

The Case for Modeling Security, Privacy, Usability and Reliability (SPUR) in Automotive Software

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Abstract. During the past few years, there has been considerable growth in the practice of modeling automotive software requirements. Much of this growth has been centered on software requirements and its value in the context of specific functional areas of an automobile, such as powertrain, chassis, body, safety and infotainment systems. This paper makes a case for modeling four cross-functional attributes of software, namely security, privacy, usability, and reliability, or SPUR. These attributes are becoming increasingly important as automobiles become information conduits. We outline why these SPUR attributes are important in creating specifications for embedded in-vehicle automotive software.

Several real-world use-cases are reviewed to illustrate both consumer needs and system requirements — functional and non-functional system requirements. From these requirements the underlying architectural elements of automotive SPUR are also derived. Broadly speaking these elements span three software service domains: the off-board enterprise software domain, the nomadic (device or service) software domain and the embedded (in-vehicle) software domain, all of which need to work in tandem for the complete lifecycle management of automotive software.

1 Introduction

The nature and terrain of computing in the automobile is in a state of transition. Automotive computing is transforming from being function-oriented to being service oriented, while the terrain (or logical boundaries) of computing *in* an automobile is expanding to include both computing elements in the wireless external infrastructure and the nomadic (or hand held, mobile) infrastructure. This transition is being driven on the one hand by consumers, wanting to keep pace with their changing life styles and, on the other hand, by regulatory agencies placing more stringent demands on the attributes such as safety, emissions, fuel economy. Given the transformation in the nature and terrain of automotive computing, this paper makes the case for modeling security, privacy, usability and reliability (SPUR) — motivated in part by David Patterson’s manifesto [1].

For nearly a century, the automobile was defined by components with local functionality and differentiated by proprietary systems engineering implementations involving mostly mechanical coupling between components. Over the past three decades, with the advent of microelectronics and local-area networks [2] in the automobile, there has been a steady growth in the use of mechatronics [3] and the practice of allocating functions across multiple components. The applications of systems engineering principles, in turn has been extended to a combination of mechanical, electronic, digital, analog (or discrete-time, continuous-time) sub-systems and components. With the growing maturity of the software ecosystem [4], including operating systems, programming languages, development environments, and engineering tools, the modern automobile is being increasingly defined by software. There is a trend to allocate automobile functions across multiple standardized components (to reduce the number or unique hardware modules) and to use software design, modeling and engineering for function implementation and associated product differentiation [5]. In this context, the automobile is rapidly becoming a distributed computing environment.

Commensurate with the growth in demand for new features, from both consumers and regulatory agencies, is the increase in the complexity of functional allocation across the distributed computing environment in the vehicle. In addition, the computing terrain of the automobile is rapidly changing [6]. With the advent of wireless personal, local, and wide-area technologies, the physical boundary of the automobile is no longer the logical bounding box for functional allocation. Functions may be distributed across on-board computing units [5], off-board (such as roadside) infrastructure units [7] and nomadic devices [8] such as cellular phones.

To manage this growth in the complexity of allocating functions, a higher level of abstraction will likely be required. A service-oriented computing approach [9] is an attractive option. The present day automobile is function-defined — most consumer perceived features are based on the specification of distributed on-board functions; the future automobile will likely be service-defined, with features being specified, modeled and synthesized by aggregating consumer and vehicle related services from both on-board and off-board sources.

The next section (Section 2) of this paper elaborates the case for SPUR in the automotive context and outlines the role of modeling SPUR. Section 3 introduces two broad examples that highlight the new computational terrain of the automobile and the role of modeling SPUR in these contexts: one example shows how the computational terrain logically extends from the the physical boundaries of the automobile into the roadside infrastructure and the second example illustrates how the new automotive computational terrain extends through nomadic devices and services into the wide area communication networks (such as the wireless telephony networks and, in general, the wireless internet). Section 4 shows how SPUR attributes associated with a specific use-case could be modeled. Section 5 lists requirements for tools needed to develop SPUR models. Section 6 discusses related work. Section 7, in conclusion, summarizes the need to model SPUR in the automotive context.

