

Henry Bäck · Hubert Heinelt
Annick Magnier (Eds.)

The European Mayor

Political Leaders
in the Changing Context
of Local Democracy

BUNDESTAG GRUNDGESETZ POLITISCHES SYSTEM EUROPÄISCHE UNION
WAHLEN VERFASSUNG INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN POLITISCHE THEO
RIE PARTEIEN INSTITUTIONEN POLITISCHE KULTUR POLITISCHE ELITEN
PARLAMENTARISMUS DEMOKRATIE MACHT REGIERUNG VERWALTUNG FÖDER
ALISMUS POLITISCHE SOZIOLOGIE GLOBALISIERUNG POLITISCHE KOMMU
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Henry Bäck · Hubert Heinelt · Annick Magnier (Eds.)

The European Mayor

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1 Introduction

Henry Bäck, Annick Magnier and Hubert Heinelt

There are various images of the political leader in Europe's cities and towns. There is the time-honoured ceremonial mayor watching over the keys of the city. But there also is the political boss ruthlessly governing his/her 'subjects'. We might also offer the streamlined university educated professional or the executive committee leader promoted to a *primus inter pares* after long service in a political party.

With this book we aim to describe and analyse the selection, daily life, networks and values of local top political leaders in seventeen European countries. The empirical basis for the investigation into town halls across Europe is a survey conducted mainly in 2003 and 2004 with mayors and corresponding top local political leaders. The data covering responses from more than 2,700 leaders¹ constitute a unique and rich material allowing descriptions and analyses pursuing a number of lines of inquiry.

1.1 *The changing context*

An important point of departure for the book is that major structural changes have been taking place in European local government systems around the turn of the millennium (see e.g. John 2000; Le Galès 2002; Kersting and Vetter 2003; Denters et al. 2003; Haus et al. 2005; Heinelt and Kübler 2005), changes that have already had substantial consequences for local political leadership and are likely to bring about further change in the future. A number of such restructuring trends are sweeping over the continent, but - and this may be significant - from different starting points, at varying pace and in various mixed configurations. Local governments in Britain and Scandinavia with traditionally a heavy emphasis on the provision of welfare state services do not start out from the same circumstances as newly erected local authorities in post-communist

¹ For inter-country comparison we have weighted data to compensate for varying national response rates. This means that inferences are made to the total population of European mayors (restricted to the participating countries).

eastern and central European countries or, for that matter, highly fragmented south European systems deeply embedded in and intertwined with central government's political and administrative bodies. Federal systems such as Austria, Belgium, Germany and Switzerland present yet other contexts for local governments. The research was designed to assess how, by playing on these different contexts, the re-structuring trends and reforms inscribed in the wider framework of increasing global exchanges impact on the concept and praxis of political representation at local level.

One such important reform movement has been privatisation, contracting out and generally mimicry of private sector institutional arrangement, be it the management of big companies or the fragmented self-regulating market that serves as the model. This reform movement has often been labelled '*New Public Management*'. We planned to investigate how this movement, in one of its numerous interpretations, has led, beyond the visible structural and functional transformation of local authorities (acting less as service providers, more as regulatory or mobilising organs) to different relationships within the town-hall between political officials and non-elected administrators, and is influencing the traditional "ecology" of local political-administrative systems..

Another key power with which local governments must necessarily interact consists of the upper levels of the public sector, including central government. In most European local government systems the general trend of change in central-local relations has been described as *decentralisation*, whereby new tasks have been allocated to the local level. There are examples of reforms of central government grant systems and equalisation schemes that increase the discretion of local authorities. The reconstruction of autonomous local governments in Central and Eastern Europe is a historic instance of decentralisation. But there are examples of the opposite movement. Especially during the years of the Thatcher regime there were obvious trends of centralisation and dismantling of British local government. In some cases decentralisation has primarily been a case of strengthening the intermediate regional level, as for instance in France. Devolution to the Scottish and Welsh regions is another example. Whether globalisation is considered the leading process in the current construction of local practice or not, one common assumption in the literature concerns the growing competition between localities. We sought to enquire into the concrete significance of such competition for local representatives and to assess its outcome using political leaders as observers of recent tendencies in multi-level government restructuring.

If the private sector and business on the one hand, and the upper levels of government and especially central government on the other, are crucial points of orientation for local governments in Europe, the third aspect is undeniably that

of *political parties*. The importance of political parties varies greatly between and within national local government systems as well as between municipalities. The first local authorities, especially those in the pre-democratic era, were not party politicised. Party politicisation proceeded with democratisation, typically spreading out from urban centres to rural peripheries, and in some countries this process is still under way. Indeed, in a number of countries and a number of local authorities within the countries the party system has matured to the point of becoming overripe. The much-discussed phenomenon of ‘the decline of parties’ has also affected local governments. In some cases, as in Italy with the collapse of the traditional party system in the early 1990s, this has happened in dramatic forms. It is of interest, in this perspective, to compare such developments with the situation in Eastern Europe: if cities where parties decline could be regarded as post-modern, Eastern and Central Europe are pre-modern. The old party system in this area, which was a one-party system, has likewise collapsed and a new party system is now being constructed, but it remains haunted by the unfavourable reputation of political parties inherited from the old regime.

Thus our general aim in observing mayors’ past and present dependency on political parties as a possible step in building their career, winning the election and defining their policy priorities was to measure the concrete transformation of their influence in the local polity.

A fourth trend of change concerns the internal institutional arrangements of local authorities. In many countries these changes directly concern the role of political leadership. *Strengthening the political executive* has been the hallmark of institutional reforms in a number of countries. Direct popular elections of mayors have been introduced in systems that previously practised the system of appointment by the council (Borraz and John 2004; Caciagli and Di Virgilio 2005). This has been the case in Italy and Poland and in a bandwagon reform movement in Germany. The option of direct mayoral elections has been one of the options offered to British local authorities in the re-shaping of the constitutional setup of Britain. But there are also examples of reforms aiming at *increasing the influence of citizens* by using local referenda and initiatives as in Germany, strengthening citizens in their role as users of municipal services as in Denmark or through the use of, often one-way, consultation procedures as in Britain. A common denominator of many of these reforms concerning both the executive and citizen influence is the tendency to bypass the political parties, thus conflicting with the observed trend of increasing party politicisation in many systems.

The structural transformations in terms of ‘New Public Management’, central-local government relations, party politicisation, the formal position and organisation of the executive and arrangements for strengthening citizen influence

all may be seen as concerning that which in a current discussion has been labelled 'local government', as against 'local governance'. The catchphrase 'from government to governance' has been used to describe an alleged transformation of the local political arena with increasing involvement of actors and actor categories which, unlike local government organisational units, cannot be integrated into hierarchical chains of command, but which form exchange networks and coalitions with local government and its political and administrative leadership.

In this structural context in flux the position and role of the mayor is changing; variations between and within national systems as well as differences between mayors are highlighted by the contributions to the book and form the focus of this analysis.

1.2 The Comparative Research Design

In these circumstances where change appears to be a dominant feature, the groups working jointly on the research (see Box 1) all acknowledged the lack of basic up-to-date information available for cross-national (or supra-national) analysis on issues of European local government. More precisely, their shared ambition was to gather data on local leadership, offering a partial but thought-provoking prospect for an assessment of the transformation of European local democracies, as it is perceived by the holders of the role subjected to the most significant revisions, namely the role of mayor, or as it may be inferred from changes in their recruitment, career, behaviour, expectations and culture.

The population investigated consists of political leaders in European municipalities²

- holding a position at the top of the city's administration and/or political bodies, thus being endowed with
 - (i) organisational resources not available to other actors,
 - (ii) political influence not available to other actors,
 - (iii) an overall responsibility with respect to urban policies, and
 - (iv) representative functions not carried out by other actors,
- being publicly visible in what they do and politically accountable for their actions by depending on some form of consent by the citizenry or its representatives and being controlled by modes of public communication (informational rights, local media etc.).

2 See for this definition of local political leaders Haus and Heinelt 2005: 27.

Box 1: Composition of the international research group

The idea of the research was first delineated in a meeting of the Euro-loc network (coordinated in Syddansk Universitet, Odense) held in Bordeaux in 2002. After having concluded the ‘Udite Leadership Study’ on appointed municipal chief executive officers (see Klausen and Magnier 1998; Mouritzen and Svava 2002) it was decided to reinforce cooperation for comparative research on local government between the members of this network. Promoted by Florence University, the project gathered a first core of participants from inside the Euro-loc network before enlarging it to the seventeen European teams which finally participated in collection of the data. These teams were:

- *Austria:* Franz Fallend (University of Innsbruck);
- *Belgium:* Herwig Reynaert, Kristof Steyvers (Ghent University),
- *Czech Republic:* Zdenka Vajdova, Michal Illner (Academy of Science, Praha),
- *Denmark:* Ulrik Kjær, Rikke Berg (Syddansk Universitet),
- *England:* David Sweeting (University of the West of England, Bristol),
- *France:* Eric Kerrouche (Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux Talence),
- *Germany:* Hubert Heinelt, Björn Egner, Michael Haus (Darmstadt University of Technology),
- *Greece:* Nikos Hlepas (University of Athens), Panagiotis Getimis (Panteion University),
- *Hungary:* Gabor Soós, Gyorgyi Ignits (Tocqueville Research Centre, Budapest),
- *Ireland:* Paula Russell (U.C. Dublin),
- *Italy:* Annick Magnier, Pippo Russo, Chiara Zanoccoli, Giovanna Cutrone, Irene Borselli, Nicola Malloggi (University of Florence), Clemente Jesus Navarro Yanez (Universidad Pablo de Olavide Sevilla),
- *Netherlands:* Bas Denters (Universiteit Twente), Harry Daemen (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam),
- *Poland:* Pawel Swianiewicz (University of Warsaw),
- *Portugal:* Manuel da Silva e Costa, José Pinheiro Neves; Jean Dominique Ackle (Minho University),
- *Spain:* Carlos Alba, Carmen Navarro (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid),
- *Sweden:* Henry Bäck, Vicki Johansson, Folke Johansson, David Karlsson (Göteborg University),
- *Switzerland:* Daniel Kübler (University of Zürich), Pascal Michel (Lausanne).

The political leaders thus defined are included in the study, irrespective of whether they have the formal title of "mayor" (or the closest corresponding term in the various languages) or not. For convenience we have throughout the book adopted the term "mayor" for all respondents to the survey. The definition of 'political leader' implies for instance that in English cities without a directly elected mayor, it is the council leader that will be included in the study, and in Swedish municipalities it will be the leader of the executive committee. We are also aware that there are important variations in the degree that our two criteria – political/administrative top position and visibility/accountability – are met. The political/administrative top position of ceremonial Irish mayors could for instance be doubted; likewise, one could dispute the local political accountability of Dutch mayors since they are central government appointees.

The written questionnaire was prepared through an attentive secondary analysis in the distinct thematic areas; it was then discussed and approved in two international meetings (see Box 2).³ The questionnaire was translated and contextualised by the national teams and finally sent to the mayors in charge of local authorities with more than 10.000 inhabitants.⁴

Box 2: International seminars of the research group

International seminars of the research group were held at the following places and with the support of the mentioned institutions:

- Florence, in February 2003 (at the Dipartimento di Scienza della Politica e Sociologia),
- Madrid, in July 2003 (at the Summer School residence of the U.A.M., at La Cristallera),
- Hydra, (Greece) in March 2004 (in the Town Hall),
- Lerici, (Italy) in September 2004 (in the Town Hall),
- Darmstadt, in June 2005 (at the Institute for Political Science of Darmstadt University of Technology).

3 The full text of the common questionnaire is included in Appendix 1 in the version distributed to the national teams for translation in their own languages. In this version, the 'language' used was a 'basic' English which demonstrated fitter to partake the research problems faced in the different questions than the correct 'English version', which was elaborated to be submitted to the English mayors.

4 The echelon of 10.000 inhabitants allows to attain a minimal similarity of the milieu (of urbanity) in which mayors are acting in and thus a consistent sample in all the covered European countries. However, it has been clear that this selection of the sample implies limits which will be successively reflected in many of the contributions of this volume.

There was general agreement among the partners that the questionnaire should be enriched through the constitution of sub-groups in which the different disciplinary and national approaches to the problems would find room and lead to the proposal of thematic chapters.

Referring to the classical typology of Rokkan (1969), the research can be labelled as a case of 'cooperative' cross national survey, but with significant variations on the ideal-type. Although the data collection was executed by the national teams the design of the survey (and especially the questionnaire) was developed with the contribution of the entire international team during the two above mentioned seminars. In a series of further international seminars (see Box 2) the interpretations of the data were discussed. These interpretations were proposed by the international thematic groups who had contributed to elaboration of the questionnaire in the early stage of the research.

Policy-oriented questioning was combined with idiographic orientation to inspire data interpretation through the whole set of contributions. But such questioning in many of the contributions, focuses on domestic experiences and problems, relying on comparison to address theoretical or operative national or regional issues. Furthermore, even in presence of European enunciations on the trends of change in local government (under labels like governance, NPM, entrepreneurship etc.), the research community in the past decades has in fact encountered few opportunities of sharing hypotheses and ideas in the field on a continuous basis. Consequently, it was agreed to allow the different international thematic groups considerable freedom to define their own sets of hypotheses and interpretative tools. This implies for example that variables appear from one chapter to another as dependent or independent variables.

Table 1: Basic information about data collection in the different countries

Country	Survey conducted	dataset	response rate
Austria	February 2004	40	54,8
Belgium	April 2003 - June 2003	140	41,9
Czech Republic	June 2003	78	45,1
Denmark	November 2003	108	76,1
England	July - October 2003	123	31,8
France	June - December 2003	188	21,0
Germany	April 2003	636	41,0
Greece	December 2002	145	66,8
Hungary	June 2003	82	59,0
Ireland	July 2003	20	35,1
Italy	April - September 2003	256	25,3
Netherlands	September 2003	234	58,0
Poland	Sept. - November 2003	229	27,8
Portugal	March - May 2004	41	22,5
Spain	March - July 2004	155	24,2
Sweden	April - July 2003	142	65,4
Switzerland	June 2003	94	66,7
Total		2711	36,7

Table 2: Population size distribution of the municipalities of the respondents

	10.000-14.000	15.000-19.000	20.000-29.000	30.000-49.000	50.000-99.000	100.000-199.999	200.000-499.999	Above 499.999	Total
Austria	42.5	22.5	12.5	15.0	2.5	5.0			100.0
Belgium	36.4	22.9	22.1	10.7	5.7	1.4	0.7		100.0
Czech Rep.	21.8	21.8	26.9	10.3	15.4	3.8			100.0
Denmark	42.6	16.7	15.7	15.7	7.4	1.9			100.0
England				2.5	33.3	45.0	15.8	3.3	100.0
France	35.6	17.0	23.9	16.0	4.8	1.6	0.5	0.5	100.0
Germany	34.9	19.5	20.3	15.1	6.2	2.1	1.6	0.5	100.0
Greece	38.2	12.5	16.7	11.8	14.6	4.9	0.7	0.7	100.0
Hungary	37.8	17.1	17.1	14.6	7.3	6.1			100.0
Ireland		18.8	25.0	6.3	12.5	25.0	6.3	6.3	100.0
Italy	34.6	17.3	16.5	15.2	11.5	3.7	0.4	0.8	100.0
Netherlands	24.5	15.9	24.0	19.7	10.3	4.7	0.4	0.4	100.0
Poland	36.8	19.3	18.0	14.9	5.7	3.5	1.3	0.4	100.0
Portugal	12.2	17.1	17.1	14.6	19.5	17.1	2.4		100.0
Spain	23.2	23.2	21.3	10.3	11.6	5.8	3.2	1.3	100.0
Sweden	35.2	9.9	15.5	19.7	14.8	4.2		0.7	100.0
Switzerland	44.7	29.8	11.7	8.5	2.1	2.1	1.1		100.0

We have not tried to superimpose a common theoretical scheme on all the different questions raised by these various developments and investigated by the contributors to the book. However, problem definitions, attitudes and opinions form our core dependent variables, i.e. we start from an actor-centred approach while it is common understanding in the group that the relation between structure and process (or actors) must be considered dialectically. It is crucial in particular to determine how actors perceive imperatives linked to or deriving from their role. Such perceptions are usually not just individual but are viewed communicatively, i.e. collectively developed and reproduced. Insofar as the development and reproduction of a common understanding or ‘meaning system’ of what is possible or appropriate is based on a communicative process, an understanding of the scope of the respective community or social grouping is essential. It can be construed as part of a national framework, but it can be a local setting as well. This points to the importance of place or the ‘dynamics of place’, i.e. a specific social context or environment in which the above mentioned communicative processes take place. Furthermore, respective communities or social groupings influencing behavioural patterns can be ‘sectorial’ (professional) or ‘generational’ (cohorts). Additionally, gender can play a role in problem perceptions, attitudes, opinions etc., and, finally, job experiences extending over a given period of time (length of incumbency) can make a difference.

The variables through which we described actors and structures in the different chapters of this book are mainly based either directly on the item of the questionnaire or on specific aggregations of these items – consecutively presented by the authors in the single contributions. Two secondary variables are nevertheless based on other sources.

In classifying the orientation of political parties, we referred to the typology of the Manifesto Data Set 1945-1998 (as indicated in particular in Appendix 1 of Budge et al. 2001). The more recent parties and those active in countries not covered in this research were classified on the same basis by the Florentine team together with the national teams concerned.

Data concerning job positions (obtained in most countries from an open question) were coded by the national teams or by the Florentine team according to the ISCO classifications.

In addition, some common typologies of local government systems have been adopted, namely those referring to certain institutionally determined opportunity structures of mayors presented by Heinelt and Hlepas in Chapter 2.

1.3 The content of the book

Chapter 2 (by Heinelt and Hlepas) presents considerations on different types of local government systems referring to typologies used in the scholarly debates. The task of this chapter is to clarify the reasons why particular typologies are used in this book when local government systems are considered as an independent variable. It should be mentioned that widely discussed typologies (like those of Hesse and Sharpe 1991 and of Mouritzen and Svava 2002) have been adjusted by information gathered by the national teams concerning current institutional arrangements in the countries covered by our study.

The following chapters (by Kristof Steyvers and Herwig Reynaert and by Ulrik Kjær) reflect on the background and recruitment of mayors. It is no surprise that mayors are a socially skewed selection of the citizenry, with male, middle-aged and middle classes being over-represented. The contributors to these chapters attempt to map this bias in various national and structural contexts. The past, the present and the self-projected future of mayors are investigated. The recruitment of women to the mayoralty is especially investigated in chapter 5 (by Vicki Johansson), linking variations in the frequency of female mayors to variations in the welfare state systems. Finally an attempt is made (by Henry Bäck) to answer the question of whether background and recruitment patterns matter. Does belonging to particular social groups affect the priorities of political leaders, or is it the allegiances and loyalties acquired at a later time that really matter?

The question of mayors' priorities leads to the broader debate on the local roots of democracy, subsequently addressed in chapter 7 by Michael Haus and David Sweeting, while examining mayors' allegiance to the different concepts of local democracy currently proposed in the literature. What are political leaders' views of how local democracy should work in the modern context, and how are degrees of support for different concepts of democracy spread over different countries and correlated with institutional aspects of local government (e.g. direct election of mayors) and party membership? Moving in the same thematic area and with particular regard to the declinations of the relationship between elected officials and their constituency, in Chapter 8 Getimis and Hlepas refer to the notion of leadership styles, as a means of identifying and distinguishing types of European mayors and relating them to certain contextual factors (for instance the local government system, the party system, city size etc.). Then in the following chapter (by Annick Magnier, Clemente Navarro and Pippo Russo), the role and attitudes of mayors are studied as pivots of local coalitions and as diversified expressions of the evolution of local governing among European localities.

The subsequent part of the book offers contributions which explore the relationship of mayors with the other main political actors outside and inside the town hall. Their role as mediators in the relationships between different territorial governmental levels is examined in chapter 10 by Daniel Kübler and Pascal Michel. Their supposed dependency on political parties is scrutinised in its multifarious configurations by Franz Fallend, Gyorgyi Ignits and Paweł Swianiewicz. Bas Denters (in Chapter 12) looks more closely at the relationships with other political representatives inside town halls: What are the activities that concretely make up a mayor's daily work? How do mayors relate to their political colleagues in the local council? Is the mayor-council relationship best described as a duo or as a duel? Particular attention is paid in a further chapter (by Carlos R. Alba and Carmen Navarro) to the relationship between politics and administration. Here we will have reason to return to 'New Public Management' (which will be explored in chapter 14 by Rikke Berg). The NPM doctrine prescribes managerial and professional autonomy, which may collide with Weberian ideas about instrumental bureaucracy, ideas that also may be part of conceptions of local self-government and local democracy as expressions of the sovereignty of the people.

Furthermore, we will attempt in the two final chapters to draw some synthetic considerations on the significance of the change that has come about during the last decades. Chapter 15 (by Björn Egner and Hubert Heinelt) addresses the nature of the attitude mayors themselves hold towards reforms. Do they actually consider there is a need for reforms? What should the relations be between politics and administration on the local level? Should there be a separation of both spheres as demanded by proponents of New Public Management? What opinion do mayors adopt towards interactive policy making, i.e. the direct involvement of societal actors in decision-making and implementation? Finally, in the last chapter (by Annick Magnier) the orientation of mayors to 'entrepreneurship' is addressed.

An Annex showing the questionnaire used complete this volume.

1.4 Acknowledgement

The editors of this book are indebted to a large number of people who made the research on which it is based possible. They include, of course, the authors of the individual chapters but also the other members of the national teams not directly involved as contributors of a chapter to this book. Less visibly, during the three years of the research Nicola Malloggi has been in charge of the progres-

sive construction of the comparative data-set.⁵ The stylistic quality of the different contributions was uniformed by Rachel Barritt Costa. Thorsten Metz and Annalena Seyffart (Darmstadt University of Technology) standardised the layout of the text delivered by the authors in a form acceptable to our publisher.

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2 Typologies of Local Government Systems

Hubert Heinelt and Nikolaos-K. Hlepas

Local government systems are usually perceived as independent variables when considering (possible) differences in recruitment patterns, professionalisation, the position of mayors in local and multi-level governance arrangements (or horizontal and vertical policy networks), the interpretation (or notion) of democracy, problem definition as well as attitudes and opinions towards decentralisation or centralisation and reforms ('modernisation') of the public sector ('new public management'). However, a decision on the most suitable conceptualisation or typology of local government systems for joint research such as that undertaken here is more problematic than might be assumed: firstly, a lot of typologies are available in the scholarly debate, and secondly, it proves difficult to apply the available typologies because none of them cover the whole spectrum of countries included in this study, and many do not include the 'new democracies' in Middle-Eastern Europe. Therefore, existing typologies will necessarily have to be adjusted and updated.

In the following, different typologies will be discussed, offering a rationale for the use of two in particular for our analysis (i.e. the Hesse/Sharpe and the Mouritzen/Svara typology) and outlining a third approach proposed on the basis of the two cited typologies. The reflection on different typologies of local government systems is grouped around two issues: vertical power relations, that is, between municipalities and upper-level government(s) – and horizontal power relations, between the council and the mayor and/or other political and administrative leaders within city hall.

2.1 The vertical dimension

Comparative analysis of local government systems employs different distinctions according to vertical power relations or the distribution of competencies between the local level and upper layers of government. *Bennett* (1989; 1993a; 1993b) makes a distinction between

- a *dual* structure where at the local level central government agencies and the municipalities exist side by side but with different competencies (as in the UK),¹
- *fused* systems where local authorities and their competencies are determined by local as well as by upper-level government and
- *mixed* systems (as in Denmark or Sweden).

Bennett classified the ‘new democracies’ in Middle-Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic) as moving *towards fused* systems. This typology has not been adopted widely in the past, mainly because all European countries should, based on Bennett’s typology, have been subsumed either under fused systems or those moving towards fused systems, with the exception of the UK (dual) and Denmark and Sweden (both mixed). This would seem too simplistic to capture differences not merely in connection with certain aspects of vertical power relations but also possible effects resulting from such relations. Furthermore, fused systems have been thoroughly changed during the last decades: In several countries territorial (new layers of government, amalgamations etc.) and functional (decentralisation, devolution, new public management) reforms have been implemented (Kersting and Vetter 2003), and thus increased the differentiation among “fused systems”.

Page and Goldsmith (1987; see also Page 1991 and Goldsmith 1993) and – later – *John* (2001) draw a distinction between the North and the South by considering the ‘relation between the number and type of functions allocated to sub-national government, the legal discretion open to local policy-makers and the access of local politicians to the central state’ (John 2001: 26). Their key idea is that there is an inter-relationship among the functions allocated to local government, the respective discretion given to local authorities and the access of local politicians to the central state. Clearly, the policies enacted as well as the corresponding leadership roles fulfilled by mayors may differ sharply, depend-

1 The concept of ‘dual structure’ has been strongly disputed by P. John (2001) especially regarding the UK. John argued (referring to the related ‘dual state thesis’): ‘Observers need to be cautious about the ascription of Britain as a dual state – or any state as dual – as this proposition has been stated in the theoretical literature (Bulpitt 1983; Saunders 1980), but has not been tested. Far from being a separated polity, the UK has always had a high degree of contact between central and local government in professional and policy-making communities (Dunleavy 1981; Rhodes 1986). Central government took initiatives through its field offices and politicians in powerful local parties, such as in Birmingham and in London, had an influence on national politics. Once researchers examine central-local policy systems in detail and according to policy sector, there is less difference in political relationships than the allocation of functions to tiers of local government would suggest’ (John 2001: 33).

ing on the pattern of this inter-relationship. The suggested dichotomy of Southern versus Northern local government systems in Europe is marked by the following characteristics:

- Southern European systems are characterized by municipalities with few functions and competencies, low legal discretion and high access of local politicians to the central (and regional) level of government. In other words: local politicians may be powerful at the central level, but they represent politically weak communes.
- Northern European systems are, on the contrary, characterized by a strong decentralisation of functions, a high level of discretion and low access of local politicians to the central state.

The reasons for these differences between North and South have their roots in the historical background. In the South of Europe, the 'Napoleonic' state model expanded throughout all the modern nation-states, which created a uniform administration over their entire territory and administered the secularised education service directly from the centre. In the Southern states local elites were looked upon with suspicion by the central government, which built up its own territorial organization, directly establishing the administrative authority of the central state over the whole country. When the welfare state emerged in the European South during the twentieth century, these functions fell to state authorities. Local Governments embody local cultural and political identities represented to the higher levels through local politicians who tend to act as local patrons and use different networks of access to the national (today also regional) centres of political power, including parties, in order to address local demands (Page 1991; John 2001). High access and low legal discretion is linked to the tendency of actors (both local/national politicians and central/regional bureaucrats) within large and dysfunctional, legalistic bureaucracies to exploit areas of uncertainty by blackmail and/or using clientelistic networking techniques. Local politicians are compelled to act within a given framework of territorial representation and political localism. The size of local government units remains small, since, within the given context, community identity is more important than service efficiency. The South has many levels of government, partly as a means of increasing the potential for territorial representation.

In the North of Europe the nation states did not develop centralized bureaucracies in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries but relied on local elites to carry out national policies (Page 1991). Education was decentralized to local government institutions and in many modern North European countries the Protestant church remained a part of the state. National law, strictly imple-

mented by impartial, professional and effective bureaucracies, safeguarded the unity of modern statehood. Subsequently, when the state expanded in response to demands for equality, legal entitlement and social security, a welfare system was created where local government, being highly responsive to local society, is responsible for welfare service provision. Northern democracies, based on the independent power of the locality to decide matters of importance, developed the theory of local self-government, which has become 'a political system in miniature' (John 2001: 30). Local politicians must achieve results, primarily by using local resources and focusing on local service provision. Since the early 1950s, a number of municipalities have merged in order to increase efficiency and achieve better service provision. The North, in the analysis put forward by Hesse and Sharpe (see below), has few levels of government, in order to avoid problems of vertical coordination.

This typology has clear advantages: it is simple and straightforward; furthermore, it avoids a legalistic approach, a characteristic of the traditional, if not 'old' institutionalism that long dominated comparative government analysis (incl. the analysis of local government). Instead, this typology clearly opens the venue for reflections inspired by sociological but especially historical institutionalism.

But certain disadvantages can be pinpointed as well: Page and Goldsmith examined only Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Britain, France, Italy and Spain, i.e. only 'unitary' states at that time, and did not consider the ('teutonic') federal systems of Germany, Austria and Switzerland. In a later study, John (2001: 35), while adapting the typology of Page and Goldsmith, included Belgium, Greece and Portugal within the Southern Group, whereas he subsumed Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands into the Northern Group. However, he again excluded Germany and Switzerland (without mentioning Austria), considering these countries to be 'hybrid systems containing states or cantons which have both sets of traditions and structures' (John 2001: 36). In addition, at the time when the Page and Goldsmith typology was originally developed, Central East European countries could not be included, whereas John specifically confined himself to 'Western Europe'. One might consider whether the two groups – and especially the Nordic group – would become more heterogeneous if other countries were included.

In a study performed at a slightly later date, Goldsmith elaborated another typology of local government systems based 'on the objective or ethos which underlies them' (Goldsmith 1992: 395).

- According to this criterion, a first model is labelled '*the clientelistic/patronage model*', where a strong presumption is that the primary duty of local

politicians is to ensure that the interests of their community are well promoted (not least regarding specific public goods and services) and defended at higher levels of government (especially in France, Italy, Greece and – to a lesser extent – Spain; Goldsmith 1992: 395).

- In some other countries (especially in the U.S.) the paramount task of local government is to promote the economic development of the city. Basic services and protection for citizens (fire protection, policing and transport networks) provide the foundation on which growth policies can be formulated. According to this ‘*economic development model*’ (or ‘Boosterism’ or ‘Growth machine’ model), local politicians are expected to enhance local economic development.
- According to the third model, the ‘*welfare-state model*’, efficient service delivery, ‘linked to national norms concerning equity and redistribution’ (Goldsmith 1992: 396) has shaped local government. This applies for countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain as well as Scandinavia. Normally, local interests are not defended through single local politicians but through local government associations at the national level. Local politicians are expected to be good managers. Furthermore, the emphasis given to effective local delivery of collective goods has resulted in the importance of highly professional paid officials, although this has been criticized as ‘local bureaucratic paternalism’ (Goldsmith 1992: 396).
- In some of these European welfare states (especially in Britain), the so-called ‘*market-enabling*’ or ‘*consumerist*’ model emerged, following earlier U.S.-experiences. In these cases local government has moved away from a role as a producer of services to that of an agency enabling others to produce services (independently or in partnership with local government). The main difference compared to the previously mentioned model of ‘economic development’ (or ‘boosterism’) is that ‘consumerist’ local government is confined to a merely ‘enabling’ role, relying on market mechanisms for the economic development of the city.

While reference to the particular objectives or ethos characterising the local government level as criteria for a typology can providing interesting insights, these criteria may not be adequate to give a complete account of the local government system of a whole country: The so-called clientelistic model may no longer be fully applicable to metropolitan municipalities of Southern Europe, where it has been claimed that the ‘economic development model’ may emerge instead. Furthermore, in municipalities of Northern Europe the prevailing system could prove to be a mix between the ‘welfare’ and the ‘consumerist’ model.

This question raised above, enquiring whether the two groups forming the original Page and Goldsmith typology would become more heterogeneous if other countries were included, is addressed by *Hesse and Sharpe* (1991). They offer a distinction between three types of local government systems which reflects (i) the distribution of competencies in service provision as well as (ii) the political power/influence of the local level in relation to upper-level government and the importance dedicated to local democracy. Furthermore, Hesse and Sharpe subdivide the Northern group of the Page and Goldsmith typology into two branches and offer a broader coverage of countries.

- The first subdivision of the Hesse/Sharpe typology is the *Franco* group (so named after its Napoleonic roots), which corresponds to the Southern group in the Page/Goldsmith typology. In this case local government is considered to cover territorially defined communities and to form structures of territorial interest intermediation at the lower level of government. The mayor is expected to represent the interests of this community towards higher government levels. France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Greece are subsumed by Hesse and Sharpe under this (Southern) type.
- A second subdivision is the so-called *Anglo* group covering the United Kingdom and Ireland (as well as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and in some respects, the USA). In these cases local government has a weak legal and political status, but is important in shaping and delivering public services. Therefore, local government has a more functional than political role. The weak formal (legal) political status of local government has to be considered in accordance with the ‘supremacy of parliament’ principle, i.e. the central role of national parliament in a unitary political system. This is reflected in a weak position of the mayor – as a political leader – and in the strength of ‘executive officers’ and councillors in respect of service provisions.
- The third subdivision is the *North and Middle European* group with the Scandinavian countries, Germany and the Netherlands (to which Austria and Switzerland can be added). Although in these cases strong emphasis is given to the shaping and delivering of public services (as in the Anglo group), local government is equally perceived and institutionally defined (by a strong constitutional status and relatively high financial independence) as a de-centralised level of autonomous democratic policy-making.

Because the Hesse and Sharpe typology of local-central governmental relations is a convincing synthesis of the before mentioned ones covering already from the beginning a lot of the ‘old democracies’ in Western Europe and can also

quite easily be extended to the other countries included in the present analysis, it will be adopted in most of the chapters of this book where the dimension of vertical power relations within local government systems is addressed as a contextual or an independent variable.² However, both the Hesse/Sharpe and the Page/Goldsmith typology share the disadvantage that the ‘new democracies’ in Eastern Europe are missing. For the purposes of the present study, the three Eastern European countries in our sample, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, have not been subsumed under one of the three types, but rather classified as a separate group: the *Central East European type*. Although local-central relations in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic have some features in common with the North and Middle European group with respect to local competencies and fiscal or financial discretion of local governments, they are here considered as a distinct group because their historical background and, in particular, the quite recent (radical) decentralisation in these countries needs to be taken into account in discussion of vertical power relations. These power relations are (as the different schools of neo-institutionalism emphasise) not just characterised by certain formal (legal) rules for the distribution of competencies and resources but also by particular meaning systems of what is perceived as appropriate – or inappropriate.

A further inevitable shortcoming of the Hesse/Sharpe and Page/Goldsmith typologies can be singled out: the surveys were conducted prior to the fundamental changes in central-local relations which have taken place in many of the East European countries since the early 1990s (for an overview see for instance Denters and Rose 2005). Therefore the present study attempts to update the previous typologies and capture the current situation in the countries covered by this study. The individual national teams thus firstly performed an assessment of

- the responsibilities of municipalities in providing social policies and especially social services (0 = none or few, 2 = many, 1 = some) and

2 Loughlin’s (2001) distinction between an *Anglo-Saxon* group with UK, US, Canada (without Quebec) and Ireland, a *Germanic* group with Germany, Austria, the Netherlands Spain (after 1978) and Belgium (after 1988), a *French* group with France, Italy, Spain (before 1978) Portugal, Quebec, Greece and Belgium (before 1988) and a *Scandinavian* group with Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland (see also Loughlin and Peters 1997) has been considered seriously but has finally not been taken into account because it explicitly emphasises broader aspects of ‘state traditions’ (incl. state-society relations, policy styles, dominant approaches to academic disciplines of public administration) – and is not focussed on local-central power relations. Rather, the later is just one aspect of this typology addressed by its dimensions ‘form of political organisation’ and ‘form of decentralisation’ (Loughlin 2001: 5).

- financial autonomy of municipalities in raising own taxes and/or discretion in using grants from upper-level government (0 = low, 2 = high, 1 = some).

Table 1: European municipalities in vertical power relations

Countries	Municipalities are responsible for social policies, especially social services (1)	Financial autonomy of municipalities (2)	Spending of municipalities in % of GDP (3)	Sum of indices (4)
France	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	0	0	0
Italy	1	1	0	2
Czech Rep.	1	0	1	2
Ireland	2	0	0	2
England	2	0	1	3
Belgium	2	0	1	3
Poland	1	1	1	3
Austria	2	1	1	4
Switzerland	2	2	1	5
Germany	2	2	1	5
Netherlands	2	2	1	5
Denmark	2	2	2	6
Hungary	2	2	2	6
Sweden	2	2	2	6

Column 1: 0 = none or few, 2 = many s, 1 = some,

column 2: 0 = low, 2 = high, 1 = some,

column 3: 0 = under 5 %, 1 = between 5 and 10 %, 2 = over 10 %

column 4: sum of columns 1 to 3.

Sources: Columns 1 und 2 are based on assessment by the national teams and column 3 on *Local Finance in the Fifteen Countries of the European Union*, Paris: Dexia, 2002 (data refer to 2000) and *Local Finance in the Ten Countries Joining the EU in 2004*, Paris: Dexia, 2004 (data refer to 2001). For England, spending by counties (according to *Finance and General Statistics 1996/1997*, London: CIPFA) has been subtracted.

- Furthermore, the level (and relevance) of public spending by municipalities is measured by its proportion of GDP (0 = under 5 %, 1 = between 5 and 10 %, 2 = over 10 %).³

As shown in Table 1, the assessment of the role of the municipal level in vertical allocation of competence and resources in the European countries covered by this study regarding these three indicators demonstrates that the grouping of countries according to the Hesse/Sharpe typology seems to be appropriate.

2.2 *The horizontal dimension*

Typologies of local government systems focusing on horizontal power relations at the local level, i.e. between the council, the mayor and the administrative executive, also provide relevant insights. Examination of differences in the roles and distribution of competencies/tasks between the mayor, the council and the municipal administration is of importance because they may be cross-cutting with respect to the three above described types of local government systems or they may even highlight differences among them.

A common general distinction reflects the legally defined distributions of task between legislative and executive functions. Whereas in *dualistic* systems the two functions are separate, they are merged in *monistic* systems. Or more precisely: 'In the *monistic* type of local government the elected local council is regarded as the (sole) supreme decision-making body, while the local administration, including its head/chief executive, acts under the instruction and scrutiny of the council without any autonomous 'executive' decision-making power of its own. In a *dualistic* system the elected council is recognized as the prime decision-making body of local government, but the head/chief executive of the local administration is seen as possessing some ('executive') decision-making powers of his/her own that are not derived from the local council' (Wollmann 2004: 151). This typology can be further refined to explore additional distinctions: (i) the role of the mayor exercising – or not – the executive function, (ii) exercising the executive function alone or together with a collective or collegiate body, and (iii) the form through which the mayor is elected (Wollmann 2004: 151-152).

3 Relating the spending of municipalities to GDP may be problematic because in some countries the public sector comprise larger share of GDP than in others. However, alternatively measuring the share of municipalities in the total public spending implies even greater problems because it is very difficult to identify what is and what is not a public spending, and respective information be very hard to compare across countries.

Drawing on ‘traditional’ ideal types in comparative constitutional analysis (of national government) and combining the distinction between (i) a monistic versus dualistic organisation with (ii) a majoritarian versus consociational form of democratic local decision-making Bäck (2005: 82-83) proposed the following typology:

- *Assembly Government*: represented by situations where executive power is in the hands of a proportionally composed committee of the council, *i.e. monism* in combination with *consociationalism*.
- *Parliamentarism*: the combination of *monism* with *majoritarianism*, *i.e.* situations featuring a collective executive, appointed by the council not using proportional techniques but some variation on the majority principle.
- *Presidentialism*: a separately elected mayor, appointing his/her own cabinet of deputies without consideration of the party-political composition of the council. In this form the *dualistic* and *majoritarian* principles are combined.
- *Semi-presidentialism*: the mayor is surrounded by a council-appointed collective executive. Here *dualism* is combined with *consociationalism* or *majoritarianism* depending on how the collective executive is appointed by the council.

However, the difference between ‘monistic’ and ‘dualistic’ systems is not always as clear in practice as it would appear from a legal point of view. This is especially the case when executive functions are fused in various forms of committees (e.g. in Denmark and Sweden; Mouritzen and Svava 2002: 60) or when, in a dual system (as in some of the German Länder), councils can intervene in administrative matters and thereby genuinely exercise executive functions (through ‘majoritarian power’, whereby a majority in the council formed by one party or a coalition is able to control the administration). Furthermore, it has to be emphasised that majoritarian and consociational forms of decision-making do not only depend on formal (legal) rules laid down in municipal codes and/or the electoral systems. Rather, they rely on a socially determined and locally embedded ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1989) or even a pragmatically driven political ‘logic of consequentiality’, taking certain actual local (power) constellations into account. Acknowledgement of such locally determined patterns of policy-making is precisely the background on which Bäck (2005) has developed the mentioned typology. Moreover, Bäck’s typology did not take systematically relationships between the political organisation and administration into account – or more precisely: between politicians and the municipal chief executives (CEOs).

Mouritzen and Svava (2002) offer another typology of local government systems oriented towards horizontal power relations. Their considerations rely on the following hypothesis: ‘The structural features of municipal government in any specific country reflect a balance or compromise among [...] three organizing principles: layman rule, political leadership, and professionalism’ (Mouritzen and Svava 2002: 50-51). Whereas ‘*the layman rule* means that citizens elected for political office should be involved effectively and intensively in the making of decisions’ (Mouritzen and Svava 2002: 51; Italics by the authors), the notion of *political leadership* implies the concept of politicians ‘promoting value choices and feeding energy and passion into policy systems’ (Mouritzen and Svava 2002: 52); finally, *professionalism* rests on the crucial distinction that ‘As politicians respond to demands, professionals respond to and seek to address needs’ (Mouritzen and Svava 2002: 53; referring to Svava 1990).

Although Mouritzen and Svava consider all three elements, ‘political leadership is the starting point for the development of a typology of government forms. The key issue is how political power is obtained, maintained, exercised, and shared. [...] Political power is a function of the degree of control a political actor – a person or a collective body – has in two arenas. First, to what extent is the city council controlled by one or more political actors? The second arena is the executive, and the question is to what extent is control over the executive in the hands of one or more political actors. Formal structure is important to answering these questions, but so are informal institutional rules and norms’ (Mouritzen and Svava 2002: 53). Based on these considerations Mouritzen and Svava distinguish four ideal types:

- ‘*The strong mayor form*: The elected mayor controls the majority of the city council and is legally and in actuality in full charge of all executive functions’ (Mouritzen and Svava 2002: 55).
- ‘*The committee-leader form*: One person is clearly “the political leader” of the municipality – with or without the title of mayor. He may or may not control the council. Executive powers are shared. The political leader may have responsibility for some executive functions but others will rest with collegiate bodies, that is, standing committees composed of elected politicians, and with the CEO’ (Mouritzen and Svava 2002: 56).
- ‘*The collective form*: The decision center is one collegiate body, the executive committee that is responsible for all executive functions. The executive committee consists of locally elected politicians and the mayor, who presides’ (Mouritzen and Svava 2002: 56).
- ‘*The council-manager form*: All executive functions are in the hands of a professional administrative – the city manager – who is appointed by the

city council, which has general authority over policy but is restricted from involvement in administrative matters. The council is [...] headed by a mayor who formally has presiding and ceremonial functions only' (Mouritzen and Svvara 2002: 56).

Although their typology is based on general country-specific formal institutional settings Mouritzen and Svvara (2002: 53) argue that not only formal structures but also 'informal institutional rules and norms' are important in building the four types. Since their approach is oriented to ideal types of national local government systems, they offer general assessments of informal institutional rules and norms characteristic of a certain type and applicable to a particular country.

Both the recognition of informal institutional rules and norms as well as their generalisation in terms of certain types constitute advantages in comparison to Bäck's typology. His distinction between majoritarian and consociational forms of democratic local decision-making allows for locally defined and particularised informal rules of the game (whereas a monistic or dualistic form of local government can be seen as a given formal institutional structure), especially insofar as consociational decision-making is concerned, so that his typology is only partly related to country-specific institutional structures. Far from representing a problem, this is an advantage for *comparative urban case studies* (which – as mentioned above – formed the background to Bäck's considerations), but it is a pronounced disadvantage for a comparative analysis based on country-related survey data.⁴

Although Mouritzen/Svvara's typology was published relatively recently (compared to the Page/Goldsmith and Hesse/Sharpe typologies) it does not capture changes effected in the last few years and – more importantly – not all the countries included in our study are considered (even Germany is missing). Therefore, the national teams from the countries not included in Mouritzen/Svvara's typology subsumed their countries under the four types of this typology.

The results of the information are summarised in Table 2 and lead to the grouping of

4 Nevertheless, Bäck (2005: 82-83) acknowledges that his 'assembly government' 'is very close to what Mouritzen and Svvara term "the committee leader form"' and that 'Mouritzen and Svvara probably would classify also the parliamentary system as a "committee leader form."' Furthermore, he stated that 'semi-presidentialism' 'and the presidential system would be classified as 'strong mayor' forms by Mouritzen and Svvara'. What is not covered by Bäck's typology is the 'council-manager form' and the 'collective form' of Mouritzen and Svvara. But they may both be subsumed under 'parliamentarism'. See his classification of individual cities of countries covered by the 'council-manager form' and the 'collective form' in Bäck 2005: 87.

- France, Germany (without the federate state/Land of Hesse), Austria (with six of its nine Länder), Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the English cases with a directly elected mayor under the *strong mayor form*,
- Denmark, the English cases of alternative arrangements⁵ and Sweden (as well as the remaining three Austrian Länder) under the *committee leader form*,
- Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the English leader-cabinet model cases, (as well as the German Land of Hesse) under the *collective form*, and
- Ireland as the only country of the council-manager form of local government systems⁶.

These groupings will be used in the following chapters when the relations between the mayor, the council and the municipal administration are addressed by referring to the Mouritzen and Svava typology.

2.3 Combining the dimensions: The POLLEADER typology

In examining the role of mayors in a particular local government system, it is not only their relations to the council and the municipal administration that must be considered. The vertical distribution of functions and competencies between the local level and upper-levels of government must also be reflected. This is of particular significance for determining whether a mayor is called upon to represent and/or to lead a municipality with a broad or a quite restricted spectrum of competencies and responsibilities (e.g. in the field of service provision) as well as with limited or wider fiscal and financial discretion. Furthermore, considering the task of a mayor together with the task of a municipality as well as the municipal's legal and financial capacity to govern local affairs is of notable importance against the background of the often cited 'shift from government to governance' and the (possible) ensuing challenge for urban leadership in (newly) evolving local governance arrangements (see Borraz and John 2004; Haus et al. 2005; Heinel et al. 2006).

Therefore, in the following description the vertical and horizontal dimensions that provide crucial insight for the characterization of local government

5 For the move of the English local government system towards the North-Middle European type – along with an encouragement of executive leadership – see Leach and Wilson 2004.

6 One English council also has this form of decision-making. They did not respond to the survey and are not included in this analysis.

systems are combined by considering the Hesse and Sharpe typology (1991) for local-central government relations and that of Mouritzen and Svava (2002) for power relations between the mayor, the council and the municipal administration. The individual countries covered by the present study are placed in different boxes either on the classification of the cited authors or on the information of the project partners from the respective countries.

Table 2: Political leadership types according to different European local government systems: The POLLEADER typology

		<i>types of local government systems according to (vertical) local-central relations (Hesse and Sharpe 1991)</i>			
		<i>Franco type</i>	<i>Anglo type</i>	<i>North-Middle European type</i>	<i>Central-East European type</i>
<i>forms of local government systems according to horizontal power relations (Mouritzen and Svava 2002)</i>	<i>Strong mayor form</i>	<i>'political mayor'</i> France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain	<i>'executive mayor'</i> England ⁽ⁱ⁾	<i>'executive mayor'</i> Germany, ⁽ⁱⁱ⁾ Austria ⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾	<i>'executive mayor'</i> Poland, Hungary
	<i>committee leader form</i>		<i>'collegial leader'</i> England ^(iv)	<i>'collegial leader'</i> Denmark, Sweden, (Austria) ^(v)	
	<i>collective form</i>	<i>'collegial leader'</i> Belgium	<i>'collegial leader; England'</i> ^(vi)	<i>'collegial leader'</i> Netherlands, Switzerland, (Germany)	<i>'collegial leader'</i> Czech Rep.
	<i>council-manager form</i>		<i>'ceremonial mayor'</i> Ireland		

(i) In the cases with a directly elected mayor.

(ii) Without the Bundesland Hesse which is subsumed under the group of 'collegial leaders'.


(iii) In six of its nine Bundesländer.

(iv) In the alternative arrangements cases.

(v) In three of its nine Bundesländer.

(vi) In the cases with a leader-cabinet model.

Figure 1: Figures of Mayors across Europe



The 'strong mayor type' (according to Mouritzen and Svava) is found in countries of the Franco and the North-Middle European (according to Hesse and Sharpe) as well as in the Central-East European type of local government systems. In addition, the following distinctions can be drawn between mayors of these types of local government systems:

- Due to the fact that mayors in the North-Middle and Central-East European types of local government systems are not only formally the heads of municipal administrations which hold responsibility for a broad spectrum of public provision but are also in full charge of their administrations, these mayors will here be called '*executive mayors*'. This applies to mayors in *Hungary, Poland and Germany* (with the exception of the Land Hesse; see below) and most of the *Austrian* mayors (i.e. the directly elected mayors in Austria).
- Because strong mayors in the Franco type of local government systems lead a municipal administration that is responsible for a relatively limited scope of 'state' functions, but are nevertheless clearly the political representative (and agent) for the local community, they will be called '*political mayors*'. *France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain* are included in this type.
- Under the Anglo type of local government systems the council-manager type is found in Ireland. In this case mayors exercise a mainly ceremonial function/role, while there is no elected local leader at the head of the municipality and the municipal administration is directed by a professional manager. Therefore, Irish mayors are here termed '*ceremonial mayors*'.
- The North-Middle European type of local government systems covers not only the strong mayor and the council-manager form, but also the committee leader and the collective type according to the Mouritzen/Svava typology. In several North- and Middle European countries mayors or elected local leaders of the municipality without the official title of a 'Mayor' (in Sweden, where no 'Mayor' exists, and in England, where most mayors – see below – have restricted ceremonial functions) are required to cooperate collegially with other powerful actors or bodies. Therefore, these institutional settings offer room only for '*collegial leaders*'. This type of mayor can be found in *Denmark, Sweden and partly in Austria* (i.e. in the three Länder where the mayors are not directly elected) as well as in the *Netherlands, Switzerland, the Czech Republic* and, due to its 'Magistratsverfassung' (unique for Germany) in the *German Land Hesse*. Although local competencies for service provision in *Belgium* are different from the above mentioned countries of the North-Middle European type, Belgian

mayors can also be subsumed under the ‘collegial leaders’ because of the collective form of local government in this country. In *England* the Local Government Act (Hambleton and Sweeting 2004; Sweeting 2003) offers councils four options:

1. directly elected mayor and cabinet (the ‘mayor-cabinet model’ adopted by 10 councils);
2. directly elected mayor and council manager (the ‘mayor-council manager model’ which has been adopted in one case not included in the data set),
3. leader and cabinet (the ‘leader-cabinet model’ closest to the collective form, 316 councils opted for this model);
4. ‘alternative arrangements’ (available as an option only for councils with less than 85,000 inhabitants, 59 councils opted for this model, which is closest to the committee leader form).

Because the third option (i.e. the ‘leader-cabinet model’) is currently the most widespread, ‘collegial leaders’ are also dominant in England.⁷

2.4 Comparison of the typologies with indicators of the institutionally determined strength of a mayor

All national teams involved in the survey provided current information specifying whether mayors in the different countries

- are directly designated by the citizens (I1)⁸,
- have a term of office that does not correspond to the council election term (I2), and which can thus be seen as an indicator of an election or appointment of the mayors independently of council elections,
- usually control the council majority (I3),
- cannot be recalled by the council (I4a) or referendum (I4b),
- preside over the council (I5),
- at least co-define the council agenda (I6),
- appoint the municipal chief executive officer/CEO (I7a) and the heads of the administrative departments (I7b).

7 In cases where the council opted for the ‘leader-cabinet model’ or ‘alternative arrangements’ the questionnaire was sent to the leaders.

8 Mayors may be designated directly (i) by direct election or (ii) as the official leader of a majority formed by election – like in the cases of France, Spain and Portugal.

By adding the values from these nine variables,⁹ an index of mayoral strength (IS) can be created. According to these variables, mayors in the countries included in the analysis reach the following institutionally defined strength (see Table 3).

Table 3: Institutional settings and mayoral strength

countries	I1	I2	I3	I4a	I4b	I5	I6	I7a	I7b	IS
France	2	0	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	12
Spain	2	0	2	1	0	2	2	1	1	11
Italy	2	0	2	0	1	1	2	1	1	10
Greece	2	0	2	1	1	0	2	1	1	10
Austria (dir. elect.)	2	0	1	1	0	2	2	1	0	9
Germany	2	1.5*	0	0.5	1	1	2	0	1	9
Engl. (mayor & cab.)	2	0.5**	2	1	1	0	2	0	0	8.5
Belgium	0	0	2	1	1	2	2	0	0	8
Hungary	2	0	2	1	1	0	2	0	0	8
Austria (not dir elect.)	0	0	2	0	1	2	2	0	0	7
Germany (Hesse)	2	2	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	7
Poland	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	6
Denmark	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	0	0	6
Czech Rep.	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	0.5	0	5.5
Portugal	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	5
Engl. (leader & cab.)	0	0	2	0	1	0	2	0	0	5
England (alternative)	0	0	2	0	1	0	2	0	0	5
Ireland	0	0	2	0	1	2	0	0	0	5
Netherlands	0	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	5
Switzerland	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	4
Sweden	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	3

* Only in two of the German Länder (North Rhine Westfalia and Lower Saxony) the majors have a term of office that correspond to the council election term.

** Directly elected mayors in England have a four year term. In some cases, the election of councillors co-incides with the election of the mayor, in others it does not. Therefore on this variable the score is 0,5..

9 The variables I1, I2, I3, I5 and I6 have got a maximum value of 2, whereas the variables I4a, I4a, I7a and I7b have got a maximum value of 1 because the later address just one aspect together with an other variable, i.e. recall by the council or by referendum and appointment of the municipal CEO or the heads of the administrative departments. In cases where no clear 'scoring' has been possible due to differences in the respective country the value has been split, i.e. a 1 or ½ have been given.

Table 4: Typologies and mayoral strength

Countries*	IS	Mouritzen/Svara typology**				Hesse/Sharpe***				POLLEADER typology****			
		manag.	coll.	comm.	strong	E-Cent	N-Mid	Anglo	Franco	cerem.	colleg.	exec.	polit.
France	12				X				X				X
Spain	11				X				X				X
Italy	10				X				X				X
Greece	10				X				X				X
Austria ^{dir. el.}	9				X		X					X	
Germany ^{dir. el.}	9				X		X					X	
England	8.5				X			X				X	
Hungary	8				X	X						X	
Belgium	8		X						X				
Germany ^{coll.}	7		X			X							
Austria ^{coll.}	7			X		X							
Poland	6				X	X						X	
Denmark	6			X		X							
Czech Rep.	5.5		X		X						X		
Portugal	5				X				X				X
England ^{lead.-cab.}	5		X								X		
England ^{altern.}	5			X					X				
Netherlands	5		X				X						
Ireland	5	X						X					
Switzerland	4		X			X						X	
Sweden	3			X		X						X	

* Abbreviations in column 1: dir. el. = directly elected, lead.-cab. = leader-cabinet model, altern. = the 'alternative' version in England. For the other abbreviations in column 1 see the abbreviations for the Mouritzen/Svara typology.
 ** Abbreviations for the Mouritzen/Svara typology: strong = strong mayor form, comm. = committee leader form, coll. = collective form, manag = council-manager form
 *** Abbreviations for the Hesse/Sharpe typology: N-Mid= North-Middle European group, E-Cent = East-Central European group.
 **** Abbreviations for the POLLEADER typology: polit = political mayors, exec. = executive mayors, colleg = collegial leaders, cerem = ceremonial mayors.

When comparing the index (IS) with the Mouritzen/Svara as well as with the Hesse/Sharpe typology and the typology developed by the present authors in the previous section (the POLLEADER typology), the following results are obtained (see Table 4).

A glance at the Mouritzen and Svara typology shows that most of the countries with a *strong mayor form* of local government systems are awarded the highest ratings according to our index of mayoral strength. The value for Poland is lower but still higher than for most of the other countries. The results for the other forms of local government systems (and the respective countries subsumed under them) point to a high degree of differences. The *council-manager form* is a special case because it comprises just one country, i.e. Ireland, which is ranked among the countries with the lowest values.

Compared to the Mouritzen and Svara typology, the POLLEADER typology is more consistent in terms of ‘mayoral strength’ measured by the index developed and shown above. According to the POLLEADER typology, all countries with a *political mayor* (except Portugal) form a group with the highest values. The group of countries with an *executive mayor* are also closely clustered and exhibit higher values than the rest, with the exception of Poland. Belgium, and the forms of local leadership not dominant in Austria and Germany are ranked above Poland. These two cases represent the stronger version of *collegial leaders*. The other countries belonging to the group of collegial leaders (i.e. Denmark, the Czech Republic, England with its cases of the ‘leader-cabinet model’ and the ‘alternative arrangements’ as well as the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden) show relatively low values. Ireland – as the only country with a *ceremonial mayor* – is again a special case with a value for mayoral strength, ranking at the lower end of the values attributed to countries with collegial leaders.

POLLEADER typology is obviously also more consistent in terms of ‘mayor strength’ than the Hesse/Sharpe typology. Just the countries of the Franco group – identical with the ‘political mayors’ – can be put in a same category achieving 9 or 10 points. Also Belgium – as an other country of the Franco group – is reaching nearly these high values. Portugal deviates totally, but this is also the case in respect to the POLLEADER typology. Furthermore, the Central East European countries show relatively little differences (from 8 to 5.5 points), but especially in the Anglo group and the North Middle European group differences are remarkable high (from 8.5 to 5 points in the first and 9 to 3 points in the second case).

In general, the index of institutionally determined mayoral strength seems to confirm the distinction between different types of mayors (or local political leaders) that has been developed in this study. Such a distinction was obtained

by combining and enhancing the Mouritzen and Svava typology on horizontal power relations with that of Hesse and Sharpe on vertical power relations or the distribution of competencies, responsibilities and financial resources and discretion between different territorial levels of government. Therefore, the POL-LEADER typology will be mainly used in the following chapters where an independent variable addressing these issues is needed for empirical analysis.

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3 ‘From the Few are Chosen the Few...’ On the Social Background of European Mayors

Kristof Steyvers and Herwig Reynaert

Even a quick look at the comparative literature on the social background and characteristics of local political elites undermines the ‘fata morgana’ of a ‘descriptive’ representation’ in which public bodies are socio-demographic samples of the society they represent (Pitkin 1967). Despite differences over time and between political systems the disproportional recruitment of certain social groups with distinctive characteristics into the (local) political elite is one of the most replicated and perpetuated findings. Furthermore, at the local level political decision-makers are predominantly male, middle aged, high in professional status and well-educated (Eldersveld et al. 1995: 31-55). This leads us to conclude that the political recruitment process, by which ‘from the many are chosen the few’ (Prewitt 1969: 169-188), does not operate in a random manner. Since local leadership selection is conceived as a process by which “individuals are screened by political institutions for elective office” (Jacob 1962: 708) a dynamic interaction of supply and demand side factors becomes apparent in which social background characteristics interfere at different stages. The political capital and motivations of aspirant office-holders intermingle with the demands of gatekeepers in the political system. The ‘structure of opportunities’ of the latter thus biases the nature of the recruitment function (Norris 1997: 209-231).

Leadership selection operates in such a way that it favours the possibility for individuals with certain characteristics to enter and to remain in public office. One of the central questions then becomes: what are these characteristics and how do they influence the selection chances of these specific individuals? Our aim here is to study a number of these questions for our mayoral population. Our intention thereby is to go beyond the mere drawing of a social sample of a specific local political elite. By scrutinising the background of mayors we hope to learn more on the recruitment process as a whole. Through study of the social composition of a selected leadership stratum we seek to link the impact of

certain social background characteristics to different stages in the ‘sifting out’ of the mayoral elite.¹

The comparative nature of this research will also stimulate us to transcend what could be called ‘the 3M-mantra’ of elite research: male, middle-aged and middle class. It will evoke questions on the similarity or divergence of social biases in leadership selection in different local political systems. For example: do the same social background characteristics distinguish ‘the many’ from ‘the few’ in all countries under study? Do these factors operate in a different way according to the political system and culture in which they occur? Do certain patterns in the ‘skewing’ of social background emerge and to what extent can they be linked to different institutional histories in local government (Hesse and Scharpe 1991: 605-608)? To what extent do shifts in these traditional frameworks (e.g. introduction of new methods of management, referenda, direct election of mayors, see Vetter and Kersting 2003: 11-28) point the way towards a ‘new political culture’ (Clark and Hoffman-Martinot 1998) of governance in which the executive leadership is strengthened (John 2001: 15-17)? This study is one of the first to structurally scrutinise the figure of the mayor in such a systematic variety of political systems. In some countries, however, even a simple view on mayoral background remains ‘terra incognita’. In this respect this contribution is also, paraphrasing Greenstein, ‘an attempt to clear away the underbrush’ (Greenstein 1967: 629-643).

Knowing who our mayors are and discovering patterns in their social background across local political systems leaves important lines of the recruitment story untold. Factors such as extensive political socialisation in adult lifetime, apprenticeship in a political party or the emergence of a ‘crystallising experience’ might add up to (or even compensate for) a (lack of a) favourable social background. Though social background should not be interpreted in a deterministic way (making inferences from ‘typical background characteristics’ only), the seminal study by Prewitt has extensively shown that social bias in leadership selection is the foundation of the recruitment process of decision-makers, which he describes as a Chinese box puzzle. The process by which from the many are chosen the few is gradual and longitudinal: each new phase is partly shaped by the residue of the former. In setting the few ‘mayoral rulers apart from the many ruled, having a ‘favourable’ social background is one of the most salient and delimiting factors (Prewitt 1970: 23-52).

1 Though studying a process by its outcome – an existing mayoral elite – is far from ideal from a theoretical point of view, the nature of this project prevents an attempt to go beyond this point. A comparison with e.g. unsuccessful candidates for mayoralty or the public at large would refine the insights derived from such a social background study.

3.1 *'Who's who' of mayors?*

There is a large body of literature focusing on the background characteristics of local political elites to explain their 'skewed' recruitment. Interpreting Mosca's heritage of a 'ruling class' in a less 'elitist' way, most of these theories (implicitly) start from a stratification hypothesis of society: the political life chances of an individual are largely influenced by his/her social status, i.e. the position in various social rankings based on commonly recognised criteria of valuation (Matthews 1967: 6-9). Eulau and Prewitt e.g. have shown that local decision-makers are recruited from the middle and upper-middle strata of their communities (Eulau and Prewitt 1973: 261-272) and not from the highest strata. This status moreover varies according to the localities in which the selection process occurs. What constitutes this status (economic power, a widely known family name etc.) and the extent to which it affects recruitment remains however debatable. Nevertheless, some common observations emerge from the literature, confirming the selective social layers from which local decision-makers (i.e. in our case mayors) are chosen. We present a short overview and focus on the characteristics relevant for our empirical study.

In their study of political recruitment in Britain, Budge and Fairlie (1975: 33-68) note a distinctive pattern of social background characteristics favouring a successful candidacy for political office. Although some differences were noted between the localities studied, occupation (of the respondent and his or her father), gender, educational attainment and involvement in associations had the highest predictive value in distinguishing the elected from the electors.² The research on local political recruitment of mayors in France and the United States by Becquart-Leclercq nevertheless showed some cultural differences in the background of mayors despite the aforementioned common 'background themes'. The typical French mayor has a family history in public office, a background as an intellectual or works as a civil servant, acts in the centre of the local para-political structure and often accumulates some (political) mandates. His/her colleague in the US has or does none of these and is often a well-known local business man (Becquart-Leclercq 1980: 407-422).

These general 'portraits of a mayor' already reveal some important characteristics of local politicians. The under-representation of women in (local) public office is among the best documented facts of social life (Kenworthy and Malmi 1999: 235-268). To explain this gender gap (for a more thorough analysis

2 An extension of their model to the Netherlands and the United States showed the highly stable and general nature of their initial findings: individuals belonging to superior social statuses (male, better-educated and of higher professional status) are more likely to become the subject of political recruitment (Budge et al. 1977: 465-492).

see Johannsson in this volume), structural explanations often emerge: the limited participation of women in advanced education or higher status professions has an indirect and multiplying effect, since political decision-makers are disproportionately drawn from these social groups. The research of Welch (1978: 372-380) has shown that these structural effects do not however constitute a sufficient base of explanation. Additional factors, such as the existence of (covert) discrimination against women-office-seekers, lack of time, energy and networks for women often taking up domestic tasks and a political socialisation stressing a gender based division of (political) labour help to understand why 'politics remains a man's game'. For Niven (1998: 57-80), the disadvantaged position of women in the recruitment process is more due to an 'outgroup-effect' (women only weakly resemble the dominant male party elite in terms of background) than to a 'distribution-effect' (women start from an unfavourable status position). Moreover, the under-representation of women is even more noticeable higher up on the ladder of political power positions. Women thus face a 'glass ceiling'. Where local politics is often seen as an entrance into public office with limited thresholds, the executive and central position of the mayor seems to counterbalance an existing political engagement of women. Therefore our mayoral elite Rule's initial question 'why don't women run?' should be enlarged to 'why don't women run this town?' (Rule 1981: 60-77)

The life cycle hypothesis of political recruitment helps to explain why the middle aged are over-represented among the mayoral group. The middle aged on average have more time at their disposal to dedicate to their political mandate than do their younger colleagues. A number of factors in their personal life add up to this 'participatory space' (marriage or living with a partner for a while with – potential – children having reached a relatively independent age). These favourable private factors are combined with the development of social networks in their community in which, in most cases, they have already been living for quite a while and the attainment of a 'professional peak'. This puts individuals in that stage of their life cycle in 'pole position' in the race for public office: their accumulated social status can be translated into political action because the impact of certain inhibiting factors in their direct life circumstances has diminished.³ For this group (often more specifically the stratum with participatory experience), the 'private costs of public commitment' are significantly reduced (Sapiro 1982: 265-279): the future mayor can, as it were, be 'married to the council' (Barron et al. 1987).

3 It is in this 'facilitating' sense that the life cycle hypothesis of political recruitment should be understood. These factors have no direct link to recruitment as such. Rather, they 'unlock' an existing political engagement.

Whereas Wollman et al. (1990: 504-505) in their US-based research have shown the mayoral population to be an intellectual and professional elite, Norris and Lovenduski (1993) specify the nature of this higher professional status group. In particular they identify an over-representation of 'talking and brokerage professions' among political leaders (e.g. lawyers, teachers, public sector professionals etc.). These are not only of a relatively high status but also benefit from a number of advantages which foster the complementarity with a political mandate: e.g. flexible time arrangements, possibility of interrupting career patterns, professional independence, the development of political skills, financial security and the development of social networks useful in political life (Norris and Lovenduski 1993: 373-408). Often, but not exclusively, these professions are closely linked with politics or the public sector as such: thus the occupational mobility towards mayoralty occurs within a (semi-) political realm.

Though the literature on this subject shows that experiences in adult life can have a considerable impact on the political socialisation of decision-makers, one of its important primary agents – the family in which most mayors spend their childhood – influences their social background to a large extent as well. Whereas earlier research showed the early political socialisation of decision-making elites (Eulau et al. 1959: 188-206), Prewitt related family socialisation to the recruitment of the political stratum. As a result of socialisation processes a small segment of the population is disproportionately exposed to political stimuli. This group contributes heavily to the leadership stratum. Not only do the individuals within it have a greater chance to strive for a political mandate, but they are also favourably positioned to become the 'target' of a recruitment attempt by selectors in the political system. The author identifies the family as the most salient environment for such an 'overexposure' to political stimuli (Prewitt 1965: 105-108), generating patterns of 'political heredity' which can be narrow (the transfer of political mandates within families) but also broader (the future politician inherits an interest, orientation or even passion for the political world from his family environment). As far as mayors in an urban environment are concerned, Garraud (1989: 25-30) notes an evolution whereby the narrow conception of 'political dynasties' gives way to its broader counterpart. The 'self-reproduction of the local political elite' is characterised by the transfer of values and a stimulation to political activity within the family. At the same time, future mayors often benefit from the activism and position of their family members in the local power structure beyond a mere internalising of political engagement. By being able to identify with a certain political reputation and history of local involvement the aspiring politician gains recruitment credit.

In interpreting the impact of the above factors, we implicitly started from the 'supply side' perspective of the recruitment process relating background

experiences to ‘political eligibility’ for candidacy. Nevertheless, among the pool of eligible individuals, gatekeepers in the political system select the few effective candidates. This brings us to the demand side of recruitment in which two questions emerge: who selects and what are the selectors looking for? Research has shown that social background characteristics are linked with the answer to both of these queries. Again, background operates in such a way that groups with certain characteristics are favoured to enter public office. Brady et al. (1999: 153-168) offer clues to the first question in terms of the problems with which selectors are confronted in their quest for candidates. To assess the appropriateness of a potential politician and to move the latter towards candidacy, selectors need information on certain individual features of candidates, most of which are not apparent to the naked eye of the recruiter. To overcome this problem, recruiters use twofold shortcuts, one of which is to fish in the ponds of their own social networks or to select candidates with whom in a sociological sense they feel an affinity.⁴ Hunt and Pendley (1972: 420-425) have shown these ‘community gatekeepers’ to be characterised by a specific high status profile and this helps to understand why highly educated, brokerage related males of middle age again dominate the recruitment picture. Another shortcut is to look for ‘demonstrated accomplishments’ of potential recruits. This is linked to the second question on the demand side of leadership selection. Since the prime criterion is their ability to attract votes, selectors look for personal and political indicators in the life history of candidates that can assure them of this electoral capacity. Apparent past performances in the field of education or high prestige occupations then provide selectors with the corollary arguments regarding talents or skills of a potential recruit (Prewitt 1970: 28-29). The recruitment chances of the same socio-demographic group thus further are reinforced.

3.2 *The social background of the European mayor*

Starting from these findings (showing the highly selective and reinforcing nature of the recruitment process in terms of social background) we will take a look at the findings of our survey. To what extent do the patterns described above emerge? Are they highly similar or quite divergent across political systems? What might account for possible variations?

4 The latter two factors reinforce one another: often people’s social networks have a relatively homogenous sociological composition. People work, mix, meet or even marry with their social likes.

3.2.1 The social background of mayors, by local government tradition

First, the social background of our mayoral population will be studied by local government tradition. Therefore we partially reorganised the data for the countries under study in the typology provided by Hesse and Sharpe (1991: 605-608).⁵ In addition to these traditional categories developed by Hesse and Sharpe, the *East- and Central European group* then categorises some eastern and central European local government systems. However, transformations in local government during the '90's undoubtedly put some of the systemic characteristics under strain in numerous countries (Caulfield and Larsen 2002: 9-26). Therefore the categorisation of Hesse and Sharpe refers to broad traditional varieties in local government systems rather than functioning as a perfect blue-print. The (regrouped) country-wise data on the background of mayors are found in Table 1. They refer to the percentage of mayors in each country meeting the background characteristics under study.

As Table 1 shows, the under-representation of women among the mayoral population is a constant factor across the different countries (see the chapter by Johannsson in this volume). At best little more than one in five mayors are of the female sex. However, there is some variation in the extent of this male domination in the mayoral office according to the Hesse and Sharpe typology. Scores for women in the mayoral chair are low in countries of the Franco group. Here only 7.1% of all mayors are women.⁶ France is somewhat of an exception in this group. Greece and Portugal have the lowest score for openness of the mayoral function to women: (almost) all mayors of the localities studied are male. The Anglo group shows a rather mixed picture though on average it scores higher for female representation than its Franco counterpart. Where 19.8% of all mayors in the first group are of the female sex this is mainly influenced by the score for Britain. The picture for the North and Middle European group is more diffuse.

On average 9.2% of all mayors in this group are of the female sex. Nevertheless, the data show considerable variation. Whereas Germany and Austria have male domination figures comparable to those of the Franco group, Sweden and the Netherlands show relatively high openness of the mayoral office to women. Approximately one in five respondents in these countries is female. The lowest scores with regard to the chances for women to attain mayoralty are found in the East- and Central European group. Here only 7.0% on average of all mayors are female. This is largely influenced by the Polish case.

5 For this typology see the chapter by Heinelt and Hlepas in this volume.

6 This is the mean for all cases of the Franco group. The result is influenced by the 'weight' of each country within the total population of mayors in charge of cities over 10.000 inhabitants.

