

# Revisiting the Computational Practicality of Private Information Retrieval\*

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**Abstract.** Remote servers need search terms from the user to complete retrieval requests. However, keeping the search terms private or confidential without undermining the server’s ability to retrieve the desired information is a problem that private information retrieval (PIR) schemes are designed to address. A study of the computational practicality of PIR by Sion and Carbunar in 2007 concluded that no existing construction is as efficient as *the trivial PIR scheme* — the server transferring its entire database to the client. While often cited as evidence that PIR is impractical, that paper did not examine multi-server information-theoretic PIR schemes or recent single-server lattice-based PIR schemes. In this paper, we report on a performance analysis of a single-server lattice-based scheme by Aguilar-Melchor and Gaborit, as well as two multi-server information-theoretic PIR schemes by Chor et al. and by Goldberg. Using analytical and experimental techniques, we find the end-to-end response times of these schemes to be *one to three orders of magnitude* (10–1000 times) smaller than the trivial scheme for realistic computation power and network bandwidth. Our results extend and clarify the conclusions of Sion and Carbunar for multi-server PIR schemes and single-server PIR schemes that do not rely heavily on number theory.

## 1 Introduction

The retrieval of information from a remote database server typically demands providing the server with clues in the form of data indices, search keywords, or structured queries to assist with the retrieval task. However, keeping retrieval clues private without undermining the server’s ability to retrieve the desired information is a requirement that is common for user-centric privacy-preserving systems. Private information retrieval (PIR) provides a means of retrieval that guarantees access privacy, by preventing the database administrator from being able to learn any information about which particular item was retrieved.

Today’s most developed and deployed privacy-preserving techniques, such as onion routers and mix networks, are limited to anonymizing the identity of users. PIR, on the other hand, by protecting the *contents* of queries, can protect important application domains like patent databases, pharmaceutical databases,

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\* An extended version of this paper is available [25].

online censuses, real-time stock quotes, location-based services, online behavioral analysis for ad networks, and Internet domain registration [3,14,18].

Chor et al., in defining the notion of PIR, proved that *the trivial PIR scheme* of transferring the entire database to the user and having him retrieve the desired item locally has optimal communication complexity for information-theoretic privacy protection with a single server. [7] However, more efficient information-theoretic solutions with sub-linear communication complexity were shown to exist if multiple, non-colluding servers hold copies of the database. They proposed a number of such multi-server information-theoretic PIR schemes [7], including a simple  $\ell$ -server scheme transferring  $O(\sqrt{\ell n})$  bits, where  $n$  is the size of the database in bits and  $\ell \geq 2$  is the number of servers. Subsequent work has mostly focused on improving PIR's communication complexity bounds [7], while some others [3,13,16] have addressed such problems as using amortization and pre-processing to reduce server-side computational overheads and improving query robustness, amongst others.

Chor and Gilboa [8] were the first to relax the absolute privacy offered by multi-server information-theoretic PIR by using cryptographic primitives. They proposed a family of 2-server computationally private PIR schemes by making intractability assumptions on the existence of pseudorandom generators or one-way functions. Schemes in this family have a worst-case communication complexity of  $O(n^\epsilon)$ , for every  $\epsilon > 0$ . In the same year (1997), Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [19] proposed the first single-server PIR scheme with a similar communication complexity by assuming quadratic residuosity decisions modulo a composite of unknown factorization are hard. Thus, the best protection offered by any non-trivial single-server PIR scheme is computational privacy, but database replication is not required. Several other single-server PIR schemes followed, each making some intractability assumption [2,6,20].

In 2007, Sion and Carbunar [28] considered the practicality of single-server computational PIR schemes and concluded that PIR would likely remain several orders of magnitude slower than an entire database transfer — the trivial PIR scheme — for past, current, and future commodity general-purpose hardware and networks. They based their result on the cheaper cost of transferring one bit of data compared to the cost of PIR-processing that bit using modular multiplication on such hardware. The PIR scheme of Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky, which was used in their comparison, requires one modular multiplication per database bit. They projected future increases in computing performance and network bandwidth using Moore's Law [21] and Nielsen's Law [23] respectively, and argued that improvements in computing performance would not result in significant improvements in the processing speed of PIR because of the need to use larger key sizes to maintain security. The significance of this work lies in establishing that any computational PIR scheme that requires one or more modular multiplications per database bit cannot be as efficient as the trivial PIR scheme.