2 SPUR in the Automotive Context

SPUR [1] was advocated on the premise of shifting research efforts in computer science and engineering away from making faster, cheaper systems to making systems that are more secure, privacy-preserving, usable, and reliable. While these attributes can take on many meanings, we are interested in applying them to the experience of the individual people who own and interact with these systems on a daily basis. For example, while security and reliability can be seen as two sides of the same coin from a technology perspective, from a user's perspective they are two very distinct concepts. A system that constantly fails impacts a user very differently from a system that causes her credit card to be stolen. In this context, we believe that the automotive industry is particularly well-suited to understand the value of each aspect of SPUR-oriented design.

Security in the automotive domain has so far emphasized physical security. The first automobiles were produced without any built-in theft deterrents. Gradually they acquired keys to start the engine and door locks to protect property left in the vehicle. Modern vehicles now use sophisticated radio transmission devices with strong cryptography to prevent unauthorized entry.

Network connectivity is being added to vehicles through telematics services (e.g., OnStar, [®] BMW ASSIST[™]) and hands-free telephony, introducing the possibility of remote intrusion into a vehicle's embedded networks. Not only could a remote intrusion compromise the physical security of the vehicle (i.e., unauthorized remote unlock), but it could directly affect the vehicle's drivability. For example, a virus could trigger the vehicle's theft alarm while driving. Clearly, as the automotive industry integrates more digital network technology into vehicles, its impact on both physical and digital security must be assessed.

On the flip-side of the security coin is a concern for privacy. Modern vehicles "know" much more about their drivers and passengers than ever before. Vehicular navigation systems could be used to correlate data and extract potentially private information. For example, correlating driver location data with the locations of points of interest such as stores, places of worship, community centers and other buildings an organization can build an accurate profile of the driver's interests. The privacy concerns of automobile customers must be treated seriously and safeguarded with the introduction of new technologies such as telematics and navigation services.

The usability aspect of SPUR in the automotive context is especially important because of its impact on safety. An automobile's human-machine interface (HMI) must allow the driver to focus on the task of driving while at the same time providing un-occluded access to driver information as well as comfort and convenience features such as climate and radio controls. Complicating the matter are the integration of new technologies such as mobile phone services, voicemail, messaging, and email into the vehicle HMI. A balance must be struck between the complexity of an HMI with many features and safe usability.

Reliability has been a serious concern in the automotive industry and in the consuming public's minds for some time now. Automobiles are increasingly

becoming software-driven, not just mechanically driven. Therefore, software reliability will be as important as mechanical reliability in future automobiles.

Table 1 outlines automotive examples that exhibit varying combinations of SPUR attributes. Each row categorizes examples as having or lacking some SPUR attributes. In the text that follows, we describe the reasoning behind the values assigned for each row:

- The Carfax[®] web service allows anyone to view detailed maintenance and accident histories of any vehicle for a fee. The service must be secure to prevent unauthorized tampering with vehicle records, usable enough for anyone to understand, and reliable to provide correct information. It’s important to note that we’re considering these attributes from the perspective of an individual user of the system. In this context, these attributes are neither orthogonal or rigorously defined. Instead, these attributes are intended to direct attention to attributes that can be easily overlooked when designing systems that are bigger, better, and faster.
- Safety is the primary concern of anti-lock braking systems (ABS) and so naturally the desire for reliability is high. Along similar reasoning, ABS must be easy and intuitive enough in its function such that untrained drivers can use the system. Security is as much of a concern as for any safety-critical module and should not be vulnerable to remote attack. Privacy is not much of a concern because the ABS does not collect or process any sensitive data to function properly.
- Comparing a standard door key and a valet key, we see that they are similar except in the privacy attribute. Both keys and their associated locking mechanisms must be secure enough to prevent people without keys from entering, both must be highly usable and reliable. However, while a standard door key should grant the holder access to all parts of the vehicle, the valet key is designed to prevent the valet from entering “private” areas, such as gloveboxes or trunks.

Table 1. Examples illustrating SPUR in an automotive context and the relative importance (Low, Medium, High) of each SPUR attribute to each example

Example	S P U R
Carfax [®] database	H L H H
Anti-lock braking system	M L H H
Door key	H L H H
Valet key	H H H H

The examples shown in Table 1 have software that resides either wholly inside the vehicle, or entirely outside the vehicle. Conversely, software implementing sophisticated telematics services reside not only on-board the vehicle but also off-board, including the IT infrastructure of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), dealerships, telecommunications operators, and in hand held consumer




Fig. 1. Diagram of automotive SPUR

devices. Because of the new push of automotive software across module and vehicular boundaries, there is a need to develop models that cross these boundaries as well. Furthermore, because vehicular telematics software relies on dynamic external software, models of telematics systems must change along with deployed systems. A service-oriented approach to implementing automotive software — both in-vehicle software as well as enterprise software — eases the design, implementation and maintenance of systems to ensure that each requirement of SPUR design is present in the system.

