

## 8 Development and Security: Genealogy and Typology of an Evolving International Policy Area

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### 8.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a broad overview of the evolving paradigms of thinking and action at the intersection between development and security. This chapter will focus primarily on the major rich countries and the institutions they control, such as the World Bank and the OECD. It is these rich countries, after all, that provide the overwhelming majority of the development assistance and defines the practical terms on which it is given. Recipient countries surely do have a capacity to subvert donor agendas, but they do not set it.

It is written from the perspective of development professionals, analysing when and why they became concerned with matters of security (genealogy section, 8.2), and what sorts of things they do when they work at the nexus between development and security (typology section, 8.3). In the former section, there is a particular emphasis on teasing out the impact of the end of the Cold War and of 9/11 on development policy and practice. The latter section presents a brief overview of different operational and policy approaches to the development/security nexus. In the conclusions, the author points to the shrinking intellectual and operational gap between development and security since the early 1990's (8.4).

### 8.2 Genealogy

During its first three decades, the development enterprise was totally agnostic towards matters of internal conflict and security. When violent conflict occurred, it was treated as an unfortunate occurrence, forcing development workers out and bringing humanitarians in – an order to be reversed when the conflict was over and normal development work could resume. The common dynamics leading up to conflict – intergroup resentment, social polarization, rising intoler-

ance and extremism, militarization of society, human rights violations, and widespread impunity, to name but a few – were emphatically *not* part of the development mandate. Development practitioners might have deplored these matters in private, but did not believe they had to consider the implications of their own work on these dynamics, or explicitly seek to address them (Uvin 1998).

Of course, in our complicated world and a fortiori for a field of human endeavour as broad and diverse as development, any statement such as the one just made is always partially wrong. Indeed, development aid was from its very birth and foremost so for the United States, part of the security calculus of the Cold War. The precursor of modern development aid was the Marshall Plan following World War II, designed to reconstruct Europe and keep it out of the hands of communism – both of which it was successful at. Later, development assistance to developing countries was at least in part motivated by Cold War concerns. This link of aid to security was of a very different nature than what emerged from the 1990's onwards. Before, the link was global and geo-strategic, and the mechanism by which the link operated was exclusively the allocation of development aid resources; it did not seek to affect conflict dynamics *within* the countries concerned.<sup>1</sup>

During the Cold War, countries that were at the frontline of the fight against communism (to mention but some, each reflecting different stages in the Cold War: South Korea and Vietnam; Zaire and Somalia; Egypt and Jordan; El Salvador and Guatemala) received massive and disproportionate amounts of development aid, as well as often military assistance, diplomatic support, preferential trade access, and intelligence support. But what was being done with those development aid funds had usually little to do

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1 On development aid as an economic security tool in the global ideological competition, see Radelet (2003a).

with domestic internal dynamics of conflict, and indeed quite a few of these countries were falling apart under the eyes of their sponsors, without the latter doing anything through their development programmes to halt this disintegration.<sup>2</sup> The way the money was used was largely motivated by the standard schools of development thinking: investments in economic and social infrastructure; education and training; basic needs (basic health, primary education, and housing); structural adjustment and liberalization of the economy, among others.<sup>3</sup>

This situation has changed dramatically. Nowadays, the nexus between development and conflict within recipient countries (and even regions) is a central focus of almost all development thinking and practice. This metamorphosis reflects a number of major trends, some of which are related to the end of the Cold War and later to 9/11, and others which are internal to the development enterprise and independent of these outside factors.

### 8.2.1 1989 and the End of the Cold War

The main impact of the end of the Cold War on the development enterprise was indirect: it created a larger need for a change in approach and opened up a space in which it could emerge, but it did not dictate its content.

First, civil war and insecurity became much more prevalent and visible in the South after 1990, forcing development practitioners to come to grips with questions of (in)security. This often happened in countries that were until recently clients of the superpowers and whose models of political and economic (ill)-governance were quickly falling apart. This was most visible in sub-Saharan Africa, of course, where way too many countries descended into a spiral of violence, destroying whatever tenuous improvements to which development aid might have contributed. At the same time, a large number of new recipients of development assistance emerged in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European bloc, many of which rapidly became theatres of violent insecurity. The overwhelming majority of these cases of violence were civil wars. As

a result, the development community soon found that as much as one-third of all countries in which it worked were close to, engaged in, or just coming out of civil war.<sup>4</sup>

Second, the intellectual and political hegemony of the Western 'liberal peace model' became greatly strengthened, ideologically justifying much wider interventions in the internal dynamics of low-status countries, the list of which grew dramatically (Duffield 2001). Most of the Cold War-induced need to make friends with unsavoury regimes throughout the world had vanished. Especially in Africa, this led to disastrous results for the likes of Siad Barre of Somalia; Mobutu Sese Seko of the former Zaire; and Jonas Savimbi of Angola (admittedly not a head of state). This trend had already started under the Reagan administration (and its allies in Thatcher and Kohl), with an increasingly assertive adherence to free markets, minimal states, and elections, and a concomitant and decreased willingness to engage in talk about new international economic orders, rights to development, and other reformist agendas. When capitalism won, all competing ideologies were de-legitimized, and the willingness and capacity to intervene in third world countries' domestic issues grew dramatically. This willingness to act on issues considered hitherto too political, too domestic, or too sensitive, is one of the factors that set the new development/security agenda apart from the preceding thirty years.

