Athens? What use can it be to discuss democracy in the twenty-first century?

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[71] Peters (2004), pp. 37–8.

[72] Aristotle, *Politics* 3.1278a. Cp. Dahl (1989), pp. 22–3; Samons (2004), pp. 45–9.

[73] See Demosthenes, *On the Liberty of the Rhodians* 15.

[74] See [Ps. Xenophon], *Constitution of the Athenians* 1.16–19.

[75] See e.g. Thucydides, 1.75.2–76.1. Melian episode: Thucydides, 5.84–116.

[76] See Thucydides, 1.2.64.

As we have seen, the overarching question of the current debate on democracy is why and how this noun has lost the evocative power that it had in the latter part of the twentieth century. The time has come to look at democracy from a lay perspective, without reverential postures. Democracy does not stand on an ivory tower, rather the opposite. It is a daily engagement with the life of a community, and its ever-evolving needs and values. By its own nature, democracy cannot rest on principles engraved on stone, and it is meant to be constantly questioned, and challenged. This is what its "triumph" made us forget. We have attributed too many meanings, and put too many expectations on democracy, and so we have lost of the sight that democracy is in fact a "time-bound" exercise, as J. Keane correctly pointed out, which has more often than not met with obstacles and opposition.[77] Also, democracy is very difficult to capture into one unequivocal definition: ask a number of people what they consider they main tenets of democracy and you would come up with just as many different opinions, but hardly anybody, whatever the ideal of democracy that they have in mind, would be able to say that any existing or past regime has ever embodied that ideal state, in spite of all the different attempts made throughout the centuries by very different peoples in very different places to create a process through which the sovereign people can express their will.[78]

But if democracy is really this wondrous, slippery process of invention and transformation, then I would argue that ancient Athens should still have a position of prominence in the debate on democracy. For the Athenian citizens, perhaps more than the dwellers of modern democracies, recognised the precariousness of their constitution. The Athenians were aware of the forces threatening it inside and outside of the city. They spoke about them openly and were ready to take them on. Therefore, Athens could provide a good comparative model for discussing how democracies can engage with opposition and crisis. To stimulate and refresh the dialogue between the democracy of ancient Athens and today's world, I would like to signal three important features of the Athenian democratic system, which highlight its ability to cope with criticism and hostility. Firstly, Athenian democracy flourished in spite of and to some extent because of the fact that it was constantly menaced by internal divisions. Secondly, the Athenians understood the cultural significance of democracy, and saw it as central to their collective identity. At the same time, they understood democracy as an eminently historical process, and were aware of the contingencies and practical factors that allowed it to succeed. Finally, the Athenians never assumed that democracy could become a *global* language outside the Athenian sphere of influence, and were aware that the international environment was largely hostile to it.

I. As we said, the democratic restoration after the fall of the 30 Tyrants acknowledged the presence of opposition to popular rule within Athens. In fact, the Athenians had always been pretty much aware that the city was constantly divided into two camps, that of the supporters and the opponents of democracy, and

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[77] Keane (2009), pp. ix–xi.

[78] Cp. R.A. Dahl, *Democracy* (1989), pp. 83–4.

were quite outspoken about it. Take the passage from Pericles' funeral speech, discussed above:[79] as the statesman says, power rests with the *polloi* (the many) and not in those of the *oligoi* (the few). These words have nothing to do with the modern notions of "majority" and "minority". For this reason it might be misleading to use expressions like "minority" and "the greatest number" to translate *oligoi* and *polloi*. What Pericles is referring to here, more or less implicitly, is the actual contrast between two different groups within the *polis* community, with different political interests, sources of income, social habits and so forth. The terms *polloi* and *oligoi* do have a strong political connotation, alluding to the more or less latent strife between a popular and oligarchic faction. In the cities of the Athenian empire, the two terms referred to the division between a popular faction – the *polloi*, *demos*, or the *pleones* – and an oligarchic, pro-Spartan one – the *oligoi*, *gnorimoi* ("notables"), or *dynatoi* ("the powerful"), which was endemic in every city of Greece at the time of the Peloponnesian War. In the opening chapter of his *Histories*, Thucydides notes that at the conflict broke out when the two contestants were both at the peak of their preparedness, while the rest of the Greeks were "taking sides in the quarrel; those who delayed doing so at once having it in contemplation".[80] This division between cities supporting Athens and Sparta was replicated within each single *polis*, where the opposition between friends of Athens and Sparta exacerbated existing divisions, often leading to violent outbursts of civic strife (in Greek, *stasis*), as famously happened in Corcyra of 427.[81] In another episode of that conflict, the Athenian occupation of the neutral island of Melos in 416/415 and the dialogue between the Athenian generals and a group of Melian representatives confronting them, the latter define themselves *oligoi*, as superior and opposed to the *polloi*.[82]

Getting back to the definition of democracy laid out by Pericles, to clarify the sense of his words we might turn to the witty pamphlet, written by the anonymous dissenter usually referred to as the "Old Oligarch". This disaffected Athenian describes democracy as a diabolical machine devised by the basest citizens – the men of no property, those who made a living by rowing in the fleet – to keep all the political power for themselves, thus displacing the good, noble and worthy. And the damn system worked quite well at that.[83] So, in the opinion of its supporters as well as in that of the critics, democracy seemed to be not as much about creating harmony and concord as about mastering inner tensions, which at times of acute crisis could escalate into open civic strife, or *stasis*. This sense of contrast and division was in fact embedded in Greek mentality. The earliest city ever depicted in Greek literature, i.e. the one engraved on the shield of Achilles in the *Iliad*, features two men at the centre of the *agora* arguing over the compensation for the killing of

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[79] See *supra*, pp. 146–8.

[80] Thucydides, 1.1.

[81] See de Ste Croix (2008), pp. 259–60.

[82] Thucydides, 5.84.3. On *oligoi* and *polloi* in the Melian episode, see Crane (1998) pp. 252–3.

[83] See [Ps. Xenophon], *Constitution of the Athenians* 1.1–5.

a relative of one of them, with a council of elderly, seating in solemn circle to judge of the case, and the rest of the population crowding around the two contestants, shouting their support to either of them.[84] The city in sum was not just the place where people met, exchanged ideas. It was also the place where people argued. The citizens were not afraid of it. Before the advent of popular government, Solon, the great Athenian lawgiver and a precursor of democracy, passed a law compelling citizens to take side with a faction when civic strife broke out.[85] Hence, we might see Athenian democracy thus was the continuous process through which this conflict was mastered and turned into positive forces driving the success of the city.

II. Judging from the words of Pericles, the Athenians, or a majority of them, were proud of their democracy.[86] Some time after the overthrown of the 30 Tyrants, they went so far as to make a deity of *Demokratía*, to whom sacrifices were offered.[87] But what exactly did they intend to celebrate? The Athenian had no solemn declaration of independence, or other founding text, or a memorable date or great founding event to remember. There was also some confusion as to who was the father of democracy, if indeed any. Herodotus says that Cleisthenes made the city great by giving it freedom after the fall of the Peisistratids, the tyrants who ruled the city between 561 and 510.[88] Yet we know barely anything about him and what we do know hardly fits in the profile of the ideal founding father. Cleisthenes was a scion of the house of the Alcmeonids, one of the aristocratic families that held the reins of Athenian politics in the seventh century. When he saw that he could not get the leadership of the aristocratic clubs, Cleisthenes took the bold step of rebranding himself as an advocate of the people, promising to hand over power to them. Hence, he carried out an administrative reorganisation of the territory of Attica, where the traditional four kinship tribes were replaced by ten new ones, representative of the whole of Attica, so that every citizen could have a share in the government.[89] We do not even know for sure whether Cleisthenes used the word "democracy" to label his reform. Some modern scholars think that in those the noun *demokratía* still had a certain negative stigma, and the supporters of popular government in Athens and abroad preferred to use the soberer term *isonomia*, "equality of political rights".[90] It is again Herodotus, writing a couple of generations after these events, who did

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[84] Homer, *Iliad* 18.497–508.

[85] See [Aristotle] *Athenian Constitution* 8.5; Plutarch, *Life of Solon* 20. On Solon as a father of Athenian democracy, see Aristophanes, *Clouds* 1187–1200; Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 6–7; Aristotle, *Politics* 2.9.2–4.

[86] Thucydides, 2.41.1.

[87] On this matter, see Hansen (1999), pp. 42–3.

[88] Herodotus, 5.66.1, cp. Aristotle, *Politics* 3.1275b.

[89] [Aristotle], *Constitution of the Athenians* 20–21.

[90] See e.g. the so-called "Dialogue on the constitutions" in Herodotus' *Histories* (3.80–83), where Otanes claims popular rule "to have the most beautiful name of all, *isonomia*" (3.80.6), while Megabyxus and Darius, supporters of oligarchy and monarchy respectively, call it "democracy", cp. Sealey (1973), p. 274.

say that Cleisthenes brought about democracy, while other authors had different ideas as to when democracy began.[91] In the historical-teleological design of the *Constitution of the Athenians* attributed to Aristotle, Cleisthenes' reform is the fifth of the 11 great turning points, or *metabolai* (i.e. "changes", or even "revolutions") that mile-stoned the centuries-long process of transformation and progressive democratisation of the Athenian constitution.[92] This continuous process of change and transformation was the heart and soul of Athenian democracy; it was driven by the events of history, the great victories such as that of Marathon, which gave more "self-confidence" to the people,[93] or the most humiliating defeats, like that of Syracuse in 413, when the Athenian fleet was annihilated by the Sicilian allies of Sparta after 2 years of campaigning. It was this disastrous defeat that generated disillusion over the functioning of democracy, and urged the citizens to appoint a commission of ten elderly men to revise the constitution "upon a more economical footing".[94] Democracy, therefore, was not static, but mutable and dynamic. Its principles therefore were not nor could have been the object of any form of political "religion". As L.J. Samons II wrote, even the cult of Democracy seems to have been the product "of particular historical circumstances rather than any beliefs that democracy or 'liberty and equality' served as the underlying principles of Athenian society or government".[95]

Greek critics of democracy often pointed at the disorder caused by an incessant political activity, where magistrates could work their way through their term in office without ever reporting to the council of the assembly, due to the quantity of business to be dealt with.[96] The Old Oligarch also blames democracy for turning Athens into a more mundane place, where the traditional sporting and music competitions and the ceremonies to honour the gods, traditional showcases to aristocratic excellence, had become a huge feast for the masses, who otherwise would not have been able to enjoy those pleasures.[97] These were the setbacks of a system based on formal, institutionalised equality. In Aristotle's *Politics*, democracy gets defined by the right of all citizens to govern and be governed in turn.[98] In this respect, democracy is the very opposite of aristocracy, where power belongs to a group of individuals of superior worth, as defined by birth (*genos*) or personal

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[91] Herodotus, 6.131. On the use, or lack of it, of *demokratia* see M. Hansen, (1999), pp. 16, 69–71.

[92] [Aristotle], *Constitution of the Athenians* 41. Cleisthenes' reforms were the second *metabole* really to move forward the process of democratisation, following the laws of Solon (third *metabole*), cp. Chambers (1961), pp. 22–5.On Aristotle's political logic-teleology, see Loraux, (1991), pp. 67–74; Chambers (1961), pp.34–6.

[93] Ibid., 22.3.

[94] Thucydides 8.1; cp. LJ. Samons II, *What's Wrong*, pp. 92–5.

[95] See Samons (2004), pp. 171–6.

[96] [Ps. Xenophon], *Constitution of the Athenians* 3.1–4.

[97] Ibid., 1.13, 3.8.

[98] Aristotle, *Politics* 6.1317b.

merit (*arete*),[99] whose natural authority does not require a formal endorsement. Democracy, on the other hand, is the realm of "formal equality", where power is the object of debate and contention. It was the daily business of politics and government, debate and decision, discussion and reform, through which the peoples of the villages of Attica became citizens of Athens.

III. Although other Greek *poleis* also boasted democratic governments, the Athenian citizens considered the development of their democratic constitution a process internal to the Athenian community, triggered by the environmental and social conditions of the territory of the city, and by the major events of Athenian history.[100] The Athenians did not "adopt" democracy because they recognised the validity of its founding universal principles. The development of the democratic constitution was simply the natural consequence of the events, the contingencies of Athens' unique history. In its Athenian variety, which the Athenians saw as *the* democratic constitution, *demokratia* could not be seen as a part of any common trans-national heritage. Rather, it was the mark of Athens' unicity, which distinguished the city from the other communities of Greece. To understand this, we might start from Thucydides' account of the causes of the Athenian-Spartan war. The historian calls it the "greatest upheaval" (*kinesis*) in the history of the Greece (and beyond), for both contestants were at the peak of their military power, and their rivalry extended to the rest of the Greek world.[101] But Athens and Sparta were not simply the two powerhouses of Greece; they also – and most critically – represented two different and irreconcilable kinds of power. Thucydides says that the "truest cause" of the conflict was the spectacular growth of Athens, and the "fear" that it brought to the Spartans.[102] The rise of Athens began at the end of the Persian Wars, when Sparta withdrew from the conflict in the eastern Aegean, leaving the command to their future rivals and thus paving the way to the establishment of a strong web of Athenian allies in the Aegean. However, Athens had been developing peculiar characteristics since its earliest past, which Thucydides traces back in the opening chapters of his work, the so-called "Archaeology". At the dawn of its history, Athens was already an exception.[103] When all the other regions of Greece were contested by opposing nomad tribes, and people from all quarters sought refuge in Attica, which was less fertile and therefore less coveted. The Athenians thus became a settled and pacified community at a much earlier stage than the other Greeks, and thus began to devote themselves to naval trades and other pursuits.[104] But Athens remained a relatively secondary player up to time of the Persian Wars. In the following decades, Athens developed a new model of *polis*,

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[99] Ibid., 4.1293b.

[100] See Thucydides, 1.2.5–6.

[101] Ibid., 1.1, 18.2–3.

[102] Thucydides, 1.23.4–6.

[103] See Ellis (1991), p. 366.

[104] Thucydides, 1.5.5–6.

based on democratic governance and naval rule, had come to upset not only the established balance of power, but also values that were deeply embedded in traditional Greek mentality.

Conclusions: Rethinking Democracy, Rethinking Athens

As Valery Giscard d'Estaing assumedly once said, "a Europe without Greece would have been like a child without birth certificate". Europe needed Greece, it was the cradle of that common cultural heritage which the ambitious project of a united Europe rested on. Democracy was of course the most precious legacy we have received from Greece; for the faith in democracy was the central pillar of a common European heritage and of a common European nation. Now the process of European integration is faltering, and the idea of democracy as a universal value is in crisis. A political and cultural journey, which set off from the ashes of World War II, seems to have come to a standstill. Questions are being asked as to how to restore our trust in democracy and how we should rethink it in the light of the revolutionary transformations of the last decades, and of those to come. If "remembrance of things past" is vital to refresh our democratic ideas,[105] can Athens still stand tall and proud amongst our inspirations?

If the twentieth century was the "democratic century",[106] we might wonder what role democracy might have in the forthcoming decades, and what is going to be of her. But the real question is, what democracy are we talking about? One might wonder whether, by putting democracy on a pillar, we have somehow betrayed her original spirit. We know that well before the times of classical Greece, communities in various parts of the world governed themselves through forms of collective decision-making. The citizens of Athens made the political assembly the centre of their identity and came to call their city a "democracy". Naturally it would be frivolous to stress the different political and social standards between a small, entrenched community living twenty-five centuries ago in a corner of the eastern Mediterranean and the complex societies of the global world. However, in the game of differences and similitudes, there are certain points that have been generally overlooked and should be brought into the debate. Unlike the post-World War II perception of democracy, the Athenians' *demokratia* was not meant to be a weapon for political soul-saving. Also, it never took itself for granted.

Imagine to be visiting Athens right now, and you would in all likelihood see yourself looking up at the majestic stones of the acropolis, the Parthenon and the other surrounding edifices. But democracy actually resided everywhere, in other, much more unassuming diggings. The *bouleuterion*, or "council-chamber", was a small, not particularly solemn building in the central square of the city, the *agora*. The latter was the place where the history of the city was celebrated in the

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[105] J. Keane (2009), p. 875.

[106] See Sen, (1999), pp. 3–4; Keane, (2009), pp. xxiv, 842.

paintings of the portico, it was the hearth of all the Athenians. Most importantly, it was the place where the people met, mingled and talked to each other. But the heart of Athenian democracy was the *pnyx*, the meeting place of the citizens' assembly, and this was nothing more than a dusty slope one kilometre west of the acropolis, with a small podium for the speaker and very little further infrastructure. Critics might have been right in pointing out that democracy had turned Athens into a more profane place, but that was exactly the point of popular government. For democracy did not put anything or anybody on a pillar, not even herself, nor did it ever had its founding principles engraved on stone. This is perhaps one of the reasons why we lack an extensive theory of politics – like those of Plato and Aristotle – sympathetic to democracy.[107]

Democracy somehow escaped extensive theorisation owing to its own nature of daily engagement on ever-new issues, problems and challenges. The Old Oligarch complained that in a democracy absolutely everybody is free to speak his mind. In fact, democracy throve on frank speech. A worthy politician was always supposed to have the courage to speak out the truth without when addressing his fellow-citizens; the Greeks called this *parrhesia*.[108] It was a risky game, as it has been observed, but democracy was a dangerous business, and one had to be prepared to take on her fair amount of challenges without fear.[109] With all its bluntness, democracy lashed out at its enemies and the threats growing around it. Democracy was unconceivable without the risk of internal *stasis*, and its enemies abroad.

This is an important lesson for modern democracies. The Athenians were not afraid of bringing the language of confrontation and crisis into the political debate. If democracy does in fact thrive in humility,[110] it must have the courage to articulate its internal conflicts and external threats. Nor should we forget that "crisis" is also a Greek world, as old at the very least as "*polis*" and "democracy".

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[107] See Dahl, (1989), p. 14.

[108] See e.g. Demosthenes, *Third Olynthiac* 3.

[109] See Monoson (2000), pp. 54–6; cp. Markovitz (2008), pp. 67–8.

[110] Keane (2009), p. 855.

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Part II

The Internet and Political Participation

EU Democracy and E-Democracy: Can the Two Be Reconciled?

Fernando Mendez

1   Introduction

> Neither E-democracy nor EU-democracy exists. Both are projects that have been imagined
> and advocated by theorists and practitioners, but have not been realised –yet. Philippe
> Schmitter (2005).

With these opening words to a book chapter Philippe Schmitter pondered the nexus between new technologies and EU democracy. As a leading scholar of democratisation and a long-time student of European integration, Schmitter is well placed to comment on the EU's democratisation potential. His use of the word -yet- implies that there is potential for further democratisation of the EU and that, perhaps, such democratisation will have an ICT component. This, at least, was the general thrust of his argument. In this chapter we shall take Schmitter's statement as a point of departure for interrogating the e-democratisation potential of the EU. However, before doing so it will be necessary to offer some further clarification on the use and understanding of the two concepts at the core of our inquiry.

The first clarification relates to the EU. On some accounts, as the Schmitter quote above suggests, EU democracy does not yet exist in a meaningful sense. This may appear puzzling. Is the EU not equipped with a parliamentary chamber housing euro deputies that are directly elected by EU citizens? Does the EU not possess a "competitive" party system in which political parties at the EU level compete on the basis of ideological preferences to influence the scope and direction of EU legislative outputs? The short answer to these questions is: "yes, but..." Over the years this "but" element has generated a vigorous debate on the EU's so-called democratic deficit (e.g. Moracscik 2008, Follesdal and Hix 2006). The debate centres on

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whether a democratic deficit exists in the EU or not. It is a debate that is in great part coloured by one's position on the ontological status of the EU. Is the EU *sui generis*? Or is it merely a peculiar version of a well understood political species? If the latter, then does it resemble a federal form of political organisation or is it more similar to an international organisation? How one answers these ontological questions has a direct bearing on one's position on the democratic deficit. Of necessity we shall sidestep this debate. To engage with it would merely detract from this chapters core aim. I shall therefore remain largely agnostic as to whether an EU democratic deficit exists and instead focus on the EU's democratic potential insofar as the deployment of innovative ICT tools are concerned.

The second clarification concerns the topic of e-democracy. It certainly does not exist. Furthermore, e-democracy as some kind of end state is unlikely materialise for the simple reason that for this to occur a new "e-democracy" paradigm would have to replace our current "liberal democratic" paradigm. Instead, what we are witnessing is innovative experimentation with ICT in the democratic realm at all levels of political aggregation. Whilst some of the tools and applications may transform aspects of the political process, they do not necessarily entail a transformation in the democratic paradigm – certainly not a transformation towards an e-democracy paradigm. This is not to suggest that e-democratic experimentation is unimportant or uninformed by higher level normative goals. Concerning the former I will argue that it is producing real world effects, even in the EU context. But more importantly, I shall also argue that e-democratic innovation is informed, at least implicitly, by normative aims or what philosophers call "intentionality" (Searle 1995). To the extent that important normative concerns are at stake, it may well be more revealing to critically evaluate the normative goals behind much e-democratic experimentation rather than the specificity of the technology used. It is with this narrower conception of e-democratic experimentation in mind rather than an elusive e-democratic paradigm that this chapter is principally concerned.

I shall proceed as follows. In the sections that follow I will begin by further elaborating on the intentionality behind much e-democratic experimentation and link this to contemporary normative theories of democracy. The aim is to identify mechanisms that emanate from particular conceptions of democracy and the extent to which they could be the object of ICT experimentation. In doing so I shall take a look at specific cases of innovative ICT use with a distinctive EU flavour. The cases chosen are meant to be indicative and not in any way exhaustive of the wider process of e-democratic experimentation. They are intended to serve as *vignettes* rather than detailed case studies. The concluding section then brings the four models together in matrix form and offers some speculations about the future of EU related e-democratic innovation.

2 Four Models of E-Democratic Innovation Within a EU Context

A necessary starting point for an exercise of this nature is to begin with a working definition of e-democratic innovation as it is understood in this chapter. I shall tend to employ the broader concept of ICT rather than the internet (although both terms

are used interchangeably) to refer to the vast array of information and communication technologies that have come together to produce a series of technological revolutions in the last decades. I will not dwell on the properties of ICT apart from stating that following Moore's Law (ICT's computational power is supposed to double every 18 months) we can expect ICT-enabled social interaction to continue to increase in its variety and scope for the foreseeable future. The relevant question is therefore what is the likely impact of such technological changes for our current forms of political organisation and for the EU in particular. Rather than focus on the material aspects of ICT we shall try to investigate what it is that these technologies are directed at in relation to the democratic process within the EU context. Philosophers refer to the "directed at" element as "intentionality" and it is a concept that will be used as point of departure for exploring e-democratic innovation in the EU. What, then, is understood by the term e-democratic innovation? The basic claim is that the intentionality behind ICT is directed at specific normative goals and therefore informed by particular conceptions of democracy. There are least four ideal type conceptions of democracy that I shall consider. Their primary focus is on strengthening specific mechanisms of representation, participation, deliberation, or contestation. e-Democratic experimentation can thus be defined as employing different techniques that can aim to (1) increase the *transparency* of the political process and thereby improving mechanisms of representation; (2) enhance the direct involvement and *participation* of citizens (3) improve the quality of opinion formation by creating new spaces of information and *deliberation* and (4) open up new channels of *contestation*. The normative goals italicised in the preceding definition all occupy a large space in contemporary political theory. In the pages that follow we shall look at each in turn and in relation to EU democratisation.

2.1 ICT and Representation

ICT techniques are especially suited for improving the transparency of the political process. This is a rather important principle for the liberal conception of democracy. Its importance stems from the delegated nature of modern political democracy. As one of the foremost democratic theorists reminds us, democracy has had to be re-invented through the ages -the result is what we call representative democracy today (Dahl 1989). As the polity grew in scope and size it became increasingly impractical for citizens to participate in the day to day matters of governing and a division of labour emerged in which citizens would elect their political representative at regular election intervals. On the basis of that electoral mandate, political representatives would get on with the business of governing but would be held accountable through the ex-post sanctioning mechanism of regular elections. For some minimal theorists of democracy, such as Schumpeter, that is more or less what a democratic regime amounted to: simply an efficient method for citizens to choose among a cartel of elites. Once that was done, the elites could get on with the job of governing. A revamped version of this theory exists in contemporary social choice

theory – the essence of which is that a functioning democracy works well to the extent it is able to satisfy individual preferences by aggregating them at the collective level. Such a regime is responsive to the demands of its citizens. Evidently, in this type of political marketplace greater transparency is an important lubricant to the political process because it diminishes the information asymmetries between agents (the citizens) and their principals (the representatives). The result is increased competition among elites, the availability of better signalling, which ultimately may lead to more electoral choice.

It is obvious that within this representative conception, ICT offers some unprecedented opportunities for improving the transparency of the political process and the monitoring of representatives. Today, a rather basic example is a government website. These now contain greater information than ever on parliamentary sessions, or on bills that are pending, or information on delegates', such as their salaries or their declared commercial interests, and so on. There are many countries that now have webcast feeds of live parliamentary debates, committee meetings etc.. Many such government websites are thematically coded and archived in ways that facilitate an easy retrieval of information. EU institutions have a sophisticated web presence in this sense (e.g. the Europa website). In particular the European Parliament and the European Commission have a wealth of electronically archived and coded information that is certainly more transparent than the average of its member states. This much could already be gleaned from an analysis in 2004 of the sophistication of the web sites of the EU and 25 of its current member states (Kies et al. 2004). What the aforementioned analysis revealed was that as far as legislatures were concerned, the EU (i.e. the European Parliament) was well above the member state average. Any researcher working on issues related to what the EU specialises in, namely regulatory policies, will know that the websites of both the European Commission and the European Parliament constitute a rich resource of relatively well organised thematic information on the policy making process (including submissions from interested parties, results from hearings, committee reports, press releases, etc.) that make it possible to reconstruct the policy process. Although much information of this type is readily available this does not necessarily make the EU more transparent to the average EU citizen. Thus the problem may be one that is less related to a purported lack of transparency than to the structural nature of the polity, including its size and scope. We shall return to these issues below.

The EU policy making process is a complex system of multi-level governance and it is not surprising that ICT has come to play a critical role in improving the flow and transparency of information. This applies to the EU's decentralised agencies too (from the ECB to the plethora of specialised EU agencies across the different member states), which apart from fulfilling their specific policy mandates, tend to specialise in producing reports and analysis and therefore use the web as one of their most important tools for disseminating information that is relevant to the European citizenry. None of this implies that European citizens ought to be flocking to EU websites to access such information -or that such a direct interaction with the average EU citizens is necessarily sought (see discussion in model 3 below). That

direct role, as would be the case for most nations let alone a continent sized polity, is played by infomediaries. The latter come in manifold guises (from large media conglomerates to individual bloggers) and together fulfil the critical function of drawing public attention to important issues, setting the political agenda, and generally holding public officials to account. The latter is particularly difficult in the EU context given the great distances between the average EU citizen and officials in the Commission or Euro deputies in the Parliament all of which contribute towards making direct channels of accountability much more opaque. Despite these structural limitations, the EU has sought to deploy ICT to make its multi-layered governance systems more transparent and less opaque. In a way this can be considered relatively straightforward since having an informative web presence lies within the EU's own competencies. Evidently, more could be done, such as for example making the deliberations of the Council more open (an innovation frequently called for by activists). But such a decision would lie with the member states. The EU, in short, would not fare badly in comparison to other continent-sized multi-level polities, such as say the US, in terms of using ICT to make its governance procedures and day to day activities more transparent and it is arguably more open and transparent than most of its constituent units, the member states (Moravcsik 2008).

There is only so much innovation that can be supplied top-down by political institutions no matter how sophisticated their web presence is. Thus an accompanying dimension is the bottom-up one. We have already mentioned the critical role played by websites of politically active infomediaries and civil society organisations, all of which can also become increasingly rich repositories of political information. Today the ability to collect and store masses of political information is unprecedented as is the ability to organise it and retrieve it seamlessly. However, one of the most intriguing elements that flows from the liberal conception is that it is not vital for citizens to necessarily get actively involved in the process of monitoring. This task can be left to the infomediary organisations such as the media and civil society. ICTs in this way can help the infomediaries to keep the representatives in check. Crucially, these ICT developments do not require much time or commitment from citizens since competitive elections at the national level still provide the central mechanism for dismissing representatives and effecting political change at the EU level. Such an understanding chimes with scholars of European integration (e.g. Moravcsik 2008) that argue that the EU is better judged in terms of its policy performance rather than its democratic input (the output legitimacy vs. input legitimacy debate).

There has of course been innovative experimentation with ICT based tools that involve rather more interaction with EU citizens. Here we will focus on an illuminating example of e-democratic experimentation with an explicitly EU dimension, the EU Profiler. The EU Profiler is what some in the academic community (e.g. Cedroni and Garzia 2010) increasingly refer to as "Voting Advice Application" (VAA). The tool was deployed during the 2009 European Parliament elections and is interesting to look at in greater detail in relation to ICT-enabled innovation in the EU context. A VAA type tools fulfil a rather simple function: it

provide a prospective voter using the tool with a best political match (parties or candidates, depending on the type of election and country). They are generally managed by academic teams consisting mainly of political scientists who elaborate a policy questionnaire designed to bring out some of the most salient issues in an electoral campaign. The parties are either self-coded or coded by academic experts on a range of policy questions (in the EU Profiler case it was a combination of both). Once the VAA tool is launched, with the party coded positions registered on the online system, citizens can then fill in online the same policy questionnaire. In many cases, citizens will also be able to weight particular policy items. The online tool then matches the prospective voters with all the parties and produces a rank ordering of parties according to the degree of overlap with the citizen's subjectively stated policy preferences. The overall match with the parties, typically a coefficient that ranges from 0 to 100 with 0 signifying total disagreement and 100 total agreement, is the main output of a VAA. In some cases, such as the EU Profiler, additional multi-dimensional maps are provided to the user. A very interesting feature of the EU Profiler was to locate citizens using the tool in a two dimensional political map. The scatterplot consisted of an x axis (socio-economic left vs. socio-economic right) and a y axis (pro EU integration vs. anti EU integration). Although the two axes are well known to political scientists studying the dimensionality of the European political space (Marks and Steenbergen 2004) it was rather innovative to expose EU citizens to their placement on the European political space. And it appears that many citizens did use the tool, approximately one million of them, according to some of the academics involved (Trechsel and Mair 2011).

