17 Human or Public: The Referents of Security in Discourses on Migrants in Japan

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17.1 Introduction[1]

This chapter offers a critical perspective on 'human security' in Japan by contrasting the meaning of the term as written in the country's Official Development Assistance (ODA) reports with that applied in discourses on, and practices towards, migrant workers. The aim is to show how the 'human being' as a referent of security – promoted under concern for 'distant others' reachable through ODA policy – has been displaced when 'distant Others' arrive on Japan's soil as migrant workers. The human dimension of security is indeed overwritten by 'public security' concerns.

First an overview is provided of the key features of Japan's restrictive immigration policy and its relationship with national identity. Next, it is shown how the combination of the demographic crisis (aging population and low fertility rate) and economic downturn has shaped the adoption of measures to import labour without allowing the visible presence of migrant labour to jeopardize the link between national identity and 'ethnic purity' (see chap. 22 by Mushakoji). New patterns of migration and new migrants that have emerged in Japan in the last two decades have politicized debates on migration, and since the events of 9/11 migration has acquired the meaning of 'public security' fuelled by the politics of fear of 'Otherness'. A paradox of security[2] prevails and operates between society's majority groups and its plural minorities.

Using data from Aichi in the Chubu Region (2005–2007) we highlight the experiences of human insecurity and their contextual differences. This region is known for its economic recovery from the burst of the economic bubble (1991–2003), which lasted until the global economic crisis began to unfold in 2008. The region also has one of the highest percentages of migrant workers compared to other regions.[3] Our analysis seeks to extend the scope of migration studies in Japan[4] by drawing attention to the complex interaction between different aspects of security (human and societal) which produce the fear of migrants and legitimize both their criminalization and exclusionary practices of an overt and/or subtle nature. The situation calls desperately for a rapprochement between these different meanings of 'security'.

17.2 Japan's Immigration Policy: Protecting National Identity and Coping with a Demographic Crisis

17.2.1 Immigration Trends in Japan in the Post-war Period

During the post-war era the Japanese government had only a fragmented immigration *control* policy and no integrated immigration approach. Until the 1970's Japan's domestic labour pool operated reasonably well, without having to consider the alternative of labour immigration as in other industrialized countries undergoing post-war economic growth. The massive inflow of a young male Japanese labour force from rural to urban areas, followed by female labour (as espe-

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2 Mushakoji (2003) inspires and emphasizes this perspective of human insecurity and migrants in terms of the security dilemma

3 See at: <http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/080601-1.pdf> (10 April 2010)

4 This field of study has have grown rapidly in Japan, especially after the bubble economy, though much attention has been devoted to the economic and social conditions of specific ethnic groups.

cially housewives) and young part-time workers had kept the domestic labour force in balance. The control of entry of foreigners into the country was primarily conducted at the national border for public security purposes.

Beneath this seemingly unproblematic domestic labour pool is the dominant myth that Japan is an ethnically homogeneous nation, which is partly accountable for the neglect of its multi-ethnic reality and has led to the marginalization of its minorities. The presence of the Koreans as a minority ethnic group has long contested official policy discourses on homogeneity. The number of Koreans in Japan was half a million at the end of the Second World War, after about 600,000 Koreans who had been conscripted into the workforce and military during the war had returned home.[5] After 1952, with the help of the U.S. government and the Japanese Red Cross, the Japanese government devised a scheme for the repatriation of Koreans to North Korea. Because Koreans were the largest minority group debates on the migration-security nexus and the social construction of 'Otherness' had most focussed on them, until recently.

Morris-Suzuki (2007: 204) notes the following report by one U.S. officer:

> The Koreans...have been an underprivileged, economically poor group living in isolated communities within major urban areas. As a result, they have been a major crime problem and a drain on the national and local social services. The Japanese, beset by their own employment problems, have not welcomed this additional burden.

The above perspective, which established a connection between being a migrant, economic hardship, and crime, was applied to the Koreans and now becomes the archetype for Japan's policy towards foreign workers, including those of Japanese descent.[6]

The 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea marked a turning point in Japan's external relations. Japanese capital supported by the government re-entered Korea, and eventually its ex-colonies in Asia, through ODA. The period of Japan's peak economic growth (between the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the oil shocks in 1970's and through to the 1980's) saw political leaders and business officially weighing the costs and benefits of a comprehensive import of Asian migrant workers.

Ochiai (1974) pointed out that practices of bringing in workers under the guise of 'trainees' began in the late 1960s to help alleviate labour shortages, particularly unskilled and semi-skilled labour in small and medium enterprises; pressure from business followed and insisted that employers be able to import workers from other Asian countries independently of the trainee system (Kuptsch/Oishi 1995).

Japan's political system has been slow in appreciating the far-reaching implications of a globalized economy, especially when it comes to migration. Having ratified the International Covenants on Human Rights in 1979 and the Refugees Convention in 1981, Japan had made amendments in social security laws to guarantee social rights to refugees and non-Japanese persons who settled in the country. Accepting new migrant workers in addition to long-term residents would mean facing the obligation to address their social rights as well. Although the domestic labour pool was showing problematic signs – fertility has declined sharply and has been below replacement level for decades and industries were pressured to hire foreigners – the government refused their demands and instituted instead policies that restructured domestic work forces for longer-term competitiveness (Meissner/Hormats/Walker/Garrigues/Ogata (1993: 68–69).[7]

The first official breakthrough was the establishment of the Japanese International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO) in 1991. In the following two years, the government launched its Technical Internship Training Program (TITP) initially designed to be part of a larger effort to facilitate the transfer of technical skills to neighbouring developing countries through trainee programmes while also allowing Japanese employers to avail themselves of rotating pools of workers. A key element of this programme was the establishment of training centres in particular sending countries, which would select applicants wishing to migrate for work and give them brief instructions on elementary industrial production techniques and Japanese language and customs. A two-year contract period with medical care and other benefits was envisaged, after which these workers would be rotated back to their home countries. Upon their return these training centres were supposed to perform a labour-placement and exchange role (Meissner/Hormats/Walker/Garrigues/Ogata 1993: 67–68). The

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5   See at: <http://www.han.org/a/fukuoka96a.html> (10 April 2010).