However, it is not clear whether the conclusions of Sion and Carbunar [28] also apply to multi-server PIR schemes as well as single-server PIR schemes that do not rely heavily on number theory (i.e., modular multiplications). This is an

important clarification to make because PIR-processing with most multi-server PIR schemes and some single-server PIR schemes [2,29] costs much less than one modular multiplication per database bit. Besides, the projections from [28] assume that all PIR schemes make intractability assumptions that would necessitate the use of larger keys when today’s hardware and networks improve. However, multi-server PIR schemes offering information-theoretic privacy will continue to guarantee security and privacy without requiring key size changes irrespective of these improvements.

In this paper, we revisit the computational practicality of PIR in general by extending and clarifying the results in [28]. First, we provide a detailed performance analysis of a recent single-server PIR scheme by Aguilar-Melchor and Gaborit [1,2], which has attempted to reduce the cost of processing each database bit by using cheaper operations than modular multiplications. Unlike previous schemes that rely heavily on number theory, this particular scheme is based on linear algebra, and in particular, lattices. The authors introduced and based the security of the scheme on the differential hidden lattice problem, which they show is related to NP-complete coding theory problems [31]. They proposed and implemented the protocols, but their analysis was limited to server-side computations by the PIR server [1] on a small experimental database consisting of twelve 3 MB files. It is unclear how well the scheme compares against the trivial PIR scheme for realistic database sizes. Using the PIR scheme of Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky and updated parameters from [28], we first reestablished the result by Sion and Carbunar that this scheme is an order of magnitude more costly than the trivial PIR scheme. We also provide a new result that shows that the single-server PIR scheme in [2] offers an order of magnitude smaller response time compared to the trivial scheme, thus extending the conclusions of Sion and Carbunar about computational PIR schemes.

Second, we explore the case of multi-server information-theoretic PIR, which is yet to be considered by any previous study. Considering multi-server PIR is important because such schemes do not require costly modular arithmetic, and hence will benefit immensely from advances in computing and network trends. We derive upper-bound expressions for query round-trip response times for two multi-server information-theoretic PIR schemes by Chor et al. [7] and by Goldberg [16], which is novel to this paper. Through analytical and experimental techniques we find that the end-to-end response times of multi-server PIR schemes to be two to three orders of magnitude (100–1000 times) smaller than the trivial scheme for realistic computation powers and network bandwidths.

## 1.1 Preliminaries

We begin by outlining a few building blocks, some of which are based on [28]. These include the hardware, network bandwidth between the user and the server, and execution time estimates for modular multiplication.

**Hardware description.** All but one of our experiments were performed on current server hardware with two quad-core 2.50 GHz Intel Xeon E5420 CPUs,

**Table 1.** Bandwidth estimates (in Mbps) for 1995 to 2010. We adapted values up to 2007 from [28] and those after 2007 are based on the Internet speed data for Canada and US from [26].

Network types	1995	1997	1998	1999	2001	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
End-user( $B$ )	.028	.056	.768	1	4	6	6	6	6	8	9
Ethernet LAN( $B_2$ )	10	100	1000		10000	10000	10000	10000	10000	10000	10000
Commercial( $B_3$ )	.256	.768	1	10	100	1000	1500	1500	1500	1500	1500

32 GB of 667 MHz DDR2 memory, 6144 KB cache per core, an Adaptec 51645 RAID controller with 16 1.5TB SATA disks, and running Ubuntu Linux 9.10. The memory bandwidth is 21.344 GB/s and the disk bandwidth is at least 300 MB/s. We note that these machine characteristics are not unusual for database server hardware; this machine cost less than \$8,000. We ran the GPU implementation of the scheme in [2] on a machine with a Tesla C1060 GPU, 8 GB RAM, 116 MB/s disk bandwidth, and running Ubuntu Linux 9.10.

**Network.** Three types of network setups were considered [28]: average home-user last-mile connection, Ethernet LAN, and commercial high-end inter-site connections. Table 1 shows various network connection speeds (Mbps) since 1995, when PIR was introduced. The values up until 2006 are reused from [28], while we provided the subsequent values based on the capacity of today’s network bandwidths.