The prime reasons for the emergence of the development/security nexus in the 1990's, however, lie in dynamics internal to the development community. First, there was the rise to prominence of the 'good governance' agenda. This agenda, whose appearance slightly precedes and totally mirrors the ascendancy of the conflict agenda, was an answer to the failure of structural adjustment. Adjustment policies were being only partly implemented in many countries, thus failing to produce their evident benefits. The World Bank and the main bilaterals concluded that there must be something wrong with the political system from which these policies emerged: it was not accountable and transparent enough, hence allowing self-serving elites to get away with inefficient and detrimental policies from which only they benefited. Starting from this economic rationale, the field of 'good govern-

2 An exception to this is US aid to Central America in the 1980's, when some of the internal use of aid was linked more directly than usual to anti-guerrilla strategies. Note that such use was typically decried in the strongest terms by leftist, critical scholars and practitioners.

3 For good overviews of changing development thinking, see Arndt (1987) and Peet (1999).

4 According to the World Bank website: "80% of the world's 20 poorest countries have suffered a major war in the past 15 years" (<[www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)>). Bank lending to post-conflict countries increased by 800% between 1980 and 1995 (World Bank 1998a, 2005a).

ance' was born in the late 1980's; it mixed with human rights and democracy agendas that precisely resulted from the triumphalism of the end of the Cold War, and marked the first significant move away from the political neutrality and respect for sovereignty that had characterized the development community thus far (Uvin 1996; Doornbos 2003; Hewitt de Alcantara 1998).

The governance agenda laid the groundwork for, and is an important part of, the "development and security" agenda: both start from the same willingness to intervene domestically and from the same ideological assumptions about the benefits of liberal peace.<sup>5</sup> These ideas are not born of ignorance: after all, many countries are characterized by exclusionary, inefficient, corrupt systems of governance, and these systems not only seem to bring about economic implosion, but also more often than not violent conflict. At the same time, the presently rich countries do combine economically and politically liberal models, albeit with significant variation.<sup>6</sup> The triangle between development, peace, and democracy thus makes intuitive sense, and has become the basis of the international community's involvement in these matters. By far the most important text here is the 1995 Supplement to the 1992 Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace, which constituted a policy milestone and a departure from standard development practice (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995a).<sup>7</sup>

The second factor is the 1994 Rwanda tragedy, which demonstrated to both the development and hu-

manitarian community that 'normal professionalism,' even if implemented successfully, could lead to disaster if conflict dynamics were not understood. As a result, the Rwanda case fundamentally challenged the status quo. For development professionals, Rwanda had been a rather successful developing country, performing well on traditional indicators of economic growth until well into the 1980's: it was in the top three in terms of vaccinations and other more human development centred indicators, and possessed a dense and seemingly vibrant civil society like few other African countries. Yet this model pupil turned out to be a serial killer, forcing everyone to reflect on what they had missed and how their ignorance and their money interacted with the dynamics that led to genocide (Uvin 1998; Andersen 2000).<sup>8</sup> The same profound challenge occurred with the massive humanitarian operation in then Zaire after the end of the genocide. From a purely logistical and public health perspective, it was a stunning achievement: in only a few weeks, cholera epidemics were halted and high quality systems of food distribution and health care were established for as many as two million persons in the middle of nowhere! However, the camps became breeding grounds for regional destabilization and eventually ended up as theatres of mass violent death and forced return (Terry 2002). In both cases, then, successful work done without consideration of dynamics of conflict led to untold death and destruction under the eyes of the international community. For the humanitarian community, this led to debates about 'do no harm' (Anderson 1999) and rights-based humanitarianism (Slim 2002; Macrae/Leader 2000); for the development community, it put the development/security nexus at the centre of the table. From the second half of the 1990's, the OECD took leadership of this agenda with a series of technocratic yet pushing-the-edge declarations and studies on aid and conflict prevention (OECD 1997; 2001; Uvin 1999).

In short, the development/conflict agenda came to maturity in the post-Cold War climate, but was not directly tributary to the security ideologues or politics of the new unipolar system<sup>9</sup> - indeed, many have

5 For a perfect example, see Boutros-Ghali (1994); for fine discussions, see Paris (2002; 2004).

6 The basic problem with this reasoning, which underlies much development thinking, is that it is ahistorical and apolitical. It neglects to analyse how rich countries became rich (which may have been in ways that were not particularly free-market based, nor friendly to the Third World). As a result, it misunderstands how Third World countries could make the same voyage, if they so desired. Prichett and Woolcock (2004) call this "skipping straight to Weber," or the 'Denmark' model (given that Denmark is peaceful, rich and democratic, let's just import Danish institutions into the rest of the world and all will be fine). See also IDS (2005) for good work on this.

7 Other important documents include Carnegie Commission (1997) and OECD (1997). The relationship between democracy, development, and peace so clearly made in this agenda - and in the accompanying *Agenda for Development* (1994) - has been contested by many scholars: Paris (2002); Ottaway (2002) and Baker (2001).

8 The first major book to make a similar argument was probably by Susan Woodward (1995) about the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.

9 Duffield (2001) contradicts this to some extent, arguing that what he calls the securitization of development was then already related to desires to contain the spread of refugees and other conflict spillovers into rich countries.

argued that there was no clear security ideology during this time in any case.

Throughout this period there was also resistance to this shift. For most of the older generation, accustomed to an apolitical and technical self-definition, the whole new agenda was too political to be palatable. Officials in nongovernmental organizations and bilateral aid agencies feared that they would become instruments of, and subservient to, foreign policy and defence establishments should they assume security and peace-building concerns (as they blatantly ended up doing in Afghanistan and Iraq). Multilateral agencies were under pressure from their Third World members to abstain from what was perceived to be a deeply interventionist and ideological agenda. Senior aid managers everywhere feared that they lacked the competencies and personnel to perform the new security agenda well and worried about the safety of their staff. Still, these were resistances against an overwhelming tide favouring the engagement of development agencies in peace-building work.

