

# 7 The New Co-Development Agenda: Official and Non-Official Initiatives between Morocco and Spain

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## 7.1 Introduction

A search for approaches that can positively connect migration with development in migrants' countries of origin has begun in Europe along with a new perception of the phenomenon of migration and a response to change in the cycle of movement. Pressure has intensified in the last few years during which Europe has set up higher barriers against the arrival of new migrants, and the living conditions for those already settled have become more harsh. Awareness of the intensification of (northward) migration – which is not always in answer to the labour market's needs – has shifted the search for 'solutions' towards the countries of origin.

This chapter traces the meanings of 'co-development' in European policies and their enactment in the relationship between Spain and Morocco. Morocco has become an entry gate to Europe not only for sub-Saharan Africans but also Asian immigrants. Border control between Morocco and Spain has strengthened, and the former has also become a priority country for 'co-development' actions initiated not just by Spain, but also by France, Belgium and Italy. A great deal of public debate in Spain has centred on the Maghrebi country which is separated from it, at its closest point, by less than nine nautical miles.

A distinction is made between state-promoted 'official co-development' (which is characterized by top-down directives and guidelines) and 'non-official co-development' initiatives which are promoted especially by non-governmental organizations and immigrants' associations using a 'bottom-up' approach. The approach by local public administrations (Autonomous Communities and municipalities) is referred to as 'medium' co-development. The aim of this paper is to show that 'co-development' – as conceived at the EU level as well as national level – has become more intertwined with security and trade issues, and remains primarily Eurocentric in that insufficient atten-

tion is accorded to local needs in the source countries. Civil society initiatives, in contrast, are directing attention to local issues. Beyond the concern for managing or curbing the flows of migrants, some of these initiatives are seeking to create a positive link between 'migration' and 'development' so as to achieve more equitable human development.

A review of official lines of action and the institutional mechanisms used, suggests that 'co-development' requires firmer commitment by the state (or the EU) to the agenda of democratization and respect for human rights (internationally) rather than allowing security and trade issues to drive action. Initiatives led by civic organizations appear more promising, but are institutionally weak and budget-dependent on governments. A critical understanding of the limits and possibilities of both official and non-official actions on co-development is needed.

## 7.2 Co-development Policy at the European Union Level

The term 'co-development' has been framed in terms of a restrictive immigration policy – usually in line both with EU security concerns and free trade with countries which in fact are also migrant-senders. The gradual inclusion of 'co-development' in EU policies manifests this trend.

The first reference to the idea of 'co-development' within the scope of migration policy was at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona in 1995. This Conference laid the foundation for a process intended to build a multilateral framework for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, bringing together economic and security aspects of cooperation. It also emphasized the social, human and cultural dimensions significant to such cooperation. The Barcelona declaration considered the contribution of civil society essential to the

Euro-Mediterranean partnership, and recognized the need to strengthen the channels for decentralized co-operation to encourage exchanges between those who are active in the field of development (Lacomba/Boni 2008). The term ‘co-development’ was not explicitly used at that time, nor was the link between migration and development actually articulated. But the declaration did prompt action on the side of civil society. The conclusions of a Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum meeting held practically in parallel with the official summit did include a clause (Section 10) on the need to consider the migrant populations as a potential agency of development acting between a host country and a sending country, thus establishing a central role which migrants can play in the development link between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours.<sup>1</sup>

The first formal EU reference to ‘co-development’ came at the European Council meeting held in Tampere in 1999, where the need for a common migration and asylum policy was brought to the fore (Geddes 2005). The reference to co-development was set out as follows:

The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts, consolidating democratic states, and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women and children. To that end, the Union as well as Member States are invited to contribute, within their respective competence under the Treaties, to a greater coherence of internal and external policies of the Union. Partnership with third countries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to promoting *co-development* [emphasis added].<sup>2</sup>

A High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration was set up by the European Council within the Tampere framework and produced different draft action plans for countries considered of special interest: Afghanistan, Albania, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia and Sri Lanka.

Spain was mandated to prepare the Morocco Report, whose Action Plan should focus on the creation of permanent dialogue on immigration between the

EU and Morocco. This plan viewed Morocco as an important external border south of the EU, a ‘buffer’ zone in respect of the migratory pressures. The main guidelines of the Spanish policy towards Morocco, according to the Action Plan, were stipulated as: co-operation to facilitate the socio-economic development of the country; the signing of agreements to implement the mechanisms allowing readmission into Morocco of migrants who have illegally entered the EU through Moroccan territory; and development of temporary migration schemes.<sup>3</sup> Commenting on this Action Plan, Terrón (2004: 14) noted that despite explicit concerns to combat illegal trafficking networks and the emphasis on economic development cooperation initiatives to reduce migratory pressure, the plan nonetheless also included aspects inherent in European immigration policy – such as integration of the (Moroccan) nationals who live in the European Union, their equal treatment along with family reunification and respect for a diversity of cultural identities. No clear reference to ‘co-development’ was made.

