

A Dynamic Coordination Mechanism Using Adjustable Autonomy

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Abstract. Agents in an organization need to coordinate their actions in order to reach the organizational goals. This research describes the relation between types of coordination and the autonomy of actors. In an experimental setting we show that there is not one best way to coordinate in all situations. The dynamics and complexity of, for example, crisis situations require a crisis management organization to work with dynamic types of coordination. In order to reach dynamic coordination we provide the actors with adjustable autonomy. Actors should be able to make decisions at different levels of autonomy and reason about the required level. We propose a way to implement this in a multi-agent system. The agent is provided with reasoning rules with which it can control the external influences on its decision-making.

1 Introduction

The motivation of this research lies in coordination challenges for crisis management organizations. Crisis situations in general are complex and share environmental features; there is no complete information, the evolvement of the situation is unpredictable and quick response is required. A crisis management organization should control the crisis as fast as possible, and therefore, it should be able to cope with such situations. For an adequate, quick response the organization needs high control. At the same time the organization needs to be able to adapt to unexpected events and therefore it needs to be dynamic and robust.

In this paper we describe different ways of coordination, and show that there is not one best way to coordinate in all situations. When modelling the decision-making process of the actors we see that there is always a trade-off between local autonomy and global control. In this paper we describe levels of autonomy in decision-making of actors, and we propose a way to implement adjustable autonomy in artificial actors in order to achieve a dynamic coordination mechanism.

In Sect. 2 we argue why we need dynamic coordination mechanisms in multi-agent systems. We describe the relation between types of coordination and the autonomy of actors. Using an experiment we point out the strong and the weak points

of different coordination types. In Sect. 3 we define agent autonomy and we introduce adjustable autonomy as a concept that allows dynamically switching between coordination types. Section 4 proposes a way to implement adjustable autonomy in agents. We extend the experiment with an implementation of adjustable autonomy. After that, Sect. 5 discusses our results and describes future research.

2 Why Dynamic Coordination?

In this section we argue why dynamic coordination mechanisms are relevant to achieve coordinated behavior in multi-agent systems. We discuss different types of coordination and their relation with the autonomy of the actors. Using an experiment we point out the weak and strong points of the coordination types and show that a static coordination mechanism is not optimal in all situations.

2.1 Autonomy and Coordination

All organizations designed for a certain purpose require coordinated behavior of the participants. There are several approaches to reach coordination, ranging from emergent coordination to explicit coordination by strict protocols. At the same time the actors in an organization are seen as autonomous entities that make their own decisions. In this paragraph we investigate the relation between autonomy of actors and coordination of behavior.

Autonomy is one of the key features of agents. It is often being used in the definition of agents [1]. In Jennings' use of the term, agent autonomy means that agents have control over both their internal state and over their behavior. The agent determines its beliefs and it decides by itself upon its actions. Multi-agent systems consist of multiple autonomous actors that interact to reach a certain goal. We will first take a closer look at coordination mechanisms for multi-agent systems.

One approach to reach coordinated group behavior is *emergent coordination*. Autonomous actors perform their tasks independently and the interaction between many of them leads to coordinated behavior. This approach is often used for agent-based social simulations. One characteristic of emergent coordination is that the actors have no awareness of the goals of the organization they are part of. The actors make their own local decisions and are fully autonomous. Although the actors have no organizational awareness, the designer of such a system has. The coordination principles are specified implicitly within the local reasoning of all actors. The organization is relatively flexible within the single task for which it has been designed. However, in the extreme case, the agents are fully autonomous, and there is no point of control that can force the organization to change its behavior if unexpected situations occur that cannot be solved by the local reasoning rules of the actors.

Where the fully emergent approach is one extreme type of coordination, the other extreme is fully *controlled coordination*. This is the case in a hierarchical organization, where there is a single point of control that determines the tasks all the others have to perform. The actors are autonomous in performing their

task, but they do not make their own decisions. Therefore, the actors do not meet the autonomy definition as used in [1].