### 8.2.2 2001 and the post-9/11 world

In contrast to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the response to 9/11 *did* lead to the creation of explicit new security frameworks, within which the development/conflict nexus was clearly identified. This is foremost the case for the US and the UK, who organized much of their new security thinking around the concepts of failed states and instability respectively (UK Prime Minister's Strategy Unit 2005; USAID 2004; Weinstein/Porter/Eizenstat 2004; Krasner/Pascual 2005; Milliken 2003). Thus, the UK Prime Minister's Office released in 2005 its *International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response*. The core concept of this strategy is instability, defined as “*inter alia*, coups d'état and other types of illegal or unpredictable political succession; breakdown of political, economic, and social institutions; systemic corruption; widespread organized crime; loss of territorial control; economic crisis; large-scale public unrest; involuntary mass population displacement; and violent internal or international conflict.” A country's capacity to manage effectively and peacefully and adapt to change is at the centre of creating stability. However, addressing other factors including structural risks such as poverty and economic decline, natural resource dependence, and a bad regional neighbourhood, as well as external stabilizers such as security guarantees and strong political associations, are also critical to fostering stability. To work on these varia-

bles, integrated and coherent approaches involving foreign policy, peacekeeping support, development assistance and broader economic support (e.g. trade, debt) are required.

The United States' new 2002 *National Security Strategy* focuses on weak states as breeding havens of terrorism. These weak states are largely poor countries suffering from the effects of civil war – the exact countries with which the development community had begun working on security and conflict a decade earlier. As a major D.C. think tank sees it:

weak and failed states pose a 21<sup>st</sup> century threat that requires institutions and engagement renewed for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. (...) But, the security challenge they present cannot be met through security means alone. The roots of this challenge – and long-term hope for its resolution – lie in development, broadly understood as progress toward stable, accountable national institutions that can meet citizens' needs and take full part in the workings of the international community (Weinstein/Porter/Eizenstat 2004: 2).

This, then, finally brings us to an equation of development with nation/state-building, the ultimate result in the most extreme cases. To quote the same report:

The roots of this challenge – and long-term hope for its resolution – lie in development, broadly understood as progress toward stable, accountable national institutions that can meet the needs of their citizens and take full part in the workings of the international community. (...) With the threat to the United States now coming not from an established state power but from dispersed forces that flourish where authority is illegitimate or non-existent, the state-building challenge can no longer be ignored (Weinstein/Porter/Eizenstat 2004: 8; see also Cragin/Chalk 2003).

A term that has become very popular in DC is LICUS: *Low-Income Country Under Stress*, an ugly acronym developed by the World Bank a few years earlier independently of 9/11 concerns. Much work takes place in both USAID and the Bank on the difficult issues of providing services, rebuilding bureaucracies, and kick-starting economies of such failed/failing states (Rondinelli 2006).

This theme is a further variation of an old Cold War theme: the security to be defended here is foremost *US* or *Western* security. One of the means of doing so is to assure poor countries' stability, which includes military security, but also economic well-being and democratic governance – for these countries can export terrorism, drugs, illegal money, and arms, etc.<sup>10</sup>

In a way, then, what is seen in this post 9/11 phase is, from the perspective of the large western coun-

tries, not only an increasing securitization of development issues (Duffield 2001), but also a newer development focus in security policies: for the first time, development plays a serious role in US security policy.<sup>11</sup> This differs from the Cold War: then, as said, development aid was often allocated to friendly Third World regimes, in the hopes that this would keep them pro-Western and in power (this still happens, of course). Now, the entire toolbox of development aid is brought to bear on countries in Central Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere in order to change their internal politics in ways that are more stable and friendly to US interests. As always, there are divergences between countries. Some European countries, for example, while collaborating in second fiddle roles in the US agenda in Afghanistan and Iraq, maintain distinct profiles in their conflict/development programmes. The Norwegians, for example, using their freedom of not being members of the EU, continue to specialize in an active mediating role in protracted conflicts worldwide, whereas the Danes, after a historic shift to the right in 2004, use new 'region of origin' aid funds – specifically designed to maintain potential refugees at home – in countries with civil war (Baare 2006). As always, too, actual policy lags seriously behind rhetoric, even in the US. Thus, the real on the ground picture is more complicated than the previous remarks suggested: a mixture between ideologies and practices from before 1989, the 1990's, and the current situation prevails.

### 8.2.3 Genealogy: Conclusion

There have been three major phases in the relation between security and development. In the first phase lasting for three decades, part of development assistance was used and abused, according to many critics, to support strategically important states in the fight against communism. The aid itself, however, was used largely for non-conflict related purposes: its use followed the constantly changing visions of how to promote standard socio-economic development. This phase ended at about the same time as the conclusion of the Cold War.

A second phase began from 1989 onwards, occurring in the context of the end of the Cold War but pri-

marily based on dynamics internal to the development enterprise. During this phase, the political nature of aid became acknowledged and the willingness of aid agencies to engage in domestic processes related to governance and conflict increased enormously. During this period, first the post-conflict agenda and then the conflict prevention agenda were born (see below). The fields of justice, security *sensu strictu* (soldiers, police, private defence contractors), broader conflict resolution (ethnic division and exclusionary attitudes; breakdowns of social capital, etc.), human rights, and governance all grew into major new areas of funding and action. All this happened largely because of a desire to do good, to promote development, and to help create a better life for the world's poor<sup>12</sup>.

Another change has been occurring since 9/11 and marks the third phase of the nexus between security and development. The previous agenda is becoming instrumentalized in order to assure the security of the rich countries in what some have labelled the war on terrorism. For those countries on the top of the list of this agenda – Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and some African and Central-Asian oil producers – a mixture of the two previous approaches prevails: they receive an enormous amount of aid designed to keep them stable and friendly to the US and to promote overall economic well-being (phase 1), *and* they are often subject to the increasingly interventionist machinery of state-building, governance, and anti-terrorism (phase 2).<sup>13</sup> For the other countries sliding into and out of conflict, phase two continues, albeit possibly with less funds as some are diverted to the former group.<sup>14</sup>

One final note: this chapter focuses on the development/security nexus, but that is of course not the only change that has taken place in the development community in the last fifteen years; other conceptual and policy shifts are ongoing as well. On a theoretical level, development thinking has changed moderately

10 There are other means as well, of course, ranging from anti-terrorism measures (intelligence, money laundering control) and homeland defence, to military campaigns.