Table 1: The social background of mayors (per cent)

Country	Franco group								Anglo group								North and middle European group								East-Central Europ.			
	F	ITA	GRE	BEL	POR	SPA	ENG	IRE	GER	NET	AUS	SWI	SWE	DEN	POL	HUN	CZ											
Male	88.8	92.2	99.3	92.9	100	90.9	78.6	89.5	96.2	81.7	95.0	89.2	78.6	93.5	95.6	90.2	88.5											
<40	4.8	9.8	2.8	7.1	12.2	18.1	4.9	20.0	6.4	0.9	7.5	5.3	9.2	2.8	7.9	8.5	14.1											
40-49	11.7	36.3	33.8	21.4	31.7	38.7	13.0	25.0	25.6	15.0	27.5	10.6	24.6	13.0	41.5	37.8	30.8											
50-59	45.2	37.1	46.9	40.0	34.1	32.9	33.3	25.0	49.7	62.2	50.0	55.3	52.1	63.9	44.5	46.3	34.6											
60>	38.3	16.8	16.5	31.5	22.0	10.3	48.8	30.0	18.3	21.9	15.0	28.8	14.1	20.3	6.1	7.3	20.5											
mean	56.4	49.8	51.8	53.9	51.4	47.7	57.1	49.4	52.4	55.0	52.3	54.6	51.6	54.9	49.3	50.1	50.5											
Education: University	68.1	65.8	85.3	75.5	79.5	72.4	67.8	44.4	60.1	60.8	42.5	71.7	44.3	23.3	85.3	97.6	80.8											
seniors	27.1	22.0	6.4	44.5	27.0	4.0	40.0	28.6	34.7	63.7	27.5	2.1	14.1	33.3	8.6	51.9	41.3											
profess.	47.3	57.0	75.0	37.0	54.1	44.3	29.1	42.9	17.0	33.5	30.0	65.6	34.5	35.4	62.9	46.8	10.7											
technical	11.7	5.4	7.1	-	18.9	36.2	14.5	-	37.0	1.4	2.5	17.2	35.2	18.2	13.7	1.3	42.7											
clerks	3.2	13.5	9.3	13.4	-	6.0	6.4	14.3	7.8	-	27.5	4.3	3.5	2.0	1.7	-	2.7											
other	10.7	2.1	2.2	5.1	-	9.5	10.0	14.2	3.5	1.4	12.5	10.8	12.7	11.1	13.1	-	2.6											
Local roots	38.8	91.1	91.0	84.2	74.3	78.4	36.7	72.7	48.1	4.0	72.4	-	62.0	48.8	63.8	53.7	64.1											
Pol. family	23.7	24.8	22.4	31.8	15.7	29.5	14.9	32.2	30.8	40.9	40.2	17.0	41.8	33.7	29.7	28.1	19.2											

For profession 'seniors' refers to senior officials, legislators or manager and 'profess.' to professionals. 'Technical' refers to mayors previously working in technical or associate professions. 'Local roots' mean that mayors have been born or spent their childhood in the city they are governing now. The 'pol. family' labels refer to mayors who had a coun-cillor or a mayor in his/her family during the last two generations.

The overall picture thus remains clear: when from the many are chosen the few, gender is a crucial factor. Whereas differences in the permeability to mayoralty for women might reflect systemic traditions (e.g. southern closeness versus northern openness⁷) an existing 'glass ceiling' seems to prevent the equal entrance of women in the highest local office.

At first sight, the age pattern of our mayoral population seems to be highly similar across the different countries.⁸ On average the mayor is around the age of fifty (confirmed by the distribution in age categories). Regardless of the Hesse and Sharpe category under study, the middle aged pattern among our respondents seems to reflect the structural characteristics of office holding almost everywhere. A common position in the life cycle of these politicians and the existence of similarities in their career experiences on the road to mayoralty (e.g. accumulation of political credit through party or lower mandate apprenticeship) probably help to explain this homogeneity. But if the different categories of the Hesse and Sharpe typology are considered, some variation in this middle aged pattern emerges. In the Franco group, mayors are 51.8 years on average ($s = 9.0$). Whereas Italy and Spain have relatively younger mayors on average, their counterparts in France and Belgium are between five and ten years older.⁹ The Anglo group shows the oldest mayoral population with an average of 55.9 years ($s = 9.9$). As with the gender distribution this is mainly due to the data for Britain. The North and Middle European group occupies an intermediate position. On average mayors are 53.1 years old in this group ($s = 7.4$). A comparison by country shows a relatively homogenous picture. The youngest mayors however are to be found in the countries of the East- and Central European group with an average of 49.7 years ($s = 7.6$ years). The country comparison shows highly comparable averages.¹⁰

When the educational attainment level of our mayors is scrutinised the picture becomes more diverse.¹¹ Whereas in all other countries under study a majority of mayors successfully attended college, in four (Ireland, Austria and the two

7 The differences in the percentage of women occupying the mayoral position by category of the Hesse and Sharpe typology are statistically highly significant. Cramer's $V = .097$ and $p\text{-value} = .000$ ($N = 2670$). $\text{Eta} = .097$.

8 The data refer to the age of the mayor at the time of our questionnaire.

9 In Italy this might be due in particular to the limited number of mandates a mayor can occupy (Magnier 2003: 189-193).

10 The differences in mean age by category of the Hesse and Sharpe typology are highly significant with $\text{Eta} = .174$ and $p\text{-value} = .000$ ($N = 2642$).

11 The original question was formulated as follows: "What is your highest completed education?". The range of selectable alternatives was reduced to a fourfold typology: primary education, secondary education or equivalent, higher vocational training and university education or equivalent. The percentage of mayors in the latter case is reproduced in the table.

Nordic countries in our sample Sweden and Denmark) this is only the case for a minority of mayors, with a considerably large share of mayors leaving school after secondary or equivalent education. The exclusivity of a university educated person in the mayoral chair also varies in countries where these graduates form a majority of our respondents. If the categories of the Hesse and Sharpe typology are studied this also becomes clear. In the Franco group a relatively large share, namely 75.4%, of all mayors is university educated. This figure is even higher in Greece and Portugal, but France and Italy score somewhat below 70%, allowing a little more openness in the recruitment process for non-university educated mayoral candidates. The latter also seems to be the case for the Anglo group: here 64.7% of all mayors are university educated. Especially in Ireland the token of a university degree seems less exclusively defining for the mayoral population. The lowest scores of university educated mayors are found in the North and Middle European group however. Here, 55.5% of all mayors have successfully attended college. Where in some countries the data approximate three fifth of all respondents, Austria, Sweden and especially Denmark show considerably lower scores for university education. The highest scores are found in the East- and Central European group, with 87.0% of all mayors having attended college.¹²

This also seems to translate into a higher status but with politics-compatible professional background among mayors.¹³ The latter confirms the brokerage explanation of political recruitment. In most countries the largest share of all mayors belongs to the category of legislators, senior officials and managers (including mainly the higher stratum of the public sector and the cadre of its private counterpart) or the ‘professional’ category (such as health professionals, teachers and the liberal professions). However, the extent to which these categories are represented, as well as their internal distribution, shows some variation. In the Anglo and Northern and Middle European group (38.7% and 34.5%) legislators, senior officials and managers are better represented than in their Franco and Eastern and Central European counterpart (20.8% and 26.4 %). In the latter groups a better representation of ‘professionals’ among the mayoral

12 The differences in the distribution of mayors among the (reduced) categories of education by category of the Hesse and Sharpe typology are highly significant. Cramer's $V = .256$ and $p\text{-value} = .000$ ($N = 2613$). $\text{Eta} = .256$. The majority of our mayors not only seem to belong to an intellectual elite, but their field of education already refers to a brokerage related domain of action: whether it is by law, political or social sciences (to a lesser extent as an architect or engineer), their education seems to reflect a disproportionate entrance in ‘talking and brokerage’ professions.

13 Categories based on the major groups of the ISCO 88 occupational classification: [Http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/class/isco.htm](http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/class/isco.htm)

elite can be distinguished (52.7% and 47.1% versus 30.6% and 27.6%). Technicians and associate professionals are constitute a layer for mayoral recruitment, especially in the Northern and Middle European group.

This pattern seems to suggest a north-south division:¹⁴ the former exhibits a more technical and public recruitment in terms of professional background, which can be seen as an extension of the substantial role of local government as a service provider, while in the latter the ‘notable’ model of recruitment appears to prevail. On the other hand, country-specific situations lead to divergence from this pattern. In the Franco type Greece has a professional group that is extensively represented; Belgium seems to tend towards the Northern and Middle European mean under this profile. In the Anglo group Ireland has a more Franco-oriented pattern. In the Netherlands the group of legislators, senior officials and managers is well represented, mainly referring to the ‘professional career’ nature of the mayoralty (due to the appointment of an executive expert by the government). In Switzerland and Sweden figures fall below the group average, to the advantage of the professional group in both of these two countries, and the technicians and associate professionals in Sweden. The Central and Eastern European group also shows internal diversity (with Poland tending towards the professional model while in the Czech Republic technicians are also well represented).

To what extent do our mayors have local roots? One hypothesis might link the systemic characteristics of local government in the countries under study to the importance of being ‘a local son’ in the recruitment process. Since Hesse and Sharpe define these systems in terms of a balance between the local government as a highly locally oriented political community (Franco) and functionally oriented service deliverer (Anglo with the North and Middle European group somewhat in between), it might be argued that the more the emphasis lies on the politics of the local community the more local roots become an inevitable token for mayoral recruitment. An enduring residential connection links the mayor with a (family) history of local knowledge and involvement. Our data seem to confirm this hypothesis, though with some exceptions. To test it, we developed a new variable representing the percentage of mayors born in their community or those who spent a considerable part of their childhood there. Having local roots seems somewhat of an inevitable ticket to mayoralty in countries of the Franco group. Here 73.5% of all mayors were born or spent part of their childhood in the municipality he or she would later on head. The data for France are more puzzling: here less than 40% of all mayors have a lifetime

14 With the southern pattern apparently extendable to the East- and Central European group. Cramer’s V = .201 and p-value = .000 (N = 2520) Eta = .059.

history connecting them with their localities. Italy, Belgium and Greece even score above the high figure for the Franco group as a whole. In the Anglo group only a minority of 41,1% of all mayors are locally connected. There is a sharp contrast however between the two countries constituting this group. For the North and Middle European group data are comparable (40.3%) though there is considerable variation within this group. Dutch mayors, in particular, only exceptionally have local roots.¹⁵ The score for the East- and Central European countries again resembles its Franco counterpart: here 61.4% of all mayors have local connections.¹⁶

Does the European mayor come from a ‘political family’? Though the nature of such a ‘childhood politicising’ can be manifold, here we focus on a rather narrow but highly important form of political heredity: the occupying of a political mandate by family members. To test the presence of such a ‘salient example’ in our mayoral population, we focused on the two items in the questionnaire referring to the existence of a local political family.¹⁷ The data show that the existence of such a politicising experience (relatives holding office as councillor or mayor) is a salient but not exclusive characteristic of the European mayor’s life history. It is mainly situated at the councillor level. As further analysis shows, it is somewhat difficult to link the systemic characteristics of local government to the extent to which mayors had a family member who was a councillor. While the countries of the Anglo group score slightly lower (15.7%) the data for the other types of local government approximate every one in four or five cases (Franco = 20.4%; North and Middle European = 24.8% and East- and Central European = 21.2%).¹⁸ There are considerable differences within these groups however. While in the Franco group Belgium has the highest scores, data for Portugal are lower. As was also the case for other characteristics, the data for the Anglo group are largely influenced by the British case. In the North and Middle European group the data for the Netherlands, Austria and the Nordic countries are fairly striking. For the intergenerational transfer of the mayoralty itself, the data for Belgium, Austria and especially the Netherlands

15 In the latter case this is due to the different nature of the mayoral office. This functions as a true career with mobility between municipalities during a professional lifetime

16 The differences in being born or having spent the largest part of the childhood in the municipality by category of the Hesse and Sharpe typology are highly significant. Cramer’s $V = .306$ and $p\text{-value} = .000$ ($N = 2134$). $\text{Eta} = .306$.

17 The data reflect the extent to which in the last two generations mayors had a family member who was a councillor or a mayor.

18 Nevertheless the differences in the local political family (councillor) variable by categories of the Hesse and Sharpe typology are statistically significant. Cramer’s $V = .062$ and $p\text{-value} = .019$ ($N = 2585$). $\text{Eta} = .062$.

(approximately one out of every five mayors) are noteworthy. Despite the permeability in the road to mayoralty for individuals lacking this experience, a substantial part of the 'political microbe' thus seems to pass through local generations.

3.2.2 Aspects of leadership and social background of the mayor

Does broadening the perspective of Hesse and Sharpe's vertical approach by integrating a horizontal counterpart affect the picture emerging from these governmental traditions? The typology developed by Heinelt and Hlepas in this volume that focuses on aspects of mayoral leadership might provide the beginning of an answer to that question. Table 2 applies this categorisation to our dataset. What picture emerges?

Regardless of the leadership type studied, women are far less represented among the mayoral group than their male counterparts. Nowhere does the number of women rise above one out of every five respondents. It should be noted however that some differences in this scarcity emerge where the 'strength' of the mayoral leadership seems to be inversely related to the representation of women. Where mayors are executive or political, women are even rarer. Where executive leadership becomes 'collectivised' or ceremonial, openness for women in the mayoralty increases somewhat.¹⁹ Though the middle aged pattern of mayoral recruitment is reconfirmed aspects of leadership seem to have an effect on the pattern found in our data. Whereas ceremonial mayors are somewhat younger, their collegiate counterparts are almost five years older.²⁰

The contrast between ceremonial/collegial and political/executive mayors also emerges in relation to their educational level. Whereas in the first case a minority of up to two out of every three mayors have successfully attended college, the share of respondents in the latter case with such an educational level increases to three out of every four or more. Above all among political mayors, holding a degree seems to be a 'must' on the road to the mayoral office.²¹ In terms of professional background the contrast is sharpest between political and collegial leaders. While legislators, senior officials, managers and professionals dominate the mayoralty nearly everywhere, the latter category comprises the

19 Differences are statistically significant. Cramer's V = .133 and p-value = .000 (N = 2665). Eta = .133.

20 Though being significant in statistical terms with Eta = .150 and p-value = .000 (N = 2626).

21 Differences are statistically significant. Carmer's V = .121 and p-value = .000 (N = 2607). Eta = .121.

majority of political mayors. In collegiate systems mayors with a public background are more common.²²

Table 2: The social background by types of mayors (POLLEADER typology) Per cent.

	Political	Executive	Collegial	Ceremonial
Gender: male	91.9	95.7	86.1	90.0
Age				
< 40	9.7	6.7	6.2	20.0
40-49	28.8	32.3	18.1	25.0
50-59	39.2	48.1	48.1	25.0
> 60	22.3	12.9	27.6	30.0
Mean age	51.6	51.1	54.2	49.4
Education: university	74.6	71.1	62.3	42.1
Profession				
Leg./sen. off./mamag	18.8	28.5	37.9	28.6
Professionals	52.2	32.5	32.1	42.9
Technical profess..	15.2	27.0	17.2	-
Clerks	7.4	5.9	5.9	14.3
Other	6.4	6.1	6.9	14.2
Local roots	67.7	54.6	45.0	72.7
Political family	24.9	29.6	34.0	30.6

Political and ceremonial mayors were to a greater extent born or spent the better part of their childhood in the municipality in which they are the political leader. In executive and especially collegiate systems this only holds true for a smaller (though significant) group of mayors.²³ As far as political families are concerned, the data fall below one out of every five mayors only for political mayors. Ceremonial and collegiate mayors most often come from political families, having in the last two generations a family member who was a councillor or a

22 Differences are statistically significant. Cramer's V = .179 and p-value = .000 (N = 2500). Eta = .088.

23 With especially contrasting figures in the collegiate group for Belgium and the Netherlands however in the collegiate group. Differences are statistically significant. Cramer's V = .189 and p-value = .000 (N = 2170). Eta = .189.

mayor. The first mandate also seems to be quite well represented among executive mayors.²⁴

3.2.3 Does size matter? Number of inhabitants and social background of the mayor

Whereas local government traditions and aspects of leadership help to understand some of the most important environmental conditions in which the mayoral leadership is exercised, it may not suffice to explain the variation in the background of the municipal figureheads. Therefore we turn from power relations to characteristics of localities. From Dahl and Tufte (1973) onwards, size and urbanisation have been considered as central variables in the study of local government. Can the same be said with regard to social background in recruitment? The indicators in Table 3 may provide some insight on this question.²⁵ We must however be cautious given the pre-selective nature of our study in terms of size.

Regardless of the categorisation, Table 3 shows the mayoral office is extensively dominated by males. The pattern in terms of size is somewhat dichotomous however. Whereas in the two largest categories of municipalities the percentage of women occupying the mayoralty is slightly over 10%, the data drop below that figure in the two less populous municipal categories. It shows that the linearly conceived relationship between size and female political representation is only partially confirmed. The general pattern stands out: even in the more populous environments women face major barriers in attaining mayoral office. These barriers seem to be most pronounced in localities with a medium number of inhabitants.²⁶ Though the general pattern of mayors who are predominantly in their fifties is replicated regardless of the size of the municipality, examination of the categorised age distribution makes it clear that as urbanisation increases, the representation of people from the older age groups follows suit at the expense of their younger counterparts. Where in the smallest municipalities approximately half of all mayors are 50 or older, this is the case for

24 Differences are statistically significant for councillors: Cramer's V and Eta = .066 and p-value = .011 (N = 2592). For mayors differences are not significant: Cramer's V and Eta = .040 and p-value = .257 (N = 2486).

25 The original categorisation in the dataset was reduced to these four categories. Data represent percentages of mayors within each category meeting the characteristic under study.

26 The differences in the gender distribution by categorised number of inhabitants are statistically not significant however. Cramer's V and Eta = .053 and p-value = .059 (N = 2657).

almost three out of four of their colleagues in the largest municipalities.²⁷ The mean age follows this pattern of unity (fifties dominance) in diversity (ageing according to size). This might suggest that especially in the case of larger municipalities the development of a different and more enduring (political) career is necessary. It is possible these mayors have to accumulate more experience in other political mandates, parties or civil society before attaining mayoral office.

Table 3: The social background of mayors by the categorised number of inhabitants (in 1000) of the municipality. Per cent.

	< 15	15 < 30	30 < 100	> 100
Gender: male	91.6	92.9	89.6	88.5
Age				
< 40	7.5	7.0	7.7	4.8
40-49	27.8	26.7	25.0	21.5
50-59	46.4	47.6	45.7	46.9
> 60	18.3	18.7	21.6	26.8
Mean age	51.9	52.3	52.4	54.2
Education: university	63.7	70.4	74.7	75.1
Profession:				
Legislat./senior officers/managers	25.0	29.1	31.8	37.4
Professionals	37.1	37.8	42.3	38.4
Technical and assoc. professions	22.2	20.5	16.6	17.2
Clerks	6.7	7.9	4.4	4.0
Other	9.0	4.7	4.9	3.0
Local roots	57.9	55.1	52.5	55.9
Political family	33.2	32.1	29.1	16.2

The same holds true for the extent to which mayors have completed a university education. While in every category of municipal size the group of mayors holding a degree forms a large majority, with increasing size category of the municipality a university degree becomes more and more of a requirement as a means of access to the mayoral office.²⁸ In populous municipalities mayoral recruitment is more professionalized in terms of education. The contrast is however sharper

27 Differences in the mean age by size of the municipality are statistically significant with Eta = .078 and p-value = .001 (N = 2614).

28 The differences in the share of mayors holding a university degree by categorised number of inhabitants are statistically significant with Cramer's V = .086 and p-value = .000 (N = 2585). Eta = .086.

between the smallest and the two largest size categories. While in the latter almost three out of every four mayors is university educated, in the former the proportion is limited to approximately two out of three. This pattern is further specified if one studies the professional background of our respondents according to size. With increasing municipal size the share of mayors from a background as legislator, senior official or manager increases. This is most pronounced in the largest municipalities. Here having completed higher education and having acquired a related job in terms of status is not sufficient for recruitment. The highly specialised and demanding leadership these larger cities require perhaps makes recruitment focus on candidates from ‘politically agglutinated’ professions.²⁹ These are mainly brokerage in nature but often also linked to the public and political realm, the professional politician being at the tip of such a ‘core-route’ to the highest local office. Mayors from a background as professionals then might reflect a comparable brokerage oriented recruitment which, however, appeals more to the notable model than to specific agglutination in the political realm.³⁰ Smaller municipalities seem more open towards the recruitment of technicians or in a larger spectrum of job positions.

One could argue that in terms of residential connection an increased number of inhabitants (as a partial indicator of urbanisation) would be accompanied by a lesser likelihood of mayors being born or having spent the largest part of their childhood in their locality, not only because there is stronger social mobility in an urban environment but also because it might be expected that the appreciation of local roots would decrease when a municipality is characterised by a strong degree of urbanisation. Though our data seem to confirm such a pattern, regardless of the category considered a majority of all mayors were born or had spent the largest part of their childhood in the municipality they are heading.³¹ The share of mayors coming from political families is highly comparable across the categorised number of inhabitants, with the exception of the most populous municipalities. In these municipalities coming from a political family seems somewhat rare. Here only slightly than 12% of all mayors had a (former) coun-

29 The subcategory of corporate managers is somewhat unfortunately merged into this category often being quoted, however, as the counterexample of a mere status criterion for professional recruitment. Further analysis shows this subcategory is only present in a limited number of cases among mayors.

30 The latter might partially explain why the share of this ‘professional’ group is highest in the largest but one category of municipal size. In bigger cities a mere brokerage oriented recruitment might be completed with a pressing demand for recruitment closer to the political realm. Cramer’s V = .100 and p-value = .000 (N = 2481). Eta = .113.

31 This also explains why the differences in the extent to which mayors have the mentioned local roots by categorised municipal size are not statistically significant. Cramer’s V and Eta = .032 and p-value = .539 (N = 2153).

cillor as a relative. It might be suggested that especially in a less urbanised environment, coming from a family with a political history is accompanied by a number of advantages not only including a clear and highly salient example of a close relative extensively involved in politics but also entailing the easily recognised family name with a history of political involvement.³²

3.2.4 Does it matter what party it is? Party family and the social background of mayors

Size thus seems to matter for recruitment in terms of social background. Larger municipalities show more openness towards women and older (but probably more politically experienced) aspiring mayors while they are more exclusive in terms of university education and brokerage oriented and politically agglutinated professions. They recruit less among candidates with local roots and those who come from political families. Can the way size differences (reflecting the existence of varying degrees of urbanisation) provide different environmental conditions for mayoral recruitment be transferred to the world of partisan cleavages as well? For Gaxie (1980: 5-45) the nature of recruitment selectivity in terms of background reflects the structure of 'le champ politique': parties recruit candidates in the social layers upon which they are drawn. More specifically this happens within an antagonised dominant social stratum (the latter reflecting the minimum of political capital needed for eligibility). Where left-wing parties favour the selection of candidates from their intellectual pool their right-wing counterparts recruit future politicians from the (market-) economic pendant of that stratum. Garraud (1989: 30-43) however notes a convergence towards a more professionalized recruitment model. Where previously left-wing mayors often compensated a somewhat lower socio-economic status by a culture of socio-political activism (e.g. in parties) and their right-wing counterparts merely drew on their notable status linked to a professional achievement, in recent times recruitment has become more homogenous. This is the result of multiple professionalisation³³: working in politics has become more demanding and parties have occupied the local arena to a greater extent than previously. Therefore merely drawing on social status and professional achievement is in-

32 The differences in the extent to which mayors had a family member who was a councillor by categorised city size are statistically highly significant with Cramer's V and Eta = .090 and p-value = .000 (N = 2564). For family members having occupied the mayoralty themselves the tendency is quite comparable.

33 An alternative hypothesis might be that the shift in social cleavages and the subsequent emergence of the catch-all and cadre party has led to a convergence in recruitment.

sufficient as a pathway to power. Political agglutination has undergone a transformation from a substitute in left-wing parties to a general core-route. Is this converging pattern confirmed by our data? The data are presented according to the party family to which the mayor belongs.³⁴

Analogously to the country-wise and size oriented analysis, feminisation of the mayoral elite is low regardless of the party family under study. Nevertheless some partisan variation in gender distribution can be observed. As might be expected, Conservative, Christian-democratic or religious and agrarian parties show limited openness for women as mayors. But in contrast to the assumptions generally made in the literature, more left-wing oriented parties (e.g. former communists or social democrats) are not characterised by a more gender-balanced mayoral stratum. It is within the ranks of liberal parties and their nationalist and regionalist counterparts that mayors are relatively more often of the female sex. Special interest parties, voter coalitions and the group of independent mayors show the second lowest openness to recruitment of women to mayoral office.³⁵ The relative openness to recruitment of women observed among the nationalist and regionalist parties can be extended to the age category, with a greater proportion of younger mayors in such parties; liberals, however, show an opposite pattern. Together with the Christian-democratic and religious parties the oldest mayors on average are to be found within their ranks. Means for mayors linked with other parties are relatively similar³⁶ though the age structure on which the latter is built does differ. While middle-aged mayors dominate among more left-wing oriented parties, the balance in a broad (centre-)right-wing block³⁷ tends towards the older layers of the age structure. In nationalist and regionalist parties a relatively large majority of mayors on the contrary are below 50.

34 Cases are linked to party families according to the Manifesto-classification. Parties are listed in an imperfect left-right continuum completed with their non-traditional or –ideological counterparts. Cases are weighted by the response related coefficient. Data for France are lacking, however. (F)COM = (former) communist parties; SODE = social democratic parties; LIBE = liberal parties; CD/RE = Christian-democratic or religious party; CONSE = conservative; AGRA = agrarian parties; NA/RE = nationalist, regionalist or ethnic parties SI/IN = special interest party, independent, voter group or spare coalition. Mayors from other ecology parties were left out of the analysis due to the limited numeric distribution. (N = 9).

35 It might well be that other factors (like municipal size, party competition) compensate for the presumed ideological openness of the left-wing parties to female mayoral recruitment. Differences between parties are highly significant however. Cramer's V and Eta = .104 and p-value = .005 (N = 1881).

36 Nevertheless differences between parties are statistically highly significant with Eta = .153 and p-value = .000 (N = 1869).

37 Liberals, Christian-democrats, conservatives, individuals from the agrarian parties.

Table 4: The social background of mayors by party family. Per cent

	Party family								
	(F)COM	SODE	LIBE	CD/RE	CONS	AGRA	NA/RE	SI/IN	
Gender: Male	93.3	90.9	83.9	90.3	94.8	90.0	86.7	93.8	
age	<40	7.3	6.3	4.7	9.7	7.8	22.6	8.0	
	40-49	35.6	31.1	18.3	18.1	27.9	21.6	38.4	
	50-59	51.1	46.1	51.6	47.7	40.3	64.7	40.2	
	60>	4.4	15.5	23.8	29.5	22.1	5.9	13.4	
mean	49.6	51.3	53.9	54.1	51.8	51.1	47.8	50.1	
Education: University	69.6	66.3	60.5	67.6	68.3	69.4	80.6	80.0	
profession	seniors	32.6	23.4	36.6	44.1	29.4	5.7	17.2	16.4
	profess.	43.5	40.5	40.2	36.8	34.3	34.3	48.3	55.9
	technical	15.2	22.8	12.5	6.6	23.9	37.1	20.7	11.3
	clerks	4.3	8.9	1.8	8.8	8.3	2.9	6.9	4.6
	other	4.4	4.4	8.9	3.7	4.1	20.0	6.9	11.8
Local roots	62.2	63.1	33.6	44.3	59.3	40.0	67.7	69.2	
Pol. family	25.2	27.5	32.5	48.6	28.5	32.0	32.3	25.9	

In terms of education most parties show a similar pattern. Approximately two thirds of all mayors successfully attended college, but there are two noteworthy exceptions. Among the ranks of mayors elected for nationalist or regionalist parties and their counterparts operating for special interest parties, voter coalitions or as independents, university education is more frequent. Four fifth of these mayors successfully attended college.³⁸ Among Christian-democrats, liberals, conservatives and members of (former) communist parties mayors with a background as legislator, senior public official or manager are better represented. The opposite holds true for other parties, although the data on mayors from agrarian parties tend to constitute a special case, as further discussed below. While the share of the other brokerage oriented category of the professionals is relatively large among almost every party, family data are particularly relevant for mayors recruited in the ranks of nationalist and regionalist parties and even more so for their counterparts from special interest parties, voter coalitions and independent mayors. Although both probably reflect the extensive distribution of a university educated group of brokers, the latter might refer to a class of 'citizen-politicians' in line with the less holistic ideological nature of such parties.

Technicians and equivalent professionals are better represented in the ranks of socialist, conservative but especially agrarian parties. It might be that a specific type of professionalisation occurs within these parties. In line with the nature of these parties (and the assumption made by Gaxie 1980) one might expect to find individuals from farming-related occupations among their mayors. Further analysis of the available data shows that in a narrow sense this pattern can be distinguished only to a limited but meaningful extent (almost 15% of these mayors are skilled agricultural or fishery workers). Though the data do not allow final answers, it seems that the brokerage oriented professionalisation for this group of mayors turns towards (possibly agricultural related) engineering than to the (semi-) political professional realm.

In terms of similarities between parties in the composition of the professional background of mayors the data show a puzzling pattern. Mayors from (former) communist parties show considerable similarities to their liberal counterparts as regards the distribution of professional categories, yet the same holds true for the social-democrats and conservatives. Mayors from nationalist and regionalist parties, in their turn, are most comparable to respondents from special interest parties, voter coalitions and independent mayors. In any case the data do not confirm Gaxie's assumption (1980) of a clear left- (intellectual/

38 Leading towards a highly significant difference between parties: Cramer's V and Eta = .114 and p-value = .001 (N = 1843).

public sector) and right-wing (professional, market-economic) recruitment pattern.³⁹

While in most parties 60% or more of all mayors have local roots, only a minority of their colleagues in agrarian, liberal and Christian-democratic or religious parties were born or spent the greater part of their childhood within their municipalities.⁴⁰ The extent to which mayors come from a political family shows relatively comparable data for all parties. Among liberals, mayors from agrarian and nationalist and regionalist parties, the share of respondents having a family member serving as a councillor during the last two generations is slightly higher. However, among mayors from the Christian-democratic and religious parties this trend is particularly marked, and the pattern is more sharply replicated when the mandate of mayor is concerned.⁴¹ It is conceivable that the specific situation of Belgium and the Netherlands (which contribute heavily to this ideological stratum), whose patterns of political heredity more often lead to a narrow self-reproduction of the mayoral elite, largely accounts for this variation.

3.2.5 If everything matters, then what matters most?

The analyses above have shown that the different factors distinguished (institutions, localities and parties) in most cases have a significant effect on the background characteristics examined. Leaving aside a discussion on the substantive interpretation of these differences (where the relativity of the differences found could be stressed) one could also speculate on the relativity in terms of interrelatedness of these effects. Are certain patterns the result of the correlation of one factor with another: for instance, are differences between north and south mainly due to a divergent size structure of municipalities in both systems, with the first 'absorbing' the influence of the second in a multivariate analysis? Which factor emerges as 'mattering most'? A binary logistic regression analysis was carried out on our data to provide part of an answer to these questions.

39 Differences between parties are statistically highly significant: Cramer's V and Eta = .138 and p-value = .000 (N = 1739).

40 Differences between parties are statistically highly significant with Cramer's V and Eta = .197 and p-value = .000 (N = 1495).

41 Differences between parties are not significant: Cramer's V and Eta = .060 and p-value = .465 (N = 1829).

As independent variables three groups were distinguished.⁴² On the institutional level the typology of Heinelt and Hlepas (as a combination of vertical and horizontal power relations) offers some clues on the broad differences in local government systems and mayoral positions. The direct election of mayors was considered separately as an institutional characteristics. A second group of factors focused on the characteristics of the locality in which the mayoralty was exercised. Size and the potentially rural nature of the municipality were distinguished as core characteristics in this respect. The last group of factors referred to the partisan background of the mayor. It included the question of whether a mayor belonged to a left wing party (socialist or (former) communist) or had attained his/her function as a candidate of a special interest party, supported by a voter coalition or as an independent candidate. As dependent variables categories of our background characteristics were considered as indicated.⁴³ The results of the analysis are found in table 5. Only significant effects are reproduced according to their extent. Nagelkerke R^2 functions as a measure of goodness-of-fit for the overall model.

Though the overall model explains a significant extent of the variation in women occupying the mayoral office, none of the single factors included has a significant effect on its own.⁴⁴ For age, the model seems slightly more predictive, Where political mayors are significantly younger than the average mayor in our dataset their collegial counterparts are older. Mayors in larger and (to a lesser extent) rural environments more often belong to the group aged above the average. In terms of education, institutional factors seem to matter less, with the exception of a directly elected mayor. The latter more often comes from a university background. This also holds true (and to a larger extent) for mayors in the more populous municipalities. While left-wing mayors are less often university educated, their colleagues from special interest parties, voter coalitions or from an independent background show the opposite pattern.

Although the overall model is more successful in explaining the variation in mayors coming from a 'politically agglutinated' profession, four single variables contribute heavily to the pattern found: political mayors, the directly elected and their colleagues recruited in less populous and rural environments belong less often to this category. This group more often resembles the notable model of political recruitment (which is also true for the single issue, voter

42 With the exception of size (logarithm of number of inhabitants) all independent variables were recorded as dichotomous with cases belonging or not to the category under study.

43 Defined in a dichotomous manner with the mayor belonging or not to the category under study.

44 With the direct election of mayors coming close however and deteriorating the chances for women to become mayor.

coalition or independent mayors). The pattern for the extent to which mayors have local roots is to some degree comparable though fewer variables contribute significantly to a more powerful model. Political mayors and their colleagues from less populous municipalities and single issue, voter coalition or independent mayors more often have local roots. Size nevertheless plays a more significant role in the extent to which mayors come from a political family. The latter occurs more often in less populous municipalities.

For most background characteristics a mix of institutional and locality characteristics seems to account for the variation found. Whereas other factors may have a specific significance, it can be noted in particular that the effect of belonging to the group of political mayors on the one hand and the size of the municipality on the other hand have a constant and rather strong effect. They seem to refer to two different types in terms of recruitment with corollaries to social background. The political mayor (strong and often with a direct electoral legitimation but operating within the limited functional and discretionary perimeter of the South) thereby refers more clearly to the notable model (local son with a professional background but not necessarily politically agglutinated).⁴⁵ In the other types of local government (mainly situated in the North) such residential connections are less marked while a professional background in the (para-) political realm is much more frequent. Though institutions thus obviously do matter, they seem to reveal in the first place the enduring relevance of the classical north-south distinction regarding a 'public and politically agglutinated' and 'notable and citizen-politician' recruitment in terms of social background.

Somewhat ironically however – since it is in line with the nuance made by the founding fathers of the mentioned institutional distinction (Page and Goldsmith 1987) – size again seems to be a crucial variable having a constant and extensive explanatory value.⁴⁶ More populous municipalities show a pattern of specialisation in the selection of mayors. They attract older aspirants, the university educated, candidates from a public or political background without local roots and less often coming from political families. In political systems with a high functional capacity and associated discretion for local government (with less stress on its meaning as a pure political community) and in more urban

45 With the East- and Central European group tending towards this model. The fact that the mayor in this model is younger than his colleagues might seem a contradiction to the idea of the 'notable' but probably refers to a more direct recruitment in the mayoralty without an extensive apprenticeship in a previous local political mandate.

46 Though our conclusion is slightly different since our type of analysis makes it possible to distinguish e.g. the existence of institutional effects such as a southern type of local government even if size is taken into account.

Table 5: The social background of mayors: a binominal logistic regression analysis

		Social background						
		Gender (male)	Age (above average)	Education (university)	Profession (politically agglutinated)	Local roots (born/ childhood)	Political family (councillor)	
Institutions	Political		--		---	+++		
	Executive							
	Collegial		++					
	Ceremonial							
	Election: Direct			+	---			
Localities	Size		++	+++	+++	---	---	
	Rural		+		+++			
Parties	Left wing			-				
	Si/in			+	-	++		
	Nagelkerke R ²	.05	.08	.06	.14	.17	.03	

environments the specialisation for mayoral selection from specific public and political social layers is more pronounced. Social status as such is less transferable among societal sectors, probably implying a more 'plural' than an 'elite' type of recruitment in the classical community power conception (Waste 1986: 13-28).

3.3 *Unity in diversity?*

In this contribution we studied the social bias for leadership selection by focusing on some of the background characteristics of European mayors. When during the recruitment process individuals are screened by political institutions for public office, social background factors interfere at the different stages. Leadership selection favours the potential for individuals with certain characteristics to enter and remain in public office. What are these characteristics and how do they operate? An overview of the literature has helped to understand why there is an over-representation of middle aged males who enjoy a favourable position in their life cycle, have benefited from a highly valued and brokerage related field of education leading to professions compatible in various ways with politics, and have life history links both in terms of residence and also in terms of family involvement in the local political community. In testing this picture for the mayoral population studied here, we aimed to go beyond the mere drawing of a social sample. By linking the variation in the background of our mayors to important traditional cleavages in local government systems, the size of the municipality under study and the partisan background of the mayor, we sought to understand how the structure of opportunities in which a future mayor functions influences the political life chances of certain groups of individuals. A multivariate analysis makes it possible to distinguish the relative impact of these factors. What are the main tendencies?

Regardless of any categorisation the domination of males in the mayoral office is very evident. Even though in North and Middle European countries among ceremonial and collegiate systems, more populous municipalities and mayors from liberal and nationalist parties the percentage of women in the mayoralty increases, nowhere is more than one out of every five mayors female. One can conclude that despite the perceived accessibility of local politics a glass ceiling seems to prevent women from climbing to the highest step of the local political ladder. There the men who predominantly cluster at the apex are in their fifties. Whereas countries in East- and Central Europe, political and executive systems of leadership, localities in less urbanised environments and (for-

mer) communist and nationalist parties seem to attract younger mayors, the general middle aged pattern of mayoral recruitment is confirmed.

With the exception of a limited number of countries a majority of European mayors have successfully attended college. The percentage of university educated mayors is highest in the East and Central European countries, among political and executive mayors, the more populous municipalities and among mayors from nationalist, special interest parties or voter coalitions and their independent counterparts. Further scrutiny of the data then seems to confirm the brokerage explanation of political recruitment in educational terms. Mayors are often educated in fields that are to a considerable extent compatible with politics; in addition they have probably benefited from professional experiences favouring entrance into the political realm.⁴⁷ This is also confirmed by the professional background of the mayor. Thus whereas the brokerage related categories of legislators, senior officials, managers and professionals are strongly represented regardless of the categorisation, our results indicate that country-wise, size oriented and partisan differences influence the extent of their representation and their internal ratio. We suggest that whereas especially brokerage related categories refer to 'politically agglutinated' recruitment in terms of profession, the country-wise, size oriented and partisan differences seem to reflect the notable model of the citizen-politician. Whereas a northern systemic tradition and size seem to have a positive effect on the extent to which this brokerage orientation is also translated into a 'political-public' recruitment, partisan differences show a highly puzzling pattern. A clear left-right distinction in terms of a public/intellectual versus market-economic/technical recruitment is not confirmed.

Mayors also often have local connections. Though the data are somewhat diverse, in many countries and localities a considerable percentage of the mayors were born or spent the greater part of their childhood in the municipality they would later head. In accordance with its stress on the local political community, the percentage of such local sons is highest in the countries of the Franco group and among political and executive leaders. The Dutch case differs sharply from the general pattern, however. The mobile nature of the mayoral career makes locally rooted respondents to an exception. Size only seems to have a dampening effect on local roots as a recruitment criterion. Coming from a political family seems to be a salient but not an exclusive characteristic of the European mayor's life history. If family members did occupy a political mandate, it must be situated primarily at the level of councillors. Anglo types of local government and larger municipalities have fewer mayors from local politi-

47 Access to networks with political relevance, coming into contact with the importance of political decisions, ability to combine professional career with a political counterpart.

cal families. Their Christian-democratic counterparts have considerably more. But it should be taken into account that these ‘hard’ indicators probably underestimate that for a large part of all mayors the ‘political microbe’ is passed on through generations in manifold ways.

One may wonder, however, if such a cross-sectional analysis might hide longitudinal changes in the recruitment pattern of mayors in terms of social background. Whereas lack of diachronic data prevents a conclusive assessment of such a question, seniority in the mayoral office could provide some indications on this type of developmental path.⁴⁸ An explorative analysis based on a dichotomy of mayors with relatively low and high seniority seems to confirm the significantly and substantively constant character of recruitment in terms of social background. While the number of women and mayors with local roots significantly decreases with seniority (in the former cases suggesting a gradual openness for women in the mayoralty), their educational attainment, professional background and potential background in a political family show similar values regardless of seniority in the mayoral office.⁴⁹

The picture that emerges thus is one of unity in diversity: though the same background experiences colour the life history of most mayors, revealing an important homogeneity in the political recruitment process, the extent to which such experiences play a role varies in ways which, in a number of cases, can be linked to the local government tradition and aspects of political leadership. Furthermore, size seems to matter. Finally recruitment is by no means ‘colour-blind’: partisan differences occur. Nevertheless the social selective nature of the recruitment process should be stressed. Despite a wide variety of local government systems, electoral modes, political cultures or localities the general tendency stands firm: mayors are disproportionately male, middle-aged, highly educated, occupy a high status but with a politics compatible profession and are rooted in their community. Equally important is the finding that in a large proportion of cases this type of background is reinforced by the phenomenon of belonging to a political family, confirming that the recruitment process is not only socially selective but also self-reproductive. Though the presence of deviant actors warns against a deterministic interpretation, the political life chances of individuals aspiring to the mayoralty are highly structured in terms of social background. This does not mean that recruitment is closed to individuals lacking

48 Seniority is an imperfect substitute for a historical approach since it might e.g. be affected by legal provisions on the length and the frequency of subsequent mandates or political circumstances.

49 Seniority was operationalised as the total number of years the respondent served as a mayor with mean = 7.5 and s = 6.7 (N = 2646). Low and high seniority based on position below or above the mean.

such an exclusive background nor that it is limited to a reproduction of that particular social structure: as the analysis in other chapters will show, party records, previous mandate experience or apprenticeships in civil society might add up to, overwrite or even compensate for social background. It does however confirm the importance of social background factors as a first (and maybe foremost) base for political recruitment. Paraphrasing Prewitt's logic of recruitment as a Chinese puzzle box: 'from the few are chosen the few'⁵⁰.

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4 The Mayor's Political Career

Ulrik Kjær

4.1 The mayoral career

From time to time the claim is made that 'politicians are all the same' – not least when politicians are lambasted in the aftermath of unpopular decisions or actions. The differences between the various individuals who make up the political elite are claimed to be minor compared to the differences between persons belonging to the upper strata of the hierarchy of formal political power and the mundane rest of the population. Even scholars often stress this point (e.g. Putnam 1976; Best and Cotta 2000), thereby basically supporting the conclusion of classical elite theorists stating that the primary line of division of the population is between the elite and the non-elite (Pareto 1935; Mosca 1939). Politicians do differ from the electorate at large – they form a subspecies of human being by the very fact of having a political mandate. And in some cases they not only have politics as an avocation but also as a vocation – living not just for politics but also off politics (Weber 1919).

On the other hand when a politician does make a political contribution, whether for good or bad, in the popular debate this is often explained in terms of the individual's personality, socio-demographic status, geographic origin and so forth. Thus it is not only the common characteristics of the elite group which are considered in the interpretation of a policy proposed, an action taken or a way of handling a political crisis but also the personal characteristics of the specific politician. Variations among politicians, it is claimed, do not exist exclusively in terms of political programme but also in terms of, for instance, leadership capabilities. During election campaigns, these differences are usually magnified, for better or for worse. Among scholars, especially among historians and political scientists, great attention is paid to individual characteristics of politicians. Sometimes there appears to be a veritable 'obsession' to try to explain important political events in terms of the persons residing in office, and on occasion the analysis is moved even further by attempting to pinpoint the personality traits of the ruling politician, which are then seen as the explanation for the policy decisions taken.

The observation of a political elite made up by individuals having certain characteristics in common and yet still quite different from others also holds true for career paths. In terms of political careers politicians share a common feature – they made a successful bid for office. Trivial though this might sound, it is important to remember that politicians are special by having reached the highest step on the ladder of political recruitment. ‘Whether he was born in the proverbial log cabin or in the mansion of the high and mighty, the fact of having been ‘chosen’ sets the representative off as someone ‘special’” (Eulau 1969: 101). But although they all made it to the summit, they might well have followed different routes on their path up the mountain.

This chapter will focus on the top political position in local governments – the mayoral office. The aim will be to describe, and where possible to explain, similarities and differences in the career paths of the European mayors. It must be stated at the outset of this chapter, however, that much of the following discussion is based on merely theoretical conditions, in the sense that any attempt to answer the question: ‘Why should we care about the career of the mayor?’ is compelled to rely on certain assumptions, which are widely accepted but are not necessarily based on hard empirical evidence.

First of all, we assume, that ‘who governs matters’ – it makes a difference who the mayor is (see Bäck in this volume). The ‘who’ most often relates to the socio-demography – gender, age, education, occupation etc. – of the politician (Kjær 2000), and without going as far as socio-demographic determinism (Putnam 1976: 142) it is clear that such characteristics can have an impact on the way politicians act. Secondly, it must be assumed that politicians’ career paths can be included among these decisive characteristics – that politicians also bring with them a heritage from their political lives. Therefore, we assume that the route to the mayoral office affects the mayor’s course of action once elected.

What is then a mayoral career? The mayoral career is created in the continuous recruitment process where a ‘unique mixture of ambition and opportunity’ is combined (Prinz 1993: 12). However, a detailed examination of the recruitment aspect will be undertaken in another chapter (see Steyvers and Reynaert in this volume); here attention will centre on a description of the career as it expands over time. Basically, a career is defined by two focal points – the point of beginning and the point of termination. Between these two points of time, the mayoral career unfolds but at the same time the two focal points also open up for a pre-mayoral career and a post-mayoral career. Effectively, describing the career of a mayor involves following two different kinds of political careers – the internal and the external (Hibbing 1993). An (internal) career system exists within local government, including the council and the mayoralty. But there also exists an (external) career system outside local government, including

for instance a seat in the national parliament or in the government. In figure 1, these two dimensions (beginning/occupation/termination and internal/external) are combined in a six-fold table.

Figure 1: Different aspects of the political career of a mayor.

	'internal career'	'external career'
Beginning of mayoral career	Number of years at the council	Pre-mayoral political career
Occupying mayoral office	Seniority	Cumul des mandats
Termination of mayoral career	Returning to the council	Post-mayoral political career

Figure 1 demonstrates that at least six different aspects of the mayoral career exist. In regard to the first four cells in figure 1 our investigation will endeavour to provide empirical data on European mayors. As far as the future career of the mayors is concerned, discussion will be based on the results of interviews with the mayors in which they were asked about their ambitions for their future political careers. Once again this is an example of 'the theoretical difficulty and empirical impossibilities associated with a study of career paths' (Wahlke et al. 1962: 73).

4.2 Long-time councillors making their way to the top?

Long ago Robert Louis Stevenson made the observation that 'politics is perhaps the only profession for which no preparation is thought necessary' (Stevenson 1882 quoted in Jay 1997). It is true that there is no formal education leading to the supposed profession of a politician but even though politicians are, therefore, self-taught out of necessity, some training grounds exist, which can replace formal schooling. Participation in the work of political parties, labour unions, NGOs, etc. can prepare citizens to enter elective political office. Important political skills can also be learned in the labour market, for instance through occupation in a brokerage job such as that of lawyer, teacher or journalist (Jacob 1962: 710). In such occupations there is a better chance to acquire 'the skill of bargaining, the ability to convince, the art of inspiring trust and confidence' (Jacob 1962: 710). These 'talking professions' can represent a good foundation for a political career (Czudnowski 1975: 230; Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 110). But there might be an even better alternative: the best place to learn politics

might actually be right at the heart of the political realm itself – by occupying political office.

However, every political career has to begin somewhere. Some political office has to be conquered from scratch – with a clean CV in terms of elective office. The crucial question is whether the mayoral office constitutes such a starting point. Since the position as mayor is at the top of the political hierarchy in local government – ranking above the position of back-benching councillor – one might expect that most occupants of the mayoral office would not be at the very beginning of their local political careers. Rather, one would presume that some time has to be served on the council in order to learn to manoeuvre in the specific local political context and to facilitate a successful bid for the highest local office. In our survey, mayors were asked if they had been a member of the council before their first term as a mayor and, in that case, how long they had served on local back benches prior to their entry to the mayoral office. Table 1 shows the mean number of years on the council calculated by country, and also includes the percentage of mayors who by-passed the position of councillor and were elected directly to the mayoralty.

Table 1 demonstrates that city hall is not an unknown locality for most mayors upon their first day in the mayoral office. On average, European mayors have served almost six years on the local council prior to their election as mayor. Thus the council functions – not surprisingly – as an important feeder for the mayor's office. At the same time, however, no less than a third of the mayors are 'lateral entrants' who come into office without having previously served on the council (Prewitt 1970: 59): clearly, therefore, not all routes to mayoral office include spending several years of work as a rank-and-file member of the council.

Table 1 also illuminates that substantial differences exist among the countries included in the study. In most of the northern European countries, mayors have a more lengthy career on the council prior to their election as mayor compared to the majority of southern and eastern European countries. That there are numerous cross-country differences as regards the percentage of newcomers is also one of the findings to emerge clearly from the above table. In England and Ireland, mayors with no prior experience from the council are indeed rare, whereas in Germany, Italy and Hungary such lateral entrants make up more than half of the population of mayors. A possible explanation for these differences could lie in the role of political parties in the race for mayor. It could be hypothesized that the substantial experience from the council gained by mayors in some countries reflects a situation where political parties contribute to the recruitment process by promoting candidates who have served a preceding apprenticeship by representing the party on the council. The distribution of partisan and non-partisan mayors varies across the countries, and if this characteristic of the coun-

tries is combined with the ranking according to experience as councillor, the pattern is very clear-cut. In table 1, the ten countries with the highest score on council experience are at the same time the ten countries where the percentage of non-partisan mayors is the lowest, while the seven countries with the lowest council experience are at the same time the countries where the highest number of non-partisan mayors are found.

Table 1: Political experience as a councillor before the first term in office as a mayor. Number of years (mean and standard deviation) and per cent of newcomers calculated for each country.

	Number of years as councillor		Newcomers in per cent	n =
	mean	s.d.		
England	11.2	7.2	3	122
Austria	10.5	7.3	13	40
Sweden	10.3	6.6	6	137
Switzerland	9.1	6.3	5	39
Denmark	8.7	6.1	12	105
Belgium	8.6	8.0	21	136
Ireland	7.8	6.1	0	18
Netherlands	6.5	6.8	32	227
France	6.2	7.6	41	188
Spain	5.7	5.1	23	153
Portugal	5.7	6.0	30	23
Greece	5.5	5.0	28	127
Czech Republic	5.3	4.1	13	77
Germany	5.1	7.1	51	551
Poland	4.3	3.9	28	202
Italy	3.0	4.2	53	255
Hungary	2.6	3.5	54	80
Total	5.8	6.5	34	2480

Note: The row with total numbers has been weighted by country.

Another potential explanatory factor could be the institutional arrangement involved in the selection process. Lateral entrants may be offered a comparatively easier way to office in systems with directly elected mayors than in systems where the councils elect the mayor as, *ceteris paribus*, councillors will wield greater power in indirect than direct elections and might tend to favour candidates who have gained some council experience and have been a colleague of the selectors. Table 1 demonstrates that most of the countries ranking low do indeed

have direct elections, while countries ranking high in terms of council experience, such as England, Sweden and Denmark, have indirect elections to the mayoral position. However, in this case the picture is more blurred than in the case of partisanship.

It is important to note that so far the analysis has been based only on aggregate data. In order to test the two hypotheses, a multiple linear regression analysis was conducted, as shown in table 2. In this analysis municipal size and some socio-demographic variables (gender and age) are included.

Table 2: Years of service at the council before the first term in office as a mayor, explained by direct election of mayor, partisanship, municipal size and socio-demography. Linear regression (standardized coefficients).

	beta
Election of mayor	
Directly	-.19***
Political party	
Member of a political party	.12***
Size of municipality (number of inhabitants)	
20-50.000	.00
50-200.000	.03
More than 200.000	.04*
Socio-demography	
Gender (male)	-.02
Age	.18***
R ²	.11

Note: Municipality size under 20.000 is used as reference group.

Level of significance: ***: p<.001, **: p<0.1, *: p<.05. n = 2.371.

Table 2 demonstrates that the two hypotheses are confirmed when individual level data are used. The length of council experience prior to mayoralty is negatively related to direct election and positively related to party membership. As regards the additional variables included in the model a relationship – albeit quite weak – can be observed between municipal size and council experience. The larger the municipality, the more experienced is the mayor upon first election, in terms of length of time served on the council. Gender is found to have no significant impact, whereas age is positively related to the dependent variable. However, it is also important to notice that the model given in table 2 explains

no more than 11 per cent of the variation in number of years of council membership prior to holding mayoral office.

4.3 Other pre-mayoral elective offices

The council is not the only possible elective office in which mayors may have served before entering their current political position. Other elective offices exist both 'below' and 'beyond' the mayoral office in the political status hierarchy. Since the ranking of different political offices can vary not only between countries but also in terms of the debater on ranking criteria, the discussion of ranking will not be addressed in this chapter. Rather, attention will concentrate on the different potential roads to mayoral office, and therefore a broad range of elective offices will be included in this primarily exploratory endeavour.

Table 3 lists the percentage of the mayors who have been elected to school boards, regional assemblies, national parliaments, and similar offices for each of the countries included in the study.

Table 3 demonstrates that upon entering city hall, approximately one third of the mayors have prior experience deriving from at least one of the elective positions included in table 3. When combined with the finding from table 1 regarding their experience on the local council, it can be concluded that a total of 76 per cent of the European mayors had some kind of record of elective position when they entered the mayoral office.

The data from table 3 on elective office probably ranking below the mayoralty (school boards and parish councils) are somewhat inconclusive; therefore, an explanation of why some countries have higher scores than others is difficult to propose. However, in some countries there is clearly a substantial link between these assemblies and the mayoral office: for example, in England and Ireland half the mayors had previous experience as a member of a school board, and in the Czech Republic the same is true for parish councils. With regard to regional and provincial governments, the close relationship between these political levels and the municipal institutions in terms of personnel is evident, with roughly a fifth of mayors having served in a regional/provincial assembly before their first mayoral term.

Table 3 also shows that mayors 'stick to' their own municipality. While table 3 indicates that the position of mayor fits into a pattern of vertical career movements (from school board, council and parliament to mayor's office) there seems to be no horizontal equivalent (from mayor in one municipality to another). The one exception to this conclusion is the Netherlands where, on the contrary, more than half of the mayors have already been a mayor in another

municipality. This circulation among the Dutch mayors can be explained by the special system of mayoral recruitment in this country. The mayors are not elected but appointed by the national government (Eldersveld et al. 1995: 13) and therefore the mayors do not need a strong local bond to the municipality they are to lead.

Table 3: The percentage of mayors from the different countries who held different kinds of elective office prior to the beginning of the first mandate as mayor. Per cent.

	School board	Parish council	Regional/provincial assembly	Mayor in other municipality	MP	Minister
Portugal	36	5	64	5	24	7
Belgium	-	-	27	-	17	6
Hungary	-	-	12	-	16	0
France	-	-	30	2	11	2
Spain	2	2	9	1	8	1
Netherlands	-	14	8	55	6	2
Switzerland	22	6	36	2	4	-
Italy	-	-	20	1	4	1
Denmark	35	5	7	-	4	0
Poland	-	16	26	4	3	0
Czech Rep.	17	50	9	0	2	0
Greece	43	7	25	2	2	2
Germany	-	-	16	5	1	0
Sweden	-	-	15	1	1	0
England	55	37	12	1	0	0
Austria	-	-	0	0	0	4
Ireland	45	30	10	10	0	0
Total	26	16	20	6	5	1

Note: - indicates that the question has not been included in the questionnaire in this country.

Note: The row with total numbers has been weighted by country.

An interesting vertical career link is that between the mayoral office and national politics. Table 3 demonstrates that with just a few exceptions mayors did not have a ministerial career prior to their election to the mayoral position in local governments, although some had been a member of the national parliament. In Portugal, Belgium, Hungary and France, this holds true for a proportion ranging

from a fourth to a tenth of the mayors while in Ireland, Austria and Ireland this phenomenon is not present.

Table 4: Parliamentary experience before first term as mayor explained in a multiple analysis. Logistic regression analysis. Odds ratios (exp(B)).

	Parliamentary experience before first term as a mayor		
	exp(B)	exp(B)	exp(B)
<i>Country</i>			
Portugal	7.16 ^{***}	5.46 ^{**}	2.64
Belgium	4.67 ^{***}	7.16 ^{***}	5.99 ^{***}
Hungary	4.00 ^{**}	5.06 ^{**}	6.48 ^{**}
France	2.68 [*]	3.65 ^{**}	2.57
Spain	1.94	1.34	1.21
Netherlands	1.38	1.42	0.75
Switzerland	1.00	1.48	1.32
Denmark	0.96	1.31	0.91
Poland	0.57	0.62	0.81
Czech Republic	0.29	0.29	0.30
Greece	0.41	0.31	0.26
Germany	0.16 ^{**}	0.14 ^{**}	0.15 ^{**}
Sweden	0.34	0.29	0.18 [*]
England	0.00	0.00	0.00
Austria	0.00	0.00	0.00
Ireland	0.00	0.00	-
<i>Size of municipality</i>			
20-50,000		2.03 ^{**}	2.56 ^{**}
50-200,000		7.43 ^{***}	8.94 ^{***}
More than 200,000		72.62 ^{***}	55.22 ^{***}
<i>Political party</i>			
Socialist/former communist			2.14 ^{**}
<i>Socio-demography</i>			
Gender (male)			0.44 [*]
Age			1.05 ^{**}
Nagelkerke R ²	0.16	0.28	0.32

Note: Italy is used as reference group for the country dummies.

Level of significance: ***: p<.001, **: p<0.1, *: p<.05. n = 2.459, 2.436, 1.994 respectively.

A possible explanation for this divergence might be found at the national level, concerning power relations between the national and local level, the nature of the electoral law, cultural tradition, and so forth. Since these variables are unlikely to differ among municipalities within a given country, it is worth enquiring whether there is variation on other dimensions than that constituted by country.

Firstly, it may be important to consider municipal size. Even though only municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants are included in this study, there are still substantial differences between municipalities just above 10,000 and municipalities with over a million inhabitants. For a member of a national parliament to leave such a position and become mayor in a small municipality might represent a step downward, while others might find it attractive to exchange a position as a back-benching MP with that of mayor in a large European metropolis. Our data seem to provide some support for this hypothesis. For instance only three percent of the mayors in municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants had previously been elected as an MP, whereas this is the case with no less than 29 per cent of the mayors in cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants. To acquire greater insight into the potential role of a former parliamentary career, a multiple analysis with prior service as an MP as dependent variable is conducted in table 4, including several explanatory variables such as country and size of municipality.

Table 4 demonstrates that the explanatory power of the model increases when variables at the municipal and individual level are included. Differences among the countries still persist, with Hungarian and Belgian mayors having significantly more parliamentary experience than their European colleagues and German and Swedish mayors being less experienced in this respect than the average mayor (English, Austrian and Irish mayors have no prior national parliamentary career at all). However, across countries, the size of municipality is also found to be a very significant independent variable in the analysis. The bigger the municipality, the higher the likelihood that the mayor had been elected MP before entering the first term in the mayoral office.

The multivariate analysis in table 4 also demonstrates that the career links between national parliament and city hall seem to be stronger in socialist and former communist parties. Mayors whose background involves this type of party affiliation more often had experience in national politics before their first term as mayor than is the case with mayors running under other party labels. There is no straightforward explanation for this phenomenon, but a hypothesis that could be interesting to pursue for further research is that the national organizations of these two party families are more active in the local nomination processes. The two socio-demographic variables included in the multivariate analysis are also found to have a significant effect: a parliamentary background is found more of-

ten among older than among younger mayors and more often among female than male mayors.

This fits well with a theoretical interpretation of the recruitment process as an elimination race, where women need to have a broader range of assets in order to conquer a political office. When it comes to mayoral office, prior parliamentary service can be such an asset.

4.4 *Cumul des mandats among mayors*

Attention has centred so far on sequential links between the mayoral career and other political careers. However, the various political offices can also be held simultaneously: mayors may hold other political offices at the same time as the mayoral office. The extent of such dual mandacy – often referred to by the French term *cumul des mandats* – among European mayors is shown in table 5.

Table 5: Dual mandates among European mayors. Per cent.

	Member of Parliament	Minister	Member of the European Parliament	Regional/provincial office
Hungary	23	0	0	31
France	16	4	6	36
Belgium	14	0	1	19
Spain	5	0	1	17
Switzerland	4	0	0	30
Italy	1	0	1	0
Denmark	1	0	0	-
Czech Republic	1	0	0	22
Greece	0	0	0	16
Sweden	0	0	0	19
England	0	0	0	6
Ireland	0	0	0	36
Total	7	3	2	19

Note: The row with total numbers has been weighted by country.

Table 5 shows results almost identical with those of table 3, which focuses on other political mandates held by mayors prior to holding mayoral office. *Cumul des mandats* is most often found in regard to regional and provincial political bodies, with almost a fifth of all mayors having held such an office. The excep-

tion to this pattern is Italy, where *cumul des mandats* between the local and regional level is prohibited by law. A few of the mayors are also MPs at the same time as holding mayoral office, with some variation among the countries. Once again, following the pattern of table 3, Hungary, Belgium and France score high on this dimension, whereas this phenomenon is absent in Sweden, England and Ireland (and Greece where this practice, as also in Poland, is prohibited by law).

The practice of dual mandacy, banned in Italy and Greece but widespread in countries like France and Belgium, also reveals that the normative view on *cumul des mandats* can vary – indeed, there is an ongoing normative discussion on the subject. On the one hand it can be claimed that *cumul des mandats* is one of the more elegant ways of knitting together the political decisions made at the national and the local levels. Mayors who at the same time sit in Parliament as elected MPs could enhance the legislative process in Parliament through their in-depth knowledge of the present state of the art of local government. For example, they might be able to identify problems at the local political level and transfer them to the national political agenda faster than their colleague MPs. They might also provide a more realistic assessment of the usefulness of a policy instrument proposed in Parliament in terms of the chances of successful local implementation than would national politicians with no practical experience from local politics. On the other hand, it can be argued that this means of coordinating the national legislation with the local realm is unnecessary, since MPs (and their civil servants) are not ‘deaf’, and information can flow through other channels than the personal experiences of the MPs. Furthermore, the practice of *cumul des mandats* may not be free from the suspicion that it implies a concentration of power, whereas the coexistence of a national and a local polity constitutes a democratic arrangement of checks and balances which could be blurred if the personal overlap of politicians at the two levels were massive. Nor should it be overlooked that another very important principle within the idea of representative democracy is the equal and free access to run for and possess political office (Dahl 1989).

4.5 Seniority in mayoral office

Another dimension of the mayoral careers is, according to figure 1, the length of their career. Do mayors hold office for no more than a few years, indeed just a single term, or do they occupy city hall for a generation or at least long enough for their predecessor to be almost forgotten, so that they themselves stand out as a symbol of the municipality? Our data do not shed light on the length of mayoral service, since the survey concerned only mayors presently in office and we

thus have no information on their career termination. However, the data can be used to calculate the seniority of the mayors surveyed, enquiring into how long they have already held the mayoral office. In table 6, the average seniority of the mayors is calculated for each of the countries included in the study.

Table 6 demonstrates that there are substantial differences in the level of seniority among the mayors in different European countries. By far the most senior are the Dutch mayors – on average they have already been in office for no less than 12 years. As already mentioned, the Netherlands is a special case, since the mayors are not elected but appointed by the national government. Therefore the position of mayor is to a greater extent seen as a job more than a public duty, and therefore a higher degree of professionalization should be expected. In fact, one element of professionalization of political offices is more generally found to be length of service. Countries like France and Belgium also score high on average seniority, a feature that might partly be seen as a result of the relatively high levels of cumulation of mandates in these two countries demonstrated in the previous section. That is to say, if French and Belgian mayors are elected to their national parliaments, they encounter no difficulty in also continuing as mayor. At the other end of the ranking stand countries like England and Ireland, where the mayors on average have only recently entered the mayoral office.

As was the case with dual mandacy, there is a fairly intense on-going normative debate in connection with seniority. This debate has two dimensions. First of all, high levels of seniority are often linked with and suspected to originate from incumbency effects. Incumbent politicians may be successful in their bid for election because of comparative advantages in the recruitment process, originating exclusively from the position in office and not from their personal qualities, thereby somewhat tilting the market process which holds that 'the best man wins'. If access to campaign channels, media exposure etc. is unequally distributed in favour of the incumbent mayor, this may give rise to concern, not least among advocates of a Schumpeterian notion of competitive democracy with its focus on accountability (Beetham 1996: 31; Pedersen 1994: 219).

The second dimension in the normative debate on seniority deals with different views on the type of politician best suited to performing the mayoral task. It could be claimed that the best mayor is quite senior, since such a figure will by then have acquired a greater store of political skills through experience. On the other hand it can equally be claimed that new ideas and new energy can be brought into local government by less experienced mayors. As Putnam outlines the dilemma in his seminal work on political elites: 'The higher the degree of elite turnover, the lower the average level of elite experience, expertise, and effectiveness,' but 'the higher the degree of elite turnover, the greater a system's innovativeness and flexibility in terms of policy' (Putnam 1976: 66). It can be

difficult to balance the demand for ‘new blood and fresh ideas’ and at the same time avoid the ‘loss of valuable member experience and continuity’ (Game and Leach 1993: 6), when there is only one seat in the mayoral office to be filled.

Table 6: Present seniority in mayoral office among the European mayors. Years.

	mean	s.d.
Netherlands	12.0	8.1
Germany	9.5	7.4
France	9.0	8.0
Belgium	8.6	7.5
Portugal	7.7	6.2
Switzerland	7.6	5.3
Austria	7.5	5.0
Greece	7.1	5.7
Hungary	7.0	4.7
Denmark	6.4	6.3
Spain	6.4	5.9
Italy	5.7	4.1
Poland	5.1	4.2
Sweden	4.5	4.5
England	4.3	6.5
Czech Republic	3.7	3.3
Ireland	1.9	1.7
Total	7.4	6.6

Note: The row with total numbers has been weighted by country.

4.6 Ambitions for the political future

In order to complete the description of the career paths of European mayors according to figure 1, the termination of their career must also be addressed. As already pointed out, no information on the derecruitment of mayors is available because those included in the present study are still in office. Therefore the length of their career, why they leave office and where they go afterwards cannot be documented. However, these questions can be addressed indirectly by exploring the surveyed mayors’ current thoughts about their political future. They may already have decided whether they will voluntarily step down at the next election

or whether they will run for one more term. Such an enquiry can also reveal a great deal about the mayors' present level of political ambitions. For example, are mayors carrying out their term of office to serve the community or do they see the mayoral position as a stepping stone on their way to higher political office, for instance a seat in the national parliament? In academic debate, their future political ambitions have become a focal point in a scholarly endeavour to understand the motives and behaviour of politicians and their careers (Fowler and McClure 1989; Williams and Lascher 1993).

Most investigations into the ambitions of politicians draw upon the seminal work of Joseph A. Schlesinger, who distinguishes between three different levels of political ambitions (Schlesinger 1966: 10ff). Some politicians have discrete ambitions, that is to say, they are at the moment engaged in what they themselves see at their last term. They will finish their work in their office, but at the upcoming election they will voluntarily step down by not running again. Other politicians are characterised by what Schlesinger labels static ambitions. These politicians will run again at the next election for their own office – but whether they will also fill it for another term is for the voters to decide. The third, and in Schlesinger's world, last category of politicians nurse progressive ambitions: rather than continuing to serve in their present office they would prefer to move upwards in the political hierarchy and run for a higher political office.

Some scholars, however, have claimed that 'city hall is typically a terminal office' (Murphy 1980: 286). In this interpretation, the interconnectedness between the mayoral office and higher political office is assessed as weak and ambition among mayors to move a step up the political ladder is expected to be low. There exists a 'conventional view of the mayoralty as a political dead end' (Murphy 1980: 279). But these views derive from an American context, and it is questionable whether this conception of the mayoral career system as a unique and isolated path can be applied to a European context. It is more realistic to speculate that a dual career system may be in function, and in order to acquire evidence on this question, mayors were asked what they intended to do at the end of their present mandate – would they step down (discrete ambitions), continue for another term (static ambitions) or seek higher political office (progressive ambitions)? The answers are reported in table 7.

Table 7 shows that a minority of mayors have progressive ambitions (approximately a seventh). However, some variation among countries is observed, with mayors of France, the Czech Republic and Italy being relatively progressive in their political ambitions, whereas very few 'MP-wanna-be's' are found in the mayoral offices of Germany, the Netherlands and Austria.

In order to explore why mayors in some countries seem to be more politically ambitious than in others, some alternative explanatory variables will again

be built into the model. The possible role of characteristics on the municipal and individual level will be examined. For instance municipal size may have an impact, with mayors of small municipalities being the most progressively ambitious. It might be suggested that in large municipalities, the position of mayor could, even for the ambitious politician, be considered just as prestigious as a seat in the national parliament, whereas in the small units, a parliamentary seat could be a very attractive alternative to the mayoral office. Another potentially interesting explanatory variable is partisan affiliation, where it might be hypothesised that the route towards higher political office might seem more accessible for mayors who run under a national, political party label, since national politics traditionally in most countries is dominated by political parties to a greater extent than is the case for local politics.

Table 7: Level of political ambitions among the European mayors according to Schlesinger's distinction between progressive ambitions (seeking higher office), static ambitions (continuing as mayor) and discrete ambitions (stepping down as mayor after next election). Per cent.

	Progressive ambitions	Static ambitions	Discrete ambitions
France	39	47	14
Czech Republic	36	36	28
Italy	35	42	23
Spain	21	56	23
Switzerland	13	49	38
Belgium	12	69	19
Sweden	12	67	21
Hungary	12	55	32
Portugal	11	52	37
Greece	11	71	18
England	9	68	23
Denmark	4	79	17
Austria	3	82	15
Netherlands	3	65	32
Germany	3	67	30
Total	14	61	25

Note: The question answered by the mayors was: 'For the time being, what are you planning to do at the end of the present mandate?'

The row with total numbers has been weighted by country.

Table 8: Progressive ambition (the mayor would like to seek higher political office after present term) explained in a multiple analysis. Logistic regression analysis. Odds ratios (exp(B)).

	Parliamentary experience before first term as a mayor		
	exp(B)	exp(B)	exp(B)
<i>Country</i>			
Portugal	0.96	0.95	0.94
Belgium	1.07	1.06	1.08
Hungary	1.28	1.25	1.33
France	2.79**	2.69*	3.07**
Spain	1.98	1.94	1.63
Netherlands	0.21**	0.21**	0.27*
Italy	4.29***	4.46***	4.68***
Denmark	0.30	0.30*	0.32
Czech Republic	4.49***	4.40***	4.84***
Greece	0.97	0.97	1.08
Germany	0.26**	0.26**	0.28**
Sweden	1.03	1.00	1.02
England	0.80	0.81	1.08
Austria	0.20	0.20	0.20
<i>Size of municipality</i>			
20-50,000		1.24	1.19
50-200,000		0.94	0.93
more than 200.000		0.98	0.93
<i>Political party</i>			
Non-partisan			0.62*
<i>Socio-demography</i>			
Gender (male)			1.47
Age			0.97***
Nagelkerke R ²	0.20	0.20	0.22

Note: Switzerland is used as reference group for the country dummies.

Level of significance: ***: p<.001, **: p<0.1, *: p<.05. n = 2.173, 2.154, 2.079 respectively.

Therefore non-partisan mayors could be expected to have less progressive political ambitions than their partisan colleagues. In regard to socio-demographic variables gender might be of some importance, with the hypothesis that male mayors are more progressively ambitious than their female counterparts (since women are generally considered less politically ambitious than men (Caroll 1993: 204)). Last but not least, the age of the mayors may have an impact on the level of progressive ambition. It is often claimed that ‘growing old dampens the fires of political ambition’ (Bledsoe 1993: 162) – that ‘the older a politician is, the less likely he or she is to seek advancement’ (Prinz 1993: 31). Or as Murphy puts it: ‘The younger the mayor, the greater the likelihood he will use city hall as a stepping stone to higher office’ (Murphy 1980: 285). These potential, explanatory variables are included in a multiple regression model, where progressive ambition is the dependent variable. The analysis is shown in table 8.

Table 8 demonstrates that the country differences found in table 7 are more or less resistant to control for size of municipality, partisan affiliation and socio-demography. Thus after controlling for these variables, progressive ambition is still more widespread in countries like the Czech Republic, Italy and France and less common among mayors from Germany and the Netherlands. The hypothesis on municipal size is unconfirmed, with no apparent impact on the level of ambition. On the other hand, in line with the hypothesis put forward, fewer non-partisan mayors have progressive ambitions compared to their counterparts running under a political party label. With regard to gender, the hypothesis claiming men to be more ambitious than women also seems to be confirmed in table 8, but it should be noted that the relationship is not statistically significant. As for the hypothesis regarding age, the proposed relationship is confirmed. Younger more often than older mayors cherish ambitions to move from their mayoral office into higher political office when their current term ends. Progressive ambitions are found among 20 per cent of mayors below the age of fifty compared to only 11 per cent among the mayors who are over fifty.