The notion of ‘co-development’ became explicit at the European Council meeting in Santa Maria da Feira held in 2000 to re-launch the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership under the framework of a ‘Common Strategy of the European Union on the Mediterranean Region’. This Strategy highlights the participation of migrants in promoting development in their communities of origin, and aims to: 1) promote transparency and greater predictability of legal systems in partner countries and 2) encourage foreign investment and lawful migrants to pursue activities in favour of co-development with their countries of origin.<sup>4</sup>

Particularly relevant for current European migration policy is the explicit inclusion of the issue of security. Migration issues have shifted rapidly from a focus on labour and finance to the domain of security due to the 9/11 attack and other considerations in respect of EU enlargement.<sup>5</sup> In December 2003 the Commission introduced a new formula with the title ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’.<sup>6</sup> The European Neighbourhood Policy followed in May 2004.<sup>7</sup> The

1 See at: <<http://www.medea.be/index.html?page=2&lang=en&doc=1632>> (13 April 2010).

2 See at: <[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm)> (27 May 2009).

3 See at: <[http://www.mmo.gr/pdf/library/Spain/ECPR\\_fuentes.pdf](http://www.mmo.gr/pdf/library/Spain/ECPR_fuentes.pdf)> (12 April, 2010).

4 See at: <[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm)> (27 May 2009).

5 See at: <<http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/Marqselim.pdf>> (3 November 2009).

6 See at: <<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>> (27 May 2009).

2003 document made no specific reference to migration, but explicit reference was made to the need to create a ring of well-governed countries to the east of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom the EU could enjoy close and cooperative relations. The 2004 document brought forward clearer ideas of reform in several areas of concern (for example political, security, trade and economic development) and underscored the need to prepare Action Plans with partner countries as part of regional cooperation.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to concerns for regional cooperation to fight illegal immigration, to reduce migration pressure and enhance judicial and police cooperation, four items of the Action Plans present migration in different guises: 1) commitment to shared values; 2) equal treatment in living and working conditions of migrant workers; 3) enhancing the connections between the people in the EU and its neighbours to promote mutual understanding of each other's culture, history, attitude and values; 4) elimination of distorted perceptions. The section on regional cooperation with the EU's Mediterranean neighbours follows the same line, reiterating the commitment to fight illegal immigration, enable legal migration and support specific activities.<sup>9</sup>

In 2005 the European Commission prepared a communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, entitled 'Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations'. This Communication mentions 'co-development' only on its second page when referring to the recommendations of the 1999 Tampere Summit; but it does list a series of new measures aimed at improving the effects of migration upon sender-country development. These are identified as: 1) migrants' remittances; 2) the role of diasporas in home country development; 3) circular migration and 'brain circulation'; 4) the mitigation of adverse 'brain drain' effects.<sup>10</sup> This communication, thus, treats migration on its own merits rather than conflating it with crime and public secu-

urity. In this line of reasoning migration is viewed as a significant potential for furthering the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through remittances, without being a substitute for any increase of Official Development Assistance (ODA). The European Consensus on Development also takes this line and includes numerous references to synergies between migration and development, making migration a positive force for development.<sup>11</sup>

Regarding European policies towards Morocco within the framework of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, the EU/Morocco Action Plan was implemented for a three to five year term.<sup>12</sup> This Plan does not mention 'co-development'; most of the actions related to migration have been developed within the scope of flow control and the fight against illegal migrants. A document dated 23 April 2009 makes a first assessment of the Action Plan, mentioning migration solely when dealing with judicial cooperation and illegal immigration, without any reference to 'co-development'.<sup>13</sup> Aubarell and Aragall's analysis of the EU 2000 to 2006 migration programmes for Morocco (which are charged to the external aid budget) shows that 38 per cent of the EU budget allocated to scheduled action linked to migration flows from Morocco relates to the fight against clandestine migrations (Aubarell/Aragall 2004: 37).

At the level of the relationship between the EU and Morocco, references to positive links between migration and development are absent; a view of migration linked to illegal immigration and control prevails. Consuelo Ramón points out that, "if we speak about the EU, we can hardly use the co-development policies formula properly" (Ramón 2005: 55-60). Yet there are initiatives of regional and local governments, as well as those of civil society, which are more grounded in actual contexts of daily life.

7 See at: <[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf)> (27 May 2009).

8 Reference to the Plan prepared by the High Level Group for Morocco is made later.

9 People-to-people projects; promotion of intercultural dialogue through educational and youth exchanges; human resource mobility and transparency of qualifications. See at: <[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf)> (24 June 2009)

10 See at: <[http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/development/sectoral\\_development\\_policies/L14166\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/sectoral_development_policies/L14166_en.htm)> (25 June 2009).

11 See at: <[http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/development/general\\_development\\_framework/r12544\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r12544_en.htm)> (25 June 2009).

12 See at: <[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action\\_plans/morocco\\_enp\\_ap\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/morocco_enp_ap_final_en.pdf)> (25 June 2009).