11 I owe this insight to Hans Günter Brauch (personal conversation).

12 As defined by the powerful, admittedly, and limited by what the powerful are not willing to consider, of course – but this has always been the case with aid, and is unavoidable.

13 Note that at the political level these two dynamics contradict each other: the very need to maintain excellent political relations with the governments of countries such as Pakistan, for example, makes it hard to intervene in their domestic politics. Thus it is really only in countries fully 'owned' by donors – foremost Iraq and Afghanistan – that the nation-building agenda can be truly implemented.

during this period. Neo-liberal thought continues to provide the basic framework for policy, albeit in a less extreme manner than in the 1980's. The state has been brought back in and more explicit attention is devoted to the poor and excluded (World Bank 2000). These are departures from the initial radical structural adjustment ideology in which less state and trickle down were the two basic concepts; however, there is no doubt that the basic structural adjustment ideology continues to be the foundation for all development policy. The two major intellectual milestones over the past fifteen years have been Amartya Sen's work defining development as freedom (1999), and new research on poverty and deprivation as seen by the poor and deprived, which demonstrated that powerlessness and voicelessness, but also insecurity and violence, were crucial dimensions of how they defined their situation (Narayan/Patel/Schafft/Rademacher/Koch-Schulte 2000; Chambers 1995). Both these strands of work create a much more holistic and politicized view of what 'development' means, and they thus easily support the growing work at the development/security nexus.

At the policy level, the major change in the development community over the past decade consists of the growing self-critique in the development community, arguing that its *modus operandi* disempowers recipient countries (foremost their governments but also their civil societies) by institutionally weakening them and by not providing enough space for them to be in the driver's seat. As usual, the World Bank (through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, PRSPs) and the OECD (through the 'good donorship' work on harmonization and alignment) have been the two key institutions in developing the acceptable policy alternatives (OECD 2003; Rogerson/de Renzio 2005; Elikana/Mapunjo 2004).<sup>15</sup> A new category of

research and discussion has even come into being on harmonization in 'fragile countries' or 'difficult partnerships', referring precisely to the sort of countries where the development/security nexus is on the agenda: countries with weak government, divided populations, and/or long periods of negative economic growth (OECD 2004; OECD 2005a, 2005b; DfID 2005; McGillivray 2005; ODI 2005; Macrae/Shepherd/Morrissey/Harmer/Anderson/Piron/McKay/Cammack/Kyegombe 2004; Chauvet/Collier 2004). Policy-makers are caught between opposed values and aims here: the harmonization agenda puts a heavy premium on work through governments so as to reduce the burdens imposed by aid, whereas the conflict agenda is cognizant of the fact that governments are often causes of or parties to violent conflicts, and are consequently worried about putting all their eggs in the government basket.

Another major policy trend, based on research conducted at the World Bank, argues that aid is only effective in countries with good policy environments – and it should thus be given only to those countries that can use it well (Burnside/Dollar 2000; Collier/Dollar 2002; Kanbur 2006; Dalgaard/Hansen/Tarp 2004; MacGillivray 2003). Aid selectivity has indeed increased in recent years (DfID 2004; Levin/Dollar 2005). This trend runs too counter to the conflict agenda, for clearly most of the countries where the development/security agenda is being implemented do not belong to the category of good performers. In the US, for example, official rhetoric repeats that aid shall go to good performers only (and a new mechanism, the Millennium Challenge Account, was established for that purpose) while at the same time funds for strategically important countries (such as Central Asian ex-Soviet republics) that are emphatically *not* good performers are increasing as well (Radelet 2003a; 2003b). Of course, this is not new: development aid has always had multiple functions, and it has always been subject to contradictory intellectual and political pressures (Browne 1982).

A final policy trend has been the emergence of the Millennium Development Goals as a central mobilizing framework for much development aid. The Goals were born in the OECD in the mid-1990's, in an attempt to recapture a moral vision for development assistance; they were enshrined in a major 2002 UN conference in Monterrey, Mexico (United Nations 2002; Millennium Project 2005). They are essentially

14 It is hard to say. The past few years have seen a dramatic growth in development assistance, mainly due to the US investments in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also to the establishment of the Millennium Development Corporation: this aid has been largely additional to previous aid flows. The other donors, while substantially providing to these countries as well, are nowhere near the level of US involvement. At the same time, the UK has been in recent years on a much more general mission to increase the flow of concessional resources to the poorest countries through development assistance and debt relief, and this has begun paying off since 2005 as well. All in all, then, most of the new security-motivated aid seems to have been supplemental to traditional aid, a conclusion also arrived at by Woods and Research Team (2004).

15 For many important official documents, see at: <[www.oecd.org/harmonization](http://www.oecd.org/harmonization)>.

a basic needs framework for development, a move away from economic growth as the end-all of development assistance.<sup>16</sup> There is no security/peace goal among them, nor for that matter is there a governance one. However, in its latest report on the MDGs, the UN does devote a chapter to conflict prevention (United Nations 2005; Stewart 2003). The MDGs neither contradict nor particularly strengthen the development/conflict agenda.

### 8.3 Typology

The remaining pages will provide a brief sketch of the specific ways in which the development enterprise has managed its impact on dynamics of conflict and security.<sup>17</sup> The previous section described the context within which the broad conceptual changes occurred; this section discusses the concrete types of actions undertaken. Beneath this taxonomy run two variables: the first is the extent to which conflict matters are incorporated into the development paradigm, i.e., considered not an external objective that development aid can occasionally be (ab)used for, but residing at the very core of the notion of development itself. Second is the extent to which the development enterprise engages explicitly in the political realm, running counter to the norm of sovereignty and the practice of ‘a-politicalness’ that historically underlie its work. It goes without saying that these categories bleed into each other and their ranking is artificial: their separation serves analytical purposes; it is not a descriptive fact.

