

Declarative Network Verification

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Abstract. In this paper, we present our initial design and implementation of a *declarative network verifier (DNV)*. *DNV* utilizes *theorem proving*, a well established verification technique where logic-based *axioms* that automatically capture network semantics are generated, and a user-driven proof process is used to establish network correctness properties. *DNV* takes as input declarative networking specifications written in the Network Datalog (*NDlog*) query language, and maps that automatically into logical *axioms* that can be directly used in existing theorem provers to validate protocol correctness. *DNV* is a significant improvement compared to existing use case of theorem proving which typically require several man-months to construct the system specifications. Moreover, *NDlog*, a high-level specification, whose semantics are precisely compiled into *DNV* without loss, can be directly executed as implementations, hence bridging specifications, verification, and implementation. To validate the use of *DNV*, we present case studies using *DNV* in conjunction with the PVS theorem prover to verify routing protocols, including eventual properties of protocols in dynamic settings.

Keywords: Declarative networking, network protocol verification, domain-specific languages, theorem proving.

1 Introduction

In recent years, we have witnessed a proliferation of new overlay networks [24] that use the existing Internet to enable deployable network evolution and introduce new services. Concurrently, as sophisticated, bandwidth-intensive, and even mission-critical services are being deployed over heterogeneous network infrastructure, there is increased demand for new network routing protocols that can flexibly adapt to a wide range of variability in network connectivity and data traffic patterns. This has cumulated into recent efforts at clean-slate efforts aimed at redesigning the Internet.

Given the proliferation of new architectures and protocols, there is a growing consensus on the need for formal software tools and programming frameworks that can facilitate the design, implementation, and verification of new protocols. This has led to several recent proposals broadly classified as: (1) *algebraic and*

logic frameworks [11,9] that enable protocol correctness in the design phase; (2) *testing platforms* [16,27] that provide mechanisms for runtime verification and distributed replay, and (3) *programming toolkits* [8,14] that enable network protocols to be specified, implemented, and model-checked.

In this paper, we present our initial design and implementation of a *declarative network verifier (DNV)*. Our work is a significant step towards *bridging* network specifications, protocol verification, and implementation within a common language and system. *DNV* achieves this unified capability via the use of *declarative networking* [20,19,18], a declarative domain-specific approach for specifying and implementing network protocols, and *theorem proving*, a well established verification technique based on logical reasoning.

In declarative networking, network protocols are specified using a declarative logic-based query language called *Network Datalog (NDlog)*. In prior work, it has been shown that traditional routing protocols can be specified in a few lines of declarative code [20], and complex protocols such as Chord DHT [31] in orders of magnitude less code [19] compared to traditional imperative implementations. This compact and high-level specifications enables rapid prototype development, ease of customization, optimizability, and the potentiality for protocol verification. When executed, these declarative networks result in efficient implementations, as demonstrated by the *P2* declarative networking system [1].

Recent significant advances in model checking of network protocol implementations include *MaceMC* [13] and *CMC* [7]. Compared to these proposals, *DNV* has the advantage that it achieves complete verification for networks of arbitrary size, a long-standing challenge in any practical network verification system. Incomplete verification is a common limitation in *MaceMC* and *CMC* due to the the state-explosion problem, particularly when used to verify large networks with complex protocol behavior. In addition, since *DNV* directly verifies declarative networking specifications, an explicit model extraction step via execution exploration is not required.

This paper makes the following two contributions. First, we propose *DNV*, a declarative network verifier that leverages declarative networking’s connection to logic programming to automatically compile high-level *NDlog* program into formal specifications as *axioms* without semantics loss, which can be further used in a theorem prover to validate protocols. A semi-automated proof guided by the user is then carried out and mechanically checked in a general-purpose theorem prover to establish the protocol correctness properties. High-level *NDlog* programs that have been verified in *DNV* can be directly executed as implementations, hence bridging specifications and implementations within a unified declarative framework.

Second, we demonstrate that *DNV* enables the verification of network protocols in *dynamic settings*, where protocols continuously update network state based on incoming network events. *DNV* achieves this via its use of declarative networking which incorporates the notion of periodic *soft-state* [26] maintenance of network state into its query language and semantics. Soft state is central and critical in networking implementations because in a very simple manner it provides eventually correct semantics in the face of reordered messages, node disconnection, and other unpredictable occurrences.

DNV aims to provide a practical solution towards network protocol verification, one that achieves a unifying framework that combines specifications, verification, and implementation. Our work is a significant improvement over existing usage of theorem proving [12,10] which typically require several man-months to develop the system specifications, a step that *DNV* reduces to a few hours through the use of declarative networking. To our best knowledge, *DNV* is also one of the first attempts at using theorem proving to verify eventual semantics of protocols in dynamic settings.