4.7 The main path

In this chapter, we have endeavoured to describe European mayors in terms of their political careers. Two points of time, in particular, define a political career – the time of first election to a specific office and the time of final departure from the office. Between these points in time, the mayoral career can be short or long, and it may or may not be interrupted. However, it should be borne in mind that a mayor’s political career need not be limited to the mayoral office, since mayors may hold other kinds of elective office, either before or after their mayoral term.

In the analyses presented here we studied both the 'internal' and the 'external' careers in these respects, namely the other elective offices within the municipality, for example, as councillor, and the other elective offices outside local government, especially seats in the national parliament.

The resulting overall picture of the 'typical' political career of a present European mayor indicates that most mayors have served on the council before moving into the mayoral office. On average almost six years have been spent on the council prior to the time when the perfect match of personal ambitions and the existing opportunity structure made it possible to move up the final step on the local political ladder. However, this does not mean that councillor experience is a *de facto* prerequisite for conquering the title of mayor. The survey also revealed that one third of the mayors are lateral entrants, which means that they were elected as mayor without prior experience in terms of local political office.

With regard to experience from national politics, fairly low scores are observed. Only approximately five per cent of the mayors have, before their first election as mayor, been a member of the national parliament. The same pattern is found in regard to serving in national politics simultaneously with holding mayoral office. *Cumul des mandats* is not widespread among mayors – only seven per cent are mayor and MP at the same time – and combinations of mayoral office with ministerial office or a seat in the European parliament are very rare. Career links to regional and provincial offices are more common, since approximately a fifth of all mayors have held elective office at these levels before becoming a mayor and the same proportion of mayors presently cumulate these offices.

The question of the length of mayoral careers cannot be addressed in depth in this study as the mayors who were surveyed are still in office. However, our findings show that on average they have already been in office for more than seven years. The investigation also inquired into their plans for their future political careers. One fourth of the mayors plan to step down voluntarily after their present term, whereas six out of ten intend to stand for another term as mayor. The remaining one seventh of the mayors have progressive ambitions, hoping to use the mayoral office as a stepping stone for higher political office, which in most cases signifies the aspiration to be elected to the national parliament.

The overall conclusion is therefore that the mayoral career is a part of the 'local political career system' as well as the 'national political career system'. That the mayoral office is part of the local political career system is, of course, an almost tautological conclusion since the mayoral office itself forms an important part of this career system. However, the council is also very important, and this chapter has demonstrated that the position as councillor is a widely used route to mayoral office. As for the national political career system, our results

show that the position as MP is found among the mayors either in their political past, present or future. Nevertheless, the link between the mayoral office and these two career systems is by no means tight. The strongest bond is very clearly that with the local political career system, although it should be noted that no fewer than one third of the mayors had no council experience prior to holding mayoral office. And in most cases, the average lengths of pre-mayoral careers on the council and present seniority in the mayoral office are far from amounting to a life-long career. The bond to the national political career system is definitely quite weak, with less than ten per cent of mayors having prior or present service in parliament on their record.

Additional variables were also investigated as possible explanations for variations in career paths. In particular, parliamentary experience is more prevalent among mayors from large municipalities, among mayors from socialist/former communist parties, among female mayors and among older mayors. Similarly, progressive ambition is found to be less prevalent among non-partisan mayors and among older mayors. However, while the variables on municipal and individual level included in the analyses improved the explanatory power of the models, they failed to control out another finding, namely the differences between countries. After controlling for municipal and individual level variables, the countries included in the study still show different pictures of mayoral career patterns. These country differences are summed up in figure 2, where each country is placed along two dimensions. The first dimension is 'local career,' which is an index created by summing pre-mayoral council experience and seniority in mayoral office. The second dimension is 'national career,' which is an index created by summing pre-mayoral experience as MP and the progressive ambitions of the mayors.


In figure 2, four different clusters of countries can be identified (only the fifteen countries where all four sources of information were used for the indices are included). The north-west quadrant contains Hungary, Spain, the Czech Republic and Italy. In these countries, the average mayor scores relatively low on the local political career index (short time on the council prior to mayoral office and/or low seniority), but relatively high on the national career index (many mayors with prior experience as MPs and/or many mayors with progressive ambitions). These countries are therefore classified as having a mayoral career system that in relative terms can be labelled 'national careerism.' In contrast to this pattern, in the south-east quadrant one finds Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Austria, Germany, England and Switzerland, where the average mayor scores relatively high in terms of local career and relatively low on national career. These countries can therefore be classified as having a mayoral career system that – again in relative terms – can be labelled 'local careerism.' In a few coun-

tries, Portugal, France and Belgium, the average mayor has a relatively high score on both indices; therefore these countries can be classified as having relatively 'strong careerism'. Finally, in one of the countries surveyed, Greece, the score on both indices is low, which is why this country is classified as having relatively 'weak careerism'.

It would be of interest to seek to explain these differences in careerism. Why is it that in some countries national careerism is found among mayors while in other countries local careerism is to be observed? In chapter 1, several typologies are presented which try to group the European countries according to different institutional aspects. Among these is the typology drawn up by Hesse and Sharpe, which is constructed against the background of the description of vertical power relations between the central and local political system (Hesse and Sharpe 1991). Hesse and Sharpe distinguish between three groups of countries: the franco group, the north-middle European group and the anglo group. This typology may be relevant to these concluding remarks on the analysis of mayoral careerism, since the overlap between this typology and the clusters observed in figure 2 is substantial. The north-middle European countries and the anglo countries can all be found in the group with local careerism. The franco countries are spread between weak careerism, strong careerism and national careerism, and the eastern European countries (which were not included in Hesse and Sharpe's typology) are mostly found among the countries with national careerism.

This finding is meaningful in terms of the above typology. In the countries included among the franco group the power relation between the national and the local level of government is traditionally described as one of tutelage practiced by the former over the latter (Hesse and Sharpe 1991: 606). Under such a central-local relation it is important for the local political level to try to interact with the national political level – ultimately by trying to move into national political office. By contrast, in the anglo group, and especially in the North and Middle European group, the central-local power relation is somewhat more balanced in the local direction (Hesse and Sharpe 1991: 607), and therefore local politicians have a platform for 'doing politics at home'. Consequently they may not have the same incentives to become involved in national politics as a means to forge for themselves a national political career.

Figure 2: Fifteen European countries and their scores on indices for the interconnectedness of the mayoral career with the local and national political career systems.



Note: The index on interconnectedness with the local political system is calculated as the standardized (divided by the cross-country average) average number of years on the council prior to first term as mayor plus the standardized (divided by the cross-country average) average number of years of seniority in the mayoral office. The index on interconnectedness with the national political system is calculated as the standardized percentage of mayors having served as an MP prior to first term as mayor plus the standardized percentage of mayors having progressive ambitions.

However, it is also worthwhile mentioning that reforms are under way in several European countries that may alter the validity of this typology of central-local

power relations in the years to come. In several countries, schemes of directly elected mayors have recently been introduced, just as amalgamations of municipalities are being undertaken, or are about to be implemented, in a number of countries. The analyses in this chapter have demonstrated that such institutional arrangements to some extent affect the mayoral career system. Therefore, the conclusions suggested above might not be resistant to trends of development in European local government.

One important question remains, and even though it will not be answered in this chapter it deserves to be raised for further discussion (not least in popular debate), the question of the normative implications of the mayoral career system described here. Is a unique mayoral career system preferable or is it more desirable to have mayoral careers that overlap, for instance, with national parliamentary careers? Is it preferable to have persons in mayoral office who specifically devote their public service to the welfare of their own community, rather than persons who see the mayoral office as just another step on the route to a seat in parliament? From another perspective, is it preferable to have a mayor who knows the game of national politics and who, for instance by cumulating offices, can facilitate the coordination of national and local political programmes rather than a mayor whose political competences are exclusively embedded in his own local political milieu? These questions demonstrate that the discussion on mayoral career systems indeed has a normative dimension – a dimension which cannot be fully examined within the scholarly community but also needs input from politicians and voters.

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5 Gendered Roads to Mayorship in Different Welfare States

Vicki Johansson

As we have seen in chapter 3 (by Steyvers and Reynaert), mayors are a fairly homogeneous elite group. Compared to the European population they are on the average more highly educated and they are generally male.

Whether this should be seen as a problem or not depends on the observer's view on gender relations and how one defines gender equality. The theoretical and normative point of departure in this chapter is that a low representation of women in central political positions is a problem indicating that women in comparison to men are under-represented in central power structures. The normative definition of gender equality used here is that gender equality is achieved when women and men exert power to the same degree in all parts of society. A necessary but not sufficient condition for this to come about is that both men and women are represented in society central power structures, such as political institutions.

If, from this normative point of departure, we state that the representation of women must increase, it is of importance to try to understand why men, not women, are chosen as leaders, in this case as mayors, bearing in mind that on the local level mayors are among the highest political leaders. Insight into the logic behind the recruitment process provide a key that might be useful as a tool of future change.

5.1 The welfare state as an indicator of gender relations within a country

One indicator which has been used fruitfully in previous research to predict gender relations within different countries is related to theories of welfare state regimes (Sainsbury, 1996; Lewis, 1992; Esping-Andersen, 2003).¹ The theoretic-

1 The questionnaire sent out to mayors was drawn up before it was decided that a chapter concerning gender and recruitment should be written. Thus gender theories were not actively used in order to formulate the questions. The theoretical perspectives that can be applied are therefore limited.

cal hypothesis that different welfare state types create variations in horizontal and vertical gender patterns and gender relations within politics, the labour market and households has received strong empirical support during the last 20 years (Sainsbury, 1994; Sundström, 2003; Daly and Rake, 2003).

The possibility for a mayor to exert power and influence policy varies depending on how competence and political authority are divided within the national political system. In some countries a major part of core welfare production as well as responsibility for this production is located at the municipal level, while in others the national and regional levels have a greater responsibility (Putnam, 1993; Sundström, 2003; see also chapter 2 in this book). At the same time the range of state activity, taking effect at local, regional and national levels, is much higher in the former compared to the latter (Lidström, 2003).

European mayors are chosen in very different contexts and work under different conditions both formally and informally. Different conditions are, as we will see, closely linked to welfare state regimes.

The classical point of departure for welfare state theorists is the well-known work by Esping-Andersens 'The Three worlds of welfare capitalism' (Esping-Andersen, 1990), although many criticise his theoretical concepts and models. Feminist writers have voiced the most severe criticism (Bussemaker and Kirsbergen, 1994; Daly, 1994; Fraser, 1994; Sainsbury, 1996; Siim, 2000). Esping-Andersen's central concept of de-commodification focuses on whether and how labour-market participation affects people's ability to support themselves in times of, for example, illness or unemployment. The more commodified a society is, the more people are dependent on market participation for survival. Societies with different decommodification structures create different patterns of stratification, i.e. status relations between groups in society. The greatest problem with the concept of decommodification is that a person first must depend on income from the market in order to be decommodified. Women and men's relations to and participation in labour market activity differ markedly, as feminist scholars have noted time after time. Several studies show that gender relations cut across the three systems of welfare capitalism because the state-family nexus is different from the links between the state and the market (Hobson, 1990; Sainsbury, 1994).

Common traits in Europe concerning gender relations with regard to women are that their employment rate is lower than that of men, they more often work part time, they earn less than men, they more seldom are leaders in business organisations or in politics, they have the main responsibility for unpaid work both within and outside the home, they more often have interruptions in their labour market participation on account of responsibility for dependents such as children and the elderly, and, not surprisingly, they are poorer than men.

Thus while men generally depend on a market income to support themselves women are more often dependent on family income. Within feminist theory, therefore, the concept of de-familisation has been put forward (Lister, 1994; Sainsbury, 1996; Lewis, 1997). This concept can be used to discriminate between welfare states that create more or less dependency for women on the family.

There have been many attempts to classify countries in terms of the degree of de-commodification and de-familisation. Some authors, like Daly and Rake (2003), argue against a classification of different countries into welfare regime types since they vary according to many dimensions that are central for gender relations. Every welfare state is unique. Specific historical, cultural, political as well as institutional factors within a country can and should be used in order to explain why a society functions as it does. But at the same time it is sometimes necessary to cluster unique units, even if important facts are thereby lost. A classification can help to identify and explain specific gender patterns and approaches discernible in different welfare states. Such knowledge can be useful regardless of whether our intention is to weaken or strengthen a certain gender pattern. Furthermore, a classification may be of aid in seeking to interpret the apparently heterogeneous results concerning the welfare state structures of 17 different countries.

One striking aspect of welfare state research is that countries seem to cluster in similar groups regardless of whether a gender perspective is adopted or not, especially in liberal and social democratic clusters. Most of the classifications are closely related, although the present writer is critical of Esping-Andersen's three welfare state models: the social democratic, the corporativist and the liberal model.

Characteristic for the *Social democratic or Scandinavian Welfare* state model is the emphasis on state responsibility. The state provides universal benefits in the form of social rights based on citizenship that are financed by taxes. Benefits are relatively high, and the welfare state itself is extensive. Universal income guarantees, active and highly developed services for children, the disabled and the elderly are also distinctive features. The two-carrier family is the norm and the employment rates of women are the world's highest. Women's representation in parliament on both local and national level considerably exceeds that of other welfare states. Within feminist research this kind of model has been classified as a weak breadwinner model or an individual model (Lewis, 1992; Borchorst, 1994; Sainsbury, 1996; Kleinman, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 2003). Sweden and Denmark are the two countries in this investigation that falls within this cluster.

Liberal regimes are dominated by means-tested benefits and modest universal cash transfers. The welfare model seeks actively to sponsor market solutions by encouraging private welfare provision as the norm and by limiting public responsibility to acute market failures. Liberal welfare states are those that create most poverty among single mothers while at the same time the provision of daycare for children and elderly is low (Borchorst, 1994; Kleinman, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 2003; Daly and Rake, 2003). Even though America and Australia often are used as examples of the typical liberal welfare state in empirical research, Great Britain and also, in recent years, Ireland have been defined as belonging to this group. In the early 1990s these two countries were used as examples of a gender regime that shared a historical commitment to a strong breadwinner model. (Lewis, 1992; Kleinman, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 2003; Daly and Rake, 2003).

Corporatist regimes are characterized by status differentiation, and social rights are connected to status and class. Compulsory labour market insurance is common, and the church and the family play a crucial role. Most welfare and care issues are referred to the family, with residual social assistance provided on grounds of family failure rather than market failure. Within this context the security of the breadwinner becomes crucial. The employment rate of women is low compared to the liberal and Scandinavian welfare states. (Borchorst, 1994; Kleinman, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 2003). Most "old" European countries are usually considered to belong to this group. But there are notable differences among the corporatist countries, leading some researchers, though in different ways, to divide this group into two clusters (Kleinman, 2002) Generally it can be said that welfare states in Southern Europe tend more often than other corporatist countries to back up their welfare states with legal, institutional or social implementation (Leibfried, 1993; Abrahamson, 1999). In the German constitution, for example, emphasis is placed on family responsibility while in the Italian constitution the individual is more in focus. (Saraceno, 1994). Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece will be defined as *South European welfare* states while Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, France and the Netherlands will be defined as *Middle European welfare* states, but it should be kept in mind that the latter two countries, from a gender perspective, deviate from the others (Esping-Andersen, 2003; Daly and Rake, 2003).

Research on East European countries is scanty from a welfare state perspective. However, Makkai states that during the period of state socialism these countries shared a common view that problems with gender relations would cease to exist as the system evolved. In Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary access to social security was dependent on positions within the political system; these positions were highly dominated by men. A patriarchal model dominated

society, assigning to women the main responsibility for care work, even though societal production of care was quite high compared to other European countries. Furthermore, women were to a higher degree engaged in full-time labour activity than in other European countries. (Makkai, 1994). Although Deacon, as cited by Makkai, claims that the Czech Republic will probably develop a social-democratic model, Hungary a liberal model and Poland a bureaucratic socialist welfare model, these three countries will be placed in a separate cluster, above all since their historical roots concerning views on gender relations are similar. But it is important to note that these welfare states today may develop very different approaches to the relation between market, family and the state.

Table 1: Types of Welfare States

Scandinavian welfare state	Liberal welfare state	Middle European welfare state	South European welfare state	East European welfare state (historical features)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Social rights (benefits) based on citizenship ▪ High production of social welfare (children, elderly and disabled) ▪ Two-carrier family norm ▪ High employment rate among all women ▪ High political representation of women 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rights based on individual need (mean tested) ▪ Low production of social welfare, preferably by market ▪ Breadwinner model ▪ Low employment rate among mothers with small children ▪ High political representation of women 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Social rights (benefits) based on status and class ▪ Low production of social welfare, to address family failure ▪ Breadwinner model norm ▪ Medium employment rate among women ▪ Low political representation of women 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Social rights (benefits) based on status and class ▪ Low production of social welfare, to address family failure ▪ Two-carrier family norm in constitution but breadwinner model in reality ▪ Low political representation of women 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rights based on position in political system ▪ 'High' production of social welfare ▪ Two carrier norm but with males as primary breadwinner ▪ High employment rate among women ▪ Political positions highly dominated by men

5.2 *Male and female mayors*

The question that now will be discussed is whether, and if so how, different welfare/gender regimes affect women's chances of being chosen as mayors. Earlier theoretical and empirical findings will be presented in four separate

sections concerning: a) the proportion of women mayors in different welfare states b) individual factors c) network resources d) political experience. Under each section results emanating from the survey of European mayors will be presented, compared and discussed in relations to earlier findings².

5.3 *The proportion of women mayors in different welfare states*

Men are highly over-represented among European mayors, and this is reflected in our sample. In eleven out of 17 countries, equivalent to almost 60% of European Countries, the percentage of female mayors is below ten. In no country do female mayors even come close to 50%, which would be about equal to their proportion in the population.

Table 2: The male prevalence in local leadership, by welfare state regimes. Percentage of male mayors in the sample

SCA	86	LIB	84	ME	91	SE	96	EE	91
Denmark	94	Ireland	90	Germany	96	Portugal	100	Poland	96
Sweden	79	England	79	Austria	95	Greece	99	Hungary	90
				Belgium	93	Italy	92	Czech	89
				Switzerland	89	Spain	91		
				France	89				
				Netherlands	82				

SCA (Scandinavian countries) LIB (liberal countries, ME (Middle European Countries) SE (South European Countries) EE (East European Countries)

Daly and Rakes (2003), in their comparative study of welfare states, point out that women in Liberal and Scandinavian countries are found in leader positions in the public sector more often than is the case for their counterparts in conservative states. Results that indicate the opposite can however also be found. Nermo (1997) for example, states that women in Scandinavian countries have a

2 An attentive reader may observe that some numbers in this chapter deviate from those reported. The reason is that in this chapter countries have been given equal weight. If data had not been weighted thus, countries with many mayors could unduly influence the pattern in each cluster, making it difficult to draw any conclusions about differences between welfare state models. England and Germany would for example highly influence the results in the liberal and middle welfare state clusters. Since the main question in this chapter is to analyse if different welfare state models create different roads to mayorship, it is of importance that the countries in each cluster have the same weight. It is therefore necessary to compensate not only for different respondent rates, as has been done elsewhere in this book.

lower chance of being chosen as leaders. He claims that that since the labour market is effectively segregated, women are more often than men employed in low paid and low status jobs will they have poorer chances of being selected. Comparative studies have shown that the welfare states with highest employment rates among women are those with the most segregated labour market (Charles, 1992).

In politics, on the other hand, the picture is a little different. First of all it can be observed that women's representation in national parliaments is highest in Scandinavia while the level of representation is very poor in Liberal Countries (Norris, 1996; www.europaortalen.nu) From a gender perspective, this would indicate that the national political class has a more equal gender composition in Scandinavian than in Liberal welfare states (Norris, 1996). The figures for welfare state clusters in table 1 show that the expected causal link is by no means obvious, even if the proportion of female mayors is higher in Liberal and Scandinavian welfare states, compared with the other clusters. These results suggest that Liberal welfare states seem to generate a greater chance for women to be chosen as mayors. The reason why Scandinavian welfare states have a lower percentage of women mayors than Liberal welfare states is due to the quite surprising results from Denmark. In Denmark only one out of twenty mayors is a woman, which in this respect places Denmark in the same group as the Southern European welfare states. The explanation can be sought in the way the Danish party system is built up. In Denmark social movements are usually not "incorporated" in the parties, the public administration, or the governmental organization as they are in other systems. Thus when a social movement, such as the women's movement, loses strength, the movement's issues likewise lose priority in the political agenda (Siim, 2000). Similar reports that gender equality questions have disappeared from Denmark's political agenda support this thesis (Dahlerup 2000)

The results from the other clusters are in line with expectations, with the partial exception of the Netherlands. A possible explanation is that even though the welfare state system in the Netherlands strongly resembles the systems in the Middle European welfare states there are deviations which, from a gender equality point of view, lead to positive effects on gender relations. Such deviations include a high reliance on means tested benefits instead of high access to public resources through care responsibilities, and this may explain why the risk of poverty for single mothers, in a comparative perspective, is low. Men's involvement in unpaid work is also higher than in comparative welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 2003; Daly and Rake, 2003).

However, the overall result is in accordance with predictions, based on welfare state theory, namely that the proportion of female mayors is highest in

welfare states where gender relations are more equal and not so closely linked to family situation, i.e. in Liberal and Scandinavian Welfare states.

5.3.1 Socialisation features of mayors

Why men rather than women are far more often chosen as leaders, no matter whether the study centres on recruitment processes in business organisations, voluntary organisations or in politics, is a question that has been asked by many, but there is no single answer. According to the leadership literature (and from different theoretical perspectives) a large number of explanations focusing on structural, institutional and/or individual level can be identified. We will concentrate here on those explanations that take their point of departure in gender relations on an individual and organisational level.

Within gender studies individual factors such as educational background and seniority have been linked to gender representation in leadership positions (Wängnerud, 2000). More interesting is that the family situation of women and men has proven to be of importance in explaining the gender composition of the leadership. For male leaders it is, for example, more common to live in a family where a wife takes the major part of the responsibility for housework and children, while female leaders more often live in relations that can be defined as equal (Barron et al., 1991; Blom, 1998; Hedlund, 1996). Further, men in leadership positions live to a higher degree than women in a family and they also more often have children. (O'Leary, 1992; Fogerty/Allen/Walters, 1981; Blom, 1998) Since no questions concerning mayors' private situation were asked in the questionnaire it is not possible to test whether family situation truly affects the probability of a city electing a male or a female mayor.

From table 3 it can be observed that the variables of individual experiences that were tested do not substantially affect either sex's chance of being chosen as mayor in the East European welfare states, and only to a certain extent in the South European welfare states. By contrast, in the Scandinavian welfare states all the variables are clearly related to gender. Women who have been brought up in a political family, have been employed by the municipality, have their roots in the municipality, and men who have education only at primary school level have better chances of being chosen than their respective male/female counterparts. Two variables affect the mayors' gender in the Middle European welfare states: men who were brought up in the municipality and who were a part of a political family have better chances of being chosen than females with the same background, while in Liberal welfare states these characteristics are more common among women.

In order to test if the variables included in table 3 are linked or interdependent, a multivariate analysis was performed, aiming to comprehend to what degree each individual variable affects the chances of a city electing a woman mayor.³

Table 3: The socialisation to mayorship by gender and welfare state regimes (per cent)

Personal characteristics	Europe		SCA		LIB		ME		SE		EE	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Political family	25	28	31	43	21	34	29	25	21	14	22	22
Have been employed by municipality	10	11	6	25	4	0	7	5	14	11	19	20
Local roots	56	48	56	66	48	55	43	23	82	78	59	60
Only primary school	6	5	19	9	0	0	7	8	2	0	0	0

SCA (Scandinavian countries) LIB (liberal countries, ME (Middle European Countries) SE (South European Countries) EE (East European Countries)

Index political family (councillor + mayor + mp), Index municipality roots (born in municipality + spent childhood in municipality)

A common trait for the Middle, South and Eastern European welfare states is that all the individual variables of experiences tested in this study influence the chances of electing a female mayor negatively or not at all. This result, although not significant, indicates that commonly used factors to explain women's representation are of no relevance in seeking to explain why women are chosen as mayors in these clusters. But it can also be concluded that the results from the Scandinavian and Liberal welfare states are clearly contextual and linked to their welfare state systems. Mayors in Scandinavia who prior to their appointment were employed by the municipality are more often women than men. It is a characteristic of the Scandinavian welfare model, as has already been pointed out, that women are employed in public sector and that the greater part of public sector production in these welfare states takes place at municipality level. Since the labour market in Scandinavian welfare states is among the most gendered in the world, with women working in the public sector in care related professions while men work in the private sector, is it reasonable to assume that those who elect a mayor align to these traditional differences. It might therefore be the case that women in the Scandinavian welfare states are seen as representatives of the 'second sex'. The difference between Scandinavian and other welfare states

3 Since the dependent variable is dichotomous we will use a logistic regression here.

would then be attributable not to a Scandinavian conception that men and women are different - for the opposite belief is held in Scandinavia (Sundström - 2003) - but to the fact that in Scandinavian as compared to non-Scandinavian welfare states the difference women are assumed to represent is regarded as more valuable in politics⁴

Table 4: Finding a female mayor: Logistic regression, odds ratios for finding a female mayor depending on socialisation features by welfare state regimes

Personal characteristics	Europe	SCA	LIB	ME	SE	EE
Local roots	,758 ***	1,180	1,178	,525 ***	,687	,885 11,5
Employed by municipality	1,070	5,854 ***	,002	,666	,669	1,003
Education	,84 2	1,107	1,789	,76 4	,749	1,025
Political family	1,189 *	1,1580 *	1,505 **	,925	,590	1,056
R ² (Cox & Snell)	0,6	5,7	3,5	2,2	0,7	0,1
R ² (Nagelkerke)	1,3	10,3	6,4	4,7	2,2	0,2

SCA (Scandinavian countries) LIB (liberal countries, ME (Middle European Countries) SE (South European Countries) EE (East European Countries)
0,10*, 0,05**, 0,01*** Index political family 0-3 (councillor + mayor + mp), Index municipality roots 0-2 (born in municipality + spent childhood in municipality)

In both the Liberal and Scandinavian welfare states women mayors are more likely to have been brought up in a political family as compared to male mayors. Why so? One possible explanation is that women in leadership positions, who in relation to men are tokens⁵, need to be better rooted and known by the political

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- 4 Johansson (2001) has written about different views on gender relations in Sweden among politicians and employees in the private and public sector, finding that in all groups it is a commonly held view that the segregated labour market can be explained by the different roles of men and women in society. Instead, the proportion who claim that the segregated labour market is a consequence of power relations is low.
- 5 Token is a concept used by Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1977). In all groups different social categories can be found. The proportional representation of social categories will, according to the theory, affect the status- and power relations between them. In a skewed group where men dominate, individual women will be regarded as representatives for women as symbols, not as individuals, i.e. tokens. For tokens it is therefore difficult to exert power or be chosen as leaders.

elite. If a woman is regarded as a token it is hazardous to choose her, but if she has known relatives in politics this would decrease the risk (Moss Kanter, 1977).

Data on female mayors in the Middle European Welfare states who have been brought up in the municipality they now head do not, when other variables are included in the model, display a higher chance for a woman to be elected to the mayoralty. Rather, the opposite is true. One reason is that the level of education and the fact of having spent one's childhood in the municipality are negatively correlated.

5.3.2 Network resources

Non-individual factors on the organisational and societal level can be used in order to predict who will be selected as leader in different organisational contexts⁶ (Naff, 1995; Holly, 1998; Baxter, 2000).

The network resources measured here focused mainly on support from local and political interests together with positions in different organisations prior to the respondents' current position as mayor (Moss Kanter, 1971; Ibarra, 1993; McGuire, 2002). In legislative recruitment research, support from different gatekeepers – such as local party organisations and community groups has been found to be fairly equal for men and women. Slight differences that can be found are in women's favour. (Norris, 1996; Rosenthal, 1998) However, prior findings show that organisations and networks are often gendered; consequently, this should be kept in mind when studying gatekeeper support

From a factor analysis of the responses concerning electoral support, two different patterns of networks of support emerge: local, i.e. *community support*, and political support, i.e. support from *party interests*. The former is defined as support from non-governmental organisations and other local interests, while the latter is defined as support from party members or party organisations. If gendered organisations are of any relevance to explain who is chosen, then women's support from organisations that are regarded as more influential than others should be lower than men's.

From table 5 one can draw the conclusion that in four of the five clusters women mayors specify to a higher degree than their male colleagues that they have enjoyed support from political parties. This pattern is most apparent in the Liberal and South European welfare states. With regard to support from com-

6 Many of these factors, such as systematic discrimination of women and the glass ceiling hypothesis cannot however, be tested in this investigation since there are no questions about discrimination within the paper.

munity interests the pattern is more diffuse. Men in the Liberal, Middle and, to a lower degree, East European welfare states indicate to a higher degree than women that prior to their mayorship they received support from community interests. The opposite is true in the Scandinavian and South European welfare states.

Table 5: Mayors' network resource by welfare state regimes and by gender

Network resources	Europe		SCA		LIB		ME		SE		EE	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Support local interests (mean)	7,8	6,6	7,9	8,5	5,4	4,1	6,8	4,9	9,0	9,6	9,4	9,2
Support political interests (mean)	9,6	9,7	11,2	11,5	11,9	12,5	8,0	6,9	10,5	11,9	8,9	9,1
Support by trade union (percentage)	19	18	25	36	20	13	16	12	24	15	16	17
Support by business and professional organisation (percentage)	20	19	23	20	24	19	18	15	16	15	25	32
Support by NGO (percentage)	28	26	46	32	36	26	26	25	16	7	31	37
Support by Party (percentage)	58	62	60	75	55	53	63	68	63	59	42	46

SCA (Scandinavian countries) LIB (liberal countries), ME (Middle European Countries) SE (South European Countries) EE (East European Countries)

Index political support 0-20 (national organs of your party + your party wing/faction + your party at the local level + national politicians. The results have for political interests been multiplied with 1,25 to make them, in this table comparable with local interests) Index local interests 0-20 (local prestigious figures + the local business + local media + the church + local associations)

No gender differences regarding prior positions in different civil organisations in Europe and in the Middle European Welfare states can be observed. Once again, here the greatest gender differences are found in the Scandinavian welfare states, where women more often than men had held positions in trade unions and party organisation and more seldom in locally bound civil society organisations.

The pattern in the South and East European clusters shows that men in the former states had more often held positions in trade unions and other non-governmental organisations, while women in the latter more often had held positions in business and non-governmental organisations, except trade unions. The relevant gender difference in the Liberal cluster is that men more often than

women have had positions in non-governmental organisations and business organisations.

The difference in support from party in comparison to community interests remains on the European level when a regression analysis is undertaken. Women mayors more often have had support from party interests and men from community interests. This pattern can also be found in the Liberal and Middle European welfare states, although the variable 'support from party interests' is not significant in the model. Why is this so and why does this occur in these welfare states and not in the others?

Table 6: Finding a female mayor: Logistic regression, odds ratios depending on network resources by welfare state regimes

Network	Europe	SCA	LIB	ME	SE	EE
Trade union	,886	1,655	,748	,733	,594	1,124
Business org	1,038	,648	,936	,863	1,033	1,360
NGO	,987	,522 *	,735	1,127	,441	1,249
Party	1,141	1,930 *	,878	1,357	- 856	1,193
Support local interests	,933 ***	1,046	,905 **	,913 ***	1,016	,988
Support political interest	1,030 *	,984	1,057	1,004	1,056	,997
R ² (Cox & Snell)	0,8	3,3	2,8	1,7	0,8	0,4
R ² (Nagelkerke)	1,6	5,9	4,8	3,6	2,6	0,8

Index political support 0-16 (national organs of your party + your party wing/faction + your party at the local level + national politicians) Index local interests 0-20 (local prestigious figures + the local business + local media + the church + local associations)

Not all networks are equal: some are more powerful than others and women are more seldom than men connected to the most influential networks (Ibarra, 1993; McGuire, 2002). The result could thus be related to the fact that different networks are awarded varying degrees of importance in different societies. Table 6 suggests some variation in judgments given by mayors in response to the question as to who exerts influence over local authority decisions in different welfare state types. For each welfare state cluster, the mean value was calculated with regard to the two most influential groups from which women and men have experienced support. The pattern that emerges can to some extent be used in order to explain why women's and men's support from different sources varies between welfare state clusters.

Table 7: The components of mayors' network, by welfare state regimes (mean, for the two most influential groups in each cluster).

	SCA	LIB	ME	SE	EE
<i>Local media:</i> high influence	25	31	33	34	29
▪ male mayors	1,68	1,04	1,20	1,44	1,47
▪ female mayors	1,92	1,20	0,81	1,73	1,31
▪ difference	-0,24	-0,16	+0,39	-0,29	+0,16
<i>Business:</i> high influence	19	31	23	34	30
▪ male mayors		0,91		1,78	2,04
▪ female mayors		0,78		1,64	1,96
▪ difference		+0,13		+0,14	+0,08
<i>Single groups.</i> high influence	7	17	29	36	23
▪ male mayors			1,99	2,54	
▪ female mayors			1,55	2,58	
▪ difference			+0,44	-0,04	
<i>Trade unions:</i> high influence					
▪ male mayors	15	12	4	13	6
▪ female mayors					
▪ difference					
<i>National party:</i> high influence	48	19	24	30	27
▪ male mayors	1,92				
▪ female mayors	1,77				
▪ difference	+ 0,15				

According to the respondents, the two most influential sources on local policy in the Scandinavian welfare states are the local media and above all party leaders. Men apprehend to a higher degree than women that they receive support from the latter while the opposite is true for women. In the Liberal welfare states local media and the local business community are claimed to exert strong influence on local authority policy. Women experience more support from the media and men from the business community. Men in the Middle European as well as in the East European welfare state models state that they receive a higher level of support from these two most influential sources. Relating this to table 4, it can be seen that a woman has a lower chance of being elected to the mayoralty in these welfare states if her path is grounded on the influential areas of 'civil society'. One possible rather broad interpretation of this result is that women are not regarded as equal members in local networks and that even if they experience support from these sources, they are regarded by the electorate as tokens in the actual networks. It is more usual to find that women who enjoy political support

are chosen as mayors in comparison to men who have the same support, indicating that there are different gendered roads to leadership positions. A female road to mayorship found in the Scandinavian, Middle and East European welfare involves the party road, while the same road in Liberal and South European welfare states is a male road.

5.3.3 Male and female mayors' political training

In all European countries political parties are important actors in the selection of mayors, but in different ways and to different degrees, as the results in the chapter 6 (by Henry Bäck) show. Women and men's prior political experience varies between the welfare state clusters. Women mayors in the Liberal and the East European welfare states are party members to a greater extent than their male colleagues, and in all welfare states except the East European welfare states women have been party members for a shorter period than men. Further, it can be noted that men in all welfare state clusters – except for the East European cluster – have held elective positions for a longer period.

Table 8: Mayors' party and elective experience by welfare state regimes and gender

Political experience	Europe		SCA		LIB		ME		SE		EE	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Party member (percentage)	84	89	96	100	92	100	90	90	83	85	62	68
Years as party member (mean)	23,3	21,1	28,4	23,3	24,8	21,9	26,6	24,8	22,5	14,8	14,1	14,4
Earlier elective position	15,7	13,2	20,0	19,5	16,0	14,8	15,7	10,3	16,6	10,8	11,7	12,1

The regression analyses in table 9 demonstrate that variables related to political experience are gender relevant in all welfare states clusters except in the East European cluster, which could be explained by the fact that the existing party systems in these countries are quite new. A common trait, albeit significant only in the Scandinavian, Liberal and South European states, is that women mayors have been party members for a shorter period than their male colleagues. Only in the Scandinavian Welfare states have women had a longer experience of elective positions. The results cannot be definitively related to welfare state arrangements, even though the importance of earlier elective experience in the Scandinavian welfare states might be explained by the fact that women's repre-

sentation in these countries is higher than in the other countries, both historically and at the present time.

Table 9: Finding a female mayor: logistic regression, odds ratios depending on political experience by welfare state regimes

Political experience	Europe	SCA	LIB	ME	SE	EE
Party member	2,567 ***	3033,4	1754,7	2,404	2,358	1,427
Years as party member	,983 **	,864 ***	,966 *	,989	,945 **	,997
Earlier Elective position	,980 **	1,146 ***	,996	,952 ***	,957	1,009
R ² (Cox & Snell)	1,1	9,3	3,7	2,4	2,8	0,2
R ² (Nagelkerke)	2,5	16,9	6,3	5,5	9,3	0,5

0,10*, 0,05**, 0,01***

5.4 Models of female roads to mayorship

The empirical analysis points to the conclusion that a mayor's individual experiences, network resources and political experiences can be used to predict the mayors' gender. The variables will now be subjected to a regression analysis, in order to investigate whether these findings are corroborated if all variables are tested together.

5.4.1 The average European woman Mayor has more political experience than her male colleague

The average woman mayor on the European level is distinguished from her male counterpart in that she has less frequently spent her childhood in the municipality, has a lower educational level, was more often brought up in a political family, more frequently held a position in her political party and received support from political interests prior to her position as mayor, and has also had lower support from local interests in the mayoral election. Therefore, if all European mayors are taken together, a rather clear pattern emerges, indicating that women in Europe who seek election to the mayoral position should ideally

Table 10: Finding a female mayor: logistic regression, odds ratios depending on socialisation features, network resources and political experience in the different welfare state regimes

	Europe	SCA	LIB	ME	SE	EE
<i>Socialisation features</i>						
▪ Childhood in municipality	.801 ***	1.144	1.423	.565 ***	.662	.863
▪ Employed by municipality	1.128	5.008 ***	.001	.664	.848	.857
▪ Education	.743 ***	1.000	2.117 *	.618 **	.605	.928
▪ Political family	1.229 *	2.176 ***	1.682 **	.882	.599	1.158
<i>Network</i>						
▪ Trade union	1.066	2.728 **	.643	.964	.574	1.228
▪ Business organisation	.760	.700	.135 **	.631	.985	1.242
▪ NGO	.802	.499 *	.234 **	.974	.367	.946
▪ Party	1.372 **	1.944	2.177	1.480	1.435	1.094
▪ Support local interests	.934 ***	1.035	.871 **	.906 ***	1.018	.997
▪ Support political interest	1.037 **	.956	1.144 **	1.079 **	1.035	.951
<i>Political experience</i>						
▪ Party membership	1.728 *	5677.4	204.8	1.796	2.380	1.704
▪ Years member in party	.976 ***	.837 ***	.984	.962 *	.932 **	.999
▪ Earlier elective appointments	.989	1.151 ***	.992	.475	.967	1.010
R ² (Cox & Snell)	.0244	.175	.149	.056	.044	.007
R ² (Nagelkerke)	.052	.314	.265	.124	.141	.017

Levels of significance: 0,10*, 0,05**, 0,01***; Index political family 0-3 (relative was councillor + mayor + mp); Index municipality roots 0-2 (born in municipality + spent childhood in municipality); Index political support 0-16 (national organs of your party + your party wing/faction + your party at the local level + national politicians); Index local interests 0-20 (local prestigious figures + the local business + local media + the church + local associations)

be firmly rooted within a 'political community'. In contrast, men's road to may- orship tends to be more dependent on relations with 'their' municipality and the local interests recognized in that environment.

5.4.2 The average Scandinavian woman mayor – a representative of the 'second sex'

Women mayors in Scandinavia, compared to all other mayors in Europe, were more often employed by the municipality prior to their current position. As has already been pointed out, this result could be taken as an indicator of differences between the competences of men and women presumed by gatekeepers.

The labour market in Scandinavia compared to other welfare states is highly gendered, with women primarily working in care related professions within the public sector while men are to a higher extent active in private sector occupations. However, the employment rate of women in Scandinavia is the highest in the world and on the same level as men. A related possible conclusion is therefore that women's chances of being elected to the mayoral position increase when men and women to the same degree are active in the labor market and that women, when chosen in the Scandinavian welfare states, gain from being regarded as representatives of a 'female' world. From an equality perspective this could be understood in both positive and negative terms: positive, in the sense that the existence of a woman's road to leadership in politics can make it easier for women to be chosen, and negative since different roads for men and women can contribute to maintaining and even strengthening gender inequality.

Former employment in the public sector is however not the only characteristic that is related to gender among Scandinavian mayors. Women mayors who were brought up in a political family, who have had appointments in trade unions and who held earlier elective positions have better chances of being chosen compared to men with the same characteristics. If these results are combined with the with the 'second sex' results a reasonable interpretation may be that in order for a representative of the 'second sex' to be chosen, the candidate must take an active part within the traditional male dominated hierarchy. In the Scandinavian context this means within the party system where unions traditionally (through the social democratic party) have exercised strong influence.

5.4.3 The average woman mayor in Liberal welfare states – a representative of a political elite

The average woman mayor in Liberal welfare states – when compared to her male counterpart – has a higher educational level and has also more often been brought up in a political family, which indicates that women have to prove their competence in relation to men within the ordinary male dominated hierarchy. In contrast to the Scandinavian welfare states, there is no clearly female road to mayorship. The result is, in accordance with welfare state theory, that women in liberal welfare states have better chances of reaching leadership positions than in Scandinavian welfare states, since women and men compete under the same conditions. From a gender perspective this may seem to be very positive but if – as research has shown – women and men de facto live under different conditions it can also constitute a problem, as women who accept the male norm and the rules of the game within the male hierarchy will have a better chances to reach the top than other women. For example, female leaders in liberal welfare states more seldom have children and if they have children they more often have to pay for child care. Care responsibility is of course, not by definition related to women, but in all welfare state models women, in practice, have the main responsibility for children, the disabled and the elderly. An acceptance of the ‘normal’ way, i.e. the male road to leadership positions can cement gender relations in so far as the ‘normal’ road never will be questioned.

As far as support from community and party interests is concerned, the female mayor in the Liberal welfare state cluster is a copy of the mean European figure, i.e. women who have support from party interests have better chances of being chosen. This too can be seen as an indicator of the male road: women must follow this road while men can deviate from it.

5.4.4 The average Middle European female mayor – a representative from outside

Men in Middle European welfare states who where brought up in the municipality where they are candidates to the mayoralty have better chances of being chosen than women with the same background. This indicates that men compared to women are better rooted in their local society. The fact that men with support from local interests also have better chances of being chosen than women also supports this finding. That would entail that women who are newcomers to a community have better chances of being chosen and that even in Middle European welfare states a male and female road to office can be found.

Men are chosen from among the citizens of a community while women are taken from outside or from the party system.

5.4.5 The average South European female mayor – a representative from the party system?

Except for the variable ‘number of years as party member’ none of the other variables tested have any significant positive effect on the chances for a woman rather than a man to be elected mayor in South Europe. Even if the variables tested are not significant it is interesting to note that almost all are negative, which means that women with the same experiences as men seem to have lower chances of being chosen. One possible interpretation is that there is only one road to mayorship in South Europe, namely a male gendered road normally closed for women. The four variables that positively affect women’s chances of being chosen, although such variables are neither high nor significant, are party membership, prior positions in party organization and support from both party and community interests. This might be an indication that a women’s road to office is under construction in Southern Europe, a road closely linked to the party system.

5.4.6 The average East European female mayor – a representative of the self made?

None of the variables in the regression analysis for East European welfare states are significant. It is not possible to detect a clear systematic pattern, but this could be due to the fact that these countries really should not be clustered together. However, variables - albeit not significant - that increase the chances for a woman instead of a man to be elected mayor are prior positions in trade unions and business organizations. This result indicates that female mayors in East Europe have, more often than men in their respective countries but in accordance with men in the other welfare state clusters, been more active in the local community.

5.5 *The roads to mayor ship are gendered – but in different ways*

In four out of five welfare state types we have identified gendered roads to power. In the Scandinavian, Liberal and South European welfare states it is

reasonable to conclude that the roads are linked to the way the welfare states are gendered, but the gendered roads in the Middle European cluster cannot easily be connected to welfare state arrangements.

The regression analyses are interesting from a theoretical point of view, regarding both welfare state and gender theory. It is clear that the analysis fits best in Scandinavian and Liberal welfare states and that the explanatory variables are significant and useful in order to explain the patterns that emerge in these clusters. The theoretical skewedness within both welfare state and gender theory is hereby obvious, i.e. welfare state and gender studies are dominated by scholars from Northern Europe and Liberal welfare state countries who use their own societies as a point of departure and reference. This renders them less sensitive to patterns built on other approaches.

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6 Does Recruitment Matter? Selecting Path and Role Definition

Henry Bäck

Other contributions to this project have, not surprisingly, shown that recruitment to the top political position of local government in European cities is socially biased. Mayors and their equivalents are predominantly male, in most cases they held middle-class jobs prior to being elected to mayoral office, and they are now in their fifties. Many grew up in the municipality they now govern, and a relatively high proportion come from ‘political families’, that is to say, their families have a tradition of political involvement. A majority have university degrees. Closer examination of the manner in which they are recruited shows that many were supported in their electoral campaigns by partisan (indeed most are themselves members of political parties) and/or influential local community actors. Although there are variations between countries, whether they are dependent on varying institutional arrangements or different national and sub-national political cultures, this is the dominant picture of social bias in the recruitment of the mayors in European cities given by Steyvers and Reynaert in Chapter 3 in this volume, while Johansson in Chapter 4 further investigates the gender dimension of recruitment.

The exploration of these differences in background and recruitment processes between and within national systems is not the task of this chapter. Instead, we aim to enquire into the question as to whether the differences matter. Do mayors with different backgrounds express different values? And if so, can we draw any conclusions about the consequences of the skewed bases and processes of recruitment of mayors in Europe in more general terms? This chapter thus is not about differing levels of value indicators. We do not seek to explain who holds which attitudes, but rather to describe and analyse the relationship between background characteristics and experiences on the one hand, and attitudes and values on the other.

As dependent variables we have selected the question posed to our respondents about their assessment of the importance of certain mayoral tasks. The underlying assumption is that the evaluation of different tasks acts as a psychological disposition, in the same way as values, personality traits and attitudes. It

is common understanding that psychological dispositions, like attitudes, consist of cognitive, emotional and behavioural components (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). The behavioural component implies that there is a relation between disposition and behaviour. In the end, behaviour, or perhaps rather action, is what politics is about. The underlying idea thus is that recruitment may or may not have consequences for political actions actually undertaken. Such consequences will concern what decisions are made, what options approved or rejected, for what ends political power is used for. These questions will not be investigated but it follows from this tacit assumption of a link between attitudes and behaviour that the enquiry into the links between background characteristics and experiences and expressed values is politically relevant.

6.1 *The dependent variables*

The question posed in the questionnaire was: ‘*Many different tasks are associated with the mayor’s position. How important do you think the following tasks are?*’ The items that respondents were confronted with and asked to react to were no less than 16 different mayoral tasks²:

- Represent the city to the outside world (Represent city)
- Implement the programme of his/her political party/movement (Party programme)
- Ensure the good quality of local services (Service quality)
- Foster the co-operation with the neighbouring municipalities (Co-operation with neighbours)
- Encourage new projects in the community (New projects)
- Generate cohesion in the political majority (Majority cohesion)
- Set goals for transforming the administrative structure (Administrative reform goals)
- Manage the implementation of his/her personal policy choices (Personal policies)
- Attract resources from external sources (European/national/regional government, foundations, private investors and business) (External resources)
- Ensure the correctness of the political-administrative process (Correctness)

1 Responses were to be given on a five-grade scale: 4 = Of utmost importance (limit to 3 answers please), 3 = Of great importance, 2 = Of moderate importance, 1 = Of little importance, 0 = Not a task of the mayor.

2 After each item there is a shorthand formulation that will be used in tables and figures in the rest of this chapter.

- Defend and promote the influence of local authorities in the political system (Local autonomy)
- Create a vision for his/her city (City vision)
- Publicize the municipality's activities (Publicity)
- Help citizens resolve complaints with the municipal government (Help citizens)
- Contribute through local experience to the general consolidation of his/her party action (Contribute to party)
- Guide the staff in day to day activity (Guide staff).³

The analysis of the substantive responses to the question is not a task for this chapter; here only a brief description will be given. Building on Kotter and Lawrence (1974), Leach and Wilson (2004) suggest four functions for the

3 Throughout the chapter we will work with the responses given on the 0-4 scale. Doubts could be raised as to whether the zero value should be used in this manner. Zero, in the questionnaire, literally is not an expression of an evaluation, but rather of an institutional restraint. Nevertheless, claiming that a particular task is not a task for the mayor implies at the same time that no attention will be paid to that particular task, i.e. it could be expected to have the same consequences for behaviour as a very low evaluation. Furthermore, there are important intra-system variations in the occurrence of zero-responses, and these were variations that should not be present if the zero response were only an expression of institutional restraint.

If we were to construct a matrix of the sixteen items and the seventeen countries, we would have 272 cells. In 109 of these there are no zero-responses at all, that is in these 109 cases all respondents agree that the task asked for is indeed a task for the mayor. In all the other 163 cells there are zero-responses recorded. In no case, however, do all respondents in a country agree that the task in question is not a mayoral task. The maximum percentage claiming that a particular task is not a task for the mayor is 72.3 per cent (Implementing the party programme in the Netherlands). Other cells in the matrix with quite extensive disagreement among the respondents are responses to the same item from Switzerland, Germany and France, where around 25 per cent claim that it is not a task of the mayor to strive for the implementation of the party programme (which of course implies that some 75 per cent believe that this actually is the mayor's task). Another related item with a similar response pattern is the item concerning contribution to the action of one's own party, where in Poland, Portugal, Greece and France 22-30 per cent declare that this is not a task of the mayor.

Another field where there is wide disagreement concerning the tasks of the mayor is the relationship to administration. In eight of the seventeen countries (The Netherlands, Sweden, England, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Belgium) between 25 and 65 per cent of respondents are of the opinion that it is not a task for the mayor to guide the municipal staff.

We believe that these within-country variations, especially in the fields of the mayor's relation with his party and with the administration, are so large that it is warranted to take the zero-responses as an expression of evaluation, rather than as an expression of institutional arrangements.

mayor. We have tentatively distributed the sixteen survey question items over their four categories, and calculated an additive index for each. The four functions are:

- Maintaining the cohesion of the administration (Internal networking): Majority cohesion.
- Developing strategic policy direction (Agenda setting): Party programme, new projects, personal policies and city vision.
- Representing the authority in the external world (External networking): Representing city, co-operation with neighbours, external resources, local autonomy, publicity, contributing to party
- Ensuring task accomplishment (Task accomplishment): Service quality, administrative reform goals, correctness, help citizens, guide staff.

Additive indices⁴ were calculated for these four functions and group means for the modified typology of local government systems of Hesse and Sharpe (1991) were calculated. If the investigation focuses exclusively on relations of group means to the grand mean, it can be concluded that typical features for the Franco group would be represented by internal networking and agenda-setting. Internal networking is also prominent in the Anglo group, which is further characterized by a below-the-mean assessment of task accomplishment. Most characteristic of the Northern and Middle European group is the low importance attached to internal networking and agenda-setting. The Northern and Middle European group thus constitutes the opposite pole to the Franco group. In Eastern and Central Europe agenda-setting appears the most prioritized function.

Table 1: Means of indices (0-4) of mayoral functions for different types of mayors

	Agenda setting	Internal networking	External networking	Task accomplishment
Political mayors	2.83	2.81	2.59	2.80
Executive mayors	2.65	2.22	2.65	2.88
Collegial leaders	2.58	2.78	2.61	2.60
Ceremonial mayors	2.70	1.89	2.78	2.49
All	2.70	2.59	2.62	2.49

4 The empirical one-dimensionality of these indices is quite poor. The argument for referring various activities to the four functions rather should be regarded as a priori. There probably would not be total agreement on the assignment of activities to functions. The four functions are here not used as analytical tools but rather, for descriptive purposes, to reduce the complexity of the set of dependent variables.

In chapter 2 Heinelt and Hlepas develop a typology of mayors combining Hesse and Sharpe's types based on vertical intergovernmental relations with an assessment of horizontal power relations. In Table 1 means for the four indices of mayoral functions are shown for the categories of this typology.

The political mayors place greater emphasis on the input functions of agenda setting and internal networking, while the executive mayors stress the output function 'task accomplishment'. The collegial leaders prioritize internal networking. With the exception of the ceremonial mayors⁵ the importance of external networking does not vary much between the categories of the typology.

6.2 *The independent variables*

The above exercise involving a comparison among means of the dependent variables between countries (or rather groups of countries) will not be taken further in this chapter. Rather, country differences, summing up the effects of institutional arrangements, political culture and other national particularities, will be taken for given and cancelled out from the analysis by introducing country dummies in the regression analyses to follow. The same holds for the size of municipalities, which will be checked for by introduction of the logarithm of population size as a control variable. The estimates of the effects of the control variables (country dummies and size) will not be shown in the tables. The regression coefficients thus obtained will indicate the effect of an independent variable on a particular dependent variable when all the control variables are cancelled out. In the penultimate section of the chapter we will return to the question of country differences, but focusing attention not on whether country matters for the evaluation of different mayoral tasks, but rather on the question of whether there are different relational patterns between independent and dependent variables in different countries.

The independent variables of the analyses have been arranged according to a time dimension where social background in terms of belonging to societal categories is considered as part of early events while events immediately preceding election are considered late events.

1. *Group belonging*: From which societal groups do the mayors come? We have data on gender and occupation. Based on the data concerning occupational background, a rough blue-/white-collar dichotomy was constructed.⁶

5 The ceremonial mayors are here represented only by a small number of Irish respondents.

6 Other important societal groups in European societies are ethnic groups. Ethnicity was not measured in this study, for it seemed a plausible assumption that variation in this respect

Theoretical frameworks suggesting that the fact of belonging to different societal groups is likely to affect values and mode of acting will touch on the concept of group representation and the 'Politics of Presence' (Phillips 1995). The sheer fact of belonging to different social categories shapes the background experiences that are subsequently brought to the mayoral office. Within social categories there may form groups that could be considered collective actors with different interests. Representatives – in this case mayors – belonging to such groups could be considered representatives of group interests (see also Hernes 1987).

2. *Socialization and learning*: Basic values and role conceptions are acquired during childhood, adolescence and education, but political socialization has more and more come to be considered a life-long process. There is a connection between the first element (namely groups) and socialization, as socialization processes and outcomes may differ between social categories. In the literature on political socialization and learning there is an emphasis on the socialization agents of infancy and adolescence, family and school. The experience of different socialization agents in different stages of life can be indicated by means of variables measuring place of birth and childhood, 'political family', education, seniority in office and age. With respect to age and seniority an especially intriguing problem is that of disentangling the effects of ageing and maturing from generational or cohort effects (Ryder 1965). Without access to diachronic data the problem is not soluble. An attempt to tentative conclusions from comparisons between the effects of age and those of seniority in office will be made in the final discussion of this chapter.
3. *Loyalties*: Group belonging and socialization can be assumed to affect the type of interactions the candidate mayor will embark on. The future mayor will become a member of professional, political and other networks characterized by exchange relations. Some of these exchange relations will extend into the future. Debts will have to be collected and claims to be met. The theoretical framework within which these variables can be understood include theories about exchange flows in networks, in other words theories about interdependence (Emerson 1962; Willer and Anderson 1981; Cook and Yamagishi 1992).

The contexts in which loyalties of this kind can be expected to arise are indicated by survey questions about previous elected and appointed office. We em-

would be small in our empirical material. Mayors in European cities probably belong to the ethnic majority groups of their respective countries.

phasized the question concerning previous elected or appointed office in business associations as such organizations could be expected to represent distinct interests.⁷ Another question of relevance is whether the candidate has been employed by the municipality itself. Contexts very close to the election – and thus more directly creating liabilities to be fulfilled after election – are indicated by party membership and support from different actors in the election campaign. From the responses to the latter questions two additive indices were constructed: Support from *party actors* is formed by the items concerning support from ‘the national organs of your party’, ‘your party wing/faction’, ‘your party at the local level’ and ‘national politicians’. The sum of responses to the items concerning support from ‘local prestigious figures’, ‘unions’, ‘the local business world’, ‘local media’, ‘the church’ and ‘local associations’ makes up the index for support from *local community actors*.⁸

6.3 The analyses

The analysis technique used throughout this paper will be OLS regression. The analyses are subdivided into four sections. Here the general format of the equations estimated in each section will be given and commented upon.

In *Section 1 (The correlates of task evaluations)* we will investigate the effects of the various independent variables on the dependent variables one by one, checking only for the above mentioned control variables, but not considering the relations among different independent variables.

7 The other organizations asked for are political parties, trade unions and NGOs. Relations to parties are covered by other questions. Trade unions in many countries have close relations with parties, and ‘NGOs’ is too broad an expression to relate to specific identifiable interests.

8 Cronbach’s alpha for the party support index is .78 and for the local community support index .77. The Netherlands will be missing on these support-in-election indices due to the fact that Dutch mayors are not elected but appointed by central government. In Sweden the question concerning support in the mayoral election would also lack relevance. Swedish mayors (leader of the executive committee) are elected by the council, and they do not generally appear in the council election as mayoral candidates. Which party will take the office of ‘mayor’ usually is determined in coalition negotiations. The issue of which person will then hold the position in actual practice will be a matter to be dealt with by this party, its council group and extra-parliamentary organization (Bäck 2005). The question was asked in the Swedish questionnaire, but without reference to the mayoral election, referring instead to the local council election. These data have been merged into the dataset analyzed in this chapter.

In *Section 2 (Towards a model of the consequences of background)* we will also consider the interrelations among the various independent variables.⁹

In *Section 3 (Paths of causality)* we are going to investigate deeper the causal models implied by the comparisons between bivariate and multivariate effects, in order to identify causal chains. The technique of path analysis (Asher 1976) consists of the following steps:

- Reconstruction on an *à priori* basis of the *weak causal order* i.e. the most plausible time sequence between the variables.
- Regression analysis with the ultimate dependent variable as dependent variable and all other variables of the model as independent variables.
- Estimation of a second regression equation with the variable immediately preceding the last dependent variable as dependent variable and all variables earlier in the weak causal order as independent variables.
- Continuation of this process up to estimation of the bivariate regression between the first variable in the weak causal order (the exogenous variable) as independent variable and the next variable as dependent variable.
- Retention from each regression, as causal links, the coefficients fulfilling some predetermined criterion of strength and/or statistical significance.

This procedure thus approaches the common criteria of causality (Bennett 1999): namely, time sequence by assumption in the first step, co-variation that holds *ceteris paribus* by the series of regression analyses, and finally, an indica-

9 The equations in the first section could be written: $Y_i = \alpha + \beta_j X_j + \gamma C + \delta \ln(\text{pop})$ where Y_i is the dependent variable under consideration, X_j the independent variable under consideration, C the vector of country dummies and $\ln(\text{pop})$ is the size control variable.

The equations estimated in Section 2 are: $Y_i = \alpha + \beta X + \gamma C + \delta \ln(\text{pop})$ where X now is the vector of independent variables, while Y , C and $\ln(\text{pop})$ are defined as in Section 1.

Comparisons of the β s resulting from the analyses in Sections 1 and 2 allow causal inferences (cf Blalock 1964, 1979):

If $\beta(2)$ [the regression estimate from the multivariate analysis in Section 2] is less than $\beta(1)$ [the regression coefficient from the 'bivariate' analysis in Section 1] then one or the other of two conclusions are supported by data: Either all or part of the causal effect of the X considered in the bivariate analysis is channelled through other X s, introduced in the multivariate analysis, as *intermediate variables*, or all or part of the correlation between the X under observation and Y is spurious, depending on both X and Y being explained by variations in the now introduced other X s, which thus act as *underlying causes*.

If $\beta(2)$ is larger than $\beta(1)$ this indicates that there are at least two causal chains between X and Y , and that these have different signs. It could be for instance that there is a positive direct effect of X on Y , which is partly offset by a negative indirect effect via one or more other X s.

If $\beta(2)$ equals or almost equals $\beta(1)$ we would conclude that there is a direct causal effect between X and Y accounting for the total effect between the two variables.

tion of causal mechanisms by dividing the total causal connection into a number of links.

In *Section 4 (Varying national patterns)* we will return to the question of inter-country comparisons. All the previous analyses have cancelled out national differences through the introduction of country dummies, accounting for different levels of the dependent variables due to institutional settings, political culture etc. Here (as mentioned above) the emphasis is not on different levels in different countries, but on different patterns of relationships between variables. Thus if the general research question addressed in the earlier sections is summarised as ‘Does recruitment matter?’, here we are interested in the question ‘Does the degree to which recruitment matters vary between countries?’¹⁰

6.4 *The correlates of task evaluations*

In this section we will inspect the bivariate (although checked for country effects as well as for population size) relationships between characteristics of the background of the mayors, as well as events more immediately preceding election, on the one hand and evaluation of mayoral tasks on the other. Table 2 will start with the earlier phases, which in this chapter have been labelled ‘group belonging’ and ‘socialization and learning’. In 24 of the total 112 cells of the matrix¹¹ significant (.05) regression coefficients can be displayed. Gender, but also seniority and age appear as important correlates of the evaluation of tasks. Gender effects have some concentration on the tasks labelled ‘networking’ and ‘agenda-setting’. Women thus are more interested in attracting external resources, in achieving publicity for the municipality, in contributing to their own party’s actions generally and in achieving cohesion in the political majority. Furthermore, in contrast to the other variables analyzed here, gender also has effects on ‘agenda-setting’ tasks. Women are more interested in implementing

10 This question will first be approached by estimating equations on the format: $Y_i = \alpha + \beta X_j C + \gamma C + \delta \ln(\text{pop})$ where Y is the dependent variable (i.e. each mayoral task), X is one of the dependent variables (i.e. gender, political family, seniority et c) and C is the vector of countries. This analysis will give a number of interaction effects (β) of combinations of independent variables (X) and countries (C). We will look into how these effects are distributed with regard to Y’s (i.e. are there mayoral tasks that can be explained in different ways in different countries?), X’s (i.e. are there explanatory factors that work differently in different countries?) and C’s (i.e. are there some countries which, in the respect investigated in the chapter, seem to function differently from the others?). Finally, as a result of these analyses some genuinely comparative analyses will be performed, where regression coefficients between some selected Y’s and X’s will be compared country-wise.

11 Including the not reported column ‘spent childhood’.

their own party's programme, and women, more than men, strive to enhance new projects in the community.

The effects of seniority and age emphasize 'networking' and 'task accomplishment' tasks. Mayors in older age groups and those with many years of service are more interested in defending local autonomy but less interested in representing the city towards the outside world. They are also less interested in setting goals for administrative reform, but would award considerable attention to helping individual citizens and to guiding the municipal staff. Social class, education, having been born in or having spent one's childhood in the municipality as well as coming from a 'political family' all display fewer significant effects on task evaluations.

Table 2: Significant bivariate (total) effects of social background and socialization and learning variables

	Gender Female=1	Middle class	Political family	Education	Seniority	Age	Total no. of effects
<i>Agenda-setting</i>							
Party programme	+		+				2
New projects	+						2
Personal policies							0
City vision		+					1
<i>Networking</i>							
Represent city		-			-	-	3
Co-op with neighbours							0
External resources	+						1
Local autonomy					+	+	2
Publicity	+			-			2
Contribute to party	+				-		2
Majority cohesion	+	-					2
<i>Task accomplishment</i>							
Service quality							0
Goals adm reform			+		-	-	3
Correctness							0
Help citizens				-	+	+	3
Guide staff					+	+	2
<i>Total no. of effects</i>	6	3	2	2	6	5	

Comment: Independent variable 'spent childhood' without significant effects not reported. Coefficients significant at the .05 level reported. Control for country dummies and ln(population).

Next we turn to the effects of events occurring in later stages of the recruitment process. Thus we will now consider networks, contacts and experiences occurring within the temporal proximity of elections that could create loyalties and liabilities.

The occurrence of significant effects is even more frequent in this table than in the preceding list. Out of a total of 80 cells, 27 display significant regression coefficients. In relative terms this figure amounts to almost twice as many, suggesting that the later stages in recruitment are even more important for the evaluations carried out by candidate mayors than are the earlier stages.

Table 3: Significant bivariate (total) effects of loyalty variables

	Municipal employee	Business association	Party member	Party support	Local support	Total no. of effects
<i>Agenda-setting</i>						
▪ Party programme			+	+		2
▪ New projects					+	1
▪ Personal policies				+		1
▪ City vision					+	1
<i>Networking</i>						
▪ Represent city	+			+	+	3
▪ Cooperate with neighbours			-		+	2
▪ External resources		+		+	+	3
▪ Local autonomy					+	1
▪ Publicity		+	-		+	3
▪ Contribute to party		+	+	+		3
▪ Majority cohesion		+	+	+		3
<i>Task accomplishment</i>						
▪ Service quality	-		+			2
▪ Goals adm. reform						0
▪ Correctness						0
▪ Help citizens		+		+		2
▪ Guide staff						1
<i>Total no. of effects</i>	2	5	6	7	7	

Comment: Coefficients significant at the .05 level reported. Control for country dummies and ln(population).

One of the most important explanatory factors consists of support received during the electoral campaign from party connected actors as well as from actors in the local community. Party membership also has important consequences, concentrated within the 'agenda-setting' and 'networking' functions. This finding is

in contrast with the age and seniority variables considered in the previous table, where the effects to a high degree concerned the ‘task accomplishment’ function. Mayors who are closer to parties (party members and those supported by party actors) are especially eager to implement their party’s programme. By contrast, mayors who were supported by local community actors favour new projects in the community and seek to develop a city vision. As regards networking, both similarities and differences are observed. Both party-supported and locality-supported mayors value representation of the city and attracting external resources highly. But while ‘party’ mayors attach importance to contributions to the party’s national actions and achieving majority cohesion, ‘locality’ mayors feel it is important to enhance co-operation with neighbouring cities, to defend local autonomy more generally and to achieve publicity for the municipality and its activities. Previous experience acquired through elected or appointed office in business organizations also appears to play an important role in the prioritization of tasks. Tasks highly valued among mayors with such experience almost exclusively cluster in the networking function. Finally, previous experience as an employee of the municipality displays fewer effects on task evaluations.

6.5 Towards a model of the consequences of background

We will now address the issue of causal modelling. This will be achieved by performing multiple regression analyses incorporating all the independent variables simultaneously for each mayoral task. The remaining significant coefficients will now represent direct, unmediated, effects of the respective independent variables. A comparison with the coefficients from the preceding bivariate analyses will thus provide insight into the flows of causality. Because there must be valid responses to all variables in the equation, the number of observations is lower in these analyses.¹²

Starting as before, from the effects of the ‘early’ explanatory factors, it can be noted that the number of significant effects has decreased. In Table 4, 13 significant effects are listed, as compared with 24 in Table 2. The decrease is partly attributable to the fact that total effects are channelled through intermedi-

12 The most important difference is that three countries are totally excluded: The Netherlands due to the fact that the support-in-election variables are missing because of the Dutch system of top-down appointment of mayors, Denmark and Switzerland due to missing data on the variable ‘having been a municipal employee’ and for the Swiss case also the variable ‘born or having spent most of their childhood in the municipality.’

ary variables.¹³ Almost half of the previously recorded effects thus have disappeared. An inspection of the single variables reveals that gender, class, childhood, political family and age are stripped of half or more than half of their effects. The implication is that the effects of these five variables on the evaluation of mayoral tasks are to a large extent indirect.

A similar pattern is detected with regard to the later explanatory variables. 27 significant effects have been reduced to 14. The drop in the number of effects of 'party membership' is particularly noteworthy. This means that a substantial part of the effects of party membership acts through the effects of party membership on the support-in-election variables.

Table 4: Significant multivariate (direct) effects of social background and socialization and learning variables

	Gender female=1	Middle class	Child- hood	Political family	Educa- tion	Senior- ity	Age	Total no. of effects
<i>Agenda-setting</i>								
▪ Party programme	+							1
▪ New projects								0
▪ Personal policies					+			1
▪ City vision								0
<i>Networking</i>								
▪ Represent city						-		1
▪ Co-op with neighb.								0
▪ External resources	+				-			2
▪ Local autonomy								0
▪ Publicity	+						+	2
▪ Contribute to party								0
▪ Majority cohesion					+			1
<i>Task accomplishment</i>								
▪ Service quality					-			1
▪ Goals adm, reform								0
▪ Correctness			-					1
▪ Help citizens				+			+	2
▪ Guide staff							+	1
<i>Total no. of effects</i>	3	0	1	1	4	1	3	

Comment: Coefficients significant at the .05 level reported. Control for country dummies and ln(population).

13 Part of the decrease is attributable to the decrease in degrees of freedom, because of the introduction of a greater number of variables into the equations and the reduced number of observations due to cases without valid values on one or more independent variables.

The pattern is similar to that of the bivariate analyses. The number of effects is roughly the same for early (background and socialization) and late (loyalty) variables. Effects of early variables are concentrated in networking and task accomplishment, while effects of late variables are concentrated in networking and agenda-setting.

The conclusions of this section are that the variables positioned early in the socialization and recruitment process – i.e. social background, socialization and learning – still exert some direct effects on how mayors evaluate various tasks, but a substantial portion of the effects of these variables comes into play through their consequences for later events in the process. Such consequences particularly concern party membership and support received from various actors in the election campaign leading up to the election of the mayor.

Table 5: Significant multivariate (direct) effects of loyalty variables

	Municipal employee	Business association	Party member	Party support	Local support	Total no. of effects
<i>Agenda-setting</i>						
Party programme			+	+		2
New projects					+	1
Personal policies				+		1
City vision					+	1
<i>Networking</i>						
Represent city					+	1
Co-op with neighbours					+	1
External resources		+	-		+	3
Local autonomy					+	1
Publicity						0
Contribute to party			+	+		2
Majority cohesion						0
<i>Task accomplishment</i>						
Service quality						0
Goals administ. reform						0
Correctness						0
Help citizens				+		1
Guide staff						0
<i>Total no. of effects</i>	0	1	3	4	6	

Comment: Coefficients significant at the .05 level reported. Control for country dummies and ln(population).

6.6 Paths of causality

In this section the causal paths alluded to in the previous section will be specified and illustrated for a couple of cases. Path models have been constructed for all 16 of the dependent variables (mayoral tasks). These can be grouped into six different categories.

- *Model 1: No significant effects:* In order to simplify the presentation of the models we have raised the criterion for inclusion of a link in terms of statistical significance to .01. A necessary consequence of this will be that all dependent variables where there are no direct effects at this level will be totally excluded. These are the six variables ‘service quality’, ‘majority cohesion’, ‘goals for administrative reform’, ‘personal policies’, ‘local autonomy’, and ‘publicity’.
- *Model 2: Direct (positive) effects of party variables:* This model type is applicable to the dependent variables ‘implement the party programme’ and ‘contribute to the action of one’s own party’. The ‘party’ mayors, those who are party members and/or received support from party actors in the electoral campaign, are more eager to implement the party programme and to contribute to the party’s actions in general. Earlier variables in the process have effects to the extent that they influence the party membership and party support variables. This model will be illustrated with a graph below (Figure 2).
- *Model 3: Direct (positive) effect of local support:* This model type is descriptive of the four variables ‘cooperation with neighbours’, ‘new projects’, ‘city vision’ and ‘external resources’. The directly influencing position is here occupied by ‘local support’ i.e. support from influential actors in the local community, instead of ‘party support’. ‘Locally supported mayors’ are more interested in favouring new projects in the local community, developing a vision for the city, developing co-operation with neighbouring municipalities and attracting external resources. With respect to attracting external resources there also is a link from previous experiences with business associations. Because party variables (membership and support) are linked to local support variables, these also have an indirect influence on the assessment of these tasks. The same holds for earlier events in the process. This model will likewise be graphically illustrated below (Figure 1).
- *Model 4 Direct effect from age:* This is the model explaining variations in assessment of the importance of the tasks ‘helping citizens’ and ‘guiding staff’. Its most striking difference from models 2 and 3 is that the ‘support’


variables have no effect. Mayors in the older age bracket are more interested both in helping individual citizens with their problems and in guiding the municipal staff. Earlier events are related to age, implying indirect effects of these on evaluation of the two tasks. Women mayors, mayors who have served a short term of office, mayors with higher education belong to the younger age brackets. The same holds for mayors who were not born in or did not grow up in the municipality they now govern, as well as for mayors who do not come from a ‘political family.’