The EU Profiler not only broke new ground in VAA development -a large scale academic effort involving over 100 researchers across 27 countries, the coding of 300 parties, and an online tool available in 24 languages- but it also represents somewhat of a milestone in EU e-democratic experimentation. It is illustrative to dwell on the "intentionality" behind the experiment. What was it that the EU Profiler was directed at? What normative goals did it try to address? The simple answer is that the normative aim of such tools is to enhance citizen competence by striving to increase voters' knowledge of the political positions of the parties. Nowhere is this potentially more pertinent than with regard to European Parliament elections which are regularly considered as second-order electoral events. This is not just because they tend to be low salience electoral contest but also, crucially, because they are seen as akin to referendums on the performance of incumbent governments. In other words, European citizens appear not to be voting on the EU issues at stake but instead use euro elections as an opportunity to punish governments. This is not necessarily the fault of the citizens themselves but rather the product of agenda setting and party competition. Indeed, Mair (one of those involved in the EU Profiler experiment) has argued that even when the EU issue is discussed it is the wrong one. Mair's (2007) claim is that member state elites have succeeded in removing the contentious EU issue that most concerns citizens (more vs. less EU integration) from national elections (where it actually matters) and competed on this issue during European Parliament elections (where it presently

does not matter since the European Parliament has no competencies on this dimension). The European Parliament helps to shape the nature and direction of the EU's legislative outputs but not the more vs. less dimension of European integration. Hence the innovation represented by the EU Profiler was to try and reframe the euro elections in terms of the EU issues at stake and to use sophisticated graphical maps to inform the users of their own subjective political preferences and the positions taken by the parties. The hope of the designers is that the users would get better informed and exercise their vote more competently, no doubt based on the outputs of the tool -though this last point is not without its problems.

2.2　　ICT and Participation

The participatory conception of democracy is rather more demanding of the citizen than the previous model (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 2004). In its ideal form it would resurrect many of the perceived positive elements of Athenian democracy, in terms of an assembly of directly participating citizen legislators. Although the modern variant of participatory democracy has many strands to it, there is an identifiable common thread. This is the notion of self government by a community of citizens directly engaged in the process of making the decisions by which their lives are regulated (Fung 2007). Rather than the passive involvement of the representation model, participatory democracy is predicated on an active conception of citizenship. However, as noticed by Rousseau -one of participatory democracy most famous proponents- the model is only suited to small scale communities such as the city-states of Ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, or his own birthplace in the Republic of Geneva, rather than the modern national state. It is precisely on this last point where some theorists see potential for ICT to overcome constraints such as size and scale (Barber 1998; Fung 2007). The starting point for a participatory variant would be at the local level where citizens would interact directly with one another, but could easily be extended to regional and national systems. Furthermore, since political participation is radically incomplete without an actual decision at the end, citizens would need a mechanism to make their preference count. This is where the mechanisms of direct democracy, such as the referendum and the citizens' initiative, come into play.

　　In the participatory model the properties of ICT could operate in a number of ways. In a first step they provide the logistic tools for distributing the flow of information within and across communities at all levels of public aggregation. This is no small achievement even in a medium-sized country let alone a continent-sized democratic polity such as the EU. In a second step, ICT can be used to facilitate the decision-making process through a variety of electronic voting technologies permitting citizens to not only express their preferences on a range of issues but to do so in a convenient and effortless way. In this regard, one could list a host ICT tools that can be used, and are being developed, in order to facilitate citizens' direct participation such as e-voting, e-consultation, e-petition, e-referendums, e-enabled citizens' initiatives, and so forth. Further distinctions such as the degree to which

the results of any ICT-enabled direct participatory mechanism are legally binding on authorities (e-consultation tends not to be whereas an e-enabled referendum might be) and whether they are initiated top down (i.e. e-voting) or from a bottom up process (citizen initiatives). Bearing in mind some of the above, what can we say about explicitly EU participatory innovations involving ICT? One issue that has preoccupied EU elites, especially at the Commission and Parliament, is the continual fall in participation rates for Euro elections. Can new technologies help to arrest this downward trend?

E-voting is a technology that has been variously touted as a possible solution to making participation more convenient. In fact, during the early years of the internet's spectacular proliferation the hopes were rather high for e-voting technologies, by which we primarily refer to remote forms of voting over the internet rather than electronic counting machines or electronic voting machines in kiosks. It seemed a rather straightforward innovation and accordingly during the early 2000s a large number of European democracies adopted e-voting programmes. More than a decade later the successful roll out of e-voting is limited at best to a handful of cases (Mendez 2010). One of these countries is Switzerland, yet it is a non-EU member state and its e-voting system is predominantly used for its system of direct democracy which involves frequent votes (approximately four referendum votes a year on multiple items) rather than parliamentary elections. The only other country to have generalised e-voting, as far a general elections are concerned is Estonia. It held the world's first e-enabled general election on 2007.

So, what can be said about e-voting and European Parliament elections? The first point to note about e-voting and European Parliament elections is that to the extent that it can take place, it is firmly in the hands of the member states, rather than the European Union (Auer and Mendez 2005). This is not unlike the process in many federal systems such as the US or Switzerland where elections are also extremely decentralised affairs. Another obvious remark is that as a so-called second-order electoral event, in contrast to first order general elections, European Parliament elections are a natural test ground for experimentation with e-voting technologies. It is hardly surprising therefore that some pioneer states rolling out e-voting would trial the technology during these electoral contests. What is interesting about such trials are the diverging outcomes produced.

In the case of The Netherlands the genesis of internet voting trials can be traced back to 2000 when a specific programme was set up to implement a plan of electoral modernisation. It was decided that experimentation could be conducted on the politically less salient European Parliamentary elections involving internet voting (as well as telephone voting).[1] However, it was to be only offered to Dutch voters abroad -the most viable "niche" market for experimenting with remote internet voting technologies (Pieter and van Haran, 2007). In 2004 an important European

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[1] See Dutch Evaluation Report on 2004 elections. Experiment with Internet and telephone voting for voters abroad. Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom. Available at: www.minbzk.nl/aspx/download.aspx?file=/contents/pages/10764/041110evaluatierapportexpinternetenteldefversie_eng3.pdf

internet voting milestone was overcome when Dutch citizens abroad voted during the European Parliamentary elections, though this needs to be qualified by the limited nature of the constituency involved. Just over 5,000 votes were cast using the new remote voting facilities with 4,871 voters specifically opting for internet voting as opposed to telephone voting. Emboldened by the success of these limited e-voting trials, the experimentation was extended to the next electoral contest scheduled for 2006. However, in the run up to the general elections worries about electronic counting machines (rather than internet voting per se) became the object of a politicised anti e-voting campaign. It effectively ended e-voting trials, including further scheduled experiments on European Parliament elections which then took place in 2009. A similar story emerged in the UK, where after a successful initial trial during local elections in 2002, internet voting was shelved (including plans to deploy it during the European Parliament elections of 2009) after problems of fraud surrounding postal voting in 2003 (Mendez 2010).

In Estonia a rather different picture emerged. No doubt an important precondition for the success of its e-voting experimentation is the availability of a sophisticated and widely used e-government infrastructure which involves an electronic national identity card or smartcard. The latter solved many of the authentication and verification problems that can afflict the roll out of e-voting. Offering e-voting to an electorate that already had considerable experience in online transactions appeared a logical step forward and this was buttressed by a broader "branding" exercise to put Estonia on the e-democracy map (Drechsler and Madise 2004, p. 97). After some initial political problems, and various trials during local elections, the Estonian government held in March 2007 the first ever general election in which e-voting as mode of participation was offered to the entire electorate. The proportion of those casting an electronic vote amounted to 3.4 % of the electorate (Alvarez et al. 2009). In 2009 another milestone was reached when the Estonians were the first to allow binding forms of internet voting to the entire national electorate for the 2009 European Parliament elections. Although the rate of participation was low - which is quite typical for EU elections- the proportion of votes cast using the internet had nearly doubled from the previous 2007 election to 6.5 %.[2]

Whilst e-voting at the EU level is an interesting case and there will no doubt be more trials to follow in the coming years, it is hardly going to constitute the "magic bullet" to address falling participation rates (Norris 2005). This is for a host of structural reasons that cannot be fixed by technology. If it were possible to address falling participation by making the voting process more "convenient" then a compelling case could perhaps be made. The truth, however, has to do with other structural factors such as the fact that the elections are simply not salient for most voters, and do not appear to produce any noticeable differences for the voters - the so-called "rascals aren't kicked out of office". Technology cannot address these issues only institutional reforms can. In this respect one potentially important

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[2] See the Estonian Electoral Commission website: http://vvk.ee/ep09/index.php?id=11195

democratic innovation of the EU in recent years is the European Citizens Initiative. Many of the member states of the EU make express provision in their basic constitutional arrangement for a variety of types of citizens' initiatives (CI). The procedures vary in important respects and across territorial levels, but the essence of a CI is that a given number of citizens can initiate a process with the potential to culminate in the adoption of a new law or the repeal of a legal act. The ECI will be implemented at the EU level in 2012. Proposals for the inclusion of an EU level CI made their way into the Constitutional Treaty and, after the latter's failure, were incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon. It is worth noting that the envisaged procedure requires the signature of not less than one million citizens from a significant number of member states to submit an initiative to the European Commission within the framework of its powers. Interestingly, the fact that the EU level CI had not yet been formally implemented did not stop organized movements from undertaking online political campaigns using this bottom-up mechanism of direct democracy. In the space of 4 months, between May 2006 and September 2006, over one million signatures were collected online and a petition submitted, the one-seat initiative, for having a single seat for the European Parliament. Evidently, the initiative had no legal effect but the internet mobilisation around it provided a glimpse of how the procedure might work.

It is worth taking a brief comparative perspective on the innovation entailed by the ECI. Although the CI is commonplace in many states, some of the most celebrated cases include California and Italy, it does not exist in any large federation (the closest form of political organisation to the EU). The US, for instance, does not provide for a citizen initiative at the federal level despite its existence in roughly half of its constituent units, e.g. California. The only federal system possessing a citizens' initiative at the federal level is Switzerland. In other words, CI's are quite common in countries, especially at the lower levels of political aggregation, but very rare to find in multi-level polities at the federal level, especially in any large-scale federation. It is in this respect that the ECI represents something of a milestone, although this has to be tempered by the fact that the ECI is really an agenda setting tool given that it does not trigger a mandatory referendum (as it does say in Switzerland or, at the subnational level, in California).

So, how does ICT fit into the ECI equation? Though many aspects of the ECI are not yet clear since at the time of writing the ECI has not yet come into effect, one thing remains rather certain: ICTs are likely to play a fundamental role in various ways, not least the signature gathering process (as we saw above in the context of procedurally invalid "one Europe seat" initiative). To begin with, the registration and management of initiatives (e.g. translation into all the official languages) will be operated via a Commission online system. But the Commission expects much more to be conducted online than mere registration and/or management of administrative procedures related to the ECI. In fact, the most critical element to an ECI - the signature gathering process- will have an online component. To this end, the Commission has made available an open source online collection system that can be deployed by the initiators of an ECI. However, as with other Euro elections which are managed by the member states, certification will be required by the

relevant member state authority. The evolution of the ECI will be keenly watched by EU observers to see what kind of institutional impact it has, if any, and whether it could breed further democratic innovation.

2.3   Deliberation

Of the four models to be discussed in this chapter the deliberative model is the most demanding on citizens. The standard set for the citizen deliberator, who is expected to interact discursively with her fellow citizen interlocutors on the basis of rational debate, is a high one indeed (Fishkin 1991; Fung 2007). The primary intellectual influence for many deliberative democrats is the revival of political philosophy brought about by John Rawls (1971) and the seminal work of Jurgen Habermas (1989) on the public sphere. Reasoned argument lies at the core of the Habermassian tradition that has influenced many deliberative thinkers. Arguing or deliberating acquires some very special procedural characteristics in this conception of democracy. Citizen deliberators need to be capable of imagining themselves stripped of their possible communal associations, ethnic, class, and professional ties, etc. Under such conditions, i.e. an impartial speech setting, political argumentation can take on a more enlightened format and is constrained by the need to argue in terms of a universal common good rather than the particularistic interests of a specific group or constituency. Here the "force of the better argument" is likely to prevail, as is its corollary, a more legitimate public policy. How does the deliberative conception relate to ICT? The simple answer is that ICT can help to create favourable conditions for deliberative interactions by opening up new, online spaces of opinion formation (Delli Carpini et al. 2004). Much hope is placed, therefore, on electronically mediated forums or virtual communities that could be configured to maximise deliberative ideals. Deliberative spaces, say for the formulation of a public policy, could be deliberately engineered by enlightened political authorities and moderated by experts. Furthermore, sponsored e-forums could be designed to maximise the plurality of viewpoints. In the European cases it may even be possible to overcome linguistic barriers or other functional barriers to creating an ideal speech setting.

What can we say about EU related deliberative activity? A simple answer, provided by Mundo (forthcoming), is that between 2001 and 2009 the EU has sponsored no less than 23 exercises in democratic innovation involving an online deliberative component. Habermas' ideas appear to have a welcome reception among EU elites. The first, and possibly the most well-known of these exercises in creating an online European deliberative sphere occurred, rather unsurprisingly, in connection with the EU's biggest constitutional project to date: the European Constitutional Treaty. As a means of accompanying the process of constitution making, the European Commission set up its vanguard *Futurum* debate website.

The most important aim of the Futurum deliberative e-forum was to provide a platform for the exchange of views among citizens and a European public forum for airing the voice of civil society. Crucially, this "could help bring the European Union closer to its citizens and reduce the *perception* of a democratic deficit"

(author's italics). The choice of the term "perception" is interesting and suggests that EU officialdom sides with the critics of the democratic deficit thesis (though they do so for the wrong reasons). Costing over two million Euros, the Futurum e-forum was designed as a so-called asynchronous threaded discussion forum and moderated by the Commission -a fact that makes its status as a general public sphere somewhat questionable (Wright 2007, p. 1171). In a detailed empirical analysis of the Futurum online deliberation Wright (2007, p. 1180) offers a number of interesting conclusions, such as the fact that English became the dominant language and that whilst citizens posted from many countries the participants were definitely unrepresentative, though, according to deliberativeness criteria, the online forum was interactive. In short, the Futurum online deliberative forum facilitated interactive, pan-European discourse. Unfortunately, no amount of online discourse could neutralise the threat to the European Constitutional Treaty -the end product of the European Convention process- which was unceremoniously rejected by French and Dutch voters in two of the referendums that took place in 2005.

In spite of the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005, and its Lisbon Treaty sequel in 2008, EU institutions continued with their e-enabled deliberative exercises. The Commission's reaction to the high profile rejections of the Constitutional Treaty (by two founder member states no less) was to put forward a number of initiatives under the rubric of Plan D. Interestingly, Plan D referred to Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, and "sought to foster communication and debate on the activities of the EU by addressing the need to listen to citizens' expectations" on the Future of the European Union.[3] Mundo (forthcoming) lists no fewer than six initiatives related to the Plan D with an online deliberative component. These include: Speak Up Europe; Our Message to Europe; Radio Web Europe; Our Europe – Our Debate – Our Contribution; 2007 Tomorrow's Europe; European Citizens Consultations 2007. The last of these, European Citizens' Consultations (ECC), was re-launched in 2009. The ECC (not to be confused with the ECI discussed in the previous section) involved a large consortium of many European partner organisations (over 40), co-funded by the European Commission and organised under the patronage of the European Parliament.[4] The consultation took place against the background of the 2009 European Parliament elections and cost 3.8 million Euros. According to its homepage, the "European Citizens' Consultations are the first-ever pan-European debate involving citizens from all 27 Member States to debate the future of the European Union across the boundaries of geography and language." Technically, the ECC went much further than an online forum. It had all the trappings of an online deliberative forum, but also included e-voting technologies for gathering citizens opinions and proposals -of which there were 150,000 online visitors- as well as 1,635 randomly selected citizens from the 27 member states engaged in face-to-face national deliberations

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[3] See http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/a30000_en.htm

[4] See http://www.european-citizens-consultations.eu/

constituting "arguably the broadest and most complex pan-European consultation ever realized" (Kies et al. forthcoming). The fact that it took place and was generally well organised, involved multiple channels (some online others not), crossed linguistic and cultural boundaries, suggests that it is possible to conduct pan-European e-enabled debates. According to Kies et al. (forthcoming) it complied with common deliberative standards, which was no doubt due also to the introduction of national web-forums.

In short, most examples of EU level induced deliberation generate similar problems. Namely the over representation of those already interested in the topic and a limited policy impact of the "deliberations" or "recommendations" that emanate from such exercises. Nonetheless, both the Futurum deliberative debates and the ECC 2009 were certainly innovative experiments which can be considered successful as a civic engagement exercise rather than in their actual policy impact. In particular the approach of the multi-layered ECC in terms of both the vertical (territorial) and horizontal (multiple-channels) dimension is interesting. No doubt this is the only feasible option for a continent-sized multi-level polity such as the EU.

2.4   Contestatory Model

If participatory democracy, let alone the liberal representative conception, does not ask enough of citizens in terms of self reflection, then it appears that deliberative democracy asks too much. Normative theorists are right to warn of the problem of e-democratic innovations that involve "nothing much more than pushing buttons and casting votes" (van den Hoven 2005, p. 54). On the other hand, deliberative democrats may be parting from a misguided standpoint. Dahlberg (2007, p. 833) for instance, is critical of the assumption of a unified "Cartesian type subject that can clearly communicate their position and understand the others meaning." Citizens may not be prepared to incur the substantial information and transaction costs that the deliberative ideal involves. This gives rise to an alternative model of democracy. A key thinker in this regard has been Philip Pettit and his idea of a contestatory dimension to democracy. Democracy, according to Pettit, has two important dimensions. The first is the familiar one of giving the people electoral control over government. But beyond the electoral dimension there is also the idea of giving people contestatory control -a power that stems from the ability to contest government decisions effectively. It is simply insufficient to wait for the next scheduled electoral contest. Channels of contestation are needed to make it possible to scrutinize policy implementation and to guard against abuses, such as when those in power allow factors that are not in the people's interest to influence them. Whilst the electoral mandate provides for authorship of policy, Pettit (2000) argues that this must be counter-balanced by a wiki-like dimension (author's ICT metaphor rather than Pettit's) involving ex-post scrutiny and censorship. The contestatory mode envisaged by Pettit gives the people editorship and censorship over collective decision making. A stronger version of the contestatory idea is favoured by radical democrats and agonists (Mouffe 2000; Dahlberg 2007). Influenced by thinkers such

as Carl Schmitt or Hanah Arendt and rejecting the rationality implied by Harbamassian style deliberation, they argue that conflict is at the core of the political process. Politics is primarily antagonistic and because of this rational, deliberatively induced consensus is neither desirable nor achievable. The task, according Mouffe (2000), is to retain contestation and conflict in the political sphere while removing from the latter the elements of oppression and violence.

How does ICT fit into the contestatory or agonistic models? We noted in the definition of e-democracy the possibility of ICT to open up new channels of contestation. ICTs provide citizens with an unprecedented resource to monitor and to contest at various levels. There could be indirect forms, for instance, where ICT serves to enhance the logistics of social protest and keep various networks connected through to more direct forms of web based protest such as forms of activism. Without denying the range of opportunities offered to new social movements by the internet, we need not restrict our horizon solely to forms of social protest. Apart from e-enabled mobilisation there are manifold ways in which the power of ICT can be utilised to give voice to alternative viewpoints in the public debate and to press specific issues that are typically ignored by the mainstream media. The internet is particularly well suited for providing the informational basis for the "contesting citizen" (van den Hoven 2005).

Paradoxically, the internet itself has also become the object of contestation in the EU context. This is because much of the legislation that regulates the internet in the EU emanates directly from Brussels, even if it is later transposed into member state law. The crucial policy battles, in other words, take place first at the EU level. Various legislative packages, including the EU's copyright directive, a number of telecoms packages, which include provisions on the retention of personal data, have been contested by EU-based activists. Mobilised against the corporate owners of creative content, such as the music labels or the film industry, which previously virtually monopolised the legislative process surrounding the regulation of intellectual property rights, this new front of consumers of creative content has acquired a new political voice. Indeed, the movement has spawned political parties across Europe, such as the Pirate Party, which has even gained representation in the last European Parliament election of 2009.

A rather more critical movement which gained prominence over the last decade is the European Social Forum (ESF). Although it belonged to the wider group of anti-globalisation social movements it took on a critical position against the EU, and in particular its market creating bias and neo-liberal policy agenda. The ESF social movement was ideologically informed by anti-capitalist values and brought together a pan-European network of NGOs and grassroots movements. The best description of the ESF is provided on its homepage as "an open space where civil society groups and movements opposed to neo-liberalism...come together to pursue their thinking, to debate ideas democratically, to formulate proposals, to share their experiences freely and to network for effective action."[5] That mission

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[5] See welcome page of the ESF at: http://www.fse-esf.org

statement more or less encapsulates some of the thinking behind the contestatory model. For this type of new social movement formed by networks of activists that are often geographically dispersed ICTs were crucial (della Porta and Mosca 2005). As well as helping to reduce communications cost and the logistics of mounting Europe-wide campaigns ICT also served another function which is dear to radical democracy theorists: helping to air alternative viewpoints. This is particularly difficult for these types of social movements because the mainstream media coverage of protest events tends to focus on law and order, rather than the substance of their policy grievances. Notwithstanding the negative coverage in the mass-media, a series of surveys (see della Porta and Mosca 2005) suggest that the movement was successful in sensitising public opinion on important issues related to the process of globalisation/Europeanization. Even if the movement websites rarely got direct media coverage, the Internet plays a fundamental cognitive function in circumventing mass-media.

In many respects the European Social Forum, which was prominent between 2001 and around 2007, has faded somewhat. It has left an open space and lack of an organised movement to contest the policy response by the EU and its member states in the wake of the financial crisis. It is still too early to tell what the full implications of the measures pursued, largely by the Southern periphery of the Eurozone, will be in the medium term. New forms of social protest are likely to continue. Some spontaneous, and rather fragmented, forms of social protest have emerged. Key amongst these was the group of "Indignados" and the later "Occupy" movements. What was interesting about these later protest movements, in contrast to the "older" ESF, was the innovative use of social networking tools, and in particular Facebook and Twitter (Pianta 2012). Indeed, the Indignados' movements mobilised initially almost exclusively via Facebook. Furthermore, Indignados in various European countries managed to acquire extensive mainstream media attention through the organisation of "Sunday virtual marches" (these events were entirely online affairs using social network technologies). In short, the financial crisis has opened up new spaces for contesting Europe and the particular responses being pursued by member states, which appears to many of the peripheral Eurozone member states as being imposed by largely unaccountable bureaucrats from Brussels. How this will affect attitudes to the EU in these countries remains to be seen.

Conclusions

In this brief tour of the emerging EU e-democratic landscape I have tried to provide a sketch, albeit a very selective one, of examples that could be considered instructive of broader normative visions of how to democratise the EU and the role of ICT therein. Some of the cases mentioned were well known, others less so. Many involved a distinct top-down element whilst others were the results of bottom-up initiatives. At the same time, the aim has been to show both the promises and the serious limits confronting designers of e-democratic exercises. But more importantly, the bigger aim was to show how e-democratic experimentation cannot be divorced from particular conceptions of democracy. The various elements are summarised in the matrix below.

The table is an attempt to draw attention to the intentionality behind much e-democratic innovation and specifically to hone in on some of the underlying assumptions. To which broader conception of democracy does the particular innovation contribute? How do they view the citizen and, crucially, which particular gap do they intend to fill? For most models, except for perhaps the representative one, the EU gaps are perceived as large and warranting a sustained democratic input. No proponent of any particular model is likely to seriously think that ICT could close the gaps in any meaningful way, especially in relation to the EU. But that is not, of course, the point. Those gaps exist as much in contemporary nation states as they do in the multi-layered polity that we call the EU. Thus part of the effort was to show that the EU has made some serious efforts at ICT enabled democratisation. But the innovations most likely to have an impact are also less likely to be in the hands of EU elites in the Commission or in the Parliament. The greatest pressures for democratic reform are likely to emanate from either bottom up movements in the form of greater contestation over Europe or from the member states themselves -the latter, after all, are ultimately the masters of the Treaties. What is surely also the case is that further serious efforts to reform the EU will involve an important ICT element.

Annex

Table A1 Conceptions of e-democracy

	Representative	Participatory	Deliberative	Constestatory
Model of democracy	Social choice theory	Participatory	Deliberative	Agonistic
Ideal of citizen	Citizen as preference maximiser	Citizen as legislator	Citizen as rational discussant	Citizen as non-conformist; monitorial citizen
Gap filled by ICT	Improve transparency	Create new channels of participation	Enhance potential for deliberation	Open up new channels for constestation
Examples of technologies	VAAs	Voting technologies	e-Forums	Social media (especially Facebook, Twitter)
EU-related examples	Europa website	E-voting	Futurum forum	European Social forum
	EU Profiler	ECI	ECC	Indignados

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The Internet as a New Channel for Political Participation?

Lorenzo Mosca

1 Introduction: Internet as an Opportunity for Resource-Poor Actors

This chapter moves from the recent debate on the democratic potential of the internet. This discussion has often been dominated by the confrontation between pessimistic and optimistic views, especially over the potential contribution of new technologies to improve political participation and democracy. The internet has been considered by some a medium that favours those already interested and engaged in politics (Norris 2001). Other scholars claim that it can reduce political inequalities (Meyers 2001). Indeed, the internet multiplies the channels for political information and participation at the micro level, provides new opportunities for communication, mobilisation and organisation at the meso-level, and creates new pluralistic arenas where citizens can discuss issues of general interest directed towards the public good at the macro level (della Porta and Mosca 2005a).

A discussion of the democratic potential of the internet should take into account the traditional critique concerning the democratic deficit of this medium: the digital divide. In fact, even in rich and technologically developed countries a significant part of the population is still excluded from access to this medium. As Norris (2001) noted, digital differences emerge in access between different territorial levels (not only between rich or poor macro-regions, but also between nations with similar levels of wealth located in the same macro-region), between different social classes in the same nation (penalising groups of citizens who lack economic and cultural resources), and between social sectors with different degrees of interest in politics (favouring groups of citizens already active and interested in politics). A large number of studies demonstrate that people without access to the internet have peculiar socio-demographic characteristics. As a matter of fact internet access

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reflects a gender divide, a generation divide, an ethnic divide, a wealth divide and an education divide, as this medium is more likely to be used by young, male, affluent, white, and educated people. While the digital divide in terms of access is gradually closing (at least in more developed countries), new types of divides emerge among people connected to the internet which are related to motivations, competencies and use (van Dijk 2005). Moreover, the concept of digital inequalities – which goes beyond a one-dimensional and binary logic of digital divide (connected/ disconnected) – concerns multiple dimensions such as technological access, autonomy, social support, skill and type of use (Hargittai 2004, p. 141).

Recent studies have focused on the use of new technologies by civil society organisations and individuals, with particular attention paid to the internet. Electronic networks have been considered the backbone of new transnational social movements[1] which gained media visibility from "the battle of Seattle" on (Bennett 2003). Being bi-directional, interactive and cost-less, they allow for the construction of new public arenas where social movements can organise mobilisations, discuss and negotiate their claims, strengthen their identities, sensitise public opinion and directly express acts of dissent (della Porta and Mosca 2005a).

Internet research has been characterised by methodological pluralism (Garrett 2006). Studies on the individual level have been undertaken through online surveys that are generally based on self-selected samples, often raising problems of reliability (Best and Krueger 2004). However, more recently some studies have looked at the political use of the internet in representative sample of citizens (see Di Gennaro and Dutton 2006; Quintelier and Vissers 2008; Anduiza et al. 2010; Hirzalla and van Zoonen 2011). Online activism has also been studied focusing on quasi-random sample of websites, independently of the actors (individuals or organisations) behind it (Earl and Kimport 2011).

As for the organisational level, the online presence of different political organisations has been investigated through the content analysis of websites (for parliaments and political parties see Coleman et al. 1999; Gibson et al. 2003; Trechsel et al. 2003; for civil society organisations and social movements see della Porta and Mosca 2005b; Van de Donk et al. 2004; Vedres et al. 2005); mailing-list analysis (Kavada 2006; Wall 2007); search engine analysis (Zimmermann and Koopmans 2003); link analysis (Koopmans and Zimmermann 2005) and with the case-study approach (Pickerill 2003; Gillan et al. 2011). Such research has provided important insights into how these organisations use the internet for acting politically by other means.

In what follows, I will address the political use of the internet by the Global Justice Movement (GJM) devoting attention to both the organisations and the individuals involved in the movement. I will show how the internet is used politically by participants in social movements taking into account those factors that can explain different styles of internet use. My hypothesis is that offline

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[1] Social movements are defined as "informal networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilise about conflictual issues, through the frequent use of various forms of protest" (della Porta and Diani 1999, p. 16).

experiences (organisational and participatory ones) define the political profile of individuals that is then consistently expressed online.

In this chapter I will present data that was gathered with quantitative and qualitative instruments employed during different researches: a survey of participants in the fourth European Social Forum (ESF) (Athens, May 4–6 2006)[2] and a series of interviews with spokespersons of different social movement families[3] of the Italian GJM.[4] While quantitative data allows for the checking of some relations among variables concerning the political use of the internet, qualitative data will provide more detailed information on internet use in the everyday life of activists and organisations.

Concerning the survey, as it is almost impossible to build a casual sample of participants in a protest event, I worked with a "non-probability sampling design" (Corbetta 2003, pp. 221–223).[5] The sampling strategy was based on previous surveys of participants in Italian social movement events like the Genoa G8 counter-summit in 2001 and the Florence European Social Forum in 2002 (Andretta et al. 2002; della Porta et al. 2006; see also della Porta 2009). Data was collected through a self-administered paper-based questionnaire.[6]

The non-probabilistic nature of the sample does not allow strong inferences to be made. Thus, I present only descriptive statistics and non-parametric correlations in order to give an idea of the strength of the relations between variables.[7] It is worth underlining that the findings provide information on the participants in a specific movement event but cannot be considered generalisations for the social movement population (for a discussion on the limits and opportunities of this type of survey see Blanchard and Fillieule 2006; Walgrave and Verhulst 2008).

As for the qualitative part of this chapter, I interviewed the spokespersons of different groups belonging to different Italian social movement families engaged in mobilisation on the issues of globalisation, democracy, and social justice: from political parties to unions, from large associations and NGOs to small informal

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[2] More information on the European social forum process can be found in della Porta 2009.