#### 8.3.1 Conditionality

The first major move toward conditionality came from the IMF, which at its 1991 annual meeting announced the desirability of reducing military spending. A few bilateral donors – foremost those who lost

World War II (Japan and Germany) and who are formally forbidden to have standing armies – soon joined the IMF in taking the lead on this issue. This constituted a major innovation. In the past, when confronted with this issue – as when critics argued that the IMF imposed harsh social cuts but accepted continued high military spending by countries implementing structural adjustment – the standard answer was always that the level of military spending was a political decision of sovereign states and thus beyond the reach of the IMF. Mysteriously, after the Cold War ended and Third World dictators suddenly became less necessary allies of the US, it was discovered that military spending patterns were actually a *financial* matter, related to productive resource allocation and budgeting, thus falling within the competence of the IMF<sup>18</sup>. Still, this is politically very dangerous for the Bretton Woods institutions, and so they must engage in a great deal of verbal gymnastics: “The World Bank position is that a country should govern how it uses its resources, including for military expenditure. Security is essential for growth, but development partners need to be convinced that the pattern of resource allocation is appropriate and well-managed.”

The German and Japanese aid agencies rapidly abandoned their formal policies on the issue: it was too difficult to measure and monitor and too sensitive to impose. The IMF and the European Union, however, have persisted. Since 1993, the IMF includes a section in its World Economic Outlook reports on military expenditures as a problem of resource misallocation. In some cases, such as Cambodia, Pakistan, Romania, and Ukraine, this matter has become a central element in IMF negotiations for stand-by agreements (Jones 1998). Article II of the 2000 Cotonou agreement requires a political dialogue between the EU and recipient countries around issues of excessive military spending. This has led to cutbacks and suspensions in aid to countries such as the Ivory Coast and Kenya. Similarly, in some strong case like Burundi, the Bretton Woods institutions tried to ensure that adjustment loans or debt relief are not diverted for military spending by providing foreign exchange directly to the private sector. In addition, Jim Boyce documents a new but inconsistent practice of making

16 They too contradict the selectivity argument, for the countries with most need for support to achieve the MDGs are often not the good performers. Indeed, the arguments of Jeffrey Sachs (2004), the economist most associated with the MDGs, run entirely counter to those advanced by Collier and Dollar (2004).

17 This section of the chapter builds on Uvin (2002). With the permission of the *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, the original copyright holder, the ideas have been developed further by taking the specific interests and goals of this book into account, as well as the most recent literature.

18 While the UN General Assembly had a history of declaring that military spending was an outrage for development, this (“anti-imperialist”) statement was not taken seriously by anyone. In Boutros-Ghali’s revolutionary 1994 Agenda for Development, however, entire pages were taken up by this subject (par. 17–40).

aid conditional to governments' implementation of peace agreements in those cases where such agreements exist (2002).

In short, an ad hoc practice of threatening to reduce development aid to countries engaged in war, or spending too much on the military, has now persisted for over a decade. Yet, the practice has been very inconsistent and partial; it also seems, a priori, not to have dissuaded any country from doing as it pleased in the security realm. As with human rights conditionality, then, the development community has started looking to "positive conditionality" (collaborative action) rather than "negative conditionality" (arm-twisting).

### 8.3.2 DDR and SSR

Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR), as well as Security Sector Reform (SSR), are perfect examples of such positive engagements that have emerged in the last decade (and would have been largely inconceivable for development actors before). They both consist of using development resources in fields that are at the core of conflict and security in recipient countries, and in a collaborative manner. The former consists of international support to the cantonment and disarmament of soldiers from the national army as well as from rebel groups and paramilitaries. Some of these will join the newly integrated army (this falls under SSR), and most will rejoin civilian life. The latter receive training and medium-term financial support to facilitate that transition.

SSR consists of a new field of action that includes international support for projects and programmes in democratic policing, security sector governance, defence review boards, regional security programmes, and human rights training for the army and police (Brzoska 2003; Wulf 2005; Rupiya 2004; GTZ 2000; Netherlands Institute of International Relations 2002). Ideally, it supports the emergence of a locally owned, externally supported strategy for efficient, 'right-sized,' accountable and rights-conforming national defence (Hendrickson 2002).

Both DDR and SSR are mainly done in post-conflict countries. They are also very politically sensitive (especially SSR), both in the countries concerned and in donor countries. For that reason, many donors fear to go there. However, a few like DFID have acquired significant competence in this area (DfID 2002).

### 8.3.3 Post-Conflict Assistance

The international community has begun codifying and implementing an agenda of using development assistance to promote peace and reconciliation in countries coming out of violent conflict. While the first cases occurred before 1989 – Cambodia, for example – it is really only in the mid-1990's that a fully-fledged field with new institutions and documents emerged. The two most important documents may well be the 1997 OECD Guidelines on Peace, Conflict and Development Cooperation and the 1992 UN Secretary-General Report, *Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali 1992). These documents give priority to areas that until a few years ago were either marginally or totally outside the development agenda: governance and representation; justice and security; prejudice, trauma, and reconciliation<sup>19</sup>.

In effect, the post-conflict domain is at the heart of the entire enterprise of integrating development and peace-building: it is here that most action takes place, and from here that most lessons have been learned.<sup>20</sup> Its domain is vast, covering fields as diverse as demobilization and transitional justice, and countries ranging from Indonesia (Aceh now) to East Timor. Following a 1999 OECD study (Uvin 1999), we can distinguish two types of innovations: brand-new sectors that have been added to the development agenda, such as security sector reform, and new approaches to be used in both the new and the old sectors (conflict sensitivity). Mary Anderson's early work was the first major and deeply influential statement on the latter by addressing the question: how should aid agencies behave differently in zones of violent conflict?