2 Background: Declarative Networking

In this section, we will provide a brief overview of declarative networking. Interested readers are referred to references [20,19,18,17] for more details.

2.1 Datalog Language

Declarative networks are specified using *Network Datalog (NDlog)*, a distributed logic-based recursive query language first introduced in the database community for querying network graphs. *NDlog* is primarily a distributed variant of Datalog. We first provide a short review of Datalog, following the conventions in Ramakrishnan and Ullman’s survey [25]. A Datalog program consists of a set of declarative *rules*. Each rule has the form $p \text{ :- } q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n$, which can be read informally as “ q_1 and q_2 and \dots and q_n implies p ”. Here, p is the *head* of the rule, and q_1, q_2, \dots, q_n is a list of *literals* that constitutes the *body* of the rule. Literals are either *predicates* with *attributes* (which are bound to variables or constants by the query), or boolean expressions that involve function symbols (including arithmetic) applied to attributes. In Datalog, rule predicates can be defined with other predicates in a cyclic fashion to express recursion. The order in which the rules are presented in a program is semantically immaterial; likewise, the order predicates appear in a rule is not semantically meaningful. Commas are interpreted as logical conjunctions (AND). The names of predicates, function symbols, and variable names begin with an upper letter, while constants names begin with an lowercase letter. An optional **Query** rule specifies the output of interest (i.e. result tuples).

2.2 Path-Vector Protocol

We present an example *NDlog* program that implements the *path-vector* protocol [23], a standard textbook route protocol used for computing paths between any two nodes in the network.

```
p1 path(@S,D,P,C) :- link(@S,D,C), P=f_init(S,D).
p2 path(@S,D,P,C) :- link(@S,Z,C1), path(@Z,D,P2,C2), C=C1+C2,
    P=f_concatPath(Z,P2), f_inPath(P2,S)=false.
p3 bestPathCost(@S,D,min<C>):-path(@S,D,P,C).
p4 bestPath(@S,D,P,C) :- bestPathCost(@S,D,C), path(@S,D,P,C).
Query bestPath(@S,D,P,C).
```

The program takes as input `link(@S,D,C)` tuples, where each tuple corresponds to a copy of an entry in the neighbor table, and represents an edge from the node itself (`S`) to one of its neighbors (`D`) of cost `c`. *NDlog* supports a *location specifier* in each predicate, expressed with `@` symbol followed by an attribute. This attribute is used to denote the source location of each corresponding tuple. For example, `link` tuples are stored based on the value of the `S` field.

Rules `p1-p2` recursively derive `path(@S,D,P,C)` tuples, where each tuple represents the fact that the path from `S` to `D` is via the path `P` with a cost of `C`. Rule `p1` computes one-hop reachability trivially given the neighbor set of `S` stored in `link(@S,D,C)`. Rule `P2` computes transitive reachability as follows: if there exists a link from `S` to `Z` with cost `C1`, and `Z` knows about a shortest path `P2` to `D` with cost `C2`, then transitively, `S` can reach `D` via the path `f_concatPath(Z,P2)` with cost `C1+C2`. Note that `p1-p2` also utilizes two list manipulation functions to maintain path vector `p`: `f_init(S,D)` initializes a path vector with two elements `S` and `D`, while `f_concatPath(Z,P2)` prepends `Z` to path vector `P2`.

Rules `p3-p4` take as input `hop` tuples generated by rules `p1-p2`, and then derive the hop along the path with the minimal cost for each source/destination pair. The output of the program is the set of `bestPathHop(@S,D,Z,C)` tuples, where each tuple stores the next hop `Z` along the shortest path from `S` to `D`. To prevent computing paths with cycles, an extra predicate `f_inPath(P,S) = false` is used in rule `p2`, where the function `f_inPath(P,S)` returns true if node `S` is in the path vector `P`.

The execution model of declarative networks is based on a distributed variant of the standard evaluation technique for Datalog programs that is commonly known as *semi-naïve* (SN) evaluation [18], with modifications to enable pipelined asynchronous evaluation suited to a distributed setting. Reference [18] provides details on the implementation and execution model of declarative networking.

For the purposes of formal verification, we do not consider the location specifiers within the proof. This does not affect the program in terms of the set of eventual facts being generated but does affect the notion of data distribution. Our extended technical report [32] elaborate this issue in greater detail.

3 Overview of DNV

Figure 1 provides an overview of *DNV*'s basic approach towards unifying specifications, verification, and implementation within a common declarative framework. *DNV* takes as input *NDlog* program specifications of the declarative protocol (see Section 2 for an example). Since most theorem provers leverage type information, *DNV* further includes a *Type Schema* with the *NDlog* program specifications. This is not unlike a database-like schema storing the attribute types of all network state being used.