Figure 1 illustrates this interesting space. As we stated before, we believe it is important to understand how to model services that cross the embedded and enterprise domains. Within this space are both functional and para-functional (or non-functional) requirements. Functional requirements are more visible, however we believe that the para-functional requirements will be increasingly important. In particular, we are interested in understanding how the mobility inherent in a vehicle impacts this space. Providing functionality to a person driving at highway speeds requires strong attention to SPUR both at the human to machine interface as well as the machine to machine interface. The safety and quality of the driving experience is clearly affected by these attributes. At the same time, designing computer communications systems that support SPUR concerns in these types of mobile applications requires careful attention to system interactions.

3 Examples of Automotive Services

In this section we use two examples to demonstrate the trend towards automotive services extending outside the physical constraints of the vehicle. The

first is the Vehicle Infrastructure Integration (VII) project [7]. The second is the Vehicle Consumer Services Interface (VCSI) project [8]. These two examples demonstrate integration of the vehicle with roadside infrastructure and consumer services respectively.

3.1 VII

The Vehicle Infrastructure Integration project is a joint effort involving the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), state transportation departments, and vehicle manufactures. The VII goal is to develop and deploy the roadside and vehicular infrastructure needed to improve the safety of the nation's roadways. By improving the amount and types of information available from the roadway and by having improved safety warnings and controls, drivers will be better prepared to mitigate or avoid accidents. The features enabled by VII include everything from warning drivers that another vehicle is about to run a red light, to notifying drivers that a given section of road is covered with ice.

The VII roadway system consists of roadside units (RSUs) deployed along highways and onboard units (OBUs) built into vehicles that communicate with each other using the Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) protocol at 5.9GHz. The roadside units are wired to an information services backend that can track traffic conditions as well as log safety problems throughout the system. Vehicles transmit useful sensor data, such as GPS location, velocity, and traction to the roadside units, which in turn process the sensor data and report back to vehicles in the area if any safety issues may be present. For example, if several vehicles report that their traction control and anti-lock brake systems were activated at the same spot on the highway, the roadside unit nearest the problem area can broadcast a warning to oncoming vehicles. Vehicles can also communicate with other vehicles directly, enabling dynamic warnings such as a vehicle notifying the vehicles directly behind it that the driver is braking suddenly.

Table 2 lists the titles assigned to some of the first scenarios being considered. In addition, it highlights how important the SPUR attributes are to each scenario. In general, scenarios that are likely to affect driver behavior or well-being have a high impact from security. For example, an incorrect signal that an emergency vehicle is approaching could cause great headaches to drivers, and potentially disrupt the usage of this signal by true emergency vehicles. Thus, it's important that such a system be secure against malicious manipulation. On the other hand, spurious information about traffic is less likely to significantly impact drivers, hence it is listed as having medium importance relative to security.¹ Privacy is more of a concern when revealing information about specific vehicles, as in the case of intersection warnings. On the other hand, road conditions are likely to be broadcast to everybody, and therefore unlikely to contain a

¹ It's important to note that we're talking about a subjective measure of security for illustrative purposes. We strongly believe that all of these attributes are important considerations for any scenario.

Table 2. List of VII use cases and the relative importance (Low, Medium, High) of each SPUR attribute to each use case

Use case	S P U R
Emergency Brake Warning	M L H H
Curve Speed Warning	M L H H
Traffic Signal Violation Warning	H M H H
Stop Sign Violation Warning	H M H H
Emergency Vehicle Approaching	H L H H
In-Vehicle Signage	M L M M
Traffic Information and alt route guidance	M L M H
Electronic payments	H H M H
Roadway Condition Information	M L H H
Traffic Management	H L H H
Emergency Vehicle At Scene	H L H H

significant privacy risk. In general, usability and reliability are significant to all of these scenarios. In some cases, usability is less important, since the consequences are less severe.