**Modular multiplication.** The work in [28] uses Dhrystone MIPS ratings for Pentium 4 CPUs in order to estimate  $t_{mul}$ , the time it takes to compute a modular multiplication — the building block for the PIR scheme of Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [19]. Such CPUs have long been retired by Intel and are no longer representative of today’s multi-core CPUs. In addition, the Dhrystone benchmark, which found widespread usage at the time it was introduced in 1984, is now outdated. According to Dhrystone benchmark author Reinhold P. Weicker, it can no longer be relied upon as a representative benchmark for modern CPUs and workloads [30].

Instead, we measure the time directly. Using the key size schedule from NIST [22], the current recommended key size for the security of the Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky scheme is 1536 bits. We experimentally measured the value of  $t_{mul}$  on the server hardware described above. After repeated runs of the measurement code and averaging, we obtained  $t_{mul} = 3.08 \pm 0.08 \mu\text{s}$ .

**Projections.** Moore’s Law [21] has an annual growth rate of 60%, which surpasses the 50% growth rate of Nielsen’s Law [23]. While the faster growth rate of computing capabilities does not necessarily favour computational single-server PIR schemes, it does favour multi-server information-theoretic PIR schemes.

## 2 Related Work

The literature has mainly focused on improving the communication complexity of PIR schemes because communication between the user and the server(s) is

considered to be the most expensive resource [4]. Despite achieving this goal, other barriers continue to limit realistic deployment of PIR schemes; the most limiting of these barriers is the computational requirement of PIR schemes. The performance measure of a scheme in terms of its computational complexity has only received attention much more recently. The first of these is the work by Beimel et al. [4] which shows that, given an  $n$ -bit database  $X$  that is organized into  $r$   $b$ -bit blocks, standard PIR schemes cannot avoid a computation cost that is *linear* in the database size because each query for block  $X_i$  must necessarily process all database blocks  $X_j$ ,  $j \in \{1, \dots, r\}$ . They introduced a model of PIR with preprocessing which requires each database to precompute and store some *extra bits* of information, which is polynomial in the number of bits  $n$  of the database, before a PIR scheme is run the first time. Subsequently, the databases can respond to users' queries in a less computationally expensive manner using the extra bits. Asonov et al. [3] similarly explores preprocessing with a secure coprocessor for reducing server-side computation. However, the specialized hardware requirement at the server makes this solution less desirable.

In 2006, panelists from SECURECOMM [10] came together to discuss how to achieve practical private information retrieval. The discussion covers several aspects of transitioning cryptographic primitives from theory to practice and the need for practical PIR implementations and benchmarks on real data. The panelists were optimistic about future PIR deployments and pointed to the need for finding PIR schemes that require cheaper operations or utilize secure hardware.

The paper by Sion and Carbunar [28] compares the bandwidth cost of trivial PIR to the computation and bandwidth cost of a single-server computational PIR scheme [19], which they considered to be the most efficient at that time. The motivation of [28] was to stimulate practical PIR schemes; nevertheless, the result has been cited in the literature to promote the general idea that non-trivial PIR is always more costly than trivial download. Our work extends the work from [28] in important ways. First, their analysis was based on a number-theoretic computational PIR scheme [19], whereas we considered different varieties of computational PIR schemes: a number-theoretic scheme [19] and a lattice-based linear algebra scheme [2]. A consideration of the state of the art PIR schemes on the basis of their underlying mathematical assumptions is important because computational performance is currently the most mitigating factor to the practicality of PIR schemes. Secondly, we extend the analysis of practicality to multi-server PIR schemes which has never been considered by any previous measurement study. Multi-server PIR schemes are especially important because they can offer a stronger privacy guarantee for non-colluding servers, unlike computational PIR schemes that require large keys to protect against future powerful adversaries. Besides, multi-server PIR schemes give better performance and are directly deployable in domains where the databases are naturally distributed, such as Internet domain name registration [24]. Even in domains where the database is not distributed, deployment is possible using servers containing random data [13], which eliminates the need for an organization to replicate its data to foreign servers.