In order to carry out the formal verification process, the *NDlog* programs and schema information are automatically compiled into formal specifications recognizable by a standard theorem prover (e.g. PVS [21], Coq [3]) using the *axiom generator*. As depicted in the left-part of Figure 1, At the same time, the protocol designer specifies high-level invariant properties of the protocol to be checked via two mechanisms: invariants can be written directly as theorems into




Fig. 1. DNV overview block diagram. Arrows denote flow of information.

the theorem prover, or expressed as *NDlog* rules which are then automatically translated into theorems using the axiom generator. The first approach increases the expressiveness of invariant properties, where one can reason with invariants that can be only expressible in higher order logic. The second approach has restricted expressiveness based on *NDlog*'s use of Datalog, but has the added advantage that the same properties expressed in *NDlog* can be verified by both theorem prover and at runtime.

From the perspective of network designers, as depicted in the left part of Figure 1, they reason about their protocols using the high-level protocol specifications and invariant properties. The *NDlog* high-level specifications are directly executed and also proved within the theorem prover. Any errors detected in the theorem prover can be corrected by changing the *NDlog* specifications. Our initial *DNV* prototype uses the PVS theorem prover, due to its substantial support for proof strategies which significantly reduce the time required in the actual proof process. However, the techniques describe in this paper are agnostic to other theorem provers. We have also validated some of the verification presented in this paper using the Coq [3] prover.

To illustrate the verification process, we step through the path-vector protocol example, shown in Section 2. For ease of exposition, we defer the treatment of soft-state derivations and events to Section 4, focusing instead on traditional *hard-state* data (with infinite lifetimes) that are valid until explicitly deleted.

3.1 Axiom Generation: From *NDlog* Rules to PVS Axioms

The first step in *DNV* involves the *automatic* generation of PVS *formalization* (or axioms) directly from *NDlog* rules. Based on the proof-theoretic semantics of Datalog [30], there is a natural and automatic mapping from *NDlog* rules to PVS axioms.¹ Before showing the actual PVS encoding for the path-vector protocol, it is informative to understand the proof-theoretic semantics of **p1** and **p2** as inference rules used in proof system:

The inference rule **p1** expresses the logical statement $\forall(S, D, P, C).link(S, D, C) \wedge P = f_{init}(S, D) \implies path(S, D, P, C)$.

¹ The equivalence of *NDlog*'s proof-theoretic semantics and operational semantics guarantees that *DNV* is sound in the sense that, the correctness property established by *DNV* corresponds precisely to the operational semantics of *NDlog* execution.

Rule **p2** is slightly more complex as some attribute variables do not appear in the resulting head. The general technique to express these variables is in terms of existential quantification. Accordingly, rule **p2** expresses the logical statement that $\forall(S, D, P, C). \exists(C_1, C_2, Z, P_2). \text{link}(S, Z, C_1) \wedge \text{bestPath}(Z, D, P_2, C_2) \wedge C = C_1 + C_2 \wedge P = \text{f_concatPath}(Z, P_2) \implies \text{path}(S, D, P, C)$.

From the above logical statements, *DNV* generates the following axioms:

```

path_generate: AXIOM
FORALL (S,D,Z:Node)(C:Metric)(P:Path):(link(S,D,C) AND P=f_init(S,D)) OR
  ((EXISTS (P2:Path)(C1,C2:Metric):(link(S,Z,C1) AND bestPath(Z,D,P2,C2)
    AND C=C1+C2 AND P=f_concatPath(Z,P2))) =>path(S,D,P,C)
path_close: AXIOM
FORALL (S,D,Z:Node)(C:Metric)(P):path(S,D,P,C)=>
  ((link(S,D,C) AND P=f_init(S,D)) OR (EXISTS (Z:Node)(P,P2:Path)
    (C1,C2:Metric): (link(S,Z,C1) AND bestPath(Z,D,P2,C2) AND C=C1+C2
    AND P=f_concatPath(Z,P2))))

```

The first `path_generate` axiom is generated in a straightforward manner from rules **p1** and **p2**, where the logical `OR` indicates that `path` facts can be generated from either rule. The `path_close` axiom indicates that the `path` tuple is the smallest set derived by the two rules, ensuring that these axioms automatically generated in *DNV* correctly reflected the minimal model of *NDlog* semantics. The list manipulation functions `f_concatPath` and `f_init` are predefined from PVS primitive types. We omit this discussion due to space constraints.