6   For a global history of "the emergence of migration as a security issue" see: Kleinschmidt (2006: 78–87).

7   For example: greater promotion of the participation of women and senior citizens in the labour market, introducing flexible work schemes.

trainee system with its rotating mechanism may be seen as a device to respond to both domestic labour demands and the government avoidance of the commitment to ensure social rights to migrant workers. Preventing their long-term settlement appeared to be a solution.[8]

17.2.2 Internationalization of Japan and the New Immigrants

Population Statistics of Japan 2008 show the projected population by age group with the proportion of people over 65 years old at 20.2 per cent in 2005, 26.9 per cent in 2015, 30.5 per cent in 2025 and, finally, 40.5 per cent in 2050.[9] According to *UN Population Prospects: the 2008 Revision Highlights* in 1990, the aggregate per woman birth rate for the previous year was 1.57, the lowest recorded birth rate since the end of the war; and it was estimated to be 1.27 during the period of both 2005–2010 and 2010–2015.[10] Japan experienced its first population decline in 2005; the last low point according to official records available was 1899.

Japanese immigration statistics show that the largest number of registered foreign nationals in Japan has changed from the Koreans (645,373 in 1997 to 593,489 in 2007) to the Chinese (252,164 in 1997 to 606,889 in 2007). In a controversial paper, a former immigration officer Sakanaka (1989) once summarized and predicted "the disappearance of Koreans in Japan" due to decades-long assimilation.[11] Changes in the composition of the population of immigrants stemmed from Japan's amendments of its immigration law in the 1990s to accept new migrants to join the domestic workforce in response to the acuteness of the demographic problem. A major amendment in

Immigration Law was the use of *Jus sanguinis* to encourage the return migration of *Nikkeijin*,[12] and groups responded at an increasing annual rate from Brazil (233,254 in 1997 to 316,967 in 2007) and Peru (40,394 in 1997 to 59,696 in 2007).[13] In addition, three tenets underpinned the foreign trainee system: 1) admitting foreign workers, on whatever basis, should be a last resort; 2) unskilled workers should not be admitted; 3) all foreigners should be admitted on a temporary basis only (Cornelius 1994: 386–387).

The neoliberal policy package implemented by successive cabinets of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)[14] included financial deregulation and flexible labour market policies, and stimulated spatial and industrial urban restructuring through the construction of more business facilities in metropolitan areas, particularly during the bubble economy. This created an enormous demand for new types of labour – especially for construction and cheap services supporting sophisticated consumer and specialized corporate/producer services (Sassen 1991).[15] Deregulation allowed many companies to replace full-time employees with part-time and temporary workers and to circumvent the foreign trainees system, thus creating a social space in which migrant workers function, formally or informally.

Despite the principle for introducing the trainee system being the transfer of technical skills to neighbouring developing countries plus meeting domestic labour shortage, there are institutional 'security holes' that have caused foreign trainees and interns to suffer, some of which are: 1) their passports have been taken away; 2) off-the-job training for foreign trainees is incomplete or not undertaken; 3) trainees must work overtime during working days or on their days off; 4) trainees do not receive training allowances; 5) trainees are not paid their wages, nor do they receive compensation for overtime work; 6) restrictions on everyday life, including the prohibition of mobile phone use, staying up overnight, and taking extended trips. The number of the trainees supported by JITCO is increasing (28,011 in 1997 to 51,012 in 2004), whereas the av-

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8   Little is known about past efforts in receiving foreign trainees, especially on a private basis, but today many researchers and practitioners have become very interested in the arrangements being made under Economic Partnership Agreement/Free Trade Agreement (EPA/FTA) with the Philippines and Indonesia to accept caregivers officially.

9   See at: <http://www.ipss.go.jp/p-info/e/psj2008/PSJ2008-02.pdf > (10 April 2010).

10 See at: <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_highlights.pdf>, (10 April 2010).

11 Sakanaka (1989: 159–160) summarized the immigrant policy for Koreans in Japan (*Zainichi Chosenjin*) as follows: "Koreans in Japan today are legally 'foreigners,' but in fact 'quasi-Japanese'. We can suppose that they are going to be Japanese in the future and should be called 'Korean-Japanese (nationals).'"

12 *Nikkeijin* are Japanese descendants living outside Japan. Those who return were mainly living in Latin America at the time. They are entitled to permanent residence but are segregated from mainstream society due to 'cultural difference', especially the younger generation.

13 See at: <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000007316.pdf> (10 April 2010).

14 From Nakasone (1982–87) to Koizumi (2001–2006).

15 Indeed, Tokyo and other urban areas have been transformed from national to global cities during this period.

Table 17.1: Comparison between industrial training and technical internship. **Source:** Compiled by the authors

	Industrial training	**Technical internship**
1. Scope of eligible duties and occupations	Activities that are not purely repetitive of the same task, complying with the Immigration Control Act and ordinances.	The 63 occupations and 116 selective works covered by the National Trade Skills tests and other similar tests.
2. Target skill levels	Basic Grade 2 of the National Trade Skill tests (by the end of one-year training).	Grade 3 of the National Trade Skill tests (by the end of the second year of internship).
3. Measures for ensuring skill acquisition	Formulation of and adherence to training plans	Formulation of and adherence to internship plans
4. Required residence status	"Trainee"	"Designated Activities"
5. Worker status	Trainees have no worker status and are not permitted to work.	Interns are treated as workers.
6. Overtime work and work on regular days off	Not allowed	Allowed
7. Protective measures	Protection implemented under the Immigration Control Act and ordinances. A training contract is between the sending/ accepting organizations.	Protection implemented under the Labour laws and regulations. A Technical Internship contract is between the technical intern and the accepting company.
8. Clarifications of terms and conditions	Trainees are provided with a "Notification of Conditions to Trainees" stipulating the training hours, allowances and other terms and conditions.	Interns are provided with a contract of employment or a "Notice of Employment Conditions," stipulating the working terms and conditions
9. Welfare guarantee provided by the accepting organization	Trainees are paid a training allowance to cover their living expenses. Allowances are decided based on the agreement between the sending organization and the accepting organization	Interns are paid wages for their labour. Wages are described in each employment contract between the technical intern and the accepting company. The Minimum Wages Law applies as in the case of Japanese employees.
10. Insurance against accidents and illness	Comprehensive Insurance for Foreign Trainees is arranged on a compulsory basis.	The Workers' Accident Compensation Insurance Law applies during the technical intern period; the Comprehensive Insurance for Foreign Technical Intern also applies.