Aguilar-Melchor and Gaborit [2,1] explore linear algebra techniques using lattices to propose an efficient single-server PIR scheme. The security of the scheme is based on the hardness of the differential hidden lattice problem — a problem related to NP-complete coding theory problems [31]. Aguilar-Melchor et al. [1] subsequently used commodity Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), which are highly parallelizable, to achieve a database processing rate of 2 Gb/s, which is about ten times faster than running the same PIR scheme on CPUs. That work makes two main contributions. First, it shows that its scheme exhibits one order of magnitude speedup by using GPUs instead of CPUs to do the bulk of the computation, and claims that other schemes will see the same speedup. Second, it shows that in GPU-based scenarios, linear algebra based single-server PIR schemes can be more efficient than trivial download for most realistic bandwidth situations; this attempts to dispel the conclusions by Sion and Carbunar [28] with respect to the practicality of single-server PIR schemes. However, the evaluation from Aguilar-Melchor et al. [1] consider a small experimental database consisting of twelve 3 MB files and they did not measure the total roundtrip response time for queries; they considered the server-side cost but ignored client-side computation and transfer costs. It is important to consider the total cost because their scheme is not as efficient in terms of communication complexity as other existing schemes, and roundtrip response time depends on both the communication and computational complexities of a scheme. In addition, the measurements for the single-server PIR schemes [12,20] used for their comparison was based on estimates derived from *openssl speed rsa*, which is quite unlike our approach where the comparison is based on analytical expressions for query response times and experimental observations. Besides, they only considered single-server PIR schemes, whereas we also consider multi-server PIR schemes and the state-of-the-art single-server PIR schemes.

In the context of keyword search using PIR, Yoshida et al. [32] considered the practicality of a scheme proposed by Boneh et al. [5]. This public key encryption based keyword search protocol is essentially single-server PIR. Their investigations found the scheme to be costlier than the trivial PIR solution.

### 3 Efficient Single-Server PIR (LPIR-A)

We experimentally evaluated an implementation of the single-server PIR scheme by Aguilar-Melchor et al. [1]. This is the most efficient known single-server PIR scheme, and has available source code both for CPUs and GPUs. We present a note of caution, however, that although this PIR scheme resists known lattice-based attacks, it is still relatively new, and its security is not as well understood as those of the PIR schemes that rely heavily on number theory.

We obtained the source code [17] for this scheme, removed interactivity, changed the default parameters to one that guarantees security in a practical setting (complexity of over  $2^{100}$  operations) [2], and added instrumentation to the CPU and GPU code variants. The data set for our experiment consists of various databases of sizes between 1 GB and 28 GB, each containing random



**Fig. 1.** Logarithmic scale plots for query generation (G), query upload(U), response encoding (E), response download (R), and response decoding (D) times for the single-server PIR scheme [1] and the trivial PIR scheme in different bandwidth scenarios

data. Bugs in the implementation [17] prevented us from testing larger databases for the selected security parameters.

We ran queries to retrieve between 5 and 10 random blocks for each database size.

Figure 1 shows the log-log plots of our results with breakdowns of the time for query generation and upload, response encoding and download, response decoding, as well as the trivial download time for the different sizes of databases we tested. Plots (a), (b), (c), and (d) respectively reflect bandwidth values typical of an Internet connection in the US and Canada, a 100 Mbps fast Ethernet, a 1 Gbps gigabit Ethernet, and a 100 Mbps fast Ethernet on the GPU hardware.

In plot (a), for example, the largest portion of the overall time is that of query upload; this is due to the comparatively low 2 Mbps upload bandwidth typical of a home Internet connection [26]. On the other hand, the time to download the query result (at 9 Mbps) is much smaller. In general, the response time is proportional to  $n$  and the slope of the line is 1, as the computation costs, in particular server-side response encoding, dominate. When the database exceeds the available RAM size, further slowdowns are seen in the results.

The slope of the trivial PIR line is always 1, since the time is simply that of transferring the entire database. For small databases, the trivial PIR scheme is faster, but depending on the bandwidth, there is a crossover point at which

sending less data plus computing on every bit of the database becomes faster than sending the entire database. For the average home connection, for example, we found this to occur at a very small database size (approximately 32 MB). For the 1 Gbps connection, the network is so fast that the entire database can be transferred in less time than it takes for the client to even generate its query, except for databases of 6 GB and larger. Even then, trivial transfer was much faster than the overall cost of this PIR scheme for such fast networks.

We note that plot (a) is the most representative of today’s consumer bandwidth situation. Based on the recently available Internet speed database [26], the average bandwidth for the Internet user is improving rather slowly, with average download rates of 6, 7.79, and 9.23 Mbps for Canada and the US for 2008, 2009, and January 1 to May 30 of 2010. The average upload rates for the respective periods are 1.07, 1.69, and 1.94 Mbps. We note that Nielsen’s Law specifically addresses the type of users described as normal “high-end” who can afford to pay a premium for high-bandwidth network connections [23]. We contrast these users from “low-end” users [23] that the above bandwidth averages from the Internet speed data [26] include. Hence, the majority of Internet users are low-end users, and their bandwidth is much more limited than that predicted by Nielsen’s Law.