- *Model 5 Direct (negative) effect from seniority:* Long-serving mayors are less interested in representing the city to the outside world than are newcomers. This model thus ‘jumps over’ what we have labelled late events in the recruitment process. Through links with seniority, however, a number of the earlier variables also come to have indirect effects.
- *Model 6 Direct (positive) effect from ‘born or spent childhood in municipality’:* The same by-passing of later stages of the process can be observed for the relation between having been born or having spent one’s childhood in the present municipality and expressing an interest in safeguarding the correctness of administrative processes in the municipality. We have no plausible explanation for this link.

Figures 1 and 2 display models 3 and 2, where support variables directly influence the resulting task evaluations. The left-hand parts of the two graphs picturing the relations between group belonging and socialization and learning variables (i.e. the ‘early stage’) are identical. This is because both are linked to the later stage through seniority and age. Negative effects between seniority and age and the support variables can be observed. Mayors in the upper age brackets are less frequently party members and more seldom indicate that they received support from local community actors than do their younger colleagues. Long-serving mayors less often report having been supported by party actors than do newcomers. This implies that there will be a negative relation between age and/or seniority and a number of task evaluations. As other ‘early’ variables are likewise related to age and/or seniority, these variables will also have indirect effects on dependent variables through the mediation of age/seniority and the support variables. Thus women mayors display shorter terms of service than men. Well educated mayors are younger and have served for a shorter period of time. Those who were born in or spent their childhood in the municipality they now govern are older and have served as mayors for greater length of time.


To summarise the reconstruction of causal models, the results can be grouped into the following propositions:

Figure 1: Path-model with direct effect from local support



Comment: Arrows represent significant (.05) regression coefficients. Broken arrows represent negative coefficients.

Figure 2: Path-model with direct effect from party support and party membership



Comment: Arrows represent significant (.05) regression coefficients. Broken arrows represent negative coefficients. The direct link from “Party member” to “Mayoral tasks” is not present in the model for “Contribute to party”.

- Late events in the recruitment process play a major role in the process whereby mayors single out certain tasks as their focus of attention. Particularly important is the issue of support received in the election campaign, which clearly affects the mayor's priorities.
- The role of the party system is likewise important. Mayors who are party members and/or have been supported by party actors appear to be obliged to deliver implementation of the party programme and contributions to the party's actions in general.
- Background variables and variables indicating socialization, learning and earlier experiences mainly have indirect effects via their consequences for the late support variables.
- The link between background variables and earlier experiences in many cases is age and/or seniority in office. Mayors in the older age group and long-serving mayors are less dependent on support from actors in the election than younger mayors or those with a shorter time of service. Together with direct effects, in a number of cases this produces a picture of the priorities of mayors that contrasts sharply between these two distinct age groups.
- Gender is one of the background variables linked to seniority. Female mayors have served for a shorter length of time as compared to males. This connection explains the observed differences in preferences between mayors of the two sexes.

6.7 *Varying national patterns*

The focus of analysis in this section will be based on country differences, in contrast to the previous sections. So far attention has been directed to understanding the causal chain between social background, socialization, learning and experiences of contacts with different types of actors, *irrespective* of country. Country differences in the level of evaluations of mayoral tasks were factored out. Here, instead, country differences will be taken into account, but not in terms of the effects of different national systems on task evaluation. Rather, we will consider the effects of different national systems and cultural orientations on the explanatory patterns. That is to say, we will seek to determine whether the patterns observed in the previous analyses are generally valid for the 17 European countries investigated or whether distinct national patterns can be traced. The problem at hand is thus to examine whether systems differ in terms of the patterns of relationships among variables rather than in terms of the fre-

quency of particular characteristics (Przeworski and Teune 1970).¹⁴. The observed number of significant interaction terms can be distributed over dependent variables (mayoral tasks), independent variables (background and recruitment) and countries.

Table 6: Distribution of significant interaction terms over mayoral tasks

	Percent
Contribute to party	9.3
External resources	7.8
Cooperation with neighbours	7.8
Party programme	7.3
Cohesion majority	7.3
Publicity	6.8
Represent city	6.3
Goals administrative reform	6.3
Guide staff	5.9
City vision	5.9
Correctness	5.9
Local autonomy	5.9
New projects	5.9
Help citizens	4.9
Service quality	3.9
Personal policies	2.9
	100.1

The distribution over the 16 mayoral tasks is relatively even, with frequencies between 3 and 9 percent. Networking tasks are generally in the upper half of the list, while agenda-setting and task accomplishment are in the lower part. This means that it is more common for the background and recruitment variables to show a country-specific relation with the evaluation of networking, and, fur-

14 This task will be approached by estimating equations of the format $Y_i = \alpha + \beta X_j C + \gamma C$. As there will be one such equation for every combination of independent and dependent variable, a total number of 192 equations ($12 \cdot 16$) were estimated. In each equation, it is registered which β s are significant (.05). A significant estimate is interpreted as indicating that there is an interaction effect between the independent variable under consideration and the fact of coming from a particular country on the dependent variable considered. A total of 205 such significant interaction terms were recorded out of a total of 3.264 possible. This total is calculated $192 \cdot 17$ (the number of countries). The actual number is slightly lower because some of the variables have not been measured in all countries.

thermore, that this occurs less frequently with regard to the assessments of agenda setting and task accomplishment. One notable exception is eagerness to implement the party programme: here this has been considered an agenda-setting task, but it scores high in Table 6. If the item 'Cohesion in majority' is added to the willingness to contribute to party action and majority cohesion, it can be concluded that almost 25 percent of the interaction effects concern tasks involving the relation to the party. This suggests that the explanations regarding evaluation of party-related tasks vary between countries.

Table 7: Distribution of significant interaction terms over independent variables

	Percent
Local support	15.1
Party support	15.1
Age	11.2
Seniority	8.8
Party member	7.8
Business association	7.8
Female	6.8
Childhood	6.3
Education	5.9
Municipal employee	5.4
Political family	5.4
Class	4.4
	100.0

An inspection of the distribution over independent variables shows a certain concentration on the support-in-election variables. There emerge important inter-country variations in the effects of these variables on the assessment of the relevance of mayoral tasks.


The distribution over countries will not be displayed but it should be mentioned that France, accounting for 18.5 per cent of the significant interaction effects, is seen as the country whose local government system presents the most striking differences from the other countries, at least in the respects investigated in this chapter. The English, Spanish, Polish and Czech systems also exhibit numerous peculiarities. On the other hand Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and Switzerland are characterized by systems that rarely differ from the general model.

Let us now seek to achieve an understanding of some of the country differences revealed. As support in election and tasks relating to the party system show a certain concentration of country dissimilarities, our attention will focus on a pair of these variables, namely the effect of support in election from party actors on evaluation of the importance of implementing the programme of one's own party. In the scatterplot in Figure 3 the countries are ordered horizontally according to the average level of party support in elections, from Germany where mayors more seldom have received support from party actors to Ireland and Spain, where such support is very common. Vertically the countries are ordered according to the size of the regression coefficient of 'party support' on 'implementation of party programme', from Ireland, where party support actually reduces the will to implement the party programme, to Hungary, where an increase in party support by one point on the 0-4 support scale results in an almost half a point increase in evaluation of the importance of party programme implementation on the likewise 0-4 implementation scale. There is an evident negative relationship between the average levels of party support in a country and the effect of party support on the evaluation of the party programme implementation task. A possible interpretation is that some European local government systems are so firmly in the hands of the political parties that it is almost unthinkable for a candidate not endorsed by a party to be elected mayor. As all candidates are thus party-supported, there seem to be no expectations that an elected mayor should have any particular obligations towards the party. By contrast in countries where some mayors are elected with the aid of parties and while others are not, there appears to be a stronger obligation to reward the party that gave its backing to the campaign.

Having thus established that there is a relationship between the average level of party support in the country on the one hand, and the effect of party support on evaluation of the importance of party programme implementation on the other, we then examined whether the average level of support from local community actors exerts similar effects. In analyzing the whole European dataset, one of the tasks that proved to be affected by local community actor support was 'creating a vision for the city.' Mayors who had received a high level of support from important local actors were more eager to create or enhance a city vision than those who had received lower levels of support.

In analogy with the analysis of the party variable, the average level of local community support as well as the effect (unstandardized regression coefficient) of local support on the evaluation of 'city vision' were computed for each country. The two country-wise variables were then regressed, just as in Figure 3. Surprisingly, they proved to be quite weakly correlated. ($r = -.158$). The average

Figure 3: Relationship country-wise between average level of party support and the effect of party support on the importance of implementing the party programme




$$Y = .569 - .186X; r = -.369$$

level of local community support in a country thus does not seem to induce consequences analogous to those of the average level of party support.

An exploratory attempt was made to regress the national regression coefficients (i.e. the effects of 'local support' on 'city vision') on the average level of party support. The results are displayed in Figure 4. The effect of local support on assessment of the importance of creating a city vision is dependent on the average level of *party support* in the country. Italy and Switzerland can be taken as examples of countries where party support for mayors is valued as low by mayors. Furthermore, in these countries the evaluation of 'city vision' is little affected by the question of whether the mayor has received support from local community actors. Indeed, the regression coefficients in these countries are

Figure 4: Relationship country-wise between average level of party support and the effect of local support on the importance of creating a city vision



$$Y = -.238 + .153X; r = .364$$

actually negative, indicating that the importance of creating a city vision is diminished by local support. An the other end of the scale there are countries such as Ireland, Spain, Denmark and Hungary where mayors are heavily supported by parties. In these countries local support matters. Increasing local support leads to increasing importance for the city vision task.

The results of this final analysis can be summarized as follows: the level of party support for candidate mayors in a country, and thus probably the importance of parties in the recruitment process, has important consequences for the evaluation of tasks, and most importantly for the effects of different kinds of support. In highly party-dominated systems varying levels of party support have relatively little effect while varying levels of support from other actors becomes a more relevant factor. In a less party-dominated system the opposite holds, and variations in local support do not play a major role, while variations in party support are more influential. Where solid party support is common it has little impact on priorities but leaves the field open for support from other actors, and

where party support does not provide backing for all mayoral candidates it has consequences for the evaluation of tasks.

6.8 *The questions raised*

The answers provided to the question ‘Does recruitment matter?’ in this chapter have, as is often the case, raised new questions. We would like to end this chapter with three such questions.

6.8.1 A new kind of mayor?

In the construction of path models age and seniority appeared to occupy a strategic position. There were a number of direct and indirect effects of age and seniority. Mayors in the older age groups and/or mayors with a long-standing record of office were less interested in representing the city to the outside world, less interested in formulating goals for administrative reform, but felt it more important to help citizens, guide the municipal staff and defend local autonomy than did younger and more recently elected mayors. There were also important links ‘backward’ in the causal chain from age and seniority, implying that the effects of the earlier experiences are channelled through age and seniority. For instance, in cases where women mayors appear to show more interest in enhancing new projects in the local community than their male counterparts. This could also be explained by the fact that women mayors are younger and newer in office and that younger mayors are more interested in encouraging new projects.

The question raised by these observations is the classical question when observing correlations with age in cross-section research: is the observed effect an effect of the ageing process or is it a difference between generations? This question merits further reflection, but a more conclusive answer depends on access to diachronic data, which has not been at hand in this project. However, some suggestions may be derived from a comparison of Tables 2 and 4. Table 2 shows that the two variables age and seniority have exactly the same number (five) of significant effects on the dependent task evaluations. In Table 4, on the other hand, there remains only one significant effect of seniority while three age effects have survived the introduction of controls. This could imply that age is the more important explanatory variable, and that seniority exerts its effects through the mediation of age. In this interpretation, mayors differ not because they have served for various long periods (and thus belong to different ‘genera-

tions' of mayors) but because long-serving mayors are older than short-serving mayors.

6.8.2 The role consequences of group representation

The only group affiliations that could be tested for in this chapter are gender and class. A number of effects of gender on task evaluation were observed. Women mayors are more interested than their male colleagues in implementing their own party's programme and in enhancing new projects in the community. The majority of differences, however, concern those tasks that here have been categorised as 'networking'. Women are more eager to attract external resources, to achieve publicity for the city, to contribute to the party's activities and to achieve cohesion in the political majority. With regard to class, fewer correlations were found between a middle class background and assessment of mayoral tasks. We recorded only that middle class mayors show a greater interest in developing a city vision. None of these effects, however, survive the multivariate regression analyses, in other words, there are no direct effects of gender or class that are not intermediated by other variables in the model.

In discussing group representation and the politics of presence, group representation is motivated by its policy consequences in terms of providing the policy process with knowledge and experience, as well as increasing access to the policy process for group-based interests. It is worth reflecting whether the relations observed in this chapter could be interpreted in these terms. To take one example, does the higher priority for party programme implementation and achieving majority cohesion that is noted with women mayors reflect specific female experiences or enhance the interests of women as a group? Alternatively, it may be the case that women are more dependent on support from parties or for some reason are elected in municipalities that have special needs for external resources. These topics will be explored in other contributions to the project.¹⁵

Another aspect, perhaps covered in the politics-of-presence discussion by the resource issue,¹⁶ refers to the similarities between many middle-class professions and the job as a leading politician. It could be argued that performing as a political leader demands the same skills as certain types of white-collar jobs.¹⁷

15 See for instance the contribution by Magnier, Navarro and Russo in Chapter 9 of this volume.

16 For Hernes 1987 the 'resource argument' implies that representatives of various groups contribute to the quality of the policy process, bringing their different experiences into the process.

17 See discussion in chapter 3 by Steyvers and Reynaert in this book.

The very modest effects of occupational background on the evaluation of mayoral tasks might be surprising in this perspective.

6.8.3 The importance of parties in cross-national comparisons

The individual-level analyses point to the importance of party membership and pre-election support from party actors as factors that influence the manner in which mayors evaluate a number of tasks. This is particularly evident as regards tasks that in various ways have the party as beneficiary. It becomes important for the ‘party mayor’ to deliver implementation of the party programme, as well as contributing to the party’s activities more generally and achieving cohesion in the party political majority of the city. A further observation resulting from the cross-national comparisons in the final results section of this chapter is that the average level of partification¹⁸ has substantial consequences for the effects of quite different conditions, in particular for the importance of support from non-partisan local community actors. In our view, this implies that ‘partification’ should be considered as an important variable in cross-national comparisons of local government and local government systems. It should be observed that this characteristic cuts across other dimensions generally used in such comparisons, such as relations between governmental levels or internal constitutional arrangements. If only the variable ‘support from party actors’ used in this analysis is considered, highly-partified countries are found to include both ‘northern’ political systems like Sweden and Denmark and ‘southern’ systems like Spain and Portugal. Among nations with low levels of party support one finds both ‘northern’ countries such as Germany and Switzerland and ‘southern’ areas like Italy and Greece. A further analysis of the role of parties as reported by the respondents to our survey can be found in Chapter 11 by Fallend, Ignits and Swianiewicz.

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18 This is a term that we have tried to launch in another paper (Bäck 2004) to describe a political system (a city for instance) whose organization is in the firm grip of the political parties – parties handle recruitment procedures and structure decision-making, but do not fiercely oppose each other. Parties are constantly organizationally present, but not necessarily in conflict.

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7 Mayors, Citizens and Local Democracy

Michael Haus and David Sweeting

The main aim of this chapter is to give an account of political leaders' views of how local democracy should work in the modern context. In particular, we are interested in how degrees of support for different concepts are spread over different countries and correlate with different factors, thereby identifying reasons for the strength of specific attitudes. We will discuss also the effects of the institutional aspects of local government of direct election and party membership on the views of political leaders and local democracy.

However, we are also interested more generally in exploring the 'logic' of different concepts of democracy and the role of leaders within them (for a more detailed account see Haus and Sweeting 2005). As in other chapters of this book, we try to make generalisations about local leadership by taking an *institutionalist* perspective, i.e. by reflecting on the organizational forms and implicit normative meaning connected to specific ways of institutionalizing local democracy. We highlight some basic features of the changing patterns of political action in localities in recent decades. We then go on to distinguish four concepts of democracy which promise to give some orientation in a time of rapid change. We then discuss the implications of these concepts with respect to political leadership, the support given to them and the impact of the factors identified above.

7.1 Local democracy, institutions, and leadership

Until recently, it may have been a precarious assumption that different notions of local democracy as shared by local actors are of any higher significance, given the subordinate status of local government in the national political system, and the integration of local authorities into the rationale of public welfare production ultimately controlled by national governments. If one turns to the typologies characterising features of different local government systems as they were developed in the eighties and nineties of the last century (see chapter 2 in this volume), notions of local democracy could be considered as mainly a function of the position of local institutions in their respective states. Each type

would give a particular meaning to the local setting of municipal institutions, consisting mainly of a representative body of laymen politicians, a group of political leaders and the administrative apparatus as the three pillars of what can be called a 'local government'. Taking the typology of Page and Goldsmith (1987) as a vantage point, one could say that in the countries belonging to the Northern group of local government systems (characterised by broad functions, high discretion and low access to the centre) local democracy was a more or less developed representative system on its own, while in the countries belonging to the Southern group local democracy was more about creating a sense of identification around the mayor as a representative of the local community or towards representatives of the state. Both different notions would be connected in a specific way to the kind of (welfare) state one finds in a country. And they were connected with specific types of local leadership (see Borraz and John 2004: 109-110): in the South personal leadership by mayors was comparatively strong in a context of low formal autonomy of local government and connected to the representative and brokerage roles; in the Northern countries, more often characterised by a higher "legal localism", individual leadership was comparatively weak and more embedded in the dominance of political parties controlling councils and committees which were responsible for implementing national welfare policies.

Larry Sharpe's influential justification of elected local government in 'Theories and Values of Local Government' (Sharpe 1970) was certainly shaped by the British experience in a time when the modern welfare state and its corresponding local state reached their perfection. But in some respects, local government at that time could be considered as a kind of implementation agency for nationalised policies. According to Sharpe, it was not some romantic notion of 'liberty' or 'participation' which made local government of crucial importance, but its *coordinative* role consisting in coherently adjusting public services and linking them to local knowledge and a participatory environment (Sharpe 1970: 166). There can be no doubt that needs for coordinated action have multiplied and transcended the field of service provision in the last decades. Nevertheless, service provision is still an outstanding task, all the more in times of permanent fiscal stress and increased expectations about equality. More than half of the mayors in this study (52.6 %) are of the opinion that the task 'to ensure the good quality of local services' is of 'utmost' importance for their position¹, and a further 42.7 % believe it to have at least 'great' importance. At the same time, the task 'to create a vision for his/her city' holds the second position with 44.4 % giving it 'utmost' and 41.6 % 'great' importance. This finding, that political

1 This 'utmost' importance could be chosen only three times in a list of 16 possible tasks.

leaders do not only have to address service provision, but also develop visionary politics and policies corresponds to positions taken in the academic debate that:

- cities hold the potential to construct, articulate and promote the common good of their societies by forming policy agendas,
- their capability to do so is part of a revival of cities as arenas for collective action, and
- dynamic leadership is a crucial aspect in this process of determining and promoting an urban common good (see Le Galès 2002; Bagnasco and Le Galès 2000; John 2001).

But how can this potential be realized through *leadership*? Borrowing two basic terms from new institutionalism, one could state that in order to make cities ‘fit for their mission’ it is necessary that they also ‘make sense’ to different actors (see Offe 1996). Leadership is a crucial element of the complex actor constellations of urban governance (John 2001; Le Gales 2002) by which meaningful action is constructed from below. That is why it is important to gain an understanding which attitudes local political leaders take towards different notions of democracy and how they react to changes in the way of governing. This can help to understand how aims of efficient and qualitatively high service delivery and developing a broader vision of the city’s development are connected to the reshaping of local political institutions.

The following sections will deal with the question of how much support the different notions of democracy find among the local political leaders in a situation characterised by the challenges outlined so far.

7.2 *Concepts of local democracy*

Inspired by a similar distinction of different types by Frieder Naschold (1996: 298-300), we investigate four notions of local democracy which are present in current institutional reshaping of local politics: *representative*, *participatory*, *market*, and *network* democracy. Like Naschold we do not suggest that the categories are mutually exclusive or incompatible. Rather, they co-exist to a greater or lesser extent alongside each other.

In most European countries, *representative democracy* has traditionally been regarded as the essence of national and local democracy, and still today the election of councillors as representatives of the citizens can be considered as ‘the starting point for local democracy’ (Stewart 1991: 27). Election and the representative process traditionally underpin “party government”. But can we still suppose,

as Elcock does, that ‘party government provides the best guarantee of strong and coherent leadership and policies’ (Elcock 2001: 173)? Not all of our surveyed mayors or political leaders are party members, and many that are do not control a majority of council members.² For many, party politics might as well be a hindrance to realize policy agendas as it is a help. One could also doubt that today’s local elections are ‘meaningful elections’ (Dahl 1971; 1989), which would not only presuppose that votes must have an equal weight, but also that the result of the election has a considerable influence on the way the city is governed. In many countries, turnout in local elections today is significantly lower than turnout in national elections, and in some countries it is declining (Vetter 2000: 437-440).³

Calls for *participatory democracy*, based on ‘free public reasoning among equals’ (Cohen and Sabel 1997: 320) became popular in the sixties and seventies (e.g. Arnstein 1969; Pateman 1970) and have re-emerged more recently, as democracy is said to have taken a ‘deliberative turn’ (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003; Parkinson 2003). Although many rather different devices are often considered as ‘participatory’, theorists of deliberative democracy like Dryzek have stressed that for example classical opinion polls are not compatible with deliberative democracy because they deny the opportunity for unconstrained reasoning of citizens and have no socializing effects (Dryzek 2004).

At first sight, citizen participation and leadership may be regarded as contradictory as the first refers to an egalitarian concept of politics whereas the second focuses on the activity of single outstanding or even ‘charismatic’ actors. However, leadership need not be reserved to the activity of the few but can also be regarded as a precondition for the activity of the many, giving this activity an initial stimulus, a vision of a common goal and reliable procedures (see Hambleton 2005; Haus and Heinelt 2005). Furthermore, those who hold leadership positions might be interested in the involvement of the broader population, in order to overcome resistance for their policy agenda within the core institutions of the local political and administrative system. They could well believe that there is a kind of ‘hidden consensus’ between themselves and the citizens ‘out there’ whereas councillors and bureaucrats are far too concerned with cultivating their organisational self-interest, and that this hidden consensus will be revealed if citizens are given a louder voice.

The notion of *market democracy* recommends a marketisation of political relationships, in order to stimulate competition within the public sector and

2 80,8 % of the surveyed mayors said they were currently member of a political party. 71,6 % reported that they were elected as the candidate of the council majority.

3 However, continental European cities fare quite well compared to the Anglo Saxon world (Le Galès 2002: 236-238).

promote consumer satisfaction (Lowndes 1995: 174-176). From the middle of the eighties the call for 'good governance' has often been a label for demanding privatization, the minimal state and new public management in its aspects related to the boundaries between private and public bodies in the production of services (see Rhodes 1997: 47-56). Public choice theory is highly critical of representative democracy as a means of revealing citizen preferences (Dowding 1996: 50-52). It sees traditional public bureaucracies, based on the representative system, as infested with the interests of bureaucrats, professional groups and trade unions who all exert pressures that are not conducive to the overall welfare of the community. The mechanisms of participation associated with this form of democracy would be surveys, opinion polls, customer suggestion schemes and so on, as well as being able to pick up signals through the different use of services. As we saw above, in the eyes of the mayors service delivery is a very important task of theirs.

Whereas the agenda of the minimal state was inherently anti political leadership, at least at the local level (see Elcock 2001: 6), the NPM movement thinks local political leadership to be crucial, however in a refined way. NPM is about managing (quasi-)markets, not leaving markets on their own. The implications for political leadership include that politicians withdraw from direct day-to-day oversight of the bureaucracy, and are less involved in matters such as the hiring of staff and internal resource allocations. They take a 'light touch' approach to bureaucracy. What they do attempt to do is paint a broad brush picture of aims, goals, directions and policies.

Finally, local democracy as *network democracy* means that '*problem-solving*' (Mayntz 1993) by building organisational networks is at the heart of policy making. Here, the most important problems of current local government are regarded not as *efficiency* problems. The real problems of modernity are considered to be intrinsically linked to processes of functional differentiation of society in which organisations gain increasing autonomy in their functional contexts. Complexity and interdependence are keywords. The problems linked with growing differentiation concern the *effectiveness* of coping with the 'wicked' problems already mentioned above, which cannot be solved by simply spending money or establishing rules (see Mayntz 1996; Scharpf 1992; Rhodes 1997; Stoker 2000).

Whereas such a problem-solving orientation could favour greater involvement of the population in policy-making, urban regimes would lead in fact to an elitist pattern of policy development. In a laconic tone, Le Galès states that 'common interests are now most often the interests broadly perceived to be "common" by elites and organized interests' (Le Galès 2002: 264). Furthermore, urban governance does not have to be successful. Indeed, there is an 'in-

evitability of governance failure' due to the 'complexity of what is being attempted in governance', and thus 'the only option open is to mix and match strategies in a never-ending attempt to provide the capacity to act' (Stoker 2000: 94, with reference to Jessop 2000). From this perspective, representative and participatory democracy would not become obsolete. Firstly, as Stoker stresses, 'the public [...] continue to cling to a model of power in which control rests in the hand of elected officials that can be blamed when things go wrong' (Stoker 2000: 100). Secondly, negotiating cannot solve all conflicts. Doubts may be raised when it comes to redistributive policies (Scharpf 1992; 1993) and the indivisible conflicts of values where religion, ideology etc. play a major role (Stoker 2000: 105).

Since representative and participatory democracy can be considered as the classical alternatives, and the survey was designed with a special attention to those forms, in the following section we give extended attention to representative and participatory democracy. We examine support for (different notions of) representative democracy as compared to the support for stronger citizen participation. We then discuss different ways in which this participation can proceed. Finally, in line with reform processes, we examine support for market democracy and network democracy as additions to traditional forms of local democracy. We use the typology of leadership forms developed in chapter 2 of this volume to explore support for notions of democracy. Given that the typology is based on distinctions related to form of leadership, and on types of local government system that themselves imply different assumptions about local democracy, there is reason to believe that support for different forms of democracy will appear on these lines. We also pick up the different views according to the direct election of mayors, especially considering the strengthening of political executives in many countries across Europe (Borraz and John 2004). We also consider what difference is made by mayors belonging to parties.

7.3 Political leaders, representative democracy, and participatory democracy

Despite all the phenomena of crises mentioned above, political leaders all in all are quite satisfied with the actual contribution of their councils in stabilising leadership. 45.1 % of them hold that the council makes a positive contribution in stabilising leadership and 19.6 % even believe it be a 'very important' contribution. Only 7.7 % think councils have a negative influence here. In order to compare the respective support for different understandings of what representative democracy entails or for the need to supplement representative democracy

with more direct citizen participation we examine political leaders' support for a set of statements about local democracy. The statements are:

1. 'Political representatives should make what they think are the right decisions, independent of the views of local people.'
2. 'The results of local elections should normally be decisive for determining municipal policies.'
3. 'Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by elected representatives.'
4. 'Council decisions should reflect majority opinion among residents.'
5. 'Residents should participate actively and directly in making important decisions.'
6. 'Urban leaders should try to generate consensus and shared values among local citizens/groups.'

It is possible to argue that from statement 1 to 5 there is a progression from one statement to the next with respect to a lower 'sovereignty' of the council and a higher direct influence of citizens. The first statement is a strict interpretation of the trustee principle, associated with Burke, and considered out of date by many (Judge 1999: 51). The second can be seen to be about the extent to which a mandate is given to elected representatives via the electoral process. The third is a less strict, softer interpretation of the trustee principle, with some (limited) citizen involvement. The fourth statement claims that the council is not only supposed to listen to citizens' views, but also to actually reflect what the majority of them thinks in its decisions, though it is somewhat ambivalent since it is not clear how 'majority opinion' will be arrived at. Statement five, finally, puts even greater emphasis on direct citizen involvement and moves towards participatory democracy. The sixth statement is more about the question whether local leaders have a more consensual or antagonistic picture of democracy as a kind of 'meta frame'. Table one shows the correlations between these statements, the percentages of the sample that support them, and the mean scores for them on a 1-5 scale (1 lowest, 5 highest, midpoint 3).

The percentages supporting each of the first five statements show that there is most support for the soft Burkean interpretation of the role of the representative, and the importance of elections in determining policies (about two thirds in each case). There is therefore considerable support for these particular aspects of representative democracy. There is a little less support for council decisions reflecting majority opinion, though still about three in five of respondents support council decisions reflecting majority opinion. Slightly fewer respondents, though still over half, support active and direct participation of citizens. There is

less support for the strict trustee position. Fewer than half the respondents supported this statement. From these figures we can make the observation that most political leaders, while supporting an element of participation in decision-making, want to retain decision-making capability. The extremes – a strict trustee view and a strong participation view – get the least support.

That there is a ‘logic’ in the statements can be also demonstrated by referring to the correlations values: If we look at correlations between the values of support we see that the first two statements are correlated positively (strict trustee and electoral mandate), as are the last two (active participation and majority opinion). There is also a strong correlation between the support for the soft trustee position and active participation. The ambivalence in the ‘majority’ statement is reflected by the fact that there is a (slight) positive correlation with the statement that results of elections should be crucial – here, it is possibly the electoral majority the mayors refer to.

The most support can actually be found for the last statement, stressing consensus generation as the ultimate goal for democratic leadership – however, as the table shows, this support of consensus and shared values is positively correlated with all of the other statements. This makes it clear that it is the ways by which consensus is supposed to evolve which actually make a difference in the view of local democracy.

There is considerable evidence to suggest that leaders views’ on these aspects of democracy differ according to the institutional variables leadership type, party membership, and executive form. Table 2 shows these differences.

In relation to other types of mayor *political mayors* tend to look to elections to determine policies. They are less supportive of trustee positions – though most still favour the softer interpretation of the trustee role. Like political mayors, *collegial mayors* also look to elections to determine policy, but are more supportive of both strict and soft interpretations of the trustee role. They tend to be less convinced by majority opinion. *Executive mayors* differ in that they are the least likely of these three sorts of mayor to rely on elections to form policy. They are more likely to be characterized by the soft interpretation of the trustee role. These three types of mayor do not differ to a great extent in their view of active and direct participation. One noticeable feature is that collegial mayors, given their higher support for the strict trustee position, and the electoral mandate, want most discretion, whereas given the higher support for active and direct participation, and for majority opinion, executive mayors are happier to operate more under the influence of citizens. Executive mayors (found in Hungary, Poland and German Länder except Hesse and the city-states) are

Table 1: The pillars of local democracy according to mayors: Correlations, mean scores, and percentages of mayors supporting propositions

	Representatives to have independence from citizens' views	Results of local elections to be decisive	Residents make views known before decisions made	Decisions to reflect majority opinion	Active and direct participation by citizens	Leaders to generate shared values/ consensus
Results of local elections to be decisive	.110(**)					
Residents make views known before decisions made	-.087(**)	-.028				
Decisions to reflect majority opinion	-.184(**)	.104(**)	.245(**)			
Active and direct participation by citizens	-.101(**)	-.032	.462(**)	.232(**)		
Leaders to generate consensus	.073(**)	.143(**)	.199(**)	.218(**)	.171(**)	
means	3.21	3.79	3.86	3.69	3.54	4.15
standard deviation	1.289	1.137	1.056	1.109	1.186	0.947
values 1 and 2 (low importance)	29.5	13.8	12.0	14.9	20.4	6.3
values 4 and 5 (high importance)	44.8	65.4	67.1	59.4	53.6	79.6

Correlation (Pearson)

therefore more inclined to rely on citizen inputs as a guide to action, while collegial mayors (found in most other central and northern European countries seem to represent a school of thought emphasizing the expertise and political judgement of professional politicians).⁴

Table 2: Support (in per cent) for aspects of representation within groups of mayors by institutional variables.

	Political representatives should make what they think are the right decisions, independent of the views of local people	The results of local elections should normally be decisive for determining local authority policies	Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important decisions are made by elected representatives	Council decisions should reflect majority opinion among residents	Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions
Overall	44.8	65.4	67.1	59.4	53.5
<i>Leadership type</i>					
Political	37.5	69.9	61.8	57.5	52.4
Ceremonial	75.0	45.0	85.7	65.0	60.0
Collegial	53.3	72.6	70.7	51.6	51.0
Executive	46.0	55.6	70.2	67.7	56.1
<i>directly elected</i>					
no	56.6	74.9	71.9	51.0	47.7
yes	41.2	62.5	65.5	61.9	55.3
<i>Party member</i>					
no	45.4	61.0	71.4	69.0	55.2
yes	44.6	66.5	66.0	57.0	53.1

Support implies the values 4 and 5 on a five-point-scale between 1 ('of little importance') and 5 ('very important').

As for the impact of direct election, while both directly and indirectly elected mayors both support the soft trustee position and the importance of elections in determining policies, the support is stronger from indirectly elected leaders for both of these statements. Directly elected mayors are more likely to favour active and direct participation. However, the main differences appear to be apparent with support for the other two statements. While a majority of indirectly

4 Ceremonial mayors are excluded from this discussion as their total number is too low.

elected mayors support the strict trustee role, this support is much weaker for directly elected mayors. Moreover, nearly two-thirds of directly elected mayors support majority opinion driving council policy, while only about half of indirectly elected mayors think the same.

There is higher support from indirectly elected mayors for the propositions that tend to give a higher sovereignty to the council, while directly elected leaders are more likely to be supportive of propositions that leave decision-makers less room for manoeuvre. This might give supporters of the direct election of mayors the room to argue that directly elected mayors are more 'in touch' with citizen views, whereas indirectly elected leaders are more influenced by other actors (parties, councils etc.).

The differences between mayors according to whether they are party members are less marked. There are fewer differences between party and non-party mayors in their support for the aspects of democracy outlined above. However, it is possible to say that while non-party mayors are most supportive of soft trusteeship for representatives and majority citizen opinion as key in decision-making, in contrast party mayors tend to favour soft trusteeship for representatives and election results as determining decision-making.

Overall, it is clear that local political leaders are supportive of representative and participatory democracy. This is in line with the idea that forms of democracy co-exist. It does however raise the question how participation shall take place within the representative system. Before that discussion, we note that representative democracy itself can be reformed and transformed, and these transformations are often linked to attempts to make local government more 'outward' looking and more oriented to the citizen. At least three broad notions of new approaches to representative democracy at the local level have emerged:

- In some countries, *individuals* as political leaders are given greater weight compared to *parties* as organisations of interest articulation and preference aggregation. This is the case in Southern countries where the election of councillors is coupled with the election of the mayor, or in Germany where the executive mayor is elected separately from councillors and council elections often offer the opportunity to deviate from the list set up by political parties.
- In other countries, the logic of *parliamentarisation* of the local political system is not reversed, but rather pushed forward in the direction of a full-blown parliamentary system at the local level. We find this approach in countries such as England, with the introduction of a separation of powers

between executive and scrutiny functions,⁵ and in Scandinavian countries like Sweden and Norway, which both seem to have moved away to some extent from the rule of committees.

- A third approach is to *decentralise* political representation, and establish neighbourhood councils to represent a territorial subunit within the city and which carry real decision powers. For example in Scandinavian cities this type of reinventing representative government by increasing the number of representatives has been popular since the late seventies, whereas it seems to be in a crisis generally today, but has been recently implemented in the biggest cities (see Bäck et al. 2005). In many other European cities neighbourhoods have a more hybrid status, being connected more to the idea of participatory democracy (see below).

The first two approaches can be regarded as different paths towards a *professionalisation* of local politics. The third can be seen as an attempt to rescue or strengthen the *layman rule*, where ‘citizens elected for political office should be involved effectively and intensively in making decisions’ (Mouritzen and Svava 2002: 51), formerly institutionalised in the strong position of standing committees with executive functions (Baldersheim 1994: 179-180).

However, alongside, and (as suggested above) sometimes implicit within these reform strategies are reforms and approaches concerning citizen involvement, perhaps via direct, deliberative or some other form of participatory method. These reforms and processes may be connected to a greater or a lesser extent to political parties.

The case for participatory democracy is based on the claim that the construction, articulation and promotion of the common good cannot be delegated, but must evolve from the communicative interactions of active citizens (Fishkin 1991; Pateman 1970; Barber 1984). Deliberation requires institutionalising forums in which citizens can articulate problems, propose ways of coping with them and discuss the quality of these proposals. This seems to be a field especially suited to the role of a political leader as an institutional designer of public deliberation. In this role he/she has to cope at least with the following three problems:

5 Concerning England, it can be debated whether the split of councillors into those with an executive and those with a scrutinizing role should be considered as a step towards introducing parliamentary government. The reform implies that also the scrutinising councillors belonging to the same party as the executive councillors will enact the scrutiny rule – which is quite at odds with the logic of government and opposition parties. Here one can see an attempt to limit the influence of party politics on political recruitment, hiring staff and policy making.

- councils will claim higher legitimacy due to their being elected democratically and thus design problems can become severe political problems; leaders can gain public legitimacy by facilitating the activation of formerly passive, marginalised and alienated groups, but of course this poses high challenges to their performance (see Stone 1993);
- in large cities participation is difficult to realise at a city-wide level; participation at the neighbourhood level, however, bears the risk that the common good of the neighbourhood comes before the common good of the city;
- since interactive governance by open deliberation cannot replace the representative bodies of local government representative and participatory democracy have to be made compatible with each other; furthermore, often necessary resources are controlled by private actors, so smaller networks of actors controlling the important resources have to be established.

In order to assess leaders’ opinions on general approaches to participation, they were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

- ‘Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation.’
- ‘Decentralisation of local government is necessary to involve citizens in public affairs.’
- ‘Local referenda lead to high quality debate.’

The results are shown in the following table.

Table 3: Support for different approaches to participation (all mayors)

	Strongly disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Neither agree nor disagree (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly agree (%)
Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation	4.0	19.5	24.3	41.8	10.4
Decentralisation of local government is necessary to involve citizens in public affairs	2.3	13.7	20.9	41.6	21.5
Local referenda lead to high quality public debate	6.0	25.8	34.3	28.8	5.1

It is a majority of mayors who believe that political parties are still ‘the most suitable arena for citizen participation’ (52.2 %; 10.4 % agree ‘strongly’ with the statement). However, nearly one quarter (23.5 %) disagree with that opinion.

Table 4: Partisan mayorship and political parties as arenas for participation. Per cent

		Importance of implementing party programme as task of a mayor		
		little or no	moderate	very important
Political parties most suitable arena for participation	disagree	10.0	6.3	7.4
	neither agree nor disagree	8.3	6.6	9.5
	agree	10.6	15.2	26.1

Note: The category ‘disagree’ comprises the original values ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’, whereas ‘agree’ comprises ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’. The categories ‘little or no importance’ comprise the original values ‘not a task’ and ‘of little importance’, whereas the category ‘very important’ sums up the values ‘of great importance’ and ‘of utmost importance’.

As for the mayors themselves, more of them do believe that it is a task to implement their party’s program than do not believe so (43.1 % stating that it is of great or utmost importance), but 28.9 % claim that it is not a mayor’s task at all or only of little importance. If we combine these variables, we can see that there is a group comprising 26.1 % of the mayors who are full-blown supporters of party government supporting both political parties as arenas for participation and their own role as implementers of party programs, a group of 10.6 % who acknowledge parties as participatory arenas, but want to maintain their distance from them; a group of 7.4 % who are willing to implement but do not think that parties are good for participation (they might believe that participation is not important anyhow); and finally, a group of 10 % who can be called ‘anti party mayors’ (see Table 4). This can not be called a general threat for party rule then. However, we can see that there is a substantial number of mayors who do not think that parties should be the main vehicles for policy formulation.

Also, decentralisation gets far more sympathy than referendum democracy. The number of mayors thinking that local referenda will lead to a high quality of public debate outweighs those who think that will not be the case, but there is a strong tendency for the middle option. In contrast, sympathies for decentralisation of local government are far stronger. Over 60 % think this is a good measure for letting citizens participate. The support for the statement that decentralisation is a necessary step towards citizens participation is actually *higher* than

the support for political parties as most suitable arena. There are also interesting differences by country, as shown in table 5.

Table 5: Approaches to participation (means, where 1= of little importance/strongly disagree, 5 = very important/strongly agree) by country

Countries	Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions	Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation	Decentralisation of local government is necessary to involve citizens in public affairs	Local referenda lead to high quality of public debate
Italy	3.57	3.49	3.75	3.17
Germany	3.53	3.49	3.42	2.99
Belgium	2.55	3.36	3.47	2.80
Switzerland	4.09	3.84	3.07	3.65
Czech Rep.	3.53	3.49	3.40	3.04
Greece	4.42	3.37	4.26	4.17
Poland	3.83	2.75	3.80	2.96
Sweden	2.88	3.98	3.66	2.74
Hungary	3.56	2.66	2.85	2.93
England	3.86	3.32	3.96	2.62
Netherlands	3.49	2.93	2.93	2.13
France	3.23	3.11	3.77	2.94
Denmark	3.46	4.07	3.88	2.54
Portugal	3.71	3.37	4.39	3.24
Spain	3.64	3.71	4.08	3.49
Austria	3.78	3.72	3.05	2.87
Ireland	3.50	3.68	4.55	3.42
Total	3.54	3.35	3.60	2.99

As discussed above, the idea that residents ‘should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions’ is supported by a majority of mayors. 53.6 % of them think that this is an important requirement of local democracy. Still, one out of five mayors thinks that this is not very important. The most sceptics can be found in Belgium, followed by Sweden, whereas Greece has the most euphoric supporters of citizen participation, followed by Switzerland (however, we can assume that the participatory practices the mayors have in mind might differ a lot in both cases; furthermore, Greek mayors were enthusiastic about *all* the options for local democracy). All other countries are more or less close to each other, at least when means are considered.

Interestingly, the mean scores of the (geographically) Southern mayors (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal) are above the overall mean in their support for referenda, whereas there is reluctance in the Netherlands, Denmark, England and Sweden. Switzerland is the only non-southern country with markedly positive attitudes towards local referenda (average of 3.65 and only 9.8 % critical views) – but since Switzerland is the only country with a long tradition of regular local referenda being actually held this might be considered as rather significant. Although we cannot generalise from one country, this can be taken as a sign that referenda can gain elite acceptance where they are actually practiced and included in the ‘logic of appropriateness’ within local democracy. In Germany (since the nineties the second country with obligatory and legally binding referenda) most mayors are still undecided (40.8 % in the middle category, average 3.0). Interestingly, the Southern mayors are also more enthusiastic about neighbourhood decentralisation. Italy, Spain, Portugal and France are above the average, but this time also Denmark and England. The biggest critics are in Austria, the Netherlands, Hungary and Switzerland. As for participation via parties, the most sceptical are mayors from Poland and Hungary, though mayors from the Czech Republic are above average in this respect.

Table 6: Support for aspects of participation, by institutional model system (percentages supporting statement)

	Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation	local referenda lead to high quality public debate	Decentralisation of local government is necessary to involve citizens in public affairs
Overall	52.2	33.8	63.1
<i>Leadership type</i>			
Political	52.2	42.6	72.5
Ceremonial	70.0	47.3	90.4
Collegial	55.7	21.9	54.8
Executive	49.0	32.7	57.6
<i>Election</i>			
Not directly elected	53.8	19.2	57.8
Directly elected	51.7	38.4	64.8
<i>Party member</i>			
No	26.1	39.0	64.7
Yes	58.5	32.4	62.7

There are also a number of interesting differences between respondents in their attitudes to participation according to leadership type, direct election, and party

membership. Table 6 shows support for various aspects of participation broken down according to those variables.

Overall, and as stated above, about two-thirds of mayors (63.1) favour decentralisation as a means of citizen involvement. Just over half (53.5%) say that citizen participation ought to be active and direct, and about the same amount (52.2%) say that parties are the best arena for participation, while only about a third support referenda as a means to enhance public debate. Deviations from this overall picture include that political mayors very much favour decentralisation, and are more likely than other sorts of mayor to favour referenda as enhancing public debate. Collegial mayors, on the other hand, are the only form of mayor that favour participation by parties as much as through decentralisation. Executive mayors are the least convinced of the mayors about participation via parties, and support active and direct participation and more-or-less as much as participation via decentralisation.

On the impact of direct election, mayors that are not directly elected tend to reject the notion that referenda trigger high quality debate (19.2% support this option), while double the proportion of their directly elected counterparts believe the same (38.2%). Directly elected mayors also tend to favour decentralisation and active and direct participation more than their indirectly elected counterparts. These observations are in line with the finding that directly elected mayors tend to be more supportive of propositions that appear to give less room for manoeuvre for decision-makers. There are smaller differences according to whether mayors are members of parties, though quite predictably party members favour participation through parties much more than non-party members.

7.4 Market democracy and network democracy

If representative democracy and participatory democracy are the main ways that local democracy has been expressed historically, more recent trends have given rise to two other options to the 'classic' forms – what we have labelled market democracy and network democracy. Within the approach to 'marketise' local democracy, strategies for reform will tend to strengthen the 'scrutiny' roles of politicians. To detach politics from administration is the first necessary step to transform local democracy where public policies are to be understood as competition of administrative and private organisations for the best satisfaction of citizens' interests. There are obviously country-specific differences with respect to the relationship between political and administrative leadership (see the chapters by Berg and by Egner and Heinelt in this volume). In some countries, administrative leadership is enacted by professionals (chief officers) as 'manag-

ers', in others mayors are political leaders and daily guides of administration at once.

According to the majority of our sample of mayors, a broader strategic and scrutiny role of local politicians is favourable. 71.2 % agree or even strongly agree with the statement that 'politicians should only define objectives and control outputs, but never intervene into the task fulfilment of local administration'; still, 27.4 % disagree. There seems to be a clear majority in favour of such a division of work between politicians and bureaucrats, but there is another peak with mayors critical of that view. However, in recent times, there has been a growing awareness of the limits to market democracy, which can be traced back mainly to two insights: first, insights about the specific logics of politics, putting institutional barriers to economization, and, second, insights about the complex and 'wicked' character of urban problems (for the notion of 'wicked problems' see Rittel and Webber 1973) which cannot be translated in categories of welfare efficiency. One implication of these insights is that the way citizen participation is conceptualised in NPM thinking is inadequate: Much citizen participation within user democracy seems incongruous with attempting to move towards the common good as it only takes place in an individual sense (e.g. responding to a survey, paying for a service). A second implication is that public actors cannot keep the distance from a 'marketised' field of providers as is required by NPM. This leads to calls for 'network strategies'. We will first discuss the question of networks as a component of local democracy and then turn to how to best communicate with citizens.

It can be argued that challenges such as urban poverty, unemployment, and complex planning processes are the kind of 'wicked problems' where there is no singular standard for measurement and no linear possibility of problem-solving. In this case, it is not sufficient to measure user satisfaction (if, for example, unemployed people are 'users' at all), but there also must be ways to include stake-holders and other interested actors. Accordingly, Gerry Stoker has emphasised the difference between a notion of 'governance' as creating interactive capacity for collective action and the 'purchaser – provider' or 'outsourcing' paradigm of New Public Management thinking (Stoker 2000: 98). In a similar vein, Danish researchers like Anne Mette Kjær and Eva Sørensen stress the difference between the network strategy of governance and the NPM belief in governance or 'meta governance' by managed markets (Kjær 2004: ch. 2; Sørensen 2005).

We asked the mayors whether they think that 'public-private partnerships and networks should play an equally important role in social problem-solving as public administration and representative decision-making'. 45.5 % agree and 14.6 % even strongly agree, whereas only 14.1 % disagree and 1.7 % strongly

disagree (see the chapter by Egner and Heinelt in this volume). Network democracy thus finds broad support among European mayors. Comparing countries, there is high support in the Central East European countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) with rates between 70 and 85 % of mayors agreeing, but also in Italy and Portugal, whereas France, Germany, Austria and Belgium are clearly below the average. Dutch, Spanish and English mayors are close to the average value. By leadership type, there are few differences (support of 61.3% in the case of political mayors, 57.7% in the case of collegial mayors, and 60.3% in the case executive mayors). Nor are there great differences by form of election (support of 59.2% by indirectly elected and of 60.3% by directly elected mayors). There is markedly more support among non-party members – 68.2% as opposed to 58.0% of party members. This would suggest that non-party members are more inclined to engage with outside interests, while their counterparts within parties are reluctant to move beyond the traditional arenas of public administration. Nevertheless, a clear majority of party members must still be seen as supporters of network democracy, or at least network governance.

7.5 *Modes of communication*

The support of ideas of democracy can also be analysed by looking at what the political leaders believe to be the most effective ways of communicating with citizens (see table 6). The method of communication that is most obviously associated with market democracy is the satisfaction survey, in that it sees the citizen as a consumer and has most in common with private sector methods. These are seen as effective by 40.8% of the sample, somewhere in the middle of the methods mentioned, but 46.7 % of the mayors think they are sensible tools only in special circumstances and 12.5 % being generally sceptical of their use. Noteworthy differences according to leadership type are that a majority of collegial mayors (54.0%) think satisfaction surveys are effective, against 40.6% of political mayors, and only 30.0% of executive mayors. Mayors that are not directly elected are far more likely to see satisfaction surveys as effective than directly elected mayors (54.6% as opposed to 35.8%), and party members are more inclined to see them as effective (42.6% against 32.4%). Focus groups rank comparatively low, the reason for which may also be that this instrument is not as widely known as surveys are (obvious also in a high number of non-respondents).

The most effective way of communicating with the citizens is considered to be the most direct way, namely *personal meetings in the town hall*. Only 1.9 % think this is not an effective way, but 81.6 % believe it is generally effective.

We can see a clear size effect here, but still, in the big cities with over 200.000 inhabitants personal meetings are still considered as the most effective means to communicate with citizens.⁶ This is an interesting finding, raising many questions: On the one hand it suggests political leaders are looking for direct contact with citizens; on the other hand it cannot be assumed that having personal meetings with a mayor in town hall of a bigger city is an ordinary practice for a wide range of citizens. Firstly, time capacities of political leaders are limited; they cannot talk to everybody having a problem. Secondly, access is not always regulated by some formal procedure (besides, maybe, of regular consultation hours) which means that there is some arbitrariness in organising such meetings. At the same time, many citizens will refrain from taking the social and psychological barriers to directly talking to a mayor. Personal meetings are beyond the light of the local public. One conclusion from all this could be that the emphasis on personal meetings hints at the role of informal contacts between members of networks. The political leaders would then value to talk to *specific* 'citizens'.

Table 7: Methods of effective communication. Per cent

	Not effective	Only effective in special circumstances	Effective
Information on citizens position gathered by the councillors	7.0	41.9	51.0
Information on citizens position gathered by people working in local administration	7.1	46.2	46.8
Information on citizens position gathered by the local parties	17.6	60.1	22.3
Citizens letters via internet	9.7	45.6	44.6
Citizens letters in the local press	16.4	52.6	31.0
Forums via the internet	34.4	54.3	11.3
Formalised complaints or suggestions	4.2	31.0	64.8
Satisfaction surveys	12.5	46.7	40.8
Neighbourhood panels or forums	7.4	40.8	51.7
Focus groups	19.3	53.9	26.8
Citizens Juries	27.6	47.7	24.7
Self-organised Citizen Initiatives	5.0	52.3	42.7
Referenda	20.8	52.8	26.5
Petitions	11.4	46.9	41.7
Public meetings and debates	3.0	29.1	67.9
Personal meetings in the Town-Hall	1.9	16.4	81.6

6 In cities under 30.000 inhabitants over 80 % of the mayors think personal meetings are a generally effective way of communication, in cities between 30.000 and 200.000 it is over 70 % and above that it is 67.1 %.

The high acceptance of formalised complaints/suggestions on the one hand and public forums/debates on the other hand points to the double orientation stated above, namely better service provision and developing a vision for the city. Administration and council are regarded as fairly valuable for communicating with the citizens, but direct links are considered as more effective. The mayors also seem to be sceptical about the potential of technological innovations as the basis for better deliberation. Internet forums are not considered as an effective way of communication whereas letters via the internet fare better.

With respect to all the variables on estimated effectiveness of communication, we can find vast differences between (groups of) countries, reflecting differing attitudes towards the role of citizens, but also different states of technology (e-government) and maybe also differing local communication circuits (with different impacts of the media in local affairs). For example, support for petitions is low in Denmark and Sweden, whereas they have good support in Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, and Poland. An interesting and somewhat paradoxical finding is that estimated effectiveness of communication via *councillors* is particularly low in Scandinavian countries, although at the same time we find the highest support for *party* politics here⁷. Only 17 % of Swedish and 20 % of Danish political leaders find councils generally effective as communicative mechanisms, whereas in 'mayoral' systems like France and Spain (and even more Hungary) 80 % and more believe so. However, if we look at the communicative role of *political parties* we see that Denmark and Sweden are above the average. In the Scandinavian countries, parties are thus widely accepted, but this does not mean that councils have a mainly communicative role. Their role might rather be one of compromising on political priorities and concrete decision making on executive boards. Citizen 'preferences' can be registered via other mechanisms, not least satisfaction surveys, focus groups or citizens juries which are supported with differing emphasis in Denmark and Sweden. There is a continental European group where parties and councillors both fare quite well. England is similar to the Nordic countries in some respects, but shows a stronger support for councillors as communicators.

We get a similar interesting picture if we ask for the communicative role for *public administration*. The lowest perceived effectiveness can be found in Sweden (17 %), the highest one in France (65 %). A number of 'north and middle European' countries in the Hesse/Sharpe typology are on the more sceptical side, whereas in Italy (58.9 %) and Belgium (64.5 %) there is high trust in the communicative role of local administration. It thus seems that there is an

7 Scandinavian political leaders are particularly convinced of political parties as the right place to participate and of political leaders as implementers of party programs.

inverse relationship between *size* and *professionalisation* of local administration on the one hand and its (perceived) *communicative role* on the other hand.

7.6 Conclusions

It was pointed out at the start of this chapter that in the past, local government was valued for its role in the co-ordination of local services. Since that time, local government has evolved to 'local governance'. As this chapter makes plain, local democracy has also evolved, with the older, classical, more traditional forms of democracy (i.e. representative and participatory democracy) joined by newer forms (network and market democracy). The co-ordinative role of local government in service provision remains – and has perhaps increased. Alongside that process the development of local governance increases the emphasis on local government as a democratic agent. Much of this emphasis can be seen in reform strategies involving political leadership, as part of the representative process, and in the increased expectation that political leaders can and will connect with their publics via participatory strategies, market mechanisms, and also with other local institutions of the public and private sector. Hence in addition to the co-ordination of public (and now private) services, there is also a case for arguing that the role of political leadership within local government now extends to the co-ordination of different forms of democracy, especially given the broad – but not identical – support for all the notions of democracy that have been analysed in this chapter. The thrust of this analysis is that all forms of democracy impact on and are addressed by political leaders and leadership.

Of course, there is the matter of assessing the extent to which notions of democracy impact differentially on different sorts of leaders. Other writers have discussed the applicability of the north/south distinction in forms of local government developed in the 1980s and whether it remains valid as an explanatory factor in cross-national analysis (Goldsmith 2005). The contribution in Chapter 2 of this volume has taken forward this debate by adding to the country-based typologies a leadership dimension, reflecting the increased emphasis on political leadership in reform strategies for local government, and the particular focus on this project. This chapter has made use of this typology in attempting to explore the support for different aspects of different forms of democracy.

Clearly, there are differences that become apparent between sorts of mayor when their support for particular aspects of democracy is assessed. The judgement that needs to be made is whether the differences between forms of mayor are slight and are therefore evidence of a dilution of national differences, or are significant inasmuch as they point to continuing differences between different

traditions that characterise different local governmental systems. Evidence for the view that the differences are slight would include that it is not possible to simply read off a list of characteristics associated with a particular type of mayor. There are many similarities between the views of leaders. Nevertheless, there is also evidence for continued difference in that different sorts of leader do emphasise different aspects of democracy. In this chapter, differences do seem particularly marked in support for aspects of the representative process and political communication. Further investigation might reveal greater differences. In short, it is too soon to conclude that the differences of the past that guided European local political analysis can be rejected in the modern context, and they continue to be useful devices to inform current research.

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8 Aspects of Leadership Styles: An Interaction of Context and Personalities

Panagiotis Getimis and Nikolaos-K. Hlepas

According to an interactionist approach (Elgie 1995), political leadership derives from a process in which political leaders matter, inasmuch as they not only shape the course of the decision making process, but are, simultaneously, themselves shaped and constrained by a set of factors (Elgie 1995: 13). Therein, the interdependence between the structures and rules that influence leadership and the personality of leaders is highlighted. As Judd (2000: 959) argues, 'urban leaders have the ability to make choices, but within the parameters imposed both by local political arrangements and by the external forces'. Elgie (1995: 23) defines political leadership as 'the product of the interaction between leaders and the leadership environment with which they are faced'. Based on such an approach, this chapter aims to focus on certain aspects of urban leadership in European cities, referring both to the institutional settings within which urban leaders (mayors) operate and to the behaviour, personal traits and perceptions of the leaders. Of particular relevance in this analysis is the debate on the personalisation of politics (see Clay W. 2000, 172) as an effect of party crises and the growing influence of media in the building of influence.

We will firstly classify different leadership styles, in accordance with the relevant literature (section 1). This classification of leadership styles is based on the leader's political values, in relation to the leadership orientation and predisposition (perception and tasks) and his/her attitude to the exercise of power. More precisely, emphasis will be placed on the construction of two dichotomies. The first refers to the 'strategic' or 'reproductive' orientation, and the second to the 'authoritarian' or 'cooperative' attitude of the Mayor. These dichotomies further elaborate John and Cole's (1999) approach on leadership styles. After identifying the leadership styles of the European urban leaders, the following three sections (2, 3 and 4) explore independent variables that influence political leadership. Leadership style is dependent partly on the opportunities and constraints determined by the contextual factors (the local government system, with its horizontal and vertical power relations, national context, party system, city

size) and partly on the personal traits and the perceptions of leaders exercising leadership.

Our research will seek to identify the different effects of the interaction of such factors (external/personal) upon leadership styles across different arenas and at different time periods. The specificity of the empirical material from our survey prescribes the opportunities and the limits of our comparative analysis on leadership.¹

8.1 Core Dimensions of Leadership Style

There are several definitions of political leadership. Edinger (1993: 6), for instance, defines leaders as ‘persons who exercise control over the behavior of others so as to move them in the desired direction’. Leach and Wilson (2000: 11) characterize ‘the ability to inspire or persuade others to follow a course of action where there is at least some initial resistance to following it’ as ‘the essence of leadership’. Such perceptions of leadership tend to focus on personal traits, abilities and skills, in order to analyze ‘the way in which the leader operates’ (Leach and Wilson 2000:10), in other words, the leadership *style*.

Many attempts have been made to develop classifications of leadership style (e.g. Barber 1977, Kavanagh 1990, Kotter and Lawrence 1974, John and Cole 1999, Getimis and Grigoriadou 2005) since there exists an extensive relevant literature on political leadership. The most elementary manner of distinguishing among leadership styles is the establishment of a dichotomy of leadership behaviour (Elgie 1995), focusing on the contrast between responsive and authoritarian leaders or between compromising and mobilizing leaders. The identification of the ways in which leadership ensues as a result of attuning the personality of the leader and the environment in which she/he acts is a matter of empirical analysis.

Consequently, this section will identify the *potential leadership styles that depend on the leaders’ political values*. Political values are to be understood as referring to the policy orientation (Elcock 2001: 57) in relation to the percep-

1 On the one hand, the richness of the empirical findings from an extended number of mayors in most of the EU countries allows a broad comparative analysis of the profile of the European mayors, their perceptions and tasks. On the other hand there is a knowledge gap regarding the policy outcomes of enacted leadership, i.e. the performance of mayors as urban political leaders (see e.g. Getimis et al. 2005). This implies that this chapter does not deal with the question of how leadership as an independent variable influences policy outcomes, but only with question of how different independent variables influence leadership style.

tions of social problems and ways of problem solving² as well as the attitude to delegation of powers.³ The personal enactment of the institutional position of leadership within a given environment will be analyzed in relation to two dimensions: leadership predisposition and attitude towards the exercise of power (Leach and Wilson 2000: 26-32).

8.1.1 Leadership predisposition: Strategic or reproductive?

The first dimension reflects the way in which leaders envisage their role. The dichotomy here refers to the strategic or reproductive orientation of Mayors:

- Some leaders develop distinctive strategic policy agendas, which they try to incorporate in the authority's policy-making. Such leaders could be labelled as '*strategic*' Mayors: These ('change-oriented') mayors are *strategic* because they believe that municipal action is possible and desirable in order to address economic and social imbalances or to resolve social or economic problems. They set long-term goals for their city and try to mobilize support and foster cooperation in order to achieve them.
- A further category is that of *reproductive* mayors, who do not develop a long-term agenda, preferring a policy framework that leaves more scope for reproduction of the status quo. These leaders may have a leadership position, but they do not intend to provide the lead in terms of new ideas, visions and strategic direction. These '*reproductive*' mayors are *status-quo*-oriented because they believe that political and administrative processes should take their 'natural', pre-designated course. Such mayors do not believe in the ability of local government to promote transformations of the local context. Rather, they are of the opinion that constant changes ('mania reformatoria') create more problems than they resolve and that cities should instead rely on markets and national policies.

The strategic/reproductive predisposition of mayors towards leadership can be further distinguished by the following set of criteria⁴.

2 This dimension is not subsequently considered in this chapter, since the emphasis is on political values referring to leadership orientations and attitudes.

3 In contrast, the personal attributes and resources of the leaders like charisma, charm or social intelligence will not be included in this classification of styles.

4 See also Leach and Wilson 2000, Kotter and Lawrence 1974, Getimis and Grigoriadou 2005.

- *The time horizon of leadership:* In this perspective, two categories of leadership may be distinguished: the *proactive* and the *reactive*. *Strategic* mayors would prefer to act proactively, in a long-term perspective transforming institutional structures, while *reproductive* mayors would prefer a reactive orientation, a day-to-day guidance in a short-term perspective. *Strategic mayors* establish clear objectives which they introduce into the municipal policy-making process (selection of policy intervention, designation of the policy that confronts the problems, policy initiation); they support a coherent program and a long term strategy. In the case of *reproductive mayors*, on the other hand, a short-term oriented leader simply responds to emerging, sometimes unprecedented, challenges once these have emerged and does not consider the formulation of new policies⁵.
- *The scope of the leader:* *Strategic* mayors typically try to generate new capacities (*capacity builder*). They display a positive attitude towards changes and initiate or encourage innovations, trying to mobilize and attract resources from various actors, and proposing or encouraging new projects in the community. By contrast, the *reproductive*, ‘*supervising*’ type of mayor is more likely to concentrate on the formal correctness of routine work and traditional municipal activities. He/she would rather tend to maintain the status quo and allow political and administrative processes to take their natural, pre-designated course.⁶

8.1.2 The leader’s attitude towards the exercise of power: Cooperative or authoritarian?

With respect to the second dimension, namely the exercise of power, the key distinction here lies between the desire to act authoritatively (‘authoritarian’) and the desire to act through empowerment (‘cooperative’), reflecting Stone’s (1995) considerations of the narrow exercise of power and the empowering exercise of power. Furthermore, *the leader’s mode of coordination* is also important.

5 According to our assumptions, strategic mayors would have mentioned ‘to set goals for transforming the administrative structure’ as an important task, while reproductive mayors would rather as an important task ‘to guide the staff in the day to day activity’.

6 According to our assumptions, strategic mayors would have been expected ‘to encourage new projects in the community’, while reproductive mayors would be expected to state that it is an important task of mayors ‘to ensure the correctness of the political-administrative process’.

- *Cooperative* leaders who generate support from the community play a crucial role in the mobilization of local civil society through the reinforcement of existing procedural rules or the establishment of new rules enabling actors to participate and interact. A cooperative mayor would try to mobilize through personal relations ('mobilizing leader') in order to 'get the municipal work done'.
- By contrast, the *authoritarian* leaders are characterized by a top down approach of command and control. They prefer more hierarchical practices of the exercise of power, awarding less significance to the institutions of citizens' participation and to the establishment of partnerships and networks between local authority and community. An authoritarian mayor would tend to rely on his/her positional competence.

The following set of criteria can be used in order to identify 'authoritarian' and 'cooperative' mayors:

- *The exercise of power:* An *authoritarian* mayor would tend to exercise power exclusively and to determine the municipal agenda unilaterally, while a *cooperative* mayor would tend to determine the municipal agenda multilaterally and include other actors in an 'open' style of exercising power⁷.
- *The mode of action coordination:* An *authoritarian* mayor would coordinate political action by using mayoral authority and would prefer the instruments of command and control, while a *cooperative* mayor would tend to coordinate political action using consensus and prefer the instruments of bargaining and deliberation⁸.

8.1.3 Combining the dimensions: A typology of leadership styles

According to the above four categories and in order to classify respondents, the following approach was followed. As mentioned above, these four categories are identified as components of two dimensions, 'exercise of power' and 'lead-


7 According to our assumptions, authoritarian mayors were expected to state that it is an important task of the mayor 'to manage the implementation of his/her personal policy choices', and cooperative mayors to express a preference 'to foster the cooperation with the neighboring municipalities'.

8 According to our assumptions, authoritarian mayors were likely to give priority to 'formal power and authority' as aspects of leadership, and cooperative mayors to prefer 'motivation through commendation and reward'.

ership predisposition'. More specifically, based on the questions that were posed in order to measure this dimension, we dichotomized our population by defining the following cleavage point⁹: When the responses of a mayor sum up to a total below the middle point, then the mayor was characterized as *cooperative*. On the other hand, when the sum of the mayor's responses was above the middle point, then the mayor was characterized as *authoritarian*. Similarly, based on the second dimension, leadership predisposition, mayors were categorized in two opposite divisions, *strategic* and *reproductive*, according to their responses. As a result we have the following distributions of responses:

- 44,5% of the respondents can be classified as '*cooperative*' and 55,5% as '*authoritarian*' mayors, and
- 56,3% as '*strategic*' and 43,7% as '*reproductive*' mayors.

Figure 1: Ideal leadership styles



Adapted from John and Cole (1999) and elaborated by the authors.

⁹ This point is equal to the middle value of the scale, implying neither support nor hindrance.

The dimensions of 'leadership predisposition' and 'exercise of power' can be related to four leadership styles following the typology of John and Cole (1999: 102):

- *The visionary (strategic and cooperative)* combines elements of pro-active, change-oriented, long-term leadership with capacity for generation. The visionary is the leader who is able to forge a powerful and effective coalition, bringing together different sides and establishing innovative policies and effective coordination.
- *The consensual facilitator (reproductive and cooperative)* implies an open agenda, shares power and identifies the best in others. However, this type of leader finds it hard to develop a coherent and long-term strategy as local policy is driven by the demands of other actors (businessmen, parties, central government) that seem to be more powerful.
- *The city boss (strategic and authoritarian)* is a strong leader who does not anticipate capacity building in local actors but is characterized by strong determination. He/she determines the municipal agenda unilaterally and coordinates action using the authority vested in the mayoral position. He/she has a long-term strategy and tries to promote changes.
- *The protector (reproductive and authoritarian)* is a political leader who does not aim to participate in complex coalitions and networks and who encounters difficulties in coping with policy changes. For this reason, a protector prefers to maintain the status quo. Such a mayor uses the authority of the office in order to coordinate municipal action and is not willing to share power with other actors.

8.2 *The contextual factors influencing leadership style*

The leadership environment essentially refers to those linkages to institutions and structures that reinforce or hinder the ambitions and behaviour of leaders. There are various approaches to political leadership that attach importance to different influential factors, which set the contextual framework in which leaders develop their styles. Elgie (1995:13) argues that two sets of factors influence leaders: the institutional structures and the needs of society. John and Cole (1999) identify four factors: contextual factors, institutional factors, factors pertaining to party organization and system and finally other external factors. Judd (2000) focuses on the responses of the local leadership to national and local pressures; others (Hambleton 1998, Svava 1994) give priority to the relationships between mayor, Council and administration. In this part of the chapter

we focus on the contextual, i.e. independent variables influencing leadership style and in particular: local government systems, (including the vertical relations between different territorial levels of government), city size, partisanship and, finally, gender and age.

8.2.1 Local Government Systems

Local government systems as well as the scholarly debate about appropriate typologies are addressed in Chapter 2 of this book. The new typology presented there, by distinguishing between ‘political mayors’, ‘executive mayors’, ‘collegial leaders’ and ‘ceremonial mayors’, combines vertical and horizontal dimensions. It stresses the importance of the vertical distribution of functions and competencies between the local level and upper-levels of government, which is of particular importance in respect of responsibilities in the field of service provision. At the same time, the typology also places emphasis on the horizontal distribution of power between the mayor, the council and the municipal administration. This is decisive with respect to the ‘move to governance’, institutional changes and the (possible) role of leadership within these current urban developments. Therefore, this typology seems to be useful for reflections on the institutional conditions for certain leadership styles, in particular since styles are examined not only within the municipality but also vis-à-vis external relations.

Institutional structures and power relations would, therefore, offer a framework for the enactment of leadership styles. In view of today’s leadership environment (with special reference to competition among cities), most of the European mayors, according to our hypothesis, would tend to follow a strategic orientation in favour of their city. Visionaries and city bosses are expected to prevail. On the other hand, cooperative exercise of power is expected to be widespread among collegial mayors, while executive leaders would instead tend to be authoritarian, since they are under pressure to ‘get things done’. Political mayors feel they are called upon to defend the interests of their city in higher levels of governance and would like to have the feeling that ‘everything is under control back home’. They would, therefore, have a greater tendency to be authoritarian than cooperative.

The four types of local political leadership imply different expectations concerning the role of leaders. The empowered, political or executive mayoral types are likely to be composed of strong leaders who offer policy directions to the council and control the executive. By contrast, in disempowered collective or ceremonial types of mayors, it is assumed that weak leaders, probably the lowest common denominator of a multi-party coalition, would prevail.

However, reality leads us to less stereotyped considerations. In Greece and France, where the strong mayor type is dominant, weak mayors who reproduce the status quo without seeking to promote their strategies can also be detected (Getimis and Grigoriadou 2005). Mouritzen and Svava (2002: 69) note that ‘the share of weak mayors is by far the largest in a country that comes very close to the strong mayor ideal type. Instead of the promotion of a strong strategy, they remain affiliated to party demands and give in to pressure groups’. Another example is that of Denmark which has been subsumed by Heinelt and Hlepas (in Chapter 2) under the collegial mayor type of leadership, while in the Mouritzen/Svava’s typology (2002) it has been classified as a committee-leader form of government. According to these authors, in Denmark there are examples of powerful mayors who have been in office since the mid-sixties and have effectively shaped the socio-economic development of their community. These examples demonstrate that the behaviour of leaders (and its success or failure) may be combined differentially with the positional types of leadership.

Table 1: Leadership styles by type of mayor/local political leader in Europe

	Political Mayors	Ceremonial Mayors	Collegial Leaders	Executive Mayors	all categories
Consensus Facilitator	17.8	15.0	22.9	19.0	19.5
Protector	23.7	10.0	22.6	26.3	24.2
Visionary	26.5	35.0	26.1	21.8	24.9
City Boss	32.0	40.0	28.4	32.9	31.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100

According to our empirical findings European mayors show a greater tendency to be city bosses (31.4%) and visionary (24.9%), which means that the majority of European mayors share a strategic leadership predisposition. Protectors (24.2%) are somewhat more numerous than the consensus facilitators (19.5%). An authoritarian attitude towards the exercise of power seems to be more widespread. Political mayors are mainly city bosses (32%) and visionaries (26.5%), adopting a strategic view, since they have to defend the position of their community within a basically centralist system. Collegial mayors are city bosses to a high percentage (28.4%) and visionaries as well (26.1%). It seems that collegial mayors are more cooperative than the political mayors. Finally, executive mayors show a substantial proportion of city bosses (32.9%), or protectors (26.3%). The surprising figures for ceremonial mayors – according to our typology 40% should be city bosses and 35% visionaries – must be considered against the background of a rather small number of respondents.

8.2.2 National systems of Local Government

Leadership styles seem to be particularly sensitive to national and local contexts. For this reason, major groupings of countries did not reveal appreciable differences. Significant differences of institutional settings and local government features across the European countries (see tables 3 and 4 in chapter 2 of this volume) are, therefore, expected to influence accordingly the leadership styles (see Table 2).