PVS provides *inductive definitions* that allows the two axioms above to be written in a more concise and logically equivalent form:

```

path(S,D,(P: Path),C): INDUCTIVE bool =
  (link(S,D,C) AND P=f_init(S,D) AND Z=D) OR (EXISTS (C1,C2:Metric)
  (Z2:Node) (P2:Path): link(S,Z,C1) AND path(Z,D,P2,C2) AND
  C=C1+C2 AND P=f_concatPath(S,P2) AND f_inPath(S,P2)=FALSE)

```

The universal quantifiers over the attributes to `path` (i.e. `S,D,Z...`) are implicitly embedding and existential quantifiers such as `C1` and `C2` are explicitly stated. *DNV* axiom generator always produces this inductive definition, and employs the axiom form only in the presence of mutual dependencies among the head predicates which makes PVS inductive definition impossible. Also note that the use of `f_inPath(S,P2)=FALSE` constraint prevents loops in `path`.

Accordingly, *NDlog* rules **p3**–**p4** are automatically compiled into PVS formalization in a similar way:

```

bestPathCost(S,D,min_C): INDUCTIVE bool =
  (EXISTS (P:Path): path(S,D,P,min_C)) AND (FORALL (C2:Metric):
  (EXISTS (P2:Path): path(S,D,P2,C2)) => min_C<=C2)
bestPath(S,D,P,C): INDUCTIVE bool =
  bestPathCost(S,D,C) AND path(S,D,P,C)

```

In addition to the above PVS encoding for *NDlog* rules, type definitions are produced automatically from the database schema information. For instance, given a database schema definition for `link(src:string, dst:string, metric:integer)` the corresponding PVS type declaration is `link: [Node,Node,Metric -> bool]` where `Node` is declared as a string type and `Metric` as an integer type.

3.2 Proving Route Optimality in the Path-Vector Protocol

The next step involves proving actual properties in PVS. Properties are expressed as PVS *theorems* and serve as *starting points* (or *goals*) in the proof construction process. We illustrate this process by verifying the *route optimality* property in the path-vector protocol expressed in the following PVS `bestPathStrong` theorem:

`bestPathStrong`: THEOREM

```
FORALL (S,D:Node) (C:Metric) (P:Path): bestPath(S,D,P,C) =>
  NOT (EXISTS (C2:Metric) (P2:Path): path(S,D,P2,C2) AND C2<C)
```

The above theorem specifies that for a given `bestPath(S,D,P,C)` from `S` to `D`, `P` is the *optimal* path, i.e. there does not exist another path `P2` from `S` to `D` with lower cost `C2`.

Given the above theorem, one can then utilize PVS to carry out the proof process. PVS performs the proof in a *goal-directed* fashion, in this case, starting from the `bestPathStrong` goal, and then recursively reducing it to subgoals until all subgoals are trivially true. PVS has approximately 100 built-in proof strategies, of which 20 are usually sufficient to automate a majority of the proof effort. We display the strawman proof process that does not utilize any user-defined proof strategies specific to declarative network beyond PVS's built-in proof commands:

```
("" (skosimp*) (expand bestPath) (prop) (expand bestPathCost)
(prop) (skosimp*) (inst -2 C2!1) (grind))
```

The proof script reflects the interactive proof process in PVS directed by the user, where PVS takes care of all low level proof details and allows the user to concentrate on high-level proof strategies. Without going into details of each PVS command, we provide a high-level intuition of each step. The first command `skosimp*` performs repeated skolemization that removes universal quantifiers `S,D,C` and `P` in the theorem. Skolemization is generally the first proof step to try in proving any universal quantified theorems. The subsequent two `expand` commands are used to unfold the earlier inductive definition shown in 3.1, each followed by `prop` that performs propositional simplification. Then `skosimp*` is employed to remove universal quantifiers and `inst` to instantiate the existential quantified variable with proper instance (`C2!1`). The rest of the proof is complete by using PVS's `grind` command which performs skolemization, heuristic instantiation, propositional simplification and decision procedures for linear arithmetic and equality.

Once the above proof script is supplied, PVS requires only fraction of a second to carry out the actual proof. When the proof is completed, it covers *all* instances of the network. This is in contrast to model checking, which explores only specific network instances. In addition to proving the route optimality property of the declarative path-vector protocol, we have proven properties such as the potential cycles in the protocol if the cycle check (enforced using the `f_inPath` function) is removed.

The strawman proof process here is restricted to PVS's built-in proof commands, and does not utilize any user-defined proof strategies that exploits domain-specific information. As a result, the proof requires an expert in declarative network and theorem proving. Given that our target users are network

designers, the proof process should ideally be automated. In reference [32], we discuss the potential of using domain-specific PVS strategies tailored to declarative networking to support the proof construction.

4 Soft-State, Events and Network Dynamics

Up to this point, we have limited our verification to a subset of the complete *NDlog* language by omitting the treatment of *soft-state tuples* (i.e. *predicates*). This simplification enables us to generate axioms recognizable by a theorem prover directly from *NDlog* programs without having to worry about the semantics of time and data expiration. In practice, soft-state data and events are central in network protocols, and adopted in many declarative network implementations. In the rest of this section, we will introduce the soft-state model in declarative networking, describe how rules with soft-state predicates (referred as *soft-state rules*) can be verified in a similar fashion as shown in Section 3, by first rewriting soft-state rules into logically equivalent rules with only hard-state predicates (i.e. *hard-state rules*).