Note: The Industrial Training Programme is designed for young and middle-aged people from developing countries to acquire technologies, skills and knowledge in specified industries ad occupations in companies in Japan. The Technical Internship Programme is a scheme that enables trainees to master the technologies, skills and knowledge they acquired through training in practical and professional ways while being employed for a period up to three years, including the training period.
Source: JITCO (2009) *Industrial Training and Internship Programmes: Operative Manual for Sending Organizations*, (Tokyo: Japan International Training Cooperation Organization).
See at: <http://www.jitco.or.jp/download/data/sendorg_manual_English.pdf>; <http://www.jitco.or.jp/english/overview/pattern.html> (23 May 2010).

erage monthly allowance is decreasing (Hatate 2006: 87–88).[16]

Business in Japan has always been cautious of absorbing the social costs of migrant labour. Even during the bubble economy period, the so-called *Kaikoku-Sakoku Ronsou* (debates on closed- or opendoor policy for immigrants), this attitude prevailed. Today business owners seem to be confident about their experiences in making use of various types of im-

migrant labour, formally or informally.[17] Importing unskilled labour is becoming less and less of a taboo subject, politically and/or economically.[18] The category of 'technical intern' has now been added to the foreign trainee system. This new category allows trainees who passed a skills examination after the training period to change their visa status to one permitting them to engage many types of paid jobs (up from 17 in 1993 to 64 in 2009) and remain in Japan for a pe-

riod of three years. Since the trainee system has been functioning as an informal measure recruiting cheap unskilled workers, adding this new category means the possibility to extend the legal time frame, job coverage, and perhaps receive better protection.

"Entertainer" as a visa category has also been subject to much criticism. Data shows that in the 1970s the Republic of Korea was the largest supplier of this category of migrant workers, followed by the Philippines in the 1980s (David 1991). Today 'entertainers' come from many countries in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. This category has been widely used to bring women into the country to work in the sex industry. Pressure to address human rights abuse in sex trafficking has increased since Japan's ratification of the Transnational Convention against Organized Crime (2000).[19] Being placed in Tier 2 and thus on the watch list in the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report 2004, Japan has sought to improve this status. Crackdown measures have led to a notable decline of the number of entertainers since 2005.

Figures for foreigners' status of residence show "an increasing trend until the end of 2004, but decreased at the end of 2005 and 2006 due to decrease in the number of foreign nationals entering Japan with the status of residence of 'entertainer'".[20] This sharp drop (from 32,297 in 1999, 64,742 in 2004 to 15,728 in 2007) stemmed from the introduction of stricter control of entertainer status granted to Filipinos and Thais.[21]

Crime control led to the expansion of the activities of the immigration bureau on public security, focussing mainly on Taiwanese, Chinese, Colombian, Romanian and Nigerian networks who have been active in the last twenty years in informal global networks of drugs, human trafficking and small arms. Given that the Japanese authority considers overstaying to be the first step that makes a person vulnerable to, and a potential target for, criminal activities, *overstayers* have become an important focal point for scrutiny and public security. *Overstayers* are those who remain in the country beyond the period authorized by their visas, not only because they have slipped through the government's strict control but because of its tacit tolerance in view of the need to satisfy labour demands by small and medium-size companies.

Recently, *Immigration Control 2007* proudly announced that the reason why the number of *overstayers* has been steadily decreasing was attributable partly to:

> ...the conducting of strict immigration examinations, concentrated efforts for close cooperation with other related agencies to detect violation of the Immigration Control Act and active performing of publicity activities to prevent illegal employment, as well as the fact that the year 2006 was the third year of the five-year plan to

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16 For further information, refer to the Advocacy Network for Foreign Trainees, see at: <http://k-kenri.net/>, (5 May 2009). Interestingly enough, in their Trafficking in Persons report (2007, 2008, 2009), the US State Department has criticized the Japanese foreign trainee and intern system as a type of trafficking in persons. See at: <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/index.htm>. The Japanese government thus announced revisions to the system on their website, only available in Japanese, See at: <http://www.jitco.or.jp/cgi-bin/press/detail.cgi?n=260&ca=2>, 20 Oct 2009.

17 For another brief explanation of unskilled labour migration to Japan in a regional context, see Shuto (2006: 206–210).

18   For instance, on 14 November 2004, *Nippon Keidanren* (Japan Business Federation) issued a report entitled *Gaikokujin Ukeire Mondai ni kansuru Chukan Iken Torimatome (Interim report on receiving foreigners*), in which it called for preparing and promoting the acceptance of a wide range of foreigners, including specialists, care workers and manual labourers. This can be said to be the very first official announcement by business associations regarding immigration.

19 The Japanese government obtained the approval of the Diet for it, but has not, to date, concluded the convention because it has not yet provided for the necessary domestic legislation to implement it. Further, three protocols have not yet been concluded: 1) Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2) Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, and 3) Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

20 Immigration Bureau of Japan, 2008: "Immigration Control 2008". See at: <http://www.moj.go.jp/NYUKAN/nyukan80-3.pdf>, 21 (10 May 2008).

21 As Japan Times online reported, Japan is trying to limit the number of foreigners entering the country on entertainer visas - most of whom are Filipino women - to tighten controls on human-trafficking. Many of the women, who often land in hostess jobs, end up in the sex industry. See at: <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20050218a4.html>, (14 June 2008). Also see at: <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20060602f2.html>, (14 June 2008).

halve the number of illegal foreign residents implemented by the Immigration Bureau.[22]

The number of foreign detainees has subsequently risen sharply nationwide. Thirty per cent of the total prisoner population in Tokyo was foreign (2005) with foreign females outnumbering Japanese female prisoners by 55 per cent (Iwai 2007: 8). The rapid increase in the number of foreign detainees is far beyond the administrative capacity of the prison system for domestic criminals. Part of the foreign detainee population is classified as belonging to the 'F class' who do not understand Japanese or are not accustomed to Japanese customs. There is no special treatment for this group: they are put in the same prison as the Japanese (male foreigners in Fuchu or Osaka Prison; females in Tochigi), or temporarily at the East and West Japan Immigration Centres.