Table 2: Leadership styles by countries and types of European mayors

Types of Mayors	Countries	Leadership styles			
		Consensus Facilitator	Protector	Visionary	City Boss
Ceremonial	Ireland	15.0	10.0	35.0	40.0
Collegial	Germany	12.9	35.5	19.4	32.3
	England	27.2	27.2	27.9	17.6
	Netherlands	30.0	19.3	26.7	24.0
	Denmark	9.8	7.8	31.4	51.0
	Austria	7.7	46.2	7.7	38.5
	Belgium	26.6	26.6	20.2	26.6
	Switzerland	39.2	21.6	19.6	19.6
	Czech Republic	19.0	22.2	22.2	36.5
	Sweden	7.5	12.5	42.5	37.5
Executive	Germany	13.9	27.4	19.6	39.1
	Poland	26.2	19.2	27.2	27.5
	Hungary	31.4	49.0	11.8	7.8
	England	20.0	40.0	20.0	20.0
	Austria	7.1	50.0	21.4	21.4
Political	Italy	11.0	28.5	19.9	40.6
	Greece	49.4	15.2	26.6	8.9
	France	25.5	7.0	45.2	22.4
	Portugal	19.4	11.9	41.8	26.9
	Spain	6.4	45.7	6.4	41.5
Total		19.5	24.2	24.9	31.4

Among the countries, visionary mayors prevail in quite different countries, such as Sweden (42.5%), France (45.2%), Portugal (41.8%) and Denmark (31.4%). Scandinavian mayors feel intensely responsible for the well-being of their city as their municipalities are important local employers, they manage high percent-

ages of local public spending and have a keen interest in local taxation¹⁰. Furthermore, many Scandinavian mayors remain cooperative, since they are of the collegial leader type and need to cooperate with strong political actors. On the other hand, French and Portuguese political mayors cooperate with higher levels of government (the French also through the 'cumul des mandats'), while developing a strategic orientation. The latter seems to prevail among some political mayors who follow a city boss style, like many among the Italian (40.6%) and Spanish (41.5%) mayors, although there are also many Scandinavian leaders of the city boss type who combine strategic orientation with authoritarian exercise of power (51% in Denmark, 37.5% in Sweden). Furthermore, Scandinavian and Spanish mayors are characterized by relatively high percentages of party membership and it could be assumed that their position within strong party structures, in countries where parties are very important, has the effect of a reliable backing which makes cooperative attitudes unnecessary. The same seems to be valid for indirectly elected 'collegial' Austrian mayors (38.5% are 'city bosses'), while their directly elected compatriots ('executive' Austrian mayors) are noticeably less often characterized as 'city bosses'.

The consensus facilitator style appears to prevail among some mayors who have to deal with a consociational culture (Switzerland, 39.2%), do not control the CEO and the administration (Hungary 31.4%), are not elected (Netherlands 30.1%) or have to act within an extremely centralist environment (Greece, 49.4%), using their own resources sparingly.¹¹ The reproductive orientation seems to be particularly strong in Hungary, since 49% of Hungarian mayors favour a protector style. The latter is also widespread in Austria (46% of the 'collegial' and 50.0% of the 'executive' mayors) and Spain (45.7%), where mayors also tend (see the high percentage of city bosses) to be authoritarian (and are nearly always party members)¹².

It should be pointed out that different institutional settings within the same country play a role in influencing styles, although the impact of other contextual factors (such as regional political cultures) should not be overlooked. In Austria, for instance, executive mayors are nearly three times more visionary than their collegial counterparts (21.4% compared to 7.7%), while in Germany, collegial mayors in the Land of Hessen seem to follow a more authoritarian style (more protectors and city bosses) than the rest of their compatriots (who are of the 'executive' mayor type). In England, finally, indirectly elected 'collegial' mayors adopt a more cooperative style (the majority among them belong to the consen-

10 See table 1 in chapter 2 (by Heinelt and Hlepas) of this volume.

11 See comments and table 1 in chapter 2 of this volume.

12 See the Chapter 11 by Fallend, Ignits and Swianiewicz in this book, with table 1 where party membership of mayors in the different European countries is presented.

sus facilitator and the visionary type) than directly elected mayors, who tend to be authoritarian (40% protectors and 20% city bosses).

Table 3: Time Management of European mayors by countries and leadership types

<i>Leadership types</i>		<i>Hours spent</i>							
		<i>Country</i>	<i>council and executive board</i>	<i>administrative staff</i>	<i>citizens, groups, etc.</i>	<i>ceremonial/representative functions</i>	<i>public debates and conferences</i>	<i>authorities from other cities</i>	<i>individual preparation</i>
<i>Executive mayors</i>	GER	5.72	8.75	7.82	4.21	3.96	2.67	9.09	42.26
	POL	7.68	7.99	8.15	5.33	3.45	1.81	7.67	42.08
	HUN	4.75	5.61	6.42	0.00	4.01	1.92	7.00	29.71
	ENG	5.00	7.80	5.80	2.20	2.67	1.40	15.00	39.67
	AUS	5.00	8.00	11.8	3.75	5.40	1.50	5.35	40.8
	Total	5.63	7.63	7.96	3.87	3.89	1.86	8.82	39.18
<i>Political mayors</i>	FRA	6.03	6.84	7.65	3.30	2.79	2.65	3.88	33.14
	GRE	6.05	9.30	14.06	3.01	4.14	2.03	8.06	46.65
	ITA	7.32	7.34	9.39	2.67	3.80	2.54	7.53	40.59
	SPA	3.56	6.64	11.33	3.36	1.63	1.93	7.28	35.73
	POR	3.78	5.11	10.73	4.43	1.85	3.83	8.83	38.56
	Total	5.35	7.05	10.63	3.35	2.84	2.60	7.12	38.93
<i>Collegial mayors</i>	GER	4.67	9.98	6.40	4.20	3.90	2.42	7.96	39.53
	DEN	4.11	6.67	4.59	3.25	3.22	2.07	10.29	34.20
	SWE	5.28	8.19	6.08	1.95	3.26	3.68	7.59	36.03
	AUS	3.41	8.31	10.44	4.94	5.60	1.87	6.25	40.82
	NET	7.51	6.60	6.97	5.32	3.20	4.46	5.79	39.85
	CZE.	4.59	5.12	9.36	3.45	3.63	2.27	8.21	36.63
	BEL	6.02	5.64	6.78	4.14	1.84	1.60	6.78	32.80
	SWI	2.94	8.78	3.64	3.60	3.53	2.16	11.37	36.02
	ENG	5.74	6.34	3.59	1.45	2.03	1.96	8.04	29.16
Total	4.92	7.29	6.43	3.59	3.36	2.50	8.03	35.97	
<i>Ceremonial mayors:</i>	IRE	6.52	6.52	4.10	5.57	6.22	3.50	1.71	34.14
<i>Average</i>		5.72	5.72	7.74	7.70	3.77	3.39	2.53	36.57

A further test concerning leadership enactment in the various European countries could be conducted from the viewpoint of the time management of mayors. In this perspective, Table 3 shows impressive variations among the local political leaders in Europe.

Among the European mayors, a time workload of more than 39 hours per week that is clearly above the average can be observed in many political-mayor countries, such as Greece, Poland, Italy and Austria, but also in Germany, where the mayor has important administrative tasks, and in Holland, where an appointed mayor devotes a considerable amount of time to cooperating with elected organs or representatives of other cities.

Mayors from Scandinavian countries, the Czech Republic, Spain and Portugal have a workload close to the average, while ceremonial mayors in Ireland, frequently multi-mandate mayors in France, collegial leaders in England as well as mayors in Hungary and Belgium do not appear to devote so much time to their mayoral duties.

Once more, remarkable differences can be pointed out concerning alternative institutional settings within one and the same country: In Austria, for instance, directly elected 'executive' mayors spend more time than their indirectly elected 'collegial' mayor compatriots on such tasks as meeting citizens and cooperating with the council and/or the executive board. In Germany, directly elected executive mayors work, on average, nearly three hours more than collegial mayors, as they spend more time with citizens (possibly because they rely less on party backing) compared to indirectly elected collegial mayors, and require more time for individual preparation. English executive mayors also spend noticeably more time than collegial English mayors in meeting citizens, while their work load amounts to nearly 10 hours more than is the case for indirectly elected ('collegial') English mayors. It is worth mentioning that among the various activities, 'meetings with citizens, groups etc.' appear to be particularly time-consuming in some countries where 'clientelistic' practices are still widespread, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy. In the South European countries, mayors are also frequently obliged to act as informal 'municipal ombudsmen' in favour of citizens facing incompetent and ineffective bureaucracies. Clearly, a heavy workload from such activities could negatively influence the ability of the mayor to develop a strategic agenda.

However, according to the empirical findings (see Table 1) a strategic leadership orientation is widespread in some South European countries (eg. Italy, France, Portugal), where city bosses and visionaries prevail, while in other Southern countries (Spain and especially in Greece), a reproductive leadership predisposition seems to be more widespread, since the majority of mayors are protectors and consensus facilitators. Once more, the picture of time manage-

ment shows important deviations across Europe and across major country groupings, such as the Southern group, in which all typologies are present to a varying extent.

8.2.3 City Size

According to our findings, the mayors of big cities are more often visionary. In the larger municipalities the mayoral presence is more closely involved in high level competition for investments and jobs. Therefore, such mayors are more likely to follow a strategic orientation, although in some cases they may opt to let the markets rule and be content with a reproductive orientation. In bigger cities, however, there is a greater number of medium and large-sized private enterprises, a wide spectrum of public and private actors that are called upon to cooperate in order to promote the competitiveness of the city. Hence, the mayor of a great city has less scope for an authoritarian leadership style, given that he/she has to cooperate with an extensive set of actors and is in charge of a large organization with strong unions of employees.

Table 4: City size and Leadership Styles

Number of inhabitants in your municipality	Leadership Styles				Total
	Consensus Facilitator	Protector	Visionary	City Boss	
10.000-14.999	21.0	25.1	23.1	30.8	100.0
20.000-29.999	19.5	28.6	23.3	28.6	100.0
15.000-19.999	20.0	22.0	25.9	32.1	100.0
30.000-49.999	16.7	22.8	25.5	34.9	100.0
50.000-99.999	18.3	23.3	25.6	32.8	100.0
100.000-199.999	20.4	21.7	28.0	29.9	100.0
200.000-499.999	17.6	15.7	39.2	27.5	100.0
above 499.999	10.5	15.8	31.6	42.1	100.0
Total	19.5	24.2	24.9	31.4	100.0

Nevertheless, very few mayors of bigger municipalities are consensus facilitators: indeed, these mayors exhibit the lowest rates of this style. Finally, the mayors of the biggest cities (above 499.000 inhabitants) show a higher than average tendency to be city bosses. It would seem that what distinguishes the mayors of the large metropolitan areas is the strategic orientation and predisposition, while some are cooperative (visionary) and some are authoritarian (city boss). The latter may be prominent party members who use their personal charisma in order to attract and mobilize resources. Ambitious leaders may be in-

clined to exploit a nationally important city hall in order to promote their career plans.

Mayors of smaller cities tend to be protectors to a greater extent than the average. However, the most widely represented group among such mayors is that of the city boss, since it appears that even in smaller municipalities, many mayors adopt a strategic orientation. Our hypothesis concerning mayors of smaller cities was that they would tend to be reproductive, as they do not benefit from copious resources and have less opportunity to influence the development of their city, and authoritarian inasmuch as they have a smaller group of employees and fewer strong actors in their city. For these reasons we assumed they would tend to adopt a protector style.

Finally, the mayors of medium sized cities (20,000 to 199,999 inhabitants) tend to be authoritarian, for reasons analogous to those identified in leaders of smaller cities. However, they also show a tendency to be more ambitious and therefore more strategic in the sense that local actors and the local society in general would expect them to display a strategy.

8.2.4 Partisanship

Are parties important for leadership styles? Are communists more authoritarian and liberals more cooperative? Are social democrats or ecologists more strategic and conservatives more reproductive? Our hypothesis was that partisanship (and independence) of mayors does influence style.

We expected ecologists to be visionary, since they have long-term perspectives such as sustainable policies and seek to promote cooperation and citizen participation, with strong links to civil society and NGO's. This hypothesis was confirmed through the empirical findings: Moreover, their strong strategic orientation also explains why the second largest group among ecologist mayors is represented by city bosses.

The second hypothesis was that communists would tend to be protectors, since they would adopt a reproductive orientation combined with authoritarian use of power. It was hypothesized that former communist mayors would use their office in order to control the municipality and would be unlikely to believe that a strategy of their own for their city would be meaningful within the capitalist system.

This hypothesis was likewise confirmed through the empirical findings. Communist mayors show a greater tendency to be protectors (39.1%) than is observed with any other group; in addition, consensus facilitators are also found

among this group, which means that the reproductive orientation is the core characteristic of result-oriented communist mayors.

The third hypothesis referred to the group of 'independent' mayors. Since mayors forming part of this group cannot rely on party support, they can hardly afford to be authoritarian, and are therefore more likely to enforce cooperation. On the other hand, their justification for claiming this office would be their ability to devise a strategy for their city. In this perspective, one might expect independent mayors to be consensus facilitators. This hypothesis was also confirmed through the empirical findings.

Table 5: Partisanship and Leadership Styles

Party classification	Leadership Styles				Total
	Consensus Facilitator	Protector	Visionary	City Boss	
Ecology parties	20.0	10.0	40.0	30.0	100.0
(former) Communist parties	17.4	39.1	26.1	17.4	100.0
Social democratic parties	16.3	27.7	22.1	33.9	100.0
Liberal parties	19.8	26.2	25.4	28.6	100.0
Christian democratic/ religious parties	28.9	18.1	23.5	29.5	100.0
Conservative parties	17.2	27.7	21.5	33.6	100.0
National parties	.0	60.0	20.0	20.0	100.0
Agrarian parties	14.0	24.0	34.0	28.0	100.0
Ethnic and regional parties	4.0	40.0	28.0	28.0	100.0
Special interest parties	33.3	22.2	16.7	27.8	100.0
Independent / voter groups/ spare coalition	29.5	21.7	21.7	27.1	100.0
In total	19.5	26.3	22.7	31.5	100.0

The fourth hypothesis was that liberals would rely on markets and tend to adopt a reproductive orientation, either with an authoritarian (protector) or a cooperative (consensus facilitator) predisposition. But this hypothesis was not confirmed. Liberal mayors do not appreciably deviate from the average mayor. The largest group among liberal mayors is represented by the city boss type (visionary and authoritarian).

The fifth hypothesis was that no pronounced differences would be found between social democrats and conservatives. Small differences could be expected in the following directions: social democrats would tend to be either strategic and cooperative (visionary), or alternatively rather authoritarian (city boss). Conservatives were, on the contrary, expected to be reproductive and

authoritarian (protectors), at times strategic (city boss). This hypothesis was partly confirmed. Although differences between these two main groups of mayors were not large, social democrats show a slightly higher than average tendency to be city bosses and protectors (which means that they would slightly more often tend to be authoritarian), while conservatives exhibit a slightly higher than average tendency to be consensus facilitators.

8.2.5 Gender

According to our findings female mayors covered in our sample are clearly more visionary than the average and to a certain extent include a greater proportion of city bosses than male mayors.

Table 6: Mayors by gender and leadership styles

	Consensus Facilitator	Protector	Visionary	City Boss	Total
Male	19.7	24.3	24.6	31.4	100
Female	16.4	21.8	27.6	34.2	100
Total	19.4	24.1	24.9	31.6	100

8.2.6 Age

We expected that the oldest mayors (age 60 and above) would be more reproductive and more authoritarian and adopt a protector style. This hypothesis was not confirmed. The oldest mayors are slightly more often visionary and certainly more often consensus facilitators than the average. They tend to be less authoritarian and more cooperative, possibly because they are familiar with the important actors in their city and are sufficiently experienced to realize they cannot stage a 'one-man show'. However, these findings are at variance with some evidence gathered in previous research and with much of the literature (see e.g. Handy 1993: 108, Elcock 2001: 80).

According to our perspective, younger mayors (up to 49) could be expected to be more frequently strategic. This hypothesis was only partly confirmed. Younger mayors do not tend to follow a visionary style, but tend to be city bosses; they probably adopt a voluntaristic view, which is not unusual for less experienced leaders.

Table 7: Age and Leadership Styles

Age categories	Leadership Styles				Total
	Consensus Facilitator	Protector	Visionary	City boss	
under 49	17.2	22.1	23.9	36.8	100.0
50 to 59	18.3	25.4	24.7	31.6	100.0
over 60	25.9	24.7	27.3	22.0	100.0
Total	19.5	24.1	25.0	31.4	100.0

Middle-aged mayors (age group 50-59) were expected to be no different than the average, with city bosses and visionaries comprising the largest groups. Although this hypothesis was confirmed, the group of city bosses is somewhat stronger than the average, and a slight tendency for middle-aged mayors to be more authoritarian than the older age group was observed.

8.3 *Towards a personalization of politics?*

In the present-day framework, the personality of the leader is strongly highlighted within the context of local politics. From Burns (1978: 425) a conception of leadership with three essential elements is derived: leadership is a purposeful activity, it operates interactively with a body of followers, and it is a form of power or causation (see also Stone 1995: 97). Interaction with the leaders' 'body of followers' could be expected to influence the leadership style. Local leaders have to deal with a concrete local society, from which they derive – through direct or indirect election – their *power* and the potential for interacting with their 'body of followers'. It is therefore important to examine the kind of electoral support a leader needs to gain in order to stand for the mayor's office.

Taking into consideration the discussion on the personalization of politics in times of 'Media-Democracy', but also in view of the need for visible leaders in times of party crisis, we investigated whether there is *an evident presence of personalized channels of electoral support*. Leaders who receive personalized electoral support act in a leadership environment where politics already is or is tending to become more personalized. One may therefore ask whether leadership styles are influenced by the level of personalization¹³. Our hypothesis is that

13 In the questionnaire of the POLLEADER survey, question 30 asked the mayor: 'As a candidate, in the last local election, to what extent did you have the support of the following persons/groups of people? The following variables indicated the electoral support of institutions: v253 'local associations', v256 'your party wing/fraction', v260 'your party at the local level'. The following variables indicated the electoral support of persons: v250 'your predecessor',

leaders adopting a cooperative attitude towards the exercise of power (visionary and consensus facilitators) would show a greater tendency to personalize politics, while authoritarian leaders (city bosses and protectors) would prefer formal authority and the support of hierarchical structures.

A large number of the mayors surveyed (almost 50% of the total responses) have indeed based their support in the last local elections on persons, thus indicating a trend towards a personalization of politics. Although there are no available data regarding previous periods that could allow a comparative study of these results, the current evidence of personalized electoral support is clear.

Table 8: Electoral support and leadership styles

kind of support	Consensus Facilitator	Protector	Visionary	City Boss	total
personalised	20.9	23.7	24.6	30.8	100.0
institutionalized	18.3	24.6	25.2	31.9	100.0
total	19.5	24.2	24.9	31.4	100.0

8.3.1 Supporting the mayors' campaign

Apart from the broader socio-political environment of leadership, there is a narrower close circle of supporters and allies a leader may count on during the campaign in order to achieve election to the mayoral office. This circle of supporters shapes the core of the leader's political legitimacy within the local society, and thus represents the leader's source of power. Furthermore, in times of declining turnouts and 'vanishing credibility of political parties', it appears natural to suppose that mayors are likely to seek electoral support within the local society and try to distance themselves from the political parties. The crucial question is thus whether there is a connection between the leadership styles adopted by mayors and the kind of electoral support they enjoyed¹⁴. We emphasize, however, that the construction of the variable stresses the balance between community and party support, and that it does not refer to the levels of support.

v254 'national politicians', v255 'local prestigious figures'. The variables of 'institutionalized' have been reversed in order to have a negative sum. For all the variables the missing values and the non responses have been replaced by the value '2' which is the midpoint of the scale.

14 Once again, we turned to question 30 in the POLLEADER questionnaire (support in the last local election). The following variables indicated party support: v251 'the national organs of your party', v253 'your party at the local level', v254 'National politicians'. The following variables indicated local society support: v255 'Local associations', v258 'Local media', v260 'Local prestigious figures'. The variables of 'Party Support' have been reversed in order to have a negative sum

All types of leaders declare greater reliance on community support during their electoral campaign, although the role of the party system remains very important, even in a period of vanishing credibility of political parties. However, there are no significant differences between leadership styles and campaign support (community or party).

Table 9: Campaign support and leadership styles

support	Consensus Facilitator	Protector	Visionary	City Boss	total
more community	21.4	23.6	23.9	31.1	100.0
more party	17.3	24.8	26.2	31.7	100.0

8.3.2 Influence on Local Authority activities

In times of public management and participatory instruments (Kersting and Vetter: 2003) it could be surmised that even if mayors still mainly rely on the ‘mobilization capacities’ of parties for their political campaign, they would probably be strongly responsive to the growing influence of the business community and of local groups on the activities of ‘their’ local authority. The supposed shift from government to governance leads to new interpretations of the figure of the mayors and of the corresponding leadership styles (John 2001, Leach and Wilson 2003). Once again, we attempted to determine whether there is any interdependence between the kind of influence exerted on a municipality and the leadership style adopted by the mayor¹⁵.

While mayors mainly rely on institutions (especially parties) for their campaign, local society is more influential with regard to municipal activities. Parties seem to remain indispensable mechanisms in order to win elections, but they do not offer the same support for governing the city¹⁶. Among the different leadership styles, protectors seem to rely on the community in order to govern their city more than is the case with other mayoral styles.

15 This time, we turned to question 11 in the POLLEADER questionnaire: ‘On the basis of your experience as a mayor in this City, and independently from the formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of the following actors are over the Local Authority activities’. The following variables are considered to indicate party influence: v134 ‘Local MPs or Ministers’, v142 ‘Party leaders’. The following variables indicated the influence of local society actors: v137 ‘Local businessmen’, v140 ‘Local single issue groups’. The variables of ‘party influence’ have been reversed in order to have a negative sum.

16 For a thorough analysis of the possible interdependence between electoral support and the priorities given by mayors to certain tasks see the chapter by Bäck in this book.

Table 10: Influence on Local Authorities activities

influence	Consensus Facilitator	Protector	Visionary	City Boss	total
community	21.4	23.6	23.9	31.1	100.0
party	17.3	24.8	26.2	31.7	100.0
total	19.5	24.2	25.0	31.4	100.0

8.4 Conclusions

Our typology of leadership styles is based on two core dimensions, namely strategic or reproductive leadership orientation and predisposition, authoritarian or cooperative exercise of power. These dimensions have been developed according to a set of four criteria (proactive or reactive leadership, scope of the leader, open or closed exercise of power, mode of action coordination). Referring to the four styles shaped on this basis (visionary, city boss, consensus facilitator, protector), we observe that European mayors in total award priority to modalities of proactive leadership but also favour an authoritarian attitude. Moreover, institutional settings, the position of local government within the political and administrative system of each country definitely influence leadership style, which has to be thoroughly tuned to the prevailing conditions, shaping expectations as well as behavioural norms and patterns. Consequently, every European country proves in a sense to be a special case. Thus in the overall framework of our survey, while broader types of local government systems were useful as an instrument of general orientation, they could not encompass the wide spectrum of national peculiarities and factors that finally configure leadership styles in each country.¹⁷

Leadership styles have to be geared to city specific circumstances. A strategic orientation seems, however, to prevail in most of the different size categories of European cities. Mayors throughout the continent perceive the development of long-term strategies for their city as an important task of local political leadership.

17 Furthermore, it should be noted, that the survey was conducted at a certain point in time, shortly after several major local government reforms had been implemented throughout Europe. Many of these reforms aimed at strengthening leadership, while the shift from government to governance and other factors (citizens' alienation, crisis of the party system etc.) seemed to favour the emergence of strong local leaders. It would, therefore, have been very useful to compare the empirical findings with previous or subsequent surveys on local political leadership: this would have made it possible to examine whether the prevalence of 'strategic' orientation and the slight tendency to 'authoritarian' use of power derive from recent reforms and the 'spirit of the times' or characterize the European mayors in the long term.

The political area to which mayors belong strongly influences the leadership style of European mayors. It should, however, be pointed out that the mayors elected in the lists of the largest 'established' parties of the social democrats and the Christian democrats (or conservatives) do not differ appreciably from one another. By contrast, a clearly distinct group of local leaders is that of the ecologists, who more often show a strategic predisposition, whereas the majority of the former communists exhibit a reproductive predisposition (mostly protector and consensus facilitator leadership styles). Non-partisan ('independent') mayors cannot rely on party mechanisms and are compelled to implement an open or cooperative style of exercising power, while Liberals generally adopt an approach similar to the mayors of the large 'established' parties but tend to be more visionary.

Among the personal traits of European mayors, gender seemed to influence leadership styles, since female leaders are observed to espouse a more long-term perspective than their male counterparts. Younger mayors seem to adopt a voluntaristic view inspired by the city-boss model. The analyses in this chapter have also conclusively illustrated the different ways in which the supposed personalisation of leadership at local level is exerting an influence on contrasting leadership styles, which variously stress the concentration of authority in the figure of the mayor, or are rooted in more or less solid frames of local personal relations within the local society, or may be based on a strong presence of the parties but also on a strong influence of the individuals, the mayors and their referents in maintaining and ruling the city.

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9 Urban Systems as Growth Machines? Mayors' Governing Networks against Global Indeterminacy

Annick Magnier, Clemente Navarro and Pippo Russo

9.1 *Mayors, activities and codes in urban systems*

Mayors' behaviour reflects their personality, their background, their political attitudes; but also the urban system in which they act.¹ By viewing them as actors within multifaceted social systems, one can obtain valuable insight into some constitutive features of a sociological object that stands at the forefront of current debate: the 'European City'. The term 'city' will not, however, be used here with its traditional evocation of a distancing between two antithetic environments, the city versus the countryside, and the related concepts of the cultural milieu versus the landscape. Rather, given the coalescence of settlements (with the resulting new boundaries in service provision), the phrase 'urban system' will be preferred, thus allowing the analysis of local democracy to be interpreted within the framework of European territorial transformation.

An urban system must be taken as a social system, that is to say as a set of individual and collective actors, practices, codes and activities endowed with internal cohesion, as well as with mechanisms that regulate its equilibrium and continuity in time. Crucially, however, it is a system that has boundaries demarcating its space relative to the surrounding systems. This notion allows some important elements of contemporary urbanism to be highlighted, in particular the fact that compared to many other types of social systems an urban system cannot be totally divorced from the identification of a physical placement. Reference to the element of 'urbanism' thereby places the phenomenon of the 'city' as a spatially situated social entity at the centre of the analysis. But it is important to keep in mind that the research object which the phrase *urban system* aims to describe is not limited to the traditional concept of the city and includes many

1 The authors thank Maria Antonia Ramirez (Political Sociology Centre, Pablo de Olavide University) for her crucial contribution in enriching both the design of the analysis and the reading of data in this chapter.

recent and partially overlapping variants, from networks of cities bordering one another to metropolitan areas, from local authority partnerships to the many formulae that bring the widest variety of territorial actors into a relationship of interests and action.

That the borderlines are labile, however, is a natural reflection of the *dynamism* of the systems in question: they are systems whose boundaries are subject to continual change that leads to incorporation or fragmentation. Moreover, the element of dynamism that characterises urban systems is not only territorial in dimension but also political and socio-economic. Urban systems can be created from units that are territorially distant, or may themselves be composed of urban systems having a smaller territorial size but united in their functioning by aggregating factors which relegate the *spatial proximity* factor to second place. Suffice it to mention that the management of services, public planning intervention and daily mobility are re-drawn along boundaries that go beyond the narrow confines of historical cities, creating boundaries that criss-cross and contradict each other. In such a context, how can appurtenance be reconstructed and political leadership legitimised? On the issue of building metropolitan areas, not only is there debate on institutional engineering, with a view to re-establishing equality in the cost-externality ratio and optimizing conditions for service management; but there is also awareness of a wider issue, that of building frames and procedures of representation and participation suitable for an urban milieu composed of multifaceted and fluid loyalties (Magnier and Russo 2002, 13ff).

In this perspective, where urban systems are seen as a structure of coordinated and coherent sets of actors, practices, codes and activities defined in territorial terms along criteria matching mobile and dynamic boundaries, the behaviour of mayors in planning and networking is highly indicative, making it possible to delimitate the actors, practices, codes and activities that are viewed as sufficiently relevant to become pivotal to the mayors' work. Moreover, adopting an approach based on the combinations of mayoral agendas and mayoral networks that are a feature of European municipalities means espousing a line of enquiry not unlike the 'urban regime' analysis, whose typology will contribute to enriching the reading proposed here (with particular focus on the continuative forms of cooperation characterising urban systems). And while certain differences can also be traced – for instance, there is a lack of information about the objectives and the ranking of the other actors participating in the 'coalition' – the assumption is made here that mayors, albeit with a varying position, always belong to this coalition; it is further assumed that examination of the network composition of the participating actors will yield a satisfactory map of those who converge in the coalition.

This quasi 'urban regime' perspective (Sanders 1987; Stone 1991; Stoker-Mossberger 1994) will be utilised here in order to enhance normative descriptions with an up-to-date ecology of local government systems. The investigation will also endeavour to outline the nature of 'governing coalitions', which will be considered as a combination of agenda (what?) and coalition (how?).²

For the definition of an agenda typology ('what...?'), the question ('which are the main themes you wish to link your mandate to....?') was used in our survey. In addition, attention was devoted to network typologies ('Who....?'), by analysing the two steps of the mayoral path, namely networks in electoral support (who helps mayors to win elections?) and networks in daily work contacts (who helps mayors to govern)? It is worth noting that the synthetic governing network typology put forward in this study contemplates possible relationships between agendas (what?) and networks (how?) in campaigning and in daily contacts.³

Taken together, these data shed light on 'governing coalitions', which will then be mapped in reference to our typology of vertical and horizontal distribution of power (see the contribution by Heinelt and Hlepas in this volume) and in reference to classes of urban centrality;⁴ in order to assess the explanatory capacity of the given institutional and contextual set-up. Coalitions will also be examined in the light of mayors' partisan orientation (summarised in the dichotomy of left vs. non-left) in order to evaluate the impact of ideological traditions on interpretation of the representative role.⁵ Finally, it will be shown that such operations lead to further typological distinctions recalling old distinctions on 'values of local democracy' (Stoker 1991).

2 The analysis includes all countries except Denmark, where the data on agenda were not collected.

3 The typologies were elaborated through two kinds of multivariate analysis. Multidimensional analysis was applied to show the structure of relations among variables. To analyse the agenda, characterised by nominal variables, an analysis of correspondences was performed; in the other cases (networks) a factorial analysis was applied. As is known, both techniques show the relations among variables by dimensions or factors as well as the score of subjects (i.e. the mayors) pertaining to these dimensions. After dimensional analysis, non-hierarchical cluster analysis was applied to the factorial scores of mayors in order to elaborate the typologies.

4 The urban centrality variable was created checking the significance of the relation between the two variables, using the data on dimension to infer urban status of the municipalities of countries where the data had not been gathered (England, Czech Rep., Hungary), and aggregating the two classes (core of a narrower urban area and part of a metropolitan area) into one class labelled as 'urban' to obtain a four typological classes: metropolitan, urban, semi-urban, rural.

5 The data on party affiliation are not available for France (consequently excluded from the corresponding elaborations).

9.2 *The agenda: which infrastructures for which development?*

As stressed in other chapters, service provision is seen by mayors as the pivotal element of their role, and probably of local authority function. But our data show that mayors also feel intensely responsible for mobilising the necessary resources to assure local development, which necessarily involves expanding infrastructures and amenities. Clearly, therefore, mayors are aware that public investment and innovative management are preconditions for economic value creation, to the benefit of business and citizens. Our survey also sought to identify the more specific objectives pursued by mayors in such entrepreneurial activity. To this end, the enquiry into the mayors' agenda was based partly on a set of themes used in the 'urban regimes' literature as 'coalition objectives', where three types are classically distinguished⁶ (development, care-taker, symbolic), and partly by reference to acute problems in European urban systems not considered in urban regimes model (such as social housing, the struggle against pollution or poverty, heritage protection, aesthetic improvement of the urban scene).


What kind of change in their local community or – to use the mainstream label 'local development' – do mayors declare to aim at?

According to the evidence concerning the 'mayoral agenda', the dynamics mayors aim to encourage is based predominantly on promotion of inward investment by attracting new firms to settle in their area or by fostering the enlargement of existing businesses. To be instrumental in the localisation of productive activities is (in the framework of the current intense globalised re-localisation) the – presumably frustrating – dominant ambition of European mayors.

Figure 1 shows that more than two thirds of the mayors are concerned about how to attract economic activities, suggesting that the supposed increase in entrepreneurial forms of mayoral action (as opposed to managerial approach, typical of the 1960s – Harvey 1989 – on this point see chapter below) also signifies a growing sense of responsibility among public leaders for the level of employment and wealth allowed by the productive structure. This phenomenon, which has been on the rise since the 1970s, now holds across national boundaries and even across political parties and ideologies. Yet apart from the dominant concern with economic development, the agendas put forward by European mayors at the outset of the new millennium do not display great homogeneity.

6 We refer mainly, as mentioned below, to Stoker/Mossberger's typology (1994).

Figure 1: The agenda: the dominant ambitions



Even though the majority of mayors share the interest in attracting new activities, this theme combines with various other agenda priorities, so that the common goal of local development of a productive economic system is found to be associated with contrasting ‘visions for the city’.

The different ideal types of agendas emerging from the survey data can be distinguished as patterns or combinations of priorities mentioned by mayors. More precisely, a multidimensional analysis shows three patterns and clusters which can be roughly matched with three dimensionally similar groups of mayors. Attracting economic activities thus appears either as the core function of a generic ‘pro-growth’ scheme, or in other cases becomes functional to schemes characterised by other priorities, such as defence of an equilibrium gradually built up over time, or the struggle for social inclusion and political integration.


The first of the above three patterns appearing from the cluster analysis may consequently be labelled *pro-growth*: the mayor in such a model aims principally at boosting innovation and growth in the local context, hoping to achieve a large set of possible local development objectives.

The second type of agenda may be defined as *care-taker*: in this model the mayor’s vision of the local community and of the governance function is centred on service provision for the citizenry, with the predominant aim of maintenance of the quality of the context, sacrificing to this safeguard any objective of development.

Table 1: The agenda: pro-growth, care-taker and deprivation remover

Pro-Growth	Care-taker	Deprivation remover
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Attract economic activity ▪ Develop high qualified activities ▪ Attract new population ▪ Attract wealthier population ▪ Improve the aesthetics of the city ▪ Change the external image of the city ▪ Defend position in urban system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maintain privileged levels of services and well-being ▪ Emphasize diversity and tolerance in community ▪ Defend local lifestyle ▪ Defend traditional local cohesion ▪ Regenerate or rebuild the city-centre 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Improve services against marginality and poverty ▪ Develop housing offer ▪ Reduce pollution ▪ Develop leisure/ cultural offers ▪ Develop infrastructures and services for mobility
34.3%	35.5%	30.2%

Figure 2: The agenda: the configuration of ambitions
(Factor loadings in the 1° and 2° factors)



In the last configuration of objectives, the mayor fulfils the function of *deprivation-remover*. Here, care and attention to the existing provision of services and amenities is substituted by a more rational and operative attention to some effects of social stratification or of policy failures. In this model, mayors regard issues as structural problems that must be addressed, and generally define a pluri-thematic set of issues.

The configuration of objectives shown in the above table is notably distant from the typologies offered in American research on urban regimes or even from their European revisitation.⁷ Firstly, our pro-growth model of the mayoral agenda combines objectives considered in the urban regimes literature as typical either of 'development' or of 'symbolic' regimes, or even of some sub-type of 'care-taker' regimes (the care-taker regimes aiming to maintain – or improve – the influential position of the local authority in the national system). More concretely, urban marketing is now considered by European local leaders as a vital component of local renewal, which includes an appeal for aesthetic improvement as part of the local symbolic apparatus marshalled to facilitate change. However, in the European context urban embellishment as a vector of change does not enter into the same agenda category as heritage preservation, which fully belongs on the contrary to the care-taker agenda. In conclusion, pro-growth mayors believe that under their mandate the locality they head must become wealthier, more attractive, but also be recognised as an example and a reference among its *similia*.

The 'care-taker' configuration more closely reflects the descriptions of motives for collective action offered in the urban regimes literature. The objectives classically regarded as defining different subtypes of care-taker regimes converge to define the figure of the care-taker mayoral agenda. Nevertheless, it can be noted that both diversity and homogeneity may be interpreted by leaders as a distinctive trait of local tradition, while the renewal of city-centres qualifies mainly not as a scenario of revolution but of restoration.

The dichotomy development/conservation is also instrumental in determining the broad orientation in mayoral attitudes. Short-sighted administrators may

7 In Stoker and Mossberger 1994, the three basic types defined by Stone are revisited as follows: instrumental, organic and symbolic regimes. For each of these three types typical configurations are listed. Instrumental regimes (the development regimes of Stone) may aim at city-centre regeneration, industrial development or the attraction of highly specialised activities. The organic regimes (the care-taker regimes of Sanders and maintenance regimes of Stone) may aim at maintaining a 'human scale' in the local context, at creating gated communities or at maintaining the position of the city in the whole political system. The symbolic regimes include middle-class progressive regimes, lower-class opportunity expansive regimes, and urban revitalisation regimes.

favour activities that blight the natural environment, or engage in heritage demolition for the benefit of supposed modernisation and enrichment, while others may acknowledge – or share – the critical observations deriving from architectural and ecological circles. In some cases this may be classified as a care-taker attitude that involves simply defending the status quo, while in other cases it may translate into proposals for development that improves the appearance of places.

The widespread attention to ‘attracting new economic activities’ hence conceals very divergent patterns of projects among mayors. In the three patterns emerging from the correspondence analysis there appear three models for reducing locally indeterminacy in the collective future: mayors appeal to the community’s emotional structure, to the desire to be recognised as forming part of a modernising (post-modernising?) global pattern, or to a rationalising progressive design focusing on specific issues.⁸

How far these agendas of the political leaders remain individual projects or match their constituency’s aspirations and attitudes (in their different components) is a question our data cannot fully answer; however, on the basis of our survey this issue can be addressed with sufficiently rich information. In particular, insight can be gained into the extent of social support these individual projects are able to gather, and the extent to which they may influence choice of a mayoral candidate and the decision-making process during the mayor’s mandate.

9.3 Describing the social support for the mayor’s project

Support in campaigning may be considered as the most reliable indicator of commitment to the mayor’s project, although the impact of the different degrees of institutionalisation of parties in local politics must also be taken into account (see the contribution by Fallend, Ignits and Swianiewicz in this same volume).

8 Differences in agenda linked to the urban centrality of the local community are not large, but significant. The care-taker agenda is more common among mayors in charge of metropolitan areas (where 39.2% of mayors refer to this model vs. an average of 35.4%). An agenda based on the improvement of specific services is more often found among mayors of the other urban areas (36.8% vs. an average of 30.3%). The propensity for offering a pro-growth project is more intense among mayors of rural communities (38.2% vs. 34.3%). The different emphasis placed in some countries on specific objectives (such as regenerating or rebuilding the city-centre in Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and England, developing the housing offer in Spain and Portugal, developing social services to combat marginality and poverty in Italy and in Ireland) may be only partly considered as emblematic of territorialized issues and needs.

Factor analysis on the data concerning electoral support highlights three different patterns, involving three dimensionally similar groups of mayors. The following distinctions can thus be drawn: mayors who declare that they benefited from the support of an extensive alliance of local society aggregations (associations, church groups) and influential personalities, mayors who were supported mainly by political entities (parties and unions), and mayors who stated that they were backed by a wide-ranging spectrum of political organisations and of local society representatives. This third pattern, as does the first, evokes the impression of collective support for the mayor's project: nevertheless, in the image of their election as presented by the mayors the presence of stakeholders is often so cautiously balanced by the influence granted to larger aggregations within their constituency as to make their description appear somewhat reliable.

Table 2: Networks: before and after elections.

<i>Electoral support</i>		<i>% (2049)</i>	<i>Contacts while acting as mayor</i>		<i>% (2224)</i>
<i>Patterns</i>	<i>Actors</i>		<i>Patterns</i>	<i>Actors</i>	
Local society	Prestigious persons, Business community, Local associations, The Church, Local media	32.0	Non-powerful ⁹	Local associations, Unions	27.6
Political actors	Parties, Unions	31.9	Powerful	Business community, Intergovernmental actors	28.8
Integrated: Local society + political actors		36.1	Integrated: Non-powerful + Powerful		43.6

The data gathered on the contact activity of mayors in their daily work shed greater light on the social basis that forms the scaffold of their project. In this case, the mayors' statements are extremely illuminating with regard to networks, which come into play to a variable degree depending on the lesser or greater presence of powerful actors among the mayors' regular contacts. In

9 It is worth recalling that this dichotomy of contact patterns (and the corresponding labels) results from the multivariate analysis developed in relation to the whole complex of countries studied, and does not imply a difference in the capacity of the various actors involved to influence and determine national policies. The distinction merely suggests that very often mayors who devote appreciable attention to unions in their daily work are more open to all associations that are active within the local community. Such an orientation contrasts with the propensity of an equivalent minority of mayors to stress relations which allow less locally rooted strategies, thereby interacting with representatives of various different authorities or with businessmen.

particular, mayors whose relations are confined to local associations and unions contrast with mayors who engage in relations mainly with other public bodies belonging to different territorial levels of government and with local businessmen. There is also a large group of mayors (44%) who endeavour to find support for their day-by-day activity among a considerable range of actors situated at various points along this ideal scale of 'power'.

Electoral support from political actors (parties and unions) increases according to a territorially delineated distribution, rising from 25% in rural districts to 45% in metropolitan areas..

Mayoral networking (that is to say the core of the job as a mayor) varies highly according to the urban centrality of the community they lead. Contrary to expectation, mayors rely more strongly on a 'powerful network' in rural communities, whereas in metropolitan municipalities the mayors' job is typically characterised by the intense presence of a complex of associations and unions which interact with the mayor in everyday life. Our data also show that in metropolitan municipalities mayors' relations with representatives of other local authorities are only slightly more frequent than among mayors acting in rural areas. In fact the majority of mayors in metropolitan areas do not communicate with representatives of other cities more often than once a week. Thus the emerging picture suggests that the 'metropolisation of politics' seems far from being a reality. On the contrary, what can be observed is a strong path (or institutional) dependency on the concrete political boundaries of urban systems in metropolitan areas. In effect, considering all the items, contacts outside the municipality are more intense among mayors acting in contexts which are not included in metropolitan areas.¹⁰ Overall, then, metropolitan contexts tend to confirm a logic more sensitive to the 'political economy' of places but not especially aware of the hinterland of such 'places'. Urban centrality does not deeply transform the pattern of networking with actors of other local governments, whereas marginality prompts to mayors to seek greater and more varied support outside the community.¹¹

These organisational features, as rules of the game affecting the different actors, impact on the kind of support mayors attempt to gather in their daily activity. But as will be described in further detail later, the interests involved, both economic and cultural, and the symbolic dimensions of political activity -

10 Correspondingly, it can be observed that the importance awarded to 'fostering the co-operation with the neighbouring municipalities' among the duties of the mayor does not vary significantly according to the urban centrality of the local authority.

11 Similarly, integrated networks are more frequent among weaker mayors (the 'ceremonial' mayor), while networks focusing on powerful actors are more frequent among collegial mayors, and networks based on local associations and unions among political mayors.

political preferences, projects, and the reduction of uncertainty they offer – constitute the real key for describing governing networks acting today in European urban systems. To the different collective projects personified by the mayors there correspond different networks.

*9.4 Developmental, communitarian and problem-solver:
the three patterns of governing networks*


Governing networks can be characterised as a combination of agendas and networks (pre and post-electoral). Analysis of these networks provides valuable insight into the various types of social mobilisation called for by the different collective ‘visions of the city’ and gives a helpful overview of local politics as personified by the mayors. Thus on the basis of multidimensional analysis, social mobilisation appears to reflect mainly the three following patterns.

Table 3: The governing networks

Traits		Patterns of governing networks		
		Developmental	Communitarian	Problem-solver
Agenda		Pro-growth	Care-taker	Deprivation-remover
Networks	Electoral support	Local society	Integrated	Political actors
	Contacts while in office	Powerful actors	Integrated	Non-Powerful
% (n=2603)		38.5%	35.8%	25.8%

Mayors who propose a care-taker agenda build up a large differentiated network, both while campaigning and during their daily activity, and benefit from or seek to obtain support from political and local society organisations, as well as from powerful but also from not so powerful organisations and aggregations of people and individuals. Their project is solidly grounded in the local community: they appeal to the emotive and defensive response of the different components of the local lifestyle, and the mediate with the external world, entering into alliances and searching for resources to be used for the preservation of local ‘places’ and codes. Urban systems belonging to this type of framework exhibit strong internal cohesion, their crucial activities being aimed at maintaining a state of equilibrium that is highly valued by the citizens, for whom it represents an objective mayors are delegated to enforce against the ‘external world’. Thus the governing network in this form of care-taker agenda, which can be defined as ‘communitarian’, illustrates the dynamics of defensive glocalisation (Norbert-Hodge 1996; Nader-Walach 1998).

Figure 3: Types of governing networks
(Factor loading in the 1° and 2° factors)



Expansive glocalism (Jensen-Butler et al. 1997; Brotchie et al. 1995), on the other hand, is based on the approach adopted by actors forming part of governing networks that may be called developmental. Rhetoric emphasizing generic progress and growth animates a campaign for the mayor not led by political parties but by local society organisations and influential leaders. Once elected, ‘developmental’ mayors turn mainly to powerful actors in order to achieve concrete realisation of their image of the city. Such urban systems are probably

structured on strong social status differences, where the political sphere has a low capacity to influence collective decisions. Mayors thus find themselves relatively isolated and are compelled to act individually in the hope of improving the collective destiny, while at the same time strengthening alliances with the main economic actors, and attempting to incorporate their projects in the kind of 'civic boosterism' typical of the Atlanta-type of 'growth machine'..

A strong impact of parties in political life – i.e. a situation in which parties and unions are instrumental in securing the election of a mayoral candidate – and a rationale of problem-solving for the extension of acquired welfare benefits (designed to benefit the underprivileged and future generations) constitute the logic underlying the third pattern of governing networks. Mayors in this pattern do not habitually interact with powerful actors in their daily life. That is to say, although the urban system in question is highly politicised, and probably characterised by strong social, cultural or even only political cleavages (with different sets of codes and defining activities), leaders acknowledge globalisation as a carrier of further inequalities and recognise the need to address ethical questions, but they do not aim at a particular local protagonism. They do not enter into the logic of glocalism (Robertson 1992).

Such patterns are not linked to the degree of centrality of the local system within an overall urban framework: only the developmental governing network appears clearly over-represented in rural communities (corresponding to 43% of cases). But they are neatly linked to the structure of leadership, inasmuch as they are influenced by the institutional structure of opportunities offered to the mayor and to his/her party affiliation (resources and political allegiance of the top leaders).

9.5 Individuals, generations and party culture

Some traits of individual training and disposition combine more easily with agenda priorities and personal relational aptitudes: physicians, for example, are more often active in problem-solving networks while social scientists are more typically found as leaders of care-taker agendas. Women elected as mayors more often (in 44.2% of cases) lead communitarian governing networks and more rarely head developmental networks (in less than one case in four). Mayoral age also acts as a partial predictor of the type of governing network to be found in an urban system: thus the older age classes appear to be associated with the communitarian networks, which are disfavoured by mayors belonging to the younger generations. But the effect of age may converge here with a strong effect of 'political generation' (defined on the basis of the date of their first

political term of office as declared by the mayors): a majority of mayors who entered the political arena prior to the 1970s head communitarian networks, while mayors who entered into politics after 1990 more often form part of a developmental network. Communitarian governing networks, and their defensive glocalism, often express the adaptive reaction of experienced (and older) mayors to the new international and national context; while developmental networks seem more connatural to the new wave of local politics; and problem-solver networks may be read as a stable component of local political dynamics.

Table 4: Governing networks by generations of mayors

first political office	Developmental	Communitarian	Problem-solver
before 1970 (11.7%)	20.6	58.2	21.2
1970-1979 (16%)	36.1	36.8	27.2
1980-1989 (26.2%)	34.1	34.7	31.2
1990-1999 (37.9%)	41.6	29.9	28.4
after 2000 (8.2%)	39.9	33.0	27.1

The structure of opportunities offered by the institutional set-up of the role seems to allow European mayors to develop specific types of governing network (Navarro et al. 2003). Thus a 'political' role appears to match better with a problem-solving orientation, a 'collegial' role with a communitarian orientation and an 'executive' role with a developmental orientation. But even within a given type of power structure, mayoral orientations vary on a left-wing/right-wing scale, with specific modes of variation in each structure.

Developmental and communitarian profiles, on a left-wing/right-wing scale, could be regarded as referring to political traditions of the 'right-wing' sphere. In both patterns, the reduction of inequalities within local society is not included among the foremost priorities. Rather, emphasis is placed on improvement of the productivity of the territorial system (in the case of developmental governing networks) or on defence of the local community against a supposed external threat (in the communitarian governing network). In the latter case, defensive localism interprets trends of change as a threat to the integrity of the community, considered as a more valuable asset than any further opportunity that would potentially be offered by the global market. In the former case, on the other hand, the network searches for opportunities that will contribute to building up the new territorial hierarchy, exploiting or – depending on the circumstances – by-passing the upper-levels of government. The themes and rhetoric that figure prominently in the manifesto of these two different types of networks can be recognised as reflecting free-trade or neo-conservative right-wing views versus localist and traditionalist right-wing attitudes.

Governing networks aiming at problem-solving focus on the provision of minimal standards of well-being for the whole population and for future generations, and on the reduction of social and political cleavage between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’. Here the themes and rhetoric belong to the social-democratic tradition. The presence of the latter form of governing networks tends consequently to vary according to the position of the mayor’s party on the left-right scale.¹²

Table 5: Institutional settings and governing networks (per cent by row)

	developmental	communitarian	problem-solver
Political mayors	22.2	36.9	40.9
Collegial leaders	28.2	49.2	22.6
Executive mayors	60.5	23.1	16.4

However, the left-right cleavage produces different effects on the nature of governing networks in terms of the institutional and cultural settings. In ‘collegial leaders’ systems it distinguishes between mayors tending towards ‘problem-solving’ and mayors tending towards ‘communitarian’ governing networks, while in ‘political mayor’ systems it distinguishes mayors tending towards ‘problem-solving’ from mayors tending towards ‘communitarian’ or ‘developmental’ networks; finally, in ‘executive mayors’ systems, it does not impact on the dominant propensity for a developmental scheme.

Table 6: Left-wing/right-wing mayors and their governing networks (per cent by row)

	developmental	communitarian	problem-solver
non-left	42.2	36.5	21.3
left	33.9	30.8	35.3

12 The impact of political cultures is further illustrated in the differences between traditional local government groups (Hesse and Sharpe 1991); which show different dichotomies of alternative dominant roles, corresponding to dominant political cleavages: pro-growth and problem-solving in Eastern countries; care-taker or pro-growth in the Franco-group; care-taker (largely predominant) and problem-solving in the Anglo-group; pro-growth and care-taker in the Northern and Central group.

9.6 *Governing networks and local welfare*

Under the pressure of macroeconomic (and macrocultural?) globalised factors, the supposed 'shift towards entrepreneurialism' among urban leaders (Harvey 1989) is expressed mainly in the desire to improve or maintain the productive resources of the local community. This ambition is declared by more than two thirds of the European mayors, for whom securing a better future for the population means 'attracting economic activities'. But even among this large majority of mayors, such an ambition combines with very different objectives, delineating different projects of 'local development'. There emerge three patterns of agenda priorities, revealing a division into three dimensionally similar clusters of mayors, whereby the tension for 'attracting economic activities' can act as the pivotal element of an agenda that may aim generically to achieve local growth, or may set itself the goal of safeguarding the local status quo, or may hope to enforce environmental and social sustainability.

Each type of mayoral agenda appeals to specific mechanisms in 'making the mayor'. A mayor benefits from a different form and extent of mobilisation and support in the electoral campaign and in daily activity according to the idea of change he/she personifies in the local context. Governing networks in European localities hence range over a broad spectrum of configurations, structured on the three models labelled here as communitarian, developmental or problem-solver. But overall, compared to the classical picture of urban regimes and to the more common current hypotheses on competition between localities, the broad variety of governing networks resulting from the combination of agendas and relations between actors emphasises a first specificity of the European experience: the stable presence, through generations, of highly partisan governing networks that are more concerned with genuinely addressing problems than with the theoretical niceties of debate on growth models.

The different types of network illustrate three models of reaction to globalisation. In one case, globalisation prompts a generic search for renewal, while the other two cases seem to point to development as a mere instrumental resource that offers a safeguard in a global scheme or as a means for addressing social issues.

Institutional settings have strong cultural effects: they forge opportunities to develop agendas (or values and objectives) and facilitate the constitution of specific types of networks. A traditional cleavage nevertheless re-emerges and interferes strongly with institutional settings in shaping local government networks: namely, problem-solving networks are created mainly by mayors belonging to parties of the left, and developmental networks by mayors from a

different political tradition (communitarian networks are less firmly anchored to a left-right distinction).

It may further be supposed that it is not only the map of actors involved and the notion of 'local development' which generate a distinction among governing networks: different modes of social integration are also correspondingly associated with the different types of networks. Moreover, certain aspects of the social capital which facilitates common action in the communitarian networks bear a relation to the emotive connotation of the spirit of place; within the developmental networks this translates into trust in the contractual reliability of partners, and in the problem-solver networks it is reflected in the convergence of ethical or ideological creeds.

Despite these distinctions, the configuration of models makes it possible to enucleate different re-interpretations of the significance of local welfare in a global world. Interestingly, more than the recent distinctions in local government ethos, the resulting picture recalls the classical debate on cleavages that represent the major determinants in this field (Goldsmith 1992; Rokkan 1999). Local welfare design, and the governing network which expresses it, is grounded in a locally conceived approach and aims to tackle cleavages that may be either socio-economic or cultural. Problem-solver networks adopt a frame which is mainly defined by socio-economic cleavages (but also by generational cleavages insofar as they point to a sounder sustainability), but in contrast to the other networks they place greater emphasis on redistribution as a crucial function of local government. Developmental networks focus on economic achievement as a vector of local welfare; while communitarian networks focus on a new cultural cleavage: place/world.

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10 Mayors in Vertical Power Relations

Daniel Kübler and Pascal Michel

From a constitutional point of view, cities are local governments. Some of them may proudly look back on a past as autonomous states. During the construction of the nation states in the 18th and 19th century, European cities were squeezed into the corset of national intergovernmental frameworks. No matter how glorious their past forgone, European cities henceforth occupy a subordinate position within national state polities. Their autonomy is limited by upper levels of government, such as regions, federate states, and the central state. Of course, the nature and the extent of these limitations differ across space and time, resulting in a great variation of patterns of constraints to which city governments have to comply, as well as of structures of opportunities through which they can expand their freedom to act.

The objective of this chapter is to shed light on these patterns of constraints and opportunities within which European city governments evolve. We will do so by looking at how these patterns are perceived by the cities' top political leader, i.e. the mayor. On the one hand, the aim of this chapter is to provide an account of how mayors in different European countries experience, perceive and behave within the set of vertical power relations in which their cities are tied up. On the other hand, the analysis in this chapter also endeavours to assess the question to what extent vertical power relations are actually determined by characteristics of the national political systems – i.e. to factors that are external to the cities themselves –, or whether endogenous factors, linked to the cities or the mayors themselves, can significantly explain mayoral experiences, attitudes and strategies with respect to upper level governments.

Our argument is developed in four steps. The first three sections draw on international literature on central-local relations in Western European countries in order to operationalise and subsequently analyse three different dimensions of vertical power relations. More precisely, we will consider the activities of mayors in liaising with higher level governments, their perception of changes in the patterns of influence between the local, the regional and the national level, as well as the strategies mayors deploy in order to act upon their city's position within these vertical power relations. The fourth section uses an inductive method to construct different types of mayoral attitudes and behaviours with re-

spect to vertical power relations, and attempts to single out the importance of individual, city-level and system-related characteristics to explain these types.

10.1 *Liaising with upper level governments*

10.1.1 Local government typologies

The characterisation of central-local relations has been a central preoccupation of research on local government (Page and Goldsmith 1987; Goldsmith 1992; Goldsmith 1995). The general constitutional framework is important here: central-local relations are different in unitary than in federal states, and the definition of local autonomy is generally an important feature of this very constitutional framework. However, legal rules are only part of the story. Cultural traditions, legacies of the past, as well as routines established through daily practice can be as least as important in shaping central-local relations. Hence, most cross-national typologies on local government systems aim to identify types of local government on the basis of various dimensions of central-local relations that go beyond constitutional rules.

This is also true for the main “vertical” traditional local government typology (Hesse and Sharpe 1991). Among the four types of local government systems it distinguishes the so-called *Franco group* of countries, following the Napoleonic model, emphasises the political function of local governments who are considered to embody territorial communities, and their office holders are expected to represent the interests of these communities in relation to higher levels of government. With respect to the countries covered by the survey, this ‘political localism’ (Page 1991) is found in France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Greece. In the *Anglo group* of countries, local governments have little legal or political status, but enjoy a high degree of autonomy and discretion from higher levels of government in terms of day-to-day operations. The emphasis here is functional rather than political and the main role of local government is to shape and deliver public services to local constituents (the United Kingdom and Ireland are found in this group). In the *North and Middle European group*, as in the Anglo group, emphasis is placed on the functional capacity of local government to shape and deliver public services, but in addition, equal emphasis is placed on local democracy per se. Countries in this group are the most formally decentralised and, reflecting the operation of the subsidiarity principle, local government enjoys a strong constitutional status and a relatively high degree of policy-making autonomy and financial independence. We surveyed in this group of countries Denmark, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria

and Switzerland. The characteristic feature of the fourth *East and Central European* type are strong 'political localism', as well as the independence of the local political personnel from the party system after the democratic transition. In our research, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland are found in this type.

This local government typology puts forward two dimensions of vertical power relations. Whereas the first, political dimension refers to the political representation of the local community within the national system, the second, service-related dimension emphasises the discretion of local authorities in the functional delivery of services to local constituents. Put briefly, the typology hypothesises that the intensity and quality of central-local exchanges varies according to the four types of local government systems. More precisely, we can, first, expect that strong 'political localism' results in a higher intensity of local-central liaising in the Franco and in the East and Central European groups whereas such liaising will be less important in the North and Middle European or in the Anglo group countries. Hence, a first question to be answered is how intensely mayors in our sample liaise with upper level governments and to what extent the differences observed are consistent with the contentions derived from this local government typology.

10.1.2 Mayors' communications with higher level governments


In general, meetings with higher level government authorities are not a priority occupation for the mayors. In average, they spend roughly 3.6% of their weekly working hours in such meetings.¹ There are significant differences across the countries under scrutiny (Figure 1).

At first sight however, Figure 1 does not suggest any clear pattern that would follow the local government typology, especially since the dispersion of these values is considerable. Indeed, the standard deviation in each country group sub-sample (Anglo: 3.28; Franco 4.12; North and Middle: 4.12; East and Central: 4.22) is not smaller than in the whole sample (3.58).

Part of the explanation for this could be that the local government typology is indifferent to state structures, i.e. unitary states and federal states are collapsed into the different country groups. Hence if we take the state structure into account, some patterns start to emerge. On the one hand, mayors' in unitary states tend to spend more of their working time with higher level authorities.

1 This was calculated by dividing hours spent in meetings with authorities from regional or national governments by the total number of working hours per week.

Figure 1: Hours spent in meetings with higher level governments
(percentage of total weekly working hours, means by country)




On the other hand, mayors in countries in the Franco and Central and Eastern European groups tend to meet more frequently with higher level authorities than their counterparts in the Anglo or Northern and Middle European countries – thereby confirming the assumptions formulated above.

Two exceptions to this general trend should be noted, however. On the one hand, Dutch mayors spend a major part of their working time with higher level authorities than one would expect. Part of this observation could be explained by the fact that, unlike everywhere else, Dutch mayors are appointed by the central government. On the other hand, Polish mayors spend a minor part of their working time in such meetings than what could be assumed.

The frequency of contacts with higher state levels², not considering anymore the quota of the total time spent in the charge, appears also to vary significantly across countries (Figure 2). The local government types according to the extended Hesse/Sharpe typology account here on the contrary for some of this variation. Whereas the mayors in the Northern and Middle European group of countries have the least frequency of contacts, followed by those in the Anglo group and the Franco group, the mayors in the East and Central European group have the most intensive contacts with higher state authorities.

2 Data on frequency of communication with higher level authorities were transformed into one indicator through factor analysis.

Figure 2: Communication with higher-level authorities (means of factor score by country)




However, the variations within the four local government types remain important. But taking into account the structure of the state (unitarian or federal) does not help: the state structure is not significantly associated with the intensity of the mayors' communication with persons of higher level institutions.

An exploratory analysis of other structural variables revealed that the size of the city played a significant role. Especially in the Franco as well as East and Central European group countries, mayors of larger cities communicate more often with persons from higher level authorities. This would suggest that the population size of a city may increase the political weight of its representatives in the national political system – a result that has been assessed by other researchers at least for the French and Italian context (Jouve and Lefèvre 1999b; Jouve and Lefèvre 1999a). However, this relationship between the city size and the political weight of its mayor does however not seem to apply to cities in the other two country groups.

The analysis on this first dimension of mayors in vertical power relations, i.e. their liaising with upper level authorities and persons from that horizon, shows the importance of different types of local government traditions found in European countries, besides obvious constitutional variables such as the state

structure (unitary or federalist). The local government typology therefore can be seen to have a certain pertinence to characterise intergovernmental relations. More precisely, it seems that mayoral contacts with upper level governments are especially intense in countries of the Franco and of the Central and Eastern European groups.

Figure 3: Perceived influence of regional and upper levels of government on local authorities' activity (mean response values by country; min=0, max=4)



It is interesting to note that, in these two groups of countries, the size of a given city seems to represent a political resource which can be used by mayors in order to make themselves heard on the higher levels of government. For the Franco countries, this result supports the idea of a 'political localism' pattern of intergovernmental relations, where mayors try to compensate limited legal authority by activating various networks and resources in order to gain influence at higher levels of government. Although competencies have been transferred from upper-level government to municipalities in Central and Eastern European countries (complemented by funding) the needs to be met at the local level in these countries seem to force mayors to engage in networking activities with higher levels of government.

10.2 *Perceptions of a changing structure*

10.2.1 'Rise of the meso'?

Several authors argue that intergovernmental relations in most Western European countries have undergone significant changes during the 1990s. The diagnosis generally tends to point out a pattern of decentralisation: new tasks have been allocated to the local level in many countries, reforms of equalisation schemes and central government grant systems have increased local discretion, new regional instances have been created and given power all over Europe..

In his comprehensive overview, Goldsmith (2002) confirms that central control of sub-national government has generally weakened. But this is only part of the story, since simultaneously, there has been a strengthening of an intermediate tier of government between central and local government. Although this rise of the regional tier seems to be a general tendency in Western Europe, its driving mechanisms and the paths through which it has come about differs across countries. Goldsmith (2002: 106 ff.) distinguishes three patterns in this respect.

First, in federal systems – such as Germany, Switzerland and Austria – the traditional weakness of central control on sub-national governments has remained. From a constitutional point of view, the intermediate tier has been important in determining the discretion of local governments in those countries ever since. It has gained additional power during the late 20th century. Indeed, the expansion of welfare services more and more exceeded the capacities of municipalities, which thus came to be more and more dependent on support – especially financially – from the intermediate level. Only large cities with substantial means were able to resist this tendency.

Second, there are unitary countries where central control over local government has been weakened due to a process of decentralisation which these countries have gone through – such as France, Spain and Belgium. In the latter two, the creation of regions has taken away power from the central state, but did not have any significant impact on the municipalities which remained weak. In France, decentralisation has not generally led to strong regions – there are the exceptions of Nord Pas de Calais, Rhone-Alpes or Languedoc-Rousillon – many of which are still fighting to establish themselves as a relevant political space. However, it has led to a strengthening of large cities, especially those with a strong mayoral leadership, extending their influence on the surrounding suburbs.

Third, there are unitary states which have not gone through a constitutional decentralisation process – such as Greece and Portugal, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and Britain. For Greece, Hlepas (2003) has shown a clear

move away from centralism in the past twenty years. Although little has changed for Greek municipalities, regional bodies became increasingly significant for the administration of state policies, and the introduction (in 1994) of directly elected prefects has created a new political actor at the supra-local level. However, little has changed in Portugal, where control remains at the centre. The same is true for the Netherlands, where, in spite of a period of intense experimentation with changes in structures and shifting of functions, the general pattern of a strong centre and compliant local authorities is still visible due to strong financial dependence on the centre. In the Nordic countries as well, little has changed, with the regional level remaining weak (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) or non-existent (Finland). In the case of Britain, Goldsmith argues that things have remained largely the same, in spite of recent initiatives towards decentralisation in the United Kingdom (e.g. new arrangements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as well as newly established Regional Development Agencies under New Labour since 1997): 'The British centre still does not trust the locality' (Goldsmith 2002: 109).


Goldsmith's review does not cover all countries included in this research. However, at a conceptual level, his considerations point out that vertical power relations not only entail central-local relations as examined in the previous section. Indeed, the relationships between central government and the regional level, as well as those between the regional level and local governments must be taken into account, as well as recent changes in these relationships.

10.2.2 Perceptions of central-regional-local relations and change

The analysis of mayors' perceptions of the influence of upper level governments³ by countries shows that there is a certain plausibility for Goldsmith's argument (Figure 4). Indeed, influence of upper level government in local affairs is estimated highest in traditional unitary states such as Spain, Greece, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The data on France certainly also reflect the regained local autonomy after important decentralisation reforms. Federalist countries such as Belgium, Switzerland, Austria are clustered in the middle of the figure, with Germany appearing as an exceptional case of low higher level influence in a federalist country.


3 The mayors were asked the following question: 'On the basis of your experience as a Mayor in this City, and independently from the formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of the following actors are over the Local Authority activities?' Beside other items, the item 'Region and Upper levels of government' was mentioned and the level of influence could be indicated on a scale from 'high influence' (4) to 'no influence' (0).

Figure 4: Perceived influence of regional and upper levels of government on local authorities' activity (mean response values by country; min=0, max=4)



However, some qualifications need to be made. For instance, the influence of upper level government structures in Portugal seems to be less than what one would have expected. The English and Irish cases probably reflect the high discretion that local governments enjoy in daily affairs in spite of their low legal status – as has been pointed out by Hesse and Sharpe (1991). The picture for Central and Eastern European countries is differentiated, in spite of them being unitary states. Whereas Hungary and the Czech Republic are somewhere in the middle of the field, Polish mayors seem to enjoy significant discretion.


Figure 5: Changes of influence between subnational and national levels of government (mean response values by country on a scale 1 to 7 where 1=much more influence to subnational levels in the last decade, 7= much more influence to national levels in the last decade and 4 indicates stability)⁴



Mayors' perceptions of changes in influence between the national and the subnational levels of government shows two groups of countries (Figure 5). In a first group of countries, mayors think that the national level has gained influence at the expense of the subnational level. This is the case for Sweden, Denmark, England, the Netherlands, Ireland, and to a lesser extent Austria and Germany. In a second group of countries, mayors think that, on the contrary, the subnational level has gained influence at the expense of the national level. This is the case for Spain, Greece, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Portugal and Belgium.

⁴ No data on this question were available for Switzerland.

Figure 6: Change of influence between the local and the regional levels (mean response values by country; on a scale 1 to 7 where 1=much more influence to local levels in the last decade, 7= much more influence to regional levels in the last decade and 4 indicates stability)⁵



Concerning the change of influences between the local and the regional level of governments, there are also two groups of countries (Figure 6). In a first group, mayors perceive the regional level to have gained influence at the expense of the local level. This is the case of Germany, Austria, England, Sweden, France and Belgium. In the second group of countries, mayors think that it is the other way round, i.e. that the local level has gained influence at the expense of the regional level. This is the case of Poland, Hungary, Spain, the Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, as well as, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands.

5 No data on this question were available for Switzerland.

Drawing on how the European mayors' perceive the central-regional-local relations as well as the change within these, Goldsmith's contention of a general tendency towards a 'rise of the regional level' needs to be revised. The summary of the results of the above analysis (Table 1) indeed suggest that the rise of the regional level (i.e. loss of influence of national level and simultaneously loss of influence of local level) can plausibly be diagnosed only in France and Belgium. Indeed, the most common trend seems to be a shift of influence from the central to local government. In a majority of countries, mayors feel that local authorities have become more important in vertical power relations in the last decade.

Table 1: Change of influence between levels of government

	Subnational at the expense of National	National at the expense of subnational
Local at the expense of Regional	<i>Decentralisation:</i> Spain, Greece, Italy, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal	<i>Polarisation:</i> Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland
Regional at the expense of Local	<i>Regionalisation:</i> France, Belgium	<i>Recentralisation:</i> Germany, Austria, England, Sweden

10.3 *Mayoral strategies in vertical power relations*

10.3.1 Re-scaling of urban governance

During the 1990s, an increasing number of urban scholars have argued that the trends towards an increasingly information-based and internationalised economy results in a radical reorganisation of historically entrenched relations among various spatial scales – a process called 're-scaling' (see for example Brenner 1999; Brenner 2000). It is argued that the increasing importance of a-territorial informational networks in the productive processes of capitalism will profoundly transform geography: 'spaces of flows' will triumph over 'spaces of place' in the making and the shaping of a new economic order of centrality (Castells 2000: 407 ff.). In a similar vein, others have argued that the ongoing integration of the single European market will result in a dislocation of spatial dynamics, and produce an urban hierarchy that is mainly shaped by the workings of territorially unbound informational capitalism (Krugman 1995). All seducing such accounts may seem, the work of other scholars suggests that there

is no reason to toll the bell for cities as territories of action. As Savitch and Kantor (2002: 346) have put it, cities need not be ‘leaves in the wind’ of globalisation. Rather than dissolving in globalised logics of flows, cities have proven capable of achieving a bargaining capacity in the face of market forces (Savitch and Kantor 2002). In this process of strengthening their bargaining position in the international marketplace, cities can be seen as ‘collective actors in the making’ (Le Galès 2002: 266), seeking to participate in the global economic order for and at their own sake, thereby seeking to break out of the subordinate position reserved to them in the established vertical power structure. The current context of globalisation, informational capitalism and Europeanization puts the nation states in crisis, thereby presenting an unprecedented opportunity – a ‘historical interlude’ (Le Galès 2002: 71) – for cities to come to the fore and strengthen their position with respect to upper-level governments. In this line of argument, the new political entrepreneurship of urban elites (Jouve and Lefèvre 1999b), but also the strengthening of the role of urban mayors (cf. the various contributions in Gabriel et al. 2000; Kersting and Vetter 2003) are increasingly interpreted as expression of cities seizing the opportunities offered by re-scaling processes.


In such a context, it becomes clear that an analysis of urban action capacity cannot remain confined to an examination of local autonomy in the traditional sense – i.e. understood as legal and political discretion with respect to central government (Le Galès 2002). Rather, it is likely that cities seek to pursue strategies that use assets of economic centrality in order to propel them at a place in the sun. Such strategies are likely to entail two dimensions, namely one oriented towards increasing the resources for the city in order to gain financial capacity to act, and a second one oriented towards increasing legal autonomy with respect to upper levels of government. Among others – business, organised interests, civil society associations, etc. – urban mayors can be considered important actors in constructing these strategies. It follows from these considerations that, mayoral strategies to influence the city’s relation to the outside world are also part of their game in vertical power relations.

10.3.2 Mayoral strategies

The extent to which mayors see it as their task to represent the city to the outside world varies significantly across countries (Figure 7). It does not vary significantly according to the size of the city (as a proxy for economic centrality), as one would have expected. Similarly, an analysis according to the position of

the city in the urban system (core city or not, situated in a larger or smaller urban area) does not reveal any significant differences (data not shown).

Figure 7: Importance of the task to represent the city to the outside world (mean response values by country; min=0, max=4)




A different pattern is revealed if we consider to what extent the mayors see it as their task to attract resources from external sources. Indeed, perceptions of mayors on this task vary significantly across countries (Figure 8), but are not significantly different according to the size of their respective cities. Interestingly, mayors from cities that are located in large urban regions (metropolitan areas) view this task as less important than those from cities that are located in smaller regions. Vice versa, mayors from cities that are not core cities put significantly more emphasis on this task.

Independently from the political economy arguments of city size or urban status, the influence of the four local government traditions again comes to the fore. Indeed, Figure 8 displays a clear break between, on the one hand, countries of the Franco and the East and Central European types clustered in the upper half of the figure, and, on the other hand, countries of the Anglo and the North

and Middle European types. This can be explained by the importance of transfer payments by higher level authorities for the funding of local projects, which is much greater in the former group than in the latter.


Figure 8: Importance of the task to attract resources from external sources (means by country)



A similar pattern appears when we consider to what extent the mayors view it as important to defend the position of the local authorities in the political system. There is a significant difference according to the countries under scrutiny (Figure 9), but not according to the size of the cities, nor to their position in the urban system.

Again, the results suggest some effect of the local government traditions. Mayors in countries of the North and Middle European or the Anglo types feel in a better position to defend and (further) promote the influence of local authorities in the national system.