13 See at: <[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress\\_2009/sec09\\_520\\_fr.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress_2009/sec09_520_fr.pdf)> (25 June 2009).

### 7.3 Co-development in the Spanish Policy Agenda

In Spain, after the turn of this century, the notion of incorporating migrants' eventual return into the official concept of 'co-development' became established in Government's plan for cooperation and immigration. A more precise focus for co-development was then required and this has been guided towards development cooperation in emigration areas where decentralized cooperation agents play a major role; there is a lower emphasis on the issue of returning. Yet while the national focus on co-development is not based on security concerns as much as it is in the EU, the idea of promoting development in the areas of origin as a means to decrease migration retains a relevant place.

The first mention of co-development in Spanish Government policy came in 2000, within the context of the so-called GRECO<sup>14</sup> Plan (Programa Global de Regulación y Coordinación de la Extranjería e Inmigración or the Global Programme to Regulate and Coordinate Foreign Residents' Affairs and Immigration in Spain). This short-lived Plan (2001–2004) specifically highlighted the need to link policies regarding development cooperation with migration policies, and also the idea that 'co-development' in countries of origin must involve investment in their regions having high rates of emigration. Promoting the possible return of the migrants to their country of origin is built on the assumption that once the migrants have received professional training in Spain and acquired work experience, they will then make a valuable contribution to the development and growth of their countries of origin upon return.

The inclusion of return migration in the Spanish Plan would seem to follow the line of argumentation of a 1997 French report on co-development (Lacomba/Boni 2008). Although Spanish International Cooperation Law does not refer to migration, the Master Plan 2001/04 states that the stability of Morocco makes a joint-development strategy, including solutions to migration, indispensable. However, official Spanish foreign aid to Morocco hardly considers migration issues, and makes few claims beyond the general hypothesis that advancing economic development will make it less likely that people feel a need to leave their place of origin.

In 2005 a Task Force on Co-development was formed, commissioned by the Spanish State Council on Development Cooperation. This Task Force, made up of civil society actors and experts, prepared a consensus document to lay the foundations of official Spanish policy on co-development seeing it as a mode of development cooperation. The Task Group stated that:

The purpose of co-development is to promote human development and integration within a context of welfare, with the following features: its scenario is the transnational space defined by the relationship between significant areas of origin and settlement of migrants in the countries of origin and destination, considering intermediate or transit countries; it lies within the space shared between cooperation and migration policy; co-development projects work in all the transnational space, in both countries, at least in two of the action areas; it mobilizes a variety of stakeholders connected in the transnational space, among which migrants play a major role as subjects transferring tangible and intangible resources; due to the variety of intervening stakeholders, efficient coordination of networks is the only way to carry out common tasks; the whole set of simultaneous actions integrated in transnational space is articulated via the feedback of processes, with the 'origin group' affecting the 'destination group' in its goals and actions (and *vice versa*); the flow of exchanges in transnational space is bi-directional and comprises people, capital, goods, services and virtual forms of interaction (Task Force on Co-development 2005: 8).

The view of the Task Force is reflected in the contents of the Master Plan for Spanish Cooperation 2005–2008,<sup>15</sup> which stipulates that co-development policy be implemented in line with the policies defined by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and, specifically, by the State Secretariat for Immigration and Emigration – in coordination with other administrations and cooperation agents. Objective number eight of the Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (2007–2010) prepared by the Ministry of Labour and Immigration (MTIN) seeks to foster co-development policies and experiences in migrant countries of origin using a variety of measures. A strong emphasis is placed on participation of migrants themselves in coordination with their associations and Spanish development cooperation agencies.<sup>16</sup>

The Master Plan for Spanish Cooperation considered migration as a source of wealth for both origin and destination countries; and co-development as being an arena for multicultural and transnational activ-

14 The text of this plan is no longer available online but can be found in the State Official Gazette (*Boletín Oficial del Estado*) dated 8 January 2001.

15 See at: <[http://www.aacid.es/web/es/publicaciones/Documentos/Plan\\_director/](http://www.aacid.es/web/es/publicaciones/Documentos/Plan_director/)> (29 May 2009): 171, 172.

ity. It set forth the priority countries for Spanish cooperation in co-development – notably Morocco and Ecuador, due to the high volume of nationals of these countries in Spain as migrant workers.<sup>17</sup> The first official initiative for co-development in Morocco<sup>18</sup> came into operation at the end of 2008 through a call by the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) for bids to prepare research (and a seminar) to identify and evaluate means for official cooperation with Morocco. Such activities would be expected to lay the foundations of a co-development strategy between Spain and Morocco, providing the guidelines for support of Moroccan immigrants engaged in development projects in their regions of origin.