A characteristic of such a centralistic approach is that the task division is made from a global perspective. Therefore an organization can adapt quickly to changes in the environment by sending out new orders to all actors. However, such an organization is sensitive to incomplete information. Wrong information at the global level can lead to wrong decisions. Furthermore, the organization is highly dependent on the decision maker at the top of the hierarchy and it misses the flexibility at the local level. Fully controlled coordination can be a good solution if there is always complete information about the situation. Task specifications and interaction protocols can be defined for all possible cases.

In between the two extreme types there are several ways to achieve coordination. For example, the designer can allow the agents to communicate and exchange information. Or he can divide the organizational task in roles, and define the interaction in protocols. Several methodologies for multi-agent systems design, e.g. Opera [2], use this approach. Drawback here is that the specified coordination framework are static. There is no flexibility within the predefined roles and interactions.

2.2 Experiment

We have set up an experimental environment in which we can test the characteristics of coordination principles. A simple coordination task is performed by an organization, and different scenarios contain situational features that can reveal the strong and the weak points of each coordination mechanism.

Organizational Description. The basic setting is a Firefighter organization. The organization operates in a world where fires appear that need to be extinguished as fast as possible. In the organization we define two roles; *coordinator* and *firefighter*. The coordinator makes a global plan and tells the firefighters which fire they should extinguish. Therefore the coordinator has a global view of the whole world. The firefighters perform the actual tasks in the world; they move to a fire location and extinguish the fires. They have only local views.

There is a hierarchical relation between the two roles, the coordinator is superior of the firefighters and can send orders to the firefighters, which fire they have to extinguish. We want to show different forms of coordination within this organization. In our implementation we achieve this by changing the autonomy level of the decision-making process of the firefighters. We have created different types of firefighters; obedient agents that follow the orders of their superior (no decision-making autonomy) and disobedient agents that ignore their superior and make their decisions only based on local observations. Now we can describe the coordination types:

- *Emergent coordination*: Disobedient firefighters, choices are made based on local information
- *Explicit coordination*: Obedient firefighters, choices are made based on global information

The performance of the organization should be measurable. In our experiment we can measure the time it takes to extinguish the fires for each of the coordination types. The best organizational performance has the lowest score.

Scenarios. We will describe the scenarios in more detail. The organization in our experiment has one coordinator and four firefighters. The start position of the firefighters in the world is equally distributed. We have one standard scenario, scenario A, in order to test whether both coordination types perform equally well. In this scenario four fires are distributed equally over the world. The start situation of scenario A is shown in Fig. 1.




Fig. 1. Screenshot of the experimental environment: begin situation of scenario A

Two other scenarios have been created that make this situation more complex. They contain the features that also return in real world situations. Scenario B is a setting where the fires are distributed equally over the world, but the coordinator has no global view, he can only see half of the world at once. As result there is no complete information at the global level. The third scenario, Scenario C, reflects a situation where the fires are not distributed equally, such that some firefighters do not observe any fires, whereas others observe several fires.

Results. The results of the experiment are shown in Table 1. The score is calculated by the number of time steps it takes until all fires have been extinguished. It is measured per scenario and coordination type. Scenario A shows no significant difference in the performance of both organizations. This is our standard scenario that shows that both coordination mechanisms work. In scenario B the firefighters reach a better performance based on their local information than the

Table 1. Results of our Experiment; time (s) until all fires are extinguished per scenario and coordination type

| | Explicit Coordination: No Autonomy | Emergent coordination: Full Autonomy |
|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| Scenario A: Standard scenario | 38.7 | 36.8 |
| Scenario B: No complete global information | 66.6 | 36.8 |
| Scenario C: No equal distribution of fires | 69.8 | 93.8 |

coordinator based on its information. The coordinator has no complete knowledge, and therefore he might miss important information for his planning task. In scenario C the fires were not equally distributed. The global information of the coordinator was more useful than the local information of the firefighters, because the coordinator's commands sent the firefighters to the fires. In the emergent organization not all firefighters could see the fires, which made them inactive.

The difference between the two organizations was that the decisions were made at a different level of the organization and based on different information. Both perform well in specific situations, none of them proved to be sufficient for all situations. We can conclude that in a scenario with a dynamic environment in which the agents experience these situations successively, both coordination types perform badly because of the weak points that are pointed out in the previous scenarios. In that case the best organization would be one that dynamically switches between the coordination mechanisms.