4.1 Soft-State Model in Declarative Networking

Declarative networking incorporates support for *soft-state* [26] derivations commonly used in networks. In the soft state storage model, all data (input and derivations) has an explicit “time to live” (TTL) or lifetime, and all expired tuples must be explicitly reinserted with their latest values and a new TTL or they are deleted.

To support soft-state, an additional language feature is added to the *NDlog* language, in the form of a `materialize` [19] declaration at the beginning of each *NDlog* program that specifies the TTL of predicates. For example, the expression `materialized(link, 10, keys(1, 2))` specifies that the `link` tuple is stored at a table with primary key set to the first and second attributes (denoted by `keys(1, 2)`) and that each `link` tuple has a lifetime of 10 seconds². If the TTL is set to infinity, the predicate will be treated as *hard-state*.

The soft-state storage semantics are as follows. When a tuple is derived, if there exists another tuple with the same primary key but differs on other attributes, an *update* occurs, in which the new tuple replaces the previous one. On the other hand, if the two tuples are identical, a *refresh* occurs, in which the existing tuple is extended by its TTL.

For a given predicate, in the absence of any `materialize` declaration, it is treated as an *event* predicate with lifetime set to zero. Since events are not stored, they are primarily used to trigger other rules or in response to network events. Reference [17] provides more details on how soft-state storage model and events are implemented within a declarative networking engine.

² Following the conventions of the *P2* declarative networking system, attribute 0 is reserved for the predicate name.

4.2 Soft-State to Hard-State Rewrite in *DNV*

The rule rewrite consists of two steps. First, all soft-state predicates of the form $p(\dots)$ where “ \dots ” refer to predicate arguments, are translated into an equivalent hard-state predicate of the form $p(\dots, Tc, Tl)$, where the additional attributes Tc and Tl denote the creation time and lifetime of each tuple p respectively. This initial rewrite step makes explicit the creation time and lifetime by adopting Tc , Tl in each soft-state predicate. Event predicates are rewritten in a similar fashion. However, Tl is omitted since events have zero lifetime by definition.

After the first step, additional constraints reflecting soft-state semantics are added to ensure that all soft-state facts only process with other facts valid within the same window period of time, as expressed in terms of constraints over Tc and Tl . Consider soft-state rules of the form, $e : -e_1, s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n$. This rule triggered by input event e_1 with creation time Tc_{e_1} , takes as input both the triggering event and several soft-state predicates s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n , and generates a event. The rewritten equivalent hard-state rules is of the form:

$$e(\dots, Tc_{e_1}) : -e_1(\dots, Tc_{e_1}), s_1(\dots, Tc_{s_1}, Tl_{s_1}), s_2(\dots, Tc_{s_2}, Tl_{s_2}), \dots, s_n(\dots, Tc_{s_n}, Tl_{s_n}), \\ Tc_{s_1} < Tc_{e_1} \leq Tc_{s_1} + tl_{s_1}, \dots, Tc_{s_n} < Tc_{e_1} \leq Tc_{s_n} + Tl_{s_n}.$$

Since the event e_1 directly triggers the derivation of e , the creation time of the derived event e is set to be the same as that of the input e_1 (i.e. Tc_{e_1}). An additional n constraints $Tc_{s_i} < Tc_{e_1} \leq Tc_{s_i} + Tl_{s_i}$ are added to ensure that only soft-states s_i with valid time interval $[Tc_{s_i}, Tc_{s_i} + Tl_{s_i}]$ that always overlaps with Tc_{e_1} are used to generate e .

Another possible class of soft-state rules are of the form, $e : -s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n$, where an event e is generated by sets of soft-states. The main difference compared to the previous soft-state rule is the lack of a triggering event. The rewritten hard-state rule is of the form:

$$e(\dots, Tc) : -s_1(\dots, Tc_{s_1}, Tl_{s_1}), s_2(\dots, Tc_{s_2}, Tl_{s_2}), \dots, s_n(\dots, Tc_{s_n}, Tl_{s_n}), Tc = \max < Tc_{s_1}, \\ Tc_{s_2}, \dots, Tc_{s_n} >, Tc_{s_1} < Tc \leq Tc_{s_1} + tl_{s_1}, \dots, Tc_{s_n} < Tc \leq Tc_{s_n} + Tl_{s_n}.$$

Note that Tc is set to the *max* of all possible creation times of the input soft-state predicates (since the derived fact is true only when all the input facts are present).