Public access to information on foreign detainees at the East and West Japan Immigration Centres is highly limited. Takahashi (2007) points to the following problematic practices: 1) forced imprisonment in every case, including people undergoing treatment for work-related accidents, pregnant women, elderly persons, and those who are unfit; 2) indefinite or longterm imprisonment; 3) family members separated by juvenile imprisonment; and 4) prisoners abused by immigration officers. It has been reported that police officers readily subject foreign detainees to violence and inhumane treatment.[23]

Coutin's analysis of 'the space of nonexistence' in the U.S. holds true with the case of Japan:

> The undocumented have been referred to as 'shadow' people who slip in and out of sight and who live in an 'underground' or a 'netherworld.' Official U.S. policy is to detain and eventually deport these troubling, ambiguous, shadowy people, and thus to remove the trace of their physical presence. Even if they are not deported, the undocumented are set apart from the juridically authorized by laws that dispense rights and services on the basis of legal identity. The undocumented therefore exist in a non-domain, a space of illegality (Coutin 2003: 174–175).

To recapitulate, the neoliberal framework of governance of migration in Japan seems to be navigating between two objectives: 1) to preserve the myth of ethnic purity, and 2) to avoid absorbing the social costs of migrant labour. The archetype of policy inherited since the end of the Second World War premised on a view that links migrants with poverty, economic burden and crime has veiled their positive contributions. Circumventions of the legal framework had been possible given this widespread belief – even in the case of the *Nikkejin* who can enter Japan, work legally and enjoy access to social security services, but who are segregated from mainstream society due to 'cultural difference' which makes them vulnerable to being treated as disposable labour in a way similar to other migrant workers. Deregulation has permitted the creation of new ill-defined zones outside the formal boundaries of legality. The underlying logic of relation between ethnic purity and social space for migrant workers is hierarchical, and status (defined on the basis of ethnicity, mode of entry, skill-level) thus serves to differentiate both the place and position occupied by these workers as well as the relations between them and mainstream society. Recent measures to crack down on crime have turned immigration detention centres into what has been termed as a new place of 'bare life' and a 'zone of arbitrary treatment' (Buck-Moss 2000; Agamben 1998) for those removed from the system.

17.3 Discursive Practices on Human Security: The 'Distant Human' in ODA versus the 'Proximate Other' in Migration

17.3.1 Human Security as Framed in Japanese ODA

Since the turn of this millennium Japan ODA policy has concentrated on the areas of international peace and economic development as one of the limited ways to show its diplomatic presence – the constraints of Article 9 of the country's Constitution limits Japan's military role to that of self-defence. Its philosophy on human security has not necessarily been clear to the international community. At the end of the Cold War Japan became a leading ODA donor

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22 Immigration Bureau of Japan, 2007: "Immigration Control 2007", See at: <http://www.moj.go.jp/NYUKAN/nyukan68-3.pdf>, (10 May 2008).

23 According to Johnston, Eric; Matsubara, Hiroshi, 2004: "Detainees stage hunger strike: Ex-Vietnamese boat people protest indefinite detention", in *The Japan Times Online,* 25 Vietnamese (later 23) being held at the West Japan Immigration Centre were on a hunger strike to protest their prolonged incarceration. Some had been held for nearly two years, partly because the Vietnamese government had refused to take them back due to their status as former boat people, and they had therefore lost their public presence for two years. See at: <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20040611a3.html> (4 June 2008).

prompting the government to initiate its own development assistance strategy which does not necessarily follow the developmental prescriptions of the West. The Cabinet approved Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter in 1992, and Japan co-hosted the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993. The co-organizers of TICAD were UN agencies – OSSA (Office of the Special Advisor on Africa) and UNDP. The key concept guiding TICAD has clearly become human security especially since TICAD's Tenth Anniversary Declaration at TICAD III (2003).

Since the introduction of the ODA Charter of Japan in 1992 successive leadership in the Japanese government has made reference to the human security agenda. According to the chronology of activities related to human security by the Japanese Government, in December 1998, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi expressed his views on human security in "Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow"; in March 1999 the United Nations established the Trust Fund for Human Security. Prime Minister Obuchi stated in his keynote speech that the concept of 'Human Security' would be reflected in Japan's concrete foreign policies. In February 2003 the co-chairs of the Commission on Human Security, Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, submitted a summary of the final report of the Commission to Prime Minister Koizumi. In October 2000 Japan also chaired the first FHS (Friends of Human Security) meeting – an unofficial and open-ended forum based in New York. The purpose of FHS is to provide an informal forum for United Nations Member States, as well as relevant international organizations, to discuss the concept of human security from different angles in order to seek a common understanding and explore collaborative efforts for mainstreaming it in United Nations activities.[24]

Most recently, in the pamphlet of the Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) for a 'human centred' 21st century, Japan explains its diplomatic position as follows. To overcome the global issues, including ethnic and racial conflicts, the smuggling of people, arms and drugs as well as infectious diseases, "...[t]he traditional concept of 'state security' alone, whose objective is to protect the boundaries and the people, is no longer sufficient. Indeed, the importance of state security will not and should not shrink at all, but addi-

tional responses are necessary to address diverse threats comprehensively".

Against this background, the notion of human security, an important pillar of Japan's foreign policy, has increasingly gained relevance. Human security aims to protect people from critical and pervasive threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity, and to enhance human fulfilment. For these objectives human security tries to integrate and strengthen initiatives that emphasize 'human-centred perspectives'. Japan presented four basic policies in its revised ODA Charter: supporting the self-help efforts of developing countries; the perspective of 'Human Security'; the assurance of fairness; and the utilization of Japan's experience and expertise. It is important to note that from the Japanese perspective, human security is understood in practice as follows:

> In order to address direct threats to individuals such as conflicts, disasters, and infectious diseases, it is important not only to consider the global, regional, and national perspectives, but also to consider the perspective of human security, which focuses on *individuals* [italic added]. Accordingly, Japan will implement ODA to strengthen the capacity of local communities through human resource development. To ensure that human dignity is maintained at all stages, from the conflict stage to the reconstruction and development stages, Japan will extend assistance for the protection and empowerment of individuals (Ministry Foreign Affairs 2003: 2).

In line with the ODA Charter and in view of its commitment to reduce vulnerabilities faced by people, communities and countries by employing the concept of 'human security', the Medium-Term Policy on ODA describes Japan's position on four priority issues: poverty reduction; sustainable growth; global issues; 'peace-building'. Global interdependence is also included.[25]

Japanese development assistance policy lies in sharp contrast to its domestic migration policy. Ironically, addressing 'vulnerabilities' faced by individuals located in foreign countries is not a policy focus when dealing with the challenges faced by foreign people (and migrant workers) on Japanese soil. It appears as though there are two types of people: those who deserve to be protected, strengthened, empowered and respected; and those to be placed under control regardless of their being exploited, voiceless and ex-

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24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008: "Friends of Human Security" see at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/friends/index.html> (1 Oct 2009).