2.3 Dynamic Coordination

From our experiment, we can conclude that a dynamic coordination mechanism can outperform the presented organizations in a dynamic environment. In each coordination mechanism mentioned in Sect. 2.1 the autonomy of the actors with respect to the organization is fixed. We want to achieve dynamic coordination by allowing the agents to make local decisions about their autonomy level. We want them to act following organizational rules, but also allow them to decide not to follow the rules in specific situations. We believe that organizations in complex environments can benefit from agents that show *adjustable autonomy*. In the next paragraph we define adjustable autonomy in more detail and propose a way to achieve this in artificial agents.

3 Adjustable Autonomy

In this section we explain the concept of adjustable autonomy. Recall the autonomy requirement for agents as it is used by [1]. It states that agents should have

control over their internal state and their behavior. We have argued that this conflicts with the extreme form of explicit coordination. The agents just follow orders and they do not determine their own actions.

We will take a closer look at agent decision-making. We believe that the decision-making process can take place at different levels of autonomy. An autonomous agent should be able to select its style of decision-making. This process is what we call *adjustable autonomy*. In this section we define levels of autonomy in agent decision-making and we propose a way to implement adjustable autonomy in agents.

3.1 Autonomy Levels in Agent Decision-Making

The difference between the two agent types in the experiment, obedient and disobedient, was the knowledge they used for their own decision-making. With autonomous decision-making the agent makes its own decisions based on its own observations, disregarding information and orders from other agents. The other extreme is that agents perform only commands that are given, and do not choose their actions based on their own knowledge.

The degree of autonomy of decision making can be defined as the degree of intervention by other agents on the decision making process of one agent [3]. Using this definition, the disobedient agent from our experiment makes its decisions autonomously, whereas the obedient agent had no autonomy at all concerning the decision making. An agent that switches between different levels of autonomy of its decision-making shows adjustable autonomy. We propose a reasoning model in which different levels of autonomy can be implemented.

3.2 Controlling Autonomy

An agent's level of autonomy is determined by the influence of other agents on the decision-making process. Adjustable autonomy implies that the level of autonomy in the decision-making process can be adjusted. Therefore, an agent should control external influences that it experiences. The agent should choose which knowledge it uses for its decision-making. Figure 2 shows the reasoning process of an agent schematically. The module for event-processing precedes the actual decision making and it determines the level of autonomy of the decision-making process.




Fig. 2. The adjustable autonomy module within the reasoning process

In the reasoning model the agent is provided with a module that gives the agent control over external influences. These external influences are the agent's own observations and messages that it gets from other agents. The agent can make an explicit choice about the knowledge that it will use for its decision-making process.

3.3 Related Work on Adjustable Autonomy

The topics *agent autonomy* and *adjustable autonomy* have been subject of many studies. However, there is no common definition of autonomy. As a result, the approaches taken to describe its features are quite distinct. We discuss the concept of autonomy and the way it is used in related work. And we investigate what adjustability is in the different perspectives that are taken. We will relate the other views on autonomy with our own view.

Castelfranchi and Falcone, [4] [5], have investigated autonomy in the context of (social) relations between agents. Considering a hierarchical relation, the abstraction level of decision-making of the delegate determines the agent's level of autonomy with respect to the master. Levels of autonomy they distinguish are *executive autonomy* (agent is not allowed to decide anything but the execution of delegated task), *planning autonomy* (agent is allowed to plan (partially), the delegated task is not fully specified) and *goal autonomy* (agent is allowed to find its own goals). Verhagen, [6], has added *norm autonomy* as an extra level, where the agent is allowed to formulate its own organizational norms.

Adjustable autonomy is the process of switching between the abstraction levels of decision making. The autonomy levels as presented above concern goals, actions, plans and norms. We believe that also *beliefs* should be part of the autonomy definition, since beliefs are another concept used in the reasoning process. If an agent does not control its own beliefs, it can hardly be called autonomous. In our definition the autonomy level is gradually related to the influence an agent allows on its decision-making process. We propose reasoning rules to control external influences that capture explicit knowledge for reasoning about autonomy.