19 For the groundbreaking field work of the War-Torn Societies Project on reconciliation and rebuilding social tissue, see Stiefel (1998); War-Torn Societies Project, at: <[http://wsp.dataweb.ch/load.cfm?edit\\_id=43](http://wsp.dataweb.ch/load.cfm?edit_id=43)>. For research on the Coexistence initiative, see Chayes/Minow (2003).

20 Adebajo 2002; Burnell 2004; Collier 2003; Lawry-White 2003; Boyce/Pastor 1998; Smith 2004; Stedman/Rothchild/Cousens 2002; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004; Crocker/Hampson/Aall 2001; Lund 2003; Chigas/Ganson 2003; Galtung 2001; Cousens/Kumar 2001; Lederach 2002; Uvin 2001; Addison 2003; USAID 2005. On a more methodological level, see also: Church/Shouldice 2003; International Alert 2004; Barton/Crocker 2004; Menkhaus 2003.



### 8.3.4 Do No Harm

Synthesizing a decade of participatory research, Anderson (1999: 39) writes:

Experience shows that aid's economic and political resources affect conflict in five predictable ways:

- aid resources are often stolen by warriors and used to support armies and buy weapons;
- aid affects markets by reinforcing either the war economy or the peace economy;
- the distributional impacts of aid affect inter-group relationships, either feeding tensions or reinforcing connections;
- aid substitutes for local resources required to meet civilian needs, freeing them to support conflict;
- aid legitimizes people and their actions or agendas, supporting the pursuit of either war or peace.

Anderson's aims are eminently practical. She presents innovative practices that can make a difference by allowing agencies to 'do no harm', avoiding unintended negative impacts on conflict dynamics. This line of work has proven to be extremely useful and widely adopted. It is a prime example of how the development community has sought to think differently about how it impacts the dynamics of conflict, regardless of the sector. It applies not only to what one might label conflict programming as such, but also to *all* sectors, whether feeding programmes, education, or community development (Anderson 2000; Anderson/Olson 2001). In so doing, it helps lay the groundwork for the next level: conflict prevention.

### 8.3.5 Conflict Prevention

From the post-conflict agenda, it was but a small intellectual step to conflict prevention, and this step was taken in the late 1990's. The longer one waits to do something about the dynamics of conflict, documents and declarations asserted, the more difficult and costly it becomes to succeed (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 1997; Brown/Rosecrance 1999). Hence, acting earlier, preferably before conflicts become violent and widespread, makes eminent sense (Annan 2001; OECD 2001; European Centre for Conflict Prevention 2004)<sup>21</sup>.

Natural and spontaneous as the step from post-conflict to conflict prevention work may be, it does

constitute an enormous further extension of the development mandate. As every country in the world is by definition a potential pre-conflict country, the new mandate applies axiomatically to *all* developing countries, instead of only the 25 or so that are post-conflict. In addition, the conflict prevention paradigm requires the official acceptance and mainstreaming of the hardest truth in the development community, namely that *all* aid – and not only aid specifically and consciously designed for that purpose – has an impact on the political dynamics of conflict. To quote the first lines of a recent OECD report on the matter:

All aid, at all times, creates incentives and disincentives for peace or for war, regardless of whether these effects are deliberate, recognized or not, before, during or after war. The issue is then not whether or not to create incentives but, rather, how to manage them so as to promote conditions and dynamics propitious to non-violent conflict resolution. (...) This involves recognizing that perceptions matter as much as facts in aid impacts; that who gets which piece of the cake is usually as important as the total size of the cake; that efficiency may sometimes need to be traded for stability and peace; that the development discourse can be used for many political purposes; and, broadly, that process is as important as product (Uvin 1999).

Here we begin approaching an entire rethinking of the development paradigm and associated practice, using an explicitly political lens.

At the level of implementation, much of the conflict prevention agenda is identical to the post-conflict one. There are no magical tools and new insights that are only valid for one but not the other (Lund 1997). There are two main differences between conflict prevention and post-conflict work. First, conflict prevention evidently is done earlier and hence requires early warning, the focus of much work in the last decade (International Alert 2004; van de Goor 1999; Harff 2003; DfID 2002a; Fisher 2000). Second, conflict prevention requires a stronger diplomatic framework to be feasible and successful. This closer integration between development and diplomacy is often couched in terms of coherence (European Commission 2000; Brachet/Wolpe 2004). From the perspective of development practitioners, coherence is at once desirable and dangerous: desirable because it reduces policy conflicts, and dangerous for it may leave the development community in a subservient role to military and foreign policy interests (Lund 2002). The UK is an interesting case in point: in 2001, it integrated funds from the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence to create

21 See also "European Commission Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict", at: <[http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cpcm/cp/list.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp/list.htm)>, 8 March 2006.

not one but two Conflict Prevention Pools: one for unimportant Africa, under the leadership of DfID, and one for the rest of the world, under the direction of the FCO.<sup>22</sup>

True conflict prevention is nearly impossible to achieve: neither international organizations, nor donor governments, nor Third World countries are capable or willing to engage in the sort of political engineering that is required for conflict prevention; hence, it usually occurs *after* major violence has taken place, trying to avoid further flare-ups or escalation (Stedman 1995; Hampson/Malone 2002; Mack/Furlong 2004; Griffin 2003). It remains the current cutting-edge of the development business.