25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009: "The Trust Fund Human Security for the 'Human Centred' 21st Century", See at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21.pdf> (1 Oct 2009).

Table 17.2: Some indicators of economic activities by Prefecture of the Chubu Region in 2005.

Prefecture	Foreign Residents	Foreign Workers	Nominal GDP by Prefecture	Nominal GDP by Industrial Sector		
				Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Aichi	150,115	83,354	35,819,911	208,639	13,907,916	22,814,718
Shizuoka	70,721	44,203	16,415,050	192,667	7,068,315	9,910,591
Gifu	36,793	25,020	7,247,705	77,728	2,490,547	5,008,871
Mie	34,249	20,778	7,699,787	116,776	3,206,302	4,688,957
Sub Total (Chubu Region)	291,878	173,355	67,182,453	595,810	26,673,080	42,423,137
Tokyo	248,363	93,501	92,269,424	47,177	13,324,590	84,428,097
Osaka	175,766	73,688	38,529,386	30,232	8,431,234	31,546,718

Notes:

1. Data of Economic Activities in 2005 from the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan; see at: <http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna/kenmin/h17/main.html> (10 April 2009)

2. Data of Foreign Residents and Workers in 2005 from the Statistics Bureau and the Director-General for Policy Planning (Statistical Standards); see at: <http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2005/gaikoku/zuhyou/syuyou.xls> (10 April 2009)

3. Unit of GDP: one million yen.

4. GDP by Industrial sector includes import tax, consumption tax on total capital formation, and imputed interest; GDP by prefecture does not.

cluded from official assistance. We call this contrast the Distant Human versus the Proximate Other.[26]

This bifurcated vision of human security is reflected in academic work. Since 2000 there have been many publications in Japan under the label of 'human security'. They fall into two broad categories. One focuses mainly on development policy, ODA and poverty reduction (Taya 2000; Yoshida 2004; JICA 2007); the other is mainly based on peace studies (Katsumata 2001; Matsukuma 2008). Most of them follow the definition of the Sen-Ogata Report on human security and shed light on the topics and cases of human security and insecurity in developing countries from their specialized perspective. This perspective is tightly connected to the definition of human security as 'freedom from fear and want', thus orienting policy towards humanitarian intervention and 'human-centred' development assistance. The basic assumption is that human (in)security is a problem 'over there' (or

abroad) rather than one arising from global interdependence. No attention has been given to the interrelationship between the forms of insecurity faced by people 'over there' and those experienced by the foreign nationals who have moved 'here' to Japan. Japanese research on human security that follows the notion of global interdependence displays more sensitivity to human (in)security 'here' and 'there' and provides an interconnected perspective on 'people on the move' inclusive of the migrant population (including migrant workers) from developed countries. In the following section the interconnected aspects of human insecurity are spotlighted in a major manufacturing region in Japan where a high number of migrants are concentrated.

17.3.2 Human Faces of Migration and Security in the Chubu Region: A Focus on the Aichi Prefecture

As pointed out earlier, Chubu is a manufacturing centre for Japan. The region is also a major point of attraction for migrant workers. Manufacturing exports (especially automobiles) to the US and BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have recently led the Japanese economic recovery after the burst of the bubble economy. The head office of Toyota is located in Chubu. This contributed to the expansion of

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26 The contradictory attitude of Japanese government becomes most apparent when reading the part on 'target peopleí and situations in the UNTFHS documents. See Item b) in Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009: 9): b) Supporting and empowering refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), economic migrants and others on the move. Particular attention should be given to the socioeconomic impact on the displaced and their host communities.

Table 17.3: Number of registered foreign residents in the Aichi Prefecture by selected cities (2007). **Source:** Department of Regional Development and International Affairs, Aichi Prefectural Government See at: <http://www.pref.aichi.jp/0000012581.html> (10 April 2009)

Nationality/Rank	Aichi						
Brazilian	79,899	Toyohashi	12,840	Toyota	7,813	Nagoya	6,213
Chinese	41,755	Nagoya	19,552	Toyota	2,646	Ichinomiya	1,712
Korean	41,456	Nagoya	21,217	Kasugai	2,473	Toyohashi	1,900
Filipino	23,701	Nagoya	6,842	Toyohashi	1,715	Ichinomiya	1,275
Peruvian	8,277	Toyohashi	1,015	Nagoya	891	Komaki	882
Prefectural Total	221,389						

the export base of the region, which has been most recently hit hard by the current economic turmoil.[27]

Within Aichi prefecture there is a concentration of 'oldcomers' (Koreans and Chinese) in the capital city (Nagoya) where there are various job opportunities for those well integrated into Japanese society, and a concentration of mainly 'newcomers' (migrant groups who arrived in Japan in increasing numbers after 1980's) in other industrial cities (Toyohashi, Toyota, Okazaki and Komaki).

Occupational distribution by nationality may also be noted. Almost all migrants from developing countries are highly concentrated in factory work as labourers, which is a part of the reason they are *invisible* to the public eye. Thais and Filipinos are concentrated in the service sector in close interaction with the Japanese people in daily life. They work in the commercial zones of Aichi, as well as Nagoya (Harada 2005: 40). In addition to these patterns of employment of formal migrants are those concerning informal residents and workers, or *overstayers*. How specific groups of migrants experience human insecurity may differ according to their legal status but it is noteworthy that they all rely on self-help organizations to achieve daily needs, sometimes with the involvement

of the local government and actors in the Japanese civil society.

Rather than providing an in-depth ethnographic analysis of the variations of human insecurity experience in this region, the intention here is to highlight those aspects which help direct attention to the web of relationships shaping these experiences. Data obtained of two groups of immigrants – the Japanese-Brazilian and South Asian workers – help to illustrate how, under a specific legal and economic environment, social and cultural factors can propel and influence interactions in ways that affect insecurity in daily life for particular groups.