3.2 VCSI

The second project, the Vehicle Consumer Services Interface (VCSI), is a project at Ford to provide an interface between consumers, their personal devices, off-board services, and vehicle systems including both networks and devices. VCSI is implemented as a service-oriented architecture, meaning that functions within the vehicle are designed as services to be used by other functions and may reside on one or more hardware modules. This design philosophy has advantages such as code reuse between modules and reduces the impact of the redesign of a module. For a more extensive treatment of VCSI see [8].

To demonstrate this system, we developed a prototype vehicle that contained several specific applications including those shown in Table 3. As with the VII examples above, we've made some attempt to demonstrate the relative importance of each SPUR attribute to each service. Since most of the consumer facing

Table 3. List of VCSI services and the relative importance (Low, Medium, High) of each SPUR attribute to each service

Service	S P U R
Vehicle Personalization	L H M H
Personal Information Management	H H M M
MyHome (Home Automation Services)	H H M M
Bluetooth Technology	H H M M
Real-time navigation	M L M H
Diagnostics	H M H H
In-vehicle media player	M M M M

services provided by VCSI are not safety critical, they have lower requirements on usability and reliability. At the same time, most of these services depend on interfacing with devices that have personal information. In that context, it's important that the privacy of the data contained within those devices be kept secure.

Overall, we think these two projects demonstrate an increasing trend towards increased connectivity with a vehicle, both from consumer devices and from roadside infrastructure. In addition, we believe that modeling provides the means to understand these services provided to the consumer at a system level.




Fig. 2. A sequence diagram showing the interactions between entities in a parking garage with an electronic payment service. In this scenario a driver parks her car in a smart parking garage and electronically pays upon exit.

4 Electronic Payment Use Case

In this section, we present a more in-depth look at the electronic payment use case mentioned in Section 3 and how it relates to SPUR-oriented design. With electronic payments, drivers will have the ability to pay for parking electronically without interacting with a parking meter or a garage attendant. Drivers will no longer have to dig around for spare change and municipalities will no longer have to collect cash from parking meters.

Figure 2 shows a sequence diagram for a vehicle involved in an electronic payment scenario with a parking garage. The main entities in the diagram are the driver of the vehicle, the vehicle’s software systems (implemented in a service-oriented architecture, as shown in Figure 3), the vehicle’s OEM (or a delegate of the OEM), and the parking garage authority. When the vehicle enters the garage, the garage transmits a list of services and their costs to the vehicle, which in turn presents this information to the driver through the vehicle’s HMI.




Fig. 3. The vehicle services needed to implement electronic payment in a service-oriented architecture

Assuming that the driver is willing to pay the cost to park, she acknowledges the cost of service, parks the vehicle and leaves. The vehicle sends a signed acknowledgement to the garage. Later, the driver returns and begins driving out of the garage. The garage calculates the amount of money owed and securely transmits a bill to the vehicle. The vehicle notifies the driver of how much is owed through the HMI and requests that the driver consent to pay. Confirmation from the driver causes the vehicle to transmit an encrypted, signed payment authorization message to the OEM. The OEM, acting in the role of an e-payment service, securely credits the funds to the parking garage and returns a signed receipt to the vehicle showing proof of payment. Finally, the garage sends a signed receipt to the vehicle showing that it has received its requested payment.

Thus, at the end of the interaction between the driver and the garage, the driver has proof from both the OEM and the garage that she has paid what she

owed. The garage has a signed acknowledgement from the driver stating that she understood the cost to park before she parked her vehicle as well as funds deposited by the OEM to pay for parking. The receipts returned to the driver are necessary to prove that she paid for services in the case of a dispute between the garage and driver. Similarly, the signed acknowledgement agreeing to the cost of parking from the driver is necessary to dissuade a driver from renegeing on payment upon exit from the garage.

4.1 Challenges

There are many challenges involving SPUR in the context of such an automotive e-payment system. While many of these challenges are not unique to e-payments in general, the scope of this paper is to understand how these issues are unique in an automotive context.

First are questions of infrastructure. E-payments require a secure, potentially private, system for transferring money from a driver or other occupant in the car to a specific payee. We also assume that these payments will reflect current cash payment characteristics, specifically, we need to support individual transactions of less than one dollar. This requires the support of a third party to aggregate payments on both sides of the payment. This could be the vehicle manufacture, as we've outlined before, a credit card issuer, or an Internet e-payment provider.