[3] The concept of social movement family has been proposed by della Porta and Rucht (1995) to indicate sets of movements of similar type (i.e. new social movements, left libertarian movements, etc.) sharing a number of values and a similar political culture.

[4] Both researches took place within the Demos project between 2006 and 2008. The project was coordinated by Donatella della Porta and focused on conceptions and practices of democracy in the European Global Justice Movements (http://demos.eui.eu).

[5] A probabilistic sample could not be built since for civil society events it is impossible to know exactly the characteristics of the population participating (indeed, lists of participants do not even exist).

[6] Most members of the Demos project plus some additional collaborators (for a total of 19 researchers) participated in the distribution and collection of the questionnaires.

[7] All results of non-parametric correlations presented in this article have been previously checked with results obtained through cross-tabulations and other descriptive techniques. The significance levels of coefficients presented throughout the paper are reported as follows: ** means significance at the 0.01 level; * means significance at 0.05 level.

groupings. During the interviews I asked to indicate both the strengths and weaknesses of internet communication.

While the first part of the chapter focuses on quantitative findings concerning the individual level, the second presents qualitative results regarding the organisational level (interviews).

2 The Political Use of the Internet by Participants in the European Social Forum

In this section the focus will be on the political use of the internet by individuals taking part in social movement events. In what follows, I will present some results of a survey of the participants in the ESF that was held in Athens on May 3–6, 2006.[8] The questionnaires (translated into English, Italian, Spanish, German, French and Greek) were distributed at the main entrance of the Forum, in the common spaces and during the workshops. We used a double sampling strategy, the main one being random, the second one over-sampling the activists coming from the countries selected for the project (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom). About 1,200 questionnaires (with a return rate of more than 30 %) were returned at our desk at the entrance of the building where the ESF was held. Given the logistical challenges of our survey, this return rate – similar to those obtained in previous research – can be considered as satisfactory (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). The questionnaire, focusing mainly on conceptions and practices of democracy within the movement, also contained some batteries concerning internet use.

First, the sample included people engaged in social movements which are characterised by an intense use of the internet to organise and carry out political actions (della Porta and Mosca 2005a; for similar findings see also Van Laer 2007). The issues around which they mobilise are scarcely considered by the traditional mass media, and are under-represented in parliamentary arenas. Consequently, the internet was heavily used: 88.2 % of respondents declared that they use it. Overall, less than one tenth of the interviewees never accessed the internet.[9]

The internet is not just a medium that provides alternative information. It can also be seen as a resource that supports political participation in several ways: by providing a new platform for debate and engagement, or by complementing offline participation through, for instance, facilitating organisation and communication between people already involved in social and political networks.

The political use of the internet has to be understood as using the internet to gather political information, to discuss political issues and to perform acts of dissent online. In order to assess if and how the internet is used politically by participants in

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[8] The survey was coordinated by Donatella della Porta.

[9] Among those who declared they did not access the internet, 51.7 % were men, 59.4 % were undergraduates, 49.6 % were more than 29 years old.

Fig. 1 Political use of the internet by social movement participants

social movement protest events, interviewees were asked about how they use the internet when online. The questionnaire contained indicators concerning the following types of internet political use: to exchange political opinions; to communicate with one's own group; to support online petitions and campaigns; and to perform online forms of action (e-petitions, net-strikes,[10] etc.).

As can be seen in Fig. 1, the internet is used to engage in interactive communication, exchanging political opinions in forums/mailing-lists/chats (75.7 % did it at least sometimes) or to communicate with one's own political group (80 %). The results are quite different if we consider another dimension of the political use of the internet, which is to practice online forms of action. While the internet is broadly used to support online campaigns and petitions (85 % of interviewees do that), less than one third of respondents ever participated in online "radical" forms of action (such as the net-strike). At this stage it is difficult to go behind the quantitative results to explain why "radical" online forms of action are scarcely practiced by participants in protest events. Just as in the offline realm (Arnstein 1969), there is evidence of the existence of what we can call a "ladder of online participation" whereas less costly actions such as discussing are more widespread while more costly activities such as protesting are less practiced. However, other studies (della Porta and Mosca 2005b) lead us to hypothesise that this findings on radical online protest seems to be related to two different factors: firstly, the fact that information on the existence and the functioning of acts of electronic disturbance is not widely widespread among participants and, secondly, the fact that such

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[10] Net-striking consists of a large number of people connecting simultaneously to the same domain at a prearranged time, in order to "jam" a site considered a symbolic target, in order to make it impossible for other users to reach it (Jordan 2002).

online actions are perceived as ineffective and often disregarded by the targets to whom they are directed (Mosca and Santucci 2009). More explanation of this will be provided in the qualitative section of this chapter.

Summarising, the data shown demonstrates that the internet is used politically at different rates by participants in the ESF: mostly for discussing in on-going assemblies with one's own political groups online and to campaigning and petitioning online. To a lesser extent, the internet is used to express political opinions online via forums, mailing-lists, blogs, etc. Engaging in acts of electronic disturbance (i.e. net-strikes and mail-bombings) is instead still restricted to a reduced quota of participants in protest events.

In order to provide some tentative explanations of the political use of the internet, I created synthetic indexes aggregating various indicators. This applies to the indexes of offline participatory experiences, offline organisational experiences, and political use of the internet.[11] Even if correlation coefficients do not tell us anything about the direction of a relation between variables, I hypothesise that offline (organisational and participatory) experiences could explain the political use of the internet to discuss politics online, to support online campaigns and to perform radical acts of dissent on the Net.[12]

It is worth noting that offline experiences and the political use of the internet are significantly correlated. The index of political use of the internet is in fact

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[11] The indicators aggregated in the index of offline participatory experiences were dummy variables concerning the following forms of action: trying to persuade someone to vote for a party, working in a political party, signing a petition/referendum, attending a demonstration, handing out leaflets, participating in a strike, practicing civil disobedience, participating in non-violent direct actions, boycotting products, occupying public buildings (i.e. schools, universities, etc.), occupying abandoned homes and/or land, participating in cultural performances as a form of protest, participating in a blockade, using violent forms of action against property. The indicators aggregated in the index of offline organisational experiences were dummy variables concerning the following organisations: political party, trade union, socialist organisation, communist organisation, Trotskyist organisation, anarchist group, group against neo-liberal agenda, local social forum, women's group, environmental/anti-nuclear organisation, peace group, religious group/community, charity organisation/social voluntary, human rights organisation, consumerism/fair trade group, gay/lesbian/transgender rights organisation, development aid organisation, international solidarity organisation, autonomist/social centre, anti-racist, immigrant rights or pro-immigrants group, unemployed organisation, student group and alternative media. The index of the political use of the internet included the above mentioned indicators: express political opinions in forums/mailing lists/chats/blogs etc.; exchange information online within your political group; sign online petitions or participate in campaigns through e-mail and/or mailing-lists/chat; participate in a net-strike and/or other forms of radical online protest.

[12] Even if I do not want to disregard the impact of the internet in shaping ways in which politics is perceived and experienced – especially by younger generations – it is clear that political socialisation, political culture and the values of the interviewees are mainly the product of offline processes.

associated both with organisational experiences (0.257**) and with participatory experiences (0.276**).[13]

This result is interesting in that it seems to support those scholars (i.e. Norris 2001) who claim that online participation does not come out of the blue but is indeed related to offline participation. However, these data only refer to politically active citizens and do not tell us anything about the political use of the internet of unengaged citizens. More research is needed on the latter because only by focusing on those citizens who are not active offline can we assess the real capacity of the internet to involve previously unengaged citizens in politics.

Another interesting result that requires more discussion concerns the fact that we did not find relevant differences in the correlation between political use of internet on the one side and participatory and organisational experiences on the other. If we compare this data with the results of another survey based on a questionnaire with similar items which was carried out in a demonstration against the Bolkestein directive (Mosca 2010)[14] we note that in a political event like the ESF – which requires non-Greek activists to move to another country in order to attend – the political use of the internet is more related with organisational experiences. This could be explained by the fact that the participation in the ESF was facilitated by the organisations which settled up the meeting while the cost of taking part in a demonstration (like the one on the Bolkestein directive) that does not require a long and expensive journey to attend did not need to be lowered by organisations.

3   Do Offline Experiences Matter in Explaining the Political Use of the Internet?

It is interesting to open the "black boxes" of organisational and participatory experiences in order to assess which specific forms of organisational and participatory practices are more likely to be associated with the political use of the internet. Are experiences in different social movement families related to different styles of using the internet politically? More specifically, are experiences in new social movements more likely to be associated with the political use of the internet than those in solidarity movements? Are there differences in the political use of the internet between people with organisational experiences in new left and old left groups? Do people with diverse repertoires of action make a different political use of the internet? Are unconventional or moderate repertoires more likely to be related to the political use of the internet than radical or traditional ones?

In order to provide an answer to these questions, organisational and participatory experiences have been split into different categories. In relation to organisational experiences (Table 1), I created four categories recalling different movement

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[13] Partial correlations controlled for the following variables: gender, education.

[14] The demonstration took place in Rome in October 15, 2005. More information on the Bolkestein directive and the mobilization against it can be found in Parks (2006).

Table 1 Organisational experiences and political use of the internet (Kendall's tau-b)

| Political use of the internet | Organisational experiences | | | |
	Old left	Solidarity movements	New social movements	New left
Expressing opinions in forums	0.171**	0.182**	0.220**	0.277**
Communicating with own group	0.250**	0.179**	0.214**	0.290**
Petition/campaigns	n.s.	0.173**	0.239**	0.173**
Radical online actions	n.s.	n.s.	0.118**	0.134**
Additive index	0.197**	0.219**	0.277**	0.313**

Note: Partial correlations controlled for the following variables: gender and education.

families: "old left", "new social movements", "solidarity movements" and "new left".[15] The hypothesis behind this classification of organisational experiences is that different movement families would adopt (and adapt to their needs) the internet in different ways. Diverse social movement families have in fact different identities, organisational formulas, repertoires of action, forms of communication, decisional styles etc. that affect their technological choices. This hypothesis could also be framed in terms of path-dependency (Pierson 2000): previous steps done by an organisation (in this case, a social movement family) in a certain direction (i.e. use of technology; strategies of communication, etc.) lead to further movement in the same direction.

Table 1 shows that experiences in old left and solidarity movements are weakly associated with the political use of the internet, mostly for expressive purposes; participation in the activities of new social movements, compared with other organisational experiences, are particularly related to supporting online campaigns/petitions; and engagement in new left is especially associated with the expressive dimension of the political use of the internet but also with its contentious dimension (protesting online).

Considering the additive index of the political use of the internet, a certain variance among organisational experiences in different social movement families was found. Taking into account different organisational experiences, we notice that only certain types of experience are not associated with the political use of the internet while others are more associated with it: experiences in new left or new

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[15] Clusters of organisational experiences were built on the basis of the score of correlation coefficients concerning similar organisational experiences. The additive index "old left" includes the following organisational experiences: political party, trade union, socialist, communist, anarchist and Trotskyist organisation. The additive index "new social movements" includes the following organisational experiences: women's group, environmental/anti-nuclear organisation, peace group, and consumerist/fair trade group. The additive index "solidarity movements" includes the following organisational experiences: charity organisation/social voluntary, religious group/religious community, human rights organisation, gay/lesbian/transgender rights organisation, development aid organisation and international solidarity organisation. The additive index "new left" includes the following organisational experiences: autonomist/social centre, anti-racist, immigrant rights or pro-immigrants group, unemployed organisation, student group, local social forum, against neo-liberal economic agenda and alternative media.

social movements are more likely to be related to the political use of the internet. Organisations belonging to the new left family like social centres are close to the hacking culture and have been at the forefront of innovative (and contentious) use of the internet (see Freschi 2003). Many alternative media and many groups active on immigrants' rights have been born within social centres and developed later as something independent. Student groups also rely heavily on internet communication, this sector of the population being among one of the most wired (Calenda and Meijer 2008). As for new social movements, even if technology has been seen with scepticism by environmentalists, most of them have eagerly adopted the internet (Pickerill 2003, p. 36). Peace groups (belonging to the family of new social movements, too) have particularly used Computer-Mediated Communication to organise important global days of action like the worldwide 15th February protest in 2003 (Walgrave and Rucht 2010; see also Gillian et al. 2011). The internet has also helped the international coordination of women's groups, playing a key role in the development of the World March of Women (Leonardi 2000), though it also caused challenges because of access problems in the Global South (Guay 2002).

As for participatory experiences (see Table 2), the repertoire of action was divided into four groups: traditional, moderate, unconventional and radical.[16] Looking at the table below, we again notice that the association with the political use of the internet varies greatly depending on different forms of action.

While having practiced traditional and moderate forms of action is not strongly associated with the political use of the internet, experiences of unconventional and radical forms of action are clearly associated with it. However, while unconventional and radical forms are primarily associated with expressive uses of the internet, both tend to be also associated with internet use directly oriented towards protest (mostly petitions in the former group and mainly radical online actions in the latter). First of all, the low association between traditional repertoires of action and the political use of the internet could be explained by the fact that the index was built to include forms of action related to traditional political actors like parties and unions, not amongst those more oriented toward a creative and inventive (political) use of the internet. The interesting result is that less conventional forms of action such as boycotts, non-violent direct actions and cultural performances are more associated with the political use of the internet. Boycotts can be considered an

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[16] Clusters of participatory experiences were built on the basis of the score of correlation coefficients concerning similar participatory experiences. The additive index "traditional experiences" includes the following participation experiences: handing out leaflets, trying to persuade someone to vote for a party, working in a political party and participating in a strike. The additive index "moderate experiences" includes the following participation experiences: signing a petition/public letter and attending a demonstration. The additive index "unconventional experiences" includes the following participation experiences: boycotting products, participating in cultural performances as a form of protest and participating in non-violent direct actions. The additive index "radical experiences" includes the following participation experiences: occupying a public building, occupying abandoned homes and/or land, participating in a blockade, practicing civil disobedience and using violent forms of action against property.

Table 2 Participatory experiences and political use of the internet

	Participatory experiences			
Political use of the internet	Traditional	Moderate	Unconventional	Radical
Expressing opinions in forums	0.184**	0.137**	0.218**	0.303**
Communicating with own group	0.315**	0.235**	0.221**	0.288**
Petition/campaigns	n.s.	0.142**	0.224**	0.190**
Radical online actions	n.s.	n.s.	0.137**	0.185**
Additive index	0.232**	0.200**	0.280**	0.341**

Note: Partial correlations controlled for the following variables: gender and education.

individualised form of action (Micheletti 2003) and this characteristic would fit very well with the political use of the internet which is largely an individual activity. As for cultural performances as a form of protest, this is close to culture jamming which is "a particular contentious, confrontational, and poignant form of discursive political consumerism that politicizes corporate logotypes and does so successfully via the internet" (Micheletti and Stolle 2008, p. 761).

It is worth noting that the data seems to confirm that participants tend to reproduce their offline styles of action online (see also Calenda and Mosca 2007; Hirzalla and van Zoonen 2011). In fact, those interviewees that adopt unconventional repertoires of action are more likely to engage in online forms of action like e-petitioning and e-campaigning while those more used to engage in radical forms of action offline are more likely to employ online "disruptive" forms of action such as acts of electronic disturbance.

4   The Political Use of the Internet by Social Movement Families

After presenting quantitative data gathered on the individual level, this section focuses mostly on qualitative data collected through semi-structured interviews.[17]

As this section is focused on Italian social movement families, before presenting the results of the analysis, it is important to discuss the Italian media system in some

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[17] The selection of interviewees mirrored the variety and heterogeneity of the global justice movement in Italy. I interviewed 19 SMOs including the most relevant ones belonging to three social movement families which – although sharing a common master frame based on democracy and social justice – differ for ideological orientations, organisational structures and repertoires of action (della Porta et al. 2006): the "solidarity-ecopacifism" sector (Lilliput network, Pax Christi, *Tavola della Pace*, *Legambiente*, the campaign against "armed" banks, *Sdebitarsi* – Italian branch of Jubilee campaign–, the fair trade association *Botteghe del Mondo*, NGOs such as *Unimondo*, *Un Ponte per* and Emergency), the sector of institutional left (Attac-Italy, Arci, left-wing trade unions and red-green political parties), and the anticapitalist sector (*Rete Noglobal*, rank-and-file unions, anti-racist and inter-ethnic associations). Furthermore, I selected local social forums, media (i.e. Indymedia-Italy, *Il Manifesto*, *Carta*, Global Project, Peacelink, *Radio Popolare*) close to the movements but also groups at the "margins" of the European social forum process (i.e. Euromayday campaign and the Italian anarchist federation), whose democratic deficit they criticize.

detail. The internet cannot be analyzed as detached from such context. In Italy, the media system has been dominated since the fifties by a reduced competition in TV ownership. Also, the Italian media system can be described as a model of "polarized pluralism" in that it is characterized by a limited circulation of printed media (elite politically oriented press); a low degree of autonomy among license-financed radio and TV; weak professionalization; and strong government intervention (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p. 67). Since television is still the first source of information for Italians, and the TV system is based on an oligopoly providing very limited opportunities for outsiders, a new medium like the internet became extremely valued, especially by resource-poor social movement organisations. Hence, the internet has been perceived as an opportunity to foster pluralism overcoming traditional mass-media. As we will see, however, only a limited portion of the Italian population accesses the internet which means that it can be hardly defined as a "mass medium".

First of all, the perception of the impact of internet use by social movement organisations varies according to the different targets of their action. The internet can be used both for in-ward oriented communication and for out-ward oriented communication, both for addressing public opinion in general and specific and peculiar constituencies, targets or groups of citizens, such as public decision-makers and politicians. However, our interviewees claimed that the internet is more effective for strengthening specific types of communication. This is also evident when analysing social movement websites.

In general it does not seem that the internet favoured more interactions with public decision-makers as such actions made via the internet were often ignored and seldom effective. It is clear that online mobilisation has more chance to influence decision-makers only when such issues have a certain visibility in the public discourse through traditional media. According to some interviewees, public decision-makers are generally neither competent nor interested in these online actions (interview 1). As a matter of fact, actions of electronic disturbance such as net-strikes and mail-bombings are generally not recognised by their targets. The same is true for websites, which generally not.

While the internet does not facilitate relationships with public institutions, it seems to be more effective in targeting and linking to other groupings. For example, it facilitates the movement's relationship with the media because press releases, photos, and documents are published on websites that are used by journalists as sources of information for their articles. Movements' websites are very informative providing articles, papers and dossiers, conference and seminar materials, bibliographies and updated news. The internet is also conceived as an important means for cross-referencing different media. Thanks to this medium, some groups more specialised in information production can act as the live sound track of political events (like counter-summits and social forums) as they happen (interview 2). The internet allows multi-media coverage of protest events through audio files, photos and video, textual reports and discussions etc. In addition, when covering a political event some websites permit their users to upload documents online, thereby generating a considerable amount of information collected in different formats

and by people with different points of view. Media-activists have gained a central role in the coverage of protest events of the GJM and in the creation of transnational public spaces like in the case of the Euromayday parade (see Doerr and Mattoni 2007).

Websites are employed to cover the current activities of the movement but also operate as archives and databases. Many interviewees refer to them as places of memory, where social movements can narrate their history, keep track of their past actions and store their documents and materials. This is for example clearly what happened with the "memory project" using the internet to recover and systematise information and knowledge produced within the ESF process (http://www. euromovements.info/english/index.htm).

A clear understanding of the role of different internet tools emerges from the interviews: different applications are used for different aims. If websites are used by Social Movement Organisations (SMOs) as places to present themselves to the general public, other tools like forums and mailing-lists favour an on-going communication and discussion among individuals (interview 4). Most interviewees stressed the importance of mailing-lists in the activity of their organisations. These applications, that are greatly appreciated and extensively used, are defined as "permanent assemblies". One activist of a local social forum in Venice underlined the contribution of the internet in terms of transparency of the organisational process (for similar results see also Kavada 2006). Mailing-lists are used to include people that could not join physical meetings by disseminating assemblies' minutes (interview 3). More recently, the "indignados" movement fulfilled online resource to broadcast its assemblies for those unable to attend. The very nature and contribution of the internet to grassroots political processes is however contested and discussed. While some groups declare an instrumental vision of the internet, other ones underline that it is a political locus in itself.

The symbolic/expressive function of the internet is stressed by those groups declaring that the internet helped in developing and strengthening their identities. This type of function is especially recognised by those groups (like local social forums) which generally lack a physical place for their meetings. In these cases the internet is referred to as a "virtual headquarter" or a "real virtual community" (interview 1).

The discussion on technology within social movement networks is often associated with a reflection on internal democracy. Contemporary social movements are making big efforts to democratise their organisational practices (della Porta et al. 2006) and the internet is perceived as an opportunity for facilitating the spread and share of power within an organisation and to widen participation in its organisational life, improving internal democracy. The internet can help to open an organisation to rank-and-file activists. One of the reasons explaining the success of this information and communication technology among social movements is its "prefigurative" nature (Downing 2001). In fact, it fits very well with the nature of post-ideological groups concretely practicing daily the values and principles of another possible world and not postponing them to the future.

However, the adoption of new technologies can also produce inequalities of power. Websites requiring technical knowledge select those with the knowledge to tackle them. Experience has also shown that centralised management of information slows down the process of dissemination (interview 8). In such cases the webmaster can make arbitrary choices and can become a de facto gatekeeper.

While SMOs are aware that technology can become a source of inequalities, their active intervention on the digital divide is quite limited. Many groups also created new websites to limit or get rid of webmasters increasing and favouring the participation of non-experts (interviews 4, 7 and 8). An open publishing system is employed on some websites in order to widen participation of their users. Principles such as non-hierarchy, public participation, minimal editorial control, and transparency tend to inform the websites employing open publishing, though they do so to varying degrees (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_publishing). Although their adoption and implementation can be problematic, open publishing and open management systems are considered antibodies to the monopoly of power in the hands of a few technologically skilled individuals. One of the first websites close to social movements adopting open publishing was the Indymedia network. Nevertheless, even Indymedia does not completely apply the logic of open publishing (Atton 2003).

Not only problems with website managements are faced through moving processes from the online to the offline environment. Many SMOs try to intervene directly on the risks deriving from internet communication by spreading technological skills within their organisation. As argued elsewhere (della Porta and Mosca 2005a), SMOs can play an important role in socialising their members to internet use. Being places where a great importance to new technologies is given, practices of media-activism and hacking developed within social centres. Most of them host what are known as "hacklabs" (hackers' laboratories), that is laboratories with a clear ideological leftist orientation socialising people to informatics knowledge, free software, freedom of expression, privacy, digital rights and self-management.

As the interviews show, some of the organisations created groups of people specifically meant to deal with internet issues and to try to diffuse knowledge on internet use among their participants (interviews 4 and 9). These groups are expected to inform and educate in using internet communication in a proper manner as, especially for the older ones, it takes time to learn to use email, file sharing and downloading, search engines etc. They also raise awareness on the alternatives to proprietary software.

Another issue worth discussing concerns the characteristics distinguishing the internet from previous communication media's interactivity. Our findings show that in some cases interactive tools are not used by SMOs because they feel that they would require a great effort. This concerns especially more traditional organisations such as trade unions which some scholars have called "dinosaurs in cyberspace" (Ward and Lusoli 2003). Most of them fear losing control of interactive spaces on their websites. As they do not have enough resources to devote one member of their staff to moderate interactive spaces, they just prefer to avoid them (interview 10). However, if on the one hand the presence of staff monitoring such spaces is important if one wants them to impact on organisational decisions and processes, on the other hand the presence of

moderators can hinder free expression, and even censor inconvenient claims. In those cases while an explicit and clear netiquette (online code of conduct) can favour a polite and constructive discussion, the presence of moderators could have negative effects on the dialogic process (i.e. structuring it around pre-defined issues). With some exceptions, the tendency of "old" organisations such as trade unions has been to use the internet as previous media of communication, not fulfilling its most innovative aspects (such as interactivity) and using it for top-down forms of communication. Findings like this have been highlighted by different studies concerning the websites of political parties (Gibson et al. 2003; Margolis et al. 1999; Lusoli et al. 2008) and institutions (Coleman et al. 1999; Trechsel et al. 2003). Recent research on Belgian political parties has showed that because of negative experiences with interactive tools (i.e. discussion fora and blogs) the presence of such applications in their websites has even decreased in recent years, particularly during election campaigns (Vissers 2009, p. 19; a similar result has been noted in the study of American and Italian MPs online presence, see Zittel 2009, p. 19 on the former; Bentivegna 2012 on the latter).

However, a generation gap within and between "old" and traditional organisations/ members and "new" and innovative groups/activists in conceiving and understanding the internet is referred to by some interviewees (interviews 1 and 11).

While the generation gap hypothesis needs to be deepened and tested with further research, one can notices that many interviewees (i.e. interviews 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17) tend to underline the importance of face-to-face relationships, irreplaceable by online communication. Many interviewees point to the fact that face-to-face interactions allow the construction of relationships of mutual trust, something that cannot be generated online (Diani 2001; Kavada 2006). That is, Computer-Mediated Communication is perceived as being something that can effectively complement face-to-face interactions but cannot substitute them.

Another important issue that is stressed by most of the interviewees is the difficulty related to the employment of the internet as a decision-making tool. It has been suggested that the suitability of the internet for making decisions could be application dependent: "applications facilitating real-time communication, such as chat, are better suited to decision-making, as they allow for complex negotiations to take place more quickly and efficiently than email and email lists" (Kavada 2006, pp. 11–12). Still, many interviewees rejected the idea of using the internet for making decisions. Others underlined that moving decision-making processes online can create new inequalities because access limitations, familiarity with written culture[18] and technical expertise give power to a limited number of people. Thus, technology can become a new source of power asymmetry. Fear of excluding some activists led in some cases to limiting the use of new technology while giving value to face-to-face communication (interview 19).

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[18] Being mostly text-based, the internet (at least in its 1.0 version) fits better with people with a background in written culture. Those more skilled in writing and used to dealing with the written word would then be more capable of profiting from such technology especially in interactive and dialogical spaces on-line.

Together with the limits of the internet for making decisions, interviewees point at the risk of overvaluing the internet's effectiveness in mobilising offline protestors. Some criticised the attitude of other SMOs and activists to "virtualising" the conflict and relying too much on the internet as an instrument for bringing people out onto the streets (interviews 1 and 16). Among structural limitations of Computer-Mediated Communication, activists are also aware of the issue of the digital divide. As we have seen, internet access is still very much restricted to well-educated people with high incomes, while women and older people generally have lower rates of access. The majority of Italian people are still excluded by this medium. This forces SMOs to adopt also different communication strategies in order to reach non-wired people (interviews 13 and 18).

Conclusion

The quantitative analysis discussed in the first part of this chapter showed that the internet is used politically by many participants in protest events who employ it to discuss politics online and perform different types of action online. Secondly, we also found that the internet is more likely to be used politically by those individuals with previous radical and unconventional participatory experiences as well as with organisational experience in new social movements and new left. Thirdly, interviewees tend to reproduce their offline styles of action online.

The qualitative interviews have shown that the internet represents a "double-faced" medium for social movements in that it provides new opportunities for practicing politics but it also implies a series of risks and challenges. While most of the literature focusing on the internet and politics tends to assess the positive contribution of Computer-Mediated Communication to political processes, the second part of this chapter has stressed both the positive and the negative consequences of the internet for social movements. Some scholars (i.e. Garrett 2006; Pickerill 2003) have underlined the need to consider also the undesirable effects of the internet: what types of constraint does it pose to collective action?

As we have seen, the internet is used to address different targets in more or less effective ways. Some groups organised online campaigns to exert pressure on public decision-makers. However, in many cases politicians disregarded these. According to the interviewees, this concerns especially the older generation of politicians who – because of cultural and/or generation characteristics – have not incorporated the internet into everyday life: most politicians experienced a belated socialisation to the internet and they are forced to employ it without a complete understanding of the potential of this medium (i.e. interactivity) using it as they would a previous medium of communication. As a consequence, online actions such as net-strikes and mail-bombings are not recognised and understood as genuine forms of action.

The internet is considered by the interviewees more effective in addressing journalists and in attracting (mass) media coverage than decision-makers.

Thanks to the internet there has been a great increase in sources of information and journalists now have direct access to SMOs' websites where press releases, mission statements, documents, leaflets, photos, video, f.a.q., etc. are stored. When covered, movements now have more chances that their point of view will be taken into account but in the end journalists are always those who build up the news, manipulating and modifying the movement's original claims. Besides, movements cannot overcome the "selection bias" of the press. Journalists are still the gatekeepers of offline information and they tend to give greater visibility to institutional actors and processes (Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991).

As we discussed earlier, the possibility of social movements using the internet to address the general public is severely limited by digital divide and digital inequalities. The internet raises the risk of selectivity and exclusion for people without access to it. Besides, the great majority of internet users tend to use search engines to orient themselves in cyberspace (Koopmans and Zimmermann 2010). As some studies proved, website visibility is strongly determined by "googlearchy" (Hindman et al. 2003), i.e. the tendency of search engines to give greater visibility to the main actors in the political game. This means that general users, ignorant of the existence of social movements, are less likely to be directed to their websites when using search engines. However, the rapid rise of web 2.0 could create significant opportunities to by-pass the gate keeping role of search engines.

Interviewees also stressed that not only the internet is more suitable to address specific targets but also different tools serve different functions: websites are mainly used for external communication, while mailing-lists and forums are employed for internal organisational communication and are conceived by activists as on-going assemblies where discussion goes on and on. SMOs use the internet to address their activists, engaging them in their organisational life and establishing an on-going relationship with them.[19] Still, it risks being a "redundant" and "self-referential" medium in that it seems capable of reaching, on the whole, already active and informed people. In addition, efforts to strengthen internal democracy through the adoption of new technologies can be frustrated by the presence of a few technologically skilled individuals who manage and control them. That is, technology can become a new cause of power inequality, creating new hierarchies. In fact, people with technical skills can exert great power within an organisation heavily reliant on internet communication. This problem has been partially faced by SMOs developing technological tools that can be easily used by non-experts, designing more participatory websites and also creating specific groups devoted to members' socialisation to new technologies. Some SMOs' websites, inspired by the principle of distributed management system, are not managed by a single webmaster but by a group of people. Hence, the continuous search for democratising the organisation offline is mirrored online.