Figure 9: Importance of the task of the mayor to promote the influence of local authorities in the political system (means by country)



The analysis in this section provides evidence for the idea that mayors pursue strategies aimed at improving their city's position on the international scene, and that this has effects on how they would like to see their cities position within the national framework of intergovernmental relations. However, there is not much evidence in support of the political economy underpinning of this argument, according to which the socio-economic centrality of a city – which can be operationalised by its size or by its position in the urban system – is the main explanatory factor for such mayoral strategies.

Rather, it seems that the pursuit of such strategies by mayors is to be explained – on an ad hoc basis – by other structural elements than political economy. In particular, the fourfold local government typology brings at least partial clarity, as strategies for developing generally the influence of localities in the whole political system are clearly given more importance in countries of the Anglo and the Northern and Middle European groups. This suggests that the strong local discretion – found in these two country groups – make mayors more likely to enter further in the rescaling processes.

10.3.3 Mayoral profiles with respect to vertical power relations

So far, this chapter has dealt with vertical power relations in a deductive way, by analysing mayors' activities, perceptions and strategies with respect to various dimensions of these vertical power relations emphasised by the literature on the topic. In this last section, we will adopt a more inductive approach. More precisely, we will use principal component analysis to identify different mayoral profiles with respect to vertical power relations, and then test the explanatory power of a set of independent variables on these profiles. In doing so, the ultimate goal of this section will consist of assessing the question – as yet unanswered – whether attitudes and behaviour of mayors in vertical power relations are related to their individual characteristics, to socio-economic structures of their cities, or to the characteristics of the intergovernmental frameworks of the countries within which they evolve.

Table 2 below shows the results of a principal component analysis of the various variables used throughout this text to characterise the mayors in vertical power relations. The analysis yielded three factors. Factor 1 can be seen to describe mayors with intense relationships to higher levels of government, who are optimistic about the development of the discretion of local governments in their country, and who think it is important to direct resources to their city. We will use the term '*vertical power enthusiasm*' to describe the attitude of these mayors: they think they can make the difference for their city by actively engaging in a context of vertical power relations which they perceive to be rather favourable to local authorities. Factor 2 describes mayors who communicate often with higher levels of government, think that upper levels of government have significant influence on local affairs, and think that it is important to represent the city to the outside world and to defend its position in the political system. We will use the term '*vertical power realism*' to describe this attitude: it means that mayors see their engaging with upper level governments as a means to defend the position of their city against the odds of power coming from above. Factor 3 describes mayors who think that higher levels of government have significant influence on local affairs, that this influence has increased and that it is not at all their task to represent the city to the outside world. The attitude of these mayors can be described by the term '*vertical power frustration*': they think they do not have a significant say against higher level authorities and therefore are not intensely engaged in vertical power relations.


Table 2: Factor loadings of various aspects of mayors' vertical power relations (Principal components)

Dimension	Variable	Factor 1: 'Vertical power enthusiasm'	Factor 2: 'Vertical power realism'	Factor 3: 'Vertical power frustration'
Activity in inter-governmental relations	Hours spent in meetings with higher level governments	.466	.349	.277
	Communication with representatives of higher state levels	.416	.525	.081
Opinion on change of influence between state levels	Perception of influence of higher state level on local affairs	.252	.413	.453
	Shift of influence from subnational to national level	-.677	.366	.225
	Shift of influence from local to regional level	-.639	.254	.399
Mayoral strategies	Importance to represent city to the outside world	-.108	.478	-.611
	Importance to attract funds from external sources	.572	.149	-.018
	Importance to defend position of local authorities in political system	-.196	.559	-.386
Variance explained by factors		21.07%	16.61%	12.77%

The enthusiastic attitude entails an active commitment to get involved with higher level authorities on the basis of a conviction that this really matters. The mean factor scores for this attitude vary significantly between the countries under scrutiny (Figure 10).

The results of a regression analysis (Table 3) suggests that several factors explain such an enthusiastic attitude about the mayors' role perception in vertical power relations. At the individual level, age and gender are significantly associated with this attitude, which is significantly less often deployed by men than by women. Regarding the types of local government, it appears that mayors in countries belonging to the Franco or Central and East European groups are significantly less enthusiastic about their possible role in vertical power relations. Similarly, the state structure plays a role: mayors in federalist countries are significantly more enthusiastic than their colleagues in unitary states.

Figure 10: Vertical power enthusiasm (mean of factor score by country)



O

LS Regression on ‘Vertical power enthusiasm’


Types of variable	Variables	Stand. coefficient (Beta)	P=
Socio-demographics	Age	.041	.029
	Gender (dummy for male)	-.034	.048
	Education (dummy for univ. degree)	.025	.155
	Years in office as mayor	-.008	.688
Intergovernmental relations	Anglo group country	.005	.806
	Franco group country	-.395	.000
	East & Central group country	-.449	.000
State structure	Federalist country	.043	.039
City centrality	Size (in classes of inhabitants)	.025	.203
	Core city	-.002	.895

Dependent variable: ‘Vertical power enthusiasm (factor score)’, N=2499; adjusted R²=27.8%.

The countries with an average high score on vertical power enthusiasm are very differently characterised for the perceived change on influence between levels of government.

Vertical power realism entails an engagement in contacts with higher level authorities, although simultaneously not expecting too much from this. Such a ‘vertical power realism’, as we have termed it, also significantly differs across the countries under scrutiny (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Vertical power realism (mean factor scores by country)




Predictors for this attitude are only found at the contextual level – but the overall explanatory power of the regression model is rather weak (Table 4). Such a realistic attitude is significantly less present in the Anglo group countries, but significantly more present with mayors in Franco and Central and Eastern Europe group countries. Curiously, realism is here more present in those countries where the mayors more often perceive a growing influence of local authorities in the whole political system (see table 1). Similarly, it is more present in unitary states. Interestingly, the city size plays a role: the larger the city, the more the mayor is likely to engage in vertical power relations on pragmatic grounds.

Table 3: OLS Regression on ‘Vertical power realism’

Types of variable	Variables	Stand. coefficient (Beta)	P=
Socio-demographics	Age	-.004	.859
	Gender (dummy for male)	.004	.854
	Education (dummy for university degree)	-.036	.075
	Years in office as mayor	.016	.465
Intergovernmental relations	<i>Anglo group country</i>	-.088	.000
	<i>Franco group country</i>	.153	.000
	<i>East & Central group country</i>	.116	.000
State structure	<i>Federalist country</i>	-.150	.000
City centrality	<i>Size (in classes of inhabitants)</i>	.149	.000
	Core city	-.010	.635

Dependent variable: ‘Vertical power realism (factor score)’, N=2499; adjusted R²=8.8%.

Figure 12: Vertical power frustration (mean factor scores by country)



Vertical power frustration entailing a rather minimalist engagement with upper government levels, on the grounds of a somewhat cynical conviction that local government has no say in any case, also significantly differs across the countries (Figure 12).

Table 4: OLS Regression on ‘Vertical power frustration’

Types of variable	Variables	Standardized coefficient (Beta)	P=
Socio-demographics	Age	.003	.687
	Gender (dummy for male)	.068	.515
	Education (dummy for university degree)	.043	.639
	Years in office as mayor	.003	.367
Intergovernmental relations	Anglo group country	.107	.000
	Franco group country	.050	.000
	East & Central group country	.067	.004
State structure	Federalist country	.049	.216
City centrality	Size (in classes of inhabitants)	.013	.003
	Core city	.042	.897

Dependent variable: ‘Vertical power frustration (factor score)’, N=2499; adjusted $R^2=10.5\%$.

The results of the regression analysis (Table 5) again show that individual-level variables play no significant role in explaining this attitude. In fact, the type of local government a country belongs to largely explains this attitude. More precisely, mayors in Anglo group countries less often deploy this attitude. It stems largely from mayors dwelling in the Northern and the Central and Eastern European group of countries, differently characterised for the perceived changes of the intergovernmental distribution of influence. Again, there is a significant influence of the city size: the bigger the city, the more its mayor is likely to become disillusioned with his engaging in vertical power relations.

10.4 Conclusion

Our analysis suggests that mayors’ perceptions, opinions and strategies concerning intergovernmental relations are strongly influenced by the traditional nature of intergovernmental and political relations between the central state and local authorities. In particular, the classic typology of local government traditions

proved to explain most of the variance observed in these three dimensions of how mayors engage and perceive themselves in vertical power relations. Similarly, the federalist or unitary structure of the state also has an effect in shaping mayors' role in vertical power relations. However, our analysis did not yield much evidence for the plausibility of the political economy argument. Mayors' activities, perceptions and strategies within vertical power relations do not appear to be significantly associated with the degree of socio-economic centrality or urban status of their city.

When it comes to individual attitudes and behaviour within vertical power relations, mayors across Europe show different profiles. Some are enthusiastic, some are pragmatic, some are frustrated about their role and their possibilities with respect to upper level governments. The analysis in the last section of this chapter has shown that, while some of these differences can be explained by individual characteristics such as age and gender, or city-level variables such as size, the heart of the matter clearly lies with the traditional characteristics of the intergovernmental relations framed by the various national political systems and that thorough decentralisation do not lead to what we called "vertical power enthusiasm", but more easily to a more cautious attitude in evaluating the possibilities of local governments (and of the personal active contribution of their mayors) to improve their position in the re-scaling processes. More precisely, the results of this analysis suggest that, in terms of vertical power relations, it is a pleasure to be a mayor in the countries belonging to the North and Middle European group, not too bad in Anglo group countries, liveable in the countries of the Franco type, but overtly frustrating in most of the countries of East and Central Europe.

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11 Divided Loyalties? Mayors between Party Representation and Local Community Interests

Franz Fallend, Györgyi Ignits and Pawel Swianiewicz

Gerhard Lehmbruch (1975: 7) once described local political parties as “Janus-faced” (although he only referred to Germany, his observation may certainly be generalised). On the one side, he argued, they are parties and as such they represent specific interests of parts of the local community, emphasise their distinctiveness vis-à-vis other parties and, on the day of election, strive to provide the voters with clear party-political alternatives. As Sharpe and Newton (1984: 202) argue, political parties which are present in local governments “are not mere transmission belts of majority interests or needs, but they have views of their own as to what policies they wish to pursue, and they only modify these views if forced to do so because they have a closer competitor”. On the other side, many citizens perceive local politics as “non political”, i.e. non-party. In a phrase which became very popular in recent local election campaign in Poland, and which was repeatedly quoted by many candidates and journalists: “there should be no politics in local policy-making, since a ‘hole in a bridge is not political’.

In this constellation individual politicians may gain relevance at the expense of parties, at least to a greater extent than is the case at the regional, national or European level. The relative smallness of the local environment, which reduces the role of parties as aggregators of diverse interests, together with the asserted non-party character of local politics and the importance of personal relationships in local communities (‘everybody knows everybody’), gives charismatic personalities theoretically better opportunities to make political careers *without* or even *against* parties than at higher levels of the political system. Things may be different when we start to differentiate between small and big municipalities; in the latter ones individual politicians may find it more difficult to achieve public visibility on a permanent and exclusive basis, and parties will be indispensable to organise and structure decision-making processes. However, in general we may assume that political parties play a less prominent role in local politics, with the consequence that individual politicians may gain a party-free profile to a greater extent compared to the regional, national or European level.

The following enquiry focuses on three major questions: (1) How often are European mayors formally in contact with political parties? (2) What kind of contacts do they have to parties, and to what extent are they dependent on them? (3) What are the main factors that account for the nature of party contacts and the extent of party dependence of the mayors? Our analysis proceeded from the assumption that four factors may influence the nature of party contacts and the extent of party dependence of the mayors, i.e. the type of the local government system, position of a mayor within the structures of local government (including the electoral system, i.e. direct election or election by the local council), the size of the municipality and personal characteristics of the mayors. It shows that the role of parties cannot be explained right away by our independent variables, but that country-specific factors seem to play a very important role on their own.

11.1 Mayors and political parties: An analytical framework

European democracies – at all levels – are party democracies. The idea that political parties are essential for practicing democracy in the modern state is in principle not contested among political scientists nowadays (Müller 2000: 309). However, the pre-dominant role they assumed nearly for granted in European democracies in the post-1945 period has been questioned in particular since the 1970s. In this decade, the political process seemed closed to public influence and open to corruption; the traditional major parties were accused of working primarily in their own organisational and power interest. Ideas of participatory democracy spread, and the ‘new social movements’ broke the monopoly of parties to articulate the interests of people and to translate them into the political arena. During the 1980s and 1990s the legitimacy of parties eroded further because of the inability of governments, irrespective of their party colour, to come to terms with the challenges posed by globalisation and to solve impending economic and social problems (recession, rising unemployment, financial crisis of the welfare state, ecological problems, immigration, etc.). Opinion polls revealed rising degrees of party disaffection, directed primarily towards the major, established parties (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Mair et al. 2004).

As a consequence of this, during the 1990s in many countries government at all levels was “reinvented” (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) or reformed (OECD 1995). In the name of efficiency and effectiveness the role of parties in public decision-making was downgraded.

At the local level, similar developments can be traced, albeit with some delay. A look at the German debate may serve to illustrate this point (cf. Holtkamp 2003: 4-7): Traditionally, German constitutional lawyers argued that local self-

government should in principle be “non-political”, dedicated to the (as it was perceived) politically neutral common good of the local community, reserving parties only a limited role. In the 1970s, however, political scientists noticed a general shift towards “party politicising” in local politics. The rising economic, social and ecological problems inspired public debates, structured by political parties (Holtmann 1994; 2002). At the same time, though, it was observed that strong party-political influence in local issues stirred up negative public feelings (Holtmann 1994: 258-9). Recently, however, the alleged trend towards “party politicising” was contested by Wehling (2003), who identified, hinting in particular at the introduction of direct election of mayors and of citizen initiatives in all municipal laws in Germany, a reverse trend of downgrading party-political influence.

But the phenomenon of shrinking party relevance has by no means been limited to Germany. After the 2nd World War in many countries of Western Europe the role of parties, as measured by membership of local councillors, has increased dramatically (for evidence from Nordic countries see for example Sundberg 1991; from the United Kingdom Sharpe and Newton 1984). But recent years brought several analyses describing the diminishing role and social prestige of parties as a whole and parties in local politics in particular (Clark 2000; Clark and Lipset 2001; Gabriel et al. 2002; Hoffmann-Martinot 1998). The traditional system of local *government*, dominated by state institutions and elected representatives (of political parties), would have been gradually replaced by a system of local *governance*, involving complex sets of organisations drawn from the public, private and voluntary sectors (John 2001: 6-18). A managerialist, market-oriented vision of central-local relations as well as of the organisation of public services has proliferated. Local citizenship values would have been more and more pushed aside by consumerism. National de-alignment processes (shrinking party membership, fading party identification, rising party disaffection) would have aggravated the situation, all the more as local party organisations are more dependent on honorary work and do not have the same possibilities as national party organisations to exploit state resources and develop into ‘cartel parties’ (see Katz and Mair 1995). In many municipalities dissatisfaction with the traditional parties has led to the uprising of issue-based parties or voter alliances, resulting in political fragmentation and a rising number of coalition (instead of one-party) governments (Stoker 1996: 1-3; Andrew and Goldsmith 1998: 104-107).

The general retreat of (traditional) political parties and the ensuing political fragmentation at the local level as well as the changes in the dominant policy-making modalities, have affected power relations in the municipalities: in particular they have strengthened the mayor. The described changes of the eco-

nomie and political environment have triggered calls for a new institutional design, for the establishment of a flexible system mixing markets and networks with traditional bureaucracy. In such a system it seems as if it is above all the mayor who has the capabilities of assuming the crucial role of a (neutral, non-party) broker, an organiser of coalitions, and a consensus builder between diverse, public as well as privately organised interests (Stoker 1996: 23). Constitutional reforms strengthening the participatory character of the political system (the above-mentioned introduction of the direct designation of mayors together with various kinds of citizen initiatives) may intensify this tendency (see the contribution of Haus and Sweeting in this book).

Table 1: Party members as percentage of voters


Countries	Year	Total membership base	Membership/Electorate ratio (%)
Austria	1999	1,031,052	17.66
Greece	1998	600,000	6.77
Belgium	1999	480,804	6.55
Switzerland	1997	293,000	6.38
Sweden	1998	365,588	5.54
Denmark	1998	205,382	5.14
Italy	1998	1,974,040	4.05
Portugal	2000	346,504	3.99
Czech Republic	1999	319,800	3.94
Spain	2000	1,131,250	3.42
Ireland	1998	86,000	3.14
Germany	1999	1,780,173	2.93
Holland	2000	294,469	2.51
Hungary	1999	173,600	2.15
United Kingdom	1998	840,000	1.92
France	1999	615,219	1.57
Poland	2000	326,500	1.15

Source: Mair and van Biezen (2001)

The observations quoted above concern first of all countries of Western Europe. The situation in the eastern part of the continent has been distinct to a large extent. Before 1990 (communist) political parties ruled over both central and local level politics with no democratic legitimisation of their position. This specific heritage to a large extent contributed to the situation after 1990, which may be characterised by an especially high level of distrust in political parties in general. As a result parties in Central and Eastern Europe are very weak. The party membership rate in Central and Eastern Europe is usually much lower than in the Western part of the continent, in spite of the considerable drop in West European countries in recent years (see table 1 for the 17 countries covered by

our project). In the Local Democracy and Innovation (LDI) Research Project on local governments in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, which was conducted in the early 1990s, it was observed that “party membership” was seen, by both citizens and local politicians, as one of the least important qualifications for local councillors (Baldersheim et al. 1996). The same observation has been confirmed by the second wave of the LDI Project conducted in 1997 in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia.¹

Figure 1: Analytical model



For the purpose of our study of the role of mayors in local politics in Europe today, this longitudinal view has to be complemented by a cross-sectional view, taking into account the different local government systems across Europe as well as more specific institutional and political differences between the municipalities under study. The analytical model which forms the basis of the subsequent hypothesis formulation and testing is presented in figure 1. We assume that the degree of party dependence of a mayor in a certain municipality is in-

¹ Observation based on own calculations of the authors using raw data collected within the LDI project. The same observation can be made from the results of this project. When we asked our respondent to value the statement “Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation” more than 40% of the eastern mayors disagreed with this. This proportion was half as big (20%) by the others.

fluenced by four sets of variables: (1) the government system of the municipality, (2) the election mode for the mayor, (3) the size of the municipality, and (4) personal characteristics of the mayor.

11.1.1 Independent variables

We base our testing on the classical typology of *local government systems* in Europe prepared by Hesse and Sharpe (1991), which is defined by the nature of local-central relations. However, as their typology does not include the “new” democracies, and as the “new” democracies in addition cannot be subsumed under one of their three categories (Franco, Anglo, Middle and Northern European type), we complemented it by a separate category for the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (cf. Heinelt and Hlepas in this book).

The central hypothesis is that in countries belonging to the Franco or South-European type, with a high degree of “political localism” (characterised by an emphasis on mobilising local political support and using clientelistic networks in negotiations with higher government as well as party levels), party is more important and the mayor therefore displays a higher degree of party dependence or party loyalty. On the contrary, in countries of the North and Middle European group, where “legal localism” is dominant (characterised by an emphasis on public service provision and directing bureaucratic organisations), the mayor should be able to a greater extent to assume a position “above” the parties.

In the CEE countries the local government systems are very much diversified (Horvath 2000; Swianiewicz 2005), but in general can be characterised as being closest to ‘political localism’. However, the weakness of political parties and the general distrust in the role of parties in local governance (Baldersheim et al. 1996; Swianiewicz 2003) may be expected to result in a relatively low partisanship of the mayors.

In terms of the POLLEADER typology (see Heinelt and Hlepas in this book), which combines the Hesse and Sharpe (1991) typology with the Mouritzen and Svara (2002) typology taking into account the intra-municipal power relations, the “political mayors” of Southern Europe would be expected to have closer ties to parties than the “executive mayors” of the Northern-Middle European and the CEE countries. These hypotheses are related to the role which is played by parties in local politics, but not necessarily to the membership of

mayors in political parties.² We also expect a relatively significant role of parties in collegial leadership forms, in which mayor is more directly dependent on ability to build coalitions and to work with various party groups within council.

As mentioned above, the distrust in parties has been quite a wide-spread phenomenon recently. Indeed, the recent international study of parties' reputation shows that only in 2 out of 13 countries covered by our survey, parties are trusted rather than distrusted.³ But the level of trust in parties is not distributed evenly among the regions of Europe. It is by far the lowest in Central and Eastern Europe (especially in Poland, which is on the bottom of the quoted ranking), and the highest in Northern Europe (with Denmark being the lead). We expect that this variation will also indirectly influence the role played by parties in local politics.

Electoral systems in which the mayors are elected directly by the citizens are expected to reduce the dependence of the mayors of their own parties but also of parties in general. Taking advantage of the growing party disaffection in recent years, they may claim that they have a higher legitimacy and a direct mandate from the people, reducing their reliance on party support and hence their contacts with party representatives. It is interesting to notice that the introduction of the direct election of mayors in the United Kingdom resulted in the election of non-partisan mayors in more than half of the municipalities which had adopted this institutional model (Elcock and Fenwick 2003). A dwindling role of parties was also observed in Poland after the introduction of the direct election of mayors in 2002 (Swianiewicz 2004), or in Hungary where the direct election was introduced in 1994 (Swianiewicz and Mielczarek 2005).

Regarding the effect of the *size of the municipality* we hypothesise that the bigger a municipality, the higher the degree of party dependence of the mayor. The bigger a municipality, the more political debates take place in the local assembly, in a competitive pattern following party lines. Important decisions are prepared in party faction meetings and taken by majority voting (Wehling 1991: 150; Holtmann 1994: 257). It is also related to the fact that political parties are in general less active and less important in small municipalities where strong personal ties are more significant (Denters 2002).

2 Hoffmann-Martinot (1998) provides data suggesting that mayors in Southern Europe might be formally independent (i.e. non-partisan) even more often than their counterparts in Northern Europe.

3 See „Global corporate reputation study“ conducted at the beginning of 2005 by TNS. The survey covered 41 countries, including 13 (Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Netherlands, England, Ireland, Poland, Hungary, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal and Italy) countries analysed in our survey of city mayors (see www.tns-global.com).

However, we should take into consideration here that our study excludes municipalities with less than 10,000 residents, where features of small communities might be the most visible. Therefore, we expect that the relationship with size may be found not as strong as it would be if our sample represented a full spectrum of size-cohorts.

We will test if the strength of links with political parties is dependent on the *personal characteristics of mayors* such as age, and education. Clark and Hofmann-Martinot (1998) identify a decrease in the role of political parties as a result of the “New Political Culture” which they attribute to younger and more educated political leaders. If this expectation is correct, we should find younger and more educated mayors more loosely connected to parties.

For the time-being we do not discuss in detail the inter-relationship between individual independent variables, but there is no doubt that such interdependency does exist. For example, Page and Goldsmith (1987) explained variation in the nature of central-local relations (this variation has an impact on the role of parties as well) by the various levels of territorial fragmentation of local government systems in Central and Southern Europe. Similarly, the variables government system and direct election of mayors are interrelated – the strong mayor form usually (though not always) coincides with the direct election of the mayor.

11.1.2 Dependent variables

In order to measure our dependent variable, the party dependence of mayors, we split it into two dimensions. First of all, we are interested in formal links between mayors and political parties. This is measured by *party membership* as self-declared by our respondents.

But the fact of being a party member or a formally independent candidate does not tell us the whole story about the role of parties in local politics. One can imagine a formally independent mayor who is very much dependent on a party machine in his/her everyday activities. Or, on the opposite, a mayor who is a party member may be strong enough to resist any attempts to influence his/her policy agenda. The actual significance of parties depends on their influence on actual decisions made by local governments, the nature and frequency of their contacts with mayors. That is why we constructed a “*party significance index*” which takes into account several items related to various aspects of parties’ activity in local politics. In fact, what we call “party significance” consists of three sub-dimensions, which are reflected in three sub-indexes constructed on the basis of the survey data:

- Mayors' attitudes to the role of parties as local political institutions: It is measured by two items: (i) the importance the mayor ascribes to the implementation of the program of his/her party, (ii) the mayors' agreement with the statement that "political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation".
- Mayors' activities related to party life, measured by: (i) proportion of work-time spent on party meetings, (ii) frequency of communication with party leaders.
- Parties' influence on local political life, measured by: (i) perceived influence of party leaders on local decision making, (ii) support of the political party for the mayor in the recent election.

These three sub-indices represent slightly different dimensions of parties' roles in local political life. However, we discovered that all six original variables taken into account are significantly correlated with each other (all correlations are significant on a 0.001 level). The same applies to correlations between the three sub-indices. The lowest correlation (+0.368, significant on a 0.001 level) has been found between the mayors' attitudes to parties and the mayors' activities related to party life, while the highest (+0.496) between the mayors' activities related to parties and the parties' influence on local decisions.

As space is limited and as all three dimensions are strongly correlated, we take into account only the main (synthetic) party significance index in the further analysis. The index has been constructed on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means no importance of parties, while 100 means the highest importance of parties for local political life.

11.2 *Mayors and political parties: Empirical results*


11.2.1 A general overview

Before we turn to the significance test of the single independent variables in our model, it is worth to present the variation of the absolute values of variables illustrating the importance of political parties in local politics (see figure 2).

The party membership rate for mayors is very diverse. It is close to 100% in Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, but it falls below 80% in Italy, Germany and all three countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is especially low in Hungary and Poland, with under 70%. But most striking is the Polish case – party membership is almost half that in any other country (only 39%

of the mayors being party members). It well corresponds with the lowest level of trust in parties, which was already quoted in previous section of this chapter.

Figure 2: Mayors' membership in political parties and the party significance index by countries



The variation of the party significance index is similar but not identical. The average value of the party significance index for those mayors who are formally members of a party is 44.2, while for non-members it is just 27.6. Sweden has both the highest value of the index and the highest membership rate. Poland has by far the lowest value regarding party membership and the next to the lowest value of the party significance index. On the other hand, the Czech Republic has a low membership rate, in spite of the fact that parties seem to play an important role in local political life. It is just the opposite in the Netherlands, Switzerland and France – relatively high membership rates of mayors in political parties coincide with a low level of dependency on parties in every-day activity. The case of the Netherlands is especially striking – a high membership rate coincides with the lowest party significance among all 17 countries. Perhaps the method of the Dutch mayor's appointment (by the government) has something to do

with this observation – an externally appointed mayor may be less dependent on local party elites. Differences between values of both indices are further illustrated by table 2. We will come back to the explanation of this pattern later in the chapter.

Table 2: Mayors' party membership and the party significance index – classification of countries.

		<i>Party Membership of Mayors</i>		
		High (more than 95%)	Medium (80-95%)	Low (below 80%)
<i>Party significance index</i>	High (more than 48)	Sweden Austria Spain		Czech Republic
	Medium (42-48)	Belgium UK Denmark	Portugal Greece	Italy Hungary
	Low (below 42)	Netherlands Ireland	Switzerland France	Germany Poland


11.2.2 The impact of the local government system

As we may see in figure 3, the party significance index does not fully correspond with the pattern of the party membership variation. The index values are the highest in Southern Europe and the lowest in Eastern Europe. Most of the differences between groups of countries are statistically significant on a 0.05 level (the only insignificant correlations are between the Eastern and the Middle and Northern group and between the Southern and the Anglo group). These differences support very much our initial hypothesis. The limited degree of the development of modern parties together with the general distrust towards party politicians results in the lowest party significance index as well as the lowest party membership ratio in Central and Eastern Europe.

As suggested by earlier results (quoted in section 2), the party membership ratio for mayors is also relatively low in Southern Europe. This difference is sometimes attributed to the interference of the size variable. South European countries are more territorially fragmented than countries in the Northern part of the continent, and as we remember size influences the probability of the mayor being a party member. Yet, our study disregards the smallest municipalities, and the median municipality size in our sample (between 19 and 20,000 residents) is similar in all types of government systems except for the Anglo type. So the difference in this respect between Southern Europe and other types of local government systems cannot be reduced to the size factor. An additional factor influ-

encing low party membership in Southern Europe is the relatively low level of trust in political parties (see section 2). However, as we expected in our hypothesis, “political localism” in this region results in an important role parties play in local political life. But the picture is not absolutely clear - the pattern of formal independence of mayors and the strong role of parties is not confirmed by all countries classified in the South European type. It is just the opposite in France, where many mayors belong to political parties, but at the same time are very strong local political figures and prove their independence from the party machines in their everyday activity.

Figure 3: Mayors’ membership in political parties (%) and the party significance index (median) by local government systems




Nevertheless, in each case the most important factor accounting for different values of the party significance index is whether the mayors are or are not party members. The data in table 3 suggest that non-partisan mayors in Central and Eastern Europe are more bound to party life than their non-partisan colleagues in the Anglo or North European group. This confirms the thesis that a very low party membership in CEE countries might be a formal phenomenon only – many mayors are closely linked to parties, although formally (for various rea-

sons, such as avoiding the unpopular label of being partisan) they are not party members. Less numerous non-party mayors in the United Kingdom, in Ireland or in Northern Europe are independent mayors to a much larger degree.

Table 3: The party significance index for mayors active in the different regions of Europe (Hesse and Sharpe typology) (mean)

	Southern Europe	Middle and Northern Europe	Anglo group	Central and Eastern Europe
Non party members	34.2	22.8	17.4	25.2
Party members	47.7	40.0	45.3	44.9

Figure 4: Mayors’ membership in political parties and the party significance index by institutional system of leadership (Polleader typology)



If we turn to the impact of the type of local institutional settings (figure 4) we observe that executive mayors are the least often members of political parties and also are the least influenced by parties. The membership rate is the highest

in case of collegial mayors, while the party significance index has the highest values for political mayors. These differences go very much along with our initial expectations.

11.2.3 Electoral system

As we expected in our hypothesis, mayors who are directly elected are less often formal members of political parties. Only one in twenty mayors appointed by the councils is independent, but the same is true for one in four directly elected mayors (see figure 4). The party plays a much more important role in the career path of the mayors who are appointed by the respective councils: the large majority of them had a position in a party before his/her first mandate, while this is true for only half of the directly elected mayors. The non-directly elected mayors feel in twice bigger proportion that one of the principal motives to become a mayor was his/her duty towards the political movement they belonged to (35% against 18% in case of the directly elected mayors). Directly elected mayors are also more often inclined to appeal to direct democracy mechanisms (such as local referenda), and this relationship remains significant even if we control its effect by the party membership of our respondents.

The same relationship seems to apply to the perceived impact of parties on local political life, as measured by our party significance index, but in this case the difference between directly and indirectly elected mayors is not statistically significant. The median value of an index for directly elected mayors is 42.7, while the median for those nominated by the councils is 43.2. In spite of their different motivations (described in the above paragraph), directly elected mayors are almost equally as those appointed by the council bound by relationship with political parties.

Also in this case, party membership is a decisive factor for the values of the party significance index (see table 4). Formally independent and directly elected mayors are the least influenced by parties (lowest value of the party significance index). Independent mayors who are appointed by the council are more dependent on on-going support from councillors, so they need to have closer links with parties represented in the council, and that explains a significantly higher party significance index in the right lower cell of the table 4. As we might expect the highest values of the index are for mayors who are party members – regardless they are directly or indirectly elected (a difference between two figures in the upper row of the table 4 is not statistically significant).

Figure 5: Mayors' membership in political parties and the party significance index by the method of mayor's designation




Table 4: Means of party significance index for directly and indirectly elected mayors

	Directly elected	Indirectly elected
Party members	45.2	42.0
Non party members	27.1	34.9

11.2.4 The impact of size

The impact of size on the role of parties in local politics is illustrated by table 5 and figure 5. In general, city size is significantly correlated with both of our dependent variables, but the impact on the membership rate is much stronger than on the party significance index. While less than three-quarters of the mayors are members of a party in municipalities with 10-15,000 residents, this proportion grows to more than 95% in the biggest cities (over 200,000 residents).

But interestingly enough, both correlations, although significant if we calculate them for the pooled data file including all 17 countries, are not necessarily significant if we analyse them country by country. Size is a significant factor which can explain the party significance index in Germany, the Czech Republic, France and Poland and – less powerful – in Portugal. However, it remains powerless in the remaining 12 countries. The situation is even more extreme for the party membership of local mayors – there are only three countries in which this variable is significantly correlated with city size: Germany, France and Italy. These observations indicate that the size alone is not a sufficient explanatory factor.

Table 5: Correlations between city size and the role of parties in local politics


	Party significance index – size	Membership of political parties – size
Austria		
Belgium		
Czech Rep.	***	
Denmark		
England		
France	***	**
Germany	***	***
Greece		
Hungary		
Ireland		
Italy		*
Netherlands		
Poland	***	
Portugal	*	
Spain		
Sweden		NA
Switzerland		
Total	***	***

Note: * - correlation significant on 0.05 level, ** - significant on 0.01 level, *** - significant on 0.001 level. Blank spaces indicate a correlation which is insignificant. NA – not applicable (100% of Swedish mayors in our sample belong to political parties). For calculations we used the natural logarithms of city size.

Figure 5 suggests that the relationship between city size and party membership is linear, but in case of party significance the relationship is more complicated. If we use means for individual size groups, the relationship is increasing monotonously with increasing the size, but differences between the last three size cohorts are not statistically significant. If we use median instead of the mean, the relationship is closer to A-shaped (or reverse U-shaped), with the role of

parties growing with city size up to (more or less) 100,000 residents, and decreasing beyond this point. This relationship is not very strong, but a possible explanation might be that mayors of big cities are often political figures who are strong enough to resist interference by their own parties. This line of explanation is confirmed by some observations from Polish cities (Swianiewicz et al. 2004), but Ken Livingstone, mayor of London, is perhaps the best known example.

Figure 6: Mayors' membership in political parties and the party significance index (based on mayors' perception) – variation by city size



But the non-linear nature of the relationship is not the only explanation for the low correlation coefficients found on the country level (table 5). If we limit our calculations to the group of cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants (figure 5 suggests that for this group the relationship should be linear) the list of countries in which the correlation between city size and the party significance index is

significant on a 0.05 level is still rather short and includes: Germany, the Czech Republic, Italy, Poland, France and Spain.⁴

Our observations in this section suggest that size alone – although not totally unimportant - is not a sufficient explanatory factor for the impact of political parties on local mayors and local politics in general. As mentioned in section 2, low significance of this independent variable is probably to a large extent related to the fact that our sample is limited to cities with more than 10,000 residents. It excludes the smallest municipalities, in which sociological arguments supporting our hypothesis on the impact of size are the most relevant.⁵

11.2.5 Personal characteristics

The ordinary socio-demographic factors (age and education) have *no* significant effect on the party membership of the European mayors. The party membership rate is independent from the age of the mayors as well as from their educational status. More interesting is the effect of these socio-demographic variables to the party significance index.

For mayors with elementary education only, parties are more important than for those with higher education. This finding goes along with the “new political culture” hypothesis mentioned in section 2, but may also be interpreted in terms of the different “resources of power” of the mayors.

Also, the age of the mayors is significantly correlated with the index: this relationship is linear, but reversed - with the age of the mayor increasing the value of his/her party-dependence is decreasing. This seems to contradict another part of the “new political culture” hypothesis. But this phenomenon can be explained when we focus on the length of terms in office of a mayor. In fact, age and terms in office can be strongly connected with each other. The older the mayor is, the longer time he/she can have spent in the mayoral office. And with the number of years spent in the mayoral office, the degree of party significance is decreasing (Pearson’s corr: -0.19, significant at the 0.001 level). The empirical results show that those mayors who are for a longer time in their office can

4 For some countries the explanation of a very low importance may be attributed to the low size of the sample (especially in Ireland, Portugal and Austria), but this is not a convincing ‘excuse’ for most of the other countries.

5 Indeed, a study performed recently for 7 countries of Central and Eastern Europe suggests that the size of local government is a very powerful factor explaining the role of parties, if we compare really small (with less than 10,000 residents) with bigger municipalities (Swianiewicz and Mielczarek 2005).

free themselves more easily from the influences of the parties at the local level. We can suppose that parallel to the years spent in office, they can accumulate more resources, such as reputation in the local society, prestige etc. This helps them to run their job regardless of whether they have support of the local party machines or not. So it is not the age itself, but rather the length of the political experience which plays a significant role.

11.2.6 Multi-variate analysis

To understand the factors influencing the role of parties in local politics better, it is necessary to check how our independent variables work together. As one of our dependent variables (party membership) is categorical, we have generated logistic regression models, while in the case of the party significance index we have used linear regression analysis.

Model I presents the results of the logistic regression analysis to explain the membership of the mayors in political parties. In order to check the correlations among the independent variables, we present the “uncleared” effects of each independent variable to the party membership of the European mayors in the first column. This means, in a first step we generated models with two variables (the relation between the dependent variable with each of the independent variables was analysed separately). By this we are able to show how strong the single effects of the independent variables on the party membership of the mayors are. From the change of the regression coefficients (exp B) in the second step, when all variables are included in one model, we can see and interpret the several cross effects among the independent variables.

In our model the odds ratios (exp B) should be interpreted as how much times more or less a mayor has got the chance to be a party member, depending on the change of the value of the independent variables. In case of categorical variables we shall always use a reference category, to which we compare the chances in all other categories of the same independent variable. In the models the reference category is the non direct elected mayors, political mayors, belonging to the Anglo group.

The model confirms that both the direct election of mayors and location in Central and Eastern Europe have a strong and negative impact on the membership of mayors in political parties. The (positive) impact of city size is also significant. In the whole model, after we filter the effects of size and the type of elections, compared to the Anglo countries, the only group of countries which differ significantly in party membership of mayors is Central and Eastern Europe. In this group of countries the chance to find a mayor who is a party

member is just a third of the same probability in the Anglo group. There is no significant effect of the type of leadership (political, ceremonial, collegial or executive mayors).

The impact of types of local government systems, as defined in this chapter, displays a somewhat different pattern in case of the party significance index (see *Model II*): In the whole model, belonging to the Southern European countries has a positive impact on the value of the index. It is interesting that the negative effect of the Central and Eastern group of countries disappears after filtering the effects of the other independent variables. This is caused by the low proportion of mayors with party membership in the groups of these countries: when we filter this effect in the whole model, it comes out that to be a mayor in Central and Eastern Europe does not mean that parties have lower influence at the local level. The same happened with the countries belonging to Middle and Northern Europe.

As the leadership type is concerned, collegial mayors, compared to political mayors are influenced by parties to significantly greater degree. This observation goes along with our initial hypothesis.

The size variable has a positive effect in the whole model, in spite of its explanatory power has decreased.. The type of electoral system has no significant effect in this model. Age and years in office have both significant and negative effects in our model, but in the case of the former variable this effect has been reduced considerably (as its impact is to a large extent due to a long term in mayoral office). We can conclude that all in all party membership has the strongest effect on the party significance index.

Table 6: Model I. Impact of independent variables on the membership in political parties. Logistic regression; odds ratios.

	Bivariate effects	Multivariate effects
Nagelkerke R ²	-	0.25
Size	1.7****	1.7****
Direct election	0.15****	0.14****
Central and Eastern	0.04****	0.3**
South	0.26***	2.2
Middle and Northern	0.28**	1.99
Ceremonial	3.3	3.2
Collegial	3.6****	3.6
Executive	0.34****	1.1

Reference: non direct elected mayors, Anglo group mayors and Political mayors

Notes: significance: * - 0.05 level, ** - 0.01 level, *** - 0.001 level, **** - 0.0001 level. For calculations we used the natural logarithms of city size.

Table 7: *Model II*. Impact of independent variables on the party significance index. OLS regression; standardized regression coefficients.

	Bivariate effects	Multivariate effects
R ²	-	0.27
Size	0.16****	0.12****
Direct election	-0.05	0.07
Central and Eastern	-0.2****	0.06
South	0.56	0.28****
Middle and Northern	-0.19****	0.03
Ceremonial	-0.01	0.02
Collegial	-0.08****	0.13*
Executive	-0.31****	0.01
Age	-0.11****	-0.07****
Years in office	-0.15****	-0.12****
Member of a party	0.41****	0.4****

Reference: Anglo group mayors and Political mayors

Notes: significance: * - 0.05 level, ** - 0.01 level, *** - 0.001 level, **** - 0.0001 level. For calculations we used the natural logarithms of city size.

Referring to the size and the electoral system variable it is very well seen from the two models, that these variables play a more important role in the case of the party membership of European mayors than in the case of the party significance index.

In general, however, the explanatory power of both models is not impressively high. In this context we should stress the great variance of independent variables within the identified country groups.

More powerful are those models in which the list of explanatory variables is supplemented with dummy variables standing for the location in individual countries (*Models III* in table 8). It re-confirms the earlier mentioned problems with the variation within groups of countries identified with different types of local government systems. The increase of R square parameter is dramatic, in particular in the model explaining the party significance index. In this case R square increased nearly twice - from 0.27 to 0.49. In case of the logistic regression model explaining party membership, the introduction of country dummies has not resulted in such a dramatic change (Nagelkerke R square increased from 0.25 to 0.29). It means that country specific factors have a much more important role in case of the party significance index, while the institutional variables (electoral system and type of local government system) have higher explanatory power in the analysis of party membership variation.

Table 8: Models III. Impact of independent variables on role of parties in local politics⁶

	Odds ratios	Standardized regression coefficients
	Membership in political parties	Party significance index
Nagelkerke R ²	0.29	-
R ² sq.	-	0.49
Significance of the model	****	****
Size	1.7****	0.11****
Direct election		
Austria		0.11****
Belgium		
Czech		0.11****
Denmark	5.46**	0.07****
England	Reference category	Reference category
France		
Germany		
Greece		0.12***
Hungary	0.56*	0.13****
Italy		0.29****
Netherlands		-0.29****
Poland	0.17****	-0.03**
Portugal		0.14****
Spain	9.07****	0.41****
Sweden		0.22****
Switzerland		
Age	-	-
Years in office	-	-0.04**
Member of a party	-	0.36****

Notes: significance: * - 0.05 level, ** - 0.01 level, *** - 0.001 level, **** - 0.0001 level. For calculations we used the natural logarithms of city size.

In multi-variate analysis, the impact on mayors' party membership remains significant in case of four dummy-country variables⁷. Location in Poland has the

6 To avoid high multi-collinearity among the independent variables, we did not include the dummy variables of the government systems (Central and Eastern, South, Anglo, Middle and Northern Europe) and the POLLEADER typology of political, ceremonial, collegial and executive mayors in these models. Ireland, because of its very low number of valid cases, is not included in both of the models.

7 In this model odds ratios (expB) have to be interpreted as a chance of a mayor to be a member of a party in each single country compared to those, who not belong to that country.

strongest negative impact, at the same time location in Denmark and Spain works in an opposite direction (it increases the probability of the mayor being a party member). City size remains significant in this model. But the impact of the mode of election disappears.

As regards the model explaining the party significance index, as many as 11 country variables remain important explanatory factors (and the level of significances is in almost all cases very convincing). By country dummies we leaved out England from the model because it was used as the reference category. Location in Poland and especially in the Netherlands reduces the value of the index. On the other hand, location in Spain, Portugal, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Greece Hungary and Czech Republic pushes up the value of the index. This effect is the highest in Spain. The age of the mayors lost its importance, but length of the term in office and party membership remain very powerful explanatory factors. It is worth to mention that belonging to Hungary has only a significant but opposite effect in the two models: to be a Hungarian mayor reduces the probability of having a membership in a party, but increases the value of the party membership index.

11.3 The roots of party significance

As a summary, we could deduce that the explanation of the role of parties in local politics cannot be limited to the system variables we identified in our analytical model. Country-specific factors cannot be reduced to the type of government, the position of the mayor or the size of cities in national samples – country-specific factors play a very important role on their own.

But at the same time, we have been able to confirm most of our hypothesis. Leaving aside relationship between role of parties and individual independent variables, but concentrating on models including all major assumed explanatory factors we found following general rules:

- Being a party member is the most powerful factor explaining party significance index (measured by intensity of contacts between mayor and party leaders, perceived influence of parties on decision making and mayors' recognition of the importance of parties in local political life);
- Size matters – party membership and parties' significance is higher in bigger than in smaller cities;
- Direct election reduces party membership rate, but not necessarily party significance index;

- Party significance index is the highest in countries characterised by a local government system with a collegial leader;
- Mayors in Central and Eastern Europe are the most often independent (non-party members), although it does not necessarily results in their lower intensity of links to parties in every-day policy making;
- Party significance index is the highest in the South European group of countries.

We have not found any strong relationship between personal characteristics of mayors (education, age) and the role of parties. But the number of years, spent in office, plays an important role in the party dependence of the mayors (party significance index is lower for mayors with a long experience in their office).

In general, while one might argue that the role of parties in local arguments, has reduced in recent years, there is no doubts that they still remain an important element of the machinery of local politics.

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12 Duo or Duel? The Relations between Mayors and Councils in Democratic Local Government

Bas Denters

12.1 Introduction

All the local government systems under study in this volume are characterized by a dual power structure in which two bodies play prominent roles: the *mayor* (sometimes as member of a collegial body: an executive board) and a directly elected *popular assembly* (referred to as municipal council). Even though the models of local government in the Western world differ in many important respects, in all systems the council is conceived as a crucial channel in the communication between citizens and their local governments. In a democratic system the council has both an internal and an external role:

- a. internally, the council should exert its influence in its relations with other agents to make local government responsive to ‘the voice of the people’,
- b. externally, the council should be capable of voicing demands and opinions of the local community in a public debate over major local issues.

In recent decades the world of local government has undergone major changes. These changes did not only affect the macro-context of local government, but also impacted upon the role of the council (see Denters 2005; Denters and Rose 2005). Internally, the role of the council may have been affected by a trend to strengthen the executive leadership in local government, often though not always in the form of a reinforcement of the position of the mayor. Externally, the legitimacy of the council may have declined as the result of a decline in the turnout, an increasing nationalisation of municipal elections and an increasing popularity of non-electoral forms of political participation.

Such changes may have profound effects on the relation between the mayor and the council as two important offices in local government. We will first chart how mayors perceive the changes and the resulting distribution of influence over the main actors in European town halls. Subsequently, we will describe how mayors evaluate the performance of the council both in its internal and its

external role. Of course these perceptions may be highly affected by the mayor's personal experiences and values, on the other hand they may also reflect variations in the 'objective' political conditions in which both the council and the mayor operate. Especially the latter type of effects may be interesting. In response to changes in its environment there is a whole wave of reform proposals and programmes aimed at modernising European local government by means of institutional reforms like the introduction of a directly elected mayor or the replacement of a committee-leader model by other models of organizing the political executive. Such reforms are aimed at for example strengthening the mayor's position in local government and improving internal procedures and the representative roles of the councils. Against such a background it may be interesting to see what difference institutional variations (e.g. having a directly elected mayor or not) may make. This will be done in the penultimate section of this contribution. In the final section we will draw some conclusions.

12.2 The influence of the council and the mayor

12.2.1 Methodological preliminaries

In the 1950s and 1960s the study of power and influence in local politics was a minor industry. Classic books by Hunter and Dahl sparked off a heated debate on the structure of local community power. In subsequent years the question 'Who governs?' became a less prominent concern. One of the major yields of this debate was a better understanding of the pros and cons of various methods of measuring political influence. In this contribution an actor A's influence is defined as the extent to which A succeeds in changing the decisions of other actors (B) or collective decision-making processes in accordance with A's preferences (Denters et al. 2000: 151; cf. Dahl 1984: 32).

Whereas traditionally formal positions and reputations were employed as indicators for the political influence of actors, it is clear that on the basis of this definition of influence research should ideally rather focus on the actual effects of the exercise of power on the outcome of political decision-making. For this reason Dahl (1961) has propagated the analysis of a set of political decisions and the processes leading to such outcomes. Although, nowadays, the superiority of the decision-making approach is acknowledged, it is also clear that this approach requires an enormous investment in data collection that precludes a comparative analysis in as many as 17 countries and over more than 2700 communities. If we nevertheless want to say something about (changes in) the relative influence of the various offices and actors in local government systems

across Europe we will have to rely on other types of data. In our questionnaires we have therefore asked mayors about their perceptions of the influence of various actors on the local decision-making process and changes in the distribution of influence over the last decades.

Obviously the perception of influence, and even more so the perception by one of the key actors, is not necessarily a valid indicator of actual influence patterns. On the other hand, results of Dutch research in which the decision-method was combined with a survey-based approach indicate that perceptions of influence by key local actors nicely matched the results of more sophisticated analyses of actual decision-making processes (Derksen 1985; Denters and Van der Kolk 2000). On the assumption that such Dutch findings may be generalized, mayoral perceptions provide us with information on the actual influence patterns.

12.2.2 Changes in recent years

In the introduction we have indicated that the relations between various actors in town halls may have changed considerably, our first main question is how such changes have effected the patterns of influence between these actors. In terms of rhetoric the 1990's were dominated by the rising popularity of New Public Management (NPM). Although the NPM ideology is a multifaceted and not necessarily consistent set of ideas, most of its advocates would probably agree on the need to strengthen the executive branch of government. This has implications at two levels. First, the NPM-advocates stressed the need to strengthen the position of the political executive vis-à-vis the parliamentary assembly; the council and other similar representative bodies should not indulge in 'overregulation and micromanagement' (Kettl 1995: 32). In local politics and government in several countries this has resulted in pleas for the introduction of the strong, directly elected mayor (Denters and Rose 2005). Second, NPM-adherents also have propagated the doctrine 'let managers manage' as a key element in the NPM reform program (Kettl 1997: 447-448). This principle implies that politicians should allow more discretion to the civil service and its managers. According to many observers the NPM-movement has also affected European local governments (e.g. John 2001; Denters and Rose 2005). Evidently if such a revolution has indeed taken place, it is also likely to have left visible marks on the relations between the various actors in European town halls.¹

1 For an analysis of the adoption of New Public Management ideas see Chapters 13, 14 and 15 by Carlos Alba and Carmen Navarro, Rikke Berg, Björn Egner and Hubert Heinelt in this volume.

In order to gauge the possible changes in patterns of local influence our questionnaire contained the following question: 'Could you characterize briefly the changes in influence that have occurred in the last decade among the various actors in local affairs. Indicate which, in the following couples, acquired relatively more influence drawing on your experience in your work as a mayor. On the basis of this question mayors could indicate to which extent they perceived changes in the influence of:

- Executive board (A) vis-à-vis the council (B)
- Mayor (C) vis-à-vis the council (B)
- Mayor (C) vis-à-vis executive board (A)
- Elected politicians (D) vis-à-vis administrative officers (E)

For each pair the respondents were asked to indicate the direction and the degree of changes in the relative influence of the actors on a seven-point scale (e.g.: much more A; more A ; a little more A; no change; a little more B; more B; much more B). According to the mayors in our surveys, there is a clear trend towards a strengthening of the political executive in general and of the mayor in particular (see Table 1). The first two main columns in the table indicate that both the executive board and the mayor appear to have increased their influence at the expense of the council and its members. This is true for all local government systems, but to varying degrees. If we consider the position of the board vis-à-vis the council the board's position in collective executive body systems has been strengthened even more than elsewhere. In the case of the relations between the mayor and both the council and the board the strengthening of the mayoral position is especially pronounced in strong mayor systems. This reflects the recent introduction of such a system in a number of countries, like Germany and Italy, which of course implies a major shift in the balance of power in the local government system. But even in the other systems we see a strengthening of the mayor's position both vis-à-vis the council and in his/her relation to the board. All this suggests a changing balance of power in local government, in which the political executive and especially the mayor have gained in political leverage over the council. From this perspective the strengthening of the political executive as one of the major desiderata in the NPM-doctrine is now very much a reality in many local governments across the continent. In the eyes of the mayors there is also little doubt that developments in recent decades have strengthened rather than weakened the political control over local bureaucracies. In the vast majority of cases mayors report strengthened political control over the bureaucracy. Only in the municipalities operating under a committee – leader system are similar changes not perceived.

Table 1: Changes in influence relation in local government over the last decade in various local government models (Mouritzen and Svava 2002)

	Board (A) - Councillors (B)			Mayor (C) - Councillors (B)			Mayor (C) - Board (A)			Politicians (D) - Administrators (E)			
	+A	+B	Mean (N)	+C	+B	Mean (N)	+C	+A	Mean (N)	+D	0	+E	Mean (N)
Strong mayor	53	13	-0.81 (1331)	70	10	-1.38 (1660)	69	8	-1.38 (1378)	46	35	18	-0.47 (1657)
Committee Leader	50	14	-0.63 (150)	42	13	-0.50 (152)	45	13	-0.51 (152)	30	39	30	-0.04 (152)
Collective	60	14	-0.99 (462)	51	14	-0.72 (456)	52	14	-0.75 (458)	44	35	20	-0.40 (459)
Total	54	13	-0.85 (1960)	65	11	-1.19 (2283)	63	9	-1.07 (2003)	45	36	20	-0.42 (2282)

Table interpretation: 53% of mayors (+A column) in strong mayor systems report that the influence of the board vis-à-vis the council has increased; 35% reports no changes (0-column) and 13% report that the council's influence over the board has increased (+B column); in the mean-column a mean < 0.00 indicates that the perceived influence of the first-mentioned actor has increased; a mean of 0.00 implies no change and a mean of > 0.00 means that the perceived influence of the second actor has increased. Statistical tests: All but one of 16 means in the table differ significantly from the no-change-value 0 (one-sample t-test); the only exception is the -0.04 score in the final column for committee leader systems; if a mean is printed in italics, it is significantly different from the other means in the column. Results for cases with a council-manager system are not included in the table; the number of respondents in this category is too low to allow for meaningful analysis. The council-manager system cases are included in the Total-row (therefore the category N's do not add up to the Total N). Original scales ran from 1 to 7; for the purpose of this analysis we deducted 4 from the original scores so that the no-change category received a score of 0 and the scale ran from -3 to +3.

Table 2: Influences over activities of local authority: mean of perceived influence of mayor, councillors, members of the political executive and executive officers in various local government models (Mouritzen and Svava 2002)

	Influence: Mayor	Influence: Councillors	Difference Councillors – Mayor	Influence: Executive board	Influence: Senior officers
Strong mayor	3.85 (1929)	2.57 (1933)	1.30 (1925)	3.03 (1725)	2.89 (1931)
Committee leader	3.77 (163)	2.60 (164)	1.20 (162)	2.86 (157)	3.13 (164)
Collective body	3.60 (555)	2.56 (543)	1.12 (538)	3.43 (552)	3.07 (558)
Total	3.79 (2667)	2.57 (2661)	1.26 (2645)	3.11 (2454)	2.95 (2674)

Differences are computed as the average of individual scores of mayors. Results for cases with a council-manager system are not included in the table; the number of respondents in this category is too low to allow for meaningful analysis. The council-manager system cases are included in the Total-row (therefore the category N's do not add up to the Total N).

To the extent that new relations between politics and administration, based on principles of mission-driven and results-oriented government, and tools like management by objectives and performance measurement and management (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) have been implemented by local governments, such reforms have not weakened the influence of elected politicians on local administrators. Further research will have to tell, whether these perceptions are in line with actual politico-administrative relations and if so whether this strengthened political accountability is an inherent quality of the NPM management tools, or the result of other developments, like the strengthening of the political executive or the downsizing of local government because of privatisations.

12.2.3 Current influence relations

After having discussed changes in the influence relations between various actors in European town halls we will now look into the results of these changes on the overall distribution of influence of the major actors on local policies. For this purpose we asked the mayors the following question '*On the basis of your experience as a Mayor in this City, and independently from the formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of the following actors are over the Local Authority activities?*' On the basis of this question mayors were asked to rate the influence of various local and non-local actors on a five point scale ranging from 0 'no influence' to 4 'high influence'.

In this chapter we are only interested in the internal distribution of influence over the mayor, the members of the political executive board, chief executive officers and councilors. In Table 2 we have presented the mean scores for the perceived influence of various local officials and officers.² The results suggest a number of interesting conclusions:

- Irrespective of the local government regime, the mayors consider themselves to be more influential in local matters than any of the other actors on

2 In the case of the influence of the mayor and members of the executive board scores are based on single items. The councillor score is the mean value for two items: influence of (other) leaders on the council and influence of single influential councillors. We have decided not to include the influence of the president of the council and the presidents of the council committees in this mean. The reason for this being that in some local government systems (e.g. the Netherlands) these officials are not or not primarily council members, but members of the executive. In systems where this is not the case, we thus may underestimate the influence of the council. The senior officers item is also based on two items: the influence of departmental heads and of the municipal CEO.

the local political stage. The mayors are also in accord in rating the influence of the councilors lowest amongst the various actors operating in town hall.³ Moreover the averages of the perceived influence scores are rather similar across the various local government systems. If we look at the relative influence of the council in relation to that of the mayor (third column in Table 2), however, we do find some interesting systemic variations in the relative influence of the council: the council's power distance to the mayor is significantly smaller in collective leadership systems than in the strong mayor systems.⁴

- In other respects too the patterns of perceived influence are sensitive to variations in the institutional context. To begin with mayors in 'strong mayor systems', they consider themselves to be more influential than their colleagues in 'committee leader systems' and both categories of mayors consider themselves to be more influential than mayors in 'collective executive systems'. The institutional context is also relevant for position of the executive board and the senior executive officers. As for the influence of the board, the influence of this body is – unsurprisingly – highest in collective leadership systems. In committee leadership systems the position of the board is least influential, with the perceived influence of the board in strong mayor systems is at an intermediate level. With regard to the senior officers, their perceived influence is lowest under the strong mayor regime.⁵

12.3 *Mayoral evaluations of the council's performance*

Although in general mayors do not think that the council is a very influential actor in the local political arena, they value the council's role in local government. As we indicated before the council has a dual role in local democracy: on the one hand the council has an internal role in steering and scrutinizing the operations of the executive branch of local government. On the other hand, the council and its members have a representative function: this implies that the council should represent the concerns of the local population and should provide the forum for a public debate about major local political issues. In the question-

3 The differences between all the relevant means are statistically significant (paired samples t-test; $\alpha = 0.05$).

4 The power distance is computed as the difference between the perceived influence of the council and the perceived influence of the mayor (or other local actor).

5 All reported differences are statistically significant when using appropriate (two-sided) t-tests.

naire we asked mayors to evaluate (on a 5-point scale: from 0 – very negative – to 4 –very positive) the performance of the council in:

1. setting the main goals for local government action (internal)
2. scrutinizing the activities of the executive branch of local government (internal)
3. the representation of public opinion on the main issues in the community (external)
4. the public debate on major community issues (external)

On the basis of these items indices were computed (as means of the original item scores) to measure the mayors' evaluations of the internal and external performance of municipal councils. With a maximum-score of 4.00, the mean scores of 3.01 (internal performance) and 2.87 (external performance) make for a rather favorable report of council activities.

Table 3: Evaluations of councils' performance, by local government type Mouritzen- Svava's typology ; mean of mayor's evaluation of council performance with regard to internal and external function

	Council performance: Internal role	Council performance: External role
Strong Mayor	2.99 (1939)	2.84 (1936)
Committee - Leader	2.96 (164)	2.88 (164)
Collective Body	3.10 (541)	2.95 (539)
Total	3.01 (2659)	2.87 (2660)

Statistical test: Only the differences between the strong mayor and the collective body system means for internal and external satisfaction are statistically significant. Results for cases with a council-manager system are not included in the table; the number of respondents in this category is too low to allow for meaningful analysis. The council-manager system cases are included in the Total-row (therefore the category N's do not add up to the Total N).

This appreciation, however, is by no means universal. As Table 3 indicates the performance ratings vary with the type of local government system. If we set aside the few cases in council-manager systems, we can see that both with regard to internal and external satisfaction, the mayors in strong mayor systems are somewhat less satisfied with their council's performance than the mayors in collective executive systems. Mayors in committee leader systems are in between these two extremes. There are various possible interpretations for such a finding: these might reflect actual differences in the quality of the council's performance, or they might reflect the intrinsic rivalry between the directly

elected mayor and the council, where both offices have their independent basis of democratic legitimacy.

12.4 Institutional effects

In the introduction we have indicated that in response to rather drastic changes in the context, there have been initiatives to modernize local government in various European countries (for an overview see e.g. Denters and Rose 2005). Notwithstanding important cross-national variations there appear to be two transnational trends: on the one hand, the strengthening of the position of the mayor by introducing the directly elected mayor. In recent years such reforms were staged in for example Italy (Bobbio 2005), Poland (Swianiewicz 2005) and in many German Länder (Gabriel and Eisenmann 2005). In other countries more modest attempts were made to introduce the direct election of the mayor. In the United Kingdom, the direct election of the mayor was one of the options that local governments had for reforming their political executive (Wilson 2005) and in Norway experiments were set up in some municipalities to look into the effects of such an institutional reform (Rose and Stahlberg 2005). In still other countries, like the Netherlands, the direct election is not yet implemented, but a bill to introduce direct elections of mayors (instead of the current system of an appointed mayor) is under parliamentary scrutiny. A second transnational trend is the reconsideration of the role of the council. Because of discontent with the council's performance, both internally and externally, reforms were proposed and implemented in several countries. Two major examples are the recent reforms of the British councils (Wilson 2005) and the recent reorganization of the Dutch local government model (Denters and Klok 2005).

All such institutional reforms are based on the presumption that institutions matter. In this section of the chapter we will ask whether institutional variations matter in terms of the mayoral perceptions and evaluations of some aspects of the local government system. More precisely, I will see whether institutional variations have an effect on the perceived influence of the mayors (one of the proclaimed reform aims) and on the mayor's evaluation of the internal and external role of the council (since improved council performance is a second important goal in many reform programs). In terms of the independent institutional variables we will concentrate on two aspects that play a major role in the reform of local government in several countries: the direct election of the mayor and the presence of a committee-leader system. Does having a directly elected mayor make a difference? And does it matter whether a municipality operates under a committee-leader system or not?

Table 4: Perceived mayoral influence and evaluations of council’s performance: summary of results from multilevel regression analyses

	Perceived influence mayor	Internal role performance of the council	External role performance of the council
Time spent on mayoral office	NS	NS	NS
Level of formal education	NS	NS	NS
Experience as mayor (in categories)	NS	NS	NS
Age (in categories)	NS	NS	NS
Gender (0=male;1=female)	NS	NS	NS
Population size (in categories)	NS	NS	NS
Clear majority in council (0=no;1=yes)	+**	NS	NS
Perceived influence mayor	xxx	+*	NS
No directly elected mayor	-**	NS	NS
Directly elected mayor	Reference category	Reference category	Reference category
No Committee-leader	NS	NS	NS
Committee-leader	Reference category	Reference category	Reference category

NS = coefficient not statistically significant; S** coefficient significant at $\alpha = 0.01$; S* coefficient significant at $\alpha = 0.05$; + / - indicate positive and negative effects.

In order to answer such questions we have regressed the occurrence of such institutional arrangements on mayoral perceptions and evaluations. Such orientations, however, may very well also reflect more idiosyncratic, personal factors. Therefore, we have also entered a number of other factors in the analyses. In part these factors relate to personal background characteristics of the mayors (e.g. their age, gender, education, experience in office, full-time or part-time employment⁶), for another part they also reflect the nature of the locality where they act as mayor (the size of the municipality and the presence of a solid council majority).

6 On the basis of a set of ten questions on the time mayors have spent on various activities the total time allocated to the mayoralty was computed and mayors who worked less than 36 hours per week were considered to be part-timers.

In a regression analysis⁷ we first of all found that mayoral perceptions of their *personal influence* are not related to personal characteristics like age, gender, education, experience in office and full-time mayoralty. Of the two institutional dummy variables the presence of a committee-leader system does not appear to have an impact. The direct election of a mayor, has a significant impact: directly elected mayors rate their personal influence higher than their indirectly elected or appointed colleagues. The presence of a stable majority in the council is also important. In municipalities where there is no such stable majority, mayors rate their influence lower than in places where the mayor enjoys the solid support of a council majority.

The mayoral evaluations of the *internal role* in steering and scrutinizing the (political) executive is related to only one factor. More influential mayors are more positive about the council's steering and scrutiny role than their less influential colleagues. Probably there are several interpretations for this result. One obvious interpretation is that the steering and scrutiny roles of the council pose less of a threat to the position of strong mayors (with a secure position, because of a solid majority support in the council and their direct election; cf. the results in the first column). The mayoral evaluations of the *representative (external) role* of the council are affected by none of the factors entered in the analysis. For none of the three models did we find evidence for direct effects of the personal background characteristics.

All in all this suggests that the impact of institutional factors (direct election of mayors and committee-leader system) is rather limited. In explaining the personal influence of the mayor the direct election of mayors proved to be of some influence. The impact of this institutional factor, however, was rather limited; it only accounted for barely four percent of the variance in the dependent variable. For explaining the council's internal and external performance, the institutional factors were not at all important. The perceptions and evaluations by mayors apparently are to a large extent the result of specific local conditions and idiosyncratic personal factors (that are not related in any simple straightforward manner to personal background characteristics).

7 In the case of contextual factors simple OLS regression analyses would result in an overestimation of the reliability of the estimators of the contextual variables (here the institutional dummies), therefore we conducted a multilevel analysis using the Linear Mixed Model routine in SPSS to estimate the relevant regression model.

12.5 *How institutional variables impact on local government “duality”*

This contribution has dealt with three issues. First the chapter has dealt with *patterns of influence* among major players in local decision-making, and the changes therein. With respect to this issue we have concluded that mayors across Europe report a change in the balance of power in local government, in which the *political executive* and especially the *mayor* have gained in political leverage over the council. As far as mayoral perceptions are accurate this suggests that the strengthening of the political executive as one of the major desiderata in the NPM-doctrine is now very much a reality in many local governments across the continent. We have also found that the apparent widespread adoption of New Public Management maxims (e.g. ‘let managers manage’) has not resulted in a decreased political control of the *local bureaucracy*. In the perception of mayors, there has rather been a move in the opposite direction: according to the mayors recent years have witnessed an increased influence of local politicians on local administrators. The mayors consistently report that of all major local political actors, the councils are least influential. Although these conclusions hold irrespective of the particular local government regime (for strong mayor, committee leader and collective body systems), there are nonetheless some interesting nuances in the overall patterns. When we looked at the relative influence of the mayor in relation to the council, for example, we found that the power distance between the two offices was much larger in strong mayor systems than in collective body systems. This suggests that the introduction of a directly elected mayor further tilts the balance of power between the mayor and the council in favour of the former.

The second issue pertained to the mayor’s assessment of the performance of municipal councils. We have distinguished between the internal performance (scrutiny and control of the executive) and the external, representative role of the council. On the whole mayors are rather positive in their evaluations of the performance of the councils. This conclusion, however, needs some differentiation. In strong mayor systems, mayoral assessments are generally somewhat less positive than in collective executive body systems. This might very well reflect the more or less ‘natural’ competition between two offices (the mayor and the council) that both have an independent democratic legitimation.

Finally we were also interested in a third issue: the impact of institutional variables (direct election of mayor and the presence of a committee leader system). Both these factors are closely linked to some of the major local government reforms, that are now under review in many countries. The direct election of the mayor is a reform aimed at strengthening local democracy and the decisiveness of local governments by strengthening the local political executive. In

other countries the discussion focuses on the need to rethink the traditional position of the council. In the United Kingdom for example attempts are made to introduce alternatives for the traditional committee leader system. Our results suggest that the impact of variations in institutional arrangements may not be as large as some of the more ardent advocates of reform initiatives probably would anticipate.

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13 Mayors and Local Administrators: A Puzzling Relationship

Carlos R. Alba and Carmen Navarro

13.1 Introduction

Developing a better understanding on how political leaders perceive the role and position of civil servants and how both groups interrelate continues to be a relevant issue in the local government research agenda. Since their interaction has a non negligible impact on the capacity of governments to perform their tasks and implement their decisions, empirical efforts to acquire in-depth information on the outcome of interaction between these two sets of officials constitute invaluable additions to knowledge on the actual functioning of democracies. Even though elected officials and administrators also interact at the local level of government, general literature on bureaucrats and politicians has so far mainly focused on the relationship at the national level. But in city governments a similar type of ‘puzzling’ relationship can likewise be observed, although with its own specific traits. In this perspective, studies such as *The Anonymous Leader* (Klausen and Magnier 1998) or *Leadership at the Apex* (Mouritzen and Svava 2002), which address this specific issue at the local level, have represented important contributions to the field by identifying aspects common to the national and the local worlds as well as the significant distinctions. The empirical source upon which this chapter is based will allow us to add some elements to the analysis of what has been described as ‘the distinctive puzzle of the contemporary state, reflecting the clash between the dual and conflictive imperatives of technical effectiveness and democratic responsiveness’ (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981).

Contemporary politics has led to the emergence of professional politicians together with modern and also professional civil servants. The Weberian and Wilsonian traditions, which establish a clear separation between the sphere of politics and that of administration, are mainly concerned with establishing clear regulations in order to prevent the corrupting and politicizing interference of party organizations in administrative affairs (Svava 1998). According to this view politicians make decisions and civil servants are entrusted with their ad-

ministrative enforcement. In other words, the former make policies and the latter implement them. This formal model has been revitalised by proponents of New Public Management (see Egner and Heinelt in this book). Moreover, this is the model many politicians bring to their office, where, however, it generates a great deal of dissatisfaction and inefficient behaviour in the day to day exercise of power. For the mere fact of standing as an electoral candidate, running for elections and winning (a mayoral race) is probably just half of the battle politicians face. To succeed in developing policies and securing their implementation through the administration that is led by the politicians is the other half and perhaps the hardest.

Even though modern typologies on bureaucrat-politician relationships always contain a type in which there is a certain separation of roles (Aberbach et al. 1981; Peters 1987), they all acknowledge that administration is not merely the execution of policies decided by political officials. Administrative officials are themselves involved in policy making and develop influence over its content. Indeed, this could not be otherwise when one considers the practical impossibility of anticipating all the details of implementation in the design of a policy or program. Even in the most restrictive vision of the role of administrators, it has to be accepted that they exert some influence over policy in the exercise of administrative tasks. And this margin for action has probably increased with the quantitative and qualitative rise of the scope of governments for action in development of the local welfare state.

Thus if the comfortable and straightforward ideal of a clear separation of roles must be abandoned, the exploration of alternative models capable of more accurately mapping the pattern of relations is the forthcoming assignment. This task has been developed in the above-mentioned work by Klausen and Magnier (1998) and Mouritzen and Svava (2002). More specifically, Mouritzen and Svava started from the presentation of the four types of models existing in the literature (separate roles, autonomous administrator, responsive administrator and overlapping roles), to conclude that in most of the cases analyzed the actual interactions maintained between mayors and top administrators fell into the overlapping roles model.

The chapter will follow the same line of inquiry, comparing the models of relations offered by the literature with the real visions of elected officials. In some respects, however, the analysis will be approached from the opposite point of view, endeavouring to identify how politicians (the mayors themselves) perceive their interaction with the administrators and how they frame the administrative organisation of municipalities. Because institutions matter and so do political leaders, the model of this interaction will take different local government

structures into account and will carefully reflect the statements by mayors about their attitudes.

13.2 *Models of interaction between politicians and bureaucrats*

There have been several theoretical developments on the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats that have produced typologies in this field. Prior to the analysis of the data and discussion of findings it is of interest to introduce some of the issues that are especially relevant for our research.

The Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981) typology was based on a comparative elite research among seven countries and referred to members of parliaments and senior civil servants at the central level of government. It outlines four images of the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians corresponding to successive models that represent a progressive expansion of the role of bureaucrats in the policy making process.

Thus, '*image I*' (*policy/administration*) is acknowledged as the earliest theory and the only one that establishes a sharp distinction between the spheres of politics and administration. The expressions 'politicians make decisions and bureaucrats merely implement them' or 'administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics' serve to capture this image. But it has long been rejected as inaccurate picture of the respective roles of both sets of officials. A simple reflection on the complexity and expertise demanded by present-day governmental policies suffices to make it clear that this perfect separation of fields is not only unrealistic but impracticable.

'*Image II*' (*facts/interests*) assumes that both politicians and civil servants participate in policy-making, but with qualitatively different inputs. Civil servants provide expertise, and politicians interests and values. This perspective rests on a situation in which politicians are not professionalized and bureaucrats monopolize technical knowledge. Such circumstances would force civil servants to focus on the technical efficacy of the policy whereas politicians would concentrate their efforts on responding to public sensitivity and providing an answer for social conflict under the policy.

'*Image III*' (*energy/equilibrium*) recognises that both bureaucrats and politicians are active in policy-making and, more interestingly, both approach it from a 'political' attitude. The only distinction would refer to the different types of interests each of the two groups serve. Whereas politicians articulate broad, diffuse interests of unorganized citizens, bureaucrats mediate narrow, focused interests of the groups with which they are involved (based on membership in policy networks). As a consequence different types of issues are brought onto

the agenda by the two groups. Broader, long-range and probably more controversial issues would be raised by politicians whereas administrators would in this respect have more an incremental and conservative position, willing to maintain the status-quo and limiting their activity to a reduced functional network.