The presence of co-development in policy became manifest in the recent and ambitious Master Plan for Spanish Cooperation 2009–2012. The Plan reaffirms the importance of protecting the human rights of migrant workers during the whole migration cycle plus the need to preserve coherence between the articulated migration policy and the cooperation policy. The Plan lists several measures which may represent a relative change in the way of understanding co-development from an official standpoint. These are: 1) Effective migration management frameworks; 2) Social protection of migrant workers by ensuring full rights during their temporary stay and throughout their migration cycle; protection of victims of trafficking, particularly for sexual exploitation, with special attention to women and minors; 3) Provision of support to diasporas and migrants' associations to strengthen their skills in organizing and implementing co-development initiatives; 4) Solutions in respect of the brain drain; 5) Consultative mode for design and implementation of policy through multi-stake-holders

participation.<sup>19</sup> Apart from the Cooperation Plans with Morocco and Ecuador, cooperation with Senegal – a country with considerable experience in the field of co-development – is also included.

It must be noted that the scope of action by organizations in civil society is already circumscribed given that 'co-development' has been officially framed as economic development through return migration. Nevertheless the presence of multiple actors below state level (Autonomous Communities and Municipalities, civil society organizations of different orientations) suggests multiple interpretations of 'co-development' in line with the values these various actors hold and in response to what affects them most. Given that both Autonomous Communities and regional governments have wide jurisdiction over development cooperation, conforming to the provisions of the State Master Plan as well as accommodating to regional and local variations remain a great challenge.

In keeping with the large number of Moroccan migrants living in Catalonia (the greatest concentration in Spain) and considering the prevalent Catalanian 'outsourcing' to, and investment and commercial interests in, Morocco, Catalonia has made the most progress in affecting co-development. The Catalanian government has its own offices in Morocco and arranges work contracts for Moroccans willing to work in Catalonia, despite the friction this created with the Popular Party which previously held power in Spain. Morocco became a priority target in the Catalanian Autonomous Cooperation Law,<sup>20</sup> under which the Master Plans for Development Cooperation 2003–2006 and 2007–2010<sup>21</sup> specifically refer to promoting co-development as well as providing incentives for projects that stimulate migrant involvement in Catalonia (Lacomba/Boni 2008).

The General Plan for Development Cooperation 2001–2004 for the Autonomous Region of Madrid also treats Morocco as a high priority. In Madrid's Master Plan 2005–2008, the term co-development is for the first time explicitly referred to as a strategic measure, treating both migrant organizations and migrants as 'partners' in the cooperation projects with Madrid.<sup>22</sup> In the Autonomous Community of Valen-

16 See at: <[http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl\\_1314\\_739898301.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl_1314_739898301.pdf)> (2 May 2010). On page 45 a budget of € 56,769,825 for the 2007–2010 term, € 16,985,756 is envisaged, with contributions from the Ministry of Labour and Immigration and an amount of € 39,784,069 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. In the Executive Summary of the Plan, Premise 1 defines 'integration' as a two-way process of mutual adaptation.

17 According to the data of the National Statistics Institute, at the beginning of 2009 the number of migrants from Morocco in Spain amounted to 683,102, and to 458,437 from Ecuador.

18 As regards Ecuador, the identification tasks of the Pilot Co-Development Project Cañar (Ecuador) – Murcia Region (Spain), promoted by the AECID, started in 2004.

19 See at: <[http://www.aecid.es/web/es/publicaciones/Documentos/Plan\\_director/](http://www.aecid.es/web/es/publicaciones/Documentos/Plan_director/)> (29 May 2009).

20 See at: <[http://www.gencat.cat/diari\\_c/3551/01361125.htm](http://www.gencat.cat/diari_c/3551/01361125.htm)> (5 May 2009). Act 26/2001, dated 31 December 2001 on Development Cooperation.

21 See at: <[http://www.gencat.cat/cooperacioexterior/cooperacio/castellano/plan\\_director\\_07\\_10.htm](http://www.gencat.cat/cooperacioexterior/cooperacio/castellano/plan_director_07_10.htm)> (29 May 2009)

cia co-development is included in the Master Plans for Valencian Development Cooperation 2004–2007 and 2008–2011.<sup>23</sup> The proposed measures include: consciousness-raising in the countries of origin concerning potential of the migrants; supporting the possibility of repatriation; recruiting active participants from the migrant residents in Valencia to promote development projects in their home countries; and establishing co-development agencies with town councils in towns with high proportions of migrants.

In the Basque Country's Strategic and Master Plan on Development Cooperation 2008–2011 migration is framed as a multi-dimensional phenomenon intimately linked to poverty, which has changed the sociological composition of different territories and the financial dynamics in many countries owing to remittances. Migration should be dealt with from the universal citizenship standpoint – advocating the rights of all human beings by virtue of simply being part of the world. Co-development should thus join the fight against poverty.<sup>24</sup>

The growing use of the term co-development by the different Autonomous Communities is proof of their interest in a field which has become part of the Spanish regional cooperation agenda. Given that immigration policy is a matter for the central government, adherence to EU principles is expected; yet the Autonomous Communities can make proposals which are more ambitious in establishing a relationship between migrant mobility and co-development. This special feature of the Spanish cooperation system is part of the de-centralized character of the Spanish administrative model, and an essential component of the Spanish political system within its constitutional framework (Montiel 2007). The system has been criticized for disregarding the principles of alignment and harmonization proposed by the Paris Declaration 2005 (Acebillo/Boni/McGee/Peris/ Calabuig/Hueso 2009; Burall/Maxwell 2006). Although it is somewhat premature to evaluate the initiatives of actors operating below state level, it is important to note that the approach adopted towards migration by Autonomous

Communities appears far less instrumental than that of the central government. In the Autonomous Communities' agenda migrant associations are seen as being vital to co-development, and thus as important for building a bi-directional approach which connects and strengthens the localities involved in each country.