The same rewrite process applies to rules that derive soft-state predicates s instead of events e . The main difference is an additional Tl attribute to s in the rewritten rule. This Tl attribute is set to the declared lifetime in corresponding table for s (indicated in the `materialize` statement). We omit the presentation due to space constraints.

5 Case Study: Distance-Vector in a Dynamic Network

In this section, we illustrate the capability of *DNV* in reasoning about eventual semantics of protocols in dynamic networks. We base our illustration on the verification of the *distance-vector* protocol, commonly used for computing shortest

routes in a network. Due to space constraints, we are not able to show exhaustively all the PVS specifications and proofs. The interested reader is referred to reference [6] for the complete PVS axioms, theorems, and proofs.

5.1 Distance Vector Protocol Specification in *NDlog*

The following soft-state *NDlog* program implements the distance-vector protocol, computing best paths with least cost:

```
materialize(hop,10,keys(1,2,3)).
materialize(bestHop,10,keys(1,2)).
materialize(bestHopCost,10,keys(1,2)).
dv1 hop(@S,D,D,C) :- link(@S,D,C).
dv2 hop(@S,D,Z,C) :- hopMsg(@S,D,Z,C).
dv3 bestHopCost(@S,D,min<C>) :- hop(@S,D,Z,C).
dv4 bestHop(@S,D,Z,C) :- bestHopCost(@S,D,C), hop(@S,D,Z,C).
dv5 hopMsg(@N,D,S,C1+C2) :- periodic(@S,5), bestHop(@S,D,Z,C1), link(@S,N,C2).
Query bestHop(@S,D,Z,C)
```

This program derives soft-state predicates `hop`, `bestHop`, and `bestHopCost` with TTL of 10 seconds, and an event predicate `hopMsg`, and takes as input `link` tuples which represents dynamic network topology and is implemented by some periodic neighbor maintenance mechanism [6].

First, rules `dv1-dv2` derive `hop(@S,D,Z,C)` tuples, where `Z` denotes the next hop (instead of the entire path) along the path from `S` to `D`. Second, the protocol is driven by the periodic generation of `hopMsg(@S,D,Z,C)` in rule `dv5`, where each node `S` advertises its knowledge of all possible best hops table (`bestHop`) to all its neighbors. Note that bidirectional connectivity and cost is assumed. Each node receives the advertisements as `hopMsg` events (rule `dv2`) which it then stores locally in its `hop` table. Finally, Rules `dv3-dv4` compute the best hop for each source/destination pair in a similar fashion as the earlier path-vector protocol.

Unlike the path-vector protocol presented in Section 2.2, the distance-vector protocol computes only the *next hop* along the best path, and hence does not store the entire path between any two nodes.

5.2 Soft-State Rewrite and Automated Axiom Generation

The following *NDlog* rules `dv1-dv6` shows the equivalent hard-state rules after applying the soft-state rewrite process described in Section 4.2.

```
dv1 hop(@S,D,D,C,Tc,10) :- link(@S,D,C,Tc,10).
dv2 hop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc,10) :- hopMsg(@Z,D,W,C2,Tc2), Tc=Tc2+5, C=C2+1.
dv3 bestHopCost(@S,D,min<C>,Tc,10) :- hop(@S,D,D,C,Tc,10).
dv4 bestHop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc,10) :- bestHopCost(@S,D,C,Tc,10),
                               hop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc1,10), Tc1<Tc<=Tc1+10.
dv5 hopMsg(@N,D,Z,C,Tc) :- periodic_dv(@S,5,Tc), bestHop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc1,10),
                               link(@S,N,C,Tc2,10), Tc2<Tc<=Tc2+10, Tc1<Tc<=Tc1+10.
dv6 periodic_dv(@S,5,Tc) :- periodic_dv(@S,5,Tc2), Tc=Tc2+5
Query bestHop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc,Tl)
```

Rules `dv1-dv5` are the corresponding hard-state rewrites, and `dv6` emulates the behavior of `periodic` streams employed in `dv5`, as described in Section 4.2. We introduce an extra constraint `Tc=Tc2+5` in rule `dv2`. This condition is required so that causality of rule execution is preserved within one interval: resulting `hopMsg` events generated within one periodic interval derives `hop` facts used in the next period interval and not vice versa. We note that this addition constraint is automatically added: required only in cases when rules depend on each other in a cyclical fashion (e.g. `hop` derived in `dv1-dv2`, `hopMsg` in `dv5`, and `bestHop` in `dv4`), a dependency that can be detected via static check.