### 8.3.6 Human Security

In the late 1990's, the term 'human security' came into vogue as a way to capture the interdependence between development, security, and peace. The term is rather vague, constituting a mobilizing device favouring the departure from the status quo over an agreed upon definition with specific policy aims. In *In Larger Freedom*, Kofi Annan (2005) refers to three pillars of human security: a) 'freedom from fear'; b) 'freedom from want'; and c) 'freedom to live in dignity'. All this allows various players to define human security very differently. Schematically, one can say that two basic visions exist, one much broader than the other (Ball 2001).<sup>23</sup>

Canada represents the narrower, security-oriented definition of 'freedom from fear'. Starting from the general point that "a people-centred approach to foreign policy ... recognizes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety, or lives," it focuses exclusively on what can be called the human dimensions of security, which includes small arms trade, landmines, and child soldiers (King/Murray 2001).

Japan's approach represents the broader, more development-oriented approach of 'freedom from want'. The late Prime Minister Obuchi said in 1998 that human security is "the keyword to comprehensively seizing all of the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and to strengthening the efforts to confront these threats." The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000) goes

on to list "threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity [such] as poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational organized crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the outflow of refugees and anti-personnel land mines..." It is in this definition that human security amounts to a reconceptualization of the development enterprise, with 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' becoming two inseparable faces of the same coin.<sup>24</sup>

The relative popularity of the human security agenda is *not* the result of the enthusiasm of the military/security establishment, but rather of the development community. The debates about human needs in the 1970's, human development in the 1990's, and human security now, all result from the fact that part of the development community has always resisted what it perceives to be overly narrow and 'economistic' approaches to development; thus using the adjective 'human' as an identifying tag setting it apart from its intellectual competitors. For them, the human security concept holds the promise of achieving two goals: the first is to more firmly embed concerns with insecurity and violence in development work, and the second is to add more attention to poverty and empowerment in high politics (security typically being a far more powerful establishment and policy concern than development).

The Human Security Network (HSN, Fuentes 2007), the Human Security Commission (CHS 2003) as well as UNESCO (see chapter of Goucha in this volume) have promoted this concept globally. Thailand is the only country that has created a 'Ministry on Social Development and Human Security'; it has also launched a 'human security index' to compare the development achievements of its 77 provinces. At the 8<sup>th</sup> ministerial meeting of the Human security network, the Thai Foreign Minister, Kantathi Suphamongkhon stated:

We should encourage a balanced approach towards both freedom from want and freedom from fear. The two freedoms are linked.... We should broaden the scope of our focus into non-traditional threats to human security. This includes the need to address the problem of environmental degradation as well as life threatening diseases and natural disasters. ... Human security is about human empowerment. We must put even more energy into human resource development. This is the best way to prepare people to effectively address human

22 For evaluations, see Lawry-White (2003) and Austin/Chalmers (2004).

23 Burgess and Owen (2004) present definitions by 21 authors.

24 See also Nef (1999); Leaning/Arie (2001), paying more attention to psycho-social factors and Brauch (2005, 2005a), focusing on 'freedom from hazard impacts.'

security issues at all levels. ... This is the top-down plus bottom-up approach.<sup>25</sup>

The 13 member states of the HSN<sup>26</sup>, with South Africa as an observer and Japan and Mexico as friends, have launched many policy initiatives to translate the evolving human security concept into policy, including: landmine clearance, marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons; protection of civilians in armed conflict; human trafficking; human rights education; and work on women, peace and security; people-centred development; and HIV/AIDS.

These are rather low key efforts: they by and large consist of safe policies that are being funded by a wide range of agencies since years in any case. The Commission that wrote the UN Secretary-General's 2005 *In Larger Freedom* report tried to go further and develop a basic equivalence or new compact between traditional security and human security: UN members would help each other in their traditional security concerns (the war against terrorism, for example) and in return seriously promote each other's human security as well. The final report contains enough lip service to all these fine concepts, but deep resistance from among others the US has made sure all this has little to no practical implications. In short, the human security strategy has by and large failed: although it has led to interesting and relevant intellectual work, human security has either become very narrowly defined or it is slowly being dropped from the policy agenda altogether.

## 8.4 Conclusion

The intellectual and operational gap between development and security has shrunk significantly since the early 1990's. Currently there exists a rapidly growing literature, often of the grey kind, on the relationship between development and conflict. Meanwhile policy declarations focused on the need for further mainstreaming and coherence are commonplace. Most of this new work is what conflict resolution professionals would call 'track II' work that is promoting and strengthening dynamics of peace at the level of individuals and communities. However, some of it - in-

cluding military conditionality, security sector reform, or the calls for coherence - falls squarely within the 'track I' government-to-government approach. Other parts of it - DDR, for example, or parts of the post-conflict agenda - seem to constitute new hybrid fields.

Most aid agencies - whether bilateral, multilateral or NGO - are now firmly anchored in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> levels described above: they try to design their projects and programmes in such a way as to do no harm, and they spend significant resources on a variety of new post-conflict sectors, such as reconciliation, transitional justice, and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration. They have hired new specialists, started new projects, and created new desks, divisions, and funds to deal with conflict prevention, management, or mitigation; more recently, they have created inter-agency coordination mechanisms to increase the coherence between their development/conflict resolution and foreign and military policies. There are of course significant differences in the importance they attach to these matters, the degree of explicit political analysis they bring to this work, the sectors, countries, and approaches they tend to privilege, and the specific aims they have.

Unsurprisingly, the post-conflict prevention agenda is strongly resisted by many. There are those in the aid community who long for the "good old days" of technical, apolitical, simplicity: a clear mandate, a specialized technical assistant to execute it, and a nice photo of a new piece of infrastructure. But the strongest dislike comes from Third World governments who may be subject to a wide range of novel and interventionist uses of aid. The conflict prevention agenda is the one that has most suffered from that resistance. Every time the Security Council, or the Governing Board of any UN specialized organization discusses conflict prevention, it encounters resistance from its Third World members. When in the late 1990's the World Bank floated the idea of creating an Operational Directive on conflict prevention, for example, the Chinese and Indian governments successfully demanded that all references in the larger document relating to this part be removed (although a directive was eventually approved in 2001). In addition, a large number of critical scholars consider this agenda - and the associated good governance one - to be a neo-colonialist move, legitimizing social engineering in the South and failing to shine a light on complicity in the North (Gordon 1997; Oberg 2002; Paris 2002; Rieff 2002).