## 7.4 Non-Official Co-development in Morocco

Pioneer actions of co-development in Spain among non-official actors came from a convergence of two factors: the wish to support the migrant populations and the related opportunity for NGOs to gain experience in the development field (Aubarell/Aragall 2004: 50). In the context of Spanish-Moroccan cooperation the growing prominence of Morocco's civil society<sup>25</sup> has provided an enabling environment for non-official co-development. So far this has included initiatives by the organizations of Moroccan immigrants and those promoted by Morocco-based NGOs, in collaboration with foreign NGOs working in the development field.

In the last few years these have received the support of official channels and have therefore spread in the EU context. For example, Morocco's cooperation with Italy has been developed through local entities such as the *Cooperazione Internazionale* (International Cooperation)<sup>26</sup> and the European Committee for Training and Agriculture.<sup>27</sup> Cooperation with the Netherlands is mediated through the Euro-Mediterranean Centre on Migration and Development (EM-CEMO) – an association formed by immigrants.<sup>28</sup> In France, *Migrations et Développement* (Migration and Development)<sup>29</sup> and the Immigration, Development and Democracy Network<sup>30</sup> (formed and led by immigrants) play an important role. It should be noted that both the concentration of Moroccan immigrants in

22 See at: <[http://www.madrid.org/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername1=Content-Disposition&blobheadervalue1=filename%3Dplanannual\\_Maquetaci%C3%B3n+1web.pdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1220442533819&cssbinary=true](http://www.madrid.org/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername1=Content-Disposition&blobheadervalue1=filename%3Dplanannual_Maquetaci%C3%B3n+1web.pdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1220442533819&cssbinary=true)> (29 May 2009).

23 See at: <[http://www.cic.gva.es/index.php?Itemid=46&cid=54&option=com\\_content&task=view](http://www.cic.gva.es/index.php?Itemid=46&cid=54&option=com_content&task=view)> (29 May 2009).

24 See at: <<http://www.lankidetza.info/DefinitivoPlanDirectorEstrategico2008-2011.pdf>> (29 May 2009).

25 See in this regard the book by Fátima Mernissi (2004) where she describes the contributions by some of the civil leaders of development in Morocco; or the books by Maria-Àngels Roque (2003) and Jesús Núñez (2004) on associativeness and the emergence of civil society in Morocco.

26 See at: <[www.cefa.bo.it](http://www.cefa.bo.it)> (15 June 2009) for information on project activities.

27 See at: <[www.coopi.org](http://www.coopi.org)> (15 June 2009) for information on project activities.

28 See at: <[www.emcemo.nl](http://www.emcemo.nl)> (16 June 2009) for information on project activities.

29 See at: <[www.idd-reseau.org](http://www.idd-reseau.org)> (15 June 2009).

30 Projects available at: <[www.migdev.org](http://www.migdev.org)> (15 June 2009).

these countries and extant funding lines for projects in Morocco have contributed to forming this pattern of cooperation. The main innovation is the attempt by such organizations to make the cooperation contain an explicit link between migration issues and development concerns.<sup>31</sup>

Spain has only brief and recent experience with civil-society-led co-development initiatives promoted by the weak and highly fragmented Moroccan migrants' associations and ones put through by Spanish development associations (which are stronger than the migrant associations originating in Spain). One example of what was defined in this chapter's introduction as non-official bottom-up co-development is ATIME (the *Asociación Trabajadores Inmigrantes Marroquíes en España* or Association of Moroccan Migrant Workers in Spain). In addition to its well-known fight for the rights of Moroccan workers in Spain, the association has recently established a foundation devoted to international cooperation: the *Red Euromediterránea de Cooperación al Desarrollo* (REMCODE). Its projects are currently located in the north of Morocco, and range from infrastructure improvements and constructing basic facilities to the promotion and strengthening of civic associations. For this purpose, REMCODE benefits from its own field-based technical staff and the cooperation of many local associations.<sup>32</sup>

Another organization of Moroccan migrants in Spain involved in co-development is Development Cooperation in Northern Africa (CODENAF), which was created at the initiative of a group of Moroccan migrants settled in Andalusia. Its profile matches perfectly the concept coined in France of "international solidarity organisations arising from migrations" (Daum 2000). It is a development cooperation organization, which stands out from others precisely because of the leading role played by migrants. Their projects in Morocco are still in an embryonic stage, currently focussing on promoting a network linking the actions of different associations of Moroccan migrants in Spain and that may actively involve them in the development of their country of origin. CODENAF is also part of the Euro-Mediterranean Migration and Development network, of which the organizations EMCEMO (Netherlands) and *Migrations et Développement* (France)<sup>33</sup> are members.