Based on this rewritten program, the automatically generated PVS axioms are as follows:

```

hopMsg(S,D,Z,C,Tc): INDUCTIVE bool =
  (EXISTS (Tc2,T3:Time): bestHop (S,D,Z,C,Tc2,10) AND periodic(S,5,Tc)
   AND link(S,D,Tc3,10) AND Tc2<Tc<=Tc2+10 AND Tc3<Tc<=Tc3+10 AND C=1)
hop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,Tl): INDUCTIVE bool =
  (link(S,D,Tc,10) AND Z=D AND Tl=10 AND C=1) OR (EXISTS (C2:Metric)
   hopMsg(S,D,Z,C2,Tc2) AND C=C2+1 AND Tl=10 AND Tc=Tc2+5)
bestHopCost(S,D,MIN_C,Tc,Tl): INDUCTIVE bool =
  (EXISTS (Z:Node): hop(S,D,Z,MIN_C,Tc) AND Tl=10) AND
  (FORALL (C:Metric): (EXISTS (Z:Node): hop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10))=>MIN_C<=C)
bestHop_refresh: AXIOM
  FORALL (S,D,Z:Node) (C:Metric) (Tc:Time): bestHopCost(S,D,C,Tc,10)
  AND hop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10)=>bestHop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10)
bestHop_close: AXIOM
  FORALL (S,D,Z:Node) (C:Metric) (Tc:Time): bestHop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10)
  => (bestHopCost(S,D,C,Tc,10) AND hop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10))
periodic_dv(S,I,Tc): INDUCTIVE bool =
  EXISTS (Tc2:Time): periodic_dv(S,I,Tc2) AND Tc=Tc2+5 AND I=5

```

Recall automatic axiom generation process in Section 3.1, PVS axioms would be explicitly used in face of mutual dependencies between rules (that derive `bestHop`, `hop`, and `hopMsg`). To break the dependency, we therefore specify `dv4` with two axioms `bestHop_refresh` and `bestHop_close`.

5.3 Eventual Convergence Proof in a Stable Network

The lack of knowledge of the entire path in the distance-vector protocol comes at the expense of potential update loops in the presence of link updates. This is a well-known limitation of the distance-vector protocol, commonly known as the *count-to-infinity* problem.

Our verification is performed on a 4-node network instance as shown in Figure 2. Note that this instance represents a network consisting of three nodes (`a`, `b`, and `c`) that can reach the rest part of the network via a fourth node `d`, and the results of this verification apply to any *arbitrary* network that contains such a loop. For ease of exposition we do not consider computation of `link` tuple here and supply this network instance using the following PVS inductive definition, where each clause connected by logical operator `OR` represents a link between two nodes:

```

link(S,D,C,Tc,Tl): INDUCTIVE bool =
((S=a AND D=b AND C=1 AND Tl=10 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i)) OR
((S=b AND D=c AND C=1 AND Tl=10 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i)) OR
...
((S=a AND D=d AND C=1 AND Tl=10 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i))

```

Network convergence is expressed using the following theorem:

```

bestHopCost_converge: THEOREM
EXISTS (j:posnat): FORALL (S,D:Node)(C:Metric)(i:posnat): (i>j)
=> bestHopCost(S,D,C,5*i,10) = bestHopCost(S,D,C,5*j,10)

```

Given an input network, the distance-vector protocol requires a number of rounds of communication among all nodes, for route advertisements (in the form of `hopMsg`) to be propagated in the network. In the above theorem, the existential quantified variable j denotes the initial number of periodic intervals (set to be at least the network diameter) required to propagate all route advertisements. The theorem states that for any arbitrary time i after j , the value of `bestHopCost` always converges (i.e. no longer changes).

5.4 Count-to-Infinity Analysis in a Dynamic Network

In the final *DNV* example, we demonstrate the capability of *DNV* to prove the presence of the *count-to-infinity* problem in the distance-vector protocol. This is a well-studied limitation where the protocol potentially *diverges* (i.e. not reach steady state) in the presence of link failures.

Before showing the actual proofs, we provide a textbook example [23] that clearly demonstrates the problem intuitively. Revisiting the network in Figure 2, when `link(a,d)` fails, node `a` would advertise this information to its immediate neighbors `b` and `c`. However, despite the fact that `d` is no longer reachable from either `a` `b` or `c`, based on information that `c` can reach `d` in two hops, `b` would conclude that it can reach `d` in three hops. Node `c` makes a similar conclusion. In the next round of updates, node `a` learns that `b` and `c` can reach `d` in three hops, and updates its distance to `d` as four accordingly. This cycle continues indefinitely, resulting in the count-to-infinity problem.