Finally *'image IV'* (*the pure hybrid*) contemplates convergence of roles, assuming a 'politization' of bureaucracy and a 'bureaucratization' of politics. In this case there is no reserved space for politicians ('politics'), neither is there an exclusive field for administration ('policy implementation'). Policy and politics are common spaces for collaboration or exchange of ideas between the two spheres.

This typology can be helpful in trying to understand the role played by perceptions in local governments, the evolution of such roles and the possibility of clarifying whether there is any exclusive space for elected politicians. In legal terms, probably every country in one way or another maintains the legal-formal model of separation (Wilson-Weber) because it serves at the same time the interests of bureaucrats (who can thus be politically active without having responsibility or accountability for their actions) and the interests of politicians (defending specific policies under neutral expertise; Peters 2001). The constitutional-state traditions of many European countries developed the difference between political representatives – those legitimated to act on behalf of the people and affecting them – and their 'agents' in charge of executing the political will of the political representatives.

In an effort to synthesize the models of relationships between politicians and their administrative subordinates existing in the literature, Peters (1987) has developed a framework of five models. The *formal model* corresponds to the Wilsonian approach. It establishes a separation of roles and a subordination of administrators to politicians. In the *village-Life model* an integration of values through socialization and recruitment defines the interaction between the two. By virtue of this integration, senior civil servants and political executives come to have relatively similar values and goals; this in turn determines their relations since one of their major goals is to maintain the 'smooth functioning of the executive branch' (the 'Oxbridge syndrome' as recruiting ground both for politicians and civil servants in the UK). The *functional model* assumes that administrators and political executives are linked because they share the same functional area (e.g. health, education). Political and administrative elites within a specific sector will be allied against political and bureaucratic elites from other policy sectors. In the *adversarial model* the two groups of actors are assumed to be competitors for power and control over policy, a feature which results in a permanent conflict between them. The political will of politicians is here con-

fronted by the political will of the civil servants. Finally, the *administrative state model* presumes a domination of bureaucracy over the decision-making process. Since the elected officers, especially if they are not professionalized, do not have the capabilities and expert knowledge to handle the complex issues arising in the tasks of government, the work of deciding policies is left to those who know how to solve the problems.

The table below presents the characteristics of the models in greater detail, expressing the expected traits of the interaction in terms of: a) pattern of the relationship (tone), b) the winner of the political process (winners), c) the mode of conflict resolution (conflict resolution); d) the approach in improving policies (policy approach) and e) the results of the interaction (impacts). The added value of this analytical effort lies in its ability to highlight the dynamics of the interactions and their consequences.

Table 1: Models of interaction of politicians and bureaucrats and their characteristics (by Peters 1987)

Type	Tone	Winners	Conflict-resolution	Policy approach	Impacts
Formal-Legal	Integrative	Politicians	Command	Authority	Variability
Village-Life	Integrative	Both	Bargaining	Mutuality	Management
Functional	Integrative	Both	Bargaining	Expertise dominance	Interest
Adversarial	Adversarial	Variable	Power	Conflict	Variability
Administrative State	Integrative	Civil Service	Abdication	Expertise	Stability

Lastly, mention must be made of the only typology that specifically addresses the local level of government. The types of Mouritzen and Svava (2002) utilised to reconceptualize the relationship between mayors and top administrators are built upon the information collected from highest ranking appointed municipal officers from 14 countries.

Initially the description focuses on the models that have received attention in the literature. Here the two dimensions for analyzing the interactions are the nature of the hierarchical relationship on the one hand and the differentiation of roles and distance between spheres on the other. Consequently, four models are defined.

The *separate roles model* implies a clear subordination of administrators to politicians and separate roles and norms. It corresponds to the 'image I' type of

Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman and Peters' 'legal-formal model'. In this case, it has been restated to adapt it to reality, acknowledging that real separation in its pure form does not exist in real political life. But there are situations in which the role of bureaucrats in policy-making is limited to technical advice while politicians 'should keep their hands off administration'. This would then approximate to 'image II' type of Aberbach et al. because there is a division of roles but no complete separation.

The '*autonomous administrator*' model recognises equal or greater influence for administrators compared to politicians and distance of politicians from the administrative sphere. Elected officials are excluded from administrative matters and administrators have a substantial or even predominant role in policy making. Politicians are primarily involved in approving policy proposals framed by administrators and in providing general oversight of administrative performance, although they are dependent on top administrators for relevant information.

The '*responsive administrator*' model maps a subordination of administrators to politicians and a dominance of political norms over administrative norms. There is a deeper dependence of administrators on elected officials and greater deference to political values. The top administrators in this model have low involvement in policy innovation – except as agents of politicians – and low independent influence in policy making. Politicians, on the contrary, are highly active in orienting the governmental process toward achieving their goals. Administrators either agree with these goals or see their interests as dependent on maintaining the support of politicians or parties. Elected officials may also intervene directly in the administrative process in order to influence specific outcomes. The model is associated with a strong elected position, as can be found under the strong mayor form of local government systems.

Finally, the '*overlapping roles model*' features a reciprocal influence between elected officials and administrators and shared roles. Each set of officials has distinct roles and administrators respect political control, but there is extensive interaction, overlapping functions and reciprocal influence. This approach presumes that administrators are active in a broad range of decisions including policy matters and that politicians are potentially involved in the detailed choices associated with administration.

These three typologies show overlaps but also differences. This may result from the fact that they capture different settings– namely either the national or the local level of government.

13.3 *Local governance and the new salience of politics*

Local government today constitutes a prominent arena for transformation and experimentation. Relations between local politicians and bureaucrats are shaped in this changing context. Local political systems differ to a lesser or a greater extent from the situation 10 or 20 years ago (Le Galès 2000; John 2001; Caulfield and Larsen 2002; Kersting and Vetter 2003; also mentioned in other chapters of this book). One crucial phenomenon of these changes is that the local scene is now populated with a variety of agents (public and private), interconnected in networks and constantly negotiating the different policies of the city. This new form of decision-making has been called *local governance*, a phrase that describes a situation whereby politicians are increasingly more oriented to policy outcomes and adequate service provision while, at the same time, administrators are increasingly aware of the fact that the performance of administrative tasks should be sensitive to the political context (Andrew and Goldsmith 1998).

It would be interesting to explore if and how leadership is strengthened in this new landscape and whether the political will of the elected officers thereby acquires greater control over the machinery of government, affecting the relation between politicians and top administrators. Taking into consideration that the political and administrative structures of local government rest on a background of different political traditions and historically derived institutional arrangements, it is appropriate to verify more specifically whether the current situation reflects a decline in the old domination of technocracy and expertise (characteristic of the 60s and the 70s) and a shift towards new processes of weakening administrative and bureaucratic autonomy (Rouban, 1998).

Unfortunately, the data collected in this survey refer only to a single period of time in each country and therefore it is not possible to measure trends directly. However, the subject can be approached through mayors' perceptions of changes in influence that have occurred in the last decade among the various actors in local affairs. Useful information can thereby be gleaned, since mayors are effectively the main witnesses of this putative transformation. As revealed by the data, mayors very clearly recognize that various modifications in power relations of have come about (see table 2). In the first place a majority of mayors identify a growth of influence of subnational governments in relation to national authorities and many of the mayoral interviewees also point to an increasing influence of local *versus* regional bodies. These trends nevertheless conceal very different patterns of change in the relationships between levels of government (discussed by Kübler and Michel in Chapter 10). The wave of devolution has obviously been more intense in 'new democracies' both in Southern and

Eastern European countries where the political systems are still in the process of consolidation and transfer of power from central to regional or local government is an important part of the process. Secondly, the winner within the local political system itself has without doubt been the political executive with respect to the legislative bodies. Local executive boards have increased their influence in relation to local assemblies, and above all mayors with respect to both local executive boards and local assemblies. In the third place, despite the introduction of NPM techniques, which in principle would presume a more important presence of private enterprises, mayors are not unanimous in this respect and opinions are evenly distributed among those who believe that the shift in influence between public services and private firms has been in favour of the former and those who maintain that the latter have acquired greater power.

Table 2: Changes in influence (%)

Increased influence	Identical Influence	Increased influence
Subnational level: 55.5	16.4	National level: 28
Local level: 46.5	18.2	Regional level: 35.3
Executive board: 54.2	32.4	Local assembly: 13.4
Mayor: 63.0	27.5	Executive Board: 9.4
Mayor: 64.5	24.7	Local Assembly: 10.8
Public Services: 30.0	38.0	Private Firms 32.0

Particularly important for the present investigation is the pattern of interaction between elected officials and administrative officers over the last decade. Here, the statements by political leaders highlight a clear growth of the power of politicians with respect to bureaucrats. In total, almost half of the mayors recognize that elected officials have intensified their influence in comparison to administrative officers over the last ten years, whereas only one fifth regard bureaucrats as having gained power and a third consider that the situation remains identical (see table 3). If these impressions are a faithful picture of the developments that have taken place, then the data gathered in this survey would support the statement of a salience of politics in a context of governance.

A closer look at the answers brings to light some interesting differences among countries classified according to the Mouritzen/Svara typology. Strong mayors and those included in the collective type are the respondents who more clearly indicate that the balance of power has changed in favour of elected officials (46.5%, 42.3 respectively). On the other hand, statements by mayors of the committee leader and the council manager type point to a less marked change in favour of elected officials. Thus almost 43% of mayors corresponding to the

council-manager type consider that change has shifted in favour of administrative officers.

Table 3: Changes in influence between elected officials and administrative officers, by Mouritzen/Svara’s typology of local government systems (%)

	More Influence of Elected Officials	Identical	More influence of Administrative Officers
Strong Mayor Form	46.5	35.0	18.6
Committee Leader Form	38.7	39.1	22.1
Collective Form	42.3	35.0	22.5
Council-Manager Form	35.7	21.4	42.8
Total of Mayors	44.8	35.4	19.7


13.4 *Separate or Overlapping worlds?*

The universe of politics and the mission of political parties is not limited to establishing priorities and future scenarios but also places major emphasis on achieving implementation of the agreed priorities. For this purpose elected officials need to be able to rely both on political support and on the collaboration of experts, the administrators. It is in this context that interaction between politicians and administrators occurs, according to various different patterns corresponding to the models described above. It is therefore of interest to enquire into the kind of interaction observed at local level, distinguishing between interaction in which each group has different roles separated by clear boundaries versus a relationship in which the administration and politics are populated by both types of actors.

When they enter office mayors bring specific ideas about the nature of their role and the corresponding role of bureaucrats in policy-making. Some of the variables of the survey questionnaire provide insight into mayoral perceptions of these aspects. In the first place, with regard to the statement ‘politicians should only define objectives and control outputs but never intervene into the task fulfilment of local administration’, six out of ten mayors agree or support this view

(see also the contribution by Egner and Heinelt in this volume). Moreover, the response given by the mayors is clearly influenced by the specific local government form with which they are associated (see figure 1). While strong mayors overwhelmingly support the politician's role as that of establishing targets and controlling outputs (63.7%), followed closely by the collective form (almost 60%), just half of the respondents of the committee-leader form back this line of reasoning. In the municipalities corresponding to the council-manager form, on the contrary, the majority of the answers point in the other direction, with 70% of the mayors in this group expressing disagreement with this position.


Figure 1: Politicians should only define objectives and control outputs, but never intervene into the task fulfilment of local administration (%)



In the second place and in order to complement the analysis, mayors were also asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement that 'local bureaucrats should as far as possible stick to politically defined goals'. The results are interesting because, together with the previously analyzed variable, they reinforce the hypothesis that mayors enter office with a view basically in agreement with the separate roles model (see figure 2). In fact, 67% of all mayors agree with this political neutrality of local bureaucrats, thereby supporting the tradition which considers bureaucrats as the agents of the political will of the elected officials. These findings confirm that support for this subordinate role of local bureaucrats is more pronounced in the strong mayor form (71.1%), followed by the collective form (58.5%), the committee leader form (54.3%) and in the last position the council manager form (47.4%). Again, within this last group the majority rejects the conception that local bureaucrats should stick to politically

defined goals (see for details by country the chapter by Egner and Heinelt in this book).


Figure 2: Local bureaucrats should as far as possible stick to politically defined goals (%)



If our interpretation is based purely on the outcome of the previous questions, it would appear that in the municipalities the predominant model of relations between politicians and administrators clearly favours the separation of roles. But in fact reality offers a quite different picture. Almost 77% of all mayors consider it of great importance ‘to ensure the correctness of the political-administrative process of the municipality’ (see figure 3). That is to say, they accept that within their role as mayors they should be involved in administrative tasks and therefore it is not enough merely to define political objectives. In acknowledging such a responsibility, mayors show that they are not shy of interfering in the administrative world, overlapping their functions with the tasks assigned to administrators and creating at least a partnership model of policy-making. In our sample, respondents from the collective type are those who most emphatically express such support (82.6%), followed by those from the committee leader form (78.6%) and, closely, by respondents from the strong mayor form (75.5%). In the group from the council-manager form, leaders either consider this not a task of the mayor (10.5%) or regard it as simply irrelevant (36.8%). Further-

more, an important group of mayors claim for themselves an even deeper involvement in the administrative sphere, considering the activity of ‘guiding the administrative staff in the day to day activity’ of great importance within their tasks. 37% of the whole universe of respondents subscribe to this perspective, in particular the strong mayors, who are especially explicit in defending the great importance of this administrative guidance.


Figure 3: To guide the staff in the day to day activity (%)



The picture outlined so far has shown mayors interfering or seeking to interfere in the administrative sphere. By contrast, what - if any - is the involvement of administrators in the politicians’ field? Some information can be gleaned among the answers to the questionnaire, specifically with regard to mayoral perceptions of the influence of higher public employees in the policy-making process. 70.8% of mayors consider that the top executive officers (CEOs) are highly influential over the local authority (see figure 4). Certainly it is the council-manager form in which the perceived influence of the top officer is the highest (95%). With respect to the heads of departments in the municipality, 58.2% of the respondents deemed these officers to be influential or very influential. The council-manager form is again the one where higher local civil servants are seen as most powerful. The countries in which heads of department rank highest in the influence scale are either those with the council-manager form or the committee leader types (as expected), but it should not be overlooked that the second group of countries all represent the ‘strong mayor’ type of local government. It thus becomes clear that in local authorities with non strong mayors there is a greater tendency for a considerable share of power to be in the hands of local bureaucrats.

By comparison to other actors in the municipal governance network, the CEOs appear as top ranking influential actors (in England for 84.2% of the respondents, in Ireland for 79.2%).¹


Figure 4: Influence over Local Authority by the Municipal Chief Executive Officer (mean by country)



The close interaction between mayors and administrators (in particular the highest-ranking administrative figures) is confirmed by examining the amount of time devoted to joint activity.


1 If one looks at other actors such as politicians (minister, local MPs), union leaders, journalists, party leaders etc. their influence is very small or insignificant in the local authority. One interesting element shows that mayors of Greece, Poland, Italy and even the highly secularized Spain consider the Church highly influential. In addition, local businessmen and interest groups are also considered by the mayors as influential mainly in the cases of Spain, Greece, Netherlands and the Czech Republic.

Figure 5: Influence over Local Authority by the Heads of Department in the Municipality




Consider for instance the time management of the mayor. As a general picture, mayors devote more time to meeting with the administrative staff and with citizen groups than to any other activity. Almost half of the mayors report that meetings and hours spent with the administrative staff take up more than seven hours a week, strong mayors being those who dedicate relatively more time to interaction with administration members. If the analysis is limited to oral communication (non physical meetings), mayors declare they maintain daily oral communication with the CEOs (73.4%; see figure 5), with the heads of departments (30.6%) and with other employees (16.4%). If one considers oral communication occurring more than twice a week, the percentages increase to 95.6% in the case of CEOs, 76.5% for heads of department and 45% in the case of 'other employees'. Note, also, that communication is always higher with CEOs and also higher within the strong mayor group.

Figure 6: Hours per week in meetings between Mayors and the Administrative Staff by countries



One final aspect that deserves to be highlighted refers to the way in which mayors perceive the existence of obstacles to their action and the success of their policies. For more than 60% of mayors the structural factor which severely affects their job is represented by financial problems. For a small group of mayors the unclear definition of the mayor's role is also a serious drawback and, finally, in the implementation process, problems also arise from conflicts among various departments and the corresponding leading officials. But the remaining options suggested as factors affecting the mayors' job (lack of political support –from the council or their party -, interference by the political parties or unclear division of labour between politicians and bureaucrats) were not considered relevant as negative factors. Almost 70% of the mayors considered the unclear boundaries between politics and administration as absolutely irrelevant (39%) or hardly relevant (31%). However, there is a group of countries in which this factor is relevant “to some extent” (see Fig.7)

Figure 7: Negative Factors: Unclear Division of Labour between Elected Officials and the Administration



In summary, the data suggest that mayors and bureaucrats are partners in a complex joint venture built upon interactive networks, interdependence and reciprocal influence. The same conclusion had been reached in the analysis based on responses of top administrators (Mouritzen and Svava 2002), which established more clearly than in previous studies that top administrators are partners in leadership and policy makers. Now, viewing the issue from the perspective of the mayors, the pattern emerging is likewise one in which a genuine separation of roles does not exist but, on the contrary, partnership and complementarity is the norm. The difference is that administrators seem to feel more comfortable with this partnership model than do the mayors.

13.5 Local Administration as a recruiting ground and a socialization space for Mayors.

Other chapters of this book broach the issue of whether the mayor was previously employed by the municipality before coming into office. Here the question will be addressed of whether prior employment by the municipality can be seen as an independent variable of the model of interaction put into practice by mayors and bureaucrats. ANOVA analysis performed on all the variables considered above gave a statistically significant relation. However, before presenting these results it should be noted that the group of mayors who moved from

the administrative machinery to the political sphere is relatively small (representing 16.2% of the total) and unevenly distributed over countries. But it is clear in the cases of Greece (45.5%), Poland (31.9%) and Germany (29.4%) that the local administration has been an important recruiting ground for mayors. In addition, Belgium, Sweden and Hungary show percentages above 20% and should therefore also be considered as relatively important in these terms. Mayors who were formerly local public employees are heavily overrepresented in the group of *executive mayors* (according to the POLLEADER typology): one third of these mayors, generally directly elected, with a strong position and in full charge of the municipal administration, were formerly local public employees. Furthermore it can be stated that almost 88% of these mayors are found in countries with a 'strong mayor form' of local government system (according to the Mouritzen-Svara typology), except for France, Italy and Spain. Such diversity can be explained by the importance of national issues and national parties in local politics in these three countries, even in small municipalities.²

Additionally, it has to be mentioned that the probability of a local employee becoming mayor is clearly related to the size of the municipality: The smaller the municipality, the higher the possibility that a municipal employee may subsequently occupy the mayoral office. In towns with 10.000 to 15.000 inhabitants the percentage of such mayors is 34%; already for cities with 15.000 to 20.000 inhabitants the proportion decreases to 15 %; for cities with 50.000 to 100.000 inhabitants it is reduced to 9%, and in cities above this size the percentage is below 1%.

For some of the variables already considered above, the findings for all mayors will be compared with the data concerning mayors who were previously employed in the municipality they now lead.

In the whole group of mayors 21.8% consider that '*to guide the staff in the day to day activity*' is not a task of the mayor. This stands in contrast to just 11.4% in the group of those who were previously public employees. This finding may imply that previous training as a public employee produces a different attitude of the mayor with respect to daily guidance of administrative staff.

Mayors who were formerly employed by the municipalities which they now govern tend to have more personal contact with the administrative staff. For example, mayors who spend 10 hours or more on interaction with the administrative staff amount to 34.4% if the whole group is considered, but this value rises to 47.3% if only those with prior employment as local public employees are considered.

2 It has to be mentioned again that municipalities with less than 10.000 inhabitants were not included in our survey.

Turning now to interaction with CEOs, daily communication is higher in the total group by comparison to mayors who have been public employees (74.2% vs. 65%), but a communication amounting to between 2 and 4 hours a week is higher in the latter group. It is likely that the bureaucratic expertise of some mayors makes them less dependent on the brokerage of the CEOs. Regarding communication with the Heads of Department and with other employees, former publicly employed mayors score higher than the whole group of mayors.

Almost one third of all mayors strongly disagree with the statement that ‘politicians should only define objectives and control outputs, but never intervene into the task fulfilment of local administration’ but only 20% of mayors who have been public employees reject this statement. It seems logical for those with previous experience in the administrative machinery of local government to defend the autonomy of the administrative sphere within the politically defined framework. But this does not hold true when mayors were asked about agreement or disagreement with the statement that ‘local bureaucrats should as far as possible stick to politically defined goals’. In general, 7 out of 10 mayors (69.8%) agreed, as compared to only 65.7% of the mayors who were previously public employees. And the proportion of respondents who support ‘flexibility’ for the bureaucratic machinery in relation to the accomplishment of politically defined goals is smaller among the mayors who were formerly public employees.

Perception of the influence of CEO’s and Head of Departments over local authority is lower among mayors formerly employed in the municipality than in the total group of mayors. One may speculate that their institutional expertise makes them less exposed to the bureaucratic pressures.

An unclear division of tasks between elected officials and appointed civil servants is considered as a less relevant negative factor by mayors who have previously been municipal employees than for the whole universe of mayors interviewed. It is obvious that one of the mechanisms of the politicization of the administration process ‘involves civil servants injecting themselves into the political arena’ (Suleiman, 2003) and those already involved in this process tend to consider the established division of labour between politicians and local bureaucrats as quite normal.

13.6 Mayoral behaviour conflicts: Priority models.

One last aspect that is worth looking at concerns how mayors face the decision making process and its outputs. When mayors are confronted with situations in

which there is a clash between different values, they have to prioritize and may be forced to decide in a trade-off situation. The three options offered

- observing the established rules and procedures (P),
- accomplishing tasks efficiently and quickly (E) and
- ensuring everybody involved is satisfied with decision-making processes and outcomes (S)


will map a variety of mayors. It is interesting to examine the priorities chosen by mayors from the different countries if there is a conflict among these orientations or values. Mayors who decide in favour of the first option can be described as more oriented to traditional administrative management, closer to a classical model of bureaucracy centred on procedures and rule oriented. Those who opt for the second choice are more problem and program oriented, emphasising effectiveness above the other aspects. The third option is likely to be more congenial to a leader focused on process and concerned about participatory governance, believing that the best policy is the one that has the support of the people affected.

The ranking of the three alternative values results in a matrix of six types, three pairs for each value ranked first (see Figure 8). As a general picture, half of the mayors correspond to those who have ranked 'efficiency' and 'speed' at the top of the list, 27% of them support efficiency achievable by observing rules and procedures and 23% also support efficiency but feel it should be achieved by ensuring everybody involved is satisfied. The more traditional position (prioritising procedures and rules) represents 18% among those who selected efficiency as the second value in the ranking and 9% among those who awarded second priority to satisfaction with decision-making and outcomes. Finally, this last value (satisfaction) occupies the lowest position among the mayoral value preferences (15% and 7% respectively).

The ranking of the three alternative values results in a matrix of six types, three pairs for each value ranked first (see Figure 8). As a general picture, half of the mayors correspond to respondents who have ranked 'efficiency' and 'speed' at the top of the list, 27% of them will support efficiency, observing rules and procedures being placed in second position, and 23% will also support efficiency but award second position to ensuring that everybody involved is satisfied. The more traditional position (prioritising procedures and rules) represents 18% for those who selected efficiency as the second value in the ranking and 9% for those who selected satisfaction with decision-making and with the outcomes as the second value. Finally, this last value (satisfaction) occupies the lowest position among the mayoral value preferences (15% and 7% respec-

tively). Thus the first conclusion is that efficiency matters and matters very much, to the extent that it appears to be the value most likely to be prioritised by a majority of mayors if compared to other – also desirable - priorities in governing behaviour.

Figure 8: Priorities in mayors' governing practices
(E= efficiency; P=procedures; S= satisfaction) %




The E-P-S model (i.e. the ranking order efficiency-procedures-satisfaction) is mainly favoured by mayors from Italy, Greece and Portugal, but also from Hungary). The E-S-P model (i.e. the ranking order efficiency-satisfaction-procedures) is the one most extensively represented in England and Ireland and also to some extent in Denmark and Germany. The countries with respondents who assigned first place in the ranking order to the observance of established rules and procedures are mainly the Czech Republic, Spain, Switzerland, apart from Greece and Ireland. Countries in which collective satisfaction is awarded priority are mainly Sweden, Poland, England and the Netherlands.

In exploring how these priorities are distributed in relation to the Mouritzen/Savara typology, a number of differences among the four forms of government were observed. However, in order to simplify the options we reduced the six alternatives to three. Since efficiency is of major importance for all mayors and does not vary significantly among the various forms, we coupled the alternatives by the least valued priority. This resulted in three types of answers:

those who, when confronted with conflict, identify the goal of ‘ensuring that everybody involved is satisfied with decision-making processes and outcomes’ as the least preferred value of the three (P-E-S and E-P-S); those for whom ‘observing the established rules and procedures’ is the least important goal in relative terms (E-S-P and S-E-P), and a third group that values ‘accomplishing tasks efficiently and quickly’ the least among the three possibilities (P-S-E and S-P-E).

Figure 9: Priorities in conflict situations by Mouritzen-Svara Typology (E= efficiency; P= procedures; S= Satisfaction) %



Now two general patterns of ranking appear. We have, on the one hand, two types of government (strong mayor form and collective form) in which ‘satisfaction for everyone involved in the policy-making process’ is the least valued priority in relative terms and, on the other hand, the remaining two types (committee leader form and council-manager form) for which ‘observing the rules and procedures’ is the third and least important value among the three under consideration. In both cases it seems that the trade off is between a more bureaucratic

and formal manner of governing versus a more participatory mode of policy-making. In this perspective, the former is represented by strong mayors who prioritise efficiency more than in any other system but who recognise the importance of rules and procedures in local political systems, probably indicating a greater role of the 'traditional' 'public' actors in the policy making process (politicians and bureaucrats). The second group is represented by the countries in which efficiency is certainly important but the 'satisfaction' of the different actors in the policy network is likewise very important – in fact, as far as the council manager form is concerned it is even more important than 'efficiency'. This may indicate a more extended network in the policy making process, overcoming the vision of the traditional partnership between politicians and bureaucrats as the only key to understanding the logic of power in local governments.

13.7 Salience of representation or expertise complementarities

The discussion on the balance of power in City Hall – greater power in the hands of the elected officials chosen by the citizens, or in the hands of the administrators or a combination of both – is an expression of concern about the relative power of the representative institutions vs. the involvement of the experts who are entrusted with administrative status and perform the corresponding roles. In this respect, the clash between technical effectiveness and democratic responsiveness described in the introduction seems to be moving towards a solution through, on the one hand, a salience of politics that places mayors in a more prominent position to steer the governments' action and, on the other hand, a complementarity of functions between the elected leaders and the executive officers. The form of government explains many of the observable and extensive variations. But it should not be forgotten that in all government forms, governing the city has become a much more intricate task, entailing the need to enlarge the analysis beyond the classical dichotomy of politicians-bureaucrats; moreover, managing to get things done is becoming a more complex target articulated around a multifaceted network not only of elected politicians and bureaucrats but also private sector actors, citizens and their associations.

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14 Political Complexity or Managerial Simplicity? Mayoral Norms of Organisational Leadership

Rikke Berg

14.1 Introduction

In the past, public organisations could function as subunits of the national state rather than as autonomous entities. Globalization, and especially Europeanization, has however made it more and more difficult for public organisations to hide behind the state (Meyer 2002: 37). Increasingly they have to shoulder responsibilities independently and directly confront the problems of decision and action. As a consequence, public organisations are undergoing a transformation into autonomous organisations. With the rise of autonomous public organisations comes the rise of management possibilities. According to Meyer (2002), any organisation worthy of the name focuses on management as a core element for all forms of structuring. Thus the head of any public organisation is increasingly defined as a manager rather than a doctor (head of hospital) or educator (head of school) and those elected head of a municipality may be seen as “managers” rather than mayors (Meyer 2002: 34).

Many management ideas are packaged and codified with labels such as MBO (management by objectives), HRM (human resource management) and TQM (total quality management). They are often composed like general recipes, sometimes in the form of advice to organisations and leaders (Sahlin-Anderson and Engwald 2002: 25). New Public Management (NPM) is one particularly popular set of management ideas, which has been transmitted from one country to another during the past two decades (Sahlin-Anderson 2001: 44; Flynn 2002). Hood (1991) was among the first to label these new administrative reform ideas New Public Management; he was later followed by the OECD (1995), among others. However, most of the attempts to define NPM as a coherent concept have ultimately concluded that NPM is more a term used to describe a recognizable multifaceted set of management ideas, than a fully established concept (Kettl 1997; Aberbach and Rockman 1999; Christensen and Læg Reid 2001:19; Barzelay 2002).

One dimension of NPM, the managerial school of thought, can be summarised as a new instrumentalist's view of bureaucracy and an approach focusing on management rather than a classical approach to administration based on public law (Caulfield and Larsen 2002). Its pivotal point is how to 'let managers manage' (Kettle 1997: 447-448). Reformers believe that managers are aware of the most appropriate line of action, but that existing rules, procedures and structures create barriers to adopting the suitable procedures. Consequently - it is argued - managers "of the old school" tend to be reactive, lack vision and are tied to day-to-day decisions of the bureaucracy. Incorporated in the managerial school of thought is a set of administrative norms prescribing appropriate behaviour for public managers. These norms include strategic decision-making, leadership by mission and entrepreneurship (Bryman 1989; 1992; Osborne and McLaughlin 2002: 9). The basic idea is to give managers more flexibility, to let them manage and, hence, increase the performance of the public organisation. NPM also emphasizes a particular interpretation of the mayoral role and a specific set of norms directed towards the elected officials at the top of the bureaucracy (Kettl 1997: 455).

The general ambition of this chapter is to discuss the role perception of the European mayors in light of these norms. The basic assumption is that the managerial school of thought - as a cross-national movement - prescribes a specific normative standard for the role of elected officials vis-à-vis the appointed executives in local governments. The standard recommends how political leaders should carry out their duties and prioritize their many daily tasks in order to become 'ideal' political leaders.

Political leadership can be defined in a number of ways (Leach and Wilson 2000; John and Cole 2000), but it will here be narrowly considered in terms of the relationship between the political and the administrative level in municipalities, i.e. the division of roles and functions between elected officials and appointed executives with regard to organisational leadership. Consequently the term 'organisational leadership' will be used to describe mayors' leadership within the administrative organisation.

The crucial research question is whether European mayors have adopted the described standard of organisational leadership, consequently making their role one-dimensional, or whether they have instead rejected this proposal, thereby maintaining a more classical and complex role. The purpose of the analysis is thus partly to examine mayoral norms of organisational leadership and partly to discuss the variations that may exist across different European countries.

The chapter will be structured into three parts. In the first part, the norms prescribed for the role of local political leaders will be delineated and two com-

mon terms, 'multi standard mayor' and 'single standard mayor', will be defined. In the second part, some theoretical expectations concerning the leadership norms for European mayors will be set out. Competing sets of expectations will be drawn from sociological institutionalism and empirical institutionalism respectively. In the third part, the opinions of European mayors will be examined in order to discuss how far their norms of organisational leadership are congruent with the managerial school of thought and, further, to what extent these norms are uniform or vary across countries. Finally, mayoral norms of organisational leadership will be explored and discussed in the light of the theoretical expectations outlined.

14.2 Managerial ideas concerning the role of local political leaders

Political leadership in local government typically embraces a range of functions, which can be grouped into two major sets of functions. The first set of functions concerns the local government's external relations with other governments, private companies, citizens, etc., while the second set is concerned with managing the internal operation of the local government. Political leaders are therefore not merely responsible to their constituents: they are also responsible for governing the municipal administration. Many local governments have established a role as the administrator of welfare state services, and although the actual executive organ varies from one country to another, local governments typically have developed complex and complementary roles as political leaders and professional administrators (Elcock 2001: 105; Mouritzen and Svava 2002).¹

Thus, in many countries the role of a political leader vis-à-vis the appointed officials has for years been determined by a rather broad and ambiguous set of norms emphasizing both general tasks, such as developing strategic and policy direction in order to specify the duties of those who work in the administration, and more implemental tasks, such as controlling and guiding the administration in order to ensure programme implementation. Accordingly, classical studies of mayors have explained the role of the mayor as embodying complex functions, including key processes concerned with both the setting of policies and their execution (Kotter and Lawrence 1974). In the present study the concept of

1 The definitions of the concept of role not only vary from discipline to discipline but also within a given discipline such as political science (Larsen 1999). According to Roos and Starke (1981), there are at least three definitions of roles: 1) roles as normative patterns which are culturally defined, 2) roles as expectations from those interacting with the incumbent of a particular role and 3) roles as the actual behaviour of a person in a particular position. Here we will use the first of the three definitions.

'multi standard mayor' will be defined as a role attaching equal importance to strategic and executive leadership, and consequently including both general and implemental tasks of organisational leadership as previously defined. Empirically the concept will be operationalised by the European mayors' priorities concerning two different tasks associated with the position: 1) creation of vision for the city and 2) guidance of the staff in the day-to-day activities. In order to be characterized as 'multi standard mayors', the political leaders of local governments must thus pay almost equal attention to the two different tasks.

The contrary applies to the concept of 'single standard mayor'. The managerial school of thought is dominated by values of effectiveness and rationality, which have thereby become dissociated from the rather complex relationship between elected officials and appointed executives. The new ideal of public management has stressed a more clear-cut function of political leaders with specific focus on the strategic and visionary role. According to the managerial approach, politicians should concentrate exclusively on laying down general principles and overall goals, focusing on service specification as well as setting financial and operational targets for operational managers (Walsh 1996). Policy makers are thus expected to make policy and then delegate implementation to the administrative managers (Christensen 2001:461; Steward 1996). The distinction between politics and management is fundamental for the managerial school of thought. The appropriate role of political leaders is defined to exclude them from the day-to-day decisions of the administrative level of bureaucracy (Davis 1996). Consequently, politicians must step back from the previous customary methods of control and instead place their trust in contracting processes which allow managers discretion on how to meet the political goals. Further, politicians must rely on performance measurement to supplement or replace the tactics previously adopted to steer administrative decision-making (Kettl 1997: 456). By dividing policy-making clearly from policy administration, the NPM ideas in fact reintroduce the policy versus administration dichotomy, originally formulated by Weber in his classical model of bureaucracy (1922/1958).

Hence the managerial approach favours political leaders in the role of 'governors' but rejects political leaders in the role of 'administrators', 'ombudsmen' and similar roles mainly concerned with the specific decision-making and day-to-day activities of the administration. Summarizing, the managerial ideas thus weaken executive organisational leadership in favour of strategic organisational leadership. On the basis of these ideas, the concept of 'single standard mayor' will be defined as a role devoting attention primarily to strategic behaviour and including only general tasks of organisational leadership. As with the concept of 'multi standard mayor', the concept of 'single standard mayor' will likewise be empirically operationalised by the relative importance

European mayors attach to two different tasks: 1) creation of vision for the city and 2) guidance of the staff in the day-to-day activities. However, the political leaders will be characterized as ‘single standard mayors’ only if they pay exclusive attention to the first of the two tasks and dissociate themselves from the latter.

While the managerial ideas of political leadership are normatively founded, the managerial recipe concerning organisational leadership norms has been questioned from many sides. Several studies conducted at the local level have not only addressed the redefinition of political roles in the municipalities but also discussed the disadvantages and problematic aspects of this recipe (Rao 1993; Steward 1993; Berg 2000; Larsen 2002; Leach and Barnett 1998; Stoker 1999; Bäck 2000; Montin 2002). Among the general points of criticism, it has been claimed that NPM ideas on political leadership ignore the complexity of politics and diminish the political sphere to the benefit of administrators and at the cost of the backbenchers. It has also been argued that the managerial recipe tends to prevent political leaders from learning and developing their policies, as they will be isolated from daily decision-making. Although the normative debate is far from trivial, for the moment attention will focus here on the theoretical perspectives of the norms proposed for European mayors.

14.3 *Sociological versus constitutional institutionalism*

Political thinking has its roots in the analysis and design of institutions, thereby giving rise over the course of history to many different branches of institutional theory (Peters 1999). The theoretical cut-off for the analysis of the European mayorsal norms will be limited to two of these branches, sociological institutionalism² and constitutional institutionalism³. Though partly sharing the same label, these theories display a number of sharp differences. While sociological institutionalism sees institutions as social constructs, i.e. cultural ‘rules’ defining

2 Sociological institutionalism has been labelled differently by different scholars. DiMaggio and Powell label the approach: ‘New Institutionalisms’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a: 1), but acknowledge that there are as many new institutionalisms as there are social science disciplines. We have chosen the label of Hall and Taylor (1996) and Peters (1999) in order to make clear that this particular approach has its roots within the sociological branch of organization theory.

3 Just as observed in the case of sociological institutionalism, there is also a variety of different approaches to the study of constitutional institutions. Guy Peters summarizes many of these approaches by the collected term: ‘Empirical Institutionalism’ (Peters 1999). However, as we find this term too general and somewhat misleading, we have for want of a better phrase chosen the term: ‘Constitutional Institutionalism’.

meaning and identity for individuals and forming patterns of appropriate activities in which individuals engage, constitutional institutionalism sees institutions as a formal structuring of interaction that determines, or at least influences, the characteristics and behaviour of individuals operating within such structures. Hence, the two different branches of institutionalism will be treated as competing perspectives in order to explore and discuss the mayoral organisational leadership norms obtaining at the municipality level.

14.3.1 Sociological Institutionalism

The proposition that organisations follow rules, and that much of the behaviour in an organisation is governed by standards of appropriateness, is common in the bureaucratic and organisational literature (March and Simon 1958) and can be extended to the institutions of politics. Many of the roles observed in formal political institutions reflect such rules of appropriate behaviour (March and Olsen 1989: 21-22). What is appropriate for a particular person in a particular organisational situation is defined by dominant cultural and social institutions (i.e. standards) widespread in the organisational field and taken for granted by the individual (Røvik 1992: 262). Two important conditions for the diffusion of a certain normative standard to a large number of specific actors are: 1) the presence of an organisational field functioning as a foundation for various types of diffusion processes and 2) the presence of carriers within the field, that is, actors who play significant roles in the framing, packaging and circulating of the managerial ideas (Sahlin-Anderson and Engwall 2002: 6-8).

An organisational field is understood as a socially constructed system of relations evolved between actors who regard themselves as concerned with similar issues. Once a field becomes well established, organisations respond to an environment that consists of similar organisations. By incorporating the institutional rules existing in the organisational field, an organisation demonstrates that it is acting according to collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner (Meyer and Rowan 1991: 50). Often the dominating organisations of the field become points of reference and models for the rest of the actors within the field. Consequently, the standards used by the dominating organisations will easily spread to the entire field. The overall effect is a thrust towards homogenisation in terms of organisational structures and ideology (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b: 64).

While the concept of a field suggests a constant unit with stable borders, the social construction of the field implies that the actors and standards within the field may undergo change. The actors within the field are moreover not

necessarily interacting with each other. The cultural perception of sharing a common social group, i.e. structural equivalence, forms an invisible bond between the actors and, in turn, influences the process of diffusion (Strang and Meyer 1993: 492). Consequently, the greater the number of actors who share the same view of themselves, their situation and their problems, the more likely it becomes that diffusion will result in similarities among such actors (Brunsson et al. 2002: 140). It follows that the diffusion of standards does not depend on specific network relationships. On the contrary, standards can travel through a variety of media: print, radio, television, the World Wide Web and so forth (Scott and Christensen 1995: 313). Organisational leadership norms of European municipalities can thus be expected to be shaped by the informal norms and values embedded in the managerial ideas and widely considered as a standard within the organisational fields of the municipalities.

However, the diffusion of a standard does not depend only on the presence of an organisational field. It also depends on carriers who can contribute to the process of diffusion. DiMaggio and Powell (1991b) distinguish between three types of processes through which diffusion can take place: 1) coercive isomorphism, 2) normative isomorphism and 3) mimetic isomorphism. The carriers of the field will often vary along these processes.

Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted by organisations upon other dependent organisations (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b: 67). It stems partly from the political influence of the organisation in power and partly from the quest for legitimacy by less dominant organisations that seek empowerment. Attention is often called to the state, as the state has the capacity and the right to define rights and to exercise authority over other organisations. Consequently, the state can set standards through regulatory means (Scott 1995: 94-95), in which case it is the legislation that acts as a typical carrier of the standard.

In the empirical framework of the European municipal fields, the Ministry of the Interior and/or local government institutions of the given country can be expected to carry the managerial school of thought pertaining to the field. In the majority of countries local government institutions will regulate the political structure of the municipalities and the authorities of the various political bodies, including the mayor. However, the ministry or the legislation may also specify the relations between the political and the administrative level and set certain standards for the daily functions of the political leadership.

Normative isomorphism is associated with professionalisation within the organisational field. Professionalisation is here understood as: 'the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work [...] and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occu-

pational autonomy' (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b: 70). In addition to the formal education system, networks of professionals also contribute to disseminating standards by defining and developing normative rules for organisational and professional behaviour (Scott 1995: 95; Sahlin-Anderson and Engwall 2002: 11). Consequently universities, trade unions, NGOs and so forth are typical carriers of the organisational fields.

In the European municipal field, the national associations of local governments – or subunits of these – in each of the European countries can be expected to form a carrier. Similarly to trade unions, the national associations of municipalities take up a structural position towards their members. This offers the associations a unique opportunity to create a common point of reference for all their members. Furthermore, the national associations of local governments in most countries are expected to enjoy a high degree of legitimacy⁴, which is assumed to encourage the diffusion of the standard through normative processes.

A third source of institutional is *mimetic isomorphism*. Uncertainty is here the powerful force that encourages imitation (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b: 69). When organisational goals are ambiguous or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organisations may model themselves on other organisations. Typically they will model themselves on organisations they perceive as more successful than themselves (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b: 70; Scott 1995: 124) in order to bring order to the chaotic world and reduce the feeling of uncertainty (March and Olsen 1976). Imitation of organisations by other organisations does not depend on concrete experience or even contact with the organisations imitated: for organisations do not imitate practice, but rather, standardised models (Sahlin-Anderson 1996: 79). Consequently dominating organisations or other relevant sources form reference points and examples from which the imitating organisations can benefit. However, the mimetic processes are often unintentional. The modelling organisation may have no desire to be copied, but models may still gain authority within the field either indirectly through employee turnover, or explicitly by organisational consulting firms or trade associations (Brunsson et al. 2002). The carriers of the models are thus professionals travelling from one organisation to another or management consultants working as 'merchants of meaning' (Czarniawska-Joerges 1990; Røvik 1992b; Sevón 1996; Ernst and Kieser 2002).

4 The legitimacy stems partly from a large number of members (in some of the European countries, membership is even compulsory), partly from the associations' extensive exercise of influence on the decision-making process at the national level of government (Blom-Hansen 2002; Paige 1991).

In the municipal context, consultants, in particular, can be expected to carry successful examples influencing the national field of municipalities, but the national associations of local government may themselves form a carrier in the mimetic processes. The potential of the national associations of local government is linked to a wide range of services typically provided by such organisations: education, professional networks, consultants, handbooks etc. (Blom-Hansen 2002). By virtue of these services, the national associations are in a position to pass on certain points of reference from the organisational field which will then filter through to the specific municipality, including the local politicians. As a consequence, the political leadership standard may become widespread within the field.

Assuming that the managerial ideas concerning political leadership are embedded in a cross-national cultural context and carried into the national field of municipalities by the state, the national associations of local governments and management consultants, it may also be hypothesized that the standard is disseminated within the municipal fields and, in turn, is reflected in the European mayoral norms.

14.3.2 Constitutional Institutionalism

For constitutional institutionalists the question is: what impact does a specific constitutional arrangement have on the performance of government? In recent studies, different types of performance have been assessed. For instance, Weaver and Rockman (1993) measured the performance of various regimes by the type of policy enacted, and Lijphart (1994) examined the impact of choices by political institutions on the relative effectiveness of governments. The most common approach is to differentiate between presidential and parliamentary institutions and determine their impact.

Constitutional institutional theory primarily takes the formal political institutions of a society for granted and then endeavours to determine whether these institutions have any impact on the behaviour of their members. The behaviour of individuals is assumed to be largely determined by their participation in the institution. In other words, a president is expected to play the role of president, rather than that of prime minister. Discussion on presidential versus parliamentary government has highlighted the marked influence of institutions over individuals, although strong leaders may be able to shape the office so that it more clearly reflects their own attitudes (Peters 1999: 93).

Mouritzen and Svava (2002) have developed an institutional typology for the study of administrative leadership in local governments, distinguishing be-

tween four institutional set-ups: the strong-mayor form, the committee-leader form, the collective form and the council-manager form (Mouritzen and Svava 2002). These types reflect the various structural relationships between the mayor and the administrative organisation found in different local governments across Europe and the USA.⁵ The Mouritzen and Svava study will be adopted as the typological reference in the specific perspective of this chapter (see Heinelt and Hlepas in this volume for a full description of the typology).

Relating the empirical institutional set-ups in the local governments throughout Europe to the research questions in focus does not – as in sociological institutionalism – suggest uniformity in the mayors' norms of organisational leadership, but rather variation. That is to say, distinctions stem from the fact that different countries structure their political organisation in different ways, including the division of labour between the mayor, the elected officials and the appointed officials. Such distinctions can be expected to influence the mayors' norms vis-à-vis the administration. In all European countries, strategic decision-making is formally located at the political level of organisation, namely at the mayors' office, the political cabinet or the council (Mouritzen and Svava 2002). Though the mayors may share their responsibility with some of their political colleagues, they will all be expected to focus to roughly the same extent on the general tasks of leadership. The same does not apply to the implemental tasks of leadership, as local government forms differ considerably in the organisation of executive decisions. In some of the European countries, formal responsibility for the executive decisions is vested exclusively in the mayor's office, while in others the mayor shares the responsibility with the elected officials, and in yet others the executive decision-making is located at the administrative level of organisation. Consequently, in Europe the mayoral norms of organisational leadership can be expected to show the greatest variation with regard to implemental tasks.

In the strong-mayor form, the mayor stands at the apex of both the political and the administrative organisation. The structure endows the mayor with considerable – indeed almost exclusive – power not only over the strategic political agenda, but also over executive decision-making, so that the administrative organisation operates under the conditions established by the mayor. This suggests that mayors in this form of government will attach great importance to both sets of norms: strategic organisational leadership and implemental organisational leadership. In the committee-leader form, on the other hand, power-sharing plays a more significant role. For instance, strategic tasks rest with the

5 See Berg and Rao (2005) for an in-depth analysis of local government forms and their impact on political leadership.

whole council, and executive decision-making is shared between the mayor and the standing committees. The appointed officials are called upon to make executive decisions only to the extent such decisions are delegated to them by the council or the committees. Since the mayors in this particular form of government share the executive power with the rest of the elected officials – and in some cases with the appointed officials as well – the mayors will be expected to pay only minor attention to the implemental tasks of organisational leadership and greater attention to the strategic tasks of organisational leadership. Finally, mayors in the collective form, like those in the committee-leader form, share executive power with other politicians. However, mayors in the collective form of local government share the executive power only with a small collegiate body, which moreover holds a particular responsibility for the overall political agenda in the local government. Consequently, the structure can be expected to sway mayors in the direction of strategic norms at the expense of more implemental norms.

In both the committee-leader and the collective form, it will thus be expected that mayoral norms will be close to the managerial school of thought. However, based on the structural conditions of the various forms of government, countries organised according to the council-manager form are likely to be closer to the managerial ideal of political leadership than countries with different organisational forms. The explanation can be sought in the fact that when the council-manager form is the one and only local government form, all executive responsibilities are vested in the office of the CEO, leaving only general policy decisions at the political level of organisation. Hence one may predict that the mayor in the council-manager form will attach great – and almost exclusive – importance to strategic tasks of organisational leadership and will tend to disregard the implemental tasks of organisational leadership. As described earlier, this is exactly the priority emphasized by the managerial ideal of political leadership.

To conclude, the two different schools of institutionalism will create two different sets of expectations. The sociological approach expects European mayoral norms of organisational leadership to be almost uniform and congruent with the managerial school of thought ('single standard mayors'). The constitutional approach, on the contrary, allows for mayoral norms to vary along with different local government forms. In some countries, it is assumed that the norms will be congruent with managerial ideas, while in other countries there is no such assumption and the norms are expected to deviate from managerial ideas (with the mayors acting as 'multi standard mayors').

14.4 *The European mayoral norms of organisational leadership*

It is relevant, here, to explore how far the European Mayoral norms are congruent with the managerial ideas and, further, to what extent these norms are uniform or vary across the countries. The investigation will therefore now focus on the empirical data collected from the joint questionnaire completed by the mayors in seventeen European countries.

As illustrated in table 1, the mayoral norms of organisational leadership in general seem to support managerial ideas concerning political leadership. A large majority of eighty-five per cent of the mayors attach great or even utmost importance to the task of creating vision for the city while only a minority, (thirty-six per cent) of the mayors emphasize the task of guiding staff in day-to-day activity.

Table 1: Mayoral tasks concerning the role as political leader
(great/utmost importance in per cent)

Country	To create a vision for his/her city	To guide the staff in the day-to-day activity
Austria	64.8	50.0
Belgium	95.4	33.1
Czech Republic	100.0	29.2
Denmark	90.7	8.4
England	90.6	19.6
France	97.8	41.3
Germany	67.7	42.8
Greece	98.6	56.8
Hungary	92.5	66.3
Ireland	89.5	23.5
Italy	87.0	21.5
Netherlands	81.1	5.0
Poland	92.2	52.7
Portugal	97.4	21.0
Spain	84.4	52.8
Sweden	97.9	20.4
Switzerland	69.6	68.8
Total of all countries	84.9	36.0

On the surface the European mayors seem to have adopted a set of norms that are congruent with the managerial ideas outlined above. However, to conclude

that all European mayors are thus 'single standard mayors' would be mistaken. Although the variations between the different countries are relatively low in terms of the general task of organisational leadership, a closer examination of the relative importance attached to the implemental task of mayoral organisational leadership reveals that some of the norms are far from uniform. Variation among the seventeen countries ranges from just five per cent to sixty-six per cent of support for the implemental task. Lowest support is found in the Netherlands, and the highest in Hungary. Thus only in a few of the countries can the mayors be characterised as 'single standard mayors'. Among these countries are Belgium, the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Sweden, England, Denmark and the Netherlands, although some variation is also observed within this group of countries. In the remaining countries, the mayors can be characterized as 'multi standard mayors' who attach importance to both strategic and executive leadership, consequently including both general and implemental tasks of organisational leadership. Exceptions are Switzerland, Austria and Germany, as mayors in these countries attach relatively little importance to the strategic task of organisational leadership compared to the other mayors in this group of countries.

However, the empirical data leave many questions unanswered with regard to the European mayoral norms of organisational leadership. Under what conditions does the managerial school of thought gain ground among mayors throughout Europe? Why do European mayors establish different priorities when choosing between the many tasks of a mayor? In order to examine these questions and to add additional knowledge to our understanding of the political leaders in European local governments, the following analysis will explore the observed variations in the light of the two competing institutional perspectives.

14.5 Barriers to managerial ideas of political leadership

Due to the empirical variation among the European mayoral norms, sociological institutionalism finds little support. Before finally rejecting this perspective, we will, however, take a closer look at the assumed carriers of the field: the state, the national associations of local governments and management consultants, in order to understand why European mayors form a heterogeneous rather than a homogeneous group with regard to norms of political leadership. The sociological theory is based on the assumption that these carriers represent the norms of the managerial school of thought and, further, are respected throughout the municipal field of each country. But in seeking to explain the empirical deviations from the theoretical expectations, these assumptions may be questioned. Do the

assumed carriers in fact represent the norms of the managerial ideal? And to what extent are they respected and valued by the European mayors?

As far as the normative status of the assumed carriers is concerned, research conducted to date is rather limited. Systematic research into local government activity is available for some countries, particular Hungary, Poland, Spain, England, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, where there is an overall tendency for the managerial school of thought to be embedded in local government activity, albeit with varying success (Horváth 2000; Grochowski and Regulska 2002; Botella 2000; Amnå and Montin 2000; Larsen and Offerdal 2000; Berg 2000). Research is even more limited concerning the national associations of local governments. There exist just a few analyses of the Scandinavian countries (Berg 2000), England (The Local Government Management Board 1993a; 1993b) and Poland (Grochowski and Regulska 2002) which support the assumption that these organisations carry the managerial standard of political leadership. With regard to the issue of management consultants, on the other hand, many studies have been completed (for Denmark and Sweden for example, see Berg 2000 and Czarniawska-Joerges 1990). Here too the analysis supports the assumption that management consultants are carriers of the managerial ideal.

Thus although some evidence exists, no final conclusion can be reached concerning the carriers and their normative status, as knowledge of the norms of relevant carriers in Europe is too limited at the present state of research. This is, however, not the case with respect to the mayors' rating of the carriers. As illustrated in table 2, the joint dataset included questions which yield new insight into the mayors' preferred sources of inspiration in the municipal field.

None of these data support the assumption that the state, national associations of local governments and the management consultants are important carriers of the field⁶. On the contrary, such carriers are emphasized only by a minority of European mayors as a source of inspiration in developing leadership skills.

Among the three actors, namely the state, the national associations of local governments and the consultants, the mayors attach the highest importance to the national associations of local government. However, only about a third of the European mayors find this source very or extremely useful in developing

6 The state is represented in the form of 'upper tier government organisations'. The national associations of local governments are represented partly by 'seminars held by the Local Government Associations' partly by 'Local Associations' journal and websites'. Finally, the third carrier of the field: 'consultants' is represented as such.

Table 2: Mayoral sources of inspiration concerning leadership (very/extremely useful in per cent)

Country	Seminars held by upper tier government organizations	Local Associations' journals and websites	Seminars held by the local government associations	Consultants	Debates with local people	Own schooling/educational background	Own professional experience
Austria	15.4	25.0	30.0	47.5	95.0	77.5	92.5
Belgium	25.7	37.2	19.1	11.3	91.3	71.2	89.2
Denmark	23.8	44.3	58.9	7.6	92.4	65.7	84.0
England	12.8	17.0	25.2	6.7	76.2	55.4	85.9
France	10.4	12.9	14.0	13.7	92.6	49.8	87.8
Germany	9.9	45.4	41.9	27.7	94.0	81.3	95.2
Greece	35.6	63.3	56.5	50.4	93.5	87.9	83.8
Hungary	27.1	26.3	26.3	48.1	87.6	67.9	90.2
Ireland	16.7	31.6	40.0	11.8	68.5	79.0	89.5
Italy	17.3	15.7	19.4	31.7	86.0	68.0	75.1
Netherlands	13.1	40.3	21.6	5.3	76.4	60.4	93.0
Poland	25.9	28.0	14.4	34.1	89.5	65.4	90.0
Portugal	15.4	7.5	12.9	65.8	87.8	80.4	85.4
Spain	15.9	14.7	20.1	33.1	90.4	59.2	77.2
Sweden	8.6	28.4	27.7	4.3	85.8	57.5	83.7
Switzerland	34.1	11.2	11.8	20.9	94.7	86.0	89.3
Czech Rep.	26.4	32.1	11.5	70.6	96.1	70.2	96.0
Total	17.0	31.9	28.4	25.5	89.1	69.6	88.3

leadership skills. As regards the other two carriers - upper tier government organisations and consultants - less than a fifth and a fourth of the mayors respectively find these sources very or extremely useful. The limited importance attached to these sources of inspiration by European mayors clearly rejects the assumption, championed by sociological institutionalism, that these actors disseminate specific norms of political leadership subsequently adopted by the mayors.

Added to this is the striking observation that the mayors in general attach highest importance to individual sources of inspiration, i.e. debates with local people, their own professional experience and educational background. Such sources are strictly linked to the mayors' personal experience and could thus explain some of the observed variation in organisational leadership norms.

Yet although the individual background of European mayors may in many ways influence the role of the mayor (see Bäck in this volume), their rating of the individual sources of inspiration does not vary systematically along organisational leadership norms.⁷


In order to acquire greater insight into why European mayors form a rather heterogeneous group with regard to organisational leadership norms, we will now turn to the competing approach, here labelled constitutional institutionalism. According to this perspective, variation is expected on account of the different forms of local government found in the European countries, but the extent and manner of correspondence between the observed variation and the different government forms requires further analysis.

In figure 1, it can be seen that variation in the norms concerning the strategic task of organisational leadership is limited. This reflects a structuring of local government whereby the responsibility for overall policy formulation is often vested in the mayors. By contrast, the implemental task of organisational leadership displays greater variation.

First, the 'strong-mayor' countries are more often observed in the north-eastern quadrant of figure 1 than in the rest of the countries. Indeed, 'strong-mayor' countries are the only countries observed in this particular quadrant. This is in accordance with constitutional institutionalism, as it is precisely mayors in the strong-mayor form that are expected to attach great importance to both

7 The correlation between the debates with local people, the mayors' own professional experience and educational background respectively and the mayors' implemental norms concerning organisational leadership (i.e. the mayors' emphasis on the task 'to guide staff in day-to-day activity') was not significant ($p = .062$, $p = .910$, $p = .245$, respectively (t-test)).

Figure 1: Mayoral priorities concerning strategic and implemental tasks. (great/utmost importance in per cent)



Note: Abbreviations are: AU: Austria, BE: Belgium, TC: Czech Republic, DEN: Denmark, EN: England, FR: France, GE: Germany, GR: Greece, HU: Hungary, IR: Ireland, IT: Italy, NE: Netherlands, POL: Poland, POR: Portugal, SP: Spain, SWE: Sweden, SWI: Switzerland

the strategic and implemental elements of political leadership. Second, the ‘collective body’ and ‘committee-leader’ countries are more often observed in the south-eastern quadrant of the figure. This is also in accordance with the approach, as these particular structures are expected to orient mayors in the direc-

tion of strategic leadership at the cost of implemental leadership. Similarly, the ‘council-manager’ country, i.e. Ireland (IR), is – as expected – observed in the south-eastern quadrant of the figure, although mayors in Ireland express less extreme priorities.

However, not all of the countries conform to the expectations of constitutional institutionalism. Switzerland deviates from the pattern observed among the rest of the ‘collective body’ and ‘committee-leader’ countries, inasmuch as Swiss mayors are located in the north-western quadrant of the figure, thus expressing almost the opposite of the expected priorities. Germany, Austria, Italy and Portugal likewise deviate from the tendency observed among the rest of the ‘strong mayor’ countries.

In Germany and Austria, mayors place less emphasis on strategic tasks than expected, while in Italy and Portugal the mayors attach little importance to implemental tasks of leadership, in spite of the local government form which supports both the strategic and daily decision-making of the mayor. It thus appears that although the structures of local governments may influence mayoral norms in some countries – either encouraging or restraining the managerial ideas of organisational leadership – the formal institutions seem to have little effect in other countries. It is conceivable that mayors in some of these countries have priorities that deviate from the expected pattern as a result of recent institutional reforms that are changing the mayoral role (Berg and Rao 2005; Caulfield and Larsen 2002) but have not yet been fully incorporated in mayoral attitudes. If this is the case, alternative theories must be introduced in order to fully explain the many different roles of the mayors’ vis-à-vis the appointed officials.

14.6 The complexity of political leadership

The managerial school of thought incorporated in NPM has stressed a more clear-cut role of political leaders, with specific focus on the strategic and visionary aspects of organisational leadership. Policy makers should concentrate on the making of policy and leave the implementation of policies to the appointed officials, i.e. the experts of day-to-day administration.

The analysis presented here has shown that not all of the European mayors share this normative approach to organisational leadership. While most of the mayors approve of the idea of creating vision for the city, a majority of the mayors still find the daily administrative task somewhat important. The self-perceived role of mayors is in fact considerably more ambiguous than described by the managerial standard. Naturally, supporters of the managerial school of thought may regard this finding as unfortunate. Some may even go so far as to

criticize European mayors as 'old fashioned' organisational leaders, out of touch with the demands of today. The question is, however, whether the real problem originates from the European mayors or the managerial ideas.

The managerial ideas are inspired by a particular set of economic and management theories whose main focus is on increasing the efficiency of organisations. These theories were originally developed for non-political organisations. The idea that leading politicians should focus explicitly on strategic tasks thus originates in a theory based on technical-administrative criteria. This particular perception of politics is in many ways far removed from political reality, including the democratic conditions under which mayors are leaders of the local administration. Local political leaders do not operate in an administrative vacuum without relation to their surroundings. Rather, they are elected by the local population with a mandate to represent the people's interests in the council. However, the role of representation cannot be excluded from the administrative room, and it will constitute an inevitable part of virtually all mayoral activity. Responding to specific cases, dealing with complaints raised by the citizens and guiding the officials in day-to-day administration are not merely administrative functions, but also tasks through which the mayor can ensure that the needs and opinions of the people are reflected in policy implementation. In this respect, such tasks are also functions of representation. Hence, the normative values of the managerial school of thought requiring mayors to distinguish and prioritise between politics and administration, between strategic tasks and implemental tasks, may – at best – be a utopia, and – at worst – a barrier to our understanding of the full complexity of local political leadership.

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15 European Mayors and Administrative Reforms

Björn Egner and Hubert Heinelt

Local government reforms are on the rise in Europe. All European countries are experiencing an ongoing political and academic debate on the most suitable approach to local government reform, and in many countries such reforms have already taken place or are about to be implemented. ‘Public sector reform is in fashion and no self-respecting government can afford to ignore it’ (Wright 1997: 8). The key goals of the reforms discussed and implemented are changes in the institutional settings of local government (local election systems, relationship between mayor and council, direct citizen participation by referendum), a fostering of the involvement of societal actors or inter-active policy-making and an increase in the efficiency of the local administration. However, it is of interest to enquire what mayors themselves think about reforms.

- Do they actually think there is a need for reforms?
- How should the relations between politics and administration be structured on the local level – in their view? Should there be a separation of both spheres as demanded by proponents of New Public Management?
- What is their opinion with regard to interactive policy making, i.e. the direct involvement of societal actors in decision-making and implementation?

In addressing these issues, which bring to light nationally diverging mayoral opinions concerning reforms on the local level, there emerge two competing approaches for explaining mayoral opinions. The first hypothesis is that mayoral opinions are determined by the institutional arrangements in which they find themselves operating (*‘institutions matter’*). The second hypothesis is that opinions are determined by standpoints of mayors in terms of ‘logics of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1989) (re)produced by certain types of domestic discourse (*‘attitudes matter’*) and appearing mainly in the definition of their role. But which approach is more promising in explaining mayoral opinions about reforms?

In the first section we will define the variables used in this chapter. The second section will be used for an outline and a brief analysis of the characteris-

tics in different European countries and intra-connections within groups of variables. In the third section we will endeavour to determine which of the two hypotheses fits better (or explains more).

15.1 Defining variables

Since we aim to analyse the effects of institutional arrangements on the local government level and on the attitude or standpoints of the mayors, there are two sets of independent variables. The institutional arrangements are represented by the nine variables (defined by Heinelt and Hlepas in chapter 2) which indicate the *strength of the mayor's position* (IS) in the political system of the municipality defined by the municipal code of the respective countries.

The second set of independent variables consists of four variables which operationalise the degree to which a mayor is involved in the daily administrative organisation, and whether he or she considers a mayor must act as an 'inward looking' local political leader guiding and controlling the municipal administration or as a more distant 'outward looking' leader in charge of defining the great goals for the whole organisation but without following their implementation within the bureaux.¹ To measure variances in the self-declared praxis of mayors as *administrative leaders*, four statements of the mayors about the importance of the mayor's tasks were selected. Mayors are 'inward looking', if they agree that

- ensuring the correctness of the political-administrative process and
- guiding the staff in the day to day activity is *important* and that
- encouraging new projects in the community and
- creating a vision for the city is *not important*.²

The four variables constitute an index for the degree to which a mayor belongs to the 'inward looking' group (AT). The direction in which the four variables

1 For a similar distinction according to municipal chief executive officers within the UDITE study, see Klausen and Magnier 1998: 23. It should be mentioned that Rikke Berg, dealing with the importance of managerial schools of thought in this book, adopted a different operationalisation of the emerging dividing line between bureaucratic and political orientations. Furthermore, Carlos Alba and Carmen Navarro are examining the relation between mayors and municipal top administrators. e

2 Note that values from the third and the fourth variable are both negatively formulated so that regression coefficients must also be read inversely.

contribute to the index 'AT' is based on the results of a factor analysis in which two components were found.³

Table 1: Principal Component Analysis on Mayoral Tasks

	component	
	1	2
Ensuring the correctness of the political-administrative process	.441	-.581
Guiding the staff in the day to day activity	.775	-.137
Encouraging new projects in the community	.668	.418
Creating a vision for the city	.110	.752
<i>Variance explained</i>	<i>31%</i>	<i>27%</i>

Because in the last section of this chapter regression models will be tested for explaining variance, eight control variables were selected. Six control variables represent social characteristics of mayors (age, gender, education, party membership, number of years in office and former employment of the mayors in their municipalities), and two control variables represent characteristics of the cities (number of inhabitants and urbanisation).

The dependent variables are based on four core statements concerning local government reforms:

- Are reforms needed or has the 'need for changes and reorganisation of the local government sector been greatly exaggerated'?
- How should the relationship between politicians and members of the administration be structured? Should there be – as demanded by proponents of New Public Management (see for example Bovaird 2003 and for an overview Peters and Pierre 2001; Toonen 2001: 195-197) – a strict separation between the two spheres; where 'politicians only define objectives and control outputs, but never intervene in the task fulfilment of local administration' and 'local bureaucrats as far as possible stick to politically defined goals', acting consequently as "classical bureaucrats" (Putnam 1975; Klausen and Magnier 1998)?
- What do mayors think about interactive policy-making? Do they state that 'public-private partnerships and networks should play just as important a

3 Although the analysis produces two principal components with nearly equal explained variance, the second component is chosen here as guideline for constructing the index., since each of the four tasks is contributing positively to the first component, which makes it the 'yes-sayer' component.

role in social problem-solving as public administration and representative decision-making’?

15.2 Brief overview of differences between countries

Before trying to analyse statistical inference within the independent variables and statements of mayors about local government reforms as dependent variables, it is worth taking a brief look at variation of the independent and dependent variables by country.

Summarising the considerations on different local government systems (in chapter 2) and resulting differences of the institutionally determined strength of mayors, it can be stated that the POLLEADER typology is obviously more consistent in terms of ‘mayoral strength’ than the Mouritzen and Svara typology or the typology of Hesse and Sharpe.

The dichotomy between ‘inward looking’ and ‘outward looking’ mayors suggests that in total a clear majority (68%) of European mayors see themselves as ‘outward looking’ rather than ‘inward looking’ local political leaders. However, considerable differences between countries can be observed. There is a small group of countries where a majority of mayors see themselves *not* as a political leader but as an ‘inward looking’ head of the municipal administration. These are the Switzerland, Hungary and Spain. In Austria the situation is exactly fifty-fifty, and although in Germany a greater proportion of mayors are in favour of a distant ‘political’ administrative leadership, the figure for ‘inward looking’ leaders is still clearly higher (43%) than the European average. Controversially, self-perception of mayors as ‘inward looking’ leaders of the municipal administration is the lowest (less than 20%) in the Czech Republic, France, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland.

At first sight, these features do not fit any institutional explanatory approach used in this book, such as the Mouritzen/Svara, the Hesse/Sharpe and the POLLEADER typology, and in this respect the attitudes or the self-understanding of mayors as administrative leaders genuinely seem to represent a variable independent from the institutional settings defined by the local government system.

Turning now to country-specific differences in the dependent variables, the general statements of mayors concerning the need for reforms again show interesting variation between countries.

We observe that in only three countries does a majority of mayors think that ‘the need for changes and reorganisation [...] has been greatly exaggerated.’

Table 2: Countries and role definition of mayors concerning administrative leadership

Country	'inward looking' mayors
Switzerland	60%
Hungary	55%
Spain	53%
Austria	50%
Germany	43%
Poland	33%
Greece	32%
Italy	28%
Netherlands	27%
England	25%
Belgium	25%
Czech Rep.	18%
France	12%
Portugal	12%
Sweden	12%
Denmark	10%
Ireland	5%
Total	32%

The country values have been calculated on the basis of all responses while the total values are based on weighted data.

Among those countries are England and the Netherlands, which were the 'front-runners' in implementing New Public Management strategies.⁴ Mayors in these countries may be either disillusioned about the benefits of administrative reforms or simply tired of reforming their municipality after prolonged discussion and continuous changes. The Greek case is different: In recent years, decentralisation has taken place in this country but NPM has neither really reached the 'world of action' nor has become hegemonic in political discourse (see Hlepas 2003). The lower portion of table 3 is also interesting: Most Spanish mayors

4 For an overview of the reforms in these two countries see Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000: 244ff and 270 ff and for summarizing statements Löffler 1998: 330 on England and König and Beck 1997: 52 on the Netherlands.

demand a reform of municipal administrations, which can be interpreted as criticism against the given bureaucratic organisation of the public sector. The demand for reforms among Swedish mayors is also high, possibly because recent reforms are not felt to have been sufficiently sweeping or because ‘considerable decentralization has taken place [...], but this has been political decentralisation [...] rather than predominantly managerial decentralisation’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000: 138).


Table 3: Countries and general attitudes of mayors towards reforms. Percent

	Statements: The need for changes and reorganisation of the local government sector has been greatly exaggerated.					
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	sum (strongly) agree
Netherlands	3	16	12	45	24	69
England	10	18	11	33	29	62
Greece	5	35	5	40	16	55
Ireland	10	35	10	35	10	45
Poland	25	23	9	31	12	43
Czech Rep.	4	24	30	31	12	42
Belgium	4	32	23	33	7	40
Austria	5	30	30	33	3	35
France	7	30	29	30	4	34
Portugal	5	49	12	24	10	34
Denmark	10	38	18	22	12	34
Germany	10	40	21	26	3	30
Italy	17	38	16	23	6	30
Hungary	33	35	9	19	5	24
Switzerland	7	47	26	17	3	20
Sweden	11	44	27	18	1	19
Spain	11	42	31	13	3	16
Total	11	34	19	28	9	37

The two variables which display the relationship between politics and administration also reveal large differences. As can be seen in Figure 1, there are some interesting findings for the combination of the two statements.

- In two countries (France and Spain) mayors feel that the local administration should stick to politically defined goals and that politicians may intervene in task fulfilment. This indicates that mayors in these countries regard

Figure 1: Mayors’ opinion on the relationship between politics and administration



the municipal administration as their ‘tool’ for implementing policies which should be bound to their personal strategies.⁵

- In three countries (Germany, Portugal and Hungary) mayors believe that politicians should not intervene in task fulfilment and that administration is not necessarily bound to politically defined goals. This indicates a rather ‘de-politicised’ view on administration matters – which may in many con-

5 Surprisingly, there is no connection between this finding and the relationship between mayors and parties on the local level. When asked about the importance of ‘implementing your own political programme’ and ‘implementing your party’s programme’, both were important for Spanish mayors while both were dispensable for French mayors.

texts be interpreted as a rejection or an expression of an acknowledged decline of 'party politics' in town hall.

- In six countries (Switzerland, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Poland and the Netherlands) mayors follow a model of 'leadership' where the administration should implement politically defined goals, but once a decision is made politicians should not intervene in task fulfilment. This indicates a strong disjunction of decision and implementation (or: politics and administration). This finding may be consistent with images of the situation in some countries (for instance in Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands and also Poland) but may in other cases (like Greece and Italy) express reflect general norms rather than actual behaviour.
- In five countries (England, Ireland, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Denmark) mayors believe that municipal administration is not bound to politically defined goals, but they consider the doors open for political intervention. This points to a constellation where it seems legitimate on the one hand for administrative decisions to be politicised, but on the other hand administrative staff may feel free to follow their own (professional) objectives. Furthermore, it has to be noted that in Anglo-Saxon countries like England and Ireland where NPM ideas have been strongly supported politically, one of its core doctrines – namely the separation between political and administrative decisions – has been neglected by our respondents.
- Austria is a special case where mayors on the one hand emphasise that bureaucrats should stick to politically defined goals but the views on political intervention are exactly split.

Do European mayors like the idea of interactive policy-making in networks and public-private partnerships, do they emphasise that 'public-private partnerships and networks should play just as important a role in social problem-solving as public administration and representative decision-making'? There are also large differences between countries as indicated in table 4 (see on this issue also Bovaird et al. 2002).

Strikingly, mayors in a group of four countries where a transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy has taken place the last decades (Hungary, Greece, Poland and Portugal) are the most enthusiastic about public-private partnerships (PPPs). Especially in Greece, this points to a strategy wherein guidelines set up by central government as well as inflexible and bureaucratic local administrations are bypassed in favour of involving private partners in the implementation of locally determined strategies (Hlepas 2003: 234). It is also of interest to note the 'teutonic' group of Switzerland, Austria and Germany, where PPPs are perceived as nearly identical – i.e. where support for the statement that

'Public-private partnerships and networks should play just as important a role in social problem-solving as public administration and representative decision-making' is noticeably below the European average. In Denmark PPPs are clearly most unpopular, possibly because of adverse experiences in individual cases which led to a nation-wide debate about the disadvantages of PPPs, e.g. the lack of transparency (cp. Greve 2003: 62).