The situation of Japanese-Brazilian children in education was studied from October 2006 to June 2007 in Komaki City, an industrial city located in the suburbs of Nagoya in Aichi, using several methods (participatory observation, group and individual interviews and analysis of secondary materials).[28] The main findings suggest that Japanese-Brazilians with formal visa status who stay for a long period – even when they enjoy relatively stable economic positions – face problems regarding the education of their children, including learning languages (Japanese or Portuguese), school dropout and juvenile delinquency. Circular migration and job-hopping nationwide by the parents has brought about serious insecurity for the young generation.[29]

An important factor to be noted is that the principle of mandatory education applies only to Japanese nationals, and therefore the education of foreign children has not been regarded as an obligation of the state but as a favour (*onkei*) – despite Japan's ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1994 (Sakuma 2006). Foreign children have no guaranteed right to education.[30] Children of Japanese-Bra-

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27 For more information on the Japanese automobile industry and the Chubu region during the post-war period, see Jacobs (2003). See also the Japan Times online article: "Over the past few months, layoffs among foreigners nationwide, especially those who are temp workers, employed by auto parts manufacturing plants in the Kanto and Chubu regions, continue to grow as Toyota and other leading automobile firms struggle with declining demand. Many now out of work would return home if they could, but the rising cost of airplane tickets due to increased fuel surcharges makes it difficult.î See at: <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20081224f1.html> (24 Dec 2008).

28 Kenji Kimura conducted the field research in this section.

zilian parents who drop out of primary school have limited educational choices, and those who cannot gain substantial help from their parents often become isolated from Japanese society. Consequently, some have begun to commit crimes and eventually separate themselves from local society. With active support from the local government and NGOs (non-governmental organizations) some dropouts can now work in the Homi apartment complex,[31] also known as 'Little Brazil'.

Since many Japanese-Brazilians do not really rely on municipalities for support, self-help organizations have played an essential role in the education of their children. Volunteers have begun to offer Japanese and Portuguese language classes privately, not just for learning but also as a means for communicating and making friends. This is considered to be an effective way to curb child dropouts and juvenile delinquency. Currently only a few public schools accept these volunteer groups in Komaki but substantial progress has been made. In 2009 this city has become an official member of the *Council for Cities of Non-Japanese Residents,* which networks its member cities.[32] Until now, long-staying formal immigrants like the Japanese-Brazilians have not received a full-range of social support other than from self-help groups. Under the current system and policies they will have to continue living as secondary citizens or aliens, unless Japan makes a concerted effort to extend and ensure them equal rights. Paradoxically, problems of school dropout and juvenile delinquency have led to better communication between young people of both Japanese-Brazilian and Japanese origin.

Turning to the South Asian *overstayers* similar reliance on self-help groups is found plus a nebulous distinction between the legal and illegal. Those who participated in our interviews in 2006[33] invited us to their homes – old Japanese-style one-storey houses located near the firms where they worked. They prepared their stories before being interviewed because the moderator had told them our purpose in advance. While they read the stories we interjected with several questions. One of the informants, over 50 years old, was formerly a political leader back in his home country.[34] He had been working in Japan for 13 years in different places: factories for chemicals, printing, fertilizer and meat processing. At the time of the interview he was working at a factory producing car plastic parts in Aichi. His bad working conditions and struggles for just treatment were clearly a challenge to him. Here he notes:

> My worst experience was at a fertilizer factory. Our employer usually ordered us to work for 12 hours (8am-8pm) and once for 36 hours without any break! He criticized me for breaking bags when I carried them, so they reduced my wages (from $100 to $50 for a few weeks). I consulted a local labour union and brought my case to the local police station, which didn't arrest me for overstaying. We won the case. The brokers were not worth trusting; they acted in collusion with the employer.

29 The economic recession in 2008–2009 is changing their life plan drastically. The government support policy provides $300 per person for foreign workers of Japanese descent to return to their home country, plus $200 per dependent. "The policy was enacted in response to the waves of layoffs that have hit foreign-born workers as the economic situation worsens, and while it forbids re-entry to Japan there are many workers of Japanese descent who say they would like to come back once the economy gets back on track." And "According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), the prohibition on a return to Japan 'for the time being' is 'to prevent people of Japanese descent from using the support for short trips to their home countries'". This policy was introduced in April 2009, and many policy-makers and the Brazilians themselves are divided on this issue. See at: <http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/archive/news/2009/04/30/20090430p2a00m0na0020 00c.html> (5 May 2009).

30 Historically, this stems from the implementation of the Alien Registration Law when the San Francisco Peace Treaty took effect in 1952. Under this law, Korean and Taiwanese residents became disenfranchised of the Japanese nationality they had held during colonial rule, and were recognized as foreigners regardless of how long or how many generations they had lived in Japan (Douglass/Roberts 2000: 6). See also Yamanaka, Keiko, 2002: "Ana Bortz's Law Suit and Minority Rights in Japan", JPRI Working Paper No. 88, The University of San Francisco Centre for Pacific Rim, See at: <http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp88.html> (18 Aug 2007).

31 The Homi public apartment complex is located in Toyota City where the headquarters of the carmaker is located. The Homi is a place where Japanese-Brazilians go when they leave the factory, where their children return after school, a surrogate home away from home. See: Linger (2001).

32 Its member cities number 27, of which cities in Chubu account for 20: three in Gifu, seven in Shizuoka; six in Aichi; and three in Mie. See also the *Council* website at: <http://homepage2.nifty.com/shujutoshi/> (10 April 2010).

33 Professors Youngku Koh and Tatsuo Harada from Chubu University conducted these interviews.

34 For security reasons, the identities of informants are kept anonymous.

South Asian *overstayers* suggested that they often received as much in wage as their Japanese counterparts, but they felt more insecure and unjustly treated due to the lack of access to medical care and other pertinent social benefits. Some assert that the Japanese government knows of their expired residency permit. One respondent asked:

> Why don't Japanese employers officially request the authorities to allow them to hire foreign workers? They know about our presence. It is easy for them [employers] to report to the authorities after we worked for a few months without any official assistance. We easily fall sick because of bad working conditions. We are exploited.

Despite the lack of public medical services these *overstayers* have solicited contributions from their fellow nationals to donate medical machines to a hospital in their own country, for which they seemed very proud. Meetings of a self-help organization held in Aichi were attended by those with a formal status and *overstayers* – young and old, both male and female – suggesting that this group is organized, has no particular fear of the local police, is apparently familiar with the insufficient cooperation between immigration authorities and the local authority, and is aware that their presence, while considered 'illegal', is tolerated owing to the contributions they make to the local economy.