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[19] Most social movements consider the interactive features of Web 2.0 applications extremely important for implementing their democratic ideals. However, when the interviews were carried out many organisations declared they had not yet employed this kind of application.

This seems to confirm that internet use is shaped in accordance with offline identity, interests and goals (Calenda and Mosca 2007).

Last but not least, the internet is used by social movement organisations and activists as a complement to (and not as a substitute for) face-to-face social interactions. Sometimes the capacity of the internet to inform and mobilise people in the streets is overestimated. Among interviewees nobody thought that the internet could replace face-to-face communication but it is much appreciated because it multiplies possibility and frequency of communication among dispersed individuals. As observed by Loader (2008, pp. 1930–1931) "there is little evidence to suggest totally new forms of separate online or virtual SMs [Social Movements]. Rather, we may say that new media are becoming a constituent part of the internal and external communications strategies of SMs . . . We are likely to witness more complementary online and offline SM activism".

As the qualitative interviews have shown, the importance of this new medium of communication is very well recognised but activists also stressed its limits and claimed that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for political action: face-to-face interactions still are the core of political action. That is, the political use of the internet is just a continuation of (offline) politics by other means.

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Interviews

1 – Spokesperson of the Abruzzo Social Forum.
2 – President of the weekly magazine, *Carta* (paper).
3 – Activist of the Venice Social Forum.
4 – Activist of the Rete Lilliput working group on the internet.
5 – Spokesperson of the Young Communists.
6 – Activist of Indymedia-Italy.
7 – Creator of the online magazine, *Social Press*.
8 – President of the Italian World Shops Association.
9 – Activist of the social centre, Bulk.
10 – Webmaster of the metalworkers trade union, Fiom (Federazione Impiegati e Operai Metallurgici).
11 – Journalist of the communist newspaper, *Il Manifesto*.
12 – Spokesperson of the Italian branch of the World March of Women.
13 – Activist of the non-violent group, Casa Pace (House of Peace).
14 – President of the ecopacifist online portal, PeaceLink.
15 – Spokesperson of the Rete Lilliput.
16 – Delegate of the rank-and-file union Sin COBAS.
17 – Collaborator of the online magazine, *Social Press*.
18 – Activist of the Italian branch of the World March of Women.
19 – Spokesperson of the COBAS Confederation.

Part III

Case Studies

Transnational Citizenship as Status, Identity and Participation: Comparative Assessment

Mari-Liis Jakobson and Leif Kalev

1   Introduction

Transnationalisation of individual lifestyles calls for the need to reassess the *modus operandi* of the system of popular engagement into the process of decision-making. As e.g. Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010) have noted, migratory experience can be a process of political learning. This has resulted in the positive spill-over effect of democratic values, giving a hard time for the states of origin that exercise non-democratic measures. But also well-established democracies face new challenges, since their citizens are not fully capable of participating in decisions that affect them most, whereas their field of governance increasingly encompasses citizens or nationals of other states. What are the challenges and what could be the substitute for the modes of civic engagement characteristic to modern statehood?

Citizenship is a useful instrument for studying various dimensions of this issue: it enables us to analyse the extent and composition of individuals' rights and obligations and their discourse and practices regarding those; but also modes of identification with the respective political community and proneness to undertake various forms of participation. It has gained use also in transnationalism studies, for example, under the name of transnational citizenship (Fox 2005; Bloemraad 2004; Goldring 2001; Halfmann 1998; Itzigsohn 2000; Smith M. P. 2007), but has

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empirically been studied mostly in separate aspects: Guarnizo et al. (2003) and Smith (2007) study participation; Bloemraad (2004) concentrates on citizenship status, Soysal (1994) focuses on identification and status in society. This paper aims to take advantage of the well developed political theory on citizenship, and especially the analytical models of citizenship aiming to outline the main problems in the understanding and governance of transnational citizenship. This outline is given in the first, theoretical paragraph.

This paper assesses the transformations of citizenship in migrant transnationalism. It outlines a six-fold analytical model (see also Jakobson and Kalev 2011; Jakobson et al. 2012b), enabling a simultaneous interpretation of citizenship as a status, an identity, and participation both vertically and horizontally. We will analyse transnational citizenship comparatively in four different contexts. The contextual unit that forms an empirical case analysed in this paper, is a "transnational space" (Portes 2003; Colbert 2001; Faist 2000): a sphere of ideas and practices with some geographic coherence, facilitated by an opportunity structure, and extending beyond the borders of "methodological nationalism" (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). This definition is inspired by Faist's concept of "transnational social spaces", but encompasses not only social interaction, but economic stock-taking, political motivations and governance regimes, that also shape the context for transnational migration. No doubt, the modern nation state discourse tends to remain alien in various regions of the world. To overcome this, the paper draws on various transnational settings that encompass not only European style nation states, but interconnect them with non-Western countries.

We will compare transnational citizenship in four transnational spaces: (1) Estonia and Finland, (2) Germany and Turkey, (3) Morocco and France, and (4) Indian Punjab and UK. These spaces were the object of study for the Trans-Net research project (see data and methods section). The material for tracking down transnational citizenship will be drawn from migrants' discourse and practices, but also the socio-economic context and legal framework, which form the opportunity structures of the transnational space.

2 Citizenship

Citizenship is a relational category: as Charles Tilly (1995) notes, it is the central relationship between an individual and a state in a democracy. Of course, conceptualisations of democracy and the state (see e.g. Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009) vary over time and space, hence leaving this assertion rather indistinctly defined. In order to grasp the depth of that "political proverb", the dimensions of this relationship should be conceptualised. Fox (2005) offers two starting points for determining citizenship: the horizontal and the vertical. From a vertical perspective, citizenship identifies a relationship to an institutional body, e.g. a state, granting the individuals rights and obligations. This is an approach most often undertaken in contributions dealing with legal issues, i.e. citizenship policies, citizen and human rights, etc. However, it also has a more affective side to it, since citizenship as a relationship to the state can reveal itself in an individual's loyalty or other

Table 1 Analytical dimensions of citizenship

Citizenship as. . .	. . . A vertical relationship	. . . A horizontal relationship
. . .Status	Passport/other document	Factual membership in a society: belonging into societal interest groups through socio-demographics, work, family, etc.
	Formal citizen rights and obligations	
. . .Identity	Identification with the state	Identification with the demos and solidarity with one's social peers, including loyalty to the nation
	Loyalty to the state	
. . .Participation	Doing the citizen's duty: participation in elections, doing military service, etc.	Civic activism: participation in civic associations, protests and rallies for the common good

Source: Authors. (Applied also in Jakobson and Kalev (2011) and Jakobson et al. (2012b))

emotional affiliation to the state (Tilly 1995), and in one's readiness to contribute. From a horizontal perspective, citizenship implies a membership in a political community, the *demos*. This perspective is most often found in sociological addresses of citizen agency, be that of sociological state or citizenship theory, or civil society studies. It overcomes pure formalism and claims that citizenship is based on shared (civic) culture – identity, participation patterns and civil society.

There are also other analytical typologies of citizenship. For example, Sassen (2002) and Goul Andersen and Hoff (2001) have proposed three analytical dimensions of citizenship: status, identity and participation. Here these will be called the "modes of citizenship". Citizenship as a status defines who is "in" and who is "out" of the political community, granting them rights and obligations respectively. Citizenship as identity indicates a sentimental basis offered by the state or the *demos*. Citizenship as participation indicates the means of negotiating one's status, but also affirming identity. As visible from the definitions above, the three modes are to a certain extent interconnected (e.g. participation enables to negotiate status and identity, status enables rights to participate, identity builds around status and reinforces participation), but can be clearly distinguished in the "horizontal" and "vertical" dimensions. The content of the six dimensions of citizenship proposed is exemplified in Table 1.

However, the content, boundaries and significance of these six dimensions are going through changes caused by transnationalisation and especially, migrant transnationalism. In the course of transnationalisation, citizenship becomes more complex. If an individual moves to another country, still maintaining connections, affiliations and allegiances in her previous country of residence, but also developing new ties in the new country, does the already six-fold combination of vertical and horizontal relationships become (at least) doubled, as the definition of transnationalism (Vertovec 2009) would suggest?

Several studies have indicated that migrants are more like quasi-citizens with some rights being absent, e.g. voting rights (Layton-Henry 1991). Even if granted rights, they don't share the same identity basis with the majority population (Koopmans and Statham 2001, p. 67). However, they should in most cases be

taken into account as bearers of "horizontal" citizen status. According to Yasemin Soysal (1994) the guest workers did not have a passport, or a valid "vertical" citizenship status at the time, but they definitely had "horizontal" citizen status, since they are part of the society, belong into various interest groups, facilitate social networks, and participate through trade unions, immigrant organisations, political initiatives, etc. Their status as transnationals has been particularly emphasised based on the social networks that tend to transcend state borders, and that are maintained even across long distances.

According to Fox (2005), transnational citizenship could be a relationship between an individual and a trans-state institution like the European Union or the United Nations (though this would need reassessment from the perspectives of Bauböck (2003) and Portes (2003), according to whom both of the institutions exemplify internationalism, and not transnationalism) or being a citizen of several states simultaneously – in legal terms, either having a supranational or multiple citizenship. Multiple citizenship is legally permitted by some states, but prohibited in others, hence creating only a scarce opportunity structure for trying out the effects of that in practice. Academic scholarship on multiple citizenship (e.g. Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002; Castles and Davidson 2000) has indicated that it enables emancipation also in other dimensions of citizenship (in addition to "vertical" status), creating equal opportunities for transnationals to be fully-fledged citizens in multiple countries simultaneously. Aihwa Ong (1999) on the other hand elaborates on a tendency of multiple citizenship leading to the devaluation of substantial citizenship, simply maintaining and managing multiple passports that can be used upon one's convenience, but that will not necessarily bring about a shift (or no motion at all) in the dimensions of identity or participation.

In terms of identity, transnationalism is often opposed to assimilation theory that presupposes an immigrant's national "melting" into the mainstream identity (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Guarnizo et al. 2003). Transnationalism supports the perspective of adaptation – an immigrant may acquire a sentiment of belonging based on just the fact of their factual presence, *being* in the society. (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). It has been a point of intense discussion in nationalism studies, on whether and to what extent can national affiliations and loyalties toward states be divided. However, migrant transnationalism opens up the grounds for shifting or even multiple allegiances, hence preferring identities that are not hermetically closed as "containers", but rather, open and overlapping as "spheres" (Pugh 2009). As also an example from the Netherlands (Snel et al. 2006) suggests, transnational networks and integration are not contradictory.

Citizenship as participation depends to a great extent on the other dimensions of citizenship, e.g. what kind of rights or identities they hold. Also the potential shift is the same: "vertical" participation may become supra- or multinational (e.g. voting in elections in multiple states, or electing supranational representatives, e.g. members of the European Parliament), "horizontal" participation may become deterritorialised, e.g. via participation in transnational social movements, or border-crossing, e.g. participation in civic initiatives of both countries (or in the other country). The studies (e.g. Guarnizo et al. 2003; Johnston 2001) report on the migrants as participant citizens in two countries simultaneously, indicating that when given citizenship rights,

also other facets of citizenship might be emerging. However, if transnational citizenship is founded solely on the horizontal relationship, its potential endurance is not expected to be sustained in the long run. As Fox (2005, p. 194) notes, "only a high-intensity, rights-based definition of transnational citizenship holds up well", thus emphasizing a need for a solid vertical relationship (i.e. in the form of multiple citizenship or supranational citizenship) as well.

The extensive literature on citizen participation informs us of the variety of intensity and forms of agency. A still useful tool for generalisation is Hirschman's (1970) typology: a citizen can either be actively participant (voice), conform passively (loyalty) or leave the system (exit). Easier migration and transnationalisation make the exit option easier by decreasing the intensives to realise one's objectives via domestic political competition. Thus transnationalisation seems to be related with a civic understanding of citizenship where the emphasis is not on democratic civic agency and participation. This poses a clear challenge for the mainstream scholarship of democratic participation (see Kalev et al. 2010).

Also, citizen participation involves a spectrum of practices with varying degrees of intensity. Colin Hay (2007, p. 75) differentiates between four main modes on the basis as to whether (a) the citizen participates or not and (b) the decision to (not) participate is seen as a political act per se. If the citizen participates and regards this as political engagement, then this refers clearly to political participation; nonetheless, there is also activity that is not correlated with political orientation that Hay terms *habit* (non-political participation). Citizens can also consciously decide not to participate (political non-participation) or just remain passive (non-political non-participation). Thus political participation is only one possibility for transnationals to get actively involved in the social and political realms.

As our previous empirical analyses (Jakobson and Kalev 2011; Jakobson et al. 2012) on citizenship discourses of transnational migrants between Estonia and Finland have indicated, the prime generalisation concerning transnational citizenship could be that though the depth of citizenship depends on respondents' individual characteristics, no dimension of the six-fold citizenship model was rarely doubled, i.e. existing in the two countries simultaneously. For example, respondents were in general socially active in one society at a time, even if engaging in vertical forms of participation in the other country; and even if they felt affiliated with both countries of residence, this affiliation was never felt in the same form toward the two countries.

3   Data and Methods

The empirical data used in this article was gathered in the course of the EC 7th framework project "Transnationalisation, Migration and Transformation: Multi-Level Analysis of Migrant Transnationalism (Trans-Net)". The objective of the Trans-Net project was to clarify and compare migrant transnationalism, analysing the border-crossing relationships in four transnational spaces encompassing eight countries: Estonia/Finland, India/UK, Morocco/France, and Turkey/Germany. Research data was gathered through content analysis of policy documents of each state, semi-structured interviews and life-course interviews.

Table 2 Characteristics of respondents (number of respondents)

		Estonia-Finland		Turkey-Germany		Morocco-France		India-UK	
Place of birth		Estonia	108	Turkey	111	Morocco[a]	101	India	138
		Finland	46	Germany	59	France[b]	60	UK	44
		Other[c]	6	Other	6			Other	7
Gender	Female	89		90		64		63	
	Male	71		86		97		127	
Interviews in total		160		176		161		190	

Source: Authors; abridged from (Pitkänen, İçduygu, and Sert 2012)
[a]Includes respondents of Moroccan origin (incl. some of them born in France) and respondents of French origin born in Morocco.
[b]Includes only respondents of French origin born in France.
[c]The other category contains citizens who have been born elsewhere (e.g. Russia, Denmark or Afghanistan), but hold the citizenship or originate ethnically from either Estonia or Finland.

Since the migratory context in countries varied, all country pairs had some autonomy in deciding on the sample (e.g. the teams of UK and India decided to focus on Indian migrants originating from the Punjab region; teams of Estonia and Finland and France and Morocco portrayed their transnational space by interviewing migrants moving in different directions). Hence the data offer a valuable viewpoint, where transnational migration is truly seen as reflecting on both immigration and emigration. As noted by Levitt and de la Dehesa (2003), analyses of transnationalism otherwise tend to give more attention to the policies of the sending state.

Around 80 respondents were selected in each country from among immigrants, return migrants, commuters and family members of people who move between the two countries (i.e. within the Finnish-Estonian, German-Turkish, French-Moroccan or UK-Indian transnational space). Multiple sampling methods were used for gathering respondents, including using snowball method, personal contacts, phishing in social media, (migrant) associations, information from media (e.g. on public intellectuals, businessmen, etc.), with the aim of creating a sample that would represent both genders, all (adult) age groups, various educational backgrounds and labour groups, and various kinds of migrants (e.g. labour, study, family migrants, refugees, transnational businesspeople, etc.). For more specific characteristics of interviewees, see Table 2. All research teams used a list of interview questions that covered five broader domains, namely, the political, socio-cultural, economic and educational domain, and migration patterns. The present study addresses research questions related to the political and socio-cultural domain.

In the framework of the Trans-Net project, all research teams have compiled country reports based on their results (Trans-Net 2009), and all country pairs have written a joint space report, that has been published as a book in 2012 (Pitkänen et al. 2012). These materials are also the prime empirical basis for our elaboration.

In the current chapter we further utilise the project material in order to examine to which extent there are similarities across spaces. We acknowledge the discussion

being limited by the research design of the Trans-Net project and the scope of the material. The material is re-examined using interpretative qualitative analysis. We go through the main findings space by space, aiming to identify the similar trends in discourses and practices in the conclusive subchapter. The findings are then discussed using the above outlined theoretical framework. We focus on the political domain and assess the similarities across the spaces in citizenship discourses and practices, conceptualising citizenship as status, identity and participation. Additionally, the analysis takes into account the spatial context of the case studies, comparing the rarely analysed intra-EU transnationalism (Estonia-Finland) to the countries of traditional mainstream studies of transnationalism (other spaces).

4   The Finnish-Estonian Transnational Space

An elementary characteristic of the Estonian-Finnish transnational space is the geographical, cultural and linguistic closeness of the two countries, as well as membership in the European Union, the Schengen area and from 2011, the eurozone. The vibrancy of the transnational space is perhaps not as remarkable in population statistics,[1] as is clearly apparent in the manifoldness of transnational activities and migration patterns. A notable feature in many cases, is that the reasons accountable for migration are often multiple. The life courses of several respondents tell a story of a line of reasons that only eventually gave way to migration, because transnational ties are imaginable in this space also without migration.

Yet, the proximity of the two countries is in deep contrast with the vast differences in terms of recent history. A Estonia was part of the USSR, while Finland remained independent and democratic. The Iron Curtain that separated the two countries is the prime reason why the transnational space between Estonia and Finland is rather recent, (again) fully functioning for about two decades. The Soviet legacy can also partially explain the different state strategies of the two rather well developed countries – whereas Finland is most often depicted as a citizen-centred welfare state, Estonia has opted for a neoliberal statist strategy that was rather common among the post-Soviet countries. Another component of the Soviet "legacy" in Estonia is the sizable Russophone population, which to a great extent consists of people who arrived in Estonia during the Soviet period and their progeny. The issue of the post-Soviet Russophone minority is probably also the

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[1] According to Statistics Finland (2011a), Estonian citizens became the largest group of official foreign citizens with 29,080 of them (~0,8 % of total population of Finland) living in Finland in 2010. Additionally over 4100 Estonian citizens have been granted Finnish citizenship (Statistics Finland 2011b) and probably the largest number of Estonians in Finland are not registered and are either illegals or commuting continuously between the two countries. According to Statistics Estonia, almost 12,000 Finns (~1 % of total population of Estonia) were living in Estonia in 2000, but this number has been continuously decreasing, reaching 10,500 by 2011 (Statistics Estonia 2010).

reason why Estonian citizenship and immigration policy is quite stringent and restrictive towards immigration. Estonia prohibits multiple citizenship and to a great extent follows the principle of *ius sanguinis*. Whereas Finnish citizenship policy – that was rather restrictive in the 1980s – has greatly liberalised in recent decades (Howard 2009), offering multiple citizenship and quite flexible naturalisation criteria.

These characteristics model the tapestry of citizenship discourses and practices. EU membership is probably one of the most important factors behind the fact that fairly few Estonian respondents (9 out of 108) had opted for Finnish citizenship, and usually prior to Estonia's joining the EU.[2] The modest importance of legal citizenship has also framed one out of the three more widespread discourses: that citizenship is *"just the passport in your pocket"* (33, male, Estonian, study/labour migrant) or, as another respondent put it, *"It all doesn't matter that much in the European Union"* (28, Estonian, female, work/family migrant). However, citizenship status was often also associated with two other dimensions: with the rights citizenship guarantees, and with the sense of identity. In the first instance, citizenship (and especially Finnish citizenship) was depicted by both Estonian and Finnish respondents as a means of guaranteeing rights, or a "citizenship of convenience" (Ong 1999). As one Finnish respondent noted, *"I'm a Finnish citizen. It means me safety. It's some kind of a security license"* (47, Finnish, female, family migrant). But many respondents also stressed the importance of national identity when asked about the meaning of citizenship. To some the two elements were inextricably connected thus giving up citizenship was seen as betraying one's nation, whereas for others they were not (e.g. some Finns who noted that they would take Estonian citizenship also, if it was allowed). Here is an example of the inherently contradictory definition of citizenship by Estonian migrants in the late 1980s and early 1990s:

> Back then, everything was very strictly determined. That if you have this and this [citizenship], then you have these and these rights. I didn't want to give it [the Estonian citizenship] up. Everyone actually wanted Finnish citizenship. And back then, you only had to like live there for 3 years and you could get it. But I didn't want it. I can speak Finnish, but I will remain Estonian (50, Estonian, female, family migrant/returnee).

The construction of national identity was rather essentialist, e.g. when asked about who do they feel they are, several Estonian respondents answered with a phrase from a song that was popular during the national awakening: *"Estonian I am, Estonian I will be, when I was created Estonian"*. Similarly, Finnish respondents claimed that *"my substance is Finnish"* (63, male, Finnish, work migrant). Even some respondents with multiple citizenship we interviewed highlighted that their status was primarily related to the cultural heritage of their parents rather than political agency. However, some respondents recalled mutual cultural progeny (being *heimoveljet/hõimuvennad* – brothers of the same tribe) or

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[2] however, opting for Finnish citizenship has again increased in the recent years of recession (2008, 2010) (Statistics Finland, 2011)

historical events and how Estonians had fought for Finnish independence and vice versa during World War II. In addition, this was not seen as an obstacle to a transnational lifestyle and adapting to another context – in this case, many respondents cited the Finnish proverb "*maassa maan tavalla*" (broadly translated as: when in Rome, do as the Romans do). In this light, several respondents criticised migrants of other origin, e.g. the Somalis in Finland, who *"have lived there for decades, but who still don't speak Finnish"* and as one Finnish respondent noted, she now understands *"your problem with Russians"*.

Contrary to the idea of a "simultaneous presence in two societies at once" (Glick Schiller et al. 1992), the interviews proved that despite new technologies, the geographic proximity and the fact that most respondents visit the other country several times a year, most of them retain a significant social network only in one country at a time. Hence, identity proves to be even more important in maintaining the bridge between the two "national realities" than social ties.

The respondents were also asked about the feeling of loyalty towards either country. The response indicates that loyalty was in most cases separate [detached?] from national identification [issues of national identity?]: it was associated with law abidance, doing one's duty towards the state where they resided, respect for the country's history, language culture, etc., but also with gratitude for the benefits they have received and having been accepted. Interestingly, loyalty was more often depicted as affiliation with the Finnish state – both by Estonians residing in Finland, Finns residing in Estonia, and even by some Estonian return migrants. Loyalty was based on recognition and feeling of trust toward the Finnish government, probably also indicating the advantage of the welfare state before a minimal state in generating loyalty.

> I think my loyalty to Finnish state has increased here. I think I will gladly pay the 35–40 per cent taxes, when we go back, because I think we get something from taxes and here are still some things that you have to figure out and to manage the money and how to divide it and so on (34, female, Finn, family migrant).

Sense of national identity seemed to be so strong among several that some Finnish respondents felt it necessary to add that they feel *"fully Finnish, I can't even say that I feel myself as a European"*. The main de-nationalised identification they used, was being "a Nordener". Post-national identification (as a world citizen, cosmopolitan, European) was more common with people who had broader international experience, but who mostly had other ethnic background, e.g. a respondent who originated from Afghanistan, but had received asylum in Finland and subsequently Finnish citizenship. Another respondent, an Estonian citizen originating from Russia noted that *"I am European, but my parents are Russian"* (24, male, Estonian/Russian, study migrant). Another group that in general tended to refuse their ethnic identity or proposed a multiple identity were the so-called 1.5ers (family migrants who are difficult to allocate both among first and second generation migrants). Some of them noted that their lives are enriched by their cultural and ethnic backgrounds:

> as a sort of a poluvernik [a multi-culturalist, a syncretist] who makes choices and combines the best elements of both cultures (27, male, Finn, family migrant).

Yet others confessed that they felt somehow ashamed of being Estonian living in Finland:

> like a piece of Lego laid in its place./---/Recently, there has been very much negative about Estonians here in Finland. So, it is rather as a Finn or some other European (27, male, Estonian, family migrant).

Questions about civic participation revealed, that even though there was some border-crossing political participation, e.g. voting in elections in their country of origin, being actively involved in a civic association in the other country – participating in *both* countries was not that frequent. Though both Estonians and Finns registered in the other country have the right to vote at local elections and participate in European Parliament elections, this option was only exercised by some Finns residing in Estonia. Most people observed that they don't have time to keep up with politics or vote in both countries. Some respondents even noted that they don't feel they have the right to decide over politics in the other country:

> I/---/cannot vote in Estonia because I do not have to live under the laws which I have the power to influence. So I think it would be ethically wrong to have an effect to how those laws are made (39, male, Estonian).

However, the difference between Estonian and Finnish respondents in this issue is striking. The Finnish respondents tended to be more active in associational life than Estonians. This means that they have founded a network of associations, including entrepreneurs' clubs, women's associations, a school and a congregation in Tallinn. Through those associations and networks they had been able to have an impact on political decisions that influenced them directly (e.g. organising the Finnish school for the children of more temporary migrants); the Finnish businessmen were able to be engaged in lobbying in both states, and they were also satisfied with the way their proposals were received. Though Estonians remain in general rather passive in terms of associational life (European Social Survey 2010), our results indicated that several Estonians in Finland participate in local, migrant and professional associations, trade unions and even political parties. However, the respondents claimed that this participation did not really make much difference: there were several stories of disappointment with engaging in decision making, e.g. the failure to get funding for minority action, for the Estonian school, or being "used and then thrown over the board" by political parties they had run for in elections. Though the factual reasons behind the disappointments may be diverse, it still indicates the either inappropriate expectations or measures taken to achieve their goals with civic initiative, hence indicating possible shortcomings of civic education. Finland functioned as the kind of a civics school, where new civic skills were acquired.

For the Finns, the associations, the congregation and the school foster the development of diasporic identity and belonging, meaning further strengthening ties with other Finns. However, some respondents had also tried entering associations for social integration purposes and building friendships with Estonians. Though – they confessed – their activities aiming at societal integration were not

very successful since *"Estonia is a network society"* (47, male, Finn, entrepreneur), whereas in Finland socialisation is based more on associational life – community and hobby clubs, local initiatives, etc.

Perhaps, the only truly transnational form of participation was membership in transnational social movement organisations, such as Amnesty International or the Red Cross, as some younger respondents noted. Paradoxically, however, though in harmony with the logic of social networks, almost all respondents who were members in the organisation in their country of origin had not established any contact with the specific branch in their country of residence.

5   The Turkish-German Transnational Space

The major differences between the Estonian-Finnish and the Turkish-German transnational space are the cultural and geographic distance, the presence of the EU border, but also the duration of constant migration from Turkey to Germany. Since this transnational space spans over the borders of the EU, and links two states with rather restrictive citizenship policies, citizenship as a status is much more important than in the Estonian-Finnish transnational space. This is visible first of all in the numbers – out of 176 interviewees, 46[3] had German and 32[4] had double citizenship. The two main discourses that relate directly to the concepts of citizenship in the German-Turkish transnational space – citizenship as a guarantor of rights and opportunities, and an index of identity –were also present in the Finnish-Estonian transnational space. However, in this case, the identity of the country of origin was not combined with an essentialist notion; but rather, the identity of the receiving country. A couple of respondents confessed that they will refrain from any activity leaning towards "naturalisation" if Germany will not allow dual citizenship. As one respondent noted:

> I mean, do I receive a brainwash after getting the German passport? Do I get a blood infusion? Will my Turkish blood be removed? (Female, 44, 1.5 generations in Germany) (cf. Gerdes et al. 2012, p. 123)

The main reason for not causing feelings of loyalty/identification with Turkey was corruption and bureaucracy that tended to diminish the sentiments associated with the value of citizenship, but also discouraged people from dealing with Turkish authorities.

Since 1961 when the first intergovernmental workforce recruitment agreement was signed between Germany and Turkey, several generations have witnessed and been part of migration This might explain why "ethnic identity seems to be declining in importance, while sense of belonging among migrants is becoming a

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[3] this number includes 8 ethnic Germans

[4] Double citizenship was enabled for Turkish citizens during a brief period afted the new German Nationality Act in 1999.

more recurrent theme" (Sert and Içduygu 2010, p. 39). The fact of a personal identity shift towards the formation of a "migrant" identity can be clearly linked to specific policies and reconceptualised in terms of a "reactive identity" (Vetik et al. 2006). Furthermore, the length of stay abroad correlated positively with an identity conflict, and proved to be similar to Estonian 1.5ers. There were also respondents who understood the construction of a dual national identity and migration background as a positive development; however, in these cases, positive feelings were associated with some positive experience, e.g. qualifying for a job, where the migration background had been considered an advantage instead of a drawback. As in the case of the Estonian-Finnish space, also Turkish and German respondents emphasised the ease of keeping in touch with new communication devices and means – cheap call cards, internet, cheap flights, etc. However, it seems that this does not suggest that transnational contacts would be on an increase. As Gerdes et al. (2012) note, the return migrants rarely retain contacts abroad, and if, then with family members who have also emigrated from Turkey. Hence, rather low enthusiasm for maintaining transnational social networks cannot be viewed as something characteristic to only to the individualistic Northern countries such as Estonia and Finland, but also the Turkish emigrants and return migrants retain limited ties to their contacts in the country of previous residence.

> I've been flying [to Turkey] every year in September. But the reason – I have recognized this only later – was my mother, because my mother was always very glad when I was there. As long as my mother was alive and I was living here, I went willingly. And after my mother was dead, I only go every two or three years. For three years I haven't gone at all. It doesn't matter to me whether I go there or not (Male, 49, refugee in Germany).

In terms of "horizontal" participation, transnational activities tended to be marginal, even rarer than those taking place in the Estonian-Finnish transnational space. This can be caused by geographic factors, but even more so due to policies and civic culture. Sert and Icduygu (2010, p. 26) also indicate low interest to participate in civil society organisations, and explain that tendency in terms of a limited understanding of contemporary civil. However, rather energetic movement was reported in terms of activities promoting Turkish culture (e.g., donating to Mosques, organising Turkish food sales, etc.). In the "third sector", as the civil society of the German-Turkish transnational space should rightfully be called, there are some more active and professional people whose role is to function as the transnational hubs for cultural and political participation. There are several Turkish German associations in Turkey like The Turkish German Businessmen and Academics Association (TAIAD) and the Turkish-German Chamber of Trade and Industry (AHK), and a number of Turkish cultural and political associations in Germany. Such organisations do not recruit a large membership but still facilitate artistic and intellectual mobility, as well as transnational exchange of culture and ideas.