Table 4: Public-Private Partnerships. Percent

	Public-private partnerships and networks should play just as important a role in social problem-solving as public administration and representative decision-making					
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	sum (strongly) agree
Hungary	0	5	9	58	29	86
Greece	0	6	11	53	30	83
Poland	2	9	8	48	33	81
Portugal	0	5	15	46	34	80
Sweden	0	3	23	54	21	75
Italy	1	4	21	52	22	74
Ireland	0	5	21	37	37	74
Czech	0	3	25	61	12	73
Netherlands	0	11	24	59	6	65
England	3	14	24	47	12	58
Belgium	1	19	30	44	7	51
Spain	0	9	40	45	6	51
Switzerland	2	20	28	46	4	50
Austria	3	23	25	43	8	50
Germany	3	22	30	39	7	46
France	2	26	28	38	7	45
Denmark	18	35	26	18	3	21
Total	2	14	24	46	14	60

15.3 What does matter – institutional settings or personality?

15.3.1 Relating institutional and attitudinal aspects to statements on reforms

After this overview of country variances the hypotheses formulated at the beginning will now be tested by performing linear regressions. We will regress the institutionally determined strength of the mayor (IS) and the index of attitudes (of 'inward' versus 'outward looking' mayors; AT) as independent variables to

the statements by the mayors regarding local government reforms in general, the relationship between politics and administration and the statements regarding public-private partnerships as dependent variables. The control variables defined earlier (in section 1 of this chapter) will also be used to check whether the variance in the dependent variables arises either from variance in IS and/or AT or from characteristics of the mayor or the city.

Table 5: Regression analysis of attitudes on reform. Model 1.

	need for changes and reforms has been exaggerated	local bureaucrats should stick to politically defined goals	politicians should not intervene in task fulfilment	PPP should play an equally important role	number of significant effects
adjusted R ²	.048	.049	.103	.043	
IS: mayoral strength	-	-	-	-	4
AT: attitude index				-	1
cv: age	+				1
cv: gender	+	+			2
cv: education		+	-		2
cv: party membership		-	-		2
cv: years in office		-	-	-	3
cv: employed by municipality			+		1
cv: population size	-				1
cv: urban status	+	-	+		3
number of significant effects	5	6	6	3	20

effects marked if $P < .05$; + pos. effect, - neg. effect

The regressions for the four statements on reforms result in low determination coefficients (adjusted R² between .043 and .103 see Table 5). However, the statistical effects in the models show that the index for the institutionally determined strength of mayors is significant for all four of the models and that the attitude index is significant for only one model. The control variables show different effects: The total years in office (hence: the experience of the mayor) and the urban status of the city seem to be important, while other factors are less relevant. Generally speaking, a low but straightforward impact of institutional settings (mayoral strength) on the four statements by mayors on reforms can be detected.

15.3.2 Regressing single institutional and attitude variables to statements on reforms

To identify effects of the single components of the (independent) variables on the strength and attitudes of mayors, the indexes were split up into their original parts to perform a more sophisticated regression.⁶

Table 6: Regression analysis of attitudes to reform. Model 2.

	need for changes and reforms has been exaggerated	local bureaucrats should stick to politically defined goals	politicians should not intervene in task fulfilment	PPP should play an equally important role	number of significant effects
adjusted R ²	.076	.243	.172	.105	
directly elected mayor	-			-	1
terms do not correspond		-	+		2
mayor controls majority	-			-	2
no recall by council	+	+		-	3
no recall by referendum	+		-	-	3
mayor presiding council		-	-	-	3
mayor (co)defining agenda		-			1
mayor appointing CEO	+			+	2
mayor appoint. dep. heads		+	+	+	3
ensuring correctness		+			1
guiding staff			-	+	2
not encouraging projects				-	1
not creating vision				-	1
Age	+		+		2
Gender					0
Education					0
party membership					0
years in office			-		1
employed by municipality					0
population size	-				1
urbanisation		-	+		2
number of significant effects	7	6	8	10	31

effects marked if $P < .05$; + pos. effect, - neg. effect

6 For the definition of the single aspects of the institutionally determined strength of mayors see chapter 2.

After introducing the single components of the indexes to the regression models, higher determination coefficients appear. The number of significant effects of the attitude variables is as low as expected from the result of the index regression. In the regression models presented above, the share of significant effects among the attitude variables is 31%. Fewer effects can be counted in the control variable set, with 6 out of 32 significant coefficients (19%). The greatest number of effects occur within the institutional variables, where nearly two-thirds of the coefficients (63%) are significant.

15.3.3 Explanatory power of local government systems

Individual institutional aspects determining the strength of mayors as well as the self-understanding of mayors as administrative leaders influence their statements on reforms, as shown earlier. However, it may be fruitful to look for patterns related to local government systems, by examining:

- horizontal power relations between the council, the municipal administration and the mayor systematically (i.e. not by summing effects related to single institutional aspects of the strength of mayors – as considered above),
- the competences of the local government in comparison to upper levels of government as described by the Hesse/Sharpe typology and
- such horizontal power relations in connection with the allocation of political competencies and financial power at the local level as covered by the POLLEADER typology.

Or to put it more precisely: does the Mouritzen/Svara or the Hesse/Sharpe typology or the POLLEADER typology explain variances in the dependent variable – and which one does it more convincingly?

In order to analyse these possible inferences, other regression models will be tested. Using the classification of mayoral attitudes or personality ('inward' versus 'outward looking'; AT) and the statements on reforms, we will attempt to predict the form of local government system or type of mayor the responding mayor belongs to. The aim is to test all three typologies for their explanatory power on differences in the statements by mayors about local government reforms and in mayoral attitudes.

Firstly, we will seek to determine whether the classification of local government systems according to the Mouritzen/Svara and/or the Hesse/Sharpe typology or the position of mayors in line with the POLLEADER typology is

more successful in predicting the role definition of mayors. Therefore three linear regression models will be set up, as described below.

Table 7: Linear Regressions: Mouritzen/Svara and the aspects of the mayors as ‘inward’ or ‘outward looking’ leaders

	model	β (std.)		
	adj.R ²	strong mayor form	collective form	council manager form
ensuring correctness of processes	.015	.020	.125 *	-.058*
guiding staff in day-to-day activity	.056	.296*	.068*	.023
not encouraging new projects	.029	-.037	.141 *	-.012
not creating visions for the city	.003	.110*	.107*	.017

significant variables (P<0.1) marked *; reference category: committee leader

Table 8: Linear Regressions: The Hesse/Sharpe typology and the aspects of the mayors as ‘inward’ or ‘outward looking’ leaders

	model	β (std.)		
	adj.R ²	Franco (South)	Anglo	North and Central
ensuring correctness of processes	.035	.146 *	.093 *	.267 *
guiding staff in day-to-day activity	.030	-.150 *	-.192 *	-.178 *
not encouraging new projects	.015	-.070 *	.089 *	-.059 *
not creating visions for the city	.072	-.057 *	-.017	.227 *

significant variables (P<0.1) marked *; reference category: east

Table 9: Linear Regressions: POLLEADER and the aspects of the mayors as ‘inward’ or ‘outward looking’ leaders

	model	β (std.)		
	adj.R ²	Political	collegial	executive
ensuring correctness of processes	.011	.346 *	.400 *	.333 *
guiding staff in day-to-day activity	.069	.134 *	-.058	.260 *
not encouraging new projects	.024	.035	.177 *	.010
not creating visions for the city	.050	-.092	.004	.161

significant variables (P<0.1) marked *; reference category: ceremonial

As can be seen from the three tables above, all models have a low determination coefficient; nevertheless, both POLLEADER (average $R^2=.039$) as well as the Hesse/Sharpe (average $R^2=.038$) typology incorporating the aspect of distribution of power and competencies as well as the distribution of finances between territorial levels of government seem to ‘fit better’ to the mayors’ answers than the Mouritzen/Svara (average $R^2=.026$) typology. The conclusions for the Hesse/Sharpe typology read as follows:

- ‘Ensuring correctness of political-administrative processes’ is most important for the North Middle European group and much less important for mayors in Anglo type countries.
- ‘Guiding staff in day-to-day activity’ is most important in the Central East European countries and least important for Anglo type mayors.
- ‘Encouraging new projects for the community’ is *not* important for Anglo type mayors, but more important for the Franco and North Middle European group.
- ‘To create visions for the city’ is *not* important for the North Middle European group, but important to some extent for mayors in all other groups.

Table 9 leads to the following conclusions for the POLLEADER model:

- ‘Ensuring correctness of political-administrative processes’ is most important for ‘collegial leaders’, but also for incumbents in the group of ‘political’ and ‘executive mayors’.
- ‘Guiding staff in day-to-day activity’ is not important for ‘collegial leaders’, but much more important for ‘political mayors’ and very important for ‘executive mayors’.
- ‘Encouraging new projects for the community’ is *not* important for ‘collegial leaders’.
- ‘To create visions for the city’ is *not* important for ‘executive mayors’, whereas it is for ‘political mayors’.

But what about the mayors’ statements on local government reforms? Can they be related to certain forms of local government systems and/or types of mayors? Which typology is provides the best fit to the variances within mayors’ statements and their executive attitude over types of local government systems? We ran fifteen linear regression models presented in the following tables.

Table 10: Linear Regressions: The Mouritzen/Svara typology and the statements of mayors on local government reforms as well as attitudes of mayors

	model	β (std.)		
	adj.R ²	strong mayor form	collective form	council manager form
Public-private partnerships and networks should play an important role	.006	.110 *	.052	.061 *
need for reforms has been exaggerated	.030	-.007	.170 *	.016
local bureaucrats should stick to politically defined goals	.026	.102 *	-.069 *	-.018
Politicians should never intervene in task fulfilment	.008	.115 *	.042	-.032
'inward' vs. 'outward looking' leaders (AT)	.017	.230 *	.203 *	-.010

significant variables (P<0.1) marked *; reference category: committee leader

Table 11: Linear Regressions: The Hesse/Sharpe typology and the statements of mayors on local government reforms as well as attitudes of mayors

	model	β (std.)		
	adj.R ²	Franco group	Anglo group	North Middle European
Public-private partnerships and networks should play an important role	.051	-.205 *	-.108 *	-.328 *
need for reforms has been exaggerated	.015	-.005	.129 *	.024
local bureaucrats should stick to politically defined goals	.060	-.058 *	-.162 *	-.267 *
Politicians should never intervene in task fulfilment	.081	-.342 *	-.195 *	-.103 *
'inward' vs. 'outward looking' leaders (AT)	.025	-.078 *	-.052 *	.089*

significant variables (P<0.1) marked *; reference category: east

Table 12: Linear Regressions: POLLEADER typology and the statements of mayors on local government reforms as well as attitudes of mayors

	model	β (std.)		
	adj.R ²	Political	collegial	executive
Public-private partnerships and networks should play an important role	.006	-.216 *	-.272 *	-.232 *
need for reforms has been exaggerated	.022	-.092	.061	-.100
local bureaucrats should stick to politically defined goals	.050	.295 *	.034	.109
Politicians should never intervene in task fulfilment	.079	.164	.195 *	.453 *
'inward' vs. 'outward looking' leaders (AT)	.033	.220 *	.221 *	.395 *

significant variables ($P < 0.1$) marked *; reference category: ceremonial

When comparing the models, in total the Hesse/Sharpe (average adjusted $R^2 = .046$) and the POLLEADER (average adjusted $R^2 = .038$) typologies fit better to the statements and attitudes than the Mouritzen/Svara typology (average adjusted $R^2 = .017$). The following conclusions can be drawn from this statistical experiment: if one sums all the findings from the regressions in Table 12, the types of mayor according to the POLLEADER typology can be categorized as follows in comparison with the reference category ('ceremonial mayor').

'Political mayors' have a slightly greater tendency to support interactive policy making than 'collegial leaders' and 'executive mayors'. They tend to see the needs for reforms and agree that the administration should be bound to political goals. Furthermore, they tend towards the opinion that politicians should not intervene in the work of the administration. 'Political mayors' are the group with the second strongest tendency to be 'outward looking' leaders, ranking immediately after the ceremonial reference category.

'Collegial leaders' have the strongest reluctance to interactive policy-making. They tend towards the separation of administration and politics by supporting the view that politicians should never intervene in task fulfilment. They also tend to be 'outward looking' like 'political mayors'.

'Executive mayors' also express reservations with regard to interactive policy-making. They strongly agree that politicians should *not* intervene in the work of the administration. As far as their self-understanding as leaders is concerned, there is a strong tendency towards the type of 'inward looking' leader-

ship.⁷ The statements by ‘executive mayors’ imply that they see themselves *not* as *politicians* but clearly as heads of the administration who have no sympathy for politicians intervening in task fulfilment, i.e. their own domain. Instead, ‘political’ and ‘ceremonial mayors’ see themselves more as ‘politicians’, which explains why they see no need to restrain political inference.

15.4 *Path dependency and mayors’ adherence to reforms*

At first sight, mayoral opinions on local government reforms seem to be country-specific. At least for most cross-country variances, the aggregation data can be explained by the specific situation in each country depending on the intensity of local reforms that have already been implemented or are about to be implemented. But a closer examination of the data reveals that institutional settings on the local level and attitudes of mayors towards their own tasks can also be picked to explain variances. We showed that both institutionally determined mayoral strength and mayoral self-perception regarding the goals and tasks are explanatory variables for mayoral notions towards reforms.

We may now recall the two hypotheses introduced in the beginning, where it was found that institutional arrangements on the local level have greater explanatory power for mayoral opinions on reforms than the mayors’ attitudes towards their tasks. It can therefore be concluded that both institutions and personality matter, but institutions more successfully explain variances within mayoral opinions on reforms.

Based on these findings, we endeavoured to move a step further by seeking to determine which typology of local government systems or of mayors is more appropriate to explain the variance. It was thus observed that the explanatory power of the POLLEADER typology developed earlier in this book is clearly stronger than the typology of Mouritzen/Svara. This can be attributed to the fact that it is not primarily the horizontal power relation between the council, the municipal administration and the mayor that determined the responses by the latter towards the enquiry concerning local government reforms, but the tasks allocated at the municipal level within domestic intergovernmental settings, combined with the dimension of horizontal power relations. That is to say, it is neither horizontal power relations nor vertical relations between local and upper levels of government which makes the difference, but rather the combination of both incorporated in the POLLEADER typology.

7 In fact, the chance that an ‘inward looking’ mayor is also an ‘executive mayor’ is approximately 32 times higher than that he/she is a ‘collegial mayor’.

Since regression models using existing and newly created typologies have greater explanatory power than the single institutional variables and the mayors' attitudes tested, we conclude that institutions do matter – in fact, they matter much more than personal attitudes when complex issues like decisions concerning reforms on the local level come into play.

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16 Strong Mayors? On Direct Election and Political Entrepreneurship

Annick Magnier

16.1 Direct election of mayors: isomorphism in local representation?

A number of different political motives and types of political discourse, rooted in diversified organisational contexts, have resulted in the extensive movement towards local government reform that has swept throughout the whole of Europe in recent decades. Many contributions in this volume (see in particular the chapters by Heinelt-Egner, Berg, Alba-Navarro) reflect the current uneasy but necessarily academic attempt to depict its main trends (Larsen 2002; Kersting-Vetter 2003; Reynaert-Steyvers 2005; Caciagli-Di Virgilio 2005). There is overall recognition that despite many country- or area-specific variations, institutional innovations have faced a common problem: a perceived crisis of representation of the whole political system, that is to say an acknowledged discrepancy between the representative structures and processes and the new contextual challenges.

It was assumed at first that this discrepancy could be dealt with at the local level, because it was likely to be more easily appreciable or more straightforward to counter at this level. In concrete terms, the crisis was manifested – depending on the contexts and sensibilities – as a decline in electoral participation, or the difficulty of finding candidates, the instability of local governments, the impossibility of producing norms in local assemblies, or the focus on participation in nimby and one-issue reactions. The various reforms of local government may thus be read as multifaceted attempts to adapt the representative structure to the new pressures on local government.

In this drive to innovation, the figure of the Mayor began to assume the character of a decisive – albeit not unique – node, the concrete effect of which translated into a greater visibility of the figure, although this was not always accompanied by increased competences. Such visibility acquired particular prominence in connection with a move away from the traditional system in which the mayor was chosen by the assembly, and towards introduction of direct election to the mayoral office.

As an outcome of the above changes, the overwhelming majority of European mayors are now directly chosen by the citizens (more than two thirds, according to the broad definition of direct election previously adopted in our analysis), in stark contrast to the situation prevailing two decades ago (Magnier 2003). Such institutional innovations offer one of the clearest European examples of isomorphism, as the result of similar but independent responses to parallel problem pressures, and probably of transnational communication based on the renown of some ‘strong mayor’ experiences in large cities (Bennett 1991; Di Maggio-Powell 1991; Holzinger-Knill 2005). As shown by Heinelt and Hlepas (Chapter 2) in their delicate attempt at assessment of the legal definition of the role within Europe, direct election corresponds to different normative structures of opportunities for the mayor. Nevertheless, the overall trend suggests a classification based, with equal frequency, on models of ‘political’ or ‘executive’ mayors. Exceptions may be found only in some areas of England and Austria, where mayors may be directly elected to lead ‘collegial’ local governments. Apart from these few exceptions, directly elected mayors may be considered, consistently with the label often used in political debate, as ‘strong mayors’.

Does the spread of direct election and the apparently new normative concentration on a relatively small number of mayoral models favour a common basic answer to the present ‘puzzle of representation’, allowing a common interpretation of their role? The empirical evidence from research on the current structure of influence and the type of activities mayors privilege among those possibly linked to their office, examined through the multiplicity of thematic and technical approaches offered in the chapters of this book, provides interesting insight into the trends in local democracy and the challenges European mayors face at this time. The findings of this survey delineate heavy path dependency schemes in the notion of representation that orients the daily interpretation of the office, but indicate overall decisive common trends in the constant construction of the role.

16.2 Un-contrasted local leadership, based mainly on party resources

First citizens, confident of their own local influence: this is the classic picture of European mayors, whether directly elected, appointed or indirectly designated, who consistently perceive themselves as the most influential person in local matters. Denters (in Chapter 12) highlights a substantial uniformity in the patterns of perceived influence across the various local government systems, the similarities being evident in particular for mayoral prominence (which varies only in a narrow range from the slightly lower scores of the Netherlands, Ireland

and Switzerland to the slightly higher scores of all the contexts of 'political mayors'). In contrast, the inter- and intra- country differences arising from the relative power mayors accord to the other elected officials and to bureaucrats are more evident. 'Executive' mayors collaborate with elected or unelected administrators whom they consider to be rather less influential than themselves, while 'political', but also 'collegial' mayors deal in their daily life with bureaucrats considered on average as more influential than the elected representatives serving in the municipality.

In such a picture, dominated by a tendency towards homogeneity, the slight variations in perception of influence mainly reflect the traditional images of the role: for instance, the mayor is particularly conscious of the impact of the position in countries of the franco group. Two unanticipated tendencies are nevertheless worth noting: on one side the relative importance ascribed to administration in the 'anglo' area (pertinently underlined by Alba and Navarro in Chapter 12), and on the other side the self-confidence now acquired by mayors in post-communist countries, illustrating the rapid resumption of a sound tradition of local autonomy.

Table 1: Compared influence of mayors, bureaucrats and councillors, in the different local government systems and according to the modalities of mayors' designation (average on scale 0 = 'no influence' to 4 = 'high influence')

	Local Bureaucrats	Councillors	The Mayor
not directly elected	2.91	2.91	3.60
directly elected	2.69	2.69	3.85
<i>Total</i>	<i>2.75</i>	<i>2.75</i>	<i>3.72</i>
Political	2.83	2.66	3.87
Collegial	2.74	2.60	3.60
Executive	2.62	2.34	3.75

Responses to the question: 'On the basis of your experience as a Mayor in this City, and independently from the formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of the following actors are over the Local Authority activities.'

Directly elected mayors show even stronger confidence in their own resources than their diversely designated colleagues. They rate their personal influence higher, and they moreover perceive a larger gap between their own capacity to determine municipal activity and that typical either of the bureaucrats or of their fellow representatives in town-hall. To be directly elected affords them a clearer sensation of being able to impose their views on the political and administrative

organisation. In some national contexts, however, concern has been voiced about the risk of autocracy as a corollary of the present reform trends; this prompts a continuing search for new forms of checks and balances adapted to the new dimensions of the role.

The non institutional resources on which mayoral influence is founded reflect a large diversity of configurations in which path dependency always combines with apparently decisive homogenizing features. Examining the recruitment of mayors, Reynaert and Steyvers (Chapter 3) maintain that it is roughly divided up between two enduring types of social background, giving rise to two different mayoral figures, now unequally represented within Europe. From their analysis, recruitment practices appear to be moving towards the figure of the 'notable and citizen-politician' (local person with a professional background not necessarily centred on administrative or political positions) not only in the countries of the southern area but also in the Eastern and Central European areas. By contrast, the 'public and politically agglutinated' figure (local connections less marked, greater presence of mayors holding a university degree and more frequent professional backgrounds in the (para-political realm) is found principally in Northern Europe. Interestingly, the spread of a synthetic model of 'notable and citizen-politician' constitutes a disrupting element in the traditional picture of the European local political landscape. Alba and Navarro (in Chapter 13) also notice the persistence of a minoritarian pattern of recruitment from within the administrative machine, although this pattern is limited and highly country-specific. Finally, the data concerning careers examined by Kjaer in Chapter 4 suggest emphasis should be placed on the contrast between direct entry to the position of mayor and progressive local elective careers. An overwhelming majority of mayors benefited from prolonged training on the city council before holding mayoral office (on average almost six years), but on the other hand, one third of mayors never practised on the Council before entering the office of mayor.

Such patterns of resources, beyond the numerous national and dimensional specificities, lead to two general – and non trivial- considerations.

Mayors belong to and exercise their influence in a very 'local' world. As shown by Kjaer, no more than one-fifth of mayors rise to the regional level in their career path, through election (occasionally prior election) to a regional body. Only exceptionally do they combine national and local experience through *cumul de mandats* or previous positions.

In forging their capacity to emerge among other actors in order to stand for mayoral office, it may be inferred from our data that political parties continue to play a crucial part. This is particularly true for the 'gender' minority: Johansson (in Chapter 5) demonstrates that independently of the varying set of commo-

ties offered to families – and to women – in the different Welfare State models, female mayors followed on average a career path more deeply embedded in the political party system. Candidates to the mayoralty may, while campaigning, acquire fairly intense support either from ‘local society’ or from political parties: the dichotomy civil society-political structures at this special phase of the mayoral path assumes concrete and vivid significance (as underlined, from varying points of view, by a number of contributions in the book: see for example Bäck so well as Magnier, Navarro and Russo). But almost all candidates belong to the ‘party’ world. With the single and striking exception of Poland, a very large majority of the national mayors have been or are members of a political party (from seven in ten to almost all).

Interestingly, Fallend, Ignitz and Swianiewicz (in Chapter 11) show that directly elected mayors are less often current formal members of political parties: one in twenty of mayors appointed by the councils, as against one in four of directly elected mayors, are now independent. The overwhelming majority of mayors chosen by the councils, but half of the directly elected mayors held a position in a party before his/her first mandate. Non-directly elected mayors much more often declare that one of the principal motivations for becoming a mayor is a feeling of duty towards their political movement. A different picture is obtained when looking at the efficient synthetic ‘party significance’ index proposed by the authors in this same contribution. Party significance is considerably less impressive than party affiliation; moreover, on this index directly elected mayors appear to be bound by a relationship with political parties in their daily mayoral activities to roughly the same extent as a mayor chosen by the council.

16.3 Local leaders in global restructuring

European mayors, as pointed out by Egner and Heinelt (Chapter 15), are commonly receptive to continuing institutional innovation. In only three countries does a majority of mayors believe that ‘the need for changes and reorganisation [...] has been greatly exaggerated’. These are countries in which the political or managerial settings have been diversely but intensely transformed in the past few decades: England, the Netherlands and Greece. A particular demand for further change emerges on the contrary from mayors holding office in Spain and in Sweden. Such an openness to change is remarkable when viewed against the background of their acute perception of the metamorphosis that has already occurred in local democracy settings and practices.

An analysis of how the distribution of influence among the key actors of local government has altered in the last decade reveals a picture of intense and multi-directional change. The landscape of local influence in all countries, as reflected in the mayoral statements, shows few stable elements in this period. Rarely (above all concerning the relationship between the business and public sector, and between the municipalities and their internal decentralised bodies) does the proportion of mayors who consider that the balance has remained untouched in the last decade rise to more than one third of those surveyed.

Kübler and Michel (Chapter 10) underline a lack of consensus in the descriptions of the directions of change in influence among the different tiers of government resulting from the survey. Linked principally to the country in which mayors are active, the picture usefully displays diverse national normative reforming trends, which are read under the light of local traditions and debates, and of individual experiences. To this one may add that Southern countries more often form the context for divergent interpretations concerning redefinition of the structure of influence between the different tiers of government.

In the light of the views expressed by the mayors, it emerges that reconstruction of the multi-level system of government by no means follows the single direction of the supposed reinforcement of municipalities. Mayors appear not to regard the formal appeal to vertical subsidiarity as a genuine current tendency. From such a description, Kübler and Michel develop an efficient typology of four modalities of multi-level restructuring. Over the last decade, according to the dominant opinion of the national mayors, the following phenomena have developed: 'recentralisation' (growth of regions at the expense of local governments, and simultaneously of central governments at the expense of sub-national governments) in Germany, Austria, England, Sweden; 'regionalisation' (growth of the regions at the expense of local and of central governments) in France and Belgium; 'polarisation' (contemporary growth of local and central governments at the expense of regions) in Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland; and 'decentralisation' (growth in influence of subnational governments, especially of the local governments) in Spain, Greece, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Portugal.

The impact on the most traditional cleavage in local government systems is imposing. Precisely in those counties where Hesse and Sharpe considered the position of the 'periphery' to be weaker, the pressure towards a consolidation of the local level has been more intense, while the anglo-group and the northern countries have been experiencing a clear trend (slighter in the second case) towards centralisation. Continuity in such evolutions would lead to a growing homogeneity in the European multi-level structure of government.

Table 2: The revolution in influence structures (% of answers 'identical')

	Sub-national/ National	Local/ Regional	Neighbourhood/ Local	Local executive board/ Local assembly	Mayor/ Local executive board	Mayor/ Local assembly	Elected officials/ Administrative officers	Public services/ Private firms
Austria	14.8	23.1	85.0	45.8	34.6	47.8	83.3	40.7
Belgium	27.2	15.0	25.0	41.2	38.4	36.0	28.3	41.0
Czech Rep.	10.2	11.5		24.2	45.2	48.3	24.2	34.4
Denmark	10.4	38.3		46.8	45.8	51.1	44.7	51.1
England	13.4	19.8	33.3	8.8	19.2	17.2	34.4	43.4
France	19.8	23.8	19.7	34.1	28.8	26.0	28.4	46.7
Germany	28.4	20.4	66.9	57.6	30.8	29.3	53.3	38.4
Greece	5.0	7.0		41.7	31.1	35.5	31.7	30.0
Hungary	15.7	14.0				24.0	22.0	28.6
Ireland		6.7	25.0	6.3	13.3	20.0	21.4	21.4
Italy	9.0	15.9	27.9	9.6	9.6	8.0	17.3	30.3
Netherlands	15.4	25.5	39.6	18.4	43.1	45.7	39.0	46.3
Poland	9.8	8.3	31.8			2.3	40.3	41.3
Portugal	29.2	38.1	28.1	67.2	35.4	50.0	64.6	60.0
Spain	7.4	7.4	27.1	24.0	19.0	15.4	23.9	21.0
Sweden	2.8	27.0	56.3	27.0	42.5	43.8	30.1	36.0
Total	16.3	18.2	37.8	32.4	27.7	24.9	35.5	38.0

Response 'identical' to the question: 'Could you characterize briefly the changes in influence that have occurred in the last decade among the various actors in local affairs. Indicate which, in the following couples, acquired relatively more influence drawing on your experience in your work as a mayor'

By contrast, the directions of change within the municipalities are not the object of major controversies. In almost all European countries, mayors overwhelmingly declare they have acquired more influence than the assembly, and much more than the executive board. The recent introduction of direct election explains a substantial part of the change in the strength of mayors vis-à-vis the local assembly, with the shift of power particularly favouring mayors in Italy, Germany and England. In countries like France and Spain, of traditional quasi-direct election, and in which this feature was not submitted to revision, the trends of change nevertheless lead to an equivalent decline in the representative capacity of local assemblies (mayors declare they have acquired more influence than the assembly), and the same pattern affects the executive board where it exists.

The balance of power between bureaucrats and elected officials, a focal point of the diversified interpretations of administrative modernisation, is depicted overall as more stable. The new and varying division of labour between bureaucracy and politics (thoroughly analysed in its many facets in the chapters by Berg, Egner and Heinelt, Alba and Navarro) broadly maintains the acquired status of relative influence of the bureaucratic sphere or perhaps leads merely to a situation that is not easily decipherable.

16.4 Local autonomy under siege

Such a metamorphosis in the distribution of influence could be argued to raise profound adaptive problems for political leaders holding the apex role in local authorities. Mayors nevertheless often have not acquired sufficient seniority to have experienced very different structures of opportunity. Many of them have held the mayoral office for less than 5 years (42%), 17% for less than 2 years. Many of the mayors surveyed moved into elective politics during the last phase of the extensive process of change they evoke: 38% among them entered their first public office in the Nineties, 8% after 2000 (11% before 1970, 28% in the Seventies, and 26% in the Eighties). Hence it is not surprising to find that they do not strongly denounce many of the conceivable difficulties possibly induced by such massive transformations. Two main observations emerge from their depiction of the obstacles they encounter in their job as a mayor.

Firstly, the dominant sensation, independently of the divergent trends in multi-level restructuring, concerns the reduced (or at least inadequate) capacities of the municipalities. The interpretation of problems mayors meet in their daily work is in fact much more homogeneous than their interpretation of the driving forces impacting on local democracy. And, without dramatizing, but clearly,

they indicate the lack of financial resources as their main adaptive problem and describe local autonomies, beyond the different patterns of institutional change, as uniformly constrained by a threatening reduction of nourishing flows, as if they were under a siege.

Secondly, the overall picture may correspond to an incremental process of change, which often began before the 'last decade' used as reference, but the revisions already acquired do not appear generally to the mayors as a segment of a reforming scheme that has yet to be implemented fully. Only in a few countries do mayors appear to acknowledge, and, even there, not very strongly, the negative effects of an unachieved re-definition of their role (Greece, Hungary, Poland, Ireland). On the other hand, confusion in administrative reform is more often denounced. The 'revolution' of local government, in conclusion, very rarely appears to them as unachieved, unless under the profile of administrative 'modernisation'. And in this field they likewise point to the lack of resources as the main obstacle.

Table 3: Obstacles claimed to impede mayoral action, according to the decade of entrance into elective politics (average on scale 0 = 'not at all' to 4 = 'to a very great extent')

Obstacles	before 1970	1970 - 1979	1980 - 1989	1990 - 1999	after 2000	Total
Financial problems in the municipality	1.6	2.6	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.6
Unclear definition of the mayor competence	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0
Lack of support from the city council	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.1	0.9
Inefficient political canalization of the request	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.1
Intrusion of political parties national organs	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7
Lack of support from my political party/movement	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5
Conflicts between the various departments and/or department heads	0.8	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1
Unclear division of labour between elected officials and the administration	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.0

Responses to the question: 'Indicate the extent to which your ability to perform your job as mayor has been affected negatively by the following factors during recent years.'

No item except the lack of financial resources suggests the presence of a widely shared uneasiness among European mayors. None, for instance, emphasise the item concerning relations with the other important actors of the municipality. In a small group of countries (Greece, Poland, Hungary), a large majority of may-

ors declare, more often implicitly, they have not socialised sufficiently to the current dimensions of the role, while an unsatisfactory state of the organisation appears as the second problem indicated by mayors in assessing the situation of local political systems.

Mayors who entered politics more recently perceive more acutely four kinds of problems: financial restrictions, lack of support among their fellow elected councillors, conflictual relations between executives within the organization, and unclear division of labour between elected officials and bureaucrats.

No kind of institutional arrangements appears markedly linked to special problems of division of labour between the main actors of the municipality. Nevertheless, the lack of financial resources is more strongly lamented by 'executive' mayors, while the problems of relations within the organization and with the administrative body are more acutely perceived by 'political' mayors. Collegial mayors appear on average less sensitive to contextual obstacles and restrictions in their action. In contrast, and this is the most interesting observation, directly elected mayors generally develop greater awareness of the obstructive effects induced by their institutional environment and limited financial set of resources.

Table 4: Modalities of election and perception of obstacles (average on scale 0 = 'not at all' to 4 = 'to a very great extent')

Obstacles	not directly elected	directly elected	Total
Financial problems in the municipality	2.1	2.8	2.6
Unclear definition of the mayor competence	0.9	1.1	1.0
Lack of support from the city council	0.6	0.9	0.9
Inefficient political canalization of the request	0.9	1.1	1.1
Intrusion of political parties national organs	0.6	0.7	0.7
Lack of support from my political party/ movement	0.5	0.6	0.5
Conflicts between the various departments and/or department heads	0.9	1.2	1.1
Uneasy relations with the media	0.8	1.0	0.9
Unclear division of labour between elected officials and the administration	0.9	1.0	1.0

Responses to the question: 'Indicate the extent to which your ability to perform your job as mayor has been affected negatively by the following factors during recent years.'

16.5 *Challenges and duties: Mayors as 'entrepreneurs'*

Their definition of their own duties suggest a marked propensity of contemporary European mayors to assume an accentuated profile of *political entrepreneur*, to be realised in various components of political action.

With regard to the term 'political entrepreneurship', our data suggest more precisely that this should be interpreted as a quite different attitude compared to the approach currently considered typical of local leaders. The notion of 'political entrepreneur' has in fact been variously declined in the tradition of political analysis, following mainly five different directions, described as follows. A 'political entrepreneur' is a politician in search of votes to obtain benefits, driven by ethical or material projects. This corresponds to the politician described by Weber, by Downs (1988), and in the literature on the 'political mediator'. A 'political entrepreneur' is also a creative leader, motivated by the pleasure of manipulating, creating or renovating organisations evoked by Schumpeter (1946). A 'political entrepreneur' is a leader searching for opportunities for development, according to the representative usage described by those who analyse local government from the perspective of political economics, or in the interpretations of local leaders as courtiers of local communities proposed by Tarrow (1977), founding the notion of political localism in Page and Goldsmith (1987). A 'political entrepreneur' is a leader who works to reduce local fragmentation by promoting aggregation around common projects, like mayor Dick Lee in Dahl's *Who Governs* (1961). A 'political entrepreneur' is a leader in charge of a public power that displays some of the characters of a private organisation; examples include city managers or elected officials in local systems where the responsibility of guaranteeing the quality of organisational efficacy is concentrated in the mayor; in such contexts 'Managerialism' may hence be read as a specific mode of political entrepreneurship (Allison 1979; Doig 1990; Osborne and Gaebler 1992).

Current research on local government calls attention to the last three of the above declinations of political entrepreneurship, linking it mainly to the mobilization of economic resources for development. On this point, as shown by the elaborations proposed in Magnier, Navarro and Russo (Chapter 8), our data offer evidence of deep policy convergences among European local authorities: mayors feel intensely responsible for bestowing as many opportunities for employment and wealth as possible on their community. Their eagerness to achieve this goal leads them to move beyond the administrative cocoon of city hall rather than concentrating on organisational rationalisation. Far from the 'managerialism' considered as typical of the Sixties-Seventies, they corroborate the general shift towards 'entrepreneurialism' in local government. It should be

stressed, however, that this holds true in the broad terms announced by Harvey in 1989, quite differently from the common assertions on the entrepreneurship of politicians at local level. In the context of strong macro-economic transformations, urban leaders, Harvey stressed, will merely acknowledge more and more acutely the necessity 'to be much more innovative and entrepreneurial to explore all kinds of avenues through which to alleviate their distressed conditions and thereby secure a better future for their populations' (Harvey 1989: 4).

In response to our question concerning their priorities among the set of tasks traditionally attributed to the role, mayors make it clear they intend to leave no avenue unexplored, although a narrow range of a few foundational tasks are considered as crucial by a very large majority of the mayors. 'Ensuring good services', 'creating a vision for the city': these are the two duties considered as essential by a large majority of the mayors. In other words, these form the true core in all European countries of the notion of representation when linked to the role of the mayor. 'Attracting external resources', 'sustaining new projects in the community', but also 'representing the city towards the external world' complete the basic image of the role of a mayor.

Using the Leach and Wilson (2004) typology of functions, Bäck (in Chapter 6) shows a slight predominance on average of the 'agenda setting' functions (realising the programme of the party, sustaining new projects, enforcing personal policy choices, offering a vision for the city), followed by 'external networking' (representing the city to the outside world), 'internal networking' (maintaining majority cohesion) and a somewhat less pronounced interest in 'task accomplishment' (quality of services, goals for administrative reform, correctness, help for citizens, daily control of staff). But he shows that when a different question is introduced ('Does recruitment matter?'), an important aspect can be singled out: prioritizing among tasks reveals a sharp contrast between the two age groups, namely senior mayors (with many years of experience) versus young holders of the mayoral office (and neophytes). Bäck also demonstrates that 'political' mayors place greater emphasis on the input functions of agenda setting and 'internal networking' (i.e. maintaining majority cohesion), while 'executive' mayors stress the output function of 'task accomplishment' (service quality, administrative reform goals, correctness, help for citizens, staff supervision), and 'collegial' leaders prioritize 'internal networking'. With the exception of 'ceremonial' mayors, the importance of 'external networking' shows little variation between the categories of the typology;

Appraising this interpretation of the role along the dimensions of responsiveness indicated classically in the literature, European mayors appear to emphasize service responsiveness and allocation responsiveness, while cultivating symbolic responsiveness (Pitkin 1972; Eulau and Wahlke 1978). The true diver-

gences between countries and between groups of mayors appear when looking at policy responsiveness and above all at the form of policy responsiveness which can be labelled as party responsiveness (i.e. the sense of a duty to enhance the party programme and authority locally). To what extent a mayor must depend on party programmes in carrying out mayoral activity is a debated point in Portugal, while in Greece and England mayors may develop very different interpretations of their capacity to undertake major political choices. These are the only two components of the responsibility as a mayor on which strong cultural divergences between and within countries may be stressed.

The overall picture thus seems distant from the more classical typologies, and is characterized overall by its inextricable heterogeneity, widely displayed in the different countries. That is to say, for the holders of the mayoral office their task consists not solely in the core missions outlined above, but also in a large number of 'duties' which are considered as less central but nevertheless call for attention.

Hence the entrepreneurship required in the mayor's role refers manifestly to different classes of resources, which may be not only economic and material, but also symbolic and integrative. Such a multidimensionality is constantly demonstrated by the directions suggested in the answers to our questionnaire. Looking first at the 'core duties', the privileged issue is provision of a good quality of local services. Such an issue is transversal and generic and its symbolic or ideological characteristics remain ambiguous. A large set of pursuits of different content and social signification may be included under such a label: for example, public utilities such as social assistance or health care or support against abuse and deprivation. With reference to the individual answers, we do not have information on the actors through which the local government provides these services – whether private, public or third sector – and how local bureaucracy intervenes in their provision.

The subsequently cited issues shed further light on the character of entrepreneurship today inscribed as a condition for most effectively interpreting the role of mayor. The second to the fifth preferred answers point to a dominant ambition to achieve a role interpretation that will combine propensity to *symbolic entrepreneurship* with the capacity to catalyze resources for local development. In a context which increasingly obliges territories to behave as competitive actors in a market of opportunities, local elites are called upon to elaborate strategies in which the capacity to manoeuvre economic tools is associated with the ability to manipulate the available symbolic resources. Such is the suggested interpretation of the preference granted, as second and third answers, to the items '*creating a vision for the city*' and '*attracting external resources*'. We may add that in many cases the two items must be considered

jointly, as shown by the analysis developed in the contribution of Magnier, Navarro and Russo (Chapter 9): a new image is created as the result of delicate operations of marketing aiming at creating a product 'city' or 'territory' attractive to possible investors. Conversely, success in attracting investments is determined by the degree to which a positive image of the product, city or territory is projected. The fourth and fifth privileged issues should also be considered in relation to different modalities of *political entrepreneurship* in the implementation of policy choices. The fourth option refers to 'new projects' emerging from the local community and requiring support from the political sphere; in such cases innovative capacity must be conjugated with an ability to build coalitions, in particular to mediate between the actors called upon to participate in the coalitions. The fifth option concerns the capacity to *represent the city towards the outside*. Such a task relies on the mayor's ability to build and project an image of the local world that has sufficient *appeal* to intercept a flux of resources (financial, touristic or others).

The following items refer to a more routine vision of the duties linked to the position as a mayor: devoting attention to the correctness of political administrative processes, providing solutions for citizens' complaints levelled against the administration, attending to inter-municipal cooperation. The latter activity is considered as being among the most monotonous tasks mayors may have to face, thus offering a further illustration of the resistance of municipal borders in local polity and of the difficulty of adjusting them to innovating delimitation of boundaries.

The re-structuring of the agenda together with the emphasis on 'developing' tasks clearly delineates the path of change involving the figure of the European mayor, who is now decidedly oriented towards facing new challenges and the corresponding implementational operations. Such a shared multidimensionality of the role also suggests that local government has undergone a rapid evolution that bears the hallmark of a common political culture of local representation, so that the 'ethical' configurations suggested not so long ago as typical of the different 'regions' composing Europe (see first of all Goldsmith 1992) now seem a characteristic of the past. Of a 'clientelistic patronage' orientation, stressing external representation of the community and paternalistic defence of citizens (which, among the duties listed above, should lead to an emphasis on the defence of local autonomy but also on support for complaining citizens), few traces are found in Southern countries, whereas the provision of good services and the search for external resources combine everywhere to build a dominant attitudinal blend of the so-called 'welfare state' and 'boosterism' models. As indicated in Chapter 8 (from Magnier-Navarro-Russo), the quest for new resources focuses mainly on attracting new economic activities.

Figure 1: The main duties of a mayor, by country ('Many different tasks are associated with the mayor's position. How important do you think the following tasks are?' Average on scale 1 to 4)




Table 5: The main duties of a mayor, by country (average on a scale from 0 = 'not a task of a mayor' to 4 = 'of utmost importance')

	To ensure the good quality of local services	To attract resources from external sources (European/national/regional government, foundations, private investors and business)	To defend and promote the influence of local authorities in the political system	To help citizens resolve complaints with the municipal government
Austria	3.7	2.8	2.8	3.4
Belgium	3.4	2.8	2.3	3.0
Czech Rep.	2.7	3.4	2.3	2.3
Denmark	3.3	2.4	3.0	2.7
England	3.8	2.8	2.7	2.5
France	3.5	3.2	2.2	3.0
Germany	3.5	2.9	2.9	3.1
Greece	3.6	3.7	2.6	3.0
Hungary	3.6	3.7	3.1	3.4
Ireland	3.5	2.7	3.4	2.9
Italy	3.5	3.3	2.3	2.6
Netherlands	3.1	2.5	2.5	2.7
Poland	3.2	3.8	2.3	2.5
Portugal	3.5	3.5	2.2	3.0
Spain	3.8	3.5	2.2	3.2
Sweden	3.4	2.7	3.1	2.6
Switzerland	3.4	2.2	2.6	2.9
Total	3.5	3.1	2.5	2.9

Responses to the question: 'Many different tasks are associated with the mayor's position. How important do you think the following tasks are?'

Nevertheless boosterism has links to numerous different objectives, including reactions to globalisation, which in many respects are path dependent and partially overlapping with respect to geographical configurations, but more narrowly dependent on the personal and ideological characters of the leadership.

As underlined by Berg (Chapter 14), this also means that the normative approach to organisational leadership based on a clear-cut role of political leaders (with specific focus on the strategic and visionary aspects of organisational leadership), which the managerial school of thought incorporated in New Public Management, is not shared by a majority of the mayors. They generally consider their daily administrative tasks as part of 'political representation' (while only a minority of mayors consider them as crucial). Consequently, the normative tension of the managerial school of thought requiring mayors to distinguish between strategic and implemental tasks appears to generate some misunderstanding of the complexity of political work at local level.

Finally, the above overall assessment suggests that in the meanwhile it is of interest to highlight a form of return to politics, as argued by Alba and Navarro (Chapter 13), or, at least, growing attention to the symbolic dimension of the role. Such a return to politics seems favoured by direct election and is promoted above all by the newly elected mayors. It also has the significant effect of encouraging widespread direct participation of citizens in local decisions.

16.6 Directly elected mayors and their constituency

At least as regards the structure of opportunities, the experience of elective political activity impacts on the definition of priorities in the representative role. Politicians do not differ by generation as regards the importance granted to representation of their party in the local world, and this finding contradicts a generic hypothesis of the decline of parties as producers of symbols and motives for action. But for mayors, the more recent is their entrance into political representation, the more they insist on the personalised dimension of policy definition and on their duty to defend the city against the lack of resources.

Table 6: Decade of entrance of into politics and task prioritizing (average on a scale from 0 = 'not a task of a mayor' to 4 = 'of utmost importance')

Tasks	Before 1970	1970 - 1979	1980 - 1989	1990 - 1999	After 1999	total
To represent the city to the outside world	3.1	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.0
To implement the programme of his/her political party/movement	1.2	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.1
To ensure the good quality of local services	3.3	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.5
To foster the co-operation with the neighbouring municipalities	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.7
To encourage new projects in the community	2.7	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.1
To generate cohesion in the political majority	2.4	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.7	2.6
To set goals for transforming the administrative structure	2.40	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.7
To manage the implementation of his/her personal policy choices	1.9	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.3
To attract resources from external sources (European/national/regional government, foundations, private investors and business)	2.7	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.1
To ensure the correctness of the political-administrative process	3.3	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.0
To defend and promote the influence of local authorities in the political system	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.5
To create a vision for his/her city	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
To help citizens resolve complaints with the municipal government	2.83	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.9
To contribute through local experience to the general consolidation of his/her party action	1.5	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.6
To guide the staff in the day to day activity	1.3	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9

Responses to the question: 'Many different tasks are associated with the mayor's position. How important do you think the following tasks are?'

Direct election intervenes strongly in the definition of duties, and in the general sense of responsibility. With regard to almost all the duties listed, directly elected mayors attribute on average more importance to these tasks than do their non directly elected colleagues (except for tasks related to consolidation of the majority, inasmuch as direct election does not free the mayor from this necessity, although it is considerably alleviated). In particular, direct election allows mayors to develop and enforce personal projects (managing the implementation of personal policy choices) while at the same time enhancing the principles defended by their political party. In addition, it sustains a transformation of the type of political representation embodied in the mayoral office, encouraging a shift in the direction of mediation between the municipal organisation and the citizens (mayors acting more as ombudsmen and as stimulators of daily administrative activity), and mediation between local projectuality and the concrete opportunities offered by the institutional and financial context. In short, it encourages both effective representation of the local community and concretisation of personal motives for action.

The general structure of opportunities interferes less clearly in the role definition. Nevertheless political mayors, as mentioned earlier, cultivate a stronger partisan orientation, and dedicate more attention to daily administrative activity. On the other hand, many discrepancies suggest a fundamental contrast between the collegial structure of the executive and the declared necessity of finding new and external resources to guarantee the level of services. Hence it does not seem hazardous to argue that what we define the collegial model of organisation of local government (Chapter 1) does not match a competitive context. Thus if we assume that such is the dominant feature of the context in which mayors have to work, under the threat of the intense re-designing of the localisation of economic activities and reduction of transfers from the national level, it would appear that organisational models of the collegial type do not favour the growth of a corresponding political culture among elected officials.

A very large majority of mayors favour the consultation of citizens on particularly important decisions, and indeed a majority of mayors consider direct citizen participation to be necessary in such cases. European mayors daily acknowledge the weakness of the traditional communication process and overwhelmingly affirm the need for some manner of more extensive involvement. For directly elected mayors, this often means more direct democracy than classical consultation.

Table 7: Direct election and task prioritizing (average on a scale from 0 = 'not a task of a mayor' to 4 = 'of utmost importance')

Tasks	Directly elected	Not directly elected
To represent the city to the outside world	3.0	3.1
To implement the programme of his/her political party/movement	2.1	2.1
To ensure the good quality of local services	3.5	3.4
To foster the co-operation with the neighbouring municipalities	2.7	2.7
To encourage new projects in the community	3.2	2.8
To generate cohesion in the political majority	2.5	2.7
To set goals for transforming the administrative structure	2.8	2.4
To manage the implementation of his/her personal policy choices	2.4	2.1
To attract resources from external sources (European/national/regional government, foundations, private investors and business)	3.2	2.7
To ensure the correctness of the political-administrative process	2.9	3.1
To defend and promote the influence of local authorities in the political system	2.5	2.7
To create a vision for his/her city	3.2	3.4
To help citizens resolve complaints with the municipal government	2.9	2.7
To contribute through local experience to the general consolidation of his/her party action	1.6	1.9
To guide the staff in the day to day activity	2.1	1.2

Responses to the question: 'Many different tasks are associated with the mayor's position. How important do you think the following tasks are?'

Haus and Sweeting in Chapter 7 show that the different institutional models do not correspond to great differences in mayoral proposals concerning active and direct participation of the citizens. Collegial mayors appear to rely more on administrators' expertise while executive mayors more intensely support active and direct participation of citizens. But the impact of direct election is much clearer. On the issue of citizen participation, directly elected mayors, as compared to their indirectly designated colleagues, are more inclined to suggest modes of direct participation in the decision-making process (and not only consultation), concluding that 'this might give supporters of the direct election of mayors the room to argue that directly elected mayors are more 'in touch' with citizen views, whereas indirectly elected leaders are more influenced by other actors (parties, councils etc.)'. Moreover, Getimis and Hlepas (Chapter 7) provide evidence of significant differences in the relationship with citizens, within

the same national context, between directly and indirectly elected mayors, showing for example that in Austria directly elected mayors spend more time than do indirectly elected mayors in meeting citizens (and also in cooperating with the other important actors inside the city hall). In addition, the same authors show that in Germany and in England directly elected 'executive' mayors face a greater work load than 'collegial' mayors, dedicating more time to citizens and to study of the individual issues involved.

Table 8: Institutional settings (types of political leaders) and task prioritizing (average on a scale from 0 = 'not a task of a mayor' to 4 = 'of utmost importance')

Tasks	Political	Collegial	Executive
To represent the city to the outside world	2.8	3.1	3.1
To implement the programme of his/her political party/movement	2.5	2.0	1.7
To ensure the good quality of local services	3.6	3.4	3.4
To foster the co-operation with the neighbouring municipalities	2.8	2.7	2.6
To encourage new projects in the community	3.2	2.9	3.2
To generate cohesion in the political majority	2.8	2.8	2.2
To set goals for transforming the administrative structure	2.7	2.5	2.8
To manage the implementation of his/her personal policy choices	2.2	2.1	2.7
To attract resources from external sources (European/ national/regional government, foundations, private investors and business)	3.3	2.7	3.2
To ensure the correctness of the political-administrative process	2.9	3.1	2.9
To defend and promote the influence of local authorities in the political system	2.3	2.6	2.7
To create a vision for his/her city	3.5	3.3	3.0
To help citizens resolve complaints with the municipal government	2.9	2.7	2.9
To contribute through local experience to the general consolidation of his/her party action	1.7	1.9	1.4
To guide the staff in the day to day activity	1.9	1.3	2.3

Responses to the question: 'Many different tasks are associated with the mayor's position. How important do you think the following tasks are?'

16.7 Renewing local representation by enhancing direct participation

The cross-national data set gathered in this survey will hopefully be the object of further thematic insights, beyond the already variegated choice of first elaborations attempted in this report. It is worth remarking here that the preliminary conclusions it offers repeatedly highlight three points of debate (or of concern) around which European polity is being shaped today, as far as mayors and their role are concerned. These are queries about how far the political party counts as a reference framework in the production of symbols and ideas; how far management of daily organisation may contribute to promoting defence and development of the local community; how citizens can become involved in the decision-making process ('how' more than 'how much').

Within the current European political debate, the present call for political participation, more specifically the call for direct democracy (vs. representative democracy) to which mayors are significantly contributing forms a distinct wave in comparison to demands put forward in the Seventies, from which it differs both in its ideological and also its institutional basis. In the Seventies, mainly through Marxist criticism – although the motives and arguments were partly shared by different and widespread parts of the political spectrum – direct democracy was conceived as a disrupting tool against a bureaucratising State that appeared as the instrument of the élite. It was a debate in which what was regarded as true participation led by direct, un-institutionalised participation (appropriation) was set in opposition to so-called false participation (representation and manipulation). The request for more direct participation came from the grassroots, and was embodied in the broad-ranging cultural and political 'movements' contesting the institutional settings. From the Nineties on, the critics of representative democracy started from the rallying cry (or the undeclared threat) of local 'coalitions', which also menaced the contracting capacity of elected officials, and above all asserted the need for direct institutionalised participation.

The emerging of 'cultural rights' as a new political arena led to redefinition of the modalities of political involvement, especially in multiethnic and more segmented local societies, with an appeal for new forms and places of participation (a problem not solved with the mere – and more or less complete – representation of foreign residents and 'minorities' in local assemblies). The European indication of horizontal subsidiarity as a meta-principle of local government emphasises participation as a duty: it is a duty of local government to mobilise 'civil society' in the decision-making process just as it is a duty of European citizens to contribute to improving the quality of local services. Globalisation as de-structuring of the centre-periphery logic obliges local systems to be

more effective, and local authorities to produce decisions in order to face competition. In such a framework, it is vital to build consensus on the directions of intervention prior to action and implementation. Finally, the concentration of power or of visibility in the executive (and above all the mayor) implies that participation – interpreted as the attempt to make an impact -- converges in one political figure. More ‘participation’ is consequently sought by leaders who feel insufficiently strong to face the challenges imposed by their office, but who are aware of the need to root their influence locally, to interpret a highly differentiated local reality, to deal with globalised threats and opportunities, to establish a fruitful dialogue with private partners and to consolidate their personal standing.

In conclusion, the picture of the culture of representation among European mayors resulting from our analysis reveals a very specific modality of entrepreneurship. In the first instance, it is the type of entrepreneurship required by a context of action portrayed as undergoing intense transformation and offering reduced opportunities. Mayors must adapt their interpretation of the role to fit a framework of declining financial resources. Their attention is consequently drawn to allocation responsiveness. The role nevertheless maintains – even exalts – its classical multifarious appearance, rooted in service provision and particularly dependent on policy responsiveness. This also leads mayors to focus more closely on local organisation in order to render the administration more effective, while they continuously seek confirmation of their mandate from their constituency. They can thus be seen as translators of a local specificity not reduced to a ‘level of services’ but requiring a constant re-definition of the principles of government.

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Annex: Questionnaire¹

1. Many different tasks are associated with the mayor's position. How important do you think the following tasks are? (limit to 3 answers please)

		Of utmost importance	Of great importance	Of moderate importance	Of little importance	Not a task of the mayor
v1	To represent the city to the outside world	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v2	To implement the programme of his/her political party/movement	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v3	To ensure the good quality of local services	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v4	To foster the co-operation with the neighbouring municipalities	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v5	To encourage new projects in the community	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v6	To generate cohesion in the political majority	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v7	To set goals for transforming the administrative structure	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v8	To manage the implementation of his/her personal policy choices	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v9	To attract resources from external sources (European/national/ regional government, foundations, private investors and business)	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v10	To ensure the correctness of the political-administrative process	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v11	To defend and promote the influence of local authorities in the political system	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v12	To create a vision for his/her city	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v13	To publicise municipal's activities	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v14	To help citizens resolve complaints with the municipal government	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v15	To contribute through local experience to the general consolidation of his/her party action	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v16	To guide the staff in the day to day activity	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>

¹ Topics to contextualize are marked in *italics* and optional questions or items are marked in *italics and bold*.

Please, specify the three most important tasks (write the item number):

k1 , k2 , k3

2. How many hours do you on average spend each week in the following activities?

		Hours/week
v17	Meetings with council and executive board	
v18	Meetings with administrative staff	
v19	Meetings with citizens, groups, etc.	
v20	Ceremonial and representative functions in the Town-Hall (weddings, register activities, receptions..)	
v21	Public debates and conferences outside the Town Hall	
v22	Field visits (official and unofficial) in the city	
v23	Meetings with authorities from other cities	
v24	Meetings with authorities from the region, national government	
v25	Individual preparation for the duties of Mayor	
v26	Political party meetings	
v27	Your other professional activity	
v28	Other important activity specify v29	

3. What are the main themes that you wish to be your accomplishments of your service as mayor? Indicate which of the following received from you a special priority (please do not indicate more than 5 themes) ?

v30	To attract economic activities in the city	<input type="checkbox"/>
v31	To develop highly qualified activities	<input type="checkbox"/>
v32	To regenerate or rebuild the city-centre	<input type="checkbox"/>
v33	To improve infrastructures and services for mobility	<input type="checkbox"/>
v34	To improve the aesthetics of the city	<input type="checkbox"/>
v35	To develop leisure services and cultural offer	<input type="checkbox"/>
v36	To develop housing offer	<input type="checkbox"/>
v37	To defend the traditional cohesion of the local society	<input type="checkbox"/>
v38	To defend the local lifestyle	<input type="checkbox"/>
v39	To emphasise diversity and tolerance in the local community	<input type="checkbox"/>
v40	To defend and develop the prominent position of the city in the urban and political system	<input type="checkbox"/>
v41	To maintain the privileged level of services and well-being which presently characterise the city	<input type="checkbox"/>
v42	To reduce pollution	<input type="checkbox"/>
v43	To change the external image of the city	<input type="checkbox"/>
v44	To attract new population	<input type="checkbox"/>
v45	To attract a wealthier population	<input type="checkbox"/>
v46	To develop social services against marginality and poverty	<input type="checkbox"/>
v47	Other, please specify v48	<input type="checkbox"/>

4. If there is a clash between different considerations in your daily work, what priority do you give to the following? (please rank from 1 to 3: where 1 stands for the most important)

v49	Observing the established rules and procedures (e.g. laws, regulations and internal procedures)	
v50	Accomplishing tasks efficiently and quickly	
v51	Ensuring everybody involved are satisfied with decision-making processes and their outcomes	

5. How often do you normally communicate (oral communication only, not written, including meetings, telephone calls, etc.) with the following persons/groups of persons?

		Daily	2-4 times a week	once a week	1-3 times a month	Seldom-never	<i>Not pertinent</i>
v52	Members of the executive board	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v53	Committee Leaders of the Local Assembly	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v54	The Local Assembly Chairperson	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v55	Majority Leaders in the Local Assembly	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v56	Opposition Leaders in the Local Assembly	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v57	Other members of the Majority in the Local Assembly	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v58	Other members of the Opposition in the Local Assembly	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v59	The Municipality Chief Executive Officer	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v60	Heads of Departments in the Municipality	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v61	Other employees in the Municipality	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v62	Union representatives regarding municipal employees' issues	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>

6. And how often do you normally communicate with these other types of persons/groups of people?

		Daily	2-4 times a week	once a week	1-3 times a month	Seldom-never	<i>Not pertinent</i>
v63	<i>The Prefect</i>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v64	<i>The President of the Regional Executive Board</i>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v65	<i>The President of the Province Executive Board</i>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v66	Local MPs	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v67	<i>Local Members of European Parliament</i>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v68	Journalists	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>

v69	Officials of the National Association of Local Authorities	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v70	Union representatives regarding issues not linked to the municipal employees	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v71	Leading actors from voluntary associations	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v72	Representatives of single issue local movements	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v73	Representatives of other cities	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v74	Representatives of public agencies at the local level	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v75	Ordinary Citizens	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v76	Private business representatives	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>
v77	Leaders of my own party	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	77 <input type="checkbox"/>

7. What priority do you give to the following aspects of leadership? (please rank them writing 1, 2,3 or 4: where 1 stands for the most important and 4 for the least important)

v78	Formal power and authority	
v79	Motivation through commendation and reward	
v80	Personal relations (friendship, respect, trust)	
v81	Motivation through political loyalty	

8. To what extent have you found guidance and useful information in developing leadership skills and policy proposals as mayor from each of the following sources?

		Ex- tremely useful	Very use- ful	Some- what useful	Of little use	Of no use
v82	Own professional experience	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v83	Other mayors	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v84	Own schooling/educational background	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v85	Consultants	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v86	Seminars held by my political party	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v87	Seminars held by the Local Government Associations	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v88	Seminars held by private firms	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v89	Seminars held by upper tier government organisations	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v90	Local Associations journals and web sites	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v91	Books and articles on general management	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v92	Books and articles on politics	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v93	Managers in private business	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v94	National political leaders	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v95	Debates with local people	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v96	National or local surveys and polls	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>

9. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
v97	Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen participation	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v98	An important task of urban leaders is to defend the interests of those who are not represented	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v99	Local referenda lead to high quality public debate	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v100	Decentralisation of local government is necessary to involve citizens in public affairs	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v101	Public-private partnerships and networks should play an equally important role in social problem-solving as public administration and representative decision-making	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v102	It is necessary that taxes are significantly reduced.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v103	Expansive public welfare policy is an indispensable means of political legitimacy.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v104	The integration of different cultural and ethnic groups within the local community is a very important task for political leaders.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v105	Small municipalities should be merged, in order to increase efficient administration.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v106	The need for changes and reorganisation of the local government sector has been greatly exaggerated.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v107	There are few benefits from contracting out or privatising services in the municipality	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v108	Local bureaucrats should as far as possible stick to politically defined goals.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v109	Politicians should only define objectives and control outputs, but never intervene into the task fulfilment of local administration.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

10. There are many ways of communicating with local people and for people to let local politicians know what they think. To be informed on what citizens think, how useful are, on your opinion, the following sources and instruments?

	Mechanism	Effective	Only effective in special circumstances	Not effective
v110	Citizens' letters via the internet	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v111	Citizens' letters in the local press	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v112	Formalised complaints or suggestions	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v113	Petitions	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v114	Information on citizens' position gathered by the councillors	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v115	Information on citizens' position gathered by people working in local administration	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v116	Information on citizens' position gathered by the local parties	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v117	Public meetings and debates	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v118	Satisfaction surveys	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v119	Neighbourhood panels or forums	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v120	Forums via the internet	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v121	Focus groups	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v122	Self-organised Citizen Initiatives	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v123	Citizens Juries	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v124	Referenda	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v125	Personal meetings in the Town-Hall	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>

11. On the basis of your experience as a Mayor in this City, and independently from the formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of the following actors are over the Local Authority activities? (Place a check in the column that shows the level of influence on the scale from high influence to no influence).

		High influence				No influence
v126	The Mayor	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v127	The President of the Council	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v128	The Presidents of Council Committees	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v129	Other Leaders in the Council	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v130	The Executive board	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v131	Single influential councillors	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v132	The Heads of Department in the Municipality	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v133	The Municipal Chief Executive Officer	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v134	Local MPs or Ministers	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v135	Union Leaders	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v136	Journalists	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v137	Local businessmen	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v138	The Church	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v139	Voluntary associations	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>

v140	Local single issue groups	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v141	Quarter Decentralised Institutional Bodies	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v142	Party leaders	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v143	Region and Upper levels of government	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v144	Other, specify please: v145	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>

12. People have different ideas about how local democracy should function. Please indicate how important for local democracy you feel the following requirements are, from 1, 'of little importance' to 5, 'very important'.

		Of little importance				Very important
v146	Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
v147	Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by elected representatives.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
v148	Council decisions should reflect a majority opinion among residents.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
v149	Political representatives should make what they think are the right decisions, independent of the current views of local people.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
v150	Urban Leaders should try to generate consensus and shared values among local citizens/groups.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
v151	The results of local elections should be mostly decisive for determining municipal policies.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>

13. In your experience of being Mayor, how would you define the *actual* contribution of the local Assembly in....

		Very important contribution	Positive contribution	No particular contribution	Negative influence	Very negative influence
v152	Defining the main goals of the municipal activity	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v153	Controlling the municipal activity	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v154	Representing the requests and issues emerging from local community	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v155	Publicising the debate on local issues	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v156	Stabilising the local leadership	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

14. How would you rate the overall effectiveness of your city council?

v157 4 Excellent 3 Good 2 Average 1 Poor 0 No statement

O1. Does any party presently have an overall majority of seats in the local council?

v158 1 Yes
 2 No, but there has been a stable majority from the beginning of my term
 3 No, there is no stable majority

O2. Were you elected as a candidate

v159 1 of a party of the majority (specify, please, the party/list in which you were elected v160
)
 2 of a party of the minority (specify, please, the party/list in which you were elected
 v160
)
 3 as an individual or independent candidate

O3. When have you been elected (present mandate as a Mayor) ?

v162 Year

15. Could you characterise briefly the changes in influence that have occurred in the last decade among the various actors in local affairs. Indicate which, in the following couples, acquired relatively more influence drawing on your experience in your work as a mayor (if the trend has been extremely favorable to the entity quoted on the left, tick the box at the extreme left; if favourable to it, but not extremely, tick one of the following boxes, according to the intensity of the change; if you don't notice change, tick the central box; and tick one of the right boxes, graduating according to the intensity of change, if the change was on the contrary favorable to the 'opposite' entity quoted on the right)

		Much more	More	A little more	Identical	A little more	More	Much more	
v163	Subnational	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	National
v164	Local	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	Regional
v165	Neighbourhood	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	Local
v166	Local executive board	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	Local assembly
v167	Mayor	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	Local executive board
v168	Mayor	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	Local assembly
v169	Elected officials	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	Administrative officers
v170	Public services	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	Private firms

16. In which of the following areas, on your opinion, do the municipalities should have more than their current competence?

v171	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Justice and the courts</i>
v172	<input type="checkbox"/> Police and struggle against crime
v173	<input type="checkbox"/> Immigration
v174	<input type="checkbox"/> Local Development
v175	<input type="checkbox"/> Fiscality
v176	<input type="checkbox"/> Education and Training
v177	<input type="checkbox"/> Heritage Protection
v178	<input type="checkbox"/> Environmental Protection
v179	<input type="checkbox"/> Public Health
v180	<input type="checkbox"/> Social Housing
v181	<input type="checkbox"/> Other, please specify v182
v183	<input type="checkbox"/> No one

17. Indicate the extent to which your ability to perform your job as mayor has been affected negatively by the following factors during recent years

		To a very great extent	To a great extent	To some extent	To a little extent	Not at all
v184	Financial problems in the municipality	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v185	Unclear definition of the mayor competence	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v186	Lack of support from the city council	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v187	Inefficient political canalization of the request	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v188	Intrusion of political parties national organs	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v189	Lack of support from my political party/movement	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v190	Conflicts between the various departments and/or department heads	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v191	Uneasy relations with the media	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v192	Unclear division of labour between elected officials and the administration	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v193	Presence of a strong local presence of organised crime	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v194	Other, precise please: v195	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>

18. Below is a list of features considered as common barriers to the improvement of productivity in local authorities. To what extent do they impact in your municipality?

		To a very great extent	To a great extent	To some extent	To a little extent	Not at all
v196	Status of civil servants	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v197	Perceived threat of job security	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v198	Antiproductivity effects of grant provisions from upper levels of government	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v199	Lack of accountability	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v200	Insufficient personal rewards for innovation and productivity	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v201	<i>Lack of clear objectives in administrative reform</i>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v202	Inadequate management commitment to productivity	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v203	Risk avoidance or reluctance to abandon (of practices or objectives)	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v204	Inadequate performance evaluation	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v205	Insufficient analytic staffing and human resources management	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v206	Inadequate stimuli or insufficient interest of the political sphere	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v207	Lack of resources to initiate administrative innovations	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v208	Other, please specify: v209	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>

Concluding, give please some information on your own previous “career”:

19. First party membership:

v210 year or: 9999 I never belonged to any party

20. Are you presently a party member?

v211 1 yes 0 no

21. First elective public office:

v212 year

22. Total number of years as a mayor:

v213

please, precise if v214 1 with some interruption
2 without interruption

23. Total number of years as a local councillor before first mandate as a mayor:

v215 years

24. Total number of years as a member of the executive board before first mandate as a mayor:

v216 years

25. Did you before your first mandate as a mayor hold a position in:

		Elected position	Appointed position	No
v217	Trade union	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v218	Business/professional association	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v219	NGOs	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
v220	Political party	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

26. And did you at some point before your first mandate as mayor hold the following elective or executive positions?

		Yes	No
v221	Member of Parliament	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v222	Minister	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v223	Mayor in another municipality	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v224	Member of regional (or provincial) assembly or executive board	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v225	<i>Parish council</i>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v226	<i>School board</i>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>

04. Did you already candidate at (or held) some public elective charge five years ago?v227 1 Yes 0 No*If Yes, in which list? v228***27. Do you hold presently another elective office?**

v229	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Regional Councillor</i>
v230	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Provincial Councillor</i>
v231	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>President of a Province</i>
v232	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>President of a Region</i>
v233	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Member of the Parliament</i>
v234	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>President of a Quarter</i>
v235	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>European MP</i>
v236	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>President of a local agency</i>
v237	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Ministry</i>
v238	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>President of a Co-operative body of Local Authorities</i>
v239	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Other, please specify v240</i>
v241	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>No one</i>

28. For the time being, what are you planning to do at the end of the present mandate?

v242 10 I would like to continue as a mayor

11 Of my municipality

12 Of another municipality

v242 20 I would like to continue my political career in a higher political office

21 At regional/provincial level

22 As member of Parliament

23 As member of the European Parliament

v242 30 I would like to quit politics

31 To return to my profession

32 For a position in a public agency

33 For a position in a private firm

34 To retire

35 Other, please specify: v246

29. In the two last generations, were one of your close relatives elected as a councillor, mayor or MP?

		Yes	No
v247	Councillor	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v248	Mayor	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v249	MP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>

30. As a candidate, in the last local election, to what extent did you have the support of the following persons/groups of people?

		To a very great extent	To a great extent	To some extent	To a little extent	Not at all
v250	Your predecessor	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v251	The national organs of your party	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v252	Your party wing/faction	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v253	Your party at the local level	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v254	National politicians	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v255	Local prestigious figures	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v256	Unions	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v257	The local business world	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v258	Local media	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v259	The church	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v260	Local associations	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>

05. Who was your main opponent?

- v261 1 *A candidate of the opposition*
 2 *A candidate of my majority*
 3 *The candidate of my party*
 4 *A non partisan candidate*

06. When you first accepted to become a candidate, which were your principal motives?
(please tick only 3)

v262	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>A civic duty</i>
v263	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>A duty towards the political movement I belong to</i>
v264	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>A way to defend an idea of civilisation</i>
v265	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>A way to enter an interesting job field</i>
v266	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>A step towards larger public responsibilities</i>
v267	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>To promote a specific programme for the community</i>
v268	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>The developing of my previous involvement in local public affairs</i>
v269	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>The family tradition</i>
v270	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>An opportunity of remaining in the sphere of public involvement</i>
v271	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Other, please specify v272</i>

31. What was your relationship to your municipality before your first mandate as the mayor?

		Yes	No
v273	I was born here	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v274	I spent most of my childhood here	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v275	I became a resident there at least one year before being mayor	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
v276	I was employed by the municipality before becoming a mayor	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>

32. What was your profession before your first mandate as a mayor?

v277

33. And presently, is your profession?v278 1 **Identical****please**, for dependent workers, precise if11 **part-time** or 12 **full time**v278 2 **Different:** v279 I'm**please**, for dependent workers, precise if21 **part-time** or 22 **full time**

v278 3 I'm exclusively a mayor

F1. Considering the corresponding responsibilities, do you think your income as a mayor is?

v279 *Not Adequate* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 *Adequate*

34. What is your highest completed education?

v280 1 elementary school
2 secondary school or equivalent
3 university or equivalent

state:

31 law
32 political and social sciences, economy
33 architect-engineering
34 humanistic area (philosophy, literature, foreign languages)
35 medicine
36 natural sciences area

35. Age:

v281 _____ years

36. Gender:

v282 1 Male 2 Female

O7. Number of inhabitants in your municipality:

v283 _____,000

O8. Region in which it is situated:

v284 _____

09. Your municipality is :

v285 1 the core (or one of the cores) of a metropolitan area
2 part (not the traditional core) of a metropolitan area
3 the core of its own narrower urban area
4 part (not the traditional core) of a narrower urban area
5 mainly rural

010. Which are its main economic activity(ies) (max. 3)

v286 _____