25 See Address by H.E. Dr. Kantathi Suphamongkhon, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, at the Opening Ceremony of The 8<sup>th</sup> Human Security Network Ministerial Meeting, 1 June 2006, Dusit Thani Hotel, Bangkok; at: <<http://www.mfa.go.th/web/200.php?id=16523>>.

26 See for details at: <<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/meeting-e.php>>.

Given this resistance, the development/security agenda in practice is mainly implemented in states too weak to object, and the weaker they are the more complete the approach. Thus, in states under foreign military control (Kosovo or Iraq, for example) or extremely poor and weak (East Timor or Burundi), the agenda is implemented more purely and completely than in richer and stronger states; in the strongest ones (Russia and China come to mind), it is not even a remote possibility. It is important to note that just because it is being implemented fully does not guarantee a successful outcome<sup>27</sup>: clearly, the degree of success depends on a range of factors including the history of the conflict and the political dynamics involved, the extent to which the local powers-that-be share the agenda or seek to subvert it, the degree to which the international community acts with one voice, and so on. Elites in even the weakest of countries continue to possess a significant capacity to resist the successful implementation of the new conflict agenda: they may not be able to autonomously define an agenda that fully conforms to their interests and preferences, but they are sufficiently powerful to reappropriate and sabotage as much as possible.

At the intellectual level, many questions remain. Indeed, after ten years practitioners have fallen into a routine of more or less the same programmes in every country: reconstruction of health and education facilities; the standard macroeconomic framework, with some initial allowances for the sequels of war<sup>28</sup>; a large DDR programme if there is a peace agreement (but with an underfunded R component), including a special programme for child soldiers; a major decentralized block grant programme typically run by the World Bank<sup>29</sup>; some general programmes of financial and technical support to decentralization, to the justice sector, and for elections; a smattering of dialogue,

media, reconciliation, and counselling projects; and lots of funding for all kinds of NGOs.

What impact did all this have on peace? What are the factors that determine this impact? What are the risks and costs of these various approaches? We still have precious little serious knowledge about these issues. Policy-makers and practitioners basically improvise, follow some fads, go with the flow of what is politically feasible, apply what seems to have worked elsewhere, and throw expensive consultancy missions at the problem. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that we do not have clear and consensual concepts – even what peace means is rather elusive – so systematic comparison is hard (Lund 2003); another difficulty is that measurement and attribution are of course stunningly hard when it comes to multi-dimensional and complicated social processes such as the ones that bring about peace<sup>30</sup>.

A deeper problem is that the whole agenda has become too large, interventionist, and devoid of priorities. The post-conflict mandate is enormous and amorphous, basically encompassing the entire political, economic, and social make-up of post-conflict societies. The breadth of the post-conflict mandate and the absence of prioritization mechanisms, together with the paucity of resources, result in donors funding a bit of everything. The outcome is a situation of small, scattered, underfunded, short-term, un-coordinated projects, with large aims and small budgets. This is not to say that many of these projects do not produce some positive impacts on their own terms, nor that they are all necessarily bad ideas. Rather, it is that they are too small, scattered, and isolated to make a fundamental difference on almost anything. The end result is a disturbing absence of checkpoints for change, and a lack of accountability to make a real difference.

Related to that, the post-conflict agenda amounts to an unconstrained and, as usual, totally un-self-critical license to intervene on the part of the international community. Its aims are highly politically sensitive and intrusive, and it is devoid of tools for making choices about priorities or under conditions of scarce resources or conflict – the true art of politics<sup>31</sup>. As a matter of fact, with the exception of Bernard Wood's (2001) report for UNDP, none of the policy statements even mentions that there *are* choices to be

27 For fascinating case studies of Rwanda, see Jones (2001) and Klinghoffer (1998).

28 Collier/Elliott/Hegre/Hoeffler/Reynal-Querol/Sambanis (2003), for example, describe such a macro-economic agenda, but fails to note how few pieces of it are actually implemented; Paris (2004) criticizes it, as does Boyce (2002b) but on different grounds; Addison (2003) has fine case studies.

29 These so-called Community Driven Reconstruction programmes have become very popular staples. See Cliffe/Guggenheim/Kostner (2003) for a description of the aims, and Lund/Wanchek (2004); Mansuri/Rao (2004) and Strand/Toje/Jerve/Samset (2003) for the main evaluations so far.

30 See Church/Shouldice (2003) and Anderson/Olson (2001) for outlines of methodology for evaluation.

31 See Chopra (2002) for a fine case study.

made, or discusses the thorny issue of who will make these choices and on what basis.

The key question of the post-conflict agenda will remain how to define an approach that minimizes the reach of the international community, leaving as much as possible to local actors, while being principled and providing a real added value. The trend until now has been to add new fields of action – an understandable dynamic given the failure of past conflict-blind development assistance. Now it is time to reflect on how to do less rather than more, how to minimize our reach while maximizing our impact. This means making explicit choices and living by them, ensuring maximum participation and (a necessary corollary) transparency, being flexible and yet principled, and being learning oriented – all things that are hard to achieve even under the best of circumstances<sup>32</sup>.

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32 See Stiefel (1998) and the website of the War-Torn Societies Project <[http://wsp.dataweb.ch/load.cfm?edit\\_id=43](http://wsp.dataweb.ch/load.cfm?edit_id=43)>, for a fascinating way out.