"Vertical" forms of political participation were more popular among respondents; however, they were very restricted, and hence, even less often transnational. As Sert and Icduygu note, the Turkish are keen voters, once they have received the chance to exercise their voting right. However, the Turkish migrants

in Germany face restrictions from both sides: while non-citizens in Germany are not allowed to vote in German elections, Turkish political institutions can only be elected by people residing on Turkish soil. Hence, once the Turkish moved from Turkey to Germany, they usually stopped voting altogether. Only in a couple of cases did the respondents fly to Turkey to exercise their voting rights. (Sert and Içduygu 2010, p. 28).

Although most respondents discontinued being actively involved in politics following their return to Turkey, there were still some cases of policy and politics learning, i.e. putting the political or policy-related experience from Germany into practice in Turkey. For example, a Turkish mayor adopted the "German type" of garbage collection model; another respondent sued the president of Turkey for human rights violation, etc. Hence, though participation rarely was transnational, there are some kinds of "political remittances" moving across borders – advancing civic courage, greater awareness of political rights, and new ideas filtered in, as was also noted in the Estonian-Finnish case.

6 French-Moroccan Transnational Space

The French-Moroccan context is noteworthy for its cultural distinctness – this transnational space connects a Western European democracy of republican values, and a North African monarchy embedded in Islamic beliefs and Arabic and Berber cultures. But the case study conducted by Virkama et al. (2012) is also noteworthy for its focus on migration both ways: from Morocco to France as well as France to Morocco. Though France as a receiving society is comparable to the UK which also has a post-colonial legacy, as is to a certain degree the case of 'Germany and Finland, Moroccan receiving contexts are radically different from that in Estonia as there is much broader cultural and racial difference making it harder for migrants to be integrated. Hence the space report on this transnational space (Virkama et al. 2012) gives an interesting point of comparison.

Arriving in Morocco is relatively easy for French – since they don't need a visa and are generally not obliged to jump through extensive bureaucratic loopholes, and in most issues one can communicate effectively in French language. But it has proved practically impossible to be integrated into the host society and its political life. For the Moroccans, the visa application processes and the various permits normally required is a much more complicated issue, albeit the process of integrating adaptation have become easier over time, due to the expanding Moroccan diaspora.

Hence, in the present study the French in Morocco is the group with the weakest "horizontal" citizenship relationships. Most of the French respondents had moved to Morocco due to family, or life-style reasons – for example seeking a comfortable climate, trying to continue the lifestyle of their parents, or wishing to escape the thick French welfare state. They have not learned Darija [i.e. Moroccan] Arabic, and none of them were Moroccan citizens (except for one dual citizen by birth). As most of them noted, they could not get Moroccan citizenship due to the highly restrictive citizenship law, but also only two respondents out of 60 reported that

they would like to obtain Moroccan citizenship. Denial was explained in terms of the poor ranking of Moroccan political system, referring to such elements as "lack of freedom", "corruption", "women's status" and "subjection to the king" (Virkama et al. 2012, p. 75). But also, they highlighted a convenience factor meaning that French nationality enables them to cross borders easily, and there are few practical restrictions on non-citizens in Morocco causing problems in everyday life.

Most French respondents expressed indifference toward Moroccan politics, and preferred to remain politically passive – both in terms of "horizontal" as well as "vertical" citizen participation dimensions – but also noted the impact of restraints to vertical participation.. Though this was not due to a generalised indifference to politics – many of them were well informed of political affairs in France and voted in presidential elections– but rather due to feeling isolated and being outsiders in the Moroccan social and political context. (Virkama, et al. 2012, p. 77). It is worth observing that political passivity was not only the result of lacking Moroccan citizenship, but also because of religious differences (apart from a few exceptions they were not Muslims). Religion proved to be a much more important top-down relationship for many than the "vertical" relationship to the state.

Most of the French respondents identified themselves as "French" and moreover as "Europeans" and Western, all insinuating or directly pointing to the ethnic and cultural boundaries between them and the Moroccans, rather than to national or territorial confines. Being French was associated to their linguistic heritage, French culture and enlightenment values, and not so to the French Republic as an object of political affiliation. Neither were the French republican citizenship values expressed, since those remained far from them, confined territorially to France. As one respondent noted:

> Am I French? Yes, I speak French, my parents are French. I have an attachment to France, but I have no patriotic pride. In fact, I think I do reject what is Moroccan. It is a rejection of their values. They are very archaic, and it deeply bothers me. If we speak of values, it would rather be the French values, the values of the Enlightenment, the beautiful French values, the great western philosophical values – undeniably (female, French born in Morocco).

In the case of the French in Morocco, societal exclusion can be interpreted in terms of their lifestyle models and attitudes. As noted by respondents, they will always remain *gawria* (a foreigner) for the Moroccans, and that *"Moroccans say 'You're a Moroccan' out of kindness. It's nice, but they don't believe it for a moment."* (female, French, Born in Morocco). However, they did not demonstrate any concrete willingness to get integrated into the Moroccan society (*ibid*). Rather, the French in Morocco had learned to capitalise their "otherness". Several respondents noted that they had been offered jobs or other positions simply because they "looked French". Similarly, coming from France and dressing and behaving like French was considered as an important capital also by Moroccan return migrants (*ibid*).

The profile of Moroccan migrants in France was radically different. Though most of the interviewees had arrived in Morocco holding student visas or for purposes of family reunion, there were also economic and political reasons behind

their arrival – the latter included ideological, civil (human rights violations) as well as socio-culturally embedded issues, such as the family's anticipated reaction to one respondent's homosexuality. Migration incentives were also described in terms of a more adventurous and cosmopolitan drive – the motivation to see the world and experience another culture in an in-depth way.

Their migration motivation, slightly different from the Turkish, may also explain their participation patterns – in addition to voting in elections in France, which many of them exercised (yet, interest in politics and participation in elections back home was again reported low), the respondents of Moroccan origin were more often than respondents from other countries involved in human rights activism, such as supporting political prisoners in Morocco, and participating in demonstrations against racism, the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, etc. (*ibid*, p. 76). Additionally, the respondents were members of trade unions, and associated with migrants' associations for Maghrebi immigrants, although the younger generation of migrants was generally more interested in professional or hobby clubs than in politically oriented associations (*ibid*, p. 87).

Participation patterns can be explained, to a certain extent, by identification patterns: the Moroccan respondents expressed solidarity with other ethnic groups living in France, e.g. the Algerians, but also with people from the same hometown or region. The respondents featured both people who felt they belonged to France as well as people who felt they belonged to Morocco. However, the sense of belonging was usually explained by social or cultural lifestyles, and not political loyalty and citizenship. (Virkama and Kadri 2010) However, there were also informants, mostly among the politically more active people, who identified themselves as world citizens. Also the cultural heritage of Islam was seen as fostering cosmopolitan identity. Identifying oneself as European was practically inexistent, even though the life projects of several Moroccans in France were projected towards Europe, proving that the European identity can in a trans-continental transnational space – resemble an ethnic or racial boundary that is rather hermetic and exclusive, in opposition to a political identity that should be inclusive and open for everyone willing to make the efforts needed for joining. Citizenship discourses among Moroccans resembled the discourses of Estonians and Turkish: some of them interpreted naturalisation processes as expression of disloyalty to their country of origin, but ethical and cultural dilemmas seems to be dissolved as pragmatic reasons intervened, such as such as freedom of movement, better access to employment, etc. Among the respondents in France, one third had French citizenship and one third had double citizenship, and some were considering or already going through the naturalisation process during the time of the interviews.

7   Punjab-UK Transnational Space

The UK-Punjab transnational space provides the case study encompassing the broadest geographical span within a transnational space, and is also characteristic due to the religious affiliation between the migrants: the majority of interviewees

(154 out of 190) were Sikhs. Whereas Islam gave the migrants in the two other transnational spaces a basis for solidarity and even cosmopolitan self-definition, Sikhism in comparison is an exclusively contained religion on the global scale, and thus provided a very strong basis for identification and differentiation from others.

Due to geographic distance between the two localities within the transnational space, transnational practices had to do mainly with migration, save from occasional vacations and returns (as opposed to Estonian-Finnish transnational space, for example). However, the defining feature behind migration motivations is the notion of mobility, as Qureshi et al. (2012) argue, rather than poverty, striving for educational development or family reunion. Qureshi et al. differentiate between migrant groups according to the time of migration ("old-timers", "British born" and "East Africans" of multiple migrations background vs. "freshies") and note that the attitudes of earlier migrants toward newcomers are rather restrictive: the newcomers are often associated with illegal or just dodgy immigration schemes, low willingness to adapt and integrate. On the other hand, interviews proved that the "freshies" are exceptional networkers, who – contrary to most other migrants irrespective of the transnational space – simultaneously maintain their connection with their peers back in Punjab, invest into building a network in the UK (as well as elsewhere), where their connections allow them to do so. Hence, leaving Punjab is no more just an issue of leaving for the UK and perhaps returning after earning enough money, but can be interpreted by employing a new sociological category: as a manifestation of "youthful masculinity" which provides a viable solution by Punjabi youth themselves (Qureshi et al. 2012, p. 26).

What kind of a "vertical" status would such "inbetweenness" require? All of the respondents settled in the UK had taken up British citizenship, or as they called it, "the passport" (*ibid*, p. 39), which was valued in terms of welfare entitlements as well as easier travelling to third countries – yet, some respondents had encouraged their wives to retain Indian citizenship with an eye to maintaining agricultural land or the inheritance rights back in India. The toolbox of policies India has developed towards its emigrants and diasporas, offering various statuses (e.g. being a Non-Resident Indian, or an Overseas Citizen of India), that as Qureshi et al. note, is implementing a reaction to Nehruvian exclusionist policies, albeit a belated one. Though many programmes of the Indian government such as Scholarship Programme for Diaspora Children, or the Know India Programme provide ground for redefining the nation in a non-territorial way (2012, p. 33), the programmes were not highly appreciated or recognised by respondents. The NRI, PIO and OCI statuses were of interest to a minority of interviewees, namely those who were doing business in India, or constantly commuting between the two countries, or willing to purchase property there. However, this did not carry any sentimental value for the respondents, or no "vertical" identity in terms of citizenship. Rather, they expressed disappointment with the new status, which deprives them from rights to political participation, but they also complained over the lack of civil rights, e.g. the right to the protection of their property. Some respondents even complained that the new statuses are a trap, because the Indian state is trying to take advantage of them through granting them various statuses. Varying definitions of "vertical" status in the UK was in some cases taken with gratitude: some

respondents had used the opportunity to take British citizenship, but retain their Indian nationality. However, this was clearly a minority.

> I am a patriot. I have always remained as Indian. I and my wife have Indian passports, we have Indian nationality. We have never left it. Q: You went there in 1968 and your family joined you in 1972, you didn't take citizenship there yet, how did you survive such a long time? I became a citizen after 1 year. I never changed my nationality. One has to take citizenship otherwise you don't get benefits, even medical benefits (Male, 70, "old-timer" on vacation).

Otherwise, no identification concerns with taking British citizenship were raised. Rather, respondents expressed their desire to naturalise as soon as possible, since there is interior prejudice against newcomers within social groups of Indian origin. Hence, "British citizenship was not only prized for the pragmatic benefits such as welfare entitlements, ease of travelling, but also for its symbolic meaning, since British is so much more desirable than Indian." (Qureshi et al. 2012, p. 40). However, many respondents still found it difficult to identify themselves with the UK, due to the "whiteness" embedded in British identities, and hence, some respondents were thriving towards other options:

> I think this is my home. It's the only home I've got, anyway, I don't fit in there [India] any more either. Maybe that's why I'm drawn to the USA more than here. I could give up Englishness or Indianness and become an American – they allow you to do that. In my mind I think I'm English, but well, am I? Why can't people say yes, be proud this is your home? (Male, 40, British-born).

As noted above, the identity of the Punjabi is rather distinct from other Indians in the UK. Religion was also the factor that prevented the growth of feelings of national solidarity with India since they had rather negative historical memories of persecution. Hence their full allegiance/loyalty is associated with Britain and this was emphasised often through narratives of historical memory (Punjabis served in the British Indian army during the two World Wars) and the self-identity of the Punjabi as the loyal marshal race. As also evidenced in the Estonian-Finnish space, several respondents had generated a reactive identity toward other minorities in the UK, and projected themselves as a prosperous, well educated and integrated model minority (*ibid*, p. 43). Such an improved model of identity was also central to the UK Punjabi identity culture celebrated in the forms of ceremonies. However, also the Punjabi community featured the community level of "horizontal" participation, namely, the *gurdwara* committees. These were often led by migrants who resemble the Moroccan political refugees, and were also engaged in human rights activism back in Punjab.

Conclusions

Based on empirical accounts of four transnational spaces, transnational citizenship resembles more a dual national citizenship rather than a qualitatively new formation, but demonstrates that the horizontal and vertical loyalties and arenas form a functionally differentiated model of agency in the two nation-state settings. In many aspects transnationalisation seems to be reinforcing the erosion

rather than constructing a new foundation for civic initiative and affiliation (see also Kivisto and Faist 2007).

In most cases among the respondents, migration is triggered by either economic or social factors whereas the impact of political factors is rather rare. Hence, the preconditions for transnational political activism are scarce, and we can rather witness the movement of financial and social remittances as the everyday practice of a transnational space, and not practices associated with either horizontal or vertical citizenship. Though migration sometimes gives an input into the political domain in the form of new civic skills or the empowerment of return migrants, we are still rather far from talking about a transnational political space or a full-fledged transnational citizenship. Rather, as was demonstrated in the four case studies, transnational citizenship means freedom to choose between the loci of political identification and participation (see also Table 3).

The cultural, political and social contexts of all four case studies varied, and also had an impact on the different dimensions of citizenship. Reactions to more exclusive identity politics practised in the framework of citizenship policies but also in other contexts, have resulted in distinct migrant identities opposing the mainstream society or specific groups of "others". And this was not an issue concerning only national identification, but also supranational identities – whereas European identity was too broad and alien for the Finnish respondents, it remained too restrictive for Moroccan respondents. On the other hand, Islam seems to be a factor that brought them closer to a cosmopolitan identification as world citizens. History also played a part in crafting transnational loyalties: the Punjabi and Estonian respondents have been recalling that they had fought for the same purpose with the British/Finnish.

Despite differences, some similarities between the case studies can be outlined. First of all, in practice membership in one society at a time (horizontal status) seemed to be a rule rather than exception. Though people always retained some transnational networks, especially to their kin, the networks that tended to foster bridging social capital, faded over time, despite new communication technologies available. However, transnational citizenship as horizontal status still grants the individual the choice to be attached to a society toward which the feelings of belonging are experienced.

The interviews also demonstrated that political participation is in most cases confined to one state or society, and hence, does not support the idea of multiple political membership. To an extent, this is the result of restrictive citizenship policies that confine citizenship to a vertical status. For example, the Punjabi respondents expressed disappointment over the fact that Non Resident Indians were not allowed to vote in India.

But usually political participation was associated with social factors, practical considerations and convictions. Even if granted the right – as in the Estonian-Finnish transnational space – it was used only by a small number, because people usually find it too time-consuming to be engaged with politics in multiple countries. The prime transnational political activists tended to be people who had migrated due to political reasons (e.g. from Morocco or India), and the

Table 3 Summary of findings from the four transnational spaces

		Estonia-Finland	Turkey-Germany	Morocco-France	Punjab-India
Status	Horizontal	Networks in one society at a time despite frequent travel	Networks in one society at a time except family	Difficulties in integration and refusal from it among French Networks in one society at a time	Networks in one society at a time, except for "freshies"
	Vertical	EU citizenship, perceived instrumentally. National citizenship as manifestation of identity	Turkish, German and double citizenship. Protest against German assimilative citizenship policies	French cannot get and don't want Moroccan citizenship. Moroccans citizenship status depends on duration of stay and return plans	Mostly British citizenship among more settled migrants. Incredulity toward Indian statuses
Identity	Horizontal	Rather primordial ethnic identity; reactive identity toward other minorities. Identity problems of 1.5ers	Migrant identity; only in some cases positive double identity. Reaction toward German identity	French identify through language, culture and values as French, European or Western. Moroccans identify as immigrants, muslims or world citizens	Religious/regional identification, identification as model minority. Hard feelings over "whiteness" of British identity
	Vertical	Loyalty toward the state of residence, but more toward Finland	Hard feelings over German naturalisation policy. Guilt over giving up Turkish citizenship	French – no allegiance to either state. Moroccans – religion a more important vertical relationship	Collective id: martial race loyal to Britain; On individual level, patriotism toward either state rather rare.
Participation	Horizontal	Participation in diaspora and local civic associations. Finnish more active. Paradox of national transnational associations.	Participation in migrant associations maintained via transnational hubs of political activists	French not participant; Moroccans active in migrant associations and transnational human rights movements	Participation in migrant civic associations and transnational human rights movements Patriotism rallies
	Vertical	Voting in one country at a time or not voting at all	Voting in Germany or not voting at all due to restrictions	Voting in one country (mostly France) at a time or not voting at all	Voting in UK or not voting at all due to citizenship

Source: Authors

political activists often functioned as transnational 'hubs' for political participation and associational life.

Migration is an option for political exit or "voting with their feet "in Hirschman's (1970) model of citizen participation. In concordance with this, transnational activities concentrate on the specific domains of migrant associations and migrant issues. Thus transnational participation is usually not focused on mainstream democratic politics and could be rather characterised as habitual in Hay's (2007, p. 75) terms. When aiming to enhance full transnational participation it is necessary to endorse political skills and engagement in addition to general social, economic and cultural empowerment.

Even if citizenship as participation and citizenship as "horizontal" status were in most cases not practised fully transnationally, the identity issue proved to be rather a matter of flexibility. Having a primordial ethnic identity, feeling loyalty to the Finnish state and behaving as an EU citizen was nothing alien to Estonian respondents. Also several respondents from the Turkish-German, French-Moroccan and the *desis* in the UK-Indian transnational space cited their double identity as something positive. However, this can again be restricted by policies, and become more vulnerable for the second generation of migrants, in some cases (e.g. Estonia-Finland), already for the 1.5ers.

Transnational citizenship, as contemporary practices of migrants indicate, is comparable to the classical nation-state citizenship. In contrast to some theoretical accounts, our findings indicate quite modest practices of transnationalism. Transnational citizenship tends to follow the pattern of the liberal rather than the republican stream in citizenship policy – that a citizen does not necessarily need to be actively engaged in political processes, but rather needs to retain the right to intervene in questions important to her. This is an evident challenge for the mainstream scholarship of democratic participation that ususally emphasises that citizens should engage in a wide range of political issues.

A more republican citizen identity is hard to maintain in as much as transnational citizens are attached to several states and cultures at the same time. Patriotism and willingness to make sacrifices to the demos or the polity as a (unique) whole cannot be the only defining feature of the state-citizen relation, since these entities are more and more difficult to define and incorporate in one's self-identity. Thus there is a significant space for reconfiguration of the reference points of political identity and participation in case of transnational citizens. In fact, there is no sustainable escape from politics. Migrants develop some kind of public interface including political aspects. The opportunity structure for this is of course still defined by the states.

The role of the European Union for transnational agency becomes clearly visible contrasting the intra-EU space between Estonia and Finland to the other, more conventional transnational spaces studied in the Trans-net project. The European rights of free movement, residence and work foster both circular migration as well as living and being active in two countries simultaneously. As people are more empowered, this leads to more informed and more effective adaptation strategies.

The transnational space between Estonia and Finland has also significantly smaller cultural and welfare distance that fosters migrant agency. The cultural proximity and EU multi-level governance framework in the Estonian-Finnish transnational space widen the political liberties and opportunities accessible for migrants while primordial ethnic identification does not necessarily mean undermining other types of solidarity. However, it could partially depend on the novelty of the Estonian-Finnish space. In other transnational spaces the cultural tensions tended to aggravate over time.

The better status of people in intra-EU transnationalism doesn't necessarily mean active civic or political participation and fast adoption of multiple societal identities. People can develop their personal mix of discourses and practices that could differ from both of their countries. They can also opt for accommodation strategies that are not politically or even publically aware but oriented to peers and working place.

Given this, one can't neglect the legal and practical benefits for migrants and citizens in case of intra-EU transnationalism. These form the ground for substantial multiple citizenship and some people also practice it. However being active in several countries needs much energy. Thus developing full multiple citizenship is a vast endeavour.

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Political Participation and Non-democratic Political Culture in Western Europe, East-Central Europe and Post-Yugoslav Countries

Andrej Kirbiš

1 Introduction

Understanding patterns of political participation in Post-Communist and especially post-Yugoslav countries is crucial for their integration in the European Union. Post-Yugoslav countries, for instance, have in the past been affected by a turbulent dissolution of the joint state with ethnic strife and armed conflicts taking place. Many areas of political culture and value orientations of post-communist citizens have previously been studied (for instance, traditionalism, authoritarianism, nationalism and related non-democratic political-cultural orientations; see, for example, Flere and Molnar 1992; Galić 2000; Frieze et al. 2003; Sekulić and Šporer 2006; Klingemann et al. 2006; Brajdić-Vuković et al. 2007; Klanjšek 2007; Lavrič 2007; Simkus 2007; Flere and Kirbiš 2009a, b; Kirbiš 2011; Kirbiš and Flere 2011b), while relatively few studies have dealt with patterns of political participation. This especially holds true for post-Yugoslav countries, since only a small number of systematic cross-national studies have analyzed and compared political participation of *all* post-Yugoslav countries (see, for example, Kirbiš 2011; Kirbiš and Flere 2011a).[1] Even though levels of political participation and political culture are important in the process of consolidating the new democracies, one aspect is especially understudied in Post-Communist states: the association between political participation and political culture.

The aim of the present chapter is to analyze the levels of political participation, non-democratic political culture and the link between political participation and political culture in three European regions. I have examined post-Yugoslav states within the wider European context. This chapter is divided into five sections.

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[1] For a comprehensive list of research dealing with post-Yugoslav countries see http://projects.ff.uni-mb.si/cepyus/en/publications.

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The first section gives a brief overview of the importance of political participation in the functioning of democratic systems and presents the working definition and multidimensionality of political participation. Relevance of the link between political culture and participation is presented in the second. In the third section the main study hypotheses are outlined and the fourth section presents the major results. Last section places the main results into the wider context of past literature and points to the central implications of this study.

2   Political Participation, Democracy, and Longitudinal and Cross-National Trends

Conceptualizing political participation is an intriguing and widely discussed issue in academic literature. In one of the earlier studies Verba and Nie (1972, p. 2) provided the following definition of political participation: "Political participation refers to those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take". As Teorell noted, this definition has dominated the empirical field of participation studies (2006, p. 789). The definition of political participation offered by Verba and Nie could be criticized on the grounds that it exclusively sees activities as *political* when they express a formal engagement – especially in terms of voting – and in relation to conventional political actors (e.g. political parties). The authors themselves acknowledged that they have examined activities that are more narrowly *political* – i.e. those aimed at affecting the government (Verba and Nie 1972, pp. 2, 3). A working definition of political participation in this study, on the other hand, is in line with Vromen's (2003, pp. 82–83) definition of participation as "acts that can occur, either individually or collectively, that are intrinsically concerned with shaping the society that we want to live in". Such wider conceptualization of political participation leads to the inclusion of "informal" and community-based participation (social participation, e.g. membership in voluntary associations), protest activities and other forms of "nonconventional" political participation, which occur beyond formal and electoral politics (Vromen 2003).

Taking into account different forms of participation, past studies have given a theoretical and empirical confirmation to the multidimensionality of political participation (see, among others, Verba et al. 1995; Makarovič 2002; Vromen 2003; Claggett and Pollock 2006). In most cases, researchers differentiate between conventional political participation, protest participation and social/civic participation (see Barnes et al. 1979; Mihailović 1986; Pantić 1988; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002; Torney-Purta and Richardson 2002; Zukin et al. 2006). That said, the focus in the present research has been on all three dimensions of political participation.

Classic theorists like Aristotle, Rousseau, de Tocqueville, J. S. Mill as well as many contemporary authors have emphasized – in one way or another – the importance of citizen participation (see Lipset 1959; Almond and Verba 1963; Dahl 1972; Dalton 1996; Barnes 2004). Despite their different views on most appropriate levels of political participation and the mechanisms to achieve them,

both participatory democrats (Pateman 1970; Barber 1984) and democratic realists (Schumpeter 1943; Sartori 1987) agree that citizen participation is an integral condition of democracy (Parry and Moyser 1994, p. 46; also Almond and Verba 1963; Easton 1975; Inglehart 1997; Norris 2002). In other words, an active, engaged citizen with a participatory-oriented perspective has a vital role in enforcing a stable and effective democracy (also see Verba et al. 1995, p. 1; Schlozman 2002, p. 433). Or as Verba and colleagues have succinctly put it: citizen participation is "at the heart of democracy" (Verba et al. 1995, p. 1). Verba and Nie (1972, p. 1) also argued that "Where few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is". Consequently, the degree of participation in a given country is considered, by democratization analysts, to be one of the indicators of its level of democracy (Parry and Moyser 1994, pp. 4–6; also see Vanhanen 1990, pp. 17–18).

It is highly important then to investigate patterns and levels of political participation in Europe. Some worrying trends have been detected in recent years raising questions about the functioning of modern democratic governance. Specifically, longitudinal research on political participation trends has shown that changes in patterns and levels of participation in recent decades have been taking place in Western and Post-Communist Europe. Many studies point to a decrease in levels of voter turnout (e.g., Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Wattenberg 1998; Gray and Caul 2000; Macedo et al. 2005; Blais 2007), and to a decrease in both party membership and intensity of party attachment (Katz et al. 1992; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995; Scarrow 2007). Social participation (membership in voluntary organizations; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Putnam 1995, 2000), trust in politicians (Holmberg 1999) and trust in political and state institutions (Crozier et al. 1975; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995) have also declined over the last decades. These trends have consequently led many authors to raise questions regarding the future of democracy (see, for instance, Kaase and Newton 1995; Macedo et al. 2005).

Immediately after the collapse of communist regimes in Europe, researchers detected indicators pointing to relatively high levels of political participation in most of the newly evolving democracies (Kostadinova 2003; Barnes 2004), although these levels were on average still lower than those in established Western democracies (Kluegel and Mason 1999). In the post-transition phase that followed, there was a decline in civic activities in the new democracies (Barnes 2006, p. 87; also see Barnes 2004). One of the reasons might have been the (mis)understanding of the nature of democracy by post-communist citizens – e.g. they understood is as an opportunity (i.e. freedom to) being politically *inactive* (Lewis 1997, p. 447; Barnes 2004, p. 4; Fink-Hafner and Kropivnik 2006, p. 68).

Postmodernization theory is one of the main explanatory perspectives on cross-national differences in political participation activities. Its main argument is that democracy is generally more stable and efficient in socio-economically more developed countries. More specifically, the process of modernization with its core elements – industrialization, urbanization, rationalization and secularization, the development of bureaucracy, etc. – brings about broader structural changes in society: it improves living standards and overall well-being, increases the share of employees in the

secondary sector (industrialization phase) and later on in the service sector (post-industrialization phase), increases educational levels and the possibilities and means of communication and access to information. These and other similar processes increase people's resources as well as their cognitive mobilization and both of these elements consequently lead to the formation of a "participatory" political culture (Inglehart 1997; Dalton 2000, 2008a; Norris 2002; Welzel et al. 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2007; also see Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Inkeles and Smith 1974).

The central thesis of postmodernization theory is that the growth of participatory, more engaged approach to politics correlates with socio-economic development. Earlier versions of this theory, such as Almond and Verba (1963, pp. 89, 116), have drawn the same hypothesis which was subsequently corroborated by empirical research. For example, research has confirmed that socioeconomically more developed countries have shown higher levels of voter turnout (Davidson-Schmich 2006; Blais 2007), non-electoral conventional political participation (e.g. contacting politicians and public officials, contributing money to working for political parties and candidates; Newton in Montero 2007), as well as higher levels of protest activity (Bernhagen and Marsh 2007; Janmaat 2006), membership in political parties (Scarrow 2007, p. 638), and levels of civic/social participation (Norris 2002; Newton and Montero 2007; Adam 2008; Roller and Rudi 2008). Socioeconomically advanced countries also score higher on subjective dimensions of political engagement, such as expressed political interest and assessment of the significance of politics in citizens' lives (Van Deth 2008, p. 198). An increasing number of studies have also found that established Western democracies score higher on aforementioned indicators of participation than Post-Communist countries (see, among others, Norris 2002; Dalton and van Sickle 2005; Newton and Montero 2007; Dubrow et al. 2008).

It is also often argued that lower levels of political participation in Post-Communist countries are not only related to their lower levels of socioeconomic development, but are also due to their cultural heritage. "Subject" political culture (Almond and Verba 1963) is thus seen as one of the main factors influencing low political engagement of post-communist citizens along with an analogous level of passivity and dependence in relation to the state and its institutions (Inglehart and Welzel 2007). Next sections presents a short review of past studies of political participation in the (post)Yugoslav context.

3   Participation Literature on (Post) Yugoslav States

Comparative studies of political and civic participation in Post-Communist countries do not provide straightforward results as postmodernization theory would expect and as comparative research on established democracies has widely proposed. More specifically, some studies suggest (Duch 1998; Markowski 2002; Kostadinova 2003; Miheljak 2006) that socioeconomic development at the aggregate level in Post-Communist countries is either *not statistically related* to levels of participation or the link is even *negative*. Interestingly, this trend was also observed

in the Yugoslav republics prior to the dissolution of the joint state (see Barbič 1973; Vrcan 1986; Mihailović 1986; Miljević and Poplašen 1991). Post-Yugoslav research has provided similar results with higher levels of participation being detected in socioeconomically less developed countries. Many studies, for instance, point out that Slovenia scores lower on political participation measures than other citizens of other Post-Communist states, despite its relatively high levels of economic development. Studies carried out on representative samples (Barnes 1998, p. 135; Thomassen and van Deth 1998, p. 156; Rus and Toš 2005; Miheljak 2006; Newton and Montero 2007) and studies of youth and student populations (Kirbiš 2011; Kirbiš and Flere 2010, 2011a; Kirbiš 2010) have provided similar findings. Moreover, Slovenes score lower on participation measures than majority of citizens in other EU and post-Yugoslav countries (Bashkirova 2002, p. 323; Rus in Toš 2005). A recent study of Slovenian youth (15- to 29-year olds; see Lavrič 2011) revealed that the smallest percentage of young people in Slovenia considers politics as very or quite important in their lives, compared to their European peers (Kirbiš and Flere 2011c), corroborating similar studies carried out on representative national samples (van Deth 2006). Studies of social participation (e.g. membership in voluntary associations) that include post-Yugoslav countries again show that there is no positive association between participation levels and socioeconomic development.