Fig. 2. Network Dynamics

The proof requires a network scenario that results in a count-to-infinity problem. Using the example described above, we supply this network dynamics using the following PVS inductive definition:

```

link (S,D,C,Tc): INDUCTIVE bool =
((S=a AND D=b AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc<100)) OR
((S=b AND D=a AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc<100)) OR
...
((S=a AND D=d AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc<100)) OR
((S=d AND D=a AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc<100)) OR
((S=a AND D=b AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc>=100)) OR
((S=b AND D=a AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc>=100)) OR

```

...
 $((S=c \text{ AND } D=b \text{ AND } C=1 \text{ AND } (\text{EXISTS } (i:\text{posnat}): Tc=5*i) \text{ AND } Tc \geq 100)) \text{ OR}$
 $((S=b \text{ AND } D=c \text{ AND } C=1 \text{ AND } (\text{EXISTS } (i:\text{posnat}): Tc=5*i) \text{ AND } Tc \geq 100))$

The definition indicates that the $\text{link}(a,d)$ and $\text{link}(d,a)$ facts are only present before time 100, denoting that a link failure between nodes a and d happens at time 100. The count-to-infinity theorem is expressed as follows:

bestHop_increase_to_infinity: THEOREM
 FORALL $(a,b,d:\text{Node})(t:\text{Time})(c:\text{Metric}): (t > 100 \text{ AND } \text{bestHop}(a,d,b,c,t,10)) \Rightarrow$
 $(\text{EXISTS } (t':\text{Time})(c':\text{Metric}): (t' > t \text{ AND } c' > c \text{ AND } \text{bestHop}(a,d,b,c',t',10)))$

The theorem above states that if the distance vector protocol diverges, the best hop from a to d will increase indefinitely over time, a symptom of the count-to-infinity problem. In reference [6], we have the complete proof of this theorem, as well as addition theorems that further verify the presence of the count-to-infinity problem. Interestingly, we have been able to prove a *stronger* PVS theorem specific to a three-node network cycle: $\forall b, d, a, c, t. (\exists i. t = i \times 5 \wedge t > 100) \Rightarrow (\text{bestHop}(b, d, a, c, t, 10) \Rightarrow \text{bestHop}(b, d, a, c + 2, t + 10, 10))$, which expresses the precise pattern that the value of `cost` argument increases by 2 at every two update intervals of 10 seconds.

We further verify that a well-known solution to this problem, known as the *split-horizon* solution can avoid any two-node cycle, and show that this solution is insufficient for fixing the count-to-infinity problem in a three-node cycle. Refer to our extended technical report [32] for more details.

6 Related Work

We briefly survey existing work on network protocol verification.

Classical theorem proving has been used in the past few decades for verification of network protocols [29,5,10,4]. Despite extensive work, this approach is generally restricted to protocol design and standards, and cannot be directly applied to protocol implementation. A high initial investment based on domain expert knowledge is often required to develop the system specifications acceptable by some theorem prover (up to several man-months). Therefore, even after successful proofs in the theorem prover, the actual implementation is not guaranteed to be error-free. *DNV* avoids this problem by using a common executable declarative networking language that can be directly verified in a theorem prover.

Runtime verification techniques (e.g. [15,16,27]) is a mechanism for checking at runtime that a system does not violate expected properties. Since declarative networks utilize a distributed query engine to execute its protocols, these checks can be expressed as *monitoring queries* in *NDlog*. However, any runtime verification scheme will incur additional runtime overheads, and subtle bugs may require a long time to be encountered. Moreover, the properties can be checked in this case are restricted to those can be expressed in *NDlog*. In particular, any universal quantified properties, such as `bestPathStrong` we demonstrated in Section 3.2 is not checkable in runtime verification based on *NDlog* query engine.

Model checking is a collection of algorithmic techniques for checking temporal properties of system instances based on exhaustive state space exploration.

Recent significant advances in model checking network protocol implementations include *MaceMC* [13] and *CMC* [7]. Compared to *DNV*, these approaches are *sound* as well, but not *complete* in the sense that the large state space persistent in network protocols often prevents complete exploration of the huge system states. While the heuristics used in exploration maximize the chances of detecting property violations, they are typically inconclusive and restricted to small network instances and temporal properties.

By adopting a theorem-proving based approach in this paper, *DNV* is more expressive and flexible compared to *MaceMC* and *CMC*, since higher-order logics can be used to specify network properties. In addition, since *DNV* directly verifies declarative networking specifications, an explicit model extraction step via execution exploration is not required.

7 Future Work

We are in the process of applying *DNV* to more complex overlay networks, and reasoning about routing protocols, particularly when integrated with policies [11,9]. Our initial experiences suggest that *DNV* is a promising approach towards a unified framework that integrates specification, implementation, and verification. Moving forward, we have identified a few areas of future work, in the areas of domain specific proof strategies [22,2], proof automation [33,34,28]. We further plan to leverage PVS's support for CTL (variant of temporal logic) model-checking [21] to integrate model checking into *DNV*. Our extended report [32] details our ongoing and future work.

Acknowledgments

This work was partially sponsored by NSF CNS-0721845 and DARPA through Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Contract FA8750-07-C-0169. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the U.S. Government.

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