There are also initiatives promoted by other associations of Moroccan migrants, such as the Cultural Association *Ibn Batuta* (ASCIB), with the project, "Reinforcing local abilities and governance in the rural community of *Ouneine in Taroudant*". The Association of Moroccan Immigrants in the Balearic Islands, the Association Amazon for Development and Socio-Cultural Promotion in Catalonia, and the Association Al-Amal of Moroccan Immigrants in the Autonomous Community of Valencia, all work in partnership with different Spanish NGOs in development projects in Morocco.

The projects promoted by immigrant associations are mostly low-scale, and they rarely continue or evolve into something more significant. In this respect they reflect the separation that usually exists between official co-development and the associative movement of migrants, both as regards the distrust generated by the very term 'co-development' and as regards their lack of recognition and resources to manage projects. Thus, in the first two cases (ATIME and CODENAF), we find two old associations of immigrants that combine vindication activities in Spain with development actions in Morocco, and are clearly separated from official pronouncements on 'co-development'. As regards the association *Ibn Batuta*, we observe a greater accommodation to the space and logic of the administration, particularly within the regional framework.

Spanish NGOs devoted to development cooperation in Morocco tend to adopt a de-centralized approach that usually counterbalances top-down official co-development. Depending on the history and experience of these civil organizations in development cooperation, some give more space to the initiatives of migrants' organizations, while others operate on a low-scale and usually design projects for cooperation.

The oldest organization is the Catalanian Agricultural Union, *Unió de Pagesos*, one of the organizations channelling Moroccan labour to work in Spanish agriculture by means of recruitment at the source. Based on this experience, this Union has taken a qualitative leap by becoming involved in promoting development actions in Morocco, through the *Fundación Pagesos Solidaris* (Farmer Solidarity Foundation), by training and by raising awareness among temporary workers in their capacity as agents of development in their communities of origin. Its project in *Sidi Yamani* (in northern Morocco) is a symbol of their desire to make migratory flows have positive effects for development on both sides.<sup>34</sup>

31 An extensive analysis of the Moroccan case is in a book by Lacombe (2004a) and another by Fernández/et al. (2008), which devotes specific chapters to Morocco.

32 See at: <[www.atime.es/cooperacion.html](http://www.atime.es/cooperacion.html)> (15 June 2009).

33 See at: <[www.codenaf.org](http://www.codenaf.org)> (15 June 2009).

The Valencian Refugee Aid Association (AVAR) has been developing a project to create employment for young people in the Tendirara (Morocco) region locally. The idea is to provide alternatives to hold back the migration of minors from this area into Spain by providing financial support to their families to help them remain in the school system with a grant for children under 16 years of age. In addition, training courses are offered for those over 16 years of age in consultation with the Local Council of Associations and with the cooperation of the Association of Moroccan Immigrants of Tendirara in the Valencian Autonomous Community and AVAR.<sup>35</sup>

The organization Cooperation for Peace Assembly in Valencia also undertakes a project to improve the production, distribution, marketing and sustainability conditions of the fishing industry in various communities in the North of Morocco, and to strengthen the relationship between Valencian and Moroccan societies within coastal municipalities. The objectives are to contribute towards creating a 'co-development' culture among Northern and Southern organizations and to improve the conditions of the artisanal fishing industry. Another project by the Cooperation for Peace Assembly aims at preventing illegal migration from Morocco and violation of Moroccan migrants' human rights, with the participation of town councils and institutions in northern Morocco and of the Moroccan community in Madrid, by raising awareness, training, and providing information in Spain and Morocco. The project also envisages the involvement of migrants in identifying and supporting development co-operation projects in the Rif, the mountainous region of Northern Morocco.<sup>36</sup>

In Murcia, the *Asociación para la Cooperación con el Sur - Las Segovias* (ACSUR-Las Segovias or the Association for Cooperation with the South-Las Segovias) initiated a project that seeks to promote networking among migrant women from the Maghreb region, and to coordinate links between these and organizations involving women and young people in Algeria and Morocco. The organization works in the areas of solidarity action, awareness and education from the perspective of human rights, premised on the principle of grass-root participation and the development of local powers. Through exchange of information and dialogues, the project seeks to promote

respect for the human rights of migrants as people (men and women) both at their place of origin and destination.<sup>37</sup>

The Spanish Refugee Aid Committee (CEAR) developed the project 'Creating Associative Bases to Undertake Co-development Actions with Morocco', intended to promote a culture of 'association' between northern Morocco and the city of Madrid by creating and reinforcing networks that are already in contact with one another. The Transnational Centre for Rifian Initiatives first started in Madrid, followed by several sessions and meetings held between associations of Madrid, Valencia, Alhucemas, Nador and Oujda in addition to training and micro-credit promotion campaigns.<sup>38</sup>