A profound question thus concerns the major premises of postmodernization theory that are not confirmed in the post-communist context, especially post-Yugoslav countries. There can be several possible reasons for that. First, as Almond already noted, one of the important characteristics of former communist regimes was a relatively wide and diffused acceptance of communist ideas among the population; one of those ideas was explicitly related to the importance of socio-political activism (Almond 1983, p. 133). This was especially the case in the Yugoslav context where the idea of self-management and socio-political activism were intertwined, representing two important constituents of Yugoslav political culture. Then cross-republic differences in participation (with economically less developed Yugoslav republics having the highest participation scores) could have reflected divergences on the level of abiding to basic communist tenets (for example, the idea of self-management; see Mihailović 1986; Jambrek 1988, p. 153). Interestingly, compared to other countries, Yugoslav citizens were politically active (see Verba et al. 1978, Chap. 11).

A second possible explanation accounting for low political participation scores of more developed Yugoslav republics could have been "politicisation of society" (van Deth in Elff 2004), i.e. the extent and debt of social *cleavages* ("deep-rooted divisions within a society that have structured political conflict and competition", van Deth and Elff 2004, p. 3) within different Yugoslav republics (ethnic fragmentation, urban–rural cleavage, owner-worker cleavage, etc.). Data show that in economically less developed (post)Yugoslav regions there are higher levels of ethnic and religious fragmentation (e.g. Kosovo, BiH and FYR Macedonia) (see Roeder 2001; Alesina et al. 2002). In addition, Kosovo and BiH have witnessed the

most extensive post-Yugoslav war conflicts (see Horowitz 2003; Gow 2009), which might have additionally increased politicisation of socioeconomically least developed post-Yugoslav societies. A similar explanation of this link (low development-high participation) was presented by Miheljak, who argued that socioeconomic stability can in fact *increase* political passivity among the population (Miheljak 2006, p. 131; also see Markowski 2002, pp. 194–195).

Presently, there are relatively few comparative studies of political participation in post-Yugoslav states – a fact to be regretted as many authors argue that citizen participation in Post-Communist states is of special importance given that it represents a central source of legitimacy of the new democratic system, and is thus an important condition of their existence (Nelson 1996, p. 345; McAllister and White 2009). In other words, without participation there is no democratic consolidation (Barnes and Simon 1998). Unlike citizens in established democracies, post-communist citizens have neither extensive nor long-lasting experience with democratic processes and values (Nelson 1996). For this reason civic mobilization during the process of democratization is a particularly important challenge (Kostadinova 2003, p. 742).

Considering the importance of citizens' political participation for the process of democratic consolidation, it is surprising that there is a lack of comparative studies of post-Yugoslav states – not the least because of the strategic importance of the Western Balkans for the European Union. In this study I set out to examine political participation patterns in a broader, comparative European context, with a special focus on post-Yugoslav countries. Moreover, I analyzed whether postmodernization theory 20 years following the disbanding of Yugoslavia could explain cross-country differences in participation in both the post-Yugoslav and wider European context. In the next section I turn to the link between participation and political culture.

4   The Link Between Political Participation and Political Culture

Consolidation of a democracy does not only depend on levels and patterns of political participation, but also on the nature of the link between political participation and political culture. In this case postmodernization theory successfully provides insights into the differences in the field of cultural orientations in cross-national contexts. Its proponents argue that citizens who have grown up in countries and contexts of relative economic security (socioeconomically more developed countries) exhibit different political-cultural orientations (more specifically, liberal, non-traditional, post-materialist, tolerant orientations), than citizens who have grown up in conditions of relatively low socioeconomic development or even in the presence of existential insecurity (Inglehart 1997; Welzel et al. 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2007).

While it is important to examine cross-nationally cultural orientations which, to a large extent, influence the functioning of democracy, I also argue that patterns of political participation are also important in terms of making formal democracy (formal political structures and processes) effective. In addition, the link between

participation and culture is particularly important as well. As other authors have noted, the consolidation of Post-Communist democracies could be halted if "authoritarians" (citizens attached to non-democratic, authoritarian attitudes) are significantly more actively engaged in public life (e.g., in electoral turnout, party membership, contacting politicians, etc.) than "democrats" (see Thomassen and van Deth 1998). Theory of postmodernization and theory of human development (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2007) indicate that political cultural orientations are associated with political and cognitive mobilization. Many researchers assert that non-authoritarian (i.e. post-materialist, democratic, self-expressive) orientations are interlinked with participatory behaviour which enables self-actualization, while more traditional orientations contribute to political passivity (see Gabriel 2004). For instance, while materialists (authoritarians or "subjects" in Almond's term) predominantly focus their efforts on satisfying basic primary physiological needs, post-materialists feel existentially secure due to their relatively high levels of socioeconomic (i.e. economic, cognitive and social) recourses and can direct their efforts and energy to other activities, among others toward participation in public life; see Inglehart and Welzel 2007; also see Sullivan and Transue 1999; Gabriel 2004.

In sum, past surveys in the long-established Western democracies have so far largely confirmed that democratically-minded citizens are politically and civically engaged on a more frequent basis (see, among others, Inglehart 1997; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Gabriel 2004; Gabriel and van Deth 2004; Gundelach 2004). Similar findings have also been noted in a few studies that included Post-Communist countries (e.g., Klingemann et al. 2006) and other world regions (Bratton 1999). Furthermore, studies of Post-Communist countries show that a process of crystallization is taking place in the sense of a positive effect of post-materialist orientations on political participation (Guérin et al. 2004; also seed Niculescu 2003). Flanagan and Lee (2003) also argue that "libertarians" (i.e. democrats) are not only more politically engaged, but also manifest increased levels of political interest and possess higher internal political competence.

When analyzing the political culture-participation link, one has also to take into consideration the dimensionality of political participation. Indeed, different participation dimensions ought to be investigated if a comprehensive analysis is to be produced. As already noted, the bulk of participation research deals with conventional participation – electoral participation (voting) and non-electoral conventional political participation (contacting politicians, party membership, working for a campaign, donating money, etc.). One dimension of citizen participation that is especially important for "effective" democracy to materialize is also protest participation (Inglehart and Welzel 2007). The present study examines cross-national differences in political participation and non-democratic political culture in three European regions. In addition, I was interested in the *motivational* factors behind political participation in the observed environments. If, for example, citizens oriented toward authoritarianism were more likely to be engaged in public life, then consolidation of democracies could be a difficult process, potentially providing good ground for elite power and populist authoritarianism to emerge (see Rizman 2006).

5   Hypotheses

First, based on past literature I assumed that that established EU20 democracies would have higher levels of political participation than Post-Communist EU9 countries and that the post-Yugoslav countries would have the lowest levels of political participation (H1a). This hypothesis was based on major surveys which confirmed that political participation tends to be higher in socioeconomically more developed countries and in established democracies. I tested the predictive power of postmodernization theory for explaining cross-country differences in political participation. To reiterate, postmodernization theory understands the process of socioeconomic development as tending to diminish existential insecurity, which increases both pro-democratic and participatory political culture and which in turn enhances the quality of democratic governance (Inglehart 1997; Dalton 2000; Norris 2002; Inglehart and Welzel 2007; Welzel 2007). H1a was also based on results of past studies, which found higher levels of political participation in countries that are economically more developed (Norris 2002; Davidson-Schmich 2006; Janmaat 2006; Bernhagen and Marsh 2007; Newton and Montero 2007; Roller and Rudi 2008) and in established democracies, compared to new democracies (Mason 1995; Siemienska 2002; Barnes 2004; Adam et al. 2005; Rus and Toš 2005; Newton and Montero 2007; Roßteutscher 2008). Within the post-Yugoslav sample, I predicted (H1b) that socioeconomically most developed countries would have the lowest participation scores, and vice versa (Barbič 1973; Mihailović 1986; Vrcan 1986; Kuzmanović 1990; Miljević and Poplašen 1991); a pattern also detected in Post-Communist Europe (see Pacek et al. 2009). H1b was the opposite of H1a and was thus not in line with postmodernization theory.

Second, socioeconomic development also generates a greater emphasis on democratic political culture (e.g. self-expression values; see Inglehart and Welzel 2007). Therefore, I predicted (H2a) that non-democratic political culture would be lowest in EU20 group; that ECE EU9 group of new democracies would have the second highest scores; and that post-Yugoslav country group would have the highest scores, since post-Yugoslav states as a whole have the lowest levels of socioeconomic development and democratic consolidation (Freedom House 2011; Human Development Report 2010). Within the post-Yugoslav sample I predicted (H2b) that citizens in socioeconomically most developed post-Yugoslav countries should express the lowest levels of non-democratic political culture (Bertsch and Zaninovich 1974; Mihailović 1986; Radin 1986; Pantić 1988, 1998; Vujović 1990; Vasović 1991a, b; Flere and Molnar 1992; Hofstede 1994). H2a and H2b are in line with postmodernization theory.

Third, based on previous research (Inglehart 1997; Shin 1999; Niculescu 2003; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Gabriel 2004; Gabriel and van Deth 2004; Guérin et al. 2004; Gundelach 2004; Klingemann et al. 2006) I predicted that citizens who were most non-democratically oriented would exhibit lower levels of political participation compared to more pro-democratically oriented citizens (H3a). In addition, a prediction was made that the negative link between non-democratic attitudes and political participation would be strongest in EU20 countries, and weakest in post-

Yugoslav country group (H3b), since it seemed reasonable to expect that established democracies with a long tradition of democratic institutions would have the most *crystallized* link between non-democratic political culture and political participation. Post-Communist countries, with a relatively short democratic history and with many of them still being regarded as "partial" democracies (Freedom House 2011), on the other hand, should have shown the weakest, yet still *negative* association between non-democratic political culture and political participation, as stated in H3a.

6 Method

6.1 Sample

World Values Survey and European Values Study have been employed. The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political change and is conducted by a network of social scientist at leading universities all around the world. Interviews have been carried out with nationally representative samples of almost hundred societies on all six inhabited continents (WVS 2012a). In order to monitor these changes, the EVS/WVS has executed five waves of surveys, from 1981 to 2007 (the newest wave of European Values Survey was carried out in 2008). Representative national surveys were undertaken in 97 societies containing almost 90 % of the world's population (WVS 2012b). The World Values Survey has produced evidence of gradual but pervasive changes in what people want out of life. Moreover, the survey shows that the basic direction of these changes is, to some extent, predictable (WVS 2012a).

The present research of non-democratic political culture was partly built on the analysis of Klingemann et al. (2006) who have analyzed levels of democratic political culture and its correlates in Post-Communist Europe and established western democracies. Specifically, Klingemann et al. have analyzed World Values Survey data from 1999, and compared three groups of countries: (1) three democratic reference countries[2]; (2) Central European countries[3]; and (3) Eastern European countries.[4]

Following Klingemann and his colleagues' pattern, present analysis also focused on three groups of countries, although the set out criterion for the selection of countries was more formal and all-inclusive. The first group of countries consisted of 20 established EU democracies (hereinafter EU20).[5] Nine Post-Communist EU

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[2] USA, Norway and West Germany.

[3] East Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

[4] Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia.

[5] This group included the following established EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Though they are not EU member states, we also included Iceland, Norway and Switzerland in this group, since all fall in the advanced European democracies group according to economic and political indicators (HDR 2010).

member states (East and Central European new democracies, hereinafter ECE EU9) were included in the second group.[6] Finally, all the countries of former Yugoslavia were included in the third group.[7] In order to test out hypotheses, I used the EVS 2008 data to compare all three country groups with regard to the levels of political participation, non-democratic political culture and with regard to the political culture–participation link.

6.2 Measures

6.2.1 Political Participation

The present study considered three dimensions of political participation. First, *electoral participation* was measured with the following item indicating voter turnout: "If there was a general election tomorrow, can you tell me if you would vote?" (1 = Yes, I would vote, 2 = No, I would not vote). With regard to *non-electoral political participation*, respondents were asked whether they are *members of a political party* (1 = yes, 2 = no). Third measure of political participation was *protest participation*, which was tapped by three Likert format items: "signing a petition", "joining in boycotts", and "attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations" (1 = would never do, 2 = have done, 3 = would do).[8] Protest participation scale was summed across all three protest items and standardized to 100 points for ease of interpretation. Higher protest values represented greater protest engagement.

6.2.2 Non-democratic Political Culture

The first measure of non-democratic political culture–authoritarian political culture–was identical to the one used by Klingemann et al. (2006, pp. 18–19). Four Likert format items were employed; two of them measured attitudes toward democracy and two of them were related to attitudes toward authoritarian political systems.

The two "democratic" items were worded as follows:

"I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a (4) very good, (3) fairly good, (2) fairly bad or (1) very bad way of governing this country?"

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[6] Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovak Republic.

[7] Post-Yugoslav group included all post-Yugoslav countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.

[8] The actual question regarding protest engagements in the EVS questionnaire were framed as follows: "Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it".

"Having a democratic political system."

"I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you (4) agree strongly, (3) agree, (2) disagree or (1) disagree strongly?"

"Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government."

The two "authoritarian" items were worded as follows:

"I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a (4) very good, (3) fairly good, (2) fairly bad or (1) very bad way of governing this country?"

"Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections."

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a (4) very good, (3) fairly good, (2) fairly bad or (1) very bad way of governing this country?

"Having the army rule."

Scores of items measuring attitudes toward democracy as a form of government were added and subtracted from the sum of scores of two items measuring attitudes toward authoritarian system (see Klingemann et al. 2006). *Authoritarian political culture* scale was summed across all four items and standardized to 100 points for ease of interpretation. Higher authoritarian political culture values represented greater pro-authoritarian attitudes.

The second measure of non-democratic political culture included three items regarding *lifestyle intolerance*. As Welzel argues, lifestyle tolerance is one of the key measures of "emancipative" values, which proved to have a strong causal effect on democratic functioning (Welzel 2011; also see Inglehart and Welzel 2007). Three items addressed life choices and were used to measure how much emphasis respondents place on "lifestyle tolerance" depending on how acceptable they find "divorce", "abortion" and "homosexuality" (since all three original items had codes from 1 for "never justifiable" to 10 for "always justifiable" I recoded them). Lifestyle intolerance scale was summed across three items, and standardized to 100 points. Higher lifestyle intolerance values represented greater intolerance toward members of society with unconventional lifestyles.

Finally, the third measure of non-democratic political culture, gender role traditionalism (GRT), was tapped with the following item: "When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women" (1 = agree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither). Item were recoded so that higher values represented greater GRT (1 = disagree, 2 = neither, 3 = agree) and wee then standardized it to 100 points. This item alone has been used in previous studies to investigate cultural attitudes toward gender roles (e.g. Tesch-Roemer et al. 2008).

With regard to the investigated macro-variable – levels of socioeconomic development – Human Development Report (2010) was employed, which included

national statistics on gross national income for majority of world countries; including post-Yugoslav states, with the exception of Kosovo (the data for the latter were acquired from Kosovo Human Development Report 2010).

7   Results

7.1   Political Participation in Europe

First, we carried out cross-sectional analysis of EVS 2008 data where levels of political participation in three European regions were compared. The prediction was that EU20 democracies would have higher levels of political participation than Post-Communist ECE EU9 countries and that the post-Yugoslav countries would have the lowest levels of political participation (H1a). The results (see Fig. 1) indicated that citizens of EU20 countries were statistically significantly more likely to vote (85.6 %) than citizens in both Post-Communist country groups (70.6 % in ECE EU9 and 71.0 % in post-Yugoslav group). The difference between both Post-Communist country groups in levels of electoral participation was non-significant.

Second indicator of conventional political participation (party membership), interestingly revealed a different picture. Citizens from post-Yugoslav country group reported highest party membership rates (6.5 %); compared with EU20 citizens (5.5 %) and ECE EU9 citizens (2.6 %). The pattern of cross-group differences in party membership clearly did not follow the turnout differences between countries.

Third indicator of political participation, protest participation, showed a similar pattern to party membership. Group of established democracies reached highest mean levels of protest participation (M = 47.7), closely followed by post-Yugoslav group (M = 44.7). The lowest protest participation was found in ECE EU9 countries (M = 27.5). The difference between all three groups was statistically significant (p < .01).

Taking into account the results of all three types of political participation, the prediction that established democracies would have higher levels of political participation (H1a) was only partly supported. While EU20 group was generally highest on the voting and protest scale, party membership was highest in post-Yugoslav group. Furthermore, it was expected that ECE EU9 group would be higher on three participation scales than post-Yugoslav country group, which did not hold true for two out of three participation measures. In the context of levels of political participation, it seems that post-Yugoslav countries are closer to established democracies than ECE EU9 countries, and in fact even outperform EU20 group on party membership.

7.2   Political Participation in Post-Yugoslav States

It was also predicted (H1b) that within post-Yugoslav sample, socioeconomically more developed countries would have lower political participation scores – a

Fig. 1 Voter turnout, party membership and protest participation in three European regions (EU20, ECE EU9 and post-Yugoslav group), EVS 2008 (European Values Study 2008)

hypothesis in contrast to postmodernization theory yet in line with past studies of (post)Yugoslav entities. Figure 2 indicates that cross-national differences in post-Yugoslav sample did not provide clear-cut results.

Let us first take a look at voter turnout. Grey columns in Fig. 2 show that voter turnout was on average somewhat higher in more developed post-Yugoslav countries, which is opposite to what we predicted. In fact, Croatia had the highest self-reported turnout rates (78.1 %), followed by Serbia, FYR Macedonia and Montenegro. Slovenia scored fifth. Least developed Kosovo (49.8 %) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (67 %) had the lowest turnout. Turnout data largely disconfirmed H1b.

Next, party membership rates are shown on lower line graph. Cross-national differences in non-electoral participation were small, which was anticipated –past studies showed that relatively low percentages of populations are party members in both established and new democracies. A quick glance at lower line graphs seems to indicate that there was no clear link between levels of economic development and party membership. Yet a closer look shows that Macedonians reported highest membership scores (11.4 %) and Slovenians the lowest (3.9 %), with other countries falling in between. Overall, three least developed countries had a mean value M = 7.7 % of party membership rates, which was higher than rates in four most developed countries, where combined only 5.5 % of respondents reported being members of political parties. Still, Fig. 2 shows a few outliers. Bosnians scored lower than the economic position of their country would predict, and Croatians scored higher. Nevertheless, membership scores seem to indicate a pattern opposite to turnout rates and give a confirmation to H1b.

Fig. 2 Voter turnout, party membership and protest participation in post-Yugoslav states, EVS 2008 (European Values Study 2008)

Lastly, protest participation scores (upper grey line) also slightly fall from the left to right indicating that protest engagement decreases with socioeconomic development. Respondents in four most developed countries had lower protest scores (M = 40.9) than those in three least developed countries (M = 59.6). Looking at individual countries, Montenegrins reported the lowest protest potential, and Kosovars the highest.

In sum, overall picture of the link between socioeconomic modernization and participation was slightly positive on one measure of participation (voter turnout), and slightly negative on two measures (party membership and protest participation). Since country differences were not large and were also in the opposite direction, one cannot confirm H1b (although there seemed to a slight negative link between socioeconomic levels and participation scores on two analysed measures). The question remains why voter turnout pattern did not follow the other two participation indicators – an issue dealt with in the last section of this chapter.

7.3 Political Culture in Europe

The results presented so far show that postmodernization theory does not predict cross-national differences in political participation within a post-Yugoslav sample. Is postmodernization theory more successful in predicting cross-national differences in political cultural orientations, which are, as convincingly argued by many scholars (Lipset 1959; Almond and Verba 1963; Plasser and Pribersky 1996; Pridham and Lewis 1996; Rose and Shin 2001; Diamond 1994; Inglehart 1997; Dalton 2000; Klingemann et al. 2006; Inglehart and Welzel 2007; Welzel 2007), of critical importance for the development and functioning of democratic institutions? We predicted

Fig. 3 Authoritarian orientations, lifestyle intolerance and traditional gender role attitudes in three European regions (EU20, ECE EU9 and post-Yugoslav group), EVS 2008 (European Values Study 2008)

that non-democratic orientation would be more widespread in socioeconomically less developed country-groups (post-Yugoslav group and ECE EU9) than in EU20 (H2a), and that the same pattern would be found within post-Yugoslav group (H2b).

The results in Fig. 3 above show a rather clear-cut pattern. The levels of authoritarian orientations (grey columns) were lowest in the established EU20 group (M = 18.8), and highest in socioeconomically least developed post-Yugoslav group (M = 33.2), with ECE EU9 group in the middle (M = 30.9). All group differences were statistical significant (p < .01).

The same pattern was found in relation to lifestyle intolerance (upper line graph in Fig. 3) with Western Europeans showing more tolerance for unconventional lifestyles, while post-Yugoslav citizens appeared to be the least tolerant. Gender inequality attitude (lower line graph) was the only of the three measures of non-democratic political culture that did not fully follow this trend. Again, as predicted, EU 20 countries had the lowest scores, but post-Yugoslav group had somewhat lower mean values than ECE EU9 group. It seems then that post-Yugoslav citizens are more in favour of egalitarian gender roles than their East and Central European counterparts. Despite this exception, these results give a confirmation to H2a and postmodernization theory, which expects socioeconomically more developed countries to have less authoritarian (and more pro-democratic) political culture, and countries with communist past to have higher levels of non-democratic political culture.

7.4 Political Culture in Post-Yugoslav States

The next test was the prediction that citizens in socioeconomically more developed post-Yugoslav countries would report lower levels of non-democratic political culture than their counterparts from less developed post-Yugoslav countries (H2b).

Figure 4 shows non-democratic orientations in post-Yugoslav countries from the socioeconomically least developed on the left to the most developed on the right. If

we first examine authoritarian attitudes, there is apparently not high variability between countries. Compared to overall post-Yugoslav mean value (M = 33.2), which is well below the normative mean, only Slovenian and Croatian means fell below, with Slovenians having the lowest scores (M = 25.6), followed by Croatians (M = 29.7). Above the post-Yugoslav mean, Serbs reported the highest authoritarian values, followed by Macedonians, Kosovars, Montenegrins, and Bosnians. This pattern does not give clear confirmation of H2b. Though economically most developed Slovenia and Croatia had the lowest scores, most authoritarian-oriented public was the Serbian, despite the fact that there are four countries that are less developed. Yet two things have to be noted. First, a second look shows that there were only two outliers – Serbia and FYR Macedonia. And second, cross-national differences among five most authoritarian countries were relatively small. So the position of Slovenia and Croatia gives confirmation to postmodernization theory, while Serbia's does not.

Overall cross-national differences in intolerance measurement among post-Yugoslav states were greater than in authoritarian attitudes. We see that Fig. 4 provides more univocal results with regard to lifestyle intolerance. Economically most developed Slovenia had the lowest intolerance score, just above the normative mean with a value of 51.4, and the least developed Kosovo scored in the highest decile with M = 91.5. As expected, other five countries fell in between these two scores and differences among them were relatively small. Finally, gender role traditionalism followed the already observed pattern: economically less developed countries had the highest scores. Again, the link if not fully linear: Macedonians scored highest and Croatian and Slovenian the lowest.

Overall results thus seem to indicate that socioeconomic development predicts country's position on non-democratic orientations scales, yet the link between both variables is only moderate, which indicates that other contextual factors must come into play. Nevertheless, results largely confirm H2b. We can loosely predict countries relative position with regard to political cultural orientations based on levels of socioeconomic development.

7.5   The Link Between Political Culture and Political Participation in Europe and Post-Yugoslav States

Next, we turn to our main research question – what is the link between analysed cultural orientations and political participation in the three observed environments? Table 1 below provides an answer. It contains nine coefficients for each of the three regions, with three mean coefficients for each region and non-democratic orientation measures (in bold) and one overall coefficient (underlined) for each of the three regions.

We expected that the association between non-democratic political culture and political participation would be negative (H3a). We also predicted that the association would be strongest in advanced democracies (EU20), followed by ECE EU9 group, and the smallest in post-Yugoslav group (H3b). Table 1 largely confirms H3a and H3b. First, the majority of coefficients – more than two thirds – were

Fig. 4 Authoritarian orientations, lifestyle intolerance and traditional gender role attitudes in post-Yugoslav states, EVS 2008 (European Values Study)

negative (19 out of 27). Seven coefficients were non-significant, while only one of the associations between non-democratic attitudinal measure and participation was positive – in the ECE EU9 country group respondents who were more intolerant toward different lifestyles were more likely to vote, though the size of the coefficient was very small ($r = .03$; $p < .01$). Furthermore, Table 1 shows that average coefficients (nine coefficients in bold) were all negative, and three overall coefficients were also negative. These results give confirmation to H3a – pro-democratically oriented public is also more participatory.

We also compared the size of mean coefficients in three regions. We predicted (H3b) that the crystallization of the political culture–participation link would be highest in established democracies and smallest in post-Yugoslav countries (so that the negative link would be strongest in EU20 and weakest in post-Yugoslav group). Table 1 confirms this prediction though it has to be noted that the differences between average coefficients were rather small. In addition, Table 1 indicates that the coefficients were largest in the case of protest participation. In other words, it seems that protesters are the most democratically-oriented public.

8 Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined patterns and levels of political participation, non-democratic political culture and the link between the two in three European regions: a group of established EU democracies (twenty countries), a group of East-Central European EU member states (nine countries) and a group of seven post-Yugoslav countries. Political participation and culture were analysed from the perspective of postmodernization theory.

Predictably, levels of political participation were highest in EU20 group, compared to ECE EU9 group (as previous studies have shown with regard to different dimensions of political participation; see, among others, Mason 1995; Barnes 2004; Adam et al. 2005; Rus and Toš 2005; Newton and Montero 2007; Roßteutscher 2008). I also expected ECE EU9 countries to score higher on participation measures than post-

Table 1 Pearson coefficients of correlation between measures of political participation and non-democratic political culture, by European regions, EVS 2008

	Authoritarian orientations	Lifestyle intolerance	Gender inequality	Overall coefficients
EU20 % vote	−0.15**	−0.04**	−0.04**	
EU20 % party members	−0.06**	−0.05**	−0.02**	
EU20 protest	−0.22**	−0.38**	−0.22**	
Mean coefficients EU20	**−0.14**	**−0.16**	**−0.09**	−0.13
ECE EU9 % vote	−0.09**	+0.03**	−0.02*	
ECE EU9 % party members	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	
ECE EU9 protest	−0.15**	−0.16**	−0.06**	
Mean coefficients EU9	**−0.12**	**−0.13**	**−0.04**	−0.10
POST-YU % vote	−0.09**	−0.03**	n.s.	
POST-YU % party members	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	
POST-YU protest	−0.13**	−0.10**	−0.04**	
Mean coefficients POST-YU	**−0.11**	**−0.01**	**−0.04**	−0.05

Source: European Values Study (2008)
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01

Yugoslav country group. The results do not uniformly confirm H1. Voter turnout was found to be higher in EU20 group, while EU ECE9 and post-Yugoslav group had lower yet similar turnout level. On the other hand, party membership rates in post-Yugoslav countries were found to be higher than in EU20 or EU ECE9 group. In addition, citizens of post-Yugoslav countries were found almost as protest oriented as citizens in EU20 (and significantly more protest oriented then ECE EU9 citizens). In fact, additional statistical analysis has shown that protest participation scores of socioeconomically much less developed Kosovo and FYR Macedonia were higher than means in EU20 group. These results seem to point out that besides socioeconomic development and communist past other factors contribute to political participation differences at the aggregate level. Further research is needed to analyse which determinants contribute to this kind of cross-national patterns of between-region differences. Still, our research indicates that citizens of post-Yugoslav countries are not the least politically engaged. In fact, in some cases their political behavioural patterns seem to be more akin to Western Europeans than to former communist counterparts.

I also predicted that within the post-Yugoslav sample, socioeconomically most developed countries would have lowest participation scores. We did not detect a strong link between levels of economic development and political participation at the aggregate level. The link was slightly positive on voter turnout and slightly negative on other two measures (party membership and protest participation). Clearly, voter turnout patterns stand out with highest levels detected in more developed post-Yugoslav countries. It seems that turnout is associated with economic development, yet an important variable might also be an institutional one. Specifically, past research has found that institutional arrangements

(governmental system, election type, etc.), and contextual factors (e.g., frequency of elections; ethno-linguistic fragmentation) can play an important role in turnout rates (see, for example, Singh 2001; Pacek et al. 2009). Future studies should examine these potentially relevant factors.

We also plausibly expected that non-democratic political culture and similar attitudes would be more widely shared by post-communist citizens, especially those in post-Yugoslav countries, as postmodernization theory has predicted (Inglehart and Welzel 2007). The results largely confirm this prediction with the West–East divide being most pronounced on lifestyle intolerance and authoritarian political culture measure. It seems that socioeconomic development and communist legacy have left a lasting impact on the political and ideological orientations of post-communist citizens. Respondents in post-Yugoslav countries, taken as a whole, proved to be most non-democratically oriented in a comparative perspective. It has to be noted that post-Yugoslav countries group scored below the normative mean on two out of three non-democratic political culture measures (as did respondents from ECE EU9 group). Only lifestyle intolerance scores were well above the normative mean, yet on this scale ECE EU9 group also scored above the normative mean value, and EU20 group just below it.

In a similar vein, we also predicted that citizens in socioeconomically most developed post-Yugoslav countries would report the lowest non-democratic political culture. Again, this hypothesis was largely confirmed even though the link between both variables was only moderate. In other words, though we can predict a post-Yugoslav country's relative position in cultural orientations map based on its level of socioeconomic development, this can be most clearly done for the most developed countries (e.g. Slovenia). Cross-country differences between other post-Yugoslav environments are smaller, despite differences in socioeconomic development.

One of the most important findings of our research was the detected relationship between participation and political culture. Namely, in all three country groups pro-democratically oriented public was found to be more politically engaged than authoritarians, corroborating the findings of past research (Inglehart 1997; Shin 1999; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Gabriel 2004; Gabriel and van Deth 2004; Gundelach 2004). We also found that crystallization of the political culture–participation link was strongest in established democracies and smallest in post-Yugoslav countries.