Automotive e-payment is inherently a mobile application. Malicious agents are likely to have easy access to all communication that takes place outside the vehicle. In addition, unlike personal mobile devices such as a cell phone, there is inherently less physical security over the vehicle. Cars are often parked in public spaces, and routinely in control of mechanics. Even users sometime have a vested interest in modifying the vehicle software, as evidenced by powertrain modification chips. These reasons imply that some type of end-to-end assurance is needed about the legitimacy of each individual transaction. However, there is an inherent trade-off between the sophistication of a given security system and the risk of compromise. For example, an individual driver is unlikely to notice or care if a individual penny or quarter is missing from his car when she takes it in for service. Similarly, users often trade off convenience for increased risk of monetary loss. For example, many electronic cash cards such as the Octopus card used in Hong Kong [10] require no authentication to use, and the owner assumes that a lost card implies the money associated with that card is also lost. Similarly, in-vehicle e-payment systems need to take into account the unique environment when trading off risk with cost. Mobility also has implications for the reliability of the system. There is no guarantee that a device will always stay in communications range during the period of a transaction.

Providing security and privacy in electronic transactions naturally implies the use of cryptographic protocols. In contrast to general purpose computers, the computational power and upgrade capabilities of embedded devices is severely limited. In addition, unlike the consumer electronics side of the embedded, mobile marketplace, vehicle software has a useful life of over ten years. In this context, how do we ensure that the computational power will be great enough

to support key lengths that can't be easily compromised long into the future, without needless expense? At the same time, flaws in cryptographic protocols are not uncommon, so the in-vehicle software should be upgradable, without causing undue burden on the driver.

Second, are questions of authentication. How do we authenticate that the person responsible for the account used in the transaction is authorized to make the payment? We can't always assume that the driver is authorized to make payments with an account associated with the vehicle. Valets or even teenage drivers quickly complicate this assumption. At the same time, we want to authenticate the payee to the driver, making sure that a hacker hasn't set up their own virtual toll booth at the side of the highway, while still making it easy for small businesses to use the system. In some sense, the physical nature of our scenario provides opportunities not usually seen on the Internet. Most drivers require a physical or electronic key in order to enter a vehicle. At the same time, in the scenarios that we described, the payee will be in physical view of the driver. This presents an opportunity to provide out-of-band signaling to facilitate authentication.

Similarly, the physical nature of owning a vehicle presents an opportunity for associating real people with digital identities. In buying or leasing a vehicle, most buyers have little expectation of privacy. Most transactions require some type of financing, necessitating at least a credit check. Even in situations where this isn't the case (e.g. person to person cash transactions), owning a vehicle requires licensing with the state, another transaction which implies a lack of privacy, and a financial interest in correctly identifying the owner.

Finally, the interface between the driver and the vehicle computer system poses several important challenges. Because we are talking about the driver authorizing payments while driving, this interaction needs to require little attention from the driver. At the same time, we need drivers to understand the security implications of the actions they're performing. Studies of web browser security have demonstrated techniques to better inform users of the security implications of the current browser state [11].

5 Modeling Requirements

The electronic payment use case detailed in Section 4 touches on all aspects of SPUR-oriented design. For vehicular electronic payment to be widely accepted, sensitive financial information must be securely exchanged between the vehicle, the OEM, and a service vendor. The privacy of financial dealings must also be preserved. Furthermore, the HMI must clearly present information about the cost of a service and indicate when consent is required. Finally, electronic payment systems must be reliable enough to give drivers the confidence to wholly adopt them.

In order to design an electronic payment system, it's important to model various aspects of the design before building a production system. This modeling would allow designers to understand how the intended system meets these and

other important attributes. However, modeling the parking garage use case requires a diverse set of tools and disciplines. The driver must not be distracted while making financial transactions yet the HMI must be involving enough to assure the driver that they are making a secure transaction. The HMI may use a text display, an LCD, voice recognition, or a combination of interface technologies to communicate with the driver. We must be able to realistically model a user interface with all of these qualities.

A significant amount of software of varying complexity is involved in our use case, from less complex programs embedded in the vehicle to highly complex back-end software at the OEM and parking garage vendor. The interactions between the vehicle, the OEM, and the service vendor must be modeled as well. We thus require a software modeling tool that can effectively model heterogeneous software environments with varying levels of complexity.