Schurr et al. [7] and Tambe et al. [8] use the term adjustable autonomy for the process in which a decision maker transfers the control of the decision-making process to another agent (or human). The researchers do not give a definition of autonomy, but it is related to decision-making control with respect to a certain goal. A coordination mechanism that runs independent of the agent's decision-making, handles the transfer-of-control (t-o-c) process. A t-o-c strategy consists of a list of decision makers and the constraints for transferring the control. An agent's position in the list of decision-makers determines an agent's level of autonomy with respect to the goal. They do not use autonomy as a gradual property of the decision-making process of the agent itself. Their reasoning mechanism for adjustable autonomy can only be used when there are more agents that have the capability to making the decision. The mechanism should make sure the optimal decision maker is selected.

In contrast, our approach focuses on the decision-making process of a single agent. The agent should select the optimal input (beliefs, goals, plans) for its

own reasoning process. Those resources determine the autonomy level of a reasoning process. We look at adjustable autonomy as a process within an agent's reasoning, whereas they view it as a separate mechanism.

Barber and Martin, [9], look at the decision-making process of a group of agents. An agent's level of autonomy with respect to a task is measured as its share in the group decision-making process. In their context adjustable autonomy concerns different decision-making strategies for a group of agents. They present an Adaptive Decision-Making Framework, in which agents propose strategies to the group, and therewith change their own autonomy level. This way, adjustable autonomy becomes a group process, because other agents can accept or reject proposed decision-making strategies.

The focus of Barber and Martin is on the decision-making process of a group of agents. In contrast, our focus is on the decision-making of a single agent. In our work, adjustment of the autonomy is a local process within the agent's reasoning process. Furthermore Barber and Martin do not specify how an agent can determine the right decision-making strategies. In the experiments they conducted they provided the agents with knowledge about the best strategy for each situation. We want the agents to reason about what the best strategy is, based on local observations.

Dastani et al., [10], argue that the deliberation cycle of an agent determines autonomy of an agent as well. Autonomy levels can be viewed at as an agent's commitment to its own decisions. For example, one deliberation cycle makes that an agent commits to a goal until it has been fulfilled, whereas another cycle makes an agent to reconsider its goals every time it receives new information. They propose a meta-language to describe the deliberation cycle of an agent. The functions used in the deliberation cycle as well as their actual implementation are relevant for agent autonomy. Levels of autonomy can be constructed changing the deliberation cycle.

In their approach, levels of autonomy are determined by the deliberation cycle, and therefore by the way decisions are made. Our approach focuses on the sources that are used for decision-making and on the process of how an agent determines its autonomy level. The two approaches can exist next to each other and complement each other.

As we see in this discussion of related work there is not a single definition of agent autonomy and adjustable autonomy. Sometimes autonomy and adjustable autonomy is viewed in the context of group decision-making, whereas others look at single agent decision-making. Furthermore different aspects of agent decision-making are taken into account, such as decision-making control or abstraction levels of decision-making. Our approach is to give the agent control over the external influences it experiences.

4 Agent Reasoning Model

Here we present a reasoning model for agents that enables the agent to control its autonomy level. The level of autonomy depends on the influence of other

agents on the reasoning process. In the reasoning-process we distinguish a phase for event-processing and a phase for decision-making, as shown in Fig. 2. The event-processing phase gives the agent control over its autonomy. The decision phase focuses on the decision on action. We describe the implementation of the two phases, starting with the latter one.

4.1 Decision Making

In the decide-phase the agent will decide upon the next action. A popular approach for goal-directed reasoning is to use of Beliefs, Desires and Intentions (BDI), introduced by Rao and Georgeff [11]. Several BDI reasoning-models have been proposed. For example, 3APL [12], [13] provides the designer with a formalized programming language which is designed for BDI-agent programming. A 3APL agent uses reasoning rules to create plans to reach a certain goal. Such reasoning rules have the following form:

```
<HEAD> <- <GUARD> | <BODY>
```

The head of a rule should match the goals of an agent. The guard should match the beliefs of the agent. The body of the agent contains sets of actions. If head and body match, the agent can commit to the plan in the body and start to execute it.