These results (positive participation-culture link) have important implications for future prospects of democratic consolidation in post-Yugoslav states. In terms of further political-cultural democratic consolidation of post-Yugoslav countries they appear to be encouraging. As already noted, some authors have argued that disproportional participation in favour of citizens that hold non-democratic (authoritarian, traditional, nationalist) orientations may jeopardize the process of consolidating the new democracies (see Thomassen and van Deth 1998, p. 154). Even worse, it could pave the way for new authoritarian, populist "national leaders" since non-democratic citizen orientations can give rise to radical political parties (Ulram and Plasser 2001, p. 115); and history shows that global socio-economic

crisis (similar to what we are witnessing in recent years) is a fertile ground for the emergence of extremist political elites.

To reiterate, our study shows that *democrats* are more politically engaged in all country groups in general, and protestors are politically open and democratically-oriented, a finding similar to past research (Kaase and Marsh 1979; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002). Since protest participation (signing petitions, joining in boycotts, attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations) is one of the central non-institutionalized, direct, individualized forms of citizen participation, and is considered by many researchers as a key component of effective and stable democracy (see Inglehart and Welzel 2007; Welzel 2007), one is justified to assert that it should be embraced by (democratically-oriented) political elites in Post-Communist countries. The future of democratic consolidation will also be determined by the response of political elites to such elite-challenging behaviour. Let us note that protest behaviour is becoming more and more popular in recent years and that, in comparison to electoral turnout, citizens engage in protest behaviour and present their views (or their opposition) to political elites on a more frequent basis, largely independent of institutional mechanisms.

As already noted, past studies of Western countries have shown that since the WW2 a downward trend in political participation took place; not only in conventional political participation (among others, see Norris 2002; Blais 2007; Dalton 2008a, b), but also in party attachment and political trust (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995; Holmberg 1999; Scarrow 2007). Future studies should analyze whether an analogous political disengagement trend also took place in post-Yugoslav states and whether post-Yugoslav citizens have become more democratically oriented.

In sum, one could about the practical implications of our study results in terms for the future of "Europeanization" of post-communist (especially post-Yugoslav) countries (in the sense of their post-communist citizens acquiring pro-democratic orientations). If "Europeanization" of Post-Communist countries is understood in terms of their population taking part in political participation motivated by pro-democratic orientations, then it seems that post-communist citizenry is not unlike their Western counterparts. This also holds true if protest participation levels are taken as an indicator.

On the other hand, earlier studies have shown that political culture is essential for the implementation of "effective" democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2007). In this case, the post-Yugoslav citizens as a group are the least democratically oriented. So, even though present study corroborates past research showing that higher socioeconomic development is positively associated with pro-democratic political orientations (for a review, see Kirbiš 2011), it is argued that the future of democratic consolidation in post-Yugoslav and ECE EU9 countries will mainly depend not only on levels of socioeconomic development and (non)existence of unfavourable macro-contextual factors (global crisis), but especially on the within- and between country relations and tensions (the latter are especially relevant in post-Yugoslav countries). In other words, while socioeconomic development is a necessary precondition in the context of democratic consolidation of post-Yugoslav countries, it is not a sufficient one. Unfortunately, the global economic crisis might

have the most detrimental effect on democratic consolidation of the already economically least developed Post-Communist countries.

Future studies should analyze other motivational determinants of political participation. For instance, it is important to investigate other important elements of democratic political culture (e.g. self-expression values, social and political trust, subjective political efficacy, etc.) and their association with different measures of political participation (conventional participation contacting political officials, campaign work, etc.) and civic/social participation (membership in voluntary organizations, donations to charity, etc.). In sum, this study together with past research indicates that the political behaviour is linked to political orientations. With this research I have aimed to contribute to relevant research and expand our knowledge of the patterns of political participation in "old" and "new" Europe.

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Political Engagement Among the Youth: Effects of Political Socialization Across Europe

Steve Schwarzer and Dylan Connor

1 Introduction

According to David Held, "Democracy, as an idea and as a political reality, is fundamentally contested" (Held 1996, p. xi). It is not possible to find a general agreement on the basic elements that are considered necessary for being an active and informed citizen in a democratic system. Additionally, there has been no consensus in defining the term "democracy", which has become synonymous with representative democracy. Despite this, adolescents should still be introduced to the rules of democracy, the democratic culture, in order to develop a sense of responsibility and learn about the implications of majority decisions. Sometimes this is referred to as a preference for an "active" rather than a "passive" social citizenship; in which citizens passively receive benefits from the state. Active citizens are increasingly regarded as users and consumers who can be seen as creative and reflexive actors who are competent and have the ability to develop personal strategies in relation to public decision making. The question of "under what political socialization conditions do children become engaged with politics?" is an imperative one.

Evidence confirming attitude formation and change after childhood extended the period under consideration from early adolescence to early adulthood (Dawson and Prewitt 1969; James and James 2004). This still failed to accept that attitudes can change after this stage, as well as the socializing role of colleagues, media, partners, organizations or work life. Currently, several authors are returning to the centrality of childhood adolescence (Hooghe 2004; Sapiro 2004), while at the same time the shift includes the school as a second important agent of socialization. Media use and awareness-raising have also become accepted as determinants of political socialization and political participation. In several European countries, the discussion of

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adolescents' civic competencies has accelerated as stakeholders use the Austrian case as precedent to reviving old dialogue on lowering the legal voting age (Schwarzer and Zeglovits 2012, forthcoming). Research has shown that young voters do not differ from other generations in terms of political knowledge or in their ability to make an informed choice on Election Day (Wagner et al. 2012, forthcoming).[1]

All things considered, there is need for an integrated approach to the process of political socialization. This will allow us to better explain individual variations with respect to political engagement, considering several factors/agents that may play an important role in the formation and change of attitudes that denote political engagement and political participation. To achieve this, the present chapter explores political engagement of youngsters (13–14 years old) across Europe. This multilevel analysis uses data from the ICC study, which took place between 2007 and 2009.[2] The analysis will focus on both within, and between country differences in explaining levels of political engagement and several of its agents.

2 Theoretical Considerations: Political Socialization and Engagement

Individuals are not born as adults. Political socialisation describes how individuals find their place in the political community and the development of their attitudes and norms toward political objects, actors, symbols and processes. This is a learning process, by which the individual learns political attitudes and behaviours from generation to generation, influenced by political socialisation agents.

The political socialization of adolescents is a specific problem which has been the subject of much renewed attention in recent years, yet we still know relatively little about the civic development of adolescents (Hooghe 2004). Our understanding remains particularly limited on questions as to whether schools do, or do not, foster political engagement among their adolescent students (Campbell 2008, p. 438). Radio, newspapers, internet and most importantly television may also impact on the political development of adolescents. The concept of political socialisation describes how individuals find their place in the political community and how they develop their individual norms and attitudes toward political objects, actors, symbols and processes.

Some authors claim that political attitudes are already formed in the pre-adolescent years (Hyman 1959), while others agree with the observation of Almond and Verba (1963; 1989) that the sources of political attitudes are multiple and can be found from early childhood to adolescence into adulthood. Political socialization is (1) a learning process through which (2) the individual (3) learns political

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[1] It is unsurprising that the focus of the discussion has been associated with the various competencies citizens need in order to participate in an election.

[2] http://www.iea.nl/?id=181

attitudes and behaviour from generation to generation and is (4) influenced by political socialization agents. Although there are sometimes slight differences in the wording, the definitions refer to the same process of acquiring information about the political system, both at the individual (learning) and community (cultural transmission) level (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, p. 13). Furthermore, most authors take for granted a causal process: the effect of the socialization agent on the outcome (knowledge, behaviour).

Engagement in any subject matter includes a variety of different processes. These not only include an individual's personal involvement in activities but also one's motivation for engagement, confidence in the effectiveness of participation and the benefits derived from one's own capacity to become actively involved. The social cognitive theory postulates a learning process wherein learners are self-direct. The development of young people's self-efficacy, relative to politics, may partially be influenced by their levels of engagement in activities that influence their environment or community. It is quite clear that willingness, motivation and awareness exist prior to political participation as such. Political engagement seems to be influenced by at least four dimensions: the family, peers, media and those institutions that provide information on the processes and the concepts of politics, attitudes, norms and abilities.

3   Bridging Political Engagement and Political Participation

What does it mean to say that people are prepared for political participation? Torney-Purta and her colleagues (2008) defined indicators of "preparation for civic life" that embrace such indicators as knowledge and skills in interpretation of political communication, democratic values and attitudes, trust in institutions, political efficacy, participation in school and organizations and expected civic participation. However, Franklin's (2004) approach emphasises the degree of preparedness which young voters feel during their first election, and further assumes that the quality of the experience is a significant factor. Franklin addresses an important point as he refers to the schooling concepts of indirect civic education. Learning the essence of politics, learning to understand that the fundamentals of politics are present in one's everyday life – in school, in the family within peer networks – reinforces students' awareness of the importance of political behaviour. Furthermore, quality of experience also refers to the context, that should support students and young individuals to develop their understanding of politics – i.e. engagement and decision making in schools need to have a real perspective. Students need to feel that their engagement matters and their voices can be heard. Any activity that puts young people in touch with a political or societal activity accompanied by an adult is likely to be part of the socialisation process (McIntosh and Youniss 2010); this is why school and parental factors are so important.

Certainly, political socialization is structured around two complementary phases. In the first phase, the child perceives and assumes her position in the world and society, as well as their main features. In the secondary phase, adults internalize institutions, rules,

habits and norms from social and political contexts (Berger and Luckmann 1967). The first phase was initially the only one that stimulated the imagination of researchers. The main hypothesis was that, just like personality, political attitudes appear during childhood. Two additional assumptions accompanied that belief: that attitudes were hierarchically organized in such a way that those acquired earliest conditioned those that appeared later (primacy principle); and that they were extremely resistant to change (Searing et al. 1973; Markus 1979). Family (mainly parents) is considered the main socialization agent (e.g. Hyman 1959), fostering civic attitudes by means of promoting self-confidence (Mondak and Halperin 2008), or providing children with some behavioural roles in the public arena. The peer group was also considered a likely cause of civic orientations (Langton and Jennings 1968; Tedin 1980), and its influence has been proved to be relevant enough to affect people beyond school and childhood.

However, is everybody equally likely to take part in or to be influenced by these kinds of influences in their adult life? Probably, those accustomed to discussing political matters since childhood will be more prone to be involved in and to be receptive to such conversations in later stages of life. Political engagement norms develop early in life, but do they remain immutable?

We can assume that the reception of political stimuli and political discussion are the main mechanisms of socialization with regard to attitude development. According to the cognitive mobilization theory, discussion entails a process of attitude learning (Dalton 2006, 2008) which differs from the attitude transmission defended by early studies of socialization. By means of arguments, exposure and rational discussion, new information and opinions come into contact with the individual – so attitudes are generated or re-evaluated in the light of these new political stimuli. Furthermore, political discussion also improves an individual's perception of herself as a political actor, provided that the citizen is intelligent enough to understand political arguments, which would lead to the development of new attitudes towards the issue discussed (Torney-Purta 2002a, b; Galston 2003; EUYOUPART 2005).

Bearing in mind the compulsory education system, school is one of these institutions which have the power to socialise (Verba et al. 1995; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Torney-Purta 2002c). Young people meet and interact with their peers in schools; in addition they interact with teachers. Early research suggested that school had little or no effect on students' political knowledge and political behaviour, a conclusion based largely on the research of Langton and Jennings (1968) in the 1960s. This result was not questioned until Niemi and Junn (1998) published their analysis of the civics exam included in the 1988 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). Contradicting Langton and Jennings, they claimed the civic curriculum "to have an impact of a size and resilience that makes it a significant part of political learning" (ibid., 145) and concluded that taking civics courses did have a significant impact on adolescents' levels of political knowledge. So, schools are the institutions, in which the youngest are introduced to the norms and value system of a community and that these norms should be part of their everyday life in school and permeate through to all processes within a

school. These authors attach particular importance to the daily life and the political and social culture of a school.

Acting within these processes as well as dealing with arguments is essential to increase political awareness and civic engagement. In school, students can be influenced to approach politics in a more "systemic" way – as they learn about the democratic system and interrelated norms and values (Nie et al. 1996; Niemi and Junn 1998; Galston 2003). As has been said, the school could be seen as an institution that plays an important role in altering the primary socialisation (families) of young people (Scherr 2008, p. 49). Further, the media is considered an important factor in influencing political engagement, as it provides important information on the political system, which in turn has the potential to stimulate or discourage political engagement.

The chapter focuses on political socialization patterns that foster students' political engagement, which can be viewed as a starting point for political participation in the future. The necessary conditions under which youth becomes involved with politics still remains a puzzle. Aside from questioning what is implicit in creating good citizens, research has increasingly focussed on the agents of political socialization; is it all about family or are other factors, such as the schools, real and virtual friends also of importance?

This chapter sheds further light on the political engagement of school pupils across Europe, while further consolidating important drivers of political engagement, mainly socialization agents and context effects. The relationship between engagement and the current political participation of young students will subsequently be addressed.

So far, political socialization studies have not compared the effect of different agents of socialization across countries. When assessing the improvements suggested in the field, we must address the subject of the agents that play a role in the political socialization process *vis à vis* each other and not strictly separately.

If an individual is exposed early to various political arguments and diverse viewpoints, if her critical sense is stimulated during her childhood, she will be more likely to repeat this behaviour later than those who have been exposed to the same context at a later date in their life. In a similar way, citizens accustomed to politicized relationships since their early childhood they will more likely pursue politicized friendships in the course of their life. The argument with regard to the family background is that the more people know about politics, the greater faith they express in the system and the more social capital they will have. But family background is also an important factor determining motivation and ability to learn about politics, along with political behaviour and the democratic rules in school.

To evaluate the role of the several agents of political socialisation, the relation between them and political engagement will be discussed with reference to the following hypotheses:

1. According to the hypotheses of persistence and crystallization, the effect of variables relating to primary socialization (family) should be stronger than that of variables measuring secondary socialization (schools).

2. As the psychological process of political engagement constitutes an evolutionary process which is highly context-dependent, opportunity structures will influence the level of political engagement.
3. Controlling for the multilevel structure of the data will reveal differences between countries and schools in terms of effects of different agents on political engagement.

4   Data and Operationalization

The data were taken from the ICC study on civic and citizenship education.[3] The ICCS is a multi-country study which was conducted in 32 countries (mainly European, South American countries and a small number of Asian countries).[4] The data set contains both questions to build, and pre-built latent constructs which can measure students' in terms of important socialisation agents. However, we were not satisfied that these prebuilt indicators suited our needs and we instead rebuilt our own. As a concept, political engagement combines a set of psychological orientations and has been defined as the interrelation of political interest and internal political efficacy (Verba et al. 1995).[5]

To become politically active people require some level of self-belief and self-confidence in turn the construct of political efficacy reflects an individual's level of belief that political and social change is possible. However, due to the ICCS being conducted within schools, this measurement may over-emphasise experiences in that environment. Thus, we note that students' self-reported confidence in their civic participation not only recognises the out of school environment but also the within.

As a result, we distinguished and segmented the different aspects of political socialization from several perspectives; parental influences, school influences, media influences and more objective measures of the students' background. Home and family have long been considered the most influential factors shaping civic learning outcome. The family domain is directly and indirectly influenced by parents; direct influences evolve through political discussions, which are regarded as a key element of democratic society. Students were asked about their parent's

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[3] The description of the data is based on documents regarding the ICC study. These documents will be published early 2011.

[4] More information on the research framework could be found here: http://iccs.acer.edu.au/uploads/ICCS%20Assessment%20Framework/ICCS%202008%20Full.pdf

[5] The general concept of political efficacy captures the feeling of an individual that political and social change is possible. It is normally differentiated into external and internal efficacy. Whereas external efficacy describes the individuals perception of the responsiveness of the political system, internal efficacy relates to the confidence of an individual to understand politics and to act in the political dimension (Converse, P. E. (1972). Change in the American electorate. In: A. Campbell & P. E. Converse (Eds.),The human meaning of social change (pp. 263–337). New York: Russell Sage Foundation),

level of political interest, how often they discussed political and social issues generally, with parents and friends, and how often with regard to other countries.

The media are recognized as important source of secondary socialization (discussed previously), yet research on the effects of media on participation in a democratic society is inconclusive. However, research usually depicts a positive link between media use (information seeking in particular) and political participation. To establish this further, from an extensive literature review and a large-scale study, Norris (2000) found no conclusive evidence for a negative relationship between media use and political participation. The ICCS survey included questions pertaining to the frequency of watching television and reading newspapers and these were included in our media factor. We should note that TV and newspaper consumption has a direct parental effect, as parents typically control which programmes and newspapers are available within a family household.

The role of school cannot be limited to providing information on political institutions, systems and other aspects of a society. Schools are smaller units of society and should establish the values which dominate the wider society. Thus, the role of schools is to establish an environment which helps foster learning of political principles more generally. Discussions in schools differ from those conducted within families in both substance and context.

For adolescents, opportunities for active participation are rather limited. However, previous studies (Verba et al. 1995) have emphasized the link between adolescent participation and later involvement as adult citizens. Aside from formal participation (e.g. voting), relatively large numbers of students did participate in voluntary activities such as collecting money or volunteering within an organization dedicated to helping people in the community (Torney-Purta 2002a, b). Students may also experiment to determine what power they have to effectively influence how their schools are run, and in doing so may develop a sense of efficacy (Bandura 1997). Democratic practices in schools can provide students with a means of ascertaining the usefulness of political action and may foster strong values and norms for their adult political participation. Participation in civic activities reflects student involvement in collective civic engagement but is not part of the formal learning context and is only weakly related to education.

Table 1 shows the variables and scales used.

5 Modelling

Students responded to a vast array of questions on different aspects of socio-political life. When appropriately clustered, combinations of these responses can indicate a student's level of activity and opinion on a range of theoretically important facets.

Methods of Multiple Correspondence Analysis/Optimal Scaling were employed to extract these measures (Benzécri 1992; Meulman et al. 2004). Optimal scaling provides a way of obtaining quantitative scale values for categorical or ordinal data (Greenacre 2007, pp. 49–57) and in this instance, was used to quantify student's original ordinal responses into single "components". The technique is believed not to be a population-generalizable tool in its own right but rather a method to

Table 1 Operationalisation of main concepts

Phase	Agency	Factors
Political engagement	Individual	Interest in politics
		Self-concept in politics
		Citizenship self-efficacy
Primary socialization	Family	Political interest of parents
		Political discussions with parents
		Possibility of political discussions
Secondary socialization	School	Political discussions in school
	Media	Students' media use
Political participation	Individual	Participation in the community
		Participation in school

reproduce the structure of categorical variables (Greenacre 1984; Meulman et al. 2004; Panagiotakos and Pitsavos 2004) and is thus, suitable here.

The discrimination measures (DM) presented in Table 2 represent the variance accounted for by each construct; these are the squared component loadings for these solutions. The Cronbach's α value has been included for completeness but did not actually figure in our methodology; variable selection was theory driven and our scales are not intended to be broadly generalizable measures outside of this setting. Our Political Engagement (dependent variable) ranking was constructed using two separate methods based on three broad latent attributes that characterize the student politically; citizenship-self efficacy, self-concept in politics and interest in politics (Table 2). In the first instance we constructed those three broad variables and then merged those into a single construct using principal components analysis. In the second case, a single optimal scaling procedure yielded the dependent variable from the original 18 ordinal response questions; both solutions were tested in the model and yielded almost identical results. The variable produced from the latter method was chosen as it is both more transparent and less prone to distortion.

A multilevel regression analysis using MLWin 2.25 was used to determine these relationships and their variability between European countries, within countries and within schools; the associated methodology was within the framework employed by researchers involved with that particular software package (Rasbash et al. 2000; Jones and Subramanian 2012) (Table 3).

Six models were estimated and fitted using Iterative Generalized Least Squares Estimation (IGLS), Wald tests were used to evaluate individual parameters while the log likelihood deviance statistics were used to compare model fit. The best fitting model included both random intercepts and slopes across three levels.

Table 2 Factor scores

Scale variable	Variable		DM	Cronbach's α
Media use	Activities	Watching the news on TV	0.567	0.595
		Reading newspaper	0.581	
		Internet use	0.51	
Discussion in school	Regular lesson	Disagree openly	0.317	0.781
		Makes up own mind	0.506	
		Expresses opinion	0.529	
		Events for discussion	0.319	
		Different opinions	0.422	
		Discusses different opinion	0.474	
		Several sides	0.454	
Participation in school	Engages in	Voluntary activity	0.234	0.673
		Debate	0.279	
		Voting	0.387	
		Decision making	0.462	
		Discussion	0.451	
		Candidate	0.464	
School engagement	Agree	Teachers treat students fairly	0.361	0.769
		Gets along well with most teachers	0.306	
		Teachers are interested	0.354	
		Teachers really listen	0.349	
		Can make schools better	0.334	
	Participation	Students work together	0.424	
		Organising groups	0.399	
		School parliament	0.287	
		More influence together	0.344	
Parental interest	Political interest	Mother	0.809	0.736
		Father	0.774	
Parental discussion		Talking with parents about issues	0.733	0.631
		Talking with parents about countries	0.728	
Citizenship self-efficacy	How well	Discussing newspaper articles	0.528	0.835
		Arguing point of view	0.542	
		Standing as a candidate	0.507	
		Organising groups of students	0.478	
		Following television debates	0.502	
		Writing letter to newspapers	0.481	
		Speaking in front of class	0.48	
Interest in politics	Interest	Political issues in the community	0.688	0.897
		Political issues in country	0.791	
		Social issues in country	0.698	
		Politics in other countries	0.654	
		International politics	0.704	

Table 2 (continued)

Scale variable	Variable		DM	Cronbach's α
Self-concept in politics	Politics	Know more about politics	0.58	0.874
		Have something to say	0.668	
		Able to understand easily	0.653	
		Opinions worth listening to	0.647	
		Able to take part as an adult	0.509	
		Good understanding	0.62	
Political engagement (OS)	How well	Discussing newspaper articles	0.347	**Cronbach's**
		Arguing point of view	0.373	**α**
		Standing as a candidate	0.236	0.912
		Organising groups of students	0.204	
		Following television debates	0.297	
		Writing letter to newspapers	0.229	
		Speaking in front of class	0.299	
		Political issues in the community	0.476	
		Political issues in country	0.555	
		Social issues in country	0.483	
	Interest	Politics in other countries	0.428	
		International politics	0.481	
		Know more about politics	0.448	
		Have something to say	0.532	
		Able to understand easily	0.468	
	Politics	Opinions worth listening to	0.488	
		Able to take part as an adult	0.388	
		Good understanding	0.481	
Political engagement (PCA)		Citizenship self-efficacy	0.753	**Variance**
		Self-concept politics	0.857	**Explained**
		Interest in politics	0.821	66 %

Table 3 Level structure

Hierarchy	Nested in higher level				
Levels	N	Min	Max	Mean	Standard deviation
Countries (v)	23	1	23	–	–
Schools (u)	3,114	1	199	137	47
Students (e)	67,909	1	379	23	18

6   Results

The predictors of "Political Engagement" among adolescents in this age group appear to be quite diverse; our hierarchical regression coefficients appear reasonably balanced across home, school and media coefficients (Table 4). Despite

Table 4 Multilevel model

	Effect size	P-values	+/− 95% CI
Random			
Level 3 – Europe			
European constant (Var)	0.014	0.000**	0.008
Parental discussion (Var)	0.002	0.000**	0.001
European/parental disc (Cov)	−0.005	0.000**	0.003
Level 2 – school			
School constant (Var)	0.010	0.000**	0.008
Parental discussion (Var)	0.003	0.000**	0.001
School/parental disc (Cov)	−0.003	0.000**	0.001
Level 1 – student			
Student constant (Var)	0.489	0.000**	0.008
Parental discussion (Var)	0.08	0.000**	0.005
Parental interest (Var)	0.059	0.000**	0.007
Student/par int (Cov)	−0.058	0.000**	0.004
Student/par disc (Cov)	−0.133	0.000**	0.004
Par disc/par int (Cov)	−0.007	0.000**	0.004
Difference (constants)			
Level 3 cons – level 2	–	0.35	–
Level 3 – level 1	–	0.000**	–
Level 2 – level 1	–	0.000**	–
Fixed			
Constant	0.039	0.12	
Individual			
Female	−0.058	0.024*	0.014
Media use	0.178	0.000**	0.006
Age	0.012	0.045*	0.01
Family			
Parental interest	0.186	0.000**	0.007
Political discussion (parents)	0.169	0.000**	0.022
Single parent family	0.054	0.000**	0.014
Nuclear family	0.022	0.000**	0.049
School			
School engagement	0.170	0.000**	0.006
School participation	0.126	0.000**	0.006
Political discussion (school)	0.058	0.000**	0.006

* Significant on 0.01
** Significant on 0.001

this, a dichotomy did emerge between family/parental indicators and all others. It is clear that in terms of model fit, parental discussion and parental interest should be modelled as both random slopes and fixed effects; the implication of this will be discussed in the following section.

The model's fixed effect parameters represent the resulting change in political engagement due to one unit increase in that parameter – all "factors" (continuous

parameters) were centered at their grand mean of zero (with standard deviations of one). A one unit change in one of these "factors" is equivalent to a one standard deviation increase/decrease. In the case of our categorical or dummy parameters (e.g. Girl), a one unit increase infers that you *do* exhibit the parameter attribute.

The "random" parameters of the model illustrate differential intercepts (constants) between schools, countries and pupils and random slopes for the differential effect of parental interest and discussion (figure 1 below). Put simply, our highly significant level two and three variance intercepts allows us, with a very high degree of confidence, to state that the average level of political engagement differs between schools within the same country and between schools in different countries, and that this doesn't occur due to random chance. Similarly, there is quite a large degree of difference in political engagement, between students within the same school (mean of 0.7 standard deviations from the within class mean). The empty model was partitioned with 3 % of the variance in the model being due to differences between countries, 4.5 % is due to differences between schools in the same country and 92.5 % is due to differences within schools. Students in the same school had a very weak positive correlation +0.07. The proportion of higher level variance due to difference between schools within countries is 43 % – a value very close to half while differences in schools between countries is the reverse and would be 57 %, This indicates that the degree of heterogeneity between schools within the same country and schools between different countries is similar. This was further corroborated through finding no significant difference in the intercepts of schools-within and school-between countries. However, the three-level model was a significant improvement on the two level model and we wanted to model as much dependency as possible in our data.

Even outside of the political spectrum, parent–child relationships are complex and it remains true in this context. The effect that increasing political discussions

with parents has on the child's level of political engagement, was allowed to have a fixed effect for all students but also random slopes for individuals within the same school, country and between countries. Similarly, the effect of parental interest had a fixed effect and a random slope at level one. These random slopes not only imply that cohorts in some hierarchies have higher or lower returns in political engagement due to parental discussion or interest (random intercepts) but the overall relationship or slope is context dependent. This is depicted visually in figure 2 (below) as we view the random slopes between different European countries. Our intention is not to engage in a discussion on differences throughout Europe but simply highlight that (a) between country differences are multidimensional and (b) the "fanning-in" of the country lines suggests that when discussions with parents are plentiful (a high value), the result in political engagement will be similar despite the country of residence. However, when parental discussion is low, the effect on political engagement is far more variable. The school and within-country levels appear similar to this.

Level 2 and 3 variance between political engagement and parental discussion.

If we view this relationship through the higher level variance functions we are presented with a similar image. For low levels of parental discussion we observe high variance in political engagement (higher for schools between countries) decreasing until approximately +1 standard deviation from the mean in parental discussion when the variances diverge again. Countries become continually less variable in political engagement as parental discussion increases – schools tend to become more variable in the same country as parental discussion increases. The

"tram lines" encompassing the variable functions represent the 95 % confidence intervals. It is clear that when parental discussion is low, we cannot distinguish between schools within the same country and between countries. However, as parental discussion increases, the distinction between the two is clearer. Given that the confidence intervals overlap at low levels of parental discussion, we cannot confidently state that schools vary differently between and within countries at these levels. We can however, confidently state that differences do exist between and within countries for higher levels of parental discussion. We can note that within countries (level 2), political engagement reaches a minimal level of variance and then begins to become more variable again, giving the quadratic function a "bowed" shape. In contrast, we observe that as discussion increases, variance between countries continually decreases toward zero. For pupils in the same school (figure 3 below), the relationship holds and is more pronounced. Although the function does begin to increase again toward the tails, this is more of an outlier effect as we start to include students that are very far from the mean.

Political Engagement

7   Discussion

School-related factors clearly play a role in the student's political engagement but it doesn't appear to actually being operationalized between schools in any consistent way; schools are still too heterogeneous. The effects of schools appear to be more "fixed" than parental-related factors; indicating that the outcomes of school-related factors are less variable across contexts than parental factors. While we can tentatively state that with few exceptions, each student has a wholly individual set of parents and family relationship, we cannot assume the same in the case of schools. Single schools not only contain many more students than the typical family, but their

environments are more easily reproduced geographically; school-settings are in many senses, contrived environments that teach from centrally designed curriculums employing teachers trained in similar environments. After controlling for school typologies, schools in different places may be quite similar; as should we exclude differences in schools based on "school type" (which include economic, social, cultural and environmental indicators of their students), we are typically, left with something closer to a centrally designed system that is reproduced regionally or nationally to educate citizens.[6] Although parents with similar political dispositions may engage or transfer information in the same way to their children, schoolchildren do not typically cluster in schools based on this parental interaction. The relationship from parent to child is one-to-one, while school or teacher to child is one-to-many. Further, our hierarchy is designed as school, and not family-orientated. Thus, it is predictable that the impact of schools upon political socialization is considerably more "fixed" than the effect of parents. Of course students perceive school information and experiences individually; nonetheless, the "school" element in that relationship is certainly less dynamic than the one experienced at home. We can perceive that the social-environmental factors affecting individual political engagement, which are not related to schools, stand on strong roots embedded into individual family environments. That is, the "random" element appearing within schools, has deeper roots outside school, than in.

One issue which hampered our ability to distinguish between schools was that school types are confounded with schools as a whole in the data; as a result, we could not model these differences. We have shown that differences do exist between schools and students at each level; however this may be accentuated if we had the means to classify schools based on multiple criteria (academic streams, geographic location, financial attributes). For example, it is plausible that some schools in Austria may be more similar to counterparts in Ireland or Norway than they actually are with other schools in Austria. This implies that the school (system) matters as we suspect schools vary differently within different countries. Certainly, further research is required to add validity to this claim.