Finally, the Movement for Peace, Disarmament and Freedom (MPDL) implemented the project "Comprehensive co-development proposal in the province of Alhucemas by training at source potential migrants" intended to contribute towards improving migratory flows between Morocco and Spain by providing concerted action on information, legal and socio-labour advice and support for those travelling between their country of origin and host country. The aim is to support the training of young workers at the source in the hotel and restaurant industry, for which there is a local supply and, eventually, in other places. MPDL also has in place the project "Co-development and Dynamization of the co-operation between Moroccan associative networks in Spain and Morocco", organized by the *Association Marocaine de Solidarité et Développement* (AMSED). This programme lies within the framework of the "Co-development Integral Programme for Morocco, Mali, Niger and bordering countries", implemented by the Movement for Peace and funded by the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID).<sup>39</sup>

Our review of the recent initiatives show that Spanish NGOs have been responding to the call to 'co-development', taking advantage of their prior experience in development cooperation and making both arenas compatible. However, given that the support came mainly from grants of regional governments, these projects must therefore follow the priority lines set and concentrate in areas pre-determined by the calls. Indeed, the bulk of the aforementioned projects share a mission to strengthen the associative movement and a geographical location in northern

34 See at: <[www.pagesosolidaris.org](http://www.pagesosolidaris.org)> (14 June 2009).

35 See at: <<http://dev.webonnet.no-ip.com:8001/avar>> (15 June 2009).

36 See at: <[www.acpp.org](http://www.acpp.org)> (16 June 2009).

37 See at: <[www.acsur.org](http://www.acsur.org)> (15 June 2009).

38 See at: <[www.fundacioncear.org](http://www.fundacioncear.org)> (15 June 2009).

39 See at: <[www.mpdl.org](http://www.mpdl.org)> (15 June 2009).

Morocco. They include the participation of immigrant associations in Spain and their local counterparts in Morocco, and create a new three-pronged relationship, which is inevitably a source for conflict.

## 7.5 Dawning Co-development: Light and Shadow

At present, co-development usually appears as an opportunity for development in emigration countries. The idea that migration may operate to promote development, and not necessarily to hamper it, has gathered strength, both in the official and unofficial arenas. According to this premise, international bodies and states have recently implemented policies and actions intended to promote the positive effects of migration in the development of the countries of origin. However, they have also often disguised the objective of using development aid for control of migration flows or even their prevention. In this sense, official co-development policies contain multiple contradictions, with a remarkable distance between discussions and actions, or between the statements that present migrations as positive for development and the attempts to prevent them. Furthermore, much of the field remains in the stage of discourse and proposals for future projects and to date, many official policies remain unimplemented. Therefore, in spite of the expectation created by the use of the term ‘co-development’, many doubts and unanswered questions remain. In any event, the challenges for development are so colossal that the actions scheduled may have little consequence.

This kind of contradiction is particularly noticeable at the official level, where co-development remains linked to security concerns and to the return of migrants, forgetting that “promoting the return of migrants without guaranteeing basic living conditions and expectations for the future means a return to sedentarism without a horizon and thus is incompatible with the retention of their function as agents of development” (Gómez 2005: 10). As proven through the texts drafted by different European bodies, official policies repeat a concept of co-development primarily as an instrument to regulate migration. As Jean-François Bayart pointed out, although “initially addressed as associating the civil society and migrants with public development aid, co-development has gradually become a counter-migratory device” (Bayart 2007: 26). Christophe Daum goes deeper, highlighting the ambiguity between development in the countries

of origin and the management of migration flows and arguing that official co-development is more oriented towards organizing cooperation of the States of origin in the control of immigration through a repressive orientation (Daum 2008: 58). Sharing this view, Thomas Lacroix writes:

The initial definition of co-development has evolved under the pressure exerted by the actors: for public powers, it is a policy of flow management through development in the regions of origin; on this basis, migrants are just development vectors, instruments invested with transnational circulatory capabilities. The re-appropriation of this notion by associative actors and territorial collectives has led to reinvestment in centres of co-development interest. Migrants have become the main topic: their integration in the transnational space, re-appropriation of circulation and the promotion of a statute of mediators have become the main goals of this decentralised co-development (Lacroix 2005: 231–232).

It is in the field of unofficial co-development where we may rebuild our hopes for this idea that some authors have qualified as hardly realizable wishful thinking.<sup>40</sup> Along the lines of attributing the feasibility and leading role in co-development to civil society, Ramón states that “the agents of co-development are not basically Governments in their bilateral relationship, but firstly migrants themselves and, secondly, the social agents of both societies: unions, companies, teaching institutions, citizen organisations, NGOs” (Ramón 2005: 51). She adds that co-development is inspired by two fundamental principles.