The firefighters in our experiment have been implemented using 3APL. They have a goal to fight fires and they have reasoning rules to make a plan in order to reach their goal. Figure 3 shows the source code of the decision phase. If a firefighter agent has a certain fire selected, it is going to extinguish that fire. Depending on the distance to this fire, they will perform either the action *GoTo* or *Extinguish*. If no fire is selected, the agent will wait.

```
GOALBASE:
    fightFires()
RULEBASE:
    fightFires() <- SelectedFire(Fire) | extinguishFire(Fire)
    fightFires() <- TRUE | Wait()

    extinguishFire(FIRE) <- distance(Fire, D) |
        BEGIN
            IF D < 20
                THEN Extinguihs(FIRE)
            ELSE GoTo(FIRE)
        END
```

Fig. 3. Source code of 3APL plan to fight fires

Each decision of the agent takes depends on its beliefs. The beliefs that are used in this plan are: *selectedFire* and *distance*. These beliefs are determined before the plan reasoning starts. Therefore we describe the event-processing phase, which prepares the actual decision-making phase.

4.2 Event Processing

In the event-processing phase the agent prepares the decision-making phase. External influences are processed here. External influence can be an agent's observations or messages from other agents. We have chosen to implement the orient phase using 3APL rules as well. This gives us the opportunity to reason with semantic knowledge. The main process consists of three functions: *handle observations*, *handle messages*, and *prepare decision-making*.

The autonomy level of the decide phase is determined by those functions. Will the agent follow the commands from the coordinator, or will it create own goals? Does the agent adopt information from the coordinator, or does it use its own observations? We show how we can implement reasoning rules that provide the agent with choices. We will take the firefighters from our experiment as example.

Handle Observations. Reasoning rules can be added to make the agent choose to handle observations differently. We gave one rule to our firefighters, which states that it believes all its own observations:

```
handleObservations() <- TRUE | Observations2Beliefs()
```

Our firefighters use only this rule for observation processing. It is possible too add more rules that distinguish between different situations. To use the rule, the guard of the rule has to match with the beliefs of the agent. Adding rules with a specified guard, the agent handles its observations differently if that guard is true.

Handle Messages. Agents can receive messages from other agents. An agent can be programmed to handle messages in different ways by adding the same types of rules. If an agent functions in an organization, it needs to know how to deal with relations towards other agents. We have implemented the following rule for a hierarchical relation. When the agent gets a request from another agent who is his superior, he interprets the content as a command.

```
handleMessages() <- message(SENDER, request, CONTENT)
  AND superior(CONTENT) | AcceptCommand(SENDER, CONTENT)
```

The firefighters believe that the coordinator is their superior. They will process the requests of the coordinator as commands. In a similar manner other rules that can be defined. For example, an agent can have a rule to ignore all messages when it feels it is in danger.

```
handleMessages() <- danger() | ignoreMessages()
```

If an agent has both rules for message handling it is dependent on the agent whether it processes messages or not. Does the agent perceive danger or not? By adding such a rule, local beliefs of the agent can change the way it handles external influences, and therefore it can influence the autonomy level of the agents' decision-making.

Prepare Decision-Making. Finally, in the function *prepare decision-making* rules are specified that determine the autonomy level of the agent. The reasoning rules in the decide-phase use certain beliefs. Here we specify per goal what kind of belief processing should take place. Recall from Fig. 3 that the beliefs that are used for the goal to fight fires are *selectedFire* and *distance*. We have specified the following rules:

```
prepareDecisionMaking() <- goal(fightfires) AND
  command(FIRE) | SelectFire(FIRE); CalculateDistance(FIRE)
```

```
prepareDecisionMaking() <- goal(fightfires) AND noCommand()
  AND seeFire(FIRE) | SelectFire(FIRE); GetDistance(FIRE)
```

These two rules specify how the beliefs for the decision-making process are determined dependent on the situations. The *SelectFire* and *CalculateDistance* statements are capabilities of the agent that construct the *selectedFire* and the *distance* belief respectively. The variable given to those functions has a different origin in both cases. If the agent has a command, he will follow the command. If there is no command, but the agent sees a fire, it will use this observation for further reasoning.