The effects of gender appear to be heavily mediated by factors relating to school. After controlling for school related parameters, the relationship between being a female and political engagement, goes from being positive to negative. Thus, it appears that school is an immediate source of gender division in political engagement at this age. Further, age appears to matter, but only slightly. Despite students being heavily clustered in age, each extra year does increase political engagement to a small degree.

Approximately half of the base higher level variance in political engagement was explained by school-based,-political indicators. This indicates that political interaction

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[6] In lack of particular variables to model the school environment, we have to be vague here. But, the model parameter indicate, that schools across countries show some similarities, which are probably related to the fact that certain school characteristics are not only influential for political engagement, but probably show the same effects in different countries.

differs across schools and this has a direct impact on students' political engagement. This implies that providing opportunities to participate in political decision making and opening up opportunity structures help to develop a level of political engagement at this early age. As increasing age also shows an effect, we can hypothesize that engagement goes with experience and that the crystallization of attitudes is related to school based factors.

We have already given much attention to the relationship between politically interested parents and the student; we have concluded that interested parents or higher political activity between child and parent is far less variable than politically disinterested parents or lower levels of political activity. Based on this result, one can more confidently conclude that interested parents are more likely to have politically engaged children, than disinterested parents are to have disengaged children. This further implies that the family context matters significantly, as it lays the foundation for the political engagement of young people. Once again, this should emphasize the importance of schools in forming political engagement; as they provide children in the "disinterested spectrum" a platform to encounter political socialization at the second stage.

Briefly turning to the individual-context parameters in the model, it is interesting to note that the socio-economic background of parents almost entirely lost its predictive power for political engagement, whereas the political interest of parents remains influential. The educational background, which is normally a good predictor for school achievement, is less important when it comes to the political engagement of young pupils. Bearing in mind the strong link between political interest of parents and political discussions at home, both quite strong predictors of political engagement for this age group, we should be careful about drawing a further conclusion that higher education leads to a higher interaction between children and parents.

Finally, we should note that after controlling for school effects in the multi-level setting, parent related factors and media use for pupils from single parent households show a higher political engagement than those in other family settings.[7]

This could be the product of more direct exchange between parents and children in this family setting. However, this certainly requires further individual research to make any substantive claims.

Conclusion

This analysis sought to evaluate the role of different agents of political socialization in political engagement on the one hand and political participation in a multi-level setting on the other. Theoretical discussions indicate that agents such as media and schools should be considered as a second important source of political participation, as adolescents spend more time in schools than they actually spend with their families. Additionally, political engagement should,

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[7] Pupil from a two parents household of different kind.

to a certain extent, function as a mediation variable between political socialisation on the one hand and political participation on the other. Of course, the relationship or the mediation cannot be established in a causal relationship as political participation depends on the complex interplay of individual factors and opportunity structures within a given political setting.

The analysis presented above is based on the theoretical assumption that socialization effects associated with families and friends are quite important for reinforcing political engagement and political participation. Furthermore, based on the data structure we expected to find different effects within countries (schools) and between countries.

It appears that even after controlling for the multilevel structure of the data, all the agents of political socialization are important in the development of the political engagement of students. It can be safely argued that the agents of primary socialization are more influential than agents from second phase of socialization, such as media and schools. The influence of parents and the family domain appear to be quite strong determinants of socialization.

Further, given that respondents are quite young, it should not be suggested that early habits of political engagement may not change in the course of their lives. An early tendency to become politically engaged may appear and then grow weaker, while someone showing a total lack of political stimuli during her childhood can eventually become involved in politics. Following from this, the role of primary socialization appears quite clearly to be an important explanatory factor of political engagement. Despite having to accept that we cannot argue a causal relationship between engagement and political participation, the theoretical and the empirical literature supports the argument, that experiencing the right stimuli during childhood will rather lead to an engaged "adult" than the other way around. The extent of the influence (family and mass media) might depend on the political contexts in which they are embedded. The indirect effects of the different socialisation agents can also be understood as lending support to the argument, that political socialisation has a direct effect on political participation but foremost by filtering already developed political motives, awareness and probably positive experiences with decision making processes. There is a strong interdependence of political engagement and political socialisation. Especially the role of primary socialisation becomes even more important, if an individual establishes a certain level of engagement.

The theoretically assumed interdependence of political participation on the one hand and political engagement on the other is also shown in our analyses. For the surveyed respondents of quite young age, political participation in the real world is not foreseen yet, but the possibility to participate in decision making at schools, obviously increases self-efficacy. Thus, this explanation works in both ways – participation or opportunity structures to participate can also have an effect on political engagement. This has also been shown in other studies as the close link between being politically engaged and political

participation allows for a two-way reading: (1) offering opportunity structures helps to develop engagement which later on will most likely lead to political participation, (2) the direction of the relationship between political participation and political engagement is not quite clear, and could also be questioned for other age cohorts.

Of course, to extend these findings a deepened data analysis is required. For instance, we didn't control for political competence, which might be highly correlated with media consumption and political engagement. Furthermore, emphasis should be placed on social contexts (different schools, social status of the family, etc.), to confirm that detailed individual socialization processes lead to political engagement across all contexts.

In light of the theoretically argued indirect model, schools provided opportunities to discuss and reflect on opinions, and of course to participate in political decision making of different kinds. We should never be sure about causality in an empirical setting like this; nevertheless, we find evidence strong enough to support Franklin's assumption that future political participation is based on experience, skills and interest which have their roots in this transitional period between childhood and becoming an "adult" (2004).

Politicians and academics have highlighted the fact that young people in the Western World are becoming increasingly disengaged from conventional politics. However this does not hold for political interest generally, as young people are interested in politics, in political discussion and engage themselves in politically orientated activities.

Furthermore, the analysis above shows that political socialization can make a difference. Foremost parents play a vital role in the very narrow setting of an individual. On the other hand, schools have the potential to reach a large proportion of young people, which could help to equilibrate the effect of missing first stage socialization and develop a positive impact on young people's political engagement and further political participation.

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The Impact of Socio-economic Status on Political Participation

Ellen Quintelier and Marc Hooghe

1 Introduction

In most of the literature on political participation, socio-economic status is the most important predictor of political participation (Campbell et al. 1960; Parry et al. 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003[1993]; Schlozman et al. 2012; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). This relation is established not only in the United States, but also in other countries (Hooghe and Quintelier forthcoming; Norris 2006). Already in the 1960s, Seymour Martin Lipset (1963, p. 182) stated that the effect of socio-economic status on political participation is universal:

> patterns of voting participation are strikingly the same in various countries: Germany, Sweden, America, Norway, Finland, and many others for which I have data . . . The better educated [vote] more than the less educated; . . . higher-status persons, more than lower.

As citizens with low socio-economic status scores are less likely to participate, this represents problems for the legitimacy of political participation: if people do not participate because they lack resources, political participation is "potentially unfair" (Verba et al. 1995, p. 27). In light of the theory on representative democracy (Dahl 2006), underrepresentation of an important group as the lower educated can be problematic, since most likely their interests will not receive the same weight in political decision-making. However, not all authors measure socio-economic status in the same way. While some refer to income, others refer to education, professional status, educational goal etc. We will discuss the effect of potential factors on political participation in the following sections.

Although the data are already a few years old, we are convinced that it is necessary to analyze panel data with respect to socio-economic status and political

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participation. As Schlozman et al. (2012) show, the effect of socio-economic status is constant over time. They state that:

> political participation in America is highly stratified by social class, and [. . .] stratification has been a feature of political activity for as long as we have surveys to measure it. (Schlozman et al. 2012, p. 174)

Furthermore, it is also extremely relevant to analyze this relationship with panel data. This allows to analyze the relationship between socio-economic status and political participation at different time points. Representative panel data that span a few years are quite rare in political science (Alwin et al. 1992; Taris 2000), partly because they are expensive and difficult to organize (Rumberger 2004).

We know from previous research that political participation is affected by socio-economic status, we do not know how this process exactly works. Is political participation influenced by young people's own socio-economic status, or do parents have a larger impact? We focus on young people because they are still forming their own participation habits and will therefore possibly have a larger impact of their parents socio-economic status than older people (Jennings and Niemi 1981; Plutzer 2002). Therefore, we will analyze this research question using the Belgian Political Panel Survey 2006–2008, a representative panel study among 4,235 young Belgian adolescents (aged 16 at time-point 1), containing self-reported questions on socio-economic status of the adolescents and their parents.

The structural equation model reveals that young people's socio-economic status has a larger influence on political participation than the parental socio-economic status. Adolescents' socio-economic status does not only affect the level of political participation at the time of measurement itself, but also 2 years later. This indicates that higher educated or in higher tracks, people are not only more likely to participate, but also more likely to participate in the future: the gap between the activists and non-activists even grows in the future.

2   Measures of Socio-economic Status

Research has shown that different indicators (income, education, occupational status) of socio-economic status can affect political participation. We will highlight the effects of different socio-economic status indicators that are used in the literature below. First, with respect to income, Verba et al. (1995) report extensively on the effect of the family income on political participation. The higher the income, the more political activities that people are engaged in. The largest gap between the "poor" and the "rich" can be found for campaign donations, the smallest for voting. This finding is not surprising, as citizens with high income levels receive most political mail and are most often asked to donate money to political campaigns (both at the absolute and relative level). Citizens with low incomes receive these mailings and requests much less often than citizens with high incomes (Verba et al. 1995, pp. 191–204). Rosenstone and Hansen (2003[1993]) also find that income influences electoral participation: whether or not people voted, influenced others,

contributed money, attended meetings and worked on campaign depends on the family income.

Second, the level of **education** also has an effect on political participation. As Nie et al. (1996, p. 2) argue "[f]ormal education is almost with no exception the strongest factor in explaining what citizens do in politics and how they think about politics". Education has widespread effects: "[s]chooling increases one's capacity for understanding and working with complex, abstract and intangible subjects, that is, subjects like politics" (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, p. 18). Rosenstone and Hansen (2003[1993]) demonstrate that the level of education has an effect on writing to congress officials and signing a political petition. Similarly, the duration of education has an effect on governmental participation (signing petitions, attending local meetings, writing letters to congress/newspapers attending political rally, giving speeches) as well as electoral participation (voting, influencing others, contributing money, attending meetings, campaigning). On the other hand, the level of education does not affect the likelihood of signing a petition. Furthermore, people with higher levels of education are more likely to be contacted by politicians (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003[1993], pp. 74–77).

Along with education and income, a third measure of socio-economic status is **occupational status**. The occupational status influences people's capability to be a member of an organization and also strengthens people's social networks: people with jobs who have opportunities to develop more relevant political skills (for instance exercise leadership) than those who have fewer opportunities (Almond and Verba 1965; Nie et al. 1996; Verba et al. 1993). There are different ways in which occupational status has been defined. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), for instance, found that clerical voted more often than manual workers. On the other hand, Parry et al. (1992) find in their analyses that unemployed people are more active than employed people, even more after controlling for individual and group-based resources. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) find that, after controlling for education, the type of job type has only a modest positive influence on turnout. Berelson et al. (1963, pp. 54–59) have furthermore indicated that "subjective class identification" (divided into upper, middle and lower socio-economic status) affects voting patterns: those with a upper class identification are more likely to prefer republicans than those with a lower socio-economic status identification. Therefore, it is quite clear that different researchers have used different interpretations and categories of occupational status, and that, therefore, they find different effects of occupational status. Milbrath (1965, p. 124) correctly points out that occupation is a "tricky" variable, as it is not also clear which occupational statuses are meaningful for political participation.

Fourth, a final measure of socio-economic status is the number of **books** at home. This question is used as a proxy for the educational level and social and economic background of the family in youth surveys (Torney-Purta et al. 2001; Woessmann 2004). The theory behind this question is that young people might not know what their parents do for their living or how long they have attended school, but they probably know how many books they have at home. This question has already proven its importance in the Cived IEA-study, TIMMS and PISA-research

(Torney-Purta and Stapleton 2002; Woessmann 2004). Moreover, Wattenberg (2007) demonstrated that, together with the rise of the level of education, the number of books at home also has increased. Kerr et al. (2003) show that children in families with "high home literacy resources" are more likely to vote than families with fewer books.

Furthermore, the various indicators of socio-economic determinants are not independent: those with a higher income are often also higher educated, have a higher occupational status, belong to a higher social class and have more books at home (Lane 1959, pp. 220–234; Verba et al. 1995, pp. 292–293; Wattenberg 2007). Nie et al. demonstrate the multidimensionality of socio-economic status and the effect of it on political participation in the following citation:

> While there are many hypotheses about why education is important in preparing citizens for democracy, there is common agreement that education provides both the skills necessary to become politically engaged and the knowledge to understand and accept democratic principles. With education, citizens become better able to understand the political world, their stake in it, and the implications for the political community. (Nie et al. 1996, p. 12)

Socio-economic status is not only multidimensional, it is also inheritable: children largely inherit the socio-economic status of their parents. Parents and children share "the same cultural, social, and class milieu", and are therefore more likely to have a similar socio-economic status (Beck and Jennings 1982, pp. 96–97; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Dalton 1980, p. 421; Schlozman et al. 2012). For adolescents, "access to resources is determined largely by their home environment": if parents, for instance, have a low socio-economic status, their children are also more likely to have a lower socio-economic status than average (Fridkin et al. 2006, p. 607). Children of lower educated parents are more likely to go to technical and vocational than general tracks (Hirtt et al. 2007; Oakes 1985), just as they have a similar (low) level of educational performance (Alwin et al. 1992; Coleman et al. 1966). The parental level of socio-economic status also has direct and indirect consequences for political participation:

> Children growing up in households that are financially strapped, with parents who have little time to engage in political activity, much less the knowledge of how to go about it, will have fewer opportunities to learn about politics than those in better-off single-parents homes (Gimpel et al. 2003, p. 78).

According to Schlozman et al. (2012) it is not really the habit of political participation that is being transmitted in families, but more the socio-economic status that is being transmitted with the corresponding political participation attitudes, skills etc.

Fig. 1 Graphical representation of the estimated model

3   Hypotheses

We expect the socio-economic status to influence political participation. More specifically, we expect that
– The socio-economic status of the adolescents at age 16 will affect their level of political participation, both at the time-point itself and over time (age 18).
– The socio-economic status of the parents will affect the adolescents' level of political participation, but of smaller magnitude than adolescents socio-economic status (Fig. 1).

4   Data and Variables

The data for this study come from the Belgian Political Panel Survey (BPPS) 2006–2008. These data constitute a two-wave panel study among 16- and 18-year-olds. In 2006, a representative survey was conducted among 6,330 16-year-olds in Belgium. Analysis of the survey responses confirms the sample is representative for region, school type, gender, and educational track. Based on written surveys completed by the respondents in 112 schools, the study focused on young people's social and political attitudes and contained questions about their participation habits. To obtain a national random sample, all schools included in the survey were selected through a stratified sample, based on the location and type of the school. In each school, a minimum of 50 students was selected, representative of

the academic tracks in that school. The response rate was 66 % for the schools and within the schools, 99 % for the pupils.

In 2008, the respondents were surveyed for a second wave, this time at the age of 18. While most of the initial respondents could still be reached in school, for those who had left or changed schools, alternative strategies had to be developed. Of the initial 112 schools, 109 participated again in the survey in 2008. In these schools, the same classes were resurveyed and this allowed re-interviewing almost 3,000 students. The other students were contacted through a mail survey. In total, 4,235 pupils (or 67 %) from the initial panel were resurveyed. The attrition rate is in line with what we can expect for this kind of panel study. The second wave is again representative with regard to region, school type, gender, and educational track. As such, this data set is ideally suited to test our hypotheses. It provides us access to a total sample of 4,235 panel respondents that was interviewed both in 2006 (average age 16) and in 2008 (average age 18).

In the literature, different measures of socio-economic status have been described. Therefore, the BPPS has incorporated several measures of socio-economic status: the current level of education (e.g. track), the educational goal, the number of books at home, the parents' level of education, and the parental occupational status. We decided not to ask for the income of the parents as it is quite unlikely that children know this and this would yield inconsistent data and would result in a highly unreliable picture (Torney-Purta et al. 1999).

A first socio-economic status-indicator is the level of current education. As the Belgian educational system is based on tracks, the inequality in socio-economic status is also spread through the tracks (Hirtt et al. 2007; Oakes 1985). The Flemish educational system has four different tracks: general, technical, vocational/professional, and arts education. The French educational system contains a slightly different system with more tracks: *général*, *technique de transition*, *transition, technique de qualification* and *professionnel* education. Arts education in the French region has been incorporated in the different tracks. In the analyses, we recoded the level of education into three categories: professional education, technical and general education.[1] The distribution of these variables is presented in Appendix 1.

A similar variable is the young people's educational goal. This is closely correlated to the current level of education, as it is quite unlikely that people from vocational education go to university. Educational goal is measured with a question about the highest education goal the student likes to pursue. Answer options included: I probably won't finish high school, high school, higher education, and university. A third indicator is the number of books at home, which is a generally accepted indicator of socio-economic status in youth surveys, and ranges between 1 = no books and 7 = more than 500 books. We use this as an indicator of adolescents socio-economic status because it is used in this manner in the literature.

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[1] Technique de transition and technique de qualification were coded as in between general/technical and technical/professional education. Arts education is left out for further analyses.

The following socio-economic status-indicators (level of parents' education and occupational status) are not directly indicative of pupil-related factors, but are symptomatic of their parents' or the family socio-economic status. We asked the respondents what the highest educational degree of their mother and father attained (lower high school (9th grade), high school, higher education, university). Furthermore, we also asked what kind of occupational status their parents had: clerical, manual worker, self employed or other jobs (mostly not employed). It should be noted that they are less knowledgeable about these topics: these questions have about 10 % more missing data than the other socio-economic status-questions. Unfortunately, the question of parental level of education was only administered in the school survey. So, as this question leads to too many missing cases, we leave them out for the analyses. The correlations between all socio-economic status measures, are presented in the Appendix 2.

The other dependent variable for this analysis results from a series of nine questions asking the respondent how often they have participated in a given political activity in the previous 12 months. The activities were selected to vary in terms of the ways in which young people in contemporary democracies might be involved in politics, from signing a petition, contacting politicians, to boycotting a product. The political participation Scale is constructed as a latent variable. The items and distribution of the variables is presented in Appendix 1.

5   Results

The data were analyzed using structural equation models. This method allows to model the data quite flexible, to include several endogenous variables (here: socio-economic status and political participation), and to include latent variables, allowing a more reliable presentation of reality. Combining the information of the literature and the data leads to the model that is presented in Figure 2. We estimated this model using structural equation modeling, and this lead to a good model fit (Chi^2: 2,494.859***, 487df; CFI: 0.966; RMSEA: 0.031). We present the findings in two steps: fist we present the structural model, in a second step, we provide the effects of the parameter estimates of employment status on adolescents' socio-economic status and political participation. The full model (parameter estimated and factor loadings) is presented in Appendices 3 and 4.

Figure 3 shows that socio-economic status influences political participation both at the time-point of the first measurement (0.258***; age 16) and the second time point (0.154***; age 18). This finding means that young people of higher educational track and/or with higher educational aspirations are more likely to participate at age 16, and that this gap even increases in the future. In the light of the strive for representative participation, these findings are quite worrisome: on the one hand it indicates that the gap between higher and lower educated pupils already exists at such a young age, and that the educational system is unable to reduce this gap. On the contrary, the Belgian educational system with tracking even increases the inequality in political participation.

Fig. 2 Estimated model (Note: the error-correlations of the indicators of socio-economic status (between age 16–18) and participation (between age 16–18) are not presented here)

Chi²:2494.859***, 487df; CFI: 0.966; RMSEA:0.031

Fig. 3 Structural model (WLSMV estimation method. Entries are standardized effects and significances: p < 0.001:***; p < 0.01:**; p < 0.05:*. All parameter estimates of the full model are presented in the appendix)

Fig. 4 Effects of employment status on socio-economic status and political participation (WLSMV estimation method. Entries are standardized effects and significances: $p < 0.001$:***; $p < 0.01$:**; $p < 0.05$:*. All parameter estimates of the full model are presented in the appendix)

The effect of the parental education and employment status on political participation (see Fig. 4), however, are much smaller. The socio-economic status of parents even has no direct effect on political participation, and has only a small (0.341***) effect on the socio-economic status of the adolescent. On the one, hand this might have to do with children not knowing the educational level of their parents, but the high correlation between the measures of the educational level of mother (0.738***) and father (0.729***) measured at the age of 16 and 18, strengthens our argument that it is not just measurement error that produces this effect.

Socio-economic status proves to be extremely stable: the effect of socio-economic status at age 16 has an effect of 0.983*** on socio-economic status at age 18, leading to an explained variance of 0.966 of socio-economic status (age 18). Political participation is somewhat less stable with an effect of 0.66***. In our analysis, we also included two control variables gender and political interest (Verba et al. 1995). We find boys reporting a lower socio-economic status. This finding is consistent with the higher proportion of girls in general education (the highest educational track) and the larger number of girls that enters university education. Political interest has a positive effect both on socio-economic status as political participation. We did not include nationality because this did not lead to significant effects (Quintelier 2009). In the literature it is often assumed that socio-economic status is the most important predictor of political participation. Although we did not fully test this argument, it must be noted that the effect of political interest on political participation is comparable to the effect of socio-economic status of the

adolescents on political participation. Therefore, the argument that socio-economic status is the most important predictor needs, at least among adolescents, qualification.

Figure 4 presents the detailed effect of employment status on socio-economic status and political participation (a part of the model presented in Appendices 3 and 4; Fig. 3). We find that self-employed mothers/fathers and clerical working mothers/father leads to a higher socio-economic status among adolescents than among unemployed parents. Mother/father being a manual worker, leads to a lower socio-economic status. Employment status, on the other hand, has only minor effects on political participation: a mother working as a clerical leads to slightly higher levels of political participation, while a father as a manual worker leads to lower levels of political participation (Verba et al. 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). But overall, these effects are quite small, certainly compared to the effects of adolescents socio-economic status on political participation.

Conclusion

In the literature, we find high expectations of the effect of socio-economic status on political participation. Socio-economic status has been cited as the most important indicator of political participation (Schlozman et al. 2012; Verba et al. 1995). Whether it is the most important indicator of political participation cannot be assessed in this article because we did not include all relevant variables (political attitudes, political socialization agents, personality, etc.). However, as the effect of political interest on political participation is comparable to the effect of socio-economic status, this statement certainly needs qualification. We find that the current socio-economic status affects political participation now and in the future, but that parental socio-economic status is not that important to explain political participation of the children. So, the conventional measures of level of education (current level of education (track) and educational goal) suffice to explain differences in level of education. Additionally, we find that political participation does not only influence current but also future political participation. This finding indicates that the educational system does not only track different levels of political participation, it even increases the gap in political participation between the higher and lower educated. For future research on the effect of socio-economic status on political participation, we recommend using the adolescents measures of socio-economic status, instead of parental or a proxy of family socio-economic status.

Although the findings of this paper are innovative and challenging, this paper suffers from some limitations. A first caveat that needs to be mentioned is that we have to rely on students' reports of parental socio-economic status. It might be that young people do not know the highest educational degree their parent attained or what the employment status is of their parents. However, as the reports of the educational level of parents correlate quite well between age 16 and 18 (0.738 and 0.729), we are quite confident that these measures are reliable, and no random guess. A second caveat lies in that we have only two waves of

data, so that we are limited in the capacity to model causal effects. Therefore, at least three waves are required. However, we must stress that panel data has many advantages over cross-sectional data and that our findings certainly add to the literature on the relationship between socio-economic status and political participation.

Appendix 1: Distribution of the Variables

	Missing	Mean	Std. deviation	Minimum	Maximum
2006					
Boy	49	0.490	0.500	0	1
Political interest	29	2.005	0.782	1	4
Educational goal	86	3.117	0.770	1	4
Number of books at home	152	4.036	1.606	1	7
Educational track	158	2.377	0.734	1	3
Mothers' level of education	413	2.478	0.909	1	4
Fathers' level of education	480	2.510	1.012	1	4
Mother manual worker	0	0.157	0.364	0	1
Mother clerical worker	0	0.394	0.489	0	1
Mother self-employed	0	0.106	0.309	0	1
Mother other prof. status	0	0.252	0.434	0	1
Father manual worker	0	0.289	0.453	0	1
Father clerical worker	0	0.324	0.468	0	1
Father self-employed	0	0.210	0.407	0	1
Father other prof. status	0	0.065	0.247	0	1
Wearing a patch	37	1.176	0.430	1	3
Signing a petition	30	1.429	0.532	1	3
Participating in a legal march	38	1.112	0.339	1	3
Donating money	41	1.484	0.559	1	3
Boycotting products	42	1.241	0.519	1	3
Forwarding a political email	36	1.133	0.378	1	3
Displaying a political message	50	1.051	0.252	1	3
Attending a political meeting	34	1.143	0.372	1	3
Contacting politicians	36	1.040	0.220	1	3
2008					
Educational goal	73	3.111	0.778	1	4
Number of books at home	35	4.106	1.596	1	7
Educational track	154	2.357	0.759	1	3

(continued)

	Missing	Mean	Std. deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Mothers' level of education	1,303	2.525	0.977	1	5
Fathers' level of education	1,329	2.614	1.095	1	5
Wearing a patch	36	1.208	0.463	1	3
Signing a petition	28	1.473	0.542	1	3
Participating in a legal march	30	1.100	0.321	1	3
Donating money	36	1.470	0.552	1	3
Boycotting products	29	1.277	0.543	1	3
Forwarding a political email	35	1.181	0.429	1	3
Displaying a political message	37	1.064	0.286	1	3
Attending a political meeting	34	1.164	0.394	1	3
Contacting politicians	33	1.062	0.261	1	3

Appendix 2: Correlation Between Socio-economic Status Measures

	Educational track 2006	Educational goal 2006	Number of books at home 2006	Level of education mother 2006	Level of education father 2006	Educational track 2008	Educational goal 2008	Number of books at home 2008	Level of education mother 2008
Educational goal 2006	0.496***								
Number of books at home 2006	0.181***	0.235***							
Level of education mother 2006	0.238***	0.290***	0.262***						
Level of education father 2006	0.246***	0.312***	0.244***	0.476***					
Educational track 2008	**0.764*****	0.556***	0.209***	0.254***	0.255***				
Educational goal 2008	0.532***	**0.612*****	0.229***	0.259***	0.272***	0.599***			
Number of books at home 2008	0.198***	0.247***	**0.594*****	0.271***	0.262***	0.232***	0.252***		
Level of education mother 2008	0.220***	0.264***	0.254***	**0.738*****	0.409***	0.242***	0.261***	0.277***	
Level of education father 2008	0.211***	0.270***	0.234***	0.382***	**0.729*****	0.209***	0.258***	0.251***	0.416***

$p < 0.001$:***; $p < 0.01$:**; $p < 0.05$:*.

Appendix 3: Parameter Estimates

	Parameter estimate	Standard errors	Standardized parameter estimate	Significance
Effect of SES adolescent age 16 on				
Political participation age 18	0.111	0.019	0.154	***
Political participation age 18 (WITH)	0.097	0.011	0.257	***
SES adolescent age 18	1.091	0.014	0.983	***
Effect of political participation age 16 on . . .				
Political participation age 18	0.692	0.029	0.66	***
Effect of SES parents on . . .				
Political participation age 16	0.04	0.023	0.045	ns
SES adolescent age 16	0.44	0.028	0.341	***
Effect of boy on . . .				
Political participation age 16	−0.145	0.025	−0.119	***
SES adolescent age 16	−0.303	0.028	−0.17	***
Effect of political interest on . . .				
Political participation age 16	0.326	0.018	0.417	***
SES adolescent age 16	0.327	0.018	0.287	***
Effect of . . . on political participation age 16				
Mother clerical	0.069	0.029	0.055	*
Father manual worker	−0.107	0.037	−0.079	**
Effect of . . . on SES adolescent age 16				
Mother manual worker	−0.185	0.043	−0.076	***
Mother clerical	0.27	0.034	0.148	***
Mother self-employed	0.168	0.052	0.058	***
Father manual worker	−0.186	0.042	−0.095	***
Father clerical	0.352	0.043	0.186	***
Father self-employed	0.291	0.047	0.133	***

Model fit: Chi^2: 2,494.859***, 487df; CFI: 0.966; RMSEA: 0.031. Thresholds, auto-correlated errors and (residual) variances are not presented here

Appendix 4: Latent Constructs and Explained Variances

	Parameter estimate	Standard errors	Standardized parameter estimate	Signif.
Indicators political participation age 16			R^2	0.209
Wearing a patch	1	0	0.59	***
Signing a petition	0.948	0.04	0.561	***
Participating in a legal march	0.926	0.045	0.549	***
Donating money	0.796	0.04	0.476	***
Boycotting products	0.922	0.042	0.547	***
Forwarding a political email	0.94	0.042	0.557	***
Displaying a political message	1.069	0.053	0.627	***
Attending a political meeting	0.762	0.042	0.456	***
Contacting politicians	0.81	0.051	0.484	***
Indicators political participation age 18			R^2	0.539
Wearing a patch	1	0	0.624	***
Signing a petition	0.948	0.04	0.594	***
Participating in a legal march	0.926	0.045	0.581	***
Donating money	0.796	0.04	0.502	***
Boycotting products	0.922	0.042	0.578	***
Forwarding a political email	0.94	0.042	0.589	***
Displaying a political message	1.069	0.053	0.665	***
Attending a political meeting	0.762	0.042	0.481	***
Contacting politicians	0.81	0.051	0.511	***
Indicators of SES parents				
Mothers' level of education	1	0	0.689	***
Fathers' level of education	1.01	0.071	0.696	***

	Parameter estimate	Standard errors	Standardized parameter estimate	Signif.
Indicators of SES adolescent at age 16			R^2	0.392
Educational goal	1	0	0.806	***
Number of books at home	0.413	0.019	0.361	***
Educational track	1.013	0.028	0.814	***
Indicators of SES adolescent at age 18			R^2	0.966
Educational goal	1	0	0.879	***
Number of books at home	0.413	0.019	0.399	***
Educational track	1.013	0.028	0.888	***

Model fit: Chi^2: 2,494.859***, 487df; CFI: 0.966; RMSEA: 0.031. Thresholds, auto-correlated errors and (residual) variances are not presented here

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