First, the leading role played by migrants as co-development agents. This requires providing migrants and their associations (which need to be promoted) with a decisive role when projecting measures and action lines, and not to perceive them as mere executors of plans drafted from the respective Governments. In addition, this also requires acknowledging the relevance of the initiatives and actions by civil society agents and subordinate State administrations, also in the societies receiving immigration (Ramón 2005: 50).

Certainly, co-development promoted by migrants themselves from the scope of civil society enjoys greater legitimacy than actions by states, and a considerable number of experiences that account for the involvement of migrants in the development of their communities of origin reinforce this view (Lacomba 2004b). By implementing transnational organizational strategies, migrants have proven their dynamism and

40 Expression used by Joaquín Arango in the Sessions on Co-development and Immigration organized in 2003 by the AECI Planning and Evaluation Bureau in Madrid.

capability to operate numerous changes. In fact, with their example, migrants opened the path for state action to follow, forcing them to compete to occupy local and international solidarity spaces.

Hence, some authors underline the importance of the natural role played by migrants in the development of their communities of origin, with or without their states. Malgesini (2007: 31) speaks of “spontaneous co-development”, as the set of positive effects of immigration for the development of the origin and hosting societies generated by the contact and exchange between people from different backgrounds. Gómez Gil highlights:

Historically, people form spontaneous solidarity networks of an extraordinary impact, as a basic component of group sociability and solidarity. Migrants also weave extremely powerful networks from the privacy of their relationships and the historic commitments built in their communities and families, something which at present we call ‘co-development’ but which merely is a spontaneous expression of sociability and solidarity that people develop.... Precisely, the strength of co-development as an idea is founded on its component of reciprocity, on the pronouncement of common commitment it contains, on the active and participative attitude to contribute towards the improvement of others (Gómez Gil 2005: 7).

Nonetheless, in addition to their own resources and strategies, migrants have also increasingly benefited from the support of development organizations present in host countries (Faist 2006). This global phenomenon is manifest in Morocco, where cooperation between civil society (including migrant associations) and the State is gradually becoming more frequent, but is subject to numerous tensions and contradictions (Lacroix 2005; Lacomba 2005).

Regarding limits, we may first refer to diverse meanings and interpretations of co-development held by the multiplicity of stakeholders. Thus, while public administrations consider co-development mainly as a mode of development cooperation, for NGOs it would be more of a methodology than a strategy, and for migrant associations co-development stands as a vehicle for their own vindication and an opportunity to increase their visibility and participation (Giménez/Martínez/Fernández/Cortés 2006: 102-105). In this sense, and to illustrate further the diversity of approaches to co-development by the stakeholders, we should highlight that public administrations continue to use the term ‘co-development’ with great caution, NGOs have largely included it in their vocabulary and projects, and many immigrant associations view it with distrust.

Criticism of the work done by NGOs sometimes come from a too technical idea of co-development, linked to the performance of projects, which considers political transformations only within a context of economic development or of the search for actual synergies between migration and economic development. In contrast, in the work carried out by the organizations created by migrants, they do not disassociate themselves from the demand for rights.<sup>41</sup>

The barriers also include the lack of coordination between the entities that promote co-development actions, with scarce participation of migrant associations, to the detriment of the leading role granted by the original concept of co-development. Grillo and Riccio also argue:

Problems of control, of misunderstandings due to naïve expectations, of idealisation of partners, of mutual disillusionment, as well as the importance of transnational social networks, and individual and collective social capital (or lack of it). Participants may have to deal with the inexperience, unreliability and self-interest of colleagues, and the demands of relatives (and venal politicians) anxious to share any success. Yet at the very least, co-development is no better or worse than more conventional forms of development (Grillo/Riccio 2004: 109).

## 7.6 Conclusion

This chapter has offered some reflection on co-development as a new term in European policy seeking to link migration with development goals. We have noted that at the EU level, the meaning of co-development is restricted to immigration control and security concerns. Co-development here appears torn between two different policy objectives: 1) security for the EU, which emphasizes the curb on illegal migration and 2) free trade, which promotes free movement of factors of production, except labour. A key assumption is that migration pressures in sending countries are the outcomes of development failure, which could be solved by using the contributions of migrants and diasporas. The increasing number of declarations posits the idea of migrants’ participation in the field of co-development in EU policies being instrumental to curb migration flows.

In Spain, the particular initiatives of certain regional and local governments and, above all, of civil society agents, emphasize their role as transformation

41 This would be the case of the network Immigration, Development and Democracy in France, or the RedCo (Network for Co-Development) in Spain.

agents in their societies of origins. However, despite the growing cooperation on co-development between civil society (including migrant associations) and the state, numerous tensions and contradictions exist, particularly regarding return migration and the lack of a clear vision after return. Other major issues that operate against civil society-based co-development initiatives include the streamlining of the budgets for official development aid, and the high expectations placed on migrants' remittances. Frontier control and national security issues have overshadowed the optimistic perspective on the transnational spaces in which migrants are expected to contribute to 'co-development'.