In the plots and in the analysis above, we show changing bandwidths and assume that computing power stays the same. However, if we assume that processors improve at a faster rate than Internet bandwidth for high-end users due to Moore’s Law and Nielsen’s Law, then the crossover point will move down and the PIR scheme will become faster at smaller database sizes. From plot (d), the GPU run gives a better response time, in comparison to plot (b), for memory-bound databases (about 6 GB or less). For disk-bound databases, the response time degenerates due to the lower disk bandwidth of the GPU machine. We ran the same code on the CPU of the GPU hardware; using the GPU, we found about five times speedup in the server-side processing rate for memory-bound databases and no noticeable speedup for disk-bound databases. Our observed speedup is half the speedup reported in [1], but we used much larger databases.

## 4 Multi-server PIR

In this section, we provide detailed performance analyses of two multi-server information-theoretic PIR schemes, from Chor et al. [7] and from Goldberg [16]. We begin with an overview of these schemes and later show how they compare with the single server schemes [2,19] and the trivial PIR scheme. The reason for choosing [7] is its simplicity, being the first PIR protocol invented. The reason for choosing [16] is its comprehensiveness and source code availability which allows for easy experimental analysis. The implementation of [16], known as Percy++ [15], is an open-source project on SourceForge.

In order to maintain the user’s privacy, it must be the case that not all (in the case of the Chor et al. protocol) or at most a configurable threshold number (in the case of the Goldberg protocol) of the database servers collude to unmask the user’s query. This is sometimes brought forward as a problematic requirement



of these schemes. We note that, as discussed elsewhere [24], there are reasonable scenarios — such as distributed databases like DNS or whois databases, where the copies of the database may be held by competing parties — in which the non-collusion requirement is acceptable. Further, other privacy-enhancing technologies, such as anonymous remailers [9] and Tor [11], also make the assumption that not all of the servers involved are colluding against the user.

#### 4.1 First Scheme (MPIR-C)

We first describe the simple  $O(\sqrt{n})$  protocol by Chor et al. The database  $D$  is treated as an  $r \times b$  matrix of bits, where the  $k^{\text{th}}$  row of  $D$  is the  $k^{\text{th}}$  block of the database. Each of  $\ell$  servers stores a copy of  $D$ . The client, interested in block  $i$  of the database, picks  $\ell$  random bitstrings  $\rho_1, \dots, \rho_\ell$ , each of length  $r$ , such that  $\rho_1 \oplus \dots \oplus \rho_\ell = e_i$ , where  $e_i$  is the string of length  $r$  which is 0 everywhere except at position  $i$ , where it is 1. The client sends  $\rho_j$  to server  $j$  for each  $j$ . Server  $j$  computes  $R_j = \rho_j \cdot D$ , which is the XOR of those blocks  $k$  in the database for which the  $k^{\text{th}}$  bit of  $\rho_j$  is 1, and sends  $R_j$  back to the client. The client computes  $R_1 \oplus \dots \oplus R_\ell = (\rho_1 \oplus \dots \oplus \rho_\ell) \cdot D = e_i \cdot D$ , which is the  $i^{\text{th}}$  block of the database.

Sion and Carbunar [28] used a closed-form expression for the computation and communication cost of the PIR scheme in [19]. While we derive similar expressions for the multi-server schemes we studied, we note that it will only approximate the cost because most modern x86 CPUs support hardware-level parallelism such as superscalar operations; single-cycle operations, such as XORs, are parallelized even within a single core. Hence, such expressions can be used to determine an *upper bound* on what response time to expect. We will later determine the exact response time for this PIR scheme through experiments.