This nebulous distinction between legality and illegality also finds its expression in the ways firms employ *overstayers,* some of which encounter curious tactics of criminal networks or anti-migrant groups. According to one respondent who is director[35] of a firm that assembles interior part of automobiles, Toyota had long known that many undocumented foreign workers were employed in subcontracted factories. Despite this, Toyota continues to limit the prohibition of illegal employment of foreigners to only a few of its subcontractors. Our employer-respondent has devoted himself to evolving better working conditions for foreign workers (informal or formal). He has encountered curious manoeuvres of extortion.

> "I have heard of this one strange case about some factories being blackmailed by members of the Yakuza or rightwing organizations. They said, "We will inform the police or the immigration office that you're committing the illegal employment of foreign workers unless you pay an amount of money [meaning a few hundred thousand yen] as hush money." How could they learn about this secret? They waited outside the factory, met the foreign trainees after these had finished working overtime and asked them: "Hey guys, are you working very hard overtime?" The trainees, who aren't allowed legally to work overtime in their first year, trusting them, answered, "Yes, we are tired!", or something along this line. This is proof of violating the law, which those groups use to blackmail factory directors."

According to him, cases of foreign trainees running away from companies are not uncommon. The decision to extend the contract terms is generally based on a company's interests, and not those of foreign trainees. An extension period without breaks can be too long for some trainees; those who have 'escaped' from the company had relied on a friend or someone whom they knew they can contact. Escaping these dire working/training conditions only meant one thing – that they have ventured into the illegal zone of categorically being labelled as *overstayers.*

In sum, the variations of human insecurity discerned show multi-causes and intersecting aspects that have produced distinctive experiences, although these are mainly related to the absence of a social policy (education and medical care) for the migrants and a work environment favouring the interests of producers. In this respect it is important to point out that to achieve human security goals would first require a social policy that is not restricted to national membership. Mutual support self-help groups formed among those having the same ethnicity, sometimes with enabling action by the local government, are the main avenues through which the immigrants receive help. New dynamics in personal and collective interactions emerging at a local level seems to aim for these goals, even if they currently are very weak. Local communities have shown a more open attitude to multi-ethnic realities; yet local restructuring and shrinking public support do place limits on the possibility of extending social policy to the new immigrants. Despite a more open attitude to multi-ethnic realities among some people at the local level, the absence of a wider public support places limits on the possibility of and opportunities for extending social policy to the new immigrants. The dialectic of inclusion and exclusion, or association and dissociation, experienced by different ethnic groups should be considered in the broader context of the transformation of local society in Japan.

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35 It had been very difficult to have contact with employers of foreign workers, especially undocumented. We interviewed an employer at several meetings held in 2005 and 2006 who has long hired many Asian workers: informally at first and now formally. This case is special in that the respondent is married to someone who had been a foreign intern at his factory. He thus seems to have a deep compassion regarding the working conditions of foreign interns.

17.3.3   Transformation of the Local Public Sphere

In Japan, those accepting the neoliberal world of fragmented labour have accused foreigners of being potential opponents to the social order, branding them as criminals. Neighbourhood-watch groups and security cameras have increasingly become common due to this fear of 'otherness'.[36] Japanese discourses and policy on immigrant control presuppose a 'preventive public security' in which foreigners are viewed as potential criminals and terrorists – just as human security discourses in Japanese ODA proclaim preventive diplomacy and development.

A missing element in this perspective is how neoliberal deregulation has reshaped many local communities and generated different forms of insecurity for the local population. One example of the destructive impact on local life space is the Large Scale Retail Stores Law in 2000, which permitted large chain stores and shopping malls to open on every corner of local cities. This suburbanization led to the closing down of local shopping streets due to competition. Homogeneous suburban spaces for consumers became dominant nationwide. With local businesses being hollowed out, communities have become more competitive as well as security-oriented.

Spatial homogenization has made every local life space unappealing for young and old generations. The elderly, in particular, lost their community – as they knew it. For them, neighbourly and family relations have become more inaccessible. For young people who have been disassociated from mainstream society (as well as gangster groups formed for other reasons) this context provides a sense of legitimacy for their hostile reaction against the presence of the 'Others' in what they perceived to be 'their' space (or the life spaces on the edge of mainstream society shared also by the unemployed and homeless). The presence of foreign trainees, *Nikkeijin* and undocumented migrants, employed by many manufacturers and agricultural producers in suburban areas, has in many ways intensified this antagonism. The 'unease' suffered by some Japanese citizens who feel discarded (because they cannot cope with the uncertainty of everyday life) has been fuelled by the "securitization" of immigration policy (Bigo 2002: 65). This unease is not only psychological, but also reflects the structural unease in a 'risk society' – framed by neoliberal discourse which always associates 'freedom' at its limits with danger and in/security (Bigo 2002).

Furthermore, local provision of social services has been deteriorating due to the financial burdens placed on local governments, thus further intensifying the 'felt' insecurities among local citizens. In the name of autonomy and decentralization, local governments are required to become independent from the central government's budget allocation. Many local governments suffer from financial collapse, and must raise taxes and social insurance contributions, including care insurance. The elderly take such a major hit that some are forced to leave their hometowns to escape the increasing financial burden. More and more local public hospitals are being closed or consolidated for financial reasons.

The Act on Assurance of Sound Financial Status of Local Governments (2007) defines the organization for early correction as a 1st step; and fiscal reconstruction as the 2nd step in accordance with one of four indicators: 1) real deficit ratio; 2) consolidated loss ratio; 3) real debt expenditure ratio; and 4) fiscal burden in future. The second indicator is of special importance. This act consolidates general with special accounts of local finance for correction and reconstruction – the latter account includes public expenses, some of which are related to the domain of social policy and tend to build up deficits. When the indicator falls below the mark, the local government has to show budget austerity to the central government. This stimulates the financial and organizational restructuring of local care systems such as hospitals.