Each aspect of SPUR is a whole-system attribute. For example, spending resources on creating a security-hardened implementation of the vehicle's embedded programs is useless if the communications between the vehicle and OEM are unencrypted. Similarly, an electronic payment system with a highly reliable embedded program but a buggy OEM back-end interface makes the system as a whole unreliable.

Therefore, to fully evaluate each aspect of SPUR we must be able to study the HMI of the vehicle, its embedded programs, the OEM and parking garage enterprise software as a single system. We require a single tool or suite of tools that can fully inter-operate in order to model the interactions between each of the system's components. The tool must allow us to inject faults or directed attacks and measure the effects both in terms of software metrics (i.e. loss of privacy, reduced reliability) and in terms of customer-facing metrics such as the effect of a fault at the OEM on the in-vehicle HMI.

While many existing tools could be used to realize this goal, there are some important requirements that should be met. First, it's important for a model to accurately reflect the design of the final product. A software system that is modeled in one tool and then completely redesigned and rewritten for production is likely to provide little value in predicting security and reliability concerns. At the same time, a modeling tool needs to allow abstractions that simplify the process of quickly building a model that can be tested before the design is finalized. Another important requirement is a tool that can easily inter-operate with other tools. While a single tool that can model everything from the HMI to the back end database might be simpler, it is unlikely to ever meet all the needs of designers and researchers. Instead such a system is likely to be tested using a suite of tools tied together to meet the unique needs of the team.

Overall, the important attributes for a system for modeling SPUR attributes has less to do with the individual tool features, but more to do with the ability of the tool to adapt to the goals of the modeling project. For example, techniques for compromising the security of a system are constantly evolving. A single tool is unlikely to meet the needs of a system security audit without adapting to new techniques. At the same time, the local resources and techniques available to

a design team are likely to be unique. However, we believe that a system level approach to modeling new systems provides a valuable approach to understanding how the SPUR attributes are preserved by a given design.

6 Related Work

While we could not hope to completely cover all relevant works in the individual disciplines of security, privacy, usability and reliability, in this section we present key related work in each of the SPUR attributes related to information systems in the automotive domain.

- *Security* As vehicles become connected to exterior networks, such as through telematics systems, the possibility of malicious hacking of vehicle networks increases. Wolf et al. [12] investigate the vulnerabilities of several common vehicle networking technologies including CAN, FlexRay, and LIN.
- *Privacy* Privacy is a concern in any system where vehicles broadcast their GPS location on a regular basis. A powerful entity, such as a government, could attempt to track the locations of individual vehicles if countermeasures are not taken. Sampigethaya et al. [13] have devised CARAVAN as a way to ensure location privacy in these types of systems. CARAVAN works by, among other techniques, grouping clusters of vehicles together and periodically nominating a new group leader to broadcast probe data while other vehicles remain silent.
- *Usability* Usability is probably the most familiar attribute to the general public. Most people have experienced the frustration of trying to turn on the windshield wipers, for example, in an unfamiliar car. A lot of research has been performed in understanding driver distraction as it relates to the usability of various in-car features. For example, Nowakowski et al. investigate usability problems with in-vehicle navigation systems [14].
- *Reliability* Reliability is also extremely important to the automotive industry and the embedded systems community in general. Unlike a desktop computer, an embedded system, such as an automotive powertrain controller, is expected to work all the time or at least fail in a way that doesn't leave the driver stranded on the side of the road. Tindell et al. look at formal methods for designing safe automotive software [15].

7 Conclusion

Given the transformation that both the nature and terrain of computing in the automobile are undergoing, this paper has outlined the case to model security, privacy, usability and reliability (SPUR) in the context of the software enabled services associated with the automobile. SPUR represents a set of attributes that are not explicitly articulated or demanded by the end customer or consumer and hence, broadly speaking, SPUR represents non-functional, or para-functional, attributes.

Security, privacy, usability and reliability have all been product creation requirements that have been well understood and refined by the automotive industry over the years, but almost exclusively in the mechanical or physical context. With the advent of the information-enabled automobile — connected to the roadside infrastructure and to consumer devices — SPUR takes on a very different interpretation. This paper highlights the importance of SPUR. In addition, we make a case for modeling SPUR, as this would avoid costly and time consuming hardware investments and will likely provide quick insights into how technologies and standards could be adapted to meet automotive SPUR requirements.

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