5 Extending the Experiment

We have extended the experiment of Sect. 2. We have constructed a third organization with firefighters that show adjustable autonomy. They are at certain moments disobedient to the commands of the coordinator and at other moments they follow the orders, depending on their local beliefs. So, the organization can switch between explicit coordination and emergent coordination. We have implemented reasoning rules for event processing, we have used the same rules as presented in the Sect. 4.2. The rules ensure that the agents follow the commands, but if there are no commands they will pursue their goal using local observations.

5.1 Results

We have run all three scenarios as well with our dynamic coordination mechanism. Table 2 shows the results next to the static coordination mechanisms.

Table 2. Results of our Experiment, including adjustable autonomy

| | Explicit Coordination: No Autonomy | Emergent coordination: Full Autonomy | Dynamic Coordination: Adjustable Autonomy |
|------------|---------------------------------------|---|--|
| Scenario A | 38.7 | 36.8 | 37.0 |
| Scenario B | 66.6 | 36.8 | 37.1 |
| Scenario C | 69.8 | 93.8 | 70.2 |

We can see that the organization with agents that use adjustable autonomy performs well in all scenarios compared to the other two organizations. The agents in the organization adapt the coordination mechanism based on the environmental features.

From the experiment we can conclude that dynamic coordination is powerful in agent organizations. The organization using dynamic coordination performs as good as the best of the other organizations. Furthermore the organization using adjustable autonomy will perform well in dynamic scenarios, since it continuously adapts its coordination mechanism.

The way we achieve a dynamic coordination mechanism, is by letting the agents adjust their autonomy level. The agents have reasoning rules to control external influences in the reasoning process. The agents decide locally on their autonomy level.

5.2 Discussion

We provide the agents with reasoning rules to control external influences. This gives the agents additional, task-unspecific knowledge that it can use in its reasoning process. It allows the agent to use its beliefs and its goals to reason about its openness towards other agents. The reasoning rules make use of criteria based on *introspection*, *social knowledge*, or *coordination requirements*.

Using introspection, the agent assesses its own mental state. Castelfranchi, [4], argues the importance of introspection in the reasoning process. For example, *relevance of information* can be determined by introspection. Certain information can be more or less relevant depending on an agent's goals. Therefore an agent may observe the world differently depending on its goals.

An agent may have a reasoning rule that makes the agent react differently to external input when it feels danger than when it feels ease. To make such adaptive behavior possible, the agent also needs to have the capability to determine when it is in danger.

Social and organizational knowledge are other examples of criteria that can be used to control external influences. The importance of explicitly modelling organizational awareness for coordination is argued by Oomes [14]. For example, knowledge about the sender of a message is useful when deciding what to do with the content. If we assume that an organization is implemented following a methodology as Opera [2], organizational concepts are available in the beliefbase. By using them in reasoning rules for influence control, we add the social knowledge to the reasoning process of the agents. The use of *trust* between agents can be modelled in the same way.

The third example of knowledge that can be used for autonomy adjustment is knowledge about coordination requirements. Given that an agent acts in a coordination mechanism, it can encounter environmental changes that influence the coordination. For example, if an agent follows orders from a superior and the communication fails at a certain moment, it can choose to increase its autonomy in order to fulfill the goals.

We will conduct more experiments to develop general heuristics that an agent can use to control external influences. Using those heuristics in the reasoning rules for event processing, we want to combine single-agent decision-making and multi-agent interaction to develop dynamic coordination mechanisms.

6 Conclusion

There are several ways to achieve coordination within an agent organization. The approaches range from emergent coordination, where the actors are autonomous and the coordination is implicitly implemented, to explicit coordination, such as a hierarchical organization where the actors have no decision autonomy but just follow the orders from their superiors. We have shown that there is not one best way to coordinate in all situations. Complex and dynamic situations therefore require a dynamic coordination mechanism.

We have implemented a dynamic coordination mechanism by providing the actors with adjustable autonomy. An agent's level of autonomy depends on the influence of others on the reasoning process. The actors have reasoning rules that control the external influences they experience. This way we have shown some situations in which the actor can change its autonomy level based on local knowledge. The agent uses the knowledge about event processing in its reasoning process in addition to the task specific domain knowledge.

Further research should lead to more understanding about relevant knowledge for event processing. We want to develop general heuristics with which the agent can determine its level of autonomy by controlling external influences.

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