The much discussed option to import foreign care workers under the *economic partnership agreements* (EPA) between the Philippines and Indonesia may serve to illustrate the messy impact of this Act on local society. Formally, these agreements were based on the reason that there is an insufficient supply of Japanese medical workers nationwide. Yet in 2008 and 2009 the numbers of actually accepted nurses and care workers were far below initially planned targets, mainly because of the lack of systematic acceptance mechanisms; this in addition to the collapse of local medical care systems and worsening working conditions of care workers generally.[37] The national perspective does not seem sensitive to the fact that financial tightening policy developed by the central government does limit the room for local govern-

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36 One of Japan's nationwide surveillance systems is called the 'N-system' in the name of crime control (first introduced in 1987). It has been set up at more than 400 points of arterial roadways and automatically records information regarding the car registration number, the driver and other passengers.

ments to accommodate foreign workers who come to Japan under terms of bilateral agreements. The post-war social welfare system in Japan is based on local community organizations (such as the Japan National Council of Social Welfare) thus once foreign care workers arrive the local organizations must be responsible for them, as has been the case for foreign trainees (Harada 2007: 68). Financial tightening means a reduction of local capacity to comply with established standards, creating a situation in which invited guest workers are not properly protected; and their presence has come to be seen by citizens as an impingement on the local life spaces over which they have a sense of 'ownership'. This domestic security tension is yet to be taken up in Japanese ODA discourses on human security.

17.4   Reformulating the Referent of Human Security

What are the key elements of human security conception and practice, following the discussion above? The first element is that the notion of human insecurity is a less contestable normative concept than human security as formally defined; thus we can more easily go beyond the formal definition and identify forms of human insecurity experienced by individuals and groups within a specific context of transnational connections and multi-local livelihoods (Truong/Gasper 2008). In other words human insecurity allows a more embedded understanding and a theorizing enriched by on-site experiences and life stories. Beyond the international migration management perspective the existential sufferings of some specific immigrant groups in Japan should be researched in ways that reveal the new local dialectical interactions on 'security'. This helps illuminate the rift between official discourses on human security under ODA and those on public security under domestic immigrant control.

The second element is that 'people on the move' represent one of the most significant individual and collective living proofs of transnational networks, through which forms of human insecurity arise and spread in a mode that connects different regions, localities and nations. If this interconnectivity is ignored, the policy orientation of universalistic human

security (presented in UNDP's 1994 report) remains within the expedient policy talk of the distant 'Human' versus the proximate 'Other'.

The third element is that the dichotomy between the definition of human security (as "freedom from fear and want") and the policy orientation of "protection and empowerment" (first chapter of the Human Security Commission Report) should be overcome. The former is embedded in the traditional framework of national security and development policy, and the latter is directed at the improvement of the living conditions of vulnerable people in developing countries.[38] Instead of clinging to these respective definitions one should comprehend the historical development of three interrelated security concepts – national, social and human security – and their historical constructions. The problem is how these seemingly different concepts of security can be bridged in a positive way. That is the core theoretical question. In Japan, social security has developed with national security and national integration since the Second World War. Human security, however, belongs to an age of "post-national membership" (Soysal 1994: 3), and is often not based upon the universalistic human rights as formally proposed (Castles and Davidson 2000: 17–19) but upon more contextual realities. The concept of human security should be made more sensitive to contextual social interactions.

The fourth element is to reconsider the questions of 'who is human?' and 'what is humanity?' within the concept of human security. Arnold Gehlen views the nature of humanity as fragile and vulnerable, due to neoteny[39] (born to be powerless) and the lack of a set of instincts to adapt itself to the natural environment – unlike other animals. Thus he called man and woman 'deficient beings'. Instead of a natural and strong action-programme based upon instincts, humanity is equipped with learning abilities and has built institutions like language, technology and culture (Gehlen 1988). Recognizing this fundamental powerlessness of human existence is vital to acknowledge the capability and human need to care for, and to ac-

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37 See at: <http://mdn.mainichi.jp/perspectives/news/20090516p2a00m0na013000c.html>, (20 May 2009): *The Mainichi Daily News*; see also: Harada (2007); Onuki (2009).

38 For a narrow conception of human security, see MacFarlane and Khong (2006: 251). They claim, "it is also the case that the 'security' in social security has little analytical function. The more widely used descriptors of the programme are 'social insurance' and 'social welfare'". In their conception the main target of human security is direct violence. As a result, structural and cultural violence (Galtung 1990) are missing from their depiction.

39 Neoteny is a kind of *pedomorphosis* in development biology.

cept care from 'others' as a vital core of 'being human'.[40] Societal institutions built on the recognition of such caring interaction can be more open and help make life more secure. Extending feminist knowledge to human security, Truong sheds fresh light on an ontology of relational self, care and human security. "Built on a 'relational ontology' care offers an alternate understanding of social reality. ...the constitution of each and every entity in the human-scale reality is made up of a nexus of relationships...and mutual constitution. Caring for the self in this regard also means an openness to 'otherness'" (Truong 2009b: 19). Clarifying the relationship between the ethics of care and human security, she writes:

> Concerns about the narrow understanding of group rights and about a singular understanding of identity require security to be more epistemologically grounded and rooted in particular geo-political contexts. The demand for such 'situated' understanding and action does not imply a whole rejection of universal norms, rather, a more reflexive approach to: (a) the existing institutions; (b) their contextual performance; and (c) their capacity to pursue (or dislocate) human security goals.... In this vein, the ethics of care can strengthen a vision on human security, as it accords significance to diversity, particularity and context (Truong 2009b: 21–22).

Thus, though we may find the agency of migrants in Japan very weak, their resiliency through caring for each other remains the key to their survival.

17.5   Conclusion

The long-standing fragmented and dual labour markets in Japan have been deepened by a neoliberal deregulative capitalist regime. This has affected Japanese nationals and immigrants simultaneously, bringing them into competition and antagonistic interactions. In addition *selective and exclusive* immigrant control policies, and the deepening of concerns for public security, have placed the onus on migrants, resulting in practices that place them in a zone of nonexistence and consequently enhancing their insecurities outside the boundaries of the law and the public sphere. This is in sharp contrast to the Japanese ODA discourse on human security which promotes the *inclusion* of all

vulnerable people in developed countries or conflict areas.

The security dilemma between the majority and minority communities in Japan is worsening with the economic recession. Multi-ethnic Japan is of a local nature; so are its problems. In this respect the human insecurity of migrant workers within Japan can be overcome by making human security thinking more socially sensitive to embrace all people living and working in Japan, moving beyond national membership and paying particular attention to the specific realities at the local level. The challenge now is to build a new form of solidarity based upon a new contextual post-national platform, working with local membership groups in the name of human security to overcome social and economic turmoil in realistic ways and promote a shift in the national position from below.

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40 According to Roach, "caring is the mode of human being" and it is "the most common, authentic criterion of humanness" (Roach 1987: 2). As Gaylin mentioned, "powerlessness, care and survival are interconnected" (Gaylin 1976: 20).