For optimal performance, we set  $r = b = \sqrt{n}$ . Hence, the upper bound for the client and server execution times for this protocol can respectively be computed as  $2(\ell - 1) \frac{\sqrt{n}}{m} t_\oplus + 2\ell \sqrt{n} t_t$  and  $\frac{n}{m} \cdot (t_\oplus + 2t_{ac}) + n \cdot t_{ov}$ , where  $t_\oplus$  and  $t_t$  are respectively the execution times for one XOR operation and the transfer time for one bit of data between the client and the server;  $m$  is the machine word-size (e.g., 64 bits),  $n$  is the database size (in bits),  $\ell$  is the number of servers,  $t_{ov}$  represents the amortized server overhead per bit of the database — this overhead is dominated by disk access costs, but also includes things like the time to execute looping instructions — and  $t_{ac}$  denotes the time for one memory access. Note that the server execution time is the worst-case time because it assumes all the blocks in the database are XORed, whereas we only need to XOR blocks where the  $i^{\text{th}}$  bit of  $\rho_j$  is 1. The expression charges all of the data transfer to the client, since it needs to be serialized there, whereas the server processing is performed in parallel among the  $\ell$  servers.

An upper bound on the query round-trip execution time for this multi-server PIR scheme is then  $T_{MPIR-C} < (2(\ell - 1) \frac{\sqrt{n}}{m} + n/m) \cdot t_\oplus + 2\ell \sqrt{n} \cdot t_t + 2n/m \cdot t_{ac} + n \cdot t_{ov}$ . The most dominant term is  $n \cdot (\frac{1}{m} t_\oplus + \frac{2}{m} t_{ac} + t_{ov})$ , which will suffice for the entire expression when the value of  $n$  is large.


The work in [28] denoted  $t_t = \frac{1}{B}$ , given that  $B$  is the bandwidth (in bps) of the network connection between the client and the server.  $t_\oplus$  will be one cycle.

(We indeed measured it to be  $0.40 \pm 0.01$  ns, which is exactly as expected on our 2.50 GHz processor.) Similarly, we measured  $t_{ac}$  to be 1 cycle ( $0.4000 \pm .0003$  ns). Using unrolling to minimize the overhead of loop instructions,  $t_{ov}$  will be dominated by the memory bandwidth if the database fits into memory, or by disk bandwidth otherwise. An upper bound for  $t_{ov}$  on our test machine is therefore 0.006 ns for in-memory databases and 0.417 ns for disk-bound databases, based on the numbers in Section 1.1.

## 4.2 Second Scheme (MPIR-G)

Goldberg’s scheme is similar to the Chor et al. scheme in its use of simple XOR operations to accomplish most of its server-side computations. However, it uses Shamir secret sharing [27] to split the user’s query vector  $e_i$  into  $\ell$  shares which are then transmitted to the servers. The server database  $D$  is treated as an  $r \times b$  matrix of  $w$ -bit words (i.e., elements of  $GF(2^w)$ ), where again  $r$  is the number of blocks and  $b$  is the number of  $w$ -bit words per block. In addition, the elements of  $e_i$ ,  $\rho_j$ , and  $R_j$  are elements of  $GF(2^w)$ , instead of single bits. These changes are necessary because the protocol addresses query robustness for byzantine servers that may respond incorrectly or not respond at all. For simplicity, in this paper we will only consider honest servers, which respond correctly. For head-to-head comparison with the Chor et al. protocol, we set the privacy level  $t$  (the number of servers which can collude without revealing the client’s query) to  $\ell - 1$ . As before, we choose  $r = b$ , but now  $r = b = \sqrt{n/w}$ . We also choose  $w = 8$  to simplify the cost of computations; in  $GF(2^8)$ , additions are XOR operations on bytes and multiplications are lookup operations into a 64 KB table. These are the choices made by the open-source implementation of this protocol [15].

A client encodes a query for database block  $i$  by first uniformly choosing  $\ell$  random distinct non-zero indices  $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_\ell$  from  $GF(2^8)$ . Next, the client chooses  $r$  polynomials of degree  $t$ , one for each block in  $D$ . The coefficients of the non-constant terms for polynomial  $f_k$  are random elements of  $GF(2^8)$ , while those for the constant terms should be 1 if  $i = k$  and 0 otherwise. Afterwards, the client hands out to each server  $j$  a vector  $\rho_j$  formed from evaluating all  $r$  polynomials at  $\alpha_j$ ; that is,  $\rho_j = [f_1(\alpha_j), \dots, f_r(\alpha_j)]$ . (Note that each  $f_k(\alpha_j)$  is an element of  $GF(2^8)$  — a single byte.) In a manner similar to the Chor et al. scheme, each server computes a response vector  $R_j = \rho_j \cdot D$ , where each of the  $b$  elements of vector  $R_j$  is also a single byte. The servers send  $R_j$  to the client and the client computes the query result using Lagrange interpolation, which also amounts to simple arithmetic in  $GF(2^8)$ . Using the protocol description in [16] and the source code [15], we counted each type of operation to derive upper bounds for the respective client and server execution times as  $\ell(\ell - 1)\sqrt{n/8}(t_\oplus + t_{ac}) + 2\ell\sqrt{8n}t + 3\ell(\ell + 1)(t_\oplus + t_{ac})$ , and  $(n/8)(t_\oplus + 3t_{ac}) + n \cdot t_{ov}$ , where the terms are as above. Again, note that we charge all of the communication to the client. The upper bound expression for the protocol’s round-trip response time is then  $T_{MPIR-G} < \left( (\sqrt{n/8} + 3)\ell^2 - (\sqrt{n/8} - 3)\ell + n/8 \right) (t_\oplus + 3t_{ac}) + 2\ell\sqrt{8n} \cdot t + n \cdot t_{ov}$ . Here, the dominant term is  $n \cdot \left( \frac{1}{8} (t_\oplus + 3t_{ac}) + t_{ov} \right)$ .




**Fig. 2.** Analytical and experimental measurements of the response time of Goldberg’s multi-server PIR scheme [16] (computations only). The upper line is derived from equation (2), but excluding time for communications. The middle line is the time for the first query, which includes startup overhead and reading the database from disk. The lower line is the time for subsequent queries, which only incur disk latencies once the database exceeds the available RAM size.

### 4.3 Response Time Measurement Experiment

We measure the round-trip response times for the multi-server PIR schemes in this section. We first modified an implementation of M<sub>PIR</sub>-G (Percy++) [15] to use wider data types to enable support for larger databases. We then measured its performance over five different sets of databases, with databases in each set containing random data and ranging in size from 1 GB to 256 GB.

Next, we fetched 5 to 10 blocks from the server. On the first query, the database needs to be loaded into memory. The server software does this with `mmap()`; the effect is that blocks are read from disk as needed. We expect that the time to satisfy the first query will thus be noticeably longer than for subsequent queries (at least for databases that fit into available memory), and indeed that is what we observe. For databases larger than available memory, we should not see as much of a difference between the first query and subsequent queries. We show in Figure 2 plots of the average response time with standard deviations for these two measurements (i.e., PIR response time for the first query, and for the second and subsequent queries). From the plot, the speed of 1.36 seconds per GB of data is consistent until the databases that are at least 16 GB in size are queried. Between 18 GB and 30 GB, the time per GB grew steadily until 32 GB. The threshold crossed at that range of database sizes is that the database size becomes larger than the available RAM (somewhat smaller than the total RAM size of 32 GB). As can be seen from the plot, the measured values for that range are especially noisy for the lower line. We designed our experiment to take measurements for more databases with size in that range; we surmise that the particulars of Linux’s page-replacement strategy contribute a large variance when the database size is very near the available memory size. For even larger databases, PIR query response times consistently averaged 3.1 seconds per GB of data. This is because every query now bears the overhead of reading from the disk. In realistic deployment scenarios where the database fits into available memory, the overhead of



**Fig. 3.** (a) Comparing the response times of PIR schemes by Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky (cPIR) [19], Aguilar-Melchor [1] (LPIR-A), Chor et al. [7] (MPIR-C), and Goldberg [16] (MPIR-G), as well as the trivial PIR scheme over three current network bandwidths data in Table 1, using different database sizes. The bandwidth used for the non-trivial PIR schemes is  $B$ . (b,c) Plots of response time vs. bandwidth for the PIR schemes as in (a) for database sizes that fit in RAM (16 GB) and exceed RAM (28 GB).

disk reads is irrelevant to individual queries and is easily apportioned as part of the server’s startup cost. Even when the database cannot fit in available memory, the bottleneck of disk read overheads could be somewhat mitigated by overlapping computation and disk reads; we did not implement this optimization because the current performance was sufficient for head-to-head comparison with the trivial solution. Note that in practice, the disk read latency would equally come into play even for trivial PIR.

We made similar measurements for the Chor et al. [7] MPIR-C scheme using an implementation we developed. The implementation differed from [15] by doing XORs in 64-bit words, instead of by bytes. We obtained a speed of 0.5 seconds per GB (sometimes as fast as 0.26 seconds per GB) for small databases that fit in available memory and 1.0 seconds per GB for larger databases.

## 5 Comparing the Trivial and Non-trivial PIR Schemes

We next compare the round-trip response rates for each of the PIR schemes already examined to the response rates of the trivial PIR scheme and the Kushile-

vitz and Ostrovsky [19] scheme. We note that for the non-trivial schemes, the amount of data transmitted is tiny compared to the size of the database, so the available bandwidth does not make much difference. To be as generous as possible to the trivial PIR scheme, we measure the non-trivial schemes with the home connection bandwidth  $B$  — 9 Mbps download and 2 Mbps upload. We provide comparisons to the trivial PIR scheme with bandwidths of  $B$ ,  $B_2$  — 10 Gbps Ethernet, and  $B_3$  — 1.5 Gbps inter-site connections (see Table 1).

Figure 3(a) shows the log-log plot of the response times for the multi-server and lattice-based PIR schemes against the earlier results from [28], which include the trivial scheme and the Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky scheme [19]. As in [28], we give maximal benefit to the scheme in [19] by ignoring all costs except those of modular multiplication for that scheme, using the value for  $t_{mul}$  given in Section 1.1. We point out that the values for the trivial scheme and the Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky scheme are computed lower bounds, while those for the LPIR-A, MPIR-G, and MPIR-C schemes are experimentally measured. The number of servers for the multi-server schemes is  $\ell = 2$ .

We can see from the plot that, as reported in [28], the trivial PIR scheme vastly outperforms the computational PIR scheme of Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky, even at the typical home bandwidth. However, at that bandwidth, the lattice-based scheme of Aguilar-Melchor et al. is over 10 times faster than the trivial scheme. Further, both multi-server schemes are faster than the trivial scheme, even at the  $B_3$  (1.5 Gbps) speeds; the MPIR-G scheme is about 4 times faster for databases that fit in RAM, and the MPIR-C scheme is over 10 times faster. For large databases, they are 1.7 and 5 times faster, respectively. Only at  $B_2$  Ethernet speeds of 10 Gbps does the trivial scheme beat the multi-server schemes, and even then, in-memory databases win for MPIR-C. The apparent advantage of the trivial scheme even at these very high bandwidths may, even so, be illusory, as we did not include the time to read the database from memory or disk in the trivial scheme’s lower-bound cost, but we did for the LPIR and MPIR schemes.

One might try rescuing the trivial PIR scheme by observing that, having downloaded the data *once*, the client can perform *many* queries on it at minimal extra cost. This may indeed be true in some scenarios. However, if client storage is limited (such as on smartphones), or if the data is updated frequently, or if the database server wishes to more closely control the number of queries to the database — a pay-per-download music store, for example — the trivial scheme loses this advantage, and possibly even the ability to be used at all.

To better see at what bandwidth the trivial scheme begins to outperform the others, we plot the response times vs. bandwidth for all five schemes in Figure 3(b,c). We include one plot for a database of 16 GB, which fits in RAM (a), and one for 28 GB, which does not (b). We see that the trivial scheme only outperforms LPIR-A at speeds above about 100 Mbps, and it outperforms the MPIR schemes only at speeds above 4 Gbps for large databases and above 8 Gbps for small databases. In addition, due to the faster growth rate of computing power as compared to network bandwidth, multi-server PIR schemes will become even faster over time relative to the trivial scheme, and that will increase the bandwidth crossover points for all database sizes.

## 6 Conclusions

We reexamined the computational practicality of PIR following the earlier work by Sion and Carbunar [28]. Some interpret [28] as saying that no PIR scheme can be more efficient than the trivial PIR scheme of transmitting the entire database. While this claim holds for the number-theoretic single-database PIR scheme in [19] because of its reliance on expensive modular multiplications, it does not hold for all PIR schemes. We performed an analysis of the recently proposed lattice-based PIR scheme by Aguilar-Melchor and Gaborit [2] to determine its comparative benefit over the trivial PIR scheme, and found this scheme to be an order of magnitude more efficient than trivial PIR for situations that are most representative of today's average consumer Internet bandwidth. Next, we considered two multi-server PIR schemes, using both analytical and experimental techniques. We found multi-server PIR to be a *further* one to two orders of magnitude more efficient. We conclude that many real-world situations that require privacy protection can obtain some insight from our work in deciding whether to use existing PIR schemes or the trivial download solution, based on their computing and networking constraints.

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